CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is the product of my own original research and contains no material that has been presented for a degree at this or any other university, or any material previously published or written by another person except where due reference is made.

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines what the management of crises can reveal about the type and the nature of regional security systems in Southeast Asia. It seeks to evaluate whether or not crisis management conducted by the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) member countries helps to provide ways of conceptualising regional security systems, namely a security community, a balance of power, or a classical concert of powers. While there is a growing body of literature examining the relevance of the first two concepts for explaining the type of regional security system in Southeast Asia, there is a very limited literature that explores whether or not a regional classical concert of powers can provide a relevant explanation. Given that historically the notion of crisis management has been a useful indicator that sheds light the international system, this thesis specifically examines a possible connection between crisis management and security systems in Southeast Asia. The study approaches this task by investigating three case studies: the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis, the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis and the 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis.

The thesis has two key arguments. First, whether or not the three conceptualisations of regional security systems examined and their variations in the thesis have explanatory value depends on at least two conditions, namely the phase of the crisis —whether it is in an escalating, acute, or de-escalating period— and the nature of the crisis —whether it is traditional or non traditional. Second, the thesis argues that under the same conditions, there are times when the regional security system can best be conceptualised as a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. The introduction of this concept contributes to ongoing debate within academic literature about the nature of the regional security systems that operate in Southeast Asia.

These two arguments also have additional implications for policy development in Southeast Asia. The first is that the management of crises in Southeast Asia needs to be reviewed and ways found to establish more robust policies and structures for managing crises. ASEAN member states need to set up formal dispute settlement and crisis management mechanisms and the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN should be strengthened with monitoring and evaluation. The second policy direction that the findings point to is that the burdens of the crisis management should be shared by the regional leading powers and all ASEAN member states. Regional security requires dedicated effort by every Southeast Asian country.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AADMER	:	ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response
ACC	:	ASEAN Canberra Committee
ACDM	:	ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management
ACDFA	:	ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster Assistance
ADB	:	Asian Development Bank
AEC	:	ASEAN Economic Community
AFTA	:	ASEAN Free Trade Area
AHA [Centre]	:	ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management
AHTF	:	ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force
AIA	:	ASEAN Investment Area
AICHR	:	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AIPMC	:	ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus
AIPR	:	ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
AMM	:	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
AEC	:	ASEAN Economic Community
AEM	:	ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meeting
AELM	:	APEC Economic Leaders Meeting
APA	:	ASEAN People's Assembly
APEC	:	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSC	:	ASEAN Political and Security Community
APT	:	ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN 10+3)
ARF	:	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASC	:	ASEAN Standing Committee
ASCC	:	ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
ASEAN	:	Association of Southeast Asia Nations
ASEM	:	Asia-Europe Meeting
ASCC	:	ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community
AVP	:	ASEAN Volunteers Program
BRR	:	*Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi* – Indonesia (Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency)
CARAT	:	Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training
CCB	:	Central Coordinating Board (Myanmar)
CEP	:	Comprehensive Economic Partnership
CGDK	:	Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

CLMV	:	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam
CPM	:	Communist Party of Malaya
CSCAP	:	Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CSIS	:	Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Jakarta)
Deplu	:	*Departemen Luar Negeri RI* now called *Kemlu/Kementerian Luar Negeri RI* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia)
DSM	:	Dispute Settlement Mechanism
EAS	:	East Asia Summit
EAEC	:	East Asia Economic Caucus
EAEG	:	East Asia Economic Group
EEZ	:	Exclusive Economic Zone
EPG	:	Eminent Persons Group
ERAT	:	Emergency Rapid Assessment Team
EC	:	European Community
EU	:	European Union
FDI	:	Foreign Direct Investment
FMS	:	Foreign Military Sales
FPDA	:	Five Power Defence Arrangement
FTA	:	Free Trade Agreement
GDP	:	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	:	Gross National Product
GPOI	:	Global Peace Operations Initiative
GSP	:	Generalized System of Preferences
GRUNK	:	*Gouvernement Royal d'Union Nationale du Kampuchéa* (Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea)
ICJ	:	International Court of Justice
ICK	:	International Conference on Kampuchea
IMF	:	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	:	International Force for East Timor
IR	:	International Relations
ISIS	:	Institute for Security and International Studies
JIM	:	Jakarta Informal Meeting
Maphilindo	:	Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia
NAM	:	Non Aligned Movement
NLD	:	National League for Democracy (Myanmar)
NGO	:	Non Governmental Organisation
OAS	:	Organisation of American States
Pacom	:	[US] Pacific Command
Pangdam	:	*Panglima Kodam* (Indonesia Military Region Commander)

PICC	:	Paris International Conference of Cambodia
PKI	:	*Partai Komunis Indonesia* (Indonesia Communist Party)
PPP	:	Purchasing Power Parity
PMC	:	ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference
PONAC	:	Post-Nargis Assistance Conference
PONJA	:	Post-Nargis Joint Assessment Team
PRK	:	People's Republic of Kampuchea
PSI	:	Pollutant Standard Index
QDR	:	Quadrennial Defense Review
R2P	:	Responsibility to Protect
ROK	:	Republic of Korea
RTA	:	Regional Trade Agreement
SAF	:	Singapore Armed Forces
SASOP	:	Standard Operating Procedures for Regional Standby Arrangement and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response
SEA	:	Southeast Asia
SEANWFZ	:	Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
SEATO	:	South East Asia Treaty Organisation
SLOC	:	Sea Lanes of Communication
SLORC	:	State Law and Order Restoration Council Myanmar
SOM	:	Senior Officials Meeting
SPDC	:	State Peace and Development Council
SPT	:	Six Party Talks
TAC	:	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TCG	:	Tripartite Core Group
TNI	:	*Tentara National Indonesia* (Indonesian National Army)
UN	:	United Nations
UNAMET	:	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNDAC	:	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNGA	:	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	:	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN OCHA	:	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNSC	:	United Nations Security Council
UNTAC	:	United Nations Transitional Authority on Cambodia
UNTAET	:	United Nations Transition Authority on East Timor
US	:	United States
VAP	:	Vientiane Action Program
VPA	:	Vientiane Plan of Action
ZOPFAN	:	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

This thesis examines whether the management of crises which have arisen in Southeast Asia by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states helps to provide an understanding of the type of security systems[1] operating in that region. The thesis is prompted by a longstanding debate about the nature of the security system in Southeast Asia. Some scholars consider that the security system in Southeast Asia is best explained as involving balance of power dynamics.[2] These scholars argue that regional cooperation in ASEAN has a limited role in building the security architecture. Accordingly, external great powers[3] such as the United States (US) and China have greater influence than Southeast Asian countries in crafting the security architecture in Southeast Asia. Ralf Emmers, for example, highlights the importance of the balance of power factor in examining ASEAN. He argues that in ASEAN, the concepts of 'balance of power' and 'cooperative security' can coexist.[4] The balance of power within cooperative security, according to Emmers, works in Southeast Asia and aims to restrict a disposition towards hegemony on the part of a member by entangling it within a rule-based regime that includes sufficient motivation to constrain hegemony.[5] ASEAN member states have tried to reduce the influence of external great powers by introducing their own norms, such as those constituting the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).[6]

Michael Leifer, who is recognised as the 'Dean of Southeast Asia' is sceptical about the ability of multilateral security dialogues to deal with the problem of power in an 'ungoverned world'.[7] Even though doubting the efficiency of ASEAN, he argues that ASEAN is best understood as an institutionalised, albeit relatively informal, expression of 'cooperative security' which serves as both a complement and an alternative to

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[1] The term 'system' in sociology involves a 'set of units and their interrelationships'. See Frank Harary and Mark F. Batell, 'What is System', *Social Network*, No. 3, 1981, pp. 29-40, p.30. In this thesis, 'system' refers to a collection of units (regional states) that interact with each other on matters of security while a 'regional security system' refers to a single or combination of security arrangements pursued by regional states that focus on one or more security issues.

[2] See Michael Leifer's works on Southeast Asia in Chin Kin Wah and Leo Suryadinata, eds, *Michael Leifer Selected Works on Southeast Asia,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005. See also Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF,* London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

[3] The term 'great powers' that I use, unless otherwise indicated, refers to external great powers outside Southeast Asia, such as the US, China and the former Soviet Union.

[4] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF,* pp. 51-52.

[5] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*

[6] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*

[7] Michael Leifer, 'North America and the Asia Pacific Region in the 21st Century: Changing Rules of Engagement', in K.S. Nathan ed., *North American and the Asia Pacific in the 21st Century: Challenges and Prospects for Cooperative Security and Prosperity,* London: ASEAN Academic Press, 1999, p. 70.

balance of power practice.[8] Leifer also argues that ASEAN is best identified as a 'diplomatic community'.[9] Emmers claims that Leifer's understanding of the balance of power concept combines a realist and neo-Grotian perspectives. [10]

Other scholars view ASEAN as a 'nascent security community'.[11] This phase in the development of a security community[12] is marked by common threat perceptions, an expectation of mutual trade benefits and some degree of shared identity. [13] The argument is based on the constructivist approach that goes beyond the Deutschian classical approach to security communities. Indeed, there is no definition of a security community in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, the first Declaration where ASEAN stipulated its willingness to build a community, nor in the Plan of Action of ASEAN Security Community (ASC), a guideline for security community building.[14] One of the main proponents of the argument that ASEAN is a nascent security community is Amitav Acharya. Contrary to Leifer's and Emmers' arguments, Acharya contends that ASEAN relies more on promoting standard international norms, principles and codes of conduct among regional partners to decrease regional tensions. [15] From his perspective, ASEAN regionalism is a process of interaction and socialisation and it focuses on the norms that underpin this process.[16] According to Acharya, the absence of war among ASEAN members since its establishment shows that ASEAN is a 'non-war community' where a pluralistic security community, in the words of Deutsch, requires that 'the keeping of the peace among the participating units was the main political goal

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[8] Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake', *The Pacific Review*, 12:1, 1999, pp. 25-38.

[9] Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, London: Routledge, 1989, p. 83.

[10] See Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, p. 6. While a true Grotian sees the international system as an 'organized state community' with an emphasis on common interests, the development of common values, and the creation of common institutions, a Neo-Grotian emphasises the importance of institutions. In this case, Leifer values forums such the ARF, for example, which he views as a modest contribution to the distribution of a balance of power.

[11] The term 'nascent security community' was introduced by Amitav Acharya in his book, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order*, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 36-38 and 297-298.

[12] In this thesis, the term 'security community' refers to a 'pluralistic security community', which can be defined as a situation where some states become integrated to the point where they have a sense of community, which in turn creates the assurances that they will settle their differences without war. See Karl Deutsh, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 5.

[13] Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 30.

[14] See ASEAN, 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord II', available at http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii (accessed on 3 November 2012).See also ASEAN, 'ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action', available at http://www.aseansec.org/16826.htm (accessed on 29 January 2010). As of December 2012, the ASEAN Secretariat's website has been reconstructed. Some of the links cited in this thesis may have been changed. The main link for the Secretariat's website is www.aseansec.org.

[15] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, p. 7.

[16] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*.

overshadowing all others'.[17] Acharya thus implies that ASEAN has fulfilled some criteria of Deutsch's definition of a security community.

Acharya's argument is supported by scholars such as Kusuma Snitwongse,[18] Muthiah Alagappa[19] and Donald Emmerson[20] who share his idea that ASEAN is already in the early phase of a security community. Snitwongse, for example, claims that while ASEAN might not have realised its goal of security self-reliance, 'its most notable achievement has been community building'.[21] Alagappa postulates that the six original members of ASEAN already comprise a nascent, quasi, semi or partial security community.[22] Emmerson argues that ASEAN has been a 'thin and pluralistic security community'.[23] Estrella Solidum further claims that ASEAN is already a security community.[24]

However, another group of scholars involved in the debate is sceptical about the idea that ASEAN is a security community. They argue that ASEAN does not yet constitute a stage in the development of a security community, and that ASEAN does not meet Deutsch's prerequisites of a security community. While the absence of inter-state threat perceptions is one of the most important criteria of a security community, Southeast Asia is still peppered with inter-state threat perceptions. Accordingly, even though Acharya points out that ASEAN norms and the ASEAN Way have 'played a central role in the development of a nascent regional identity sought by ASEAN', he also concedes that 'the norms of ASEAN, including those associated with the ASEAN Way are not always upheld in practice'.[25] For this reason, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith term ASEAN an 'imitation community'.[26] They argue that ASEAN suffers from a gap between rhetorical aspiration and regional reality.[27] Criticism has also come from Andrew Chau, who investigated the threat of terrorism in the Southeast Asian region;

[17] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia*, p. 7.
[18] Kusuma Snitwongse, 'Meeting the Challenges of Changing Southeast Asia', in Robert Scalapino, Sijabura Sato and Sung-Joo Han, eds, *Regional Dynamics: Security, Political and Economic Issues in the Asia Pacific Region*, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1990.
[19] Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, Stanford: Standford University Press, 2003. See also Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN' *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 12:4, 1991, pp. 269-305.
[20] Donald K. Emmerson, 'Security, Community, and Democracy: Analyzing ASEAN', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 6:2, 2005, pp. 165-185.
[21] Snitwongse, 'Meeting the Challenges of Changing Southeast Asia', p. 40.
[22] Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order*, p. 8. See also Alagappa, 'Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia', p. 298 and p. 301.
[23] Emmerson, 'Security, Community, and Democracy: Analyzing ASEAN', pp. 165-185, p. 180.
[24] Estrella Solidum, *Towards a Southeast Asian Community*, Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1974.
[25] David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, 'ASEAN Imitation Community', *Orbis*, 46:1, 2002, pp. 93-109, p. 93.
[26] Jones and Smith, 'ASEAN Imitation Community', p. 93.
[27] Jones and Smith, 'ASEAN Imitation Community'.

he argues that the prospect of successful community building in Southeast Asia still remains far in the future.[28]

This brief review shows that the debate about the nature of the security system in Southeast Asia is vigorous. The regional security system that characterises ASEAN therefore is still unclear. Among possible explanations, one that is rarely invoked is that ASEAN is based on dynamics that reflect an intra-regional concert of powers. The possibility of a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific more generally has been investigated by Acharya, Robert Ayson and Nicholas Khoo. They consider that it is debatable whether the notion of a concert of powers applies to the Asia Pacific region.[29] Ayson, for example, examines the Six Party Talks (SPT) as a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific. He points out that the SPT may offer the best chance of a bridge to an Asian concert of powers but that it is only embryonic. One of the reasons for this, he claims, is that the only real great powers within the SPT are the US and China.[30] He concludes that 'while the Talks may contribute to the Concert, the Concert is not the Six Party Talks'.[31] He further argues that a concert of Asia Pacific powers might well prove ineffective because of the differences in strategic interests between its members.[32] Neither Ayson nor his colleagues investigate the possibility of a concert of powers, or some variation of it, within Southeast Asia.

At the official level, ASEAN is attempting to establish a community by 2015. Indonesia proposed the formation of an ASEAN Security Community at the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Cambodia in June 2003. This proposal was formalised at the Bali Summit in October 2003 through the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II, when ASEAN member states agreed to develop three community pillars: the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Furthermore, ASEAN member states had high expectations of the launch of the 'ASEAN Security Community (ASC) Plan of Action' at the 10th ASEAN Summit in Laos, 29 November 2004. Without being labelled as such, the ASC Plan of Action not only provides the basic guidelines for ASEAN's security arrangement, but it is also assumed to be a new set of socio-political values for further cooperation in the area of political development and security. In general, the ASC − now called the ASEAN

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[28] Andrew Chau, 'Security Community and Southeast Asia: Australia, the U.S., and ASEAN's Counter-Terror Strategy', *Asian Survey,* 48:4, 2008, pp. 626-649.

[29] See Amitav Acharya, 'A Concert of Asia?', *Survival,* 41:3, 1999, pp. 84-101 and Nicholas Khoo and Michael L. Smith, 'The Future of American hegemony in the Asia Pacific: a Concert of Asia or a Clear Pecking Order', *Australian Journal of International Affairs,* 56:1, 2002, pp. 65-81.

[30] See Robert Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?' in Ron Huisken ed., *The Architecture of Security in Asia Pacific,* Canberra: ANU E Press 2009, pp. 59-66. Ayson defines a concert of powers as a permanent formal and institution, but it would be a non permanent, non formal and non institutionalised process of great power collaboration which creates such stabilising and convergent expectations that when major problems arise, the major powers can sit down and seek to manage their differences.

[31] Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?', p. 63.

[32] Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?'.

Political Security Community (APSC) –Plan of Action consists of six main components: political development, shaping and sharing norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building and an implementation mechanism.[33]

An interesting question about the debate discussed above is, how can there be such different explanations of the ASEAN security system? A critique of the debate suggests several possibilities: scholars examine ASEAN from different theoretical perspectives (realists, neo-liberal institutionalist and constructivists); during different periods of history; and use different types of case studies. Emmers' argument is based on an analysis of several cases, such as the early years of ASEAN, the integration of Brunei into ASEAN in 1984, ASEAN's response to the Third Indochina Conflict, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and ASEAN's involvement in the South China Sea dispute. Both Emmers and Leifer combine realism and a neo-Grotian perspective. Acharya bases his argument on some of the cases that used by Emmers but also others. He examines the Cambodian conflict, constructive engagement with Myanmar, the Spratly Island dispute, the ARF, and the recent ratification of the ASEAN Charter. He uses the tenets of constructivism as a framework for his study.[34] In short, these scholars reach their conclusions through analysing different cases and using different theoretical perspectives to develop their arguments.

Although some scholars such as Melly Caballero-Anthony do examine case studies that suggest how ASEAN manages crisis or conflict situations, few examine whether ASEAN's crisis management informs understanding of the regional security system in Southeast Asia. Even though Caballero-Anthony explains crisis management using ASEAN's unique mechanism, known as 'the ASEAN Way', she does not suggest what this might imply for the type of security system that operates in Southeast Asia. Rather, she focuses on the linkages between conflict management and the security approach being taken by ASEAN.[35]

This thesis argues that investigating crisis management provides a useful way to understand the security system in Southeast Asia. The foundation for such a proposition can be found in the history of international relations where crises or conflict and their subsequent management helped shed light on the international security system operating during the crises, namely a concert of powers, a balance of power and a security community. Three examples support this contention. First, the Napoleonic Wars disturbed the existing structure of Europe, at the domestic, social and

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[33] ASEAN, *ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint*, available at http://www.aseansec.org/22337.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2010).

[34] The tenets of contructivism and other perspectives will be discussed in Section 2.2.1.

[35] See Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Asian Way*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005.

political levels and the relationships of power among the existing states. The making of the anti-French coalition is of special interest from the standpoint of the Concert of Europe.[36] Hence, the management of Napoleonic Wars indicated a security system which was the Concert of Europe. Second, the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis provides insight into how the international system at that time was characterised by the dominance of the bipolar balance of power in which two rival superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, dominated global affairs. It demonstrates that the world was divided into two hostile camps aligned with the US and Soviet Union, epitomising bipolar international politics.[37] Third, the process by which Western Europe has become a security community is also an interesting example. The 1961 Berlin Wall crisis has provided insight into 'status quo détente'.[38] Pierre Hassner describes the period from 1961 to 1968 as a period of 'selective détente'. [39] Furthermore, the 1965-1966 'constitutional crisis' when France relinquished its chair in the European Community (EC) prompted the Western European countries to consider whether EC integration was a threat to state sovereignty.[40] However, the effect of the crisis reinforced processes of moderate and controlled integration, and thereby reinforced the establishment of a security community in Europe. These are three examples of how examining crisis management provides an explanation of the security system at both an international and a regional level.

In sum, crisis management in Southeast Asia has not been thoroughly examined as a way of understanding the security system in that region, and the three examples just described indicate this is a plausible way to proceed. This thesis aims to fill this gap by asking, first, *does an examination of how ASEAN states manage crises provide a way of understanding the type of security systems that operate in Southeast Asia?*; and second, *if it does, what type of security systems are they?*

To answer the above research questions, this thesis will examine three major crises in Southeast Asia — the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis,[41] the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis,

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[36] Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *The Concert of Europe 1815-1914,* New York: Harper Touchbooks, 1968. The concept of 'concert of powers' as a regional security system will be discussed in Section 2.5.

[37] Graham T. Allison, and Phillip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn,* New York: Longman, 1999.

[38] Pierre Hassner, 'The Politics of Western Europe and East-West Relations', in Nils Andren and Karl Birbaum, eds, *Beyond Détente: Prospects for East-West Cooperation and Security in Europe,* Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1976, pp. 15-37.

[39] Hassner, 'The Politics of Western Europe and East-West Relations'. A security community as part of regional security system is explained in Section 2.3 while a balance of power is elaborated in Section 2.4.

[40] Ole Waever, 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community', in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 86-87.

[41] Even though some scholars refer to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia as a conflict, I will refer to it as a crisis. This is because I define a crisis as an important set of events which marks a turning point of transformation in a pattern of relationships or a system (see Section 2.2.A), the Cambodian case created a continous set of events that produced the transformation in a relationship pattern among the conflicting parties, ASEAN member states and external great powers. As a crisis can take the form of military, political,

and the 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar[42]. Following the above rationale for the thesis and the resulting research questions, the remainder of Chapter 1 will discuss the arguments of the study, the aims and focus of the study, the potential contribution the thesis will make, the methodology adopted, the limitations and challenges, and the structure.

1.2. Arguments of the Study

The main argument of this thesis is that whether or not the three conceptualisations of regional security system examined (a security community, a balance of power and a classical concert of powers) and their variations have explanatory value depends on at least two conditions, the phase of the crisis (whether it is in an escalating, acute, or de-escalating period) and the nature of the crisis (whether it is traditional or non traditional). The second argument is that the management of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis during the acute period is best conceptualised as a 'quasi-concert of regional leading powers', which is a modification of the classical concept of a concert of powers. On the one hand, the novel concept shares some indicators with the classical concept and on the other hand, has several unique characteristics.

The thesis draws out the policy implications of these arguments. First, the management of crises in Southeast Asia needs to be reviewed to establish a more robust structure and policies related the management of crises. ASEAN member states need to improve dispute settlement and crisis management mechanisms and the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN needs to be further empowered. Second, there is a necessity to share the burden of the regional leading powers with the rest of the ASEAN member states on traditional security issues.

1.3. Aims and Focus of the Study

To investigate the two central research questions, the thesis suggests three explanatory concepts for analysing the regional security systems in Southeast Asia and examines the relationship between crisis management by ASEAN member states and regional security systems in Southeast Asia. The key objectives are three-fold: first, to explore the correlation between crisis management by ASEAN member states and regional security systems in Southeast Asia; second, to examine the possibility of other security systems operating during crises in Southeast Asia other than what have been debated

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economic, environmental, humanitarian and other aspects, the Cambodian case can be characterised as a military, political, economic and also humanitarian crisis.

[42] The State, Law and Order Restoration (SLORC) government changed the name of Burma to the Union of Myanmar in June 1989 through the 'Adaptation of Expression Law', See Alan Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia: Domestic, Regional and Global Issues,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2003. In this thesis, I use the short version of the official name given by the authority government of Myanmar, which is 'Myanmar'. ASEAN member countries have also used the term 'Myanmar', instead of 'Burma'.

by scholars; finally, to explore the possibility of a concert of powers dynamic existing in Southeast Asia. To these ends, the study establishes indicators of three explanatory concepts: 'security community', 'balance of power', and 'concert of powers'. It further analyses the application of these indicators in the process of crisis management by ASEAN member states.

The focus of the study is the possible connection between crisis management by ASEAN member states and regional security systems in Southeast Asia during three crises, namely the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis, the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis, and the 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis. The study focuses on ASEAN member states instead of ASEAN as an organisation for two reasons.[43] First, in some crises, ASEAN did not work as an organisation, but particular ASEAN member states contributed to the management of the crisis. Second, ASEAN membership increased over the period 1978 to 2010. During the Cambodian crisis, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) countries were not yet members of ASEAN and Brunei Darussalam only joined in 1984, whereas, during the East Timor crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis, ASEAN consisted of ten members. Therefore, reference to ASEAN member states is more practical in the analysis.

The three crises have been selected as case studies for four reasons. First, the three crises represent big challenges to ASEAN member states. The Cambodian crisis represented political and military challenges; the East Timor crisis posed political, military as well as economic challenges to some member countries, and; the Cyclone Nargis crisis created humanitarian, environmental, political, and economic challenges. Second, the crises cover some 30 years (the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s) and will indicate whether crisis management by ASEAN member states has changed over this time. Third, each of these crises should demonstrate strengths and weaknesses in terms of management. Some scholars argue that ASEAN's crisis management of the Cambodian crisis can be regarded internationally as successful, while others claim that ASEAN failed to manage this crisis. ASEAN's response to the invasion of Cambodia benefited from the dynamics of the external great powers' behaviours. Both criticism and praise came when ASEAN tried to settle the 1999 East Timor Crisis. Finally, the 2008 Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar was selected to examine recent management of a crisis by ASEAN member states after the signing of the ASEAN Charter in December 2007. Finally, the selection of these three crises is also based on the observation that two of the crises (the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the 1999 East Timor crisis) represent traditional security threats to the region, whereas the 2008 Cyclone Nargis

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[43] The thesis is mainly about ASEAN member states. However, sometimes it is about the ASEAN organisation where it is relevant.

crisis represents a non-traditional security threat. This allows for observing two types of crises, traditional and non traditional.

The first case study has its origins in the mid 1970s. ASEAN confronted its first crisis when Vietnam announced an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1975. Following this, Vietnam's refusal to sign the TAC in 1976 and its invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 created a severe crisis. From the start, ASEAN rejected Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, insisting that the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), which was installed by Vietnam and headed by Heng Samrin, was illegitimate and illegal. ASEAN's position was that Vietnam had violated Cambodia's sovereignty and self determination. For the next twelve years, ASEAN member states tried to manage the situation by forcing Vietnam to leave Cambodia. To many scholars, including Samuel Sharpe, ASEAN's achievement in responding to an external threat to regional security was demonstrated in the decade following the 1978 invasion.[44] ASEAN was generally successful and effective in mobilising sustained support from the international community by involving the United Nations (UN). Furthermore, ASEAN also gained diplomatic support from its official dialogue partners like Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan and the US. It urged its partners to impose economic sanctions on Vietnam.[45] Emmers, in contrast to Sharpe, concludes that it was the role of external great powers and the external factors at the time that helped the crisis to be solved, instead of effective management of the crisis by ASEAN.[46]

The second case study in this thesis is the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis. ASEAN's response to the East Timor crisis was a major test of the organisation's ability to ameliorate and manage regional crisis. The issue of East Timor historically posed a foreign policy dilemma for ASEAN. Open criticism of Jakarta, it was feared, would achieve an adverse outcome. ASEAN's collective focus on East Timor had always been to maintain good relations with Indonesia but this was changed by the 1999 crisis.[47] ASEAN was criticised by the international community for failing to act to resolve a crisis in its own backyard. Security analysts hit out at the 22-member ARF, saying that ASEAN made no contribution to resolving the East Timor crisis in the past, and had little to offer.[48] Although ASEAN was criticised by Western communities, Alan Dupont supports ASEAN by claiming that ASEAN nevertheless demonstrated a preparedness to

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[44] Samuel Sharpe, 'An ASEAN Way to Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia', *The Pacific Review*, 16:2, June 2003, pp. 231-250.
[45] Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Asian Way.*
[46] Emmers, *Cooperatice Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*
[47] Alan Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54:2, 2000, pp. 163-170.
[48] Sonny Inbaraj, 'ASEAN's commitment to East Timor faces tough test', available at http://www.atimes.com/se-asia/BB01Ae01.html (accessed on 7 November 2011).

play a significant political and military role in the management of the East Timor crisis.[49]

The final case study examines the crisis caused by Cyclone Nargis. Myanmar was struck by Cyclone Nargis on 2 May 2008. Nargis was the worst natural disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar, causing catastrophic destruction, particularly in the Ayayerwady Delta. Almost 2.4 million people are believed to have been severely affected by the cyclone.[50] Around 800,000 people were displaced by the Cyclone. Some 450,000 homes were destroyed and 350,000 were damaged and three quarters of all health facilities were damaged, as were 4,000 schools.[51] Up to 600,000 hectares of farmland were destroyed, having a huge impact on agriculture supply to the rest of the country.[52] The financial cost of the cyclone is estimated to be four billion US dollars, with 2.7 per cent of the country's projected GDP in 2008 destroyed. [53]

In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, a diplomatic disagreement between Myanmar and the international community arose when the junta not only delayed international relief workers from accessing the devastated delta, but also rejected the use of American, French and British naval assets to expedite the relief effort.[54] The UN and other relief agencies were concerned about the possibility of a second large-scale wave. The difficulties in providing assistance led to a debate about a possible humanitarian intervention on the basis of the 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P).[55] The Myanmar government was persuaded to allow entry for the deployment of the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) assembled by the ASEAN Secretariat in coordination with the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management (ACDM). Finally, the Myanmar government allowed the ASEAN Secretary-General, Surin Pitsuwan, to lead the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force, which in turn gave rise to the establishment of a Tripartite Core Group (TCG) to coordinate the relief effort involving ASEAN, the UN and the Myanmar government itself.[56]

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[49] Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'.
[50] William Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar' in Nick Cheesman, Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, eds, *Ruling Myanmar: From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010.
[51] Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar'.
[52] Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, *Listening to Voices from Inside: Myanmar Civil Society's Response to Cyclone Nargis,* Phnom Penh: CPCS, 2009.
[53] Alnap, 'Cyclone Nargis: Lessons for operational agencies' http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/ALNAPLessonsCycloneNargis.pdf (accessed on 19 December 2009). See also Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, *Listening to Voices from Inside: Myanmar Civil Society's Response to Cyclone Nargis,* Phnom Penh: CPCS, 2009.
[54] Jürgen Haacke, 'ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?', *Contemporary Southeast Asia,* 30:3, 2008, pp. 351-378.
[55] Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect', *Myanmar/Burma Briefing,* No. 2, 16 May 2008, pp. 1-20.
[56] Haacke, 'ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative?'.

1.4. Potential Contributions

This study seeks to contribute to the debate about the nature of the security system in Southeast Asia by examining how crises are managed by ASEAN member states. Crisis management is used as an indicator of the region's security system, thus providing a different approach from the literature to analyse Southeast Asia's security systems. Crisis management as an indicator of the security system in Southeast Asia is under-investigated by scholars, and the historical crises canvassed earlier suggest that crisis management can be adopted as an indicator. However, the scholarly literature on crisis management and on security systems rarely investigates the proposed link between the two, particularly within the Southeast Asian context.

Therefore, this study has the potential to contribute broadly to the literature on international relations, strategic studies, diplomacy, crisis management, and particularly to the literature that debates the nature of the security systems in Southeast Asia. More specifically, the study will contribute to the literature on ASEAN and its member states as crisis managers.

The study is important for two major reasons. First, in the empirical world, it seeks to suggest a better policy for ASEAN member states as crisis managers. It also aims to provide insights for ASEAN dialogue partners with regard to ASEAN's crisis management and ASEAN's role in building the regional architecture. The thesis will not only examine the character of ASEAN member states' crisis management operations but also offer some suggestions about their efforts to define themselves as a community. It may also provide inputs for how the ASEAN member countries might reform the organisation.

Possible policy directions from this research will provide useful inputs for ASEAN's dialogue partners as ASEAN is increasingly regarded as important by the international community. ASEAN now has 11 dialogue partners: China, Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the US, Canada, the European Union (EU), the UN, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and India. Other states wish to join ASEAN. Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea are now knocking on ASEAN's door to become members of ASEAN. Pakistan, a sectoral partner, has been seeking dialogue status for several years now, although such status has not been granted because cooperation between ASEAN and Pakistan has not developed substantially. Russia and the US have been members of the East Asia Summit (EAS) since 2011. Significantly, 33 countries including Australia, China, India,

Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the US have acceded to the TAC,[57] demonstrating that ASEAN norms are now accepted.

Second, this study seeks to contribute to the academic literature. Research on a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific region, including in the Southeast Asian region is under-investigated by scholars. This may be because none of the ASEAN member states is regarded by scholars as a great power. Although the concept is certainly used to explain how great powers constitute a particular security system, this thesis argues it can be adopted and applied to situations where the meaning of great powers is relative. Therefore, the thesis suggests a way of classifying regional powers, using Lemke's theory of multiple power hierarchy, enabling the concept of a concert of powers to be applied to an examination of ASEAN.[58]

The thesis also seeks to contribute to the literature on crisis management in Southeast Asia. Much of the literature on ASEAN focuses on the 'ASEAN Way' as the mechanisms employed in ASEAN's day-to-day life. However, it is not always clear if these mechanisms are routinely applied during a crisis. The thesis thus aims to show whether during a crisis ASEAN still utilises the 'ASEAN way' as it does for day-to-day operations or applies other mechanisms.

1.5. Methodology

A qualitative interpretive approach is the methodology adopted in this thesis. Because the research engages in a dialectic process between the questions asked and data observed rather than testing a hypothesis, a qualitative approach is considered to be more appropriate. Information gathered in this process of research shapes the questions. A qualitative approach is appropriate for this reseach because: (i) as an Indonesian diplomat, I served in the field as a participant-observer during my service in the ASEAN Directorate General for ASEAN Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia from 2004-2006 and 2007-2008 and in the ASEAN Canberra Committee from 2008-2012; (ii) I conducted in-depth interviews with policy actors, officials, practitioners and academics; and (iii) unlike a quantitative approach which emphasises large-n research, I focus more on processing words and phrases from data collection and interviews into comparative case studies. It is an interpretive approach because: (i) I interpreted my data; (ii) the method was a word-based method, from data collection instruments to data analysis tools, and (iii) it is ontologically constructivist and epistemologically interpretivist. I constructed the study based on observing the

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57 ASEAN, 'Norway Enhances Engagement with ASEAN" available at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-secretariat-news/item/norway-enhances-engagement-with-asean (accessed on 29 September 2013). See also ASEAN, 'Instrument of Accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia by Australia', available at http://www.asean.org/news/item/instrument-of-accession-to-the-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-by-australia (accessed on 29 September 2013).
58 The theory will be discussed on Section 2.5.

nature of reality. Epistomology can be defined as the relationship between the researcher and reality. An interpretivist approach is based on the principle that there can be more than one reality and more than a single structured way of accessing such realites. The knowledge generated was perceived through socially constructed and subjective interpretations. [59]

Following Hendrik's and Yanow's phases of interpretive methods,[60] I conducted the research in four phases, namely: observing, close reading of topic-relevant documents, interviewing, and analysing data.

Phase 1: Observing

I have been an active participant-observer as a staff member of the Directorate General of ASEAN Cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia and a member of the ASEAN Canberra Committee in Canberra. The latter grouping has regular meetings with the Ambassadors of ASEAN member countries and with Ministers in the Australian cabinet. These activities have helped me to understand the events from within the officials' frame of reference and their sense-making of the situation. On the basis of these observations, I generated my research questions.

Phase 2: Collecting and Reading Relevant Documents

The data were collected from archival and secondary sources. For the archival research, I collected:

1. Official documents of ASEAN member countries, papers, agreements, speeches, press releases;
2. Official ASEAN documents such as treaties, communiqués, declarations, agreements, speeches, and minutes of meetings;
3. Publications from think-tanks, journalists, centres of studies in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand.

The secondary sources for this study consist mostly of:

1. Books and periodicals on related issues;
2. International and local newspapers and magazines; and
3. Working papers, policy papers and occasional papers from related research institutes and universities.

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[59] See Laurel Anderson Hudson and Julie L. Ozanne, 'Alternative Ways of Seeking Knowledge in Consumer Research', *Chicago Journals*, 14:4, 1988, pp. 508-521.

[60] See Carolyn M. Hendriks, 'Praxis Stories: Experiencing Interpretive Policy Research', *Critical Policy Analysis*, 1:3, 2007, pp. 278-300 and Dvora Yanow, 'Qualitative-Interpretive Methods in Policy Research', in Frank Fischer, Gerald J. Miller, and Mara S. Sidney, eds, *Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods*, Boca Raton : CRC/Taylor & Francis, 2007. pp. 405-415.

After collecting this data, I did my reading and focused on meaning-making. This is how I was able to analyse the officials', practitioners' and experts' ideas about ASEAN's crisis management. Reading was an important part of my research because reading equipped me with the necessary background information when I moved to the next phase, which was interviewing.

Phase III Fieldwork and In-depth Interviews

After undertaking an ANU Ethical Protocol Clearance (Record No: 4088; Protocol Type: Expedited Ethical Review E2, and Protocol No. 2010/576), I conducted fieldtrips to four ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand from February to April 2011. Interviews in these four countries were conducted with 44 interviewees who included members of government, academia, the press and international and non-governmental organisations. The interviews were continued in Canberra where I interviewed six respondents including academics, diplomats, and Australian officials. I interviewed 50 sources in total. The selection of countries for fieldwork was based on the observation that these countries represent 'regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia and both interviews and data collection were feasible. The target of interviews for my research was officials at both the national and regional levels. At the national level, I conducted interviews with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of member states of ASEAN, particularly the Ministers and the Directors General of the ASEAN Divisions. At the regional level, I interviewed officials from the ASEAN Secretariat. In order to identify appropriate interviewees among relevant academics, journalists and researchers, I used academic references and recommendations.

While sets of standardised questions were individually designed for each interview and were subsequently asked, the interview was conducted in a non-standardised manner focusing on the particular areas of specialisation and knowledge indicated by each interviewee's background. The questions in the set schedule are listed in Appendix 2. Given some interviewees are high-level officials, a non-standardised format was the most appropriate. Most of the interviews were voice-recorded. Some of the interviewees asked that the conversation not to be recorded. In these situations, I took notes during the interview. An estimated eighty percent of the relevant commentary was recorded via voice-recorder.

If interviewees believed that their answer to any of the questions might compromise them personally or have negative consequence from a national security or legal perspective, they could of course refuse to answer without any need to explain the reason. These interviewees asked the researcher for all or part of the information provided to the researcher to be treated as confidential by indicating that the statement

was 'off the record' (in such cases, I discarded the information as research data). Participation in the project was entirely voluntary, and any informant could withdraw at any stage. However, no participants withdrew at anytime during the process. One participant withdrew before the interview because the person thought it was not necessary to be interviewed after I interviewed that person's supervisor. Any participant requesting anonymity was de-identified at either the data storage or submission phase of the project according to their preference.

Phase IV: Interpreting and Analysing Data

After finishing the interviews, the next phase of my research project was synthesising the material from both the data collection and interviews. I transcribed the interviews and then started writing in order to refine and communicate my interpretations. I sought feedback on my interpretations from colleagues and my supervisors and tried to be open to rethinking my interpretations and willing to shift my perspective in view of the arguments of others.

1.6. Limitations and Challenges

I faced several challenges during the research. First, the key concepts in the study — security community, balance of power and concert of powers — are difficult to define and measure with any great precision. One solution is to identify indicators from the literature for these concepts and then to investigate in relation to individual states and regional policies whether the indicators are meaningful in terms of collective action, such as a joint approach. Second, the formalisation of a security community in ASEAN is relatively recent and is still developing (even as I finish writing the thesis). Third, because the Cambodian crisis started in 1978, I had problems finding key actors/decision-makers/negotiators who were involved in the crisis. Some had passed away. Fourth, limited funding prohibited me from travelling to all Southeast Asian member countries. I believe that had I travelled to all ASEAN member states, I would have obtained more and deeper interviews related to my case studies. Fifth, all interviewees were aware that I am a serving diplomat and at the same time also a researcher. This might have impacted on their answers to my questions in the interviews. Finally, despite being a working diplomat, I faced the obstacle of not being able to join formal ASEAN Meetings because they are restricted to the relevant officials only. For example, I was denied permission to join or listen to the Special Foreign Minister Meeting convened to discuss Thai-Cambodian border issue in February 2011. Listening to such meetings could have helped me better understand whether crisis management really is indicative of the operating regional security system.

1.7. Structure

The thesis is organised around the central theme of crisis management during the Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone Nargis crises and what this may indicate about the type of security systems that operate in Southeast Asia. Chapter 2 examines the conceptual frameworks adopted in the thesis by scrutinising the literature regarding regional security systems, particularly 'security community', 'balance of power' and 'concert of powers' and the literature regarding crisis management. The chapter develops a synthesised conceptual framework on the possible connections between the concept of crisis management and the regional security systems in Southeast Asia. It argues that there is a gap in the connection between the literature on crisis management and regional security systems. Therefore, the chapter develops a synthesised conceptual framework on the possible connections between the concept of crisis management and the regional security systems in Southeast Asia.

Chapter 3 is the first empirical case study. The chapter begins with the historical background to the 1978-1991 Cambodian Crisis. It then elaborates ASEAN members' perception of threat pertaining to the crisis. The chapter examines whether the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states fits the indicators of a security community, a balance of power or a classical concert of powers. The main argument in this chapter is that during the acute period, the management of the Cambodian crisis can be characterised by a modification of the classical concert of powers, and during the de-escalation period it can be explained by the indicators associated with a balance of external great power influence. However, none of the possible security systems is indicated fully. The challenge is to understand whether another system might provide a better explanation of the management of crises.

Chapter 4 first elaborates the nature of the 1999 East Timor crisis. It then investigates the ASEAN member states' perceptions of threats. The period of the East Timor crisis is divided into three periods, the escalation, the acute and the de-escalation period. It examines ASEAN's response to and management of this crisis. This chapter analyses whether or not crisis management by ASEAN member states during the East Timor crisis fits into a particular regional security system. It argues that during the acute period, the management of the East Timor crisis demonstrated the importance of the external great powers' influence, and during the de-escalation period, the management can be characterised as a partial security community among dominant members. None of the security systems operated fully.

Chapter 5 is the final empirical case study. Similar to the two previous chapters, Chapter 5 provides background to the 2008 Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar. This chapter

explores ASEAN member states' roles in the crisis during the period 2008-2010. The duration of the crisis is divided into two periods, the acute and the de-escalation period. The year 2010 was chosen to mark the end of the crisis because the ASEAN Post-Nargis humanitarian effort in Myanmar came to an end on 31 July 2010 with the closure of the Coordinating Office of the AHTF in Yangon. This chapter argues that during the escalation and the acute periods, the crisis management by ASEAN member states can be characterised as a variation of a classical concert of powers. During the de-escalation period, it indicated an embryonic security community. It argues that different security systems operated at different stages of the crisis and at certain times. Again, none of the security systems operated fully. This means that there is a need to review the conceptualisation of regional security systems.

Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the ASEAN crisis management derived from the three case studies, in order to answer the research questions. The main finding in answer to the research questions is that crises in Southeast Asia have been managed according to the nature and the phase of the crisis and therefore have indicated different types of regional security system. The types of regional security system evident in the Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone Nargis crises were a quasi concert of regional leading powers, a partial security community, an embryonic security community, and a balance of external great power influence. Furthermore, besides the importance of external great powers' influence without the notion of balance being recognised, a variation of the classical conceptualisation of a concert of powers has emerged in responding to crises. The management of the crises also demonstrates that among ASEAN member states, some leading states exert more influence than others and that within these leading states, some are consistently influential.

The conclusion of the thesis sums up the previous chapters and concludes the analysis. It provides answers to the research questions and discusses the implications of the findings for the debate about the security systems operating in Southeast Asia, their contribution to the debate about the security system operating in Southeast Asia and to regional policy development.

DEVELOPING A POSSIBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL SECURITY SYTEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. Introduction

To address the research questions posed in the thesis, this chapter constructs a conceptual framework for exploring a possible connection between crisis management by ASEAN member states and regional security systems in Southeast Asia. From reviews of the literature on crisis management and the three explanatory concepts of regional security systems — security community, balance of power and concert of powers — this chapter develops indicators for these explanatory concepts and classifies the regional powers in Southeast Asia. I argue that the literature is largely devoid of any vigorous attempt to make a connection between the two conceptualisations of crisis management and regional security systems. However, I refer to three historical examples which illustrate the value of connecting crisis management to security systems. I then suggest that the concept of crisis management can shed light on the type of regional security systems operating in Southeast Asia. I further argue that the literature review shows that the concert of powers concept has rarely if ever, been applied in Southeast Asia, even though a theoretical foundation can be established that justifies its application to the region. I also identify a need for a further examination of the responsibilities of members of a regional organisation in managing crises. The chapter is divided into the following sections: an introduction; a review of the literature on crisis management, security communities, balance of power, and concert of powers; an explanation of why the connection between crisis management and regional security systems in Southeast Asia is valid; and a brief conclusion.

2.2. Conceptualising Crisis Management

In this section, I elaborate the concepts of crisis and crisis management before reviewing the literature on crisis management. The main argument of this section is that the concept of crisis management should be adopted as an indicator of a regional security system. While there has been research on the linkage between crises and international systems and between wars and international systems, I argue that the research that examines the possible connections between crisis management and regional security systems is no less important. Indeed, there is at least one study that examines the causality between economic crisis management and the nature of

regionalism.[1] This leads me to contend that crises are multifaceted, and moreover that an economic crisis does not represent all aspects of a crisis and is thus insufficient to explain regionalism or any regional system. Therefore, this thesis, which investigates traditional and non-traditional security crises and their management, can helpfully provide an understanding of the operating regional security systems. Because it embraces both traditional and non-traditional security aspects, the thesis does not define a crisis as a situation characterised by the high risk of war; rather, it emphasises that a crisis is more a turning point in a system.

A second argument pursued in this section is that the literature does not address to what extent the burden of managing crises is shared by small and dominant powers in Southeast Asia. The literature on crises and the management of crises in Southeast Asia does not address the connection between burden sharing in crisis management and the classification of powers in the region. The responsibilities shared by members of regional organisations depend on a set of complex factors that explain the inequality of burden sharing in crisis management among the ASEAN member states.

A. Concepts of Crisis and Crisis Management

Crises

In this sub-section, I argue that because of the multifaceted challenges of a crisis, a crisis is best characterised as a turning point situation following a set of events rather than being identified by the high risk of war. The evidence reveals the changing challenges in international security, where natural disasters, epidemics and environmental degradation can also lead to a crisis without any potential of war. Specifically, most crises in Southeast Asia, since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, have not led to open conflict or war.

The concept of 'crisis' has been used in a variety of ways by social scientists and historians. Most definitions of a crisis contain three elements: threat, urgency and uncertainty. Generally, a crisis can be defined as 'a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms (of a society), which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions'.[2] This definition encompasses many types of crisis: natural disasters, environmental threats, financial meltdowns, surprise attacks, hostage takings, epidemics and organisational decline.

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[1] Jürgen Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism', *The Pacific Review*, 13:3, 2000, pp. 421-451.
[2] Uriel Roshental, Michael T. Charles, and Paul t'Hart, *Coping with Crisis: the Management of Disasters, Riots and Terrorism*, Springfield: Charles Thomas, 1989, p. 10.

Scholars working within the field of IR have studied crises and crisis management from two different angles. The first adopts a decision-making perspective to study international crises. This perspective has revealed much about leadership behaviour in times of crisis,[3] as well as the dynamic interaction between parties.[4] In explaining the escalation and outcomes of international crises, IR scholars investigate how pervasive perceptions, bureaucracy and small-group dynamics affect the critical decisions made during a crisis. [5]

A second group of IR scholars conceives of a crisis as part of a growing number of problems that threaten national security. Within this category, there are two sets of concepts of crisis. The first set defines a crisis as the critical turning point in human activities which could threaten national security.[6] When understood as *a turning point*, a crisis is associated with rapid or sudden change. Some authors do not emphasise the speed of change or the quantity of energy invested in it, but rather the degree of change. Eugene Wolfenstein, for example, conceives of a crisis as a situation which threatens to transform an existing political and social order.[7] As another example, Coral Bell defines international crises as 'the turning points or decision points in relations between states'.[8] According to Bell, one of the most successful techniques of crisis management is to turn an 'adversary crisis' into an 'intramural crisis'. She defines an 'adversary crisis' as a crisis between actors who consider themselves adversaries, while an 'intramural crisis' is a crisis within the walls of an alliance system or a power sphere.[9]

A critical turning point in a crisis often refers to a specific kind of change – that is, sudden variations in the level of conflict or in the intensity of hostilities which could lead to conflict. For example, A.J. Wiener and H. Kahn describe a crisis as a situation involving significant actual or potential international conflict in either a novel form or at an abruptly changing level. [10] Wiener and Kahn specify twelve generic dimensions: (i) a turning point in an unfolding sequence of events and actions; (ii) a situation in which

[3] See Charles F. Hermann, ed., *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research,* New York: The Free Press, 1972; G.A. Craig and A.L. George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983; and I.L., Janis, G.M. Herek and P. Huth, 'Decision-making during international crises: Is quality of process related to outcome', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 21:2, 1987, pp. 203-226.
[4] See Michael Brecher, *Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality,* Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993.
[5] See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,* Boston: Little Brown, 1971: Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976 and R.N. Lebow, *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis,* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981.
[6] Eugene V. Wolfenstein, 'Some Psychological Aspects of Crisis Leaders', in Charles F. Herman, *Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis,* New York: The Bobs-Merill Company Inc, 1969.
[7] Wolfenstein, 'Some Psychological Aspects of Crisis Leaders'.
[8] Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis: A study in Diplomatic Management,* London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1971, pp. 4-5.
[9] Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis,* pp. 50-72.
[10] A.J. Wiener and H. Kahn, *Crisis and Arms Control,* Hudson Institute 1962, p.2, quoted in Charles F. Herman, *Crises in Foreign Policy: A Simulation Analysis.*

the requirement for action is high in the minds and planning of participants; (iii) a threat to the goals and objectives of those involved; (iv) a situation followed by an important outcome whose ramifications and effects will shape the future of the parties to the crisis; (v) a convergence of events whose combination produces a new set of circumstances; (vi) a period in which uncertainties about the assessment of the situation and alternatives for dealing with it increase; (vii) a period or situation in which control over events and their effects decreases; (viii) a situation characterised by a sense of urgency, which often produces stress and anxiety among the actors; (ix) a circumstance or set of circumstances in which information available to participants is unusually inadequate; (x) a circumstance characterised by increased time pressures for those involved; (xi) a situation marked by changes in the relations among participants; and (xii) a period includes increased tensions among the actors especially in political crises involving nations. [11]

Other scholars who define a crisis as a turning point include James Richardson and Oran Young. Richardson argues that an international crisis may be viewed as 'the decisive moment in a conflict, the turning point opening a way to an outcome normally involving some redistribution of gains and costs among the participants'.[12] Similarly, an international crisis, according to Young is 'a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilising forces in the general international system or any of its subsystems substantially above normal levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system'.[13] A systemic definition sees a crisis as a brief phase in which the breakdown or transformation of a system (a pattern of relationships) is threatened.

The second set of concepts related to crisis that IR scholars analysing national security refer to, characterises crises with the high risk of war. Glen Snyder and Paul Diesing, for example, define an international crisis as a:

> ... sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war, but involving the perception of dangerously high probability of war. [14]

Another definition proposed by Charles Hermann also looks at the possibility of war arising out of a crisis. Hermann defines an international crisis as a situation of limited duration between two or more international actors having as one of its potential

[11] Hermann, *Crisis in Foreign Policy*.
[12] James L. Richardson, 'Crisis Management: A Critical Appraisal', in Gilbert R. Winham, ed., *New Issues in International Crisis Management,* London: Westview Press, 1988, p. 15.
[13] Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 10.
[14] Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises,* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977, p. 6.

outcomes the occurrence of military conflict or a sharp increase in level or scope of violence already existing between parties.[15]

After the Cold War, scholars turned their attention to what might be called new security challenges, ranging from civil or ethnic conflict, resource scarcity, environmental degradation, uncontrolled migration, organised crime, international terrorism and drug trafficking.[16] Scholars in this field studied how security policy elites make a great effort to design an effective policy response to these threats, why they become subjectively 'securitised' and how governments take into account the prospects of crises and 'failed security'. This development contributes to the field of crisis research, where the crisis concept encompasses a wide variety of threats.

This thesis defines crisis as *an important set of events which marks a turning point or transformation in a pattern of relationships or a system*. This definition highlights the importance of a crisis as a turning point in a system, not a situation identified by the high risk of war for two reasons. The first is that the definitions linked with the possibility of war are not in line with the changing challenges in the international security where natural disasters, pandemics, and environment degradation can also lead to a crisis without any potential of war. The second reason is that most crises within ASEAN, since its establishment in 1967, have not led to an open conflict or war. The ASEAN member states, most of the time, strictly adhere to the principles of the TAC that require member states to avoid the use of force. This principle has helped prevent open conflict occurred following crises in Southeast Asia. I refer to, for example, the three crises investigated in this thesis. Even though the 1978 Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia might have led to an all-out war, and the 1999 East Timor crisis might also have opened up the possibility of serious conflict, the 2008 Nargis Cyclone crisis in Myanmar was not characterised by any possibility of open conflict between the countries/actors involved. Other examples can be seen in the transnational smoke haze crisis in 1997-1999 or the ASEAN economic crisis in 1997-1998. Although they are not investigated in this thesis, these crises did not lead to any possibility of war.

Crisis Management

In the IR literature, realism, liberalism and constructivism have become the most prominent perspectives in explaining the concept of crisis management. It could be argued that a good explanation of a case can be made by only looking through one window (one approach/perspective). However, I suggest that a better explanation can

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[15] Charles F. Hermann, 'Types of Crisis Actors and Their Implications for Crisis Management', in Daniel Frei, ed., *International Crises and Crisis Management,* Farnborough: Saxon House, 1978.
[16] See Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London: Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc, 1998.

be constructed by observing events through several windows. This means that each perspective has its own focus, strengths, and weaknesses, and it is not prudent to look at things only through the eyes of one perspective. In investigating the three case studies, I do not adhere to one specific perspective, but I do recognise the importance of the most prominent ones in this literature review.

The concept of crisis management is actually not new in the discipline of IR. [17] Nonetheless the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 served as a catalyst for the emergence of the concept. Some authors explicitly define the term 'management in crises' and some prefer to use the term 'coping' or 'diplomacy'. Thomas Milburn, for example uses the term 'coping' not 'management'.[18] Bell, however, prefers the term 'crisis management' and defines management as 'imply[ing] a rational, dispassionate, calculating, well considered activity conducted with judgment and even at a leisurely pace'. [19] Furthermore, Christine Pearson and Judith Clair describe crisis management as a systematic attempt to avoid organisational crises or to manage those crisis events that do occur.[20]

If a crisis is defined as a situation identified by the high risk of war, crisis management is then often defined in terms of restraint such as measures taken to reduce the risk of war in a crisis. Hanspeter Neuhold refers to measures taken in order to isolate and mitigate crises: 'a crisis can be regarded as managed if its intensity has so far been reduce that major armed hostilities can reasonably be ruled out'.[21] Alexander George, David Hall and William Simons define 'crisis management as all those measures directed towards restraint and limitation of conflict, against provocation and escalation'. [22] Alternatively, Snyder and Diesing propose that the term 'crisis management' refers to the whole of the process whereby each of the adversaries seeks to reconcile their competing goals.[23] Snyder and Diesing also analyse many case studies of crisis and demonstrate that there has been a wide variety of circumstances in the twentieth century in which the bargaining process during crises has enabled decision-makers to correct their misperceptions. Hence Snyder and Diesing focus more on the bargaining process in a crisis. The main limitation of the application of the realist

[17] The literature on crisis management can be traced back to ancient Jewish and Christian texts which were written as a direct response to earlier situations of crisis. See David C. Sim and Pauline Allen, eds, *Ancient Jewish and Christian Texts as Crisis Management Literature,* Oxford: T&T Clark International, 2012.
[18] See Thomas Millburn, 'The Management of Crises', in Hermann, ed., *International Crises: Insights from Behavioural Research.*
[19] Coral Bell, 'Decision-making by governments in crisis situations', in Frei, ed., *International Crises and Crisis Management.*
[20] Christine M. Pearson & Judith A. Clair , 'Reframing Crisis Management', *Academy of Management Review*, 23:1, 1998, pp. 59-76.
[21] Richardson, 'Crisis Management', p. 15.
[22] Alexander L. Goerge, David Hall, and William E. Simons, *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba and Vietnam*, Boston: Little Brown, 1971 quoted in Richardson, 'Crisis Management', p. 15.
[23] Snyder and Diesing, *'Conflict Among Nations'.*

perspective in Southeast Asia is that ASEAN states have drawn back from any regional defence military arrangements.[24]

A preliminary assessment of contemporary studies on security in Southeast Asia shows that realism, liberalism and constructivism have become the most prominent perspectives. Some scholars argue that in Southeast Asia, neoliberalism and realism remain the two dominant theoretical perspectives, while some contend that realism and constructivism are now competing in Southeast Asian security studies.[25] Realist theory holds that in an international environment characterised by anarchy and with no overarching authority in the international system, states are preoccupied with their survival and always act to seek and maximise benefits.[26] Therefore, crisis management by cooperative behaviour is only possible if the relative powers of the state have not been subject to continuous change. Crisis management would only be successful within a regional organisation if the security dilemma is minimised.[27]

In managing a crisis, realists see the logic of a balance of power politics, such as defence ties and alliances with major powers, both within and outside the organisation. By doing so, states help themselves to maintain a stable balance of power. The resolution or management of a crisis is also related to collective defence, peace-keeping machinery or a common military and diplomatic front. The maintenance of the balance and distribution of power is thus assured. In Southeast Asia, any proposal of a regional defence military arrangement has never been accepted and is regarded as counter-productive by the leaders of ASEAN.[28] Realist theory was a major focus in Southeast Asian studies in the 1980s-1990s periods. By then, there had been three major wars that had affected Southeast Asia; the First Indo China War (1945-1954), the Second Indo-China War (1965-1973) and the Third Indo-China War which is also known as the Cambodian conflict (1978-1991). The perspective continued to be relevant in the context of possible conflict with the possibility of conflict because of the South China Sea dispute, territory disputes, and terrorism. Jurgen Rüland defends the utility of the realist perspective in ASEAN whose 'policy mix is closer to the realist that the institutionalist pole'.[29]

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[24] Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN WAY,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005.
[25] For the first argument, see Sheldon W. Simon, 'Realism and Neoliberalism: International Relations Theory and Southeast Asian Security', *The Pacific Review,* 8:1, 1995, pp. 5-24., and Bary Buzan and Gerald Segal, 'Rethinking East Asian security', *Survival,* 36:2, 1994, pp. 3-21.
[26] Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia.*
[27] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1938 quoted in Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia.*
[28] Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia.*
[29] Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis', p. 443.

Other theories, such as the neo-realist perspective, see power and material considerations as the main factors leading to states joining regional organisations. The neo-liberal approach sees that through cooperation, the effects of anarchy can be mitigated.[30] International trade and commercial activities become incentives and will gradually result in peace. [31] This approach is useful to explain the birth of economic cooperation in Southeast Asia such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN Plus Three (APT). The latter grouping, for example, initially aimed at helping ASEAN member states to emerge out of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. However, the neo-liberal approach has not always been practical in the Southeast Asian region. Increased economic cooperation indeed supported increased interdependence, but did not necessarily provide a guarantee against political crises. This theory also failed to explain the challenges raised by natural disasters and environmental degradation.

Constructivism has gained its influence in the studies of Southeast Asia since the late 1980s. In explaining crisis management in ASEAN, it emphasises ideational factors, including norms and ideas in helping understand how and why the 'ASEAN Way' mechanisms have emerged and were shaped. It provides an understanding of how the norms encapsulated in the 'ASEAN way' actually operate in managing crisis. [32] Constructivism is also useful in explaining how the region's security approaches inform the development of certain mechanisms in ASEAN, such as TAC, and helps provide an understanding of ASEAN's rationale for leading the establishment of the ARF and other multilateral forums in the region. Among the constructivists, Acharya is arguably the most prominent. However, Acharya's work is often criticised as having little basis in empirical practices and 'run[ning] the risks of trying to explain everything and nothing'.[33]

B. Looking Outside the Box: Is Crisis Management Connected with Regional Security Systems in Southeast Asia?

The perspectives of the scholars discussed in the previous section assist in understanding the concept of crisis management. However these scholars do not investigate the concept of crisis management as a means to explain a regional security system. Some other scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, have investigated the link between crisis and international systems, [34] or between war and international systems, as Hedley Bull did. [35] The relationship between crises and international systems and vice versa can be seen in Waltz's argument. For Waltz, a crisis will contribute to change

30 Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*.
31 Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*.
32 Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*.
33 Peou, 'Realism and Constructivism', p. 136.
34 Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar World', *Daedalus*, 93:3, 1964, pp. 881-909.
35 Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Palgrave, 1977.

in the international system while the nature of the international system will also influence the frequency with which crises occur. Interactions between actors who seek alterations of their international status are more prone to crises than interactions between actors who have accepted their positions. Certain international systems are better structured to allow policy makers to cope with crises without destroying the system. The structures and processes that maintain an international system may be more or less subject to the sudden stress imposed by a crisis. [36]

According to Waltz, one 'distinguishing factor' in the bipolar balance is the nearly constant presence of pressure and the recurrence of crises. In addition to finding crises more frequent in a bipolar system than in a multipolar system, Waltz also claims that in a multipolar world a nation's policy makers can create a crisis to further their objectives in the hope that opponents of the change will not join together in opposition. In a bipolar system, the permanency of opposing polar powers greatly increases the probability that any move to initiate a crisis will be countered. Thus, two relevant hypotheses from Waltz's study are that the type of international system influences (i) the rate at which crisis occurs; and (ii) the probability of direct confrontations between actors when any actor attempts to abruptly change a significant systemic variable.[37]

Bull in explaining the relationship between war and international systems argues that war remains a basic factor in shaping the international system. Among nuclear powers, it is the threat of war rather than war itself that determines the relationship. Mutual deterrence between the great powers rules out unlimited war as a means of resolving disputes between them and this affects the basis of war in the system as a whole. [38]

Other scholars have also found that the effects of crises on the relations within an alliance or between two adversaries may be quite different from the effects of that same crisis on the overall system. A specific crisis may drastically alter a subsystem without having any destabilising consequences for the whole international system. However, the linkage between crisis management and regional security systems is not further explored by these scholars.

Some literature, however, causally links economic crises with the nature of regionalism. Rüland, for example, argues that the type of regionalism influences how a regional organisation manages its crises and how the regional organisation manages crises

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[36] Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar World'.
[37] Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar World'.
[38] Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics.*

affects the type or regionalism.[39] For the former link, he contends firstly that the less institutionalised regional organisations, such as ASEAN, are more vulnerable to crisis and more prone to failure. Unlike the EU, according to Rüland, ASEAN members who opted out of previous agreements would not have to be afraid of any sanctions. Second, he argues that the more politically diverse the members of a regional organisation, the more difficult it will be to solve a crisis. This is true in the case of ASEAN as it consists of both democratic and authoritarian regimes as its members. Third, economically advanced regional organisations are better prepared to solve major crises. Rüland cites the EC in the 1970s and NATO in 1994 as examples of economically advanced regional organisations; he argues they were more prepared to face these economic crises than ASEAN was when it dealt with the 1997 Asian crisis.[40]

How a regional organisation manages crises affects the type of regionalism, according to Rüland. When a crisis occurs, the nation-states do not respond to it by strengthening cooperation but rather prefer to go it alone.[41] In the wider arena, a crisis can also create a revitalisation of global multilateralism, such as the creation of the G7/G8.[42] Rüland comprehensively describes the causality between crisis management and regionalism. However, he focuses more on economic crises. Economic crises alone cannot be representative of the multifaceted crises that occur in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, his conclusion places more emphasis on how the type of regionalism will influence crisis management than vice versa.[43] Hence, it is difficult to generalise from his study about the linkage between crisis management and the security system in Southeast Asia.

I contend, however, that the arguments of Rüland, Waltz and Bull provide ways of thinking about links between crises, particularly crisis management, and the regional security system. I focus here on what the crisis management of ASEAN member states can reveal about regional security systems in Southeast Asia. The study of regional security systems is important when one looks at the examples of dire mismanagement in the past. World War II, for example, resulted from a whole series of mismanaged crises, including Munich, the Italian attack on Ethiopia and Adolf Hitler's continuing preparation to invade Poland even after he realised that this act might lead the United Kingdom (UK) and France to oppose him. Similarly, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor derived, in part, from a failure of Japanese decision-makers to evaluate properly the response of the US.

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39 Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'.
40 Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'.
41 Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'.
42 Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'.
43 Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis'.

Managing Regional Crises: Whose Responsibility?

The arguments and concepts elaborated above lead to the questions, whose responsibility is it to manage regional crises? Is it the responsibility of all the powers in the region, the members of the regional organisation or some members that qualify to be referred as to 'regional dominant powers'? The literature on crises and crisis management does not address the connection between the two concepts and the classification of powers in Southeast Asia. It does not assess the extent of the differences in the managing roles conducted by regional dominant powers and small powers. Regional organisations such as ASEAN are now placing enhanced importance on developing more organised roles in managing crises. If all powers dedicate some portions of their sovereignty to a regional organisation, when crises occur they at least are facing the threat of jeopardising the international image of their organisation if the organisation fails to manage. This leads to a logical assumption that they share equal responsibilities for managing the crisis. However, in most cases within Southeast Asia, the burden of responsibility is not shared equally. The argument that burden-sharing is not equal further supports the classification of great powers in Southeast Asia. This will be discussed in Section 2.6.2.

The three crises case studies (Chapters 3, 4, 5) will examine the responses of each member of ASEAN. Even though the chapters are not specifically aimed at measuring the role of each member, the regional security systems indicated by the crisis management of ASEAN member states in the three crises will imply which countries take greater responsibilities in each crisis. The extent of the role of each member of a regional organisation in managing regional crises depends on a complex equation that includes national interest, the member's understanding of collective responsibility, the opportunity cost of action and inaction and the capabilities of each member of a regional organisation.[44] Based on these complex factors, I argue that smaller powers are reluctant to take big responsibilities because of one or more of these possible reasons: (i) they consider whether or not the crisis really directly threatens their own national interests, not necessarily their regional interests; (ii) they do not feel thus equal responsibilities with the greater powers; (iii) they do not have the willingness to contribute to the crisis management; (iv) their calculation of the cost of action exceeds the cost of inaction, so being inactive gives more benefit to them; and (v) they are willing to help but do not have the capability. These factors are involved, to some degree, in the unequal sharing of responsibility among ASEAN states.

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[44] Charles Van Der Donck, 'Conflict and the Regional Option: A Study on the Role of Regionalism and Regional Arrangements in Conflict Management in the early Post Cold War', PhD Dissertation, Canberra: ANU, 1999.

Two general examples support my arguments above. In the Americas, for example, the Organisation of American States (OAS) has been successful in resolving a number of minor interstate conflicts.[45] However, the most prominent role has been taken by the US, resulting in the OAS often being widely regarded as an instrument of US hegemony. In Southeast Asia, even though the ASEAN Charter stipulates an equal distribution of roles for each member state, some countries assume greater responsibilities than others. For instance, a part from the three crises elaborated below, during the recent Thai-Cambodian border dispute, only some countries devoted their attention and capacities to trying to manage the crisis. Besides the disputing parties (Thailand and Cambodia) only Indonesia and Singapore out of ten members of ASEAN have expressed their views concerning the issue. Countries like Laos, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Vietnam have shied away from any involvement.

2.3. Conceptualising Security Communities

This section seeks to evaluate the literature on security communities. In this section, I argue that another way of understanding the conceptualisation of a security community in Southeast Asia is by investigating the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states. However, little, if any, of the literature adopts crisis management as an indicator of a security community. Some scholars are too optimistic about Southeast Asia's community building without being able to provide substantial evidence to support this position. Some are too sceptical and close their eyes to the positive development of community building in the region. Furthermore, some scholars select unrepresentative case studies to explain ASEAN as a security community.

The section is divided into three parts. The first part begins with a brief introduction to the typology of security systems and reviews the concept of security. The second part assesses the literature on security communities. Finally, the third part evaluates the literature on security communities in Southeast Asia.

A security community can be referred to as one type of security system. Bruce Cronin places the concept of a security community alongside seven possible types of security system: (i) an international state of nature; (ii) a balance of power system; (iii) a pluralistic security community; (iv) a collective security system; (v) a concert system; (vi) a common security association; and (vii) an amalgamated security community.[46]

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[45] Van Der Donck, 'Conflict and the Regional Option: A Study on the Role of Regionalism and Regional Arrangements in Conflict Management in the early Post Cold War'.
[46] Bruce Cronin, *Community under Anarchy,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

TABLE 2.1 Typology of Security Systems

Security System	Common Identity	Constitutive Rules	Patterns of Behaviours	Primary Institutions
International State of Nature	None	None	War of all against all	None
Balance of Power System	Statism	Sovereignty and Independence	Balancing and Bandwagoning	Alliances
Concert System	Great Power	Multilateral Security Management	Consultation/Joint Action	Congresses/Summits
Pluralistic Security Community	Cognitive Regionalism	Peaceful Settlements of Disputes	Demilitarisation and Cooperation	Regional Organisations and Regimes
Common Security System	Institutional or Ideological	Solidarity	Mutual Support	Transnational Association
Amalgamated Security Community	Pan-Nationalism	Collectivity as Singularity	Political Integration	Federal Government
Collective Security System	Cosmopolitan	Peace is indivisible	Collective Action	International law and Organisations

Source: Bruce Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p.9.

Three of the security systems shown in the Table 2.1 — a balance of power system, a pluralistic security community and a concert system — will be used in this thesis to identify the type of security system that ASEAN employs in crisis management. I chose those three (out of the seven security systems listed in Table 2.1) because they are the security systems most relevant to Southeast Asia. First, an international state of nature has no constitutive rules and lacks any social or political institutions, [47] so this type of security system is not relevant for Southeast Asia. Second, an amalgamated security system is also not relevant to Southeast Asia due to its identity which refers to a pan-nationalism rather than regionalism. Third, a collective security system is more relevant to an International Organisation such as the UN, and not to ASEAN. The idea of a collective security system initiated after World War I and aimed at replacing balance of power method.[48] Fourth, a *common security system is irrelevant for ASEAN* because a common security system is based on an ideology, such as monarchy, communism, or democracy, while ASEAN is not.[49]

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[47] According to Cronin, despite the lack of a central authority at the global level, this system has never existed in the modern world. He gives an example of Europe in the early Middle Ages to illustrate the system. See Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy,* p. 4.

[48] Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features,* Stanford: Standford University Press, 2003.

[49] Some examples of a common security system include: the Non Aligned Movement, the Arab League, the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Holy Alliance and the Communist International. See Cronin, *Community Under Anarchy,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 5.

A. Concepts of Communities and Security Communities

Communities

The concepts of community and security community are critically examined in this section to create a framework for understanding the type of security systems operating in Southeast Asia. I argue that 'equal responsibilities', similar to 'mutual responsiveness' is an important indicator in assessing any security system operating in a region. The crisis management in Southeast Asia may be characterised by a security community, if all ASEAN member states share equal responsibilities or mutual responsiveness in managing the crises. Generally, the concept of a community is used to refer to a human collection within the protective walls of national borders. IR scholars have borrowed this concept from sociology.

