

Ironic effects of performance are worse for neurotics

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1 Abstract

2 *Objectives*: To conduct the first examination of neuroticism as a predictor of (1) the 3 incidence of what Wegner (1989, 2009) terms ironic processes of mental control and (2) the 4 precision of ironic performance errors under high- and low-anxiety conditions. 5 Design: Across two studies we employed a repeated-measures design. 6 *Method*: In a football penalty-shooting task (Study 1) and a dart-throwing (Study 2) task, under high-anxiety and low-anxiety conditions, participants gained maximum points for 7 8 hitting a *target* zone and fewer points for hitting a designated *non-ironic* error zone. 9 Additionally, we instructed participants to be particularly careful *not* to hit a designated 10 *ironic* error zone, because such hits would score minimum points. 11 Results: Across both studies within-subjects moderation analyses revealed a 12 consistent moderating effect of neuroticism on the incidence of ironic errors in the high-13 anxiety condition. Specifically, when anxious, neurotics displayed a significant increase in 14 *ironic* performance error and a significant decrease in *target* hits. Importantly, *non-ironic* 15 error did not differ across anxiety conditions. Additionally, Study 2 results revealed that neuroticism moderated the *precision* of ironic errors when anxious. Specifically, when 16 17 anxious, neurotics' ironic error zone hits were significantly farther from the target zone and 18 significantly farther into the ironic error zone than their relatively emotionally stable 19 counterparts' errors. 20 *Conclusion*: We provide the first evidence that neuroticism moderates both the 21 incidence and precision of ironic performance errors. These results will enable practitioners 22 in coaching environments to make evidence-based predictions and interventions regarding

23 which individuals are most prone to ironic performance breakdown when anxious.

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Keywords: anxiety, ironic error, neuroticism, football, darts, stress.

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Ironic effects of performance are worse for neurotics

The greatest mistake you can make in life is to be continually fearing you will make one (Elbert Hubbard, 1927, p. 94)

Bill is a PGA tour golfer; he is also a worrier and most aspects of Bill's life are 5 characterized by frequent concerns. So it was unsurprising that Bill felt anxious as he placed 6 7 his golf ball on the 18th tee, knowing that he needed only to make par to secure victory. Bill 8 recognized that the biggest threat on this final hole was the lake to the right of the fairway. As 9 Bill readied himself to take his tee shot he said to himself, "Right, whatever you do, just don't 10 slice the ball into the lake." As soon as Bill hit the ball, he knew; he knew he'd hit the one 11 shot he was trying to avoid; he then saw the splash of water as confirmation of his worst fear. 12 He knew immediately that his chances of victory were lost in the water. As this example 13 demonstrates, under pressure certain individuals exhibit not just a generalized decrease in 14 performance but rather a decrease in performance that is precisely counter-intentional.

15 Wegner's (1989, 1994, 1997, 2009) theory of ironic processes of mental control was developed with the aim of understanding counter-intentional error. To date researchers have 16 17 given relatively little research attention to Wegner's theory in a performance domain. This 18 may be in part due to the expressed reservations (e.g., Hall, Hardy, & Gammage, 1999) that 19 Wegner's theory offers little over and above more established theories of stress-performance 20 such as cognitive processing (Baumeister, 1984; Masters, 1992), attentional control (Eysenck, 21 Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007), and catastrophe models (Hardy, 1990; Hardy, Mullen & 22 Jones, 1996). However, this reservation is somewhat surprising given that the alternate 23 established theories cannot adequately explain why, under pressure, certain performers make 24 errors that are *ironic* in nature; that is, a performance breakdown that is precisely counterintentional (Janelle, 1999). 25

Wegner's theory of ironic processes of mental control asserts that "the ironies of
 mental life are not just happenstance examples of the frailty of human endeavors but rather

1 logically arise due to the nature of mental control" (Wegner, 1994, p. 34). Specifically, 2 foundational to Wegner's theory is the premise that mental control requires two processes in 3 order to work effectively. First, the cyclical operating process carries out intentional, effortful 4 regulation by consciously searching for, and directing the individual toward, mental contents 5 that will yield a desired outcome or intended emotional state; known as the desired state. It is 6 through active engagement in this mentally demanding search that regulation will most likely be maintained and the desired state will be reached. Second, the monitoring process 7 8 subconsciously searches for mental contents that indicate a failure to achieve the desired 9 state. If this *monitor* identifies any such failures it reactivates the *operating* process with the 10 aim of filling the mind with mental contents that are relevant to the desired state, and thus 11 reestablishing a regulated mind. Both processes work within one control system and operate 12 together as part of a feedback loop that, under normal circumstances, provides effective 13 mental control (Wegner, 1994).

14 Wegner (1994) suggested that these very processes that enable an individual to 15 exercise mental control are also, under certain conditions, responsible for undermining 16 intentional mental control. Specifically, under conditions of mental load (e.g., anxiety), some of the cognitive space that is required for the effortful operating process to operate effectively 17 18 is consumed by the mental load. As such, the operating process becomes less effective at 19 introducing the desired content into awareness. Conversely, the functioning of the monitoring 20 process – because it is both unconscious and not easily interrupted – remains largely 21 unaffected under mental load. Thus, under mental load the monitoring process becomes more 22 salient and the search for thoughts or sensations that conflict with the desired state are enough 23 to bring them into consciousness and thereby undermine the intended control (Wegner, Erber, 24 & Zanakos, 1993). This is *ironic* because the (monitoring) process that normally ensures that 25 the to-be-avoided state is kept at bay is the very process that increases an individual's

awareness of – and thus likelihood of bringing about – the to-be-avoided state (Woodman,
 Barlow, & Gorgulu, 2015). The result is that one is more likely to do specifically what one
 intends not to do, when one least wants to do it.

4 Several studies have provided evidence in support Wegner's theory (e.g., Binsch, 5 Oudejans, Bakker & Savelsbergh, 2009; Dugdale & Eklund, 2003; Wegner, Ansfield, & 6 Pilloff, 1998; Woodman et al., 2015). For example, in a dart throwing task, Oudejans, Binsch, 7 and Bakker (2013) demonstrated that the combination of negatively worded instructions ("Be 8 careful not to hit...") and induced anxiety (participants threw their darts whilst positioned 9 high on a climbing wall) significantly increased the proportion of darts landing in the 10 specifically to-be-avoided zone when compared to negatively worded instructions under 11 conditions of low-anxiety (participants threw their darts whilst positioned at a low-level on a 12 climbing wall). However, manipulating height-off-the-ground is clearly not an ecologically 13 valid stressor in a dart-throwing task. Interestingly, other studies have failed to demonstrate 14 effects consistent with Wegner's postulate. Indeed, across two studies, using a golf putting 15 task, de la Peña, Murray and Janelle (2008) revealed findings that were seemingly counter to 16 Wegner's theory. Specifically, when instructed 'not to putt long' or 'not to putt short' participants compensated by putting significantly *shorter* or *longer* respectively. To explain 17 18 their results, which are in direct contrast to the prediction from Wegner's theory, de la Peña et 19 al. (2008) proposed the *implicit overcompensation* hypothesis (see also Russell & Grealy, 20 2010; Toner, Moran, & Jackson, 2013). de la Peña et al. (2008) argued that the negatively 21 worded self-instruction "don't putt it short" subconsciously exaggerates the negative 22 connotation (i.e., "leaving the putt short is a failure") thus activating an overriding implicit counter message (i.e., "to avoid failure, it is better to err on the side of putting too long"). 23 24 This implicit counter message generates an implicit command that guides movement 25 execution under the notion that, in this example, it is better to overshoot the hole.

