It's Not What You Know, It's Who You Know: What are the implications of networks in U.K. politics for electoral choice?

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Abstract

The role of biraderi kinship networks has recently gained attention in U.K. elections. Biraderis are patriarchal and hierarchical kinship networks that are led by male elders and originate from Pakistan and Bangladesh. These networks have been accused of influencing selections and elections through bloc votes. Existing research into the actions and implications of biraderi in U.K. politics has examined these networks in isolation. To further understand and contextualise the actions and implications of biraderi networks in U.K. politics, I compare them to trade union networks. Trade unions are paid membership networks in which groups of employees take collective action to maintain and improve employment conditions. Using my two case studies, I focus on the Labour Party and ask two questions. Firstly, what are the implications of network influence for electoral choice? Secondly, are the actions of biraderi networks, and the implications of these actions, different to other networks? And if so, why?

I use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data in the process of this inquiry. In chapter three, I use the analysis of 37 interviews with political and community activists to introduce biraderi networks and present their role in the selection and election of political representatives. In chapter four I use the same data to contextualise the role of biraderi and examine the relationship between biraderi networks and the Labour Party. In chapter five, I introduce trade union networks and use the analysis of 16 interviews with MPs, political activists and trade unionists to outline three aspects of the role that trade unions take in the selection and election processes: the legitimate aspect, the controversial aspect and the idealised aspect. In chapter six, the final empirical chapter, I ask which candidates receive support from trade unions. I build upon an existing dataset to analyse financial and in-kind trade union donations to the Labour Party.

I find that biraderi and trade union networks both, to some extent, carry out five actions in the selection and election of political representatives: providing political education; providing financial and in-kind support; providing campaigners in selections and elections; selecting candidates; supporting the under-represented. I find that the implications of these five actions for voter choice are two-fold. On the one hand, networks can increase voter choice by providing political education and support to candidates who might not otherwise be able to stand for election. On the other hand, I find that networks can reduce electoral choice. Through a combination of legal and illegal actions, when elders control votes biraderi networks can at best restrict electoral choice and at worst remove it entirely. Although these networks carry out the same five actions, I do find that they differ in the way that they carry out some of these actions. I ague that there are three reasons for this: differing network structures; differing network motivations; and access to different resources to influence selections and elections. I argue that networks are motivated to influence selections and elections by instrumental desires to increase their political influence and power as well as ideological motivations to support the party. I find that political parties need networks to help to campaign and deliver political education. Networks can work alongside parties to do this but they can also takeover as political parties' abdicate their responsibilities, effectively becoming the party on the ground in a constituency.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The role of the biraderi system in U.K. elections has recently gained political (Cryer, 2007; Electoral Commission 2014; Jackson, 2015; Cassey, 2016; Citizens Commission on Islam, Participation and Public Life, 2017) and academic attention (Wilks-Heeg, 2008; Akhtar, 2013; Baston, 2013; Sobolewska et al., 2015; Peace and Akhtar, 2015; Martin, 2016; Hill et al., 2017; Akhtar and Peace, 2018). This hierarchical and patriarchal kinship system originating from Pakistan and Bangladesh is accused of influencing the selection and election of politicians through the formation of bloc votes (Hill et al., 2017). These bloc votes are based on a combination of loyalty to the biraderi and pressure to vote with the biraderi that can involve tactics of intimidation, personation and undue influence (Baston, 2013; Akhtar, 2013; Peace and Akhtar, 2015; Hill et al., 2017). In this thesis, I examine the role of biraderi networks in Labour Party selections and elections, comparing the actions that they take to the actions of trade unions.

Biraderis are kinship networks that provide welfare and support for their members. Individual biraderis form the biraderi system, each biraderi fits hierarchically into this system and this hierarchy would traditionally have been based on occupation (Jalal, 2002). Membership of a biraderi is based on a combination of patrilineal descent and marriage, and contemporary ties between individuals who are not necessarily related by common descent or marriage but are considered to be family (Alavi, 1972; Werbner, 1989; Siddique Seddon, 2004). The biraderi provides welfare, financial support, and advice and gives members "a sense of belonging and psychological security" (Khan, 1979: 45). In Pakistani villages, the biraderi can determine access to things like electricity or a telephone, and in cities, jobs, loans and planning permission (Evans, 2010). The welfare function of the biraderi is particularly important when the state is unable or unwilling to provide adequate support, in these

instances the biraderi is able to step in and offer support to members. Financial support given by the biraderi creates financial interconnectedness, cementing the connections between biraderi members (Akhtar, 2013). Similarly, the biraderi can influence the choice of a marriage partner and marriages within the biraderi are another way to maintain strong connections between the families in the biraderi (Akhtar, 2013; Alavi, 1972).

Biraderi has been crucial in enabling immigration from Pakistan and Bangladesh to the U.K., particularly between the 1950s and 1980s when large numbers of immigrants arrived from these areas (The Change Institute, 2009; ONS 2013a). A system of chain migration was established where those who had already arrived assisted biraderi members from Pakistan and Bangladesh to migrate. This could be done by, for example, supporting people financially to make the journey or, once people arrived, providing them with accommodation and work and helping them with official forms and processes like registering to vote or communicating with the local council (Akhtar, 2013; Shaw, 2000). Biraderi remains important today; although immigration from Pakistan and Bangladesh has decreased, new arrivals are still likely to seek the support of the biraderi. The biraderi also provides immigrants with a means of keeping in contact with 'back home' through intercontinental marriages, remittances and visits (Bolognani, 2007). In economically deprived areas of the U.K. the biraderi may be a particularly important source of welfare support. A recent study carried out by NatCen found that in deprived communities with few opportunities for success, the biraderi can provide an alternative opportunity structure for achieving power and status (Gill, Jago and Hussain, 2015).

When it comes to U.K. politics, biraderis have helped members of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities to participate in elections by providing information about when, where and how to vote (Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017). They

may also have aided their members to gain political representation in the face of ethnic and religious exclusion (Garbaye, 2005; Purdam, 2001; Akhtar, 2013; Sobolewska et al., 2015). Research has found that Pakistani voters are more likely to vote for Pakistani candidates and biraderi influence has been suggested as a possible explanation for this (Fisher et al., 2015; Martin, 2016). Despite this, biraderis have also been accused of subverting the electoral process to get their preferred candidate elected. Akhtar (2013) uses the term 'biraderi-politicking' to describe the use of biraderi networks to support individual political ambition. Biraderi has been linked to cases of electoral fraud, including in Birmingham, Oldham, Blackburn and Burnley (Wilks-Heeg, 2008; Mawrey, 2005; Peace and Akhtar, 2015). In 2014 the Electoral Commission found that, whilst allegations and convictions of electoral fraud remain low, they are higher in areas where there are large communities of South Asian origin (Electoral Commission, 2014). They commissioned research to establish why this is the case and the influence of kinship networks such as biraderi was found to be an important factor (Sobolewska et al., 2015).

There has been some excellent work carried out about the role of biraderi in U.K. politics, most recently the works of Parveen Akhtar and Timothy Peace (Akhtar, 2013; Peace and Akhtar, 2015; Akhtar and Peace, 2018). However, existing work examines the role of biraderi in U.K. politics in isolation. The actions and implications of biraderi have not been compared to the actions and implications of other groups in U.K. politics. This runs the risk that biraderi-politicking could be unjustly presented as exceptional and unusual behaviour that is perhaps even distinctly 'un-British' as it has been imported, along with the biraderi system itself, from South Asia. Indeed, in an interview for *The Times*, the then Attorney General Dominic Grieve argued that many immigrants "come from backgrounds where corruption is endemic" and particularly cited Pakistani communities in this discussion of corruption (Brogan, 2013). In order

to better understand the role and influence of biraderi in U.K. elections, I conceptualise biraderi as a type of formal network and compare it to another formal network operating in U.K. politics: trade unions. By comparing biraderi networks and trade union networks I am able to test whether biraderi-politicking really is unusual in the U.K. context, or whether this is in fact just network politics as usual.

Networks in politics

The idea of biraderi as a network appears to be relatively new. The older anthropological literature on biraderi does not refer to it as a network (Werbner, 1989; Khan, 1979; Ballard, 1979; Shaw, 2000; Alavi, 1972). In more recent work looking at its role in U.K. elections, biraderi has started to be referred to as a network (Akhtar, 2013; Peace and Akhtar, 2015; Akhtar and Peace, 2018; Baston, 2013). However, what exactly this means, and what the theoretical implications of this are, have not been explored. In this thesis, I am addressing this gap by building upon the understanding of biraderi as a network and stating the case for why it should be understood as a network, what this means, and what the theoretical implications are. I conceptualise biraderi as a network, and I use existing network theory to approach this study.

The network perspective defines society as a system of participants joined by different types of relationships (Tichy, 1981). Networks are created when individuals are connected; networks are "a set of socially relevant nodes [network members] connected by one or more relations" (Marin and Wellman, 2011: 11). They "are the connections that exist among individuals and institutions as they engage in their everyday activities" (Heaney and McClurg, 2009: 728). Resources flow through networks and the structure of a network affects the resources available in it, with more diverse networks leading to more diverse resources (Marin and Wellman, 2011; Kilduff and Tsai, 2003; Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 2004; Zuckerman, 2005).

Theoretically, we are all connected in large networks of individuals. These networks are either informal or formal. Informal networks are fluid and largely coincidental, based on the people we happen to interact with regularly in our lives. Formal networks, conversely, are based on membership, joint strategic goals and a sense of shared identity. In chapter two I define both biraderis and trade unions as formal networks. In biraderis, network connections are derived from kinship (Alavi, 1972; Akhtar, 2013). The relationships are kept alive and strengthened through marriages between different families in the biraderi, the exchange of gifts and welfare, and a sense of obligation to fellow biraderi members (Werbner, 1989; Alavi, 1972). In trade unions, network connections are formed through shared membership of a trade union and participation in trade union meetings and events.

Current research focuses on the role of networks outside of political parties. There is a well-established body of literature relating to policy networks and how they influence the policies that governments make (Rhodes, 1990, 2008; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Hay and Richards, 2000). There is also a large body of literature that examines how our individual informal networks affect the decisions we make in elections. This body of research argues that electoral choices are not made in isolation, but are impacted by the interactions that we have with our networks around us (Huckfedlt and Sprague, 1995; Zuckerman, 2005; Fowler et al., 2011). Research has found, for example, that the household is an important arena for political discussion and decision-making (Cutts, 2014) and that families influence one another in their decision to vote (de Rooij, 2014).

What has received less attention is the role of networks inside political parties, particularly how they can influence candidate selection and election and what the implications of this are for voter choice. This thesis addresses this theoretical and empirical gap in our understanding by focusing on these areas. There are two

important things to consider here. Firstly, networks could increase electoral choice by providing support to candidates who would not otherwise be able to stand. The resources that flow through networks could provide the information and support necessary to be a political candidate. This could be particularly important for candidates from marginalised and under-represented groups who do not otherwise have access to the resources necessary to overcome the barriers to becoming a politician. Past research has found kinship networks have helped ethnic minority candidates overcome discrimination and allowed them to participate in politics (Purdam, 2001; Garbaye, 2005; Akhtar, 2013).

Conversely, networks could reduce electoral choice. It could be that only candidates connected to the right network or networks can access political office. If all of these candidates come from a similar background, then this could reduce the diversity of experiences and ideas represented by the candidates and, ultimately, the diversity of choice given to the electorate. Furthermore, networks could become combative, competing factions vying for power and resources (Bonzionelos, 2005). In these circumstances, the tactics used by networks to get their candidates selected and elected could reduce electoral choice. There has been some recent concern in U.K. elections of tactics of intimidation being used, as gangs of men hang around outside polling stations (Cryer, 2007; Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017). There has also been concern about the manipulation of the postal voting system with votes stolen, tampered with, or completed by someone other than the intended elector (Metropolitan Police Authority, 2006; Wilks-Heeg, 2008; Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017).

Secondly, whether increasing or reducing electoral choice, the actions carried out by networks could be considered to be acceptable or unacceptable depending on whether or not they break electoral laws or party rules. Tactics of intimidation or manipulating the postal voting system, for instance, are examples of electoral fraud

and could therefore be considered unacceptable. Other examples may be less clear-cut. It may be difficult, for instance, to identify the line between encouraging somebody to vote for a candidate and unduly influencing somebody to vote for a candidate. What appears to be encouragement in one situation could be undue influence in another depending on the context and the relationship between the actors involved. There could also be situations where rules have not actually been broken but the actions taken do challenge normative ideas of the democratic process (see for example: Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011).

Currently little is known about how networks are influencing candidate selection for political representatives, the work in this thesis addresses this theoretical and empirical gap. Existing literature has shed some light on candidate selection. It has been argued that internal party democracy is important because those who make internal party decisions, particularly around which candidates are selected, are the ones that hold the power (Russell, 2005; Katz, 2001; Denver, 1988; Rahat, 2007; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). As a result, elections to internal party positions and candidate selection are recognised as a potential source of conflict within political parties. Katz (2001), Russell (2005) and Rahat (2007) all refer to 'groups' within the party and their ability to influence candidate selection but do not identify these groups as networks.

The focus of much of the existing literature is on the fact that candidate selection *is* an area of influence, rather than on exactly *how* it can be influenced. Katz (2001) does argue that there are two areas of conflict in candidate selection and this gives some indication as to how candidate selection could be influenced by networks. The first centres on which candidate is selected within an agreed set of rules. Here the candidate able to mobilise the most support whilst working within the existing rules wins. This could result in existing members being encouraged to turnout to vote or

new members being signed up to vote. For example, in Canadian leadership elections in the Conservative and Liberal parties, time is set aside at the beginning of the campaign, usually three to five months, for leadership candidates to recruit new party members to vote in the campaign (Cross, 2013; Cross and Blais, 2012). This leads to an increase in party membership at the time of nomination and election as people join to vote for a new leader (Young, 2013). It also means that those who can recruit large numbers of electors are influential in the leadership election (Cross, 2013). The second area of conflict identified by Katz (2001) centres on the development of rules, recognising that selection rules may be more favourable to one candidate or group of candidates than another. Conflict can arise over existing rules and the development of new rules that are seen to be advantageous to particular candidates or groups of candidates.

There are two things missed in this analysis. Firstly, that rules could be broken to ensure the selection of a particular candidate. Secondly, that even before the selection process begins, the influence of networks could affect who puts themselves forward as a candidate. In this research, I address these gaps in the literature by not only arguing that candidate selection is a key battleground for networks within political parties, but also by using my two case studies to examine what actions networks can take to influence candidate selection both within and outside of existing rules. I also show how, even before candidate selection is underway, the actions of networks affect who puts themselves forward (or who is put forward).

It is the actions networks take that fall outside of the existing rules that are perhaps of most interest. Although occurrences of electoral fraud remain low in U.K. politics, recent concerns have gained some empirical attention (Clark and James, 2017; Soboloewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017). Particularly, research has been carried out to understand why, though not all, a high proportion of convictions of electoral fraud

since 2000 have occurred in areas with large Pakistani and/or Bangladeshi communities (Soboloewska et al., 2015). Little is understood about how this electoral fraud fits into the existing literature. In this thesis, I address this gap in the research by applying concepts of patronage, clientelism, vote buying and machine politics to the actions of networks arguing that these are the mechanisms that they can use to commit electoral fraud. Patronage politics is based on patron-client relationships, an unequal relationship between two actors where one is reliant on the other for resources (Weingrod, 1968). Biraderi networks are also based on patron-client relationships and biraderi leaders dispense patronage benefits to members of their community (Akhtar, 2013; Hill et al., 2017). Not all members of the network are equal; there are unequal ties between elders and other biraderi members. Elders are patrons with access to resources and other members of the biraderi are clients who are reliant on these elders, or patrons, for access to resources. I discuss this relationship in more detail in chapter three and the implications this has for gathering political support in chapters three and four.

Patronage politics has been described as a sort of "currency" used to attract supporters and voters as well as to maintain internal party cohesion and support for policies (Sorauf, 1961). It is closely related to brokerage, the key difference being that in patronage politics the patron owns or controls the resources that they give out, the broker does not. Instead, the broker acts as an intermediary between those who want access to resources, and those that own the resources (Kopecký and Mair, 2006; see Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015 for a discussion of different broker types).

There is some disagreement in the literature about how patronage politics should be understood. Narrowly it can refer to just the distribution of public and semi-public jobs by parties and politicians to their supporters (Kopecký and Spirova, 2011; Kopecký et al., 2016; Sorauf, 1959). In this understanding, the distribution of

patronage jobs is motivated by a desire to control state institutions and to reward supporters (Kopecký et al., 2016). More broadly, patronage politics can refer to the distribution of personal rewards and gifts, favours such as contracts and licenses, the allocation of public works projects and pork barrel politics (Kopecký and Spirova, 2011). In this understanding, patronage is used to control state institutions and reward supporters, as well as maintain an active and cohesive party, and, crucially for this research, induce electoral support (Sorauf, 1961).

Some research differentiates between clientelism and patronage. Kopecký and Spirova (2011) use clientelism to refer specifically to the exchange of benefits for votes. In other research the concepts of clientelism and patronage are not differentiated in the same way (see for example: Kobayashi, 2006; Scott, 1969; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980) and a far broader definition of patronage is used than just the distribution of public jobs, including what Kopecký and Spirova (2011) would term clientelism. Schaffer (2007a) distinguishes between 'vote buying', where goods are exchanged for electoral support (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014), and patronage. He argues that vote buying only takes place at election time and is a last attempt to influence the outcome of an election whereas patronage is based on enduring relationships and can happen at any point in the electoral cycle (Schaffer, 2007a). Political machines carry out vote buying on the behalf of parties or individual politicians and target poorer members of the electorate to offer favours in return for votes (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014; Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014; Scott, 1969; Jensen and Justesen, 2014).

Much of the existing research focuses on patronage politics, clientelism, vote buying and machine politics in developing and newer democracies and not advanced, developed democracies (for example: Stokes, 2005; Kopecký and Spirova, 2011; Stokes et al., 2013; Jensen and Justesen, 2014; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). This

focus on developing democracies is in part because the patron-client relationships that fuel clientelism and patronage have been viewed as "feudalistic", "old-fashioned" and "pre-modern" (Kobayashi, 2006: 1), likely to die out with democracy, modernisation and economic advancement (Kobayashi, 2006; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980; Kitschelt, 2000). It is also because research has found that when the state, political parties and civil society are weak, as they often are in new and developing democracies, patronage politics is more likely to occur (O'Dwyer, 2006).

Machine politics was prominent in U.K. and U.S. politics in the 19th century (Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014) but the assumption is that these practices no longer exist in such advanced democracies. Kopecký et al. (2016) find in their dataset that party patronage is strongest in Latin America, followed by Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Africa. Western Europe is found to have significantly lower occurrences of party patronage than any of the other regions (Kopecký et al., 2016). In this thesis, I challenge the assumption that patronage politics, clientelism and machine politics do not take place in developed democracies and address the dearth of literature by using these concepts to understand the murkier side of the activities carried out by networks. I build upon the work of Akhtar (2013) who applied the concepts of patronage and clientelism to the political actions of biraderi networks in her study into biraderi networks in Britain. She coined the term 'biraderi-politicking', "the use of [biraderi] networks in a patronage relationship for political gain", which she described as "a form of clientelism" (Akhtar, 2013: 90, 92). Applying these concepts and the concepts of machine politics and vote buying to the actions of biraderi networks could help to contextualise and understand biraderi-politicking as something that fits into a long tradition of politics.

In this thesis, I use my two case studies to ask what the implications are of both acceptable and unacceptable network influence for electoral choice. I examine this in

three ways. Firstly, I examine the role that networks within political parties play in the selection of parliamentary candidates. I consider how these networks are able to influence the selection process, either acceptably or unacceptably, in order to select a favoured candidate. Secondly, I examine the role that networks play in the election process at the stage of campaigning or casting the vote, considering how they influence the choices of the electorate through acceptable and unacceptable methods. Finally, I examine where the line falls between what is considered acceptable and unacceptable influence.

Research questions and case study selection

In this thesis, I seek to understand how networks affect electoral choice in U.K. elections. Within this, I want to understand whether the actions and implications of biraderi kinship networks are unusual or whether they are examples of network politics as usual. I ask two questions. Firstly, I ask: What are the implications of network influence for electoral choice? Secondly, I ask: Are the actions of biraderi networks, and the implications of these actions, different to other networks? And if so, why? I use two case studies in the process of this inquiry: biraderi networks and trade union networks. Both of these networks are most strongly associated with the Labour Party. The Labour Party developed from trade unions and they continue to play an important role in internal Labour Party processes (Taylor, 1989; Russell, 2005). Whilst biraderi-politicking is not confined to one political party it is has been strongly associated with the Labour Party (Akhtar, 2013), as I argue in chapter four.

Choosing a second case study

Taking biraderi networks as my starting point, I considered two different types of networks as the possible second case study before trade unions were selected. Firstly, I considered 'old boys networks'. Old boys networks are an "essentially closed, informal system" that control resources in a way that benefits male members

(Durbin, 2011: 91). These informal gender-segregated networks, predominantly occupied by wealthy, high status, elite educated, white men, are often linked to an increase in job opportunities and power and promotion in organisations (McDonald, 2011; Waldstrøm and Madsen, 2007; Gamba and Kleiner, 2001). The U.K. parliament has been described as an old boys club or network when talking about the masculine style of politics and barriers faced by female politicians (Childs, 2004). In addition, the large numbers of publicly educated politicians, known by their former schools as 'old boys' to refer to the fact that they studied there, has led to research into the prevalence of the old boy network in parliament (Reeves and Friedman, 2017). There has also been research into the privileged background of many Conservative Party politicians (Hill, 2013).

I decided against making the old boys network my second case study for two reasons. Firstly, this is an informal network where those who benefit from it may not even recognise that they are a part of it. This creates issues around accessibility and makes it difficult to study this network. Secondly, this network is not confined to one particular party but it is most strongly associated with the Conservative Party because of their history of selecting candidates from "Britain's social elite" (Hill, 2013: 81). Biraderi networks, as I argue in chapter four, are most strongly associated with the Labour Party. I felt that focusing on more than one political party would be beyond the scope of the PhD thesis. It would not allow me the space and time to delve sufficiently into the actions of the network case studies, as I would instead need to spend more time researching and writing about party context.

Secondly, I considered examining another diaspora and/or religious community in the U.K. Past research has looked, for example, at the political influence of the Irish Catholic community in the U.K., which has been strongly linked to the Labour Party (Fielding, 1993; O'Connor, 1974; Steed, 1971). According to Fielding (1993: 105),

strong support of the Labour Party began in the period immediately after world war one and Irish voters became "one of the most consistently pro-Labour elements within the working class" in the inter-war period. The Irish community was perceived as forming a political bloc that delivered a community vote, described by O'Connor (1974) as the "Irish 'ethnic vote'". Irish immigrants had a strong political influence in some constituencies that was as a result of residential clustering (O'Connor, 1974; Swift, 2002). Steed (1971) found that up to 11 seats in the 1970 election might have been decided by the Irish vote. Politicians, particularly Labour politicians, courted Irish immigrants to gather their electoral support by sending representatives to community events and offering community specific assistance that generated votes (O'Connor, 1974).

The influence of the Irish Catholic community was not just confined to elections but could also be seen within the Labour Party. The selection of Michael O'Halloran as the Labour candidate in Islington North was, according to O'Connor (1974), in part down to the influence of Irish members of the selection committee. A later report by the Labour Party National Executive Committee found that O'Halloran's largely Irish Catholic backers had used machine politics and personation to ensure his success in the contest (Roth, 1999).

I decided against a second case study network that was chosen based on ethnic or religious criteria because I did not believe that this would allow me to fully test whether biraderi-politicking is exceptional or unusual in U.K. politics. I felt that comparing two ethnic networks or one ethnic network and one religious network ran the risk of drawing conclusions of exceptionalism. Both of the networks may have been considered as 'outliers' or 'exceptional' examples in the U.K., their actions may have been seen as based on practices imported from a different country or 'unBritish' beliefs.

The selection of trade unions

Trade union networks are groups of employees joined together in a fee paying membership organisation working to improve their employment rights and conditions (Webb and Webb, 1898). They are the industrial arm of the Labour movement, established to fight for the rights of blue-collar workers (Muller, 1977). They seek to protect and enhance the conditions of working people through a combination of collective bargaining and political action; unions can act as interest groups or as an ally to a political party in an attempt to influence public policy (Taylor, 1989). The Labour Party formed from trade unions and they are traditionally allied with the party to represent the interests of the workers, a group that is associated with social and political marginalisation (Russell, 2005). Today trade unions maintain strong institutional links to the Labour Party (Bale and Webb, 2017), which may affect both the actions taken by trade unions in the selection and election of Labour Party representatives and the way that these actions are viewed.

Trade union networks were selected as the second case study because they have historical roots in U.K. society and are connected to U.K. institutions, including their institutional links to the Labour Party. Selecting trade unions as a second case study allows me to compare the actions of a historically British network embedded in U.K. society and Labour Party politics, with the actions of biraderi networks that have been imported into the U.K. and do not have the same institutional connections that embed trade unions into U.K. politics. This allows me to test how exceptional the actions of biraderi networks really are in U.K. politics, and whether they may actually fit into a longer tradition of politics in this country. It also means that this research is able to focus on networks in the Labour Party, removing the possible research problems created by introducing a network that is more strongly associated with another party.

Existing research has examined the institutional links between the Labour Party and trade unions that formally give trade unions ways of influencing internal

party politics (Russell, 2005; Quinn, 2010; Bale and Webb, 2017). Research into the involvement of trade unions in selections and elections has focused on two areas. Firstly, the rules governing what trade unions can do in selections and how they have changed over time (Russell, 2005; Lovenduski and Norris, 1994). Secondly, the role trade unions play in Labour leadership elections (Quinn, 2004; Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011; Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013). In this research I look at how trade unions act to influence selections and elections at the constituency level. I do not focus on the rules governing these processes, but what trade unions are actually doing. During elections, trade unions can offer political parties financial support, votes and campaigners (Allern and Bale, 2017). I examine this support in elections looking at how it is accessed, who accesses it, and why. I also look at assistance that comes before the election campaign in the form of political education and training, and support in the selection process.

Instrumental and ideological motivations

It seems likely that both trade union networks and biraderi networks could have a combination of ideological and instrumental motivations for influencing Labour Party selections and elections. Historically trade unions have ideological reasons for their involvement with the Labour Party. As was typical in industrial democracies, the Labour Party and the unions were established as the two wings of the British labour movement, which had the aim of representing the interests of workers, one operating in industry and the other in parliament (Bale and Webb, 2017; Muller, 1977; Ebbinghaus, 1995). There remains some ideological overlap between trade unions and the Labour Party, which was, to an extent, revived by the election of Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the party in September 2015 (Bale and Webb, 2017). However, there has been a general shift away from shared values and ideas towards more instrumental reasons for the links between the two: trade unions give the Labour Party resources

and the party gives trade unions policy commitments (Bale and Webb, 2017). This instrumental exchange between trade unions and political parties is driven by mutual need; parties need resources and votes, and trade unions need favourable policy commitments to look out for the interests of their members (Allern, Aylott and Christiansen, 2007; Allern and Bale, 2017). Warner (2000) argues that this mutual need is a feature of the relationship between political parties and interest groups.

Trade unions are motivated to work with political parties and give them resources in elections because they want to influence the policy-making process to favour their interests and the interests of their members (Allern and Bale, 2017). These resources are given for two reasons. Firstly, on the understanding that in return for resources trade unions are able to influence policy (McLean, 1987). Secondly, because a party's ability to bring about policy change is reduced when it is not in government, there is a motivation for trade unions to help the party to win elections (Allern, Aylott and Christiansen, 2007). The institutional links between the Labour Party and trade unions mean that having a Labour government increases the chances of being able to influence the government policies that affect union members (Quinn, 2010). The Labour Party constitution makes provisions for trade unions to influence party policy through seats on the National Executive Committee, delegates at the party conference, and involvement in drawing up the party manifesto (Labour Party, 2016).

Trade unions also want to increase their membership and, though Allern, Aylott and Christiansen (2007) find that this is not always the case, links with political parties can be a way of increasing membership. This is because these links can lead to favourable party policies that can help unions to offer collective benefits such as improved wages and working conditions (Bale and Webb, 2017; Allern, Aylott and Christiansen, 2007). The Labour Party promotes trade union membership amongst its

members and particularly amongst its political representatives (Labour Party, 2016; Bale and Webb, 2017).

Biraderi networks may similarly have a combination of instrumental and ideological motivations for influencing Labour Party selections and elections. Turning to the existing literature it is possible to find evidence to suggest that biraderi elders might be instrumentally motivated to influence selections and elections as they seek to increase their own power and status in their community. Past research has found that representatives acting as intermediaries between the local arms of the state and their community, in the way that biraderi elders have done, were motivated, at least in part, by a desire to strengthen the patronage roles that they held in their community (Akhtar, 2013; Shaw, 1988). In her study into the Pakistani public sphere in Manchester, Werbner (2002: 44) found that to be able to provide their followers with "tangible advantages", the leader of a faction must have access to higher sources of patronage that they can disperse amongst members. Links with MPs were viewed as one way to obtain access to patronage (Werbner, 2002). Shaw (1988) found that for Pakistanis in Britain, being elected as a councillor was seen as a way to increase personal status and often little of the work involved, such as attending meetings, was actually carried out. In her research into biraderi networks, Akhtar (2013) argues that biraderi elders were happy to gather votes for white politicians in return for status enhancing positions in their own community and that biraderis are used to advance individual political ambitions.

In the absence of ideological motivations, the fact that biraderi-politicking is most strongly associated with the Labour Party (Akhtar, 2013; Martin, 2016) could be explained by two things. Firstly, the geographical concentration of Asian immigrants in wards controlled by the Labour Party (Akhtar, 2013) meant that this was the party they were most exposed to and established links with. Secondly, because Asian

immigrants were concentrated in Labour wards the Labour Party deliberately sought links with the Asian community (Akhtar, 2013). They ensured that members of the Asian community could participate in local Labour politics by doing things like translating leaflets and newsletters and even employing translators at party meetings (Purdam, 2000). These two things could mean that biraderi elders have focused their efforts on influencing Labour politics to advance their own interests because this is the party in which they have the greatest influence and longest established connections.

Biraderi elders may also, however, be ideologically motivated to support the Labour Party. This could lead to elders gathering support for politicians who are not biraderi members because of a shared ideological position. It could also lead to biraderi networks being used to help biraderi members who, because of their ideological position, want to be Labour candidates but because of discrimination may struggle to become candidates without the help of the network (Sobolewska et al., 2015). There is a bias towards supporting the Labour Party amongst ethnic minorities in Britain (Akhtar, 2013; Fisher et al., 2015; Martin, 2016), which could explain why biraderi elders could be ideologically motivated to influence Labour Party selections and elections. There are two reasons for this bias. Firstly, because the Labour Party is seen as the party that supports the working class and ethnic minority communities are overly represented in the working class (Akhtar, 2013). Secondly, because it is the party perceived to represent the interests of ethnic minorities (Akhtar, 2013; Akhtar, 2015; Fisher et al., 2015; Martin, 2016).

Despite the fact that there was effectively a consensus on immigration between the two main parties during the 1960s, Labour's later stance on immigration and race relations is largely responsible for the perception that it represents the interests of ethnic minorities (Akhtar, 2013). They were the party most associated with legislation to outlaw racial discrimination and, in the 1970s, took steps to accommodate

immigrants by having an amnesty for illegal immigrants from the Commonwealth and introducing new rules relaxing legislation around admitting the husbands and fiancés of women living in Britain (Akhtar, 2013; Akhtar, 2015). Issues around immigration may have been particularly important to biraderi elders who were instrumental in the chain migration progress to the U.K. The Labour stance on this may have appealed to them and have been a catalyst for their involvement with Labour Party politics.

Similarities and differences between biraderis and trade unions

The similarities and differences between these two networks are presented in Table 1.1 and each will be addressed in more detail in the proceeding sections. There are two important similarities between biraderi networks and trade union networks that make them both suitable for this study. Firstly, they have both represented and mobilised traditionally marginalised groups. This means that both of these networks could be increasing electoral choice by supporting marginalised groups. Secondly, they have both faced criticisms for their actions in the selection and election process. This means that both of these networks could be carrying out unacceptable actions that break party rules and/or electoral law.

There are, however, more differences between these networks than there are similarities. Firstly, trade union networks are more accountable for their actions than biraderi networks. Secondly, trade unions are more diverse networks with diverse membership and links to other networks, which enables access to a diverse range of resources. Biraderi networks are less diverse networks, which is likely to reduce the diversity of resources available. This affects the political opportunities available to these two networks. Thirdly, trade union networks are institutionally linked to the Labour Party and biraderi networks are not. This affects the utility of the resources available to these two networks and, as with network diversity, the political opportunities available. The differences between these networks could lead to them

taking different actions to influence selections and elections. They could also lead to

similar actions being viewed differently. Differences in these networks could make

similar actions appear acceptable when carried out by one network and unacceptable

when carried out by the other.

Table 1.1: Similarities and differences between biraderi networks and trade union networks.

	Represents and mobilises traditionally marginalised groups	Role in selection and election has been criticised	Accountability		Diversity		Institutional links
			More accountable	Less accountable	More diverse	Less diverse	
Biraderi	X	X		X		X	
Trade Union	X	X	X		X		X

Representing and mobilising traditionally marginalised groups

Both of these networks traditionally provide social support and political

mobilisation and representation for the marginalised. As I discuss in chapter three,

biraderi networks have been crucial in aiding the process of immigration to the U.K.

and they remain an important support mechanism in the lives of British Pakistanis and

Bangladeshis, helping individuals to find work and housing, providing financial aid

and helping new immigrants to navigate life in the U.K. (Akhtar, 2003a; Akhtar,

2013). In politics, kinship networks like biraderi may be responsible for relatively high

levels of turnout in South Asian communities (Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2008). Biraderis

can support individuals who may otherwise be excluded from the political process

because of difficulties created by language and a lack of knowledge of the political

system in the U.K. They can do this by translating forms and providing information

about when, where and how to vote (Sobolewska et al., 2015). This is particularly

important because Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants do not have to be citizens to vote but are eligible to vote on arrival in the U.K. (Electoral Commission, no date a). At this point, they may have little knowledge of the political system and may lack the necessary language skills to navigate the voting process.

In addition to supporting electors in the voting process, biraderi networks can mobilise a bloc vote, which I discuss further in chapter three. This bloc vote may have provided the strength in numbers necessary for an ethnic minority group to gain political representation in the face of exclusion in the U.K. (Purdam, 2001; Garbaye, 2005). The bloc vote is important at both the selection and the election stages, with parties seen as less likely to select Asian candidates and voters seen as less likely to elect them (Sobolewska et al., 2015). Previous research has shown that Muslim candidates may face an electoral penalty in the U.K. (Fisher et al., 2015) and given that Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants in the U.K. are predominantly Muslim, this may lead to them needing the support of the biraderi network to gain political office.

Traditionally trade unions have supported working class people to enter into politics, particularly important before the introduction of a wage for MPs in 1911 (Muller, 1977). As I discuss in chapters five and six, trade unions can use their resources to support political candidates in the selection and election processes by making financial and in-kind donations to a particular constituency party to support a campaign (Taylor, 1989; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010). This support could enable some candidates to stand for selection and election who would otherwise find themselves without the necessary resources to stand. They can also provide political education to both prospective candidates and electors mobilising those who may otherwise be excluded from the political process, which I discuss in detail in chapter five (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Like biraderis, trade unions are also likely to encourage their members to vote through direct means such as

asking them to vote, but also indirect means like providing political information and education. For both of these networks the old maxim 'unity is strength' could be said to apply: by standing together these marginalised communities become stronger, more likely to gain representation and more likely to get their interests heard.

Criticisms of biraderi and trade union roles in selection and election

Concerns about actions that may be deemed contrary to the democratic process have been raised about both trade union and biraderi networks. The biraderi system has gained the attention of academics (Wilks-Heeg, 2008; Baston, 2013; Akhtar, 2013; Sobolewska et al., 2015; Peace and Akhtar, 2015; Martin, 2016; Hill et al., 2017; Akhtar and Peace, 2018), politicians (Cryer, 2007; Jackson, 2015), the Electoral Commission (2014), the Cassey Review (2016), and the Citizens Commission on Islam, Participation and Public Life (2017) regarding concerns about electoral fraud. Both allegations and convictions of electoral malpractice have been associated with biraderi political behaviour (Wilks-Heeg, 2008).

There is concern that by creating a bloc vote, biraderi elders can use their networks to gain power and status at the expense of biraderi members whose interests are not represented by the male elders that lead these networks (Akhtar, 2003a; Akhtar, 2013; Hill et al., 2017). In chapters three and four I show how elders can create this bloc vote by intimidating, unduly influencing and treating electors and how they can take advantage of the postal voting on demand system to commit personation and tamper with ballots. In extreme cases these practices can take away individual electoral choice as votes are instead dictated by biraderi elders (Wilks-Heeg, 2008; Akhtar, 2013; Sobloewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017). There is also concern that political parties intent on electoral success can deliberately use the biraderi system to mobilise an ethnic bloc vote, something that I discuss in more detail in chapter four (Baston, 2013; Akhtar, 2013; Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017).

Similarly, the role of trade unions in U.K. politics has always faced some criticism (Pimlott and Cook, 1991) and recent concerns have emerged that have led to renewed debate. Trade unions have gained academic, media and political attention regarding their behaviour in selections and elections and the degree of influence they hold in the Labour Party (Syal, 2013; BBC News, 2010, 2013; Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011; Stratton, Watt and Wintour, 2010; Bale and Webb, 2017). Whilst trade unions may have enabled under-represented groups to gain access to parliament, the influence of trade unions could also lead to the selection and election of politicians solely to act in the interest of trade unions. Recent criticism has centred on two main events, which I discuss further in chapter five. Firstly, the role that the unions played in the election of Ed Miliband as leader of the Labour Party in 2010. In the lead up to the election, there was concern over how much influence unions should be allowed to have when the GMB union placed envelopes containing ballot papers inside larger envelopes calling for their members to support Ed Miliband (Stratton, Watt and Wintour, 2010).

Secondly, the selection process in the constituency of Falkirk in 2013 for the 2015 General Election candidate (BBC News, 2013; Criddle, 2016). It was alleged that activists backed by the Unite union used 'underhand tactics' to gather support for their prospective candidate, Karie Murphy, by recruiting members to the local party who would be able to vote in the selection meeting (Syal, 2014). An internal report into the Falkirk controversy was carried out by the Labour Party and was leaked by the Guardian newspaper. Although evidence was limited, the report found that: 'There can be no doubt that members were recruited in an attempt to manipulate party processes' (Labour Party, 2014: 1, cited in the Guardian, 2014). Ultimately the allegations were found to be untrue (Mason, 2015), but they did lead to two major changes in the Labour Party. Firstly, the ending of a scheme that allowed unions to sign up members

to the Labour Party and pay their first year of fees (Labour List, 2013). Secondly, the replacement of the Electoral College that had previously given trade unions a 30% bloc vote in party leadership elections with One Member One Vote in leadership elections (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016a).

Network accountability

There is a greater degree of accountability in trade union networks than biraderi networks. The different degrees of accountability could lead to the actions of trade unions and biraderis being viewed differently. As a more accountable network, the actions of trade unions may be viewed as more acceptable than the actions of biraderis. The differences in accountability stem largely from the fact that biraderis are kinship networks, and trade unions are not. Trade unions are relatively transparent, and therefore accountable, networks that have their aims and values clearly and publicly stated. Those holding positions in trade unions are either officials, elected by members of the union, or appointed staff. In theory, members are able to hold their union to account through elections held to decide on staffing, union policy positions and political policy positions. In practice, it is likely that the extent to which they are able to do this varies.

Members are also able to hold their union accountable through their membership. Becoming a member of a trade union is an active decision and suggests an endorsement of union activities. Membership is based on shared values and aims and perceived benefits, such as wage increases, protection from unfair employment practices and working conditions, legal support and pension advice (Gomez and Gunderson, 2015). Dissatisfaction with a union could lead to members resigning their membership and no longer paying the subscription fees that trade unions rely upon. Similarly, the Labour Party can also hold the trade unions to account. The rules governing the relationship between the Labour Party and the trade unions provide

clear parameters for trade unions to operate within. The Labour Party can hold trade unions to account by attempting to limit or extend the influence that the unions have depending on their actions. It has been argued that the introduction of the Electoral College system for the selection of parliamentary candidates in 1989 was designed to limit the power of trade unions in the selection process (Clark, 2012).

In contrast, there is a lack of accountability in the biraderi network, which is a direct result of it being a kinship network. To those outside of them, biraderis are opaque, closed networks making it very difficult to hold them externally accountable. There are no official websites, membership cards or written constitutions making it difficult to identify the existence, membership and leadership of biraderi networks. The aims and values of the biraderi are not clearly stated and appear to be based on the narrow interests of the elders that lead them, even if these elders claim to represent the interests of their wider ethnic community (see Akhtar 2013 for discussion of elders pursuing their own interests when acting as community representatives or leaders). Difficulties identifying biraderi membership, or even the existence of a biraderi, make it hard to hold the networks accountable for their actions and potentially contribute to a perception that their actions are unacceptable.

Membership of the biraderi is automatic, based on birth and sometimes marriage (Alavi, 1972). For this reason, unlike in trade unions, membership of the biraderi is not an active choice and it does not indicate an endorsement of biraderi actions. Biraderi elders are not placed in positions of power based on election or interview; instead they hold these positions based on their position in the biraderi hierarchy and because they are seen as a person of prestige or influence in the local community (Akhtar, 2015). As biraderis are kinship networks and providers of welfare, the relationships inside them are governed by a sense of obligation and loyalty that can make it difficult to hold elders to account (Khan, 1979; Alavi, 1972; Akhtar, 2013).

