



**THE MIDDLE EAST, 1982:  
POLITICS,  
REVOLUTIONARY  
ISLAM, AND  
AMERICAN POLICY**

#2365

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THE MIDDLE EAST, 1982  
Politics, Revolutionary Islam, and American Policy

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## NOTE

The results of my other travels in 1981 in Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Far East may be found in my The Super-Powers and Regional Tensions. The USSR, the United States and Europe (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1981.)



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# I

## Politics

The Middle East<sup>1</sup> is the prime example of Murphy's Law: "If things can get worse, they will." It is also the most dangerous area of the world in terms of superpower relations, because allegiances and influence are so fluid, instability so endemic, and superpower interests so great.

The Middle East's intractability and instability have recently been demonstrated by the Soviet-Afghan and Iraqi-Iranian wars, the U.S.-Libyan crisis, the assassination of Sadat, the failure of the Saudi eight-point peace program at the abortive Fez Arab summit, and the recent unparalleled height of U.S.-Israeli tension. The mid-1981 cease-fire in the Lebanon seems increasingly precarious, endangered by the

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<sup>1</sup>This essay is primarily based on travels in Israel, Egypt, Sa'ūdī Arabia, Bahrein, Pakistan, and Jordan in August 1981. I am grateful to The Reader's Digest, of which I am a roving editor, and to its editor-in-chief, Edward T. Thompson, which sponsored the trip. For general surveys, see Roberto Aliboni (director of the Italian Istituto Affari Internazionali-IAI), "Sicherheitsprobleme im Nahen und Mittleren Osten--von innen gesehen," Europa Archiv, Oct. 10, 1981 (a condensed version of the original in Lo Spettatore Internazionale, vol. 16, no. 3, 1981); A.H. [Arnold Hottinger], "Polarisierung der arabischen Welt?," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Sept. 27/28, 1981 and "Die Zukunftsprobleme der Araber," ibid., Oct. 16, 1981; The Economist, Dec. 26, 1981, pp. 51-59; George S. Wise and Charles Issawi, Middle East Perspectives: The Next Twenty Years (Princeton, N.J.: Darwin Press, 1981). For the Gulf, see "Defending the Gulf," The Economist, June 6, 1981 and Hossein Amiersadeghi, ed., The Security of the Persian Gulf (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1981.)



renewed PLO artillery buildup on the Lebanese-Israeli border. Iran after Khumaynī is threatened by civil war and possibly even by superpower intervention. And one watershed is close indeed: will Israel evacuate the rest of the Sinai before April 26, 1982, and what will Egypt do thereafter?

The most immediate, but probably temporary good news in January 1982 was that the mid-1981 Lebanese cease-fire, imposed on Israel by the United States and bought from the PLO by Sa'ūdī Arabia, and the first even indirect Israeli-PLO agreement, was still holding. The second one was that Mubarek seemed to be consolidating his position in Egypt. The third, and perhaps the most important, was that it seemed likely that the Israelis would evacuate the rest of the Sinai and that a Sinai international peace-keeping force would be deployed, for the first time, with an American at the head and without United Nations involvement, and that it would have West European participation.

Even so, 1981 thus showed again how intractable the Arab-Israeli problem is, and how it still dominates the foreign policies of the antagonists. (The new American Administration's belief that it could organize an Arab-Israeli anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" was soon shown to be an illusion.)

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The mid-1981 cease-fire in the Lebanon<sup>2</sup> where popular sentiment for a restoration of genuine independence, especially vis-à-vis Syria, was growing, was imposed on Israel by the United States and bought from the PLO by Sa'udi Arabia. It was the first time that Israel had even indirectly negotiated and agreed with the PLO on anything.

Syria continues troubled by Sunni terrorism against Hāfiz al-Asad's minority Alawite regime. It has moved closer to the Soviet Union roughly parallel to, and related with, Iraq's move away from it. Asad's missiles in Zahle (in the Lebanese Bekā'a valley on the Beirut-Damascus road), have still not been removed, despite U.S. Ambassador Habib's efforts, and Syria still may become involved when, as is likely, the Lebanese cease-fire breaks down. (Indeed, one possible scenario thereafter would be an Israeli strike on Syria.) Finally, recently tension has developed between Syria and Arafat, due to the latter's natural desire not to be so dependent on the former.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1980); A.H. [Arnold Hottinger] from Beirut, "Umschichtung in Libanon," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Oct. 7, 1981; William W. Haddad, "Divided Lebanon," Current History, Jan. 1982.

<sup>3</sup>The essential recent article on Syrian politics is Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance," Middle East Journal, Summer 1981. Prof. Batatu is working on a book on Syrian politics, which bids fair to become as definitive as his The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, 1978.) See also Itamar Rabinovitch, "Full Circle -- Syrian Politics in the 1970s" in Wise and Issawi, Middle

Jordan continues prosperous and stable. It has become the closest Arab ally of Iraq and serves as its rear area for transportation and air flights, now that Basra is unusable.<sup>4</sup> Washington's continued pursuit of the Camp David process, its initial incorrect assumption that Jordan could be brought to join it, and its toleration of Begin's occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem led to a serious deterioration in Jordan's relations with the United States. King Husayn's November visit to Washington seemed to improve them somewhat again.<sup>5</sup>

Sa'udi Arabia also seems somewhat less unstable than a year ago and certainly more active in regional politics. It has in part overcome the shock of the 1979 Mecca rebellion, and its intelligence service is not so likely to be caught by surprise again. The 3000-strong royal family is more like a one-party system than a typical monarchy. Yet corruption continues to flourish and the continuing ban on political activity is bound to increase discontent, especially among western-educated youth. There may be one or more attempted coups in the next years. However, the country's size, its carefully built-in checks and balances between the army and the national guard, its lack of one capital city, and the great size of its royal family make a

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Eastern Perspectives, op. cit.; David Ottaway from Damascus, "Syria's Assad Gets Upper Hand," The Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1981; and Adeed Dawisha, Syria and the Lebanese Crisis (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1980.)

<sup>4</sup> Le Monde, Sept. 23, 1981, p. 3.

<sup>5</sup> The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 4, 1981, p. 6. See in general Aliboni, op. cit.; Adam Garfinkle, "Jordan and Arab Polarization," Current History, Jan. 1982.

successful coup unlikely in the near future.

Sa'udī Arabia's more active foreign policy<sup>6</sup> has occurred because enough time has passed for its leaders to recover from the Mecca incident and because the other Arab states were inactive. Without Sa'udī help the cease-fire in the Lebanon would not have occurred. The Sa'udī-led Gulf Cooperation Council, taking advantage of Iran's and Iraq's near-paralysis in foreign policy, is consolidating conservative Arab control of the Gulf and improving its security. The Sa'udīs have used the Islamic Council, which they control, to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In October 1981 they successfully imposed one price (\$34) on OPEC and agreed as a consequence to lower their production to 8.5 mbd. Sa'udī Crown Prince Fahd's recent eight-point Middle Eastern settlement plan, which for the first time implicitly recognized Israel's right to exist,<sup>7</sup> crashed primarily because of Syrian opposition at the Fez Arab summit. Even so, it marked a significant Sa'udī initiative and might well be renewed later. Pakistan seems likely to station an army unit in Sa'udī Arabia as an unacknowledged pretorian guard for the Sa'udī royal family.

Sa'udī Arabia needs and wants U.S. support for its security. But it believes that the unsolved Palestinian question also menaces its

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<sup>6</sup>I have profited from a seminar by M. Jean François-Poncet at the Harvard Center for European Studies on Nov. 4, 1981.

<sup>7</sup>The best analysis is by A.H. [Arnold Hottinger] in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Aug. 11, 1981, p. 1.

security. Kuwait and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, where many more Palestinians live than in Sa'ūdī Arabia, believe the same. Khumaynī seems to have discredited his revolution among some of their Shī'a, of which there are many, especially in Bahrein. Moreover, there is more Pakistani military personnel in some of the Sheikhdoms, relatively, than in Sa'ūdī Arabia. Finally, the Dhufar rebellion remains quiet in Oman. Yet the causes of Islamic fundamentalism exist in the Gulf as in Sa'ūdī Arabia, and the British presence in Oman remains overwhelming.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, South Yemen, aided by Libya and the Soviet Union, is actively supporting the North Yemeni National Democratic Front in its guerrilla war in the south of North Yemen.<sup>9</sup> The recent treaty among South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia, undoubtedly with Soviet blessing, indicated that such activity might well be stepped up in the future.

The fundamental cause of Sa'ūdī strains with Washington is the Sa'ūdī distrust of American leadership. Reagan's AWACS victory will prevent Sa'ūdī-American relations from worsening, but only progress on the Palestinian question will improve them decisively.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Conversations in Bahrein, August 1981; Adelbert Weinstein from Salalah, "Oman kann hart zuschlagen, wenn es angegriffen wird," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Oct. 27, 1981, and for excellent background, Navil M. Kaylani, "Politics and Religion in Umān: A Historical Overview," Journal of International Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 10, 1979, pp. 567-579. See also Mark Mallock Brown from Oman in The Economist, Aug. 11, 1979, p. 11.

<sup>9</sup> See James Adams in Sana'a in the London Sunday Times, Sept. 6, 1981, summarized in the Boston Sunday Globe, Sept. 13, 1981, p. 23.

<sup>10</sup> For background on Sa'ūdī Arabia, see Arnold Hottinger, "Does Saudi

Turkey's military regime has overcome the terrorism which threatened to tear the country apart and destroy Atatürk's pro-western, secularist heritage, of which the Turkish military have been the historic guardians. The military takeover in Turkey, although not democratic, is thus stabilizing and pro-western,<sup>11</sup> and a timetable has been announced for return to democratic rule.

In Afghanistan the Soviets have settled down to a long war, with no end in sight. The insurgents are more numerous and active than in 1980 and are reportedly receiving arms from abroad. The Soviets control little more than the major cities and the major roads only by day; the rebels dominate most of the rest of the country.<sup>12</sup>

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Arabia Face Revolution?," The New York Review of Books, June 28, 1979 and an important series of articles from Riyadh in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 12, 14, and 21, 1979; William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1981); and Bruce R. Kuniholm, "What the Soviets Really Want: A Primer for the Reagan Administration," Orbis, Spring 1981.

<sup>11</sup>See Andreas Kohlschlütter from Ankara, "'Noch sind die Menschen der Armee dankbar,'" Die Zeit, July 31, 1981; Arnold Hottinger, "Ohne Atatürk gäbe es keine Türkei," ibid., May 22, 1981; Paul B. Henze, "The Long Effort to Destabilize Turkey," The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7, 1981; "How sick a man?," The Economist, Sept. 21, 1981; James Brown, "Turkey's Policy in Flux," Current History, Jan. 1982.

