

## The same (as what?)

The same (as what?). Són referencials les expressions en anglès que contenen el sintagma *the same* ('el mateix')?

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**Abstract:** This paper adopts a radical contextualist approach to the reference of definite descriptions that contain the English expression *the same*, either without a complement or with a complement in the form of a head noun and/or a comparison phrase of the type *as X*. It is argued that definite descriptions which contain *the same* do not refer to a unique entity, despite the fact that the result of a comprehension test carried out seems to give some support to the belief that such descriptions may serve the function of a directly referring term.

**Keywords:** definite descriptions; referential/non-referential; relevance theory; pragmatic enrichment; procedural meaning.

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**Resum:** Aquest article adopta un enfocament radicalment contextualista en relació amb la referència de descripcions definides que contenen l'expressió anglesa *the same*, tant sense complement com amb complement en forma de nucli nominal i/o de sintagma comparatiu del tipus *as X*. S'argumenta que les descripcions definides que contenen *the same* no fan referència a una entitat única, encara que el resultat de la prova de comprensió efectuada sembla donar suport a la idea que aquestes descripcions poden afavorir la interpretació que aquests sintagmes definits es refereixen directament a una entitat específica.

**Paraules clau:** descripcions definides; referencial/no referencial; teoria de la rellevància; enriquiment pragmàtic; significat procedimental.



## 1. *Same* – syntactically a definite determiner, semantically a predicate

Syntactically, the English word *same* is an adjective-like, pre-nominal determiner (Det) occurring exclusively in definite Determiner Phrases (DPs). This syntactic property is shared by its counterparts in several other languages, including French (*même*), Spanish (*mismo*), Portuguese (*mesmo/mesma*), and Italian (*stesso/stessa*). Written German even incorporates the definite article in the sameness Det, i.e. *derselbe*, *dieselbe*, *dasselbe*, where *-selbe* is a cognate of English *self*. In the Scandinavian languages, a DP that contains *samme/same/samma/sama* (same) is syntactically definite even when there is no overt expression of the definite article (or a demonstrative Det) in the phrase. A Scandinavian adjective inserted between the similitude Det and the head N requires the so-called weak form indicative of definiteness. The weak form is triggered by the similitude determiner, so the DP is grammatically definite even if it contains no adjective and no other sign of definiteness than the word that looks deceptively like a cognate of English *same*<sup>1</sup>.

Semantically, *same* does not behave like a typical Det in an attributive position before a head N<sup>2</sup>. Its semantic function is that of a two-place predicate on a par with regular similitude adjectives like *similar (to)*, *identical (to)*, *equal (to)* and the verb *equal*. The two arguments of this predicate frequently denote something abstract, in accordance with the following formula: What X did/said is the same as what Y did/said, and there is a tendency for the head N after *same* to be omitted when it represents a discourse-given entity, especially when the two arguments compared are abstract entities. Example (1), a passage from the Norwegian author Jostein Gaarder's novel *Sofies Verden (Sophie's World)*, 1991, illustrates this. It presents first the author's original Nor-

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<sup>1</sup> English *same* is a actually loan from Old Norse. It does not exist in Old English, which used *ilca* to express 'the same'. *Same* only appears in Middle English around 1200 a.d. (Leiv Egil Breivik p.c.).

<sup>2</sup> This discrepancy between syntactic structure and semantics amounts to a violation of the Isomorphism Principle originally attributed to Frege (1923). The idea is that isomorphism exists between the syntactic constituents of a sentence S and the corresponding constituents of the proposition P that S expresses.

wegian text with interlinear glosses and then the respective English and German translations of it.

- (1) Jenta i speilet svarte ikke med så mye som en liten grimase.  
 [girl.Def in mirror.Def]<sub>i</sub> answered not with as much as a small grimace  
 Uansett hva Sofie gjorde, gjorde hun akkurat det samme. *Norwegian source*  
 regardless what Sophie<sub>i</sub> did did she<sub>i</sub> exactly the same  
 → The girl in the mirror did not react with as much as a twitch.  
 Whatever Sophie did, she did exactly the same. *English target*  
 → Das Mädchen im Spiegel schnitt als Antwort nicht einmal die kleinste Grimasse.  
 Egal, was Sofie auch machte, sie machte genau dasselbe. *German target*

No extra information would have been transmitted if a comparison phrase were added after *det samme*, *the same*, or *dasselbe*, a phrase that mentions Sophie. This covert referent in the final clauses in (1) is just as easily retrievable as if there had been an *as*-phrase complement there (*the same as Sophie*). The countenance of the girl in the mirror is compared to Sophie's own visage, in this case an inevitable similarity.

Section 2 explores how English DPs with the Det *same* differ in form and how the syntactic variation impacts on the addressee's pragmatic processing of the utterance, with a focus on the reference of the truth-conditionally equivalent arguments of the similitude predicate. Section 3 is the central part of the paper. It addresses the question whether a definite description that contains *same* can ever be used as a directly referential term. The position I shall defend is that *same* blocks a referential reading of definite DPs, in any context. Native English judgments emerging from a comprehension test suggest, at first glance, that a DP modified by *same* may in fact be used as a directly referring term, while other data seem to show that this is a false impression. Special attention will be given to the pragmatic consequences of the contrast between a *same*-modified DP with, and one without, a complement in the form of a comparison phrase starting with the connective *as*. Two definite descriptions occurring in the set of talk exchanges included in my test data – *the same hotel as Peter* and *the same hotel* without a comparison phrase – appear to refer to a unique object, Hotel Excelsior, and more strongly so in some exchanges than in some others. Despite

appearances, it will be argued that these DPs should be analyzed as non-referential, descriptive terms. They do not direct the addressee to a unique singular referent at the explicitly communicated level of content. Some theoretical consequences of my analysis are expressed in the final Section 4.

## 2. The possible syntactic environments of *the same* and their pragmatic consequences

*Same* can appear as a pre-N determiner in a DP whose definite form *the same* is accompanied by a zero complement<sup>3</sup> that needs to be saturated (e.g. Recanati 2010) by a pragmatic process of conceptual transfer from a discourse antecedent<sup>4</sup>, or it may be followed by a complement in the

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<sup>3</sup> My formulation “accompanied by a zero complement” should be read as a metaphorical expression. I do not believe there to be a syntactically real null element there. Sentences like *They are the same*, *John experienced the same* and *The same is true of her brother* are grammatically complete. A token of *same* that is not accompanied by a following head N and a comparison phrase (*as* NP) triggers the hearer’s pragmatic search for a contextually determined concept whose linguistic counterpart could have occupied the head N position as well as a search for the contrastive, opposite member of the similitude relation that could have been realized linguistically as a comparison phrase. An addressee must infer the reference of these unexpressed items in order to form a mental representation of a truth-evaluable proposition. These linguistically covert objects may be subsumed under Perry’s category of “unarticulated constituents” (Perry, 1986; Crimmins & Perry, 1989; Crimmins, 1992; Korta & Perry, 2011). Stanley (2000) perceives such unarticulated logical constituents as syntactically real variables, while Recanati (2004, 2010) and the relevance theorists view them as the result of context-dependent pragmatic enrichment. This implies that a token of *same* causes the addressee to look for, and draw inferences about the identity of, the contrastive member of the similitude relation, in case there is no linguistic trace of it.

