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Public Deliberation, Networks Analysis and the Political Integration of Muslims in Britain

Manlio Cinalli and Ian O'Flynn

Research Highlights and Abstract

This article

- Is one of the first papers to bring deliberative theory and network theory together.
- Maps 'who is talking to whom' in the field of ethnic relations in Britain.
- Argues that, while Muslim actors do not necessarily couch their claims in general terms, they are well integrated nevertheless.

In this article, we examine the assumption that, insofar as actors deliberate well, political integration will follow. We do so specifically with respect to the political integration of Muslims in the field of ethnic relations in Britain, using data retrieved from two quality British broadsheets. Our approach has two components. First, we consider the quality of the deliberative interventions actors make, comparing Muslim actors with other actors. Second, we use measures drawn from network analysis to assess the level of political integration as indicated by the ties that those deliberative interventions forge. Our findings show that the link between how Muslim actors deliberate and their political integration in the field is more complex than one might assume. Although Muslims do not deliberate as well as normative deliberative theory says they should, empirically they are politically integrated, having forged diverse relationships that avoid the danger of polarisation.

Keywords: deliberative democracy; network analysis; political integration; British Muslims

In recent years, the British government has become increasingly concerned about the lack of political integration of Muslims living in Britain. This concern, which can be viewed as part of a broader British concern with ethnic relations generally, is shared by a great many actors besides government, including civil society organisations, trade unions, the media and ordinary individuals. And of course it is also shared by some of those who define themselves in the first instance as 'Muslim'.¹ This article is not about the reasons *why* the political integration of Muslims has become such a salient topic in Britain. Rather, its aim is to offer a new perspective on that topic by considering the relationship between public deliberation and political integration.

There are many views on what public deliberation ideally ought to involve (cf. Cohen 1989; Gutmann and Thompson 1996; Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2000). Yet all deliberative theorists agree that important decisions of law and policy should turn not on the force of numbers but on what Jürgen Habermas calls 'the force of the

1 better argument' (Habermas 1984, 25). As such, we must pay attention to the views
2 of other actors, listen respectfully to what they have to say, and develop our views
3 and opinions in ways that make them responsive to theirs. Insofar as actors live
4 up to this normative ideal, deliberative theorists claim that certain normatively
5 desirable consequences will follow. Some of those consequences are central to
6 traditional understandings of political integration—*inter alia*, greater levels of
7 engagement in public affairs, trust in government and faith in the democratic
8 process, a strong sense of political self-efficacy, increased levels of information
9 seeking and political participation (Fishkin 1995, 2009; Mendelberg 2002; Delli
10 Carpini et al. 2004; Searing et al. 2007).

11
12 Our concern is to examine the extent to which public deliberation in Britain is
13 linked to desirable consequences of this sort, focusing in particular on the political
14 role and position of Muslims in the public sphere. For us, political integration is not
15 just engagement in public affairs, trust in government, self-efficacy, and so forth,
16 but consists especially of durable ties or relationships forged by and among different
17 actors. Those relationships can be created or sustained in different ways or through
18 different types of activity. On the face of it, one might naturally assume that public
19 deliberation is one such activity (see Habermas 1987). Yet as Diana Mutz argues,
20 this assumption may or may not be well founded. As she argues, 'the tests of
21 deliberative theory offered to date typically do not develop well-specified explana-
22 tions for the relationships between deliberation and its many proposed benefits'
23 (Mutz 2008, 525). While deliberative theorists tend to assume that as long as actors
24 deliberate well, political integration will follow, this assumption has not been
25 systematically tested. We use network analysis to see whether the field of ethnic
26 relations in Britain is characterised by durable ties and relationships between
27 diverse actors and, in particular, to assess the specific contribution made by Muslims
28 to the forging of those relationships. In sum, our aim in taking this approach is to
29 check whether a relationship actually exists between public deliberation and politi-
30 cal integration and, if so, to offer an assessment of the character of that relationship.

31
32 In the first section, we define 'public deliberation' in terms of three basic require-
33 ments or normative components. We argue, however, that when it comes to
34 operationalising those requirements for the purposes of empirical analysis, par-
35 ticular attention must be paid to the actual context in which they are to apply. In
36 the second section, we define what we mean by 'political integration'. Whereas
37 contemporary scholarship treats political engagement as the key indicator of
38 political integration (e.g. van Deth et al. 2007; Morales and Giugni 2011), we
39 stress the mutual ties or relationships that that engagement involves. In making
40 this case, we distinguish between ties of support and dissent and emphasise the
41 importance of considering whether the prevailing pattern of support and dissent
42 maps onto deep divisions in the field. In the third section, we turn to questions
43 of design and data. Our analysis has two main components—the first component
44 involves evaluating 'deliberative interventions' in the field of ethnic relations in
45 Britain, while the second component examines the relational dimension of this
46 field. Since our data is drawn from newspapers, we also consider some attendant
47 difficulties. In the fourth section, we present our findings, while in the fifth we
48 turn to our discussion.

1 Before proceeding, two points are worth noting. First, as we have said, the aim of
2 this article is map the relationship between public deliberation and political inte-
3 gration in the field of ethnic relations in Britain. But since the relationship between
4 public deliberation and political integration may look very different in, for example,
5 Britain or France, we cannot safely generalise from our *results*. That said, our
6 *approach* is not specific to the field of ethnic relations or to Britain; it could,
7 conceivably, be applied to an indeterminate number of policy fields and countries.
8 Secondly, as we have also indicated, deliberative democrats assume that if actors
9 deliberate well, political integration will follow. Yet while this treats political inte-
10 gration as an *outcome* of public deliberation, one might just as easily suppose that
11 political integration is a *pre-requisite* of public deliberation. Public deliberation prob-
12 ably does require some threshold level of political integration. But it may be that
13 that threshold does not need to be very high for public deliberation to commence.
14 Once it has commenced, it may well lead to greater levels of political integration,
15 just as deliberative democrats suppose.