The literature on the concept of community demonstrates a wide range of focuses on community. A German sociologist, Ferdinand Tönnies divided human association into two groups, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. He defined *Gemeinschaft* as:

> an association in which individuals are oriented to the large association as much if not more than to their own self interest. Individuals in *Gemeinschaft* are regulated by common mores or beliefs about the appropriate behaviour and responsibility on members of the association to each other and to the association at large; association marked by unity will.[50]

Meanwhile, the term *Gesellschaft* was identified by Tönnies as civil society or association where individual interest is greater than society interest. [51] Another sociologist, Joseph Gusfield, observed a community from two dimensions: territorial and relational. From the relational dimension, a community is related to the characteristic and quality of the relationship inside the community. Some communities which are based on relations do not have territorial borders. Gusfield gives examples of a community of scientists or community of scholars. From the territorial dimension, a community is divided based on territorial agreements.[52]

Benedict Anderson then applied the concept of communities to political science. In his view, a nation is an 'imagined political community that is imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'. [53] Anderson added that a nation could be imagined as a community because regardless of actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep and horizontal comradeship. Ultimately,

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[50] Ferdinand Töönnies, *Community and Civil Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 22.
[51] Töönnies, *Community and Civil Society*.
[52] Joseph R. Gusfield, *Community: A Critical Response*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1975.
[53] Benedict Anderson, ed., *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* London: Verso, 1991, p. 6.

it is this fraternity that has made it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, to be willing to die for such limited imaginings.[54]

In IR, the term community is rarely interpreted as a theoretical concept or a descriptive phrase. Realists prefer to use the term 'cooperation' to refer to an alliance as the primary form of community. Institutionalists favour the term 'regimes' rather than community. Alex Bellamy, for example, defined a community as a 'human collection formed by the shared norms and understanding among its members'.[55] Meanwhile, Acharya suggests three characteristics to define the formation of a community: (i) the existence of a collective identity; (ii) a direct interaction among members of the community; and (iii) a practice of reciprocity.[56]

Security Communities

Karl Deutsch and his associates in the 1950s carefully examined the definition of a security community by perceiving it as a product of human communication flows. They defined a security community as a group of states whose members 'share dependable expectations of peaceful change' and rule out 'the use of force as a means of problem solving'.[57] With his associates, Deutsch identified two types of security community, namely an amalgamated security community and a pluralistic security community.[58] He argued that it is the building of a security community that can eliminate 'war and expectation of war' within the boundaries of participating states.[59]

An amalgamated security community was defined by Deutsch as a political and security arrangement where previously independent units formed a single unit with a common government. He also provided the following conditions for the formation of an amalgamated security community: (i) mutual comparability of values; (ii) a distinctive way of life; (iii) expectations of joint rewards timed so as to come before the impositions of burdens from the amalgamation; (iv) a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participant units; (v) superior economic growth on the part of some participating units and the development of so-called core areas around which are grouped comparatively weaker areas; (vi) unbroken link of social communication, both geographically and between territories and between social

[54] Interview with Anderson, in Ratna Shofi Inayati, ed., *Menuju Komunitas ASEAN 2015: Dari State Oriented ke People Oriented, (Towards an ASEAN Community in 2015: From State Oriented to People Oriented),* Jakarta: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia Pusat Penelitian Politik, 2007.
[55] Alex J. Bellamy, *Security Communities and Their Neighbours: Regional Fortresses or Global Integrators?,* Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 31.
[56] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order,* 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009.
[57] Karl W. Deutsch et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience,* New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1969, p. 34.
[58] Deutsch et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.*
[59] Deutsch et al, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area,* p. 34.

strata; (vii) broadening of the political elite; (viii) mobility of persons, at least among the politically relevant strata; and (ix) multiplicity of communication and transactions.[60]

A pluralistic community, on the other hand is a political and security arrangement where participating states or units retain their legal independence. NATO and the bilateral security arrangement between the US and Canada are two examples of this kind of security community. Deutsch identifies the following conditions for the formation of a pluralistic security community: (i) comparability of values among decision-makers; (ii) mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers of units to be integrated; and (iii) mutual responsiveness of government to the actions and communication of other governments.[61]

Deutsch's conceptual framework was later refined by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. They depicted security communities as evolutionary. They offered a conceptual vocabulary and conceptual foundations for the study of security communities. They argued that one of the virtues of the study of security communities is also one of its vices: it raises a host of important but potentially intractable concepts such as community dependable expectations of peaceful change, governance, and institutions.[62] Their conceptual foundations for the study are related to three tiers. The first tier consists of the precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies. The second tier consists of the 'structural' elements of power and ideas and the processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning. These lead to the third tier: the development of trust and collective identity formation. The causal relationship between these three tiers is responsible for the production of peaceful change.[63] They then offered three phases of the development of a security community: a nascent, ascendant and mature security community.[64]

In the security community's nascent form, states establish relationships in order to: maximise their mutual security; reduce the transaction costs associated with their exchanges; and/or promote further exchanges and interaction.[65] In the community's ascendant stage, ties deepen through institutions and organisations, which in turn give rise to a sense of trust. This phase is indentified by: increasingly dense networks; new

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[60] Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.*
[61] Deutsch, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area.*
[62] Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
[63] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities.*
[64] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities.*
[65] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities.*

institutions and organisations that reflect either tighter military coordination and cooperation and/or decreased fear that the other represents a threat; a cognitive structure that promotes 'seeing' and acting together and therefore, the deepening of the level of mutual trust and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectation of peaceful change.[66] Finally, in its mature phase, regional actors are able to share an identity and therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change.[67]

B. Gauging a Security Community in Southeast Asia

In this section I argue that examining the indicators of the existence of a security community in Southeast Asia should be done both empirically and theoretically. I argue that the crisis management system adopted in Southeast Asia may provide evidence that it is a security community if all member states of ASEAN share equal responsibilities in managing the crisis. A partial security community, therefore, is indicated if only some rather than all states share the responsibilities. I also argue that in Southeast Asia, while a security community is not an 'imaginary' concept, it has not yet reached full implementation.

Deutsch, Adler and Barnett's concept of a security community may be suitable for western and developed countries but it is quite challenging for developing countries such as those in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia has been examined as a potential security community since 1974.[68] The first argument of the possibility of an emerging security community was introduced by Estrella D. Solidum in her book *Towards a Southeast Asian Community* in 1976.[69] Two years later Monte H. Hill examined the possibility of a Southeast Asian security community with a focus on Deutsch's theory of transactionalism.[70] Several years later, in 1991, Acharya's publication entitled, 'The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'' brought substantive application of the concept of 'security community' to the region.[71] This led him to write a major book entitled *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order* in 2001 that was revised with a second edition published in 2009.[72]

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[66] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.
[67] Adler and Barnett, *Security Communities*.
[68] Monte H. Hill, 'Community Formation within ASEAN', *International Organisation,* 32:2, 1978, pp. 569-575.
[69] Estrella D. Solidum, *Towards a Southeast Asian Community,* Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1974.
[70] Hill, 'Community Formation within ASEAN'.
[71] Amitav Acharya, 'The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: "Security Community" or "Defence Community"?' *Pacific Affairs,* 64:2, 1991, pp. 159-178.
[72] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.*

The concept of a security community in Southeast Asia has been widely discussed by scholars. These scholars can be divided into three groups: those who claim that ASEAN is already a security community; those who believe that ASEAN and/or some member countries of ASEAN are already at the earlier stage of a security community; and those who do not think that ASEAN is a security community at all. Solidum, within the first group, is very optimistic about the idea of Southeast Asia as a security community. She depicts ASEAN as 'the wave of the future in Southeast Asia'.[73] She had been watching ASEAN grow into a 'community' based on cooperation. She argues that the ASEAN Way is now extended to the grass root level through functional cooperation for establishing 'a real community where members share a feeling of identity and responsibility'.[74] Solidum claims that ASEAN is successful. In her eyes, security is not only an ASEAN achievement but also an ASEAN product. Security is 'the enjoyment of the ASEAN values of peace, economic, social and cultural development, cooperation, political stability and regional stability in progress'.[75]

Acharya and Muthiah Allagapa are among the second group of scholars who view ASEAN as developing into a security community. Acharya claims that ASEAN is a 'nascent security community'.[76] Acharya proposes an alternative security community framework which he argues is more applicable for developing countries. Examining the prospects of building a security community in Southeast Asia, Acharya identifies the following basic requirements: (i) a total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects for such conflict in the region; (ii) a total absence of a competitive military build-up or arms race involving the regional actors; (iii) formal or informal institutions and practices; and (iv) a high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship.[77]

In Acharya's opinion, a security community describes groups of states which have developed a long-term habit of peaceful interaction and ruled out the use of force in settling disputes with other members of the group. The concept has twofold significance. First, it raises the possibility that through interactions and socialisation, states can manage anarchy and even escape the security dilemma. This then challenges the assumptions of the realist, neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives that a security dilemma is a permanent feature of international relations. Second, the concept offers a theoretical and analytical framework for international (regional) institutions in promoting peaceful change in international relations.[78] Acharya interprets the fact that

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[73] Estrella Solidum, *The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism,* Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003, p. vi.
[74] Solidum, *The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism,* p. 93.
[75] Solidum, *The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism,* p. 1.
[76] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia,* p. 298.
[77] Acharya, Constructing *a Security Community in Southeast Asia.*
[78] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.*

there has not been a war between ASEAN member states as a sign that ASEAN has been relatively successful in forging a degree of common identity among its members and therefore can be regarded as a nascent security community.

The theory of 'security communities' according to constructivists like Acharya was among the first to raise the possibility of non-violent change in international relations. It contradicts the concept of 'security dilemma' because 'security community' is integral to a perspective that sees international relations as a process of social learning, identity formation driven by transactions, interactions and socialisation.[79] It recognises the possibility of change being a fundamentally peaceful process with its sources lying in the perceptions and identifications among actors.[80] Such a process explains why states may develop greater mutual interdependence and responsiveness, develop 'we feelings', and ultimately come to abandon the use of force to settle problems among themselves.[81]

Muthiah Alagappa advocates that explanations of security order draw on both 'material and ideational' determinants at the domestic and inter-state levels.[82] Alagappa mentions how the ASEAN Six (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei) have been recognised as a nascent security community, and recognises that substantive aspects of international order have been studied inter alia under security community frameworks.[83] However, he does not explain or critique the relationship between his 'security order' framework and that of a 'security community framework'. This leads to confusion as to how a 'security order' framework links to a 'security community' framework.

A very different view was expressed by David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith in 2001, who can be categorised as belonging to a third group of scholars:

> ASEAN is neither a security nor an economic community, either in being or in prospect. It is in fact, an imitation community (comparable to a fake state whose insecure and illegitimate leaders, ensconced through bogus elections or military coups, wield unrestrained power over those whom they rule). Such insecurity translated at a regional level produces a rhetorical and institutional shell. The shell delivers declarations, holds ministerial meetings, and even supports a secretariat, but beyond the flatulent musings of aging autocrats or postmodern constructivists pontificating in Track Two fora nothing of substance eventuates. However, because Southeast Asia's political elites along with their academic

[79] Donald J. Puchala, 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations', in Charles W. Kegley and Eugene M. Wirrkopf, eds, *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives*, New York: Random House, 1984.

[80] Puchala, 'The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations'.

[81] Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, 'The Integrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis' in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano, eds, *The Integration of Political Communities*, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964, p. 4, and see Joseph S. Nye 'Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement', *International Organisation*, 22: 4, 1968, pp. 855 - p.880.

[82] Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*.

[83] Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*. In Alaggapa, 'Regional Arrangement and International Security in Southeast Asia', pp. 298, Alagappa refers to ASEAN-6 members as 'semi or partially-security community'.

fellow travellers have invested so heavily in ASEAN's alternative security discourse, it is regarded as impolite to point out (the Association's) essentially ersatz quality.[84]

Two years later, Jones expressed clearly his scepticism towards ASEAN's sustainability. He argued that it 'increasingly resembled other failed postcolonial Cold War organisations like the Non Aligned Movement, the Organisation of African Unity and the Arab League'.[85] Writing with Michael L. R. Smith, he rejected the notion of ASEAN as a security community. He saw that Southeast Asia itself, as a region, had been and remained a fantasy – 'a region that never was'.[86]

Long before Jones published his articles, Michel Leifer in 1984 was already sceptical of ASEAN. In 1988, Leifer published an important book that contributed to the neo-realist camp where again 'the balance of power' remained a key factor. However, in his book, he suggested that ASEAN can be best described as a diplomatic community that evidences elements of a 'collective-political defence with an extra-mural point of reference'.[87] His work also acknowledged the possible existence of a 'sub-regional security community'.[88] Most of Leifer's works focus on ASEAN's response at the time to the Cambodian conflict, which forced the member states to coordinate their policies with external factors as their major consideration. Based on ASEAN's response, he argued that this 'collective political defence' was 'expressed through diplomatic solidarity in the face of threat to the premises of regional order and more specifically to the security of a member state'.[89] Leifer asserts that because ASEAN's operational experience of collective political defence was suited to the realm of political diplomacy, ASEAN is best viewed as a diplomatic community rather than a security community.

Leifer's student, Emmers, in his book *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF* argues the continuing relevance of the 'balance of power' approach in Southeast Asia. Instead of being a security community, Southeast Asia is, according to Emmers, a playground where the two concepts of 'cooperative security' and 'balance of power' coexist.[90] Emmers claims that neo-liberalist and constructivist theories that embrace concepts like cooperative security at the expense of utilising the power balancing theory, provide an incomplete and unrealistic view of Southeast Asia.

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84 David Martin Jones and Mike L. Smith, 'The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror and the Delusions of Regionalism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 24:4, 2001, p. 285.
85 David Martin Jones, 'Regional Illusion and its Aftermath', *Policy,* 19:3, 2003, p. 43.
86 David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, 'ASEAN's Imitation Community', *Orbis,* 46:1, 2002, pp. 93-99.
87 Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia,* London: Routledge, 1989, pp.VII & 83. This term has continued to be used to this day.
88 Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia,* p. 157.
89 Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia,* p. 152.
90 Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF,* London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

This is because they reject the high potential for tension in the bilateral relations of Southeast Asia, such as between Malaysia and Singapore, as well as Thailand and Myanmar.[91]

From this literature on security communities in Southeast Asia, it can be seen that on the one hand, Solidum is a strong supporter of the idea of Southeast Asia as a security community, while on the other hand, scholars like David Martin Jones, offer contrary arguments. Another group of scholars holds either that the whole of ASEAN is a nascent security community (Acharya) or that only the ASEAN Six is already a nascent security community (Alagappa).

Solidum's enthusiasm and Jones' scepticism have limitations. Emmerson points out that Solidum's work does not really reflect the reality of the region.[92] Emmerson cites Michael Haas' comment quoted on the back cover of Solidum's book. According to Haas, Solidum, who has been regarded as 'Ms. ASEAN', has produced the book as a result of consultation with primary sources and interviews with government officials to offer the most authoritative assessment about the region.[93] However, Emmerson finds that Solidum has not actually provided any evidence that she interviewed government officials. There are no notes of interviews at any of her endnotes. Her book relies instead on a selection of secondary writings about ASEAN and on official ASEAN statements. For example, she frequently cites ASEAN's 1998-1999 annual reports.[94] Therefore, for Emmerson, her conclusion is not really convincing.

Jones's argument, which depicts ASEAN as a failed organisation and which predicts a slow process of disintegration, is also not compelling. He does not offer enough evidence for his argument. When he wrote his book in 2003, Southeast Asia was recovering from a financial crisis. It did not show any signs of disintegration. Instead, in the same year, ASEAN announced its plan to establish a community based on three pillars: economy, political-security and socio-cultural.

I argue that none of these scholars has investigated ASEAN's crisis management in a representative and exclusive manner that provides a way of shedding light on the regional system in Southeast Asia. This gap offers an opportunity for a deeper investigation, which this thesis aims to do. The linkage between crisis management and the regional security system is important because it has been observed previously that international crisis management has provided insights into the characteristics of

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[91] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*.
[92] Donald K. Emmerson, 'Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up? Security, Community and Democracy in Southeast Asia', available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/4130/Emmerson_04_05_2005.pdf (accessed on 10 January 2010). See also Emmerson, 'Security, Community, and Democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN'.
[93] Emmerson, 'Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up?'
[94] Emmerson, 'Will the Real ASEAN Please Stand Up?'

the international system. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, for example, stimulated scholars to depict the existing international system at that time. By investigating this crisis, it is clear that the international system by then was characterised by bipolarity, with the US and the Soviet Union as the poles.

2.4. The Balance of Power in Southeast Asia Revisited

This section reassesses the literature on the concept of balance of power. The purpose of this section is to discuss the concept of balance of power and determine whether it is relevant to crisis management in Southeast Asia. To that end, it combines the ideas of two traditional schools of thought on balance of power, Richard Little's 'balance of power' and John David Ciarciori's 'balance of influence'.[95] In this section, I argue that in the context of Southeast Asia, the balance of power factor should neither be exaggerated nor underestimated. On the one hand, the balance of power factor plays an important role for ASEAN in managing some crises. It is not only important for understanding the management of the crisis, but it also becomes a factor in the occurrence of the crisis itself, because a crisis often results from an escalating adversarial balance of power. On the other hand, given the different characteristics and challenges of each crisis in Southeast Asia, in many cases, management of the relations between ASEAN member states and between ASEAN member states and external powers will be difficult to achieve by power-balancing alone. Furthermore, I argue that realists and neo-realists often overuse and misuse the term 'balance'. They refer to 'multilateralism' in Southeast Asia as an 'institutional balancing' and to the norms promoted and implemented in the region as 'ideational balancing'. However, the purposes of the multilateralism and the promotion of norms in Southeast Asia are not only about balancing.

As highlighted earlier in Section 2.2.B on the importance of 'equal responsibilities', I further argue that the crisis management in Southeast Asia may provide evidence of the presence of a balance of power dynamics among ASEAN member states, if there are at least two equal powers in the region competing or balancing in managing crisis. The crisis management can be characterised by a balance of external great power influence dynamics if at least two external great powers exercise their influence on ASEAN member states in managing their crisis. The influence can be either balanced towards associative behaviour or adversarial behaviour.

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[95] For full reference, see John David Ciorciari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence in Contemporary Southeast Asia', *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, 9, 2009, pp. 157-196; and Richard Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations, Metaphors, Myths and Models* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

This section consists of three subsections. The first section examines the conventional understanding of the term balance of power by reviewing its meaning and critiques in the literature. The second section explores the literature on the balance of power in the context of the Asia Pacific. This leads to the third section which describes the role of a balance of power in Southeast Asia and suggests why ASEAN's crisis management is useful as an indicator of the existence of a balancing system in the Southeast Asian context.

A. Balance of Power Theories

The central suppositions of the concept of balance of power are based on realist assumptions. Attempts to understand IR in terms of the balance of power can be traced back more than five hundred years. Historically, the balance of power concept was given a fundamental position in studies by Machiaveli and Hobbes, and other classical realists. In the 19th century Morgenthau developed the concept and his work has become one of the foundations of the development of realism theory itself. Morgenthau has been regularly identified as the 'father of realism' and the precursor of neo-realism. After Morgenthau, the concept of balance of power was then developed within modern IR theory by Kenneth Waltz. He introduced the balance of power as a central theme of neo-realism perspective. The concept was then revisited by the English School scholars, such as Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. Mearsheimer and others continued the work on balance of power within the realist framework.

Although the concept has been discussed by many scholars and from different perspectives, the balance of power has no single precise definition. Inis Claude argues that there are four key definitions of the term balance of power.[96] These are: a situation, associated with the distribution of power; a policy, referring to the policies taking the power situation into account: a symbol, related to a sign of realistic concern with the power and issues; and a system, seen as 'a certain kind of arrangement for operation of international relations in a world of many states'.[97] Michael Sheehan has further explained the difference between balance of power as a policy and as a system.[98] As policy, it involves 'the creation and preservation of equilibrium, the confrontation of power with countervailing power to prevent a single power laying down the law to all others'.[99] As a system, the balance of power has often been used as 'a point of reference for studying the working of the states system'.[100] Because my thesis will try to correlate

[96] Inis Claude, *Power and International Relations*, New York: Random House, 1965, pp. 13-39.
[97] Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp. 13-39.
[98] Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, London: Routledge, 1996.
[99] Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, p. 53.
[100] Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, p. 53.

ASEAN's crisis management and the regional security system in Southeast Asia, it will focus on the balance of power as a system, not as a policy.

There have also been some other categorisations of the balance of power. Organski, for example, divides 'balance of power' according its modes of operation.[101] Regarding forms of operation, Organski argues that two types of balances can be distinguished. A simple balance involves two groups, each consisting of one or more states, opposing each other with a roughly equal amount of power while, a multiple balance includes several groups balancing each other on a unilateral multilateral basis.

Among scholars who have investigated the balance of power, four prominent authors have made significant but contentious theoretical contributions in international relations[102] These authors are Hans J. Morgenthau (*Politics Among Nations*, 1948), Hedley Bull (*The Anarchical Society*, 1977), Kenneth Waltz (*Theory of International Politics*, 1979) and J. Mearsheimer (*The Tragedy of Great Power*, 2001). The work of Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, Kenneth Waltz and Mearsheimer is investigated by Richard Little in his book 'The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths and Models'.[103] He acknowledges and critiques the works of these authors. This literature review will not reiterate the critiques of these four prominent scholars, but will look more deeply into the argument prompted by Richard Little, that the modern conception of the balance of power embodies two distinct traditions of thought. The first, an adversarial tradition, depicts political actors in competitive and self-interest terms.[104] In the second tradition, the associative tradition assumes that in a balance of power, political actors can be co-operative and pursue policies which embrace the interest of others. In modern IR literature, the associative approach of balance of power is seen in the works of Martin Wight and Hedley Bull.

The central question addressed in this thesis is whether 'crisis management' provides a way of understanding regional security systems in Southeast Asia and if it does, what types of security systems are they? The term 'crisis management' itself comprises two traditional thoughts of balance of power. The term 'crisis' can be associated with the result of an escalation of an 'adversarial balance of power' while 'management' can be associated with a relationship within an 'associative balance of power'. Therefore, these two traditional approaches to balance of power are applied in ASEAN's crisis management.

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101 A.F.K. Organski, 2nd edn, *World Politics*, New York: Knopf, 1968.
102 Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations, Metaphors, Myths and Models*.
103 Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations, Metaphors, Myths and Models*.
104 Little, *The Balance of Power in International Relations, Metaphors, Myths and Models*.

B. Balancing in the Asia Pacific

The conceptualisation of a 'balance of power' in the Asia Pacific has been widely discussed. Paul Dibb, for example, refers to a balance situation as one where no one power is in a position to determine the fate of others.[105] He claims that Asia's future will be determined by cooperation and peaceful interaction between China, Japan, India, Russia and the US. He also contends that even though there are established regional security organisations, such as the ARF, new emerging transnational issues such as climate change, scarce resources, an ageing population, greater expenditure on arms and nuclear weapons could change the situation. He argues that potential shifts in the regional balance of power will carry uncertain results as the interaction of great powers in the Asia Pacific region is still unstable.[106] Thus, Dibb reasserts, 'it is time to challenge ASEAN's complacency in this regard'.[107]

Susan Shirk, on the other hand, doubts the future of the effectiveness of a balancing system in the Asia Pacific. She postulates that the prospect for managing multipolar relations among four major powers in the Asia Pacific region (the US, Japan, China and Russia) by balance of power methods is not good.[108] Her argument is supported by Chinese scholar Ji Guoxing who contends that:

> In the Asia-Pacific a new stable relationship among the big countries has not yet emerged and there is disequilibrium in international relations. Relations among the US, Japan, Russia and China have decisive effects on the stability of the whole Asia-Pacific.[109]

These relations are subject to overall adjustment and a stable relationship among the four will not likely emerge soon. Now that multipolarity has returned to the Asia Pacific, Shirk believes that balance of power methods are likely to fail.[110] Shirk reasserts that due to multipolar dynamics in the Asia Pacific replacing bipolarity, a balancing system is too problematic. Multipolar balances are problematic because:

> Greater complexity breeds a greater risk of miscalculation because of mistaken estimates of relative power and different interpretations of history; miscalculations can also be caused by confusion about the commitment of coalition partners to deter an aggressive state; countervailing coalitions are likely to form too slowly to deter an aggressive state; and shifting alliances inhibit cooperation among coalition partners. [111]

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[105] Paul Dibb, *The Future Balance of Power in East Asia; what are the Geopolitical Risk, SDSC Working Paper,* No. 406, January 2008, pp. 1-12.
[106] Dibb, 'The Future Balance of Power in East Asia'.
[107] Dibb, 'The Future Balance of Power in East Asia', p. 11
[108] Susan Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?' in David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds, *Regional Orders: Building and Security in a New World,* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 245-270, pp. 262-264.
[109] Ji Guoxing (1994) quoted in Shirk, 'Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers', p. 251.
[110] Shirk, 'Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?'
[111] Shirk, 'Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?' p. 251.

If Shirk sees that the balance of power is eroding in the Asia Pacific region, Acharya sees it is also eroding in Southeast Asia.[112] Whether or not balance of power applies in Southeast Asia is discussed in Chapter 3, 4, and 5.

C. Southeast Asia: Does a Balance of Power Operate?

It is also important to make a distinction between the balance of power dynamics among ASEAN member states and the balance of external great power influence in Southeast Asia and between the associative and the adversarial balance of power as illustrated in Figure 2.1. Among scholars who apply the balance of power theory in the Southeast Asian context are Leifer, Emmers, Robert Ross, Evelyn Goh, and John David Ciorciari. Leifer argues that the balance of power is relevant to an examination of ASEAN and ARF. Leifer does not investigate the balance of power factor only in terms of adversarial relations and self-help. Instead, he combines realist perspectives and neo-Grotian understandings. He is sceptical of the potential role of either ASEAN or ARF, both of which he argues, should be viewed as 'a modest contribution to a viable balance or distribution of power within the Asia Pacific by other than traditional means'.[113]

FIGURE 2.1
Balance of Power in Southeast Asia

Source: Adapted by author from Little 2007 and Ciarciori 2009

Emmers adds to Leifer's argument by stating that balance of power dynamics are at work in the Southeast Asia region.[114] These dynamics were the key factor in the foundation of ASEAN and have developed in significance as ASEAN has grown. The balance of power factor, according to Emmers, was significant on the occasions of the Third Indochina conflict, the integration of Brunei Darussalam, the South China Sea conflict and the establishment of the ARF.[115] He further contends that in Southeast Asia,

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[112] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.*
[113] Michael Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending Model of Regional Security', *Adelphi Paper*, 302, 1996, p. 21.
[114] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia*, pp. 40-84.
[115] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia.*

the balance of power and cooperative security can coexist and complement each other. In his opinion, a cooperative security model depends on and cannot exclude the balance of power factor. It is Emmers' view that ASEAN was established because of efforts to prevent Indonesia's hegemony and as the organisation develops, the feelings of mistrust, bilateral disputes and contradictory strategies among its members push them to become dependent on external guarantees to ensure individual security [116] In short, the balance of power factor in Southeast Asia, for Emmers, is demonstrated in the region's rejection of 'intra-mural hegemony' and its 'countervailing responses to external threats'.[117]

While Leifer and Emmers do not separate clearly the concept of 'balance of power' from the 'balance of influence' in examining Southeast Asia, Ciorciari clearly divides 'balance of power' and 'balance of great power influence'.[118] He contends that the security system in Southeast Asia is 'a multi-dimensional balance that is relatively resilient and places significant constraints on any external power's ability to exercise unwanted dominance in the region'.[119] Emmers calls this the 'promotion of countervailing response of external threats'.[120] Ciorciari argues that Southeast Asia's security system does represent the dynamics of balance of external great power influence. Like Leifer and Emmers, he sees that external great powers have contributed significantly to the course of Southeast Asian affairs. However, unlike the other two authors who emphasise the role of military muscle as the key to the balance of power dynamics in Southeast Asia, Ciorciari examines four key dimensions of the aggregate balance of external great power influence in the region: the military, economic, institutional and ideational balances.[121]

Ciarciori claims that the establishment of multilateralism, such as ARF, is part of the region's effort to achieve such a balance and refers to it as an 'institutional balancing'.[122] He further argues that institutions in Southeast Asia are used as a 'playing' field among states with different material power capabilities.[123] Emmers and Leifer also take a similar view. Leifer argues that ARF is best viewed as 'valuable adjunct(s) to the working of the balance of power in helping to deny dominance to a rising power with hegemonic potential'.[124] Multilateralism in Southeast Asia therefore, is used as a site where small or 'middle powers' can challenge China and the US. Goh also sees the

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[116] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia.*
[117] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia*, pp. 52-53.
[118] Ciorciari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence'.
[119] Ciorciari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence', p. 157.
[120] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia*, pp. 53.
[121] Ciorciari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence', p. 158.
[122] Ciorciari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence', p. 175-182.
[123] Ciorciari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence'.
[124] Leifer, 'The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending Model of Regional Security', *Adelphi Paper*, 302, 1996, p. 21.

institutional balance as important in Southeast Asia. She agrees that ASEAN members have tried to 'institutionalise major power balancing'.[125] Institutions are mechanisms by which Southeast Asian countries have attempted to bring about an 'associative' balance of influence in the region.[126]

In contrast to these three scholars, Acharya challenges the relevance of the balance of power and other classical realist concepts in the discourse. Acharya argues that the balance of power is actually a concept of gradually eroding importance in Asia, because 'Asia is increasingly able to manage its insecurity through shared norms, rising economic interdependence and growing institutional linkages'.[127]

David Kang and Martin Stuart-Fox take a similar view to Acharya's that the concept of balance of power is gradually eroding in Southeast Asia. Kang contends that countries in Southeast Asia are generally 'bandwagoning' rather than 'balancing' external powers,[128] while Stuart-Fox argues that Southeast Asian states prefer to develop 'bilateral regimes' than 'balancing coalitions'.[129] For Kang, Southeast Asian states are generally pursuing accommodative strategies towards China because 'Asia has different historical traditional, geographic, political realities and cultural traditions than the West, where realist IR theories were born.'[130] Therefore, Southeast Asian countries are generally 'bandwagoning' rather than 'balancing' China. China is the gravitational centre of Asia and the East Asia order will be more hierarchical in the future.[131] Meanwhile, Stuart-Fox argues that for Southeast Asian countries, clear alignments are too confrontational and provocative.[132] Strong alignments can be seen as being against the essence of Southeast Asian 'strategic culture', which has tended to view robust alliances as unwise. Therefore, Southeast Asian countries tend to avoid balancing coalitions. Stuart-Fox quotes the late Ali Alatas, the former Indonesian Foreign Minister who refers to non-alignment as 'the moral alternative to polarizing alliance blocs'.[133]

I argue that in investigating the balance of power in Southeast Asia, Emmers overlooks cases that are not of major interest to these external guarantees or great powers outside

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[125] Evelyn Goh, 'Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing regional security strategies', *International Security*, 32:3, 2007/08, pp. 113-157, p. 144.
[126] Goh, 'Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia', p. 144.
[127] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community*, p. 150.
[128] David Kang, 'Getting Asia Wrong: the Need for New Analytical Frameworks', *International Security*, 72:4, p. 66-85
[129] Martin Stuart-Fox, 'Southeast Asia and China: the role of history and culture in shaping future relations', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 26:1, pp. 131-136.
[130] Kang, 'Getting Asia wrong', p. 67.
[131] Kang, 'Getting Asia wrong', p. 68.
[132] Stuart-Fox, "Southeast Asia and China: the role of history and culture in shaping future relations', p. 132.
[133] Stuart-Fox, "Southeast Asia and China: the role of history and culture in shaping future relations', p. 132.

the region. Some non-traditional security threats in Southeast Asia, such as smoke haze, the spread of SARS/Bird Flu, the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami, and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis are difficult to see as a reflection of balance of power dynamics or as attractive to great powers' interests. ASEAN's cooperation over the management of smoke haze problems is an example. It reflects genuine efforts to address a problem of haze in Indonesia which affected other countries in Southeast Asia. I argue that claims made by Leifer and Emmers that balance of power dynamics contribute more to regional security than does ASEAN's cooperation are also misleading. ASEAN's cooperation has successfully prevented the region from erupting into open conflict or war. Both Leifer and Emmers also fail to respond to critiques from neo-liberal institutionalists, such as Hurrel, who argue that balance of power dynamics only matter during the initial phase of regionalism and disappears in its later development.[134]

It is dangerous to see multilateralism only as an effort to achieve a balance. There is a 'balancing' part being played there, but it is not only about balance. Countries in Southeast Asia used multilateralism to pursue their national interests, and not necessarily to balance other countries in the region or to balance great-power influence. Multilateral forums like the ARF, APEC and ASEAN Plus Three were not established in order to balance external powers either. If they were established for the purpose to balance external powers, as argued by Ciarcioari, Emmers and Leifer, it is not proven that ASEAN members can really shape the interaction between the US and China in these forums. Furthermore, the sheer number of meetings among ASEAN officials — now close to 500 per year — has created an expectation of cooperative behaviour, including peaceful management of issues as they arise.

Ciarciori also refers to the efforts to implement norms in Southeast Asia as 'ideational balance'.[135] He agrees that ASEAN is used as a place to influence the development of norms of democracy and human rights. In that sense, Ciarciori seems to be confusing the term 'influence' with 'balance'. Democratic countries like Indonesia and the Philippines, have indeed been trying to impress the norms of democracy and human rights on other member countries of ASEAN, particularly Myanmar, and persuaded other countries to agree to include these norms in the ASEAN Charter.[136] However, this does not mean that they are trying to 'balance' the norms of democracy and human rights with other norms, such as authoritarian principles.

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[134] See Andrew Hurrell, 'Foreword to the Third Edition: The Anarchical Society 25 Years On', in Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Palgrave, 1977.
[135] Ciarcioari, 'The Balance of Great-Power Influence', p. 176.
[136] Interview with senior level of officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.

In relation to external great powers, historically there were cases where great powers influenced ASEAN member countries, but their influence did not involve attempts to balance power with each other. Here, instead of a balance of external great power influence, the importance of one or more great powers' influence on one or more ASEAN member states is recognised. In short, the concept of 'balance of power' should be used cautiously, and be neither exaggerated nor underestimated.

The argument pursued above does not imply that this thesis will exclude the balance of power option from the nature of the security systems in Southeast Asia. Instead, this study will investigate to what extent the security system in the region reflects the balance of power dynamics by using crisis management as an indicator. It will also seek to answer to what extent the region is associated with the balance of power dynamics among Southeast Asian countries and with the balance of external great-power influence. Further, it will canvass which crisis shows evidence of an adversarial balance of power and which crisis shows an associative balance of power, if balance of power was operating.

In summary, few scholars attempt to link the concept of balance of power in Southeast Asia to ASEAN's crisis management. In the introduction, it was shown that Leifer uses the Cambodian crisis to conclude that the security system in Southeast Asia is based on the dynamics of balance of power. Emmers utilises some cases, but only two of them can be really referred to as crises: the Cambodian crisis and the South China Sea crisis. Other scholars whose work is reviewed here, such as Ciorciari, Kang, and Stuart-Fox do not apply crisis management in explaining the security system in Southeast Asia. Hence, this thesis will follow other historical literature mentioned earlier and use the management of three crises as an indicator, thus developing an interesting way of analysing the security system in Southeast Asia. Therefore, it will hopefully contribute to the literature on crisis management and balance of power, particularly in Southeast Asia.

2.5. Conceptualising a Concert of Powers

This section reviews the literature on the concept of a concert of powers. I argue that understanding the nature of Southeast Asia in terms of a concert of powers is worth examining for several reasons. First, theories of concert-like behaviour can be applied not only in the international system but also in regional contexts. Second, Southeast Asia faces many issues that can be potentially dealt with by a concert of powers model. Third, a concert of powers does not necessarily require spheres of influence. Finally, the existence of a concert of powers in Southeast Asia can be determined by how ASEAN manages its crises. I further argue that a concert of powers may be indicated in

Southeast Asia if dominant powers within the region share 'equal responsibilities' in managing crises.

The literature on concert of powers can be divided into three groups. The first body of literature examines the Concert of Europe which took place in Europe in the 19th century (particularly between 1815 and 1854, although some historians argue that it remained in existence until 1914). The second body of literature investigates the possibility of a concert of powers in the Post Cold War era. The third explores the chances of establishing a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific. None of the literature examines Southeast Asia as a concert of powers, and this thesis proposes to fill that gap.

The Concert of Europe was established at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and managed inter-state relations in Europe between 1815 and the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. The Concert's members were the great European powers of the day: Prussia, Austria, Great Britain and Russia (France joined in 1818). The literature establishes that there are six special requirements for great powers to establish a concert of powers, based on the experience of the Concert of Europe, namely: (i) common rights and responsibilities; (ii) special managerial roles; (iii) formal and common consent; (iv) conceptual norms; (v) protection of small powers; and (vi) a relationship management among themselves. Ian Clark emphasises four requirements: common rights and responsibilities, formal and common consent, special managerial roles and management of relations among great powers. Clark asserts that there are two principles in the Concert of Europe: (i) the great powers had a common responsibility for maintaining the peace treaties of 1815 and for solving the problems that arose in Europe; and (ii) when the status quo had to be modified or a problem had to be settled, changes should not be made unilaterally and rewards should not be made without their formal and common consent.[137] He argues that the significance of the concert lies in its elaboration of diplomatic conduct for the great powers. The importance of the concert derives from two inter-related ideas: first, the formal assertion of the unique privileges and responsibilities of the great powers in the maintenance of international order; and second, if the special managerial role of the great powers was to be recognised, it would be necessary to order the relationships more formally between the powers themselves.[138]

The responsibilities and the managerial role of the great powers in the maintenance of international order have been highlighted by historians of the period. Of the former,

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[137] Francis H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963, p. 225 quoted in Ian Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
[138] Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order.*

Elrod has observed that 'concert diplomacy' actively cultivated the conception of the great powers as a unique and special peer group.[139] This is quite similar to Albrecht-Carrie's argument that 'order could best be maintained by the clear assertion of the right and responsibility of those possessed of power, the great powers'. [140] Of the latter, Elrod has likewise drawn attention to the concert as 'a conceptual norm among the great powers of the proper and permissible aims and methods of international politics' or more simply put, the Concert as a 'group norm'.

Medlicott also adds another element of concert diplomacy, which is 'protection of the small powers'.[141] He is of the opinion that a concert could serve as a means of protection of the smaller powers by the great powers, and a concert could serve as a means of preserving peace by preventing war between the great powers themselves. A concert of powers, therefore, is of the powers, and between the powers.[142]

The second body of literature involves scholars who were inspired by the example of the Concert of Europe, such as: Robert Jervis, Risto Pentillä, John Kirton, Charles and Clifford Kupchan, Richard Rosecrance, and Benjamin Miller. They suggest that such a model might be appropriate in the post Cold War world: Charles and Clifford Kupchan argue that a new concert made up of the US, Russia, Britain, France and Germany may bring a stable collective security regime to Europe.[143] Rosecrance similarly calls for a global concert, with the US, China, Russia, Japan, and the European Community as its members.[144] Others, such as Pentillä and Kirton, argue that the G7 or G8 already fulfils this kind of role. [145] Miller, among this group of scholars, suggests that there are two types of concert. One focuses on the mutual restraint which typifies the relationship between major powers in a concert. Here the powers define their own interests, to some degree, in terms of the larger common good. Miller calls this a 'passive concert', in which each of the great powers still behaves as an individual actor, but acts in a more moderate way.[146] The second type of concert refers to an arrangement where great powers are more active as regulators of the international system, and in their

[139] Richard.B Elrod, 'The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System', *World Politics*, 8:2, 1976, pp. 159-174, p. 167.

[140] R. Albrecht-Carrie, *The Concert of Europe 1815-1914*, Harper, 1968, p.5 quoted in Ian Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 79.

[141] W.N. Medlicott, *Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe*, Athlone Press, 1956, p. 18 quoted in Ian Clark, *Reform and Resistance in the International Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 79.

[142] W.N. Medlicott, *Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe*, Athlone Press. 1956.

[143] Clifford Kupchan and Charles Kupchan, 'Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe', *International Security*, 16:11, 1991, pp. 114-161.

[144] Richard Rosecrance, 'A New Concert of Powers', *Foreign Affairs*, 71:2, 1992, pp. 64-82.

[145] See John Kirton, 'The Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, the G-7 and the Halifax Summit', *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 3:1, 1995 and Kirton, *The Seven Power Sumit As an International Concert*, available at http://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/html/1807/4855/kcon1.htm (accessed on 26 October 2009). See also Risto E.J. Pentillä, 'The G8 as a Concert of Powers', *Adelphi Papers*, 43:355, 2003, pp. 17-32.

[146] Benjamin Miller, 'Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts', *Review of International Studies*, 20:4, 1994, pp. 327-348, p. 329.

relationships with smaller powers in the system. This 'regulatory concert' stresses the great powers' 'co-managerial responsibilities for maintaining peace and stability and resolving disputes'.[147] It is also more collective and more demanding. [148]

Some scholars view a concert as a formal institution, while others perceive it as informal. For some, the key to a concert lies in its attempt to formalise international politics, to systematise a spontaneous balance of power situation. For others, by contrast, the keynote of a concert is its informal nature, to the point where its very existence has been called into question. Pentillä, for example, focuses on whether the collaboration of great powers is temporary or permanent; he also divides concerts into two types. The first is a temporary concert or a 'concert with a small 'c''.[149] It is typically set up to seek a solution to a particular crisis. Therefore, it has a mandate: to find a solution and then dissolve. There are various examples of this type of concert. The four largest European Union (EU) members that met in London on 4 November 2001 to coordinate their response to the 'war on terror' could be regarded as such a concert. Pentillä also mentions that the Contact Group set up to resolve the crises in Herzegovina, Kosovo and Namibia as another example of this kind of concert.[150] The second form of concert is a permanent Concert or a 'concert with a capital 'C''. [151] It is a great-power coalition which is involved in long-term joint management. It is aimed at maintaining international order and justice, promoting growth and ensuring the sustainability of the financial system. Such a concert, according to Pentillä, is represented by the G8.[152]

Finally, a third body of scholars examines the possibility of establishing a concert of powers in the Asia and Asia Pacific regions. Among these scholars, Shirk and Michael Wesley are strong proponents of the idea of an Asia Pacific concert of powers, while Nicholas Khoo and Michael Smith are sceptical of this idea. Acharya, Ayson, Goh and Brian Job see the possibility of an Asia Pacific concert of powers with some limitations. Shirk, a State Department official during the Clinton Administration, argues that in order to avoid offending regional sensitivities, the objectives of an Asia Pacific concert would have to be modest. She suggests a regional concert could have two goals: first, to 'regulate relations between the major powers'; and second, 'to prevent conflicts between other regional states from provoking a major conflict between the great powers'.[153] She argues that, at a minimum, the concert would establish a norm that the powers would not intervene militarily in conflicts between smaller states. A regional

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[147] Miller, 'Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts', p. 330.
[148] Miller, 'Explaining the Emergence of Great Power Concerts'.
[149] Pentillä, *The G8 as a Concert of Powers*, p. 18.
[150] Pentillä, *The G8 as a Concert of Powers*.
[151] Pentillä, *The G8 as a Concert of Powers*, p. 19.
[152] Pentillä, *The G8 as a Concert of Powers*.
[153] Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?', p. 252.

concert of powers comprising of China, Japan, Russia and the US would, according to Shirk, be more workable than a larger body. However she realises that an Asia Pacific concert would not attempt to provide security for all the states in the region.[154] Instead it would establish a norm that powers can not intervene militarily in conflicts among the less powerful states. Some crises among small and middle powers might erupt without precipitating a response from the concert. This distinguishes Shirk's model from the Concert of Europe. In an Asia Pacific concert, great powers could not dictate to small and medium powers, instead they would have to recognise the much greater autonomy of small and middle powers in the international system.[155]

At a Sydney conference held in December 2009, an idea for an Asia Pacific concert of powers was proposed by Australia and reiterated by the former Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy, Michael Wesley. Wesley stated that an Asia Pacific concert of powers could bring together eight of the biggest powers of the Asia Pacific — the US, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Indonesia, and Australia, all of which are members of the G20. [156] Wesley's certainly provoked criticism particularly from Asia Pacific countries that were not included either in the G20 or in the concert, such as Thailand. A senior level Thai officer said that the idea of an Asia Pacific concert was in line with Kevin Rudd's idea of an Asia Pacific community, which according to him was really disappointing for Thailand as Thailand is one of the most influential and important countries in Southeast Asia but was not invited or consulted.[157] He also said that some ASEAN member countries were reluctant to accept that idea.[158]

In contrast to the idea of a concert, Khoo and Smith claim that the existing reality of American dominance in the Asia Pacific is far more viable than a concert of powers.[159] They argue that the proposal for a formalised Concert of Asia along the lines of the Concert of Europe appears to have little to do with the inherent condition of the region's international relations.[160] Khoo and Smith argue that ASEAN nations would not accept such an idea as they either suspect it of harbouring designs to impose

[154] Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?'.
[155] Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?'.
[156] Amitav Acharya, 'Asia Pacific Security: a Concert or What?' paper for the Pacific Forum CSIS Pacnet, 12 March 2010, pp. 1-4, available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/ascdf3_acharya.pdf (accessed on 30 June 2010).
[157] Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, 21 February 2011.
[158] Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, Bangkok, 21 February 2011.
[159] Nicholas Khoo and Michael L. Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific: a Concert of Asia or a Clear Pecking Order?' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 56:1, 2002.
[160] Khoo and Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific'.

traditional patterns of dominance by China or have still not totally forgiven acts committed by Japan.[161] They see little to recommend a Concert of Asia in practice.[162]

Between these contrasting views, scholars like Ayson, Acharya, Job, and Goh, see some prospect of establishing a concert in the Asia Pacific while acknowledging that this idea has some limitations. Ayson argues that the Six Party Talks (SPT) could offer a bridge to an Asian concert of powers. He suggests that such a concert would be a process of great power collaboration which would create expectations that the major powers can sit down together and seek to manage problems.[163] While Ayson focuses on examining the SPT, Acharya notes that the recent occurrence of bilateral summits between the region's four 'great powers' — the US, China, Japan and Russia — could, like the Concert of Europe, be formalised into a system able to contain rivalry, maintain order and preserve peace.[164]

However, Acharya admits that the notion of an Asia Pacific concert has several limitations.[165] First, an Asia Pacific concert is seen more as venue for moderating the major powers' rivalry than in developing a joint approach on their part to other regional issues.[166] Second, 'if an Asian concert is to emerge, it will not resemble the classic nineteenth century European varieties', and it will be characterised by cross-cutting bilateral channels, with occasional alternative asides from *ad hoc* multilateral consultations.[167] Finally, Acharya argues that a concert approach in Asia is likely to be more relevant in managing security issues in North-east Asia than in Southeast or South Asia, as Southeast Asia is less central to external great power relations and the external great powers' involvement in South Asia may produce declaratory commitments and some complementary parallel measures.[168] Acharya echoes Job's argument that even if a fully-fledged and institutionalised concert is unlikely to emerge in the region, less formal patterns of cooperation, including 'concerting behaviour' and 'ad hoc consultations among major powers' are already evident.[169]

Another critique Acharya makes in response to Wesley's statement at the Sydney Conference is related to Wesley envisaging an Asia Pacific concert that includes the region's 'smaller states as well as the great powers'.[170] Acharya asserts that concerts by

[161] Khoo and Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific'.
[162] Khoo and Smith, 'The Future of American Hegemony in the Asia Pacific'.
[163] Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?'
[164] Acharya, 'Asia Pacific Security: Community, Concert or What?'.
[165] Amitav Acharya, 'Recording Asia: "Cooperative Security" or "Concert of Powers"?', *IDSS Working Paper Series,* No.3. July 1999, pp. 1-25.
[166] Acharya, 'Recording Asia'.
[167] Acharya, 'Recording Asia', p. 20.
[168] Acharya, 'Recording Asia'.
[169] Brian L. Job, 'A Matter of Delicate Diplomacy: Prospect for a Concert of Power in the Asia Pacific', Paper presented at the 1996 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Diego, USA, September 1996.
[170] Acharya, 'Asia-Pacific Security: Community, Concert or What', p. 1.

definition either exclude smaller nations or reduce them to the status of objects, rather than subjects, of a regional diplomatic system.[171]

Goh argues that the basic principles of a concert of powers are applicable in a 'duet' of power between the United States and China.[172] A potential duet between Washington and Beijing would, Goh suggests, involve four aspects: (i) spheres of influence, (ii) power distribution, (iii) exercise of power through the use of force, and (iv) modes of conflict management that involving territorial change by consensus, multilateral conference diplomacy and restraint of minor allies by each great power.[173] Goh claims that the major characteristic of a concert of power is the acceptance of sphere of influence. [174] The evolution of the concept of a concert of powers from Concert of Europe to a possible Southeast Asian concert of powers is illustrated in Figure 2.2.

FIGURE 2.2
Evolution of Concert of Powers: Concert of Europe to Southeast Asia?

Concert of Europe ⟶ Concert of Powers ⟶ Asia Pacific Concert of
Post Cold War Era Powers: Pros and Cons

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Southeast Asia
Concert of Powers?

Source: Compiled by author

A. Why a Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia?

The literature discussed in the previous section does not address Southeast Asia as a region in which the dynamic of 'concert diplomacy' could work. Yet, in the 2003 ASEAN Concord II, ASEAN member states reaffirmed the organisation as a concert:

> **REAFFIRMING** that ASEAN is a concert of Southeast Asian nations, bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community of caring societies, committed to upholding cultural diversity and social harmony. [175]

The absence of comment in the literature on a concert of powers in Southeast Asia is understandable because the scholars reviewed earlier do not go beyond the accepted definition of 'great powers' constituting a concert. Most of these scholars refer to the US,

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[171] Acharya, 'Asia-Pacific Security: Community, Concert or What'.
[172] Evelyn Goh, 'US Strategic Relations with a Rising China: Trajectories and Impacts on Asia-Pacific Security', in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, eds, *The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia,* London: Routledge, 2009, p. 69.
[173] Goh, 'US Strategic Relations with a Rising China', pp. 69-79.
[174] Goh, 'US Strategic Relations with a Rising China'.
[175] ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) available at http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii (accessed on 3 November 2012). As of December 2012, the ASEAN Secretariat's website has been reconstructed. Some of the links cited in this thesis may have been changed. The main link for the Secretariat's website is www.aseansec.org.

China, Germany, France, and England (some also include Russia, Japan, and India) as existing great powers. I argue, however, that the concept of 'great powers' can be applied not only in the international system, but also in regional systems.

My argument rests on four points. First, theories of concert-like behaviour are indeed applicable to regional systems, such as the Asia Pacific, Europe, America, Africa or a smaller region, such as Northeast Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Susan Shirk, for example, although conceding that a Concert of Europe was in effect a global management system, asserts that theories of concert-like behaviour can be applied in regional systems. [176] Brian L. Job also argues that a concert can exist in both global and regional systems. [177] Furthermore, Rosecrance and Peter Schott cite a concert of Western powers as an example of a regional concert of powers. They argue that a regional concert of Western powers continued to function after 1945-1947 and preceded the bipolar alliance in that it offered the Soviet Union membership (in the Marshall Plan) in 1947. When the Soviet Union refused, the regional concert became an alliance (NATO).[178]

Although Acharya and Ayson imply in their arguments that there is no great power in Asia, except China, and therefore a concert of powers in the Asia Pacific has many limitations, a counter-argument is raised here. If a comparison of power is carried out within a smaller region, it is possible to identify comparatively great powers and small powers within that region, so it could be argued that China is a 'great power' in Northeast Asia while Indonesia is a 'great power' in Southeast Asia. Importantly, Douglas Lemke, separates power hierarchy into global hierarchy and local hierarchy.[179] Within a local hierarchy, one can measure and compare the power of countries and see whether or not the great powers in the local hierarchy have conducted 'concert diplomacy'.

Second, Acharya claims that a concert approach is likely to be more relevant in managing security issues in Northeast Asia than Southeast Asia or South Asia.[180] He claims that Southeast Asian issues are less central to external great power relations. In contrast to Acharya, I argue that Southeast Asia actually has a large range of serious issues to be managed such as terrorism, transnational crimes, border disputes, and environmental threats. They are central to both global great powers and local dominant

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[176] Shirk, 'Asia-Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?'.
[177] Brian L. Job, 'Matters of Multilateralism: Implications for Regional Conflict Management', in Lake and Morgan, eds, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*.
[178] Richard Rosecrance and Peter Schott, 'Concerts and Regional Intervention', in Lake and Morgan, eds, *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World*.
[179] Douglas Lemke's theory will be further elaborated in the section 'Identifying Great Powers in Southeast Asia.
[180] Acharya: 'Recording Asia'.

powers. The issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia is considered seriously by the US. The multi faceted maritime issue in the Malacca Strait is a big problem for China, Japan and the US because any disturbance in the Strait may disrupt access to their imports. South China Sea issues have also drawn the attention of the external great powers to the region. These issues could easily escalate to a wider confrontation if they are not well managed. For local dominant powers, these issues are considered to be serious and need to be handled. However, this thesis will focus on the 'local dominant power relations' instead of 'global great power relations' in examining a concert of powers in Southeast Asia. This will be further explained in the next section.

Third, Goh contends that a major characteristic of a concert system is spheres of influence in the system across which other powers are not expected to intrude. Members of a concert of powers, I argue, do not necessarily have to possess spheres of influence. If, as argued earlier, the Six Party Talks, the Contact Group (to resolve the crises in Herzegovina, Kosovo and Namibia), the G-20, and G-7 or G-8 are models of a concert system, then not every member of the groups has a sphere of influence. Within the Six Party Talks, for example, Japan does not have a sphere of influence. Within the G-20, South Korea does not have a sphere of influence. The European concert system indeed demonstrated that Great Britain and Russia had spheres of influence, but it is difficult to draw generalisations from the European case for Southeast Asia or any other region. The spheres of influence factor, therefore, will not be used as an indicator of a concert system in this thesis because the concept is not applicable to Southeast Asia.

Finally, whether Southeast Asia can be regarded as a concert of powers or not can be measured by how ASEAN manages its crises. Do the 'dominant powers' in Southeast Asia sit together to resolve crises or did any single country act vigorously in managing the crises? Do 'small/status-quo powers' give special rights and responsibilities or special managerial roles to their 'dominant power' fellows? Or do 'dominant powers' in Southeast Asia act as if they are given such roles? The answers to these questions will provide evidence as to whether the dynamic of the security system in Southeast Asia reflects a concert of powers or not. Therefore this thesis will further examine the linkage between the management of crises by ASEAN member states and a Southeast Asian concert of powers.

B. Identifying Regional Powers in Southeast Asia

In this section, I start with establishing the foundation for my arguments by reviewing the literature on powers, great powers, and dominant powers. I then classify powers in Southeast Asia according to whether they are economic or military power, and based on on Lemke's theory of regional dominant powers. I argue that Indonesia, Singapore,

Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines can be considered as regional dominant powers in Southeast Asia.

A considerable amount of literature in international politics has analysed and debated international great power politics. Balance of power theorists argue that an equality of power among nations tends to discourage war.[181] Others, however, believe that power transitions and hegemonic declines tend to lead to great power conflicts.[182] These theorists claim that differential rates of growth in power between the dominant state and a challenger lead the challenger to overtake its rival. During such periods of power transition, characterised by an approximately equal distribution of power, conflict is very likely.[183]

Other scholars focus on the means for boosting national power. Most and Starr emphasise the importance of foreign policy 'substitutability'.[184] A nation can augment its national capabilities through the internal build-up of military strength or through alliance formation. Others, such as Waltz, also suggest that each nation's power can be boosted through external and internal means. The growth and expansion of a nation's economy and population, increases in military strength, and the development of military strategies fall into the category of 'internal means'. Alignment and realignment of nations, by strengthening and enlarging a nation's alliances or by weakening and shrinking any opposition, fall into the category of external means of increasing national power.[185]

The process of great power emergence is underpinned by the fact that the economic (and technological and military) power of states grows at differential, not parallel rates. The emergence of regional powers is also underpinned by the differential growth rates. The process is similar for regional powers, although their scope is only regional instead of international and world-wide. However, the power transition in a region does not always lead to conflict or crisis.

For the purpose of identifying regional dominant powers in Southeast Asia, in this thesis I will use the multiple hierarchy model theory developed by Douglas Lemke and key economic and military indicators as measures of power.[186] The multiple hierarchy model theory suggests the international power hierarchy has nested within it localised

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[181] See Claude, *Power and International Relations*, and Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*.
[182] See Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1981; and A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
[183] Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*. See also A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*.
[184] Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, *Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1986, p. 98.
[185] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York: Random House, 1979.
[186] Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

power hierarchies operating within minor power regions of the overall international system. This theory is an extended theory of the power transition theory which argues that in the international hierarchy, at the top sits the dominant power, the most powerful state in the system.[187] The dominant power supervises the informal patterns and the rules of interstate interaction labelled the 'status quo'. It also carries out these tasks because it benefits from the status quo. To the extent that other states are similar to the dominant state, they too get benefits from the status quo and are satisfied with it.[188] Lemke further argues that 'states disadvantaged by the status quo are dissatisfied and if their efforts at development are successful, such that they come to rival the dominant state in power, the probability of conflicts among the great powers for control of the international system is expected to rise dramatically'.[189]

In the multiple hierarchy theory, Lemke separates hierarchy into international hierarchy and local hierarchy.[190] In the international hierarchy, powers are divided into global dominant powers, global status quo powers and global dissatisfied status quo powers, while in the local hierarchy powers are divided into local dominant powers, local status quo powers and local dissatisfied powers.[191] Local dominant powers are fighting for control of the status quo of their local hierarchies and fight for the privilege to write the rules governing important local elements of their relations with each other.[192] In the context of Southeast Asia, Vietnam could be regarded as a dissatisfied status quo power because it wanted to change the system to give it more benefits. This was shown when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia. Indonesia could also be labelled as a 'dissatisfied state' when it engaged in confrontation with Malaysia and forced East Timor to become part of its territory. However Indonesia could be more appropriately categorised as a dominant power that was dissatisfied and wanted to gain more benefits. Nowadays, the political situation is relatively more stable, and Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore can be regarded as dominant powers, while Vietnam can be referred to as a status quo power. The reasons for this assessment will be explained below.

A state is dissatisfied if it is willing to use force to try to alter the status quo. States may be dissatisfied with the status quo for a number of reasons. First, the existing informal rules in the system may disadvantage the dissatisfied status quo power, when it is receiving no direct benefits from the rules. Second, states may be dissatisfied because they employ different domestic institutions for the allocation of values in their societies

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[187] Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace.*
[188] Lemke, *Regios of War and Peace.*
[189] Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace,* p. 27.
[190] Lemke, *Regios of War and Peace.*
[191] Lemke, *Regios of War and Peace.*
[192] Lemke, *Regios of War and Peace.*

from those used by the dominant powers. [193]I argue that in the current system there is no dissatisfied status quo power in Southeast Asia. Myanmar may be dissatisfied, but it has not shown any willingness to use force to try to alter its status in the region. It utilised force domestically instead of externally in order to change its status quo status. The other states are similar in domestic composition and international outlook to the dominant powers and they are satisfied with the rules employed by dominant powers. [194] They are labelled as status quo powers. In Southeast Asia, these characteristics fit Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar. As a new member of ASEAN, Vietnam could arguably also be labelled as a status quo power.

To complement the use of Lemke's multiple hierarchy model theory, I will also use some key economic and military indicators (particularly defence expenditure and military manpower) to measure the power of ASEAN member countries. Many scholars, such as Arbertman and Kugler, and Merritt and Zinnes, argue that economic indicators, including Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are valuable measures of power. Among power transition researchers GDP, often weighted by the efficiency of the government of the state, is the most commonly used measure of national capabilities. National product is preferred by power transition researchers because of the theory's focus on domestic and demographic factors as the basis of power. GDP measures have emerged as empirically the most robust and most plausible. The studies by Kugler and Arbertman, and Merritt and Zinnes have demonstrated that GDP measures of power are highly correlated.[195]

Based on these key economic and military capabilities which are analysed using Lemke's classification of power, I argue that Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are local dominant powers, while Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar are local status quo powers. The Philippines cannot be categorised as dominant in terms of economic and military capabilities. However, in terms of ideas and roles in managing crises, it can be referred to as one of the local dominant powers. This will be further explained in the case study chapters (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). The economic and military indicators of ASEAN member countries are set out in Tables 2.2. 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.

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[193] Robert Powell, *In the Shadow of Power,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999 quoted in Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace.*
[194] Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace.*
[195] Kugler, Arbertman and Merrit and Zinnes offer a detailed discussion on GDP as measures of power. Their explanation can be seen in Marina Arbertman and Jacek Kugler, *Political Capacity and Economic Behaviour,* Boulder: Westview Press, 1997 and Richard Merritt and Dina Zinnes, 'Alternative Indexes of National Power', in *Power and World Politics,* Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989.

TABLE 2.2 Selected Basic Economic Indicators for ASEAN Member States at 2010

Country	Total land area	Total population1/	Gross domestic product 2/ at current prices		Gross domestic per capita		GDP Growth	International merchandise trade				Foreign direct investments inflow	
	Km2	Thousands	US$ million	PPP$ Mn	US$	PP$ Mn	Percent	Export In US$ million	Import In US$ million	Trade	Trade in percent share to GDP	US$ million	Percent Share
	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010	2010
Brunei Darussalam	5,765	415	12,402	19,406	29,915	46,811	2.6	8,615	2,384	10,999	88.7	629	0.8
Cambodia	181,035	15,269	11,168	28,985	731	1,898	5.0	5,584	4,897	10,480	93.8	783.	1.0
Indonesia	1,860,360	234,181	708,032	1,030,998	3,023	4,403	6.1	157,779	135,663	293,442	41.4	13,304	17.5
Lao PDR	236,800	6,230	6,508	16,105	1,045	2,585	7.2	2,433	2,076	4,509	69.3	333	0.4
Malaysia	330,252	28.909	238,8 49	415,157	8,262	14,361	7.2	198,801	164,733	363,534	152.2	9,156	12.0
Myanmar	676,577	60,163	43,025	76,601	715	1,273	5.3	7,600	4,199	11,798	27.4	450	0.6
The Philippines	300,000	94,013	189,326	351,686	2,014	3,741	7.3	51,432	58,229	109,660	57.9	1,713	2.2
Singapore	710	5,077	223,015	291,934	43,929	57,505	14.5	371,194	328,079	6,999,273	313.6	35,520	46.6
Thailand	513,120	67,312	318,709	585,698	4,735	8,701	7.8	195,312	189,728	385,041	120.8	6,320	8.3
Vietnam	331,212	86,930	107,650	291,260	1,238	3,351	6.8	72,192	84,801	156,993	145.8	8,050.0	10.5
ASEAN	4,435,830	598,498	1,858,683	3,107,829	3,106	5,193	7.1	1,070,941	974,790	2,045,731	110.1	76,208	100.0

Sources: ASEAN Community in Figures 2011

Symbols used
-       not available as of publication time
-       n.a. not applicable/not available/not compiled
Data in italics is the latest updated/revised figure from the previous posting

Notes:
1/ In 2010, CLMV's population comprised more than 28% (168.6 mn) that of the total ASEAN with total GDP (PPP$) representing 13% (413 Bn PP$)
 of the total ASEAN
2/GDP per capita in PPP$ is GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity (PPP) rates hence PPP $1 in a country, say Cambodia has the same purchasing power as PPP $1 in all other countries in the world.
PPP is an index of purchasing power, showing the purchasing power of US$1 in a country compared to US$1 to benchmark country USA

From Table 2.2, I rank countries based on their key economic indicators in the Table 2.3.

<div align="center">TABLE 2.3</div>
<div align="center">Ranking of Key Economic Indicators of ASEAN Member States at 2010</div>

Country	Total Land 2010	Total Population 2010	GDP 2010 in US$ and PPP$	GDP per capita 2010	Growth of GDP 2010	Total Trade 2010	Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2010
Brun	9th	10th	8th	2nd	10th	8th	8th
Cam	8th	7th	9th	9th	9th	9th	7th
Indo	1st	1st	1st	5th	7th	4th	2nd
Lao	7th	8th	10th	8th	4th and 5th	10th	10th
Mal	5th	6th	3rd	3rd	4th and 5th	3rd	3rd
Myan	2nd	5th	7th	10th	8th	7th	9th
Phil	6th	2nd	5th	6th	3rd	6th	6th
Sing	10th	9th	4th	1st	1st	1st	1st
Thai	3rd	4th	2nd	4th	2nd	2nd	5th
Viet	4th	3rd	6th	7th	6th	5th	4th

<div align="center">Sources: Adapted from ASEAN Community in Figures 2011</div>

Table 2.3 shows that Thailand is always within the big five. Except for its growth of GDP in 2010, Indonesia is also always within the big five. For Malaysia, the situation is quite similar but the exception lies in its total population. Meanwhile, Singapore's exception lies in its total land and population. For GDP per capita, Growth of GDP, Total Trade and FDI inflow, Singapore always ranks first. Vietnam and the Philippines are at a similar level. Although the Philippines showed weaker key indicators compared with Vietnam in 2009, the Philippines' roles in crisis management and ideas for ASEAN as an organisation are more robust than those of Vietnam. The military indicators can be seen in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 below:

<div align="center">TABLE 2.4</div>
<div align="center">International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower</div>

Country	Defence Expenditure US$ m			Defence Expenditure Per Capita			Defence Expenditure % GDP			No in Arm Forces (000)	Esti mated Reser vists (000)	Para milit ary (000)
	2008	2009	2010	2008	2009	2010	2008	2009	2010	2012	2012	2012
Brun	360	332	351	945	854	889	2.50	3.18	2.88	7	1	2
Camb	255	275	271	18	19	19	2.26	2.54	2.41	124	0	67
Indo	5,108	4,821	7,182	22	20	30	1.00	0.89	1.02	302	400	280
Laos	17	14	n.k.	3	2	n.k.	0.32	0.25	n.k.	29	0	100
Mal	4,370	3,883	3,651	160	140	129	1.96	2.01	1.54	109	52	25
Myan	n.k.	n.k.	1,762	n.k.	n.k.	33	n.k.	n.k.	4.91	406	0	107
Phil	1,427	1,363	2,024	15	14	20	0.82	0.85	1.02	125	131	41
Sing	7,662	7,831	8,098	1,554	1,555	1,575	4.05	4.29	3.64	73	313	75
Thai	4,294	4,732	4,821	66	72	73	1.58	1.79	1.52	306	200	114
Viet	2,907	2,137	2,573	33	24	29	3.22	2.20	2.51	482	5,000	40

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons-commitments, force levels and economics', *The Military Balance,* London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 463-476, p. 469.

TABLE 2.5
Ranking of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower of ASEAN Member States

Country	Defence Expenditure US$ m	Defence Expenditure Per Capita	Defence Expenditure % GDP	Number in Armed Forces (000)	Estimated Reservists (000)	Paramilitary (000)	Approximate Rank
	2010	2010	2010	2012	2012	2012	
Brun	7th	2nd	3rd	10th	7th	10th	8th
Camb	8th	9th	5th	6th	8th/9th/10th	6th	7th
Indo	2nd	6th	8th and 9th	4th	2nd	1st	2nd
Laos	9th	n.k.	n.k.	9th	8th/9th/10th	4th	10th
Mal	3rd	3rd	6th	7th	6th	9th	6th
Myan	n.k.	5th (2010)	1st	2nd	8th/9th/10th	3rd	5th
Phil	6th	8th	8th and 9th	5th	5th	7th	9th
Sing	1st	1st	2nd	8th	3rd	5th	1st
Thai	4th	4th	7th	3rd	4th	2nd	3rd
Viet	5th	7th	4th	1st	1st	8th	4th

Source: Adapted by author from International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Chapter Ten: Country Comparisons- commitments, force levels and economics', *The Military Balance*, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 463-476, p. 469.

Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show that Singapore is in first place in terms of defence expenditure followed by Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Cambodia, the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Myanmar and Laos follow. From these tables of key economic and military capabilities, it can be seen that Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are always among the big five, in terms of both economic and military capabilities.

2.6. Drawing a Possible Connection between Crisis Management and Regional Security Systems in Southeast Asia

In this section, I establish some key indicators for the three security systems discussed as follows:

Indicators of a security community

Based on the characteristics of a security community reviewed in this chapter, it is possible to compile several indicators:

- A comparability of political values among decision-makers;
- A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers;
- A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments;
- Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies;
- Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning;
- Development of trust and collective identity formation;

- A total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects for such conflict in the region;
- A total absence of a competitive military build-up or arms race involving regional actors;
- Formal or informal institutions and practices; and
- A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship.

Indicators of a balance of power

From the characteristics of a balance of power elaborated in the literature review section, it is possible to construct several indicators: the first set of characteristics refers to a balance of power dynamics among ASEAN member states and the second set refers to a balance of external great power influence.

Balance of power among ASEAN member states:
- Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors;
- Intentions of some states to expand;
- Alliances on the basis of short-run interests; and
- War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft.

Balance of external great power influence:
- Dependency on external great powers as security providers;
- Alignments with external great powers;
- Military cooperation with external great powers;
- Distribution of external great powers' armed forces; and
- Economic dependence on external great powers.

Indicators of a concert of powers

Based on the literature on a concert of powers in Section 2.4, several indicators will be utilised:
- A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order;
- A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers ;
- A pattern of cooperative behaviour;
- Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms;
- An effective equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers;
- A joint approach to regional issues; and
- A need for system stability and international order.

Table 2.6 demonstrates how I will analyse each indicator in the three case studies. This table is a summary of the indicators of the three concepts chosen for analysis of a regional security system: a security community, a balance of powers and a concert of powers. Each indicator is ranked as significant, moderate, or insignificant in terms of its importance to the existence of a security community, a balance of powers and a concert of powers. These indicators are fully assessed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

TABLE 2.6 Indicators of a Regional Security System in the Crisis Management of the ASEAN Member States during the Three Case Studies of Crises

No.	Indicators	Vietnam Crisis	East Timor Crisis	Myanmar Cyclone Nargis Crisis
Security Community				
A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies;	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
I.	Formal or informal institutions and practices	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship.	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
Balance of Power				
Among ASEAN Members				
A.	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
B.	Intentions of some states to expand	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
C.	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
D.	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
Balance of External Great Power influence				
E.	Dependency on external great powers as security providers	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?

No.	Indicators	Vietnam Crisis	East Timor Crisis	Myanmar Cyclone Nargis Crisis
F.	Alignments with external great powers	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
G.	Military cooperation with external great powers.	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
H.	Distribution of external great powers' armed forces	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
I.	Economic dependence on external great powers	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
Concert of Powers				
A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
C.	A pattern of cooperative behaviour	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
D.	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
F.	A joint approach to regional issues	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?
G.	A need for system stability and international order	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?	Significant/Moderate/ Insignificant?

Sources: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

2.7. Conclusion

This chapter has identified several shortcomings in the relevant bodies of literature. First, there is a gap in the research on crisis management, particularly the proposed connection between crisis management and the existence of a regional security system. Second, there are problems with the research on security communities: the literature is a-theoretical, has little basis in empirical work, or does not examine representative crises. Third, there is room for further analysis of the concept of a concert of powers or a variation of it. Fourth, another way of examining the regional security systems, including balance of power dynamics in Southeast Asia, by using crisis management as an indicator, has potential as an analytical tool. Fifth, from the literature reviews of three possible different regional security systems —a security community, a balance of power and a concert of powers— it is possible to construct indicators that can be used to analyse the proposed connection between crisis management and the type of security system in Southeast Asia. This analysis will inform judgements about the type of security systems operating in Southeast Asia. To this end, the thesis will investigate three case studies in the next three chapters: the 1978-1991 Cambodian crisis, the 1999-2002 East Timor crisis and the 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis crisis.

THE 1978-1991 CAMBODIAN CRISIS

3.1. Introduction

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine three case studies, the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis. This chapter investigates whether the crisis management conducted by ASEAN countries during the Cambodian crisis (1978-1991) indicates a particular type of regional security system.[1] The evidence reveals that the management of the Cambodian crisis by ASEAN member states can be partly explained by just four out of the ten indicators associated with a security community during the acute and the de-escalation periods of the crisis. I argue that during the acute period of the Cambodian crisis, the crisis management can be explained by five out of seven indicators associated with a classical concert of powers and each indicator is considered as significant. Because two important indicators are not evident, this observation requires me to hypothesise that it may be necessary, after examining the other case studies, to introduce another type of security system concept whose indicators are modifications of the classical concert. During the de-escalation period of the Cambodian crisis, the ASEAN member states' crisis management is explained by three out of five indicators associated with a balance of external great power influence and each is rated as significant. The importance of a balance of external great power influence is related to a change of behaviour of the world's great powers in the de-escalation period of the crisis. These events had a strong impact on the management of the Cambodian crisis by ASEAN member states.

For the purposes of the analysis in this thesis, the period of the Cambodian crisis began with the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia on 25 December 1978 and ended with the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on 23 October 1991. The crisis is divided into two periods, the acute and de-escalation periods. In this chapter, the events before the invasion that can be considered as the escalation period are not investigated. The acute period is divided into two phases. The first phase began on 25 December 1975 and ended at the end of 1985 and the second phase started in 1986 and concluded in 1989. This definition does not disregard the fact that many events that occurred before the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia had a spill-over effect on the crisis, such as the Second Indochina conflict and the refugee influx crisis. It is also recognised that the whole crisis did not merely end at the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1991. However,

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[1] This chapter is about the management of the Cambodian crisis by ASEAN member states, but I refer to the organisation where it is relevant.

this thesis focuses on the period from 25 December 1978 to 23 October 1991 in order to elaborate in detail the ASEAN member states' role during this particular period.

In this crisis Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia played important roles in trying to manage the crisis while the Philippines played a relatively smaller role. Brunei Darussalam joined ASEAN in 1984 while the crisis was still in train. Nevertheless, as a new member of ASEAN it did not participate actively and only followed the lead of the association. It is essential to note that at the time of the crisis Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar were not yet members of ASEAN, and therefore, ASEAN was regarded by Vietnam as an outsider, with no rights to intervene. However, ASEAN was concerned because the crisis disrupted the region's stability and each member, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, had its own interests in bringing peace to the region.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. Following the introduction, the background to the crisis is elaborated in the second section. The third section examines the different perceptions of the threat held by the ASEAN members. The fourth section offers an analysis of the management of the crisis, and argues that it does not point to the presence of a security community. The fifth section elaborates how the management of this crisis does not indicate a balance of power among ASEAN member states. However, during the de-escalation period, the management of this crisis is characterised as a balance of external great power influence. The sixth section throws light on how the management of the Cambodian crisis indicates that a modified concert of powers was operating as a security system during the acute period. These sections are summarised in a brief conclusion.

3.2. Background

Acute Period

The acute period of the Cambodian crisis can be further divided into two phases. The first phase started when 100,000 Vietnam troops launched a military campaign backed by war planes, tanks and artillery against Cambodian forces on 25 December 1978,[2] and ended in the end of first half of 1980s. During this phase, there was a sharp polarisation of positions pertaining to the Cambodian issue at both the regional and the international level and there were no signs of settlement.[3] The Cambodian crisis was locked in a situation of stalemate or 'stable war'.[4] There was little resistance from the forces of Pol Pot against the invasion. Within 12 days, on 6 January 1979, Phnom Penh

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[2] Chang Pao-Min, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam,* Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985.
[3] Ramses Amer, *Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia,* Upsalla: Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Upsalla University, 1995.
[4] William S. Turley, 'The Kmer War: Cambodia After Paris', *Survival,* 32:5, 1990, pp. 437-453, p. 437.

fell to the invaders, and a new government was formed under the leadership of Heng Samrin[5] The pro-Vietnamese government that was established was called the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). The new government with Vietnamese support gained control of major areas but Pol Pot and his men fled, and remained military active in rural areas, particularly along the Thai border.

