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SOME ASPECTS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

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I have long been puzzled about what is at issue when people debate the merits of studies called, (in the presently popular jargon), "behavioral" versus others called "conventional." Today perhaps I can share my confusion with you.

Emissaries of nations dealing with each other are engaged in human behavior as much as any other human beings. Insofar as valid methods exist for studying human behavior they may be applied to this situation as to any other. Awareness of that obvious fact has not elevated us to a level of insight not shared by our forbears. It is a reaffirmation of what has always been understood.

There is, though, one justification for the sense of discovery which students of political behavior now often express. We have at our command certain newly acquired facilities for observation of the individual. In the absence of such facilities social scientists must often be satisfied with establishing correlations between a condition and its predictable consequences, skipping the difficult task of describing the human acts which lead from these conditions to the consequence. The student of political behavior can now begin to fill in some of the intermediate mechanisms. This highly abstract statement needs an example.

Students of politics often correlate certain economic, physical, or demographic facts with the policies of nations. Thus, for example, political geographers try to predict which nations will become empire builders from analyses of their resources, their lines of communication, climate, population, etc. It is not the climate or the minerals which build empires; it is statesmen. But sometimes we can allow ourselves to forget the statesmen and their behavior since we find that a correlation exists between the conditions and the consequences regardless of the peculiarities of the intermediate individuals. Building such depersonalized theories is a reasonable activity. If it turns out that in fact insular powers do attempt to prevent the consolidation of unified control on neighboring continents, this is an important fact to know, even had we not the slightest suspicion about the mental processes, the internal

maneuvering, and the political acts by which such a policy was implemented. Similarly, if we find that as a matter of accepted international practice or law, navies treat foreign vessels differently inside and outside of a line three miles off shore, that is an important fact to know and from it predictions can be made. If in practice, ship captains obey this item of international law, we can neglect for many purposes observation of the quality and mode of their behavior while so doing. In short, students of international relations (as other social scientists), have developed extensive fields in which they establish correlations without concerning themselves with the behavioral mechanism by which the correlations come into being.

I have already suggested that this practice often results not only from the irrelevance of the intermediate conditions but also sometimes from lack of facilities for observation of the intermediate data. The lack of facilities may vary in cause. For one thing, the student of international relations is often trained primarily in an historical or legal tradition of library research while the unpublished data which he needs can be ascertained only through interviews, testing, participant observation, or experimental manipulation, skills with which he is not familiar.

Secondly, the behavior lying between the condition of a country and its policy actions is often massive and not effectively observable by a single scholar. Thus while a single scholar can safely assume that the development of a great military potential and force in being in one country will produce counter-armaments in its strong neighbors, he cannot by himself track down the way in which knowledge of the foreign development reaches the thousands of influential persons who each play petty roles in building up a state of public anxiety and then in forming a policy. For that he would need all the resources of modern group research and survey techniques.

In the third place, the behavior which the scholar wishes to observe is often highly confidential. Finally, the behavior is usually that of elite groups whom the modest social scientist hesitates to badger. Under these circumstances the social scientist quite rightly does the best he can and develops a theory based on the behavior of institutions or aggregates, apparently omitting the human beings

who compose them. In defense of such bodies of theory, whether geo-politics or international law or what-not, we should add that few of their practitioners if any have ever denied that their propositions were mediated by human behavior, nor denied that it would be a good thing to have more knowledge about that human behavior. It should also be reaffirmed that such a correlational body of theory is both scientific and useful.

We are fortunate, however, at the present stage in being able to break through some of the previous limitations to scientific observation of international behavior. New research techniques have developed in some of our sister disciplines which we can apply. In addition, our prestige as scientists has grown to the point where we can sometimes successfully inject ourselves for the observation of confidential elite behavior. Finally, adequate resources are coming our way to permit massive observation. These present facts do not seem to me to constitute a new school of thought, but only an opportunity to look more closely at some aspects of international relations about which we previously speculated.

I wish in this paper to discuss three types of studies which deal with aspects of political behavior in international relations on which we are gaining added insight thanks to the new facilities and resources open to us. First there are studies of elites and their behavior. Secondly, there are studies which seek better to formalize the analysis of rational calculation. Thirdly, there are studies of the role of identifications and reference groups in political behavior.

These three aspects of political behavior should ring familiarly to students of international relations, for international relations are generally relations among diplomatic officials, (i.e. elites) engaged in bargaining and power strategies, (i.e. rational maximizing), on behalf of units of national identification.

I. Studies of Elite Behavior

Much of the data on elites is biographic, often deriving from Who's Who's, obituaries, and similar sources. By now there is a rather extensive literature analyzing such data. I am naturally inclined to refer to the Hoover Institute Studies in one of which, The Comparative Study of Elites by Lasswell, Lerner, and Rothwell, there is a bibliography through 1952. A more recent survey by Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision Makers, contains some later references. Elite studies of this sort are appearing with increasing frequency, and a number of those in the works, (notably by Suzanne Keller and S. Ramalingam) focus on diplomats.

