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### Personal Identity

In the preceding chapter we have noted that in *Spinozism* and in the *Short Presentation of the Spinozistic System*, Schleiermacher adopted a thoroughly Kantian standpoint regarding the conditions of knowledge. We only have direct access to representations, the content of which is given to us in sensation. Furthermore, it is through the work of the understanding, in particular as exemplified in the analogies of experience, that we come to distinguish between inner and outer sense. However, Schleiermacher saw that given this starting point, we have no guarantee that what we perceive as phenomenal individuals have a noumenal ground. From an epistemic standpoint, we have no access to the *vinculum* of the monads. And from the standpoint of metaphysics, Schleiermacher argued, once we posit that phenomenal entities stand in thoroughgoing interdependence with one another, it becomes very difficult consistently to posit more than a single noumenal ground of all phenomenal reality. This, he believed, brings us back to the Spinozistic relation.

Schleiermacher's arguments in *Spinozism* move beyond the problem of the principle of individuation to the problem of personal identity. Of course, the two questions are inherently related. His protracted discussion of personal identity is significant for two reasons. First, it reveals the basic contours of Schleiermacher's understanding of subjectivity. This understanding is first and foremost a Kantian one. Even after Schleiermacher moves beyond the position he takes in *Spinozism* and in the *Short Presentation*, it remains a determinative influence on his thought and has significant consequences for his ethics. Given the discursive character of thought, the self is known only through its world; we have no access to the "inner" self, only

to the “outer.” Second, this discussion reveals the depth of Schleiermacher’s grasp of what can be inferred from the Kantian theory of subjectivity regarding the metaphysical problem of the relation of self and world and the ground of both. His analysis proceeds from the question of what can be inferred from the unity of self-consciousness. It is heavily influenced by Kant’s argument in the chapter on the paralogisms of the first *Critique*, where Kant argues that we cannot validly infer the noumenal substantiality of the self from the identity of self-consciousness. Schleiermacher argues, further, that even the conditions of the possibility of practical rationality do not warrant the inference that we are (a) noumenally real substantial beings and (b) that we are transcendently free. This chapter continues the analysis of *Spinozism* begun in the last chapter. It is divided into two parts. In the first I discuss Schleiermacher’s analysis of subjectivity along with his claim that the unity and identity of self-consciousness cannot ground metaphysical inferences to the noumenal reality of intelligible substances. In the second, I discuss his understanding of practical rationality and its relationship to determinism and the mechanism of nature.

#### PERSON, PERSONALITY, AND THE PRINCIPLE OF PERSONALITY

In a long passage in *Spinozism* Schleiermacher distinguishes between “person” and “personality,” and claims that both concepts can be found in Kant and Jacobi.<sup>1</sup> Personality is “that property characteristic of a thing making it into a person.” He will argue, however, that it is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition of “complete” personhood. Following Jacobi, he argues for a distinction between what he calls the “personality” and the “principle of personality,” and defines these terms in the following way: “the personality is the characteristic property of a thing considered as a subject; the principle of personality is

<sup>1</sup> As Grove notes, another important source for Schleiermacher’s discussion is the article on person and personality in Carl Christian Erhard Schmid’s 1788 *Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften nebst einer Abhandlung* (Schmid, *Wörterbuch*, 276); Grove, *Deutungen des Subjekts*, 102.

the characteristic property of a thing as person if it is to be considered purely as object (KGA I.1, 539). The upshot of this distinction is the following: the principle of personality is *objective* and has to do with whether, objectively considered, a being has its own principle of individuation. This relates to our discussion in the previous chapter regarding the *vinculum* of the monads. Personality, however, is merely *subjective*. It concerns the relation between the merely logical, analytic unity supplied by the transcendental I in Kant's philosophy and its relation to self-consciousness. Does the relation of the transcendental I to self-consciousness ground valid inferences regarding the nature of the metaphysical self? The problem, as Kant had clearly noted in the paralogisms of the first *Critique*, is whether the analytic unity of consciousness—the transcendental I in virtue of which all my representations are mine—can be used as the basis for a rational psychology in which we attribute substantiality, simplicity, personal identity, and independence to the soul. In *Spinozism*, Schleiermacher clearly sides with Kant on this problem; his discussion is clearly informed by Kant's paralogisms.

Given the distinction between the personality and the principle of personality, Schleiermacher delineates three possibilities. He notes,

The foundational concept, namely, is overall identity with consciousness. a. If a thing is itself conscious of this identity, and also really possesses it, then it is a complete person, that is, a person in both respects, considered as subject and as object. b. If it is conscious of this identity, but does not really have it, then it is only subjectively a person but has no objective personality. c. If it really has this identity, but is not itself conscious of it, then it has objective personality but no subjective personality. (KGA I.1, 539)

Only if some thing both has consciousness of its own identity and really possesses it can it be considered a "complete person." There are, however, two other possibilities. First, the fact that we are self-conscious does not allow us to make inferences concerning the noumenal reality of the self. It is therefore possible that a being have self-consciousness (personality) without it having any genuine substantiality grounding its consciousness of itself as an individual being (a principle of personality). This is what is being considered under option b. Second, what Schleiermacher describes under c.

concerns the possibility that animals, for example, which are not self-conscious, nevertheless possess a genuine principle of individuation. This may also be true of things having a principle of individuation, but which have no personality. All three options, a, b, and c, are genuine possibilities because personality and the principle of personality do not in any way imply or exclude one another. Each can exist with or without the other.

Schleiermacher remarks that he does not believe that from a purely theoretical standpoint “the second kind should be called a true person” and “even so little do I believe one can deny the third kind (the animals) would be a real person” (*KGA* I.1, 539). He thereby claims that the principle of personality (the principle of identity) is both necessary and sufficient for personhood. For our purposes, the most interesting claim is that the principle of personality (genuine *noumenal* substantial identity throughout change) is *necessary* for genuine personhood. We have already seen in the previous chapter that Schleiermacher denies that we have any epistemological access to the principle of identity of a thing. And from a metaphysical standpoint, he argues that we are led to conclude that there is only one noumenal ground of all phenomena. This excludes the idea of a plurality of noumenal agents.

The most significant aspect of Schleiermacher’s long discussion of the relationship between the three concepts, person, personality, and the principle of personality is his claim that the consciousness of personality does not imply the substantiality of the noumenal self. In other words, the having of personality does not imply possession of a principle of personality. Moreover, Schleiermacher affirms that when we view a person objectively, from a third-person point of view, we can think of such an individual as an individual substance (that is, such an individual is phenomenally, as an object of experience, a substance). However, we cannot attribute unity and simplicity to the consciousness of such an individual. In making these claims, Schleiermacher clearly relies on the results of Kant’s paralogisms. His argument here is worth quoting at length:

For Jacobi, the personality is what makes a being into a person of the second kind (for insofar as the thing thinks of itself as subject, and the unity of self-consciousness relates only to it as such, this cannot decide whether it

possesses the personality of the first kind) and the principle of personality is what makes a being into a person of the third kind. However, then he should not say: each thing that possesses personality—and only this—is a person. If, therefore, the concept of the third kind were the actual foundational concept of a person, then the person of the second kind would be only an apparent person. A person of the first kind, however, would be a person with this consciousness, that she is a person. The question is whether a purely apparent person is possible. Jacobi admits the Kantian assertion that I can doubt whether my consciousness is continuous, more than he himself affirms it. This case of an apparent person thereby touches purely upon the possibility of doubt that consciousness can be continuous. In what sense can Jacobi admit this doubt? This must determine the point of comparison between his own doctrine and that of Kant's. Jacobi defined the personality as unity of self-consciousness and for him the person is a being that has consciousness of its identity. Since only the personality is technically the whole of what makes a being into a person, the consciousness of identity must thereby have to do with the unity of consciousness. There is no doubt about the latter. It is therefore empirically certain since I always refer one consciousness to a preceding one, and see many together as a joined series in which the representations that therein come to the fore are in fact different and outside one another. The different acts of consciousness, however, are related to one another through the identity of the subject through which the different representations are referred. There is therefore no doubt concerning the first expression (consciousness of identity), and no appearance of the same can take place in its stead insofar as merely the identity of self-consciousness of the transcendental unity of the I should be thereby understood. Alone the old school made a leap and said: where this transcendental unity is identical, there also its substratum, the substance, must be identical. If, then, this also were to be understood under the identity, the consciousness of which makes a being into a person, then in any case we find doubt and an appearance of the same instead. Namely, the thing [is] subjective if it does not proceed from itself and behaves itself as an object. Rather just as it considers itself in self-consciousness, it can never achieve the idea of the identity of a real substrate, for the consciousness, which is the sole *ratio cognoscendi* of self-consciousness, relates itself only to the outer of the thing, not to its inner, and the unity of this self-consciousness can thereby relate to the I and not to the substance. From an objective point of view, I then admittedly have a reason to attribute something that persists to a thing, to think the same thing as having consciousness, and to thereby ascribe a continuity of consciousness to it. In this way alone I cannot again attain the unity of self-consciousness, for I have no reason to arrive at the unity and inner connection of consciousness

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from its continuity. And if I also do this hypothetically, in that I attribute to consciousness a transcendental ground, then I may in no way identify this transcendental I with the real substrate or substance. Here thereby a double doubt, or moreover, uncertainty, is not only possible, but even necessary.