The occupation led to several related offensive operations. To 'punish' Vietnam, China concentrated 160,000 regular troops, 700 aircraft and hundreds of heavy artillery pieces along the Vietnamese border.[6] China began the invasion on 16 February 1979. The punitive nature of the invasion was made clear by China on 24 February 1979 at a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) meeting on the Sino-Vietnamese border war. The Chinese delegate declared that the objectives of China's military action were limited and urged the UNSC to take 'immediate and effective measures to stop Vietnam's armed aggression against Kampuchea and to bring an end to Vietnam's military occupation'.[7] Vietnam further exhibited its power by launching a dry-season offensive along the Thai-Kampuchean border from November 1984 to March 1985.[8]

The second half of the 1980s to 1990 is considered as the second phase and had a different nature from the first phase of the acute period because this period saw important changes in the interaction at both regional and international levels. This phase was a bridging phase towards the de-escalation period. At the regional level the early steps were bilateral discussions between Indonesia and Vietnam.[9] Prince Sihanouk met with Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the PRK, in Paris. That was the first high level meeting between representatives of the two Cambodian governments. The regional dialogue continued with a meeting in Indonesia in July 1988, known as the first Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM 1) with the participation of the ASEAN members, Laos, Vietnam, and the four Cambodian parties. The JIM 2 was held in February 1989. At the international level a Paris Conference on Cambodia was convened from 30 July to 30 August 1989. These meetings resulted in a declaration of intention by Vietnam to withdraw the last of its troops from Cambodia in late September 1989.[10]

De-escalation Period
The period 1990-1991 is regarded as the de-escalation period, during which the focus of attention shifted from regional initiatives to external great power initiatives. The US

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[5] M. Nagendra Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem,* Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.
[6] Pao-Min, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam.*
[7] Pao-Min, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam,* p. 87.
[8] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem.*
[9] Amer, *Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia.*
[10] Amer, *Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia.*

moved in 1990 to review its own position in relation to the crisis. From mid-1990 it expanded its range of dialogue on the issue and initiated direct talks with Vietnam on Cambodia. A diplomatic dialogue was also initiated for the first time between the US and Phnom Penh regime. Furthermore, the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev developed a strong interest in promoting détente in relations with the global great powers.[11] It began to advance efforts in normalising its relations with China and sought to develop relations with ASEAN. The changing Soviet emphasis placed further pressure on Vietnam to also modify its approach to Cambodia.[12]

The work of the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council was also crucial during the de-escalation period. On 28 August 1990, the Permanent Five presented a document entitled: 'Framework for a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict', and the Cambodian parties accepted it as a basis for a comprehensive settlement at a meeting in Jakarta on 9-10 September 1990.[13] However, the situation remained deadlocked during the first five months of 1991, with the only notable progress being a cease-fire implemented in May. To break the deadlock, the four Cambodian parties met in Jakarta on 2-4 June 1991. The meeting did not produce positive outcomes. However, this meeting became a basis for a dramatic change in relationship between the Cambodian parties. At a series of meetings from June to September 1991 the Cambodian parties reached agreement on the major disputed points. The crisis ended at the Paris Conference on Cambodia on 23 October 1991 and two agreements were signed: the 'Agreement on a comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodia conflict' and the 'Agreement concerning the sovereignty, independence, territorial, integrity and inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia'.[14] This event marked the end of the crisis.

3.3. The Differing Threat Perceptions

ASEAN member countries held differing perceptions of the threat arising from the Cambodian crisis. Understanding the threat perceptions of each ASEAN member is important to further investigate the member's behaviour in managing the crisis and to comprehend the dynamics of the groupings of the different states during the crisis. ASEAN member states were divided on the significant issue of whether Vietnam or China was the greatest threat to their immediate and long-term security. Indonesia and Malaysia shared the view that China was a major threat and therefore pursued a more flexible approach vis-à-vis Vietnam. In contrast, Singapore and Thailand took an

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[11] Frank Frost, 'The Cambodian Conflict', *Parliamentary Research Service Background Paper*, 7 May 1991.
[12] Simon Long, 'China and Kampuchea: Political Football on the Killing Fields', *The Pacific Review*, 2:2, 1989, pp. 151-157.
[13] Amer, *Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia*, p. 17.
[14] Amer, *Peace Keeping in a Peace Process: The Case of Cambodia*, pp. 18- 19.

uncompromising stance towards Vietnam as they believed that a coalition between the Soviet Union and Vietnam would pose a major threat to the region's security. The threat perception of each ASEAN member states is elaborated below.

Indonesia

Indonesia viewed China as the main threat while it did not see that Vietnam could expand its hegemony. Reaffirming Indonesia's armed forces chief, General Benny Murdani's statement, General Purnomo, Secretary to the Coordinating Minister for Defence and Political Affairs stated that: 'According to reports I have in hand, the Vietnamese are weak from malnutrition which makes it impossible for them to launch an invasion to the south'.[15] Jakarta feared that if China could teach a lesson to Vietnam by invading it, a similar invasion of other Southeast Asian countries could also become a possibility. General Murdani, even more surprisingly, stated that Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia was 'a question of survival' aimed at protecting itself from a Chinese threat.[16] Figure 3.1 shows that Indonesia considered communism as one of the biggest threats.

Indonesia had strived to be independent of Dutch colonialism for about three and a half centuries. This had an impact on how the country perceived other countries which also had fought against colonialism, including Vietnam. Indonesia considered Vietnam to be a country which shared memories of colonial domination and had engaged in a prolonged struggle against European imperialism. Hence, Indonesia had empathy for Hanoi. Unlike the other ASEAN member states, Indonesia adopted a more sympathetic attitude vis-à-vis Vietnam. The relationship between Indonesia and Vietnam continued to develop and consolidated during the crisis.[17] Furthermore, both countries identified China as a security threat. The Communist Coup d'état in Indonesia in 1965 influenced Indonesia in its perception of China and the threat of communism. This was confirmed by a statement from General Benny Murdani, during his visit to Hanoi, 'Some countries say that Vietnam is a threat to Southeast Asia but the Indonesian Army and people do not believe it'.[18]

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[15] US Embassy (Jakarta) Translation Unit, Press Summary 53/1984, March 19, 1984, quoted in Donald E. Weatherbee, *Southeast Asia Divided The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis,* Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, p. 20.
[16] US Embassy (Jakarta) Translation Unit, Press Summary 53/1984.
[17] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem.*
[18] US Embassy (Jakarta) Translation Unit, Press Summary 34/1984, February 17, 1984, quoted in Weatherbee, *Southeast Asia Divided The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis,* p. 20.

FIGURE 3.1
Indonesia's Characterisation of Enemies 1945-2004

Source: All figures are adapted from Widjajanto and Wardhani (2008) as quoted by Evan Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', *Journal of Indian Ocean Region* 7:1, 2011, pp. 96-116, p. 102.

Indonesia's characterisation of degree of threat is based on the types of enemy faced in the 249 military operations undertaken by the Armed Forces between 1945 and 2004.[19] The figure shows that Communists represented an internal security threat in 12 per cent of Indonesia's military operations. Therefore, Indonesia was always cautious about communism and saw China as one pole of communism. Interestingly, Indonesia also perceived Malaysia as a threat during the period of Soekarno's Confrontation policy, which had caused the two countries become suspicious towards each other. However, the perception of Malaysia as a threat for Indonesia was relatively small during the Cambodian crisis.

Indonesia consistently shows suspicion towards external great powers. The sense of insecurity for Indonesia is best exemplified by the strong view among Indonesia's policymakers that the country's security depends on its ability to manoeuvre between the US and China. Indonesia's suspicion is partly related to the strong feelings of nationalism and anti-colonialism developed as a result of the bitter experiences with foreign powers throughout its history.[20] Hence, Indonesia was never fully comfortable with the involvement of external great powers in Southeast Asia, particularly China, during the period of the Cambodian crisis.

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[19] Evan Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture', *Journal of Indian Ocean Region*, 7:1, 2011, pp. 95-116.
[20] Daniel Novotny, *Torn between America and China: Elite Perceptions and Indonesian Foreign Policy*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010 quoted in Laksmana, 'The enduring strategic trinity: explaining Indonesia's geopolitical architecture'.

Perception of a Soviet threat was not as well-defined for Indonesia as it was for other ASEAN members. The threat perception was most tangible indirectly in the sense that Vietnam could not sustain its military occupation of Kampuchea without Soviet resources.[21] Indonesia was not too worried about Vietnam's link to the Soviet Union through military assistance. Indonesia's concern was that the increased Soviet activity would diminish the prospects for a Southeast Asian zone of peace and eventually another Chinese effort to 'punish' Vietnam could escalate to a widening regional conflict.

Malaysia

Similarly to Indonesia, Malaysia saw that ASEAN could compromise with Vietnam over the Cambodian issue to allow it to break with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the then Malaysia's Prime Minister, Tun Hussein Onn and President Soeharto of Indonesia affirmed the Kuantan Principle when they met in Kuantan Malaysia in March 1980.[22] Though to a lesser extent than Indonesia, Malaysia viewed Beijing as a primary danger to its security and wished that Vietnam would be integrated into the region. Malaysia's perception of the threat was dominated by fears of internal subversion due to China's past assistance to the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), its interference in its domestic affairs and the existence of a large ethnic Chinese minority in the federation.[23] Furthermore, Malaysia perceived that a strategy of 'bleeding Vietnam white' which was supported by China would only boost the Vietnamese dependence on the Soviet Union.[24]

Malaysia also shared Indonesia's view that the crisis could extend great-power rivalry in the region and thus bring greater instability. Both Indonesia and Malaysia came to the conclusion that Vietnam would serve as a 'counter-weight' against Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia and would also assist in stopping the revival of power rivalry in the region. To Malaysia, the extension of their influence by China and the Soviet Union in the conflict had brought the rivalry of the two big communist powers into the region. As the main architect of ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), Malaysia wanted these giants to play only a minimal role in the region. Malaysian Foreign Minister, H.E. Tengku Ahmad Rithuddeen, at the twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Bali 28 June 1979 stated:

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[21] Weatherbee, *Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis.*
[22] Leonardo C. Sebastian, 'Southeast Asian Perceptions of China: the Challenge of Achieving a New Strategic Accommodation', in Derek Da Cunha, ed., *Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2000.
[23] Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF,* London: Routledge Curzon, 2003.Emers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*
[24] Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN WAY,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2005, p. 94.

> The tensions and conflicts prevailing in Indochina continue to be destabilizing factors in the region of Southeast Asia hampering further efforts by ASEAN member countries to establish the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. In my view, these factors emphasize more strongly the need to pursue with greater vigor the objectives of ZOPFAN for Southeast Asia. [25]

To a greater degree than Indonesia, Malaysia's concern was related to the problems of the boat people and refugees from Indochina. Malaysia shared a land border with Thailand and was host to thousands of refugees. When the crisis broke out, there were around 75,000 refugees in Malaysia.[26] Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen also stated at the twelfth AMM in Bali:

> It is estimated that in June 1979 itself, well over 17,000 Vietnamese boat people would have landed in ASEAN countries and Hong Kong. Out of this in Malaysia alone, there are more than 75,000 boat people awaiting resettlement in third countries. We are now being deluged by these boat people, whose rapid influx is causing serious political socio-economic and security problems.[27]

This statement demonstrates that the refugee exodus issue was a major concern for Malaysia, which therefore sought action from ASEAN to address the problem.

Thailand

While Indonesia and Malaysia were regarded as the 'soft-liner' group, Thailand and Singapore can be regarded as the 'hard-liner' group. Thailand was ASEAN's front line and therefore was directly threatened because it had to confront immediate security problems from the Vietnamese domination in Cambodia. In the 19th century, Vietnam and Thailand had competed for power in Cambodia. Milton Osborne argues:

> The almost total control exercised over Cambodia by the Vietnamese at this period set of the stage for a struggle by Siam to regain its influence... The Vietnamese, following the stern policies of Emperor Minh Menh, attempted to change the face of Cambodia. Vietnamese provincial administration was substituted for Cambodian, and an attempt was made to impose Vietnamese patterns of dress on the Cambodians.[28]

Thailand had already perceived Vietnam as a threat since the US-Vietnamese war. However, Thailand was not able to exhibit its military capability or its capacity to deter Vietnam. For Bangkok, the Vietnamese intervention was the logical outcome of the Vietnamese quest for domination over Indochina, a goal inseparable from reunification. Thailand saw that a reunited Vietnam would pose an immediate danger to its security

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[25] ASEAN, *Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987*, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1987, p. 312.

[26] John Funston, 'Indochina Refugees: The Malaysian and Thai Response', in *Asian Thought and Survey*, Vol. 14, September 1980 quoted in Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*.

[27] ASEAN, *Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987*, p. 312.

[28] Milton Osborne, *The French Presence in Cochinchina and Cambodia*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, p. 10.

environment. It feared that the creation of an Indochinese federation under Vietnam's rule would disrupt its territory. Evans and Rowley argue: 'Thailand was seeking to balance Moscow and Beijing against each other, though Bangkok's aim was to bring as much restraining influence as possible to bear on a reunited Vietnam'.[29]

The perception of Vietnam as a threat was shared by the Thai Foreign Minister, Upadit Pachariyangkhun who claimed that Vietnam's armed intervention 'suddenly shattered' all hope and expectation of starting a new era of 'constructive and peaceful coexistence' among the peoples of the Southeast Asian region.[30] The situation was difficult for Thailand: on the one hand as a front-line state, it needed to confront the risk brought to Cambodia; on the other hand Thailand also had to make sure its national security was not compromised when agreeing to a united position of ASEAN.[31]

Singapore

Like Thailand, Singapore was critical of Vietnam and viewed the latter as the primary threat. Singapore saw Vietnam as looking to establish an Indochinese hegemony in the Southeast Asian region. Singapore's Foreign Minister, S. Rajaratnam, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on 28 June 1979 claimed that Southeast Asia was Vietnam's target. He quoted an extract from Article 5 of the treaty between Laos and Vietnam:

> The two sides will endeavor to strengthen the militant solidarity and the relations of cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries: together with the socialist countries and the international communist movement positively contribute to strengthening solidarity and mutual support and assistance on the basis of Marxism and Leninism and proletarian internationalism.... support the struggle of the peoples of Southeast Asia for real national independence, democracy, peace and neutrality and establish and develop relations of friendship and cooperation with other countries in the region.[32]

Singapore perceived that Vietnam wished to liberate the people of Southeast Asia whose independence, democracy and neutrality they considered somewhat suspect.

For Singapore, the Vietnamese refugee problem was also an issue. The refugee exodus was not merely a humanitarian problem, but it was more a military exercise to promote Indochinese hegemony in Southeast Asia. This was reflected in a statement by Rajaratnam at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 28 June 1979 in Bali that:

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[29] Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, *Red Brotherhood at War*, London: Verso, 1984, p. 182.
[30] Asiaweek, 'Time to Talk', 24 July 1981, p. 1, quoted in Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*, p. 22.
[31] Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*.
[32] S. Rajaratnam quoted in Nayan Chanda, 'Agreement to disagree', *FEER*, June 26, 1981.

> Seen in this context the refugee problem is not an exercise in humanitarianism. It is a military exercise to further the ambitions which the Vietnamese have concealed from us but not from their own people and their allies. They made us blind to it. Their ambitions are hegemony in Southeast Asia.[33]

This statement shows Singapore's serious concerns about the refugee issue. Not only did Rajaratnam consider it a humanitarian problem, but he also saw it as an effort by Vietnam to disseminate its people to build hegemony in Southeast Asia.

The Philippines

The Philippines identified Vietnam as the main source of the problem and considered that it should assume its just responsibilities as a member of the international community.[34] Manila is geographically separate and was not confronted with foreign troops at its border. It was more reserved in its condemnation mostly because it was occupied with its own domestic problems.[35] Nevertheless, Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was for the Philippines a violation of international norms and a violation of the principles stated specifically in ASEAN's Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and the TAC.

The Philippines' main interests were the maintenance of peace in the region and the termination of the influx of refugees from Indochina. Achieving peace in the country really depended on the stability of Southeast Asia as a whole, and Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia threatened to jeopardise the region's stability. Even though it was geographically separate, refugees from Vietnam were also a problem for the Philippines, with an estimated number of 6,000 refugees entering the country.[36] Consequently, it supported the proposal by the UK for an international conference on Indochina refugees under the auspices of the UN.[37]

Brunei Darussalam

As a small country, Brunei considered itself vulnerable to foreign invasion and aggression. To Brunei, a peaceful and stable region was essential to its survival, therefore the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was indeed a bad precedent. Brunei which only joined ASEAN in 1984 appeared to be following the position of Thailand and Singapore. However, it did not really play an active role during the crisis.

The elaboration above shows the different perceptions of the threat held by ASEAN member states during the crisis. The different perceptions influenced their policies and

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[33] ASEAN, *Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987*, p. 322.

[34] ASEAN, *Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987*.

[35] Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*, p. 90.

[36] ASEAN, *Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987*.

[37] ASEAN, *Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 1967-1987*.

determined their contribution to managing the crisis, which will be elaborated in the next three sections. By investigating the three explanatory concepts of regional security systems during the crisis (a security community, a balance of powers and a concert of powers), the contribution of ASEAN member states will be examined.

3.4. A Security Community?

This section addresses whether or not ASEAN member states' management of the Cambodian crisis indicates that there was an operating security community in the region. The ten indicators of a security community listed in Box 3.1 are used to address the question:

Box. 3.1. The Ten Indicators of a Security Community

A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers;
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers;
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments;
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies;
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning;
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation;
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region;
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build up arms race involving regional actors;
I.	Formal or informal institutions and practices; and
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship.

Each of the indicators is treated as equally important. Table 3.1 provides an explanation of each indicator of a security community in the Cambodian crisis and a detailed analysis of these indicators follows.

TABLE 3.1

TABLE 3.1
A Security Community in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian Crisis?

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
		Security Community				
A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers: **Moderate**	ASEAN member states demonstrated that they shared some political values on the one hand but held different political values and responded to the crisis differently on the other hand.				
		During the Cambodian crisis, Indonesia's political values vis-à-vis the crisis were similar to those of Malaysia.	Thailand's values depended on its decision-makers. During the leadership of Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanan and Prem Tinsulanond, Thailand was hardline towards Vietnam. However, Thailand under the Chatichai government from 1988 adopted a more flexible approach vis-à-vis Vietnam.	After the Vietnamese invasion, its values were more similar to Indonesia's as it regarded China instead of Vietnam as the main threat.	Singapore supported Thailand's view that Vietnam was the biggest threat to regional security.	Brunei and the Philippines were of the view that the crisis was a concern for regional stability.
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers: **Moderate**	During the Cambodian crisis in general, the decision-makers' behaviour was unpredictable, although to some extent it was also predictable. Commonly predictable behaviour among the decision-makers included the desire to work as a unit, the willingness to elevate the principle of consensus to a high position, and willingness to compromise and bargain. The unpredictable behaviours are elaborated in below columns.				
		Behaviour of decision-makers in Indonesia was consistent exercising 'soft-liner' policies. Its behaviour could be regarded as unpredictable by other ASEAN member	Thailand's behaviour was unpredictable during the crisis, because it really depended on the decision-makers of the time. It was consistent until the	Malaysia's behaviour was relatively consistent. The only unpredictable behaviour was its support to the arms ammunition to Cambodia.	The behaviour of Singapore was unpredictable. An example of its unpredictable behaviour was that while being a 'hard-liner', Singapore	As they basically did not have a particular standing, their decision maker's behaviours were predictable.

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
<td colspan="7" align="center">**Security Community**</td>
		states, particularly in regard to its close relations with Vietnam. For Indonesia, it might not be unpredictable since the behaviour of decision-makers was always based on the 'free' and 'active' foreign policy. However, the close relations with Vietnam and official visits to Hanoi were often seen as a surprise by other countries.	Prime Minister Chatichai took power.		supported Indonesia, which was a 'soft-liner' to be the interlocutor of the negotiations between Vietnam and parties in Cambodia.	
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments: **Significant**	<td colspan="5">Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore were all responsive and active in actions and communication with other governments.</td>
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies: **Moderate**	The main factors for Indonesia were regional stability and the settlement of the crisis. Other precipitating factors for Indonesia were the trauma with	The main precipitating factor for Thailand was its geographic proximity with Cambodia. Other precipitating factors for Thailand were regional	The main precipitating factors for Malaysia were regional stability and settlement of the crisis. Other precipitating factors were earlier confrontation with	The main precipitating factor for Singapore was the fear of Vietnamese hegemony. Other precipitating factors for Singapore were Indo-Malaysia	The main precipitating factor for the Philippines and Brunei was regional stability. The precipitating factors that discourage them from orienting themselves in each other's direction were

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
		Security Community				
		China and communism and the close bilateral relations with Vietnam.	stability, and the prevention of Vietnamese hegemony.	Indonesia and its trauma with communism.	condominium and the fear of spill over effects to Singapore, regional stability and the settlement of the crisis.	domestic problems and geographical distance.
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning: **Significant**	The transactions and negotiations by the Indonesian Government were exercised with Malaysia, Vietnam, ASEAN as a group and the UN.	The transactions and negotiations by Thailand were exercised with Cambodia, with Singapore, the US, China, ASEAN as a group and the UN.	The transactions and negotiations by Malaysia were conducted with Indonesia, Vietnam, ASEAN as a group and the UN.	The transactions and negotiations by Singapore were conducted with Cambodia, Thailand, the US, China, ASEAN as a group and the UN.	There were no identified specific transactions and negotiations conducted by either the Philippines or Brunei individually. The transactions and negotiations involving them were under the ASEAN framework.
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation: **Moderate**	Trust and collective identity formation were developing from early in the crisis until the Paris Agreements in 1991. Vietnam's attack near the Thai Border in 1980 contributed to strengthen ASEAN cohesion. It forced also Jakarta to adopt a tougher stance against Vietnam. However, to what extent was not identified.				
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region: **Insignificant**	The Cambodian crisis itself reflected that there was not a total absence of armed interstate conflict in the region. However, during the crisis, there was a total absence of armed inter-state conflict among ASEAN member states.				
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors: **Significant**	There was no military build up arms race among ASEAN members				

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
		Security Community				
I.	Formal or informal institutions and practices: **Significant**	Formal practices included bilateral meetings with Malaysia, negotiations with ASEAN member countries, negotiations within the UN.				
		Informal practices conducted by Indonesia were 'Cocktail Meeting', negotiation with Vietnam, and parties in Cambodia.	Informal practices conducted by Thailand were negotiation with Vietnam, negotiation with parties in Cambodia, negotiations with China, negotiation with the US.	Informal practices conducted by Malaysia were negotiation with Vietnam, and parties in Cambodia	Informal practices: conducted by Singapore were negotiations with Vietnam, negotiation with parties in Cambodia, negotiations with China, negotiation with the US.	No informal practices identified being conducted individually. Formal meetings involving these two countries were held under the ASEAN framework.
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship: **Insignificant**	There was very limited economic integration demonstrated during the crisis.				

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

A. A comparability of political values among decision-makers

ASEAN member states demonstrated that they shared some political values on the one hand but held different political values and responded to the crisis differently on the other hand. Thus, the indicator, a comparability of political values among decision-makers, is considered as moderate. The commonly-held political values included a desire to achieve stability and to manage relations; to protect national resilience; to advance the principle of non use of force; to assert the importance of dialogue; and to intensify joint efforts to secure more expeditious and increased departure of immigrants for permanent settlement in the Third Countries.[38]   Another value shared by members of the group was their willingness to use the UNSC as an avenue for taking the necessary and appropriate measures to restore stability in Indochina. These values were those which the ASEAN member countries could set up and assert in a united way.

Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia maintained a consensus that the Vietnamese invasion was a threat to regional stability and urged Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Cambodia. On 9 January 1979, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja stated:

> The ASEAN member countries deeply deplore the current escalation and enlargement of the conflict between the two states in Indochina. They express grave concern over the implications of this development and its impact on the peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia.[39]

This statement was strongly supported by the other ASEAN Foreign Ministers in that meeting; they reaffirmed the statement of the Indonesian Foreign Minister as the chair of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) at the time.[40]

The ASEAN member states also strongly deplored the armed intervention, arguing that it was against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea. They also believed that the Kampuchean people had the right to determine their future by themselves free from interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their rights of self determination. Among their political values there was also a desire to advance the principle of non use of force and therefore, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, at the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Minister on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asian Region in Bangkok on 12 January 1979 published a Joint Statement that

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[38] Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Researcher, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.
[39] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, *Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985*, Bangkok: Thai Watana Panich Press, 1986, p. 73.
[40] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, *Documents on the Kampuchean Problem 1979-1985*.

the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was against the principle of non-use of force. ASEAN member countries also reaffirmed several times in their Joint Statements/Communiqués that they sought a peaceful resolution by a peaceful means by a Cambodian settlement.[41]

Frank Frost argues that there were additional reasons for the comparability of political values among decision-makers in general in January 1979. This was partly because the end of the Second Indochina War had occurred only a short time earlier, three years before Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Furthermore, there was evidence of political repression within each of the countries, particularly Cambodia. There was also a substantial problem of the refugee exodus from the mainland border. The effect of this sizeable refugee movement was felt by most ASEAN countries, thus creating a comparable value that a settlement for Cambodia was expected to address the problem of the refugee influx. [42] The refugee crisis had a big impact on how ASEAN reacted to the Vietnamese invasion. This background created an extraordinarily disturbed environment across the region.

However, the management of the Cambodian crisis was a dynamic process and during the process the group had different political values in several elements: different perceptions of threat, different strategic outlooks, particularly in engaging Vietnam in negotiations, and different approaches on how to solve the crisis. These differences then lead to a division of ASEAN member states. Thailand and Singapore were regarded as the 'hard-liners' while Indonesia and Malaysia were known as the 'soft-liners'. While the first group perceived Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as an effort to seek hegemony in Southeast Asia, the second group, even though it did not support Vietnam, saw the invasion as a means of survival to protect themselves from China's expansion. The two groups were of one voice in their statements, but they had a different approach. While pursuing regional efforts, each of the member states acted individually. This individual behaviour sometimes could not be predicted and accepted by the others. Indonesia and Malaysia tried to pursue a 'softer' approach towards Vietnam. This however assisted the association to include Vietnam in many negotiations and to soften Vietnam's demand. Hence, the 'soft-liners' particularly Indonesia played the role of 'interlocutor' or 'mediator' in creating a bridge between Vietnam and the 'hard-liners'. In short, the indicator of 'comparability of the political values of member states' is regarded as moderate, in its ability to shine light on a security community during the crisis.

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[41] The willingness of ASEAN member countries to utilise a peaceful means was reflected in their Joint Statements/Communiqués. See ASEAN, *Statement at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at ASEAN Ministerial Meetings 1967-1987.*

[42] Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.

B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers

During the Cambodian crisis in general, the decision-makers' behaviour was unpredictable, but in some cases, was also predictable. Therefore the 'mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers' indicator is rated as moderate. Usually, the behaviour of a country can be predicted from its political values. The members of ASEAN did act based on their values, however given the tense situation, some countries could not understand if one acted beyond what had been agreed. For instance, Indonesian officials paid at least nine visits to Hanoi. This was often criticised by Thailand and Singapore. It may be predictable in the sense that the other members knew that Indonesia had a growing friendship with Vietnam, but it could also be seen as unpredictable particularly by Singapore and Thailand who disapproved of any excessive indulgence towards Vietnam.

Frank Frost argues that the predictable point was that ASEAN genuinely wanted to work as a unit and placed great emphasis on the principle of consensus.[43] He says that members would put a high value on compromise and willingness to bargain.[44] However, I argue that 'consensus' was undermined by 'national interests'. A consensus was not apparent when Thailand and Singapore criticised the Kuantan Principles, for example. Indonesian President Soeharto and Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein met in March 1980 in Kuantan on peninsular Malaysia's east coast, to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia in general and the Indochina conflict in particular, resulting in the Kuantan Principles being agreed. The four main elements of the Principles were: (i) Vietnam should withdraw its troops from Cambodia in a phased manner; (ii) Vietnam should not remain in the orbit of Soviet influence; (iii) Vietnam should ask the Soviet Union to withdraw from Vietnamese military bases; (iv) and Cambodia's neutrality should be restored as well as its earlier status of a buffer state between Vietnam and Thailand. [45] These principles were not well received by Thailand and Singapore who favoured a tough stance instead of a conciliatory stance against Hanoi.[46]

These principles may also have seemed naïve, especially the third principle, coming just three months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This principle failed to become an ASEAN position. The Kuantan Principle contained elements of a possible trade-off between Vietnam's security interests and that of ASEAN as defined by Malaysia and

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[43] Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.
[44] Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.
[45] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*.
[46] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*.

Indonesia.[47] Thailand and Singapore considered this meeting to be unpredictable because Indonesia and Malaysia should not have had met without seeking the participation of Thailand and Singapore. It can be argued that Thailand and Singapore should have been able to predict that this would occur because each country held some different perceptions of the issue. However, I argue that this was unpredictable to Thailand and Singapore because the Kuantan Meeting was convened in March 1980, only a few months after the ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in June 1979 and had agreed on a Joint Statement towards the Cambodian situation.

The behaviour of member countries was unpredictable in the sense of who supported whose ideas. In March 1983, Malaysia proposed the 'Five-plus-Two' Talks at the Non-Aligned Movement Meeting in New Delhi. The idea was to bring the five ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines) together with Vietnam and Laos. This idea was supported by Indonesia. Thailand rejected the proposal because Bangkok did not want to recognise Vietnam as one of the main parties of the negotiations. Surprisingly, Singapore, which was also rigid vis-à-vis Vietnam, supported the idea.[48]

Another surprising behaviour was also demonstrated by Singapore. Despite being a hard-liner with little tolerance vis-à-vis Vietnam, Singapore proposed Indonesia as ASEAN's 'interlocutor' to carry on further negotiations with Vietnam.[49] This proposal was endorsed by the other members at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in Jakarta on May 7-8, 1984. This appointment then established a new stage of ASEAN's efforts to seek a resolution of the Cambodian crisis.

Malaysia's support for military assistance to Cambodian resistance might also be seen as unpredictable by Indonesia. While Indonesia always saw Malaysia as a partner in this crisis, Malaysia supported Singapore's idea of transferring ammunition, training, communication equipment, and food to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). With Singapore, Thailand and the US, Malaysia also supported regular meetings in Bangkok to ensure the transfer of this assistance.

Thailand's policies vis-à-vis Vietnam after the formation of Chatichai Choonhavan's government were also quite unpredictable. Chatichai was strongly interested in resolving

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[47] Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizee and Sorpong Peou, eds, *Cambodia-the 1989 Paris Peace Conference*, Toronto: Kraus International Publications, 1991.
[48] Caballero-Anthony, *Regional Security in Southeast Asia*.
[49] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*.

the Cambodia issues through more friendly cooperation with the Indochina states. This new policy was also reflected by the visit of Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila to Hanoi on January 9-11, 1989 which marked the first visit by a Thai Foreign Minister in ten years. The meeting resulted in a Joint Press Statement, issued on 11 January 11 1989 in which the two ministers said:

> Thailand and Vietnam, being two close neighbors sharing common borders with Kampuchea, have an important role and direct interests in solving the Kampuchean question... agreed that the building up of mutual trust and confidence between the two countries is essential in contributing to a comprehensive political solution to the Kampuchean problem. [50]

Without talking to his counterparts in ASEAN, the newly elected Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven declared his intention of strengthening economic ties with Vietnam, although this was a policy that undermined the actions and initiatives of ASEAN.[51] These events occurred when Indonesia was pursuing its own agenda in relation to Vietnam while trying to maintain ASEAN unity by endorsing punitive actions against Vietnam. Thailand's policies were most likely dictated by economic interests and traditional concerns.

In short, during the Cambodian crisis, the general pattern of the behaviour of the ASEAN member states was that Indonesia was quite persistent in pursuing 'soft line' policy, while Malaysia and Singapore were changing over time on the basis of issues, even though Malaysia was consistent to a greater extent than Singapore. Thailand was relatively consistent in promoting a harsh policy vis-à-vis Vietnam until the change of the Thai government in late 1988.

C. A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments

The indicator, a mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments, is rated as significant. Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore were all active in actions and communication of other governments. Meanwhile, the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam were not keen to be closely engaged. Even though Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore were all responsive to the actions and communication of other government, the responsiveness of each country was different and really depended on its own perceptions of threat and national interests.

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[50] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem,* p. 81.
[51] Shaun Narine, 'ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security', *Pacific Affairs,* 71:2, 1998, pp. 195-214.

Overall, I argue that there was a mutual responsiveness in the way that the other ASEAN members supported and wanted to support Thailand throughout the 1980s, but particularly at key points, such as in mid-1985 when Thailand was more pressured by Vietnamese military operations. There was also responsiveness by some countries like Indonesia and Malaysia who wanted to explore how to find a basis for additional thinking and additional communication. Those countries were sensitive to the others' interests in looking for a consensus. There was sensitivity on the Thai side in recognising that its interests were not necessarily all shared at all times by other members.

Indonesia was responsive and active from the beginning of the crisis. Even though it had a growing relationship with Vietnam, Indonesia was aware that Singapore and particularly Thailand were not always in favour of Indonesia's approach. Indonesia pursued its interests bilaterally while trying not to step ahead of or breach ASEAN. Later on, Jakarta's approach was appreciated by the international community. Indonesia conducted a multi-track approach: a bilateral, regional and multilateral approach. Throughout the crisis, Indonesia had never forced other countries to accept its ideas or proposals in seeking avenues to resolve the crisis. For example, Indonesia and Malaysia did not force Singapore and Thailand to accept the joint statement known as the Kuantan Declaration. Among Indonesia's initiative was the 'Cocktail Meeting', which was proposed in December 1985. The format of the proposal was changed several times to adjust to other countries' interests. The idea was originally initiated by Prince Norodom Sihanouk in July when he proposed an informal meeting of all major parties in the Cambodian dispute, including Vietnam, China and the USSR. Indonesia's proposal of the 'Cocktail Meeting' was restricted only to the Cambodian factions. Because of Thailand's rejection of the format of the meeting, the format was modified to become a two-staged meeting. The first stage was a meeting with the Khmers. The second stage was a meeting between CGDK and Vietnam. The idea was finally endorsed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in June 1986 together with the proposal of 'Proximity Talks' from Malaysia.[52] The 'Cocktail Meeting' was subsequently transformed into the JIM 1 held on 25 July 1988. Indonesia continued mediating the negotiation by convening the JIM 2 in 1989, Hun-Sen-Prince Sihanouk Talks in Jakarta in May 1989, the JIM 3 or the First Informal Meeting on Cambodia (IMC) in 1990 and the Second Informal Meeting on Cambodia.

Malaysia was no less active and responsive than Indonesia. Malaysia proposed the 'Five-plus-Two' Formula and the 'Proximity Talks'. Malaysia proposed the idea of 'Proximity

[52] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem.*

Talks' at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (AFMM) in Kuala Lumpur in May 1985. The objective of the talks was to bring the CGDK and the Heng Samrin regime together to push the Cambodians to resolve the crisis by themselves. This was a forward-looking idea which put emphasis on a political settlement rather than a military solution. This idea was supported by all the other countries but Thailand. Without any efforts to compel Thailand to accept the proposal, it was finally endorsed at the AFMM.

Because Thailand and Singapore were 'hard-liners', they not only pursued a diplomatic approach, but also a practical approach by sending military assistance to Cambodia with the help of China and the US. Thailand and Singapore were also sensitive towards Indonesia and Malaysia who wanted to explore more bases for cooperation. They might have thought at the beginning that Indonesia's close relationship with Vietnam was unacceptable, but in the middle of the process of seeking a resolution for the crisis, they agreed for Indonesia to be an interlocutor.

Brunei, even though not very active, hosted several meetings such as the AFMM held in Bandar Seri Begawan on 21 January 1989 as preparatory to JIM II, and the AFMM on 3 July 1989 as preparation for the Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC). The latter was an avenue for the ministers to present their views on the Cambodian settlement for the PICC's perusal.[53]

D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand exhibited some common precipitating factors that both encourage states and discourage them from orienting themselves in each other's direction, and thus this indicator is considered as moderate. Among those factors were: (i) the refugee influx; (ii) Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia; (iii) the alignment between Vietnam and the Soviet Union; and (iv) the Vietnamese incursion over the Thai border. Before the actual crisis fully emerged, that is before the invasion in December 1978, I argue that the refugee inflows had already constituted a crisis which began to produce a much greater degree of communication and coordination on those issues. The Vietnamese expansion was clearly a precipitating factor. There was a strong alignment between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, as Vietnam's invasion came after it had signed the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in December 1978. This added significantly to the concerns of the ASEAN countries.

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[53] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem.*

Even though they had common precipitating factors, each country had its own specific impetus factors to orient them in each other's direction and coordinate their policies. For Indonesia, the main impetus factor was the stability of the region. Indonesia perceived that a prolonged Cambodian crisis would only benefit China, while a quick resolution of the Cambodian issue would help Vietnam to escape from international isolation and also to serve as a 'credible buffer' against China.[54]

As with Indonesia, the main factor for Malaysia to be drawn towards other countries was the objective of regional stability. Instead of letting Indochina become a site for external great power rivalry, Malaysia preferred to unite with other members of the organisation to manage the crisis. The faster ASEAN could manage the crisis, the better for Malaysia in the sense that the end of crisis was expected to stop the influx of refugees.

The main precipitating factor for Thailand to orient itself in the direction of others was the fact that it was the most affected country. Being ASEAN's frontline, Thailand did not want to be left out by the other members. Furthermore, after the act of aggression at the Thai-Kampuchean border, Thailand was intimidated by the tactics employed by Vietnam. More than two thousand Vietnamese troops had invaded Thai territory, leaving death and destruction. Thailand's security had been jeopardised as a result. Without the help of other countries in the region, Thailand did not have the capacity to assist the Cambodian civilians to express their legitimate right of returning to their own country.

For Singapore, the key precipitating factor in coordinating its policies with other ASEAN members was that Singapore realised that it did not want Vietnamese hegemony in the region. S. Dhanablan, Singapore Foreign minister at the Thirteenth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 25 June 1980 said:

> It is especially dangerous to us who are neighbours of a Vietnam that has announced repeatedly that it is the vanguard of a revolution to 'liberate' the nations of Southeast Asia and usher them into an era of genuine independence. The Vietnamese have told ASEAN members in bilateral talks that they have no aggressive intentions on their neighbours. But in all their official appeals and exhortations to their own people and their socialist friends, they have constantly reiterated that it is their duty and obligation to bring about communist regimes in Southeast Asia because only socialist states are truly independent.[55]

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[54] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*, p. 161.
[55] ASEAN, *Statements by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers at ASEAN Ministerial Meetings 1967-1987*, p. 349.

Furthermore, Singapore did not have the capability to settle the crisis without other member countries. It also did not have a strong reason to refuse to coordinate with other member countries.

However, there are some precipitating factors that discourage states from orienting themselves in each other's direction and coordinating their policies. These factors include: (i) differences in political values and in the perception of threats; (ii) different national interests; (iii) geographical separation (for the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam); (iv) domestic issues (for the Philippines); (v) changes in policies of decision-makers (in the case of Thailand); (vii) relationship with conflicting parties: Thailand had a poor relationship with Vietnam on the one hand, and Indonesia had a growing relationship with Vietnam on the other hand. Because there is a balance of precipitating factors that encourage states to cooperate and discourage them from cooperating, this indicator is rated as moderate.

E. Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning

In the Cambodian crisis, various continued processes of transactions occurred among ASEAN member countries themselves, between ASEAN and conflicting factions and Vietnam, between ASEAN and the UN and between each ASEAN state and other external powers such us China, the US, the Soviet Union, France and Australia. ASEAN utilised the existing international organisations, such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as a diplomatic leverage point. From the beginning, ASEAN concentrated its diplomatic efforts at the UN, mobilising international support of Hanoi and securing approval for an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK). ASEAN was the major actor in initiating this conference and for ASEAN, such a conference was critical in assisting the international community to recognise that the central issue in the Cambodian problem was Vietnam's invasion and occupation of that country. [56] ASEAN also discussed the issue of the Cambodian crisis with the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). It shared with the NAM the Five-plus-Two formula proposal by Malaysia at the Seventh Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in March 1983.[57]

In any negotiation, including at the ICK, there is an element of transaction. During the ICK, for example, China, supported by the US, rejected the ASEAN proposal which gave equal status to the Vietnamese aggressor and the legitimate Cambodian government. China

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[56] Acharya, Lizee and Peou, eds, *Cambodia-the 1989 Paris Peace Conference.*
[57] Justus van der Kroef, 'Kampuchea: The Road to Finlandization 1983', *Asian Profile,* 13:3, 1985, pp. 221-241.

claimed that the Khmer Rouge was willing and capable of convening free and fair elections and should be restored to power. France finally put forward a compromise formula. The final statement of the conference called for 'appropriate arrangements to ensure that armed Kampuchean factors will not be able to prevent or disrupt the holding of free elections, or to intimidate or coerce the populations in the electoral processes'. [58]

Social learning was reflected by the change in Thailand's stance from 'rigid' to a softer one after the change of Prime Minister and the change in Malaysia's and Indonesia's behaviour on key occasions such as Vietnam's incursion across the Thai border. Given the various transactions and social learning, the indicator of 'processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning' is rated as significant.

F. Development of trust and collective identity formation

There was a considerable development of trust and collective identity throughout the crisis. Trust and collective identity formation had been developing from early in the crisis until the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1991. The Vietnamese attack near the Thai Border in 1980 jeopardised ASEAN cohesion. It forced Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to adopt a tougher stance against Vietnam. While Jakarta's and Malaysia's stance towards Vietnam were growing tougher, Thailand's foreign policy towards Vietnam was becoming more flexible after Chatichai became Prime Minister.

According to Frank Frost, ASEAN developed some degree of trust and collective identity during the Cambodian Crisis. He argues:

> ASEAN did operate successfully to manage differences. It did pursue goals in relation to the Cambodia conflict and there was a lot of cooperation too from 1979 onwards. I think that it is necessary to talk about issues like trust and collective identity formation in a qualitative way. I am not arguing that ASEAN at the end of the Cambodia conflict period had developed a high level and high degree of collective identity. There is no high level interstate trust or collective identity to the extent they would be willing to give over some sovereignty to the organisation at the end of the Cambodian crisis. It did not transform the association. I do not think the Cambodia cooperation removed any possible area of sensibility between countries and potential for mistrust, because some of them no doubt continue distrusting each other. [59]

Even though trust and collective identity had developed, still some levels of distrust and the Cambodian crisis did not remove the sensitivity among ASEAN member states. However, the evidence reveals that ASEAN member countries placed trust and collective identity on a higher level than the distrust and sensitivities. The assortment of trust,

[58] Acharya, Lizee and Peou, eds, *Cambodia-the 1989 Paris Peace Conference*, p. xxxi.
[59] Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.

collective identities, distrust and sensitivities suggests that the indicator of 'development of trust and collective identity formation' is moderate.

G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region

The Cambodian crisis itself reflected that there was not a total absence of armed interstate conflict in Southeast Asia, if Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar are considered geographically part of the region. The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in December 1978, China occupied the northern Vietnamese border area in February-March 1979, and the Vietnamese conducted an incursion on the Thai-Kampuchean border in 1985. These events highlight that the region did not reflect a total absence of armed inter-state conflicts. However, during the crisis, there was a total absence of armed inter-state conflict among ASEAN member states. The principle of TAC helped member states restrain themselves from using force. This does not mean that there was a total absence of suspicion of each other. The feelings of suspicious and distrust did exist among ASEAN member states. Singapore was afraid of an Indo-Malay mini empire and an Indochinese Empire. Malaysia and Indonesia were suspicious towards each other. Malaysia also showed distrust towards the Philippines due to the latter's claim over Sabah. In short, the combination of crises, suspicion, territorial claims, fear of other countries' expansion renders the 'total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region' indicator insignificant in pointing to the presence of a security community during the crisis.

H. A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors

In general there was no arms build-up or an arms race in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis. To investigate the existence of a competitive military build-up or arms race, I will elaborate the definitions of 'arms race' and 'military build-up'. Barry Buzan states that 'the term arms race suggests self stimulating military rivalry between states in which their efforts to defend themselves militarily cause them to enhance the threats they pose to each other'.[60] An arms build-up is defined by Acharya as an 'upward spiral in key military indicators such as defense spending and arms procurement'.[61] Acharya argues that an arms build-up will become an arms race if it is driven by an interactive or competitive dynamic among the countries involved.[62]

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[60] Barry Buzan cited in Amitav Acharya, *An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 1994, p. 3.

[61] Amitav Acharya, *An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 1994, p. 3.

[62] Acharya, *An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia*.

During the Cambodian crisis, the ASEAN states not only rejected turning their regional grouping into a military block but also kept their defence spending at relatively modest levels in comparison to other Third World States. In the early 1980s, ASEAN countries began shifting towards conventional warfare capabilities, but this transition was initially focused on land forces. This may be the result of the security concerns raised by the Cambodian crisis. The late 1980s saw a shift of emphasis towards naval and air forces signalling the salience of maritime security issues.[63] This again reflected a transition of emphasis, from counter-insurgency to conventional warfare.

Defence industries in Southeast Asia was characterised as 'lowest- late comers' during the crisis.[64] Defence industries in the region displayed little ambition to achieve total self-reliance in defence production,[65] as set out in Tables 3.2 and 3.3.

TABLE 3.2 ASEAN Defence Expenditure Data Compared, Absolute Figures
(Constant million 1985 US dollars)

Year	Brunei		Indonesia		Malaysia		Philippines		Singapore		Thailand	
	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI
1975	n.a.	70	2,069	2,557	719	1,143	760	1,109	642	535	1,012	959
1976	n.a.	123	1,809	3,195	621	1,195	721	1,283	554	647	1,058	1,182
1977	203	124	2,494	3,0855	894	1,371	1,121	1,268	678	720	1,230	1,553
1978	196	125	3,126	2,066	1,093	1,152	1,219	826	682	579	1,219	1,278
1979	241	224	2,334	1,971	1,645	1,298	1,082	758	747	582	2,194	1,739
1980	n.a.	234	2,683	2,184	1,760	1,618	792	713	769	653	1,418	1,662
1981	233	224	3,360	2,375	2,405	1,951	942	746	835	747	1,966	1,654
1982	217	242	3,183	2,292	2,365	1,899	1,009	781	824	792	1,711	1,734
1983	276	265	2,701	2,243	2,223	1,468	712	779	1,002	773	1,766	1,858
1984	314	259	2,024	2,205	919	1,108	519	503	939	1,013	1,805	1,989
1985	205	292	2,341	1,936	1,764	977	474	386	1,188	1,151	1,517	2,050
1986	226	326	1,603	1,979	982	1,465	502	424	1,134	1,114	1,524	1,997
1987	179	263	1,704	1,793	1,455	1,286	766	437	1,078	1,125	1,579	1,996
1988	213	287	n.a.	1,717	1,641	1,312	855	476	1,184	1,209	1,573	1,977
1989	n.a.	n.a.	1,570	1,722	1, 418	1,362	1,168	645	1,288	1,264	1,493	1,959
1990	n.a.	n.a.	1,776	1,520	1,557	1,389	878	616	1,313	1,305	1,601	2,105
1991	n.a.	n.a	1,739	1,568	1,670	1,204	843	549	1,518	1,508	1,761	2,292

Sources: Amitav Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 1994, p. 13.

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[63] Acharya, *An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia.*
[64] Acharya, *An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia*, pp. 6–7.
[65] Acharya, *An Arms race in post Cold War Southeast Asia.*

TABLE 3.3 ASEAN Defence Expenditure Data Compared (Percentage of GDP/GNP)

Year	Brunei		Indonesia		Malaysia		Philippines		Singapore		Thailand	
	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI	IISS	SIPRI
1974	n.a.	2.1	2.6	4.5	3.8	5.9	2.1	2.9	5.1	4.7	3.2	3.7
1975	n.a.	3.5	3.8	5.1	4.0	6.9	2.6	3.3	5.3	5.5	3.7	3.2
1976	n.a.	4.8	3.5	5.8	3.8	5.9	3.0	3.4	5.4	6.0	3.7	3.6
1977	n.a.	4.1	3.4	5.1	4.4	6.1	3.4	3.2	6.4	6.3	4.0	4.4
1978	n.a.	4.6	4.0	5.0	4.5	5.8	3.3	2.7	5.7	5.6	3.4	4.3
1979	n.a.	6.1	3.2	4.1	5.7	5.5	2.6	2.4	5.7	5.0	3.7	5.4
1980	n.a.	3.9	3.9	3.8	5.7	6.4	1.7	2.2	5.2	5.0	3.3	5.1
1981	4.6	4.5	3.4	3.7	8.1	8.1	2.1	2.2	5.2	5.1	4.6	4.8
1982	n.a.	5.3	3.3	4.2	8.2	7.8	2.3	2.3	n.a.	5.1	5.0	4.9
1983	n.a.	6.5	3.5	3.7	7.1	5.6	1.8	2.2	4.8	4.5	4.1	5.0
1984	8.0	6.5	2.4	3.5	2.6	3.8	1.6	1.5	4.9	5.5	4.2	5.0
1985	6.0	7.7	2.8	3.0	5.6	3.5	1.4	1.3	6.7	6.5	4.1	5.0
1986	7.2	n.a.	2.3	3.0	3.7	5.7	1.7	1.4	6.6	6.3	3.7	4.7
1987	n.a.	n.a.	1.9	2.5	4.6	4.5	2.1	1.3	5.6	5.8	3.7	4.3
1988	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.3	n.a.	4.1	n.a.	1.3	n.a.	5.5	n.a.	4.0
1989	n.a.	n.a.	1.4	2.1	3.7	4.0	2.8	1.8	5.3	5.1	2.6	3.2
1990	n.a.	n.a.	1.4	1.6	3.7	3.6	2.2	1.8	4.9	5.0	2.6	3.2

Sources: Amitav Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 1994, p. 14.

Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the overall spending on defence by the ASEAN states was generally on the rise, particularly in the case of the Philippines and Thailand in contrast to Indonesia and Malaysia. Interestingly, spending in relation to the total Gross National Product (GNP) had actually declined, especially for Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Singapore had the highest ratio of defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, while Indonesia had the lowest. In general, I conclude that there was no arms race or arms build-up in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis, and this indicator is rated as significant.

I. Formal or informal institutions and practices

ASEAN convened many formal and informal meetings related to the Cambodian crisis, thus indicating the significance of the 'formal or informal institutions and practices' indicator in shedding light on the existence of a security community during the crisis. Formal meetings were conducted through either the ASEAN framework or the UN framework. The ASEAN member states used the UNGA to support ASEAN's stances. Throughout the crisis, the number of formal meetings conducted by ASEAN member states increased as they were supported by the role of the UN and the Permanent Five Members of the UNSC. After the Paris Agreements in 1991, which are not discussed in this thesis, some ASEAN members were involved in the UN Peace-keeping Operation in Cambodia.

With regard to informal practices, many are noted during the Cambodian crisis, particularly conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand both among

themselves, under the ASEAN framework or with external parties such as Vietnam, Cambodia, the US, Soviet, China and the UN. Informal practices initiated by Indonesia included the Kuantan Meeting with Malaysia, the 'Cocktail Meeting' that later transformed into the JIMs, negotiations with Vietnam and parties in Cambodia. Informal meetings conducted by Thailand included negotiations with parties in Cambodia, negotiations with Vietnam, negotiations with the US, negotiations with China, and negotiations with Singapore. Informal meetings conducted by Malaysia consisted of among others, the 'Kuantan Meeting' with Indonesia, negotiations with Vietnam, negotiations with parties in Cambodia, and negotiations to transfer arm supply, with the US, Thailand, and Singapore. For Singapore, informal meetings were convened with Vietnam, parties in Cambodia, China, the US, and Malaysia. For the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam, no informal practices were conducted individually. All formal meetings involving these two countries were held under the ASEAN framework.

J. A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship

There was very limited economic integration or any effort towards economic integration identified. During the Cambodian crisis, even between 1967 and 1990, intra-ASEAN trade as a percentage of a total trade changed only modestly. ASEAN failed to cooperate in the creation of industrial projects during this period because the ASEAN economies were either too similar to each other, and therefore competitive, or so different as to make efforts to create economic integration difficult.[66]

The idea of AFTA only came up after the 1992 ASEAN Summit in Singapore. Former ASEAN Secretary-General, Tan Sri Ajit Singh argues that before 1992, the economies of Southeast Asian countries grew remarkably well.

> If you look at the economic broader picture of the economic situation, right up before 1990 to the end of 1997, ASEAN started experiencing a double digit growth. When countries are doing well economically, you find that there is only little incentive for them to think about issues like having an ASEAN Free Trade Area or any financial arrangement with each other. They are all competing for the same market. Arising from that situation, one of the important results of the 1992 Summit was the decision to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area. So when I assumed my task as the Secretary-General, my top priority was to implement AFTA. So, I saw AFTA [in] the very first five years. That was the specific task given to the Secretary General. I played a key role. It is my task to creating public awareness of AFTA from public and business community.[67]

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[66] Narine, 'ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security'.
[67] Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011.

After the Asian Financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN tried to deepen its economic integration by: establishing an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) to prevent the distraction of FDI from Southeast Asia to other regions while increasing intra ASEAN investment; initiating the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) where trade disputes are adjudicated by the AEM or SEOM which has binding rules and is linked to the ASEAN Secretariat; setting up an ASEAN Surveillance Process which is aimed at guaranteeing economic stability through the establishment of an early warming system and evaluating potentially destabilising financial and economic trouble spots in the region; and expediting the reduction of tariffs in the region, integrating eleven priority sectors including fisheries, electronics, healthcare and tourism, simplifying the custom procedures, harmonising regulations and standards and other forms of trade barriers.[68]

To summarise, the extent to which the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states during the Cambodian crisis is suggestive of a security community is rated in Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2.

TABLE 3.4
Summary of the Indicators of a Security Community during the Cambodian Crisis

Security community during the Cambodian crisis				
No	**Indicators**	**Significant**	**Moderate**	**Insignificant**
A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers		√	
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers		√	
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments	√		
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies		√	
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning	√		
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation		√	
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region			√
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors	√		
I.	Formal or informal institutions and practices	√		
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship			√
Total		4	4	2

Source: Compiled by author

[68] James R. Ferguson, 'ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional 'Development', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 26:3, 2004, pp. 393-415.

FIGURE 3.2
Indicators of a Security Community during the Cambodian Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2 demonstrate that ASEAN's crisis management during the Cambodian crisis did not reflect that it was operating as a security community.[69] It explained some indicators such as a mutual responsiveness of governments to actions and communication of other governments; processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning; a total absence of competitive military build-up or an arms race involving the regional actors; and formal and informal institutions and practices. However, besides being minor (only four out of ten indicators are significant) these significant indicators were shared by the four dominant powers.

3.5. Balancing in Southeast Asia?

The next section of the chapter analyses whether the crisis management by ASEAN indicated that there was a balancing system in the region. This section is divided into two parts: the first is an analysis of the possibility of a balance of power dynamic existing among ASEAN members while the second part is an examination of the possibility of a balance of external great power influence. There are four indicators of a balance of power being adopted among ASEAN member states as listed in Box 3.2.

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[69] The table and figure might not reflect precisely each indicator.

Box 3.2 The Nine Indicators of a Balancing System

Balance of Power among ASEAN member states:
- A. Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors;
- B. Intentions of some states to expand;
- C. Alliances on the basis of short-run interests;
- D. War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft;

Balance of External Great Power Influence:
- E. Dependency on external great powers as security providers
- F. Alignment with external great powers;
- G. Military cooperation with external great powers;
- H. Distribution of external great powers' armed forces; and
- I. Economic dependence on external great powers.

Table 3.5 provides a brief overview of the indicators of a balancing system in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis.

TABLE 3.5
A Balancing System in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian Crisis?

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
		Balance of Power				
		Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States				
A.	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors: **Significant**	Indonesia, Malaysia Singapore, Thailand can be considered as relatively equal powers during the Cambodian crisis.				
B.	Intentions of some states to expand: **Insignificant**	Indonesia had no intention to expand.	Thailand had no intention to expand. Instead, Thailand feared Vietnam's intention to expand.	Malaysia had no intention to expand.	Singapore had no intention to expand. Instead, Singapore feared an Indochinese Empire and Malaysia-Indonesia mini Empire.	Generally there was no intention to expand, but the Philippines had a claim over Sabah.
C.	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests: **Moderate**	There was no alliance between ASEAN member states. However, groups existed within ASEAN.				
		Indonesia shared a similar view with Malaysia towards the crisis and they were often regarded as a 'soft-liner' group.	Thailand shared a similar view with Singapore and they were often regarded as a 'hard-liner' group.	Malaysia shared a similar view with Indonesia towards the crisis. They were often regarded as a 'soft-liner' group.	Singapore shared a similar view with Singapore towards the crisis and they were often regarded as a 'hard-liner' group.	The Philippines was not included in any groupings. Brunei was not included in any groupings. However, its stand in general followed Thailand and Singapore.
D.	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft: **Insignificant**	For Indonesia, war was an illegal instrument of statecraft. Therefore Indonesia was against Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Indonesia	Thailand was against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. But since its security was threatened, it also provided military assistance to	As a strong supporter of ZOPFAN, Malaysia was against the Vietnamese invasion.	Singapore was against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. However, Singapore also provided military assistance to Cambodia. War was	Both countries were against the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
				Balance of Power		
		ruled out any possibility of the use of force in dealing with the Cambodian crisis.	Cambodia. So, war was not unthinkable for Thailand.		not unthinkable for Singapore too.	
				Balance of External Great Power Influence		
E.	Dependency on external great powers as security providers: **Significant**	Indonesia's foreign policy was free and active. Indonesia did not rely too much on external great powers to solve the regional crisis.	Thailand had a dependency on China and to a lesser extent to the US. The US supplied arms to the Thai military.	Malaysia retained some forms of dependency on the former colonial power as an external security provider.	Singapore had a dependency on China and also the US.	The Philippines had a dependency on the US
F.	Alignment with external great powers: **Significant**	Indonesia had no alignment with external powers. Indonesia and Malaysia considered Vietnam as a safeguard to balance China.	Thailand had a tacit alignment with China and ensured China's commitment to a strategy of attrition against Vietnam. Thailand and Singapore viewed China as necessary to balance Vietnam.	Malaysia was a member of FPDA.	Singapore had tacit alignment with China and ensured China's commitment to a strategy of attrition against Vietnam. Singapore and Thailand viewed China as necessary to balance Vietnam.	The Philippines had a close relationship with the US. The Philippines in the overall picture made ASEAN's voices were stronger in front of the US.
G.	Military cooperation with external great powers: **Significant**	Indonesia resisted military cooperation with external great powers in relation to the Cambodian crisis.	Despite the tacit alignment with China the US supplied arms to the Thai military under the Manila Pact of September 1954.	Like Singapore Malaysia maintained some forms of security cooperation with the former colonial power.	Singapore nevertheless remained keen to retain some form of security cooperation with the former colonial power, not least because their defence capabilities were extremely limited at this time.	Strong military cooperation between the Philippines and the US.

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
			Balance of Power			
H.	Distribution of external great powers' armed forces: **Moderate**	Indonesia did not host any external great powers' armed forces and never supported such distribution to any country to solve the crisis.	The PRC contributed to Thailand's defence capabilities through the transfer of military equipment.	Malaysia supported distribution of China's force and US transfer of military equipment.	Singapore supported distribution of China's force and US transfer of military equipment.	The US had military bases in the Philippines, namely the Naval Base Subic Bay, in Olongape, Zambales and the Clark Air Force Base. The Naval Base Subic Bay was established in 1884 by Spain and captured by the US in 1898. It was closed in in 1992. The Clark Air Force Base was established in 1930 and closed in 1991.
I.	Economic dependence on external great powers: **Moderate**	Not identified	Thailand demonstrated economic dependence on external great powers, particularly on China and the US.	Not identified	Not identified	For the Philippines, there was an economic dependence on the US.

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States

A.   Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors

During the Cambodian crisis, four countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand had relatively equal powers, thus the indicator, relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors, is rated significant. Within the equal powers, suspicion existed towards each other. Indonesia was suspicious towards Malaysia. Malaysia perceived Indonesia and Singapore as a plausible threat while Singapore was suspicious of Indonesia and Malaysia. An official of ASEAN interviewed for this research argued that there was no such balance of power among ASEAN members. What they have is a 'competition', which is always disadvantageous, but some times is helpful to for advancing the organisation.[70]

Many scholars argue that there has never been a 'balance of power' among ASEAN member states. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy for Political Affairs, Vice Presidential Office of Indonesia, for example, suggests that there has been no balance of power in Southeast Asia because there are no relatively equal powers between a minimum of two actors.[71] She also argues that the increasing military budgets of countries in Southeast Asia are not aimed against other ASEAN member countries.[72] Alexandra Retno Wulan from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta also suggests that:

> There is no balancing within ASEAN member countries. The core principle of balancing is that there is one strong power and the others try to balance this strong power... There is no such unipolar in Southeast Asia.[73]

Evan Laksamana, a researcher from CSIS Indonesia, defines what happens in Southeast Asia as a 'balance of weakness and dependency' instead of a balance of power. He argues:

> Southeast Asian countries are mutually dependent and weak vis-à-vis their neighbours. I had in mind the precarious balance and dependency of Indonesia-Malaysia, Malaysia-Singapore, Singapore-Indonesia, Philippines-Vietnam, Vietnam-Thailand, Thailand-Myanmar, Cambodia-Thailand. This is just the bilateral side, where both countries see the other as the potential rival or enemy [militarily] but also realise they both need each other in terms of economic engagement or political weight. Indonesia cannot go to war with Malaysia, for example, not only because the military might not actually win, but because they are one of Indonesia's largest investors, especially in Kalimantan and the fact that billions of dollars depend on the Indonesian working migrants based there. This is of course very simplistic, but that feeling seems real in the minds of some policymakers. The same goes to Singapore and Malaysia and Singapore vis-à-vis Indonesia for example, as well as other countries. [74]

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[70] Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Putrajaya, 10 March 2011.
[71] Interview with Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, Secretariat of the Vice President of Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 March 2011.
[72] Interview with Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, Secretariat of the Vice President of Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 March 2011.
[73] Interview with Alexandra Retno Wulan, CSIS-Jakarta Researcher, Jakarta, 18 February 2011.
[74] Interview with Evan A. Laksamana, CSIS-Jakarta Researcher, Jakarta, 21 March 2011.

In contrast to Laksmana's view, I argue that Southeast Asia is not characterised as a 'balance of weakness' nor a 'balance of dependency' because first, dominant powers in the region are not weak; and second, countries may be dependent on each other, but these dependencies do not lead to the notion of 'balance' because smaller countries are more dependent on dominant powers, and not vice versa. The concept of 'balance of weakness' may only be applicable to smaller powers and the concept of 'balance of dependency' may only be relevant within smaller powers and within dominant powers. It cannot be generalised across Southeast Asia as a region.

B. Intentions of some states to expand

There was no intention by any member state to expand during this time, so it can be argued that the 'intentions of some states to expand' indicator is not significant in explaining the presence of a balance of power among ASEAN member states. Some member countries indeed feared the possibility of expansion of other countries. Thailand was afraid of another Vietnamese expansion into Cambodia and a possible encroachment into Thailand itself. Singapore feared an Indochinese empire in Southeast Asia. It also feared — although to a lesser extent — an Indonesia-Malaysia mini empire. Even though Malaysia did not speak out blatantly, it had reason to fear Indonesia's expansion. Indonesia's confrontation policy resulted in Malaysia's uncertainties about Indonesia as a security threat. These fears and suspicions were felt more strongly in the acute than in the de-escalation period.

Indonesia itself, after the fall of the Soekarno regime, tried to convince its neighbours that it did not have any intention to expand. That was one of the reasons for Soeharto's support for the establishment of ASEAN; he saw it as a forum in which the government of Indonesia could convince its neighbours that it did not have any intention to expand. Indonesia did not fear Indochinese expansion in the region, and was more afraid of the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that action against communism represented 12% of Indonesia's military operations.

C. Alliances on the basis of short-run interests

There was no alliance among ASEAN member states during the Cambodian conflict, but there were groupings. Hence, the 'alliances on the basis of short-run interests' indicator is rated as moderate. The pattern of the groupings was not permanent during the Cambodian crisis. For example, Thailand changed its policy after Prime Minister Chatichai took power. The pattern of alignment among the core group was more complicated than simply

dividing them into the soft-liner and hard-liner group. Some countries tended to have a particular orientation towards the issue of major powers. Thailand had an intensive cooperation with China in terms of channelling support for the resistance. Malaysia and Indonesia had different balances of interest particularly towards the role of China. There were some factors arising from historical evolution which gave rise to different perspectives, for example the role of Vietnam. Thailand, unsurprisingly had reservations about and rivalry with Vietnam. It was shocked by the Vietnamese invasion, which was followed by the refugee influx, and by the communists coming to power in Laos.

Indonesia had stronger communication with Vietnam during the period, due to a sense of a common identity of interests. Both had declared independence in 1945. There was also a shared identity of interests, and perhaps a basis and capacity for dialogue, indicated by Indonesia's willingness to talk with Vietnam, on the parts of both the Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry.

Being members of the one group, the joint stance between Indonesia and Malaysia was reflected in the Kuantan Declaration and their support for each other's proposals. Indonesia and Malaysia maintained consistent interests in moving ahead, such as the 'Five-plus-Two Dialogue' proposal. Malaysia was also supportive of the idea of the 'Cocktail Party' Meeting proposed by Indonesia.

According to Frank Frost, after its change of government, Thailand departed a little from ASEAN's position on the Cambodian crisis. There was interplay of regional policy, domestic political structure and characters, and the impact of domestic changes on regional policy. Frost also sees that Singapore, Indonesia and Brunei were quite consistent while the Philippines did not fit the pattern of any grouping.[75]

It should be noted that there had been four bilateral border security cooperation within ASEAN during the Cambodian crisis: between Thailand and Malaysia, Malaysia and Indonesia, the Philippines and Indonesia, and Malaysia and the Philippines. The Malaysia-Thailand arrangement constituted the earliest and most comprehensive cooperation within ASEAN. Since 1977, joint operations, both combined and coordinated, had been used to suppress the 'bits and pieces' left of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) operating on the Thai-Malaysia border. These operations continued until 1989, when the CPM signed a peace accord with the Thai-Malaysian authorities, proclaiming an end to its armed struggle.

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[75] Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.

The joint operations led to the destruction of several CPM sanctuaries, kept the CPM on the run for most of the 1970s and 1980s and led to demoralisation within its rank.[76]

For Malaysia and Indonesia, after the peace accord was signed between the two countries at the end of their confrontation in 1967, a joint border committee was established to conduct counterinsurgency operations along the Kalimantan-Sarawak and Kalimantan-Sabah borders. The scope of these operations was enlarged in 1984 to cover maritime security issues facing the two sides, including smuggling, piracy and arms selling. With the decline of the communist threat, the border committee shifted its attention to the South China Sea issue and military exercises and joint contingency plans for a common response against a spill-over of the Cambodian crisis.[77]

In addition to the annual meetings of the intelligence agencies of all the ASEAN countries, bilateral arrangements covering intelligence exchanges existed between Singapore and Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia, Indonesia and Thailand, and Singapore and Brunei.[78] On the escalation of the Cambodian crisis, it was claimed that some bilateral exercises could be geared to providing a common response to a Vietnamese threat. Furthermore, bilateral military exercises also served as a confidence building measure, helping the participants to overcome mutual suspicion and promoting an understanding of each other's military-security requirements.[79] Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, despite their divergent perspectives, were ready to assist Thailand against a Vietnamese attack. Indonesia asserted that it would provide aid to Thailand. Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, General Panggabean, stated that Indonesia's assistance could take the form of economic as well as military aid. Malaysia was less accommodating as far as direct military aid was concerned. The Home Minister, Ghazalie Shafie, indicated that Malaysia envisaged provision of logistic support rather than troop assistance as the form of aid in the event of a Vietnamese attack. Singapore's position was to be ready to provide logistic support as well as armaments to Bangkok.[80]

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[76] Amitav Acharya, 'Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: A Conceptual Analysis of the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN', *Journal of Peace Research*, 29:1, 1992, pp. 7-21.
[77] Acharya, 'Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World'.
[78] Amitav Acharya, 'A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States: From Bilateralism to Alliance?' *Occasional Paper of Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University*, No. 14, May 1990.
[79] Acharya, 'Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World'.
[80] Acharya, 'A Survey of Military Cooperation among the ASEAN States: From Bilateralism to Alliance?'.

D. War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft

War was not regarded as a legitimate instrument for any ASEAN country during the whole period of the Cambodian crisis, thus the indicator of war being a legitimate instrument of statecraft is considered as insignificant. ASEAN member countries viewed Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia as being against ASEAN's principle of the non-use of force. Vietnam and Cambodia as countries in dispute were regarded as outsiders to the organisation. An ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) meeting was held to discuss the escalation of the armed conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. It resolved that in conformity with the principles of the UN Charter and the Bangkok Declaration, all countries in the region shall be obliged:

> to strictly respect each other's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political system; to refrain from using force or threatening to use force or threatening to use force in their bilateral relations, from interfering in each other's internal affairs and from carrying out subversive activities, directly or indirectly against each other; to settle all difference between the countries by peaceful means through negotiations in a spirit of equality, mutual understanding and respect.[81]

ASEAN also rejected the idea of becoming a military pact despite concerns regarding the crisis. Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila stated: 'We in ASEAN don't want to be seen as a military pact... and even though regional security relates to all of us, we have never agreed to have multilateral military exercises'.[82]

Balance of External Great Power Influence

The Cambodian crisis cannot be separated from great-powers rivalry. In this section, I argue that the management of the crisis is explained more by the indicators associated with a balance of external great power influence during the de-escalation period. During this period, the US started playing a more active role, the Soviet Union started changing its behaviour and promoted a 'détente' relationship with other world's great powers; and the Permanent Five took charge in the crisis management. External powers, such as France and Australia, started demonstrating significant roles in the crisis.

E. Dependency on external great powers as security providers

The 'dependency on external great powers as security providers' indicator is significant in pointing to the presence of a balance of external great power influence. Many academics argue that the Indochina crisis situation was dependent on the triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union and the US. Banning Garrett, for example, argues that the

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[81] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, *Documents on the Kampuchean Problem, 1979-1985*, p. 73.

[82] Bangkok Post, 11 September 1982 quoted in Acharya, 'A Survey of Military Cooperation', p. 7.

basic dynamic of the triangular relationship during the Indochina crisis was each power trying to prevent any collaboration against it by the other two.[83] Some ASEAN countries, particularly those that were directly threatened, depended on external security providers. Thailand had a tacit alignment with China and military assistance from the US. The tacit alliance with China resulted from Sino-Thai relations and not from a common position vis-à-vis the Cambodian crisis. Singapore strongly supported this alliance and Indonesia and Malaysia were not against it because they tried to tolerate the other countries' interests. However, it somehow affected the unity of the organisation. Thailand was not able to depend on ASEAN states to militarily oppose the invasion of Cambodia, deter incursion on its border or defend its territory. [84] The tacit alignment with China ended in January 1979 after Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The PRC continued to give assurances to Thailand that it would invade Vietnam if Vietnamese troops entered Thailand. The PRC not only acted as a deterrent but also a provider of military equipment to Bangkok.[85]

However, the external security given by the providers did not amount to a security guarantee. There were two basic problems with security and defence associations, as identified by Ronald Yalem: (i) the difference in power and resources of great powers and their regional allies, and the consequent opportunity for and the propensity of the great powers to manipulate and control their lesser allies; and (ii) the conflict between the interests of the great powers and their ability to concentrate their superior military and economic resources within one region on the one hand, and the regional security environment where threats could be indigenous in origin on the other hand.[86] Thailand, during the Cambodian crisis, sought security assistance from the US, which transferred increased financial and military aid to Thailand. In February 1979, when the Thai Foreign Minister visited Washington, President Carter told him that the US would honour its security commitments under the Manila Pact of September 1954. It also accelerated supply of arms to the Thai military. However, Thailand was a victim of the second weakness, as argued by Yalem, pertaining to its formal alliance with the US and this was reflected in the US policy. The US' assistance was not merely for helping Thailand but more related to US relations with the other external great powers, such as the Soviet Union and China.

[83] Banning Garret, 'The Strategic Triangle and the Indochina Crisis', in David P.W. Elliott, *The Third Indochina Conflict,* Boulder: Westview Press, Inc, 1981.
[84] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*
[85] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*
[86] Ronald Yalem, 'Theories of Regionalism', in Richard A. Falk & Saul H. Mendlovits, eds, *Regional Politics and World Order,* San Francisco, CA: Freeman, 1973.

F and G. Alignment and military cooperation with external great powers

Two indicators, namely the alignment with external factors and the military cooperation with external factors, are examined in this section. The combining of these two indicators is aimed at seeing the broader picture of cooperation with external powers and its implication for their roles in the crisis. The crisis between Cambodia and Vietnam served to give rise to a wider struggle engaging the interests of major external states over the appropriate and acceptable pattern of power in Indochina. The conflict became central to the competing interests of China and the Soviet Union, when they committed resources to the cause of their respective clients.

The key elements of a balance of external great power influence during the Cambodian crisis were the changes of behaviour of external great powers. The Soviet Union's behaviour change was related to the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations and the strengthening alliance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet differences escalated when the Vietnamese opted for an alliance with the Soviets and the latter provided them with much needed equipment and assistance. China was further alarmed by the Kampuchean developments. The Pol Pot government, which was supported by China, was largely and obviously menaced by the Vietnamese government. While China called for the formation of a 'provisional coalition government' headed by Sihanouk, the Soviets proposed a 'provisional organ under the charge of Sihanouk with quadripartite representation'.[87] During the de-escalation period, the change of behaviour of the external great powers, which led to the importance of a balance of external great power influence, will be further explained below.

Soviet Union

None of the ASEAN member states established an alliance with the Soviet Union during the Cambodian crisis. However, Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union was crucial in this crisis and will therefore be discussed. It somehow affected the pattern of alignment between Thailand and Singapore with China and the US. The Soviet Union's role was also crucial in bringing the crisis to an end. International support for Vietnam's Cambodia policy had been largely confined to the Soviet Union and its allies. The USSR, which saw Vietnam as a 'bastion of peace and socialism in SEA', is estimated to have provided aid valued at $US730m in 1979 and during the period since the signing of the Soviet-Vietnam friendship treaty (November 1978) and the Kampuchean invasion saw an increased Soviet

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[87] Frank Frost, *The Kampuchea Conflict: Internal conditions, regional and international implications and the current prospects for negotiation and settlement*, Department of the Parliamentary Library Current Issues Brief, No. 5, 1980.

presence in Vietnam.[88] There were an estimated 5000-8000 Soviet training personnel in Vietnam, and extensive use of Vietnamese base facilities was made by Soviet aircraft and naval vessels.[89] The only major non-Soviet bloc country that recognised the PRK in Cambodia was India. It did not merely derecognise the DK but also recognised the PRK as announced by the government just after the border fight of late June 1980.