17 Deliberation

18 Some deliberative theorists tend to focus on the policy domain of institutions
19 and political elites (e.g. Bessette 1994; Habermas 1996; Elster 1998; Uhr 1998)
20 whereas others tend to focus on the broader public domain of individuals
21 and civil society (e.g. Mansbridge 1980, 1999; Fung 2003; Jacobs et al. 2009;
22 Smith 2009). Yet in whichever domain, the general guiding assumption is that
23 proposed laws and policies should be assessed on their merits—they should
24 be based on the balance of evidence and not merely on the balance of voting
25 power.

26 That said, moving from the policy domain to the broader public sphere has required
27 deliberative theorists to relax some standards and to introduce certain others. For
28 example, some deliberative theorists claim that arguments for or against public
29 policies should be couched in the language of democratic principles or other widely
30 shared political considerations (e.g. Cohen 1996, 99–100; Gutmann and Thompson
31 1996, 3–4; Rawls 1996, 100–101). Yet this claim has led critics to argue that
32 deliberative theory is biased against those who do not have access to a sophisticated
33 political vocabulary and who might therefore struggle to express themselves in such
34 terms (e.g. Sanders 1997; Williams 2000; Young 2000). Hence, these critics argue
35 that instead of necessarily having to appeal to, for example, a principle of equality,
36 ordinary people might instead simply describe events from their life histories (but
37 see Dryzek 2000, 68–69).

38 Shifting from one domain to another also has implications for those interested in
39 measuring deliberation empirically. A good case in point here is the ‘discourse
40 quality index’ (DQI), a quantitative measurement tool for assessing public delib-
41 eration (Steenbergen et al. 2003). Normatively, the DQI is expressly grounded in
42 Habermas’s discourse ethics (Habermas 1991). In the ideal case, deliberation will be
43 open, reasoned, respectful and authentic; it will also be marked by a concern for the
44 common good and will aim at consensus. Yet the coding categories that are meant
45 to measure the degree to which these attributes are present in any given instance
46 of deliberation are as much a reflection of the parliamentary context to which the

1 DQI was originally intended to apply as of the normative theory from which they
2 were originally derived. For instance, the DQI seeks to measure the openness of a
3 parliamentary debate in terms of the degree to which a speaker is interrupted by
4 some other parliamentarian (Steenbergen et al. 2003, 27). Yet while one could also
5 envision using this measure to assess the quality of deliberation on display in, for
6 example, the context of a deliberative poll (Fishkin and Luskin 2005) or other such
7 'mini-public', it might not so easily apply to deliberation in the broader public
8 sphere. This latter contains a plurality of actors who do not necessarily deliberate
9 face-to-face. And since they may not have deliberated face-to-face, the degree to
10 which one speaker is interrupted by another speaker is obviously not a telling
11 measure.

12
13 In any large democracy, it is impossible for everyone to deliberate together in a
14 single arena. Consequently, actors must rely to a considerable extent on the mass
15 media to make information available to them and to debate the pros and cons of
16 different policy choices on their behalf. There is, in fact, a growing body of research
17 that seeks to assess the quality of deliberation on display in the media, and espe-
18 cially in newspapers (e.g. Page 1996; Ferree et al. 2002; Wessler 2008; Dolezal et al.
19 2010). Yet in order to measure claims made in the media, appropriate codes need
20 to be devised—and indeed different codes may be required for different media (cf.
21 Mutz 2008, 527).

22
23 When it comes to devising appropriate codes, much will therefore depend on the
24 particular *locus* to which those codes are to apply; there is no 'one size fits all'
25 measurement instrument on which empirically-minded deliberative theorists can
26 rely. Researchers must also be explicit about their guiding normative assumptions
27 and the arguments for them. Our normative starting point is the fact that, in any
28 modern pluralistic society, different actors will tend to see the world in different
29 ways. This variation is perfectly natural. But it carries with it certain implications for
30 how we ought to relate to one another as political equals. Recognising others as
31 equals in political argument means recognising that those others can have reasons
32 to hold their views as firmly as we hold ours. Hence, if we do not make a serious
33 effort to deliberate with them and try to offer arguments that they could in principle
34 accept, we fail to respect their standing as political equals (Cohen 1996, 101; Rawls
35 1996, 54–58).

36
37 This understanding of political equality can justify three of the more commonly
38 posited requirements (or necessary conditions) of public deliberation. Any serious
39 attempt to measure public deliberation must consider whether actors (i) couch
40 their interventions in language that is acceptable to others, (ii) provide a valid
41 supporting argument and (iii) show concern for the general interest. The thinking
42 behind this last condition is this: since policy decisions are mutually binding, they
43 should be mutually justifiable. Hence, actors should be prepared to appeal to the
44 general interest (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). This is not to say that particular
45 interests are irrelevant to the policy process. But ultimately policy decisions
46 cannot be justified on such grounds alone. In short, deliberative democracy
47 requires actors to take a broader view of public issues than merely consulting
48 their own interests in them (O'Flynn 2010; cf. Mansbridge 2010).

Political Integration

Political integration is often understood in terms of political interest, electoral participation and trust in both institutions and political elites (e.g. Verba et al. 1995; Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004; van Deth et al. 2007; Morales and Giugni 2011). This understanding of political integration places a great deal of emphasis on active engagement in the political life of the country in which an actor lives (Berger et al. 2004; Jacobs et al. 2004). More generally, for scholars who share this understanding, active engagement is treated as vital to democracy because it helps hold government to account while also fostering the sorts of civic disposition upon which a healthy *demos* depends. In this latter vein, John Stuart Mill famously argued that political engagement could contribute to the raising of the moral character: Each citizen 'is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good' (Mill [1861] 1991, 255).