<sup>4</sup> *Instead* is a function word with a similar semantic property (Fretheim, 2017), and so is the comparison marker *rather* (*than*). The contrast between the alternative chosen and the alternative rejected is an integral part of the semantics of *instead*. When the discarded option is not overtly expressed, the addressee will handle it as a zero complement of *instead*, a complement whose conceptual meaning must be retrieved via a pragmatic saturation process. For example, a given utterance of the sentence *Peter put his bag in a locker instead* must be enriched in such a way that the explicit content, or explicature (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995), of the utterance answers the question of what alternative was discarded and replaced by the decision to place the bag in a locker. Similarly, the contrast between a preferred and a dispreferred alternative is an integral part of the semantics of *rather*, as in the sentence *I would rather wait here*, where the covert, dispreferred alternative must be retrieved via a pragmatic search for a discourse

form of a comparison phrase starting with *as*. A third option is to embed a restrictive relative clause in a complex DP starting with *the same* N, as in (2).

- (2) Karen went to the same store that Neil had recommended.

When a restrictive relative is embedded in a definite DP that contains *same*, the semantic contribution of this word seems to be quite modest. Even (3), identical to (2) except for the missing determiner *same*, informs the hearer that the store that Karen visited was the (same) store that Neil had recommended. According to the analysis to be defended in this paper, one difference between (2) and (3) is that, while (3) may be used in an act of singular reference to a unique store, the DP with *the same* in (2) does not pick out a particular entity. The proposition expressed in (2) tells us that the store visited by Karen is the same as the store that Karen was recommended by Neil, but the name of that store or any further information about it is extraneous to the explicitly communicated proposition.

- (3) Karen went to the store that Neil had recommended.

While omission of a token of *the same* in the head of a restrictive relative clause does not change the speaker's truth-evaluable content, the presence of the connective *as* in the comparison phrase *as Neil* in (4) makes *same* a mandatory item.

- (4) Karen went to the same store as Neil.

The explicitly communicated content of an utterance of (4) conforms to the following paraphrase: 'The store that Karen went to is the same as the store that Neil went to', while (2) may be paraphrased as 'The store that Karen went to is the same as the store that Neil had recommended'. (2) tells us why Karen went to a particular store, without referring to that place. (4) tells us that Karen and Neil both paid visits to one particular store, again without referring to it.

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antecedent that makes the linguistic stimulus relevant. Unlike *same* (*as*), the connectives *instead* (*of*) and *rather* (*than*) never assume the function of a predicate; they are adverbial adjuncts.

Frege's "sense", or "Sinn" in his original German text (Frege 1892), is a "mode of presentation" of the referent (Frege's "Bedeutung") of a singular term that illuminates a single aspect of the referent as truth-conditional constituent of the proposition expressed. Wettstein (1991) introduced the term "cognitive fix" on a referent, saying that, "One's 'cognitive fix' on an object is how one thinks of it, in a broad sense of 'thinking'". A speaker's expressed cognitive fix on a particular referent is typically rather volatile; it will change from one occasion to another, depending partly on what the speaker believes to be information shared by speaker and hearer at the time of utterance, information that hopefully makes it maximally easy for the hearer to identify the referent. This could be background information of a contextualizing sort, often *ad hoc* description of the referent that could not have been expressed by means of an indexical. The present paper is an attempt to demonstrate that the appearance of *same*, in data like (2) and (4), guarantees that the respective DPs in those sentences are used as non-referential terms. Because the descriptions differ, the truth-conditional contents of (2) and (4) differ.

True enough, both (2) and (4) may cause the addressee to think of one particular singular referent, in a context shared by speaker and hearer, a unique place that Karen visited, say the BHS store in the center of Lonsfield. Still, the definite descriptions in the two sentences do not designate this particular store at the explicit level of communication. While the DP in (3) may or may not be used referentially to pick out, say, that BHS store in Lonsfield, the addressee's association of the DPs in (2) and (4) with a unique singular referent would be a pragmatic effect of a conversational implicature (Grice, 1989, specifically Part 1 entitled Logic and Conversation). For radical contextualists (e.g. Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995; Carston, 1988, 2002; Bezuidenhout, 2002; Recanati, 2004, 2010), an implicature is a communicated thought that a hearer activates wholly on the basis of inference. Inference drawn from the explicit content of (2) on the one hand and (4) on the other hand may point to the same implicated information that Karen went to the BHS store. The radical contextualist tenet is that sentence meaning generally underdetermines not only the speaker's meaning but also more narrowly what is said. Grice, in contrast, drew a theoretical distinction between what is said, i.e. explicit content, and all sorts of implicatures, and did not permit pragmatic inference to interfere with what is said (cf.

neo-Gricean literature represented, among others, by Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2007; Huang, 2015).

No matter whether you are a radical contextualist or a neo-Gricean, there is no context in which the truth-evaluable proposition expressed by an utterance of (4) above can be the same as the proposition expressed by an utterance of (2). What is said in (2) and in (4) is not that Karen went to the BHS store in Lonsfield, even if that may be exactly what happened and also information that the interlocutor cannot help deriving inferentially at the time of utterance. If the BHS store in Lonsfield had been the occasion-specific referent of the prepositional objects of (2) and (4), then an utterance of (2) would have expressed the same explicature as an utterance of (4). That thought does not ring true.

In (5), there is no overt mention of the person who did something similar to what Karen did, like the man called Neil in (2)–(4), or, in a different context, no mention of a time in the past when Karen visited the (same) store.

(5) Karen went to the same store.

If the communicated similarity concerns what Karen did and what someone else did, then the hearer must make a context-driven, inferential search for the covert argument of the two-place similitude predicate SAME, hence most typically for the unmentioned human referent contrasting with the referent Karen. Consider the talk exchanges between A and B in (6), where  $B_1$ ,  $B_2$  and  $B_3$  are meant to be disjunctive reactions to A's utterance.

(6) A: Neil went to the BHS store next to the market place in Lonsfield.  
 $B_1$ : Karen went to the same store.  
 $B_2$ : Karen went to the same store as Neil.  
 $B_3$ : Karen went to that store as well.

