

Love, Ethics, and Emancipation

*The Implications of Conceptions of Human Being and Freedom
in Heidegger and Hegel
for Critical International Theory*

By

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SUMMARY

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This thesis is an original contribution to critical international relations theory. Responding to Hartmut Behr's call for the development of more universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry for contemporary (global) politics and ethics, our original contribution is to establish a 'critical' approach to international theory on a more universalistic meta-theoretical foundation. Proceeding from a philosophical analysis of 'ontological' foundations in influential normative, meta-theoretical, and critical approaches to international theory, we argue for a shift from international theory's reliance on a shallow ontology of 'things that exist' to a fuller ontology of being, and of human being in particular. After identifying with the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, and establishing that the most compelling and promising advocate of a 'critical' approach to international theory, that of Andrew Linklater, rests on a limited conception of human existence and a thin understanding of human freedom, we explore the implications of conceptions of human being and freedom in the work of Martin Heidegger and Georg W. F. Hegel for critical international theory. Offering an epistemological defence of our universalism through Hegel's phenomenological constructivist approach to knowledge, then demonstrating how this allows us to transcend the schism between foundationalist and anti-foundationalist approaches to normative theory, we premise our own emancipatory cosmopolitanism on a commitment to the human being conceived as 'singularity' rather than subject. Proceeding from a discussion of 'what it means to be' a free human being according to Heidegger and Hegel, we then foreground two aspects of human freedom that have hitherto been obscured in critical international theory and develop a praxeological emancipatory cosmopolitanism on this basis. Rather than rejecting Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, we call for its 'overcoming,' and demonstrate ways that our meta-theoretical argument can effect international practice by offering 'love' as a guide for ethical and emancipatory praxis and an evaluative tool for critical social theory.

Key Words

Critical International Relations Theory, Critical Theory, Andrew Linklater, Heidegger, Hegel, Meta-theory, International Relations, Political Theory, Ontology, Epistemology, Freedom, Emancipation, Ethics, Subjectivity, Singularity, Phenomenology, Love.

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Whilst at Cardiff as an undergraduate I was fortunate enough to be taught by Peter Sutch and Peri Roberts, whose infectious enthusiasm for political theory played no small part in sparking my intellectual curiosity, which led me into postgraduate study. I then found fertile ground in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth, where interactions with my colleagues and cohort were formative in the development of this argument. Although many contributed in incremental but not insignificant ways, I'd like to give special mention to a few individuals.

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Mae Sot,
September 2012

Declarations

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Where ***correction services** have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is clearly marked in a footnote(s).

Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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Preface

Like all pieces of scholarly work this thesis has a personal history. In the first semester of my second year as an undergraduate at Cardiff University, I took David Boucher's course *History of Ideas in International Relations*, during which I was introduced to both Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man* and Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*.¹ I chose to write an essay comparing and contrasting these approaches as a component of my coursework. This of course required me to engage in the secondary literature on these texts; yet I found something quite unsatisfactory about engaging with these discourses on their own terms. This is because it was not their theoretical inadequacies that I found troubling, but the potentially pernicious effects of these theoretical interventions. Against the backdrop of the post-Cold War era, Fukuyama's thesis appeared to warrant the expansion of neo-liberal political and economic ideology, whilst Huntington's seemed to risk making potential sources of conflict actual, reinvigorating the military-industrial complex and vivifying an oppositional sense of American identity through the perpetuation of discourses of danger that serve to recreate imagined communities.² It seemed to me then that these were far from being politically neutral pieces of scholarship, and that these scholars had a fundamental responsibility for the consequences of the political imaginaries that they forged and lent credibility to.

1. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993). Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997).

2. On the use of foreign policy and collective identity formation see David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).; Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).; Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (1996): 139-74; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: "the East" in European Identity Formation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

It was for this reason that theoretical approaches to politics with a specifically 'normative' intent resonated with me as an undergraduate; Mervyn Frost's case for normative theory against 'value-free' social inquiry was particularly influential, and I consistently found ethical questions in international relations to be the most intriguing ones.³ Yet I soon found the consequentialist and deontological frameworks to which I was introduced to be talking at cross-purposes. It became clear that these general moral conceptions were fundamentally incompatible, and ultimately rested upon assumptions or commitments that were neither transparently evident nor appropriately defended: assumptions and commitments regarding the highest good, what is right, and the nature of human beings and their place in the world, all of which provide the conditions of intelligibility for these approaches. It seemed that the application of these approaches to the cosmopolitical realm, such as the now-classical interventions from Peter Singer or Charles Beitz, for instance, would simply serve to multiply and intensify disagreements between competing perspectives on what properly ethical relations between people might involve, since the international realm is the realm where human differences are most pronounced.⁴ It seemed sensible then that theories aspiring to a global purview should explicitly defend these underlying assumptions before proceeding.

For this reason meta-theoretical discussions about the importance of epistemology and ontology in my first year in Aberystwyth struck home. My exposure to post-positivist and 'critical' theorising led me closer to being able to coherently articulate what it was that I had found troubling about the range of political theories that I had encountered: it was the ontological commitments that remained implicit therein. While sharing the normative theorist's deduction that value-free inquiry was impossible, critical theorists recognised the importance of defending their own ontological and epistemological commitments: their commitment to the ontological priority of the individual over the state, or to human

3. See Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), especially pp12-40

4. Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 1, no. 1 (1972): 229-43. Charles R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

freedom, for instance. Despite the strengths of their positions, I felt that normative theorists such as Frost, Walzer and Rawls relied on such commitments without adequately defending them.⁵

During my masters studies I was introduced to the work of Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth, two of the most prominent and influential theorists working in the critical tradition of international thought. I felt encouraged and inspired by their explicit commitment to political analysis that aimed to contribute to the progressive transformation of international practices and institutions in the name of human freedom. I was also impressed by the scholarly breadth and historical depth of their work, and the contributions that both had made to the study of world politics.⁶ Yet in spite of this, I could not entirely shake the feeling of discontent that had earlier characterised my reaction to Fukuyama and Huntington, and I soon became uneasy about their own meta-theoretical commitments and the conceptions of freedom that appeared to underwrite their arguments; this disquiet has motivated and informed the character of my postgraduate studies.

For instance, Booth discusses 'the meaning of freedom' as part of a defence of his commitment to emancipation in his 2007 magnum opus, *Theory of World Security*.⁷ An immediate issue to confront, he claims, is the idea of 'false

5. This point will of course be elaborated on shortly.

6. See for instance: Ken Booth, et al., eds. *How Might We Live? Global Ethics in a New Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Ken Booth, and Timothy Dunne, eds. *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Ken Booth, ed. *Critical Security Studies and World Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005); Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Ken Booth, ed. *Realism and World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2011); Ken Booth and Timothy Dunne, eds. *Terror in Our Time* (London: Routledge, 2012); Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Andrew Linklater, "The Harm Principle and Global Ethics," *Global Society* 20, no. 3 (2006): 329-43; Andrew Linklater, "Global Civilizing Processes and the Ambiguities of Human Interconnectedness," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2010): 155; Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics*. Vol. 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

7. Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*.

consciousness.⁸ Influential in Gramscian-inspired critical theory, this is 'the idea that a person or group cannot grasp their *true* interests because of indoctrination or traditionalist socialisation.'⁹ As a result, knowledge, *enlightenment* is central to freedom, because 'one cannot have one's own understanding (looking at a matter with some critical distance) under conditions of indoctrination, traditionalist socialisation, and inadequate relevant knowledge.'¹⁰ Booth then proceeds by stating that 'we freely choose when our noumenal selves *control* our phenomenal selves; in other words, when our actions are not the result of error or passion, but are fully voluntary, founded on understanding and reason.'¹¹

It struck me that Booth's position here involves a whole raft of philosophical assumptions regarding the relationship between human understanding, theoretical reason, freedom, and ethical and epistemological particularity, which are simply not recognised as contestable (and essentially so). Furthermore, it appeared that the rhetorical force of a phrase such as '*false* consciousness' is likely geared towards smuggling in contestable assumptions about the world as fact, elevating the world-view of the proponent and delegitimising dissenting voices. In short, whilst ostensibly committed to freedom, my sense was that Booth's approach to world politics might betray a vanguardist or contradictory understanding of human freedom, where 'backward-looking' individuals might ultimately be 'forced to be free' or have their best interests dictated to them. I found this troubling. My initial reaction to these critical approaches to world politics, then, was one of deep ambivalence: while profoundly sympathetic to their aims, I remained suspicious of the meta-theoretical commitments that underwrote them and of the conceptions of freedom that drove them, both of which could potentially have profound effects on political practice.

A similar contradictory combination of sympathy for the overarching argument, coupled with a suspicion of the underlying conception of freedom,

8. Ibid., 112.

9. Ibid. emphasis added

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., 113. emphasis added

characterised my reading of Andrew Linklater's work; yet Linklater's conception of freedom was harder to identify than Booth's and thus more intriguing to me. Whilst receptive to some of the challenges to Linklater's position, I found none wholly convincing, and I thought the readiness of some critics to simply reject the goal of emancipation somewhat petulant.¹² However, equally unsatisfactory was Linklater's tendency to respond to criticism with a 'gesture of embrace,' a characteristic response that appeared to indicate a blind-spot to the nature of the challenges to his position.¹³ Given that such challenges often align according to the divergent intellectual inheritances of various 'critical' approaches to politics, I came to suspect that Linklater's blind-spot might be essentially related to the influence of Kant and Marx on his position, and I thought it possible to trace an alternative trajectory of thinking about freedom that might contribute to an even richer critical approach to world politics. What follows is an attempt to shed light on this blind-spot and an attempt to embolden and develop further a critical and emancipatory approach to world politics.

12. In a graduate seminar that followed the publication of *Theory of World Security* Ken Booth recounted an exchange with a prominent IR scholar, possibly Rob Walker, whom he credited with claiming that 'emancipation is the problem.'

13. The term 'gesture of embrace' is Martin Weber's. Martin Weber, "Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global Political Change," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 3 (2002), 302.

Introduction

Political and Historical Contexts

World politics, in the modern era at least, has primarily been conceived as relations between states. As Rob Walker notes, that the academic study of world politics should be referred to as International *Relations* suggests that what happens inside states is quite different from what happens outside states.¹ Yet the distinction between domestic order and international anarchy, which has been foundational to the discipline of International Relations but has always been problematic, has become increasingly untenable over the past forty years as dynamics of globalisation have placed increasing pressures on the nation-state as an effective institution for managing the vicissitudes of contemporary political life.

Globally we confront shared crises such as climate change, resource scarcity, the militarisation of cyberspace, the vicissitudes of financial markets, along with the proliferation and intensification of the means of violence, the movement of peoples, and drastic inequalities in power and wealth, to which the nation-state has become increasingly unable to effectively mitigate its vulnerability. These material developments have been accompanied by shifts away from the nation-state as the principal locus of authority, legitimacy, and community; we feel less estranged from the experiences of others beyond our traditional communities and yet, especially in more diverse and multicultural societies, there is often a perceived gulf between citizens of the same state. On one hand, the development of security communities, such as the zone of liberal

1. In what follows, when 'international relations' is not capitalised, I am referring to relations between states. When capitalised, as in 'International Relations,' I am referring to the field of study concerned with the study of those relations; usually shortened simply to 'IR.' 'World politics' includes both, referring to politics viewed from a broader vantage.

democratic peace and the project of European integration, along with expressions of cosmopolitan solidarity during the Arab Spring and in the Occupy movement, in addition to the development of cosmopolitan norms such as R2P, appear to indicate forms of community developing beyond the nation-state. On the other, the rise of the far right in Europe, religious extremism, and the characterisation of some conflicts as 'civilisational' seem to indicate the fragmentation of communities and the realignment of forms of identity that might be regarded as constitutive of individual human beings as political subjects.

These developments testify to the fact that political life is becoming increasingly decoupled from its traditional territorial location in the nation-state. While the loss of the steering capacity of the state was underlined as early as 1976 during the first wave of the globalisation debate, more recently scholars have argued that these are signs of the transformation of international relations into something more akin to world politics.² In light of these transformations, and in the interests of peace, security, human freedom, and ethics, many have argued that the task faced at our current historical juncture is to recreate the norms of the *polis* at a global level: norms such as the non-violent resolution of conflict, dialogue, co-operation for mutual benefit, collective security, and the collective management of resources. Mark Neufeld, for instance, suggests that:

In a context in which the factors which will determine whether the human species will survive or perish, suffer or prosper, operate on a global scale, a good case can be made that the polis which is 'coterminous with the minimum self-sufficient human reality' is the planet itself. In short, the problems presently faced by the human species call out for the identification of the idea of the polis with the planet as a whole: a truly *global polis*.³

Similarly Richard Beardsworth has argued that 'the material conditions of an integrated world capitalist economy create an array of global problems,'

2. See Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).; John Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalisation* (London: Routledge, 1998), 174-175, 195-197.; R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 183. Heikki Patomäki, *After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2002), 1.

3. Mark A. Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 11.

including '[m]igration, human trafficking, climate change mitigation and adaption, global macroeconomic and financial stability, global health regulation, regional resource-conflict,' all of which are *political* issues stemming from increasing dependence among states and between people; the resolution of which requires effective decision-making at the global level.⁴ These shared international, and often global, problems mean that, just as the thinkers of the Scottish and European Enlightenment stood towards a material actuality of the middle to end of the eighteenth century that required the invention of the *polis* at a level that could embed or transform the social consequences of capitalisation, the level of the nation-state, 'so we today have to re-invent the political at a level and in terms that will appropriate the planetarisation of these same relations'.⁵

Echoing such a view, Fred Dallmayr suggests that we presently sit at the twilight of the so-called Westphalian system, where the juncture of radical state autonomy and a state of true and increasing human interdependence, wrought by dynamics of globalisation, has given rise to 'two opposing tendencies: on one side, ambitions to subject globalisation to global sovereignty (a global Leviathan)' and, on the other, ambitions towards 'a democratic cosmopolis achieved through the subordination of sovereignty to global interdependence.'⁶ Painting a starker picture, this juncture is characterised by Barry Gills as a struggle between 'Cosmopolis' and 'Empire,' suggesting that global politics is today embroiled in a 'clash of globalisations' between these two opposed approaches to world order, both struggling to define the character of globalisation, where the experience of the global community is drawing us to imagine a world characterised either by greater collective human responsibility or one that remains ensnared in the naked pursuit of power and wealth.⁷

4. Richard Beardsworth, "Assessing Cosmopolitan Theory in World Politics," *e-International Relations*, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/05/27/assessing-cosmopolitan-theory-in-world-politics/> (accessed 25/06/2012, 2012).

5. Richard Beardsworth, "The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2005), 210, 212.

6. Fred R. Dallmayr, *Small Wonder: Global Power and Its Discontents* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 55.

7. Barry K. Gills, "Introduction," in *The Global Politics of Globalization: "Empire" Vs "Cosmopolis"*, ed. Barry K. Gills (London: Routledge, 2007).

In short, the modern political imaginary, where a person's primary fealty is to his state, and his interactions with others presupposes a political and cultural background that does not differ drastically from his own, is being profoundly unsettled. Yet this imaginary has had a remarkably profound influence, not only on the field of International Relations, but also on political theory. Although its precise influence is subject of debate, and despite being couched in broader historical dynamics such as the capitalisation of economic and social relations and divisions in Christianity, the Peace of Westphalia, comprised of the Treaty of Münster and the Treaty of Osnabrück, is commonly recognised as a landmark in the evolution of the European state and state system.⁸ The principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity associated with it have had an enormous and lasting impact on human political and social relations, not least for the disciplining effect that it has had on political thought and practice. That this was to initiate 'the international problematic' of domestic order/international anarchy is well known, but it was also to have a lasting impact on the canon of political theory. Suggesting that the principle of state sovereignty embodies the formalisation of political space that has functioned as a spatio-temporal resolution of questions of political community, Rob Walker has argued that the emergence of modern political theory was coterminous with the emergence of the national, territorial state, both of which conspiring to produce a vision of politics that would be contained within the state.⁹

It is both necessary and profoundly challenging to at least partially extirpate ourselves from this modern political imaginary. The practice of state sovereignty and the system of sovereign states has embodied what Walker identifies as 'an historically specific articulation of the relationship between universality and

8. On the historical significance of '1648' see Benno Teschke, *The Myth of 1648: Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations* (London: Verso, 2003).; Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton.: Princeton University Press, 2001).; Heikki Patomäki, *After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics*, 26-36.; R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside*, 125-40.; Beardsworth defines 'capitalisation' as: 'an economic process whereby increasing parts of nature and life are subordinated to the law of value: exchangeability and valorisation (the process, in turn, by which value is added to an object).' Richard Beardsworth, "The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics," 208.; on the interaction between capital and state formation in the evolution of the European states system see: Charles Tilley, *Coercion, Capital and Western States: Ad 990-1992* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992).

9. See R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside.*, especially p63

particularity in space and time'.¹⁰ In simpler terms what is meant by this is that differences between human beings (religious, political, ethical, etc.), differences that have often led to violence or the forceful submission of one to another have for the past few hundred years been managed through a spatial resolution where they have essentially been treated as if they were the internal affairs of any given state. Such a resolution was historically specific because it was established as a way to resolve competing claims to fealty in Europe of the late middle ages, involving what Jens Bartelson has called a 'sublimation of otherness' whereby order grows out of disorder, harmony out of conflict, and identity out of difference.¹¹ In summary then, the Westphalian system of sovereign states has essentially functioned as a way of escaping the problem of difference rather than confronting it, a strategy that Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney refer to as the 'Westphalian deferral:'

With the emergence of the states system, the differences constituting and complicating each state as a particular political community are kept separate and managed within the territorial boundaries of the state. This demarcation and policing of the boundary between the 'inside' and 'outside' of the political community defines the problem of difference principally as *between and among* states; difference is marked and contained as *international* difference. This construction of difference allows us to claim to 'solve' the problem by negotiating a *modus vivendi* among political communities.¹²

Given the material transformations discussed above, such a deferral is no longer as effective as it might once have been; this calls for a reassessment of the relationship between universality and particularity with a view to developing more universalist, less parochial, tendencies that may already be latent within the *status quo* in order that we may challenge the spatial resolution of the problem of difference, a *modus vivendi* that is gradually disintegrating under the force of contemporary material and ideational challenges. Standing as an obstacle to this, however, is that the overwhelming trajectory of thought since the eighteenth

10. Ibid., 176.

11. Jens. Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 24-28.

12. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* (London: Routledge, 2004), 6-7. Inayatullah and Blaney discuss another prevalent strategy deployed in the response to difference, the temporal strategy, whereby difference would be mitigated as traditional societies modernise.

century has been geared towards recognising the radical particularity of ontological and epistemological interests.

Such a trajectory is demonstrated by Hartmut Behr in his recent *Ontologies of the International*, a study of the interplay of universal and particular interests embedded within the ontological and epistemological commitments that have underwritten various conceptions of 'the world' in generations of political thinkers from Western antiquity to the present.¹³ Behr demonstrates that there was a shift in thought in the eighteenth century, most prominently reflected in the thought of Georg W. F. Hegel, from universal and universalistic ontologies to particularist ontologies, and argues that this shift was instrumental in the emergence of nationalistic, particularist moralities that have since contributed to the loss of ethics in international political thought and international theory in the twentieth century.¹⁴

Echoing an argument made by Heikki Patomäki in *After International Relations* Behr makes the case that, as a consequence of the prominence of particularistic ontologies and epistemologies, a distinctive *positivist* methodology evolved throughout the nineteenth century, influencing international political theory to come.¹⁵ '[I]n contrast to traditional hermeneutic, interpretative, and speculative metaphysics,' this positivist methodology 'considered "external realities" and thus structures of inter-national politics in general, as objective and objectifiable, measurable, and quantifiable.'¹⁶ Disputing the myth of a perennial 'realist' tradition then, Behr contends that it was this shift to particularist *ontology*, *epistemology*, and *methodology* that represents the legacies in which the establishment of IR as an academic discipline, especially its neo-realist mainstream, is embedded.¹⁷

13. Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

14. *Ibid.*, 2.

15. Patomäki's argument, however, is that the modern study of 'International Relations' is a descendant of Hume's empiricist ontology/epistemology. See Heikki Patomäki, *After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of World Politics*, 21-41. Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International*, 2-3.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, 3. Realists often claim descent from Thucydides, but this claim has been challenged elsewhere. Cf. Nicholas J. Rengger, "Realism, Tragedy, and the Anti-Pelagian Imagination in

Behr's persuasive conclusion is that, given the conditions of twenty-first-century politics, the challenges and requirements for a *contemporary* theory of the international 'lie in the study of ontological and epistemological dynamics' with a view to providing a groundwork with which to overcome 'the cemented frameworks and aporias of particularism to establish renewed ontology(ies) and respective epistemologies for contemporary and future politics and ethics.'¹⁸ He then suggests that the guiding question for these attempts might be formulated as follows: 'how should we (re)create the transcendental principle/principles that recognize and socialize plurality and diversity while not expecting "the other" to assimilate and/or not violating "the other" through logo- and egocentric epistemologies?'¹⁹ The problem, as Behr concludes and we will demonstrate, is that there is both a lack of universalist, global ontologies, and reluctance among contemporary international theorists to engage in new ontologies.

Our Problematic and Conceptual Remarks

This is the problematic to which we respond. Given the material transformations of human life on the planet, our increasingly international and global political condition, and in order that we might gradually extirpate ourselves from the aporias and contradictions of particularist thought that have been bequeathed to us by modern political and international theory, more universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry are needed for contemporary politics and ethics.

Ontology

International Political Thought," in *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 134-135n6.; Richard Ned Lebow, "Texts, Paradigms, and Political Change," in *Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations*, ed. Michael C. Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

18. Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International*, 246.

19. *Ibid.*

Ontology, from the Greek 'ὄντος' (being), present participle of the verb 'εἶμι' (to be), and -λογία, (-logia) science, study, or theory, can be understood as a form of philosophical inquiry into existence: about *what* exists, and about the nature of existence, or, what it *means* to exist. Ontology can be deployed in different ways but in IR it has tended to mean something quite facile, usually interpreted simply as relating to what 'objects' are seen to exist in international relations, whether those objects are states (realists), individuals (liberals), social structures (Marxists), or 'intransitive objects' (critical realists). Besides the fact that talking about 'ontology in IR' already limits ourselves to one small corner of the empirical world, the elevation of some international phenomena over others to a level of foundational objectivity often tells us more about the political/theoretical commitments of the advocate than it does about the (empirical) world of international relations. Indeed, since it ignores or leaves implicit the question of the *nature* of the existence of those entities, what we consider to 'exist' in world politics is hardly an ontological question at all, but rather a mere matter of articulating our own (subjective) images of 'the world.'

As a branch of philosophical speculation, ontology only really begins after we realise that the question is not merely about 'what exists,' but is about the question of existence itself: when we start to question the *nature* of the existence of the entities (or phenomena) that we encounter in world politics, or, more pertinently, the nature of the entity (i.e., the human being) that encounters such entities (states, individuals, social structures) as 'objects.'²⁰ We therefore take 'ontology' to mean a philosophical analysis of, or investigation into, 'existence;' specifically, 'human existence,' and thus what it means 'to be' a human being. As a result, we will not be focussing on an ontology of 'things' in world politics, states, intransitive objects or causal powers, for instance - but an ontology of *being*: an inquiry into the *nature* of (human) existence rather than *what* exists. For reasons

20. Torsten Michel has recently made this argument very forcefully in relation to the treatment of 'ontology' by critical realists such as Alexander Wendt and Colin Wight. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow: A Phenomenological Critique of Critical Realism," *Review of International Studies* 38 (2012): 209-22. See also Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness: A Phenomenological Path Towards a New Social Ontology in International Relations" (Ph.D Thesis, St Andrews, 2008); Torsten Michel, "Pigs Can't Fly, Or Can They? Ontology, Scientific Realism and the Metaphysics of Presence in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 35 (2009): 379-419.

that will become apparent, we are especially concerned with the concept of 'freedom' associated with the nature of human existence, and therefore, what it means to be a free human being. It is on this understanding of ontology that we proceed, and it is in this sense that we interpret Behr's call for more universalistic ontological inquiry.

Universality

At the time of revising this introduction, the plight of so-called 'boat people' seeking asylum in Australia, is, once again, in the news. There are a number reasons for this: two weeks ago the Australian parliament enacted tough new laws seeking to deter asylum seekers, often originating from war-torn countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and others in the Middle East, the second season of the popular and award winning SBS documentary series *Go Back to Where You Came From* is currently being aired, and a search and rescue operation is presently underway for a boat carrying 150 asylum seekers, including women and children, which issued a distress signal a few days ago off the coast of Indonesia.²¹

These tough new measures, coming into effect in September 2012, involve the mandatory deportation of new asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat to the Pacific atoll of Nauru or Papua New Guinea. Besides over 300 lives being lost on the same passage between Java (Indonesia) and Christmas Island (Australia) since December 2011, the cost to detain asylum seekers since 2000 - removing the costs for deterrence and anti-people smuggling activities - totalled over Aus\$2bn.²² During this period just over 18,000 people arrived by boat, which meant that Australian taxpayers spent around Aus\$113,000 simply to detain *each asylum*

21. Neil Hume, "Australia Searches for Missing Boat People," *Financial Times*. Thursday 30th August 2012., <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6a87bd78-f270-11e1-ac41-00144feabdc0.html> (accessed 30th August, 2012).

22. Ibid.; Bernard Keane, "Cost of Detention? \$113,000 Per Asylum Seeker," *Crikey*. 17th August, 2012 <http://www.crikey.com.au/2011/08/17/detention-centre-cost-of-asylum-seekers/> (accessed 30th August, 2012).

seeker, on average, across the period.²³ Not long after a popular Australian radio talk-show host, Bob Francis, was publicly censured for telling his radio audience 'bugger the boat people, I say. As far as I'm concerned, I hope they bloody drown out there on their way over here [sic.],' an Australian Commonwealth minister was reported as saying that 'the only acceptable policy to my electorate would be for the Navy to sink asylum boats on sight.'²⁴

Our ways of thinking about such issues are outdated, partly because the ways that we organise our political lives at a global scale are too. The Australian case is indicative of a broader contemporary malaise that runs deep and betrays some of the essential limitations of particularist thought. States are predicated on the violent exclusion of others, and a global system organised around national citizenship is simply not designed to deal with mass migrations of people. That governments spend vast amounts of money on harsh policies of detainment and deterrence is paradoxical, and such callous disregard for the lives of non-citizens betrays an abhorrent solipsism that is, sadly, not uncommon.²⁵

Cosmopolitans will often respond to these sorts of issues by insisting that there are certain moral obligations owed to other human beings *qua* human beings, pointing to some shared human property or trait, such as rationality or vulnerability, in order to provide some neutral ground upon which shared principles of international coexistence might be established.²⁶ Alternatively cosmopolitans might insist that states should live up to their obligations and duties

23. Ibid.

24. Michael Owen, "Radio 'King' Slammed Over Boatpeople Tirade," *The Australian*. June 8th, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/radio-king-slammed-over-boatpeople-tirade/story-fn9hm1gu-1226388100400> (accessed 30th August 2012, 2012).; Allan Asher, "The Lies We Feed Ourselves to Paint Refugees as Villains," *The Punch*. 27th August. 2012, <http://www.thepunch.com.au/articles/The-lies-we-feed-ourselves-to-paint-refugees-as-villains/> (accessed 28th August, 2012).

25. It the *perception* of difference that is key here, after all there are nearly 500,000 New Zealanders living and working in Australia, who need no visa to do so.

26. Habermas's reformulation of the Kantian principle of universalisation is an example of a contemporary application of the principle of universal respect. He writes: 'A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.' Jürgen Habermas, *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 42.

under international law, such as those to 'respect, protect, and fulfil' human rights.²⁷ Although echoing these sentiments, our universalism, our cosmopolitanism, pursues a different line of argument. We will not simply insist that people or states must live up to some preconceived subjectivity and act as if they were good moral or legal subjects, nor will we be relying on the evocation of a common human community, as if we already faced such a collective singularity, 'mankind' as such.²⁸

Our approach to universality is of a different kind; it is not one of moral principles, but of ethical outlook. In essence we are offering a non-foundational cosmopolitanism; reflecting the understanding of 'ontology' discussed above, our cosmopolitanism amounts to questioning 'what does such an incident tell us about the nature of the being of those entities that encounter refugees as others to be excluded or detained?' Does their prerogative to do so as citizens and agents of a sovereign state amount to an exercise of their freedom as human beings, or simply

27. By virtue of their membership, states are bound under the United Nations charter to respect human rights, and through their ratification of successive human rights treaties they assume further obligations as principal duty-bearers to protect such rights. See <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml>

28. This common cosmopolitan supposition of a foundational 'human' subjectivity or collective singularity ('humanity as such') is misguided for three reasons. Firstly, a pre-established foundational subjectivity is controversial and contestable. Such a controversy is documented in a recent special issue of *International Politics* on ethics and world politics, where the central point of divergence between contributors to this special issue was the problem of referring to a human 'we.' While Smith, Linklater and Erskine explore the possibility of extending ethical frameworks so that suffering in world politics might be mitigated, 'Elden, Zehfuss, Hutchings and Vaughan-Williams inveigh that ethical frameworks produce the world they seek to reform.' James Brasset and Dan Bulley, "Ethics in World Politics: Cosmopolitanism and Beyond?," *International Politics* 44 (2007), 14-15. This 'we' problem derives from the problematic supposition that subjectivity is in some sense foundational or primordial: that it can be drawn upon to justify the extension of ethical frameworks rather than being produced by those frameworks themselves. Secondly, such a supposition runs into difficulties when it comes to the character of our encounter the 'other': whether the other is encountered simply as a mirror image of ourselves, or whether they are recognised as truly independent and singular beings. This is a point regularly made by so-called 'poststructuralist' approaches to politics and ethics. For examples, see D. Campbell, and M.J. Shapiro, eds. *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).; Thirdly, responding to his discourse theory of morality, Benhabib rightly objects to Habermas's evocation of a common humanity by arguing that 'a collectivity is not constituted theoretically, but is formed out of the moral and political struggles of fighting actors.' Consequently, a common humanity is something that is constructed in an ongoing process, and the deployment of the language of an anonymous species subject, 'humanity,' 'preempts the experience of moral and political activity as a consequence of which a genuine "we" can emerge.' Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 331. See also Seyla Benhabib, "The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics," *New German Critique* 35 (1985), 95-96.

as political subjects? Does an ethical relation to non-citizens consist in the non-contravention of cosmopolitan norms?

Love, Ethics, and Emancipation: An Overview of Our Argument

The Nature of the Complaint:

The 'Ontological' Foundations of Normative International Theory

Ontological assumptions and commitments underwrite our understandings of 'the world' and what it consists of, and serve as the (often unacknowledged) premises of our political and ethical thought; yet normative international theory has either tended to be too shallow or conservative with its 'ontological' foundations, or else it has mis-recognised the partisanship upon which it is based - claims that we illustrate in Part I with reference to Mervyn Frost, John Rawls, and Andrew Linklater.

Rawls and Frost

Keen to avoid contestable meta-theoretical commitments and recognise the particularity of their own ethical claims, we will see that Rawls' and Frost's respective foundational ethical commitments to the basic structures of a constitutional democracy and the system of sovereign states lend credence to Walker's claim that modern political theory has tended to produce visions of politics that remain essentially caught within the embrace of the nation-state and to Behr's claim that there has been a reluctance amongst political and international theorists to engage in more universalistic forms of ontological inquiry.

By circumscribing their approaches to world politics and ethics in this way, both Rawls and Frost shy away from interrogating the ontological nature of their

foundational commitments; commitments that reflect a shallow interpretation of the nature of 'ontological foundations' simply as the existence of 'objects' presupposed as the conditions of any ethical theory, rather than as the nature of the existence of that entity that encounters such foundations as objects. The upshot is that neither can pose much of a challenge to the violent and questionable practices associated with the continued existence of the system of sovereign states, nor can they contribute to an overcoming of the international problematic, outlined above.

Left-Hegelian Thought

In response to Frost we explicitly situate ourselves within a left-Hegelian tradition of thought. From a Hegelian point of view, it is simply not sufficient for us to encounter such ethical foundations as 'objective,' since for Hegel what it means 'to be' is to be free: it is the self-actualisation of freedom in the world that serves as the ontological foundation (in the fuller sense of the term) of human existence, and this allows us to criticise practices and institutions that fail to live up to this normative ideal. It is this foundational commitment to human freedom that underwrites the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, from Marx all the way down to contemporary critical theory and critical international relations theory (CIRT).

Defending the view that the future of critical theory lies in CIRT, we learn that CIRT has developed along two paths since first making inroads into IR in the early 1980s: a historical/sociological path, inaugurated by Robert W. Cox, that highlights different futures for international politics, and a philosophical/normative path, inaugurated by Richard K. Ashley, that uses freedom as a critical standard with which to criticise the theory and practice of world politics and to indicate ways forward. We see that the most comprehensive and compelling advocate of CIRT, Andrew Linklater, has developed a 'twin-track' approach that is reflected in his insistence of the necessarily 'tripartite structure' of critical theory, where any critical theory is seen to remain incomplete unless it contains philosophical/normative, sociological, *and* praxeological elements.

Andrew Linklater's Critical Approach to International Relations Theory

Not content to remain caught within the solipsistic particularism that characterises much modern political and international thought, Linklater confronts the international problematic head-on with a self-consciously universalistic argument that aspires to be sensitive to particularity. Far from taking modern institutions such as the system of sovereign states as 'objective' ethical foundations, Linklater adopts a broad and historically, sociologically, and philosophically informed vantage on contemporary international institutions and practices; one that is explicitly concerned with ongoing transformations of the Westphalian system and with possibilities for emancipatory political change latent within it. For these reasons, and more besides, we maintain that Linklater offers a far more promising approach to theorising contemporary world politics than do Rawls and Frost.

However, we later find Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, the philosophical defence of his CIRT and the justification of his subsequent sociological and praxeological analyses, to be predicated on the existence of an ethical subject: an interpretation of the being of human beings that serves as a foundational ethical commitment: a (subjective) interpretation of the being of human beings that is treated as if it were a general ontology of being.

Largely a consequence of his reliance on Kant, Marx, and Habermas, this commitment is reflected in Linklater's conception of emancipation, which is presented as a process of the historical self-actualisation of the ethical subject, and in his defence of universalism against Richard Rorty's anti-foundationalism, which amounts to the projection of ethical subjectivity on 'the other' and on other others. Our contention is that this involves Linklater submitting to a form of metaphysical dualism based upon a foundational subject-object split, where individual human beings are simultaneously treated as (ethical) subjects and (mind-independent cognitive) objects. This dualism is metaphysical because ethical subjectivity is

treated as if it were the essential nature of human beings *qua* human beings, applying to human beings 'as such' and to human beings as a whole.

There are two essential components to Linklater's dualism: an ontological dualism and an epistemological dualism.²⁹ He commits himself to an *ontological* dualism by virtue of his treatment of ethical subjectivity as the essential *being* of human beings (whose objects are universal principles), and to an *epistemological* dualism because the human being (conceived as ethical subject) is treated as if it were as a mind-independent cognitive object that is known by the epistemic subject (i.e., Andrew Linklater). This mind-independent object (the ethical subject) is what serves as the 'ontological' foundation of Linklater's universalist normative claims. 'Ontological' is placed in scare quotes to indicate that we do not consider such a foundation to be ontological in the full sense of the term; this is because, despite his left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom, by thinking this freedom as the freedom of the ethical subject Linklater falls back onto a foundational ontology of 'things,' since the ethical subject is the object presupposed by his emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

In light of this objection to Linklater's critical theory we make the broader claim that, although critical theory professes a high degree of reflexivity regarding the relation between subject and object, this concern is limited to the role of knowledge in the recreation of reality and in the emancipatory purposes of theory, rather than with any possible implications of any foundational commitments to subjectivity or objectivity; since these implications concern our mode of being in the world, they are referred to as 'ontological implications.' This omission, we argue, leads to what we call a 'politics of subjectivity': ethico-political practices that are ultimately incompatible with a commitment to an ethical and emancipatory politics.

29. Following Heidegger, we understand metaphysics as a speculative activity that goes beyond that which is immediately accessible to human beings, seeking to grasp the essence of entities (such as human beings) in order that general claims may be made about them. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002), 106. Although such a brief definition is inadequate, we request the reader's patience until Chapter 4 when a more thorough explanation will be given.

A Non-Dualist Approach to the Human Being: the Meta-Theoretical Condition of an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism

By the end of Part 1 we demonstrate that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, the philosophical defence of his approach to CIRT, is riven by an internal contradiction, and may ultimately fail by its own standards. We therefore find the most potent defence of a universalistic, ethical and emancipatory approach to contemporary world politics to be hamstrung by a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity. The deeper problem indicated by this commitment, we suggest, is both a shallow (and insufficiently universalistic) philosophical ontology of the human being and a thin conception of human freedom, where freedom is conceived simply as the freedom of the human being *qua* ethical subject. We conclude Part 1 by arguing that a non-dualist approach to the human being is the meta-theoretical condition of an ethical and emancipatory politics.

Research Question

Our contention is that Heidegger and Hegel present two potent defences of a non-dualist approach to the relation between self and world. Since both proceed from non-dualist premises, both reject any foundational commitments to subjectivity or objectivity, which they consider to contribute to an alienation of self from world, and as serving to 'un-live' human existence. Consonant with our earlier identification with the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, both Heidegger and Hegel are motivated by foundational ontological commitments (in the fuller sense of the term) to human freedom and, in contrast to Linklater's *rationalist* cosmopolitanism where the relationship between self and world is ultimately mediated by moral reason, both Heidegger and Hegel (respectively) are concerned with developing pre- and post-theoretical, *phenomenological*, relations to reality, and their

arguments in this regard help us to develop an alternative, *praxeological* emancipatory cosmopolitanism. We thus proceed into Parts 2 and 3 with the research question:

What are the implications of conceptions of human existence and freedom in Heidegger and Hegel for critical international theory?

Part 2: Worlds and World Politics

As we proceed, our two principal concerns in Part 2 are to deepen the ontological foundations (in the fuller sense of the term) of CIRT and to begin our task of developing a fuller understanding of human freedom upon which an alternative emancipatory cosmopolitanism might be based. To this end, Chapter 4 engages with Heidegger's *Being and Time*, where we discuss Heidegger's existential analytic of human existence. This offers us a firmer (more universalistic) ontological ground from which to proceed, and we defend the claim that any attempt to contribute to a more universalistic ontological inquiry for contemporary politics and ethics must proceed from a recognition of the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities. Such recognition would involve resisting the (characteristically dualist) temptation to regard our own interpretation of the being of beings as the only interpretation, and thus forgoing an approach to politics and ethics that is predicated on some universal foundation (such as ethical subjectivity). The upshot is that emancipation cannot be grounded on the self-actualisation of the ethical subject, as it is by Linklater, but must be premised on what Heidegger calls 'resolute solicitous being-with,' which is to be characterised by a de-centred receptivity to the existence of others.

After offering an alternative account of the individual as a world-relating creature rather than ethical subject, Chapter 5 explores Heidegger's account of freedom in greater depth. We establish that, before it is associated with any form of subjectivity (ethical subjectivity, or the political subjectivity associated with

citizenship, for instance) freedom must be recognised as the condition of any interpretation of the being of beings; as the 'ground' of the ontological difference.³⁰ In short, this amounts to repositioning freedom so that freedom is no longer principally seen as the property of a subject but is recognised as the existential condition of world-disclosure. It is for this reason that Linklater's projection of ethical subjectivity (an interpretation of the being of human beings) as a general ontology of human being involves the abrogation of a central aspect of human freedom.

We start exploring the ethical and political implications of our position towards the end of Chapter 5, where we resound calls from the likes of Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida for a 'politics of singularity;' this, we suggest, should displace the politics of subjectivity that we argued in Part I characterises Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism. The reason for this, which will become clearer in Chapter 5, is that the recognition of the ontological difference heralds a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics: while politics is the process of projecting and contesting interpretations of the being of beings as a whole, ethics concerns a relation to the other as singularity (rather than as foundational subject). For this reason we argue that, by predicating his emancipatory cosmopolitanism on an interpretation of the being of human beings as ethical subjects, Linklater mistakenly treats his politics as an ethics.

Part 3: Life, Love, and Emancipation

Developing Heidegger's account of resolute solicitous being-with through Hegel's account of inter-human recognition, the aim of Part 3 is to develop a more universalistic approach to contemporary politics by outlining the contours of an ethical and emancipatory politics of love and praxis. Our rationale for turning to Hegel is fourfold. One of the conclusions to Part 2 is that a central weakness of

30. For Heidegger freedom is the '*Abgrund*' (groundless ground / abyss) upon which the ontological difference rests. 'Ground' is therefore placed in inverted commas here as it is an inaccurate translation of '*Abgrund*'. This terminology will be explained in Chapters 4&5.

Heidegger's lies in his failure to explore for the interpersonal aspects of freedom and individuality, a mistake he might have avoided had he been a better student of Hegel; secondly, the discontinuity between politics and ethics heralded by Heidegger's fundamental ontology is already there in Hegel's distinction between *Sittlichkeit* (ethical life) and *Moralität* (ethical/moral reason), and Hegel gives a far more adequate account of ethics than does Heidegger; thirdly, the phenomenological impulse, an attempt to develop a non-theoretical relation to reality, although foregrounded by Heidegger, is already there in Hegel (this has unfortunately been obscured by more rationalist interpretations of Hegel); and finally, Hegel offers us a phenomenological approach to epistemology that is more persuasive than the renewed emphasis on the nature and function of language in post-Husserlian phenomenology, and this provides us with the epistemological defence of our emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

We initiate Part 3 with a discussion of the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel in Chapter 6, where we explore the nature of Hegel's completion of Kant's critical philosophy and his argument that (ethical or epistemological) subjectivity is essentially an ongoing social and historical achievement.³¹ As a result, the achievement of self-conscious 'subjectivity,' which differs in very significant respects from Kantian subjectivity, involves recognising that the subject-object split is not foundational but derivative, and that subject-object dualism is ultimately overcome through a post-theoretical relationship to reality: a relation between self and not-self (world) that Hegel discusses with relation to the experience of 'love.' Such a relation amounts to overcoming object-oriented forms of consciousness and recognising that the self is fundamentally exposed to the existence of others, i.e., realising that we are *not* essentially Kantian/Fichtean subjects. We then argue that mis-recognising the nature of Hegel's self-conscious 'subjectivity' as a Kantian form of subjectivity (as do Habermas, Linklater, and Honneth) leads to deleterious implications for our mode of being in the world, 'ontological' implications that include diremption, reification, and de-reification.

31. Although Linklater also regards subjectivity as a social and historical achievement, by taking an essentially Kantian approach to ethics he departs from Hegel in significant ways. The nature and significance of this divergence will become apparent in Chapter 6.

These are all consequences of conceiving the self as a subject standing in a transcendent and assimilatory relation to the objects of its experience: objects that include other persons.

Further exploring the nature of self-conscious 'subjectivity,' in Chapter 7 we engage with Hegel's account of the master and slave. Based on the experience of love, this provides a model of the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness and, as a consequence of this re-cognitive structure, the character of our own individuality is radically dependent on the nature of our relations with others. Consequently, the achievement of self-conscious 'subjectivity,' the attainment of a mature personality, requires that we recognise the 'interruptive condition of subjectivity:' that we are bound together with others in a 'community of fate.' This leads us to a characteristically Hegelian approach to human freedom: a form of freedom as an entirely immanent form of transcendence that follows from the concrete of between persons participating in the dynamic of ethical life. Following Nancy, we refer to this freedom as 'the crossing of love.'

Our last chapter, Chapter 8, picks up on this latter point, honing in on the ethical aspect of our argument through a discussion of the distinction drawn by Hegel between ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) and moral reason (*Moralität*), and the nature of the relation between these two approaches to society. Ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), we discover, operates according to an 'ethical logic of love,' while moral reason (*Moralität*) proceeds according to general laws given through the exercise of practical reason and is associated with a Kantian approach to ethics. Learning that ethical society requires the recognition of the mutual dependency of both perspectives, we demonstrate that, as a result of their foundational commitments to ethical subjectivity, both Habermas and Linklater mistreat the notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) by asserting the dominance of moral reason over ethical life. Attempting to rebalance this bias we conclude by advocating the importance of ethical life and engaged conscientious activity for an ethical and emancipatory politics.

Conclusions: Love, Ethics, and Emancipation

In light of our argument that a genuinely ethical relation to the other would involve resisting the (characteristically dualist) tendency to project an interpretation of the being of human beings onto others and engaging with others *as others* (as unique singularities rather than as ethical subjects) and having learnt that there are two aspects of human freedom obscured by Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism - freedom as the existential condition of any interpretation of the being of human beings (as ethical subjects, for instance) and freedom as 'the crossing of love,' where any given subjectivity is transcended through interactions with others - we conclude that, in order to reflect the fact that human beings are neither foundational ethical subjects, nor mind-independent cognitive objects, a more universalistic approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics must be predicated on non-dualist meta-theoretical commitments.

Having demonstrated the inadequacies of Linklater's philosophical defence of CIRT, which depends on a conception of emancipation as the historical self-actualisation of the ethical subject and an ethical universalism that is predicated on the universal projection of ethical subjectivity - both of which betray dualist meta-theoretical premises - we suggest that a more universalistic philosophical defence of CIRT, an alternative emancipatory cosmopolitanism, might instead be predicated on what it means 'to be' a free human being. Following Heidegger and Hegel, this would involve foregrounding resolute solicitous being-with and the ethical and emancipatory aspects our participation in the dynamic of ethical life; from a global perspective, we argue that this would involve the cultivation of a nascent international ethical life.

Recalling Linklater's insistence that any critical theory must include philosophical/normative, sociological, and praxeological aspects, we conclude that Linklater's reliance on Habermas's normative ideal of a universal discourse community as an evaluative tool for critical social theory is no longer sufficient, as

it rests on a limited conception of freedom that equates freedom with the exercise of ethical subjectivity, and is ethically deficient since ethical recognition is extended to human beings *qua* ethical subjects. Instead, we argue that a fully ethical and emancipatory approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics would involve self-consciously identifying with others beyond our immediate circles of concern, taking their interests as not wholly distinct from our own, and acting accordingly. To this end, displacing Linklater/Habermas's normative ideal of universal communication, we outline ways in which love can be deployed as an evaluative tool for critical social theory; how it can be deployed as a non-dualist normative standard with which to indict forms of ethical habituation (institutions and practices) that generate and sustain forms of indifference towards others.

Although affirming the praxeological aspects of Linklater's argument in his *The Transformation of Political Community*, where he argues that states are obliged to contribute to the development of forms of community beyond the state and create new forms of citizenship, we suggest a second practical application of our argument by proffering love as a guide for ethical and emancipatory praxis. Not dissimilar to the notion of cosmopolitan citizenship advocated by Linklater and others, this amounts to a form of cosmopolitan solidarity where the existence of others (where others are not confined to compatriots or fellow believers) comes to be seen as part of a deeper fabric of our own self-understandings, and whose interests are then taken as not wholly distinct from our own. In contrast to Linklater, whose praxeological arguments are directed primarily towards states and their agents, the praxeological aspect of our emancipatory cosmopolitanism is explicitly geared towards individuals and locates the emancipatory project in the experiences of individual human beings themselves (in the real lives of Bob Francis's audience, or the Commonwealth minister's constituents), rather than in civilising processes taking place above them.³²

32. On this point we follow Shannon Brincat. Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 2011), 312,314-315.

In brief then, our aim is to effect an 'overcoming' of Linklater's essentially *rationalist* cosmopolitanism with a *praxeological* cosmopolitanism.³³ While Linklater relies on a conception of the human being as ethical subject as a mind-independent foundation for his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, we argue that such a dualism is an inappropriate basis for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. It is worth making it clear at the outset that, despite our ardent criticisms of his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, we are not rejecting Linklater's approach to CIRT. Ours are not opposing viewpoints. Rather, we are attempting to establish CIRT on a firmer meta-theoretical foundation; essentially, on what it means to be a free human being. This is our original contribution to a critical approach to international theory; one that, we hope, can provide us with a more universalistic approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics than one based on a foundational commitment to an interpretation of the being of human beings as ethical subjects.

Aim, Scope and Limitations

Our discussion is a meta-theoretical response to ethical and emancipatory approaches to IR - one that seeks to provide a sounder basis for an emancipatory cosmopolitan politics than Linklater's. Our focus lies on the ontological aspects of ethical and political theory, yet our project is necessarily limited in its scope. We do not engage in a thorough overview of the tradition of critical international thought, this has already been provided by Rengger and Thirkell-White.³⁴ Neither do we engage in an overview of the diverse range of approaches to cosmopolitan thought, a task that has been engaged by many other scholars, most recently Richard Beardsworth.³⁵

33. Our use of the verb 'overcoming' will be explained shortly.

34. See Nicholas J. Rengger, and Ben Thirkell-White., ed. *Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

35. Richard Beardsworth, *Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).

Furthermore, although our cosmopolitanism is practically relevant, we shall not be concerned with demonstrating this relevance beyond the arguments offered in the concluding chapter. There is already a wealth of literature dealing with concrete proposals for cosmopolitan reform in world politics, and many critical theoretical approaches to world politics have already demonstrated the practical relevance of this position; CIRT already has a well-established empirical research agenda that this thesis does not immediately contribute to.³⁶ On the latter point see Booth, Krause and Williams's influential calls for the restructuring of security studies, Cox's arguments in international political economy for the examination of world order and global hegemony, or indeed any application of constructivism, which is (not unproblematically) considered by Price and Reus-Smit as 'the applied wing' critical theory.³⁷ In summary, as Linklater notes, 'even a brief analysis of the evolution of the empirical research agenda over the past fifteen years reveals that contemporary critical theorists have no reason to apologise to the allegedly more empirically minded for any failure to deliver concrete analysis.'³⁸

36. On cosmopolitan proposals for reform see David Held's arguments for the reform of the Security Council, the creation of a second chamber in the UN, the enhancement of political regionalisation, the use of trans-national referenda, the creation of a new human rights court, the foundation of a new co-ordinating economic agency at regional and global levels, and the establishment of an effective, accountable, international military force. In the longer term Held suggests such reforms should include the entrenchment of cosmopolitan democratic law in a new Charter of Rights, a new Global Parliament, and an interconnected global legal system. Daniele Archibugi, and David Held, eds. *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); David Held, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda," in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, ed. James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997).

37. Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 313-26; Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs* 63, no. 3 (1991): 527-45; Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds. *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997). Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-55; Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Robert W. Cox, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert W. Cox, "Civil Society At the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 3-28; Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, no. 3 (1998), 264.

38. Andrew Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn-Jones (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2001), 31-32.

A Note on Methodology

Sometimes it is hard to know where politics ends and metaphysics begins: when, that is, the stakes of a political dispute concern not simply a clash of competing ideas and values but a clash about what is real and what is not, what can be said to exist on its own and what owes its existence to an other.³⁹

Our argument is an exercise in international meta-theory, an exercise that involves responding to the question as to what it is that makes good theory.⁴⁰ Here we respond to the more specific question: what it is that makes good *critical* theory. It is perhaps Horkheimer who provides the sternest defence of a meta-theoretical approach to theory when he notes that, although there may be periods when one can get along without meta-theory, 'its lack denigrates people and renders them helpless against force.'⁴¹

Horkheimer also supplies what may be the most appropriate response to those that would question the practical relevance of meta-theory in his insistence that: 'today the whole historical dynamic has placed philosophy at the centre of social actuality, and social actuality at the centre of philosophy' and that we should therefore regard any hostility directed towards meta-theory as 'really directed against the transformative activity associated with critical thinking.'⁴² Living up to the promise of the critical study of world politics requires we recognise Horkheimer's statements hold true for International Relations, just as much as any other discipline, and perhaps more than most.⁴³

Our methodology is one of immanent critique, a method that is central to the work of Hegel, and is later advocated by members of the Frankfurt School, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. This immanent methodology 'starts with

39. J.M. Bernstein, "The Very Angry Tea Party," *New York Times*. 13th June. (2010).

40. 'International meta-theory ... seeks an answer to the question: "what constitutes good theory with regard to world politics?"' Mark A. Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, 2.

41. Cited by *Ibid.*, 1.

42. Cited by *Ibid.*

43. Mark A. Neufeld, "What's Critical About Critical International Relations Theory?," in *Critical Theory in World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 144.

the conceptual principles and standards of an object, and unfolds their implications and consequences. Then it re-examines and reassesses the object [...] in light of these implications and consequences. Critique proceeds, so to speak, 'from within.'⁴⁴ CIRT is explicitly committed to a high degree of reflectivity about the relationship between subject and object, to the process of human emancipation, and to the justification of its position according to universalist and universalistic ontologies; these are the standards in light of which our immanent critique assesses CIRT. Our mode of reception is closer to Walter Benjamin's 'redemptive hermeneutic' than it is to an Adornian 'absolute negation,' in that our aim is to redeem and retain what we consider to be most valuable in Linklater's approach.⁴⁵

44. Adorno and Horkheimer, quoted in Mark A. Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory*, 5.

45. Mark A. Neufeld, "What's Critical About Critical International Relations Theory?", 128-29.

Part 1.

International Theory

Chapter 1.

'Ontological' Foundations in Contemporary Approaches to International Thought

Introduction.

In light of our aim to contribute to the development of more universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry necessary for contemporary (global) politics and ethics, this chapter is primarily concerned with the role that ontology and 'ontological' foundations have played in international theory. To this end, we survey influential contemporary 'normative,' meta-theoretical, and 'critical' approaches to international theory. Maintaining that no theory is possible without ontological and epistemological (meta-theoretical) assumptions and commitments, and recalling our explanation that 'ontology' is a form of philosophical inquiry into what exists and the *nature* of existence, our central claim is that the dominant voices in each of the approaches that we survey rely on a shallow ontology of 'things,' rather than an ontology of being, as their ontological foundation.

Lending support to both Behr's claim that the overwhelming trajectory of thought since the eighteenth century has been geared towards the recognition of the particularity of ontological interests, and Walker's claim that modern political theory has overwhelmingly produced visions of politics and ethics that remain framed by the sovereign state, we shall see that normative international theorists such as Rawls and Frost attempt to sidestep important philosophical (ontological and epistemological) questions by taking dominant practices and institutions associated with the sovereign state as foundational ethical commitments. However, despite their best attempts, philosophical questions invariably arise due to their

treatment of such ethical foundations as the 'objects' presupposed as the conditions of their normative claims.

This leads us to a brief discussion of Hegel, for whom institutions such as the state do not in themselves have an 'objective' existence, as their objectivity is conditional upon the nature of the being of the being that encounters such entities as 'objects.' Put differently, for Hegel the 'objectivity' of dominant practices and institutions remains dependent upon the extent to which such institutions contribute to the freedom of the human being: to the self-actualisation of freedom in the world. We suggest that such a foundational ontological commitment (in the fuller sense of the term) might represent a more universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary (global) politics and ethics.

However, mainly due to the prominence and ascendancy of critical realism in contemporary international theory, attempts to bring ontological reflection into IR have overwhelmingly been confused and facile. This is largely the consequence of a questionable philosophical commitment to a mind-world dualism, which permits Wendt and critical realists to separate epistemology from ontology and to prioritise ontological questions; these commitments have led to an overvaluation of the role of scientific inquiry in world politics and a marginalisation of alternative 'philosophical ontologies' from debates in international theory. Fortunately however, the dualist commitments underwriting these approaches to international meta-theory have recently been subjected to persuasive challenges from Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Torsten Michel; the latter pointing to Heidegger's distinction between entities and the being of entities and arguing that proper ontology concerns the latter.

In light of this survey, we return to a discussion of left-Hegelian thought, which is represented by 'critical' approaches to international theory. By refusing to encounter (currently) dominant practices and institutions in world politics as 'objects,' these approaches overcome the weakness of Rawls and Frost's approaches to normative international theory. Nonetheless, we suggest that the most persuasive

advocate of a critical approach to international theory, Andrew Linklater, might not overcome the weakness common to the normative theorists and the critical realists; that is, to rely on a shallow ontology of 'things' rather than an ontology of being. The 'thing' presupposed by Linklater's CIRT is the ethical subject, which is treated as if it were a mind-independent object and serves as the 'ontological' foundation (in the shallow sense of the term) of his critical approach to international theory, claims that we corroborate in Chapter 2.

We conclude Chapter 1 by affirming Michel's suggestion that deeper reflection regarding notions of subjectivity and objectivity is called for in international theory. However, while Michel has shown us that Heidegger can lead us to a deeper ontological appreciation of subjectivity and objectivity, since he is apparently uninterested in the problem of knowledge, he can only get us so far. We therefore conclude by outlining Hegel's phenomenological constructivist approach to epistemology: a more fruitful phenomenological approach to knowledge than that can be found in post-Husserlian phenomenology and the approach to knowledge according to which our argument proceeds.

'Ontological' Foundations in Normative (International) Political Theory

As Habermas explains, ontological assumptions and commitments serve as the (often unacknowledged) premises of our political and ethical thought:

Ontological commitments, whether philosophical or scientific, logically precede substantive claims, and serve as the often-unacknowledged basis on which empirical claims are founded. In this sense, ontological commitments are 'foundational'--not in the sense that they provide unshakable grounds that universally guarantee the validity of claims that are founded on them, but 'foundational' in the sense that they provide the conditions of intelligibility for those claims. In that way, ontological commitments are world-disclosing, since they make a particular kind of tangible world available to a researcher.¹

1. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), 321.

Indeed, the theoretical divergence in the hugely influential cosmopolitan/communitarian debates in political theory and normative international theory in the 1980s and 1990s might largely be attributed to an underlying (and often implicit) disagreement about what the ultimate ground, i.e., what the *subject*, of justice is taken to be: whether that is the individual (the rational individual/the vulnerable individual/the 'free' individual) or the collective (the nation/state/*polis*/religious community).² In each case these act as foundational 'ontological' commitments: the 'objects' presupposed as the conditions of any subsequent normative claims.

Given the theoretical divergence in normative international theory, an intelligent way ahead is to engage in meta-theoretical analysis of the epistemological and ontological presuppositions underwriting these positions: evaluating the (ontological) nature of their foundations, and the (epistemological) status of the claims that follow.³ The latter task is taken up by Molly Cochran in her *Normative Theory in International Relations*, an impressive study of the ethical foundations underwriting a range of approaches to normative international theory, including Rawls, Walzer, Frost, and Linklater, which results in an appraisal of the epistemological status of the normative claims that follow from their respective ethical foundations.⁴

Situating the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate in normative international theory within the context of a larger debate in the social sciences about modernist, foundationalist epistemologies, Cochran argues that the question of whether moral claims are universal or particular is a tension not primarily about the *scope* of moral claims, 'but about *how* those claims are made [...], about how claims to ethical judgement in IR are grounded or justified.' Consequently, she

2. There is a huge secondary literature on these debates. For exemplary discussions see Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, *Liberals and Communitarians*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

3. This is the strategy deployed by Kenneth Waltz in relation to causal theories of war. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

4. Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*.

claims that although the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate is principally concerned with 'ontological questions,' it 'leaves untheorized the rival foundational assumptions upon which these ontologies stand.'⁵ As a result of her evaluation of the epistemological aspects of different normative theories, Cochran concludes that 'in order to offer a criterion for ethical judgement,' the 'burden of an ethics' is 'shifted back onto ontology.'⁶

Recalling our earlier explanation that ontology is a form of inquiry into *what* exists and into the nature of existence, or what it *means* to exist, in as much as these foundational ethical commitments are commitments to entities that are presupposed as the conditions of any normative claim, disputes about whether the individual or the community is a more appropriate ethical foundation might be considered an 'ontological' debate in a shallow sense of the term. That said, since the 'objectivity' of such foundations is often presupposed, such debates are very superficial (ontologically speaking) and the ontological questions raised by such foundational commitments are commonly left unanswered: whether such foundations can be considered to have objective existence, and what it means to treat such ethical foundations as objects, for instance.

Supporting Behr's claim that the overwhelming trajectory of thought since the eighteenth century has been geared towards recognising the particularity of epistemological and ontological commitments, the root of the problem is that political theorists usually try hard to evade the ontological questions that invariably arise from their foundational commitments. Moreover, since a common strategy of evasion is to take dominant practices and institutions as foundational ethical commitments, the upshot of this humility is that dominant practices and institutions are treated as if they were 'objective,' thus lending uncritical ideological support to the status quo and reinforcing visions of politics and ethics that remain framed by the sovereign state.

5. Ibid., xvi.

6. Ibid.

Since both approaches rest upon foundational ethical commitments to institutions and practices associated with the modern state, we will explore these questions in the following section with reference to John Rawls's 'Political Liberalism' and Mervyn Frost's 'secular Hegelianism.' Although leading to undeniably persuasive and practical approaches to normative international theory, as approaches to contemporary (global) politics and ethics they are fundamentally limited by these foundations. We further argue that such foundations cannot in themselves be considered 'objective' and must themselves be subject to evaluation; our suggestion is that these ethical commitments must themselves be underwritten by a deeper, more foundational ontological commitment to human freedom.

Ethical Foundations in The 'Political Liberalism' of John Rawls

Responding to criticisms of his seminal publication *A Theory of Justice* (1971) in an article titled *Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical* (1985), a precursor to his *Political Liberalism* (1993), Rawls asserts the particularity of his normative claims by explicitly limiting his conception of 'justice as fairness' to a *political* conception of justice that applies only to the 'basic structure' of a modern constitutional democracy.⁷ Rawls's clarification that his normative theory is only meant to apply to the political, social, and economic institutions of a modern constitutional democracy is basically an attempt to sidestep philosophical disputes regarding the essential nature of persons, since he only intends for his theory to apply to human beings *qua* subjects (i.e., citizens) of a constitutional democracy, and to likewise avoid claims about universal truth, since he does not suppose that his normative claims apply universally, but only on the condition of a prior acceptance of these ethical foundations and therefore only *within* the jurisdiction of the state. He writes:

7. See: John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999)., and Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).; Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (London: Duckworth, 2007).; Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983).; John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical*, vol. 14(3), *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (1985), 224.

In this discussion I shall make some general remarks about how I now understand the conception of justice that I have called 'justice as fairness' (presented in my book *A Theory of Justice*). I do this because it may seem that this conception depends on philosophical claims I should like to avoid, for example, claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and identity of persons.

[...]

Thus, the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons.⁸

Rawls thus leaves the question open as to whether 'justice as fairness' can be extended to different societies existing under different historical and social traditions.⁹ Reasserting his particularism in his *The Law of Peoples* (1999), Rawls explicitly states that his conception of international justice does not claim universal scope, but applies only to the foreign policy of a liberal people:

[I]t is important to see that the *Law of Peoples* is developed within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples. I emphasize that, in developing the *Law of Peoples* within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. This concern with the foreign policy of a liberal people is implicit throughout. The reason we go on to consider the point of view of decent peoples is not to prescribe principles of justice for them, but to assure ourselves that the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a liberal people are also reasonable from a decent nonliberal point of view. The need for such assurance is a feature inherent in the liberal conception. The *Law of Peoples* holds that decent nonliberal points of view exist, and that the question of how far nonliberal peoples are to be tolerated is an essential question of liberal foreign policy.¹⁰

Although Rawls is correct to recognise and emphasise the particularity of his normative claims, by taking the basic structures of a constitutional democracy as a foundational ethical commitment he effectively treats these structures as if they were 'objective.' This requires that we accept that these institutions are essentially 'good' (because they are subject to no further evaluation), and that they are here to stay. Moreover, since his theory of 'justice as fairness,' only applies *within* states, and (later) to the outward-directed foreign policy of a liberal state, it serves to reinforce what Jens Bartelson identifies as the 'parergonal' (framing) logic of sovereignty, taking sovereignty itself as an unproblematic good and remaining

8. Ibid., 223,230.

9. Ibid., 225.

10. John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 9-10.

blind to both the contemporary transformations of the Westphalian states-system and the possibilities of progressive change.¹¹ We will return to these issues shortly.

Ethical Foundations in Mervyn Frost's Constitutive Theory

By taking the state, the system of sovereign states, and global civil society as his foundational ethical commitments, Mervyn Frost's 'secular' interpretation of Hegel provides us with a second illustration of the tendency in modern political theory to try to evade ontological questions and thereby reinforce visions of politics and ethics that remain contained within the sovereign state.¹²

Building on the original articulation of his 'constitutive theory of individuality' as developed in *Ethics in International Relations*, in his later work *Constituting Human Rights*, Frost argues for the centrality of human rights in international relations, which leads him to explore the apparent conflict between the rights practices associated with global civil society and those of the society of democratic states.¹³ Distinguishing between the rights we have as citizens and the rights we have as civilians, Frost argues that as participants within global civil society we claim for ourselves and constitute each other as civilians with first generation human rights. Similarly, as participants in the global society of democratic and democratising states, we claim for ourselves and constitute each other as citizens, as holders of the second and third generation rights that we associate with citizenship.

11. Bartelson argues that sovereignty functions according to the same logic as the *parergon*. The *parergon* is a problem discussed in aesthetics, centring on the relationship between a frame, a work of art itself, and its background. The solution, as explained by Bartelson is that: 'a frame, a line of demarcation, an ontological divide, or geographical or chronological boundary all assert and manifest class membership of a phenomena, but the frame or line itself cannot be a member of either class. It is neither inside, nor outside, yet it is the condition of possibility of both. A *parergon* does not exist in the same sense as that which it helps to constitute; there is a ceaseless activity of *framing*, but the frame itself is never present, since it is itself unframed.' Jens. Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 51.

12. On Frost's 'secular' Hegelianism see: Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 143-58.

13. Ibid.; Mervyn Frost, *Constituting Human Rights: Global Civil Society and the Society of Democratic States* (London: Routledge, 2002).

We only 'have' human rights by virtue of our participation within these two practices, and the context and scope of different types of rights claims therefore correspond with the context and scope of these respective practices. First generation rights such as freedom of speech, conscience, and the right not to be killed or assaulted are *negative* rights that claim universal scope, applying universally to all those who participate in global civil society, while second and third generation rights, such as rights to employment, housing, health-care, economic and social development, and group and collective rights, are *positive* rights that depend on our participation in concrete political institutions such as the state. Since these institutions are necessary for their provision, these positive rights can only apply within their jurisdiction.

Although Frost's argument provides a convincing account of the generation of human rights, and it clarifies the nature and scope of our commitments to these rights, his normative theory, like Rawls's, is predicated on our acceptance that practices and institutions such as the sovereign state, the system of sovereign states, and global civil society, are foundational ethical goods. While such practices and institutions are the conditions of human rights, which are undoubtedly a significant historical and political achievement, they are themselves far from unproblematic; yet by taking them as the ethical foundations of this normative theory Frost also effectively treats these foundations as if they were 'objective:' they have to be taken as givens, subject to no further evaluation, no higher court of appeal.

The Return of the Repressed (Ontology)

In her analysis, Cochran rightly disputes the 'objectivity' of these foundations and refers to them instead as 'weak foundations' that lead to *contingently* held normative claims.¹⁴ Such a conclusion reflects the

14. Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*, 113-14.

epistemological focus of her analysis: she is primarily concerned with the status of normative claims. However, Cochran recognises that this shifts the burden of an ethics back onto ontology.¹⁵ Ironically then, despite attempting to evade philosophical questions by emphasising the particularity of their normative claims and taking dominant practices as their ethical foundations, treating such commitments as 'objects' presupposed as the conditions of their normative claims invites an ontological evaluation of such commitments. A properly ontological evaluation of Rawls and Frost's ethical foundations would not simply consist in debating which represents the better ethical foundation, but must involve questioning the 'objectivity' of such foundations themselves: whether such foundations have objective existence, what it means to take these ethical foundations as objective, and what it says about the being of the entity that encounters such institutions as objects.

Cutting to the chase, our contention is that it is not sufficient to encounter such foundations as objects and that ontologically speaking we need to dig a little deeper. This does not require that we reject Rawls or Frost's normative theories but it does require that we subject their foundational ethical commitments to further evaluation before accepting their normative claims. It should not be too controversial to suggest that human freedom might provide a normative ideal with which to evaluate these ethical commitments. Such a deeper commitment to human freedom might involve the contention that these practices and institutions could be considered historical achievements in virtue of their contribution to our self-actualisation as free beings: for example, that the state might be considered an achievement to the extent that it provides a sphere in which and through which we are able to provide ourselves with positive rights, such as those to education, health-care, and social security. In this way, such a foundational commitment to human freedom might then underwrite Rawls and Frost's (previously foundational) ethical commitments, so that the state and the system of sovereign states are no longer themselves taken as foundational ethical goods but are evaluated against a normative ideal of human freedom. In this way the ethical claims that follow from

15. *Ibid.*, xvi.

their normative theories would hold only on the condition that they contribute to human freedom.

The Actual and the Rational

This is Hegel's position. For Hegel it is not sufficient for us to encounter institutions, such as the state, as 'objects;' the 'objectivity' of these entities must itself be evaluated against a more foundational commitment to human freedom. Such is the idea behind his (in)famous (and enigmatic) dictum 'what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational,' for when Hegel talks of 'actuality' he is not talking about the purely contingent, that which has (empirical) existence, he is talking about that which is infinite (unconditioned) and free. As H. B. Nisbet points out, the fact that Hegel is *not* uncritically validating the status quo becomes clearer in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Right*, where his formulation of the dictum as 'what is actual *becomes* rational, and the rational *becomes* actual,' emphasises the *dynamic* and *progressive* aspect of reason that becomes actual in the world.¹⁶

On Hegel's account then, rather than taking practices and institutions associated with the modern state as 'objective' ethical foundations, it is a particular understanding of human freedom that justifies the settled order. As Allen Wood helpfully explains:

The actual is always rational, but no existing social order is ever wholly actual. In its existence, the rational Idea of an ethical order is always to some extent disfigured by contingency, error, and wickedness.¹⁷ The present social order must be measured not by a timeless standard, but by its own ethical Idea [...] There is plenty of room in Hegel's ethical theory for *criticism of the existing order as an immature or imperfect embodiment of its own Idea* [...] The principles of an ethical order are valid only so long as that order is rational [...] The foundation of the ethical is its actualisation of spirit's freedom. The cause

16. G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen Über Rechtsphilosophie (Lectures on the Philosophy of Right)* (Stuttgart: Frommann Verla, 1974), 19 51. emphasis added. G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 389-390n22.

17. The Idea is freedom. On the understanding of 'Idea' in Hegel see Glenn Alexander Magee, *The Hegel Dictionary* (London: Continuum, 2010), 111-15.

of that freedom is served *not only* by the structure of a rational social order, but also by the *destruction of an order that has lost its rationality* [...] Inevitably Hegel's ethical theory focuses critical attention on prevailing social institutions: Does the existing social order actualise its Idea? Is the ethical order itself rational, or has it lost its foundation in spirit's struggle to actualise freedom?¹⁸

From a Hegelian perspective then, ontologically speaking, practices and institutions such as the state do not in themselves have an 'objective' existence, but must be evaluated with relation to the being of that entity that encounters these institutions as objects; since for Hegel the human being is a free being, the 'objectivity' of these foundations is conditional upon their contribution to the freedom of the human being. Put differently, it is the self-actualisation of freedom that provides the underlying standard by which practices and institutions, Rawls and Frost's foundational ethical commitments, are to be evaluated.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* is a defence of the view that the ethical state is the most rational *modern* form of the actualisation of objective freedom: the state's rationality is dependent on it being effective at actualising human freedom; when it no longer serves human freedom it will (presumably) be subject to revision.¹⁹ This is the critical purchase of Hegel's argument. His attempts to show in the *Philosophy of Right* how the institutions of modern society, such as the family, civil society, and the state, actualise freedom in the modern world all presuppose the possibility that modern society might fail to meet these critical standards: this is the radical dimension of his ethical theory; the possibility of a radical Hegelian 'left' is immanent in his thought, as is an apologetic Hegelian 'right.'²⁰

As Wood notes, the historical Hegel himself was a moderate, reformist 'centrist,' but to know which Hegel to deploy presupposes the prior judgement as to whether modern society is really rational.²¹ By taking the settled norms of state sovereignty and human rights as foundational goods, Frost has to presume that these norms are both rational (and have to be reconciled), yet without an

18. Allen W. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 256. Emphasis added.

19. G.W.F. Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*.

20. Allen W. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought*, 257.

21. *Ibid.*

underlying (foundational) commitment to human freedom Frost cannot claim the 'actuality' of human rights or of the system of sovereign states, and hence is only able to offer an account of the rationality of the contingent. In so doing Frost divests himself of the critical purchase of Hegel's ethical theory: he cannot evaluate these practices with anything other than the yardstick of their own internal coherence and thus leaves himself at risk of being charged with being an ideologue of the *status quo*, an apologist for the practices of violence and exclusion implicated in the continued existence of the system of sovereign states.²²

Reviving the Philosophical & Confronting the Ontological

With regards to the basic structures of a constitutional democracy and the liberal state, a similar criticism might be levelled against Rawls's theory of 'justice as fairness.' The central weakness of both approaches is that by treating them as foundational, they treat their ethical commitments as objective, rather than ensuring that the 'objective' status of these ethical commitments is itself conditional upon the historical self-actualisation of the human being as a free being. Both do so in order to sidestep metaphysical questions, contestable philosophical (ontological and epistemological) questions about the nature of human beings. Yet the upshot of this evasion is that they divest themselves of the necessary resources with which to counter claims that their foundational commitments are simply the artefacts of military might or capital, for instance, and that their normative theories are anything other than ideological justifications of the sovereign state (as historical materialists might argue).

Moreover, by taking such foundations as 'objective,' both largely preclude the possibility of ethical and emancipatory change pertaining to these foundations. Frost is unable to envisage movement beyond the current state of affairs, such as the potential reform of global institutional arrangements so as to extend the scope

22. On more than one occasion I have heard Chris Brown say that, when asked, Frost cannot decide whether he is a 'left' or 'right' Hegelian. Based on the evidence given here, I would suggest he is a right Hegelian.

of the provision of second and third generation rights more universally, while the 'parergonal' logic of Rawls's theory of justice, its sharp inside/outside distinction, means that 'outsiders' have few ethical claims on 'insiders,' and we must therefore acquiesce to the violent and exclusionary practices associated with the exercise of state sovereignty.

Both Rawls and Frost thereby reinforce visions of politics and ethics that remain framed by the state, and offer inert approaches to contemporary (global) politics and ethics that neglect the historical nature of (currently) hegemonic social and political institutions, which are unable to provide any guide for future-directed action, save for the effective management of the status quo. Despite both offering eminently persuasive and practical approaches to normative questions in international relations when accepted on their own terms, these terms themselves rest upon questionable ontological assumptions that remain unresponsive to the contemporary transformations of the Westphalian system, and leave us impotent in the face of potentially progressive transformations of our political and social arrangements.

These essential limitations of Rawls and Frost's approaches to contemporary (global) politics and ethics are consequent of their attempts to evade philosophical questions by asserting the particularity of their claims, attempts that are ultimately unsuccessful. Since normative international theory has so far lacked ontological reflection (in the fuller sense), we might then suggest that the conditions of contemporary (global) politics and ethics call for us to confront such ontological questions, and to do so with more self-consciously universalistic intent; preferably proceeding from a left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom. In contrast to the particularism of Rawls and Frost's approaches to normative theory, such an approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics would be more universalistic because it would apply to human beings *qua* human beings, rather than to human beings *qua* participants in global civil society, or *qua* subjects of a constitutional democracy. However, as we shall discover in the next section, a

central obstacle to such a task is that attempts to bring ontological reflection into international theory have, so far, overwhelmingly been superficial.

'Ontological' Foundations in International Theory

The previous section provided us with confirmation of both Walker's claim that modern political theory has overwhelmingly reproduced visions of politics and ethics that remain framed by the nation-state, and Behr's claim that, although more universalistic forms of ontological inquiry are required for contemporary (global) politics and ethics, the overwhelming trajectory of political thought has been geared towards the recognition of the particularity of its claims. Consequently, although indelibly marked by ontological and epistemological, *meta-theoretical*, presuppositions and commitments, normative political theorists have attempted to elude such commitments by conservatively taking dominant practices and institutions as their ethical foundations, insisting that their claims only apply on the condition that these foundations are accepted.

International thought has not similarly retreated from confronting the meta-theoretical aspects of political and social inquiry. This may in part be attributable to the fact that IR is a derivative discipline that applies insights from other disciplines such as political science, philosophy, sociology, economics, history, linguistics, etc., but also because the increasingly heterodox and trans-disciplinary nature of various studies of war, peace, order and change in the field might have forced a greater degree of meta-theoretical reflexivity.²³ However, owing to the influence of dualist philosophical commitments on these meta-theoretical debates, until very recently ontological debates in international theory have overwhelmingly remained either very basic, or confused; concerned only with an ontology of 'things' that exist, rather than an ontology of being. Notable exceptions to this rule,

23. On IR as a derivative discipline see Ronen Palan, "Transnational Theories of Order and Change: Heterodoxy in International Relations Scholarship," in *Critical International Theory After 25 Years*, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

which will be discussed in due course, are relatively recent contributions from Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Torsten Michel.²⁴

The Third Debate

Meta-theoretical concerns came to prominence in IR during the 'fourth great debate' between positivism and post-positivism, somewhat confusingly referred to in the literature as the 'Third Debate.'²⁵ Positivism involved a unified conception of science and the adoption of the methodologies of the natural sciences to explain phenomena in the social realm, and it dominated the academic study of IR in the latter half of the twentieth century.²⁶ From the early 1980s a plethora of 'critical' approaches to IR emerged, principally Critical Theorists inspired by the Frankfurt School and/or Gramsci, normative theorists, 'postmodernists', 'post-structuralists', and feminists.²⁷

24. See Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory," *Review of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2008): 129-53; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2011). and Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness: A Phenomenological Path Towards a New Social Ontology in International Relations" (Ph.D Thesis, St Andrews, 2008); Torsten Michel, "Pigs Can't Fly, Or Can They? Ontology, Scientific Realism and the Metaphysics of Presence in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 35 (2009): 379-419; Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow: A Phenomenological Critique of Critical Realism," *Review of International Studies* 38 (2012): 209-22.

25. Yosef Lapid coined the term 'Third Debate' to refer to the debate between positivist and post-positivist theories of IR. Earlier debates in international theory are referred to as the 'First Great Debate' (between Realism and Idealism) and the Second Great Debate (between scientific and classical approaches to IR); what is considered to be the 'Third Great Debate' in IR (between realism, liberalism and radical approaches) is also sometimes referred to as the 'Inter-Paradigm Debate.' Consequently, what Lapid terms the 'Third Debate' would be considered to be the 'Fourth Great Debate.' Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," *International Studies Quarterly* 33 (1989): 235-54.

26. For a concise yet illuminating overview of the history of positivism and its influence on IR see Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Steve Smith, et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14-18,31-35.

27. Habermas and Gramsci influenced the two pivotal texts in this debate, from Richard K. Ashley and Robert Cox respectively. See Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (1981): 204-36; Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 2 (1981): 126-55. For a retrospective discussion of their influence see Nicholas J. Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White., eds. *Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

What united these approaches was not so much anything substantive as much as their shared rejection of the assumptions associated with positivism. On one hand critical approaches challenged the dominance of the neo-realist and neo-liberal emphasis on technical questions, and on the other they attempted to introduce social-theoretical concerns in order to move the discipline in a radically different direction.²⁸ Since international theory underpins and informs international practice, far from being exercises in 'navel gazing,' the stakes in these debates were high, since 'once established as common sense theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate *not only what can be known* but also what it is sensible to talk about and suggest[; hence ...] what is at stake in debates about epistemology is very significant for political practice. Theories do not simply explain or predict, they tell us *what possibilities exist* for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also *our ethical and practical horizons*.²⁹

Indeed, one of the reasons that positivism was dominant for so long lay in the fact that by determining 'what kinds of things existed in international relations' its empiricist epistemology had determined what could be studied in IR.³⁰ In order to challenge this orthodoxy, post-positivist debates were necessarily epistemologically oriented.³¹ And yet, despite highlighting the importance of

28. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 72. I am aware that this account of the development of 'the discipline' is not entirely neutral. However, it is a commonly accepted narrative and it serves the purpose of situating the thesis as a contribution to meta-theoretical debates in IR. For an alternative history of the discipline see Craig Murphy, "Critical Theory and the Democratic Impulse: Understanding a Century-Old Tradition," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Craig Murphy, "The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept," in *Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years*, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

29. Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 13. emphasis added. On the links between international theory and practice, see also Marysia Zalewski, "'All These Theories Yet the Bodies Keep Piling Up': Theory, Theorists, Theorising," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Ken Booth, Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

30. Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 11.

31. Ashley and Cox's interventions are good examples of this. Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests.," Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory." The 'great debates' in the discipline's history, between realism and idealism in the 1930s and 1940s, between the 'scientific' and 'classical' (alternatively, 'traditional') approaches in the 1960s, or the inter-paradigm debate between realism, pluralism and globalism/structuralism, did not involve questions of epistemology. As Smith notes, 'the discipline has tended to accept implicitly a rather simple and, crucially, an uncontested set of positivist assumptions which have fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world is like and how we

theory and bringing dissident voices from out of the margins of the discipline, it could be argued that the emphasis placed on the reflexive importance of epistemology as constructive of the world of objects (of states and the states-system, for instance) coupled with the diversification of epistemological approaches to the study of IR, a degree of epistemological radicalism emerged from the Third Debate. This, and increasingly unproductive epistemological debates, were to occasion a shift back to 'ontology,' most prominently heralded by Alexander Wendt in the mid-1990s.³²

The Turn to 'Ontology'

Given the epistemological orientation of the Third Debate, and the positivist empiricism that had previously determined 'what kind of *things* existed in international relations,' this 'turn to ontology' was always likely. Yet this is not to suggest that ontological concerns arose only after the Third Debate, since this would clearly be wrong.³³ There have long been approaches that challenged the foundational commitments of neo-realism, that have stood at variance with those associated with positivism, and ontological claims permeated the Third Debate. Nevertheless, it was only after this 'great debate' that IR became explicitly and self-consciously reflexive about the 'ontological' aspects of social and political inquiry.³⁴

might explain it.' Although those working in the 'English School' or on the intersection of international theory and political theory never really bought into the positivist assumptions that dominated the discipline, it has been positivism that has dominated the overwhelming character of the discipline of International Relations. Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 11.

32. Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 71-81; Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 335-70; Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

33. On Richard Falk and the World Order School, and peace studies/peace research, see Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 58-69. On dissident traditions of IR in the USA also see Craig Murphy, "The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept." On ontological commitments in political thought pre-dating the dominance of positivism or realism see Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

34. Steve Smith, "Positivism and Beyond," 11.

By arguing that 'what really matters is what there is rather than how we know it,' Wendt's proposal was that the IR debate should move away from epistemological questions (specifically, whether the methods of the natural sciences could be validly applied to social reality) to questions concerning what kind of things existed in world politics.³⁵ The logic here is that if what *really matters* is what kinds of things exist in world politics, then *how* we know those things is not important. Wendt's compromise thus warranted an epistemological pluralism, promising to accommodate positivists and dissidents alike. However, such a compromise came at the cost of accepting a critical realist philosophy of science, and it is this critical realist approach to IR that is currently ascending.³⁶

Wendt's (contentious) distinction between 'epistemological' and 'ontological' questions allows him to argue that ontological questions take priority over epistemological ones, and allows him to suggest that we look 'beyond given appearances to the underlying social relationships that generate (in a probabilistic sense) phenomenal forms.'³⁷ Drawing on Anthony Giddens's structuration theory and Roy Bhaskar's epistemology of scientific realism, Wendt engages with the 'agent-structure problem.' His most recognisable argument, captured in the pithy phrase 'anarchy is what states make of it,' is the social constructivist claim that ideational factors play a role in the recreation of the anarchical structure of the international system that neo-realists claim govern state interaction, and that this anarchical system is therefore a phenomenon that is socially constructed and reproduced by states.³⁸

35. Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, 40.; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 73.

