

MIXED FEELINGS. CARL STUMPF'S CRITICISM OF JAMES AND BRENTANO ON EMOTIONS*

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In *The Principles of Psychology*, William James not only recognizes his debt to Carl Stumpf regarding the perception of space and the psychology of sound, but he also considers Stumpf as “the most philosophical and profound of all writers” (James 1890, 911). James and Stumpf maintained a friendly relationship since they first met in Prague in 1882 and had a considerable correspondence, which testifies to an evident interest in each other’s work in the field of psychology (cf. Dazzi, 1994). In 1928, Stumpf published a small book dedicated entirely to this correspondence, in which he expressed his esteem and affection for James, whom, on the occasion of the latter’s nomination as a corresponding member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences, Stumpf describes as “the most outstanding philosophical mind that the new world has created until now.” In this work, Stumpf claims that, beyond his criticism of James’s psychology, there is a broad consensus between his *Erfahrungsphilosophie* and James’s radical empiricism, namely regarding their world view and their methods:

From a methodological point of view, he calls [his world view] radical empiricism, because (from a purely intellectual point of view) it acknowledges all and only what is given in experience as real. No covering up, no escape through reasoning, but only taking things as they are: this is probably the most general maxim of this theory of knowledge. (1928b, 31)

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However, this starting point in what is given in experience is not only a maxim, but also represents for both proponents of empiricism the primary source of all contents and concepts of thought (cf. Stumpf 1928b, 22). Despite this consensus on method, Stumpf does not espouse James's sensualism, as evidenced by his criticism of James's theory of emotions.

Stumpf's long-lasting relationship with Brentano is well known, and despite his significant deviations from Brentano's philosophy, Stumpf always unequivocally advocated Brentano's philosophical program until his very last work, *Erkenntnislehre*, which is in fact dedicated to Brentano. Stumpf's main departures from Brentano's psychology are quite obvious with respect to his views on emotions. Indeed, Brentano's position on emotions and sensory feelings represents the counterpart of James's sensualism, and this opposition corresponds exactly to the distinction that Stumpf established between emotions, which are intentional states such as beliefs and desires, and what he calls *Gefühlsempfindungen* or sensory feelings, which are sensations, such as colours and sounds. In all his writings on affective states, Stumpf opposed sensualism to a form of mentalism as epitomized by the work of Wundt or by Brentano's representationalism, which Stumpf accused of committing the opposite error to that of sensualism insofar as it reduces sensory feelings to objects or properties of mental states. In short, Stumpf's position on this issue is *prima facie* a kind of compromise between James' and Brentano's views in that he argues against Brentano that sensory feelings are necessary conditions of emotional experience in general, and against James, that this phenomenal dimension of emotional experience is not by itself a sufficient condition. Ultimately, the main issue at the heart of this debate is the distinction introduced by Stumpf in 1906 between mental states and phenomena, and more generally the distinction between phenomenology understood as the science of phenomena and psychology understood in a narrow sense as the science of functions or mental states.

Stumpf's three main papers on the topic of affective states are collected in a book published in 1928 under the title *Gefühl und Gefühlsempfindungen*, in which one also finds a substantial introduction on the classification of affective states.¹ The first two articles are

¹ The references to Stumpf's three papers (Stumpf 1899, 1907, 1916b) are taken from Stumpf (1928a).

complementary: the first, published in 1899 under the title "Über den Begriff der Gemütsbewegung" deals with emotions and is specifically directed against James' sensualist theory of emotions (Stumpf 1924, 46); in the second article, entitled "Über Gefühlsempfindungen" and published in 1907, Stumpf examines three theories of sensory feelings. The latter article belongs to a period of change in the thought of Stumpf and is the result of extensive research, the findings of which were presented to the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 1905 and published the following year in two important treatises (1906a, 1906b). I have in mind, more specifically, Stumpf's article "Phenomena and Psychical Functions," in which substantial changes are made to his theory of sense perception and his views on phenomena put forth in his 1899 paper. This is also confirmed in his lectures on psychology delivered in the winter semester of 1907, in which great importance is attached to James' views on emotions. Stumpf's prevailing views on affects during this period remained unchanged until his last book, *Erkenntnislehre*, published posthumously. Finally, another important source of Stumpf's discussions on the topic of emotions is his rich correspondence with Brentano, which we will examine in the second part of this study.

1 Stumpf's classification of mental states

The starting point of the controversy that opposes Stumpf to Brentano and James on the nature of affective states and sensory feelings lies in the distinction between emotions and sensory feelings. There are several types of sensation that fall under the category of sensory feelings:

[First] the purely bodily pains (that is, those which appear without any essential involvement of intellectual functions), whether they are set up from within or from without the organism; secondly, the feeling of bodily well-being in its more general and in its more special forms, the latter of which includes the pleasure component in a tickle, the feeling produced by an itch, and sexual feelings; and lastly the agreeableness and disagreeableness that may be connected, in the most various degrees of gradation, with the sensations of all or nearly all the "special" senses, with temperatures, odours, tastes, tones, colours. (Stumpf 1928a, 54-55)

Stumpf argues that there is a *specific* difference between sensory feelings, which are sensory qualities such as colours and sounds, and emotions, which are defined in terms of “an affective state which is directed toward a judged state of affairs” (1928a, 56). The essential difference between elementary feelings and emotions lies in the fact that the latter is directed toward complex objects, and more specifically, toward states of affairs, thereby presupposing a judgment:

Concerning states of feelings which undoubtedly and in the most appropriate sense of the term belong to the class of affects, we are saying that they relate to a state of affairs about which we are pleased, angry, irritated, afraid, etc. That is to say, the affect is founded on a judgment. In contrast, the sensory agreeableness of a colour or a taste is triggered directly by the sensory impression. (1928a, 2-3)

Let us for the moment leave aside the topic of sensory feelings in order to concentrate on Stumpf’s conception of emotions proper. The simplest way to approach this complex topic is through the classification of mental states which Stumpf presents in the preface to his 1928 book.

