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## *Raum* and 'Room': Comments on Anton Marty on Space Perception

Clare Mac Cumhaill

### 1 Space and Place

At the very outset of his discussion of space, in the first part of *Raum und Zeit*, a work composed in haste at the end of his life and published posthumously by his students—the 'feather' fell from the author's hand mid-composition (RZ: iv),<sup>1</sup> we are told—Anton Marty introduces a number of ways in which 'Raum' (space), and the related term 'Ort' (place) can be used. At least some of these uses are centrally relevant to his exploration. More than that, they set the data for his treatise in a way to be made clear.

Marty at once dispenses with two uses; a 'social' use which he concedes may even be primary, whereby 'place' is understood to be an 'inhabited space'; and one which might be expressed in English as 'terminus'—the end of some process or thing (for instance, the ground may be the 'place' for fallen things). He observes that sometimes 'Ort'

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A1 C. Mac Cumhaill (✉)  
A2 Durham University, Durham, UK  
A3 e-mail: [clare.maccumhaill@dur.ac.uk](mailto:clare.maccumhaill@dur.ac.uk)



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19 and ‘Raum’ are used interchangeably, sometimes synonymously. The  
20 example he gives is striking:

21 Der Körper ist an dem Orte” heißt ganz dasselbe wie “er ist in dem  
22 Raume. (RZ, §1: 3)

AQ1

23 There is a like parallel in English. ‘an dem Orte’ is naturally translated  
24 in English as ‘at the place’. But while ‘at’ may be distinguished from ‘in’  
25 insofar as the former refers to a place idealised as a zero-dimensional  
26 topological point and the latter a place idealised as two-dimensional  
27 area or a three-dimensional volume (Wesche 1985: 385), we typically  
28 tend to think, and say, that things ‘in’ space, in being in space, are ‘at’  
29 places. On this intuitive conception, a place is understood to be a spa-  
30 tial region of limited extent, a use of ‘place’ that Marty also catalogues  
31 and which goes hand in hand with the conception of space that I note  
32 in closing. For now, I can be brief.

AQ2

33 Places are countable and ‘spaces’ may be too. ‘Space’, however, is  
34 often used as a *mass* noun like sugar or rain; we may speak of there  
35 being more or less ‘space’ (notice, it is less felicitous to say more or less  
36 ‘place’). In everyday English, we also sometimes speak of there being  
37 more or less ‘room’, a term cognate with the German term ‘Raum’.  
38 Marty’s exploration evidences that *his* ‘Raum’ encompasses what *we*  
39 call ‘room’—a space for a purpose or a person, a space which is often  
40 enclosed. But the English word ‘space’, and certainly in recent analytic  
41 philosophical use, is less embrative.

42 Finally, Marty introduces two analogous uses where ‘place’ and ‘space’  
43 overlap. *Empty* places are those that can be easily passed through and  
44 filled, while ‘the space of a body’ refers to its cubic content or three-  
45 dimensional extent. Critically, Marty writes that the latter concept  
46 presupposes a local positivity that is not identical with it [the body]’  
47 (RZ, §1: 4). Let us call this the *Naive Presupposition*—‘naïve’ since it  
48 tallies, I think, with our pre-theoretic ontology of perceptual space. Or  
49 so I shall assume.

50 Marty takes it that *what exists* is the subject of true affirmative  
51 judgement—*viz.* a judgement with the content that ‘*x* is’ or, in this  
52 case, ‘space exists’. Such pronouncements are hardly every day. Less



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53 mysteriously, it seems we can truly judge of things that they are 'in  
54 space' or 'at a place'—that an acrobat is suspended in mid-air 'over  
55 there', say. Marty's project is to uncover the nature of this 'what is'—  
56 *space*—and the spatial relations that, as he argues, it grounds, and he  
57 does so by arguing against a series of philosophical fathers, among them  
58 Descartes, Berkeley, Kant and his former teacher Brentano, a dialectical  
59 strategy that, as Simons (1990: 157) notes is by no means advantageous.  
60 In particular, Marty's positive view, which is interpolated with polemic,  
61 is motivated mostly negatively. By sifting a number of positive claims  
62 from the earlier sections of *Raum und Zeit*—the section entitled 'vom  
63 Raume'—I have a go at setting a Martyan picture of space perception  
64 against the backdrop of contemporary philosophy of perception.

65 The paper unfolds as follows. In Sect. 2, I sketch two charges that  
66 Marty raises against Kant and Brentano. Both charges are descriptive  
67 and conceptual. Kant's descriptive phenomenology is inadequate, Marty  
68 urges. 'Form' is in no sense prior to 'matter'. But it follows from this  
69 exploration, in ways I will explain, that Brentano's empirical psychology  
70 is also inadequate, and this despite its anti-Kantian flavour. From there,  
71 I outline Marty's unusual ontology of space (Sect. 3). Marty has it that  
72 spatial relations are non-real but existent, causally inert relations that are  
73 grounded in space, which is itself non-real but existent. Objects do not  
74 inhere in space in the way properties inhere in substances. Rather, there  
75 is a primitive non-real relation of 'fulfillment' (Erfüllung) that holds  
76 between objects and places in space, which itself subsists.<sup>2</sup>

77 In Sect. 4, I consider whether any contemporary philosophy of percep-  
78 tion is equipped to make sense of Martyan space perception, and I  
79 suggest that the most promising conception is Naïve Realism. I support  
80 my proposal by drawing on some limited remarks that Marty makes in  
81 a short correspondence with Husserl.<sup>3</sup> I then outline a difficulty for this  
82 theoretical translation.

83 Naïve Realism is a direct theory of perception which is often cast  
84 as *relationalist*: Perceptions are fundamentally conscious experiences  
85 in which the perceiver is directly acquainted with mind-independent  
86 worldly objects, events, and, for some, regions of space and intervals  
87 of time. Thus, S perceives O, just in case S stands in such a psycho-  
88 logical relation of acquaintance. This relation is non-representational,



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89 primitive, and, typically, is conceived as a relation of *perceptual aware-*  
90 *ness*. As we shall see, the worldly objects of one's acquaintance partly,  
91 though constitutively, determine conscious character.<sup>4</sup>

92 For Marty, however, *all* relations are non-real. Further, insofar as they  
93 are grounded, they are not fundamental. But in this sense, it might  
94 be supposed that they ought not to be construed as brute or primitive  
95 either. With this in mind, we might wonder in what sense, if any, the  
96 perceptual relation that the Naïve Realist envisages might be conceived  
97 as non-real and what its real grounds could thereby be. I explore these  
98 matters in Sect. 5, before going on to describe a distinctively Martyan  
99 form of Naïve Realism, one which preserves the central theoretical tenet  
100 that phenomenal character is fundamentally constituted by worldly  
101 objects—Call this the *Assimilation Thesis*—but which regards the  
102 apparent relational structure of *awareness* as derived, for reasons to be  
103 made plain. There are two routes to explain the derivation of the struc-  
104 ture that the standard Naïve Realist invokes in her talk of a relation of  
105 awareness: one is psychological and necessary, the other is artefactual. I  
106 make headway in spelling out the latter by bringing Marty into fleeting  
107 conversation with another Thomist—G.E.M. Anscombe (Sect. 6).

## 108 2 Kant and Brentano—Dimensions of a 109 Critique

110 Marty's *Raum und Zeit* has two parts; the first dealing with space, of  
111 which there are 33 numbered sections, the latter with time. My recon-  
112 struction considers only the first part. Of those 33 sections, a substan-  
113 tial number deal with the shortcomings, as Marty sees them, of central  
114 canonical figures—most notably, for my purposes, Kant and Brentano.  
115 Both of the charges that I see as relevant to my exploration (there are  
116 many others), Marty erects primarily on descriptive phenomenological  
117 grounds. Let's start with the first objection.<sup>5</sup>

118 Kant is correct, says Marty, in maintaining that if *anything* sen-  
119 sory is given than so is space. For Kant, notoriously, this is since the  
120 form of the receptive faculty is such that, necessarily, anything that



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121 is phenomenally given is given in space. But Marty wonders whether  
 122 from this descriptively true claim, Kant's treatment of space as a sub-  
 123 jective form of intuition is invited. Marty reads Kant's transformation  
 124 of Newtonian space into a subjective form of intuition as preserving  
 125 Newton's insistence on the unity, infinity and independence of space  
 126 from that which fills it. In Kant's case however, the independence cri-  
 127 terion is reconceived in the following way: the form of intuition is  
 128 'pure'—a priori and not dependent on quality. Marty questions this  
 129 from a descriptive phenomenological perspective.