<sup>12</sup>The best recent analysis (from Peshawar) is "Russia in Afghanistan," The Economist, May 23, 1981. See also Richard S. Newell, "International Responses to the Afghanistan Crisis," The World Today, May 1981; my "Super-power Relations after Afghanistan," Survival, July/Aug. 1980 and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Afghanistan and the Crisis in American Foreign Policy," ibid.; Carl Bernstein, "Arms for Afghanistan," The New Republic, July 18, 1981.

Pakistan's General Zia is less unpopular than in 1980. The economic situation is better, because of two good monsoons and the \$2 billion yearly remittances from Pakistanis working in the Gulf. The opposition has been discredited by the stay in Kabul of the two sons of its former leader, Bhutto, and their association with the hijacking of a Pakistani airplane, during which a Pakistani diplomat was killed. The intermittently rebellious tribes in Baluchistan remain quiet, and the Soviet invasion of, and preoccupation with, Afghanistan make unlikely a revival soon of the Baluch tribal insurgency of the early 1970s. The arrival of the Soviet army on Pakistan's Afghan border has also strengthened Zia's position. So has Washington's military and economic aid. Pakistan, like Prussia, is an army which possesses a state. Its army may change generals, but it is unlikely soon to surrender control of its state.<sup>13</sup>

The other peripheral areas of the Middle East seem no less stable, and some more so, than last year. In Algeria, President Chadli

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<sup>13</sup>For Pakistan, see several articles in The Economist, Oct. 31, 1981, including one by one of Bhutto's associates. See also Erwin Häckel, "Kernenergie und Kernwaffenverbreitung: der Fall Pakistan," Europa Archiv, May 25, 1981. I differ with Selig Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981.) I think the danger of renewed Baluch insurgency in the near future, and of actual Soviet intervention, overt or covert, less than he does. This having been said, however, the book is a mine of information and essential reading for any student of Pakistani and Baluch politics. It is especially valuable for its interviews with Baluch leaders and for chap. 6 on Iranian Baluchistan. I have also profited from Richard Frye, "Attitudes of Baluch Intellectuals," (unpub. MS.)

Benjedid has consolidated his power and moved further toward technocracy. Morocco's agreement to a plebiscite in the Western Sahara may foreshadow a compromise between it and the Libyan- and Algerian-supported Polisario guerrilla movement,<sup>14</sup> which has, however, recently had some military successes. Mengistu's Ethiopia is still tied down by the Eritrean rebellion but finds Moscow and Havana increasingly irrelevant to its nationalist and development objectives. Nor has Mengistu's signing a cooperation agreement with South Yemen and Libya led to a worsening of his improved relations with the Sudan, which in turn has restricted the activities of the Eritrean rebels in its territory. Somalia remains quiet.<sup>15</sup>

In Israel,<sup>16</sup> the reelection of Begin marked the victory, at

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<sup>14</sup>Robert Mortimer, "Algeria's New Sultan," Current History, Dec. 1981; Philippe Rondot, "Der Maghreb im Wandel," Europa Archiv, Nov. 25, 1981. Paul Balta from Rabat, "Le Maroc face aux échéances," Le Monde, Sept. 22, 1981 et seq.; Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Western Saharans (N.Y.: Barnes and Noble, 1980); William H. Lewis, "Western Sahara: Compromise or Conflict?," Current History, Dec. 1981; "Polisario Gains Worry Hassan," The Observer (London), Dec. 14, 1981, p. 14; A.H. [Arnold Hottinger], "Die Spannung zwischen dem Sudan und Libyen," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Oct. 8, 1981; and especially dispatches from the Polisario- and Moroccan-occupied parts in Le Monde, Dec. 17, 1981, p. 7.

<sup>15</sup>Paul B. Henze, "Communism and Ethiopia," Problems of Communism, May-June 1981; Udo Steinbach, "Spannungsherd Horn von Afrika. Ansätze zu einem neuen Pragmatismus in der Region," Europa Archiv, Apr. 25, 1981; Philippe Decraene from Mogadiscio, "Bruits de bottes en Somalie," Le Monde, August 5, 6, 1980.

<sup>16</sup>Bernard Avishai, "The Victory of the New Israel," The New York Review of Books, Aug. 13, 1981; Harold M. Waller, "Israel's Foreign Policy



least for some time to come, of a coalition of the chauvinist minority of the (European) Ashkenazi elite and the majority of (Oriental) Sephardi masses, who make up 60 percent of all Israelis. Two-thirds of the Sephardim voted for Begin and two-thirds of the Ashkenazim for his Alignment opponent Peres. The Sephardim are so pro-Begin because they have been discriminated against by the Labor Zionist Ashkenazi elite; they hate and fear the Arabs, from whose lands they came; and their religiosity is attracted by Begin's. Begin's vote was inversely proportional to newspaper readership and university education, but Israeli youth, including Ashkenazi ones, supported him the most strongly of all age groups. Begin's narrow victory made him make major new concessions to the chauvinist religious extremists. The Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, overwhelmingly popular in Israel, staked out Israel's claim to regional nuclear monopoly and will drive the Arabs even more to challenge it. However, the bloody Israeli air-raid on Beirut, much less popular in Israel, hurt Israeli-U.S. relations because U.S. television coverage of its results helped lead to Reagan's compelling Begin to accept the Lebanese cease-fire.

Begin has stepped up Israel's creeping annexationism on the West Bank. He is expanding the Israeli settlements there and

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Challenge," Current History, Jan. 1982. For a first-hand American account of Israeli policy on the West Bank, see "Iron Fist on the West Bank," Newsweek, Aug. 24, 1981.

setting up "village councils" of Arab collaborators to compete with the pro-PLO elected mayors,<sup>17</sup> and he has cut off development aid to the West Bank and Gaza from the Arab states.

Palestinian national consciousness, within and without the West Bank and Gaza, is increasing. The PLO's political victories and rising prestige, and those of the whole Arab world, plus the increasing isolation of Israel, increased PLO support among Palestinians, and the historically predictable cycle of repression, resistance, more repression, and more resistance, which has characterized the West Bank and Gaza, have increased it still further. The Israeli occupation has not been so severe, as occupations go, but it seems gradually to be becoming more so.<sup>18</sup>

Begin argues that the PLO is terrorist and a Soviet instrument and that a Palestinian state on the West Bank would therefore be a Soviet satellite. But other guerrilla fighters for independence,

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<sup>17</sup> See the revealing report by Shipler from Hebron in The New York Times, Jan. 10, 1982, p. 4E.

<sup>18</sup> My conclusions in these respects are primarily based upon yearly visits to the West Bank for the last decade. See also Ahmad J. Dhaher, "Changing Cultural Perspectives of the Palestinians," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Spring 1981; Avi Plascov, "A Homeland for the Palestinians?," Survival, Jan./Feb. 1978 and especially Ann Moseley Lesch, Political Perceptions of the Palestinians on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute Special Study, no. 3, 1980). I have also profited from seminars on the West Bank Palestinians by Dr. Muhammad Hallaj and Prof. Ian Lustick at Harvard on Nov. 12 and 19, respectively.

Algerians and Africans, have also used terrorist tactics, and during the Israeli independence struggle Begin himself was one of the most successful terrorist leaders of modern times. The PLO buys weapons from Moscow, for it cannot get them elsewhere, but few of its members are Marxist-Leninists. Its money comes from the conservative Arab oil states. A Palestinian state would be financially dependent upon them, hemmed in by Israel and Jordan, and thus unlikely to become pro-Soviet. If Arafat and his Fatah majority of the PLO were to agree to a settlement which would include recognition of Israel within its 1967 boundaries, the PLO's radical minority would probably split off, but they would hardly be able to wreck the settlement.

The recent flare-up in the Lebanon reached its height because for the first time, primarily through Libyan help, PLO artillery just outside Israel made the Israeli border settlements unlivable. (In one of them, Kiryat Shmona, 14 out of 17 thousand inhabitants fled under PLO artillery fire.) When Israeli bombardment failed to silence PLO fire, Begin ordered Beirut bombed.

The PLO won a political victory by Israel's acceptance of its indirect participation in the Lebanese cease-fire. It is now again building up its artillery in the southern Lebanon. Given the short duration of previous Middle Eastern cease-fires, plus this build-up, if the cease-fire is not rapidly extended and consolidated

it will probably collapse.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, the Israelis, shaken by AWACs victory and fearful that Reagan will go too far toward Fahd's 8-point peace policy, hope to get some U.S. reassurance by hinting that they might otherwise be forced again to invade the Lebanon to crush the PLO's artillery build-up there.<sup>20</sup>

Not that the other Arabs like the Palestinians: they do not. Many of them fear, with some reason, that they may radicalize the region. The Gulf oil states subsidize the PLO primarily to avoid this. But the Arabs fear the Israelis more, and more still after the Israeli raids on Baghdad and Beirut. Moreover, the domestic legitimacy of many Arab elites, endangered by the revival of Islamic fundamentalism, requires them to insist that Israel abandon unilateral sovereignty over East Jerusalem, the site of the third holiest shrine of Islam. This is especially true of the Sa'ūdī royal family, the titular guardians of the two main Islamic holy places, Mecca and Medina, and of the pre-Sa'ūdī Hashimite rulers of Mecca.

The story of recent developments in the Arab-Israeli conflict begins with Crown Prince Fahd's August 1981 announcement of his 8-

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<sup>19</sup> For an argument that this need not, and should not, occur and that limited Israeli-Syrian cooperation is possible and desirable, see Zvi Lanir, "Israel's Involvement in Lebanon: A Precedent for an 'Open' Game with Syria?," Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic Studies, no. 10, Apr. 1981.

<sup>20</sup> Karen Elliott House, "Fear that Cease-Fire in Lebanon May Fail Grows in Washington," The Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 1981.

point peace plan, in which point 7 spoke of the "right of states in the region to live in peace" -- i.e., the de facto recognition of the right of Israel to exist. (The Sa'ūdīs publicly back and fell on this point, to placate the radical Arabs, but the Fez summit demonstrated that this was its meaning.) Fahd's plan got little publicity at first but in the autumn the Sa'ūdī launched a major effort to get it adopted at the next Arab summit.

