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MOSCOW AND ARMS CONTROL: EVIDENCE
FROM THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE

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I. THE SETTING¹

"The atomic bomb does not adhere to the class principle-- it destroys everybody within the range of its devastating force." With these words the Soviet Communist Party statement of July 14, 1963 attempted to epitomize the differences in its outlook and the views of Peking on central issues of war and peace. Both parties to the Sino-Soviet polemic have engaged in distortion and exaggeration,² but their dispute has thrown considerable new light on the zigs and zags of Soviet and Chinese policy over the past decade. The present essay seeks to sift the polemic for evidence on one bone of contention: Soviet policy on nuclear proliferation and, more generally, on arms control and East-West détente. The nodule points in 1957, 1959, and 1962 will receive particular attention. The basic approach will be to weigh evidence from the Sino-Soviet polemic against the record of Soviet disarmament diplomacy with the West and other information regarding military and political relations between Moscow and Peking.

The basic question we seek to answer is: What was China's impact on Soviet policy toward arms control? First we must

¹ The author wishes to express his thanks for suggestions and support to Dr. William E. Griffith and the International Communism Project at M.I.T.

² For example, China's alleged indifference--according to Moscow--to a nuclear holocaust or Peking's charges regarding Soviet "pacifism." See Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "The Sino-Soviet Dispute--Dogma and Dialectics on Disarmament," International Affairs (London), Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 1965), pp. 204-222.

summarize the main characteristics of that policy and the role played by factors other than the position of Russia's fraternal ally to the east.³ The Kremlin's position on arms control seems to have passed through three major stages in the past decade: first, from 1955 to 1960, a trend toward greater realism and feasibility, manifested, e.g., by increasing interest in partial measures like a nuclear test ban; second, from 1960 to 1962, ambivalence and recalcitrance, exemplified by obstructionist tactics in negotiations and by the decisions to resume nuclear testing in 1961 and send missiles to Cuba in 1962; third, from 1962 to Khrushchev's fall in 1964, intensified interest in agreements on specific arms control measures. Stabilizing the East-West military environment by means of arms control became a salient goal of Soviet strategy even while anti-Western propaganda and propagation of general and complete disarmament remained as tactics to buttress Moscow's position in the ranks of international communism.

The continuities and the changes in Soviet arms control policy seem to have reflected foremost the constants and variables in the East-West military balance of power. A second key factor was Khrushchev's calculation (except perhaps from the 1960 Paris Summit Conference until after the Cuban missile crisis)

³ See Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Franklyn Griffiths, Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament: The Decade Under Khrushchev, 1954-1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, M.I.T., mimeo., 1965); see also Walter C. Clemens, Jr., Soviet Disarmament Policy, 1917-1963:

that peaceful coexistence on his terms was feasible with the moderate governments in the West. Domestic politics and economic factors provided both goads and limits to Soviet policies on arms control, but they seemed generally to play a role subordinate to exogenous forces.

Within this framework what was the role of China?

There is little evidence that China played any significant role in the decisions which brought on the shift in Soviet arms control policy in 1954-1955. But as early as February 1956 and certainly by the second half of 1957 the state of Sino-Soviet relations became a key determinant of the twists and turns of Soviet foreign policy generally and, increasingly, toward arms control in particular. There was virtually a steady deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, precisely in those areas which would most affect arms control policy, most prominently characterized by steadily mounting Chinese opposition to Soviet détente and disarmament policy.

The inducements toward accommodation with the West resulting from the Chinese political and--in the long run--potential military threat seems to have been much more decisive than the restraints which flowed from Moscow's interest in keeping its most powerful ally within the fold.

An Annotated Bibliography of Soviet and Western Sources (Stanford, Calif.: The Hoover Institution, 1965).

II. THE "NEW TECHNOLOGY" PACT, 1957-1959

The Chinese date the downturn of Sino-Soviet relations from the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, while Moscow initially dated it from the Chinese ideological attacks of April and June 1960 but then traced it to 1958, presumably to disagreements over China's "Great Leap Forward" program.⁴ One Western analyst sees the dispute as virtually irreparable after the summer of 1959 (subject, however, to a shift of leadership).⁵ In any event, Moscow appears after 1959 to have decided to run whatever risks would be involved in pursuing its own course toward the West regardless of Chinese opposition. Although there were moments of lessened hostility, divergent power political interests, ideological differences, and personal frictions moved Sino-Soviet relations almost inexorably toward an open rift.

According to Peking Moscow had been "correct" until 1956 in calling for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, and China supported this view. But at the Twentieth Congress

⁴ The 1958 date was cited in Mikhail A. Suslov's secret address on February 14, 1964, which was published only in April 1964. "Struggle of the CPSU for the Unity of the World Communist Movement," Soviet Documents, Vol. II, No. 16 (April 20, 1964), p. 43. A subsequent Soviet statement indicated serious differences with China over Outer Mongolia as early as Khrushchev's 1954 trip to Peking. See "Concerning Mao Tse-tung's Talk with a Group of Japanese Socialists," Pravda, September 2, 1964, p. 2.

⁵ William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 18 and 29.

Khrushchev had stated that Russia would stop testing if other nuclear powers followed suit and stressed that implementation of "such measures could pave the way of agreement on other more intricate aspects of disarmament." (At the U.N. Disarmament Commission Subcommittee on March 27, 1956 Khrushchev's lead was followed by Gromyko's proposal for a hydrogen bomb test ban as a partial measure which could be implemented without inspection.) In Chinese eyes Khrushchev "divorced the cessation of nuclear tests from the question of disarmament. Subsequently the CPSU leaders were wrong on certain issues and correct on others, and we supported them in all their correct views."⁶ It is possible that objections to the ideological revisionism of Khrushchev were probably more muted in 1956 than Peking later suggested. But there can be little doubt that the Chinese leadership was dismayed at other aspects of Khrushchev's policies, especially the vigor of the Soviet Union's economic and political march into the third world, including Nehru's India, since it infringed on territory Peking staked out for Chinese influence even before the Bandung Conference. Further, as noted above, Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev disagreed as early as 1954 over the status of Outer Mongolia.⁷

⁶ Chinese statement of August 15, 1963, Document 7 in ibid., pp. 340-353, at p. 352.