There are obvious limitations to the inferences which can be drawn from the social composition of an elite, though such data coupled with historical knowledge and general information may provide the basis for fruitful inferences. We may gain insight from such facts as that one parliament is heavily weighted with teachers, another with lawyers, and another with military men. Several caveats are in order, however.

(1) The significant implications are not uniquely derived from the structural data. There is no uniform one to one relationship between having a large number of men from a single prep school in a foreign service and the operation of that service. The social structural facts reduce the possible variance and are therefore clues which a sophisticated observer can use in his interpretation, but it would be misleading to claim more for them than that.

(2) An institutional framework limits, or we might say homogenizes, the actions of different types of men, imposing some uniformity upon them. Thus for example the M.I.T. study of the activity of heads of firms on the Reciprocal Trade issue found education to be a relatively trivial variable in explaining behavior. That is the reverse of the finding in almost every survey of a cross section of the national population. Political and social difference between the educated and the poorly educated are usually enormous. Among heads of firms, however, the significant fact was the social position that a man had achieved. If he had done so despite a lack of educational advantages he had nevertheless in the process turned himself into roughly the same kind of person as others born to and trained for high status.

Thus institutional controls may limit the predictive relevance of social composition.

(3) Elite composition studies need to be supplemented by studies of elite perspectives. To ascertain, as Schueller did, that the early members of the Politburo included a large proportion of persons of urban, cosmopolitan origin, whereas the later members were more largely of peasant origin, is significant and interesting mostly if we can add some propositions about differences in calculations made by men of these two kinds. Elite perspective studies, (including operational code and reference group studies, to both of which we shall return), and elite composition studies complement each other.

A review of the literature on foreign policy perspectives would reveal that until the last few years those studies which made efforts at careful observation and precise measurement were those which dealt with the perspectives of the general public or the mass media, while studies which took account of the perspectives of influential small, elite circles tended to be highly impressionistic, historical, and speculative. Through the 1920's and 1930's dissertations were being produced at Chicago, Stanford, Columbia and elsewhere on public opinion in country A about country B or about war X. The usual procedure was to survey editorials and sometimes news stories, quoting and sometimes counting the themes that appeared. The preface usually contained a correct bow to the inadequacy of press coverage as an index of effective opinion. Having no better index, the authors did what they could, however.

A decade or two later, the public opinion polls came into the field. Polls started out to measure the opinion of the voting public. They made no attempt to weight one man's opinion as more important or less important than another. They took the easy out of weighting each man's opinion as one, a procedure which is just as arbitrary and no more defensible, but at least reduces problems of statistical analysis to the minimum.

Public opinion polls were seldom launched by students of international relations for their own purposes; however hundreds of surveys included something or other on international attitudes. By the late 1940's a vast mine existed, largely unworked despite the admirable efforts of Gabriel Almond in The American People and Foreign Policy, Thomas A. Bailey in The Man in the Street, Jerome Bruner in Mandate

from the People, and Hadley Cantril in Public Opinion, 1935-1946 and How Nations See Each Other. These writings began what will undoubtedly be a continuing effort to ascertain who are the people who know anything about world affairs, who are the ones who care about them, what the people want, and what they are willing to do about it.

It soon became clear, if it was not clear already, that for foreign policy in particular (as for many other technical fields) the attitude of the general public, (while not unimportant) is but a minor factor compared to the special interests of small groups of highly involved persons. Long before the polls came along, Congressmen had concluded rightly or wrongly that nobody ever lost an election on foreign policy. They and other men of practical wisdom minimized poll results recognizing that often what matters is not what the public thinks, but what certain small influential groups are willing to do.

For the same reasons the traditional political scientist had focussed on the activity of these elite groups in foreign policy. Often he wrote historical monographs based on memoirs of the mighty or he himself might be a scholar-statesman writing on the basis of first-hand knowledge. Such studies, however, lacked the rigor of modern observational techniques. They had realism but not the freedom of analysis that comes from scientific detachment nor the objectivity and system of it. The alternatives seemed to be to use modern attitude measurement methods, but to duck the difficult problems of getting access and cooperation from key groups, or to work one's way to positions where one could get information about circles of influence by remaining at best a bright commentator. A few writers such as Hans Speier have for some time insisted on the importance of studies on opinion and attitude focussing on the true influentials and set in the context of an adequate understanding of the social structure through which they act. But other social scientists have despaired of the prospect. Now the possibility of such studies has been demonstrated by several successful on-going programs. At Princeton Hadley Cantril and Lloyd A. Free are about to embark on a long-range program of research growing out of a series of studies which Lloyd Free has already conducted in Japan, France, and Italy. In all of these studies Free has used extensive interviewing with top-level policy makers to reach certain generalizations about the ways in which decisions are made in those countries. Similar in the basic

method of data collection are the studies being conducted at the Rand Corporation by Hans Speier, Nathan Leites, Gabriel Almond, and others in which the focus is also on policy attitudes of elite groups. At M.I.T., the Research Program in International Communications was set up with the specific injunction to study elite behavior in international relations.