Unlike Brentano, Stumpf recognizes only two major classes of functions or mental states, namely, intellectual functions and emotional functions. This classification is based on a distinction put forth between two possible modes of intentional relations through which consciousness refers to its objects. To these two modes of intentional relations correspond two distinct types of attitudes (*Stellungnahmen*) directed toward their objects, namely, a pleasurable (*gemütlich*) attitude (1928a, 68) with respect to the class of affective states, and a cognitive stance in the case of the class of judgments, i.e., affirmation and negation. All functions that fall under one of these two classes are related hierarchically with one another, so that the functions of the second class, which are more complex, presuppose and are based on the functions of the first. The most basic function is sensory perception, which is directly related to sensory phenomena and, thus, represents the basis of this classification. Between perception and judgments we must also presuppose numerous operations, such as abstraction and concept formation, which provide higher states of this class with their conceptual content (1906a, 4-5).

Stumpf distinguishes the class of affective functions, to which emotions belong, from the class of intellectual functions. To under-

stand the nature of emotions, we must also consider a new division within the field of affective functions, that of passive and active states. The subclass of active affects is dominated by desires (*Begehrungen*), which in turn is subdivided into elementary desires (instincts) and volitional acts. Stumpf says very little about these basic desires except that they are instincts (like hunger) and that they presuppose and are based on passive elementary feelings (1928, xv). In his 1907 lectures on psychology, Stumpf defines these as *Lustgefühle*, which are essentially linked to behaviour and are related to volitional actions in the same way that elementary feelings are related to emotions in the class of active states. However, there are important differences between these two subclasses, the most important of which being that only active affects lead to (instinctive or volitional) actions. Stumpf uses the term *Streben* (striving, or what in today's action theory would be called an "act of trying") to characterize the elementary feelings of this subclass (1940, 837). Although this term refers to a tendency or an orientation toward something, which is also the main characteristic of mental states proper, it does not fall under the concept of intentionality mainly because the instinctive states that we find in animals lack concepts and, therefore, intentional contents. It refers rather to a behavioural disposition. The term *Seinsollen* (ought to be), by which Stumpf characterizes this class of affective functions, designates precisely this tendency toward a goal, i.e., a value understood as the prime object of desire, the latter being an intention or a plan to be achieved through voluntary actions (1928, p. xv). Values are for this subclass of active affective states what states of affairs are for judgments. Passion, envy, wishes, and will are all desires whose content is a value, or to quote Stumpf, "an ought to be in accordance with the intention of the desiring [subject]" (1940, 836), and by "intention," he means "something which appears to the desiring subject as somehow a consequence of his momentary valuable state" (1940, 837).

Emotions belong to the subclass of passive sentiments. Affects are called passive when they have as an object something existent, i.e., the object of a true judgment, while active affects are obligations (1928a, ix). The class of passive affects is subdivided into elementary feelings and emotional states. The essential difference between these two subclasses is that elementary feelings are triggered directly by sensory phenomena without the aid of any other classes of functions and their contents, be they judgments or concepts, while emotions, which are

intentional states directed toward states of affairs, presuppose the formation of concepts and conceptual thought broadly understood (1928a, ix). The basic difference between elementary feelings and emotions is one of complexity, and it is comparable to the difference between an accomplished musician and a novice.

Let us focus on the structure of an act of judgment given the latter's fundamental role in Stumpf's definition of an emotion as a passive affective state directed toward a state of affairs. Stumpf distinguishes, in an act of judging, between the latter's quality, matter, content, and object. The quality of judgment is affirmation and negation, and that which is affirmed or rejected is its content or meaning. As in Brentano, the matter of an existential judgment of the form "this rectangular table exists" is provided by the presentation of "table" and "rectangular," which presuppose of course the formation of the corresponding concepts. Unlike Meinong, and in agreement with Husserl, Stumpf conceives of states of affairs as truth-makers, whereas (propositional) contents of judgment are considered truth-bearers. The truth of this proposition depends partly on the appropriateness of the quality of this state to its matter (1939, 61) and partly on internal perception. The content of a judgment is also distinct from its object, i.e., from the state of affairs taken to be an existent true judgment. When Stumpf says that states of affairs are expressed linguistically in subordinate clauses of the form "that P", he has in mind an indirect judgment in which the state of affairs is considered as the matter of a new judgment such as "that P is true or evident" or "I wish or desire that P." However, in a direct judgment, P stands for the content of the propositional attitude (*Gebilde*) and not for the judged state of affairs. Furthermore, when Stumpf claims that emotions are based on judgments and that they have states of affairs as objects, judgments and state of affairs must be understood in a very broad sense. For the object of an emotion can be a state of affairs, known or believed, that we formulate in the linguistic form of a statement or as something that we think of conceptually (1928a, 13); however, it does not necessarily involve an actual or explicit judgment.

Stumpf's classification raises several questions, in particular, regarding the justification of subsuming emotions under the same class as desire and will, given their significant structural differences. For, to use John Searle's terminology (1983), desires and intentions (and will) have different conditions of satisfaction and different directions

of fit: the fulfilment of the object of a desire requires a change in the world, and accordingly, its direction of fit is a world-to-mind relation, whereas judgments (and emotions) have the opposite direction of fit insofar as they must fit with the existing state of affairs; their conditions of satisfaction therefore coincide with their truth conditions, and their direction of fit is a mind-to-world relation. Of course, Stumpf's criterion for this classification is not the structure but the quality of an act, i.e., the attitude or stance toward one and the same state of affairs. However, we will see that it is also difficult to subsume these two subclasses under one and the same attitude. Stumpf's definition of emotions raises further problems, namely, the relation between emotion and judgment and that of emotion and sensory feelings, which we will examine in the fourth section.