⁷ See note 4. Another indication that all was not well between Moscow and Peking derives from the pattern of their trade balance, which altered in 1955-1956 so that Chinese exports to Russia thereafter exceeded imports from the Soviet Union. See note 29.

Despite this early evidence of a Soviet interest in stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the Chinese leadership decided in 1956 to depend on a transitional military strategy that required heavy reliance on the Soviet Union.⁸ Chinese hopes for Soviet nuclear assistance may have been fanned by Moscow's 1955 plan for sharing Soviet experience in the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the Communist bloc. By mid-1957 ten Chinese scientists were engaged in research in high-energy physics at the Joint Institute in Dubna. A research reactor and cyclotron, which the Soviet Union promised China in 1955, finally began operation in September 1958.⁹

The strengthening of Khrushchev's personal position and the intensified Soviet commitment to Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line which followed the removal of the "antiparty group" in 1957¹⁰ took place at the same time that the Soviet Union demonstrated its new military might by the successful launching of an ICBM in August and Sputnik I in October 1957. These dramatic

⁸ Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), Chapter 2.

⁹ Anne M. Jonas, "The Soviet Union and the Atom: Peaceful Sharing, 1954-1958" (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, RM-2290, November 20, 1958), p. 88.

¹⁰ See the "Resolution of the Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee.--On the Anti-Party Group of G. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich and V. M. Molotov," Pravda, July 4, 1957, pp. 1-2; CDSP, Vol. IX, No. 23 (July 17, 1957), pp. 5-7; see also, "For a Leninist Peace Policy," International Affairs, No. 7, 1957, pp. 5-10.

feats suggested to Peking that the time had come for a more forward political strategy by the Communist camp; it turned out that Peking drew more radical conclusions from these successes than Moscow. For Mao Tse-tung the ICBM test meant that the balance of forces now favored in an absolute sense the Communist camp: the East wind was prevailing over the West wind. Soviet statements, on the other hand, averred only that the balance had shifted relatively to favor the Communist bloc. The evidence suggested that Mao, convinced that the over-all strength of socialism outweighed that of imperialism, believed the bloc "could now pursue a policy of 'brinkmanship' in selected areas under the cover of the Soviet nuclear shield."¹¹ Thus it was hardly accidental that Soviet spokesmen began in the fall of 1957 to warn of the dangers of broad escalation from local military conflicts.

At the same time, Peking may have been encouraged at least temporarily to exercise restraint in its relations with Moscow because of a Soviet commitment that, Peking later implied, bound Moscow to help China develop nuclear weapons. The primary source is a Chinese statement of August 15, 1963:

As far back as June 20, 1959, when there was not yet the slightest sign of a treaty on stopping nuclear tests, the Soviet Government unilaterally tore up the agreement on new technology for national defense concluded between China and the Soviet Union

¹¹ Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 168; Hsieh, op. cit., p. 85; see also Harold P. Ford, "Modern Weapons and the Sino-Soviet Estrangement," The China Quarterly, No. 18 (April-June 1964), pp. 161-162.

on October 15, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. This was done as a presentation gift at the time the Soviet leader went to the United States for talks with Eisenhower in September.¹²

Several fascinating questions arise from this revelation, throwing doubt on its precision but probably not on its general importance as an indication of a major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations in 1959. First, the date on which the treaty was supposedly signed preceded by three days, as we shall see, the arrival of a Chinese military group in Moscow. It is not excluded, of course, that there may have been initiated by plenipotentiaries on October 15 some protocol that served as the basis for subsequent negotiations. Second, since the Chinese statement does not indicate the precise nature of the 1957 agreement except to state that it concerned national defense, it is not necessarily true, as some have concluded, that "Moscow promised to furnish Peking one or several samples of the Russian A-bomb and to supply scientific information to help with the construction of a bomb."¹³ The eventual Soviet refusal to provide a sample bomb may have violated the spirit but not necessarily the letter of the October 1957 agreement. Third, one wonders why Khrushchev would make far-reaching concessions to China in

¹² Document 7 in Griffith, op. cit., pp. 340-353, at p. 351.

¹³ See Robert Guillain's article, "Ten Years of Secrecy," written for Le Monde, but appearing also in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1965, p. 24.

late 1957, after his successful ouster of the antiparty group and Zhukov, the recent displays of Soviet rocket power, and the diminution of ferment in the "people's democracies." The answer may be that Khrushchev still needed China's support, for Gomulka and other East European leaders came to the November 1957 Moscow conference intent upon pursuing their polycentric ways. To their surprise they found that Mao Tse-tung had already aligned with Khrushchev and that the Chinese leader personally championed the formula "the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union."¹⁴ This gesture may have been as much anti-Yugoslav as it was pro-Soviet, but Khrushchev benefited greatly and may have paid a high price, perhaps the defense technology pact.