Disobeying the biraderi risks angering and alienating the family members an individual may rely upon for things like housing, work or money. For this reason, biraderi members may feel unable to leave the biraderi, and so cannot use this as a way to indicate dissatisfaction in the way that a trade union member might be able to. Moreover, this sense of loyalty and obligation can be taken advantage of to create a bloc vote when it comes to selections and elections (Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017).

Network diversity

The diversity of these two networks matters because it affects the information and opportunities presented to individuals in the network. Resources flow through networks (Marin and Wellman, 2011). These resources can affect anything from a person's health to their career success (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). Past research has found that the strength and type of connections in a network affect the resources that flow through the network (Granovetter, 1973; Huckfedlt and Sprague, 1995; Burt, 2004; Zuckerman, 2005; Leighley and Matsubayashi, 2009; Zappa and Lomi, 2015). Networks that are homogenous in their membership, where people are from similar backgrounds and have similar experiences, are less likely to share new and different information (Zuckerman, 2005). Where networks are more diverse, members are more likely to be exposed to new and different ideas (Burt, 2004; Granovetter, 1973). Connections between networks are important for promoting heterogeneity in a network (Granovetter, 1973; Leighley and Matsubayashi, 2009). 'Weak ties' link together individuals from different networks and help to spread new ideas and information (Granovetter, 1973; Zappa and Lomi, 2015).

Biraderis are not very diverse networks and they lack connections between other networks. Biraderi members are closely connected to one another and the network often plays a part in daily life. Martin (2016: 176) describes Pakistanis in the U.K. as

having more "inward-facing networks" than other groups, with more connections inside the group than between groups. As kinship networks, everybody in the network is family or is perceived to be family and traditionally marriages take place within the biraderi (Alavi, 1972; Gilliat-Ray, 2010; Akhtar, 2013). Everybody is of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent and, in the U.K., there is a shared experience, or family history, of immigration. Whilst the biraderi is not based on Islam, members are most likely to be Muslim (Akhtar, 2013).

As biraderi networks are welfare providers, members may rely on them for emotional support, money, housing or work. Network ties are maintained through living in close geographical proximity to fellow biraderi members and maintaining frequent interaction with biraderi members, including those who do live further away. Studies have shown that, particularly when people first arrived in the U.K., the majority of interactions were within the biraderi (Khan, 1979; Akhtar, 2013). Ballard (1979) argues that even as people moved and kinship networks became more scattered in Britain, loyalties and obligations remained strong and there was constant contact and visiting between members. Martin (2016) argues that consanguineous marriage, marrying within the biraderi, and lower levels of female participation in public life and the labour market continues to lead to reliance on biraderi for social and political support.

Trade unions are more diverse networks and members are likely to have more connections between networks than biraderi members. Union members are not from one background, though as I discuss in chapter six white workers are more likely to be in a union than ethnic minority workers and public sector workers are more likely than private sector workers. Trade unions offer support to their members around workplace issues, such as working conditions, payment and pensions (Gomez and Gunderson, 2015). They may also support members with training, as I discuss in chapter five.

Unlike biraderi they are not kinship networks and they do not offer broader welfare and social support for their members. The help offered by trade unions is related to employment and as a result they do not help with processes like getting a passport, signing up for a GP or paying council tax. Neither do they provide emotional support, housing or work in the way that biraderi networks do for their members. This means that trade union networks are unlikely to play such a prominent role in the daily lives of their members. Trade union members are likely to turn elsewhere to networks of friends and family, which could contain fellow union members, for welfare and support.

As these two networks differ in their network diversity, they are likely to have different opportunities and tools available to them for influencing selections and elections. In turn, this may lead to different actions being taken by these two networks.

Institutional links

The utility of the resources that flow through networks depends upon the connections in the network and the resources that they bring. If a person has connections that can tell them when job openings are coming up, introduce them to useful contacts to advance their career, or coach them for a job interview then this is likely to aid them with their career. Likewise, if a network contains individuals who are in positions of power and influence, then this could lead to benefits for other network members. Shaw (2000) writes of biraderi members employed in positions of power and influence protecting other biraderi members from the legal ramifications of their actions, including imprisonment.

When it comes to being able to influence selections and elections, trade union networks have more useful connections than biraderi networks created by the fact that they are institutionally rooted in the Labour Party. The Labour Party emerged from the trade unions and because of this, unions are integral to Labour Party politics (Taylor,

1989). As affiliated organisations, trade unions have some influence over internal party procedures and decisions. The actions of trade unions are protected by the rules governing them; provided they follow the rules stipulated in the Labour Party constitution, their actions are acceptable as outlined by the party. Even if they do not follow these rules, it is possible that the relationship between the party and affiliated unions could lend trade unions a degree of protection for their actions. National and Regional Trade Union Labour Party Liaison Committees manage the relationship between the party and affiliated trade unions as they work together in the pursuit of stated shared aims (Labour Party, 2016). Liaison committees facilitate the sharing of information between trade unions and political parties (Allern and Bale, 2017). The party constitution makes provision for trade union delegates at the Labour Party conference and trade unions help to shape the conference agenda as well as help to decide what is included in the party manifesto at election time (Labour Party, 2016). Seats are reserved for trade union representatives on the National Executive Committee, with 13 of the 39 seats filled by trade unionists at the time of writing (Labour Party, no date).

Affiliated trade unions also have connections with the party at the local level with representatives on Local Campaign Forums and affiliations with constituency parties (Labour Party, 2016). Institutional links give affiliated unions formal access to resources and ways of influencing selection and election that biraderi networks do not have. Trade unions are allowed to recommend candidates in the selection that will be included on a national panel of candidates, if a national panel is used (Labour Party, 2016). They can also publically endorse candidates. Whilst this does not give any guarantees that a candidate will be selected or elected it could add a level of credibility to their candidacy.

It is not just formal institutional links, but informal connections with the Labour Party that give trade unions resources to influence selections and elections. There is an overlap in personnel between trade unions and the Labour Party; many MPs have previously worked for a trade union, often in communications, campaigning or policy (Bale and Webb, 2017). These informal connections provide trade unions with knowledge and contacts that could be helpful when it comes to getting candidates selected and elected. Knowledge about the candidate process, particularly about selection, means that trade unions could explain the process and offer advice to candidates. They can even develop specific training events geared towards helping their members become Labour Party representatives, as I discuss in chapter five. Trade unions may also be privy to insider knowledge such as when and where resignations will be taking place, which could enable them to help their members to start preparing for a selection contest in advance.

Biraderi networks do not have the same formal institutional links that give access to influence over internal Labour Party politics, knowledge, information and connections. This means that, just as with network diversity, the two networks have access to different resources when it comes to the selection and election of political representatives. It also means that without specific Labour Party rules governing their actions the influence of biraderi may automatically appear unacceptable. This could be true even if the two networks carry out very similar actions. With different resources, the actions taken by the two networks are likely to be different. What biraderis may have, however, is informal links that give them access to some of the same resources as trade unions.

In the past, as I discuss in detail in chapter four, biraderi elders developed informal connections with white politicians at the constituency level whom they gathered votes for (Akhtar, 2013; Solomos and Back, 1995). These informal

connections to political representatives could have helped them to reproduce some of the same informal links that trade unions have, providing them with resources like information and informal candidate support and training. Although past research has shown that these connections exist at the local level, there is no evidence to suggest that they also exist at the national level. In contrast, informal trade union connections exist at both the local and national level because of their formal involvement in both national and local Labour politics. Whilst there may then be some overlap in the resources that the two networks have as a result of informal links to the Labour Party, the informal links that trade unions have at the national party level are again likely to give them access to different resources to biraderi networks.

Methodology

To understand whether and why biraderi actions differ in selections and elections and what the implications of network actions are for electoral choice, I use a combination of qualitative and quantitative data in this thesis. In total I analysed 53 interviews to understand the role of biraderi and trade union networks. All interviews were recorded and transcribed and copies of the interview schedules, participant information and consent forms are included in the appendix. All of the interviews were analysed using NVivo10 software and the thematic analysis method (Guest et al., 2012). This method allowed me to isolate, analyse and categorise recurring themes in the data (Aronson, 1994; Braun and Clarke, 2006). In thematic analysis interesting occurrences in the data that are related to the research question are coded in the data, these codes are then organised into themes (Clarke and Braun, 2014). I also used, and built upon, an existing quantitative dataset to investigate who receives financial and in-kind support from trade unions. All of the data in this dataset were taken from publicly available sources. This dataset was analysed using SPSS 20 software.

Biraderi interviews

The biraderi interviews used in chapters three and four were taken from a piece of research originally conducted for the Electoral Commission. The Electoral Commission gave me access to 37 interviews, carried out with activists in eight different electoral wards in England, between June and October 2014. I took part in the design and the data collection of this particular study, and conducted 18 of these interviews myself. The interviews were commissioned to understand why the majority of allegations and convictions of electoral fraud in Britain are found in areas with a high proportion of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin residents.

Four of the eight wards were selected from a list of areas with a high risk of electoral fraud as identified by the Electoral Commission (2014). Areas were classified by the Electoral Commission as high risk based on analysis of electoral fraud allegations and investigations recorded by police forces after 2008. There were 62 cases that involved allegations of electoral offences in these areas and whilst in the majority of these cases no further action was taken, there have been at least 18 convictions of electoral fraud since 2000 in the local authorities that the 'high-risk' areas are based in. All of the 'high-risk' wards had experienced recent allegations of electoral fraud. The other four areas were chosen as comparator areas based on their demographic and political profile. These wards had no convictions of electoral fraud between 2008 and 2013 and just seven allegations of electoral fraud between 2008 and 2013. This research was designed to be comparative and to avoid the common methodological pitfall in the fraud literature: selection on the dependent variable (Lehoucq, 2003).

All of the interviewees were engaged in local politics and the local community and included leaders of religious and community organisations, councillors and one MP and one electoral official. Twelve of the interviewees were white and 25 were Asian or British Asian, with 23 identifying themselves as Pakistani or Bangladeshi.

Just six of the interviewees were female and two of these women were Pakistani or Bangladeshi. This gender imbalance does reflect the lack of ethnic and gender diversity amongst local politicians (Thrasher et al., 2013). In order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, the research areas will not be revealed and interviewees will be referred to as only 'Asian activist' or 'white activist'. We intended to interview 40 people, five per area, however difficulty in recruiting interviewees in one of the areas, where we obtained just one interview, meant that we interviewed a total of 37. Despite the difficulty in finding participants in some areas, we did reach saturation point with similar themes occurring in all interviews (Guest, Bunce and Johnson, 2006).

Interviewees were recruited through purposive sampling with some elements of snowball sampling. Prior to conducting the full interview, the interviewers conducted an in-depth scoping exercise, speaking with potential gate-keepers and interviewees. All of the interviews were semi-structured and interviewees were asked questions around four themes: local organisational density and structure, political parties locally, integrity of elections and local electoral context.

I was asked to be a Research Assistant in this piece of research for the Electoral Commission whilst a Master's student at the University of Manchester because I had been accepted to do a PhD on biraderi. When analysing the interviews it became apparent that biraderi was a strong theme throughout and that these interviews should be used for my own research. In discussion with my colleagues I found myself asking of biraderi: "Is this behaviour different to the behaviour of other actors in selections and elections? And if so, why is it different?" It is for this reason that I decided that my thesis would compare the role of biraderis in selections and elections with the role of trade unions, to understand where the differences lie between these two networks and what the implications of their actions are.

Trade union interviews

I conducted 16 interviews with MPs, councillors, activists and trade unionists to understand the role and implications of trade union actions in selections and elections. Potential interviewees were identified through purposive sampling. Initially I intended to interview people from distinct categories: Labour MPs and candidates from 2015, councillors, activists and trade unionists. However, it became apparent that these categories are more fluid than I expected and I found that each of my interviewees could bring experience and points of view based on multiple roles. Trade unionists are sometimes also MPs, councillors and activists. Often in a local party, there are few activists and the most active members are the councillors. It also became clear that recruiting unsuccessful candidates from 2015 was not possible. I did try to ensure that I interviewed some MPs first elected in 2015. However, this proved to be difficult, I had a particularly low response rate from these MPs and interviewed just one MP who was first elected in 2015. The time of first election varied for the interviewees between first being elected in 1992 and first being elected in 2015. Two of the interviewees had been an MP in two seats and so were able to bring their experience of working in different areas and with different trade unions to the interview.

Recruiting interviewees was difficult and gatekeepers proved to be particularly important in this round of interviews. This is perhaps unsurprising as many of the potential interviewees were elite actors receiving large volumes of email communication daily and with significant constraints on their time. An introduction from a gatekeeper helped to overcome these barriers to access in some cases. It was far easier to gain access to councillors and activists than it was to gain access to MPs and trade union staff. Trade union staff was the most difficult category to access and just two of my interviewees are trade union staff.

Taking into account the fluidity of the categories, which means that interviewees actually fit into more than one category, seven of my interviewees were MPs; seven were, or had been, councillors; seven described themselves as 'trade unionists' amongst other roles; two were trade union staff. As in the biraderi interviews, women are under-represented amongst my interviewees. Interviewees were asked slightly different questions depending on their role. However, all interviewees were asked in some form to explain their role in the Labour Party or trade union, what help is offered by trade unions and how it is accessed and whether or not they think the current system of support works well.

Both the biraderi and trade union interviews were semi-structured. Although I followed a clear interview questionnaire in both cases, the format was flexible allowing me to explore areas that the interviewees brought up (Walliman, 2006). This allowed me to adapt my questions in response to themes developed by the interviewees. This was particularly helpful in the trade union interviews because I did not conduct an initial scoping exercise. This meant that the first few interviews I conducted introduced me to new and interesting themes that I had not previously considered. I was able to include these themes in the subsequent interviews. I was also able to adapt the order and wording of the interview questionnaires based on my initial interviews.

Donations data

The final substantive chapter in this thesis is based on the analysis of donations from trade unions to constituency Labour Parties. Two questions had emerged as unanswered from my interview data. Firstly, who receives trade union financial and in-kind support? Secondly, what are the motives behind the distribution of this trade union support? In order to answer these questions, I used publicly available donations data downloaded from the Electoral Commission website. I analysed donations that

were given in the lead up to the 2015 election and for that reason I limited the data to just donations given in the 2010-2015 parliament. To understand whether trade unions target candidates with particular characteristics I needed data relating to candidate characteristics in the 2015 General Election. For this, I was given access to the Parliamentary Candidates Project U.K. dataset, which was originally collected by Jennifer vanHeerde-Hudson and Rosie Campbell (2015) with support from the Leverhulme Trust (RPG-2013-175).

This dataset includes variables related to the party and constituency location of the candidate as well as whether or not the candidate was supported by a union; biographical and socio-demographic information such as gender, ethnicity, age, marital status, education and occupation; information about the outcome of the election, incumbency, the number of candidates and voters, and turnout; institutional information including the year the candidate entered parliament, their Twitter handle and website URL. I added a variable on class using the existing occupation variable and the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification method of deriving class. I also added two further variables using the existing occupation and previous occupation variables to indicate whether or not the candidate had previously worked for the Labour Party or a trade union.

The Parliamentary Candidates U.K. dataset also includes some information about seats, for example, the region the seat is in and whether or not it was already held by the Labour Party. However, to find out whether trade unions are guided by seat characteristics in their distribution of support I needed to collect further variables. I categorised each seat into one of four seat types: safe, winnable, target and hopeless. I used safe seat data from the Electoral Reform Society (no date) and the list of target seats released by the Labour Party in the lead up to the 2015 election (Labour List, 2013). Hopeless seats were identified as any seats that needed a 10% or greater swing

to become Labour. Winnable seats were all those that needed a less than 10% swing and were not already included on the safe or target seat list.

The donation data downloaded from the Electoral Commission website indicates which constituency party received support. It does not link support to a specific candidate. In order to link support to a specific candidate and discover whether or not trade unions offer support to candidates with certain characteristics, I collected candidate selection dates. This allowed me to say which candidate was in a seat when the support was given and to analyse the characteristics of these candidates. I analysed this by creating a variable detailing whether or not seats received support after the candidate was selected. I also created a variable for whether or not seats received support before the candidate was selected to test the relevance of the candidate to that seat receiving support.

Thesis outline

In chapter two I introduce selections, elections and networks. I begin by characterising my two case study networks; I argue that biraderis and trade unions are examples of formal networks. Next, I discuss one of the primary functions of networks: to facilitate the flow of resources between members. I argue that in the case of selections and elections the resources flowing through the network are campaign assistance, donations, and political information. I then examine the relationship between networks and power, arguing that networks can be used to challenge power and as a way to mobilise, maximise and utilise power. Finally, I look at the role of networks in selections and elections arguing that both of these processes are points at which networks can utilise and build upon their existing power base.

In chapter three I introduce my first case study, biraderi, and its role in U.K. politics. To do this, I analyse 37 interviews carried out with political and community activists. I argue that biraderi networks have two functions. Firstly, it is a hierarchical

system of social stratification. Secondly, it is a welfare system that provides support for its members. I argue that these two functions of the biraderi have implications for U.K. politics, particularly the selection and election of political representatives. Biraderi networks can play a positive role in elections by helping members to overcome discrimination and enter into politics. However, I argue that biraderi influence can lead to selections and elections based on patronage, undue influence and intimidation. I outline the methods used by biraderi networks to influence selections and elections and I argue that, as a result of this influence, large groups of the electorate are effectively disenfranchised and constituents can be left with weak, ineffective and self-interested representatives. Moreover, I argue that local political parties have acted in their own self-interest and turned a blind eye to this behaviour and its implications.

In chapter four I contextualise the role of biraderi by arguing that it is a form of a political machine that has been used to incorporate newly arrived immigrant voters into U.K. politics. In this sense, I argue, it is similar to the political machines used to incorporate newly arrived immigrants in some U.S. cities in the 19th and 20th centuries. I build upon the argument made in chapter three, that political parties have turned a blind eye to biraderi networks by arguing that politicians deliberately used biraderi networks to incorporate newly arrived immigrant voters. I argue that the Labour Party has been the party to first and most effectively use the biraderi networks to gain and strengthen political power. By using biraderi networks in this way, politicians turned them into political machines and encouraged patron-client politics to take place. I argue that over time the role of biraderi networks has evolved, whilst they were originally turned into political machines by white politicians keen to cement their own power, they are now more often used to help the biraderi network gain political power. I outline the importance of the patron-client relationship arguing that for biraderi

machine politics to take place it must exist at multiple levels. I show how the position of biraderi elders in the patron-client relationship has shifted over time.

In chapter five I introduce my second case study, trade unions. I begin by outlining the historic relationship between trade unions and the Labour Party, the role of trade unions in selections and elections and some recent prominent selection and election controversies involving trade unions. I then examine what support trade unions can offer to candidates. I analyse 16 interviews conducted with MPs, councillors, activists and trade unionists and argue that there are three different aspects to the role played by trade unions. Firstly, there is the legitimate aspect where, in keeping with electoral laws and party rules, they use their resources to help candidates to overcome financial and cultural barriers to their political participation.

Secondly, there is the controversial aspect where trade unions may be acting within the rules but their actions could challenge the democratic spirit. Here I look at how candidates access support, arguing that informal connections akin to biraderi network connections are beneficial for accessing support. I also look at how party members are recruited and encouraged to attend selection meetings. I find that increasing the number of Labour Party members and encouraging them to vote in selections is seen as a positive thing that is part of building political consciousness and a key aspect of the role of the political party. However, I also find that activists can concentrate on recruiting those members most likely to support a preferred candidate and can even recruit 'paper members' to support a preferred candidate.

Finally, there is the idealised aspect of trade unions where trade unions were presented as legitimate and transparent sources of funding and support, particularly in comparison to big businesses where interviewees felt the origin of funding can be unclear. They were also presented as champions of the labour movement fighting for

the rights of workers, unlike the central Labour Party and organisations within the party such as Progress.

In chapter six I move on from looking at what support trade unions offer to look at who they offer that support to. This is an important question as it could also give some indication as to the motivation for their support. For example, are they trying to increase the number of working class MPs? Do they give support to increase the overall number of Labour MPs regardless of other criteria? Or are they looking to increase the number of Labour MPs with particular characteristics? Do they give support to reward previous and future behaviour? To find out who receives support and some indication about the purpose of this support, I use the financial records of trade union donations to constituency parties in the 2010-2015 parliament taken from the Electoral Commission website. Where possible I use the date of candidate selection to match donations to candidates. I then use the Parliamentary Candidates Project U.K. (VanHeerde-Hudson and Campbell, 2015) dataset, with additional variables that I have collected, to find out whether donations are given to candidates or seats with particular characteristics. I find that the most important indicators of trade union support are incumbency and seat characteristics with those in target, winnable, and safe seats most likely to receive trade union support.

In the conclusion, I draw together my two case studies comparing their roles, and the implication of their roles, in the selection and election processes. I present my findings showing how they answer my research questions and how they contribute to existing literature. I argue that trade unions and biraderi networks both carry out five actions to influence selections and elections: political education; financial and in-kind support; sending campaigners to selection and election campaigns; selecting candidates; supporting the under-represented. They do, however, differ in the way that they carry out some of these actions. I conclude that networks can either increase or

decrease electoral choice, depending on the actions that they take and the way in which they carry them out. I argue that network actions differ because they have different structures, different motivations for their actions, and access to different resources and that they are motivated to carry out these actions by a combination of ideological and instrumental aims. I offer three conditions that must be satisfied for network actions to be considered acceptable. The actions must not break electoral law or party rules, they must not restrict electoral choice, and open and accountable networks must carry them out.

I argue that political parties need networks and the relationship between the two can take two different forms. On the one hand, networks can work alongside political parties to help them to campaign and deliver political education. On the other hand, networks can take over from political parties to carry out local party functions. I conclude that biraderi networks have been turned into political machines that are carrying out patronage politics and argue that this contributes to the literature in three ways. Finally, I outline areas for future research arising out of my work and broader implications of the research.

Taken together, these chapters address the gaps that I identified in the literature around what actions networks take inside political parties to influence selections and elections. In chapters three, four, five and six I show what actions networks can take to influence elections at the local level, both within and outside of party rules and electoral law. In chapters three and five I address the gap in understanding around selections by showing how networks can influence selections. I show how they can break the rules to do this and how their influence can be important even before the selection process begins to determine which candidates put themselves forward.

In chapter three I identify biraderi-politicking as an example of patronage politics and in chapter four I identify biraderis as an example of political machines and

show exactly how they carry out patronage politics. Here I am addressing the lack of literature regarding patronage politics, vote buying and machine politics in an advanced democracy and showing how these practices can be carried out in an advanced democracy. I am also providing a framework to approach recent concerns regarding electoral fraud in areas with large Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations. By comparing the actions of biraderi networks to the actions of trade union networks, I address the current focus on studying biraderi in isolation and draw conclusions about how unusual biraderi politicking really is in U.K. politics.

Chapter 2: Networks, selections and elections

Networks exist in all areas of life and are the things that human beings are connected to one another through. Marin and Wellman (2011) liken network connections to pipelines through which resources flow. They give the examples of information about jobs, social support, norms, disease, immunity to disease, material aid and knowledge about culture (Marin and Wellman, 2011). Networks can take different forms, from the informal network connections that exist largely based on coincidental actions, to the more formal networks that individuals consciously join with shared values and aims. Networks can affect anything from career success, to health, to personal or organisational identity (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). They can also be an important source of support and power by uniting individuals who would otherwise have few resources at their disposal. Networks are central to politics; political information, influence and power flow through networks. Lazer (2011: 66) argues that:

> Politics is a relational phenomenon. Political action is built not just on the coincidence of interest and the foundation of institutions, but also on a superstructure of favors owed, friendships, and enmities. Even the construction of interest is surely joint, the result of a common calculation of communal and personal interest.

Similarly Heaney and McClurg (2009: 737) have argued that networks are central to the ability to exert power in politics: "it remains fundamentally true that the ability to exert power in politics often depends on relations among actors that encourage cooperation or facilitate the exchange of political goods on which the influence is often based." Despite the centrality of networks in politics, they have remained largely understudied in political science (Lazer, 2011; Zuckerman, 2005). There has been some work about the role of networks in policy-making (see for example Rhodes, 1990). Networks have also been seen as a way to understand the political behaviour of

citizens (see for example, Zuckerman, 2005; Fowler et al., 2011; Huckfedlt and Sprague, 1995). Meanwhile, Schwartz (1990: 11) has argued that political parties are themselves organisations made up of networks of actors; they are "individual or collective units sharing a party name whose activities have some recognized partisan purpose". What has received little attention is the role that networks play within political parties, particularly at the local level, and how this affects voter choice. This is the focus of this thesis as I explore what the implications of network actions in the selection and election processes are for electoral choice.

In this chapter I turn to some of the existing literature to introduce networks, selections and elections. In the first section I characterise my two case study networks. I argue that biraderis and trade unions should both be understood as formal networks. In the second section I examine one of the primary roles of networks: facilitating the flow of resources between network members. I argue that the resources can take different forms: assisting with campaigns, donations and political information. I argue that heterogeneous networks can be a source of diverse political information, exposing electors to new information that influences the voting process. In the third section I examine the relationship between networks and power. I argue that networks can be both a way of challenging power and a way of creating, utilising and maximising power. I apply research from the personnel and human resources management literature to understand how networks can both challenge and seek to create and maximise power in political parties. I focus on staff recruitment, which in political parties is candidate selection, as the primary way of consolidating and strengthening network power. In the final two sections, I look at the role of networks in first selections and then elections. I argue that both getting a candidate selected and getting a candidate elected are key points at which networks can utilise their existing power base and enhance their power.

Characterising networks

I argue that networks can take two different forms. Firstly, they can be informal and fluid, based on the everyday interactions between, for example, neighbours, customers and cashiers, and colleagues. Informal networks do not set out common goals nor do they necessarily create a sense of group identity. They are in some ways coincidental, based on the people we happen to live near, the people we happen to work with and where we happen to shop. However, informal networks are not completely coincidental and decisions can be made to maintain or break ties with individuals. Secondly, networks can also be more formal. I define formal networks as networks that are based on membership, joint strategic goals and a sense of a shared identity created through network membership. Hay and Richards (2000: 12) describe what I identify as a formal network when they argue that networks can be "strategic alliances forged around a common agenda…of mutual advantage through collective action". In other words, individuals come together to form a network to advance their specific interests.

Trade unions and biraderis are both examples of formal networks. Individuals sign up to become members of a trade union and pay membership fees. Membership fees must be paid continuously to maintain membership. Members sign up to a set of values and aims that are clearly articulated and promoted by the trade union. They are encouraged to support these values and achieve these aims by doing things like striking, attending rallies and supporting the political candidates most likely to share the union's values. Biraderi members do not sign up to the biraderi or pay membership fees. In fact, their membership to a particular biraderi is often coincidental and decided by birth or marriage. Despite this, biraderis should be considered formal networks because they do promote a strong network identity. What is more, although not necessarily articulated to all biraderi members, biraderis do work towards specific

aims. It is expected that members will assist in achieving these aims in politics by, for example, campaigning or voting for a biraderi candidate.

Networks and political resources

Networks facilitate the sharing of resources through their members (Marin and Wellman, 2011). These resources can take different forms. For example, a candidate may appeal to members of their network to help them campaign to win a selection or an election. Network members may be asked, for example, to stuff envelopes, deliver leaflets, go door knocking, attend speeches, transport campaigners or the candidate to events and meeting places, and provide refreshments for those out campaigning. In this case the resources shared in the network are the time and energy of those who assist the candidate, the cars that are used to transport the candidate and campaigners and the financial implications of this, the food and drink that is given to sustain campaigners and the necessary costs that this incurs. Financial resources may also flow through the network in the form of monetary and in-kind donations to a party or a campaign. An example of this is the financial and in-kind donations made by trade unions to the campaigns of Labour Party candidates.

Resources may also take the form of information. It is through networks that electors receive political information, both at the national level and at the local level. An individual's political decisions are not made in isolation in an election or in the candidate selection process, but in the context of their network ties and influences (Zuckerman, 2005; Fowler et al., 2011; Huckfedlt and Sprague, 1995). According to Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) citizens are interdependent, their electoral choices are informed by the interactions that they have and the information that they encounter from those around them. The quality and type of information flowing through a network varies according to the strength and type of the relationships between the individuals sharing information. Homogenous networks, where individuals are from

similar backgrounds and share similar beliefs, are unlikely to lead to the sharing of new and different information (Zuckerman, 2005). Individuals in these network types are less likely to be presented with new ideas and diverse opportunities. Heterogeneous networks, where the connected individuals come from different backgrounds and hold a variety of beliefs, are likely to lead to the circulation of new and different information that broadens an individual's opportunities and challenges their beliefs (Burt, 2004). Zuckerman (2005) argues that the information shared in more politically heterogeneous networks is likely to have greater consequences than the information shared in more politically homogeneous networks. When an individual is presented with a new viewpoint, they are forced to critically examine it and possibly alter their own viewpoint (Zuckerman, 2005). This can mean that, as Leighley and Matsubayashi (2009) argue, those with diverse networks are more likely to have diverse ideas and sympathy for different viewpoints.

It is because of the significance of having heterogeneous networks that Granovetter (1973) argues that the presence of weak ties is particularly important in an individual's network. Weak ties are bridging ties, they are the ties that join different groups together through a connecting relationship. Weak ties are "more likely to link members of *different* small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups" (original emphasis) (Granovetter, 1973: 1376). In a network without weak ties, information will often feed back to its source in a circulatory manner (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995). By linking individuals to other networks, weak ties are likely to bring a greater diversity of contacts, information and opportunities. Zappa and Lomi (2015) similarly argue that connections between "distant others" lead to the creation of heterogeneous knowledge as individuals are exposed to information that they are not exposed to in their immediate network. In terms of selections and elections, weak network ties are likely to lead to electors

exposed to more information and a variety of opinions, helping them to make decisions based on more balanced information. They may also help those candidates standing for selection and election. Candidates can use their weak ties to spread their campaign to audiences that they might otherwise struggle to meet.

Networks and power

Not only do network facilitate the flow of resources, it is also through networks that power is gained and utilised. The use of networks to gain power receives a lot of attention in the personnel and human resources management literature, which focuses on business organisations. Political parties are a type of organisation (Panebianco, 1988; Schwartz 1990). Strom (1990) even likens party leaders to entrepreneurs; they organise parties and operate within a context of supply and demand where they supply policies that the electorate demand. It is useful, therefore, to turn to this literature focusing on business organisations to explain how networks are used to gain power in political parties. According to Bolman and Deal (2003), organisations are political arenas in which there are multiple networks with diverse values and beliefs struggling to gain power and influence. Networks are formed as it is recognised that allies are important when it comes to gaining power within organisations (Pfeffer, 1992; Bolman and Deal, 2003). Mintzberg (1985: 135) used the term "alliance building" to describe the formation of these networks within organisations. Networks are used to advance personal and network agendas (Mintzberg, 1985; Bonzionelos, 2005) and it is because these agendas are not advanced by the overall organisational agenda that networks are established. In order to advance their interests, networks must amass power within the organisation and this power often comes from the ability to control "valued resources" (Shwartz, 1990: 122). Networks fight over scarce resources in order to obtain power and influence decisions (Bolman and Deal 2003).

Political parties do differ from the sort of business organisations referred to in

the personnel and human resources management literature. Most importantly, political parties in the U.K. are different to other forms of organisation in that they are open and inclusive organisations; anybody can become a member of, and be active in, a political party. As a result, the networks active within parties could be networks that have developed through relationships between individuals in the party who may wish to advance their status and gain power within the party. They could, however, also be networks that are based on relationships that existed first outside of the party. These relationships have then been transferred into the party as the network members have recognised the importance of political parties and political power. In this sense, unlike in other forms of organisation, political parties are used as a vehicle for the success of a network both inside and outside of the political party. Biraderi networks are a clear example of this. Biraderis exist outside of political parties but they can transfer their network relationships into political parties as a way to achieve their aims.

Networks can be a positive feature of political parties. They can hold established formal power to account and can help to broaden debate and represent a diverse range of interests. Mintzberg (1985) argued that the politicking that takes place within organisations can be used to challenge formal power and ensure that a diversity of views is heard. Likewise, Belloni and Beller (1978) argued that networks could challenge the dominant power within a political party by representing a different set of interests. Individuals belonging to groups that are marginalised are able to use networks to strengthen their social and political position and make it more likely that their grievances are heard. Graham (1993) argues that whilst factions can be clientelist and caught up in power games, they can also help to achieve local, regional and group interests and promote a set of values. This is an important aspect of the democratic process as it helps to ensure that parties are accountable to, and representative of, their voters.

Networks can also use the power they obtain in ways that are disruptive and harmful to the organisation or political party. It may even be felt that networks are operating against the interests of the general public as they advance their own agenda (Hay and Richards, 2000). Mintzberg (1985) argued that the politicking carried out by networks can be divisive, costly, a waste of energy and something that prevents organisations from carrying out their proper roles. Whilst networks can help to ensure that a wide range of views are represented, they can also lead to the dominance of one network and one viewpoint. In the quest to gain resources and increase the power of their members, networks may attempt to advance the aims of their group at the expense of all others (Belloni and Beller, 1978). Networks can be used to control resources and obtain power solely in the interest of the actors in that network, who are competing for things like resources, power, status and influence. This role of networks can lead to factionalism, or destructive "rival camps" within organisations (Mintzberg, 1985: 138). In political parties competing networks can lead to a perception of disunity and corruption within the party (Belloni and Beller, 1978). Perceptions of disunity and corruption may damage the electoral chances of the party as it is seen by the electorate to be untrustworthy and incapable of governing.

One of the key areas of network competition occurs around the recruitment of staff, particularly, according to Bozionelos (2005), during the interview process. Workers are an organisational resource and the ability to influence and control this resource will strengthen the position of a network within the organisation. The recruitment of new staff can tip the balance of power in an organisation between the different networks and for this reason the decisions of those on the selection panel are likely to favour the candidate that is most likely to advance the interests of their network (Bozionelos, 2005). As Bozionelos (2005) shows, this can lead to individuals being employed based on the judgement of a selection panel despite lacking the

required formal qualifications for the job.

In political parties the equivalent of the organisation's recruitment of staff is the selection of candidates and the election of party members to internal party positions, such as chairperson or treasurer. Both of these processes are carried out within the party with a combination of interviews, campaigning and internal elections used to determine who the candidate will be and who will be elected to internal party positions. The balance of power can be altered within the party by which network manages to get somebody selected as a candidate or elected to a position such as treasurer or chairperson. Rusell (2005: 2) argues: "How […] internal party functions are carried out, and crucially who has influence within them, is […] crucial for shaping the broader political system." Whilst the election of political representatives is also similar to the recruitment of staff, it does differ. The election of political representatives is done outside of the local party and the whole electorate is eligible to vote. This is unlike the selection process or the recruitment of staff in organisations where only members are able to vote or certain staff are able to make hiring decisions. As with selections and elections within the party, the balance of power in a local area can be affected by which candidate is elected as a political representative. The network that gets one of their members elected may reap benefits from this appointment as the representative advocates the interests of that network above all others.

Networks and candidate selection

Before an election can take place, parties must select their candidate. Candidate selection is the first stage of the democratic process. It is the point at which, generally without the interference of the state and within the confines of the political party, the party agrees who will represent them and gain their support in either a national election or a local government election. According to Katz (2001: 278) "candidate selection is one of the central defining functions of a political party in a democracy." It

is the ability to select candidates to stand for election that distinguishes political parties from other interest groups in the political process, which only have the power to support or oppose candidates (Ranney, 1981; Katz, 2001). It has been described as the "key stage" (Gallagher, 1988a: 2) and "the most important stage" of recruitment (Czudnowski, 1975: 219 cited in Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 109).

Candidate selection is both private and secret; it is carried out within political parties and not discussed outside of the confines of the meetings that take place during the process (Duverger, 1959). Party members select candidates and as selectors they are criticised for being an unrepresentative group. Writing in 1988, Denver argued that party members were different from the rest of the population in that they were politically active, they were also likely to be more middle class and better educated than the rest of the electorate. Thirty years later, Bale, Webb and Poletti (2018) have shown that party members are likely to be male, middle class, white and older than the average Briton. They are also more likely to live in London and the south than the north, Midlands or Wales, though Labour Party members are more geographically spread (Bale, Webb and Poletti, 2018). Data from a 2015 survey of Labour Party members shows that 56% of members are graduates compared to just 30% of Labour Party supporters (Bale and Poletti, 2017). This suggests that, in the case of the Labour Party at least, Denver's (1988) argument that party members are better educated remains true. Party members also generally see themselves as more ideologically extreme than party voters. Labour and Liberal Democrat Party members place themselves further to the left than their voters, and Conservative members place themselves further to the right than their voters (Bale, Webb and Poletti, 2018). This matters because the candidates selected by party members may reflect the interests of this unrepresentative group, leaving the wider electorate to choose from candidates that do not fully represent their interests.

Candidate selection involves the allocation of a scarce resource: political candidacy and the possibility of becoming a politician. As a result of this it can become a source of conflict within the party with networks fighting to advance their own power (Katz, 2001). These networks may be formed of individuals within the party, or they may be networks that exist outside of the party but are using the party as a vehicle to advance their own social and political goals. Networks mobilise support for their candidate in order to increase the power of the network and advance their cause (Denver, 1988). Boss Tweed, the boss of the Tammany Hall political machine, once said: "I do not care who does the electing, so long as I get to do the nominating" (cited in Welch et al., 2009). Meanwhile, Schattschneider (1942: 64) argued: "The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party."

The candidate plays a part in defining what the party is; they manifest the party's demographic, geographic and ideological dimensions (Katz, 2001). The candidates selected and elected are the individuals that go on to form the government, to hold ministerial positions and crucially to, in large part, determine the ideological and policy positions of the party. The ability to select candidates is the ability to control the ideological direction of the party. Norris and Lovenduski (1995: 3) argued that: "placing candidates in safe seats, possibly for a lifetime political career, has more significant consequences than getting conference resolutions adopted, or supporters nominated to internal bodies." The ability to influence and even control candidate selection gives any network a large amount of power and it is the key point at which networks can use and build upon their power base.

Katz (2001) identifies two different forms of conflict surrounding candidate selection: conflict about who is selected within the existing procedures and conflict about the rules chosen for selecting candidates with attempts being made to change

these rules. I believe that a third form of conflict can be added between these two forms where networks do not try to change the rules governing candidate selection, but nor do they work within them. Instead they break the existing rules to try and get their candidate selected. Katz's (2001) first form of conflict centres on who should be selected within the existing framework of procedures and which networks are strongest within the arenas that decisions are made. The strongest networks, able to get their preferred candidate into the final selection meeting and mobilise the support of the most people in that meeting, are the networks that are able to get one of their members selected.

This form of conflict implies that the battle to be the strongest network takes place without breaking party or electoral rules. However, I believe that whilst the methods used by networks to get their candidates selected may be in keeping with the rules, networks may resort to methods that break the rules. The result of this form of network action is that representatives may be selected purely based on the size and organisational strength of their network and not their ability to be in such a position, leading to concerns about the quality of political representatives selected in this way. The candidate may not be selected in the interest of the electorate, the local party, or the national party. Instead the candidate may be selected in the interest of the individuals whose careers are advanced, and the networks that are able to build their power base by getting their members into the local council or parliamentary party.

The second form of conflict identified by Katz (2001), is about the procedures themselves; different procedures are likely to be to the advantage of different groups. For example, it has been argued that the central Labour Party designed the selection procedure for the 2000 London mayoral election specifically to exclude the possibility of the selection of Ken Livingstone (Riddell, 2003; Russell, 2005). The procedure for selecting candidates has evolved a number of times, each time to benefit one network

at the expense of another. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s in particular, the left and the centre-right of the Labour Party used the selection process as a way to try and increase their strength in the parliamentary party (Gallagher, 1988b).

Traditionally candidate selection was localised and the constituency party was responsible for shortlisting and selecting a candidate but the National Executive Committee could then veto the candidate (Clark, 2012). In 1980 mandatory reselection was introduced after a campaign by the Labour left, which argued that it would make MPs more accountable for their actions as they would no longer automatically be the party's candidate in an election (Clark, 2012). The Labour left benefitted from mandatory reselection as it meant that they could attempt to deselect incumbents perceived to be to the right of the party. In 1987 an Electoral College system was introduced for the selection of candidates (Russell, 2005). The Electoral College was formed from two groups, the local party members and local affiliated organisations. It was hoped that this system would reduce some of the power of "radicalised" local activists (Clark, 2012:77). The reform was also designed to limit the power of the trade unions; their contribution to the Electoral College could be a maximum of 40% (Clark, 2012).

In 1993 the system of one member one vote (OMOV) was introduced (Russell, 2005). This system replaced the Electoral College system in which members of the General Council would make the final decision about which candidate was selected in each constituency, and allowed all fee paying party members in the constituency to vote in the final selection meeting for their preferred candidate (Williams and Paun, 2011). It was believed that by widening the selectorate the central party would limit the role of the trade unions and "extreme factions" and give power to more moderate individual party members whose views were perceived to be more in line with those of the party leadership (Hopkin, 2001: 351). Currently all fee paying party members, who

have six months or more continuous membership in the local party, are able to vote in the final selection meeting (Labour Party, 2016). Whilst the local constituency party oversees candidate selection, the National Executive Committee does have to endorse the candidate after this selection process has been carried out (Labour Party, 2016).