Our conceptualisation of political integration gives the same centrality to the idea of political engagement. However, we give a 'relational twist' to this idea by considering actors to be politically integrated when they have forged extensive ties with other actors across the polity. These ties enable actors to exchange flows of information, reinforce overarching values and capitalise on opportunities for intervening in the policy process (e.g. Lin 2001; Diani and McAdam 2003; Cinalli 2004 and 2007). In so doing, we draw upon recent social science research on relational attributes and in particular on studies of social capital that have highlighted how actors access and make use of trust and resources through their ties, both at the individual level (Lin 1999 and 2001) and at the group level (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993 and 2000). Clearly, there is scope for applying lessons from the study of social capital to issues of ethnic and religious integration: for example, recent scholarship has shown that participation in political elections can be explained by reference to the structure of ethnic communities as reflected in networks of ethnic organisations (Fennema and Tillie 1999).

In a further advancement of previous studies, we focus not only on ties of support, as an indicator of the exchange of values, resources, trust etc., but also on ties of dissent. The analysis of patterns of support is useful to detect underlying structures of mutual alliance, while the analysis of patterns of dissent is useful to detect underlying structures of mutual opposition, that is, structures that are less favourable to the exchange of values, resources, trust etc. At the same time, we examine systematically not only ties which Muslims forge with civil society actors in the public domain but also ties which Muslims forge with institutions and political elites in the policy domain. While this latter type of 'vertical' network (Cinalli 2004) has thus far received little scholarly attention, here it is treated as crucial for reaching a systematic appraisal of Muslims' political integration.

In sum, Muslims may or may not build ties of support and/or dissent with other actors across the public and policy domains, so our analysis seeks to (i) evaluate the shape and intensity of these interactions and (ii) to assess the extent to which the prevailing pattern of support and dissent maps onto deep divisions in the field.

1 Along the first dimension, the main goal is to check whether Muslim actors engage
2 extensively with other actors in the field—evidence showing the extensive preva-
3 lence of ties of support over dissent would serve as a first indication of political
4 integration in the field. But even if Muslims engage extensively both with civil
5 society actors and with policy makers, we still need to check whether the way in
6 which they engage occurs along some deep hidden cleavage in the field. Crucially,
7 the presence of unconnected blocks of actors may reveal deep divisions and pro-
8 cesses of polarisation at work in the field, with actors tending to engage only with
9 'like-minded' others. This is a crucial strand of our research, since 'group polarisa-
10 tion' is viewed with utmost concern in deliberative theory.

11
12 Deliberative theorists worry that if a group of people from the same background
13 (demographic, attitudinal etc.) meet to discuss an issue, their deliberations may
14 conform to what Cass Sunstein calls 'the law of group polarisation' (Sunstein 2002).
15 That law refers to a statistical regularity which allows us to predict that when
16 like-minded people meet to discuss an issue of importance to them, they will move
17 toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the median point of their
18 prior views and opinions. Of course, the mere fact of moving in a more extreme
19 direction is neither good nor bad in itself. But if people only engage in political
20 discussions with 'like-minded others', the chances are that they will become more
21 entrenched in their views and hence less responsive to the views of others. Insofar
22 as this occurs, integration may be hindered rather than facilitated.

23
24 As Dennis Thompson argues, the assumption that like-mindedness encourages
25 group polarisation needs to be systematically tested (Thompson 2008, 502). We
26 take up this challenge below. For now, though, the point to stress is that our
27 analysis proceeds on basis that (i) the salience of support and dissent and (ii) the
28 salience of deep divisions can be combined into an overall measure of political
29 integration. Accordingly, the political integration of Muslims is well developed
30 across both the public and the policy domains when, just like other actors in the
31 field, their engagement is characterised by high intensity of support over dissent as
32 well as low saliency of cleavages. By contrast, high intensity of dissent over support
33 combined with high saliency of cleavages indicates a correspondingly low level of
34 political integration.

35 36 **Design and Data**

37 As indicated above, the overall design of the argument of this article has two main
38 components. The first component involves evaluating deliberative interventions in
39 the field of ethnic relations in Britain, and specifically those interventions that allow
40 us to assess how Muslim actors deliberate in comparison to other actors. Specifi-
41 cally, we code any intervention pertaining to Muslim and other ethnic or religious
42 minority actors, as well as all interventions made by Muslim and other ethnic or
43 religious minority actors themselves. The second component examines the rela-
44 tional dimension of the field, which extends from the core policy domain of
45 governmental institutions and political elites to the public domain of civil society
46 organisations. The aim of this second component is to study the networks and

1 channels of political engagement between Muslims and other actors. Together, the
2 two components allow us to appraise the purported link between public delibera-
3 tion and political integration.

4
5 Methodologically, the first component of our analysis draws upon 'claims making
6 analysis' (Koopmans and Statham 1999; Giugni and Passy 2004) to assess the
7 content of newspaper articles (we discuss some of the difficulties and dangers, but
8 also some of the advantages, in coding newspapers below). This method has proved
9 to be useful in analysing the roles and positions of different actors within national
10 public spheres, extending the more traditional method of 'protest event analysis'
11 in studies of contentious politics (Tilly et al. 1975; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998). In
12 our approach, claims making analysis is itself extended so as to go beyond an
13 assessment of the public sphere in terms of its factual articulations in order to
14 provide an evaluation of the quality of the deliberative interventions actors make.
15 For us, a 'deliberative intervention' is a verbal statement made by an actor in the
16 public sphere that rests upon a variable articulation of an argument in relation to
17 the argument of another actor. That is to say, an actor that makes a deliberative
18 intervention is an actor that takes an argumentative stance on an issue which can
19 be read as supporting or opposing the argumentative stance taken by another actor
20 in the same field on the same issue.