The accuracy of the Chinese statements about the 1957-1959 pact has not been specifically challenged or confirmed by Moscow, although the Kremlin has indicated that it did refuse sample atomic bombs to Peking. Further, the Soviets have accused China not only of "making public classified documents and information relating to the defenses of the countries of the socialist community, and, what is more, of presenting the facts tendentiously, in a distorted light."¹⁵

¹⁴ For the November 1957 Moscow meeting, see Griffith, op. cit., pp. 17, 396-398, 415-417, 445, and, more recently, Suslov in Pravda, April 3, 1964, and "The Proletarian Revolution and Khrushchev's Revisionism--Comment on the Open Letter of the CPSU (VIII)," Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i, March 31, 1964, and Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 14 (April 3, 1964), pp. 5-23.

¹⁵ Soviet statement of August 21, 1963, Document 8 in Griffith, op. cit., pp. 354-370, at p. 365.

What we do know is that a large delegation of Chinese scientists headed by the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences was in the Soviet Union from October 18, 1957 (three days after the pact is supposed to have been signed) to January 18, 1958 and that during this period agreement was reached for joint Soviet-Chinese scientific research in 1958-1962 on 122 different items. Later reports indicated that the key fields in this research would be physics and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.¹⁶

A hint that military matters were also involved in these negotiations came on November 6, 1957, when a high-level Chinese mission left for Moscow without prior publicity. Mao Tse-tung, as noted above, was also in Moscow in November for discussions with Khrushchev prior to the Party Conference. However, the different emphases in speeches by Defense Ministers P'eng Teh-huai and Malinovsky on November 27, 1957--after the "Moscow Declaration" of the Conference--suggested that the Kremlin had not yet committed itself to providing nuclear weapons to China.¹⁷

This latter interpretation gained support from a sudden reversal in the trend of Chinese military doctrine in 1958,

¹⁶ Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 100-101. A delegation of the Supreme Soviet had been in Peking at the time of the alleged agreement of October 15, 1957, but was probably too low-ranking to have signed an obligation of this nature. See Alice L. Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June 1964), p. 111.

¹⁷ Hsieh, op. cit., p. 102.

strongly implying a Soviet refusal to satisfy fully China's nuclear aspirations. A military training program promulgated by Peking in January 1958 indicated an expectation that China would receive modern weapons from Russia. It stressed the importance of incorporating "Soviet advanced experience" in the "development of modern military techniques and military science" and of coordinating "various branches of the Army in combat under the modern conditions of atom bombs, chemical warfare and guided missiles" But after an interim period in which the new program was not approved or even heard of again a new strategic line was proclaimed in mid-1958 that turned the January program on its head. "Dogmatism" in the blind reliance on foreign experience, experts, and textbooks was condemned. Slavish reliance on the Soviet Union (by name) was said to have a harmful effect on China's military modernization. Man--not technology--was termed the decisive factor in modern war. A series of official statements in early and mid-August 1958 made the point that China should not and could not rely on outside military aid, but ought to carry out its own research in the newest technology, even while mobilizing the masses. The validity of Mao Tse-tung's strategic ideas from the 1930's was reaffirmed for the contemporary era as the "Great Leap Forward" endeavored to establish a national militia organized in communes.¹⁸

¹⁸ Ford, loc. cit., pp. 161-165; see also Ralph L. Powell, "Everyone a Soldier: The Communist Chinese Militia," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 1 (October 1960), pp. 100-111. Peking's

While this stress on the need for self-reliance suggested a lack of confidence in Soviet aid, Chinese spokesmen in May 1958 nevertheless gave the first public indication that their country planned to produce nuclear weapons.¹⁹ Their announcements could have been geared to the commencement of operation in September 1958 by the nuclear reactor promised to China in 1955, although the process by which this reactor built up the requisite plutonium stockpiles would be lengthy, taking at least five years, and would require a Russian blank check to use irradiated fuel rods for that purpose.²⁰ It is perhaps more likely that the announcements, if meant as realistic predictions, were based on some new Soviet aid commitment in late 1957 or early 1958. It might have taken the form of an outright transfer of nuclear weapons, stationing of Soviet weapons to China under joint control, or the initiating (or intensification) of Soviet scientific and technological assistance to China's nuclear weapons program.

continued infatuation with the militia is suggested by the publication in China's leading newspapers on January 4, 1964 of a new poem by Mao Tse-tung, entitled "Inscription for the Portrait of a Militia Woman," Peking Review, Vol. VII, No. 2, (January 10, 1964), p. 3.

¹⁹ Klaus Mehnert, Peking and Moscow (New York: Putnam's, 1963), p. 436; Ciro E. Zoppo, "The Test Ban: A Study in Arms Control Negotiation" (unpub. Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1963), pp. 379-380.

²⁰ Arnold Kramish, "The Chinese People's Republic and the Bomb" (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, P-1950, March 23, 1960), p. 5. For a list of monographs and periodical and newspaper articles in the English language on atomic energy research and technology in Mainland China, see "Nuclear Research and Technology in Communist China," External Research Paper 39, U.S. Department of State, July 1963. 7p

The first possibility seems unlikely in view of Moscow's consistent interest in containing Chinese policies, especially those that could lead to escalation. There were signs that Soviet and Chinese views toward "limited war" began to diverge at this time, particularly in the Quemoy crisis of 1958, when Moscow refused to back China in its perilous moves.

The second alternative was hinted at by Khrushchev in his talk with Averell Harriman on June 23, 1959, but the Soviet Premier spoke only of rockets being shipped to China, not nuclear warheads, and he did not specify that rockets had been put in China's hands. Subsequently, in September 1961, Khrushchev told C. L. Sulzburger of The New York Times that no nuclear warheads or long-range missiles were stationed outside Soviet territory except "perhaps in East Germany." One informed speculation is that Khrushchev's remark to Harriman was designed to confuse U.S. planners and perhaps to offer a means of meeting Peking's demands on the strategic level.²¹ The Chinese charge in 1963 that Moscow refused in 1959 to provide a sample atomic bomb could corroborate the latter supposition.