Radical change in Eastern Europe and internal instability in the Soviet Union reinforced Soviet President Gorbachev's need for greater outreach to the West. This motivated the Soviets to attempt to reach a détente with the US and China, after Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's desire to improve relations with the PRC was indicated in a speech in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986. Negotiations on the normalisation of relations were initiated in August 1988. The restoration of party-to-party ties with China also had an impact on Soviet support for Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia. When Sino-Soviet relations were restored, the Soviet Union terminated its support for Vietnam. Without substantial support from the Soviet Union, Vietnam was unable to continue its occupation of Cambodia; the Vietnamese leaders understood that it would not receive any further substantial support from the Soviets. Consequently, being no longer able to rely on external assistance and in urgent need of domestic economic reforms, Vietnam withdrew its troops in September 1989. Its decision made a Sino-Vietnamese dialogue possible and brought the prospect of a peaceful solution in Cambodia closer.[90]

China

China had a tacit alliance with Thailand and to a lesser extent with Singapore. Chinese strategic policy was dominated by its aspiration to avert a situation where one single state could control Indochina and threaten its south-eastern border.[91] It had three major objectives in the region. First, it looked for a significant decline of Soviet influence in the region. Second, it sought the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia and the removal of Vietnamese power from China's southern periphery. Third, it sought the termination of the Vietnamese-influenced Heng Samrin/Hun Sen government.[92] China would not accept Vietnamese hegemony over Cambodia and Laos. Therefore, China remained relentlessly opposed to the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea. After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, China was prepared to 'punish' Vietnam during its invasion

[88] Frost, *The Kampuchea Conflict.*
[89] Frost, *The Kampuchea Conflict.*
[90] Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power.
[91] Emmers, Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power.
[92] Robert S. Ross, 'China and the Cambodian Peace Process, The Value of Coercive Diplomacy, *Asian Survey,* 31:12, 1991, pp. 1170-1185.

in February-March 1979 and it issued warnings that a second 'punishment' could not be ruled out if Vietnam continued what China regarded as aggressive and expansionist policies in the region. China was particularly suspicious of Vietnam's alignment with Moscow and perceived the invasion of Cambodia as part of a Soviet regional expansion. China, therefore, established a tacit alignment with Thailand.

China was the only state that strongly supported the DK regime. Chinese leaders attempted to downplay the DK regime's past record in office as policy 'errors' which the Khmer Rouge was rectifying. In addition to its direct military activities, Beijing actively supported the Khmer Rouge resistance, which had established sanctuaries along the Thai-Cambodian border. The Khmer Rouge had killed over 40,000 to 50,000 soldiers by June 1980.[93] Receiving Chinese assistance through Thailand, the Khmer Rouge fought guerrilla warfare that prevented the Heng Samrin government from fully controlling its territory. [94] Moreover, it obliged Vietnam to commit numerous troops in Cambodia and to hold yearly offensive operations along the eastern border of Thailand. These attacks against Khmer resistance led to military incursions into Thai territory. Some limited military assistance was provided by Thailand and Singapore to the so-called non-communist Khmer resistance. China saw the withdrawal of Vietnam and the restoration of the DK regime as the only acceptable outcome in Kampuchea.

Over 1986-90, Thailand had planned to rely upon Chinese weapons purchases to modernise Thai defence capabilities in three areas: (1) strengthen Thailand's ability to handle border incursions; (2) strengthen Thailand's integrated air defence; and (3) expand Thailand's naval capabilities. Chinese terms for the purchases were reportedly at 'friendship prices' —half the normal cost, low interest rates, and a five-year grace period for instalment payments.[95] After Chavalit resigned from the Army in March 1990 to become deputy defence minister, the Thai military's enthusiasm for Chinese weapons faded, and Chavalit's successor, General Suchinda, declared that Thailand would turn to the US for weapons purchases.

United States

Thailand and the Philippines were the US' allies during the crisis. US policy in the Indochina region was particularly sensitive because of the deep impact which the Vietnam

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[93] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*
[94] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*
[95] Leszek Buszynski, 'Thailand's Foreign Policy: A Management of Regional Vision', *Asian Survey*, 38:4, 1994, p. 737.

War had on American society and on the lives of several million US servicemen and their families. America's political strategic interests centred on assuring a settlement in Cambodia that restored stability to Southeast Asia, secured the interests of the US treaty ally Thailand and the other members of ASEAN and checked the expansion of Soviet influence through Vietnam or other means in Southeast Asia.[96]

The US had a strong interest in the strategically and economically important communication routes that converge in the Straits of Malacca and other passageways in the region. The Soviet presence at US built bases in Vietnam including Soviet bombers, fighter aircraft, submarines and surface warships at times posed a potentially serious challenge to US access to those routes, but in late 1989, Moscow pulled some forces back from bases in Vietnam. US interest in working with ASEAN members to check Soviet-backed Vietnamese expansion continued in parallel with US cooperation with other ASEAN regional actors concerned with Soviet and Vietnamese influence, notably China and Japan. Indeed, common opposition to suspected Soviet expansion or 'hegemonism' in Asia was a central feature of US-Chinese negotiations following the opening of diplomatic relations with Beijing in 1972.[97]

The US strongly condemned the Vietnamese invasion and presence in Cambodia and supported moves to maintain diplomatic recognition for the DK in the UN as a response. In contrast to China, the US did not support the return to power of the DK regime, which it regarded as thoroughly discredited and unacceptable. Somphong Chomak argues that Thailand and the US were incorporated into an alignment opposed to the consolidation of Vietnamese power throughout the whole of Indochina.[98]

The US remained an ally of Thailand, the key ASEAN conduit of support for all three Cambodian resistance groups and the base for the 300,000 displaced Cambodians who provided the new recruits for the resistance. The US also transferred covert and overt aid to the non-communist Cambodian resistance. Besides allying with Thailand, US leaders also focused on various efforts by third parties to reach a settlement in Cambodia. Efforts by ASEAN countries, France, Australia and the UN were considered in the late 1980s and 1990.[99] Interestingly, US President Jimmy Carter had tacitly approved China's punitive

[96] Robert G. Sutter, *The Cambodian Crisis & US Policy Dilemmas*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
[97] Sutter, *The Cambodian Crisis & US Policy Dilemmas.*
[98] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF.*
[99] Sutter, *The Cambodian Crisis & US Policy Dilemmas.*

offensive on Northern Vietnam during Deng Xiaoping's visit to the US in early 1979.[100] This complex alignments and military cooperation with external great powers led me to consider that these two indicators are significant.

H. Distribution of external great powers' armed forces

Both the Soviet Union and China deployed their armed forces in the 'conflicting area'. The Soviet Union launched a large-scale military supply in the spring of 1979 to aid Vietnam, with a total of 79 flights over Thai air-space within May and June 1979 alone.[101] The Soviet Union also supplied the most sophisticated weapons transported to the Sino-Vietnamese border areas.[102] Hanoi also relied upon the Russians for technical and logistic support and tehnical and military advice. Vietnam also opened up its air bases and seaports to Soviet use.[103] China, on the other hand, had stationed up to 300,000 troops along the Sino-Vietnamese border in 1979, which served to impose high costs on Vietnam's military venture in Cambodia. Hanoi itself deployed approximately 150,000 troops in Cambodia for over 10 years to defend Heng Shamrin against the insurgent forces.[104]

The US possessed two military bases in the Philippines during the Cambodian crisis, namely the Naval Base Subic Bay, in Olongape, Zambales and the Clark Air Force Base. Naval Base Subic Bay was established in 1884 and closed in 1992, while the Clark Air Force Base was established in 1930 and closed in 1991. The Clark Air Force Base was a stronghold of the combined Filipino and American Forces during the end of the Vietnam War. However, these military bases did not necessarily have a connection with the US involvement during the Cambodian crisis. Thus, the 'distribution of external great powers' armed forces' indicator is regarded as moderate in indicating the existence of a balance of external great power influence in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis.

I. Economic dependence on external great powers

The indicator, economic dependence on external great powers, is rated as moderate because it was only Thailand that was heavily dependent on external assistance during the crisis. It is difficult to separate economic aid and military aid in the crisis, as these were already interconnected at the time the crisis occurred. Thailand was dependent, particularly for economic assistance to support the Cambodians, on China and the US.

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[100] Michael Leifer, *The ASEAN Regional Forum: Extending ASEAN's Model of Regional Security*, Adelphi Paper no 302, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996.
[101] Pao-Min, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam*.
[102] Pao-Min, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam*.
[103] Pao-Min, *Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam*.
[104] Ross, 'China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value of Coercive Diplomacy'.

Chinese aid to Thailand totalled $283 million from 1985 to 1989 alone, and the military also gained preferential access to advanced weapons technology and oil. This allowed the Thai military to control a fifth of the national budget by 1982, shoring up the capitalist dictatorship.[105]

Washington assisted the CGDK camps in Thailand with an input of US $20 million and annual aid ranging from US$17 million to US$32 million thereafter.[106] The US also transferred up to $5 million through international relief agencies to children within Cambodia.[107] Japan gave about US$5.8 million in assistance to Thailand between 1980 and 1984. During the same period Canada transferred about US$3.5 million. West Germany in 1981-1984 assisted Thailand by donating US$3.4 million.[108]

Thailand also requested the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), which was responsible for assisting the refugees, to assist about 80,000 Thai villagers. In 1984 alone, assistance given to Thai villagers who were affected by the refugee exodus and fighting on the border amounted to US$4,205,300.[109] Several International Organisations also assisted both the refugees and Thai villages. The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, had begun its assistance operation, including medical treatment, in 1975. UNICEF provided assistance in water supplies, medication and education worth US$2 million during 1980-1981.[110] Another international organisation that offered assistance was the World Food Program, which provided food assistance.

Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia were less dependent on such external assistance than Thailand. However, initiated by Singapore, ASEAN gave military aid to CGDK. Jakarta was unwilling to join or to legitimise ASEAN's behaviour. With Singapore leading the way, a covert Singaporean-Malaysian-Thai-American group was convened regularly in Bangkok to coordinate assistance to the CGDK. This included arms, ammunition, training, communication equipment, food and the establishment of a Khmer language radio station with British assistance. Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia spent around US$70 million.[111] Vietnam was dependent on the Soviet Union. Soviet officials provided material support

[105] Lee Jones, 'ASEAN intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to conditionality', *The Pacific Review*, 20:4, 2007, pp. 523-550.
[106] Jones, 'ASEAN intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to conditionality'.
[107] Sutter, *The Cambodian Crisis & US Policy Dilemmas*.
[108] Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University, *The Kampuchean Problem in Thai Perspective*, Asian Studies Monographs, No. 032, August 1985.
[109] Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University, *The Kampuchean Problem in Thai Perspective*.
[110] Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University, *The Kampuchean Problem in Thai Perspective*.
[110] Institute of Asian Studies Chulalongkorn University, *The Kampuchean Problem in Thai Perspective*.
[111] Jones, 'ASEAN intervention in Cambodia: from Cold War to conditionality.'

(over $3 billion a year in economic and military aid) to support Vietnam and PRK. In 1989, they reportedly gave Phnom Penh double the amount of military equipment delivered in 1988. However, aid levels dropped quickly after that. [112]

Vietnam had virtually no other choice to rely on but to the Soviet Union for the necessary economic assistance to rebuild the underdeveloped country. In late 1975, Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Working People's Party of Vietnam, signed a number of highly significant economic agreements in Moscow. One pledged 'coordination of national economic development plans' of the two countries,[113] while another promised a major Soviet guarantee of Vietnam's forthcoming five-year plan (1976-80). The Soviet Union was Vietnam's major aid donor and its largest trade partner. Moreover, Vietnam increased its exports to the Soviet Union by 157 per cent in the first six months of 1977 in its effort to pay off Soviet loans which had financed Hanoi's huge trade deficit. Finally, other than the small arms which came largely from China until the end of the war when Beijing terminated the flow, and the $5 billion worth of equipment left by the US forces in 1975, Vietnam's military hardware came from the Soviet Union.

Vietnam was also subject to an economic embargo by the US. The US finally ended its embargo. This was seen to be the main incentive that could be offered by the US in order to encourage Hanoi to press its client regime in Phnom Penh to be flexible over a Cambodian settlement. The US also exerted influence on the lending policies of international financial institutions and some influence on the lending policies of other sources, notably Japan.

The Role of Other External Powers

In order to envisage a more comprehensive picture of the crisis, the decisive role of external powers will be elaborated. Although they were not particularly aligned with any conflicting factions in the crisis or with Southeast Asian countries, their roles were crucial in helping ASEAN states bring peace to Cambodia.

Australia

Australia's involvement was recorded when Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden set out the principles which Australia considered necessary in seeking a settlement. Hayden's proposal was to pursue a comprehensive Cambodian solution based on:

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[112] Sutter, *The Cambodian Crisis & US Policy Dilemmas.*
[113] Robert C. Horn, 'Soviet-Vietnamese Relations and the Future of Southeast Asia', *Pacific Affairs,* 51:4, 1978-1979, pp. 585-605, pp. 585-605, p. 587.

> ... the acceptance by Vietnam of an appropriate accommodation with its neighbours; phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia matched by an effective arrangement to prevent Khmer Rouge forces going back into Cambodia; an act of self-determination for Cambodia; the creation of conditions for the peaceful return of displaced Cambodians to Cambodia; the acceptance by all parties that Cambodia is neutral, independent and non-aligned and the restoration of normal relations on the part of Vietnam with China, ASEAN and the west.[114]

However, such a proposal encountered resistance from ASEAN, particularly from Thailand and Singapore, and from China. Hayden continued to try to insert new ideas into the debate. A series of three seminars on Cambodia were held at Griffith University which brought representatives of all major contending parties together with the exception of the Khmer Rouge.[115] Hayden, later on in 1986, initiated a proposal for a tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge on charges of genocide as a way of improving the conditions for national reconciliation, but this proposal was not widely accepted.[116]

Australia's proposal was then developed by Gareth Evans, the successor of Hayden. Based on initial suggestions by Prince Sihanouk and US Congressman Stephen Solarz, Australia announced its proposal on 24 November 1989. This proposal sought an enhanced role for the UN in the transitional process. Unlike Hayden's proposal, this proposal quickly gained widespread support. From December 1989, Senator Evans' envoy, Michael Costello, did shuttle diplomacy, 'selling' the proposal to Southeast Asian countries. This proposal then became a reference for conflicting parties in the JIM.[117] With this proposal, Australia was able to cooperate actively with the ASEAN member states in looking towards a settlement. Senator Evans worked closely with Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, as Michael Maley, one of the contributors of the Red Book on the election part has observed:

> I am pretty sure the proposal was developed in a very close consultation with *Deplu*. When we were doing the actual drafting, it was the Australian exercise, but the ideas were being bounced around the other players to make sure that it was not going to make any embarrassment or cause difficulties to any party. Diplomacy associated with the ideas was starting at the same time as the document was being cooked together.[118]

He also argues that the Red Book was quite influential and useful in pursuing avenues towards a settlement. He particularly argues:

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[114] *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates,* vol. 134, House of Representatives, 7 December 1983, pp. 3404-09, quoted in Frank Frost, 'Labor and Cambodia', in David Lee and Christopher Waters,eds, *Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, Sydney*: Allen & Uwin, 1997, p. 203.

[115] Frank Frost, 'Labor and Cambodia', in David Lee and Christopher Waters,eds, *Evatt to Evans: The Labor Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy*, Sydney: Allen & Uwin, 1997.

[116] Hayden, *Hayden: An Autobiography*.

[117] Ken Berry, *Cambodia From Red to Blue Australia's Initiative for Peace*, Sydney, Allen & Uwin, 1997.

[118] Interview with Michael Maley, Special Adviser Electoral Reform and International Services, Australian Electoral Commission, Canberra, 8 August 2011.

It was quite influential in terms of the shape of the mission, and the model for a UN mission was ultimately embodied in the Paris Agreements and its annexes were reasonably quite close to what was in the Red Book. The proposal also gave a momentum to the process in which Australia was able to think through what should happen after the signing of the agreement. [119]

France

Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia requested on April 6, 1989 that the French President hold an International Conference with the goal of facilitating a resolution to the Cambodian problem. France responded positively the next day, with the French Foreign Minister stating: 'France confirms that it would be ready to accommodate the indispensable international conference intended to bring about and guarantee the restoration of peace in Cambodia'. Several other factors also encouraged France to host an International Conference on Cambodia. First, with its historical links with the Indochina region, it felt that it had a moral obligation to help to resolve the Cambodian crisis. Secondly, France had been maintaining contacts with Prince Sihanouk: Sihanouk had mentioned that the future Cambodian Constitution should resemble the French Constitution. Third, France also did not want a communist-dominated government in Cambodia. Fourth, as it was celebrating the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution of 1789, the French government had a desire to play a meaningful role in promoting peace and security in the world. Finally, it also wanted to establish a 'Francophone community world wide'.[120] France therefore requested that Indonesia serve as a Co-chairman of the PICC.

The mix of international changes and their subsequent effects, particularly after the Soviet introduced a new era of flexibility in foreign relations as the Soviet Union tried to curtail foreign involvements, helped the creation of a settlement. At the same time, relations between Beijing and Moscow had improved. Vietnam lost its economic assistance from the Soviet Union. This process started to create new incentives for terminating the crisis. It was then easier for ASEAN, Australia, and the Permanent Five, including France to contribute and propose a peace settlement as the conflicting parties had become more flexible. The overall balance of power dynamics is summarised in Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3.

[119] Interview with Michael Maley, Special Adviser Electoral Reform and International Services, Australian Electoral Commission, Canberra, 8 August 2011
[120] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*, p. 136.

TABLE 3.6
Summary of the Indicators of a Balancing System during the Cambodian crisis

No	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	Insignificant	Note
Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States					
A.	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors	√			
B.	Intentions of some states to expand			√	
C.	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests		√		
D.	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft			√	
Sub Total		1	1	2	
Balance of External Great Power Influence					
E.	Dependency on external great powers as security providers	√			Existed during the whole period but only relevant to settlement during the de-escalation period
F.	Alignment with external great powers	√			
G.	Military cooperation with external great powers	√			
H.	Distribution of external great powers' armed forces		√		
I.	Economic dependence on external great powers		√		
Sub Total		3	2	0	
Total		4	3	2	

Source: Compiled by author

FIGURE 3.3
Indicators of a Balancing System during the Cambodian Crisis[121]

Source: Compiled by author

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[121] Figure 3.3 combines a balance of power among ASEAN member states and a balance of great-power influence because scholars supporting the balancing idea often refer to both types.

Table 3.6 and Figure 3.3 reveal that the crisis management by ASEAN member states during the Cambodian crisis shows one significant indicator out of four associated with a balance of power among ASEAN member countries. The regional security system, however, was characterised by signs of a balance of external great power influence in which some ASEAN member states still depended on external security providers, and had some forms of alignment and military cooperation with external great powers. Three out of five indicators were associated with a balance of external great power influence and each indicator is rated as significant. Nevertheless, the region could not be considered to exhibit the full dynamic of a balance of external great power influence because two indicators, namely the distribution of great power armed forces and economic dependence on great powers, were not significant. The balance of external great power influence dynamic existed throughout the whole period of crisis, but was only relevant and important in the settlement of the crisis during the de-escalation period. The US and the Permanent Five began to move in from 1990. The Soviet's efforts to promote a 'détente' situation with other great powers and to coerce Vietnam to pursue similar policies towards its neighbour also occurred during the de-escalation period. Therefore, during the de-escalation period the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states indicated a balance of external great power influence. Because the external great powers were balancing towards an associative behaviour, it is fair to say that the crisis management during the de-escalation period was characterised as an 'associative balance of external great power behaviour'.

3.6. ASEAN as a Concert of Powers?

The final section provides an analysis of whether ASEAN worked as a concert of powers, as measured by the following indicators[122] listed in Box 3.2:

Box 3.3 The Seven Indicators of a Concert of Powers

A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order;
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers
C.	A pattern of cooperative behaviour;
D.	An effective equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers;
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms;
F.	A joint approach to regional issues; and
G.	A need for system stability and international order.

Each of the indicators of a concert of powers is treated as equally important. Table 3.3 provides a brief overview of each indicator of a concert of powers.

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[122] These indicators are adapted from the literature on the concert of powers (see Section 2.5).

TABLE 3.7
A Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian Crisis?

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
Concert of Powers						
A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order: **Significant**	For Indonesia, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was a shock to the region's stability.	For Thailand, besides being a shock to the region's stability, it was a shock to the country's stability.	For Malaysia, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was a shock to regional stability. There was also a fear of a spill-over effect.	For Singapore, besides being a shock to the region's stability, there was a fear of a spill-over effect.	It was a shock to the region's stability for the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam. However, it was not a decisive shock to their specific national interests.
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers: **Significant**	Countries had differences but were still cooperative. All dominant powers in Southeast Asia considered the crisis important and therefore there was a high and self-conscious level of cooperation. Meetings and conferences were held intensively and communication and negotiations were also conducted actively.				Limited self-conscious level of cooperation among the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam.
C.	A pattern of cooperative behaviour: **Significant**	A common pattern of cooperative behaviour was evident in the sense that the dominant powers were willing to cooperate to find a settlement. However, some particular patterns of behaviour disturbed the cooperative behaviour of dominant powers.				Prior to and during the crisis, the pattern of cooperative behaviour demonstrated by the Philippines was not too active or involved in the management of the crisis. Brunei only joined ASEAN in 1984 and

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
		Concert of Powers				
		During the crisis, the pattern was similar to Malaysia's. However, Indonesia was regarded as an interlocutor because of its close relations with Vietnam.	During the crisis, the pattern was similar to Singapore's.	During the crisis: the pattern was similar to Indonesia's.	During the crisis, the pattern was similar to Thailand's.	like the Philippines, it was not too active.
D.	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers: **Moderate**	The roles of the four members were relatively effective and equal. However, the roles were not always collectively predominant and interdependent.				Their roles were not effective or equal compared to the other four members: Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms: **Significant**	Indonesia carried out some summit diplomacy with Malaysia, for example the Kuantan Meeting. Indonesia's leader also met the Foreign Minister of Vietnam in August 1985. President Soeharto also met PM Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi on 16 November 1985.	Thailand leaders met with ASEAN, China, Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge, and the nationalist Cambodian leaders.	Malaysia carried out some summit diplomacy with Indonesia, for example, the Kuantan Meeting; and other ASEAN member states.	Singapore conducted summit diplomacy with ASEAN member states.	No individual summit diplomacy was identified.

No.	Indicators	Indonesia	Thailand	Malaysia	Singapore	The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam
		Concert of Powers				
		Supporting consultative mechanisms included: the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 12-13 January 1979, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bali, 28-30 June 1979, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 June 1980, the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) in New York in 1981, the Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1982 to establish CGDK, the Jakarta Informal Meetings in July 1988 and February 1989, International Conference on Cambodia in Jakarta in 1991.				
F.	A joint approach to regional issues: **Moderate**	There was a joint approach. However each country also pursued other approaches individually.				
G.	A need for system stability and international order: **Significant**	There was a need for system stability and international order.				
		Indonesia considered the need for system stability and international order as its primary objective.	Thailand also saw the need for system stability. However its national interests as the most affected country came first.	Malaysia saw the need for system stability and the need for avoiding the rivalry of external great powers. One of the reasons for Malaysia's need for system stability was the fact that it also became host of Cambodian refugees.	Singapore perceived a need for system stability. However, the need for the prevention of Vietnamese hegemony in Southeast Asia came first.	The Philippines and Brunei also saw the need for regional stability.

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

A. A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order

The crisis can be regarded as a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order for several reasons. First of all, it violated the rule of the international states system, namely respect for national sovereignty which had been stipulated as the core principle of ASEAN in 1976. Failure to respond would have discredited ASEAN and created a dangerous precedent. The Vietnamese invasion was a blatant case of aggression that altered the strategic environment in Southeast Asia.

Secondly, a member state of ASEAN, Thailand, faced a direct external threat to its national security in the presence of Vietnamese military troops on its border. The other member states faced an indirect threat, the flow of predominately Indochinese refugees. This concern was shared by countries like Malaysia and Singapore. Indonesia's concerns were more about regional stability and the cessation of hope of establishing stable relations with Hanoi. The Cambodian crisis was the main priority of ASEAN for almost 20 years. Scholars such as Emmers contend that no comparable anxiety was demonstrated with Indonesia's entry into East Timor in 1975 and Malaysia's challenge over the legitimacy of Brunei Darussalam.[123] It is also often argued that Vietnam invaded its neighbour either to create an Indochinese federation under its control or to respond to a Chinese threat on its south-western border. General Vo Nguyen Giap, leading strategist and founding father of the People's Army of Vietnam, had then declared:

> Indochina is a strategic unit: a single theatre of operations. Therefore, we have the task of helping to liberate all of Indochina —especially for reasons of strategic geography, we cannot conceive of Vietnam completely independent while Cambodia and Laos are ruled by imperialism.[124]

Finally, it was feared that the strategic influence of external powers like China, Soviet and the US would result in more complication. The Cambodian crisis was related to the Sino-Soviet split. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and its hegemony over Laos was unacceptable to China. The PRC was highly suspicious of Hanoi's alignment with Moscow and perceived the occupation of Cambodia as part of a regional expansion by the Soviet Union. The invasion of Cambodia received financial assistance from the Soviet Union, whose regional presence increased in early 1979 through its military deployment at the air and naval bases at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay. Interestingly, although the US shared the same concern with China, it had scaled down its military involvement in Southeast Asia and was initially unwilling to demonstrate an active response to the power shift in Indo China. Out of fear of the revival of communism and the greater influence of China, Indonesia and Malaysia supported Thailand and

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[123] Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*.
[124] Gareth Porter, 'Vietnamese Policy and the Indochina Crisis', in David W.P. Elliot ed., *The Third Indochina Conflict*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1981, p. 69.

Singapore, who saw Vietnam as posing a greater threat than China, in condemning the Vietnamese aggressive action.

This complex situation united the ASEAN member countries in assuming a common response for the need of regional order and stability. Rooted in the aspiration of the founding states, ASEAN's principal concern was and still is to establish a framework for regional order. Even though security did not formally become part of its agenda until its fourth summit in January 1992, the Association's success in its first 25 years was primarily in the political-security realm.[125] In fact, internal security and stability are major preoccupations of the ASEAN states and have significant regional implications, but the responsibility for addressing domestic conflicts is assigned almost entirely to each member state.[126]

B. A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers

Countries with strong interests, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore showed a self-conscious level of cooperation with considerable awareness of fellow countries' interests. This chapter argues that the dominant powers in ASEAN during the crisis were Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, and all demonstrated high commitment throughout the crisis. ASEAN, at that time, had not envisaged or formulated any conflict management in relation to conflicts involving non-member states. However, the dominant powers demonstrated a high and self-conscious level of cooperation, as shown by the intensity of the dialogue, meetings, conferences, and mediation sessions that ASEAN convened on the Cambodian issue.

Because of its geographic location and military links with the US, the Philippines did not feel threatened by either Vietnam or China. Consequently, the Philippines, unlike the other four members of ASEAN, did not play a significant role in the crisis. Similar to the Philippines, Brunei also did not show a high and self-conscious level of cooperation pertaining to the management of the Cambodian crisis after joining ASEAN in 1984. It, however, was willing to be host to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in January and July 1989.

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[125] Muthiah Alagappa, 'Regionalism and the Quest for Security: ASEAN and the Cambodian Conflict', *Journal of International Affairs*, 46:2, 1993, pp. 439-467.
[126] ASEAN, 'Declaration of ASEAN Concord', available at http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm (accessed on 13 July 2010). As of December 2012, the ASEAN Secretariat's website has been reconstructed. Some of the links cited in this thesis may have been changed. The main link for the Secretariat's website now is www.asean.org.

C. A pattern of cooperative behaviour

The pattern of cooperative behaviour did exist but had been changing from the early 1970s up to the Paris Agreements in 1991. In this chapter, I argue that the pattern of cooperative behaviour in the early 1970s revealed Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand to be in one group and Malaysia and the Philippines in another group; these groups shared similar perspectives towards regional security. While Singapore and Thailand wanted a US presence in the region, Indonesia wanted ASEAN to play a greater role. These three countries, therefore, were less sympathetic towards Malaysia's proposal of the principle of neutralisation. The Philippines, interestingly, despite its close alignment with the US, welcomed the Malaysian proposal as it aspired to engage China in the region.

Leifer argues that it was difficult for ASEAN to formulate a common response to this crisis. Its member states have never possessed a legal responsibility for collective defence.[127] ASEAN member states indeed held diverse perspectives and interests in how to define regional security and in how they viewed the conflict. However, ASEAN finally achieved a common stance on this issue. Its common values can be seen in several phases of the crisis.

After the Vietnamese occupation in Cambodia in late December 1978, the pattern of cooperative behaviour changed. Pre-crisis, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand could be located in one group while Malaysia and Thailand were in the other group. Right after Vietnam invaded Cambodia, Thailand and Singapore perceived Vietnam as a threat and were together regarded as a 'hard-liner' group while Indonesia and Malaysia perceived China as a threat to regional stability and were known as a 'soft-liner' group. The Philippines abstained from the debate. This pattern, however, led to a single stance of working together to resolve the problem. The single stance invigorated cooperative behaviour among the ASEAN states.

D. An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers

The roles of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore were relatively effective and equal, although it is hard to say that the group was fully collective, predominant or interdependent. There were instances when they demonstrated themselves to be a collective, predominant and interdependent group of dominant powers. No one country claimed to be the decision maker. No one country became so angry or was disturbed by another country's perspective which was different from its own.

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[127] Michael Leifer, 'ASEAN and the problem of common response', *International Journal,* 38:2, 1983, pp. 316-329.

However, the dominant powers did not always share the same strategic outlook and this was due to a long-established different emphasis by Indonesia and Malaysia on the one hand, and Thailand and Singapore on the other hand. Those differences were evident quite soon after the 'Kuantan Declaration'. Meanwhile, the role of the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam were not equal compared to other four ASEAN members.

Because the roles of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore were effective and equal and were considerably predominant and interdependent, the 'effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers' indicator can be regarded as moderate.

E. Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms

High Level Diplomacy

The various institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms suggest that this indicator is significant. Institutionalised high level diplomacy included: the Kuantan Meeting in 1980, the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, 12-13 January 1979, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bali, 28-30 June 1979, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25-26 June 1980, the International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) in New York in 1981, the Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1982 to establish CGDK, the Jakarta Informal Meetings in July 1988 and February 1989, International Conference on Cambodia in Jakarta in 1991. Among these meetings, the Kuantan Meeting was the only summit of leaders. The declaration, joint statements and other outcomes of these meetings led to ASEAN's success in gathering international support for a settlement at various international meetings.

On 9 January 1979, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Professor Mochtar Kusumaatmadja formulated the initial ASEAN response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. However, the statement did not mention Vietnam in order to preserve a possible form of dialogue with the country. A special meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers was held in Bangkok on 12-13 January 1979 and led to a stronger position being taken that condemned the invasion. The Joint Statement of 12 January declared: 'The ASEAN Foreign Ministers strongly deplored the armed intervention against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Kampuchea'.[128] In addition, it asserted the right of the 'Kampuchean people to determine their future by themselves free from

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[128] ASEAN, 'Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asia Region, Bangkok, Thailand, 12 January 1979', available at www.aseansec.org/3708.htm (accessed on 21 September 2011).

interference or influence from outside powers in the exercise of their rights of self-determination and called for the immediate and total withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchean territory'.[129]

This response was repeated in the joint communiqué of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting organised in Bali on 28-30 June 1979. ASEAN's diplomatic response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was brought to the UN in 1979. Soeharto and the Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn discussed how the satisfaction of interest in Cambodia might be achieved at Kuantan, Malaysia, in March 1980. The 'Kuantan Declaration' proposed a political settlement that specifically recognised Hanoi's security interests in Kampuchea. Cambodia should be made neutral and non-aligned with a maximum degree of autonomy, but Hanoi would exercise 'effective veto power over much of Cambodia's defence and foreign policy'.[130]

Informal Meetings

The JIMs were examples of informal meetings and also paved the way for the 1989 Paris Peace Conference and the 1991 Paris Accord. The First JIM in Bogor provided a breakthrough in the peace process. The four Kampuchean parties sat down together at the same table, free from any outside influence, to discuss independently their own affairs. The first JIM had provided a vivid example of how through an informal meeting, a problem could be discussed and negotiated.

Other informal meetings included talks between the Foreign Ministries of Indonesia and Vietnam in Ho Chi Minh City in July 1987, followed by the talks between Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen in late 1987. Indonesian and Vietnamese officials also visited each other at least nine times seeking to explore ways to conduct dialogues with Vietnam. Indonesia's visits can be traced back to May 1980 when General Murdani, Indonesia's Military Intelligence Chief, visited Hanoi to draw out from his counterpart. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach, Vietnam's views on Cambodia. On 3-4 September, Murdani paid a second visit to Hanoi to discuss the Cambodian problem with Vietnam Foreign Minister, Thach. Almost three years later, Murdani paid another three day visit on 13 February 1984 as Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces. This time, his trip was termed an 'official visit' for the Indonesian Foreign Minister was informed in advance of the visit. He sought to impress Vietnam that Indonesia was trying to look for an early solution to the Cambodian crisis in the wider interests of the region.

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[129] ASEAN, 'Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Current Political Development in the Southeast Asia Region'.
[130] Serpong Peou, *Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Towards Democracy?*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2000, p. 140.

The Vietnamese Defence Minister returned Murdani's visit in April 1985, reaffirming the deepening friendship and relationship between Indonesia and Vietnam. Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach visited Jakarta in August 1985 to talk with Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and President Suharto. In July 1987, Mochtar made a visit to Vietnam to convey a message from Prince Sihanouk to the Vietnamese leaders and also to discuss and finalise his 'Cocktail Party' proposal. The Joint Press Release said that the proposed talks would be held in an 'informal way' between the two sides of Kampuchea on the basis of equal footing without preconditions and with no political label.[131]

On 21 November 1987, Vo Van Kiet, Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam visited Jakarta , and praised Indonesian foreign policy for its substantial contribution to the promotion of peace and stability in the world in general and Southeast Asia in particular. Following the signing of the Mochtar-Thach agreement, the two countries formed a high level group consisting of senior Foreign Ministry Officials. This working group met twice, first on 23-24 November 1987 and then on 21-23 December 1987 to prepare the groundwork for the 'Cocktail Party'.[132] Another meeting that was recorded was Alatas' visit to Hanoi on 17-19 November 1988 to discuss various aspects of the crisis with Vietnam and to seek Vietnam's support for the JIM II.[133]

F. A joint approach to regional issues

The joint approach by ASEAN can be seen in the first (1978- mid 1980s) and second phases (mid 1980s-1990) of the acute period. During the first phase, ASEAN made several efforts to manage the crisis. In these efforts, ASEAN presented a united voice. These efforts included, firstly, ASEAN making clear its stance that it was against the Vietnamese military intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 and the subsequent overthrow of the existing government and the establishment of the pro-Vietnamese government —the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) in early January 1979. Secondly, ASEAN's role in establishing the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982 was also crucial. ASEAN encouraged the formation of the Khmer resistance coalition in 1982 and successfully led efforts at the UN to deny international acceptance of Vietnam's presence.[134] Thirdly, ASEAN was also regarded as successful in generating international condemnation and isolation of Vietnam. ASEAN's lobbying for support from other countries in the UN proved triumphant as a

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[131] ASEAN, 'Joint Press Release of the Informal ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Bangkok, 16 August 1987), available at http://www.aseansec.org/3700.html (accessed on 21 July 2011).
[132] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*.
[133] Prasad, *Indonesia's Role in the Resolution of the Cambodian Problem*.
[134] Frank Frost, 'The Cambodia Conflict: the Path towards Peace', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 13:2, 1991, pp. 119-161.

growing majority of member-states of the UN supported the ASEAN position in the General Assembly during the 1980s.[135]

Throughout the 1980s, the General Assembly adopted resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia, criticising the military intervention in the country and expressing support for the struggle of the opposition coalition. ASEAN's success was also reflected in the declaration of a July 1981 ASEAN-initiated, UN sponsored International Conference on Kampuchea. The declaration also called for total withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, emphasised the right of the Cambodian people to self-determination and stressed the need for Cambodia to remain non-aligned in order to safeguard the legitimate security concerns of its neighbours.[136]

In mobilising international support for its goals, the ASEAN member states successfully used their membership in the UN, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the British Commonwealth, as well as ASEAN's dialogue partnership with the US, the European Community, Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.

During the second phase of the acute period, the approach adopted by ASEAN member states was not directed against Vietnam. Instead, ASEAN members gradually changed their perceptions towards Vietnam and the relations between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries gradually improved. This development is identified in several activities: (i) Indonesia-Vietnam dialogue in 1987; (ii) discussions between the Cambodia parties, the ASEAN members, Laos and Vietnam from 1987-1988; (iii) Jakarta Informal Meeting in 1988; and (iv) total withdrawal from Cambodia in September 1989. The involvement of 'dominant powers' in the Paris Agreements in October 1991 was evidence that they also played a role in the de-escalation period even though external great powers took charge. This change of approach was also related to the change of government in Bangkok. Chatichai Choonhavan, who became Prime Minister in August 1988, abandoned the hard-line position of Thailand and adopted a new step-by step approach to the resolution of the conflict. Bangkok was then prepared —at least in the short term— to accept some Vietnamese political influence in Cambodia and Laos in return for a settlement.

G. A need for system stability and international order

The indicator, a need for system stability and international order, is rated as significant. Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer define 'stability' as 'the probability that the system

[135] Ramses Amer, 'Regional integration and conflict management: the case of Vietnam', *Asia Europe Journal,* 2:4, 2004, pp. 533-547.
[136] Alagappa, 'Regionalism and the Quest for Security'.

retains all of its essential characteristics: that no single nation becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur'. It is a characteristic of such a system; Deutsch and Singer add that it has the capacity for self-regulation: the ability to counteract stimuli that would otherwise threaten its survival, much as the automatic pilot on an airplane or the governor on a steam engine would do.[137] Looking at these definitions, I argue that there was a need for system stability and international order during the Cambodian crisis. This indicator is significant because all ASEAN member states considered the system's stability and international order were crucial during the crisis. What made a difference between Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore were their efforts in managing the crisis. Big efforts were demonstrated by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. The efforts included meetings between leaders, negotiations between officials, visits to Vietnam and other ASEAN member states, and negotiations with external parties. In conclusion, the above analysis is rated in Table 3.8 and Figure 3.4.

TABLE 3.8
Summary of the Indicators of a Concert of Powers during the Cambodian Crisis

No	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	Insignificant	Note
A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order	√			Significant particularly during the acute period
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers	√			Significant throughout the period
C.	A pattern of cooperative behaviour	√			Significant throughout the perioud
D.	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers		√		Moderate troughout the period
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms	√			Significant particularly during the acute period
F.	A joint approach to regional issues		√		Moderate throughout the acute period
G.	A need for system stability and international order	√			Significant throughout the acute period
	Total	5	2	0	

Source: Compiled by author

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[137] Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability', in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, rev. edn, New York: Free Press, 1969.

FIGURE 3.4
Indicators a Concert of Powers during the Cambodian Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 3.8 and Figure 3.4 together reveal that ASEAN fulfilled most of the indicators of a concert of powers in this crisis. These indicators are: a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order; a high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers; a pattern of cooperative behaviour; institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms; and a need for system stability and international order.

I argue that these indicators show that the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states during the Cambodian crisis in five out of seven indicators is similar but not identical with a classical concert of powers and each is rated as significant. Two indicators are considered moderate. The crisis management did not indicate any insignificant indicator at all. Therefore, it is fair to say that the management of this crisis indicated a modification of a classical concert of powers. However, because most of the significant indicators were important only during the acute period, the regional security system in Southeast Asia during the Cambodian crisis indicated a modification of a concert of powers only during the acute period of the crisis. As explained earlier in Section 3.5, the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states indicated the existence of a balance of external great power influence during the de-escalation period. Because two indicators of a concert of powers are not evident, this observation requires me to hypothesise that it may be necessary, after examining the other case studies, to introduce another type of security concept whose indicators are variations of the classical concert.

3.7. Conclusion: A Variation of a Concert of Powers?

The crisis management during the Cambodian crisis certainly did not indicate the existence of a fully-fledged security community because only a minority of the four

significant indicators of the total ten indicators was indicated, and those four significant indicators were only demonstrated among the regional dominant powers. I argue that the nature of the crisis management indicated the existence of a balance of external great power influence during the de-escalation period. The de-escalation period was relevant to the management of the crisis because the external great powers, China, US and Soviet Union started to change their behaviour towards the crisis in early 1990 when the crisis was de-escalating.

During the acute period, the regional security system in Southeast Asia was explained by the majority (five out of seven) of the indicators associated with a concert of powers. Dominant powers, during that period, acted largely but not completely like a concert of powers. There are some unique characteristics that are different from the classical conceptualisation of the concert of powers. First of all, the term 'concert of powers' usually comes with the notion of great powers. Instead of great world powers, the concert in Southeast Asia involved the 'regional dominant powers' — Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Furthermore, the term 'concert of powers' includes the notion that military forces could be used by the great powers to restore order in the region. However, in Southeast Asia the use of force to restore the region's order and stability was unthinkable. Diplomatic means was the main joint approach of the concerts in the region.

Because of these unique characteristics, it is now necessary to consider whether a modified conceptualisation of a concert of powers is required to characterise the security system in Southeast Asia. The analysis in the next two case studies will therefore include observations about the possible variation of a classical classical concert of powers which could potentially provide the basis for indicators of a new conceptualisation of a concert of powers.

The management of the Cambodian crisis also demonstrates that there was unequal sharing of responsibility among ASEAN member states. Countries like the Philippines did not participate actively because of the geographical separation, thus the crisis did not directly threaten its national interests. Furthermore, the benefit for the Philippines of being inactive in this crisis exceeded the benefit of being active because of the political domestic challenges Manila encountered during the period of the crisis. Meanwhile, Brunei Darussalam was hardly involved because it was a relatively new member, the crisis did not directly threaten its national interests, and it did not have the capacity to assist in managing the crisis. The next chapter examines a possible connection between the management of the East Timor crisis by the ASEAN member states and the regional security systems operating during that crisis.

CHAPTER 4

THE 1999-2002 EAST TIMOR CRISIS

4.1. Introduction

In 1999, ASEAN confronted another challenge, the East Timor crisis.[1] This was one of the most serious crises that ASEAN member states have coped with and it put ASEAN's international image at stake. For the purpose of explaining how ASEAN's role helps shed light on the regional security system in Southeast Asia, this chapter determines the period of the crisis to be between 27 January 1999 and 20 May 2002. The East Timor crisis started on 27 January 1999 when the Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced a referendum for East Timor in which the East Timorese could opt for independence or accept Indonesia's proposal for autonomy. It ended when the East Timorese gained independence in May 2002. This period is selected because, during this time ASEAN member states demonstrated their serious involvement, unlike before, particularly when Indonesia took over East Timor as its territory and ASEAN member countries remained silent.

In this chapter, I argue that during the escalation and acute periods the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states is characterised by the external influence of the UN, Australia, particularly of the US as an external great power. Their management did not however indicate a balance of external great power influence because the principle of balance was not evident. During the de-escalation period, the crisis management is characterised as meeting seven out of ten indicators of a security community, and each indicator is rated as significant. However, because the significant indicators are only met by those countries that participated and not all member states of ASEAN, I argue that a partial security community is indicated. The dominant powers in this crisis are Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the same countries which participated actively in the Cambodian crisis. In addition, the Philippines became a new 'dominant power' during the de-escalation period of this crisis.

ASEAN member states were concerned about the crisis because it represented a serious challenge to the ASEAN organisation, and it came from East Timor, which was part of Indonesia, one of the biggest ASEAN members and is argued to be one of the dominant powers in Southeast Asia. Most of the ASEAN member states appeared to be awkward

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[1] Since its official recognition as an independent country, the official name of East Timor is Timor-Leste. This chapter is about the management of the East Timor crisis by ASEAN member states, but I refer to the organisation where it is relevant.

in responding to this crisis. [2] On the one hand, they did not want to jeopardise their relationship with Indonesia, and on the other hand, they were worried that instability in East Timor would affect the regional and their national security. The bordering neighbours, such as Singapore and Malaysia, generally sensed a greater urgency to respond to the crisis than more distant neighbours, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.

This chapter comprises seven sections. Following the introduction, the second section starts with a brief background on how the crisis escalated, became acute and finally de-escalated. The third section further sets out the ASEAN member states' different perceptions of threats during this crisis. The fourth section examines why the response of ASEAN member states to the East Timor crisis does not provide evidence that there was a balancing system, either a balancing system among the ASEAN member states or a balance of external great power influence. However, it demonstrates that an external great power, the US, and other external powers had leverage in influencing the response of Southeast Asian states to the East Timor crisis, particularly during the escalation and the acute periods of the crisis. The fifth section analyses why the management of the crisis is not completely explained by the indicators of a concert of powers. An examination of how the role of ASEAN member states in this crisis demonstrates some indicators of a security community among the participating powers is elaborated in the sixth section. A brief conclusion summarises the finding of this chapter.

4.2. Background

For the purpose of analysis, the East Timor crisis is divided into three periods: (i) a period of escalation, between the time when President Habibie announced a referendum and when the result of the referendum was announced (27 January – 30 August 1999); (ii) an acute period, between the announcement of the result of the referendum, in which the majority of East Timorese voted for independence and the announcement by Habibie to allow an international peace-keeping force to restore security (30 August – 15 September 1999); (iii) a period of de-escalation, when Habibie allowed an international peace-keeping force to enter to when East Timor's independence was acknowledged in May 2002 (15 September 1999 – 20 May 2002).

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[2] By the time the crisis started in 1999, ASEAN already had 10 members: the original five member countries; Brunei who joined in 1984; Vietnam which entered the organisation in 1995; Myanmar and Lao PDR which entered in 1997; and Cambodia which became a member in 1999.

Escalation Period

The crisis began when the Indonesian President Habibie announced a proposal of a referendum in which the people East Timor could vote for independence or accept Indonesia's autonomy. This proposal was mostly stimulated by four major events that really incited the world's interest in East Timor: the Santa Cruz massacre; the case of Portugal versus Australia in the International Court of Justice (ICJ); the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Belo; and the capture of Xanana Gusmao by the Indonesian government. Another factor that influenced Habibie's decision to open up an option for independence was the Australian Prime Minister's letter to President Habibie.

These four major events occurred in a sequence. The first event is known as 'the Santa Cruz massacre'. On 12 November 1991, a group of people went to a burial ceremony for a friend who had died two days previously. This event was used by this group to protest against the Indonesian military's repression in East Timor. It stimulated tension with the military and ended up with the killing of some protesters. A key point was that it was captured on film. Due to this event, opposition to Indonesia's rule in East Timor increased. The Catholic Church also raised this issue and it gained popular attention around the world. After the event, the Portuguese government increasingly championed the East Timorese issue in international fora, including the UN. The second event that also attracted international attention was the capture of Xanana Gusmao on 20 November 1992. Because of international pressure, in 1993 his sentence was commuted from life imprisonment to 20 years in prison. Also because of international pressure, on 20 June 1998, President Habibie offered to free Xanana Gusmao, withdraw troops and establish a state of autonomy in East Timor. An intriguing argument asserted by Suhardi Somomoeljono is that if Habibie had not freed Xanana Gusmao, Xanana would have been happy to accept autonomy for East Timor and the position of Governor for himself.[3] The third event was the Australia versus Portugal case on 30 June 1995, resulting in a judgement of the ICJ on the 'Timor Gap Treaty'. In this case, Portugal challenged the legality of the so-called 'Timor Gap Treaty', negotiated between the Australian government and the Indonesian government to put forward a 'joint development of petroleum resources in an area of overlapping maritime jurisdiction' between Australia and East Timor'.[4] The fourth event was when Bishop Carlos Belo of Dili and Jose Ramos Horta, who was the most prominent international spokesman for East Timor, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996. This award raised the issue of

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[3] Suhardi Somomoeljono, *Menguak Konspirasi Internasional di Timor Timur Sebuah Analisis Yuridis*, (Exploring an International Conspiracy in East Timor: a Juridical Analysis) Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Advokasi Independensi Peradilan Indonesia, 2001.
[4] William Maley, 'The UN and East Timor', *Pacifica Review*, 12:1, 2000, pp. 63-76, p. 66.

Timorese independence, not only in terms of publicity but also in terms of moral authority. It was also a shock for Indonesia as the prize givers doubtless intended.[5]

Another event that is also often argued by scholars to have influenced Habibie's decision to allow the option for independence was the letter sent to Habibie by the Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet of Australia (at the time PM&C) suggested the Australian Prime Minister send a letter to President Habibie. According to Hugh White, the letter, which was signed on 19 December 1998, highlighted that:

> Australia wanted East Timor to remain part of Indonesia, and the proposal it made for an act of self-determination was couched clearly in the context of the discussions already underway between Indonesia and Portugal and East Timor's future in the UN. [6]

On the one hand, Australia wanted East Timor to remain part of Indonesia, and on the other, it proposed a self determination act. This rather contradictory proposal was an obvious policy shift, from fully supporting Indonesia's inclusion of East Timor in 1975 to proposing the principle of self determination.[7] It was not clear whether Howard's letter became a major factor in Habibie's decision to open up the option for independence. However, it created 'pressure' on Habibie.

Previously, Habibie had locked in a seven-month timetable for the UN to supervise the ballot despite the UN's request for a longer time-frame. Habibie's refusal to allow a longer time-frame was suspect because by the later time stipulated he would probably no longer be President and his successor might change the policy on East Timor.[8]

Indonesia and Portugal, under the auspices of the UN reached an agreement on 5 May 1999 to give the UN a mandate to consult the people of East Timor whether to accept or reject Indonesia's offer of autonomy. Based on the agreement, the Secretary-General of the UN set up a special mission for East Timor (United Nation Mission in East Timor/UNAMET) in the same month. On 30 August, 78.5 per cent of East Timorese voted for independence, with 98 per cent of those enrolled casting their votes.

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[5] Maley, 'The UN and East Timor'.
[6] Hugh White, 'The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor December 1998-September 1999', *Security Challenges*, 2008, 4:1, pp. 69-87, p. 72.
[7] White, 'The Road to INTERFET'.
8 Damien Kingsbury, 'East Timor to 1999' in Damien Kingsbury, ed., *Guns and ballot boxes: East Timor's vote for independence*, Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2000.

Acute Period

The crisis escalated from the day when the result of the popular consultation was announced, and the militia did not accept the result of the consultation. Fighting between militia and independence supporters caused much destruction and many deaths in the territory. Hundreds East Timorese were estimated to have been killed; many were forced to flee into the hills or into West Timor. It has been estimated that the number killed was 'greatly in excess of 1000 persons and more than 250,000 people were transported under Indonesian and militia control to West Timor'.[9] The UNAMET was also forced to withdraw. Indonesia lacked the capability to deal with this situation: this was when the crisis became critical, and Indonesia needed help.

During the acute period of the crisis, Indonesia was put under pressure by the UN, the US, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and regional neighbours through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Meeting. The US indicated that it wished for Australian leadership in an East Timor intervention.[10] It also put pressure on Indonesia to accept an international peace-keeping force in East Timor. The commander-in-chief of the US forces in the Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair, met General Wiranto, who was the Commander of the Indonesian military, in Jakarta on 8 September 1999, and announced that military ties between the US and Indonesia were to be suspended.[11] The external pressures on Indonesia are further elaborated in the 'balancing system' section (Section 4.4) of this chapter.

Australia played a key role during the APEC Meetings held in Auckland, in September 1999. Australia tried to persuade APEC member countries to be part of the 'coalition of the willing' in persuading Indonesia to agree to an international peace-keeping force entering East Timor and contributing to the peace-keeping force.[12] Following the special meeting of APEC Foreign Ministers in Auckland on September 8 1999, the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting (AELM) lent considerable momentum to international pressure on Indonesia to end the bloodshed and address the humanitarian crisis in East Timor. This culminated in the announcement in the early hours of 13 September by President Habibie to accept UN peace-keepers.[13]

De-escalation Period

The crisis slowed down after Habibie's announcement that Indonesia would agree to UN peace-keepers. After the announcement, the UNSC acted decisively and

[9] Michael G. Smith and Moreen Dee, *Peace-keeping in East Timor the Path to Independence,* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 44.
[10] White, 'The Road to INTERFET'.
[11] Damien Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty,* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
[12] James Cotton, 'Against the Grain: East Timor Intervention', *Survival,* 43:1, 2001, pp. 127-142, p. 132.
[13] Smith and Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the Path to Independence.*

unanimously to authorise a peace enforcement under Resolution 1264 of 15 September. The mandate was under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and provided the Multi National Force (MNF) with 'all necessary measures' to restore security and deal forcefully with the militias and other threats.[14]

The arrival of INTERFET further abated the tension. Led by Major General Peter Cosgrove, an experienced infantry officer from Australia, INTERFET began its deployment in Dili on 20 September 1999. By the end of September, INTERFET's headquarters were fully operational and more than 4,000 troops had been deployed.[15] By 1 November, a force of over 8,200 was operating and security had been slowly restored.[16] As the coalition strengthened and more forces arrived, INTERFET continued to maintain security, countered militia activity and maintained cooperation with the Indonesian military, *Tentara National Indonesia* (TNI), to manage the border following the TNI's final withdrawal from East Timor on 1 November. The coalition comprised a majority of Australian troops, supported by forces from Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Denmark, Fiji, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand, the UK and the US.[17] The US provided logistics support and intelligence capabilities.[18]

Under the UNSC Resolution 1272 of 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was established to provide peace-keeping to maintain security and order; to facilitate and coordinate relief assistance to East Timorese people; to facilitate the emergency rehabilitation of East Timor's physical infrastructure; to administer East Timor and create functional state structures for sustainable governance and the rule of law; and to assist in the drafting and conducting of elections.[19] UNTAET was led by the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative (SRSG), Sergio Vieira de Mello from Brazil and later by Lieutenant-General Jaime de los Santos from the Philippines as its Supreme Commander. Interestingly, while Michael Smith argues that INTERFET and UNTAET were successful,[20] external observers, such as Damien Kingsbury argue that there were many flaws in the operation. Kingsbury argues that the UN staff was largely unsuited to the task and had no understanding of the reconstruction and development context.[21]

[14] Smith and Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the Path to Independence*, p. 45.
[15] Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty*.
[16] Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty*.
[17] Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty*.
[18] Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty*.
[19] Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty*.
[20] Smith and Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the Path to Independence*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
[21] Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty*.

4.3. The Differing Threat Perceptions

ASEAN member countries held a diverse range of perceptions of threat about the East Timor crisis. Understanding the perceptions of threat of ASEAN member states is important for further investigation of their behaviour and their contribution during the crisis. The perceptions of threat range from the threat to regional stability and countries to the threat of a domino effect of separatism. While all ASEAN member states were concerned that the instability in Indonesia would affect their security or at least regional security, some countries like Thailand and Philippines feared that the spirit of independence would influence separatist movements in their countries, particularly in Southern Thailand and the Southern Philippines. For Indonesia itself, its perception of threat was more complex and derived from both the international and domestic communities. The threat perceptions of each ASEAN member state are elaborated below.

Thailand

Thailand's perception of threat was based on four factors. First, the threat of Indonesia's breaking-up was the biggest threat for Thailand. Thailand, like any other country in Southeast Asia wished for regional peace and stability. The possibility of Indonesia's break-up would certainly affect Thailand's domestic politics and economy. Second, Thailand was anxious that the East Timor crisis would somehow impact on the Muslim separatist movements in its southern province. At the time of the August ballot almost 80 per cent of the Thai Army feared that Western interference in East Timor could be 'a Pandora's Box' for a similar scene in Thailand.[22] Third, similar to Malaysia, Thailand was also concerned that it might be politically damaging to allow Australia to lead an international force into Southeast Asia. This might be interpreted that ASEAN's lack of capacity to address regional problems on its own terms and indicated the limits of its ability to maintain regional stability. This anxiety was reaffirmed by the statement of Thai Deputy Foreign Minister M.R. Sukumbhand Paribatra:

> We in ASEAN have been saying since 1971 that we want the region to be free from outside interference. Now a problem has arisen that can lead to outside interference in regional affairs. So we must do something about it – we cannot logically stand still and do nothing – we must put our words into action.[23]

Finally, the downgrading of ASEAN's international image was also considered a threat by Thailand. Thai Foreign Minister Pitsuwan was very cautious in his words with regard to this crisis and in his separate consultations with APEC members on East

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[22] Alan Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54:2, 2000, pp. 163-170, p. 165.
[23] Jürgen Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 3, 2003, pp. 57-87, p. 67.

Timor. [24] Thailand was among the countries which had recognised Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor in December 1975 and had been supportive of Jakarta's position ever since.

The Philippines

The Philippines' perceptions of threat during the crisis were similar to those of Thailand. Apart from the worry that instability in Indonesia would jeopardise regional stability, the Philippines did not want to be seen to support any separatism movement. The economic relationship with Indonesia was among its concerns. Indonesia's investment in the country was estimated at around US$700 million in 1999. [25] Any disturbance to political relations with Indonesia might bring about negative impacts on Manila's economic interests.

Malaysia

For Malaysia, the biggest threat was a Western interference in the region. Malaysia's perception of the West being a threat was based on its suspicion of Western countries' efforts to internationalise the dispute. Like Indonesia, it was unhappy with the UNSC decision to let the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) and the UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) operate under the mandate of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. [26] The then Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad expressed his criticism of the East Timor crisis and blamed the West for the crisis. He argued that Indonesian President, B.J. Habibie was pressured by the West in finally providing the option of a referendum while many East Timorese had been well integrated with Indonesia. [27] Mahathir claimed that Indonesia was experiencing difficult timing in making the decision because the internal situation was a mixed condition of political transition, and economic recovery. [28] Mahathir also accused the West of having double standards in rejecting East Timor's integration into Indonesia while closing their eyes to similar situations in other countries. [29] Many Southeast Asian countries shared Mahathir views because the majority of the states were experiencing ethnic disputes, separatist movements or demands for independence.

Malaysia also saw Australia's domination as a threat, as Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi stated:

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[24] Kavi Chongkittavorn, 'ASEAN peace-keepers must go to Timor', *The Nation*, 13 September 1999.
[25] Sony Inbaraj, *East Timor Blood and Tears in ASEAN*, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1997.
[26] Chapter VII of the UN Charter permits UNSC-authorised forces to take coercive and forceful measures as necessary to fulfill their mission and mandate.
[27] Dupont, 'ASEAN's response to the East Timor Crisis'.
[28] Dupont, 'ASEAN's response to the East Timor Crisis'.
[29] The Straits Times, 'Timor will be Australia's Vietnam, says Mahathir', 14 October 1999, p. 23 quoted in Dupont, 'ASEAN's response to the East Timor Crisis'.

> We don't wish to see any country appointing itself the protector or leader for this region. Asian countries are capable of looking after the region themselves and cherish peace for the region more than others.[30]

Even though Badawi did not explicitly name the country he meant, it was clearly directed at Australia.

Malaysia was also concerned about the flow of illegal migrants and refugees from Indonesia during the economic crisis and the transition process into a democracy. It feared the possibility of receiving an exodus of illegal migrants and refugees if the situation in East Timor deteriorated.

Singapore

Singapore did not view the situation in East Timor as a conventional military threat, but its first concern was the potential destabilising force in Southeast Asia that could disrupt the region's economy and create large-scale population movements triggered by violence.[31] While Malaysia was the strongest supporter of Indonesia in this crisis, Singapore saw a need to invigorate Indonesia's international credibility. Singapore called for Indonesia's armed forces to moderate themselves. Singapore perceived that little would be achieved if the international community threatened Indonesia's stability by discrediting its civil or military leaders.[32] If the East Timor crisis continued, it would become another impediment for the regional grouping. For Singapore, another threat arose from the possibility of an exodus of illegal migrants or refugees from East Timor. This was understandable because of its geographical proximity: Singapore is the closest destination country for refugees or illegal migrants from Indonesia.

Indonesia

The threats for Indonesia can be divided into two: the first consisted of threats coming from the international community and the second included threats from its domestic audience. Internationally, first, Indonesia wanted to revitalise its international image. A bad image arising from how it handled East Timor was a threat for Indonesia. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan delivered a strong message to Indonesia that East Timor was becoming anarchic and therefore it had to accept an international peace-keeping force.[33] The second threat derived from the international community, and was related to the issue of external powers, particularly Australia, that was perceived by Indonesia as being too dominant in its own backyard. Therefore, Habibie invited other ASEAN

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30 Michael Richardson, 'Asians criticize Australia for playing role of 'US deputy', *International Herald Tribune*, 27 September 1999 quoted in Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture', p. 70.
31 Robert Karniol, 'Singapore-Deconstruction Forges Ahead', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 25 June 2001.
32 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.
33 Chongkittavorn, 'ASEAN Peace-Keepers must go to Timor'.

countries to participate, rather than letting Australia become the 'leader' of an intervention. Pitsuwan said that President Habibie requested for a large-scale of ASEAN troops to be deployed in East Timor, and when Pitsuwan answered that ASEAN did not have the capacity, President Habibie requested troops from Nordic countries.[34] The statement of President Habibie implied that Indonesia did not want Australian leadership in East Timor.

Third, another international threat for Indonesia arose from the economic and military pressures. The IMF and the World Bank threatened Indonesia to stop loans and assistance for Indonesia to restore its economy from the financial crisis in 1997-1998. Military pressures came from the US, which had stopped military cooperation with Indonesia. As mentioned previously, the military tie between the US and Indonesia was suspended on 8 September 1999 during the meeting between Admiral Dennis Blair and General Wiranto.[35] For Indonesia, the economic pressures were harder than military pressures because economic assistance from the IMF and the World Bank was incremental while Indonesia could still look for another source of military procurement aside from the US.

A second group of threats for Indonesia came from inside the country. Indonesia needed to scale down the crisis and prevent the referendum from becoming a precedent for separatist movements in Aceh and Papua seeking independence. Indonesia had to find the right 'formulation', to show that the East Timor case was different from other cases in these regions, so it would not create demands for independence.

Brunei Darussalam
Brunei Darussalam had interests in national and regional security. It shares a land border with Indonesia. Even though it is located far away north from East Timor, Brunei Darussalam would have become one of the first destination countries for East Timorese refugees to escape, if something wrong happened in East Timor.

Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV)
For the CLMV countries, the threat meant a disruption to regional stability and had negative impacts politically and economically. Indonesia had not yet recovered after being hit by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1999. A prolonged East Timor crisis was predicted to affect Jakarta's process of economic recovery. A protracted crisis in East Timor also created a challenge to Indonesia's journey into democracy. One of these situations or a combination of political and economical instability in Indonesia would

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[34] Surin Pitsuwan, Speech at the Launch of ANU Southeast Asia Institute, Australian National University, Canberra, 23 October 2012.
[35] Kingsbury, *East Timor: the Price of Liberty*.

also impact the smaller countries in ASEAN like Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar due to the need to continue economic activities in Indonesia. Vietnam's position on the crisis was quite interesting. Before Vietnam became a member of ASEAN, it was among the sternest critics of Indonesia.[36] After it became a member, Vietnam joined the group and remained silent.

4.4. A Balancing System?

This section analyses whether or not ASEAN's management of the East Timor crisis provides evidence that a balancing system in the region was operating. In this section, I argue that there was no balancing system among ASEAN members during the period of the crisis, 1999-2002. The crisis management by ASEAN members indicated the importance of great-power and external influence, particularly the US, the UN and Australia. However, the notion of 'balance' was not evident, because no external great power tried to balance the US in this period. The same indicators of a balancing system that were used to analyse ASEAN's crisis management in the Cambodian crisis (Chapter 3) are adopted again to analyse ASEAN's response to the East Timor crisis. Thus, a balancing system among ASEAN member states during the East Timor crisis is explained by the indicators listed in Box 3.2 (see Section 3.5). Each indicator is treated as equally important. Table 4.1 summarises the elaboration of the indicators of a balancing system during the East Timor crisis and a detailed analysis follows.

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36 Cotton, 'Against the Grain: East Timor Intervention'.

TABLE 4.1
A Balancing System in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis?

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
		Balance of power among ASEAN member states					
A.	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors: **Insignificant**	Indonesia and Thailand were the countries most affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Malaysia's economy had started to recover by 1998. Vietnam also gave signals of rapid development. However its power compared to Singapore was not yet equal. Singapore was the strongest power in terms of military strength during 1999-2002. Not only did it spend the highest amount on defence expenditure but also its percentage of GDP was the highest.					
B.	Intentions of some states to expand: **Moderate**	There was no intention of ASEAN member states to expand, but there existed many territorial disputes and claims. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei had been and still have been claimant countries of South China Sea.					
		Thailand had no intention to expand but there was a border dispute with Myanmar.	The Philippines had no intention to expand, but had been a claimant country in the South China Sea dispute and over Sabah.	Malaysia had no intention to expand, but at that time had territorial disputes with Indonesia (Sipadan & Ligitan and Ambalat), Singapore (Pedra Blanca/ Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge), with Brunei over Limbang, Lawas, Terusan, Rangau and Louisa Reef and with the Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan (the Spratly Islands). Some of	Singapore had no intention to expand and was always cautious of any intention of expansion by its neighbours. There were disputes with Malaysia over Pedra Blanca, Middle Rocks and South Ledge.	The case of East Timor gave an example to Indonesia how state expansion was not accepted internationally. There were disputes with Malaysia over Sipadan and Ligitan and Ambalat.	Vietnam and Brunei had been and still have been claimants in the Spratly Islands dispute.

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				these territorial disputes have not been settled up to the time of writing (2012).			
C.	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests: **Moderate**	ASEAN itself did not work as an alliance and was not divided into alliances among members. However, some groupings had emerged pre crisis and during the crisis. Before the crisis, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines always gave strong support to Indonesia. In terms of support of Indonesia's early rejection of Western interference, Indonesia was supported by Malaysia and Thailand. Singapore and the Philippines did not really say much about this. In terms of contribution to the international force, Thailand and the Philippines were in the group giving the biggest contribution of military personnel.					
D.	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft: **Insignificant**	All ASEAN documents highlighted the principle of the non use of force. However, even though Thailand was aware of ASEAN's principle, the border dispute with Myanmar had caused the deaths of 50-100 Myanmar soldiers in February 2001.					
			Balance of External Great Power Influence				
E.	Dependency on external great powers as security providers: **Significant**	Thailand and US relations also developed during the period of the crisis. Thailand also developed relations with China.	After US withdrawal from its air force base in 1991 and naval base in 1992, the US naval force returned on a regular basis in 1999. The Philippines became a major non NATO ally in 2003.	In contrast with its criticism of Western countries, particularly on the East Timor issue, Malaysia's dependency on the US had been growing. It was not a formal ally and the US did not necessarily provide a security guarantee. However, its closeness to the US	Singapore's military relations with the US were also growing. Singapore declared that US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year 2000.	Indonesia looked for another source for its military procurement. After the US embargo of its export on military equipment, Indonesia looked to the Soviet Union. The US lifted the ban on spare parts for aircraft in 2000 and military cooperation resumed slowly after that.	Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar had a dependency on China as a security provider, while Vietnam had been 'bandwagoning' the US.

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				reflected Malaysia's belief that the US was still the main security provider.			
F.	Alignment with external great powers: **Moderate**	Thailand maintained good relations with both the US and China.	The Philippines was a non NATO US ally.	Malaysia did not have any formal alliance with military powers. However, the FPDA provided a 'credible diplomatic and psychological deterrent' to potentially threatening countries.	Singapore was and is still a member of the FPDA.	No alignment with external powers, because of its free and independent policy.	After the normalisation between Vietnam and the US was announced on 11 July 1995, a stronger relationship was built between the two countries.
G.	Military cooperation with external great powers: **Significant**	Between February and December 2000 China negotiated long-term cooperative framework agreements with all ASEAN member countries. During 2001-2002, Chinese warships visited several ASEAN member countries.					
		Strong military cooperation with the US and China.	Resumed military cooperation with the US. As early as 2002, China invited the Philippines to participate in a naval exercise.	Malaysia had been a member of FPDA and contributed more actively within the group. Malaysia also developed a strong military cooperation with the US.	Like Malaysia during 1999-2002, Singapore developed a stronger cooperation with the US and participated more actively within the FPDA.	Cooperation with the US was suspended by the US in 1999. In 2001 military cooperation was slowly resumed but the cooperation with *Kopasus* (Indonesian special military force) was only re-established in 2010.	Vietnam, Brunei and Laos had agreements with China that included a clause on security cooperation, between February 1999 and December 2002. Myanmar had a strong military cooperation with China and India.
H.	Distribution of	In 1998, Singapore declared that US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year

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No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
	external great powers' armed forces: **Moderate**	2000. Because of the East Timor crisis, external powers' armed forces distributed in Indonesia under UN auspices included those from Australia, Portugal, South Korea, Japan, and China. The US also deployed ships in Malaysia.					
I.	Economic dependence on external great powers: **Significant**	Because of the impact of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, the situation reflected economic dependency on external great powers. Even for Indonesia, willingness to open to the international force was related to its dependency to the US particularly and international loan through the IMF and the World Bank.					

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States

A. Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors

In the period 1999-2002, there were no relatively equal powers that comprised a minimum of two actors, and therefore, this indicator is ranked as insignificant. No country can be regarded as a strong economy during that period. Countries like Indonesia and Thailand were still affected by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Indonesia was struggling with its economy and internal political transition. It was also affected by the East Timor crisis and other internal armed conflicts, such as in Aceh and Papua. Ethnic and religious (Muslim and Christian) conflicts in Ambon in August 1999 further complicated the situation. Procurement in Indonesia in 1999 was also subject to some rescheduling and cancellation.[37] Thailand focused on recovering its economy. Table 4.2 shows that Myanmar demonstrated the highest increase in GDP growth during 1997-2003 and followed by Cambodia and Vietnam.

TABLE 4.2
GDP Growth in ASEAN Countries 1990-1996 Compared with 1997-2003
(per cent change from previous period)

	1990-1996	1997-2003
Brunei Darrusalam	2.8	1.9
Cambodia	5.8	7.8
Indonesia	8.0	1.5
Laos	6.5	5.6
Malaysia	9.5	3.8
Myanmar	5.5	10.5
Philippines	2.8	3.4
Singapore	8.7	4.2
Thailand	8.6	1.7
Vietnam	7.9	6.7

Source: Asian Development Bank, *Economy and Output: Statistical Database System 2004*, available at https://sdbs.adb.org/sdbs/index.jsp, (accessed on 10 December 2011)

In terms of defence expenditure, Malaysia's defence expenditure demonstrated a slight decline in 2000 but between 2000 and 2002 its military spending was increasing. However, Malaysia did not develop its military rapidly and its defence expenditure percentage of GDP was relatively small. Singapore was less affected by the financial crisis. Nonetheless, it showed a constant decline in defence expenditure between 1998 and 2001. Only in 2002 its military spending increased again as shown in Table 4.3.

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[37] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia', *The Military Balance*, 99:1, 1999, pp. 171-209.

TABLE 4.3
Defence Expenditure of ASEAN Member States in 1998-2002

| | Defence Expenditure | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | US$m | | | | | US$ per capita | | | | | % GDP | | | | |
	98	99	00	01	02	98	99	00	01	02	98	99	00	01	02
Brun	386	402	353	277	253	1,217	1,240	1,075	826	741	6.7	6.7	7.1	5.5	5.2
Cam	155	176	195	83	87	15	17	15	6	6	5.1	5.1	6.1	2.5	2.5
Indo	967	1,502	614	5,419	6,245	5	7	3	25	29	0.8	1.1	0.4	3.8	3.7
Laos	34	22	20	16	14	7	4	4	3	3	2.6	2.3	1.1	0.9	0.8
Mal	1,891	3,158	2,579	3,223	3,260	88	146	114	143	145	2.6	4.0	2.9	3.8	3.6
Myn	1,302	2,142	1,020	2,236	2,837	45	42	21	46	58	5.0	5.0	2.8	5.0	5.0
Phil	1,521	1,627	1,357	1,123	1,511	21	22	18	15	19	2.3	2.1	1.8	1.6	2.1
Sing	4,936	4,696	4,316	4,247	4,334	1,275	1,174	1,105	1,036	1,010	5.6	5.6	4.9	5.1	5.2
Thai	2,124	2,638	2,419	1,861	1,730	35	43	38	29	27	1.7	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.5
Viet	943	890	2,351	2,311	2,286	12	11	29	29	29	3.5	3.1	7.3	7.2	7.1

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* 2000-2003.

Singapore was arguably the strongest in terms of military power during 1998-2002. Not only did it spend the highest amount on defence expenditure (particularly in 1998-2000) but also the percentage of GDP spent on defence was the highest. Indonesia spent a higher amount on defence expenditure in 2001 and 2002 but the percentage of the spending was small in relation to its GDP (3.8% and 3.7%, respectively). Myanmar's defence spending percentages of its GDP from 1998-2002 were also high, but the total amounts in US$ were relatively small.