21
22 Our coding breaks each deliberative intervention down into its elementary units
23 along the structure of its linguistic grammar (Tilly 1995; Franzosi 2004). In par-
24 ticular, we focus on (i) the location of the intervention (where and when it
25 occurred); (ii) the subject of the intervention (the actor who makes the interven-
26 tion); (iii) the target of the intervention (the actor supported or opposed by the
27 intervention); (iv) the policy issue taken up in the intervention (the specific subject
28 matter on which the subject intervenes); (v) the values that are used to frame the
29 deliberative intervention; and (vi) the three general requirements of good delib-
30 eration discussed above (acceptable language, supporting arguments and appeals to
31 the general interest). All of this information is coded in machine-readable format
32 through SPSS and analysed through standard statistical tools. As regards the coding
33 of our three deliberative requirements, we start by seeing if actors couch their
34 interventions in language that is acceptable (e.g. because it is respectful or inclu-
35 sive) or unacceptable (e.g. because it is offensive or designed to manipulate). We
36 then check for the presence of a supporting argument and, more specifically,
37 whether arguments are valid or spurious.² Finally, we check whether the argument
38 contains an appeal to a particular interest (e.g. the actor appeals only to the good of
39 its own ethnic group) or to a general interest (e.g. the actor appeals to the good of
40 society at large, rather than just to the good of its own ethnic group).

41
42 Having assessed the field in terms of the quality of its deliberative interventions,
43 network analysis then allows us to assess political integration in terms of relational
44 dynamics amongst actors. Here, we rely on network measures (Knoke and Kuk-
45 linsky 1982; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Scott 2000) to assess patterns of relation-
46 ships that actors, and specifically Muslims, forge with other actors. In particular, we
47 focus on two main types of tie amongst actors, namely ties of support and ties of
48 dissent (and hence the constellations of support and/or dissent which those ties
49 form). As already noted, the literature on 'group polarisation' suggests that we

1 should worry greatly if it turns out that Muslim actors talk only amongst themselves
2 or, by corollary, only side with one another. In contrast, a more encouraging picture
3 would be one in which Muslims engage in an extensive web of different types of
4 relationships with a large variety of actors, thereby avoiding the creation, consoli-
5 dation or deepening of divisions in the field.

6
7 Thus, the second component of our research involves a different treatment of our
8 data, as it rests upon the construction of matrices of ties rather than on the coding
9 of attributes for each deliberative intervention. Since our data are retrieved from
10 newspapers, our concern is not with actors that argue back and forth in face-to-face
11 contexts. Instead, we look for patterns of support or dissent so as to detect under-
12 lying structures of alliances and oppositions in the overall field. To this end, each
13 actor is treated as a nodal focus from which ties of support and/or dissent radiate to
14 other nodes—for example, when actor *A* says that it supports actor *B*'s position on
15 the public funding of religious schools while actor *C* says that it opposes *B*'s position.
16 Support and dissent are defined strictly, as we exclude actors that have engaged
17 only in occasional relationships of this kind, producing no durable ties. Specifically,
18 in seeking to capture the recursive nature of political argument, our operationali-
19 sation of a tierequires that two actors have referred to each other at least three
20 times. If they do not meet this strict requirement, they do not feature in our
21 analysis.

22
23 Network analysis offers a number of different quantitative measures that can then
24 be used to assess empirically both the overall shape of the field and the specific
25 position of Muslim actors within it. Three measures are especially relevant to our
26 inquiry. To begin with, 'density' gives us a ready sense of the degree of political
27 integration (or lack thereof) in the field. It is usually defined as the ratio of actual
28 ties to all possible ties (e.g. Wasserman and Faust 1994, 181). Density allows us to
29 assess the overall degree of support and dissent in the field at an initial, aggregated
30 level.

31
32 Network analysis also enables us to say something more precise about the actual
33 position each actor occupies in the field (Scott 2000, 83–85). We make use of two
34 particular measures to gauge the centrality of an actor, namely 'out-degree' and
35 'in-degree' (Knoke and Burt 1983). Out-degree calculates the number of ties
36 radiating *from* an actor, whereas in-degree calculates the number of ties radiating
37 *toward* the actor. A high number of ties radiating from an actor (out-degree) is a
38 clear indication of its 'activism' (*vis-à-vis* other actors) in the field, while a high
39 number of ties radiating towards an actor (in-degree) is a clear indication of its
40 relevance (to other actors).

41
42 Finally, network analysis enables us to check for 'cliques', that is, blocks of actors
43 that stand out within the larger network for the fact that they have all forged
44 mutual ties with one another (be that a bloc that is forged while supporting the
45 position of, for example, the government on a given issue or one that is forged
46 while dissenting from that position). Otherwise put, a clique is a group of actors in
47 which each actor is directly tied to every other and hence where cohesion is at its
48 highest (Doreian 1979, 51–52; Scott 2000, 114–115).

1 Our data on interventions and networks have been retrieved from the analysis of
2 two widely read British newspapers, *The Guardian* and *The Times*, during the course
3 of 2007. Although we accept that two newspapers cannot allow for a comprehen-
4 sive analysis, we chose these two newspapers because each is a broadsheet news-
5 paper with a long-standing reputation in terms of consistent and detailed coverage
6 of news. We also chose them because together they offer a balanced left vs. right
7 (labour vs. conservative) perspective. Following Statham et al. (2005), we have also
8 tried to minimise the problem of description bias by only coding direct statements
9 (usually, deliberative interventions are surrounded, wholly or partly, by inverted
10 commas) and excluding secondary or indirect comments and evaluations by news-
11 paper editors or reporters. We chose 2007 because we sought to gain at least some
12 distance from the events of 2005, and in particular the London bombings, and
13 hence to get a more 'stable' view of deliberative interventions in the field.

14 It should be noted that our analysis does not depend on any preconceived, 'essen-
15 tialised' notion of what it means to be a 'Muslim' (or 'non-Muslim'). There may or
16 may not be a relatively coherent and identifiable bloc within the British polity that
17 can be labeled as 'Muslim'; and it may or may not be the case that the Muslim actors
18 whose interventions we analyse are representative of that bloc. Our analysis does
19 not take a position on these issues. Rather, an actor is coded as a 'Muslim' actor only
20 if that actor unambiguously *self*-identifies as such or when they explicitly speak on
21 behalf of a Muslim organization.