36. See, for instance, a recent forum on critical realism in the *Review of International Studies* 38(1) January 2012. See also the forum 'Scientific and Critical Realism in International Relations' *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 35(2) 2007

37. We will explain why such a distinction is contentious in due course. Ibid. Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," 362.

38. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." See also Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory."; Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*.

Critical Realism

Arguing that 'the intersubjective merely represents one important and necessary part of the social', critical realists strive to gain deeper access to reality than that offered by Wendt's social constructivism.³⁹ Whereas Wendt emphasises the 'reality' of ideational factors (for Wendt the intersubjective nature of social structures makes ideas 'real'), critical realists consider these factors relatively superficial, and strive to uncover the 'objective,' 'causal' processes that undergird the problematics that Wendt argues are intersubjectively constructed.⁴⁰ Citing the example of North-South relations, Wight and Joseph claim these are simply not reducible to intersubjective relations, as Wendt would have us believe, but are phenomena (appearances) that are underwritten by the 'objective' structure of the global capitalist system.⁴¹ The implication is that we are thus able to make *scientific, objective* claims about 'material' structures, 'intransitive objects' that structure and condition human relations; herein supposedly lies the emancipatory potential of critical realist inquiry.⁴²

The central critical realist objection to both positivism and post-positivism is that both are embedded within a philosophical discourse of anti-realism.⁴³ In contrast, their own position rests upon an ontological commitment to 'depth

39. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight., "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," *International Studies Quarterly* 44 (2000), 217-18.

40. 'What makes these ideas (and thus structure) 'social' [. . .] is their intersubjective quality' Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," 73.

41. Jonathan Joseph, and Colin Wight, "Scientific Realism and International Relations," in *Scientific Realism and International Relations*, ed. Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

42. We use the term 'supposedly' because it does not question whether encountering these entities as 'objects' is a contribution to human freedom or an abrogation of it. Moreover, there is a level of correspondence here with Booth's questionable claim, discussed in the Preface, that 'one cannot have one's own understanding ... under conditions of indoctrination, traditionalist socialisation, and inadequate relevant knowledge.' In other words, that knowledge, *enlightenment*, is central to freedom. This equation of theoretical, *scientific*, knowledge, with freedom is more problematic than it is commonly treated, as Horkheimer and Adorno demonstrate. Ken Booth, *Theory of World Security*, 112. Theodor W. Adorno, and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Verso, 1986).

43. Patomäki and Wight cite Martin Hollis's observation that the 'empiricist theories of knowledge (upon which positivism is based) are 'anti-realist at bottom,' and David Campbell's claim that 'nothing exists outside of discourse,' in support of this claim. David Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity, and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1998), 24-25. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," 216-19.

realism,' the view that objects exist independently of our knowledge of them.⁴⁴ As Wight explains: 'A commitment to depth realism presupposes that there are things, entities, structures and/or mechanisms that operate and exist independently of our ability to know or manipulate them.'⁴⁵ As a result of this 'ontological' commitment to the existence of objects that lie beyond our comprehension:

One of the basic tenets of a critical realist approach to explanation is that good theories refer to a mind-independent world, and that this world therefore exercises a limiting effect on those theories. Both Searle's 'brute facts' and Bhaskar's 'intransitive' objects of knowledge serve to mark the role played by an external world in realist philosophy of science: the world is out there, outside of human knowledge practices, and it stubbornly resists efforts to conceptualise it in ways sharply at variance with itself.⁴⁶

However, despite offering robust defences of the importance of 'ontology' in social inquiry, due to their dualist philosophical commitments, Wendt and other critical realists often misunderstand or misrepresent the nature of their own ontological commitments; consequently, their deployment of 'ontology' is confined to a shallow ontology of 'things' that exist, which in turn leads to a misunderstanding of the status of scientific inquiry in world politics, and the marginalisation of alternative 'philosophical ontologies' in IR. Given the prominence of critical realism and its influence on meta-theoretical debates in IR, and in order that our conceptual terminology is not confused with theirs, it is worth addressing these issues before proceeding.

The Marginalisation of 'Philosophical Ontology' in IR Theory

Critical realists take their cue from the 'ontological turn' in IR, from Wendt's counter-ontology to structural realism.⁴⁷ The aim of Wendt's intervention into the postpositivist debate was to shift focus away from epistemological questions to 'the kinds of things that exist' in world politics. However, such a move

44. Ibid., 217-18.

45. Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 29.

46. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory," 138.

47. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow," 211.

requires the acceptance of a critical realist epistemology, and in particular 'its twin presuppositions that knowledge reaches out to a mind-independent world, and that knowledge can go beyond experience to grasp deeper levels of reality.'⁴⁸ Consequently, although Wendt's solution to the Third Debate lent credibility to non-conventional philosophical approaches to the study of world politics, this pluralism came with two related costs: 'the widespread promulgation of terms such as "ontology" and "epistemology" with conceptually specific definitions that preclude other alternatives, and the virtual disappearance of *philosophical* ontology from IR debates.'⁴⁹

As a result, the very terms of recent debates in IR about 'epistemology' and 'ontology' have 'been set by critical realists starting with Wendt.'⁵⁰ Debates regarding the relation between epistemology and ontology, as well as the conceptual terminology according to which they have proceeded, are, 'not surprisingly, critical realist in orientation.'⁵¹ These debates arose as a consequence of Wendt's adoption of critical realism, and it is along critical realist lines that 'epistemological' and 'ontological' questions are defined; yet 'critical realism *is itself a philosophical ontology* first and foremost.'⁵² Since all ontology is philosophical, Jackson's distinction here between 'philosophical' and 'scientific' ontologies is somewhat problematic. However, since critical realism tends to be treated as a scientific ontology, i.e., as if it were above philosophical contestation, this distinction serves to highlight the fact that critical realism itself rests upon a philosophical argument, a mind-world dualism that allows them to separate ontology from epistemology and to then prioritise ontological questions.⁵³ This fact has been obscured in recent debates, resulting in the marginalisation of alternative 'philosophical ontologies.'

48. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *The Conduct of Inquiry*, 73.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 74.

51. Ibid., 74,73.

52. Ibid., 73.

53. For a defence of the scientific realism that informs critical realism see Roy Bhaskar, *A Realist Theory of Science* (London: Verso, 1997). For a discussion of the relation between scientific realism and critical realism see Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight, "Scientific Realism and International Relations."

The Challenge to Dualism

Critical realism's dualist philosophical commitments thus raise an old question: the status of scientific inquiry in world politics.⁵⁴ Specifically, the problem is the status of the social scientific findings derived from critical realist debates, or, as Jackson puts it: 'the issue of whether the knowledge that academic researchers produce is in some sense a reflection of the world, or whether it is irreducibly a perspective on the world.'⁵⁵ After surveying approaches associated with a dualist approach to social science, including neopositivism, critical realism, and Habermasian approaches, Jackson argues that social science must be considered 'an irreducibly partial and perspectival endeavour;' that there is an inescapably *perspectival* character to the knowledge that researchers produce.⁵⁶ As a result, he suggests, it might be more useful to explore the possibility of a social science built on *monistic* premises, as exemplified by Max Weber's conception of social science.⁵⁷ He argues that this kind of social science would embrace its perspectival character and refrain from claims to have captured the objective essence of anything in the world: 'a monistic social science would serve as a kind of disciplined process of world-construction, whereby a perspective was first elaborated in ideal-typical fashion and then used as the baseline from which to rigorously produce an account.'⁵⁸

A similarly sophisticated and persuasive criticism of the nature and role of 'ontology' found in Wendt and Wight can be found in the recent work of Torsten

54. For a discussion of this point, see Friedrich Kratochwil, "Constructing a New Orthodoxy? Wendt's 'Social Theory of International Politics' and the Constructivist Challenge," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 29, no. 1 (2000): 73-101.

55. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory," 130. Jackson's use of 'perspective' here is also problematic. 'Per-spective' means 'seeing through,' i.e., a particular filter/angle/conceptual scheme through which we can see an aspect of the world as it is in itself. I thank Hidemi Suganami for a discussion on this point. With this caveat, I will continue to use the term 'perspective.'

56. *Ibid.*, 131,130.

57. *Ibid.*, 146.

58. *Ibid.*

Michel.⁵⁹ Despite welcoming the trajectory of taking ontology more seriously, he highlights how the specific conceptualisation of ontology in critical realist thought leads to a common problem regarding the lack of 'a deeper appreciation of the ontological significance of science and language as human activities and potentialities.'⁶⁰ Michel demonstrates that this is an intrinsic problem with the critical realist reading of ontology: while overcoming epistemological foundationalism on the one hand, it does so through the affirmation of an *ontological* foundationalism due to the *apodictic* positing of 'intransitive objects' that exist outside and independent of the human mind. Michel's explanation is worth reproducing at length:

The crux in Wendt's and Wight's arguments lies with the fact that they commit themselves willingly or not to a foundationalist enterprise and whether based on ontology or epistemology this move is indeed a very modern one. Wendt, of course would counter this argument and insist that his re-conceptualisation is thoroughly anti-foundationalist. He says: "... realism is anti-foundationalist. Thus, although it is common to conflate the two, the correspondence theory of truth does not entail epistemological foundationalism. What makes a theory true is the extent to which it reflects the causal structure of the world, but theories are always tested against other theories, not against some pre-theoretical 'foundation' of correspondence." (Wendt, 1999: 58-9)

What Wendt shows here is not that his theory is anti-foundationalist but that his epistemology is not monistic. For his whole account to work, as he admits and we have shown, there must be a mind-independent ontological ground which does not depend on any epistemological conception. If this ground exists independent of any epistemology, his epistemology might be anti-foundationalist but his ontology is not. Apart from that, scientific realism in the form Wendt and Wight present is not able to confirm the existence of this ontologically given reality beyond human existence. As was shown by reference to examples from the natural as well as social sciences above, any attempt to grasp these "intransitive" objects unavoidably draws them into a web of linguistic meanings dependent on social practices. Ontology and epistemology are always intertwined and cannot be conceptualised independent of one another. Their attempt just to say and rely on what "is" and then devise *ex post* epistemological tools to establish knowledge is as misguided as any attempt to devise epistemological devices in order to discern what "is." Any conceptualisation of what "is" already takes place within a system of social meanings and knowledge in the same way as any conceptualisation of what can be known already exists within a framework of assumptions about what "is."⁶¹

59. Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness.>"; Torsten Michel, "Pigs Can't Fly, Or Can They? Ontology, Scientific Realism and the Metaphysics of Presence in International Relations.>"; Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow."

60. Ibid., 210.

61. Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness," 53-54.

The Ontological Difference

Michel proposes that Heidegger offers a path towards an engagement with ontological matters in a different and more fruitful way.⁶² Enlisting Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference, the difference between entities and the being of entities, Michel argues that the whole debate about what comes prior (epistemology or ontology) seems to be mistaken, because it rests on a conflation of entities and the being of entities: of whether an entity might be said to 'exist' or not, and of the *nature* of this existence.⁶³ He demonstrates that, for Heidegger, traditional ontological approaches have conflated these two in different ways: while realists rightly observe that entities exist independently of the human understanding of them, for them this implied that the *being* of these entities *also* lies outside of human understanding; idealists, on the other hand, have maintained that the being of entities resides in human understanding, but they then make the problematic assumption that this means that the *entities themselves* are *also* dependent upon human understanding.⁶⁴

Recognising that there is a difference between entities and the *being* of entities is therefore 'the crucial point through which Heidegger establishes his transcendent move beyond the realist/anti-realist chasm.'⁶⁵ It is the conflation of the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities that leads us to the stalemate in the realism/anti-realism debate.⁶⁶ Proceeding from a recognition of the ontological difference, Heidegger teaches us that 'entities are indeed independent [of] human understanding (the realist element) but their being as entities can only be realised through a specific form of being which is human being (in Heidegger's jargon *Dasein*). For Heidegger then, any position that ignores the ontological difference already commits a fallacy before even entering any realist/anti-realist exchange.'⁶⁷ Importantly, Heidegger reveals to us that the debate

62. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow," 210.

63. *Ibid.*, 213.

64. *Ibid.* It is worth noting that the debate between realism and idealism discussed here is one in the philosophy of social science, rather than in international theory.

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*, 214.

67. *Ibid.*, 213.

between realists and anti-realists 'rests on a very specific interpretation of ontology which posits the "problem of reality" as a problem in the first place.'⁶⁸ In other words, the 'problem of reality' only arises because dualists posit a foundational split between 'seemingly ontologically primitive distinct entities of "subject" and "object."⁶⁹

The Meaning of Being: Shrouded in Darkness

Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference means that the fundamental ontological question is not 'what objects exist independent of our knowledge of them' or 'what entities are there in world politics,' but is 'what is the meaning of the being of the entity that encounters these entities as objects?' Put differently, Heidegger is not interested in entities thought of as 'objects' or 'external realities' as much as he is in the *underlying current* of the being that encounters these entities; that is, with the *being* of beings. 'Heidegger's thought is therefore projected towards the *sine qua non* for entities.'⁷⁰ By inquiring as to the understanding of *Being* of the *being* that encounters entities as 'intransitive objects,' Heidegger's thought 'goes one step deeper into the matter than CR with its initial focus on beings.'⁷¹ Michel's central point then is that critical realism is 'not proposing a renewed focus on ontology (in the sense of scrutinising the meaning of being relied upon in IR) but exhibits an always already posited understanding of the meaning of

68. Ibid., 214.

69. Ibid. Michel quotes Heidegger, who regards the 'problem of reality' as the "scandal of philosophy": "The "scandal of philosophy" does not consist in the fact that this proof [of an external world] is still lacking up to now, but in the fact that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again. Such expectations, intentions, and demands grow out of an ontologically insufficient way of positing what it is from which, independently and "outside" of which, a "world" is to be proven as objectively present.' However, as we will see in Chapter 8 the same point is made differently by Hegel in the first paragraph of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, where he tries to make us anxious about the idea of epistemology as first philosophy. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 249; G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), §73.

70. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow," 221.

71. Ibid.

being manifested in scientific enquiry which itself is never questioned or scrutinised.⁷²

In other words, although critical realism is interested in ontology in as much as it is concerned with things that exist, this ontological interest is itself based upon a prior ontological presupposition; that is, a mind-world dualism and a commitment to the problematic assumption that scientific inquiry can grasp the reality of a world that is external to our experience. Through Heidegger's notion of the ontological difference, Michel thus establishes that 'the focus on ontology as the ground of theorising is itself under-conceptualised in many instances of CR,' and that 'a specific commitment to seemingly ontological primitives such as subjectivity and objectivity is itself in need of deeper and more differentiated reflection.'⁷³ By demonstrating that the scientific disposition involves a specific mode of comportment towards the world that presupposes that entities, beings, appear to us as 'objects,' the heart of Michel's phenomenological critique of critical realism is the (Heideggerian) contention that the epistemological focus of philosophical thought in the twentieth century has left ontology, the 'meaning of being,' 'shrouded in darkness.'⁷⁴

The central problem with epistemological and ontological foundationalisms, such as those found in Wendt and Wight, is that the split between subject and object is not foundational, as they treat it, but always already proceeds from a prior interpretation of existence, upon which ground subsequent theorising is based. This 'meaning of being' is the pre-understanding that we bring to the world: it is that which 'opens spaces of being and reveals specific objects in the world in a specific way but at the same time through its specific horizon conceals others from our view. This is not a neutral description of the world but a recognition that human involvement only allows for the deconcealment of *a* world not *the* world.'⁷⁵

72. Ibid., 218.

73. Ibid., 220.

74. Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness.": Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow."

75. Ibid., 221-22.

Owing to their dualist assumptions then, Michel concludes that critical realism does not lead to a new and better conception of ontology, but simply 'reifies the same biases of Cartesian subjectivity, the designative nature of language, a correspondence theory of truth and the problem-laden concept of freedom as it was conceived in Kant's third antinomy.'⁷⁶ In order to transcend these problems, we need to overcome these dualist commitments and challenge the being of the entity that encounters things as 'objects,' which for Michel involves 'radically challenging the way that beings are apprehended in the sciences as we understand them today.'⁷⁷

'Ontological' Foundations in Critical International Thought

During our survey of the treatment of 'ontological' foundations in normative international theory we established that, despite their best attempts, normative international theorists are unable to sidestep ontological questions, since treating their ethical foundations as 'objects' presupposed as the condition of their ethical claims invites questions concerning the nature of the being of that being that encounters such entities as objects, and lends those practices and institutions philosophical credibility, rather uncritically. We then suggested that a more foundational left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom, to the freedom of the being that encounters such institutions as 'objects,' might represent a more compelling foundational commitment for contemporary (global) politics and ethics, since the objectivity of these ethical foundations might then be regarded as conditional upon the historical self-actualisation of the human being as a free being. Applying to human beings *qua* human beings, rather than simply to human beings *qua* subjects of dominant practices and institutions, such a foundation might represent a more universalistic foundational commitment for contemporary (global) politics and ethics.

76. Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness: A Phenomenological Path Towards a New Social Ontology in International Relations [Abstract]" (Ph.D Thesis, St Andrews, 2008).

77. Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness," 59.

Such a commitment is an ontological commitment in the fuller sense of the term; one based upon a commitment to the (free) being of the human being. However, due to the nature of Wendt's intervention into the Third Debate, and the subsequent ascendance of critical realism, 'ontological' debates in international theory have so far proceeded according to a shallow ontology of 'things' that exist in world politics, rather than an ontology of the being of the entity that encounters such 'things' as objects. This is largely consequent of the dualist philosophical commitments underwriting such approaches: commitments that have resulted in the conflation of the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities, and the virtual disappearance of 'philosophical' ontology from debates in IR.

In this section of the chapter we return to our discussion of left-Hegelian thought in light of our survey of the treatment of 'ontology' in international thought, synthesising the insights gleaned so far with the aim of situating what will principally be a contribution to critical international thought within a broader context of 'normative' and 'ontological' approaches to international theory. We suggest that, although critical international thought overcomes the weakness of other normative international theory by refusing to recognise the foundational objectivity of dominant practices and institutions, by virtue of a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, the most persuasive and promising advocate of this position, Andrew Linklater, commits himself to a form of dualism that ultimately undermines his own commitment to an ethical and emancipatory politics; a claim we substantiate in the next chapter.

Critical Theory

Critical Theory and critical theory are related, though not equivalent, areas of inquiry into the social sciences. In the narrow sense, Critical Theory is associated with several generations of the west European Marxist tradition, known as the Frankfurt School, which includes, but is not limited to, Max Horkheimer, Theodor

Adorno, Jürgen Habermas, and Axel Honneth. First defined as such by Max Horkheimer in his 1937 essay *Traditional and Critical Theory*, for Horkheimer, theory might be considered 'critical' insofar as it seeks 'to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them.'⁷⁸ Jürgen Habermas, a second generation Frankfurt School social theorist, further develops this nascent epistemology in his 1968 *Knowledge and Human Interests* wherein he identifies three kinds of knowledge - technical, practical, and emancipatory - before claiming that any knowledge about society is incomplete if it does not involve an emancipatory component.⁷⁹

Due to this commitment to criticise and transform *all* the circumstances that enslave human beings, many 'critical theories' in the broader sense have since been developed.⁸⁰ For this reason, Jay Bernstein's definition of critical theory is instructive.

[C]ritical theory is not *a* theory of society or *a* wholly homogenous school of thinkers or *a* method. Critical theory, rather, is a tradition of social thought that, at least in part, takes its cue from its opposition to the wrongs and ills of modern societies on the one hand, and the forms of theorizing that simply go along with or seek to legitimate those societies on the other hand.⁸¹

Critical Theory started making inroads into international theory in the early 1980s with the publication of seminal articles by Richard K. Ashley and Robert W. Cox; Ashley's *Political Realism and Human Interests* draws on Habermas, while Cox's *Social Forces, States and World Orders* (1981) and his *Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations* (1983) draw on Gramsci.⁸² Although both were pivotal in the development of critical international relations theory (CIRT), and both draw

78. Max Horkheimer, *Critical Theory* (New York: Seabury Press, 1982), 244.

79. Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972).

80. James Bohman, "Critical Theory," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2012). In what follows, when referring to Critical Theory in the narrow sense, that associated with the Frankfurt School, Critical Theory will be capitalised and/or abbreviated to "CT." When referring to critical theories in the broader sense, no capitalisation or abbreviation will be employed.

81. J.M. Bernstein, *Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory* (London: Routledge, 1995), 11.

82. Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests.," Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.," Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 12, no. 2 (1983): 162-75.

on a tradition of post-Marxist thought, the 'critical' nature of CIRT is best conceived in the broader sense of the term described above, since CIRT includes approaches that draw on a variety of intellectual sources in order to engage with a range of different 'wrongs and ills' in global politics.

Critical International Theory

Given the emancipatory commitments of critical theory and the dominance of positivism in IR, critical international theory emerged primarily in response to the restrictive understanding of role and purposes of theory as reflected in the 'neo-neo' orthodoxy. Reacting against the predominance of behaviouralism, where the field was largely characterised by methodological assumptions taken over from the natural sciences, different areas of contemporary social theory began to be deployed in the context of international relations, including Frankfurt School critical theory, so-called 'post-structuralism' and 'post-modernism,' neo-Gramscianism, feminism, and post-colonialism. Whereas positivists would tend to regard the purpose of IR to involve the explanation of the workings of the international system to policymakers so that they could use that knowledge to their own ends, these critical theorists would regard the pursuit of knowledge in IR to involve the examination of material and ideational structures that have created and sustained the existing order, and to identify alternatives to existing structures in order to rid ourselves of its oppressions.⁸³

For Ronen Palan, writing twenty-five years after the publication of Cox and Ashley's articles, one of the principal contributions of CIRT has been to radically re-situate the discipline in relation to the other social sciences. He argues that the critical tradition abandoned the efforts to establish the study of IR as a separate,

83. For a discussion of the roles of theory and theorists see Marysia Zalewski, "All These Theories Yet the Bodies Keep Piling Up": Theory, Theorists, Theorising." For a critical theoretical account of the relation between academics and practitioners see Ken Booth, "A Reply to Wallace," *Review of International Studies* 23, no. 3 (1997): 371-77; William Wallace, "Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 3 (1996): 301-21.

bounded discipline, but sought to situate IR as a component of pan-disciplinary studies of global order and change.⁸⁴ This involved the recognition that IR is unlikely to serve as a 'first order discipline,' but will remain a 'derivative discipline,' drawing on more fundamental theoretical claims made in other disciplines, such as moral philosophy, political economy, sociology, and linguistics.⁸⁵ What it does do, Palan notes, is to address a particular, *global*, aspect of the human condition that tends to be omitted in other social sciences.

The Two Key Strands of CIRT

As Kimberly Hutchings notes, although taking many different forms, critical theory 'always distinguishes itself from other forms of theorising in terms of its orientation towards change and the possibility of futures that do not reproduce the patterns of hegemonic power of the present.'⁸⁶ She continues that, despite their differences, both Ashley and Cox's arguments exhibit the characteristic that makes them 'critical' in Cox's terms: 'both are oriented towards the possibility of alternative futures, rather than to the perpetuation of the *status quo*.'⁸⁷ Since 1981, critical international theory has developed in two key ways. Some scholars have pursued Cox's historical/sociological path of highlighting different futures for international politics, while others have followed Ashley's ethical path, 'in particular using the idea of freedom as a vantage point from which to criticise the theory and practice of international politics and indicate alternative ways forward.'⁸⁸ Others, such as Andrew Linklater, have operated on a 'twin track'

84. Ronen Palan, "Transnational Theories of Order and Change: Heterodoxy in International Relations Scholarship," 50.

85. *Ibid.*, 50,54.

86. Kimberly Hutchings, "Happy Anniversary! Time and Critique in International Relations Theory," in *Critical International Theory After 25 Years*, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72.

87. *Ibid.* Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," 87-91.

88. Kimberly Hutchings, "Happy Anniversary!," 76.

approach, linking historical/sociological, philosophical, and praxeological levels of analysis.⁸⁹

Straddling both normative and empirical inquiry into world politics, what unites these approaches is their commitment to the emancipatory purposes of theory and the possibility of alternative global futures. Given its foundational commitment to human freedom, to the emancipatory purposes of theory, critical international theory can be regarded as a powerful contribution to left-Hegelian thought. In contrast to Rawls and Frost, critical international theorists are not content to treat dominant practices and institutions as 'objective' ethical foundations, but are often motivated instead by the Marxian assumption that 'all that is solid eventually melts into air,' and by 'the belief that human beings can make more of their history under conditions of their own choosing.'⁹⁰

Andrew Linklater's 'Critical' Approach to International Theory

Despite articulating critical theoretical concerns in his 1982 book *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, which drew on the voluntarist tradition of political thought and Hegel's philosophical history, it was not until the second edition of the book in 1990 that Linklater explicitly engaged with critical theory by adding a postscript on Habermas and Foucault. Following the subsequent publications of *Beyond Realism and Marxism* (1990), two important articles in *Millennium*, and his influential *The Transformation of Political Community* (1998), it is with good cause that Andrew Linklater is considered to be 'the foremost critical theorist of international relations.'⁹¹ Given transformations in the material

89. Ibid. Andrew Linklater, "The Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 21, no. 1 (1992): 77-98; Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).

90. Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Ken Booth Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 280.

91. Andrew Linklater, "Dialogue, Dialectic and Emancipation in International Relations At the End of the Post-War Age," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 23, no. 1 (1994): 119-31; Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke:

conditions of human life, and that humanity is increasingly existing in a state of true interdependence, it should not be controversial to claim that 'the future of critical theory lies with critical international relations theory, a view subscribed to by a number of "noninternational" critical theorists as well as - as you might expect - by a number of international critical theorists.'⁹² It therefore 'seems certain that Linklater's influence will grow.'⁹³

Critical international theorists such as Linklater are not content to remain caught within the solipsistic particularism that often characterise other normative approaches to international theory.⁹⁴ Although recognising the particularist nature of morality, he also realises that the conservative response of modern political and international theory is inadequate for our contemporary (increasingly global) political condition. For this reason, while keen to balance the claims of particularity with a necessary universalism, Linklater refuses to encounter dominant practices and institutions as 'objects,' and develops a broad, historically, sociologically, and philosophically informed vantage on contemporary institutions and practices in world politics; interventions that are motivated by a commitment to contribute to a global politics that would be characterised by greater collective responsibility, less inequality, and, ultimately, greater levels of human freedom. It is not surprising then, that, in the words of one sympathetic critic: 'critical IR theory represents one of the most humane and generally hopeful accounts of contemporary world politics available. Its insights are profound and its sensibilities

Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990); Andrew Linklater, "The Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View."; Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory."; Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*; Andrew Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn-Jones (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2001).; Nicholas J. Rengger, "Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics," in *Critical Theory in World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 97. Similar sentiments are expressed by Brincat: Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 2011), 280.

92. Nicholas J. Rengger, "Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics," 97.

93. Ibid.

94. As we saw in the Introduction with reference to Australia's reception of 'boat people,' such a self-regarding particularism extends to the popular imagination.

far more interesting than much of what passes for reflection (even theory) in international relations more generally.⁹⁵

The Dualist Philosophical Ontology of Linklater's Universalism

While Linklater is certainly not the only contributor to the critical project in IR, the view taken here is that he is the most comprehensive, powerful, and ultimately the most promising advocate of this position. However, despite being perhaps the most persuasive international theorist writing today, since both his conception of emancipation and his defence of moral universalism are predicated on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, Linklater might fall foul of the same mistake made by Rawls, Frost, and the critical realists: that is, to rely on an ontology of 'things' presupposed as the condition of his international theory, rather than an ontology of being. Whereas Frost and Rawls treat their foundational ethical commitments as the 'ontological' foundation of their normative claims, and critical realists rely on a mind-independent 'intransitive object' to provide the 'ontological' foundation that warrants their prioritisation of scientific claims about world politics, we will argue that Linklater relies on the mind-independent existence of the individual human being conceived as ethical subject as the 'ontological' condition of his approach to CIRT, which warrants his prioritisation of universal ethical claims.

If we manage to demonstrate this in the next chapter, Linklater's foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity would amount to a conflation of the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities (conceived as ethical subjectivity), and would submit him to a form of metaphysical dualism: an ontological dualism that treats ethical subjectivity as the essential being of human beings (although it manifests itself historically), and an epistemological dualism where the individual conceived as ethical subject (i.e., the post-conventional discourse agent) is treated as if it were an 'intransitive object' existing

95. *Ibid.*, 103.

independently of the subject's (Linklater's) claim to know it. Consequently, although keen to balance the claims of moral particularity with a necessary universality, Linklater's claims to universality arise out of an always already posited meaning of being (as the historical actualisation of ethical subjectivity) and its derivative structuring of the ground (what the human being is: an ethical subject/post-conventional discourse agent), upon which it proceeds. This, we will contend, is a contradictory and inappropriate basis for an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

A Note on Epistemology

For this reason, as well as the Heideggerian ones he offers, we concur with Michel's call for a deeper treatment of 'seemingly ontological primitives such as subjectivity and objectivity.'⁹⁶ The strength of Jackson's position lies in his demonstration that critical realism's approach to ontology, to the 'intransitive object,' is premised on a mind-world dualism, a foundational split between the subject and object that occurs between mind and world. The strength of Michel's position lies in his criticism that dualist approaches to knowledge, approaches that rely on an epistemological or ontological foundationalism, conflate the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities. While ontological foundationalist (realist) approaches treat the object as something that has a mind-independent existence, epistemological foundationalist (idealist) approaches insist that the subject is constructive of the world objects: both dualisms conflate the ontological difference between the mind-independent existence of entities and our mind-dependent understanding of these entities (the being of these entities).

As Jackson demonstrates, the dualist separation of ontology from epistemology, and the subsequent prioritisation of either ontological or epistemological questions, depends on this questionable philosophical commitment to a mind-world dualism. Due to the ontological aspects of Heidegger's argument,

96. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow," 220.

we agree with Michel that Heidegger can most certainly lead us to a deeper appreciation of 'seemingly ontological primitives such as subjectivity and objectivity.'⁹⁷ However, since Heidegger claims to be uninterested in the problem of knowledge, in what we now call epistemology, he cannot take us much further; for that we need Hegel.⁹⁸

Michel's criticism of critical realism is that their dualist commitment to the 'objectivity' of intransitive objects leads it to overestimate the significance of science as a human potentiality, as scientific discourse can only lead us to a specific kind of knowledge: knowledge about entities, and not the *being* of entities, which is disclosed through language.⁹⁹ Presumably, since scientific discourse only allows the entities under consideration to appear as scientific objects, recognising that language is not a neutral toolset for us to make 'objective' statements about the world, but is vitally important in making the ontological realm intelligible, means that we have to denounce the epistemological relativism that was the result of Wendt's intervention into the Third Debate, since more discursively sensitive forms of inquiry would be less likely to conflate the ontological difference, and thus allow the being of beings to be disclosed more authentically. Whilst not disputing Michel's subsequent advocacy of a renewed focus on the nature and function of language, this focus reflects the interest in language in post-Husserlian phenomenology, especially in Heidegger's later works.¹⁰⁰ However, this is to overlook a more fruitful phenomenological approach to epistemology, which can be found in German idealism; specifically, in Hegel.¹⁰¹

Hegel: A Phenomenological Constructivist Approach to Epistemology

97. Ibid.

98. On Heidegger and the problem of knowledge see Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 140-41.

99. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "Foregrounding Ontology: Dualism, Monism, and IR Theory," 146.

100. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow," 219.; Torsten Michel, "Shrouded in Darkness," 53-56.

101. Here I follow an argument developed by Tom Rockmore. See Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, especially pp209-215

Michel's rejection of the representationalist approach to knowledge found in critical realism is based upon a critique and solution found in post-Husserlian phenomenology. Arguably though, the representationalist approach to knowledge 'reached a high point in the critical philosophy, where Kant demonstrated the inability to show the world as it is rather than how it appears.'¹⁰² Kant, who initially espouses a representational approach to knowledge, later rejects it and develops a constructivist approach in its stead, based upon the claim that in some sense we 'construct' the object of knowledge. Despite calling for a phenomenological epistemology, Kant never developed one; a task that was taken up by Hegel, who reformulates Kant's *a priori* constructivism as *a posteriori*.¹⁰³ As Rockmore explains, Hegel's view of knowledge is constructivist in three senses:

[F]irst, knowledge arises in an ongoing historical process in which we construct conceptual frameworks based on prior experience that we test against later experience. Second, we routinely alter these frameworks when they fail to fit experience; and to alter the framework alters the conceptual object. Third, since cognitive objects depend on the conceptual framework, a change in the framework results in a change in the object.¹⁰⁴

In contrast to the representationalist approach, where the split between subject and object occurs between mind and world, Hegel's constructivist epistemology involves the view that the split between subject and object occurs *within* consciousness, and that we only know cognitive objects because we construct them on the basis of phenomena that appear to consciousness: a constructive process that is subordinate to the interaction between human beings situated within historical processes 'in which we come to know the world and ourselves.'¹⁰⁵ Importantly then, rather than being established through a simple correspondence between mind and world, 'truth,' 'objectivity,' subject-object unity, or what Hegel calls 'absolute knowledge,' is never fully achieved, but is perpetually deferred in an ongoing process within consciousness whereby increasingly adequate accounts of reality emerge.

102. Ibid., 210. Rockmore adds, 'Kant's criticism of representationalism has never been answered' Ibid.

103. Ibid., 213. We will return to a more in depth discussion of this in Chapter 6 where we discuss the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel, and its ontological implications.

104. Ibid. It is the third point here that really distinguishes Hegel's constructivism from scientific realism.

105. Ibid., 213-15.

Mind/World and Mind-Independent Real

According to scientific realism, an approach to knowledge predicated on mind-world dualism, the split between subject and object occurs between mind and world, where the 'intransitive object' is seen to have a mind-independent ('objective') existence. In contrast, Hegel's phenomenological constructivism, as it has been presented here, calls for a further distinction to be drawn between 'mind', 'world', and the 'mind-independent real'. Since subject and object are both constructed through the activity of consciousness, such a position involves mind-world monism because mind and world are not independent: cognitive objects are constructed historically and are fundamentally dependent on 'mind' (*Geist*). This does not, however, mean that we know nothing of reality; it does not require that we subscribe to anti-realism, a charge Wight and Patomäki level against both positivism and post-positivism, since there remains a dualism between mind/world and the mind-independent real, where the latter 'appears' to consciousness.¹⁰⁶ While we are able to construct increasingly adequate accounts of the mind-independent real, what we actually *know* is the mind-dependent cognitive object, not the entity that exists in the mind-independent real. It is the appearance of the mind-independent real to consciousness that establishes the condition of falsifiability, thus enabling the possibility of scientific knowledge.

This further distinction between mind/world and mind-independent real is responsive to the ontological difference. While entities have a mind-independent reality, the being of those entities, our understandings of them, which remain reliant on mind-dependent conceptual frameworks, are not. From this perspective, the problem with dualist approaches to social inquiry is that by taking the subject-object split as foundational, and occurring between mind and world, they cannot recognise the distinction between mind/world and mind-independent real. This

106. Heikki Patomäki and Colin Wight, "After Postpositivism? The Promises of Critical Realism," 216-19.

leads to a collapse of this distinction, the conflation of the ontological difference, and the misguided belief that their 'world' largely corresponds to the mind-independent real: that '*their* world' is '*the* world.'

Following a comprehensive survey of phenomenological thought, which, despite his claim, does not begin with Husserl, Tom Rockmore has recently concluded that Hegel's 'constructivist strategy, which is routinely overlooked in phenomenological circles, is arguably the best such approach we currently possess.'¹⁰⁷ Proceeding from the view that 'knowledge does not concern the world in itself but the world for us,' Hegel's approach situates knowledge within the historical process and subordinates knowledge construction to the interaction between human beings.¹⁰⁸ In contrast to Kantian constructivism, a dualist approach to knowledge based upon a foundational subject-object split, according to Hegel's constructivism, the subject-object split occurs within consciousness; consequently, knowledge is not representational, but is socially constructed and arises dialectically. Since subject and object are split *within* consciousness, and not between mind and world, neither remain unconditioned. This means that both reality (what we consider to be 'real' or 'objective') and knowledge (what the epistemic subject knows) emerge out of relations between human beings. There are therefore irrevocably plural and historical dimensions to 'subjectivity:' a significant point that has not been well-heeded by recent interpretation of Hegel, especially ones (like Habermas and Linklater's) that remain closer to Kant.¹⁰⁹

Conclusions

107. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 213. According to his faculty website at Duquesne University, Rockmore is currently preparing a manuscript on *Epistemology and Phenomenology* that will likely explore these themes further.

108. *Ibid.*, 215.

109. We will return to an extended discussion of the development of the relation between subject and object from Kant to Hegel in Chapter 6, where we also discuss the inadequacy of the concept of 'subjectivity' in from a Hegelian perspective.

Having began the chapter with Habermas's explanation that ontological assumptions and commitments serve as the (often unacknowledged) foundational premises of our political and ethical thought, we have surveyed the that role ontological foundations play in prominent 'normative' and meta-theoretical approaches to international theory. After criticising the dualist philosophical commitments that underwrite these approaches, and despite praising Andrew Linklater's 'critical' approach to international theory, we suggested that a similarly misguided foundationalism might be at play in Linklater's work.

We established that, by taking dominant practices and institutions associated with the sovereign state as foundational ethical commitments, normative international theorists often attempt to sidestep controversial philosophical questions; an evasive strategy that lends credence both to Behr's claim that the overwhelming trajectory of thought since the early eighteenth century has been geared towards the recognition of the particularity of ontological and epistemological interests, and to Walker's claim that modern political theory has overwhelmingly produced visions of politics that would be contained within the nation-state.

However, these normative approaches to international theory cannot evade the philosophical questions that are raised by its ethical foundations, since treating these commitments as *foundational* commitments, the 'objects' presupposed as the condition of subsequent normative claims, invites the evaluation of such commitments; we suggested that an ontological evaluation might involve questioning whether such ethical foundations can be said to have 'objective' existence, and what it means for us to encounter such ethical foundations as objects. We then argued that it was not sufficient for us to treat dominant practices and institutions associated with the sovereign state as 'objective,' offering human freedom as a more basic ontological commitment that might act as the normative ideal according to which we could evaluate the (previously foundational) ethical commitments that underwrite different normative approaches to international theory.

This brought us to a discussion of Hegel, for whom the 'objectivity' of institutions and practices is conditional on the relation between these practices and the being of the being that encounters them as 'objects.' Put differently, that for Hegel the 'objectivity' of these entities is conditional upon their contribution to the self-actualisation of the human being as a free being: on the self-actualisation of freedom in the world. We argued that this foundational Hegelian commitment to human freedom, an ontological commitment to the human being as a free being, might serve as a more universalist foundation for contemporary (global) politics and ethics. Whereas Rawls and Frost assert the particularity of their normative claims by limiting them to apply only to human beings *qua* subjects of a modern constitutional democracy, or *qua* participants in global civil society, a foundational ontological commitment to human freedom would apply to human beings *qua* human beings.

This ontological commitment is an ontological commitment in the fuller sense of the term: an ontology of being, rather than one of things. However, we argued, attempts to bring ontological reflection into international theory have so far overwhelmingly been facile, confined to a discussion of 'things that exist' in IR. This, we saw, was the result of Wendt's intervention into the Third Debate, which came at the cost of accepting dualist philosophical commitments to a foundational mind-world split. This dualism is the condition of being able to split epistemology from ontology, and has led to an overvaluation of the status of scientific inquiry in world politics, the marginalisation of alternative 'philosophical ontologies,' and the virtual disappearance of philosophical ontology from debates in international theory. Fortunately though, these dualist assumptions have recently been challenged by the likes of Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Torsten Michel, with Michel pointing out that Heidegger distinguishes between beings and being, and that proper ontology concerns the latter.

We then moved on to discuss 'critical' approaches to international thought. We saw that, since originally making inroads into international theory in the early

1980s following the publication of Richard K. Ashley and Robert W. Cox's seminal *Millennium* articles, CIRT has followed two key paths: the historical/sociological path of highlighting different futures for international politics, and the normative/ethical path of using the idea of freedom as a vantage point from which to criticise the theory and practice of international politics in order to indicate alternative ways forward. We learnt that some, such as Andrew Linklater, operate a 'twin-track' approach, linking historical/sociological, ethical, and praxeological levels of analysis.

Taking its cues from the wrongs and ills of modern societies, critical theory is often self-consciously motivated by a left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom. For this reason, and by refusing to encounter dominant practices and instructions such as the state as 'objective,' but treating this objectivity as conditional upon human freedom, critical approaches to international theory might be seen to overcome the central weakness of other normative approaches to international theory. However, we concluded by suggesting that, by virtue of his foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, Linklater might ultimately fall foul of the same mistake as Rawls, Frost, and the critical realists: that is, to rely on an ontological foundation of 'things' as the condition of his approach to international theory, an ontology of the ethical subject, rather than of the human being as a free being.

If we succeed in corroborating this claim in the following chapter, Linklater's critical approach to international theory would rest on a conflation of the ontological difference between beings that exist (human beings) and being of those beings (i.e., as ethical subjects / post-conventional discourse agents). This would mean that Linklater submits to a form of metaphysical dualism: an ontological dualism based on his treatment of the being of human beings as ethical subjects (although subjectivity manifests itself historically), and an epistemological dualism that treats the human being conceived as ethical subject as a mind-independent intransitive object that serves as the 'ontological' foundation of his critical approach to international theory.

For these reasons we concurred with Michel's call for a deeper treatment of 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' in international thought; yet we claimed that Michel's intervention is based on a critique and solution found in post-Husserlian phenomenology, and that this overlooks a more fruitful phenomenological approach to epistemology that can be found in Hegel. Since the separation of epistemology from ontology is predicated on the questionable dualist commitment to a *foundational* split between mind and world (a split that we will argue must be regarded as *non-foundational*, or derivative), and given that Heidegger is apparently uninterested in epistemology, while Heidegger can help us with a deeper *ontological* appreciation of the relation between subject and object, both epistemologically and ontologically, Hegel is able to take us further.

Towards the end of the chapter we introduced Hegel's phenomenological constructivist epistemology, and saw that according to this approach to knowledge, the split between subject and object occurs *within* consciousness rather than between mind and world, whereby cognitive objects are constructed on the basis of the appearance of phenomena to consciousness, a process that is subordinate to interactions between human beings situated within historical processes. This account of knowledge thus calls for a further distinction to be drawn between mind, world, and the mind-independent real: a distinction to which dualists must remain blind. We explained that this Hegelian view entails mind-world monism, because cognitive subject and object both depend on 'mind' (*Geist*), yet that it avoids subscribing to anti-realism, since entities in the mind-independent real *exist* although they only 'appear' to consciousness. Consequently, what we *know* is the cognitive object, not the mind-independent entity; therefore, 'objectivity,' what we consider to be 'real,' emerges out of relations between human beings situated within historical processes. As a result, there are plural and historical dimensions to subjectivity: a point that is not well-heeded in left-Hegelian thought and critical international theory, and one that we aim to develop.

Chapter 2.

Ethical Subjectivity in Andrew Linklater's Critical International Theory

Introduction.

Having surveyed a range of prominent contemporary approaches to international theory in the previous chapter, where we defended the view that, by virtue of their foundational commitment to human freedom, 'critical' approaches to international theory represented the most persuasive of these approaches to contemporary world politics, we now turn our attention to a sustained engagement with the critical approach to world politics that has been developed by Andrew Linklater. Through a sympathetic exposition of several of his key works, our aim is to demonstrate that Linklater relies on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, and our discussion culminates in a philosophical (epistemological and ontological) evaluation of this commitment before turning to an evaluation of its ethical and emancipatory credentials in Chapter 3.

We will recall that Linklater is not the only contributor to the critical project in international theory, yet that he might be considered to be the most persuasive and promising advocate of this position. We will also recall that since the early 1980s critical approaches to international theory have developed along two key paths: a historical/sociological path inaugurated by Cox, and a normative/philosophical path, inaugurated by Ashley; Linklater, we claimed, has operated a 'twin track' approach, linking philosophical/normative,

historical/sociological, and praxeological levels of inquiry: aspects that he refers to as the 'tripartite structure' of critical theory.

Given that Linklater's work covers an impressive breadth of reference, spread over many important publications, our engagement with his work is necessarily limited in scope. Given our problematic, we confine our engagement to an analysis of the philosophical/normative aspect of his theory, which we often refer to simply as his emancipatory cosmopolitanism. This aspect of Linklater's thought is primarily located in his early works: in *Men and Citizens*, *The Transformation of Political Community*, and a series of related articles. Our rationale for foregrounding this aspect of his critical theory is that it provides the philosophical justification for his subsequent praxeological and sociological analyses; indeed, Linklater explicitly refers to these works as a 'ground clearing exercise' in which he 'sought to overcome challenges to the emancipatory project of CIRT through the formulation of a philosophical defence of ethical universalism that could offer the justification for the formation of cosmopolitan political community.'¹ Although already evident in outline in *Transformation*, Linklater's later work turns to a more sociologically based analysis that enlists the process sociology of Norbert Elias to explore the problem of harm in world politics. Besides the pragmatic necessity to limit the scope of our engagement, the view taken here, and shared by another recent doctoral thesis in CIRT, is that the emancipatory politics of Linklater's early work is, if not lost, considerably weakened by his turn to the process sociology of Elias.²

1. Mark Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 20, no. 2 (1991), 173.

2. Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 2011), 312,303. Linklater has also contributed to the English School. However, in the interests of brevity we will not be engaging with this work here. See Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Men and Citizens: the Bifurcated Subjectivity of Modern Man

Linklater's approach to International Relations emerges in *Men and Citizens*, originally his doctoral thesis and first published in 1982; the aim of which is the '[r]ecovery of a critical approach to international politics, initiated by Kant and Marx (and marginalised by realism and neo-realism).³ Writing at a time when realism, neo-realism, and pluralist approaches to international society were dominant in the study of international politics, Linklater draws on the voluntarist tradition of political philosophy, most notably Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, in order to recover a critique of the international states-system and to 'seek a non-rationalist foundation for the traditional belief in obligations to humanity.'⁴

Man's Bifurcated Subjectivity

Central to Linklater's argument is the view that the modern subject leads a bifurcated existence, between his simultaneous existence as a political being, a citizen of a state, and his existence as a moral being by virtue of his humanity.

A very significant part of the history of modern international thought has centred upon what may be termed the problem of the relationship between men and citizens. We may characterise this problem in different ways as the issue of the proper relationship between the obligations which men may be said to acquire *qua* men and the obligations to which they are subject as citizens of particular associations; or, as the question of reconciling the actual or potential universality of human nature with the diversity and division of the political community.⁵

This notion of a bifurcated subjectivity, the division between man and citizen, is crucial to understanding Linklater's approach to both international theory and political theory, since he regards the moral conflict between the obligations of

3. Andrew Linklater, *Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity* (London: Routledge, 2007), 30.

4. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), xi.

5. *Ibid.*, x.

citizenship and those to humanity to be fundamental to our experience of the modern states-system.⁶

Claiming that 'any political theory which ignores the problems created by our double existence as men and citizens is no longer adequate to the conditions of modern political life; for it fails to attempt to harmonise all aspects of modern moral and political experience,' one of Linklater's central contentions, both in *Men and Citizens* and in subsequent work, is that a crucial challenge posed to IR theory in an era of globalisation is the need to reconcile this problematic.⁷ The posing and answering of this question is seen to be central to the further development of international theory, and it leads to 'the establishment of important connections between a consolidated political theory of international relations and that remarkable tradition of political thought, beginning essentially with Rousseau, which is concerned with the enhancement of human freedom.'⁸ Linklater thus reads the reconciliation of these rights to be a continuation of the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment, part of the unfinished project of modernity, because it is in the name of human freedom that the gap between the universal moral obligations that we have as men, and the particular obligations that we have as citizens, may be overcome.

Drawing on the voluntarist tradition of political theory, in Rousseau and Kant Linklater finds the outlines of a nascent critical approach to international politics that he seeks to recover. Both Rousseau and Kant addressed the problem of our simultaneous obligations to humanity and to our compatriots, and both were committed to the transformative potential of social and political theory: 'common to each writer was the belief that our experience of living in and among sovereign states cannot avoid a sense of moral division and political estrangement.'⁹ Rousseau considered modern man to be 'dragged by nature and by men in opposite directions', and that the formation of society, where unity is restored to man's

6. Andrew Linklater, *Critical Theory and World Politics: Citizenship, Sovereignty and Humanity*, 16.

7. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 36.

8. *Ibid.*, x-xi.

9. *Ibid.*, 25.

social relations, comes at the expense of the duties that individuals owe to each other as members of the larger society that encompasses the whole human race.¹⁰ Yet, for both Rousseau and Kant, modern men were more than simply members of states and possessed the capacity to express their freedom in the fundamental reorganisation of their international relations:

Their historical experience was not that of being unchanging and unchangeable insiders condemned to live within particularistic social systems, but of being self-developing and self-directing beings with the possibility of transforming existing relations of intersocietal estrangement into relations of familiarity, so completing a process which had begun in the ancient world. An unprecedented political project was made possible by the historically developed notion of the rights and duties inherent in humans themselves, a concept which produced the possibility of fundamentally extending the boundaries of moral and political community.¹¹

Linklater locates the foundations of a modern theory of international relations 'within theories that sought to comprehend the nature of man as an historical subject, as a self-developing and self-transforming being realising the conditions of his freedom,' and claims that several themes follow.¹² The first is the argument that the division between citizenship and humanity is 'integral to the historical movement from attempting to realise autonomy within states to aiming to advance autonomy in relations between them.'¹³ This leads to the further argument that a moral community more inclusive than the sovereign state can be defended on the basis of human freedom, 'man's unique capacity for self-determination.'¹⁴

Emancipation & the Reconstruction of Kantian Freedom.

Kant & Moral Freedom

10. Andrew Linklater, "Hegel, the State and International Relations," in *Classical Theories of International Relations*, ed. Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996), 197.

11. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 26.

12. *Ibid.*, xii.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

It is in Pufendorf and Vattel's theories of natural law that Linklater finds the most adequate philosophical defences of modern realist and pluralist international society approaches to international politics respectively. He criticises both, however, for failing to provide an adequate account of the relationship between the contractual rights and duties of citizenship and the idea of humanity. While Vattel overcomes weaknesses in Pufendorf's account, his own account of the state 'fails to provide a coherent theory of the relationship between the moralities of men and citizens.'¹⁵ The various inconsistencies in both their approaches 'are finally overcome in the Kantian theory of international relations.'¹⁶

Famously criticising Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel in *Perpetual Peace* as 'tiresome comforters' for foregoing the ideal unity of mankind, for Kant 'rationalism required a progressivist understanding of international relations which conceived the perfectibility of world political organisation as a sublime historical goal.'¹⁷ According to Kant, 'all men were bound together by the necessary obligation to so arrange their social and political lives that they could gradually realise a condition of universal justice and perpetual peace,' because it is by acting in accordance with moral principles prescribed by his own reason that 'man asserts independence from the natural world and establishes what is distinctively human in his nature [...] his uniquely human characteristics, his non-natural being, his freedom.'¹⁸ For Kant, what then follows is the necessity of radically transforming the political world so that all human beings are able to 'live in conformity with the imperatives grounded in their common rational nature.'¹⁹

It is our 'unsocial sociability' that for Kant provides the fillip to lift ourselves from out of the state of nature and to establish a new kind of freedom, civil freedom; a freedom that is expressed in 'legal guarantees for persons and their

15. Ibid., 60.

16. Ibid.

17. Immanuel Kant, "Towards Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, ed. Pauline Kleingeld (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 79. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 97.

18. Ibid., 97,99.

19. Ibid., 99.

property.²⁰ For Kant, the highest expression of human freedom however, is not in the mere fact of choice (natural freedom), nor in the establishment of legal constraints upon inclination (civil freedom), but in the capacity to exercise self-constraint and act in conformity with moral imperatives legislated by human reason (moral freedom).²¹

Linklater notes that Kant's typology of human freedoms is influenced by Rousseau: for both man is most free when living under political conditions where they can obey 'the laws which they themselves make.'²² As he explains: '[i]n Kantian thought, freedom, if governed by a universal principle, "is the one and original right that belongs to every human being by virtue of humanity."²³ The argument of *Perpetual Peace* and *Idea for a Universal History* is that, like the individuals that had emerged from a prior state of nature, man's moral freedom eventually obliges states to relinquish their 'wild, lawless freedom' by entering into a federation of states based on international right.²⁴ Linklater concludes that rationalism thus reaches its zenith in Kant's rational moral universalism and his political cosmopolitanism.

Linklater subsequently discusses the historicist challenges to Kant's rationalism and the social contract theorists of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, challenges that led to the reconstructed defence of particularism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Linklater recognises that the historicist critique of rationalism means that we must reject the rationalist notion of an immutable, universal human reason (as relied upon by Kant) and he concedes that historicists are right to say that man is socially and historically shaped. However, historicism and the resultant relativism are deemed to be self-defeating, because historicism 'denied ethical universalism while paradoxically proclaiming cultural diversity as a universal ideal.'²⁵ Moreover, Linklater claims, the historicist tradition itself failed

20. Ibid., 142.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 143.

23. Ibid., 112.

24. Ibid., 113.

25. Ibid., 208.

to provide an adequate alternative theory of international society.²⁶ The combination of these weaknesses lay the groundwork for his own construction of an historicist theory of international society, 'in conjunction with an analysis of the historical development of human freedom.'²⁷

Hegel, the Historical Development of Freedom, and its Embodiment in the Ethical State

Linklater thus engages in a dialectical reading of rationalism and historicism, where the ethical absolutism of rationalism and the ethical relativism of historicism are sublated in an approach to international society based upon philosophical history. From this rationalist-historicist perspective, which is presented as dialectically transcending the rationalist-historicist opposition, human reason has a history: 'reason is neither uniform nor inevitably plural and diverse; it is developmental [...] Ethical absolutism and relativism appear as sides of a false dichotomy. Neither offers an account of the growth and transformation of both human subjects and the practices in which they are objectified.'²⁸ Importantly, this philosophical history allows Linklater to defend the internationalist dimension of Kantian thought along historical lines. Recognising that Kant's 'unqualified moral and political individualism' is problematic, he argues that 'with suitable modification, the more advanced elements of rationalist thinking can be recovered by re-locating them within a theory of history.'²⁹

A theory of the historical development of human freedom offers good reasons for the belief in obligations to humanity; it also provides the philosophical resources which enable us to present a vision of a unified moral and political experience, one which can accommodate the fact of obligations to humanity without permitting these to conflict with the roles and responsibilities of other communities.³⁰

26. Ibid., 60.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., 140.

29. Ibid., 144,202.

30. Ibid., 202.

Linklater's dialectical treatment of rationalism and historicism is Hegelian in method, and his philosophical history draws heavily on Hegel's philosophy of history. In particular he draws on Hegel's criticism of Kant that individualism has to be located within different forms of social consciousness.³¹ Linklater's Hegel focusses on the emergence and evolution of societies 'that are based upon rational, critical thinking,' where 'the development of human freedom is exhibited in man's increasing rational control of his self and his environment,' and where 'the culmination of this process in modern history is the modern state.'³² Within the state, 'this community of rational law-makers, humans realise the triumph of thought over nature, and express those capacities (particularly the potentiality for free, rational choice) which are specific to human subjects.'³³ Nonetheless, Hegel's location of freedom within the state poses a challenge to Kant's cosmopolitanism, a cosmopolitanism Linklater wishes to retain. His solution, in *Men and Citizens* and in a later piece, *Hegel, the State, and International Relations* is to deploy a left-Hegelian argument and draw out cosmopolitan elements that are immanent in Hegel's thought.

Freedom Beyond the State

Linklater notes that Hegel regarded cosmopolitanism as 'simultaneously a major Western intellectual achievement and a threat to its principal political accomplishment which was the modern state.'³⁴ Hegel's advocacy of the state was based on his view that 'the state provided the sole context in which human beings could unfold their unique capacity for freedom.'³⁵ The ethical state is regarded as centrally important to the cause of human freedom under conditions of modernity because it had the capacity to institute the 'synthesis of modern individualistic rights proclaimed by reason (*Moralität*) and the strong affective ties towards

31. Ibid., 144.

32. Ibid., 147. Linklater's reading of Hegel is challenged in Part 3.

33. Ibid.

34. Andrew Linklater, "Hegel, the State and International Relations," 200.

35. Ibid., 194.

specific communities (*Sittlichkeit*).³⁶ Linklater's criticism of Hegel enlists the help of E.H. Carr, for whom Hegel was too complacent about war, and failed to realise that the modern state could in fact cancel the freedom of its own citizens: two cogent criticisms based in experiences of states in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that bore witness to a crisis of modern state structures, indications of which began emerging in the 1870s, but became most pronounced between 1914 and 1939. These experiences rendered the exclusivity of Hegel's 'ethical state' problematic, and lead Linklater to a defence of the contemporary relevance of Hegel based upon a left-Hegelian interpretation of his thought; one that rightly notes that Hegel's commitment to freedom meant that we would eventually move beyond the sovereign state.³⁷

As we saw above, Hegel's defence of the ethical state is based upon the view that it was the most adequate actualisation of human freedom: this was its rationality. However, in the context of international relations, 'the immediate problem arises of the apparent contradiction between the principle of human freedom, which demands the rational organisation of political life, and the actual operations of the international states-system, the coercive or uncontrolled relations which pertain to the life of states.'³⁸ For this reason, 'when compared to Kant, Hegel has often been accused of failing to support the ideal of a universal community which could uphold the freedom of all humanity. The criticism is that Hegel failed to acknowledge that the process of recognising the freedom of the other could be extended further than he had realised into the domain of international relations.'³⁹

Although he justifiably questions whether Hegel goes far enough, Linklater rightly defends Hegel by noting that he did not just detect reason in the domestic

36. Ibid., 195-96.

37. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 149.

38. Ibid., 148.

39. Andrew Linklater, "Hegel, the State and International Relations," 199.

institutions of the state, but also in the state's external relations.⁴⁰ He later cites more recent Hegelian thought, from Shlomo Avineri and Anne Paolucci, in defence of this claim: for Avineri, Hegel envisaged a world in which 'sovereignty would diminish and the resort to force would disappear,' while 'Paolucci credits Hegel with envisaging a universal international society in which all free peoples are treated as equals.'⁴¹ He goes on to note that in some accounts, 'Hegel appears as a revolutionist precursor of Fukuyama. [For instance,] Smith's recent interpretation notes that, for Hegel, history is the process of mankind's progressive emancipation from those forces that inhibit the granting of respect to other individuals, peoples, and cultures [...] Following Kojève, this interpretation maintains that Hegel believed the modern state would come to encompass the whole of humanity, thus ending *Andersein*, otherness.'⁴² Linklater's central point is that Hegel looked beyond the loosely organised society of states to the possibility of the future dialectical development of freedom in international relations, although the form and content of how it might happen is not clear. Rather than pursuing this line of inquiry, Linklater criticises Hegel for his 'passive philosophical disposition,' and swiftly moves onto a discussion of Marx.⁴³

Marx & Political Freedom: the Universal Society of Men

The Marxist challenge to Hegel and Kant draws attention to the fact that a focus on legal and political practices in the development of human freedom is insufficient, and that we also need to focus on the economic and social conditions of freedom. This suggests that we need to investigate the nature of international

40. 'Among the rational practices developed in the modern world Hegel included the fact that states extend recognition to one another and agree to conduct their hostilities without harming 'persons in their private capacity' Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 148.

41. Andrew Linklater, "Hegel, the State and International Relations," 193,199.

42. *Ibid.*, 199.

43. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 155. If he *had* pursued this line, we might expect him to explore the implications of Axel Honneth's reworking of Hegelian recognition theory for global politics, as has been done recently in Brincat's excellent thesis. Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (London: Polity, 2007); Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism."

economic life, and possibly transform the international economic system so that it better satisfies the goals of human freedom, for '[i]f freedom refers to that set of circumstances in which individuals collaborate to maintain conditions favourable to their own development, then it ought to include cooperation to ensure individual rights of access to a basic level of economic and social resources. For the freedom of individuals or communities is simply formal in the absence of the capacity to exercise that freedom.'⁴⁴

On the Marxist view, 'freedom is understood as global control of social relations in order to maximise species-powers [where ...] international relations as relations between particularist forms of organisation give way to a universal society in which members equalise their access to material resources subject to their common ownership and collective control.'⁴⁵ This is because, for Marx, men can only realise their freedom within a properly humanised society, where humans go beyond intersocietal estrangement and abolish the competitive and conflictual types of interaction that have prevailed between particularist social groups. This conception of international society is seen by Linklater to overcome the shortcomings within the Kantian or Hegelian systems.

The 'Scale of Forms'

By providing a yardstick with which to judge actual historical arrangements of international society according to an ascending 'scale of forms,' where different social formations are judged according to their realisation of the conditions of actualised human freedom, Linklater's philosophical history of the progressive development of human freedom is used to provide the foundations of a critical theory of international relations.⁴⁶ In *Men and Citizens*, freedom is understood as

44. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 200.

45. *Ibid.*, 159-60.

46. Linklater borrows the notion of a 'scale of forms' from Collingwood and, in hindsight, recognises that it 'smacked' of nineteenth century ideas of civilisational superiority. He later abandons it, replacing it with how the harm principle has been reflected in history. Shannon

the 'realisation and expression of the notion of self-determination,' which involves 'overcoming various forms of intersocietal estrangement' and ultimately, the 'exercise of control over the totality of social and political relations.'⁴⁷

The erosion of intersocietal estrangement is regarded the development of a nascent international ethical life, whereby international relations are gradually humanised, ultimately leading to the realisation of the unity of the species: the achievement, in Kantian terms, of a 'universal kingdom of ends.'⁴⁸ This process involves human subjects transcending their citizenship, widening their sphere of moral concern, and recognising the claims of humanity upon them.⁴⁹ The individual thereby develops a 'moral relationship with his species,' achieving 'an advanced form of moral consciousness, an intimation of a higher kind of international political life' and subsequently 'changes in the structure of political life become essential.'⁵⁰

Accordingly, Linklater envisages the emergence of a more rational form of international political life and the development of universal rules of political co-existence, where we might have rights against each other as *men* as well as citizens.⁵¹ He argues that this expansion of moral community requires the surrender of sovereignty, the dissolution of the state's right to use force, replacing the balance of power, and a more centralised and principled form of international government; in short, the institutionalised expression of the Kantian idea of a universal community of ends.⁵² Heeding Marx's criticism of Hegel, this would also require the transformation of economic and social conditions so that individuals would have access to a basic level of economic and social resources.⁵³ Ultimately then, it is through the increasing recognition of and adherence to universal

Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism:," 297. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 165. And, one would presume, a more solidarist conception of intentional society.

47. Ibid., xii.

48. Ibid., 195, xiii.

49. Ibid., 188.

50. Ibid., 199.

51. Ibid., 185, 185, 201.

52. Ibid., 199.

53. Ibid., 200.

obligations that Linklater hopes we may overcome 'the bifurcated nature of modern moral and political experience,' and thereby lead 'morally unified lives.'⁵⁴

The Triple Transformation of Political Community

Universal Moral Inclusion

While *Men and Citizens* was concerned with the problem of citizenship, and specifically, how the benefits accrued through citizenship can be reconciled with the universal obligations to humanity, Linklater's later work, *The Transformation of Political Community*, is concerned with the problem of community; in particular, with the normative, sociological, and praxeological analysis of practices of inclusion and exclusion in international society. This move is foreshadowed in the second edition of *Men and Citizens*, published in 1990, in which he adds a postscript on Habermas and Foucault. As we saw in the previous chapter, following the publication of the first edition in 1982, critical social theories started making contributions to international theory, and this postscript explores the debate between Critical Theory and anti-foundationalism through the work of Habermas and Foucault.

Linklater is particularly complementary about the empirical nature of Foucault's work, which – in light of CT's concern with methodology, philosophy of the social sciences, and communicative action and rationality – he regards as outpacing CT in its analyses of constraints on human freedom.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, he considers the work of both Foucault and Habermas to be capable of lending support to the original project of *Men and Citizens*. Foucault's empirical work is seen to complement Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism, since the latter incorporates moral aspects of human development; both are read as extending the themes developed in *Men and Citizens*, as co-contributors to 'the

54. Ibid., 38-39,25.

55. Ibid., 219.

project of developing a critical sociology of moral development in international relations.⁵⁶ Foucault's discussion of moral subjectification in *The History of Sexuality*, for instance, leads Linklater to discuss the possibility of an historical analysis of the construction of the 'moral other' in international politics, and how the structures and practices of modern international relations might be changed in the future 'to include those who have been systematically excluded.'⁵⁷ This sheds light on the basic idea that unites *Men and Citizens*, *Transformation* and Linklater's later work on harm: the idea of universal moral inclusion and the extension of rights to 'outsiders.'

The last word in *Men and Citizens* is given to 'the two great exponents of moral or political universalism within the tradition of philosophical history,' Kant and Marx.⁵⁸ Yet the subsequent cosmopolitan/communitarian debate and the 'postmodern' anti-foundationalism of writers such as Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty leads Linklater to recognise that the universalist vision of international society presented in *Men and Citizens* is too substantive and potentially exclusive of difference. Responding to these challenges Linklater restates his position in *The Transformation of Political Community*, a 'magisterial work' that is 'not simply the best account yet available of the contribution critical theory can make to International Relations, [but] the most impressive account of international theory in general to have been produced in Britain since Bull's *Anarchical Society*.'⁵⁹

Restating the Universal Moral Community

Although moving away from the more substantive aspects of their arguments, Kant and Marx remain, and still remain, Linklater's 'two great

56. Ibid., 220,209,219.

57. Ibid., 220-221,226.

58. Ibid., 205.

59. This acclaim is from Steve Smith and Chris Brown, and can be found on the back cover to *Transformation*.

luminaries.'⁶⁰ The Kantian ideal of a universal moral community, in which humanity might be united 'as co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends' and the Marxist ideal of universal association, with its commitment to the 'critique of the realms of alienation, exploitation and estrangement' that obstruct this ideal, are both updated and extended through Habermas's discourse ethics and his reconstruction of historical materialism.⁶¹ In short, Linklater reconceives his cosmopolitanism along communicative lines; the end-point of the emancipatory project becoming the realisation of a discursively based cosmopolitan human community, where emancipation is understood as freedom from unjustifiable forms of exclusion through inclusion within a discursively conceived universal human community.⁶²

The Kantian and Marxian ideal of a universal society of moral and political association remains, but Habermas's normative ideal of the universal communication community replaces the philosophical history of the development of human freedom as the standard of social criticism. Reflecting the dialogic turn in critical society theory, which puts the normative ideal of expanding the realm of social interaction governed by open dialogue front and centre, the goal of a universal communication community, or, a 'universal dialogic community in which the justice of all modes of exclusion is tested in open dialogue' is seen to at once remain true to Kantian and Marxian ideals, and to do what is necessary to update and extend them.⁶³ Although Linklater concedes that such a universal community might be an unattainable goal, it nonetheless serves as a standard of social criticism, something to aspire to and to approach as nearly as we can.⁶⁴ The ultimate purpose is the goal of a future global society that rests upon the consent of each and every member of the human race and furthers 'the autonomy of all human

60. Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship, Community, and Harm in World Politics. Interview With Shannon Brincat," in *Critical Theory in International Relations and Security Studies: Interviews and Reflections*, ed. Shannon Brincat, Laura Lima, João Nunes (London: Routledge, 2011), 8.

61. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 84,219-220,79,106,211-212.

62. Richard Shapcott, *Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 86.

63. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 40-41,220. Norman Geras, "The View From Everywhere," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 157-63.

64. *Ibid.*

beings,' rather than one perpetually 'determined by considerations of national power or by a concern for maintaining order and stability between the most powerful or potentially disruptive states.'⁶⁵

A Defence of Universalism

Responding to anti-foundational criticisms of universalism, which he discusses mainly with reference to the challenge posed by Richard Rorty, Linklater recognises that a cosmopolitan ethic can itself be exclusive of difference. According to Linklater's interpretation of these anti-foundational challenges to universalism, these criticisms of cosmopolitanism centre around a rejection of the possibility of an Archimedean viewpoint from which a conception of the good life might be identified.⁶⁶ Linklater's solution to this problem is to conceive universality as the ideal of universal inclusion within discourse communities, where the systematically excluded might be engaged through dialogue. Linklater's rationale for this is as follows:

It is not universalism as such which should be at issue in contemporary debates about ethics and difference but one specific form in which it is supposed that individual reason can discover an Archimedean moral standpoint that transcends the distortions and limitations of time and place. The possibility of occupying an Archimedean standpoint which permits objective knowledge of permanent moral truths which bind the whole of humanity is a claim that has long been denied - by Hegel's famous critique of the Kantian categorical imperative, to cite one of the most influential examples. It is a claim which many of the leading strands of contemporary social and political theory are correct to deny. Precisely where this leaves moral argument is the intriguing question.⁶⁷

Linklater's answer to this 'intriguing question' is to distinguish between thick and thin versions of cosmopolitanism and to identify not with a thick cosmopolitanism that 'believes in determining the precise content of the good life,' but with a thin cosmopolitanism that has 'no fixed and final vision of the future.'⁶⁸ His claim is that such a thin cosmopolitanism would be more radical than ones that

65. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 22,93,123,22.

66. *Ibid.*, Ch2&3.

67. *Ibid.*, 48.

68. *Ibid.*, 48-49.

seek to incorporate all human beings into a single form of life because it would 'support the development of wider communities of discourse which make new articulations of universality and particularity possible.'⁶⁹

By advocating a thin cosmopolitanism Linklater seeks to establish common ground – shared by foundationalists and anti-foundationalists alike – which he locates in their shared commitment to a philosophical ethos of critique that is concerned with problematising the practices of exclusion.⁷⁰ The point of divergence, however, lies in whether 'our' universals can lay claim to universal normative validity and therefore be binding on persons from other cultures. Anti-foundationalists such as Rorty deny that this is the case.⁷¹ Conversely, foundationalists such as Kant and Habermas 'regard the evolution of a critical orientation towards exclusion and difference as exemplifying progress towards a rational morality with universal significance.'⁷² It is on this foundationalist belief that Linklater proceeds to build his approach to a cosmopolitan community of humankind.

Linklater takes issue with Rorty's argument that analyses of duties to others that rest on some notion that others have rights simply by virtue of being human are 'weak' and 'unconvincing,' arguing instead that sometimes the strongest defence a culture can give for recognising the rights of outsiders involves nothing other than an appeal to common humanity.⁷³ Linklater wishes to suggest that there are duties that members of states owe to others by virtue of their humanity alone and that other cultures might also assent to this claim. He is aware that:

Writers such as Rorty argue that an ethic which is critical of exclusion may be significant in the life of the liberal community but it cannot be assumed to have any binding authority on the rest of the human race. Each community can work out the logic of its own cultural beliefs and some may impose cosmopolitan checks upon the ethnocentric tendencies

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid., 72,73.

71. Ibid., 76.

72. Ibid.

73. Richard. Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 191. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 78.

which reside within their own practices and are the source of profound moral unease. But none can issue moral requirements which others are obliged to obey.⁷⁴

Nonetheless, he wants to argue that certain appeals to shared humanity may indeed be able to lay claim to transcultural validity; that there are duties that members of states owe to others by virtue of their humanity alone, and that other cultures might also assent to this universalist claim.⁷⁵ Nevertheless, this shared ground could only be established through dialogue, because 'what counts as a compelling reason for resisting practices of exclusion in a Western society cannot be assumed to hold automatically for all forms of life.'⁷⁶

Consequently, in Linklater's updated and restated approach to CIRT '[u]niversality takes the form of a responsibility to engage others, irrespective of their racial, national and other characteristics, in open dialogue about matters which impinge on their welfare [... because] transcultural validity can only be established by bringing judgements about good reasons for actions before a tribunal which is open to all others.'⁷⁷ His thin universality is thus a defence of the ideal that every human being has an equal right to participate in dialogue in order to determine the principles of inclusion and exclusion that might govern global politics.⁷⁸ This, he argues, is 'crucial for the radical intensification of the democratic impulses which are inherent in modernity but are frequently stifled or cancelled by competing logics of normalisation and control,' and it is in this way, following Habermas, that Linklater distinguishes his position from Kant's.⁷⁹

Kant believed that separate moral agents had a duty to ask if it was possible to universalise the maxim underlying any action. Judgments concerning universalisability involved a process of private ratiocination for individuals rather than any dialogic encounter with others. Habermas argues that the test of universalisability is found not in private reason but in associating with others in wider communities dedicated to open and unconstrained dialogue.⁸⁰

74. Ibid., 85.

75. Ibid., 79.

76. Ibid., 101.

77. Ibid., 101-02.

78. Ibid., 107.

79. Ibid., 101.

80. Ibid., 91-92.

The Triple Transformation of Political Community

The Habermasian normative ideal of undistorted dialogue thus sets the trajectory of Linklater's mature emancipatory cosmopolitanism. The development of dialogic communities in world politics requires, Linklater argues, a radical agenda of cosmopolitan reform that he outlines as the 'triple transformation' of political community: transformations that would revolve around commitments to produce arrangements that are more universalistic, secure greater respect for cultural differences, and which entail stronger commitments to the reduction of social and economic inequalities, nationally and internationally.⁸¹ This is the central thesis of *Transformation*.

At a minimum this 'triple transformation' of post-Westphalian political communities would require promoting more inclusive dialogue in international politics so as to promote the transnationalisation of democracy, while maximally it would involve the institutionalisation of discourse ethics in global relations by establishing international and global institutions conducive to the expansion of 'dialogic communities' in world politics. Both necessitate the transcendence of state sovereignty and 'measures to reduce or eradicate the asymmetries of power and wealth which exist within states and in the global economic and political system.'⁸²

Such a transformation of political community would lead, not to the demise of the state, but to its reconstruction: towards new forms of political authority and citizenship where 'sovereignty, territoriality, nationality, and citizenship are no longer welded together to define the nature and purpose of political association,' where multiple political authorities and loyalties could develop, and where states would assume responsibilities that they have avoided in the past.⁸³ Ultimately then, the aim is nothing less than the end of the Westphalian era, where societies would

81. Ibid., 3,106,109.

82. Ibid., 109.

83. Ibid., 44,45.

no longer confront each other as geopolitical rivals in the condition of anarchy, and where domination and force is replaced by dialogue and consent, so as to ensure that 'global arrangements have the consent of a greater proportion of the human race.'⁸⁴

The Tripartite Structure of Critical Theory: Normativity, Sociology, & Praxeology

The emancipatory ethical vision initiated in *Men and Citizens* and updated through Habermas also receives concrete analysis of the prospects of its realisation in *Transformation*. Echoing Kant's recognition of the necessary passage from ethics to sociology in his connection of 'the normative defence of perpetual peace with a sociological account of the prospects for its realisation' in his essays *Perpetual Peace* and *Idea for a Universal History*, Linklater argues that there are three tasks for any critical theory: the normative or philosophical, the sociological, and the practical or praxeological, which he later refers to as the tripartite structure of critical theory.⁸⁵

We have seen that the normative ideal of dialogue sets the trajectory of Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, but for Linklater critical theory requires more; specifically, it requires 'modes of sociological investigation which analyse the prospects for achieving progress towards higher levels of universality and difference in the modern world' and it requires praxeological reflection on the 'resources within existing social arrangements which political actors can harness for radical purposes.'⁸⁶ Praxeology, Linklater explains, is not concerned with strategy or tactics, 'but with revealing that new forms of political community are immanent within existing forms of life,' and turning these progressive dimensions

84. Ibid., 8.

85. Ibid., 4. Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship, Community, and Harm in World Politics. Interview With Shannon Brincat," 26-27.

86. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 4-5.

against unnecessary constraints.⁸⁷ Hedley Bull's discussion of alternatives to the states system is enlisted to this end.⁸⁸

A New Medievalism

Linklater enlists Bull's notion of a 'New Medievalism,' 'a modern and secular equivalent of the kind of universal political organisation that existed in Western Christendom in the Middle Ages,' as an alternative to the Westphalian state; a central characteristic of this form of organisation is 'a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty.'⁸⁹ According to Bull, 'we might imagine [...] that the government of the United Kingdom had to share its authority on the one hand with authorities in Scotland, Wales, Wessex and elsewhere, and on the other hand with a European authority in Brussels and world authorities in New York and Geneva, to such an extent that the notion of its supremacy over the territory and people of the United Kingdom had no force.'⁹⁰

Bull suggests that these crisscrossing loyalties and overlapping authorities might help avoid the classic dangers of the sovereign states by holding all peoples together in a universal society, while at the same time avoiding the problems associated with the concentration of power in a world government.⁹¹ Given the trend towards regionalism in many areas of the world, Linklater proposes this neomedievalism as a model of post-Westphalian political organisation that may be emulated across the globe, with Europe's neomedievalism providing an ideal of a more inclusive polity that has moved from a system of states where rivalry and suspicion prevail, beyond even a more solidarist society of states, where states increasingly cede exclusive territorial sovereignty and engage in cooperative

87. *Ibid.*, 5-6.

88. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 3 ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), 225-47.

89. *Ibid.*, 245.

90. *Ibid.*, 246.

91. *Ibid.*

political frameworks that encourage new relationships between sub-state, national and transnational authorities and solidarities.⁹²

The Extension of Moral Community

Linklater argues that one of the central achievements of the Westphalian nation-state has been to release societal potentials for achieving levels of universality and difference within the state, yet that processes of globalisation and fragmentation are eroding the traditional conceptions of the form of community within which such a balance has been achieved. He argues that the moral significance of national boundaries is being reduced, and that while this is creating new threats and challenges relating to deepening material inequality and the extreme particularism of ethnic fragmentation, it also creates 'unprecedented opportunities' for overcoming the 'moral deficits' of states that have previously been insufficiently universalistic. As a result Linklater argues that, by virtue of their commitment to the modern conception of citizenship, post-Westphalian era states are obliged by that commitment to increase levels of universality and diversity through their participation in the creation of institutional frameworks that widen the boundaries of dialogic communities beyond the state.⁹³ To this end, post-Westphalian states are then obliged to participate in one of three modes of international society:

to cooperate with radically different states to establish and maintain a pluralist international society; [...] to collaborate with states which have similar conceptions of human rights to create a solidarist international society; and they have the more far-reaching obligation when dealing with like-minded states which expose one another to high levels of transnational harm to join them in designing post-Westphalian arrangements.⁹⁴

This move towards post-Westphalian political organisation is to be accompanied by the creation of new forms of citizenship, the task of which is 'to

92. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 182,193-198,204.

93. *Ibid.*, 5,7.

94. *Ibid.*, 181.

project the achievements of national citizenship out into the sphere of international relations.⁹⁵ While the transnational citizenship of European states is cited as progress in the right direction, we are urged to look beyond transnational citizenship rights found in Europe towards a form of cosmopolitan citizenship.

Although recognising with Falk that 'global citizenship' smacks of the sentimental and the absurd, he argues that it is best understood not as subjection to a common world political authority, but as a way of uncoupling citizenship from the sovereign state so that a sense of moral obligation is felt to all members of the species.⁹⁶ Linking cosmopolitanism and citizenship serves the dual purpose of maintaining that states are not the only moral agents in world politics, and that individuals and non-state actors have moral duties to the rest of humanity that their membership in sovereign communities has consistently overshadowed.⁹⁷ More broadly it links individuals to humanity, and would represent a shift away from our cosmopolitan obligations being conceived as charity, to ones of duty.

Linklater accordingly differentiates between thin conceptions of cosmopolitan citizenship, which may lead to action out of compassion for the vulnerable, and a thick conception of citizenship that would attempt to influence structural conditions of asymmetries of power and wealth, before arguing that cosmopolitan citizenship requires latter, and therefore international joint action to ameliorate the condition of the most vulnerable in world society.⁹⁸ By reconciling the universal moral commitment to engage all in dialogue with political loyalties to nation-states, these praxeological aspects of the post-Wesphalian order would thus contribute to the desire originally expressed in *Men and Citizens*: the reconciliation of modern man's bifurcated subjectivity through the promotion of the 'the Kantian vision of a universal kingdom of ends, and the parallel enterprise of realising the

95. Ibid., 212.

96. Richard Falk, "The Making of Global Citizenship," in *The Condition of Citizenship*, ed. Bart van Steenberg (London: Sage, 1994), 139. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 204.

97. Ibid., 205.

98. Ibid., 206.

neo-Marxian ideal of overcoming asymmetries of power and wealth, [which] form the essence of cosmopolitan citizenship.⁹⁹

In Linklater's later work the explicit normativity and praxeology of *Transformation* takes a back seat to a historical sociological analysis of practices of inclusion and exclusion. This turn to sociology reflects comments made in the postscript to *Men and Citizens* noting that Foucault's empirical analysis outstripped the philosophical concerns that preoccupied Critical Theorists. While Habermas was originally judged by Linklater as the true inheritor of Kant and Marx for developing both the normative ideal of undistorted communication and providing a more adequate account of social evolution based on the idea of social learning, in his later work this mantle is occupied by Elias.¹⁰⁰

Linklater's later empirical analyses draw on Elias's process sociology of civilising processes to develop an historical sociology of the problem of harm in world politics, a turn that was influenced by an interest in the emancipatory potential of the harm principle that was stimulated by passages in Marx's *The German Ideology*.¹⁰¹ The significance of this for world politics lies in the possibility that the reduction of harm in world politics may lead to the gradual pacification of human social relations, but for Linklater it also serves to demonstrate the shared human capacity for collective moral learning, and thus the potential for moral progress in world politics. As against more positive forms of emancipation, Shannon Brincat notes that this focus is surprising, and argues that the emancipatory politics of Linklater's early work is lost in this move to Elias, a move that consequently represents a weakening of the emancipatory project. This view is shared here.¹⁰²

99. Ibid., 212.

100. Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Ken Booth Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 284.

101. Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship, Community, and Harm in World Politics. Interview With Shannon Brincat," 1-2.

102. Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism:," 281,312,303.

Ethical Subjectivity in Linklater's Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism

Linklater's Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism

An egalitarian universalism that treats individual persons as connected yet distinct and morally equal units of the human species provides the élan that drives Linklater's approach to CIRT. We see this in the concern to reconcile the obligations of citizenship and humanity in *Men and Citizens* and in the advocacy of cosmopolitan dialogic communities as a strategy by which inclusion within a universal moral community might be approximated in *Transformation*.