Are  $B_1$ – $B_3$  truth-conditionally equivalent utterances in the context of A's statement? In other words, do the DPs *the same store* in  $B_1$  and *the same store as Neil* in  $B_2$  refer directly to the same object as A's lengthy DP and the coreferential DP *that store* in  $B_3$ ? The DPs in  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  need a nuclear accent, on *same* or on *store*. The newness (information focus) of the utterances of  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  is the information that



the store visited by Karen is (the same as) the store visited by Neil.  $B_2$  in particular does not seem to commit speaker B to the belief that the store was the one described by speaker A; what we know for sure is just that Karen's store and Neil's store were the same. In  $B_3$ , however, the complex demonstrative *that store* needs to be de-accented because it is coreferential with the DP in A's declarative. The focus marker *as well* in  $B_3$  relates to the subject nominal *Karen*, and the predicate complement there is truth-conditionally the same as the one in A's utterance. If there was likewise a truth-conditional identity relation between A's predicate phrase and the predicate phrases in  $B_1$  and  $B_2$ , one would legitimately expect the focus marker *as well* to be a suitable addition in those sentences too. However, the presence of *same* in  $B_1$ – $B_2$  appears to be incompatible with the focus marker, which is arguably a sign that the predicate phrases in those sentences do not express the same content as the predicate phrase in A's utterance. The DPs in  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  designate the store that Neil and Karen visited, regardless of how that store was described by A, whereas the DP in  $B_3$  refers directly to the BHS store described in a uniquely identifiable way by speaker A. That Karen went to that store is implicated in the case of  $B_2$ , but is that information just implicated even in  $B_1$ ? In case one is inclined to interpret the shorter predicate phrase in  $B_1$  differently than the longer predicate phrase in  $B_2$ , the longer form with the *as*-phrase gives the addressee an input to the inferential phase of utterance interpretation that differs from the way that the alternative without the *as*-phrase affects the addressee's pragmatic derivation of the content of the utterance. If  $B_1$  and  $B_2$  are not truth-conditionally equivalent expressions in (6), then it is pertinent to ask why the linguistic difference between the two DPs matters.

The pragmatic inference that directs the addressee's attention to a unique person who went to the same store as Karen is input to a mental process of context-driven conceptual enrichment (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995). This is a pragmatic enrichment that takes us from the contextually invariant meaning of (6)  $B_1$  to a mental representation with two contrasted referents, Karen and Neil. The latter referent does not belong to the encoded logical form of  $B_1$  but it is overtly expressed in  $B_2$ . If the DPs in sentence  $B_1$  can be pragmatically enriched in two, or more, distinct ways, leading to distinct mental representations of speaker B's alternatives  $B_1$  and  $B_2$ , then it is incumbent on linguists with an

interest in the gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning to try to account for what is going on in such linguistic pairs.

When the grammatical subject has a plural form, the individual referents of the plural subject nominal – a plural definite description, a plural personal pronoun or a set of conjoined noun phrases – share one specified property that is predicated of them all. Then the hearer's inferential processing does not have to involve saturation of a zero complement of *the same*. An utterance of (7), with *all* as a floating universal quantifier, may be relevant even if the explicit truth-conditional content of the utterance does not include information about how the individual members of the set of subject referents are the same, that is, what the identity consists in.

(7) They are all the same<sup>5</sup>.

It is acceptable to produce a stimulus like (7), with the DP *the same* after a copula predicate, even if the hearer has not yet been told in what respect the speaker is judging the individual referents of the pronoun *they* to be similar. That information may be disclosed in a forthcoming utterance. What we know for sure, regardless of contextual input, is that all individual members of the set designated by the 3<sup>rd</sup> person plural pronoun share one attribute that is relevant to the topic of discourse.

The pronoun *they* in (8), a quantifier-free sentence but otherwise identical to (7), is probably a bit more likely to represent just one of the arguments of the similitude predicate.

(8) They are the same.

The other argument could have been expressed overtly in a comparison phrase introduced by the connective *as*, but this other argument is linguistically suppressed by the speaker of (8), so it must be identified

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<sup>5</sup> The illformedness of \**They are (all) same* shows that *same* is not a predicative adjective, unlike the near-synonymous adjectives *identical*, *similar* and *equivalent*, as well as the adjective *alike*, which only occurs in a predicative position. Like *former*, *latter*, *preceding*, *following* and *late* in the sense of “deceased”, the identity marker *same* is invariably in a pre-N position in the DP.

through a pragmatic process of enrichment triggered by some element in the sentence used, here the word *same*<sup>6</sup>.

*The same one* in (9), with the overt pro-N *one*, represents a particular token of something, not a general concept as in (8).

(9) They are the same one.

It is not the pronominal head N *one* alone that is responsible for the expression of identity between members of a set of seemingly distinct things designated by the pronominal subject *they*. What matters is the combination of grammatical definiteness and *one*<sup>7</sup>. The DP *the same one* in (9) constrains the range of possible pragmatic interpretations more than what *the same* in (8) does. There are possible worlds in which an utterance of (8) would be true but an utterance of (9) would be false. A token of (8) could mean that the individual referents of the plural personal pronoun *they* share one specific attribute with respect to which they are being compared, though they may differ in other respects. (9), however, means more than that the objects designated are identical in terms of one or more properties. What may look like different objects is the same object. For instance, a single object may have been photographed from different angles and in such a way that you get the visual impression that the photos represent distinct objects.

In the attested example (10), the predicate *carried on* interacts positively with the overt comparison phrase *as before* appearing post-nominally in the complex DP *the same manner as before*. The author is comparing two temporally distinct stages of a single communicative event. Christoff's performance in the first phase of his speech is being compared to his performance at a later stage.

(10) Christoff carried on with his argument, a slight tension in his voice, but otherwise in much the same manner as before.

(Kazuo Ishiguro: *The Unconsoled*, 1995, p. 197)

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<sup>6</sup> Because of the contrast between the referent of *they* and the referent to be retrieved inferentially, *they* is likely to be a contrastively accented pronoun when it represents just one of the contrasted arguments of the similitude predicate.

<sup>7</sup> When the form of the DP is indefinite, the pro-form *one* points to a general concept, and is required in the head N position if the nature of the denoted type of object is not specified. The general concept denoted by a discourse antecedent will then saturate the pro-form *one* (cf. *I bought a new one* vs. *\*I bought a new*).