Being most familiar with the last of these programs, let me describe in more detail what has happened in a series of studies in each of which we have interviewed top-level samples. Harold Isaacs has been doing a study of American attitudes towards India and China. Isaacs' background is that of a highly skilled newsman rather than that of a cloistered scholar. It was therefore not unnatural for him to decide to interview a panel of 175 influential people, about half of whom have major personal experience with Asia. Because a large proportion of these people are prominent and therefore easily identified, I can say no more than that the sample includes a large proportion of the men in public and private life, who in the last few years have played a major role in moulding Asia policy. The interviews repeatedly reveal the degree to which major policy judgments are affected by the deep traces of early private experiences. The respondents have typically reacted to depth interviews with enthusiastic interest. The interview, scheduled to take two hours, is an intense emotional experience for most of the participants who rapidly find that they are exploring the early roots of their images of Asia. The willingness of highly placed respondents to expose these is a testimonial to the extent to which good faith and the confidence of freedom is assumed in the United States. It would be absurd to believe that similar cooperation could be obtained under all circumstances or in all countries, though cooperation is being reported by our field workers in India and France.

In France Daniel Lerner, in cooperation with the French Political Science Association and an especially established Institut d'Études Européennes has been able to launch a program of 1000 interviews with elite Frenchmen on problems of European unity. This has been possible despite a strong cultural emphasis upon privacy, because of the distinguished character of the sponsoring institute of which Andre Siegfried is the Chairman and Raymond Aron on the Scientific Committee. Other Institute members include the President of the Employers Association, of the

non-Communist and Catholic Unions Federations, etc.

Another study in our program at M.I.T. is of American business attitudes towards foreign economic policy. Here we interviewed heads of American firms in a one hour survey type interview, and 500 other leading figures including some 52 Congressmen in unstructured newspaper type interviews. The survey of heads of firms included 166 out of 203 such firms in the United States with 10,000 or more employees. In this material we have a mine of data about the foreign policy attitudes and personal political behavior of businessmen, information of a kind which many scholars have considered impossible to collect.

For example we got answers to questions such as, "During the last month or so, have you talked with anyone. . .about the subject of tariffs or foreign trade?" "Was this just an informal discussion or in a formal meeting?" "On most issues, which groups in this district do you think your Congressman listens to most?" "Suppose a majority of the businessmen in this district came out for a tariff policy that was opposite to the position taken by the Congressman, do you think the Congressman would go along with the views of the businessmen?" "Have you or your company ever gotten in touch with a Congressman or Senator?" "When? About what?" "Would it be best to get in touch with him directly or approach him indirectly?"

II. Formalizations of Rational Strategies.

Any behavior, elite or otherwise, aimed to influence foreign affairs may be analyzed as a problem of rational strategy. The actor has a value he wishes to maximize and also has some conscious or unconscious theories about means by which that may be achieved. In this connection I would like to take note of game theory and the theory of operational codes, on both of which topics workers at the Rand Corporation have been active.

Game theory was evolved for the primary benefit of economists. The seminal event was the publication in 1944 of The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern. It is a theory predicated upon the assumption that n opponents are each trying to maximize his receipt of some quantifiable value under conditions in which the gain for one is loss to the others. It proceeds also on the assumption that there is a definable and known list of alternative strategies available to each opponent. Finally, it proceeds on the assumption that each opponent should be expected to play his best strategy. It is therefore a theory of conservative rather than speculative play. This theory, lucidly described in a way that any political scientist can follow by J. D. Williams in The Compleat Strategist, has obvious analogies to many political situations, particularly in international relations. We should, however, also stress its limitations for our purposes.

In almost all political situations available intelligence enables us to prognosticate to some degree the strategy which an opponent is likely to take rather than forcing us to assume that he will use his optimum strategy. Furthermore, there are very few international situations which are zero sum games, i.e. a loss to one is an equivalent gain to another. Finally, there are very few in which the number of alternative strategies is finite and generally known. Clearly then, game theory as it exists today is not the solution for the political scientist's problem. Yet it contains enormous promise for the formalization of at least some aspects or simplified models of international situations and is being used in exactly that way. The attempt to formalize helps us become aware of our assumptions even if the attempt fails.

Less formal and much closer to the traditional content of political science is the attempt by a number of authors in recent years to state systematically the operational codes of different policy makers. By an operational code we mean a set of propositions (usually implicit) about the way things are likely to happen and the ways in which outcomes can be influenced. It is, in short, a statement of how a player sees the rules and strategies of the game. The operational code of many lobbyists in the United States, for example, includes the belief that Congressmen's opinions are affected by mail, that personal letters will be attended to better than form ones, and that constituents will get more attention than strangers. I have picked a rather mundane example. The interesting parts of an operational code are the parts which are not so generally conscious. Thus, for instance, a key proposition in any operational code formulates the role of compromise. Does the politician conceive of compromise as a goal desirable in itself, as a concession of defeat, or as a weapon to be used temporarily until one is ready for stronger action.