Adopting a broad vantage on the issue of moral equality of human beings, Linklater's normative commitment leads him to question, what, if anything, justifies practices of exclusion that serve to establish a differential equality between citizens and individuals *qua* individuals. While the achievement of citizenship rights are defended as an emancipatory political achievement, the nature of this achievement remains essentially ambivalent and incomplete until these positive freedoms are reconciled with broader obligations owed to humanity in general. The freedoms achieved through citizenship remain incomplete if those citizens remain bound by the structural constraints of neo-realism, and they are ambivalent if they negatively impact on the freedom of those excluded, such as in the pursuit of one-sided goals: national defence, or economic growth at another's expense, for example. In short, positive freedoms must not come at the expense of those excluded. The goal then of CIRT, as Linklater sees it, is to contribute to the gradual reconciliation of particularist freedom, embodied in nation-state communities, with the universal freedom of moral equals, and to thereby transcend the structural limitations of the international states system by uniting the species to form a 'universal kingdom of ends.'

This reconciliation is key to understanding his cosmopolitanism, which takes on slightly different guises across his work. In *Men and Citizens* it appears as the

advocacy of more universalistic forms of social organisation than the presently existing international states system, while in *Transformation* it is reconceived along communicative lines, with the endpoint of the emancipatory project becoming the realisation of a universal discourse community. In this later work Linklater shares Habermas's emphasis on moral-practical learning, Habermas's reconstruction of Marx's historical materialism - which is based upon the claim that human history revolves around interaction as well as labour - and the view that human beings determine the principles that make social order possible.

'[I]n this sphere, they are involved in a process of moral-practical learning which differs from the realm of technical-instrumental learning in which human beings increase their mastery of nature. Moral-practical learning is key to the development of free social relations.'¹⁰³

In more recent work this emphasis on moral-practical learning is applied as a form of historical sociological analysis of what Elias calls the civilising process. While Elias identifies long-term social changes regarding the use of violence, Linklater also explores whether the notion of the harm principle, the ethical injunction to cause no serious bodily or mental harm, may represent an appropriate foundation for thinking about progress in world politics. He remains committed throughout to an inclusive universalist ethics that may restrict, but does not contradict those rights given by the state.

Linklater's Foundational Ethical Commitment

In Chapter 1 we emphasised the foundational role that philosophical (ontological and epistemological) commitments play in our approaches to international theory. Having explained that an ontological evaluation of such foundational commitments would include questioning whether such foundations have 'objective' existence, and what it means for us to encounter such foundations as 'objects,' towards the end of that chapter we made the suggestion that Linklater's critical approach to international theory might commit the same mistake as that

103. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 91.

made by the other normative and meta-theoretical approaches that we surveyed: to rely on a shallow ontology of 'things' rather than an ontology of being as a foundational ontological commitment. Our exposition of Linklater's CIRT in this chapter means that we are now in a position to defend such a claim.

Throughout his work, Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is essentially concerned with the progressive establishment of the global political conditions of human autonomy, and since it follows the same argumentative structure employed by Kant in his essay *Perpetual Peace*, this is a very Kantian move. However, the similarities between Linklater and Kant's approaches to international relations go much further. In that essay, it is ultimately man's ethical subjectivity, his ability to act according to the categorical imperative, that warrants the restructuring of international political life whereby states relinquish their 'wild lawless freedom' and enter into a federation of states based upon international right.¹⁰⁴

That Linklater constantly uses the term 'human subjects' is not incidental; an historically developing ethical subject with *significant* debts to Kant's original formulation undergirds Linklater's CIRT. Linklater's 'Man' is perpetually confronted by an objective material reality that negates his autonomy, an autonomy that is conceived as the full appropriation of ethical subjectivity. Reminiscent of Kant, what persists in Linklater's approach to CIRT is an ethical subject, although in contrast to Kant, Linklater's ethical subject manifests itself historically. Across his work, this ethical subject is variously negated by irrational social structures, exclusionary practices, and parochial ethical discourses.¹⁰⁵ In Linklater's work emancipation appears as a large scale historical process by which anything that negates this subjectivity is itself progressively negated, ultimately leading to the establishment of both the conditions of non-contradiction of ethical subjectivity, and the gradual self-realisation of this ethical subject over the course of human history. For Linklater, this involves increasing levels of self-consciousness, the

104. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 8:357.

105. We will discuss the persistence of the ethical subject in Kant in Chapter 8, having discussed its pernicious ontological implications in Chapter 6

rational mastery of self and world, and the development of species-capacities, such as that of post-conventional reasoning.

We see this in *Men and Citizens* with the concern to reconcile modern man's 'bifurcated subjectivity,' the reconciliation of his political experience as a citizen and his moral experience as a human being in order that he can live a 'morally unified life.'¹⁰⁶ More importantly though, this reconciliation is seen to be *essential* to the possibility of self-determination. Although also influenced by Rousseau, Linklater thus follows a Kantian typology of human freedom where natural freedom in the state of nature is transcended by the civil freedom of political society, which is itself transcended by the moral freedom of the ethical subject. Moral rationality is therefore regarded to be the highest form of human freedom, as this rationality allows the human being to transcend the determinism of the natural order and act in accordance with universal moral principles. Ultimately then, as with Kant, for Linklater men are most free when living under political conditions that allow them to obey 'the laws which they themselves make.'¹⁰⁷

Linklater does recognise that Kant's 'unqualified moral and political individualism' is problematic, but he invests a great deal in reconstructing the notion of the ethical subject that underwrites Kant's moral universalism, initially on his own, but later with the aid of Habermas.¹⁰⁸ The dialectical treatment of rationalism and historicism, for instance, which occupies a large portion of *Men and Citizens*, is essentially an attempt to recover the more advanced elements of Kantian thought by locating it within theory of history, where Kantian moral freedom is essentially read as an historical achievement.¹⁰⁹

Linklater's reconstruction of Kantian freedom and subjectivity finds its most sophisticated articulation in *Transformation*, where ethical subjectivity is manifest in the idea of the post-conventional discourse agent, as reflected in Linklater's

106. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 38-39,25.

107. *Ibid.*, 143.

108. *Ibid.*, 102,144.

109. *Ibid.*, 202.

reconception of moral universality as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue. Habermas's discursive account of moral reasoning providing Linklater with a new way of transcending moral particularity and an updated normative standard by which potential and actual transformations of the Westphalian states-system might be evaluated. Here, Kant's monological account of ethical reason is replaced by Habermas's dialogical account: while the idea of the categorical imperative is reworked into the structure of discourse, the Kantian ethical subject (of universal moral reason) remains, as does the need to reconcile man's bifurcated subjectivity. As Linklater writes in the Introduction to *Transformation*: 'The fact that citizens have to reconcile their identity as citizens with their conception of themselves as subjects of universal duties and rights is central to the analysis.'¹¹⁰

In his later work, following his own classification of the 'tripartite structure of critical theory' Linklater moves from both the philosophical / normative defence of this ethical subject and the praxeological analysis of the possibilities for its realisation, to an historical sociological analysis of the development of moral subjectivity over the course of human history. Influenced by Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism (and specifically the idea of moral-practical learning) Linklater engages in his own empirical analysis based upon Elias's process sociology of civilising processes and the liberal notion of the harm principle. The aim of such an analysis is to demonstrate both the human capacity for moral-practical learning, the potential for moral progress in world politics, and hence the possibility of the gradual pacification of human relations whereby harmful constraints on human autonomy, such as war, might be removed. While Kant and Marx's insufficiencies were originally overcome by Habermas's reconstruction historical materialism and his cosmopolitan ethical ideal of a discourse theory of morality, it is now Elias who takes centre stage as 'the real heir to the tradition to which Kant and Marx belonged.'¹¹¹

110. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 2.

111. Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship, Community, and Harm in World Politics. Interview With Shannon Brincat," 6-7.

Conclusions

In light of our exposition of his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, it should be clear by now why Linklater is considered to be 'the foremost critical theorist of international relations,' and why 'critical IR theory represents one of the most humane and generally hopeful accounts of contemporary world politics available.'¹¹² His proposals for the 'triple transformation of political community,' to involve greater sensitivity to practices of inclusion and exclusion, stronger commitments to the reduction of social and economic inequalities nationally and internationally, the development of a notion of cosmopolitan citizenship, greater international dialogue, and states' participation in more solidarist conceptions of international society to achieve these ends, are cogent. The problem, however, is that this radical agenda of cosmopolitan reform is predicated on the 'objective' existence of an ethical subject.

For this reason, although offering us a much more promising approach to international theory than those offered by Rawls or Frost, whose ethical foundations are tied to an uncritical acceptance of practices and institutions associated with the sovereign state, by relying on a shallow ontology of 'things' presupposed as the 'ontological' foundation of his critical approach to international theory (i.e., the ethical subject), Linklater falls foul of the same mistake as the other approaches to international theory that we surveyed in Chapter 1. While Linklater is correct to encounter entities in world politics, such as the sovereign state, as 'objective' to the extent that they contribute to human freedom, because this freedom is conceived simply as the exercise of ethical subjectivity, Linklater's critical approach rests upon encountering such practices and institutions (phenomena) as 'objective' on the condition that they contribute to the actualisation of the human being as an ethical subject, as opposed to the self-actualisation of the human being as a free being.

112. Nicholas J. Rengger, "Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics," in *Critical Theory in World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 97. Brincat expresses similar sentiments: Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism," 280.; Nicholas J. Rengger, "Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics," 103.

Since it requires of us that we encounter both the ethical subject and ethical subjectivity as 'objective' foundations – that is, since it presupposes the 'objective' existence of the ethical subject – Linklater's critical approach to international theory rests on a conflation of the ontological difference, between entities that exist (human beings) and the being of those entities (as ethical subjects). This submits him to a form of metaphysical dualism: an ontological dualism by virtue of his treatment of ethical subjectivity as the essential nature of the being of human beings, and an epistemological dualism whereby the human being conceived as ethical subject is treated as if it had a mind-independent ('objective') existence, independent of Linklater's claim to know it.

As a result of this conflation of the ontological difference, Linklater's universalism arises out of an always already posited meaning of Being (as the historical becoming of the ethical subject) and a derivative structuring of a ground (the mind-independent existence of the individual conceived as ethical subject), upon which this universalism is founded. Consequently, whereas Rawls and Frost's ethical foundations are too conservative due to their desire to recognise the particularity of their normative claims, Linklater's ethical foundation is insufficiently universalistic because he fails to recognise that his ethical foundation is partial, rather than 'objective'.

We might then suggest that a more universalistic ontological foundation, one that is not 'objective' in the sense of having a mind-independent existence but is more universalistic because it would apply to human beings *qua* human beings, would be one based upon an account of what it means to be a free human being, rather than on a partial interpretation that what it means to be a free human being is to be an ethical subject. We shall develop such an argument in Parts 2 and 3 after our appraisal of the ethical and emancipatory credentials of Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism in the next chapter.

Chapter 3.

Critical International Theory and the Politics of Subjectivity

Introduction

In light of our discussion of the importance of philosophical (epistemological and ontological) commitments in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 was concerned with establishing that Linklater's 'critical' approach to international theory is predicated on a foundational commitment to existence of the ethical subject; a commitment, we argued, that submits him to a form of metaphysical (epistemological and ontological) dualism. Given our foundational left-Hegelian commitment to human freedom, a commitment shared by Linklater, this chapter evaluates the ethical and emancipatory credentials of Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

In order to clarify where we follow and where we depart from Linklater's approach to international theory, we begin our discussion with an outline of what Linklater claims to be the four main achievements of Critical Theory: its challenge to positivism, its challenge to the immutability thesis, its reconstruction of historical materialism, and its development of a discourse theory of morality. While affirming the first two, we remain sceptical regarding the last two, as we consider them dependent on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, which we intend to challenge. We turn to a discussion of discourse ethics to demonstrate this claim, and explore the nature of this approach to morality along with some of the central objections that have been raised to it.

We then highlight what has been the major fault-line of CIRT since the 1980s: drawn between those proceeding according to a foundational commitment to a (potentially) rational, autonomous subject, and those that challenge such a commitment. We see that a common weakness amongst dissidents is that, while disputing the ontological commitments of foundationalist approaches, they often leave their own ontological commitments in the dark. Suggesting that the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate in normative theory bears striking similarities with the realist/idealist dispute in the philosophy of science, we argue that a greater degree of reflexivity about the relation between subject and object might help us transcend this debate.

Having surveyed several recent moves in critical international theory, which move further and further away from a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, we reinforce our objection that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is based on an overvaluation of one human potentiality (ethical subjectivity). In short, although both Linklater and Habermas are committed to a form of ethical constructivism that, like Hegel, subordinates knowledge construction to the historical process and the interaction of human beings (in this case knowledge about ethical principles) the problem is that they predicate this construction, not on the interaction between human beings *qua* human beings, but on the interaction between human beings *qua* ethical subjects.¹ We learn that not only is ethically insufficient, because recognition is extended only to ethical subjects, but it also complicates Linklater's commitment to emancipation; Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, we thus conclude, may ultimately fail by its own standards.

1. Shifting this analysis from epistemology to ethics does not entail a huge leap; especially given that Habermas's account of discourse ethics insists on 'the cognitive "knowability" or rational decidability of ethical principles and metaprinciples.' Fred R. Dallmayr, "Introduction," in *The Communicative Ethics Controversy*, ed. Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 2-3. On this claim, and for a recent critique of Rawls's constructivist approach to justice from an epistemological angle, see Eric Thomas Weber, *Rawls, Dewey, and Constructivism: On the Epistemology of Justice* (London: Continuum, 2010).

On the Achievements of Critical International Relations Theory

The Challenge to Positivism

As we saw in Chapter 1, for the greater part of the latter half of the twentieth century, positivism dominated the academic study of international relations. Its methodological commitments dominated the 'neo-neo' orthodoxy of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, both of which subscribed to what Brown calls the Rationalist Actor Program, within which mainstream realist and liberal institutionalist scholars such as Waltz, Keohane, and Axelrod looked to understand how rational actors behave under conditions of anarchy.² The first achievement of critical theory is to take issue with positivism by arguing that knowledge does not arise from the subject's neutral engagement with an objective reality, but reflects pre-existing social purposes and interests; it then invites observers 'to reflect upon the social construction and effects of knowledge and to consider how claims about neutrality can conceal the role knowledge plays in reproducing unsatisfactory social arrangements.'³ This meta-theoretical intervention has been crucial to both the critique of neo-realism and to 'the gradual recovery of a project of enlightenment and emancipation reworked to escape the familiar pitfalls of idealism.'⁴

Muting The Immutability Thesis

Secondly, critical theory stands opposed to empirical claims about the social world that assume existing structures to be immutable.⁵ The central objection is that 'notions of immutability support structured inequalities of power and wealth

2. Chris Brown, "Situating Critical Realism," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2007), 413.

3. Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," in *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, ed. Ken Booth Steve Smith, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 279.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

which are in principle alterable.⁶ The immutability thesis, the idea that human actions and social structures are 'natural and unchangeable rather than contingent and renegotiable' is particularly important to neo-realism.⁷ Central to the neo-realist position, most evident in the work of Kenneth Waltz, is the proposition that the international system is made up of sovereign states that interact under a condition of anarchy; that this structure of the international system is immutable, and that the actions of international political actors are therefore constrained in a fundamental way. Most notable in this regard are the constraining effects of an immutable anarchy on the moral conduct of states in world politics, putative constraints that Linklater notes 'have the consequence of absolving states of the moral responsibility for devising practices which will bring more just forms of world political organisation into existence.'⁸ From a Critical Theoretical point of view, the problem with perspectives that subscribe to the immutability thesis is that they serve to naturalise what is essentially social and historical; Critical Theorists find this troubling because of their belief that human beings make their own history and can in principle make it differently.⁹

Citing forceful challenges to the immutability thesis from Wendt (1987), Ruggie (1983), Ashley (1988), Bartelson (1995), and Biersteker and Weber (1996), Linklater supplements these assessments by drawing on critical social theory so that we may be equipped to distinguish between 'the mutable from the immutable, the natural from the contingent, in human affairs.'¹⁰ As a result, two robustly defended claims of Kenneth Waltz have been challenged: '[t]he first is that the

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 282.

8. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 19.

9. Linklater gives three examples in support of this belief. The first is Marx's critique of bourgeois political economy, which supposed the institution of private property was natural. The second is Hegel's critique of the Indian caste-system, which contended that nature decreed that human beings be arranged into sharply divided social categories. The third is the feminist critique of the patriarchal claim that the nature of womanhood precludes full involvement in the political realm. For Marx, private property is not a natural institution but an historical product to be overcome within Communist society. For Hegel, caste distinctions are not given in nature but arise within a particular ensemble of social relations in which spirit has yet to release itself from nature. For feminism, nothing in the nature of womanhood precludes full involvement in a public realm, which can be reconstituted in the post-patriarchal state. Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," 282.

10. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 19.

international system, which has been remarkably similar across whole millennia, will endure indefinitely. The second is that the anarchic system will thwart projects of reform as in the past.¹¹ 'The neo-realist riposte has been to insist that advancing the moral case for a different world order will not prevent the recurrence of old patterns of inter-state rivalry and war.'¹² Although CT recognises that there are constraints on emancipatory change, it avoids the neo-realist advocacy of resignation to international political fate by examining prospects for greater freedom immanent in existing social relations.¹³ Linklater's own contribution to CIRT is to engage in an historical mode of analysis that aims to undermine the neo-realist riposte to critical theory by highlighting philosophical contradictions within the states-system, its historical contingency, an account of how we might move beyond it, and a sociological analysis of historical processes that demonstrates the potential for progressive change in human social relations in the international realm.

The Reconstruction of Historical Materialism

The most distinctive aspects of Linklater's own contribution to CIRT, which are most prominent in *Transformation* and in later publications such as *The Problem of Harm*, reflect what he considers to be the third and fourth contributions of CT. These involve challenging Marx and Marxism 'in order to develop a more adequate account of social evolution and an improved normative standpoint.'¹⁴ The crucial theme here is the move in critical social theory, inaugurated by Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism (the third achievement of CT), from the paradigm of production to the paradigm of communication, and the subsequent development of a discourse theory of morality (the fourth achievement of CT). These achievements are responses to the perceived weaknesses in Marxism, which are redressed by:

11. Andrew Linklater, "Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice," in *International Relations Theory Today*, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 241.

12. Ibid.

13. Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," 280.

14. Ibid., 284.

developing the idea of undistorted communication, creating a more complex historical sociology which is based on the idea of social learning and envisaging the democratisation of politics, domestic and international. These important developments rework the Marxian analysis of the historical development of species capacities and construct an account of human emancipation which is concerned with enlarging the meaning and scope of discourse rather than with elaborating the relationship between the species and nature.¹⁵

Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism recognises that there are several axes of social exclusion, of which class power is not necessarily the most fundamental form, and that forces including, but not limited to, production shape history. In particular, Linklater regards Habermas's emphasis on forms of social learning to open new possibilities for the construction of an 'historical sociology with an emancipatory purpose,' which Linklater develops in his work on civilising processes and the harm principle.¹⁶

The Discourse Theory of Morality

Based upon Habermas's general theory of communicative action and Lawrence Kohlberg's analysis of individual stages of cognitive development, where post-conventional morality is identified as the highest form of morality, according to Linklater the fourth contribution of CT is the establishment of unconstrained communication as the normative ideal by which the validity of moral and political principles may be tested. This entails, *inter alia*, 'a willingness to question all social and political boundaries and all systems of inclusion and exclusion.'¹⁷ The normative ideal of undistorted communication thus provides an evaluative tool for critical social theory, and hence:

[C]ritical theory judges social arrangements by their capacity to embrace open dialogue with all others and envisages new forms of political community which break with unjustified exclusion [...] Critical theory [...] envisages the use of unconstrained discourse to determine the moral significance of national boundaries and to examine the possibility of post-sovereign forms of political life.¹⁸

15. Ibid., 284-85.

16. Ibid., 280.

17. Ibid., 285-86.

18. Ibid., 280.

For reasons to be given in what follows, we affirm the first two contributions of CT but remain sceptical regarding the third and the fourth. Linklater is correct to reflect on the social construction and effects of knowledge, and to challenge the immutability thesis in order to provide an opening for progressive and emancipatory approaches to International Relations. He is also right to argue that a challenging question for international political theory today is how to balance between pluralist identities and necessary universalisations.¹⁹ The problem is that the accounts of universality and freedom that emerge from Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism and the subsequent development of a discourse theory of morality are based on a dualist commitment to the ethical subject. Turning now to a discussion of discourse ethics, we will explore the nature of this approach to morality, highlight some of its weaknesses before demonstrating the role that it plays in Linklater's CIRT.

On Discourse Ethics

Moral Cognitivism

Purporting to be a universalistic, democratic form of moral practical reasoning guided by justice, discourse ethics depends on Habermas's general theory of communicative action, which emphasises the centrality of consent to intelligible communication.²⁰ Reacting against a prevalent mood of moral scepticism, and following the linguistic turn in philosophy (the turn from a focus

19. Andrew Linklater, *International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science* (London: Routledge, 2000). cited by Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 10.

20. Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory," in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Andrew Linklater Scott Burchill, et al. (London: Macmillan, 1996), 171. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1. Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (London: Heinenmann, 1989). See also William Outhwaite, *Habermas: A Critical Introduction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 68-120.; J.M. Bernstein, *Recovering Ethical Life: Jürgen Habermas and the Future of Critical Theory* (London: Routledge, 1995), 35-57,88-135.

on subjectivity or consciousness to one on language), Habermas's account of discourse ethics insists on 'the cognitive "knowability" or rational decidability of ethical principles and metaprinciples.'²¹ Proceeding from the presumption that 'no vantage point other than discourse itself can provide the objectivity once grounded in religious authority and metaphysical worldviews,' the aim of discourse ethics is therefore 'to recover moral objectivity in a posttraditional world no longer able to look to an overarching moral authority agreeable to all.'²² Discourse ethics is thus an attempt to provide a non-metaphysical ground for *praxis*, allied to the contention that philosophy can avoid metaphysical accounts of reason by showing how rationality is 'embodied not in metaphysical principles, but in the assumptions embodied in the activity of discursive communication.'²³

Sharing their commitment to the central role that the exercise of human reason plays in relation to the attainment of moral autonomy, public justice and progress, discourse ethics owes substantial debts to the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Habermas's discourse theory of morality shares with Kant the view that human autonomy involves the adoption of a universalist standpoint from which to evaluate and justify our actions. However, rather than subjecting maxims to monological reasoning to make sure they accord with the categorical imperative, for Habermas a universal standpoint may be achieved through linguistically mediated inter-subjective communication; his account thus represents a dialogical account of moral reasoning.

Integrating Hegel's and Marx's insights that the autonomous subject was not an isolated Cartesian ego, but a historically and socially situated, concrete, and embodied self, in the early phases of their formulations, they extended this Enlightenment ideal into a general critique of the material and social conditions which hindered its realisation. In this task, they were inspired by Hegel's critique of Kant, which showed the necessity of developing

21. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Introduction," 2-3.

22. William Rehg, *Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics of Jürgen Habermas* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 34.

23. David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, *Critical Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 148. 'Praxis, in the old Aristotelian sense, referred to a dimension of action which was categorically 'ethical' because it could not be separated from a person's essential being or character (ethos); it meant a doing which was also a being. It also implied action directed towards a particular end (telos), but an end immanent within the very means used to achieve it, the practice of 'virtue'.' John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 161.

a critique of pure reason into a phenomenology of human spirit - the story of reason's historical and cultural becoming. Reason was thus given a historical, developmental core.²⁴

Critical Rationalism & the Reconstruction of the Kantian Subject

Habermas enlists this insight of Hegel's to lend support to the emancipatory possibility that human subjects may involve themselves in the creation of their own world from a critical rationalist perspective. In so doing, he draws on Kohlberg's cognitivist theory of moral development, who in turn draws on Jean Piaget's theory of moral education, both of whom adapt and apply Hegel's phenomenology of human spirit.²⁵ Distinguishing between pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional stages of morality, Kohlberg identifies the post-conventional stage as the highest form of morality.²⁶ As Linklater explains, 'pre-conventional morality exists when actors obey norms because they fear that non-compliance will be sanctioned by a higher authority; conventional morality exists when norms are observed because actors are loyal to a specific social group; post-conventional morality exists when actors stand back from authority structures and group membership and ask whether they are complying with principles which have universal applicability.'²⁷

As Habermas rightly points out, Kohlberg's empirical data is theory laden; indeed, Kohlberg is quite explicit that he wants to follow Kantian practical philosophy when he explains that the 'assumptions of our psychological theory are naturally allied to the formalistic tradition in philosophic ethics from Kant to Rawls. This isomorphism of psychological and normative theory generates the claim that a psychologically more advanced stage of moral judgment is more

24. Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 344.

25. Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement," *Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1973), 632. Jean Piaget, *The Moral Judgement of the Child* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983).

26. Kohlberg's argument was first presented in his 1958 doctoral thesis under the title of *The Development of Modes of Moral Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16*

27. Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," 285.

morally adequate, by moral philosophic criteria.²⁸ Taking from Kohlberg the moral cognitivism, the belief that moral subjects can approximate knowledge of objective moral principles, Habermas modifies Kohlberg's account of post-conventional morality by situating the procedural conditions of post-conventional morality within the dialogical framework of discourse ethics, where subjects are required to publicly justify normative claims and convictions in order to assess their validity: ratiocination is no longer an individual activity, as in Kant and Kohlberg, but a collective one. Nonetheless, the moral cognitivist commitment to the possibility of objective moral principles, and the Kantian ethical subject as both the ground of such principles and the loci of ethical praxis, remains.²⁹

Challenges to the Kantian-Habermasian Subject

It is these commitments that a range of diverse perspectives from feminist, poststructuralist, post-colonial, philosophical hermeneutic, and normative political theory variously take issue with.³⁰ David Campbell, for example, draws on Foucault, Heidegger and Nietzsche to make the claim that a 'fundamental presumption' that enables Habermas's position is a metaphysics of subjectivity, since it 'makes possible ideas of autonomy and rights as the basis of freedom.'³¹ Martin Weber disputes this charge, claiming that it 'misses the point of the pervasive departure from just this framework in Habermas's turn to

28. Jürgen Habermas, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992). Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgement," 632.

29. For an introduction to Habermas's moral and political theory, and Habermas's roots in, and differences from Kant, see Thomas McCarthy, "Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism: Rawls and Habermas in Dialogue," *Ethics* 105 (1994): 44-63.

30. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). David Campbell, "Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-Structuralism," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 27, no. 3 (1998), 504-10. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* (London: Routledge, 2004), 122-23. Richard Shapcott, *Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Beate Jahn, "One Step Forwards, Two Steps Back: Critical Theory as the Latest Edition of Liberal Idealism," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 27 (1998): 613-41.

31. David Campbell, "Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-Structuralism," 504.

intersubjectivity, as well as a carefully crafted account of autonomy that does not rely on a Kantian account of 'unencumbered selves.'³²

Nonetheless, turning from subjectivity to intersubjectivity does not extricate ourselves from a commitment to subjectivity. As Richard Shapcott demonstrates, in its requirement that discursive agents accept the rational presuppositions of discourse, discourse ethics relies on participants adopting a post-conventional form of agency. The problem, as he sees it, is that the account of the kind of consciousness that is required to engage in conversation 'equates individual human development with the awareness of the possibility of universality and equates universality with maturity.'³³ Since it presupposes that discourse is only possible between agents that have transcended their pre-conventional or conventional moralities, the consequence is that '[t]he other's equality is only realised when they are emancipated, when they become modern, reflexive unalienated individuals, when they are assimilated.'³⁴ This puts the discursive objective of assessing the validity (i.e., the rationality) of claims in tension with objective of universal inclusion, and gives rise to the possibility of legitimating either the exclusion of certain agents, or their assimilation.

The Dual Context of Moral Maturity

Another important challenge to discourse ethics arises out of Carol Gilligan's criticism that Kohlberg's theory of moral development is one sided, since his account of moral maturity leaves no room for human relationships and care for others.³⁵ One of Gilligan's central contentions is that there is a dual context of

32. Martin Weber, "Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global Political Change," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 3 (2002), 308.

33. Richard Shapcott, *Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations*, 119.

34. *Ibid.*, 119-120,126.

35. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice*, xii. In fairness to Habermas, he also claims that there must be something more to moral maturity than Kohlberg account suggests, but his solution is to move from monologue to dialogue, and strive for a dialogic relation founded on a universal ethics of speech. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1979), 89-90. Jürgen Habermas, "Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning Stage 6," in *The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion Between*

moral maturity: between care and justice; an insight that has led to the development of both a feminist, and a phenomenological, ethics of care.³⁶ A comparable notion is also supported by both Paul Ricoeur and Axel Honneth in their respective essays *Love and Justice* and *Love and Morality*.³⁷ That this insight has resonated so profoundly with moral theorists is unsurprising, after all:

Most of us would consider such a person very odd who bases his or her morality solely on the Kantian notion of duty and justice, like Abraham who would sacrifice his son in the name of duty. Likewise, most of us would consider immature a person who always listens to his or her moral sentiments and never considers duty, impartiality, and validly agreed rules and laws.³⁸

From this perspective, what is objectionable about post-conventional morality is its emphasis on the supremacy of moral rationality. For Benhabib this requires that moral subjects abstract from lived experience and adopt the perspective of what she calls the 'generalised other'.³⁹ From this perspective our interaction with other people is governed by the norm of formal reciprocity, where 'each is entitled to expect and to assume from us what we can expect and assume from him or her [...] If I have a right to 'x,' then you have the duty not to hinder me from enjoying 'x,' and vice versa. In treating you in accordance with these norms, I

Philosophy and the Social Sciences, ed. Thomas E. Wren (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990).

36. Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminist Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (Oxford: Polity, 1992). Joan C. Tronto, *Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care* (London: Routledge, 1993). Virginia Held, *Feminist Morality: Transforming Culture, Society, and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Joanna Hodge, *Heidegger and Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1995). Patricia Benner, "The Quest for Control and the Possibilities of Care," in *Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honour of Hubert L. Dreyfus*, ed. Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000). John Paley, "Heidegger and the Ethics of Care," *Nursing Philosophy* 1, no. 1 (2000): 64-75.

37. Paul Ricoeur, "Love and Justice," in *Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996). Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (London: Polity, 2007), 174.

38. Leena Kakkori and Rauno Huttunen, "The Gilligan-Kohlberg Controversy and Its Philosophico-Historical Roots," *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy of Education* (accessed 26th June, 2012), 19. As we shall see in Chapter 8 these arguments are both foreshadowed and outshone by Hegel's simultaneous response to Kant's moral formalism and theories of moral sentiments from members of the Scottish Enlightenment.

39. Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, 340-41.

confirm in your person the rights of humanity, and I have a legitimate claim to expect that you will do the same in relation to me.⁴⁰

This perspective is contrasted with that of the 'concrete other,' where each and every human being is treated as 'an individual with a concrete history, identity, and affective-emotional constitution,' and our relations are governed by the norm of 'complimentary reciprocity,' where 'each is entitled to expect and to assume from the other forms of behaviour through which the other feels recognised and confirmed as a concrete, individual being with specific needs, talents, and capacities.'⁴¹ The characteristic norms of such interaction are those of solidarity, friendship, love and care, where our interactions go beyond what is strictly required of us as rights-bearing persons.⁴² Treating each other in this way confirms not just our respective humanity, abstractly conceived, but our individuality.⁴³

Interpretive Presuppositions of Consensus and Convergence

Further compounding the problems with discourse ethics are presuppositions regarding the nature of interpretation that are embedded within Habermas's theory of communicative action, upon which discourse ethics depends. While Habermas recognises that we live in different 'life-worlds,' and that our understandings of the world are conditioned by different background contexts that cannot be completely represented in theory, he maintains that consensus is still possible, since he believes that conflicts between first-order theories about object domains are resolvable in the long run because they 'necessarily presuppose convergence on a single *focus imaginarius*, a focal point that is beyond the present field of vision.'⁴⁴ Consequently, his universalist approach to human interpretation 'posits two rational presuppositions of rational discourse and inquiry: consensus and convergence.'⁴⁵ It

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. David Hoy and Thomas McCarthy, *Critical Theory*, 201.

45. Ibid.

remains to be seen whether these 'rational presuppositions' are warranted; after all, we can engage others in rational discussion without presupposing that there is ultimately one true interpretation of morally correct conduct; yet these are the conditions of Habermas's moral cognitivism and his commitment to the ethical subject: without them moral principles cannot be considered 'objective.'

The Logocentrism of Discourse Ethics

To recap, discourse ethics requires: i) the adoption of a post-conventional form of agency that puts the objectives of universal inclusion and the rational validation of norms in tension; ii) a one-sided perspective of moral maturity, and iii) questionable presuppositions regarding the nature of human interpretation. Alone and together, these objections challenge the suitability of discourse ethics for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism, yet they are all implied in Linklater's approach to CIRT. For this reason Blaney and Inayatullah are correct to criticise Linklater for embracing pluralism in only a very truncated form.⁴⁶ They realise that 'Linklater would surely protest that what he proposes is really nothing more than a set of "procedural universals" that work to support dialogue by breaking sharply "with any substantive vision of a good [global] society,"' but rightly recognise that this response would be deceptive:

as is the similar appeal to a 'thin' proceduralism in liberal thinking generally, including that in Grotius, Hobbes, and Locke. Rather than being neutral and thereby capable of being embraced by all, regardless of ethical or political view, it is clear that procedural liberalism entails a particularly liberal vision of the individual and the cultivation of a peculiarly liberal set of virtues that may be at odds with and threaten alternative modes of life (see Galston, 1986; Nandy, 1990; and Hopgood, 2000). Iris Marion Young (1996:123-124) would also add that the idea of a dialogic community as a deliberative device also presumes and privileges certain ways of speaking (formal, general, and rationalistic) [...] Thus, the claim of neutrality or universal consent 'misrecognizes the partisanship on which it rests' (Connolly, 1995:124), and Linklater's universalism appears as only a particular (relatively thick and substantive) vision among many. Interestingly, Linklater is quite aware of this critique (see Linklater, 1996a:290-292; and 1998: 87-100), but he seems to mostly brush such concerns aside as he returns to his single-minded pursuit of a cosmopolitan view. Thus [...] Linklater's (global) liberal modernization appears, in Nandy's terms, as the hegemonic framework within which all other forms of cultural life

46. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*, 110.

are judged. And [...] deviations from the global liberal vision are judged (at least implicitly) as backward, regressive, or corrupt unless assimilated to the dominant vision.⁴⁷

This criticism is on the right track, but it is a little overzealous and somewhat lacking in nuance. In essence though, the problem with both Habermas's discourse theory of morality and Linklater's adoption of it, is the relation of subject to subject necessary for the rational reconstruction of universal norms – since this subject-subject relation presupposes a faith in the reconciliatory potential of human reason, a 'thin' conception of the subject regarding the communicative competence to engage in discussion, and the subject's inclination to both engage in such an activity and to act according to principles thus derived.⁴⁸ These presuppositions are all implicated in Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and are necessary for his defence of freedom and universality; yet it remains to be seen whether they are necessary for, or even conducive to, an emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

Linklater's Defence of Universality

We saw in Chapter 2 that the basic theme uniting *Men and Citizens*, *Transformation* and Linklater's later work on harm is the idea of moral inclusion and the extension of rights to 'outsiders,' and that in *Transformation* this leads to the normative, sociological and praxeological analysis of practices of exclusion in international society – in short, that Linklater's normative commitment to universal inclusion is what drives his approach to CIRT, as it is this that leads him to problematise practices of exclusion. While affirming his problematisation of practices of exclusion, the problem with this strategy is that it is predicated on the inclusion/exclusion of the *subject*. For practical and philosophical reasons universal inclusion was not conceived politically, after all states are predicated on the differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens, and Linklater's argument

47. Ibid., 111-12.

48. On this point see the dispute between Schiller and Kant on the relation between duty and inclination Friedrich Schiller, *Werke. Nationalausgabe*, vol. 1-42 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1943), 357. Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180-184,275n3.

about post-Westphalian forms of community led not to the demise of the state but its reconstruction. Rather, universal inclusion was conceived in moral terms, where universality was reconceived as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue.

Inclusion through Exclusion? The Nature and Function of Dialogue

It is not self-evident that Linklater's defence of universalism can be charged with having a coercive disregard for difference: a common charge against late-Frankfurt School CIRT, especially from 'poststructuralist' or post-colonial critics.⁴⁹ Indeed, Linklater is not looking to undermine differences, but is actually in favour of greater diversification, as reflected in his claim that his thin cosmopolitanism is more radical than others because supporting 'the development of wider communities of discourse' makes 'new articulations of universality and particularity possible.'⁵⁰ He also later stresses that these wider communities of discourse are explicitly concerned not only with tolerating difference but with enlarging human diversity.⁵¹ For this reason Blaney and Inayatullah's criticism that 'dialogue functions only to break down barriers and moral estrangements, never to reveal (perhaps irreconcilable) conflicts in values, identities, and forms of life' is unfair.⁵² For Linklater, particularist claims to irreconcilable differences are perfectly legitimate, so long as they are made through an engagement with the other based upon post-conventional reasoning: 'communicating subjects [need] to rationalise or account for their beliefs and actions in terms which are intelligible to others and which they can accept or contest.'⁵³ Herein lies the rub.

49. Martin Weber, "Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global Political Change." Weber cites Campbell as an example: David Campbell, "Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-Structuralism." On the post-colonial criticism, see the quote from Inayatullah and Blaney above.

50. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 48-49.

51. Andrew Linklater, "The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn-Jones (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 2001), 43.

52. Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*, 122.

53. Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory," 171.

The value of greater dialogue should not be at issue; Lyotard is surely correct to argue that ‘the right to speak, and the right of the different not to be excluded from the speech community, are fundamental rights.’⁵⁴ What *is* at issue is the nature and the function of dialogue. For instance, the concern for Brown is whether any particular voices are heard louder than others: ‘[c]learly voices cannot be excluded arbitrarily, and it would be wrong to suggest that either Habermas or his followers employ Eurocentric or gender-based criteria to restrict the voices that can be heard. The more compelling criticism is that although these and other dissenting voices are heard, the cost is that dissenters are obliged to speak in a particular kind of way, using, as it were, “received pronunciation” rather than the dialects they employ in everyday life.’⁵⁵

In regards the latter, the issue is the commitment to the function of dialogue as a way of transcending moral particularity and extending moral inclusion. In Chapter 2 we saw that Linklater responds to anti-foundational criticisms of cosmopolitanism from the likes of Rorty by distinguishing between thick and thin versions of cosmopolitanism, associating himself with a thin cosmopolitanism that entails ‘no fixed and final vision of the future.’⁵⁶ The validity of the latter claim will not concern us here: the more pertinent issue is that this thin cosmopolitanism *does* entail substantive commitments about how that future should be determined. To put a finer point on it, we should be taking issue with Linklater’s claim that discourse ethics involves ‘the willingness to engage wildly different human beings *qua* human beings,’ because this future is not to be determined by human beings *qua* human beings, but as human beings *qua* ethical subjects.⁵⁷

54. Jean-François Lyotard, “The Other’s Rights,” in *On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures*, ed. S. Shute and S. Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993). Quoted by Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 98.

55. Chris Brown, ““Our Side”? Critical Theory and International Relations,” in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 198. This criticism reflects Iris Marion Young’s criticism, referred to in the Inayatullah and Blaney quote above.

56. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 48-49.

57. *Ibid.*, 87. Indeed, in the phrase ‘wildly different human beings’ *qua* human beings’ is quite telling, since the adjective ‘wildly different’ drops from the latter. Rather than saying ‘human beings *qua* human beings,’ to say ‘wildly different human beings *qua* human beings’ is precisely to neglect the ‘wildly different’ feature of human beings and impose the idea of ‘human beings’ upon them: different human beings are not then engaged as different human beings, but as similarly rational human beings. I thank Hidemi Suganami for a discussion on this point.

Including the Ethical Subject

We saw in Chapter 2 that Linklater interprets anti-foundational criticisms of cosmopolitanism as revolving around a rejection of the possibility of an Archimedean viewpoint, which duly leads to his advocacy of a thin cosmopolitanism where 'universality takes the form of a responsibility to engage others [...] in open dialogue.'⁵⁸ It is this normative ideal, the ideal of unconstrained communication, that provides Linklater the means with which to ground an extension of the moral community, to thereby approximate universal moral inclusion and problematise practices of exclusion. The problem however is that Linklater's reconceived universalism is predicated on the projection of an ethical subject, because to be included within the moral community broader than the state, presumably one must adopt the position of a post-conventional discourse agent, as this is how the validity of competing particularist claims might be evaluated.⁵⁹ That recognition is extended only to others in so far as they are identical with ourselves, that they are similarly rational agents, reveals the profound ethical deficiency of the discourse theory of morality that underwrites Linklater's defence of universalism.⁶⁰

The problem is Linklater's explicit commitment to foundationalism.⁶¹ He does not regard this to be particularly contentious, citing the foundationalism of Kant and Habermas, for whom 'the evolution of a critical orientation towards exclusion and difference' is regarded 'as exemplifying progress towards a rational morality with universal significance,' and it is on this foundationalist belief that

58. Ibid., 48-49, 101-102.

59. In fairness to Linklater, it is not clear whether he goes as far as to submit to the full implications of Habermas's moral theory, yet this may simply be because he does not feel the need to go into the details of this theory in a book in international theory that covers a lot of ground. Yet by deploying Habermas's arguments and not addressing such an issue, Linklater can be criticised by extension.

60. Dallmayr points out (in the context of Nussbaum's moral globalism, rather than Linklater's), such treatment 'is egocentric in the sense that it appropriates or reduces the *alter* to the rational self (or ego), instead of recognizing the distinct otherness of fellow beings.' Fred R. Dallmayr, "Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political," *Political Theory* 31, no. 3 (2003), 439.

61. See Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 76.

Linklater builds his emancipatory cosmopolitanism.⁶² However, just as CT takes issue with positivism by arguing that knowledge does not arise from the subject's neutral engagement with an objective reality but reflects pre-existing social purposes and interests, inviting observers to reflect upon the effects of knowledge, the problem with foundationalism is not simply the impossibility of an Archimedean viewpoint, but lies with the political and social *implications* of foundational commitments, such as those to ethical subjectivity.⁶³

In his concession to anti-foundationalism Linklater cites Hegel's 'famous critique of the categorical imperative' as one influential example of the rejection of the possibility of an Archimedean standpoint; yet, as we shall see in Part 3, Hegel's critique of Kant's moralism goes much further than simply rejecting the possibility of 'objective knowledge of permanent moral truths,' and he is far more concerned with the social and political *implications* of Kant's commitment to the ethical and epistemological subject.⁶⁴ This is a crucial and important argument that is either overlooked or ignored by Linklater. In summary then, although Linklater is correct to argue that it is not universalism that should be at issue in debates about ethics and difference, his thin cosmopolitan defence of universalism is neither thin enough nor radical enough.⁶⁵

Rationality, Freedom, Subjectivity: The Major Fault-line of CIRT

Subjectivity: Freedom as Autonomy

The deeper problem indicated by Linklater's foundational commitment is that his emancipatory cosmopolitanism is based on a limited understanding of human freedom, where freedom is associated with rationality and the exercise of a

62. Ibid.

63. Andrew Linklater, "The Achievements of Critical Theory," 279.

64. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 48.

65. Ibid.

foundational ethical subjectivity. Such a commitment to a rational autonomous subject is one of the hallmarks of political modernity. Reacting against the hold of religious authority and superstition on seventeenth and eighteenth century social life, thinkers such as Descartes and Kant tried to install the individual as ground of knowledge and action in the world, as the *cogito ergo sum* and the transcendental unity of apperception respectively. It was through the exercise of theoretical and practical reason that humans were able to shed their superstitions and irrational religious beliefs and thereby proceed to establish reliable knowledge about the world and thus gain increasing control over themselves, the natural environment and their social relations.

Of course, understandings of freedom have developed over the past three hundred years, but the autonomous ethical subject as envisaged by Kant still remains pervasive, especially in late-Frankfurt School CT.⁶⁶ Just as Linklater's dialectical treatment of rationalism and historicism in *Men and Citizens* results in Kant's ethical subject being sublated into a philosophical-historical understanding of man, in Habermas the Kantian ethical subject is resuscitated in light of, and with the aid of, Hegel's critique. This demonstrated the necessity of developing both Kant's critique of pure reason and the *a priori* subject into a phenomenology of human spirit, where reason is given an historical and progressive core.⁶⁷

While the subsequent paradigm shift from the production (or work) model of action operative in Hegel and Marx to communicative interaction in Habermas brought with it a change in the understanding of freedom that underwrites the emancipatory aims of CT, we ultimately return to a form of neo-Kantianism.⁶⁸ '[A]utonomy is no longer conceived of as self-legislation (Kant), self-actualisation (Hegel and Marx), or reconciliation with otherness (Adorno and Horkheimer). It is viewed instead as the capacity to adopt a universalist standpoint and act on this

66. This includes second and third generation Frankfurt School critical theorists, specifically Habermas and Honneth.

67. Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, 344. As we shall see in Chapter 6 Habermas's emergent dualist commitment to the foundational subject represents a significant but an ill-advised retreat from Hegel's own position.

68. *Ibid.*, 346.

basis.'⁶⁹ The project of Hegel's *Phenomenology* returns 'in the form of a "reconstruction" of the empirical history of the competencies of the species.'⁷⁰ In Habermas's case this takes the form of a requirement that the universal discourse community be comprised of post-conventional agents cognisant of the rational presuppositions of discourse. Linklater both endorses Habermas's position and emboldens it in more recent work with the aid of Norbert Elias' historical sociology.⁷¹

The Anti-Foundationalist Challenge

A common response is to remain suspicious about the universality of such claims to subjectivity, and hence to reject the accounts of freedom, reason, or community upon which emancipatory or cosmopolitan approaches to politics such as Linklater's are based.⁷² Nietzsche is a particularly influential referent for challenges to the emancipatory role of reason. Responding to such scepticism directed toward the Enlightenment and its idea of political life governed by reason, Martha Nussbaum's essay *Kant and Cosmopolitanism* opens with a spirited attack on thinkers sceptical of enlightened human reason.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Andrew Linklater, "A European Civilising Process?," in *International Relations and the European Union*, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Andrew Linklater, "Civilizing Processes and International Societies," in *Globalization and Global History*, ed. Barry K. Gills and William R. Thompson (London: Routledge, 2006); Andrew Linklater, "Towards a Sociology of Global Morals With an 'Emancipatory Intent'," in *Critical International Theory After 25 Years*, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Andrew Linklater, "Global Civilizing Processes and the Ambiguities of Human Interconnectedness," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no. 2 (2010): 155; Andrew Linklater, "Process Sociology and International Relations," *The Sociological Review* 59 (2011): 48-64; Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

72. For instance, Hutchings identifies 'dangerous and unwarranted' temporal assumptions in CIRT that 'distract attention from political plurality, and thereby risk repeating 'the hubris of Western political imaginaries.' Kimberley Hutchings, "Happy Anniversary! Time and Critique in International Relations Theory," in *Critical International Theory After 25 Years*, ed. Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-White (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 89.

Nussbaum writes that 'under the influence of Nietzsche, eminent thinkers of quite different sorts have felt dissatisfaction with a politics based on reason and principle' and have looked to base politics 'less on reason and more on communal solidarity, less on principle and more on affiliation, less on optimism for progress than a sober acknowledgement of human finitude and solidarity.'⁷³ All of them are supposedly 'united in their opposition to a hopeful, active, and reason-based politics grounded in an idea of reverence for rational humanity wherever we find it.'⁷⁴ The arch-foe, she notes, tends to be Kant, because 'Kant, more influentially than any other Enlightenment thinker' defended a 'truly universal,' 'active, reformist and optimistic' politics 'based upon reason.'⁷⁵

Contrary to Nussbaum's portrayal, the real point of contention is not the objection to a hopeful, active or rational politics, neither is it a rejection of the reverence of humanity; as Dallmayr notes, 'what unites these diverse thinkers is their opposition to "foundationalism," which is another word for homogenising universalism.'⁷⁶ The point of contention thus lies in what are regarded as the essentially *ambivalent* achievements of abstract or instrumental reason and the problematic associations between reason, freedom, and foundational subjectivity that operate in Kantian cosmopolitanism. Two examples of such objections – Hegel's criticisms of Kant's universalism and Adorno's identification that the achievement of instrumental reason has led to the rationalisation of modern societies and the domination of institutions over people – are taken up by 'postmodernism,' but the latter are all dismissed by Nussbaum as 'Nietzscheans' or 'post-Nietzscheans.'⁷⁷

73. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Kant and Cosmopolitanism," in *Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal*, ed. James Bohman (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), 25.

74. *Ibid.*, 26.

75. *Ibid.*, 27. See also Dallmayr's insightful reply: Fred R. Dallmayr, "Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political."

76. *Ibid.*, 430.

77. Nicholas J. Rengger, "Negative Dialectic? The Two Modes of Critical Theory in World Politics," in *Critical Theory in World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 100. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political," 430.

An Inconsistent Critique?

The predictable riposte to anti-foundationalist scepticism is the familiar charge that the historicist/communitarian/postmodernist rejoinder is self-defeating, because they simultaneously criticise rational universality while relying on their own implicit universalist claims.⁷⁸ This is a cogent criticism. Cochran demonstrates that 'while they are engaged in shining a spotlight on foundationalist epistemologies, [postmodern anti-foundationalists] leave in the shadows the ontologies at work in their own methodological assumptions,' and, despite their protestations about modern subjectivities, 'a concept of the person and thoughts about being [...] fuel the ethical claims that follow.'⁷⁹ She continues: '[t]he poststructuralist's Foucauldian understanding of radical autonomy and Rorty's "liberal ironist" motivate an ethics which aims to realise human autonomy to the highest degree possible or imaginable.'⁸⁰ Consequently, she rightly concludes that 'an unacknowledged foundationalism remains in the ontologies at work in their projects' and that 'a turn away from epistemologically centred thinking places the burden of standards for ethical judgement onto ontology.'⁸¹

And so, while Linklater and Habermas are concerned about potentially conservative implications of anti-foundationalism, and thereby seek to re-establish a criteria of truth via Habermas' account of discourse ethics and communicative action, anti-foundationalists are concerned about the potentially assimilatory, exclusive, or violent response to difference that foundational commitments entail.⁸² For their part, anti-foundationalists robustly dispute the charge of conservatism, and it is worth noting that the dispute here is not over the commitment to human

78. See, for example, Linklater's criticism of historicism, Erskine's criticism of Walzer, and Cochran's criticism of Rortyian or Foucauldian poststructuralism. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 130-33. Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism: Duties to Strangers and Enemies in a World of 'Dislocated Communities'* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 137. Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 167-68.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., 167.

82. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1*; Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 2*.

freedom.⁸³ Ashley and Walker, for instance, explicitly claim that their theorising is in a 'register of freedom,' although as Hutchings explains, this 'register of freedom' is identified with the Foucauldian notion of an imperative to constantly transgress the boundaries of given limitation (in theory and practice) rather than with any substantive ideal of a world without oppression.⁸⁴

Overcoming the Anti-foundationalist/Foundationalist Divide

We thus encounter what has been the major fault-line in critical theory since the early 1980s: drawn 'between theories that are explicitly committed to the legacy of the philosophy of history in the work of Kant, Hegel and Marx on the one hand, and theories that deny the validity of the accounts of progress and singularity inherent in that legacy on the other.'⁸⁵ The mutual suspicion here is justified, yet the two perspectives might not be incommensurable. Both are motivated by a commitment to human freedom, but talk at cross-purposes because their underlying philosophical (ontological and epistemological) commitments remain opaque: whereas foundationalists associate freedom with the exercise of a foundational (usually Kantian) subjectivity, anti-foundationalists demur the universality of such a commitment, and hence question whether approaches to politics that take it as a point of departure might constitute an abrogation of human freedom rather than a defence of it.

By tracing the development of both ethical subjectivity and the political conditions within which it might be fully appropriated, Linklater's emancipatory

83. For examples of the "affirmative" aspect of "poststructuralism" see Richard K. Ashley and R.B.J. Walker, "Introduction: Speaking the Language of Exile: Dissident Thought in International Studies," *International Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (1990): 259-68. D. Campbell, and M.J. Shapiro, eds. *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); David Campbell, "Why Fight? Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post-Structuralism." Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity," *International Politics* 44 (2007): 107-24. Richard Beardsworth, "The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2005): 201-35.

84. Kimberley Hutchings, "The Nature of Critique in Critical International Relations Theory," in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 83.

85. Kimberley Hutchings, "Happy Anniversary!", 77.

cosmopolitanism most definitely captures an important aspect of human freedom. Nonetheless, 'post-structuralists' are also correct to identify the transgression of any given limitation, including that of any established subjectivity, as another important aspect of human freedom, and to recognise that an autonomous subjectivity does not exhaust human freedom. They are also correct to recognise that the *foundational* commitment to ethical subjectivity is mistaken and poses a threat to other aspects of human freedom. However, bearing a striking similarity with Michel's demonstration that debates in international theory about whether epistemology or ontology comes first is based on a conflation of the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities, that these two normative perspectives commonly face each other as adversaries depends on under-theorised philosophical (epistemological and ontological) assumptions that serve as the grounds for their respective contributions.

We will recall from Chapter 1 that, while realists rightly observe that entities exist independently of our claims to know them, the being of those entities does not; idealists, on the other hand, who rightly maintain that the being of these entities resides in human understanding, then make the problematic assumption that this means that the *entities themselves* are *also* dependent upon human understanding.⁸⁶ The foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate similarly conflates the ontological difference. Foundationalists (such as Linklater and Habermas) rightly recognise that human beings exist independent of our claims to know them, but they then treat the being of those beings (as ethical subjects) as if it also had a mind-independent existence; anti-foundationalists rightly recognise that the 'ethical subject' is a mind-dependent construction, yet since a *foundational* commitment to ethical subjectivity leads to potentially exclusive and violent responses to difference, and due to their commitment to 'irony' or radical autonomy where freedom is often equated with resistance, they fail to recognise that ethical subjectivity is a significant historical achievement, and that 'acting as if' we were ethical subjects is an important aspect of human freedom. We might then draw a similar conclusion to Michel's concerning the realist/idealist debate: that the debate

86. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow: A Phenomenological Critique of Critical Realism," *Review of International Studies* 38 (2012), 213.

between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists only arises because of underlying dualist commitments to a foundational split between (cognitive) subject and (cognitive) object, and that these seemingly primitive ontological categories are themselves in need of deeper reflection.⁸⁷

Freedom as the Condition of Ethical Subjectivity: Foucault and Travail Éthique

A further problem with Linklater's *foundational* commitment to subjectivity is that it remains blind to the fact that the process through which we *become* ethical subjects is itself grounded in freedom; following Heidegger, this is a point made by Foucault. That Linklater invests the time and space in both the postscript to *Men and Citizens* and in *Transformation* to discussing Foucault and Rorty indicates that he recognises the strength of the anti-foundationalist challenge, and perhaps also that they share more in common than not. However, his 'gesture of embrace' concedes too little to their critique.⁸⁸ For instance, Linklater refers in his postscript to Foucault's empirical work on 'moral subjectification,' which he simply reads as a way to extend his discussion of the theme of the construction of the 'moral other' in international politics.⁸⁹

Yet in the passages to which Linklater refers, Foucault discusses the manner in which persons form themselves as ethical subjects, a discussion that presents a powerful challenge to Kohlberg, Habermas, and Linklater's foundational commitments to subjectivity.⁹⁰ In this passage Foucault distinguishes between a 'moral code' and moral conduct. Code morality is morality that relies on formal moral rules, while moral conduct is itself differentiated into motivational guidance and actual conduct. He writes: 'a rule of conduct is one thing; the conduct that may

87. Ibid., 214.

88. This apt phrase is Martin Weber's Martin Weber, "Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global Political Change," 302.

89. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens*, 220-221, 226.

90. See Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure (New York: Vintage, 1985), 25-28. See also Dallmayr's discussion of this passage Fred R. Dallmayr, "Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political," 430.

be governed by this rule is another. But another thing still is the manner in which (one thinks) one ought to conduct oneself,' where one 'forms oneself as an ethical subject.'⁹¹ This adoption of a position of ethical subjectivity is, for Foucault, a practice of self-formation, which he calls 'ethical work' (*travail éthique*).⁹² As Dallmayr explains in his commentary, moral conduct is not 'rigidly standardised but is necessarily differentiated among individuals acting in different times and places,' for modes of self-formation 'do not differ any less from one morality to another' than do systems of rules and interdictions.⁹³

The Deficit of Moral Universalism

The significance of Foucault's argument for our current purposes is not only that he demonstrates ethical subjectivity to be a labour one performs on oneself in order to bring oneself into conformity with rules of conduct rather than an innate human capacity (Kant), or the highest expression of moral maturity (Kohlberg, Habermas, Linklater).⁹⁴ Rather, it lies in the fact that, like Heidegger before him, Foucault acknowledges that freedom is not simply the possession of the subject, but is also the premise of moral conduct through which one transforms oneself into an ethical subject.⁹⁵ As Foucault explained in an interview before his death, 'freedom has to be seen as the 'ontological condition' of human-being-in-the-world and as the basis of ethics - where ethics denotes not so much a theory or a codified set of rules but rather a practice or way of life (ethos).'⁹⁶

Dallmayr calls the neglect of moral self-formation and the de-emphasis of concrete motivation, both evident in Linklater's CIRT, the 'deficit of moral

91. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 26.

92. *Ibid.*, 27.

93. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political," 430.

94. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 27.

95. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political," 431.

96. *Ibid.* Referring to Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 28,54-55,73. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 3. *The Care of The Self* (New York: Vintage, 1986). and Michel Foucault, "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview With Michel Foucault on January 29, 1984," in *The Final Foucault*, ed. James Bernauer and David Rasmussen (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 4-7.

universalism,' and argues that 'the issue is not simply the slighting of difference as particularity (which, as such, might still be subsumable under universal rules) [...] The issue is more serious and has to do with the privileging of moral theory over *praxis*, that is, of principles over moral conduct and self-formation grounded in freedom.'⁹⁷ This issue of *praxis* brings into view the domain of politics, a domain that is unavoidable given the quandaries of moral rules: 'Even assuming widespread acceptance of universal norms, we know at least since Aristotle that rules do not directly translate into *praxis* but require careful interpretation and application.'⁹⁸

The sidelining of politics by morality is the result of treating ethical subjectivity as if it were foundational. Whereas Linklater assumes that we are always already ethical subjects, and simply equates freedom as the exercise of this subjectivity, what Foucault, following Heidegger, is pointing to is that we *become* ethical subjects through moral conduct/subjectification, and that this process of subjectification is itself grounded in freedom. Ethical subjectivity is itself therefore conditional upon a more primordial (practical) freedom, and thus cannot simply be associated with acting morally. We will explore the implications of this praxeological aspect of freedom in our discussion of Heidegger's notion of 'solicitous being-with' in Chapter 4.

Freedom and Inter-Subjectivity

Foucault and Dallmayr's emphasis on the importance of *praxis* as well as principles of moral conduct reflect promising moves in recent critical theory that focus on the inter-subjective aspect of human freedom. One of the most encouraging lines of inquiry in this regard can be found in the recognition theory of Axel Honneth, a third generation Frankfurt School theorist, and in the work of Shannon Brincat, whose recent doctoral thesis engages Linklater's CIRT through

97. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political," 434.

98. *Ibid.*

Honneth.⁹⁹ The relative balance of influence between Kant, Hegel and Marx shifts in favour of Hegel in Honneth's work.¹⁰⁰

Love, Rights, and Solidarity

In contrast to Habermas and Linklater's reliance on Kant, Honneth draws more on early Hegel, whose theory of recognition is developed into a social-psychological theory. In contrast to the influence of Kohlberg on Habermas and Linklater, empirical support is lent to Hegel's speculative insight in the *Phenomenology* into the intersubjective conditions of subjectivity with aid of social psychologist George Herbert Mead and child psychologist David Winnicott, where inter-subjective relationships of recognition are seen as crucial in the development of individual personality.

For Honneth, the achievement of basic self-confidence in childhood is supplemented in the further development of personality in later life by the development of self-respect and self-esteem.¹⁰¹ A loving relationship (such as parental love) is the basis of self-confidence, while self-respect involves the awareness of oneself as a person, as a responsible moral agent entitled to the same status and treatment as every other person; while self-esteem involves the sense of what it is that makes the self a distinctive individual and is developed through the person's participation in activity that is of value to the community.¹⁰² These different practical relations to the self are connected to three different kinds of recognition: love, rights, and solidarity.¹⁰³

99. Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*. Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 2011).

100. Although, as we shall see in Chapter 8, this does not go far enough, particularly in reference to Honneth's Kantian view of morality.

101. Axel Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, 120.

102. *Ibid.*, 121.

103. *Ibid.*, Ch5.

It is the empirical experience of disrespect, or 'moral injustice,' when human 'subjects' are 'denied the recognition they deserve' and which create the moral feelings of 'shame, anger or indignation' that provides Honneth with the 'pretheoretical basis for social critique.'¹⁰⁴ The fillip to social change is then seen to arise as a response to the injury of one of these forms of self-relation: the denial of rights, for instance, is an injury to self-respect, and the emotional response to this injury provides the affective motivation that can lead to resistance and the struggle to have those rights recognised. In contrast to Habermas's notion of distorted communication, these moral experiences are not 'aroused by a restriction of linguistic capabilities' but by the 'violation of identity claims acquired in socialisation.'¹⁰⁵ The project of emancipation is therefore not just about securing the conditions of subjectivity, but is also essentially connected to relations of inter-subjectivity. While Honneth himself does not reflect much on the cosmopolitan dimension of recognition theory, Brincat argues that the expansion of claims for 'love, rights and solidarity' in global social relations demonstrates that recognition theory has a global dimension and that ethical life (in this case, claims for recognition) simultaneously operates domestically and globally.¹⁰⁶

The Emancipatory Credentials of Process Sociology

We will recall that Linklater's insistence on the 'tripartite structure' of any critical theory enjoins a sociological analysis of the prospects for the realisation of any normative argument, and that Linklater endorses Habermas's reconstruction of Marx's historical materialism, which calls for an emancipatory historical sociology based on the idea of social learning and the historical development of species capacities; what we might refer to as an historical sociological analysis of the actualisation of the ethical subject. Drawing on Elias, Linklater develops such an approach in his later work on civilising processes and the harm principle. Brincat's

104. *Ibid.*, xix.

105. *Ibid.*, 163,167. See also Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism:," 310-11.

106. *Ibid.*, 360. A different perspective on 'ethical life,' also derived from Hegel, will be outlined in Chapter 8

deployment of Honneth's theory of inter-subjective recognition represents a promising move away from Linklater's foundational commitment to subjectivity, one motivated by a scepticism regarding Linklater's later reliance on Elias's process sociology, and one that gestures towards the recognition of what Dallmayr identifies as the deficit of moral universalism. However, such a move, we shall see, does not manage to overcome Linklater/Habermas's foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity.

In light of Honneth and Joas's criticism of Elias, who demonstrate that Elias's process sociology relies on the authoritarian and repressive structures of the state as the 'necessary subjugating central authority for any gains toward "civilisation,"' Brincat rightly questions the merits of Linklater's recent reliance on Elias's work.¹⁰⁷ He notes that Linklater's focus on the reduction of harm for the pacification of human social relations, as opposed to more positive forms of emancipation, is surprising, and suggests that Honneth's intersubjective concept of autonomy offers complimentary insights into Linklater's research agenda that can help further the emancipatory project of CIRT.¹⁰⁸ The problem with Linklater's reliance on Elias's process sociology in relation to the harm principle is that it fails to take 'into account the importance of recognitive acts implicit within this process and upon which the normative potential of the harm principle is fundamentally reliant.'¹⁰⁹ For this reason, Honneth's 'refinement' of Hegel's recognition theoretic approach and the diagnosis of social pathologies are seen by Brincat to be 'broadly supportive of Linklater's ideal of emancipation through the transformation of political community and in ways more effective than Elias' process sociology.'¹¹⁰

Brincat then argues that 'it is only through recognition that the unequal moral significance of proximate and distant suffering - the privilege given to the suffering of the same "survival group" over all "others" - that has been the common concern of Linklater's work, can be overcome,' and that hence it is only the *combination* of

107. Ibid., 308,326.

108. Ibid., 281.

109. Ibid., 298.

110. Ibid.

Habermasian discourse ethics, Eliasian process sociology and Honneth's recognition theory that can offer the complementary and holistic account necessary to ground the philosophical, empirical and sociological aspects of Linklater's project of emancipation.¹¹¹ Honneth's recognition theory is therefore offered as 'an empirical means to ground an emancipatory politics concerned with a movement to a cosmopolitan community' that 'gestures towards an ideal vision of a global recognitive sphere that affirms all aspects of human difference and individuality and which has been expanded to include all human-beings.'¹¹²

The 'Intersubjective' Turn

The emphasis placed on the *intersubjective* aspect of human freedom by Honneth and Brincat is a significant contribution to critical theory. In particular, through Honneth, Brincat rescues the emancipatory politics of Linklater's earlier work that is lost in his turn to Elias's process sociology by locating the emancipatory project of critical theory and CIRT 'within the experiences of the "dominated" themselves rather than civilising processes that take place "above them."¹¹³ In so doing, Honneth and Brincat also represent an important departure from the teleological side of Kantian cosmopolitanism, whose guarantee that perpetual peace will come about as though by a logic taking place 'behind the backs or over the heads' of political subjects 'leaves little or no room for politics or the active shaping of political life as such,' which casts a shadow over Linklater's approach to CIRT.¹¹⁴ Despite this important departure, and although it offers significant contributions to the emancipatory project of CIRT, the 'intersubjective' turn in Honneth's recognition theoretic is not simply a 'refinement' of Hegel's

111. Ibid., 311

112. Ibid., 327.

113. Ibid., 312,314-315.

114. Robin Cohen and Robert Fine, "Four Cosmopolitan Moments," in *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice*, ed. Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 142. Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity," 112.

notion of recognition, but an overhaul; one which misreads Hegel as a theorist of intersubjectivity and thus fails to appropriate the full force of his insights.¹¹⁵

Reading Hegel Through a Kantian Kaleidoscope

The root of the misunderstanding lies in the reliance on subjectivity in the accounts of 'intersubjectivity.' Hegel never uses the term intersubjectivity, and subjectivity in Hegel has a very different meaning to the meaning it has acquired today, where it usually relates to an individual person, a meaning implicit in the term 'intersubjectivity.'¹¹⁶ Although dating back to Aristotle, in its modern usage it is Kant's definition of the subject that remains pervasive. For Kant '[a] person is a subject whose actions can be imputed to him [...] subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself, either alone or at least along with others.'¹¹⁷

For Hegel however, the subject and the individual are two very distinct categories. The subject is *not* an individual consciousness formed in its interactions with other individuals, but is a particular relation between individuals and universals: this is a very different proposition.¹¹⁸ Honneth, as well as Linklater, Habermas, and others, uncritically accept Kant's identification of the individual and the subject, and hence read Hegel through 'the kaleidoscope of a Kantian conception of the subject,' a conception to which Hegel was profoundly opposed.¹¹⁹ While Honneth is right to emphasise the importance of love in human relationships and in the development of personality, as we shall see in Part 3, love

115. This questionable interpretation of Hegel's notion of recognition is not confined to Honneth. Andy Blunden has shown that other pragmatic interpretations of Hegel, such as Francis Fukuyama and Robert Williams also commit the same mistake. See Andy Blunden, "The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel," <http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/missing-mediation.htm> (accessed 29th June 2012, 2012). We shall outline what we consider to be more powerful insights of Hegel's in Part 3.

116. Ibid.

117. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 50/223.

118. Andy Blunden, "The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel."

119. This is Blunden's term. Ibid.

has a much more profound existential/ontological and emancipatory meaning in Hegel that is obscured by Honneth's kaleidoscopic reading of him.

For Hegel the autonomous subject is an institution, 'an artefact created by the practices of modern life: the intimate family, the market economy, and the liberal state. Each of these social arrangements articulate and express the value and the authority of the individual; they give to the individual a standing she would not have without them.'¹²⁰ These institutions *manufacture* the idea of an autonomous individual, an ethical subject of its own actions. Honneth et al. thus read into Hegel a 'methodological individualism' that not only finds no support in his writing, but to which his whole project was an attempt to overcome.¹²¹

Hegel's notion of recognition is not only incomprehensible as a relation between Kantian subjects, but from a Hegelian perspective, the individualism associated with the Kantian subject effectively alienates us from political reality.¹²² As will become clear in Chapter 7, Hegel's struggle for recognition is *not* a confrontation between two independent subjects demanding recognition from each other, as is implied by Honneth's recognition theoretic, but is a process of self-differentiation through which two independent persons (self-consciousnesses) emerge from a single dominant shared subjectivity. Honneth's 'reworking' of Hegel's recognition theory is thus based on a very creative reading of Hegel; its key failure 'the doomed attempt to read Hegel through either a Kantian conception of the subject, or the common sense view of the individual as an autonomous being.'¹²³ As Blunden correctly concludes: '[t]o appropriate Hegel's great insights

120. J.M. Bernstein, "The Very Angry Tea Party," *New York Times*. 13th June. (2010).

121. Andy Blunden, "The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel." The term 'methodological individualism' is Blunden's. Since methodological individualism is an approach to explaining society and social phenomena solely in terms of decisions and choices made by individual human beings, where there is no such thing as society, social phenomena, and social forces, applying this label to Marxist or post-Marxist critical theorists such as Honneth, Brincat, or Linklater can be seriously misleading. It is, however, an instructive way of communicating the fact that these readings of Hegel mistakenly associate subjectivity with individuality, and thus overlook the fact that for Hegel individuals stand in a particular relation to categories of subjectivity and objectivity. We will return to this point in Chapter 6

122. See Bernstein's review of Honneth's most recent work for a criticism of this kind: J.M. Bernstein, "Axel Honneth, the Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel's Social Theory (Review)," *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* (2010).

123. Andy Blunden, "The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel."

into social philosophy, the very first task must be the renovation of the concept of “subject”, rejecting both naïve Cartesian or positivist conceptions and anti-humanist conceptions like those of structuralism and poststructuralism.¹²⁴

Relational Individuality and Singularity

Blunden’s criticism of ‘poststructuralism’ is not entirely merited, and recent work taking orientation from Heidegger can be read as (indirect) contributions to the task initiated by Hegel of challenging Kant’s association of the individual with subjectivity, and with foregrounding the fundamental debt owed by individuality to its relational construction. There are a number of interesting contributions in this regard, but Louiza Odysseos’s work on the ‘coexistential subject’ and Jean-Luc Nancy’s work on ‘singularity’ are worth singling out.¹²⁵

Coexistentiality

In contrast to other philosophers drawing on Heideggerian thought, such as Sartre, Levinas, Gadamer, Derrida, and Agamben, Nancy re-emphasises the role of ‘*Mitsein*’ (being-with) in Heidegger’s thought, opening the implications of Heidegger’s thought for politics and ethics in a new way.¹²⁶ Central to Nancy’s

124. Ibid.

125. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007). Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). Frederik Olafson's work and Stephen K. White's survey of the 'weak ontological turn' in political theory are also worthy of note. Frederick A. Olafson, *What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Stephen K. White, *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

126. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, xiii. This discussion of Nancy serves to introduce us to his thought and contextualise him in relation to the overall argument, we will engage in a more thorough engagement with his work, and Heidegger's, in Chapter 5. For an overview of Nancy's relevance for IR see Martin Coward, “Jean-Luc Nancy,” in *Critical Theorists and International Relations*, ed. Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 2009).

argument is the Heideggerian understanding of humans as world-forming beings whose experiences are singular and unique, due to the essential facticity of the human mode of being. Crucially, for Nancy (and Heidegger) the self is not best thought as a subject because it is not essentially distinct from the experiences that constitute it, but is instead *deeply* implicated in its relation to them; at the deepest level individual human beings cannot be seen as antecedent to their relationality. The reason for this is that for Nancy, the proximal fact of human existence is *coexistence*, the coexistence of individuated selves that are co-originary or relational from the start, and who are constituted through their relations towards singular and multiple worlds.

The Subject of Coexistence

Nancy's prioritisation of relationality over subjectivity, his focus on the coexistential nature of human existence, leads to a way of thinking about human sociality that prioritises neither the individual nor the community, since to focus on the general or the particular detracts from the coexistential nature of sociality. This aspect of Heideggerian thought is taken up in IR by Louiza Odysseos. Odysseos's primary engagement is with the concept of coexistence in IR. She argues that the dominant social ontology in IR is individualistic, and that as a result coexistence has traditionally been understood as the social and political co-presence of homologous unitary entities, such as states or individual human beings, and that this perpetuates an untenable commitment to the modern subject and obscures the co-constitutive relation between self and other.¹²⁷ Odysseos turns to Heidegger in order to demonstrate that subjectivity is coexistential from the start, arguing that coexistent entities should be considered as heteronomic rather than simultaneously present autonomous entities, which results in the need to recognise the primacy of the radical embeddedness of the self in the world, and hence to forgo conceiving the self in ways that essentialise any perspective of the subject.

127. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence*.

Since the subject is inescapably bound up in webs of relations that constitute it as a concrete entity, Odysseos echoes Nancy's insistence on prioritizing relationality over subjectivity, arguing that 'theory can no longer be seen as consisting of establishing relations between non-relational subjects, self-sufficient in an ethical and political sense, but must reflect the priority of relation over subjectivity.'¹²⁸ This leads her to claim that IR theory needs to develop a 'theoretical sensibility that is attuned to the existence of a self constituted by otherness [...] so as to promote an international political theory that has at its centre, not the modern subject, but rather an understanding of coexistence as the proximal fact of human life.'¹²⁹ Human propriety, on this account, involves 'the appropriation of one's own being as heteronomous being-with,' rather than the realisation of some foundational subjectivity.¹³⁰

Heteronomy

Odysseos's argument that the subject must be understood as heteronomous rather than autonomous has significant implications for the way that we think about freedom. Rather than relating to the ideal of self-directing action of autonomous individuals, freedom for Odysseos (as for Heidegger) relates to a heightened sensitivity to the coexistential nature of subjectivity and to the possibility of the 'freeing up' the possibility of human existence as being-with-others. Consequently, rather than referring to capacity of individuals to initiate autonomous action, on this view freedom has to do with 'freeing up, in the sense of properly disclosing, the proper possibilities for the kind of Being that Dasein is, i.e., being-in-the-world with others.'¹³¹

Odysseos's charge against Linklater is that due to his subjectivist ontology, or, as it has been presented here, his reliance on ethical subjectivity, means that he

128. Louiza Odysseos, "Radical Phenomenology, Ontology, and International Political Theory," *Alternatives* 27 (2002), 399.

129. *Ibid.*, 374.

130. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence*, 107.

131. *Ibid.*

confuses freedom with the conditions of possibility of a certain kind of subjectivity.¹³² Because politics is understood as the negotiation of the terms, or the field of possibilities, of human (co)existence, any limitation on this negotiation should be regarded as compromising human freedom. For Odysseos (as for Heidegger), freedom and coexistence are not simply about inclusivity and universality, but must also involve calling into question the edifice of the modern subject upon which accounts of liberal cosmopolitanism rest, since freeing up the possibility of human existence as being-with-others must involve foregoing conceptions of the self that essentialise any perspective of the self as subject.¹³³ The problem then is not that Linklater attempts to include the excluded other, but that he does not engage with the prior issue 'as to how one could allow [human] existence [*Da-sein*] to show itself as other-determined, that is, as being heteronomous and coexistential from the start.'¹³⁴

A Politics of Singularity

132. Ibid., xxii.

133. Ibid., xxiii.

134. Ibid. In regards the relational constitution of subjectivity and its importance for international theory, it should be noted that Brincat makes similar claims of Honneth's recognition theoretic to those Odysseos makes for her 'coexistential subjectivity.' Brincat's claim is that Honneth can help us to understand social relations in a way that can expand the purview of IR theory: Honneth does not allege that individual human-beings possess specific constitutive essences, an assumption that underlies Hobbesian, Machiavellian, Liberal, 'First-Image' Realist and even Neo-Realist accounts. This has allowed Honneth to focus on the role of conflict between social groups as the site of social reproduction rather than as between *individuals* (as assumed by Hobbesian and rational choice theorists), or between *structural entities* (as assumed in systems theorists, realism and neo-realism and by structuralists and post-structuralists). Instead, human beings, as social actors, are regarded as the product of ongoing, intersubjectively constitutive practices that are themselves part of the ongoing interpretations and struggles of participants. Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism:." Cf. Louiza Odysseos, "Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002): 403-18. Both claims seem entirely right, and there are notable similarities here with the relational view of subjectivity that has been applied to an analysis of collective identity formation in the work of Iver B. Neumann, David Campbell, and Maja Zehfuss. Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (1996): 139-74; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: "the East" in European Identity Formation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999). David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). Maja Zehfuss, "Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality," *International Politics* 44, no. 1 (2007): 58-71.

A similar scepticism regarding the reliance on a foundational subjectivity informs Nick Vaughan-Williams's approach to cosmopolitan thought.¹³⁵ Surveying the cosmopolitanism of Daniele Archibugi, David Held, and Linklater, Vaughan-Williams draws out their shared commitment, with various modifications, of a Kantian cosmopolitical ideal, with special reference to the Stoic, Christian, and Kantian ideal of extending hospitality to others.¹³⁶ Drawing on Derrida's argument that there is an economy of violence at the heart of any ethical generality, Vaughan-Williams argues that there exists a structural impediment to the cosmopolitan ideal of the 'mutual acknowledgement of, and respect for, the equal and legitimate rights of others.'¹³⁷ For, according to Derrida, 'it is only ever possible to extend hospitality to the other while at the same time, scandalously and paradoxically, sacrificing all the others to whom it is also necessary to respond.'¹³⁸ Echoing moves made by Dallmayr, Honneth, and Brincat, Derrida's answer in his later works is a relocation of ethics to politics, to what Vaughan-Williams calls a 'politics of singularity.'¹³⁹

Derrida's ethico-political thought shares a great deal with Nancy, especially the latter's commitment to relational subjectivity. Rather than understanding ethico-political relations as relations between human beings *qua* subjects, as other cosmopolitans such as Linklater tend to do, there is for Derrida a primordial sense of solidarity with others 'caught up in conflict, famine, or other disastrous circumstances' that exceeds any notion of common citizenship, as if all were 'citizens of the world,' a sense of solidarity that relates to 'the incalculable singularity of everyone, before any "subject" [...] beyond all citizenship, beyond every "state", every "people", indeed even beyond the current state of the definition of a living being as a living "human" being, *and* the universality of

135. Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity."

136. *Ibid.*, 118.

137. This argument is most pronounced in Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 244.

138. Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity," 118-19.

139. Alex Thomson, *Deconstruction and Democracy: Derrida's Politics of Friendship* (London: Continuum, 2005), 67. Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity," 119.

rational calculation.¹⁴⁰ Singularity, and a *politics* of singularity is thus offered as an alternative site around which to think about relationality, and an alternative approach to the ‘tired and totalising’ *polis/cosmopolis* dichotomy that shapes much thinking regarding the possibilities of global order.¹⁴¹ Derrida’s argument for a ‘democracy to come’ is one attempt to grapple with such a politics of singularity, and should be considered an important contribution to thinking about the radical sensibility, the democratic impulse that lies at the heart of approaches to CIRT.¹⁴²

The Challenge to Dualism

We may venture the suggestion that what unites the approaches surveyed in this section is the common challenge to the treatment of ‘subjectivity,’ and especially *ethical* subjectivity, as in some sense foundational. Odysseos’s analysis of the ‘subject of coexistence’ demonstrates that coexistent entities, such as ideological systems, states, civilisations, and the modern political/ethical subject, owe radical debts to alterity, while Vaughan-Williams’s identification of an economy of violence at the heart of any ethical generality highlights the fact that cosmopolitanism cannot simply be based on ethical universals, and has to be motivated more by a *political* concern for the singularity of human beings and political contexts.

Consequently, all the writers mentioned above may be read in some way as contributions to what it might mean to approach international relations from non-dualist assumptions. Moreover, they demonstrate that we cannot legitimately rely on the idea of a foundational subject, ethical or political, to provide the ground for

140. Jacques Derrida, “Nietzsche and the Machine: An Interview With Jacques Derrida By Richard Beardsworth,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 7 (1994), 240. Jacques Derrida, “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides. A Dialogue With Jacques Derrida,” in *Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues With Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida*, ed. Giovanna Borradori (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2003), 120.

141. Nick Vaughan-Williams, “Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity,” 108.

142. On CIRT as democratic impulse, see Craig Murphy, “Critical Theory and the Democratic Impulse: Understanding a Century-Old Tradition,” in *Critical Theory and World Politics*, ed. Richard Wyn Jones (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

principles of coexistence or cosmopolitan ethical ideals. In fact, there is an interesting argument to be made that Nancy and Odysseos's arguments about relational subjectivity might be able to provide Foucault and Rorty with the ontological ground to base their claims to radical autonomy and liberal irony, which Cochran demonstrates they rely upon but do not defend.

However, these approaches are largely concerned with critique, with reacting *against* and resisting any foundational determination of the being of beings with the aim of freeing us up for alternative possibilities, while those that do strive to be more affirmative (Honneth, Brincat) remain reliant on an (intersubjective) subject. This is not to say that a 'politics of singularity' is not affirmative: it is. However, the relations between the emancipatory aspect of Derrida's politics of singularity, the argument in *Spectres of Marx* and Linklater's emancipatory approach to international relations, remain relatively untheorised. Our argument will attempt to redress this.

Ethics as Pragmatic Critique?

This is not the first engagement with Linklater on meta-theoretical lines: we briefly introduced another, Molly Cochran's *Normative Theory in International Relations*, in Chapter 1. Her focus, however, is on the epistemological status of the normative claims that follow from the foundational ethical commitments of various normative approaches to international theory, rather than on an explicit evaluation of the ontological aspects that underwrite them. Similarly disputing the 'objectivity' of these foundations, she refers to them as 'weak foundations' that are presupposed as the conditions of subsequent normative claims, and argues that these can only lead to *contingently* held ethical claims relating to principles of sovereignty and universal moral inclusion.¹⁴³ Cochran's criticism of both Frost and Linklater, for example, is that they both mistakenly treat the claims derived from their weak foundations as *non-contingent*, and that because we cannot rely on any

143. Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*, 113-14.

firm foundations, any mind-independent object, international ethics should be conceived instead simply as a form of pragmatic critique.

Cochran's pragmatism is an anti-foundationalist approach to normative theory that draws on Rorty and Dewey. However, the problem with this pragmatist approach to ethics is that it must ultimately remain ambivalent about the validity of the weak foundations that it would presumably flit between as circumstances change, leading to ethical claims that cannot be made with much conviction. In contrast, a normative argument that proceeds according to a constructivist epistemology, such the Hegelian one outlined in Chapter 1, might be able to present a renewed defence of Linklater's critical approach to normative theory (i.e., one motivated by a foundational commitment to human freedom) against other's, such as Frost's.

As we have seen, the problem with Linklater's approach is that he treats the cognitive object (i.e., the ethical subject) as if it had a mind-independent existence, which functions as the foundation of his universalism and hence also his emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Yet if we proceed from non-dualist premises and engage in a 'philosophical ontology' of what it means to be a free being (rather than simply assume that this amounts to the exercise of ethical subjectivity), if deemed persuasive, we might consider our ontological argument to represent a contribution to the construction of our understanding of the human being as a cognitive object (i.e., a mind-dependent interpretation of the human being as a free being). This is our intent as we move into Parts 2 and 3. Such an exercise might constitute a renewed defence of a characteristically 'critical' approach to international theory due to a more persuasive philosophical defence of its foundational commitments, commitments that are more universalistic than alternatives (such as Frost's) and hence more appropriate for contemporary (global) politics and ethics.