- (11) is from the same novel by Kazuo Ishiguro<sup>8</sup>.  
 After all, they said to me, all that's required is to impress on the guests something of the true nature of our work. Two bags or three, the effect would be much the same. I should reduce my minimum to two suitcases and no harm would be done. I accepted what they said, sir, but I know it's not quite the truth. I can see it doesn't have nearly the same effect when people look at me.  
 (Kazuo Ishiguro: *The Unconsoled*, 1995, p. 8)

The narrator who is sharing his thoughts with someone in (11) is Gustav, an old porter in a hotel, and the pronoun *they* refers to his colleagues. There are two instances of *the same* in (11). The first occurrence is in a sentence in which the author is using free indirect speech (oratio tecta) in order to metarepresent a thought attributed to Gustav's porter colleagues. A context-dependent enrichment of the statement *the effect would be much the same* is something like the following: 'The positive effect upon guests would be much the same if I carried no more than two bags as if I go on carrying those three bags that I normally carry'. Gustav's own belief is that there is indeed a significant difference, from this veteran porter's perspective, between a guest's seeing a porter laden with two bags and seeing one laden with three bags. The second occurrence of *the same* in (11) is functionally almost a replica of the first one, except that this time it is Gustav's own opinion we hear, not the metarepresented voice of his colleagues. Gustav is now explicitly rejecting the thought that the difference between carrying three bags at a time and carrying no more than two is unimportant. People's reactions to the heavier load is such that he feels they respect him more than when his load is a mere two bags. The referent of the anaphoric pronoun *it* in the sentence *I can see it doesn't have nearly the same effect*

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<sup>8</sup> The very sentence that you just read contains what may be likened to an anaphoric zero variable after the complex DP *the same novel by Kazuo Ishiguro*. The explicitly communicated content is that the text fragment in (11) is from the same novel by Ishiguro as the fragment in (10). Readers of this sentence have contextual knowledge sufficient to derive the information that the novel is the one entitled *The Unconsoled*, but that information is solely due to inference, because *the same novel by Kazuo Ishiguro* is, at least according to the analysis presented in this paper, not a directly referential term. At the explicit level, the sentence means that the novel that the excerpt in (11) belongs to is the same as the novel which (10) belongs to. The explicit content (explicature) does not involve the title of the novel.

when people look at me is ‘my carrying two bags instead of three’, and *the same effect* has to be enriched as ‘the same effect as if I had carried three bags’, or possibly ‘the same effect as when I carry three bags’, without counterfactivity.

In (12), which is extracted from the bidirectional translation corpus OMC (the Oslo Multilingual Corpus), the fact that the narrator had made a disappointing decision in her life is not asserted, it is presupposed. Here, as in example (2) above, the word *same* makes a very modest contribution to relevance, compared to its importance in (11) and in other data presented above.

- (12) If it lay within her power, Yvette would never have to make the same disappointing decision that she herself had made.  
(Anita Brookner: *Latecomers*, 1988)

The 3<sup>rd</sup> person narrator in (12) is a woman named Martine, here referred to by means of the pronominal forms *her*, *she* and *herself*. Yvette is Martine’s daughter, and Martine dreads that Yvette will make the same unfortunate decision in her life that Martine herself had made. The meaning would be essentially the same if *same* were dropped. Its function in (12) is not that of a two-place predicate at the explicit level of content. No other decision than Martine’s own is mentioned. We fail to discern two distinct, compared arguments here. Even if *same* is eradicated, one understands that Martine’s fear is that Yvette might at some point in her life repeat her mother’s regrettable decision. (12), with the determiner *same* in the complex DP with the embedded restrictive relative clause, conveys no more than that.

(13a) is an English target text found in the OMC, a translation of Norwegian (13b). The English translation starts with a singular masculine possessive pronoun, *his*, an anaphor that points backwards to a singular masculine antecedent, and the head N *son* reveals that the linguistic antecedent phrase can only refer to the father of this son. The trade of the son was the same as the trade that his father had chosen many years earlier. In the Norwegian source text of (13b), there is no linking possessive pronoun but the intended explicature is just as unambiguously expressed there as in the English translation<sup>9</sup>.

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<sup>9</sup> Possessive pronouns with the function of a pre-nominal determiner are quite often left out in Norwegian, and this happens very frequently when the head N is a kinship term.

- (13) a. His son began in the same trade ....  
 (from the Norwegian novelist Gunnar Staalesen's novel *I Mørket er Alle Ulver Grå*, 1983, translated by David McDuff, 1986, with the title *At Night All Wolves are Grey*)
- b. Sønnen begynte i samme faget, ...  
 son.Def began in same trade.Def  
 (Staalesen's source text)

In (14b), the word *samme* appears in the Norwegian source text but there is scarcely a trace of it in the English target text of (14a), with the exception of the translator's use of a clause introduced by the comparison connective *as*, the English counterpart of the connective *som* in the source text.

- (14) a. "You can trust us as you trust your own children, Mr. McElroy, sir."  
 (from Joan Tate's translation of Erik Fosnes Hansen's novel *Salme ved Reisens Slutt/Psalm at Journey's End*)
- b. "De kan ha samme tiltro til oss som til Deres egne barn, Mr. McElroy, sir."  
 you can have same trust to us as to your own children ....  
 (Fosnes Hansen's source text)

English (14a) and Norwegian (14b) communicate the same explication. The absence of the word *same* in (14a) does not stop us from construing the linguistic form as an expression of similarity between two abstract objects, that is, 'The degree to which you can trust us is the same as the degree to which you can trust your own children'. This applies to English (14a) no less than to the source text of (14b), although the similarity between the two eventualities compared is only signaled by the connective *as* in the English target text. What made it possible for the English translator Joan Tate to drop the word *same* is her choice of the verb *trust*. Use of an English noun that corresponds directly to the Norwegian noun *tiltro*, something like *confidence* or the noun *trust*, would obviously have demanded the presence of the Det *same* before the head noun.

(15) is a translation of a Norwegian text fragment found in the same novel as (13). Here the word *same* occurs in an elliptical linguistic form, a sentence fragment which tells us that two points on the time scale are being compared, but neither of them is overtly expressed. Both argu-

ments of the similitude predicate have to be inferred on the basis of contextual evidence.

- (15) “Why don’t we meet again tomorrow in the café and I’ll tell you about it then.”

I got up.

It was a heavy burden to lift and the floor felt like quagmire underneath me.

“Same time?”

(Gunnar Staalesen: *At Night All Wolves are Grey*)

Reading (15), we infer that the question *Same time?* means the same as *Same time tomorrow as today?*. Although neither one of the contrasted dates is overtly expressed in the elliptical form *Same time?*, we do not fail to infer that the arguments of the similitude predicate are the time of our meeting tomorrow and the time of our meeting today, i.e. the day on which the conversation between the 1<sup>st</sup> person narrator and his antagonist took place. One pertinent question is whether the propositional form pragmatically derived from the request for information, *Same time?*, contains a reference to a mutually known time of the day, so that it could have been replaced, *salva veritate*, by, say, the question *Nine p.m.?*, in case that was when they met on the day of utterance. This would mean that the term *same time* is used referentially as opposed to descriptively, or attributively (e.g. Recanati 1993). The question whether a definite DP modified by *same* can ever function like a directly referential term will be addressed and examined in full in the next section.

### 3. Is the presence of *same* in a definite DP consistent with direct referentiality?

How do we distinguish between possible referential versus non-referential uses of definite descriptions that contain the word *same*? Are there any disambiguating formal criteria? Is a DP with *same* in it ever of the (directly) referential sort? My answer is that *same* blocks referential use, in spite of the fact that certain data, to be considered presently, seem to support the opposite conclusion.

Consider first the invented talk exchange between two interactants A and B in the adjacency pair of (16).

- (16) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B: Penny was staying in the same hotel.