Begin was trying to implement the "strategic collaboration" with the United States, agreed with Reagan in September 1981, and also to ward off U.S. pressure on him in the Camp David negotiations. (He later said, and Washington did not deny, that the U.S. was trying to get him to allow the Arabs in East Jerusalem to vote in the Palestinian autonomy plebiscite provided for in the Camp David agreements.) He was also being pressured by his own right wing not to evacuate all of the Sinai, and felt that the U.S. was trying to get him to pull back to Israel's 1967 borders.

The Sa'ūdīs, meanwhile, were meeting opposition to Fahd's plan from the Rejection Front, including most of the PLO. Arafat was waffling, trying to avoid the double threat that confronted him: the loss of Sa'ūdī subsidies or of his majority in the PLO executive.

While this was going on, the vote on the sale of the AWACs to Sa'ūdī Arabia came up in the U.S. Senate. The Administration reportedly -- and naively -- had thought, or at least hoped, that Begin would lay off them on this issue in return for the agreement

on the "strategic consensus." But by the week before the vote, the pro-Israeli lobby in Congress (and the pro-Sa'ūdī one also) were working hard to influence the Senate. In the end, Reagan won by two votes. The net result was primarily that the initially strongly pro-Israeli feelings of Reagan's "California Mafia" were severely eroded and Begin's distrust of Washington greatly increased.

The next event, at the end of November, was the Arab summit at Fez. There Asad's opposition and Arafat's equivocation not only resulted in its abrupt and unprecedented adjournment after Fahd withdrew his plan. Those who rejoiced were, of course, Israel and the Rejection Front; those who lost the most were Sa'ūdī Arabia and the United States.<sup>21</sup>

The following week, on November 30, the American-Israeli "memorandum of understanding" was signed by Secretary Weinberger and Defense Minister Sharon in Washington. The agreement provided for joint maneuvers, stockpiling, and little else, and it was strictly limited, at American insistence, to "the threat to peace and security of the region caused by the Soviet Union . . ." and "not directed against any states within the region" (i.e. not against the Arabs.) However, the signing of the agreement was a further blow to the Sa'ūdīs (and the Egyptians) and helped the Rejection Front.

The United States and Israel were also arguing about the participation of four West European states, Great Britain, France, Italy,

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<sup>21</sup>See the very revealing report by Rouleau from Fez in Le Monde, Nov. 27, 1981.

and the Netherlands, in the Sinai peace-keeping force. The United States had wanted them to participate from the beginning, the more so because Australia seemed to be making it a condition for its participation. So had Egypt. Israel, initially in favor of it in the hope that it would tie the Europeans to the Camp David process, reversed its position when the EEC ministers welcomed Fahd's 8-point plan and insisted that the Europeans must formally accept the Palestinian autonomy provisions of the Camp David agreements. Because the Europeans, fearing that otherwise the Arabs would turn against them, had declared on November 23 that the solution of the Palestinian problem must be based on the principle of self-determination for the Palestinians and with the participation of the PLO, Begin declared that he would not accept European participation. Finally, Secretary Haig, in discussions with Foreign Minister Shamir in Washington compromised on a joint U.S.-Israeli declaration of December 3 that neither shared the Europeans' views on this subject or the EEC Declaration of Venice, which took the same position.<sup>22</sup>

Then, in mid-December, just after the declaration of martial law in Poland, Begin suddenly pushed through the Knesset a law extending Israeli "law, administration, and justice" to the Golan

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<sup>22</sup>Text: The New York Times, Dec. 4, 1981, p. 11; background: Cornu from Jerusalem in Le Monde, Dec. 5, 1981; The Economist, Oct. 31, 1981, p. 62; Dominique Moïsi, "L'Europe et le conflit israélo-arabe," Politique étrangère, Dec. 1980; Adam M. Garfinkle, "America and Europe in the Middle East: A New Coordination?," Orbis, Fall 1981;

Heights -- i.e. annexing it to Israel. The American reaction was swift and sharp: suspension of the "memorandum of understanding," of an annual \$200 million agreement for Israel to sell the U.S. services for the Sixth Fleet, and of the use of U.S. AID funds to help finance the Israeli defense industry. The U.S. also voted in favor of a Security Council resolution condemning the annexation. However, other U.S. military and budgetary aid was not cut back.

These measures triggered an unprecedented and extraordinary denunciation of the United States by Begin. He said that this was the third time that Israel had been "punished" by the United States which, given its conduct in World War II and Vietnam, had no right to condemn Israel's bombing of Beirut; he implied that the U.S. had informed Israel that Iraq was "about to produce atomic bombs"; and he declared that he considered that the U.S. had cancelled the "memorandum of understanding." He went on:

. . . What kind of talk is this, 'punishing Israel?'  
Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a banana republic?  
Are we 14-year olds who, if we misbehave, we get our  
wrists slapped?

And he concluded by suspecting the Administration of anti-Semitism:

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Harvey Sicherman, "Politics of Dependence: Western Europe and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *ibid.*, Winter 1980; Stephen J. Artner, "The Middle East: A Chance for Europe?," International Affairs (London), Summer 1980.



. . . Now I understand all this effort in the Senate to win a majority for the arms deal with Saudi Arabia, accompanied by an ugly anti-Semitic campaign. First we heard the slogan 'Begin or Reagan,' and then it followed that anyone who opposed the deal with Saudi Arabia supported a foreign head of state and was not loyal to the United States. . . .<sup>23</sup>

While the Administration's public reaction was remarkably mild, in the hope that U.S.-Israeli relations could be improved, its pro-Israeli sentiments were further greatly eroded.

Israel's dilemma was serious. On the one hand, it had to keep the autonomy negotiations going, in which the United States was a full participant, so that Washington and/or Cairo could not abandon Camp David and take up the Saudi peace plan -- to which Reagan, to Israel's fury, made several favorable references. On the other hand, Begin did not intend to make any major substantive concessions in the autonomy negotiations, for he was determined to annex the West Bank and keep East Jerusalem. The second Israeli dilemma was organically tied to the first: How could Jerusalem bring sufficient pressure and persuasion to bear in Washington to prevent its position deteriorating further without so antagonizing Washington, as it had over the AWACs issue, that the attempt itself would worsen Israel's

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<sup>23</sup>Quoted from The New York Times, Dec. 21, 1981, p. 20. See the excellent analysis by Shipler from Jerusalem in *ibid.*, Dec. 27, 1981, p. E3, and the speech by Foreign Minister Shamir in the Knesset, Dec. 23, 1981.

situation?

By November 1981 Begin had accomplished what one would hardly have thought possible: he had turned the most pro-Israeli administration which the United States had ever had into one at whose top the resentment at Israeli pressure over the AWACs issue had become so great that it moved even closer to Riyadh. It is difficult to see how Begin could have worsened more effectively the feelings of his unique and essential ally toward him and his policy.

Iran after Khumaynī is unpredictable. There the first Islamic theocratic revolution of our times, now based only on the lower and lower-middle classes, is devouring its young, the Mojahedin-e khalq,<sup>24</sup> and being killed by them. Khumaynī's increasingly bloody course, economic decline, political terror, and the inconclusive war with Iraq have antagonized the professional middle class, the westernized, liberal intelligentsia and the bazaar merchants. The Kurds are rebelling. Azerbaijan is disaffected. When Khumaynī goes, Iran may well turn to military rule. Or it may fall apart. Moscow might then try, although it probably will not, what it did in 1921 and 1941: to get control of Iranian Azerbaijan. Would the United States then occupy

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<sup>24</sup> See the more extensive treatment of them in part II, infra.

the oil fields of southern Iran?<sup>25</sup>

The war between Iraq and Iran seems less likely than it did earlier to endanger Gulf stability. Iran's loss of territory in it

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<sup>25</sup> Since my "The Revival of Islamic Fundamentalism: The Case of Iran," International Security, Summer 1979 (q.v., p. 137, fn. 6), I have found the following particularly illuminating on Iran: Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, "Secularization, Industrialization, and Khomeini's Islamic Republic," Political Science Quarterly, Summer 1979; W.R. Campbell and Djamchid Darvich, "Global Implications of the Islamic Revolution for the Status Quo in the Persian Gulf," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Fall 1981 (particularly for Khomeini's version of Shi'a); Eric Rouleau, "Khomeini's Iran," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1980 and his three series from Tehran in Le Monde, June 13, 1979 et seq., Jan. 6, 1981 et seq., and July 22, 1981 et seq.; Vahe Petrossian, "Dilemmas of the Iranian Revolution," The World Today, Jan. 1980; Arnold Hottinger, "Die Krise in Iran -- eine Folge des Geheimdienstregimes," Europa Archiv, Jan. 25, 1979 and "Die neue Taktik der Mujahedin in Teheran," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Sept. 23, 1981; L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "The Iranian revolution," International Journal (Toronto), Summer 1979; Majid Tehranian, "Iran: Communication, Alienation, Revolution," Intermedia (London), Mar. 1979; Andreas Kohlschütter, "Eine Sieg der islamischen Eiferer," Die Zeit, June 26, 1981; and especially James A. Bill, "The Politics of Extremism in Iran," Current History, Jan. 1982. Several books and collective volumes have appeared which throw much light on Iranian developments: Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: SUNY, 1980); Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim, eds., Toward a Modern Iran (London: Frank Cass, 1980) and especially valuable for Mangol Bayat-Philipp, "Shi'ism in Contemporary Iranian Politics: the Case of Ali Shari'ati"; Nikki R. Keddie, Iran: Politics, Religion and Society (London: Frank Cass, 1980) and "Iran: Change in Islam and Change," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 11 (1980).

and Khumaynī's bloody terror foiled his attempts to subvert Arab leaders. In late 1981, in contrast, an Iranian counter-offensive made some gains. The war is likely to last so long; it has so weakened Iran and Iraq; and the danger of its spreading, despite the recent Iranian air-raïd on Kuwait's oil facilities, has so declined that the Arab Gulf states can now breathe easier. But although Iraq has made some minor territorial gains, it cannot use its Gulf port of Basra, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (although not the Iranian or, for that matter, the Iraqi Army) has fought well. Moreover, Saddam Ḥusayn's ethnic and religious base is extremely small. Thus if the war drags on for many years, his position, now still firm, will be seriously endangered.<sup>26</sup>

In Libya, the recent U.S. shooting down of two Libyan air-planes over the Mediterranean showed the limits of Qadhḥafī's power

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<sup>26</sup>The above is largely based on a seminar given by Prof. Hanna Batatu at Harvard University on Oct. 29, 1981. I am also grateful to Prof. Batatu for many discussions on Iraq, Syria, and other Arab countries. For analyses of the current military situation as seen from the front, see Michel Bole-Richard from Hoveyzah (Iraqi-occupied Iranian Khuzistan) in Le Monde, July 25, 1981, p. 4, and Jean Gueyras, "L'Irak des grandes ambitions," *ibid.*, Sept. 20, 21-22, 1979 and "Un an de guerre dans le golfe," *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1981; Bruce Porter, "Soviet Arms and the Iraqi-Iranian Conflict," Radio Liberty Research, RL 382/80, Oct. 16, 1980; Philippe Rondot, "L'Irak: une puissance régionale en devenir," Politique étrangère, Sept. 1980 and "La guerre du Chatt al-Arab: Les raisons de l'Irak," *ibid.*, Dec. 1980; Arthur Campbell Turner, "Iraq: Pragmatic Radicalism in the Fertile Crescent," Current History, Jan. 1982; for recent Iranian victories, The Economist, Dec. 19, 1981, pp. 42-43.

but also pushed him toward the Soviet Union. The assassination of Sadat, his principal enemy in the Middle East, overjoyed him. Yet he remains, as he wants to be, an ally, not a satellite, of the Soviet Union. Algeria continues to try to prevent him moving closer to Moscow.<sup>27</sup>

He also suffered a defeat in Chad, which he had occupied since the end of 1980. In October 1981 the man whom he had brought to power there Goukouni Oueddei, tired of Libyan interference and supported by Mitterand, ordered the Libyan troops out. They left, to be replaced by a pan-African force, with arms and transport aid from France.