2 Criticism of James's sensualist theory of emotions

In his paper "Über Gefühlsempfindungen," Stumpf distinguished between three competing theories of sensory feelings, to which correspond, respectively, the positions of James, Wundt, and Stumpf himself (Titchener, 1908). Stumpf claims that Brentano, like himself, advocates the third theory, according to which sensory feelings are themselves sensations:

The so-called sensory feelings or affective tone of sensations are themselves sensations (Sinnesempfindungen). Therefore, they do not belong to the functional side but to the objective side of consciousness, not to the mental states but to the material, provided that colours, sounds, and noises belong to the objective side and to the material of consciousness and in the same way that we usually do it. (1928a, 93)

However, this is not Brentano's position, as confirmed by his correspondence and a long footnote to his paper "From the psychological analysis of sound qualities in their properly first elements," also published in 1907. In fact Brentano's position in this regard is far from clear, as Stumpf wrote to James in a letter from 1899:

It seems that you have not yet received the last article that I sent you, 'Über den Begriff der Gemütsbewegung.' Since I took there a position which is opposed to your theory, I originally intended to send an accompanying letter [...]. Between Brentano and me things have taken a curious turn. I thought that I was rather in agreement with him, in respect to emotions, and now I have received a letter from him, seven

pages long, in which he definitely declares himself in favour of your views and against mine. (Stumpf in Dazzi 1994, 247)

This passage suggests that Stumpf also seems to have associated Brentano with the first theory, i.e., to James's sensualism. However, Brentano in fact advocated a version of the second theory according to which sensory feelings belong to a kind of mental state and to the same genus as emotions (Stumpf 1928a, 108). Brentano's position on that issue stands out clearly in his theory of primary and secondary objects, which we will discuss in the next section.

James advocates a version of the first theory according to which sensory feelings and emotions are properties (attributes, moments, aspects, modes of change) of sensations. In the same way that a sensation has a quality (red, hot, bitter), intensity, duration, and, in the case of the senses of touch and sight, a spatial extension and location, sensory feelings possess an affective tone [*Gefühlston*] as, for example, the sensation of hunger and the unpleasant bodily feeling produced by this sensation. According to this theory, this attribute of affective tone represents the main property of emotions understood as bodily feelings (1928a, 18-19).

Stumpf dedicated much of his 1899 paper to criticizing the James-Lange sensualist theory of emotions. His discussion focused partly on the physiological assumptions of their theory and partly on their definition of emotions and bodily feelings. For the purposes of this study, we will emphasize Stumpf's main objections to their definition of sensory feelings. Let us begin with an outline of James's sensualist conception of emotions in 'What is an Emotion?' which Stumpf summarizes in this passage taken from his 1899 paper:

The nature of affects consists in the peripheral bodily processes, which we regard as expressive movements, reactions, side effects; more precisely (since the affect is something mental) in the sensations and sensory feelings that we have from these peripheral bodily processes. Trembling is fear, crying is sorrow, blush is shame; more specifically, again: the sensation of trembling and all changes related to blood vessels, respiratory and cardiac movements and so on, are fearing ... (1928a, 17)

Stumpf's first objection to this definition concerns James's ideomotor hypothesis, according to which each and every sensation and presenta-

tion (and the corresponding central processes in the brain) influences the peripheral processes of the body (Stumpf 1928, 32). This hypothesis is central to James's account of emotions defined in terms of the expression of movements and bodily reactions (crying is sorrow), understood as organic reactions and sensations. Stumpf argues that this hypothesis is not plausible because, as Reizenstein (2003) points out, it is not clear what adaptational value would result from a brain that is, to quote Stumpf, "like a tube through which every affective stimulus immediately flows to the periphery (...) and it is good luck, adds Stumpf, that we do *not* react so sensitively" (Stumpf 1928a, 82-83).

Stumpf's second objection to this theory concerns the relation between physical sensations or bodily feelings and the underlying brain processes. He claims that James theory does not provide evidence as to the correspondence between peripheral bodily reactions and the underlying processes of the central nervous system (1928a, p. 38). It follows that James definition of affects in terms of organic sensations is at best a postulate. For even if we had such a proof, it could not be used to justify our actually experiencing these sensations, or more precisely, the phenomena understood as contents of sensations. Hence, Stumpf's criticism of this definition of affects: it is not attributed to consciousness nor justified by the evidence of internal perception, to use Brentano's expression, and it stands in flagrant contradiction with the basic principles of James radical empiricism (1928a, 37).

Stumpf's fourth objection is directed against the very form taken by James definition of emotions, i.e., as a definition by identification, which consists in reducing the *definiendum* to the *definiens*, such as by defining water in terms of its chemical properties. Stumpf claims that this type of definition must be reversible, i.e., to use James' definition, if every emotion is a sensory feeling, then sensory feelings such as hunger and gastric pressure must also fall under the class of affective states (Stumpf 1928a, 38). Stumpf argues against James that the generic difference between sensory feelings and emotions rules out any attempt to reduce one of these terms to the other. Furthermore, by not recognizing the specific distinction between phenomena and psychic functions and by seeking to reduce emotions to bodily feelings, James theory is unable to account for more complex emotional experiences such as artistic emotions. In aesthetic experiences, and more specifically, in the aesthetic enjoyment provided, for exam-

ple, by a work of art, there is a specific difference (and not only a difference in degree of intensity) between aesthetic enjoyment and bodily pain or sensory feelings such as the pleasure triggered by this object. For aesthetic enjoyment presupposes the involvement of judgment and conceptual thought in general (Stumpf 1928a, 41-2). However, Stumpf attributes to James the merit of having shown, against the prevailing intellectualist conceptions of emotions, the importance of sensory feelings for a full-fledged theory of emotions.