Networks and elections

Elections are "the defining institutions of modern democracy" (Katz, 1997:3). It is through elections that regimes gain legitimacy, public positions are filled, the electorate are provided with choice and representation, and popular involvement with politics and political education is provided (Katz, 1997). Elections are also the point at which political parties win or lose seats, form governments and gain influence over the running of a country. In most countries elections are open events that are reported on by the media, and all of the electorate have the right to cast a ballot. In the U.K., those over the age of 18 who are British citizens or immigrants from a qualifying Commonwealth country are eligible to vote in national elections. All British citizens, European Union citizens and immigrants from qualifying Commonwealth countries are eligible to vote in local elections (Electoral Commission, no date a). This is important in relation to biraderi networks; all Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants are eligible to vote in national and local elections when they arrive in the U.K. This means that biraderi networks were able to play a political role immediately upon arrival in the U.K.

In elections networks aim to get their candidate elected as a way to gain power and resources. As in selections they can do this by working within the existing electoral framework. They can help their preferred candidate to win the election by legitimately campaigning for them according to electoral law. They can also provide them with financial aid and help in-kind, as long as they follow the regulations set out by the 2000 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA). Acting within

the rules, network participation can therefore be an important part of the democratic process and particularly campaigning.

Networks can also break the rules in order to get their candidates elected as is demonstrated by the literature on 'machine politics', 'vote buying' and 'turnout buying' (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014; Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014; Nichter, 2008; Schaffer, 2007a Stokes, 2005; Chubb, 1982). In machine politics, votes and turnout are bought in order to manipulate the outcome of the election and get the preferred candidate selected (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). Machine politics relies upon a patron-client relationship where patrons distribute favours to electors, their clients, in return for votes (Chubb, 1982). Poorer members of the electorate are often targeted because they rely on the favours distributed (Scott, 1969). Votes are not cast based on ideology or party policies but on personal relationships between patrons and clients and the favours received by members of the electorate (Chubb, 1982).

When vote buying exists alongside the secret ballot, machines are faced with a monitoring issue. They are unable to confirm that an elector has voted as instructed in return for the reward given, and must find ways to circumvent the secret ballot (Stokes, 2005). In British elections, the postal voting on demand system has provided the conditions needed to circumvent the secret ballot. Absentee voting, such as postal voting, is important as a way to enable all electors to vote regardless of whether or not they can attend the polling station. Postal voting on demand was introduced in 2001 to allow all electors to vote by post if they choose to (White, 2012). The motivation behind this was to make voting more convenient and thus increase turnout (Wilks-Heeg, 2009). However, postal voting on demand has failed to show any significant effect on turnout, despite the motivation behind its introduction (Curtice, 2005). Moreover, the postal voting on demand system has proven itself to be vulnerable to

abuse and this abuse can be carried out on a large scale (Wilks-Heeg 2008). This is because, as Birch and Watt (2004:62) argue: "adequate levels of secrecy are virtually impossible to guarantee when voting is conducted in unsupervised locations". Taking the act of casting a ballot outside of the polling station makes it harder to prevent electors from being bribed or treated in return for casting their ballot in a certain way. It also makes it harder to prevent electors from being unduly influenced or ballots being tampered with. Networks aiming to gain power and resources by getting their preferred candidate elected could take advantage of the weaknesses inherent in the postal voting on demand system to manipulate the outcome of an election.

As in the selection process, networks could also campaign to change electoral procedures to ensure that they advantage their interests. In practice, this appears to happen at the party level. It tends to be whole parties that campaign for changes to rules rather than networks within parties, unlike in the selection process. For example, electoral administration can be manipulated to benefit one party or another (James, 2012). Studies have found that higher voter turnout is associated with better electoral outcomes for left wing parties (Fowler, 2013) because it increases the number of low socio-economic electors (Alvarez and Nagler, 2001; Watson, 2001). As postal voting on demand was introduced in Britain[1] with the aim of increasing electoral turnout, it could be assumed that left wing parties would benefit the most from this. Indeed, James (2012) argues that the Labour Party took a partisan approach to electoral administration because there was a perception that they would benefit from increased turnout.

Just as the method of voting could lead to an advantage for one party, so can the electoral system that is used to turn votes into seats. In the U.K. the campaign to move to a system of proportional representation has been partisan. It has generally been

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[1] Concerns about electoral fraud mean that postal voting on demand was not introduced to elections in Northern Ireland (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, 2007).

called for and supported by the smaller parties most likely to benefit, such as the Liberal Democrats (Liberal Democrats, no date), the Green Party (2015) and United Kingdom Independence Party (2015).

Conclusion

In this chapter I have introduced networks and the role that they play in politics. I established two ways of characterising and understanding networks. Firstly, there are the informal networks that are predominantly based on coincidental actions. Informal networks do not develop shared aims and whilst there could be some sense of group identity, this is unlikely to be strong. Secondly, there are the formal networks with clear strategic aims, formal membership and a strong sense of group identity. The two case study networks in this thesis, biraderi networks and trade union networks, are both examples of a formal network. In both networks there is clearly defined membership with trade union members required to sign up to be members and paying membership fees, and biraderi members born or married into the network. Membership of these networks comes with a strong group identity. In both of these networks members have shared goals, though the extent to which these goals are communicated does differ between the networks. Trade union goals are clearly and openly articulated whereas biraderi goals are opaque and not even necessarily shared with all members.

Secondly, I considered the role of networks as a way of sharing political resources. I argued that resources such as campaigning assistance, financial and in-kind donations and political information can all flow through networks. I argued that, unlike homogenous networks, heterogeneous networks can be a source of diverse political information, exposing electors to new information that influences the voting process.

Thirdly, I argued that networks can be used to obtain and utilise political power. Individuals use networks to advance their own personal agenda as well as to achieve mutually established network aims. They can be positive, a way to challenge power and represent the under-represented. They can also be negative, the cause of disunity and in fighting. Networks may seek to advance their aims at the expense of the party and the electorate.

Finally, I argued that they key areas of conflict are candidate selection and election as both provide the network with power and resources. Conflict in candidate selection and election can centre on working within the rules, breaking the rules, or working to change the rules to get candidates selected and elected. In the proceeding chapters I use my two case studies to examine the role of networks in Labour Party selections and elections. I examine what the implications are of networks for voter choice and how different the behaviour of biraderi networks really is in U.K. elections. In the next chapter I introduce my first case study, biraderi networks, and show how they can act to win selections and elections to gain power for their network.

Chapter 3: Biraderi in U.K. Politics

Biraderi kinship networks have long been used by politicians from all parties in the U.K., but particularly the Labour Party, to access the South Asian bloc vote (Akhtar, 2012; Peace and Akhtar, 2015). However, in recent years concern has emerged about the role of biraderi kinship networks in U.K. elections. Anecdotal evidence has linked the biraderi system to cases of electoral fraud and there have also been concerns about the effects of the essentially hierarchical and patriarchal system on the participation and representation of women and young people in U.K. elections (Wilks-Heeg, 2008). The intention of this case study chapter is to demonstrate the ways in which biraderi networks act during the selection and election of political representatives in the U.K. and to consider the broader implications of this for U.K. politics and electoral choice. The data for this case study has been taken from 37 interviews with political activists, community activists and politicians working in eight different parts of the U.K. The interviewees were predominantly from white British, Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds. All interviewees will remain anonymous; no reference has been made to their identity or location. Interviewees are referred to as Asian or white activists.

In this chapter I will introduce the biraderi system and its origins. I will argue that the biraderi system has two roles. Firstly, it is a hierarchical system of social stratification. Secondly, it provides a welfare system that acts as an alternative to state support and has been crucial in the immigration process between Pakistan, Bangladesh and the U.K. I will also discuss membership of biraderi networks and argue that in the U.K. context a combination of participation and obligation most commonly defines membership to a biraderi network, which has implications for U.K. politics.

I will then focus on the role of biraderi networks in U.K. politics, particularly on the selection and election of political representatives. I will argue that biraderi networks can play an important and positive role in U.K. politics. However, through the biraderi system, selections and elections can easily be based upon patronage, influence and intimidation. Moreover, political parties have often turned a blind eye to this for their own gain. The activity of biraderi networks around selections and elections, I will argue, has implications for electoral choice and political representation because it disenfranchises large groups of the electorate and can leave voters with weak, ineffective and self-interested candidates.

Biraderi: kinship, patronage and hierarchy

Although the biraderi system originates from Pakistan and Bangladesh (Jalal, 2002), a process of chain migration, predominantly from Pakistan, means that biraderi networks have become important in the lives of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis living in the U.K. (Akhtar, 2013). Biraderi literally translates to mean 'brotherhood' and is a system in which all members of the biraderi network are considered to be family (Gilliat-Ray, 2010). The biraderi system is made up of individual biraderi networks, membership of which is based on kinship and patronage. There is a strict hierarchy within the biraderi system and each biraderi network. The biraderi system functions as a hierarchical system of social stratification. Each biraderi is not equal in status and fits into a hierarchy of biraderis. Status and position in the hierarchy of biraderis is traditionally associated with certain jobs. For example, the Mughals and Rajputs would generally be amongst the wielders of power in a locality; Syeds and Quereshis would be local religious leaders; Bhattis, Sheikhs and Khojas would be trading people; Arains would be rural artisans; Jats would be cultivators and Gujars would do menial labour (Jalal, 2002: 217). The Kammi biraderis, who were traditionally the servant classes, can also be added to this hierarchy (Akhtar, 2003a; Gazdar, 2007).

According to Jalal (2002: 217) biraderis "are now mainly symbols of identity" with jobs no longer constrained by membership to a particular biraderi. However, biraderis remain an important system of social classification for many people, whether as symbols of identity or more (Gazdar, 2007). There is also a strict hierarchy within each biraderi; biraderis are hierarchical and patriarchal and led by a council of male elders known as the *biraderi panchayat* (Alavi, 2001). Decisions within the household may be discussed communally, but it is the male head of the household who has the final say on decisions (Akhtar, 2013). For this reason, the interests of women and young people may be overlooked or be secondary to the interests of male elders.

As well as a system of social stratification, biraderi networks also act as welfare systems. Just as in Pakistan, where it has been argued that biraderis are often more trusted than the police and the justice system, biraderi networks in the U.K. supplement state support (Shaw, 2000). In this respect, biraderis act as an alternative to state support by providing emotional support, financial aid, translation and any other services that help individuals to navigate life in the U.K. (Shaw, 2000). One of the primary ways the biraderi networks have performed their welfare function is by aiding immigration to the U.K. and it was through the biraderi that a large amount of immigration was even possible. Biraderi networks would provide sponsorship for individuals to come to the U.K. and once they had arrived, biraderis could provide accommodation and help individuals to find jobs (Akhtar, 2013). The pattern of chain migration meant that most migrants were surrounded by kin and fellow villagers both at work and in their neighbourhood; this ensured the ease of biraderi participation and the continuation of the biraderi system in the U.K. (Ballard, 1994).

The biraderi system also helps to maintain ties between the U.K. and the 'homeland'. Through intercontinental marriages, remittances and visits back home, the biraderi system helps to ensure that connections are maintained (Bolognani, 2007).

According to Bologanni (2007: 62), the "two worlds" of the U.K. and Pakistan are "constantly fused in the economy of *biraderi*." Huge villas are constructed in Pakistan by those living in the U.K. to demonstrate their success and wealth (Bolognani, 2007). Biraderis also act as a mechanism of control. The honour of the biraderi is tied up with the honour of the individual and biraderi elders can reprimand those who misbehave by ostracising them in order to maintain the *izzat* (honour) of the biraderi (Akhtar, 2013).

According to Din (2006) the size of a biraderi can range from anywhere between 50 and 500 members. Membership of the biraderi is based on a combination of vertical and horizontal ties between men (Alavi, 1972). Women inherit their father's biraderi and, if they marry outside of the biraderi, become a member of their husband's biraderi upon marriage (Alavi, 1972). Members of the biraderi may share vertical ties because they descend from a traceable common male ancestor (Alavi, 1972). Whilst vertical ties are important, horizontal ties may have surmounted vertical ties in their importance in the U.K. context. Horizontal ties emphasise the idea of biraderi as a 'brotherhood' where relationships are based on "horizontal fraternal ties between contemporaries" and refers to those households that participate in the biraderi (Alavi, 1972: 2).

Studies into biraderi in the U.K. have suggested that patrilineal descent is a less important qualification for biraderi membership than these fraternal relationships. For example, Werbner's (1989: 296) study into the biraderi system in Manchester found that biraderi could include "cognatic kinsmen, affines [relatives by marriage], the consanguineous relatives of affines and even the affines of affines". In a similar study in Bristol it was noted that biraderis could include a person's acquaintances and those of the same social class (Siddique Seddon, 2004). In this form of biraderi,

participation is emphasised (Alavi, 1972); it is those families that engage with the biraderi that are included in the biraderi.

Anwar (1979: 63) argued that the biraderi of participation is particularly relevant in the U.K. context "as members cooperate and interact in a new situation". Participation can take the form of marriage or prestations. Anthropologists have typically used the French word 'prestation' to refer to gift giving, however, it can be used more specifically to refer to the exchange of goods in a ritualistic environment (Sherry, 1983; Belk and Coon, 1993). The gifts exchanged can be material or non-material goods (Good, 1982), for example money, food, time or ideas (Belk and Coon, 1993). Marriages and the giving of prestations signify the continued cooperation of different families within the biraderi (Werbner, 1989; Alavi, 1972). Marriages take place between different households in the biraderi to reinforce the relationship between them (Werbner, 1989). Prestations are performed through the system of *vartan bhanji* where gifts are presented to the host family of a ceremony (Alavi, 1972).

The practice of *vartan bhanji* creates obligation between the different families within the biraderi. According to this practice, members of the biraderi attending the ceremony give gifts of money to the hosting family. However, such 'gifts' should more accurately be seen as obligations as families must reciprocate to symbolise unity within the biraderi. The reciprocation of these gifts does not take place at the same time but at a subsequent ceremony where the amount is repaid and an extra amount is paid to the hosting family to ensure that an outstanding obligation remains between the families (Alavi, 1972). By creating obligations, the practice of *vartan bhanji* ensures continued cooperation between the families in the biraderi. This sense of obligation has implications for U.K. politics, as will be shown in the next section.

Biraderi and U.K. politics

Biraderi networks have played a positive role in U.K. politics in a number of ways. Firstly, as networks that have helped members to navigate life in the U.K., biraderis have helped to translate and provide information about where and how to vote (Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017). Interviewees remarked on the high level of electoral participation in the Asian community, something that may, in part, be attributed to the role played by biraderi networks in translating relevant literature and ensuring information about when, where and how to vote is provided. Secondly, where funds are scarce in an election, having help from the biraderi network in campaigning and spreading the party message can be very effective (Peace and Akhtar, 2015). Thirdly, biraderi networks have also provided their members with the necessary strength in numbers to gain political representation in the face of ethnic and religious exclusion in the U.K. (Purdam, 2001; Garbaye, 2005).

Despite these positive functions of biraderis, in recent years there has been increased concern about the role of biraderi networks in U.K. politics. The very nature of the biraderi system as hierarchical and based on kinship, patronage and obligation enables it to be manipulated by biraderi elders, political parties and candidates in order to influence selections and elections. Akhtar (2013: 90) terms this manipulation "biraderi-politicking" and argues that whilst the biraderi system and biraderi-politicking are connected (biraderi networks are necessary for biraderi-politicking), biraderi networks do not necessarily lead to biraderi-politicking. She argues that in biraderi-politicking, biraderi networks are used in a patronage relationship to advance political interests (Akhtar, 2013).

Primarily the aim of any political party or candidate in an election is to be elected and, to this end, to gain as many votes as possible. The biraderi system can help this to happen. According to Akhtar (2013: 91), the role of the biraderi system in

U.K. elections is to advance "the political ambitions and interests of individuals, including individuals outside the community". The main way of advancing the interests of individuals is through the creation of a bloc vote. A biraderi is a rallying point for individuals; it is a patronage system in which loyalty is given in return for support. It follows then, that in selections and elections the biraderi network, and the loyalty of individuals to that network, can be called upon to ensure the selection or election of a particular candidate. The candidate may be a respected member of a biraderi, often an elder, who calls upon their biraderi network for support. Equally, the candidate may not be a member of a biraderi but offer some kind of incentive to the elders of a biraderi in order to gain their votes, and subsequently the votes of all biraderi members.

There are four actors to be considered in the selection and election process. Firstly, there are the political parties whose aim it is to select a suitable candidate to stand and, ultimately, win the election. Secondly, there are the candidates whose aim it is to be selected as a candidate and then to be elected as the political representative. Thirdly, there are the biraderi elders who act as brokers between the political parties and their candidates, and the voters. Finally, there are the voters themselves who are presented with a choice of candidates from different political parties in the election. A combination of patronage and pressure existing between these different actors enables biraderi-politicking to take place. Biraderi-politicking will be explained below in relation to each of these actors.

Elders and Candidates: Patronage Politics

Biraderi-politicking can be used in a number of ways to enable the selection and election of a political candidate. Whether it is an elder trying to gain the support of other elders, a respected member of the biraderi trying to gain the support of elders, or a non-biraderi member trying to gain the support of the elders, the relationship is that

of patron and client. It is patronage politics where candidates (patrons) offer favours in return for votes collected by the elders (clients). In patronage politics voters will go wherever they can get the best deal: "relying upon patronage…means that the voters are available to the highest bidder, and with them, the political activists" (Warner, 1997: 538). A voter's attachment to the political party is based on "individual material interests, not on ideological stances" (Warner, 1997: 539). In biraderi-politicking elders *are* the voters. They play a 'middle-man' role between political parties and their candidates, and the voters. They take on a brokerage role in which they become "intermediary actors facilitating transactions between other actors lacking access to or trust in one another" (Fernandez and Gould 1989: 91). Elders take the votes, votes that belong to them as a result of their brokerage role, and give them to whichever candidate offers them the best deal.

Candidates and Patronage

The benefits and hindrances of this patronage system for candidates are clear. Candidates are being guaranteed a number of votes to help them be selected or elected and have to approach very few people to get them. This interviewee explains how easy it is to get the biraderi vote:

> […] there is 14 people […] I need to see to get the clan vote sorted.

> White activist.

For biraderi members these guaranteed votes may be of particular importance. Being from a Pakistani or Bangladeshi background may mean that there are barriers in place that prevent their selection and election; parties are perceived to be less willing to select, and voters are perceived to be less willing to elect (Sobolewska et al., 2015). Previous research has shown that white voters may be less likely to vote for Muslim candidates (Fisher et al., 2015) and given that the majority of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis living in the U.K. are Muslim this could negatively impact their electoral

chances. As this interviewee demonstrates, there is a belief that racism can prevent Asian people from being selected by political parties whilst white people will be selected, despite ability, because they are white:

> I have seen so many white councillors who don't have any knowledge about different things and they are still there for ages because they are white because the predominantly white area, there Asian people can't be selected because they have the racism.

> Asian activist.

Similarly, another interviewee argues that parties will not select non-white candidates in predominantly white areas because they are worried that their voters will not vote for them:

> So, round here, where do non-white candidates get selected from? Generally, from those areas where there are black voters. They seldom get selected from all-white areas. Why not? It's not through lack of ability alone...it's because obviously, you know, ethnicity plays a part in it.[...]It's blatant discrimination, not just kind of. It's absolute discrimination because they know their white voters won't vote for them.'

> Asian activist.

In a system where Asian candidates and biraderi members believe that it is not possible for an Asian candidate to be selected and elected based on ability alone, biraderi-politicking becomes necessary. As this interviewee argues, even those candidates who speak against biraderi-politicking find that it is necessary for selection and election:

> On the one hand, they condemn openly, vigorously these grouping based on biraderis and the regions. They condemn that. But on the other hand, without having that, they can't move further...you know… they can't progress at all... they can't enter in that field because... But they're having to face this barrier also...you know… and they come up, they are very energetic, they believe in their strength, educational strength, their other strengths, they're outspoken and everything. But when they come to the saddle they

> realise…hang on a minute we can't go any further...
>
> Asian activist.

Akhtar (2013) and Purdam (2001) have both argued that reliance on biraderi has been a necessary way of accessing political office in the face of discrimination. A report carried out by researchers from NatCen found that biraderi can be used in deprived areas with few opportunities to obtain status and power in the face of perceived structural racism (Gill, Jago and Hussain, 2015). Biraderi, therefore, provides an alternative opportunity structure and appealing to biraderi relationships may be seen as necessary to gain access to political office.

This system can, however, be a hindrance rather than a benefit for some candidates. Those candidates who do not want, or are not able, to use the biraderi networks may not be selected or elected. A candidate may simply be unable to gather enough votes to challenge the bloc vote created through the biraderi networks. Moreover, the patriarchal nature of the biraderi system means that women in particular are unlikely to gain the support of their biraderi. As this interviewee argues, women may face trouble from their family and this prevents some women from standing as candidates:

> Well, to be honest, it is a setting, you can't change the mentality,
> you can't change the family system. It is hard. You can see few
> womens they are coming forward, but they have to face lots of
> trouble in their family. So I don't think that near future we could
> see a bigger change. I can't see anything.
>
> Asian activist.

This interviewee discusses a situation where a candidate was forced by a male elder to withdraw her candidacy:

> X she put up, she would be a good candidate, there was a lot of
> pressure put on and someone phoned her uncle back in Pakistan
> and coerced her into withdrawing her candidacy so a male

candidate could stand, who was Pakistani heritage.

White activist.

In 2016 women from the Muslim Women's Network U.K. wrote to the Labour Party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, to tell him of the systematic blocking they faced from Asian men when attempting to become Labour Party candidates. This was put down to a combination of the patriarchal nature of the biraderi system and men not wanting their power to be challenged as well as some believing it is 'un-Islamic' for women to be involved in politics (Razzall, 2016). By failing to support, or actively preventing, female candidates from standing as political representatives, the biraderi networks are exacerbating the problem of female under-representation in politics and particularly the under-representation of South Asian women in U.K. politics.

Elders and Patronage

The benefit of this patronage relationship is also clear for the elders who are not themselves candidates. The relationship means that elders have some control over who is selected to stand for political parties and, eventually, who is elected to be a political representative. There is a degree of status involved in these transactions. Elders become known among local politicians as the people to approach for votes, they become important on the local political scene. They are promised favours in return for votes, which according to the Representation of the People Act (RPA) 1983 (section 113) is considered to be bribery and is an example of electoral malpractice. These favours could be small political positions or perhaps promises of financial support for particular community projects if that individual gains office (Akhtar, 2013). As this interviewee stated, helping a candidate to win leads to favours when they are in office:

> and they feel that because we've got somebody elected, in there
> tomorrow will be, eh…they will be favouring us…in…in whether
> it's projects, whether it's help, support…because "I was there, I

made you win", yeah?

Asian activist.

In the election campaign, political candidates and their supporters will treat elders and the heads of individual households within the biraderi in order to obtain the votes of biraderi members. Treating is an example of electoral malpractice. It is defined as when a person "corruptly, by himself or by any other person, either before, during or after an election, directly or indirectly gives or provides, or pays wholly or in part the expense of giving or providing any meat, drink, entertainment or provision to or for any person" with the intention of influencing that person's or another person's vote or because that person has voted or not voted (RPA, 1983: Section 114). This interviewee explained how candidates will treat elders and male heads of households in the lead up to the election campaign:

> They'll call them to a meeting, they've had a nice meal, speeches are made, people have been asked to, and then people have said 'yeah, yeah, I'll support you, I can get you 40 votes.'

Asian activist.

In order to demonstrate that these individuals have indeed garnered the promised number of votes for the candidate and favours be given, votes must be collected and shown to the candidate. This process is facilitated by the postal voting system whereby individuals may cast their vote remotely rather than in the polling station. This interviewee explains how the postal voting system facilitates the treating process:

> But there is no way of checking 'I am going to deliver my 40 votes'. The only way to do that is to go to your friends, relatives and say 'when you get your postal votes, one register your vote in the post.' So that's the only way because otherwise no one knows whether you have been able to give someone a vote because it is a secret ballot… But what's happened is that, in order for people to say that I have delivered my 40 votes because for the 6 weeks I have been coming round every other day to the house that you have rented for the three months prior to the election, where none stop food is served and you are being treated basically. So for that month/6

weeks you haven't had to eat at home basically, you have been fed and looked after. And the only way that you know when people are sitting there is say 'well look, here are half a dozen that I picked up today.'

Asian activist.

Votes become a sort of currency, a way for elders to negotiate rewards and favours and this practice continues once a candidate has been through the selection and election process and enters into political office. There is a sense that the representative who has been voted in is 'owned' by those who have provided the votes and once again votes become a currency exchanged for favour and representation, as this interviewee demonstrates:

And it's like 'yeah I voted for you and therefore you are mine for four years and when I need you, you will be there. If not, next time I am not going to vote for you.'

Asian activist.

Processes such as this can create the expectation that political representatives will be available at any time, day or night. For example, one interviewee, a councillor, discussed their own experience of this:

My home is theoretically open 24/7. I have had people knocking at 11 o'clock at night saying "can you sign my passport for me?" or 6.45 in the morning saying "actually I am off to London can you give me a signature please?" And that is just the way it is and when you become a councillor you just have to accept that.

Asian activist.

Elders, and some individuals, may be forced to vote for a candidate for fear that if that candidate wins without their support, they will not be represented. As this interviewee argues:

[...] because if you say "I didn't vote for you" or you say "Look, I'm not interested, yeah"...you know that they will not engage with you, the politician will not want to do anything with you...they'll certainly remember what "You didn't vote for me so therefore, you

know... I'm not...!", yeah...and you tend to find that once politicians know that you if you are affiliated to a party, you know...they will most likely help and support those people from their party...

Asian activist.

Theoretically, political representatives are supposed to stand for all members of their ward or constituency regardless of whom they voted for or their party loyalty. In practice, however, this does not always happen and the system of patronage employed by the biraderi networks means that representation is seen to be dependent on the way an individual cast their vote in the previous election. As with treating during the election campaign, this makes it necessary to prove that you have voted in order to receive representation, as this interviewee argues:

I think they see it as something that they have got to do in the sense that, you know if I am standing, so and so will vote just to let me know that he is voting and if he ever needs me then I am there for him.

Asian activist.

Representation, therefore, can become factional, dependent on votes and divided according to who voted for whom.

Elders and Voters: The Bloc Vote

In order to be able to negotiate with candidates for votes, elders must be able to gather votes and create a 'bloc' vote for their favoured candidate. Likewise, if an elder is the candidate he may try to create a bloc vote in order to be selected and elected. This bloc vote could be based on respect of biraderi elders and their opinions. As this interviewee explains:

But that influence thing, and it comes out of respect more than anything else, and because culturally that's how we've always been […].

Asian activist.

A sense of respect and admiration for what an elder has achieved could mean that their opinion is both particularly valued and difficult to go against. For example, as this interviewee explains:

> […]if my dad tomorrow, he is head of my family, if he said tomorrow 'no we're voting for an independent candidate' it would be difficult for me to say no because for me and my family, he is everything to us. He is the reason why we are here, you know, for us it would be difficult. I know he wouldn't, but if he did. And that is played right across the ward now. There are certain individuals who are very, you know, who have got large families and carry that clout. You would never get all the votes, but there is a chance that you would pick up the vast majority. Now you can call that abuse, you can call that respect.
>
> Asian activist.

In itself, voting according to a sense of loyalty and respect is not necessarily wrong and exists to some extent in all cultures; young people in particular may be unsure how to vote and respect the opinions of their elders who have more experience in such matters. However, if voters feel that they *must* vote according to the wishes of their elders *despite* their own views and because they fear the repercussions of not obeying their elders, this is a problem and brings into question the democratic rights of that individual and the legitimacy of the selection and election process.

Pressure and influence

The bloc vote can be created through a combination of pressure and influence. As this interviewee argues:

> Well...they are not getting the votes…they are forcing the votes! That's the issue. They're forcing the votes on people to vote for them.
>
> Asian activist.

Pressure is often based on the fact that the biraderi system is itself hierarchical and based on patronage. The elders are the patrons in a biraderi; they are the ones who

members (clients) are reliant on for decision-making regarding matters such as finances. Biraderi members offer their support and loyalty to elders in exchange for leadership, protection and welfare. Moreover, in the U.K. context, membership of the biraderi is often defined by participation and obligation; voting for the biraderi favoured candidate could be considered a form of participation and an obligation. This relationship makes it difficult for members of the biraderi to go against the wishes of their elders when it comes to voting. Fear about the repercussions of not voting for the biraderi favoured candidate means that voters will be more concerned about their connections to a candidate than a candidate's campaign, as this interviewee explains:

> It won't be the message that we're listening to… it…what will be looking at is "Who is he? And where is he from back home? And, um, wh-where is my link to him, yeah? My connection? So if...if I don't support him, it's going to affect me this, this and this way. I'm going to…my uncle's going to be upset with me. My cousin'll get upset with me".

> White activist.

The postal voting system has made it possible for elders and candidates to influence voters or even steal ballots on a large scale in order to create a bloc vote. According to this interviewee, one individual may even control up to several thousand votes through the postal voting system:

> There are some people in the community, who control about 4-5 thousands votes in that area, in that locality. And he normally decides which way it's going...

> Asian activist.

Without the protection of the secret ballot created by the conditions of the polling station, postal ballots leave their users more vulnerable to pressure and influence. Undue influence is defined as taking place when a person, or someone acting on their behalf, uses or threatens to use force, violence or restraint, or to inflict or threaten to inflict, injury, damage or harm to persuade or force a person to vote or refrain from

voting. It is an example of electoral malpractice and can be used to apply pressure to biraderi members to vote in a certain way (RPA, 1983: Section 115). This particularly affects women and young people whose status in the biraderi is such that they can end up with little say over how their vote is cast. As this interviewee explains:

> Well the choice, yeah, the choice is based on pressure and if it's like a hierarchy in the family they will say 'right, vote for this, vote for that.' A lot of people, especially young people, don't have a clue what they are doing or what they are voting for.
>
> Asian activist.

In 2006 the Metropolitan Police Authority expressed concern about postal voting and the influence that the head of an extended family may have over voters:

> Anecdotally, some community contacts have remarked on how such practices that are seen as acceptable outside the U.K. have been adopted in respect of U.K. elections – for example, the head of the extended family instructing family members to vote for a particular party or candidate. Postal voting increases the risk, as the safeguard of a truly secret ballot is removed. (Metropolitan Police Authority, 2006).

As well as unduly influencing electors, elders may also fill in postal votes belonging to members of the biraderi. This is considered to be personation, where a person votes as somebody else at the polling station, as a proxy voter or by postal ballot (RPA, 1983: Section 60), and breaks U.K. electoral law. According to the interviewees, this most commonly takes place where the head of the household will fill the postal vote in on behalf of any women and young people in the house. A large number of interviewees suggested that this is happening in elections and women and young people in particular may never even see their postal ballot, let alone fill it in. As these two interviewees state:

> Oh yeah, I have had people say, 'oh I don't know my dad fills it in', 'Oh I don't know how we're voting till my dad gets back.'
>
> White activist.

> We get told on the doorstep 'my husband decides'.
>
> White activist.

It is important to note that although the postal voting system has made it easier for elders to influence women, interviewees were also concerned about influence in the polling station. For example, this interviewee argues that women will have been told who to vote for before they enter the polling station:

> They…they'll be told who to vote for, I'll can assure you o' that. They…they will go with a set number in their head. If it's number two, they'll go and vote for number two. They'll know straight away. And…and it's without a doubt they…they've already been told who to vote for and where to go for it.
>
> White activist.

Intimidation

Pressure and influence to vote can easily become intimidation, which is also a form of undue influence. This intimidation can mean that biraderi members are frightened of the consequences of not voting or voting for the 'wrong' person. As an interviewee on Navid Akhtar's (2003a) radio show *The Biraderi*, stated:

> If you don't vote then of course when you go back home there will be people waiting for you and you won't be a very popular person. They'll say that person lost because of you, you are a traitor to our biraderi, because you didn't vote that Sikh person got in, or that white person got in, or that person belonging to low caste got in, you should be ashamed.

Similarly, respondents to the research carried out by NatCen felt that not voting for the elected candidate could result in social stigma, ill-feeling and being less able to request support from the elected individual (Gill, Jago and Hussain, 2015).

A number of the interviewees reported concerns about the way in which candidates and their supporters encouraged voters to attend the polling station. Both of these interviewees felt that tactics of intimidation are used:

> [T]hey transport people and, you know, take 'em to the voting station, which I …don't agree on. I think that's intimidating somebody, they come and knock on doors and they say "Go and vote, go and vote", seen it with my own eyes, you know…when… somebody wants to vote, they'll vote. Some people are pushed to vote either, obviously, by their partners or their families…or, you know…by their community people that come to your house and say "You better vote, you better vote". So…that…in that sense, it's all a bit, you know…
>
> Asian activist.
>
> They will go and drag them out, you don't get a choice, there's Tannoys going, there's people knocking on the door saying 'you haven't voted yet, come on I'll take you down there'. And it's, I am not saying it is all illegal, a lot of it is encouraging people to go and vote but I do believe that there is a certain amount of intimidation in there as well.
>
> White activist.

Concern was also expressed about gangs of men outside of polling stations on Election Day creating an intimidating presence as electors arrive to cast their vote.

> Groups of ten young, adult males stood outside the polling station, I was told that people were frightened to go past them to vote.
>
> White activist.

Such intimidation has not just been reported by the interviewees. In a statement to the House of Commons in 2007, then MP Ann Cryer claimed that in the Keighley constituency similar problems took place where crowds gathered outside the polling station in an intimidating manner (Cryer, 2007). A number of interviewees pointed out that this behaviour is unlikely to change the way in which an individual votes as most people will have decided how to cast their vote before they arrive at the polling station.

However, one interviewee did suggest that such intimidation could prevent people from wanting to vote in the polling station at all:

> or people just don't want to go out when there is men congregated around the polling stations, that is another issue, they don't like going out, they finding it intimidating sometimes, so they prefer to vote at home, sat at home.
>
> Asian activist.

Undue influence, personation and intimidation are illegal according to U.K. electoral law, calling into question the legitimacy of the selections and elections in which they are used. Moreover, these tactics undermine democracy and remove an elector's democratic right to a vote free from the interference of other individuals and organisations. Such tactics do not adhere to the principle of one person, one vote which aims to represent the interests of individuals in the democratic system, not organisations and groupings which often promote the interests of a minority.

Party membership

Creating a bloc vote in the selection process may involve some of the same tactics of pressure and influence discussed above. However, it is also necessary to have members in the local party to vote. Therefore, the loyalty of the biraderi is called upon and candidates fill the local party with members of their biraderi in order to obtain votes. As this interviewee explains:

> You know... if there was a strong personality that wanted to stand in X. then... of course you would have that kind of thing… you would recruit members to your own political party... say for example, if you was a Labour councillor and you was Pakistani and I was opposing you, I wanted to stand here, then I would recruit members from my own region that I come from Pakistan or from my own biraderi[…]
>
> Asian activist.

This may not be based on pressure because members of the biraderi may wish to become members of the party and to vote for that candidate. However, some of the

interviewees did also claim that membership is being bought by candidates for members of their biraderi in order for that candidate to gain the party nomination. According to this interviewee:

> [I]f you have got £300 for one year, you could easily be a councillor because you have to buy like 15-30 membership and maximum I think £2/£3 a month is of any party, you can buy 15-30 people's membership and when the nomination comes and you have been selected as a councillor, this is what is happening in that area.
>
> Asian activist.

Where membership is bought for individuals it seems likely that there would be at least some cases where it is not based on free choice, calling into question the legitimacy of the candidate selected and going against the Labour Party constitution. According to the Labour Party Rule Book, buying party membership for others is only permitted if they would have been willing to pay for that membership themselves: "It is an abuse of party rules for one individual or faction to 'buy' party membership for other individuals or groups of individuals who would otherwise be unwilling to pay their own subscriptions" (Labour Party, 2016: 9). It seems unlikely that in all cases of biraderi members being bought a membership, those individuals would have willingly bought their own membership. In fact, one interviewee stated that members recruited in this way would not have become party members otherwise:

> And I don't want to be a member but because he is paying my £20 I might as well put my name there. And I won't even go, I'll attend the meeting when there is a shortlisting. They'll be herded along, they'll go onto the meeting and select them. It is local parties, they have to root it out, they have to make sure that these people are not just members for the sake of selecting certain candidates.
>
> Asian activist.

It is likely therefore, that at least some of these individuals have not been recruited according to the rules set out in the Labour Party constitution. Furthermore, those

individuals who have membership bought for them purely to vote for a particular candidate are unlikely to have a strong interest in, or knowledge about, the party and party policies. Wholesale membership of the local party is not driven by any interest in politics or the party but is instead motivated by the desire to support a particular candidate. As these two interviewees state:

> And membership […] at times is driven […]by family memberships […]your extended families and friends […]becoming a members, rather than, eh… "This is my policies, this is what I stand for, I want you to join, I want you to come and do the leafleting, I want you to do canvassing". That's not…that's not the issue…says "Look, you know"…if I say "Look, eh, I have to have these people, eh, boost my membership up". "Fine, we'll do that".

> Asian activist.

> Because if somebody got three hundred members here, they probably their relatives, friends, families…you know…if you got four children, the four members Labour party, him and his wife…they're probably be his cousins and his friends…they're not going against him. They…they're not interested in politics, they not going to vote for me…so…

> Asian activist.

Membership in this way does not encourage an interest in politics, political parties and the political process, instead it encourages factionalism and self-interest. Moreover, this way of selecting political candidates also makes it extremely difficult, even impossible, for candidates outside of the biraderi system or with a small biraderi to be selected in certain seats. One interviewee even goes so far as to suggest that in their area politics is dominated by one biraderi and members of other biraderis cannot be selected:

> [I]n that area, in XXX, is mostly a Jatt family. They have predominantly living there from Azad Kashmir, the people […] So they decide who could be the councillor. Like me who is from Pakistan, we can't be involved, we can't be involved, I know that because we can't be nominated. I don't have that much votes. And they can easily be, they can decide easily, 'oh this is the person

who can be the councillor, this is the person who can't be the councillor'.

Asian activist.

Political parties

Political parties have been accused of turning a "blind eye" to biraderi-politicking (Akhtar, 2003a). As Shahid Malik (cited in Akhtar, 2003b), a former member of the Labour National Executive, has argued:

> Labour and other parties got used to dealing with clan people and there seems to be an unwitting collusion there between the parties and first generation British Pakistanis [...] Unless and until the main political parties take responsibility then the clan mentality will continue and people will continue to abuse the democratic process and we're not going to get the kind of healthy outcomes we are looking for.

Like candidates, political parties typically want to get enough votes to win an election and in some areas, biraderi-politicking can enable that to happen. It is not just specific candidates, but political parties in general, that are accused of taking advantage of biraderi-politicking. A number of the interviewees felt that parties are happy to turn a blind eye to biraderi activity in order to gain votes. As this interviewee argues:

> Parties encourage that or turn a blind eye to that when they know that[…]so that's why initially I said that it is a problem in the Pakistani community but the parties, rather than addressing these issues, they are compounding it basically, they are encouraging that because they want their candidate to win at any cost. So they are actually, rather than say 'look, no no, sorry, for us, for me as Labour Party chairman in the local constituency or whatever, I won't have that, I won't tolerate it,' They know it and sometimes they come to these big gatherings that they organise it, make a speech, you know.

Asian activist.

For political parties, the principal benefit of turning a blind eye to this biraderi politicking is votes. Selecting a candidate with a large amount of biraderi support can

mean that parties get more votes for less work as elders carry out their role as brokers and create a bloc vote. Parties can also directly manipulate biraderi ties as a way to divide the Asian community, and thus the vote, by selecting candidates from different biraderis to stand against one another. Purdam (2001) found that the Conservative Party had attempted to divide the Labour vote by selecting candidates from rival biraderis. This was also a concern highlighted by some of the interviewees. As one interviewee argued:

> And a lot of people are saying that the only reason I didn't get in, lot of independent people, you know, my friends, people I work with, said because there is another independent from the Pakistani community who stood just to make, and now it is quite an open secret, that he was only encouraged to stand by some individual who probably didn't like me or some people from other political parties who wanted to break the ethnic vote basically because if all the ethnic vote was galvanised you never know you could get someone like me get in.

> Asian activist.

By turning a blind eye to biraderi-politicking and even directly engaging with biraderi-politicking, political parties run the risk of selecting and electing ineffective and self-interested political representatives. Local parties can be willing to select a candidate based on the number of votes they believe that candidate will get, despite, and even because of, a lack of ability on that candidate's part. As this interviewee argues:

> And it's not ability either. So it's really, it's not, there are two Pakistanis[…]but someone is a graduate, an independent thinker, can think for himself, got a good strategy, speaks well in the meeting as well. And the other one hardly said anything but, you know, a number of people have said this person because of his clan or whatever will get more votes. That person will be selected, they know that that person won't be any good within our own organisation challenging us, disagreeing sometimes, having a counter view, is not a bad thing either. […] But, you know, they wouldn't even, because they will see that person who is educated, he's quite vocal or whatever, probably as a threat as well because

they might challenge the norm. That individual might see the racism that that person who is probably not educated, can't influence or whatever, wouldn't be able to see, wouldn't be able to notice.

Asian activist.

According to this interviewee, not only do parties want to continue to take advantage of the votes delivered through biraderi-politicking, they also want to ensure that a strong Asian candidate cannot challenge the party organisation.

Biraderi-politicking can lead to candidates being selected and elected who have no loyalty to the political party. The candidate is not standing to represent the interests of the party but to advance their own interests. This interviewee argued that self-interest comes before an interest in party and policy:

And what the other factor is, is that their loyalties are not, even the candidates, their loyalties are not based on 'because I am passionate about the Labour Party policies' their loyalties are based on 'I can get the best out of this party for me, personally I have got a lot to gain. […]'

Asian activist.