While the fully story of this development belongs to European and African rather than to Middle Eastern politics -- it demonstrated Mitterand's decision to play a substantial anti-Libyan role

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<sup>27</sup>The best analysis of Qadhdhāfi's policies is Arnold Hottinger, "L'expansionnisme libyen: Machrek, Maghreb et Afrique noir," Politique étrangère, Mar. 1981. See also John K. Cooley, "The Libyan Menace," Foreign Policy, Spring 1981; Eric Rouleau from Tripoli, "Le colonel Kadhafi s'oriente vers une alliance avec Moscou," Le Monde, Sept. 8, 1981; Allan Cowell from Tripoli, "Qaddafi's Dream of an Islamic Empire Seems a Mirage," The New York Times, Nov. 22, 1981; Conrad Kluhlein, Die politischen Ideen Mu'ammer al-Qaddafis (Ebenhausen/Isar: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP-AZ 2300, Aug. 1981); "Chad faces life without those Libyans," The Economist, Nov. 14, 1981, pp. 37-44; an interview with Qadhdhāfi by Oriana Fallaci in The New York Times Magazine Dec. 16, 1979; Ronald Bruce St. John, "Libya's Foreign and Domestic Policies," Current History, Dec. 1981.

in the continent and the desire of some African states, notably Nigeria, to do the same -- it had considerable implications for the Middle East. It marked a defeat for Libya and a victory for Egypt and for the Sudan (which had been sheltering Goukouni Ouedde<sup>4</sup>'s chief opponent, Hissène Habré, who has now cut back his guerrilla activities) which thereafter could feel less menaced by Libya, and indirectly for the United States, whose intense concentration on Libya seemed exaggerated to many observers.<sup>28</sup> However, violent student demonstrations in the Sudan demonstrate again the potential instability of Sudanese politics. The whole affair may well push Qadhdhāfī again toward the Middle East.

In Egypt Sadat was able to carry through his revolution in Egyptian foreign policy, beginning with his trip to Jerusalem, not only because of his own vision and charisma but also because of Egyptian size and military strength, because far more than any other Arab state Egypt is a historic state and nation, and because the other Arab states were so divided, inter alia on the Arab-Israeli dispute, and had no credible policy, either peace or war,

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<sup>28</sup> See the regular coverage and analyses in Le Monde; an analysis by Geoffrey Godsell in The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 3, 1981; René Lemarchand, "Chad: The Roots of Chaos," Current History, Dec. 1981; John O. Voll, "Reconciliation in the Sudan," ibid.; and A.H. [Arnold Hottinger] from Beirut, "Die Spannung zwischen dem Sudan und Libyen," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Oct. 8, 1981 and from Cairo "Äussere und innere Bedrängnisse des Sudans," ibid., Oct. 21, 1981 and "Entspannungssignale zwischen Libyen und Sudan?," ibid., Oct. 23, 1981.

with respect to it.<sup>29</sup> But Egypt's problems remain primarily economic, and Sadat's "open door" policy (infitah) increased the gap between rich and poor, his 1981 repression of almost all of the oppositional intelligentsia alienated them, and the stagnation of the Camp David process eroded his support still further.

Reports from Cairo<sup>30</sup> indicate that the plot by Islamic extremists against President Sadat was considerably more extensive than had originally been thought and that the riots shortly thereafter in Asyut were related to it. Several hundred officers and enlisted men have been arrested, as well as more than a thousand Muslim fundamentalists.

Mubarak has maintained Sadat's foreign policies and modified his domestic ones. He has changed Sadat's domestic policies considerably. He has pledged to decrease the gap between the rich and the poor, while keeping the infitah basically in effect. He has started trials for corruption against some important political figures. After his initial wave of arrests following upon Sadat's assassination, he has released some of the Nasserist and even Muslim Brotherhood leaders and he has made overtures to the various oppositional groups. In sum, Mubarak seems to be correcting the abuses of Sadat's

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<sup>29</sup>P.J. Vatikiotis, "Regional Politics," in Wise and Issawi, eds., Middle East Perspectives, op. cit., p. 35.

<sup>30</sup>E.g., Olfat M. El Tohamy in The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 29, 1981.

domestic policies and Sadat's own massive arrests just before he was assassinated, while keeping the basic thrust of Sadat's foreign policy in effect.

However, he may well eventually become cautious vis-à-vis Israel and try to move back somewhat toward the other Arab states. He has already stopped criticism of Sa<sup>u</sup>di Arabia in the Egyptian media. (Sadat reportedly often made more concessions than his advisors had recommended to Jerusalem and Washington, and was more overtly critical of the other Arab states.)

He may eventually cut back somewhat on, although almost surely not end, normalization with Israel; try more to influence Washington to press Israel harder on the Palestinian issue; and try to overcome Egypt's isolation in the Arab world by improving relations with the conservative Arab states, especially Sa<sup>u</sup>di Arabia. His long-range aim will be to recapture Egyptian leadership of the Arab world. Until April 1982, however, he will probably go very slowly in these directions in order to give no reason, or even excuse, to Israel not to evacuate the rest of the Sinai. And even thereafter he is very unlikely to abandon peace with Israel or alliance with the United States.

Soviet Middle Eastern policy since World War II quite naturally has sought minimally to prevent or at least to limit the area of local, regional, or extra-regional powers hostile to the Soviet Union and, maximally, to bring it under its own. It has therefore sought to



lower U.S. presence and influence, remove U.S. military bases, and establish its own. It has believed that it can and will profit from the radicalization and anti-westernism which modernization brings, especially vis-à-vis modernization's principal representative, the United States, and it has tried to make this profit irreversible.

More recently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its growing military power, and the American debacle in Iran and inactivity in the Horn and elsewhere have made the elites of the region perceive the Soviet Union as more capable, more motivated, and more successfully exploitative of its rising opportunities than in the past. Moreover, even the moderate Arabs, except for Egypt and its allies, continue to see the Soviet Union as a pro-Palestinian and therefore useful balance to U.S. support of Israel, and some want to restrain its hostile attitude toward them. For all these reasons, a tendency to be more forthcoming to Soviet overtures for increased contacts has appeared, notably in Kuwait and even in Saudi Arabia.

In sum, Soviet gains and American losses in the Middle East show that despite significant losses itself, most of all in Egypt, the Soviet Union has considerably more influence there than it did in 1950. Moscow may well, depending on regional opportunities and American policies, get more still. Certainly it will continue to try to do so.

Moscow has been aiding Qadhafī in his ventures in Chad and his support of the Polisario, and South Yemen in its support of the

NDF guerrilla struggle in North Yemen. The Soviets have probably been urging on Asad a policy which in any case he can do little else but follow: somewhere between defiance of, and concessions to, Israel. We do not know what the Soviet position has been on the rising tension between Asad and Arafat, but Moscow has presumably been urging both not to endorse Fahd's 8-point program, and Asad's opposition to it certainly pleased the Soviets.<sup>31</sup>

Moscow's greatest opportunity, of course, would be if Iran fell apart after Khomeini. Yet even if this were to occur -- and I think it unlikely -- the Soviets would probably be cautious about moving their forces into Azerbaijan, to say nothing of trying to

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<sup>31</sup>The two most useful essays on this subject that I have seen recently are Shahram Chubin, "Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East," International Security, Spring 1982 and (for historical background) Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "The Evolution of Soviet Strategy in the Middle East," Orbis, Summer 1980. See also Rubinstein, "The Soviet Presence in the Arab World," and O.M. Smolansky, "Soviet Policy in Iran and Afghanistan," Current History, Oct. 1981; Karen Dawisha, Soviet Foreign Policy towards Egypt (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1979) and "Soviet Decision-Making in the Middle East: The 1973 October War and the 1980 Gulf War," International Affairs (London), Winter 1980-1981; Rubinstein, "The USSR and Khomeini's Iran," ibid., Autumn 1981; Muriel Atkin, "The Kremlin and Khomeini," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1981 and a series of articles in Journal of International Affairs, Fall/Winter 1980/1981; Karen Dawisha, "Moscow Moves in the Direction of the Gulf -- So Near and Yet So Far"; Robert H. Donaldson, "The Soviet Union in South Asia: A Friend to Rely on?"; Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since the Invasion of Afghanistan"; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lessons." See also Galia Golan, The Soviet Union and the PLO (N.Y.: Praeger, 1980.)

march to the Persian Gulf.<sup>32</sup> Until then, Moscow is likely to continue its present policy of having the Tudeh support Khumayni, encourage Khumayni's anti-Americanism, and wait for better opportunities anon.

The Soviet situation in Afghanistan is no better, and quite possibly worse, than it was in 1980. Yet it would be wrong to anticipate that for that or any other reason Moscow will abandon its attempt to subdue Afghanistan. My impression is that they mean to fight it out if it takes all this decade. Moscow would of course like to get Pakistan to close its border, diminish if not end its relations with China and the United States, and become "Finlandized." But this remains a dream, despite the tendency in the PPP and elsewhere in Pakistan civilian society to try to improve relations with the Soviet Union. President Zia and, presumably, the other military leaders have chosen the other course. In late 1981, Moscow realistically could only hope to continue to cause Pakistan to limit its toleration of aid to the Afghan rebels and its ties with the West.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Joshua Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent," International Security, Fall 1981. For a balanced appraisal of Soviet (and American) policies in the Middle East, see Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Superpowers in the Arab World," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1981.