Researchers have suggested that such equivocal results regarding the incidence, or
not, of ironic performance effects may be attributed to a failure to manipulate anxiety (e.g.,
de la Peña et al., 2008; Woodman et al., 2015). Additionally, a failure to differentiate clearly
between ironic and non-ironic error (e.g., Dugdale & Eklund, 2002; Wegner, Ansfield &
Pilloff, 1998) has hampered the research examining ironic processes in performance settings:
a limitation that has only recently been addressed by Woodman et al. (2015).

7 It is also worth considering factors beyond methodological limitations that may lead 8 to such equivocal findings. Indeed, a growing body of evidence indicates that under specific 9 environmental conditions (e.g., anxiety), personality may exert differential effects on 10 performance (see Roberts & Woodman, 2015). Thus, it is a theoretical shortcoming that 11 previous research in this area has failed to consider personality as a potential moderating 12 factor on the incidence of ironic performance errors. Since Wegner proposes that ironic errors occur when cognitive load occupies the critical mental capacity required to maintain the 13 salience of the operating process, examining personality traits that are associated with 14 15 elevated cognitive load is theoretically the most natural starting point for this line of 16 investigation.

In this regard neuroticism is a personality trait that is worthy of research attention 17 18 regarding its potential moderating role in the incidence of ironic performance errors (cf. 19 Roberts & Woodman, 2015; Woodman et al., 2015). Neuroticism is a broad dimension of 20 personality – appearing in both the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1987) and Giant 3 (Eysenck 21 & Evsenck, 1985) – characterized by the tendency to experience negative, distressing 22 emotions (Costa & McCrae, 1987), anxiety (Watson & Clark, 1984), and a lack of emotional stability (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985). Research suggests that neurotic individuals experience 23 24 stress and anxiety more frequently (Bolger & Schilling, 1991), demonstrate greater sensitivity 25 to criticism and negative stimuli (O'Sullivan, Zuckerman, & Kraft, 1998; Tellegen, 1985),

have lower self-confidence (Bandura, 1977), and have larger negative reactions to anxiety
 (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995; Ormel & Wohlfarth, 1991). Indeed, research has shown
 neuroticism to be an undesirable trait in relation to successful performance in sport (Davis &
 Mogk, 1994; Silva, Shultz, Haslam, Martin, & Murray, 1985).

5 The neurotic individual's emotional experience in everyday life is such that cognitive 6 space is consumed by generalized worries and concerns (cf. John & Srivastava, 1999). The 7 chronic negative affective state of the neurotic may itself act as a mental load, soaking up 8 some of the mental resources necessary to maintain mental control (cf. Dalgleish et al., 2009). 9 Despite this, under normative conditions – that is with no additional load of anxiety – we 10 argue that the neurotic individual will have sufficient cognitive space for the operating 11 process to work effectively. However, under anxiety-provoking conditions - in which the 12 neurotic individual's experience of distressing emotions is increased and less cognitive space remains for the operating process to operate effectively – the neurotic individual's monitoring 13 14 process will become salient and ironically bring into consciousness the specifically to-be-15 avoided state. In contrast, the cognitive resources of the emotionally stable (i.e., low neurotic) individual are not consumed by generalized concerns and worries. Thus, in line with 16 Wegner's postulate, we argue that even under conditions of high-anxiety, emotionally stable 17 18 individuals will have the requisite cognitive resources to maintain the salience of the 19 operating process. In this way, for emotionally stable individuals, the specifically to-be-20 avoided state will not be brought into consciousness.

Despite such a strong theoretical basis for examining potential personality moderators of ironic performance errors, only Woodman and Davis (2008) have to date taken up this mantle. Woodman and Davis (2008) explored individual anxiety coping styles as a moderator of ironic performance errors. They revealed that *repressors* were significantly more prone to suffer from ironic performance errors when compared to both low- and high-anxious *non*-

1 repressors. In line with the present theoretical rationale, Woodman and Davis (2008) 2 concluded that the additional mental load that repressors experience by denying their anxiety 3 undermines the operating process. The Woodman and Davis (2008) investigation provides 4 promising initial evidence that the extent to which individuals invest (mental) effort in self-5 and emotion-regulation moderates their susceptibility to producing ironic performance errors 6 when anxious. However, the Woodman and Davis (2008) investigation was limited by its 7 lack of differentiation between *ironic* and *non-ironic* performance error (Woodman et al., 8 2015). Indeed, Woodman et al. (2015) noted that there are two main shortcomings of the 9 previous limited research on ironic performance error: (1) the failure to differentiate *ironic* 10 and *non-ironic* error; and (2) a reliance on working memory tasks (as opposed to anxiety) to 11 increase cognitive load. Consequently, in the present studies we clearly differentiate *ironic* 12 and *non-ironic* performance error and we induce mental load by manipulating anxiety via an ecologically valid performance stressor. Specifically, we aim to manipulate anxiety using a 13 14 performance-contingent financial reward (i.e., the opportunity to gain a financial reward as 15 recompense for performance accomplishments), a method which has been successfully implemented in previous research (e.g., Bell & Hardy, 2009; Woodman & Davis, 2008; 16 Woodman et al., 2015; Wright, Killebrew, & Pimpalapure, 2002). Furthermore, and of 17 18 primary importance, we provide the first examination of neuroticism as a moderator of both 19 the occurrence (Study 1 and Study 2) and precision (Study 2) of ironic error within a 20 performance domain.