22 Of course, we recognize that all newspapers are biased to one extent or another
23 (McQuail 1992, 193–195; Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009), and so one may
24 have more general concerns about the representativeness of our data.³ Of particular
25 relevance in the present context is criticism of selection bias (McCarthy et al. 1996;
26 Hocke 1998; Oliver and Maney 2000; Myers and Caniglia 2004) which points to the
27 risk of portraying a distorted deliberative reality. Yet there are also grounds for
28 arguing that the problem of selection bias should not be overplayed. For better or
29 worse, newspaper reporting plays its part in constituting the world in which we
30 live. Quite simply, one 'does not need to adhere to the fashion for radical construc-
31 tivism and post-modernism to recognise that the mass media contribute to the
32 symbolic construction of realities' (Peters et al. 2008, 139). Newspapers may report
33 only a small number of deliberative interventions. Yet to a considerable extent,
34 actors can only deliberate about the issues that are made publicly available to them.
35 As such, our analysis supposes that strong selection mechanisms in the public
36 sphere forge the borders within which deliberative interventions can occur.

37 Findings

38 Our findings cover a broad range of actors and a large number of deliberative
39 interventions ($n = 1007$). Table 1 shows which types of actors have made delibera-
40 tive interventions and how often. We also aggregate scores so as to distinguish
41 between the policy, intermediate and broader public domains.

42 Taken together, formal institutional actors account for 37.9 per cent of deliberative
43 interventions. Civil society actors (including individuals) account for over half of all
44 interventions (51.7 per cent). This suggests that, in contrast to a typical 'client
45

Table 1: Deliberative Interventions: Actors

| | |
|-----------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Government | 12.5 (126) |
| Parliament | 5.1 (51) |
| Judiciary | 8.0 (81) |
| Police and security agencies | 6.9 (69) |
| Executive agencies | 5.5 (55) |
| All Institutional Actors | 37.9 (382) |
| Media | 4.9 (49) |
| Political parties | 2.9 (29) |
| Employers' organisations | 0.9 (9) |
| Unions and employees | 1.8 (18) |
| All Intermediate Actors | 10.4 (105) |
| Religious or ethnic minority actors | 16.3 (164) |
| Pro-minority actors | 2.5 (25) |
| Civil society actors | 13.1 (132) |
| Minority religious or ethnic extremists | 0.5 (5) |
| Extreme right | 0.1 (1) |
| <i>Individuals</i> | 19.2 (193) |
| All Civil Society Actors | 51.7 (520) |
| Total | 100.0 (1007) |

Table 2: Deliberative Interventions: Muslim Actors in Comparison to Other Actors

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Muslims | 12.5 (126) |
| Other religious minorities | 4.5 (45) |
| Other (non-religious) minority actors | 3.8 (38) |
| All other actors | 79.2 (798) |
| Total | 100.0 (1007) |

politics' analysis, the field of ethnic relations is notable for the key role played by non-governmental actors generally.⁴ This impression is reinforced by the fact that intermediate actors (including trade unions, political parties and the media) are much less visible than one might have expected (10.4 per cent), especially in view of their traditional role as 'gatekeepers' between the policy and public domains.

However, within the broad category of civil society actors, religious and ethnic minorities are clearly visible (16.3 per cent). And on top of not having to rely on intermediate actors, they do not need to rely on pro-minorities organisations either (just 2.5 per cent). Table 2 tells us about how minorities feature in relation to one another; in this case, the same deliberative interventions are analysed in terms of whether actors belong to the Muslim minority, to other minorities, or to no minority at all.⁵

Table 3: Quality of Deliberation: Use of Language

| % | Unacceptable | Acceptable | Total |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Institutional actors | 12.6 (48) | 87.4 (334) | 100.0 (382) |
| Intermediate actors | 25.8 (27) | 74.2 (78) | 100.0 (105) |
| Civil society organisations (excluding all religious or ethnic minority organisations) | 6.3 (10) | 93.7 (148) | 100.0 (158) |
| Religious or ethnic minority organisations (excluding Muslim organisations) | 6.0 (4) | 94.0 (63) | 100.0 (67) |
| Individuals (excluding Muslims) | 18.9 (32) | 81.1 (137) | 100.0 (169) |
| All non-Muslims | 13.7 (121) | 86.3 (760) | 100.0 (881) |
| Muslim actors | 13.5 (17) | 86.5 (109) | 100.0 (126) |
| Total | 13.7 (138) | 84.5 (851) | 100.0 (1007) |

χ^2 0.005 ns
 $P < 0.10$; $P < 0.05$; $P < 0.01$; $P < 0.001$

Of the many minority actors that intervene in the field, Muslims feature most. In fact, they intervene more than all other minority actors combined. In one sense, this is understandable, since, as noted above, the integration of Muslims living in Britain has been hotly debated in recent years. Yet in another sense, the fact that Muslims intervene more than all other minority actors combined is surprising. Within the ethnic relations debate, a great deal of emphasis has been placed on the dangers of ‘communitarianism’, and in particular on the idea that many Muslims wish to close themselves off from engaging in an extensive dialogue with the broader society. Our data suggest that this worry may be overstated.

The mere fact that an actor intervenes in a field suggests that they see some value in engaging with other actors. Yet before we can arrive at anything approaching a determinate judgement about Muslim actors—in comparison to other actors in the field—we need to know whether or to what extent they meet our three requirements of good deliberation. Table 3 allows us to get some initial sense of the way that Muslims deliberate.⁶

More than 86 per cent of all interventions made by non-Muslim actors (760 out of 881) were couched in an acceptable language, while slightly less than 15 per cent (121 out of 881) were couched in an unacceptable language. As Table 3 shows, the interventions Muslim actors make are just about as likely to be marked by language that is broadly acceptable (109 out of 126), with no relationship at work between the type of actor—whether Muslim or non-Muslim—and the type of language (chi-square test is not significant). That is, for Muslims, acceptable language is the norm, just as it is for non-Muslims.