Respondents to research carried out by NatCen felt that councillors in particular use their positions to advance their own status and particularly to advance their status in Pakistan (Gill, Jago and Hussain, 2015: 30).

By turning a blind eye to biraderi-politicking, parties are allowing themselves to be used as vehicles for an individual's success. The selection and election of self-interested candidates is dangerous for political parties. Downs' view of self-interested candidates states, they "never seek office as a means of carrying particular policies; their only goal is to reap the reward of holding office per se" (Downs, 1957: 28). Candidates who act based on self-interest and not in the interest of the party or particular policies will show little loyalty to the political party. As with patronage based voting, candidates will seek to represent whichever party they will gain the most

from. This can lead to representatives moving between parties for personal gain as these two interviewees explain:

> I suppose I never recovered really when he was Lib Dem, he just switched from Lib Dem to Labour in my first election. I asked him why he changed and he said 'well Labour is in power'. And to me that just says it all, I have never asked him again, 'why are you Labour?'
>
> White activist.
>
> And indeed, there have been cases where councillors have moved from one party to another, they have predominantly been from Pakistani heritage councillors, and when they've moved they have become mayor or the chair of a committee, money has followed.
>
> White activist.

The implications of biraderi-politicking

There are three implications of biraderi-politicking that effect both the electoral choice provided to the electorate and the quality of political representation. Firstly, biraderi-politicking means that voters are disconnected from the political process and are not provided with the necessary information to make an informed, individual choice. Biraderi-politicking means that candidates and parties do not engage with the electorate. The brokerage position that elders have as middle-men in selections and elections acting between candidates and the electorate, means that voters are disconnected from parties and candidates. One interviewee explained the problems associated with this system:

> [O]ur job is to make sure that we get the individual and we get the whole, so we go through the whole 220 members of that family, rather than go to one and the other 219 feel like they are not part of something, I say we need to make them part of what we do and make them feel like we are there for them as well. Because the way it works is they would then go to the person and saying 'well

actually who shall we vote?' and then that person will then contact us.

Asian activist.

Voters are not treated as individuals, and the notion of one person, one vote is bypassed. Instead votes 'belong' to elders who build a bloc vote based on a combination of pressure and influence created by the hierarchal nature of the patronage based biraderi system. Political parties do not canvas individual voters but those elders who can guarantee the vote, and because of this a political void opens up between voters and parties. Indeed Sobolewska et al. (2013) found that ethnic minority voters were less likely to report being contacted by political parties during the 2010 election campaign than white voters. Perhaps for the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities this could, in part, be accounted for by the brokerage position carried out by elders.

The disconnect between political parties and voters can leave voters feeling as though they are not valued in the political process and that political representatives are not there to work for them. Voters are not canvassed and educated on the different policies of the parties (Sobolewska et al., 2015). Without knowledge about the political process and party policies it is hard for members of the biraderi to challenge the authority of the elders at election time. In fact, there may be a sense that elders know more about the voting process and therefore should be deferred to in elections. As one interviewee stated:

> No, no it is just something that they're told to do. I don't think they'll think it is wrong, I don't think they'll see it as wrong, I don't think they'll see it that they're giving up their right to vote. They'll just say 'well he knows about things that I don't know'.

> White activist.

If voters received the necessary education from political parties about the voting process and party policies, then the belief that elders know more about politics may be challenged and women and young people in particular may have more control over their vote at election time. Greater engagement with political parties would increase the ability of voters to make an informed and individual choice in elections.

Secondly, some electors are also directly excluded from the political process, which means that they are actually not provided with any choice at election time. Voters are disenfranchised when elders prevent them from casting their ballot free from undue influence, or when they are prevented from casting their ballot at all. As Abbas (2006: xiii-xiv) argues:

> Local community "elders" are propped up through artificial support mechanisms that facilitate the electoral process to the advantage of the main political parties but take out of the hands of the people the choice of who they want as their leaders.

Votes that are dictated or stolen by elders do not represent the interests of all voters. Instead, these votes represent the interests of a few male elders as elders take away the electorate's electoral choice. This means that the interests of women and young people in particular are left under-represented in the political realm and makes it very difficult for women and young people to seek political office. As this interviewee argues, young people often will not even know whom they have voted for:

> And you'll probably ask some people and they probably won't even know who they voted for because sadly their vote has come in the post, they will request a postal vote because dad would like to see that happening and then all they have done is just signed a piece of paper.
>
> Asian activist.

Biraderi-politicking also influences the electoral choice of electors outside of the biraderi system. The use of a bloc vote makes it difficult for candidates without a bloc

vote to gain the necessary support to be selected and elected. The votes of those outside of the biraderi system may count for little against the bloc vote.

Thirdly, biraderi-politicking affects the quality of political representation. The lack of electoral choice provided to voters as a result of biraderi-politicking can lead to the selection and election of weak and ineffective candidates. Moreover, the biraderi-politicking carried out by biraderi networks in the selection process also means that those voters who are able to make an individual choice in elections may be left with weak and ineffective candidates to choose from. Biraderi-politicking means that if a large enough bloc vote is created then a candidate will be selected and elected whether they have the necessary skills to be in political office or not. In the selection process this means that filling the local party with enough supporters can be enough to guarantee your selection. As a former Labour Party campaign manager stated during the 2010 Bradford by-election, in order to succeed in the Bradford Labour Party "you need roots tracing back to Mirpur" (Pidd, 2012). This can lead to candidates being selected who do not have the necessary skills for political office. As this interviewee stated, a large enough membership means selection regardless of skill:

> We do have a problem because if somebody got a membership…even if he's…he's good enough for a council or he's not…but he going to be elected and selected.

> Asian activist.

Likewise, in the election process voting for a candidate based on pressure and influence can lead to the election of ineffective candidates. Electors are not given the opportunity, and may lack the political awareness, to consider the skills of the candidates in selections and elections. As this interviewee argues:

> [S]ome people are voting blindly because they know him...they just vote for him, they don't ask...'has he got the ability? is he able to raise question in council chamber where people have master degrees and things like that...They will be very literate person...is he gonna be able to go there and raise question? For my [area]...

> Does he have the ability? Most people don't have that, they don't
> have that kind of awareness…
>
> Asian activist.

Interviewees were very concerned about the impact that this could have on the quality of their political representatives. This interviewee doubted the competency of the Pakistani councillors in their area:

> In my view, in [area], out of the 5 councillors, the one cabinet
> member they had...none of the other councillors is capable of
> becoming even a cabinet member. That's my honest view about the
> Pakistani councillors that we have. They are not competent enough
> to have...to be even a cabinet member.
>
> Asian activist.

Some of the interviewees were concerned about representatives in their area who could not speak English well. As one interviewee argued:

> How are you going to hold the chief executive or local authority or
> whatever account…when that individual has a string of degrees and
> 40/50 years of local authority experience…and you can't even
> speak English properly, have difficulty reading and writing, have
> no prior knowledge of local authorities or how their systems
> work…how are you going to challenge them?
>
> Asian activist.

Political representatives who lack the necessary skills for their role cannot sufficiently represent all members of their ward or constituency. Poor representation leads to distrust in the political process and politicians. According to this interviewee:

> And you know the parties have Pakistani candidates and they just
> say 'well they are in it for themselves' you know. You often hear,
> 'they're in it for themselves.' That's the most often heard statement,
> 'they're in it for themselves.'
>
> Asian activist.

Poor representation could also lead to a decline in the area. As Zarina Khan (cited in Akhtar, 2003a), a presenter for the BBC Asian Network, has argued, it is

often in deprived areas that need skilled and effective candidates that biraderi-politicking takes place, which prevents these areas from developing. One interviewee also expressed concern about this and felt that, not only do areas not develop, areas may actually decline when representatives are selected and elected in this way:

> And what has happened is that, you know, a lot of the areas up and down the country, including where I live, ever since we have had local Pakistani councillors elected, which has been great to see, but sadly, the impact has been negative in terms of the improvements in the area, the services in the area. The area has declined in everything that you would expect your local councillor to be improving things.
>
> Asian activist.

Voters are afraid to report the political activity of biraderis because of the possible repercussions they will experience. As this interviewee states:

> […]"I've been asked for my postal vote". But the problem is, if you say something to the police, they get threatened: "Why have you gone to the police?", you know what I mean? And a lot of people are scared. They will admit to it but officially they won't. They'll say "Everything's fine. Not a problem". And…and that is very worrying, you know what I mean?
>
> White activist.

This makes it very difficult to challenge the biraderi-politicking carried out and encouraged by biraderi elders, candidates and political parties. The result is that voters continue to be disconnected, and even disenfranchised, from the political process and unsuitable candidates continue to be selected and elected to be political representatives.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have used the biraderi system as an example of how networks can act around the selection and election of political representatives and the implications that this has for voter choice. The biraderi system is comprised of

individual biraderi networks, membership of which is based on a combination of kinship, participation and obligation. In U.K. elections these networks can facilitate the selection and election of particular candidates. Through the creation of a bloc vote, which is based on a combination of loyalty, pressure and influence, elders can ensure that their favoured candidate is selected and elected. In return for the bloc vote elders are presented with favours and gifts from political candidates. Biraderi-politicking is, therefore, an extreme example of patronage politics; elders receive gifts and in exchange present votes to candidates. Similarly, in return for their support, biraderi members continue to receive the patronage of their elders. Biraderi-politicking can result in electoral malpractice in the form of treating, bribery, undue influence and personation. Political parties have colluded with biraderi elders and turned a blind eye to biraderi-politicking in order to obtain votes.

The result of biraderi-politicking is that in elections voters are presented with little electoral choice. They may be pressured to vote a certain way or to give their vote to their elders; they may even have their vote stolen. Members of the electorate that escape the pressure and influence of the biraderi elders could still find their choice limited because of a selection process influenced by biraderi-politicking and they may be presented with self-interested and ineffective candidates who have been selected as a result of biraderi-politicking. The election of such representatives can mean that the electorate are not being adequately represented by their politicians, distrust develops between the electorate and politicians, and the areas represented by self-interested and ineffective politicians experience decline.

Whilst the behaviour of biraderi networks and the implications of biraderi-politicking are clear, what is not clear is the extent to which this is a unique political occurrence. The idea that delivering votes buys you some power on the local political scene is not too different to the idea that donations on the local, or national, scene can

buy some power and influence within a political party. Similarly, when candidate selection takes place within the local party, candidates being selected based on their connections to that party, and not their ability to hold public office or their loyalty to the political party, cannot be unusual. Immigrant networks, such as the Tammany Hall Irish political organisation, as well as non-immigrant networks, such as trade unions, have all attempted to influence the political process in their favour.

The next chapter will further examine the relationship between political parties and biraderi networks, building upon the argument in this chapter that political parties have turned a blind eye to biraderi-politicking. It will show how the Labour Party in particular has used the biraderi system to their electoral advantage. After that the role of trade unions in the selection and election process will be examined. It is through the comparison of these two case studies that it will be possible to consider the implications of networks for the electorate, and to what extent biraderi-politicking really is different, or if it is just old politics in new bottles.

Chapter 4: The Labour Party and biraderi

For the biraderi-politicking discussed in the previous chapter to take place, political parties must be complicit at some level in the actions of biraderi networks. As I argued in the previous chapter, political parties have been accused of turning a "blind eye" to biraderi-politicking (Akhtar, 2003a). However, using the same dataset as the previous chapter, in this chapter I argue that the role of political parties has been far more than to simply turn a blind eye to biraderi-politicking. Instead I argue that biraderi networks have been consciously used as a mechanism to incorporate newly arrived Pakistani and Bangladeshi voters into U.K. politics. Politicians have deliberately taken advantage of the relationships in the biraderi networks and have used them to gather political support. As immigrants from the Commonwealth, Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants are able to vote upon arrival in the U.K. For politicians wishing to obtain or maintain power, it has been necessary to gather their votes. In order to incorporate these electors and gather their political support, politicians turned biraderi networks into political machines. Biraderi networks are carrying out machine politics that is reminiscent of the machine politics used to target immigrant populations in the 19th and 20th centuries in cities such as Chicago and New York.

By arguing that biraderi networks behave as political machines in U.K. elections, I am placing the role of biraderi in U.K. elections into a wider context and demonstrating that it is not perhaps as new and different as it has previously been made out to be. Furthermore, by arguing that biraderi networks have been used as mechanism for the political incorporation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants, I am contributing to the understanding of the mechanisms used to incorporate new immigrant voters, an area that has received little academic attention (Hochschild et al., 2013).

Whilst Labour Party politicians have not been the only ones to take advantage of biraderi networks, I outline three reasons why they were the first and most effective users of these networks. Firstly, Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants overwhelmingly settled in urban, industrial areas typically dominated by the Labour Party. Secondly, many of these immigrants were employed in unionised workforces and so are likely to have been exposed to the Labour Party through trade unions and shared some of the concerns of the traditional party voter. Thirdly, the divide between the left and right wings of the Labour Party provided an incentive for politicians to incorporate new members in order to support their position within the local party.

In the first section of this chapter I outline the challenge posed to political parties by vast numbers of new electors, and the ways in which parties have responded to this challenge. I argue that when there are large numbers of new electors political parties can respond by outsourcing their incorporation, as they have with Pakistani and Bangladeshi voters through the biraderi networks. I argue that the desire to incorporate new electors can be as much about intra-party competition as inter-party competition, as factions within a local party can compete for new members to bolster their power.

In the second section of this chapter I show how biraderi networks have been used as a tool of political incorporation and, as a result, turned into political machines. I argue that biraderi networks are well placed to carry out machine politics because they share many of the characteristics of political machines that enable machine politics to take place. I also argue that although biraderi networks were originally turned into political machines in order to build support for white politicians, the primary aim of biraderi-politicking today is to advance the interests of the biraderi and this is most often achieved by lending political support to a biraderi member. I identify a change over time in the role of the biraderi network and the relationship between the biraderi elder and the political party. Building on Garbaye's (2005) 'patronage model'

and 'ethnic community model' of ethnic minority participation, I argue that biraderi elders have shifted from dependent to independent actors. As dependent actors biraderi elders were reliant on white patrons in the political party for their role as vote brokers, gathering political support in order to strengthen the position of that politician. As independent actors they are no longer reliant on the white patron and they gather political support in order to strengthen their own position and the position of their biraderi.

Finally, in the third section of the chapter I discuss in detail the patron-client relationships necessary for the machine politics carried out by biraderi networks to take place. I argue that patron-client relationships are necessary at multiple levels. In the dependent actor model these patron-client relationships exist between the politician and the biraderi elder, and the biraderi elder and heads of households in the biraderi. In the independent actor model they exist between the elder and the heads of the households. Heads of households gather political support by using their hierarchical position in the family and the notion that all votes belong to the head of the household. I argue that today biraderi machine politics is facilitated by the postal voting on demand system, which enables heads of households to collect the votes of their household members.

Political parties and the challenge of new electors

Political parties must constantly try to incorporate new electors into the electoral system and, crucially, win their political support. These new electors may be recently arrived immigrants from the Commonwealth, they may be those who have recently gained citizenship and with it the right to vote, or they may be British citizens who have turned 18 and so have the right to vote for the first time. Political parties and individual politicians court the political support of each of these new electors, alongside the support of existing electors. Political support does not just mean votes in

an election. Also valuable for parties and politicians is recruiting new members to the party. New members can be desirable to increase the activist base in the party, more members means a larger pool of people who could campaign and run events, as well as more money levied through membership fees. Perhaps more importantly though new members can be recruited to bolster specific factions within the party. In other words, the incorporation of new voters is not just about inter-party competition, but also about intra-party competition.

Where there are opposing factions and different interests being represented in a local party, recruiting new members to support the interests of your faction could tip the internal balance of power in your favour. Garbaye (2005) writes that in the Labour Party, where candidate selection is carried out by party activists at the grass roots level, this building up of internal factions can be particularly important as it can allow one faction to gain control of candidate selection. According to Schattschneider (1942: 64): "The nature of the nominating procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party." This is because the candidate plays a part in defining what the party is; he or she manifests the party's demographic, geographic and ideological dimensions (Katz, 2001). Getting a candidate selected increases the power and resources of an internal party faction. Increasing the number of sympathetic members could also allow a faction to take over some of the internal party positions such as treasurer or party chair, which come with a degree of power and influence.

Generally the proportion of new voters in any ward or constituency will be small. Between 2015 and 2016, the size of the U.K. parliamentary electorate increased by 2.3%, an increase of approximately 1 million voters (Office for National Statistics, 2017). The local government electorate increased by 2.5%, an increase of approximately 1.1 million voters (Office for National Statistics, 2017). Given that

there are 650 constituencies and, as of December 2015, there were 9,196 wards in the U.K., the electorate in each constituency and ward increased only marginally (Office for National Statistics, no date a). Even if, as is likely, the increase in the size of the electorate was concentrated in certain wards and constituencies, political parties would find themselves tasked with incorporating a small number of new electors. What is more, this increase in the number of registered voters was partly driven by the European Union referendum (Office for National Statistics, 2017). Between 2012 and 2015 the overall size of both the local and parliamentary electorates decreased each year (Office for National Statistics, 2013b, 2014, 2015, 2016). Despite this, there have been times when political parties have been faced with the challenge of incorporating large numbers of eligible voters into the electorate and winning their votes. When there are quite suddenly large numbers of newly eligible voters they often share group characteristics. One way political parties can respond to situations like this is by treating the new voters as a single group of voters. They do not campaign to them as individuals but instead delegate the incorporation of these groups of voters to outside organisations and networks who incorporate them as a group.

During the 19th and 20th centuries the extension of the franchise in the U.K. led to political parties seeking votes from a larger and larger proportion of the male population and eventually the female population. As well as giving women over the age of 30 the right to vote in parliamentary elections, the 1918 Representation of People Act gave almost all men over the age of 21 the right to vote (Johnston, 2013). The number of male electors was increased from around 5 million to approximately 13 million (Johnston, 2013). The Act abolished property requirements that had disproportionately meant that working class men were unable to vote (Johnston, 2013). The incorporation of these working class electors into the Labour Party was largely facilitated by trade unions, who provided political education and support

through shop stewards in the workplace and through trade union meetings. Similarly, political machines facilitated the political incorporation of some 36 million European immigrants who arrived in the United States between 1840 and 1930, and immigrants were instrumental in the rise of political machines in the U.S. (Mollenkopf and Sonenshein, 2009). Political machines such as Tammany Hall, the Democratic Party machine in New York, managed the incorporation of these new immigrant groups into the electorate through the distribution of particularistic support aimed at helping them to settle into life in their new surroundings (Scott, 1969; Jones-Correa, 2013). Comparing the political incorporation of ethnic minorities in Los Angeles and New York, Mollenkopf and Sonenshein (2009) concluded that cities with political machines are better able incorporate immigrant groups.

In the U.K. the increase in immigration from Commonwealth countries meant that in the second half of the 20th century political parties, particularly in some urban, inner city areas, were met with the challenge of winning the votes of increasing numbers of newly arrived immigrants. Political parties were presented with the challenge of how they should interact with new communities of voters who may have particular needs and demands that differed to the existing population based on things like their experiences as recently arrived immigrants, language barriers or religious requirements. As immigrants from the Commonwealth automatically have the right to vote in all U.K. elections upon arrival, the newly arrived were a potentially powerful political force making it all the more important for political parties to gain their support.

Biraderi networks as tools of political incorporation in the U.K.

Between the 1950s and 1980s there was a large wave of immigration from Pakistan and Bangladesh to the U.K. (The Change Institute, 2009; ONS 2013a). Immigration from these countries does continue today at a lower level with marriages

accounting for the biggest influx of immigrants from these countries (Charsley et al., 2012). In order to incorporate these newly arrived Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants into U.K. politics, local Labour Party politicians in some areas used the biraderi kinship networks characteristic of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities to carry out machine politics. Politicians took advantage of the existing patronage relationships within the biraderi and the hierarchical and patriarchal nature of the biraderi to facilitate this machine politics. As with political machines in the United States and trade unions during the early 20th century, they outsourced the political incorporation of a new group of electors.

Labour Party politicians have not been the only ones to use biraderi kinship networks and indeed there is evidence from my interviews of all three of the main parties using these networks. However, there are three factors that made the incorporation of ethnic minorities particularly important for the Labour Party and have meant that it was politicians from this party that first and most effectively used these networks. Firstly, the Labour Party is typically strongest in the urban, inner city areas that many immigrants moved to (Garbaye, 2005). In some areas the Labour Party may have been the only local party with the organisational strength necessary to take advantage of these newly arrived voters and incorporate them as supporters and party members. Furthermore, in some wards the high proportion of ethnic minority residents meant that it was necessary for the Labour Party to incorporate these voters in order to ensure that they maintained their electoral dominance (Garbaye, 2005). For example, in 1991 six Birmingham wards had ethnic minority populations of more than 55%, and 57.3% of the city's ethnic minority population lived in just seven wards (Garbaye, 2005). All of these wards were located in Labour dominated constituencies.

Secondly, many of the newly arrived were employed in typically unionised, Labour supporting, industrial workforces. This meant that they were more likely to be

exposed to the Labour Party and may share many of the concerns of traditional Labour Party supporters such as workers' rights, in addition to specific concerns related to their particular situation as immigrants (Garbaye, 2005). On top of this, the Labour Party is seen to be the party that best represents the interests of ethnic minorities in Britain (Akhtar, 2013; Akhtar, 2015; Fisher et al., 2015; Martin, 2016). As a result, biraderi elders may have been ideologically motivated to work with Labour Party politicians rather than politicians from other political parties.

Thirdly, the existence of a strong internal party competition between factions on the left and right of the Labour Party meant that there was an additional incentive for new communities to be incorporated into the party beyond gathering electoral support (Garabaye, 2005). The newly arrived could also be incorporated as members of the party in order to increase the power of one or other faction in the local party. This was made all the more important by the institutional nature of the Labour Party where activists in local branches select election candidates and can hold positions of power in the branch such as chairperson or treasurer. Garbaye (2005) and Solomos and Back (1995) argue that in Birmingham in the 1980s ethnic minority activists were incorporated into the Labour Party by existing councillors and MPs to the right of the party who feared deselection and wanted to increase the number of supportive party members to ensure that this did not happen. To prevent deselection, white politicians would speak to 'community leaders' who would then recruit people to vote for them (Solomos and Back, 1995). Garbaye (2005) goes on to argue that as time progressed ethnic minorities became allied with the left of the party during the 1980s and 1990s as 'radical actors'.

Machine politics involves the manipulation of the electoral process by offering favours to voters in return for electoral support for a particular party or candidate (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter, 2014). It becomes a part of the party or

candidate's campaign strategy and the aim is to ensure electoral success. Vote choice is based on the distribution of favours rather than ideology or party policy (Chubb, 1982). Under these conditions, electors are seen as a uniform group rather than individuals with individual experiences, concerns and demands. The creation of electoral support amongst this group is delegated to brokers acting on the behalf of the candidate or party (Sobolewska et al., 2015). In the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities, these brokers are the male elders that lead biraderi networks. They utilise an existing patron-client relationship to generate electoral support. In carrying out this broker role they are seeking to advance their own self-interest, either by gaining political power or gaining access to those who wield political power and the favours they can grant them. As this interviewee explains:

> and it's near enough a job for the boys sometimes… "If you get elected, you'll do this for me" or "I'll help you, I'll do that", you know what I mean?

> White activist.

Politicians recognise that if they have the support of the biraderi elder, they will get a bloc vote from the whole community (Akhtar, 2013).

In effect biraderi networks are turned into political machines similar to the ones credited with incorporating newly arrived immigrant voters into U.S. politics in the 19th and 20th centuries (Scott, 1969). As shown in Table 4.1, biraderi networks share many of the characteristics of political machines as described in the literature. Crucially, there are patron-client relationships in the biraderi that can be manipulated to create political support. This makes biraderi networks the perfect vehicle for machine politics. For politicians, delegating electioneering responsibilities to biraderi elders is a particularly useful tactic for incorporating Pakistani and Bangladeshi voters for two reasons. Firstly, a language barrier could prevent the party from effectively communicating with the electors. Secondly, the biraderi elder might be better placed

than the party to understand, and where possible ensure the delivery of, particularistic community demands.

Table 4.1 The shared characteristics of political machines and biraderi networks.

Characteristics typically associated with machine politics	Characteristic shared by biraderi networks?
Patron-client relationship based on inequality of status (Chubb, 1982).	Yes, male elders lead the biraderi (Alavi, 2001) meaning that the interests of women and young people in particular may be overlooked.
Patron-client relationship based on reciprocity (Chubb, 1982).	Yes, biraderi members offer loyalty to elders in return for resources (Sobolewska et al., 2015).
Use of patron-client relationship to create political power (Chubb, 1982).	Yes (Peace and Akhtar, 2015).
Targeting poor voters and particularly immigrants (Scott, 1969). A dependence on the welfare distributed by the machine.	Yes, in the biraderi this poverty can be understood specifically as a lack of resources needed to navigate life in the U.K. Biraderi members can become dependent on their elders for these resources (Shaw, 2000; Akhtar, 2003; Akhtar, 2013).
Electoral support based on personal relationship and favours, not ideology or policy (Chubb, 1982).	Yes (Yaqoob, 2008; Sobolewska et al., 2015).

Elders: From dependent to independent actors

In order to turn biraderis into political machines, local politicians had to develop a relationship with biraderi elders. I believe that this relationship has changed over time as biraderi networks stopped being used purely to advance the political interests of a white politician and instead began to be used primarily to advance the interests of the biraderi. Applying Garbaye's (2005) 'patronage model' of ethnic minority participation and 'ethnic community model' of ethnic minority participation to biraderi networks, I have identified two different relationships between elders and politicians that have changed over time. Biraderi elders were first 'dependent actors'

reliant on white patrons for their role as vote brokers. Akhtar (2013) notes that biraderi elders originally collected votes for white politicians and received benefits in return that allowed them to cement the patronage relationship that they had with the members of their biraderi. The interview data suggests that for the most part they can now be considered 'independent actors' who are no longer reliant on white patrons for their role as vote brokers and work to advance their personal interests and the interests of the biraderi rather than the interests of a white patron. Whilst biraderi elders could in some instances be motivated by shared aim and values to gather electoral support for the Labour Party, the instrumental aim to increase personal power appears to be the primary motivation for elders gathering support as both dependent and independent actors. In both the dependent and independent actor categorisations the political party benefits electorally from the machine politics conducted by the biraderi. In addition a specific candidate or existing politician may benefit from sympathetic political party members joined through the biraderi machine.

In the 'dependent actor' categorisation biraderi networks are turned into political machines by white politicians in order to incorporate Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants. In this model biraderi elders are brokers who generate support for a white politician; this could be both in an election and within the party. The elder is dependent on the white politician for their brokerage role because the white politician provides access to resources that can be distributed to electors in return for votes. Local politicians act as patrons for biraderi elders and in return the elders gather political support (Akhtar, 2013). For the biraderi elder, this role gives them some access to power in the local party and makes them powerful in the biraderi as it is through them that biraderi members can access resources.

Writing about the political participation of ethnic minorities in Birmingham, Garbaye (2005) describes this as the 'patronage' model. He identifies the use of

community networks such as biraderi in local party politics in Birmingham in the late 1970s and 1980s. He argues that existing community networks were used to generate support for the Labour Party using the 'patronage model' of ethnic minority political participation. In this model, white politicians were patrons who courted 'community leaders', offering them patronage in return for support from their community. In the biraderi the 'community leaders' were biraderi elders, leaders of different biraderis who held important positions in their local community. Biraderi elders were seen as a source of votes for white politicians (Akhtar, 2013). Interestingly, Solomos and Back (1995) suggest that this patronage politics may have already existed in the areas of Birmingham that they studied. They suggest that the Asian community could have been incorporated into an existing pattern of patronage politics being carried out by political parties, challenging the notion that this behaviour is imported from 'back home' (Solomos and Back, 1995).

The support gathered by biraderi elders for their patron could be votes in an election. It could also be recruiting members to, and therefore strengthening, one of the factions in a party internal struggle which in the 1980s was between the left and right-wings of the Labour Party (Garbaye, 2005). The patronage given by white patrons to biraderi elders was then distributed to biraderi members through an existing patron-client relationship within the biraderi in return for political support. This patronage was important at a time when many people were isolated and vulnerable because of their position as newly arrived immigrants. According to Garbaye (2005), it included things like help with immigration papers or help dealing with the council social services department. The services offered by politicians as patronage were not necessarily beyond the services it could be expected that an MP or councillor would perform for a constituent. However, by distributing them through the biraderi elder, politicians turned these elders into gatekeepers who controlled access to resources. As

well as helping to create political support, this increased the reliance of biraderi members on their elders and increased the power of biraderi elders.

As an 'independent actor' the biraderi elder is no longer dependent on a white patron. There is a shift over time where the elder moves from being dependent, to independent. The biraderi remains a political machine but it is a political machine where the primary aim is to generate political support and power for the biraderi elder and their biraderi, not the party. As this interviewee explains, the aim of biraderi elders is to increase their own status and the power of the biraderi:

> It is about power. It's about prestige. It's about... "I have to win, I can't lose". It's about that and...they'll do anything to get them votes. It really is about the popularity and prestige in Y...you know...if...if I'm the councillor or whatever, I'm seen as, you know, something really high in the hierarchical system [...].

> Asian activist.

Access to political office means that biraderi elders are able to independently access resources to distribute to electors in return for support, meaning that they are no longer reliant on the white politician for their role as a broker. They work independently to generate political support for themselves or a member of their biraderi, using the biraderi as their main source of political support. This is similar to the observations made by Garbaye (2005) in the ethnic community model of political participation. He argues that "councillors of Asian background, mostly Pakistani, operate independently of any other group in the party, building their careers solely on resources drawn from ethnic minority communities" (Garbaye, 2005: 135).

Through their role as dependent actors, biraderi elders ensured that biraderi members were reliant on them for access to politicians and their services. Elders made themselves important and necessary members of their communities, helping them to gather personal political support as independent actors. The support could be in the form of votes gathered in an election to ensure that the biraderi candidate wins. It

could also be in the form of signing up members to the local party in order to boost the voting power of the biraderi within the party and ensure the selection of the biraderi candidate. As this interviewee explains:

> I think they are making a determined effort to get their persons in by making sure that there are a good number of people who are Labour Party members who can vote for the person that they want which may not have too much to do with what they understand about the Labour Party or why they are Labour or anything else but they will get their man, and it probably will be a man, in.

> White activist.

As an independent actor, the biraderi elder may be a candidate using the biraderi to generate personal political support, or they may be gathering support for another biraderi elder or member who is a candidate. This is similar to the 'dependent actor' relationship in that the biraderi elder is gathering support for someone else. However, unlike in the 'dependent actor' relationship, the elder and the candidate share the same aim: to increase the power of the biraderi. Campaigning is almost entirely based on community specific issues and the services of the councillor are understood as 'belonging' to those who voted for them. In one of the interview areas, interviewees referred to the 'Asian Labour Party' distinguishing between the local Labour Party and what they perceived to be a party machine run entirely by, and for, Asian constituents.

The political party still benefits electorally from this approach. Whilst the biraderi elder is able to act independently to gather political support, it is important to note that the local party is complicit in this electioneering tactic to some extent. Some of the interviewees explained that Pakistani and Bangladeshi candidates are sometimes seen as desirable by local parties because of a perception that they bring guaranteed votes. As this interviewee states:

> And the parties will actually vote for a particular person because of, they think that this person has got a standing in the community and

will get them more votes, you know.

Asian activist.

However, for the independent biraderi elder, loyalty to the party is likely to be shallow and activists may move between different parties in order to boost their own prospects of power and status. As this interviewee explains:

They're not idiots, they know how to work the system and they'll jump from party to party if they can get a better deal.

White activist.

Garbaye (2005:136) states that, in the ethnic community model of ethnic minority incorporation, Asian councillors campaigned almost entirely on issues that affected their own communities and used the Labour Party "as a platform to legitimize and publicize their candidacy." The party becomes a vehicle for the biraderi elder's personal political campaign. In this sense, biraderi elders with an independent actor relationship with the party fall into the "organisational broker" type identified by Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015). As illustrated in Table 4.2, the organisational broker is one of four broker types including: the party broker, the independent broker and the hybrid broker (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). The organisational broker negotiates with different political parties at election time to find the best deal in exchange for the votes of the members of their organisation. They are not loyal to one particular party but do represent the interests of the members of the organisation in their brokerage role.

Organisational brokers are leaders with a loyal following amongst organisational members and because of this they are able to rally members for both election campaigning and voting (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). Organisations can vary in their degree of formality, mobilisation strategies and policies but their function will be to represent the common interests of the group (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). In this understanding, biraderi networks meet the criteria of organisation. Elders have a

pre-existing relationship with their network members; this means that they have a population of electors to target at election time. The degree of formality and organisation may vary across different biraderi networks, and at different periods in the life of the biraderi, but there is a very clear and formalised structure to the biraderi. Male elders lead the biraderi and members of the biraderi hold more or less important positions according to their age and gender. Furthermore, for members of the biraderi there is a shared organisational interest: to increase the hierarchical status of the biraderi network in relation to other biraderis.

Table 4.2: The four broker types identified by Holland and Palmer-Rubin (2015).

Broker type	Characteristics
Party broker	Gather votes for one party, loyal to that party. Motivated by partisan interests and rent-seeking interests. Political gain for the party will improve their own future job prospects. (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015: 1199).
Organisational broker	Not loyal to a particular party, uses organisational following to gather votes for the party offering the best deal in exchange. (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015: 1200-1201).
Hybrid broker	Loyal to a particular party and organisation. Negotiates with party to deliver benefits to organisation in return for votes. Able to negotiate on-going benefits but bargaining power is limited because loyalty to one party means cannot take votes elsewhere. (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015: 1202).
Independent broker	Not loyal to a particular party or community organisation. Motivated by rent-seeking interests; gather votes in return for payment from politicians and may receive payment or job conditional on electoral success. Use large personal network and coercive power to gather votes. (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015: 1197).

Patron-client relationships

Patron-client relationships are essential for gathering political support through the political machine and both the 'dependent' and 'independent' biraderi elder relies on these relationships. These patron-client relationships are the mechanism that enables the incorporation of new voters. In addition to patron-client relationships, in the biraderi the gathering of political support relies on the role played by the heads of households. Biraderi elders have a patronage relationship with the head of the household who uses their hierarchical position and authority in the household to create political support. Today the postal voting on demand system is the mechanism that makes it possible for elders and heads of households to gather political support on a large scale.

The patron-client relationship is described by Scott (1972: 92) as "a largely instrumental friendship" between two people, where one is of a higher socio-economic status than the other (the patron) and uses their influence and resources to provide benefits or protection to the other (the client), who is of a lower socio-economic status. The essential features of the patron-client relationship are "reciprocity, inequality of status, and the personal, enduring nature of the relationship, a kind of lopsided friendship" (Chubb, 1982: 4). Chubb (1982: 4) argues that clientelism is different to other kinds of exchange relationships because of its "asymmetrical nature". The monopolisation of critical resources by patrons means that they hold the power in the relationship; if the client wants access to these resources then they have "no alternative but to return loyally the benefits received" (Chubb, 1982:4). Political machines use this relationship, and the reliance on patrons for resources that this entails, to gather and retain political power (Chubb, 1982). Patrons act as brokers on behalf of a party or candidate; they are middle-men between the political party and the voter, charged with collecting votes. The organisational structure of the modern mass party is replaced by

personal influence networks generated through the patron-client relationship, parties become patrons and state resources become personal resources at the disposal of patrons who use them to gather electoral support (Chubb, 1982).

The patron-client relationship is used by brokers to generate electoral support. They "turn the politically motivated distribution of benefits into electoral support" (Stokes et al., 2013: 100). Electoral support can be created in two ways. Firstly, by distributing short-term benefits in return for votes. Schaffer (2007a: 5) describes this vote buying as a "last-minute effort to influence electoral outcomes". Secondly, electoral support could be based on the long-term distribution of patronage in return for loyalty. Schaffer (2007a: 5) distinguishes the distribution of patronage from the practice of vote buying arguing that patronage tends to be a longer term practice carried out at any point in the electoral cycle "within the context of enduring, asymmetric, but reciprocal, relationships." Whilst the longevity and the nature of the relationship between brokers and voters differ, in both of these approaches the broker dispenses goods.

Brokers (patrons) use the patron-client relationship to offer favours to their networks of clients. These favours can be understood as a form of welfare distributed by the machine, rather than the state, to those members of the electorate unable to access crucial resources. Research has shown that the dispensation of rewards for votes is strongly associated with poverty. Scott (1969: 1150) stated: "Perhaps the most fundamental quality shared by the mass clientele of machines is poverty". He argued that poverty makes it more likely that a person will sell their vote for quick material reward or the promise of future reward. Poor constituents are more likely to be reliant on the welfare offered by the machine than their wealthy counterparts. In addition, Scott (1969) argued that machine politics is a particularly effective strategy in populations of recently arrived immigrants who need help adapting to their new life.

In the biraderi network, biraderi members may find themselves to be resource poor when it comes to navigating life in the U.K. and have little choice but to demonstrate loyalty to their elder in order to gain access to resources such as financial aid, translation and work, as well as aid in the immigration process from Pakistan and Bangladesh to the U.K. (Shaw, 2000; Akhtar, 2003; Akhtar, 2013). A lack of resources in the form of language and knowledge barriers and the subsequent reliance on family and community members has been shown to be a source of vulnerability to electoral fraud in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities (Sobolewska et al., 2015).

The 'dependent actor' approach to vote gathering is reliant on patron-client relationships at two levels where the biraderi elder is both a patron and a client, as shown in Figure 4.1. Firstly, the white politician must develop a patron-client relationship with the biraderi elder, offering them patronage in return for gathering support. In this relationship the politician is the patron and the biraderi elder is the client. The politician is able to offer patronage because their position in office gives them some control over access to resources. Secondly, the biraderi elder must exploit the existing patron-client relationship between biraderi elders and biraderi members in order to gather individual votes. One interviewee sums up the effect of the patron-client relationship in the biraderi stating that because biraderi members 'belong' to elders they will follow them:

> And the old guy, the head guy, the leader he took advantage of everybody basically. But again, they belong to him, they respect him, they will follow this guy.
>
> Asian activist.

Male elders are already patrons who use their power and status to provide benefits to biraderi members, the clients, who would struggle to access resources otherwise. The

vote brokerage role of biraderi elders reinforces the patron-client relationship by further ensuring biraderi members are reliant on them for access to resources.

Figure 4.1: The patron-client relationship for dependent and independent actors.

In the 'independent actor' relationship, the patron-client relationship between biraderi elders and biraderi members continues to be exploited to gather political support. As in the 'dependent actor' relationship, this support is not based upon ideological affinity or the policies of a particular party or candidate, but the patron-client relationship between biraderi elders and members. Where the two models differ, as Figure 4.2 illustrates, is that there is no longer a patron-client relationship between elders and the white politician as biraderi elders become autonomous actors independent from their white patron. Resources obtained by positions of office are dispensed by the biraderi elder to biraderi members in order to obtain political support.

Figure 4.2: The patron-client relationship for independent actors.

```
                        ┌─────────────────────┐
                        │    Biraderi elder   │
                  ┌──────│                     │
                  │      │       Patron        │
  Patron-client   │      └─────────────────────┘
  relationship    │                 │
                  │                 │ Patronage
                  │                 ▼
                  │      ┌─────────────────────┐
                  └──────│   Biraderi member   │
                         │                     │
                         │       Client        │
                         └─────────────────────┘
```

Whilst the relationship between biraderi elders and members can be characterised as patron-client, there is an added pressure in the biraderi network that is not typically a factor in machine politics, but can be used to generate political support. In the biraderi, all members of the network are considered to be family. Loyalty is not just to the elder but to the network as a whole and is based on familial relationships as well as access to resources. Furthermore, biraderi networks fit into a hierarchical system with some biraderis considered to be higher in that system than others. This means that loyalty to the biraderi can also be about increasing the status of the biraderi relative to other biraderi networks. In the following quote an interviewee recounts a conversation with an elector who was voting for someone solely because they were a member of the same biraderi:

> I mean I was walking by and I just happened to bump into him and I said 'oh X, I don't know if you are aware but I am contesting this election for the XXX and I hope that I can count on your support.' And it just really shook me because you hear a lot of these things but someone actually having the audacity to say that and he said 'with respect, I have to say to you I can't vote for you because someone from my own clan', this other chap who was independent, 'he is from my own clan and I'll be supporting', you know in

> Punjabi 'one of my own is standing against you so I'll be supporting him'.
>
> Asian activist.

Going against the biraderi at election time and voting for somebody outside of the biraderi could mean not just facing difficulty in accessing resources, but also sacrificing familial relationships.

Heads of households

Both 'dependent' and 'independent' biraderi elders use the patron-client relationship and a loyalty to the family and the biraderi to carry out machine politics. They use a combination of the dispensation of patronage and vote buying to rally electoral support. For this to work, biraderi elders rely on an additional actor: the head of the household. As figure 4.3 illustrates, elders gather political support from biraderi members by targeting male heads of households, who in turn ensure the support of the members of their households. Biraderi elders are here using the patron-client relationship that they have with the heads of the households in their biraderi. This interviewee explains how the head of the household is a part of the electoral campaign tactics:

> And so the evening at 10.00 we say 'let's all get together' so we book a hall and we just, everybody gets there and it is a chance to relax. We just have a meal, the meal has come all prepared, they come and eat and have a laugh and then at about 12.30 then the politics starts, 'did we win?' You know. And they all fresh and it is a way of saying thank you, regardless of what happens. And I think that's another bonding session. I mean 102 people, that is a lot of people. So 102, that is 102 households, so if we have got 4 votes, 3 votes in the household, that is 500 votes straight away. So they're going to their wife and children saying come on and vote, of course they are going to vote.
>
> Asian activist.