TABLE 4.4
Number of Armed Forces, Reservists and Paramilitary of ASEAN Member States in 1998-2002

| | Numbers in Armed Forces (000) | | | | | Estimated Reservists (000) | | | | | Paramilitary (000) | | | | |
	98	99	00	01	02	98	99	00	01	02	98	99	00	01	02
Bru	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.9	7.0	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	4.1	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.7
Cam	139.0	139.0	140.0	140.0	125.0	n.a.	n.a	n.a.	n.a	n.a	220.0	220.0	220.0	67.0	67.0
Ind	299.0	299.0	297.0	297.0	297.0	400.0	400.0	400.0	400.0	400.0	200.0	200.0	195.0	195.0	195.0
Laos	29.1	29.1	29.1	29.1	29.1	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a	n.a.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mal	110.0	105.0	96.0	100.5	100.0	40.6	40.6	49.8	42.8	41.6	20.1	20.1	20.1	20.1	20.1
Myn	349.6	343.8	343.8	344..0	444.0	n.a	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	85.3	85.3	85.3	100.3	100.3
Phil	117.8	110.0	106.0	107.0	106.0	131.0	131.0	131.0	131.0	131.0	42.5	42.5	42.5	44.0	44.0
Sing	72.5	73.0	60.5	60.5	60.5	250.0	275.0	213.8	312.5	312.5	108.0	108.0	108.0	94.0	96.3
Thai	306.0	306.0	301.0	306.0	306.0	200.0	200.0	200.0	200.0	200.0	71.0	71.0	115.6	104.0	113.0
Viet	484.0	484.0	484.0	484.0	484.0	3000,0	3000.0	3,000.0	3000.0	3000.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* 2000-2003.

Table 4.4 demonstrates that during 1998 to 2002 Vietnam had the largest armed forces and number of reservists, while Cambodia had the largest number of paramilitary personnel in 1998 to 2000 and Indonesia had the largest number of paramilitary personnel in 2001 and 2002. However, this table does not show the numbers of armed forces, reservists and paramilitary as a percentage of total population. So, it cannot be argued that Vietnam was strong in terms of numbers in the armed forces. Furthermore, logically by looking at the number and estimating the rough total of the populations of ASEAN member countries, the highest percentage of armed forces per population belongs to Singapore and Myanmar.

B. Intentions of some states to expand

In this section, I argue that the 'intention of some states to expand' indicator is moderate because during 1999-2002, no country demonstrated its intention to exercise force to occupy other ASEAN countries; nevertheless many territorial/border disputes occurred. The case of East Timor crisis and the Cambodian crisis provided good examples to Indonesia, Vietnam and other countries of ASEAN that an invasion or expansion was not favourable in the eyes of the international community. However, territorial and border disputes could not be avoided.

Such disputes involved nine out of the ten members of ASEAN. Malaysia, for example, shares borders with Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei and therefore has been involved in territorial disputes and overlapping maritime claims with almost all its neighbours. Malaysia's territorial disputes include: (i) Sipadan and Ligitan Islands, and Ambalat with Indonesia; (ii) Batu Puteh with Singapore; (iii) Limbang, Lawas, Terusan, Rangau and Louisa Reef with Brunei and (iv) the Spratly Islands with the Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan. [38] On 2 November 1998, Indonesia and Malaysia submitted their intention to solve the dispute to the ICJ. It entered into force on 14 May 1998. After four years, on 17 December 2002, the ICJ ruled by 16 votes to 1, that the sovereignty over Sipadan and Ligitan Island belonged to Malaysia.[39] In the beginning, Indonesia rejected the proposal of bringing the dispute to the ICJ, basing its reasons on its belief that the ICJ did not understand the problem. On the other hand, Indonesia preferred to initiate the use of the ASEAN High Council, which is an adhoc body introduced by the TAC of 1976, whose membership comes from representatives at ministerial level from each of the member countries. Malaysia rejected this proposal, and from Indonesia's point of view, the reason was because Malaysia feared ASEAN

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[38] Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali, Kamaruzaman Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes', *Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution*, 1:5, 2009, pp. 107-116.
[39] Salleh, Hamdan, Razali, and Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'.

member states would favour Indonesia, particularly as Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, the Philippines and Vietnam had territorial or border disputes with Malaysia.

Interestingly, each dispute was approached differently. While it preferred to bring the Sipadan-Ligitan issue to the ICJ, Malaysia rejected Brunei's idea of bringing the dispute over Lawas-Limbang-Terusan-Rangau-Louisa Reef to the ICJ. Both countries have entered into a number of negotiations to resolve the issues, including several meetings between Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.[40]

The Spratly Islands disputes are Malaysia's most complex territorial dispute in the South China Sea. The Philippines and Vietnam had occupied reefs and islands claimed by Malaysia since 1979 through the publishing of a *Peta Baru* (New Map). The Philippines occupied Commodore Reef (*Terumbu Laksamana*) while Vietnam occupied Amboyna Cay (*Pulau Kecil Amboyna*) and Barque Canada Reef (*Terumbu Perahu*). Another feature claimed by Malaysia, but not occupied as of 1997, was Luconia Shoal.[41] In March 1998, the Philippines military discovered that Malaysia was building structures on the disputed reef. The Philippines, having been assured by the then Malaysian Foreign Minister, Abdullah Badawi that the works had not been authorised by the Malaysian government, did not make any official protest. However, in June 1999, Malaysia built a two-storey structure, helipad, pier and radar antenna in the claimed area. This time China, Taiwan and Vietnam protested against Malaysia's actions on the disputed features. By 1996, the Philippines had 595 troops deployed to guard its (occupied) nine Spratly Islands.[42]

Since 1982 Vietnam has been protesting against Malaysia's claims that were based on the *Peta Baru*. Despite Vietnam's claim to Swallow Reef, Malaysia went ahead and occupied the reef on 4 September 1983. Malaysia requested that Vietnam withdraw from Amboyna Cay. Malaysia continued to insist on its rights over Amboyna Cay when in 1988, Malaysia Deputy Foreign Minister Abdullah Che Wan was reported to have asserted that Malaysia's claims were legal and in line with international law.[43] In total by 1996, Vietnam had occupied 25 islands in the Spratlys with 600 troops stationed thereon.[44] In 2002, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed on 4 November 2002 by ASEAN countries and China. It mainly calls for states to reaffirm their determinations to maintain peace and stability in the region by

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[40] Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'.
[41] Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'.
[42] Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'.
[43] Abdullah Che Wan quoted in Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'.
[44] Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'.

exercising self-restraint in their conduct and to seek mutually peaceful solutions to the Spratlys disputes.[45]

China had undertaken construction work on Mischief Reef, a thousand miles from the nearest Chinese territory, prompting diplomatic protests from the Philippines. This is among the concerns which have prompted Manila to agree to the return of US naval forces to the Philippines on a regular basis, seven years after US bases there were closed.[46] Singapore has always been cautious of any intention of expansion by its neighbours, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia and the intention of a hegemony creation by Vietnam.

This general picture suggests that although no country wished to expand or exercise powers to occupy other ASEAN countries, territorial and border disputes had occurred in almost all ASEAN countries during 1999-2002. ASEAN member countries had no explicit intention to expand, but implicitly, one can argue that territorial and border disputes are the result of another form of an intention to expand. At least nine out of ten countries, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Philippines, and Myanmar were involved in territorial/border disputes.

C. Alliances on the basis of short-run interests

The TAC signed in 1976 does not allow ASEAN to create any alliances among the members of ASEAN, but there were some groupings pre crisis and during the crisis. Hence, the indicator, alliances on the basis of short run interests, is rated as moderate. Before the crisis and during Indonesia's rule of East Timor, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines always gave their strongest support to Indonesia. Vietnam criticised Indonesia's occupation of East Timor but later, after becoming a member of ASEAN, it did not continue this criticism.

In terms of support for Indonesia's early rejection of Western interference, Indonesia was supported by Malaysia and Thailand. Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar, indicated that Kuala Lumpur was worried about 'new concepts which might compromise sovereignty in the name of humanitarianism'.[47] Malaysia's criticism of Western interference received a sympathetic response in Southeast Asia because the majority of its states were also grappling with separatism, ethnic tensions and the demands of nation-building.[48] Prime Minister Chuan also favoured more proactive

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[45] Salleh, Razali, Jusoff, 'Malaysia's policy towards its 1963-2008 territorial disputes'.
[46] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia'.
[47] Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture*, p. 70.
[48] Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'.

actions from ASEAN members, but he questioned whether ASEAN had the capability to pursue interventions without the assistance of friendly great powers.[49] Singapore and the Philippines did not really say much in relation to Western interference.

In terms of their contribution to the international force, Thailand and the Philippines were in one group based on providing the biggest contribution of military personnel. Within this group, there were three sub groups: those which contributed major numbers of military personnel (Thailand and the Philippines); those which contributed a minimum number of military personnel and also sent civilian personnel (Malaysia and Singapore); and the rest consisting of countries which did not contribute any personnel such as Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Indonesia could not be included in those groups because its contribution was different from the others. It contributed by consenting to the UN peace-keeping operation and in its effort — though still regarded minimum by the international community — to disarm the militias, and to discontinue TNI's support of pro-independence militias.

D. War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft

Since its establishment, ASEAN member states have strongly adhered to the principle of non-use of force. Besides the use of force on the border between Thailand and Myanmar, other disputes did not lead to an open conflict. Therefore, overall, the 'war as a legitimate statecraft' indicator is insignificant in helping to shed light on the principles of a balance of power among ASEAN member countries. The non-use of force principle took on a special significance in Third World regional organisations because of anti-colonial struggles and demand for recognition in international affairs. [50] Chapter IV, Articles 13 to 17 of the TAC specifically called for a High Council to:

> take cognisance of the existence of disputes and situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony [and] in the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations to recommend [to] the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation.[51]

Although the mechanism has never been used, it indicates a commitment to the non-use of force in ASEAN's relations with other member states as an effort towards conflict avoidance and the members complying with the principle of non-use of force.

However, during the period 1999-2002, a limited use of force between Thailand and Myanmar was identified. Among the many issues straining bilateral relations are the failure to demarcate the joint border; the cross border fighting between the Myanmar army and various insurgent ethnic groups; the flow of drugs from Myanmar into

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[49] Haacke, *ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture.*
[50] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community.*
[51] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community*, p. 63.

Thailand and the activities of various insurgent ethnic groups; and various economic issues such as the suspension of Thai fishing rights in Myanmar waters.[52] In 1999, during the Chuan Leekpai government, Thailand refused to extradite the people responsible for the occupation of Myanmar's embassy in Bangkok. The relationship deteriorated over the apparent inflow of drugs from Myanmar into Thailand and cross-border incursions.[53] In February 2001, just days before the successor administration of Thaksin Shinawatra assumed office, the long-running diplomatic feud between Bangkok and Yangon finally escalated into a serious border confrontation and led to the death of approximately 50-100 Myanmar soldiers.[54] This border conflict was not a major news item and attracted only limited attention in most international media.

Balance of External Great Power Influence
E. Dependency on external great powers as security providers

The 'dependency on great-power security provider' indicator is rated as significant. Countries in Southeast Asia have continued believing that an external security provider is vital. Singapore has historically considered a continued US involvement in the region fundamental to its own security. Malaysia has also perceived the US presence as necessary to preserve regional stability. Following US withdrawal from Clark Air Force Base in 1991 and Subic Bay Naval Base in 1992 in the Philippines, in January 1998, Singapore declared that US aircraft carriers would have access to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year 2000. Singapore has further developed strong military relations with the US Pacific Command (Pacom), including war games, map planning and manoeuvre exercises like Cobra Gold.[55] Within only seven years, the Philippines sought the return of US naval forces to its shores on a regular basis.

Aside from Malaysia's and Singapore's stronger dependency on and stronger relations with the US, Washington stopped its military assistance, including its training schemes with Indonesia in 1999, along with military sales, in protest against human rights violations in East Timor. Indonesia looked for stronger military trade relations and cooperation with Russia afterwards. In October 2000, Indonesia and the US resumed the cooperation, signed by lifting the ban on aircraft spare part sales by the US. In 2001, the US has cautiously resumed low level training exchanges with the Indonesian Navy and Air Force. In 2002, the US recommended its training programme for Indonesia, and invited Indonesia to join a global programme called the Regional Defence Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Fund (RDCTFF). The total amount for the

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[52] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment'.
[53] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment'.
[54] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture: a constructivist assessment'.
[55] Ralf Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture', *RSIS Working Paper*, No 195.

global programme was $17.9 million and that amount included $4million for Indonesia, with three officers on the first course.[56] In Southeast Asia, the Philippines received $1.5 million and sent two officers on the initial course, while Malaysia received $500.000 covering four officers.[57]

F. Alignment with external great powers

The 'alignment with external great powers' is a moderate indicator to shine a light on a balance of external great power influence. During the period 1999-2002, only the Philippines and Myanmar were allies of external great powers, but bilateral and multilateral security arrangements between other member states and external great powers were also important. Bilateral security arrangements have indeed persisted in Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period. While not being a formal ally, Singapore has further developed close military ties with the US. The Philippine Senate refused a new base treaty with the US in September 1991 leading to a complete withdrawal from Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base by November 1992. Yet the two countries have remained military allies through the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty. Moreover, Manila signed a Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in February 1998. Post-9/11, the bilateral alliance was further reinvigorated in the context of the global war on terror and Washington gave the Philippines a major non-NATO ally status. Brunei has relied on an agreement with Britain renewed in December 1994 that guarantees the presence of a battalion of Gurkha Rifles in the Sultanate.[58]

During the period of 1999 to 2002 and to date, two ASEAN countries —Malaysia and Singapore — have been members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) established in London on 16 April 1971. The role of the FPDA has been deepened and strengthened since the end of the Cold War and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The five powers saw the emergence of an uncertain multi-polar structure and the changing strategic conditions in Southeast Asia as a concern. Andrew Tan argues that the 'unwillingness of the ASEAN states to cooperate militarily resulted in Singapore and Malaysia turning to other vehicles to improve transnational military cooperation'.[59] Conveniently, the FPDA provided such a vehicle. For Singapore and Malaysia who are not in formal alliances, in which an American military response to external attack against the two countries is not guaranteed, the FPDA provided a credible diplomatic and psychological deterrent to potentially threatening countries.[60]

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[56] Robert Karniol, 'Indonesian officers join US training programme', *Jane's Defence Weekly,* 9 October 2002.
[57] Karniol, 'Indonesian officers join US training programme'.
[58] Karniol, 'Indonesian officers join US training programme'.
[59] Andrew T.H. Tan, 'The Five Power Defence Arrangements: the Continuing Relevance', *Contemporary Security Policy,* 29:2, 2008, pp. 285-302, p. 292.
[60] Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements'.

Therefore, the two Southeast Asian nations participated more actively in the FPDA. Since 1997, Singapore and Malaysia have also alternatively hosted the FPDA Professional Forum as an arrangement to discuss new ideas, concepts and the way ahead, including the future of FPDA. The FPDA exercises through out the 1990s and early 2000s included complex combined exercises involving a major platform.[61]

While Singapore and Malaysia have built bilateral security arrangement with the US, Myanmar is regarded as a close ally of China. Among other popular assumptions is that Myanmar is a client state of China.[62] China is the biggest supporter of Myanmar and one of its larger trading partners. China's need for Myanmar's energy resources is a major determinant of China's support towards the regime.[63] This further demonstrates that *realpolitik* is without doubt influenced by economic interdependence. Myanmar's military junta allowed the Chinese navy to set up military facilities in its country's military bases in exchange for China's political support on the world stage. Since 1992, there has been considerable and continuing speculation about the existence of China's naval bases on the Great Coco Island and Hainggyi Island in Myanmar. This formed part of China's emerging assertive maritime diplomacy, which is known as a 'string of pearls' strategy, which covers ports in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia.[64]

G. Military cooperation with external great powers

Southeast Asian countries sought a greater military cooperation with the US during 1999-2002 and therefore military cooperation with external powers was a significant indicator of a balance of external great power influence. As discussed above, after Clinton stopped the US military trade and cooperation with Indonesia in 1999, a year after that in October 2000, the US lifted the ban on spare parts sales for Indonesia's US built C-130 aircraft. In 2001, the US government has cautiously resumed low level training exchanges with the Indonesian Navy and Indonesian Air Force. The US Navy taskforce convened a week-long 'Cooperation Afloat and Readiness Training' exercise with the Indonesian Navy on May 2001. The US and Thailand also invited four Indonesian Air Force officers to observe the Cobra Gold Exercise in Thailand. Singapore participated in the exercise, and nine countries sent observers.[65]

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[61] Emmers, 'The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements'.
[62] See Karl D. Jackson and Paul H. Nitze, *Myanmar Awakening and US National Interests*, Testimony prepared for the subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C., 26 April 2012. See also Maxwell Harrington, 'Conference Report: China-Myanmar Relations: The Dillemas of Mutual Dependence', *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 31:1, pp. 133-139.
[63] Pak K. Lee, Gerald Chan and Lai-Ha Chan, 'China's *'Realpolitik'* Engagement with Myanmar', *China Security*, 5:1, 2009, pp. 101-123.
[64] Lee, Chan and Chan, 'China's *'Realpolitik'* Engagement with Myanmar', p. 8.
[65] Lee, Chan and Chan, 'China's *'Realpolitik'* Engagement with Myanmar'.

On 3 October 1999, US Defence Secretary William Cohen and Philippine Secretary of National Defence Orlando Mercado, met in Manila and announced plans for a joint exercise in early 2000. Cohen said that the cooperation is intended to 'facilitate, coordinate and assist in meeting the equipment requirements of the AFP'.[66] Under a new visiting forces agreement approved by the Philippines Senate in May 1999, the US has permission to use ports in the Philippines and to participate in annual joint exercises with up to 2,000 troops on each side.[67] After the 9/11 attacks, Singapore and Malaysia have closely collaborated with the US on the war on terror. Both countries have shared intelligence with Washington. Singapore was the first Asian country to sign the Declaration of Principles for the Container Security Initiative (CSI) with the US in September 2002. Malaysia has been a close partner of the US since 2001.[68]

Indonesia had actually embarked on a major programme of defence cooperation with Australia which was codified in December 1995, including the training of forces in East Timor. The cooperation was called 'Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security'.[69] However, it was revoked by Jakarta in 1999 due to the East Timor crisis.

Besides cooperation with the US and Australia, Southeast Asia member countries also developed military cooperation with China during 1999-2002. From February 1999 to December 2000 all ten ASEAN members negotiated long-term cooperative framework arrangements with China. Seven ASEAN member countries, namely Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, the Philippines and Laos included a clause on security cooperation on their agreements with China. Since then, China has also initiated defence cooperation with Cambodia and Indonesia while China's military cooperation with Myanmar had developed earlier than with other ASEAN member countries.[70]

Since 2001, China and nine ASEAN states have conducted naval goodwill visits. Chinese warships visited Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. In turn, China hosted port visits from Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines. In 2002, China invited the Philippines to participate in a naval exercise. The development of military cooperation escalated from that exercise.[71]

[66] Brian Bender, 'Philippines, USA strengthen links', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 13 October 1999.
[67] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia'.
[68] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia'.
[69] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.
[70] Carlyle A. Thayer, *Positioning ASEAN between Global Powers,* Paper presented to the 14th Regional Outlook Forum 2012, 5 January 2012.
[71] Carlyle A. Thayer, *Positioning ASEAN.*

The year 2002 also marked security cooperation between ASEAN and China. In November 2002, ASEAN and China signed a Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. For ASEAN, this declaration was important because for the first time, China was willing to have an agreement with ASEAN as an organisation on the South China Sea issue, unlike before when China always preferred to negotiate over this issue with individual claimant ASEAN states.

The details above indicate that security cooperation between Southeast Asian countries and external great powers, mainly the US and China, was strong. Dominant ASEAN countries mostly placed their priorities on military cooperation with the US and tried to balance this with good relationships with China, while countries like Myanmar had no opportunity to seek close relationship with the US and therefore sought support from China. In short, 'military cooperation with external powers' is a significant indicator, providing evidence of the presence of a balance of external great power influence in Southeast Asia during the East Timor crisis.

H. Distribution of external great powers' armed forces

The 'distribution of external great powers' armed forces' indicator is considered as moderate. The distribution of external great powers' armed forces was centred in East Timor. External great powers' armed forces in East Timor included armed forces from Japan and China. The armed forces of external powers included those of Australia, Portugal, New Zealand, the UK, South Korea, Japan and China. Australian troops grew to around 5,500 at peak deployment with a figure of approximately A$740 million.[72] Republic of Korea sent a battalion-size force to provide security for a significant stretch of territory.

Other external powers that contributed to the East Timor crisis in terms of funds and manpower were: France, Italy, Canada, Jordan, South Korea and Kenya. Japan also facilitated the launch of INTERFET by providing a fund of US$ 100 million to supplement the expenses of less-developed coalition members. Pitsuwan stated that ASEAN member countries asked for assistance of US$50 million, but Japan gave double the requested amount of money.[73] The US provided logistic and intelligence. James Cotton argues that the US' role was vital.[74] This argument was supported by a

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[72] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.
[73] Pitsuwan, Speech at the Launch of ANU Southeast Asia Institute, Australian National University, Canberra, 23 October 2012.
[74] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.

Thai Army officer who said: 'The US ship was there, but what was most interesting was that the US Ambassador visited Dili regularly, almost once a month'.[75]

Apart from East Timor, external great powers' armed forces were only identified in the Philippines and in Singapore. As elaborated above, US Naval forces have been in the Philippines since 1999 on a regular basis and US aircraft carriers have access to the Changi Naval Base after its completion in the year 2000. China was also suspected of having naval bases on the Great Coco Island and Hainggy Island in Myanmar.[76]

I. Economic dependence on external great powers

Because of the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, Southeast Asian countries were largely economically dependent on external great powers, such as the US and other external powers, such as Japan. The Indonesian economy contracted by more than 13 per cent in 1998, the Thai economy by around 8 per cent and the Malaysian economy by over 7 per cent. With about 1 per cent contraction, recession was milder in the Philippines and Singapore. In Indonesia, there was a shift in the direction of growth in FDI flows in 1997. For Thailand and Malaysia, inflows increased as a percentage of GDP in 1997. Inflows remained strong in Thailand in early 1998 and were stable in the Philippines. Investments in Indonesia were discouraged by the unstable political environment.[77]

TABLE 4.5
Inward Investment by Investor Country in 1999 by Percentage of Total Investment

	Thailand	Indonesia	Philippines	Malaysia
Japan	30%	20%	25%	32%
NIEs	30%	28%	16%	34%
US	17%	7%	30%	14%
Europe	12%	28%	23%	13%
Others	11%	17%	6%	7%

Source: Stephen Thomsen, 'Southeast Asia: the role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in Development', *OECD Working Papers on International Investment*, 1999, p.11.

Table 4.5 shows that trends in FDI in those countries were strongly influenced by external countries. Inward investment by Japan and New Industrialised Economies/NIEs (such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa) shared the highest percentage in Thailand and Malaysia. The Philippines' investment came mostly from the US. This demonstrates the Philippines' economic dependency on the US; Thailand and Malaysia had economy dependency on Japan and NIE countries, while Indonesia

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[75] Interview with a Thai army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC of Force Commander of UNTAET, Bangkok, 23 February 2012.
[76] This speculation is discredited by India's chief of naval staff and the US intelligence claiming that there is no Chinese base on the Great Coco Island.
[77] Stephen Thomsen, *Southeast Asia: the role of Foreign Direct Investment Policies in Development*, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No.1, 1999, pp. 1-33.

had economic dependency on NIE and European countries. Faced with these external influences, individual host countries have had to adjust their FDI policies in order to benefit from opportunities offered by the external powers.

Indonesia's willingness to accept a UN peace-keeping operation could not be separated from its economic dependence on external powers. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced two days after Clinton's call for cuts in international lending that it was suspending its planned visit to review Indonesia's progress on the East Timor crisis, before the next instalment of US$450 million could be approved. The total of the IMF rescue package for Indonesia was $12.3 billion, and $2.3 billion still had to be granted. Airing on Radio Australia, the IMF's Asia Pacific Director, Hurbert Neiss said that Indonesia must end the violence in East Timor if it wanted the review to be rescheduled.[78] Five days later, the World Bank froze a $1 billion aid programme to Indonesia. In a move designed to place pressure on the government to stop the violence in East Timor, the President of the World Bank, James Wolfenson had written to Habibie the previous week urging the government to honour the results of the referendum.[79]

The US used its leverage over the IMF to put pressure on Indonesia. US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers stated that 'We have urged the IMF and the World Bank to make clear that their lending to Indonesia in support of financial stability is dependent on the conduct of the Indonesian government and military in East Timor'.[80] Indonesia rejected the linkage, claiming that withholding funding would push the country deeper into economic turmoil and that such threats amounted to blackmail. Clearly, however, this was a major source of international leverage.

The situation in East Timor also led the US Congress to pass the Leahy Amendment which cut the limited amount of aid and training that the US still provided to the TNI and made concrete reform of the Indonesian military and the prosecution of those responsible the conditions of the restoration of military ties. The Leahy Amendment thus created an obstacle to future rapprochement with Indonesia. This situation left Habibie with no choice; he finally agreed to accept an international peace-keeping force. In contradiction, John Smith argues that calls for Indonesia's debt to be withheld were actually aimed at destabilising Western banks and markets rather than pressuring

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[78] Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism', *International Affairs*, 77:4, 2001, pp. 805-827.
[79] Wheeler and Dunne, 'East Timor and the new humanitarian interventionism'.
[80] Ann Marie Murphy, 'US Rapprochement with Indonesia: From Problem State to Partner', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 32:3, 2010, pp. 362-387 , p. 368.

Indonesia on the East Timor issue. On 7 September 1999, BBC Radio News reported that:

> The IMF's bail-out of Indonesia was not designed to rescue the Indonesian economy from recession... but to save western banks from the threat of bankruptcy. This is why western governments are reluctant to use the debt to put pressure on Jakarta.[81]

Because no IMF money had ever been given to Indonesia, calls for the IMF to postpone its assistance to Indonesia are more likely to destabilise Western banks and markets than influence the situation in East Timor.[82] Whether this was a real fact or not, the US threat through the IMF which caused resentment in Indonesia's domestic politics had influenced Habibie government to accept the international peace-keeping force.

Other countries like Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam were all heavily dependent on trade with Asia; over 60 per cent of Vietnamese and 60 per cent of Myanmar exports had Asian countries as their destination including those hit by the crisis. Their capacity to absorb exports from India and China had declined. In 1997 Vietnam's export growth fell from 21 per cent and to just 3 per cent in 1998. Laos was greatly dependent on electricity exports to Thailand and faced major set-backs in export revenue due to the reduced energy need in Thailand.[83] Vietnam is the only country in Southeast Asia to have engaged in so many intensive negotiations with the US over the past few decades. These include the Bilateral Trade Agreement during 1996-2000 which led to negotiation on Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in 2003-2006 and finally paved the way for Vietnam's entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 1 January 2007. Meanwhile, Myanmar established economic interdependence with China. In 2001, Myanmar began joint natural gas explorations with China. Four years later Myanmar allowed China to explore in the areas off its western coast in the Bay of Bengal. Energy security is an important element in the relationships between these two countries.

The Role of Great Powers and External Powers

The role of the great powers, particularly the US, was crucial in the East Timor crisis. External powers such as the UN and Australia also played important roles. Other external powers that also contributed were Portugal, the UK, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, China, France, Italy, Canada, Jordan and Kenya. Although Portugal was

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[81] John Smith, 'Third World Debt, G7 Tighten its Nose', available at htttp://www.ragingwave.com/index_files/G7%20tightens%20the%20noose.pdf, (accessed on 15 November 2011).
[82] Smith, 'Third World Debt, G7 Tighten its Nose'.
[83] Jürgen Rüland, 'ASEAN and Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism', *The Pacific Review*, 13:3, 2000, pp. 421-451.

a prominent player, I will only elaborate the role of the UN, Australia and the US to specifically look into the balance of power dynamics in the region.

United States

Since the Santa Cruz incident in Dili, a bipartisan effort in Congress and an expanding grassroots movement set out to reverse US policy on East Timor. After the incident, 52 Senators wrote to President Bush calling for active U.S. support for the implementation of the UN resolutions on East Timor 'with an eye towards a political solution that might end the needless suffering in East Timor and bring about true self-determination for the territory'.[84] It was the first of many bipartisan House and Senate letters affirming support for East Timor's self-determination. Since then, Congress has acted repeatedly on several fronts to encourage resolution of East Timor's political status and to protect the human and political rights of its people.[85]

The US also played a role in persuading Indonesia to open up to the UN presence in East Timor. The US demanded that Indonesia permit an international peace-keeping force into East Timor to stop the violence. In the beginning, for Indonesia, the idea of foreign soldiers on Indonesian soil was humiliating. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton, together with US Pacific Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Dennis Blair, was influential in convincing Indonesian Defence Minister General Wiranto, to agree to the UN presence in the territory.[86] As discussed above, the US also used its influence in international financial institutions as a tool to pressure Indonesia.

US political, economic and military persuasion, as well as involvement in the INTERFET mission, was critical to the success of the mission. The US was engaged in a major amphibious exercise with Australia, Crocodile '99. The Aegis-class cruiser USS Mobile Bay and destroyer USS O'Brien also participated in Crocodile '99.[87] The supply ship USNS Killeau was en route to the nearby region. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the US Ambassador in Jakarta visited East Timor regularly. It shows that the East Timor crisis held an important place in the US foreign policy.

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[84] ETAN, 'Background on East Timor and US Policy', available at http://www.etan.org/timor/BkgMnu.htm (accessed on 14 November 2011).

[85] ETAN, 'Background on East Timor and US Policy'.

[86] Adam Dobb, 'East Timor and Australia's Security Roles: Issues and Scenarios', *Australian Parliamentary Library Current Issues,* No. 3, 1999-2000, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/cib/1999-2000/2000cib03.htm (accessed on 14 November 2011).

[87] Jim Garamore, 'Clinton Says US Would Aid Aussie Peacekeepers in Timor', *American Forces Information Service New Articles,* Defence Link, US Department of Defense, 10 September 1999 available at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=42164 (accessed on 1 October 2013). See also Maryanne Kelton, *More than an Ally? Contemporary Australia-US Relations,* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2008.

An Indonesian official in the Indonesian Embassy in the US during the East Timor crisis said that they had to issue a lot of visas for Americans to be observers in East Timor. When asking Jakarta about the maximum number of visas to be issued, the instruction was to give everyone in the US who wanted to go to East Timor a visa. The reason was 'We knew where it was going to be, East Timor would finally choose for independence with the support of the US. There was no reason to challenge it'.[88] This showed that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia already expected that the East Timorese would vote for independence and the US gave its full support for that. The person also mentioned that the Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas at that time had consulted with President Habibie and his advisor, Dewi Fortuna Anwar. They agreed that it was time to release East Timor which had been a 'pebble in the shoe' for Indonesia's international diplomacy. However, this idea was not shared by the Indonesian TNI. [89] With the support of the US on East Timor independence, Indonesia had no power to challenge it. It should be noted that Indonesia received support from the US when it invaded East Timor in 1975.[90] Without the continuing US support for Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor, no matter how hard Indonesia tried to hold on to the province, it would face failure.

The United Nations

Since Indonesia had incorporated East Timor as its 27th province in 1975 with the US' blessing, the UN had always condemned Indonesia for its action. The UN had observed what had been going on in East Timor under Indonesia's rule. It also played an important role in expressing concern regarding the deterioration in the security situation in East Timor to Indonesia. The UN, after the New York agreement on 5 May 1999, administered East Timor, conducted a ballot and led the effort to restore security, return refugees and displaced persons, rebuild the physical infrastructure and establish a national administration. Since May 1999, there have been six UN or UN–sanctioned missions in East Timor: the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) which ran the 1999 independence referendum; the multinational peace-enforcement operation, INTERFET

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88 Interview with Indonesian Diplomat 1, Canberra, 17 November 2011.
89 Interview with Indonesian Diplomat 1, Canberra, 17 November 2011.
90 On the night before the invasion, US President Gerald Ford and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, were in Jakarta meeting with Suharto and gave Suharto the green light to invade. Ninety percent of the weaponry used by the Indonesian forces in their invasion was from the US (despite a U.S. law that bans the use of its military aid for offensive purposes) and the flow of arms, including counterinsurgency equipment, was secretly increased. In the United Nations, U.S. ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan ensured that the international organisation was ineffective in challenging Jakarta's aggression. Under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the self-proclaimed champion of human rights, there was a further increase in US military aid to Indonesia. Since 1975, the US has sold Jakarta over $1 billion worth of military equipment. See Stephen R. Shalom, Noam Chomsky and Michael Albert 'East Timor Questions and Answers', available at http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199910--02.htm, (accessed on 4 February 2012).

and UNTAET which took East Timor to independence in May 2002 and the post-independence UN of Mission of Supporter in East Timor (UNMISET), followed by the peace-building UN Office in East Timor and from August 2006, the peace-keeping and electoral support mission the UN Integrated Mission in East Timor (UNMIT). In describing the UN's role in the crisis, Dewi Fortuna Anwar suggests that from the beginning, the crisis was under the UN's auspices, not the ASEAN framework.[91]

Australia

Australia played a significant role in several ways. First, its role through Howard's letter in pushing for Indonesia's change of mind on East Timor crisis became an important factor of Habibie's option for a referendum.

Second, Australia also played a role in persuading Indonesia and ASEAN member countries that Indonesia should allow international peace-keeping. Australia was successful in convincing ASEAN countries to agree to discuss the East Timor issue prior to the APEC ministerial meeting in Auckland in 1999. As the potential leader of a 'coalition of the willing', the delegation from Australia arranged for the APEC conference to discuss the East Timor crisis. Before the APEC meeting, in Australia there was a talk about the alliance relationship as a result of an obvious lack of US engagement.[92] Furthermore, Australia's view on the issue was believed to influence other countries to join the 'coalition of the willing'. The Republic of Korea for example, decided to contribute to INTERFET after an announcement by President Kim Dae Jung at the Auckland APEC meeting on 13 September 1999.[93] Australian Prime Minister Howard also raised the question of an international peace-keeping force with Habibie during their meeting in Bali on 27 April 1999. In his second meeting with Habibie, Howard sought to persuade Habibie to allow a larger international police and a small number of military observers.[94] Even though his ideas were rejected by Habibie, Howard's aspiration was finally achieved. Habibie agreed to allow the international peace-keeping force to create security in East Timor on 12 September 1999. Three days after that, the UNSC authorised an Australian-led intervention (INTERFET) under Resolution 1264.

Third, Australia's remarkably quick response to the crisis in September 1999, demonstrated that East Timor has a special place in Australia's domestic and foreign policy. Its participation in INTERFET and UNTAET was crucial. Australia became the

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[91] Interview with Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, Secretariat of the Vice President of Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 March 2011.
[92] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.
[93] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.
[94] White, 'The Road to INTERFET'.

leader of INTERFET mission. INTERFET became an exercise dominated by Australia. The commander of INTERFET, Major General Peter Cosgrove claimed: 'the Australian logistics contingents supported the whole [INTERFET] force well above design capacity'.[95] Under INTERFET, Australia's national contribution to the humanitarian programme in East Timor amounted for A$37 million in the 1999-2000 financial year. A further A$7.6 million was provided for refugees in West Timor.[96] Cotton argues that not only had Australian intervention led to the birth of a new Southeast Asian nation, but Australia had also committed to providing security and economic assistance.[97]

Australia managed the transition to the peace-keeping force role of UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor), started its mission in February 2002 and participated as a major partner in UNTAET.[98] Under UNTAET, Australia provided trainers for an East Timor Defence Force Training Centre in Mentinaro.[99] Under UNTAET, Australia provided 80 out of 1270 civilian police (6.29%) and 1500 out of 8000 personnel (18.75%) in the UNTAET security force.[100] Australia maintained a robust contribution to UNTAET and a significant but declining Australian Defence Force (ADF) was maintained until unrest in May 2006 called for another deployment.

At the outset, Australia's dominant role was not well accepted by Indonesia and some ASEAN member states, such as Thailand and Malaysia. Indonesia stated that Australia's intervention without Indonesia's consent would be regarded as an attack on Indonesia. Australia's policy on East Timor brought the relationship between the two countries to a new low. The Australian government had miscalculated reactions from Indonesia, such as the thought that East Timor ballot would strengthen the two countries' relationship and the expectation that the East Timor initiative would be welcomed by Indonesia.[101] The bilateral relationship with Indonesia was severely damaged, and the defence cooperation with TNI had been mostly dismantled.[102] Malaysia also criticised Australia's policy in the territory and Thailand was initially afraid of Australia's dominance in the region, as discussed earlier in this chapter. However, over time, ASEAN member countries appreciated Australia's role. Thailand easily became a good friend of Australia during the operation of INTERFET and UNTAET. The discussion of indicators above is summarised in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1.

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[95] James Cotton, *East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and its aftermath in Southeast Asia*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p. 88.
[96] Sue Downie 'UNTAET: state-building and peace-building', in Damien Kingsbury and Michael Leach, *East Timor beyond Independence*, Melbourne: Monash University Asia Centre, 2007, p. 37.
[97] Cotton, *East Timor, Australia and Regional*, p. 89.
[98] Cotton, *East Timor, Australia and Regional*.
[99] Sue Downie 'UNTAET: state-building and peace-building'.
[100] Cotton, *East Timor, Australia and Regional*, p. 122.
[101] William Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor crisis', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 54:2, 2000, pp. 151-161.
[102] White, 'The Road to INTERFET'.

TABLE 4.6
Summary of the Indicators of a Balancing System during the East Timor Crisis

No	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	In significant	Notes
	Balance of Power among ASEAN member states				
A.	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors			√	
B.	Intentions of some states to expand		√		
C.	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests		√		
D.	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft			√	
Sub Total		0	2	2	
	Balance of External Great Power Influence				
E.	Dependency on external great powers as security providers	√			
F.	Alignment with external great powers		√		
G.	Military cooperation with external great powers	√			
H.	Distribution of external great powers' armed forces		√		
I.	Economic dependence on external great powers	√			What was actually significant was the economic dependence towards external great powers
Sub Total		3	2	0	
Total		3	4	2	

Source: Compiled by author

FIGURE 4.1
Indicators of a Balancing System during the East Timor Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 4.6 and Figure 4.1 suggest that ASEAN's role in the East Timor crisis provides some significant indicators of a balancing system. These significant indicators are all derived from indicators of a balance of external great power influence: a dependency on external great powers as security providers, military cooperation with external great powers, and economic dependence on external great powers. This demonstrates that external great powers played an important role in this crisis, particularly during the escalation and the acute periods of the crisis, where the US used its leverage to push Indonesia by using its economic and military ties with Indonesia and economic institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank to accept an international peace-keeping force. However, the notion of balance was barely evident. With regard to the East Timor crisis, there was no other external great power demonstrating any effort to balance US influence. Apart from Indonesia's attempt to look for a replacement for military trade from Russia, no other Southeast Asian countries attempted to seek great powers' effort to balance US policies in the crisis. Thus, I rather argue that the crisis management indicated the importance of external great power influence instead of a balance of external great power influence.

Not only was US influence important, but influence from other external powers was also crucial. Australia's role was decisive, from Howard's letter to its contribution in INTERFET and UNTAET. Australia, with the help of the US also played a very significant role during the APEC Meeting in Auckland in May 1999 in persuading APEC member countries, particularly ASEAN members, to push Indonesia, and to convince Indonesia that it could not halt violence on its own and therefore would need help from an international peace-keeping force.

4.5. A Concert of Powers?

This section investigates whether or not the crisis management by ASEAN member countries indicates a concert of powers during the East Timor Crisis. In this section I argue that the regional security system in Southeast Asia is explained by only two significant, four moderate and one insignificant indicator associated with a concert of powers. Therefore the crisis management does not provide convincing evidence that it is a concert of powers. The analysis uses the indicators of a concert of powers listed in Box 3.3 (see Section 3.6). Table 4.7 provides an overview of the indicators associated with a concert of powers and a detailed analysis follows.

TABLE 4.7
A Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis?

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
		Concert of Powers					
A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order: **Moderate**	The East Timor crisis was a shock but not a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order.					
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers: **Moderate**	The cooperation among dominant powers was self-conscious but the level was not as high as the cooperation during the Cambodian crisis. It is important to note that the cooperation was not intended to be conducted among dominant powers.					
		Thailand was consistent in its contribution and cooperation with other ASEAN countries or non ASEAN countries under INTERFET and UNTAET.	The Philippines was consistent in its contribution and cooperation with other ASEAN countries or non ASEAN countries under INTERFET and UNTAET.	Malaysia's intention to deploy a major contribution of military personnel was rejected by Jose Ramos Horta who stated that Malaysian personnel would not be welcome in East Timor.	Like Malaysia, Singapore's contribution was not as large as those of Thailand and the Philippines.	Indonesia wished for a greater role by ASEAN member countries. Indonesia played a role in trying to stop TNI's support to militias.	These countries did not demonstrate a high and self-conscious level of cooperation because their contribution as governments was barely visible.
C.	A pattern of cooperative behaviour: **Significant**	There existed a pattern of cooperative behaviour, which showed solidarity with Indonesia; ASEAN member countries supported Indonesia by being silent. Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore further demonstrated support by sending military/civilian personnel. Based on their contributions, the ASEAN members could be divided into: Thailand and the Philippines who gave major contribution of military personnel; Malaysia and Singapore who sent a minimum number of soldiers with civilian personnel; and other countries with small roles such as Lao PDR, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam. However, it is important to note that individuals of the latter countries were in East Timor working in NGOs or as volunteers.					
D.	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent	The roles of dominant powers were not equal but their roles were effective. There were also some elements of economic interdependency between the dominant powers during the East Timor crisis.					

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No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				Concert of Powers			
	group of all dominant powers: **Moderate**						
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms: **Insignificant**	No summit diplomacy or consultative mechanism among participant countries. The only high-level meeting about the East Timor issue was the APEC Ministerial Meeting in New Zealand, 1999. However, even though there was no summit diplomacy, Rodolfo Severino, the then ASEAN Secretary-General and Surin Pitsuwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, were very active in exploring how ASEAN could contribute.					
F.	A joint approach to regional issues: **Moderate**	There was no joint approach to the issue of the East Timor crisis. However, there was a joint approach in terms of other issues, such as ASEAN integration.					
G.	A need for system stability and international order: **Significant**	Thailand saw the need for system stability. It did not see as a direct threat, but the fact that Thailand sent troops also reflected that Thailand wished for a stable Southeast Asia.	Stability in Southeast Asia in general and in Indonesia in particular is important for the Philippines which shares a border with Indonesia.	Malaysia saw the need for system stability and international order, but it refused Western deep involvement, including that of Australia.	Singapore was the only Southeast Asian country that abstained from voting on the UN Resolution in 1975-1976. It means that Singapore had longed for stability in Southeast Asia. Singapore did not seem worried about Western involvement.	For Indonesia, domestic stability was the top priority compared to system stability or the need for international order.	Brunei Darussalam and the CLMV countries need stability and international order, mostly for economic reasons.

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

A. A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order

Southeast Asian countries at the outset did not perceive the East Timor situation as a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order. However, their views were eventually transformed, and they considered the crisis could be a disturbance after being persuaded of this by external powers. Singapore, for example, never really regarded East Timor as an ASEAN problem as Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong told reporters in November 1999: 'It [East Timor] was not a problem created by ASEAN; it was and is an international problem that remains an issue with the UN. It never started off as an ASEAN problem'.[103] Malaysia also always saw an internal Indonesian issue. As elaborated earlier in this chapter (Section 4.3) for participating ASEAN countries, the concerns were if Indonesia continued to be unable to provide security in East Timor, it would jeopardise (i) Indonesia's credibility before the international community; (ii) ASEAN's credibility as an organisation; and (iii) regional stability. If the crisis continued it would accelerate the numbers of East Timorese fleeing to neighbouring countries.

However, to Indonesia it was a decisive shock. Indonesia faced difficulties in its economy. The military and Indonesian Parliament members were among parties who were against Habibie's decision to hold a referendum. The government also had to confront pressures from international community and external great powers, such as the US. In a speech on 9 September 1999, President Clinton threatened dire economic and other ramifications should Indonesia fail to comply with the international demand for intervention:

> If Indonesia does not end the violence, it must invite — it must invite — the international community to assist in restoring security. It must allow international relief agencies to help people on the ground... Today, I have also ordered the suspension of all programs of military cooperation with Indonesia effective immediately. Our military leaders have made crystal clear to senior military officials in Indonesia what they must do to restore our confidence.[104]

Habibie's decision for a referendum for East Timor raised concerns about setting a precedent for other areas in conflict, such as Aceh and Papua to request a similar referendum. In domestic politics, Habibie was accused of aiding an international conspiracy to let East Timor go. His transitional government was claimed to be illegitimate and therefore did not have the right to make such important decisions for Indonesia. Furthermore, Habibie was criticised because he never consulted on his policy and before his actions afterwards with the Indonesian Parliament. Under the Indonesian National Constitution, for example, an international agreement should get

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[103] Cotton, *East Timor Australia and Regional Order,* p. 126.
[104] Clinton, William, 'Statement by the President on East Timor, 9 September 1999', available at http://clinton6.nara.gov/1000/09/1999-09-09-statement-by-the-president-on-east-timor.html (accessed on 1 November 2011).

approval from Parliament. Habibie did not consult with the Indonesian Parliament neither before he agreed on the New York Agreement on 5 May 1999 nor about his decision to accept an international force in East Timor in September 1999.[105] Thus, the East Timor crisis was a decisive shock only to Indonesia. It was a relative shock for participating ASEAN member countries and arguably not even seen as a shock by non-participating ASEAN countries. For these reasons, this indicator, a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order, is ranked as moderate in its significance for indicating a concert of powers in Southeast Asia.

B. A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers

The cooperation among the dominant powers of ASEAN was self-conscious but the level was not as high as the cooperation during the Cambodian crisis, therefore the 'high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers' indicator is rated as moderate. Although ASEAN's role in the East Timor crisis was often criticised as being minimal, it was crucial. Without the participation of ASEAN member states, Indonesia might not have accepted international intervention. However, it is also important to note that the cooperation was not intended to be conducted among dominant powers. From the beginning, Indonesia wished for a greater role to be conducted by the other ASEAN member countries, and Indonesia invited all members of ASEAN to participate. Because ASEAN did not have its own peace-keeping force and because the members thought that the crisis had always been under UN supervision, ASEAN did not participate as a group. The participation of ASEAN member states was as individual countries under the UN framework, not under any ASEAN framework. What is interesting was the dominant powers, with the addition of the Philippines, like in the Cambodian crisis, were involved again.

Thailand and the Philippines had been consistent in their contributions and cooperation with other ASEAN countries or non ASEAN countries under INTERFET or UNTAET. According to Thanet Aphornsuvan, a Thai lecturer at the Thammasat University, Bangkok, ASEAN's role may not have been crucial but Thailand's role was pivotal. He stated that:

> Thai troops were not only building and maintaining peace and security but also assisting the non military efforts such as building infrastructure like shelters and hospitals and also helping with agricultural sector, medical sector and other civilian activities.[106]

Malaysia committed to deploying major contribution of military personnel, but this was opposed by Jose Ramos Horta who stated that Malaysian personnel would not be

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[105] Somomoeljono, *Menguak Konspirasi Inernational di Timor Timur.*
[106] Interview with Thanet Aphornsuvan, Distinguished Fellow, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 23 February 2011.

welcome in East Timor. Like Malaysia, Singapore's contribution was not as large as those of Thailand and the Philippines. However, it was widely recognised that the personnel sent to East Timor from Singapore were very smart and professional. Michael Maley confirms by saying that:

> Eric [Tan Huck Gim] who was appointed as Deputy Special-Representative for the Secretary-General (DSRSG) for Security Sector and Rule of Law for United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was very professional. Like other Singaporean personnel, he was very smart too.[107]

Indonesia's self-conscious cooperation was seen through its effort to disarm the militia that were for autonomy and stop the TNI support of violence conducted by the militia.

C. A pattern of cooperative behaviour

There was a clear pattern of cooperative behaviour among ASEAN states before and throughout the East Timor crisis. This indicator, thus, is significant, and suggests the presence of a concert of powers in Southeast Asia during the crisis. The pattern of cooperative behaviour before and during the crisis signalled solidarity with Indonesia. Before the crisis, ASEAN maintained solidarity with Indonesia by regarding the East Timor issue as Indonesia's domestic problem, and therefore never discussed the issue within ASEAN meetings. Unlike the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis was never regarded by ASEAN members as a problem of ASEAN. Academics such as Cotton and Sonny Inbaraj argue that ASEAN paid no attention to the human rights violations in Indonesia.[108]

The dominant powers of ASEAN were divided in terms of support for Indonesia regarding the rejection of Western intervention. This further led to a split: Malaysia and Thailand supported Indonesia while Singapore and the Philippines did not reject Western intervention. Little is known about the view of Brunei and the CLMV countries on Western intervention in East Timor.

During the crisis, ASEAN also sought to respect Indonesia's sensitivities as much as possible. For instance, details of a meeting between Pitsuwan and Alatas and General Wiranto on 14 September 1999 to discuss the participation of ASEAN member states were treated as confidential. ASEAN foreign ministers decided not to deliberate the East Timor issue at their meeting on the sidelines of the 1999 UN General Assembly. This respect for Jakarta's sensitivities was also demonstrated by the request of Thai

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[107] Interview with Michael Maley, Special Adviser Electoral Reform and International Services, Australian Electoral Commission, Canberra, 8 August 2011.
[108] See Cotton, *East Timor, Australia and Regional Order*, p. 83, and Inbaraj, *East Timor Blood and Tears in ASEAN*.

Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to see Indonesian troops participate in INTERFET.[109]

Furthermore, the measure of solidarity with Indonesia was shown by sending military/civilian personnel. Clearly, without Jakarta's explicit consent, ASEAN governments would not have joined INTERFET. Based on their contributions, the dominant powers can be divided into: Thailand and the Philippines which made major contributions of military personnel; Malaysia and Singapore which sent only a limited number of soldiers as well as civilian personnel. However, it is important to note that individuals of these latter countries were identified in East Timor working in NGOs or as volunteers.

The pattern of deployment by participating countries also demonstrated solidarity with Indonesia. ASEAN members' armed forces were not meant to engage in peace enforcement. The Thai Army Chief, General Surayu Chulanont, explicitly stated that Thai soldiers serving in INTERFET would only participate in peace-keeping operations to which Jakarta had given its assent. Therefore, the presence of individual states in East Timor was therefore confined to the east rather than the western part of the territory. The danger of running into militia members was significantly higher in the west than in the eastern part. This pattern of deployment began to change only in 2001 when Singapore deployed peace-keepers near the West Timor border.[110]

D. An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers

The indicator, an effective equal collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers, is rated as moderate. The participant countries did not really contribute as a group, therefore it is difficult to identify an equal contribution. The role of Malaysia, for example, could not be regarded as equal to the roles of Thailand and the Philippines. The defence forces of ASEAN states, with the exception of Malaysia, had little previous experience in UN operations and were initially hesitant about their ability to turn war fighters into peace-makers. Singapore and Thailand harboured fears that conscripted troops deployed to East Timor could be killed, provoking anti-government criticism.[111] Furthermore, there were fears of having to fight Indonesian troops stationed along the border with West Timor. Also, deploying peace-enforcers and peace-keepers to East Timor would incur financial costs. Finally, not all member

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109 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.
110 Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.
111 Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'.

states were welcomed by the East Timorese. These factors led to unequal contributions by the dominant powers during the East Timor crisis.

The role of Thailand was bigger than the role of Malaysia and Singapore in terms of military deployment. Thailand also created a good network and work environment with other nationals of the armed forces, leading to its role being regarded positively by INTERFET and UNTAET officials. The role of Indonesia was different as well, therefore it could not be compared with the role of participating countries. Although its TNI and police made mistakes here and there, without the commitment of the Indonesian government, militias would be very difficult to disarm and it would be difficult to cut the link between militias on the one side and TNI and Police on the other side. At the end, the contribution Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore were regarded effective and successful. Malaysia and Singapore finally increased their military personnel.

E. Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms

The 'institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting mechanisms' indicator is insignificant in indicating a concert of powers during the crisis. The only high-level meeting that discussed the East Timor issue involving ASEAN members was the APEC Ministerial Meeting in New Zealand, 1999. However, even though there was no summit diplomacy, Rodolfo Severino, the then ASEAN Secretary-General and Surin Pitsuwan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand were very active in exploring how ASEAN could contribute. As mentioned above, on 14 September 1999, the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pitsuwan met with Ali Alatas and General Wiranto to discuss the participation of ASEAN member-states in the international force. In the afternoon of the same day Habibie formally requested Thailand to help organise an ASEAN military contribution in a meeting with Pitsuwan.[112]

Summit diplomacy existed not among ASEAN countries or participating ASEAN countries but between Indonesia and Australia. As mentioned earlier, Howard met Habibie twice to discuss the East Timor crisis. Meetings between high level officials also occurred between Indonesia and the US to talk about Indonesia's consent for an international intervention to restore security in East Timor.

Because no institutionalised summit diplomacy and no regular formal practices among dominant powers occurred with regards to the East Timor crisis, there were no formal

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[112] Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'.

consultative mechanisms. The only consultative mechanisms found were between the military personnel in the field.

F. A joint approach to regional issues

No joint approach was ever discussed by dominant or participating powers on the issue of East Timor crisis. However without a joint approach, the behaviour of participating powers was in harmony in the sense of making a contribution to assist Indonesia and keeping respect for Indonesia's sensitivities. Apart from the East Timor crisis, the organisation had demonstrated a joint approach on regional issues such as ASEAN integration and cooperation on counter-terrorism. ASEAN's dominant powers showed more active participation in those issues than other members. During 1999-2002, there were other issues, such as the proposal for an ASEAN Troika by Thailand and the rules of procedure for the ASEAN High Council. The ASEAN Troika proposal was rejected by countries like Myanmar, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines while ASEAN leaders finally reached agreement on the rules of procedures of the ASEAN High Council in 2001.[113]

Outside of the East Timor crisis, a joint approach was reached on 5 November in 2001 when ASEAN countries signed the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in Bandar Seri Begawan, and in late 2002, ASEAN member countries signed a Declaration on a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea with China. However, these declarations did not really demonstrate a joint approach by dominant powers, but more actions by ASEAN as a whole organisation. Therefore, the indicator, a joint approach to regional issues, is rated as moderate.

G. A need for system stability and international order

There was a need for system stability in Southeast Asia. Malaysia saw the need for system stability and international order, but it rejected Western deep involvement, including that of Australia. Interestingly, despite Mahathir's criticism of the West, Malaysia during the period of 1999-2002 demonstrated a strengthened military cooperation with the US. This also meant that Malaysia was seeking an 'umbrella' to provide stability in the region. Thailand also saw the need for system stability. It did not see East Timor as a direct threat, but the fact that Thailand sent troops also reflected that Thailand wanted a stable Southeast Asia. Stability in Southeast Asia in general and in Indonesia in particular was important for the Philippines which shares borders with Indonesia. Singapore was the only Southeast Asian country to abstain during a UN vote. It means that Singapore also wanted stability in Southeast Asia. From statements by its

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[113] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.

officials, Singapore was not worried about Western involvement. Instead, in 2000, it gave access to US Navy access to the naval base at Changi, showing it still believed that the US could play a role in restoring stability in Southeast Asia. Indonesia's position was difficult. On the one side, it wanted regional stability and wished for the restoration of its credibility. On the other side, it did not want its military officers in East Timor become 'victims' of legal procedures about past violation of human rights.

The indicator, a need for system stability and international order is significant although the indicator, a decisive shock to stability and order is insignificant. The need for system stability is not necessarily the result of a decisive shock. On the contrary, it resulted from other factors such as the complex national interests of ASEAN member countries, and solidarity with Indonesia. A review of the indicators of a concert of powers is summarised in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.2.

TABLE 4.8 Summary of the Indicators of a Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis

No.	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	Insignificant
	Concert of Powers			
A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order		√	
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers		√	
C.	Patterns of cooperative behaviour	√		
D.	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers		√	
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms			√
F.	A joint approach to regional issues		√	
G.	A need for system stability and international order	√		
	Total	**2**	**4**	**1**

Source: Compiled by author

FIGURE 4.2
Indicators of a Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 4.8 and Figure 4.2 demonstrate that for this concept there were only two significant indicators out of seven are met. Those two indicators are the pattern of cooperative behaviour and the need for system stability and international order. Four indicators of a concert of powers are moderate and one indicator is insignificant. This was a testament that the ASEAN's management during the East Timor crisis in 1999-2002 does not provide evidence that there existed of a concert of powers among the dominant powers in Southeast Asia.

4.6. A Security Community?

This section analyses some indicators of a security community and examines how ASEAN responded to the East Timor Crisis. The indicators of a security community elaborated here are the same indicators that were used to analyse the regional security system during the Cambodian crisis, and are listed in Box 3.1 (see Section 3.4). Each of these indicators of a security community is treated as being equally important. In this section, I argue that ASEAN members' management of the East Timor crisis is explained by seven out of ten indicators of a security community. However, these indicators only applied among the dominant powers, namely Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. The indicators are not relevant to countries like Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Table 4.9 summarises narratives of all indicators of a security community in Southeast Asia during the East Timor crisis.

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				Security Community			
A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers: **Significant**	Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines shared common values: the importance of supporting and maintaining relations with Indonesia, the strong adherence to the principle of non-interference and strong adherence to ASEAN solidarity.					
		Thailand had supported Indonesia since the East Timor integration with Indonesia in 1975. It contributed the largest military personnel, not only among ASEAN countries but also among Asian countries.	Human rights is an important issue for the Philippines, however good relations with Indonesia had prevailed in the Philippines' foreign policy. The Philippines also contributed a large number of military personnel.	Malaysia had been supporting Indonesia on the East Timor situation since 1975. After Habibie opened up the option for independence, Mahathir still supported Indonesia and sent military and civilian personnel.	Like Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, Singapore supported Indonesia.	Before the referendum, Indonesia valued a united Indonesia including East Timor as its most important political value. During its rule, Indonesia sought for support from ASEAN and prevented this issue from being discussed in any ASEAN meeting. After Habibie announced option to vote for regional autonomy or independence, Indonesia elevated international image as an important value.	Vietnam supported Indonesia after becoming member of ASEAN.
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers: **Significant**	Most of the behaviour among decision-makers of the ASEAN member countries was predictable.					
		Thailand's behaviour was also predictable. Its policy was its consistent in supporting	Philippines had to balance internal aspirations and its relationship with Indonesia. However, Manila's	Among other ASEAN member countries, Malaysia was regarded as the strongest Indonesia's	Singapore's behaviour was generally predictable, but its abstention from voting on the UN	Indonesia's was often accused by international community of being insensitive towards the East Timor crisis.	The behaviour of decision-makers of Brunei and the CLMV countries was quite predictable in the

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				Security Community			
		Indonesia, being silent on Indonesia's rule in East Timor and giving its assistance when the crisis arose.	behaviour was predictable because it always valued first its relationship with Indonesia, particularly Indonesia's investment in East Timor.	supporter on the East Timor crisis. This also was confirmed when the East Timorese rejected any Malaysian army to be the leader of UNAMET, given its closeness to Indonesia.	draft resolution of A/C.4/37/L8 was quite unpredictable to Indonesia.	However, for ASEAN countries, Indonesia's behaviour is understandable and predictable.	sense that they gave support to Indonesia but were unable to contribute.
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other government: **Significant particularly during the de-escalation period**	Thailand was active and responsive in the crisis. It was also responsive to actions and communication of other governments in the field.	The Philippines was active and responsive in the crisis. It was also responsive to actions and communication of other governments in the field. Interestingly, the East Timorese were in favour of the Philippines' involvement.	Malaysia was active and responsive to the crisis. It was always consultative with Indonesia and other member countries. Malaysia however ended up not making a large contribution because of its resistance to working under Australia's leadership and rejection by the East Timorese because Malaysia was seen as too sympathetic to Indonesia.	Singapore was also responsive in delivering assistance in the crisis.	Indonesia was responsive in the field. The army leaders in the peace-keeping force met regularly with the Military Region Commander Region/*Panglima Kodam* (*Pangdam*) IX Udayana. However, there was criticism that TNI supported the violence conducted by pro-independence militias and the government of Indonesia did not expend effort to stop it.	The level of responsiveness of Brunei Darussalam and the CLMV countries is considerably low.

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				Security Community			
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies: **Significant**	For Thailand the factors were regional stability and solidarity with Indonesia.	For the Philippines, the precipitating factors were the threat to regional instability and economic relations with Indonesia.	The precipitating factor for Malaysia was solidarity with Indonesia.	For Singapore, the precipitating factors were ASEAN's credibility and the threat of a refugee influx from East Timor.	Indonesia seen international pressure on humanitarian aspects in East Timor as the precipitating factor.	Not relevant
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning: **Significant**	Thailand was consistent in its contribution and its role.	The transaction involving the Philippines was related to the assignment of a Commander in East Timor.	Malaysia planned a major contribution, but because of refusal of Jose Ramos Horta, it only sent 30 personnel. However, because of process of transactions Malaysia increased its military deployment.	Singapore increased its military and civilian deployment in East Timor.	Indonesia in the beginning was reluctant to receive an international force in East Timor. After international pressures, it was willing to do so. Indonesia also was reluctant to accept Australia's leadership in INTERFET. The participation of other ASEAN member countries made Australia's role more diplomatically acceptable for Indonesia.	Not relevant
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation: **Significant**	Trust and a collective identity were developed among member countries who were participating in the peace-keeping force. This did not necessarily mean that at the end of the East Timor crisis, ASEAN had a high level of collective identity.					

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				Security Community			
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflict in the region: **Insignificant**	Thai-Myanmar relations had become conflicted during 1999-2002. The poor relationship was exacerbated by Thailand's refusal to extradite the perpetrators of the 1999 occupation of the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok, as requested by Myanmar. In February 2001, the tension escalated into a serious border confrontation and lead to the death of approximately 50-100 Myanmar soldiers.	Domestically, the Philippines had problems with insurgencies from the Southern Area. The claim over South China Sea often created tension with China.	Even though Malaysia supported Indonesia on the East Timor issue, during 1999-2000 there was friction between Malaysia and Indonesia over Ambalat. Tension with Indonesia also existed because of the smoke haze issue. Malaysia and the Philippines had also not reached agreement about the Philippines' claim over Sabah.	Aside from the East Timor crisis itself, during 1999-2002, Singapore criticised Indonesia's policy in handling the smoke haze issue. Singapore was quite upset about being referred to as a 'little red dot' by Indonesian President Habibie.	There were tensions with Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam because of the smoke haze issue. Furthermore, there was also tension with Malaysia over the Ambalat issue and tension with Singapore because of the statement of President Habibie referring Singapore as a 'little red dot'.	Thai and Myanmar had a border dispute, that led to the use of force. Brunei Darussalam had a territorial dispute with Malaysia over Limbang, Lawas, Terusan, Rangau. Brunei and Vietnam have been claiming Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors: **Significant**	Competitive military build-up or arms race was insignificant but this does not mean that there was no competitive build-up or arms race before and after the East Timor crisis or in the longer period.					

No.	Indicators	Thailand	The Philippines	Malaysia	Singapore	Indonesia	Brunei and CLMV countries
				Security Community			
I.	Formal or informal institutions and practices: **Moderate**	Informal practices among ASEAN member countries during the East Timor crisis included the meeting between Indonesian Foreign Minister and Thai Foreign Minister to discuss participation of ASEAN member-states in the international force, and informal practices conducted by military personnel in the field.					
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship: **Moderate**	In October 1998, ASEAN established an ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) which encompassed two aspects: the monitoring of global, regional as well as national economic and financial developments, summarised twice yearly in a surveillance report. Discussion of an ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) was introduced in the Singapore Summit in 1992 and was developing by 1999. APEC established in 1994 was also one of the games. It is important to note that after the financial crisis, ASEAN really boosted their efforts for integration. The ASEAN Plus Three also reflected a sense of integration.					

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

A. A comparability of political values among decision-makers

Political values of ASEAN member states during the East Timor crisis were comparable and therefore, the 'comparability of the political values among decision-makers' indicator can be regarded as significant in suggesting the presence of a security community in Southeast Asia. For ASEAN member countries, commonly-held values were the importance of supporting and maintaining relations with Indonesia; strong adherence to the principle of non-interference; and strong adherence to ASEAN solidarity. They also shared the view that a weak and isolated East Timor could easily become a source of instability for the whole region. [114] Another common value, particularly for Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore, was the willingness to contribute to INTERFET and UNTAET. ASEAN's reputation also depended heavily on how ASEAN member states responded to the crisis.

Bangkok, like Kuala Lumpur, Singapore and Manila, has always regarded Indonesia as an important friend. Because of this, Thailand did not really want to jeopardise its relations with Indonesia by raising the East Timor issue with Indonesia. In December 1992, approximately 500 international NGO activists gathered in Bangkok for the second People's Plan for the 21st Century (PP21) assembly. Ramos Horta was a resource speaker during the assembly, and East Timor was one of the themes of the workshops in the PP21 assembly. However, the Thai media paid little attention to the issue of East Timor. Most of the Thai press had yet to see East Timor as an issue.

Malaysia had also been a consistent supporter of Indonesia. When the Santa Cruz incident happened in 1999 in Dili and the local Malaysian television company aired the incident, it was criticised by Indonesian Information Minister, Murdiono. Following that, Prime Minister Mahathir sent Malaysian Information Minister to Jakarta as personal envoy to express apologies. [115] Malaysia did not condemn the Indonesian military or state any negative claims towards what happened like any another Western countries, but once more reaffirmed its back-up of Indonesia. The second Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor' convened in Kuala Lumpur in November 1996 was cancelled by the ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) out of respect for Indonesia's sensitivities. In addition, the Malaysian police arrested 66 local activists and journalists[116].

The Philippines paid a higher degree of attention to its internal aspirations than Malaysia and Thailand did in relation to the East Timor issue. An Asia Pacific

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[114] Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'.
[115] John Funston, *ASEAN and the Principle of Non Intervention – Practice and Prospects*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2000.
[116] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.

conference on East Timor was set for May 1994 in Manila. When the Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas met with Filipino diplomats in early November 1993 during the first round of talks between the Philippine government and the secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), he raised the issue of the convening of the Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor. After the meeting, Philippine President Fidel Ramos gave orders to his National Security Adviser General Jose Almonte to tackle the problem of the East Timor conference because he thought the Asia Pacific Conference on East Timor (APCET) could endanger its bilateral relations with Indonesia. Resistance came from the organisers of the conference but finally on 20 May 1994, President Ramos banned East Timorese and other foreigners from attending the conference because it was seen as contrary to Manila's national interests.[117] Malaysia also supported Indonesia in rejecting the convening of the APCET, as Mahathir commented in a reference to President Ramos: 'I would accommodate Indonesia in the wider interests of ASEAN'. [118] Malaysian Law Minister Syed Hamid Albar also reaffirmed the consistency of Malaysia's stance by saying:

> I think it is important for us to take sensitivities into account, and we must not talk of human rights as though they are in a vacuum... I cannot tell what the Filipinos should do but I think we must always be conscious that what we do will affect other people.[119]

Another political value that was shared by Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines was the willingness to assume collective responsibility for the region's security problems. Malaysia, for instance, made it clear that it was willing to provide the commander for the UNTAET Peace-keeping Force, reflecting Kuala Lumpur's long-standing support for UN Peace-keeping operations. Thailand also shared the same aspiration. Malaysia's aspiration was finally destroyed by opposition from Xanana Gusmao who thought that Malaysia was too sympathetic towards Indonesia. To compromise, an ASEAN force commander, a Filipino Lieutenant-General was chosen to lead UNTAET's peace-keeping operation, with an Australian as his deputy.[120] However, countries like Myanmar, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam had shown little enthusiasm to assume such responsibility. Myanmar had made it clear that it did not approve of any external involvement in East Timor. Vietnam did not want to participate either in INTERFET or UNTAET.[121]

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[117] Inbaraj, *East Timor Blood and Tears in ASEAN*.
[118] Inbaraj, *East Timor Blood and Tears in ASEAN*, p. 136.
[119] Inbaraj, *East Timor Blood and Tears in ASEAN*, p. 137.
[120] Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'.
[121] Dupont, 'ASEAN's Response to the East Timor Crisis'.

B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers

Throughout the crisis, the behaviour of the decision-makers of the ASEAN member states was predictable, thus highlighting the significance of the 'mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers' indicator. During the escalation period, ASEAN countries remained 'silent' and supported Indonesia. This had been seen in their leaders' comments, in the fact that the East Timor issue had never been discussed in any ASEAN meeting, also in their support at UNSC session on East Timor. During the acute and de-escalation period of the crisis, most of the behaviour among decision-makers of the ASEAN member countries was predictable. Malaysia's consistent support for Indonesia's policy could be seen, from Indonesia's occupation of East Timor to the time when the East Timor's independence was recognised internationally in 2002. Mahathir had been a staunch defender of Indonesian behaviour in East Timor. Asked in Singapore to explain his opposition to East Timor's independence in light of his outspoken support for the right of Kosovo, which has a Muslim majority, to break away from Serbia, Mahathir said Indonesia was entitled to integrate the territory. 'The difference between East Timor and Kosovo is that East Timor has been with Indonesia for 25 years, and during that time there were no massacres'. Mahathir added, 'The Indonesians were not behaving like Serbs'.[122] Bangkok's policies in relation to the East Timor issue had also been quite predictable because it had shown a consistency in supporting Indonesia's national integrity. Media in Thailand was not too interested in the issue and the voice of human rights activists in Thailand was basically 'ignored' by the Thai government to sustain its maintain its resilient relationship with Indonesia and the 'ASEAN solidarity'. The Philippines, however, found that its internal pressure was quite contradictory with Indonesia's pressure. President Ramos faced a dilemma between promoting a pure democracy in the Philippines in which activists could voice their aspirations on East Timor and sustaining good political relations on the one hand and prospective economic benefits from investment and trade with Indonesia on the other hand.

Among other ASEAN member countries, Singapore was the only country who was a little bit unpredictable. As discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, Singapore was the only ASEAN country that abstained from the UNGA votes on East Timor in 1975 and 1976. The behaviour of Myanmar, Brunei Darussalam, and Laos was predictable in the sense that they feared the possibility of regional instability, 'Indonesia's break up' or any other regional disorder as impacts of the East Timor crisis, but they did not want to assume any responsibility in any of the UN operations during the East Timor crisis. This was also related to their limited capabilities to offer assistance.

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[122] Inbaraj, 'ASEAN's commitment to East Timor faces tough test'.

C. A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments

Four ASEAN countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore) were very responsive in terms of delivering assistance to Indonesia while Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos did not commit to any responsibility for any of the UN-sponsored East Timor operations. Since the beginning, Thailand and Malaysia had indicated their willingness to participate in a peace-keeping force if Indonesia approved. During the crisis, Thailand and the Philippines ended up offering the biggest contingents from among the ASEAN states, with a Thai general assuming deputy command. Malaysia was reluctant to work with Australia as a leader of the peace enforcement cooperation.[123]

The four countries were also responsive to acts and communication with Indonesia, in particular, and with other countries involved in the field. They did not really work as a unity in ASEAN, but they had a collective identity. A Thai army officer interviewed said that even though there was no ASEAN Peace-keeping Force and ASEAN countries contributed individually under the auspices of the UN, military officials from ASEAN countries did develop a sense of collective identity as ASEAN and the successor to Lieutenant General Del Costa met regularly with the Indonesian Military Region Commander (*Pangdam*) IX Udayana in Bali to consult with and to update the *Pangdam* on the real situation on East Timor.[124]

Bangkok participated in a multinational humanitarian mission to East and West Timor in response to another 'invitation' by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas in late September 1999. Indonesia invited ASEAN members to join this mission in response to concerns in the US and elsewhere about the lack of safety for refugees from East Timor and the civilian character of the camps in which they were housed. When Australia and the United Sates suggested extending military operations in West Timor to hot pursuit of pro-Jakarta militias, ASEAN governments, including Thailand argued that such action would constitute a flagrant breach of Indonesia's sovereignty. Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai reminded the US defence secretary that the mandate of the international force in East Timor was restricted to East Timor itself.[125]

Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore were very active in the peace-keeping operations. The Thais were the first Asian forces in the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) sent on September 20 to quell the

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[123] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.
[124] Interview with a Thai army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC of Force Commander of UNTAET, Bangkok, 23 February 2011.
[125] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.

militia violence in the territory. For INTERFET, the Thai Major-General served as deputy-commander with 1,580 Thai military personnel comprising the second-largest element after Australia. [126] With the UNTAET, Lieutenant-General Boonsran Niumpradit of Thailand in July 2000 became the first commander of the military component replacing Lieutenant General Jaime de los Santos of the Philippines.[127] Liutenant General Boonsrang Niumpradit was known for his keen intellect, infectious sense of humour and remarkable people skills. Under his leadership, the force became more closely intertwined, and he changed INTERFET's focus from countering militia activity to sustaining the support of local people. [128] Apart from their Lieutenant General being the first commander, the Philippines also supported INTERFET and UNTAET with military personnel. Malaysia and Singapore also contributed military personnel and civilian police component. Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore also contributed to the new force, the East Timor Defence Force. Thailand offered to provide expertise in civil-military affairs, especially in the area of linking national development and security. Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore also agreed to help build the new defence force.[129]

Lao PDR, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar did not participate in sending military personnel to the international peace-keeping force. However, civilians from these countries worked with the UN Agencies in this regard, or worked at NGOs based in East Timor. [130] Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam also contributed in the training of the East Timor Defence Forces and supported its organisational efforts.

D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies

The various precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction make this indicator become significant. The factors included solidarity with Indonesia, the pursuit of regional peace and stability and ASEAN's credibility. However, there were individual factors such as economic interests and refugee influx concerns. For Thailand, the most important precipitating factors were the pursuit of regional peace and stability and the need to sustain a good relationship with Indonesia. A Thai army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC to the Thai Force Commander of UNTAET commented:

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[126] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.
[127] Cotton, 'Against the Grain: The East Timor Intervention'.
[128] Smith and Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor the Path to Independence*.
[129] Thalief Deen, 'Australia-Portugal to help East Timor with defence force', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 7 December 2000.
[130] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.

