

**CONGRESS RESTORED:
POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONTEMPORARY
INDIA**

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
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The elections of 1980 restored the Congress party to the preeminent position that it has held since independence. Once again, the party has an overwhelming majority of parliament, controls all but a handful of state governments, and has a national leader who commands both domestic support and international attention. In retrospect, then, can one view the emergency, the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress party in the election of 1977, and the emergence of an alternative government under the Janata party as a brief (five year) break in what is otherwise a remarkable pattern of continuity and stability in basic institutions and processes? Or were fundamental tensions in the system revealed that foreshadow still another breakdown in the parliamentary and democratic system? In an effort to answer these questions I shall first examine the continuities in Indian politics by comparing the elections and post-election scene of 1980-81 with the election of the last Congress government in 1971, and by comparing both to earlier elections. Then I shall consider some of the discontinuities, particularly by looking at the ways in which the organizational structure of the Congress party has changed. And finally, I shall discuss some of the major political economy challenges likely to face Mrs. Gandhi or her successor in the next few years.

I

How do the election results of 1980 compare with 1971?

1. In 1980 Congress won 351 Parliamentary seats with almost 43% of the popular vote as compared with 352 seats and nearly 44% of the popular vote in 1971.

In both instances the electoral coalition was similar. Congress won the support of the very rich and the very poor, from Brahmins to ex-untouchables, from well-to-do businessmen and government bureaucrats to tribal agricultural laborers and Muslim weavers. In 1980, for example, Congress won 50 out of 79 reserved scheduled caste constituencies and 29 of 37 scheduled tribe constituencies compared with 50 and 26 respectively in 1971. In 1980 a centrist program won for Mrs. Gandhi and her party not the support of the center, that is the middle classes and the middle peasantry who were either divided or opposed to Congress, but the extremes of the class structure.

2. Congress remains the party of choice among India's religious minorities. Congress did well in the Sikh state of Punjab in both 1980 and 1971. It lost in Kerala, but in both elections Congress did best in constituencies with large numbers of Christians. As far as Muslims are concerned, in 1980 and in 1971 Congress won a low plurality of seats in constituencies where Muslims form more than 20% of the electorate, the strongest party among Muslims.

3. While its victories are based on the rural vote, the Congress position in urban India is also secure. In the cities with a million or more population, Congress won 25 of 39 constituencies in 1980, and 26 in 1971 and it did well in the smaller towns.

4. Congress once again demonstrated in 1980 that it is a national party, indeed, in electoral terms India's only national party. Congress won a majority of parliamentary seats in all major states with the exception of West Bengal and Kerala, improving its position over 1971 when it also failed to win a majority of seats in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. There is no state in which Congress is not either the first or second party. In contrast, all other parties are limited to a single state or region. Janata is the most

national of the opposition parties, but in votes polled it was the second largest party in only nine states, with its strength mainly in the north. Lok Dal is the second largest in Uttar Pradesh and Orissa and the largest party in Haryana. The CPI(M) is the single largest party in West Bengal and Tripura, and the second largest in Kerala. Four other parties, the are strong in a single state each, While there is only one truly national party, India actually has many party "systems", if by party system we mean stable patterns of competition among parties. Each state has its own party system, unique ones in the case of Tamil Nadu, Kashmir and Punjab, and shared ones in the case of some north Indian states.

5. In 1980 Congress won a majority in all but two of the ten states which held state assembly elections. Similarly, Congress swept the state assembly elections in 1972, winning 70% of all assembly seats, following its parliamentary victory a year earlier.

6. Congress continues to remain weak among the middle peasantry, particularly in northern India, as demonstrated by the electoral performance of the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Bihar where it won only 36%, 29% and 36% of the vote respectively. The Lok Dal, the party of the peasant owner-cultivator class won 29%, 34% and 17% respectively in these states. Lok Dal did well in this region in 1967 and 1971, but its position in 1980 has much improved and the corresponding strength of the Congress party within this class has declined.

7. The Congress position within the urban middle class, never as secure as it was among the lower income groups in urban areas, was also not as great in 1980 as in 1971. Much of the intelligentsia is opposed to Mrs. Gandhi and there are indications that the middle class in the largest cities voted against Congress. In 1980 Congress lost a majority of seats in the metropolitan cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras (but carried Delhi).

On each of these dimensions - the electoral coalition of the Congress party, the position of Congress among the scheduled castes and tribes, the Muslims, and in the urban areas, its geographic spread, the fragmentation of the opposition, and the position of Congress in the states, the situation in 1977 was an exception. Congress then, as is well known, dropped to 153 seats in Parliament with less than 35% of the vote. The lowest income groups voted against its candidates. Congress won only 16 of 78 scheduled caste constituencies, 12 of 38 scheduled tribe constituencies, and 20 of 81 Muslim populated constituencies. In the urban constituencies Congress won only 7 of 39 seats. Congress was smashed in the Hindi-speaking states where it voted against its candidates. Congress lost most of the scheduled caste, scheduled tribe constituencies, and Muslim populated constituencies. In the urban constituencies, Congress won only 7 of 39 seats. Congress was smashed in the Hindi speaking states where it won only two out of 239 seats, turning the party into a regional party of the south and west. In the state assembly elections of June 1977 Congress lost all fourteen states. The old electoral coalition behind Congress had fallen apart, the victim of the emergency and the resulting unity of the opposition parties.