(KGA I.1, 539–41)

Briefly put, from the necessity of the transcendental unity of the I (worked out in Kant's transcendental deduction), we cannot conclude to the substantial unity of the self. Schleiermacher notes that the "consciousness of identity" has to do with the "unity of consciousness." In other words, the unity of consciousness is a necessary condition of the consciousness of identity. What does Schleiermacher mean by such a unity of consciousness? He tells us there is no doubt that there is such a unity. He calls it "empirically certain" in the sense that we know that we are aware of our own activity of bringing together representations that are "different and outside one another" in one consciousness. It is through the identity of the subject that the different representations are "bound with one another." What is the nature of this identity of which he speaks?

In §16 of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant begins his discussion of "that which itself contains the ground of the unity of different concepts in judgements, and hence of the possibility of the understanding, even in its logical use." His argument begins with the well known proposition that "the I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much to say that the representation would either be impossible or else would be nothing for me" (KRV B132). This "I think" is what Kant calls the transcendental unity of self-consciousness. It is the necessary condition for all combinations of representations. Since our consciousness is discursive, that is, we are conscious of representations that are "different and outside of one another," these can only be related to one another through the transcendental unity of consciousness. Such a transcendental unity is a necessary condition for our ability to form concepts, for it is through concepts that many representations are thought together under one representation. Hence the transcendental unity of consciousness relates to the analytic unity of the concept. But for any kind of combination to take place, a transcendental

unity of consciousness through which different representations are grasped and then related to one another is presupposed. Since the representations, considered in themselves, are different and outside one another, the only way that they can be brought into relation with one another is through some third thing, to which both are related. This is the transcendental unity of consciousness itself, which first relates to representation x, and then to representation y, and relates x to y in and through the fact that they relate to it (the transcendental unity of consciousness).<sup>2</sup> This transcendental unity and its function is what Schleiermacher refers to when he notes that “I always refer one consciousness to a preceding one, and see many together as a joined series in which the representations that therein come to the fore are in fact different and outside one another. The different acts of consciousness, however, are related to one another through the identity of the subject through which the different representations are referred.”<sup>3</sup> If the “I think” were not to accompany all my representations, that representation which the “I think” did not accompany could not be related to other representations, and hence could not be thought. The “I think” is as such the *ratio essendi* of the possibility of the combination of all representations, and hence of all thinking itself. The unity of consciousness to which Schleiermacher refers is just this transcendental unity. This is the “identity of self-consciousness of the transcendental unity of the I.”

The *self*-consciousness of identity presupposes the unity of consciousness, that is, the transcendental unity of apperception. If I am to be *conscious* of myself as one and the same thinker of my representations, all my representations must be referable to a single “I think.” I must, thereby, possess a unity of consciousness. This unity of consciousness, however, need not imply a consciousness of this unity, that is, self-consciousness. For instance, it is possible for animals to have consciousness without having self-consciousness.

<sup>2</sup> This analytic unity must be distinguished from the synthetic unity. The analytic unity allows us to infer that these representations all belong to the same subject, whereas the synthetic unity implies combination of representations in accordance with necessary laws making possible complex thoughts. As Henrich has noted, “the conditions constituting complex thoughts must surely be distinguished from the conditions of the mere co-presence of thoughts in one and the same subject.” See Henrich, “Identity and Objectivity,” 171.

<sup>3</sup> On this point, see also Grove’s discussion in *Deutungen des Subjekts*, 101–11.

Schleiermacher does not bother to make this distinction here, as this problem is not his principle concern. His main concern, rather, is with whether the transcendental unity of apperception, and even the self-consciousness of this unity, implies the *substantial* unity and identity of the self. Schleiermacher mentions the “leap” made by the “old school”, namely, the inference that “where this transcendental unity is identical, there also its substratum, the substance, must be identical.” Is it possible to move from the “I” of apperception grounding the series of fleeting representations to the substantiality of the self? It is precisely this inference that Kant claimed is unwarranted, and his arguments for its lack of warrant can be found in his chapter on the paralogisms of pure reason. Kant there argues that substantive claims cannot be made about the transcendental subject, and that it is an error to attribute substantiality, simplicity, personal identity and independence to the soul. This is an error in judgment, which arises when we seek the unconditioned unity of apperception and think that it can be brought under the same concepts through which we think objects of experience.<sup>4</sup> Because the categories of the understanding cannot legitimately be applied to this unconditioned unity, we can have no concept of any object that corresponds to it (A339/B397).<sup>5</sup> The transcendental unity of apperception is a condition of thought that cannot itself be understood in terms of the conditions valid for the *objects* of thought, that is, this transcendental unity cannot itself be subsumed under the categories.

<sup>4</sup> In her book *Kant's Doctrine of Transcendental Illusion*, Michelle Grier convincingly demonstrates that the paralogisms are a specific instance of Kant's general theory of transcendental illusion in the Dialectic as a whole. Moreover, she notes the distinction between the inescapability of transcendental *illusion*, and the avoidability of the mistake in *judgment* that results from the application of the categories of the understanding to the transcendental unity of apperception, the supreme condition of all thought. Grier correctly claims: “in taking this illusion to be unavoidable, however, Kant is *not* claiming that we are necessarily deceived by it, as shown by his own distinction between the illusion and the deceptive inferences of rational psychology...the ‘illusion’ (here, in rational psychology) is said to *manifest itself* in a transcendental ‘subreption,’ referred to as the ‘subreption of the hypostatized consciousness [*apperceptionis substantiatae*]’ (A402). However, Kant clearly wishes to distinguish the ‘natural illusion’ in rational psychology from the ‘logical’ error that characterizes the subsequent paralogistic *inferences*,” 149.

<sup>5</sup> In his *Reflexion* 5553 Kant notes that the first paralogism mistakes the “unity of apperception, which is subjective,” for the “unity of the subject as thing” (*Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 18:224).



In order to understand Schleiermacher's remarks, it is instructive to take an in-depth look at the Kantian arguments to which Schleiermacher refers. In his introductory remarks regarding the dialectical inferences of pure reason Kant characterizes the paralogisms in the following way: "from the transcendental concept of a subject that contains nothing manifold I infer the absolute unity of this subject itself, even though in this way I have no concept of it" (A340/B398). Kant's discussion of the problem of the paralogisms takes into consideration what was already noted by Hume in his *A Treatise of Human Nature*, namely, "When I turn my reflection upon myself, I can never perceive this *self* without one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing but the perceptions. 'Tis the composition of these, therefore, that forms the self."<sup>6</sup> Hume's reflections on the problem led him to posit what is referred to, famously, as the "bundle" theory of consciousness, the identification of the self with the various thoughts, desires, and experiences that are the denizens of a person's psyche. Of course, Kant's own theory of mind is significantly different from Hume's. At the basis of Kant's understanding of mind is his positing of the transcendental I grounding all logical functions of judgment.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, Hume's observation is telling and plays a significant role in Kant's development of the paralogisms. When combined with Kant's understanding of the function of the transcendental unity, two things follow from Hume's observation regarding the fact that the self cannot be perceived. Both are inherently related. First, no perception of which I am aware can play the role of the transcendental unity of apperception grounding all functions of judgment. Any perception is itself an element that must be related to other elements of perception *through* the transcendental unity. Second, the *transcendental unity of the subject contains nothing manifold*. This is the *nervus probandi* of the paralogisms. It is *because* the transcendental unity can contain nothing manifold that one cannot have a perception of the self. Such a transcendental unity *cannot* contain anything manifold, for it is merely a logical function *through which* the manifold

<sup>6</sup> David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 634.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Franks perceptively notes that the transcendental unity of apperception "expresses the finite character of a subject whose thought remains empty without data given to its receptive faculty." Franks, *All or Nothing*, 62.