<sup>33</sup> David Willis from Islamabad, "Pakistan considers friendlier line toward Moscow," The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 9, 1981; conversations in Moscow, December 1981; and William E. Griffith, "The USSR and Pakistan," Problems of Communism, Jan.-Feb. 1982.

II

Revolutionary Islamic Fundamentalism

Revolts against western-style<sup>34</sup> modernization are not new, nor are fundamentalist religious revivals, in Islam or elsewhere. Usually, indeed, they are combined, as they were in the Taip'ing rebellion in China, the Ahmadiya in India and Pakistan, the Madhist movement in the Sudan, and the Babi movement in Iran. Nor do such revolts reject all aspects of the West: usually western technology is accepted but western morals and culture are rejected. Even in Japan, which most westerners think the epitome of Asian western-style modernization, the wounds of it remain, as one perceptive Japanese recently noted:

What is a nativist? He is a man who sticks to the perception of the world lost . . . . I have never lived in Japan when Japan was the whole world to the Japanese. But still I am sharing this nativist's sorrow. . . .

And in the West itself, what was the New Left, and what are the remaining flower children in urban and rural communes, the Hare Krishnas, the Jesus freaks, if not those who try to recover the sense of community which they have lost?

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<sup>34</sup>As contrasted to Japanese- or Soviet-style.

Nor is the current revival of Islamic fundamentalism<sup>35</sup> the only one going on. Protestant fundamentalism is certainly rising in the United States. But why, in Islam in general and the Arab world in particular, does the religious revival so menace the existing political structures? And why is a significant, albeit

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<sup>35</sup>I have found Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (N.Y.: Cambridge, 1981) the most profound and V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers (N.Y.: Knopf, 1981) the best at conveying atmosphere, especially when one adds to it the review of it by Ajami in The New York Times Book Review, Oct. 24, 1981. The best country-by-country survey is Mohammed Ayoob, The Politics of Islamic Reassertion (N.Y.: St. Martin's, 1981.) Fazlur Rahman, Islam (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966) is basic. I have also drawn on three articles by Prof. Saad Eddin Ibrahim of the American University in Cairo, "Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Dec. 1980, pp. 423-453; "An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat," prepared for the First International Seminar on the Islamic Alternative at the Institute of Arab Studies, Belmont, Mass., June 5-6, 1981; Nazih N.M. Ayubi, "The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, Dec. 1980; and A.H. [Arnold Hottinger], "Macht und Ohnmacht der 'egyptischen Fundamentalisten'," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Oct. 11-12, 1981 and "Universitäten als Nährboden der Revolte," ibid., Nov. 24, 1981; Gabriel Warburg, "The Challenge of Populist Islam in Egypt and the Sudan in the 1970s" in Wise and Issawi, eds., Middle East Perspectives, op. cit. For background on the Muslim Brotherhood, see Christina Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt (The Hague: Mouton for Hoover, 1964) and Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (London: Oxford, 1969). I have also profited from Bernard Lewis, "The Return of Islam," Commentary, Jan. 1976; R. Stephen Humphreys, "Islam and Political Values in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria," Middle East Journal, Winter 1979; R. Hrair Dekmejian, "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives," ibid., Winter 1980; Godfrey Jansen, Militant Islam (London: Pan, 1979); my "The Revival of Islamic Fundamentalism: The Case of Iran," International Security, Summer 1979; Jean-Pierre Péroncel-Hugoz (their former Cairo correspondent), "Egypte: le grand défi du rais," Le Monde, Oct. 6, 7, 8, 1981; also Thomas L. Friedman (from Cairo), "Rise of Military by Moslems Threatens the Stability of Egypt," The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1981; and

small, part of it so revolutionary, violence-oriented, and indeed often terrorist?

What follows, therefore, is an attempt to analyze several revolutionary, violence-oriented groups of Islamic fundamentalists devoted to overthrowing their own Islamic governments: the Egyptian terrorist groups and the Mojheddin in Iran. It does not, therefore, include Qadhdhāfi's Islamic fundamentalism, which like Khumayni's is in power, the Muslim rebellion in southern Thailand and in Mindanao against the non-Muslim governments in Manila and Bangkok, or the Sunni fundamentalist terrorism against Asad's Alawite regime in Syria.

I tend to share the view, put forward inter alia by Mohammed Ayoob, that such an all-embracing "religion plus" as Islam, despite its own claim to overshadow them, cannot be studied apart from the

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Andreas Kohlschütter from Cairo, "Kann Mubarak den Kurs Kairos halten?," Die Zeit, Oct. 23, 1981. Fundamentalism is rising throughout the Islamic world. See Helena Cobban from Kuwait, "Kuwaiti election points to new tide of Islamic fundamentalism in region," The Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 2, 1981; Michel Deure from Tunis, "Le courant intégriste occupe désormais une place importante dans la vie politique et sociale," Le Monde, July 14, 1981; and for Pakistan, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Ayoob, The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, op. cit. and Naipaul, Among the Believers, op. cit.; for Malaysia, Mohamad Abu Baker, "Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia," Asian Survey, Oct. 1981; for Pakistan, William L. Richter, "The Political Dynamic of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan," ibid., June 1979; and for the Philippines, Lela G. Noble, "Muslim Separatism in the Philippines, 1972-1981: The Making of a Stalemate," ibid., Nov. 1981.

country, culture, and variety in which it occurs. I do not share what Edward Said has called an "orientalist" view<sup>36</sup> that the Islamic revival is by definition a danger to the West; unlike Marx,<sup>37</sup> I am interested in this part of the essay in understanding, not changing, it. As Said points out, Marx himself was ambivalent about imperialism:

. . . . Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath the traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. . . .

England, it is true in causing a social revolution in Hindustan was actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia? If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Edward Said, Orientalism (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1978.)

<sup>37</sup> In his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach.

<sup>38</sup> Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile, ed. David Fernbach, (London: Pelican, 1973), pp. 306-307, quoted from Said, Orientalism, op. cit., p. 153.

Islam is much more than a religion: it is a total way of life, an all-embracing system of law, politics, economics, culture, and religion. Thus even the idea of the separation of church and state is in theory meaningless in Islam, for it originally knew no such separate concepts as "church" and "state"; and religion, not language, ethnicity, or state should be central to a Muslim's life. Moreover, Islam is a courage culture, a religion spread, as its Prophet urged, by fire and the sword. It was formed and initially spread by men of the desert, who called for violence in its cause. Unlike Christianity, it thus has no pacifist elements in it. Islam is also, like primitive Christianity, theoretically egalitarian and thus always is grist for radical social reformers. Islam believes that it represents God's final revelation through the Prophet and that therefore the Islamic community (umma) is by definition superior not only to the heathen but also to the "People of the Book" -- Jews and Christians. Indeed, Islam usually tends to be unable, and unwilling, to tolerate in a libertarian way the outside world. Finally, for Islam the imperial intrusions of the West, and of the state of Israel established with western support, by the tolerated but despised Jews, were, and remain, constant challenges to the Prophet's promises and to the Arab's frustrated, furious ex-imperial pride.

There have been many Islamic fundamentalist revivals in the



history of Islam, beginning with the (originally terrorist) Kharijites<sup>39</sup> in the first century after the Prophet, and going on to the Wahhabi in the eighteenth, the Senussi in the late nineteenth century, and the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan) in the 1930s and since. Nor is the present revival confined to the Arab world: the Islamic radical leftist Mojahedin in Iran today hold, as we shall see, views similar to the violence-oriented Islamic fundamentalist groups in Sa<sup>u</sup>di Arabia and Egypt.

The Islamic fundamentalist revival is transnational and omnipresent, although it has neither one center nor one traditionalist or charismatic leader. It has been persistent, despite interruptions, for at least a century, for it is primarily a revulsion against the impact of the West. Unlike Japan, the Islamic world has been unable -- or unwilling -- to create a viable synthesis between traditionalism and western-style modernity.

Islamic fundamentalism is genuinely religious, but its causes, and its programs, are also nationalist. Anti-colonial, pan-Arab nationalism was among its causes. It also provides political and cultural legitimacy, because it searches for genuine independence and for cultural legitimacy vis-à-vis the "corrupt" al-Saud dynasty, the theoretically secular and socialist Ba<sup>ath</sup> in Syria and Iraq, and the more or less "Islamic

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<sup>39</sup>The Encyclopedia of Islam, new ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1978), vol. 4, pp. 1074-1077, at p. 1075.

modernists" in Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and the Sudan. V.S. Naipaul has put the present Islamic dilemma very well. He is quoting a high, and very perceptive, Indonesian technocrat and civil servant, but the analysis applies throughout most of the Islamic world:

. . . there are many people whose bodies have been abroad but whose minds have stayed in the country . . . But . . . they don't have the feudal values of noblesse oblige. So, with their new dignity, they seek power and wealth, mainly . . . . In their loss of identity they have lost all values except . . . power. . . . So you feel adrift. Feeling adrift is like this. You know you should do good and avoid the bad. But now you have to think . . . that is when you start feeling adrift. I am telling you: it takes a conscious mental and moral effort for someone like me to do good. Which is wrong . . . 40

This leads to a frantic search for authenticity, which becomes, as Fouad Ajami has put it, "a refuge when practical politics fails to deliver concrete solution to foreign weakness, to domestic breakdown, to cultural seduction. . . ."41 In the global context, this is "the usual nostalgia that lives in every vanished civilization with a long memory for a vanished whole world."42 In the Middle East, it is also a frantic determination to escape from becoming a "Levantine,"

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<sup>40</sup>Naipaul, Among the Believers, pp. 358-359.

<sup>41</sup>Ajami, The Arab Predicament, p. 141.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 177.

whose attempt to mix the Middle East and the West, these men feel, perpetuates, the dilemma which they are determined to exorcise.

Naipaul analyzes how such men become Islamic fundamentalists:

. . . These men were not peasants . . . . They aspired to high western skills; they took encouragement from, they need, western witness. It was a part of their great dependence. This dependence provoked the anguish which (like adolescents) they sought to assuage in the daily severities of their new religious practice. . . . The religion which was theirs but which they had disregarded had now become an area of particular privacy. It gave an illusion of wholeness; it held a promise of imminent triumph. . . .

Islam sanctified rage -- rage about the faith, political rage: one could be like the other. And more than once on this journey I had met sensitive men who were ready to contemplate great convulsions. <sup>43</sup>

Khumayni, of course, was in one respect as extreme as the terrorist groups, for he wanted, as they did, to overthrow all secular authority and replace it with a theocratic system of government. (The Mojahedin, however, also wanted to revolutionize society.)