The votes in the family are seen as 'belonging' to the head of the household. He has a right to them and they are his resource in the exchange of votes for rewards, as is shown by quotes from two interviewees:

> Well, he can say "My five, I've got them sorted for you", which…which I think…it's totally wrong.
>
> Asian activist.
>
> I had somebody come round, a candidate, and say "Will you vote?" and I said "No. I'm not going to vote for you. I'm going to vote for the other side." "Aw please, you've got five votes… can, I have some?"
>
> Asian activist.

It is because the head of the household can use his household's votes to prove their loyalty to elders that they are able to continue to access the patronage and rewards dispensed by elders and gain preferential treatment from those in office. As this interviewee explains:

> I mean someone will say you know, 'our family got you X number of votes so why aren't you doing what we want?'
>
> White activist.

Heads of households may also be offered short-term benefits in return for gathering the votes of their family. One interviewee talked about how brokers will identify who can get them votes. They will 'treat' them and then in return they are asked to gather votes from friends and family members. In this situation votes are being bought and paid for with food. In return for the food given, the head of the household ensures that all votes in their family are completed for the candidate requested.

Figure 4.3: How biraderi elders generate political support.

```
                          ┌─────────────────────────┐
                          │      Biraderi elder      │
                          │                          │
              ┌───────────│          Patron          │
              │           └─────────────┬────────────┘
 Patron-client│                         │
 relationship │                         │ Patronage
              │                         ▼
              │           ┌─────────────────────────┐
              │           │    Head of household     │
              └──────────▶│    (Biraderi member)     │
                          │                          │
                          │          Client          │
                          └─────────────┬────────────┘
                                        │
                                        │ Authority over household
                                        ▼
                          ┌─────────────────────────┐
                          │    Member of household   │
                          │                          │
                          │    (Biraderi member)     │
                          └─────────────────────────┘
```

To gather votes, heads of households use their hierarchical position in the family. According to Akhtar (2013), whilst decisions in the household may be discussed it is the head of the household, the eldest male, who has the final say. Some of the interviewees explained that in many families the oldest male is recognised as the person in charge of the household, they have authority over the household and it is difficult to challenge them. As this interviewee explains:

> For say the South Asian communities, they still very much have this concept of man of the house who decides everything, whatever the eldest male says goes and that's not challenged and there is not enough external pressure to challenge that behaviour and therefore people are quite comfortable engaging in that way, that sort of behaviour in elections.

> Asian activist.

Since its introduction in 2001, the postal voting on demand system has helped the head of the household to use his authority to gather votes. It has also been used by politicians as a way of interacting with ethnic minority groups and gathering votes,

according to one interviewee:

> It tends to be a bulk voting in terms of one person will fill it in for everybody and hand everything it in so I think it is a concern and it is a way that a lot of the parties engage with small ethnic minority groups by just saying 'oh don't worry, you don't need to leave the house, you just carry on as you are, you just need to fill this in and one of you can do all of that and we'll take the vote'.

> Asian activist.

Whilst it is possible to get votes without this system, it has enabled the creation of a bloc vote on a large scale. Postal voting on demand enables all electors to register to vote at home. Removing the act of casting a ballot from the polling station can undermine the secrecy of the ballot and leaves electors vulnerable to undue influence. The home may be private and protected from the outside world, but it is not private for those residing in it. It is impossible to create the same level of privacy, secrecy and security in the home as in the polling station (Birch and Watt, 2004).

Birch and Watt (2004) argue that there are three factors specific to voting in the home that may lead to individuals being influenced. All of these factors help to facilitate the gathering of electoral support by heads of households. Firstly, if voting takes place in a group setting, loyalty to the group or one specific individual could mean that the conscience of one voter may be transferred to the whole group and individual choice is removed (Birch and Watt, 2004). Individual members of the household may worry that their position in the household or group could be compromised if they do not vote in the same way as the rest of the group. Gerber et al. (2013) found that even when an elector just believes that the secrecy of the ballot might be compromised and that there is a chance of their vote choice being revealed, individual choice can be affected. Secondly, Birch and Watt (2004) argue that inequality in the household based on age, gender, ability and financial contribution to the household, may lead to an individual being pressured to vote a certain way.

Thirdly, household norms such as honouring a spouse or parent may take precedent over norms of the public sphere where individuals are expected to vote independently. This could lead to the secrecy of the ballot being compromised and the effective disenfranchisement of those feeling pressured to vote as instructed (Birch and Watt, 2004). This interviewee explains the implications of postal voting when it exists alongside biraderi networks arguing that it restricts choice:

> What the postal votes has done is… I think... it has restricted people's choice. Because people are working in groups and clans, what you might find is some people who may want to vote for you or previously did vote for you can no longer vote for you because other people are influencing those postal votes.
>
> Asian activist.

Voting stops being an individual act and instead exists as a group exercise, which can effectively disenfranchise some electors whilst allowing others to control multiple ballots.

Postal voting on demand also makes it far easier for heads of households to commit personation to ensure they gather the required electoral support to guarantee the continuation of their patronage relationship with the biraderi elder. The risk of personation occurring is exacerbated by the belief that all of the ballots in the household 'belong' to the head of the household. It may be considered normal, even acceptable, for ballot papers to be completed by the head of the household on behalf of the whole family. This interviewee explains how the eldest male often completes postal ballots on behalf of the household:

> [P]articularly families from places like Bangladesh, India, Pakistan… I have no doubt in my mind that there were dozens, probably hundreds, where people did not fill out the ballot themselves on the postal vote. And it would simply be the…the head of the house – typically the…the eldest male – who would simply fill out all the votes for all the people, he'd write in the

number […]and ask […]the individual to sign it or, you know, potentially even just sign it himself.

White activist.

Personation can also take place on a larger scale, not just in the individual household. This interviewee talks about bags of ballots being collected and completed:

You know, the couple of year back…or three, four year…you know, they used to run…start produce these postal ballot…I seen the people carry bag full. Collecting from the…then they sit down, like me and you on the table…and cross it, post it.

Asian activist.

Postal voting on demand removes the issue of vote monitoring that exists in machine politics where rewards are exchanged for votes (Stokes, 2005; Finan and Schechter, 2012; Schaffer, 2007b; Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). It enables the biraderi elder to see the vote before they dispense any rewards. In this sense it is actually beneficial to both the elder and the head of the household. The elder only dispenses goods to those who have voted as instructed, increasing the efficiency of the approach. Meanwhile the head of the household is able to prove that their claim to the reward is beyond doubt. Showing the vote can also guarantee access to future patronage and ensures that the claim of the head of the household to the political representation of the candidate is clear.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the relationship between political parties and biraderi networks, arguing that for biraderi-politicking to take place political parties must be complicit at some level. I have argued that political parties have used biraderi networks as a mechanism to facilitate the incorporation of Pakistani and Bangladeshi voters into U.K. elections. This contributes to the understanding of how political parties incorporate new immigrant voters, a currently under researched area

(Hochschild et al., 2013). As a result of this, biraderi networks have been turned into political machines similar to those used to facilitate the political incorporation of ethnic minorities in the United States during the 19th and 20th centuries. This shows that whilst some of the specific behaviours may be different and context dependent, biraderi-politicking is not new and should be seen within the context of machine politics.

Evidence from the interview data suggests that all three of the main parties have used biraderi networks in this way. However, three factors mean that Labour politicians were the first to realise the power of these networks and use them for gathering political support. These factors are, firstly, that the majority of Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants lived in Labour dominated areas. Secondly, that Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers were in traditionally Labour supporting, unionised, jobs and that the Labour Party is perceived to be the party that best represents the interests of ethnic minorities in the U.K. This means that elders may have been more likely to be exposed to the Labour Party than other parties and that they may have been motivated by a shared ideological position to gather support for the party. Thirdly, that some of the actors involved in the struggle between the right and the left of the Labour Party during the 1970s and 1980s realised the party internal political support they could build by using biraderi elders to gather members.

Biraderi elders gather political support for the party or candidate. This support may be votes for an election or a party-internal selection process. It may also be signing up members to the party so that they can vote in a selection process. In the past elders did this as 'dependent actors' who relied on the patronage of a white patron for their role as a vote broker. Today the interview data suggests that they are more likely to be 'independent actors' gathering support for themselves or another member of the biraderi seeking political office. They are no longer reliant on a white patron to gather

this support. Whether the elder is gathering support for a white patron or a biraderi member, one thing remains the same: the political party benefits electorally from this method of campaigning and mobilising voters. Furthermore, at some level, the political party is complicit in this approach.

The patron-client relationship is what enables biraderi elders to gather political support. They take advantage of the patronage relationship that they have with the heads of the different households within the biraderi, promising them the continuation of the patronage relationship and the rewards that accompany it in return for votes. The head of the household then uses his position of authority within the household to instruct his family on how to vote. The postal voting on demand system has made it possible for the head of the household to ensure that his family members are voting as required by making it possible for them to view ballot papers or even fill the ballots in themselves. Universally available remote voting, such as that created by the postal voting on demand system, makes it easier for machine politics to take place. As there is a general move towards increased remote voting in many countries around the world, either in the form of unconditional postal voting or internet voting, academics and politicians should consider the possible abuses of these systems.

Chapter 5: Trade unions and the selection and election of Labour Party candidates

Unlike either the Conservative or Liberal parties, the Labour Party was established as an extra-parliamentary body (Russell, 2005). It was born of the trade union movement, emerging from the Trade Union Congress' (TUC) Labour Representative Committee in 1906 (Taylor, 1989). This has led to a party shaped by the culture and values of affiliated unions, as Lovenduski and Norris (1994: 203) argued: "Unions have a diffuse but pervasive effect on the party's ethos and culture". The unions were the industrial arm of the labour movement and the Labour Party, established to represent the views of working people in parliament, became the political arm of the movement (Muller, 1977; Russell, 2005). Labour MPs were expected to represent the interests of workers in parliament and the Trade Union Group of MPs were there to both represent workers, and to educate other MPs about workers (Muller, 1977). Meanwhile, trade unions were expected to help to get Labour MPs into parliament through sponsorship. Trade unions have been motivated to work with the Labour Party because of a combination of ideological and instrumental reasons. Today, alongside some shared ideological positions, instrumental reasons appear to be the main motivator (Bale and Webb, 2017). Mutual need drives much of the relationship between the two. Trade unions give the central party and individual politicians the resources that they need to run campaigns and win elections in return for policy commitments from the party (Bale and Webb, 2017).

Although there have been a number of changes to the role played by trade unions within the Labour Party, set within the context of a battle for power between different factions in the party, trade unions have maintained some formal influence in the party (Russell, 2005). Most importantly for this research, they maintain some ways of influencing the selection and election process, such as supporting individual

candidates. This support may enable working class people to enter politics in the face of barriers to their participation. However, there is a lack of clarity over how trade unions support candidates and exactly whom they support.

In this chapter I use data from interviews with 16 political activists, MPs and trade unionists to examine the contemporary relationship between trade unions and the Labour Party. I focus on the original aim of the trade unions to get more working class MPs into parliament and consider how trade unions are able to influence the selection and election of candidates in the Labour Party today. I argue that there are three different aspects of the role that trade unions play. Firstly, there is the legitimate aspect of the role where trade unions use their resources to help working class candidates to overcome financial and cultural barriers preventing their political participation. In this section I will argue that whilst trade union support does help to alleviate the effects of some of these barriers, it does not remove them and may actually exacerbate some of the issues.

Secondly, there is the controversial aspect to the role. In this section I will look at ways of accessing help from trade unions arguing that whilst there are formal processes involved, informal factors such as having connections in the trade union were presented by some of the interviewees as important and could potentially exclude some candidates. I will then look at the selection process where interviewees talked about the importance of recruiting supportive party members to vote at the final selection meeting. Here I will argue that recruiting members is an important part of growing a party and increasing political participation, but that it can be used to subvert the democratic process.

Thirdly, there is the idealised aspect of the role of trade unions where trade unions were presented by many interviewees as a legitimate and transparent influence in candidate selection and election, particularly in comparison to the central party and

other political funders. The first section of the chapter will focus on the relationship between the Labour Party and trade unions, the rules governing the role of unions in the selection and election process, and recent selection and election controversies. The subsequent three sections will then address each of the three aspects of the role of trade unions in turn.

Interviewees were given the option to be identified or anonymous on their consent forms. Quotes from interviewees who chose to be identified will include their name and whether they are a political activist, trade unionist or MP. Quotes from interviewees who chose to remain anonymous will only state whether they are a political activist, trade unionist or MP. In ten cases the interviewee chose to remain anonymous and in six cases they agreed to be identified. A list of interviewees is available in Appendix D; interviewees who requested to have their quotes attributed are named here and all others remain anonymous.

Trade Unions and the Labour Party

Since the Labour Party's inception in 1906, the proper role of trade unions has been debated and changes to party rules have both bolstered and curtailed their power over time. This debate has been tied up with a wider debate about internal party democracy, which was increasingly dominated by factions to the left and right of the party in the 1970s and 1980s (Russell, 2005). For much of the twentieth century trade unions dominated the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, where they controlled 90% of votes in the 1980s, and the party conference, where they controlled up to 90% of votes (Russell, 2005). Today, trade union delegates fill 13 of the 39 NEC seats (Labour Party, no date) and affiliates hold 50% of the vote at party conference with the other 50% going to Constituency Labour Party delegates (Russell, 2005). Between 1981 and 1993 trade unions also dominated the Electoral College that elected Labour Party leaders with the largest bloc vote, 40%, belonging to affiliated

organisations the vast majority of which were trade unions (Russell, 2005). The move to the Electoral College was not wholly popular and led to the Limehouse Declaration, which stated: "A handful of trade union leaders can now dictate the choice of a future Labour Prime Minister" (cited in Quinn, 2004: 333). They continued to have a bloc vote in leadership elections, albeit with a reduced proportion of votes at 30%, until Ed Miliband abolished the Electoral College in 2014 and the party moved to one member one vote in leadership elections (Russell, 2005; Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016a).

Trade unions in selections and elections

In candidate selections and elections, trade unions have also enjoyed changing degrees of influence over time. Changes to internal party democracy shaped by the on-going battle between the left and right of the party have affected the role played by trade unions. After the 1918 constitution first recognised local parties and gave them candidate selection responsibility, trade union delegates that sat on each constituency's General Committee were able to influence candidate selection (Russell, 2005). They were also able to sponsor candidates and MPs, particularly important before a wage was introduced for MPs in 1911 (Muller, 1977). Russell (2005) describes trade unions as so strong in some safe Labour constituencies that, through their influence on the General Committee and the sponsoring of candidates, they were running their own personal fiefdoms where their favoured candidate would become an MP.

Muller (1977) highlighted two central problems with trade union sponsored MPs, both related to what their proper role in the party should be. Firstly, there was a class rivalry between working class union MPs and middle class MPs. Working class union MPs resisted any efforts to move away from the union founding fathers, believing that the party belonged to them. He also noted that in the past there was concern about the role of the Trade Union Group of MPs in parliament: "the Trade Union Group poses the threat of becoming a party within a party, or a political faction,

though this danger has all but disappeared in the last several decades" (Muller, 1977: 80). Secondly, that it was unclear what the proper role of a sponsored MP should be and who they should represent (Muller, 1977). This tension over party ownership and the degree of influence that trade unions held was also pointed out by Lovenduski and Norris (1994) who argued that whilst trade union practices were legal and open, it was unclear what unions actually got in return for their donations. Was it channels of access and information? Or more direct influence over representatives?

In 1980 mandatory reselection of MPs was introduced, campaigned for by activists to the left of the party who argued that it would make MPs more accountable (Clark, 2012). This led to a campaign to introduce one member one vote in candidate selections. It was thought that this would limit the influence of left wing activists, and help to prevent them from deselecting right wing MPs, by including ordinary party members thought to have less extreme views (Russell, 2005; Clark, 2012). Unable to agree on either a system of one member one vote or maintaining the existing system of General Committee control over candidate selection, an Electoral College system for selecting candidates was introduced and was in effect between 1987 and 1993. As affiliated organisations, trade unions were granted 40% of votes, strengthening their influence over selection (Russell, 2005). However, this system proved to be unpopular and in 1993 one member one vote was introduced for constituency selections, ending formal organised trade union influence over selection (Russell, 2005).

Today in selections and elections, trade unions must follow many of the same rules applied to individual members of the party. Following the introduction of one member one vote, individual members of a trade union are eligible to vote in the selection process if they have also been a Labour Party member for 6 months prior to the selection process (Labour Party, 2016). As affiliated organisations, trade unions are encouraged to recruit their members to become members of the Labour Party. The

Labour Party rule book is clear that members should be recruited in order to engage fully in the party and that they should not be recruited solely to advance the interests of one faction or individual (Labour Party, 2016). In the case of trade unions this means that members should not be recruited solely to vote for the trade union favoured candidate. Trade unions can, however, inform their members about the candidates that they are supporting in both the selection and election campaigns and encourage them to support them.

Trade unions are allowed to make donations to a candidate's selection and election campaigns. However, since 1947 no individual or organisation has been allowed to pay an MP to advocate on their behalf in parliament (Rowbottom, 2010). This means that, whilst trade unions can give donations to candidates, they cannot do so on the condition of parliamentary advocacy. The 1995 Nolan report on Standards in Public Life ended the sponsorship of MPs by trade unions and instead moved the party to a system where donations are made to constituencies (Brown, 1995; Bale and Webb, 2017). This was designed to separate individual MPs from donations and the accusation that they were paid to represent trade unions in parliament. In line with the 2000 Political Parties Elections and Referendums Act, all donations made to a constituency by a trade union that are over the value of £1,500 (either individually or when donations are aggregated over a 12 month period) must be reported to the Electoral Commission and this donation information is publicly available on the Electoral Commission website (Electoral Commission, no date b).

Selection and election controversies

Recently there have been two controversies about the way that trade unions exert their influence in the selection and election processes at both the local and national level. The first controversy surrounded the role that unions played in the election of Ed Miliband as leader of the Labour Party in 2010. According to Jobson and Wickham-

Jones (2011) the interventions of trade unions in the 2010 campaign were decisive in Ed Miliband's victory and were a direct reaction to the one member one vote system, which limits union power in the selection process. Whilst Jobson and Wickham-Jones (2011: 318) are very clear that neither electoral law nor Labour Party rules were broken by the actions of the unions, they argue that their actions were influential in the outcome of the election and that the "normative legitimacy of the electoral process […] can be called into question." They argue that union leaders were able to shape the outcome of the contest in three ways. Firstly, they used their powers to nominate and streamlined their nominations with accusations in the press that the big unions met to coordinate their nominations.

Secondly, some of the trade unions restricted access to their membership list to their favoured nominee. Other nominees were unable to access the union's membership list and could not make contact with union members. Thirdly, unions were able to influence the way in which their members received their ballot papers. Some ballot papers were sent with strong endorsements for the trade union leaderships' favoured candidate alongside a brief Labour Party statement about the other candidates (Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011). It was noted, for example, that the GMB union placed envelopes containing ballot papers inside larger envelopes calling for their members to support Ed Miliband (Stratton, Watt and Wintour, 2010). Inside were included further endorsements for Miliband in the union magazine and in a letter from the General Secretary. Similarly, Unite the Union sent the ballot paper out with a leaflet with an endorsement for Miliband from their General Secretaries (Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011).

The second controversy surrounded the candidate selection process for the 2015 General Election in the Falkirk constituency (BBC News, 2013). It was alleged that activists backed by the Unite union used "underhand tactics" to gather support for

their prospective candidate, Karie Murphy, by recruiting members to the local party to vote in the selection meeting and that their membership fees were paid by Unite (Syal, 2014; Criddle, 2016). An internal report into the Falkirk selections was carried out by the Labour Party and was leaked by the Guardian newspaper. Although evidence was limited, the report found that: "There can be no doubt that members were recruited in an attempt to manipulate party processes" (Labour Party report, 2014: 1, cited in the Guardian, 2014). It found that members were recruited without their knowledge; that members were pressured into completing direct debit mandates and that in some cases members were persuaded to give financial details without knowing that they were completing direct debit forms; that signatures were forged on application forms, direct debit mandates or other documents (Labour Party report, 2014: 1, cited in the Guardian, 2014). Despite the findings reported by the internal Labour Party investigation, it was ultimately found that these allegations were untrue (Mason, 2015). However, the episode does serve to highlight some of the tensions around the role that trade unions are allowed to play in the Labour Party and the potential for power to be abused. As a result of the allegations, Ed Miliband ended a scheme that allowed unions to sign up members to the Labour Party and pay their first year of fees (Labour List, 2013). He also commissioned the Collins Review into Labour Party Reform, which recommended more transparent links and a closer relationship between the party and unions (Collins, 2014).

Legitimate role of trade unions

Trade union support has traditionally been intended to enable working class people to enter into politics; it "provided an alternative means of entry into the British political elite" (Muller, 1977: xvi). This was particularly important before 1911 when MPs did not receive a salary, effectively ensuring that only those who had access to independent means were able to become MPs and excluding the working class from

parliament (Muller, 1977). Even though MPs now receive a salary, working class people still face barriers to entry and trade unions can help to alleviate some of these barriers. I have found that there are two ways that trade unions can help to overcome these barriers that are seen as legitimate and acceptable by many, but not all, people. Firstly, in order to overcome financial barriers to participation created by the high cost of candidature unions can provide the candidates that they support with financial assistance and help in-kind in order to increase the resources available to them in both the selection and election campaigns. Secondly, in order to overcome cultural barriers that are created by the need to have specific skills that are not obtained in all workplaces, trade unions provide both formal and informal political education to their members. This political education and support from the unions may be particularly important for female and BAME members.

Financial barriers: cost of candidature

To overcome financial barriers, I have found that trade unions are able to give financial help to the individuals that they support in both the selection process and the election process. Financial help from trade unions was seen by some of the interviewees as most important and influential during the selection process. This was because in selections individuals must raise the money for their campaign themselves, whereas in elections the onus on raising money for the campaign is on the whole constituency party. As this interviewee explains:

> [W]here they have their impact is at the selection rather than the election. […] [M]ost CLPs will be able to fund a general election campaign, […] union money is very helpful for that but it is not, sort of, you know bank breaking, they don't make a huge amount of difference because lots of the things you need to do to win a general election in a close fight don't actually require a lot of money, they require a lot of energy, lots of resources in terms of people but they don't require an awful lot of money […] I think that for me, unions' influences are quite rightly, most powerful at

the selection stage, rather than the election stage.

Anonymous political activist.

Without the financial support of trade unions at this point, individuals who cannot afford to pay for a selection may find themselves excluded from the process. On top of this, there is no spending limit in the selection, meaning that candidates without vast resources may struggle to compete with candidates who have access to more finances. According to one interviewee, candidates may find themselves spending £10,000 just to be selected. The Collin's Report (2014) recommended introducing a spending cap in selections to address this problem.

Candidates are expected to have at least one mail out to all constituency party members, the cost of which will increase with the size of the constituency party. They are also expected to meet members of the constituency party by attending meetings and visiting them in their homes. There are practical costs involved in this, such as the cost of petrol and maybe the cost of childcare and lost working hours. Sometimes it is necessary to move to a new constituency, which has even greater financial implications:

> So a friend of mine […] moved from X […]to X 3 years ago, took her children with her, took you know, her husband, got a new job in X, you know, moved her whole house there because she was a parliamentary candidate in a seat we absolutely should have won back. We didn't, so actually, you know, she is tens of thousands of pounds worse off than otherwise. So I think there is an issue about the Labour Party about how it supports people to do that.

Anonymous political activist.

Candidates may also face loss of earnings during the selection and election campaign. Some of the interviewees talked about how difficult it is to fight a selection alongside a full time job and so candidates will often leave their job or take unpaid leave from work. This can be a barrier to participation:

> [O]ne of our Labour members, local, younger than me, wanted to stand as the MP, decided that she would stand in X and we all supported her because, you know, she's young. But she has quite a good job as a civil servant, and obviously so she went for a 6 month […] like holiday […] and she wasn't allowed to do it because it was such a political job, she would have had to have given her job up. But that's not fair because there was a young woman who would have been […] a very good MP, […] but she said she has a big mortgage her and her partner, they have a lovely home, but without her wages, he's self-employed, who pays the mortgage, do you know what I mean? And so she couldn't do it.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

Despite the emphasis placed on barriers in the selection process, financial and in-kind support was also presented as important in elections.

To combat the financial barrier to participation unions offer their candidates help in-kind, financial contributions and campaigners. This interviewee highlights the things that their union can do to help candidates win a selection, from giving guidance to encouraging members in the constituency to do what they can to support the candidate:

> We give guidance over selections because selections sometimes are incredibly competitive. So we advise them how to get through the process. We help with websites and leaflets, on occasion we'll identify activists who can work as field organisers to support candidates, and we'll encourage our members in the constituencies to do all they can to support candidates [...].
>
> Jennie Formby, Unite, trade unionist.

In the election campaign, unions can send a 'car load' of campaigners to help an existing team with leafleting, reducing the amount of time that needs to be spent on this and allowing more resources to be channelled into other aspects of the campaign. As part of the campaigning role unions can also run phone banks where they contact their members in the constituency to encourage them to support the Labour Party candidate. Trade unions can also contact their members living in the constituency and

encourage them to vote for the preferred candidate at the selection and the election. This is effectively another form of election contact, organised and paid for by the unions. However, one interviewee did question the value of this particular support at the selection meeting:

> [W]hat they would tend to do is if they have endorsed a candidate they might, for example, then write out to their members who are also Labour Party members in that constituency and say we have endorsed this person, we think you should to. [T]hey […] might pay attention to that or might pay no attention to it. [W]hen X was the candidate in X he was endorsed by Unison, […] but I was going to vote for him anyway and had he not been endorsed by Unison I would still have voted for X.

> Anonymous political activist.

Unions may offer help in-kind by using their equipment to print, envelope and frank letters being sent out to constituents. This interviewee explained that this was valuable in their campaign because it saved time and allowed them to focus on other aspects of the campaign:

> [I]t's just much more stress free and I don't know, it depends on what kind of candidate you are I suppose, if you're a bit of a control freak, which I think a lot of candidates are, […] then perhaps it's just much more convenient to say 'I know within this 3 day window that is going to be done,' rather than, 'oh, it might tip over into 5 days, in which case is it going to have a knock on effect with something else that we're going to want to deliver, or another activity that we want to do?'

> Melanie Onn, MP.

Unions can also provide direct financial assistance. In elections this could be giving a donation to the constituency party to be spent on the election campaign as necessary or paying for specific aspects of the campaign, such as leaflets, a website, office space or a campaign organiser.

The support of trade unions was seen by most of the interviewees as a way of reducing the barriers faced by candidates. However, it was not seen as the answer to

the problem created by the enormous cost involved in being a candidate. This was particularly true in relation to the selection process where one interviewee argued that the support of trade unions could actually exacerbate the problems faced by individuals seeking selection:

> Well, you hear stories of unions that have supported people in a campaign in a selection campaign, if that's the case then I think that's a problem, when I got selected in 1981 I don't suppose I spent £5, OK, you just didn't. Now people come, I mean X, probably lived in the constituency for 3 months before getting selected, you have to contact all these party members individually, it's hugely expensive. I've got friends in the House who reckon it cost them £10,000 to be selected. that's what's got to change. I don't think you want to get into the position where you're either a wealthy middle class person who can afford it, or you have to be paid for by a trade union. I think that somebody has got to look at the selection rules and just cut the costs that you're allowed to spend full stop.
>
> John Denham, former MP.

Although I found that trade union support could help some candidates to overcome financial barriers to participation, it does not solve the fundamental problem: the cost of being a candidate excludes some people from parliamentary politics, particularly at the selection stage. In fact, rather than increasing diversity in parliament, trade unions may actually help to reinforce the very barriers that they aim to remove. Whilst there are funding options in place for those who cannot afford to run their own campaign, policies such as placing a funding cap on selections may be less likely to be introduced. Those without trade union support or the ability to personally fund a campaign may find themselves unable to stand. If they are able to stand but have limited resources then they may find themselves at a disadvantage to those candidates who have access to more funds. As this interviewee argues:

> The winner […] had immense financial backing from Unite the union, and he was backed by other trade unions as well but they paid for his postage and you're talking about there an electorate in,

I would have thought, well thousands, an electorate in the thousands, and he had several colour communications that other candidates, I worked for another candidate […] who was backed by Unison but they didn't have the budget there to help him particularly, he couldn't compete financially on that level.

Anonymous political activist.

In effect, union support could lead to greater barriers to entering parliament for the very people they want to support: working class people who cannot afford to run an expensive selection campaign.

Cultural barriers: political education

The second barrier to entering into politics is cultural, created by a lack of the skills required to enter into parliament. Some people develop the skills necessary for politics through education or work but for others this is not the case. Trade unions provide political education to try and help their members overcome this barrier. Writing in 1995, Verba, Schlozman and Brady argued that politically engaged trade unions, along with social democratic or labour parties, mobilise those who, on the grounds of their education and income, might not otherwise be politically engaged. Political education varies in formality and type. It ranges from informal political education that comes just from being a part of a union, to formal training for members who express an interest in being a candidate. Jennie Formby from Unite explains the different types of training that they provide, demonstrating the range in formality from political education schools to union publications:

We run specific political education schools in every region and also nationally, including some specifically for women and BAME members to encourage greater and more diverse participation. We also use our publications and online presence to make sure that members are fully aware of our political strategy and policies that we are pushing that are important to our members, their families

and the communities they live and work in […].

Jennie Formby, Unite, trade unionist.

The less formal education is not specifically about encouraging members to become politicians, it is more about encouraging them to be aware of politics, how it relates to their lives and how they can get involved. This interviewee talks about how unions can equip their activists with arguments about issues that matter to them:

> I mean my experience of their political work is that it is mostly about equipping their activists with the arguments on the issues that matter to them. So obviously they have done a lot of work on Sunday trading […]they represent a lot of lower paid workers, they do a lot of work on issues around low pay but also kinda broader workers' rights issues like maternity and paternity leave. So I think a lot of it is equipping the active members in how they make political arguments but I guess out of that there will be people who then become more active in the union who […] may want to pursue things politically.

Stephen Twigg, MP.

Informal political education was thought by a couple of the interviewees to be a feature of the past. As this interviewee argues:

> A lot of people, particularly working class men, when they worked in factories, that's where they learnt about politics because the shop-stewards would tell 'em about politics, about trade unionism and about democratic socialism and they would be a kind of education for them, they would go in from school pretty raw, wouldn't know much about anything at all, but after five years, ten years, 15 years, they'd been in the union, they knew what the union stood for, when they got in trouble at work the union would protect them, it would defend them, so they came out thinking 'I'm a trade unionist' and they would say 'the Labour Party is our party' because Labour are affiliated. And that used to be very very strong […] And it wasn't so much formal education, it was just everyday people talking about politics and explaining […].

Kelvin Hopkins, MP.

Informal political education, to the extent that it still exists within the unions, is an important way of encouraging union members to interact with politics. It can lead to members of the union becoming more involved in formal politics. It is a way of developing activists and campaigners as well as providing some individuals with the interest in politics, confidence, and skills necessary to become politicians.

More formal political education and training also exists within unions. This training could be focused on developing the skills and confidence necessary to be active union members or union officials. However, as with much of the informal political education, this could lead to some union members becoming political representatives. For example, this interviewee discusses the training that they were given as a union official and how subsequently this helped them as a politician:

> [Y]ou get training […] the union will give officials training in, you know, public speaking, things like, you know, they used to call it power dressing. It's funny because I remember the first time I wore a suit and it was on the advice of this woman that was brought in by the union and I wore a suit at conference, and a woman who I had known for years said 'I couldn't believe it was you, you walked on to the platform and everybody just went quiet' and it's crazy but it works […] while it wouldn't be seen as being necessary to be an MP, it does help.

> Anonymous MP.

Political education and training can also be more specifically aimed at training those union members who have expressed an interest in becoming a political representative. This sort of training is likely to focus on the skills needed to successfully navigate the selection and election process, such as writing and delivering speeches, running a campaign and interacting with the media. This interviewee states that one of the main purposes of their union's formal political education is to build confidence amongst working class people who do not believe that politics is for them:

> I think the main thing is for us to identify people with potential to be Parliamentary Candidates, and through training to give them the

> skills and the confidence they need. We're conscious that working class people often lack confidence in themselves, and think they don't have what it takes to be an MP when, in reality they're quite stunning in terms of their ability and what they've got to offer.

> Jennie Formy, Unite, trade unionist.

It is clear here that the traditional aim of enabling working class people to enter into politics is still a focus of the Unite political strategy.

Political education could be particularly important for helping to increase the participation of women and BAME union members. The majority of the interviewees thought that unions help to promote diversity in politics. They talked about this in relation to women and BAME groups and the specific steps taken to help them to get into politics such as specialised political education and training for those who want to become candidates or be more involved in politics. Some of the interviewees talked about the importance of increasing the confidence of women as well as providing them with specific skills to enable them to become politically active. This interviewee, for example, emphasises the role of trade unions in empowering women to have a voice and to take the lead:

> There used to be a course called springboard, which lots of trade unions did. And it wasn't purely for women but it was very much directed for women and it empowered women because what it did was it took them on a course and they found that they could speak, that they had a voice, they were encouraged to write things down, they were encouraged to take the lead.

> Anonymous political activist.

The interviewees were in general less aware of specific training aimed at BAME members. Here some of them talked in more general terms about the existence of groups and forums within the union for ethnic minorities but less about support directed at BAME union members to help them become more active in politics or to become candidates.

A minority of interviewees were concerned that trade unions can be unrepresentative and exclusive organisations. One interviewee felt that unions were failing to adequately represent the views of the working class in politics, one of their primary aims. The interviewee argued that the current composition of trade unions means that they tend to support candidates with more middle class views:

> I think that they are more likely to support candidates who share their views which are more likely to be middle class [...] as trade unions become more middle class more middle aged and more left wing and more public sector, I think they endorse candidates who support people with those 4 characteristics even more perhaps than they did before.

> Anonymous political activist.

However, the main focus was on the exclusion of female and BAME union members. One interviewee talked about their experience of attending a trade union's political weekend and described it as:

> [L]ike all union events they are largely social based, lots of drinking, and, you know, it's a macho masculine, boy's, men's club kind of atmosphere […].

> Anonymous political activist.

Other interviewees reflected on the male dominance of unions in general, although Unison was thought to be a bit of an exception here and one interviewee felt that Unite are starting to take positive steps to get more women into politics. There may also be a difference in gender diversity at the local compared to the national level, with more women at the national union level. One interviewee reflected that the space used by many local union meetings could exclude people and continue male dominance within local unions:

> [Y]ou know often when there is a problem with trade unions we'll go to the pub to sort it out cos that's what trade union culture is like, we are always at the pub. I know it is terrible and it is rather often misogynistic and […] I am certainly a group in the trade

unions that are trying to change these things.

Anonymous political activist.

Although this interviewee stated that this was something people are trying to change, they also felt that there probably isn't a space that could be used that would be inclusive to all union members:

> [T]he fact that the pub will put off people, there's probably no venue that you can't put off anyone, the fact is if you have a trade union branch full off, currently full of a lot of older blokes because that's what you're representing and say 'actually no we're going to down to the community centre and you can't have a drink in the meeting' you're not, you're not sort of failing those people in a representation sense but you're doing something rather bizarre to their structures of organisation. If that's where people have traditionally met, you are rather changing that in a drastic sense [...].

Anonymous political activist.

The idea that moving to a venue that may be more inclusive to women and people who do not drink for personal or religious reasons would be off putting to many of their members actually reinforces the idea that some groups are under-represented in unions whilst others (older men) dominate the agenda.

Political education can help individuals to develop the confidence and skills necessary to overcome cultural barriers to political participation. However, there may be issues within trade unions around who is able to access this political education, particularly for female and BAME union members. Moreover, the very culture and organisation of unions at the local level may sometimes be exclusive and off putting to female and BAME members, ensuring the continued dominance of older, white, men at the local level.

Controversial role of trade unions

In this section I will examine two controversial areas of trade union involvement in the selection and election processes. Firstly, I examine the question of how people

get help from trade unions. Whilst a large number of the interviewees discussed a formal process for getting help from a trade union, many of them also emphasised the importance of knowing the right people to talk to. This could lead to some individuals finding that they are unable to access trade union support and, as with financial donations in selection campaigns, could actually lead to further inequality in parliament as only those with a strong connection to a union are able to access support. Secondly, I will examine the practice of getting supporters to selection meetings in order to ensure that the preferred candidate is selected. Interviewees did not talk about this as a trade union specific tactic, but as a general feature of politics.

Accessing help

The question of *how* candidates and sitting politicians access help from trade unions can shed light on *who* can access this help and whether or not some people are disadvantaged when it comes to getting support. The interviewees were fairly evenly split when discussing accessing help with some interviewees making reference to a formal process for accessing help and others making reference to the importance of knowing the right people when accessing help. Interviewees made reference to a formal process of accessing help in both local and national elections. However, in local elections the process was presented as simpler and there seemed to be more consistency from the interviewees in the way that this process was presented. This is probably because of the relative simplicity of that process and because of the small, set, amounts of money available. Often, council election candidates can fill in a form to receive a set amount of money, somewhere between £50 and £200 depending on the union, which will go to their local party to help run their campaign.

The formal process of seeking support in the parliamentary process was generally presented by the interviewees as more complicated and rigorous. This is because the level of support in parliamentary contests is far greater. Unions must make

sure that they are investing their limited resources in the right candidates. In parliamentary contests, the formal process of accessing help varies across the different affiliated organisations, as this interviewee explains:

> [W]hat they will tend to do I think is when a selection process starts […] all the trade unions will invite most of the candidates who have expressed an interest to come to a meeting of them, which might be a regional committee or it might be just of the local members or whatever, […] and they will interview those people. […] [F]or some of them you have to do like a test, erm, or, you know for the co-op party for example, I know you have to do a test and I think you have to write an early day motion something like that[…] and others you just have to kind of do a speech and then get an endorsement. So […] all the affiliated organisations to the Labour Party can kinda determine their own process that sort of thing, so there is not a one size fits all.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

One interview explains that their union's process is centred on interviews with members who want to seek selection. The decision about who to support is then made by the union's Regional Labour Party Liaison Committee:

> If there are people who have been through the candidate development programme and they want to seek support to stand as a candidate in a particular Constituency, the relevant RLPLC [Regional Labour Party Liaison Committee] will arrange to interview them, together with any other Unite members who have expressed an interest. They don't always agree to support one candidate over another, but they look for members who share our political values.
>
> Jennie Formby, Unite, trade unionist.

Other interviewees, particularly those who had not had to seek trade union support for a long time because they had been given it at their original selection process and had not sought it since, were less clear about the formal process for accessing union support. This could partly reflect a move towards greater formality and clarity around the process over time.

Other interviewees made reference to knowing the right people in order to access help from unions. Whilst in this case the formal process of accessing help could still be important, knowing the right people to talk to about this was seen as beneficial. The benefits of knowing the right people were perceived differently by the different interviewees. For some, knowing the right people could mean simply knowing whom to approach to start the formal process of getting help. For example, this interviewee was able to use their existing union connections to help them establish connections in other unions:

> I mean it was when my seat came up, that was when you start making phone calls, […] some, you don't have any connection to so I was ringing ASLEF [Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen], you know I don't have any, contacts in ASLEF so, obviously working for a union helps because you can talk to other people in the union and say 'do you know anybody in ASLEF?'
>
> Melanie Onn, MP.

For others it meant that when they were asking for help they knew the person they were speaking to and that person was aware of their long-term commitment to the union:

> I was […] meeting these people, these are my friends, you know it is not like I am writing to somebody saying 'dear Sir, you may never have heard of me', it's like you know 'last week we were doing this' or 'remember' so it wasn't, I was pushing a very very easy door […] probably more easy than the vast majority of people.
>
> Anonymous MP.

Here this was presented as something likely to benefit them in comparison to others asking for support.

For some of the interviewees, knowing the right people was thought to lead to automatic union support. This was presented as a positive thing by some of the interviewees. For example, this interviewee explained that they would not go through

the formal process of applying for money in a local election because they would know

who to ask for support:

> I wouldn't go through the route of getting £200 off GMB anyway. I'd just work out how much I need and make a few phone calls and I'd get what I needed. Especially X would, X is, if I say X and I need x, we'd get it. Unless there was some crazy issue.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

For others, this was presented as a negative thing, which leads to people being offered

help based on their connections and not their abilities:

> Yeah, unions' line that people approach the union to ask for support, others will be the unions have their own officials who, you know, I'm a Unite official, I suddenly decide I want to be an MP and obviously it's much easier for them because if they don't control who is their preferred candidate, you know, their mate does and so it can be much easier for them that way and the funding that comes with it […].
>
> Anonymous political activist.

The same interviewee goes on to state:

> [U]nion members would say they wish it was a bit more open and transparent as to how they do come to endorse candidates rather than it just being knowing the right people and then they suddenly, you know, your mate's got a reasonable role there, then all of a sudden you can basically get a full nomination from whoever you want. You know, donations of a couple of thousand, or 'oh just give me a bit of [mail] through the union franker' […].
>
> Anonymous political activist.

