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THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Future scenarios and tools to stimulate forward-looking discussions

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The Future of Migration in the European Union: Future scenarios and tools to stimulate forward-looking discussions

This report presents trends that are likely to impact the future of migration in the European Union and delineates four possible future migration scenarios towards 2030. These narrative scenarios are then applied into a set of interactive tools that stimulate forward-looking and strategic discussions about migration and integration. The tools can be used to involve various actors that shape migration policymaking and research in constructive and non-divisive debates about these otherwise highly politicised matters. Whereas the 2030 migration scenarios are fairly general, the report offers examples of how they can be used to zoom-in on specific thematic areas such as foreign and security policy, labour market policies and integration policies and how to explore future implications of different migration developments on these policy areas. A group of invited experts contributed to the report with their take on how the four scenarios could play out in different parts of the world including the European Union, its neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia. The tools are included in the Migration discussion toolkit that constitutes the second part of this report. They are presented in a practical recipe-style format and are accompanied by templates and other visual aids that help facilitate discussions and harvest their outcomes.

THE FUTURE OF MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Future scenarios and tools to stimulate forward-looking discussions

European Commission's Joint Research Centre

Science for Policy Report

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Executive summary

This report is the outcome of a year-long interactive and participatory process led by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) on the Future of Migration in the European Union (EU). The project responded to the growing demand from European Commission services for foresight and anticipatory knowledge around future migration patterns. Based on a set of four future migration scenarios, the project engaged several stakeholders in exploring and reflecting upon the needs of EU policymaking and EU responses around future migration challenges and opportunities.

Predicting future migration trends is difficult because forecasting models are unable to capture the plethora of social, political, demographic, economic, environmental and technological drivers that fundamentally underpin and shape migration processes. A foresight approach focuses on plausibility and offers visions and narratives as to what alternative futures could look like. It produces scenarios built around variables that are both relatively certain and uncertain and is most useful when applied to mid to longer-term futures. When used as a starting point for debate and engagement with diverse stakeholders, narrative scenarios enhance a systemic and nuanced understanding of a policy issue and can help stimulate cooperation among various actors. This is particularly important when tackling complex and politicised policy issues such as migration.

In this report, we briefly present four foresight scenarios for the future of migration in the EU, with 2030 as a future timeframe. The scenarios were used to explore policy implications of different political, economic and migration developments for specific thematic areas of EU policymaking: foreign and security policy, labour market and integration policies. We also explored how the scenarios could play out in different parts of the world, the result of which are brief scenario narratives for the EU, European neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia developed by invited experts.

Points for reflection derived from these insights include:

Forward-looking policy thinking about migration in the European Union should be based on long-term migration trends and should emphasise the importance of coherence between migration and other policy areas.

The level of attention paid by policymakers to specific migration flows should not be determined by heightened media and political attention to refugee and irregular migration as opposed to more substantial but less talked-about migrant flows such as labour and family migration. Policymakers need to carefully communicate their efforts in tackling challenges emerging from migration, but the role of migration policies alone should not be over-estimated as there are many other factors determining migration flows that are outside of the remit of migration policies (including, but not limited to, development, labour demand, welfare and foreign policies). Similarly, immigrant integration outcomes will depend on policy areas that go beyond integration policies. Therefore, internal and external policy coherence and coordination are essential to producing desired migration and integration outcomes.

Effective migration governance requires inclusive multilateral cooperation based on more equal partnerships with third countries and increased attention paid to the role of diasporas.

One of the possible futures for the EU's position in global governance of migration is that it will not maintain its leverage in relations with third countries. This situation could be conducive to more equal partnership relations with those countries and potentially facilitate negotiations of readmission agreements. To support the success of partnerships with third countries, their diasporas will need to have a bigger say in policies of destination countries. At the same time, in sub-Saharan Africa, inflows of various forms of capital from the diaspora need to be supported but also carefully managed because they could disrupt social and economic opportunities for the "locals" and give rise to internal political resistance against the political influence of diaspora citizens. In Southeast Asia, where growing number of countries is likely to experience population decline, diaspora groups will be crucial in facilitating mobility of skilled labour force across borders.

By 2030, the EU may no longer be among the most attractive destinations for migrants coming from the EU neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia because other regions could offer better economic and social prospects to foreign workers and their families.

In the long-term, the EU should move beyond the current policy focus on stemming migration flows. Reflections on a possible future in which the EU will face a shortage of immigrants of all skill levels should begin by paying close attention to other countries (such as China) with an ageing population and shrinking workforce that may strive to become more attractive destinations than the EU. Therefore, new strategies to attract people will need to be devised with a particular focus on highly-skilled migrants from third countries. These strategies will need to take into account not only demand from employers but also technological innovation that affects production and service systems. The progress and acceptance of labour-replacing automation will likely be affected by interrelations between labour market priorities and migration policies.

This project was driven by our conviction that in order to have a stronger impact, foresight knowledge requires customised engagement methods. Therefore, this report is accompanied by a Migration discussion toolkit that brings together participatory and interactive tools and processes we developed and tested with diverse audiences. The toolkit can be used as a practical guide for leading future-oriented and strategic discussions on migration. It offers a platform for collaboration and planning inside organisations, as well as for building relations with external partners and stakeholders.

1. INTRODUCTION

The European Commission Joint Research Centre's (JRC) project on the Future of Migration in the EU[1] responded to the growing demand from the European Commission for foresight and anticipatory knowledge around likely future migration patterns. Based on a set of four scenarios of the future of migration, the project engaged a group of experts and policymakers to explore and reflect upon the needs of EU policymaking and possible EU responses to future migration challenges and opportunities.

The need for future-oriented thinking had become particularly apparent in the context of the rapid increase in the numbers of refugee and immigrant arrivals to the EU during 2014 and 2015. The institutional and political fallout of this situation put different services of the European Commission into a near crisis mode. The EU institutions were often criticized for their reactive actions and failure to anticipate future challenges and opportunities in the sphere of migration and displacement. At the same time, migration has long been recognized as an important factor in the overall population dynamics in European ageing societies with immigration replacing births as the principal component of population growth in several EU countries. Demographic forecasts are an essential resource for policy planning and to be credible, they need to account for future migration dynamics. Hence, the appetite has been growing for more comprehensive and forward-looking migration analysis to inform future EU policymaking.

1.1. Difficulties in predicting migration flows

The emphasis on better measurement of migration dynamics and demand for quantitative forecasts of future migration flows has been growing in recent years. Such predictions are essential for building institutional capacity to anticipate, prepare for possible future crises and produce policies better attuned to future trends.

The JRC has already done substantial work on this subject: 1) by quantifying major drivers of migration and exploring how they change in relation to development stages of countries and different dimensions of migration (Migali, Natale & Münz 2018; Migali, Natale, Tintori, et al. 2018). 2) by exploring possible future impacts of alternative migration scenarios for the EU with respect to population ageing and the productivity of the EU labour force.[2]

However, there is also ample evidence about the challenges in predicting a phenomenon as complex and multifaceted as migration (Bijak 2016; Disney et al. 2015; Migali, Natale & Münz 2018; OECD 2016). Predicting future migration trends is such a difficult task because forecasting models are not able to capture the multitude of social, political, demographic, economic, environmental and technological drivers that underpin migration processes. These drivers are often highly uncertain and hard to quantify, and their mutual interactions result in different migration outcomes. Models are also limited by poor quality or missing migration data and different definitions of what constitutes migration across countries. As a result, different methods and data sources have produced vastly different projections of migration flows (OECD 2016).

Since migration cannot be predicted without substantial errors, it is essential that the uncertainty around migration forecasts is made explicit to policymakers and the general public (Disney et al. 2015). Another possibility is to combine forecasting with a qualitative approach to scenario-building in which uncertainties are embraced and made a central element of the discussion about future trends and their implications for managing migration.

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[1]   The project was carried out in the EU Policy Lab.

[2]   This project is a result of collaboration between the JRC Centre of Expertise on Population and Migration (CEPAM) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) from 2016 to 2019. For more information about the results, please follow the website of the European Commission Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/migration-and-demography/partnerships/demographic-scenarios.

1.2. Scenario-based approach as a way to explore alternative migration futures

Forecasting often focuses on probability and risk, and uses models built around variables that are considered fairly likely to happen in order to offer predictions as to what the future will look like. It is usually applied to short-term futures. A foresight approach, by contrast, offers visions or narratives as to what possible alternative futures might look like. It produces scenarios built around variables that are both relatively certain and uncertain and is most useful when applied to mid to longer-term futures.

Scenarios tend to highlight rather than reduce the complexity of policy issues. They are generated through discussions about the past and the future that often help reveal taken-for-granted assumptions about the matter.

The usefulness of narrative scenarios for policymaking processes is sometimes questioned because they do not provide clear answers supported by numbers. However, they are very useful in creating a space for reflection that can lead to new questions and potentially new solutions to policy problems. Scenario-based exercises also have the potential to move participants beyond a process of single loop of learning where experts simply impart information to decision-makers, to one of double and triple loop learning where participants can reframe problems and solutions and undergo a process of transformation.

Moreover, given the contentious and highly politicised nature of migration policymaking, discussion of alternative scenarios is a useful tool to overcome divisive positions held by different stakeholders and to build a shared understanding of possible futures. In this way, qualitative scenarios can help stimulate cooperation among stakeholders that is essential for tackling complex policy issues.

1.3. The aim and the structure of the report

The aim of this report is to present briefly the insights from the process through which we developed the four scenarios of the future of migration in the EU and to demonstrate in a practical way how the scenarios can be used to stimulate forward-looking discussions about migration.

We started by commissioning a background study that analyses past and recent migration trends, their drivers and intended and unintended consequences of migration policies (de Haas 2018). This work together with other foresight reports on migration and discussions with experts helped us identify a list of relative certainties and uncertainties that are likely to influence the future of migration in the EU (see section 3). We then incorporated the certainties and uncertainties into the development of four synthetic scenarios on the future of migration by 2030 (see section 4.1). We presented the insights from the project to a wide range of policymakers and experts in a workshop that contributed to challenging some of the taken-for-granted ideas about migration which emerged from our analysis of dominant policy discourses and our discussions with the experts (see section 2).

The synthetic scenarios were then used as a starting point in focus groups with experts and policymakers and inspired contributions from members of our Advisory Committee. Section 4.2 presents insights from the focus groups in which we explored what the alternative futures could mean for specific policy areas of EU policymaking such as foreign and security policy, labour market policies and integration. Section 4.3 includes contributions from the members of the Advisory Committee who further elaborate how the scenarios could play out in the EU, its neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia.

The second part of the report consists of a Migration discussion toolkit with various participatory and interactive tools and processes developed throughout the project in order to stimulate forward-looking and collaborative group discussions on the future of migration and integration in the EU.[3] The toolkit suggests practical ways of employing the migration scenarios as a starting point for such debates. The tools presented there can help build platforms for collaboration both inside organisations (in and outside of the EU) and between the EU institutions and external partners and stakeholders. This part of the report will be of interest to those seeking to employ innovative ways of exploring the future relevance of migration and the roles and interactions of different actors in migration policymaking.

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[3]   The Migration discussion toolkit can be printed as a standalone document.

2. CHALLENGING TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MIGRATION

There is now a large body of literature on different aspects migration. Yet, despite the high level of academic and general interest in the subject, we see perpetuation of certain taken-for-granted assumptions in policy debates about migration.

In 2017, we organised a one-day workshop on the future of migration in the EU. The event brought together over 80 researchers, representatives of civil society, think-tanks, Member States and different sections of the European Commission. We invited experts who were involved in our scenario discussions to question some of the commonly held myths and taken-for-granted assumptions about migration and integration. Below we summarise some of the interventions that are most relevant to the focus of this report.[4]

BOX 1: THE LEVEL OF ATTENTION PAID BY THE MEDIA AND POLICY-MAKERS TO REFUGEE AND IRREGULAR MIGRATION AS OPPOSED TO OTHER MIGRANT FLOWS IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE NUMBERS

There is a discrepancy between the attention paid by the media and policy-makers to refugee and irregular migration as opposed to other migrant flows.

*By **Rainer Münz**, Adviser on Migration and Demography to the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC)*

Asylum seekers and migrants arriving irregularly in higher numbers during the years 2014-2017 have come to symbolise migration to Europe. Media coverage has strongly contributed to this bias and helped to shift the debate towards the need to regain control over the borders and away from (a) regular migrants who come to the EU in an orderly manner and (b) migrants who enter the EU with valid visa, as visa-free travellers or with short-term permits, but do not leave within 90 days or after their residence permit has expired. In 2016, according to Eurostat, there were 2.3 million first residence permits issued to non-EU citizens, either for employment reasons (853,000), family reunion (779,000), or education (695,000). In the same year, 1,204,000 people asked for asylum. A similar shift of attention happens with fatal journeys. Here the main focus is on those irregular migrants losing their lives in the Mediterranean while those who die when crossing the Sahara are usually not mentioned and never become the target of any rescue operations or other forms of humanitarian intervention.

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4   For summaries and short videos of all the interventions, see a post on the EU Policy Lab blog: https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eupolicylab/nine-myths-about-migration-and-long-term-trends-you-might-not-have-thought-about/

BOX 2:   MIGRATION POLICY HAS A LIMITED ROLE IN DETERMINING MIGRATION FLOWS

Only a small proportion of migration flows can be directly controlled by migration policy and many factors with a major influence on determining migration flows lie outside of the remit of migration policies.

*By **Jean-Christophe Dumont**, Head of the International Migration Division in the Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)*

Migration policy is naturally seen as a key tool to control and manage migration flows. However, only a small proportion of migration flows can be directly controlled by migration policy. Consider for example free movement of people in areas without border controls or family and humanitarian migration that are both rights-based and depend on the fulfilment of certain criteria rather than on migration policy priorities. Therefore, it can be estimated that less than half of all movements, mostly related to labour migration, can be directly controlled by migration policy. Although migration policy also affects the rights-based flows, for example by setting conditions for family reunion such as minimum income or language requirements, it is clear that many factors with a major influence on determining migration flows lie outside of the remit of migration policies. Take, for example, the case of energy transitions. The extent to which we will be able to replace carbon energy with green energy will impact the price of oil and potentially the stability and prosperity of major oil producing countries such as the Gulf countries, Nigeria or Russia. Such changes could dramatically alter the demand and supply of migrants worldwide. If we do not anticipate what might happen in these migration hub countries, we may find greater pressures at our borders in the future.

Furthermore, the very idea of countries using their migration policies to compete for high-skilled migrants is also a myth. Thanks to information exchange and continuous dialogue, OECD countries' policies to attract and retain high-skilled migrants have converged so much so that other factors and migrants' individual choices determine where they migrate. In other words, rather than countries picking high-skilled migrants, it is the people picking the country based on characteristics not necessarily related to its migration policies.

BOX 3:   STRENGTHENING OF BORDERS AND RESTRICTIVE VISA REGIMES MAY NOT BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO MANAGE MIGRATION

Countries with high migration restrictions do not necessarily succeed in reducing immigration and liberalisation of border controls does not always lead to massive and uncontrolled migration flows.

*By **Simona Vezzoli,** Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam*

Evidence on global migration trends shows that countries with high migration restrictions do not necessarily succeed in reducing immigration. For example, Mexican migration to the United States shows that increasing restrictions and border enforcements along the US-Mexico border did not stop migration, but pushed Mexicans desiring to migrate to use more smuggling services and to cross the border at isolated and dangerous border points. This has made migration costlier and more dangerous, lowered return rates and increased settlement of Mexican families in the United States. In Europe, Moroccans could travel freely to Spain up until 1991. Young Moroccans would often work and visit Spain during the summer months and then go back home. Such circulation was halted with the introduction of travel visas. This made young Moroccans who entered Spain to remain longer, eventually increasing their permanent settlement. On the flip side of this, is the myth that liberalisation of border controls will expose countries to massive and uncontrolled migration flows. The EU enlargement experience challenges this assumption. The enlargement of the 1980s did not lead to massive outflows from Greece, Portugal or Spain although this was in part also because of temporary restrictions on the free movement of workers from these countries. The 2004 enlargement resulted in higher emigration rates but only from some new member states (such as Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria). Although emigration from these countries continues, the initial increase in numbers rapidly normalized to lower migration volumes and circulation patterns.

BOX 4:   STANDARD MIGRATION DATA DOES NOT FULLY REFLECT THE SCALE AND THE NATURE OF HUMAN MOBILITY

The importance of tourism is poorly understood despite its potentially strong link to migration.

*By **Ronald Skeldon**, Emeritus Professor in Geography, University of Sussex and Professor of Human Geography, Graduate School of Governance Maastricht University*

The 2015 United Nations figure of 244 million international migrants worldwide is well known. It reflects the number of persons living in a country other than where they were born for more than a year or, in the absence of such data, the number of people of foreign citizenship. The figure includes refugees and was 41 % higher compared to 2000. But does it adequately express what is happening with human mobility? By definition, short-term and circular mobility is missing from these statistics and so is data about actual cross-border flows of people. Yet, these are important elements of how people actually move. In particular, the importance of tourism is poorly understood despite its potentially strong link to migration. The number of international arrivals has grown more than fivefold between 1990 and 2016. Although this number does not reflect the actual number of tourists, its massive growth is indicative of the rising importance of the phenomena. Statistically and also in terms of policy, tourism is treated as separate from migration. However, it can both expand migration and act as a substitute for longer-term stays. In Europe, migrants have been a key source of labour to the growing tourism industry; the hospitality sector could hardly function without foreign workers. However, expanding tourism can also lead to the expulsion of local populations, for example due to rising prices and therefore generate internal or even international out migration. Open paths for tourist travel can also dissuade people from settling on a more long-term basis. Without systematic inclusion of short-term movers, our understanding of human mobility and migration dynamics is bound to be limited.

3. CONSIDERING MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT OF RELATIVE CERTAINTIES AND UNCERTAINTIES

One of the benefits of the foresight approach to migration is that it prompts consideration of a wide range of social, economic, political, demographic and environmental variables that are likely to affect migration and related socio-economic processes. Moreover, scenario development encourages discussions about how the various variables interact with each other. In that way, it also prompts us to step back and look at the issue from different angles and perspectives.

The importance and future impacts of social, economic, political, demographic and environmental variables can be considered either relatively certain or relatively uncertain. Our scenarios were built around what we considered to be the most important of these variables.

Relative certainties are variables characterised by their continuity (i.e. they will play an important role no matter what), and by relative predictability in terms of how the trends underpinning the variable are likely to evolve in the future. Their development and evolution can be monitored through data and accumulated knowledge that can be projected for at least 10 years ahead. Demographic trends, for example, can be projected with relative certainty because these trends have already been set in motion and are supported by data. Relative certainties help to set the parameters of the scenario narratives and to ensure that the scenarios remain plausible.

Yet, if relative certainties help to set parameters of what is possible, relative uncertainties are most interesting in framing the dynamic, contextual environment of each scenario. Relative uncertainties are variables that are hard to predict and have a greater potential for change. Their development and evolution depend very much on their interaction with other variables (both relatively certain and uncertain) and/or the context in which they operate. For example, political or economic crises are notoriously hard to predict. However, their impact on migration is

potentially very important. Relative uncertainties can impact migration in multiple ways.

The relative certainties and uncertainties were identified as important for constructing the future migration scenarios for the EU because of their potential influence on migration flows by 2030. We built on the key migration determinants elaborated in the background study that informed the project (de Haas 2018). These include the structure of labour demand, inequality and levels of development, demographic structure and population size, trade, welfare and social security, education, infrastructure and technological change, political freedoms, conflict and violence. Furthermore, three previous migration scenario exercises carried out by the Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2016), the United Kingdom Government Office for Science (The Government Office for Science 2011) and the team of researchers associated with the International Migration Institute of Oxford University under the Global Migration Futures project (2009-2013) served as an important inspiration in this process.[5] We also drew on contributions from experts in our Advisory Committee[6] and a workshop we organised with them in March 2017. We identified relative certainties and uncertainties in the social, technological, economic, environmental, political and demographic (STEEP+D) categories, all of which are likely to influence and impact migration outcomes by 2030.