Yet the dilemma remains, as Naipaul writes of Khumayni:

. . . He required only faith. But he also knew the value of Iran's oil to countries that lived by machines, and he could send the Phantoms and the tanks against the Kurds. Interpreter of God's will, leader of the faithful, he expressed all the

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<sup>43</sup>Naipaul, Among the Believers, pp. 378-379.

confusion of his people and made it appear like glory, like the familiar faith: the confusion of a people of high medieval culture awakening to oil and money, a sense of power and violation, and a knowledge of a great new encircling civilization. That civilization couldn't be mastered. It was to be rejected; at the same time it was to be depended on.<sup>44</sup>

So, Naipaul concludes, the revolution will continue:

. . . paradoxically, out of the Islamic revival . . . that appeared to look backward, there would remain in many Muslim countries, with all the emotional charge derived from the Prophet's faith, the idea of modern revolution . . . increasingly now, in Islamic countries, there would be those who would have a vision of a society cleansed and purified, a society of believers.<sup>45</sup>

Recent Islamic fundamentalism has been a frequent response to the interacting crises of the Islamic world, resulting from the impact of western (and Soviet) imperialism, extremely rapid economic development, the challenge of Israel, most recently by the loss of Arab Jerusalem and the West Bank and various secularist currents, including liberalism and Marxism, of western origin.

All these secularist movements, Islamic fundamentalists are convinced, have failed. Moreover, because Islam is the only non-

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<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p. 82.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., pp. 429-430. For an earlier, similar insight, see Arnold Hottinger, "The Depth of Arab Radicalism," Foreign Affairs, Apr. 1973.

governmental institution which Islamic authoritarian states cannot suppress, many of those educated in universities and thus socially mobilized look to it, and to the fundamentalist Islamic movements, as the only available possibility, however indirect, to achieve political participation.

Most leaders of Islamic fundamentalist groups are middle class extreme nationalists, usually of rural, traditionalist backgrounds, with modern education. But their universities are overcrowded; their chances of good jobs thereafter, unless they emigrate to the Gulf, slim; and their living standards low. What they want is more power and money, "true" independence, and Muslim, not western culture. Islamic fundamentalism gives them cultural legitimacy and authenticity, makes them oppose all Arab regimes and their superpower associates and become the heirs of Arab anti-colonialism and nationalism. This combination of power through social revolution, plus return to the "golden age" of Islam, to be gained by the only possible way, violence, and thus to overcome one's desperation and existential Angst, may well be compared, as Arnold Hottinger has, to fascism. They can hope to get support from the petit bourgeoisie, the urban proletariat and the lumpenproletariat, whom economic growth and modernization have touched and tempted but not given equity, democratization, or cultural authenticity; all of which Islam can be

interpreted to demand and, ideally, to provide. Therefore many of them join the university-educated Islamic fundamentalists in striving to overthrow the Arab political and social order and Arab alliances, with one or the other superpower.<sup>46</sup> These masses are not becoming more religious -- they always have been. What is happening is that they are participating more in politics.

The other important responses to the West, secularism and Islamic modernism, have had varying results. It seems now clear, however, that except in Turkey, where the new military dictatorship has renewed Atatürk's repression of the traditionalist Islamic majority, secularism has failed or, as in Syria, is under severe attack. But Islamic modernism, not fundamentalism is the predominant current in the Arab world and is likely to continue to be so, although its wealthiest area, the Arab oil-producing states, is still, at least in theory, traditionalist fundamentalist.

One must distinguish between two major versions of Islamic fundamentalism: traditional and revolutionary. The best examples of the former were Wahhabi Sa'ūdī Arabia and Khomeynī's Iran, and of the latter the three Egyptian and one Iranian violence- and revolutionary-oriented movements which I discuss below. (Qadhdhāfī's Islamic fundamentalist ideology is a modified combination of the Senussi, Nāsir's Arab Socialism, and the Muslim

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<sup>46</sup>I rely here on Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Superpowers in the Arab World," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1981, pp. 94-95 and, for economics

Brotherhood.)<sup>47</sup> Khumaynī is a counterrevolutionary against the Shāh's secularism. His goal is to revive the overriding power of the clergy ('ulāmā'.) In contrast, the violence-oriented movements are revolutionary vis-à-vis the regimes now in power in Egypt and Iran. Their goals are extreme egalitarianism, the destruction of the regimes (and in the case of one of them, the whole social structure as well), and of the power and privileges of the 'ulāmā'.

I shall compare the four most important Islamic fundamentalist movements today: three in Egypt, the Islamic Liberation Organization,<sup>48</sup> Repentance and Holy Flight,<sup>49</sup> and the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwān), and the Iranian Mojahedin. All four have three key common characteristics.

The first is their social origin: they come from the middle and lower-middle strata of the "new middle class": those of rural background who for the first time have come to the cities. This produces their second characteristic: psychological alienation arising

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and equity, M. Ali Fekrat, "Stress in the Islamic World," Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Spring 1981.

<sup>47</sup> Kllhlein, Die politischen Ideen Mu'ammār al-Qaddafis, op. cit.

<sup>48</sup> Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Islamī (sometimes also referred to as Shahab Muhammad-Muhammad's Youth), and called by the Arab mass media Jam'at al-Fanniyya al-askariyya [Technical Military Academy Group-MA.]

<sup>49</sup> Jam'at al-Muslimin, known in the Arab media as al-Takfir w'al Hijra [Repentance and Holy Flight-RHF.]

out of the sudden leaving of a traditional community for the city, plus the encounter there with foreign cultural influence, agnosticism, and secularism, all in glaring contrast to traditional Islam. This shock is the more understandable when one realizes that in the Middle East, as elsewhere in the third world, the impact of western-style modernization has been considerable, albeit still partial, only in the urban intelligentsia, while the rural and urban masses have remained gripped by an all-pervasive traditionalist Islamic religiosity.

The third factor is a sense of national, social, and economic deprivation. The Muslim Brotherhood spread most rapidly in the 1940s, when the impact of the depression of the thirties was increased by intensified anti-colonialism, caused by the wartime influx of British troops in Egypt and the rising inflation, all of which most affected exactly the middle and lower-middle classes from which the Brotherhood got most of its recruits. Iran in the 1960s and 1970s was much the same: American crushing of the nationalist movement of Mussadeq, massive movement from the country to the city, intense inflation, and massive American presence. Egypt in the 1970s was also similar: an increasing gap between the wealthy and the middle and lower-middle classes, caused by Sadat's liberal economic program, high inflation, relative decline of upward social mobility for the thousands of university students, and massive foreign presence, first Russian and then American. Thus, in sum, three perceptions interacted: national crisis, class crisis, and personal anomie caused by the



transition from a traditional rural to a partially modern urban environment (from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft.)

Most of these youthful rebels turned to Islamic fundamentalism rather than to the left, to Nasserism or communism, because leftism was discredited. They associated it with a foreign power, the Soviet Union. They believed that it had failed, in Egypt and elsewhere, as, they thought, the 1967 war had demonstrated. They believed that it was contrary to Islam. Finally, for them Islamic fundamentalism combined rejection of all foreign influences with a recovery of traditional community, for Islam seems most effectively to ease the anomie of Muslims of rural origin thrown into urban life.

All these groups have three principal foreign enemies: western, primarily American, capitalism; Marxist, primarily Soviet, communism; and "Zionism," i.e. Israel. Israel is always their enemy, and either the United States or the Soviet Union is the more important other enemy depending on its perceived presence. They always see Israel as the ally of one or both of the others.

Finally, these groups share four major commitments: to replace the present totally corrupt regimes and Muslim clergy ('ulama') and in the case of Takfir wa'l Hijra the societies as well (which they see as a Jahiliyya like pre-Islamic Arabia) by a pure Muslim community ('umma), living by the Shari'a; to repel all foreign intrusions on the Dar al-Islam [the House of Islam]; to aid the poor and establish equity (al-qistas) and social justice (adala); and to do all these by violence.

Let us now look for the immediate causes of the Islamic revival in Egypt. The main one, as elsewhere in the Arab world, was the "disaster" (naqba) of the Arabs: their 1967 defeat by Israel. This defeated not only the Nasserist left but pan-Arabism as well. The 1973 war confirmed this, for it was a victory of states, and primarily of Egypt, not of the Arab leftist revolutionaries, typified by the PLO. Yet, ironically, the disasters of 1967 and 1973 also made the Palestinian cause the least common denominator of the Arab struggle against Israel. Indeed, the collapse of pan-Arabism left only Islam and state consciousness, and since the only real state in the Arab world is Egypt, Islam usually filled the gap.

Moreover, the death of Nāsir and the end of his charismatic appeal, plus OPEC's quadrupling oil prices, had two other results: the decline of the appeal of Arab nationalism and the distinction and rise in influence within the Arab and Islamic worlds of the oil-producing countries -- the victory, so to speak, of the pure, traditionalist desert men over the corrupt, westernized cities. (But of course the desert men themselves, in the eyes, for example, of those who in 1979 stormed the Grand Mosque in Mecca, had become corrupt and westernized, and were therefore un-Islamic.) The calm of Sa'ūdī Arabia and Sadat's Egypt, after the storm of Nāsir, therefore gave way -- all the more so because they seemed unable to get the U.S. to solve the Palestinian and Lebanese crises, themselves insults to

Islam -- to a renewed wave of Islamic fundamentalism.

Westerners saw 1973 as a victory of the Arab world over the West. But in the Arab world, radicals of the right and left, Islamic, Nasserite, and communist, saw it quite differently: as the massive engagement, economic and political, of the conservative oil-producing Arab states with the West, particularly with the United States, and with its Arab allies such as Egypt. Thus Arab radicals saw 1973 as not only a victory for Israel but also for the United States and its "corrupt satellites" Egypt, Sa'ūdī Arabia, and the Shāh's Iran.

Sadat was a more faithful practicing Muslim than Nāsir. Indeed, this plus his initial priority for combatting the leftists and Nasserists led him to make a serious mistake: to tolerate, and indeed until the late 1970s somewhat to encourage, the "moderate" Muslim Brotherhood. But they forgave him neither his previous association with their arch-enemy Nāsir nor his alliance with the United States and his peace with the "Zionist entity" (Israel.) Only when it was too late, and when they had infiltrated the army, did he turn on them.