21

Study 1

In the present study we aimed to extend Wegner's theory by providing the first test of neuroticism as a moderator of ironic performance error. Bakker, Oudejans, Binsch and Van der Kamp (2006) and Binsch, Oudejans, Bakker, Hoozemans and Savelsbergh (2010) successfully used a football penalty shooting task – which given their experimental design

1 was by necessity laboratory based – to examine the influence of *final target fixation* on ironic 2 performance error. In the present study, with the aim of increasing ecological validity, we 3 employed a football penalty shooting task that has three major differences to the penalty 4 shooting task employed in the Bakker et al. (2006) and Binsch et al. (2010) studies. 5 Specifically, we used a regulation size 5 FIFA approved football (as opposed to a size 4 foam 6 ball), a standard football goal located outside (as opposed to a screen with a projected image 7 of a football goal located in a laboratory), and a standard 11m penalty kick (as opposed to 8 penalty kicks from 2.48m and 2.83m, respectively). In line with Wegner's theory, we 9 hypothesized that neurotics would demonstrate significantly greater increases in *ironic* 10 performance error, and decreases in *target* hits, from low-anxiety to high-anxiety conditions 11 than their comparatively emotionally stable counterparts. Importantly, in terms of providing 12 specific support for the theory of ironic processes, neuroticism should not moderate significantly the incidence of *non-ironic* error across anxiety conditions. 13

14 **Method**

Participants. Before a university team-training session, we approached experienced male football players and invited them to participate in the study. The inclusion criteria were that participants represent one of the top three squads at the university and trained and/or played in a match at least once per week throughout the competitive season. The final sample comprised 67 male university football players ($M_{age} = 20.55$, SD = 1.92).

20 Measures

Anxiety. We measured anxiety using the Mental Readiness Form-3 (MRF-3; Krane,
 1994). The MRF-3, which comprises three single-item factors, requires participants to
 express how they feel *right now* by placing a mark on three separate 10cm visual-analog
 scales. From left to right the scales are anchored: *worried – not worried* (cognitive anxiety);
 tense – not tense (somatic anxiety); and *confident – not confident* (self-confidence). Thus,

1 high scores represent low cognitive anxiety, low somatic anxiety and low self-confidence. 2 We preferred the MRF-3 to the Competitive State Anxiety Inventory-2 (CSAI-2; Martens, 3 Burton, Vealey, Bump, & Smith, 1990) because it is more expedient and less intrusive to 4 administer. As such, we were able to deliver the experimental instructions and measure the 5 participant's anxiety in close temporal proximity. Additionally, given that the present 6 research revolves around the experience of *anxiety*, we preferred the use of the word 7 "worried" in the MRF-3 which better captures the experience of anxiety compared to the use 8 of the more ambiguous term "concern" in the CSAI-2 (see also Woodman & Hardy, 2001). 9 The MRF-3 has been used in previous studies to assess anxiety in competitive settings (e.g., 10 Robazza, Bortoli, & Nougier, 2000; Woodman & Davis, 2008) and is significantly correlated 11 with the CSAI-2 (Krane, 1994): .58 (cognitive anxiety), .59 (somatic anxiety), and .77 (self-12 confidence).

Neuroticism. The 50-item International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg, 1999) measures emotional stability, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. We used the 10-item emotional stability factor (e.g., *I get upset easily*) as a measure of neuroticism on a five-point Likert scale (1 = very inaccurate; 5 = very*accurate*). High emotional stability scores reflect low neuroticism. This factor has been shown to have strong internal consistency ($\alpha = .86$; Goldberg, 1999; Gow, Whiteman, Pattie, & Deary, 2005).

Performance. We measured performance on a flat Astroturf surface using a
regulation size 5 FIFA approved football, a standard football goal, and a standard 11m
penalty kick (FIFA, 2013). A *target* zone was delimited by a rope that hung vertically from
the football crossbar to the ground, 1m from the right-hand post. Both the *ironic* error zone
(to the right of the target zone and delimited by a cone) and the *non-ironic* error zone (to the
left of the target zone and delimited by a rope) were the same size as the target zone (i.e., 1

1 meter wide and 2.44 meters high; see Figure 1). Left-footed participants were given a 2 mirrored set-up. Specifically, their *target* zone was marked one meter in from the left-hand 3 post with the *ironic* error zone to the left of the target zone and *non-ironic* error zone to the 4 right. We operationalized performance as the number of shots hit into each zone (ironic error 5 zone, target zone, non-ironic error zone), which was recorded by a qualified Level 1 Football 6 Association coach who stood directly behind the strike of the ball. The coach was male, aged 7 25, and himself an experienced football player (University 1st team). Shots that did not clearly 8 enter one of the three zones were retaken (0.5%).

9 **Procedure.** We first obtained institutional ethics approval for the study. On arrival at 10 the test site, each participant reported their preferred kicking foot and completed the IPIP. 11 The experimenter reminded each participant that the football-shooting task would comprise 12 taking two sets of 20 penalty kicks. The experimenter then described the scoring system for 13 the penalty-shooting task. Instructions regarding the location of the target and error zones 14 were specific to whether the participant was right- or left-footed. Right-footed participants 15 were told that they would score 10 points for hitting the *target* zone, zero points for hitting 16 the left of the target zone (non-ironic error zone) and minus five points for hitting the right of the target zone (*ironic* error zone). The verbal instructions concluded with the priming 17 18 phrase, "Try to hit the target zone. Be particularly careful not to hit the ball to the right of the 19 post, as you will score minus five points each time you do." We gave left-footed players 20 mirrored instructions. Immediately before striking the first ball in the low-anxiety condition, 21 we reminded participants of the instructional set and then completed the MRF-3 before we 22 repeated the priming phrase to them. In the high-anxiety condition, we used the same procedure with one exception: Before completing the MRF-3, we informed participants of the 23 24 performance-contingent financial reward. Specifically, we told participants that we would 25 award £100 (approx. US\$155) to the participant with the highest performance score. In both

conditions, participants took 20 penalty kicks. We counter-balanced the order of presentation
 for the anxiety conditions across participants and we gave all participants a two-minute break
 between conditions.

Analysis. We used Judd, Kenny, and McClelland's (2001) regression procedure to 4 5 test within-subjects moderation. Specifically, we examined the potential moderating effects 6 of *neuroticism* (N) on *performance* – performance was operationalized as the total number of 7 shots hit into the (1) *ironic* error zone, (2) *target* zone and (3) *non-ironic* error zone – in a 8 repeated measures (high-anxiety and low-anxiety) design. The advantage of employing the 9 Judd et al. (2001) approach in the present studies is that this method is not bound by the 10 large-sample assumptions underlying certain estimation procedures in multilevel modelling. 11 Based on the Judd et al. (2001) methodology we first regressed low-anxiety performance (\hat{Y}_1) and high-anxiety performance (\hat{Y}_2) on neuroticism (see Table 1). To examine neuroticism as a 12 moderator we regressed the performance difference $-Y_d$ (i.e., $Y_1 - Y_2$) – on neuroticism. The 13 14 test of whether this slope differs from zero is equivalent to testing whether the slope for 15 *neuroticism* in the high-anxiety condition (i.e., the Y_2 equation) differs from the slope for 16 *neuroticism* in the low-anxiety condition (i.e., the Y_1 equation). A significant *neuroticism* \times performance interaction is evidence of a significant moderation effect (see Judd et al., 2001). 17 18 **Results**

Anxiety manipulation. Paired samples *t*-tests on the MRF-3 data confirmed that the anxiety manipulation was successful. Specifically, participants' cognitive anxiety was higher in the high-anxiety condition (M = 7.30, SD = 2.19) compared to the low-anxiety condition (M = 9.07, SD = 1.82; t(66) = 6.73, p < .001). Somatic anxiety was higher in the high-anxiety condition (M = 7.33, SD = 2.17) compared to low-anxiety condition (M = 8.69, SD = 2.05; t(66) = 4.70, p < .001). Self-confidence was significantly lower in the highanxiety condition (*M* = 5.25, *SD* = 2.49) compared to low-anxiety condition (*M* = 4.16, *SD* =
2.09; *t*(66) = 5.26, *p* < .001).