3 Stumpf's criticism of Brentano

In his book *Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie und Theodizee*, Georg Katkov, a pupil of O. Kraus in Prague, said of the controversy opposing Stumpf to Brentano's theory of affects that it "is perhaps the most important reaction of modern psychology to Brentano's ideas" (1937, 94-95). Some aspects of the controversy were known at the time when Katkov published his book, in particular, through Brentano's long footnote, which we mentioned above and in which Brentano discussed some of his disagreements with Stumpf on sensory feelings and emotions. Part of Stumpf's reaction to Brentano's objections was published several years later in a paper entitled 'Apology of Sensory Feelings,' in which Stumpf finally recognizes the existence of significant disagreements with Brentano, not only on sensory feelings and emotions, but also on several other aspects of his psychology. However, the most important source of information on this controversy is their rich correspondence, which shows, namely, that these issues were the subject of many missives, from the publication in 1899 of Stumpf's article on emotions until Brentano's death in 1917.² All these

² Brentano's first reaction to Stumpf (1899) is a ten-page letter dated August 18, 1899, in which he criticizes Stumpf for having deviated from the original doctrine on the following points: the lack of a principle of classification that Brentano conceives of in this letter as intentional inexistence (1989, 59); and Stumpf's rejection of Brentano's classification into three classes (representation, judgment, and emotion) in favour of a classification whose two main classes are intellectual and emotional functions. Hence the question as to what justifies subsuming representations and judgments under the single class of intellectual functions. Brentano also questions the distinction within the class of affects between passive and active states. Finally, their positions differ on the nature of sensory feelings and phenomena (i.e. content of sensation). In reaction to Brentano's letter, Stumpf merely tries to minimize his disagreement with Brentano and claims that he remains in agreement with the initial doctrine on most issues raised by Brentano's letter. In 'Über Gefühlsempfindungen' (1928a, 4) Stumpf thought his views on emotions and sense feelings were in agreement with Brentano's psychology

documents bear witness to the fact that this dispute concerns several key aspects of Brentano's descriptive psychology: the classification of

on the basis of a conversation he had with the latter. However, in a letter dated January 1, 1907, Stumpf reports that he was told by Marty that he misunderstood once again Brentano. Brentano reminded Stumpf that he was absolutely not in agreement with his theory in a long footnote to his paper "From the psychological analysis of sound qualities in their properly first elements" (1907). In this footnote, Brentano summarizes in five points his main disagreements with Stumpf. For Stumpf, pleasure and pain are sensory qualities like colour and sound. For Brentano, they are emotions or mental phenomena. For Stumpf, there is nothing common between sensory pleasure and enjoyment (*Wohlgefallen*); for Brentano, on the contrary, '*die sinnliche Lust ist ein Wohlgefallen, der sinnliche Schmerz ist ein Missfallen, welche auf einen Empfindungsakt gerichtet sind, zu dem sie selbst gehören*' (2009, 177). They also disagree on the issue of internal perception: according to Brentano, the evidence of internal perception justifies the existence of pleasure and pain. As well, they disagree on the nature of sensations and their relation to mental acts. Brentano differs from Stumpf in his theory of primary and secondary objects: "Rather, it is for me the fact that each act of sensation has, in addition to its primary object, itself as a secondary object, or, as Aristotle says, *en parergo*, and in several ways; and that is the case of sensations of pleasure and pain as opposed to others (such as seeing and hearing), emotionally in particular, i.e. in the modes of love and hate" (2009, 178). By separating pleasure and displeasure from aesthetic enjoyment proper, Stumpf excludes, at the same time, pleasure and displeasure from the field of aesthetic enjoyment (1907, 238). In 'Apology of Sensory Feelings' (1916a), Stumpf responds to Brentano's criticism. He now recognizes the existence of significant disagreements with Brentano not only on the matter of sense-feelings, but also on other fundamental aspects of his psychology. Stumpf acknowledges the heterogeneous nature of affects or emotion, which fall under the class of functions, and the pleasure and displeasure that belong to the domain of sensory phenomena. This raises the question of what the relationship between sensory phenomena and functions or intentional acts consists in. It follows that pleasure and displeasure are different from aesthetic enjoyment understood as an emotion, which presupposes an act and whose object is a state of affairs. As a sensory phenomenon, the reality of pleasure and displeasure cannot, by definition, be justified by the evidence of internal perception since it applies only to mental acts or functions. Stumpf criticizes Brentano's doctrine of primary and secondary objects, as we will see below. Stumpf claims that he does not exclude pleasure and displeasure from the field of aesthetics since he believes that sensory feelings are necessary conditions to experience any kind of aesthetic enjoyment. In one of his last letters to Stumpf dated from July 1916, Brentano comments on Stumpf's responses in 'Apology' and his paper 'Verlust der Gefühlsempfindungen im Tongebiete' and accuses him of having misunderstood his position on several points because he does not take into account the results of his new research in the field of sensations. In this long letter, Brentano informs Stumpf of some of the changes in his conception of sensations and accuses the latter of dismissing the evidence of inner perception in the field of psychology. Finally, Stumpf concludes this long controversy with Brentano in the preface to his 1928 book, in which Stumpf's three main articles on affects are collected.

mental states; the criterion of this classification; external or sensory perception and the evidence of inner perception; Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects; and the nature of sensations and aesthetic enjoyment. Given the complexity and the number of issues raised in the course of these discussions, it is very difficult to make a sound and precise diagnosis on the ins and outs of the discussion and, above all, to identify the philosophical stakes that divide both philosophers. Moreover, their respective positions evolved during the course of this period, so much so that Stumpf does not seem to have succeeded in identifying Brentano's final position on affects until 1916 (Stumpf 1916).