In fact both of these possibilities seem to be scouted by the Chinese charge that "In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet

²¹ Hsieh, op. cit., pp. 164-166.

military control," but that "these unreasonable demands were rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese Government."²²

However, the third possibility--Soviet technical aid to China's indigenous atomic production--was most likely. Such a commitment could have been ambiguous, qualified, and long-term. It could have been tied to the 122-point scientific cooperation program agreed on in January 1958. Perhaps it was the failure of Moscow to "deliver" on this program that led to Chinese complaints and Moscow's eventual flat refusal to go further in assisting China's nuclear program.

According to President Johnson, Soviet assistance to China's nuclear program did not entirely cease until 1960, when Soviet

²² Chinese statement of September 6, 1963, Document 10 in Griffith, *op. cit.*, pp. 388-420, at p. 399. A causal tie between the rejection of these "demands" and Moscow's refusal in 1959 to give China a sample atom bomb is suggested by this same Chinese statement's allegation that the one event followed "not long" after the other. As to the nature of the 1958 "demands," Edward Crankshaw and Raymond L. Garthoff have suggested that Moscow may have proposed a joint naval command in the Pacific and integrated air defense arrangements. (Edward Crankshaw, "Sino-Soviet Rift Held Very Deep," *The Washington Post*, February 12, 1961; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 349 [September 1963], p. 87.) Going further, the Soviet proposals could conceivably have included a bid for Russian bases in China and joint Sino-Soviet control of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems on Chinese territory or even for close military cooperation across the board. (See Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," *loc. cit.*) A participant in the Moscow Conference in 1960 heard reports that Peking had earlier refused "the Soviet government permission to build a joint early warning radar station that would be used to defend Pacific waters, Chinese and Soviet, for mutual protection." (Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, "Recollections of the 1960 Conferences," *Political Affairs* [New York], Vol. XLIII, No. 11 [November 1963], p. 30.)

technicians withdrew "with the blueprints under their arms."²³
Taking into account the various ways of producing a nuclear device and the Atomic Energy Commission's analysis of Peking's atomic explosion in October 1964, scholars have concluded that the blast was probably made with enriched uranium from a gaseous diffusion plant probably constructed with Soviet aid.²⁴

The evidence pro and con summarized here is hardly complete, but it seems to throw doubt on the extent of the Soviet commitment in 1957 and the nature of Soviet aid to China's nuclear program from 1957 to 1959. It seems reasonable to conclude with Alice L. Hsieh--even after the 1964 Chinese explosion--that the 1957 agreement was probably "general in tone," making some provision for Soviet aid in the construction of facilities but leaving unspecified the nuclear technical data to be made available to China.²⁵ Whatever the extent and kind of aid, however,

²³ Speech of October 18, 1964, in The New York Times, October 19, 1964.

²⁴ Morton H. Halperin, China and the Bomb (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 75-80; David R. Inglis, "The Chinese Bombshell," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1965, pp. 19-21. Similarly, in May 1965, following the second Chinese nuclear explosion, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission expressed the judgment that the first two Chinese atomic devices had utilized uranium derived from a gaseous diffusion plant or other separation process and not, as some had supposed they would be, from enriched uranium or a reactor handed over by the Russians before 1960. See The New York Times, May 21, 1965, p. 7.

²⁵ Hsieh, "The Sino-Soviet Nuclear Dialogue: 1963," loc. cit., pp. 111-112. On the other hand Robert Guillain, writing for Le Monde, probably gives a too narrow estimate of Soviet aid when saying that the 1957 "agreement was probably implemented, at the

Soviet spokesmen have indicated privately their regrets that it took place at all.

It may be that contradictory developments in 1956 and 1957 served to make Moscow relatively amenable to Chinese influence and then to become more resistant by 1958. The Kremlin still needed Peking's assistance in bringing the Gomulkas, Kadars, and Togliattis into line at the 1957 Moscow Conference. For whatever reason, Mao proved himself more orthodox in November 1957 than the Moscow patriarchy in urging a vanguard role for the Soviet party in the world Communist movement. One factor in Mao's attitude may have been a Soviet commitment in October 1957 to aid China's nuclear program. For his part, however, Khrushchev had the Moscow Declaration's tribute to Soviet hegemony in his pocket as well as an improved domestic stance (Zhukov gone to join the antiparty group in oblivion) and international power position (the beginnings of the "missile gap" myth). From this base of general strength Khrushchev did not need to look kindly on the independent course manifested in China's more forward strategy toward imperialism and the Formosa regime and, domestically, in the economic and ideological innovations of the "Great Leap Forward" program. All these considerations would lead the Kremlin to caution in implementing whatever nuclear aid commitment it had made in 1957 either because Moscow still hoped to

very most, only by some scientific documentation and the residence of Chinese scientists in Russian atomic establishments." (Guillain, loc. cit., p. 24.)

tame the left deviation in Peking or because it feared an inexorable break with the colossus to the east. As noted earlier, Suslov had pointed to 1958 as the beginning year of the Sino-Soviet rift.²⁶

III. IDEOLOGICAL WARFARE, 1959-1962

The date of June 20, 1959 assigned by China to Moscow's refusal to provide a sample bomb is consonant with the Soviet stress at that time on nuclear-free zones to which Peking was responding coolly and with the hint to Harriman that Khrushchev may have sought to compensate Peking by placing Soviet rockets on Chinese soil, but without nuclear tips. The timing of the refusal is also consonant with the Soviet broadcast to North America on June 12 assailing the "Washington claim" that the test ban under negotiation could not be trusted because China would not be a signatory. The broadcast accused Washington of persisting in this refusal "in order to have an excuse for getting out of all kinds of international agreements."²⁷ The Chinese claim that Khrushchev "broke" the 1957 pact in June 1959 as a gift to Eisenhower is not so plausible. While the Kremlin was pushing for a summit meeting with the West at this time, the

²⁶ See note 4.