Another interviewee felt that knowing the right people is not just helpful, but

necessary. They felt that just presenting union values and having a history of working

in the trade union is not enough to secure selection and election support:

> And obviously being able to demonstrate that you have supported Unite previously, be it erm attending rallies or things like that, but, you know, I think, just having that record of 'well I've always gone to a rally, I've always supported Unite, I've always been a member' wouldn't be enough to secure the union backing. It's

really having a link to the person who makes the decision, who is the political level officer, well I believe it is anyway.

Anonymous political activist.

If access to trade union help is easier, or even reliant upon, having the right connections, then trade union support could actually become another barrier to political participation. Some people, who need the financial and educational support of a union to enter into politics, may find themselves unable to access this support if they do not know the right people.

Recruitment

Membership of political parties is a key aspect of democracy and political parties rely on members for votes, campaigners, financial resources and the maintenance of the party (Hopkin, 2001). Affiliated trade unions play an important role in growing the Labour Party and encouraging their members to become more active in politics. However, there is tension over the recruitment of members. The Labour Party (2016: 61) states in their Rule Book that it encourages the recruitment of active members but warns against the recruitment of "paper members" recruited in order to "manipulate […] democratic procedures". In order to be selected as the Labour Party candidate, it is necessary to win the vote of the local party members at the final selection meeting. It could be desirable, therefore, to ensure that membership of the local party, and attendance at the meeting, is as advantageous as possible to secure the vote.

This could lead to 'paper members' recruited solely to influence the outcome of the selection meeting. Allegations of people being recruited, possibly without their knowledge, were made in Falkirk in 2013 (Labour Party report, 2014: 1, cited in the Guardian, 2014) and there have been repeated allegations made against biraderi networks (Fielding and Geddes, 1998; Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017; Wilks-Heeg, 2008). It could also lead to existing members being strongly encouraged

to attend the selection meeting by one of the candidates for selection, only if they are supporters of that candidate. The interviewees talked about this recruitment to the party and to the final selection meeting in quite general terms and did not limit their observations to trade unions. Instead, attempting to ensure that the selection meeting attendance is advantageous was seen as a normal part of party politics. In fact, one interviewee even felt that the recruitment of 'paper members' carried out by trade unions is more likely to be observed than if it is carried out by another organisation or individual:

> I think, for example, if you look at Falkirk […] what that trade union did was, or what it allegedly did or whatever, because I think it is all, still not entirely clear, but to be really honest, actually, you could be a golf club and sign up members of that golf club unwittingly [to] the Labour Party and pay their money on their behalf and they'd all be members of the Labour Party and then when the selection came round you'd be in a much better place to then talk to those people and do it. What happened with Falkirk in particular doesn't seem to be unique to a trade union at all. I think ironically it was probably only spotted because it was a trade union, whereas if it was this golf club analogy then probably people would never have known.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

Some of the interviewees discussed the process of signing up members to the Labour Party and getting their supporters to the selection meeting. For all of them signing up members to the party was overall a positive and acceptable practice, important for growing the party and increasing political participation. As this interviewee states:

> [W]e all sign up members. I mean I have signed up members, you know we all sign up members, we all want more people in the party erm and that's fine […]
>
> Anonymous political activist.

Jennie Formby from Unite made a specific reference to Falkirk when she explained that in signing up members unions are in fact just doing what the Labour Party wants them to do and encouraging people to get more involved in politics:

> What happened in Falkirk and what has happened in other places is that we've done exactly what the Labour Party wanted us to do, in line with Unite's political strategy of encouraging our members to join and get involved with their local Labour Party. In effect, saying to members that they shouldn't just moan from the side-lines, they should join the Party as full members, pay their fees and have a voice, including in selections. A lot of our members decided to join the Labour Party so they could do just that – which of course was exactly what Ed Miliband encouraged a year or so later when he launched the Collins Review.

> Jennie Formby, Unite, trade unionist.

Getting supporters to the selection meeting was also portrayed as a normal part of the process, designed to ensure selection:

> Well at selection times, [...] the candidates aspiring to be councillors get their supporters there and […] they turned out in large numbers. At selection for MP, I and my supporters will also endeavour to get my supporters there to make sure that, you know, it's all ok.

> Anonymous, MP.

For this interviewee signing members up to the party and then getting them to the selection meeting was about increasing political consciousness and building a party, with the added bonus of selecting your candidate:

> And is it subverting the process to recruit people to the Labour Party to get your candidate? I don't think that is subverting the process, that's recruiting people to the party they should be members of, because it is the party that should represent their interests. But they are not politically involved but they are becoming politically conscious, so you recruit them in the Labour Party. And you have got a candidate who you want selecting, and they get selected because you recruited these 200 people into

activity in the Labour Party, that's not subverting the process, that's building a party.

Anonymous political activist.

The same interviewee went on to discuss in more detail the packing of meetings with members to support a particular candidate arguing that whilst it might not be fair, it is not wrong:

> [W]e had a an MP in [place] who erm survived a re-selection process by packing the meeting with elderly people who had never been seen at the Labour Party, nobody knew who they were. They were members though […] but they had never been at the Labour Party meetings […] They were bussed in to swing the vote. Can you do that? Yes. Is that fair? No. But is it wrong under the rules? It's not really is it, because they're Labour Party members. It's not wrong under the rules but you sit back and think 'you bastard'. And we've all done it, of course, and I have said to people 'you need to be at the AGM […], 'if you don't come to the AGM, there's a move to introduce an honorarium and it'll be passed […].' Is that packing the meeting? Yeah. But are those people entitled to be at the meeting? Yeah. It is therefore not unfair, it is only unfair if you bus people in who have no right to be there, don't have voting rights and make them vote.

Anonymous political activist.

Encouraging members to vote in a selection because they support the same candidate as you is not wrong. However, it could become problematic if you are simultaneously making no effort to encourage members who may vote for an opposition candidate to attend the selection meeting or even actively taking measures to discourage their attendance. The Labour Party Rule Book (2016) states that all members must be able to participate in the selection process on an equal basis, if supporters of an opposition candidate are being discouraged from attending the meeting then this clearly breaks Labour Party rules.

For some of the interviewees the line of acceptability became blurred when it came to signing people up to be members of the party who had little involvement with

the party, the party may not even hold contact details for them, and who had clearly been recruited in order to participate in the selection meeting. One interviewee stated that it is normal and acceptable to make sure that the membership list is advantageous when it comes to the selection process. They did, however, feel that line was crossed if people were unaware that they had become party members:

> I think it's not uncommon for people to when they know a candidate is standing down, at national more than council level, to make sure that membership list is as advantageous to them as possible and there's nothing wrong with that. There's nothing ignoble about going and recruiting members, you know, to try and get people to join the Labour Party. I think in Falkirk where it went wrong was the fact that they didn't tell people that they were doing in on their behalf, erm but actually had they done that there is nothing wrong with that at all and it is lauded that trade unions, or indeed anyone else tries to persuade people to join a political party. Erm, so no I don't have a problem with the principle of that, I think that is quite legitimate.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

One interviewee was concerned about this practice of recruitment with people effectively being signed up to be members of a specific faction of the local party:

> [T]here is a question of whether it is right that someone can pay for someone to be a member of the Labour Party, there is a big question about whether they even know they're members and let's say, this is hypothetical, not even necessarily in X, […] they don't necessarily know they're members, […] things like all the email addresses and postal addresses and phone numbers, it won't be theirs it'll be the sponsoring member as such so they control their interaction with the Labour Party and I think, I couldn't tell you exactly what the rule would say but it would strike me as the fair rule would be that, I am all for encouraging people to sign up to the Labour Party, that is fine, but the Labour Party has to be able to contact those people erm because it is not, because you can't have me and my proxy members, that's not right.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

In this case, the interviewee is also concerned about the participation of members being controlled through recruiters. Three of the interviewees made specific references to

membership in the 'Muslim' or 'Pakistani' communities. It is possible here that what they were referring to was as a result of biraderi, as discussed in the previous chapter. They talked about there being a large number of members in these communities that are not seen at constituency party meetings unless there is a selection or some other kind of internal party election taking place. The suggestion here is that these members are 'paper members'; they are members purely to vote in elections in the support of one faction in the local party. This interviewee sums this up when they say:

> [I]f you went to a meeting of the local party or the constituency or city wide meetings, you'd think the membership was 80% white, it's not it's 80% Pakistani but there's a lot quiet members, but we met them all at the selection last year.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

This form of recruitment could lead to candidates being selected based on their connections rather than their skills and could mean that other candidates are overlooked because they do not gather support in this way.

Idealised role of trade unions

Finally, there is the idealised aspect of the role of the trade union where trade unions were presented as both legitimate and transparent organisations. Interviewees directly contrasted the legitimate and transparent trade unions with other political party funders and the central Labour Party.

Legitimacy and transparency

Many of the interviewees were keen to emphasise the legitimacy of trade union participation in Labour Party politics. This was often done by emphasising their transparency, particularly in relation to other organisations, and phrases like 'the cleanest money in politics' were used a number of times to refer to trade union support. Trade union money was seen to be more easily traceable to its source, the political fund of the individual trade union. Trade unions were presented as subject to

regulations that other organisations would not be, such as trade union laws. These regulations were perceived to increase their legitimacy, as this interviewee stated:

> [T]he taking of the political fund is covered by different trade union laws […] that's why they call it the cleanest money in politics because it is regulated […] there is always an audit trail.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

The money was also presented as having been raised by thousands of hardworking trade union members with a commitment to the labour movement and strong Labour Party values. This interviewee summed up that view when they stated:

> I suppose the only thing about trade union money is, because you always know with every candidate where it has come from and you always know, it is the cleanest money by a mile in British politics […] you have absolute complete clarity on where that's come from and who it is from and when it was agreed and all that kind of stuff, you know. And for me, there is a kind of quantifiable difference between one person giving a million pounds and millions of people giving a £1 and trade union money is the latter and money in business is the former and I think that is quite an important thing to think about.
>
> Anonymous political activist.

Another interviewee shared the view that the transparency of trade union money is important, emphasising the difference between trade union money and money from big business being that trade union members are able to vote on where their money goes:

> [Trade union money is] much more transparent, it has been said time and time again that the only honest, the only clean money in British politics comes from trade unions. All the rest of it is a Chief Executive who gives money to […] an organisation, which means he's taking money from his company, he's giving it to his political party, the shareholders have no control or say in that. If they are very disgruntled they can get rid of that chief executive but it's not easy to do. In the trade unions there are votes on whether or not they're affiliated to the Labour Party and what that means. If we're not affiliated to the Labour Party what our position would be regarding the Labour Party, what will we do about supporting a candidate, […] it is true to say it is that the only honest, clean

money in British politics comes from trade unions, which is democratically controlled.

Anonymous political activist.

The unions themselves, not just the rules governing their political funds, were viewed as legitimate organisations in comparison to some businesses. This interviewee stated:

But they're a legitimate organisation, so at least it's not like, you know accepting it from some shady Cayman Islands hedge fund.

Melanie Onn, MP.

Presenting money from trade unions as transparent and legitimate as opposed to the opaque and illegitimate money from big businesses is also an attack on other political parties who are more likely than the Labour Party to rely solely on this money.

Interestingly, it was not just financially and in comparison to big business that trade unions were viewed as legitimate. The legitimacy and transparency of trade unions was directly contrasted by some of the interviewees with the perceived lack of transparency and legitimacy of the central Labour Party and some of the groups situated at the right of the party such as Progress. This centred on an ideological debate where the trade unionists viewed themselves as the left of the party, champions of the labour movement and perhaps even as the 'real' Labour Party. On the other hand they viewed the central party, as well as organisations like Progress and some party members, as being to the right of the Labour Party where they try to destabilise the labour movement. For example, this interviewee discussed the allegations made in Falkirk, stating that they were made by those on the right of the party that realised a trade unionist could be elected

Unfortunately people on the right of the party, in particular those associated with Progress, saw the increasing number of members of trade unionist Labour Party members as a threat to their own candidates and on occasion have reacted very negatively,

sometimes crying 'foul' as they did in Falkirk.

Jennie Formby, Unite, trade unionist.

This interviewee explains that the central party continuously parachutes candidates into seats whilst when trade unions try to use the influence that they have, they are criticised:

> You know, I'll be absolutely blunt, the one organisation which has had the greatest influence in terms of fixing selections has been the National Executive of the party and the party officialdom, no doubt about that, much more than any individual trade union. I just think that frankly the stance of successive leaders of the party has been nothing short of hypocritical in that respect. I mean there has been people parachuted into the constituencies left, right and centre, all over the country and, you know if the trade union tries to use its influence through the local membership networks to do something very similar, all of a sudden all hell breaks loose and I think its mad.

> Anonymous MP.

Another interviewee complained that the 'Westminster elite' are able to promote their friends at the expense of working class MPs:

> [Y]ou have had a self-perpetuating Westminster elite, you know with people being parachuted in, you know, who are friends of the prevailing leadership get parachuted in, promises get made, MPs stand down just before elections then they'll be given a peerage or something like that, […] and then hey presto somebody working for the leaders office ends up in that seat. That's caused enormous resentment […] locally, but it is often meant that you have had people parachuted into seats […].

> Anonymous MP.

Criticisms were not just levied at the central party. This interviewee talked about the role of Progress in the Labour Party and about the hypocrisy in their criticisms of trade union involvement:

> Progress, now more often identified jointly with Labour First, complain about the support trade unions give to candidates we support but they're no different. They have their own websites their

own political agenda, they spend thousands of pounds on training people, on running selection campaigns and in the past Progress has been sponsored with huge amounts of money by Lord Sainsbury amongst others, yet they complain when trade unionists and others get a bit of a leg up.

Jennie Formby, Unite, trade unionist.

The interviewee goes on to argue that support from some organisations is viewed as more acceptable than support from other organisations in the Labour Party.

This idealised view of trade unions as legitimate and transparent organisations fighting for the left of the Labour Party and traditional Labour Party values is particularly interesting at a time of deep ideological divisions in the Labour Party. However, it is important to remember that these divisions are not new and this tension over legitimacy, party ownership and the degree of influence trade unions have in the party has shaped the Labour Party's interactions with trade unions since its formation.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have introduced my second case study, trade unions. I have introduced the role of affiliated trade unions in the selection and election of political representatives in the Labour Party. I have shown how trade unions are able to influence the selection and election processes of Labour Party representatives to help get the candidates that they support elected. I have argued that there are three aspects to the role that trade unions play in the selection and election of Labour Party politicians. Firstly, there is the 'legitimate' aspect of the role, which is based on the traditional aim of trade unions to enable more working class people to get into parliament. In this role, unions attempt to help their members to overcome financial and cultural barriers to political participation. They do this by providing campaigners, help in-kind and financial assistance in selection and election campaigns. This support is particularly important in selections where there is no cap on campaign spending and

candidates are expected to raise funds themselves for their campaign. They also provide both formal and informal political education for their members, which can help them to overcome cultural and skill barriers to entry into politics.

Secondly, there is the 'controversial' aspect of the role. This looks firstly at how candidates are able to access support from trade unions and I argue that whilst there are formal procedures for accessing support, those seeking support may also benefit from personal connections with union officials. Secondly, I look at recruitment to the party and the selection meeting. I argue that the signing up of members to the party to vote purely in the candidate selection meeting, often to represent one faction in the local party, can lead to candidates being selected based on connections rather than skills. Interestingly, interviewees did not discuss this as a trade union specific practice and instead some of them presented it as a feature of democratic politics and the selection process.

Thirdly, there is the 'idealised' aspect of the role of trade unions. Here interviewees presented the trade unions as legitimate and transparent, particularly in comparison to the central party and other political funders. This legitimacy and transparency is partly as a result of the rules governing trade union political funds and the open and accountable nature of their organisation. It was also fuelled by an ideological debate where the trade unions are presented as the left of the party; they are the champions of the labour movement, whereas the central party was presented as to the right of the party and perhaps as betraying the labour movement.

In the next chapter I will build upon the findings in this chapter about what support is available and how candidates access this support from trade unions. I will analyse trade union donations to Labour Party constituencies to establish who gets support from trade unions and what the motivations are behind the distribution of that

support. I will then move onto the conclusion where I will draw together my two case

studies to conclude on the effects of networks in politics for electoral choice.

Chapter 6: Trade union support in the 2015 General Election

Providing financial and in-kind support is a way that networks can influence the selection and election of candidates. The amount and type of financial and in-kind support given will vary according to the network. Biraderi networks are unlikely to have the resources to make large financial donations whereas trade unions, which have specific political funds, will be able to do this. Trade unions are also more likely than biraderis to have the equipment to provide in-kind support such as printing leaflets, which can be helpful in an election campaign. There are also differences between networks in terms of being able to trace donations to their source, with donations from trade unions easily traceable but donations from the more opaque biraderi networks being difficult, if not impossible, to identify. Trade unions are the biggest donors to the Labour Party and in 2014 trade union donations totalled around £11 million, accounting for 58% of the total donations received by the party that year (Phelps, 2015). Some of this money is donated directly to the Central Party; however a large amount is also donated to individual constituency parties as cash or in-kind donations.

Whilst the previous chapter outlined *how* candidates can get support from trade unions and what shape this support takes, there is very little known about exactly *who* gets support from trade unions or if trade unions target specific types of constituency. Traditionally trade unions would support working class candidates in order to increase the representation of workers and their interests in parliament. However, with just 3% of MPs in 2015 coming from a manual working background (Barton and Audickas, 2016), is this still the case? And, if it is, do trade unions look for working class candidates with other specific characteristics? Or, if not, what other factors might trade unions look for when they allocate support? In relation to specific types of seat, it

could be expected that trade unions would want to support marginal or target seats in order to increase the number of Labour MPs in parliament, but is this the case?

These questions are important because if trade unions do give the majority of their support to candidates with particular socio-demographic backgrounds this could lead to some types of candidate, and ultimately politician, being over-represented in comparison to others who could be excluded. For example, if trade unions are more likely to support men this could lead to more men than women seeking candidacy, more men being selected and more men being elected. Trade unions could in fact be creating further barriers to participation by providing support to certain types of candidates and not others. Conversely, trade unions could be reducing inequalities by focusing their support on under-represented groups.

These questions are also important because they can tell us more about the purpose of trade union support. Past research has emphasised instrumental motivations behind trade unions working with the Labour Party, arguing that whilst today they are motivated by shared ideology to an extent, instrumental motivations are the primary reason behind the continued relationship between the two (Bale and Webb, 2017). If trade union support focuses on mainly winnable and target seat types, then it could reasonably be argued that trade unions are attempting to increase the number of Labour Party MPs and to support the formation of a Labour government. In this case it could be argued that trade unions are acting to support their own interests to have a Labour government and to support the interests of the Labour Party as they attempt to increase the size of the parliamentary party. They might be ideologically motivated to support the Labour Party to bring about a Labour government that represents their shared values. They may also be instrumentally motivated to help form a Labour government. The institutional links between the Labour Party and trade unions mean that there is an increased chance of trade unions being able to influence government

policy if there is a Labour government (Quinn, 2010). However, if support is more likely to be given to Labour candidates in safe seats or to Labour incumbents, this argument would not apply. Instead, this could suggest that trade unions are instrumentally motivated as support is more likely to be given to politicians with a proven track record of representing trade union interests in parliament. In this case it could be argued that trade unions are prioritising their own interests to have trade union supporters in parliament over the interests of the Labour Party to increase the number of Labour MPs.

In this chapter I will present an analysis of donations in cash and in-kind to constituency Labour parties from trade unions in the 2010 to 2015 parliament. This period saw an increase in donations to constituencies from 2014 as a number of unions, including Unite, GMB and Unison, responded to the allegations of malpractice in the Falkirk selection. They reduced the amount of money they paid to the Labour Party in affiliation fees and instead used this money to make large donations to constituency candidates (Cowley and Kavanagh, 2016b). Donations data will be used to identify whether trade unions are more likely to give support to Labour Party candidates with certain socio-demographic characteristics, or to particular types of seat. I reference and build upon the interview data from the previous chapter whilst doing this. I will look at gender, ethnicity, region, incumbency, class, age and past employment by the Labour Party or a trade union as indicators of trade union support. I will also look at whether candidates in safe seats, target seats, winnable seats or hopeless seats are more or less likely to get support.

The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will review the literature and present 10 hypotheses related to individual candidate characteristics and seat characteristics. Secondly, I will outline the data used in this analysis, a combination of data that I have collected, data from the Parliamentary Candidates Project U.K.

(vanHeerde-Hudson and Campbell, 2015) and financial data from the Electoral Commission. Thirdly, I will present the results of my analysis and argue that the biggest determinants of receiving trade union support at the 2015 General Election were being an incumbent and being in a safe, target or winnable seat. All candidate characteristics, other than incumbency, proved to be statistically insignificant indicators of support in the final analysis. Region also proved to be statistically insignificant with the exception of Scotland, where candidates were less likely to receive support.

Who gets support?

The variables affecting trade union support can be split into two types. Firstly, there are the candidate characteristics. These are the individual characteristics of a particular candidate that could affect the likelihood of them receiving trade union support. Secondly, there are the seat characteristics. These are the characteristics of a particular seat that could affect the likelihood of the candidate in that seat receiving trade union support.

Candidate characteristics

There are seven candidate characteristics that I argue could affect the distribution of trade union support. The first of these characteristics is class. From the middle of the twentieth century onwards, there has been a trend towards trade unions supporting fewer working class MPs. According to Muller (1977), in the late 1950s, trade unions began to send professional, younger and better educated representatives to parliament, which marked a break with the original aim to get working class people into parliament. Between 1951 and 1983 the proportion of MPs in the parliamentary Trade Union Group with no previous trade union work experience increased from 12.3% to 49% (Webb, 1992). Writing in 1986 Park, Lewis and Lewis stated that the Trade Union Group still had a strong working class core, even if the majority of members

were not working class. In 1992 Webb similarly argued that whilst MPs in the Trade Union Group were typically more working class than others, they were less working class than they used to be.

Trade union membership statistics show a similar story of a decline in working class presence. According to a report carried out into trade union membership in 2015 by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2016), middle-income earners, highly educated workers and those in professional jobs were more likely to be in trade unions. Additionally, there was a far higher percentage of public sector workers (54.8%) in trade unions than private sector workers (13.9%) (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2016). One of my interviewees stated that because trade unions are becoming increasingly middle class and dominated by the public sector they might be more likely to support candidates with those characteristics:

> as trade unions become more middle class more middle aged and more left wing and more public sector, I think they endorse candidates who support people with those 4 characteristics even more perhaps than they did before.

> Anonymous political activist.

Despite this shift towards an increasingly middle class membership and increasingly middle class trade union supported MPs, the political aim of trade unions is still to increase the representation of workers in parliament. For example, Unite emphasise on their website their aim to both get "working people" involved in the Labour Party at all levels and to gain representation for workers in policy and in a Labour government (Unite the Union, no date b). Interviewees similarly argued that increasing the presence of workers and their issues in parliament remains the focus of trade unions' political strategies and politicians are lobbied and briefed on issues related to trade unions and their members.

The decrease in the traditional support of working class MPs may be the result of changes in the labour market and in a general trend towards the increasing professionalization of politicians (Hunter and Holden, 2015). In other words, the decrease in the support of working class MPs could be more of an issue of supply than of demand on the part of unions. It could be expected then, that when presented with the opportunity to support a working class candidate, unions would be likely to support this person. Therefore, I hypothesise that because trade unions still aim to gain parliamentary representation for workers, when they are presented with a working class candidate they will be more likely to support that candidate.

H1: Being a working class candidate is associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support in 2015.

The second candidate characteristic that I argue could impact the distribution of trade union support is ethnicity. As discussed in the previous chapter, a small number of interviewees expressed concern about white, male dominance of trade unions. Trade unions have had a complex relationship with BAME and female workers in the U.K. For both BAME and female workers, a combination of discrimination experienced within trade unions and a lack of connections within the trade union hierarchy could make it harder for them to obtain trade union support. BAME workers are less likely than white workers to be members of trade unions. According to the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2016), in 2015 25.3% of white workers were in a union compared to 24.4% of Black or Black British workers, 18.8% of Asian or Asian British workers and 16.1% of Chinese workers and other ethnic groups. There are two possible reasons for this. Firstly, although many immigrants arriving in the second half of the 20th century were employed in traditionally unionised jobs in factories and textile mills for example, ethnic minority workers may now be less likely to be employed in heavily unionised sectors. In fact, one of my interviewees

pointed out that in their constituency their South Asian constituents are less likely to be in unions because they work in the service industry, which is not very heavily unionised.

Secondly, there could be fewer BAME members because a failure to fully represent BAME workers could have prevented some from joining a union. Although trade unions now espouse principles of racial equality, this has not always been the case (Kirton and Greene, 2002). This has led to failure to tackle issues related to BAME workers and a lack of representation of BAME workers in union governance. Trade union politics in the twentieth century was based on a fixed concept of workforce interests that was sometimes "ethnically or racially bound" (Lucio and Perrett, 2009: 326). Workers were represented against employers and outsiders, and there was a concern that cheap immigrant labour signified a threat to the jobs of white British workers (Lucio and Perrett, 2009; Kirton and Greene, 2002). This led to ambivalent or even racist attitudes from trade unions towards BAME workers (Solomos and Back, 1995; Lucio and Perrett, 2009). For example, in 1954 the Transport and General Workers Union banned black workers from working on buses because white conductresses disliked working with them (Solomos and Back, 1995). Some research found examples of unions colluding with workplace management to carry out racist practices (Lee, 1987; Phizacklea and Miles, 1987).

The Trade Union Congress began to tackle these issues in the 1970s with anti-racist campaigns and in 1981 the TUC's Black Workers' Charter stated that unions must redress the lack of BAME representatives on trade union decision-making bodies (Kirton and Greene, 2002). Despite this, writing in 2002, Kirton and Greene found that BAME workers were under-represented in all layers of trade union decision-making, with the exception of Racial Equality Committees. Alongside the evidence that fewer BAME workers are in trade unions, if it remains the case that BAME members are

under-represented in positions of power and influence within unions, it could be that BAME candidates have fewer of the connections that were seen as important by my interviewees for accessing help.

H2: Being a white British candidate is associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support in 2015.

Thirdly, following on from ethnicity, I argue that a candidate's gender could influence the distribution of trade union support. In the previous chapter some of the interviewees felt that trade unions are taking positive steps to increase female political participation, such as running political education sessions aimed at women. Whilst this may be the case, women are still under represented in positions of power in trade unions and, as with BAME candidates, this could mean that they do not have the connections perceived by the interviewees to be needed to access trade union support. Kirton and Greene (2002) wrote about a long history of gender campaigns within unions, with a number of positive outcomes, however, they found that the gap between the proportion of female members and female senior officials remains large. They also found that women are under-represented as workplace stewards and representatives. Today there are more female workers than male workers in trade unions (27.7% compared to 21.7% in 2015 according to the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, 2016), but despite this women remain under-represented in positions of power. Ledwith (2012) argues that women are under-represented in trade unions despite the increasing proportion of women in employment and in trade unions. Of the 14 affiliated unions, none currently have a female General Secretary and none of them have had a female General Secretary in the past. Eleven of the 14 unions have officers listed on their websites (although not necessarily all officers were listed), the proportion of listed female officers at these 11 Unions ranged between 0% and 48% of all officers, with an average of just 20% of officers being female.

Heyes (2012) found that trade unions shape opportunities for their members in ways that can damage women in relation to men and lead to the under-representation of female members. Writing in the 1990s, Dorgan and Grieco (1993) and Kirton and Healy (1999) argued that women's participation could be affected by the male dominance of decision-making bodies where they may experience sexism and perceive that there are few opportunities for their participation. In 2016 a Unite report found that over half of the female officers employed there had experienced bullying or sexual harassment by other officers or members (Syal, 2016). As with BAME union members, this under-representation of women in positions of power and influence could make it harder for women to gain union support. This means that they may find themselves with fewer of the necessary informal connections to call on when it comes to getting support. On top of this, in the past women were less likely to be in unionised labour than they are today. This may mean that, particularly in comparison to older men, they have had less opportunity to build the connections that are important in the selection process.

H3: Being a male candidate is associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support in 2015.

The fourth candidate characteristic that I predict could have implications for the distribution of trade union support is age. As trade union membership has declined over time, it is possible that older candidates are more likely than younger candidates to have been in unionised labour and to have developed strong connections with trade unions that could be utilised for getting support. On top of this, some of the interviewees felt that trade unions have in the past done more to train and develop relationships with future candidates. Older candidates are, therefore, more likely to have benefitted from this.

H4: Being an older candidate is associated with a greater likelihood of support in 2015.

The fifth candidate characteristic with possible implications for the distribution of trade union support is incumbency. Incumbents experience an advantage in elections compared to first time candidates (Smith, 2013), and for this reason it could be expected that trade unions intent on increasing the number of Labour MPs in parliament would be less likely to offer support to incumbents. It may be seen as a poor investment of limited trade union resources to support incumbents. However, there are two reasons why incumbents may have an advantage over non-incumbents when it comes to getting trade union support. Firstly, incumbents may already have had the opportunity to develop relationships with a trade union that could help them to access support during an election campaign. Secondly, they may have had the opportunity to prove themselves as supporters of worker and union values, which may make them desirable candidates for trade unions to support.

H5: Being an incumbent is associated with a greater likelihood of receiving trade union support.

The final two candidate characteristics that I predict could have implications for the distribution of trade union support centre on previous employment. I predict that both previous employment by a trade union or the Labour Party may affect the chance of receiving trade union support. The interview data presented in the previous chapter showed that unions look to support candidates who represent trade union values. If a candidate has worked for a trade union in the past then this is a clear indication of their support of trade union values. Interviewees also discussed informal connections as an important factor in accessing trade union support. Candidates who have previously worked for a trade union or the Labour Party may be more likely to have connections that could help when accessing trade union support.

H6: Previously working for a trade union is associated with a greater likelihood of receiving trade union support.

H7: Previously working for the Labour Party is associated with a greater likelihood of receiving trade union support.

Seat Characteristics

As well as the seven candidate characteristics with possible implications for trade union support outlined above, I believe there are two further seat characteristics that may affect the distribution of trade union support. The first of these characteristics is seat type. I believe that being in a safe, target, winnable or hopeless seat could have implications for the distribution of trade union support. Labour Party affiliated trade unions have chosen to be affiliated because they believe that the best way to ensure the interests of workers are heard in parliament is to increase the number of Labour Party MPs. The interview data in the previous chapter showed that they particularly want to increase the number of Labour Party MPs that are sympathetic to trade unions. The ultimate goal is for the Labour Party to win enough seats to form a strong Labour government that will protect and represent workers' interests.

For this reason it would make sense for trade union resources to be focused on winning new seats for the Labour Party and keeping marginal seats, rather than supporting candidates in safe seats or hopeless seats. To this end, union support is likely to be focused on seats that were identified in the lead up to the 2015 election by the Labour Party as 'target' seats. They are also likely to support candidates in 'winnable' seats, seats that were not highlighted by the Labour Party as targets but needed a less than 10% swing for the Labour candidate to win or were Labour held but were not identified as safe seats. Concerns about wasting resources mean that it is unlikely that support would be given in either safe seats (seats identified by the Electoral Reform Society as safe Labour seats) or hopeless seats (seats where the

Labour Party required a swing of 10% or greater to gain the seat) because in both of these types of seats it is unlikely that trade union intervention would impact the overall outcome of the election.

H8: Being in a target or winnable seat is associated with a greater likelihood of receiving trade union support in 2015.

H9: Being in a safe or hopeless seat is associated with a lesser likelihood of receiving trade union support in 2015.

The second of these two seat characteristics that might affect the distribution of trade union support is region. There is a very clear regional trend of unionisation, presented in Table 6.1. According to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2016), in 2015 the North East was the most heavily unionised of the English regions with 30.1% of employees in unions. Wales was the most unionised area in the U.K. with 35.2% of employees in unions. In comparison London was the least unionised region with only 18.1% of employees in trade unions. The proportion of employees in trade unions across the whole of the U.K. was 24.7%. Candidates living, and standing, in strong union regions are more likely to have been in unionised employment, meaning that they may have been better able to develop connections within the union. Greater unionisation, presence of unions and union activity may also mean that trade unions are more likely to have an existing strong relationship with a local constituency party. The local party is likely to know the process for getting trade union support and to be able to help a candidate with that once selected.

Moreover, trade unions in more heavily unionised areas are likely to have more resources than those in less unionised areas. They may, for example, have more activists to assist with campaigning or more capacity to offer help in-kind such as printing leaflets or franking mail. It is also possible that trade union support is considered more or less acceptable in some constituencies depending on the degree of

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unionisation. Constituency parties and constituents in heavily unionised areas may feel more favourably towards union support than those in less unionised areas because they have more party members who are also active members of a local union and have had more opportunity to engage with their union locally.

H10: Being a candidate in a heavily unionised area is associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support in 2015.

Table 6.1: The percentage of employees in a trade union in 2015 broken down by region. Source: Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2016.

Country/region	Percentage of employees in a trade union, 2015
United Kingdom	24.70%
England	23.00%
Wales	35.20%
Scotland	32.00%
Northern Ireland	34.30%
North East	30.10%
North West	27.90%
Yorkshire and the Humber	27.20%
East Midlands	23.10%
West Midlands	25.20%
East of England	20.00%
London	18.10%
South East	20.80%
South West	22.20%

Data

To discover whether trade unions give money to Labour Party candidates, or seats, with certain characteristics I have used data from a combination of sources. Firstly, for information about candidates, I have been given access to the Parliamentary Candidates U.K. dataset (vanHeerde-Hudson and Campbell, 2015). This dataset includes information about all candidates who contested the 2015 U.K. General Election and has been compiled from publicly available candidate, party and

electoral information. There are 67 variables divided into 4 categories. Firstly, the 'general' section includes variables related to the party and location of the candidate as well as whether or not the candidate was supported by a union. The second section includes biographical and socio-demographic information such as gender, ethnicity, age, marital status, education and occupation. The third section contains electoral variables with information about the outcome of the election, incumbency, the number of candidates and voters, and turnout. The final section contains institutional information including the year the candidate entered parliament, their Twitter handle and website URL. I have expanded this dataset to include additional variables related to trade union support, candidates' class and constituency information.

The original trade union support variable included in the 2015 dataset only asks 'was the candidate sponsored by a trade union?' and contains a large amount of missing data. For this reason it was necessary to gather more information related to trade union support in 2015. For this I used information downloaded from the Electoral Commission website. Regulations set out in the 2000 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) require political parties to record donations (any money, goods or services over the value of £500) (Electoral Commission, no date b). Local constituency parties must report all donations that are considered impermissible (i.e. they are not from an accepted source; in this case the donation is returned to the sender but must still be reported to the Electoral Commission). They must also report all single donations that exceed £1,500 and all donations from the same source that, when aggregated over 1 year, exceed £1,500 (Electoral Commission, no date b). As the term donation only applies to gifts exceeding the value of £500, any gifts with a lower value will not be recorded and will therefore be missed from the analysis. Likewise, any donations that do not exceed £1,500 singly or when aggregated will not have been reported to the Electoral Commission and so will not be

included in the analysis. I filtered the available information to only contain donations from trade unions in the 2010-2015 parliament and used this to find information about which constituencies have received money, goods or services, when, and how much.

These data show which constituencies received detectable trade union support but not which candidates receive trade union support. In order to link trade union support to specific candidates for the 2015 election, it was necessary to collect all candidate selection dates for non-incumbents. Once selection dates were matched to constituencies, it was possible to determine which donations had been made after the candidate had been selected. I created a variable for 'post-selection trade union support', which indicates which seats received support after their candidate for the 2015 General Election was selected. This allowed me to test whether candidate and seat characteristics had any impact on the distribution of trade union support in 2015. I also created a variable for 'pre-selection trade union support', which indicates which seats (without incumbents, and therefore holding selections for their 2015 candidate) received trade union support in the 2010-2015 parliament even before they had a candidate selected for the 2015 election. I was able to use this variable to test the relationship between the distribution of pre-selection trade union support and seat characteristics. As no candidate was selected for the seat, pre-selection support can only be linked to seat characteristics and not candidate characteristics.

Selection dates were collected from publically available sources. Where possible they were collected from local newspaper articles announcing the candidate's selection using the Lexis Library newspaper archive. Where this was not possible, the information was collected from local party or candidate websites, Facebook pages or Twitter feeds. In 43 cases it was not possible to collect the candidate selection date. In three of these cases it was clear from a newspaper article, the party website or social media that, although the exact selection date was not confirmed, the candidate had

been selected by a certain date. In these three cases the selection date was entered as this date. In two of the 43 cases I found indication that the candidate was selected within a certain month, the 1st of the following month was entered as the selection date. Based on the selection dates that I had found, I calculated that the average selection date for the 2015 election was 6th February 2014; this date was entered for the remaining 38 cases where I was unable to find a selection date so that they could be included in the analysis. Once the selection dates were collected it was possible to create variables providing more information about trade union support in 2015. The first additional trade union variable asked whether or not the candidate's constituency party received support *after* their selection (incumbents were included in this variable). The second additional variable asked whether the seat received support *before* the candidate was selected. These variables make it possible to link trade union support with specific candidates and their characteristics as well as to observe any changes in trade union support caused by the selection of a new candidate.

Further additional variables were created in order to test the relationship between the candidate's class and trade union support and previous employment and trade union support. Class was calculated using the 'Occupation' variable included in the original Parliamentary Candidates U.K. dataset, which details the candidate's occupation at the time of selection. I used this information to calculate social class according to the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS SEC). Unfortunately I did not have the information required to apply the full method of deriving social class and so instead applied the simplified method which only uses occupation to derive social class (Office for National Statistics, 2010). Using the Office for National Statistics online tool (Office for National Statistics, no date b), I generated a Standard Occupational Classification code that was then used to place each candidate into one of eight analytical classes. These eight classes were collapsed

into three overarching classes: higher managerial and professional, lower managerial and professional, non-managerial or professional. The class variable was used to test hypothesis 1, that being a working class candidate is associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support in 2015.

I created two binary variables to test the relationship between trade union support and previous employment by the Labour Party and previous employment by a trade union. The information for these variables was taken from the employment variables included in the Parliamentary Candidates U.K. dataset, which provide information on the candidate's occupation at the time of candidacy and their three previous occupations (vanHeerde-Hudson and Campbell, 2015). Using this information I created variables indicating whether or not a candidate had ever worked for the Labour party or a trade union. It is possible that some candidates had worked for either the Labour party or a trade union but that this information was not provided in the occupational history in this dataset. These variables were created to test hypotheses 6 and 7 that working for the Labour party/a trade union is associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support.

To test whether or not seat type affects the distribution of trade union support I created a categorical variable where seats were divided into safe, target, winnable and hopeless. This categorical variable was created to test hypotheses 9 and 10 that being in either a target or winnable seat will be associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support and being in either a hopeless or safe seat will be associated with a lesser likelihood of trade union support. Data for target seats was taken from the Labour Party's official list of the 106 2015 target seats released in January 2015 (Labour List, 2013). The data for safe seats was downloaded from the Electoral Reform Society Website (Electoral Reform Society, no date). There were 150 Labour held safe seats in the lead up to the 2015 election.

Winnable seats are those that require a less than 10% swing to Labour to win and seats that were held by Labour in the 2010-2015 parliament but were not identified as safe seats. They do not include safe or target seats. 'Safe' and 'target' seats have been distinguished from 'winnable' seats because, whilst safe and target seats are clearly seats that the party should or would like to win, the labels 'safe' and 'target' have their own distinct implications. In a safe seat, trade unions may be less likely to give support because the seat will almost certainly be won and their support is unlikely to change this. In a target seat trade unions may be more likely to give support because this seat has been identified as a key target according to the Labour Party. Winnable seats have neither of these distinctions, the Labour Party has not highlighted them as seats that they would like to win, nor are they considered safe seats that will almost definitely be won. For these reasons, the three distinct variables, safe, target and winnable seats have been created.

Finally, hopeless seats are those that the Labour party have no chance of winning. They have been calculated as those that require a 10% or greater swing to Labour because, whilst a greater than 10% swing does happen in singular seats, it is rare. The highest national average swing since 1950 was 10.2% to Labour in 1997, the next highest swing was just 5.4% to the Conservatives in 1979 (Clements, 2012). Two seats that should be considered hopeless by this criterion were included in the Labour Party's list of target seats. These two seats, Bristol West and Leeds North West, have been included in the target seat variable rather than the hopeless seat variable.

Findings: Trade union support at the 2015 General Election

This section looks at which candidates and which seats received reportable in-kind and financial support from trade unions in the 2010-2015 parliament. It is possible that some candidates and seats received money from trade unions that did not meet the reporting requirements set out by the PPERA and is therefore excluded from

the analysis. However, given the reporting threshold of £1,500, including aggregated donations from the same source in one year, it is likely that the vast majority of donations are included in the analysis. In total, candidates in 281 constituencies received support from a trade union after they were selected (including incumbents), accounting for 44.5% of candidates. Where a non-incumbent candidate contested a seat, 86 seats (20.8%) also received reportable trade union donations or in-kind support prior to the selection of the 2015 candidate.

Candidate Characteristics

Descriptive analysis of the distribution of trade union support for each of the seven candidate characteristics is presented in Table 6.2. The initial descriptive analysis of candidate characteristics suggests that class, ethnicity, gender, age, incumbency and employment by the Labour Party or a trade union could all be important determinants of trade union support. The analysis shows, firstly, that candidates employed in lower managerial and professional roles were more likely than those in higher managerial and professional or non-managerial and professional roles to receive trade union support. This result suggests that trade unions are less focused on increasing the number of working class MPs in parliament than I originally thought. It was possible to assign a class to 531 of the 2015 Labour candidates, 100 candidates had to be excluded because the necessary occupational information was not available. Labour Party candidates were overwhelmingly concentrated in managerial or professional occupations, 94.4% were in either a 'higher' or 'lower' managerial or professional occupation at the time of their selection, with 53.7% of candidates in a higher managerial or professional occupation and 40.7% in a lower managerial or professional occupation. Just 5.6% of them were in non-managerial or professional occupations including: intermediate occupations, small employers and account workers, lower supervisory and technical occupations and semi-routine and routine

occupations. Of the candidates employed in lower managerial and professional occupations at the time of selection, 52.8% received support. This is compared to 46.7% in non-managerial or professional occupations and 47% in higher managerial and professional occupations.