Is speaker B saying explicitly that Penny was staying in Hotel Excelsior? Or does B's response only commit B to the belief that Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, the result of pragmatic enrichment based on retrieval of the other member of the sameness relation, via inference based on the content of A's statement about Peter? While *Hotel Excelsior* is a referring expression used referentially in A's utterance, it is far from obvious that B's term *the same hotel* refers to Hotel Excelsior. *The same* in (16) B does not function in the same way as the demonstrative Det *that* of *that hotel* in (17) B, an indexical whose semantic value is transferred from A's referential term *Hotel Excelsior*.

- (17) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B: Penny was staying in that hotel. (= She was staying in Hotel Excelsior.)

In contrast to *that hotel* in (17), *the same hotel* in (16) is a description that uniquely picks out one hotel which, according to B, was the temporary residence of both Penny and Peter<sup>10</sup>. That Penny was staying in the hotel referred to by A does not necessarily mean that the name given to it by A is correct. We can imagine that B proceeds to tell A subsequent to (16) that its name is not Excelsior. Alternatively, B may believe that Penny and Peter were staying in the same hotel, without also sharing with A the belief that it was Hotel Excelsior. B could think it was a different hotel. Unlike (16), (17) B does not permit that interpretation. More will be said about these contrasts in what follows<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>10</sup> Their respective stays there may have coincided in time, or they may have been temporally disjoint. However, the continuous tense *was staying*, in contradistinction to *stayed*, supports the simultaneity reading, which suits my purpose.

<sup>11</sup> I should add here that it was pointed out to me by one anonymous reviewer that the Det *same* and the Det *that* may cooccur in a DP. I have used the contrast between *that N* and *the same N* to illustrate the difference between a definite term that is used referentially and one that is used non-referentially, respectively, but what about *that same N*? Does the lexical semantics of *same* override the procedural meaning of the anaphoric demonstrative *that* in such phrases? I have no fixed opinion about how to deal with the pragmatic consequences of the combination of *that* and *same* in a DP. It may be signif-



I carried out a test in which 25 not linguistically trained speakers of English volunteered to read B's disjunctive reactions to A's statement in the talk exchanges presented in (18) B<sub>1-4</sub> below, each with two alternative verbal reactions from speaker B, an <sub>a</sub>-version with the comparison phrase *as Peter* and a <sub>b</sub>-version without it. The stimuli were presented on a computer screen in the same form as (18) below. I was present in the room, and I asked each participant individually if they felt that B's continuation in the form of a *but*-conjunct occurring in each of B's list of stimuli was coherent/relevant or incoherent/irrelevant in the context of A's statement and the first of B's coordinate sentences. I also asked them to paraphrase the *but*-conjunct in each case, so as to give me an idea of what they took the second part of B's utterance to mean. All communication between me and the respondents was oral. They were offered the stipulation that Peter and Penny were simultaneous hotel residents; otherwise no contextual constraints were imposed on their evaluation task. My physical presence gave me an opportunity to discuss the data with respondents who felt like it when the test was completed<sup>12</sup>.

- (18) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B<sub>1a</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but it had a different name.  
 B<sub>1b</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it had a different name.  
 B<sub>2a</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but it wasn't Hotel Excelsior.  
 B<sub>2b</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it wasn't Hotel Excelsior.  
 B<sub>3a</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but it wasn't that hotel.  
 B<sub>3b</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it wasn't that hotel.  
 B<sub>4a</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but Peter didn't stay there.  
 B<sub>4b</sub>: Penny was staying in the same hotel, but Peter didn't stay there.

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icant, though, that there is no expression *\*that same hotel as Peter*. The discussion in the present section will hopefully shed some light on this issue.

<sup>12</sup> I have some ideas as to how the design of my test could be changed and effectively improved, but that, unfortunately, belongs to a different paper, one in which the stimuli are spoken utterances presented one at a time and in a random order. An anonymous reviewer said that a more elaborate, properly controlled psycholinguistic study would need to be carried before one could state conclusively that *same* has the lexical semantics and the pragmatic consequences that I attribute to the word.

When dealing with (18) B<sub>1a</sub> and B<sub>1b</sub>, the 25 participants responded univocally that they understood speaker B to be making the point that the name of the hotel selected by A is incorrect, but some of them suggested that B may be able to infer which hotel A is referring to even if A got the name wrong. Thus, A and B were understood to agree about the referent, the Fregean Bedeutung (Frege 1892), of A's name, but B objects to A's "mode of presentation" of the reference, the Fregean Sinn (Frege *ibid*), or Kaplan's "character" (Kaplan 1989).

In hindsight, I can see that the pair of B<sub>1a-b</sub> should not have been included in my set of stimuli at all. The hotel name issue introduced explicitly in B<sub>1</sub> probably had an impact on the respondents' reactions to the next pair (B<sub>2a-b</sub>) that was unfortunate. I must admit that I was at first surprised to find that the conjunct (*but*) *it wasn't Hotel Excelsior* in B<sub>2a-b</sub> was uniformly understood in the same way as (*but*) *it had a different name* in B<sub>1a-b</sub>. The co-presence of the pair of B<sub>1a-b</sub> among the set of stimuli was probably responsible for the consistency of their reactions to B<sub>2a-b</sub>. Once again, everyone understood the issue to be the name of hotel, not the hotel itself. It is conceivable that this partly happened because they felt the *but*-conjunct would otherwise contradict the explicitly communicated content, or explicature (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995; Carston 2002), of B's preceding conjunct *Penny was staying in the same hotel (as Peter)*, but the respondents' attention to the first pair of stimuli that tells us directly that A got the name of the hotel wrong may have been an important impetus to the uniform judgment of B<sub>2a-b</sub>, an unintended trigger that I should have foreseen.

If the debate in the different talk exchanges in (18) is just over the name, then we do not have to worry about whether the referent of the proper name employed by A is the same as what is designated by B's definite descriptions. However, if the pronoun *it* in (18) B<sub>2a-2b</sub> is meant to refer to the hotel rather than to its name, then the claim that it is not Hotel Excelsior would be coherent just in case the terms *the same hotel as Peter* in (18) B<sub>2a</sub> and *the same hotel* in (18) B<sub>2b</sub> designate a different hotel than the one A referred to. However, no respondent accessed the thought that B was talking about a hotel which was not Hotel Excelsior. As I said, I consider it highly plausible that their belief that B's negative statement in (18) B<sub>2</sub> concerns the name of the hotel may (at least for some respondents) be a consequence of their having first read and interpreted (18) B<sub>1a-1b</sub>.