130 It is 'undeniable', he says, that we can only abstract spatiality from  
 131 quality; when we see colour we see extent, and it is only by abstraction  
 132 that we can 'abstract' away from the peculiarities of colour and conceive  
 133 of spatiality as distinct from quality. Further:

134 Immediately and vividly we are only given the presentation of a space  
 135 filled with quality. (RZ, §4: 8)

136 But, this being so, it is 'factually above all doubt', says Marty, that our  
 137 intuition of space is not quality-less, or 'pure' in the sense specified  
 138 above, and nor are we given an infinite space—Marty takes it as just  
 139 obvious that our spatial vision is finite, and even very limited.<sup>6</sup> Again,  
 140 his point is descriptive, but he augments it with a genetic or causal  
 141 claim: no purely empty space could affect our senses. This does not  
 142 show that space is a subjective form of intuition however. It only shows  
 143 that just as colour cannot be sensed without extent, *the converse also*  
 144 *holds*. Space cannot be intuited without localised quality.<sup>7</sup> Prima facie,  
 145 this might be thought to suggest that Marty must deny that intuited  
 146 space retains aspects of the Newtonian conception—most modestly,  
 147 the thought that space is something over and above its contents, or  
 148 that which fills it. As we will see however, though Marty agrees with  
 149 Kant that whenever something sensible is given so is space, and while  
 150 he argues that space cannot be given without quality—deriding, as his  
 151 friend Carl Stumpf also does, Kant's imaginative 'subtraction argument',  
 152 something which I leave aside<sup>8</sup>—he rejects a relationist conception of  
 153 space, and not only on descriptive phenomenological grounds, but also,



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154 it seems, on conceptual grounds too. Thus, we find Marty writing in an  
155 intriguing footnote:

156 Kant considers the presentation of an ‘empty space’ as a posteriori. If one  
157 understands by this the presentation of an empty space outside the world,  
158 this only follows. For the presentation of a world is certainly empirical,  
159 and so also is the [presentation] of adjacent space, not filled with bodies,  
160 that would have common boundaries with that world, since the adjacent,  
161 as such, cannot be presented without *what* borders it. (RZ, §6: 17, fn. 1)<sup>9</sup>

162 It is notable that Marty refers here to the presentation of *an* empty  
163 space, the singularity of which must, in Kantian terms, be a posteriori.  
164 This claim is difficult to make sense of, but one suggestion is the  
165 following: such a presentation must be a posteriori since an empty space  
166 is *one that is not filled with body*. It is hence not ‘empty’ in the sense that  
167 a mere form of intuition is, viz. contentless, or without sensible mat-  
168 ter. If correct, this suggests a further tempting line of thought. C. B.  
169 Martin holds that the provision of the limits of the being of presences  
170 (things like pens and bicycles) requires the presence of *absence* outwith  
171 those limits—the presence of absence *at places* where those things are  
172 not or *empty* regions.<sup>10</sup> But if so, and if part of the concept of a body is  
173 that of a *limited* whole, then the concept of an empty space in the first  
174 sense (viz. not in the sense of a form of intuition) attends, or is part of  
175 the structure of, our concept of a body. More explicit is Marty’s critique  
176 of Brentano, also on conceptual grounds—and here, as Smith puts it,  
177 ‘Marty seeks a position more commonsensical than that of his master,  
178 even at the price of a certain sort of theoretical inelegance’ (1990: 129).  
179 I detail Marty’s ‘inelegant’ theory in Sect. 3. First, some comments on  
180 his divergence from Brentano.

181 Like Marty, Brentano also maintains a form of spatial *nativism*—  
182 namely, the thought that space is given as part of the originary content  
183 of experience: it is not a form of intuition, as Kant thought, and nor is  
184 form (typically the form of objects) constructed from bundles of sensa-  
185 tion, as an empiricist might hold. Rather, colour continua are *founded*  
186 on spatial continua, the spatial extents they ‘colour’. Here ‘founded’ is a  
187 technical term that we can gloss simply, for the purposes of this paper,



188 as one-sided dependence.<sup>11</sup> Since colour is founded on spatial continua,  
189 we cannot see colour without seeing extent.

190 For most of his life, Brentano maintained that spatial continua are in  
191 turn secondary to, or founded on, temporal continua, where this entails  
192 a concomitant rejection of spatial absolutism; what is spatial coincides  
193 with what is *corporeal* and only insofar as bodies persist through time  
194 can we say that the three-dimensional spatial continuum that they con-  
195 stitute persists also.<sup>12</sup> In later writing on space, however, specifically  
196 in the *Categories*, Brentano appears to grant that places are substances  
197 which may or may not be filled. For Smith (1990: 128), Brentano  
198 makes this shift so as to be able to give an account of what individuates  
199 otherwise qualitatively identical things. Thus, '[t]wo dots of identically  
200 the same red are individually different only because one is here, and the  
201 other there' (*Kat*, 247, Eng tran., p. 177). But, unsurprisingly, such an  
202 individuation condition makes movement impossibly rare; if things are  
203 individuated by the places at which they are, no *thing* can move place  
204 and yet be the same.<sup>13</sup>

205 Marty rejects both these Brentanian theses, the earlier and the later.  
206 Philosophy, he says, has to 'exercise its office by stubbornly and repeat-  
207 edly, pointing out the questionable, even the impossibility and absurdity  
208 of certain conditions' (RZ, §1: 72), words he borrows from Hermann  
209 von Lotze, his former dissertation supervisor (an appeal that is strik-  
210 ing in the context of his dispute with his other mentor, Brentano).  
211 For Marty, that space is nothing but the ordering of bodies is one such  
212 absurdity. But so is the thought that movement is something merely,  
213 and only relative or, worse, a fiction. I will assume that this rejection  
214 is something that Marty thinks follows from the very *concept* of move-  
215 ment. But this is not all. Recall the *Naïve Presupposition* has it that we  
216 take bodies to be *at* places of three-dimensional extent, where such  
217 places are *positivities* that we may say are *filled*—indeed, as we shall see,  
218 Marty takes the relation of 'fulfilment' as basic. The relationist about  
219 space can only reductively identify such places with respect to *other*  
220 bodies in the web of corporeal bodies that constitute the spatial contin-  
221 uum. But, as such, the place at which an object is, for the spatial rela-  
222 tionist, somehow 'external to it'; it is individuated with respect to *other*  
223 bodies in the nexus, something that, for Marty, seems to run counter



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224 to how things strike us. How so? For if this were the case, he seems to  
 225 ask, what could be the meaning or essence of what might be called the  
 226 *in-dwelling*, or in-space being of a body (Innewohnen oder Im-Raum-  
 227 Sein der Körper [RZ, §15: 76])—the very space or place which the  
 228 *Naïve Presupposition* presupposes that things in space occupy or fill?  
 229 Marty characterises the alternative, reductive strategy of his opponent as  
 230 follows:

231 To say that between this and another body (atom) is an *empty space* is  
 232 only a pictorial way of speaking which, by a fiction of inner form of lan-  
 233 guage, puts something positive in the place of something negative. The  
 234 correct negative form of expression would be that *no other body* is between  
 235 bodies X and Y at any distance from them. Similarly, instead of: from a  
 236 certain place, empty space expands (in the infinite), the facts can be stated  
 237 more reasonably as: beyond a certain distance, no body is found anymore.  
 238 (RZ, §18: 88)