The breakup of the Janata coalition in 1979, and the victory of Congress (I) in 1980 restored India to its normal political state: one national party, and many opposition parties confined to a single region or single state, with almost all of the parties further divided into factions. The 1980 elections and the post-election party splitting that followed produced a veritable parody of the fragmented multi-party system. There are now two Congress parties, two Communist parties, two Janata parties, two Lok Dals, two Dravida parties, two Muslim Leagues, and countless small state parties.

The party names may differ, but once again opposition parties are fragmented as they were in the 50s and 60s and while there are some electoral differences between the position of Congress and the opposition

parties of 1980 and 1971 as compared with the earlier years, it is also striking how much similarity there is. The electoral results for the Congress party from 1952 through 1980 show how stable the vote for Congress has been with the exception of the elections of 1977. In the six other parliamentary elections, Congress has never fallen below 40.7% nor risen above 47.8%.

CONGRESS PARTY RESULTS IN SIX PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 1952 - 1980

| ELECTION | VOTE (in %) | SEATS | |
|----------|----------------|--------|------------|
| | | NUMBER | PERCENTAGE |
| 1952 | 45.0 | 357 | 73 |
| 1957 | 47.8 | 359 | 73 |
| 1962 | 44.7 | 358 | 73 |
| 1967 | 40.7 | 283 | 54 |
| 1971 | 43.7 | 352 | 68 |
| 1977 | 34.5 | 153 | 28 |
| 1980 | 42.7 | 351 | 67 |

Faced with a fragmented party structure, and factions within each of the parties, including Congress, Indian politicians spend much of their time trying to build political coalitions capable of winning elections and forming governments - and undercutting existing coalitions. Central to any analysis of Indian parties and elections is this fundamental principle: the political necessity of coalition building transcends program, ideology, and class interests.

II

Thus far we have focused on the similarities between the election and post-election scene in 1980 and 1971 to emphasize the degree of political continuity. We have already alluded to some differences - the greater weakness of the Congress party among the Muslims, the divisions within the urban middle class, and the weakness of the party in the Hindi-speaking states. We might also note that the Congress position among the scheduled castes is not as secure as it was earlier. But apart from differences in the composition of the Congress coalition there is one other respect in which political trends in the 70s and 80s differ from the first two decades after independence. The first is the weakness of the local organization of the Congress party and (its corollary) the extent of centralization within the party. In the 1950s and 60s power within Congress was in the hands of state party bosses who ran traditional party machines based upon control over patronage. This pattern of multiple power centers came to an end with the split in the party in 1969 when Mrs. Gandhi, fearful that the party bosses might try to choose a new national leader, formed her own Congress party. Since it was the state leaders who had challenged Mrs. Gandhi between 1967 and 1969 and whom she defeated when they ran against her candidates in the 1971 and 1972 elections, she was eager to prevent new independent centers of power from ever again rising.

Mrs. Gandhi restructured her party by centralizing it. State leaders, including chief ministers, were no longer allowed to build an independent local base in the countryside or in the party, but were appointed (or dismissed) by the prime minister. As state party organizations and state governments became increasingly subservient to the center, intra-party democracy within Congress declined. Meetings of the All India Congress Committee and the Working Committee became infrequent and their political importance reduced. Not only did state governments become less independent, but even municipal governments and village panchayats languished as local governments were often superseded

and local elections became infrequent. Under these circumstances the local Congress party atrophied. Mrs. Gandhi may have reduced political threats to her power, but in doing so she also weakened the local and state party organizations. The result was that state governments became weaker and, between 1972 and 1975, the year she declared an emergency, less stable.

Many of the older functions of the Congress party - mobilizing local support, accommodating itself to local factions, providing opportunities for competing political elites, transmitting to state and central governments information about the local scene - dissipated.

While Mrs. Gandhi's position within her own party has never been greater, nor has the party ever been as dependent upon a single leader to sustain its electoral support - Mrs. Gandhi continues to fear the emergence of any independent center of political power. The reason has less to do with political reality than her sense of personal insecurity and vulnerability. The result is that none of the country's well known national and state leaders have remained in Congress. Congress has become a one-person party (or as one wit put it in 1980 when Sanjay was still alive, a one and a half person party). Some former associates of Mrs. Gandhi in the Congress (U) have returned to Mrs. Gandhi's Congress, and her son Rajiv, is said to be interested in "consolidation", but there has been no major movement back so far, and those who return will be leaders without followers.