²⁷ Radio Moscow, International Service, June 14, 1959.

Khrushchev trip to the United States was not yet arranged. Further, it may be doubted that Moscow in 1959 would reveal so much about the Sino-Soviet rift and military relations to Washington as the 1963 Chinese accusation implies. But there is no doubt that Sino-Soviet relations were strained throughout 1959. The positions taken by the Twenty-first Soviet Party Congress in February appeared to rebuff Peking on two counts: first, with their stress on peaceful coexistence, and second, by claims that the Soviet Union was entering a period of the rapid building of the foundations of communism. More important, Soviet dissatisfaction with the leftward turn in Peking coincided with similar feelings by Defense Minister P'eng Teh-huai, and strong evidence suggests that Khrushchev backed P'eng in a challenge to Mao's authority (which was put down at the Lushan plenum in July and August 1959).²⁸ To make matters worse, the Soviet government declared its neutrality in the Chinese-Indian border clashes in September, and Khrushchev journeyed from Camp David and to Peking to campaign for a peaceful solution of the Formosan Straits problem.²⁹

²⁸ David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai," The China Quarterly, No. 8 (October-December 1961), pp. 63-76.

²⁹ See the Chinese statement of August 21, 1963, Document 9, in Griffith, op. cit., p. 382. The decisive importance of 1959 as a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations is suggested also by the pattern of trade: "From 1955 to 1956 the Chinese began to repay their debts by substantially increasing their deliveries, whereas the Soviets reduced their exports. . . . Soviet exports

Increasing Soviet concern over China's military pretensions was evident in the negotiations concerning a test ban and accession to it by fourth parties. During the 1957 negotiations in London Soviet representative Zorin once asserted that he could find no real reason why China should not accede to a treaty banning nuclear tests.³⁰ But soon after the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests began in 1958 Moscow seems to have revised this optimistic forecast. On December 4, 1958 Soviet delegate Tsarapkin objected to the Western position that the proposed test ban treaty being drafted should contain an article on accession of other parties, warning: "You wish to liberate a genie from a bottle whom you will not be able to put back in the bottle and keep under control." Tsarapkin in the preceding weeks had argued that the ban and control system should be limited to the three powers and that the moral and political force arising from their agreement would be adequate to prevent tests by other states. Shortly afterwards, on January 12, 1959,

to China thus declined markedly from 1956 through 1958, while Soviet-Indian trade jumped more than 500 per cent in 1956 and nearly doubled again by 1958. Similarly, the temporary upsurge of Soviet exports to China during 1959 and 1960 again coincided with a simultaneous slump in exports to India." Finally, after reaching its highest total volume in 1959, Sino-Soviet trade rapidly dwindled so that the turnover was less in 1962 than it had been in 1951. A more than 50 per cent decline in Soviet exports to China during 1961 was paralleled by a near doubling of exports to India. (Griffith, op. cit., pp. 233, 234.)

³⁰ United Nations, Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission, Verbatim Record, plenary session of July 12, 1957, p. 15.

he modified this position to the extent that a provision on accession was possible so long as the operation of the treaty with respect to the three original parties was not linked with the accession of other states.³¹

Following Moscow's declaration of its neutrality in the Sino-Indian border conflict of September 1959, and Khrushchev's fraternization with Eisenhower, the Chinese began increasingly to criticize Moscow's pursuit of East-West détente and disarmament. In February 1960 the magazine China Youth called disarmament an "impractical fantasy" since the imperialists would never disarm themselves. The Chinese observer at a Warsaw Pact conference in February insisted that since the United States wanted an arms race, "the struggle for general disarmament is a long-term complicated struggle between us and imperialism."³² In April 1960 came the Chinese broadside entitled "Long Live Leninism!" Imperialism had not changed since Lenin's day, it was asserted, and to attempt to negotiate disarmament or a relaxation of tensions was to mislead the people.³³

³¹ A. L. Hsieh, "The Chinese Genie: Peking's Role in the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations" (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND Corporation, P-2022, June 20, 1960), pp. 1-2.

³² NCNA English, Moscow, February 4, 1960 (SCMP 2194, February 11, 1960, pp. 42-46, at p. 44), cited in Zoppo, op. cit., p. 382.

³³ For text, see G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 82-112. The Kremlin replied almost immediately, when Otto Kuusinen told a Lenin anniversary meeting at the Moscow sports palace that those who opposed the CPSU's "creative development"

The U-2 incident seemed somewhat to vindicate the Chinese image of the West. But Moscow continued in the following months to uphold its view that some members of Western "ruling circles" took a sober and reasonable approach to East-West relations. Khrushchev now recalled Soviet specialists from China, sharply reduced Soviet trade with China, and reportedly tried to overthrow the Albanian leadership.

Following the attempted settlement at the 81-party meeting in Moscow in November 1960 there was an apparent lull in Sino-Soviet relations in 1961. This was shattered, however, at the Twenty-second CPSU Congress in October when Khrushchev denounced Albania, later breaking off diplomatic relations with Tirana. From March to September 1962 another outward lull seemed to prevail--a period of curious ambivalence in Soviet policy.