To resolve these difficulties, we will venture two hypotheses, one on the philosophical issues of this debate, the other on its motivations. Regarding the first, the philosophical issue lies in what might be called the intentionalist thesis or Brentano's representationalism. In his paper "The Pleasant and the Beautiful," Katkov makes a similar diagnosis when he says that Stumpf's conception of sensory feelings contradicts Brentano's intentionality thesis in such a way that it presupposes from the outset a non-intentional mode of consciousness such as pain or pleasure, whose contents are precisely sensory phenomena.³ Some remarks in Titchener's works on emotions follow along these lines.⁴ My second hypothesis is based on the fact that Stumpf was influenced by the criticism of his student Husserl, who in the *Logical Investigations*, and especially in Section 15 of the fifth *Investigation*, disputes Brentano's theory of emotions. This seems to be confirmed by Stumpf in his 1916 paper (1928a, 104), in which he recognizes that he had simply failed to mention Husserl's position in the *Logical Investigations* and the important distinction that Husserl

³ Katkov advocates Brentano's position on this issue and argues against Stumpf that applying the terms 'pleasure' or 'displeasure' to sensory qualities is a *denominatioes extrinsecae* because, originally, these terms refer to intentional relations much like the terms 'the seen,' 'the heard,' 'the feared,' and 'the hoped for' (1939, 184). Katkov's main argument is based on the principle that every conscious state is intentional—consciousness and intentionality being coextensive (1939, 181).

⁴ The American psychologist E. B. Titchener (1908, 1917, 1929) has extensively discussed Stumpf's theory of affects and he is one of Stumpf's main interlocutors in his article 'Apology of Sensory Feelings' (1928, 113 ff). Titchener also took a stance in the debate opposing Brentano and his students on many aspects of his psychology, particularly in his *Prolegomena*, in which he claims that the main issue of this debate is Brentano's intentionalism (1929, 177 ff). On this issue, see also Reisenzein (2003, 261-2) and Reisenzein & Schönplflug (1992, 35).

makes between sensory feeling and emotion, on which Stumpf's own criticism of Brentano is based. Stumpf's remarks are important not only because the position he advocated on these issues is very close to Husserl's but also because of the significant modifications Stumpf made to his original conception of sensory feelings as advocated in his 1899 paper. These modifications concern primarily Stumpf's theory of sensory perception and Brentano's thesis that perception is a judgment, which Stumpf abandoned during this period.

Let us first address the first hypothesis. In section 15 of the fifth *Investigation*, Husserl raises the general question "as to whether the 'intentional relation' suffices to demarcate 'psychical phenomena' (the domain of psychology) or not" (1982, 107). This question concerns Brentano's criterion for delineating the field of descriptive psychology from that of the natural sciences, i.e., what Brentano (1874) called intentional inexistence. Husserl wondered whether or not such a criterion justifies the classification based on the division between psychology understood as the "science of psychical phenomena," and the natural sciences understood as "sciences of physical phenomena." However, this is precisely what Husserl challenges in this section:

It can be shown that not all 'psychical phenomena' in the sense of a possible definition of psychology are psychical phenomena (i.e., mental acts) in Brentano's sense, and that, on the other hand, many genuine 'psychical phenomena' fall under Brentano's ambiguous rubric of 'physical phenomena'. (1982, 94)

Husserl argues against Brentano that phenomena such as *Gefühlsempfindungen* or sensory feelings, which belong to a stratum of experience that he calls, in the *Logical Investigations*, 'primary contents,' do not fall under any of the two classes of phenomena in Brentano's classification; hence, the criticism directed at Brentano for having confused, in his usage of the term *Gefühl*, sensory feeling (*Gefühlsempfindung*) with emotional state (*Gefühlsact*). The issue is whether pain and bodily pleasures, which are feelings associated with sensations of the senses (such as temperature, sound, taste, sound, and colour) are intentional states (such as joy, sadness, anger, hope, desire, and disgust), as Wundt and his followers (mainly Titchener and T. Ribot) claim, or whether they are sensory phenomena, as argued by advocates of sensualism such as James and Mach (Fisette, 2011). The

position advocated by Husserl in his *Logical Investigations* is based on the distinction between primary contents and mental states, and it consists in subsuming sensory feelings under the class of primary content, while maintaining with Brentano, contra the partisans of sensualism, that emotions such as shame or envy belong to the class of intentional acts.⁵

Husserl's position in his *Logical Investigations* is indeed very close to that advocated by Stumpf in his 1907 paper and in his 1906 treatise 'Phenomena and psychical functions,' in which he frequently refers to this work of Husserl. In his paper on sensory feelings, Stumpf confirms that his revisions on the nature of sensory feelings were mainly motivated by his research on sensory perception (Stumpf 1928b, 95). Stumpf advocates a thesis that is similar to what today is called 'direct perception,' according to which sensory perception is a mode of consciousness directly related to the sensory phenomena, i.e., without requiring the involvement of any concepts or any intentional items. It consists in a direct relation to sensory feelings, which are defined, as we saw above, as sensory qualities. This thesis is the result of Stumpf's criticism of Brentano's thesis according to which "perception is a judgment" (Brentano 1874, 214), which Stumpf still advocated in his *Psychology of Sound* and most likely in his 1899 paper on emotions (Stumpf 1924, 40). Stumpf argues that perception is not a judgment but a more primitive mode of consciousness that is prior to presentation and judgment, and which founds the latter and, therefore, the class of affective states as a whole (1906a, 16). On this new conception of perception is based Stumpf's thesis, directed against Brentano and James, that there is a specific difference between the domain of sensory feelings and that of mental states such as emotions, whose study falls within the domain of descriptive psychology

⁵ According to Husserl, Brentano's principle according to which every state of consciousness is either a representation or is based on a representation fails to account for sensory feelings, which are not, as Husserl pointed out in his *Investigations*, "representative acts, in the term of acts of feeling-sensation, [that] underlie acts of feeling" (1982, 354). Husserl argues that many sensory feelings such as pleasure and pain that we usually range in the class of intentional states belong to the same genus as the sensations of touch, taste, or smell. One of Husserl's arguments is that the differences of intensity that we attribute to sensory contents, and therefore to pleasure and pain and to sensory feelings in general, are not attributes of psychical phenomena and thus of representations, as Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects presupposes (1982, 111). For no predicate or attribute of the field of sensory content such as intensity or space is attributable to mental states (Fisette 2010).

understood in a narrow sense. Stumpf's entire argument against Brentano's views on emotions is based on this distinction. We will briefly examine the bearing of Stumpf's criticism on some of the important theses which underly Brentano's theory of affects, and summarize Stumpf's main arguments.