Performance. The results provide support for the hypothesis that neuroticism
moderates the incidence of both *ironic* performance error and *target* hits across anxiety
conditions. Importantly, *non-ironic* error was unaffected (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
Specifically, neurotics demonstrated significantly greater increases in *ironic* performance
error, and decreases in *target* hits, from low-anxiety to high-anxiety conditions than their
comparatively emotionally stable counterparts.

9 **Discussion**

10 Study 1 provides the first evidence that neuroticism moderates the incidence of 11 anxiety-induced ironic performance errors. As hypothesized, neurotics experienced greater 12 increases in *ironic* performance error and greater decreases in *target* hits, from low-anxiety to 13 high-anxiety conditions, than their comparatively emotionally stable counterparts. 14 Importantly, neuroticism did not moderate the incidence of *non-ironic* error. That is, it was 15 specifically neurotics' incidence of *ironic* error rather than their generic error that was 16 affected by anxiety.

17 Using a 'real-world' penalty shooting task is an improvement in ecological validity 18 compared to previous laboratory-based penalty-shooting tasks (e.g., Bakker, et al., 2006; 19 Binsch et al., 2010). However, the ecological validity of the task was limited in that the non-20 *ironic* error zone was operationalized within the goal itself (see Figure 1). Thus, although we 21 classified shots entering the non-ironic error zone as an 'error' (i.e., failure to hit the target 22 zone), shots that entered this zone in a 'real-world' football penalty could go past the 23 goalkeeper into the goal. A more serious limitation is that the fixed location of the non-ironic 24 error zone could have introduced a systematic performance bias. Specifically, for right-footed 25 participants, the *non-ironic* error zone was consistently located to the left of the *target* zone,

and the *ironic* error zone was consistently located wide of the goal to the right (we used a
mirrored set-up for left-footed participants). Thus, despite no theoretical or empirical
evidence for the postulate that anxious footballers might systematically 'slice' penalty kicks
to the outside of the goal (reflective of systematized error rather than ironic performance error *per se*), such a postulate cannot be dismissed. We address this limitation in Study 2.

6

Study 2

7 The reader will recall Bill, the PGA tour golfer who is also a worrier. Bill hit his golf 8 ball into the lake when playing his tee shot at the final hole. He did the very thing he was 9 specifically trying to avoid doing. But Bill's tee shot was not just a marginal error (i.e., the 10 golf ball didn't only just miss the fairway and roll slowly into the very edge of the lake). 11 Rather, Bill hooked his tee shot high, wide, and into the very middle of the lake. Bill's shot 12 was *precisely* ironic. In a performance setting, such precision is laudable and sought after, if only it were not specifically counter-intentional. However, researchers have typically 13 14 dichotomized the incidence of ironic errors rather than investigating the specific precision of 15 any ironic errors.

The aim of Study 2 was threefold: First, we aimed to replicate the moderating role of neuroticism on the incidence of *ironic* performance error, as revealed in Study 1, using a different task. The hypothesis remained unchanged. That is, neurotics will demonstrate significantly greater increases in ironic performance error, and decreases in target hits, from low-anxiety to high-anxiety conditions than their comparatively emotionally stable counterparts. Again, we hypothesized that non-ironic error would not significantly change across anxiety conditions.

23 Second, we aimed to examine the *precision* of irony in ironic performance errors (see 24 Woodman et al., 2015) as moderated by neuroticism. That is, we aimed to examine whether 25 neurotic individuals' ironic errors are more *precisely* ironic when anxious compared to

1 emotionally stable individuals' errors. As argued previously, maintaining emotion regulation 2 in daily-life consumes more of the neurotic individuals' cognitive resources compared to their 3 emotionally stable counterparts. Thus, for the neurotic individual, conditions of elevated 4 mental load – such as high-anxiety – occupy the critical mental capacity required to maintain 5 the salience of the operating process. Since a salient monitoring process increases an 6 individual's conscious awareness of the specifically to-be-avoided state, we argue that under 7 conditions of high-anxiety neurotics will *more precisely* do the very thing they are trying not 8 to do. Thus, we hypothesize that under conditions of high-anxiety neurotics' ironic error zone 9 hits will be *farther* away from the *target* zone and *more precisely* within the *ironic* error zone 10 compared to emotionally stable individuals.

11 Third, we introduced three methodological modifications to improve the methodology 12 used in Study 1: (a) We included an additional stressor – social evaluation – to enhance the ecological validity of inducing mental load in a competitive sporting environment. Previous 13 14 research has utilized social evaluation to successfully manipulate anxiety (Bell & Hardy, 15 2009; Hardy et al., 1996; Woodman et al., 2015; Woodman, Roberts, Hardy, Callow & Rogers, 2011); (b) We included an indicator of participants' physiological arousal with the 16 17 aim of deriving a more reliable measure of anxiety change across conditions; (c) To dismiss 18 the postulate that Study 1 results can be attributed to systematic performance bias (as a 19 consequence of the ironic error zone being in a consistent direction relative to the target), we 20 varied the location of the ironic error zone across participants.

21 Method

Participants. We used poster adverts to recruit 73 participants (45 men, 28 women; $M_{age} = 22.82$, SD = 4.07; 71 right-handed, 2 left-handed) who had played darts fewer than 10 times.