Our aim with the overviews presented in Table 1 and Table 2 is to illustrate major drivers that need to be considered when building scenarios and discussing the future of migration.[7] The tables with relative certainties and uncertainties are followed by short insights from the experts involved in the Advisory Committee in which they highlight interesting aspects of the selected certainties and uncertainties (Box 5 – 9).

The European side is more developed and the trends in other parts of the world are treated more

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[5]   Hein de Haas, Simona Vezzoli, Ayla Bonfiglio from the International Migration Institute: https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/completed-projects/gmf

[6]   For the list of members of the Advisory Committee see the Annex.

[7]   For a comprehensive overview of drivers of migration that can be quantified based on existing data see a JRC report (Migali, Natale, Tintori, et al. 2018).

generally. We recognise that migration to and from the EU is influenced by trends in other parts of the world, however, it was not in the scope of this report to provide a comprehensive mapping of all the relevant developments in other world regions. Therefore, the regional differences mentioned below should be treated as illustrations only. They would obviously need to be further developed if they were to be used for more geographically-focused discussions. While the overall focus of the scenario narratives reflects the currently dominant political focus on immigration from non-EU countries, it is also important to consider the importance of these trends for intra-EU mobility and for the position of the EU as a source of migration towards other parts of the world.

The lists of certainties and uncertainties can be used to stimulate a systemic debate about the future of migration and to explore interconnections between different trends and variables. For this purpose, we developed ready-to-print Certainty and Uncertainty cards that are included among the elements accompanying the Migration discussion toolkit.[8] They can be used as prompts during group discussions, focus groups or workshops.

BOX 5:   EXPLORING DEMOGRAPHIC CERTAINTIES – THE LINK BETWEEN THE PROPORTION OF YOUNG PEOPLE AND LEVELS OF MIGRATION

There is a potential for a decline in internal and international migration flows in regions with a declining youth population.

*By **Ronald Skeldon**, Emeritus Professor in Geography, University of Sussex and Professor of Human Geography, Graduate School of Governance Maastricht University*

One of the few generalizations that can be made about migration is that the majority of people who move tend to be young adults and therefore the number of migrants in and from any population must to some extent be a function of the number of young adults in that population. Not in any simple deterministic way but nevertheless the trend in the number of youthful age groups is a component of any change in migration. For example, in Asia, this relationship can be seen in the pattern of internal migration in Japan where the numbers of internal migrants declined by some 39 per cent between 1970 and 2010 while the number of young adults declined by 20 per cent. Given the declining youth cohorts, we can also envisage the internal movements in China, Thailand, and Vietnam slowing down in the near future. While they may expand in India towards 2030, the internal migration may also slow thereafter. Given the declining youth cohorts in European countries, we can expect to see a reduction of intra-European migration, although issues around housing, access to labour markets and growth need also to be added to any explanatory mix.

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[8]   These visual aids can be downloaded here: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf

BOX 6: EXPLORING SOCIAL CERTAINTIES – ETHNICALLY AND CULTURALLY DIVERSIFIED SOCIETIES VERSUS ISLANDS OF HOMOGENEITY IN EUROPE

Despite hyper-diversification of urban centres, some segments of the population might continue to have much less exposure to diversity.

*By **Simona Vezzoli**, Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam*

Cosmopolitan cities like London, Paris and Rome offer a glimpse of how migrants have entered, integrated and become part of the socio-economic fabric of global cities. The extent of diversification is visible in rising proportions of foreign-born populations (e.g. in 2015, the number of foreign-born people relative to total population in Inner London was 41 per cent) and in the number of nationalities present in cosmopolitan cities (e.g. Rome is home to citizens from 180 countries). This diversity is linked to the flourishing global networks and migrants' transnational ties that strengthen the connections between origin and main destination countries. While this trend is bound to continue, we should not forget that although migrants come from a more diverse set of origin countries, they have concentrated in a few major destination countries. Thus they have increased diversity in global cities and regional hubs and contributed to the perception that the world is increasingly diverse (Czaika & De Haas 2014). However, in some European countries and in particular in more rural areas, exposure to ethnic and cultural diversity is much lower. Even super-diverse cities may hide areas of high segregation. Moreover, we must not forget that international migration generally affects certain segments of the population (e.g. urban, professional, service sector workers) more so than a country's populations as a whole. As processes of gentrification and peri-urbanization[9] take place, we have to consider that, in the midst of hyper-diversification, some segments of the population might continue to have less exposure to diversity. This can contribute to growing social and political divisions and tensions in European societies.

BOX 7: EXPLORING TECHNOLOGICAL CERTAINTIES – THE LINK BETWEEN ADVANCES IN COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND LEVELS OF MIGRATION

As growing numbers of people across the globe gain access to sophisticated communications technologies, there is a potential for migration flows to increase.

*By **Mary Harper,** Africa Editor, BBC World Service*

Anecdotal evidence suggests modern communications technology, especially social media, plays a key role in encouraging migration. Those who have already arrived in host countries often exaggerate their 'successes' when posting on social media, leading populations at home to believe their lives will dramatically improve if they migrate. Mobile phones and social media platforms are used by traffickers to demand payments and make threats, and by migrants sharing information about the best migration routes to follow. Interviews conducted in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland and in diaspora communities suggest younger migrants use Snapchat and Instagram while older ones use Facebook. Online messaging and calling applications, such as WhatsApp, Skype, Imo, Viber and Telegram, are also popular with migrants and would-be migrants, particularly those with end-to-end encryption. As internet penetration increases globally and the cost of data falls, messaging related to migration is likely to grow, potentially leading to increased population flows. However, modern communications technology can also be used for messaging which informs about the risks associated with migration as long as it is presented in attractive and convincing form. Traditional and social media has also played a central role in shaping usually negative attitudes towards migration in host countries, although it can be used to present positive stories about migrants too. Repressive governments will continue to try to block populations from using communications technologies, but this is likely to have limited effectiveness as people usually find crafty ways of bypassing such restrictions.

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[9]   Peri-urbanisation is urban transition in the hybrid space in-between urban areas and rural hinterlands.

TABLE 1: **RELATIVE CERTAINTIES FOR MIGRATION BY 2030**

	EU
Demographic certainties	• Fertility rates across the EU will remain below the replacement level. • Ageing of EU societies will continue. • Life expectancy will continue to grow. • Shrinking labour force in many EU member states is likely to impede economic growth.
Social certainties	• Demand for health and elderly care services will expand. • Ethnic and cultural diversity will grow but remain unevenly distributed between and within EU countries. • Certain parts of population will continue to resist growth in ethnic and cultural diversity (especially those in more ethnically homogenous areas). • Popular concerns around national identity and culture will gain even more importance. • Density of cross-border social and family ties will continue to grow.
Technological certainties	• Digital divide will narrow down but still persist. • New risks associated with hacking and cyberterrorism will emerge. • Border management will increasingly rely on a range of technological solutions.
Political certainties	• The importance of new political players alongside traditional political parties will grow. • Security and tackling of terrorism will remain high on the political agenda. • Political significance of migration will further grow. • Conflicts and instability in the European neighbourhood will continue.
Environmental certainties	• Global mean temperature will increase. • More high-impact weather events (floods, droughts, wild fires, landslides) will take place. • Health impacts and losses to productivity related to heatwaves and epidemics of some infectious diseases will be more severe.
Economic certainties	• Automation and digitalisation will impact labour markets and particularly affect low and medium-qualified workers. • Proportion of workers in stable and permanent employment will decrease while precarious working conditions will affect more people. • Skills shortages will result from the shrinking pool of university graduates between 2017 and 2030.

	Non-EU: Africa, Asia & Eastern European neighbourhood [10]
Demographic certainties	• Population growth and youth bulges will persist in North and sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East. • Ageing and shrinking of labour force in China, Japan and Korea will continue. • Demographic imbalances in countries with higher proportion of men (e.g. China, India) will persist. • Population decline and ageing in Eastern European neighbourhood will continue.
Social certainties	• Increasing access to education will give rise to aspirations among young people (e.g. quality of life, professional fulfilment). • Urbanisation will continue and intensify in some parts of the world. • Demand for health and elderly care services in Eastern European neighbourhood will grow. • Density of cross-border social and family ties will continue to grow.
Technological certainties	• Access to internet and communication technologies will grow. • There will be more technology and innovation hubs with global impact (e.g. in China). • Digital divide will narrow but still persist.
Political certainties	• Areas of ongoing and new political instability in certain regions (North Africa and some countries in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East) will persist. • Democratic transitions in will take place in some African countries. • Growing number of refugees will be stuck in protracted refugee situations. • Russia will continue to try to extend its influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
Environmental certainties	• Global mean temperature will increase. • Droughts, floods, hurricanes and other natural hazards will grow in prevalence and will be particularly devastating for urban centres in coastal areas. • Levels of food insecurity in different regions will grow. • Health impacts and losses to productivity related to heatwaves and epidemics of some infectious diseases will be more severe.
Economic certainties	• Automation and digitalisation will impact labour markets and particularly affect low and medium-qualified workers. • High levels of informal employment will persist. • Fluctuations in oil prices will continue.

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[10]   These are regions that have traditionally been the main sources of immigrants coming to the EU. Eastern European neighbourhood includes non-EU countries in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

TABLE 2: **RELATIVE UNCERTAINTIES FOR MIGRATION BY 2030**

	EU
Demographic uncertainties	• The level of success in tackling non-communicable diseases • The effects of and responses to population decline
Social uncertainties	• Levels of welfare and education spending • Public response to growing cultural and ethnic diversity • The level of success in transforming education systems, retraining and life-long learning • Inequality within and across Member States (class, gender, ethnic, residence status) • Levels of liberalism versus conservatism in relation to family, gender and sexuality • The role of media and social media in particular in shaping public and political response to migration • The nature, presence, and role of the transnational community and diaspora networks
Technological uncertainties	• Speed and social and regulatory acceptance of automation and digitalisation and their impact on labour demand • The level of success and acceptance of technologies for alternative energy production and its impacts on labour demand • Developments and acceptance of technologies that facilitate teleworking and outsourcing • Developments in technologies that further facilitate transnational social and family ties: from communication technologies to transfer of money and goods
Political uncertainties	• The extent and form of EU integration • The role of cities and the shape of multi-level governance • Levels of xenophobia, islamophobia and racism • Levels of violent extremism and its political repercussions • EU member states' military engagement around the world • Levels of spending and target groups of European development aid and investment • On-the-ground impact of international efforts to cooperate in migration management
Environmental uncertainties	• The level of investment into tackling the roots and effects of climate change • The level of resilience of EU coastal cities faced with sea level rises and heightened risks from coastal storms and floods • Shape and speed of the transition to green technology and energy production • Levels of adaptability of different populations to climate change • Sudden and irreversible changes in the climate • Sudden collapse of ecosystems and ecosystem services • Sudden onset of high-impact weather events
Economic uncertainties	• The level of economic growth • Structure of the labour demand • Effects of trade deals with the rest of the world • Access to resources, especially energy • The need to import labour

	Non-EU: Africa, Asia & Eastern European neighbourhood
Demographic uncertainties	• The level of success in tackling non-communicable diseases • The speed of decline in fertility rates
Social uncertainties	• Levels of welfare and education spending • Access to quality education and social security • Levels of extreme poverty • Inequality within and across countries (class, gender, ethnic, residence status) • Levels of liberalism versus conservatism in relation to family, gender and sexuality • Erosion of traditional cultures vs. strengthening or retrenchment of traditional cultures • The role of media and social media in particular in shaping public and political responses to migration • The nature, presence, and role of the transnational community and diaspora networks
Technological uncertainties	• Speed and social acceptance of automation and digitalisation and their impact on labour demand • The extent of the digital divide • The level of radical innovation and leapfrogging • Developments in agricultural technologies and water management • Developments in technologies that further facilitate transnational social and family ties: from communication technologies to transfer of money and goods • Increased use of technology for education (increased access, expanded reach) • Perceived credibility of information gained from social media
Political uncertainties	• Levels of regional cooperation and governance • Russia's and China's involvement in conflicts and the potential of EU and the U.S. involvement • Continued democratisation • The level of democratisation versus shift towards dictatorship in different parts of the world • Outcomes of conflict resolution and reconstruction efforts in conflict-stricken regions • Emergence of new conflicts • Levels of corruption • Violent extremism and its impact on general insecurity • On-the-ground impact of international efforts to cooperate in migration management • Levels of spending and target groups of development aid • Levels of youth engagement in political developments
Environmental uncertainties	• The level of investment into tackling the roots and effects of climate change • The size of population displaced and/or trapped by the effects of environmental change • The outcomes of the coincidence of environmental hazards and state fragility in some countries • Shape and speed of the transition to green technology and energy production • Levels of adaptability of different populations to climate change • Sudden and irreversible climate changes • Sudden collapse of ecosystems and ecosystem services • Sudden onset of high-impact weather events
Economic uncertainties	• The level of economic growth • Structure of the labour demand • Effects of trade deals with the rest of the world • Investment in food production, especially in Africa • Levels of industrialisation and economic diversification in African countries • Access to land and the persistence of customary land tenure • Access to finance and financial literacy • Access to insurance schemes (e.g. of crops) • Access to electricity

It is impossible to predict future migration outcomes as a direct response to environmental change because environmental change is never a single pressure and because we cannot know for certain how individuals and households at risk and governments will perceive and respond to such changes. This applies both to how environmental change will impact origin and destination regions and economies.

*By **Dominic Kniveton**, Professor of Climate Change and Society, University of Sussex*

Rather than looking at how environmental change influences mobility, it may be more sensible to identify what factors drive and influence particular migration flows and to estimate how sensitive these drivers are to environmental change.[11] Such an approach allows the identification of longer (more indirect) causal changes between migration and the environment. Furthermore, migration flows are also influenced by individual and household migration behaviour, attitudes and their impact on other households' perception of both the risks they face and mobility options they have.[12] Accounting for the emergence that this and other feedbacks in the migration process (such as changes in migration policies) cause, is important for understanding the conditions under which mass migrations may or may not occur. The occurrence of rapid mass displacements that might arise from acute livelihood and security shocks, which are themselves in turn, sensitive to environmental variability and change, is of particular concern and uncertainty.

One of the key insights of the foresight report from the UK Government Office for Science (The Government Office for Science 2011) was the identification of so-called 'trapped populations'. These populations were defined as being comprised of impoverished people that face a 'double set of risks' by being both unable to move away from environmental threats and especially exposed and vulnerable to their impacts. The acknowledgment of the existence of such populations points to the need to consider both environmental variability and change pushing people to move, as well as forcing them to stay in locations exposed to the impacts of natural hazards. In particular it is likely that such populations will be found in expanding slums in urban areas of low-income countries where exposure to environmental risks tends to be high and protective governance low. Although being 'trapped' has been readily accepted as a concept and has gained some traction in policy circles, the identification and definition of trapped populations has received less critical examination. As noted by Black et al. (2013), it is 'difficult to distinguish, either conceptually or in practice, between those who stay where they are because they choose to and those whose immobility is in some way involuntary' (pS36). For example, when unpacking the notion of being 'trapped' it is sensible to ask whether it should be extended to people who do not see migration as an optimal solution to environmental or any other stresses and shocks as well as to those who do not perceive the risks they are facing as demanding a mobility response.

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[11]   For a comprehensive framework for assessing environmental determinants of migration see also Black et al. (2011).

[12]   This is further elaborated by Kniveton et al. (2012).

BOX 9: EXPLORING ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTIES – THE STRUCTURE OF LABOUR DEMAND AND THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

By **Simona Vezzoli**, *Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam*

It is relatively certain that by 2030, European societies will have a combination of aged population, high dependency ratios and strained pension and welfare systems. Solutions such as raising the retirement age will not resolve the long-term labour demand, both in the high and low skilled labour markets. Past strategies to address labour shortages have included encouraging women's labour participation, the recruitment of foreign labour and increase in labour productivity. We might see these solutions re-proposed as women's labour participation continues to be lower than men's (in 2015, 64.3 per cent of all 20 to 64-year-old women in comparison to 75.9 per cent of all men in the same age group for the EU 28)[13] and schemes to attract particular types of foreign workers may be introduced.

The future structure of the EU labour market and the specific labour demand are dependent on a wide range of factors, among which are: sectors driving the economy, the offshoring of industrial and service sector operations, the availability of relevant skills in the national labour force, the advancements of labour mechanization as well as employment benefits, healthy working conditions and foreign workforce policies. Furthermore, the provision of high quality programmes enabling workers to adapt to changing economies by promoting skills in demand and the accessibility of this training to workers within the country and abroad is linked to the uncertainty of the availability of the necessary skills.

The push for labour-replacing technology to substitute (migrant) labour[14]

While advancing technology is a relative certainty, it is unclear how our lives might be affected, in particular our work lives. What technology has done for work has been revolutionary, enabling rapid transfer of files, financial transfers as well as telecommuting, virtual meetings and the possibility of work re-entering the private space of the family as it did in pre-industrial times. Technology developers envision that other daily functions will be similarly revolutionized. Examples include driverless cars, 3D printing, robotics for personal care (which are already becoming a reality in Japan) and army robots, among others. Technological innovation affecting production and service systems will be influenced by technical feasibility, costs of technology, benefits of automation and regulatory and social acceptance. Central to the relationship with migration policy will be the supply or shortage of workers, their skill levels and labour productivity. Labour-replacing automation will, therefore, be affected by interrelations between government priorities and labour migration policies.

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[13]   Eurostat, 'Employment Statistics' <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Employment_statistics> [accessed 21 March 2017].
[14]   For a 2018 JRC report on the topic see Biagi et al. (2018).

4. FUTURE MIGRATION SCENARIOS

From the list of relative certainties and uncertainties, we constructed a set of four possible scenarios for what the future of migration in Europe could look like by 2030 (see Figure 1 below). The scenarios are built around two axes that represent two major areas of uncertainties that are crucial for migration outcomes. The horizontal axis refers to the level of international cooperation in key policy areas affecting migration and the degree to which local governance of political, social and economic matters is inclusive or exclusive of underprivileged groups of the population. We assume that a more cooperative governance style at the international level also tends to be more inclusive at the local level. The vertical axis represents the level of economic convergence or divergence between OECD and non-OECD countries.[15]

The scenarios presented in this section are not predictions of the future. In their development, we built on existing scenario reports carried out by the OECD (2016), the UK Government Office for Science (2011) and under the Global Migration Futures project (2009-2013).[16] These exercises were carried out over longer period of time and involved larger numbers of experts and discussions. They arrived at broadly similar results – hence the choice for us to build on and further develop these existing scenarios rather than running our own scenario development process from scratch. In this way, we could structure our debates with a small group of experts around an already prepared list of certainties and uncertainties and scenario narratives. The final versions of the scenarios were deemed plausible by these and other experts and stakeholders with whom we engaged during the course of the project.

We tried to find different ways of putting the scenarios to practical use that would outlive both the duration of the project and the usual 'shelf life' of a report. This is why we kept the big-picture scenarios general and brief so that they can serve as a basis for developing tools and engagement methods to generate insightful discussions.

The scenarios open up debates about different constellations of more and less certain future developments and possible actions that could be taken today in order to prepare for processes that can emerge from these constellations. It is, therefore, most useful to consider the four scenarios as a whole and discuss them in comparison with one another. Such a holistic view enables us to think through how different drivers could play out and interact with one another under different global political and economic contexts.

4.1. The big-picture scenarios and the implications for migration by 2030

In this section, we present a more detailed, chronological overview of the big-picture scenarios followed by insights from thematic and geographical 'zoom-ins' that emerged from our collaboration with experts who used the broad scenarios to dig deeper into specific topics.