The Politics of Subjectivity: the Subject/Object Split and the Politics of Reality.

Ethical Theories as Exercises in World-Making

We will recall from Chapter 1 that one of our objections to dualist approaches to international theory was that they suppose a foundational split between subject and object occurring between mind and world; that this conflates the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities, and means that they cannot recognise the distinction between mind/world and mind-independent real. When an interpretation of a mind-independent entity (such as the human being) serves as the ‘ontological’ foundation of a universalist theory (such as Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism), the mind-dependent cognitive object is projected out onto the mind-independent real and is treated as if it had a mind-independent ‘objective’ existence. Since they presume to ‘know’ the cognitive object, such a projection entails a simultaneous claim to (epistemological) subjectivity by the claimant. This is a position of power; one that attempts to usurp the essentially social and historical process through which the mind-dependent cognitive object, our understanding of the being of the human being, is constructed.

Since foundationalist ethical frameworks depend on an interpretation of the being of beings as their ethical foundation (the post-conventional discourse agent by discourse ethics, for instance) universalist ethical reasoning is essentially a political exercise: it is an exercise in world-making, because these ethical theories *produce* the world they seek to transform¹⁴⁴ For example, in Linklater’s account of CIRT, attempts to mediate differences involve ‘the other’ having to adopt a position of ethical subjectivity: that they become a post-conventional discourse agent. Such an approach to ethical universalism betrays a false neutrality because it

144. On ethical frameworks producing the works they seek to transform see Brassett & Bulley’s summary of the contributors to a special issue of *International Politics* on ethics and world politics. James Brassett and Dan Bulley, “Ethics in World Politics: Cosmopolitanism and Beyond?,” *International Politics* 44 (2007), 14-15.

is predicated on presuppositions about what is essential about human beings, i.e., their ethical subjectivity. Linklater thereby depoliticises his politics by presenting it as an ethics, elevating his politics above political contestation. This depoliticises the ontological assumptions that he brings to the cognitive object (i.e., his presumption that the human being is essentially an ethical subject), which serves as the foundation for his subsequent normative, sociological, and praxeological claims.

To restate our central complaint: by treating emancipation as the historical actualisation of the ethical subject, where the material conditions that negate the full appropriation of ethical subjectivity are themselves progressively negated, and providing a defence of moral universalism as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue, Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism rests on a conflation of the ontological difference between human beings and the being of human beings. Linklater's approach to CIRT thus overvalues one human potentiality (ethical subjectivity) and is based upon relations between human beings *qua* ethical subjects. Ethical and emancipatory relations are thus reduced to relations between intransitive objects (i.e., ethical subjects), which is morally deficient because recognition is extended only to ethical subjects. Moreover, this projection of ethical subjectivity neglects the process of moral self-formation, the process by which we *become* an ethical subject, a process that is grounded in human freedom. A less sympathetic critic of Linklater might then conclude that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is neither ethical nor emancipatory.

A Non-Dualist Account of the Human Being: the Meta-Theoretical Condition of an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism

CIRT professes a high degree of reflexivity about the relation between subject and object, but focus lies in the role of that theorising plays in the recreation of social reality and in the emancipatory purposes of theory, and scant attention has been paid to the (ontological) implications of any underlying

commitments to ethical subjectivity, or of our ‘knowledge’ about mind-independent objects, for our modes of being in the world. In his discussion of the subject-object split Linklater’s takes issue with the positivist claim to separate facts from values, arguing that critical theory collapses the subject-object distinction. For Linklater this collapse makes it impossible to engage in politically neutral analysis of an external reality, where a neutral subject faces an independent object, and this rightly leads to emphasis being placed on the role that knowledge plays in the reproduction of social reality.¹⁴⁵

This collapse of the subject-object distinction is tied to Habermas’s identification of three kinds of knowledge, technical, practical, and emancipatory, and leads to the claim that ‘knowledge about society is incomplete if it lacks the emancipatory purpose.’¹⁴⁶ This is because ‘[a]ny assumption that critical theory starts from normative and inevitably subjective preferences whereas problem-solving theory avoids moral commitments in order to grapple with basic truths objectively is therefore untenable.’¹⁴⁷ The upshot of Habermas’s identification of three knowledge-constitutive interests is that the attempt to collapse the subject/object distinction in Critical Theory has led to an overwhelming focus on demonstrating the impossibility of value-free social inquiry.

While this has resulted in ‘human needs and purposes’ being brought to the fore of what counts as valuable knowledge, and it offers a cogent defence of the normative aims of critical theory, the consequence has been that reflexivity surrounding the relation between subject and object has been limited to epistemology; to the problem of knowledge rather than that of being.¹⁴⁸ For instance, when it comes to *ethical* theorising, Linklater falls back on a foundational commitment to the ethical subject, and fails to consider the implications of this commitment; implications that might even undermine the commitment to emancipation. For this reason, along with the others given throughout this chapter

145. Andrew Linklater, “The Achievements of Critical Theory,” 295-96.

146. *Ibid.*, 281.

147. *Ibid.*

148. *Ibid.*

and in Chapter 1, we proceed into Parts 2 and 3 with the intent of developing a non-dualist approach to CIRT, one not predicated on a foundational commitment to subjectivity or objectivity. In other words, an anti-foundational emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

Given our discussions so far, it should not be surprising that we will turn to Heidegger and Hegel for such a task. Both depend on foundational ontological commitments (in the fuller sense of the term) to human freedom, and both proceed from non-dualist premises that can give us a deeper appreciation of seemingly ontological primitives such as subjectivity and objectivity. Whereas dualists suppose that the split between subject and object occurs between mind and world, as is implied by the Kantian association of subjectivity with individuality, for Hegel at least, the subject-object split occurs *within* consciousness. This introduces a vertical dimension to both subjectivity and objectivity that has hitherto been ignored.¹⁴⁹ A non-dualist approach to understanding the human being as a free being would recognise that dualism is not foundational but derivative, and that claims to subjectivity and objectivity are essentially *political* exercises that must remain open to contestation.

This does not involve rejecting the very many contributions that Linklater has made to CIRT; rather it seeks to integrate his insights with those of his critics, surveyed above. Whereas Linklater's foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity results in an essentially *rationalist* emancipatory cosmopolitanism, where the relation between self and world is ultimately mediated by moral reason, Heidegger and Hegel are keen to develop a non-mediated, phenomenological relation to reality, and their arguments in this regard will help us to develop an alternative *praxeological* emancipatory cosmopolitanism. We thus proceed into Parts 2 and 3 with the research question:

149. This is a Hegelian insight, but for an example of such a split between subject and object occurring *within* an individual self-consciousness, rather than simply between mind and world, see G.H. Mead's famous distinction in social psychology between the "I" and the "Me," where the "I" is the subject, the initiator of actions, and the "Me" represents the cognitive object, known only retrospectively. George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviouralist* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 173-78.

*What are the implications of conceptions of human existence and freedom in
Heidegger and Hegel for critical international theory?*

Conclusions.

Given the material conditions of contemporary (global) politics and ethics, we argued in the Introduction that international theory needs more universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry. Following our survey of ‘ontological’ foundations in international theory in Chapter 1 we suggested that Linklater represented the most powerful advocate of a left-Hegelian tradition in IR, and promised an approach to IR that remained universalistic while recognising that certain forms of universalism can submerge or extinguish difference. After demonstrating that Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism is predicated on the existence of the ethical subject, we discussed the philosophical (ontological and epistemological) inadequacies of this foundational commitment in Chapter 2 before initiating an evaluation of the ethical and emancipatory credentials of such an approach to world politics in Chapter 3, which will continue in Parts 2 and 3.

In light of these discussions, we conclude Part 1 by reasserting the view that Linklater’s approach to international theory is one of the most persuasive and promising available. He presents a forceful defence for the recovery of the ethical imperative that animated IR in the early years; one that rightly places normative ideas and the prospects for change at the heart of the discipline’s research agenda. Three of his contributions are particularly cogent: his criticism that the neo-realist reduction of the study of international relations to an analysis of elements of recurrence and repetition is profoundly mistaken, that the discipline has a deeper purpose that is both normative and philosophical, and his contention that IR should be concerned with an analysis of the potentials for the transformation of political

community.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, his characterisation of the ‘tripartite structure’ of critical theory – the view that any normative, philosophical position is incomplete as critical theory if it does not include sociological and praxeological analyses of the prospects for its realisation – offers a strong rebuttal to would-be criticisms that his emancipatory vision is hopelessly utopian.¹⁵¹

However, although his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and the praxeological and sociological analyses that follow, represent an important contribution to the development of *one aspect* of human freedom in international relations, the freedom of the ethical subject, Linklater’s key mistake is to treat his commitment to ethical subjectivity as a foundational one since this leads to what we have called a ‘politics of subjectivity,’ where his politics are presented as an ethics. Consequently, we claimed that Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism is ethically deficient because, contrary to his claim to engage human beings *qua* human beings, ethical recognition is extended only to human beings *qua* ethical subjects. Such a commitment also undermines his commitment to emancipation, because it emphasises moral universality at the expense of emancipatory praxis and moral self-formation grounded in freedom. Ultimately then, Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism may fail by its own standards.

The deeper problem indicated by Linklater’s reliance on the foundational subject is both a limited philosophical ontology and a thin understanding of human freedom, where freedom is associated with rationality and the exercise of subjectivity. Indeed, as Brincat demonstrates, one of the problems with this exclusive focus on the freedom of the ethical subject is that, in Linklater’s later works for instance, we are led to a level of analysis so broad (i.e., world history) that we risk losing the emancipatory and ethical potential of critical theory. Dallmayr, Honneth, Brincat, and Odysseos all reminded us that freedom is not simply the possession of the subject, and that emancipation is not just about securing the conditions within which subjectivity can be exercised (as

150. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 216.

151. Although this has not prevented some from decrying it as such. See Randall L. Schweller, “Fantasy Theory,” *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999): 147-50.

foundationalists such as Kant, Habermas, and Linklater assume), but is also about inter-personal relations and emancipatory *praxis*. Linklater's foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity undermines this inter-personal, *relational* aspect of human freedom, and thus represents an inappropriate basis for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

That said, this does not require that we reject Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Rather, we should recognise it as a potent defence of one aspect of human freedom: i.e., the self-realisation and autonomy of the ethical subject. The ideal of more inclusive dialogue in international relations, along with his proposals for the triple transformation of political community in *Transformation*, are basically sound. What we must realise, however, is that these arguments are predicated on a one-sided conception of human freedom, and that social interaction governed by open and rational dialogue cannot legitimately claim to be either an essential expression of human freedom, or its highest form. Moreover, that moral rationality is not an effective arbiter of difference. As a result, we must look elsewhere for a reliable guide for emancipatory *praxis* and a more universalistic evaluative tool for critical social theory; one that can offer a guide for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism *not* based on a commitment to subjectivity.

Part 2.

Worlds and World Politics

Introduction to Part 2

We explained in the Introduction that there was a shift in thought in the eighteenth century from universal and universalistic ontologies to particularist ontologies, a shift that was instrumental in the emergence of nationalistic, particularist moralities that have since contributed to the loss of ethics in international political thought and theory in the twentieth century.¹ We also saw that as a consequence of the prominence of these particularist ontologies and epistemologies, a distinctive *positivist* methodology evolved during the nineteenth century, and that it was the combination of this shift to particularist *ontology*, *epistemology* and *methodology* that is the legacy in which the establishment of IR as an academic discipline, especially its neo-realist mainstream, is embedded.² We then concluded with Behr that – given the material and ideational conditions of twenty-first century (global) politics – the challenges and requirements for a contemporary theory of the international ‘lie in the study of ontological and epistemological dynamics’ with a view to providing a groundwork with which to overcome ‘the cemented frameworks and aporias of particularism to establish renewed ontology(ies) and respective epistemologies for contemporary and future politics and ethics.’³ Such an approach, we prescribed, must be able to recognise plurality and diversity without ‘expecting “the other” to assimilate and/or not violating “the other” through logo- and egocentric epistemologies’⁴

Assessing Linklater’s self-consciously universalistic approach to international theory in Part 1, we argued that, despite offering perhaps the most persuasive and comprehensive of the ‘critical’ approaches to contemporary world politics, his emancipatory cosmopolitanism was hamstrung by a foundational commitment to the ethical subject/ethical subjectivity. This commitment, we argued, rested on a conflation of the ontological difference, and involved Linklater

1. Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 2.

2. *Ibid.*, 3.

3. *Ibid.*, 246.

4. *Ibid.*

submitting to a form of metaphysical dualism: comprised of a foundational ontological commitment to ethical subjectivity, and a foundational epistemological commitment to the ethical subject as a mind-independent cognitive object. As a result, we claimed that Linklater's defence of universalism was predicated on the 'projection' of ethical subjectivity onto 'the other' and other others, and that his conception of emancipation is essentially an account of the historical actualisation of the ethical subject. Such an emancipatory cosmopolitanism was ethically deficient because it presumed that the other adopt a position of ethical subjectivity, and we questioned its emancipatory credentials because too little attention was paid to the role of praxis or inter-personal relations as against the exercise of ethical subjectivity.

The Argument of Part 2

Having outlined the insufficiencies of various alternatives in Part 1, we initiate our response to the problematic outlined above in Part 2. Our two principal concerns here are to deepen the ontological foundations (in the fuller sense of the term) of CIRT, and to begin our task of developing a richer account of human freedom upon which an emancipatory cosmopolitanism might be based. To this end, Chapter 4 engages with Heidegger's *Being and Time*. By eschewing a foundational commitment to subjectivity and focussing instead on an existential analytic of human existence, we argue that Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology' can lead us to a more universalistic foundation for contemporary politics and ethics than can Rawls, Frost, or Linklater. Whereas Rawls and Frost's ethical foundations mean that their normative theories apply only to human beings *qua* political subjects of dominant institutions and practices associated with the sovereign state, and Linklater's applies only to human beings *qua* ethical subjects, Heidegger's fundamental ontology of human existence can provide us an ontological foundation that might apply to human beings *qua* human beings.

In contrast to Linklater's universalism, which arises out of an always already posited meaning of Being (as the historical becoming of the ethical subject) and its derivative structuring of a ground (the mind-independent 'objective' existence of the individual conceived as ethical subject), Heidegger's fundamental ontology solicits any universalistic approach to politics and ethics to proceed from a recognition of the ontological difference. This would involve resisting the (characteristically dualist) temptation to regard our interpretation of the being of beings as the only interpretation and forgoing approaches to politics and ethics predicated on some mind-independent foundation (such as the ethical subject). The upshot would be that emancipation could no longer equate to the universal self-actualisation of ethical subjectivity, as it is for Linklater, but must be premised on what Heidegger calls 'resolute solicitous being-with,' an engagement between self and world characterised by a de-centred receptivity to the existence of others. Such emphasis on practical engagement with others as others would begin to emend Linklater's neglect of the praxeological aspect of human freedom in his account of emancipation.

After offering an account of the individual as first and foremost a 'world-relating creature' rather than an ethical subject, Chapter 5 explores Heidegger's account of freedom in greater depth. Here we establish that, before it is associated with any form of subjectivity (ethical subjectivity, or the political subjectivity associated with citizenship, for instance) freedom must be recognised as the condition of any interpretation of the being of beings, as the 'ground' of the ontological difference. This amounts to a repositioning of freedom, so that freedom is no longer principally seen as the property of a subject, but is recognised as the existential condition of world-disclosure. It is for this reason that we then claim that Linklater's projection of ethical subjectivity (one interpretation of the being of human beings) as a general ontology of human being amounts to an abrogation of one aspect of human freedom.

We start exploring the ethical and political implications of our position towards the end of Chapter 5, where we resound calls from the likes of Jean-Luc

Nancy and Jacques Derrida for a ‘politics of singularity;’ this, we suggest, should displace the politics of subjectivity that we argued in Part 1 characterises Linklater’s emancipatory cosmopolitanism. The reason for this, which will become clearer in Chapter 5, is that the recognition of the ontological difference heralds a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics: while politics is the process of projecting and contesting interpretations of the being of beings as a whole, ethics concerns a relation to the other as ‘singularity’ (rather than subject). As a result, we argue that a more universalistic approach to ethics would be one based on the ethical relation: on a relation to the other as other, rather than as an ethical subject.

Heidegger and the Critical Tradition

We are all too well aware that, given the character of the man and his political involvements, the suggestion that Heidegger can offer us important contributions to an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism is to court both controversy and misunderstanding. As Nikolas Kompridis notes in his recent *Critique and Disclosure*, a singularly important contribution to critical theory based upon the thesis that reconciling Habermas and Heidegger is necessary for the renewal of the critical tradition: ‘the idea of integrating Heidegger’s thought into critical theory may be greeted with suspicious resistance if not outright revulsion by some critical theorists. And the idea that Heidegger’s thought can contribute to the renewal of critical theory is more likely to be greeted with disbelief (if not derision) than with curiosity.’⁵ He continues ‘[t]he fact is, both Heidegger’s person and his thought have played the role of critical theory’s “other:” he is the very antithesis of the critical intellectual as critical theorists imagine “him.”’⁶ Kompridis demonstrates, however, that Habermas badly misunderstands Heidegger’s insights

5. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006).

6. *Ibid.*, 32.

into world-disclosure, and mishandles arguments that are vitally important for a renewal of critical theory.⁷

Whereas in Habermas, the central praxis of democracy is located in the removal of the barriers to the implementation of practical discourses, Heidegger offers us a way of reformulating praxis in terms of decentred receptivity and open engagement with others, where receptivity is characterised, not by a ‘mindless submission,’ but by an ‘intensification of one’s cognitive and affective capabilities.’⁸ In contrast to the neo-Kantianism of Kohlberg, Habermas, Elias, and Linklater, decentring is not a learning process, and it ‘is not about overcoming our partial view of things in order to arrive at the single right answer to a moral problem. It is not about a “transcendence” of our parochial self in order to achieve an impartial or objective view of things; it is about an enlargement of self, opening it up to what was previously closed.’⁹

As Dallmayr has noted, this has important implications for the notion of inter-human recognition; implications that go beyond Honneth’s account of ‘inter-subjective’ recognition.¹⁰ Whereas in the past recognition has been seen to operate purely on a cerebral level – such as in the extension of moral community only to post-conventional discourse agents (Habermas), or as a confrontation between two independent subjects claiming recognition from one another (Honneth) – Kompridis’s interpretation of Heidegger’s concepts of receptivity and solicitude reconnects cognition with affect and sensibility.¹¹ For Kompridis, what this brings into view is not a ‘bland universalism or cosmopolitanism,’ but ‘an increased sensitivity to the presence and endangered state of plural “local worlds” – plural understandings not subsumable under a single notion of being.’¹²

7. Ibid. Preceding Kompridis's critique, Dallmayr has also demonstrated that Habermas has a very poor grasp of the significance of *Mitsein* (being-with) in Heidegger's thought. See Fred R. Dallmayr, *The Other Heidegger* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 59-60.

8. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future*, 59.

9. Ibid., 211,213.

10. Fred R. Dallmayr, “Nikolas Kompridis. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future. (Review),” *Notre Dame* (2009).

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.; Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future*, 219.

We shall not, however, be concerned with defending Heidegger's thought against Habermas and the Frankfurt School. This is a task that has already been accomplished by both Fred Dallmayr and Nikolas Kompridis, with Dallmayr noting that Kompridis's *Critique and Disclosure* performs the valuable function of nudging rank-and-file critical theorists away from certain 'orthodox' school positions that Habermas himself now seems ready to abandon.¹³ Neither will we be discussing 'The Heidegger Affair,' as his disastrous political involvements have come to be known, since this has been covered extensively elsewhere and there is nothing here that will add to that discussion.¹⁴ Besides, the standard disclaimers and explanations offered by those sympathetic to his work sound increasingly stale and trite, and detract from the very real contributions that Heidegger has to offer to the way that we think about politics; these should now be taken on their own terms.

We *will* be concerned then with demonstrating the fact that Heidegger provides very real and very powerful insights into 'philosophical ontology' that can contribute greatly to the development of more universalistic ontology for ethics and politics at a global level. What is more, the centrality afforded to freedom by Heidegger – as the 'groundless ground' (*Abgrund*) of human existence and the condition of politics – represents a potentially important contribution to the left-Hegelian tradition of evaluating practices and institutions against their contribution to human freedom. More than this though, by redressing the dualism that

13. See Fred R. Dallmayr, *Between Freiburg & Frankfurt: Towards a Critical Ontology* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1991). Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future*. Fred R. Dallmayr, "Nikolas Kompridis. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future. (Review)." I stress that we will not defend Heidegger's *thought* against criticism since that has been done extensively elsewhere. I have no interest in defending Heidegger 'the man.' In this regard I concur with G.B. Smith's argument: 'We must confess that speculative genius need not imply nor be aligned with moral virtue or practical wisdom. Indeed, we seem to have it as a doctrinal statement, from no less an authority than Aristotle, that there is a chasm between moral and theoretical virtue ... Heidegger lends credence to the existence of this distinction.' Gregory Bruce Smith, *Martin Heidegger: Paths Opened, Paths Taken* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), viii.

14. See Fred R. Dallmayr, *The Other Heidegger*; Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism* (Philadelphia University Press: Temple University Press, 1989); Thomas G. Pavel, "The Heidegger Affair," *MLN* 103, no. 4 (1988): 887-901; Tom Rockmore, "Heidegger After Farias," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* (1991): 81-102; Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Gregory Bruce Smith, *Martin Heidegger: Paths Opened, Paths Taken*; Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being: The Political Thought of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

characterises Kant, Habermas, Linklater (and possibly also Marx) Heidegger's 'philosophical ontology' has an important role to play in the future of the critical tradition.¹⁵

Indeed, since one of the central contentions made here is that we may be *constitutively unable* to build a valid emancipatory cosmopolitanism from dualist premises, in order to contribute to a more universalistic philosophical ontology for IR – especially one committed to emancipatory and ethical relations between persons – we must take cues from Heidegger's understanding of fundamental ontology.¹⁶ Infact, given the profundity of his ontological insights and that he is considered by many to be the twentieth century's 'greatest thinker,' the onus of justification should rather be on any philosophical ontology that *does not* engage with Heidegger's 'fundamental ontology.' With this in mind, we proceed in the recent spirit of the reconciliation of what have seemed to be divergent trends in critical theory: where Heidegger's relation to the critical tradition is complementary, rather than antagonistic.¹⁷

15. Whether or not Marx can be considered an ontological dualist is the subject of ongoing debate. On Marx's ontological dualism see Anthony King, *The Structure of Social Theory* (London: Routledge, 2004), 107-21., while for an opposing perspective, see Murray E.G. Smith, "Against Dualism: Marxism and the Necessity of Dialectical Monism," *Science & Society* 73, no. 3 (2009): 356-85.

16. Heidegger's apparent shift from a monistic to a pluralist ontology in a late seminar does not negate this contribution. On this shift see Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future*, 219. Braver makes a convincing case that Heidegger should be read as an ontological pluralist see Lee Braver, *A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 171-75.

17. Although Dallmayr's *Between Freiburg and Frankfurt* was an early attempt at this reconciliation, for Dallmayr it is *Critique and Disclosure* that 'in a way signals the end of a period marked by divergent, even opposite tendencies: on the one hand, the "postmodern" fascination with "extraordinary" rupture (or rapture), and on the other, the streamlining of critical theory in the mold of a rule-governed, rationalist normalcy.' Fred R. Dallmayr, "Nikolas Kompridis. Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future. (Review)." See also Fred R. Dallmayr, *Between Freiburg & Frankfurt: Towards a Critical Ontology*. On the reconciliation between Derrida and Habermas see Richard Beardsworth, "The Future of Critical Philosophy and World Politics," *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 34, no. 1 (2005): 201-35.

Chapter 4.

Beings & Being: Heidegger & Fundamental Ontology

Introduction

This chapter engages with Heidegger's *Being and Time*, read in a way that emphasises the profound challenges that it poses to dualism; specifically, to the idea that we might encounter the world in a relation of (epistemological) subject to (mind-independent) objects. Central in this regard is Heidegger's argument that our encounter with entities is never neutral: that 'things' never appear to us as they are 'in-themselves,' but are always encountered with subjective pre-understandings, interpretations of the 'object' that we surreptitiously project onto it; entities that include other human beings.

In a related move – though applying to action as opposed to understanding – Heidegger profoundly unsettles any commitment to 'subjectivity' by arguing that man exists essentially as potentiality rather than ground (as is implied by 'subjectivity'), and that our mode of being in the world is fundamentally conditioned by existential structures that inform and condition our individual existences. In the process, Heidegger offers us a much deeper account of human existence and sociality than can be provided by accounts that depart from notions of 'subjectivity' or 'intersubjectivity.' Not only does this subvert Habermas/Linklater's approach to critical theory, but also those of more recent critical theorists such as Honneth and Brincaat.

Although beginning with an analysis of our experiences of *human* existence, Heidegger has something altogether grander in his sights: the meaning of Being in general, or, what existence ‘as such’ might mean. This question of Being is approached through a phenomenological hermeneutical method, and leads to an *interpretation* of Being in general from an analysis of our *experience* of our particular existences.¹ Thus it is through a phenomenology of the being of human beings (and of other entities such as rocks and hammers) that Heidegger attempts to gain a grasp on Being as a whole. Due to human finitude, he soon realises that the meaning of Being in general is out of our reach, and so ‘temporality’ is posited as the transcendental horizon of any interpretation of Being. This has profound implications for our mode of being in world; this includes a conception of freedom as ‘resolute solicitous being-with others,’ and Heidegger’s famous call for an ‘overcoming’ of metaphysics. We shall see that, in essence, the latter amounts to a call for us to ground any universalist claim – claims to what the human being is, for instance – in ‘fundamental ontology’: in an understanding of the experience of existence. Put differently, it is an attempt to establish ‘perspectivity’ or ‘doxa’ as originary to human existence.

The Ontological Difference & the Leading Question of Philosophy

The Ontological Difference and the Forgetting of Being

Heidegger’s guiding aim in his most influential work, *Being and Time*, is to address the question of the meaning of Being. For Heidegger, this requires that we distinguish between beings (*Seiende*) and Being (*Sein*), or, between entities and their existence. Three kinds of entities are identified by Heidegger, each of which

1. On hermeneutics and phenomenology see John D. Caputo, “Husserl, Heidegger, and the Question of a “Hermeneutic” Phenomenology,” *Husserl Studies* 1 (1984): 157-78. and Susann M. Laverty, “Hermeneutic Phenomenology and Phenomenology: A Comparison of Historical and Methodological Considerations,” *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 2, no. 3 (2003): 21-35.

having a different kind of existence. Mere things, such as rocks, the existence of which is characterised by being ‘present-at-hand;’ tools, the existence of which is characterised by their ‘readiness-to-hand;’ and human beings, whose existence is characterised by Da-sein (there-being). Importantly then, entities and their being are not coterminous, and the existential uniqueness of human beings lies not in their subjectivity, but in their Da-sein (there-being). What is particularly unique about *human* beings is that they have access to Being, ‘that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood.’² Being is thus related to the understanding, and so only human beings can have an understanding of Being: rocks and tools clearly cannot.³ Importantly, *contra* the dualist, human beings never encounter entities as knowing subject to mind-independent object, as we always encounter the entity with a more or less unconscious understanding of it, and project upon it meaning and possibilities.

Heidegger’s famous example is the hammer. As a ‘substance,’ something ‘present-at-hand,’ a hammer is simply a composite of wood and metal: these properties do not make the hammer a hammer. The hammer only *becomes* a hammer when a person (a Da-sein) who understands what a hammer is used for, encounters it. The being of the hammer, its existence as a tool, is dependent upon its being understood as such by a human being: the properties of a hammer are not intrinsic to that object, but are essentially dependent on the entity that encounters it as an object. Da-sein’s pre-theoretical understanding of the entities it encounters informs the meaning and possibilities projected upon that entity. A carpenter will project onto the hammer different possibilities than a physicist would, for example. Similarly, to use Wight and Joseph’s example, a radical Marxist will project upon ‘the international system’ a very different understanding of its meaning and possibilities than will the executive of a large hedge-fund. Neither Da-sein’s understanding of this entity is a transparent reflection of a mind-independent reality, but always occurs ‘in the light of Being.’ Heidegger’s inquiry into ‘the

2. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 25-26.

3. For a challenge to Heidegger’s anthropocentrism here see Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

meaning of Being' in *Being and Time* is thus not directed towards an analysis of the meaning of the entities that are encountered by Da-sein, and neither is it directed towards the meaning of Da-sein itself, it is directed towards the meaning of Being in general: the underlying current, the *sine qua non* of Da-sein's encounter with entities.⁴

Arguably, the question of Being has been the fundamental question of both philosophy and theology. Why is there something rather than nothing? Is there any support for human or cosmic existence? Is the universe primarily composed of matter, or spirit? Are human beings essentially rational or are they asocial beasts that need to be subdued? Da-sein has interpreted Being in various ways, and these various interpretations have influenced our political and ethical lives since they inform our interpretations of the being of the entities that we encounter. What would life be like in a 'state of nature?' What then justifies authority? Security (Hobbes)? Protection of property? (Locke) Democratic legitimacy? (Rousseau) Is man essentially rational? If so, then surely we should act in a way that allows him to flourish as a rational being (Kant). In a theological register, Christians may encounter other human beings as essentially all God's children, fallen, but endowed with reason and essentially good, and standing towards the earth as stewards of God's creation. Each understanding of Being will inform the way that human beings (Da-sein) interpret their own existence, and will inform the possibilities that they project for themselves and for others.⁵ These are all examples of different interpretations of Being that serve as the *sine qua non* of Da-sein's encounter with entities in the world, both 'things' and other human beings. In each case the encounter with entities occurs in the light of an understanding of Being, 'that on the basis of which entities are already understood.'⁶

4. Torsten Michel, "In Heidegger's Shadow: A Phenomenological Critique of Critical Realism," *Review of International Studies* 38 (2012), 221.

5. 'As a nominalized infinitive, *Dasein* has no plural. It refers to any and every human being, in much the way that *das Seiende*, lit. "that which is," refers to any and every being. When more than one person is in play Heidegger speaks of (the) other(s) or *Dasein-wifh* (*Mitdasein*). He revives the original sense, "being there," often writing *Da-sein* to stress this.' Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 42.

6. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 25-26.

Heidegger thus distinguishes between ‘ontic’ inquiry and ‘ontological’ inquiry, where ontic inquiry explores determinations that pertain to specific entities – such as rocks, hammers, or human beings – and *ontological* inquiry, which explores the meaning of Being itself. This is Heidegger’s ‘ontological difference,’ his ‘most prized philosophical innovation.’⁷ While a hammer has an ontic existence independently of our knowledge of it, its being, its existence as a tool, is dependent upon our understanding of it. Similarly, although human beings have an ontic existence independently of our knowledge of them, their being as specifically human existences does not, and relies upon an interpretation of Being.

Heidegger’s central complaint against the Western philosophical tradition is that, while it has been concerned with the question ‘what are beings,’ it has forgotten that there is a distinction to be drawn between entities and their existence. Consequently, ontological questions, questions about existence, have been reduced to questions about ‘what is’ rather than the ‘*being*’ of what is. The forgetting of the ontological difference has thus reduced the study of ontology, of what it means ‘to be,’ to the study of the ontic. Since it has merely asked ‘what *are* beings,’ the central question of philosophy, the question of what it means ‘to be,’ has been a leading question; it has led us away from inquiring as to the nature of Being itself. Heidegger gives interpretations of reality as mind or spirit (*Geist*), as matter or force, as becoming, representation (*Vorstellung*), will, substance, subject, *energia* as example responses to this leading question. In each case entities appear as entities ‘in the light of Being’ (*Sein*), but Being itself is not thought: whenever metaphysics ‘represents’ entities, Being, as the ‘clearing,’ has already happened.⁸

7. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 219.

8. Paul Gerner, *Twentieth Century German Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 116. Heidegger tells us from the start that Da-sein is being-in-the-world, but we are never directly in the world; we are always thrown into a particular context that informs the way that we relate to the world. Heidegger calls this situation a *Lichtung* (Clearing). This is an open space within which we can encounter objects. ‘Things show up *in the light of* our understanding of being.’ Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 163.

On the Necessity and Priority of the Question of Being

In his *Categories*, Aristotle divided Being into a primary category of ‘substance’ (*ousia*), natural ‘things’ that existed in their own right, and other entities as *attributes* of substances (quality, quantity, relation, etc.). According to Aristotle then, what it meant ‘to be’ was to either be a substance or to be an attribute of a substance. Importantly, Aristotle was a metaphysical *realist*: he regarded these categories as distinctions that inhered in the nature of things, ‘they are *read off* nature and are not schemas read into or imposed upon nature by us.’⁹ This characterisation of Being as substance, or as an attribute of a substance, persisted throughout the Western ontological tradition. Heidegger refers to this traditional reliance on a substance or ground as the enduring principle of reality as constituting a ‘metaphysics of presence,’ and his innovation is to problematise the view that reality must be understood in terms of substance at all.¹⁰

This approach to the theorisation of reality was central to both Heidegger’s doctoral thesis and his qualifying dissertation (his *Habilitationsschrift*), both of which challenged the ‘substance’ ontology that permeated Aristotle’s theory of the categories and its acceptance within the ontological tradition. For instance, Heidegger’s *Habilitationsschrift* demonstrated that in Duns Scotus’s treatment of the categories, ‘the conditions and means by which the subject takes hold of, or interprets, its objects, which Scotus had called the “conditions of subjectivity,” attain paramount importance.’¹¹ This led Heidegger to challenge Aristotelian metaphysical realism by questioning the consequences of reflection and theorizing on reality; in short, ‘the categories of “all that is” become the categories of our understanding of Being: the categories become the “elements and means of the interpretation of the meaning of what is experienced.”’¹² Crucially though, the idea that categories of ‘what is’ are categories of the interpreter’s understanding of

9. Dorothea Frede, “The Question of Being: Heidegger’s Project,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 45. emphasis added

10. Ibid.

11. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 35.

12. Ibid.

Being led Heidegger to conclude that reality is in fact framed by the subject's understanding.¹³ This leads to his attempt in *Being and Time* to find a way to access a pre-theoretical attitude toward the world and reality.¹⁴

Heidegger's engagement with Scotus led to his related argument that the objectifying attitude of the subject towards the object originates in the *theoretical attitude* itself.¹⁵ He thus wanted to inquire as to a method for ontology that would avoid the imposition of subjective categories onto reality the way that modes of theoretical thinking did.¹⁶ In short, for Heidegger, theoretical activity served to 'un-live' human experience and objectify existence.¹⁷ Although Heidegger was not *against* theory he wanted to mitigate the inevitably subjectivist bias of the theoretical orientation by grounding it in an holistic conception of human existence as *Da-sein*; as being-in-the-world, with 'care' (*Sorge*) as the meaning of that existence, and temporality as the transcendental horizon of any interpretation of Being.¹⁸

Fundamental Ontology

An exercise in what Heidegger calls 'fundamental ontology,' *Being and Time* is an attempt to provide such a ground. Whereas ontology has traditionally been concerned with the 'ontic' – the inquiry as to what exists focussing on *properties* of entities, their 'whatness' – *fundamental* ontology inquires as to the meaning of being of that entity that encounters entities as objects. Fundamental ontology therefore represents a step back from engaging in rational *representations* of reality – which Heidegger considers to be either metaphysics or ontology grounded in metaphysics – to an analysis of the fundamental structures of our *experience* of existence. Such an understanding must provide the foundation from which any

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. As we shall see in Chapter 6 this is an insight shared by Hegel.

16. Ibid., 35-36.

17. Ibid., 36.

18. Dorothea Frede, "The Question of Being: Heidegger's Project," 50-51. See also Odysseos's discussion: Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence*, 32-36.

subsequent interpretations of Being proceed, since after the loss of any transcendent authority, the ‘death of God,’ this pre-theoretical guide is the best that we now have.

Investigating the ‘truth of Being’ is thus a phenomenological task. It is only through the *experience* of existence, a phenomenology of Da-sein, that the meaning of Being in general can be *interpreted*. While ontology, the meaning of Being, is the object of philosophy, phenomenology is its procedure; ‘phenomenology of Da-sein is hermeneutics [...] the work of interpretation.’¹⁹ In the wake of the ‘death’ of God, a phenomenology of Da-sein’s *experience* of existence is the only reliable path to interpret the meaning of Being: ‘[p]henomenology is the science of the being of beings-ontology.’²⁰

In the terms of the overall argument presented here then, what Heidegger is offering us in *Being and Time* is an account of the human being that goes deeper than the dualist reliance on a foundational subject. This account has profound implications for the emancipatory project of CIRT since it fundamentally alters the way that we understand the nature of the relations between human beings and other entities in world politics; this includes social objects such as states and the international system, but most importantly, the nature of our relations with other human beings.

Being and Time

Being and Time is divided into three sections: the Introduction, Division One, and Division Two, each in turn divided into chapters. The Introduction establishes the priority and necessity of the question of Being by rehearsing the argument against metaphysical realism outlined above. As Heidegger puts it: ‘we always conduct our activities in an understanding of Being,’ where Being is ‘that which

19. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 68.

20. *Ibid.*, 61.

determines entities as entities.’²¹ In social science parlance, Heidegger is identifying the ontological presuppositions of inquiry, which relate to the judgment of the prior necessity of a worldview informing any engagement with the world, foreshadowing what Gadamer identifies as the hermeneutic circle.²² In a different register, the idea of our world-relation speaks to the situatedness of knowledge, since even basic concepts do not give an unbiased representation of the world, but are themselves grounded in, and involved in the recreation of particular worlds:

Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding. Only after the area itself has been explored beforehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and “grounded.” But since every area is itself obtained from the domain of entities themselves, this preliminary research, from which the basic concepts are drawn, signifies nothing else but an interpretation of those entities with regard to their basic state of Being.²³

Consequently, the question of Being aims at ‘ascertaining the *a priori* conditions both of the possibility of the sciences,’ but also ‘for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations.’²⁴ Heidegger continues: [b]asically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.²⁵ This is the essence of Michel’s critique of critical realism: that critical realists unjustifiably assume scientific inquiry to be the highest mode of human activity.²⁶

Moving onto Division One, Heidegger provides a ‘preparatory fundamental of Dasein,’ where he offers an existential analysis of the elements of the experience of human existence such as it is essentially ‘Being-in-the-world.’ Here

21. Ibid., 25.

22. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (London: Continuum, 2004), 268-306. For Heidegger's discussion of the hermeneutical circle: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 362-63.

23. Ibid., 30.

24. Ibid., 31.

25. Ibid.

26. Torsten Michel, “In Heidegger’s Shadow.”

he identifies structures that inform the human experience of existence and that constitute the structure of *Dasein*; these include ‘worldliness,’ ‘being-with,’ and ‘care.’ Division Two then offers a general interpretation of ‘the meaning of Being,’ which Heidegger identifies as ‘temporality.’ temporality is posited as the *horizon* of any interpretation of existence. The final part of Division Two then returns to the ontological structures identified in Division One in order to demonstrate their existential-temporal nature. We will now proceed to discuss Divisions One and Two in greater depth.

Being and Time: Division One

Worldhood (BT:91-149)

In the Introduction to *Being and Time* Heidegger writes that ‘Dasein’s understanding of Being pertains with equal primordially both to an understanding of something like a “world,” and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world.’²⁷ While there are four different uses of the term ‘world,’ in this sense, as Da-sein’s ‘worldhood,’ the world is understood as the familiar horizon within which we move confidently in our everyday existence and within which entities are encountered as entities.²⁸ It is not just a collection of the countable or the uncountable, familiar or unfamiliar things that become present to us, and neither is it merely the imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of these things. Rather, it is the composite whole of our significant relationships with other entities, and within which meaning is conferred upon those entities. The world is something that is generated and projected by human Da-sein, it draws us in and shapes us, and we recreate these worlds in our projects and projected possibilities. Worlds, however, are not created by ‘subjects,’ since we cannot stand above, below, or to the side of them as subjects, whether as an ‘I’ or as a ‘We.’

27. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 33.

28. On these four uses see *Ibid.*, 93.

Being-with (BT:149-169)

Turning to an analysis of *who* Da-sein is in its everydayness, there-being (*Da-sein*) is always already being-with (*Mitsein*). Being-with and *Dasein*-with (*Mitsein & Mitdasein*) are fundamental existential structures of Da-sein that are ‘equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world.’²⁹ As Heidegger writes, ‘[t]he world of Dasein is a *with-world*. Being-in is *Being-with* Others.’³⁰ As we shall see, this structure of Da-sein does not relate to the co-presence of individual subjects, but is a basic state in which Da-sein gets co-determined by its relations with others.³¹

Care (BT:225-270)

The third existential structure of Da-sein is ‘care’ (*Sorge*). Care discloses the concrete constitution of Da-sein’s existence and is itself constituted by three elements: Da-sein’s facticity or thrownness, falling, and projection. These loosely correspond to an individual’s past, present, and future, and presage the later determination of time as the horizon of any interpretation of Being. Care thus represents the ‘structural whole’ of Da-sein, which is to say that concerned relations with the world represent the state of being of Da-sein:

Dasein’s Being is care. It comprises in itself facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), and falling. As being, Dasein is something that has been thrown; it has been brought into its “there,” but *not* of its own accord. As being, it has taken the definite form of a potentiality-for-Being which has heard itself and has devoted itself to itself, but *not* as itself. As existent, it never comes back behind its thrownness in such a way that it might first release this “that-it-is-and-has-to-be” from *its Being-its-Self* and lead it into the ‘there.’³²

Because it is *primordially* constituted by care, any Da-sein is always already ahead of itself: ‘[a]s being, it has in every case already projected itself upon definite possibilities of its existence; and in such existentiell projections it has, in a

29. Ibid., 149.

30. Ibid., 155.

31. Ibid., 153.

32. Ibid., 329-30.

pre-ontological manner, also projected something like existence and Being.³³ Basically, thrownness is inescapable, and as selves we cannot go behind our thrownness in order to direct our relations with other entities from the ground up.

Disputing the Subject

All three existential structures of Da-sein thus present a challenge to the supposition of a foundational subject. In Chapter III, Heidegger stresses the importance of gaining proper access to the phenomenon of Da-sein's world-hood, and contrasts this view with that of Descartes, for whom the only genuine access to the world (as *res extensa*) lies in *knowing* the world, such as the knowledge we achieve in mathematics and physics. Heidegger's complaint against Descartes is that he ignores the ontological difference by supposing that we always encounter entities as things 'present-at-hand,' as substances.³⁴ Heidegger's objection is that Descartes thereby projects an interpretation of Being as 'substantiality' onto entities:

[T]he Being of the "world" is, as it were, dictated to it in terms of a definite idea of Being which lies veiled in the concept of substantiality, and in terms of the idea of a knowledge by which *such* entities are cognized. The kind of Being which belongs to entities within-the-world is something which they themselves might have been permitted to present; but Descartes does not let them do so. Instead he prescribes for the world its real Being, as it were, on the basis on an idea of Being whose source has not been unveiled and which has not been demonstrated in its own right – an idea in which Being is equated with constant presence-at-hand.³⁵

Heidegger's contrasting view is that we do not encounter entities as if they were context-independent-present-at-hand-primitives, neutrally transmitted to us as raw sense data – such as a 'pure' experience of the colour blue – to which meaning would have to then be added, but that our encounters with entities is a kind of

33. Ibid., 363. Heidegger distinguishes between "*existential*" determinations and "*existentiell*" determinations. Existential determinations relate to the *general* structure of an entity's existence, to its *being*, while *existentiell* determinations relate to the *particular* existence of any given entity. So, the ability of human beings to act in different ways to shape their own being is an *existential* determination of human beings, whereas a person's decision to place more importance on being a good parent than a career-person is an *existentiell* determination.

34. Ibid., 128-29.

35. Ibid.

encounter with things that are always already ready-to-hand, and which therefore come laden with context-dependent significance. Perhaps his best statement of this distinction comes later in *Being and Time*:

What we “first” hear is never noises or complexes of sounds, but the creaking wagon, the motor-cycle. We hear the column on the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the fire crackling [...] It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of mind to “hear” a “pure noise.” The fact that motor-cycles and wagons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already dwells alongside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does not dwell proximally alongside “sensations;” nor would it first have to give shape to the swirl of sensations to provide a springboard from which the subject leaps off and finally arrives at a “world.” Dasein, as essentially understanding, is proximally alongside what is understood.³⁶

The difference then, is that rather than starting with pure present-at-hand ‘substances’ that appear simply as they are ‘in-themselves,’ Da-sein’s worldhood means that it has always already conferred meaning upon the entities that it encounters. Trying to adopt a more objective perspective on those entities involves attempting to strip away the layers of meaning that we project upon them; a task that can perhaps never be fully achieved.³⁷ This projection of meaning is not confined to things or tools, it will happen in our encounter with other persons too.

Mitsein / Intersubjectivity

In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* Habermas criticises Heidegger for remaining basically ‘caught up in the problems that subject-centred philosophy (in the form of Husserlian phenomenology) had bequeathed to him.’³⁸ Habermas demonstrates here a profound misunderstanding of the importance of being-with (*Mitsein*) as an existential structure of Da-sein. As Dallmayr has shown, terms such as ‘co-being’ and ‘being-with’ in *Being and Time* ‘are used precisely to forestall the impression of a mere conjunction or juxtaposition of individual subjects (an

36. Ibid., 207.

37. This is what happens during our constructions of cognitive objects. In the end though, cognitive objects are never simply reflections of the mind-independent real but are more or less adequate *constructions* of mind-independent entities.

38. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990), 136-139, 148-152.

impression still conveyed in such formulas as “intersubjectivity” or “intersubjectively achieved agreement”).³⁹ Indeed, Heidegger’s identification of the existential structure of *Mitsein* represents a deeper ontological recognition of the essential nature of human sociality, a sociality from which Habermas’s concept of inter-subjectivity *abstracts* and subsequently *objectifies* by representing it as a relation between subjects. Heidegger’s insistence that Da-sein (there-being) is always already *Mitsein* (being-with) means that we cannot suppose that subjectivity is antecedent to our relations (past, present and future) with others, and that inter-personal relations cannot simply consist in establishing connections between *Ego* and *Alter* as if these relations were a bridge between autarchic subjects. Rather, he demonstrates that something much deeper – our very selfhood – is at stake.

The Ek-sistent Individual

Lastly, rather than presenting the human being as a subject, Heidegger has something altogether different in mind; namely, man as ‘*ek-sistent*’. The structural totality of ‘care’ (*Sorge*) as Da-sein’s essential state of being reflects the view that Da-sein has been ‘thrown;’ it has been brought into existence, but not of its own accord. Importantly, Da-sein cannot come back behind its thrownness to have power over its being from the ground up, so our understanding of existence is only possible on the basis of our thrownness, a basis that is beyond our power or control. Nonetheless, we understand ourselves in terms of possibilities and continually project ourselves into different possible futures; Da-sein is then nothing else but a constant becoming, right up to the point of death, when it ceases to exist. Da-sein *is* that being that is ‘between’ birth and death; *existence* is definitive for Da-sein, which exists as possibility rather than as ground.

This argument – that ‘existence’ is definitive of human existence – is influential in the development of Sartre’s existentialism, as reflected by his claim

39. Fred R. Dallmayr, *The Other Heidegger* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 60.

that ‘existence precedes essence.’⁴⁰ We should not confuse Sartre’s claim with Heidegger’s, however. The difference between the two is most pronounced in Heidegger’s response to Sartre’s claim that ‘existentialism is a humanism’ in his *Letter on Humanism*, where Heidegger clarifies what is meant by his claim that existence is definitive for Da-sein. This is not a question of existential priority between existence and essence, since this would perpetuate the metaphysical tradition that Heidegger is trying to overcome. Rather, the key lies in the relationship between man and Being. Da-sein’s existence is thus distinguished not by some essence, something that precedes, but by its ‘ek-sistence,’ a neologism that is intended to distinguish his own view that existence is definitive of human being from Sartre’s, and is meant to signify that man ‘stands out’ into the ‘truth of Being.’

In *Being and Time* ‘ecstatic’ temporality (from the Greek *ekstasis*) signifies the way that human being stands out the various moments of the temporality of care, being ‘thrown’ out of a past and ‘projecting’ towards a future by way of the present.⁴¹ Ek-sistence is both the ground of the possibility of reason (*ratio*) but also the ‘essence’ of man, in that it relates to the human way ‘to be.’⁴² ‘As ek-sisting, man sustains Da-sein in that he takes the Da, the clearing of Being, into “care.” But Da-sein itself occurs essentially as “thrown.” It unfolds essentially in the throw of Being as the fateful sending.’⁴³ Distinguishing this view of man from those within the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger writes:

The ecstatic essence of man consists in ek-sistence, which is different from the metaphysically conceived *essentia*. Medieval philosophy conceives the latter as *actualitas*. Kant represents *existentia* as actuality in the sense of the objectivity of experience. Hegel defines *existentia* as the self-knowing Idea of absolute subjectivity. Nietzsche grasps *essentia* as the eternal recurrence of the same.⁴⁴

40. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

41. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David F. Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 204. cf. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 54.

42. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 204.

43. *Ibid.*, 230-31. In *Being and Time* Heidegger writes: ‘And how is Dasein this thrown basis? Only in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown. The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis.’ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 330.

44. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 229.

Proceeding to distinguish his view of the nature of man's existence as ek-sistence from Sartrean existentialism, he writes 'Ek-sistence, thought in terms of *ecstasis*, does not coincide with *existentia* in either form or content. In terms of content ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of Being. *Existentia* (*existence*) means in contrast *actualitas*, actuality as opposed to mere possibility as Idea.'⁴⁵ According to Heidegger then, even Sartre's existentialist claim that 'existence precedes essence' thus mistakenly affirms a metaphysical actuality, a substance that inheres in man. Heidegger resists a metaphysical definition of humanity because this fails to recognise that our 'essence,' or more accurately, what is principally unique about man, is that we relate to something that is not ourselves – to Being. Ek-sistence for Heidegger means that we are given over to Being, we interpret the world and give it meaning, meaning that we project out onto the entities that we encounter.

Man's proper relationship to the world is therefore not a relationship of subject to object. We are not the creator and manipulator of entities, the primordial source of all meaning and value in the world; yet neither are we simply making sense of a world with which we have had no involvement in creating. Human beings are *both* interpreters and creators of worlds that we are involved in, but which nonetheless lie beyond us. As ek-sistent, man is neither vassal nor lord over entities, rather, 'man is the shepherd of Being.'⁴⁶ Our proper relationship to the world then is not primarily a relation of knowing subject to known object, and our relations to each other are not primarily relations between subjects, since '[a]ll ontical experience of entities – both circumspective calculation of the ready-to-hand, and positive scientific cognition of the present-at-hand – is based upon projections of the Being of the corresponding entities.'⁴⁷

A commitment to foundational subjectivity is therefore considered to be a 'fugitive' way of understanding the self.⁴⁸ 'When saying "I," Dasein surely has in

45. Ibid., 230.

46. Ibid., 234.

47. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 371.

48. Ibid., 368.

view the entity which, in every case, it is itself. The everyday interpretation of the Self, however, has a tendency to understand itself in terms of the “world” with which it is concerned.⁴⁹ Understanding social relations as intersubjective relations presupposes then a shared interpretation of Being, and hypostatizes the process by which Being itself is co-disclosed with others. ‘Both talking and hearing are based upon understanding. And understanding arises neither through talking at length nor through busily hearing something “all around.” Only he who already understands can listen.’⁵⁰ According to Heidegger then, Da-sein’s proper role is not to establish the conditions of subjectivity but to ‘let Being be;’ to allow others to present themselves in their uniqueness, not simply as ethical subjects engaging in dialogue. Our political projects should aspire to allow the ‘here’, the ‘da’ of our Da-sein, what Heidegger calls ‘the clearing’ to be a place where Being can be disclosed, can come to presence.

Being and Time: Division Two

While the existential analytic of the experience of human existence (Da-sein) in Division One established ‘care,’ concerned relations with the world, (*Sorge*) as the basic state of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world, the meaning of Being *as a whole* itself was not offered.⁵¹ Division Two sees Heidegger bring the question of Da-sein’s being-in-the-world into an authentic relationship with *time*, where *temporality* is posited as the transcendental horizon of Da-sein’s concerned dealings with the world. In his *Letter on Humanism* Heidegger describes concerned relations with the world, ‘care,’ in the following way:

Most poignantly experienced in the phenomenon of anxiety – which is not fear of anything at hand but awareness of my being-in-the-world as such – “care” describes the sundry ways I get involved in the issue of my birth, life, and death, whether by my projects, inclinations, insights, or illusions. “Care” is the all-inclusive name for my concern for other people, preoccupations with things, and awareness of my proper Being. It expresses

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., 208.

51. Ibid., 273-74.

the movement of my life out of a past, into a future, through the present. In section 65 the ontological meaning of the Being of care proves to be temporality.⁵²

Because Da-sein exists as possibility, ‘care’ is brought into a relation with temporality; since existence is definitive for Dasein’s being, its essence is in part constituted by potentiality-for-being, for: ‘as long as Dasein exists, it must in each case, as such a potentiality, not yet be something.’⁵³ An entity that is defined as existence, then, cannot possibly grasp the whole as an entity. This hermeneutical situation makes us ‘question whether “having” the whole entity is attainable at all, and whether a primordial ontological interpretation of Dasein will not founder on the kind of Being which belongs to the very entity we have taken as our theme.’⁵⁴ Consequently the meaning of Dasein *as a whole*, or Being in general, may thus be limited to an interpretation of the meaning of *entities* in general.

Temporality as the Meaning of Being

Since the meaning of Being as a whole is dependent upon entities in general, *temporality* is posited as the ‘upon which’ that any interpretation of Being is dependent: temporality is ‘the primordial ontological basis for Dasein’s existentiality.’⁵⁵ Identifying temporality as ‘the meaning of Being in general’ is not the most transparent of moves, so a brief explanation is in order.

Heidegger understands meaning as ‘that wherein the understandability of something maintains itself – even that of something which does not come into view explicitly and thematically. “Meaning” signifies the “upon-which” of a primary projection in terms of which something can be conceived in its possibility as that which it is.’⁵⁶ Thus positing temporality as the ‘ontological meaning of care’ is not to say that temporality is expressed or signified by Being, nor is it to say that temporality is the end or purpose of existence. Rather, it is to identify temporality

52. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” 223n.

53. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 276.

54. *Ibid.*

55. *Ibid.*, 277.

56. *Ibid.*, 370-71.

as the ‘upon which’ of any projection of Being. Temporality is the basis of our concern with the world; our understanding of the world is both temporal and temporary.

‘Temporality’ is a translation of the German *Zeitlichkeit*, which Lewis prefers to translate as ‘temporariness’ or ‘temporaeity,’ basically signifying that Being as a whole is founded on a being that only has a temporary span.⁵⁷ Understanding Being as temporality or temporariness means that human existence is understood as founded upon the presence of human beings who are finite, and who thus only ever have a *partial* relation to the whole of Being. There are two key implications of this move: the first for the human mode of being in the world, the second for metaphysics and the project of fundamental ontology; both contribute to a more primordial conception of human freedom than that associated with the exercise of subjectivity.

Authenticity, Resoluteness, Solitude

Any given Da-sein’s understanding of itself is considered to be authentic when it is based on an understanding of its own being as being-in-the-world; when it proceeds from the recognition that the existential structures of worldhood, being-with, and care, condition the nature of the self’s existence.⁵⁸ The ontological basis for such an authenticity is Da-sein’s realisation that its being-in-the-world is a being-towards-death; when the issue of our own mortality is faced head on.⁵⁹

Da-sein’s realisation that death is its ownmost, non-relational and unsurpassed – certain yet indefinite – possibility, leaves it standing in an anticipatory relation to the future. This brings with it the realisation that its existence is not just a series of perpetual ‘presents,’ and thereby compels the structures of care – thrownness, falling, and projection – into an authentic relation

57. Michael Lewis, *Heidegger and the Place of Ethics* (London: Continuum, 2005), 15.

58. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 276.

59. *Ibid.*, 310-11.

with time. The structures of concerned relations with the world explored in Division One are thus ultimately subjected to finitude (*Endlichkeit*).

The *indefiniteness* of one's own potentiality-for-Being, even when this potentiality has become certain in a resolution, is first made *wholly* manifest in Being-towards-death. Anticipation brings Dasein face to face with a possibility which is constantly certain but which at any moment remains indefinite as to when that possibility will become an impossibility. Anticipation makes it manifest that this entity has been thrown into the indefiniteness of its "limit-Situation;" when resolved upon the latter, Dasein gains its authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. The indefiniteness of death is primordially disclosed in anxiety. But this primordial anxiety strives to exact resoluteness of itself. It moves out of the way everything which conceals the fact that Dasein is abandoned to itself. The "nothing" with which anxiety brings us face to face, unveils the nullity by which Dasein, in its very *basis*, is defined; and this basis itself is as thrownness into death.⁶⁰

In short, confronting our own mortality leads us to realise that ultimately we are responsible for our own self-actualisation, which frees us from our absorption in the present, our lostness in 'the they' (*das Man*).⁶¹ This freedom is 'resoluteness' (*Entschlossenheit*).

Resoluteness

Kompridis is clear that he considers the translation of *Entschlossenheit* as 'resoluteness' to be 'deeply flawed and very misleading,' and claims that resoluteness should not be misunderstood as a species of decisionism, but as essentially a mode of disclosure: '*Entschlossenheit* is not synonymous with decision, or decisiveness, or a manly readiness to take action; it is synonymous with *Erschlossenheit*, with disclosure, or disclosedness. "Unclosing" or "unclosedness" would serve as a much more accurate and felicitous translation.'⁶² This view is reinforced by Heidegger's later clarification that '[t]he resoluteness

60. Ibid., 356.

61. Ibid., 311.

62. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future*, 51n11,58.

intended in *Being and Time* is not the deliberate action of a subject but the opening up of human being, out of its captivity in beings, to the openness of Being.⁶³

Resoluteness is authentic being-in-the-world because it leads Da-sein to take care of things, of other beings, and of its own mode of being. Realising that our time on the earth is limited and will not come again frees us through an anticipatory resolve towards the future, a resolve to make the most of our time.

[A]nticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned *freedom towards death* – a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the “they,” and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious.⁶⁴

Resoluteness is therefore key to Da-sein’s authentic being-in-the-world, and involves the transcendence of Da-sein’s ‘falling’ (*Verfallen*) into the everyday concerns of the present by taking over Da-sein’s own past and projecting it into the future.

Importantly, resoluteness is always the resoluteness of some factual Da-sein; it is not simply the picking out of some possibility that has been recommended, but amounts to ‘the disclosive projection and determination of what is factually possible at the time.’⁶⁵ Da-sein *frees itself* through resoluteness, which is a mode of human freedom because it depends on Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being being indefinite: resoluteness is, therefore, both dependent upon and expressive of human freedom.

For Heidegger then, it is resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) that constitutes the authentic mode of human being in the world, as authentic potentiality-for-being. It is *authentic* because it simultaneously recognises the existential structures that condition the possibility of Da-sein, and is not the simple freedom of the individual thought as subject:

63. Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David F. Krell. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 192.

64. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 311.

65. *Ibid.*, 345.

Resoluteness, as *authentic Being-one's-Self*, does not detach Dasein from its world, nor does it isolate it so that it becomes a free-floating "I." And how should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness, is *authentically* nothing else than *Being-in-the-world*? Resoluteness brings the Self right into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into solicitous Being with Others.⁶⁶

In contrast to the simple ethical or practical self-determination of the individual thought as subject, freedom for Heidegger must relate to some concretely existing, factual human being. Resoluteness is therefore Heidegger's way of expressing our authentic freedom for self-determination.⁶⁷

Solicitude

A common criticism of Heidegger is that he paid too little attention to the ethical aspects of being-in-the-world. Although he certainly paid far too *little* attention to the ethical relation between self and other, he does not ignore it, because it is central to his notion of solicitude (*Fürsorge*).⁶⁸ As we saw above, 'resoluteness brings the Self into its current concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand, and pushes it into *solicitous Being with Others*.'⁶⁹ Solicitous being-with-others is when we comport ourselves towards others in the manner of 'caring for;' the character of this relation with others is very different from the character of our relations with entities that are present-at-hand (things) and ready-to-hand (tools), since it is other people that are encountered. Concern is thus a mode of being-with.⁷⁰

Solicitude (*Fürsorge*) itself is a neutral concept, and there are different types of solicitous relations with others, ranging from the negative (indifference) to the positive ('active'). It is the mode of indifference that characterises everyday being-with-one-another, and this mode of indifference often gets misinterpreted as the

66. Ibid., 344.

67. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future*, 49.

68. Ibid.

69. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 344. emphasis added.

70. Ibid., 157.

mere co-presence of multiple individual subjects.⁷¹ Positive solicitous relations with others can themselves be either inauthentic – ‘taking care of’ others possibilities *for them* – or ‘authentic,’ where one actively works to *free up* the other for their *own* possibilities. Heidegger offers us two extreme examples:

[Positive solicitude] can, as it were, take away “care” from the Other and put itself in its position of concern: it can *leap* in for him. This kind of solicitude takes over for the other that with which he is to concern himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. In such solicitude the Other can become one who is dominated and dependent, even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden from him. This kind of solicitude, which leaps in and takes away “care,” is to a large extent determinative for Being with one another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand. In contrast to this there is also the possibility of a kind of solicitude which does not so much leap in for the other as *leap ahead* of him (*ihm vorausspringt*) in his existentiell potentiality-for-Being, not in order to take away his “care” but rather to give it back to him authentically as such for the first time. This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care – that is, to the existence of the Other, not as a “*what*” with which he is concerned; it helps the other to become transparent to himself *in* his care and to become *free for* it.⁷²

As Kompridis has noted, Heidegger’s account of positive solicitude in this passage comes very close to Hegel’s understanding of freedom in the master-slave dialectic in the *Phenomenology*. Though the problem with Heidegger’s account, *contra* Hegel, is that he thinks that resoluteness must *precede* solicitous being-with others.⁷³ And so, while Heidegger offers us both a more convincing account of the relation between freedom *and* dependence than can be offered through a reliance on the subject, as well an account of relations with others as solicitous being-with that serves as a nascent but fruitful alternative to relations of inter-*subjectivity*, he falls short when it comes to a concrete analysis of inter-personal relations. Essentially, Heidegger fails to demonstrate that both freedom and self-intelligibility are ineluctably acquired in relation to others under conditions of cooperative interaction. Had he been a better student of Hegel’s, Heidegger might perhaps have avoided this mistake, since in this regard at least, Hegel’s

71. Ibid., 158.

72. Ibid., 158-59.

73. 'In the light of the "for-the-sake-of-which" of one's self-chosen potentiality-for-Being, resolute Dasein frees itself for its world. Dasein's resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the Others who are with it 'be' in their ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and to co-disclose this potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forward and liberates ... Only by authentically Being-their-Selves in resoluteness can people authentically be with one another.' Ibid., 344.

‘intersubjective’ account of freedom and subjectivity is much more convincing, more consistent with and more favourable to, Heidegger’s account of positive solicitude.⁷⁴ We shall return to these claims in Part 3.

Perspectival Presentation of the Whole: Overcoming Metaphysics.

The second important implication of Heidegger’s analysis of the experience of human existence relates not primarily to characteristically free and ethical action of the individual *person*, as do resoluteness and solicitude, but to the scope and nature of the ethical and political claims that persons might make. While claims to ethical or epistemological objectivity, such as those sought after by Habermas and Linklater’s (epistemological) identification of the human being as post-conventional discourse agent, or the (ethical) attempt to transcend ethical particularity by reaching agreement on objective moral principles, require the presence of a knowing subject (epistemological or ethical) to underwrite such claims, Heidegger’s identification of temporality as the ‘meaning of Being’ leads us to regard these ethical or epistemological claims as essentially *political* and *perspectival*. The present section thus returns to a consideration of Heidegger’s discussion in Division Two of *Being and Time* of the nature of the possibility of grasping the meaning of Being as a whole.

Before we discuss what might be considered to be the broader political implications of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, we must first remind ourselves what it is that he is responding to. We will recall that for Heidegger, since it has forgotten the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities, the history of philosophy has obscured the question of Being; and, since our understanding of reality is not simply read off reality but is at least partially imposed upon it, the question of Being is a fundamental one. In short, on the basis

74. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future*, 53,54,56.

of our prior experience, we *project out* interpretations of existence onto entities themselves; we give things meaning. The problem, as Heidegger sees it, is that we have misinterpreted the nature of this exercise. In part due to an overestimation of our rational faculties, we have come to think that our constructions of the mind-independent real are reflections of reality as it is independent of our knowledge of it.

Heidegger's complaint against the history of Western philosophy is that, by engaging in essentially representational forms of thinking, it has tried to understand the nature of human existence as a whole by identifying properties or traits that make beings beings 'as such.' Various attempts have been made to represent that which is essential to humans, and to thereby understand the nature of our existence in general. What this neglects is that such attempts to understand reality always involve the projection of Da-sein's own understanding of the being of entities, an understanding that is grounded in Da-sein's own concerned relations with the world, and a prior interpretation of Being. The problem then is that, while Da-sein inevitably understands entities in the light of its own interpretation of Being, the Western philosophical tradition has had a tendency to treat this understanding to be a *reflection* of reality rather than simply a perspective on it. In the form of his 'fundamental ontology,' Heidegger's contribution is to force a step back from these perspectives on the world by providing ontological depth to these interpretations, interpretations that he considers to be metaphysical.

Dualism and Metaphysics

Putting it in terms of the broader argument of the thesis, Heidegger's famous call for an 'overcoming of metaphysics' is essentially a call for us to eschew social inquiry that proceeds from dualist premises, since it calls for us to realise that our constructions of the mind-independent real are in fact *perspectives* on reality that are influenced by our 'world-hood,' as opposed to being transparent *reflections* of reality as it 'really is'. To consider them reflections of reality forgets the

ontological difference between entities and their being. Calling for such inquiry to be grounded in fundamental ontology, on non-dualist premises, would contribute to the recovery of the question of Being because it would involve the recognition that any reliance on ethical subjectivity (as in the case of moral universality) or claim to epistemological objectivity (to have access to a mind-independent object) is itself dependent upon an interpretation of Being that is essentially contestable – such as a philosophical history of human freedom (Linklater), or the overestimation of science as a human potentiality (critical realists). It has been an unwarranted faith in the nature of metaphysics that has led us to disregard the ontological difference, and to forget that these are essentially contestable *perspectives* on the world. This faith in metaphysics has been allied with a form of representational thinking and relies upon a mind-world dualism.

Deriving from the title of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the term 'metaphysics,' Heidegger explains, derives from the Greek (*ta*) *metá* (*ta*) *physiká* (τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ) – literally the (works) after the physical (works) – and is later interpreted as the inquiry into that which goes beyond beings as such, in order that beings may be grasped in their essence, allowing their existence as a whole to be grasped.⁷⁵

As traditionally understood, metaphysics means knowledge of supersensible beings, i.e. knowledge of those beings which lie out beyond that which is experientially accessible. Traditional metaphysics [...] defines these supersensible beings under the three headings "soul," "world," "God." Soul understood in respect of what especially concerns man, i.e. its simplicity, indestructibility and immortality. World as the totality of present nature, and God as the ground and author of all beings. Soul [...] is the object of psychology, world (totality of nature...) is the object of cosmology, God [...] is the object of theology. [...]

Metaphysical questions concerning soul, world and God seek to define the essence of these and not just their empirically contingent characteristics. However, for traditional metaphysics, non-empirical knowledge is understood as rational knowledge, i.e. knowledge from pure reason alone: "Pure thought proceeds from concepts alone, independently of experience. Understood in this sense, the three above-mentioned disciplines together make up genuine metaphysics: rational psychology, rational cosmology, rational theology."⁷⁶

Metaphysics, on this account, relates to those claims or assumptions relating to the nature of human beings or of the world, and of the existence or non-

75. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002), 106.

76. *Ibid.*, 141.

existence of a deity as the author or 'prime-mover' of that which we encounter. Metaphysical claims and assumptions are ones that go beyond that which is immediately accessible to human experience, claims that purportedly allow us to make claims about 'the whole' i.e., universal claims about the essence of man or of the universe. Since it has traditionally been the exercise of our rationality that has been seen to allow us to grasp the essence of something, metaphysical 'knowledge' has traditionally been achieved through the exercise of reason.

Beings 'as Such' and Beings as a Whole

Metaphysics has traditionally involved inquiry into the essential nature of beings: what is the essential nature of beings as beings, and what is the essential nature of beings as a whole. 'What are human beings?' is an example of the first, while Leibniz's famous question 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' is an example of the second. When answering the first question, we tend to abstract from our own particular experiences in order to generalise and make claims about what we consider to be common to all beings. When providing answers to the second, we have often sought to ground the existence of these beings (taken as a whole) in the existence of a larger being, which has often been a deity such as the Christian God. In 'Western' societies at least, the two responses have mutually reinforced each other but the problem, as heralded by Nietzsche's proclamation in *The Gay Science* (1882) of the death of God – 'God is dead, God shall remain dead' – is that those metaphysical claims can no longer be considered to be reliable.⁷⁷

The 'death of God' is a problem for our understanding of what human beings are because European thought had essentially relied upon God as an anchor for everything else. God was there to explain why the universe made sense, he was the answer to the endless question: but why? 'Why do we exist?' Because God created us. 'But why should we trust our reason?' Because God is rational and God came first. As Yannaras explains, the historical self-consciousness of Europe had

77. Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 120.

presupposed God as both 'a conceptual "first cause" of cosmology and as the axiomatic "principle" of categorical morality.'⁷⁸

Even as early as the ninth-century Carolingian "Renaissance," but especially with the radical distortion of Aristotelian epistemology by scholasticism, European metaphysics has been built upon by the presupposition of God's existence, while progressively excluding his presence from the world. God is either identified with the conceptual notion of an impersonal and abstract "first cause" of the universe (*causa prima*), or of an absolute "authority" in ethical (*principium auctoritatis*). In both cases the existence of God is a conceptual necessity, secured by demonstrative argument, but unrelated to historical experience and the existential condition of human beings.⁷⁹

Nietzsche's proclamation is thus interpreted by Heidegger as 'the prophetic acknowledgement of an already accomplished event, the inevitable climax of a long historical process in European metaphysics.'⁸⁰ Growing scepticism and disbelief in the nineteenth century meant that God could no longer play the anchor function, and the transcendent grounds for universal truth or ultimate value had thus been withdrawn.⁸¹ Although marking the end of Western metaphysics, Nietzsche does not move beyond it; consequently, he is for Heidegger the last metaphysician in whom the oblivion of Being is complete.⁸² As Smith explains, by defining Being as Will, 'Nietzsche is the final and most radical spokesperson for [the] one-sided elevation of human subjectivity.'⁸³

For Heidegger, metaphysics is only overcome by thinking the truth of Being: by recognising that any interpretation of the being of beings will occur in the light of an interpretation of Being, which is itself conditioned by the transcendental horizon of temporality. To be clear, this is not then a *rejection* of metaphysics.⁸⁴

78. Christos Yannaras, *On the Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the Areopagite* (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 40.

79. *Ibid.*, 22.

80. *Ibid.*, 21.

81. For a discussion of the causes of this growing scepticism and disbelief see Andrew Norman Wilson, *God's Funeral: The Decline of Faith in Western Civilisation* (London: W.W. Norton, 1999).

82. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, trans. David Farrell Krell, vol. One: The Will to Power as Art (London: Routledge, 1981), 204-06; Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, trans. David Farrell Krell, vol. Two: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991), 199-203.

83. Gregory Bruce Smith, *Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Transition to Postmodernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 229.

84. This distinguishes Heidegger from Rorty. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). especially 46-121

Man will inevitably still speculate as to the essence of man, the origins of the universe, or the purpose of human existence; in Heidegger's words '[a]s long as man remains the animal *rationale* he is also the animal *metaphysicum*. As long as man understands himself as the rational animal, metaphysics belongs, as Kant said, to the nature of man.'⁸⁵ We will still project meaning, and we will still engage in rational 'ontic' analysis of the entities that we encounter: causal analysis, for instance, or similar epistemological analyses that suppose a subject facing an object or objects; similarly, rational ethical analysis that supposes relations between subjects. However, with the withdrawal of any transcendent authority, the 'death' of God, we can no longer consider these exercises to be *reflections* of a mind-independent real and must recognise that they can only ever be perspectives on it. Heidegger is, therefore, simply arguing that these 'reflections' of reality must now be grounded in a pre-theoretical *experience* of reality: this is the task of *Being and Time*, to ground such theoretical endeavours and thereby prepare for such an overcoming of metaphysics.

The Perspectival Presentation of the Whole

It is the identification of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) as the meaning of Being in general in Division Two of *Being and Time* that aims to initiate such an overcoming of metaphysics. We saw that at the end of Division One Heidegger suggested that the hermeneutical nature of our relation to Being meant that we had to question whether 'having' the whole was attainable at all, and whether our interpretation of Being in general would founder on the kind of existence that is accessible to human beings.⁸⁶ This was because the meaning of Being in general rests upon *interpretations* of Being by entities (human beings) that exist as potentiality rather than ground, and so human beings cannot possibly grasp the whole in its entirety.

85. Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to 'What is Metaphysics'*, trans. Walter Kaufmann, Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 279.

86. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 276.

Since the whole can never be fully illuminated, human intelligibility will always be partial or horizontal as it depends on sites within the whole (of beings) to act as orienting centres. The whole then can never be fully illuminated because we can never escape our own situation within the whole, nor our own mortality. It is therefore our finitude, our mortality, that characterises our relationship to Being: both because our confrontation with our own mortality compels us into a state of anticipatory resoluteness through which we participate in the disclosure and co-disclosure of Being with others, *and* because our finitude means that our intelligibility of Being as a whole is horizontal and temporal. This is what is meant by Heidegger's claim that temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is the 'upon which' that any interpretation of Being is based; 'temporariness' or 'temporaeity' is the transcendental horizon of any understanding of Being.⁸⁷

As Lewis puts it, the response to one's own birth and death introduces a 'site of singularity into beings as a whole.'⁸⁸ This singularity is not identical with Being as a whole but is a precondition of its disclosure. In Heidegger's words:

As surely as we can never comprehend absolutely the whole of beings in themselves we certainly do find ourselves stationed in the midst of beings that are revealed somehow as a whole. In the end an essential distinction prevails between comprehending the whole of beings in themselves and finding oneself in the midst of beings as a whole. The former is impossible in principle. The latter happens all the time in our existence.⁸⁹

This distinction is central. Although we will continue to project meanings on the whole - we will always conjecture what it is that makes human beings human beings, and whether there is any ultimate ground for human or cosmic existence - the consequence of our hermeneutic relation to Being, because our understanding is always inevitably conditioned, partial, and horizontal, is that we can never consider those projections to have captured the objective essence of human beings or of human or cosmic existence. This is occluded by our position within beings as a whole: metaphysics is *structurally incapable* of providing an objective ground (for political action, for instance).

87. Ibid., 370-71.

88. Michael Lewis, *Heidegger and the Place of Ethics*, (London: Continuum, 2005), 15.

89. Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David F. Krell. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 99.

Since human beings are finite, mortal creatures, our partial, horizontal, interpretations of Being themselves are subject to a temporal horizon that we cannot transcend. Universal statements about what makes a human being a human being are constitutively unable to transcend our own perspectival relation to Being because, as Heidegger puts it, if one is to take a position one must already have a place to stand.

Any enunciated statement requires a place from which to enunciate. Given that the statement [i.e., a metaphysical statement] attempts to determine beings as a whole and without exception, it is constitutively unable to take account of its own placement within this whole, its historical situatedness or "thrownness," the very givenness of the whole, which constitutes an exception to its determination of this whole by providing something which cannot be understood from within this "position." Metaphysics as a whole cannot understand the inherence to the whole of perspectival presentation, otherwise it would fall apart.⁹⁰

‘Overcoming’ Metaphysics

Although initially quite confusing, Heidegger's claim that temporality is the meaning of Being is therefore a hugely significant move, since it seeks nothing less than the 'overcoming' of the whole Western philosophical tradition by bringing the question of Being into a more authentic relation with time. The problem with this tradition, according to Heidegger, is that it has consistently eluded confronting the proper relationship between Being and time because it has consistently understood Being in terms of enduring presence. That is, this tradition has sought to identify some ground, subject, or essence that can serve as the foundation of reliable knowledge and action in the world – examples include the cogito in Descartes, the thinking substance that grounds reliable knowledge of the world, or the responsible individual person in Kant, the presence and accountability of which grounds our ethical relations to other humans. Identifying temporality, or 'temporariness' as the meaning of Being is Heidegger's attempt to exert a metaphysical paradigm shift from a modality of Being understood as something constantly *present* (spirit,

90. Michael Lewis, *Heidegger and the Place of Ethics*, 6-7

matter, substance) to recognise that the meaning of Being in general must be in a constant state of flux.

The problem with the history of Western philosophy, for Heidegger then, is that it has tried to understand beings as a whole by identifying properties or traits that make beings beings 'as such'. Various attempts have been made by writers to represent that which is most basic to humans thus allowing us to grasp the whole in its essence. What this neglects is that these attempts to grasp the whole involve projecting an understanding of the being of the entities that are to be grasped, an understanding that is inevitably grounded in Dasein's own concerned relations with the world, which are limited in scope and grounded in time. Such an identification of properties that are distinctive to entities is always done on the basis of some prior understanding of human existence: it is always done in the light of Being.

Heidegger's call for an 'overcoming of metaphysics,' amounts to the call to ground any claim that goes beyond that which can be experienced – such as claims about 'beings as such' (such as beings as ethical subjects) or beings as a whole – in fundamental ontology. This is essentially an attempt to establish perspectivity or *doxa* as originary to beings as a whole. *Doxa*, from the Greek (*dokeō*) 'I suppose' relates to common belief. For Pierre Bourdieu, a sociologist heavily influenced by Heidegger, *doxa* is a species of 'practical faith' tacitly required by any given field, a constructed vision of 'reality' so naturalised that it appears to be the *only* vision of reality; it is the unquestioned habitus that persons consider to be the one and only 'truth' about the nature of existence. 'Doxa is the relationship of immediate adherence that is established in practice between a *habitus* and the field to which it is attuned, the pre-verbal taking-for-granted of the world that flows from practical sense.'⁹¹ *Doxa* exists as 'a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organisation [...] (in which) the natural and social world appears as self-evident. *Doxa* is the unsaid in the field of cultural

91. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Cambridge: Polity, 1990), 68.

possibilities, making it seem as if there are not multiple, but only a single possibility.⁹²

Heidegger's Anti-Foundationalism

The upshot is that the perspectival presentation of the whole is incompatible with the search for a neutral, objective foundation for political action; this is how Heidegger can be situated in the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate. We saw that in *Transformation* Linklater took issue with Rorty's anti-foundationalism, and defended the Kantian and Habermasian foundationalist commitment to a rational morality with universal significance.⁹³ Part of the motivation for Linklater's defence of universalism is his view that 'sometimes the strongest defence a culture can give for recognising the rights of outsiders involves nothing other than an appeal to common humanity.'⁹⁴ Linklater's mistake here is to conflate the ontological difference, in this case, between humanity and the being of human beings. His mistake is to interpret cross-cultural compassion and solicitous being-with others as a justification for the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue, which is itself consequent of his commitment to the foundational ethical subject. In the same way that Heidegger criticises Descartes for projecting an interpretation of Being as 'substantiality' onto entities, Linklater's defence of universalism projects an idea of Being as ethical subjectivity onto those outside of the particular community. Importantly though Heidegger's argument leads to neither foundationalism nor anti-foundationalism.

Heidegger refers to foundations (such as Linklater's commitment to ethical subjectivity) as a 'ground,' a substance or subject that, as Heidegger puts it 'is that *from which* beings as such *are what they are* in their becoming, perishing, and

92. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 164.

93. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 76.

94. *Ibid.*, 78.

persisting as something that can be known, handled, and worked upon.'⁹⁵ The ground is that which is considered to be 'the ontic causation of the actual, the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects.'⁹⁶ It has been interpreted as 'the dialectical mediation of the movement of absolute spirit [Hegel] and of the historical process of production [Marx], and the will to power positing values. [Nietzsche]'⁹⁷

The mistake continually made in Western philosophy is to think about the ground as something that can be represented and essentialised, as something identifiable above or behind phenomena like the human being (such as a thinking substance) rather than recognising that what comes to presence, what appears to us in its immediacy, is but one determination of Being. Heidegger's alternative 'groundless ground' for thinking about human sociality rests on the ontological difference: it is on the basis of the ontological difference that entities come to presence *in the light of* prior interpretations of Being. In each case what is brought to presence is brought to presence in its own way and it is from this non-foundation that other foundations – such as a political or ethical subject – can be projected onto others and thereby come to presence. As will be shown later, the condition of this presencing – that which allows beings to variously come to presence – is freedom.

Conclusions: From a Dualist to Non-Dualist Approach to Emancipatory Politics.

Our aim in Part 2 is to contribute to the task of developing a more universalistic ontology for global politics and ethics, one that does not expect 'the other' to assimilate and/or not violating 'the other' through logo- and egocentric epistemologies. More specifically, the aim is to contribute to the emancipatory project of CIRT by deepening the understanding of ontology – of existence, human

95. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 432. emphasis added.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

existence, and the nature of human beings – upon which it relies.⁹⁸ This chapter has sought to initiate such a task. One of its central claims is that Heidegger's fundamental ontology presents a profound challenge to the metaphysical dualism that characterises Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism: a dualism comprised of a foundational ontological commitment to ethical subjectivity, and a foundational epistemological commitment to the individual (conceived as ethical subject) as mind-independent cognitive object.

Heidegger's existential analytic of Da-sein provides compelling reasons why the human being should be regarded primarily as neither subject nor object. In Heidegger's words:

Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or Real. Its "subsistence" is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on the "*Self-subsistence*" of the existing Self, whose Being has been conceived as care. The phenomenon of the *Self* - a phenomenon which is included in care - needs to be defined existentially in a way which is primordial and authentic.⁹⁹

Heidegger's existential definition of the self involved the identification of three existential structures that condition any existing human being: worldhood, being-with, and care. All three challenge the notion that we can usefully be thought as self-directing ethical subjects, or even epistemological subjects facing mind-independent cognitive objects.

We saw that, because of Da-sein's worldhood, any encounter with other entities, including human beings, would not simply be an encounter with a mind-independent object as it is in itself, but that this encounter will inevitably involve the projection of subjective meaning onto that entity. The way that entity *appears* to the self is, therefore, not an entirely reliable basis for us to generalise from. Heidegger's subsequent identification of *Mitsein* as a primordial existential structure of human existence – the recognition that 'there-being' (*Dasein*) is always 'being-with' (*Mitsein*) – offered us a glimpse of the ontological

98. Hartmut Behr, *A History of International Political Theory: Ontologies of the International* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 246.

99. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 351.

insufficiency of thinking about sociality on the basis of inter-subjective relations, since this involves *abstracting from* and subsequently *objectifying* the existential condition of being-with: reducing it to relations between subjects, rather than co-constitutive relations between 'Da-seins.'