Brentano's thesis that *Wahrnehmung* is a judgment, i.e., that internal perception is what is taken to be true and the only veridical perception, is responsible for the asymmetry between internal and external or sensory perception. This thesis confers internal perception with a double advantage over external perception: an ontological advantage because it warrants and justifies the existence and reality of what is perceived; an epistemological advantage because inner perception is the only reliable source of knowledge, where knowledge is a justified belief, and any justification ultimately rests on the evidence of internal perception. Stumpf, after Husserl, recognizes that internal perception is indeed an important source of knowledge, but he does not admit that it is the only one. In fact, external perception, which Brentano, following Descartes, dismissed for being illusive and dubitable, is considered by both Husserl and Stumpf to be a source of knowledge as important as internal perception (Stumpf 1939, 215). Two consequences can be drawn from this: the first is ontological and challenges Brentano's thesis that (physical) phenomena only exist intentionally, as opposed to mental phenomena which are the only ones to really exist; at the epistemic level, the domain of sensory phenomena, and therefore of sensory feelings, can now be regarded as a genuine source of knowledge.

Stumpf's position on Brentano's conception of affects stands out more clearly in his criticism of Brentano's theory of primary and secondary objects, which, according to R. Chisholm (1979), is the heart of the controversy opposing both philosophers on the issue of sensory feelings. This doctrine is clearly stated by Brentano in his *Psychology* of 1874 and is reformulated several times in his correspondence and in the long footnote of 1907. Brentano claims that every perception has a primary object, for example, sound or colour, and a secondary object, which is the very act of presenting sounds or colours.

The first is something sensually qualitative and the second is the act of sensation itself, to which the sensing (*das Empfinden*) always refers both in the mode of representing and that of acquiescing in the evident

judgment, and sometimes even emotionally; and the latter case occurs in sensory pleasure and in pain and results in relevant acts of sensation being distinguished from others as true emotions. (Brentano 1907, 237)

According to Brentano's theory, the pleasure provided by the scent of a flower is a pleasure that stems not from the perfume as such, but from the smelling of the perfume, i.e., from an act of presentation which subsumes seeing and hearing (and sensing and the sensed). To use Stumpf's metaphor (1928a, 109), this theory of primary and secondary objects places the sensory quality in a double set of brackets, and it is therefore doubly indirect: the first set of brackets represents the act of sensing; the second set of brackets represents a higher order act, namely, the act of emotion, to which pleasure and displeasure are associated. The doctrine of primary and secondary objects amounts to identifying pleasure and the act of sensing pleasure (primary and secondary objects being in the third class of acts) as one and the same thing.

An important distinction introduced by Stumpf in his two 1906 Academy treatises refers to that of first and second order phenomena, which constitutes Stumpf's alternative to Brentano's distinction between primary and secondary objects. First order phenomena are contents of sensation, while second order phenomena are "mnemonic images" and phenomena such as colour or sound as "merely represented." The issue is whether, between sensation and representation, between primary and secondary objects, there is, as Brentano claims, a specific difference or simply a difference of degree, as Stumpf maintains (Stumpf, 1918). The difference between intensity and the "fullness of detail" of a piece of music and its mere representation in the imagination, for example, is not, following Brentano's doctrine, a difference in the degree of intensity between phenomenal content and representational content, but rather a difference in the very act of presentation, which is, depending on the circumstances, more or less intense. Therefore, following Brentano, the properties that Stumpf attributes to phenomena, including intensity, are in fact properties of a class of mental states. Stumpf's entire argument against Brentano's theory is based on the idea that the properties of pleasure and pain, for example, cannot be reduced to properties of functions (representational or emotional).

One of Stumpf's arguments against Brentano stands out clearly in the classical case of localization as applied to cases of sensory feelings. We may ask a patient to locate her pain by asking her whether she has a toothache or a headache. However, we cannot ask her to locate her anger or sadness. Now, space or location, just like intensity, is an attribute of tactile and visual phenomena, not of functions. It follows first that sensory pleasure and pain are phenomena in the same way as colour is, for example. It follows secondly that we cannot speak of a specific difference between the contents of first and second order phenomena, i.e., between representation and sensation. There is, indeed, a specific difference between an act or a mental state and its content, but there is only a difference of degree between the content of a presentation and that of sensing (Stumpf 1939, 348). As we saw above, these sensory contents are founding contents (phenomena) as opposed to founded contents (intentional) of mental states such as emotions, which are states of affairs.⁶

4 Mixed feelings: Emotions *cum fundamentum* in sensory feelings

The question is how does Stumpf reconcile in his overall theory of affects the phenomenological dimension of sensory feelings with the intentional dimension of affective states, while avoiding at the same time the objections made to Brentano's representationalism (of intentionalizing sensory feelings) and to James's phenomenalism (of sensualizing the intentional content of affective states). We saw that most of Stumpf's arguments against both rival theories were based on the thesis that there is a specific difference between the fields of sensory phenomena and psychical functions and therefore that these two heterogeneous aspects of experience are irreducible. As we have shown, Stumpf's position on the classification of acts and his definition of emotions as a subclass of affective states whose objects are states of affairs is incomplete because it does not account for the essential role of sensory feelings within his theory of emotions. We also pointed out that the modifications that Stumpf made to his origi-

⁶ Another argument worth mentioning is based on the case of anhedonia, which Stumpf (1916a) applied to the pathological case of a musician suffering from an evident inability to feel pleasure in listening to music or other activities that were previously perceived as pleasant. In such cases, the sense of hearing itself is not significantly affected. Stumpf argues that anhedonia to musical notes would result in an apathy or a loss of enjoyment and emotion toward music in general. Hence the idea that sensory feelings are a necessary condition to affects.

nal conception of affects in his 1899 paper proceeded more or less along the same lines. In this regard, we have to take into account the bearing of these modifications on Stumpf's early criticism of James. For while his criticism of James in 1899 suggested that no true compromise was possible with sensualism, Stumpf's later works are much more sympathetic to the sensualism of Condillac or James and reveal an important contribution to his own theory of emotions (1939, 337).