25 Measures.

1	Anxiety. We administered the MRF-3 (Krane, 1994), as described in Study 1, to
2	measure cognitive anxiety, somatic anxiety and self-confidence. Additionally, we measured
3	physiological arousal by recording heart rate (HR) and heart rate variability (HRV) using
4	the Polar RS800CX heart rate monitor (Quintana, Heathers & Kemp, 2012). We analyzed
5	individuals' HR and HRV data from the final three minutes of their engagement in both the
6	high-anxiety and low-anxiety conditions. Researchers have previously used HR and HRV as
7	a successful indicator of participants' physiological response to anxiety (e.g., Cervantes,
8	Rodas, & Capdevila, 2009; Laborde, Brull, Weber, & Anders, 2011; Mateo, Lafarga,
9	Navarro, Guzman & Zabala, 2012; Murray & Raedeke, 2008).
10	Neuroticism. The 10-item Big Five Inventory-10 (BFI-10; Rammstedt & John, 2007)
10 11	<i>Neuroticism.</i> The 10-item Big Five Inventory-10 (BFI-10; Rammstedt & John, 2007) measures extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness on a
11	measures extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness on a
11 12	measures extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness on a five-point Likert scale ($1 = strongly \ disagree$; $5 = strongly \ agree$). We used the neuroticism
11 12 13	measures extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness on a five-point Likert scale (1 = <i>strongly disagree</i> ; 5 = <i>strongly agree</i>). We used the neuroticism factor, which comprises two items: <i>I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handless stress</i>
11 12 13 14	measures extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness on a five-point Likert scale (1 = <i>strongly disagree</i> ; 5 = <i>strongly agree</i>). We used the neuroticism factor, which comprises two items: <i>I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handless stress well</i> (reverse-scored item); <i>I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily</i> . This factor has
11 12 13 14 15	measures extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness on a five-point Likert scale (1 = <i>strongly disagree</i> ; 5 = <i>strongly agree</i>). We used the neuroticism factor, which comprises two items: <i>I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handless stress well</i> (reverse-scored item); <i>I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily</i> . This factor has been shown to have strong internal consistency (α = .88; Denissen, Geenen, Selfhout, & van

Performance. We measured dart-throwing performance using a regulation dartboard and darts. We positioned the center of the dartboard 1.73cm from the floor and 2.37m horizontally from the Oche (throwing line). Following removal of the standard wireframe, we placed a paper coversheet that matched the dimensions of the dartboard over the dartboard (see Figure 3). On the dartboard cover sheet we marked in black a central circle – the *target* zone – which measured 6cm in diameter. Participants scored nine points for hitting the *target* zone. Darts landing in the next concentric circle scored eight points. Darts landing in the next concentric circle scored seven points. The scoring system continued in the same manner to
 the outermost concentric circle, which scored one point. All concentric circles were 2.1cm
 wide, except the outermost one, which was 3.9cm wide to accommodate the cover sheet to
 the edge of the dartboard.

5 A single quadrant (e.g., top-right quadrant of the dartboard excluding the area of the 6 *target* zone that fell within the quadrant) was operationalized as the *ironic* error zone. We 7 informed participants that they would score zero points for any darts landing within this zone. 8 We designated the *ironic* error zone as the top-right quadrant for the first participant. We then 9 rotated clockwise the location of the *ironic* error zone by one quadrant for each subsequent 10 participant. Thus, for the second participant the *ironic* error zone was the bottom right 11 quadrant. Each time, we conceptualized the quadrant opposite the *ironic error* zone as the 12 non-ironic error zone but we did not mention this to the participants. Hits in the non-ironic 13 error zone scored between one and eight points dependent on the proximity to the *target* 14 zone. An observer recorded the zone hit for each dart. Darts that missed the dart board 15 entirely were retaken (0.3%).

16 **Procedure.** Using a standardized instructional set, the experimenter informed each participant that the task – as approved by the university ethics committee – would comprise 17 18 two sets of 24 dart throws and described the scoring system for the dart-throwing task. Participants completed an informed consent form with additional demographic data (age, sex, 19 20 and experience) and wore a heart rate chest strap transmitter. Before the task, we conducted a 21 warm up that consisted of 15 practice throws, the scores of which were not recorded. These 22 15 shots primarily served as a warm-up rather than as a meaningful task familiarization; that 23 is, despite all participants being inexperienced darts players, we did not consider the task to 24 be a difficult one with which to familiarize oneself.

1 Our pilot testing revealed that (similarly inexperienced) participants who initially 2 performed in the high-anxiety condition often remained highly anxious, even after a two-3 minute break, when subsequently participating under conditions of supposed low-anxiety. As 4 such, to minimize any anxiety carryover effect, we fixed the order of the presentation of 5 anxiety conditions for all participants as low-anxiety first and high-anxiety second (cf. Hardy 6 & Hutchinson, 2007). Thus, the task required each participant to perform 24 throws in the 7 low-anxiety condition, followed by a two-minute break, and 24 throws in the high-anxiety 8 condition. Each participant completed the dart-throwing task individually.

9 Immediately before the first dart throw, in the low-anxiety condition, we repeated the 10 instructional set to the participants who then completed the MRF-3. These verbal instructions 11 concluded with the priming phrase, "Please try to hit the target zone, or as close to the target 12 zone as possible, in order to gain maximal points, but be particularly careful not to hit the top right quarter¹ of the dart board, as you will score zero points each time you do so." We used 13 14 the same procedure in the high-anxiety condition with one exception: Before completing the 15 MRF-3, we informed participants that, for one week, we would display all scores publically 16 on a television screen located in a busy indoor thoroughfare of the university. Additionally, 17 we informed each participant that the highest scoring participant would receive £50 (approx. 18 US\$80).

19 **Results**

Anxiety manipulation. Both physiological arousal and self-report anxiety measures confirmed the anxiety manipulation. Specifically, paired samples *t*-tests on the MRF-3 data revealed that participants' cognitive anxiety was higher in the high-anxiety condition (M =6.37, SD = 2.86) compared to the low-anxiety condition (M = 8.10, SD = 2.48; t(72) = 6.03, p

¹ The priming phrase was modified to reflect the changing position of the ironic error zone between participants: (a) bottom right quarter (b) bottom left quarter (c) top left quarter.

1	< .001). Somatic anxiety was higher in the high-anxiety condition ($M = 6.09$, $SD = 2.57$)
2	compared to low-anxiety condition ($M = 7.63$, $SD = 2.60$; $t(72) = 4.93$, $p < .001$). Self-
3	confidence was significantly lower in the high-anxiety condition ($M = 6.17$, $SD = 2.22$)
4	compared to low-anxiety condition ($M = 5.46$, $SD = 2.06$; $t(72) = 2.94$, $p = .004$).
5	Additionally, participants' HR was significantly higher in the high-anxiety condition ($M =$
6	96.03, $SD = 14.20$) compared to low-anxiety condition ($M = 85.83$, $SD = 12.72$; $t(72) = 9.42$,
7	p < .001). We examined HRV using both standard deviation of R wave intervals (SDNN) and
8	root mean square of successive R-R intervals (r-MSSD), where low values (i.e., low HRV)
9	represent a high stress response. Specifically, SDNN was significantly lower in the high-
10	anxiety condition ($M = 64.34$, $SD = 17.69$) compared to the low-anxiety condition ($M =$
11	75.34, $SD = 18.93$; $t(72) = 6.23$, $p < .001$) and r-MSSD was significantly lower in the high
12	anxiety condition ($M = 35.05$, $SD = 15.27$) compared to the low-anxiety condition ($M =$
13	40.63, $SD = 15.48$; $t(72) = 4.37$, $p < .001$).