Finally we saw that combination of the 'care' structure – man's thrownness, falling, and projection – which loosely correspond to an individual's past, present, and future, as well as the relationship between man and Being, lent further support to the view that man is not a foundational subject, since what is unique about us is not to be found in some 'essence;' even if, as for Sartre, that essence lies in our 'existence.' Rather, we saw that it lies instead in man's unique relationship to Being, a relation that is grounded in time; a relationship for which Heidegger coins a neologism, identifying man as 'ek-sistent,' signifying his 'ecstatic temporality' and his 'standing out' in the 'truth of Being.'

Division One of *Being and Time*, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, thus poses a profound challenge to the view of the individual as subject: a view that underwrites the understanding of emancipation as the process whereby ethical subjectivity can be exercised (as implicit in Linklater's account), but also the moves in more recent critical theory that locate the emancipatory project in relations of *intersubjectivity* (such as in Honneth and Brincat). The question remains then as to what moves must the emancipatory project make from here. Indications of how we might proceed were given in the second half of the chapter, which followed Heidegger's discussion of how the existential structures of human existence might be brought into an authentic relationship with time in Division Two. Here we saw that Da-sein was 'freed' from its lostness in 'the they' (*das Man*) through the recognition of its own finitude, which forces us into an anticipatory resoluteness towards the future and into solicitous being-with others.

Since it related to the 'freeing up' of the future possibilities of any concretely existing human beings, we suggested that Heidegger's notion of resoluteness offered a more convincing account of the relationship between freedom *and*

dependence than did an association of freedom with the autonomy of a self-directing subject. We shall recall that resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) is not synonymous with decisiveness or a manly readiness to take action, but is better thought as an unclosing, or unclosedness towards the future that sees us pushed into solicitous being-with-others. Since solicitude (*Fürsorge*) involves concerned relations with others, which in its authentic and active mode can mean working to *free up* the other for their own possibilities, we saw that the notions of resoluteness and solicitude contributed to an account of relations with other persons as solicitous being-with that served as a nascent but fruitful alternative to relations of intersubjectivity.

However, following Kompridis we claimed that the weaknesses of Heidegger's account lay in his insistence that Da-sein's resoluteness must *precede* solicitous being with others, which was indicative of a broader problem: that Heidegger falls short when it comes to demonstrating that both freedom and self-intelligibility are ineluctably acquired through conditions of cooperative interaction; a weakness that might have been avoided had he been a better student of Hegel, whose interpersonal account of freedom and 'subjectivity,' we shall come to see, is both more consistent with and more favourable to Heidegger's account of positive solicitude.

Lastly, we discussed the broader implications of Heidegger's fundamental ontology for the nature of political and ethical universality. Early in the chapter we saw that, since Da-sein always encounters entities 'in the light of Being,' the question of Being in general must be brought to the fore. Towards the end of the chapter, since the meaning of Being in general is dependent on its interpretation by beings that are finite, we had to conclude that bringing meaning of Being as a whole into view is not possible. Consequently, temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*), or 'temporariness' was posited as meaning of Being in general. This meant that metaphysical (universal) claims, claims that rely on our reason to go beyond that which we can experience, have to be grounded in fundamental ontology.

This involves recognising that our interpretations of reality are conditioned by Da-sein's own existential structures, and must therefore be brought into an authentic relation with time – i.e., involving the realisation that they are essentially *perspectival* claims that *project* interpretations on the whole. We also saw that any universalist claims about human beings in general would be considered to be metaphysical if they were not grounded in fundamental ontology. This would include an interpretation of the 'whatness' of human beings that regarded post-conventional reasoning as the most advanced stage of human development and the highest expression of human freedom, but also other epistemological claims about the mind-independent real.

Heidegger's argument that any claims about the nature of human existence that aspire to apply to human beings in general – such as the ones relied upon by Linklater in his defence of universality – must then be grounded in an analysis of the *experience* of human existence if they are not to be considered metaphysical (or grounded in metaphysics), is cogent. This is why we claim that Linklater submits to a form of metaphysical dualism, even though he would likely dispute it. Moreover, since it is based on an analysis of human existence that should be familiar to all human beings regardless of political or ethical differences, Heidegger's existential analytic of Da-sein should be considered to be a significant contribution to a universalistic philosophical ontology for world politics and ethics, since it provides us a more universalistic ontological foundation than does ethical subjectivity.

In essence then, we should interpret Heidegger's call for an 'overcoming' of metaphysics to be initiating a move away from social inquiry that proceeds from dualist premises. Not only does this involve eschewing the view that scientific claims are reflections of the world rather than perspectives on it, but it also involves forgoing a reliance on ethical subjectivity as an 'objective' way of mediating political differences. It does not, however, require of us that we give up on an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, given that the individual cannot be thought primarily as a present entity (a subject), it does have important

PART 2/Ch4. Beings & Being: Heidegger & Fundamental Ontology

implications for the way that we understand human freedom – and hence also for an ethical and emancipatory politics. Indeed, Heidegger's fundamental ontology harbingers a shift in thinking about what politics and ethics themselves in fact *are*. Consequently, before we proceed to develop the interpersonal aspect of resoluteness and solicitude with the aid of Hegel in Part 3, the next chapter will engage in a regional ontology of the person, freedom, ethics and politics, that proceeds from Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

Chapter 5.

Ek-sistence, Freedom, and an Ethical and Emancipatory Politics

Introduction

We saw in the last chapter that Heidegger's alternative 'groundless ground' for thinking about human sociality rests upon what he calls the 'ontological difference,' and that his fundamental ontology contributes depth to the project of developing an emancipatory cosmopolitanism by providing us with a more universalistic ontological foundation for critical international theory – applying not simply to human beings *qua* political subjects (Rawls/Frost) or *qua* ethical subjects (Linklater) but to human beings *qua* human beings.

For Heidegger, we learnt, what is most distinctive about 'man' is his ek-sistence: he is the being that interprets Being. Since our own understanding of the nature of an entity's existence always occurs in the light of a broader interpretation of Being in general (an interpretation that is necessarily partial, horzonal, and temporal), in contrast to Linklater's approach to critical theory, a recognition of the ontological difference impels us to resist the (characteristically dualist) tendency to treat our own interpretation of the being of human beings as an 'objective' foundation for an ethical or emancipatory politics, and prompts us to base an emancipatory cosmopolitanism on engaged being-with others instead. Thus for Heidegger, what it means to be a free human being is to engage in resolute solicitous being-with others.

The chapter closed with the suggestion that not only does Heidegger's fundamental ontology have important implications for the way that we understand human freedom, and hence also for any emancipatory cosmopolitanism, but that it also it harbingers a shift in our understanding of what politics and ethics actually *are*. We pick up on this point in this chapter by discussing four related areas that are affected by Heidegger's fundamental ontology, all of which entail significant implications for the development of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

We will recall from the last chapter that the existential analytic of human existence provided in Division One of *Being and Time* posed a robust challenge to the idea that the individual could be thought as subject. Proceeding from this critique, we will draw on the work of Frederick Olafson who has applied Heidegger's general ontology of Being (existence in general) to the philosophy of mind and developed a regional ontology of the human being. Offering an alternative to a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, Olafson proposes that we conceive human beings as essentially 'world-relating creatures,' whose world-relation is the proximal fact their existence, a constitutive perspectivity that individuals are unable to transcend by adopting a position of subjectivity. We then proceed to discuss three further central implications of Heidegger's general ontology of Being and Olafson's regional ontology of the person; these relate to our understandings of human freedom, politics, and ethics.

Through a discussion of Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* we come to see that Kant's conception of freedom as autonomy (which undergirds Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism) must itself be grounded in freedom as existential condition. A central aim of Heidegger's, we will recall, is to effect an 'overcoming of metaphysics,' which would involve coming to see *doxa* or perspectivity as original to beings as a whole. Returning to this proposal, we characterise politics as the activity of projecting meaning onto the whole: as attempts to create a common world out of a plurality. In regards what we claim are the ethical implications of Heidegger's more universalistic ontology, since Being is always being-with (Da-sein is always already Mit-sein), we follow Nancy's

identification of the self as a singularity and argue that this means that ethics can no longer be primarily about ethical principles (since these are necessarily underwritten by an ethical subject) but amounts to an open and receptive relation to the other as singularity rather than subject.

Humans as World-Relating Creatures.

The Turn to Ontology in Political Theory.

Heidegger's general ontology of Being has had both a direct and indirect influence on contemporary political thought. Some of that influence has been surveyed by Stephen K. White in his book *Sustaining Affirmation*, which engages the work of George Kateb, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler and William Connolly, and illuminates the crucial role that Heidegger's thought has played in the what he refers to as the 'weak ontological turn' in political theory.¹ 'Weak ontology' is understood by White as a field that entwines ontological reflection with political affirmation, a theoretical turn that went hand in hand with a shift in the meaning of ontology in analytic philosophy and philosophy of science that occurred in the twentieth century; a shift from understanding ontology as relating to the existence of entities presupposed by our scientific theories and towards a 'growing propensity to interrogate more carefully those "entities" presupposed by our typical ways of seeing and doing in the modern world.'²

The prime target of this challenge has been the assumption that we may treat human beings as independent and autonomous, ontologically prior to their relations. For this reason it has tended to be political theories that, even implicitly, work from such assumptions that have been singled out for criticism. Most

1. Stephen K. White, *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

2. *Ibid.*, 4.

prominent of these are the autonomous individual agent in liberalism and the ideally autonomous *collective* agent in Marxism. As White explains:

At issue is the assertive, disengaged self who generates distance from its background (tradition, embodiment) and foreground (external nature, other subjects) in the name of an accelerating mastery of them. This Teflon subject has had a leading role on the modern stage. Such subjectivity has been affirmed primarily at the individual level in Western democracies, although within Marxism it had a career at the collective level as well. In both cases, the relevant entity is envisioned as empowering itself through natural and social obstacles; it dreams ultimately of frictionless motion. This modern ontology of the Teflon subject has, of course, not usually been thematized in quite such stark terms. But the lack of explicit thematization has been at least partially a measure of modernity's self-confidence. It is precisely the waning of this self-confidence that engenders such a widespread recourse to ontological reflection. Accordingly, the current turn might now be seen as an attempt to think ourselves, and being in general, in ways that depart from the dominant - but now more problematic - ontological investments of modernity.³

White notes that Heidegger's existential analysis of the human being and the historical/temporal dimension of ontological reflection that he initiated is crucial to this turn.⁴ While Heidegger's influence on recent French philosophy is particularly noticeable, this is only one of several strands of thought that participate in the ontological turn:

One finds similar countermodern, ontological themes in various locations across the contemporary intellectual landscape: in communitarianism, in political theory influenced by theology, in feminism, in post-Marxism, and even in some versions of liberalism itself [...] In each of these initiatives, ontological concerns emerge in the form of deep reconceptualizations of human being in relation to its world. More specifically, human being is presented as in some way "stickier" than in prevailing modern conceptualizations.⁵

By 'stickier' what is meant is that these approaches exhibit a resistance to the 'disengaged self,' to an autonomous, antecedent subjectivity:

[w]eak ontologies do not proceed by categorical positing of, say, human nature or telos [...] Rather what they offer are figurations of human being in terms of certain existential realities, most notably language, mortality or finitude, natality, and the articulation of "sources of the self." These figurations are accounts of what it is *to be* a certain sort of creature.⁶

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 5. On Heidegger's influence on French philosophy see Tom Rockmore, *Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism and Being* (London: Routledge, 1995).

6. Stephen K. White, *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*, 9.

Engaged Agents

Charles Taylor and Frederick Olafson dig deeper into the philosophical roots of this scepticism in political theory with reference to the philosophy of mind. In a short essay titled *Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger*, Taylor presents dualist and mechanist perspectives on the mind as two different ways that a disengaged perspective has been 'ontologised.'⁷ These accounts of consciousness involve a view of the human being similar to that of the Teflon subject since they purport to discover reality out there, as it 'really is,' by freeing us from the perspective of embodied existence.⁸ Inaugurated by Descartes, dualist perspectives see human beings as essentially minds located in bodies, while mechanistic perspectives, drawing on Hobbes, understand thinking as 'an event realized in a body, mechanistically understood.'⁹

Both these perspectives are underwritten by a rationalist epistemological model: the belief that reason is the only reliable path to knowledge. For Taylor, Heidegger helps us to pry ourselves loose from modern rationalism by making us appreciate the role of the background in human activity. Although Linklater famously says that 'reason has a history,' that it has an historical, developmental core, neither he nor Habermas depart from the rationalist commitment to the individual thought as subject; a commitment that supposedly allows us to overcome these background conditions and transcend the particularity of context through the exercise of moral reason.¹⁰

7. Charles Taylor, "Engaged Agency and Background in Heidegger," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 323.

10. 'Reason has a history; it develops a determinate and progressive content from its expressions in various forms of social life.' Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 160. Arguing that Linklater's subject attempts to transcend embodied existence is not the same as arguing that he ignores the material conditions of the exercise of ethical subjectivity; due to his sympathies for Marx, the latter claim would clearly be wrong.

Frederik Olafson's *What is a Human Being: a Heideggerian View* makes similar arguments regarding the importance of deeper ontological reflection to the ones surveyed by White and the non-rationalist approach to the philosophy of mind that is sketched by Taylor, but his argument is far more extensive.¹¹ For Olafson, as for Heidegger, the question of Being is the central question of philosophy. He illustrates this with the claim that the three questions that defined the domain of philosophy for Immanuel Kant - 'What can I know?' 'What ought I to do?' and 'What may I hope?' – are aspects of the more general question, 'What is man?'¹²

Rather than distinguishing between weak and strong ontology, as White does, Olafson remains truer to Heidegger in distinguishing between 'regional' and general approaches to the study of Being. Inquiring as to the nature of the human being rather than into Being as such is an exercise in regional ontology, as opposed to general ontology. 'Regional' ontology is a Husserlian term that shares with general ontology the study of being *qua* being. However, regional ontology is concerned with addressing entities of a *certain kind*: understanding what is distinctive about a human being would thus belong to regional ontology.¹³ By contrast, general ontology is concerned not with the being of any particular entity, but with the concept of Being as such.¹⁴

It will be recalled that for Heidegger all *general* claims about what human beings are, must be brought into an authentic relationship with time and grounded in fundamental ontology if they are not to be considered metaphysical. Although Linklater does not explicitly identify what he takes the essence of the human being to be, we saw that emancipation appears in his work as the gradual negation of that which negates ethical subjectivity, and that his defence of universalism further indicates a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, since this mode of

11. Frederick A. Olafson, *What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

12. *Ibid.*, 1.

13. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

14. *Ibid.*, 12. Heidegger's existential analytic of Da-sein is an exercise in the regional ontology of human experience, from which he seeks to draw conclusions regarding a general ontology of Being. The problem, as Heidegger sees it, is that metaphysics has been preoccupied with regional ontology, and has ignored general ontology. His overcoming of metaphysics is therefore intended to ground regional ontology in general ontology.

being is projected upon the other and all other others in his conception of universality as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue concerning shared principles of coexistence. Since this ethical subject is what *persists* in his CIRT, and is the *foundation* or the *ground* by which he justifies his universalism, from a Heideggerian perspective this is a metaphysical commitment that must therefore be recognised as a 'perspectival' claim regarding the essential being of human beings, and thus subordinate to resolute solicitous being-with others.

Although we caught glimpses of its inadequacy in our discussion of the existential structures of human existence explored in Division One of *Being and Time*, we did not focus on the shortcomings of understanding the human being as subject. Rather than proceed here with a full-scale criticism of Linklater's reliance on the ethical subject, we will focus instead on engaging in a philosophical ontology of the person that can provide a more adequate and universalistic basis for an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. For this task we will draw on Frederik Olafson's argument that we are not subjects, but essentially world-relating creatures; that what is common to all human beings is not their free will, nor their ethical subjectivity, but their world-relation: their habituation and participation in the creation of meaningful worlds.

World-Relating Creatures¹⁵

Olafson avoids the problems associated with Linklater's reliance on the subject by taking orientation from Heidegger's general ontology of Being in order to inquire as to the nature of the human being. Like Taylor, Olafson presents an alternative understanding of the human being to those views represented by materialist or dualist philosophies of mind. He understands humans not as composites of body and mind but as unitary entities that 'have a world.' Basing his argument on a distinctive and Heideggerian way of conceiving 'mental' life, he

15. It is worth noting that there is an overlapping concern here with Walzer's claim that 'we are (all of us) culture-producing creatures' Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 314.

makes the case for a radical particularist understanding of human subjectivity, suggesting that human beings should be understood as entities to which things are present; since there are many human beings, there are many entities to which things are present. Humans must then be understood as 'particulars,' as 'loci of presence:' a position that readily lends itself to pluralisation.¹⁶

As particulars, human beings are individuated by 'the varying patterns of the presence and absence of entities that are in the first instance a function of spatial location and orientation.'¹⁷ In this view, '[e]ach subject would delimit a part of the same world that would typically overlap with those delimited by others but would never coincide perfectly with them,' a thought that reflects what he calls the 'perspectival variation' of subjects: individuated entities that have a locus in the space of the world, a space which 'broadly coincides with the body I call mine.'¹⁸

Polarity and Agency

Proceeding from an understanding of human beings as entities to which things are present, Olafson elaborates an account of human beings as 'ek-sistents' whose mode of being is 'ek-sistence,' Heideggerian neologisms that reflect the passive and active sides of human existence. Olafson's account of ek-sistence is constituted by two interrelated concepts: agency and polarity; where polarity can be further distinguished into feeling and desire. These elements reflect characteristic aspects of the entity that humans are. When understanding human beings as entities to which other entities are present, polarity is the 'ordering of the field of presence of a given individual human being in terms of pairings of actual and possible states of affairs.'¹⁹ The passive side of polarity is 'feeling,' which

16. Frederick A. Olafson, *What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View*, 133,141.

17. *Ibid.*, 139.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, 166-67.

expresses the 'way things are with us,' in the sense that we are always 'subject to a situation that in some way affects our interests.'²⁰

Nevertheless, we are also active beings, and even if it is beyond our power to effect a course of action, 'the situations in which we find ourselves are typically ones that we do not merely suffer or enjoy, but [are ones] that we want to terminate, modify, or maintain.'²¹ *Desire* is the human response to these life situations, acting as the intermediary between feeling and action. In this way desire orients us towards the future by disclosing possible and particular futures to each of us in a primordial way.²²

'Polarity' then represents the field of presence of any given human being, broadly corresponding to their spatial location and orientation. The counterpart to which is *agency*, the human ability to intervene in the world to modify or terminate actual or possible states of affairs. Not only do we ek-sist in the sense that entities are present to us, but we also have the capacity to intervene in the world to make it different from what it might have otherwise been.²³ Indeed, as the counterpart to presence, action is 'the fullest expression of ek-sistence.'²⁴

This agency, however, is not the possession of the individual thought as subject. We will recall that authentic freedom, for Heidegger, is not the deliberate action of a subject, but is thought as the 'resoluteness' (*Entschlossenheit*) of some concretely existing human being, which involves 'the disclosive projection and determination of what is factually possible at the time.'²⁵ Polarity and agency are thus deeply implicated in each other; exercising agency, which is itself contingent upon capability or power, involves intervening in the world – but this intervention is dependent upon polarity (feeling *and* desire) as the condition and the motivation

20. Ibid., 178.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., 186.

23. Ibid., 187.

24. Ibid.

25. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 345.

for any meaningful action.²⁶ Meaningful action, as we will recall, does not relate simply to the autonomous self-direction of the subject, but is concerned Being-alongside what is ready-to-hand: engagement in solicitous being with others.²⁷

World/Worlds

On Heidegger's/Olafson's account then, the human being 'is individuated in one way by the location in space and time of that body and in another by the way the world is present to it.'²⁸ This individuation means that each and every individual human being has 'a world' which influences the way they relate to 'the world.' This means to signify 'the web of meanings and references' through which any individual orients itself, and 'constitutes any fundamental understanding of the self and its immediate context.'²⁹ While 'the world' is involved in the constitution of the worlds of individual human beings, and individuals' worlds will traverse each other's and have much in common, these worlds can only ever remain approximations of *the* world. Since an individual's world can never be wholly identical with the world, individual worlds are inescapably partial; it is this world-relation, rather than any inherent or achieved subjectivity, that is both constitutive of individual human beings and represents the proximal fact of our existence.

Given that there are over seven billion human bodies in the world, and proceeding from the claim that humans have worlds that largely coincide with the location in space and time of their bodies, the way individuals make sense of the world will vary greatly depending upon the variation in time and space of each individual body. While individual worlds will overlap with others, resulting in a high degree of congruence between worlds in certain circumstances, thus retaining a commitment to the salience of particular communities and joint ventures such as

26. Frederick A. Olafson, *What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View*, 166-67.

27. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 344.

28. Frederick A. Olafson, *What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View*, 246.

29. Louiza Odysseos, "Radical Phenomenology, Ontology, and International Political Theory," *Alternatives* 27 (2002), 387.

states when thinking about the sources of individual agency, these worlds will never coincide perfectly.

When talking of 'communities' one assumes that the entities within that community at least on some level share a singular world, whether this is a nation (Wales) a state (Britain) a supra-national community (the European Union) or even a community of humankind (a universal dialogic community, or global recognitive sphere). There is a *prima facie* case for elevating any given community to a position of prominence in light of shared political objectives by encouraging the disparate worlds of individuated human beings to coalesce around something that they share in common (such as culture, language, state, or species) in order to facilitate cooperation in some joint venture (such as the preservation of a national or religious culture, to enjoy the benefits of citizenship, or to work towards cosmopolitan goals such as combating climate change).

A Non-cognitivist Account of Agency

Whereas thinking of the human being as a 'composite of body and mind' serves to accentuate a cognitivist or rationalist approach between self and world, since 'mind' functions as the privileged signifier, Olafson's unitary conception of human being as ek-sistent recovers the importance of feeling and desire in an account of human agency. This non-cognitivist approach to agency also chastens attempts to emphasise one particular affiliation over others. While the elevation of one particular affiliation, such as national identity of common humanity, over others can certainly contribute to an emancipatory politics, there is nothing natural or necessary about any of these communities.³⁰ By reducing persons to what they share in common, and a community to a simple aggregate of similar entities, the elevation of any of such subjectivity amounts to a 'levelling' of human existence;

30. For a compelling account of the emancipatory role of the state in addressing global inequality see Michael Walzer, *Politics and Passion: Toward a More Egalitarian Liberalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 131-41.

since what is most distinctive about man, his singular 'ek-sistence' is subordinated to some shared subjectivity.³¹

It seems, therefore, there might exist a trade-off between claims to political or ethical subjectivity, their potentially galvanising and emancipatory effects, and what makes us characteristically human: our ek-sistence. The essential tension between subjectivity and ek-sistence lies in the fact that freedom is not simply the possession of any of these entities, individual or collective, thought as subjects, but must be something more; the condition of the establishment of any such subjectivity, for instance.

The Essence of Human Freedom: Heidegger's Ontological Reading of Kant

In Chapter 2 we saw that Linklater's *Men and Citizens* engaged in a dialectical treatment of Kantian rationalism and Hegelian historicism, which supported his philosophical history of the development of human freedom that was then used as a yardstick with which to judge actual historical arrangements of international society. We then saw that in *Transformation*, Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism was reconceived along communicative lines, where Habermas's normative ideal of the universal communication community replaced the philosophical history of human freedom as the standard of social criticism. While Hegel's insights were seen to be his contribution to the historical development of human freedom, and Marx's lay in the commitment to the transformation of the economic and social conditions that undermine the conditions of human freedom, it is Kant – and in particular the Kantian ethical subject – that remains the central and guiding light of Linklater's understanding of

31. There is a range of different, perhaps competing, subjectivities that persons can adopt, the relative importance of which varies between persons. For instance, a Welsh speaker is a subject of the Welsh language, and a British citizen is a subject of the British state. The two are not incompatible, but if the policies of the British state do not do enough to help preserve the Welsh language, we should not be surprised if the assertion of a more particularist subjectivity becomes more forceful.

freedom; it is an historically developing ethical subject with *significant* debts to Kant's original formulation undergirds Linklater's CIRT.

While Habermas modifies Kohlberg's account of post-conventional morality by situating it within the dialogic framework of discourse ethics, thereby making ethical ratiocination a collective activity rather than an individual one, the commitment to the Kantian ethical subject as both the ground of universal principles and the loci of ethical praxis remains. More broadly, we also saw how Linklater's understanding of emancipation – as an historical process of the gradual self-realisation of the ethical subject, whereby that which negates ethical subjectivity is itself negated – bears striking similarities with the argumentative structure of Kant's *Perpetual Peace*: both remain fundamentally committed to the ideal of a universal moral community in which humanity might be united 'as co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends.'³²

Freedom and ethical subjectivity thus go hand in hand in Linklater's approach to CIRT. However, we concluded Part 1 by claiming that Linklater's *foundational* commitment to the ethical subject indicated not just a limited philosophical ontology, but also a thin understanding of human freedom. Honneth and Brincat reminded us that freedom was not just the possession of the subject, but was located in *intersubjective* relations, and the emancipatory project of critical theory was thereby relocated 'within the experiences of the "dominated" themselves rather than in civilising processes taking place "above them."³³ However, we saw that Honneth and Brincat themselves remained reliant on the kaleidoscope of the Kantian subject and so we demurred on their commitment to *intersubjective* recognition as the path to emancipation.

Indications of Linklater's shortcomings in this regard were given through Foucault's discussion of the process of moral self-formation whereby the person

32. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 84.

33. Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 2011), 312,314-315.

becomes an ethical subject, and in Foucault's acknowledgement that freedom is not the possession of the ethical subject but is the *premise* of moral conduct through which one *transforms oneself into* an ethical subject. It is in this light that Odysseos's claim that Linklater confuses freedom with the conditions of possibility of a certain kind of subjectivity rings true.³⁴ The following section responds to these discussions with the aim of contributing greater depth to an understanding of human freedom necessary for any emancipatory cosmopolitanism, one that moves away from a principal association of freedom with subjectivity or intersubjectivity.

Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.

Despite his discussion of resoluteness challenging the Kantian identification of freedom as the possession of an antecedent subjectivity, and briefly discussing Kantian subjectivity in *Being and Time*, it is not until *The Essence of Human Freedom* that Heidegger engages in a more thorough evaluation of Kant's conception of freedom and practical reason, explicitly defending his own conception of freedom in the process.³⁵ Based on lectures given in Freiburg in the summer of 1930, three years after the publication of *Being and Time*, the central idea here is to reverse Kant's idea that humans are free because they *have* freedom, to argue that it is rather *freedom* that '*has*' man; in other words, to make us come to regard freedom as a condition of our existence as 'world-relating' creatures as opposed to a property of individuals. Rather than being the possession of an individual thought as subject, freedom becomes the condition of being able to determine individuals as subjects in the first place.

Freedom is therefore understood not as a 'thing' or a property, but as an experience or occurrence through which the human being can appropriate his own being, such as in solicitous being-with others; freedom is thought as release or

34. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), xxx.

35. Heidegger's discussion Kantian subjectivity can be found in Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 366-67.

deliverance to existence rather than autonomous self-control and mastery over things in the world. This argument is important in two respects. Firstly it does not involve contestable metaphysical presuppositions regarding what the human being is, since 'the human' is not associated with some essential substance or property. Secondly, it offers an understanding of freedom that respects the limitations and constraints of human perspectivalism as presented in an understanding humans as world-relating creatures.

In part a study in the ground of Kantian freedom, by conceiving freedom as the 'absolute self-activity' of the 'power of self-determination' of human beings *qua* human beings – as against the Christian theological tradition, in which Paul, Luther, and Augustine had conceived freedom as independence from God – *The Essence of Human Freedom* credits Kant with being the person who brings the problem of freedom 'for the first time into a radical connection with the fundamental problems of metaphysics.'³⁶

Heidegger demonstrates that there are two aspects to Kantian freedom, 'practical' freedom and 'cosmological' freedom; both of which are grounded in a metaphysics of presence and hence persist in following the leading question of philosophy ('what are beings?'). Both understandings are thus susceptible to the arguments made regarding the forgetting of the ontological difference and the elusion of an authentic relation between an understanding of Being and time.

Essentially, Heidegger's critique is that Kant's determination of freedom as the autonomy of the ethical subject, coupled with his failure to inquire as to the proper relationship between being and time, means that Kant is unable to recognise that his determination of freedom as the autonomy of the ethical subject is only one of several possible determinations of the being of human beings. Voicing a concern echoed fourteen years later in Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, the shared objection is to a form of levelling manifest in the

36. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002), 15-16.

Enlightenment commitment to freedom and equality that leads directly (or dialectically, in the case of Horkheimer and Adorno) to its opposite.³⁷

The Two Paths to Freedom: Spontaneity, Autonomy & Practical Freedom

Heidegger begins by explaining that the idea of freedom that normally comes to the fore in any discussion of freedom is freedom understood as autonomy. Autonomy itself is principally understood in the negative form, as a form of freedom-from: a denial of dependence upon something else.³⁸ Negative freedom becomes fully defined by what it is that man is free from, which has been experienced and problematised in two essential directions: independence from *nature*, and independence from *God*. The former involving the claim that human action is not primarily caused by natural processes, while the second involving the view that humans have free will and that their action is not predetermined by God.³⁹

Accompanying negative freedom is positive freedom, which refers to the 'toward-which' or the being 'free for;' for Kant, practical freedom, the freedom of the ethical subject, is the positive freedom to be a self-determining, responsible person. However, this practical freedom is presented by Kant as a *negative* freedom, as a form of independence, and specifically 'the independence of the will of coercion by sensuous impulses.'⁴⁰ Practical freedom for Kant then refers to the independence of the will: the human ability to be self-legislating and autonomous, and it is as a specific characteristic of man as a rational being that attains actuality in the concrete willing of the pure ought.

37. Theodor W. Adorno, and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Verso, 1986). This common concern is likely due to the shared influence of Nietzsche on Heidegger, Horkheimer and Adorno.

38. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, 4.

39. *Ibid.*, 5.

40. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Allen W. Wood and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A534, B562.

In short, the essence of human freedom is for Kant '*the condition of the possibility of the factuality of pure practical reason.*'⁴¹ Kantian freedom therefore establishes the individual as *essentially independent from his world.*

There are two paths to Kantian freedom, cosmological and practical – both intersecting in the individual thought as subject. Referring to a 'free act' as an 'originary action,' freedom is determined in terms of cause and effect, and is thereby posed as a problem of causality in Kant's third antinomy.⁴² For Kant, all experience is subject to the law of causality, the law that 'everything that happens, that is, begins, to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule.'⁴³ As Kant explains: 'the causality of the cause of that which happens or comes into being must itself have come into being, and [...] in accordance with the principle of understanding it must in its turn require a cause.'⁴⁴ In the natural world, the world of phenomena, nothing is the cause of itself: every cause of a cause itself follows from a prior cause.

Implicit in the concept of mechanical causality, however, is the notion of a first cause, an uncaused causal power (i.e., transcendental freedom), since the law of causality would be self-contradictory if there were not another kind of causality that also effected phenomena in the world.⁴⁵ This logical claim that natural causality must itself be grounded in something that is *unconditional* is what constitutes the antinomy between causality and freedom in speculative reason; an antinomy that Kant resolves in the first *Critique* by positing a sharp distinction between the *phenomenal* world of appearances and the *noumenal* world of 'things in themselves.'

In the third antinomy this takes the form of the proposition of the necessity of an uncaused cause (transcendental freedom), an absolute spontaneity of cause,

41. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, 201.

42. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A544,B572.

43. Ibid., A189,B232.

44. Ibid., A532,B560.

45. This is the role that God plays in a mechanistic paradigm of nature: as the abstract 'first cause' (*causa prima*) of the universe.

which of itself originates a series of phenomena which *then* proceed according to natural laws. This distinction means that freedom and causality are no longer mutually exclusive, since the concept of cause presupposes two kinds of causality, where the causality of freedom does not contradict the laws of nature because it lies outside of the realm of experience. The phenomenal-noumenal distinction thus resolves the contradiction between freedom and mechanistic laws of nature: transcendental freedom is cosmological freedom.

Metaphysical Freedom as the Ground of Practical Autonomy

The problem though is that we cannot *experience* this transcendental freedom: it is something that we can never prove or know. Cosmological freedom is therefore an object of *intelligibility* rather than sensibility, and has to be deduced through the exercise of reason. Kant argues in the second *Critique* however that we must still presuppose cosmological freedom – to *act as if* the transcendental thesis were true – since to conclude that human beings cannot be an uncaused cause would undermine our ability to consider ourselves (and therefore act as) responsible agents. Despite the epistemic possibility that we might well be deluded, for Kant there is a practical necessity of *acting as if* we had cosmological freedom, because otherwise we simply could not act.⁴⁶

This variance reflects the divergent concerns of Kant's two *Critiques*: while pure reason aims at truth, practical reason tells us what we must do. This is why the first *Critique* cognises freedom in a purely negative way, as the pure possibility of freedom as an independence from, while the second *Critique* thinks about actually existing freedom, where freedom is regarded as the ability to will an action for ourselves; and for that willing to be driven by reason alone, since reason provides motivation for the will that transcends natural causality. It is, therefore,

46. In a metaphysics lecture Kant is quoted as saying: 'Freedom is practically necessary – man must therefore act according to an idea of freedom, otherwise he cannot act. That does not, however, prove freedom in the theoretical sense.' Henry E. Allison, *Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133-34.

ethical action driven by reason alone that allows us to consider the person to be engaging in an original effecting. In short, freedom is, according to Kant 'a non-empirical (intelligible) kind of causality'; a 'causality of reason' that practical reason gives reality to.⁴⁷

Freedom as a Problem of Metaphysics: Cosmology, Causality & Human Responsibility.

We saw in the last chapter that Heidegger argues that any encounter with entities occurs 'in the light of Being'; Kant's account of freedom and ethical subjectivity is an effective illustration of this.⁴⁸ Kant, a committed Newtonian, sought to apply Newton's insights in physics to metaphysics, a philosophical discipline that, in promising to give us knowledge of entities existing beyond experience, he regarded as a fledgling science. Newtonian physics had provided a mechanical explanation of nature as governed by causally determining natural laws; understanding freedom as non-empirical (intelligible) kind of causality allows Kant to find a place for human freedom in a Newtonian universe by reconciling the mechanical necessity of nature with the view of humans as beings endowed with a distinctive kind of causality.⁴⁹ Kant's encounter with human beings thus occurs in the light of a mechanistic paradigm of nature; his positing of freedom as a transcendental idea is at root an attempt to make sense of the unity of nature given a commitment to a mechanistic understanding of the world. Hence, it is only within a certain conditioned interpretation of Being that freedom becomes a problem for Kant.

It is in the light of *this* understanding of Being in general (the mechanistic paradigm of nature) that allows Kant to postulate that ethical subjectivity resides in

47. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, 177.

48. We will recall from the previous chapter that Da-sein is always 'thrown' into a particular context that informs the nature of our relation to the world, and that Heidegger calls this situation a *Lichtung* (Clearing): an open space within which we can encounter objects. 'Things show up *in the light of* our understanding of being.' Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991), 163.

49. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, 177.

the individual. This notion then later finds practical expression in his second *Critique* and in the *Groundwork*, before being expressed politically in his essays *Perpetual Peace* and *Idea for a Universal History*. Kant's conception of ethical subjectivity is thus a corollary to his understanding of freedom as transcendental idea (cosmological freedom); both of which are metaphysical because they cannot be validated by experience. Although the two are not the same – autonomy is the self-legislation of a rational being according to its individual will, and absolute spontaneity is the self-origination of a state – it is only on the basis of absolute spontaneity that practical autonomy is possible. *Practical autonomy is a kind of absolute spontaneity*, the latter delimiting the essence of the former:

The self-determination of action as self-legislation is a self-origination of a state in the specific domain of the human activity of a rational being. Were there no absolute spontaneity, there would be no autonomy. The possibility of autonomy is grounded in spontaneity, and practical freedom is grounded in transcendental freedom.⁵⁰

Hence what initially seems to be an unproblematic, even instinctual way of thinking human freedom, becomes far more complicated since it leads us to ask what it is that *enables* practical autonomy, and, what absolute spontaneity even means. Kant's commitment to individual autonomy thus forces us to confront a broader problematic, the problem of causality in general.

Presence, Responsibility, and the Leading Question

The practical freedom associated with ethical subjectivity is not just about rational activity, but also involves being responsible for our actions. While the traditional definition of man as *homo animale rationale* recognises only two elements: man as the *animal* endowed with *reason*, since an animal can be rational without possessing the ability to act on behalf of itself, for Kant the humanity of man must consist in more than this: '[r]eason could be purely theoretical, such that man's actions were guided by reason, but with his impulses stemming entirely from

50. Ibid., 18.

sensibility, i.e., from his animality.⁵¹ Consequently it is not simply rationality or animality, but also *personality* that must be distinctive of man for Kant: our ability to rise above our animal nature and be held accountable for our actions as persons. In short, man is not just a rational being, but also an accountable being: '[t]he essence of person, the personality, consists in self-responsibility.'⁵²

The idea that we are responsible beings that can be held accountable for our actions is crucial for a Kantian conception of freedom, since it is this experience of individual responsibility or accountability that provides substance to the idea that we are free. Such a view of freedom has become widely accepted, at least in modern, liberal, societies. If we murder someone, we expect to be held accountable for that crime. Similarly, when someone engages in supererogatory action we hold that person in esteem. Kant's understanding of freedom is therefore crucial to our modern self-understandings, without it we would have neither legal nor moral personality; both of which are central to the functioning of our modern societies. The problem however is that Kant treats this kind of freedom as something that persists historically and trans-culturally: he treats this form of ethical subjectivity as *foundational*.⁵³

Heidegger's objection is that Kant treats this form of subjectivity as a form of perpetual presence, where the self is characterised not *qua* self but as 'the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand. To define the "I" ontologically as "subject" means to regard it as something always present-at-hand.'⁵⁴ From Heidegger's perspective then, by allowing the question of the essence of human freedom to finish with the positing of freedom as the self-legislation of practical reason, Kant persists in asking the leading question of philosophy ('what are beings?') since beings are the beings that are free.

51. Ibid., 180.

52. Ibid.

53. Linklater's dialectical treatment of Kant's rationalism and Hegel's historicism in *Men and Citizens* is a significant move away from *this* form of foundationalism, yet reconstructing ethical subjectivity as an historical achievement does not fully extricate himself from this commitment.

54. Ibid., 367.

Despite resonating profoundly with a modern sensibility then, by understanding freedom simply as the practical autonomy of a present being, of an individual conceived as self-directing substance, Kant's understanding of freedom betrays an essentially limited conception of the human being (as existent entity). This is because it fails to engage with the being of that entity, with the nature of the kind of existence that pertains to human beings; a form of existence that Heidegger identifies as our 'ek-sistentiality' – the fact that we are the beings that interpret Being. As a result, Kant's treatment of freedom and human existence is ontologically shallow.

We shall recall from the last chapter that Heidegger rejects metaphysical realism, arguing instead that our understanding of reality is not simply read off the mind-independent real, but is at least partially imposed upon it; that, on the basis of our prior experience we *project out* interpretations of existence onto entities themselves: we give things meaning. Moreover, that Heidegger's complaint against the Western philosophical tradition is that it has misinterpreted the nature of this exercise: that, in part due to an overestimation of our rational faculties, we have come to think that our constructions of the mind-independent real are in fact reflections of reality as it is independent of our knowledge of it.

Consequently, the reason why Kant's conception of human freedom and existence are so shallow is that he considers his metaphysics to be a fledgling science, and therefore that his account of human beings as rational, autonomous, persons, is a reflection of what human beings *actually are*, rather than an interpretation of the being of human beings that operates *in the light of* a mechanistic paradigm of nature; one that *projects* meaning onto human beings, and which can therefore be subject to evaluation according to its effects: effects including reification that will be explored in the next chapter. It is for this reason – because he ignores the priority and the necessity of the question of Being – that Heidegger concludes that Kant's treatment of freedom as a problem of causality

'lacks the metaphysical ground for the problem of freedom.'⁵⁵ This leads him to consider if it is, in fact, the reverse that is true.

Freedom as a Problem of Causality, or Causality as a Problem of Freedom?

While Kant presents the problem of freedom as a problem of causality, Heidegger questions whether it makes more sense to consider the problem of causality to be itself grounded in freedom. The suggestion is that we should consider freedom to be a *condition* rather than a *property*; that freedom might rather first be the condition of the possibility of interpreting the being of human beings as ethical subjects. Or, to put it differently, whether freedom is in fact the condition of our (historical and social) construction of a world in which human beings are deemed to be entities that possess the power of 'absolute self-activity' or 'self-determination.' This amounts to positing freedom as the condition of any understanding of the being of beings, the condition of our 'world-hood,' or of what Heidegger calls the 'manifestness of the being of beings.'

The letting-be encountered of beings, comportment to beings in each and every mode of manifestness, is only possible where freedom exists. Freedom is the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being.⁵⁶

Consequently, Heidegger leads us to a discussion of the relationship between the question of Being and freedom. While the question of Being has been the leading question of philosophy, the fundamental *problem* of philosophy is that concerning the essence of freedom.⁵⁷ Heidegger suggests that it is only by regarding the question of Being as rooted in the question concerning the essence of human freedom that we can recognise the proper ontological dimension of freedom. 'The essence of freedom only comes into view if we seek it as the ground of the possibility of Dasein, as something prior even to being and time.'⁵⁸ Rather than seeing freedom as freedom-from and freedom-to, he suggests then that 'we

55. Ibid., 134.

56. Ibid., 205.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 93.

must effect a complete repositioning of freedom, so that what now emerges is that the problem of freedom is not built into the leading and fundamental problems of philosophy, but, on the contrary, the leading question of metaphysics is grounded in the question concerning the essence of freedom.⁵⁹ Freedom then is no longer conceived primarily in terms of a property of man, but it becomes 'superordinate and governing in relation to the whole.'⁶⁰

Although it is the ground that our existence as meaningful creatures rests upon, freedom cannot strictly be considered to be a foundation, as freedom must by definition remain indeterminate. Consequently, freedom is posited as the *Abgrund*, the *abyss* that the ontological difference rests upon. Freedom is the 'groundless' ground of the ontological difference, the condition of any interpretation of Being and of the perspectival presentation of the whole. We will recall that in *Being and Time* Dasein 'is in existing, the ground of its ability to be.'⁶¹ Dasein is *thrown* into existence, and since it is thrown, Dasein is not itself subject, but projects 'itself onto possibilities into which it has been thrown [...] It has been released from the ground, not by itself but to itself, so as to be the ground.'⁶² Freedom is the condition of man's ek-sistence. As Inwood explains:

Dasein does not lay the ground or basis: it does not choose its entry into the world or the range of possibilities that initially confront it. But it assumes these possibilities as its own and makes them a spring-board for its subsequent trajectory. Its ability to do this depends on its "ecstatic temporality:" "Even if concern remains restricted to the urgency of everyday needs, Dasein is never a pure making present; it springs from a retention that awaits, and exists in a world on the ground of this retention or as itself this "ground."⁶³

With freedom as the abyssal root of both Being and time, freedom is more primordial than man, and so man can only be the administrator and not the owner of freedom: 'he can only let-be the freedom which is accorded to him.'⁶⁴ As the administrator of freedom, man is the site where beings in the whole become revealed, i.e., he is that particular being through which beings as such announce

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 284.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., 356 cf. 436. Michael Inwood, *A Heidegger Dictionary* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 83.

64. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*, 93.

themselves.⁶⁵ Hence, man is not just one being amongst other beings but he is the being through which the being of beings - thus beings in the whole - are revealed. He is that being that interprets Being.

An Emancipatory Humanism?

Heidegger's complaint against existentialist, Marxist and Christian humanisms in his *Letter on Humanism* is that they overlook the fact that *this* is what constitutes man's uniqueness. The common humanist concern is that man become free for his humanity and finds his worth in it. While they differ on what they conceive 'freedom' and the 'nature' of man to be, along with the path to the realization of these conceptions, various humanisms are aligned in the sense that according to each, the '*humanitas* of *homo humanus* is determined with regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole.⁶⁶

Each of these humanisms thus projects an interpretation of beings without questioning the truth of Being; they engage in regional ontology without grounding that ontology in *general* ontology, which would lead to a recognition that such interpretations of Being are partial and temporal and thus subordinate to the ontological difference. It is man's ek-sistence, his world-relation, that constitutes

65. Ibid., 94.

66. '[I]f one understands humanism in general as a concern that man become free for his humanity and find his worth in it, then humanism differs according to one's conception of the "freedom" and "nature" of man. So too are there various paths toward the realization of such conceptions. The humanism of Marx does not need to return to antiquity any more than the humanism which Sartre conceives existentialism to be. In this broad sense Christianity is also a humanism, in that according to its teaching everything depends on man's salvation (*salus aeterna*); the history of man appears in the context of the history of redemption. However different these forms of humanism may be in purpose and in principle, in the mode and means of their respective realizations, and in the form of their teaching, they nonetheless all agree in this, that the *humanitas* of *homo humanus* is determined with regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole. Every humanism is either grounded in metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one. Every determination of the essence of man already presupposes an interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is metaphysical.' Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David F. Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 225-26.

man's existential uniqueness for Heidegger: the way that man 'stands out' in the various moments of the temporality of care, being 'thrown' out of a past and 'projecting' himself toward a future by way of the present.⁶⁷

Thought in terms of ek-sistence, "world" is in a certain sense precisely "the beyond" within existence and for it. Man is never first and foremost man on the hither side of the world, as a "subject," whether this is taken as "I" or "We." Neither is he ever simply a mere subject which always simultaneously is related to objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his essence is ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that clears the "between" within which a "relation" of subject to object can "be."⁶⁸

Therefore, despite our previous recognition that responsibility and accountability resonate so profoundly with our modern sensibility, freedom cannot principally consist in our subjectivity as it does for Kant, Habermas and Linklater. Rather, freedom must first be understood as engaged immersion in the world, on the basis of which freedom as ethical subjectivity can then be *projected* upon beings as a whole.

Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow a being). Prior to all this ("negative" and "positive" freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosedness of beings as such. Disclosedness itself is conserved in ek-sistent engagement, through which the openness of the open region, i.e., the "there," "Da," is what it is.⁶⁹

As the groundless ground of our existence, the *Abgrund* upon which the ontological difference rests, freedom is not simply the self-direction of individuated entities, and neither is it caprice or absence of restraint.⁷⁰ Before it is any of these, freedom is the existential condition of world-disclosure, and then a

67. Ibid., 228.

68. Ibid., 252.

69. Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David F. Krell. (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 126.

70. As Louis Blond explains: "The 'non-essence' that constitutes being and nothingness, as they are not 'things,' is described as an abyss that functions as a 'non-grounding ground' which gives the freedom of possibilities (or rather existence) to beings. Freedom is not like an unchanging essence; freedom provides the space for possibilities. The abyssal ground (*Ab-grund*) is the boundless quality that is the counterpart of ground." Louis P. Blond, *Heidegger and Nietzsche: Overcoming Metaphysics* (London: Continuum, 2010), 78. For Heidegger's own (lengthier) explanation of freedom as 'groundless ground' see Martin Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment," *Arion* 1, no. 4 (1973): 576-626.

state of being – a resolute, solicitous being-with others, where others are engaged *as others*. This involves, in Heidegger's words, 'letting beings be,' allowing others to appear as they are rather than on the basis of some preconceived notion of subjectivity that is projected onto them. It is in this solicitous engagement that Being is mutually co-disclosed with others, a mutual co-disclosure that is hampered by the projection of a substantive interpretation of what human beings are; such as by representing others as subjects, the strategy relied upon by Linklater's defence of universalism.

As a result, emancipation cannot simply be seen as the progressive self-actualisation of an ethical subject and the establishment of the political and social conditions whereby individuals can exercise this subjectivity. The emancipatory project of CIRT cannot, from this perspective, simply involve the extension of community by removing barriers to universal discursive reasoning (Habermas/Linklater), and neither can it be about the establishment of a universal *intersubjective* recognitive sphere (Honneth/Brincat). Although an emancipatory politics can still lead to these conclusions, to be considered emancipatory these political projects must arise as a consequence of solicitous being-with others.

An Ethical & Emancipatory Politics

So far we have engaged in a regional ontology of the person, where human beings are presented as essentially world-relating creatures rather than subjects, and have contributed to a shift in understanding freedom from being a property of an individual thought of as subject to the existential condition of world-disclosure. The current section will discuss further implications of these arguments for an ethical and emancipatory politics.

Politics, from the Greek *politika* (Πολιτικά) was considered by Aristotle to concern the affairs of the city, the *polis* (πόλις), and is commonly conceived as the art and science of forming, directing, and administrating political units such as the

state. Such a practice often involves the invocation of a shared identity as the common ground for social cohesion or collective action. To claim that something is 'un-American,' for instance, indicates this in the negative. Sometimes such social cohesion is established through the identification of threats to the polity, both internal or external, but it can also be effected through national celebrations, such as Australia Day, the Queen's Diamond Jubilee, or more sombre occasions such as Armistice Day.⁷¹

The celebration of such an imagined community, the invocation of a shared identity, or the remembrance of collective sacrifice, as well as efforts to influence the formation of public opinion, can be read as paradigmatically political activities since they involve attempts to establish or re-establish a political project, achievement, or shared vulnerability that can be regarded as common to all members of the community: these are processes of collective world formation. While an individual's world-relation is interpretive and particular, politics should be regarded as the process by which a common world is created from a plurality of individual worlds. This involves the projection of meaning onto all members of the community, a process that is essentially contestable, and is contested within the *polis*. Politics may then be said to involve the perpetual contestation of meaning and its institutionalisation, and such an activity may be motivated by interests of power or influence, financial gain, or emancipation. It is the latter that we shall be concerned with here.

The Political Implications of our World-relation

While we argued that understanding human beings as essentially world-relating creatures represented a more universalistic way of thinking the human

71. On foreign policy and collective identity formation see David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).; Michael J. Shapiro, *Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997).; Iver B. Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (1996): 139-74; Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: "the East" in European Identity Formation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

being as subject, we will recall that Heidegger identifies *Mitsein* (being-with) as a fundamental existential structure of human existence, a basic state within which human existence is 'co-determined by its relations with others.'⁷² While Olafson develops Heidegger's idea that we are essentially ek-sistents by addressing our thrownness and potentiality-for-being, he does not explore the notion of being-with.⁷³ This is a significant limitation, especially for thinking about an ethical and emancipatory approach to world politics, because it means that he cannot examine how one ek-sistent stands to another. Olafson recognizes this shortcoming and suggests in his conclusion that his understanding of human being in terms of presence and ek-sistence 'needs to be amplified by an account of the ways in which the essential plurality of human being and the kind of community to which it gives rise would be at the centre of the discussion.'⁷⁴

Beyond this limitation of being unable to think through the implications of his argument for the relations *between* ek-sistents, Olafson's account of the human being does not consider the role of others in the constitution of the self. If we are to enlist his account of humans as world-relating creatures then, we need to reinforce it by expanding it in the light of the proper recognition of the significance of the ethical and political nature of man's existence. There are two tasks here: the ethical and the political. The ethical task is to think of the ways in which single particulars ought to stand in relation to each other, while the political task, or the task for an ethical politics, is to consider what sort of political goals, or forms of organisation, we should set ourselves as targets. Since both emphasise Chapter 4 of *Being and Time*, where being is always being-with, the coexistential ontological accounts of Louiza Odysseos's analysis of coexistence in *International Relations* and Jean-Luc Nancy's *Being Singular Plural* will guide the discussion towards this end. Both Odysseos and Nancy lead us further away from a reliance on subjectivity and towards an understanding of human existence that is necessarily relational/co-existential.

72. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 153.

73. Not until three years later, at least. See Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Ground of Ethics: A Study of Mitsein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

74. Frederick A. Olafson, *What is a Human Being? A Heideggerian View*, 255.

Coexistence

We briefly encountered Odysseos's work in Chapter 3 in our discussion of the move from inter-subjectivity to relational individuality in CIRT, where we saw that self is not best thought as subject – since it is not essentially distinct from the experiences that constitute it, but is deeply implicated in its relation to them. We saw that Odysseos's key contribution was to challenge the subjectivist ontology of IR by demonstrating that subjectivity is coexistential from the start. To put it differently, this is a move from an atomistic conception of individuality to a relational one. Odysseos's primary engagement, we saw, is with the concept of coexistence, and that she is emphatic that coexistence (between individual human beings or states for example) should not be understood simply as the co-presence of individual units, as it has traditionally been assumed to be by IR, because:

[O]thers are not encountered in the world as a "plurality" of subjects that, thanks to their incarnation, arise as "person-things-present-at-hand" among other "things." The logic of composition, with its conception of others as subjects and of their coexistence as the coming together of self-sufficient subjects, is directly refuted by Heidegger. His reformulation of the "with" beyond composition "unworks" the nonrelational character assumed of the modern subject. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitt-dasein]. "With," then, shapes the very Being of Dasein as a worldly entity and cannot be understood as signifying copresence.⁷⁵

Since the nature of a human being's existence (Da-sein) is irrevocably bound to the character of their 'being-with' (Mitsein), Odysseos wants to replace the 'logic of composition' with a 'logic of comparison' animated by a coexistential sensibility, where comparison is understood as appearing to and with the other. Her notion of a logic of comparison therefore disavows a 'politics of self-sufficiency' and the perception that mechanist concepts, such as interest, are required in order to be related to the other.⁷⁶ Rather, according to her coexistential

75. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence*, 73.

76. Louiza Odysseos, "Radical Phenomenology, Ontology, and International Political Theory,"

396. A concept of shared interest can be seen as important to a social contractarian approach to the

ontology that draws from both Heidegger and Nancy, the individuality of a state or a human being is radically dependent on the broader plurality within which it arises. Odysseos's hope is that the recognition of this existential condition might 'arrest a return to subject-driven politics,' serve as an 'ethical imperative commanding respect for others's, and secure 'the open-endedness (a-teleology) of political life.'⁷⁷

Being Singular Plural

We noted in the last chapter that one of the shortcomings of Heidegger's notion of solicitous being-with was that, despite his prior insistence that Da-sein is always being-with, Heidegger falls short when it comes to an analysis of the interpersonal conditions of selfhood. There is also a danger that our discussion of humans as world-relating creatures might be misinterpreted as leading to or lapsing into a form of solipsism. Nancy's development of Heidegger's notion of being-with guards against these possible misunderstandings.

In *The Inoperative Community* and in *Being Singular Plural* Nancy draws upon Heidegger's insight that there is no understanding of Being that is not always already being-with, in order to develop a coexistential ontology. While Emmanuel Levinas distances himself from the 'mit' of *Mitsein* by shifting emphasis from 'being with' to 'being in front of,' which allows him to downgrade Heidegger's ontology of Being and being-with and claim that *ethics* is first philosophy, Nancy's aim is to redo first philosophy – i.e., ontology – by giving the 'singular plural' of Being as its foundation.⁷⁸

While he focuses on the 'mit' of *Mitsein*, Nancy's position remains underwritten by a Heideggerian understanding of the human being as Da-sein,

state, and the perception that states must share a common interest in order for them to cooperate – as in projects of collective security, for instance.

77. Ibid.

78. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), xv.

where humans are understood as the beings that have access to Being. In Heideggerian thought it is through 'the event' that Da-sein is opened to Being: Being is revealed to beings through personal experience that is characteristically singular and unique. It is due to the facticity of human existence that human experience is singular as opposed to general, and it is this singularity of human experience that leads to the fact that our experience of Being is necessarily multiple and differential.⁷⁹ The singularity our experience necessarily implies the multiplicity of Being because 'if the articulation of Being is always singular, Being cannot be One, and it cannot be thought simply as gathering or collecting. And if that to which *Dasein* opens is always already articulated [...] then Being must be thought as differential or relational.'⁸⁰

Despite this insistence that Being cannot be One, there remains what Nancy calls the 'political space,' the site of community, which is based upon the differential structure of human existence. This political space is the place of human sociality and is crucial to the nature of human existence, since it is that fact that we experience our political existence as a *question* that differentiates us from other animals. This 'political space' is also the place where we experience freedom; freedom is experienced when thought is exposed to the 'fact of Being' the fact '*that there are beings* (and not nothing, Heidegger adds).'⁸¹

Echoing Heidegger's insistence on the necessity of an overcoming of metaphysics by claiming that there is no meaning of the world beyond being-in-the-world: singularly plural and plurally singular, Nancy's coexistential ontology starts with an understanding of the world where 'being-with' refers to what he calls 'the singular multiplicity of origins,' where 'the plurality of beings is at the foundation of Being.'⁸² By this is meant that, in light of Heidegger's critique of metaphysics, we must proceed from the assumption that we only have access to ourselves and to the world; that meaning is *created* rather than discovered, and is

79. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), xiii.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, 12.

created by each and every one of us in our relations with others. Given its emphasis on the importance of human sociality, Nancy's coexistential ontology emphasises relationality over subjectivity, prioritising neither the individual nor the community – because to focus on either the general or the particular would detract from the coexistential nature of our sociality. Consequently, Nancy claims, just as community is 'inoperative,' the individual is 'nonviable':

Some see in its invention and in the culture, if not in the cult built around the individual, Europe's incontrovertible merit of having shown the world the sole path to emancipation from tyranny, and the norm by which to measure all our collective or communitarian undertakings. But the individual is merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community. By its nature - as its name indicates, it is the atom, the indivisible - the individual reveals that it is the abstract result of a decomposition. It is another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for-itself, taken as origin and as certainty.⁸³

The significance of this for liberalism or Marxism is clear. Where liberalism understands freedom as the protection of a sphere of rights that allows individuals to act according to their inclinations, Marxism judges social systems according to the extent that they alienate man from his natural being, or to the degree to which they foster the autonomous action of individuals freed from the dictates of material scarcity or insecurity. What is common to both is a view of the subject that is not detached from society – indeed in Marxism man's social relations are key to his 'natural being' – but where the individual subject can nonetheless be seen in some way as primordial, as antecedent to its community.

The Singular Multiplicity of Origins

Despite his talk of beings as 'origins' indicating that his position is affiliated with a commitment to the aseity of the self, Nancy understands the self in a way that does not involve treating it as essentially distinct from the experiences that constitute it, but as deeply implicated in its relation to them.⁸⁴ The self, according

83. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, 3.

84. 'Aseity,' 'from-himself-ness,' deriving from the latin *a* (from) and *se* (self) is the property of a being that exists in and of itself. It is traditionally used in Christian theology to affirm a qualitative

to Nancy, 'takes place as itself and/or as the other,' it's aseity 'anterior to the distinction between a consciousness and its world. Before phenomenological intentionality and the constitution of the ego, but also before thinglike consistency as such,' there is for Nancy 'a co-originary accorded to the with.'⁸⁵ Nancy's account of being singular plural is therefore not an account of human social relations that anticipates the realisation of some primordial essence, but one which shifts concern away from *both* the individual *and* the community to *singularity* and the plural formation of singular worlds.

Nancy explains that 'singularity never has the nature or the structure of individuality. Singularity never takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable if not identical entities; rather it takes place at the level of the clinamen, which is unidentifiable.'⁸⁶ Any given (individual, singular) world is formed 'in exposure to others and thus is a relational world (or constituted in and through the relations that are its (co)existential building blocks).'⁸⁷ Crucially then, worlds are singular and plural rather than general and universal as they are distinctively experienced and formed by individuals in their social relations; they are, therefore, divisible and constitutively exposed to other worlds, with which they intersect and overlap. Hence:

The unity of a world is not one: it is made of a diversity, and even disparity and opposition [...] The unity of a world is nothing other than its diversity, and this, in turn, is a diversity of worlds. A world is a multiplicity of worlds; the world is a multiplicity of worlds, and its unity is the mutual sharing and exposition of all its worlds - within this world.⁸⁸

For Nancy then, as for Heidegger and for Odysseos, the proximal fact of human existence is coexistence: the coexistence of *singularities*, individuated selves that are co-originary or relational from the start and which are constituted through their relations towards singular and multiple worlds. Significantly though,

difference between God and the creatures that he made. Nancy's use of the concept is meant to indicate that we can rely on no transcendent source of meaning, and that we must now consider aseity to inhere in individual human beings themselves.

85. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, 40-41.

86. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, 6-7.

87. Martin Coward, "Jean-Luc Nancy," in *Critical Theorists and International Relations*, ed. Jenny Edkins and Nick Vaughan-Williams (London: Routledge, 2009), 259.

88. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, 185.

as with Odysseos, coexistence does not refer to the relations between preformed subjects – it 'holds itself just as far from juxtaposition as it does from integration.'⁸⁹ Coexistence does not supplement existence, and it cannot be subtracted out of existence: existence is coexistence.⁹⁰ By stressing that coexistence is neither integration nor juxtaposition Nancy distances himself from Hobbesian realism that perceives the other as threatening and seeks to secure the self, just as he does from the Kantian and Marxian goal of uniting a community of humankind.

Co-existentiality & the Impossibility of a Community of Subjects

In contrast to this commitment to a foundational *singularity*, and in a vein reminiscent of Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism*, Nancy writes that 'it is precisely the immanence of man to man, or it is man, taken absolutely, considered as the immanent being par excellence, that constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community.'⁹¹ In other words, so long as we conceive community in terms of a community of *subjects*, we will never experience authentic community, since such a community would founder on the identification of what constitutes the essence of man.

Ironically then, since he is attempting to establish a universal moral community, according to Nancy's way of thinking, it is precisely Linklater's strategy of projecting an ethical subject in his defence of universality that establishes the *impossibility* of an authentic community with the other. By defending a *dialogic* approach to ethical universality and hence universal moral inclusion where individuals (thought as subjects) encounter, or at least expect to encounter, other individuals *qua* ethical subjects, Linklater precludes the possibility of a genuine encounter with other persons. Since, as Nancy writes:

89. *Ibid.*, 187.

90. *Ibid.*

91. Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community*, 3.

What cannot appear is both the other and communication. For the other of a communication becomes the object of a subject - even and perhaps especially as "suppressed object or concept" as in the Hegelian relation between consciousnesses [...] This other is no longer an other, but an object of a subject's representation (or, in a more complicated way, the representative object of another subject for the subject's representation). Communication and the alterity that is its condition can, in principle, have only an instrumental and not an ontological role and status in a thinking that views the subject as the negative but specular identity of an object, that is, as an exteriority without alterity. The subject cannot be outside itself: this is even what ultimately defines it - that its outside and all its "alienations" or "extraneousness" should in the end be suppressed and sublated in it. It is altogether different with the being of communication. The being-communicating (and not the subject-representing), or if one wants to risk saying it, communication as the predicament of being, as "transcendental," is above all being-outside-itself.⁹²

Discourse ethics, therefore, inescapably reduces the other to a mere representation, meaning that communicative consensus can lead to neither an authentic community, nor to mutual understanding. This problem is not confined to discourse ethics, but is common to a politics of subjectivity more generally, since persons are reduced to subjects or objects. A politics of universal principles or norms, for instance, means that a politics of generality is structurally unable to pay heed to the singularity of being, effacing it and undermining human freedom. An exercise in universalist ethical reasoning is therefore an exercise in world making; it requires an underlying commitment to a shared subjectivity, and is therefore an essentially political exercise.

Relations to Singularity

What is being heralded here is a *fundamental discontinuity* between politics and ethics. The origins of which, as we shall see in Chapter 8, go back at least to Hegel's positing of an inequality between the logics of love and law in his *Spirit of Christianity* essay, an inequality that finds mature expression in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right* as the division between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*, between a rule governed morality and the immanent experience of ethical life. More on this later. The root cause of this divergence, however, lies in the rejection of the dualist commitment to a foundational subject.

92. Ibid., 24.

If we remain committed to a foundational subject, ethics is simply the body of rules that follow from taking such a subject as a ground. If the subject is *not* regarded as foundational, the rules and principles that necessarily rely upon a given subject as a ground cannot be seen as anything more than contingently binding; contingent upon the adoption of such a common subjectivity. Our rejection of a foundational subject is not a rejection of rules or principles, however, but it does involve the view that an ethical relation is not exhausted by relations between subjects.

This is where Nancy's concept of *singularity* comes into its own, since it captures the ontological fullness of a person in a way that a commitment to subjectivity cannot. We saw above that Nancy first talks about the singularity of Being in *The Inoperative Community*, but his use of the term in relation to the individual is stated more clearly in *Being Singular Plural*. Simultaneously rejecting a Rorty-esque pragmatism and defending against the familiar criticism levelled against continental philosophy as leading to relativism or nihilism, Nancy asserts:

There *is* a common measure, which is not some one unique standard applied to everyone and everything. It is the commensurability of incommensurable singularities, the equality of all the origins-of-the-world, which, as origins, are strictly unexchangeable.⁹³

As we saw in Chapter 3, the concept is also explored by Derrida, in *Spectres of Marx, Nietzsche and the Machine* and later in his *Politics of Friendship*, where singularity signifies the transcendent alterity of the other, 'heterogenous and singular, hence resistant to the very generality of the law.'⁹⁴ Echoing Hegel's discussion of the divergent orders of love and law, Derrida sheds light on the relationship between subjectivity and singularity in his discussion of the 'aporetic' structure of democracy:

93. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, 75. emphasis added. We will recall from Chapter 3 that Nick Vaughan-Williams has deployed Nancy's argument in relation to various cosmopolitan discourses in IR. See Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity." *International Politics* 44 (2007): 107-24.

94. Jacques Derrida, "Nietzsche and the Machine: An Interview With Jacques Derrida By Richard Beardsworth," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 7 (1994): 7-66; Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International* (London: Routledge, 1994); Jacques Derrida, *The Politics of Friendship*, trans. George Collins (London: Verso, 2005), 277.

With this becoming-political, and with all the schemata that we will recognize therein [...] the question of democracy thus opens, the question of the citizen or the subject as a countable singularity. And that of a "universal fraternity." There is no democracy without respect for irreducible singularity or alterity, but there is no democracy without the "community of friends" (*koīna ta philōn*), without the calculation of majorities, without identifiable, stabilizable, representable subjects, all equal. These two laws are irreducible to one another. Tragically irreconcilable and forever wounding [...] political desire is forever borne by the disjunction of these two laws. It also bears the chance and the future of a democracy whose ruin it constantly threatens but whose life, however, it sustains.⁹⁵

What is common to Hegel, Nancy, Derrida, and Heidegger, is a rejection of foundational subjectivity that goes hand in hand with their scepticism towards the essentially ambivalent achievements of reflective rationality.⁹⁶

Singularity

Although Heidegger does not spend much time discussing the ethical implications of his existential analytic of Da-sein, representing other Da-seins as singularities is entirely congruent with his philosophical ontology. The term 'singularity' originates in physics, designating the point of discontinuity in phenomena such as black holes: that which is, and must remain, beyond the field of vision. As we saw, an authentic relation between self and world involves letting entities appear as they are, resisting our tendency to project our regional interpretations of Being onto beings as a whole. The implication is that a genuinely ethical relation to the other would resist our tendency to project an interpretation of what the human subject is or should be, but would be a relation to that which must essentially exceed our own representations of them – a relationship that does not reduce the other simply to a particular case of the human species, but treats them as a singular, irreplaceable being: as a unique ek-sistent Da-sein.

It is for this reason that, in a move echoing Hegel's emphasis of the importance of ethical life over morality, Heidegger distinguishes between ethics

95. Ibid., 22.

96. We could also add Adorno and Horkheimer to this list.

and its Greek root *ēthos*. Whereas ethical norms and principles presuppose an underlying ethical subject, as demonstrated by Cochran's analysis of the foundational commitments implied in Frost and Linklater's approach to normative theory, 'ethos' refers to an abode or dwelling place, the 'open region in which man dwells.'⁹⁷ Since Heidegger regards human dwelling to be authentic when it is responsive to the ontological difference, the ethical cannot simply be about theoretically constructed norms, principles, or practices, but must relate to our concrete way of being in the world. It is in this way that Heidegger can be said to be 'against ethics.'⁹⁸ In the writings of those influenced by Heidegger, ethos is preferred to ethics since the rules and principles of the latter are generally incompatible with *Da-sein*.⁹⁹ Connolly, for instance, uses it to 'emphasize continually that the orientation he seeks is vivified more by a spirit or sensibility than by any set rules of conduct,' while Odysseos distinguishes ethos from the *nomos* of moral principles and universal ethics to understand it as 'an attitude and mode of relating to others.'¹⁰⁰

Conclusions: Towards a Politics of Singularity

Proceeding from a discussion of Heidegger's general ontology of Being in the preceding chapter, where we suggested that subjectivity is an ontologically

97. Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 256.

98. John D. Caputo, *Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation With Constant Reference to Deconstruction* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005).

99. See, for instance William Connolly, "Suffering, Justice, and the Politics of Becoming," in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, ed. D. Campbell, and M.J. Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). David Campbell, "The Deterritorialisation of Responsibility: Levinas, Derrida, and Ethics After the End of Philosophy," in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, ed. D. Campbell, and M.J. Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro, "Introduction: From Ethical Theory to Ethical Relation," in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, ed. David Campbell and Michael J. Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). Angus Brook, *The Early Heidegger and Ethics: The Notion of Ethos in Martin Heidegger's Early Career* (Saarbrücken: VDM, 2009); William Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); William McNeill, *The Time of Life: Heidegger and Ethos* (New York: SUNY Press, 2006).

100. Stephen K. White, *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*, 116. Louiza Odysseos, "Dangerous Ontologies: The Ethos of Survival and Ethical Theorizing in International Relations," *Review of International Studies* 28 (2002), 404.

deficient way of thinking the human being, this chapter has explored the implications of this general ontology for a regional ontology of the person, and suggested that we understand human beings as essentially world-relating creatures instead of ethical subjects.

Universality and Particularity

As a non-subjectivist way of conceiving the individual, thinking about humans in terms of their having 'a world' that is distinct from 'the world' offers a novel concatenation of the relationship between universality, particularity and individuality. As such, it offers an alternative understanding of the being of the human being to that relied upon by Linklater, for whom man's particular existence as a citizen of a political community is interrupted by more primordial moral claims upon him as an individual (thought as ethical subject): as a subject to the universal obligations of morality. Further, not only does this non-subjectivist account of the individual provide an alternative to Linklater's foundational reliance on man's 'bifurcated subjectivity', it also offers a way beyond the competing subjectivist assertions about universal and particular identities often made in the cosmopolitan / communitarian debate.

While communitarian thinking tends towards exclusivity and the problematic assumption of the shared presence of a particular community (such as the state) to all those subject to it, cosmopolitan thought often relies on more inclusive reasoning that is often divorced from people's social experiences, gives a poor account of motivation, and is regularly charged with being insufficiently attentive to difference and particularity. In contrast, the idea of humans as essentially world-relating creatures leads to the view that it is our world-relation that is universal, while as entities/beings to which worlds are present, the nature of our world relation is necessarily plural and individuated. Conceiving human beings as essentially world-relating creatures also provides a more nuanced way of accounting for the differential salience of a variety of associations or identities,

along with their relative importance in the constitution of any given individual's personality. It thus represents a more nuanced way of understanding the multifaceted, often conflicting influence of human cultures, identities and human agency in world politics, and offers a particularist response to the cosmopolitan trope that increasing interconnectedness between people as a result of processes of globalisation undermines the exclusive nature of particularist positions, and thus necessitates a cosmopolitan response that often involves the problematic invocation of a universal human community.

Freedom

The second part of the chapter followed Heidegger's ontological reading of Kant. Here we saw that the association of freedom with subjectivity that resonates profoundly with a modern, liberal sensibility – and which characterises Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism and his approach to CIRT – must be considered to be one of many possible determinations of the being of human beings. This also required that we understand freedom not as a property of man, but primarily as the condition of any interpretation of the being of beings – the presupposition of any and all of our understandings of beings. In short, that we could not associate freedom with a *foundational* subject. Consequently we suggested that emancipation cannot first consist in the self-realisation of the ethical subject, or in the establishment of the conditions of subjectivity, and that the extension of community cannot simply be thought as the removal of barriers to discursive reasoning, and neither can it simply be about the establishment of the *intersubjective* recognitive sphere. Rather, we concluded that, if international political action is to be considered emancipatory, it must be predicated on resolute solicitous being-with others.

We then explored Odysseos and Nancy's contributions to the idea of coexistence, where, drawing on Heidegger's identification of *Mitsein* as a fundamental existential structure of human existence, subjectivity and singularity

are presented as being deeply constituted by a relationality that is antecedent to any subjectivity. The result is that a politics of generality, such as a politics based on ethical principles, or universal rules of conduct, must exist in an essential tension with the nature of man as an ek-sisting, world-relating creature. Moreover, Nancy demonstrated that any attempt to establish community on the realisation of some inherent essence or subjectivity, such as common political identity or ethical subjectivity, was essentially bound to fail. This, we saw, heralded a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics; the cause of which can be identified as the rejection of the foundational commitment to the ethical subject.

Towards a Politics of Singularity

As a result, ethics becomes disassociated with universal principles that attempt to reconcile or manage human differences, and becomes primarily a relation to singularity. In light of cosmopolitan claims about universal principles or norms, what is interesting about this account is that ethics is understood as a mode of dwelling marked by a particular kind of relation to our own existence and to the existence of others rather than one wedded to a consensual approach to rules of conduct. Consequently, from this perspective, an ethical politics must be one that is predicated on openness to the other, rather than a politics based upon ethical principles. In contrast to subjectivist approaches to freedom (Marxist, late-Frankfurt School, liberal) where emancipation amounts to increasing the possibility of the subjective freedom of individual human beings, by taking departures from Heidegger's thought, freedom has to be understood in terms of an openness and practical engagement with others as others: an openness to be characterised by a decentred receptivity and an 'intensification of one's cognitive and affective capabilities.'¹⁰¹ Emancipation, therefore, cannot simply consist in the establishment of the political conditions conducive to the exercise of subjectivity,

101. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 59.

but must first involve *freeing up* the possibility of human existence as being-with others.

In short, if we eschew a foundational commitment to the ethical subject, an ethical or emancipatory politics can only be understood as such so long as it is predicated upon an understanding of politics as an interaction of singular and overlapping worlds, and on a recognition and defence of the singularities upon which it is based; a politics of subjectivity is structurally unable to do this. The notion of a politics of singularity, therefore, must be seen as central to the development of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Given the singularity of our own world, and the imperative to recognise and defend other worlds, two questions follow. The ethical question of how single particulars should stand in relation to each other, and the political question (or more accurately the task of an ethical politics) of how we should structure our social relations on the basis of the singular/plural character of Being. We will address these questions next, in Part 3.

Conclusions to Part 2

We concluded Part 1 by claiming that the weakness of Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and hence his approach to CIRT, was that it was predicated on a philosophically shallow understanding of human existence and a limited understanding of human freedom; it was these shortcomings that permit his (essentially problematic) foundational commitment to the subject. The aim of Part 2 has been to contribute to the development of a more universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary politics and ethics with a view to developing a more philosophically and praxeologically adequate emancipatory cosmopolitanism; one that might supplant Linklater's reliance on Habermas's normative ideal of a universal discourse community as the philosophical and normative aspect of the tripartite structure of critical theory.

In Chapter 1 we explored some of the problems associated with approaches to international theory that relied on dualistic premises, such as a commitment to foundational subjectivity or an intransitive object. Echoing the strategy employed by Hegel's phenomenological constructivism – where the split between subject and object does not occur between mind and world, but occurs *within* consciousness, where the cognitive object is constructed from conscious phenomena in an ongoing historical process – we suggested (against Cochran's pragmatist anti-foundationalism) that, conceived as a cognitive object, through a philosophical ontology of the being of human beings we could construct a more universalistic ontological foundation for a critical approach to international theory.

By demonstrating that subjectivity is a property that we project onto human beings and that human beings are better thought as singularities, Part 2 has laid the foundations for this more universalistic philosophical ontology of the human being for a critical approach to international theory. Heidegger's ontological difference has helped us to see that the being of entities is not intrinsic to that object, but is dependent upon context specific meanings that are projected onto it by human beings that encounter such entities as objects. Just as Heidegger criticises Descartes for projecting an interpretation of Being as 'substantiality' onto entities, Linklater's defence of universalism projects an idea of the existence of human beings as ethical subjects onto those entities outside the political community. We also learnt that Heidegger considers the objectification of reality to result from the theoretical attitude itself; that theory served to 'un-live' human experience and objectify existence.¹⁰² This is the core of the Heideggerian objection to the commitment to *intersubjectivity* in the critical theory of Habermas or Honneth, because *intersubjectivity* involves *abstracting from* and then *objectifying* human sociality as relations between subjects rather than relations between always-already-related-(co)existences.

If the being of entities, such as human beings, is not intrinsic to an entity but dependent upon meaning projected upon it by human beings themselves, then it

102. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence*, 36.

stands to reason that a core concern of any emancipatory cosmopolitanism must be to effect changes in the way that we encounter other human beings. Heidegger's notion of resolute solicitude provides such an orientation; the notion of resolute, solicitous being-with others holds great potential for the future of critical theory, as Kompridis has already argued. It offers us a more convincing account of the relation between freedom and dependence than one predicated on the subject, one that serves as a nascent but fruitful alternative to relations of inter-*subjectivity*. That said, we saw that Heidegger insists that resoluteness must precede solicitous being with others, and he thereby fails to demonstrate that both freedom and selfhood are ineluctably acquired in relation to others under conditions of cooperative interaction. We also noted that had Heidegger been a better student of Hegel's, he might have avoided this mistake; in this regard, Hegel's 'intersubjective' account of freedom and subjectivity is both much more convincing, and both more consistent with and more favourable to, Heidegger's account of positive solicitude. For this reason, it is to Hegel's compelling contributions to an emancipatory cosmopolitanism that we now turn.

Part 3.

Life, Love, and Emancipation

Introduction to Part 3

In light of the arguments developed in Parts 1 and 2, Part 3 draws on Hegel with the aim of contributing to the development of a more adequate philosophical defence of a critical approach to world politics. With this aim in mind, Chapter 6 engages in a discussion of the development of the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel. Here we foreground the implications of what might initially be understood as purely epistemological arguments for our mode of being in the world, and since these implications concern modes of being, we often refer to them as 'ontological implications'. Through this discussion we substantiate the claim made in Chapter 2 that dualist approaches to international political action perpetuate a 'politics of subjectivity,' and we outline some of the implications of this: these implications lend further credence to the claim made tentatively in Chapter 2 that we might be constitutively unable to build an ethical and emancipatory politics from dualist premises.

Following a more detailed discussion of Hegel's constructivist approach to knowledge in Chapter 6, we also develop our earlier claim that we might be able to overcome the anti-foundational/foundational divide in normative theory by recognising that our claims about the human being are claims about the human being *qua* constructed cognitive object rather than about the human being *qua* mind-independent entity. Chapter 7 then initiates a shift in focus to the ethical and emancipatory implications of our argument, picking up on our earlier discussion of Heidegger's conception of authentic human freedom as leading us into resolute, solicitous being-with, augmenting the necessarily inter-personal aspect of this argument that remains under-theorised by Heidegger.

We do this through a discussion of the role of love in Hegel's thought. Pre-empting the possibility of misunderstanding Hegel's conception of love as overly sentimental, romantic, or idealistic, we demonstrate in Chapter 6 that it should instead be conceived as a proto-phenomenological relation between self and world, where the limitations of theoretical activity are overcome through an attunement to

a practical relation to reality by a mature personality. Chapter 7 develops this claim, arguing that the experience of love can lead to a form of self-consciousness whereby we recognise that we are not actually subjects, but that our individuality – our sense of self and our individual autonomy – are ineluctably acquired through participation in society, which leaves us fundamentally dependent on others for our own 'subjectivity.' We then claim that properly ethical and emancipatory relations with others require an attunement to the social conditions of our own self-hood, and that we act accordingly.

Chapter 8 then sharpens our focus on the ethical and emancipatory aspects of our argument. We discover that Kant casts a long shadow over contemporary conceptions of the relationship between love and morality, since his insistence that love must be subordinate to a rational morality if it is not to be considered 'pathological,' has several influential contemporaries. We explicitly reject this view, siding instead with Hegel's view that the converse is true: that rational morality *not* subordinate to loving relations must be considered pathological. We discuss Hegel's essay *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*, which is formative in the development of his notion of *Sittlichkeit* (ethical life), wherein he heralds a fundamental discontinuity between the logics of love and law. These two separate logics inform Hegel's conceptions of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) and morality (*Moralität*) respectively, and they underlie a fundamental inequality between ethical life and moral laws – a discontinuity that is reflected in more recent 'poststructuralist' approaches to the 'ethical relation,' of which Nancy's critique of discourse ethics (discussed in Chapter 5) is an example.

We learn that for Hegel these two logics are mutually implicated; yet, as a result of their dualist commitments to a foundational ethical subject, both Habermas and Linklater dubiously affirm the sovereignty of ethical law (*Moralität*) over ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). This, we see, reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of ethical life and its superordinate relation to ethical law. In contrast, a central argument developed over the course of Part 3 is that it is our participation in ethical life – engaging in conscientious activity proceeding from the knowledge

of love – that represents the fullest appropriation of our own freedom, and can lead to properly ethical relations between self and other. We conclude by suggesting that an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism must then be proximally concerned with the cultivation of a more cosmopolitan international ethical life, an argument that we outline and defend in the conclusion.

Chapter 6.

Understanding Through Love, Not Vivisection: Reification, De-Reification, and Deification

Introduction

Through a discussion of development of the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel, this chapter explores the nature of Hegel's completion of the critical project that is initiated by Kant. We are particularly interested in Hegel's reworking of Kant's conception of 'subjectivity' into 'self-conscious subjectivity,' his departure from a foundational commitment to subjectivity, and his disassociation of subjectivity from individuality. In light of these moves, we argue that Hegel poses a robust challenge to the dualist commitment to a foundational split between subject and object occurring between mind and world.

The achievement of 'self-conscious subjectivity,' we learn, involves coming to see that the subject-object split is not foundational, but derivative, occurring *within* consciousness rather than between mind and world, and is overcome through a post-theoretical, phenomenological relation to reality, which Hegel discusses with reference to the experience of 'love.' The 'love' relationship, we argue, is not overly sentimental, but amounts to an openness of self to other: a receptive attunement to practical experience by a mature personality cognisant of the limitations of reflective rationality. The latter serving to un-live human experience and objectify the entities of experience, entities that include other human beings.

We argue that mis-recognising the nature of 'self-conscious subjectivity' as a Kantian form of subjectivity leads to deleterious implications for our mode of being in the world – including diremption, reification, and de-reification. These are all consequent of a commitment to a foundational subjectivity, where the self (conceived as subject) stands in a transcendent and assimilatory relation to the objects of its experience. Our discussion here is concerned primarily with the philosophical (ontological and epistemological) aspect of this argument, and we explore the ethical and emancipatory implications of these arguments in the two subsequent chapters.

On Hegel and Dualism

Before proceeding it is worth clarifying the use of our terms 'dualism' and 'monism' in relation to Hegel. For Hegel, as for Schelling and Spinoza, there is one substance, the 'absolute.'¹ The absolute is that which is presupposed as the 'ground' that underlies all the differentiated spheres of life. This is Hegel's *metaphysical* (ontological) monism. Human consciousness develops out of these underlying relations of life, and the mind-independent real 'appears' to consciousness: appearances (phenomena) that consciousness splits into subject and object. This split between subject and object is the condition of knowledge of the mind-independent real, but for Hegel it occurs *within* consciousness rather than between mind and world. Consequently, since mind and world are not independent, Hegel's approach to *epistemology* is also monistic.