Part of the solution to the problem of the relationship between sensory feelings and emotions is formulated in Stumpf's important paper 'Phenomena and Psychical Functions,' in which he argues that mental states and phenomena form a real unity that can only be separated by abstraction. Stumpf conceives of phenomena as wholes, not as aggregates of sensations, and they appear to consciousness as unitary and structured wholes. As unitary wholes, complex phenomena are contents of sensation, which are characterized by certain properties that Stumpf calls attributes of sensation (or sometimes psychological or metaphysical parts). These attributes entertain different kinds of relations with phenomena, including relations of fusion and part-whole relations. These relations are not imposed from without or produced by conceptual thought or by mental functions, but are rather given (and perceived directly) together with the phenomena. As we have noted above, Stumpf considers sensory perception as the most primitive function, which underlies Brentano's class of representation within his own classification. In its most general sense, sensory perception is understood as a *Bemerken* or a 'noticing' (of parts in wholes), or as attention, which Stumpf defined in the first book of his *Tonpsychologie* as '*Lust am Bemerken*.' This characterization applies both to inner perception, oriented toward mental states, and sensory perception, which is directly related to first order phenomena, i.e., directed toward attributes and the relations they have with their substance (quality) (1906a, p. 16). In visual perception, noticing relates to parts of the perceived, for example, intensity, colour, and space, and to relations of similarity, fusion, dependency, etc., while the whole, or the perceived, as such, is a second order presentation. For example, in the hearing of a melody, sounds and notes are noticed while the melody, which Stumpf conceives of as a Gestalt, is perceived as a second order phenomenon.

Now, we said above that there is a hierarchy in the class of intellectual functions between perception and judgment. This hierarchy is

understood as a relation of foundation between higher order mental states and more primitive ones, between foundational contents (first order phenomena) of the sensory perception and founded contents of judgments. The relation of foundation between these two levels of complexity can be understood in terms of ontological dependence (the existence of the judgment's contents depends, in turn, on that of the phenomena) or in psychological terms (conceptual contents of judgments are the result of a process of abstraction based on sensory contents). This relation of foundation is also obtained between affective states and the class of intellectual functions to the extent that judgments provide emotions with their matter, and we saw that emotions, though more complex than the former, are nevertheless structured in the same way. Between the subclasses of passive and active affects, between emotion, desire, and will, there is a hierarchy similar to that which exists in the class of mental states, with the difference that the phenomenal basis of affective states is nothing other than sensory feelings:

My theory of the 'sensory feelings' [Gefühlsempfindungen] is therefore that there is a class of sensory phenomena, to which such elementary feelings are primarily attached, that expressions such as pain, tickle, etc. essentially designate sensory feelings, and that the purely sensory agreeableness of sounds, colours, smells and other sensory impressions is grounded in the admixture of such specific sensory feelings. (1928a, p. IX)

These elementary feelings are triggered directly either by the stimulation of peripheral bodily organs, such as the sensation of pain on the skin, or by central processes in the brain. In both cases, however, these feelings are not mediated by any psychical functions (1928a, p. ix). Stumpf argues that each and every function belonging to the class of active or passive affective states are *lustvoll* in that they are all intimately linked to pleasure (1928a, p. XII). The difference between an elementary feeling and an emotion lies primarily in the conceptual contribution of the judged state of affairs to emotions, and consequently, to the whole class of affective states.

As we pointed out earlier, Stumpf's classification raises several problems, the most important of which, in the present context, is the relation between emotion and judgment and that of emotion and sensory feelings. The first problem has been studied by Reizenzein

(2003), who understands Stumpf's theory of emotions as evaluative states directed toward the object of a judgment. The evaluative component of an emotion rests on a positive or negative stance vis-à-vis the judged state of affairs. The distinction between these two classes of function would therefore rest on their quality, i.e., in the positive or negative attitude toward their objects: affirmation and negation in the case of judgment; love and hate in the case of emotions. According to Reizenstein, the relation of foundation between emotions and judgments or beliefs presupposes, on the one hand, a causal relation between the belief and the evaluation, and on the other hand, a particular semantic (or intentional) relation between the intentional content of belief and the emotion.

Let us consider the case of jealousy in order to illustrate these two aspects which characterize the relationship between belief and emotion. Jealousy is considered on this account as a negative attitude and as an evaluation of the state of affairs that someone else owns a good that is desired or coveted for oneself but that one does not own; and this state of affairs would be caused by the belief or the judgment that this state of affairs exists (true existential judgment). However, this case is misleading because, as Stumpf himself points out, jealousy belongs to the subclass of active feelings in that it presupposes the desirability of the judged state of affairs and the value of the coveted good. It presupposes indeed an evaluation and a choice. In contrast, the subclass of passive sentiments, to which disgust and aesthetic enjoyment belong, does not seem to presuppose such an evaluation, and their object does not consist in a value (or *Wertverhalt*), but rather a state of affairs. On the other hand, there is indeed a causal relation between desire and will (or the intention to achieve what ought to be), but there is no causal relation according to Stumpf's theory between a belief (or its content) and the corresponding attitude. In fact, the source of an emotion, or what triggers an aesthetic experience, for example, is not a belief or its intentional object as such, but precisely the sensory feeling triggered by primary content understood as a structured phenomenon (a Gestalt, precisely) originally given in experience. It is first and foremost primary content that can provide pleasure or displeasure, and it is precisely this sensory feeling that constitutes the sensory basis (the founding content) of a more complex intentional act. The relationship between such elementary feelings and emotions is comparable to that between sensory perception and judg-

ment in such a way that the founding content of affects (i.e., the structured phenomenon as such) constitutes the raw material of more complex intentional states (whose content is actually the conceptual working out of the original sensory content) such as emotions.⁷