Figures 2-5 outline various developments leading up to 2030. They are presented in five-year timeframes for the EU and non-EU countries.[17] We also include broad implications for migration of these scenarios. A one-page detailed overview of all four scenarios to be printed in A3 format can be found among the Migration discussion toolkit elements.[18]

When used to stimulate debates, the presentation of the scenarios can be accompanied by a series of questions. The participants are encouraged to read/listen to the scenario with these questions in mind as a way to engage them and prompt them to think through the consequences of alternative futures.

1. Will there be more or less migration in this scenario? Of what kind? In what directions?

2. Who will be the key institutional players influencing migration governance?

3. Will there be clear winners and losers in this scenario? Who could that be and why?

4. What are the key policy initiatives and directions that could enhance or reverse this scenario?

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15   Similar axes were used in the foresight projects by the OECD and UK Foresight that we were drawing on.

16   Hein de Haas, Simona Vezzoli and Ayla Bonfiglio from the International Migration Institute, https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/completed-projects/gmf

17   Non-EU countries include the European Union neighbourhood (non-EU Eastern Europe, North Africa and the Middle East), sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.

18   http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf

FIGURE 1: **BIG-PICTURE SCENARIOS WITH SHORT NARRATIVES**

Multilateral and inclusive governance

1

CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

Economic crisis creates patches of instability, but international collaboration allows for some progress in global migration management.

2

INCLUSIVE GROWTH

Economic growth and strong global collaboration create more inclusive but also more diverse societies.

4

SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

International cooperation is at its lowest. Despite technological progress, social inequalities are on the rise, stirring unrest and forced migration around the world.

3

SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

Economic convergence is not matched with social progress, giving way to rising inequality, xenophobia and isolationism in Europe and the neighbourhood.

Global economic divergence

Global economic convergence

Bilateral/unilateral and exclusive governance

FIGURE 2: **CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030**

1

CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

There is a strong divergence between advanced economies and the emerging and developing economies as a global crisis originating in China leads to major economic setbacks in the developing world. Despite the economic downturn in some parts of the world, Europe recovers quickly, and there is a strong appetite for multilateral and inclusive international and regional governance and increased accountability. The crisis creates patches of instability, but overall collaboration between countries of destination and origin allows for some progress in global migration management.

EU

2020 Temporary increase in unemployment due to economic crisis and low growth.

2025 Quick recovery from the crisis due to reforms and social spending measures. Steady support for EU integration. Regional trade agreements preferred means for cooperation with other advanced economies.

2030 Focus on regional cooperation and social inclusion – inequality between Member States is reduced, tensions limited. Investments in green tech and alternative energy.

NON-EU

2020 Economic crisis in China spreading throughout the world and hitting low-income countries hardest.

2025 Youth bulges in some regions create tensions and instability -> uprisings and crack-downs. International funding towards regional integration, rural communities and urban infrastructure.

2030 More frequent natural disasters – droughts in Middle East, North Africa and Sahel -> food and water shortages. Youth exodus towards urban centres. Greater international cooperation within and across regions to address interconnected challenges.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR MIGRATION?

2020 Progress on global cooperation in migration management. Migration mostly short distance and regional.

2025 Demand for high-skilled labour mostly in the health and services sectors. Migration pressures from youth bulges and rising refugee flows, most stay in region.

2030 Selective skills-based immigration schemes spread in the EU. Regional organisations in sending countries take on migration management.

FIGURE 3: **INCLUSIVE GROWTH: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030**

2

INCLUSIVE GROWTH

There is a strong commitment to progress on multilateral governance and even global governance in areas such as tax evasion and migration in this scenario. Countries strive for inclusive governance towards equitable distribution of wealth and income, access to health, education and land. Global economic convergence towards higher-income countries enables countries to invest in infrastructure and green technology and drives up demand for labour. Population growth in developing countries gradually decreases as do levels on inequality. Societies become more culturally heterogeneous which can lead to political tensions. Economic growth encourages greater collaboration between sending and receiving countries.

EU

2020 EU grows slowly but steadily. EU more united after Brexit, stronger mandate for international cooperation (tax, environment). EU invests in integration and inclusion.

2025 Growing cultural diversity remains a political issue. Cities more involved in social inclusion agendas. Expansion of renew. energy sources and usage.

2030 EU Pillar of Social rights becomes a reality. EU-wide recognition of education and professional qualifications of third-country nationals.

NON-EU

2020 High growth in low and lower-middle-income countries. Investment in infrastructure and green tech. Youth bulges in some regions and not enough jobs.

2025 Improved access to services (technology helps). Some countries start to reap the demographic dividend.

2030 Lower threat of extremist groups and fewer conflicts. Some areas in Africa and Asia become uninhabitable due to draughts. Decrease in fertility rates in some areas.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR MIGRATION?

2020 Target to reduce the transaction costs of remittances to below 3% has been hit in most of the world. Migration and Refugee Global compacts agreed with some binding elements.

2025 Demand for labour both in sending countries and in Europe generates new channels for foreign workers.

2030 Numbers of refugees go down, regular & circular migration flows overall increase.

FIGURE 4: **SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030**

3

SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

Global cooperation efforts are fragmented and countries pursue their own interests with little coordination with others. Despite this, we see global economic convergence with many developing countries moving towards high/upper-middle-income economic status. However, economic growth in the developing world is not met with social progress. An increasing number of unemployed young people living in socially volatile areas are looking for opportunities elsewhere. Europe is experiencing an economic slump, coupled with increasing social disruptions and rising inequality within Member States and regions. This is also reflected in the EU neighbourhood. Isolationist and anti-immigration political parties flourish. Socio-economic inequalities and displacement impact migratory flows.

EU

2020 Slow growth, high public debt and youth unemployment in some countries. Welfare cuts, social tensions, xenophobia and euroscepticism.

2025 Growing support for populist parties and social tensions. Growing automation and investment into green tech & defence.

2030 Shift towards political social conservatism in EU. Strong focus on national security and migration control. Shortages of workers in the health care sector.

NON-EU

2020 Economic convergence with advanced economies but corruption is high. Growing youth cohort with improved levels of education lacks opportunities.

2025 China becomes a high-income country, India and Russia upper-middle-income countries – though incountry inequality rises. Inequalities, social tensions and environmental pressures lead to conflicts.

2030 Tech progress in agriculture, but poor left behind.

## WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR MIGRATION?

2020 More migration towards East Asia that the EU. Bilateral agreements to address labour shortages.

2025 Low support for recruitment of lower-skilled migrant workers in the EU. Emigration from the EU and return to Africa and Asia.

2030 Irregular migration remains a problem. Labour shortages in Eastern Europe. Growing number of people displaced by environmental pressures combined with political instability.

FIGURE 5: **SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL: SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS 2030**

4

SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

Governance is fragmented with countries pursuing their own interests and exclusive policies to the point of abandoning some hard-won global agreements. Global economic divergence and stagnation in parts of the world heighten pressures on welfare systems in advanced economies and unemployment is high. Pressures linked to social inequalities are on the rise leading to unrest globally, especially in countries with youth bulges. Lack of coordination leads to significant loss of life due to famines and pandemics. There are more conflicts and extremism around the world driving large-scale forced migrations. Cyber-terrorism grows prominent in heavily tech-dependent countries. Increase in anti-immigration sentiments influences the political stance in sending and receiving countries.

EU

2020 The relevance of international organisations is fading; more countries consider leaving the EU. High investment in R&D and automation. Investment in border technology. Rising unemployment and social tensions.

2025 Economic divergence in the EU. More cooperation among some cities. Sense of insecurity in the EU, populists on the rise.

2030 Overreliance on tech – EU vulnerable to cyber attacks.

NON-EU

2020 Low-income countries become less competitive due to automation. Youth bulges and lack of jobs produce tensions in some regions.

2025 Extremism and political violence on the rise in Africa and Asia. Shift to regional and domestic markets in Africa and Asia.

2030 Emerging economies attract more immigrants. Technology enables more people to work abroad without migrating..

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR MIGRATION?

2020 Growing divide between people with mobility rights and the rest, rise in irregular flows.

2025 Migrants marginalised by lack of investment in integration and by increase in anti-immigration sentiments.

2030 Emigration from the EU goes up, EU no longer seen as an attractive destination for migrants.

4.2. Scenario implications for specific policy areas

To test whether the big-picture scenarios are capable of generating a future-oriented debate on specific policy areas, we organised three thematic focus groups with six to eight experts around the following EU policies:

- Foreign policy and external action

- Labour market and welfare policy

- Immigrant integration policies

These sessions had the same format each time: to set the scene, the current state-of-play on the topic was introduced in a 15-minute presentation by an invited expert. This was followed by a brief presentation of the 2030 scenarios. We then asked the participants to place themselves in 2030 and discuss how each scenario might challenge or impact the respective policy area and together we considered possible implications for migration in the EU under each future scenario. Below, we present the main highlights of these discussions and interesting horizontal questions that emerged.

4.2.1. EU foreign policy, external action and external policies

Key insights from the debate

- If the collaborative scenarios are to result in stronger and more inclusive governance structures, diasporas will need to have a bigger say in policies of destination countries.

- More equal partnership relations with third countries (perhaps with the EU no longer having an upper hand in these relations) could lead to easier negotiations of readmission agreements.

- More collaboration does not necessarily mean more progressive governance. By 2030, there could also be enough momentum for a joint push to reinterpret international law in order to facilitate containment of migrants and refugees and to speed up their returns to countries of origin or transit. This could be done by, for example, abolishing the *non-refoulement*[19] principle or by reinterpreting the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the related Protocol.

Current state of play

By **Rosa Balfour**, *Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US*

The EU's global outreach remains uneven. It is still underdeveloped as a political actor on the international scene but nonetheless a key player in trade and economic terms, and of some normative significance at the multilateral level. Geographic proximity determines the degree and depth of EU engagement, as well as the histories and ties of relations at the national level. Over the past few years, the EU has attempted to strengthen its international identity with the elaboration of some policy preferences, through for example the EU's Global Strategy. Britain's departure from the EU is likely to negatively impact the EU's ability to become a global player though the region is contributing to modest (and potentially insignificant) political commitments towards security defence cooperation.

The EU's ability to influence international developments remains deeply volatile and dependent on events determined elsewhere, including on issues which have direct consequences for EU affairs, including on migration patterns. Migration patterns are increasingly shaping preferences with impacts on several areas of international activity, showing a strong vulnerability to domestic politics shaping external engagement. How the U.S., Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia behave shapes and constrains Europe's choices. In this regard,

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[19]   A fundamental principle of international law that forbids a country receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in danger of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

so long as the EU's role in conflict prevention and mediation is curbed by the predominance of other powers in global governance, the continent is likely to continue being at the receiving end of trends it cannot influence. Instability and conflict in the EU's neighbourhood and sub-Saharan Africa have all caused population movements towards Europe. Indeed, the political crisis of 2015-2016 which saw a major breakdown in solidarity within the EU and a pushback against the European Commission's assertion of its competences was triggered by the arrival of mixed flows of migrants, the great majority of which were refugees fleeing wars or conflict-driven insecurity which European states had not been able to contain or de-escalate (Syria, Afghanistan in primis).

Emerging EU external migration policies are showing a growing dependence on domestic politics. EU migration policy can limit the EU's ability to influence international events, making the EU vulnerable to the preferences of other actors. For instance, the priority accorded by the EU to rely on Turkey's cooperation in dealing with refugees from Syria has curtailed the EU's ability to influence Ankara's policies in Syria and towards the Kurdish question. Domestic politics is also changing the nature of the EU's development policy, which now has a stronger emphasis on migration-related issues and on security sector cooperation to enable third states to better control their borders. Finally, the EU's budget for humanitarian relief to support populations hit by conflict and other natural and man-made disasters has increased enormously in recent years.

The EU still struggles to achieve coherence between external policies, despite the double role the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has as a Vice President of the European Commission. The external impact of internal policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or the Fisheries Policy, can sometimes contrast with other political objectives. The relationship between the EU and Morocco, for example, is shaped by the shared interest both parties have in maintaining and upgrading their fisheries agreement, which the EU is also normatively tied to and ensuring that these do not negatively affect the situation in Western Sahara. The European Court of Justice is currently dealing with a complaint from the Western Sahara campaign. Similarly, increasing food safety standards in the EU can impact on third countries which depend on access to the EU market for their agricultural products.

These examples show how the external impact of internal EU policies can have unintended consequences on the livelihoods of many employed in these sectors in third countries. Indirectly, changes in sources of domestic product can lead to population movements in search of better opportunities. While development aid is increasingly geared towards supporting local economic growth, other EU policies may not be dovetailed to that end. More research connecting the linkages between the impacts of different policies is needed.

Table 3 below presents the main implications for the development of the EU's foreign policy and external action efforts in each of the four scenarios.

TABLE 3: WHAT COULD THE CONTEXT FOR EU FOREIGN POLICY AND EXTERNAL ACTION LOOK LIKE IN 2030 IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS?

SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

- EU to play a coordination role on restrictions and containment of migration flows
- Tensions between inward- and outward-looking Member States
- Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based on piecemeal cooperation
- European external action carried out through trade and development
- Outsourcing of migration management to third countries enhanced

SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH

- Less conditionality and more partnership in EU's dealing with third countries
- Focus on circular migration and regularisation of labour migration
- Development-oriented partnerships with third countries more emphasis on the benefits of migration as part of development
- Stronger CFSP cooperation amongst Member States
- Diasporas have a bigger say in EU destination countries
- Readmissions agreements are easier to conclude

SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

- Inward-looking trend in EU foreign policy dominates
- Divisions between the core EU states and the periphery
- Policy innovation exists but mostly at the level of Member States
- Focus on tackling irregular migration
- Growth in smuggling and trafficking as political volatility in the EU neighbourhood grows and so do migration pressures
- EU becomes less attractive for highly-skilled immigrants

SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

- Minimal cooperation amongst Member States on foreign policy issues
- Limited collaboration on: border control, returns and externalisation of migration policies
- Revisions of the fundamental principles of international law such as the 'non-refoulement'[20] principle or the right to asylum

HORIZONTAL QUESTIONS:

- Could increasing cooperation on defence, in response to a global rise in military expenditure, increase militarisation and consequently stimulate existing and new conflicts?
- Can the EU achieve an external migration policy independently from its internal migration policy?

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[20] A fundamental principle of international law that forbids a country receiving asylum seekers from returning them to a country in which they would be in danger of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

4.2.2.   Labour market and welfare policies

Key insights from the debate

- Contrary to common expectations, trade protectionism could lead to more migration by pushing up the demand for low-skilled labour in migration destination countries.

- An introduction of the universal basic income and similar universal schemes can be politically difficult if migrants are perceived as receiving benefits without prior contribution. More evidence on the link between universal basic income schemes and public perceptions of migrants is needed to avoid feeding demand for migrants' exclusion and the anti-immigrant sentiment among citizens.

Current state of play

By **Alexandre Afonso,** *Assistant professor of public policy at Leiden University, Netherlands*

Labour market and welfare policies remain largely the responsibility of the EU Member States rather than common European policies. However, together with patterns of future economic growth, labour market and welfare policies will matter greatly in shaping future migration within, from and towards Europe.[21] Labour market policies are important indirect migration drivers since they affect the degree to which temporary recruitment of labour is possible, workers' rights are protected, workplace abuses are prevented, and unauthorized labour is tolerated in practice. European welfare regimes also interact with migration, for example by raising different demands for foreign labour. The increasing demand for care workers has been a major factor in explaining the continued migration of regular and irregular (and increasingly female) workers towards some EU countries. Considering the ageing of the European population and growing demand for health and elderly care services, the need for such skills is likely to increase in the future. Debates about migration, labour markets and welfare are often framed by the assumption that welfare generosity attracts more migration and reduces immigrants' incentives to participate in the labour market. However, existing evidence shows that welfare generosity reduces rather than increases the demand for low-skilled work and therefore can limit the number of foreign workers. There is also a lack of substantial evidence supporting the argument about welfare tourism. Access to work is a much stronger incentive for migration than welfare for both EU and non-EU migrants (Afonso & Devitt 2016).

Table 4 below presents the main implications for the development of the EU's labour market and welfare policies in each of the four scenarios.

4.2.3.   Immigrant integration policies

Key insights from the debate

- There is not a straightforward relationship between inclusive policies and positive integration outcomes. Integration will crucially depend on other policy areas such as labour markets and social security.

- Across the scenarios, growing selectiveness in access to integration programmes is to be expected in the future with employers gaining a stronger voice as advocates for selective immigration and integration policies. This growing selectiveness needs to be complemented by mainstreaming of integration across policy areas to avoid social exclusion of other immigrant groups.

Current state of play

By **Ilke Adam**, *Research Professor at the Institute for European Studies of the Free University in Brussel*

Similar to labour-market and welfare policies, integration policies have also traditionally been the exclusive prerogative of EU Member States. In recent years, there has been a dispersion of authority over integration up-wards to the EU, down-wards to regions and cities and out-wards to non-governmental organisations and the private sector. At the EU level, there has also been a horizontal dispersion of governance illustrated by the increase in intra-service groups and emphasis on better cross-sector coordination. The EU strongly promotes 'civic integration policies', such as the provision of integration courses, through its funding mechanisms, currently in the form of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). However, after a decade of implementation, we lack clear evidence regarding the benefits of the courses and tests funded. Rather, the existing evidence shows that language acquisition and labour-market integration are not always better for those who followed integration courses than for those who did not. Research has also shown that too strict integration requirements (such as integration tests in exchange for stable residence permits) might actually hinder integration if they are used as a form of migration control. The complex relationship between inclusive policies and positive integration outcomes stems from the importance of other public policies such as labour market, welfare, education and citizenship which may have a higher impact on integration outcomes. Moreover, public perceptions of investments into immigrant integration can affect public confidence and reduce or expand political space for reform and policy innovation in this area (Adam & Caponio 2018).

Table 5 below presents the main implications for the development of the EU's immigrant integration policies in each of the four scenarios.[22]

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[21]   The importance of the structure of labour demand in destination countries and the impact of welfare policies as drivers of European migrations are further elaborated in the project's background study (de Haas 2018).

[22]   A set of four 2030 integration scenarios for the EU was also developed by Rainer Münz as part of an ESPAS Ideas Paper Series (Münz 2018).

TABLE 4: **WHAT COULD THE CONTEXT FOR LABOUR MARKET AND WELFARE POLICIES IN THE EU LOOK LIKE IN 2030 IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS?**

SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

- More limited access to social security but parts of the welfare system are regulated at the EU level
- Decrease in welfare generosity but increase in coverage of different groups of workers (e.g. in the domestic and care sector dominated by migrant workers)
- Spending cuts in education and labour-market protection
- More emphasis on individual investment in reskilling
- The labour market becomes more segregated

SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH

- Stronger links between economic growth and social aspects (e.g. in the European Semester)
- Agreement on intra-EU transfers to Member States to compensate for costs related to inflows of immigrants
- EU social security accounts, common European benefits scheme
- More investment in inclusive education systems
- More governance on EU labour market protection
- Potential for nationalist backlash against 'non-deserving' immigrant beneficiaries

SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

- Preference for local workers and welfare chauvinism
- More conditionality for certain groups, including immigrants
- Growing social conservativism
- Lack of investment in public services at the state level feeds anti-immigrant sentiment
- No EU labour-market protection systems and collective bargaining mechanisms
- EU cooperation only on necessary elements around the single market

SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

- Less spending on education and social housing
- More conditionality in access to welfare and the labour market for immigrants
- Trade protectionism could lead to more migration as the demand for low-skilled labour would grow
- More conditionality in immigration and integration policies
- Investment in technology and new possibilities for remote work could decrease demand for longer-term migration of high- and medium-skilled workers
- Decline in welfare chauvinism as more people emigrate from the EU

HORIZONTAL QUESTIONS:

- Do more diverse societies necessarily need to be more unequal?
- Could new welfare schemes such as universal basic income or EU-wide benefits create a popular demand for excluding non-citizens from access to benefits if they have not contributed to the national system prior to benefiting from it? Could they therefore inadvertently feed nationalist and populist tendencies in some Member States?