IV. NON-PROLIFERATION AND THE TEST BAN, 1962-1963

In late August 1962, according to Chinese sources, Moscow informed Peking of a decision to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons:

On August 25, 1962, two days before the United States and Britain put forward their draft treaty

of Leninism with respect to matters of war and peace were adopting a "dogmatic" position. He rejected the argument that minimized the significance of nuclear weapons on the ground that man, not technique, determined history. (Ibid., pp. 116-122.)

on the partial halting of nuclear tests, the Soviet Government notified China that U.S. Secretary of State Rusk had proposed an agreement stipulating that, firstly, the nuclear powers should undertake to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to non-nuclear countries, and that, secondly, the countries not in possession of nuclear weapons should undertake to refrain from manufacturing them, from seeking them from the nuclear powers or from accepting technical information concerning their manufacture. The Soviet Government gave an affirmative reply to this proposal of Rusk's.

The Chinese Government sent three memoranda to the Soviet Government, on September 3, 1962, October 20, 1962, and June 6, 1963, stating that it was a matter for the Soviet Government whether it committed itself to the United States to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons and technical information concerning their manufacture to China; but that the Chinese Government hoped the Soviet Government would not infringe on China's sovereign rights and act for China in assuming an obligation to refrain from manufacturing nuclear weapons. We solemnly stated that we would not tolerate the conclusion, in disregard of China's opposition, of any sort of treaty between the Soviet Government and the United States which aimed at depriving the Chinese people of their right to take steps to resist the nuclear threats of U.S. imperialism, and that we would issue statements to make our position known.³⁴

People's Daily charged on September 12, 1962 that the United States was obstructing the progress of the ENDC by demanding on-site inspections. But the article went on to indicate a deeper concern. The U.S.-U.K. statement on testing, said People's Daily, declared that the

treaty would make it easier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing

³⁴ Chinese statement of August 15, 1963, Document 7 in Griffith, op. cit., p. 351.

them. . . . The reason U.S. ruling circles are so interested in preventing what they call nuclear proliferation is not secret. . . . Washington is anxious to tie China's hands in developing nuclear weapons.

People's Daily went on to say that

only a complete ban on nuclear weapons and the unconditional destruction of all existing nuclear weapons can prevent a nuclear war. . . . The discontinuance of nuclear tests . . . should under no circumstances become a means by which the United States may achieve and maintain nuclear superiority.³⁵

Did Moscow--as Peking alleges--inform the Chinese leadership on August 25, 1962 that it would sign a nonproliferation agreement with the United States? Shortly before the Cuban missile crisis erupted Moscow shifted its position on two central arms control issues. First, on August 29 and September 3, 1962, after rejecting two alternative test ban proposals put forward by the United States on August 27, the Soviet delegate to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) announced his government's willingness to sign a three-environment test ban with a moratorium on underground testing "while continuing negotiations on the final prohibitions of such explosions." A similar proposal had been made by Moscow on November 28, 1961, but with the provision that inspection over the underground test moratorium could take place only in the context of a comprehensive disarmament

³⁵ NCNA English, Peking, September 12, 1962. (SCMP 2820, September 18, 1962, pp. 30-31.) This policy statement crowned a series of declarations on disarmament in which nuclear test cessation was generally made dependent on the banning of nuclear weapons. See Zoppo, op. cit., p. 385.

agreement. Moscow's position of August 29-September 3, 1962 seemed no longer to be contingent upon GDC measures being enacted, but Soviet representative Kuznetsov clouded the issue on September 5, 1962 by reiterating Moscow's support for its stand of November 28, 1961. In any event, the Western delegates rejected the new Soviet overture on principle because--after Soviet test resumption in 1961--the West would no longer consent to an unpoliced moratorium.³⁶ But the shift in Moscow's position on August 29, 1962 was described by Pravda on the following day as "opening the way to agreement" and was soon thereafter similarly featured by the Soviet publication New Times (Russian edition, September 8, 1962). On October 1, 1962 in Ashkhabad, Khrushchev reiterated Soviet willingness to sign an agreement on a partial test ban on the terms articulated by Mr. Kuznetsov.³⁷

The second shift in Moscow's position prior to Cuba took place during the general debate of the Seventeenth General Assembly. Foreign Minister Gromyko announced on September 21, 1962:

Taking account of the stand of the Western Powers the Soviet Government agrees that in the process of destroying vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons at the first stage exception be made for a strictly limited and agreed number of global inter-continental missiles, anti-missiles, and antiaircraft

³⁶ ENDC/PV.76, August 29, 1962, pp. 14-23; ENDC/PV.79, September 3, 1962, pp. 72 and 78-80. See also Verbatim Records of September 5, 1962.

³⁷ Pravda, October 2, 1962.

missiles of the ground-to-air type which would remain at the disposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States alone.³⁸

Ostensibly this concession was made to meet the Western demands for retention of a "nuclear umbrella" during the early stages of the disarmament program.³⁹ But the threat to Peking was manifest: only the two superpowers would retain the nuclear umbrella. (A year later Moscow extended the proposal to cover the third as well as the second stage of disarmament.)

The aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis to the "Moscow Treaty" on nuclear testing is a story of almost unrelieved deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations and of steady progress toward U.S.-Soviet détente generally and entente on arms control. President Kennedy's June 10, 1963 "Strategy of Peace" address announced that high-level talks on a nuclear test ban would commence shortly in Moscow. A dominant theme of the speech was "Common Interests of the United States and the Soviet Union."⁴⁰

³⁸ United Nations Document A/PV.1127, September 25, 1962, pp. 38-40.

³⁹ But during the brief third session of the ENDC in November and December Soviet spokesmen refused to clarify the Gromyko proposal until it was accepted "in principle" by the West. (ENDC/PV.83, November 26, 1962, p. 22.) Some elucidation took place on March 27, 1963 when the Soviet delegate spelled out for the first time that Moscow would permit inspection of the missile launch pads. (ENDC/PV.114, March 27, 1963, pp. 39-40.)