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is combined in accordance with the categories. Kant characterizes the I of apperception as an “empty representation . . . of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept” (KRV B404/A346).

Kant develops the claim that the transcendental unity of the subject contains nothing manifold in the following passage concerning the first paralogism of substantiality from the A edition: “For the I is, to be sure, in all thoughts, but not the least intuition is bound up with this representation, which would distinguish it from all objects of intuition. Therefore one can, to be sure, perceive that this representation continually recurs with every thought, but not that it is a standing and abiding intuition, in which thoughts (as variable) would change” (KRV A350). The I of apperception is given with every thought. The problem, however, is that it is an *empty* representation. In other words, no abiding intuition is given with it, and hence it cannot be characterized in terms of any such intuition. Without such an intuition, *it cannot be distinguished* from other intuitions. And if it cannot be so distinguished, it cannot be picked out in such a way that it can be *related* to other intuitions. The self cannot, therefore, be thought of as a substance *in which* thoughts change. The categories of unity, simplicity, substantiality, and possibility are ultimately functions of unity for our representations. But without such an abiding intuition of the I that accompanies all my representations, there is no way to relate the transcendental self to other empirically given intuitions and to thereby unite them through a category. As such, the categories *cannot possibly* serve to unify the transcendental self with other intuitions, and hence the categories cannot be applied to it. To apply the categories in such a way would be to treat the transcendental self as if it were something empirically given, which it is not.

The application of the concept of simplicity to the “I think” is similarly problematic. Kant notes that “I am simple signifies no more than that this representation I encompasses not the least manifoldness within itself, and that it is an absolute (though merely logical unity)” (KRV A355). He continues:

so it is permitted to me to say, “I am a simple substance,” i.e., a substance the representation of which never contains a synthesis of the manifold; but

this concept, or even this proposition, teaches us not the least bit in regard to myself as an object of experience, because the concept of substance is used only as a function of synthesis, without any intuition being subsumed under it, hence without an object, and it is valid only of the condition of our cognition, but not of any particular object that is to be specified.

(KRV A356)

Whatever simplicity there is to the “I think” is not the simplicity that could be attributed to an intelligible substance. It is, rather, merely the logical requirement that all representations be related to the same “I think” if judgment is to be possible. Moreover, as noted above, the category of substance cannot be applied to the I in such a way as to make it into an object of experience: as Kant notes, here the notion of the I as substance can only be correctly applied as a function of synthesis, that is, the transcendental I *functions* in such a way as to allow my representations to be brought together through the functions of judgment.<sup>8</sup>

Kant’s discussion of the substantiality and simplicity of the self ground his discussion of the third paralogism of transcendental psychology, namely that concerning personal identity. This problem is what is at issue when Schleiermacher notes, with regard to what he calls an “apparent person” (a being that is itself conscious of its identity, but to which *objective* substantiality cannot be attributed), that such a case “thereby touches purely upon the possibility of doubt that consciousness can be continuous.” What does this doubt amount to? In an important passage introducing the third paralogism, Kant notes:

If I want to cognize through experience the numerical identity of an external object, then I will attend to what is persisting in its appearance, to which, as subject, everything else relates as a determination, and I will notice the identity of the former in the time in which the latter changes.

(KRV A362)

Kant affirms that a necessary condition of the attribution of identity to a thing involves the determination of some quality persisting in

<sup>8</sup> On the relation of the “I think” to the logical forms of judgment in Kant’s thought, see Beatrice Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, especially 64–72.

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appearance.<sup>9</sup> If Kant's analysis of this necessary condition for cognition of the numerical identity of an object is correct, then right off it can be seen that since the transcendental I contains nothing manifold, it cannot meet these conditions for the cognition of numerical identity. Since the I has no manifold, no part of it can persist in appearance. As such, I cannot continuously identify some quality of the I that endures throughout the changes in its representational states.

This is no doubt the argument that Schleiermacher has in mind in noting that when the self "considers itself in self-consciousness, it can never achieve the idea of the identity of a real substrate." What he says in what follows is elliptical, but of supreme importance for the understanding of the self that he will eventually adopt: "the consciousness, which is the sole *ratio cognoscendi* of self-consciousness, relates itself only to the outer of the thing, not to its inner, and the unity of this self-consciousness can thereby relate to the I and not to the substance." That consciousness relates only to the *outer* of the thing, and not to what is *inner*, concerns all objects of possible experience.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> As Longuenesse notes, "For the concept of substance has no other meaning than that of being the referent of the term *x* to which all concepts of real determinations are attributed in judgment. Outside this relation to accidents, there is no substance, just as outside their relation to a substance there are no accidents" (Longuenesse, *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, 331). She cites *Reflexion* 5861, in which Kant claims "Accidents are only the substance's manner of existing according to what is positive." She also cites the *Met. Volckmann*, "An absolute subject which would remain once we had abandoned all predicates cannot be thought and is thus impossible, because it is contrary to human nature, for we cognize everything discursively" (Ak. xxviii-1, 429-30). The point is that we can only know a substance through its determinations, but these must be given to us as the real in sensation. The problem for Kant then becomes, "How is it possible for 'realities' which are given to us only through the arbitrary and contingent interplay of our sensations, to be 'determined' in respect of the relation between subject and predicate in judgment?" Kant's answer to the question lies in the *synthesis speciosa*. As Longuenesse notes, "the schema of the relation between substance and accidents is the temporal relation between a real that is permanent and a real that changes" (332). But this means that in order to determine something as an empirical substance, we must be able to relate a determination of a thing that persists to changing determinations. Absent a real that persists and that can be related to continual change of representations in the self, we cannot attribute substantiality to the transcendental I. But since the I think has no manifold, with it there is given no reality that persists.

<sup>10</sup> The idea that we can know things only in relation to us, as well as their relations to one another only insofar as they stand in relation to us is firmly rooted in Kant's critical philosophy. This is what Schleiermacher means when he notes that we know only the "outer" and not the "inner" of a thing. In his first *Critique* Kant notes

This includes the self insofar as it is an object of experience, that is, the empirical self (the empirical self must be carefully distinguished from the transcendental self). In its consciousness of itself, the self can relate itself only to the manifold of its representations. However, all these representations go on to constitute the empirical world; they are all *relational* insofar as they represent the world in relation to the self. And insofar as some of these representations are of the self, they can only be of the empirical, embodied self in its relation and interactions with the world. As such, there is no representation of the *inner* self that contains some quality that appears; indeed there cannot be one, as the transcendental I does not itself contain a manifold. The *unity* and *identity* of self-consciousness is a feature of the transcendental I. This unity and identity, however, cannot be understood as a feature of the empirical self, that is, the self as substance in the empirical world. Hence the “unity of self-consciousness” can relate only “to the I and not to the substance.”

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant frames the problem of personal identity in terms of ascertaining the identity of the self throughout its changing determinations, that is, in terms of the identity of consciousness throughout the continual change of its representations.

“Everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition . . . contains nothing but mere relations; of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces). But what is present in the place, or what it produces in the things themselves besides the alteration of place, is not given through these relations. Now through mere relations no thing in itself is cognized; it is therefore right to judge that since nothing is given to us through outer sense except mere representations of relation, outer sense can also contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not that which is internal to the object in itself. It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense” (*KRV* B66–7); cf. *KRV* A283/B339, “a persistent appearance in space (impenetrable extension) contains mere relations and nothing absolutely internal,” and *KRV* A285/B341, “whatever we can cognize only in matter is pure relations (that which we call their inner determinations is only comparatively internal).” For a discussion of the problem of the relation of a thing’s monadic properties (properties that a thing has in abstraction from all relations) to its relational properties in Kant, see Franks *All or Nothing*, 36–51. What is important for our purposes here, however, is that both Kant and Schleiermacher clearly affirm that we have no access to the thing in itself, that is, the “inner” character of things independent of their relation to us. Hence, all we have access to is the outer, that is, things as they appear and stand in relation to us. We also only have access to the self as it appears, as it is given to us in inner intuition and as acting in the external world. Of the self we also know *only* the “outer” self.

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Ultimately, the problem concerns the identity of the self through time. How is cognition of the identity of the self through time possible? Kant provides two answers, each stemming from a different point of view. From the point of view of the subject, time is *in me*. That is, insofar as time is that which orders *my* representations, and given that these representations are all mine, it goes without saying that it is the same *I* that relates first to one representation and then to another. Personal identity is unfailingly met with in *my own consciousness*. As Kant notes:

Consequently, I relate each and every one of my successive determinations to the numerically identical Self in all time, i.e., in the form of inner intuition of my self. On this basis the personality of the soul must be regarded not as inferred but rather as a completely identical proposition of self-consciousness in time, and that is also the cause of its being valid *a priori*. For it really says no more than that in the whole time in which I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of my Self, and it is all the same whether I say that this whole time is in Me, as an individual unity, or that I am to be found with numerical identity, in all of this time.

The identity of person is therefore inevitably to be encountered in my own consciousness. (KRV A362)

The story is quite different when the question concerns the empirical self, that is, the self as viewed from a third-person, “objective” point of view. When a person is viewed from such a point of view, one can, indeed, attribute substantiality to him or her in an objective sense, that is, I can think of him or her as something in the world interacting with other things in the world subject to all three of the analogies of experience. However, the kind of unity and identity of self-consciousness that I attribute to myself from a first-person point of view cannot be attributed to the self from a third-person point of view. As Kant notes:

But if I consider myself from the standpoint of another (as an object of his outer intuition), then it is this external observer who originally considers me as **in time**; for in apperception **time** is represented only **in me**. Thus from the I that accompanies—and indeed with complete identity—all representations at every time in **my** consciousness, although he admits this I, he will still not infer the objective persistence of my Self. For just as the time in which

the observer posits me is not the time that is encountered in my sensibility but that which is encountered in his own, so the identity that is necessarily combined with my consciousness is not therefore combined with his consciousness, i.e., with the outer intuition of my subject. (KRV A363)

In other words, the unity and identity of self-consciousness is available only from the first-person point of view. This unity and identity is merely the logical, or “formal condition of my thoughts and their connection” (KRV A363). This is a *functional* unity given through the activity of uniting all representations that are to constitute an experience in one consciousness. As such, it can only be apprehended in and through this *activity* of uniting representations, and can only be grasped from the first-person point of view. Moreover, when Kant notes that “time is in me,” what he means is that from the point of view of the subject, time is generated through (a) my continuous apprehension of representations and (b) my connection of these representations in accordance with the analogies in such a way as to arrive at objective experience. Since the functional unity of the I is what apprehends and connects these representations, it must be logically identical throughout, that is, it is an *a priori* condition of the unity of experience from the first-person point of view. But when I observe another person, I do not have access to his or her activity of uniting representations, and hence to the unity and identity of that person’s self-consciousness throughout the person’s experiences. I therefore do not have access to the time in which the observer posits me, for it is “not the time that is encountered in my sensibility.”

Kant further notes that the logical identity of the I does not warrant the supposition that there is an underlying identical substance serving as the substrate for the determinations of the self, i.e. its changing representations. This is because the functional identity of the I does not require the existence of a single substance for which the representations serve as determinations. In an important footnote in the third paralogism, Kant notes that it is entirely possible that such a functional unity co-exist with a state of affairs in which “representations, together with consciousness of them, flow from one [substance] to another.” Hence “a whole series of these substances may be thought, of which the first would communicate its state, together with its consciousness, to the second, which would communicate its

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own state, together with that of the previous substance, to a third substance . . .” He concludes that given such a scenario, the last substance would be conscious “of all the previously altered substances in its own states” (*KRV* A364). In other words, the functional unity, along with all the representations it unites, could be passed on baton-like from one substance to the next. Hence the functional identity would be preserved, including the content that it unites with it as well, without this having any implications concerning the identity of an underlying substance.

Schleiermacher most certainly has these arguments in mind. He notes that from a third-person, objective point of view I can think of another person or animal as something that persists throughout change and that stands in dynamic interaction with other changing substances. I think of such individuals as elements in my objective experience, in accordance with the analogies. From this third-person point of view I “have a reason to attribute something that persists to a thing,” that is, I can think of such an individual as a substance that changes in dynamic interaction with other substances. Schleiermacher also claims, however, that I can “think this same thing as having consciousness,” and that I can “thereby ascribe a continuity of consciousness to it.”<sup>11</sup> However this does not mean that I have a reason to “arrive at the unity and inner connection of consciousness from its continuity.” In other words, my attribution of substantiality to this other being does not warrant the affirmation that all of this individual’s experiences are unified in virtue of a transcendental, logical I. Such a self can only be grasped from the first-person point of view. In sum, Schleiermacher is quite aware that (a) the transcendental function of uniting all representations in a single “I” does not imply a single substance that underlies this function, and

<sup>11</sup> The question here is what Schleiermacher means by the attribution of consciousness and its continuity to another being from such an “objective” point of view. This is especially troublesome given Schleiermacher’s immediate admission afterwards that from the substantiality attributed to this other, I cannot conclude to the transcendental unity and identity of that person’s consciousness. One might assume that such a logical unity is the *sine qua non* of the attribution of consciousness. However, on this point Schleiermacher also follows Kant. In the first paralogism Kant notes that the claim that thinking can only follow from the absolute unity of a thinking being is not an analytic one; as such we are not precluded from attributing thinking, and thereby a kind of consciousness, to a being without also attributing to it the analytic unity of thought. On this point see note 12 below.



(b) the substantiality that I attribute to another conscious being, from a third-person point of view, does not warrant the attribution of a single, identical I that makes the “unity and inner connection” of its experiences possible.<sup>12</sup> This is most certainly the “double doubt” that Schleiermacher affirms is not only possible, but even necessary concerning personal identity.

Given this discussion, Schleiermacher then gives an account of the three kinds of person. The designations originally provided had only to do with “their formulas,” but now he provides an account “in accordance with their content.” Given the possible combinations between the “personality” and the “principle of personality,” the first possibility concerns a being that has both personality and the principle of personality. He defines it, under (a) as “a personality, where the unity of self-consciousness is necessarily connected with the identity of substance of the transcendental subject” (*KGA* I.1, 541). Unlike Schleiermacher’s preceding account of the first kind of person, this definition highlights a *necessary* connection between the personality and the principle of personality. Only given such a necessary connection between the two can we be certain that a single being possesses both. Schleiermacher notes that this necessary combination of the two is applicable to the “highest being in a necessary and complete way” (*KGA* I.1, 541), that is, in God both are necessarily combined. This is because God’s thought is (a) not discursive, like our own, and (b) the *content* of God’s thought does not come from the *outside*, that is, God’s thoughts do not stand in relation to (and therefore do

<sup>12</sup> The idea that thought, or consciousness, might be possible without attributing simplicity to the subject is discussed by Kant in the first paralogism. As Margaret Wilson has convincingly argued (“Leibniz and Materialism,” *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 3, [1974]: 495–513), Kant is here arguing against an essentially Leibnizian claim. Kant notes that the proposition “A thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of a thinking being” cannot be treated as analytic. This is because a concept through which many representations are brought together has multiple parts, namely, the multiple representations themselves; hence the unity of such a thought is the unity of a collective. As such, it is conceivable that this unity be “related to the collective unity of the substances cooperating in it (as the movement of a body is the composite movement of all its parts)” (*KRV* A353). Kant seems to be arguing here that it is quite conceivable to think of something extended, and that is thereby composed of parts, as acting in the same way as a being that synthesizes its representations through the functional unity of the “I.” However, it is important to note that such a view of a thinking being is possible only insofar as it is viewed from the third-person, objective point of view.

not depend in any way on) anything existing *independently* of God.<sup>13</sup> Rather, in God the unity of thought is equivalent to the complete dependence of these thoughts on God. This kind of personality “is completely problematic” (*KGA* I.1, 543), that is, we cannot know whether such a being exists.