TABLE 5: **WHAT COULD THE CONTEXT FOR IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION POLICIES LOOK LIKE IN 2030 IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS?**

SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

- There is space for reform and cooperation, including in the area of migration and integration

- New opportunity for the EU to be a global player in tackling crises of global relevance: e.g. environmental displacement, supporting intra-regional migration in Africa

- EU initiates a new legal and institutional framework for integration of environmentally displaced populations

SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH

- Systematic mainstreaming of integration across policy areas, especially into social inclusion

- More opportunities for larger-scale resettlement programmes

- More intra-EU competition for highly skilled immigrants

- More harmonization of integration policies at the EU level – also through the EU Pillar of Social rights

- Greater levels of mobility and diversity in the EU could impact the sense of collective belonging, which might have to be based on different criteria than national identity

SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

- EU becomes less attractive as a destination

- Little space for EU-wide actions on integration

- Legal migration channels and integration programmes become very selective and benefit the needs of some EU Member States only

- Migrants' social and political rights are seriously curtailed

- Growing inequality among different groups of immigrants

- Little space for programmes supporting social cohesion among different disadvantaged groups

SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

- Little space for coordinated integration policies, rising tensions among disadvantaged groups

- Increased concentration of migrants in some cities, that can reap the benefits of immigration

- Growing urban – rural divide

- Short-term increase of intra-EU mobility due to growing economic divergence but more obstacles to freedom of movement in the long term

- Employers become vocal advocates of selective integration

HORIZONTAL QUESTIONS:

- Could strengthened political and socio-economic rights for immigrants result in more inclusive policies in destination countries?

- At the individual level, what if there is a gap between immigrants' subjective perception of wellbeing and their socio-economic integration?

4.3. Scenario implications for the EU, the EU neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia

While the focus groups presented in the previous section dealt with possible scenario implications for EU policies linked to migration outcomes, we also asked experts involved in the project to consider how the scenarios would play out in and beyond the EU. Their insights focusing on the EU, the EU neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia are presented below (Boxes 10 – 13).

Using the certainties and uncertainties identified for the different regions, the experts developed narratives for each of the scenarios about what the future could look like and what the implications for migration might be in different regional contexts. While the big picture scenarios offer a framework under which we can discuss different policy implications, the regional zoom-ins provide more detail and precision as to the four alternative futures. This kind of precision can be useful when discussing the various conditions and dynamics under which migration policymaking is formulated, the range of outcomes that are possible, and the interaction between these dynamics in different world regions. Furthermore, considering the scenario implications beyond the EU makes us realise how migration dynamics are shaped both in countries of origin and destination.

The regionally-specific scenario narratives presented below can be used to adjust and adapt the discussion tools from the Migration discussion toolkit included in the last part of this report.

4.3.1. General insights from the geographically-specific scenarios

Despite different political and economic parameters that distinguish the four future scenarios, some general trends emerge from the narratives and could be considered in debates about future policy priorities:

- A situation in which EU Member States collaborate only on migration control measures and negotiate other elements of their migration and development policies bilaterally or in smaller groups of Member States emerges as a plausible future in multiple scenarios.

- Lack of international collaboration on migration governance and sustainable development is likely to stimulate growth in irregular migration flows.

- In a number of scenarios, the EU in 2030 is no longer amongst the most attractive destinations for migrants coming from the EU neighbourhood, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia because non-European regions will be in a position to offer better economic and social prospects to foreign workers and their families.

- A combination of the economic and political rise of Middle Eastern powers and natural disasters caused by climate change in the EU neighbourhood could make the EU vulnerable to influxes of migrants, both refugees and irregular, incentivised and facilitated by the social networks with communities already established in EU countries.

- In sub-Saharan Africa, inflows of various forms of capital from the diaspora need to be supported but also carefully managed. Such capital has the potential for disrupting social and economic opportunities for the "local" population and could give rise to internal political resistance against the political influence of the diaspora.

- In Southeast Asia, diaspora groups will be crucial in facilitating mobility of skilled workers across borders, as an increasing number of countries in the region will experience population decline and a shrinking labour force.

- Unless the security situation and economic opportunities in cities significantly worsen, Southeast Asian countries will have to respond to the problems associated to rural depopulation.

4.3.2. 2030 in the European Union

BOX 10: 2030 SCENARIO IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

*By **Simona Vezzoli**, Postdoctoral Researcher, Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam*

SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

In 2030 the European landscape is overall positive as the European Union not only has retained relevance but it has become a more cohesive union. Through its leaders' strategic vision, the EU has continued to hold political and economic power in a changing international context where new emerging economic blocs have started to dominate. The EU has displayed strong cooperative efforts, solidarity and a desire for social inclusion, which has come as a surprise considering the deep internal divisions experienced in the late 2010s and early 2020s for both political and economic reasons, including escaping the collapse of the Schengen Area.

While greater cooperative efforts are now (2030) widely accepted, the road has been rocky as, over the past decade, EU Member States have reacted to external and internal pressures expressing different preferences. While France and Germany fully supported EU consolidation in the late 2010s, other countries took a more cautious approach: Southern European countries remained committed to the EU project but firmly requested measures to reduce inequalities, while CEE countries showed diverse preferences with Poland standing with France and Germany and Bulgaria and Romania standing with Southern Europe. A general consensus arose on the need to improve the efficiency of the EU, which encouraged goodwill among most Member States and their willingness to financially support reforms, particularly EU-level socio-economic reforms which have reduced intra-EU inequalities and limited social tensions.

The growth of industry in green technologies and alternative energy sources has also been a stimulus for smaller scale initiatives both in the EU and abroad. The EU has not dominated this industry, but it has spearheaded innovative techniques thanks to R&D investment and the inflow of scientists and experts from other developed countries, mainly previously based in the US. While the investments initially aimed to find sustainable solutions to water scarcity in Southern Europe, similar needs in several countries – either needing energy sources or facing water scarcity and management issues – have sparked partnerships in North Africa and the Sahel region, reducing some of the long-term constraints to economic growth.

The migration landscape is characterized by a dynamic migration system of high-skilled workers, including growing numbers of professionals from developing countries, but also some channels that allow the rapid entry of skilled and lower-skilled immigrants, including humanitarian cases, in the labour market. At the same time, we see the emergence of other migration systems that completely by-pass the EU, as other regions are similarly attempting to promote technology-driven economic growth through the immigration of highly skilled professionals as well as harnessing the talents of skilled migrants and individuals among the sizable displaced populations.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- In 2020, while Member States consolidated their support behind the EU, the economy continued to be slow, albeit stable. The instability, growing inequalities within the EU and between the EU and other parts of the world stimulated contestations to neoliberal principles. Within the EU, these movements led to political adjustments as traditional parties sought to find new solutions to the deep socio-economic divisions within society.

- The economic crisis led to low labour demand in certain sectors – industry and some services – and immediate pressure to constrain the entry of new foreign workers

- By 2025, Member States began their economic recovery, which was grounded on regional trade agreements with other advanced economies.

- In the EU, the social movements against globalization were placated as governments committed to improving social protection, particularly in the reinvestment into the wellbeing of all members of society, mainly the young and disadvantaged, but also catering to the needs of an ageing population.

- Service sectors to support high-skilled workers also grew and the chronic shortage of labour in the EU resulted in the renewed demand for labour.

- In an attempt to prevent immigration to the EU, Member States renewed their commitment to Schengen and introduced new vetting procedures to restrict and contain immigration.

SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH

By the early 2020s, social tensions in most EU Member States reached a point of no return. A handful of visionary political leaders, recognizing that the options were either to plunge into total chaos or try to offer real honest solutions to a politically disillusioned populace, started a new European movement focused on cooperation, social protection, justice and equality. Their movement, which came to be known as the European Renewal Movement (ERM), provided a new vision and inspiration for young and old to collaborate for a better society. ERM's main achievement was the creation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. While terrorist attacks endured into the mid-2020s, the sense of optimism towards a new inclusive rights-based social model led to a relatively fast weakening of the recruitment base of terrorist networks.

Businesses were central in pushing for the EU-wide recognition of education and professional qualifications of graduates with non-European degrees, which also facilitated the migration of highly skilled professionals, despite ongoing claims of 'brain drain' by origin countries. With the US losing some of its appeal as a leader in innovation, the EU gained attractiveness, although it is competing with other attractive destinations. Even for other types of migration, from displacement, skilled and low-skilled migration and irregular migration, the EU remains an attractive but not the sole potential destination. As a result, while migration management remains on the EU agenda, the stimulus for creating shared migration and integration policies has waned as Member States try to address the concerns of migrant populations through their general rights-based approach. Migration flows have also diversified not so much towards the EU but to other countries in the EU neighbourhood, which have seen sectors of their economies grow.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- By 2020, economic conditions began to improve, leading to increased labour demand, particularly in the green tech sector, which received large financing by the EU as well as individual Member States.

- Given growing global competition for workers by other high-growth countries, the EU developed the strategy to 'recruit' from countries where political tensions are making emigration desirable.

- The slow recovery from the economic crisis led to an impulse for immigration, particularly from lower-middle-income countries in the EU neighbourhood, e.g. Montenegro, as well as across the Mediterranean, e.g. Morocco, and beyond, e.g. Ethiopia, Senegal and Sri Lanka. Asylum seeking towards the EU decreased to a trickle as a result of a peaceful Middle East.

- By 2025, the EU showed a thriving green tech industry centred in areas around cities like Berlin and Warsaw. Some tensions emerged as a result of the contrast between urbanites spreading into peri-urban and rural areas, particularly because of the higher cultural and ethnic diversity of urban dwellers.

- Governmental campaigns emphasized the European ethos of solidarity and cohesion in diversity through the appeal of food and music festivals, the support for the arts and other initiatives that introduce creative solutions to environmental and social challenges, e.g. urban renewal projects that rely on green technologies, recycling and promote community-building.

- By 2025, the expectations of a growing migrant labour force were becoming a reality, affecting also peri-urban areas. This generated some social tensions among more homogeneous populations in Germany, Poland and Czechia. But the economic benefits generated by migrant workers, have rapidly rallied support for EU-level labour migration and integration schemes.

SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

In 2030, there are attempts to rise above instinctive reactions to terrorism and to re-open the gaze to the outside. This approach, however, is limited to some of the Member States as cohesion among the EU Member States has suffered. It appears that the countries that opened to the world were influenced by three developments in particular: 1. The expansion of the green technology industry, the impulse to trade, and human resource exchanges with other economic hubs, e.g. India, Indonesia and Eastern and Southern Africa; 2. Frequent rapid-onset environmental crises, such as flooding in coastal cities and in river valleys, e.g. in Skopje, Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are promoting a sense of solidarity as these events are hitting closer and closer to home and necessitate global solutions more than ever before; and 3. Growing cybercrime and the fact that both the sources of this threat and possible solutions seem to originate outside of the EU space.

Demographic trends have continued as expected, with low fertility, longer life expectancies and a sizeable 65+ cohort. Continuous security threats have influenced the older generation, who have supported the entry into Member States' governments of ultra-conservative parties that emphasized job access, social protection and publicly-funded social services only for natives and naturalized citizens. While much of these conservative values did not translate into actual policies, employers minimized the hiring of foreign workers. As they 'grew apart' Member States adopted various approaches to their labour market demands. In a few countries, e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland and Hungary, there was a conservative backlash as differentiated access to social services was established, depending on tax contributions and access for migrants only after a 'probationary' period. In other countries, such as Greece, Italy and Spain, governments attempted to retain universal coverages for health, unemployment and pensions.

The EU Member States tried to hold on to the idea of a shared future but in fact several divisions emerged, often tied to social services, right to work and quality of life. Collaboration continued in the areas of security, protection from external attacks and, most recently in the fight against cybercrime threats. This resulted in different groups of Member States: some experiencing stronger economic conditions, greater employment opportunities and stability, some legal labour immigration channels but low social protection, particularly for non-natives and long-term residents; and others where quality of life was centred around principles of social security and the pursuit of fulfilling work, but where these 'benefits' were reserved for natives, while being more restrictive for immigrants. In either case, Member States continued to be economically attractive for migrants, but less desirable in terms of social justice, particularly as China, India and Russia provide even more favourable economic opportunities. The sectors that continue to attract important numbers of foreign workers are health and care services, but not unlike the 1970's guest-worker programmes, they intend to promote circulation and prevent long-term settlement of migrant. It has been mostly Eastern European countries that have begun to put pressure on having common migration policies as they seek to find viable solutions for their labour shortages. However, given the fragmented interests among the Member States, Eastern European countries have resorted to bilateral agreements promoting circular migration.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- In the 2020s, EU Member States struggled to relaunch their economies, particularly in Southern Europe, but also in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland and France.

- In Southern Europe, high youth unemployment, combined with further austerity measures and cuts to welfare and education, led to grave social tensions.

- Combined with a surge in terrorist attacks, many Member States took a rapid turn toward conservative and inward-looking policies, particularly aimed at making the population feel safe through insulation.

- Disagreements among Member States on the way forward led to different visions of the future of the Union and a gradual fragmentation of the EU, with the last entrants among the first 'exiters' in the 2020s.

- By 2025, there are important tensions between migrant and non-migrant communities, recurrent fears of large flows of displaced people due to environmental pressures and conflict in Africa and anxieties from the growing presence of populist parties in governments.

- The EU has rapidly lost appeal as a region of migration destination and much to the surprise of EU leadership, Europe has become a destination of last resort for asylum seekers and displaced population, who can still rely on the human rights approach that still survives in some EU Member States.

SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

By 2030, Europe is characterized by a climate of great uncertainty. On the one hand there have been interesting developments with the emergence of leadership of cities like Berlin, the economic growth of certain Member States that invested heavily in R&D in technology, robotics and engineering; on the other hand, other Member States have stalled, unable to catch up with technological change and important setbacks have occurred in international cooperation, which have hampered efforts to deal with large numbers of people displaced by conflicts in Africa and Asia and to tackle massive cyberattacks. In 2030, the EU is fragmented: some countries collaborate with each other, i.e. Austria, Denmark and Hungary, as they try to protect and save their position, but they shun external collaboration. Their increased isolation is also linked to their decision to scale down reliance on automation both in the public and private spheres as a way to limit exposure to cyber threats. Others have embraced the idea of working as a global community to find sustainable solutions to climate and environmental issues, e.g. China has become a leader in funding high-tech solutions to flooding, and implement sustainable answers to population displacement for example, and even here China has been heavily involved given its need to relocate its population living in the coastal areas and it has worked in partnership with Russia, India, the US and a few African countries.

In 2030, the EU project has failed overall, although some of its principles survive among those few Member States that have taken steps to move forward relying on some collaboration. There is growing interest among the forward-looking Member States to move towards the reduction of EU membership. But the institutional fragmentation of the EU is not the only loss: it is disadvantaged people, the working classes and the vulnerable that have paid a high price through the changes of the last two decades. Furthermore, we have moved from talking about an EU labour market to reverting to discussions about individual Member States labour markets. Fortunately, the authorities of a few cities, sites of business ventures and economic growth, have instituted municipal level programmes and services, including education and language services for new arrivals, and have become attraction poles of both intra-EU migration and international migration.

Within the EU, borders have been reintroduced by the isolationist countries, which are keen on preventing most immigration, except for a few sectors in which skilled migrants are in demand. Continued uncertainties in the EU into the 2020s made the Member States less attractive than in past decades, even leading to return of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers unable to regularize their situation and less and less able to rely on access to the informal market as controls increased, including at the borders. Migration into the EU became accepted and regulated primarily in high tech, medical and health sectors, including mid-level experienced care sector as well as lower-skilled care provision. These migrants no longer enjoy freedom of movement within the EU and benefits previously enjoyed, such as rights to family reunification. These conditions made the EU less attractive to migrants, who could also consider other alternative destinations in emerging economies.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- In 2020, the EU collaborative efforts, encouraged by a new group of political leaders in 2019, started to lose momentum as divergent interests and approaches emerged to deal with social divisions and terrorism, migration management issues and approaches to combat cybercrime. These divergent interests were associated with the fact that some Member States put their bets on a future led by technological progress, particularly centred in some attractive cities such as Berlin and Strasbourg, while others avoided outward openness, perceived as full of threats.

- Protectionist policies hampered economic growth, rapidly enlarging government debt and the shrinking of welfare provisions by limiting the numbers of beneficiaries and putting needs of the native populations before those of migrants. This led to worsening social tensions.

- By 2025, investment in automation was preferred to more migration in order to avoid stimulating the growth of a strong support base for right-wing anti-immigration populist parties. Strong anti-immigration attitudes and failures to tackle environmental and security issues as global problems are main motives that lead to the progressive fragmentation of EU unity and to the first steps to be taken by the most conservative EU Member States towards an exit from the EU.

4.3.3.   2030 in the EU neighbourhood

By **Rosa Balfour**, *Senior Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the US*

SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

By 2030, Europe continues to be surrounded by a volatile neighbourhood. EU governance and its relations with Eastern Europe, the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East remain based on a patchwork of slow enlargement, some trade agreements and deepening of relations with individual countries, accompanied by an enduring inability to influence authoritarian regimes and conflict in the neighbourhood. In addition, the EU seeks cooperation with neighbouring countries to contain the consequences of conflict further afield – hence Europe's foreign policy is guided by a demand towards neighbouring countries to act as a buffer zone, limiting its ability to shape and influence positive change. However, additional spending on foreign policy ensures that the impact on Europe of the crises in neighbouring countries and beyond is relatively contained and does not fundamentally undermine the European project.

In terms of migration, large numbers of North Africans seek refuge in Europe following political crises there (in politically fragile and/or demographically bulging countries such as Egypt), alongside irregular migrants and refugees from other parts of Africa. Only some could integrate into the needs of the labour market; others were deported thanks to the improved ability of European states to cooperate with third countries on returns and on delivering humanitarian support outside Europe and to a growth in demand for labour in non-European countries. Continued instability in the Eastern neighbourhood also caused population flows to Central Europe. People from the Eastern neighbourhood were better integrated than those coming from the South. However, due to the lack of longsighted immigration and integration policy to address Europe's own demographic changes (with population declines in the countries least willing to integrate migrants) the full potential of these flows remains unfulfilled.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- In 2020, the EU decided to continue its commitment to the Western Balkans, though a solution to the conflicts in Eastern Europe was intangible. It supported Turkey's policies in the Levant (Syria, fight against the Kurds) as long as they cooperated on refugee management. Instability in Libya continued to cause concern, but relations with Morocco improved.

- The EU increased its spending on external relations with a focus on migration containment, supporting cooperation with third countries on migration management, and towards the neighbouring countries. Development cooperation continued to be a large part of EU external spending, but its objectives were increasingly politicised to reflect domestic preferences (mostly migration containment) and security priorities (anti-terrorism, border management).

- Europe continued to build up its profile in security matters, but its focus remained tied to anti-terrorism in Europe, North Africa and the Sahel, and other parts of the African continent. Its role in the broader Middle East remained secondary to other players, such as the US, Russia, Turkey, Iran, the Gulf States, and even China.

- A few trade deals continued to be negotiated with trade-friendly countries which kept the international trade agenda ticking during the lull caused by a retrenchment in the US. Europe expanded its relations with Asian countries but remained a minor player as far as security in the Asian continent was concerned.

- Other issues became part of the multilateral dialogue and saw a wide range of partners involved, including the US and China. These were tied to digital and technological developments and cyber security, where states cooperated especially when needing to address the rise of non-state actors in cyber space.

- Environmental disasters occasionally caused unexpected forms of cooperation. Through the EU, Member States boosted their capabilities to respond to natural and human-made disasters.

SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH

By 2030, Europe manages to promote a notion of regional order which is projected beyond its borders and included the whole of Europe and parts of North Africa and the Middle East. The EU completed the accession process in the Balkans and developed a model of differentiated relations with other countries, some with the ambition to join the EU, others more focused on economic integration and intensification of political, cultural and human relations. Instability has not disappeared from Europe's still fragile neighbourhood, and the consequences of conflict require immense efforts at reconstruction, but these also provided economic opportunities, which Europe and its neighbouring countries successfully seize. This helped diffuse demographic dynamics in North Africa and the Middle East, some of which continued to undergo transformation to become countries of immigration.

Inclusive growth and demographic needs support policy changes in immigration policy, making EU Member States more positive towards improving legal channels for migration. Policy investments in education and training, coupled with support towards preventing brain drain in neighbouring countries help create a better match between supply and demand. Circular migration is supported, and technology becomes increasingly relevant to helping manage migration and labour markets.

Key developments that led to this scenario

- By 2020, the EU managed to diffuse underlying tensions in the Balkans and pursue a truly transformative policy. A breakthrough with Russia enables a settlement of the conflict in Eastern Europe, where a more cooperative environment starts to emerge.

- Europe makes a political and economic investment into peace in the Middle East.

- By 2025, it became apparent that investing into sustainable development in Europe's neighbourhood was a win-win scenario with opportunities for further economic growth, facilitating smoother political relations and improved cooperative governance. Migration policies became part of this nexus.

- EU Member States managed to broker a forward-looking Multi-Annual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2027 onwards which brought innovation to the ways in which the EU conducted its affairs, with a much stronger nexus being developed between internal and external policies.

- Stabilising the neighbourhood provided economic opportunities for European companies and led to investments into transnational infrastructure. Diversification of energy supplies and the growth of the green economy were made possible through public-private partnerships and investments.

- By 2030, the world moved towards large and integrated economic and political spaces cooperating with each other also on security matters.

SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

By 2030, the European continent's ability to manage its own challenges is hampered by its own fragmentation and slow growth. Eastern Europe and the Balkans displayed similar demographic patterns but Europe's decline made the continent less attractive to immigration, thus causing important problems on the continent (ageing population, soaring social security costs, labour shortages). Russia too was affected by these patterns and lost weight in Eastern Europe and the Middle East.

Conversely, Turkey, the Gulf states, Iran, Egypt all emerged as new powers emerged increasingly shaping North African and the Middle East interests. China became an external actor shaping Europe's neighbourhood, with more of an interest in the Middle East and Central Asia than in Eastern Europe. Climate change increased environmental risks; European governments spent resources on addressing the consequences of major floods in Northern and Eastern Europe and desertification and fires around the Mediterranean basin.

The combination of the rise of Middle East powers and natural disasters caused by climate change made Europe vulnerable to influxes of migrants, both refugees and irregular – notably because of the presence of family and friends in European countries. Although Europe remained an attractive first stop, putting pressure on border management and reception infrastructure, overall the lack of economic prospects made most migrants move on to other emerging parts of the world.

Democracy wanes globally, with authoritarianism rising and the quality of democracy deteriorating in the 'old world'. Rising inequality and poverty puts great strain on all countries and creates uncertainty worldwide.

Key developments that led to this scenario

- By 2020, economic recession in the Balkans led to inter-ethnic tensions which the EU did not manage to assuage. The level of political conflict brought the accession process to a standstill.

- Eastern Europe's protracted conflicts remained unaddressed, prolonging a situation of stable instability, with Russia able to influence developments there.

- By 2025, sluggish growth put the whole of the European continent on hold. The EU moved towards declining irrelevance while other actors emerge. An authoritarian government in Russia began to tremble by 2025 and was eventually challenged by uprisings which, after a promising start for a degree of democratic change, degenerated into political infighting amongst clusters of financial and economic groups with uncertain consequences even in 2030.

- China consolidated its dominant position in Asia and globally. Trade continued haphazardly, mostly pushed by China, even if commercial-related disputes multiplied and some descended into security spats in the Asian seas and between the US and China.

- EU institutions moved towards irrelevance, plagued by the inability to address the consequences of climate change. With the European economy increasingly dependent on Chinese investments, migration patterns became shaped by China's policies. Asia became a more popular destination leaving the EU behind in renewing its economy.

- Some areas of cooperation emerged, such as on climate change, some security issues in Asia, and a limited web of bilateral trade agreements continued.

SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

Europe's neighbourhood is deeply affected by the decline of international cooperation. The EU is unable to project any stability and growing international tensions run through the vulnerabilities of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and North Africa. Other actors pursue interfering politics in neighbouring countries with the aim of destabilising the EU. Democracy disappears from the EU's neighbourhood, which has become territory for new and old authoritarian powers each pursuing inflammable politics.

By 2030 the EU is little more than a single market, with most countries pursuing national policies. The Schengen space is beyond repair; those Member States which managed to weather the crises (e.g. Germany) pursue bilateral policies on migration but the EU as a whole is less attractive for immigration. In fact, it heads towards becoming a continent of emigration following a period of brain drain of talented and best educated Europeans.

Key developments that led to this scenario

- By 2020, the EU accession process came to a halt, also affecting Eastern Europe. By 2025, Russia imploded, Egypt went through a coup, and authoritarianism rose everywhere.

- Globally, commercial disputes turned into conflicts and brought international trade to a halt.

- The uncontrolled development of digital technology without an international cooperative legal framework made governments and the private sector vulnerable to increased cyber-attacks on part of entities hardly known to the intelligence services.

- The weakening of state infrastructure supported uncontrolled movements of people, and contributed to the growth of illegal criminal activities around the movement of people.

- Mercenary wars spread with no hope of international efforts brokering peace agreements between warring factions.

- Global inequality rose inexorably, welfare states crumbled, changing the face of the old democratic West.

- Pockets of wealthy elites led their economic affairs as private enterprises, with education, health, and societal security becoming privatised.

- The system attracted the migration of individuals, to work as service providers in such a privatised and atomised society, but did not contribute to overall economic development.

4.3.4. 2030 in sub-Saharan Africa

BOX 12: 2030 SCENARIO IMPLICATIONS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

*By **Edefe Ojomo**, Lecturer, Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, Faculty of Law, University of Lagos*

SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

In 2030, African countries have deepened their partnerships with one another and the rest of the world through regional and global multilateral arrangements, and they have been able to engage in global partnerships by presenting a united front in terms of harmonized policies and institutions in trade, security and social infrastructure. This has resulted from cooperation to address economic, political and social challenges in the region, including armed conflicts within some countries, public health challenges, and increased external economic reliance across the region. The African Union and some of the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have established efficient synergies across institutions and regions, forging partnerships in infrastructure development, launching successful political interventions in Member States, and fostering cooperation for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa have spearheaded the renegotiation of regional partnerships with the EU and China. This has facilitated greater macro-economic gains for African countries. China has also agreed to partner with the RECs to foster its relations with African countries in an effort to streamline economic development across the continent.

Despite increased collaboration, national income inequality is rampant across the region and has translated into regional economic divergence. This separates relatively rich countries like Botswana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa, from poor countries like Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau, and Liberia. While regional institutions seek to address this divergence, the infrastructure deficit on the continent limits the availability of technology to address economic and environmental challenges. Collaboration with China to improve infrastructure is on the increase but has also led to a xenophobic backlash against the influx of Chinese migrants who have settled on the continent. Droughts in the Sahel and the effects of deforestation in parts of Central and East Africa have contributed to some displacement of the population. Though countries like Uganda have made efforts to integrate refugees, new movements put a strain on already-challenged economies.

Migration trends and flows remain similar to the past three decades, with the prevalence of intra-regional migration. As labour migration increases and economic divergence deepens, diaspora communities work to fill gaps in the domestic socio-economic conditions of families and communities in origin countries. Remittance flows increase but continue to flow through mostly informal channels. Migrants are involved in the establishment and maintenance of small and medium-sized enterprises in origin countries.

Key developments that led to this scenario

- By 2020, the African Union enhanced its peace and security architecture and worked closely with the RECs to promote democratic governance.

- Environmental crises were tackled collectively at the regional level and with strong support from the World Bank and the African Development Bank and other partners.

- Persistent socioeconomic differences amongst countries and sub-regions posed a threat to regional partnerships and demanded greater investments in social and political reforms.

SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH

In 2030, regional economic communities in Africa thrive. Regional trade is at record levels, and political cooperation has led to the development of regional infrastructure to serve cross-border engagements and communities. Economic development is also accompanied by political engagement at different levels of society, improving youth education and employment opportunities, as well as participation in the articulation of governance strategies. Developments in technology have also enhanced collaborations amongst businesses, public and private institutions, and individuals across the region. There has been clear progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, but despite significant economic growth and development and coordinated regional support, many countries fall short of meeting the goals.

Migration flows in the region increase significantly, as regional cooperation improves trade and economic opportunities for citizens. Although stronger global cooperation enhances global trade, global migration trends show a decrease in migration from Africa to countries outside the region, mostly because regional development has led to intraregional trade and economic vibrancy, leading to greater movements across the region. Countries like Nigeria and Cote D'Ivoire in West Africa, Kenya and Rwanda in East Africa and South Africa in Southern Africa remain hubs for migrants from within the respective sub-regions and across the region, but there are also significant business flows from those countries to other countries within and outside their sub-regions. Thus, there is a balance of movements between rich countries in the region and their less wealthy counterparts. While this has overall positive effects, there are xenophobic attacks in low-income countries with large migrant populations and political movements supporting these attacks claiming that "the foreigners are stealing local jobs and introducing crime". Xenophobic attacks in rich countries like South Africa also targets migrants from Zimbabwe and Nigeria.

Refugee flows are contained because of strong safeguards against political and environmental crises, based on regional and global cooperation. Intraregional migration consists mainly of voluntary sociocultural and economic movements, involving workers, students, and tourists. Regional institutions develop a framework for channelling diaspora engagement for coordinated national and regional growth, but there are reservations among local populations that inflows from the diaspora could disrupt social and economic opportunities for "locals", so these tensions also give rise to political resistance. Remittance flows provide additional growth opportunities for countries with strong diaspora communities, but this is threatened by social and political movements attacking the political influence of citizens in the diaspora.

Key developments that led to this scenario

- By 2020, the RECs were at the core of the African Union's development agenda and this delivered progress in the areas of energy supply, public health, disease surveillance, trade facilitation and free movement of people, goods and capital. Poorer countries received significant support from larger economies such as Nigeria and South Africa.

- After Morocco re-joined the AU, Mauritania re-joined ECOWAS in the early 2020s, suggesting political and economic benefits to integration.

- International engagement and cooperation resulted in a launch of a decisive offensive against terrorist groups in the region and provided security support to vulnerable communities in the affected countries. However, foreign support of groups like Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and Boko Haram in Nigeria stifled economic and political growth in affected countries.

- By 2025, several successful elections led to democratic transitions in Cameroon, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Zimbabwe.

- The international community and a coalition of international NGOs partnered with local governments and supported African countries in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals, but even in spite of a last-minute push, security and political instability in some parts of the region derailed attempts to meet the goals.

- By 2030, the EU had been successful in developing strong partnerships with Africa in the areas of trade, investments, peace and security, and migration.

- Movements into the EU from Africa were coordinated through regional and bilateral arrangements between receiving and sending countries.

SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

In 2030, countries are more inward-looking, as they seek economic growth and political development through nationalist frameworks in trade, investment, and resource development. Regional economic communities are unable to deliver on ambitious legal and policy goals because of the lack of political will among Member States. In West Africa, for instance, the ECOWAS community levy is being paid by half the Member States and regional resources are at an all-time low. Although some countries are experiencing economic growth, they are doing this amidst political strains, with increasing inequalities and limited political opportunities for young people. Technological and infrastructural developments provide some optimism, but these are hampered by fewer collaborative partnerships among nations, making infrastructure development more expensive in the absence of scale economies. Limited cooperation among states derails efforts to combat terrorism and incorporate climate change adaptation mechanisms on a regional scale.

African sub-regions have strong social and cultural linkages that encourage regionalisation even in the absence of regional integration and sustain irregular intraregional migration flows. However, the absence of multilateralism and regionalism limits public regulation of increased transnational activities. Domestic growth in many states makes regional hubs more attractive as migrants seek greener pastures, but it also increases xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments. Diaspora networks demand more inclusive governance which can affect an increase in formal channels of remittances. However, informal channels continue to dominate, and diaspora communities encourage outward mobility amongst their networks in origin countries.

Key developments that led to this scenario

- By 2020, international engagement and cooperation to tackle terrorist threats suffered from lack of resources and the lack of political will thus increasing instability, insecurity and eventually growing internal displacement and refugee flows.

- Understaffed and underfunded, the African Union was unable to effectively respond to the political instability and armed conflict in some Member States, including in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic.

- RECs lost their influence. Francophone countries in West Africa looked to France for economic and political support, and, in the face of an increasingly isolationist UK government, Anglophone countries looked to the US, where the 2020 elections saw a change in government and a more international-friendly government. Poor countries relied more on bilateral partnerships and donor countries like China preferred unilateral efforts to pursue their political goals in the region.

- African countries were unable to negotiate a new partnership agreement with the EU after the expiration of the Cotonou agreement in 2020.

- By 2025, owing to increasingly onerous global trade conditions, intraregional trade grew significantly, as countries competed for participation in neighbouring markets.

- Private organizations engaged in smaller infrastructure and development projects to take advantage of the thriving regional economic conditions.

- Growing youth populations were involved in innovative technological projects and enterprises, and many of them sought better opportunities in education, industrial training, and employment in countries within and outside the region.

SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

In 2030, global, regional and national inequalities in the political and economic spheres generate crises in countries across the region. Economic partners are unwilling to pursue collaboration and African countries have also lost the political will to integrate on many issues. Domestically, governments pursue their political goals by building strong client networks that undermine any efforts at seeking reforms. Poor infrastructure impedes technological development, and political activists, especially youth groups, clamour for change, while many pursue better economic and political conditions in other countries within and outside the region.

Regular migration becomes more difficult as receiving countries – particularly those outside the region – place tighter restrictions on inflows. Irregular migration is on the rise. Citizens move through informal channels and border crossings and the informal economy expands, thus encouraging more irregular movements across the region and to other parts of the world. Migration to the EU increases. Economic and political crises, as well as environmental and natural disasters, lead to migrant and refugee flows within the region and occasionally escalate into irregular migration flows towards the EU. African countries seek partnerships with the EU (mostly bilateral in order to address national challenges), but the expansion of informal movements and economies render many such partnerships ineffective.

Regionalism is dead in Africa and, owing to the proliferation of megaregional arrangements across the world, multilateral institutions like the World Trade Organisation have become incompetent to establish and influence global standards. Countries are inward-looking and close-fisted, while citizens are outward-looking, seeking greater political freedoms, escaping persecution and inequalities, and pursuing economic subsistence in countries within and outside the region.

Key developments that led to this scenario

- By 2020, African RECs experienced serious capacity deficits due to challenges with memberships and donor funding.

- Nigeria and South Africa had to deal with domestic political instability in the aftermath of controversial elections and limited their cooperation and coordination with the African Union and other regional entities.

- More economically successful countries experimented with new job programmes and basic income policies. This led to a higher influx of migrants from neighbouring countries and calls for restrictive immigration policies and a revision of the African Union's free movement policy.

- By 2025, several environmental crises, particularly in the Sahel region, had not received effective regional attention, thus facilitating the move against regionalism. The Sahel countries relied on bilateral partnerships with European partners, especially France, to address climate change and environmental challenges in the region.

- Armed insurgencies and the rise of terrorist groups in Libya, Mali, and Nigeria, led to refugee flows and arms proliferation in the region, sparking more widespread conflict and xenophobia, with politicians taking advantage of such situations to divert attention from the poor economic performance in their countries.

4.3.5. 2030 in Southeast Asia

By **Ronald Skeldon**, *Emeritus Professor in Geography, University of Sussex and Professor of Human Geography, Graduate School of Governance Maastricht University*

SCENARIO 1: CRISIS WITH COLLABORATION

The economic crisis in China in 2020, which lead to confrontation in the South China Sea between China on the one hand and the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam on the other, created growing regional and global tensions. Increased regional and transnational cooperation and the movement to free market and free movement begin to take hold. There is a decline in labour force in various sectors across the region and automation is on the rise. We also see the emergence of primarily urban and multi-ethnic societies.

The region increasingly looks within for the skilled migrants it needs, particularly to Singapore. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) reduces barriers to skilled migration, while forced migration of minorities within and outside the region is on the rise. There is also an emergence of pressures to import less-skilled labour from South Asia in particular. Internal migration is prevalent and is dominated by inter-urban movements and urban sprawl.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- By 2020, there was declining population growth with demographic decline in some countries and rural depopulation across the region.

- Trade with China reduced and Southeast Asian nations looked to each other as preferred trade partners.

- Democracy receded in the face of the rise or re-imposition of military rule. Rising nationalism took hold across the region and ethnic Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia came under pressure.

- By 2025, nationalism began to recede somewhat as education levels rise, demographic growth continued to lessen, and the economies improved. Automation was on the rise.

- Regional and global economic growth resumed.

- The United States re-engaged with ASEAN, which emerged as a significant political and economic force in the region, and there was a renewal of trade with China, initially through ethnic Chinese networks.

- By 2030, closer trade ties between both China and India and a strong movement towards an Asia-wide trading bloc began to emerge.

SCENARIO 2: INCLUSIVE GROWTH

By 2030, China is a dominant power in the region but protects its margins with prosperous nations. An EU type of integration emerges with the beginning of free trade and movements towards a common currency.

As the region experiences sharp declines in rural-to-urban migration even as the largest cities continue to grow, there is a growing circulation of skilled migrants within the region and to overseas destinations. Severely depopulating rural areas emerge as a major policy concern. As a consequence of an ageing society and increased automation, migration at all skill levels within the region increases as the area of free movement expands. Skill interchanges with other regions are on the rise, though the search for unskilled labour continues, mainly in South Asia.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- By 2020, China deepened trade relations with other parts of the developed world, while China and India sought rapprochement and mutual border recognition.

- ASEAN forged closer ties among the states of Southeast Asia politically and economically, and there was a trend towards more open democratic regimes in the region.

- Population growth across the region continued to slow but cities continued to grow.

- By 2025, China reached peak population and commenced a slow demographic decline.

- Closer economic integration emerged across the region.

SCENARIO 3: SLOW GROWTH AND FRAGMENTATION

By 2030, stagnation across Asia has given rise to internally oriented governments. Fragmentation at the global level also led to the disintegration of the United Nations and its agencies. As smaller and weaker states cease to be viable, they are absorbed in whole or in part into stronger neighbouring states. New empires start to emerge to combat the fragmentation but with weak penetrative power to bring effective control at the local levels. Capitalism as an effective global force is now dead and military governments dominate.

Rural-to-urban migration has slowed as economic growth in urban areas declined, with heavy return migration from cities in China to the rural sectors. Refugee flows from and to the region are on the rise. Those that are able, leave for destinations outside the region despite little progress on intra-regional recognition of skills. Expatriate populations leave the region in record numbers. As tension rise, movements of military personnel are meant to keep order and extend areas of national control. Whole villages and groups are directed to where labour is required or where security is ensured.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- By 2020, growing nationalism led to intra-regional rivalries, some states looked to China, others to India and others more broadly.

- China faced internal dissent and turned to foreign adventurism to deflect domestic pressures.

- Fertility decline stalled in certain parts of the region, mainly in rural and Muslim and Catholic groups.

- By 2025, unemployment was on the rise and anti-Chinese riots took hold as dominant Buddhist and/or Muslim groups responded to austerity and inequalities.

- China and India engaged in border hostilities.

SCENARIO 4: SHOCKS, INEQUALITY AND CONTROL

Governments across the region remain more authoritarian than democratic in order to direct an economic recovery. Inequalities are sharply on the rise. The region is plagued by shocks, primarily of a political nature, giving rise to disputes and even conflict, although these are dissipated within a five to ten-year period.