Nonetheless, since there remains a duality between mind/world and mind-independent real, and between the subject and object that is split within consciousness, there remains a place for dualism in Hegel's thought. Indeed, for Hegel, dualism is the condition both of our knowledge of the world and of 'subjective' freedom. That said, since this dualism is derivative, not foundational, the subject does not persist and the object is not intransitive; both depend on our

1. It is only Schelling and Hegel that refer to this substance as the absolute, however.

cognitive frameworks (on the activity of mind, *Geist*) and develop historically through the interaction of human beings. For this reason dualism is seen as an essentially limited and one-sided way of conceiving the relationship between self and world. Consequently, despite their achievements, for Hegel object-oriented forms of consciousness, and related conceptions of the self as subject, must ultimately be overcome.

Hegel attempts to effect such an overcoming through the achievement of 'self-conscious subjectivity,' which entails recognising the essential limitations of reflective rationality and the epistemic attitude, and orienting ourselves accordingly: by cultivating a post-theoretical, receptive relation to reality, for instance. Such a relation is essentially a relation of finite to infinite; it is a relation between that which is conditioned by our knowledge of it to that which lies beyond consciousness and which cannot, ultimately, be known: relations to ourselves, to life, to 'God,' and to other beings in their full singularity. This attempt to overcome dualism is crucial to understanding Hegel, yet is often suppressed by rationalist or 'demythologised' interpretations of his thought.

Kant & Hegel

In Part 1 we saw how both Linklater's conception of emancipation and his defence of universalism indicated a foundational commitment to the ethical subject. Linklater's dialectical reading of rationalism and historicism in *Men and Citizens* led to an historically developing ethical subject providing the grounds for the critique of actually existing arrangements in international society, while his cosmopolitanism was reconceived along discursive lines in *Transformation*, where the emancipatory project came to be seen as the removal of the constraints on universal dialogue about principles of coexistence in international society. Common to both was the underlying commitment to a Kantian ethical subject and the concurrent commitment to the critique of social and political conditions that

stand as obstacles to the realisation of a Kantian ideal of a universal moral community.

In Chapter 5 we then saw that Kant's conception of freedom was an effective illustration of Heidegger's claim that any encounter with entities occurs 'in the light of Being,' since Kant, a committed Newtonian, sought to provide a place for human freedom within a mechanistic paradigm of nature; that his positing of freedom as a transcendental idea is at root an attempt to make sense of the unity of nature given a commitment to a mechanistic understanding of the world, where the mechanical necessity of nature was reconciled with the view of human beings as beings that are endowed with a distinctive kind of causality.² Heidegger's move to posit freedom as the *Abgrund* of the ontological difference as opposed to a property of the individual conceived as subject is, in short, a move that gives existential depth to Kant's conception of freedom; one motivated by a fuller consideration of the nature of human existence. A similar, but ultimately more persuasive move is made by Hegel, yet his thought is often misunderstood, and he is commonly dismissed as a metaphysician of the Absolute; not least by Heidegger.³

Hegel's Completion of the Critical Project

That Hegel was Kant's most powerful critic is commonly known, and his reaction to Kant is roughly significant as Aristotle's critique of Plato.⁴ However, there is an unfortunate tendency to overemphasise the difference between Kant and

2. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy* (London: Continuum, 2002), 177.

3. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1962), 77,239,438. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 187-88. For two illuminating discussions on this topic see R.S. Sinnerbrink, "Sein Und Geist: Heidegger's Confrontation With Hegel's Phenomenology," *Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* 3, no. 2-3 (2007): 132-52. Slavoj Žižek, "Hegel Versus Heidegger," *E-Flux* 32, no. 02 (2012). The similarity between Heidegger and Hegel's approaches to freedom – freedom as *Abgrund* and freedom of the Absolute – is largely due to the influence of Schelling on both in this regard.

4. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 156.

Hegel and, despite the title of his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, to ignore the fact that Hegel is a phenomenologist.⁵ Hegel's critique of Kant, along with those of the entire post-Kantian German idealist movement, is an essentially *constructive* critique with the aim of working out and completing Kant's critical project. Despite criticising Kant on nearly every page of his writings, Hegel's engagement with Kant is *not* a rejection of Kantianism, but part of the development of his own Kantianism.⁶ Perhaps Hegel's central point of contention with Kant lies in the ontological status accorded to the individual human being and the nature of its relation to the entities that it encounters. Specifically, what is contested is Kant's view that the individual can be regarded as an ethical (moral) or epistemic (knowing) subject: the view that the individual can be completely autonomous, or stand in a transcendent and knowing relation to the entities that it encounters. The first view informs Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism, while the second is reflected in the representationalist approach to knowledge that underwrites critical realist approaches to the study of world politics.

The *sine qua non* of this divergence is Hegel's rejection of the mechanistic paradigm of nature, which serves as the ontological background to Kant's philosophy, in favour of an organicist one: this amounts to a rejection of Kant's dualism in favour of a monistic, holistic, organicist philosophical ontology. As we saw in Chapter 3, although Habermas, Honneth and Linklater all develop from Kant in important ways, drawing on Hegel in significant respects in the process, their commitment to *intersubjectivity* shares with Kant the equation of individuality and subjectivity, two categories that for Hegel are very distinct. Consequently, while affirming Hegel's historicist view that 'reason has a history' and that the individual is deeply implicated in his historical circumstances, they read Hegel through a kaleidoscope of the Kantian subject: *reading into* Hegel an individualism that not only finds no support in his work, but which his whole project is an attempt to overcome.⁷

5. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 212.

6. For a discussion see Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Idealism*, 156. and Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 212-13.

7. Andy Blunden, "The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel," <http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/missing-mediation.htm> (accessed 29th June 2012, 2012). We

These kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel neutralise some of Hegel's most powerful and interesting insights, insights that can contribute to our development of a non-dualist, anti-foundational understanding of the human being, and a richer, more praxis oriented understanding of freedom than that which associates freedom with subjectivity or intersubjectivity; both of which will be engaged in the next two chapters with the aim of contributing to a more philosophically and praxeologically adequate emancipatory cosmopolitanism. With this aim in mind, the following section explores the development of the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel before drawing out some of the implications for our approach to the problem of knowledge and for our mode of being in the world.

In Chapter 5 we saw that Heidegger engages in an ontological reading of Kant's epistemology in *The Essence of Human Freedom*.⁸ A similar task is engaged here, since we provide a reading of the development of German idealism – specifically the move from Kant's representationalist epistemology to Hegel's completion of Kant's project in his constructivist approach to knowledge – and draw out the 'ontological' implications of what are often simply read as epistemological debates. By the end we will see that Hegel's completion of Kant's epistemology demonstrates both the ontological error and epistemological insufficiency of associating freedom and subjectivity with individual human beings: an insufficiency that marks dualist approaches to emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

The Subject-Object Relation from Kant to Hegel

Philosophy has long been concerned with the general problem of knowledge; all approaches to which 'share an interest in grasping, knowing, or cognising the

will recall from Chapter 3 that Blunden accuses Honneth of reading a *methodological* individualism into Hegel, and that since methodological individualism in the social sciences denies the fact that there are social forces etc. that this is a misleading term to apply to post-Marxist thinkers.

8. Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Human Freedom*.

cognitive object or objects, sometimes also called nature, or the world, or the real.⁹ This problem was initially understood in ancient philosophy through terms such as reality, phenomena, and appearance, while modern philosophy is distinguished by its insight that cognitive claims depend on the subject.¹⁰ Applied to epistemology, this insight requires of knowledge 'an identity in difference between the epistemological subject and the epistemological object, or between epistemology and ontology.'¹¹

The 'Birth' of the Epistemological Subject

Truth and knowledge rest upon a correspondence between the epistemological (knowing) subject and the cognitive (known) object; starting with Kant there are two main approaches to the nature of the relation between knowing subject and known object: representationalist and constructivist. The representationalist approach maximally presupposes an 'identity' between a representation and what is represented: for instance, between an idea in the mind and the cognitive object that is conceived as a mind-independent thing.¹² While constructivists affirm the same standard of truth and knowledge, they hold that the subject must in some sense 'construct' what it knows. These two approaches to knowledge lead to different claims about the cognitive object. Representationalists claim to uncover, discover, or reveal what is *as it is*, while constructivists on the other hand make the incompatible claim that we construct, produce, or make what we know.¹³ This constructivist claim to knowledge rests upon the activity of the subject in *bringing about* an identity between subject and object, which *presupposes* working towards an ever-closer identity between the cognitive object and the mind-independent entity that it seeks to know. Both representationalist and

9. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 3.

10. This shift to an idea of the epistemological subject is influenced by the Augustinian view of the human subject as ethically responsible, but the transition from a religious question of individual human responsibility that presupposes a subject to an epistemological conception of the subject occurs much later in Montaigne and Descartes. *Ibid.*, 10.

11. *Ibid.*, 12.

12. *Ibid.*, 11.

13. *Ibid.*, 12.

constructivist approaches appear in Kant's critical philosophy, and Hegel completes the constructivist approach to knowledge that Kant initiates.

Prior to Kant, the subject was regarded as essentially passive in regards to the objects that it experiences, merely registering what impacts upon it. Starting with Kant, and common to all post-Kantian German idealists, is the converse claim that the subject is active in its experience of objects: that in some sense it shapes what it knows. Insisting on the central importance of the subject in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant maintains that there can be no knowledge of objects without a subject, without an 'I think' to which the object appears.¹⁴ For Kant therefore, the subject is active in respect to the objects of experience, meaning that we never perceive 'things in themselves,' how things are independent of our experience of them. Rather, our perceptions of the object are dependent upon the way that our perceptual apparatus is constituted, and this inevitably influences the givens of experience.¹⁵

Kant's Copernican Revolution

Kant, a committed Newtonian, sought to apply Newton's insights in physics to metaphysics. While Newtonian mechanics provided a mechanical explanation of nature as governed by causally determining natural laws, Kant was interested in what Newton's postulation of laws of nature standing behind observable phenomena tells us about the perceiving subject; specifically, about the relation between pure thought and intuition. The fable of Newton observing an apple falling from a tree, which may or not have led to him postulating gravity as the cause of the effect that he observed, means, for Kant, that we can infer something about the perceiving subject. While gravity can explain *why* the apple fell from the tree, the relation of causal dependency between that movement and its cause is a relation that cannot itself be observed: the relation of causality, between cause and

14. Tom Rockmore, *Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003), 6-7,32-33.

15. *Ibid.*, 6-7.

effect, has to be projected by the subject in order to make sense of phenomena that are given to sensible intuition.

Kant's argument is that, while our immediate grasp of objects is an intuitive one, we rely upon our understanding, on the exercise of pure reason, to make sense of reality as it really is; consequently, in knowing the cognitive object, the subject's perceptions of that object are not passively caused by that object. Rather, the subject is active in 'working up' the objects of its experience. This is Kant's so-called 'Copernican Turn.' Just as Copernicus inverted the traditional understanding regarding the relation between the earth and the universe, Kant reverses the relation between subject and object. In so doing, and in distinction to Locke, who reduces the subject to mere physiology, and Hume, for whom the subject is 'a mere transitory bundle of perceptions,' Kant introduces a conception of the subject as enduring and transcendent in relation to the objects of its experience.¹⁶

By means of a transcendental deduction, Kant reasons that there must exist categories, pure *a priori* concepts of the understanding that give form to the phenomenal content of sensible intuition, which must shape our experience. These categories are not given in experience and are not simply transmitted by sense or intuition, but are the precondition of the cognitive subject's active synthesis of the objects of sensible intuition.¹⁷ To say that Kant's subject is transcendent is to identify it as the entity/being that draws the phenomena of sensible intuition together. The transcendental subject, which Kant barbarously calls the 'transcendental unity of apperception' (TUA), is the entity/being that draws together – it is that which creates the rules of the relations between the entities that it perceives. On the Kantian account then, it is this transcendental subject that is the condition of knowledge.

16. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 136.

17. Kant's transcendental deduction (TD) postulates twelve categories of four types: categories of quantity, quality, relation, and modality. The most familiar of these is the category of causality: an *a priori* category of relation between cause and effect that allows us to make sense of the appearance of movement in the world. According to Kant these pure concepts of the understanding are universal, applying to objects of intuition in general. Causality, unity, plurality, and negation are all concepts that we presuppose before we face reality. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Allen W. Wood and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), §79.

From Representationalism to Constructivism

While Kant innovates with regard to the subject's active role in its synthesis of the cognitive object, he holds two contradictory positions regarding the nature of this relation between the knowing subject and the cognitive object: between the subject passively representing the object and actively constructing it. Most dominant of the two is a representationalist approach, a metaphysical realist position where representations of the cognitive object appear to the subject, having their ontological cause in the mind-independent real, which leads to knowledge of the world as it is in itself. However, Kant does also hint at a constructivist approach to knowledge where the activity of the subject is not just confined to *synthesising* the object, but is more active in *constructing* the cognitive object.

It is worth noting that the Kantian subject, the TUA, is *not* a finite human being but is rather a subject reduced to its epistemological capacities. While this subject is active as regards its synthetic activity, these epistemological capacities are passive in the subject's relation to the world. This obscures the relation between the epistemological subject and the finite human being, which leads to a split between theoretical reason and practical reason, a split between the knowing subject and the acting subject.¹⁸ Kant's representational account of the subject thus opens a gulf that cannot be bridged between human understanding and human activity.

Moreover, Kant draws a crucial distinction between the mind-independent world, which lies beyond appearances, and the world of human experience, which is distinguished from reality.¹⁹ As a result, both Kant's representationalist and constructivist approaches to knowledge fail to give us knowledge of the cognitive object as it really is: of the thing in itself. There are, therefore, two dualisms that

18. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 137.

19. *Ibid.*, 44.

Kant's transcendental deduction cannot reconcile: the duality between subject and object, and the duality between theoretical and practical reason; between the knowing subject and the acting subject, and the knowing subject that might not actually know its object. It is these essential contradictions in Kant's critical philosophy to which post-Kantian German idealism responds.

Knowledge: The Identity of Identity & Non-identity

The central problem of Kant's account of knowledge is that, by failing to grasp the thing in itself, it is unable to reconcile the unity of subject and object. Subject and object need to be united in order to explain the possibility of knowledge, yet they must also be divided in order to explain the basic facts of everyday experience.²⁰ What we see, hear, or feel, appears independent of our will or conscious control: there is subject-object dualism. Yet making a claim to *know* something entails the necessary identity of what is represented and what is known: an identity between subject and object.²¹ Kant maintained that the thing in itself could not be known, and hence subject-object identity, the standard of truth, could not be achieved. In Kant's wake Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all tried to resolve this duality, to thereby achieve what Hegel is to call an identity of identity and non-identity.

Fichte & the Infinite 'Striving' of the Ego.

Fichte resolves Kant's dualism between subject and object by postulating a principle of subject-object identity, which he locates in *self*-knowledge. In self-knowledge the subject of knowledge (the knowing self) and the object of knowledge (the known self) are the same, they are united, I=I. Self-knowledge thus

20. Subject and object need to be united, not in the sense of merging into one, but terms of having a relationship of some sort, if not outright correspondence.

21. By 'identity' we do not mean that subject and object are identical, but that there must be a degree of self-sameness between the subject and object; some correspondence between the object and the subject's representation of it.

provides Fichte the foundation for all knowledge. Fichte therefore abandons Kant's representationalist approach to knowledge and develops Kant's constructivism in its stead, emphasising the active role of the subject in its construction of the cognitive object from out of the empirical content of experience.

By rejecting Kant's representationalist approach and stressing the cognitive role of human activity, Fichte unifies theoretical and practical reason by grounding them both in the dynamic activity of self-consciousness, an exercise in practical reason that he calls 'striving.' According to Fichte, rather than ideas having their ontological cause in the mind-independent real, the subject *constructs* the cognitive object from its phenomenally given content; Fichte thus resolves Kant's dualism between appearances and the mind-independent real by simply doing away with the thing in itself.

Self-knowledge on the Fichtean account is the foundation for all knowledge but again, as with Kant, the subject of subject-object identity is not the finite human being, but is what Fichte calls the 'pure ego.' This pure ego is a self-positing, unconditioned 'I' that divides itself into the finite 'I' and the not 'I,' where the finite I represents individual human particulars and the not-I is that which negates it. Rather than coming about through the persistence over time of the synthetic unity of the TUA, the Fichtean subject, the 'I,' comes about purely in the act of self-positing. Knowledge is no longer conceived as a representation of the world in theoretical understanding that corresponds to the mind-independent real, but comes through the inexorable march of practical reason, represented by Fichte as the infinite striving of the ego – where self-consciousness 'strives' in its moral actions (i.e., practical reason) to conform to its own moral law: to make the 'is' what it '*ought*' to be.

The Fichtean Trope

Essential to Fichte's account of knowledge then is a dynamic relation between the Self (*das Ich*) and the Non-Self (*das-Nicht-Ich*), where the self at once confronts and projects the not-self.²² Consequently, on the Fichtean account, nature becomes an essential self-limitation on the universal 'I;' Northrop Frye provides a beautiful image that illustrates Fichte's representation of the dynamic between self and other in his suggestion that the fundamental gesture of Western thought is the transformation of the natural world into the farm.²³ Such a dynamic is thus characterised by a process of de-reification, a process of taking something that is thing-like, independent, and de-reifying it by withdrawing its independence so as to bring it into accordance with the norms of reason, desire, and humanity.²⁴ This thought, that consciousness strives to take objective recalcitrance out of the world and bring it into conformity with human desire, is hugely important to Marxist thought, and there is a whole aspect of continental thought that attempts to overcome the independence of the object by bringing it into conformity with the norms of reason.²⁵

However, despite offering an account of the 'striving' subject, the epistemological problem of the thing in itself remains. By using *self*-knowledge as an epistemological foundation Fichte is able to account for subject-object identity in self-knowledge, but he cannot do likewise for subject-object non-identity. By doing away with the thing in itself, the mind-independent real, Fichte reduces the world to its construction by the subject, where objects of experience are treated as negations of the subject and thus exist simply in order to be overcome: to be assimilated by the subject. Reality on the Fichtean account is thus purely reducible to its construction by the subject. By relying on a *foundational* subject, Fichte inevitably overemphasises the constructive role of the subject, and cannot provide

22. Roger Cardinal, "Romantic Travel," in *Rewriting the Self: Histories From the Renaissance to the Present*, ed. Roy Porter (London: Routledge, 1997).

23. Northrop Frye, *The Double Vision: Language and Meaning in Religion* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 22-39. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 8th November (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/19MasterSlaveA.mp3>.

24. Ibid.

25. See Tom Rockmore, *Fichte, Marx, and the German Philosophical Tradition* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1980). J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a)."

an adequate account of the object. The problem is that we want our subject-object dualism, we want our experience of the world to be different from our experience of ourselves, but Fichte's account cannot provide this as he denies the object any mind-independent reality.²⁶ There thus remains a dualism between the knowing subject and mind-independent real that neither Kant nor Fichte can reconcile. Proceeding from a foundational subject, both rationalist accounts fail to give an account of how we can know things in themselves.

It is for this reason that, in his (1799) open *Letter to Fichte* Jacobi charges the transcendental idealism of both Kant and Fichte with leading us to the spectre of sceptical nihilism. Nihilism is the inevitable conclusion of a reliance on the foundational subject because if we can only know what we create or produce according to the laws of our own activity, we cannot know anything beyond our own consciousness. According to Kant we can only know appearances, not things in themselves, and because we do not know things in themselves, Jacobi suggests that that these representations might be representations of nothing at all.²⁷ This would make Kantianism a philosophy of nothingness, what we nowadays call nihilism, since nihilism is the thought that we know nothing by knowing appearances.²⁸

From Dualism to Monism: Situating the Subject

The problem with both Kant and Fichte's accounts of human experience is that they take the conscious subject as their point of departure. Responding to both, Schelling's transcendental idealism moves away from the question of the 'I' as point of departure, regarding consciousness not as a condition of our experience of the world, but as a result. For Schelling, consciousness has its origins in nature, which it transcends: this is why Schelling's idealism is referred to as a *transcendental*

26. Ibid.

27. 'Without the presupposition [of the 'thing in itself,'] I was unable to enter into [Kant's] system, but with it I was unable to stay within it.' Friedrich Jacobi, *David Hume Über Den Glauben, Oder Idealismus Und Realismus. Ein Gespräch* (Breslau: Gottlieb Löwe, 1787).

28. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a)."

idealism as opposed to Fichte's *subjective* idealism. Whereas for Fichte nature was seen as an essential limitation on the striving of practical reason, Schelling recognises that nature has a reality in and of itself, and out of this reality, ideality, consciousness, springs: nature begins unconsciously and results in conscious, philosophical activity and knowledge. Subjective consciousness is grounded in, and thus becomes the result of, the organic development of nature. Schelling therefore also represents a broader shift away from the mechanistic paradigm of nature, the *sine qua non* of Kant's account of ethical and epistemological subjectivity, towards the *Naturphilosophie* central to understanding Hegel's thought.

Of equivalent import is Schelling's introduction of the notion of the absolute, which is posited as the ultimate ground of nature and of reality in general, later becoming central not only to Hegel's 'absolute idealism' but also to Heidegger's positing of freedom as the *Abgrund* of the ontological difference.²⁹ It is in the absolute, rather than in the epistemological subject, that Schelling locates the unconditional identity of subject and object; subject and object only then become divided within consciousness, as the condition of the knowledge of the real: the absolute is the starting point, and subjective consciousness is the result. As an exercise in subjective consciousness, philosophy cannot represent this absolute because conscious thinking 'operates from the position where the "absolute identity" of the subjective and the objective has always already been lost in the emergence of consciousness.'³⁰ Schelling thus conceives the epistemological subject to be driven by conceptually inaccessible forces and essentially limited in what it can know: a conception of the subject that is later to influence Nietzsche and Freud but, most importantly, Hegel.

29. See Parvis Emad, "Heidegger on Schelling's Concept of Freedom," *Man and World* 8, no. 2 (1975): 157-74. and Martin Heidegger, *Schelling's Treatise: On the Essence of Human Freedom* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1985).

30. Andrew Bowie, *Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Von Schelling*, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2010 Edition) (2010).

Self-Conscious Individuality: Hegel's Completion of Kant's Critical Epistemology

Both Kant and Fichte take the subject as their point of departure; for Kant this means that the mind-independent real cannot itself be known and that we can only know 'appearances' or 'phenomena,' while Fichte resolves the dualism between mind and world by simply doing away with the thing in itself. Hegel wants to be able account for subject-object dualism, and his resolution is to argue that the subject-object split does not occur between mind and world, but occurs *within consciousness*. This entails a mind-world monism, but retains a duality between subject/object and mind independent real; the mind-independent real is that which lies beyond consciousness, and 'appears' at the level of consciousness. Through a process of cognitive activity, the understanding splits what appears to consciousness into subject and object, an ongoing historical process through which the cognitive object is *constructed* from phenomena given to consciousness, leading to the construction of increasingly adequate accounts of the mind-independent real.

Hegel takes Jacobi's charge against Kantianism seriously, and his answer to the spectre of sceptical nihilism is to shift from consciousness to self-consciousness. Rather than arising from the persistence of the TUA over time, or of the activity of the striving of the pure ego, Hegel's thought is that self-knowledge is only possible through mutual recognition, and not through the Cartesian view, of which Kantianism is a type, of the self-knowledge of a rational subject. In short, without the recognition of the other, the self cannot have knowledge of itself as a rational being. Because self-consciousness depends on intersubjective recognition, reason is no longer confined to the activity of individual subjective consciousness, but is exercised through intersubjective activity, bringing both the individual and practical reason into a close relationship with a historical community.

The Passage to Self-Consciousness.

One of the central moves of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, a book that traces the development of *Geist*, the self-conscious subject, is to provide an account of the achievement of self-consciousness. The treatise is split into three main parts: A) 'Consciousness'; B) 'Self-consciousness;' iii) and a final, unnamed part comprising chapters on 'Reason,' 'Spirit,' 'Religion,' and culminating in 'Absolute Knowing.' Part A) discusses three forms of object-oriented consciousness, sense-certainty, perception, and the understanding. The construction of the cognitive object, however, requires some sense of self, as subject, that is independent of the object. As we have seen, Kant regards this sense of self as the consequence of the persistence over time of the TUA, while Fichte thought it as something that came over the course of subjective activity. Hegel's intervention is to insist that this self is not foundational, and what is required for this sense of self, which is a prerequisite of an encounter with objects, is a move from subjective consciousness to *self-consciousness*.

Self-consciousness, for Hegel *contra* Kant and Fichte, only arises when cognitive activity is turned *in on itself*. A sense of self, as an independent agent, is not fully complete until one realises that one's self is also an object for other subjects. Children and animals may well possess consciousness of things that are external to them without having an awareness of themselves as an independent consciousness aware of those things as objects. The achievement of a sense of self is the key move played out in the passage from consciousness to self-consciousness, a move that is explored in Hegel's famous account of the master and slave. Self-consciousness, understanding ourselves as independent beings, develops from consciousness's encounter with objects, but only comes about when an object-oriented consciousness encounters another consciousness, i.e., through human sociality. Crucially though, because the self-conscious 'subject' is *fundamentally* dependent on others for its self-consciousness, the individual is no longer regarded as a subject of the Kantian/Fichteian type, and subjectivity is sublated into 'absolute' knowledge: an insight, or at least the implications of this

insight for our mode of being in the world, that is overlooked by kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel as a theorist of intersubjectivity.

Absolute Knowledge

While philosophy, and modern philosophy especially, has aimed at absolute knowledge, certainty beyond any doubt, as symbolised by the Cartesian idea of epistemological *apodicticity*; this is not what Hegel has in mind.

Absolute knowledge in [Hegel's] theory is not merely a later version of the Cartesian claim to certainty; nor is it related to the Kantian idea that philosophical knowledge is absolutely permanent and not subject to revision of any kind. On the contrary, the upshot of Hegel's detailed and lengthy review of the different angles of vision on knowledge, or conceptual perspectives that have historically emerged in the human search for knowledge, is that we absolutely cannot escape from the perspectival approach to some angle of vision beyond all perspective. For whenever we scrutinize experience, we necessarily do so from the attitude due to our time and place. Absolute knowledge, if this reading of Hegel's theory is correct, is, then, the consequence of thinking through the epistemological problem to the end where we finally become aware that we cannot avoid an ever changing perspective with respect to our experience. There is no absolute knowledge if that is interpreted to mean knowledge beyond time and place. Rather, since claims to know are never beyond time and place, they are, then, always and necessarily subject to revision as our experience changes.³¹

The achievement of self-conscious individuality, which is a moment on the path to knowledge, ultimately leads to an awareness of ourselves as non-knowers: to realise that we are *not* essentially Kantian/Fichtean subjects. This is the conclusion of the *Phenomenology*: to come to realise that we are essentially not-subjects, that we are historical beings living in complex social worlds according to communal norms.³² Although Heidegger is apparently uninterested in epistemology, there are striking similarities here with the Heideggerian view of the perspectival presentation of the whole, as discussed in Chapter 4.

31. Tom Rockmore, *Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought*, 102.

32. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Introduction," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 10th October (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/09PhenomenologyIntroC.mp3>.

Hegel's Constructivism

Kant and Fichte's mistake is to take the foundational subject as their point of departure. On both accounts this leads to a transcendental conception of the subject where the subject exists in a hierarchical relation to the objects of its experience. The transcendent subject is left essentially unconditioned by these experiences, and objects are encountered in a way that presupposes their assimilation into subject-object identity: these objects are never out of the subject's reach. Hegel takes from Kant the essential role of the epistemological subject and he follows Fichte's emphasis on the active and constructive role of the subject. However, he avoids falling foul of Fichte's mistake of over-stressing the role of subjective activity by following Schelling's argument that the subject-object split occurs *within* consciousness rather than between mind and world; that the subject-object distinction is not something prior to consciousness, but arises through conscious activity. As a result, Hegel argues that subjectivity is *derivative* rather than foundational: that the subject is *immanent* to the phenomenal realm, existing in a mutually conditioning, dependent relationship with the object. Contra Kant and Fichte, subject and object emerge through the *interaction* between self and world, and neither subject or object is transcendent or unconditioned. This is what Hegel means by the notion of subject-object unity, not that they are identical, but that they are not independent.

While Kant analyses the preconditions of consciousness, Hegel lays no claim to know what lies beyond consciousness.³³ For this reason his argument cannot be considered metaphysical, in the Heideggerian sense at least. For Hegel the mind-independent real 'appears' to consciousness, which it *constructs* rather than represents: a process that is generative of both subject and object. Rather than

33. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 97. There is an attractive, immanent quality to Hegel's thought. He does not engage in the kind of metaphysical projection (projection outside of experience) that Kant, Nietzsche, and Freud make; projections that make their thought questionable. 'Kant saw metaphysics as speculation about transcendent entities, as *a priori* reasoning about objects lying beyond the sphere of experience. In this sense Hegel cannot be a metaphysician at all, and for a very simple and compelling reason: he denied the existence of the transcendent, the purely noumenal or supernatural. If metaphysics consists in speculation about such a realm, then Hegel would be the first to condemn it as a pseudo-science.' Frederick C. Beiser, *Hegel* (London: Routledge, 2005), 55.

reflecting a split between mind and world, it is *consciousness* that splits appearances of the mind-independent real into subject and object, and the cognitive object is constructed in light of our conscious experience of the mind-independent real. Although we can never fully know this realm, we can develop increasingly adequate accounts of it. Knowledge is thus a non-objective *construction* of the world that is derived from a practical relation to reality.

In contrast to the Kantian or Fichtean subject, which is treated as foundational, Hegel's subject is derivative, emerging from its interaction with the objects of its experience, and *self-conscious* subjectivity is mediated by processes of recognition: by the intersubjective creation and validation of ourselves as certain kinds of subjects. The important epistemological and ontological implication of this is that we do not primarily relate to the world as knowers. Because our knowledge of objects presupposes our knowledge of ourselves as subjects, our encounter with the objects of our experience is *fundamentally mediated* by our relations with others. We will return to this in the next chapter.

For this reason self-conscious subjectivity is itself sublated into absolute knowledge. What this means is that, while human beings are essential components of epistemological or ethical subjectivity, *they are not its direct correlate*. Subject-object identity is located in the absolute, to which individual human beings stand as parts to whole: we exist within epistemological and ethical communities; individuality and subjectivity are not coextensive. This is a radical insight of Hegel's, with important implications for our understanding of the human being and freedom, an insight that is neutralised by kaleidoscopic readings of him as a theorist of intersubjectivity; readings that, by establishing the individual conceived as subject as the point of departure, threaten to perpetuate a politics of subjectivity associated with the Kantian/Fichtean approach to the subject. We will return to this claim shortly.

Hegelian Subjectivity

Rather than presuming an *a priori* subjectivity that precedes and underwrites the finite human being's interactions with the world, the central insight of Hegel's account of the master and slave is that self-consciousness arises relationally; that I can only gain self-consciousness of my existence as a free being by being recognised as such by the other. While the self initially manifests itself to the other as an external object, as simply an immediate concrete existence, the ensuing struggle for dominance between these two consciousnesses results in mutual recognition between free beings. The struggle for recognition that is the foundation of self-consciousness thus binds us together in relations of dependence with others, on whose recognition we are dependent for our own 'subjectivity.' Our 'subjectivity' is *interrupted* by the other, and this interruption of subjectivity is the *condition of* subjectivity.³⁴ Consequently, although often read as a discourse on the nature and possibility of freedom, before it is this, the struggle for recognition is a struggle between our absolute dependence and our absolute independence: it is a struggle between *love* and *death*.³⁵

The passage to self-consciousness is not essentially a confrontation between independent subjects, but is a process of mutual self-disclosure in which the operation of object-oriented consciousness is disrupted by its interaction with another consciousness. Treating each other 'as if we were' subjects is a compromise solution, a way of mediating our absolute dependence on one another – but it is misleading to represent this compromise as an essentially *intersubjective* relation because the individuals are co-dependent, fundamentally reliant on one another for their (relative) independence. The disarmingly simple point demonstrated by Hegel in the passage to self-consciousness then, is that individuals are neither subjects nor objects. This is disarmingly simple because it is all too easy to fall back into

34. Levinas, for whom the 'not me' is simply opposed to 'me,' disputes this. For Hegel however, we need more than difference, we need interruption. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a)."

35. On a reading of the struggle for recognition as a discourse on the nature and possibility of freedom see Robert B. Pippin, "What is the Question for Which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?," *European Journal of Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2000): 55-172. Love is the image of our absolute dependence, whilst death demonstrates our absolute independence.

the logic of subject-object thinking by treating the other independent self-consciousness simply as a subject, as a self-enclosed and independent ground of action, thereby eschewing the mutually codependent constitution of any given 'subjectivity'.

In addition to the dependence on other consciousnesses, self-conscious 'subjectivity' is also essentially conditioned by the other objects (entities) that it encounters: subject and object are mutually conditioned. Hegel's 'subject' thus does not persist – that is, stand in being – but is transformed in action. To put it bluntly, Hegel's 'subject' *is not a subject*. Resonating with Heidegger's existential analytic of *Da-sein*, in her classic work on the *Phenomenology* and its reception in France Judith Butler explains that:

The emergent subject of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is an ek-static one, a subject who constantly finds itself outside itself, and whose periodic expropriations do not lead to a return to a former self. Indeed, the self who comes outside of itself, for whom *ek-stasis* is a condition of existence, is one for whom no return to self is possible, for whom there is no final recovery from self-loss.³⁶

While we are often constituted as subjects – legal persons or citizens, for instance – there is therefore a definitional difficulty in associating 'subjectivity' and 'intersubjectivity' with individual human beings in Hegel's thought, since subjectivity properly resides in the absolute, to which individuals stand as parts to whole. Associating 'subjectivity' with individual human beings evades the deeply relational nature of individuality and the temporal (ek-sistential) nature of human existence; the latter relating to the view that human individuals are not preformed monadic entities (subjects), but are beings that exist in a perpetual state of becoming.

It is Jean-Luc Nancy who comes the closest to capturing this ek-sistential aspect of the Hegelian 'subject' in his *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*.³⁷ For Nancy the Hegelian subject 'is not recoiled into itself, but is defined

36. Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), xv. emphasis added.

37. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).

fundamentally as an act by which the self overcomes itself in its passage toward and into the world. The subject disperses itself into its world, and this self-surpassing is precisely the operation of its negativity [...] the 'disquiet' of the self is precisely its mode of becoming its final non-substantiality in time, and its specific expression of freedom.³⁸

For this reason, conceiving the individual human being as a subject is both epistemological error and ontological insufficiency: it misunderstands what the human being is and it misrepresents our mode of being in the world. Permitting ourselves the indulgence, it would be more appropriate to write the Hegelian subject *sous rature* – as ~~subject~~ – since 'subject' is necessary, but insufficient.³⁹ From a Hegelian perspective, the problem with conceiving the human being as a subject, and relations between beings as *intersubjective* relations, is that it makes it harder for us to extirpate ourselves from the mechanistic paradigm of nature against which Hegel was reacting.

The Problem of Life: Hegel's Monistic Philosophical Ontology

38. Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France*, xii. 'The subject is - or makes up - the experience of its being-affected as the ordeal of what dissolves its subsistence. But again: it is not "some thing" (pain, death, the other, or joy) that undoes this subsistence from the exterior. It is not another subsistence that divides the subject; it is substance that divides itself - that enters into relation, or that opens itself to it, or that manifests itself. The subject is the experience of the power of division, of ex-position or abandonment of self.' Ibid. Nancy continues: "'Self' "is" only this: negating itself as in-itself. Self in itself is nothing, is immediately its own nothingness. Self is only fissure and fold, return upon self, departure from self, and coming to self. That is why the Hegelian "self" has its concept only in the multiple and infinite syntax of these expressions: *in itself, for itself, right at itself, or near itself, unto itself, outside of itself*.' Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, 42-43.

39. Writing the 'subject' as ~~subject~~, is meant to signify that it is necessary, but insufficient. The technique was first used by Heidegger in his letter to Ernst Junger *The Question of Being*, and was later used extensively by Derrida as a way of denouncing the metaphysics or 'presence' behind the word used. As Spivak explains in her preface to Derrida's *Of Grammatology* 'Since the word is inaccurate, it is crossed out. Since the word is necessary, it remains legible.' Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), xiv.

Whereas Kant and Fichte take the epistemological subject as their points of departure, an ontological commitment informed by Kant's approbation of Newtonian physics, Hegel follows Schelling by taking 'life' as the starting point of his philosophy: his thought proceeding from an organic vision of the world, a view of the universe as a single living organism.⁴⁰ The main challenge to such a monistic holism came from the old mechanistic paradigm of nature associated with Newton, Hobbes, and Descartes, which was elevated into the very paradigm of rationality by Kant and Jacobi. According to the mechanistic paradigm, the natural world can be best explained mechanically in terms of cause and effect, as it is governed by certain fundamental laws of nature.

Hegel thought this mechanistic paradigm insufficient for understanding life for two main reasons: firstly because living beings, and life in general, are self-generating and self-organising, while mechanistic explanations of events can only explain the action of one entity upon another. Secondly, whereas organicism regards living entities as a unity, a *totum* where whole and parts form an indivisible unity, a mechanism can only be understood analytically, as a *compositum* where the parts precede the whole.⁴¹ Hegel's reaction against dualism, his concern to show, against Kant and Descartes, that the world is *not* primordially divided into subject and object, mind and body, self and other – as well as all his central and characteristic concepts, such as unity-in-difference and the dialectic – all grow out of this organic conception of nature: a monistic, holist philosophical ontology that underwrites his approaches to epistemology, subjectivity, freedom, ethics, and politics.

Those encountering Hegel for the first time will likely find his use of apparently contradictory terms such as 'infinitely finite,' 'unrestricted restrictedness,' and later 'unity-in-difference,' perplexing to say the least. Indeed

40. Although this sounds implausible, besides Winnicott's example of the mother and child to be discussed shortly, such an organicist approach is not too far-fetched (at least on planet Earth). See, for instance, research into the Last Universal Common Ancestor (LUCA), a single cell existing 3/4billion years ago, from which all life has since evolved. Gary Hamilton, "Looking for Luca - the Mother of All Life," *New Scientist* 2515 (2005).

41. Frederick C. Beiser, *Hegel*, 81-82.

Hegel has often been dismissed as nonsensical.⁴² However, Hegel's concepts and dialectical logic are less incomprehensible when placed in the context of his organicism, since they emerge as attempts to provide a non-reductive or non-atomistic method of understanding living beings as self-generating and self-organising concrete wholes.⁴³ They represent a reaction against atomistic accounts of our understanding of life, where focus begins with the particular, from which universals are generalised.

Hegel's Philosophy of Life

Hegel's holistic philosophical ontology represents an immensely important move away from the metaphysical and methodological individualism associated with the social contract theorists, but most significantly, from Kant. His holistic philosophical ontology sees human beings, not primarily as subjects, but as elements of a broader multiplicity of life. The term 'multiplicity' is used in contrast to a plurality, as the latter implies a collection of subjects. Human 'multiplicity' reflects the view that human beings are not independent units, isolated essences that exist as one of many in a plurality of substantiality, but exist as different elements of the multiplex nature of life; individuals are thus regarded as modifications of the same life rather than being wholly separate essences.

While Habermas, Honneth, and Linklater all read Hegel through a Kantian kaleidoscope, Hegel's philosophy of life had earlier found favour, influencing the development of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's *Lebensphilosophie* ('life-philosophy'), hermeneutics, and Heideggerian phenomenology - the latter two at least through the work of Wilhelm Dilthey. In contrast to other biographer's focus

42. Schopenhauer's many denunciations of Hegel along these lines reaches almost comic vigour. An example: 'But the height of audacity in serving up pure nonsense, in stringing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words, such as had previously been known only in madhouses, was finally reached in Hegel, and became the instrument of the most barefaced general mystification that has ever taken place, with a result which will appear fabulous to posterity, and will remain as a monument to German stupidity.' Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: The Edinburgh Press, 1906), 22.

43. Frederick C. Beiser, *Hegel*, 81-82.

on Hegel's 'mature' system, Dilthey's (1905) study *The Young Hegel's History* considers Hegel's later thought as an inexorable expression of his earlier metaphysical and theological concerns, which are most apparent in his essays *Fragment on Love* (1797/1798), *The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* (1799), and his *Fragment of a System* (1800) – now published as his *Early Theological Writings*.⁴⁴ What emerged from Dilthey's (1905) study of Hegel was a principal concern with the concept of 'life,' which is the holistic, temporal context of meaning. Dilthey writes '[l]ife is the basic element or fact which must form the starting point for philosophy. It is known from within. It is that behind which we cannot go. Life cannot be brought before the bar of reason.'⁴⁵ Palmer explains that the significance lies in the implication that '[o]ur access to an understanding of 'life' lies deeper than reason, for life is rendered understandable through its objectifications.'⁴⁶

Dilthey's (Hegelian) view that 'life' is the holistic, temporal context of meaning was to become a central theme in the writings of both Rosenzweig and Heidegger, and in turn influenced the 'ontological turn' in hermeneutics, as initiated by Heidegger and developed by Gadamer.⁴⁷ Dilthey's influence on early Heidegger is well documented, for whom philosophy occurs within a hermeneutic sphere of temporal existence: in *Being and Time* this is *Dasein*, but in Heidegger's early

44. This rescuing of Hegel's metaphysics is common to writers of the (first) 'Hegel Renaissance,' which emerged at the end of the 19th century. G.W.F. Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). Alice Ormiston, Laura Werner, and the author of this thesis also share this view. See Alice Ormiston, "'The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate:' Towards a Reconsideration of the Role of Love in Hegel," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 3 (2002): 499-525; Alice Ormiston, *Love and Politics: Re-Interpreting Hegel* (New York: SUNY Press, 2004). Laura Werner, "The Restless Love of Thinking: The Concept of *Liebe* in Hegel's Philosophy" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2007).

45. Quoted in Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 120.

46. *Ibid.*

47. On Dilthey's influence on Rosenzweig and Heidegger see Peter Eli Gordon, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 86. On his influence on hermeneutics see Richard E. Palmer, *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer*. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's *Lebensphilosophie* ('life-philosophy') proceeds in a similar vein, criticising the theoretical and positivist focus of post-Kantian philosophy.

work, such as his 1920-1921 lectures on the philosophy of religion, he designates this sphere as 'life.'⁴⁸

It is worth noting that Hegel's idea of an underlying unity of life is not as mystical or metaphysical as it might first appear, especially in contrast to Kant's assignation of subjectivity to the individual. Illuminating in this regard is the work of the child psychologist Donald Winnicott, who develops an essentially Hegelian approach to understanding the relation between a mother and child.⁴⁹ Successful child development requires that the infant build the self-confidence to separate from the mother and to have an independent existence. In this process Winnicott treats the mother-infant as a single subjectivity that subsequently develops into separate, autonomous individuals. This development is not a process of confrontation between two independent subjects, but is a process of differentiation of a single subjectivity into independent agencies.⁵⁰

Blunden uses this illustration to criticise Honneth's reading of Hegel's recognition theory, as this is a process of *becoming* a self-conscious independent person through a process of *differentiation* rather than 'a demand for recognition from an already self-conscious subject upon another independent subject.'⁵¹ Since this not a process of confrontation between two independent subjectivities, the criticism applies to kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel as a 'theorist of intersubjectivity' more broadly. Considered in this light then, rather than being mystical or metaphysical, Hegel's monistic philosophical ontology can be seen as contributing to a deeper ontological account of individuality.

From Particular/Universal to Part/Whole

48. In his *History of the Concept of Time* Heidegger writes that 'Dilthey was the first to understand the "aims of phenomenology."' Quoted by Peter Eli Gordon, *Rosenzweig and Heidegger: Between Judaism and German Philosophy*, 87n12. See also Martin Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Especially pp7-10

49. See Donald Woods Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (London: Routledge, 1971).

50. Andy Blunden, "The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel."

51. Ibid.

Hegel's holism thus marks an important shift from thinking relations of particular to universal to relations of parts to whole; a shift that plays out across his work, with consequences for fields such as ethics, freedom, epistemology, aesthetics and theology. His *Science of Logic* presents a 'logic of life,' an attempt to understand the organic development of life in conceptual form, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a philosophical study of the organic and phenomenological development of different forms of consciousness, while his *Philosophy of History* traces the historical development of different forms of human freedom, and his *Philosophy of Right* is a study of the organic development of *Recht* (law/right).

It is this latter example, where relations between individual and community are presented as organic relations between parts and whole that is likely to be most familiar with the reader. Hegel's argument in the *Philosophy of Right* poses a forceful challenge to the social contract approach to the relation between individual and state, and is later a source of inspiration for Mervyn Frost's 'constitutive theory' of individuality.⁵² Whereas the social contract tradition projects an interpretation of the nature of human individuals that might be said to exist in a hypothetical state of nature, from which universal interests – such as provision of security, the protection of property, or the enforcement of the general will – can serve to justify state authority, Hegel's holism presents the interests of citizens and community not as relations of particular to universal, but as part to whole. This does not subordinate the individual to the community, but regards both as implicated in mutually sustaining living relations between parts and whole. Hegel provides a poetic illustration of this idea in his essay *The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate*:

Even in the expression "A son of the stem of Koresh," for example, which the Arabs use to denote the individual, a single member of the clan, there is the implication that this individual is not simply a part of the whole; the whole does not lie outside him; he himself is just the whole which the entire clan is. As with any genuinely free people, so among the Arabs, the individual is a part and at the same time the whole. It is true only of objects, of things lifeless, that the whole is other than the parts; in the living thing, on the other hand, the part of the whole is one and the same as the whole. If particular objects, as substances, are linked together while each of them yet retains its character as an individual (as

52. Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

numerically one), then their common characteristic, their unity, is only a concept, not an essence, not something being.⁵³

It is for this reason that Nancy is correct to claim that Hegel's world is a 'world in which no generality subsists, only infinite singularities.'⁵⁴

Neither generality nor particularity subsists, for the "particular" is still only the finite in an extrinsic relation with the general, itself still exterior and therefore in its turn posited as particular - the finite, therefore, in the relation of particular interests with a general interest. The singular, on the contrary, is the finite in itself and for itself infinite, for which there is no separate universality. If I say, "Socrates is a man," I take Socrates for a particular case of the human species. But Socrates-the-singular is not a case: it is he and nothing other. If one prefers, he is an absolute case, and the absolute in general is made up solely of absolute cases and of all their absolute relations.⁵⁵

‘Ontological’ Implications of the Foundational Subject

In the opening pages of the *Phenomenology* Hegel criticises any philosophy that is only an epistemology, and, since it involves claims and assumptions about the relationship between individuality and subjectivity and the relationship between self and world, our discussion of the development of the relationship between subject and object is not exclusively an epistemological one but is also an ontological one. In light of the previous discussions of Hegel's completion of Kant's constructivist approach to knowledge, along with his rejection of the emergent (Kantian/Fichtean) subject of transcendental idealism, and his monistic philosophical ontology, we are now in a position to discuss the implications of these (primarily epistemological) arguments for our mode of being in the world.

We will recall that Hegel's completion of Kant's critical epistemology involves reformulating Kant's *a priori* constructivism *a posteriori*, where knowledge is constructed retrospectively on the basis of our experience. This also involves a shift in the conception of the knowing subject. Whereas Kant's subject is

53. G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," in *Early Theological Writings* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 260.

54. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative*, 22.

55. *Ibid.*

a foundational subject that faces the world, remaining unconditioned by the objects of its experience, Hegel's self-conscious subject is one that is dependent on others for its subjectivity and is transformed in its interaction with the objects of its experience. In contrast to Kant's dualist account of the relation between self and world, where the individual (as subject) faces a world of objects, Hegel's monistic perspective sees 'subject' and 'object' as categories that arise through the activity of consciousness, subordinate to the relationship between self and world, where consciousness splits experiences into 'subject' and 'object.' This leads to a very different conception of the nature of the role of reason in the relations between self and world, centring on the faculty of the understanding.

The Activity of the Understanding

Hegel discusses the faculty of the understanding in Part (A) of the *Phenomenology*, where it is introduced as a more complex form of object-oriented consciousness than the other two forms that he discusses, perception and sense-certainty.⁵⁶ For both Kant and Hegel the understanding attempts to grasp the object intellectually. Whereas for Kant the understanding is a relationship of subject towards an object, where the subject 'works up' the objects of its experience, for Hegel it is the understanding that *splits experience into* subject and object. The faculty of the understanding is an activity, a mode of being in the world.

Whereas in Kant and Fichte theoretical and practical reason mediate the encounter between mind (subject) and world (object), for Hegel practical reason is necessarily retrospective, it occurs on the basis of prior experience, experiences that it splits into subject and object. While for both Kant and Hegel the understanding seeks to grasp the objects of experience intellectually, since for Hegel the split between subject and object occurs *within* consciousness, rather than corresponding to a primordial split between mind and world, the understanding is

56. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), §§132-65.

regarded as a source of difference and otherness. The mind-independent real appears to consciousness, which the faculty of the understanding then splits into relations of subject and object (other persons can be objects too), and relations are understood negatively, through a form of dissolution and relation.⁵⁷ So, whereas for Kant and Fichte the subject-object split occurs between mind and world, for Hegel it is the *understanding* that is the source of this split, and is therefore a source of difference and otherness.

Reification

So conceived, the understanding effects a 'diremption' (*Entzweiung*) of life: literally, a splitting in two. This diremption is the condition of conceptual knowledge of the world, but treating this split between subject and object as foundational and as coextensive with the relation between self and world is seen by Hegel to lead towards the pathologies of modernity: the establishment of bifurcations between mind/body, man/nature, individual/society, faith/reason. The central objection being made here is against metaphysical dualism, against approaches that rely on a foundational subject-object split. This objection is made because – by treating this split as foundational, and thus conceiving the individual as subject – a false independence is established between self and world, where the two seemingly escape the logic of mutual dependence through which 'subjectivity' (and objectivity) is established. To put it differently, a foundational subject-object split effectively treats the finite individual human being as something that is essentially pre-formed and unconditioned by its interaction with the world; the individual is thereby reified into an object. This is the paradoxical logic of treating the human beings as subjects: they become things.⁵⁸

57. See *Ibid.*, §§113-15.

58. This is the truth of Adorno's remark that, the more autonomously the subject ascends above the ontic realm, the more it surreptitiously turns into an object, in ironic cancellation of its constitutive role. Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (London: Routledge, 1990), 176-77. It is also the idea expressed by Nancy in his criticism of discourse ethics, quoted in Chapter 5: 'What cannot appear is both the other and communication. For the other of a communication becomes the object of a subject - even and perhaps especially as "suppressed object or concept" as in the Hegelian relation between consciousnesses [...] This other is no longer an other, but an object of a subject's

This concept of 'reification' (literally, 'making into a thing') later becomes prominent in Western Marxist thought, and is employed by Marx, Lukács, Adorno, and Honneth.⁵⁹ For Lukács, reification follows from contemplative activity in a capitalist mode of production, within which social relations become objectified.⁶⁰ Building on Lukács's work, Honneth identifies three kinds of reification: in relations to the objective world, in towards other persons, and in relations towards ourselves.⁶¹ For Honneth, each of these types of reification indicate an underlying social pathology, a pathology where one's own relation towards praxis - one's mode of being in the world - is misunderstood. Reification thus leads to 'an atrophied or distorted form of a more primordial and genuine form of praxis, in which humans take up an empathetic and engaged relationship toward themselves and their surroundings.'⁶²

The similarities here with Heidegger's notion of resolute solicitous being-with-others, discussed in Chapter 4, are clear. Indeed, the similarities between Heidegger and Hegel go further. We will remember from Chapter 4 that Heidegger's engagement with Duns Scotus led him to regard the objectifying attitude of the subject towards the object to originate in the *theoretical attitude* itself, and that he considered theoretical thinking to 'un-live' human experience and to objectify existence.⁶³ Hegel held a similar view. Since *Geist* is the passage between mutually conditioned subject and object, self and other – which, as Nancy has shown, is perpetually restless – the understanding is essentially a mode of

representation (or, in a more complicated way, the representative object of another subject for the subject's representation). Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 24.

59. See Marx's discussion of 'commodity fetishism' in Chapter One of *Capital*. Karl Marx, *Capital: Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1976).; Georg Lukács, *Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat*, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Pontypool: The Merlin Press, 1971). Axel Honneth, "Reification: A Recognition-Theoretic View" (Paper presented at the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, University of California, Berkeley, 2005); Axel Honneth, *Reification: A New Look At an Old Idea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

60. Georg Lukács, *Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat*.

61. Axel Honneth, *Reification: A New Look At an Old Idea*.

62. Axel Honneth, "Reification: A Recognition-Theoretic View," 101-02.

63. Louiza Odysseos, *The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 36.

death, as it fixes subject and object in their determinations: it is a hypostatisation of beings that exist essentially in their becoming. As T.M. Knox explains in a note to Hegel's *Fragment of a System*, for Hegel '[p]hilosophical reflection always 'kills' life by distinguishing oppositions, and it cannot give up those distinctions without killing itself.'⁶⁴

For Hegel then, the understanding necessarily leads to the diremption and reification of life, and it fosters several divisions that characterise the historical conditions of modernity: such as those between individual and community, mind and nature, reason and emotion. This diremption, these divisions, contribute to the development of human life from an immature unity (being-in-itself) in the absolute, but the mistake is to remain caught in the dualist frame that is wrought by the understanding. Hegel wants us to transcend this framing by recognising a higher unity between thought and being, a unity he thinks can be achieved by overcoming the contemplative attitude, achieving self-conscious subjectivity, and identifying with the broader wholes within which the self is situated: such as epistemic or ethical communities.

Dereification

A related problem that arises as a result of taking subjectivity as foundational and treating it as coextensive with individuality (i.e., the view that every individual person is necessarily to be regarded as a subject with reason) is that identified with as Fichteian trope. As we saw above, Fichte, who is credited by Jacobi as the true disciple of Kant for taking the premises of his transcendental idealism to their logical conclusions, attempts to overcome Kant's dualisms between theoretical and practical reason, and subject-object non-identity, by grounding them in the dynamic activity of self-consciousness – where self-consciousness strives in its moral actions to make the 'is' what it *ought* to be. This, we saw, is de-reification:

64. G.W.F. Hegel, "Fragment of a System," in *Early Theological Writings* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 312-313n6. translator's note.

the activity of taking something that is thing-like, independent of us, and withdrawing its independence by bringing it into accord with the norms of reason, desire, and humanity.

The problem with the Kantian/Fichtean foundational subject is that it leads to a conception of the self where the self stands in a transcendent, knowing and assimilatory relation to the objects of its experience. Other persons can also be objects of our experience, as the struggle for recognition attests. However, while Hegel's account of the master and slave disrupts the subject's object-oriented consciousness, the Kantian/Fichtean foundational subject is not similarly interrupted – and persons are therefore encountered in a way that presupposes their assimilation into the order of the same. We claimed earlier that this thought – that consciousness strives to take objective recalcitrance out of the world and bring it into accordance with human desire – is important to a whole aspect of continental thought, including Marx; it is most certainly evident in Habermas's moral cognitivism, and Linklater's account of emancipation as the progressive self-realisation of the ethical subject, along with his defence of universalism through the projection of an ethical subject, seems to lend credence to the contention that it underwrites his emancipatory cosmopolitanism too.

Deification

Hegel's objection is that the commitment to a foundational subject is both ontological error and epistemological insufficiency as it misunderstands what the human being is, and misrepresents our mode of being in the world. It leads to an overemphasis on the role of reason in the self's relation to the world, and an ignorance regarding the pernicious implications of a foundational commitment to subjectivity, which involves the distortion of the relationship between self and world where the self encounters the objects of its experience in an assimilatory and dominating way.

Indeed, it is perhaps the overemphasis on the nature and role of reason that is Hegel's central objection to the emergent subject of transcendental idealism. It is reflective rationality, for Hegel, that splits subject from object, establishing distance between the self and the objects of its experience, and alienating self from world. He recognises that this diremption contributes to the development of life – and importantly, the *self-consciousness* of life – but he insists that this dualism between self and world is simply a *moment* on the path to truth, which requires the subsequent reconciliation of consciousness and being.⁶⁵ This, in short, is his way of maintaining a commitment to subject-object non-identity: the fact that our experience of the world is different from our experience of ourselves, a duality that neither Kant nor Fichte can account for.

In short, Hegel is soliciting us to step back from our reliance on reflective rationality, on our commitments to subjectivity or objectivity, and instead attune ourselves to our practical relation to the world. For Kant, theoretical reason allows the self-conscious subject to make intelligible the appearances given to sensible intuition, and practical reason is exercised when the subject acts in the world, while for Fichte practical reason brings about subject-object identity in the objective world. For Hegel, on the other hand, practical reason is essentially retrospective: we can only know what has appeared to consciousness, and this knowledge is achieved by alienating self from world. Crucially then, *Hegel rejects the Kantian/Fichtean view that reason should mediate the relation between self and world*. If we are to maintain a commitment to subject-object non-identity and not fall into the problems associated with the Kantian/Fichtean overemphasis on the role of subjectivity, we have to remain open to the mind-independent real 'appearing' to consciousness.

65. While Hegel follows Schelling in his adherence to *Naturphilosophie* and his positing subject-object identity residing in the absolute as the ground of existence, there are two important differences between Hegel and Schelling that must be noted. Firstly, Hegel was unable to accept Schelling's notion that the absolute in which subject-object identity resided be regarded solely as the *ground* of existence, as this would reduce human beings to non-being, since as the finite particulars the implications is that humans non-essential as they contribute nothing to the substance of the absolute. Hegel contrarily wants subjective activity to be recognised as an integral part of the development of *Geist*, of human spirit, and so the absolute becomes both the ground *and* the result in his absolute idealism: the absolute starts as being 'in itself' and ends as being 'for itself' in self-conscious subjectivity. In short, whereas Schelling provides an account of the development of consciousness from life, Hegel goes one step further to account for the *self-consciousness* of life.

Overcoming the Limitations of Reflective Rationality

As we saw, Hegel's response to the emergent subject of transcendental idealism is to insist that our mode of being in the world is not essentially as knowers, but as agents. For Hegelian self-conscious *subjectivity* is not a subjectivity of the Kantian/Fichtean type, but involves recognising the essential limitations of our own *subjectivity*. This recognition entails being open to an overcoming of the limitations of reflective rationality, being open to the reconciliation of thought and being, to the achievement of a living union between self and world. For Hegel it is the experience of love, an experience where thought and being are reconciled, that represents such an overcoming.

From an underlying unity of life the activity of the understanding erects oppositions between subject, object, and between objects (and subjects). As an experienced identity of subject and object, love is a step beyond the reifying effects of contemplative activity and thus constitutes a higher form of knowing. It transcends the divisions that the understanding establishes, reconciling subject and object in a broader unity-in-difference.⁶⁶

While the philosophical or theoretical standpoint assumes the subject and object to be distinct from one another, and the moral or the practical standpoint demands that the subject dominate the object, in love subject-object unity is achieved: in love, we are at one with the object, which at the same time is not us. As an experienced identity of subject and object, love transcends these prior standpoints, annulling or overcoming the differences that are established by the understanding: '[love] is this feeling of unity of life, a feeling in which all oppositions, as pure enmities, and also rights, as unifications of still subsisting

66. We will return to an extensive discussion of Hegel's notion of a 'unity-in-difference' and its relation to love in the next chapter.

oppositions, are annulled.⁶⁷ Love is thus a living, non-conceptual bond that reacts against the objectification of life through the adoption of philosophical or moral standpoints, which it transcends in order to achieve a mature unity of subject and object. As Frye puts it in *Double Vision*: 'the conscious subject is not really perceiving until it recognises itself as part of what it perceives. The whole world is humanised when such a perception takes place.'⁶⁸

This is because in the love relationship, that which is encountered is not a subject or an object, but something unique and irreplaceable. While the self can stand towards the world in an open, loving way – Heidegger's discussion of the Rhine is an example – the love relation is perhaps easiest to comprehend as a relation to another person, to a singular and irreplaceable being.⁶⁹ In both examples – in our relation to other persons and our relations to nature – these entities are reified and (figuratively) 'killed' by contemplative reflection because such a relation is constituted by a relation of 'subject' to 'object'.

Since something dead here forms one term of the love relationship, love is girt by matter alone, and this matter is quite indifferent to it. Love's essence at this level, then, is that the individual in his innermost nature is something opposed [to objectivity]; he is an independent unit for whom everything else is a world external to him. That world is as eternal as he is, and, while the objects by which he is confronted change, they are never absent; they are there, and his God is there, as surely as he is here; this is the ground of his tranquility in face of loss and his sure confidence that his loss will be compensated, because compensation here is possible. [trans. note: i.e., what is lost at this level of thought is a material object and therefore something replaceable by something else.]⁷⁰

Sharing a concern to challenge views of the relation between self and world as relations of subjects to objects, what Hegel terms the 'love' relation bears striking affinities with the relation between self and world that Heidegger seeks to foster

67. G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," 278.

68. Northrop Frye, *The Double Vision: Language and Meaning in Religion*, 23.

69. In *The Question Concerning Technology* Heidegger contrasts technology's 'challenging forth' and poetry's 'revealing.' Technology's instrumental orientation to the world, where the world is turned into a 'standing-reserve,' and the human relation to the world becomes one of 'enframing,' is contrasted with poetic 'revelation.' Using the example of the Rhine, when a hydroelectric dam is built on the river, the meaning of the Rhine changes; it becomes an energy reserve. This is contrasted to the appearance of the Rhine in Hölderlin's work, where it serves as a source of philosophical inspiration and cultural pride. Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 16.

70. G.W.F. Hegel, "Fragment on Love," in *Early Theological Writings* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 303.

with his notion of solicitous being-with. We saw in Chapter 4 that the latter is Dasein's authentic mode of being in the world, and leads to a genuine appropriation of human freedom. Similarly, the 'love' relation involves overcoming a theoretical attitude through engaged praxis – the intention of both is the same: to overcome the limitations and pernicious effects that each author regards as going hand in hand with a dualistic 'philosophical ontology'. Heidegger's primary target is Descartes, whereas Hegel's is Kant.

Hegelian 'Phenomenology'

It would be easy to misunderstand Hegel's view that love leads to a reconciliation of self and world as something overly sentimental, romantic, or idealistic. We should not make this mistake. Hegel's conception of love is better understood as a proto-phenomenological approach to the relationship between self and world that recognises that the theoretical attitude serves to un-live human existence and to objectify the objects of its experience, including other persons. We have seen that for Hegel the mind-independent real 'appears' to consciousness, and that these appearances are understood retrospectively. We have also seen that, if we are to avoid the pernicious implications of the Kantian/Fichtean subject, we must be cognisant of the limitations of both our own subjectivity and of the limitations of reflective rationality – which means that we must leave ourselves open to experiencing the mind-independent real. It is this openness that Hegel is advocating when he is talking about the love relationship. The love relationship is a relationship of openness of self to self and self to other, a post-theoretical attunement to practical experience; a position that we now call phenomenology.⁷¹

Phenomenology

71. This is a key difference between Hegel's 'phenomenology' and Heidegger's phenomenology. Heidegger's phenomenology, his fundamental ontology, seeks a *pre*-theoretical approach to reality.

Phenomenology is not simply a method, but is best understood as an attitude towards philosophical problems.⁷² For Scheler this attitude equates to a 'spiritual seeing,' while for Heidegger it involves being open to 'the event' through which Being is disclosed.⁷³ Common to both is an attunement to original experience, an engagement with phenomena as phenomena, and an openness to experience that resists the assimilation of experience into a set of categories – resisting the presupposition of essences given *a priori*.

While widely attributed to Husserl, who believed and sometimes even claimed to have invented phenomenology, there are significant pre-Husserlian phenomenologists, including Kant, Fichte and Hegel.⁷⁴ Phenomenology is broader than the epistemological domain because phenomenologists often regard knowledge claims to be a subset of a broader phenomenological domain – such as ontology or metaphysics – and as such 'phenomenology' may be traced back as far as Parmenides and Plato, who drew the distinction between appearance and reality. However, as an approach to *knowledge*, phenomenology goes back at least to Kant's epistemological concern with the construction of phenomena as distinguished from mere appearances; this then entails all the reformulations and rejections of Kant's approach as contributions to phenomenology, which includes Fichte, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.⁷⁵

Phenomenology takes on different meanings across these different angles but it retains its concern throughout with a distinctly practical relation to reality. In part due to his emphasis on practical reason (as embodied in *Geist*), over two hundred years later, Hegel's thought remains a good guide. Deriving from the Greek *phenomenon* ('what appears') 'phenomenology' is literally the study of phenomena present to our mind at the level of consciousness. As such, Hegel completes what

72. On the misguided conception of phenomenology as a method see Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 189-90.

73. Max Scheler, *Selected Philosophical Essays* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 137.

74. The term appears for the first time in a book published by Kant's friend Lambert in 1764. Tom Rockmore, *Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought*, 87.

75. For more on this see Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*. especially pp1-3

Kant's epistemology starts and, as a phenomenologist, is perhaps even more Kantian than Kant:

Since Kant maintains that without doubt all our knowledge comes from experience, he opens the door wide to the possibility of knowledge that is not founded on experience [...] [although he later closes this door]. Hegel immediately closes the door on this possibility, or rather, he does not open it. According to Hegel, the only source of knowledge is experience, namely what appears on the level of consciousness. The difference, however, is clear. For where Kant speaks of experience, Hegel speaks of the experience of consciousness. He goes, hence, further than Kant, since he elucidates what his illustrious predecessor presupposes. According to Hegel, our experience of the external world is not something that remains external to us. For experience presupposes that its object is, so to speak, in consciousness.⁷⁶

For Scheler, who describes philosophical thinking as 'a love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles,' a properly phenomenological relation to the world is a loving one, an appropriate attitude that allows the proper disclosure of phenomenological facts.⁷⁷

Understanding Through Love, Not Vivisection

We can illustrate the phenomenological impulse and illuminate what Hegel is talking about with the love relationship with reference to Stanislaw Lem's science-fiction novel, *Solaris*.⁷⁸ The novel highlights anthropological limitations through an interaction between human beings and a higher sentience, 'Solaris,' where the protagonist, Kris Kelvin, a psychologist, is sent to a space station hovering above Solaris – a planet covered by an ocean that we soon discover is a single-planet encompassing sentient organism. The space station is host to scientists that have studied Solaris for decades, research that has yielded little more than the formal classification of phenomena occurring on the ocean surface. Shortly prior to Kelvin's arrival, the scientists embark on a more aggressive form of

76. Tom Rockmore, *Before and After Hegel: A Historical Introduction to Hegel's Thought*, 88.

77. Max Scheler, *On the Eternal in Man*, trans. Bernard Noble (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 74.

78. Stanislaw Lem, *Solaris* (New York: Berkeley Books, 1982). The novel has inspired cinematic adaptations by both Andrei Tarkovsky (1972) and Stephen Soderbergh (2002).

experimentation by bombarding the planet with X-rays, which elicits a response from Solaris.

Solaris's sentience is beyond the reach of human understanding, but it attempts to communicate with the humans aboard the research station by reading their minds and constructing physical human simulacra from their memories. However, this attempt to communicate between two vastly different consciousnesses fails, exposing deeper, hidden aspects of the researcher's personalities in the process. One of the scientists is sent dwarves and strange creatures, and his response is to dissect them and experiment on them, which he justifies as essential to understanding the phenomena. Kelvin, however, is visited by a simulacra of his late wife, Rheyra, who had killed herself after Kelvin had told her that he would leave her. Although aware that he is in fact communicating with Solaris and not with his wife, Kelvin falls in love with Rheyra.

The novel serves to reveal the stark contrast between divergent responses to attempted communication from an unfamiliar consciousness. The scientist's dissection of the phenomena reflects the objectifying attitude of scientific inquiry, an attitude that kills the object of inquiry and perverts the subject (the scientist) into a monster, a lesser Dr Mengele. Kelvin, however, resists objectifying the phenomena that he experiences, a response that reflects the phenomenological attitude: what Hegel represents as the love relationship, and what Heidegger discusses as positive solicitude. In short, phenomenology seeks to understand through love, not vivisection.⁷⁹

Conclusions

79. My characterisation of phenomenology is an adaptation of a blog post on Solaris. See Phil Hall, "Solaris: Higher Sentience Communicates Through Love, Not Vivisection," <http://xuitlacoche.blogspot.com/2008/07/solaris-higher-sentience-communicates.html> (accessed 14/06/2012).

In light of our previous discussion, we can now return to the broader argument that is being developed over the course of the thesis: that we are constitutively unable to build an emancipatory cosmopolitanism from dualist premises. The problem, to be precise, is foundational subject-object thinking, a dualism that characterises Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Such thinking is both epistemological error and ontological insufficiency: it misunderstands the nature of the cognitive object as something that exists in the mind-independent real rather than something that we construct on the basis of our experiences, and it misrepresents our mode of being in the world by representing ourselves as subjects, rather than as self-conscious subjects cognisant of the limitations of the contemplative attitude, and open to the transcendence of reflective rationality through an attunement to practical experience: what Hegel understands as the love relationship, and Heidegger as engaged solicitous being-with.

The problem is that treating individuality as coextensive with subjectivity establishes the individual a false independence and reifies the person into an object. Through an overemphasis on the constructive role of the subject, and failing to recognise the objectifying nature of reflective rationality, approaches to social inquiry proceeding from foundational commitments to subjectivity are unable account for subject-object non identity – that is, the independence of the thing in itself – and leads to a conception of the self that stands in a transcendent and assimilatory relation to the objects of its experience. By failing to account for the independence of the mind-independent real, the Kantian/Fichtean subject de-reifies the objects of its experience, leading to a conception of the human being where the self strives to bring the phenomena it encounters into conformity with its own moral law through the exercise of practical reason. This, we contend, is a central aspect of what we have called a politics of subjectivity: a politics that follows from a foundational commitment to the individual conceived as subject. Such a foundational commitment to subjectivity thus unwittingly leads dualist approaches to social inquiry into the terrain of hegemony and domination.

The trick then must be to situate subject-object thinking; this is the task of philosophy. Hegel's challenge to dualism, for instance, solicits us to different understandings of the cognitive object, the self, the relation between self and world, and the nature and limitations of reflective rationality. For Hegel, we saw, the cognitive object is not represented by the epistemological subject, but is constructed on the basis of the mind-independent real *appearing* to consciousness. From these phenomena that appear to consciousness we construct the cognitive object; although corresponding entities exist in the mind-independent real, the cognitive object itself does not, but is instead constructed through 'the interaction between human beings situated within the historical process in which we come to know the world and ourselves.'⁸⁰ Consequently, rather than being established through a simple correspondence between mind and mind-independent real, 'truth,' 'objectivity,' subject-object unity, or what Hegel calls 'absolute knowledge,' is never fully achieved, but is perpetually deferred in an ongoing process within consciousness whereby increasingly adequate accounts of reality emerge; a process that transforms both subject and object.

Following a comprehensive survey of phenomenological thought, which, despite his claim, does not begin with Husserl, Rockmore concludes that Hegel's 'constructivist strategy, which is routinely overlooked in phenomenological circles, is arguably the best such approach we currently possess.'⁸¹ He explains that Hegel's view of knowledge is constructivist in three senses:

[F]irst, knowledge arises in an ongoing historical process in which we construct conceptual frameworks based on prior experience that we test against later experience. Second, we routinely alter these frameworks when they fail to fit experience; and to alter the framework alters the conceptual object. Third, since cognitive objects depend on the conceptual framework, a change in the framework results in a change in the object.⁸²

Proceeding from the view that 'knowledge does not concern the world in itself but the world for us,' Hegel's approach situates knowledge within the historical process and subordinates knowledge construction to the interaction between human

80. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology*, 215.

81. *Ibid.*, 213.

82. *Ibid.*

beings.⁸³ Reality, what we consider to be 'real,' emerges out of these relations, and there are thus irrevocably plural and historical dimensions to 'subjectivity.'

In contrast to kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel, such as those of Habermas and Linklater, who read into Hegel an individualism in order to recover a commitment to moral cognitivism, Hegel's phenomenological approach to the construction of knowledge means that we simply cannot hold fast to an understanding of the individual as subject. Rather, as a knowing and acting being, the individual can instead be understood as potentially a self-conscious ~~subject~~ who is cognisant of the limitations of contemplative activity and who remains open and attuned to practical experience. In relations between persons, so as not to slip back into a form of object-oriented consciousness, a form of consciousness that the account of the master and slave serves to disrupt, we suggested that other persons are best thought as singularities.

Understanding the human being as a self-conscious ~~subject~~ or singularity involves treating ourselves as cognitive *objects*, as something that can be known. This represents a move beyond the foundational/anti-foundational divide in normative theory, providing a response to Cochran's claim that we must resign ourselves to pragmatic critique; a response that follows in the spirit of Nancy's claim that there *is* a common measure, which is not a common standard applied to everyone and everything, but 'the commensurability of incommensurable singularities.'⁸⁴

We saw that Linklater's commitment to foundational subjectivity involves treating the human being as a mind-independent object, which serves as the ground for his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and that Cochran's anti-foundationalism denies the validity of this strategy. Later in Chapter 3 we then suggested that both foundationalist and anti-foundationalist strategies involved obscuring the

83. *Ibid.*, 215.

84. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Being Singular Plural* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 75. See also Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity," *International Politics* 44 (2007), 122.

ontological difference between entities and the being of entities; that is, while human beings clearly exist independent of our knowledge of them, the being of those beings does not. Our determination of the being of human beings as ethical subjects, for instance, is dependent on a particular interpretation of the nature of human beings that is projected onto them. We saw in Chapter 4 that Heidegger's concern is to ensure that the being of beings remain open to contestation, that we do not treat our regional ontologies of the person as general ontologies. Hegel's constructivist epistemology can help us develop this further.

Ontological claims about the nature of a being's existence are simultaneously epistemological claims because they entail the supposition to know that this claim is true. The problem with foundationalist approaches to normative theory is that they usually presuppose the truth of their understanding of the being of beings: that they (the subject) are representing the nature of human beings (the object) 'as it really is'. With the aid of Heidegger we have argued that this is simply not the case, and that we project interpretations of the being of beings onto human beings in general on the basis of our own particular (subjective) experiences. An example would be to interpret ethical subjectivity as the essential being of human beings.

The mistake made by many foundationalists, including Linklater, is to fail to recognise that such an interpretation of the being of human beings is in fact a construction of the human being as a cognitive object – one that remains dependent on historically and socially conditioned (i.e., particularist) conceptual frameworks (such as a mechanist paradigm of nature and a Kantian/Fichtean conception of the self as subject) – rather than an unbiased representation of the human being as a mind-independent 'thing'. It is this mistake that anti-foundationalists rightly call our attention to.

Nonetheless, their skepticism often leads anti-foundationalists to resign themselves to pragmatic critique or liberal postmodern irony, for instance. The oversight here is to fail to recognise that there can be better or worse accounts of the nature of human existence. By conceiving the human being as both mind-

independent entity and mind-dependent cognitive object, with the being of human beings an aspect of our understandings of human beings as cognitive object, Hegel's constructivist approach to knowledge can lead us out of this impasse.

From the Hegelian perspective developed here, accounts of the being of human beings would not be evaluated according to their correspondence with the mind-independent real (whether they represent the thing in itself), but with the degree to which they accord with our experience, and/or according to their political and ethical consequences – such as their contribution to human freedom, for example. For instance, by proceeding from a foundational commitment to the ethical subject, Linklater's critical approach to international theory (including his criticism of neo-realism and his agenda for the triple transformation of political community) can be judged favourably since it can contribute to the development of states of affairs that are more conducive to human freedom. Nonetheless, it can also be criticised as an insufficiently universalistic foundation, and for potentially undermining his commitment to emancipation for the reasons given earlier.

We can then attempt to further the debate by engaging in a philosophical ontology of the human being, provided that we recognise that these interpretations of the being of human beings are essentially *perspectival* and must be left open to contestation rather than providing the foundation for a form of universalism. Consequently, rather than simply rejecting the foundationalist claim that human beings *are* ethical subjects, by specifying that our interpretations of the being of human beings can be regarded as contributions to an understanding of the human being as a constructed cognitive object, Hegel's constructivist epistemology can lead us out of this impasse.

Our philosophical ontology of the human being as singularity or ~~subject~~ is a contribution to such a task, responding to both the foundational/anti-foundational divide and Behr's call for more universalistic ontology(ies) for global ethics and politics. The respective epistemology is a phenomenological constructivism, which is considered to be a more fruitful phenomenological approach to knowledge than

Michel's renewed focus on language, and which stresses the essential limitations of the contemplative attitude; emphasising instead the importance of a practical relation to reality. One of the central contentions of this philosophical ontology is the concern to avoid over-relying on subjectivity and reflective rationality as an arbiter of difference, since these commitments are constitutively unable to reconcile the divisions that they foster.

We saw that Hegel's insistence on a practical relation to reality, what he considers to be a loving relation between self and world, bears similarities with Heidegger's conclusion that an authentic (read ethical) relation to the other is not one in which subjective preconceptions are foisted upon them, but involves engaging in solicitous being with others. We saw, however, that Heidegger's weakness lay in the fact that he fails to provide for an account of the interpersonal conditions of self-hood and freedom. We caught a glimpse of how Hegel achieves this in our discussion of the interpersonal conditions of self-conscious subjectivity, but it is to a discussion of this point that we now turn.

Chapter 7.

Exposure, Transcendence, and the Community of Fate

Introduction

One of the central aims of the thesis is to contribute to the development of more universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary (global) politics and ethics, a task motivated by a left-Hegelian commitment to evaluate practices and institutions on the basis of a commitment to human freedom. This has seen us engage with the tradition of left-Hegelian thought in International Relations, most notably that of Andrew Linklater. We saw in Part 1 that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism relies on a commitment to a foundational ethical subject, where freedom is equated to the unhindered exercise of ethical subjectivity, a commitment reflected in his treatment of emancipation as the process by which that which negates the autonomy of the ethical subject is itself negated.

Chapter 3 discussed challenges to Linklater's association of freedom with subjectivity in more recent critical theory, where Brincat (following Honneth) shifts focus to the *inter*-subjective conditions of human freedom. Here, emancipation is no longer simply about the establishment of the political conditions for the non-contradiction of ethical subjectivity as it is in Kant, Habermas, and Linklater, but develops along a more Hegelian line, where emancipation is located in relations of intersubjectivity. However, we argued that, although a valuable contribution to the revival of the praxeological aspect of emancipation that remains largely recessive in Linklater's CIRT, Honneth and Brincat rely on a kaleidoscopic reading of Hegel as a theorist of intersubjectivity,

where recognition is mistakenly conceived as the confrontation between two independent subjects. We will demonstrate in this chapter that this reading of Hegel jettisons some of his most interesting and powerful ontological insights – insights into the nature of human existence and human freedom.

Later in Chapter 3 we discussed recent challenges to such a commitment to subjectivity in the work of Nancy and Odysseos, both of whom demonstrate the deeply co-existential and relational nature of individuality and subjectivity. Part 2 deepened this insight through an exploration of Heidegger's general ontology of Being, whose existential analytic of human existence demonstrated that a commitment to a foundational subjectivity is misguided, and that approaches to sociality reliant on the notion of intersubjectivity involved abstracting from and subsequently objectifying sociality. We then learnt that Heidegger's engagement with Kant's understanding of freedom meant that an understanding of freedom as individual autonomy must itself be grounded in freedom understood as existential condition, where properly free and ethical relations with others cannot be relations predicated upon the projection of a substantive interpretation of the being of beings, but must be predicated on an engagement with others as others, which involves orienting ourselves in a way that encourages authentic mutual co-disclosure between self and other.

Although such an aim is shared by Linklater, most clearly in his defence of universalism against Rorty's anti-foundationalism in *Transformation*, we saw that his argument for the universal responsibility to engage others in dialogue is predicated on the projection of an ethical subject, a morally deficient strategy as recognition was extended on the condition that the other appeared as an ethical subject. Further compounding this weakness, we saw in Chapter 5 that for Nancy it is precisely this commitment to a foundational subjectivity that constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community, and that hence, ironically, it is precisely this foundational commitment that establishes the *impossibility* of an authentic community, since the dialogic approach to ethical universality and moral inclusion *precludes* a genuine encounter with the other.

In light of these prior discussions, the last chapter engaged with a reading of the development of the subject-object relation from Kant to Hegel with three main aims. Firstly, to destabilise readings of Hegel as a theorist of intersubjectivity, such as those of Habermas, Linklater, and Honneth; all of whom read Hegel through a kaleidoscope of the Kantian subject. Secondly, to outline the ontological and epistemological groundwork for the alternative emancipatory cosmopolitanism that will be developed in this chapter and the next; and finally, to provide a defence of Hegel as a theorist of self-conscious subjectivity.

This chapter develops the latter point, turning what has largely been an ontological and epistemological argument in an essentially ethical and emancipatory direction. In so doing, we substantiate the claims made in Chapter 1 that Hegel's philosophy leads to a better way of conceiving human relationality (relations to other persons, to our worlds, and to ourselves) than can Linklater's reliance on Habermas's discursive account of moral reason. We also pick up and develop the claim made in Chapter 4 that, while the notion of resolute solicitous being with others has important implications for an account of inter-human recognition that does not purely operate at a cerebral level, that Heidegger's position lacks an account of the inter-personal conditions of freedom and individuality – a deficiency that he might have avoided had he been a better student of Hegel.

This chapter will continue the discussion of the inter-personal aspect of freedom as sociality initiated in Chapter 3: the aspect of freedom that is not simply associated with the autonomy of the individual, but is understood as practical engagement with others. However, with the aim of effecting a shift from conceiving the individual as an autonomous ethical subject to a recognition of the concrete interdependence of selves, our focus is on the inter-*personal* rather than inter-*subjective* aspects of freedom and individuality. It was suggested in the last chapter that Hegel's account of the master and slave in the *Phenomenology* essentially serves to disrupt object-oriented forms of consciousness, and leads to

the achievement of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ where the self becomes cognisant of the essential limitations of reflective rationality and attunes themselves to practical experience: to the appearance of the mind-independent real, where other consciousnesses (i.e., persons) are related to as singularities rather than subjects. This chapter engages with Hegel's account of the master and slave in greater depth, demonstrating the profoundly ethical and emancipatory aspects of this argument that are, by and large, obscured by kaleidoscopic readings of Hegel.

We saw that for Hegel it is *love* that represents an overcoming of the limitations of reflective rationality, representing a higher form of cognition where the duality between self and world is overcome. In this chapter we will see how the experience of love models the ethical logic of traversal between self and other, leading to the transcendence of subjectivity. We argue that this is *not* confined to the experience between two lovers, but that it provides us with both the personal experience of the co-existential nature of individuality, and an experience that can provide us with a model of more genuinely ethical and emancipatory relations with others than can the notion of intersubjectivity.

However, in order to distinguish it from Kant's model of freedom, where transcendence is the transcendence of the self conceived as ethical subject from its phenomenal experience, the suggestion is made that the model of self-other relations provided by the experience of love is better understood as a process of *transgression* rather than transcendence – where emancipation is thought as a process through which any prior determination of the self (subjectivity) is transcended, or better, *overcome*, through the concrete interaction between self and world. Understanding emancipation as a process of beings in their becoming, freedom is then thought as freedom-with rather than freedom-from, and the model of our radical dependency is love.

The Argument of Chapter 7

The central argument of this chapter is that properly ethical and emancipatory action is action that proceeds from the knowledge of love. By this what is meant is that the experience of love is an experience that can lead to a greater awareness of the nature of our existence as self-conscious beings, as individual selves who are dependent on others for the very constitution of our own ~~subjectivity~~. This awareness solicits us to cultivate our practical relation to reality, and leads us to engage with others as others rather than as ethical subjects.