Table 4: Quality of Deliberation: Supporting Arguments

| % | Spurious argument | No argument | Valid argument | Total |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| Institutional actors | 7.3 (26) | 18.4 (65) | 74.3 (263) | 100.0 (354) |
| Intermediate actors | 17.7 (17) | 29.2 (28) | 53.1 (51) | 100.0 (96) |
| Civil society organisations (excluding all religious or ethnic minority organisations) | 1.3 (2) | 16.0 (24) | 82.7 (124) | 100.0 (150) |
| Religious or ethnic minority organisations (excluding Muslim organisations) | 5.2 (3) | 17.2 (10) | 77.6 (45) | 100.0 (58) |
| Individuals (excluding Muslims) | 17.9 (27) | 29.8 (45) | 52.3 (79) | 100.0 (151) |
| All non-Muslims | 9.3 (75) | 21.3 (172) | 69.5 (562) | 100.0 (809) |
| Muslim actors | 7.2 (8) | 21.6 (24) | 71.2 (79) | 100.0 (111) |
| Total | 9.0 (83) | 21.3 (196) | 69.7 (641) | 100.0 (920) [†] |

[†] *N* excludes deliberative interventions where the provision of a supporting argument was not applicable, for example, a factual statement in response to a call for clarification

χ^2 0.507 ns

$P < 0.10$; $P < 0.05$; $P < 0.01$; $P < 0.001$

As we see from Table 4, non-Muslim actors meet the second requirement of having to provide a valid supporting argument about two-thirds of the time (562 out of 809). Only a small number of interventions by non-Muslim actors (75 out of 809) contain a spurious argument, while non-Muslim actors fail to provide any argument (when the need for an argument was clearly implied) at all about one fifth of the time. Our data show that Muslim actors are just as likely as any other actor to offer a valid supporting argument. In fact, the fit between Muslim and non-Muslim actors in terms of percentages is strikingly close across all three value labels, with no relationship at work between the type of actor—whether Muslim or non-Muslim—and the type of argument is made (chi-square test is once again not significant).

Our distinction between appealing to the general interest and appealing to a particular interest is of signal importance in any comparison of how Muslim and non-Muslim actors deliberate. In principle, if an actor only sees an issue narrowly from its own perspective when it is also clearly possible to take a broader view of that issue, then that actor is not thinking about how its views and opinions stand to affect other actors in society. As Table 5 shows, non-Muslim actors appeal to the general interest about two fifths of the time (298 out of 740).

More specifically, institutional actors appeal to the general interest about nearly half of the time (45.9 per cent), with intermediary actors scoring equally high (45.1 per cent). Civil society actors also score relatively well, appealing to the general interest about 43 per cent of the time. Interestingly, other (i.e. non-Muslim) religious or

Table 5: Quality of Deliberation: Appeals to Interest

| % | Particular interest | General interest | No clearly identifiable interest | Total |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Institutional actors | 12.8 (42) | 45.9 (151) | 41.3 (136) | 100.0 (329) |
| Intermediate actors | 8.8 (8) | 45.1 (41) | 46.2 (42) | 100.0 (91) |
| Civil society organisations (excluding all religious or ethnic minority organisations) | 20.0 (28) | 42.9 (60) | 37.1 (52) | 100.0 (140) |
| Religious or ethnic minority organisations (excluding Muslim organisations) | 47.4 (27) | 42.1 (24) | 10.5 (6) | 100.0 (57) |
| Individuals (excluding Muslims) | 7.3 (9) | 17.9 (22) | 74.8 (92) | 100. (123) |
| All non-Muslims | 15.4 (114) | 40.3 (298) | 44.3 (328) | 100.0 (740) |
| Muslims | 18.0 (18) | 28.0 (28) | 54.0 (54) | 100.0 (100) |
| Total | 15.7 (132) | 38.8 (326) | 45.5 (382) | 100.0 (840) [†] |

[†] *N* excludes deliberative interventions that did not involve interests, for example, purely factual interventions, and hence where this category was not applicable

χ^2 5.609[†]

[†] $P < 0.10$; * $P < 0.05$; ** $P < 0.01$; *** $P < 0.001$


ethnic minority actors appeal to the general interest 42 per cent of the time. Yet, in the majority of cases (328 out of 740), non-Muslim actors do not refer to either a clearly identifiable particular interest or a clearly identifiable general interest. In comparison to non-Muslim actors, Muslim actors score relatively poorly on this measure, appealing to a general interest just over a quarter of the time (28 per cent). This time there is an important correlation at work between the type of actor—whether Muslim or non-Muslim—and the type of appeal to interest (with chi-square test close to full significance). That is, for Muslims, appealing to the general interest is certainly not as likely an occurrence as it is for non-Muslims.

Now that we have seen how Muslims deliberate in comparison to other actors, we can move on to the second component of our analysis which appraises their political integration in relational terms. As we explained earlier, we begin by assessing the extent to which actors in general and Muslims in particular have forged ties of support or ties of dissent in the field. We then examine whether those ties of support and dissent are broken into cliques, which in turn enables us to detect entrenched blocks that may signal on-going processes of polarisation.

As a starting point, Figure 1 conveys a broad picture of ties of support in the field.

Overall density is 0.23, which is to say that 23 per cent of all possible ties of support have been created. Given that the field is comprised of actors as diverse as Parlia-

Figure 1: Ties of Support



ment, the extreme right, and Muslims, this figure indicates an extensive presence of relationships of mutual support in the field. Muslims are situated close to government, civil society organisations and the judiciary. By contrast, Muslims are relatively distant from actors whom one might naturally think of as their most natural interlocutors, such as pro-minority actors.

Continuing our analysis of networks of support, Table 6 enables us to gain a more nuanced understanding of the position of Muslims by considering our two indicators of centrality, that is, in-degree and out-degree.⁷ Muslims have a relatively high in-degree score, signalling that they can count on the support of a relatively large number of non-Muslim actors. Along this dimension, only three actors—civil society organisations, individuals, and other religious and ethnic minority actors—occupy a more central position within the network as a whole. By contrast, intermediary actors such as political parties and the media have a relatively low in-degree score.