Most of the published work on operational codes to date deals with the Soviet code, although Margaret Mead has made some insightful remarks about British negotiatory and political behavior in And Keep Your Powder Dry.* On Soviet codes of political behavior, the main studies are Johnson and Mosely, Negotiating with the Russians, and Nathan Leites' Study of Bolshevism of which a shorter version appeared under the title of The Operational Code of the Politburo. Leites is doing further work now in France. Pamela Wrinch has been writing at Yale on the operational code of Winston Churchill.

* See also "A Case History in Cross-National Communications" in Lyman Bryson, ed., Communication of Ideas, New York, 1948, pp. 209-229; or "The Application of Anthropological Techniques to Cross National Communication" in Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, Feb. 1947, Series II, Vol. 9, #4, pp. 133-151.

Political scientists have written operational codes for centuries. Among the more famous ones are those found in Aristotle's Politics and Rhetoric, Machiavelli's Prince, and so forth. The distinctive characteristic of the newer operational codes may be credited to the contributions of cultural anthropology and psychoanalysis. Cultural anthropology has made us aware of the differences in the assumptions made by persons in different cultures. Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Geoffrey Gorer and others have made it difficult to assume, for example, that power is a value universally desired in the same form by everyone. As a result we now tend to state the assumptions about the universe as propositions characteristic of people in specific cultures rather than as universal truths. Instead of writing a la Machiavelli about the skillful use of flattery or threats, we now tend to ask, what is the conception held by a German, a Japanese, a Frenchman, an Indian, or an American about the role of threats and flattery in an act of persuasion.

Clearly, we are dealing with a psychological as well as an expediential problem. Machiavelli or Kautilya could give advice on the assumption that for any one set of circumstances there was one optimum strategy to reach a specified goal. But to explain the code chosen by a specific political actor we must take account not only of considerations of pure rationality in the abstract, but also of the unconscious forces working to make the politicians see one strategy as rational rather than another.

Let me take Nathan Leites' study of Bolshevik behavior to illustrate the link between the psychological and operational interpretations. The Bolshevik code according to Leites sees the self as located in an essentially hostile world in which enemies constantly seek one's annihilation, (S.B. Chapter XVIII). The danger, however, arises not from the activities of the enemy alone but from an inclination of the self to become passive and relaxed in the face of this danger, (S.B. pp. 249 ff., p. 25) Survival requires constant effort and vigilance. The code therefore prescribes the maintenance of total self-control. Furthermore, it projects the practice of such control on the external world and on the enemy.

Thus it assumes that there are no accidents. Every act of the enemy is carefully calculated, (O.C.P. p. 1). Anger, aggression, showing of feeling on the part of the enemy are assumed to be turned on and off as water from a tap, (S.B. pp. 188 ff.) A Bolshevik correspondingly must not be provoked by the enemy (O.C.P. p. 42). He must at all times control his feelings, using anger, friendliness, etc. as weapons, (O.C.P. Chapter V). The gravest danger is always that of dependency, passivity, and being used. (O.C.P. Chapters IX and X). To ward off this danger calls for maximum effort to the limits of strength and skill, (S.B. Chapter VIII). It also calls for complete precision in conforming to the party line, (S.B. Chapter IV), which either prescribes or forbids every detail of conduct. (O.C.B. p. 1).

Now a set of statements of the sort indicated above may be dismissed as platitudinous by an unsympathetic reader. Any writer of political advice would mention the necessity of working hard, of being able to control one's feelings on occasion, and of recognizing in politics a struggle against enemies. The point of the above statements is clearly a quantitative one. It deals with degree of obsession. Just as the psychiatrist distinguishes personalities, not on the basis of their manifesting or failing to manifest any of the universal traits of human behavior such as aggressiveness, dependency, sexuality, etc. but rather on the extent to which certain conceptions and handling of these **universals** are recurrent in life or in the obsessions or silences occurring in repeated interviews; so the student of operational codes in politics notes emphases above all. A vision of the world as peopled by enemies bent on one's destruction differs from a vision of the world as peopled by "good guys", not in a flat proposition about "all people", but in the degree of salience of one or another assumptions when interpreting a situation.

A large proportion of the categories of current operational code descriptions, particularly those of Nathan Leites, are as indicated above, categories used extensively in individual psychiatric descriptions. Much of the above summary of Leites' analysis of Bolshevik could be rephrased in Freudian terms as a reaction

formation against passive, receptive longings. Depressed passivity, (which is viewed by the Bolsheviks as the Russian national character), is counteracted by compulsive activity.