We first discuss the philosophy of love, coming to see love as an experience that can lead to an overcoming of object-oriented forms of consciousness to attain self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~, where the self becomes fully cognisant of a living union between self and world, and leads to a more faithful attunement to reality and to the world of others. When we talk of the 'knowledge of love,' it is the knowledge of this experience to which we are referring, not knowledge of what love is, since we argue that love is not a substantial thing that we can know.

We see that Hegel's conception of love is best understood in this experiential way – as an open receptivity to otherness – and we learn that it plays a central role in the development of his thought; a role that, until recently, twentieth-century interpretations of his thought have obscured. This claim is substantiated through a discussion of Hegel's account of the master and slave. Although commonly interpreted as a treatise on the nature and possibility of freedom, this passage is principally about the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness, serving to identify a radical mutual dependency of self on others for the constitution of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~. This account of the nature of self-consciousness is modelled on the experience of love, by which is meant that the moves through which self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ is established reflect the movement between self and other in loving relations, and the experience of both leads to a higher form of self-awareness: an awareness of myself as ~~subject~~.

Whereas Linklater ultimately equates acting freely with acting morally, where individuals are most free when they act according to maxims that have been

subjected to the test of universalisability, our conception of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ leads both to a different conception of self-other relations, and an understanding of freedom as the transcendence of any prior determination of my subjective being through concrete interaction with others. Finally, we argue that self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ involves cultivating an attunement to the existence of others where the existence of others becomes part of a deeper fabric of our own self-understandings, subsequently informing the way that we relate to ourselves, to others, and to our worlds. We represent this orientation through the notion of our participation with others in a community of fate, and argue that this self-conscious awareness of the relational constitution of our own individuality augments Heidegger's account of freedom as solicitous being-with others by demonstrating the profoundly inter-personal and cooperative basis for own freedom and self-hood.

To pre-empt an obvious criticism: this is not an overly idealistic argument. We are not arguing that the establishment of a universal human community where all human beings relate to each other in this way is likely, or even necessary. In this sense we echo Linklater's recognition that the normative ideal of a universal discourse community is, at the limit, unattainable. Although recognising that there are significant obstacles to the realisation of these characteristically ethical and emancipatory relations, and that there are limits to what can be achieved by an emancipatory politics, our argument is that it is these relations that constitute both the fullest appropriation of our freedom and to properly ethical relations between self and other, and that this is what an emancipatory politics should be seeking to achieve.

The Philosophy of Love

The Metaphysics of Love

Love has been a mainstay in philosophy at least since the early Greeks, and its discussion transcends many sub-disciplines, including metaphysics, epistemology, theology, politics and ethics. There are a variety of approaches to love ranging from the materialistic reduction to a physical phenomenon – an animalistic or genetic urge – to idealist conceptions of love as the construction of the mind that is the consequence of the body's release of endorphins, but also spiritualist conceptions that associate it with the touch of divinity. Most of these use Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions as a touchstone.¹

Characterising it in the *Symposium* as a series of elevations, for Plato love starts with animalistic desire or base lust that is superseded by an intellectual conception of love, before this too is superseded by an almost theological love that transcends sensual attraction and mutuality.² In contrast, Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* offers a secular theory, where love is reflected in what he poetically described as 'two bodies and one soul.'³ In English the word 'love,' deriving from the Germanic form of the Sanskrit *lubh* (desire) is broadly defined and hence imprecise, which generates problems of definition and meaning. For this reason explorations often start with a discussion of the different shades, or 'natures' of love; shades that are discussed through the Greek terms *eros*, *philia*, and *agape*.⁴

Accompanied by its two companions, *pathos* (longing) and *himeros* (desire), *eros* refers to that aspect of love experienced as a passionate and intense desire for something, where the subject is driven toward the object; this is often conceived in sexual terms, leading to the modern notion of the erotic. *Eros* is conceived by Plato as desire that *transcends* the particular object. It is a desire for *transcendental* beauty rather than the beauty of a singular entity since 'the particular beauty of an

1. For a concise overview of behaviouralist, physical determinist, and expressivist approaches to love, see Alexander Moseley, "'Philosophy of Love' Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy," <http://www.iep.utm.edu/love/>.

2. Plato, *Plato's Symposium*, trans. Seth Benardete (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). See also Allan Bloom, "The Ladder of Love," in *Plato's Symposium* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2001).

3. Alexander Moseley, "Philosophy of Love."

4. As we shall see, the contention that love has a 'nature' would likely be disputed by Hegel, since it presupposes that love can be described in rational propositions; a form of cognition that love transcends.

individual reminds us of true beauty that exists in the world of Forms or Ideas.⁵ On this account, to love is to love the element of the ideal (true beauty) that the particular element (a person, or piece of art) possesses. The implication is that the object of love becomes interchangeable across people and things.

Contrasting with the yearning associated with *eros*, *philia* entails a fondness and appreciation of the object, and is a derivative of *eros* that Aristotle characterises as 'a sort of excess of feeling.'⁶ *Philia* is roughly captured by the English concept of 'friendship,' although for the Greeks it also incorporated loyalty to the family, to the *polis*, or to a job. Further distinguishing it from *eros*, *philia* entails *reciprocity* between the subject and object of *philic* love. For Aristotle, those with whom we share a *philic* love are only those who are worthy of it, and he suggests that there is therefore an objective basis for *philia*. For instance, we would share with them dispositions, and they would admire us appropriately as we admire them, etc. Although it is not necessarily equal, and parental love can involve a one-sided fondness, *reciprocity* is the condition of Aristotelian love and friendship.⁷ Aristotelian *philia* is a love of virtue. True lovers are those whom act out of virtue or the other's interest; all other relationships are ones of pleasure or utility.⁸

Drawing on elements of both *eros* and *philia*, for the Greeks at least, *agape* is the highest kind of love; a perfect kind of love that entails both the fondness of *philic* love and the passion and transcendence of the particular object of love in *eros*, as well as its non-requirement of reciprocity. Unlike *philia*, *agape* is not directed towards particular persons but to all of humanity, and it is later appropriated by Christian theology where it refers to the 'paternal love of God for man and man for God,' and to a brotherly love for all humanity. For this reason

5. Ibid.

6. Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), VIII,6.

7. Aristotle writes: 'In all friendships implying inequality the love also should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he loves.' Ibid., VIII, 7.

8. C.F. Cheung, "Between Myself and Others: Towards a Phenomenology of the Experience of Love" (Paper presented at the Identity and Alterity: Phenomenology and Cultural Traditions, Hong Kong, 24th May 2005).

agape is most commonly associated with the Christian sense of love as giving.⁹ The Biblical command to 'love thy neighbour as thyself' is a universalist command that, if necessary, may be unilateral since the onus is on the extension of love to others.¹⁰ That said, C.S. Lewis is misguided in his *The Four Loves* to claim *agape* as a specifically Christian virtue since all the world's great religions assume and teach the priority of love in religious practice.¹¹

The Experience of Love.

'... the ultimate essence of love and hatred cannot be defined but only exhibited'
Max Scheler

The problem with the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Christian understandings of love is that they focus on the object and finality of love rather than love as a *phenomenon*.¹² The *eros-philía-agape* schema is not a description of what love actually is, but represents different attempts to prescribe meanings of what love *ought* to be and against which all love should be measured. The schema thus defines what I should love and how I should love it.¹³ These metaphysical accounts of love are misguided: there is no object of love, there is not a 'thing' that love is. Love is *no-thing* other than a movement, a *lived experience*. As Cheung notes, the question of what love *is*, is then a metaphysically misplaced question, because love is not a substance.

Between myself and the beloved object, there is love. But, the being of love is in loving experience, i.e., my love for my mother is only meaningful if "loving my mother" is a lived experience (*Erlebnis*) for me. This love cannot be abstracted from the "I" who is loving my mother [...] I do not have something called love but I am loving something. This loving as an irreducible unique in-between lived experience is the phenomenon of love.

9. Alexander Moseley, "Philosophy of Love."

10. Matthew, 19:19; 22:39; Mark 12:31; Luke 10:27; Romans 13:9; Galatians 5:14; James 2:8 Ibid.

11. C.S. Lewis, *The Four Loves* (Boston: Mariner Books, 1960). See John Templeton, *Agape Love: A Tradition Found in Eight World Religions* (Radnor: Templeton Foundation Press, 1999). The Buddhist example of *Mettā* ("loving-kindness," active interest in others) is a case in point.

12. C.F. Cheung, "Between Myself and Others: Towards a Phenomenology of the Experience of Love," 5.

13. Ibid., 4.

The how of love as experienced by myself is phenomenologically more primordial than the reason or cause of love.¹⁴

Consequently, we should change our focus from the *eidōs* to the *ethos* of love. Since even *if* love has a nature, the question remains as to whether we are able to understand it, whether love can be an *object* of our knowledge. We can perhaps catch glimpses of its essence as phenomena of our experience, meaning that it can be hinted at even if not ever fully understood in and of itself. Although fundamentally limited, this is the benefit of the *eros-phia-agape* schema, since it reflects several shades of love that are exhibited in different kinds of relationships: romantic love, love for friends, or love of photography, etc. Rather than imposing these prescriptive meaning onto experiences, however, we must suspend the definitional schema of *agape-eros-agape* in order to render the lived-experience of love more transparent.

Love and Phenomenology

Towards the end of the last chapter we saw that Hegel considers 'love' to represent an overcoming of the standpoint of reflective rationality, an experience that represents a higher form of cognition through which the self becomes more attuned to practical experience and where that which is encountered is no longer simply a subject or an object. This is why we suggested that what Hegel calls 'love,' the achieved reconciliation between self and world, is best understood not as something overly sentimental or romantic, but as a proto-phenomenological relationship between self and world. We also learnt that phenomenology is not simply a method, but is better understood as an attitude towards philosophical problems, an attunement to practical experience and an openness to experiencing prior to the assumption of a set of criteria or assimilation within a set of categories or conceptual scheme.

14. Ibid., 5.

Since Plato, grasping the meaning or essence of an object has involved disengaging from the object, suspending that object's present and immediate existence in order that it may be grasped as it is 'in itself.' In contrast, phenomenology cultivates a shift in seeing so that the world is no longer taken for granted, as is the assumption in treating something as a given object, but is regarded critically and engaged with practically. Importantly, the phenomenological attitude does not simply reject the objectification of the world, where entities are treated as objects, but holds this objectified world in abeyance out of a love of the world.¹⁵

Following both Augustine and Hegel, love is taken by Scheler as the foundation of knowledge, and hence an affective and emotional life to be the foundation of a rational one: '[b]efore the world is known, it is first given. The loving human being is this openness to the world, to that which is other.'¹⁶ Love is often derided as a way of acting in the world, and a more rational, objective way of looking at the world is seen to be more appropriate since it helps us see how the world 'really is.' However, perhaps we are blinded to the full mystery, depth and singularity of other people by the standpoint of dispassionate objectivity; perhaps it is our overemphasis on rationality that is the mistake, and perhaps love is the expression of a more faithful attunement to a world of others, one that makes a more honest and faithful encounter with the world possible. As Wirzba and Benson write:

Love makes it possible for us to receive the world as it is rather than as we want or wish it to be. Love enables us to resist the (often violent) integration of others into the sameness and comfort of the thinker's world. It acknowledges in a way that no other disposition or activity can the integrity and the mystery of existence.¹⁷

15. Zachary Davis and Anthony Steinbock, *Max Scheler*, Winter 2011 ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scheler/>, 2011).

16. Ibid. Referring to Max Scheler, *Gesammelte Werke* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1986), V,83.

17. Norman Wirzba and Bruce Ellis Benson, *Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love's Wisdom* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 18.

Hegel and Love.

It is in light of these latter dimensions of love that Hegel's conception of love is best understood. Love, for Hegel, is not an object but an *experience* of essentially connected yet differentiated forms of life, which is best represented as an experience through which the self overcomes the limitations of object-oriented forms of consciousness to achieve the recognition of a living union between self and world. We have seen that for Hegel reflective rationality reifies life into subjects and objects, and can therefore only capture *external* relations between things. Consequently, reason is an essentially limited way of understanding relations towards and between living entities, as it is constitutively unable to grasp the mutually conditioned nature of the relation between subject and object: reason simply cannot capture the unity-in-difference that is, for Hegel at least, the structure of life.

Proceeding from an underlying unity of life, the understanding splits this unity into subject and object so that we may rationally *represent* the objects of our experience and gain knowledge of them. The exercise of rationality therefore *alienates* ourselves from the worlds in which we are immersed. This raises us above our immediate existences, a process that is essential for the development of knowledge and our self-conscious freedom. This *relative* independence of self and world, however, is easily misconstrued – and the self might come to think of itself as independent from nature and other persons, such as in the case of the Kantian/Fichtean subject, for instance.

This misunderstanding, however, is self-defeating and cannot be sustained because it involves a self-defeating logic that we see play out in the account of the interaction of object-oriented forms of consciousness in the account of the master and slave. For this reason, an object-oriented form of consciousness must itself be transcended. This transcendence is not achieved by further abstraction, but through a reconnection between self and world. This higher form of cognition requires that the self takes a step beyond the reifying nature of contemplative activity to achieve

self-conscious subjectivity, whereby a living relation between self and world is re-experienced, and the self recognises both its fundamental difference, and its essential connection, to the rest of life: both physical processes of life, and the life of *Geist*.

Love's recognition of a 'unity-in-difference' thus aims to capture the nature of *living* relations between parts and whole: a dynamic that cannot be captured wholly conceptually because these relations have no static structure or form, but consist in fluid relations to that to which is not-me, but to which I am nonetheless essentially bound.¹⁸ This recognition most certainly does not require a cancellation or levelling of difference, nor a simple transcendence of difference through abstraction. Rather, 'unity-in-difference' aims to reflect that the independence and autonomy of parts, such as individual human beings, cannot be thought in separation from their respective wholes, and that at the same time, these wholes are nothing without their parts. Although fundamentally connected to these wholes, there is an essential non-identity between part and whole: a non-identity that is the essential condition of that whole. For instance, the self is essentially located within communities, but these communities are nothing without the selves that comprise them. The 'structure' of unity-in-difference is therefore an immense contradiction: a contradiction that the understanding simply cannot resolve, because it wants relations to be either external relations between subjects and objects, or for the parts to be fully immersed within (and thus subordinate to) a broader unity, but as self-conscious living beings, we are both.¹⁹

The Role of Love in Hegel's Thought.

First appearing early in his career during his Frankfurt years, in his *Fragment on Love* (1797/1798) and in *The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* (1799), love

18. Just as Heidegger's 'being-in-the-world,' is hyphenated, 'identity-in-difference' or 'unity-in-difference,' is hyphenated to denote that this recognition is a unitary phenomenon.

19. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 8th November (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/19MasterSlaveA.mp3>.

plays a formative role in the development of Hegel's thought; three of Hegel's most important ideas first emerge in these essays: his organicist conception of freedom, his dialectical logic (the mutually conditioned nature of the relation between subject and object), and his notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Responding to Kant's duality between freedom and nature, where freedom is thought of as the freedom of the subject and the object as a *limitation* on the subject's freedom, Hegel reworks the Kantian model of self and world. Here, the freedom of the self is worked into a true freedom of the infinite, where the opposition between subject and object is reworked into a *living*, mutually conditioned union of subject and object in *Geist*, and the interaction between subject and object is governed by a *dialectical* rather than a transcendental logic. Kant's *transcendental* morality, governed by the categorical imperative, is thus situated within and subordinated to the immanent structure of ethical life, and this leads to Hegel's well-known distinction between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*. All three of these responses to Kant are based on the experience of love. Both love and freedom are defined by Hegel as 'being with oneself in the other,' his dialectical logic is based upon the 'logic' of love, and the experience of love is the experience of ethical life in its most basic form. All three of these concepts developed in his *Early Theological Writings* are central to the development of his subsequent thought.

The Reception of Hegel

Marxist appropriations of Hegel justifiably endorse the view of him as the 'pre-eminent philosopher of reconciliation.' However, they primarily read him as a 'philosopher of the concept', where the 'immature' metaphysics of his early theological writings are superseded by a 'mature' analysis of the dialectical logic of reason. Frankfurt School theorists such as Habermas, for instance, affirm Hegel's commitment to the essential role that reason plays in the attainment of moral autonomy and progress. Habermas follows Hegel in understanding reason as having a historical and progressive core, thus supporting the emancipatory possibility that human individuals thought as subjects may involve themselves in

the creation of their own world from a critical and rationalist perspective. In so doing, Habermas reads the movement of Hegel's thought as a development from the standpoint of love to the standpoint of reason. It is this reading of Hegel that characterises Linklater's appropriation of his thought.

There are understandable historical reasons why this rationalist aspect of Hegel's thought has been emphasised. The Hegel renaissance of the mid to late 19th century took great interest in Hegel's early metaphysics of life, a metaphysics that played a role in the development of the *Lebensphilosophie* (life-philosophy) of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.²⁰ Yet the emphasis that *Lebensphilosophie* placed on vitalism and renewal is believed to have been complicit in the promise of a reinvigoration of the German spirit prior to the Great War, and this subsequently led to Rosenzweig's infamous disavowal of Hegel in the introduction of his doctoral thesis *Hegel and the State* prior its submission in 1920/21.

In the English-speaking world Hegel's thought was primarily represented by the British Idealists, against whom the analytic tradition emerged as a revolt.²¹ Subsequently the opinions of writers such as Russell and Popper, whose accusations that Hegel was an enemy of freedom and a totalitarian were as off the mark as they were influential, prejudiced a whole generation of analytic philosophy against Hegel. This prejudice went largely without challenge for over half a century, as a generation of post-War German philosophers were keen to resuscitate those elements of their beleaguered tradition that were not tarnished with any association to a proto-fascistic irrationalism, and that were at least compatible with key strands of analytic philosophy.²²

20. See, for example, Dilthey's biography of the young Hegel Wilhelm Dilthey, *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels Und Andere Abhandlungen Zur Geschichte Des Deutschen Idealismus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990).

21. See David Boucher, ed. *The British Idealists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, *British Idealism and Political Theory* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).

22. Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (London: Polity, 2007), 164.

The consequence is that, during the last century at least, people writing about Hegel have consistently emphasised the developmental understanding of reason in his writings, suppressing the role of love. However, Hegel's 'absolute' – absolute knowledge and absolute spirit – is achieved through a recognition that is not given wholly conceptually but is based instead upon a reconciliation of concept and being, where the latter operates as the privileged signifier. Because of this, 'secularised,' 'demythologised,' or 'pragmatic' interpretations of Hegel ultimately elevate reason to a position from which Hegel *consistently* and *insistently* displaces it, effectively severing or 'killing' the living relationship between subject and object, self and world, that is absolutely central to Hegel's thought. Consequently, this dominant interpretation of Hegel is at best debatable, and, as is the opinion of this author, may even be fundamental distortion of Hegel's thought.²³

What is at stake here is nothing less than a recognition of the proper nature of the relationship between self and world, the role of praxis, and the questionable authority of reason (along with its essential limitations). Fortunately though, there are several recent attempts to redress this interpretation of Hegel, Jay Bernstein (1994;2003) and Alice Ormiston (2002;2004) are the most significant of these, but Richard Beardsworth (2006) and Laura Werner (2007) are also worthy of note.²⁴ These all see in Hegel's early writing a potentially radical way of conceptualising self-other relations that is not effectively reflected in the 'demythologised,' 'secular,' and 'mature' readings of Hegel.

23. An argument might even be made that the emphasis on the sovereignty of reason in rationalist interpretations of Hegel actually contributes to the totalitarian charges made against him by Popper. On this rationalist view, universality is something that might be achieved: hence the part can ultimately be subordinated to the whole, as opposed to recognising that our 'universals' are always conditioned and incomplete; our concepts constituted by a Derridean 'trace,' a constitutive exclusion or blind-spot. Such a realisation enjoins us to recognise the essentially limited nature of our understandings.

24. J.M. Bernstein, "Conscience and Transgression: The Persistence of Misrecognition," *Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain* 29 (1994): 55-70; J.M. Bernstein, "Love and Law: Hegel's Critique of Morality," *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 70, no. 2 (2003): 393-431. Alice Ormiston, "'The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate: Towards a Reconsideration of the Role of Love in Hegel,'" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 35, no. 3 (2002): 499-525; Alice Ormiston, *Love and Politics: Re-Interpreting Hegel* (New York: SUNY Press, 2004). Laura Werner, "The Restless Love of Thinking: The Concept of Liebe in Hegel's Philosophy" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2007). Richard Beardsworth, "A Note to a Political Understanding of Love in Our Global Age," *Contretemps* (2006).

The Struggle For Recognition

We saw in the previous chapter that, in contrast to the Kantian/Fichtean foundational subject that remains unconditioned by the objects of its experience, the Hegelian subject is one that is transformed in its interactions with the objects of its experience: it is a subject that does not persist, but is one that is transformed through action. In Butler's words, Hegel's subject is an 'ek-static' subject.²⁵ Further deepening this account of Hegelian subjectivity – in contrast to *self-conscious* subjectivity simply arising purely from the persistence over time of the TUA (Kant), or from the practical activity of the 'pure ego' (Fichte) – for Hegel self-conscious subjectivity is an *achievement*. This achievement is modelled in the account of the master and slave, an encounter initiated when an object-oriented form of consciousness encounters another object-oriented form of consciousness: when two Kantian/Fichtean 'subjects' collide.²⁶ To be clear, this is not an account of the interaction of two independent *self-conscious* subjects demanding recognition from each other (Honneth), but is about the *achievement* of differentiated self-conscious subjectivities by the respective protagonists.

Although the outcome of this struggle is mutual recognition between self-conscious subjects, this is only the *non-vital* end of the struggle.²⁷ It is non-vital because mutual recognition between free beings is simply a compromise solution.²⁸ To be treated as autonomous, free, beings is what both the master and the slave

25. Judith Butler, *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), xv.

26. Hegel's account of the master and slave is found in the section of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* on 'Lordship and Bondage,' commonly referred to as the master-slave dialectic or the struggle for recognition. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), §§178-96.

27. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit The New School*. New York City. 8th November (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/20MasterSlaveB.mp3>.

28. The struggle for recognition is commonly read as a discourse on the nature and possibility of human freedom, but the establishment of subjective freedom is only the non-vital end of this struggle. For a reading of this passage as a treatise on the nature and possibility of freedom see Robert B. Pippin, "What is the Question for Which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer?," *European Journal of Philosophy* 8, no. 2 (2000): 55-172.

want: it is their desire for absolute independence, *subjectivity*, that draws them into the struggle in the first place.²⁹ Treating each other *as if they were* subjects is a way of resolving the ensuing struggle between life and death. The 'subjects' that face each other make *claims* of freedom on one another, and ultimately resolve to recognise each other as subjects; this is freedom as sociality. Freedom as independence is problematic because it is part of a fantasy of freedom, the fantasy that freedom is absolute independence from all conditionality.³⁰ Hegel's move is to reroute freedom and argue that it is only within dependent relations with others that we can establish any independence.³¹ Importantly though, mutual recognition is a way of *mediating* the fact that we are absolutely dependent on the other, and consequently, our independence can only ever be a *relative* independence, relative to the others on whom we depend.

Freedom is the non-vital end of the struggle for recognition because the outcome of the account of the master and slave is not simply about the 'intersubjective' conditions of 'subjectivity' (purposefully written without the strikethrough), but is the achievement of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~; achieving awareness of the fact that the self is not a subject. The self-conscious ~~subject~~ establishes itself as an independent entity, but at the same time recognises that its ~~subjectivity~~ is dependent on others. Recognition is, therefore, a union of separateness and connectedness: it leads to the recognition that we are both absolutely dependent on the other for their recognition, and at the same time, absolutely independent of them. In short, the self-conscious ~~subject~~ achieves a recognition of their unity-in-difference. Self-consciousness – becoming aware of the nature of our own existence, what we actually are, and our mode of being in the world – involves recognising this unity-in-difference, recognising our simultaneous dependence and independence on others.

29. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (B)."

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

Love and Recognition: The Three Moments of the Re-cognitive Structure of Self-Consciousness³²

In short, what is being explored in the account of the master and slave is the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness. Becoming self-conscious, gaining a higher level of self-awareness about the nature of our own individual existences as human beings, as selves, involves overcoming object-oriented forms of consciousness by realising that I am *not* a Kantian/Fichtean subject, and that I am fundamentally and irrevocably reliant on others for the constitution of my own **subjectivity**. In other words, that my own freedom and my self-understandings are not purely own to me, but depend on the others with whom I interact.

There are three moments to this achievement, which are modelled on the experience of love. Although stating that 'there are no parts, moments, types or stages of love [...] only an infinity of shatters,' Nancy's discussion of the movement of love mirrors the three moments of the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness discussed in Hegel's account of the master and slave, and dividing Nancy's account of the movement of love into these moments can help us to better grasp what Hegel is getting at in this part of the *Phenomenology*.³³

Love is, for Nancy, 'the extreme movement, beyond the self, of a being reaching completion,' which he later restates in Hegelian terms as 'having in an other the moment of one's subsistence.'³⁴ The first moment of love is that I do not wish to exist as an independent person in my own right, since as this independent existent I feel deficient and incomplete; in the second moment I then find myself through the recognition of another person, and they find theirs in me. The

32. The discussion in this section follows Nancy's discussion in: Jean-Luc Nancy, "Shattered Love," in *A Finite Thinking* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). And Bernstein's discussion in J.M. Bernstein, "Early Theological Writings," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 20th September (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/06EarlyTheologicalWritingD.mp3>; J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a)."; J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (B)."

33. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Shattered Love," in *A Finite Thinking* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

34. *Ibid.*, 249.

combination of these two moments leads to the third moment, which is the achievement of the recognition of unity-in-difference. This will now be unpacked.

Because love is essentially other-regarding, the first moment of love can be referred to as the *moral* moment of love.³⁵ Our *experience* of finding our own meaning or truth in the love-object means that loving something is accompanied by a feeling of being dispossessed of exclusive self-regard. The lack of reciprocity here between the subject and the object of love shows that this is not a form of self-love, which is why this constitutes love's *moral* moment. The second moment is the *logical* aspect of love. Should the other return my love, I then find my fulfilment in them and they find theirs in me; by finding fulfilment in the other, the self lacks nothing, life has run the circle of development to a completely mature unit of self and other. It is this moment that Nancy refers to in his definition of love as the movement, beyond the self, of a being reaching completion. Since in this moment, love neither restricts nor is restricted: it is not finite, between self and other there is no exteriority, no external restriction.³⁶

The third moment of love is a combination of these two prior moments, in which I recognise a unity-in-difference with that which is not-me. This recognition entails the renunciation of my absolute autonomy and the recognition of my connection to the other, but simultaneously recognising that the other remains absolutely independent, and will die proving this independence.³⁷ This aspect of love equates to the experience of being 'broken,' and of being constituted by this exposure. This 'break' should not be confused with being damaged or faulty, because being 'broken,' being exposed to the existence of others, is what makes us human. It is only the narcissist who clings to their absolute independence.

35. Ibid., 258.

36. This is what Hegel means by 'infinite,' for example, when he says that, in love, finite life is raised to infinite life: 'The partial character of the living being is transcended in religion; finite life raises to infinite life.' G.W.F. Hegel, "Fragment of a System," in *Early Theological Writings* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 313.

37. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a)."

This unity-in-difference does not require a spontaneous one-ness of will: the self is still a self, an independent agent, but it does realise that this independence is only relative, and that absolute independence, *subjectivity*, is illusory. The other remains other because I cannot make it will things. Although I can will its will and desire its desire, I cannot force either: I cannot get ahold of the other's freedom. If I am lucky the other can will what I will and desire what I desire, and in this case I am united with the other, and them with me. However, the other can stop loving me at any time, and so remains and *must* remain other: it cannot be dominated by either force or reason. This is why love is an immense contradiction that the understanding simply cannot resolve: the understanding demands either internal relations or external relations, it wants me to be either in myself (separate) or immersed in this unity (from which I cannot separate myself from), but I am both, and there is no whole either holistically or atomistically.³⁸

Unity-in-Difference: Emerson's Experience

We can readily admit that this discussion is not a straightforward one, and the notion of recognising a unity-in-difference with something that is not-me does seem foreign. But we can illuminate our discussion of love as the image of our radical dependency, and its distinction from a model of self-other relations based upon the subject, through a brief discussion of Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay, *Experience*.

Emerson published two collections of essays, the first series in 1841 and the second in 1844. Preceding the first was the death of his first wife Ellen in 1831. The nature of Emerson's response to Ellen's death is reflected in the themes of his first collection. These themes, best illustrated in the 1841 essay *Circles*, included nature's forgetfulness, an overcoming of the past through casting off, and the transcendence of pain and suffering by severing his relations to her. Essentially, *Circles* sees Emerson responding to Ellen's death through acts of Stoic resignation

38. Ibid.

where he sheds his past and establishes himself as autonomous from it; an individualism that is carried over to a fourth theme of the collection, the possibility of self-perfection, where solace is sought by carrying the self to its highest possible achievement.³⁹

Preceding Emerson's second series of essays published in 1844 was the death of his five-year-old son Waldo in 1842. Emerson is unable to react to his son's death as he did to Ellen's, and this bind is reflected in his second collection in which he adopts a radically different attitude to the autonomous individuality that characterises the first: an attitude of embracing rather than forgetting; of relations rather than individuality; and of mature acceptance rather than adolescent rebellion.⁴⁰

This shift in attitude is due to the fact that Emerson's stoicism simply does not work with the passing of his son. He can neither forget Waldo, nor transcend the experience of his death. Because he cannot achieve a visceral understanding of Waldo's death, Emerson simply cannot *comprehend* the death of his son, and is thus unable to pass through the experience to the other side. Waldo's ghost *haunts* him.⁴¹ There is 'no scar' from Waldo's death, there was no ripping apart; no separation. Emerson writes '[s]ome thing which I fancied was a part of me, which could not be torn away without tearing me, nor enlarged without enriching me, falls off from me, and leaves no scar. It was caducous.'⁴² Emerson is saying to himself that, if love was what he thought it was, which is what every lover, every parent thinks love is, then he could not have survived this death; because they were one. Yet he survived. And that is his terror: that he is absolutely separate.⁴³

39. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Selections From Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960). Stephen Barnes, "Emerson: Death and Growth" (Paper presented at the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, Las Vegas, 2001).

40. Ibid.

41. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Selections From Ralph Waldo Emerson*. Stephen Barnes, "Emerson: Death and Growth."

42. Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Selections From Ralph Waldo Emerson*.

43. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Introduction," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 27th September (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/07PhenomenologyIntroA.mp3>.

The Interruptive Condition of Subjectivity

Clearly the death of a son is an extreme case, but it demonstrates what is for Hegel a deeper truth about the nature of human existence; that is, the interruptive condition of subjectivity. For Hegel, I can only gain awareness of myself as an independent and free personality through the recognition of an other. 'Self-consciousness exists only in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.'⁴⁴ Since I cannot be assured of being a self-conscious rational being without being recognised as such by the other, Hegel's claim is that *the other mediates my self-relation constitutively*.⁴⁵ For this reason I remain bound to others on whom I come to depend on for my sense of self.

Although Emerson is not so affected by Ellen's death, and clearly would be even less so for the passing of a stranger, the love that he feels for his son brings stark relief to the human connectedness that Hegel considers to be part of the very fabric of self-conscious life. Waldo's death reveals Emerson's exposure, attesting that he is in fact a finite human being who is exposed by his love, and that consequently, his subjectivity is not wholly up to him. Indeed, Emerson's assertion of a radical selfhood in response to Ellen's death paradoxically only serves to affirm this connection. It is her death that spurs him to respond in this way; so, despite attempting to establish himself as autonomous to his past, his connection to Ellen remains in the person that he becomes: his Stoic acts of resignation only distances him from Ellen, the relation simply cannot be severed.

Reading an individualism into Hegel's thought leads to representing interpersonal relations as external relations between subjects, as 'intersubjective' relations. Yet if our relations with others were simply external relations, then these

44. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §178.

45. An opposing view is given by Levinas, for whom the 'not me' is simply opposed to 'me,' but for Hegel ~~subjectivity~~ requires more than difference: it requires interruption. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Lordship and Bondage. (a)."

relations would not constitute our own subjectivity. The experience of love thus discredits the idea that we can consider ourselves to be subjects because we are fundamentally exposed to the existence to others, an exposure that constitutes the condition of our own subjectivity.

Importantly, as Emerson attests, we cannot simply transcend these attachments as if we were essentially undetermined by them. Our individual freedom thus cannot consist in tearing ourselves away from these commitments, because these commitments are deeply implicated in who we are; indeed, it is precisely *because* I cannot transcend my attachments that I am a person at all. Just as Emerson's assertion of an independent selfhood can only ever distance himself from Ellen, thinking of ourselves as subjects is simply a fugitive way of understanding the self. It is recognising the opposite, that transcendence is an impossibility, and then acting accordingly, that constitutes the achievement of a mature personality for Hegel.

Although he formulates it as the recognition of a 'unity-in-difference,' it is this third moment of love – the recognition that the individual is 'broken' – which the struggle for recognition leads to.⁴⁶ This amounts to the achievement of a mature personality, by renouncing my complete autonomy and recognising my exposure, whereby self-consciousness has been established through several moments which, in Hegel's words: 'must on the one hand be held strictly apart, and on the other hand must in this differentiation at the same time also be taken and known as not distinct.'⁴⁷ It is recognising that I am 'broken,' exposed to others in my subjective being and that my independence is only ever a relative independence, that constitutes the highest form of self-awareness of the nature of our own existences as selves.

46. Indeed, Nancy suggests that the *Phenomenology* can essentially be read as a tome that ultimately leads to this exposure of the individual (i.e., the individual's exposure to absolute knowledge). Jean-Luc Nancy, "Shattered Love."

47. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §178.

Transcendence: The Crossing of Love

Accompanying this conception of the person is a shift in an understanding of freedom. Whereas Kantian/Fichtean freedom is predicated on the self transcending (in the sense of standing *above*) the objects of its experience and negating that which negates the exercise of autonomous subjectivity, Hegel's conception of freedom is an entirely immanent form of transcendence that arises through the interaction of exposed subjects.

This exposure binds self to other, and transforms both in their interaction; something of the 'I' is lost in the act of loving: I come back to myself, I come out of the experience broken.

The "return" does not annul the break; it neither repairs it nor sublates it, for the return in fact takes place only across the break itself, keeping it open. Love re-presents *I* to itself broken (and this is not a representation). It presents this to it: he, this subject, was touched, broken into, in his subjectivity, and he *is* from then on, for the time of love, opened by this slice, broken or fractured, even if only slightly [...] the break is a break in his self-possession as subject; it is, essentially, an interruption of the process of relating oneself to oneself outside of oneself. From then on *I* is *constituted broken*. As soon as there is love, the slightest act of love, the slightest spark, there is this ontological fissure that cuts across and that disconnects the elements of the subject proper [...] The love break simply means this: that I can no longer, whatever presence to myself I may maintain or that sustains me, pro-pose myself to myself (nor im-pose myself on another) without remains, without something of me *remaining* outside of me.⁴⁸

It is the interaction between self and other that leads to the transcendence of the self; it is through the movement of love that I transcend the immanence of my 'subjectivity' and overcome any prior determination of my being. The interruption of subjectivity is the *transcendence* of this subjectivity, and the transcendence of subjectivity is the operation of human freedom. This transcendence is not the transcendence of the Kantian (knowing or ethical) subject that stands above the objects of its experience, but is the transcendence of a being that becomes something else as a result of its interaction with others.

48. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Shattered Love," 260-61. Butler expresses the same idea differently: 'The price of self-knowledge will be self-loss, and the Other poses the possibility of both securing and undermining self-knowledge. What becomes clear, though, is that the self never returns to itself free of the Other, that its "relationality" becomes constitutive of who the self is.' Judith Butler, "Longing for Recognition: Commentary on the Work of Jessica Benjamin," *Studies in Gender and Sexuality* 1, no. 3 (2000), 286.

In order to distinguish this entirely immanent form of transcendence from the Kantian form of transcendence, it is better termed 'the crossing of love.' This form of transcendence is termed a 'crossing' because the individual does not 'unite' or 'commune' with the other, as if they stood in an external relation; neither does the other 'penetrate' the self, transforming one but not the other. Love cuts across self and other, exposing both.⁴⁹ As the self-conscious individual is not separated, and is neither subject nor object, this serves to reinforce our earlier designation of human beings as finite singular beings: as singularities rather than subjects.

Bound Together: The Community of Fate

Hegel's account of the achievement of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ not only leads us to a very different understanding of the self than that which emerges from kaleidoscopic readings of him, but also to a very different model of self-other relations. Moreover, and as a consequence, it leads to a radically different conception of the nature of community from that presented by Linklater. We will now explore the nature of these self-other relations, criticising the divergent strategy employed by 'intersubjective' approaches to emancipatory cosmopolitanism, before arguing that the character of this community can be represented by the notion of a 'community of fate'.

I-Thou / I-It

We can illuminate the nature of the relationship between genuinely self-conscious ~~subjects~~ that have emerged from the struggle for recognition with reference to Martin Buber's relational schema. Buber, a philosopher, theologian, and Levinas's friend and mentor is, like Hegel, concerned with the nature of the

49. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Shattered Love," 262.

relationship between self and world.⁵⁰ Referring to the nature of this relation as a 'between,' which we co-constitute before we know it, the nature of our relation to the 'between' prefigures all subsequent relations that we have. In a similar vein to Hegel's development of different forms of consciousness from an underlying unity of life, Buber begins from a relational situation of all beings, akin to a prenatal existence, out of which the establishment of a separate 'I' requires a fundamental split. The establishment of this separate 'I' can then lead to the separateness of an *I-it* relation, built on the schism of subject and object. This *I-it* relation is the typical subject-object relationship 'in which one knows and uses other persons or things without allowing them to exist for oneself in their uniqueness.'⁵¹

However, the *I-it* relation is not the only possible mode of interaction between self and other, and Buber contrasts it to the *I-Thou* relation: a concrete encounter between two persons that is characterised by openness, mutuality, and presence.⁵² Whereas in the *I-it* relation I experience a detached thing (an object), in the *I-Thou* relation self and other participate in a dynamic process in which we exist as polarities of relation, the centre of which is the 'between'. Importantly, the 'I' of man differs in these alternative modes of existence. The 'I' can be taken as the sum of its attributes or acts, an abstracted essence that permits it to be represented as a subject, or it can be taken as a singular, irreducible, finite being. Only in the *I-Thou* relation is the other truly other, rather than existing as a representative object for a subject, and only in this concrete encounter can the 'I' develop as a whole being. Although Buber challenges Hegel in important respects in his lecture *What is Man*, Buber's categorisation here can illuminate our response to Linklater through Hegel, and help us to shed any latent religiosity, mysticism or romanticism when discussing Hegel's notion of love – by foregrounding the ethical logic that is reflected in the experience of love.

Since the establishment of a separate 'I' requires a split from a prior unity, just as for Hegel, and in contrast to Kant, for Buber subjectivity is not

50. Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man* (London: Routledge, 2002).

51. *Ibid.*, xii.

52. Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (London: Continuum, 2004).

foundational, but derivative. Moreover, this 'I' has different modes of interaction with the world, Buber's *I-it* relation thus resonating with Hegel's analysis of object-oriented forms of consciousness, both of which are inappropriate as relations to persons. In this respect, as a relation between persons, Buber's *I-Thou* relation echoes what Hegel seeks to achieve through the struggle for recognition: namely, the transcendence of an object-oriented form of consciousness in the concrete encounter with another human being. In Hegel's version, both 'subjects' actively react against their reduction to objects, demonstrating right up to the pain of death that they are underdetermined by their constitution as subjects in order to achieve mutual recognition between mature personalities (i.e., self-conscious subjectivities).

For both Buber and Hegel our mode of interaction with the world is constitutive of the self. While for Buber the 'I' of man differs according to our mode of interaction with the world, for Hegel subject and object are mutually conditioning, and both are transformed in the interaction between self and world. It is only in the *I-Thou* relation that both *relata* can develop as whole beings – just as the interaction between mutually recognising self-consciousnesses is the condition of a complete personality for Hegel. Although Buber's *I and Thou* is criticised for denigrating *I-it* relations, he does not deny their usefulness and necessity. His point is that one is only fully human to the extent that one can participate in the *I-thou* relation. Similarly, Hegel would identify the *I-it* relation as a form of diremption of life, epitomised by Kantian dualism between subject and object, a duality that is transcended when the self achieves recognition of its own exposure.

Intersubjectivity: Walls and Bridges

Essentially what both Hegel and Buber recognise is that there is a different kind of relation here, between *I* and *Thou*, and that it is this relation that constitutes properly ethical relations between self and other. Since reflective thought represents ethical relations as relations between ethical subjects, it constitutes a

retreat from the concrete relation between singular finite beings that are not reducible to their ethical subjectivity. The problem is that in affirming the sovereignty of reason in ethical subjectivity, we reinforce the split between self and other and distort the nature of the 'between,' which adversely affects both self and other. Moreover, as we have seen, by reducing persons to ethical subjects we preclude the possibility of a genuine encounter with the other.

This is the problem of reading a methodological individualism into Hegel: it reduces concrete interactions between self-conscious beings to relations between things. If we were to draw out the implications of this insight regarding ethical and emancipatory relations between persons even further, we might go so far as to suggest that this indicates a more fundamental problem: that, perhaps, we are *constitutively* unable to build an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism theoretically. One of the central problems with developing an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism from individualist, subjectivist premises is that this essentially involves a strategy of building walls around the self, before attempting to surmount those walls and bridge relations *between* selves through the exercise of reason.

As we saw in Chapter 2, Linklater is far from unfamiliar with Hegel's thought, especially with Hegel's insight into the social and historical constitution of subjectivity and development of self-conscious freedom. Further, Linklater's later works are not anti-Hegelian in their themes in as much as they engage in an historical-sociological analysis of the evolution of the moral capacities of the human being, and he does attempt to do justice to this notion of a unity-in-difference, most evident in his desire to balance universality and particularity in *Transformation*. However, Linklater's emphasis on discourse ethics simply serves to reaffirm a separation between individuals by treating them as ethical subjects. Here, concrete differences between individuals are supposedly reconciled through discursive reason and ethical constructivism, but he is constitutively unable to achieve this reconciliation because he remains reliant on thinking the individual as a Kantian ethical subject (where the individual is represented as an autonomous

ground of action) before subsequently 'bridging' the relation between subject and subject through the exercise of reason. In so doing Linklater effectively imposes a vision of the ethical subject onto the human being. Not only can this imposition be considered neither ethical nor emancipatory, but it serves to alienate self from other.

While for Linklater individuals are by no means unconditioned, and they exist in a social-historical context, this contradictory position that he gets himself into is a direct consequence of failing to adequately apply Hegel's insight about what self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ entails and, in the last instance, treating human beings as ethical subjects. This is precisely what Hegel insists against, and it is why the struggle for recognition is essentially a struggle between love and death rather than simply about the path to the constitution of free subjectivity. What Hegel is demonstrating to us, not only in the struggle for recognition in §§178-196 of the *Phenomenology* on 'Lordship and Bondage,' but also in his *Spirit of Christianity* and *Fragment on Love* essays, as well as in the *Philosophy of Right* (specifically in the distinction drawn between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*) is that as individuals, our subjectivity is not absolute or foundational – and that hence ultimately, we cannot adequately be referred to, or be treated as subjects. Through the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness Hegel is demonstrating to us that we are connected to each other in ways that go beyond what can adequately be represented by reflective thought, and that consequently reason is of limited value for representing the relations between self and other. The struggle for recognition is about a mutual dependence between self and other that reason is unable to adequately grasp, where what is ultimately demonstrated is that the notion of the subject is an inappropriate way of thinking about the relations between self and other. This is why the free subject is the *non-vital* end of the struggle, and why the relations between self and other that are modelled here are better understood as a struggle between love and death.

Consequently, Linklater's dualist approach to emancipatory cosmopolitanism establishes walls around the autonomous subject while it simultaneously attempts

to surmount that subjectivity through the exercise of discursive reason. By building these walls around the subject freedom does not consist in the concrete interaction between persons, but in the adoption of a universal perspective and acting according to the rules given thereby. In addition to the problems associated with the foundational ethical subject explored in the previous chapter, this involves an alienation from our radical dependency, from the interruptive condition of our own subjectivity, which leads to a limited account of human freedom and threatens to alienate ourselves from the depth phenomena of human existence: from a genuine experience of our own individual existences as selves, from a full appropriation and experience of our freedom, and an from an authentic experience of community. In short, the very experiences that make us human.⁵³

The Community of Fate

We have seen that it is precisely the notion of an ethical subject that constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community; a commitment that, ironically, leads to the impossibility of a genuine encounter with the other. Moreover, we argued that the theoretical construction of a more universal human community is probably destined to fail. Questions remain however about post-Westphalian forms of community: about how we ought to effect emancipatory political change, and how we can overcome our solipsistic particularisms if not by the establishment of some common measure such as 'impartial' ethical principles. This section will argue that developing the notion of a 'community of fate' can help us respond to these questions.

In Chapter 4 we saw that for Heidegger resolute solicitous being-with others is the authentic appropriation of *Da-sein's* freedom, and that this form of activity is both dependent on and expressive of human freedom. We learnt that this involves acting in ways of 'caring' for others, and that this was a nascent but fruitful

53. Heidegger has a similar concern about the Western technological civilisation see Gregory Bruce Smith, *Martin Heidegger: Paths Opened, Paths Taken* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 3.

alternative to conceptualising interpersonal relations as intersubjective relations. Nonetheless, we concluded that the weakness of Heidegger's account was that it falls short when it comes to demonstrating that both freedom and self-intelligibility are ineluctably acquired in relations to others under conditions of cooperative interaction, and that Hegel's intersubjective account of freedom and self-hood is more convincing. We are now in a position to substantiate that claim, and to suggest that an important aspect of any emancipatory cosmopolitanism involves not just establishing the conditions for the exercise of subjectivity, but engaging in resolute solicitous being-with others and cultivating the awareness of our shared participation within a 'community of fate.'

We have seen that while both Kant and Fichte identify the self with reason rather than the authority of someone else, Hegel thinks that this view of self-other relations, where a sharp distinction is drawn between the rational self and everything else, is a mode of escape or self-withdrawal from our condition of radical dependency. Hegel follows Fichte in understanding the self as its own self-positing activity, but the self is regarded as the outcome of this activity rather than its condition. Selfhood is not achieved through an aloofness of subject to object, but through engaged participation in the world of objects and other consciousnesses. Self-conscious selfhood (**subjectivity**) is achieved when I recognise that I exist in a condition of unity-in-difference with others on whom I am dependent for the constitution of my own **subjectivity**.

The idea that is modelled in Hegel's account of the master and slave – the interruptive condition of subjectivity, that were we are left fundamentally exposed to the other as part of the very fabric of our being – leads to self and other being bound together in a community of fate. This is not a community based upon an abstraction, such as one in which we participate simply by virtue of being 'human' rather than 'non-human' – where specific attributes or capacities, such as compassion for others, or universal ethical reasoning, have to be used or developed in order for us to become 'fully human' – but is an existential community that is

created and recreated through our own activity, constituting the social matrix within which humans become the kinds of beings that we are.

This experience of being broken, of being exposed, reveals my bind to others – and, regardless of whether I recognise this exposure, I can either distance myself from others through my actions, or I can identify with them. But I cannot sever this bind. For Hegel at least, recognising this exposure amounts to the achievement of a higher form of self-consciousness. Subsequently identifying with it, and taking other's interests as not entirely distinct from my own – whereby the other is regarded not as an external limitation on my own freedom but as co-constitutive of it – is essential to the progressive development of human freedom.

The central idea here is that, ultimately, our self is not up to us: that we are reliant on others not just for the things that we have and the things that we do, but also for the very way that we are. This is not a psychological claim, but an ontological one. Clearly we develop psychologically in relations to others. A child is fundamentally dependent on their parents and other caregivers, and we all develop at least initially in relation to others. As an ontological claim though, the idea is not just that the self develops in relation to others, but that in some sense that this relation *precedes* the self.

Co-dependent Arising

At least from the point of view of a Western cultural tradition, this is clearly a paradoxical thought, which is why at least one commentator has suggested that here Hegel perhaps reaches the end or limit of traditional Western thought and approaches the East.⁵⁴ There are striking similarities here with a Buddhist metaphysics of 'no thing' and dependent arising, for example. The latter (Sanskrit: *Pratītyasamutpāda*) is a cardinal Buddhist doctrine that all phenomena arise

54. See the comments section on J.M. Bernstein, "An Interview With J.M. Bernstein," *The New York Times* Opinionator 21st November (2011).

together in a mutually dependent web of cause and effect. In the Madhyamaka philosophy, founded by Nāgārjuna, this is synonymous with saying that all things and persons are lacking in inherent existence and are without any enduring essential nature; that there is no independently existing self and that all phenomena depend on other things for their existence.⁵⁵

Clearly this is a very different model of community from that which we are accustomed to, but at its most basic it is simply a model of radical human dependency at the level of self-consciousness. Hegel's idea is that the subject (*Geist*, mind) is not in the head, but is in the social world, embodied in relations of intersubjectivity, meaning that we are radically dependent on others for who we are. The minimal unit for there to be self-conscious subjectivity is two, we cannot have an immediate relationship to ourselves, our being is always mediated by the other. But two is never enough; we always need the third: for an 'I think' we need a 'we think,' and this 'we think' is embodied in *Geist*.⁵⁶

A key contention here is that rather than being something that bubbles up from the *ego* or the *id*, the self is something that exists between you and me; i.e., that my subjectivity is essentially related to the way that people respond to me.⁵⁷ Who I am is how I connect, how I get responded to, how I get recognised or fail to get recognised by others. Others can harm, degrade, and devalue me, and it is in these relations of intersubjectivity that human life is lived. We are taught independence since we need to separate from our parents, from our school, and from our peer group. It is important to us that our lives are not pre-scripted, and that we make our own way. Consequently, we seek to establish or secure our own

55. See Nāgārjuna, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, trans. Jay L. Garfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 24:18,24:19. also Dalai Lama, *How to Practice: The Way to a Meaningful Life*, trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 137,149,156-159. Candrakīrti, *Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakīrti's Madhyamakavatara* (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2002). Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness: A Tibetan Buddhist Interpretation of Mādhyamika Philosophy Emphasizing the Compatibility of Emptiness and Conventional Phenomena* (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2003).

56. J.M. Bernstein, "Introduction," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 9th September (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/01IntroA.mp3>.

57. J.M. Bernstein, "An Interview With J.M. Bernstein."

independence, and as a result freedom is often understood in terms of an individual thought as subject participating with other subjects on mutually agreeable terms.⁵⁸

The problem with this conception of freedom from a Hegelian perspective, however, is that it denies our mutual dependence and thus misrecognises 'subjective' freedom as an absolute freedom. It thereby contributes to the crises of modernity, where dualisms between self and other, individual and community, man and nature are taken to be absolute or foundational. To put it differently, our mutual dependence and independence as finite singular beings does necessarily equate to the subjective freedom associated with the sense of a self-directing 'I.' our subjective freedom as individuals is not an absolute independence. Instead, our subjective freedom only warrants us a partial independence, and so imagining ourselves as subjects ultimately misrecognises the nature of our own existence and leads to forms of alienation of self from other. Curiously we feel an indebtedness to another is a limitation on our freedom rather than its proper condition, so we tend to block out our dependency since it is almost always a sign of failure – just as when we are old, ill, or incapacitated – rather than acknowledging it and celebrating positive images of this dependency, playing in an orchestra, for instance.⁵⁹ From this perspective freedom is not the establishment of a separate 'I,' nor does it equate to the ethical self-determination of the individual, although these are both *moments* of freedom: true freedom is found through engagement, and self-conscious, emancipatory engagement proceeds from the knowledge of love.

Action that Follows from the Knowledge of Love: The Condition of Ethical Relations and the Full Appropriation of Human Freedom.

Since it proceeds from the recognition of the nature of the self's dependency on others, action that follows from the knowledge of love is ultimately the condition of a truly ethical and emancipatory politics. Such an approach to an

58. These Hegelian insights are Jay Bernstein's. See J.M. Bernstein, "Introduction (a)." J.M. Bernstein, "An Interview With J.M. Bernstein."

59. Ibid.

ethical and emancipatory politics might lead to a form of cosmopolitanism based upon the recognition that emancipatory political action is not simply about defending other people's rights to engage in dialogue with us, but involves being aware that my fate is bound with yours (at least when it comes to self-conscious individuality). Such an approach to an emancipatory politics would not require that we 'bridge' relations between subjects through the exercise of reason, but would demand instead that we foster an attunement to the social conditions of our own 'subjectivity'. On this basis it would then require that the relationship between self and world be characterised by relations of openness, mutuality and co-presence; relations that would contribute to the liberation of *both self and other*.

The rationale for this is as follows. By recognising my exposure and subsequently identifying with the other within a common structure of unity-in-difference, I transcend my previously alienated condition of a subject facing other subjects in external relations between subject and object. This attunement to the conditions of *my own* subjectivity leads to the possibility of a fuller appropriation of my own freedom: a freedom that does not consist in an isolation from my relations with others but in engagement with them. Because this engagement is based upon the recognition of the other as other, rather than as subject or object, it is also the proper condition of *ethical* relations between self and world. This engagement, in order to be ethical, involves eschewing attempt to manage, dominate, or control others (or at least recognising the essential limitations of these engagements) and relating to the other as a singularity.⁶⁰ Here ethical relations are grounded not in universal ethical reason, but in the cultivation of loving relations between self and other where I am motivated less by a desire to act according to duty – the course of action that I should take if I wish to act like an ethical subject – but from the recognition that the other's interests are not wholly distinct from my own.

60. Recognising the essential limitations of these forms of engagements does not deny that there will be a great many situations in world politics where the management or control of political differences will represent an ethically significant improvement on a previous state of affairs, particularly in cases where the protagonists are in a violent confrontation with one another. The point being made here is that pacification or control is more a politically expedient or pragmatic resolution rather than a truly ethical one.

Conclusions

We began the chapter by arguing that love is not an object of knowledge, but is a lived experience, and that we should therefore change our focus from the *eidos* of love to the *ethos* of love. Understanding love as an *ethos* is to regard it as an experience through which we transcend object-oriented forms of consciousness thereby achieving a higher level of self-awareness of the living union between self and world. Understood in this way, we claimed that such an ethos of love can be considered as a proto-phenomenological attitude that suspends the objectified world in abeyance in order to attune the self to practical experience, thereby making a more genuine encounter with the world possible.

We then saw that the experience of love is formative in the development of Hegel's central and characteristic concepts, such as his dialectic logic, his organicist conception of freedom, and his notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). Nonetheless, we learnt that twentieth-century interpretations of Hegel's thought have elevated the role of reason to a position from which Hegel *consistently* and *insistently* displaces it, effectively severing or 'killing' the living relationship between self and world, subject and object, that is absolutely central to Hegel's thought. What is at stake here, we claimed, is nothing less than a recognition of a genuine, authentic relationship between self and world, of the (limited) authority of reason, and of the emancipatory role of praxis.

We later discussed Hegel's account of the master and slave, which is not an account of the interaction of two independent self-conscious subjects demanding recognition from each other, but is an account whereby the respective protagonists overcome object-oriented forms of consciousness and thereby *achieve* self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ as a result of their concrete interaction. For this reason, we argued, the account of the master and slave is about our radical dependency on

others for our own sense of self, and that the mutual recognition between free beings ('subjects') is only the non-vital end of this struggle.

Consequently, the achievement of what we have termed 'self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~, gaining a proper awareness of the nature of our own existence as individual selves, involves recognising our unity-in-difference: that our 'subjectivity' is ultimately illusory and that others mediate our self-relation constitutively. It is for this reason that the achievement of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ is modelled on the experience of love. This then leads to a different form of freedom, where freedom is thought as 'the crossing of love.' In contrast to Linklater/Habermas's Kantianism, this is an entirely immanent form of transcendence that occurs through the concrete interaction of self-conscious ~~subjects~~.

The problem with Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism from this point of view is that it employs a strategy whereby walls are built around individuals (conceived as ethical subjects) while it simultaneously attempts to surmount these walls by establishing relations *between* subjects whose independence has already been asserted. In summary, we claim that Linklater's reliance on the existence of an ethical subject ultimately (and paradoxically) reifies individuals, distorts the nature of our interactions, and alienates ourselves from the depth phenomena of our existence: from a genuine experience of our own individual existences as selves, from a full appropriation and experience of our freedom, and from an authentic experience of community; the very experiences that make us human.

Since it is precisely the notion of an ethical subject that constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community, a foundational commitment that ironically leads to the impossibility of a genuine encounter with the other, an ethical and emancipatory politics begins to take a different shape. For instance, we argued that a politics that aims to overcome our solipsistic particularisms and develop more inclusive post-Westphalian communities ought not primarily be concerned with the establishment of some common measure, such as 'impartial'

moral principles, but should involve cultivation an attunement to a practical relation to reality and to the existence of others.

We represented this with the notion of our shared participation within a community of fate, where an attunement to the existence of others becomes part of a deeper fabric of our own self-understanding and informs the way that I relate to myself, to others, and to the social and political institutions in which I am enmeshed. In this account of an ethical and emancipatory politics, our freedom is no longer about the ability of the ethical subject to abstract from its particularity and act according to maxims that have been subjected to the test of universalisability (even across state boundaries) but involves an attunement to, and sense of responsibility towards, the social conditions of our own individuality.

This is not a community of ethical subjects, nor one based on the possibility of mutual understanding, but is a community of mutually conditioning finite singular beings co-existing in their becoming. In Chapter 4 we argued that an authentic mode of being in the world involves solicitous being-with others, where engaging with others as others, and in a way that 'frees up' their potentiality for being. Hegel's contribution to this mode of being in the world involves self-conscious ~~subjects~~ recognising that such an activity contributes to their own liberation too, by overcoming forms of alienation between self and other that seems to follow from object-oriented forms of consciousness.

In contrast to the establishment of the conditions of subjectivity then, which can only achieve a partial and limited ethical and emancipatory politics, it is action that follows from the knowledge of love that is the condition of a properly ethical and emancipatory politics. The experience of love, which leads to a greater awareness of the social conditions of my own ~~subjectivity~~, allows us to be more attentive to our co-dependent arising, and helps us move beyond a politics predicated on the subject, and lead to a fuller engagement with the depth phenomena of our existence, and a fuller appropriation of our freedom. The next chapter will develop this claim by arguing for the development of a cosmopolitan

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ethos from these premises, fleshing out the essentially ethical logic of the experience of love, and exploring the nature of this logic as a guide for emancipatory *praxis*.

Chapter 8.

The Lived Character of Ethics

Introduction

We have seen that when it comes to the interactions between self and world, both Heidegger and Hegel consider the theoretical attitude to lead to an objectification of human experience and an alienation of self from world. This leads them both to develop pre- and post-theoretical relations to reality. Heidegger's pre-theoretical relation to reality entails human beings being enjoined into resolute solicitous being-with others, while Hegel's pre- and post-theoretical relation involves an overcoming of object-oriented forms of consciousness through the achievement of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ – where the self recognises the social conditions of its own individuality and acts accordingly. In the last chapter we argued that the experience of love provides a demonstration of our exposure to the existence of others, with phenomenological enquiry demonstrating that this is so, and that fully ethical and emancipatory relations with others were relations that proceeded from this knowledge rather than on the basis of some notion of ‘intersubjectivity’.

We return here to a point made in Chapter 6, where we claimed that the experience of love plays a formative role in the development of three of Hegel's most important ideas. We focus here on one of these: that 'love' is the feeling of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) in its natural form. Just as rationalist interpretations of Hegel obscure his insights about the achievement of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~, they also obscure his insights into the nature of ethical life. Both Habermas and Linklater, for instance, mistakenly regard ethical life as essentially atavistic, and

thus subordinate it to ethical rationality. This reverses Hegel's own conception of the relation between moral law (*Moralität*) and ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*), so that it falls into line with their commitments to understanding the individual as subject rather than as a potentially self-conscious subject. We argue that this denies them a powerful tool for critical social theory, a claim that we defend in our conclusion.

Love in Practical Philosophy

The subject of love has played a minor role in postwar philosophy, with practical philosophy paying little attention to its concept and essence. There are several reasons for this, but, as Honneth suggests, they ultimately 'derive from the predominance of a concept of morality geared so strongly towards principles of impartiality that personal relationships hardly seemed worthy of inquiry.'¹ He further explains that in the postwar Anglo-Saxon world, practical philosophy did not engage in any serious exploration of the experience of love largely as a consequence of a 'narrow interpretation of Wittgenstein,' where focus lay on meta-ethics and the logical status of moral statements; as the dominance of this approach receded, 'the resurgent currents of utilitarianism and Kantianism then saw to it that the subject remained in the margins of philosophical interest.'² In the German-speaking world, if we were to take the phenomenological tradition further beyond Heidegger to Max Scheler, we would rediscover 'a work enormous current importance in philosophy's treatment of the subject.'³ Yet Scheler's influence was quickly overshadowed by that of Heidegger.

Nonetheless, in the 1970s a full-scale turn towards topics of love and friendship was initiated by Michael Stocker's seminal essay *The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories*.⁴ Stocker's central claim was that modern ethical theories

1. Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (London: Polity, 2007), 163.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, 163-64.

4. Michael Stocker, "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," *The Journal of Philosophy* 73, no. 14 (1976): 453-66.

had failed to examine motives and the motivational structures of ethical life, and thus dealt 'only with reasons, with values, with what justifies.'⁵ Stocker argued that this exclusive concern with moral rationalism led to ethical theories ignoring the fact that love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling and community are important sources of moral action, and that by ignoring them modern ethical theories force moral agents to live a bifurcated, schizophrenic life in order to achieve what is good.⁶

The Long Shadow of Immanuel Kant

With the possible exception of Andreas Wildt, who drew on Hegel's early work to point out 'forms of moral awareness that could not be defined in legal or contractual terms, thus setting them in opposition to the posture of impartial justice favoured by Kant,' the vast majority of the subsequent treatment of love in practical philosophy has remained trapped within a Kantian moral paradigm.⁷ Honneth's discussion of love in his essay *Love and Morality* is a case in point.⁸ We have already seen how Honneth reads Hegel through a kaleidoscope of the Kantian subject, reading into Hegel an individualism that obscures the ontological and ethical significance of his account of love; this is reflected in his conclusion of his survey of contemporary approaches to love and practical philosophy, where he states that love 'does not lead us to abandon the idea of moral duty, but rather to diversify it.'⁹

Rather than being an experience through which object-oriented consciousness is overcome and an attunement to a practical relation to reality is

5. Ibid.

6. Stocker uses the example of a friend visiting you in hospital. You are pleased to see them until you find out that they are visiting you, not out of any particular concern for you, but out of a sense of moral duty. The point is that there is something wholly deficient about action motivated purely by duty; we want to be visited by someone who cares about us directly, not about his duty. Ibid.

7. Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, 164. Andreas Wildt, *Autonomie Und Anerkennung: Hegel's Moralitatskritik Im Lichte Seiner Fichte-Rezeption* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982).

8. Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, 163-81.

9. Ibid., 178.

achieved, for Honneth love is simply an affective bond that we have to people close to us, such as to our family – a relationship that must be appropriately balanced with the respect that we owe to all.¹⁰ Pointing out that Honneth's ethic is 'very "communitarian" in the bad sense of that word,' Blunden's critique of Honneth's ethic of recognition illuminates the differences between Honneth's treatment of love and the one developed here.¹¹

Blunden reduces Honneth's ethical claim to the claim that 'individuals are entitled to expect appropriate love, respect and esteem from other people with whom they interact.'¹² A claim that is 'supplemented by the psychological claim that people suffer injury to their moral development if they fail to receive the affirmation that they expect from others by way of love, respect and esteem.'¹³ The problem however is that, if 'solidarity' is given on the basis of the person's contribution to the community, and 'rights' are what are owed to everyone as a human being, then:

there is no place in Honneth's system for solidarity in the sense of hospitality, or unconditional support extended to a stranger. But solidarity in this sense is the very foundation of modern, urban, multicultural society, and Honneth's failure to incorporate it in his ethics is problematic. On the basis of what mode of "recognition" would a stranger give up their seat on a bus to a pregnant woman, or assist a lost child? According to Honneth one owes loving care only to those with whom one has a close personal bond, one owes solidarity only to those who have earned your esteem, and what one owes to a stranger is only their rights. There is no room for the supererogatory. What right does the child have for the care of a stranger? [...] What right, under Honneth's schema, does a child have at all, for a child is not yet a subject.¹⁴

Honneth's treatment of love as a *diversification* of moral duty – as 'a form of intersubjective relationship in which the persons involved are entitled to a degree of reciprocal benevolence greater than that which can be expressed in the observance of the Kantian requirement of respect' – is indicative of a general trend in the way that love has been treated in practical philosophy. That is, to focus on attempting to reconcile the special obligations that we undoubtedly owe to some

10. Ibid., 164.

11. Andy Blunden, "The Missing Mediation in Pragmatic Interpretations of Hegel," <http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/missing-mediation.htm> (accessed 29th June 2012, 2012).

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

(such as family members) with the opposing moral demand that we treat everyone as equals.¹⁵

Kant casts a long shadow over these discussions. Recognising that the partiality of loving relations exist in tension with practical reason's principle of universalisability, Kant distinguishes between two aspects of love in his *Groundwork* and in the *Metaphysics of Morals*: 'practical' love and 'pathological' love.¹⁶ Insisting that morality must override loving relations, practical love is love that is *grounded in and subordinate* to reason; love recalcitrant to such subordination is considered 'pathological.'¹⁷ Kant thus treats love essentially as *problem* for morality, and in a way that asserts the sovereignty of reason over desire, the priority of concept over being: both serving to affirm a foundational commitment to the individual thought as ethical subject.

Hegel: Love as the Condition of Morality

Hegel's famous critique of Kant's ethical theory proceeds from close readings of both Kant's ethics of duty and the major alternative in moral theory at the time,

15. Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, 178. See, for example Michael A. Slote, *Goods and Virtues* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). J.D. Velleman, "Love as a Moral Emotion," *Ethics* 109, no. 2 (1999): 338-74. Susan Wolf, "Morality and Partiality," *Philosophical Perspectives* 6 (1992): 243-59.

16. It is worth noting that not all accounts of love see its universality and partiality as necessarily contradictory. As Moseley explains: "The universalism of agape runs counter to the partialism of Aristotle and poses a variety of ethical implications. Aquinas admits a partialism in love towards those we are related while maintaining that we should be charitable to all, whereas others such as Kierkegaard insist on impartiality. Recently, Hugh LaFollette (1991) has noted that to love those one is partial towards is not necessarily a negation of the impartiality principle, for impartialism could admit loving those closer to one as an impartial principle, and, employing Aristotle's conception of self-love, iterates that loving others requires an intimacy that can only be gained from being partially intimate. Others would claim that the concept of universal love, of loving all equally, is not only impracticable, but logically empty - Aristotle, for example, argues: "One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling, and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one person)" Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), VIII.6. Alexander Moseley, "'Philosophy of Love' Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy," <http://www.iep.utm.edu/love/>.

17. Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A German-English Edition*, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2011), 27,399,31. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 203,401.

the Scottish theory of moral sentiments. Hegel read Hume, Rousseau, Kant and Smith carefully, and is concerned *throughout* his philosophy (not just in his early works) to overcome the tension between love and reason. Eschewing the foundational commitment to an ethical subject, Hegel sees a broader ontological significance to the experience to love, and he reverses Kant's formulation of the relation between love and morality. Explicitly responding to Kant's notion of a pathological love in his *Spirit* essay, he writes:

[O]f course "love cannot be commanded;" of course it is "pathological, an inclination;" but it detracts nothing from its greatness, it does not degrade it, that its essence is not a domination of something alien to it. But this does not mean that it is something subordinate to duty and right; on the contrary, it is rather love's triumph over these that it lords over nothing, it is without any hostile power over another.

[...]

Only through love is the might of objectivity broken, for love upsets its whole sphere

[...]

Love alone has no limits. What it has not united with itself is not objective to it; love has overlooked it or not yet developed it; it is not confronted by it.¹⁸

While Kantian approaches to love forcibly reassert the sovereignty of the ethical subject by shoehorning the experience of love into a deontological moral schema, reconciling love's partiality with the overwhelming authority and universality of practical reason, on the Hegelian view the experience of love tells us something deeper about our own existential condition: that we are not actually ethical subjects relating to objects (such as other ethical subjects).

On this view, love is not simply a special relationship between subjects who love each other, but is an experience associated with a higher form of awareness of the relation between self and world. Here, the self's independence is recognised as only a *relative* independence; ultimately leading to the possibility of the sublation of egoistic and object-oriented forms of consciousness into a form of other-directedness, akin to what Gilligan identifies as 'care.' While for the Kantian love must be grounded in the will if it not to be 'pathological,' for Hegel the converse is true: the rational will must be grounded in love. And, as we shall see in our later discussion of the *Spirit* essay, if not subordinate to this other-directedness, it is

18. G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," in *Early Theological Writings* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 247.

reason that becomes pathological. From a Hegelian perspective then, love is the *condition* of morality.

It is Harry Frankfurt who is the closest contemporary exponent of this view. His central claim is that:

The origins of normativity do not lie [...] either in the transient incitements of personal feeling and desire [as some Humeans would have it], or in the severely anonymous requirements of eternal reason [as some Kantians would have it]. They lie in the contingent necessities of love. These move us, as feelings and desires do; but the motivations that love engenders are not merely adventitious or (to use Kant's term) heteronomous. Rather, like the universal laws of pure reason, they express something that belongs to our most intimate and most fundamental nature. Unlike the necessities of reason, however, those of love are not impersonal. They are constituted by and embedded in structures of the will through which the specific identity of the individual is most particularly defined.¹⁹

Frankfurt thus associates volitional qualities with love, defining it as an involuntary form of caring that involves an investment in and identification with that which is loved, and is not dependent on reciprocity or symmetry. He sees in the experience of love an originary quality as a form of motivation – from love springs other drives: esteem, value, and reasons for action. By regarding love as a source and limit on the will, Frankfurt defends an essentially Hegelian position that regards love as the ultimate ground of practical rationality: that rationality is dependent upon moral experience, that the authority of practical reason is lesser than that of love, and that the authority of reason is itself grounded in the authority of love.²⁰

Deflecting the Ethical

According primacy to love over an essentially limited moral rationality further pits this reading of Hegel against that of Habermas and Linklater. Although neither denies that other-directedness is an important *component* of morality, both

19. Harry G. Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48.

20. *Ibid.*, 170. Harry G. Frankfurt, *Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).

fail to recognise the full ethical and ontological significance of Gilligan's identification of the dual context of moral maturity. While Gilligan's criticism of Kohlberg resembles that of Hegel's critique of Kant, Habermas and Linklater's rationalist interpretations of Hegel essentially obscure the nature of Hegel's position; similarly, their ontological commitment to a foundational ethical subject means that they are unable to grasp the full implications of Gilligan's position. This significance, we will argue, is that it reflects a fundamental discontinuity between the logics of love and law: between ethics and politics.

We saw that Habermas's discourse ethics proceeds from a moral cognitivist belief that ethical subjects can approximate knowledge of universal, 'objective' moral principles. In his response to Gilligan's critique of Kohlberg, Habermas reasserts the sovereignty of ethical subjectivity by insisting that an ethics of care *supplements* a universalistic form of moral reasoning.

The unique disposition of a particular case that calls for regulation, and the concrete characteristics of the people involved, come into view only *after* problem of justification have been resolved. It is only when it has to be established which of the prima facie valid norms is the most *appropriate* to the given situation and the associated conflict that a maximally complete description of all the relevant features of the particular context must be given.²¹

Linklater responds twice to Gilligan in *Transformation*, both times reflecting Habermas's reassertion of ethical subjectivity. His first discussion recognises the feminist claim that women frequently speak in a different voice to men, but concludes that the ethic of care simply cannot deal with social relations separated by considerable distances.²² Although only reflecting the title of Gilligan's book, this gendered frame of reference deflects the deeper ontological and ethical significance of Gilligan's position.²³ Linklater's second discussion of Gilligan returns to Habermas's insistence that the ethic of care complements the ethic of justice, and Linklater recognises that the criticism that Habermas's account of moral reasoning always privileges universality over difference is understandable;

21. Jürgen Habermas, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 153-54.

22. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 68-69.

23. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).

yet, deploying his familiar strategy, Linklater simply surmises that we must be more sensitive to difference.²⁴

Although Linklater's work commands a truly impressive breadth of reference, and despite being admirably responsive to criticism, challenges to his position tend to be met with this logic of supplementarity – where alternative perspectives to his own are only ever seen to *augment* rather than fundamentally challenge his central argument. His non-negotiable commitment to moral universalism is supplemented by an ever increasing sensitivity to difference; yet he never seems to recognise that his concern to balance universality and particularity rests upon the fulcrum of a shared foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity.

Another example is his treatment of 'cosmopolitan emotions' in his most recent book, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics*.²⁵ Here he engages in a historical sociological and social psychological discussion of emotions – including love, shame, and guilt. He follows Elias's view that emotions represent an essential component of the civilising process, with shame and guilt playing the role of regulating conduct in modern societies, which he views as potentially supportive of cosmopolitan harm conventions.²⁶ He also discusses the relationship between emotional responses to suffering and proximity, and the possibility of emancipating human sympathy from its ties to existing groups in order that emotional attachment might be extended to distant strangers.²⁷ He concludes, however, that moral emotions 'might be more useful in shaping ethical ideas than in trying to understand how radical change may occur at a global level.'²⁸ We challenge this conclusion in the next chapter.

In the same work Linklater briefly discusses Schopenhauer's critique of Kant, making the point that compassion is important for moral conduct. Nonetheless, the

24. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 94-95.

25. Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

26. *Ibid.*, 211-212, 221.

27. *Ibid.*, 222-31.

28. *Ibid.*, 231.

discussion of the relation between compassion (i.e., 'love') and reason is largely confined to footnotes, and he quickly returns to the importance of the rationality and universality of moral principles for just relations between strangers.²⁹ The latter point is correct, but still misses the significance of Gilligan's argument about the dual context of moral maturity. We hinted at this in Chapter 5 when discussing Nancy's criticism of discourse ethics. This, we claimed, heralded a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics, where ethics is understood as a relation to the other, while politics is the domain of competing universal principles. This discontinuity is also reflected in the work of Derrida, Nancy, and Levinas. While the latter reformulates Heidegger's fundamental ontology, both Derrida and Nancy's positions draw heavily on Hegel.³⁰ We return to Hegel's discussion of this discontinuity, his identification of an essential inequality between ethics and politics, which will lead to our distinction between a cosmopolitan justice and a cosmopolitan ethos in the next chapter.

Love and Law: the Vertical Moral Geometry of Moral Law and the Ethical Logic of Love

We will recall that the claim was made in Chapter 7 that Hegel's central and characteristic concepts first arise in his early works, in which the experience of love plays a formative role, setting the trajectory of the future development of his thought.³¹ This section sees us return to a discussion of Hegel's essay *The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* (1799) to illustrate the nature and significance of Hegel's

29. Ibid., 94-96.

30. Levinas reformulates Heidegger's *Mitsein* from being-with to being-in-front-of in order to establish ethics as first philosophy. Derrida's ethical position develops most obviously in relation to Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* in his *Gift of Death*, but before this he deals with Hegel's identification of this discontinuity in *The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate* in his *Glas*, while we saw that Nancy refers to Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* in our quote from *The Inoperative Community*. Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1999). Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Jacques Derrida, *Glas* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990). Jean-Luc Nancy, *The Inoperative Community* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 24.

31. For two strident defences of this reading of Hegel see Alice Ormiston, *Love and Politics: Re-Interpreting Hegel* (New York: SUNY Press, 2004). Laura Werner, "The Restless Love of Thinking: The Concept of *Liebe* in Hegel's Philosophy" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2007).

understanding of love and its relation to Kantian moral rationalism, before we draw out what we consider to be the implications for an ethical and emancipatory approach to world politics.

We will remember from Chapter 6 that Hegel considers the understanding to be a mode of being in the world, an activity that is essentially retrospective, dissolutive, and objectifying; a view later shared by Heidegger, who considered the objectification of the object by the subject to originate in the theoretical attitude itself. As a result both seek a pre- or post-theoretical relation to reality that overcomes this objectifying attitude. For Heidegger this involves Da-sein's resolute solicitous being-with, while for Hegel this is achieved through action that proceeds from the knowledge of love. While Heidegger's challenge to Kant is more indirect than direct, Hegel's response is far more explicit.

A Genealogy of Transcendental Reason

Although once prizing the Kantian ideal of autonomy in *The Life of Jesus* (1795), by the time he wrote *The Spirit of Christianity* (1799) Hegel had distanced himself from Kant's commitment to the notion that individual self-legislation under the aegis of reason leads to freedom because he considered it to establish in the subject a division between law and inclination, concluding that submitting to the laws of one's own reason merely makes a man 'his own slave.'³²

In his *Spirit* essay Hegel engages in a genealogy of moral reason with the aim of establishing the theological origins of the rationalism that characterises Kant's approach to ethics. Hegel locates the emergence of Western rationality as a response to the flood whereby humans might master a nature that they discovered to be indifferent to themselves.³³ Through a discussion of Noah, Nimrod, Deucalion and Pyrrah, and Abraham, Hegel sees in Judaism a vertical moral

32. 'For Kant, man remains a duality; reason tries to thwart desire, but the two are never synthesised.' G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," 211n34.

33. *Ibid.*, 182-87.

geometry in which the individual subject mediates his relation to the world through a relation to a fictional transcendent object: God.

This leads Hegel to regard Judaism as a religion of positive legislation, where believers subject themselves to an external authority and are subsequently only able to appeal to categories of generality, where universal rules are applied to particular instances. Taking an ultra-rationalist view of Kantian morality, Hegel regards the transcendental idealism of Kant and Fichte to be a philosophical replication of the same vertical moral geometry – where God's authority is replaced with that of reason; Kant substituting the fear of a dominant lord outside of him for a reverence of the moral law within man's conscience. Both Judaism and Kantianism are seen as systems of positive legislation, where action is subordinated to an overarching law.

The implication of this mediated relation between self and world is illustrated by the story of Abraham and Isaac, where Abraham's willingness to act on God's command by sacrificing his son demonstrates a refusal of love in order to be free. By being cold and indifferent to his son, Abraham's freedom consists in tearing himself free from his family – from the most affective of loving relations. For Hegel, this parable heralds a form of diremption between life and law that is pervasive in Western thought, a diremption that is the source of discontinuity between two different forms of social organisation: between family and state, *Sittlichkeit* and *Moralität*.³⁴

Hegel regards Kant's equation of acting freely with acting morally to be a replication of Abraham's assertion of a strict independence of self from world, where loving relations – affective ties, relations that Kant regards as 'pathological' unless subordinate to duty – are regarded as essential limitations of individual freedom. Hegel's basic criticism is that the categorical imperative is a replication of the instrumental rationality through which we master nature: a logic of causal manipulation and the subjection to an external authority are common to both. Both

34. Cf. Kierkegaard and Derrida's discussions of Abraham and Isaac. Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*.

ways of relating to the object internalise a conception of the other – nature without and nature within – as antagonist, making the assumption that the only possible relationship between self and world is one of mastery, domination, and control.

Presumptive Dualism

Hegel's central objection is to Kant's establishment of a presumptive dualism between self and world, which he considers to be a fundamental error that deforms the relationship between the two. Hegel's basic point is that, by treating this dualism as fundamental, as something that *precedes* our relation to the world, the self is forced to mediate its relation to the world through reason – and this casts us into a series of ethical and epistemological binds from which there is no escape.

We can illustrate the nature of the epistemological bind into which we are cast with reference to the introduction to the *Phenomenology*, where Hegel is trying to make us anxious about the idea of epistemology as first philosophy. Here, in reference to *theoretical* reason, i.e., to the faculty of the understanding, the problem is that *from the moment that we become sceptics*, as soon as we doubt the validity of our knowledge of the external world, we find ourselves in trouble. Hegel writes:

If cognition is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being, it is obvious that the use of an instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets out to reshape and alter it. If, on the other hand, cognition is not an instrument of our activity but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists through and in this medium. Either way we employ a means which immediately brings about the opposite of its own end; or rather, what is really absurd is that we should make use of a means at all.³⁵

Hegel is trying to unsettle Kant's epistemology by demonstrating that treating knowledge (theoretical reason) as a medium through which we navigate the world presupposes a foundational dualism between the subject and object: a

35. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), §73.

dualism that casts us into a series of paradoxes. The first is that the idea of knowledge as an *instrument* generates the very opposite of what it intends: if knowledge is an instrument then it must alter the object, and by altering the object it creates a categorial synthesis, thus leaves the object behind. The second is that if we treat knowledge as a passive *medium* through which the world reaches us, then we do not know the world as it is in itself, but only as it exists in and through this medium; this generates a gap between the knower and what they hope to know.³⁶

The issue is the language of instrumentality, and the mistake is to think of knowledge as a medium. The root of the problem is that epistemology is borne out of fear: out of a fear of error we step back from the knowledge that we already have and institute the subject-object split; but *it is the fear of error that is the error*. This fear generates a series of responses that deepen the separation between self and world, with no way back.³⁷

This is the logic applied to ethical reason in the *Spirit* essay. Here, in the terms of *practical* reason, the problem is that from the instant that we perceive the world to be hostile to us, that our relations to the world must be mediated by reason, we establish ourselves a false independence that adversely affects our relations to ourselves, to others, and to the natural world. From our position of false independence we project outside of our shared lived experience with others and submit ourselves to an ideal, which deforms internal relations of life because moral law, the idea of the good, or God, does not exist.

The Separate Logics of Love and Law

36. This epistemological bind is pithily captured in the following rhyme:
'But for these and the rest, the greatest distress
trapped in a philosophers hell
For even the best, there's infinite regress
Which means you never can tell'

37. J.M. Bernstein, "Phenomenology of Spirit. Introduction," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 27th September (2006):
<http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/08PhenomenologyIntroB.mp3>.

Against the mediated relation between self and world implied by a commitment to understanding human beings as subjects, Hegel contrasts *living* relations with others. And these relations are modelled on the experience of love. This discussion is crucial in the development of his notion of *Sittlichkeit* (ethical life), which is understood in contrast to the formal, rule-governed approach of Kantian *Moralität* (moral law); where properly ethical relations are ones proceeding from the knowledge of love rather than from the authority of reason. Essentially Hegel is heralding a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and justice, the idea that there is an inequality between the logics of love and law: that the two are separate orders.³⁸

Hegel regards Kantian ethics, *Moralität*, to operate according to a logic of law, which is at issue when a higher court is called upon to adjudicate between competing claims from opposing parties. This adjudication requires a common authority, such as that of Reason or the state, where parties concerned either identify themselves as subject to this authority, or are forced to subject to it. The logic of law is a logic of mediation, where subjects of the law mediate their relations to themselves and one another with reference to a common authority. Hegel regards this logic to be a form of external command, where the law is grounded in a double movement beyond the concrete particular, whereby the particular is subsumed and controlled by an authority that stands above it: an authority such as transcendent reason, or 'God.'