Mrs. Gandhi's cabinet is made up of political unknowns, and cabinet members know that if they attempt to build a political base of their own they will be removed. The chief ministers she appointed were also little known and in several cases she deliberately kept them weak by appointing their opponents

to the central cabinet. She has avoided holding elections within the party knowing that elections produce leaders with an independent political base.

It would be interesting to know what proportion of time is spent by various national heads of state on politics apart from programs and policies. Surely the Indian Prime Minister would be high on such a list. It is not difficult to imagine what kinds of issues have absorbed Mrs. Gandhi's attention this past year. How should the government deal with the agitation in Assam against illegal migrants from Bangladesh? (How about forming a new government with a Muslim as chief minister?) How should the government respond to the agitation of farmers in Maharashtra and elsewhere for higher procurement prices and lower rates? (How about Rajiv organizing a pro-government rally in Delhi of peasant cultivators?) What should be done about the agitation among students in Gujarat against reservations for scheduled castes in the medical colleges? (How about offering caste Hindus an equivalent number of new seats to compensate them for those that are put aside as reservations?) What these issues share in common is the sharp and often violent social and political cleavages involving language, class and caste, and the extent to which the Prime Minister must devote her attention to these conflicts without the support and guidance of strong state party leaders.

No wonder the Prime Minister increasingly turned to her son Sanjay and now to her son Rajiv. Succession is obviously central, but the prime minister also needs a trusted advisor who can help deal with local and state political issues that have increasingly become national.

III

Now that Mrs. Gandhi is again in control of her party, two thirds of Parliament, and all the major states except West Bengal, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, how is she using her power? Not much, her critics, reply. She appears to be spending most of her time on political matters, and the remainder on hundreds of administrative decisions that cabinet members and officials are reluctant to make on their own. There are some changes here and there - fewer controls over investment and imports, some efforts to expand exports, some efforts to deal with the bottlenecks in coal production, electricity, rail transport, and the ports and more attention to industry than agriculture compared with the Janata government. But there have been no significant new policy directions. India today is very much an administrative state. The government can, and has, expanded allocations for development. The Indian bureaucracy is superbly equipped, technically and administratively, to do project planning. Few bureaucracies in the third world can equal India's in building a hydroelectric dam or irrigation project, or constructing a fertilizer plant, a MIG factory or a plutonium reprocessing facility! But the government seems ill-equipped to effectively coordinate investment decisions (or allowing the market to deal with the resulting bottlenecks), or to chart new courses. Pronouncements from the Prime Minister's office are more likely to deal with the appointment of personnel than with new policies. Though Mrs. Gandhi's government runs the largest development program and the largest public sector in the non-communist world, she remains remarkably unconcerned with questions of macro-economics.

There are plenty of issues that could be addressed by the Prime Minister. The Economist recently assailed India for its autarchic development policies which have led successive governments to encourage import substitution, favor capital over labor intensive industrial development, nationalization of industry, and opposition to foreign investment. The result has been slow industrial growth, slow growth in industrial employment (especially since 1965), and protected and inefficient industries that are less productive than their counterparts elsewhere. Since planners emphasize new industrial investment, maintenance is neglected; inefficiencies in coal production and rail transport, and poor maintenance in electric power plants have kept electric supply below demand, and slowed the pace of industrial growth and employment. Agriculture needs more irrigation, electricity, credit and in some places land redistribution if the boom affecting the Punjab, Haryana and other green revolution areas is to spread to Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh.

In short, India's critics - and friends - believe that India has the potential to become a major grain producing and exporting country, that agricultural - led growth would provide an increase in consumer demand that could stimulate industrial productivity, that an influx of foreign investment would bring in new technologies, and that a reduction in regulations and protection would stimulate more efficient production. But all of this depends upon the pursuit of a different strategy of development and the choice of new policies.

There is no evidence that Mrs. Gandhi or any cabinet members or high officials are rethinking fundamentals. Neither political constraints nor ideological commitments are the barrier, though both play a role.

The simple fact is that Mrs. Gandhi is not a policy oriented person. When new measures have been adopted - e.g. the nationalization of the banks, or the end of the privy purses for ex-maharajas - they were for purely political reasons. She has been prepared to relax controls, but has not shown any inclination to rethink the question of the role of controls in the economy. Mrs. Gandhi, as several observers have noted, is a leader with attitudes rather than policies, with a point of view rather than a coherent ideology. Politics, personnel, and administrative decisions is what draws her attention, not the larger questions of what new policies should be pursued. It will take a major economic crisis, not simply a change in cabinet personnel, to force the government to rethink economic policies.

There are at least three major sets of economic problems that will force the government to make politically difficult decisions in the next few years.

The first of these is the growing balance of payments deficit, the result of rising oil prices, a slow growth in trade, and growing dependence upon imports.