This combination is also attributed to human beings “by dint of faith.” However, given the discursive character of human thought, we can affirm no necessary connection between personality and the principle of personality in human beings. This then brings us to the second kind of personality, (b). This is “a personality where the unity of self-consciousness is fully formed, but the identity of the substance is not knowable from the same grounds, and therefore a doubt regarding the complete connection of the two is possible.” Under (b) from the first-person point of view, we begin with the transcendental unity of the self, but cannot from there arrive at the substantial identity of the self. As such, the second part of this definition, regarding the identity of substance, “is also completely problematic” (*KGA* I.1, 543). Schleiermacher notes “this personality befits human beings, in that, namely, each directly ascribes to him/herself the unity of self-consciousness and, according to the analogy, the identity of substance; each ascribes to the other identity of substance, and according to the analogy, also the unity of self-consciousness” (*KGA* I.1, 541). We ascribe to others a transcendental unity of consciousness in virtue of the fact that we think of their consciousness as analogous with our own. And we ascribe substantiality to the unity of our own consciousness in virtue of an analogy between our own consciousness and that of others. However, while in our everyday life we proceed in accordance with such analogies, strictly speaking unity of self-consciousness and identity of substance are not necessarily combined. Schleiermacher describes (c) as “a personality in which the identity is formed by a substance equipped with consciousness. In the third category are animals: in them, the “unity of self-consciousness in accordance with the analogy is highly unlikely” (*KGA* I.1, 541).

<sup>13</sup> Interestingly, in §16 Kant also distinguishes our own understanding from that of God’s. He notes, “An understanding, in which through self-consciousness all of the manifold would at the same time be given, would *intuit*; ours can only *think* and must seek the intuition in the senses” (*KRV* B135).

Schleiermacher claims that his own understanding of self-consciousness is “completely parallel to the Kantian.” Significantly, he notes that given this way of conceiving consciousness, “the unity of self-consciousness (whether one take it as ground or consequent of consciousness) relates itself always only to the phenomenal” (*KGA* I.1, 542). What does Schleiermacher mean by ground and consequent here? The *ground* of the unity of consciousness is, no doubt, the analytical unity referred to by Kant in §16 of the first *Critique*. It is the I that must accompany all my representations if they are to be mine and is, as such, the *ratio essendi* of self-consciousness. Although it is transcendental, it relates itself only to the phenomenal. It is a necessary condition for the possibility of experience, that is, it functions to unify representations belonging to the phenomenal, empirical world. Such a ground cannot be thought without also thinking the *consequent* of the unity of self-consciousness, namely, the synthetic unity. This synthetic unity is constituted by the successive representational states of the subject bound together in accordance with necessary rules. As Kant had noted, the identity of the subject “does not yet come about by my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but rather by my adding one representation to the other and being conscious of their synthesis.” In other words, “the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presumption of some synthetic one” (*KRV* B133). The analytical unity means nothing without a possible content for it to unite. Moreover, I can only become conscious of this analytical unity in and through the synthetic unity. Hence the synthetic unity is the *ratio cognoscendi* of consciousness. The importance of this latter fact for both Kant and Schleiermacher cannot be stressed too much. The identity of the subject is only cognizable in and through the synthesis of the manifold of intuition.<sup>14</sup> This means that the identity of the subject is

<sup>14</sup> The point is key to the argumentative strategy of Kant’s transcendental deduction. The connection between the identity of the transcendental subject and the unity of the synthesis of the self’s representations is explored in depth by Dieter Henrich in his article “Identity and Objectivity.” As Henrich notes, for Kant “self-consciousness comes about only in conjunction with the consciousness of the synthetic functions of the subject” (192). Furthermore, “The thought of the identity of a subject in all its representations must also, from the outset, be formulated with reference to the unity of all its representations. It knows itself as the identical subject only when

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wholly bound up with the identity of the world to which the subject relates. It is, therefore, completely bound up with the phenomenal sphere.

However, from that which we know of the self as phenomenon, “no conclusion is valid as to what it may be as noumenon” (*KGA* I.1, 542). Schleiermacher agrees with Kant that from the theoretical point of view, insofar as the identity of substance relates to noumena, “it is even for this reason an empty concept.” As noted in the previous chapter, according to Kant, insofar as we posit appearances and therefore phenomena, we must also posit *that which appears*, and which can be thought in abstraction from its relational properties. We must, therefore, posit things as they are in themselves. Schleiermacher moves beyond Kant in speculating about the possible character of such noumena. If we attempt to think them,

two cases can be portrayed. First, it is possible that a multiplicity lies at the ground of experienced consciousness, to which we ascribe the ‘I’ as phenomenon. That is, the so-called consciousness has already been several transcendental subjects throughout the entire time series. This is what Schmidt understood by the Kantian expression that consciousness can be passed along. Another case is, however, yet also possible, namely, absolutely no noumenon lies at the basis of the I of consciousness for itself alone, but rather this I is merely a fluid property of another thing, having only to do with time. Such a case strikes me in the Spinozistic business. (*KGA* I.1, 542)

The first case Schleiermacher mentions is the one discussed above in the analysis of Kant’s third paralogism, that is, for all we know

representational states replace other representational states. However, it is the subject of representations, all of which it knows to be its own only if it is equally conscious of the mutual referability of the contents of its representational states. In this awareness it has original cognizance of the simplicity and identity of itself in equal measure” (196). In other words, the self recognizes itself as the selfsame subject insofar as it can connect all its representations according to a rule. It is in and through these rules (the categories) that the content of one representational state is referable to another. And it is through the referability of any given representational content to every other representational content that the unity of the experience of the *identical* subject is constituted. As such, the identity of the I is knowable only in the unity of experience.

the functional unity of the self and the content it unites is passed on baton-like from one substance to another. The second possibility is the Spinozistic one, where the I is merely a fluid property of another thing. In such a case, the I has no independent existence, since it is merely a mode of something else. Moreover, insofar as Schleiermacher envisions it as a merely “fluid” property, it has only a fleeting duration.<sup>15</sup> Significantly, Schleiermacher leaves out another possibility. This is the alternative favored by Jacobi, in which there exist many substances standing in interaction with one another. However, Schleiermacher argues against this possibility in the latter part of *Spinozism* for the reasons enumerated in the previous chapter: first, we can have no epistemic access to the *vinculum* of the monads, and hence to the individuating principles of things, and second, whenever we attempt to think the ground of phenomena, we are inexorably led to the conclusion that there can only be one such ground.

<sup>15</sup> Once the Spinozism controversy had erupted, several authors were prepared to recognize an affinity between Kant’s philosophy and Spinozism, in particular in regard to the question of the self. If what we know of the self always relates—in one way or another—to the empirical, phenomenal self, then the possibility of Spinozism is left open, since we are not required to posit a plurality of noumenal selves. The possibility that Kant’s transcendental self is a mere mode was already entertained by Hermann Andreas Pistorius in a 1786 review of Schultz’s *Erläuterungen*. There Pistorius notes, “The author’s [i.e. Kant’s] theory would secure [Spinoza’s] pantheism against the important objection that an infinite thinking substance cannot be put together out of an infinite number of finite thinking substances, for, if according to [that theory] our substantiality is merely logical and apparent, if our I is nothing but self-consciousness, and this only a subjective pre-requisite of the synthesis of representations, a modification of other modifications; what then prevents it from being the case that all these representations are modifications of the sole substance? Thus reason finds all its demands satisfied in Spinoza’s system, if time determinations and all representations related to them are merely apparent and subjective, and reason would be unjust, after such a satisfaction, if it still wanted to seek a particular Godhead, at any rate the interest of truth demands no Godhead other than the intelligible world.” (Cited and translated by Franks, *All or Nothing*, 95–6; originally in Landau, *Rezensionen zur kantischen Philosophie 1781–87*, 329–30). Pistorius makes the point—not lost on Schleiermacher—that even the transcendental self is intelligible only in relation to the synthesis of representations and calls it merely a “subjective pre-requisite,” and as such can be understood as a mere “modification of other modifications.”