Out-degree scores are roughly consistent with in-degree scores. Muslims have a relatively high out-degree score vis-à-vis other actors, which suggests that they are relatively active in terms of building ties of support. Intermediate actors again stand out for their low scores. In the case of the judiciary, there is a crucial mismatch between in-degree and out-degree (given that the latter is nearly three times the

Table 6: Networks of Support: Actors' Degree

| | Out-Degree | In-Degree |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------|
| Government | 46.7 | 33.3 |
| Muslims | 26.7 | 33.3 |
| Religious or ethnic minority organisations (excluding Muslim organisations) | 33.3 | 46.7 |
| Individuals | 53.3 | 46.7 |
| Judiciary | 53.3 | 20.0 |
| Civil society organisations | 26.7 | 53.3 |
| Executive agencies | 53.3 | 26.7 |
| Police and security agencies | 6.7 | 13.3 |
| Pro-minority organisations | 13.3 | 6.7 |
| Parliament | 0.0 | 6.7 |
| Media | 6.7 | 13.3 |
| Political parties | 13.3 | 6.7 |
| Employers | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| Unions | 6.7 | 6.7 |
| Minority religious or ethnic extremists | 6.7 | 0.0 |
| Extreme right | 0.0 | 13.3 |


former), but this may have to do with the fact that the judiciary is a major pillar for the defence of minorities in the policy domain (Joppke 2001). Almost half of all actors have greater out-degree than in-degree scores, which suggests that many actors are not complacent about their position in the field.

Turning, then, to ties of dissent, Figure 2 shows that, with an overall density of 0.31, many actors join together with other actors in forging ties of dissent. There is more dissent than support, but not drastically so for such a supposedly contentious field.

Muslim actors are now at the periphery of network, relatively distant from government and quite close to pro-minorities. In particular, as we can see in Table 7, Muslims engage in the building of ties of dissent with other actors more than other actors engage in building ties of dissent with Muslims. The position of government is perhaps as one might expect: In-degree is over three times higher than out-degree, and indeed government is by far the major target of dissent in the field, while government seems to have little interest in forging (or little need to forge) ties of dissent with other actors.

We now turn to the analysis of cliques in the field, focusing on specific network portions where actors all share a tie with each other. In particular, we measure how many times couples of actors share a tie across different cliques, while at the same time assessing the extent to which this configuration of repeated ties across over-

Figure 2: Ties of Dissent



Colour

lapping cliques amounts to a meaningful relational pattern in the field.⁸ As we see in Table 8, Muslims are present in about a third of cliques of support and in about a third of cliques of dissent. Muslims share ties of support with civil society and executive agencies across three different cliques; they share two cliques with individuals and the judiciary and one clique with government and the media. As regards ties of dissent, Muslims share five cliques with individuals, four cliques with government, two cliques with civil society, pro-minorities, ethnic extremists and the police, and one clique with employers.

By broadening our analysis to all cliques in the field, we can detect blocks made of overlapping cliques.⁹ Figures 3 and 4 shed light on overlapping cliques of support and dissent respectively.

Having matched blocks of support with blocks of dissent, we can identify four main groups of actor, each linked to Muslim actors in a distinct type of relationship. First, actors such as the judiciary and executive agencies stand in (what might be termed) a relationship of *consensus* with Muslims, owing to the high connectedness of these actors within the same block of support coupled with their unconnectedness in terms of dissent. Secondly, actors such as pro-minorities and ethnic extremists stand in a relationship of *opposition* to Muslims, owing to the high connectedness of these actors within the same block of dissent coupled with their unconnectedness in


Table 7: Networks of Dissent: Actors' Degree

| | Out-Degree | In-Degree |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|-----------|
| Government | 26.7 | 86.7 |
| Muslims | 46.7 | 26.7 |
| Religious or ethnic minority organisations (excluding Muslim organisations) | 33.3 | 53.3 |
| Individuals | 53.3 | 53.3 |
| Judiciary | 26.7 | 20.0 |
| Civil society organisations | 20.0 | 53.3 |
| Executive agencies | 40.0 | 20.0 |
| Police and security agencies | 46.7 | 46.7 |
| Pro-minority organisations | 40.0 | 13.3 |
| Parliament | 26.7 | 6.7 |
| Media | 40.0 | 40.0 |
| Political parties | 20.0 | 13.3 |
| Employers | 13.3 | 20.0 |
| Unions | 13.3 | 0.0 |
| Minority religious or ethnic extremists | 40.0 | 26.7 |
| Extreme right | 6.7 | 13.3 |

Table 8: Muslims in Cliques of Support and Dissent

| Support (9 cliques in total) | Dissent (18 cliques in total) |
|----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| 1: Muslims CS Indiv Judiciary Ex.Agencies | 1: Gov Muslims CS Pro-Min Indiv |
| 2: Muslims Media CS Indiv Ex.Agencies | 2: Gov Muslims Pro-Min Indiv Police |
| 3: Gov Muslims CS Judiciary Ex.Agencies | 3: Gov Muslims CS Ethn.Extr Indiv |
| | 4: Gov Muslims Ethn.Extr Indiv Police |
| | 5: Muslims Indiv Employers |

Figure 3: Overlapping Cliques of Support




terms of support. Civil society actors stand in a *pragmatic* relationship with Muslims, owing to their connectedness within blocks of both support and dissent at one and the same time. Lastly, actors such as unions and employers form a fourth group that stands out for its *indifference* vis-à-vis Muslims, owing to their striking unconnectedness in terms of both support and dissent.

Discussion

Muslim actors are just as likely as any other actor in the field of ethnic relations in Britain to use acceptable language and, moreover, to provide a valid argument in support of the positions that they take. To this extent, there is no disjunction between how Muslims deliberate and the broader policy field within which their interventions are located. However, when it comes to the requirement of appealing to the general interest, Muslim actors score relatively poorly: they only appeal to the general interest about a quarter of the time.

Simply on the basis on this evidence, one might worry about the political integration of Muslims living in Britain. Yet as we have stressed from the outset, assumptions of this sort need to be systematically tested. Empirically-minded deliberative theorists have had much to say about whether the interventions actors make

Figure 4: Overlapping Cliques of Dissent



display the right sorts of attribute. Yet they have little to say about the relational dimensions of those interventions. Quantitative treatment of data in most deliberative studies, including, for example, studies which utilise the DQI mentioned earlier, has focused on how actors deliberate rather than on the linkages that they build.