239 Marty does not accept this negative thesis. I sketch his positive proposal  
 240 below. For now, it is worth noting that Brentano appears, if not to  
 241 revert to his former position at the end of his life, then to equivocate.  
 242 Only weeks before his death, on 23 February 1917, a year after the  
 243 publication of *Raum und Zeit*, Brentano dictated the essay ‘What we  
 244 can learn about space and time from the conflicting errors of philoso-  
 245 phers’. Brentano, it seems, wants to reclaim the thesis that empty space  
 246 is a fiction:

247 It has been said that if a body is to move then there must exist an empty  
 248 space into which it moves. This is just as compelling as if someone were  
 249 to say that, if something to change colour, there must already exist a col-  
 250 our which it then takes on. (quoted in Smith 1990: 169)

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251 Adding in a footnote:

252 And indeed why not also: if someone is to enter into marriage, then this  
 253 marriage must already exist beforehand? (ibid.: fn. 3)

254 Marty’s name is mentioned six times in this discussion.





### 255 3 Marty's Radical Conception

256 We have seen that for Marty space is not a subjective form of intui-  
 257 tion. Mind-independent space would exist in the absence of anyone  
 258 perceiving it (see Johansson, this volume). Nonetheless, *when* space is  
 259 perceived, it is given *with* the sensible. Further, just as one cannot see  
 260 colour without seeing extent, one cannot see space without seeing sen-  
 261 sible bodies. Importantly, however, this does not entail, *pace* the early  
 262 Brentano, that space is to be *identified* with sensible bodies and the rela-  
 263 tions in which they stand to one another—it does not mean that 'empty  
 264 space' is a fiction. So, what, then, is Marty's radical alternative?

265 For Marty, empty space, at least on one understanding, is *space* that  
 266 is not filled, where space is a positivity, or, more precisely, as I explain  
 267 below, non-real existent (see also Johansson, this volume). Prima facie  
 268 this might seem to align with Brentano's later position, but this is not  
 269 so. For Marty, whatever can be the subject of a true affirmative judge-  
 270 ment exists, where what is non-real in addition is non-real insofar as it  
 271 cannot enter into causal relations. After Smith, let us call those objects  
 272 that *can* enter into causal relations, and which Marty designates as 'real',  
 273 *energetic* objects. Non-real entities are, by contrast, *anergetic* objects,  
 274 among which are included collectives, states of affairs, values and, as we  
 275 shall see, relations and space.

276 Now, that space is anergetic might tempt one into supposing that  
 277 it is ideal and subjective. But Marty holds that it cannot be subjective  
 278 for the nativist reasons he offers in critique of Kant. Yet nor can it be  
 279 objective only through being identified with real bodies, as the earlier  
 280 Brentano proposes. This not only runs counter to what I am calling  
 281 the *Naïve Presupposition*, but leads too to an unacceptable scepticism,  
 282 or at least reductionism, about movement. And once space is admit-  
 283 ted instead as a substance that individuates property instances, this  
 284 scepticism only grows. It is this latter Brentanian proposal that Marty's  
 285 proposal definitively wants to avert.

286 Substances are real for Marty, and they individuate property  
 287 instances. Since movement is possible however—and here is Marty's  
 288 common sense in action—space cannot be said to individuate otherwise

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289 identical things. Space then is not a substance, so defined. Rather it is,  
290 says Marty, a *subsistent*. Subsistents are like substances insofar as they do  
291 not ‘inhere’ in anything, but unlike substances *subsistents* are non-real.  
292 Thus, while property instances (accidents) inhere in substances, objects  
293 cannot be said to ‘inhere’ in space. Rather, Marty takes the relation  
294 of objects to space as brute and basic—they are said, again in the line  
295 with common parlance, to ‘fill’ it (we have called this relation ‘fulfil-  
296 ment’; Johansson, this volume calls it ‘space-filling’; the German term is  
297 ‘Raumerfüllung’).

298 With this much spelt out, we can finally detail out the nature of spa-  
299 tial relations for Marty. Spatial relations hold *between positions in space*:

300 As far as location [*Ortlichkeit*] by itself is concerned it is uncontroversial  
301 that the relations of being outside and of being side by side are grounded  
302 local relations that presuppose absolute places as their grounding funda-  
303 menta. (RZ, §7: 24)<sup>14</sup>

304 Like all relations, spatial relations are themselves non-real. Nonetheless,  
305 they are grounded in space, itself an objective non-real existent (see  
306 Johansson 1990 for discussion).

## 307 **4 Marty, Husserl and a Contemporary** 308 **Translation**

309 Let us gather together some claims that have been sketched, and  
310 grant that, from the contemporary perspective, a rather exotic picture  
311 emerges.

- 312 – Space is existent; it is the subject of true affirmative judgement.
- 313 – Its manner of existence is that it subsists; nothing inheres in it.
- 314 – Space is a positivity.
- 315 – Space is anergetic.
- 316 – Space is non-real.
- 317 – Space is not a quality-less form of intuition.
- 318 – When something sensible is given so, necessarily, is form.<sup>15</sup>



- 319 – Objects fill space, where the relation of objects to space is *sui*  
 320 *generis*—it is one of fulfilment.  
 321 – Space cannot be intuited without the presentation of something  
 322 sensible.

323 To make this latter point a little clearer, let us distinguish *subsistent*  
 324 *space* from *substantial form*. Unlike Brentano and Stumpf, Marty *doesn't*  
 325 think that we only perceive substantial form. The relation of substantial  
 326 form to subsistent space is, recall, one of fulfilment (space-filling),  
 327 where empty space is subsistent space that is unfilled. Can we assume,  
 328 therefore and further, that Marty supposes that empty space can be  
 329 perceived?

330 Two considerations might be offered here. First, Marty's opening  
 331 exploration appeals directly to empty space. The concept of an empty  
 332 space is of a region that can be passed through. Such spaces can be sub-  
 333 jects of true affirmative judgement. Second, the concept of an empty  
 334 space is not the concept of a pure form of intuition, but, arguably, the  
 335 concept of a region that is empty of body. Since, however, Marty denies  
 336 that space is to be identified with sensible bodies and the relations in  
 337 which they stand to one another, even while he holds that we cannot  
 338 perceive space without also perceiving something sensible, it is argua-  
 339 ble that he ought to be prepared to grant that we perceive empty space.  
 340 Why? Since he allows that we perceive space *tout court*; both filled and  
 341 unfilled (to wit: empty) spatial regions.

342 I consider this line of thinking attractive, and it guides what fol-  
 343 lows.<sup>16</sup> However, further work is needed to establish Marty's final view  
 344 on the possibility of our perceiving empty space—a question over which  
 345 Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl all waver. To this extent while the explo-  
 346 rations that follow are *Martyan* insofar as they are in the spirit of Marty,  
 347 they might not be wholly to the letter. My task in the remainder of the  
 348 paper is to consider *Martyan* space perception, thus understood, in  
 349 the light of contemporary philosophy of perception. I take this to be  
 350 a useful exercise since Marty, as I read him, offers a host of conceptual  
 351 resources that suggest ways of reframing questions about space percep-  
 352 tion and perceptual experience more generally, in ways I hope to show-  
 353 case, if only in a schematic way.



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354 The explorations that follow then are rough. Even so, it strikes me  
355 that two lessons already follow from what I have drawn out so far.  
356 Setting these out helps frame the course of the rest of the paper.

357 First, for Marty, space is a non-real existent, not a subjective form  
358 of intuition. This being so, it might be thought that any philosophy  
359 of perception that endorses the thought that space *itself* is a subjective  
360 form of intuition—rather than something that can be presented under a  
361 subjective or ideal mode of presentation say—is non-Martyan.<sup>17</sup>

362 Second, since space is non-real on this Martyan picture, it is anergetic.  
363 Hence any philosophy of perception which necessitates a causal  
364 theory of perception, even where this is treated counterfactually, or one  
365 whereby our receptivity extends only to sensible matter, is also at odds  
366 with Marty.