Secondly, the analysis shows that white British candidates and female candidates were more likely to receive trade union support than BAME candidates and male candidates. Whilst the effect of ethnicity on the distribution of trade union support was as I expected, the effect of gender was surprising. I had expected a combination of discrimination and a lack of connections to trade union decision-makers to make women less likely than men to receive trade union support. Over 91% of candidates in 2015 were white British. Just 53 of the candidates (8.4%) were from BAME backgrounds, slightly higher than the overall proportion of BAME candidates for all parties in 2015, which was 7.3%. A little under half of the white British candidates received support at 45.3%. In comparison, only 35.8% of BAME candidates received trade union support, representing just a little over one third. Meanwhile, the majority of the 631 Labour candidates at the 2015 General Election were male, only 214 women contested seats for the Labour Party accounting for 33.9% of candidates. This was up from 30% in the 2010 General Election (Centre for Women and Democracy, 2010) and is higher than the overall proportion of women contesting seats in 2015, which was 27.2%. Unexpectedly, over half of female candidates received support from a trade union, at 56.5%, in comparison to just 38.4% of male candidates.

Thirdly, the descriptive analysis shows that the proportion of candidates receiving trade union support increased as candidates got older. The youngest Labour Party candidate in 2015 was 18, whilst the oldest was 85. The average age was 49, varying only slightly from the average age of all candidates at 50. In order to test the

distribution of trade union support by age, I created a categorical variable. The three categories in this variable (18-35, 36-62 and 63+) were created based on the mean and the standard deviation, the mean age was 48.65 and the standard deviation was 13.188 meaning that the majority of candidates are between the ages of 36 and 62. 20% of candidates in 2015 were aged 18-35, 64.6% were aged 36-62 and 15.4% of candidates were aged 63 and over. In 176 cases the candidate's age was missing and so these candidates have been excluded. By far the least likely group to receive trade union support in 2015 were those aged 18-35. Just 37.4% of candidates aged 18-35 received support compared to 62.9% of over 63's, the age group most likely to receive support.

Finally, the descriptive analysis shows that incumbents and those who had previously worked for the Labour party or a union were more likely to receive support than non-incumbents and those with no party or union working history. This is perhaps unsurprising, all of these candidates would have likely had the opportunity to demonstrate commitment to the party and to union values as well as to develop useful connections within the party or a union that could aid the process of receiving support. Over a third of Labour candidates in 2015 were incumbents accounting for 34.5% or 218 candidates. Table 6.2 shows that a far larger proportion of incumbents (81.2%) than non-incumbents (25.2%) received trade union support in the 2015 General Election. Just 87 (13.8%) of the candidates in 2015 had worked for a trade union either at the time of their selection or in any of their three previous occupations. More candidates (188) had worked for the party according to their listed current and previous occupations, accounting for 29.8% of Labour Party candidates. A higher proportion of candidates who had previously worked for a union received trade union support than those who had not worked for a union. Likewise, a higher proportion of candidates who had previously worked for the Labour Party received trade union support than those who had not.

Table 6.2: The percentage of candidates in each candidate characteristic category that receive trade union support in 2015.

Candidate characteristic	Trade union support	Number of candidates in each category
Gender		
Male	38.4%	417
Female	56.5%	214
Ethnicity		
White	45.3%	578
BAME	35.8%	53
Class		
Higher Managerial and Professional*	47.0%	285
Lower Managerial and Professional*	52.8%	216
Non—Managerial and Professional*	46.7%	30
Age		
18-35**	37.4%	91
36-62**	57.8%	294
63+**	62.9%	70
Union work		
Worked for union	66.7%	87
Not worked for union	41.0%	544
Labour Party work		
Worked for Labour Party	56.9%	188
Not worked for Labour Party	39.3%	443
Incumbency		
Incumbent	81.2%	218
Non-incumbent	25.2%	413

N: 631

*100 candidates are missing from the three 'class' categories due to missing data. N: 531.

**176 candidates are missing from the three 'age' categories due to missing data. N: 455.

The initial descriptive analysis shows that a higher proportion of lower managerial and professional candidates than any other class group received support, a higher proportion of white than BAME candidates received trade union support, a higher proportion of female candidates than male candidates received support, a higher proportion of incumbents than non-incumbents received support and that the proportion of candidates who received support in 2015 increased with age. Finally, those candidates who had been employed by a trade union or the Labour Party at any

point were more likely to receive support. A binary logistic regression containing these candidate characteristic variables is able to give further insight. Binary logistic regression was chosen for this analysis because the dependent variable is a binary variable.

Table 6.3 shows that even when class, ethnicity, age, incumbency and employment by a trade union or the Labour Party are taken into account, there is a positive relationship between being female and receiving trade union support. Female candidates are still associated with a higher likelihood of receiving trade union support than male candidates. Similarly, being an incumbent is still positively associated with receiving trade union support. Ethnicity, class, age and previous employment with the Labour Party or a trade union are no longer statistically significant indicators of trade union support. This suggests that when all candidate characteristic variables are taken into account, ethnicity, class, age and previous trade union or Labour Party employment did not affect the distribution of trade union support in 2015. However, being a female candidate or an incumbent candidate increased the likelihood of receiving trade union support in 2015.

Table 6.3: Logistic regression candidate characteristics as indicators of post-selection trade union support.

Candidate characteristic	Post-selection support	
	Coeff.	SE
Gender	0.821*	0.252
Race	-0.367	0.411
Class		
Higher Managerial and Professional		
Lower Managerial and Professional	0.100	0.256
Lower Classes	-0.207	0.534
Age		
18-35		
36-62	-0.131	0.312
63+	-0.534	0.456
Worked for Trade Union	0.641	0.343
Worked for Labour Party	0.261	0.252
Incumbency	2.272*	0.271
Constant	-1.057*	0.315

*N 402. R^2 .330. *p <0.05.*

Seat characteristics

Unlike the analysis of the impact of candidate characteristics on the distribution of trade union support in 2015, the analysis of the impact of seat characteristics includes both pre- and post-selection union support. Pre-selection union support is the support that was sent to seats before the selection took place. Using the pre-selection variable it is possible to see which seats received trade union support even before they had a candidate in place to fight the 2015 election and whether or not there were any trends in the type of seat this support went to.

The descriptive analysis presented in Table 6.4 shows that target, winnable and safe seats were all more likely to receive trade union support after their candidate was selected. In contrast, hopeless seats were unlikely to receive trade union support. Of Labour's 106 'target seats', released in January 2013 (Labour List, 2013), 67% received post-selection trade union support. Meanwhile, 129 seats were classified as 'winnable' for the Labour Party and 72.1% of winnable seats received trade union support post-selection. This suggests that trade unions are sending support to seats

where there is a chance that it will help a Labour candidate to win. Of the 150 safe seats at the 2015 General Election, 68% received post-selection trade union support. This result is interesting, I expected to find that safe seats were less likely to receive support because they would be almost guaranteed a win and therefore trade union support would be better sent elsewhere. Less surprisingly, just 6.1% of the 246 hopeless Labour seats received support, far lower than any other seat type. This makes sense; trade unions are unlikely to waste resources on seats that the Labour Party has no hope of winning. The seat type most likely to receive pre-selection trade union support was target, 37.7% of target seats received support before their 2015 candidate had been selected. Far fewer winnable and safe seats received pre-selection trade union support, 14% of winnable seats and just 10% of safe seats.

The regional distribution of seats contested by the Labour Party is displayed in Table 6.4. The most seats were contested in the South East of England, and the fewest in the North East. Table 6.4 shows that the region where the most candidates received post-selection trade union support was the North East with 75.9% of candidates receiving support. In comparison, just 16.7% of candidates received trade union support in the South East. This is unsurprising; of all the English regions the North East had the highest proportion of employees in a trade union in 2015 (Table 6.1). Conversely, the South East has the second lowest proportion of employees in a trade union, behind only London. The distribution of pre-selection trade union support is more surprising. Whilst Wales has the highest level of pre-selection union support (27.5%) and is also the most heavily unionised area in the U.K., the North East, the most heavily unionised of all the English regions, had the lowest proportion of candidates receiving trade union support at just 6.9%.

Table 6.4: The percentage of candidates in each seat characteristic category that received pre- and post-selection trade union support in 2015.

Seat Characteristic	Pre-selection union support	Post-selection union support	Number of seats in each category
Seat type			
Safe	10.0%	68.0%	150
Target	37.7%	67.0%	106
Winnable	14.0%	72.1%	129
Hopeless	5.3%	6.1%	246
Region			
London	12.3%	53.4%	73
North East	6.9%	75.9%	29
North West	10.7%	62.7%	75
Yorkshire & Humber	22.2%	57.4%	54
East Midlands	8.7%	37.0%	46
West Midlands	10.2%	59.3%	59
East of England	15.5%	22.4%	58
South East	7.1%	16.7%	84
South West	11.1%	20.4%	54
Wales	27.5%	60.0%	40
Scotland	22.0%	47.5%	59

N: 631.

The initial descriptive analysis suggests that candidates in a safe, target or winnable seat were all more likely to receive post-selection trade union support in 2015 and those in hopeless seats were less likely to receive post-selection support. It also suggests that those in the North East were the most likely to receive post-selection support and those in the South East were the least likely (Table 6.4). All seats were unlikely to receive support before their candidate was selected, however, target seats had the highest proportion of pre-selection support at 37.7%. A logistic regression containing both region and seat type variables gives further insight into these results.

The results of the logistic regression presented in Table 6.5 are split into pre- and post-selection trade union support. This is to see whether trade union support for seat type differs before and after a candidate has been selected and to isolate particular trends in where support is sent both pre- and post-selection. The results show that the type of seat that a candidate is in remains an important indicator of post-selection trade union support. Target, winnable and safe seats are all more likely to receive trade

union support than the reference category, hopeless, when region is taken into account. The region that a candidate is in is largely statistically insignificant when seat type is taken into account, with the exception of Scotland and the East Midlands, which are both less likely to receive post-selection trade union support than the reference category, London. The only seat characteristic showing a statistically significant result for pre-selection support is target seats. Target seats are more likely to receive support before they have selected their candidate than hopeless seats.

Table 6.5: Logistic regression seat characteristics as indicators of pre- and post-selection trade union support.

Seat characteristics	Pre-selection		Post-selection	
	Coeff.	S.E.	Coeff.	S.E.
Seat type				
Hopeless				
Safe	0.679	0.454	3.087*	0.360
Winnable	0.683	0.440	3.999*	0.385
Target	2.382*	0.367	3.356*	0.348
Region				
London				
North East	-0.514	0.845	0.551	0.559
North West	-0.328	0.544	0.023	0.404
Yorkshire & Humber	0.704	0.517	-0.256	0.439
East Midlands	-0.429	0.668	-0.940*	0.474
West Midlands	-0.461	0.594	0.473	0.465
East of England	0.349	0.57	-0.465	0.525
South East	-0.247	0.605	-0.913	0.500
South West	0.066	0.618	-0.806	0.551
Wales	0.956	0.538	-0.346	0.464
Scotland	0.914	0.556	-1.368*	0.474
Constant	-2.962*	0.485	-2.298*	0.399

*Pre-selection support: N631. R^2 .204. * p <0.05.*
*Post-selection support: N 631. R^2 .510. * p <0.05.*

Candidate and seat characteristics

The logistic regressions presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.5 show first the effects of candidate characteristics and then the effects of seat characteristics on the distribution

of trade union support at the 2015 General Election. A final logistic regression, presented in Table 6.6, analyses the effects of candidate and seat characteristics combined. The results of this regression show that, when all variables are taken into account, the only statistically significant indicators of trade union support are incumbency, seat type and a seat being in Scotland. Incumbents were still more likely to receive support than non-incumbents when considered alongside all variables. Safe, target and winnable seats were all still more likely to receive trade union support than hopeless seats when all seat and candidate characteristics are taken into account.

Seats located in Scotland were still less likely than seats located in London to receive trade union support. This is despite the fact that Scotland had one of the highest rates of employees in a trade union in 2015, 32%, behind only Wales with 35.2%. A possible explanation for this could be that Scottish seats were less likely to be classed as target or safe, two of the seat types most likely to receive trade union support. Just 8.5% of Scottish seats were classed as target, compared to 16.8% of all seats, and no seats were considered safe, compared to 23.8% of all seats. Interestingly being female, which was statistically significant in the candidate characteristic regression presented in Table 6.3, is no longer an indicator of trade union support. Similarly, the regression presented in Table 6.5 had shown that seats in the East Midlands were less likely to receive trade union support in 2015, however this is no longer the case.

Table 6.6: Logistic regression candidate and seat characteristics as indicators of post-selection trade union support.

Seat and candidate characteristics	Coeff.	S.E.
Gender	.477	.294
Ethnicity	-.605	
Class		
Higher Managerial and Professional		
Lower Managerial and Professional	.070	.302
Lower Class	.304	.692
Age		
18-35		
36-62	-.716	.424
63+	-1.037	.559
Worked for Trade Union	.726	.400
Worked for Labour Party	.180	.292
Seat type		
Hopeless		
Safe	1.663*	.724
Winnable	3.213*	.704
Target	3.959*	.645
Region		
London		
North East	-.175	.645
North West	.065	.504
Yorkshire & Humber	-.163	.562
East Midlands	-1.088	.619
West Midlands	-.046	.582
East of England	.527	.781
South East	-.634	.749
South West	.764	.832
Wales	-.511	.620
Scotland	-1.837*	.684
Incumbent	2.915*	.462
Constant	-2.779*	.749

*N: 402 R^2 .402. *p <0.05.*

Discussion and conclusions

In this chapter I set out to understand who receives trade union support and if certain candidates and seats are more likely to receive trade union support than others. The rationale behind this was two-fold. Firstly, by discovering whether or not trade unions support candidates with particular characteristics it is possible to see whether trade unions are redressing issues of inequality or creating further barriers to participation for some groups. Secondly, by understanding which candidates and seats

get support it is possible to draw some conclusions about the purpose of trade union support. The chapter was based on the analysis of donations made in the lead up to the 2015 General Election and I created two variables for trade union support: support that was received by a constituency party after their 2015 candidate was selected and support that was received by a constituency party before their 2015 candidate was selected. Characteristics effecting the distribution of trade union support were divided into two types: candidate characteristics and seat characteristics. The results of the analysis show that seat type and incumbency were the most important determinants of the distribution of post-selection trade union support at the 2015 General Election. Region may also have had some effects with seats in Scotland less likely to receive support, however no other regions showed any statistically significant effect on the distribution of support. The only variable with a statistically significant effect on the distribution of pre-selection support was whether or not a constituency had been identified as a target seat with target seats more likely to receive pre-selection support than non-target seats.

Initial descriptive analysis of candidate characteristics suggested that female, white, lower managerial and professional, incumbent and older candidates as well as those who had previously worked for a trade union or the Labour Party were all more likely to receive trade union support in 2015. These findings support three of my original hypotheses, where I predicted that white candidates, incumbents and older candidates were all more likely to receive support. They do not support my hypotheses around gender and class. I had hypothesised that a combination of discrimination, lack of representation and lack of connections needed to access trade union support would mean that men would be more likely than women to receive support. In fact, the initial descriptive analysis showed that women were more likely than men to receive trade union support in 2015, leading to the rejection of the original hypothesis. This

suggests that trade unions could be focusing support on helping to get more women into politics and redressing the historic imbalance of gender representation both in parliament and trade unions. This does fit with the perspective of some of the interviewees that more work is being done to encourage female participation in trade unions and politics. I had also hypothesised that working class candidates would be more likely than managerial and professional candidates to receive trade union support. However, according to the descriptive analysis, working class candidates were the least likely to receive trade union support and lower managerial and professional candidates the most likely. This was surprising given the historical political aim of trade unions to represent the interests of workers in parliament.

When all of the candidate characteristic variables were analysed together in the binary logistic regression, gender and incumbency proved to be the only statistically significant indicator of trade union support. Women and incumbents were still shown to be more likely to receive support than men and non-incumbents in 2015. The effects of age, race, class and having previously worked for a trade union or the Labour party on the distribution of trade union support disappeared in this analysis.

Initial descriptive analysis for seat characteristic variables suggested that candidates in target, winnable and safe seats were more likely to receive post-selection trade union support. In contrast those in hopeless seats were less likely to receive post-selection trade union support. These results support my original hypothesis that those in winnable and target seats would have a greater likelihood of receiving trade union support because support directed at these seats may help the Labour Party to win more seats and increase the number of Labour MPs in parliament. They also support the hypothesis that those in hopeless seats would be less likely to receive trade union support because such an intervention would be unlikely to lead to a win in that seat and so would be a poor investment of limited resources. However, they do not support

my hypothesis that those in safe seats would be less likely to receive support because trade union intervention would be unlikely to affect the outcome of the election and so would be a poor use of limited resources. When all seat characteristic variables were placed into a binary logistic regression, being in a target, safe or winnable seat remained statistically significant indicators of trade union support.

The initial descriptive analysis of the regional distribution of post-selection support suggested that those regions that are more heavily unionised were also the regions where the highest proportion of candidates received support post-selection. This supported my hypothesis that candidates in more heavily unionised regions would be more likely to receive support because they are more likely to have worked in a unionised sector and developed connections with local unions that they could call upon in an election. Moreover, unions are more likely in heavily unionised areas to have existing relationships with the local Labour Party and to have more capacity to offer support to candidates. It could be that these candidates had also had the opportunity to demonstrate their union values by participating in union events and being active trade union members in heavily unionised areas. However, the majority of regions were shown to be statistically insignificant as an indicator of trade union support when placed in the binary logistic regression alongside seat type, leading to the rejection of the original hypothesis. Only Scotland and the East Midlands were statistically significant and negatively associated with trade union support post-selection in comparison to London, the reference category.

Just 20.8% of seats received support before they had selected their candidate for the 2015 parliamentary election. Interestingly, target seats were the variable with the highest proportion of seats receiving pre-selection trade union support at 37.7%. Being in a target seat also showed the only statistically significant effect on receiving pre-selection support; when all seat characteristics were analysed in a binary logistic

regression they were positively associated with receiving pre-selection support. This suggests that trade unions recognise target seats in advance of selection and are actively supporting those seats, regardless of candidate, with the aim of winning the seat for the Labour Party. This could imply that just winning seats for the Labour Party is seen as more important than winning seats for the Labour Party with candidates that are sympathetic to trade union values.

The results of the first two binary logistic regressions showed which candidate characteristics and which seat characteristics affected the distribution of post-selection trade union support. However, they did not show the effect of these two characteristic types on one another. The final binary logistic regression, which contained all seat and candidate characteristics, showed which characteristics remained statistically significant indicators of the distribution of trade union support in 2015. This regression showed that seat type and incumbency were the most important indicators of trade union support in 2015. When all seat and candidate characteristics were taken into account, being in a safe, winnable or target seat meant a candidate was more likely to receive trade union support than candidates in a hopeless seat. Similarly, incumbents were more likely to receive support than non-incumbents. Interestingly, candidates in Scotland were less likely to receive support than those in London. This is despite Scotland being the second most heavily unionised area in the U.K. with 32% of employees in a trade union, coming second only to Wales where 35.2% of employees were in a trade union in 2015. After the final analysis, I can reject eight of the ten hypotheses related to the distribution of trade union support in 2015. I can accept hypothesis 5, which states that being an incumbent is associated with a greater likelihood of receiving trade union support, and hypothesis 8, that being in a target or winnable seat is associated with a greater likelihood of trade union support in 2015.

These results suggest three things about who trade unions are supporting as well as the motivation behind the distribution of trade union support. Firstly, the motivation for the distribution of trade union support is two-fold. Trade unions are trying to increase the number of Labour MPs in parliament but at the same time they seem to be rewarding past and future behaviour. Whilst target, winnable and safe seats are all more likely than hopeless seats to receive trade union support, target and winnable seats are more likely to receive support than safe seats. This shows that trade unions are most likely to direct their support at seats that need to be won in order to maintain and, most importantly, increase the size of the parliamentary Labour Party. However, safe seats are still more likely than hopeless seats to receive trade union support, despite the fact that in both of these seat types trade union intervention is unlikely to impact the outcome of the election. This means that there must be another explanation for the distribution of support in safe seats.

It may be that as well as trying to increase the number of Labour MPs, trade unions are also trying to build upon existing relationships and reward past and future behaviour by offering support in these safe seats. Trade unions may be trying to increase the number of representatives that support their interests rather than just trying to increase the size of the Labour Party in general. There are some similarities here between trade unions supporting candidates in safe seats and the way that biraderi networks operate. As outlined in chapters three and four, whilst the actions of biraderi networks can benefit the Labour Party, biraderis are less interested in advancing the interests of the party and more interested in advancing the interests of their network.

Secondly, trade unions seem to direct support to those who are most likely to have existing trade union connections and those who are able to demonstrate their support of trade union values in parliament: incumbents. Having already served in parliament, incumbents are likely to have forged connections with trade union

representatives, which could be used to access support at election time. Moreover, trade union supporting incumbents are able to prove their support of trade union values by pointing to their track record in parliament.

Thirdly, trade unions do not appear to be supporting any under-represented group to gain access to politics. Neither gender nor ethnicity were shown in the binary logistic regression to have any statistical significance on the distribution of trade union support in 2015. More surprisingly, despite the traditional focus of trade unions on getting parliamentary representation for workers, class also had no impact on the distribution of support in 2015. It is likely that this finding reflects a change in the workforce and in trade union membership as it becomes increasingly middle class and professional. Furthermore, changes in the labour market mean that the concept of the worker may have become more fluid to take into account highly educated and professional workers as well as those carrying out non-managerial and non-professional roles.

The very availability of the data used in this chapter marks a difference between biraderi and trade union networks and directly contributes to a differing sense of acceptability of the actions of these two networks. This analysis of the distribution of trade union support is possible because any donation from a trade union comes from a central, identifiable, trade union fund and is recorded as such. Trade unions are accountable and any reported money or in-kind support is easily traceable. In contrast, because biraderis are closed, opaque networks without a structure and governance that is clear and accessible to, or can be held accountable by, those outside of the network, it is not possible to conduct the same analysis. Any reportable donations made by a biraderi would be reported as being given by an individual or organisation rather than the biraderi network. It is therefore not possible to link biraderi networks to specific donations or to know how much, if any, reportable support biraderi networks give.

Being able to track trade union donations adds to the sense of acceptability surrounding trade unions, whereas being unable to identify any biraderi donations adds to the sense of unacceptability of biraderis. The concluding remarks in the following chapter will further discuss the differing perceptions of acceptability of these two networks.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis posed two questions. Firstly: What are the implications of network influence for electoral choice? Secondly: Are the actions of biraderi networks, and the implications of these actions, different to other networks? And if so, why? The starting point of this research was to understand more about the actions of biraderi kinship networks in U.K. selections and elections and what the implications of these actions are. Particularly, I wanted to understand how these actions compare to the actions of other networks acting in British politics. Existing work on biraderi has focused on the political actions and implications of the network in isolation. This runs the risk that biraderi-politicking is incorrectly presented as unusual or even 'unBritish'. In this thesis, I addressed this gap in the literature by studying biraderi alongside a second case study: trade unions.

Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative data, I examined the actions of biraderi and trade union networks in the selection and election of Labour Party politicians. Taking biraderi as my starting point, trade unions were selected as the second case study because they have roots in U.K. society and institutional links to the Labour Party. This allowed me to compare the actions of a network with formal and historical connections to the Labour Party, which is embedded in U.K. society and politics, with a network lacking historical and formal connections to the Labour Party that has been imported into the U.K. By comparing these two networks it was possible to draw conclusions about the extent to which biraderi-politicking is unusual in U.K. politics as well as the implications of network actions for electoral choice.

In this chapter I present my findings and show how they answer my original research questions and contribute to existing literature. I begin with my findings around the actions that trade unions and biraderis carry out in selections and elections, arguing that each carry out five actions but that there are differences in the way that

they do this. Next I present my findings on the motivations for these actions. I argue that networks are ideologically and instrumentally motivated to influence selections and elections. I find that trade unions are a both ideologically and instrumentally motivated and that biraderis are instrumentally motivated. In the next section I offer some suggestions for why network actions differ. Here I argue that network actions differ because of different network structures, different motivations for their actions, and access to different resources.

In the next section, having found that biraderis and trade unions carry out the same actions but in different ways, I ask where does the line lie between acceptable and unacceptable network actions? I identify three conditions that must be satisfied for network actions to be acceptable: the actions must not break electoral law or party rules; the actions must not restrict electoral choice; and open and accountable networks must carry out the actions. I then present my findings regarding the relationship between networks and political parties. I argue that networks can work with political parties to help them to deliver political education and run campaigns, but that they can also take over from political parties to deliver these functions. Finally, I turn to political machines and patronage. I argue that biraderi networks have been turned into political machines that carry out patronage politics and show how these findings contribute to the existing literature.

After presenting my findings, I outline three areas for future research that have arisen out of my work: networks and political parties; trade unions; and machine politics and patronage. Finally, I turn to the broader implications of this research. I argue that the implications for political parties are three fold. Firstly, they need to take steps to reduce the need for networks. Secondly, they need to stop treating Britain's Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin communities as a bloc vote. Finally, political parties need to ensure that they are present at the local level. I also argue that there are two

implications for policy. Firstly, there are weaknesses in the postal voting on demand system that must be addressed. Secondly, political education is needed to address vulnerabilities to electoral fraud.

The actions of trade unions and biraderis in selections and elections

Through my analysis I have identified five actions that trade union networks and biraderi networks carry out in the selection and election of Labour Party candidates, displayed in Table 7.1 and discussed in more detail below. In this section I begin to answer my two research questions by identifying, firstly, what the implications of these actions are for electoral choice. Secondly, by showing that biraderi networks are similar to trade unions because they each perform the same five actions in selections and elections. However, biraderi networks carry out these actions in different ways and this can lead to different implications.

The identification of these five actions contributes to the literature in three ways. Firstly, in my introduction I identified a gap in the literature around our understanding of how candidate selection and election at the local level can be influenced. Existing literature has focused more on the fact that candidate selection is a potential area of conflict and the rules that govern candidate selection and election at the local party level (Clark, 2012; Russell, 2005; Katz, 2001; Denver, 1988; Rahat, 2007; Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). There is less focus on the actual actions being performed, particularly those actions that break rules. Although some research has looked at how trade unions have acted in the selection of Labour Party leaders (Quinn, 2004; Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2011; Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013), there has not been equivalent research into how they act in candidate selection and election in the U.K. at the ward and constituency level. More attention has been given to biraderi networks, often within the context of concerns about electoral fraud (Wilks-Heeg, 2008; Akhtar, 2013; Baston, 2013; Sobolewska et al., 2015; Peace and Akhtar,

2015; Martin, 2016; Hill et al., 2017; Akhtar and Peace, 2018). I was able to add to this existing research to show exactly how biraderi networks are able to influence candidate selection and election. The five actions that I have identified show how networks influence candidate selection and election at the local level and how they sometimes break the rules to do this.

Secondly, the existing network literature finds that resources flow through networks and that they can affect anything from health to career success (Marin and Wellman, 2011; Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). I can now add to this literature that the resources that flow through networks to influence selections and elections are political information and education, finances, in-kind support, and people to campaign and vote at both the selection and election stages. As I will show in the proceeding sections, these resources can lead to an increase in electoral choice, but they can also lead to a decrease in electoral choice depending on how they are deployed.

Thirdly, the findings around trade union financial and in-kind support are an important and original contribution to the current literature. To my knowledge, previous studies have not examined which Labour Party candidates receive trade union financial and in-kind support. Through analysis of trade union support I was able to identify that seat type and incumbency were the most important indicators of trade union support at the 2015 General Election and that candidate characteristics such as gender, age, ethnicity, class and previous work experience had no effect on the distribution of this support once seat type and incumbency were taken into account.

Political education

The first of the five actions that biraderi networks and trade union networks carry out is providing political education for their members, albeit the way that they do this and the nature of this education does differ for each network. Networks can increase electoral choice by providing political education that helps electors to vote.

My two case studies demonstrate that the political education provided by networks can be basic information about when, where and how to vote, which enables electors to participate in elections. It can also be more in-depth information that increases political awareness and knowledge and helps electors to make decisions at the ballot box. The political education provided by biraderi networks focuses on the mechanics of voting and they can provide vital information that enables their members to vote. As I explain in chapter three, information can include when, where and how to vote as well as services translating the forms necessary to register to vote or complete a postal vote. This information may have been particularly important in the past when fewer people could speak English. However, it does remain important today for newly arrived immigrants, regardless of English language ability, with little or no knowledge of the British political system.

The political education provided by trade unions moves beyond the mechanics of voting. Trade union political education is focused on equipping members with the information and skills needed to participate in politics. Whilst this information is likely to be useful at the ballot box, trade union political education is intended to equip members to be activists, campaigners and political representatives. As I show in chapter five, they provide both informal and formal political education for their members. Informal political education includes the internal union newsletters that are sent to all members and website pages that are accessible to all. Newsletters and union websites keep members up to date with issues and policies that affect them as well as providing them with information about the union's political position and political activity. For more active members, informal political education also comes from attending trade union meetings and the opportunity to participate in campaigns.

Formal political education takes place through workshops and courses. Some of these workshops and courses may not be explicitly intending to teach political skills

but the skills taught may still be valuable for political participation. Others will be explicitly focused on teaching political skills and may be directed at members who have expressed an interest in becoming political representatives. Political education in trade unions may be directed at all members or it may be directed at particular groups within the union, such as women or ethnic minority members.

Financial and in-kind support

Trade union and biraderi networks both provide financial and in-kind support in elections. As discussed in chapter six, it is possible to identify this trade union support in elections but it is not possible to identify biraderi support. The Electoral Commission record reportable financial and in-kind donations made by a trade union as coming from that trade union. It is clear that this support meets the legal requirements for the giving of donations set out in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. Biraderi support cannot be identified because, as they are not official organisations, any donation made by a biraderi is likely to be in the name of an individual member or possibly a business owned by a biraderi member. Not being able to track biraderi donations adds to a sense of uncertainty about the network and what influence it has in U.K. politics. It contributes to a sense that biraderi actions are unacceptable because they may break electoral law and party rules on financial support.

Trade union support can be provided to constituency parties at all points during the electoral cycle in order to maintain the local party, but in the lead up to an election this support increases both in terms of the number of constituencies receiving it and the financial value of the support. Despite not being able to track support through the Electoral Commission, there is some indication from the biraderi interviews that in-kind support is also being given by this network. This is most clearly displayed in the discussion of treating in chapter four. The food that is given to biraderi elders in return

for gathering votes could be provided by somebody other than the candidate and therefore would be considered a form of in-kind support contributed to the candidate's campaign. In this case the in-kind support being provided constitutes an electoral offence; this is in direct contrast to any recorded in-kind trade union support, which does not break electoral law.

Campaigners in selections and elections

Biraderi and trade union networks both provide campaigners for the selection and election processes. As Peace and Akhtar (2015) point out in relation to biraderi, this can be important where funds and campaigners are scarce. Given that both of these networks traditionally represent groups that are economically marginalised, this could be particularly important for some of their members. Although both of these networks provide campaigners, their campaigning methods do show that the actions and implications of biraderis are different to the actions and implications of trade unions. This difference centres largely on the finding that biraderi networks have been turned into political machines by some local politicians and elders have become vote brokers. Elders and heads of households use their position in the biraderi hierarchy to influence electors restricting electoral choice, as I argued in chapter four. As I demonstrate in chapters three and four, the campaigning methods of biraderi networks may not always be in keeping with Labour Party rules or electoral law. Interviewees claimed that campaigners use tactics of intimidation, undue influence, treating and tampering with ballots. The postal voting on demand system facilitates much of this, as I argue in chapter four. There is an expectation that getting votes for a candidate will be rewarded by favours and particularistic representation once that person takes office.

In contrast, trade union networks are not political machines brokering votes and interviewees did not report campaign behaviour that breaks electoral law. In

chapter five interviewees discussed trade union members campaigning on behalf of candidates in selections and elections as fairly common practice with campaigners brought into constituencies from elsewhere to support the candidate's campaign. Given that trade union political education is focused on equipping members to be politically active, it is likely that trade union members have more knowledge about what constitutes legal and illegal campaign practices. Moreover, they may be better equipped as a result of this political education to carry out an effective campaign without resorting to such tactics.

The different methods of campaigning have different implications for electoral choice. On the one hand, network assistance in election campaigns could lead to more electors being made aware of the election and receiving information that helps them to vote, increasing electoral choice. On the other hand, when networks place pressure on electors to vote a certain way or effectively cast network members' ballots for them, individual electoral choice is reduced or even removed entirely. Through a combination of legal and illegal activity, biraderi elders control the votes of their members, which in effect creates a situation where elders are over-represented and members under-represented in politics. By instructing members on how to vote, completing ballots on their behalf, tampering with completed ballots, intimidating members and treating members, biraderi elders are at best restricting individual electoral choice and at worst removing it completely.

Influencing candidate selection

Biraderis and trade unions both influence the selection of candidates. They do this by getting their supporters to selection meetings and need to recruit new members or activate existing members in order to make this happen. By showing how these two networks get supporters to the selection meetings, I address the gap that I identified in the literature around how exactly networks can influence candidate selection at the MP

and councillor level. There are similarities in the way that these two networks influence candidate selections and there is a simple explanation for this that was presented by my trade union interviewees in chapter five: everybody does it. The trade union interviewees talked about getting supportive members to a selection meeting as a normal part of party politics, not an activity confined to trade unions or any other networks. They presented recruiting members to ensure that the membership list is as advantageous as possible for a particular candidate as something that does occur and is acceptable. Winning the vote means having enough supporters in the room to have a numerical advantage over opponents and so getting supporters to the meeting is a necessity. That recruiting supporters to influence selection meetings is seen as 'normal' and necessary, is an important finding. It shows that the actions and implications of biraderi networks may not be so different to other networks when it comes to influencing candidate selections.

There are, however, some differences in the way that these two networks get members to selection meetings. On the one hand, biraderis seem to be actively recruiting new members who they can instruct to attend the selection meeting and then influence to vote for the preferred candidate. The biraderi network, as I explain in chapter three, gets supporters to the selection meeting by signing up biraderi members who often have little knowledge about, or interest in, politics in order for them to vote for the biraderi candidate in the selection meeting. These members are generally inactive at other times, only participating in selection votes when, as my interviewees explained, they will be told to attend the meeting and vote for the preferred candidate.

On the other hand, the trade union interviewees talked more about candidates and their supporters recruiting new members and encouraging existing members to turn up if they knew they would support them in a vote. Whilst it was recognised that encouraging those who support a particular candidate to join the party is in the interest

of that candidate and their supporters, there was no suggestion that only these people are recruited to the party. The difference in the way that the interviewees presented the approaches of these two networks lies in the difference between influencing or even instructing members on how to vote, which could take away individual choice, and encouraging supportive members to vote, which does not take away individual choice.

The implications of recruiting new party members could be similar, regardless of the network doing the recruiting. Whether it is because they are influenced to vote for the candidate or because they already support the candidate, the recruitment of supportive party members is clearly in the interest of a selection candidate. When biraderi networks are recruiting new party members this appears to be done purely in the interest of the biraderi. As I showed in chapter three, new members are not encouraged to take part in party politics in a way that could be beneficial to the party and are instead there only to vote for the biraderi candidate. In contrast, the trade union interviewees did also talk about recruitment to the party as desirable to increase political awareness and participation.

However, it is worth noting that there is no evidence that those recruited by trade unions maintain their membership and go on to be active members. Research across several democracies has shown that the majority of party members are inactive (Young, 2013). Furthermore, people often join parties just for the benefit of being able to vote in internal party elections and in some cases are recruited for this purpose (Cross, 2013; Young, 2013). This suggests that when networks recruit new members, whether they espouse principles of encouraging political participation and awareness or not, many new members will not go on to participate in the party. This means that the actual results of the recruitment of new members by biraderis and trade unions may vary very little. In either case new members may be unlikely to become active members of the party after voting in the selection meeting.

Supporting under-represented groups

Finally I have found that both biraderi networks and trade union networks, to an extent, support under-represented groups in Labour Party selections and elections. When support is offered to candidates who may otherwise face barriers to their participation, this could lead to an increase in electoral choice. Supporting under-represented groups to enter into politics increases the diversity of candidates' backgrounds and experiences and, as a result, may increase the diversity of political positions and viewpoints represented at the ballot box. As I argued in chapter three, biraderi networks may help their members to overcome barriers to their participation created by discrimination. Parties are perceived as less likely to select, and voters as less likely to elect, candidates from Pakistani and Bangladeshi backgrounds (Sobolewska et al., 2015). Previous research has found that Muslim candidates may face an electoral penalty in the U.K. (Fisher et al., 2015) and this could apply to biraderi members given that the majority of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin people are Muslim. The biraderi network may, therefore, help Pakistani and Bangladeshi candidates to overcome these barriers and gain political power. When biraderi networks help Pakistani and Bangladeshi candidates to be selected, this increases the diversity of the candidates that electors can choose from in an election.

Similarly, trade unions also support under-represented groups to gain access to politics. As discussed in chapter five, they direct some political education at under-represented groups, particularly women and there is some discussion of work also being done with working class and ethnic minority union members. This political education may encourage members of under-represented groups to stand in elections, thus increasing the diversity of candidates and, as a result, electoral choice. By offering support to under-represented groups, the two case study networks are helping to open up opportunities to become political representatives. This supports the existing literature that argues that networks can open up opportunities for those in them by

facilitating the sharing of resources, particularly information (Granovetter, 1973; Kilduff and Tsai, 2003; Burt, 2004; Marin and Wellman, 2011).

However, I have found that these networks only support under-represented groups to an extent. Biraderi candidates are almost exclusively older men with women failing to receive support, or even actively discouraged from participating in politics in favour of male candidates. Biraderis are acting like the old boy's networks that support men in gaining positions of power and influence but not women (Gamba and Kleiner, 2001; Waldstrøm and Madsen, 2007; Durbin, 2011; McDonald, 2011). This means that whilst biraderis may be supporting one under-represented group to gain access to politics, they are creating further barriers to the participation of another. Whilst trade unions may not be actively excluding certain groups of candidates, I did find in chapter six that they are not using their financial and in-kind donations to support any under-represented groups. Moreover, whist interviewees were split on the extent to which trade unions are helping working class candidates to overcome barriers to participation, the analysis in chapter six showed that, at least in terms of donations, they do not. Therefore, whilst trade unions may be trying to increase the political participation of women and ethnic minorities by providing targeted political education, this aim does not seem to follow through in terms of financial and in-kind support with neither group more likely to receive support in 2015.

By failing to support some groups of candidates from under-represented groups, or even acting in a way that excludes some groups of candidates, networks are reducing electoral choice by reducing the diversity of the candidates electors can chose from in an election. They can do this by failing to offer support to individuals at two different stages. Firstly, before candidate selection even occurs, by offering political education to some groups and not others, networks could effectively be equipping some members to put themselves forward as candidates and not others. Secondly, by

failing to offer financial or in-kind support to some groups once a candidate is standing for selection or has been selected they could be reducing the diversity of candidates. In some cases, networks could be failing to support candidates from under-represented groups because they are prioritising their broader ideological and instrumental aims over supporting these candidates. The findings on the distribution of trade union financial support presented in chapter six show that networks are likely to prioritise sending support to those seats where their influence is most likely to impact the outcome of the election or to those candidates most likely to represent their views, rather than to candidates from under-represented groups.

Table 7.1: The actions of biraderi and trade union networks in the selection and election of Labour Party representatives.

Action	Biraderi	Trade union
Providing political education	Yes - focused on the mechanics of voting. Information provided about, when, where and how to vote. Possible translation of information about parties, candidates and policies.	Yes – intended to equip members to be campaigners and political representatives. Informal political education through union website and internal newsletters as well as meetings and opportunities to campaign. Formal education through skills workshops. Political education can be targeted at specific groups – e.g. women and ethnic minority members.
Financial and in-kind support	Likely - impossible to track financial and in-kind support through the Electoral Commission. Treating may be an example of in-kind biraderi support. Not being able to track financial and in-kind support adds to sense of actions being unacceptable.	Yes - can track financial and in-kind support through the Electoral Commission. Provided to constituency parties to help run campaigns in the lead up to elections.
Campaigners for selections and elections	Yes. Campaigning methods may not always be legal or in-line with Labour rules with interviewees concerned about intimidation, undue influence, treating and tampering with ballots.	Yes. Campaigners bussed around the country to help in elections.
Selecting candidates	Yes. Biraderi members signed up to the Labour Party only to vote for the biraderi member. Often have little interest in or knowledge about politics. Attend selection meetings purely to vote for biraderi candidate. Inactive at other times. Membership may be controlled through one person with the same email address provided for multiple members.	Yes. Encouraging sympathetic members to attend meetings to try and win the vote. Do not exclusively sign up supporters to be party members but do recognise that it is a benefit to sign up supporters. Presented as action that is not unique to trade unions. Encourage political participation - interviewees talked about membership as desirable to grow Party and develop political awareness.
Supporting the under-represented.	To an extent. Biraderis may enable members to overcome barriers of discrimination and become political representatives. However, biraderi candidates are almost exclusively older men with women failing to receive support or even actively discouraged from participating in politics.	To an extent. Trade unions do direct some political education at under-represented groups such as women and ethnic minorities. However, the distribution of trade union financial and in-kind support is not directed at any under-represented groups.