I turn now to the two Egyptian violence-oriented Muslim fundamentalist groups: MA and RHF. (While the Muslim Brotherhood has much the same ideology, it has generally forsworn violence.) The main difference between the MA and RHF was that MA believed that only the regime was irretrievably corrupt, while RHF believed that society was as well and that therefore it must be revolutionized. The MA members came mostly from lower Egypt, as did their leader; RHF

members came from Upper Egypt, as did their leader. (Significantly, he came from Asyut.) Both leaders were relatively young, had modern science educations, Muslim Brotherhood background, prison experiences, disposition to conspiracy, charisma, and a desire for martyrdom.

RHF, which reportedly played the major role in the assassination of Sadat and the subsequent riots in Asyut, was more extreme than MA. Because it rejected society as well as regime, it was determined to sever itself from it. Many of its members actually went to the desert to live and train in caves. It had a long-range strategy and did not intend initially to kidnap and then kill a minister, as it did in 1977. It recruited through kinship and friendship -- normal in Arab society. Its members remained largely loyal after Sadat's police arrested many of them, and their leader was executed, in 1977.

So far I have been analyzing violence-oriented Islamic fundamentalism in the Arab world, primarily in Egypt. Islamic fundamentalism in Iran is different from the Sunnī world in several important ways, and since 1979, most importantly, by the victory of theocratic basically counter-revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism. Twelver Shi'ī Islam has a much more structured religious hierarchy than Sunnī. Modern Persian history has been a prolonged, shifting struggle, between the monarchy, which profited also from pre-Islamic Persian traditions and from the declaration in 1501 by Ismail, the first Savafid Shāh, of Shi'a as the state religion, and the hierarchy of Islamic jurists (fuqaha.) Ismail also declared that through his

(alleged) descent from the eight Imam, he was entitled to the regency (niyabat) of the occulted Twelfth Imam. The fuqaha thus had to fight a double battle: against the Shāhs and, outside of Persia, the Sunnī rulers, and also against Shī'a radical sects. (Sectarianism was favored in Shī'a by its millenarianism and by its belief that the Imams could reveal the true (esoteric) meaning (the ilm) of the Quran and the Hadith.)<sup>50</sup> By the nineteenth century the highest ranking fuqaha, the mujtahids, were generally acknowledged as necessary sources of imitation. They claimed the occulted Imam's regency but remained out of politics. On the other side, dissident ulāmā used philosophy and mysticism to claim for themselves the right to interpret divine knowledge (ilm) and therefore rejected the unique right of the fuqaha to do so. They resorted to deception, an authorized Shī'i tactic against Sunnī oppressors, to avoid personal danger. The struggle between the dissidents and the fuqaha has continued to the present time.

The 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution was the first major impact of modernization on Iranian religion and politics and produced the secularization of social thought and the growth of non-clerical intellectuals (raushanfikr), non-clerical (but still Muslim) nationalists, who moved away from the traditionalist Islamic (rather

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<sup>50</sup>This sectarianism produced, e.g. the Ismailis and the Nuseiris (Alawites.)

than nationalist) fuqaha. The two Pahlavi Shāhs were extreme examples of this: they tried both to break the power of the fuqaha and to base Iranian nationalism on pre-Islamic Persian traditions. By the 1960s this led most of the fuqaha, led by Khumaynī, to ally temporarily with the dissident Muslim intellectuals against the Pahlavis and their secularized supporters. Khumaynī got the support of the alienated middle and lower-middle classes as well as the peasantry and proletariat. He preached cultural as well as political revolution, including, for the first time in Iranian history, the theocratic claim that the fuqaha were the sole legitimate political as well as religious rulers of Iran.

The Islamic oppositionists to him may be divided into two groups: the moderate Islamic nationalists, of whom Mihdi Bazergan, Khumaynī's first prime minister, is a good example, and the radical, revolutionary Muslims, of whom the major ideologist was the Paris-educated sociologist, 'Alī Shari'atī, who died in 1977, and the main organization of the guerrilla Mojahedin.

Shari'atī was one of the major figures in the Iranian revulsion against tyranny, corruption, and western cultural colonialism and a search for an Iranian cultural and political identity. (The other one was Jalal Al-e Ahmad.) He wanted a revolutionary, anti-theocratic Shī'ī Islam. Like many of the previous Shī'ī philosophers and mystics, he rejected the claim of the fuqaha to authority and legitimacy, religious and political. For him Shī'ī millenarianism

was a revolutionary "Islamic Protestantism," carried out by intellectuals (raushanfiker), not the reactionary 'ulāma), to produce a just, classless society with a dictatorship of the minority of Islamic revolutionary intellectuals over the reactionary masses. He demanded that the westernization of Iranian culture be overcome in order to regain true Iranian independence, as a part of the global third world anti-imperialist movement, including such secular intellectuals as Cesaire and Fanon -- thus once again, as Ajami has pointed out, showing that Islamic revolutionary socialism in fact reflects much of the very West which it claims to reject.<sup>51</sup>

Shari'ati's appeal to educated Iranian youth of bazaari and lower-class origin was immense, for he explained and refuted western ideologies -- just what they were looking for. His influence was particularly great among the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the principal Moslem terrorist guerrilla organization. (The other one, the Feda'eyan-e Khalq, was secular and Marxist.) The former grew up among children of bazaaris and 'ulāma in the radical youth wing of the (Islamic) National Front (just like the Egyptian Islamic terrorist groups); the latter among the radical children of the modernized elite and workers

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<sup>51</sup>The above is largely based on two chapters by Prof. Mangol Bayat of Harvard, to whom I am most grateful for many discussions on this subject: "Islam in Pahlavi and Post-Pahlavi Iran: A Cultural Revolution?," in John L. Esposito, ed., Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse Univ., 1980), pp. 87-106 and "Shi'ism in Contemporary Iranian Politics: The Case of Ali Shari'ati" in Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim, eds.,

in the Tudeh. Both arose out of frustration vis-à-vis the Shāh's ruthless repression. Both groups split before the revolution; both played active roles in it. (The split in the Mojahedin was between Marxists and non-Marxists; as Nasirhad shown, Islam and socialism have in common collectivism, anti-westernism, and egalitarianism. Khumaynī thereafter suppressed first the Feda'iyān and then the Mojahedin because of their competition with the 'ulāmā' and their demands for a social revolution. The Feda'iyān declined in power, especially because the majority group cooperated with the religious fanatics, but the Mojahedin became the principal challenge to Khumaynī and were close to Banī-Sadr. In 1980 and 1981 they engaged in a bloody wave of assassinations of Khumaynī's associates and he of them. Thus Khumaynī predictably reverted to the historic struggle of the fuqaha with the dissidents, while the mohajedin carried on a bloody guerrilla struggle with him, reportedly including a partial, pragmatic alliance with the moderate Islamic reformers. The result, at the beginning of 1982, remains like all other aspects of Iran, in doubt.<sup>52</sup>

What can one say of the future of Islamic fundamentalism, in Egypt and elsewhere in the Islamic world? It will rise or fall

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Towards a Modern Iran (London: Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 155-168. I am very grateful to Prof. Bayat for many discussions on Iran. I have also profited from Yann Richard, "Contemporary Shi'ī Thought," in Keddie, Roots of Revolution, op. cit., pp. 202-228 and Bill, "The Politics of Extremism in Iran," Current History, Jan. 1982.

<sup>52</sup>This paragraph is based primarily on Shahram Chubin, "Leftist Forces in Iran," Problems of Communism, July-Aug. 1980.



according to the regimes' effectiveness in meeting the social, economic, and national grievances to which it responds, and to what happens in Islamic fundamentalist Iran.

But it is unlikely to succeed permanently anywhere. Like anarchism, it is more destructive than constructive. It is also, to use Durkheim's distinction, a sect rather than a denomination, and fanatical sects have always evolved into less fanatical denominations, because Weber's "ethic of responsibility" wins out, in those who want to run a state and society, over his "ethic of absolute ends." Egypt, above all other Arab states, is too modernized to accept indefinitely, or probably even to allow to come to power, the Islamic fundamentalists. Terrorist religious mania is one way to try to escape the age of anxiety, what Weber called the "ice age of bureaucracy." But it rarely wins at all, and has never won for long. The Muslim world seems condemned, like the rest of the third world, to be trapped between its religion and traditions and an unachievable western-styled modernity. But then, so is the West itself.

In this respect, I think, Ajami, rightly criticizes Naipaul, and expands, worsens, and thus correctly poses the problem:

. . . Were Naipaul to mediate on place less haunted for him by old ghosts, he might come to realize some of the truths that Conrad learned; that darkness is not only there but here as well; that all men and societies are haunted by their own demons;

that all of us are denied a clear vision of  
the world.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>In his review of Naipaul's Among the Believers in The New York Times Book Review, Oct. 25, 1981, p. 32.

III

United States Policy in the Middle East: The Palestinian Issue<sup>54</sup>

The basic American national interests in the Middle East are, first, to avoid, or at least to postpone, another Arab-Israeli war, because it would probably mean another oil boycott and production limitation, another opportunity for the Soviet Union, and more tension with U.S. allies in Western Europe and Japan.

Second, to contain, and if possible to reverse, Soviet influence in the region. Given Soviet ambitions there and the unlikelihood of Soviet support for an effective guarantee of Israel's security, Moscow is unlikely to want or to help to bring about a settlement. The United States therefore has no interest in Soviet participation in the peace process.

Third, to preserve secure western and Japanese access, at bearable prices, to Middle Eastern oil. This may now seem less

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<sup>54</sup>For three varying recent views on this issue, see Robert G. Neumann, "Toward a Reagan Middle East Policy?," Orbis, Fall 1981 and Harvey Sicherman, "The United States and Israel: A Strategic Divide?," ibid., Summer 1980; and Joseph N. Greene et al., The Path to Peace (Mt. Kisco, N.Y.: Seven Springs Center, Oct. 1981.)

pressing, for there is an oil glut, but if the western recession were to end or Sa'ūdī oil production to be seriously cut, the glut would soon disappear. Such access requires stability and pro-western policies in the conservative Arab oil-producing states. Progress toward the solution of the Palestinian problem will not alone ensure these, for the sources of Arab radicalism are too deep, but it will help, and lack of it will speed up the danger. A Palestinian solution would be another insurance policy for the United States against a much worse energy crisis.

For all these reasons, plus the collapse of American influence in Iran, the United States has been trying to improve its relations with Sa'ūdī Arabia, to establish, if not bases, then stand-by military facilities there, primarily for the deployment of the planned Rapid Deployment Force, and to arm and train the Sa'ūdī armed forces.<sup>55</sup> (The same reasoning has led to American plans for military facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya, and at Ras Banas on the Red Sea coast of Egypt.)