> The biggest interests of Thailand in participating in the UN peace-keeping operation were: First, we want regional peace and stability. If you look at the history of the rest of the world, war in Iraq, the Middle East and any other place in the world, peace for Thailand is more upfront. Second, the relationship between Thailand and Indonesia was also important, Thai gave priority to its neighbours. We are aware that if there is a problem, the first circle of countries who are going to help us are those who share borders with us and then those who are our neighbours. For Thailand as a member of ASEAN, the organisation is a long term thing, it has real value. [131]

Similar to Thailand, which valued regional peace and stability, the Philippines also saw regional peace and stability and its economic relationship with Indonesia as important precipitating factors. Support of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor was based on its economic interdependency with Indonesia. Instability in Indonesia would jeopardise Indonesia's investment in the country.

For Singapore, ASEAN's credibility and concern about refugee influx were the most significant precipitating factors. Thus, the participating countries have common precipitating factors as well as other individual precipitating factors.

E. Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning

The processes of transaction began when Indonesia kindly asked other ASEAN countries to participate. One of the reasons for Habibie's request was that he was offended by the role Australia was playing in resolving the East Timor crisis. To influence at the last minutes the composition of the international force without formally setting preconditions over the nationality troops, Habibie specifically requested Thailand, the then Chair of the ASEAN Committee, for ASEAN member states to take a major role in the international keeping force. Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore agreed to help. The Philippines government requested two conditions for its participation: first, a UNSC Resolution and second, an invitation from the country to intervene. In responding this request, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas suggested that any new norm of humanitarian intervention should be based on the principles of legitimacy and universal applicability.[132] He also warned that external forces might initiate or exploit internal situations for their own political ends.

Apart from the four ASEAN member countries there were key actors such as Australia, Portugal and of course the UN. Also quite a number of UN Agencies and NGOs were involved. For an ASEAN country sending its military personnel, there was a need to

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[131] Interview with a Thai Army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC to the Thai Force Commander of UNTAET, Bangkok, 23 February 2011.
[132] Ali Alatas, 'Jakarta's diplomacy challenges', *The Straits Times*, 2 April 2002 quoted in Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.

balance with its own country's interest and Indonesia's interests with the international interests that had been mandated to them. As a Thai official declared:

> You would see a lot of meetings NGO, UN Agency, the political dimensions. ASEAN member countries meet to do best to preserve their interests and to balance it with the international mandate. We had to do it right because so many people were watching us.[133]

There was some bargaining between Indonesia and the UN. In the beginning, Indonesia did not favour any international intervention and the UN needed permission from Jakarta before any peace-keeping force could be set up. When Indonesia accepted international intervention, it sought ASEAN leadership for the operations. It finally did not refuse Australia's leadership in INTERFET. This demonstrates that transactions and bargaining between Indonesia and the UN occurred. Singapore's final intention to send troops for UNMISET was also a social learning experience for Singapore.

F. Development of trust and collective identity formation

Trust and the formation of a collective identity were developing throughout the escalation, acute and de-escalation periods of the crisis. This does not necessarily mean that by 2010, ASEAN had developed a high degree of trust and collective identity. The participating countries indeed developed some degree of trust and collective identity. An ADC to the Force Commander in the East Timor crisis commented that the Thai Force Commander realised that apart from being given a mandate by the UN, he was also a Thai, and a part of ASEAN. Personnel from ASEAN member countries also were aware of bearing an ASEAN identity, despite their duty being under UN auspices.[134]

However, this collective identity was only developed between those countries who were participating in the international peace-keeping force. Beyond the East Timor crisis, Thailand had border problems with Myanmar; Singapore was offended by Indonesia due to the 'little red dot' reference by President Habibie in 1998; and Indonesia received criticism from Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines over the pollution haze.

G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflicts in the region

The indicator, a total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for conflicts in the region, is rated as insignificant. When the East Timor Crisis happened, an armed border dispute was occurring between Thailand and Myanmar, which was not widely

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[133] Interview with a Thai Army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC to the Thai Force Commander of UNTAET, Bangkok, 23 February 2011.
[134] Interview with a Thai Army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC to the Thai Force Commander of UNTAET, Bangkok, 23 February 2011.

known to the public. The relations between Thai and Myanmar had been conflicted before the East Timor crisis occurred, because the Thai government was not able to agree with his Myanmar counterpart on issues like the joint border, the cross-border fighting between the Myanmar army and various insurgent ethnic groups, the flow of drugs from Myanmar into Thailand, and various economic issues such as fishing rights in Myanmar waters. The situation was exacerbated by Thailand's refusal to extradite the perpetrators of the 1999 occupation of the Myanmar Embassy in Bangkok, as demanded by Myanmar. In February 2001, before the successor administration of Thaksin Shinawatra assumed office, the long-running diplomatic friction between Bangkok and Yangon escalated into a serious border confrontation. This dispute led to the death of 50-100 Myanmar soldiers.[135]

The smoke haze problems occurred in 1997-1998. The recurrence of smoke haze in 2002 had created tension between Indonesia on the one side and Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and the Philippines on the other side. Simon Tay, a researcher from Singapore commented: 'ASEAN has to date been unable to supplement failures by Indonesia to address Southeast Asian fires'.[136] Singapore recorded a Pollutant Standard Index (PSI) of 140 in two days in September 1997 (as compared with a reading of 153 during the smoke haze problems occurred in October 1994).[137] In Peninsular Malaysia, Malaysia Air PSI reached a peak reading of 849 in October 1997 for Kuching in Serawak. In early April 1998, the index reached 502 in Miri (Sarawak) causing the closing of schools. This had caused a tension but somehow also forced ASEAN member countries to work harder.

Besides smoke haze problem which was regarded by Cotton as one of Southeast Asia's biggest challenges,[138] there was a tension between Indonesia and Singapore. President Habibie received criticisms from Singapore for referring to Singapore as a little red dot and for accusing the island state of racism for not promoting or appointing Malay officers within the Singapore Armed Forces.[139]

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[135] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic security and culture'.
[136] James Cotton, *Crossing Borders in the Asia Pacific in the Asia-Pacific Essays on the Domestic-Foreign Policy Divide,* New York: Nova Science Publisher, 2002, p. 16.
[137] A reading of over 100 is judged as 'unhealthy', and in excess of 300 is 'hazardous'. See Cotton, *Crossing Borders in the Asia-Pacific.*
[138] James Cotton, 'The 'Haze' over Southeast Asia: Challenging for the ASEAN Mode of Regional Engagement', *Pacific Affairs,* 72:3, 1999, pp. 331-351.
[139] Lim Seng Jin, 'No Place for Discrimination,' *The Straits Times,* 28 February 1999 quoted in Collins, *Security and Southeast Asia.*

H. A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors

I argue that there was limited, if any, competitive military build-up or arms race in 1999-2002 due to the impact of the Asian Financial crisis in 1997-1998. Among ASEAN members only Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar demonstrated an increase in their defence spending. Brunei's defence budget and outlays had increased since 1995 because of an extensive modernisation program. Myanmar's 1999 defence budget increased to K32.6 billion from K24.5 billion in 1998.[140] Singapore demonstrated a static defence budgeting showing the same nominal as in 1998 for 1999 Sing$7.3bn ($4.2bn) defence budget.[141] The other ASEAN countries had shown a decline in the purchasing power of defence budgets in line with currency depreciation. Malaysia, for example, delayed an order for 27 patrol vessels from Germany. Indonesia also demonstrated a decline in budget spending.[142] The Philippines delayed the initial phase of its modernisation program because of the reduced purchasing power of defence. Thailand's 1999 defence outlay was b77 billion, decreasing b9 billion from its b86 billion defence budgets in 1998. Cambodia, the newest ASEAN member announced its plan to reduce defence spending, which accounted for 4% of its GDP in 1998 to 3% of GDP in 2002.[143] In 2000, although it planned to increase naval personnel from 47,000 to 67,000 from 2000-2005, Indonesia again limited its defence spending because of the poor state of the economy.[144]

Overall, it is fair to say that there was a total absence of a competitive military build arms race at that time and therefore it can be argued as an important indicator to signify a security community dynamic in Southeast Asia. However, it does not mean that there was no arms race before 1999 or after 2002 or within a longer term.

I. Formal or informal institutions and practices

Within ASEAN member states and ASEAN participating countries, there were few formal opportunities to discuss the East Timor issue. Most were informal and therefore I argue that the 'formal or informal institutions and practices' indicator is moderate. The only formal practices were the APEC meeting in New Zealand in 1999 where the APEC members raised concerns of East Timor crisis and the following meetings between Pitsuwan from ASEAN side and Ali Alatas and General Wiranto and between Pitsuwan and Habibie. Following the special meeting of APEC foreign ministers in Auckland on September 8, the APEC Leaders Meeting gave considerable momentum to

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[140] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia' 'East Asia and Australasia'.
[141] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia' 'East Asia and Australasia'.
[142] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia' 'East Asia and Australasia'.
[143] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia' 'East Asia and Australasia'.
[144] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'East Asia and Australasia' 'East Asia and Australasia'

international pressure on Indonesia to end the bloodshed and address the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, which culminated in the announcement in the early hours of September 13 by then President Habibie of Indonesia's willingness to accept UN peace-keepers. At that gathering, Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita, representing President Habibie, stated Indonesia's wish for substantial ASEAN participation in a multinational force that the UN might establish, upon Indonesia's invitation, to restore order and security in East Timor.[145]

Formal practices were limited in ASEAN because ASEAN's sense of belonging to the issue had never really existed. Rodolfo Severino argues that ASEAN responses to the crisis in East Timor were always carried out within the UN framework. According to him, the UN, instead of ASEAN, had been facilitating the Indonesia-Portugal talks. This is also related to the fact that the UN was more legitimate and capable of undertaking the peace-keeping operation rather than ASEAN.[146]

However, there were a lot of informal practices in the field where personnel from Southeast Asian countries, namely Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore always consulted to Indonesia.[147] In short, the 'formal or informal practices' indicator can be regarded as moderate, because there were few formal practices but frequent informal practices occurring during the East Timor crisis.

J. A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship

There was some level of political and economic integration during the period 1999-2002. The formal initiative to establish political integration in a form of political and security community had not developed yet, but a certain degree of political integration was seen in the way the political cooperation between ASEAN member countries had been increasingly developing. ASEAN included new members —Vietnam and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia and Lao PDR in 1999. It did not mean that the efforts to integrate were weakened by the new membership. However, it is fair to say that with the inclusion of some new entrants, ASEAN needed to work harder to integrate themselves, either politically or economically. This effort was still ongoing when the thesis was being written. To boost its effort of integration, ASEAN announced an Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in November 2000.

[145] Rodolfo C. Severino, *Southeast Asia In Search of an ASEAN Community,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2006.
[146] Rodolfo C. Severino, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way', speech given at the ASEAN Scholars' Roundtable organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, Singapore, 3 July 2000.
[146] Severino, 'Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way'.
[147] Interview with a Thai Army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC to the Thai Force Commander of UNTAET, Bangkok, 23 February 2011.

The formal expression to integrate economically started in the 1992 Singapore Summit where countries agreed to develop an ASEAN Free Trade Area and it had been developing by 1999. The efforts to integrate economically were also enhanced by the fact that some of the ASEAN countries were strongly affected by the 1999 Asian Financial Crisis. The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) established in 1994 was one such effort. The ASEAN Plus Three also reflected a sense of integration.

The period between 1999 and 2000 was unique for ASEAN member states. In 1997, some countries in Southeast Asia were strongly hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, particularly Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Other countries were affected but the impact was smaller compared to those of the other three countries. In October 1998, ASEAN members agreed on the establishment of an ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP). The ASP encompassed two aspects; first, the monitoring of global, regional as well as national economic and financial developments. These developments were summarised twice early in a surveillance report. The purpose was to prevent deterioration into major macroeconomic and financial instability by ASEAN member states. The ASP centred on a peer-review process conducted by the ASEAN Finance Ministers. Through the ASP, the Ministers could henceforth raise macroeconomic or financial issues with their colleagues that previously considered being none of their business.[148]

ASEAN Leaders at the 3rd Informal Summit in Manila in 1999 recognised the launching of the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) in March of 1999 as a major milestone in ASEAN financial and monetary cooperation. They likewise noted progress in the conduct of the peer review process of the economic situation in ASEAN and welcomed the support extended by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the UN Development Programme to the ASP. The HOS/G directed their respective Ministers to explore further options to strengthen regional support mechanisms.[149]

After the crisis, ASEAN found itself facing important opportunities and challenges including the need to better integrate the new members into the regional and global economy. In November 2000, the ASEAN Leaders agreed to launch an 'Initiative for ASEAN Integration' (IAI) programme, which gives direction to and sharpens the focus of collective efforts in ASEAN to narrow the development gap between ASEAN's older and newer members (Cambodia, Laos Myanmar and Vietnam). To realise this objective, the ASEAN Leaders at their Summit Meeting in Phnom Penh in November 2002 endorsed a Work Plan (with 48 projects) that would ensure dynamic sustained growth

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[148] Haacke, 'ASEAN's diplomatic and security culture'.
[149] ASEAN, 'Chairman's Press Statement on ASEAN 3rd Informal Summit Manila, Philippines, 28 November 1999' available at http://www.asean.org/5300.htm (accessed on 8 November 2011).

of the sub region and prosperity of the peoples. Besides the CLMV countries, there are also underdeveloped regions in the ASEAN-6 countries, therefore the Initiative for IAI is also aimed at bridging the gaps. The first six year IAI Work Plan was implemented from July 2002-June 2008.[150]The indicators discussed above can be seen in Table 4.10 and Figure 4.3.

TABLE 4.10
Summary of the Indicators of a Security Community during the East Timor Crisis

No.	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	Insignificant	Note
	Security Community				
A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers	√			Only among participating countries
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers	√			Only among participating countries
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments	√			Only among participating countries
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies	√			Only among participating countries
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning	√			Only among participating countries
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation	√			Only among participating countries
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospect for such conflict in the region			√	All ASEAN member states
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving self-conscious regional actors	√			All ASEAN member states
I.	Formal or informal institutions and practices		√		Only among participating countries
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship		√		All ASEAN member states
	Total	7	2	1	

Source: Compiled by author

[150] ASEAN, 'Bridging the Development Gap among Members of ASEAN', available at http://www.aseansec.org/14683.htm (accessed on 31 October 2011).

FIGURE 4.3
Indicators of a Security Community in Southeast Asia during the East Timor Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 4.10 and Figure 4.3 demonstrate that during the East Timor Crisis, ASEAN member states' response indicated seven out of ten indicators of a security community. This was a significant number, and so it can be reasonably argued that the response to the East Timor crisis has shown that a security community existed among the participant countries, particularly Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia, and therefore can be regarded as a partial security community. The indicators, however, did not apply to non-participant countries, such as Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam.

This again demonstrated how Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore have always been 'important actors' in ASEAN crises, particularly in the two crises that have been investigated in this thesis so far, namely the Cambodian crisis and the East Timor Crisis. Indonesia's position in East Timor was unique, because its role was not really similar to that of Malaysia, Thailand, or Singapore. Its role as the country in which the crisis occurred was more as: a country that invited other ASEAN member countries to participate, a country which had the responsibility to oblige international mandates to withdraw troops and also a country with which other participating ASEAN countries, without any request, had always consulted.

The Philippines emerged out as a new dominant power in this crisis for several reasons: (i) geographical proximity, which brought the possibility of the spill over-effect of instability to the Philippines; (ii) the fear that the crisis would become a precedent to the separatist movement in the Southern Philippines; (iii) a good relationship with Indonesia which motivated the country to assist by participating in peace-keeping operations; and, (iv) the fact that instability in Indonesia would jeopardise its economic

interests, such as trade and Indonesia's investment in the country. In the Cambodian crisis, none of these elements really carried any weight for the Philippines.

Seven of the indicators of a security community can be seen within the five participating countries, thus clarifying several points. First, from the Cambodian crisis in 1979-1991 to the East Timor crisis in 1999-2002, there was an evolution towards a security community, among the dominant powers, for several reasons. First, during the Cambodian Crisis, the Philippines was not involved and during the East Timor Crisis, it was willing to take responsibility. Second, during the Cambodian crisis only four out of ten indicators of a security community were considered as significant, while during the East Timor crisis, ASEAN's response showed seven out of ten indicators of a security community among the dominant powers. Third, from these seven indicators in the East Timor crisis, six indicators only applied among the participating countries. This clarifies again that there had been no security community in Southeast Asia as a region by the time the crisis arose. It clarifies some scholar's arguments, such as those by Rizal Sukma that an ASEAN Security Community might be established among the original member countries. [151]

4.7. Conclusion

ASEAN's stance since Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor in 1975 as one of its provinces was clear. All member states supported Indonesia. With the exception of Vietnam which was not a member at the time when it expressed criticism at Indonesia's East Timor policy and Singapore abstained at the UNGA votes on East Timor in 1975 and 1976, others always maintained their backing for Indonesia. The perception of threat of each ASEAN member state in regard to the East Timor crisis was running in different directions, thus creating different levels of participation during the crisis. While Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore were involved, and the Philippines came in as a new 'active power', countries like Brunei Darussalam and the CLMV countries preferred not to be engaged too deeply.

This chapter shows that ASEAN member states still played a role in this crisis. The role of ASEAN member states were important for at least for two reasons. First, ASEAN countries provided a means to put some pressure on Indonesia to accept an international intervention.[152] Without the participation of the ASEAN members, the APEC summit meeting in Auckland in September in 1999 might not have facilitated the international agreement to suggest an intervention. Secondly, the participation of

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[151] Interview with Dr. Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the CSIS-Jakarta, Jakarta, 15 February 2011. In the interview Rizal mentioned the possibility of a security community between six ASEAN countries.
[152] Derek McDougall, 'Asia Pacific Security Regionalism: The Impact of Post 1997 Developments', *Contemporary Security Policy*, 23:2, p. 128.

Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore within INTERFET and UNTAET made the operation more diplomatically acceptable to Indonesia.[153]

This chapter has shown that during East Timor crisis, the role of involved members did not indicate a concert of powers. The initial indicator of the importance of a concert of powers, namely a decisive shock to the prevailing order, was not fulfilled. This created a weaker level of cooperation among dominant powers. Furthermore, the capability of sustaining financial costs is very different from one country to another. The different intimacy with Indonesia and different perceptions of threat between the dominant powers also resulted in a looser cooperation as a concert.

The East Timor crisis, however, provides evidence of the importance of the influence of great powers as well as external powers during the escalation and the acute periods without the notion of balance and demonstrates a partial security community among Southeast Asian dominant powers during the de-escalation period. In the escalation and the acute periods of the crisis, the US utilised its leverage to push Indonesia to allow an international peace-keeping force through several channels. An external middle power, namely Australia, also used its power to influence Indonesia and to persuade ASEAN member countries to convince Indonesia to deploy an international peace-keeper. The crisis management of ASEAN member states is explained by seven out of ten indicators of a security community where six out of seven indicators were shared only by the dominant powers: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Unlike the Cambodian crisis, the crisis management of ASEAN member states during the East Timor crisis did not indicate a variation of a classical concert of powers. The observation of whether or not crisis management indicates a variation of a classical concert of powers will be continued in the final case study, the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

The management of the East Timor crisis demonstrates that there was unequal sharing of responsibility among the ASEAN member states. Countries like Brunei Darussalam, and the CLMV countries did not participate actively because of (i) the geographical separation (except for Brunei); (ii) the crisis did not directly threaten their national interests; (iii) they did not have the capacity to contribute in terms of funds or military personnel; and (iv) CLMV countries were relatively new members by that time and they shared a sensitivity towards separatist movements with Indonesia. They feared any international intervention if something happened in their own backyard. The next chapter is the final case study; it examines the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar.

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[153] McDouggall, 'Asia Pacific Security Regionalism', p. 128.

The 2008-2010 Cyclone Nargis Crisis

5.1. Introduction

The final crisis that will be examined in this thesis is the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar. Unlike the other crises elaborated, the Cyclone Nargis crisis is a non-traditional crisis. In Chapter 2, a crisis was defined as an important set of events which marks a turning point or transformation in a pattern of relationships or a system.[1] This definition encompasses many types of crises including natural disasters, environmental threats, financial meltdowns, surprise attacks, hostage-takings, epidemics and organisational decline. A specific classification of crises by IR scholars refers to critical turning points in human activities, which could threaten national security. When understood as a turning point, a crisis is associated with rapid or sudden change. In the case of Cyclone Nargis, the crisis highlighted a turning point to a degree of change that came after a natural disaster.

Security discourses in recent times have undergone a radical transformation from state-centric and militaristic formulation to human-centric. The concept of security in this thesis broadens the myriad ways in which insecurity affects different collectivities ranging from the state, society, interest groups to cross sections of individuals. In other words, the concept of security elaborated in this chapter includes the concept of human security. Even though there are debates about this concept, I argue that there are linkages between security and human beings because security is related to economic, food, energy and environmental issues. Therefore, a natural disaster is one facet of human security.

The Cyclone Nargis crisis was a humanitarian catastrophe confronting the people of Myanmar and the government of Myanmar. At the outset, the latter demonstrated its inability to respond in an effective and timely fashion. The current Indonesian Foreign Minister contends that 'In the recent past the largest source of death and destruction has not been conflicts but natural disasters. So if there's a common enemy, that's it'.[2] A natural disaster now is therefore regarded as a common enemy for every country in the world, and thus considered as a security threat. In this chapter, I explore a security dimension of a national disaster and assess whether or not a non traditional crisis can

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[1] The term 'crisis' is defined in Section 2.2.A. This chapter is about the management of the East Timor crisis by ASEAN member states, but I refer to the organisation where it is relevant.

[2] Dr. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, an interview by Peter Hatcher on 15 March 2012, a recording of the interview is courtesy of the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra. The material can be seen at http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/indonesia-urges-calm-over-rise-of-china-20120315-1v8d5.html#ixzz1pF7jy9zz . The author also attended the interview.

be indicated by the explanatory concepts of a regional security system: a balance of power, a security community and a concert of powers.

This chapter focuses on the management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis by ASEAN member states in 2008-2010. The period of 2008-2010 is selected because Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on 2 May 2008 and ASEAN member states started to provide assistance right after the incident, and the responsibility of the ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism and Tripartite Core Group (TCG) ended on 31 July 2010. It is important to investigate this crisis because if ASEAN had failed to assist Myanmar and was unsuccessful in convincing Myanmar to open its doors to international assistance, ASEAN's creditability as an organisation would have been at risk. This crisis also opened a window for ASEAN to develop a meaningful cooperation with Myanmar. The ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan is satisfied with the role of ASEAN's role during the crisis. He said 'ASEAN had been baptised by Cyclone Nargis' and that it was ASEAN that had been able 'to open up the humanitarian space'.[3] The crisis is also valuable to examine because it was the first crisis that occurred in Southeast Asia after the ASEAN Charter was adopted at the 13th ASEAN Summit in November 2007, and therefore, the newly appointed Secretary-General of ASEAN was able to test the new power of the organisation. The ASEAN Charter was finally ratified by ASEAN member states on 21 July 2008, although there was controversy among member nations because of some worries about the existing human rights record and doubts about the way the Myanmar government would handle a humanitarian crisis.

Due to the nature of the crisis, the approach this chapter takes in elaborating whether or not the management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis provides an understanding of the regional security system operating in Southeast Asia is a little different from the approach used in the previous chapters. The Cyclone Nargis crisis was a humanitarian crisis, and therefore, a balancing system was not necessarily relevant to the crisis. In this chapter, the indicators of a balancing system are summarised rather than elaborated. The balance of power section shows that even though border disputes and territorial claims continued during the crisis, ASEAN member states placed cooperation as their priority.

This chapter divides the Cyclone Nargis crisis into two periods. The first period was an acute period, which started when the Cylone Nargis hit the Ayeyarwady[4] (formerly Irrawaddy) delta; this was followed by the refusal of the Myanmar government to

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[3] Christopher B. Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010, p. 194.
[4] The name 'Ayeyarwady' is an official name introduced by the Myanmar government in 1989.

accept assistance from the international community. During this period, ASEAN member states, particularly the regional dominant powers in ASEAN tried to encourage Myanmar to accept the international aid facilitated by ASEAN. The acute period started on 2 May and ended on 19 May 2008 at the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers Meeting in Singapore when Myanmar agreed to an ASEAN-led mechanism. The second period was a de-escalation period, which started from the time Myanmar officially accepted ASEAN's facilitation of international assistance on 19 May 2008 to the conclusion of the ASEAN-lead coordinating mechanism on 31 July 2010. Unlike the East Timor crisis, the Cyclone Nargis crisis did not have an escalation period because the nature of this crisis, a natural disaster, provided a sudden, shock and unforeseen shock and brought the crisis directly to the acute period.

I argue that the crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis can be explained as a modification of a concert of powers while during the de-escalation period the crisis management can be characterised as an embryonic security community. A modification of a classical concert of powers during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis involved Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore as members.

This chapter is divided into seven sections. After the introduction, the second section provides background to the Cyclone Nargis crisis. The third section analyses the different perceptions of threats held by ASEAN member countries. The fourth examines why ASEAN's management of the crisis did not indicate a balance of power. A detailed explanation of how ASEAN's management of the crisis indicated a variation of a classical concert of powers in Southeast Asia during the acute period is elaborated in the fifth section. The sixth section investigates why the management of the crisis sheds light on a security community dynamic during the de-escalation period. A brief conclusion summarises the findings of the chapter.

5.2. Background

A. Brief History of Myanmar

The reluctance of the Myanmar government to receive assistance can be explained by and traced back to the country's history. There have been ethnic-based divisions in Myanmar's historical phases. After being ruled by the British government, Myanmar gained its independence in 1948. After independence, the ethnic rivalries contributed to the break-up of the political system which was established by the British and hampered the stability of the newly independent government. Democratic elections were held for the last time in 1960, but in 1962 General Ne Win launched a military coup, which was followed by years of economic decline. From 1987, widespread resentment accumulated

until it reached a high point with the Red Bridge incident in March 1988. On this occasion, the authorities killed dozens of peaceful student protesters and eventually led to Ne Win's resignation. On 18 September 1988, a group of officials called the State Law and Order Restoration reinstated government control in central Myanmar and announced plans for multiparty elections. At this point, Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of 'independence founder' General Aung San, formed the National League for Democracy (NLD). Despite her arrest and disqualification from the elections, the NLD won 80 per cent of the 485 seats.[5] The SLROC refused to accept the result of the vote and would not hand over power to the elected government. Under the new name, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), they remain in power until this day. In the years that followed, the regime continued to suppress any form of disagreement. During the SPDC era, the country has been considered to have the worst human rights record in Asia and potentially one of the worst in the world.[6] Among the human rights violations by the Myanmar government were the deployment of child soldiers, forced labour and the use of porters for the military, the displacement of persons, mass rape, the use of chemical weapons, extrajudicial killings and taking political prisoners.[7]

B. Background of Cyclone Nargis Crisis

Acute Period

Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on the afternoon of 2 May 2008, ripping through the lower delta regions of the Ayeyarwady and Yangon Divisions. The Cyclone severely affected the lives of 2.4 million of the 7.5 million people living in the Ayeyarwady Delta and the winds exceeded 190 kilometres and the subsequent 3.5 meter high tidal surge swept through the entire villages.[8] Cyclone Nargis is recognised as the worst natural disaster in Myanmar's history and the most catastrophic cyclone to hit Asia since 1991[9] and the eighth-deadliest cyclone ever recorded. [10] Its casualties stand at 77,738 dead, with 55,917 missing.[11] The total amount of physical damage and economic losses caused by the cyclone in the affected areas of Myanmar is estimated at about 4,500 kyats (approximately US$4,057 million).[12]

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[5] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community*.
[6] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community*.
[7] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis: Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community*.
[8] Andrew Selth, 'Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's Fears of Invasion', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30:3, 2008, pp 379-402.
[9] U Kyaw Thu, Speech on 'Post Nargis Current State of Response and Recovery in Myanmar for the ASEAN Roundtable on Post-Nargis Joint Assessment for Response, Recovery and Reconstruction,' Yangon, 24 June 2008. See United Nations Development Program, 'Early Recovery Cluster Myanmar', available at http://www.mm.undp.org/UNDP_Publication_PDF/Early%20Recovery%20Framework.pdf (accessed on 1 December 2011).
[10] William Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar', in Nick Cheeseman, Monique Skidmore, Trevor Wilson, eds., *Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010
[11] Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Moe Thuzar, *Myanmar Life After Nargis*, Jakarta and Singapore: the ASEAN Secretariat and ISEAS Publishing, 2009.
[12] Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, *Myanmar Life After Nargis*.

FIGURE 5.1

Cyclone Nargis: Most Affected Areas by % of Population and Area

Source: John Hopkins Bloombergh School of Public Health, 'Cyclone Nargis: Most Affected Areas by Percentage Population and Area', available at http://mappery.com/map-of/Cyclone-Nargis-Affected-Area-Map (accessed on 15 August 2012).

The Myanmar government was relatively quick in responding to the crisis domestically. However, it was criticised as being too slow in taking action with regard to foreign assistance. It established a National Disaster Preparedness Central Committee on 3 May 2008, headed by Myanmar Prime Minister, General Thein Sein. Cabinet ministers were assigned to assess damage and loss and to coordinate relief assistance in the affected districts. Myanmar's Foreign Minister publicly acknowledged that it needed assistance to respond to the disaster.[13] However, the extent of the damage was too enormous, and therefore, international assistance was urgently required in order to save the lives of those who had survived the disaster.

On 6 May, the Myanmar government agreed to receive foreign assistance, but only the basis that it would control aid distribution. It was too slow in issuing visas to foreign specialists and allowing aid into Myanmar. Supplies were stacked up in neighbouring countries waiting for clearance. The US, Britain and France sent naval vessels to deliver aid supplies, but were denied permission to land in Myanmar or to deliver supplies by helicopter.[14] In Thailand, the US government had loaded a C-130 cargo plane with relief supplies that would have taken under an hour to reach Myanmar, but the Myanmar

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[13] Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, *Myanmar Life After Nargis*.
[14] Selth, 'Even Paranoids Have Enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's Fears of Invasion'.

government did not give clearance for the craft to land at Yangon airport.[15] The United Nations World Food Programme had three planes ready to fly in from Bangladesh, Thailand and Dubai.[16] Inside the country, the movement of foreign aid workers was restricted, and distribution of assistance was strongly controlled by the authorities. Permission to enter the area of the disaster had first to be attained from Major General Thura Myint Aung, Commander of the Southwest Regional Command and Chairman of the Ayeyarwady division.

Within a week, a massive international relief effort began. There were 24 countries which had pledged financial assistance, totalling US$30 million.[17] On 5 May 2008, forty-eight hours after Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, ASEAN member countries extended relief assistance to victims under the leadership of the ASEAN Secretary-General, Pitsuwan. Singapore and the Philippines dispatched experts to join the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team assembled in Bangkok. The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta notified all relevant ASEAN focal points to be on high alert and prepared for the mobilisation of emergency assistance. The ASEAN Secretary-General requested governments, the private sector, and the civil society of ASEAN to assist the people of Myanmar. He also sought to mobilise resources to assist survivors and alleviate suffering through funds from the ASEAN Cooperation Fund for Disaster Assistance (ACFDA), an emergency humanitarian relief fund created by the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta on 8 May 2008.

De-escalation Period
On 19 May 2008, Singapore as the ASEAN Chair at the time hosted a special meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers. In this meeting, ASEAN tried to convince Myanmar that it needed international assistance. According to an Indonesian Foreign Ministry officer who attended the meeting:

> ASEAN told Myanmar that such a disaster cannot be solved solely by Myanmar. Indonesia tried to convince Myanmar by saying that Indonesia, which is relatively bigger and has more capacity than Myanmar would not have been able to overcome the impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami in Aceh without international assistance. Myanmar finally agreed to the facilitation by ASEAN.[18]

The Myanmar government agreed to accept ASEAN to channel communication between the Myanmar government and the international aid donors. At the meeting,

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[15] Emma Larkin, *No Bad News for the King: The True Story of Cyclone Nargis and Its Aftermath in Burma,* New York: Penguin Books, 2010.
[16] Larkin, *No Bad News for the King.*
[17] Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, *Myanmar Life After Nargis.*
[18] Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.

ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed to establish an ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism and an ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force (AHTF) under the Chairmanship of ASEAN Secretary-General, Pitsuwan. The mandate of the ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism was to 'facilitate the effective distribution and utilisation of assistance from the international community, including the expeditious and effective deployment of relief worker, especially health and medical personnel'.[19] In order to assist the HTF, an Advisory Group to the AHTF was established, consisting of representatives from Myanmar's neighbours (China, India, and Bangladesh), the UN, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the Word Bank, NGOs, UK, Norway and Australia.

The TCG was also established soon after the decision of the First AHTF Meeting with support from the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference convened on 25 May 2008 in Yangon. The TCG consisted of three representatives each from the Myanmar government, ASEAN and the international humanitarian community led by the UN. Chaired by the Myanmar government, this mechanism created latitude for international governments, civil society organisations and international NGOs to take part in the massive humanitarian assistance to help those who had survived the Cyclone. A timeline for the acceptance of the aid is illustrated in Figure 5.2.

FIGURE 5.2
A Timeline towards Accepting Aid

Source: Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, *Myanmar Life After Nargis,* p. 51.

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[19] ASEAN, 'The Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting Chairman's Statement', Singapore, 19 May 2008, Cyclone Nargis, Myanmar available at http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/special-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-chairman-s-statement-singapore (accessed 3 November 2012).

5.3. The Differing Threat Perceptions

After Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, threats to cyclone affected people and for ASEAN member countries were serious. Similar to the previous crises, the perceptions of threat were significant and had impacts on the behaviour, policies, and contributions of ASEAN member states during the crisis. The threats to affected victims were not necessarily the same as those of the Myanmar government, because (i) the first reaction of the Myanmar junta military, particularly in preventing the flow of international assistance, exacerbated the threats to the affected victims; (ii) while the Myanmar government thought of ways of preventing intervention, the affected victims' life were placed at risk, demonstrating that the Myanmar government did not see the affected victims as its number one priority; (iii) the Myanmar military junta also continued on with its plan to convene a referendum while the severe catastrophe was occurring in the country's south. The threats to the victims were mostly humanitarian threats.

ASEAN countries themselves had different perceptions of the threats arising from the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar. Unlike the other crises discussed in this thesis — the Cambodian crisis and the East Timor crisis — which presented traditional threats, the threats coming from the Cyclone Nargis crisis were non traditional threats and included threats of repudiation, threats of incoming refugees, and also threats of ruining the reputation of an organisation, in this case ASEAN.

The affected people in Myanmar

The scale of Cyclone Nargis was unprecedented in the history of Myanmar. The cyclone's destructive winds and battering waves flattened houses, uprooted trees, swept away power lines and severed communication systems. Adding to the devastation was the cyclone's accompanying saltwater storm surge that was reportedly as high as 12 meters in some areas of the Delta, which killed thousands of people and animal.[20] Most residents of Labutta, Pyapon and Bogale of the Ayeyarwady who lived to tell about the suffering had horrifying tales of survival. The cyclone destroyed three-quarters of the hospitals and clinics, crippled the primary agriculture and fishery sectors, caused property damage estimated at over US$4.1 billion.[21] Hundreds of thousands of homes were destroyed along with essential infrastructure like roads, jetties, electricity, water supplies, fuel supplies and sanitation systems. The cyclone struck towards the end of the dry season, just as the Delta's paddy farmers were in the last stage of harvesting their 'dry season' rice paddy crops, which account for 25 per cent of annual rice

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[20] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action*, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010.
[21] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*

production in the Delta.[22] The continuous obstruction by the Myanmar government of foreign humanitarian aid and workers caused yet another humanitarian threat for the affected people.

There was also concern that infectious diseases would break out. The risk consisted of a second wave of casualties due to disease and nutritional deficiency if relief was not effectively distributed. Road access was also limited, and thus provided challenges and required specialised equipment and personnel. The need for shelter and resettlement for the affected population also created a challenge, especially shelter with adequate sanitation facilities. Provision of water was paramount, where large numbers of people did not have access to clean drinking water. Diarrhoea and dengue hemorrhagic fever were among health concerns. Food aid was also crucial and needed rapid mobilisation. Education for children was also vital to their post-disaster psychological recovery.[23]

The Myanmar Government

For the Myanmar government, threats after Cyclone Nargis hit the country included intervention of other countries in the political affairs of Myanmar. The presence of naval vessels from France, the UK and the US with offers of assistance, the arrival of foreign forces including marines, helicopters and amphibious landing craft off the country's shore elevated the sense of fear of foreigners, fear of interference and the spread of influence under the guise of delivery of aid.[24] These fears brought consequences for how the leadership behaved and the perceptions, therefore, shaped the strategic realities inside the countries. Thus, the regime saw the crisis 'as more a national security issue than a humanitarian operation'.[25] For Myanmar, it would be possible that the US might want to plead for access to the Delta so the US President could award Aung San Suu Kyi its highest civilian honour –the US Congressional Gold Medal.[26]

The government itself did not have the experience or capacity to handle such a huge disaster relief operation. There has been no catastrophe approaching the scale of Cyclone Nargis in living memory in Myanmar. Compared to China, which collected 100 helicopters to carry out rescue efforts in Sichuan, Myanmar has very poor infrastructure (particularly in the Delta) and backward technology.[27]

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[22] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action*, p. 18
[23] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call the ASEAN Response to Cyclone Nargis*, Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010.
[24] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis*.
[25] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis*, p. 90.
[26] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis*.
[27] Donald M. Seekins, 'State, Society and Natural Disaster: Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (Burma)', *Asian Journal of Social Science*, No. 37, 2009, pp. 717-737.

Another threat for the Myanmar government was that Cyclone Nargis would impede its plan to hold a referendum. The government had conducted a campaign, and if the referendum was postponed, it would lose its momentum and the people of Myanmar might vote to reject the new constitution. The authorities issued an order forbidding criticism of the new constitution and government media distributed mottos: 'To approve the State Constitution is a national duty of the entire people today. Let us all cast 'Yes' vote[s] in the national interest'. [28] In Yangon, the government applied various tactics to ensure the referendum turned out in the regime's favour. In some neighbourhoods, votes were collected in advance. A young woman witnessed that she was forced to pay K160,000 (about US$10 –an unaffordable amount for most ordinary Myanmar people) if she chose to vote against the constitution.[29] Furthermore, the majority of people voting in the referendum had not even seen the draft constitution (194 pages) and had very little interest in it.[30]

Thailand

The Thai government has looked at Myanmar in two ways: on the one hand, Myanmar has been regarded as the root of transnational threats including the cross-border flow of narcotics and refugees that impact Thailand's national security. On the other hand, Thailand's diplomatic flexibility in relation to Myanmar is jeopardised by its dependency on its neighbour's natural gas, timber and labour.[31] For Thailand, the issue of the Cyclone Nargis crisis was multi-dimensional. First of all, Thailand shares a border with Myanmar. This geographical fact has many implications for Thailand. It raised concerns about the possibility of the increased number of refugees to the border area. The ten provinces in Thailand which border Myanmar are populated by 6.8 million Thais, over 120,000 displaced persons in nine UNHCR-run camps, and an estimated 500,000 to 1 million registered and undocumented migrants.[32] The 2009 World Refugee Survey states that Myanmar has produced over 750,000 refugees including 361,000 in Thailand. [33] It also further raised a health concern. The undocumented migrants were the largest public health concern, as many do not have access to health services, have increased morbidity and present a number of public health risks, such as low immunisation rates. Sharing a border also means Thailand had to agree to be the front door of international assistance waiting to get in to

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[28] Larkin, *No Bad News for the King*.

[29] Larkin, *No Bad News for the King*, pp. 67-68.

[30] Larkin, *No Bad News for the King*.

[31] Jürgen Haacke, 'ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards a Regional Initiative', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30:3, 2008, pp. 351-378.

[32] World Health Organisation, 'Myanmar-Thailand Border', available at http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/myanthai/en/index.html (accessed on 11 February 2012).

[33] Veronika Martin, *Prospects for Hope? Myanmarese Refugees in Thailand, 2005*, available at http://www.refugees.org/uploadedFiles/Investiate/Publications_&Archives/WRS_Archives/2005/veroni ka_martin.pdf. (accessed on 14 February 2012).

Myanmar. A lot of personnel from international NGOs were waiting in Bangkok to enter Myanmar. The UN regional office briefly set up a parallel cluster system in Bangkok to at least manage coordination while waiting for access arrangements to be agreed.

The second dimension of threat for Thailand is related to its moral obligation. Thailand also experienced a similar situation after being hit by the Indian Ocean Tsunami in late 2004 and thus had a moral responsibility to share experiences and lessons learned. A failure to help would risk its international image.

Finally, Thailand was also among ASEAN members who did not want to jeopardise ASEAN's international credibility because of the crisis. While trying its best to assist bilaterally, Thailand also encouraged Myanmar to accept ASEAN's role in facilitating assistance to Myanmar.

Singapore

Singapore did not want the Cyclone Nargis issue to endanger its image or reputation as ASEAN's Chair. Singapore held the chairmanship of ASEAN in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. During its chairmanship, looking for a way to exert influence over Myanmar was crucial for Singapore. Singapore aspired to a successful chairmanship, and this included success in pushing Myanmar to open up to assistance from the international community. Singapore shared Indonesia's view that Myanmar's membership in ASEAN should be questioned if the junta government refused ASEAN's request to facilitate. According to Christopher Roberts, there was discussion in the Foreign Ministry of Singapore of the possibility of ousting Myanmar from ASEAN if it did not want to cooperate. The Foreign Ministry has discreetly discussed this issue with retired Singapore diplomats who are currently working as researchers.[34]

Interestingly, Singapore did not want to impose or support any economic sanction as it could have created another threat for Singapore if ASEAN countries pushed Myanmar further into China's arms. Such sanctions could prompt China and India to engage in a destabilising competitive struggle for influence in Myanmar leading to adverse effects for ASEAN as an organisation.[35]

Indonesia

For Indonesia, ASEAN's credibility was number one priority in terms of threat perception. Indonesia was at the point where, if Myanmar did not wish to cooperate

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[34] Interview with Dr. Christopher B. Roberts, Senior Lecturer, National Security College of the ANU, Canberra, 27 September and 21 December 2011.
[35] Haacke, 'ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar'.

with ASEAN and open to international assistance with the help of ASEAN, Indonesia was willing to question Myanmar's membership in ASEAN. Indonesia wished ASEAN would demonstrate its capability to assist Myanmar as a facilitator.

Like Thailand, Indonesia had a moral responsibility to share its experience and lessons learned from the Indian Ocean Tsunami that hit Aceh on 26 December 2004. As a member of ASEAN and as a neighbour, if Indonesia did not become involved actively and quickly render assistance, its international prestige would have declined.

Indonesia was one of the countries which opposed the argument that the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a matter of international peace and security, and consequently, Indonesia saw that the issue should be put outside the responsibility of the UNSC. Indonesia was supported by China and Vietnam, and they argued that the situation in Myanmar is a purely natural disaster. The three countries were sceptical about involving the UNSC in the international response to Cyclone Nargis despite the fact that the proposals were actually put on the table.[36] Indonesia perceived that there were other better forums to discuss the humanitarian dimension of Cyclone Nargis. Indonesia also rejected any attempt to give a political spin to the technical realities and the situation on the ground.

Malaysia

Malaysia was concerned about the possibility of receiving more refugees from Myanmar after the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Up to 2010, there were more than 100.000 refugees in Malaysia and 90% were flowing in from Myanmar.[37] Furthermore, it was in Malaysia's interest to prevent refugees flowing in from Myanmar in order to restore its credibility because Malaysia was being accused by the US of being involved in the human trafficking of people from Myanmar. In April 2009, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee published the results of a year-long investigation into allegations that the Malaysian government was complicit in the human trafficking of people seeking refuge from the extreme persecution they faced in Myanmar.[38] The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee argued that there is a highly organised collusion between police, immigration officials and traffickers in Malaysia which sells refugees into prostitution rings and fishing trawlers.[39]

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[36] Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect', *Myanmar/Burma Briefing,* No, 2, 16 May, 2008.
[37] Karen Zusman, 'Burma is bleeding well beyond its borders', available at http://www.pleasedontsaymyname.org/ (accessed on 11 February 2012).
[38] Zusman, 'Burma is bleeding well beyond its borders'.
[39] Zusman, 'Burma is bleeding well beyond its borders'.

In the UNSC, Vietnam shared Indonesia's view that the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a natural disaster and not a matter of international peace and security. Vietnam also refused to allow the issue to be discussed in the UNSC because of the 'R2P' principle. For Vietnam, the R2P, which became part of international law through a UN General Assembly Resolution in 2005, was created to guide international action when confronted with mass atrocities, not natural disasters, epidemics, or similar problems. Nevertheless, unlike Indonesia, Vietnam was not willing to question Myanmar's membership in ASEAN. As a relatively new member, Vietnam supported continuing membership of Myanmar in ASEAN. Furthermore, Vietnam is also prone to natural disasters, particularly typhoons. Typhoons Xangsane and Ketsana struck Vietnam in 2006 and 2009 respectively. These reasons prohibited Vietnam from pushing Myanmar too harshly.

The Philippines, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Brunei Darussalam

Cambodia and Lao PDR shared Vietnam's view that Myanmar's membership in ASEAN was unquestionable. Little was known about Brunei's view. The Philippines was among countries which dispatched its experts a few days after the cyclone hit Myanmar. The Philippines did not have a strong view about Myanmar's membership of ASEAN. However, in general it supported other ASEAN members to push Myanmar to open to international assistance.

5.4. A Balance of Power?

This section analyses whether ASEAN's management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar is characterised by the indicators of a balancing system in the region. In this section, I argue that there was no balancing system during the acute and the de-escalation periods of the crisis between ASEAN member states. These countries were also not subject to the leverage of the external great powers and the external powers during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. However, it is important to note that external powers, such as the US, the UK and France placed pressure on ASEAN to play an active role in this crisis. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the approach used here to analyse the indicators of a balancing system is different. In this chapter, I will not elaborate every indicator as I did in the previous case study chapters. Instead, I will summarise the analysis in tables and elaborate only the indicators of a balancing system that are relevant to the crisis. Table 5.1 provides a brief overview of the indicators of a balancing system in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
		Balance of power among ASEAN member states				
A.	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors: **Not necessarily relevant**	Singapore and Vietnam were leading economically and militarily. Singapore was hit by the global economic crisis but had recovered by 2010. Vietnam demonstrated rapid development of military capability. Indonesia started to demonstrate its leadership by becoming a member of G-20. However, their powers were not necessarily relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis. The strength in military power was not relevant to the crisis. Economically, it could be relevant because Singapore and Indonesia were ranked no.2 and no.3 respectively in giving financial contribution to Myanmar during the crisis. Economic matters did not seem relevant to Thailand which did not perform as well as Singapore and Indonesia economically but was the biggest financial contributor to the crisis.				
B.	Intentions of some states to expand: **Moderate**	In general, no states explicitly intended to expand. Nevertheless, every member state of ASEAN has territorial disputes with other members. Despite these disputes, countries worked together to assist Myanmar particularly after the de-escalation period.				
		Myanmar and Cambodia are engaged in border disputes with Thailand and Vietnam is involved in territorial disputes in the South China Sea.	Thailand has border disputes with Cambodia over Preah Vihear, with Myanmar and with Malaysia.	Singapore and Malaysia were in dispute over the Pulau Batu Puteh/Pedra Blanca and in May 2008, the dispute was settled in Singapore's favour.	Indonesia has a dispute with Malaysia over Ambalat Block.	The lingering Philipines –Malaysia dispute over Sabah remained unsettled. Brunei had a dispute with Malaysia over Limbang.
C.	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests: **Moderate**	There were groupings of CLMV countries and the ASEAN-6. The ASEAN-6 gave a stronger push to Myanmar while Cambodia, Lao were moderate with Myanmar. The ASEAN-6 countries were willing to question Myanmar's membership while the three countries preferred not to be too hard on Myanmar. The other grouping was found in the forum of UNSC, where Indonesia and Vietnam would not agree to the issue of Cyclone Nargis being discussed in the UNSC for the reason of 'Responsibility to Protect'. Other ASEAN countries did not refuse.				
D.	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft: **Insignificant**	War is not considered as legitimate. However there was high tension between Cambodia and Thailand that started in 2008. The tension did not translate into the use of force until 2011. This issue was also swept under the carpet by ASEAN member states and they focused more on the Cyclone Nargis crisis instead of Cambodia and Thailand's dispute over Preah Vihear.				

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
	**Balance of Extenal Great Power Influence**					
E.	Dependency on external great powers as security providers: **Not necessarily relevant to Cyclone Nargis crisis.**	Myanmar demonstrated its dependency on China and India while Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam increasingly indicated dependency on the US.	Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia had developed security cooperation with the US. However, they are not really dependent in terms of security on the US.			Since 2002, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have remained largely dependent on US military aid. In September 2007, China promised an initial $6.6m worth of assistance for the AFP as a 'confidence building measure'.
		However, their dependency on external security providers was not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis. It was only relevant for Myanmar which sought help particularly from China and India rather than the US and other Western external powers.				
F.	Alignment with external great powers: **Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis**	Myanmar has developed military relations with China and India.	Thailand maintained good relations with both the US and China.	Singapore was developing its activities in FPDA.	Indonesia had alignment with external powers, but was developing military cooperation with the US and economic cooperation with China.	The Philippines renewed the 1951 Mutual Security Treaty through arms and equipment sales and military exercises. Malaysia was developing its activities in FPDA US and Vietnam signed a Memorandum of Understanding on defence cooperation. Vietnam leaned on the US on the issue of the South China Sea.
		Like dependency on external security providers, the indicator of 'alignment with external powers' was only relevant for Myanmar. Myanmar looked up to the Chinese government. One week after the earthquake in Sichuan a three-day period of mourning was declared in China and the flag was flown at half-mast in memory of the victims. The very next day the Myanmar government copied the gesture by lowering flags and announced its own three days of mourning.				

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
G.	Military cooperation with external great powers: **Not necessarily relevant**	All ASEAN countries, with the exception of Myanmar developed military cooperation with the US. The close cooperation with China helped Myanmar substantially in reconstructing the area affected by the Cyclone.				
H.	Distribution of external great powers' armed forces: **Insignificant**	Distribution of external great powers armed forces is insignificant because external great powers distributed assistance through military means instead of distribution of armed forces.				
I.	Economic dependence on external great powers: **Significant**	Because of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, Myanmar was heavily dependent on international assistance				

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

Specific Dynamics Related to the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

Dynamics within Southeast Asia

This section examines the specific dynamics of a balancing system that are relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis. In relation to specific dynamics related to the Cyclone Nargis crisis, some indicators of a balancing system among ASEAN member countries are relevant to the crisis, particularly the intention of some states to expand, war as a legitimate instrument of statecraft and the existence of an alliance (or grouping) on the basis of short-run interests. During 2008-2010, there was no explicit intention on the part of any Southeast Asian member state to expand. However, there were several territorial disputes. Indonesia and Malaysia were engaged in a bilateral dispute over Ambalat which is believed to have massive oil and natural-gas potential.[40] Manila's suspicion that elements in Malaysia's state of Sabah were providing support for Moro separatists in Mindanao led Philippine politicians take a hard line on completing formal repudiation of the claim to Sabah. Meanwhile, suspicion continued in Thailand over Malaysia's alleged sympathy for Muslim separatists in the south of the country. Myanmar's membership of ASEAN has compounded ASEAN's problems concerning the transboundary spill-over of internal political conflicts. The pursuit by the Myanmar military of Kayin (Karen) refugees fleeing to Thailand led to military tensions between Nayipadaw and Bangkok.[41] Other territorial disputes included the Malaysia-Singapore dispute over the Pulau Batu Puteh/Pedra Branca Island in the Singapore Strait, the Thai-Malaysia dispute regarding their common border, the dispute between Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang and the lingering Philippines-Malaysia dispute over Sabah. The Singapore-Malaysia dispute over Pedra Branca had been settled, again through arbitration by the International Court of Justice, in May 2008 in Singapore's favour.[42]

In addition, a number of disputes existed in the maritime arena over issues such as boundary demarcation, exclusive economic zones, fishing rights and resource exploitation. The majority of maritime boundaries in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand were in dispute. Indonesia and Vietnam are still in dispute over the continental shelf of the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea that once led Indonesia to consider the possibility of facing a sea battle. Thailand and Vietnam are contesting maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Thailand. Little progress has been made in resolving border demarcation disputes between Thailand and Laos, an issue that has led to armed clashes between the two countries in the last decade. Only 58 km of the 2500 km

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[40] International Institute for Strategic Studies 'East Asia and Australasia', *The Military Balance*, 110:1, 2010, pp. 377-440.
[41] International Institute for Strategic Studies 'East Asia and Australasia'. 'Kayin' is the official name for the Karen ethnic group. introduced by the Myanmar government in 1989.
[42] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order,* 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009.

land border between Thailand and Myanmar has been demarcated.[43] Singapore and Malaysia have also disputed over water rights. Singapore has sought to 'desecuritise' the issue by making serious efforts to become self-sufficient in water supply, through measures such as desalination and fresh water recycled from used water.[44] The most serious dispute during 2008-2010 was the Cambodian-Thai border dispute which began in June 2008. This was a century-long dispute between Cambodia and Thailand involving the area surrounding the 11th-century Preah Vihear Temple, located in the Dângrêk Mountains between the Choam Khsant district in the Preah Vihear province of northern Cambodia and the Kantharalak district in the Sisaket province of Northeastern Thailand.

TABLE 5.2
Disputed maritime areas in Southeast Asia with petroleum potential

Area	Countries disputing jurisdiction	Note
Doi Lang	Myanmar and Thailand	Border dispute
The eastern Gulf of Thailand	Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia	Cambodia objected to a settlement between Thailand and Vietnam
The southwestern Gulf of Thailand	Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam	
Pedra Branca Light house	Singapore and Malaysia	Despite the ICJ ruling, sovereignty over the surrounding territorial waters has yet to be resolved
An area north, west and east of Natuna Islands	Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and China	
Offshore Brunei	Brunei, Malaysia, possibly China, possibly Vietnam	
Sabah	Philippines and Malaysia	The Philippines maintains a dormant claim
The Gulf of Tonkin	China and Vietnam	
The Spratly Islands	Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, China and Taiwan	Maritime dispute
Sulawesi/Celebes sea	Malaysia, Indonesia	Maritime dispute
Further territorial disputes	Including Malaysia and Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, Thailand and Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand	Some of these disputes are in the process of being resolved through bilateral initiatives establishing committees for territorial demarcation.

Source: Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order,* 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009, p. 150.

However, despite these territorial and border disputes, ASEAN states were willing to put their disputes aside and cooperate to help Myanmar in the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Nevertheless, before ASEAN successfully persuaded Myanmar to agree with ASEAN's facilitator role, member countries can be divided into two groups: the first group consisted of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam who did not want to push Myanmar too harshly, while the second group comprised Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam who had already been willing to expel

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[43] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.*
[44] Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.*

Myanmar from ASEAN if it did not want to cooperate. Other groupings also existed in terms of the involvement of the UNSC and in terms of the contribution made. Indonesia and Vietnam are ASEAN member countries who strongly rejected the issue being discussed in the UNSC based on principle 'R2P'. Other ASEAN member countries did not demonstrate their rejection.

After Myanmar agreed with the establishment of TCG in which ASEAN played a bridging role, there was no grouping among ASEAN countries. Moe Thuzar, a Myanmar ISEAS researcher argues that ASEAN had a collective perspective in helping Myanmar and there was no tension between members.[45] Even Western governments, who were highly critical of Myanmar, were present in the UN Pledging Conferences.[46] Thuzar's statement implies that this collective perspective was reached after the acute period had passed.

War is therefore still considered illegitimate for the ASEAN member states. However, because of the border and territorial disputes that were still lingering, the indicator of some states to expand' is regarded as moderate. The indicator of the 'alliances on the basis of short-run interests' was demonstrated only by the existence of groupings in contributing to the management of the crisis. This aspect will be discussed later in this Chapter; it is not considered as significant in indicating a balance of power among ASEAN countries.

Dynamics with External Great Powers

In relation to a balance of external great power influence dynamics, there were some indicators that were related to Cyclone Nargis, such as the distribution of external power's armed forces and economic interdependence. The distribution was more a distribution of assistance through external power's ships and aircrafts rather than a distribution of armed forces. Among the ships and aircraft carrying assistance to Myanmar were those of the US and India. US Navy ships with humanitarian supplies had arrived but were withdrawn after being denied entry into Myanmar for three weeks. Not far off the coast of Myanmar, the US government had mobilised four ships from the USS Essex Amphibious Ready Group that had been in the region for the Cobra Gold joint task force exercises with the Thai Military. Since 13 May, these huge vessels had been positioned offshore in preparation to assist the relief effort. However, even though they were on a humanitarian mission, they were equipped for combat. One of the ships, the USS Mustin, was a guided missile destroyer. The fleet boasted four amphibious landing craft that could operate in areas inaccessible by road, twenty-two helicopters

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[45] Interview with Moe Thuzar, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011.
[46] Interview with Moe Thuzar, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011.

and more than five thousand US military personnel. The US Navy released photographs of a Seahawk helicopter, part of the Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 25, transporting pallets of supplies between ships.[47]

From 12-20 May, USAID and the US Department of Defence coordinated the delivery of nearly $1.2 million of US relief commodities to Yangon on C-130 flights. India, one of the few countries which maintained close relations with Myanmar, launched *Operation Sahyata,* under which two Indian Navy ships and two Indian Air Force aircraft supplied the first international relief material to Myanmar. The two aircraft carried four tonnes of relief supplies each while the Indian navy transported more than 100 tonnes of relief On May 8, the Indian Air Force dispatched its third air consignment carrying over 32 tonnes of relief material including tents, blankets and medicines.[48] England and France had also redirected craft towards Myanmar. England had sent the British frigate HMS Westminster, and France was moving the amphibious assault ship the Mistral. [49]

Thuzar argues that from the Myanmar side, it was difficult not to be prejudiced by the sight of the presence of outsiders' ships and aircraft.

> Starting from the early days after the Nargis hit the Ayeyarwady Delta, there were aid that came in from neighbouring countries like India and ASEAN countries. The problem happened when offers started pouring in. Some of the offers were made in a good faith, I would like to believe and I do believe so, but there were proposed to be delivered by military means, for example, the US navy was there because it was the time when Thai was conducting the Cobra Cold Exercise. Mr Severino likes to use the expression that if he were the general sitting there, seeing foreign military vessels are approaching his waters, that kind of paranoia would set in. I think that was how the perception on how international assistance really picked up in the media. [50]

Thuzar claims that it was not that the Myanmar government did not want to receive foreign assistance, but it was the way in which some countries delivered the assistance by military means that scared the government. According to her, it is normal for any country to be paranoid if foreign military vessels are seen to be approaching their waters. Furthermore, she adds that while delivering assistance, some countries brought media teams with them, and that was perceived by the Myanmar government as not being in good faith.

> The government of Myanmar did refuse, but they were also very cautious. They would say 'Give us the aid package. We will mobilise our own troops to distribute them and so on'. There is a story where it was not well distributed.

[47] Larkin, *No Bad News for the King.*
[48] *Thaindian News,* 'India to send 8 tonnes of relief material to Myanmar,' May 6, 2008 available at http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/india-to-send-8-tonnes-of-relief-material-to-myanmar_10045845.html (accessed on 8 February 2012).
[49] Larkin, *No Bad News for the King.*
[50] Interview with Moe Thuzar, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011.

> The difference would have been the interest of those countries to come in with media team. The strong rejection is the government did not want any media covering the disaster. The reluctance was to be seen in media. [51]

The Myanmar government was afraid that the media teams from other countries would report on not only the disaster and its reconstruction but also the political situation in the country. It was very different in Indonesia which had opened Aceh to international media. The Indonesian government wanted to let the world know that the Acehnese people were devastated by the disaster and as a result would be more inclined to help.

During 2008-2010, there was minimal presence of armed forces of external powers in Myanmar. In relation to the Cyclone Nargis crisis, there was not really a distribution of armed forces, but a distribution of assistance through the means of military vessels and aircraft. Consequently, the indicator of 'distribution of external powers' armed forces' is insignificant. However, in 2011, the US started to plan the deployment of its military forces in two Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines and Singapore, and in Southeast Asia's neighbour, Australia.[52]

In connection with economic interdependence, the total economic losses caused by the cyclone were very damaging to Myanmar's underdeveloped economy. The Cyclone Nargis crisis resulted in lower growth in Myanmar in fiscal year 2008-2009 and the economic losses were estimated to be about 2.7 per cent of the officially projected national GDP in 2008. Based on the 2007/2008 Human Development Report, GDP per capita for Myanmar was US$1,027, the lowest in the region, compared to US$29,663 for Singapore, US$8,677 for Thailand, or US$3,843 for Indonesia. [53] Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Myanmar in recent years has been about US$3 per capita per year, one of the lowest in the world. As shown in Table 5.3 , the comparative figure for Lao PDR is US$63 per capita, for Cambodia US$38, Sudan US$55 and Zimbabwe US$21.

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[51] Interview with Moe Thuzar, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 17 March 2011.

[52] In 2011, the US based military forces in the Philippines, Singapore and Darwin, Australia. Shortly before flying to Bali to attend the Sixth East Asian Summit on November 17-18, President Obama announced in Canberra that the US military would expand its role in the Asia-Pacific region, despite budget cuts, by deploying military forces in Darwin. The US would begin its military outreach in Southeast Asia by deploying marines, naval ships and aircraft in northern Australia starting in 2012. The process would be gradually intensified until the US had a 2,500-strong task force in Darwin by 2016. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia expressed their concern, particularly towards the plan of US military development in Darwin. However, Prime Minister of Australia, Julia Gillard and US President, Barack Obama assured President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that the deployment was related to disaster management and spelled no harm to Indonesia or the Southeast Asia region.

[53] Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar'.

TABLE 5.3
GDP and ODA Comparisons 2007/2008

Country	GDP per capita	ODA per capita
Cambodia	US$2,727	US$38
Lao PDR	US$2,039	US$63
Myanmar	US$1,027	US$3
Sudan	US$2,083	US$55
Zimbabwe	US$2,038	US$21

Source: www.oecd.org/dac/statesidsonline, Development Asisstance Committee, OECD, Paris, quoted in William Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar', in Nick Cheeseman, Monique Skidmore, Trevor Wilson, eds., *Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010, p.198.

The relatively high economic losses from Cyclone Nargis stemmed from the disaster's impact on assets, industrial production and commerce in the largest city of Yangon as well as the Ayeyarwady Delta which is known as the 'rice bowl' of Myanmar (see Table 5.4).

TABLE 5.4
Impact on GDP

	Nominal GDP 2008 (Kyat billion)	Gross Losses (Kyat billion)	Value Added Coefficients	Value Added Losses	Impact on Sectoral GDP
Agricultural	10,632	225	0.8	185	1.7 %
Livestock and Fisheries	2,330	160	0.6	98	4.2%
Industry	5,130	1,362	0.2	239	4.6%
Commerce	6,708	461	0.7	334	5.0%
Total GDP	31,672				

Source: www.oecd.org/dac/statesidsonline, Development Asisstance Committee, OECD, Paris, quoted in William Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar', in Nick Cheeseman, Monique Skidmore, Trevor Wilson, eds., *Ruling Myanmar From Cyclone Nargis to National Elections*, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010, p.198.

Given its poor economy, Myanmar was heavily dependent on international assistance. However, its politics influenced the level of humanitarian assistance. Myanmar received only eighth of the international assistance given to Aceh. As of June 2009, Myanmar had received 67 per cent of the US$477 million promised in the revised flash appeal, and there had been difficulty in securing the US$691 million as the total budget for the three-year recovery and preparedness plan.[54] On 25 November 2009, ASEAN initiated a Post Nargis Assistance Conference (PONAC) to mobilise resources to address the immediate critical needs. As a result of this conference, Myanmar received US$103.5 million and US$88.5 million from Australia, EC, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. By comparison, Aceh had received US$5,140 million in international assistance

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[54] Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar'.

during the first three years after the tsunami.[55] The difference was that Indonesia realised quickly that it needed international assistance. Only a few days after the Indian Ocean Tsunami struck Aceh, Indonesia convened an international conference asking for pledging.

These figures demonstrate that Myanmar actually had a very high level of economic dependence on external powers. Therefore the indicator of 'economic dependence on external great powers' here is considered as significant.[56] Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 summarise the indicators of a balancing system in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

TABLE 5.5
Summary of the Indicators of a Balance of Power during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

No.	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	In-significant	Note
**Balance of Power among ASEAN Member States**				
A.	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors	Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis			
B.	Intentions of some states to expand		√		Moderate during the acute and de-escalation period
C.	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests		√		Moderate during the acute and de-escalation period
D.	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft			√	Moderate during the acute and de-escalation period
	Sub total	0	2	1	
**Balance of External Great Power Influence**				
E.	Dependency on external great powers as security providers	Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis			
F.	Alignment with external great powers	Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis			
G.	Military cooperation with external great powers	Not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis			
H.	Distribution of external great powers' armed forces			√	Insignificant during the acute and de-escalation period
I.	Economic dependence on external great powers	√			Significant during the acute and de-escalation period
	Sub total	1	0	1	
	Total	1	2	2	

Source: Compiled by author

[55] Sabandar, 'Cyclone Nargis and ASEAN: A Window for More Meaningful Development Cooperation in Myanmar'.
[56] Furthermore, after the Asian financial crisis, economic relations between ASEAN member countries and external great powers have become more interdependent, so ASEAN member countries during 2008-2010 were economically dependent on external great powers.

FIGURE 5.3
Indicators of a Balancing System during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 show that the regional security system in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis crisis is not reflected by the presence of a balance of power among ASEAN member states. There is no indicator of a balance of power among ASEAN member states being ranked as significant, and two indicators are regarded moderate. There is one insignificant indicator, namely the indicator 'war as a legitimate statecraft', and the other indicators are not necessarily relevant to the crisis.

Furthermore, ASEAN's management of the crisis is only explained by one out of nine significant indicators of a balance of external great power influence, namely 'economic dependence on external great powers'. One indicator, 'distribution of external great powers' armed forces', is considered an insignificant indicator, while there is no indicator that can be regarded as moderate. The other indicators are not necessarily relevant to the crisis. This means that external great powers played a limited role in the crisis, and therefore did not really indicate a balance of external great power influence during the Cylone Nargis crisis. The main roles that external powers played were to put pressure on Myanmar to open up to international assistance, pressure to put the issue on the table of the UNSC and pressure on ASEAN to ensure Myanmar would accept to international assistance. These pressures were considered as background factors rather than an important indicator of a balance of external great power influence.

5.5. A Concert of Powers?

In this section, I argue that during the acute period of the crisis, from 2 May to 18 May 2008, regional dominant powers played an important role in managing the crisis. In the de-escalation period, regional dominant powers shared the burden of managing the crisis with the rest of ASEAN member states. The crisis management by dominant powers provides evidence that the regional security system can be characterised as a variation of the classical concept of a concert of powers. Regional dominant powers in Southeast Asia were Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. However, even though their contribution was important, there was little evidence that the cooperation was conducted exclusively among these three countries.

Several indicators are used to analyse the existence of a sub-regional concert of powers in the region as listed in Box 3.3 (see Section 3.6). Table 5.6 presents a summary of the indicators of a concert of powers in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. A detailed analysis follows the table.

TABLE 5.6
A Concert of Powers in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis?

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
			Concert of Powers			
A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order: **Significant particularly during the acute period**	For Myanmar people, Cyclone Nargis was a decisive shock to stability. For the government of Myanmar, it was a shock to its security as it feared 'intervention' by Western countries.	For other ASEAN countries, the crisis was a humanitarian shock and also a potential shock to ASEAN's reputation. Countries like Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia perceived the crisis as a shock particularly after the Myanmar government resisted international assistance. It was a shock when at the outset, the Myanmar government did not want to accept ASEAN's offer to facilitate, even though Mynmar was open to bilateral assistance from ASEAN countries, India and China. It was a shock to ASEAN's credibility, particularly when France proposed the issue be discussed in the UNSC under the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect'. For ASEAN member countries, if Myanmar failed to accept its role, ASEAN's credibility would be questioned. On the other hand, countries like Indonesia and Vietnam did not want this humanitarian issue to be considered a security issue by the international community and then discussed in the UNSC.			
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers: **Significant during the acute period**	There was a high and self-conscious level of cooperation among the ASEAN six members particularly during the acute period. Foreign Affairs Ministers contacted each other either by phone or by letter. Even though the cooperation was among the six ASEAN member states, when it came to practical implementation Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia played the greatest role. The high and self conscious level of cooperation continued during the de-escalation period but the burden of managing the crisis was shared among the regional dominant powers and the remainder ASEAN member states.			
C.	A pattern of cooperative behaviour: **Moderate between the six ASEAN members**	A pattern of cooperative behaviour vis-à-vis Myanmar dated back to Myanmar's admission into the organisation. The ASEAN member countries had different positions that later created different patterns of cooperative behaviour towards Myanmar during the Cyclone Nargis crisis.			

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
			Concert of Powers			
D.	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers: **Moderate during the acute and de-escalation periods**	The roles of Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore were effective and relatively equal. They were among the first countries to render assistance, sending medical teams and technical expertise. They were also willing to question Myanmar's membership in ASEAN. However, it seems the assistance given to Myanmar particularly during the acute period was not collective and interdependent among Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia. It was quite collective among the ASEAN-6, while Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were the most important players but their actions were not interdependent.				
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms : **Moderate during the acute and de-escalation periods**	This indicator is considered as moderate because there was no institutionalised summit diplomacy among regional dominant powers, but there were high level diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms conducted by ASEAN member states under the TCG. On 12 May 2008, Pitsuwan organised a meeting between the ASEAN Secretariat, the World Bank and the United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for the purpose of assessing potential support for a 'coalition of mercy'. Several consultative mechanisms within ASEAN were held afterwards, on 21 May, 25 May, 31 May, 2 June, 10-19 June, 23 June, 24 June, 21 July, 26 November 2008, 17 January 2009, 9 February 2009, 27 February 2009, 2 July 2009, 17-20 July 2009, 2 October 2009, 17 October 2009, 23-25 October 2009, 25 November 2009, 13 January 2010, 8 March 2010, 12 March 2010, 12 March 2010, 7 April 2010, 18 June 2010 and 31 July 2010.				
F.	A joint approach to regional issues: **Significant during the de-escalation period**	Myanmar was initially reluctant to accept any joint approach by ASEAN in helping the country. However, Myanmar was convinced that it could trust ASEAN member countries as facilitators.	There was a joint approach by Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia to pushing Myanmar during the acute period, being the first countries to deploy experts and assistance and playing an important role during the de-escalation period. A joint approach to other regional issues that arose during Cyclone Nargis crisis was also demonstrated by these countries. The joint approach during the de-escalation period was also demonstrated between Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam whose experts were represented in the TCG.			The Philippines' experts were also deployed after ASEAN-ERAT was sent to the Delta.

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
		Concert of Powers				
G.	A need for system stability and international order: **Significant particularly during the acute period**	The need for system stability was demonstrated by the effort of ASEAN member states to push the Myanmar government to accept international assistance. The consideration of the expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN also reflected the need for system stability. Outside Southeast Asia, the need for system stability was demonstrated, by France's effort to table the issue at UNSC in the context of a 'Responsibility to Protect' and the presence of US. French and UK naval ships and aircraft from the US and India.				

Source: Adapted from the literature and interviews and compiled by author

A. A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order

To the Myanmar people and government, ASEAN member states and the international community, the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order. Cyclone Nargis had a substantial long-term impact on livelihoods and resulted in enormous physical losses. Besides the humanitarian catastrophe, what further presented a shock was the fact that the country's military regime only allowed limited humanitarian access. Many NGOs were denied access to the country. Organisations already present in the country, such as *Médecins sans Frontières* and Save the Children were able to get relatively small numbers of aid workers into the affected areas but reported a tightening of restrictions.[57] Other NGOs, UN agencies and states offered assistance to the Myanmar government which insisted on distributing the aid itself, and on restricting aid worker's movement. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and Oxfam reported that, at most, only a quarter of the aid required was being permitted to enter the country, and the aid was not being effectively distributed.[58]

ASEAN member countries also perceived the crisis as a shock particularly after the Myanmar government resisted in allowing international assistance. It was a shock when at the outset, the Myanmar government did not want to accept ASEAN's offer as a facilitator, even though Myanmar was open to any bilateral assistance from ASEAN countries, India and China. It was a shock to ASEAN's credibility and ASEAN did not want another embarrassment after the cancelation of Professor Ibrahim Gambari's briefing East Asian Leaders on the Myanmar situation at the EAS in November 2007, just six months before the crisis. In October 2007, Singapore's Ambassador to the UN informed the UNSC that it had invited Professor Gambari to brief the leaders at the EAS in November. On 19 November, after Gambari had already departed on a flight for Singapore, at an informal dinner, Myanmar objected to the briefing and Myanmar's Prime Minister threatened to scuttle the Charter before walked out of the meeting.[59] Gambari's group briefing was cancelled. This embarrassed ASEAN in front of the international community. Singapore as Chair, supported by other members — particularly the original members — wanted to make sure that the international community saw that such an event would not happen again and that ASEAN can do things correctly.