The respondents' reactions to (18) B<sub>1a-1b</sub> and (18) B<sub>2a-2b</sub> do not support the thought that they may have understood the reference of the longer DP *the same hotel as Peter* differently than the reference of the shorter DP *the same hotel*. After all, why should it be a legitimate thought that they would be interpreted differently? Is it not to be expected that the respondents would read the description without the *as*-phrase as a less explicit linguistic vehicle than the description with the *as*-phrase, yet one that is truth-conditionally equivalent to the longer form? Depending on one's theoretical preferences, one might postulate a syntactic complement of *the same hotel* that includes a term with the function of a zero anaphor, an indexical with no segmental form. The most accessible discourse antecedent of this zero anaphor would be one that causes the addressee to equate the denotations of *the same hotel as Peter* and *the same hotel*, making Penny and Peter the compared arguments of the similitude predicate in either case: [the hotel in which Penny was staying]<sub>Arg1</sub> is the SAME as [the hotel in which Peter was staying]<sub>Arg2</sub>. Alternatively, one could be a radical contextualist who believes in massive linguistic underdetermination of propositional content and disavows the Isomorphism Principle (footnote 2), including the claim that quite a few apparently missing syntactic elements are syntactically real zero items.

My position is that the presence of the word *same* is sufficient to trigger the addressee's context-dependent search for the other argument of the two-place predicate when it is not overtly expressed but has to be retrieved contextually. No other linguistic cue is needed in the DP, so we should not postulate any. The presence of *same* makes the putative job of a postulated zero anaphor in the DP redundant.

When encountering (18) B<sub>3a-3b</sub> and (18) B<sub>4a-4b</sub>, the respondents' interpretations were no longer muddled by the proper name issue. Let us first compare B<sub>3a</sub> with the DP *the same hotel as Peter* and B<sub>3b</sub> with the DP *the same hotel*, followed by the negative statement *it wasn't that hotel*. Regardless of whether the description contains the comparison phrase *as Peter* or lacks that phrase, the entity designated by B's pronoun *it* is bound to be a hotel, as opposed to the name of a hotel. The respondents' reactions revealed that most of them failed to detect any relevant interpretation of B's coordination of declaratives at all, whether or not the DP contained the complement *as Peter*. The majority spotted an internal inconsistency in the longer (18) B<sub>3a</sub> and the shorter

(18) B<sub>3b</sub> alike. For those people, there was a confusing step from the first to the second conjunct of B's utterance. B's negative statement was found to be incoherent in the context they had accessed. This came as no surprise to me.

One of the reviewers of this paper found B<sub>3b</sub> difficult to process, but judged it to be coherent and to mean the same as B<sub>3a</sub>. According to this reviewer, B is in each case both correcting A (with regard to A's belief that the hotel was Excelsior or that it was named Excelsior) and at the same time saying that Penny stayed in the same hotel as Peter. Robyn Carston (p.c.) told me she got the impression that, although B<sub>3a</sub> is longer than B<sub>3b</sub>, it may be that B<sub>3a</sub> costs less processing effort in the end for some (including her). In the case of B<sub>3b</sub>, she found herself more likely to take the reference of *the same hotel* to be Hotel Excelsior and to persist with that referent so that, by the time she got to the end of B's utterance, she was faced with a contradiction and had to go back and try to find another interpretation. That was much harder in B<sub>3b</sub>, she said, than in B<sub>3a</sub> whose DP mentions Peter and opens for the possibility that Peter and Penny not only were in the same hotel but even that this hotel was not the one A referred to. I second Carston's feeling that B<sub>3a</sub> makes better sense than B<sub>3b</sub> because the added phrase *as Peter* makes it easier to activate the thought that Peter and Penny were not staying in Hotel Excelsior.

What, then, did the participants in the comprehension test actually say about (18) B<sub>3a-3b</sub>? 17/25 evaluations of (18) B<sub>3a</sub> (*Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but it wasn't that hotel*) supported the conclusion that B's negative statement is incoherent in the context offered by A's utterance and B's first conjunct clause. A minority group of 8/25 respondents judged the *but*-conjunct in (18) B<sub>3a</sub> to be meaningful, offering me paraphrases which entailed that Penny and Peter were not staying in Hotel Excelsior but in a different hotel. As for (18) B<sub>3b</sub> with the shorter DP (*Penny was staying in the same hotel, but it wasn't that hotel*), as many as 23/25 dismissed the *but*-conjunct because it was felt to be incoherent, contradictory, or unintelligible. Just 2/25 respondents said the *but*-conjunct was coherent. This outcome suggests that, once you are forced to lay aside the hypothesis that B's negative statement concerns the name of the hotel, it does matter whether or not there is an *as*-phrase in B's description. The pattern of responses to (18) B<sub>3a</sub> and B<sub>3b</sub> informs us that these are far from optimally relevant stimuli, the former

because the respondents were divided in their judgments of whether or not the *but*-conjunct is coherent, the latter because nearly everyone dismissed it as incoherent.

In principle, the term *the same hotel* in B<sub>3a-b</sub> admits of two pragmatic enrichments that are of interest to me, on the one hand ‘the hotel at which Peter was staying’, on the other hand ‘the hotel that A is referring to’. These are two different senses, potentially matching two distinct referents. The former enrichment is consistent with the assumption that Penny and Peter were staying in Hotel Excelsior as well as the assumption that they were staying somewhere else. In contrast to this, the enrichment ‘the hotel that A is referring to’ is only consistent with the assumption that Penny and Peter were staying in Hotel Excelsior, an assumption contradicted by the content of the second conjunct whose referential term *that hotel* clearly refers to Hotel Excelsior. When the description contains the *as*-phrase, the choice between two competing enrichments and the higher degree of accessibility of the alternative ‘the hotel at which Peter was staying’ may have contributed to the fact that at least a minority number of 8/25 responses linked *the same hotel as Peter* to a hotel at which Penny and Peter were both guests, one that was not Hotel Excelsior according to the information in the second conjunct clause. It was evidently harder to reconcile the shorter DP with the thought that they were not staying in Hotel Excelsior, although only that would have made the *but*-conjunct relevant. The reason for the respondents’ problem with B<sub>3b</sub> is undoubtedly the fact that there is no overt verbal mention of Peter in B<sub>3b</sub>, in contrast to B<sub>3a</sub>. Omission of the phrase *as Peter* reduces the relevance of the stimulus considerably if the speaker intends the referent of *the same hotel* to be the hotel at which Peter was staying. Even B<sub>3a</sub> with the *as*-phrase apparently confused a majority of the respondents. This was probably because the DP *the same hotel as Peter* in the first conjunct and the DP *that hotel* in the second conjunct appear at first glance to be coreferential, an impression that proves untenable. The situation gets worse when there is no *as*-phrase in the first conjunct. Then it is comparatively harder to refrain from enriching the DP as ‘the hotel that A is referring to’, an analysis that leads to an impasse because it is contradicted by the information in the second conjunct.