The case of aesthetic enjoyment is more suited to the present context because it represents, in Stumpf's writing on emotions, a paradigmatic case of emotions and illustrates the intimate relationship between this class of affective states and sensory feelings. In one of his earlier writings on the nature of enjoyment in tragedy, Stumpf regarded the problem of the immediate action (*Wirkung*) of a work of art in the production of an artistic enjoyment (*Genuss*) as the main difficulty in the field of aesthetics (1910, 5). In his paper on sensory feelings, Stumpf tackles this problem with that of defining sensory feelings precisely in terms of the actions they exert on the soul (*Gemüt*) (1928a, 69). He carefully distinguishes the pleasure brought about by a piece of music from the aesthetic enjoyment proper, which corresponds to the distinction in music between euphony (the sensory effects produced by rhythm) and the enjoyment and agreeableness obtained through the structure, technical execution, and the content of the piece of music (1924, 53-54). The first factor involves only sensory feelings, while the second, which varies according to the musical knowledge of the listener, is related to the aesthetic object itself. However, aesthetic enjoyment is conditioned both by the sensory

⁷ Despite the merits of this stimulating study of Reisenzein on Stumpf's theory of emotions and the useful references to contemporary theories of emotions, there are at least two aspects of his interpretation that I disagree with. The first concerns the causal relation between judgments or beliefs and attitudes (Reisenzein 2003, 241-2). The only textual support that I have found in this paper is a reference to a passage in Stumpf's first study (1899, 50), in which, in fact, there is no mention of any causal relation. The second problem with this interpretation is the understanding of the subclass of affective states in terms of the so-called occurrent pro-evaluations and con-evaluations, i.e., approvals and disapprovals of states of affairs (Reisenzein & Schönplflug 1992, 35). This neo-Kantian interpretation (*à la* Windelband), which amounts to regarding all classes of attitudes as evaluation, was criticized by Brentano and Stumpf (1906b, 57-8). Belief is not an evaluation but a judgment about the existence or nonexistence of the judged state of affairs, i.e., about the truth or falsity of the propositional content of the judgment. Stumpf's definition of passive emotional states as states that have as their object something existent, i.e., a state of affairs, shows sufficiently clearly that emotional states presuppose such a judgment. Affective states, on the other hand, comprise an evaluation, but this element belongs to the subclass of active states that Stumpf defined in terms of obligation and whose object is a value or what might be called, following Meinong, a *Wertverhalt*.

feelings directly obtained directly through the way we experience a piece of music and by the form and content of its object. Hence the distinction between two sources of aesthetic emotions: the first is called the fullness or wealth of formal relations among its parts, which are involved in the experience of a genuine work of art; the second involves the properties of the object, or more precisely, of the judged state of affairs (Stumpf 1928a, 9).

The first source is of a phenomenological origin and lies in the formal relations that are directly given to consciousness. The action produced by a work of art is inherently direct and immediate in a sense comparable to the experience of having a pain or a sexual orgasm; therefore, it rules out any differences that may result from culture, knowledge of the contemplated objects, or world-view (historical, cultural, or other). Stumpf recognizes that sensory feelings alone cannot produce an aesthetic affect, as such, without the aid of conceptual thought or representation. For aesthetic enjoyment can only arise when sensations and a combination of sensations are “entangled” with an act, i.e., with a passive affective state. The feeling of pleasure is immediately linked to an activity as sensory pleasure is to sensations, but it is not yet an emotion in the strict sense of the term. It becomes an emotion in the enjoyment (*Entzücken*) provided by a work of art, for example, as soon as, and only when, the intuited unitary relations are objectified by consciousness and become an intentional object. However, these two sources represent two essential conditions of emotions, including aesthetic enjoyment, and they form a whole that can only be separated through abstraction (Stumpf 1928a, 111).

5 Final remarks

To conclude, let us consider an alternative to Reizenzein's causal interpretation of Stumpf's theory of emotions. According to this alternative interpretation, which is based on part-whole relations, an emotion consists in a whole whose parts are its content (the judged state of affairs) and sensory feelings, which exert a triggering action on the emotion without being emotions themselves. This mereological interpretation has the advantage of accounting for the phenomenological contribution of sensory feelings in Stumpf's overall theory of affects, which the causal theory does not seriously take into account. This interpretation also finds support in Stumpf's thesis on the unity of consciousness and has the further advantage of allowing for a connec-

tion with James on this issue. This is confirmed by H. Langfeld, an American student of Stumpf in Berlin, in his commentary on Stumpf's 1906-1907 lectures on psychology. Langfeld reports that Stumpf stressed several times in these lectures the importance of his views on the unity of consciousness for his psychology, and mentioned several times the name of James in relation to this topic. According to Langfeld, Stumpf "took a position similar to that of James against the atomistic theory. The unity of consciousness is not a sum of parts but a totality, the parts of which are recognized only through abstraction" (Langfeld 1937, 55). This is also the position taken by Stumpf in several of his works vis-à-vis the antagonism not only between sensualism and intellectualism, but also between nativism and empiricism, between the psychology of acts and the psychology of contents, and between hedonism and stoicism in the field of ethics.

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