The deficit in the balance of payments in 1979-80 was approximately \$3 billion and it doubled in 1980-81. If the deficit grows and the country's exchange reserves are drawn down, India is likely to experience a foreign exchange deficit as it did in the 1960s, though probably not of the same magnitude. Under these circumstances policymakers will try to reduce imports through import substitution, and encourage exports.

Dependence upon external agencies for funding will grow. Invariably, there will be disputes, particularly if the foreign exchange situation becomes serious enough for international donors to press for devaluation, the end of subsidies, or changes in policies. The question of private foreign investment, relatively dormant for some time, has already been raised with a decision by the government to encourage investment by OPEC countries under more favorable terms. The need for an assured oil supply, for concessional payment terms, and for barter agreements

will be important considerations affecting India's policies in West Asia. One difficult choice for the Government of India will be whether a grain surplus (food grain production is expected to be 136 million tons in 1980-81 and it could increase to 160 million tons by the mid-eighties) should be used to expand exports or used for a politically popular food for work program. As the balance of payments deficit grows officials in the central government will want to use food exports for oil rather than for rural works programs while many politicians in the states will pressure to continue these programs. Moreover, should India increase its military purchases the case for exporting food to pay for imports will be stronger.

The second political economy issue is the disparity between the prices of agricultural commodities and the soaring costs of agricultural production. In the last few years, peasants have become more concerned with the price and availability of agricultural inputs. Farmers want procurement prices for their produce at a price that will cover the cost of their inputs and provide them with a profitably return on their investment. As a class they want better terms of trade with the city - cotton prices that are commensurate with the cost of refined sugar, and so on.

Higher procurement prices are not easily provided by the government since they result in higher food prices which in turn generate protests from industrial labor, the urban middle class, and the urban and rural poor. Leftist supporters (and critics) of the government are divided, some discrediting the middle peasantry by labelling them "kulaks" and "capitalist farmers" while other see in their protest a revolutionary potential. For the government all the solutions are painful. The country needs the energies of the middle peasantry whose productivity is essential if the economy is to expand and exports grow, but the government finds it politically difficult to pass on the higher costs of production to consumers.

It is worth noting that it is the middle peasantry, not the landless agricultural laborers or poor marginal farmers that have been politically aroused. The prediction that the poor would not benefit from the green revolution has proven to be false. Many small farmers have also adopted the new technology, and more agricultural labor is employed where the new crops are planted. The Janata food for work scheme further spread the benefits. Inequalities have grown, but there has been a trickle down. In any event, outside of West Bengal and Kerala the poorest agriculturalists have not been politically organized as have the middle peasantry.

A third set of issues has to do with the growth of middle class unemployment. Unemployment is linked to the high birthrates and declining mortality rates of the 1960s and the slow industrial growth of the seventies and early eighties. But the problem of unemployment should also be seen in the context of expanding enrollments in secondary schools and colleges. The result is a higher educational level among the unemployed. The combined

effect of rapid population growth and expanding education has been to create not a middle class, but middle class aspirants in search of white collar jobs.

One safety valve has been the export of educated manpower. Nearly a million Indians have migrated to advanced industrial countries, particularly to the U.K., the United States, Canada and the Netherlands. Since 1973, another half million Indians have found employment in the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf states.

For the newly educated among social classes that have previously not been educated, opportunities for overseas employment are more limited, while the competition for employment within India is more acute. The problem therefore, of educated unemployment is particularly severe in some of the less developed regions. There is also an unemployment problem among the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as their educational level has increased, although they are partially helped by the system of reservations. And there is now a growing demand from the sons and daughters of the backward castes, many belonging to the middle peasantry, who have graduated from the secondary schools and colleges to search for non-agricultural white collar employment.

The employment demands by the newly educated take a variety of forms: for regional development, industries located in rural areas, and job reservations that can assure their social group a share of positions. The educated unemployed do not, of course, form a single class. As members of particular linguistic communities, castes, and tribes they turn to their community for political support with the result that demands often take an ethnic form.

The emergence of demands for reservations from the backward castes in U.P and Bihar were the most recent manifestations of this phenomenon. There are also signs of growing politicization among the emerging Muslim middle classes whose demand for adoption of Urdu as an official language in various states has employment as well as cultural implications. And the recent backlash against reservations for the scheduled castes in Gujarat is an indication that the improvement of the lower castes is now seen as an employment threat to many members of the middle and upper castes.

In human terms the problem of unemployment among the recently educated is probably less acute than the larger problem of unemployment among the rural poor, but in political terms it is often more serious since the middle classes are politically more articulate and have a capacity to rally large numbers of people to their cause by appeals to ethnic solidarity.