14 Performance. As in Study 1, we applied the Judd et al. (2001) within-subjects 15 regression procedure to examine the potential moderating effect of neuroticism on 16 performance. Results again provide support for the hypothesis that neuroticism moderates significantly the incidence of both *ironic* performance error and *target* hits – but not *non*-17 18 *ironic* error – across anxiety conditions (see Table 1 and Figure 2). Specifically, as in Study 19 1, neurotics demonstrated significantly greater increases in *ironic* performance error, and decreases in *target* hits, from low-anxiety to high-anxiety conditions than their comparatively 20 21 emotionally stable counterparts.

How precisely ironic are ironic errors? Woodman et al. (2015) conceptualized the
precision of irony, for ironic error zone hits, via two measures of irony. We adopted their
approach to test the hypothesis that neurotic participants would perform in a more precisely
ironic fashion when anxious compared to their emotionally stable counterparts. Specifically,

4 *zone* (see Figure 4). Results provide support for the hypothesis that across anxiety conditions

5 neuroticism moderates significantly how precisely ironic participants' ironic performance

6 errors are (see Table 1). Specifically, neurotics demonstrated significantly greater increases in

7 both mean *arc-length* and mean *radial error* (of their *ironic* error zone hits) from low-anxiety

8 to high-anxiety conditions than their comparatively emotionally stable counterparts².

9 **Discussion**

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10 Results support the Study 1 findings that neuroticism moderates significantly the 11 incidence of ironic performance error when anxious. This replication is important since, 12 unlike in Study 1, in the present study we varied the location of the *ironic* and *non-ironic* 13 error zones across participants. As such, we demonstrated that the results cannot be attributed 14 to generalized performance breakdown under conditions of high-anxiety, but rather represent 15 a precisely ironic performance decline.

² We have focused on the incidence of ironic effects across both studies and have revealed a greater incidence of ironic error (and not of generic, non-ironic, error) from low- to high-anxiety for individuals higher in neuroticism. When testing for anxiety-induced ironic effects, other researchers (e.g., de la Peña et al., 2008) have revealed *overcompensation* effects (albeit not investigating neuroticism as a moderator). As such, to explore the potential incidence of *overcompensation*, we ran paired samples *t*-tests examining changes in *non-ironic* error from low-anxiety to high-anxiety conditions. In Study 1, there was no significant increase in the incidence of *non-ironic* error from low-anxiety (M = 4.72, SD = 2.27) to high-anxiety (M = 4.51, SD = 2.32) conditions, t(66) = .84, p = .40. Similarly, in Study 2, there was no significant increase in the incidence of *non-ironic* error from low-anxiety (M = 7.30, SD = 2.93) to high-anxiety (M = 7.58, SD = 2.55) conditions, t(72) = .98, p = .33.

1	Additionally, Study 2 provides the first evidence that, under conditions of high-
2	anxiety, neuroticism moderates the precision of irony in ironic performance errors.
3	Specifically, as hypothesized, from low-anxiety to high-anxiety conditions, there was a
4	significantly greater increase in neurotics' ironic error zone hits as reflected by mean arc-
5	length and mean radial error – compared to their comparatively emotionally stable
6	counterparts.

7

General Discussion

8 We provide the first evidence for the moderating role of personality in both the 9 incidence and precision of irony of ironic performance errors under conditions of high-10 anxiety. Across two studies, neurotic individuals experienced significantly greater increases 11 in *ironic* performance error and greater decreases in *target* hits, from low-anxiety to high-12 anxiety conditions. Their comparatively emotionally stable counterparts suffered no such 13 ironic performance decrements. Importantly, in terms of providing specific support for 14 Wegner's theory of ironic processes, neuroticism did not moderate significantly the incidence 15 of non-ironic error. Additionally, Study 2 results provide the first evidence that under 16 conditions of high-anxiety, neuroticism moderates the *precision of irony* in ironic 17 performance errors. Specifically, as hypothesized, from low-anxiety to high-anxiety 18 conditions, there was a significantly greater increase in neurotics' *ironic* error zone hits as 19 reflected by both the distance from the closest *non-ironic* error zone (arc-length) and the 20 distance from the *target* zone (radial error). Previous research examining ironic effects of 21 performance has utilized performance tasks and performance stressors with limited ecological 22 validity (e.g., Bakker et al., 2006; Binsch et al., 2010; Oudejans, et al., 2013). We addressed 23 this limitation by employing ecologically valid performance tasks (e.g., Non-laboratory based 24 penalty shooting) and ecologically valid performance stressors (e.g., Performance-contingent 25 financial reward and social evaluation).

1 The neurotic individual's life is characterized by the experience of more frequent 2 distressing emotions, and more elevated negative reactions to such emotions, compared to 3 their emotionally stable (low neurotic) counterparts (Bolger & Zuckerman, 1995). As such, 4 self- and emotion-regulation processes demand more cognitive resources for the neurotic 5 individual when compared to the emotionally stable individual even under normative 6 conditions of supposed low-anxiety (Gross, 2007). Consuming critical cognitive space with 7 more general self- and emotional-regulation processes leaves the neurotic individual 8 susceptible to overwhelming their cognitive capacity when additional processes - such as 9 dealing with high-anxiety situations – tax their working memory. The present results support 10 the theoretical position that, for neurotic individuals, the additional cognitive load of 11 engaging in a high-anxiety sport-performance task is enough to tax cognitive resources to the 12 degree that the *operating process* cannot work effectively. Consequently, the *monitoring* 13 process becomes salient, which increases the likelihood of experiencing a precisely ironic 14 performance breakdown under pressure (Wegner, 2009).

15 Interestingly, emotional stability was associated with fewer *ironic* errors and a greater number of *target* hits under conditions of high-anxiety compared to low-anxiety. In the 16 17 context of ironic processes theory, in the low-anxiety condition - in lieu of either a perceived 18 incentive and/or a significant stressor – emotionally stable individuals may have processed 19 both relevant and irrelevant attentional cues (Eysenck et al., 2007; Weinberg & Gould, 2007) 20 as a consequence of boredom (Brissett & Snow, 1993) or under-arousal (Hardy, 1990). 21 Emotional stability is a strong predictor of positive interpretations of anxiety (e.g., challenge, 22 excitement) and positive emotion (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Hills & Argyle, 2001). As such, emotionally stable individuals may use the stressor and/or the reward as a motivational tool to 23 24 concentrate their attentional focus primarily on salient aspects of the performance task (Jones, 25 Swain, & Hardy, 1993). In doing so, the emotionally stable performer is able to increase

effort and free-up any cognitive resources that had been consumed processing irrelevant cues
 (Eysenck et al., 2007). In other words, conditions of high-anxiety may afford the emotionally
 stable individual more cognitive resource, and thus increase the likelihood of the (operating
 and monitoring) control system working effectively.