367 These two lessons touch on Marty's anti-*Kantian* misgivings on the  
368 one hand, and his anti-*Brentanian* considerations on the other. Space  
369 is not ideal (anti-Kantian), and nor can it be identified with corporeal,  
370 substantial bodies (anti-Brentanian). On the assumption that space can  
371 be an object of experience, however, rather than a subjective form of  
372 intuition, *and* on the assumption that space is something anergetic that  
373 exists in addition to the objects it fills, a question is suggested. What  
374 philosophical theory of perception could embrace a Martyan space  
375 perception, this much assumed?

376 Begin with orthodoxy. Many forms of standard representationalism,  
377 where this is taken to be a thesis concerning the fundamental nature of  
378 experience, should run into difficulty on the second count—viz. where  
379 the anergetic nature of space is acknowledged. This is since veridical  
380 experience is typically taken to be experience that has been caused in  
381 the right way, where here the appeal is to experiential states and their  
382 causes. In addition, externalists emphasise a history of causal interac-  
383 tion with properties or kinds represented. But this being so, the ineffica-  
384 ciousness of space should make problematic the individuation of certain  
385 aspects of spatial content.<sup>18</sup>

386 These twin difficulties suggest to me that we should leave representa-  
387 tionalism aside, and I do so for the most part of the remainder paper.  
388 But the standard palette of philosophical theories of perception is more  
389 colourful—it includes forms of relationism, as well as adverbialism. In



390 what follows, I will suggest that it is plausible to think that Martyan  
 391 perception embraces some form of Naïve Realist relational theory; how  
 392 we should characterise this is something I turn to in the next section.  
 393 Before that however, it is worth querying whether the kind of structure  
 394 of experience that the sense-datum theorist envisages, also a relationist  
 395 of sorts, could plausibly apply to experience of space, including, criti-  
 396 cally, experience of empty regions.

397 For the purposes of this paper, I will treat the philosophical con-  
 398 cept of a sense-datum *functionally*. Call a sense-datum *whatever it is*  
 399 that we are immediately aware of in experience, in virtue of which, in  
 400 non-hallucinatory perception, we are mediately aware of worldly objects  
 401 and their properties.<sup>19</sup> Assume, here, that experience has an act/object  
 402 structure and, further, that demonstrative reference to worldly objects  
 403 is secured in virtue of the experience of or sensing of sense data. After  
 404 H. H. Price, call the relation between the sense-datum and that which  
 405 is indirectly or mediately perceived in virtue of the sensing of the  
 406 sense-datum '*belonging*'. Take it that belonging is a non-causal relation.<sup>20</sup>

407 Now, supposing that sense-datum 'belongs to' the worldly object  
 408 sensed in virtue of the sensing of it (the sense-datum), we might ask:  
 409 Could there be a space-presenting sense-datum in virtue of which non-  
 410 real objective space is perceived and could be demonstrated?

411 If my reading of Marty is on the right track, the relevant sense-datum  
 412 could not be ideal or subjective, though it could plausibly be private (cf.  
 413 Johansson 2018). Importantly, however, it cannot be entirely insensible.  
 414 The notion of an insensible sense-datum is hardly a happy one, but,  
 415 as we have seen, Marty anyway insists that space cannot be perceived  
 416 in the absence of the perception of *some* local quality. Yet even if this  
 417 much is granted we might wonder: How could a space-presenting sense-  
 418 datum *belong* to its object?

419 Belonging is perhaps no more mysterious in the case of space per-  
 420 ception than it is in the case of objects. Still, from the functional per-  
 421 spective we have adopted above, belonging, whatever its nature, must  
 422 allow for the kind of cleavage on which arguments from conflicting  
 423 appearances to the existence of sense-data spin. That is, belonging ought  
 424 to be consistent with the putative immediate objects of experience hav-  
 425 ing properties that, as we may say, 'conflict' with the properties of the



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426 worldly items mediately perceived in virtue of the sensing of sense data.  
 427 Thus, we want to allow that an elliptical sense-datum can ‘belong’ to a  
 428 circular coin.

429 It is not clear that Marty would be willing to admit such disparity or  
 430 conflict between entities that can be said to putatively ‘belong’ together.  
 431 Why so? As Smith (1990: 137) explains ‘consciousness, for Marty, is  
 432 itself just a variety of *assimilation* of mental processes to (real or non-  
 433 real) objects in the world’. He likens Marty’s position to that given by  
 434 Aristotle in *De anima*, quoting the following passages:

435 What has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived  
 436 object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its  
 437 being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end  
 438 of the process the one acted upon has become assimilated to the other.  
 439 (*De anima*, 418 a 2ff.)

440 Within the soul the faculties of cognition and sensation are *potentially*  
 441 these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. These  
 442 faculties, then, must be identical either with the things themselves, or  
 443 with their forms. Now they are not identical with the objects; for the  
 444 stone does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the stone. (*De*  
 445 *anima*, 431 b 26ff.)

446 Commenting on the parity, Smith writes:

447 Similarly, now, for Marty, all psychic activity is a process which has as its  
 448 consequence that the psychic activity comes into a certain *sui generis* sort  
 449 of conformity with something other than itself. (Ibid.)

450 Smith’s exegesis makes it plausible to suggest that the metaphors of ‘con-  
 451 formity’ and ‘assimilation’ are more aptly applied to Martyan percep-  
 452 tion than the metaphor of ‘belonging’, where conflict or *non-conformity*  
 453 is even implied or permitted. But, if so, then this suggests that Marty’s  
 454 position is quite different from those versions of sense-datum theory  
 455 that lend themselves to being characterised functionally in the way I  
 456 have above. Instead, it seems closer to a distinct form of relationism:  
 457 Naïve Realism. This is (in part) the view that:



458 [T]he objects we are consciously acquainted with in perceptual experi-  
 459 ence are constitutive of conscious character: the aspects of the world that  
 460 we are acquainted with in perceptual experience constitutively 'shape  
 461 the contours of the subject's conscious experience' (Martin 2004: 64).  
 462 Perceptual experiences have the characters they have because of, or in  
 463 virtue of, the nature and character of the mind-independent objects they  
 464 involve. (French, forthcoming)

465 Beck (2018) notes a list of adherents:

466 Brewer (2011: 100), Campbell (2002: 116), Fish (2009: 49–50), French  
 467 (2014: 395–396), Logue (2012, p. 212), Martin (1998, pp. 173–175)  
 468 and other naïve realists all hold that the items a subject perceives in hav-  
 469 ing a perception constitutively shape the perception's phenomenology.

470 There are, I propose, two features of this understanding of Naïve  
 471 Realism as a thesis about perceptual phenomenology that bring us  
 472 closer to a Martyan space perception (for further discussion see Beck  
 473 [2018]).

474 First, on Naïve Realism conceptual space may be made for *aner-*  
 475 *getic* objects. This is since there is no requirement that the aspects of  
 476 the world that shape the contours of consciousness be real or energetic.  
 477 Thus, arguably shadows can shape the contours of consciousness.

478 Second, it appears that insofar as worldly objects 'shape the con-  
 479 tours of the subject's conscious experience', conscious experience can  
 480 be understood to 'assimilate' its objects, where here assimilation means  
 481 the 'taking in', or 'picking up', or as Naïve Realists sometimes put it,  
 482 the *involvement* of objects in experience. Call the *Assimilation Thesis* the  
 483 central theoretical Naïve Realist tenet that the aspects of the world that  
 484 we are acquainted with in perceptual experience constitutively *shape*  
 485 *the contours* of the subject's conscious experience. Strictly speaking, we  
 486 can make sense of involvement without *Assimilation* and a theorist may  
 487 be committed to the former but not the latter; the metaphysical struc-  
 488 ture of experience is such that it just ensures that objects are involved.  
 489 Nonetheless, if we read Naïve Realism as a thesis about not only the  
 490 nature of experience but the nature of conscious character too, and if it





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491 is granted that *Assimilation* entails involvement, then it is fair to pit the  
492 *Assimilation Thesis* as a central tenet.