What motivates networks?

Networks can be ideologically and instrumentally motivated to influence selections and elections. Instrumentally, they are motivated to increase their own political power and influence. This supports the existing literature on networks in organisations, which finds that networks operate to advance the interests of their members (Mintzberg, 1985; Bonzionelos, 2005). Ideologically, they are motivated to work alongside the political party because it is the party that shares their aims and values. They recognise that working alongside this party, and helping it to form a government, is the best way to achieve their ideological aims. Some networks will be motivated by a combination of ideological and instrumental aims. A network can work alongside a political party because they share an ideological perspective, but they will also be motivated to some extent by instrumental aims. In this case, they advance their own interests alongside shared ideological interests. This is something that has been identified in the literature relating to brokers who gather political support. These brokers can be ideologically motivated but they will also seek to advance their own rent-seeking interests (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015; Stokes et al., 2013). In contrast, a network that is instrumentally motivated will not necessarily also be ideologically motivated for their actions. In this case, a network's instrumental aims could coincide with shared ideological aims but they may also be motivated solely by a desire to advance the interests of the network.

Previous research has found that trade unions were historically motivated by shared aims and values to work with the Labour Party but that there has been a shift away from these joint ideological aims towards more instrumental motivations for the two to work together (Bale and Webb, 2017). In return for resources and voters, trade unions want policies that are sympathetic to their members (Allern, Aylott and Christiansen, 2007; Allern and Bale, 2017). In the case of the Labour Party, Bale and

Webb (2017) argue that there has been a slight return towards a joint ideological position under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn suggesting that there could now be a combination of ideological and instrumental motivations for their support. My findings support the view that trade unions are ideologically and instrumentally motivated to work with the Labour Party. As it was established to be the political arm of the working men's movement, many of the Labour Party's political aims match those of trade unions. Whilst their ideological affiliation means that trade unions act in the interest of the Labour Party, they can also act to strengthen their own position in the party.

I demonstrate this combination of ideological and instrumental aims in chapter six where I examine the way that trade unions distribute financial and in-kind support to different seat types. Target and winnable seats were the most likely seat type to receive trade union support in 2015, suggesting that trade unions were intent on maintaining and increasing the size of the parliamentary Labour Party. The motivation behind increasing the size of the party is likely to be ideological, based on the need to have a Labour government to achieve the ideological aims that the two share. There is also an instrumental element to this. Trade unions, particularly affiliated ones, are invested in the success of the Labour Party. A Labour government is seen as the best way to ensure policies protecting the interests of workers. The degree of representation and influence that trade unions enjoy in the Labour Party means that a Labour government could enable them to advance their own interests. As well as sending support to target and winnable seats, I found that trade unions also sent support to safe seats. As safe seats are likely to be won regardless of trade union support, this suggests that they were acting to advance their own interests by also rewarding past and future union friendly behaviour.

I found evidence that biraderi networks are instrumentally motivated for their actions. In chapters three and four I argued that biraderi-politicking leads to shallow loyalty to political parties and leads to individuals using the political party as a vehicle for their own success. Biraderi-politicking does not just take place within the Labour Party and biraderis are not loyal to one particular party. In chapter three, interviewees referred to a lack of loyalty to one party or another and instead a desire to advance personal interests. In chapter four I showed how Labour Party politicians have used biraderi networks and in return elders were able to enhance their own interests. Over time this relationship has changed and now biraderi elder are likely to be candidates themselves or to be collecting votes for fellow biraderi members. In both of these cases, biraderi elders have aimed to increase their own personal power and the power of their biraderi. The party is the vehicle that is used to increase personal and biraderi power and, unlike in the case of trade union networks, the success of the party is coincidental to this aim. That biraderi elders are instrumentally motivated for their actions fits with the findings of previous studies. Akhtar (2013) argued that biraderis advance the political ambitions of individuals and that elders were happy to gather political support for white politicians in the past because they helped them to enhance their own status. Werbner (2002) and Shaw (1988) both found in their studies into Muslim and Pakistani communities in the U.K. that there was an emphasis on personal status and influence amongst political representatives.

Biraderi networks are most strongly associated with the Labour Party, and this could indicate that there is some ideological support for that party. I argued in chapter four that the Labour Party has been the first and most effective user of biraderi networks for three reasons. The first two reasons do not rest on a shared ideology, whilst the third suggests that shared ideology could be a factor. Firstly, the Labour Party has been the first and most effective user of biraderi networks because Pakistani

and Bangladeshi immigrants settled in large groups in areas traditionally controlled by the Labour Party. Secondly, because Labour Party politicians incorporated Pakistani and Bangladeshi voters into local parties as a way to reinforce their own power and influence. Thirdly, because many of these immigrants were employed in unionised workforces where they may have been exposed to Labour Party politics and they may have shared some of the concerns of the traditional party voter. On top of this, they may have been motivated to support Labour because of the party's support of ethnic minority interests (Akhtar, 2013; Akhtar, 2015; Fisher et al., 2015; Martin, 2016). Despite this association with the Labour Party I did not find evidence in my analysis that the influence of biraderi networks in Labour Party selections and elections is motivated by shared ideology. I classified biraderi elders as 'organisational brokers', who collect votes from their organisation and take them to the party or candidate offering the best rewards, according to Holland and Palmer-Rubin's (2015) typology of vote brokers. This is not to say, however, that biraderi-politicking could never be ideologically influenced. There may be situations where biraderi elders are ideologically motivated for their actions. Or at least, where they are motivated by a combination of ideological and instrumental aims. Future research could explore whether biraderi networks are ever ideologically motivated for their actions.

Why do network actions differ?

My analysis of biraderis and trade unions suggests that there are three reasons why the two networks differ in the way that they carry out the five actions identified. Whilst here I am addressing my second research question and explaining why the actions of my two case study networks differ, I believe that the three reasons I have identified could be applied to other networks to understand the differences in their actions. The first reason is because these two networks differ in their structure. When networks have relatively open and accountable structures, like trade unions, it is easier

to monitor their actions and observe any wrongdoing. When networks are closed and difficult to identify, like biraderis, it is harder to observe wrongdoing and to hold them accountable. There is less risk of discovery and, therefore, reprisal when these networks break electoral laws and party rules to influence selections and elections than there is for open and accountable networks. With less risk involved, these networks may be more tempted to use practices that break electoral law or party rules to influence selections and elections.

The second reason that these two networks differ in their actions is because of their different motivations for supporting candidates in selections and elections. Where networks are ideologically motivated to support candidates in selections and elections their interests are tied up with the interests of the party. In these circumstances networks may be less likely to break party rules and electoral law because they do not want to discredit the party. This may be particularly true if, as in the case of trade unions, the network is also formally connected to the party and so any allegations of wrongdoing could reflect negatively on the party. Networks that are predominantly instrumentally motivated and are using the party as a vehicle to advance their own interests, will only want to avoid discrediting the party if this will also damage their own interests. If discrediting the party will not damage their own interests then concerns about this are unlikely to prevent them from carrying out practices in selections and elections that break electoral law and party rules.

The third reason is because they have access to different resources to influence selections and elections. To run a political skills workshop, for example, a network must have money to finance the workshop, space to hold it in, the knowledge and skills to organise it, and the conveners to lead it. Of my two case studies, trade union networks have ready access to these resources and this allows them to deliver political education in this way. Trade unions have money raised from members; spaces to hold

workshops in their own buildings or money to hire spaces if necessary; knowledge and skills created by formal institutional links and informal links with the Labour Party and individual MPs; and the finances and connections to arrange convenors. Biraderi networks do not have ready access to these resources meaning that they do not deliver this kind of political education. Access to different types of resources may explain why some networks are more likely to break party rules and electoral law when it comes to influencing selections and elections. I suggest that a network's access to resources is affected by two factors: connections to a political party and network diversity.

Formal and informal connections to a political party give networks access to resources that they can use to influence selections and elections. Crucially, these resources provide legitimate ways to influence selections and elections that do not break party rules or electoral law. This does not mean that networks with these resources will not break party rules or electoral law or that these resources cannot be used to carry out unacceptable forms of influence. However, I suggest that with access to acceptable means of influence, networks will be less likely to resort to unacceptable means of influence. In the case of trade unions, their formal and informal connections to the Labour Party provide them with means of influencing selections and elections without breaking electoral law and party rules. The ability to be involved in internal party processes and decision-making, access to information, contacts within the Labour Party and official ways of raising money and distributing financial and in-kind support are important resources that unions have.

Where networks are more diverse in their membership and have ties to other networks, the resources flowing through the network will be more diverse as members with different backgrounds and experiences bring different resources (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 2004; Zappa and Lomi, 2015). Networks with a more homogenous

membership, created by members being from similar backgrounds and having similar experiences, are less likely to share new information (Zuckerman, 2005). When there is more diversity in a network, members are more likely to be exposed to new and different ideas, information, knowledge and skills (Burt, 2004; Granovetter, 1973). The implications for this in relation to selection and election are that where networks are more diverse and have weak ties linking them to other networks, they are more likely to have access to a wider range of resources that could be used to support candidates. A wider range of resources may mean more resources that can be used to support candidates in selection and election without breaking party rules or electoral law, affecting the way that they perform the roles identified above. Conversely, less diverse networks lacking a wide range of resources may need to resort to actions that do break party rules and electoral laws.

Where does the line lie between acceptable and unacceptable network actions?

I have shown that biraderis and trade unions perform the same five actions when it comes to influencing selections and elections, but that they carry out these actions in different ways. In this section I examine what makes these actions acceptable or unacceptable. Through my analysis I have identified three conditions that must be satisfied for network action to be considered acceptable. Firstly, the action must not break electoral law or party rules. Actions carried out by networks that break electoral law or party rules are immediately unacceptable. However, the opposite is not true; actions that do not break electoral law or party rules are not necessarily acceptable. Secondly, the action must not restrict electoral choice. Some of the actions carried out by biraderi networks do not necessarily break electoral law but they do restrict electoral choice. For example, in chapter three the interviewees discussed a sense that an elected councillor will only give help to those that can prove

they voted for them. This could lead to a situation where electors may not vote for their preferred candidate in a local election because they are concerned that if they do not vote for another candidate and that candidate wins, they will not receive any help from them once they are a councillor. In this case, electoral law has not been broken but it could be argued that electoral choice has been restricted.

Thirdly, actions must be carried out by open and accountable networks. The differing structures of the two network case studies underpin many of the differences in the acceptability of the two networks. Fundamentally, because trade unions are relatively transparent, identifiable, and accountable networks that historically have played a large role in the Labour Party, their actions are generally more acceptable than the actions of biraderi networks. Trade unions appear to be, for the most part, operating above the surface, to be open about their actions and motivations and to follow the rules set out by the Labour Party and electoral law. Conversely, biraderis appear to be operating below the surface, and, as my findings have shown, do break Labour Party rules and electoral law. As identifiable organisations, trade union political activity is monitored and, if necessary, investigated. Actions carried out by trade unions are recorded and identified. As a result it is easier to identify wrongdoing and to hold unions accountable for their actions, as argued by one interviewee in chapter five in relation to the allegations of wrongdoing in Falkirk.

In contrast, biraderi networks are opaque, often unidentifiable and unknown to those outside of them. The result of this is that they are generally not accountable for their actions. As discussed in chapter three, many actions carried out by biraderi networks in selections and elections will not be reported for fear of repercussions but they also may not be reported because it is difficult to identify who is carrying out these actions. When actions do arouse interest they will not necessarily be linked to a biraderi network but to an individual or group of individuals. This means that when,

for example, reportable donations are made to a constituency party, they will be recorded as from an individual rather than the biraderi. This makes the motivation of these donations difficult to ascertain and allows the biraderi network to exert influence in the electoral process that is unlikely to be identified. By operating under the surface, any actions carried out by biraderis, whether actually breaking Labour Party rules or electoral law or not, automatically appear suspicious and the acceptability of these actions is questioned.

Networks and political parties

I have found that because parties and candidates have limited resources they need networks to help them to run election campaigns and provide political education to electors. In the Labour Party, this is seen when networks make donations to constituency parties or to the central party that help them to run their election campaigns as well as maintain the party between elections. Here the network makes donations to the party at either the local or national level, and the party then decides on how best to use the money donated. Where help in-kind is given this is a direct response to the needs of the constituency party to, for example, frank mail or print leaflets. In both of these cases the network works alongside the party. The party maintains control whilst the network provides them with the resources that they need.

Networks also work alongside political parties and candidates to deliver political education and run election campaigns by providing them with activists. With a general decline in party membership (Audickas, Dempsey and Keen, 2018), political parties have found themselves with fewer people to contact electors by knocking on doors, delivering leaflets, and staffing stalls in town centres and at events that provide information to the local community about local party activities. For the Labour Party a recent increase in individual membership, going from 201,000 in May 2015 to 515,000 in July 2016 (Bale and Webb, 2017), will help to remedy this situation.

However, an increase in the number of members signed up to the party does not lead to the same increase in the number of active members willing to carry out local party activities. When network members step in to deliver leaflets and knock on doors, this can allow parties to deliver a much needed and positive campaigning function that enables constituents to receive important information about party policies and activity locally as well as find out about when, where and how to vote.

In some circumstances, networks do not work alongside political parties. Instead they take over the functions of the party and effectively become the political party on the ground in an entire constituency or amongst specific groups of voters in a constituency (Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017). Parties are no longer in control of the campaign as they abdicate their responsibilities to the network. Political parties do not necessarily consciously hand over these responsibilities. Instead the absence of a political party in a constituency could be as a result of few activists in the locality. This could lead to a network stepping in to carry out the duties of the party. However, political parties may consciously abdicate their campaigning responsibilities to a network, something that I argued in chapter four has happened with the Labour Party and biraderi networks in some areas. Local Labour politicians have delegated their electioneering responsibility to biraderi elders, who they rely upon to gather votes from the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities. Here Labour politicians are treating the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities as a bloc vote and ignoring the principles of one person, one vote. One person, one vote is fundamental to electoral choice as each individual has the opportunity to cast their own vote without the undue influence of others. By seeing Pakistani and Bangladeshi voters as a bloc rather than individuals, politicians and biraderi elders are removing individual choice and ascribing a group choice. In a case like this, the political party is at some level complicit with the actions of the network.

Political machines and patronage

In chapter three I argued that biraderi networks carry out patronage politics, where long-term patronage is exchanged for votes. This supports the work of Akhtar (2013) who argues that biraderi-politicking is patronage style politics. In chapter four I argued that biraderi networks have in fact been turned into political machines that incorporate Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants into U.K. politics and create bloc votes. Biraderi elders are vote brokers who offer long-term patronage or immediate short-term gains in exchange for votes. In this way, they are similar to the political machines that incorporated new immigrant voters in the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein, 2009). Local Labour politicians use the biraderi networks to their advantage in internal party selections and elections to secure their position and increase their power. This machine politics relies on patron-client relationships that have changed over time. In the past biraderi elders were 'dependent actors', vote brokers who were reliant on the patronage of white politicians. As dependent actors they delivered votes to white politicians to help them to be selected and elected. In return biraderi elders became gatekeepers that guarded access to politicians and the support they could offer their constituents. This reinforced reliance of biraderi members on biraderi elders. Now biraderi elders are more likely to be 'independent actors'. They are likely to be candidates themselves, or to be gathering votes for a fellow biraderi elder rather than a white politician. In return they have access to power that can be used to advance personal and biraderi interests.

That biraderi networks are political machines is an important finding that makes three contributions to the current literature. Firstly, it addresses the gap in the literature that I identified in the introduction that although there has been some recent empirical research carried out into electoral fraud in the U.K., there is still little understanding of how occurrences of fraud in the U.K. fit into the existing literature.

The persistence of machine politics, patronage and vote brokering in the U.K. provides a way for understanding concerns about electoral fraud, and particularly electoral fraud in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities.

Secondly, to my knowledge the concept of 'political machine' has not previously been applied to biraderi networks and this provides a new approach to understanding biraderi-politicking. I contribute to the literature the mechanism by which biraderi elders are able to create bloc votes by using their patronage relationship with household heads, who in turn use their authority in the household to obtain votes. I also contribute to the literature on the incorporation of immigrants into politics, something that is currently under-researched (Hochschild et al., 2013). By adding that biraderi networks are political machines that have helped to incorporate Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants into U.K. politics, I support the finding of previous studies that political machines can be used to incorporate immigrant voters (Mollenkopf and Sonnenshein, 2009; Jones-Correa, 2013). I build upon these studies that have focused on immigrant incorporation in the United States by showing that that this has happened in the U.K. through biraderi networks.

Thirdly, despite a focus in the literature on machine politics and patronage politics in developing and newer democracies, this type of politics can and does exist in an advanced democracy such as the U.K. My findings show that the outmoded and out-dated patron-client relationships, which are necessary for this type of politics, can endure in a politically, socially and economically advanced society. Despite an assumption that machine politics ended in the U.K. in the late 19th century (Camp, Dixit and Stokes, 2014), I show that biraderi networks do practice this type of politics.

Future research

Networks and political parties

This thesis has concentrated on selections and elections in the Labour Party. This focus on one party was a deliberate choice made because of concerns that researching two networks in two different parties would mean that I would not have the space to sufficiently analyse and draw conclusions about network activity. The focus on the Labour Party in particular was because the starting point of the research was an interest in biraderi networks and biraderi-politicking, which has been most strongly associated with the Labour Party. However, it does mean that it is unclear to what extent the findings about how networks influence selections and elections can be applied beyond this party. Factors such as party formation, the location of traditional party strongholds, the identity of the traditional party voter, and the strength of party activism may all affect to what extent a party is influenced by networks and the actions that networks take to carry out this influence.

Building on this study, future research should look at networks in other political parties. It should identify which networks operate, what actions they take to influence selections and elections, and what the implications of these actions are for electoral choice. It should examine whether there are differences across parties in the way that networks act and what causes these differences. This will allow conclusions to be drawn about the extent to which party formation, the traditional geographic strongholds of parties, and the demographics of the traditional party voter could impact the role and influence of networks. I have categorised the two network case studies in this thesis as formal networks, but informal networks may also be found to be important. Previous research has pointed to the over-representation of privately educated graduates of elite universities such as Oxford or Cambridge (Cairney, Keating and Wilson, 2016; Kirby, 2016; Allen and Cairney, 2017). This particularly

applies to the Conservative party: 45% of Conservative MPs elected in 2017 were privately educated compared to an average of 29% of MPs overall (Barton and Audickas, 2017). Conservative MPs were also more likely to attend Oxford or Cambridge with 31% attending one of these universities compared to an average of 23% of MPs overall (Barton and Audickas, 2017). Future research could explore whether attendance at an elite educational institution can lead to the formation of informal networks that can assist candidates in selection and election and in what ways these networks assist candidates.

Trade unions

The findings stemming from the analysis of trade union financial and in-kind data raise two areas for future research. Firstly, in this study I did not apply the same analysis of trade union financial and in-kind support of parliamentary candidates to candidates in the selection process. This means that the conclusions I draw about the role of candidate characteristics in the distribution of trade union support are limited to those candidates that made it through the selection process. Whilst I found that seat type and incumbency indicated trade union support, it might be that at the selection process candidate characteristics play a more important role. Given that the interviewees identified that trade unions are trying to increase the number of women, working class and, to some extent, ethnic minority politicians we may see more donations to candidates from these groups at the selection stage. Future research should ask: which candidates receive trade union support in the selection process? This would build upon the work that I have done and contribute further to understanding if, and how, trade unions provide support to under-represented groups.

Secondly, I focused on who receives support from trade unions and was able to use this information to draw some conclusions about the motivation behind the distribution of support. Future research should build upon this work and ask: what are

the effects of trade union financial and in-kind support on the actions of MPs? Research should examine whether the parliamentary votes of MPs that receive support are sympathetic to trade unions and their members. Links should be made between the interests of the union(s) that support them and the way that MPs vote. Additionally, the parliamentary speeches and contributions made by MPs should be analysed to see whether there is a higher occurrence of MPs who receive support discussing trade union issues. Analysis could establish whether the value of the support received by an MP affects how likely they are to represent union interests in parliament and whether the value of support increases or decreases according to how well an MP represents union interests.

Machine politics and patronage politics

The extent to which machine politics and patronage are specific to biraderi is unclear as this is one element that was found to be lacking in my comparator network, trade unions. This raises the question: are patronage and machine politics limited to biraderi networks in the U.K., or are there other examples of machine and patronage politics taking place? Existing research has shown that poorer voters are more likely to be vulnerable to machines and patronage politics (Scott, 1969). In Britain, poverty rates are higher for ethnic minority groups, especially for those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin (Weekes-Bernard, 2017). This suggests that poverty within a particular group could lead to machine politics taking place even in an advanced democracy and that this might occur amongst other low socio-economic status groups of voters in the U.K., not just those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin. Existing research has also shown that patronage politics occurs in those areas where democratic institutions are weakest (O'Dwyer, 2006). The absence of political party activity in areas with a high proportion of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin residents (Sobolewska et al., 2015; Hill et al., 2017) could facilitate this patronage politics in an

advanced democracy. This suggests that if political parties are absent in other communities, this could also create the necessary conditions for patronage and machine politics to occur.

Broader research implications

Political Parties

The implications of this research for political parties are three-fold. Firstly, political parties need to take actions that reduce the need for, and effects of, networks. To do this, political parties should work to remove the barriers that individuals face when they are seeking political candidacy so that the assistance of networks is not necessary. At the national level, political parties have tried to introduce changes to remove some of the barriers to participation created by ethnic discrimination (Sobolewska, 2013). However, these changes are often harder to make at the local level (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995). They require cultural changes that take time to implement and so this is not a quick fix solution. Political parties should work with their local party branches to provide education and training to eliminate discrimination against ethnic minority candidates. This would reduce the need for biraderi networks to overcome the discrimination in the selection process that interviewees reported in chapter three and would also apply to other networks that help their members to overcome discrimination based on ethnicity. Political parties should also reduce financial barriers in the selection process by introducing a cap on spending in the selection campaign, as I discussed in chapter four. Collins (2014) recommended a limit on selection spending in his review into Labour Party selections. This would stop the financial and in-kind donations of networks from being so important, and potentially influential, in the selection process.

Secondly, political parties must stop treating the U.K.'s Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities as producing a bloc vote that can be accessed through

relationships with a small number of community leaders, as I describe in chapters three and four. Whilst political parties treat these communities as a bloc they are failing to promote individual electoral choice and the modern democratic principle of one person one vote. If political parties promoted the principle of one person one vote then this might help to challenge the notion that votes belong to the head of the household rather than to each individual elector. Furthermore, treating the votes of any group of electors as a bloc that can be accessed through a few community leaders helps to promote patronage politics. Treating electors as individuals and canvassing them individually will help to reduce patronage politics because it will reduce the access of community leaders to patronage, which is created by their brokerage position. However, one of the reasons that political parties may be tempted to deal with community leaders rather than canvassing electors individually is a lack of activists. Without enough activists, local parties may struggle to canvas individual electors meaning that the incentive to continue approaching community leaders will remain.

Thirdly, political parties need to be present at the local level. Their absence creates a power void that networks can fill. This can lead to networks taking over the selection of candidates and local electioneering and carrying out actions that lead to the selection of candidates regardless of ability, prevent some candidates from standing because they do not have the support of the network, and limit individual electoral choice. Given that the absence of democratic institutions, such as political parties, can lead to patronage politics taking place (O'Dwyer, 2006), the increased presence of political parties could help to reduce the occurrences of patronage politics. However, this raises the same issue as above: without enough activists, political parties will struggle to be present at the local level.

Policy

The findings from the biraderi case study show that there are weaknesses in the electoral system that mean that electoral fraud can take place. These weaknesses are particularly present in the postal voting on demand system. Changes to the rules governing the postal voting on demand system could help to reduce some of the abuses of the system discussed in chapters three and four whilst also ensuring that electors can access absentee voting. The current rules that allow electors to register to vote by post indefinitely should be changed to require electors to reapply for postal votes after a specified period of time. This could be at each election, however this might create an administrative burden that is too large for local elections units to process. A better suggestion would be for postal vote applications to be renewed after a specified number of years. Eric Pickles (2016) suggests three years in the recommendations that he sets out in his review into electoral fraud. This could disrupt the postal vote fraud described by the biraderi interviewees because electors whose postal ballots had been subject to fraudulent practices would be able to choose not to have a postal ballot sent to them if they feared that it would be vulnerable again.

As well as taking steps to reduce the vulnerability of the postal voting system, the sort of electoral fraud that was identified in the biraderi case study requires cultural changes brought about by political education. This is far more difficult to implement because it requires a shift in attitude over time, but it is no less important. Instances of biraderi influence largely occur because of a belief that votes belong to the head of the household and that they, and the biraderi elder, know best when it comes to electing candidates. Campaigns by non-partisan organisations to make electors more aware of the principle of one person one vote and what constitutes electoral fraud would help to limit some of the influence of biraderi networks.

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Appendix A: Trade Union Interviews Participant Information Sheet

Participant Information Sheet

What is the title of the research? It's Not What You Know, It's Who You Know: What are the implications of social networks in UK politics for electoral choice?

Who will conduct the research? Eleanor Hill, PhD candidate at the University of Manchester

What is the aim of the research? This research will aim to build an understanding of the role of social networks in British politics, particularly in the selection and election of candidates. It will focus on two networks that are active in the British Labour Party: trade unions and biraderi networks.

Why have I been chosen? You have experience working in the Labour Party and/or with trade unions and I feel that your experience and knowledge would be valuable for my research.

What would I be asked to do if I took part? If you decide to take part in this research than I would like to conduct an interview with you about your experiences of working in politics and with trade unions.

What happens to the data collected? If you give permission for this interview to be recorded then the recording will be transcribed and be securely stored on the university computer system or a password protected USB stick. The transcription will then be analysed and used in my PhD thesis. I may use direct quotes from your interview if you agree to this.

How is confidentiality maintained? Participants can choose to remain anonymous. If you choose to remain anonymous then your name, your organisation and your location will not be revealed.

What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind? If you do not wish to take part in this research then please inform me and you will not be contacted again in relation to this research. If you agree to take part in this research and then change your mind then you can withdraw at any point, including once the interview has started.

Will I be paid for participating in the research? There is no payment for participating in this research.

What is the duration of the research? Interviews last for no more than 1 hour.

Where will the research be conducted? Interviews will be conducted at a public location of your convenience. This could include cafes and other public places as well as registered offices.

Will the outcomes of the research be published? The outcomes of the research will be used in the PhD thesis and may be used in published journal articles.

Contact for further information For further information please contact Eleanor.hill@postgrad.manchester.ac.uk

What if something goes wrong? If you have any concerns with the way this research is being conducted please contact Dr Maria Sobolewska at the University of Manchester maria.sobolewska@manchester.ac.uk

Thank you for your time!

Appendix B: Trade Union Interview Consent Form

It's Not What You Know, It's Who You Know: What are the implications of social networks in UK politics for electoral choice?

CONSENT FORM

If you are happy to participate please read the consent form and initial it:

Please Initial Box

1. I confirm that I have read the attached information sheet on the above project and have had the opportunity to consider the information and ask questions and had these answered satisfactorily.

2. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to any treatment/service.

3. I agree for the interview to be audio recorded.

4. I agree to the use of quotations that are anonymous/attributed (delete as appropriate).

I agree to take part in the above project

_____   _____   _____
Name of participant   Date   Signature

_____   _____   _____
Name of person taking consent   Date   Signature

Appendix C: Trade Union Interview Questionnaire

Questions for Trade Union officials

1. Introduction: Explain research
   Go through consent form
   Go through consent form

   Anonymity.

2. Would you say that politics is important to your union and its members?
   - Do you provide political education for your members?
   - Do you have internal publications/talks about politics?
   - Do you think that your members are politically active?
   - How many of your members campaign in elections?
   - Do you encourage members to become members of their local Labour Party and to be active in the local party?
   - Do you think that it is important for your union to support/sponsor political candidates? Why?
3. Who does your union support in the selection/election process?
   - Do you give help to candidates, local parties, or both?
   - Do you support aspiring councillors as well as MPs?
   - What criteria must they meet?
   - What criteria must a local party meet?
   - How do you decide to give help beyond these criteria?
   - Must a person being helped be in the union?
   - Would you favour candidates that work in the industries that you represent?
   - Do you do anything specifically to get under-represented groups into parliament? Women? BAME?
4. What is the process for deciding who to support?
   - Is there a specific process?
   - Do you meet people first?
   - Who decides? Is it an individual or group?
   - When are these decisions made?
5. As far as you are aware, do other unions have similar rules about who they support and how they decide who to support?
6. What sort of help do you offer to aspiring politicians?
   - Do you offer help in the selection process as well as the election process?
   - Is it common to offer help in both?
   - What sort of help do you offer to individuals in the election process? In-kind? Financial? Campaigners?
   - Does help differ for aspiring councillors?
   - What sort of help do you offer to individuals in the selection process?

- What sort of help do you offer to local parties?
- Do you offer courses or training for people considering standing for selection?
- Are you aware of any regulations around giving help to aspiring politicians?
- Do other unions offer similar help?

7. Does the relationship between a union and a candidate continue if that candidate is elected?
   - Does the relationship change?
   - Do representatives you have sponsored help to represent the interests of the union?
   - Do you continue to communicate with these representatives and discuss TU issues with them?
   - Do you think that this is the same for other unions?

8. Do you think that the current system of support and sponsorship works well?
   - Why do you think that there is sometimes controversy about the way that unions support and sponsor candidates through the selection and election processes?
   - Do you think that it is deserved?
   - Has your union ever had any controversy around the candidates that you have supported?
   - Some people say that unions have too much influence in the selection/election of Labour Party candidates, do you think this is fair?
   - Do you think that the relationship between the party and unions could be improved in the future? How?

9. Wrap up : Any questions?

   What will happen to the data now

   Thank you for your time

Questions for candidates/politicians/activists

1. Introduction: Explain research
   Go through consent form
   Anonymity.
2. Is there a lot of political activity in your area?
   - Are political parties active in your area?
   - Do you have a lot of activists in your party?
   - What organisations exist in the local area?
   - Do these local organisations campaign in elections?
   - Are people in the area interested in politics?
   - Are a lot of your members trade union members?
   - Is there one specific TU that dominates?

- Are the same trade unionists involved in lots of different organisations in the local community?

3. How does a candidate get help from a trade union in their campaign?
    - Can you talk me through the process of getting help in your campaign?
    - Is this a typical way of accessing trade union help?
    - Do different unions have different processes?
    - How did you hear about the available help?
    - Which union(s) did you get help from?
    - Are you a member? [candidates/politicians]
    - Do you have many members of this union in the local party?
    - What sort of criteria did you have to satisfy to get this help?
    - Did you already know people in the union to speak to about getting help?
    - Did you know other candidates receiving similar help?
    - Are you aware of any union campaigns to get under- represented groups into parliament? Women? BAME?

4. What sort of help do trade unions offer?
    - Do they offer help in the selection and election process?
    - What do they offer in the selection process?
    - What do they offer in the election process?
    - Is it common to get help in both?
    - What sort of help have you received?
    - Did you get help in the selection and election process? [candidates/politicians]
    - What sort of help did you get in the selection process? [candidates/politicians]
    - What sort of help did you get in the election process? Financial? In kind? Campaigners?
    - Do you have a constituency development agreement?
    - Could you have got this help from elsewhere?
    - Could you have stood without this help? Did it affect your decision to stand? [candidates/politicians]
    - Do you think that trade union help is important? Why?
    - Are you aware of any regulations around the help that you are able to accept from a union?

5. Does the relationship between a union and a candidate continue if that candidate is elected?
    - Once elected what sort of relationship do representatives have with unions? Does help continue? [candidates/politicians/activists]
    - Do representatives do things like speeches at local union branches for the unions that support them?
    - Are representatives sponsored by trade unions expected to represent union interests?
    - Will they be reminded of these interests?

6. Do you think that trade union support can affect a candidate's relationship with their party members and with voters?
    - Do you find that party members who are in the same trade union as a sponsoring union have a particularly strong relationship with you?
    - Do you already know some members of your party because of your own previous trade union activities?
    - Do voters recognise you because of your union activities (i.e. speeches etc?)
    - Do voters respond well to your union links?
    - Do you think that trade unions have a role to play in voter education?
7. Do you think that the current system of support and sponsorship works well?
    - Why do you think there is sometimes controversy surrounding the system?
    - Is it fair?
    - Did you experience any criticism of your union relationship? [politicians/candidates]
    - Have you ever worked on a campaign that has had its union relationship criticised? [activists]
    - Some people say that unions have too much influence in the selection/election process, do you think this is true? Why do you think this is said?
    - Do you think that the relationship between the party and the unions could be improved in the future? How?

8. Wrap up : Any questions?

   What will happen to the data now

   Thank you for your time.

Appendix D: List of Trade Union Interviewees

1. Kelvin Hopkins, MP, September 2015

2. Anonymous political activist, October 2015

3. Anonymous MP, October 2015

4. Anonymous political activist, November 2015

5. Anonymous political activist, November 2015

6. Jennie Formby, Unite, trade unionist, November 2015

7. Anonymous political activist, November 2015

8. John Denham, former MP, November 2015

9. Anonymous political activist, November 2015

10. Anonymous political activist, November 2015

11. Anonymous, MP, November 2015

12. Melanie Onn, MP, December 2015

13. Anonymous political activist, December 2015

14. Anonymous MP, January 2016

15. Linda Hobson, Unison, trade unionist, January 2016

16. Stephen Twigg, MP, February 2016

Appendix E: Electoral Fraud Participant Information Sheet

Understanding Electoral Fraud

Participant Information Letter

V2. 13.08.2014

What is our research about?

Proven cases of electoral fraud in the UK are very rare and on the whole international monitoring organisations classify elections in the UK as well run, fair and democratic.

However, some areas experience serious allegations or proven cases of fraud. We want to understand why this happens and what can be done to prevent those few cases. We are studying areas that experience fraud and comparing them to similar neighbourhood which do not, to see what makes some areas less likely to experience fraud and what lessons we can take from them to make our elections more secure and fair.

We are particularly concerned that South Asian communities which are already politically under-represented or disengaged may be more vulnerable to fraud. This is why this research will focus on ethnically diverse, often deprived neighbourhoods.

Why were you asked for an interview?

You have been asked to be interviewed because we feel you are knowledgeable about and engaged in local politics and community. You do not need to have any experience of electoral fraud and, as we are also interviewing local activists in areas which have not experienced fraud.

Who are we doing this research for?

This research is done for the Electoral Commission who will publish its findings. The final report will be used to inform policy, but NOT to investigate any cases of fraud. All our participants will have their anonymity guaranteed and the report will NOT name any participants.

What will we do with what you say today?

This interview will be fully confidential. The content of your interview will be used for research purposes ONLY. We are NOT investigating electoral fraud or any allegations of it. Nothing you say about past cases of fraud can be reported to the

police or any other authority, unless we believe there is an imminent threat of serious personal harm to another person or you inform us about a planned criminal activity.

If you have any concerns or evidence about electoral fraud, which you would like to pass on to the authorities please contact your local Returning Officer [write in local number].

What will happen to this interview and your personal information?

We will guard your PRIVACY. All identifying details and the transcripts of the interviews (recordings will be destroyed) will be kept on an encrypted file at the University of Manchester. We are required by our University's regulations to store the data in the encrypted files for ten years. The interviews may be re- used for research purposes ONLY. We will NEVER share any of your details or recorded materials with a third party.

Can we record this interview?

If you allow us we will make an audio recording of this interview, which will help us transcribe what you said and will make our analysis easier. We will destroy these recordings once we make a transcription.

You can stop at any time

We aim to be respectful and flexible towards our research participants and so if for whatever reason you want to stop the interview, or stop recording it, please feel free to tell us.

If you have any complaints

You can direct any complaints about any part of this research to Dr Maria Sobolewska, University of Manchester, 0161 275 4889, maria.sobolewska@manchester.ac.uk. If you are further dissatisfied you can contact Phil Thompson, at the Electoral Commission: 020 7271 0570 pthompson@electoralcommission.org.uk.

Thank you for your time!

Your contribution makes a difference

Appendix F: Electoral Fraud Interview Consent Form

Understanding Electoral Fraud

Consent Form

If you are happy to participate please complete and sign the consent form below

Please initial box.

1. I understand that my participation in the study is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to any treatment/service. This includes a withdrawal of the right to use the interview after it has been conducted up to the point where the final report is published.	
2. I understand that the interviews will be audio-recorded.	
3. I agree to the use of anonymous quotes.	
4. I agree that the anonymised transcription of this interview will be stored at the secure University of Manchester computer for a minimum of 10 years.	
5. I agree that the anonymised transcription of this interview can be used by the University of Manchester researchers working on this project in their future work.	
6. I confirm that I have read and understood the Participant Information Letter V.... Dated	
7. I agree to take part in the above project	

Name of participant	Date	Signature
Name of person taking consent	Date	Signature

Appendix G: Electoral Fraud Interview Questionnaire

Interview guide for interviewers

Introduction:

1. Hello and introduction. Thanks for time, importance of contribution.
2. Reminder about anonymity, read through the consent letter, agree recording

Part one: local context and local politics

a. Local organisational density and structure
i. Ethnic, religious, broader appeal?
ii. Are there any umbrella organisations (is your organisation member?), are some of the same people engaged in more than one organisation?
b. Political parties locally
i. Are political parties active in the area?
ii. Do you think they have a lot of activists locally? *(esp if political party activist being interviewed)*
iii. *Do the local organisations working with the parties or on elections more generally? Do business organisations?*

Part two: electoral politics

c. Integrity of elections
i. Are there any campaigns to raise awareness of registration and turnout run in your area (by whom)?
ii. Do a lot of people in the area use postal voting? Are you aware of any issues around this?
iii. There is a common concern around the country about postal voting causing fraud, what are your thoughts? (Prompt: Someone else may be more likely to tell you how to fill it out, or fill it out for you or maybe see how you voted; prompt families, including extended families here)
iv. Prompt what they actually think fraud is- is there any grey area where they think something is not fraud but it actually is? Do you think everyone in the area agrees what fraud is, or are some things more accepted (like showing someone your postal ballot before sending it off- other examples?) Prompt families deciding together, or someone deciding for the whole family
v. If area of fraud: do you think the allegations are unfair?
vi. Do you think there are any (similar/other) problems with the elections in neighbouring areas or wards?
vii. Why do you think the problems we spoke about takes place?

d. Local electoral context
[if problems not mentioned proceed with the prompts as a further local context info]:

i. Ask about local electoral context (based on previous research into area: impact of UKiP presence, one party dominance, competitive context)
ii. Are some parties/candidates considered more for one ethnic group?
iii. Do people in the area experience a lot of discrimination or exclusion on the basis of ethnicity or religion? In politics?
iv. Do people generally struggle to engage in local politics because of English- is local politics run in other languages?
v. Do people around here have a lot of interest in/ knowledge about politics? How about politics back 'home' (countries of origin)?
vi. Do people around here think voting is a civic duty/responsibility?
vii. Do you think women participate/engage as much as men? (is there anything being done about this in the area?)
viii. Are Mosques or religious organisations also engaging in elections like the other organisations?
ix. Are young people engaging in politics locally in the same way? Prompt different organisations, any conflict with elder community leaders or disengagement. (this is when hopefully biraderi may come out- I also added the family earlier on)

e. [If any concerns reported] We were talking about [problems mentioned] can I ask you if you had witnessed it personally (remind if need be that we won't report to the police), or is it one of the 'everybody knows' situations, someone told you?

Part three: wrap up

1. Thank you
2. What will happen now: data analysis, reporting, reminder of anonymity
3. An opportunity to ask questions

Appendix H: Anonymised List of Electoral Fraud Interviewees

1.   White, male, political activist. July 2014

2.   Indian, male, political activist. July 2014

3.   Pakistani, male, community leader. July 2014

4.   Pakistani, male, community leader. September 2014

5.   Pakistani, male, political activist. September 2014

6.   Pakistani, male, political activist. September 2014

7.   Asian, male, community leader. September 2014

8.   White, male, political activist, September 2014

9.   Pakistani, male, political activist. September 2014

10.   White, male, political activist. September 2014

11.   White, male, political activist. September 2014

12.   Pakistani, male, community activist October 2014

13.   Bangladeshi, male, community leader. October 2014

14.   White, female, community leader. October 2014

15.   Pakistani, male, political activist. October 2014

16.   White, female, political activist. October 2014

17.   White, female, political activist. October 2014

18.   Pakistani, male, political activist. October 2014

19.   Bangladeshi, male, political activist, October 2014

20.   Bangladeshi, male, political activist, October 2014

21.   Bangladeshi, male, political activist, October 2014

22.   Bangladeshi, male, political activist, October 2014

23.   Bangladeshi, male, political activists, October 2014

24.   Bangladeshi, female, community activist, October 2014

25.   Bangladeshi, male, political and community activist, July 2014

26.   White, male, political activist, September 2014

27.   White, male, political activist, September 2014

28.   Pakistani, male, community and political activist, September 2014

29.   Pakistani, male, political and community activist, September 2014

30.   Pakistani, male, community leader, September 2014

31.   Pakistani, male, community leader, October 2014

32.   Pakistani, male, community leader, October 2014

33.   Pakistani, male, community leader, October 2014

34.   White, female, political and community activist, October 2014

35.   White, male, political activist, October 2014

36.   Bangladeshi, female, community and political activist, October 2014

37.   White, male, political activist, November 2014

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