5 The present results support the postulate that anxiety exerts differential effects on 6 individuals' susceptibility to producing ironic performance errors (cf. Diener, Larsen, & Emmons, 1984; Woodman & Davis, 2008). The influence of personality and individual 7 8 differences on the precise nature of performance breakdown when anxious has considerable 9 applied implications for practitioners. For example, given that neuroticism can be reliably 10 assessed via a two-item measure (Rammstedt & John, 2007) it is feasible to assess an 11 athlete's neuroticism and (1) for coaches to individualize their own coaching behaviors 12 accordingly or (2) for sporting systems to align athletes with a coach whose behaviors will 13 most complement their neuroticism. For example, research suggests that during competitive 14 scenarios cognitive load is increased for those athletes who perceive that their coach exhibits 15 negative activation coaching behaviors; that is low emotional composure that increases the athlete's feelings of tension and worry (Williams et al., 2003). As argued previously, elevated 16 cognitive load increases the likelihood of a (neurotic) individual's monitoring process 17 18 becoming salient relative to their *operating* process, thus increasing the incidence of ironic 19 performance errors. Furthermore, *negative activation* coaching behaviors increases athletes' 20 negative self-talk (Zourbanos, Theodorakis & Hatzigeorgiadis, 2006). To continue with the 21 golfing example from earlier, negative self-talk may comprise self-statements such as, "Don't 22 mess up here by hooking the golf ball into the lake". In a competitive environment – that is, under conditions of relatively high-anxiety when the *monitoring* process is salient over the 23 24 *operating* process – the neurotic athlete's internalized negative self-talk could ironically bring into consciousness the specifically to-be-avoided state (i.e., hitting the golf ball into the lake). 25

1 It is worth noting that *negative activation* coaching behaviors may not prove acutely 2 detrimental to the neurotic individual's performance under conditions of low-anxiety (i.e., 3 during training). In other words, the athlete's *increased cognitive load* and increased *negative* 4 self-talk that is associated with experiencing perceived negative activation coaching 5 behaviors would not increase ironic performance errors if the neurotic individual has the 6 cognitive capacity to accommodate such additional mental load (i.e., in a training environment). As such, a coach may not overtly witness any (ironic) performance breakdown 7 8 that is directly caused by their *negative activation* coaching behaviors because the low-9 anxiety (training) environment does not directly result in ironic performance breakdown. 10 Indeed, it is only when the individual transfers his/her negative activation to the high-anxiety 11 environment (e.g., competition) that the likelihood of the ironic performance breakdown 12 dramatically increases. This issue is further compounded by the majority of a coach's time 13 being spent with an athlete when the athlete is not in anxiety-inducing environment. As such, 14 the coach might understandably argue that his/her coaching techniques and feedback are 15 effective. However, although the coach who employs *negative activation* behaviors with the 16 neurotic athlete may produce exceptional performances in training (i.e., low-anxiety condition), they may fail to repeat such elevated performances in the 'heat of competition' 17 18 (i.e., high-anxiety condition). Research would do well to examine the extent to which 19 coaching behaviors such as emotional composure and esteem support provide a buffer from 20 the effects of anxiety on ironic performance errors for neurotic individuals (see also Kenow 21 & Williams, 1992).

Future research should examine the precise mechanisms that may underpin the neurotic's susceptibility to ironic performance error when anxious. Indeed, personality variables beyond the Big Five have considerable potential in moderating the incidence of ironic performance error and are worthy of research attention. Alexithymia is one such

1 personality trait that has been subject to little research attention in the competitive sport 2 domain (Roberts & Woodman, 2015). Alexithymia is the difficulty in identifying emotions 3 and an inability to express them (Taylor, Bagby & Parker, 1997). The alexithymic 4 individual's difficulty in interpreting emotional signals frequently impedes their interpersonal 5 relationships (Taylor et al., 1997). However, beyond the high-risk sport domain (e.g., 6 Woodman, Hardy, Barlow & Le Scanff, 2010), research to date has failed to consider any functional aspects of alexithymia (Roberts & Woodman, 2015). The alexithmic individual's 7 8 somewhat 'blunted' emotional response may prove advantageous in the competitive sporting 9 domain. Specifically, alexithymic individuals may not acknowledge the distinct and profuse 10 intense emotions that are typically concomitant with the (high-anxiety) competitive 11 performance environment: the very emotions that for most individuals - and neurotics in 12 particular – increase cognitive load and the associated tax on cognitive resources. 13 In the present research we did not primarily aim to test directly de la Peña et al.'s 14 (2008) *implicit overcompensation* hypothesis. However, in line with recommendations by 15 Woodman et al. (2015), we clearly differentiated *ironic* and *non-ironic* performance error. 16 The precise nature of this differentiation made possible an examination of *overcompensation*. Specifically, the *non-ironic* error zone was located on the opposite side of the *target* zone to 17 18 the *ironic error* zone. Thus, evidence that participants hit more penalty kicks (Study 1) or 19 threw more darts (Study 2) in the non-ironic error zone under conditions of high-anxiety 20 (compared to low anxiety) would be evidence of *overcompensation*. No such difference was 21 evident in either Study 1 or Study 2. Although there was no difference in non-ironic error 22 between low- and high-anxiety conditions, the incidence of *non-ironic* error was consistently higher than the incidence of *ironic* error, regardless of anxiety condition, in both Study 1 and 23 24 Study 2. In other words, although an individual is more likely to commit an *ironic* error when 25 anxious (compared to when not anxious) an individual is also more likely to commit a non-

ironic error (compared to an *ironic* error) regardless of whether that individual is anxious or
 not.

3 In the present research a single observer adjudged whether penalty kicks (Study 1) or 4 dart throws (Study 2) had entered one of the three zones (ironic error, non-ironic error, or 5 target zones). He asked participants to retake the shot if the shot had missed all three zones. 6 As such, we cannot dismiss the postulate that shots or darts not entering one of the three designated zones were evidence of 'extreme' ironic or compensatory non-ironic errors. This 7 8 approach is a limitation that is mitigated only by the fact that $\leq 0.5\%$ of shots/darts were 9 unclassified (and were thus retaken). Nonetheless, given that 'wild' shots could reflect 10 extreme cases of irony when least desired, research that is geared specifically to explore such 11 incidences, rather than to dismiss them, would clearly advance our understanding of ironic 12 processes of performance. Researchers would do well to grapple with specifically how one 13 might conduct such an experiment. The single-source methodology is also a limitation of the 14 present studies. First, by verbally informing each participant of the stressor (i.e., the financial 15 reward and the social evaluation), the observer was not blind to the respective anxiety 16 condition (high- or low-anxiety). Importantly, however, the observer was blind to the participants' neuroticism scores. As such, even if one were to argue that the experimenter 17 18 biased the results, such experimenter bias could not account for the observed three-way 19 interaction. This robust interaction meaningfully mitigates any such concern.