This policy led to the U.S. AWACS sale to Riyadh. Israel, predictably, feared and strongly opposed the U.S. rapprochement with Sa'ūdī Arabia. Jerusalem had already been confronted with Washington's increasing treatment of Egypt as nearly an equal of Israel.

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<sup>55</sup> See the long article by Scott Anthony on U.S. construction of RDF facilities in Sa'ūdī Arabia in The Washington Post, Nov. 1, 1981 and John Kifner from Beirut in The New York Times, Nov. 1, 1981.

That Washington should do the same with Sa'ūdī Arabia, which had not made peace with Israel and supported the PLO, seemed to the great majority of Israelis outrageous.

Fourth, the United States should continue to guarantee the independence and security of Israel. This is morally necessary because of the tragedy of the Jewish people in our time, the long, solemn American commitment to it, Israel's western democratic polity, and the psychological wounds that Israel's destruction would inflict not only on Jewish Americans but on the whole American body politic. It is strategically necessary because of Israel's key geographic location, its proven military strength and valor, and its safely anti-Soviet policy.

But American toleration and financing of Begin's creeping annexationism, at the cost of c. \$2 billion per year, is contrary to the American tradition of opposition to colonialism and support of self-determination. (It is also a betrayal of the noblest ideals of Zionism.) It is a strategic liability because it plays into the hands of the Soviet Union and Arab radicalism and thus promotes conflict and endangers energy security. Indeed, the United States stands globally almost alone in its toleration of Begin's annexationist policies.

From the perspectives of American ideals and national interests, therefore, Begin's policies are morally indefensible and strategically disastrous. Begin's Israel is a strategic liability to the United

States, not an asset.

Why does the United States continue to subsidize Begin to sabotage American policy? There is widespread U.S. public support for Israel, intensified by pro-Israeli fundamentalist Christians and by American admiration for Israel's democracy and military feats, plus widespread American popular resentment against "the Arabs raising the price of oil" (although Venezuela and the Shāh started it.) There are deep, genuine differences in American public opinion on Middle Eastern issues. Finally, and most important, the pro-Israeli lobby in Washington is extremely effective. Jewish Americans, although only some six and one-half million, are superbly organized. They vote far more frequently than other Americans. More prosperous than the national average, they put their money where their mouth is, in campaign contributions to candidates who pledge to support Israeli policies. They have overwhelmingly supported Israel since the Holocaust and the foundation of the state of Israel. And although many of them now oppose Begin's policies, few say so publicly and their organizations generally still support them.

A successful American Middle Eastern policy also requires effective global containment of the Soviet Union, a global nuclear, conventional, and naval build-up and the reestablishment of a regional Middle Eastern military balance to overcome the effects of the recent Soviet strategic gains on its periphery -- notably its air bases in southwestern Afghanistan, which can give fighter cover

to bombers over the Straits of Hormuz. This now is under way through defense build-up of the Navy and of facilities in the region, aid to Pakistan,<sup>56</sup> and, reportedly, arms aid to the Afghan rebels.

The U.S. has cut back oil imports substantially and is increasing its strategic oil reserve. It needs to cut back imports and to encourage oil substitutes more than it has.

But above all, Washington should give priority to preventing another Middle Eastern war and an oil boycott and production limitation. These aims, and, indeed Israel's own long-range security interests, require that the Palestinian issue be gradually and finally resolved.

The U.S. should certainly counter Soviet activities in the Middle East. But there as elsewhere Moscow exploits, but rarely creates, the opportunities which arise from local and regional tensions. The best way to lower Soviet influence, therefore, is to forestall or contain these opportunities. Since the Palestinian issue is Moscow's greatest Middle Eastern opportunity, its settlement is essential to contain Soviet influence there.

The time has finally come for Americans to distinguish between support for Israel's security and independence and support for Begin's annexationism. The organized American Jewish community should

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<sup>56</sup> A case for U.S. aid to Pakistan, which, however, does not discuss the nuclear non-proliferation dimension, may be found in Rodney W. Jones, "Mending Relations with Pakistan," The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1981.

consider whether it is prudent to support Begin's policies so completely. President Reagan's recent comment, clearly directed at Begin, that the United States cannot accept foreign interference in its policies, was followed by former Presidents Carter and Ford declaring, on their way back from Sadat's funeral, that the United States should negotiate with the PLO as soon as the latter recognizes Israel's right to exist.<sup>57</sup>

Washington should make clear, as former Presidents Ford and Carter have advocated, that it will deal with the PLO as the representative of the great majority of Palestinians if and when the PLO simultaneously recognizes the right of Israel to exist within its 1967 boundaries and accepts international and American guarantees of Israel's security. Washington should explore privately and more vigorously whether the PLO will accept this condition. Second, Washington should make clear to Begin, first privately and then publicly, that the U.S. will compel Israel to evacuate all the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, within the context of such a comprehensive peace settlement. This process would begin by Washington withholding an amount of economic aid equivalent to the cost of Israeli West Bank settlements. If this had no effect, Washington would begin to reduce military aid. It

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<sup>57</sup>The New York Times, Oct. 12, 1981.



should simultaneously reiterate to the Arab governments and to the Soviet Union that it will continue to guarantee Israel's independence and security, within the 1967 boundaries, by all means necessary, including military force.

Israel gives two justifications for not returning to the 1967 boundaries: security and, for Begin and the religious parties, Israel's religious and historic right to the West Bank. With respect to the former, the United States has no reason necessarily to accept Israel's definition of its own security. Not to return to the 1967 boundaries guarantees an indefinite succession of wars, to great American disadvantage. The Arabs will not, and need not, accept anything less. Almost the whole world, including America's allies, agrees with them on this point. A Sinai-type peace-keeping force would be more valuable to prevent a war than Israeli posts along the Jordan. Israel wants to have full American support and continue to be able to carry out preemptive raids as it wishes. A comprehensive settlement would have to prevent both Israelis and Arabs from such actions.

With respect to the second, U.S. traditions and national interests, in my view, preclude agreement with Israel's claim to the West Bank. The same is true for East Jerusalem, which contains the shrines not only of Judaism and Islam but also of Christianity. The 1947 United Nations Palestinian partition resolution provided for its internationalization. Thus there is no reason for American foreign

policy to support unilateral Israeli sovereignty over East Jerusalem, at the price, which would have to be paid, of never reaching a comprehensive settlement.

Finally, one may argue that the number and population of the Israeli settlements within the West Bank and the post-1967 extended boundaries of Jerusalem are so great that their evacuation is no longer practical. It has certainly become more difficult, and it would even now be possible for an Israeli government to undertake only if it were under extreme pressure. Yet, again, should this weigh more heavily in U.S. calculations than having a comprehensive settlement? I think not.

Washington should make clear that it would compel Israel to leave the occupied territories only if and when the Arab states involved, (Jordan, Syria, and the Lebanon) signed peace treaties with Israel and accepted the extension of the Sinai peace-keeping force, including its American component, all along the Israeli border. Jordan might well agree to this before Syria, so Israel should not be compelled to evacuate the Golan Heights until Damascus agreed. East Jerusalem should after the settlement be under Arab, not Israeli sovereignty, for no lasting peace is possible if it remains so, but the peace-keeping force should also patrol the border between Israeli and Arab Jerusalem, and the settlement should guarantee free movement within the city and free access for all to the holy places

of all three religions. The peace settlement should also include an explicit recognition by the PLO of Israel's independence and security within the 1967 boundaries.

The form of government thereafter in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem should be determined by the Arab states bordering on Israel and Sa<sup>u</sup>d<sup>i</sup> Arabia, plus the PLO, and the peace settlement should require that it be ratified by a referendum of the inhabitants of these territories. This is an Arab matter and should be left by the United States and Israel for the Arabs to decide. They will very probably agree on a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. However, such a state would be dependent on Sa<sup>u</sup>d<sup>i</sup> subsidies and militarily greatly inferior to Israel and/or Jordan. The danger of it becoming, as most Israelis fear, "a Soviet base" is so small that it can be dismissed as compared to the gains for the U.S. of a settlement.

We must have no illusions: the Arabs will only refrain in the future from attacking Israel as long as they remain certain, as most of them have been since the 1973 war, that the United States will prevent its destruction. (No one else will, and Israel alone no longer can.) Israel's fear of destruction is genuine. But given the spiralling cost of weapons systems and the Arabs' ability to buy them, Israel can survive only if it continues to get massive American arms and budgetary aid. Its long-range security can

be guaranteed only if the Palestinian issue is solved and if American troops help guarantee the security of its 1967 boundaries. True, this will restrain Israel as well as the Arabs from preemptive strikes against each other. But nothing less will preserve peace. The danger to the U.S. of war and Soviet expansionism, and the threat to its energy supplies are so great that the U.S. should take what risk is involved. As the U.S. troop presence in West Berlin and South Korea has demonstrated, the danger of war is much less when U.S. troop presence guarantees peace.

Such a comprehensive peace settlement will require that the President announce it publicly, with his reasons for it, and get Congressional support for it; that American pressure to attain it be credible; that American assistance to the moderate Arab states, notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and to the Afghan rebels continue; and that American military facilities and the Rapid Deployment Force continue to be built up.

It is all too easy to lean back and console oneself with the biblical adage that "sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof," and to hold on to the unrealistic belief that the Arabs can be brought to cooperate with the United States and Israel against the Soviet Union. Democracies often wait until it is too late to tend to their vital interests, for their leaders usually bow to domestic pressures and thus often feel compelled to neglect the national interest.

I have no illusions that the U.S. policy I propose above is at present possible, given American domestic politics. In 1957 Eisenhower compelled Israel to withdraw from Sinai shortly after Israel had occupied it. He moved quietly and decisively, and his triumphal reelection just before had made his domestic position unassailable. But Ben Gurion was not Begin, much more time has passed since Israel's conquest of the West Bank in 1967, East Jerusalem means much more to Israelis than does Sinai, and Reagan is not Eisenhower.

Nevertheless, editorial opinion<sup>58</sup> and Congressional action in the United States is beginning to change, as the AWACS victory in the Senate recently showed. It is therefore high time to expand full and frank American public discussion of all these issues. Only the understanding of them by the American public can give a President the popular support that he will need to carry out such a policy. And only if he does so can American national interests in the Middle East, and the interests of moderate Israelis and Arabs alike, be preserved. The longer that he does not, the more America's interests will suffer, and so will those of Israel and of the Arabs. Only Moscow will gain.

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<sup>58</sup> A recent striking example of this was Strobe Talbott, "What to do about Israel," Time, Sept. 7, 1981.