493 Now, there is reason to think that the theoretical puzzle that I used  
494 to partly frame this chapter can be dissolved on such a Naïve Realism.  
495 I asked: If space can be an object of experience rather than a subjective  
496 form of intuition, and if it is something anenergetic that exists in addition  
497 to the objects it fills, what philosophical theory of perception could  
498 embrace a Martyan space perception? Naïve Realism is a contender since  
499 on Naïve Realism it can be granted that non-efficacious entities, including  
500 empty regions, can shape the contours of consciousness, such that the  
501 phenomenal character of experience is fundamentally constituted by those  
502 entities and regions, recognising, as Marty does, that we cannot perceive  
503 space in the absence of the perception of local quality. Necessarily, when  
504 we see empty regions we see sensible objects. Both are, to borrow a term  
505 from Husserl, co-seen.<sup>21</sup> This congruence notwithstanding, however, the  
506 theoretical translation is not seamless. Let us explore why.

507 For most Naïve Realists, the *Assimilation Thesis* goes hand in hand  
508 with a further doctrine. Cast neutrally, this is the idea that perceiving  
509 involves the obtaining of a perceptual relation whereby the perceiving  
510 subject ‘stands’ in a perceptual relation to mind-independent worldly  
511 objects. For most Naïve Realists, it is in virtue of the perceiver standing  
512 in a perceptual relation to mind-independent worldly objects that  
513 those objects can play their character constituting role—to wit, by  
514 shaping the contours of consciousness. Different theorists have different  
515 ways of articulating this idea. Some speak of a relation of ‘conscious  
516 acquaintance’; others refer to the obtaining of a ‘psychological relation  
517 of acquaintance’—both technical notions. Sometimes ‘conscious attention’  
518 is appealed to, but very often the perceptual relation is spelt out as  
519 a *relation of awareness*. For instance, Soteriou (2013) writes (commenting  
520 on a passage from Moore’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’):

521 Sensory experience somehow involves some kind of *psychological relation*  
522 *of awareness*, and not simply some psychological event, process, state,  
523 or property. In this context, to say that the relation of awareness is a psychological one isn’t simply to say that one of the relata of the relation is a psychological subject—a bearer of psychological properties—for there are



526 also non-psychological relations that psychological subjects can stand in to  
527 things. The suggestion appears to be that when one has a sensory experience  
528 there obtains a distinctive psychological relation that one stands in to some  
529 sensory quality, where that sensory quality is not a quality of the psychologi-  
530 cal relation. The awareness of blue is not itself blue. (Soteriou 2013: 13)

531 Importantly, for many theorists, this relation is primitive.

532 Now, there is reason to think that Marty would partly concur with  
533 this picture. In a letter to Husserl, written in 1901 from a 'well-wooded  
534 and charming area of the Bohemian Mittelgebirge', he iterates the fol-  
535 lowing two points, responding to objections from Husserl<sup>22</sup>:

- 536 1. You [Husserl] argue: if an act is a relation to an object and if the  
537 object, as is normally the case, is transcendent, then on my view it  
538 would follow that the transcendent object exists necessarily. Thus,  
539 this view (that if a presenting exists then a presented something exists  
540 too) cannot be correct. But what does transcendent object mean?  
541 Doubtless an object that does not exist merely in consciousness. But  
542 a presented something exists. Whether this something exists *outside*  
543 *consciousness* has nothing to do with the presentation as such [...]
- 544 2. Now another of your objections seems to be: according to me the  
545 object of a presentation of blue would not be 'blue' but 'presented  
546 blue'. But the object presented in a presentation is in fact 'the same  
547 object that is judged about in the corresponding judgment and loved  
548 in the corresponding state of love'. This object is just blue not the  
549 presented blue. I entirely agree with this assertion of yours. The  
550 object of the presentation of blue is: blue, not: presented blue".

551 I suggest that 2 might be recruited *against* reading Marty's position  
552 along sense-datum lines—after all, it is 'the same object that is judged  
553 about in the corresponding judgement and loved in the corresponding  
554 state of love'. While 1 can be read as gesturing at the *Assimilation Thesis*  
555 and an associated relationism. This is so at least in the following sense.  
556 For the Naïve Realist, in order that worldly objects can play a character  
557 constituting, consciousness-shaping role, the perceptual relation must  
558 obtain. In such cases, the perceptual relation obtaining entails that those



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559 objects that partly shape phenomenal character exist, but *not* that they  
560 exist necessarily. I pick up the further matter of ‘presenting’ below.

561 For all that, however, there are significant differences between Marty’s  
562 position and the Naïve Realism I have articulated above. These can  
563 be brought into view by sketching a challenge for the Naïve Realist  
564 attracted by Marty’s unusual take on space. For the Naïve Realist, per-  
565 ception involves a primitive perceptual relation. But for Marty *all*  
566 relations, and not only spatial relations, are unreal. If there is such a  
567 perceptual relation then, it is a *non-real* relation. What kind of Naïve  
568 Realism can be developed, starting from this assumption? I make some  
569 tentative suggestions in the next section.

## 570 5 Space for Naïve Realism?

571 To begin, on a Martyan Naïve Realism, the perceptual relation ought  
572 not to be conceived as primitive in the sense of brute or unanalysable.  
573 The relation is non-real, as all relations are. Further, it is grounded.  
574 In *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und*  
575 *Sprachphilosophie*, Marty writes that ‘the peculiar relationship of con-  
576 sciousness to its object’ is a special kind of grounded relation (quoted  
577 in Johansson 1990: 191). Johansson reads Marty as supposing that non-  
578 real relations can be grounded in non-real entities like space and time,  
579 as well as in real entities. Start by considering only *real* worldly relata of  
580 the putative perceptual relation—for instance, a cherry tree.

581 All Naïve Realists teach that when a perceiver sees something, a par-  
582 ticular cherry tree say, she stands in a perceptual relation to that thing,  
583 where standing in this relation explains why the cherry tree, in this  
584 case, can play a consciousness-shaping role. It should be plain by now,  
585 I hope, that merely being a psychological subject isn’t sufficient to field  
586 the subject-end of the relation since such a subject can stand in man-  
587 ifold non-psychological relations to things—as when asleep and the  
588 cheery tree is outside the window. Rather, the relevant relatum must be  
589 a psychological subject in a certain conscious state or in whom certain  
590 conscious occurrences are unfolding.<sup>23</sup> I suggest that Marty assumes this  
591 much with the concept of ‘presenting’:



592 Presenting [...] is a real process in the mind. *In case there exists that which*  
 593 *one calls the presented*, then as a non-real consequence of the process it fol-  
 594 lows that the presenting mind stands to this thing in a peculiar relation,  
 595 which might be described as an ideal similarity or adequacy. (U: 406,  
 596 quoted in Smith 1990: 125)

597 And when 'presenting' occurs Marty writes:

598 What really exists within us is not a peculiar, modified double of the real  
 599 object, but only the real psychic process to which in certain circumstances  
 600 there becomes attached as consequence an ideal similarity with some-  
 601 thing other, existing independently of this process. (ibid.: 415f., quoted  
 602 in Smith, ibid.)