IV

Mrs. Gandhi's government is thus faced with a series of gaps - between imports and exports, between agricultural prices and the cost of agricultural inputs, and between the rapid expansion of education and the slow growth of employment. Each of these economic issues creates political challenges for the government, particularly since policies to deal with the political problems arising from these gaps create political costs. To give job reservations to one community, for example, is to generate political hostility from another. To help peasants is to hurt consumers. To invite more foreign investment is to evoke the anger of left nationalists.

The government may, of course, muddle through as governments often do. Several good monsoons which still further increase agricultural productivity would slow the inflation rate and might stimulate demand for and the production of consumer goods. A more rapid development of offshore oil and an

improvement in coal production would ease the energy and foreign exchange situations. If the agitations are confined to a few areas then ad hoc political solutions may be possible. However, with the expansion of a market economy in agriculture and the growing trade linkages between India and the outside world the economic problems and the policies the government adopts are often international or national, not regional or local.

If these economic problems grow, if they are accompanied by an increase in agitations, if neither the center nor the states can find political ways of managing these demands, if the level of violence increases, then within the bureaucracy, the government and the Congress party there will be many to call for authoritarian measures. (The American aphorism, "when the going gets tough, the tough get going", seems appropriate.) In the mid-seventies a government led by Mrs. Gandhi failed to muddle through and took recourse instead to authoritarianism. It was the growing centralization of power within the Congress party from 1972 to 1975 and a corresponding decline in the organization and popularity of the party within the states that set the stage for Mrs. Gandhi's decision to declare an emergency. The reinstating elections of 1980 produced an even more fragile system of authority than was produced by the elections of 1971 and 1972. Congress remains organizationally weak, and once again the Prime Minister is reluctant to allow political leaders with independent popular support to emerge in the states or in the center. At no time since independence has the electoral standing of the governing party been so dependent upon a single person's popularity. The party desperately needs to have in the wings a nationally popular vote winning personality. Hence the interest in building up Rajiv. A combination of intractable economic problems and a fragile institutional structure for the management of political conflict continues to make the Indian political system particularly vulnerable to authoritarianism.

Where is India going in the next few years? Shifting to the right? To the left? Civil conflict? Another emergency? And economically - to

an agricultural boom or a foreign exchange disaster? Who can say? Still, some lines of development seem more likely than others.

--It is inconceivable that a country as poor, ethnically diverse and politically open as India will not experience some severe economic and/or political crises - perhaps a drought-induced decline in agricultural productivity one year, a worsening of inflation, and political protest movements by peasant proprietors, landless laborers, industrial workers, backward castes, university students, religious minorities, regional malcontents and other groups not yet heard from.

--So long as the central leadership prevents the emergence of powerful state leaders, then instability in the states seems inevitable, and the center must spend much of its time mending the state governments.

--Political turmoil in the Hindi states, particularly Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, eroded Mrs. Gandhi's position in 1974-75, and led to the emergency, and in 1976-77, that led to her electoral defeat. She will keep a close watch on this region, and so will her son.

--India's most productive classes remain frustrated by the present set of economic policies and they will press hard on the fringes for change. The middle peasantry, the scientific/engineering community, the new entrepreneurial/management class - all three the product of India's increasingly modernizing economy, and the growth of her educational system - are impatient with a leadership that is preoccupied with politics and a bureaucracy that remains preoccupied with regulations.


--There are no signs that this government will be innovative, either in domestic or foreign affairs. Its stance is a reactive one - to wait for a crisis, then try to cope with it. There are no indications that the government

is moving to the "left" or to the "right", whatever those labels mean, for so far there have been no indications of any significant policy movements at all. New policies are likely to be crisis induced.

ELECTORAL SWINGS - THE VOTE FOR MRS. GANDHI'S CONGRESS


1962 - 1980

GROUP - I



| | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Karnataka | 5. Punjab | 9. Rajasthan | 13. Jammu & Kashmir |
| 2. Orissa | 6. Himachal Pradesh | 10. Bihar | |
| 3. Assam | 7. Delhi | 11. Uttar Pradesh | |
| 4. Maharashtra | 8. Madhya Pradesh | 12. Haryana | |

ELECTORAL SWINGS — THE VOTE FOR MRS. GANDHI'S CONGRESS
1962 - 1980



- | | |
|-------------------|------------|
| 1. Andhra Pradesh | 5. Kerala |
| 2. Gujarat | 6. Manipur |
| 3. West Bengal | 7. Tripura |
| 4. Tamil Nadu | |