To be sure, some scholars, most notably Donatella della Porta (2005), have already highlighted the importance of putting networks at the core of deliberative analysis. Yet, in della Porta's account, networks act as facilitators of deliberation that help to increase the capacity of actors to meet the requirements of good deliberation. In other words, they are taken as a variable that helps to explain why one actor deliberates better than another. In our analysis, by contrast, networks are treated as macro-level *explananda*, whose precise shape can tell us much about what public deliberation actually achieves—namely, relationships of consensus, opposition, pragmatism or perhaps even mutual indifference.

To assess those relationships, we consider not just the patterns of ties of support and dissent on which they rest, but also the cliques and cleavages with which they are bound up. We find that Muslim actors appear in about a third of cliques of support and dissent. The diverse composition of both sorts of clique is striking. But what is

1 even more striking is that cliques do not map onto cleavages. The field is, in fact,
2 characterised by overlapping cliques rather than by deep cleavages that might signal
3 a lack of political integration. We do not find evidence of 'group polarisation' and
4 we think that worries about 'communitarianism' may be overstated.

5 That said, we agree that appealing to the general interest is, or at least can be, part
6 of what it means to deliberate well. Yet the fact that Muslim actors score relatively
7 poorly when it comes to appealing to the general interest does not seem to be a
8 major impediment to their political integration. The reasons why are complex, but
9 the following points strike us as especially noteworthy. Despite the fact that Muslim
10 actors score relatively poorly in terms of appealing to the general interest, they can
11 nevertheless count on the support of a relatively large number of non-Muslim
12 actors for the positions that they take. Empirically, therefore, their failure to appeal
13 to the general interest does not seem to have cost them their position in the field.

14 Overall, our sense is that Muslim actors are reasonably well integrated, despite
15 what, for example, elements in the British popular press would have us believe.
16 They clearly want to engage and clearly are engaged with a broad range of actors
17 across both policy and public domains. Far from simply seeking to build ties of
18 support or dissent with 'like-minded others', the relationships in which they stand
19 to other actors are multifaceted and complex. Their deliberative interventions link
20 them to a diverse range of actors, with variable mixtures of consensus, conflict,
21 pragmatism and indifference. This complexity would need to be taken into account
22 in any thorough assessment of the political integration of Muslims living in Britain.
23 Of course, ours is only a small contribution in this direction, but we hope it is
24 nevertheless telling. Beyond the particular case of Britain, we hope we have shown
25 why deliberative democrats should expand the horizons of their research so as
26 to make the link between public deliberation and political integration more central to
27 their concerns.

28 **About the Authors**

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30 **Manlio Cinalli**, Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (CEVIPOF), CNRS, 75007, Paris,
31 France, email: manlio.cinalli@sciences-po.fr

32 **Ian O'Flynn**, School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon
33 Tyne NE1 7RU, UK, email: ian.o'flynn@ncl.ac.uk

34 **Notes**

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- 37 1. For example, Cattle 2001; Ouseley Report 2001; Home Office 2005; Meer 2006; Malik 2006/07; COIC
38 2007; Modood 2007; Policy Exchange 2007; Meer and Modood 2009.
- 39 2. A 'spurious' argument is one where there is no clear connection between the claim being made and
40 the argument offered in support of it (e.g. 'John could not have planted the bomb because I know him
41 to be a good father who pays his bills on time.'). By contrast, a 'valid' argument is one where, for
42 example, the relevant facts or values on which the claim is based are clearly established and
43 applicable, and where those same facts or values are plausibly connected to the conclusion drawn by
44 the actor (e.g. 'John could not have planted the bomb because he is a pacifist and in any case was out
45 of the country at the time').
- 46 3. See Earl et al. 2004 and Ortiz et al. 2005 for general overviews of criticisms of the use of newspaper
47 data; for analyses that seek to relate such criticisms to the specific case of Muslims in Britain, see
48 Richardson 2009 and Meer 2006.

4. Typically, on a 'client politics' analysis, political elites shape an expansionist multicultural agenda in 'hidden' agreement with the most powerful stakeholders and Muslim actors themselves, without engaging in an extensive dialogue with civil society actors across the public sphere more generally (e.g. Freeman 2002).
5. In Table 1, the variable is 'actor status'. Here, in Table 2, the variable is 'religion'. Hence, individuals from Table 1 with a clearly stated religious identity have been reassigned.
6. In this case, we aggregate figures in a way so as to consider both the 'status' attribute of Table 1 and the 'minority' attribute of Table 2. This allows us to check both for the presence of some types of actors over others and for the contrast between Muslims and non-Muslims. The same logic underlies the construction of Tables 4 and 5.
7. In-degree and out-degree scores are calculated by working out the ratio, that is, a proportion in percentage between the total ties an actor forges (in terms of in- or out-ties) and the total ties that that actor might possibly forge. For example, a score of 46.7 for in-degree means that the actor receives 46.7 per cent of all ties that it may receive (if all the other actors were forging out-ties with it). So, in one network with 1,000 actors, 46.7 means that the selected actor has 467 ties.
8. Formally, a clique is the maximum number of actors who have all possible ties present among themselves. Three is the minimum number of actors required to form a clique.
9. Here we proceed by identifying all couples of actors sharing a common presence in the same clique; we then build blocks of cliques around couples of actors, from couples sharing the highest number of cliques to couples with a lower number of cliques.

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
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
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


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- Highlight a word or sentence.
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there is no room for extra profits and the number of competitors are zero and the number of competitors (net) values are not determined by the number of competitors. Blanchard and ~~Kiyotaki~~ (1987), perfect competition in general equilibrium. The effects of aggregate demand and supply in the classical framework assuming monopoly. The number of competitors and the impact of an exogenous number of firms

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- Highlight the relevant section of text.
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
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
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


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