PRACTICAL REASON, DETERMINISM,  
AND THE MECHANISM OF NATURE

The ultimate significance of all metaphysics concerning personal identity is found in the sphere of morality. It is no accident, then, that Schleiermacher proceeds to apply the results of his investigation to the practical sphere. He begins by characterizing Kant's definition of a person in the following way: "a person is a rational subject that sets itself ends independently of the mechanism of nature, and in this regard personality is the property of a subject to be its own end" (*KGA* I.1, 543). Importantly, however, he claims,

no equation allows itself to be made between identity of consciousness and rational self-determination or independence from the mechanism of nature. Even so little does the necessary and universal connection come to mind, for the original meaning of person and personality has only to do with a certain property of consciousness and has the least to do with the matter at hand.

(*KGA* I.1, 543)

What can be deduced from the identity of consciousness? If we follow Kant, as Schleiermacher here seems to be doing, then: if there is to be identity of consciousness there must also be a thoroughgoing connectedness of our representations in accordance with the categories. As such, only if there is unity among our representations (which constitute our world) is there an identity of self-consciousness. The proof of this proposition is central to Kant's transcendental deduction. However, Schleiermacher notes that identity of consciousness does not imply "rational self-determination or independence from the mechanism of nature," that is, it does not imply transcendental or intelligible freedom.

Schleiermacher's intimate acquaintance with Kant's paralogisms plays a key role here as well. In the paralogisms Kant had argued that neither the identity of consciousness nor the spontaneity of the intellect in determining objects allows us to equate self-consciousness with an intelligible substance. And neither does it allow us to infer the transcendental or intelligible freedom of such substances (rational self-determination). The concepts of an intelligible substance and transcendental freedom mutually imply one another. As Kant had

noted in *Reflexion* 5653, “The concept of freedom is already by itself necessarily connected with the concept of a substance with respect to the intelligible, because the substance must be the ultimate subject of its actions and cannot itself be the mode of action of another substance.”<sup>16</sup> But while the concepts of substance and intelligible freedom imply one another, both Kant and Schleiermacher claimed that neither is implied by the identity of consciousness and the spontaneity of the intellect. Schleiermacher’s reasons for this, as we shall see, closely follow those of Kant. Both Kant and Schleiermacher affirm the irreducibility of thought to matter in motion. But this irreducibility of thought to the mechanism of nature does not preclude the possibility that both thought and the changing determinations of the spatial substrate are expressions of a single underlying ground. This thereby excludes the existence of both individual noumenal substances and intelligible freedom. In the chapter on the paralogism Kant had argued:

But now although extension, impenetrability, composition, and motion—in short, everything our outer senses can transmit to us—are not thoughts, feelings, inclinations or decisions, and cannot contain them, as these are never objects of outer intuition, yet that same Something that grounds outer appearances and affects our sense so that it receives the representations of space, matter, shape, etc.—this Something, considered as noumenon (or better transcendental object) could also at the same time be the subject of thoughts, even though we receive no intuition of representations, volitions, etc. in the way we are affected through outer sense, but rather receive merely intuitions of space and its determinations. But this Something is not extended, not impenetrable, not composite, because these predicates pertain only to sensibility and its intuition, insofar as we are affected by such objects (otherwise unknown to us) . . .

If matter were a thing in itself, then as a composite it would be completely distinguished from the soul as a simple being. But it is merely an outer appearance, whose substratum is not cognized through any specifiable predicates; hence I can well assume about this substratum that in itself it is simple, even though in the way it affects our outer senses it produces in us the intuition of something extended and hence composite; and thus I can also assume that in the substance in itself, to which extension pertains in respect of our outer sense, thoughts may also be present, which may be represented

<sup>16</sup> *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 18, 311.

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with consciousness through their own inner sense. In such a way the very same thing that is called a body in one relation would at the same time be a thinking being in another, whose thoughts, of course we could not intuit, but only their signs in appearance . . .

But if we compare the thinking I not with matter but with the intelligible that grounds the outer appearances we call matter, then because we know nothing at all about the latter, we cannot say that the soul is inwardly distinguished from it in any way at all. (KRV A358–60)

Thoughts, feelings, and desires are irreducible to space and its determinations. But this does not imply an irreducible dualism between the thinking self and matter, since both may be the expressions of a single underlying ground. An irreducible dualism between thought and the material world only follows if we think of matter as if it were a thing in itself. Since, however, a necessary characteristic of matter, namely its extension, cannot be a feature of things in themselves but is, rather, only a feature of outer appearances (that is, of how things must appear to us given the forms of sensible intuition),<sup>17</sup> it is not impossible that what is given in inner sense and what appears in outer intuition have the same ground. As such, while the mechanism of nature would not *directly* determine the spontaneity of thought, yet since both are the expressions of a single underlying Something, mental occurrences could *appear* to supervene on physical occurrences. The correspondence between changes in thought and extension would not be the result of one being the cause of the other, but of both being the expression of a single underlying ground expressing itself in two distinct ways. Given that we have no positive concept of a noumenon, Kant notes that this idea of a single underlying ground to both thought and extension cannot be excluded.

Schleiermacher provides much the same argument at the beginning of *Spinozism*. There Schleiermacher answers Jacobi's charge that Spinoza is forced to conclude that "discussion is a pure thing of the body," that is, that thought is merely the product of the mechanism of nature. First, he notes that

as changeable in causal relationships, finite things bring one another forth. Spinoza certainly depended not only on the *ex nihil nihil fit*, but also on

<sup>17</sup> On this point see Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 237–54.



the *nihil ex nihilo fit*. Rather, each thing must have something from which it springs, that is, each thing must be understood as an effect, and therefore too, each change in that which thinks. As change, effects are not brought forth from the infinite directly (from the Infinite as *causa libera*), for each finite thing springs directly only out of the finite, thereby from the finite.

(KGA I.1, 528)

The Infinite in no way directly institutes a change in the finite. Rather, each change in the realm of the finite relates to a previous state of the finite. However, changes in thought do not stem directly from changes in the physical, extended stuff, “for thinking does not stem from extension.” Thought, rather, stems “from that which thinks.” Schleiermacher notes that according to Spinoza, “each change in that which thinks, viewed as an effect, is related to a prior thought.” Spinoza, he argues, does not think of thought as the mere product of physical changes. It is true that such a change in thought “cannot exist for itself alone, but rather only makes up the change of thing taken together with a change in what is extended.” In other words, while the genesis of each thought must be understood in terms of prior thoughts alone, this does not preclude that for each change in representational states there must be a corresponding change in the physical, material substrate. Hence it may be the case that there exists a necessary correspondence of changes in thought with changes in the physical, such that no change in thought takes place without a change in the extended, physical substrate. Changes in the material substrate, however, must be accounted for in terms of prior states of the material substrate, just as changes in thought must be accounted for in terms of prior representational states. The one to one correspondence between changes in thought and matter does not in any way mean, however, as Jacobi surmised, that thought can be understood as an effect of physical changes, or that thought is in any way reducible to physiological events. Moreover, consciousness of physical changes is not a “mere accompaniment” of such changes. Schleiermacher claims:

If I myself take the hardest case of a moral action, it can very well be thought in the spirit of the system that insofar as the decision contains judgment and desire, it is an effect of what has been previously thought. However, actual determination of the physical faculty, with which together