603 Importantly, on this view then, to say that the experience 'has an  
 604 object'—the presented—is not to suppose that the presented is a  
 605 'double', some kind of sensory image of the real object say. For in cir-  
 606 cumstances where '*there exists that which one calls the presented*', the  
 607 object that the experience *has*, *is* the object that exists independently of  
 608 the presenting—to wit, the worldly object. Accordingly, the experience  
 609 'has an object' necessarily in the sense that the present *existence* of the  
 610 object is a requirement on the existence of process that is *the presenting*  
 611 *of an existing object*.<sup>24</sup>

612 Support for this reading comes, I think, from a distinction that  
 613 Marty makes between the relations of *correlation* and *relative determi-*  
 614 *nation*. The relation of correlation entails the coexistence of its *relata*  
 615 (Mulligan 1990: 19)—though, as we have seen, in the perceptual case, **AQ5**  
 616 the subject-end of the relatum cannot simply be a psychological subject,  
 617 but one for whom there is a presenting of an existing object, a present-  
 618 ing which thus has an existent object necessarily but which does not in  
 619 turn necessitate the existence of its object.

620 But experiences can also 'have an object' in a different sense (see  
 621 Egidi 1990 for discussion). Experiences are often said to 'have an object'  
 622 insofar as they are typically taken to be *intentional*. Insofar as experi-  
 623 ences are taken to be intentional however, they may also seem to involve  
 624 a relational structure, at least insofar as they are said to be objects of



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625 mental states of various sorts. It is notable that for Brentano this appar-  
 626 ent relational structure is only apparently relational; in fact, it involves  
 627 a ‘complex of presentations’ which involves instead ‘relative determina-  
 628 tions’ (Smith 1990: 126), where the complexity of the relevant presenta-  
 629 tions is relative in the following sense. Brentano supposes that where  
 630 one thing is thought of (or experienced) relative to another, that which  
 631 is thought of or experienced directly is said to be thought of or experi-  
 632 enced ‘*in modo recto*’, while that which is thought of or experienced  
 633 relative to what is thought of or experienced directly, is thought of or  
 634 experienced ‘*in modo obliquo*’—viz. relative to that which is thought  
 635 of in the direct mode. Importantly, in cases of relative determination  
 636 that which is thought of or experienced *in modo recto* must exist, *if that*  
 637 *which is relative is to exist*. But that which is presented *in modo obliquo*  
 638 need not exist (except in certain cases). But as such, on this understand-  
 639 ing, an experience can have an object in the *second* sense (the intentional  
 640 sense), while not having an object in the *first* sense (the transcendent  
 641 sense). Chisholm (1990: 2) details Brentano’s application of this distinc-  
 642 tion to sensation in a 1914 manuscript:

643 [Brentano] makes two remarkable statements. The first is: ‘In sensing  
 644 I am the sole object that is presented in recto [*das einzige in recto vorg-*  
 645 *estellte Objekt*]’. The second is: ‘The thing that we have as external object  
 646 is sensed only *in obliquo*.... It is sensed as sensed by us’.

647 As we have seen however, Marty appears to insist that presenting of  
 648 an existent object involves *correlation*—the necessary coexistence of its  
 649 *relata*. As such, this demands the existence of the object of experience in  
 650 the *first*, transcendent sense, and not merely as a relative determination  
 651 within a complex presentation.

652 Now, it might be objected that the obtaining of a relation of correla-  
 653 tion is consistent with contemporary forms of representationalism that  
 654 likewise deny the existence of an internal ‘double’ of the real object—  
 655 I am thinking here of what Fish designates as ‘strong’ versions of rep-  
 656 resentationalism (2010: 67)—and insofar as Marty often speaks of cor-  
 657 relation in terms of ‘adequation’ or ‘correctness’ this reading might seem  
 658 supported. Once it is recalled, however, that Marty seems to hold that



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659 space, as a non-real objective entity, is a possible object of experience in  
 660 the first sense, it is, I think, possible to resist this interpretation. Why?  
 661 Space is anenergetic. There is then a question for the representationalist  
 662 as to how space can 'get into experience'—viz. be represented—without  
 663 itself having any causal impact on the subject.<sup>25</sup> One promising strategy,  
 664 surely, is to appeal, simply, to relations between *things* and to *rep-*  
 665 *resent* those relations. But it not clear that Marty would find the mere  
 666 representation of spatial relations between things satisfactory. This is  
 667 because he seems to think that the spatial relations are themselves also  
 668 presented to us in experience (bearing in mind, recall, that these are  
 669 grounded in space). He writes:

670 We find them [spatial relations] there before us, and if this were not so, if  
 671 they were a product of our psychic activity, then how would things stand  
 672 with regard to the objectivity of our entire knowledge of nature [...]? (U:  
 673 468, quoted in Smith 1990: 126)

674 However, it is plausible to think that, for the representationalist, spa-  
 675 tial relations are precisely *not* 'there before us' but are only *represented* as  
 676 ways things are arrayed or stand relative to each other and the perceiver.  
 677 But, as such, spatial relations cannot be presented in experience directly  
 678 and nor is there any possibility of their playing a character-shaping role.  
 679 This former point is in essence the criticism that Marty wages against  
 680 Brentano's reduction of non-real spatial relations to relative determina-  
 681 tions in complex (intentional) presentations (see Egidi 1990 for discus-  
 682 sion). Johansson (2014) suggests a way of transposing this objection to  
 683 the contemporary scene, formulating Naïve Realism as the conjunction  
 684 of the following four broad theses:

- 685 (a) the perceiving subject and the perceived object are two distinct  
 686 entities where none is part of the other<sup>26</sup>;
- 687 (b) there is a distance between the subject and the object, but the sub-  
 688 ject and the object are nonetheless in some sense connected;
- 689 (c) the distance between the subject and the object is empty;
- 690 (d) there is a relation of directedness (the arrow) from the subject to  
 691 the object.



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692 He notes:

693 The term ‘distance’ adds something important to the view that, necessar-  
694 ily, consciousness is consciousness *of* something. The conjunction of the  
695 statements (a) and (d) says that perception is always perception *of* some-  
696 thing, but it does not bring in any notion of distance; this is done in (b)  
697 and (c). (RZ, 3)

698 But, for a Brentanian, arguably, (b) and (c) are subsumed into (a) and  
699 (d) inasmuch as the ofness (a) and directedness (d) of intentional expe-  
700 rience might be supposed sufficient to capture the phenomenology that  
701 (b) and (c) articulates. For the contemporary representationalist in addi-  
702 tion, experience might be said to be ‘of’ or about distance—the empty  
703 distance between the subject and object say. Such regions must be rep-  
704 resented. But for Marty, who resists the ideality or subjectivity of space  
705 as a form of intuition, insisting too that space is *energetic*, such regions  
706 are, and are *presented* as being, there, before us.<sup>27</sup>

707 Now, so far, I have suggested reasons for thinking that the Martyan  
708 position I am constructing should be found sympathetic to contem-  
709 porary Naïve Realism, specifically insofar as it seems to endorse a cor-  
710 relational account of the relation which requires the existence of, and  
711 is dependent on, the worldly consciousness-shaping objects that such  
712 experiences *thereby have*. On this understanding, perceptual correla-  
713 tion involves *Assimilation*. As noted, correlation is a non-real relation.  
714 Earlier, however, I noted that most Naïve Realists characterise the per-  
715 ceptual relation as one of *awareness*. I now want to suggest that this  
716 spells trouble for the attempt at a theoretical transposition.

## 717 6 Awareness Versus Correlation

718 To begin, we ought to grant that perceptual awareness requires more  
719 than perceptual correlation. It requires relative determination insofar as  
720 it requires that the experience or episode of perceptual awareness have  
721 an object in *both* senses detailed above. Second, perceptual *awareness* is  
722 typically understood as reflexive in the sense best characterised by quot-  
723 ing directly from Moore’s ‘Refutation of Idealism’:





724 To be aware of the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image -  
725 of a 'thing', of which 'blue' and some other element are constituent parts  
726 in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue bead.  
727 It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness being used, in both  
728 cases, in exactly the same sense. (Moore 1903: 25)

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729 That perceptual awareness involves awareness *of awareness* explains why  
730 sensory experience, so understood, can be meaningfully cast as a kind of  
731 knowing, as the Naïve Realist often insists—this follows from the claim  
732 that experience is direct acquaintance with mind-independent worldly  
733 things and events, etc. But that awareness *could* be a kind of knowing  
734 is also, one would think, explained by the fact that genuine perception  
735 involves what Marty calls correlation: it involves the presentation of an  
736 existent object.<sup>28</sup>

737 Now, although perceptual awareness requires more than perceptual  
738 correlation insofar as the former but not the latter is conceived to have  
739 an object in the second sense as well as the first, and insofar as the latter,  
740 but not necessarily the former, involves reflexive awareness, it is also the  
741 case that many Naïve Realists deny that we are *aware* of anything in  
742 hallucination. This might seem to tally with Marty since although per-  
743 ceptual awareness requires more than correlation, correlation demands  
744 the coexistence of its relata. If this requirement were 'inherited' by  
745 awareness then, it would follow that in the absence of the existence of  
746 the object apparently presented, as in hallucination, there could be no  
747 awareness. Marty, I suspect, would say differently.