TABLE 1

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1971, 1977, 1980

| PARTY | 1971 | | 1977 | | 1980 | |
|-------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|
| | SEATS WON | PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES | SEATS WON | PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES | SEATS WON | PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES |
| Congress(I) | 352 | 43.7 | 153 | 34.5 | 351 | 42.7 |
| Congress(U) | | | | | 13 | 5.3 |
| Janata | | | 298 | 43.2 | 31 | 18.9 |
| Congress(O) | 16 | 10.4 | | | | |
| Jana Sangh | 22 | 7.4 | | | | |
| Swatantra | 8 | 3.1 | | | | |
| Socialists | 5 | 3.5 | | | | |
| Bharatiya Lok Dal | 2 | 3.2 | | | | |
| | 53 | 27.6 | | | 41 | 9.4 |
| CPI | 23 | 4.7 | 7 | 2.8 | 11 | 2.6 |
| CPI(M) | 25 | 5.1 | 21 | 4.3 | 35 | 6.0 |
| DMK | 23 | 3.8 | 1 | | 16 | |
| AIADMK | | | 18 | 4.7 | 2 | 4.5 |
| Akali Dal | | | 8 | | 1 | |
| Independents | 14 | 8.3 | 14 | 10.5 | 8 | 10.5 |
| Others | | | 19 | | 16 | |
| TOTAL | 513 | 100.0 | 539 | 100.0 | 525 | 100.0 |

TABLE 2

VOTE FOR CONGRESS PARTY, 1962 TO 1980

(in percentages)

| STATE | 1962 | 1967 | 1971 | 1977 | 1980 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Andhra Pradesh | 48.0 | 46.9 | 55.8 | 57.4 | 56.2 |
| Assam | 45.2 | 45.8 | 57.0 | 50.6 | - |
| Bihar | 43.9 | 34.8 | 40.1 | 22.9 | 36.4 |
| Gujarat | 49.5 | 46.9 | 45.3 | 46.9 | 54.8 |
| Haryana | 40.3 | 44.1 | 52.6 | 18.0 | 29.3 |
| Himachal Pradesh | 56.7 | 48.3 | 77.0 | 38.6 | 50.7 |
| Jammu and Kashmir | - | 50.5 | 53.9 | 16.4 | 19.3 |
| Karnataka | 52.7 | 49.0 | 70.8 | 56.8 | 56.3 |
| Kerala | 34.3 | 36.2 | 19.8 | 29.1 | 26.3 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 39.6 | 40.8 | 45.5 | 32.5 | 46.5 |
| Maharashtra | 30.3 | 48.3 | 63.5 | 47.0 | 53.3 |
| Manipur | 26.0 | 32.7 | 30.1 | 45.3 | 23.0 |
| Nagaland | - | - | 39.5 | 48.3 | - |
| Orissa | 55.5 | 33.3 | 38.4 | 38.2 | 55.7 |
| Punjab | 41.9 | 37.3 | 45.9 | 34.9 | 52.5 |
| Rajasthan | 37.6 | 39.9 | 50.3 | 30.6 | 42.7 |
| Tamil Nadu | 47.4 | 41.7 | 12.5 | 22.3 | 31.6 |
| Tripura | 31.9 | 58.3 | 36.3 | 39.7 | 22.6 |
| Uttar Pradesh | 38.2 | 33.7 | 48.0 | 25.0 | 35.9 |
| West Bengal | 46.8 | 39.8 | 27.7 | 29.4 | 36.5 |
| Delhi | 40.4 | 38.8 | 64.5 | 30.2 | 50.4 |
| TOTAL, India | 44.7 | 40.7 | 43.6 | 34.5 | 42.7 |

TABLE 3

"JANATA PARTY" VOTE, BY STATE, 1971, 1977, 1980

(vote in percentages)

| STATE | 1971 ^a | 1977 ^b | 1980 | | TOTAL |
|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|--------|---------|-------|
| | | | JANATA | LOK DAL | |
| Andhra Pradesh | 12.1 | 32.3 | 15.3 | 6.4 | 21.7 |
| Assam | 11.6 | 35.8 | - | - | - |
| Bihar | 34.0 | 65.0 | 23.6 | 16.6 | 40.2 |
| Gujarat | 48.6 | 49.5 | 36.9 | 2.9 | 39.8 |
| Haryana | 25.6 | 70.4 | 28.1 | 33.5 | 61.6 |
| Himachal Pradesh | 17.7 | 57.2 | 36.2 | 5.6 | 41.8 |
| Jammu and Kashmir | 13.1 | 8.2 | 9.0 | - | 9.0 |
| Karnataka | 24.2 | 39.8 | 22.9 | 1.2 | 24.1 |
| Kerala | 6.1 | 7.2 | 6.7 | - | 6.7 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 38.7 | 57.9 | 31.7 | 7.9 | 34.6 |
| Maharashtra | 12.5 | 31.4 | 20.6 | 1.1 | 21.6 |
| Manipur | 14.2 | 8.6 | 17.6 | - | 17.6 |
| Orissa | 50.6 | 51.8 | 14.4 | 19.5 | 33.9 |
| Punjab | 9.9 | 12.5 | 10.0 | 2.2 | 12.2 |
| Rajasthan | 31.3 | 65.2 | 30.4 | 12.1 | 42.5 |
| Tamil Nadu | 40.7 | 16.1 | 8.0 | 0.5 | 8.5 |
| Tripura | 0.5 | 17.8 | - | - | - |
| Uttar Pradesh | 38.0 | 68.1 | 22.6 | 29.0 | 51.6 |
| West Bengal | 12.9 | 21.5 | 4.6 | 0.5 | 5.1 |
| Delhi | 31.4 | 68.2 | 37.9 | 6.9 | 44.8 |
| TOTAL, India | 27.7 | 43.2 | 18.9 | 9.4 | 28.3 |

^aCombined vote for Congress O., Jana Sangh, the Samyutka Socialist party, Bharatiya Kranti Dal, the Praja Socialist party, the Utkal Congress, the Swatantra party the the Bangla Congress.