Faced with the last two talk exchanges in (18), A’s statement followed by (18) B<sub>4a</sub> (*Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter, but*

*Peter didn't stay there*) was rejected by 21/25 respondents, only 4/25 accepted it. When the DP did not contain the *as*-phrase, in (18) B<sub>4b</sub> (*Penny was staying in the same hotel, but Peter didn't stay there*), an increased number of respondents accepted B's correction as meaningful. 7/25 selected an interpretation of (18) B<sub>4b</sub> which implied that Penny was a resident of Hotel Excelsior but Peter was not, while 18/25 dismissed B's *but*-conjunct in (18) B<sub>4b</sub> as contradictory. Compared to the group's reactions to (18) B<sub>3b</sub> on the one hand and (18) B<sub>4a</sub> on the other, there was a moderate swing from rejection to acceptance of B's negative statement in (18) B<sub>4b</sub>.

One respondent made an interesting observation. If we assume that the anaphoric pro-adverb *there* is unstressed in (18) B<sub>4a</sub>, the content of the second conjunct does contradict the content of the first conjunct. But things may change, this person said, if one imagines that speaker B produces an utterance of (18) B<sub>4a</sub> with an anaphoric indexical *there* that has contrastive accent: *but Peter didn't stay THERE*. Then the referent of *there* could possibly be Hotel Excelsior, while the earlier term *the same hotel as Peter* would designate the hotel where Peter and Penny were both staying. True enough, contrastive accentuation of *there* may be interpreted as an indicator that the addressee should bypass the nearest candidate antecedent (cf. Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski 1993), i.e. the PrepP *in the same hotel as Peter*, and select one that such prosodic handling of *there* makes more accessible, i.e. the PrepP *in Hotel Excelsior* in A's utterance. Personally I feel that the relevance of both (18) B<sub>4a</sub> and (18) B<sub>4b</sub> is dependent on the presence of a contrastive pitch accent on *there*. Letting the nuclear accent fall on *there*, at the expense of any one of the preceding word forms *Peter*, *didn't* or *stay*, is a way of indicating that Peter and Penny were both staying in a hotel that was not the Excelsior. The alert test subject's ideas about the significance of B's prosodic handling of *there* applied to (18) B<sub>4a</sub> only, not to (18) B<sub>4b</sub>, whose shorter phrase *in the same hotel* makes no mention of Peter. He did not tell me why he did not extend the same analysis to (18) B<sub>4b</sub>, and I decided not to press him on that point.

(19) and (20) were not incorporated in my set of test data, naturally. (19) B and (20) B are impeccable denials of the belief that Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior. They reduce the addressee's processing cost considerably compared to the alternative form of (18) B<sub>4b</sub>. The only reading of (18) B<sub>4b</sub> that was accepted by some respondents was one that

made that stimulus truth-conditionally equivalent to (19) B/(20) B, but while most evaluations of (18) B<sub>4b</sub> were negative, the content of (19) B or (20) B is crystal clear.

- (19) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B: Penny was staying in Hotel Excelsior, but Peter didn't stay there.  
 (20) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B: Penny was staying in that hotel, but Peter didn't stay there.

In contrast to the name *Hotel Excelsior* in (19) B and the description *that hotel* in (20) B, the descriptive DP *the same hotel* does not refer to a particular object. The people who understood (18) B<sub>4b</sub> in the same way that any speaker of English will understand (19) B or (20) B must have chosen a pragmatic enrichment of *the same hotel* that does not involve Peter as the other argument of the similarity predicate. This means that their enrichment yielded a propositional form for the first conjunct that is paraphrasable as 'Penny was staying in the hotel that A is referring to', which implies that Penny was staying in Hotel Excelsior. The alternative enrichment 'Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter' is contradicted by the negation in the following *but*-conjunct. Even though it led to contradiction, that must nevertheless have been the reading chosen by the majority. A pragmatic interpretation that would have made the stimulus of (18) B<sub>4b</sub> meaningful involves expenditure of so much mental processing work that many participants were forced to give up deriving a content for B's first conjunct that was not contradicted by B's second conjunct. In addition, the *as*-phrase in (18) B<sub>4a</sub> seems to reduce the relevance of that utterance even more, because the *as*-phrase tells us explicitly that Penny and Peter were staying in the same hotel, the consequence being that the interpreter has to find an antecedent for the adverb *there* which is not expressed in B's first conjunct, or else conclude that what B is saying does not make sense.

An alternative analysis in the case of (18) B<sub>4b</sub> would be to call *the same hotel* a description that is used to refer directly to Hotel Excelsior, but in my opinion the grammatical deviance of (21) B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub> indicates that there is no coreference relation between *Hotel Excelsior* in A's utterance and *the same hotel* in B's disjunctive utterances. The additive focus marker *as well*, or *also*, would not be a fully acceptable addition to B's reaction to A's statement.

- (21) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B<sub>1</sub>: ?Penny was staying in the same hotel as well.  
 B<sub>2</sub>: ?Penny was also staying in the same hotel.

*As well* (or *too*) and *also* indicate that the content of A's and B's predicate phrases is the same, which implies that the denotation of the nominals employed by the two interactants is the same. This condition is satisfied in (22) B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub>, but not in (21) B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub>.

- (22) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B<sub>1</sub>: Penny was staying in that hotel as well.  
 B<sub>2</sub>: Penny was also staying in Hotel Excelsior.

*As well* in (22) B<sub>1</sub> and *also* in (22) B<sub>2</sub> are not simply redundant expressions of a semantic equivalence between the predicate phrases of the interactants. If we delete these focus markers and furnish the subject argument *Penny* with a contrastive accent, it is an open question whether B endorses the explicature communicated by A. (23) B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub> are utterances whose relevance may depend partly on the speaker's implicitly denouncing the proposition expressed by A. B shares A's propositional attitude in (22) but does so only contingently in (23), and rejects it in case it is mutually manifest that Penny was not in the same place as Peter.

- (23) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B<sub>1</sub>: *PENNY* was staying in that hotel.  
 B<sub>2</sub>: *PENNY* was staying in Hotel Excelsior.

That the whole predicate phrase in (23) B<sub>1</sub>–B<sub>2</sub> is treated prosodically as a post-nuclear domain with no pitch accent indicates that the terms *that hotel* in B<sub>1</sub> and *Hotel Excelsior* in B<sub>2</sub> represent referentially given entities. The accentual pattern indicated in (23) B<sub>1</sub>–B<sub>2</sub> is less suitable if we let *the same hotel* substitute for the description in (23) B<sub>1</sub> or the proper name in (23) B<sub>2</sub>, because B's DP *the same hotel* in (24) is not coreferential with *Hotel Excelsior* in (23).

- (24) A: Peter was staying in Hotel Excelsior.  
 B: ?*PENNY* was staying in the same hotel.