The fact that there is this borrowing of categories from individual psychology is not to say that individuals and nations are being analyzed in the same way as some of the critics of psychiatric interpretations allege. Undoubtedly, the fact that groups, nations, or political parties consist of individuals helps explain the transferability of some of the psychiatric categories. Nevertheless, no automatic transferability is implied. What we have here is a normal phenomenon in the development of any science. A large proportion of all scientific advances consist of borrowing insights from other disciplines. Darwin's theory of evolution came straight out of Malthus. The atom for many years was pictured as a miniature solar system. In the history of political theory, we have had biological analogies, physical analogies, familial analogies, etc. The only relevant question to ask about the categories of an operational code is whether they work, not what suggested them.

The code works if it predicts regularities of behavior. The next step, as yet only begun in operational code studies, is to apply simultaneously two operational codes in the study of a negotiation or other situation in which persons who make different assumptions about the nature of reality and behavior are thrown together. This is obviously like analyzing a game. This type of analysis is foreshadowed in Negotiating With the Russians and in some comments of Margaret Mead's. It would seem to hold great promise for the study of international relations.

III. Studies of International Identifications and Reference Groups.

To distinguish most simply the study of international identifications from that of operational codes we can resort to a dichotomy long used by political scientists in one form or another, or more accurately to any one of a series of common dichotomies which, however, leave the universe divided in approximately the same way. These are the dichotomies between expectations and identifications, between facts and values, between rational and non-rational factors in human behavior.

The social scientist analyzes behavior part of the time by formal examination of the relationships between means and ends and part of the time by observation of the ways in which identifications, habits, passions, etc. determine behavior independently of its deliberate quality. An operational code calculates how a self can maximize some value it wants, but there remains the question: who is that self? The cathexis or feelings which define the self and the other are parameters, not subjects, of the calculation. To what other individuals does the political actor relate himself in "we" aggregates, and how does he see these aggregates as related?

To students of international relations the most important identifications for study are those which are super-national. Traditionally, the study of international relations proceeded on the assumption that the nation was a cardinal, self-oriented unit, the representatives of which were acting solely in terms of its own needs and interest. That is obviously a simplification. Relations between Britain and America are deeply affected by a common cultural heritage. So are relations of Britain and India between whom the ties are sufficient to provide the glue for a commonwealth relation which has no sanction. On the other side the myth of a progressive Communist Russia solving problems of underdevelopment gives the Soviets much allure to many Asians while their education links them to the West. We cannot disregard the cross national identifications of those individuals engaged in international negotiations if we wish to understand their behavior. A growing body of studies concerns international contacts and consequent identifications. An important study is the recent book by

John and Ruth Useem, The Western Educated Man in India. This book corrects a number of the widespread illusions about such increasingly important activities as exchange of persons programs, information programs, etc. The growth of these is evidence of an increasing awareness among American foreign policy makers of the importance to us of the foreign images of us. We wish people to be "pro-American," i.e., to have an extra-national identification with us as somehow a symbol of goodness and progress. The Useems' book demonstrates how much more complex is the process by which Indian students react to their voyages. The students came over not for the purpose of studying America but for the purpose of acquiring certain skills of value in their own country. To them their reactions to America were incidental. They were indeed largely favorable. When they returned home, however, many had difficulties of readjustment which required them to over-react to prove their 110% Indian-ness. Yet the net effect was not anti-American. The net effect was to move them towards the official Indian neutralist line. That was so whether the individual started out inclined to the pro-Western extreme or to the anti-Western extreme. The effect of the trip was to shake the individual from his idiosyncratic relationship to his own culture and to make him see himself as a representative of India and thus to adopt the central Indian point of view. A study being done in the International Communications Program at M.I.T. has shown identical patterns of reaction to travel by American businessmen. Those results are being reported more fully at the current Sociology Meetings. Suffice it to say that businessmen too, when they travel abroad, move from either extreme towards the central position for their major reference group. To put the reaction somewhat facetiously, the man who travels finds himself playing Secretary of State and converts himself to the beliefs he assumes in that role.

Travel is one of a wide range of events which can influence a person's relationship towards things foreign. Having a common task orientation with foreigners seems to be another one that seems of considerable significance for what happens in the course of international negotiations or in continuing bodies such as U.N. agencies. Elmore Jackson has reported on similar behavior during labor negotiations in a book called, Meeting of Minds. In the studies there reported, Ann Douglas found in each labor mediation proceeding a critical point at which the negotiators no longer were

relating univalently to their constituents, but began to relate to each other. This stage precedes the arrival at agreement. Subsequent tensions arise between the negotiator and his constituents as to whether the agreement reached is acceptable. All of this has important implications for international mediation and for the morale and ethos of international agencies such as the UN Secretariat.