Furthermore, Singapore as ASEAN's chair also saw this catastrophe as a shock because ASEAN as an organisation was expected to come up with tangible solutions. Singapore

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[57] Larkin, *No Bad News for the King*.
[58] Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect'.
[59] Lee Jones, 'ASEAN's Albatross: ASEAN's Burma Policy, from Constructive Engagement to Critical Disengagement', *Asian Security* 4:3, 2008, pp. 271-293, p. 286.

received reports that the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military government) had not been called in to help the victims of the cyclone because they had instead been ordered to take up 'defensive positions'. Singapore was facing the risk of losing credibility in its chairmanship if ASEAN did not come up with solutions or failed to ensure Myanmar accepted international assistance, and in particular, accepted ASEAN as facilitator.

Indonesia had experienced a similar situation when the Boxing Day Tsunami struck Aceh in 2004. Indonesia held a Summit Pledge Conference on 5 January 2005, only 12 days after the tsunami hit Aceh. If it had not been during the holiday season (Christmas and New Year), the Indonesian government would have held the conference earlier than 5 January 2005. A Japanese diplomat working at the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta during that time reported that the reaction of the Indonesian government towards the natural disaster was very fast and it was quite difficult to contact their headquarters in Japan to ask to participate in the Summit because of the holiday season.[60] The fact that the reaction of the Myanmar government was relatively slow, particularly in accepting the relief effort was a shock to Indonesia. Given that it had experienced a similar situation, Indonesia knew how devastated the victims were and how they needed a quick distribution of aid. This prompted the Indonesian government to talk with its Myanmar counterpart. The same view was held by Thailand. As its closest geographical neighbour which also had a similar experience, Thailand wanted Myanmar to react more promptly.

These shocks resulted in ASEAN's effort to react quickly to the disaster. On 5 May, ASEAN released its first press statement and dispatched its Emergency Rapid Assessment Team (ERAT) to Myanmar between 9-18 May to assess the extent of the disaster. Interestingly, the ASEAN ERAT deployed in Myanmar only consisted of countries from the six ASEAN members, namely Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Myanmar also joined the group. The participation of only six members is understandable in the sense that the decision to establish the ASEAN-ERAT was made in March 2008 before Cyclone Nargis. At the time of Nargis, the ASEAN-ERAT had essentially not yet been established.[61] In 48 hours, experts from ASEAN member countries gathered. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam found it difficult to find experts on disaster management within 48 hours. In the early days, experts from Indonesia were sent under the ASEAN Secretariat. Their deployment was conducted under the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER) which had been ratified by Myanmar. On 8 May, the ASEAN Secretary-General initiated the ACFDA.

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[60] Interview with a Japanese diplomat, Canberra, 16 February 2012.
[61] ASEAN, *Post-Nargis Needs Assessment and Monitoring*, Jakarta: ASEAN, 2010.

The frustration was also felt by countries that were willing to help, but access was denied. For example, on 7 May, the French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner proposed that the UNSC invoke the 'R2P' to authorise the delivery of aid without the consent of the Myanmar government. This proposal was reiterated by the French Ambassador to the UN and by commentators, analysts and politicians, primarily in Europe and North America. This proposal was rejected by the Chinese government, which argued that the concept did not apply to natural disasters. Similarly, the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator referred to the proposal as unnecessarily confrontational.[62] The British Minister for International Development, Douglas Alexander also rejected, but somehow Britain later backtracked and indicated that it would welcome discussion of the 'R2P'.[63] This further triggered a substantial scholarly debate.

On 12 May 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his 'deep concern and immense frustration at the unacceptably slow response to this grave humanitarian crisis' and warned of the threat of infectious disease taking hold if urgent assistance was not delivered. The Secretary-General tried to contact the head of Myanmar's military regime, Than Shwe, but his calls were unanswered.[64]

Various media outlets around the world also jumped on the 'intervention' calls bandwagon. The *Australian,* for example, suggested 'it's time for an aid intervention'. *Time Magazine* recommended that it was time to consider 'the more serious option' of 'invading Burma' and the *AsiaTimes Online* argued that while an invasion was 'once a paranoid delusion', it was now a 'strong pre-emptive possibility'.[65]

For the Myanmar government, the catastrophe brought a fear of invasion by Western countries. The junta perceived the cyclone more as a 'security threat' than a 'natural disaster. For them, granting permission for a massive relief effort would result in a large flow of foreign aid workers and media personnel. The junta believed that it was essential to prevent 'alien cultural influences' that might result in 'social instability'.[66]

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[62] Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect'.
[63] Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect'.
[64] Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 'Cyclone Nargis and the Responsibility to Protect', p. 3.
[65] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis,* p. 190.
[66] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis,* p. 191.

B. A high and self conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers

Cooperation was established not among Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia exclusively, but rather among ASEAN-6 member countries. The level of cooperation among Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia, however, was high and self-conscious, and therefore I argue this indicator is significant. This is shown in the acute period of the crisis. On 5 May 2008, two days after Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, ASEAN member states successfully extended relief assistance to the victims of the cyclone. The ASEAN-ERAT was sent to join the UN Disaster Assessment Coordination (UNDAC) Team assembled in Bangkok. The members of ASEAN-ERAT who were deployed to Myanmar were from the six member countries. [67]

Even though the cooperation was actually conducted among the six ASEAN members, when it came to practical implementation Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were the most active players. The ASEAN Secretariat updated the situation to all ASEAN members, but communication among the six members was very intensive.[68] The vigour of the ASEAN members' role is represented in 5.7 and Figure 5.4.

TABLE 5.7
Classification of the Contribution of ASEAN Member Countries in the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

| Contribution	Countries	Period
Pushing Myanmar Hard to open to international Assistance	**Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia,** the Philippines	Acute Period
Early Assistance and Deployment (ASEAN-ERAT and relief assistance, and UNDAC)	**Thailand, Singapore,** Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and **Indonesia**	Acute Period
Financial contribution	**Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia** (rank no 1-3), followed by Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Lao, Vietnam and Cambodia. [69]	Acute and De-escalation period
Technical expertise	**Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia,** the Philippines and Malaysia	Acute and De-escalation Period
ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force	**Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia,** the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam.	De-escalation Period
TCG	**Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia** and Vietnam	De-escalation Period
Volunteers	**Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia,** Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	De-escalation Period

Source: compiled by author

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[67] ASEAN, *Post-Nargis Needs Assessment and Monitoring,* Jakarta: ASEAN, 2010.
[68] Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
[69] See Table 5.8 Post Nargis support from ASEAN members.

FIGURE 5.4
Classification of the Role of ASEAN member countries in the Cyclone Nargis crisis

Note to figure: The inner circle comprises countries which played the most active role during the Cyclone Nargis crisis, followed by the second circle, and by the third circle countries which played the least active role.

Source: Compiled by author

Both Table 5.7 and Figure 5.4 suggest that Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia consistently played a role in all aspects of contribution. Interestingly, a Thai military officer claimed that Thailand played the greatest role in assisting Myanmar while an Indonesian official also claimed that Indonesia played the greatest role in pushing Myanmar to open up to international assistance.[70] Thailand contributed approximately US$29.7 million to relief and recovery efforts, and was the first country to provide assistance to Myanmar following the Cyclone, which was transported on a C-130 aircraft on 6 May 2008. Relief support included food, medicine and medical supplies, drinking water, survival kits, plastic sheets, roofing materials, water purifiers, generators, diesel, satellite telephones, boats, tillers, fertiliser, agricultural and fishing equipment. Thailand also offered its Don Muang Airport as a staging area, where relief supplies from other countries could be channelled through to Myanmar. All told, 26 cargoes of relief from all over the world were transported on C-130 aircraft from Thailand and from other countries. Thailand was also the first country to dispatch a medical team to Myanmar at the end of May 2008. Thailand contributed cash, equipment and materials towards the set up and operation of the TCG and AHTF Coordinating Office in Yangon. Thailand supported the TCG Pilot Project in Seik Gyi Village by helping to renovate the monastery in Seik Gyi and reconstruct schools in

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[70] Interview with a Thai Army officer who was in charge of the Cyclone Nargis Crisis, Bangkok, 23 February 2011. and Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.

Nyang Wai Village. Former Thailand Ambassador to Myanmar, Bansarn Bunnag was designated an ASEAN member to the TCG from mid July 2008 to December 2009.[71]

Indonesia was one of the first countries to provide humanitarian assistance to Myanmar following the Cyclone. Material weighing 22,395 MT was transported on two Hercules planes that arrived at Yangon International Airport on 9 May 2008. The aid included 27 sacks of clothing, 150 sacks of biscuits, 10,000 blankets, 50.000 sarongs, 10 tents, 292 bags of medicine, 744 sacks of food and 4,000 bags of instant noodles. On 2 June 2008, a team of 30 medical professionals from Indonesia carrying 7 MT of medication, medical supplies and operational tools, arrived in Myanmar to help survivors in Kawhmu Township. During the recovery phase, Indonesia donated US$1 million to build a 38 bed hospital in Pynsalu.[72]

Singapore contributed US$3.5 million to the post-Nargis relief and recovery effort. The assistance began in June 2008, when Singapore provided funding for an aviation group handling equipment at the Yangon International Airport that was used in the distribution of relief supplies. In September 2008, Singapore supported crop replanting activities in six designated townships: Dedaye, Ngapudaw, Labutta, Mawlamyinegyun and Kyaiklat. On 2 July 2008 five Singaporean psychologists organised a workshop on disaster mental health issues that was attended by 35 Myanmar officials. Four months later, Singapore donated 1,000 wooden fishing boats and nets through an implementing partner, Mingalar Myanmar.[73]

TABLE 5.8
Post-Nargis Support from ASEAN Member States

Rank	ASEAN Member states	Total funds committed/contributed (USD
1.	Thailand	29,713,688*
2.	Singapore	5,634,900*
3.	Indonesia	1,800,000*
4.	Brunei Darussalam	1,303,693
5.	Malaysia	1,160,772*
6.	Philippines	350,000
7.	Cambodia	310,000
8.	Vietnam	300,000
9.	Lao PDR	120,000
	Total	**40,693,053**

Note: * cash and in-kind contribution

Source: The ASEAN Secretariat, *A Humanitarian Call the ASEAN Response to Cyclone Nargis*, Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2010, p. 80.

Thus, it can be concluded that the indicator, a high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant members, is significant in this case.

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[71] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call.*
[72] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call.*
[73] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call.*

C. A pattern of cooperative behaviour

The pattern of cooperative behaviour vis-à-vis Myanmar had actually been established since Myanmar's admission into the organisation. Given that the pattern of cooperation was slowly being established and was changing among the dominant members, the indicator of 'pattern of cooperative behaviour of dominant powers' is rated as moderate. There were some other grounds that slowly created a pattern of cooperative behaviour towards Myanmar among the ASEAN-6 members, including the proposal for Constructive Engagement by Thailand, the proposal for an ASEAN Troika by Indonesia, the issue of Myanmar Chairmanship in ASEAN, the cancelation of Gambari's briefing, and the UNGA vote in 2007. These occasions further influenced the pattern of cooperative behaviour that emerged in helping Myanmar during the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

These events finally but slowly created a pattern of cooperative behaviour, mostly among the ASEAN-6 members, so when the Cyclone Nargis crisis hit Myanmar; it was relatively predictable that the ASEAN-6 members would cooperate to provide assistance. It is not a secret that some countries like Indonesia and the Philippines actually have a long-term agenda towards democratisation in Myanmar. However, they could not express it bluntly to the Myanmar government at the time of the crisis, because it risked Myanmar objecting to the role of ASEAN as facilitator.

Not only during the acute period, but also during the de-escalation period, these countries played a bigger role. According to Pavin Chacalpongvun, Thailand and Singapore played the biggest role. Thailand, for example, at least had three significant roles: as a next-door neighbour, a frontline neighbour, and as a gateway of assistance delivery. Thailand offered its airport to be the place where supplies from other countries could be channelled through Myanmar and, 26 cargoes of relief from all over the world were transported on C-130 aircraft from Thailand.[74] Furthermore, the ASEAN Secretary-General who is from Thailand and the Thai Ambassador in Naypyidaw, were the most influential people on the ground. While Pitsuwan was not always around, Bansarn Bunnag became the focal point for any foreigner to consult with.[75]

Chacalpongvun also stated that Singapore was important in several ways: as being a rich country and as Chair of ASEAN. Singapore also had business interests in Myanmar, so its assistance could be seen as a long-term investment. The Dean Ambassador in Yangon was the Ambassador of Singapore, Robert Chua, who was the second most

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[74] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call.*
[75] Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011.

influential person after Bansarn Bunnag. [76] Ambassadors carried significant political weight with their respective nations and as members of the TCG. Moreover, they were on the ground, they were aware of what was happening and they relayed what they were seeing and hearing back to the ASEAN Secretariat. At the same time, they were the only Ambassadors in Myanmar who were seriously committed.[77]

Indonesia also played a significant role in pushing Myanmar by questioning the meaning of ASEAN to Myanmar and the meaning of Myanmar to ASEAN. Three out of seven officials who served on the TCG were from Indonesia. These persons are Adelina Kamal, Head of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Division of the ASEAN Secretariat; Dr Puji Pujiono, Senior UNDP officer seconded to the ASEAN Secretariat; and Dr William Sabandar, Special Envoy for Secretary-General of ASEAN for Post Nargis Recovery.[78]

In terms of financial contribution, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia could also be ranked no.1 to no.3 in that order. Thailand ranked no.1 with US$29,713,688 of assistance, Singapore with US$ 5,634,900 of contribution and Indonesia with US$1,800,000 of funds given to Myanmar. Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam also rendered large contributions. Malaysia contributed US$1.16 million worth of aid on two C-130 Royal Malaysian Air Force aircraft and sent humanitarian supplies consisting of blankets, clothing, dry food, medicines, tents and water purification tablets. [79] However, for Malaysia, aside from assistance in terms of funding and humanitarian supplies, little is known. Brunei contributed US$1,303,693 of assistance and supported the deployment of two volunteers to Myanmar to join the ASEAN Volunteers.[80] However, it lacked the technical expertise to assist the cyclone victims. Vietnam did not give a substantial contribution but the Vietnamese Ambassador in Naypyidaw played a role by becoming a member of the TCG as shown in Table 5.9.

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[76] Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011.
[77] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*
[78] ASEAN, *Charting A New Course,* Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010.
[79] ASEAN, *Charting A New Course.*
[80] ASEAN, *Charting A New Course.*

TABLE 5.9
Officials Who Served on the TCG

Myanmar Names and Designation	ASEAN Names and Designations	UN Names and Designations
U Kyaw Thu, Chair of the TCG and Chair Civil Service Selection and Training Board	Singapore Ambassador Mr. Robert HK Chua	Mr. Bishow Parajuli, UN Resident Coordination/Humanitarian Coordinator
U Aung Htun Khaing, Deputy Director General, Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of Social Welfare and Resettlement	Thai Ambassador Mr Bansarn Bunnag	Mr. Daniel Baker, then Acting UN Humanitarian Coordinator
U Than Aye, Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Diretor General of the Department of Agricultural Planning	Vietnamese Ambassador Mr Chu Cong Phung	Mr Ramesh Shresta, UNICEF Country Representatives
	Dr Anish Kumar Roy, then Special Representative of Secretary-General of ASEAN in 2008	Mr. Thierry Delbreuve, Head of UNOCHA in Myanmar
	Ms Adelina Kamal, Head of Disaster Management and	Mr. Bhairaja Panday, UNHCR Country Representative
	Dr Puji Pujiono, Senior UNDP officer seconded to the ASEAN Secretariat	
	Dr William Sabandar, Special Envoy for Secretary-General of ASEAN for Post Nargis Recovery	

Source: ASEAN, *Charting a New Course,* Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010, p. 31

Table 5.9 shows that among the CLMV countries, only the Vietnamese Ambassador was a member of the TCG from ASEAN. However, Vietnam's contribution to Myanmar was relatively small, about UA$300,000 and ranked no. 8 among ASEAN member countries in terms of funding. Compared to its economic growth, Vietnam's contribution to Myanmar can be regarded as small. Countries like Cambodia, Laos had neither the capacity in terms of funding nor the technical expertise. Cambodia and Laos also did not want to push Myanmar too hard in opening up to international assistance and did not want to question Myanmar's membership in ASEAN because they were also relatively new as members. They appeared not to want to create problems for themselves.

The pattern of cooperative behaviour vis-à-vis Myanmar was slowly established. This pattern could be seen among the ASEAN-6 members, but among these, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia played the most important roles. Therefore, the indicator, a pattern of cooperative behaviour among dominant powers, is regarded as moderate.

D. An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers

The role of regional dominant powers, namely Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore was quite effective. However, the cooperation was not really collective and interdependent. The contributions of the Thai, Indonesian and Singaporean governments were

relatively equal, and thus this indicator is considered as moderate. They effectively pushed Myanmar to open up to international assistance by agreeing to the establishment of the TCG. According to See Seng Tan, Indonesia and Singapore were the strongest countries exerting influence in pushing Myanmar.[81] The contribution of Indonesia and Singapore in terms of funding may not be equal to Thailand's contribution; this amounted to US$29,713,688, which was bigger than the total contribution of the other nine ASEAN countries together. However, in terms of technical expertise contributed, their roles were about equal. In addition, Thais, Singaporeans and Indonesians served as TCG officials.

While Indonesia sent a medical team to help survivors in a field hospital and mobile clinic, the Singapore government conducted a workshop on disaster mental health issues in October 2008 and the Thai government provided two medical teams, both under the patronage of H.R.H. Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn. Whilst the Indonesian government donated US$1 million to build a 38 bed hospital-cum-cyclone shelter in Pyinsalu Township, Singapore supported the reconstruction of Kayin Chaung Hospital, a 16 bed facility that was inaugurated by Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong in June 2009 and the Thai Red Cross Society funded the renovation of the National Blood Centre in Yangon and helped construct a rural health centre in Taman Village and a 16-bed hospital di Daw Nyein Village, Pyapon Township.[82]

Interestingly, a sense of competition developed between ASEAN and China in helping Myanmar. Chacavalpongpun commented that the Chinese government wanted to play a pivotal role and had been aggressive and fast in rendering assistance. He said:

> I remember I walked with Ja Du, the spokesperson of the Myanmar government for the whole process of reconstruction. He showed me a new village and accidentally mentioned that it was funded by China. After realising that I was from an ASEAN member country, he corrected and said that it was not from China. The construction of the new village was very fast.

China wanted to be regarded as the closest friend of Myanmar, and as the one who came first to help. China, which was facing a comparable catastrophe after the Sichuan earthquake, urged Myanmar to follow its example and be more open with the international community.[83]

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[81] See Seng Tan, 'Herding Cats: Socialisation and Political Change and Continuity in ASEAN', Seminar organised by the Regulatory Institutions Network, School of Regulation, Justice and Diplomacy, College of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University, Canberra, 21 August 2012.

[82] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call*.

[83] International Crisis Group, 'Burma/Myanmar after Nargis: Time to normalize aid relations', *Asia Report*, No. 161, 20 October 2008, pp. 1-39.

E. Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms

There was limited institutional summit diplomacy but a number of informal summit diplomatic moves, and formal and informal consultative mechanisms occurred. Among the regional dominant powers any summit diplomacy was made through telephone communication. Greg Sheridan of the *Australian* reported that probably no foreign leader had been more influential in the unfolding events in Myanmar than the Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Indonesia had been trying to engage Senior General Than Shwe for several years in a process of personal correspondence. [84] This is evidence that there was summit diplomacy but it was conducted informally.

On 19 May, Singapore called for a Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers and after 19 May, a sequence of supporting consultative mechanisms occurred. These consultative mechanisms were conducted not only by regional dominant powers, but also by ASEAN as an organisation and as a party to the TCG Mechanism.

Besides these consultative mechanisms, the Coordinating Office of AHTF established a delivery unit, headed by a monitoring and evaluation officer and supported by four data analysts. The delivery unit tracked the delivery of pledges resulting from the ASEAN Post-Nargis Conference to follow up with donors, to monitor the delivery of the project's trust fund and implementing partners; and communicate the overall delivery of assistance to stakeholders.

The indicator 'institutionalised summit diplomacy and supportive consultative mechanisms' can be regarded as moderate, because (i) the summit diplomacy between regional dominant powers and the Myanmar government was informal rather than institutionalised; (ii) institutional summit diplomacy existed among ASEAN member states, where regional dominant powers were influential; and (iii) supportive consultative mechanisms were not conducted by Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore alone, but by ASEAN as an organisation and as party to the TCG, where regional dominant powers played important roles.[85]

F. A joint approach to regional issues

A joint approach was explicitly demonstrated by the ASEAN-6 members after the Cyclone hit Myanmar. Strong communication was established among those members. This joint approach, for example was demonstrated by Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia in pushing Myanmar hard during the acute period. Among

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[84] Greg Sheridan, 'SBY shepherds Indonesia into a modern community', *The Australian*, 25-26 February, 2012.
[85] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call*.

the ASEAN-6 members, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia played the biggest role. Their roles in working with the Myanmar government during the acute period included being the first country to render assistance and send medical teams (Thailand), and being one of the first countries to contribute funds and provide humanitarian assistance (Singapore and Indonesia). The foreign ministers of Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand engaged in shuttle diplomacy, reassuring the world of ASEAN's attempt to act as facilitator.[86] However, little evidence was found to demonstrate that these three countries cooperated exclusively with each other in assisting Myanmar.

A joint approach during the de-escalation period was demonstrated by all ASEAN member states. It was not until the meeting held when the acute period ended that the ASEAN-led mechanism started and brought the government of Myanmar, ASEAN, the UN, and international NGOs (TCG) together. The TCG agreed on 31 May to conduct a Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) to address the Pledging Conference's call for a credible and multi-sectoral assessment.

During the de-escalation period, ASEAN worked as an organisation under the TCG, in a joint approach. All ASEAN member countries were represented in the AHTF. However, in the TCG only Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam, the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Secretary-General were represented.

As elaborated in the 'balance of power' section (Section 5.4), during the Cyclone Nargis crisis, a crisis was also developing between Cambodia and Thailand over the Preah Vihear Temple. This crisis did not really involve ASEAN as an organisation, but did involve Singapore as Chairman in 2008 and Indonesia when the crisis turned into conflict in 2011. Pitsuwan terms the border dispute 'two Buddhists are fighting over a Hindu ruin, and two Muslims are mediating'. He was referring to Cambodia and Thailand as two Buddhists; the Hindu ruin is the Preah Vihear; and the two Muslims refer to the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Marty Natalegawa and himself. [87]

G. A need for system stability and international order

Nationally, regionally and internationally there were pressures for system stability, thus I argue that the indicator of 'a need for system stability and international order' during the Cyclone Nargis crisis, and thus indicating a concert of powers in Southeast Asia, is significant. Looking back to the definition of stability discussed in Chapter 3, Deutsch and Singer set out three necessary preconditions of stability: 'that no single nation

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[86] Chachavalpongvun and Thuzar, *Myanmar Life After Nargis*.
[87] Surin Pitsuwan, Speech at the Launch of ANU Southeast Asia Institute, Australian National University, Canberra, 23 October 2012.

becomes dominant; that most of its members continue to survive; and that large-scale war does not occur'. [88] The Cyclone Nargis crisis does not meet the first two requirements because the Myanmar government became too dominant and the victims faced challenges to survive. Nationally, Cyclone Nargis provided an opportunity to impede the process of the referendum. People who were afraid of the government and already agreed to vote 'Yes' might change their mind because of the weak government response to the crisis. The rejection of a new constitution might have changed the government and disrupted system stability.

For ASEAN, Myanmar's case could also bring about the possibility of disruption of system stability. ASEAN member countries were affected in terms of their prestige. Singapore had to demonstrate appropriate responses as it was burdened with the chairmanship of ASEAN. Thailand and Indonesia had the responsibility for sharing their experiences as both had experienced a tsunami in 2004. This shows that the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a concern for ASEAN as well as for individual regional dominant powers. For ASEAN, there was a need to strengthen cooperation on disaster management to prevent or at least better manage such disasters in the future.

There was a need to find tangible solution because the ASEAN Charter was signed at the ASEAN Summit in 2007. It was expected that in June 2008, the ASEAN Charter would enter into force. ASEAN thought that if there was disagreement with Myanmar over the crisis, it might threaten to scuttle ASEAN's Charter ratification. Furthermore, the international community would not support the Charter if ASEAN did not come up with tangible solution.

The Cyclone Nargis crisis, however, provided both a need and an opportunity for ASEAN to develop its cooperation on disaster management. Cyclone Nargis can be considered as the first 'true' engagement of ASEAN in the mission of relieving natural or manmade disasters. ASEAN as an organisation had tried to put its own stamp on crisis management in its region, but had never been offered the chance. Cyclone Nargis was also a reminder that ASEAN should expedite its AADMER, which finally entered into force in November 2009 after being ratified by all ten member states of ASEAN. AADMER also provides for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) to undertake operational coordination of activities under the Agreement. This also represented ASEAN's affirmation of its commitment to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). AADMER was signed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in July 2005. Cyclone Nargis

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[88] Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, 'Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability', in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, rev. edn., pp. 315-317.

really forced the organisation to expedite the ratification of the agreement, and provided a need and also some latitude at the same time.

A need for international order was demonstrated when the French Foreign Minister called for the UN to invoke R2P in relation to Cyclone Nargis in order to secure the delivery of aid without the approval of the government of Myanmar, as discussed previously. Moreover, the decision of the US and France to send their naval ships stocked with supplies to the coast of Myanmar created uncertainties as to the nature of the international humanitarian intervention, and was possibly perceived as a threat to the integrity of the State rather than a lifeline to Cyclone-affected peoples. This also demonstrated that external great powers like the US and middle powers like the French believed that there was a need for international order.

The tension between the international community and the Myanmar government in the first two weeks after Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar was also evidence of the need for system stability. While there was willingness from members of the international community to help the victims and survivors, the Myanmar government was suspicious of their motives. Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5 provide a brief summary of the indicators of a concert of powers during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. The analysis of the indicators of a concert of powers is illustrated in Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5.

TABLE 5.10
Summary of the Indicators of a Concert of Powers during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

No	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	Insignificant	Note
**Concert of Powers**					
A.	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order	√			Significant, particularly during the acute period
B.	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers	√			Significant, particularly during the acute period
C.	A pattern of cooperative behaviour		√		Significant between the six members and moderate between dominant powers
D.	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers		√		Moderate during the acute and de-escalation period
E.	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms		√		Moderate during the acute and de-escalation period
F.	A joint approach to regional issues	√			Significant
G.	A need for system stability and international order	√			Significant, particularly during the acute period
	Total	**4**	**3**	**0**	

Source: Compiled by author

FIGURE 5.5
Indicators of a Concert of Powers during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 5.10 and Figure 5.5 show that during the acute period of the crisis, the security system in Southeast Asia is confirmed by four significant and three moderate indicators associated with a concert of powers. Because not all but a majority of indicators were indicated, it is appropriate to refer to the security system as a 'variation of a classical concert of powers'.

5.6. A Security Community?

This section analyses the indicators of a security community and discusses how ASEAN member states responded to the Cyclone Nargis. In this section, I argue that the crisis management by ASEAN members during the de-escalation period is explained by eight out of ten indicators associated with a security community, and each is rated as significant. I adopt the same indicators used to analyse the regional security systems during the Cambodian crisis and East Timor crisis as listed in Box 3.1 (see Section 3.4). Table 5.11 provides an explanation of each indicator of a security community in the Cyclone Nargis crisis; this is followed by a detailed analysis.

TABLE 5.11
A Security Community in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis?

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
			Security Community			
A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers: **Significant during the de-escalation period**	As a recipient country, Myanmar had a fear of intervention, particularly from Western countries. ASEAN members had a humanitarian concern: Myanmar should have opened up to international assistance from the beginning.	ASEAN member states in general have comparable values. ASEAN member states share similar histories, values and societal norms. These commonalities provided a platform to create an understanding between Myanmar and the donor community, and to ease the fears of Myanmar that had been battered by its response to the deadly Cyclone. Nevertheless, there were differences of political values between ASEAN member states. Compared to other member states of ASEAN, Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam expressed solidarity with Myanmar in this crisis by not placing undue pressure on the country. During the acute period of the crisis, there were differences in willingness to push Myanmar too hard and to use the concept of 'R2P'. However, during the de-escalation period, the values converged, and all member countries worked together to help Myanmar.			
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers: **Moderate during the acute period and significant during the de-escalation period**	During the acute period, the behaviour of the decision-makers of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was relatively predictable, but the behaviour of decision-makers of the ASEAN-6 was not really predictable. Behaviour of decision-makers was relatively more predictable during the de-escalation period.				
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments:	Responsiveness to actions and communication during the acute period varied. In general, ASEAN member states were responsive but in particular, their level of response was different. The amount of initial contribution was different. There were also differences in terms of the speed of dispatching assistance and the level of willingness to push Myanmar to open up to international assistance. Responsiveness to actions and communication by all ASEAN member countries was clearly seen during the de-escalation period.				

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
			Security Community			
	Significant particularly during the de-escalation period					
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies: **Significant during the acute and de-escalation periods**	There were five common precipitating factors that encouraged ASEAN member states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies: (i) the fact that the Cyclone Nargis crisis is a natural disaster and humanitarian crisis and (ii) the possibility that if ASEAN failed in finding a tangible solution, ASEAN's credibility would have been disturbed, (iii) the opportunity to show international awareness of poverty in Myanmar; (iv) the opportunity and the need to develop cooperation on disaster management, and (v) the need to test the power of the ASEAN Charter. Aside from common precipitating factors there were individual precipitating factors. Thailand shares a border with Myanmar, was a front line state, and had similar experience of natural disasters. Singapore held the chairmanship of ASEAN and had business and investment interests in Myanmar. Indonesia also had experienced a similar disaster. Some factors discouraged states from coordinating their policies: (i) national interests, (ii) solidarity with Myanmar —not to push Myanmar too hard, and (ii) the lack of capacity in terms of financial contribution and technical expertise. Nevertheless, the precipitating factors that encourage states to coordinate outnumber those that discourage states from coordinating their policies.			
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning: **Significant during the acute period and de-escalation periods**	There were various processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning occurred from the first day. This indicator was significant during the acute period and the de-escalation period.			

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
			Security Community			
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation: **Significant, particularly during the de-escalation period**	Myanmar itself showed development of trust in ASEAN as an organisation. While in the beginning it was reluctant to receive ASEAN as a facilitator, Myanmar finally agreed to an ASEAN –led mechanism.	Trust was developed particularly during the de-escalation crisis. The ASEAN Volunteers program also strengthened trust and enhanced people-people communication during the Cyclone Nargis crisis.			
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects for such conflicts in the region: **Insignificant during the acute and de-escalation periods**	There was no open armed inter-state conflict, but there were some disputes. The disputes included between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear Temple in 2008; Indonesia and Malaysia over the Ambalat block; Malaysia and the Philippines over the Philippines' suspicion of Sabah's support for Moro separatists in Mindanao; Malaysia and Thailand over Malaysia's alleged sympathy for Muslim separatists in the South of Thailand; Myanmar and Thailand over Kayin (Karen) refugees; Malaysia and Singapore over Pulau Batu Puteh; Thailand and Malaysia over their common border; Malaysia and Brunei over Limbang; and the plethora of territorial claims in South China Sea. However, the element of 'total absence or presence of armed inter-state conflicts, or prospects for such conflicts in the region is rated as insignificant' because it was not relevant to the Cyclone Nargis crisis.			
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors: **Insignificant during the acute and de-escalation periods**	Increases in military expenditure by ASEAN member countries are identified. However, the growth was relatively stable, there was no dramatic increase or extraordinary decrease. This growth of military expenditure did not relate to the situation in the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Therefore, the element 'total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race' is rated as insignificant because it was not relevant to the management of Cyclone Nargis.			

No.	Indicators	Myanmar	Thailand	Singapore	Indonesia	The Philippines, Brunei and CLV Countries
				Security Community		
I	Formal or informal institutions and practices **Significant during the acute and de-escalation periods**	The indicator of 'existence of formal or informal institutions and practices' is significant due to the frequent and substantial practices and meetings during the crisis, both formal and informal. Formal institutions established during the Cyclone Nargis crisis included the TCG mechanism, ASEAN Volunteers Program, ASEAN ERAT, ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the victims of Cyclone Nargis crisis, and the UN Advisory Group. Informal institutions included presence of volunteers, NGOs from donor countries. Informal practices/meetings included negotiations between the Secretary-General of ASEAN with TCG members stakeholders in the field, such as victims of Cyclone, businessmen, volunteers, experts, and NGOs; between Ambassadors of ASEAN and stakeholders; between experts and stakeholders; between volunteers and stakeholders.			
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship **Significant during the acute and de-escalation periods**	ASEAN member states consolidated efforts to be more integrated economically. Within the last ten years, ASEAN has further consolidated through the ASEAN Plus Three Arrangement, the ASEAN Swap Arrangement, the ASEAN Surveillance Process and the ASEAN Economic Community and its plans of action and blueprint.				

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

A. A comparability of political values among decision-makers

The comparability of political values was significant in the Cyclone Nargis crisis. ASEAN member states share similar histories, values and societal norms. These commonalities provided a platform for an understanding between Myanmar and the donor community, and worked to ease the fears of a government that had been reaffirmed by its response to the deadly Cyclone. As a recipient country, Myanmar had a fear of intervention, particularly from Western countries. The common values held by all ASEAN member countries made it easier for ASEAN to ensure that such an intervention would not occur and that ASEAN would stand by Myanmar during the crisis. The most important political value shared by all ASEAN member states was that Cyclone Nargis was a humanitarian crisis and ASEAN member states should render assistance to Myanmar. They all also agreed that due to the nature of the crisis, Myanmar should have been open to international assistance from the beginning.

The political value of the importance to help Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis was collectively shared by all ASEAN member states. Nonetheless, the process of rendering assistance showed that the political values among ASEAN member states were actually divided. They all agreed about the significance of rendering assistance, but the nature of that assistance varied. Countries like Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam had limited sources of finance and technical expertise. Even so, Vietnam's expert was a member of the TCG. Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia rendered the greatest contributions, dispatching funding, technical expertise, humanitarian supplies, and also medical teams.

Other divisions in political values also became obvious. The ASEAN-6 members generally supported the democratisation of Myanmar, with Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand as consistent players. On almost all occasions, they had been highly critical of Myanmar. Malaysia's and Brunei Darussalam's policies have not always been consistent. In the UNGA vote against Myanmar, for example, Brunei was abstained. However, Brunei did not consider the option of suspension or expulsion of Myanmar from the organisation during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Malaysia supported the ASEAN consensus not to defend Myanmar in 2005, and also supported the suspension of Myanmar's Chairmanship in 2005. Nevertheless, Malaysia rejected the draft resolution of UNGA in December 2007. Malaysia was also against the idea of suspending or throwing Myanmar out of ASEAN.

Malaysia and Brunei were supported by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam who always maintained their backing of Myanmar and shared solidarity as new members of ASEAN. They also did not want to push Myanmar too hard towards democratisation or during

the Cyclone Nargis crisis. In short, unlike Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, five of other countries, Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam were not really eager to expel Myanmar from ASEAN if Myanmar did not cooperate. However, this option had become an official option and was offered by ASEAN as an organisation at the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 19 May 2008 in Singapore.[89]

Groupings of political values can also be recognised among ASEAN member states in the UNSC. Indonesia shared a similar perspective with Vietnam, that the notion of 'R2P' should be rejected. It was not acceptable to these two countries for the issue to be brought to the UNSC. The others did not explicitly support or reject the concept. However, the concept of 'R2P' finally became one of the options offered to the Myanmar government at the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers Meeting in Singapore on 19 May 2008. This means that ASEAN member countries were willing to play 'sticks and carrots' with Myanmar.

In conclusion, all ASEAN member countries agreed that Myanmar needed assistance. During the acute period, the political values were divided in the process of ensuring Myanmar of how important international assistance and the role of ASEAN would be. A division of political values also occurred with regard to the involvement of the UNSC. However, during the de-escalation period, the political values of member countries were collectively comparable. They worked hand in hand to help the affected people in Myanmar. The indicator of 'comparability of political values of member states' became more significant during the de-escalation period.

B. A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers

I argue that the behaviour of the decision-makers from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was quite predictable during the acute and de-escalation periods of the crisis. However, the behaviour of decision-makers of the ASEAN 6 members vis-à-vis Myanmar were quite unpredictable during the acute period and even before Cyclone Nargis. This behaviour dated back to the submission by Myanmar to the organisation. Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines had been relatively consistent in pushing Myanmar towards democratisation. Malaysia and Brunei, on the other hand, were not really consistent.

Malaysia was among the strongest supporters of the acceptance of the military junta into ASEAN in 1997. At the end of 2005, Malaysia was part of an overwhelming consensus among ASEAN six members that unless Myanmar decided to be more

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[89] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action*..

constructive in the way in which it responded to their expectations, the grouping could no longer publicly defend Myanmar.[90] As mentioned above, the meeting with Professor Gambari to brief East Asian leaders on Myanmar at the Singapore Summit was cancelled. In the UN General Assembly vote on the situation in Myanmar in late 2007, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand all abstained, while Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Vietnam voted against the revised draft resolution under consideration. Cambodia was absent. This shows that the ASEAN-6 members did not necessarily agree with each other. Even though it was part of the ASEAN consensus in 2005 not to defend Myanmar if the junta government did not act in a constructive way and also invited Gambari to brief EAS leaders on the Myanmar issue, Malaysia voted against the draft resolution of UNGA in December 2007. Malaysia also did not want to consider the option of Myanmar's suspension and expulsion from ASEAN. This policy was criticised by Lim Kit Siang of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) of Malaysia who also served on the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Steering Committee for not choosing Myanmar's suspension and expulsion from ASEAN as options.[91]

Brunei was also one of the countries that agreed to the invitation of Professor Gambari and which abstained from the UNGA vote of the draft resolution in 2007, and did not agree with the suspension and exclusion of Myanmar. In terms of financial contribution, it was quite unpredictable that a rich country like Brunei would give contribution of $1,300,000 only. It was understandable that Brunei could not send technical expertise, but Brunei had given $6,000,000 to all the countries affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, and $1,900,000 to Aceh alone.[92] Malaysia also gave a relatively small amount compared to its GDP. However, Malaysia had experienced a decline in terms of its GPD, its domestic investments and also FDI.

In the de-escalation period demonstrated, the behaviour of ASEAN member states was more predictable. The quite unpredictable and surprising point, in a positive way, was the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and the Secretary-General of ASEAN. Since the Cyclone hit Myanmar, Pitsuwan had been very active in contacting the Myanmar government, ASEAN member states, the World Bank and the donor community to help the people of Myanmar.

As a new Secretary-General of ASEAN had been appointed less than a year before the Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, Pitsuwan wanted to show his best. He also wanted to

[90] Jürgen Haacke, 'Comparing ASEAN Countries' Efforts to Influence Political Developments in Myanmar: Towards a New Regional Approach?' *SIIA Papers,* No, 4, 2008, pp. 173-200.
[91] Haacke, 'Comparing ASEAN Countries' Efforts to Influence Political Developments in Myanmar'.
[92] Azlan Othman, 'His Majesty visits tsunami-hit Aceh', available at http://www.sultanate.com/news_server/2_feb_2.html, (accessed on 6 March 2012).

test the new powers of ASEAN as a legal entity after the ASEAN Charter was signed in 2007. On 5 May, Pitsuwan called ASEAN member countries to provide urgent relief assistance to the victims of Cyclone Nargis. At the ASEAN Regional Forum Senior Officials Meeting (SOM), he stressed the need for ASEAN to intensify its efforts in disaster management. Pitsuwan also used his personal diplomacy to persuade the government of Myanmar to open up avenues for relief workers and specialists to assist the cyclone victims, in the spirit of the 2005 ADDMER and to manage the mounting concern and frustration reported in the international media.[93] He also wanted to test the power of the new legal organisation after the Charter was signed at the ASEAN Summit in 2007.

Chachavalpongpun suggested that:

> There was a personal ambition of Dr Surin Pitsuwan as a new Secretary-General of ASEAN. Surin was really active since day one, and he always kept coming back to the affected areas to monitor. He used all of his channels to help Myanmar.[94]

Chachavalpongpun also added that Pitsuwan's channels in Myanmar made the operation of the TCG much easier. For example, there was an occasion when the TCG need cash money urgently, and they really could not wait another day. Because of Pitsuwan's good relationship with the Thai Ambassador in Myanmar, the Thailand Embassy lent the TCG money. Another example was when the ASEAN Secretariat had difficulty in finding a location for its office, a Thai businessman with a close connection with Pitsuwan and owned a hotel offered a whole floor of his hotel to be used as the ASEAN Secretariat office, at a very low rate.[95] People on the ground praised Pitsuwan's leadership in the crisis, suggesting it was instrumental in achieving a solution. His interest in and concern for the survivors of Nargis was apparent to all working with him and his steadfast commitment to the overall post-Nargis effort.[96] However, according to Roberts, in 2008, when the ASEAN-led mechanism had just started, Pitsuwan had already been too optimistic that the mechanism would be a success. This made observers quite worried that Surin's optimism would not be realised.[97]

The behaviours of ASEAN member states themselves were generally predictable, particularly during the de-escalation period. Therefore, the indicator, a mutual predictability among decision-makers, was moderate during the acute period, but significant in the de-escalation period.

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[93] Chachavalpongpun and Thuzar, *Myanmar Life After Nargis*.
[94] Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011.
[95] Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011.
[96] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action*.
[97] Interview with Dr. Christopher B. Roberts, Senior Lecturer, National Security College of the ANU, Canberra, 27 September and 21 December 2011.

C.   A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments

Responsiveness to actions and communication during the acute period varied, but became more equal and significant during the de-escalation period. In general, ASEAN member states were responsive but in particular, the level of response was different. The amounts of initial contributions were rather different. There were also differences in terms of the speed of dispatching assistance and the level of willingness to push Myanmar to open up to international assistance.

When the ASEAN Secretary-General called for assistance from ASEAN member countries, and deployed the ASEAN-ERAT on 5 May 2008, no one from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was present. It was not because they were not responsive, but more because they did not have the capacity to provide a quick response to render assistance to Myanmar. Again, Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia, had been very responsive since the beginning. Following the Cyclone, several UN and donor agencies approached Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, the Director of the Indonesian Bureau for Recovery and Reconstruction Agency of Aceh and Nias, Indonesia to offer assistance. Dr Mangkusubroto assigned Mr Heru Prasetyo, then Director for International Relations and Dr William Sabandar, Chief of Nias recovery program for the BRR, to closely monitor developments in Myanmar.[98] However, Indonesian doctors could not enter Myanmar and much of the Indonesian aid was held up in Singapore waiting to get in.[99] Indonesia and Singapore worked together to ensure the Myanmar government allowed assistance in. The Indonesian government also consulted with Dr Noeleen Hayzer, Under-Secretary of the UN and Executive Secretary of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP). Dr Hayzer immediately contacted Pitsuwan to make sure that the Cyclone Nargis crisis would be discussed at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.

Singapore, along with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines was part of the ASEAN-ERAT. ERAT members were permitted access to the Delta and conducted an assessment from 9 to 18 May. They also consulted with government representatives, members of civil society, NGOs and UN staff members, as well as survivors of the Cyclone. [100] Derived from the team's assessment, they made several recommendations to a Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting held on 19 May in Singapore. The deployment of the ASEAN-ERAT was significant because it was the first official and international

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[98] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*
[99] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*
[100] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*

assessment team allowed by the Myanmar government to enter the country following the Cyclone.

Thailand's assistance was also rendered very quickly after Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar. According to a senior Thai military officer who was involved closely:

> The government of Myanmar allowed us to visit the country and to provide assistance since the beginning. Even though we have border issues with Myanmar, we try to maintain a good relationship with the country. After the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers' Meeting in May 2008, the Thai Minister of Defence deployed the Thai military forces because it has the capability to handle disaster relief. The Thai military forces worked together with European NGOs and ASEAN NGOs. I remember there were some Muslim NGOs from Indonesia who also rendered assistance.[101]

When asked who played the biggest role during the Cyclone Nargis crisis, he said:

> Within ASEAN, Thailand played the biggest and most important role, while within the international community; China had the biggest influence in Myanmar during the crisis. China played the greatest role because Myanmar has the biggest trade with China.[102]

Thuzar agrees with the view that Thailand played the greatest role:

> A lot of Thais volunteered in Myanmar. In terms of facilitating the entry of the aid workers, they would gather in Bangkok for entry visa and so on. Bilaterally, the relationship is good and under bilateral relations, the assistance was offered. Dr Surin himself offered that Bangkok airport be used as an entry point for aid packages which were then forwarded to Yangon.[103]

Responsiveness to actions and communication were clearly seen during the de-escalation period. All members were active in helping the survivors under ASEAN-led mechanism of TCG. The structure of the ASEAN-led Coordinating Mechanism can be seen in Figure 5.6.

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[101] Interview with a Thai Army officer who was in charge of the Cylone Nargis crisis, Bangkok, 23 February 2010.
[102] Interview with a Thai Army officer who was in charge of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, Bangkok, 23 February 2010.
[103] Interview with Moe Thuzar, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011.

FIGURE 5.6

Structure of ASEAN-led Coordinating Mechanism

Source: The ASEAN Secretariat, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar Comparison in Action,* Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, p.37.

Figure 5.6 shows that the four key focal points in the coordinating mechanism for Cyclone Nargis assistance: the AHTF, the Myanmar Central Coordinating Board (CCB), the TCG, and the Advisory Group and invited International Organisations and donor countries. The AHTF, chaired by Surin, was established to provide policy decisions and determine priorities and targets with regard to the implementation of this ASEAN-led initiative. It was made up of two senior representatives from each of the 10 member states. The first meeting was held on 25 May, just before the ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference in Yangon.[104] An Advisory Group was also set up to assist the AHTF by providing relevant technical expertise and inputs. Its members included representatives from neighbouring countries (China, India, and Bangladesh), the UN the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, the World Bank, the ADB and NGOs. International donors represented by Australia, Norway and the UK joined the Advisory Group at a later stage.[105] When asked to name ASEAN's greatest contribution to the post-Nargis effort, Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, the 'the convening of the Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008, the conduct of the Damage and Loss Assessment and Village Tract Assessment and Post-Nargis and Regional Partnership Conference on 25 November 2009'.[106] Another important contribution by ASEAN member states was the ASEAN Volunteers Program in which all member countries were represented.

Thus, the indicator, a mutual responsiveness to actions and communication of other governments, is more significant during the de-escalation period than during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

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[104] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*
[105] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*
[106] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action,* p. 31.

D. Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies

The indicator, precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies, is considered significant because the precipitating factors that encourage outnumber those that discourage states from coordinating their policies. There were five common precipitating factors that encouraged ASEAN member states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies: (i) the fact that the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a natural disaster and a humanitarian crisis; (ii) the possibility that if ASEAN failed to find a tangible solution, ASEAN's credibility would be questioned; (iii) the opportunity to show international awareness of poverty in Myanmar; (iv) the opportunity and the need to develop cooperation on disaster management; and (v) the need to test the power of the ASEAN Charter.

These four factors were connected one to another in several ways. First, all ASEAN member countries felt compelled, out of a sense of compassion, urgency and fraternity to support one of their members whose people had suffered death, destruction and despair. It was a humanitarian crisis where an estimated 140,000 people were killed or missing. While the international community also felt sympathy, ASEAN countries, as Myanmar's closest neighbours and 'siblings' felt obliged to help their 'little brother'. Second, Myanmar has become a 'pebble in ASEAN's shoe'; ASEAN was urged by the international community to take the lead. If ASEAN failed, it would lose credibility. ASEAN had never carried out such large-scale undertaking before, but it had confidence in taking the lead, and finally the result was very positive. The third factor was that ASEAN could play an important role in promoting cooperation over the alleviation of poverty in Myanmar. ASEAN wished to show the world that Myanmar needed help, and Cyclone Nargis stirred opened international awareness of how limited had been the development assistance given to Myanmar up to this time.

The fourth factor was the need to develop cooperation on disaster management. ASEAN had AADMER, signed in 2005 after the Indian Ocean Tsunami hit some ASEAN countries in 2004. Cyclone Nargis was a push factor for ASEAN members to expedite cooperation on disaster management. As mentioned in the previous section, an agreement finally entered into force in November 2009 after being ratified by all ten member states of ASEAN. AADMER also provided the foundation for the establishment of an ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre).

The last factor was that Cyclone Nargis occurred at a crucial time, when ASEAN member states were embracing the ASEAN Charter and the association was striving to become a more collective, dynamic and inclusive entity. The disaster provided ASEAN with a need and opportunity to test the power of the Charter, to make meaningful progress on the goals of the Charter to bring ASEAN closer to the people, enhance the well-being and livelihoods of ASEAN people, and narrow development gaps through closer cooperation with the Myanmar government.

Aside from common precipitating factors, there were also precipitating factors for individual countries. Thailand, which shares a border with Myanmar, was a front line states, having had a similar experience of a natural disaster. Singapore held the chairmanship of ASEAN and had business and investment interests in Myanmar. Indonesia also had experienced a similar disaster.

However, there were factors that discouraged states from coordinating their policies: (i) national interests; (ii) solidarity with Myanmar — not to push Myanmar too hard; and (ii) the lack of capacity in terms of financial contribution and technical expertise. National interest was a factor for Malaysia's policy not to push Myanmar as hard as Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. Malaysia's ambivalent policy towards Myanmar reflected a combination of economic interest and increasing domestic political pressures. Economic interests included the state-owned energy company Petronas' investment in the Yatagun gas project while domestic political interests pushed the Malaysian government to keep the suspension and expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN off the agenda.[107] For new ASEAN members such as Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, it was more a sense of solidarity that made them respect the decision of the Myanmar government not to open up to international assistance. They did not support other ASEAN members' suggestion to oust Myanmar from ASEAN, even though it had become one of the three official options offered by ASEAN during the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 19 May 2008 in Singapore. As new members, they did not want Myanmar to become a bad precedent if a crisis occurred in their own countries. The last factor that discouraged states from coordinating their policies was their lack of capacity in terms of technical expertise and financial contribution. Cambodia and Laos were not able to render substantial financial assistance due to their economy. They also could not offer technical expertise because of the limited number of experts on disaster management in their countries. However, they participated in the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force and also in the ASEAN Volunteer Program.

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[107]Haacke, 'Comparing ASEAN Countries' Efforts to Influence Political Development in Myanmar: Towards a New Regional Approach?'.

In short, the analysis shows that the indicator of 'precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies' is significant'. The precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies were more numerous and substantial than the factors that discouraged them from doing so.

E. Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning

During the acute period, processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning were explicit. These were negotiations between ASEAN member states and the Myanmar government. Furthermore, several UN and donor agencies also approached ASEAN member states, like Indonesia and Thailand to share their experience from the Indian Ocean Tsunami Response. As mentioned above, after the Cyclone struck Myanmar, several UN and donor agencies approached Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto to offer assistance based on his agency's experience in the post-Indian Ocean Tsunami operation. [108]

Dr Noeleen Heyzer, Under-Secretary-General of the UN and Executive Secretary of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific contacted Dr Pitsuwan and met Dr Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. They agreed that ASEAN would have to make a strong stand to support the Myanmar government through ASEAN, which by then in close contact with Myanmar. After a number of reports, communication and recommendations as a part of the ASEAN Standard Operating Procedure for Regional Standby Arrangements and Coordination of Joint Disaster Relief and Emergency Response Operations (SASOP), Myanmar accepted a recommendation from the ASEAN Secretariat to deploy personnel and assistance, and for the ASEAN-ERAT to conduct an initial assessment. Once the government gave the green light, the team was deployed in 48 hours.

The transactional process involving ASEAN member states and external powers included a call for international pledging. Dr Pitsuwan suggested establishing an ASEAN-led 'Coalition of Mercy' to assist the Cyclone Nargis survivors. On 15 May, Dr Pitsuwan met with World Bank President Robert Zoellick in the US and pledged his support. Robert Zoellick said 'I like it Surin, we are ready to stand behind you. I know you need help. I know you need support. You can count us in to be with you'.[109]

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[108] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action.*
[109] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action*, p. 36.

The toughest transactions occurred during the ASEAN Special Foreign Ministers Meeting on 19 May 2008 when the Foreign Minister of Indonesia made a strong plea for ASEAN to play a leading role in the response, as ASEAN would be able to build a bridge of trust to encourage Myanmar to work with the outside world in a more coherent and coordinated way.[110] Myanmar was given three options: (i) a UN-led mechanism for relief and reconstruction effort in Myanmar; (ii) an ASEAN-led mechanism for the same purpose in which ASEAN would work with the government to provide access for the coalition partners to implement relief and recovery programs in the affected areas; and (iii) the 'R2P' would be invoked and Myanmar would stand the mounting pressure to open up alone, including the possibility that the international community would deliver aid without authorisation.[111] At this meeting, Myanmar chose the second option and agreed for ASEAN to play a bridging role, and therefore, this meeting marked the end of the acute period of crisis.

During the de-escalation period, there was also a transactional process. Any assistance needed approval from the Myanmar government. The approval could take a few days, but the victims could not wait even one day. Moreover, the assistance and visit were not necessarily approved by the junta government. Interestingly, visits were usually accompanied by Myanmar officials. Instead of showing the areas that need urgent help, the Myanmar officials usually pointed to success stories of government efforts, such as the reconstruction of a new village.[112] Therefore, ASEAN member states tried to persuade Myanmar to expedite the approval process, which it did.

The transactional process during the de-escalation period also included efforts by ASEAN member states to convene a Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008, at which they invited the international community to pledge for Myanmar. ASEAN also conducted the second pledging conference on 25 November 2009. When asked to name ASEAN's greatest contribution to the post–Nargis effort, Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, 'the convening of the Pledging Conference on 25 May 2008, the conduct of the Damage and Loss Assessment and Village Tract Assessment in June 2008, development of the Post-Nargis Joint Assessment and Post-Nargis and Regional Partnership Conference on 25 November 2009'.[113]

F.   Development of trust and collective identity formation

The indicator of 'development of trust and collective identity formation' is significant and sheds light on the existence of a security community in Southeast Asia during the

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[110] Roberts, *ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis*.
[111] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action*.
[112] Interview with Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ISEAS-Singapore Researcher, Singapore, 16 March 2011.
[113] ASEAN, *The Story of the ASEAN-Led Coordination in Myanmar: Compassion in Action*, p. 7.

Cyclone Nargis crisis. Through the AHTF Coordinating Office, ASEAN deployed 40 ASEAN volunteers from seven ASEAN member states, including Myanmar, to implement six community- based early recovery projects in Nargis-affected areas. Most of the projects were implemented in partnership with local and international NGOs based in Myanmar. The ASEAN Volunteers Programme (AVP) at a certain level strengthened the involvement of civil society, developed trust and formed a collective identity. The volunteers assisted in carrying out three Community-Based Early Recovery (CBER) projects in Bogale, Kungyangon and Pyapon townships from 2008-to 2009.[114]

The AVP in Myanmar had positive outcomes, delivering humanitarian aid, rebuilding community livelihoods and strengthening community resilience. The program 'promoted cultural and knowledge exchange among the volunteers and the communities where they worked; increased awareness about ASEAN; and fostered capacity building among ASEAN volunteers, villagers and the implementing partners'.[115] ASEAN volunteers in Myanmar served as young ASEAN Ambassadors at the community level, as champions for DRR as well as agents of change and early recovery.

The AVP program indeed served as an agent of change and strengthened the involvement of civil society. Interestingly, it also reflected the strengthened people to people relationship in general. ASEAN bridged trust not only among ASEAN members, but also between Myanmar and the international community, particularly the Western democracies. Myanmar's relationship with many Western democracies had been strained for close to two decades before the Cyclone struck. It was against this very confusing and tense backdrop that ASEAN took the lead in breaking down the communication and trust barriers that were preventing the flow of aid and international relief workers into the country.

G. A total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflicts in the region

The indicator, a total absence of armed inter-state conflict or prospects for such conflicts in the region, is rated as insignificant because this indicator was only a background factor and was not directly related to the management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis. There was no open armed inter-state conflict, but there were some disputes. Even though Thailand had problems over its border and Kayin (Karen)

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[114] ASEAN, *Bringing ASEAN Closer to the People, The Experience of ASEAN Volunteers in Myanmar,* Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010.
[115] ASEAN, *A Humanitarian Call,* p. 121

refugees with Myanmar, it still gave assistance to Myanmar. As reaffirmed by the Thai Army officer interviewed, Thailand wished to maintain a good relationship with Myanmar. Moreover, Thailand's amount of assistance was the biggest among ASEAN member countries and Thailand was the first country to dispatch assistance to its neighbour. Even though there were disputes among ASEAN member states, they put aside the problems and concentrated on assisting Myanmar.

H. A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors

There were increases in military expenditure and arms acquisition, but military expenditure was stable, and importantly did not relate to the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar. Therefore the indicator of 'total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race' is considered insignificant in this case. One of the indicators of a military build up arms race habitually used is the trend in the level of military capability. In 1993, Desmond Ball analysed regional arms acquisitions and drew an important conclusion. His analysis shows that there was an arms build-up (not an arms race) in the Asia Pacific region.[116] Was it the same for Southeast Asia? To answer the question, this section looks at the current military expenditure and acquisition trend in Southeast Asia, the relationship between military strategy and the change in military expenditure, and asks how increasing military capabilities can secure peace and stability in the region.

TABLE 5.12
Defence Expenditure of ASEAN member countries in 2007-2010

	Defence Expenditure								
	US$m			US$ per capita			% GDP		
	07	08	09	07	08	09	07	08	09
Brunei	346	360	332	895	945	892	2.81	2.49	3.18
Camb	137	255	275	10	18	19	1.59	2.30	2.54
Indo	4,329	5,108	4,821	18	22	21	1.00	1.00	0.89
Laos	15	24,182	14	2	500	2	0.36	2.60	0.25
Mal	4,021	4,370	3,883	162	173	141	2.15	1.97	2.01
Myn	7,009	n.a	n.a.	148	n.a	n.a	33.38	n.a	n.a.
Phil	1,130	1,427	1,363	12	15	15	0.78	0.85	0.85
Sing	7,007	7,662	7,831	1539	1,663	1,570	4.35	4.20	4.29
Thai	3,333	4,294	4,732	515	65	70	1.36	1.57	1.79
Viet	3,709	2,907	2,137	43	33	24	5.24	3.19	2.20

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, 2008-2011.

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[116] Desmond Ball, 'Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia Pacific Region,' *International Security*, 18-3, 1993, pp. 78-112.

TABLE 5.13
Number of Armed Forces, Reservists and Paramilitary of ASEAN member countries in 2007-2010

	Numbers in Armed Forces (000)				Estimated Reservists (000)				Paramilitary (000)			
	08	09	10	11	08	09	10	11	08	09	10	11
Brun	7	7	7	7	0.7	0.7	1	1	2	2	2	2
Cam	124	124	124	124	0	0	0	0	67	67	67	67
Indo	302	302	302	302	400	400	400	400	280	280	280	280
Laos	29	29	29	29	0	0	0	0	100	100	100	100
Mal	109	109	109	109	52	52	52	52	25	25	25	25
Myn	406	406	406	406	0	0	0	0	107	107	107	107
Phil	106	106	120	125	131	131	131	131	41	41	41	41
Sing	73	73	73	73	313	313	313	313	94	94	94	75
Thai	306	307	306	306	200	200	200	200	114	114	114	114
Viet	455	455	455	455	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	40	40	40	40

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance,* 2008-2011.

Table 5.12 shows that Singapore's growth in military expenditure was ahead of other ASEAN member states, followed by Vietnam, in 2007-2009. Between 2007 and 2009, the increase in military expenditure was relatively stable among ASEAN member countries. There was no dramatic increase and also no extraordinary decrease. In terms of numbers of army personnel, paramilitaries, and reservists, there was relatively no change, as shown in Table 5.13.

The acquisition of arms by ASEAN member states was related to a variety of interests. These were: (i) Brunei: the protection of offshore resources and assets and the enforcement of territorial claims; (ii) Indonesia: internal security; archipelagic control; the protection of offshore resources; the enforcement of territorial claims; sea lane security; (iii) Malaysia: the protection of offshore resources and assets; the enforcement of territorial claims; internal security; and the conventional warfare capabilities; (iv) the Philippines: the protection of maritime resources and offshore assets; archipelagic control; internal security; and the enforcement of territorial claims; (v) Singapore: sea lane security; the forward strategic depth against external threats; and (vi) Thailand: the conventional warfare capability; the protection maritime resources; and limited blue water and power projection capabilities. [117] However, the growth of military expenditure as shown in Tables 5.15 and 5.16 did not reflect a situation that was related to the Cyclone Nargis crisis in Myanmar. It reflected more the shifting of national security concerns of ASEAN member countries.

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[117] Amitav Acharya, *An Arms Race in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia? Prospects for Control,* Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 1994.

I. Formal or informal institutions and practices

The indicator of 'formal or informal institutions and practices' is significant due to the frequent and substantial institutions, activities and meetings during the crisis, both formal and informal. Formal institutions that were established during the Cyclone Nargis crisis included the TCG mechanism, ASEAN Volunteers Program, ASEAN ERAT, ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force for the victims of Cyclone Nargis crisis, and the UN Advisory Group. Informal institutions consisted of, among others, volunteers, NGOs from donor countries. The formal activities are set out in Table 5.14.

Table. 5.14
Formal Meetings during the Cyclone Nargis crisis

Date	Meeting
19 May 2008	Special AMM, Myanmar accepted aid through ASEAN.
21 May 2008	The Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with Prime Minister of Myanmar in Yangon to convey the messages agreed to in Singapore and to discuss the possibility of establishing the TCG (TCG).
23 May 2008	Meeting between UN Chief and ASEAN ERAT.
25 May 2008	An ASEAN-UN International Pledging Conference on Cyclone Nargis in Yangon, attended by representatives from 51 countries.
	AHTF on the same day, convened its first meeting to lay the foundation for establishment of TCG.
31 May 2008	TCG convened its first meeting, agreeing to conduct a Post-Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA) to determine the full scale of the impact of Cyclone Nargis and requirements for both immediate humanitarian assistance needs and medium –to longer term recovery.
23 June 2008	A workshop was held in Yangon to elicit feedback from national and international medical missions on post-Nargis relief and early recovery.
24 June 2008	AHTF convened the ASEAN Roundtable for Post Nargis Joint Assessment for Response, Recovery, and Rehabilitation in Yangon. The Roundtable brings together expert from Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh, Pakistan.
21 July 2008	At the meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Singapore, PONJA report was launched.
26 November 2008	A TCG Roundtable was held.
17 January 2009	AHTF convened the fifth meeting to review the progress of the relief and recovery work in the post-Nargis relief effort.
9 February 2009	TCG launched the Post Nargis Recovery and Preparedness Plan.
27 February 2009	During the 14th ASEAN Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers agree to extend the mandate of the AHTF and the TCG until July 2010.
2 July 2009	AHTF convened its sixth meeting in Jakarta and recommended the continuation of the TCG's coordination role in the affected areas.
17-20 July 2009	ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Phuket was held and approved the AHTF recommendations.
2 October 2009	A Recovery Forum – a forum to synthesise policy and discuss strategic issues concerning the recovery process- was held for the first time.
17 October 2009	The TCG issued the PONREPP Prioritised Action Plan at a cost of US$103 million that set out policies in education, health, livelihoods, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene up to July 2010.
23-25 October 2009	15th ASEAN Summit was held, and the ASEAN Foreign Ministers approved the Prioritised Action Plan proposed by TCG.
25 November 2009	A Regional Partnership Conference was held by AHTF at UN Conference Centre in Bangkok to raise fund.
13 January 2010	During the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Da Nang, Viet Nam, ASEAN Foreign Ministers confirmed the completion of the mandate of AHTF and TCG in July 2010.

Date	Meeting
8 March 2010	AHTF convened its seventh meeting in Ha Noi, Viet Nam to discuss the progress of the post-Nargis effort and the completion of the AHTF and TCG mandate at the end of July 2010.
12 March 2010	The Second Recovery Forum was held to examine the recommendations for a transition strategy and the way forward after July 2010 for future recovery in the Cyclone-affected areas.
7 April 2010	ASEAN Foreign Ministers agreed on actions and events towards the completion of AHTF mandate in Da Nang, Viet Nam.
18 June 2010	Third Recovery Forum was convened in Nay Pyi Taw to hand over of recovery function from the TCG to the MoSWRR.
31 July 2010	Completion of ASEAN-led coordinating mechanism and the TCG in Myanmar.

Source: The ASEAN Secretariat, *The Story of the ASEAN-led Coordination in Myanmar, Compassion in Action,* Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2010.

Table 5.17 shows that many formal meetings convened to manage the crisis. The first formal meeting was the Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Singapore on 19 May 2008. It followed by the meeting between the Secretary-General of ASEAN and Prime Minister of Myanmar in Yangon to convey the messages agreed in Singapore and to discuss the possibility of establishing the TCG. On 23 May 2012, UN Chief met with ASEAN ERAT and the following day, the ASEAN-UN Pledging Conference was held to gather aids from donor countries. Subsequent events can be seen in Table 5.17.

Informal practices/meetings included negotiations among the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the TCG members, stakeholders in the field such as the victims of the Cyclone, businessmen, volunteers, experts, Ambassadors from ASEAN countries and NGOs.

J. A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship

The indicator of 'a high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship' is rated as significant. Within the last ten years, ASEAN's economy has further consolidated through the ASEAN Plus Three Arrangement, the ASEAN Swap Arrangement, the ASEAN Surveillance Process and the ASEAN Economic Community and its plans of action and blueprint. These economic endeavours show a normative development between the neighbours, which in turn requires a degree of transparency and dialogue regarding the domestic policies of the ASEAN member states.[118] It further shows that ASEAN develops a better understanding in terms of economic integration.

ASEAN economic integration is demonstrated by three key pillars: a market and production base, a competitive economic region and equitable economic development. The implementation of these three key pillars is illustrated in Table 5.18.

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[118] Christopher B. Roberts, *ASEAN Regionalism, Cooperation, values and institutionalization,* London: Routledge, 2012.

Table 5.15 Impelementation of ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard under Phase I and Phase II (as of December 2011)

67.5% of targets achieved			
Single Market and Production Base: 65.9%	**Competitive Economic Region: 67.9%**	**Equitable Economic Development: 66.7%**	**Integration with the Global Economy: 85.7%**
Liberalisation and facilitation of free flow of: - goods - services - capital - investment - skilled labour	Laying the foundation for: - competition policy - consumer protection - intelectuall property rights	Development of SMEs	Entry into force of FTA
Development of 12 priority integration sectors	Infrastructure development	Implementation of Initiative for ASEAN integration	
Strengthening food security and cooperation under agriculture sector	Development of energy and mineral cooperation		
Key to ASEAN Economic community: - Political will; - Coordination and resource mobilisation; - Implementation arrangements; - Capacity building and institutional strengthening: and - Public and private sector consultations.			

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, *ASEAN Economic Community Score Card*, Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat, 2012, p. 16.

This chart shows that the development of an ASEAN economic integration has achieved 67.5% of its target. ASEAN has made considerable progress in integrating its economy. By the end of December 2011, it had completed 187 measures out of 277 due for the two phases under review (2008-2011). However, some measures due for implementation have not been fully implemented because of the delays in ratification of signed agreements and their application into national domestic laws and delays in implementation of specific initiatives.[119] Table 5.16 and Figure 5.7 summarise the indicators of a security community in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

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[119] ASEAN, *ASEAN Economic Community Score Card*, Jakarta: the ASEAN Secretariat, 2012.

Table 5.16 Summary of the Indicators of a Security Community during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

No	Indicators	Significant	Moderate	In significant	Note
**Security Community**				
A.	A comparability of political values among decision-makers	√			Significant during the de-escalation period
B.	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers	√			Significant during the de-escalation period
C.	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments	√			Significant, particularly during the de-escalation period
D.	Precipitating factors that encourage states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies	√			Significant during the acute and de-escalation of crisis
E.	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning	√			Significant during the acute and de-escalation period
F.	Development of trust and collective identity formation	√			Significant, particularly during the de-escalation period
G.	A total absence of armed inter-state conflict, or prospects for such conflicts in the region			√	Insignificant during the acute and de-escalation period: irrelevant and only background factor
H.	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors			√	Insignificant during the acute and de-escalation period: irrelevant and only background factor
I.	Formal or informal institutions and practices	√			Significant during the acute and de-escalation period
J.	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship	√			Significant during the acute and de-escalation period
	Total	**8**	**0**	**2**	

Source: Compiled by author

FIGURE 5.7 Indicators of a Security Community in Southeast Asia during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis

Source: Compiled by author

Table 5.19 and Figure 5.7 show that there are six significant indicators out of eight indicators that indicate the existence of a security community during the de-escalation period. Two indicators are insignificant because of their irrelevancy to the management of the crisis and there was no moderate indicator. However, since the nature of this crisis is a non-traditional crisis, the nature of cooperation was also different. Therefore, I argue, that instead of indicating the existence of a security community, the cooperation of all ASEAN member states, particularly during the de-escalation period, indicated the existence of an embryonic security community. ASEAN's cooperation in the crisis brought ASEAN closer to the people in the Cyclone-affected areas, through mobilising ASEAN young and professionals to support cross-cultural exchange and recovery initiatives.

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter shows how ASEAN, in the form of individual member states during the acute period and as an organisation during the de-escalation period, played several important roles in the Cyclone Nargis crisis. The management of the crisis helps shed light on the regional security system in Southeast Asia.

During the acute period of the crisis, from 2 May to 19 May 2008, regional dominant powers, namely Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia played a bigger role than any other ASEAN member states. The crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states is explained by three significant out of seven indicators associated with a concert of powers in the region. The other four indicators are rated as moderate.

Because four indicators are moderate, a modification of a classical concert of powers is again introduced. This is a modified concert of powers because, first, the evidence for close cooperation between the three dominant powers —Thailand, Singapore, and Indonesia— was limited. Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia indeed played important roles compared to the other members of ASEAN during the acute period. However, an exclusive cooperation only among those three is difficult to prove. The cooperation among the ASEAN six members was more apparent. Second, there was no legitimacy for any ASEAN member state to use force during the crisis itself. As a background factor, the use of force during the Cyclone Nargis period, between Thailand and Cambodia over the Preah Vihear Temple dispute in June 2008, was considered irrelevant.[120] Third, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were not regarded as great powers internationally. Therefore, 'regional dominant powers' is used to refer to these

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[120] The conceptualisation of a traditional concert of powers allows members of a concert and gives legitimacy to declare war.

countries.[121] Finally, whereas a classical concert of powers was established to manage challenges in traditional security issues, the Cyclone Nargis crisis indicated that a modification of a concert of powers can also be utilised to manage non traditional security issues, such as a natural disaster.

During the acute period of the crisis, Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia played a bigger role, while during the de-escalation of the crisis after the dominant powers shared the burden of managing the crisis, ASEAN member states shared the responsibility. Out of eight indicators of a security community, four indicators are significant but only during the de-escalation period, and another four indicators are significant during both the acute and the de-escalation periods. Two indicators are insignificant because they are not relevant to the management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

The de-escalation period did not demonstrate a balancing system, a concert of powers, or a fully-fledged security community. However, the analysis does provide evidence of the presence of an embryonic security community, in which all members were committed to relatively equal sharing of responsibility and demonstrated a normative development. Adler and Barnett argue that the young phase in the development of a security community, which they refer to as 'nascent', is marked by common threat perceptions, an expectation of mutual benefits and some degree of shared identity.[122] ASEAN member countries during the Cyclone Nargis crisis demonstrated common threat perceptions, mutual benefits and a developed sharing of identity thus fulfil the requirements of a young phase of security community development.

The management of the Cyclone Nargis crisis demonstrates that there was unequal responsibility sharing by ASEAN member states during the acute period. However, there was some burden sharing by dominant powers to smaller powers during the de-escalation period. Smaller countries were willing to assist, but during the acute period, it was very difficult to send experts in a very short time, and they also did not have many experts to send. Furthermore, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam did not want to push Myanmar too hard or question Myanmar's membership of ASEAN themselves because they did not want to be expelled from ASEAN if the same thing happened to them in the future. The next chapter compares the three case studies examined in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 and presents the main findings of the research.

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[121] The notion of traditional concert of powers consists of great powers that widely accepted internationally as great powers.
[122] Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

CHAPTER 6

FINDINGS: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter I summarise the evidence presented in the three case studies examined in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and show how it supports my preliminary argument, that whether or not the three conceptualisations of security systems introduced at the beginning of the thesis – balance of power, security community and the classical concert of powers – and their variations have explanatory value depends on at least two conditions — the phase of the crisis (whether it is an escalating, acute or de-escalating period) and the nature of the crisis (whether it is traditional or non-traditional).

The evidence from the three case studies also supports my second argument, that the regional security system operating in these instances, can, *at times,* be conceptualised as a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' and that the introduction of this innovative concept can be theoretically justified because it relates to a strand of thinking in the literature about the behaviour of regional powers.[1]

To substantiate my argument about the relevance of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' operating at times during crises (as in at least two of the three case studies) I take several steps. First, as mentioned earlier, I show that drawing from the theoretical literature, a case can be made that there exists a variation on the classical conceptualisation of a concert of powers that supports the notion of a 'quasi concert' and that its features can be explained within the scope of the theory. Second, I demonstrate that from an examination of past behaviours of ASEAN states there are some five leading states that will be introduced in this chapter as 'regional leading powers' which have more influence than the other five and furthermore, that within the five leading states, three are *consistently* influential. Thus, in addition to the evidence that these three were regional leading powers during two of the crises, there is historical material that justifies the concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Third, building on the two crises where such a quasi concert was operating, I establish several new indicators of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Fourth, I compare the three crises investigated in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 to show that some

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[1] A partial and (or) an embryonic security community cannot be considered as a novel variation of a security community because the two concepts have been widely investigated by scholars with many different names.

explanatory concepts of regional security system are not applicable to some stages and within the particular nature of a crisis. Fifth, I elaborate my findings. In the subsequent conclusion of the thesis I argue that my findings contribute to the academic literature and have implications for policy directions.