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it comprises only a change of the thing, is the consequence of a previous change of what is extended, only that we admittedly must resort to such changes which somewhat coincide with the material ideas or changes of the animal organs of the psyche. Thus the doctrine of harmony leads always to such subtleties, whether it be Leibniz or Spinoza who has put them forward. How can Jacobi thereby say that discussion is a pure thing of the body? How can he say the inventor of the watch has not invented the watch? The idea of it [the watch] developed itself as a consequence of other ideas; that its bodily accompaniments were a consequence of the movements of its body is irrelevant. So it is with what he says of the effects of the affections. The consideration which here drives him back from Spinozism is, however, only morality, and this really loses nothing through this, that the determinations of the physical faculty stem from changes in what is extended (especially when their necessary coincidence is assumed), since he actually comes to the decision insofar as it is judgment and desire. The last of Jacobi's words leave in doubt whether he means that what is extended determines actions, or whether the infinite thing has this function. I have clarified myself regarding the first, and the last seems to me to fully contradict the system and the sentences already put forward. Even so I cannot grasp how he can say that sensation and thought would be only concepts of extension, movement and speed. There certainly belongs a simple distinction to it, in order to here follow Spinoza correctly and exactly, but Jacobi is also equal to this task. I think the matter so: Each change of a thing is a new relation of it to other things; the relations of a thing can however be regarded from two points of view and at the same time consist of two parts exactly harmonized to one another. The expression of this new relation consists in the outer part in what is extended and the representation of it in the inner part, which consists of what thinks. Because both relate to the whole relation, so all that is in the expression is also in the representation, and all that is in the representation is also in the expression. Therefore I can correctly say: thought and sensation are nothing but concepts of extension, movement, and speed. I can also say: extension, movement, and speed are nothing but expressions of spirit, will and talent. In this way do I think Spinoza will have understood his system in this part. (KGA I.1, 529–30)

For Kant, the notion that thought and extension are both the appearances of an unknown Something is a possibility left open by his critical idealism. Schleiermacher, however, here declares this to be his considered view. To think a change in a representational state, and to view a physiological change, is to understand the same thing from two points of view or two standpoints. Both extension and

thought relate to the “whole relation,” that is, each is in its own way an appearance fully expressive of the infinite. Because both have the same common ground, “all that is in the expression [physical reality] is also in the representation, and all that is in the representation is also in the expression.” The two parts will thereby “be exactly harmonized to one another.”

When Schleiermacher claims that “no equation allows itself to be made between identity of consciousness and rational self-determination or independence from the mechanism of nature,” his discussion of the *harmony* of the progression of thought with physiological change, which mirrors Kant’s discussion of the possible relation of inner and outer sense in the paralogisms, needs to be taken into account. Given this discussion, Schleiermacher cannot be claiming that thought (and hence the identity of consciousness in thinking) is reducible to the mechanism of nature, or that it is simply an effect of this mechanism. Thought is not independent of the mechanism of nature only in the sense that both thought and nature express a single underlying and common ground. It is because both are expressive of the same underlying ground in such a way that harmony results. What follows in Schleiermacher’s text, however, poses some difficulty to this interpretation:

Even so little does the necessary and universal connection come to mind, for the original meaning of person and personality has only to do with a certain property of consciousness and has little to do with the matter at hand. For on the one hand, if one assumes a receptivity that is completely free and open, and is not limited to certain organs, it very well allows itself of a faculty of representation and a consciousness without a faculty of desire, and on the other hand, I do not see why an identical consciousness, a being that possesses unity of self-consciousness, nevertheless could not be completely passive in its actions and dependent upon the mechanism of nature, for just as Kant had himself deduced, indisputably self-consciousness does not touch upon self-determination. (KGA I.1, 544)

The question at issue here is, once again, whether the identity of consciousness implies that the self is a substance. Kant had correctly argued that the category of substance and intelligible freedom mutually imply one another. Something is a substance if its mode of action can be explained in terms of its intrinsic or monadic properties, that

is, the substance must in some way ground its accidents.<sup>18</sup> If all the changes that a thing undergoes are merely the effects of something acting upon it, then it is a mere mode of that other thing, since nothing about the thing functions to ground its properties in any way that is independent from other things. Schleiermacher claims there is no contradiction in thinking the identity of self-consciousness along with the notion that this consciousness is completely passive in its actions. He claims, in other words, that there is no contradiction in affirming the identity of self-consciousness, and in denying that the self is a substance and that its mode of action can in any way be grasped *independently* of the mechanism of nature. This would mean that whatever changes occur in self-consciousness can be explained completely through the mode of action of something else.

In this regard, several difficulties present themselves. First, it is unclear how Schleiermacher's idea of self-consciousness as completely passive or receptive does not contradict the *spontaneity* of thought required in the activity of synthesizing one representational state with another.<sup>19</sup> The only way that the two do not contradict

<sup>18</sup> Kant distinguishes between a substance and its powers and argues that the two cannot be identified. The relation of power belongs to the category of causality, and the relation of inherence in a substance is entirely different from it. In the Pölitz metaphysics Kant argues that "power is the concept of the relation between substance and accidents *insofar* as the substance contains the ground of the accidents." Moreover, this distinction is crucial to the avoidance of Spinozism: "For the concept of substance . . . is thereby (sc., by identifying substance and power) in reality completely lost . . . just as Spinoza would have it, since he affirmed the universal dependence of all things in the world on an original being as their common cause, and by making the universal, effective power itself into a substance, he converted this dependence into inherence" (cited in Henrich, "On the Unity of Subjectivity," 27).

<sup>19</sup> So Kant, "Yet the human being, who is otherwise acquainted with the whole of nature through sense, knows himself also through pure apperception, and indeed in actions and inner determinations which cannot be accounted at all among impressions of sense; he obviously is in one part phenomenon, but in another part, namely in regard to certain faculties, he is a merely intelligible object, *because the actions of this object cannot at all be ascribed to the receptivity of sensibility* (A546–7/B574) [Italics mine]. And in *Reflexion* 4220, Kant notes that "The expression 'I think' indicates already that I am not passive in regard to the representation, that it must be ascribed to me, and that its counterpart depends on me." As Allison notes, "Largely against the empiricists, he [Kant] argues that the senses provide the mind with the data for thinking objects, but not with the thought or knowledge thereof. The latter, he maintains, requires the active taking up of the data by the mind, its unification in a

one another is through the argument Kant provides at A358, discussed above and echoed by Schleiermacher. Henrich summarizes the results of this argument in a way that illuminates Schleiermacher's point: "For even if consciousness is aware of itself in all its thoughts as the ground of their being thought, it is still possible to imagine that the conditions that bind consciousness to the laws for the production of its own thoughts are not at all different from the conditions that underlie the material appearances in their transcendental substrate."<sup>20</sup> Hence what seems to be the spontaneity of self-consciousness *could* be accounted for in terms of the transcendental substrate, which also grounds the material appearances. Only in this way can we think the *spontaneity* of thought as intrinsically related to the material conditions, but such a relation would only take place through their common ground, namely the transcendental substrate. On such a scenario, there are ultimately no noumenal substances that are intelligibly (transcendentally) free in their actions. Insofar as, for Kant, transcendental freedom is inherently bound up with the concept of a moral person, Schleiermacher is correct to claim that the idea of the identity of consciousness does not imply moral personhood.

Our analysis thus far has shown that what can be inferred from an analysis of the conditions of the possibility of experience (the identity of consciousness) does not allow us to conclude that there are noumenal, transcendently free substances. We cannot, in other words, move from experience and its conditions to a positive concept of noumenal substances, which is what would be required in order to affirm the self's independence from the mechanism of nature. The move from noumena to phenomena is equally problematic:

If Kant wants to proceed, not from the phenomenal concept, but from the noumenal, then I see even less how he could make such a use of a clearly known concept and say something. If something corresponds to this concept, then it must express itself through rational determinations of the will.

concept or synthesis, and its reference to an object. All of this is the work of judgment, which is simply the spontaneity of the understanding in action" Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 36.

<sup>20</sup> Henrich, "On the Unity of Subjectivity," 29.

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Even this would be a true contradiction. For since we know so little of the connection between noumena and phenomena, then it would be laughable to claim that a certain noumenon must produce such a phenomenon.