After several years of low mobility, urban-ward migration is re-established. Diaspora organisations take on a greater role in both security and development. Eventually, this sets in motion the beginnings of an exchange of the skilled labour force across countries within the region, after years of stagnation.

Key developments that led to this scenario:

- By 2020, markets for regionally produced goods declined and unemployment rose, as well as the appeal of nationalist governments that expelled or practised forced assimilation of minority groups.

- Expansionist China but also India brought political and military pressure on governments across the region.

- By 2025, ASEAN economies were at a virtual standstill as regional and local trade declined.

- Famine or at least severe food shortages in more marginal parts of the region took hold.

- China and India were at virtual war, although stepped back from nuclear conflict, while the United Nations and other global agencies struggled to achieve some form of order.

- Indian and Chinese Diasporas provided sanctuary for fearful citizens and those rich enough to flee. There was a mass return to rural areas as security in the cities deteriorated, and rising rates of stress migration, mainly within states and often rural-to-rural took hold.

- By 2030, after a period of confrontation, economic growth began once again, and tensions dissipated between China and India with the resolution of border conflicts.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS

Based on the discussions and insights that informed this report, it seems important that some reflections on the future of EU migration policy should be started today in order to ensure that migration is a well-managed EU policy area by 2030.

Across different scenarios, we see that the future of EU migration policymaking is moving towards more collaboration on migration control measures. However, one of the recurrent themes to come out of this report is that in the long-term, the EU may face a shortage of immigrants of all skill levels and should therefore think strategically beyond the current policy focus on stemming migration flows. There are a number of countries (such as China or Japan) with ageing populations and a shrinking workforce that will strive to become attractive immigration destinations in the near future. Therefore, new strategies to attract people with the skills in demand will need to be devised.

Migration policies can shape migration flows by selecting who can enter and reside in a country but have only limited impact on migration volumes and direction of flows. Other policy areas often have impacts beyond their intended scope, and inadvertently affect, whether positively or negatively, social-economic conditions that are inextricably linked to the drivers of migration and displacement. Therefore, migration should be treated with a comprehensive and forward-looking approach that takes account of various social, technological, economic, environmental and political drivers. This requires reaching beyond migration policies and working towards systematic consideration of migration implications in a wide range of policy areas starting from trade, agriculture and fisheries, environment and finance. Foresight approaches can be helpful in these efforts because they provide methodologies and tools for a systematic consideration of relative certainties and uncertainties and their future relevance in a multi-stakeholder process.

Finally, what methodological lessons can be drawn from this project? There are different ways of approaching a foresight project that involves scenarios. In this case, rather than developing original foresight scenarios from scratch, we decided to adapt existing migration scenarios produced by other institutions that involved larger groups of experts and ran the project over longer periods of time. While there are obvious advantages to developing original scenarios (e.g. fit for purpose, sense of ownership in the group), our approach allowed us to speed up the process and focus our energy on developing and testing the practical application of the scenarios that resulted in the Migration discussion toolkit. In our experience, this was an essential and innovative part of the process that makes the scenarios and the foresight approach accessible to broader audiences who would otherwise not be impacted by such work. The resulting discussion tools are presented in the second part of this report.

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ANNEX: ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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**EU
POLICY LAB**

MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT

INTRODUCTION

Migration has become a politically explosive and a highly divisive topic in the European Union (EU) and around the world. More than ever before, we need innovative discussion formats that enable a more balanced and less polarised debate about migration; where personal experiences and scientific evidence can come together and help to stimulate a forward-looking perspective, mutual understanding and collaboration between different stakeholders. This toolkit is a response to this need. It is the result of an interactive and participatory process led by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), EU Policy Lab,* on the future of migration in the EU. The project engaged several stakeholders to explore and reflect upon the needs of EU policymaking and European responses around future migration challenges and opportunities.

Future scenarios offer a means of stepping back from present day concerns and going beyond current mainstream thinking. By bridging research and policy, future scenarios can be used as tools for drawing policy implications from research findings and testing the long-term viability of policy proposals.

However, scenarios on their own can only offer limited insights when it comes to actually informing policy processes or creating spaces for constructive dialogue with multiple stakeholders. This is why we developed a toolkit and guidelines on how to use scenarios in different contexts and for different purposes, based on user needs and adaptable to different levels and facets of migration governance. This toolkit is the result of a years' worth of developing, experimenting and testing a series of scenario-based tools ready to be used by a variety of stakeholders in various contexts.

Tool development: testing and experimentation

Seven tools were developed for this toolkit. We first tested whether scenarios could offer a meaningful platform for discussion on the future of migration in Europe in a series of focus groups (Tool 3). Here we asked experts, civil society, and policy-makers to discuss how different future scenarios might challenge or impact the future of EU policymaking and EU governance structures. The focus groups, composed of no more than 15 experts, were a valuable and intimate platform in which the scenarios served as a backdrop for considering policy preparedness within the context of possible future developments.

The scenarios were also used and adapted to a serious game, which serves as a simulation tool to engage in scenario exploration and future-oriented systemic thinking (Tool 5). Users experience the scenarios in different roles such as a business representative, a civil society organisation, a public voice or a policymaker. The game was tested with policymakers and civil servants from different parts of the world as well as with European policymakers, academics, and experts. The game allows users to quickly understand the logic of scenarios, the complexity of decision making, as well as the constraints and opportunities faced by diverse sets of stakeholders. We further adapted the serious game to a simpler approach that can be used with larger audiences (Tool 6), and in addition, we included a process that allows users to quickly develop their own scenarios for use with the serious game, or with any of the other tools included in this toolkit (Tool 7).

With the aim of developing processes to suit a variety of needs, we also developed tools that would require less time than the focus groups and the serious game, and be better suited to users such as local authorities, civil society, or business and enterprise, as well as policy-makers at the EU level. The Migrant journeys tool (Tool 1) takes aspects of the scenarios to more closely investigate how migrant decisions and journeys might be affected under various conditions and the extent to which policies actually impact such decisions. Similarly, The future of integration in European cities tool (Tool 2) looks more closely at the national and local levels, and how various stakeholders can collaborate under certain conditions deriving from the scenarios. Both these tools were tested with students, experts, local authorities, and civil society, and on each occasion, based on detailed feedback, adapted and adjusted to better fit user needs. Lastly, the co-designing policies tool (Tool 4) was developed in collaboration with our expert group, as a means to discuss the opportunities and constraints that future scenarios provide in negotiating common objectives and policies, with the view that a wide set of public policies should be considered when shaping and planning for desired migration outcomes.

How to use this toolkit

The toolkit was initially envisioned for use in EU policymaking circles, where the tools on co-designing policies, the scenario exploration, and focus groups can offer fruitful and innovative ways for discussing, planning and testing policy developments in an inclusive and flexible setting. The tools can also be used by other stakeholders, including those based outside the EU, such as civil society, private enterprises, think-tanks and academia. Some of the tools have already been used also in educational setting for university students.

In each tool description, users will find who is the ideal target audience and what outcomes can be expected by using the tool, the requirements in terms of facilitation, duration, and materials (including a set of accompanying toolkit elements* specific to each tool), and step-by-step instructions on how to use the tool, including possible alternatives and options to better tailor to specific user needs. The tool instructions should be interpreted as guidelines on how best to use the tools – users should feel free to tailor and adjust according to the topic they are looking to explore, the participants needs and expectations, the timeframe of interest, and the timing and setting available to them.

The facilitation of discussions that use the tools does not require any specific skills beyond the ability to clearly explain the rules, create a pleasant and welcoming atmosphere for the discussion and effective time management. It is essential that in preparation for the use of the tools, users have a clear idea of what they want to achieve with the exercise. This needs to be communicated to the participants in order to stimulate their motivation to actively contribute to the process.

The tools presented here, are an initial set – from which other forms of engagement are likely to stem, and which will continue to be developed as their use becomes more widespread. We encourage users to provide us with their feedback and experiences in using the different tools, and we hope that together, we can refine and spread these new ways of discussing migration issues.

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*http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf

MIGRATION DISCUSSION TOOLKIT
Overview

TOOLKIT ELEMENTS

To be able to use the tools you need accompanying elements. The ones you need are listed in the instructions of the tools. This is an overview of all the elements, which you can request by contacting alice.szczepanikova@ec.europa.eu.

Migrant Persona narrative templates

Integration Stakeholder narrative templates

**Scenario detail cards**

TOOLKIT ELEMENTS

Certainty and uncertainty cards

There is one set of certainty and uncertainty cards that apply to the EU, and another set for non-EU: Africa, Asia and Eastern European Neighbourhood.

Governance cards

Scenario poster

TOOL 1. MIGRANT JOURNEYS AND THE ROLE OF POLICIES

3-12 participants

1-2 facilitators

2.5 hours

A4

DESCRIPTION

This tool helps participants learn about key aspects in migration decision-making by taking the role of a potential migrant whose life unfolds over one or two distinct future scenarios. The tool is suited for people interested in the interplay of intended and unintended consequences of migration policies and their inter-section with decision-making processes by migrants and other stakeholders.

REQUIREMENTS

Facilitation
1-2 facilitators

Duration
2.5 hours to explore two scenarios, 1.5 hours to explore one scenario only

Toolkit elements and materials
- Migrant Persona narrative templates
- Scenario detail cards for one or two opposing scenarios
- Markers (optional)
- Flipcharts (optional)

STEP 1
INTRODUCTIONS

10
minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Introduce yourself and briefly describe the tool and the process.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Briefly introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for taking part in this exercise.

STEP 2
EXPECTED AND UNEXPECTED EFFECTS OF MIGRATION POLICIES

20
minutes

GOAL
Make participants aware of both expected and unexpected effects of migration policies.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Stimulate discussion about expected and unexpected effects of migration policies.

POSSIBLE KICK-OFF QUESTIONS
Based on your knowledge and/or experience how have migration policies such as introduction of visa, tightening of border controls or establishing of an area of freedom of movement influenced actual migration flows and patterns?

Insights from the JRC report *European Migrations: Dynamics, Drivers, and the Role of Policies** with historical examples of these effects can be used as a starting point for the discussion.

*de Haas, 2018. Available at: https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/0e56c014-3232-11e8-b5fe-01aa75ed71a1

STEP 3.0
MIGRATION DECISION-MAKING: POTENTIAL MIGRANT'S PERSPECTIVE

GOAL
Make participants aware about key aspects in migration decision-making by taking the role of a potential migrant whose life unfolds over two contrasting future scenarios.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Introduce migrant profiles by using Migrant Persona narrative templates.
2. Ask participants to form up to 4 groups of up to 3 participants around each persona.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Decide which persona you want to work on and form a small group.
2. Develop brief narratives of individual/family decision-making, including possible migration decisions, on the basis of the two selected scenarios.

STEP 3.1
(MIGRATION) DECISIONS BASED ON FIRST SCENARIO

40 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Provide details about the first scenarios per 5-year time frame (2020, 2025, 2030) every 10 minutes using scenario detail cards.

**INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS**
1. Consider the characteristics of your person/family and identify possible decisions made, including the decision to migrate or to stay.
2. In case of migration, identify when, how and where to migration would occur.
3. Consider how migration policies affected migrants' decisions and what other factors were important, including the potential role of other policies.
4. Prepare a brief summary of your discussion framed around a few key questions listed on the narrative template.

STEP 3.2
(MIGRATION) DECISIONS BASED ON SECOND SCENARIO

35 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)

1. Provide details about the second scenarios per 5-year time frame (2020, 2025, 2030) every 10 minutes using scenario detail cards.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS

1. Using the same profile and following the structure as in Step 3.1, consider the decisions made by the individual/family as the second scenario unfolds.

2. Prepare a brief summary of your discussion framed around a few key questions listed on the narrative template.

ATTENTION

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)

If you want to avoid the 10 min. interruptions, you can also provide the full scenario detail at the beginning of Step 3.1 and Step 3.2. The trade-off being that this makes the simulation exercise less realistic because in real life, we do not know what is going to happen that far in the future.

STEP 3.3
GROUP REPORTING

15 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS

1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute summary of your individual/family's decisions in each scenario.

2. Focus on the factors that were important in making (migration or non-migration) decisions and the role of migration and non-migration policies in this process.

STEP 4
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

30
minutes

GOAL

Share and capture policy implications emerging from the parallel discussions.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS

1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute pitch of the lessons learned from the exercise and the policy implications that can be derived from these lessons.
2. Anybody can offer insights from the overall exercise.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)

1. If the results are to be recorded and/or shared with those who did not participate in the exercise, capture the main points on post-its.
2. Moderate the discussion in a way that insights from different migrants' journeys in the two scenarios can be compared and more general conclusions can be drawn.

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

What was the main difference in the decision-making process in the two scenarios? What does it tell us about possible impact of future trends and developments? What did you learn about the expected and unexpected effects of migration policies in this exercise? Can you think of an example of how you could apply what you have learned today in your field of work?

3. Close the session.

PERSONA

TOOL 2. THE FUTURE OF INTEGRATION IN EUROPEAN CITIES

3-12 participants **1-2 facilitators** **2.5 hours**

A4

DESCRIPTION

This tool invites users to explore the challenges and opportunities in shaping future immigrant integration processes in European cities by putting themselves in the shoes of national or local policymakers, a private sector and a civil society representative. The users will discuss what strategies and forms of collaboration could be developed to better harness immigrant potential and to avoid the formation of segregated and divided societies.

### REQUIREMENTS

Facilitation
1-2 facilitators

Duration
2.5 hours to explore two scenarios, 1.5 hours to explore one scenario only

Toolkit elements and materials
- Integration Persona narrative templates
- Scenario detail cards for one or two opposing scenarios
- Markers (optional)
- Flipcharts (optional)

STEP 1
INTRODUCTIONS

10 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Introduce yourself and briefly describe the tool and the process.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Briefly introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for taking part in this exercise.

STEP 2
LEARNING FROM THE PAST

20 minutes

GOAL
Discuss trends and myths with regard to integration policies, their level of success and the changing role of actors at different levels of governance.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Stimulate discussion about the topic.

POSSIBLE KICK-OFF QUESTIONS
How do we measure impact of integration initiatives? What could be done differently?

STEP 3.0
INTEGRATION POLICY IN TWO DIFFERENT FUTURE SCENARIOS

GOAL
Make participants aware of key aspects in integration policymaking by positioning themselves as key integration stakeholders in two contrasting future scenarios.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Introduce immigrant integration stakeholders by using narrative templates.
2. Ask participants to form up to 4 groups of up to 3 participants around each integration stakeholder.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Decide which integration stakeholder you want to work on and form a small group.
2. Develop brief narratives of different stakeholders' policy proposals and constraints on the basis of two different selected scenarios.

STEP 3.1
DEFINE CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR INTEGRATION STAKEHOLDER

15 minutes

NARRATIVE TEMPLATE +

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Explain the use of the narrative templates and distribute these to all participants.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Fill out one template per stakeholder group. Start off by considering and further defining the characteristics of your selected integration stakeholder and note them.
2. Clarify what responsabilities, capacities and resources you have to take actions in support of immigrant integration.
3. Clarify your short-term and mid-term priorities with regards to immigrant integration.
4. These characteristics are based on the present situation and are kept the same for both scenaros.

STEP 3.2
INTEGRATION DECISIONS AND ACTIONS BASED ON FIRST SCENARIO

30 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Provide details about the first scenario by using the Scenario detail cards ("This is a story about how the world could evolve in the next X years").

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Write down a brief summary of your discussion on a template structured by questions written on the template.

2. Also consider how migration policies affected your space to manoeuvre and your actions.

3. Also reflect on what other factors were important, including the role of other policies.

STEP 3.3
INTEGRATION DECISIONS AND ACTIONS BASED ON SECOND SCENARIO

30 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Provide details about the second scenario by using the Scenario detail cards ("This is a story of how the world could evolve in the next X years").

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Using the same profile and following the same structure as in Step 3.2, consider the decisions mande by you as an integration stakeholder as the second scenario unfolds.

2. Prepare a brief summary of your discussion structured by questions provided on the template.

STEP 3.4
GROUP REPORTING

15 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute summary of your actions and constraints in each schenario.

STEP 4
INSIGHTS AND WRAP-UP

30 minutes

GOAL
Share and capture policy implications emerging from the parallel discussions.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. One group at a time provides a 5-minute summary of their integration stakeholder's decisions, actions and challenges in each scenario, addressing in particular the role of migration and non-migration policies in their decision-making process.

2. Each group summarises the lessons learned from the exercise and the policy implications that can be derived from these lessons.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Capture the results on a few post-its with legible handwriting and place them on a poster/flipchart sharing with the rest of participants if relevant. These should ideally be written in a format of short statements that will communicate the main outcomes of the discussions.

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what you have learned today in your field of work?

Close the session.

TOOL 3. THEMATIC FOCUS GROUPS EXPLORING MIGRATION POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS

6-10 participants

1-2 facilitators

2-3.5 hours

DESCRIPTION

This tool allows users to explore the future of migration and migration-related policies under four different future scenarios. It can be used to test the preparedness of policies for future developments, and alternative pathways towards reaching preferred policy outcomes. It can be used both by those involved in the policymaking process, particularly in the agenda-setting phase, as well as by various stakeholders in civil society and the private sector.

REQUIREMENTS

Facilitation
1-2 facilitators

Duration
2 - 3.5 hours

Toolkit elements and materials
- Scenario detail cards for two opposing or four scenarios
- Empty scenario poster (optional)
- Governance cards (optional)
- Certainy and uncertainty cards (optional)

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STEP 1
INTRODUCTIONS

10
minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Introduce yourself and briefly describe the tool and the process.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Briefly introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for taking part in this exercise.

STEP 2
SETTING THE SCENE

20
minutes

GOAL
To come to a common understanding of the current state-of-play of the policy area under discussion and to discuss possible future developments and challenges.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Give a basic overview of the state-of-play of the policy area under discussion (i.e. labour-market policies, foreign policy and external action, integration policies, migration policies) (see for example section 3.2 in the accompanying report).

**INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS**
1. Discuss the major developments in the policy area under discussion and its implication on migration outcomes and processes.
2. Discuss possible policy developments in the future and whether the policy is fit-for-purpose given current and future challenges and opportunities.

STEP 3.0
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER DIFFERENT FUTURE SCENARIOS

20 minutes

GOAL
To discuss policy developments in a certain policy area in the context of a migration scenario; to discuss how policy developments in a scenario could impact migration outcomes; to discuss whether policies are fit for purpose/preparedness.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Using the Scenario detail cards for one scenario, explain the developments in that scenario.

2. Explain the implications on migration for that scenario.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Participants discuss the following questions:
   a. What are the likely developments in the policy area and initiatives in this scenario?
   b. What are the likely impacts of these policy developments on migration and integration outcomes in Europe in this scenario?
   c. What space for policy reform and innovation would there be under the constraints and opportunities in governance under this scenario?

2. Participants may wish to have an empty scenario poster (with axes only) to be used for note-taking.

SUGGESTIONS
1. For foreign and external policies, consider the following: different policy and funding instruments (i.e. non-migration policy tools such as trade, development aid, conditionality, third-country agreements) for migration management, future of the migration-development-security nexus, the role of conflict and crisis management/fragility.

2. For labour market policies consider the following: labour market liberalisation and segmentation, impacts of automation and digitalisation on labour demand, implications of ageing population and shrinking workforce, the role of trade unions.

3. For integration policies consider the following: space for innovation, role of technology, educational policies, interrelationship between migration and integration policies.