6.2. Conceptualising a Quasi Concert of Regional Leading Powers

The existing theories about regional powers are inadequate, and fail to acknowledge that the emergence of regional powers is also underpinned by the differential growth rates and under similar process that apply to the emergence of great powers. While a power transition for a great power in the international system tends to conflict, a power transition in a region tend not towards conflict. The last open conflict involving two regional leading powers of ASEAN member states was the Confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the 1960s. The rise of Singapore as an emerging regional leading power did not lead to a conflict or crisis. Furthermore, Indonesia rose to be a regional leading power under the leadership of Soeharto and this did not lead to a conflict or crisis.

Douglas Lemke provides a useful explanation of the rise of local dominant powers within a regional system. He argues that a local dominant power is a special privileged leader of the regional system. The local dominant power establishes and maintains the status quo in order to continue its own long-term interests.[2] Aiming at securing more net gains and benefits from its interactions, the local dominant power creates self-serving patterns of interaction that are based on its political and economic resources.[3] In this thesis, given that Southeast Asian countries are hesitant and suspicious about the concept of a 'dominant power', I argue that it is more appropriate to refer to 'regional leading powers'.

Theories about a concert of powers in regional contexts are limited. The concept of a 'condominium of great powers' is introduced by Stanley Michalak to describe a concert of five great powers in the UNSC.[4] Because the two crises investigated point to the presence of a variation of the classical concert of powers (the Cambodian and Cyclone Nargis crises), I term the new concept 'quasi concert.' The term 'quasi' has been used by by Robert Jackson, as well as Hedley Bull and Adam Watson in explaining 'quasi-states', to characterise states that possess some of the attributes of 'states' such as sovereignty, but lack others, such as established institutions capable of constraining and outlasting

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[2] Douglas Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
[3] Lemke, *Regions of War and Peace*.
[4] Stanley J. Michalak, *A Primer in Power Politic*, Washington: A Scholarly Resource Inc, 2001, p. 202.

the individuals who occupy their offices. [5] The Cassell English Dictionary and Thesaurus' definition of the term 'quasi' is, 'partly, not quite, to some degree'. [6] Meanwhile, as argued in Chapter 2 the term 'concert' has two important tenets, namely the formal assertion of unique privileges and responsibilities of the 'great powers' in the maintenance of international order; and the special managerial role of the 'great powers'. As also indicated in Chapter 2, Risto E.J. Pentillä argues that there are two types of concert. The first is a temporary concert or a 'concert with a small "c"'. [7] It is informal and typically set up to seek a solution to a particular crisis. The second form of concert is a permanent Concert or a 'concert with a capital "C"'. [8] It is a great-power coalition which is involved in long-term joint management. As a quasi concert in Southeast Asia is informal, it can be appropriately referred to as a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' with a small 'c'.

From these definitions, I define a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' as a concert of powers which takes unique responsibilities for the maintenance of regional order, but exercises only those institutions capable of ordering informally the relationship between the powers themselves. It is also referred to as 'quasi' because it does not fulfil some of the criteria of a traditional concert of powers: as the Cassell's dictionary indicates it is partly, but not quite, a classical concert of powers.

6.3. Justifying the Idea of of Regional Leading Powers in Southeast Asia

This thesis argues that ASEAN's crisis management indicates that in two of the three crises that have been investigated in this thesis, the acute periods of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis, ASEAN member states have functioned more as a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers', rather than as a security community or a balancing system. In managing these crises, the ASEAN members did not really play equal roles. There is a group within ASEAN comprising Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, whose members exert more influence and play greater roles than the other members outside the group. This group can be referred to as 'regional leading powers'. However, these five leading powers in Southeast Asia are not necessarily always active in every crisis. Among the five powers, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand have consistently played discernable roles in the three crises investigated in the thesis. As Figure 6.1 shows, they were in the first circle of regional leading powers in Southeast Asia.

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[5] Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 22. The term 'quasi-state' is also used by Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds, *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 430. Also see Robert H. Jackson, 'Quasi-states, dual regimes and neoclassical theory', *International Organization*, 41, 1987, pp. 519-549.
[6] Betty Kirkpatrick, *The Cassell English Dictionary and Thesaurus*, London: Orion, 1998.
[7] Risto E.J. Pentillä, 'The G8 as a Concert of Powers', *Adelphi Papers*, 43:355, 2003, pp. 17-32, p. 18.
[8] Pentillä, *The G8 as a Concert of Powers*, p. 18.

FIGURE 6.1
Regional Leading Powers in Southeast Asia

First Circle: Thailand
Indonesia Singapore

Second: Malaysia
The Philippines

Third: Vietnam, Brunei
Cambodia, Lao Myanmar

Source: Compiled by author

As Figure 6.1 illustrates, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand are within the first circle of regional leading powers in Southeast Asia. They have played important roles in all three crises investigated in this thesis, the Cambodian crisis (1978-1991), the East Timor crisis (1999-2002) and the Cyclone Nargis crisis (2008-2010). Over the whole period, their roles have been significant. Malaysia and the Philippines are within the second circle. Malaysia was a key player during the Cambodian crisis and the East Timor crisis while the Philippines was one of the most active players during the East Timor crisis. The thin dashed line between the first circle and the second circle of Figure 6.1 indicates that members of both groups are still recognised as regional leading powers while the thick dashed line between the second and the third circle means these groups are quite separate even though all are ASEAN member states.

In this section, I present evidence to show that Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines are regional leading powers in Southeast Asia. Besides identifying the role of regional leading powers during three crises (as I did in Chapters 3, 4, and 5), I will also show that these powers have a long and complex history of being recognised as regional leading powers. The role of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines in proposing ideas, and mediating disputes, from ASEAN's establishment up to 2012, can be seen in Table 6.1.

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TABLE 6.1
The Role of Regional Leading Powers in Southeast Asia

Issues	Members of a 'Concert of Regional Leading Powers'				
	Indonesia	**Malaysia**	**Singapore**	**Thailand**	**The Philippines**
Cold War					
Crisis	The Cambodian crisis, the South China Sea	The Cambodian crisis, the South China Sea	The Cambodian crisis	The Cambodian crisis, South China Sea	-
Ideas	TAC, Cocktail Meeting that was transformed into JIM 1 and JIM2 in relation to the Cambodian Crisis	The 'Proximity Talks' and the 'Five-plus-Two' Formula (in relation to the Cambodian crisis			
Post Cold War					
Crises	South China sea workshops, Pressure on Myanmar on Cyclone Nargis issue, Thai-Cambodia border dispute	South China Sea, the East Timor crisis, Cyclone Nargis, and pollution haze.	Active role in the East Timor crisis, active role in the Cyclone Nargis crisis, Haze Pollution	Active role in the East Timor crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis	The East Timor crisis
Ideas	APEC, APSC, ASEAN Human Rights Body (with the Philippines), ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation	East Asia Caucus, EAS, Constructive Intervention	AFTA (with the Philippines), APEC, ASEAN Economic Community, the role of ASEAN Secretary-General as Secretary-General of ASEAN, not that of ASEAN Secretariat	Flexible Engagement, ASEAN Connectivity, Lower Mekong Initiative	ASEAN Charter ASEAN Human Rights Body (with Indonesia) ASEAN Free Trade Area (with Singapore)

Source: Adapted from the literature and interviews and compiled by author

The contribution of each regional leading power is elaborated below:

First Circle

Indonesia

Most academics and officials in Southeast Asia interviewed for this research suggested that Indonesia is the natural leader of ASEAN. In particular, President Soeharto from the establishment of ASEAN to his fall in 1998 was perceived as 'leader' of ASEAN's leaders. The Indonesian presidents after the Soeharto era were not really perceived as 'leaders' of ASEAN. They mostly focused on domestic issues as the country was in transition. Some scholars argue that the current Indonesian President, Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) does not seem enthusiastic about being involved in foreign policy. For example, Ralf Emmers argues that 'SBY is not really keen on foreign policy.

Maybe it is more in his second term, but not in his first term'.[9] However, this does not mean that after Soeharto stepped down, Indonesia had not shown leadership in ASEAN. Indonesia has always been very active in crises. In the three crises examined, Indonesia has been in the first circle of regional leading powers in terms of its role, as discussed in the three previous chapters. Its other contributions are elaborated below.

Since the early establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia has been very active in proposing ideas. The changes in Indochina in the 1970s led Indonesia to come up with the idea of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the TAC. It was during the first summit in Bali in February 1976, that all ASEAN leaders signed the documents. Both documents provided ASEAN with a political identity, a shared approach to security and a code of conduct for regulating intra-mural relations. The TAC reflected a collective joint effort to regulate the regional order, with its aim of applying a code of conduct to the whole Southeast Asia.[10]

Moreover, even though Indonesia is not a claimant country in the South China Sea issue, it has been active in promoting negotiation between China and ASEAN as a whole, and convened workshops on the issues. Since 1990, the Indonesian Foreign Affairs Ministry has initiated track-two informal workshops and technical meetings on managing the conflicts in the South China Sea, which have been attended by government officials in a private capacity, academics from affected countries and outside observers. These meetings have allowed for discussions on 'practical' cooperation such as search and rescue operations and marine scientific research. The founder of the workshops, Ambassador Hashim Djalal of Indonesia, contends that informal discussions will gradually build a feeling of comfort among those involved in the dispute, and perhaps eventually even lead to an agreement. [11]

The Thai-Cambodia border dispute in 2011 also involved 'leadership' by Indonesia. Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa did shuttle diplomacy right after the incident in early 2011. He went to Thailand and Cambodia to meet with the Thai and Cambodian Foreign Ministers and offered to act as a mediator. He and the other two Foreign Ministers also went to the UNSC for advice. It was the decision of the UNSC that this problem should be brought into the ASEAN mechanism. It was also the Indonesian Foreign Minister's initiative that an ASEAN Informal Foreign Ministerial Meeting be held on 22 February 2011 in Jakarta. In this meeting, the two parties, agreed to accept

[9] Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Assosiate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011.
[10] Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF,* London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
[11] Evan A. Laksmana, 'Jakarta Eyes South China Sea' available at http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/02/23/jakarta-eyes-south-china-sea/ (accessed on 5 June 2012).

an Indonesian military observer on the border. Indonesia was also chairman of ASEAN when the dispute erupted in 2011, but this does not mean that Indonesia is only active when it holds chairmanship. A high level official of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry commented that:

> 'Indonesia has been very active in almost all crises in ASEAN, if not all, both during its chairmanship or other country's chairmanship. Therefore, Indonesia believes that it will still play an important role after the chairmanship is handled over to Cambodia in 2012 and then from Cambodia to Brunei Darussalam in 2013'.[12]

This senior officer also reported 'a lot of examples of Indonesia's initiatives created during other country's chairmanship. For example, when the Philippines held ASEAN's Chairmanship, Indonesia was active and initiated an ASEAN Declaration on Migrant Workers'.[13]

Indonesia's purpose in being so active is also related to its effort in elevating its international prestige. Tang Siew Mun, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Studies of ISIS-Malaysia argues that 'in mediating the current Thai-Cambodia conflict, Indonesia actually is not only active because it holds the chairmanship. It actually wants to boost its international profile'.[14] This argument was echoed by Emmers who points out that 'It is not surprising that Indonesia wanted to boost its international profile. It has done it several times'.[15]

Nowadays, many perceive Indonesia as a rising power. White, for example, argues that Australia should be embarrassed for giving development assistance to Indonesia as the country is predicted to be the fourth largest economy and will exceed Australia's economy in a few decades.[16] Laksmana argues that Indonesia can be regarded as a rising power because it is one of Southeast Asia's key leaders and also an active player in Asia's emerging regional security architecture.[17] Indonesia, according to Laksmana, possesses growing economic and political power and has the potential as well as aspiration to challenge the legitimacy of the post-Second World War order.[18] Most recently, the country has been asserting its prominent role by proposing original ideas, creating new images of democracy and gradually supporting 'controllable change' in the regional and global environment. Indonesia seeks to promote a 'dynamic equilibrium'

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[12] Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
[13] Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
[14] Interview with Tang Siew Mun, Director of Foreign Policy and Security Studies at the ISIS Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 2011.
[15] Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011.
[16] Hugh White, 'A Great Power on Our Doorstep', Speech at the Australian National University, 21 May 2012.
[17] Evan Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile: Does Size Really Matter', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 33:2, 2001.
[18] Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile'.

among regional and global powers to the benefit of all – a core principle in the so-called 'Natalegawa Doctrine'.[19]

Singapore

Singapore also can be considered as one of the regional leading powers. Economically, it ranked first in GDP per capita and total trade in 2010[20]. Also in the same year, it ranked second in terms of FDI. Singapore was also numbered one in terms of defence expenditure, defence expenditure per capita and defence expenditure per cent of GDP in 2008-2010[21].

Even though it is small in size, its ideas to advance ASEAN, particularly on economic issues, are widely acknowledged. Officials in Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore interviewed for this research emphasised the importance of Singapore's role in enhancing economic cooperation among ASEAN member countries. A high level officer of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry declared that 'While Indonesia plays an important role in promoting an APSC Singapore plays a significant role in promoting an AEC'. [22] Emmers also argues that 'Indonesia and Singapore are within the inner circle of the core group'.[23] Other officials also indicated in interviews that while others were not comfortable about enhancing their economic cooperation within ASEAN, Singapore proposed an AFTA. [24]

Thailand

Thailand is a regional leading power for economic, political, and initiative reasons. Thailand, in terms of GDP ranked second after Indonesia,[25] and is second to Singapore in terms of total trade in 2010.[26] Its paramilitary was number two and in terms of number of armed force personnel, ranked number three in 2012.[27] An officer from the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs argues that Thailand has contributed many ideas to ASEAN, for example the proposal of 'ASEAN Connectivity'. Even though the ASEAN Connectivity was announced during the Summit in Hanoi in October 2011, it was Thailand which initiated it.[28] Thailand also contributed ideas to enhance cooperation

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[19] Laksmana, 'Indonesia's Rising Regional and Global Profile', p. 159.

[20] ASEAN: *ASEAN Community in Figures, 2011*, Jakarta: the ASEAN Secretariat, 2012, p. 1 and p. 9.

[21] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Country Comparions-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics', *The Military Balance,* London: Routledge, 112:1, 2012, pp. 463-476, p. 469.

[22] Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.

[23] Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011.

[24] Interview with a senior level officer at the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 16 February 2011; Interview with Senior Level Officers of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 and 3, Jakarta, 16 February 2011, Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011.

[25] ASEAN: *ASEAN Community in Figures 2011*, p. 1.

[26] ASEAN Community in Figures 2011.

[27] 'Country Comparions-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics', *The Military Balance 2012*.

[28] Interview with a senior level officer of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok, 23 February 2011.

within ASEAN, with the principle of 'flexible engagement' among its initiatives. The principle was coined by the former Thai Foreign Minister, Pitsuwan, who is currently Secretary-General of ASEAN. The principle of 'flexible engagement' involves publicly commenting on and collectively discussing fellow members' domestic policies when these have either regional implications or adversely affect the disposition of other ASEAN members.[29] The proposal was officially presented as a non-paper at the Thirty First of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila in 1998.[30] Even though the meeting decided to reject Thailand's proposal, it agreed on a formula that affirmed member state's freedom to purse 'enhanced interaction' vis-à-vis one another. This can be perceived as progress towards a forward-looking ASEAN.

With its domestic issues and current border conflict with Cambodia, Thailand is often considered as a 'spoiler', but it somehow still contributes to regional issues. Dewi Fortuna Anwar suggests that 'the current Cambodia-Thailand border dispute was a setback to the community building process. It was the first time ASEAN member countries fired live bullets at each other in 44 years'.[31] Melly Caballero-Anthony holds a similar opinion. She argues that 'if you observe statements of officials of the ASEAN member countries, the current conflict between Thailand and Cambodia is a stumbling block of a security community process building'.[32] This was also echoed by Ralf Emmers who sees Thailand recently as a spoiler instead of leading powers.[33] However, I argue that even though it has been challenged by domestic issues, of which the Cambodia-Thailand dispute in 2011 was related to domestic political challenges,[34] Thailand still demonstrates its leadership regionally, for example, by taking a lead in the Cyclone Nargis crisis.

Second Circle

Malaysia

Malaysia lies within the second circle of the concert. In terms of economic development, in 2010 Malaysia sits at number one in its ability to attract FDI.[35] Its Gross Domestic Product per Capita in 2010 was number three (after Singapore and Brunei Darussalam).[36] Its total trade in the same year was also number three after Singapore

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[29] Jürgen Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction: Intramural Challenges to the ASEAN Way', *The Pacific Review*, 12:4, 1999, pp. 581-611.

[30] Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interation'.

[31] Interview with Dr. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy Secretary for Political Affairs to the Vice President, Secretariat of the Vice President of Indonesia, Jakarta, 29 March 2011.

[32] Interview with Dr. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Director of External Relations, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 25 March 2011.

[33] Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011.

[34] My argument was supported by Ambassador Tan Seng Chye: Interview with Ambassador Tan Seng Chye, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 February 2011.

[35] ASEAN: *ASEAN Community in Figures 2011*.

[36] ASEAN: *ASEAN Community in Figures 2011*.

and Thailand. In terms of military capabilities, Malaysia ranks the 3rd in its defence expenditure (after Singapore and Indonesia) and defence expenditure per capita (after Singapore and Brunei Darussalam) in 2008-2010.[37]

The famous principle of 'flexible engagement' by Thailand was actually triggered by an initiative by Malaysia's then Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. He suggested in July 1997 that ASEAN adopt a policy of 'constructive intervention' to deal with domestic issues that may impact on regional security. The idea was that ASEAN members should invite each others' services to boost each others' civil society, human development, education and national economy to avoid the kind of political crises experienced by Cambodia after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords up to 1997.[38] However, Anwar Ibrahim's proposal of constructive intervention did not imply or lead to a reversal of Malaysia's official stand on the issue of non-interference. The principle itself was supported by the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand which later came up with the principle of 'flexible engagement'.

Many officials in Southeast Asia argue that Malaysia is among the region's leading powers. Former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Tan Sri Ajith Singh, for example, argues, 'To me, the key pillars in ASEAN are still Indonesia and Malaysia. They were the countries which started the ASEAN, rising out of *Konfrontasi*. Right throughout, ASEAN is sustained by the strong support of Indonesia and Malaysia'.[39] In terms of ideas, there has always been competition between Indonesia and Malaysia. For example, the idea raised by former Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohammad about an East Asia Caucus, created friction between Indonesia and Malaysia. According to Singh 'It was about face, Indonesia thought: why Malaysia came up with a big project without first consulting with Indonesia'.[40] A high level senior officer of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry who used to deal with ASEAN issues is also of the same opinion. The officer argues that 'there has been competition between Indonesia and Malaysia in terms of ideas. However, competition is not always bad. Sometimes, competition is good for an organisation'.[41] This official sees Malaysia as a role model for ASEAN member countries in its economic transition, from a developing country to a developed country. Malaysia therefore has always provided insights and inputs and has played important roles in ASEAN's economic cooperation.[42]

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[37] International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'Country Comparisons-Commitments, Force Levels and Economics', p. 469.
[38] Haacke, 'The Concept of Flexible Engagement and the Practice of Enhanced Interaction'.
[39] Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011.
[40] Interview with Tan Sri Ajit Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011.
[41] Interview with a senior level officer of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, Putrajaya, 11 March 2011.
[42] Interview with a senior level officer of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, Putrajaya, 11 March 2011.

The Philippines

The Philippines falls into the second circle of Figure 6.1. It was not very active during the Cambodian crisis and went along with the ASEAN consensus, apparently without having tried to shape that consensus or create diplomatic on political initiatives of its own. This may be partly explained by its sense of relative political and strategic remoteness from the crisis, both geographically and in light of its American security linkages.[43] The Cambodian crisis also coincided with an economic downturn in the Philippines and the rise of political opposition to Marcos. Increasingly preoccupied with internal affairs in the 1980s, the Marcos government had little political contribution to make to ASEAN. However, The Philippines played a very important role in the East Timor crisis. The East Timorese put great trust in the Philippines, perhaps because they shared Roman Catholicism.

Manila, alongside Singapore, was among the first countries to seek to move towards freer intra-ASEAN trade. The Philippines government has consistently been supportive of moving ASEAN in genuinely integrative directions. With Indonesia, it was one of the strongest supporters of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Rights Body. Manila and Jakarta High Level Task Force members struggled to put forward articles for the establishment of ASEAN Human Rights Body, and the following finally was stipulated in the ASEAN Charter, Article 14:

> In conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN Charter relating to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, ASEAN shall establish an ASEAN human rights body.[44]

And further:

> This ASEAN human rights body shall operate in accordance with the terms of reference to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.[45]

Rodolfo Severino contends that the ASEAN Charter was initially proposed by the Philippines.[46] He claims that the Philippines also spearheaded the idea of regional economic integration.[47] Severino further argues that the Philippines was at times occupied with its own domestic issues, but his proposals for enhancing the organisation were valuable.[48]

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[43] Donald E. Weatherbee, 'The Philippines and ASEAN: Options for Aquino', *Asian Survey*, 27:12, 1987, pp. 1223-1239.

[44] ASEAN, *The ASEAN Charter*, Jakarta: the ASEAN Secretariat, 2007, p. 19.

[45] ASEAN, *The ASEAN Charter*, p. 19.

[46] Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS-Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011.

[47] Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS- Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011.

[48] Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS-Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011.

Even though scholars such as Emmers, Tim Huxley and Frost express different views on who should be referred to as 'regional leading powers, I argue that on the basis of economic and military powers, their role in managing the three crises investigated in Chapter 3, 4, 5, and the ideas they contributed to the ASEAN organisation, the Philippines and Thailand are part of the 'regional leading powers'. Emmers, for example, regards Vietnam as replacing Thailand after the uncertain domestic political situation in the country.[49] Tim Huxley also argues that historically, Vietnam is one of 'dominant powers' in Southeast Asia.[50] Similarly, Frank Frost claims that Vietnam, rather than the Philippines, should be referred to as a regional leading power.[51] However, I argue that the ideas by the Philippines contributed to ASEAN and the role as crisis manager outnumber those of Vietnam. Vietnam's role has been rising in the last five years; nevertheless its role in many crises in Southeast Asia, including the three crises investigated in this thesis is hardly visible.

6.4. Indicators of a Quasi Concert of Regional Leading Powers

Having established the validity of my term 'regional leading powers', in this section, I establish the indicators of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in order to justify its inclusion as an explanatory concept. To do this, I draw on the two case studies where none of the original explanatory concepts seem applicable and the quasi concert may apply. During the acute periods of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis, there were several developments that support the concept. In contrast to a classical concert of powers, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia has some unique characteristics. First, whereas a classical concert of powers concept is usually associated with the notion of great powers, the concert in Southeast Asia involved regional leading powers: Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Building on Lemke's theory of dominant powers (see Section 2.5), it is appropriate to use this term in the context of smaller regions like Southeast Asia where there are regional leading powers rather than great powers.

Second, unlike the classical concert of powers which has fixed members, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia does not have permanent members. The members of this concert are not always the five countries discussed here. Nonetheless, there is an inner core group within the concert comprising Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand which was consistently active in the three crises investigated. Malaysia and the Philippines are in the second circle of regional leading powers.

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[49] Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011.
[50] Interview with Dr. Tim Huxley, IISS-Singapore, Singapore, 18 March 2011.
[51] Interview with Dr. Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Researcher, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.

Third, the classical concert of powers includes the option of using military force to restore order in the region. However, for a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia, the use of force to restore order or stability in the region is considered unthinkable by ASEAN member states. Diplomatic means are the main mechanism used by the concert. Members of the quasi concert support this principle in the TAC, which prevents them from exercising force. On rare occasions, members of the concert, for example Thailand, during the 2011 border dispute with Cambodia, have used limited force.

Fourth, unlike a classical concert of powers, the 'spheres of influence' factor is also not applicable to Southeast Asia. The three crises investigated in the thesis demonstrate that 'regional leading powers' did not really have spheres of influence in the region. They do have influence, but the influence is targeted towards the entire membership of ASEAN rather than specific members or spheres.

Finally, while a classical concert of powers requires a high level of cooperation accompanied by institutionalised summit diplomacy and supportive mechanisms, in 'a quasi concert of regional leading powers', the cooperation between members of the concert does not include formal institutionalised summit diplomacy. Rather, informal summit diplomacy is conducted, either by phone, or in the corridors of meetings. Furthermore, in keeping with Southeast Asia multilateral norms, the effort to develop relationships that supports informal interactions is central to the cooperation.

The five unique indicators of a quasi concert of regional powers elaborated above suggest the concept can be added to the other explanatory concepts of security systems, namely a balance of power, a security community and a traditional concert of powers. The concept of concert of powers in Southeast Asia has not been applied before as an explanatory concept. Yet, the new concept of a 'quasi concert of regional powers' implies that a modified concert of powers in Southeast Asia is plausible from the analysis of the three case studies. Having shown the relevance of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' for explaining the type of security systems that operate in Southeast Asia during the three crises, I now add the indicators of this arrangement to those of the other security concepts that have been used to examine the three case studies. Then I use these indicators to briefly summarise the type of security system that appeared to operate during the three crises examined.

TABLE 6.2
Indicators of Regional Security System in Southeast Asia

Regional Security Systems in Southeast Asia	Indicators
Security Community	A comparability of political values among decision-makers
	A mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers
	A mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments
	Precipitating *factors* that encourage *states* to orient *themselves* in the others' direction and coordinate their policies
	Processes of transactions, international organisations and social learning
	Development of trust and collective identity formation
	A total absence of armed inter-state conflicts or prospects for such conflicts in the region
	A total absence of a competitive military build-up arms race involving regional actors
	Formal or informal institutions and practices
	A high degree of economic integration as a necessary precondition of a peaceful relationship
Balancing System	**Balance of Power among ASEAN Members**
	Relatively equal powers among a minimum of two actors
	Intention of some states to expand
	Alliances on the basis of short-run interests
	War as a legitimate instrument of statecraft
	Balance of External Great Power Influence
	Dependency on external great powers as security providers
	Alignment with external great powers
	Military cooperation with external great powers
	Distribution of external great powers' armed forces
	Economic dependence on external great powers
Concert of Powers	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order
	A high and self-conscious level of cooperation among dominant powers
	A pattern of cooperative behaviour
	An effective, equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all dominant powers
	Institutionalised summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanisms
	A joint approach to regional issues
	A need for system stability and international order
Quasi Concert of Regional Leading Powers	A decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order
	Regional leading powers as members
	Certain level of cooperation among regional leading powers
	Flexible membership of group of regional leading powers
	The use of force to restore the region's order or stability is unthinkable
	A pattern of cooperative behaviour
	Informal summit diplomacy and supporting consultative mechanism
	A flexible joint approach to regional issues
	A need for system stability and international order

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author. The author established indicators for a quasi concert of regional leading powers.

6.5. Characteristics of the Crises

In this section I explain that the nature and phase of a crisis determines the regional security system that will operate. These differences have implications for which of the four regional security systems was operating. I also elaborate other characteristics of the three crises. I further argue that when characterising each regional security system operating during each phase of a crisis, it is necessary to make several qualifications.

A 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' was indicated in the acute periods of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis. A security community was indicated during the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis and Cyclone Nargis crisis. However, the security community during the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis was only operating among the regional leading powers, while the security community that was indicated in the de-escalation period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis was among all ASEAN member states. A balance of external great power influence was indicated in the acute period of the Cambodian crisis. In the East Timor situation, great power influence was an important factor for ASEAN member states in managing the crisis. Neither a balance of powers among ASEAN member states nor a classical concert of powers was indicated in any stages of the three crises investigated in this thesis. Table 6.3 sets out the characteristics of each crisis.

TABLE 6.3

Comparison of the Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone Nargis Crisis in Myanmar

Case Studies	Nature of Crisis	Key Actors	Regional Leading Powers	Legal Documents	ASEAN Mechanism	Other Mechanism	Regional Security System			
							Balancing System	Security Community	Concert of Powers	Quasi Concert of Regional Leading Powers
Cambodian Crisis	Traditional Crisis	• ASEAN member states during the acute period • Great Powers during the de-escalation period	• Thailand • Indonesia • Malaysia • Singapore	• Bangkok Declaration • TAC	• High Council was not utilised and not relevant	• Adhoc by regional leading powers	• Balance of external great power influence' during the de-escalation period	• No	• No	• There was a quasi concert of powers consisting of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore during the acute period
East Timor Crisis	Traditional crisis	• Great and external powers during the acute period • Regional leading powers during the de-escalation period	• Indonesia • Thailand • The Philippines • Malaysia • Singapore	• Bangkok Declaration • ASEAN Concord • Hanoi Action Plan • TAC	• High Council was not utilised and not relevant	• UN mechanism	• No (Great-power influence without the notion of balance)	• An partial security community during the de-escalation period	• No	• No
Cyclone Nargis crisis	Non traditional crisis	• Regional leading powers during the acute period • ASEAN member states during the de-escalation period	• Thailand • Singapore • Indonesia	• Bangkok Declaration • TAC • ASEAN Concord • Bali Concord II • Vientiane Action Programme • Hanoi Plan of Action • ASEAN Charter • APSC Blueprint	• High Council was not utilised and not relevant • ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force	• TCG	• Back-ground factor	• An embryonic security community during the de-escalation period	• No	• There was a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' consisting of Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia during the acute period.

Source: Adapted from the literature and compiled by author

Comparison of all Crises

The three crises are compared in this section to demonstrate that each crisis has its own characteristics and that the regional security systems indicated have distinguishing characteristics in each crisis and during different phases of each crisis.

Similarities

Similarities and differences of the three crises can be drawn. The similarities are: first, in all three crises, the type of regional security system changed during the different phases of each crisis. During the Cambodian crisis, the system in operation changed from a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' to a balance of external great power influence. During the East Timor crisis, after being influenced by both great and external powers in the acute period, the regional security system that was operating in the de-escalation period was a partial security community. During the Cyclone Nargis crisis, it evolved from a quasi concert of powers to an embryonic security community.

Second, the High Council was not really applicable in the three crises investigated in this thesis. The High Council can only be invoked by members of ASEAN states. During the Cambodian crisis, Cambodia and Vietnam were not members of ASEAN. In the East Timor crisis, before Timor Leste gained its independence, Indonesia was the sole actor in the crisis. Furthermore, after Timor Leste voted to establish itself as a new nation, it could not invoke the High Council as Timor Leste was not a member of ASEAN. Indonesia, on the other hand, looked for the assistance of ASEAN member states, but again the High Council was not really relevant for the issue. In the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the High Council was again not relevant because of the non-traditional nature of the crisis. Generally, there were no 'disputant parties' in the crisis, even though it can be argued that during the acute period ASEAN and the UN can be regarded as one party, and Myanmar as the other party.

Third, among all the key actors that played important roles during the three crises, the regional leading powers were actually always consistently active. During the acute period the Cambodian crisis, they formed a quasi concert of regional leading powers. During the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis, the regional leading powers acted as a partial security community, while during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, they served as a quasi concert of regional leading powers; they formed an an embryonic security community only during the de-escalation period.

Fourth, despite the signing of more documents, most recently the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN's crisis management mechanisms have not been developing. The ASEAN Charter provides a limited basis for the settlement of disputes, but despite the

provisions for the settlement of disputes in six articles of the Chapter, namely article 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27 of Chapter VIII 'Settlement of Disputes', the substance of the settlement of disputes provision is weak. The ASEAN Charter did not establish a new dispute settlement mechanism. This is again referred to the TAC. What is new is the provision of the role of Secretary-General of ASEAN who, the Charter states 'shall monitor the compliance with the findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from an ASEAN dispute settlement mechanism, and submit a report to the ASEAN Summit'.[52] The Charter also highlights the enhanced role of the ASEAN Chair: 'the ASEAN Chair and the Secretary-General can be requested to provide good offices, conciliation or mediation in a dispute'.[53] Nevertheless, the provision only calls for an intermediary role since unresolved disputes must be referred to the ASEAN Summit for decision. Questions arise about how the ASEAN leaders will resolve disputes when the common practice for decision-making processes is through consensus.[54]

Finally, UN mechanisms assisted and played a role in all three crises. In the Cambodian crisis, the UN played the most important role after the Paris Agreements in 1991. In the East Timor crisis, the UN played a role from the beginning of the crisis and even in the pre-crisis. In the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the UN exercised a discernable role within the framework of the TCG.

Differences

The differences among the three crises lie at the level of the development of trust and collective identity, which was increasing and strengthening over the period. The sense of 'we-ness' was also different over the period. This sense has continued to develop since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. ASEAN also developed itself in terms of intervention in internal affairs. While in the early years of its establishment, ASEAN adhered strictly to the principle of 'non intervention' in each others' domestic affairs, the case of the Cyclone Nargis to some extent demonstrated a change in this rule.

The three crises occurred in different periods, from when ASEAN was still a nascent organisation (the Cambodian crisis) up to when it became a legal entity (the Cyclone Nargis crisis). When the Cambodian crisis started, ASEAN was only 11 years old and was governed only by the Bangkok Declaration, the ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord I) and the TAC principles. By the time Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, ASEAN had adopted several new principles such as the Bali Concord II (the basis for the establishment of the ASEAN Community), the Hanoi Plan of Action, and the Vientiane Action

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[52] ASEAN, *The ASEAN Charter*, p. 25.
[53] ASEAN, *The ASEAN Charter*, p. 25.
[54] Mely Caballero-Anthony, 'The ASEAN Charter: An opportunity missed or one that cannot be missed',*Southeast Asian Affairs*, 2008, pp. 71-85.

Programme.[55] In addition, the ASEAN Charter was adopted in November 2007 and entered into force in July 2008 just a few months after the Cyclone. Nevertheless, the development of more principles did not really give rise to better crisis management. The only dispute settlement mechanism governed by the organisation is the High Council, which has never been invoked. The comparison between the crises is elaborated below.

Comparison between the Cambodian and the East Timor crises

This comparison is made to demonstrate how the nature and the phase of each crisis can point to different regional security systems.

Similarities

There were some similarities between the Cambodian and East Timor crises. First, both the Cambodia and East Timor crises were 'traditional' crises. They involved the use of force between the disputant parties.[56] Second, in both crises, regional leading powers played an active role. Third, in both crises, ASEAN had no legal basis and therefore must be considered as a non legal entity. ASEAN had only adopted the Bangkok Declaration, the Bali Concord I and the TAC by that time. ASEAN had not yet considered creating a Charter. The idea of an ASEAN Charter was initially proposed by Malaysia but only in 2004.[57] Fourth, the High Council was not applicable in both crises for the reasons explained above. Fifth, the UN also played important roles in both crises.

Differences

There are also some differences between the two crises. First, the Cambodian crisis occurred in the Cold War era while the East Timor crisis arose in the post Cold War era. It could be argued that the end of the Cold War reduced the balancing efforts by the world's great powers. Second, the members of ASEAN were also different. At the beginning of the Cambodian crisis, ASEAN only consisted of five members, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In the middle of the crisis in 1984, Brunei Darussalam joined the organisation. During the East Timor crisis, ASEAN consisted of ten members after Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam joined. Fourth, the regional leading powers during the Cambodian crisis consisted of Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. In the East Timor crisis these countries also played

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[55] The Hanoi Plan of Action was established in 1998 and created a range of economic initiatives to boost investment in Southeast Asia. The Vientiane Action Programmes was initiated in November 2004 to realise the objectives of Bali Concord II. See Alan Collins, 'Forming a security community: lessons from ASEAN', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 7:2, 2007, pp. 203-225.

[56] Vietnam and Cambodia were not members of ASEAN during the Cambodian crisis while East Timor was not yet member of ASEAN.

[57] Ilango Karuppannan, 'The ASEAN Community and ASEAN Charter: Toward a New ASEAN', *Journal Diplomacy and Foreign Relations,* No. 8, 2005.

the active role with the addition of the Philippines. Finally, during the Cambodian crisis, ASEAN still only had only limited integration in economy and politics.

Comparison between the East Timor and the Cyclone Nargis crises

Similarities

There are some similarities between these two crises. First, both crises demonstrated a change in the regional security system during the crisis. The East Timor crisis saw a change from the importance of external great powers with an absence of the 'balance' notion, to a partial security community. The Cyclone Nargis crisis showed a change from a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' to an embryonic security community. Second, both crises occurred in the Post Cold War era. This might have impacted on the relevance of the notion of 'balance' between external great powers. Third, in both crises, ASEAN already had ten members. Fourth, regional leading powers were important, even though they were in a different form. Regional leading powers served as a partial security community during the East Timor crisis while serving as a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Fifth, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore were part of the regional leading powers in both crises. Sixth, the High Council was not applicable and was not invoked during either crisis. Seventh, the UN played a very important role in both the East Timor and Cyclone Nargis crises. On the issue of East Timor, the UN played a significant role even before the crisis. During the de-escalation period of the Cylone Nargis crisis, the UN together with ASEAN worked under the TCG mechanism. Finally, both crises indicated the existence of some form of a security community during their de-escalation periods.

Differences

Despite these similarities, there are also some differences between the two crises. First, the issue of East Timor was a traditional one that involved the use of force while Cyclone Nargis was a non traditional crisis. Second, in the East Timor crisis, ASEAN had only adopted the Bangkok Declaration, the ASEAN Concord (Bali Concord II) and the TAC as their main principles of resolving the crisis. When Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, ASEAN had adopted the ASEAN Charter which finally entered into force in July 2008. There was a need to test the power of the new legal organisation during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Finally, even though both crises indicated the existence of a security community, there was a difference in terms of the members of the security community. Thus, the security community indicated during the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis only consisted of the regional leading powers while the security community indicated during the de-escalation period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis comprised of all the ASEAN states who were members at that time.

Comparison between the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis

Similarities

Some similarities between the Cambodian and Cyclone Nargis crises have been elaborated above such as the role of the UN, and regional leading powers, particularly Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia. The crisis management in the acute period of both crises can be characterised by a quasi concert of regional leading powers.

Differences

The differences between the two crises include first, that the nature of crisis was different. The Cambodian crisis was a traditional crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis was a non traditional crisis. Second, even though they both have features of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers', the nature of each quasi concert was very different. The 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' during the Cambodian crisis really demonstrated a close and exclusive cooperation among the regional leading powers, while the 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' during the Cyclone Nargis that consisted of Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia did not really demonstrate an exclusive cooperation among themselves. Third, the Cambodian crisis occurred in the Cold War era while the Cyclone Nargis crisis occurred in the Post Cold War era. Fourth, at the time Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, ASEAN only had five members while at the time Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar, ASEAN already consisted of ten members. Fifth, during the Cambodian crisis, ASEAN was still a non legal organisation and adhered only to the basic principles of the Bangkok Declaration, the Bali Concord I and the TAC. At the time of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, ASEAN already adopted additional principles, such as the Bali Concord II, the Hanoi Action Plan and the Vientiane Action Programme. The Bali Concord II is important because it is the foundation document for the establishment of an ASEAN Community which is comprised of a Security and Political Community, an Economic Community and a Socio-Cultural Community. Furthermore, ASEAN adopted the Charter six months before the Cyclone and the Charter entered into force in July 2008. Finally, while in the Cambodian crisis, actors — the members of the regional leading powers — changed their policy hence their behaviours were difficult to predict, while in the Cyclone Nargis crisis, actors' policy was relatively consistent, particularly in providing assistance, the predictability was clearer during the de-escalation period than the acute period.

6.6. Crisis Management and Regional Security Systems in Southeast Asia

In general, this thesis finds that examining the nature of crisis management in the three crises in Southeast Asia is helpful in understanding the type of security systems that operate in Southeast Asia. Table 6.4 summarises how investigating the three cases of

crisis management inform the understanding of security systems in Southeast Asia. This summary is then explained in more detail.

Table 6.4
ASEAN Member States' Crisis Management and Regional Security Systems in SEA

Nature of Crisis	Phase of Crisis	Important Players	Regional Security System	Examples of Crises
Traditional	Escalation Period	External Great powers	(Great-power influence)	East Timor crisis
	Acute Period	Regional leading powers	Quasi concert of regional leading powers	Cambodian crisis
		Great powers	(Great-power influence)	East Timor crisis
	De-escalation Period	Great powers	Balance of external great power influence	Cambodian crisis
		Regional leading powers	Partial security community among regional leading powers	East Timor crisis
Non Traditional	Acute Period	Regional leading powers	Quasi concert of regional leading powers	Cyclone Nargis crisis
	De-escalation Period	All ASEAN member states	Embryonic security community of all ASEAN member states	Cyclone Nargis crisis

Source: Compiled by author

The connection between the management of the crisis conducted by ASEAN member states and the regional security systems in Southeast Asia is significant for several reasons. First, ASEAN's responses to the three crises depended on the nature and the phase of the crisis rather than the provisions of the ASEAN Concord or the Charter. The ASEAN Concord contained provisions for the establishment of a High Council that would resolve regional disputes. Nevertheless, any disputants must consent to arbitration by the 'good offices'. The High Council was not applicable for the three crises investigated. The High Council is more pertinent to traditional disputes, such as a territorial dispute or border disputes. Nevertheless, the good offices of the High Council have never been invoked. The three crises demonstrated change in the regional security systems over several phases. An embryonic security community was operating only in the one non-traditional crisis not in the two traditional crises.

Second, the necessity of involving external great powers was different between the one non traditional and the two traditional crises. During the acute period of the Cambodian crisis and the East Timor crisis, the external great powers played important roles although in the latter crisis, the notion of balancing dynamics was not evident. External powers, particularly the US, used their leverage to influence Indonesia and

leading powers in Southeast Asia in managing the East Timor crisis, but its influence was not balanced by other external great powers directly nor through ASEAN member states. In the one non-traditional crisis, the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the external great powers were not key actors, but only part of the background. In contrast, the regional leading powers played active roles in all three crises. Only when they were unable to cope with the challenges did they look for help from outsiders. Unlike Tobias Nischalke's argument that 'in ASEAN's case, it is clear that intra-ASEAN security relations are subordinate to those with outsider powers',[58] I argue that this situation changed to an intra-ASEAN security relationship, moving upwards from a subordinate position, during the period in which the three crises occurred.

Third, during the transition through the phases of the three crises, burden sharing occured. The burden was shared by all the regional leading powers to the external great powers during the transition from the acute to the de-escalation period of the Cambodian crisis because of the change in the behaviour of the external great powers towards a settlement. The burden was also transferred by the external great powers to the regional leading powers during the transition from the acute period to the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis. In the case of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the burden was shared from the regional leading powers to all ASEAN member states during the transition from the acute period to the de-escalation period.

The burden sharing among the members of ASEAN was not equal in most phases of the three crises. This further supports my preliminary argument discussed in Chapter 2 that the responsibility of managing crises was not shared equally between greater and smaller countries and that smaller countries were reluctant to take an equal share of the responsibilities. In the Cambodian crisis, the burdens were not shared equally by the group comprising Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia with the Philippines and Brunei Darussalam. The reasons for this were, first, the crisis did not directly threaten the latter countries' national interests due to their geographical locations. The Philippines and Brunei Darussalam are located far from the conflict area. Second, the Philippines' calculation of the cost of action exceeded the cost of inaction, and it faced domestic challenges at that time. Third, Brunei did not have the capability to contribute.

In the East Timor crisis, the management of the crises reveals evidence of the presence of a partial security community among participating countries. The burdens were not shared equally because the crisis did not directly threaten the national interests of

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[58] Tobias Nischalke, 'Does ASEAN Measure Up? Post Cold War Diplomacy and the Idea of Regional Community', *The Pacific Review*, 2002, 15:1, pp. 89-117, p. 109.

Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Brunei. Furthermore, as argued by some interviewees, these countries did not have the capabilities to contribute. [59] The management of Cyclone Nargis during the acute period demonstrates the presence of a quasi-concert of regional leading powers. During this phase, non-regional leading powers did not share the responsibility because their calculation of the cost of action exceeded the cost of inaction. Pushing Myanmar too hard to open up to international assistance for Vietnam, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Brunei (particularly for the first three countries) could have set a bad precedent for them as new members of ASEAN. During the de-escalation period, the burden was shared relatively equally by all members, and that is why the management of the crisis provides evidence of the presence of an embryonic security community among all members.

Fourth, this thesis finds that an embryonic security community worked in a non-traditional crisis. When the crisis was acute, ASEAN member states did not work together as a security community. The Cyclone Nargis case demonstrates that ASEAN member states could only work as an embryonic security community during the de-escalation period of this crisis, after the regional leading powers find tangible solutions. This finding is actually in line with the arguments of scholars who argue that a security community was more likely to arise within the ASEAN six member countries than the ASEAN ten. Logically, it was easier for six countries than for ten countries to establish a security community. It is easier to establish a common view among six than ten members. Some officials and scholars argue that based on Deutsch's definition, ASEAN is already in the early stage of a security community. Some claimed that the process of establishing a security community is still below 50 per cent of completion. Rizal Sukma suggests a precise percentage of 38 per cent.[60] Others say that the process now is around 60 per cent.[61] However, all share a common view that the most important parts or 'the heart of a security community' were not yet established. Allan Chong from Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore argues that ASEAN is now an intangible security community in the sense that there is no war occurring in Southeast Asia. However, according to him, ASEAN will never be a tangible security community because (i) there is no liberal peace across ASEAN and ASEAN members are still targeting each other, (ii) there is an absence of significant non-governmental involvement, and (iii) ASEAN is not treated as the most important aspect of foreign policies of ASEAN countries in the members' national statements/speeches'.[62]

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[59] Interview with a Thai Army Officer; Indonesian Official 2; Chinintira Na Thalang; and Thanet Aphornsuvan.
[60] Interview with Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the CSIS-Jakarta, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
[61] Interview with senior level officers of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1,2,3 and middle level officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 1, 2 (See Lists of Interviews).
[62] Interview with Allan Chong, Researcher, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 16 March 2011.

Fifth, the security system in Southeast Asia can also reflect a concert dynamic in a non-traditional crisis. While the traditional notion of a concert of powers only works in a traditional type of crisis, the thesis finds that during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis, the management of this crisis indicated the existence of a quasi concert of regional leading powers.

Sixth, the members of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia have varied in the different crises. The Cambodian crisis demonstrated that the regional leading powers were Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The East Timor crisis showed that the regional leading powers at that time were Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore. The Cyclone Nargis crisis showed that Thailand, Singapore and Indonesia were the regional leading powers. From the three crises, it is seen that Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand were the key actors in the regional leading powers followed by the second circle of group consisting Malaysia and the Philippines (see Figure 6.1).

Seventh, among the ASEAN members themselves, the three crises did not demonstrate the existence of a balancing system among ASEAN members. The balance of external great power influence still exists in ASEAN as some member countries still depend on external great powers to ensure their security, and have alignments and military cooperation with external great powers. As Emmers argues, 'Great powers will never leave the region, however in managing crisis, unless the crisis influences them directly, great powers are reluctant to take part'.[63]

Eight, this thesis also finds that the role of the ASEAN Chair is very important, but only if one of the regional leading powers holds the chairmanship. The country that holds the chairmanship has always been consulted when any crisis arises. If the Chairmanship is held by countries like Brunei, Cambodia, Lao PDR or Myanmar, even though the chair is still consulted, it will not play such an important role. Meanwhile, the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN cannot be ignored. The role of Pitsuwan, during the Cyclone Nargis Crisis for example, is widely recognised as being prominent. It is quite understandable why the role or contribution of the previous Secretaries-General of ASEAN is not widely known. Only after the ASEAN Summit in 1992 in Singapore was a Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat given the status of Secretary-General of ASEAN. Before the Summit, the position was called Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat. Hence, Tan Sri Ajit Singh was officially the first Secretary-General of ASEAN and his period of leadership was a period of transition. He

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[63] Interview with Dr. Ralf Emmers, Associate Professor, RSIS-Singapore, Singapore, 15 March 2011.

mostly dealt with AFTA and the enlargement of ASEAN. According to him, there was no big crisis during his term. Rodolfo Severino who was Ajit Singh's successor handled the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 1999 East Timor Crisis. However, his role in these two crises is not widely publicised.

Finally, the historical review provides evidence to suggest that a 'collective identity', as one of the most important indicators of a security community, emerged slowly during the three crises. As ASEAN has become more integrated, the collective identity has grown stronger. This has been demonstrated by the fact that ASEAN member states are getting ready to work as a security community. The Cambodian crisis, which occurred in 1978 just 11 years after ASEAN was established, showed very few significant indicators of a security community. ASEAN member states indicated a partial security community in the East Timor crisis only among the regional leading powers and only during the de-escalation period. During the de-escalation period of the Cyclone Nargis, even though the nature of this crisis was non-traditional, it worked as an embryonic security community.

6.7. Conclusion

The thesis finds that in addition to the explanatory concepts of regional security systems — a balance of power, a security community and a classical concert of powers — there is a variation of the classical conceptualisation of a concert of powers that supports my proposal for a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Among the crises that were investigated, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' characterised the acute period of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis. The East Timor crisis shows the importance of great and external powers' influence during the acute period but the 'balance' notion was absent. A balance of power among ASEAN members and a classical concert of powers did not explain any phase of the three crises investigated in the thesis.

The concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers', while sharing some characteristics of a classical concert of powers, (such as a decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order, a level of cooperation among members, a pattern of cooperative behaviour and a need for system stability and international order) has several unique characteristics'. First, instead of great powers, the concert in Southeast Asia consists of regional leading powers. Second, unlike the concept of a classical concert of powers which has fixed members, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia does not have permanent members. Third, while the term 'a classical concert of powers' includes the possibility of military forces being deployed to restore order in the region, within a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' in Southeast Asia, the use of force to

restore the region's order or stability is considered to be unlikely. Fourth, unlike the classical concept of concert of powers, the grouping of 'regional leading powers' does not have spheres of influence. Finally, the form of cooperation does not include institutionalised summit diplomacy. Rather, the main type of cooperation is informal summit diplomacy conducted by leaders, either by phone, in the corridors of meetings and through informal personal relationships and interactions that support the concert members.

With regard to the regional leading powers that comprise the quasi concert, the thesis finds that historically during the crises five leading states, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines exerted more influence than the other five (Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar). Within the five leading states, three member states — Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand — are consistently influential.

The concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' helps to explain the crisis management during the acute periods of both the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis. Other concepts of security systems that explain other stages of crisis include a balance of external great power influence and a security community. The management of the de-escalation period of the Cambodian crisis demonstrates that a balance of great power influence was operating. The ASEAN member states' crisis management during the acute period of the East Timor crisis indicates the importance of external great power influence where the concept of balance was not operating. During the de-escalation of the crisis, the forming of a security community between regional leading powers applied. For the last case study, the crisis management during the acute period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis indicated a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' and during the de-escalation period, an embryonic security community.

A further key finding is that there are connections between crisis management and the regional security system in Southeast Asia. The type of security system that operates depends on two conditions: the nature and the phase of the crisis. The comparison of the three crises demonstrates that the three concepts of a regional security system were not applicable in some stages of the crises and type of crisis. The gap was filled by the concept of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. The Conclusion Chapter summarises the case studies and the findings; it also elaborates the thesis contribution and suggests appropriate policy directions.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1. Introduction

The research questions addressed in this study are: first, *does an examination of how ASEAN member states manage crises provide a way of understanding the type of security systems that operate in Southeast Asia?* Second, *if it does, what type of security system are they?* The thesis examines a possible connection between crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states and the regional security system in Southeast Asia. The study focuses on three case studies: the Cambodian crisis in 1978-1991; the East Timor crisis in 1999-2002; and the Cyclone Nargis crisis in 2008-2010. It investigates whether or not an analysis of traditional crises (the Cambodian and East Timor crises) and a non traditional crisis (the Cyclone Nargis crisis) helps to explain the possible types of regional security systems, namely: a balancing system, a sub-regional concert of powers and a security community.

The thesis was prompted by the long-standing debate about the type of the security system in Southeast Asia. The recent systems in Southeast Asia have been stamped with many different labels, ranging from an 'imitation community'[1] to a 'security community'.[2] Acharya makes a distinction between different types of security community.[3] Leifer[4] and Emmers[5] emphasise the balance of power factor in Southeast Asia security system. Although Acharya,[6] Shirk,[7] Wesley,[8] Ayson[9] and Goh[10] investigate the possibility of a concert of power in the Asia Pacific region, none of them argue considered its application to Southeast Asia. None of the literature considers that the security system in Southeast Asia can be understood as a regional concert of powers. Furthermore, the literature rarely investigates whether there are connections between

[1] David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, 'ASEAN Imitation Community', *Orbis*, 46:1, 2002, pp. 93-109, p. 93.

[2] Estrella Solidum, *The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism*, Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2003.

[3] Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order*, 2nd edn, London: Routledge, 2009.

[4] Michael Leifer, *ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia*, London: Routledge, 1989.

[5] Ralf Emmers, *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.

[6] Amitav Acharya, 'Asia Pacific Security, Community, Concert or What?' paper for the Pacific Forum CSIS Pacnet, 12 March 2010, available at http://www.iseas.edu.sg/aseanstudiescentre/ascdf3_acharya.pdf (accessed on 8 May 2010).

[7] Susan Shirk, 'Asia Pacific Regional Security: Balance of Power or Concert of Powers?' in David A. Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds, *Regional Orders: Building and Security in a New World*, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, pp. 262-264.

[8] Michael Wesley, quoted in Acharya, 'A Concert or What?'.

[9] Robert Ayson, 'The Six Party Talks Process: Towards an Asian Concert?' in Ron Huisken ed., *The Architecture of Security in Asia Pacific*, Canberra: ANU E Press 2009.

[10] Evelyn Goh, 'US Strategic Relations with a Rising China: Trajectories and Impacts on Asia-Pacific Security', in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, eds, *The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia*, London: Routledge, 2009.

the management of crises and the type of regional security system, that is, if the way ASEAN members manage crises is an indicator of the type of regional security system that operates in Southeast Asia.

In response to these contentions and the associated debate, the thesis attempts to delineate the regional security system that operated in Southeast Asia between 1978 and 2010 by scrutinising how ASEAN member states managed their crises. The central arguments of this thesis are, first, that the examination of the way ASEAN member states manage crises indeed provides a way of understanding the type of security system that operates in Southeast Asia. Crises in Southeast Asia have been managed according to the nature and the phase of the crisis and therefore have indicated different types of regional security system. The nature of the crisis means whether it is traditional or non-traditional, while the phase of the crisis means whether it is escalating, acute or de-escalating. The nature of the crisis also determines the involvement of certain types of powers. The three crises investigated in this thesis demonstrate that traditional crises have involved either regional leading powers or external great powers, while the one non traditional crisis involved either all ASEAN member states or only regional leading powers. The particular phase of the crises investigated also determines the type of regional security system that is operating. At the time when the phase of the crisis was acute, the regional leading powers would take the lead in managing the crisis (all three crises), and if the regional leading powers were not able to manage, the external great powers would then take on a role (as in the Cambodian and the East Timor crises). The types of regional security system evident in the Cambodian, East Timor and Cyclone Nargis crises were a quasi concert of regional leading powers, a partial and embryonic security community, and a balance of external great power influence.

A partial security community emerged during the de-escalation period of the East Timor crisis among the regional leading powers and an embryonic security community was evident during the de-escalation period of the Cyclone Nargis crisis which involved all member states. An embryonic security community among all the ASEAN states was indicated during the Cyclone Nargis crisis due to the non-traditional nature of the crisis. During the de-escalation period of the Cambodia crisis, the management of the crisis can be characterised by a balance of external great power influence, while during the acute period of the East Timor crisis, the crisis response shines a light on the importance a great-power influence without the notion of balance being evident. In another stage, the crisis management also shows the existence of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' (the acute period of the Cambodian crisis and the Cyclone Nargis crisis).

Second, another central argument is that an additional security concept is required to explain some aspects of some crises. A variation of the classical conceptualisation of a concert of powers has emerged among the ASEAN member states in responding to crises. The crisis management conducted by ASEAN member states during the acute period of the Cambodian and the Cyclone Nargis is characterised by a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'.

These findings contribute to the debate about security systems in Southeast Asia. While few scholars have investigated crises in Southeast Asia in terms of the phases of the crisis, an examination of the three crises shows a change in operation of the regional security system over phases in one crisis. The Cambodian crisis saw a change from a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' to a balance of external great power influence. The management of the East Timor crisis is characterised by a change from the importance of external great power influence to a partial security community. Finally, the Cyclone Nargis crisis also saw an alteration, from a quasi concert of powers to an embryonic security community.

7.2 Contribution of the Study

This thesis contributes to the academic literature and can also help in forming ASEAN member countries' policy directions. First, the thesis shows that crisis management is another way of explaining which regional systems are operating during crises. It introduces a new indicator for explaining regional security systems. While historically the notion of crisis management has been a useful indicator that sheds light on the international system, this thesis provides evidence that the concept is a helpful indicator to understand the regional security systems operating in Southeast Asia.

Second, the thesis introduces two conditions, the nature (traditional or non-traditional) and the phase of a crisis (escalating, acute and de-escalating period) in order to examine different systems working at different times. Few scholars have looked at the phases of a crisis in examining either crisis management or security systems.

Third, the thesis introduces a new explanatory concept, namely a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. The conceptualisation of a concert of powers in Southeast Asia has rarely been investigated. This thesis demonstrates that some crises, and in a particular the phases of crises, indicate a variation of the classical concept of a concert of powers, namely a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Unlike the previous literature on concerts of powers that has focused on great powers in specific areas of potential conflict such as Europe, the US and East Asia, the thesis shows that a variation of the traditional concept of concert of powers is also applicable to regional

leading powers and is relevant to Southeast Asia. The thesis further contributes to the academic literature by creating a set of indicators of a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers'. Some indicators share the traditional concept of concert of powers, in particular the decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order, the level of cooperation among members, a pattern of cooperative behaviour and the need for system stability and international order. However, a 'quasi concert of regional leading powers' has unique indicators: the concept of regional leading powers; having flexible membership; promoting peaceful diplomatic means instead of the use of force; conducting informal summit diplomacy and having flexible joint approaches.

Finally, this thesis also has policy implications for ASEAN member states. The absence of the usual formal mechanisms of crisis management has resulted in different types of regional security systems arising according to the phase and nature of the crisis. If ASEAN member states are committed to establishing the ASEAN Security Community in 2015, they have to maximise their efforts in among other things, establishing new formal mechanisms and fulfilling the criteria that are elaborated above, based on the current ASEAN Charter, or perhaps a revised ASEAN Charter. If new formal mechanisms were to be established, they would not necessarily indicate a fully-fledged security community as the regional security system operating in Southeast Asia. However to establish a security community, a formal mechanism of crisis management is essential.

7.3. Policy Directions

From the three crises that have been investigated, it can be concluded that ASEAN's responses to crises have occurred according to the nature and phase of the crisis and this finding has implications for the direction of policy. The first implication is that the management of crises in Southeast Asia needs to be reviewed and ways need to be found to establish a more robust structure. At the time of writing, ASEAN member states have not developed nor exercised any formal mechanisms for crisis management. The member states claim that the extensive numbers of meetings held by ASEAN will lead to a closer interaction that will smooth the consultation process towards achieving consensus. ASEAN member countries until now have been reluctant to utilise such formal mechanisms, as the High Council, as mandated in the TAC. This is because there is concern over potential violations of the non-interference principle upheld by all ASEAN member states. Any intervention in the form of mediation or other third-party involvement by any ASEAN member state in another member's affairs is unlikely to be welcome since there remains the fear that the mediator will not be neutral.

In the three crises investigated in this thesis, the regional leading powers of that time took the initiative and then shared the burden with all ASEAN member states only when the crisis had de-escalated. When regional leading powers did not have the power to respond to the crisis, external great powers took the initiative of responding to the crisis and then shared the burden with the regional leading powers in Southeast Asia. In the future, a permanent dispute settlement mechanism or crisis management mechanism would be imperative for ASEAN member states, which are now ruled by the ASEAN Charter. There was a high expectation at the time of its promulgation that the ASEAN Charter would regulate new principles for a permanent crisis and dispute settlement mechanisms. Since it did not, and the provisions of the current ASEAN Charter do not cover this, ASEAN member states should review the Charter or establish new principles under the Charter framework to regulate dispute settlement or crisis mechanism. The current response mechanism which is heavily dependent on the regional leading powers, the ASEAN Chair and even the world's great powers, would prevent ASEAN from becoming a mature security community. Given the fact that between ASEAN member states and the CLMV countries there has been a development gap, it is difficult to expect the CLMV countries to take equal responsibility at least in terms of material capabilities. Vietnam, however, is gradually taking more responsibility. In the current South China Sea dispute, Vietnam played a significant role as a balancer vis-à-vis China. The Philippines and Vietnam have been trying to guard other ASEAN member states not to be too influenced by China. Vietnam also initiated the dispute settlement mechanisms of the ASEAN Charter during its chairmanship in 2010.[11] Brunei Darussalam, on the other hand, even though it possesses economic capacity, shies away from taking a very active role like the other five countries. If this continues, the regional leading powers will remain key actors in any crisis in ASEAN, perhaps with help or pressure from the external great powers.

The response to the Cyclone Nargis crisis showed good signs for the establishment of a security community, even though this is still embryonic. This could be developed to include traditional security issues. However, this would require some prerequisites: (i) the development and economic gap between regional leading powers and the rest of ASEAN member states be gradually narrowed, (ii) that all members move towards democracy, and (iii) that non-regional leading powers are willing to resume equal responsibility in a crisis. The first prerequisite is ongoing, but the last two requirements still need to be developed.

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[11] ASEAN, 'Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Signed, Ha Noi, 8 April 2010', http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-bulletin-april-2010#Article-5 (accessed on 1 October 2013)

Furthermore, ASEAN member states need to take the initiative in producing a crisis and dispute settlement mechanism. At least, they should continue working on the establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR) as called for in the follow-up 2009 ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint.[12] At the 18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta Indonesia on 8 May 2011, ASEAN Leaders tasked their Foreign Ministers with submitting their recommendations to the 19th ASEAN Summit.[13] The proposal for this institute actually came from Indonesia. Indonesian Foreign Minister Natalegawa said that the Institute would comprise think-tanks or second-track institutions across the Southeast Asian region. According to Natalegawa, 'not all issues can be solved at the governmental level. Therefore, the institute will allow a process where any conflict can be responded to through non-state mechanisms. The institute will not involve a military element and limit participation to institutions from ASEAN member states'.[14] He added that 'the role of the AIPR would not be perceived as challenging the non-interference principle embraced by ASEAN'.[15]

The idea of establishing the AIPR, while still far from providing an immediate solution to managing conflicts among ASEAN members, should be welcomed and supported. The establishment of the AIPR would also provide an entry point for engagement and participation by non-governmental elements in ASEAN mechanisms. Ideally, the AIPR should develop both research and practical and 'direct-result' activities (such as mediation and training) due to the high intensity of conflicts in the region. However, looking at the evolutionary process which has become common in ASEAN and also considering the strict adherence to the non-interference principles, a first step to establishing a more research-oriented institution is appreciated.

Additionally, it is important that the institute be given the authority to collect necessary and accurate information related to the conflict. In this regard, the non-interference principle should be modified in some respects. While the members of the AIPR would be limited to participants from non-governmental institutions in ASEAN member states, networking as well as cooperation from outside the region should be welcomed, especially to learn from similar but more established and experienced institutions. Finally, the issue of funding might be challenging since ASEAN is still struggling with its limited budget. ASEAN member states should be willing to contribute funds for the institute's operation.

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[12] See ASEAN, *ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint*, Section B2.2, Action (ii), available http://www.aseansec.org/22337.pdf (accessed on 26 July 2010).
[13] ASEAN, 'ASEAN Leaders' Joint Statement on the Establishment of an ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation', available at http://www.asean.org/Joint_Statement_IPR.pdf (accessed on 14 May 2011).
[14] Lina Alexandra, 'Bringing Peace and Reconciliation to ASEAN', available at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/05/31/bringing-peace-and-reconciliation-asean.html (accessed on 11 June 2011)
[15] Alexandra, 'Bringing Peace and Reconciliation to ASEAN'.

The findings of this thesis suggest that the role of the Secretary-General of ASEAN should also be strengthened. A prominent role was played by Pitsuwan during the Cyclone Nargis crisis. A Secretary-General in the future should be able to push all members of ASEAN to play equitable role. Even though indicating that he played a mediator role (see Section 5.5.F), Pitsuwan appeared to shy away from taking a prominent role in the 2011 Cambodia and Thai border dispute. There was a possibility that Cambodia was reluctant to be facilitated by Pitsuwan given that Pitsuwan is a Thai and former Thai Foreign Minister. On the other hand, Pitsuwan might have been hesitant to be too vocal in this border dispute or he may simply have concluded that his own background disqualified him from being able to mediate effectively in this case. Even though Pitsuwan claims that he and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Natalegawa mediated the dispute, his role was barely visible compared to the latter. However, a strengthened role of the ASEAN Secretary-General would need also monitoring and evaluation in its implementation.

In addition, with regard to ASEAN member states' relations with their dialogue partners, I suggest that dialogue partners, particularly the world's great powers, such as the US and China, would be well advised to refrain from intervening in the management of crises in Southeast Asia where possible in order for the ASEAN member states to remain independent, gain more experience, build expertise and be able to create and utilise home-grown robust and effective crisis mechanisms.

The final policy direction that the findings point to is that there is a need to share the burden from the regional leading powers to the other ASEAN member states on traditional security issues. Burden-sharing involves the willingness on both sides. The regional leading powers should be willing to share the burdens and the other member states should be willing to accept this. The non leading powers should be ready to assume responsibility to take the initiative to offer good offices for disputant parties.

7.4. Final Thoughts

The argument offered in this study is presented with my strong awareness that there is much more work to be done to confirm that the findings have any general application beyond the three case studies. Indeed, even the bounded argument I present, like all arguments, can be improved by others. Rather than going into the many qualifications that I could make about my own study my hope is that it will provide a useful set of propositions: first, that examining crisis management may well be a way of understanding the security systems operating in Southeast Asia; second that crises change and therefore so does the security system; and third, that is it possible to conceptualise other types of security systems than those commonly offered. My hope is

that these propositions will provide scholars with useful avenues of research so that policy makers have more options for making Southeast Asia a safe and prosperous region for its peoples.

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INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Security Community

Questions regarding Southeast Asia as a security community

1. Please describe the security system in Southeast Asia.

2. Do you think ASEAN is already a security community? If not, is it already in the early stage of a security community? When do you think ASEAN will be a fully-fledged security community?

3. Do you think ASEAN will be able to establish a fully-fledged security community by 2015 as planned by the organisation? Why?

4. Do you think citizens of Southeast Asian countries already feel that they are part of a security community? Why?

Questions regarding the linkages between the three case studies and Southeast Asia as a security community?

5. Was there any comparability of values among decision-makers in general, during the Cambodian crisis?

6. Was there any mutual predictability of behaviour among decision-makers during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?

7. Was there any mutual responsiveness of government to actions and communication of other governments during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?

8. Were there any general precipitating factors that encouraged states to orient themselves in each other's direction and coordinate their policies during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?

9. Did trust and collective identity formation develop during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis? In what ways?

10. Did formal or informal institutions and practices exist during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?

Balance of Power

Questions regarding a balance of power in Southeast Asia

1. Is Southeast Asia characterised by the existence of a minimum of two equal powers?

2. Is Southeast Asia characterised by the need of member countries to survive and to expand?

3. Do some countries ally with each other on the basis of short-run interests?

4. Is Southeast Asia influenced by great powers outside the region?

5. Do Southeast Asian countries depend on external great powers as their security providers?

Questions regarding the linkages between the three case studies and Southeast Asia as a balance of power

6. Do you think ASEAN effectively managed the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis or do you think it was because of external factors that the crises could be solved? How would you describe the role of external powers in these crises?

Concert of Powers

Questions regarding Southeast Asia as a concert of powers?

1. Would you define Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand as dominant powers in Southeast Asia? If not, who would you define as dominant powers?
2. Do the dominant powers engage in 'telephone diplomacy'?
3. If they do, does 'telephone diplomacy' work efficiently in assisting to resolve crises?
4. Are these powers given common rights and responsibilities by other powers in the region?
5. Is there any pattern of cooperative behaviour between 'dominant powers' in ASEAN? If not, do you think any confidential summit diplomacy/informal summit diplomacy exists among them?
6. Does ASEAN have a special or unique mechanism in managing crises besides what scholars have called the 'ASEAN Way'?
7. Do you think that how ASEAN manages its crises could be used as an indication of the regional security system in Southeast Asia?

Questions regarding the linkages between the three case studies and a concert of powers

8. Was there any decisive shock to the stability of the prevailing order in the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?
9. Was there any high and self-conscious level of cooperation among 'dominant powers' in general, during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?
10. Was there any pattern of cooperative behaviour in general, during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?
11. Was there any effective equal, collectively predominant, interdependent group of all 'dominant powers' in general, during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?

12. Was there any joint approach to regional issues in general, during the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?

13. Do these dominant powers gather and sit down to solve problems in general crises, in the Cambodian crisis, the East Timor crisis, or the Cyclone Nargis crisis?

14. Do you think ASEAN effectively managed these crises or do you think it was because of external factors that the crisis could be solved? How would you describe the role of external powers in this crisis? How would you describe the role of 'dominant powers' in these crises?

LIST OF INTERVIEWS IN INDONESIA, THAILAND, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, AUSTRALIA 2011-2012

Indonesia

1. Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 (requested anonymous), Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
2. Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 (requested anonymous), Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
3. Interview with senior level officer of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3 (requested anonymous), Jakarta, 16 February 2011.
4. Interview with a senior level officer of the ASEAN Secretariat (requested anonymous), Jakarta, 25 March 2011.
5. Interview with Alexandra Retnowulan, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 18 February 2011.
6. Interview with Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Deputy of the Vice Presidencial Office, Jakarta, 29 March 2011.
7. Interview with Evan Laksmana, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 21 March 2011.
8. Interview with Evi Fitriani, PhD, Lecturer, University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 14 February 2011.
9. Interview with Lina Alexandra, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 18 February 2011.
10. Interview with Dr Mely Caballero-Anthony, Research Fellow, the ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta, 25 March 2011.
11. Interview with Dr Rizal Sukma, Executive Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies-Jakarta, Jakarta, 16 February 2011.

Thailand

12. Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011.
13. Interview with middle level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 1 (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011.
14. Interview with middle level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 2 (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011.
15. Interview with junior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 1 (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011.
16. Interview with junior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 2 (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 21 February 2011.
17. Interview with a Thai army officer in charge of Cyclone Nargis Crisis, Bangkok, (requested anonymous) 23 February 2011.
18. Interview with a Thai army officer who was sent to East Timor as an ADC of Force Commander of UNTAET, (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 23 February 2011.
19. Interview with a Thai army officer in charge of the Cambodian-Thai border dispute, (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 24 February 2011.
20. Interview with Alexandra Owens, Australian diplomat based in the Australian Embassy in Bangkok, Bangkok, 22 February 2011.
21. Interview with Chinintira Na Thalang, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 28 February 2011.
22. Interview with Sarah Storey, Australian diplomat based in the Australian Embassy in Bangkok, Bangkok, 22 February 2011.
23. Interview with Siripon Wajjwalku, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 25 February 2011.
24. Interview with Kavi Chongkittavorn, Journalist of ASEAN issues, Bangkok, 25 February, 2011.

25. Interview with Thanet Aphornsuvan, Distinguished Fellow, Thammasat University, Bangkok, 22 February 2011.
26. Interview with Indonesian diplomat 1 based in the Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 1 March 2011.
27. Interview with Indonesian diplomat 2 (requested anonymous), Bangkok, 1 March 2011.

Malaysia
28. Interview with a senior level officer of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia, Putrajaya, (requested anonymous), 10 March 2011.
29. Interview with Tan Sri Ahmad Fuzi, a retired senior level official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia who was a DG of ASEAN Cooperation, Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 2011.
30. Interview with Dr Jatswan Singh, Associate Professor, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 2011.
31. Interview with Prof. Dato' Mohamad Abu Bakar, Research Fellow, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, 3 March 2011.
32. Interview with Shariman Lockman, Researcher, ISIS-Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 2011.
33. Interview with Tan Sri Ajith Singh, former Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kuala Lumpur, 10 March 2011.
34. Interview with Dr Tang Siew Mun, ISIS-Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 4 March 2011.
35. Interview with an Indonesian diplomat (requested anonymous), Kuala Lumpur, 7 March 2011.

Singapore
36. Interview with Dr Alan Chong Chia Siong, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, 14 March 2011.
37. Interview with Ambassador Barry Desker, RSIS, Singapore, 15 March 2011
38. Interview with Daljit Singh, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, 17 March 2011.
39. Interview with Moe Thuzar, ISEAS, Singapore, 16 March 2011.
40. Interview with Dr Pavin Chachavalpongpun, ISEAS, Singapore, 16 March 2011.
41. Interview with Dr Ralf Emmers, Associate Proffesor, RSIS, Singapore, 15 March 2011.
42. Interview with Ambassador Rodolfo Severino, ISEAS, Singapore, 16 March 2011.
43. Interview with Dr Tim Huxley, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Singapore, 18 March 2011.
44. Interview with Ambassador Tan Seng Chye, Researcher at RSIS, Singapore, 15 March 2011.

Australia
45. Interview with Dr Christopher Roberts, Lecturer, National Security College, ANU, Canberra, 27 September and 21 December 2011.
46. Interview with Dr Frank Frost, Australian Parliamentary Library, Canberra, 16 and 24 August 2011.
47. Interview with Michael Maley, Special Adviser Electoral Reform and International Services, Australian Electoral Commission, Canberra, 8 August 2011.
48. Interview with an Indonesian diplomat 1, Canberra, 17 November 2011 (requested anonymous)
49. Interview with an Indonesian diplomat 2, (requested anonymous), Canberra, 12 December 2011.
50. Interview with a Japanese diplomat (requested anonymous), 16 February 2012.

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