Travel and joint work are adult experiences. Foreign identifications are, however, also an expression of deep-lieing personality traits acquired in early personal experiences. Howard Perlmutter of the M.I.T. program on International Communication has made a number of interesting findings about a phenomenon which he calls xenophilia. Xenophilia is a tendency to agree with extreme statements that are favorable to other countries in contrast to one's own. It is tested by an attitude scale, including such items as "European girls make better wives than American girls." Xenophiles are apt to play a particularly active role in international affairs. They may be found in the so-called international set. They are often the people our ambassadors meet and whose views they send home. They are often people who seek foreign service jobs or who want to Westernize their countries or communize them in the image of some foreign utopia. Perlmutter has been studying the correlates of xenophilia in a number of countries. His general finding, reported already for his American sample, is that xenophilia is correlated with authoritarianism. Ever since the publication of the Authoritarian Personality by Adorno, Fraenkel-Brunswick, and others, we have been aware of the fact that xenophobes tend to be authoritarian. Xenophiles, on the other extreme, might be expected to be very unauthoritarian. In fact, however, the extremes meet. A considerable proportion of extreme xenophiles are also highly authoritarian. They have simply formed a different kind of in-group, out-group identification, but they are just as rigid as the xenophobes in distinguishing "we" and "they" in terms of black and white. In phantasy, at least, this kind of xenophile thinks his problems would be solved if he were abroad, at least if he were in that particular foreign country which serves as his psychic utopia. In fact, when such xenophiles do go abroad, they are just as unable to form good identifications with their new close neighbors as they were at home. American agencies seeking personnel for overseas posts have become aware of this phenomenon, discovering that an extreme desire for a certain foreign assignment often prognosticates a poor adjustment if sent there.

This type of xenophilia is an extreme phenomenon. For the most part, public opinion throughout the world is still highly parochial. A relatively small proportion of the citizens in most countries are sufficiently cosmopolitan even to take extensive account of foreign reactions and foreign consequences to alternative policies. Even high officials, and one might add even high officials famous for the amount of traveling they do, have been known to make remarks calculated for their domestic audiences, overlooking for the moment the serious consequences they would have when heard by unintended audiences abroad. In short, relatively few people have had experiences enabling them to form effective and realistic foreign identifications. Of these experiences, we have already mentioned personal events such as travel and early patterns of emotional identification. We should add one more - communication. The prospects for the congealing of a political community or reference group are not only a function of the personalities who compose it, but also of the extent of their interaction. Karl Deutsch and the Center for Research on World Political Institutions at Princeton have done a great deal of work on the conditions of a political community as determined by the extent of mutual interaction and communication. Deutsch has concerned himself with such phenomena as linguistic unity, direction and flow of the mails, commercial intercourse, etc. He has sought to arrive at the suggestion of certain critical values of such variables beyond which communities are likely to divide or to coalesce.

However, scope and intensity of foreign identification, awareness, or even information are not always associated with effectiveness or role in the making of foreign policy. Were that so, the world would be a much easier place for internationalists. In fact, however, elite structure is often such as to select for the making of foreign policy decisions persons in a parochial communications net and to select out those who are too cosmopolitan. A totalitarian state tends to compel avoidance of the foreign, but even the spontaneous operation of a democratic system often pushes into the decision making roles those individuals who are most at home in the in-group and penalizes those with too many roots outside.

In this connection, I would like to conclude with a description of a few scattered results of the M.I.T. study of the impact of business communications on the making of foreign economic policy in the U.S. This study involves the types of behavioral science research emphasized in this paper on the identifications and operational strategies of elite groups.

It was concerned among other things with the identifications of internationally minded or cosmopolitan vs. parochial businessmen and the differences in their roles in the making of foreign policy. We have noted above that identifications affect in the first place thinking about politics in that they control what consequences of actions are taken into account, and in the second place that they affect the channels through which a person works. For some businessmen the overseas consequences of American economic policy are salient. Others, while not denying these consequences, ordinarily react in terms of their personal daily experiences of their own plant or firm. There may well be rather fundamental psychological differences between persons who orient themselves by empathy with their immediate contacts only, and those who are able to put themselves in the shoes of a larger range of persons.

In some institutional situations persons of broad and narrow identifications work through different channels of political influence. The individual turns for cooperation to others with whom he, in some sense, feels identified, i.e., with whom he is familiar, agreed, comfortable, or confident. One of the fundamental facts of politics is who associates with whom.

Among top business executives, we found, in fact, differences between those who oriented themselves primarily to their own firms and the impact of tariffs on them, and those who were oriented to the community more broadly. The time budget of one businessman will be occupied with problems arising within his own bureaucratic organization, and the bulk of his attention will be focused within it. Another will be continuously attending industry conferences or phoning colleagues and contacts. The business world often makes the distinction between the "inside" and the "outside" man. Let me use as one index of this distinction their pattern of discussions. We asked our respondents to list the persons with whom they had discussed the

reciprocal trade issue during the past month. The most active ones, of course, listed both persons inside and outside the firm. The uninterested ones listed neither. We can, however, leave aside these two extremes, to compare persons who spoke only to insiders with those who spoke only to outsiders. We asked these respondents what they consider to be their best available source of information on foreign trade and tariff matters. Those who spoke only to insiders sometimes mentioned persons from the business world in which they were immersed. Those who spoke only to persons outside their firm mentioned such characters virtually never. Conversely, political figures were occasionally mentioned as the best source by those who spoke to outsiders but virtually never by those who spoke to insiders only. When probed as to whether they could think of any public figures who were good sources, those who spoke inside the firm only continued to cite considerably fewer than those who spoke outside.