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STEP 3.1
POLICY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO

20 minutes

GOAL
To discuss policy developments in a certain policy area in the context of an opposing migration scenario; to discuss how policy developments in the opposing scenario could impact migration outcomes; to discuss whether policies are fit for purpose/preparedness.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Using the Scenario detail cards for an opposing scenario from the one previously discussed (i.e scenario 1 and 3, or scenario 2 and 4), explain the developments in that scenario.
2. Explain the implications on migration for that scenario.
3. Compare the results of the two scenarios once participants have completed the steps below.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Participants discuss the following questions:
   a. What are the likely developments in the policy area and initiatives in this scenario?
   b. What are the likely impacts of these policy developments on migration and integration outcomes in Europe in this scenario?
   c. What space for policy reform and innovation would there be under the constraints and opportunities in governance under this scenario?
2. Participants may wish to have an empty scenario poster (with axes only) to be used for note-taking.
3. Compare the results of the discussion across the two opposing scenarios.

ALTERNATIVE
Steps 3.0 and 3.1 may be repeated with two further opposing scenarios for a four-scenario overview of different future developments.

ALTERNATIVE
An additional or alternative discussion can take place using the certainty and uncertainty cards. Facilitators can guide the discussion by asking participants to consider how certainties and uncertainties in the social, technological, environmental, economic and political spheres might develop considering the developments in the different scenarios.

STEP 4
CONSTRAINTS AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE
(Optional)

30 minutes

GOAL
To evaluate the scope for influence and impact at different levels of governance under various constraints and opportunities in different migration scenarios.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Present the participants with the set of governance cards.
2. Ask participants to discuss the opportunities and constraints for each in the different scenarios.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Using the governance cards, discuss the constraints and opportunities for each level of governance under each of the two scenarios.
2. Discuss whether different levels of governance would benefit from collaboration in order to meet their policy objectives.

STEP 5
WRAP-UP

20 minutes

GOAL
Share and capture the implications emerging from the discussions.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute pitch of the lessons learned from the exercise and the policy implications that can be derived from these lessons.

2. Anyone can offer insights from the overall exercise.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. If the results are to be recorded and/or shared with those who did not participate in the exercise, capture the main points on post-its.

2. Moderate the discussion in a way that insights from different policies can be compared and more general conclusions can be drawn.

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what you have learned today in your field of work?

3. Close the session.

TOOL 4. CO-DESIGNING POLICIES

4-10 participants

1-2 facilitators

cca 2 hours

DESCRIPTION

This tool allows users to explore the perceptions and interests of different actors in developing migration policies and public policies that are linked to migration outcomes. It can be used to prepare for negotiations or stakeholder consultations with partner countries, or when formulating policies within an organisation or at different levels of governance.

REQUIREMENTS

Facilitation
1-2 facilitators

Duration
2 hours and 10 minutes

Toolkit elements and materials
- Governance cards
- Certainty and uncertainty cards (available for EU and non-EU)
- Scenario detail cards for two opposing scenarios (optional)
- Scenario poster (optional)

A3

STEP 1
INTRODUCTIONS

10
minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Introduce yourself and briefly describe the tool and the process.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Briefly introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for taking part in this exercise.

STEP 2
ROLE DEFINITION

15
minutes

GOAL
To define the role of each participant and to understand the differing positions, objectives, and goals of each stakeholder

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Explain that participants are to define their role.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Choose a category of stakeholder from the set of governance cards.
2. On the back of the card, each participant writes down:
    a. their role in the organisation
    b. the policy area they are working in
    c. from their perspective, what the policy objective(s) for migration and broader public policies should be (max 2-3 bullet points per person)
3. Cards are then placed in the middle of the table, wall or poster paper.

⚠️ **ATTENTION**
Governance cards can be used twice (more than one participant can choose the same category of stakeholder) and not each card needs to be represented.

STEP 3
SHARING PERCEIVED INTERESTS

30
minutes

GOAL
To identify the shared interests amongst the group, and where possible collaboration and/or negotitation is required to come to a common objective.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Each participant reads out the objectives to the rest of the group.
2. As a group, discuss the overlaps and disconnects within and amongst the objectives.
3. Identify (at least) 3-5 common agreed-upon priority objectives for migration and related public policies between the stakeholders.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Capture the 3-5 priorities on a separate sheet of paper, flip chart or board.

STEP 4.0
CO-DESIGNING POLICIES

45 minutes

GOAL
To collaborate on designing policies that reach specified objectives, and where public policies are linked to reaching certain migration objectives.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Choose one priority area and find a partner (preferably and opposing stakeholder with potentially conflicting views) to work with you.
2. Partners discuss the following:
   a. What migration policies are needed to reach this obejctive?
   b. What other public policies are needed to reach this objective?
   c. How can these policies become more consistent with the aspirations and behaviours of migrants?
   d. Who are the stakeholders that you will need to work with in order to implement this policy?
3. Present the policies developed to the rest of the group.
4. Discuss whether collaboration is necessary in order to reach the policy objectives.

ALTERNATIVE
If you have more time available, consider running STEP 4 using two different future scenarios as a framework for collaboration and negotiation. Use the scenario poster and the Scenario detail cards and focus on two opposing scenarios to frame a discussion. First, run the exercise under one scenario, and then again using an opposing scenario. Discuss the opportunities and constraints each scenario provides in negotiating common objectives and policies.

STEP 4.1
LONG TERM VIABILITY

15 minutes

GOAL
Test the long-term viability of the policies developed in STEP 4 using the certainty and uncertainty cards.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Each member of the group picks one certainty and one uncertainty card at random.
2. Discuss whether the policy developed takes account of the certainties and uncertainties that have been picked.
3. Discuss whether the policy will need to be adapted in order for it to be viable in the long-term.

ALTERNATIVE
Cards can be prepared beforehand if you wish to test some particular elements, or if you want to focus on a particular theme i.e. social, technological, environmental, economic, or political .

STEP 5
POLICY IMPLICATIONS

15 minutes

GOAL
Share and capture policy implications emerging from the parallel discussion.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Select a rapporteur in your group and provide a 3-minute pitch of the lessons learned from the exercise and the policy implications that can be derived from these lessons.

2. Anyone can offer insights from the overall exercise.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. If the results are to be recorded and/or shared with those who did not participate in the exercise, capture the main points on post-its.

2. Moderate the discussion in a way that insights from different policies can be compared and more general conclusions can be drawn.

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what you have learned today in your field of work?

3. Close the session.

TOOL 5. SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM
The future of migration in the EU and beyond

The Scenario Exploration System (SES) is a board game that was developed by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), EU Policy Lab, to facilitate the practical use of scenarios from foresight studies.* The original motivation behind this development was to create a platform on which EU policymakers and other stakeholders could explore and engage with foresight scenarios in a quick and interactive process that should make it easier to apply foresight to policymaking. The game enables participants to develop a long-term perspective and consider visions and strategies of different stakeholders that include policymakers at different governance levels, business and civil society representatives and the general public.

The usual format of the game that explores two opposing alternative futures takes about 3 hours. Over the past years, the tool has proved to have a broad range of applications that appealed to diverse audiences ranging from EU policymakers, member states, civil society and business representatives, academics and university students. It was played in different institutional settings with participants from all around the world.

A number of thematic adaptations have been developed inside the JRC as well as by independent third parties.

The migration edition of the SES emerged from the Future of Migration in the EU project** and is based on migration 2030 scenarios. Its objective is to stimulate non-divisive and future-oriented debates on this highly politicised issue and to help participants dealing with migration to appreciate positions of different stakeholders and to align their potential actions with relative certainties and uncertainties that are likely to affect future migration flows and processes. The migration edition has been played with diverse audiences ranging from migration officials from countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia, with European Commission officials, with various EU Member State representatives, civil society, students and academics.

A range of issues have been explored through the SES such as the future of international protection and the role for the European Asylum Support Office, strategies for satisfying labour-market needs in the EU through international migration or fostering diaspora engagement in Europe and the European neighbourhood to name just a few.

The SES is available to any interested party under a Creative Commons licence (CC-BY-SA) that lets users use it and transform it according to their own needs.

All the elements that are needed to use the migration edition of the SES (board, cards, record sheets) are available upon request. Please contact alice.szczepanikova@ec.europa.eu for more information.

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
*Bontoux et al. 2016. "The JRC Scenario Exploration System – From Study to Serious Game." Journal of Futures Studies 20(3): 93–108

**This project was run by Alice Szczepanikova and Tine Van Criekinge in 2017. Anna Hakami helped with finalising the SES Elements.

TOOL 5. SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM

5-13 participants

1 facilitator

3 hours

The Scenario Exploration System (SES) is a tool to enable participants to stimulate their possible paths towards the future in relation to an issue of their choice around an exploration board. It operates as a board game.

The purpose of the Scenario Exploration System is to have participants experience and act through plausible alternative futures, by thinking and conversing outside of their usual frame of reference. The aim is not to play a game and win, but rather to promote a constructive conversation amongst key actors, and to promote integrated long-term thinking in a spirit of collaboration.

Four characters (two Policymakers, a Business and a Civil Society Organization) develop and take up roles to chart their own courses towards their long-term objectives. They take actions to reach these objectives over three rounds towards a certain time horizon (usually ca 12-20 years from the present day). A fifth participant, the Public Voice, analyses the actions taken at every round and gives feedback and value to the actions taken by the characters.

Success takes several forms: the character wielding the most influence by collecting highest number of points throughout the three rounds; the character who has reached his/her own long-term objective; or collectively by how close the players' actions have brought them to a sustainable future.

In the course of a 3-hour session, participants experience this time journey twice, holding the same roles under contrasting scenarios and pursuing the same long-term visions. The Scenario Exploration System can be applied to various scenarios and used to discuss a range of issues. Roles are flexible. The standard version described here uses two policymakers, one civil society representative and one business representative.

Roles

The Public Voice
The Public Voice represents a substantial group of citizens and voters. They can choose to support or to rebel against the other Scenario Explorers. As the Public Voice is an observer, its influence will not be expressed through actions but through its analysis of the situation and the assessment he/she will write and share with everyone at the end of each round.

The Scenario Explorers

Policymaker I: This can be either an EU policymaker or a policy-maker at the supranational level. This player should represent a key actor in a public or political administration responsible for decision-making and implementation in the topic being explored.

Policymaker II: This can be either another EU policymaker, national policymaker, or a local authority. This character usually has a role to play in setting or implementing national or local decisions and has an impact on planning and agenda-setting.

Business: This should be a business that has a meaningful involvement and/or stake in the topic under discussion. It can be a large or multinational company that has an influential role or a small- to medium-sized business that wields some local influence.

Civil society organisation: This should be a civil society organisation that undertake activities that can influence decision making and/or influence public opinion.

Green

Purple

Blue

Yellow

Requirements & Elements*

Elements needed to use the SES:

1 dice

1 game board (to be printed in A0)

5 Megatrend cards
Megatrend cards present strong driving forces that affect all scenarios and must be taken into account as far as realistically possible. The Megatrends cards should be placed on the designated spots on the board.


Set of "What if" cards
These are variable drivers that have been identified as potentially relevant but with a high level of uncertainty (in terms of the direction they will take). They influence gameplay in a random fashion, by becoming concerns of varying importance for the participants and the Public Voice. A different "What if" card will affect each corresponding round as far as is realistic. The cards should be placed on the designated spot on the board.

4 Scenario discs
The Scenario discs give an overview of the social and economic conditions created by the scenarios, and specify how many resource tokens should be distributed to each participant. The Scenario disc being used is placed at the centre of the game board.

3 SES Scenario detail cards per scenario:
Scenario details cards provide a sequence of events at 5-year, 10-year, and 20-year horizons leading to each scenario. The cards can be placed at the designated spot on the game board.

* A separate file with the instructions and all the game elements including the board, the cards and record sheets is accessible here: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111539/jrc111539_kjnc29060enn.pdf

1 set of Action cards per Scenario Explorer

Each Scenario Explorer (not the Public Voice) receives a set of action cards adapted, and colour-coded, to their role. Participants can invent new actions if necessary using generic Action cards.

Real-life cards

They describe real-life events that can be used by the Scenario Explorers. Scenario Explorers (not the Public Voice) pick 2 Real Life cards. They can play a maximum of one Real Life card per round. Each card contains the instructions on how to use it. After having used a card, they pick a new one from the pile so as to have the choice between two cards for the next round.

60 red tokens for the public voice

The Public Voice receives 10 red tokens for each round and is free to distribute them among the Scenario Explorers as a sign of approval of their proposed actions as it pleases.

25 resource tokens (colour-coded to match each role) for each of the Scenario Explorers

Scenario Explorers receive resource tokens to give strength to their actions. The number of resource tokens per role for all three rounds of the scenario is stated on the Scenario disc. Explorers use resource tokens as they please but should distribute them wisely to last all three rounds of one scenario exploration.

4 Scenario Explorer record sheets

To help the explorers define their roles and keep an account of their actions.

1 Public Voice record sheet

To allow recording of its tokens allocation and headlines.

1 Scoring record sheet for the Scenario Exploration Master

To allow recording of the resource token allocations by the Scenario Explorers, the Public Voice's red tokens, and to calculate the score.

THE ROLE OF THE SCENARIO EXPLORATION MASTER

1. ENSURING THE OVERALL QUALITY OF THE EXPERIENCE
To be a pleasant, stimulating host.
To explain the rules.
To guide the participants, help create ownership.
To be familiar with the scenarios.

2. PRESENTING THE ELEMENTS
Use Megatrends cards to stimulate future thinking. Present them in connection to current events.
Explain the use of the "What if" cards.
Explain the use of Action cards.
Explain the use of Real-life cards.
Explain how scores are calculated.

3. CREATING THE STORIES
Based on the SES Scenario detail cards.
Start from today and connect to current events.
State date/year at each round.
Build on outcome of each round.
Improvise to make events more realistic.

4. MANAGING EXPLORATION DYNAMICS
Stimulate the conversation.
Ensure smooth transitions between participants.
Ask clarification questions if needed.
Volunteer suggestions if someone lacks ideas.
Help participants to take the story seriously.

5. MANAGING TIME
Important for session dynamics.
Session starting time impacts dynamics. If possible, opt for morning rather than afternoon when participants tend to be more tired.
Participants must be on time.
Taking a 10 min. refreshment break after exploring the first scenario is recommended.

STEP 1
PREPARING THE EXPLORATION

50 minutes

GOAL
Prepare the specific scenario exploration session.

1. WELCOME
Welcome participants.
Tour de table, make people feel at ease.
Ask participants for a theme of interest (if not decided previously). Select two contrasting scenarios (if not decided previously). Note that scenario 1 and 3, and scenario 2 and 4 are most contrasting.

2. DEFINING THE ROLES
Explain the various roles available.
Make participants choose their role.
Distribute the Explorer record sheets and the Public Voice record sheet.

Ask participants to develop their role and define their long-term objectives in detail (e.g. what does your organisation want to achieve in the next 12–15 years?").

For example, the business actor should have a clear business plan, define its location, size, market, suppliers, etc. The civil society organisation should define its scope, objective, membership, etc. Policymakers should describe how they hope their policy area will develop in the next 12–15 years.

Give participants time to define their roles.

EXPLORER RECORD SHEET

PUBLIC VOICE RECORD SHEET

3. DISTRIBUTING THE ELEMENTS

Put the selected Scenario **disc** in the middle of the board. Distribute the **tokens:**

– 30 red tokens to the public voice.

Red tokens are used by the public voice to express its opinion. The public voice can spend up to 10 tokens per round. It is free to allocate the tokens as it wishes with a minimum of one token per action for each Scenario Explorer.

– resource tokens to each Scenario Explorer according to the distribution indicated on the Scenario disc.

Resource tokens give strength to the actions taken by the Scenario Explorers. Scenario Explorers receive one set of tokens corresponding to the scenario being explored. These are all the resources that the Scenario Explorer will have until the end of this exploration. The Scenario Explorer is free to decide how to use his/her resources to support his/her actions.

Distribute the **Action cards to each Scenario Explorer**
Put the **Real-life cards on the board.**
Give 2 **Real-life cards** to each Scenario Explorer.

4. CREATING THE EXPLORATION COMMUNITY

Let each participant explain his/her role to all.
Make sure this is detailed enough. It should take 1-2 minutes to explain.
Explain the use of resources to the Scenario Explorers and the red tokens to the Public Voice.
Explain how scores are calculated (see scoring sheet).*
Distribute 2 Real-life cards to each Scenario Explorer and. explain their use.

5. CREATING THE CONTEXT FOR THE SCENARIO EXPLORATION

Before starting the game, the participants are made aware of five megatrends that will affect all the scenarios in the future. The Megatrends cards are initially placed face down on the board. The Scenario Exploration Master turns the Megatrend cards one by one face up and explains how each megatrend is likely to affect the scenario exploration over the selected time horizon.

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*Each action gets a score by multiplying the number of resource tokens used by a Scenario Explorer to support his/her action by the number of red tokens attributed to the action by the Public Voice.

STEP 2
EXPLORING THE FIRST SCENARIO

60 minutes

GOAL
To explore the first scenario and become familiar with the rules of the game (the exploration of the second scenario takes less time).

1. FIRST ROUND
We are now in the first time horizon (in the zone closest to the **Scenario disc**).
The Scenario Exploration Master tells a story based on the the first **Scenario detail card.**

The Scenario Exploration Master then lays down the pile of **"What if" cards** face down and reveals the first one.
This first "What if" card will influence the first round of the scenario exploration as the Scenario Explorers should take this factor into account while planning their actions.

Then Scenario Explorers roll the dice:

– the Scenario Explorer who gets the highest score starts.
– the other Scenario Explorers then take action clockwise.
– Scenario Explorers are asked to consider more particularly the elements of the Scenario detail cards corresponding to the number they rolled on the dice (optional).

They put one **Action card** on the **board** in the zone corresponding to the time horizon.
They support their action with own resources of their choice by putting **resource tokens** on the **action card**.

Once all four Scenario Explorers have taken action, the Public Voice reacts by attributing **red tokens**. The Public Voice can spend up to 10 tokens per round. It is free to allocate the tokens as it wishes with a minimum of one token per action.

During the round, each Scenario Explorer can use one **Real-life card** according to the instructions that each carries. The explorers that have used a **Real-life card** pick a new one from the pile.

At the end of the round the Scenario Exploration Master creates a wrap up story of the round and collects the scores.*

*SCORES:

The scores are calculated by the Scenario Exploration Master after all Real-life cards have been used. They result from the multiplication of the resources allocated to each action by the number of red tokens attributed to the corresponding actions by the Public Voice.

SCENARIO DETAIL CARDS

WHAT IF...

SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM

SCENARIO
EXPLORATION
SYSTEM

2. SECOND ROUND

The Scenario Exploration Master continues the story based on the next **Scenario detail card** (next time horizon) and reveals the next **"What if"** card.
Scenario Explorers roll the dice and the one who gets the highest score starts. The other Scenario Explorers take one action in turn clockwise.*
They put one **Action card** on the **board** in the zone corresponding to the time horizon.
They support their action with own resources of their choice by putting **resource tokens** on the **Action card**.

In the 1st round, the explorers act individually. In the 2nd and 3rd rounds they can, in addition to acting individually, also collaborate upon request with one, two, or three other explorers.

In that case, each contributes as many **resource tokens** as desired. The Explorers can solicit collaboration from other players when they are explaining their individual actions. Other players can reflect on this and decide to collaborate only after all players have finished putting down their actions. If a collaboration is agreed, the Scenario Explorer who wants to engage in a collaboration puts some of his/her own resource tokens on the action(s) he/she wants to collaborate with.**

In the case of collaborations, the owner of the action receives the score for the sum of his/her resource tokens plus those of the collaborating partner multiplied by the red tokens allocated by the Public Voice. The collaborating partner also receives some points from that action: but only the points that equal the resource tokens that he/she invested in the collaboration multiplied by the red tokens attributed by the Public Voice.**

The collaborations must be completed before the Public Voice judges the actions.