(KGA I.1, 544)

In his chapter “Phenomena and Noumena” in the first *Critique*, Kant had argued that we have no positive conception of noumena.<sup>21</sup> In other words, we cannot think noumena through the categories, for we have no guide as to how noumena are to be subsumed under the concepts of the understanding. Hence Kant concludes, “that which we call noumenon must be understood to be such only in a negative sense” (KRV B309). Such a concept is merely a “boundary concept,” allowing us to distinguish between things as they are given to us in experience and their unknowable ground. Schleiermacher emphasizes that since we can have no positive conception of a noumenon, if we begin from the idea of a noumenon, we can have no understanding of the connection between noumenon and phenomenon. He thereby argues that even if we agreed that the noumenal, intelligible self must “express itself through rational determinations of the will,” we have absolutely no insight into how the noumenal, intelligible self might manifest itself in the phenomenal sphere.

But what of the connection that comes from “the other side,” that is, that begins from the point of view of morality? In his *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant had argued that morality is a fact of reason and that morality and transcendental freedom mutually imply one another. Allison has termed this claim the “Reciprocity Thesis.”<sup>22</sup> While we do not understand it, “freedom,” Kant argued, is “the

<sup>21</sup> Kant notes that “the transcendental use of a concept in any sort of principle consists in its being related to things *in general* and *in themselves*” (KRV B298). This merely transcendental use of the categories is “in fact no use at all, and has no . . . determinable object” (KRV B304). Without the formal conditions of sensibility, the pure categories lack “the formal conditions of the subsumption of any sort of supposed object under these concepts” (KRV B305). Hence if “we wanted to apply the categories to objects that are not considered as appearances, then we would have to ground them on an intuition other than the sensible one, and then the object would be a noumenon in a *positive sense*. Now since such an intuition, namely intellectual intuition, lies absolutely outside our faculty of cognition, the use of the categories can by no means reach beyond the boundaries of the objects of experience.”

<sup>22</sup> Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 201ff.

condition of the moral law which we do know" (*KprV* 5:5). We know we are bound by the moral law, and this implies that we must be transcendently free. In *Spinozism*, Schleiermacher stands in fundamental disagreement with Kant on this point. While each "moral subject that can act in accordance with laws" is a person, Schleiermacher affirms that this is true only in a "phenomenological" or subjective sense. Even if "action in accordance with the representation of rules presupposes the faculty of concepts and the ability to synthesize our acts of consciousness in one [consciousness]," this does not imply that moral subjects must be noumenal selves. In other words, Schleiermacher admits that action in accordance with rules presupposes both the analytic and the synthetic unity of consciousness. In order to act in accordance with such rules, the self must be conscious of the distinction between itself and the world. This further presupposes the ability to construct complex concepts in accordance with necessary laws and to make judgments about objects. And in order to act in accordance with rules, the self must be conscious of itself and its desires; coherence in action is possible only through the structuring of desire. It is clear that all of this involves the identity of self-consciousness. But this identity of self-consciousness, Schleiermacher argues once again, does not imply the substantiality of the noumenal self:

action in accordance with laws, and even so to be an end in itself, and set ends for oneself, is nothing other than a certain identity of the rules of desire. In any case, this relates itself to the transcendental self-consciousness, to the I, and at the same time thereby, along with this [transcendental self-consciousness, it] can just as well change from one transcendental substrate to the other, and so be a property that is passed on. (*KGA* I.1, 545)

Schleiermacher's argument is that "action in accordance with laws" does not presuppose the identity of a noumenal, substantial self that remains identical throughout its changes. For the possibility exists that the practical imperatives structuring desire are passed along baton-like, along with the transcendental unity of consciousness itself. In such a case, one need not presuppose the identity of a *subject* that acts in accordance with laws; rather all that is needed is the preservation of the identity of the rules themselves, along with the functional identity of the transcendental I. Schleiermacher does

concede that “self-consciousness in the production of a representation, unity of self-consciousness in the production of a series of representations, and . . . identity of the rules of desire” are necessary conditions of moral personhood. They are not, however, *sufficient* to establish that the self is a transcendently free noumenal subject. While Schleiermacher notes that for Kant “we stand in the intelligible world for the sake of the moral law” (*KGA* I.1, 545) his own view in *Spinozism* is that no element of our phenomenal experience, including that of morality itself, requires us to posit that there are substantial, noumenal selves.

Kant’s considered view was that it is our moral experience that leads us to conclude that we are transcendently free and members of an intelligible world. The moral law confronts us as a fact of reason. While as late as 1785 Kant is still trying to ground moral insight in the spontaneity of theoretical reason,<sup>23</sup> his mature view in the *Critique of Practical Reason* recognizes such attempts as futile;<sup>24</sup> he then posits moral insight as a fact of reason.<sup>25</sup> Moral insight

<sup>23</sup> In the *Groundwork* Kant argues “one cannot possibly think a reason that, in its own consciousness, would receive steering from elsewhere in regard to its judgments; for then the subject would ascribe the determination of its power of judgment not to its reason but to an impulse.” Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 65 (4: 449).

<sup>24</sup> For instance, in *Reflexion* 5442, Kant distinguishes between what he calls “logical freedom” and “transcendental freedom.” He notes, “Logical freedom can be found in rational acts, but not transcendental freedom.” Karl Ameriks argues that by the time Kant produced the second edition of the first *Critique* in 1787, he had come to doubt the argument that the cogito can establish transcendental freedom. He notes that in the “general note” with which Kant concludes the revised section of the Paralogisms, “he brings under critique the idea that dominates the arguments of all the moral texts we have analyzed, namely, the spontaneity of thought. Kant does not deny that thinking exhibits a ‘pure spontaneity,’ but now he emphasizes that this represents merely a ‘logical function’ and that although it ‘does not exhibit the subject of consciousness as appearance,’ it also does not ‘represent myself to myself as I am in myself’ (B428).” Karl Ameriks, “Kant’s Deduction of Freedom and Morality,” 71.

<sup>25</sup> For an in-depth discussion of the differences in Kant’s views as presented in *Groundwork III* and the second *Critique*, see Ameriks, “Kant’s Deduction of Freedom and Morality,” 45–65. Ameriks notes that in the *Groundwork*, “the assertion of our freedom seemed to be based on the assertion of morality, which in turn rested on an appeal to freedom. Now instead of the last step, which does involve a circular grounding, no step at all and so no theoretical grounding is offered. In the place of ambitious but understandable attempts at a strict deduction Kant has fallen back into the invocation of an alleged a priori fact of practical reason” 66. See also Karl Ameriks,



consists not only in rationally determining what the moral law is, but also in the fact that the moral law confronts us as a *demand*. As Henrich has put it, the moral law is “not an arbitrary matter of fact.” Rather, it must be “originally affirmed” by us, since to say that something is good is also to accept it “in its being.”<sup>26</sup> This grounds Kant’s understanding of positive freedom, that is, the moral law can function as an incentive to action. This means that our fundamental commitment to morality has consequences for our ontological commitments. Morality cannot be grounded in theoretical or speculative thought. Rather, our theoretical reflections must be informed by our moral commitments. For the mature Kant, it is the fact that morality confronts us in this way that leads us to posit our transcendental freedom and the idea that we are members of an intelligible world. Our affirmation of the absolute value of the moral law as the standard of action cannot simply be taken as one empirically conditioned desire among others. It is through *reason* that we recognize its unconditioned character and validity. But as I argued in Chapter 1, the recognition of such an unconditional demand and its capacity to influence us also implied, for Kant, transcendental freedom and the causality of reason. And since the category of substance and freedom mutually imply one another, this has the implication that we must think of ourselves as intelligible substances.

By the time that Schleiermacher writes the *Monologen* in 1800 we find that a major reversal has taken place in his thought. Instead of the monism he defends in Spinoza essays, he affirms a qualified monadic individualism. This reversal is ultimately informed by some of the same ethical concerns driving Kant’s philosophy, although in Schleiermacher the problems and their solutions will be developed quite differently. But it is important to recognize that Schleiermacher does not so much repudiate Kant’s thought as move beyond him. His own achievements in ethics, which are quite significant, would have been impossible without his predecessor.

*Kant’s Theory of Mind*, in particular chapter VI, “Independence.” Cf. Henrich, “The Concept of Moral Insight,” 55–87, especially 82.

<sup>26</sup> Dieter Henrich, “The Concept of Moral Insight,” 61.