If time permitted, I could cite other interesting differences in the sources of information used regarding foreign economic affairs by these two groups of businessmen. Oddly enough, the inside oriented cite newsmagazines and business magazines as a more important source on foreign economic policy than those who speak outside. Among small firms, those with 100 to 1,000 employees for example, nearly two-thirds of the inside oriented mention these as the best source, as compared to one-quarter of the outside oriented. Actually, however, that is not odd since citing these sources is a standard bromide to be used in the absence of any more relevant ideas. This became very clear when we asked what specific things the respondents had read or heard on tariff and foreign trade matters during the preceding month. Those who spoke to insiders only could cite far fewer items than those who spoke to outsiders only, despite the fact that the former had cited the magazines in which such items appeared. In actual fact the businessman with a frame of reference oriented predominantly to the reactions of his immediate colleagues and to the problems of his own firm, tends to find in that environment his answers to questions having national and indeed international consequences.

It is not surprising that to some extent such an executive reaches different conclusions about world affairs from the businessman who is oriented to a larger community. For instance, the latter are more likely to favor a reduction of tariffs. The pattern is even stronger among that minority on both sides of the question who took the trouble to contact

their congressman. Limiting ourselves to the activists, we find that among those who talked inside the firm only, proponents of higher tariffs outnumbered proponents of lower tariffs by four to one; among those who discussed the issue outside their firm only, proponents of lower tariffs outnumbered proponents of higher tariffs by more than five to one.

Other indices besides discussion of the tariff issue inside or outside the firm reveal similar patterns. For example, those businessmen who devote most reading to trade publications (i.e., are more narrowly business-oriented than if they read general business magazines, newsmagazines, etc.) are less likely to approve American tariff cuts without reciprocal concessions by foreign countries than those businessmen whose sources of information suggest a more broadly political approach to the issue. They are also less likely to regard political stability abroad as very important to their own business than are, for example, readers of newsmagazines. As we might expect, those businessmen who wrote their congressmen on the side of protection, were more immersed in trade publications; whereas those who wrote their congressmen on the side of lower tariffs were more immersed in general business magazines.

The structure of the American government provides a separate natural channel of influence for those individuals with narrow, parochial interests, contacts, and activities, and those with more cosmopolitan ones. Congress, particularly the House of Representatives, provides a channel of expression for locally oriented political activists. It is to his Representative that the parochial constituent can turn for the protection of his familiar world. Those concerned with world affairs or even with national affairs at the highest level, are more apt, on the other hand, to direct their identifications to the Administration. Their operational codes on how to operate in Washington differ.

As we might expect, we find the active proponents of protection orienting themselves more heavily to Congress than to the Executive branch. Individuals on the side of lower tariffs, even those who have contacted their congressmen, when asked to name political figures who are good sources of information on tariff matters, named

almost exclusively members of the Administration. Those who were protectionist more often named members of Congress, and in general distributed their responses fairly evenly between Congress, the Administration and non-governmental public figures. The attitude of the active protectionists to Congress is further illustrated by the fact that in 90-95% of the cases, when asked whether they would approach their Congressman directly or through an intermediary, they said "directly." That was true for only 70-80% of the low tariff activists. Furthermore, when asked whether Congress would go along with some trade measure if the majority of the business community came out for it, the active protectionists were much more confident of the support of Congress than the active proponents of lower tariffs. The confidence of the protectionists that their Congressman is their spokesman perhaps accounts for the fact that 93% of them have ever contacted their Congressman on other than foreign trade matters, whereas only some 75-80% of those who are for lower tariffs have ever done so.

All of these facts give us one clue as to how certain interests with a narrow frame of reference manage on occasion to exert so much Congressional influence. Protectionists, though far outnumbered in the business community today, as they are in the general community, are man for man more active and this activity is focused not on those national agencies which by their structure are compelled to take a broad view, but rather on those where restricted identifications create easy access. The advocates of higher tariffs in our sample are somewhat more active in their political parties than the advocates of lower tariffs. Those who are politically active on the issue on the high tariff side are more likely to have asked their branch managers to do something about foreign trade matters than those on the low tariff side; they are more likely to have discussed the issue in the company; and they are much more likely to know the tariff stand of their own member of Congress. Only about one out of four or five of the active low tariff people, even those who had contacted their Congressman, thought they knew where these Congressmen stood on foreign trade matters. In contrast, six out of ten of the protectionist activists thought they knew.