The Public Voice reacts by attributing **red tokens**. The public voice can spend up to 10 tokens per round. It is free to allocate the tokens as it wishes with a minimum of one token per action.
During the round, each Scenario Explorer can use one **Real-life card** according to the instructions that each carries.
The explorers that have used a **Real-life card** pick a new one from the pile.
At the end of the round the Scenario Exploration Master creates a wrap up story of the round and collects the scores.***

3. THIRD ROUND

The third round is identical to the second round.

4. CONCLUSION

At the end, the Scenario Exploration Master summarises the scenario exploration, calculates the overall final scores on the scoring sheet and asks the Scenario Explorers to assess how well they have managed to reach their long-term objectives. This self-assesment is expressed on a scale of 1 – 10 with 10 meaning fully achieving the objective and 1 meaning not achieving it at all. After the Public Voice agrees with or modifies this self-assesment, these additional points can be added to the final score of each Scenario Explorer.

*Scenario Explorers are asked to consider more particularly the elements of the Scenario detail cards corresponding to the number they rolled on the dice (optional).
** For examples of score calculations see page 38.
***Depending on the scenarios and the objectives of the session, the minimum cost for collaboration can be made to vary between the two scenarios being explored (optional).

STEP 3
EXPLORING THE SECOND SCENARIO

45 minutes

SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM

GOAL
To explore the second scenario.

The exploration of the second scenario takes place on the other half of the board.
It is carried out in an identical fashion as the exploration of the first scenario (Step 2).

All the participants keep the same roles and long-term objectives. However, resource distribution changes according to the characteristics of the new scenario as indicated on the Scenario disc.

PHASE 4
DISCUSSION

15 minutes

GOAL
To reflect on the contrasting explorations.

In this phase, participants look at both sides of the board and reflect on the similarities and differences between the two scenario explorations, their success in achieving their long-term objectives and overall, the kind of future they created with their actions in each of the two scenarios.

This phase can be structured and extended according to the needs of the organiser.

EXAMPLES OF SCORE CALCULATIONS*

ROUND 1

HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
The scores are calculated by the Scenario Exploration Master after all Real-life cards have been used. They result from the multiplication of the resources allocated to each action by the number of red tokens attributed to the corresponding actions by the Public Voice.

EXAMPLE OF SCORE CALCULATIONS
- A Scenario Explorer invests 3 resource tokens in his/her action.
- The Public Voice attributes 3 red tokens to this action.
- Result: Unless a Real-life card is used to influence the score, the Scenario Explorer scores 9 points in round 1.

3 x 3 = 9

ROUND 2 & 3 IN CASE OF COLLABORATIONS

HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
In the case of collaborations, the owner of the action receives the score for the sum of his/her resource tokens plus those of the collaborating partner multiplied by the red tokens allocated by the Public Voice. The collaborating partner also receives some points from that action: but only the sum of the resource tokens that he/she invested in the collaboration multiplied by the red tokens attributed by the Public Voice.

EXAMPLE OF SCORE CALCULATIONS
- The first Scenario Explorer invests 2 resource tokens in his/her action.
- The second Scenario Explorer wants to collaborate and adds 3 resource tokens to the action of the first Scenario Explorer.
- Public Voice in the end attributes 2 red tokens to this action.
- The first Scenario Explorer also wants to collaborate with the third Scenario Explorer and therefore adds 1 resource token to the action of that Explorer.
- Public Voice in the end attributes 3 red tokens to this action.
- **Result:** Unless a Real-life card is used to influence the scores, the first Scenario Explorer gains 13 points: 10 points from his/her own action (which was supported by the second Scenario Explorer) plus 3 points from collaboration with the third Scenario Explorer.

((2+3) x 2) + (1 x 3) = 13

- **Result:** The second Scenario Explorer gains 6 points from collaboration with the first Scenario Explorer plus the points gained by his/her own action (Y).

(3 x 2) + Y

FINAL SCORE

HOW TO CALCULATE THE SCORE
The final score of a Scenario Explorer is the sum of his/her scores from all 3 rounds of one scenario plus the value of the self-assessment done at the end of round 3.

EXAMPLE OF FINAL SCORE CALCULATIONS
- A Scenario Explorer get a score of 6 in the first round.
- The Scenario Explorer get a score of 15 in the second round.
- The Scenario Explorer get a score of 11 in the third round.
- The Scenario Explorer gives himself/herself a 7/10 in the self-assessment. That counts as 7 scores.
- **Result:** The Scenario Explorer gets the final score of 39.

6 + 15 + 11 + 7 = 39

*A Scoring record sheet that will help you with score calculations is included among the SES elements to be found here: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111539/jrc111539_kjnc29060enn.pdf

TOOL 6. SCENARIO EXPLORATION SUITABLE FOR LARGER AUDIENCES

5-50
participants

1-5
facilitators

1.5-3.5
hours

A3

DESCRIPTION

Over the past years, the Scenario Exploration System (SES) and the serious gaming approach to policy innovation more generally have gained popularity and the EU Policy Lab has been repeatedly approached with the request to assist in applying the SES in different institutional settings and to audiences of different sizes. In its original application, the SES requires a trained game-master who leads the process and a single game session of three hours can accommodate up to ten participants. Although the game-master training can be delivered in a few hours, the time and human resources investment can become too high if the SES is to be applied to larger audiences. Therefore, this tool was developed in order to serve bigger groups in processes that do not allow for prior training of game-masters and preparation of game material (i.e. boards, cards, tokens etc.). The broad logic of the game is till applied.

REQUIREMENTS

Facilitation
1-5 facilitators

Duration
1.5 - 3.5 hours

Toolkit elements and materials
- Scenario detail cards for one sceanario or two opposing scenarios
- Scenario poster

Configuration
Groups of 5-10 persons each + at least one facilitator

STEP 1
INTRODUCTIONS

10
minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Introduce yourself and briefly describe the tool and the process.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Briefly introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for taking part in this exercise.

STEP 2
PREPARING THE EXPLORATION

5
minutes

GOAL
Prepare the specific scenario exploration session.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Open the session:

1. Ask participants for a theme of interest (if needed)

2. Select one scenario (or two contrasting scenarios, if time allows for it).

STEP 2.1
DEFINING THE ROLES

20 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)

1. Explain the 5 available roles (i.e. policymaker I, policymaker II, civil society, private sector and Public Voice. NB – roles can be adapted as required)
2. Make participants choose their role (roles can be repeated).
3. Explain that they should develop their role and define their long-term objectives.
4. Explain the specificities of the Public Voice (i.e. to evaluate actions by the other participants based on a predefined position of public opinion. This opinion should represent a substantial part of the population.
5. Give participants time to build their roles.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS

1. Choose a role.
2. Define who you are, what your position is, and what your long term objectives are in relation to the chosen theme.
3. Explain your role to the other participants and what your long-term objectives are.

STEP 2.2
CREATING THE CONTEXT FOR THE SCENARIO EXPLORATION

10 minutes

TREND

WHAT IF...

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)

1. Lay down the Megatrend cards one by one face up, explaining how each megatrend is likely to affect the scenario exploration over the selected time horizon.

2. Then lay down the pile of "What if" cards face down and reveal one, this first card will influence the first round of the scenario exploration.

STEP 3.0
EXPLORING THE SCENARIO(S)
FIRST ROUND

30 minutes

GOAL
To explore and discuss future migration scenarios.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
1. Take the Scenario detail card for the scenario that has been selected.
2. Tell a story based on the selected "What if" card and the first timeframe of the Scenario detail cards (i.e. 2020).

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Taking into consideration the Megatrends cards, the "What if" card, and the story told by the facilitator, discuss what actions you would take in order to reach your objectives.
2. Discuss the importance of this action and its relevance for reaching your objectives.
3. Identify whether you will need to collaborate with another person in order to better reach your objectives.
4. Approach other participants with proposals to collaborate and negotiate a possible collaboration.
5. Once all four participants have done the above, the Public Voice reacts by providing comments on each person's actions and possible collaborations.

STEP 3.1
SECOND AND THIRD ROUND

40 minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Repeat the above, by turning over a new "What if" card at the start of each round, and telling the story of the consecutive timeframe (i.e. 2025 in the second round, and 2030 in the third round).

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Repeat the process as in the first round, ensuring that each action builds upon the previous, takes account of the Megatrends and "What if" cards, and brings you closer to your desired objective.

STEP 3.2
EXPLORING AN OPPOSING SCENARIO

60
minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S) AND PARTICIPANTS
If time allows, an opposing scenario can be explored by repeating STEP 3.0 – 3.1.

STEP 3.1
DISCUSSION

15 –30
minutes

GOAL
To reflect on the contrasted explorations and lessons learned.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Reflect on the similarities and differences between the two scenario explorations.
2. Reflect on the constraints and opportunities you faced in the different scenarios.

POSSIBLE DISCUSSION QUESTION
Can you think of an example of how you could apply what you have learned today in your field of work?

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATORS
This phase can be structured and extended according to the needs of the organiser.

TOOL 7. BUILDING NEW SCENARIOS OR ADAPTING EXISTING ONES TO BE USED WITH THE SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM

8-16 participants   1 facilitator   5 hours

DESCRIPTION

While scenario building is normally a lengthy process involving several iterations and the participation of a variety of stakeholders and experts,* the following tool provides a more expedient way of developing scenarios when faced with time constraints. In using this tool, the four migration scenarios that are used in this toolkit can be easily adapted to better fit the theme and topics that users would like to explore further. In addition, users can also create entirely new scenarios based on different axes, narratives and time frames. The outcome of this exercise can be used in the Scenario Exploration System. Furthermore, Step 7 of this tool demonstrates how users can adapt existing scenarios for use with the Scenario Exploration System. This tool allows users to quickly create and adapt scenarios and the accompanying serious game to their own needs, topics and themes.

REQUIREMENTS

Facilitation
1 facilitator

Duration
5 hours

Toolkit elements and materials
- Post-its
- Certainty and uncertainty cards (optional) (available for EU and non-EU)
- Pens and markers
- Flip chart, white board, or poster paper
- Dot stickers (optional)
- Templates for scenario axes and for STEEP categories (optional)

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* For an in-depth introduction into scenario planning, see for example Schwartz, Peter, *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1996.

STEP 1
INTRODUCTIONS

10
minutes

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR(S)
Introduce yourself and briefly describe the tool and the process.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
Briefly introduce yourselves and explain your motivation for taking part in this exercise.

STEP 2
SCOPING AND SYSTEM DEFINITION

30
minutes

GOAL
To agree on what scenarios will apply to the chosen theme and to define the time horizon.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS

1. Decide on a common theme or topic on which scenarios will be built.
2. Choose the time horizon towards which the scenarios will be built.

STEP 3
DRIVERS OF CHANGE

80 minutes

GOAL
To identify all elements of change relevant to the future of the chosen topic.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Explain the concept of drivers of change to the participants (i.e. agents that will drive the future change in a given theme or topic, starting from today's state-of-play).
2. Explain that drivers of change should be found in each STEEP category (Social, Technological, Economic, Environmental, Political).
3. Use the Certainty and Uncertainty cards as samples of drivers of change.
4. Once participants start to identify the drivers, collect post-its and arrange according to category.
5. Ensure coherence and possible reformulation if necessary.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Brainstorm on what drivers may impact on your chosen topic and explain why.
2. On post-its, identify a maximum number of drivers of change in each of the STEEP categories.
3. Split into groups to facilitate the work.
4. Collect all the drivers and put these on walls or spread across a table or large poster paper according to category.

ALTERNATIVE
Rather than brainstorming on drivers of change from scratch, use the stack of Certainty and Uncertainty cards (organised according to STEEP categories)* to kick start the conversation or as the set of drivers of change.

** The cards are available here: http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf

STEP 4
PRIORITISATION AND DEFINING THE AXES

20
minutes

GOAL
To identify the scenario logic (the axes).

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Explain that participants will vote on the impact and uncertainty of the drivers.
2. Explain that impact means the extent to which the driver will influence or create a change.
3. Explain that uncertainty means that it is unclear in what direction or what speed the driver will evolve.
4. When voting on impact, select the 10-15 drivers that are most voted.
5. When voting on uncertainty, place the 10-15 most voted drivers on a graph of impact versus uncertainty.
6. Select the two most voted drivers.

ATTENTION
Uncertainty does not indicate that the change will or will not happen but rather impacts the direction and speed of change.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Using sticker dots, or a pen, vote on the 5 drivers of change you believe will have most impact.
2. Select the 10-15 most voted drivers of change.
3. Using 4 sticker dots or a pen, and using the 10-15 remaining drivers, vote again on the drivers that you think are the most uncertain.
4. The most voted drivers are placed on an impact versus uncertainty graph.
5. The two most impactful and most uncertain drivers of change are selected as axes upon which to build the scenarios.

For example in the 2030 migration scenarios presented in the accompanying report, the two selected axes were the direction of governance and economic convergence versus divergence among world regions.

STEP 5
REFLECTION ON THE SCENARIOS

60
minutes

GOAL
To define the core dynamic of each scenario.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. On a white board or flip chart, draw the 2 axes, formulating 4 scenario quadrants.
2. Ask participants to fill each quadrant with key words according to the scenario logic.
3. As a second step, split participants into 4 groups, assign each group a different scenario, and ask them for key words and bullet points in each STEEP category for their scenario.
4. Once completed, ask each group to look at the work done by the other scenario groups.
5. Ensure consistency and comparability between the scenarios.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Fill each quadrant with key words according to the scenario logic.
2. Split-up into groups and choose a scenario to work on.
3. Come up with key words and bullet points in the STEEP categories for the chosen scenario.
4. Once complete, look at the work done by the other scenario groups.
5. Fill-in or enhance the other scenarios.

STEP 6
DEVELOPING THE NARRATIVES

60
minutes

GOAL
To create a draft of 4 scenario narratives.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Split the participants into 2 groups.
2. Provide each group with 2 scenarios (one diagonal, i.e. two contrasting scenarios).

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. For each scenario, write the stories explaining how the present evolved to bring us to each scenario and split them in three time steps (i.e. how did we get here?).
2. Each group presents a story and gets comments from all.

STEP 7

ADJUSTING EXISTING SCENARIOS FOR THE SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM (Optional)

30 minutes

GOAL
To use the scenario narratives for adaptation to the elements needed for the Scenario Exploration System.

ATTENTION
If you have already pre-prepared scenarios that you would like to use with the Scenario Exploration System, that can be done by following the steps outlined below.

INSTRUCTION FOR FACILITATOR
1. Present the participants with a sample of the elements included in the Scenario Exploration System (notably, "What if" cards, Action cards, Scenario detail cards, Scenario discs).
2. Split participants into 2 groups, each with opposing scenarios.
3. Ask participants to adapt the elements according to their 2 scenarios.

INSTRUCTION FOR PARTICIPANTS
1. Develop each scenario story into 6 bullet points per time (this step will become the text of the Scenario detail cards).
2. Look at the list of drivers, select the drivers voted uncertain and/or impactful (these will become the "What if" cards).
3. Identify the various roles relevant for role-playing in this scenario and identify a set of actions for each role (these will become the Action cards) and the level of influence for each role in each scenario (this will become the basis for the tokens given to each player in each scenario – adapt the Scenario discs accordingly).

ATTENTION
The Scenario Exploration System's elements can be downloaded as a separate document.* All elements can be adapted to fit user requirements or needs.

STEP 8

RUN A SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM SESSION WITH NEW SCENARIOS

160 minutes

See Tool 5: SCENARIO EXPLORATION SYSTEM
See Tool 6: SCENARIO EXPLORATION SUITABLE FOR LARGER AUDIENCES

* http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111539/jrc111539_kjnc29060enn.pdf

GETTING IN TOUCH

If you have questions, please get in touch with us. We would also be happy to hear your feedback on the tools and learn how you used them in your field of work.

EU Policy Lab

JRC-I2@ec.europa.eu

https://blogs.ec.europa.eu/eupolicylab/

ANNEX: EXAMPLES OF MIGRATION TOOLKIT ELEMENTS

The Migration Toolkit is accompanied by a number of elements (such as templates and cards) that support the use of the tools. In the following pages, you see examples of some of these elements. All the Migration Discussion Toolkit Elements can be downloaded as separate documents.*

*Scenario Exploration System instructions and elements; other Migration Discussion Toolkit elements:
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111538/kjnb29060enn.pdf

PERSONA

Name: Clarita

Country of origin: Philippines, mid-sized city

Age: 34

Family situation: 2 children (10 & 5 year-old), husband recently unemployed, elderly parents, two of her sisters already left Philippines to work abroad, one brother stayed

Skills level / education: trained as a nurse in the Philippines, works at city hospital

Situation:
With her husband without a job and elderly parents who need expensive healthcare, the family is struggling to get by on Clarita's income. She would like to see her children get good education. Her sisters seem to be doing well abroad and are sending money home.

Decision to migrate and the role of policies

When developing the story, try to cover the following questions:

- What options do you consider? Why?
- What are the obstacles to carry out your (migration/non-migration) decision? (e.g. lack of visa or a work permit)
- What factors are facilitating your (migration/non-migration) decision? (e.g.exchange of information with friends already settled abroad, improved security and job prospects)
- Do you migrate? Why or why not?
- If you migrate: When? How? Where to? Who migrates and who stays?
- Are there multiple migrations? If so, explain when, how, why and who for each destination.
- Do migration policies have any effects on your decisions to migrate or not to migrate?
- Do migration policies have any unintended consequences?
- What other factors affect your decisions?
- Do any other policies in your country of origin, transit or destination affect your decisions?

Scenario:

Year	Description

Scenario:

Year	Description

Scenario:

Year   Description

Scenario:

Year   Description

✎ **MAIN LESSONS LEARNED:**

✎ **KEY IMPLICATIONS FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE:**

INTEGRATION STAKEHOLDER

Type: Immigrant integration stakeholder

Level: City-level / regional-level authority

Please briefly specify who you are:

What responsibilities, capacities and available resources do you have to take actions in support of immigrant integration?

What are your short-term (1-2 years) and mid-term (2-4 years) priorities with regard to immigrant integration?

Integration-related decisions and actions in response to evolving future scenarios

When developing the story, make a note of the aspects below and indicate a year in which different actions and developments take place:

1. What room for manoeuvre do you have in the scenario? Why?
2. What policies are you going to develop?
3. With whom will you need to cooperate?
4. What are the major challenges and opportunities you expect to encounter?
5. Do migration policies have any intended or unintended effects on your policies and actions?
6. What other factors are likely to significantly affect your policies and actions?
7. Which other policies are likely to significantly affect your decisions and actions?

Scenario:

Year	Description

Scenario:

Year	Description

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GOVERNANCE CARD

REGION

GOVERNANCE CARD

INTERNATIONAL
ORGANISATION

GOVERNANCE CARD

CITY

GOVERNANCE CARD

EU

GOVERNANCE CARD

MUNICIPALITY

GOVERNANCE CARD

STATE

Certainty and uncertainty cards for the EU

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GLOBAL WARMING
Environmental

RELATIVE CERTAINTY
RELATIVE UNCERTAINTY

ECONOMIC GROWTH
Economic

TACKLING CLIMATE CHANGE
Environmental

RELATIVE UNCERTAINTY

AUTOMATION AND DIGITALISATION
Economic

RELATIVE CERTAINTY

DIGITAL DIVIDE
Technological

RELATIVE CERTAINTY
RELATIVE UNCERTAINTY

EU INTEGRATION
Political

ACCEPTANCE OF AUTOMATION
Technological

RELATIVE UNCERTAINTY

NEW POLITICAL PLAYERS
Political

RELATIVE CERTAINTY

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Speed and social and regulatory acceptance of automation and digitalisation and its impact on labour demand

Growing importance of new political players alongside traditional political parties whose social basis is eroding

Digital divide will narrow down but still persist.

The extent and form of EU integration

Investment in tackling roots and effects of climate change

Automation and digitalisation will affect labour markets and demand re-training of low and medium-qualified workers.

Increase in global mean temperature

The level of economic growth in different parts of the EU

JRC Mission

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