^bCombined vote for Janata party, Congress for Democracy, and in Tamil Nadu the Congress O.

TABLE 4

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST) VOTE, BY STATE, 1971, 1977, 1980
(in percentages)

| STATE | 1971 | 1977 | 1980 |
|----------------|------|------|------|
| Andhra Pradesh | 2.8 | 4.7 | 3.6 |
| Assam | 1.4 | 2.9 | - |
| Kerala | 26.2 | 20.3 | 19.1 |
| Maharashtra | 0.5 | 3.6 | 1.4 |
| Orissa | 1.1 | 2.0 | 0.9 |
| Punjab | 2.2 | 4.9 | 2.5 |
| Tamil Nadu | 1.6 | 1.6 | 3.2 |
| Tripura | 43.5 | 34.1 | 47.5 |
| West Bengal | 34.5 | 26.2 | 39.4 |
| TOTAL, India | 5.2 | 4.3 | 6.0 |

Note: All of the states where the Communist party of India (Marxist) ran candidates in 1971 and 1977 are shown. In 1980 the CPI(M) also put up three candidates in Bihar (winning 0.9%), and one candidate in each of the following states: Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and U.P. Tripura, where the CPI(M) won its highest percentage in all three elections, has only two seats in Parliament. For the distribution of CPI(M) seats in Parliament, see Table 1.

TABLE 5

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA VOTE, BY STATE, 1971, 1977, 1980

(in percentages)

| STATE | 1971 | 1977 | 1980 |
|------------------|------|------|------|
| Andhra Pradesh | 5.9 | 2.7 | 3.7 |
| Assam | 5.6 | 1.4 | - |
| Bihar | 9.9 | 5.6 | 7.3 |
| Himachal Pradesh | 1.7 | 1.4 | 2.5 |
| Kerala | 9.1 | 10.4 | 6.5 |
| Madhya Pradesh | 1.1 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| Maharashtra | 1.7 | 0.7 | 0.5 |
| Manipur | 15.0 | 11.5 | 9.7 |
| Orissa | 4.3 | 3.2 | 0.9 |
| Punjab | 6.2 | 1.7 | 1.3 |
| Tamil Nadu | 5.4 | 4.6 | 3.6 |
| Tripura | 6.8 | 2.2 | - |
| Uttar Pradesh | 4.4 | 1.1 | 1.6 |
| West Bengal | 10.3 | 6.5 | 4.4 |
| TOTAL, India | 4.8 | 2.8 | 2.6 |

Note: All of the states in which the Communist party of India ran candidates in 1971 or 1977 are shown. In 1980, the CPI also put up one candidate in each of the following states: Karnataka, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Delhi.

TABLE 6

CONGRESS VOTE IN SCHEDULED CASTE CONSTITUENCIES, 1977 AND 1980

| STATE | 1977 | | 1980 | |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------|--------------------|-------|
| | SCHEDULED CASTE | STATE | SCHEDULED CASTE | STATE |
| Andhra Pradesh (6) | 63.4 | 57.4 | 66.5 | 56.2 |
| Bihar (8) | 20.4 | 22.9 | 40.3 | 36.4 |
| Delhi (1) | 34.2 | 30.2 | 55.4 | 50.4 |
| Gujarat (2) | 37.8 | 46.9 | 55.7 | 37.8 |
| Haryana (2) | 27.7 | 18.0 | 35.9 | 29.3 |
| Himachal Pradesh (1) | 32.0 | 38.6 | 51.0 | 50.7 |
| Karnataka (4) | 55.3 | 56.8 | 57.4 | 56.3 |
| Kerala (2) | 27.3 | 29.1 | 45.9 | 26.3 |
| Madhya Pradesh (5) | 38.4 | 32.5 | 43.4 | 46.5 |
| Maharashtra (3) | 39.7 | 47.0 | 54.4 | 53.3 |
| Orissa (3) | 41.1 | 38.2 | 56.6 | 55.7 |
| Punjab (3) | 30.1 | 34.9 | 47.2 | 52.5 |
| Rajasthan (4) | 32.7 | 30.6 | 50.5 | 42.7 |
| Uttar Pradesh (18) | 22.5 | 25.0 | 33.8 | 35.9 |
| West Bengal (8) | 31.6 | 29.4 | 38.2 | 36.5 |
| Tamil Nadu * | 65.7 | 22.3 | 58.6 | 31.6 |

* In 1977 the Congress party contested 2 out of 7 reserved constituencies. In 1980 the Congress party contested 3 out of 7 reserved constituencies.