⁴⁰ For analysis, see the introduction to Toward a Strategy of Peace, edited by Walter C. Clemens, Jr. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

Khrushchev commented favorably on the address,⁴¹ but Peking termed it "Kennedy's Big Conspiracy."⁴² On June 14 came the Chinese "open letter" to the CPSU, in effect scuttling any hope that the Sino-Soviet talks scheduled to begin soon in Moscow could lead to any reconciliation.⁴³ The Soviet reply on July 14 gave a coup de grace to any prospect of rapprochement with Peking. Replying to Peking's criticism of Khrushchev's view "that the Kennedy government also displayed a certain reasonableness and a realistic approach in the course of the crisis around Cuba," the Soviet party letter asked rhetorically whether the Chinese "really think that all bourgeois governments lack all reason in everything they do."⁴⁴ The upshot was the collapse of the Sino-Soviet party negotiations and the quick movement by mutual compromise to the initialing of the limited nuclear test ban on July 25, 1963.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Pravda and Izvestiia printed the Kennedy address in full on June 13. Khrushchev's comments appeared in Pravda on June 15 and in Izvestiia on June 16, 1963. The First Secretary accepted "with pleasure the appeal for an improvement" in U.S.-Soviet relations, but criticized Kennedy's address for not coming to grips with what Khrushchev depicted as the basic problems of the cold war--the West's refusal to sign a German peace treaty, U.S. "occupation" of Taiwan, and other manifestations of U.S. aggression.

⁴² See Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 26 (June 28, 1963), pp. 12-14.

⁴³ Document 2 in Griffith, op. cit., pp. 259-288.

⁴⁴ Document 3 in ibid., pp. 289-325, at p. 303.

⁴⁵ The three-power negotiations began in Moscow on July 15. After the first day Moscow let its demand for a non-aggression

IV. DRANG NACH WESTEN

There is no doubt that Moscow's relations with China have been a factor of paramount importance in Soviet arms control and disarmament policy in the last decade, providing both restraints and inducements to Soviet moves toward accommodation with the West. The weight of the inducements resulting from the Chinese political and--in the long run--potential military threat seems to have been much more decisive than the restraints which flowed from Moscow's interest in keeping its most powerful ally within the fold.

If one were to plot the movement of the key factors in Sino-Soviet relations bearing upon arms control matters, five trends would emerge to support the above conclusion. One would see steadily increasing, first, Moscow's commitment to the theory and (to a lesser extent) the implementation of the peaceful co-existence doctrine as the basis for foreign policy; second, Chinese criticism of this ideological "revisionism" and cooperation

pact issue drop to the background, although it was clear that the final communiqué would have to make some mention of it. The negotiations thereafter were friendly and businesslike. The main problems were the withdrawal clause and the questions of depositories for the treaty. These were solved with relatively little difficulty, strong Soviet resistance to the former being overcome by a circumlocution. On July 25 the treaty was initialed and on August 5, 1963 it was signed.

Already on June 7, 1963 a Soviet publication noted that Secretary of State Rusk on May 29 had supported the proposal of a group of U.S. Senators for a partial ban as being in the interest of both countries. (New Times, No. 23, 1963, p. 32 Russian edition .)

with capitalism; third, Soviet concern over Chinese military actions in the Formosan Strait and India, combined with anxiety over frictions along the Sino-Soviet frontier and Chinese talk about unequal treaties of the nineteenth century; fourth, Soviet diplomatic moves to achieve a test ban and to propagate the idea of nuclear-free zones; fifth, Soviet economic and military moves to choke off China's ability to develop her own atomic military capacity.

Whereas there was diversity in the West that could be subjected to Soviet political manipulation, Peking presented to Soviet policy a monolithic front that generally opposed Khrushchev's efforts toward peaceful coexistence and arms control agreements with the West. That opposition ran squarely athwart Moscow's potent interest in maximizing its position of leadership in the international Communist movement, initially by keeping China within the Soviet camp and, as this failed, in keeping ahead of Peking both in the international Communist movement and in influencing the "gray zones." A third set of Soviet interests derived from the military desideratum of preventing Chinese moves that could involve Russia in a war, which in turn involved keeping China from acquiring nuclear weapons. Clearly, depending on the priority accorded to one or another of these basic interests, the effect of China could be either to restrain or accelerate Moscow's posture of accommodation with the West.

Moscow at first, from 1956 to 1959, endeavored to mollify Peking's political and military aspirations by adding tough

phrases to Communist pronouncements on East-West relations and by offering some assistance in developing nuclear strength. No doubt many Soviet party and military officials found their own reasons to oppose détente and arms control reinforced by the realization that such an orientation was alienating Peking. Even after 1959 a faint hope of rapprochement with China may have exerted some drag on Soviet policy if only because it added to other conservative pressures for restraint in moving toward coexistence.

As we have seen, however, as early as 1956 the Soviet Union took steps that could have been expected to grate on Peking's sensitivities. These feelings may have been assuaged in 1957 and 1958 by some Soviet assurances of aid to indigenous nuclear weapons development in China, but the Soviet Union appeared to stall on whatever was promised and finally refused flatly to deliver a bomb or technical data when requested. The propagation of a nuclear-free Far East was certainly a transparent device for putting unwelcome pressure on China to refrain from developing her own nuclear weapons. Moreover, even while the defense technology pact still existed, the Soviet Union made some of its most reasonable negotiating proposals on a test ban and disengagement. All of this implies that the pressures from the East did little to inhibit Moscow's arms control strategy; indeed, far from restraining the Kremlin's interest in negotiating a test ban, concern over China probably acted to overcome some reservations Moscow may have had about cutting off nuclear

testing at an unripe moment or under conditions requiring onerous inspection procedures.