#### 4. Conclusion

An indexical of the pronominal sort cannot survive as indexical in the mental representation of the propositional content of an utterance. By virtue of its procedural meaning, an anaphoric pronoun causes the interlocutor to identify a discourse antecedent that will saturate it through an inference-based process of activating in the interlocutor's mind information that supplies, as a truth condition, the intended referent of the pronoun. Referentially used definite descriptions play a similar role. The concepts that those nominals encode are not supplied to the truth-conditional semantics of an utterance. Instead, they are endowed with procedural meaning that constrains the interlocutor's inference needed to identify the referent of the nominal<sup>13</sup>. Thus, a definite description like *the hotel you're mentioning* or a complex demonstrative like *that hotel* could refer to a unique hotel. In my set of data, DPs like these could refer directly to Hotel Excelsior even if no concept expressed by these descriptions is a logical constituent of the explicature of B's response to A's statement about Peter. *That hotel* would refer to Hotel Excelsior by virtue of the procedural semantics of the demonstrative determiner *that*, while phrases like *the hotel you're mentioning* or *Peter's hotel* do so by directing the attention of B's conversational partner A to a referent correctly described as a uniquely identifiable hotel mentioned by A in the former case and a hotel where Peter was a guest in the latter case. A DP like *the hotel you're mentioning* or *the man I told you about* can refer back to a unique entity similar to the way that indexical expressions that encode no concept are vehicles of direct reference.

Adding the determiner *same* to an English definite description means that the DP loses its ability to function like a term that enables the addressee to pick out a unique discourse-activated referent. One should not draw the conclusion that the expressions *the same hotel* and *the same hotel as Peter* are DPs that refer directly to Hotel Excelsior if context permits. The hypothesis that the determiner *same* blocks a directly referential reading of the DP is vindicated, both when *same* is

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<sup>13</sup> Fretheim (2011) argues that the conceptual meaning of a referentially used definite description can also direct the hearer to information that goes beyond truth-conditional content, for example information opening for activation of contextual premises that will increase the overall relevance of a linguistic stimulus. This is information that is not provided by anaphora of the indexical type.

not accompanied by an *as*-phrase referring to a discourse-given entity and when the DP does contain an *as*-phrase. Due to the presence of the lexical item *same*, a DP like *the same hotel as Peter* should be interpreted as a non-referential term. This implies that the identity marker *same*, the common noun *hotel* and the proper name *Peter* are all linguistic ingredients entered into the speaker's propositional content. The DP *the same hotel* without the comparison phrase is also non-referential. When there is no overt mention of Peter, the other part in the similitude relation will be correctly recognized as Peter if that pragmatic enrichment of the encoded logical form of the sentence makes the stimulus relevant for the interpreter. Otherwise some other enrichment is required, and if no other enrichment is accessible to the interpreter, there is a very real risk that no relevant mental representation of the stimulus will be found. In some of the talk exchanges, the explicature of B's second declarative will then be felt to contradict the explicature of the declarative preceding the adversative connective *but*.

Neither the longer DP *the same hotel as Peter* nor the shorter DP *the same hotel* is an optimally relevant term in the set of stimuli constituting the test data presented and discussed in section 3. The respondents' judgments of coherence or incoherence support the far from astonishing fact that B's choice of linguistic structure in the first of the two conjunct clauses is not the best linguistic choice if B's intention is to let the DP refer to Hotel Excelsior, a referent introduced by speaker A. Nor are these DPs successful if B's intention is to express the information that Peter and Penny were staying in a different hotel than Hotel Excelsior.

Peculiar to the DP *the same hotel* without the *as*-phrase complement is the fact that it allows for a choice between two different pragmatic enrichments of the encoded logical form, either the hotel where Peter was staying or the hotel referred to by A. These two senses are mutually exclusive in some of B's stimuli in (18). The similitude marker *same* is redundant in the term *the same hotel that A is referring to* but certainly not in *the same hotel as Peter*. This may be one reason why an enrichment of *the same hotel* that represents the hotel referred to by speaker A is not as accessible, *ceteris paribus*, as its rival interpretation, the hotel where Peter was staying. Some respondents may not have been willing to spend the extra effort needed to reconcile the content of B's first conjunct with the content of B's second conjunct, so their verdict is that B's *but*-conjunct expresses a self-contradiction, a much simpler egress in a

potentially stressful test situation. Faced with (18) B<sub>3b</sub> and B<sub>4b</sub>, a relevant interpretation of those stimuli would have been obtainable if they had been able to access the alternative enrichment ‘the (same) hotel that A is referring to’ without a disproportionate expenditure of mental effort.

I have said that the tendency to associate *the same hotel as Peter* and even more so *the same hotel* with the singular referent Hotel Excelsior is not that speaker B is using these DPs to refer to Hotel Excelsior, though some of the test stimuli may have directed the addressee to the implicated conclusion that Penny and Peter were staying in Hotel Excelsior. The venerable cancelability test for conversational implicature (Grice 1989) seems to open for the possibility that the implicature ‘Penny and Peter were staying in Hotel Excelsior’ is canceled when the content of B’s negative statement in B<sub>4</sub> (*Peter didn’t stay there*) appears to contradict it. The explicated information that Penny was staying in the same hotel as Peter would then direct the addressee to the inference that their hotel was not Hotel Excelsior, and to a comprehension of the *but*-conjunct as a legitimate objection to A’s claim about Peter. This arguably involves a lot more processing effort than the competing judgment that B’s *but*-conjunct contradicts the proposition expressed by B’s previous conjunct. In order to activate a relevant interpretation, the respondents would have to bypass B’s first conjunct in their search for the antecedent of the anaphor *that* (of *that hotel*) in B<sub>3</sub> and of *there* in B<sub>4</sub>, and to establish a coreference relation between these indexicals and A’s proper name *Hotel Excelsior* instead. Their incoherence judgment was moreover supported by my having told them to judge the *but*-conjunct to be either coherent or incoherent, an important contextual clue. The information that the *but*-conjunct could potentially be incoherent may have caused some to opt for the least effortful result of their attempts to come to grips with B<sub>3a-3b</sub> and B<sub>4a-4b</sub>.

According to Russell (1905), the sentence *The present King of France is bald* expresses a true proposition iff there is at most one thing which is currently King of France and bald, but since nothing is currently King of France, the proposition expressed by that famous sentence is false. Strawson (1950) objected to Russell’s analysis, arguing that since nothing fits the description *the present King of France*, the proposition is not false, there is simply a failure of reference in that subject phrase. Donnellan (1966) pointed to weaknesses both in Russell’s and

Strawson's accounts. There are two different uses of definite descriptions, he said: referential and non-referential (or attributive in his own terminology). *Smith's murderer* in the sentence *Smith's murderer is insane* is used non-referentially if the speaker's meaning is that Smith's murderer, whoever he is, is an insane person (because of what he did). *Smith's murderer* is used referentially if it is a description that is meant to enable the addressee to identify a particular individual as the referent of the term, say someone called Jones. Donnellan's distinction has not gained universal acceptance among philosophers and linguists. I have tried to demonstrate that the word *same* in a description means that it can only be given a non-referential reading. In my opinion, the existence of a word with those semantic properties in the lexicon of English (and the existence of equivalent words in other languages) supports the view that Donnellan's distinction is fruitful even for practitioners of linguistic pragmatics.

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