748 On the Martyan picture I am sketching, in hallucination, there may  
749 be relative determination *without correlation*. Cast differently, the hallu-  
750 cinatory experience does not 'have an object' in the first, transcendent  
751 sense, but it does in the second, intentional sense. It is worth harnessing  
752 G. E. M. Anscombe's criticism of the Ordinary Language philosopher  
753 in her difficult paper 'The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical  
754 Feature' to make sense of this.

755 In saying that Marty seems to allow that hallucination involves the  
756 presenting of a non-existent object, it might be thought that the use of  
757 'object' deployed here is that which is also admitted by the sense-datum  
758 theorist or Meinongian when they wish to preserve the intuition that in



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759 such cases (or in thinking of entities like unicorns say) we *are* aware of,  
760 in experience (or in our thinking of), some *thing*. But Marty does not  
761 seem to have this particular understanding of ‘object’ in mind, at least  
762 in the case of hallucination. This is because he seems to think that in  
763 these cases the meaning of ‘object’ is transferred from cases where pred-  
764 icates are applied to real objects; there is a kind of linguistic *Bild*, or fic-  
765 tion of inner linguistic form, as though:

766       one were to allow the person portrayed to inhabit the portrait because of  
767       the similarity between the contours and colours of the painted bit of can-  
768       vas and those of the portrayed body or face. (RZ, §12: 58)

769 This recalls G. E. M. Anscombe’s critique of both the Ordinary  
770 Language philosopher and the sense-datum theorist. Both theorists  
771 offer an *ontological* response to the question ‘what do you see?’ That is,  
772 they respond by giving the name of *entities*, things—everyday objects  
773 or, alternatively, sense data—as *things* seen. But while the Ordinary  
774 Language theorist denies that we see anything in hallucination—since  
775 what we *see* are ordinary things—the sense data insists that we see some  
776 thing, some data of sense! In contrast, Anscombe recommends a *gram-*  
777 *matical* approach. The objects of sensation are not things, in the weighty  
778 ontological sense but *direct objects* of the sensation verb. Thus, we can  
779 intelligibly say that we see things even in cases where it is evident to all,  
780 including the speaker, that no such thing exists in the perceiver’s vicin-  
781 ity. How does this shift from ontology to grammar help the Martyan  
782 theorist, who is nonetheless tempted by Naïve Realism with respect to  
783 the nature of phenomenal character?

784       Notice that when the Naïve Realist denies, as she typically does, that  
785       in hallucinatory experience we are aware of anything, in doing so, she  
786       *preserves* the sense of ‘thing’ that applies in the good, non-hallucinatory  
787       case—this is precisely why she denies that we are aware of anything in  
788       the hallucinatory case. It strikes me, however, that a Martyan Naïve  
789       Realist should want to urge that genuine perception involves correla-  
790       tion and that this is what grounds phenomenal character, but without  
791       deploying what is ostensibly a linguistic picture to articulate the met-  
792       aphysical structure of experience (and which may in turn lead one to



793 insist that in hallucinatory experience we cannot *say* that something  
794 is seen). To clarify: sensation verbs take direct objects. The verb 'to be  
795 aware' though not a sensation verb strictly speaking also takes a *gram-*  
796 *matical* object. The Naïve Realist, in noting that in hallucination,  
797 by definition, there is nothing in the world that answers the subject's  
798 description of what they 'see', and in supposing that phenomenal char-  
799 acter is partly constituted by the worldly objects of which the perceiver  
800 is putatively aware, may be tempted to suppose both that nothing is  
801 seen—i.e. the subject is mistaken in her use of that term, that she is not  
802 thereby aware of anything—and, further, that the experience thereby  
803 lacks phenomenal character.

804 The Martyan picture is more circumspect. It says only that hallucina-  
805 tion involves the presenting of a non-existent object. But, if I am right,  
806 Marty does not want to read the notion of object here—an intentional  
807 notion—*ontologically*. Scholarly work is required to establish the scope  
808 and correctness of this claim.

## 809 7 'Raum' and Room

810 To conclude, I want to sketch briefly two positive lessons that fall out of  
811 my attempt to provide for a Martyan Naïve Realism.

812 At the outset I noted what I called the *Naïve Presupposition*, which  
813 is just the perceptual datum that we do not take the spaces that bodies  
814 fill to be identical with them; and this is partly why it makes sense to  
815 say that things appear to be located at places. The *Assimilation Thesis*,  
816 recall, is the idea that perceptual conscious is fundamentally shaped by  
817 (or constituted by) worldly objects. We might not ask: Are these two  
818 conceptually or theoretically related?

819 I think it is plain that they are not *conceptually* related. Nonetheless,  
820 if the generic characterisation I have given of Naïve Realism above is  
821 accurate, they are, at least, theoretically related. How so?

822 For those theorists who think the perceptual relation is a relation  
823 of awareness, and where the possibility of *Assimilation* is explained by  
824 the subject's standing in such a relation of awareness to the objects



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825 of her experience, there may be a tendency to think that the *Naïve*  
826 *Presupposition* is likewise assured. Why so?

827 Awareness is a non-solipsistic relation. P. F. Strawson famously pro-  
828 posed that a requirement on non-solipsistic consciousness is that a  
829 subject be able to conceive of things existing in the absence of her expe-  
830 rience of them where this requires a conception of space. If having a  
831 conception of space is partially what grounds the phenomenology that  
832 the *Naïve Presupposition* is supposed to capture however, and where  
833 the possibility of awareness is secured when there is such a conception,  
834 awareness being non-solipsistic, then the *Assimilation Thesis* and the  
835 *Naïve Presupposition* should go hand in hand.

836 If we take Naïve Realism to be a thesis, *only*, about the fundamen-  
837 tal *nature* of phenomenal character however, a weaker form of rela-  
838 tionism may suffice. What form this may take, I leave for some other  
839 occasion, suffice to say that unyoking the *Naïve Presupposition* from the  
840 *Assimilation Thesis* opens up explanatory paths not much explored in  
841 contemporary analytic philosophy of perception. This is one reason for  
842 taking seriously Marty's peculiar take on space—one which, as I under-  
843 stand it, is nonetheless supposed to honour perceptual and linguistic  
844 data. Another is the following:

845 I began this paper by detailing a variety of ways in which the words  
846 'place' and 'space' can be used. I noted Marty's inclusion in this list of  
847 the English word 'room', completely untheorised in contemporary  
848 analytic philosophy of perception—for various reasons, not uncon-  
849 nected with the point above, 'room' just vanishes from contemporary  
850 analytic theorising (the Brentanian school is thereby an informative  
851 counterpoint).