The net effect of Soviet advocacy of GCD (general and complete disarmament), though in theory such proposals might appeal to China because of their implicit opportunities for propaganda of "exposure," served simply to stir up more virulent Chinese attacks against illusions about a "warless world" before the overthrow of capitalism.

Perhaps the main political use that disarmament policies came to serve in Moscow's relations with Peking was to counter the Chinese challenge to Soviet ideological "revisionism." Soviet disarmament policy was one source of Chinese displeasure. But Moscow tried to turn the issue around and use it against Peking by showing that it was incorrect to insist that Lenin's 1916 dicta on disarmament should guide Communist policy when capitalism no longer encircled socialism and when the atomic bomb did not respect the class principle.⁴⁶

The threat posed by China to Soviet strategic interests seems to have been of special concern to Moscow. In the short run China might involve Russia in a war with the West, or, at least, undermine Soviet efforts for *détente*, as in 1958-1959. In the long run there was the possibility of territorial disputes

⁴⁶ For a study based on documents released since 1959 of Lenin's changing views on the possibility and desirability of disarmament, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., "Lenin on Disarmament," Slavic Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 3 (September 1964), pp. 504-525.

and, more important, the prospect of great conventional and nuclear Chinese military power. Moscow tried to keep Peking militarily dependent upon a nuclear shield based in the Soviet Union, and, from 1957 to 1959, placated Chinese nuclear aspirations by some kinds of long-term aid in developing a new defense technology.

Both in propaganda and in practice Moscow opposed nuclear proliferation, especially to Germany or China.⁴⁷ In June 1959 Moscow seems to have flatly refused to provide a sample atomic bomb or technical data required to produce one. Moscow had earlier refused to give Mao carte blanche to risk escalation in the Formosa Strait, and in September 1959 declared Soviet neutrality in the first Sino-Indian border clashes. Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in the Far East and Moscow's espousal of peaceful coexistence as the highest form of international class struggle were both aimed in part, although with little prospect of success, at inhibiting China's military pretensions. There is reason to speculate, but as yet no firm evidence, that Khrushchev may have sought in 1962 or 1963 to impose with the

⁴⁷ In 1963 Moscow declared that "an increase in the number of socialist countries possessing nuclear weapons would immediately lead to a chain reaction in the imperialist camp. . . ." Peking was berated for its opposition to the nuclear test ban, which allegedly showed the Chinese leaders' "desire to acquire their own atom bomb at any cost." (Soviet statement of September 21, 1963, Document 12 in Griffith, op. cit., pp. 426-467, at pp. 434, 433.)

West a nonproliferation agreement upon China.

The net result of China's military and political threat was to push Moscow steadily westward, to increase its interest in arriving at a test ban and other agreements to impede proliferation, and to defend in ever stronger terms the thesis that "a world without arms is a world without war." By mid-1959 the die was cast as Moscow tried to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to China and to rebut forcefully its ideological critique. Even after the U-2 incident and the Paris Summit debacle in 1960 Moscow have no quarter to Chinese orthodoxy. At Bucharest in June and in Moscow later on in the year Khrushchev assailed dogmatic insistence that imperialism remained unchanged. The deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in late 1962 and the evident abandonment of Soviet hopes of mending the breach probably helped remove the last inhibitions in Moscow to moves toward détente and arms control with the West. The 1963 "Treaty of Moscow" was then used against Peking--even in propaganda to the "third world"--likening the Chinese opponents of the test ban to "madmen" such as Goldwater and Adenauer.

Whether the needs of Soviet state security and Moscow's role in the Communist movement could be effectively upheld against the Chinese threat by reliance on arms control and collaboration with the West was another matter. What arms controls would be effective--a test ban, a nonproliferation agreement, GCD with a "nuclear umbrella" for the superpowers? The more feasible arms

controls seemed also the less promising as ways of keeping China from membership in the nuclear club. Or should Moscow continue to fight a two-front struggle, hoping that Soviet military and economic prowess would deter the not-too-aggressive West and suffice for many years before the somewhat more aggressive Chinese became a great military power?

These were questions to which Moscow may not have given a firm answer. But the evidence suggests that the Chinese pressure goaded the Soviets increasingly toward attempts at arms controls and disarmament propaganda that would impede if not check the Chinese military and ideological challenge.

Chinese pressure probably added to Khrushchev's reasons for seeking tangible proof that a peaceful coexistence policy could pay off in mutually advantageous agreements with moderates in the West. The very necessity of having to defend his policies from Chinese criticism may have made Khrushchev more determined in his commitment to East-West détente, and what may have been a tentative probing tactic might, in the process of warding off Chinese attack, have become more of a broad strategy.⁴⁸

None of this is to imply that Moscow did not wish and prefer to keep China a member of a Soviet-dominated international

⁴⁸ A Soviet desire to keep China in the fold may on the other hand have spurred occasional Soviet attacks on Yugoslav "revisionism" in the period under review. But Moscow had additional concerns--excessive liberalism within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe--to motivate attacks on revisionism.

Communist movement. But if a choice had to be made, it appeared increasingly that Moscow would prefer to alienate China than to forgo opportunities for policy successes in the West--especially if such successes helped to keep China from obtaining nuclear weapons or if they served to undermine the "dogmatist" line on the unchanging nature of imperialism. Consciously or not, the Kremlin's sense of common interest with the governments of the industrialized and status quo nations of the West was no doubt deepened as the Weltanschauung and strategy favored by Peking parted from that of Moscow.