Congress hears primarily from the small, vocal segment. Only about one in ten of our sample had contacted Congress on foreign trade in the past two years. Among those who favored higher tariffs that rises to one in six, and among

that 10% of the sample who said that a 15% drop in tariffs would injure their business, one-third had contacted Congress. In consequence, although protectionists are a distinct minority in the business population, they outnumber their opponents among those who have approached a Congressman in the last two years.

Thus we see in practice how the structure of identification defines the effective elite. It might be well in closing to note how attitudes toward foreign trade and tariff vary as we move along the continuum from the least influential and least active segments of the population to the most so. The only segment of the population in which a protectionist majority is still found is in the lowest educated, lowest income strata, predominantly manual and custodial workers, who incidentally are predominantly Democratic in party affiliation. As we move into the high school and college educated strata, we find increasing support for a liberal trade policy. It is most strongly advocated by that 10-15% of the population who have strong views on foreign policy, who read about such matters in the daily press, and who might be alert to the international attitudes of their Congressmen. It is in this stratum that we find the bulk of the business community as well as professional groups. These largely college-educated, Republican, upper income persons overwhelmingly support the Administration's liberal trade program. In our sample, which is a 5% sample drawn from a universe which consists of roughly 1/50th of 1% of the voting population, those who would raise tariffs are outvoted by those who would reduce them by roughly seven to one. Yet, at the very tail of the distribution, among that 1/10th or less in our tiny universe who are politically active on this issue, the protectionists again become the majority, as they are at the very opposite, or apolitical end of the continuum.

The behavioral analysis of the making of foreign policy, whether it concerns the tariff in America, or EDC in France, or neutralism in India, is bound to lead one into similar structural analyses if we are to advance beyond generalizations of the most naive kind. It is promising that so many studies are now going forward, all of which converge on the closely related problem of elite structure, identifications, and operational codes as they impinge on foreign policy.

Table I

Comparison of the Behavior of Executives
Who Have Discussed Foreign Economic Policy Within
Their Firms and Outside Their Firms

	Firms with 1000 or more employees		Firms with 100 to 1000 employees	
	Discussion inside only	Discussion outside only	Discussion inside only	Discussion outside only
Percent spontaneously mentioning no individuals in industry as good source of information on foreign trade policy	75	97	86	95
Percent mentioning three or more such persons	9	2	10	0
Percent spontaneously mentioning political figures as good source	1	8	0	10
Percent mentioning no political figures as source even when probed	83	65	83	78
Percent mentioning two or more political figures when probed	6	19	1	16
Percent mentioning newsmagazine as good source	20	11	21	14
Percent mentioning general business magazine	21	14	41	11
Percent able to cite no items read on trade in last month	71	49	86	71
Percent able to cite two or more	8	14	2	14
Percent who favor lower tariffs	43	47	33	63

Table II

Those Who Are Immersed in Trade Publications
Are More Insistent on Reciprocity

	Firms with 1000 or more employees			Firms with 100 to 1000 employees		
	% reading none	% reading avg.	% reading most	% reading none	% reading avg.	% reading most
Approve cuts without reciprocity	18	71	11	14	68	17
Disapprove cuts without reciprocity	16	63	20	10	65	26

Table III

Those Who Are Immersed in Trade Publications
Consider Political Stability Abroad Less Important

	Firms with 1000 or more employees			Firms with 100-1000 employees		
	% reading none	% reading avg.	% reading most	% reading none	% reading avg.	% reading most
Consider it very important	17	71	12	11	69	21
Consider it only fairly or not important	16	64	20	8	70	22

Those Who Read Newsmagazines
Consider Political Stability Abroad More Important

	Firms with 1000 or more employees		Firms with 100 to 1000 employees	
	% reading none	% reading	% reading none	% reading
Consider it very important	12	88	22	78
Consider it fairly important	18	82	28	72

Table IV

Comparison of High Tariff Activists and
Low Tariff Activists

	Firms with 1000 or more employees		Firms with 100 to 1000 employees	
	High tariff activists	Low tariff activists	High tariff activists	Low tariff activists
Percent reading four or more trade publications	20	19	37	9
Percent reading four or more general business publications	5	21	4	9
Number of administration members cited as best source	26	10	23	54
Number of congressmen cited	38	1	24	0
Number of other public figures cited	33	4	43	10
Percent saying Congress would go along with majority of business on trade matter	38	22	78	59
Percent who would approach Congressman directly	90	71	96	82
Percent who have asked branch manager to do something on trade	30	7	3	0
Percent who did not know tariff stand of congressman	46	74	38	82
Percent who have talked to foreign trade man in company	44	32	9	10
Percent who have talked to other in company	78	65	82	63

Table V

Political Party Activity of
Low and High Tariff Advocates

	Firms with 1000 or more employees		Firms with 100 to 1000 employees	
	High tariff advocates	Low tariff advocates	High tariff advocates	Low tariff advocates
Percent active in political party	36	26	17	12
Percent who have approached Congressman on matter other than foreign trade	93	81	93	74