852 Johansson, this volume, explains in what sense the concept of 'a room'  
853 helps isolate Marty's conception of '*Raum*', with which it overlaps:

854 A room is regarded neither as some kind of relations between the things  
855 in it, nor as a contingent structure inhering in the properties of the things  
856 there. Also, rooms can always easily be thought of as being completely  
857 empty, as three-dimensional holes so to speak; and some of them are also  
858 so perceived. Such a room is homogenous in the sense that all its different  
859 parts are regarded as exactly similar in their emptiness. (This volume, p. x)



860 This gloss is illuminating. Empty rooms can be perceived—the empty  
861 space they enclose is co-seen with the walls which 'line' the room (recall,  
862 for Marty, we cannot see space without seeing localised quality). But  
863 there are a host of other uses that are relevant to the concept of space  
864 that contemporary analytic philosophers have almost wholly ignored. In  
865 English, 'room' can sometimes mean dimensional extent—the amount  
866 of space that is or may be taken up by a thing, event or process. In such  
867 cases, there may be 'more' or less 'room'. Sometimes 'room' refers not to  
868 some dimensional extent but the capacity to accommodate a person or  
869 thing or to allow a particular kind of action; 'room' in this sense appears  
870 with modifying words such as 'ample', 'enough', 'plenty of'; sometimes  
871 there can be 'no room'.

872 Marty takes it that spatial relations are *there*: 'We find them there  
873 before us'. Space is not a nexus of spatial relations between real things  
874 on this view, a conception of which is a condition on the possibility  
875 of awareness and so, on certain views, experience. Nor are experienced  
876 spatial relations determined relative to ourselves, where we are experi-  
877 enced in *modo recto*, and everything else in the oblique mode. Rather,  
878 on a Martyan understanding, as I have been telling it, there are exist-  
879 ent ways in which our world is shaped, ways which in turn shape our  
880 consciousness.

881 Anscombe famously thought that no action could fail to have moral  
882 significance—even the plucking of a single flower. Assuming perceiving  
883 involves perceptual activity, it is hardly plausible that this demanding  
884 and austere thought could apply to *Raum* qua 'space'. Yet although, as  
885 Johansson urges, *Raum* is homogeneous *in its emptiness*, 'room' in some  
886 of the above senses, *which is also there*—room for a person, or for an  
887 event—is not. And this suggests, at least to me, an unexplored place for  
888 the theorist of perception to retreat to, and 'dwell in' with her theories.

## 889 Notes

- 890 1. Page numbers refer to the original edition text.
- 891 2. For discussion, see Johansson, this volume, as well as Johansson (1990),  
892 Rosaria Egidi (1990), and Barry Smith (1990).



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- 893 3. Trans. Mulligan and Schuhmann, K. in Mulligan (1990: 225–236).
- 894 4. Though intentional theories are sometimes presented as relational—
- 895 experience involves an intentional relation to sensible properties (that
- 896 may or may not be instantiated)—I leave explicit consideration of this
- 897 construal aside. See, for example, Pautz (2010).
- 898 5. Marty’s work is untranslated. The exposition that follows is far from
- 899 scholarly. I have been helped in my comprehension by the work of
- 900 Chisholm, Johansson, Mulligan, Simons, Smith, and, particularly,
- 901 Egidi in the 1990 volume ‘Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics’, edited by
- 902 Kevin Mulligan. Hélène Leblanc and Mark Textor helped me with the
- 903 translation of some puzzling passages. Special thanks to Craig French
- 904 and Ingvar Johansson for insightful comments on an earlier draft.
- 905 6. He supplements this point with an interesting and early discussion of
- 906 modality-specific spatial fields, which I leave aside.
- 907 7. Husserl is more explicit on this point in his 1907 *Thing and Space* lec-
- 908 tures: ‘It must be noted, however, that a given empty space is neces-
- 909 sarily an empty space between given things or phantom of things. If
- 910 nothing spatial at all is given, then neither is any space’ (Husserl
- 911 1997/1973: 323, fn. 1).
- 912 8. See instead Mac Cumhaill (in preparation).
- 913 9. Thanks to Mark Textor and Hélène Leblanc for suggestions as to how
- 914 to translate this passage.
- 915 10. See C. B. Martin (2006).
- 916 11. See O. Massin (forthcoming) for a discussion of the conception of
- 917 ‘founded’ relations.
- 918 12. See Barry Smith (1988) for discussion of Brentano’s notion of a contin-
- 919 uum, and the distinction, and relations, between spatial and temporal
- 920 continua.
- 921 13. Ingvar Johansson rightly points that if things are *partly* individuated
- 922 with respect to places, there is no problem with movement.
- 923 14. This translation appears in Johansson (1990: 153). Johansson notes
- 924 that this characterisation leads to a peculiar consequence: there must be
- 925 at least two different kinds of grounded relations—those grounded in
- 926 something real (e.g. colour resemblance and difference of weight) and
- 927 those grounded in something non-real (e.g. spatial relations).
- 928 15. We can now see perhaps why Marty mostly favours the term ‘ausgebret-
- 929 itet’ (spread out) to characterise the relation of sensible matter to form,
- 930 over ‘durchdringend’ (interpenetrated), used by Stumpf.



- 931 16. See, however discussion at §§17–18.
- 932 17. Johansson (2018) argues that space is objective in Marty's sense, but
- 933 that the space of perceptual experience is nonetheless subjective. Since
- 934 a careful elaboration of Johansson's subtle and distinctive position
- 935 requires the introduction of a number of concepts that are peculiar
- 936 to Johansson (for instance the notion of intentional-logical distance),
- 937 I treat his view directly and in detail elsewhere.
- 938 18. Prima facie, Chalmers recent development of spatial functionalism
- 939 (Chalmers 2006, 2012, forthcoming), a species of phenomenology-first
- 940 representationalism where veridical space perception involves a Fregean
- 941 manner of presentation, might seem to escape this difficulty. I leave the
- 942 reader to follow this position up. I would suggest however that Fregean
- 943 representationalism is also at odds with Marty's picture, albeit for
- 944 another reason: it makes visible space essentially ideal.
- 945 19. I recognise that this functional treatment may be viewed as inadequate
- 946 in a number of respects. It defines sense-data in terms of non-hallu-
- 947 cinatory experience rather than, as is more common, by appealing to
- 948 historical responses to the argument for hallucination and illusion (see
- 949 Fish 2010 for discussion). I do this for dialectical reasons. Second, my
- 950 formulation may prompt epistemic worries—for instance, it might
- 951 be thought that whether or not an entity is a sense datum cannot be
- 952 determined until it is known whether experience is non-hallucinatory.
- 953 I don't think this is a difficulty for a functional treatment for the
- 954 kinds of reasons spelt out in Martin (2004). Further, it does not
- 955 strike me that saying that a sense-datum is *whatever* one is aware of in
- 956 non-hallucinatory perception *in virtue of which* objects (say) are indi-
- 957 rectly sensed, does not preclude the further claim that hallucination
- 958 involves entities of the same kind but in virtue of which nothing is
- 959 sensed. Thanks to Ingvar Johansson for raising these worries.
- 960 20. For discussion, H. H. Price (1932).
- 961 21. See fn. 7.
- 962 22. Translated by K. Mulligan and K. Schuhmann (1990).
- 963 23. It is plausible to think that, for the world to play a consciousness-shap-
- 964 ing rôle, the subject must be awake. Merely being awake isn't sufficient
- 965 for perception however—one could be awake in a sensory-deprivation
- 966 tank.
- 967 24. To be clear: both according to Marty and Brentano, a presenting may
- 968 be a presenting of an existing or non-existing object. But according to





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- 969 Marty, only the presenting of an existing object really has an object.  
 970 This constitutes a difference between Brentano and the late Marty:  
 971 Brentano maintained that even the presenting of a non-existing object  
 972 has in a sense an object. Thanks to Giuliano Bacigalupo for emphasising  
 973 this point.
- 974 25. I leave aside the question as to how space could be *phenomenally*  
 975 represented.
  - 976 26. An important though not unproblematic exception is of course when  
 977 we perceive ‘ourselves’.
  - 978 27. Johansson distinguishes between material-logical and intentional-  
 979 logical distance, an important and productive distinction that I discuss  
 980 in Mac Cumhaill (in progress).
  - 981 28. Cf. Johansson (2014, Section 4).

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