The primary limitation of Study 1 was that the location of the ironic error zone remained consistent. Thus, we could not dismiss systematic performance bias as a potential explanation of the findings. In Study 2, we were able to dismiss this alternate explanation of the results by varying the location of both the *ironic* and *non-ironic* error zones across participants (see also Woodman et al., 2015). Additionally, one can be confident in the generalizability of the present findings because of the methodological differences between

- 1 Study 1 and Study 2, namely the performance tasks (football, darts) and the experience of
- 2 participants (expert and novice). In summary, the data across two studies provide new and
- 3 compelling evidence that neuroticism moderates both the *incidence* and the *precision of irony*
- 4 of ironic performance error when anxious.

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difference score is evidence that neuroticism is a significant moderator.

	Study 1				Study 2			
	Mean (SD) hits	b_0	b_1	t	Mean (SD) hits	b_0	b_1	t
Ironic performance error								
Low-anxiety (\hat{Y}_1)	3.75 (2.11)	1.69	.06 ^a	1.38	2.16 (1.74)	3.58	21ª	2.32^{*}
High-anxiety (\hat{Y}_2)	4.06 (2.08)	7.82	11 ^a	2.68^{**}	3.58 (1.92)	1.43	.36 ^a	3.75***
$\hat{Y}_1 - \hat{Y}_2$ difference	.31 (2.53)	6.13 ^a	17ª	3.52**	1.42 (2.73)	-2.12	.56ª	4.25***
Target hits								
Low-anxiety (\hat{Y}_1)	11.12 (2.94)	15.73	14 ^a	2.29^{*}	4.83 (2.81)	1.20	.56ª	4.09^{***}
High-anxiety (\hat{Y}_2)	11.22 (2.88)	6.98	.12ª	2.15^{*}	3.00 (2.63)	4.09	17ª	-1.19
$\hat{Y}_1 - \hat{Y}_2$ difference	.10 (2.97)	-8.75 ^a	.26ª	4.90^{***}	-1.83 (2.94)	2.89 ^a	73 ^a	-5.43***
Non-ironic error								
Low-anxiety (\hat{Y}_1)	4.72 (2.27)	2.95	.05 ^a	1.10	7.30 (2.93)	7.39	01 ^a	.09
High-anxiety (\hat{Y}_2)	4.51 (2.32)	5.44	03ª	.57	7.58 (2.55)	6.88	.11ª	.79
\hat{Y}_1 - \hat{Y}_2 difference	21 (2.03)	2.49 ^a	08 ^a	1.92	.28 (2.50)	51ª	.12ª	.92
Arc-length (cm)								
Low-anxiety (\hat{Y}_1)	-	-	-	-	2.34 (1.82)	2.70	06	57
High-anxiety (\hat{Y}_2)	-	-	-	-	3.61 (1.69)	2.33	.19	2.11^{*}
\hat{Y}_1 - \hat{Y}_2 difference	-	-	-	-	1.19 (2.17)	43	.25	2.08^{*}
Radial error (cm)								
Low-anxiety (\hat{Y}_1)	-	-	-	-	6.68 (3.10)	7.84	19	-1.07
High-anxiety (\hat{Y}_2)	-	-	-	-	8.72 (2.75)	7.02	.26	1.71
\hat{Y}_1 - \hat{Y}_2 difference	-	-	-	-	1.86 (3.58)	-1.27	.49	2.47^{*}

Table 1. Regression results based on the Judd et al. (2001) procedure for testing within-subjects moderation in Study 1 and Study 2.


p < .05,p < .01,

^a = The b_1 values between Study 1 and Study 2 have opposite values because we assessed neuroticism using Goldberg's (1999) IPEP measure of emotional stability in Study 1 (high scores reflect low neuroticism) and we assessed neuroticism using Rammstedt and John's (2007) BFI-10 neuroticism factor in Study 2 (high scores reflect high neuroticism).

Notes: $b_0 = Y$ intercept; $b_1 = U$ nstandardized beta coefficient; Based on the Judd et al. (2001) within-subjects moderation procedure, a significant $\hat{Y}_1 - \hat{Y}_2$

 $^{^{***}}p < .001$


- 1 Figure 1. The *ironic* error, *target*, and *non-ironic* error zones for the football penalty-shooting
- 2 task in Study 1.
- 3 *Note*: The thick dashed line represents two ropes that delimited both the *target* and *non-ironic*
- 4 error zones. The *ironic* error zone was delimited by a cone. A mirrored set-up was used for
- 5 left-footed participants.
- 6



1 Figure 2. Regression slopes for performance (*ironic* error hits, *target* hits, *non-ironic* error

2 hits) regressed on neuroticism in Study 1 and Study 2 as presented in Table 1; a significant


neuroticism x anxiety interaction for ironic error hits and target hits (top two graphs) but not
for non-ironic error hits (bottom graph).



- 1 Figure 3. The dart throwing task target.
- 2 *Note:* The dart board cover sheet indicates the available scores based on proximity of the dart
- 3 to the central *target* zone, which was worth nine points. The designated *ironic* error zone was
- 4 one of the four quadrants (e.g., top right quadrant) and was balanced across participants. We
- 5 informed participants that hits landing in the designated *ironic* error zone would score zero
- 6 points regardless of the proximity to the target zone. This figure is reproduced with
- 7 permission of Woodman et al. (2015).
- 8
- 9



- 1 Figure 4. The measurement of arc-length and radial error in the Study 2 dart throwing task.
- 2 *Note.* The quadrant represents the *ironic* error zone. The points that are labeled 1 and 2
- 3 represent two hypothetical dart strikes, which have landed within the ironic error zone. We
- 4 consider Dart 1 to be precisely more ironic than Dart 2 because it has both a greater *arc*-
- 5 *length* (a; the arc-length from the closest non-ironic error zone) and a greater *radial error* (b;
- 6 the radial distance from the target zone c). This figure is reproduced with permission of7 Woodman et al. (2015).
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Highlights

- Across two studies we examined Wegner's theory of ironic processes of mental
 control
 - We used ecologically valid performance tasks and ecologically valid performance stressors
- We provide the first evidence that neuroticism moderates ironic performance error
- Neuroticism moderates the *incidence* of ironic performance error when anxious
- Neuroticism moderates the *precision of irony* of ironic error when anxious