TABLE 7

CONGRESS VOTE IN SCHEDULED TRIBE CONSTITUENCIES, 1977 AND 1980

| STATE | 1977 | | 1980 | |
|--------------------|-----------------|-------|-----------------|-------|
| | SCHEDULED TRIBE | STATE | SCHEDULED TRIBE | STATE |
| Andhra Pradesh (2) | 57.2 | 57.4 | 47.8 | 56.2 |
| Bihar (5) | 23.7 | 22.9 | 35.6 | 36.4 |
| Gujarat (4) | 52.0 | 46.9 | 55.5 | 54.8 |
| Madhya Pradesh (8) | 34.6 | 32.5 | 52.3 | 46.5 |
| Maharashtra (3) | 49.7 | 47.0 | 57.8 | 53.3 |
| Orissa (4) | 43.6 | 38.2 | 53.6 | 55.7 |
| Rajasthan (3) | 21.6 | 30.6 | 51.0 | 42.7 |
| West Bengal (2) | 37.4 | 31.7 | 32.1 | 36.5 |

TABLE 8

CONGRESS VOTE IN MUSLIM CONSTITUENCIES, 1977 AND 1980

(in percentages)

| STATE | CONSTITUENCIES 20% OR MORE MUSLIMS | | STATE-WIDE | | DIFFERENCE | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|------|------------|------|------------|-------|
| | 1977 | 1980 | 1977 | 1980 | 1977 | 1980 |
| Uttar Pradesh (N*=23) | 25.9 | 34.4 | 25.0 | 35.9 | +0.9 | -1.5 |
| West Bengal (N=24) | 29.1 | 37.6 | 29.4 | 36.5 | -0.3 | +1.1 |
| Bihar (N=4) | 30.5 | 48.7 | 22.9 | 36.4 | +7.6 | +12.3 |
| Andhra Pradesh (N=5) | 55.8 | 52.4 | 57.4 | 56.2 | -1.6 | -3.8 |

TABLE 9

CONGRESS AND ITS NEAREST OPPONENT
STATE ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULTS, 1980
(Percentage of votes)

| STATE | CONGRESS(I) | CLOSEST COMPETITOR |
|----------------|-------------|-------------------------------|
| Bihar | 32.4 | 15.7 (Lok Dal) |
| Gujarat | 51.1 | 22.6 (Janata) |
| Kerala | 17.7 | 19.4 (CPI-M) |
| Madhya Pradesh | 47.5 | 30.3 (Bharatiya Janata Party) |
| Maharashtra | 44.5 | 20.8 (Congress-U) |
| Orissa | 47.9 | 19.6 (Lok Dal) |
| Punjab | 45.2 | 26.9 (Shrimoni Akali Dal) |
| Rajasthan | 43.0 | 18.6 (Bharatiya Janata Party) |
| Tamil Nadu | 20.5 | 38.7 (AIADMK) |
| Uttar Pradesh | 37.6 | 21.6 (Lok Dal) |

TABLE 10
 CONGRESS AND ITS NEAREST OPPONENT
 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS, 1980
 (Percentage of votes)

| STATE | CONGRESS(I) | CLOSEST COMPETITOR |
|--------------------|-------------|--|
| Andhra Pradesh | 56.2 | 15.3 (Janata) |
| Bihar | 36.4 | 23.6 (Janata) |
| Gujarat | 54.8 | 36.9 (Janata) |
| Haryana | 29.3 | 33.5 (Lok Dal) |
| Himachal Pradesh | 50.7 | 36.2 (Janata) |
| Jammu and Kashmir* | 19.3 | 37.1 (Jammu & Kashmir National Conference) |
| Karnataka | 56.3 | 22.9 (Janata) |
| Kerala | 26.3 | 19.1 (CPI-M) |
| Madhya Pradesh | 46.5 | 31.7 (Janata) |
| Maharashtra | 53.3 | 20.6 (Janata) |
| Manipur | 23.0 | 17.6 (Janata) |
| Orissa | 55.7 | 19.5 (Lok Dal) |
| Punjab | 52.5 | 23.4 (Akali Dal) |
| Rajasthan | 42.7 | 30.4 (Janata) |
| Tamil Nadu | 31.6 | 25.4 (AIADMK) |
| Tripura | 22.6 | 47.5 (CPI-M) |
| Uttar Pradesh | 35.9 | 29.0 (Lok Dal) |
| West Bengal | 36.5 | 39.4 (CPI-M) |

*Srinigar and Ladakh are not included because JKNC stood uncontested in Srinigar and elections were not held in Ladakh during January 1980.