It is in this light that Hegel reads the teachings of Jesus. The central idea of the *Spirit* essay is to demonstrate that there is a logic of ethical experience in early Christianity that can be read as a guide to ethical conduct immanent to human experience rather than transcendent to it. Against the objective models of positive legislation of Judaism and Kantianism, where the self mediates its relation to the world through an 'objective' law, by demonstrating that human need trumps

38. Derrida makes a similar argument in his *Force of Law* essay. Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority," in *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice*, ed. Rosenfeld and Carlson Cornell (London: Routledge, 1992).

religious command, Hegel claims that Jesus introduces something totally foreign: the subjective.

Over against commands which required a bare service of the Lord, a direct slavery, an obedience without joy, without pleasure or love, i.e., the commands in connection with the service of God, Jesus set their precise opposite, a human urge and so a human need.³⁹

This is because Jesus focussed not on becoming a good subject of a transcendent Other (Reason or God), but on responding to the human need of the finite singular being. He replaced law with love.

In contrast, Kant insists that 'love is not to be understood as a feeling' but 'must rather be thought as the maxim of *benevolence* (practical love), which results in beneficence.'⁴⁰ Kant thus asserts the sovereignty of both the law and the subject over that of love, a move later shadowed in the work of both Habermas and Linklater. Although Hegel does not deny the necessity of law, he holds that 'the law is later than life and is outranked by it:' a key move through which he reverses Kant's conception of the relationship between love and morality, as discussed above.⁴¹

Subverting Kant's account of the relation, for Hegel love is the feeling of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) in its natural form. Whereas (moral) law is a kind of practical reasoning that abstracts from context-specific particularity, involving the deployment of reasons and arguments, in loving relations the law loses its form. In other words, love is a living relation to reality that makes the (moral) law superfluous. Hegel illustrates this difference with regard to the religious command 'Thou shalt not kill:'

The command "Thou shalt not kill" [Matthew v.21-22] is a maxim which is recognized as valid for the will of every rational being and which can be valid as a principle of a universal legislation. Against such a command Jesus sets the higher genius of reconcilability (a modification of love) which not only does not act counter to this law but makes it wholly superfluous; it has in itself a so much richer, more living, fullness that so poor a thing as a law is nothing for it at all. In reconcilability the law loses its form, the

39. G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," 206,209.

40. Immanuel Kant, *The Metaphysics of Morals*, 243-244,449.

41. G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," 230.

concept is displaced by life; but what reconcilability thereby loses in respect of the universality which grips all particulars together in the concept is only a seeming loss and a genuine infinite gain on account of the wealth of living relations with the individuals (perhaps few) with whom it comes into connection. It excludes not a reality but only thoughts and possibilities.⁴²

For Hegel the essence of Christianity lies in this 'reconciliation,' where the law 'loses its' form and 'the concept is displaced by life.' Reconciliation is not achieved conceptually here, such as through the affirmation of a common humanity, but is achieved through love, through action that makes the law superfluous. The loving relation is congruous with both the law and the inclination: it is their synthesis; one that express an attunement to our ethical immediacy, dissolving the need for law.

An Immanent Ethical Logic

To reiterate, Hegel is not denying the necessity of law, but is arguing that love and law are mutually implicated, although they operate according to different logics. However, in contrast to Kant, and also Habermas and Linklater, it is ultimately love that is more binding than law, and it is the person's participation in the dynamic of ethical life that constitutes an ethical and emancipatory relationship between self and world.⁴³ By demonstrating that ethical life is lived independently of moral laws, and that acting freely and ethically does not involve assuming the perspective of an ethical subject but simply an attunement to practical experience, Hegel's critique of Kantian rationalism is supplemented by an immanent doctrine of ethics.

For Hegel, what Jesus demonstrates practically is that our first question when we see someone who is hungry should not be 'do they deserve food,' but to recognise that they are hungry means to recognise that they need food, full stop: the logic of ought has no role in ethical life. The notion of 'ought' is related to the idea of moral law, and belongs to a mediated relation between self and world; to

42. Ibid., 215-16.

43. Ibid., 230.

act ethically what we need is not to obey the law, but to love thy neighbour. Ought only enters into consideration in relations of authority: you ought to obey because it is your duty, or because you will be punished if you do not.

Here relations between self and other are not external relations between subjects bridged mechanically by notions of common interest or moral law, but operate according to the logic of unity-in-difference, a logic that we discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the idea of mutual exposure and co-dependent arising, where the central idea is that my selfhood and freedom is essentially related to the character of my relations with others.

Hegel's basic thought here is that we cannot harm others without ethically harming ourselves; to act against some other person is not to break some transcendent law, but to act against our own life. This sees him drawing a distinction between punishment and what he calls 'fate,' which appears whenever life is injured. The working of fate commences 'when the trespasser feels the disruption of his own life [... and] The deficiency is recognised as a part of himself.'⁴⁴ While punishment is 'the effect of a transgressed law' that is enforced by something alien, an external power that is opposed to the self, fate is experienced as something *internal* to the person, taking the form of guilt or shame. Whereas punishment presupposes a figure that inflicts the pain of punishment (and the fear of punishment is fear of Him) in fate, the fear is not the fear of an *alien* being but the fear of 'the power of life made hostile.'⁴⁵ The appearance of 'fate' thus discloses the fact that we are fundamentally connected to each other: a phenomenological demonstration of the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness.⁴⁶

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid., 231.

46. Harris's commentary on 'fate,' community & forgiveness is worth reproducing here: 'Fate is the *understandable* shape in which *absolute* Spirit finally emerges. Hegel speaks of "God appearing" only when the community understands its own function of forgiveness. Until then, "God" (as a subject-name) identifies only a necessary "transcendental illusion." Fate we must always reverence; but rational beings do not worship the Big Bang. But when we arrive at the consciousness that "God is Love," we are recognizing a divinity whose very being is constituted by our recognition. Nature forgives nothing. There is no "spirit of forgiveness" anywhere except in human self-consciousness. That is what God's necessary "Incarnation" conceptually signifies; and "nothing in fate is changed by it" - any more than Fate could be changed by Zeus. H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, vol. 2: The Odyssey of Spirit (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 540.

Deeper insight into the dynamic of ethical life, our connectedness and the operation of fate, can be gained by applying the notion of love and fate to murder. In this context, the significance of murder is not so much that it is a negation of life; killing one life is not killing all life, and it does not sever my connection to that other, at least not fully. Instead, this transgression effects the *diremption* of life through a violent act of two-ing. In other words, by transforming life into an enemy, the destruction of life in this transgression undermines the conditions of my *own* life. In characteristically eloquent prose Hegel writes:

Only through a departure from that united life which is neither regulated by law nor at variance with law, only through the killing of life, is something alien produced. Destruction of life is not the nullification of life but its diremption, and the destruction consists in its transformation into an enemy [i.e., the murderer thinks he has killed his victim. But he has only turned life into an enemy, only produced a ghost to terrify him]. It is immortal, and, if slain, it appears as it is terrifying ghost which vindicates every branch of life and lets loose its Eumenides. The illusion of trespass, its belief that it destroys the other's life and thinks itself enlarged thereby, is dissipated by the fact that the disembodied spirit of the injured life comes on the scene against the trespass, just as Banquo who came as a friend to Macbeth was not blotted out when he was murdered but immediately thereafter took his seat, not as a guest at the feast but as an evil spirit. The trespasser intended to have do with another's life, but he has only destroyed his own, for life is not different from life, since life dwells in the single Godhead. In his arrogance he has destroyed indeed, but only the friendliness of life; he has perverted life into an enemy. It is the deed itself which has created a law whose domination now comes on the scene; this law is the unification, in the concept, of the equality between the injured, apparently alien, life and the trespasser's own forfeited life. It is now for the first time that the injured life appears as a hostile power against the trespasser and maltreats him as he has maltreated the other. Hence punishment as fate is the equal reaction of the trespasser's own deed, of a power which he himself has armed, of an enemy made an enemy by himself.⁴⁷

The disruption of my own life through the appearance of fate means that I must recognise the prior transgression *as my own*, and acknowledge my own answerability for it. By recognising my fate through guilt or shame, I face up to my own responsibility for my transgression, and can then attempt to atone for my transgression and reconcile with the other by seeking their forgiveness. There is no *external* authority here: my transgression reveals that I am already situated within an ethical community where I am bound together with others with whom I co-participate within a community of fate: the trespass reveals the whole.

47. G.W.F. Hegel, "The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate," 229-30.

While the subjective, formal, freedom that I have by virtue of being an individual ensures that I am able to deny this 'originary debt' to the other and cling on to my own independence as a subject, or perhaps to suppose that the other deserved whatever fortune became of him and to thereby eschew my responsibility for his situation, this only establishes for myself a false independence. Causing injury to another, and subsequently disavowing or ignoring my answerability to them, considering my actions just or permissible, leaves me bound to my prior subjectivity and constitutes an alienation from my own existence as a self-actualising being. Similarly, hate is not a rejection of love but its inversion. Hating someone, a person or even a group, does not deny my connection with them; neither does it dissolve that community, it only perverts them. Hate is a tearing apart, a terrible distortion of 'the between' that both perverts the hater and is destructive of the self.

More serious than hate is indifference. Indifference to others, feeling no guilt for wrong-doing, or no compulsion to help those in need, amounts to a rejection of love, not hate. It is therefore narcissism that is the ultimate failure of love. Narcissism is an individual and social pathology that is worse than hate. My subjective freedom as an individual to deny my originary debt, to transgress the law, to act out of caprice or to hate – in short, to avoid participation in my community of fate – is, for Hegel, not a full appropriation of my freedom as a self-actualising being. However, reconciling with the other by acknowledging my answerability for my transgression, facing up to my responsibility, seeking forgiveness and subsequently being let back into the fold represents the fullest appropriation of my freedom. Love is the model of this reconciliation: 'in love fate is reconciled,' and it is this conception of freedom that serves as Hegel's normative standard.⁴⁸ Through my reconciliation, in love, I transcend my prior subjectivity and am no longer bound to my prior fate: reconciliation in love is a liberation.

48. *Ibid.*, 231.

Moralität and Sittlichkeit

Ethical life, experienced as love, both underwrites and transcends the law; it may even be set against it. Such is the case with Antigone. Against the conscious written law of the state, i.e., Creon's decree that, as a traitor of the state, Polynices' body be left out in the open for the vultures, Hegel regards Antigone as the personification of the unwritten ethical law that is society's unwritten foundation.⁴⁹ In direct contrast to Habermas's moral cognitivism Hegel writes:

True ethical law is the unwritten, inerrant, unalterable divine law spoken of in the *Antigone*. It is not anything that an individual can hope either to criticize or to justify, and certainly not in terms of mere self-consistency.⁵⁰

Antigone's conscientious disobedience of Creon's decree is seen as righting the one-sidedness of the 'thought of' human law. Creon's edict is driven by the need to punish Polynices and to deter any future sedition; yet this is incompatible with Antigone's love for her brother and her conviction that, despite his transgression, he deserves the respect of a proper burial.

The Mutual Implication of Moralität and Sittlichkeit

In his commentary of the *Phenomenology* Harris argues that Antigone's personification of the unwritten law is not just referring to the particularity of familial relations, but to the broader ethical identity of the members of 'the whole Greek world over which Zeus holds sway,' an identity extending beyond the confines of the specific polis.⁵¹ Creon then represents the 'thought of' human law that is realised by self-consciousness and *built on top of* this unwritten law, a law that generates its own commitments and obligations.⁵² The tragedy consists in the

49. This ethical law corresponds with ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) rather than moral law (*Moralität*).

50. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, 550n437.

51. H.S. Harris, *Hegel's Ladder*, 168.

52. For an illuminating extended commentary on Hegel's Antigone see Kimberley Hutchings, *Hegel and Feminist Philosophy* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2003), 96. Also Kimberley Hutchings and Tuija Pulkkinen, eds. *Hegel's Philosophy and Feminist Philosophy: Beyond Antigone?* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

fact that Antigone and Creon can only act out their one-sided conviction in their own right rather than recognise the rightness and mutual implication of the opposing perspectives and achieve a reconciliation therefrom; the written law of the state and Antigone's personification of the unwritten law of moral conviction are thus tragically entwined because each can only act out one side of the synthetic unity that would constitute truly ethical behaviour.

Demonstrating that love is not simply mere emotion, Hegel's point is that ethical society needs the recognition of the mutual dependency of *both* perspectives. He is not following the Humean or Smithean view that ethics are based simply on the intuition, on feelings: his position is that it is the unity of intuition *and* reason that is the ground of ethics. Ethical relations are not simply individual preferences grounded in the intuition, they also have a conceptual element: the 'thought of' human law. This 'thought of' law must be *grounded in* an underlying ethical life, the extension of which is not correlative with the extension of human law, a reconciliation or unification under the concept, because without this underlying ethical life, the 'thought of' human law is simply an imposition on those subject to it. This position, we shall see, has profound implications for an ethical and emancipatory approach to world politics.

Although this ethical position does contain a relative aspect, it does not subjectivise value. Ethics are not relative in the sense that anything goes, but relative in the sense that ethical concepts are not universal, but are historically grounded in the mores and practices that constitute ethical life. In the *Philosophy of Right* (1820), Hegel's 'mature' work that builds on his earlier work by applying his philosophical system to the actualisation of freedom in the world – to the objective structures of right that represent the social conditions of human freedom, institutions such as the family, civil society and the ethical state – Hegel formulates the divergent logics of love and law through his distinction between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*.

Moralität and Sittlichkeit in Linklater's CIRT

Linklater discusses Hegel's distinction in his *The Transformation of Political Community*, where he writes:

Moralität is the approach to ethics which assumes that the solitary individual can use autonomous reason to discover the normative foundations of a cosmopolitan society. It abstracts individuals from concrete settings and credits them with innate powers for apprehending universal moral truths. *Sittlichkeit* refers to the social institutions and norms which precede the individual and lend shape to the subject's moral life.⁵³

Linklater's treatment of this distinction centres around his attempt to reconcile universality and particularity by balancing the ethical claims of universality with the claims of the (nation-state) community to difference, self-determination, and exclusion.⁵⁴ He understands *Sittlichkeit* to be 'central to Hegel's attempt to defend state sovereignty from a cosmopolitan critique,' and affirms Hegel's notion of *Sittlichkeit* to be both a 'bold formulation of the nature of social morality' and 'a rich explanation of the diverse forms of political community.'⁵⁵ Nonetheless, unsurprisingly given his foundational commitment to the ethical subject, Linklater repeats the dialectical strategy employed in *Men and Citizens* where rationalism and historicism are sublated into a synthesis that simply reasserts the sovereignty of ethical reason: an affirmation that betrays both a limited understanding of the nature of ethical life and of Hegel's account of the relation between ethical life and moral law.⁵⁶

According to Linklater, the importance of the distinction between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit* revolves around the centrality of *either* rational deliberation *or* the reliance on custom and convention at the heart of social and political life.⁵⁷ He makes two key mistakes here: firstly, reducing ethical life to customs and conventions, and secondly, supposing that *either* rational deliberation *or* ethical life are central to social and political life, rather than recognising that the two are

53. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 52.

54. *Ibid.*, 55.

55. *Ibid.*, 52.

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*

mutually and inexorably implicated. As we have just seen, against the privilege that Linklater ascribes to ethical reason, it is the mutual implication of ethical life and ethical reason that constitutes Antigone's tragedy. While Creon's refusal to bury Polynices is in accord with the 'thought of' human law (forbidding traitors a proper burial), and overrides the Thebian custom (of burying the dead under normal circumstances), the significance of this action is not just that it constitutes a simple contravention of a local, particularist morality, but because it contravenes an unwritten ethical law: it goes against what is *right*; what Douzinas refers to as the law as *dike* (justice) as opposed to the law as reason and *nomos*.⁵⁸

As Hegel writes: 'Ethical disposition consists in sticking steadfastly to what is right, and abstaining from all attempts to move or shake it, or derive it.'⁵⁹ He goes on to explain in a footnote that:

Ethical law is implicit in communal living. It is not grounded on arbitrary individual decrees, which can be simply disregarded. It is what all men in the community accept as their standard, and that without question, and what they do not in anyway see as foreign or alien.⁶⁰

This ethical law, the 'unwritten, inerrant' law that is felt as love, and which underwrites ethical life, is not the same as the 'thought of' moral law. Nor does it simply consist of 'customs and conventions,' to be transcended by a rational morality. Ethical society is dependent on the dialectical interaction of both.⁶¹

The Dominion of Moral Law

58. Costas Douzinas, "Law's Birth and Antigone's Death: On Ontological and Psychoanalytical Ethics," *Cardozo Law Review* 16, no. 3-4 (1995): 1325-62.

59. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §437.

60. *Ibid.*, 549-550n436.

61. While Antigone and Creon have different points of view on the matter of Polynices's burial, the matter is not reducible to their contrasting perspectives: the facts that Antigone is Polynices's sister, and Creon is the head of state are largely inconsequential. Rather, it revolves around the justice of the Creon's decree. As Hegel explains 'Alteration of the point of view is not contradiction; for what we are concerned with is not the point of view, but the object and the content, which ought not to be self-contradictory.' *Ibid.*, §437.

We saw in Part 1 that the basic theme uniting *Men and Citizens*, *Transformation* and Linklater's later work on the harm principle is the normative ideal of universal moral inclusion, where universality was conceived as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue. The problem, we claimed, was that this defence of universalism against anti-foundationalism involved the projection of an ethical subject, a strategy that conflates the ontological difference between human beings and the being of human beings (conceived as ethical subjectivity). Hence it should cause little surprise to learn that, while he affirms the social nature of morality, he effectively treats ethical life as an anachronism that is subordinate to the sovereignty of moral reason.

Linklater's position here mirrors that of Habermas, who considers himself a 'communicative Kantian;' the communicative aspect reflecting his dialogical or communicative turn away from Kant's monological conception of practical (moral) reason. Although claiming that 'for all its affinities with Kant's moral theory, discourse ethics is rather different,' Habermas nonetheless explains that discourse theory 'takes its orientation for an intersubjective interpretation of the categorical imperative from Hegel's theory of recognition but without incurring the cost of dissolution of morality in ethical life:' the implication is that rational morality, moral law, is superordinate to the lived character of ethics.⁶²

Linklater is correct to recognise that *Moralität* brings a reflective orientation to *Sittlichkeit*, and that it plays a central role in 'promoting the decisive transition from unreflective to reflective social moralities,' but he is wrong to treat this as a linear progression from a customary morality to a reflective one rather than one aspect of a dialectical interaction.⁶³ It is his foundational commitment to the notion of an ethical subject that is the cause of this error. This commitment allows him to read the transcendence of *Sittlichkeit* by *Moralität* as a Kantian form of transcendence rather than a Hegelian one. While this distinction was discussed in

62. Jürgen Habermas, "Morality and Ethical Life: Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse Ethics," in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1992), 203. Jürgen Habermas, *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, 1n24.

63. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 52.

the previous chapter, the difference is that the Kantian form of transcendence involves moral law *rising above* ethical life, while the Hegelian form involves the mutual implication of ethical life and moral law, where moral law is immanent within ethical life and manifests itself through the dialectical transformation of ethical life, but cannot simply rise above it.⁶⁴

In contrast to Habermas and Linklater's reading, Hegel's version of ethical society requires not the exclusion or transcendence of ethical life but recognition of the mutual dependence and dialectical interaction of ethical life and moral law where, due to the essentially limited nature of reflective rationality, precedence is ultimately given to ethical immediacy: to the operation of conscientious activity that proceeds from the knowledge of love. As Moyar has recently noted 'the free conscience is the pivotal concept in [Hegel's] view of modern ethics and politics.'⁶⁵ It is the activity of the *conscience* that is the moving and justifying principle for the continuing development of human freedom; Hegel's focus thus falling sharply on the *activity* of liberation.⁶⁶

Hegel's emphasis on the relation between freedom and conscientious activity develops Schiller's objection to Kant.⁶⁷ The famous controversy between Kant and Schiller is over the role of duty and inclination.⁶⁸ For Schiller, our attitude to

64. For more on the notion of *Sittlichkeit* see sections §§142-64, §§182-8, §§194-5, §§201-2, §§205-8 and §§255-8 of the *Philosophy of Right*, which discusses ethical life and its articulation in the moments of family, civil society, and the state. See also Allen W. Wood, *Hegel's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 195-203. and Frederick C. Beiser, *Hegel* (London: Routledge, 2005), 233-39; Terry Pinkard, "Virtues, Morality and Sittlichkeit: From Maxims to Practices," *European Journal of Philosophy* 7, no. 2 (1999): 217-39.

65. Dean Moyar, *Hegel's Conscience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 23.

66. Hegel is taking cues from the development of free religious conscience in the Protestant Reformation, and he thought that the authority of individual self-consciousness could only come into its own with the displacement of traditional religious authority. In his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* he claims that the Reformation was the decisive moment in European history for setting into motion the development of modern freedom. The Reformation introduced into the world what Hegel calls 'free spirit,' 'the idea of an inner disposition to will the ethical without an internalised fear of religious authority.' *Ibid.*, 23-24.

67. On the relation between Kant, Schiller and Hegel see Dieter Henrich, "Ethics of Autonomy," in *The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy*, ed. Richard Velkey (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1994).

68. The disagreement is neatly surmised in Schiller's infamous epigram, much discussed in the neo-Kantian literature:

'Gladly I serve my friends, but alas I do it with pleasure
Hence I am plagued with doubt that I am not virtuous.

morals had to be different to that presented by Kant, and he emphasised the role of the sensuous, emotive side of human nature, and the cultivation of ethical inclinations, in contrast to Kant's insistence that moral actions are ones that follow from a dutiful respect for the moral law. What Schiller was attempting to show is that, in a free human being, duty has to descend and become inclination, while inclination has to ascend so that a natural inclination is developed for the content of duty; in order that, acting out of inclination rather than rational respect for the moral law, the free human being does what is right for the whole of mankind.

Although defending Kant against Schiller, Gerold Prauss argues that the dispute highlights the fact that Kant overlooks a third source of motivation besides inclination and duty; that is, love.⁶⁹ As Rudolf Steiner puts it: '[i]f we look for the roots of moral Intuitions in human nature, if we look for the actual impulse, the ethical motivation in those moral Intuitions, we find love;' this love, he continues 'absorbs into itself the moral Intuitions, and we are moral human beings in so far as we love our duty, in so far as duty has become something that arises out of the human individuality itself as an immediate force.'⁷⁰

In Hegel this all relates to the idea of conscientious activity. First arising in his discussion of the activity of the conscience in the *Phenomenology* (§§632-671), the conscience is understood as the finding of an appropriate response in a given situation: 'it is in and through the activity of conscience that the knowledge of love is actualised in the world,' the activity of the conscience represents 'the resurfacing of the knowledge of love.'⁷¹

For that there is no other advice: you must try to despise them,
And then do with aversion what duty commands you.'

Cosmopolitans might read 'friends' here as pertaining to circle of moral concern beyond our compatriots. Friedrich Schiller, *Werke. Nationalausgabe*, vol. 1-42 (Weimar: Böhlau, 1943), 357. Quoted by Frederick C. Beiser, *A Lament*, Friedrich Schiller: Playwright, Poet, Philosopher, Historian (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007), 237.; For a discussion see Herbert James Paton, *The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), 47.; Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180-184, 275n3. Frederick C. Beiser, *A Lament*.

69. Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, 275n3.; Gerold Prauss, *Kant Über Freiheit Als Autonomie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 240-77.

70. Rudolf Steiner, *Fruits of Anthroposophy* (London: Rudolf Steiner Press, 1986), 59.

71. Alice Ormiston, *Love and Politics: Re-Interpreting Hegel*, 55-56.

It is this activity of the conscience, the actualisation of the knowledge of love in the world, that Alice Ormiston demonstrates is the basis of Hegel's politics. The very logic of the *Philosophy of Right*, she shows, is meant to affirm the knowledge of love, upon which it is based.⁷² The logical development of the will – from the immediate ethical unity of the family to civil society and to the ethical state – as well as the logical arguments that Hegel presents to convince reflective rationality of the truth of the political principles articulated in the *Philosophy of Right* are predicated upon 'the inner certainty that is acquired through the experience of love.'⁷³ Hegel's arguments concerning welfare, for instance, depend on more than just abstract right, they require the actual recognition by individuals of their own and other's finitude, of their shared vulnerability: it is love that makes this recognition possible. It is love that allows us, at the level of intuition, 'to feel our commonality with others and to see the injustices of a system that creates such inequality.'⁷⁴ It is only on the basis of this recognition that Hegel's concept of 'morality' subsequently helps to rationally justify the prior response of love.⁷⁵

By affirming the sovereignty of ethical reason over ethical life, Linklater not only distorts Hegel's characteristic form of transcendence, where freedom is associated with the activity of the conscience and the overcoming of any given subjectivity, but in supposedly standing above the perspective of ethical immediacy Linklater also denies himself a powerful evaluative tool with which to engage in critical social theory. *Per contra* Linklater, rather than representing a conservative or atavistic approach to ethics, Hegel's approach to ethical life, as modelled on the experience of love, represents both a more primordial aspect of our ethical experience, an aspect that Linklater's approach overlooks, and a powerful tool for CIRT.⁷⁶

72. Ibid., 71.

73. Ibid., 73.

74. Ibid., 78.

75. Ibid.

76. In a similar vein, Neuhouser argues that the concept of 'life' in Hegel's early philosophy can be deployed as an evaluative tool to identify forms of social pathology. Frederik Neuhouser, "Hegel on Life, Freedom, and Social Pathology" (Paper presented at the Philosophies of Right: Philosophical Conceptions of Right from German Idealism to Critical Theory, New York, 2011).

The Lived Character of Ethics

In short, there is much more to the idea of ethical life than is reflected in Linklater's treatment of *Sittlichkeit*; specifically the model of social relations provided by the experience of love.⁷⁷ While Linklater concurs with Hegel that the standpoint of morality represents a higher form of freedom because it raises us above the simple acceptance of norms and customs, and leads to the principle of individuality that characterises modernity, Hegel quite rightly insists that this perspective is itself inexorably entwined with ethical life, and that it is the operation of ethical life that drives 'the moral point of view' forwards. While more rationally based moral understandings and principles represent a higher form of self-conscious freedom than do simple customs and norms, these moral principles are themselves only developed and overcome through the operation of ethical life. This does not entail rejecting moral rationalism, but recognising its pernicious effects and limitations, and ultimately supplementing it.⁷⁸

As we have seen from our discussions in Chapters 6 and 7, this supplementation amounts to a view of the individual, thought as self-conscious ~~subject~~, overcoming the limitations of object-oriented consciousness and becoming attuned to a practical relation to reality and the recognition of our shared participation in a community of fate. This involves an attunement to the experience of others becoming a deeper part of the fabric of our self-understandings and informing the way that we relate to ourselves, to others, and the natural world.

77. Indeed, it seems that our discussion of Linklater's treatment of the relation between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit* affirms Walker's (brief) criticism of *Transformation* where he claims: 'in each and every case Linklater's strategy is to take what he thinks is useful and then discard the rest. And what is useful is always some sort of argument for a greater universalization, and what can be discarded is the tattered residue of particularity.' R.B.J. Walker, "The Hierarchicalization of Political Community," *Review of International Studies* 25, no. 1 (1999), 152.

78. 'Although Hegel has quite often been taken to be rejecting Kantian, "individualistic" morality in favour of something else – "social ethics," accepting one's community's norms, or some such view – more recent work has argued that in fact he is best seen as extending Kant's "rationalist" morality by critiquing it and supplementing it, but not rejecting it. This interpretation seems to me entirely correct.' Terry Pinkard, "Virtues, Morality and *Sittlichkeit*: From Maxims to Practices," 222.

Borrowing an argument of Heidegger's, it involves engaging in resolute solicitous being-with, a form of conscientious activity that not only appropriates our freedom as existential condition, but frees ourselves up for being-with others, and leads to an entirely immanent form of transcendence: freedom as the crossing of love.

It is this prioritisation of our ethical immediacy that is the central point of the distinction between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*. Derrida makes similar point in *Glas*.⁷⁹ There he notes that the transition from *Moralität* to *Sittlichkeit*, from Part Two to Part Three of the *Philosophy of Right*, is intended to reflect the transition from Judaism to Christianity in the *Spirit* essay: from a religion based on command and duty to a religion based on love and freedom.⁸⁰ The idea of *Sittlichkeit* is thus better understood – not as parochial ethical particularism, an anachronistic morality of custom and conventions to be transcended by ethical reason – but as an attempt to reflect an existential condition of ethical immediacy, a condition modelled on the experience of love. The supplementary role given to moral reason over a practical relation to reality is demonstrated in Hegel's discussion of the conscience in the *Phenomenology*. Although superseded by chapters on religion and absolute knowing, the activity of the conscience transcends the standpoint of reflective rationality and represents the completion of the *Phenomenology* at the level of personal experience, i.e., conscientious activity is the highest form of the activity of individual human consciousness.

The Activity of the Conscience

As we saw previously, the activity of the conscience is understood as the finding of an ethical response in a given situation. It bears testament to the antecedent experience of love since it is in the conscience that reason and being are united; conscientious activity is not the dutiful activity of morality, but neither is it pure intuition. It is in the conscience that law no longer exists in an abstract form,

79. Jacques Derrida, *Glas*.

80. *Ibid.*, 33a-93a. See also Simon Critchley, *Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary French Thought* (London: Verso, 1999), 6.

standing over sensuous being as something alien that commands it. Rather, through conscientious activity, law and being are united and expressed through the individual person. Here ethical action is not action that follows a rational calculation (or even discussion) of our duties, but is conscientious action in a contingent context that expresses something universal. If we see someone drowning, we jump in and save them: we just act. This action is not mediated by moral reason, reasons do not exist. This is ethical immediacy: moral reasons and validations of that action come later. For instance, if asked *why* we jumped in to save the person we might retrospectively justify our action in the form of a maxim by saying that, if it were us drowning then we would want someone to save us; yet we must recognise that this is a *retroactive* justification of an experience that tells us something more fundamental about the structure of our life with others.

It is of course possible for us to feel indifferent towards another in need, or perhaps to consider their suffering to be deserved – but neither position will absolve us of our personal responsibility if we fail to act. This is an important point: it is not simply the case that acts of conscience should be considered supererogatory and be lauded, as is the tendency with perspectives that affirm the sovereignty of the ethical subject, but it is to hold that there is a fundamental responsibility, an originary debt to the other, and that our existence as separate entities, as ethical subjects for instance, is based upon an abstraction that denies such a debt. We tend not to recognise this.

The problem is that as soon as we start to think in terms of rights and duties associated with ethical subjectivity, as soon as we start to rely on our moral reason, we are already in trouble. This frame of mind leads to an essential limitation on what we think we owe to others, and we tend to mediate these relations with reference to some overarching norm or rule, which we might dutifully observe. However, arguments regarding duty have only a limited purchase: they only serve to bolster or modify prior commitments.⁸¹ Philosophy is simply not that powerful,

81. To borrow Bernstein's metaphor, there is no use saying to the parent of a suicide bomber 'your son ought not to blow up other people,' because once that primitive notion of empathy is gone, there is little point arguing with them philosophically. J.M. Bernstein, "Early Theological Writings,"

pointing out logical mistakes or inconsistencies in the beliefs that people hold is not going to make them change their position dramatically; philosophy only gives non-sceptics and non-fanatics internal reasons to think that they are rationally justified in holding the beliefs that they do: it is the scepticism or fanaticism that is the barrier and, in ethical discourse, affirming the sovereignty of reason over love is more likely to encourage that scepticism rather than eliminate it.

Shakespeare illustrates as much in *Othello*. As a soldier Othello simply cannot stand the feeling of vulnerability that his all-encompassing love for Desdemona brings; he simply cannot bear his exposure to her, and his dependence makes life intolerable for him. This leads him into a desperate quest for 'ocular proof' of her love for him; yet what would such proof look like? Iago plants a terrible thought into Othello's head: that while it cannot be proved, Desdemona's love can surely be falsified; infidelity would provide Othello with solid proof that she does not love him. Othello's anxiety – feelings that accompany his unstable subjectivity – drives him to seek evidence of Desdemona's infidelity, and the tragedy begins its course to its murderous conclusion. *Othello* is a tragic demonstration that overemphasising the role of reason over love can turn even intimate lovers into distant strangers.⁸²

That we *expect* people to be other-regarding and compassionate can be demonstrated by the recent censoring of Chinese society after a two-year old girl was hit by two different vehicles and ignored by passers-by. After being run over by a van, more than a dozen people walked or cycled past her before she was hit by a second truck. In the ensuing public uproar, Chinese society was reproached for a 'moral numbness' due to the incredible display of public apathy towards a seriously injured child in extreme danger.⁸³ The episode holds a perverse mirror up to the

Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit The New School. New York City. 13th September (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/04EarlyTheologicalWritingB.mp3>.

82. This illustration is Giles Fraser's: Giles Fraser, "You've Got to Respect Sceptics," *The Guardian* Friday 29th June. (2012). For a discussion see Stanley Cavell, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 451-96.

83. See Ben Blanchard, "Chinese Girl Dies in Hit-and-Run That Sparked Outrage," *Reuters*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/21/us-china-girl-idUSTRE79K0HM20111021> (accessed 12/03/2012).

parable of the Good Samaritan in which Jesus illustrates the injunction to love thy neighbour.⁸⁴ Although the parable focusses on commending the Samaritan's compassion, it can also be read as an indictment of both the priest and the Levite who both cross the road in order to pass by the 'half dead man.' Read in this way, both the parable and the Chinese episode function as a negative illustration of Hegel's use of love as an image of human connectedness. In both cases, there was a fundamental ethical responsibility to the other on the parts of the priest, the Levite, and the Chinese public, and in both cases all failed in their responsibility.

There are of course mediating factors. The priest, who is supposed to be ritually clean, could not tell if the man were a 'neighbour;' if he were a non-Jew, the priest risked defilement, while if he were dead he could not come within four cubits of the man without incurring the humiliating and lengthy process of restoring ritual purity. Similarly, people in China are hesitant to help those in distress out of fear of being blamed themselves. However, we are right to reprehend those responsible for allowing these concerns to mediate the immediate ethical responsibility of the priest to the half-dead man, and the Chinese public to the little girl; allowing these concerns to mediate their relation to reality represents a distortion of an underlying ethical life. The error in both cases is that these factors were allowed to mediate the lived character of ethics. While there is no external authority to punish the Chinese public, the Levite, or the priest, all have to face up to their fate, experienced here as shame. A shame that is the proper response to the lack of love, from the denial of their mutual implication and an abrogation of their ethical responsibility for the other.

Conclusions

Through our discussion of the relationship between love and morality we have seen that Kant casts a long shadow over contemporary ethical thought. There are good reasons for this. Clearly Kant's moral rationalism is an important contribution to our understanding of ethics. Nonetheless, we will recall that the

84. (Luke 10: 25-37)

claim was made in Chapter 6 that, despite being the most strident of Kant's critics, Hegel's engagement with Kant is an essentially constructive critique with the aim of developing his own Kantianism; accordingly our aim here has not been to reject Kantian ethics, rather to demonstrate how Hegel completes it. Although Hegel's criticism of Kantian ethics is certainly not new, Hegel's insights into the nature of ethical life are often overlooked, and the tendency of twentieth century left-Hegelian thought has been to read him as a philosopher of the concept, a reading which obscures his most powerful insights.⁸⁵ We have demonstrated this to be true in the cases of both Habermas and Linklater with reference to their prioritisation of Kantian *Moralität*.

The problem in both cases is that this simply asserts the sovereignty of the ethical subject, leading to a dualism between self and world that we have sought to demonstrate is profoundly misguided. In contrast, the position taken here is that, in order to live up to the ethical and emancipatory ideals of CIRT, we need to eschew this duality and follow the moves made in post-Kantian German idealism away from the foundational commitment to the individual thought as ethical subject to a conception of the human being as the being that has the potential for self-conscious subjectivity.⁸⁶ This not only entails a shift in our understanding of freedom, as discussed in the previous chapter, but also in our understanding of the nature of ethical relations.

Ethical relations, as they have been presented here, are not simply relations of ethical subjects that proceed according to maxims that have been subjected to the test of universalisability, whether that ratiocination is seen to be an individual exercise (Kant) or a collective, communicative one (Habermas, Linklater). Rather, they consist in the concrete interaction of conscientious self-conscious subjects

85. There are of course notable exceptions to this. Dean Moyar's recent *Hegel's Conscience* is a good example. Dean Moyar, *Hegel's Conscience*.

86. There are clearly similarities here with Linklater's account of emancipation as the historical actualisation of the ethical subject. However, recalling our discussions from the previous chapter, self-conscious subjectivity differs significantly from Linklater's treatment of this as a Kantian form of subjectivity. Moreover, the problem is with Linklater's treatment of ethical subjectivity as a foundational commitment. We will return to a discussion of our relation to Linklater in the Conclusion.

proceeding from the knowledge of love. This is not to deny the need for ethical reason or the postulation of moral laws. It does however insist that we recognise that properly ethical relations must operate according to a different logic: a logic of love, and that it is ultimately action that follows from the knowledge of love that leads to a genuine reconciliation with the other, not the exercise of discursive reason – as implied in Linklater's defence of universalism.

There is a further problem with deploying an argument based on the affirmation of *Moralität* at the cosmopolitical level. We have seen that the exercise of moral reason operates according to the logic of law, where a higher court is called upon to adjudicate between competing claims between opposing parties. This requires either an identification with a common authority or enforced compliance; no such authority currently exists in world politics. The underlying assumption behind Linklater's defence of universalism is that moral reason can provide such an authority, yet we have been questioning the ethical and emancipatory credentials of such a position. While most international political actors recognise the binding authority of norms such as state sovereignty, or peremptory norms against gross human rights violations such as genocide, the authority of these norms have *followed from* humanity's experience of their violation: from our prior transgressions. Our collective responses to such violations reveal that we are already situated in a universal human community, albeit one limited to the collective rejection of such transgressions rather than a stronger sense of community that may be required to tackle the problems that humanity faces as a species (such as those discussed in the Introduction).

These examples might then lend further credence to Hegel's insistence on the mutual dependency of moral law and ethical life. Without reiterated demands for the recognition of human rights from those who have theirs violated, it would be easier to decry universal human rights as Western impositions on non-Western cultures. But these universal norms seem to be grounded in a nascent but developing international ethical life; they are not impositions. We might then venture to contend that rather than overextending our abstractive capabilities by

projecting ethical subjectivity on others in order that we may reach a consensus regarding shared principles of coexistence, that Hegel's argument for the mutual dependency of ethical life and ethical law can lend support to the argument that we must also be concerned with cultivating a more cosmopolitan form of international ethical life; indeed that this might need to come first. We shall defend such an argument in the Conclusion.

Conclusions.

Love, Ethics, and Emancipation

Political and Theoretical Contexts

We saw in the Introduction that several writers have suggested that, given increasing global interdependence, we sit at the twilight of the Westphalian system, confronting a material actuality that is drawing us into a struggle to define the character of globalisation: a struggle between the development of a more democratic cosmopolis that could be characterised by greater collective human responsibility, where sovereignty might be subordinated to global interdependence, or one where we remain increasingly ensnared in the naked pursuit of power and wealth.¹ We learnt, however, that the principle of state sovereignty has had an enormous and lasting effect, not only on the objective structuring of human political and social relations, but also on our political imagination; both of which have conspired to produce a vision of politics that would be contained within the state.²

In light of these material transformations, we affirmed Behr's call for more universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry for contemporary (global) politics and ethics. Ontology, we explained, is a form of philosophical inquiry into existence: into what exists, and into the nature of existence. Yet, beyond the disciplining effect that the principle of state sovereignty has had on political

1. Fred R. Dallmayr, *Small Wonder: Global Power and Its Discontents* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 55. Barry K. Gills, "Introduction," in *The Global Politics of Globalization: "Empire" Vs "Cosmopolis"*, ed. Barry K. Gills (London: Routledge, 2007).

2. R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 63.

thought and practice, standing as further obstacles to the initiation of more universalistic forms of ontological inquiry in world politics is the fact that attempts to bring ontological reflection into international theory have largely been facile, concerned only with 'things that exist' in international relations (as opposed to the being of that entity which encounters such entities as 'objects'); furthermore, the overwhelming trajectory of thought since the eighteenth century has been geared towards recognising the particularity of philosophical (ontological and epistemological) interests.

These claims were illustrated in Chapter 1: the first with reference to recent meta-theoretical debates in international theory, and the second with relation to two influential 'normative' approaches to international theory, those of Rawls and Frost. Both Rawls and Frost assert the particularity of their claims, and attempt to evade controversial philosophical questions by taking dominant practices and institutions associated with the sovereign state as their ethical foundations. Their attempts at evasion, however, were ultimately unsuccessful, since we are led to ask whether we can consider such ethical foundations to have an 'objective' existence, what it means to take such foundations as objective, and what it tells us about the being of that entity that encounters such entities as 'objects.'

Left-Hegelian Thought

It was in this context that we introduced Hegel, for whom freedom serves as the normative standard by which institutions and practices such as the sovereign state are to be judged. According to this view, the 'objectivity' of institutions and practices remains conditional upon the relation between these practices and the being that encounters them as 'objects.' Put differently, the 'objectivity' of institutions such as the state is conditional upon the extent to which they contribute to the self-actualisation of the human being as a free being. Our contention was that this foundational Hegelian commitment to human freedom, an ontological commitment to the human being as a free being, might represent a more

universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary (global) ethics and politics, applying to human beings *qua* human beings rather than to human beings *qua* political subjects of dominant institutions such as the state.

It is worth reminding ourselves that this was a meta-theoretical engagement with Rawls and Frost. We were not necessarily rejecting their normative claims, but arguing that for their approaches to be considered 'good theories,' their ethical foundations are in need of further evaluation.³ In other words, that we should only accept their normative claims as binding on the condition that their respective foundations serve to contribute to human freedom, that the basic structures of a modern constitutional democracy (Rawls), or the practices of global civil society and the system of sovereign states (Frost) contribute to the historical actualisation of the human being as a free being.

It was for this reason that we identified with the left-Hegelian tradition of thought. Motivated by an ontological commitment to the human being as a free being, left-Hegelians, from Marx all the way down to contemporary critical theorists and critical international theorists, have engaged in social inquiry with the aim of foregrounding the possibilities for emancipatory change of the status quo. After a discussion of the relation between critical theories and critical international theories, where we outlined the two main paths of enquiry (historical/sociological and normative/philosophical) into CIRT since the early 1980s, we defended the view that the relevance of critical international theory is likely to grow and the claim that Andrew Linklater's thought represents the most powerful, persuasive, and promising version of CIRT.

Linklater's Dualist Rationalist Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism.

3. As Neufeld explains 'International meta-theory [...] seeks an answer to the question: "what constitutes good theory with regard to world politics?"' Mark A. Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2.

CONCLUSIONS: Love, Ethics, and Emancipation

By not treating dominant institutions as 'objective' ethical foundations, but adopting a broad, philosophically, historically, and sociologically informed vantage on these institutions instead, Linklater represents a marked improvement on both Rawls and Frost. Nonetheless, we suggested that he might fall foul of the same mistake made by Rawls, Frost, and the critical realists: that is, to rely on a shallow ontology of 'things' as his ontological foundation, as opposed to a fuller ontology of the human being as a free being.

With a view to substantiating such a claim, Chapter 2 initiated a philosophical analysis of the philosophical/normative defence of Linklater's critical international theory, which we often referred to simply as his 'emancipatory cosmopolitanism.' Our central claim was that this is underwritten by a foundational commitment to the human being conceived as ethical subject. To establish this, we engaged in a meta-theoretical analysis of some of Linklater's key works: we analysed his conception of emancipation, which is presented as the historical actualisation of the ethical subject, the process by which the material conditions that negate the full appropriation of ethical subjectivity are themselves progressively negated, and his defence of moral universalism, where universality is conceived as the universal responsibility to engage in dialogue. Both of these, we argued, are underwritten by a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity.

Our contention was that this foundational commitment represents a conflation of what Heidegger identifies as the ontological difference between entities and the being of entities (conceived as ethical subjectivity), which reveals Linklater's submission to a form of metaphysical dualism: an ontological dualism where ethical subjectivity amounts to the essential being of human beings (although it manifests itself historically), and an epistemological dualism where the individual conceived as ethical subject (i.e., the post-conventional discourse agent) is treated as if it had a mind-independent existence, independent of the subject's (Linklater's) claim to know it. Such an argument is *metaphysical* because it presumes to apply to human beings *qua* human beings (human beings 'as such')

and to human beings as a whole, and is *dualist* because it rests on a foundational split between subject and object.

As a result, Linklater's universalism, his emancipatory cosmopolitanism, arises out of an always already posited meaning of being (as the historical actualisation of ethical subjectivity) and its derivative structuring of a ground (what the human being is: an ethical subject/post-conventional discourse agent) upon which basis any claims to universality proceed. Our complaint was that this overvalues one human potentiality (ethical subjectivity), and leads to an emancipatory cosmopolitanism that is based upon relations between human beings *qua* ethical subjects. Here, ethical and emancipatory relations are essentially reduced to relations between 'intransitive objects' (i.e., ethical subjects), which is morally deficient because moral recognition is extended only to ethical subjects.⁴ Moreover, we argued in Chapter 3 that Linklater's commitment to moral universalism neglects the role of emancipatory *praxis*: the significance of practical engagement with others, and the processes through which we *become* ethical subjects, both of which are grounded in human freedom. Our conclusion was that this is a contradictory and inappropriate basis for an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism might then fail by its own standards.

A Non-Dualist Praxeological Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism

Part 1 thus made the case that more universalistic forms of ontological inquiry were required for contemporary (global) politics and ethics, and established that the central weakness of Linklater's critical approach to international theory lay in his foundational (ontological and epistemological) commitments to subjectivity and objectivity. These commitments, we suggested, indicated both a limited philosophical ontology of the human being, and a shallow conception of human

4. It is worth noting that moral recognition is not the same as moral concern. Whereas moral recognition is extended to those who can, and/or are willing, to engage in dialogue, there is no basis whatsoever to question the universality of moral concern in Linklater's account.

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freedom. This led us to the conclusion that, although CIRT professes a high degree of reflexivity regarding the relation between subject and object, its focus lies on the role that theorising plays in the recreation of social reality and the emancipatory purposes of theory, rather than with the implications of any underlying commitments to ethical subjectivity, or claims to know any mind-independent objects, for our modes of being in the world.

Having identified Heidegger and Hegel as two powerful challenges to foundational commitments to subjectivity and objectivity, and with the aim of improving on Linklater's essentially *rationalist* cosmopolitanism, we suggested that both Heidegger and Hegel could help us develop an alternative *praxeological* cosmopolitanism; one that might overcome the deficit of moral universalism. We thus proceeded into Parts 2 and 3 with the research question:

What are the implications of conceptions of human existence and freedom in Heidegger and Hegel for critical international theory?

Part 2

The central aims of Part 2 were to deepen the ontological foundations (in the fuller sense of the term) of CIRT, and to begin our task of developing a richer account of human freedom upon which an alternative emancipatory cosmopolitanism might be based. Our claim was that, by eschewing a foundational commitment to subjectivity and focussing instead on an existential analytic of human existence, Heidegger's fundamental ontology could help us develop a more universalistic ontological foundation for contemporary (global) politics and ethics. In contrast to Rawls, Frost and Linklater, whose foundational ethical commitments to 'objects' such as the state or the ethical subject led to normative claims that applied only to human beings *qua* subjects of dominant political institutions, or *qua* ethical subjects, Heidegger's existential analytic of human existence provides

us with a more universalistic ontological foundation, applying to human beings *qua* human beings.

After establishing that Heidegger offers a much deeper account of human existence and sociality than those departing from notions of 'subjectivity' or even 'intersubjectivity,' we argued in Chapter 4 that a more universalistic approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics must involve resisting the (characteristically dualist) temptation to regard our own interpretation of the being of beings as the only interpretation, and therefore to forgo an approach to politics and ethics that is predicated on some universal foundation (such as an ethical subject). Instead, the condition of an ethical and emancipatory politics, we argued, is that it is predicated on what Heidegger calls 'resolute solicitous being-with,' which is to be characterised by an 'intensification of one's cognitive and affective capabilities' and a de-centred receptivity to the existence of others as others.⁵

Having surveyed Heidegger's existential analytic of human existence and his general ontology of Being in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 explored some of the implications for a regional ontology of the human being. Endorsing Olafson's proposal that we conceive human beings as essentially 'world-relating creatures' rather than ethical subjects, we then argued what this might mean for our understandings of freedom, politics and ethics. Through Heidegger's engagement with Kant's conception of freedom, we established that, before it is associated with any form of subjectivity (ethical subjectivity, or the political subjectivity associated with citizenship, for instance) freedom must be recognised, not as the property of an individual, but as the existential condition of world disclosure: as the *Abgrund* of the ontological difference.

Towards the end of Chapter 5 we saw that Heidegger's demonstration that existence is coexistence, that relationality is antecedent to individuality, effectively heralds a fundamental discontinuity between ethics and politics; while politics is the process of projecting and contesting interpretations of the being of beings as a

5. Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2006), 59.

whole, ethics concerns an open, receptive relation to the other as other. Consequently, the problem with foundationalist approaches such as Linklater's is that, by treating ethical subjectivity as a foundational ethical commitment, a (subjective) interpretation of the being of human beings that is projected as a general ontology of human being, they effectively present their politics as an ethics, raising it above political contestation. For this reason we resounded calls from the likes of Nancy and Derrida for a 'politics of singularity' to displace the 'politics of subjectivity' that we argued characterised Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

Part 3

Since one of the central weaknesses of Heidegger's account of resolute solicitous being-with lies in his failure to give an account of the interpersonal conditions of freedom and individuality, one of our reasons for turning to Hegel was to refine our argument with the aid of his account of inter-human recognition. With a view to demonstrating the nature of Hegel's completion of Kant's critical project, this task was initiated in Chapter 6 through a discussion of the subject-object relation from Kant and Hegel. We were particularly interested in Hegel's reworking of Kant's treatment of (ethical and epistemological) subjectivity into self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~, Hegel's departure from Kant's foundational commitment to subjectivity, and the nature of his disassociation of subjectivity from individuality.

We determined that the achievement of self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~ involves recognising that the subject-object split is not foundational, but derivative, occurring *within* consciousness, and is overcome through an open, receptive (phenomenological) relation to the mind-independent real, a relation discussed by Hegel with reference to the experience of love. Insisting that this not be misinterpreted as overly sentimental, we ascertained that 'love' is best understood as an openness of self to other, and an attunement to the practical experience of the

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mind-independent real by a mature personality cognisant of the limitations of reflective rationality. Misrecognising the nature of self-conscious *subjectivity* as a Kantian form of subjectivity, we argued, leads to deleterious implications for our mode of being in the world, contributing to diremption, reification and de-reification. These implications are consequent of a conception of the self as foundational subject that stands in a transcendent and assimilatory relation to the entities of its experience, entities that include other human beings.

Shifting focus from the philosophical (ontological and epistemological) aspect of self-conscious *subjectivity* in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 attended to the emancipatory aspect through a discussion of Hegel's account of the master and slave. We established that this passage of the *Phenomenology* provides a model of the re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness and the interruptive condition of subjectivity. Or, put differently, it provides a demonstration that, as self-conscious beings, we are fundamentally exposed to the existence of others for the character of our freedom and our individuality - an exposure that is disclosed phenomenologically through the experience of love. In light of this re-cognitive structure of self-consciousness, we introduced another aspect of human freedom: freedom as the transcendence of any given subjectivity through the interaction of self and world.

In contrast to the Kantian conception of freedom as autonomous self-direction, this form of freedom is best understood as an entirely immanent form of transcendence, a process of *transgressing* any prior determination of a self. Emancipation is then understood as a process of beings in their becoming, which, following Nancy, we referred as the 'crossing of love.' We then argued that the achievement of self-conscious *subjectivity* involves cultivating an attunement to the existence of others, a receptivity that becomes part of a deeper fabric of our self-understandings and ultimately informing the way that we relate to ourselves and to others. We represented this with the notion of a shared participation in a community of fate - an affective, cognitive attunement to the inter-personal and

cooperative conditions of our own (subjective) freedom and self-hood that augments Heidegger's account of resolute solicitous being-with.

Having outlined the philosophical and emancipatory aspects of Hegel's argument in Chapters 6 and 7, Chapter 8 focussed on the ethical aspect. Our central aim here was to resuscitate and foreground the importance of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) in an ethical and emancipatory politics, especially relative to the importance of universalistic moral reason. For Hegel love is the feeling of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) in its natural form, and following Hegel and Frankfurt, we argued that love is a source and limit on the will and should be considered to be the ultimate ground of practical rationality. Demonstrating that Habermas and Linklater mistreat the notion of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*) by ultimately treating it as subordinate to moral law (*Moralität*), we established that ethical society requires the recognition of the mutual implication of moral rationality *and* ethical life.

Since the exercise of moral reason operates according to the logic of law, requiring the subjection to a common authority that is absent in world politics, our contention was that there is a fundamental problem with the deployment of *Moralität* at the cosmopolitical level. While the underlying assumption of Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is that a shared commitment to ethical subjectivity can provide such an authority, we have questioned the ethical and emancipatory credentials of such a position. Having contended that ethical life both underwrites and transcends the law, and that the ethical logic of love operates in the absence of authority, we concluded by arguing that an ethical and emancipatory approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics must be based upon the cultivation and extension of ethical life at a cosmopolitical level: the development of a cosmopolitan ethos of love.

Vivifying *Sittlichkeit*: a Cosmopolitan Ethos of Love

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While this is to concur with the conclusion to *Men and Citizens* that progressive change in world politics involves the development of a nascent international ethical life and a more rational form of international political life, it does take issue with Linklater's more recent claim in *The Problem of Harm*, in which he states that what he calls 'moral emotions' 'might be more useful in shaping ethical ideas rather than in trying to understand how radical change may occur at a global level.'⁶ Our complaint here is that Linklater underestimates the full ethical and emancipatory significance of ethical praxis: circumscribed by his foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, he is unable to incorporate the other two aspects of human freedom we have been discussing into his emancipatory cosmopolitanism. With a view to clarifying the nature of our own contribution, and shedding light on the nature of the shortcomings of Linklater's, we can draw a distinction between cosmopolitan justice and a cosmopolitan ethos.

Cosmopolitan Justice / Cosmopolitan Ethos

We will recall from Chapter 5 that Heidegger distinguishes between ethics and ethos, where the latter denotes an abode or dwelling place. Ethics, from the Greek (*hē*) *ēthikē* (*tekhne*) '(the science of) morals,' rely on the existence an ethical subject, whereas 'ethos,' deriving from the Greek *ēthos*, 'nature' or 'disposition' relates to a habit of character, a spirit that is manifested in the actions that such an ethos inspires. This distinction between ethics and ethos is also reflected in Hegel's distinction between *Moralität* and *Sittlichkeit*, and our advocacy of a cosmopolitan ethos of love clearly relates to the latter.

Largely characterised by the emphasis placed on moral universalism and the development of universal norms of coexistence that might command the consent of all those who stand to be affected by them, Linklater's emancipatory

6. Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 195. Andrew Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 231.

cosmopolitanism is one primarily motivated by the ideal of justice.⁷ While this remains an important *aspect* of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism, Linklater's foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity undermines the significance of an emancipatory cosmopolitan *ethos*.⁸ This leads to a neglect of the importance of *praxis* (the deficit of moral universalism), an overemphasis on the significance of moral rationality, and a reductive emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

Our distinction between a cosmopolitan justice and a cosmopolitan ethos builds on Paul Ricoeur's distinction between justice and love.⁹ Despite containing no explicit reference to Hegel, Ricoeur's suggestion that justice and love are dialectically entwined is both illuminating and Hegelian in its theme. Insisting that justice and love are not dichotomous, and neither should they be confused, with one being reduced to the other, Ricoeur argues that the two exist in a creative tension: between the poetics of love and the prose of justice, between a logic of superabundance and a logic of equivalence.¹⁰ Ricoeur's insight is that the logics of justice and love exist together in a way that makes a more responsible human life possible.¹¹ For Ricoeur, love is a medium of exchange between two people that goes beyond the level of command (law). Although the law, the universal above and beyond the two (the domain of justice), is a restraint against that which destroys the possibility of this relation, love is a gift that both goes beyond and sustains the law. Ultimately then, love comes *before* justice and makes justice possible.¹²

Although both love and law are required for ethical society, we argued in Chapter 8 that a logic of love is more appropriate in the absence of a common authority. While we can try to foist a common authority onto others, ultimately this can only lead to the establishment of the *conditions* of cooperation, preventing

7. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 96.

8. We will clarify our relation to Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism shortly.

9. Paul Ricoeur, "Love and Justice," in *Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996).

10. *Ibid.*, 23-37.

11. *Ibid.*, 31.

12. Norman Wirzba and Bruce Ellis Benson, *Transforming Philosophy and Religion: Love's Wisdom* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 5.

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communities from disintegrating, rather than developing them. Although an emancipatory cosmopolitanism needs both, given that a key aim of cosmopolitanism is to overcome the duality of 'the domestic' and 'the global,' to create more inclusive forms of communities and foster more universalistic forms of common identification, love, compassion, and emancipatory *praxis* must come first.

While more just relations can contribute to the development of such a cosmopolitanism, the active transcendence of a condition of mutual disinterest, of mutual antipathy, the achievement of a renewed and richer recognition of our mutual dependence, and the development of heightened forms of mutuality and solidarity, are things which cannot simply be based upon principles derived through practical reason: it requires the development of more *loving* relations, relations through which a more genuine human 'we' might emerge.

Our Praxeological Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism

Before we outline what we consider to be our original contribution to critical international theory, and offer some examples of how our emancipatory cosmopolitanism might be deployed, we will first outline some of the limitations of our argument and clarify our relation to Linklater.

Limitations of Our Argument

The objections that we have raised to Linklater's CIRT, especially our claim that it rests on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, are important to our argument and our own emancipatory cosmopolitanism has been developed in response to these perceived shortcomings. However, our claims have been made through a meta-theoretical analysis of his work and there are limitations to this form of argument.

For instance, Linklater does not explicitly defend a commitment to ethical subjectivity, and so our claims are necessarily inferential and are, therefore, fallible. Beyond the inferential analysis of his conceptions of emancipation and moral universality, our claim that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is predicated on a foundational commitment to the ethical subject was bolstered by an analysis of Habermas in Chapter 3; but Linklater is not Habermas, and there are differences between the two.¹³ It is not patently clear, for instance, whether Linklater wholly subscribes to Habermas's moral cognitivism and he is much more sensitive to the concerns of 'postmodernism' and the challenges made to ethical universalism than is Habermas.¹⁴ For these reasons, our argument may be errant.

Nonetheless, we maintain that there is ample evidence to conclude otherwise. Much of this was provided in our close reading of *Men and Citizens* and *Transformation* in Chapter 2, but also in our discussion of his essay *The Achievements of Critical Theory* in Chapter 3. While affirming the challenges to positivism and the immutability thesis, we questioned the ethical and emancipatory credentials of Habermas's reconstruction of historical materialism and development of a discourse theory of morality, both of which are crucial to Linklater's philosophical, praxeological, and sociological analyses – and both are underwritten by a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity and the ethical subject.

Another shortcoming is that we have necessarily curtailed our engagement with Linklater's work. Although we have broached his praxeological and sociological arguments, our focus lay on the philosophical/normative aspect of his CIRT. Besides the fact that Linklater has been impressively prolific, and his output covers a broad ambit that we cannot hope to do justice to given our constraints, our justification for this focus is that Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism serves

13. For an explanation of differences between the two, and the weaknesses of Linklater's deployment of Habermas see Martin Weber, "Engaging Globalization: Critical Theory and Global Political Change," *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 27, no. 3 (2002): 301-25.

14. See the section on 'Dialogue and Discourse' in *Transformation*, especially his discussion of the feminist critique of discourse ethics, and his search for common ground between Lyotard and Habermas. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 87-100,93-95,96-98.

as the philosophical defence of his subsequent praxeological and sociological analyses; any weaknesses in the philosophical/normative defence of his CIRT will therefore be carried over. Nonetheless, given Linklater's insistence on the 'tripartite structure' of any critical theory, save for the praxeological/sociological aspects of our argument that are outlined below, our attempt to develop an emancipatory cosmopolitanism on more convincing meta-theoretical foundations remains incomplete according to Linklater's standards. This is an area for further work.

Our Relation to Linklater's CIRT

Our engagement with Linklater has obviously been a critical one; our concern to outline the central weaknesses and shortcomings of his emancipatory cosmopolitanism and develop our own has involved using his work as a critical foil. While we stick by our criticisms, and insist that our own departs from his in significant ways, our method of argumentation might ultimately be misleading, and perhaps even at times, a little unfair; we can afford to be more conciliatory in concluding our argument.

Linklater's emancipatory cosmopolitanism is a very real contribution to international theory; we stand by the view that it represents the most persuasive and powerful approach to international theory available. Moreover, we self-consciously identify with the aspirations of CIRT and consider our argument to be a contribution to the project of which Linklater has played a central part. Without drastically overestimating our own abilities (or Linklater's for that matter), there is a parallel running between our relation to Linklater's critical project and Hegel's to Kant's.

As we explained in Chapter 6, there is an unfortunate tendency to overemphasise the differences between Kant and Hegel, since 'Hegel's critique of Kant, along with those of the entire post-Kantian German idealist movement, is essentially a *constructive* critique that aims to work out and complete Kant's

critical project. 'Despite criticising Kant on nearly every page of his writings, Hegel's engagement with Kant is *not* a rejection of Kantianism, but part of the development of his own Kantianism.'¹⁵

Similarly here, despite our criticisms of Linklater's work on nearly every page, we are not rejecting Linklater's CIRT, but developing it; our ardent criticisms does not deny our deference. Linklater must be commended for reminding the discipline of the deeper philosophical and normative purpose of international theory and for placing normative ideas and prospects for emancipatory change at the heart of the research agenda in IR. His defence of a left-Hegelian approach to international theory against alternatives is sound, as are his criticisms of neo-realism, positivism, and the immutability thesis (as discussed in Chapter 3). Moreover, his insistence on the 'tripartite structure' of any critical theory provides a strong rebuttal against criticisms that emancipatory change is hopelessly idealistic or naïve, and his later historical/sociological analyses of emancipatory political change, as well as his praxeological arguments in *Transformation* that connect up with the international society approach to international theory, all demonstrate that an ethical and emancipatory approach to world politics can be realistic and realisable. These are all important contributions that should be built upon, not rejected.

Beyond the Foundationalist / Anti-foundationalist Divide?

However, running parallel to Rawls's and Frost's normative approaches to international theory, the force of Linklater's argument rests on our acceptance of a commitment to ethical subjectivity as an 'objective' ethical foundation. Such an assumption is unwarranted.

We demonstrated the epistemological insufficiency of treating the individual human being as ethical subject in Chapters 1 and 6, where we discussed Hegel's

15. Tom Rockmore, *Kant and Phenomenology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 212.

non-dualist approach to knowledge, according to which our interpretation of the being of human beings is a mind-dependent construction. From this point of view, the problem with foundationalist approaches to ethics and politics is that their universalism rests upon a conflation of what Heidegger identifies as the ontological difference between the mind-independent existence of entities and our mind-dependent interpretations of their being (as ethical subjects, for instance). By treating a commitment to ethical subjectivity as a *foundational* commitment, foundationalist approaches to politics and ethics misrepresent their (subjective) interpretation of the being of human beings as objective, treating the ethical subject (or another interpretation of the being of human beings) as if it had a mind-independent existence.

Our philosophical evaluation of such a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity was initiated in our discussion of recent departures in critical theory in Chapter 3. Our discussion there aimed to highlight the general tendency to move increasingly further away from a foundational commitment to the ethical subject. One of the central arguments developed was that the foundational commitment to the ethical subject led to the privileging of moral theory over emancipatory *praxis*: the side-lining of politics by morality (the deficit of moral universalism). This argument was made primarily with reference to Foucault's notion of *travail éthique*.¹⁶ Following Heidegger, Foucault aimed to draw attention to the fact that a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, acting as if we were always already ethical subjects, neglects the process of moral self-formation - the process through which we *become* an ethical subject, a process that is grounded in human freedom.

In light of this we endorsed Brincat's deployment of Honneth's theory of recognition, which focussed on the interpersonal aspect of human freedom. Such a move is promising because the project of emancipation is no longer only connected to the establishment of the conditions for the exercise of ethical subjectivity, but locates it within relations of inter-subjectivity: 'within the experiences of the

16. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, trans. Robert Hurley, vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure (New York: Vintage, 1985), 27.

'dominated' themselves rather than civilising processes that take place 'above them.'¹⁷ Nonetheless, following Odysseos's and Nancy's Heideggerian arguments, we departed from Brincat's and Honneth's reliance on relations of 'intersubjectivity' because this is unable to provide an adequate account of the relational nature of individuality: the fact that relationality is antecedent to subjectivity, or, that existence is coexistence.

The Achievements of Ethical Subjectivity

Anti-foundationalists rightly challenge foundationalist ethical or political commitments (to ethical subjectivity for instance), arguing that these commitments can potentially lead to violent and exclusive responses to difference. However, due to their commitments to 'irony' or to radical autonomy, they often fail to recognise that ethical subjectivity, and the political conditions within which it might be exercised, are very real historical achievements.

We clearly need commitments to ethical subjectivity. We want to feel that our decisions are our own. Acting 'as if we were' ethical subjects and being treated 'as if we were' ethical subjects empowers us to aspire to this level of responsibility and autonomy: notional commitments to ethical subjectivity encourage individuals to *become* free and responsible. Moral reason encourages us to adopt a level of critical distance from our immediate existences and it helps shed light on the essential limitations of our particularist communities. It enjoins us to challenge the irrationalism and parochialism of nationalist ideologies and the exclusivity of self-regarding forms of communitarianism, and offers us a forceful way of challenging questionable institutions and practices – such as the self-defeating nature of drives for power and influence in international affairs (of which Linklater's analysis of Waltz's structural realism is a cogent example). Acting 'as if we were' ethical

17. Shannon Brincat, "Towards an Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Reconstructing the Concept of Emancipation in Critical International Relations Theory" (Ph.D Thesis, University of Queensland, 2011), 312,314-315.

subjects most certainly does lead to the achievement of higher levels of self-determination; ethical subjectivity helps *bring the free being into being*.

Indeed, we underlined the importance of our ability to 'act as if' we were ethical subjects in Chapters 5 and 7 in relation to Kant's conception of freedom, and Hegel's account of the master and slave. In regards the former, we saw that Kant's resolution to the third antinomy between freedom and causality was to posit the necessity of an uncaused cause (transcendental freedom). Although we cannot *experience* this transcendental freedom, Kant argues in the second *Critique* that we must act as if this transcendental thesis were true; to act otherwise would deny us the ability to consider ourselves (and therefore act as) responsible agents. Despite the epistemic possibility that we might well be deluded, for Kant there is a practical necessity of *acting as if* we had cosmological freedom, otherwise we simply could not act.¹⁸

Similarly with Hegel, in Chapter 7 we saw that both master and slave enter the struggle for recognition with the desire for absolute independence; it is their desire for freedom from all conditionality, their desire for *subjectivity*, that draws them into the struggle in the first place. The individuals that face each other make claims of freedom on one another, and resolve to treat each other 'as if they were' ethical subjects to avoid the ensuing struggle between life and death. Importantly though, this mutual recognition between 'subjects' is simply a way of mediating the fact that they are fundamentally dependent on each other for their freedom, and hence their subjective freedom is only ever a relative independence.

This is the central strength of Linklater's rationalist emancipatory cosmopolitanism: he provides us with a potent defence of *one aspect* of human freedom. Just like our meta-theoretical engagement with Rawls and Frost did not lead to a rejection of their normative claims, but to an insistence that their

18. In a metaphysics lecture Kant is quoted as saying: 'Freedom is practically necessary – man must therefore act according to an idea of freedom, otherwise he cannot act. That does not, however, prove freedom in the theoretical sense.' Henry E. Allison, *Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 133-34.

foundational ethical commitments be subjected to further evaluation before we accept their normative claims as binding, we are arguing that Linklater's normative claims must be conditional upon the extent to which ethical subjectivity contributes to human freedom; to be judged according to a more comprehensive account of this normative ideal, such as ours.

'Overcoming' Linklater's Rationalist Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism

It is because we recognise with Linklater that ethical subjectivity is an historical achievement, and that a logic of mutual equivalence is an important aspect of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism, that we are not rejecting his emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Reflecting Heidegger's famous call for an 'overcoming' of metaphysics (discussed in Chapter 4), we *are* arguing that cosmopolitanism must be predicated on a more persuasive, more universalistic, meta-theoretical foundation: that is to say, on a fuller ontological account of the human being as a free being, to be accompanied by an epistemology that does not conflate the 'ontological difference' or overlook the distinction between mind/world and mind-independent real.

The problem with working from dualist premises is that ontological commitments are concealed or treated as if they were neutral or universal. Rhetorically, this method of argumentation is powerful but philosophically it might be disingenuous and, in any case, it does not stand up to much scrutiny. Hence despite recognising the achievements of ethical subjectivity (in this sense we are more Hegelian than Heideggerian), we hope to have demonstrated that treating it as a foundational commitment, or as if it were the apex of human maturity (Kohlberg, Habermas, Linklater), is profoundly mistaken.

This way of thinking does not correspond to our experience (Emerson); it misrepresents the essentially connected nature of our personalities (Hegel, Emerson); it distorts our understandings of the world by objectifying the entities of

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our experience (Heidegger, Hegel, Scheler, Lem); by establishing the self as transcendent, knowing, and assimilatory in its relations to the entities that it experiences, it adversely affects the nature of the relation between self and world (the problem with Kant and Fichte; Frye, Buber); it precludes the possibility of a genuine encounter with the other (Nancy); and it alienates us from the depth phenomena of our existence - our experiences of ourselves as self-actualising beings, of our positive freedom gained through the transcendence of any given subjectivity (the crossing of love), and from our experiences of authentic community - communities in which we are not subjects relating to other subjects. For all these reasons a foundational commitment to the ethical subject is profoundly misguided, epistemologically, ontologically, and ethically.

Furthermore, and more pertinent to an emancipatory politics, this way of thinking undermines the two other aspects of human freedom that we have sought to shed light on: freedom as existential condition of world-disclosure and freedom as the transcendence of subjectivity, where any given subjectivity is transcended in ethical and emancipatory praxis. For this reason, as it stands, being reliant on a foundational commitment to ethical subjectivity, there is an essential tension between Linklater's commitment to the development of more ethical and emancipatory human relations and his philosophical defence of this position. This is why we have argued that we are constitutively unable to build an emancipatory cosmopolitanism from dualist premises, and why we need to overcome Linklater's rationalist emancipatory cosmopolitanism with a praxeological emancipatory cosmopolitanism. Herein lies our original contribution to critical international theory.

Conclusions: Our Contribution to Critical International Theory

Responding to Behr's call for the development of more universalistic trajectories of ontological inquiry for contemporary politics and ethics, and having

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identified with the left-Hegelian tradition of thought, our original contribution to critical international theory has been to argue that it must be predicated, not on any foundational commitments to subjectivity or objectivity, but on a fuller ontological foundation: on an ontology of being, and of human being in particular. After highlighting the essential weaknesses and contradictions latent within the most compelling advocate of this approach to international theory, our move has been to establish a 'critical' approach to international theory on a more persuasive and universalistic meta-theoretical foundation. Our hope is that this represents a contribution to a more adequate ethical and emancipatory approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics.

We offered an epistemological defence of this praxeological universalism through Hegel's phenomenological constructivist approach to knowledge. In contrast to the dualist approach, where the subject-object split occurs between mind and world, and the object is treated as if it had a mind-independent 'objective' existence, Hegel's approach to knowledge regards the subject-object split as derivative, rather than foundational, and occurring *within* consciousness. This called for a further distinction to be drawn between mind/world and mind-independent real, where entities have a mind-independent existence, but their being, which is dependent upon human understanding, and therefore on the activity of 'mind' (*Geist*), does not.

Our contention was that this epistemological aspect of our argument can help us move beyond the foundationalist/anti-foundationalist schism in normative theory. In contrast to the foundationalist approach, we recognise that our interpretation of the being of beings is a mind-dependent interpretation of a reality that we wish to construct, and thus does not have a mind-independent existence; consequently, that an ethical and emancipatory politics cannot be predicated on an interpretation of the being of human beings that is projected as a universal ontology of human being. In contrast to the anti-foundationalist approach however, we realise that we can give better or worse accounts of the being of human beings,

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accounts that are to be evaluated according to the normative ideal of more ethical and emancipatory relations between human beings.

This brings us to the ontological aspect of our meta-theoretical argument, which has aimed to develop a fuller, more universalistic understanding of the nature of the human being as a free being. This has been an essentially philosophical exercise that amounts to an attempt to contribute to the development of a more adequate account of the human being as mind-dependent cognitive object.

Since every human being that we encounter is first and foremost an entity that has a mind-independent existence that we must presume exceeds our understanding or interpretation of them, we have argued that relations to others are best conceived as relations to singularities, relations that do not reduce the other to simply a particular case of the human species, but relations that aspire to treat them as singular irreplaceable beings. Building on this premise, we have also sought to contribute other non-subjectivist accounts of the being of human beings. These accounts are not mutually exclusive: they all capture aspects of the being of human beings. Moreover, while they do not deny our ability to 'act as if' we were subjects, they do amount to a recognition that such an activity is essentially a fugitive way of understanding the self.

Firstly, following Heidegger, in Chapter 4 we defended a view of human beings as *ek-sistents*: as beings that interpret Being, and which exist essentially as potentiality rather than ground (as implied by 'subjectivity'). Following Olafson, we built on this in Chapter 5, where we defended the view of the human being as a world-relating creature, whose world relation represents the proximal fact of their existence, and which they cannot simply transcend when they adopt a position of subjectivity. Finally, in Part 3 we defended the view of the human being as the being with potential for self-conscious ~~subjectivity~~, the achievement by a mature personality of a form of cognition that overcomes the limitations of object-oriented

forms of consciousness, which is characterised by an open, receptive attunement to the existence of others, and to the disclosure of the mind-independent real.

Our argument that our interpretations of the being of human beings are mind-dependent constructions means that an ethical and emancipatory politics cannot be based upon some universal ground, a shared subjectivity, but must be premised instead on a universal relation: an affective and receptive relation to the mind-independent real where 'the other' can appear to us in their full singularity. Having argued that freedom is not a property that drives our actions, but is appropriated in praxis with others, and that what it means to be a free human being is to engage in resolute solicitous being-with others, we concluded that an ethical and emancipatory politics does not simply amount to the establishment of the political conditions for the exercise of subjectivity, but must go beyond this.

Indeed, our fuller account of human freedom and the being of human beings allow us to go beyond Linklater's praxeological arguments, which are seemingly confined to the obligations of states to engage in different modes international society to promote higher levels of universality and difference, or to project the achievements of national citizenship out onto the sphere of international relations.¹⁹ While not opposing Linklater's suggestions, our emancipatory cosmopolitanism calls for a deeper and more demanding approach to an ethical and emancipatory approach to contemporary (global) politics and ethics. Given the material transformations of world politics outlined in the Introduction, it is important that we make this move.

Our praxeological arguments are not just aimed at states and their agents, but should also be received as a galvanising call to human beings *qua* human beings to fully appropriate our own freedom by acting in ethical and emancipatory ways towards others that we encounter. We might then return to our discussion of Bob Francis and the Commonwealth minister's constituents from the Introduction and ask again: what does it tell us about the being of those beings that encounter

19. Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, 181,211-212.

refugees as others to be excluded? Does their prerogative as political subjects (as citizens of the Australian state) to exclude others amount to an exercise of their freedom as human beings? Does an ethical relation simply consist in their state's non-contravention of cosmopolitan norms? In light of our previous discussions, the answer to both is clearly a resounding 'no.'

Applying Our Argument

One of the problems highlighted with Wight's ontological argument about the relation between structure and agency is that, although he shows that ontology matters, it is not clear how social practice is affected by this realisation, both analytically and normatively.²⁰ We should avoid such a mistake. Moreover, our fuller account of human freedom allows us to look beyond Habermas's and Linklater's deployment of the normative ideal of universal communication as an evaluative tool for critical social theory and a guide for ethical and emancipatory praxis.

Based upon our argument for the vivification of an international ethical life, we will now discuss three key implications of our argument. These allow us to adopt critical stances on cosmopolitan norms, institutions, and identities, and they relate to love as a guide for *praxis*, love as an evaluative tool for critical social theory, and love as a way of cultivating a common human identity.

It is worth noting at the outset that we are not arguing *against* Linklater in what follows; Linklater's rationalist emancipatory cosmopolitanism and ours are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, unsurprisingly, there is much overlap with Linklater's concerns. However, Linklater's foundational commitments deny him powerful philosophical and motivational resources for an ethical and emancipatory cosmopolitanism, and our emancipatory cosmopolitanism can inform international practice in ways that Linklater's cannot. In contrast to Linklater's rationalism, our

20. Corneliu Bjola, "Agents, Structures, and International Relations: Politics as Ontology By Colin Wight," *International Studies Review* 9(2), no. 2 (2008): 316-18.

applications of our argument all proceed from an affirmation of our ethical immediacy, from the essentially lived character of ethics, and from a relation to the other as singularity rather than subject.

Love and Praxis

Our praxeological approach to an emancipatory politics enjoins us to resist or overcome mediated relations between self and other, recognising that our independence is only ever a relative independence and soliciting us to disconnect from the organic community into which we are born, from our inherited places in the global order of things, in the name of a higher universality.²¹ In the context of world politics this might involve acting in ways that generate forms of solidarity beyond traditional communities, across lines that traditionally divide people. It might involve attempting to dissolve perceptions of mutual enmity or diffusing hostility between collective entities through trust building initiatives, for instance.²²

21. See for instance Žižek's article on the purpose and meaning of the E.U. as an application of this logic. He writes: 'Christ's "scandalous" words from Luke point in the direction of a universality which ignores every social hierarchy: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and his mother, his wife and children, his brothers and sisters – yes even his own life – he cannot be my disciple" (14:26). Family relations stand here for any particular ethnic or hierarchic social link that determines our place in the global order of things. The "hatred" enjoined by Christ is therefore not the opposite of Christian love, but its direct expression: it is love itself that enjoins us to "disconnect" from our organic community into which we were born, or, as St Paul put it, for a Christian, there are neither men nor women, neither Jews nor Greeks. No wonder that, for those fully identified with a particular way of life, the appearance of Christ was perceived as ridiculous or traumatic.' Slavoj Žižek, "I Have a Dream," *The Guardian* 4th February (2011).

22. A recent anti-war initiative, 'Israel Loves Iran,' launched by Tel Aviv resident Ronny Edry and his wife Michal Tamirm is a heartening example of such a venture. See www.israelovesiran.com; Elizabeth Flock, "'Israel Loves Iran' Anti-War Initiative Takes Off," *The Washington Post*. 19th March 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/blogpost/post/israel-loves-iran-anti-war-initiative-takes-off/2012/03/19/gIQA1qWXNS_blog.html (accessed 20th June 2012). Ruth Margalit, "Israel Loves Iran (on Facebook)," *The New Yorker*. March 23rd, 2012 <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/culture/2012/03/israel-loves-iran-on-facebook.html> (accessed 20th June 2012).

Indeed, given that Muhammad was a descendant of Ishmael, himself a son of Abraham (and half brother of Isaac), Israel and Iran may be seen as branches from the same trunk; relations between them might then prove to be an interesting example of Hegel's argument for the reconciliation in love of differentiated spheres of life that have split from an underlying unity. See (Genesis 12:4-7; 13:12-18; 15:1-21; 17:1-22; 21:1-14; 25:19-26; 26:1-6; 35:9-12); (Sura 19:54; Sura 37:83-109 cf. Genesis 22:1-19)

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It also encourages us to actively participate in ethical life (domestic and global) with the aim of ameliorating injustices, which might involve the vindication of acts of conscience. As a recent article on the activities of the hacker collective Anonymous succinctly states, 'in more naïve times, one might naturally prefer a law-bound state deciding which power abuses should be reined in and which information exposed. But these are no longer naïve times.'²³ In a decade that saw the normalisation of policies of lawless detention, torture, extraordinary rendition, targeted assassinations, along with the instigation of wars of questionable legitimacy or legality, and a persistent refusal to bring those now or formerly in power, in both public and private sectors, to account for their transgressions, and political systems that increasingly favour the rich and powerful, it is unsurprising that there is growing public mistrust of authority and increasing suspicion that those with formal authority cannot be trusted to decide what wrongs should be righted, what social ills should be addressed, what information should be shared, or what actions are in the best interests of either of their own constituents or those of a broader humanity.²⁴

In light of these developments it should be unsurprising that individuals acting collectively in networks and organisations such as Anonymous, Wikileaks, or Sea Shepherd feel that they are able to make decisions based on the activity of their own consciences and act on them with greater legitimacy than those occupying positions in traditional structures of authority. These developments are at once disconcerting and hopeful, and in their positive mode they are examples of engaged, ethical, and emancipatory praxis.

Another, more pressing and disturbing example of love as a potential guide for ethical and emancipatory praxis relates to an ongoing situation in Western Burma.²⁵ The Rohingya, a stateless people who have lived in Burma for at least 60

23. Yochai Benkler, "Hacks of Valour: Why Anonymous is Not a Threat to National Security," *Foreign Affairs*, 4th April 2012 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137382/yochai-benkler/hacks-of-valor>. (accessed April 4, 2012).

24. Several of these examples are Benklers, several my own. Ibid.

25. See Moshahida Sultana Ritu, "Ethnic Cleansing in Myanmar," *New York Times*, 12th July 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/13/opinion/ethnic-cleansing-of-myanmars-rohingyas.html>

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years (and perhaps centuries), have faced torture, neglect and repression since Burma's independence from Britain in 1948. They are denied even the possibility of citizenship by the country's constitution. Following recent unrest in Arakan state, the Burmese are now trying to push them out of the country all together. Rohingya people have been driven off their land, raped, beaten and starved to death, and forced to flee to Bangladesh where they have simply been turned back to Burma – the Burmese President Thein Sein even recently submitted a proposal to the UN to have approximately all 800,000 Rohingya resettled in a third country.²⁶

Acts of love and compassion enjoin us to reconcile perceived differences between self and other, to extend our trust and to take other's interests as our own, in a process that is transformative of both; Bangladeshis who hid Rohingya refugees from the authorities in their homes are lustrous examples. An ethical and emancipatory response to this situation does not simply call for the establishment of mutually agreeable principles of coexistence, nor does it call for the separation of these communities; for even if all the Rohingya were resettled, those who forced them to leave their lands would remain snared in their own hateful, xenophobic subjectivity. Rather, our argument is that an ethical and emancipatory response requires a revolution in the spirit or the ethos that governs such relations: a revolution with the ultimate aim of reconciling these bitter divisions, reconciliation that would constitute transcendence for both Rohingya and for other ethnic Burmese.

(accessed 12th July 2012, 2012). and Benedict Rogers, "Is Burma Ready to Embrace Diversity?," *Democratic Voice of Burma*. 7th August, 2012 (accessed 12/08/2012).

26. Human Rights Watch, "The Government Could Have Stopped This," *Human Rights Watch*. 1st August (2012).

Love as Evaluative Tool²⁷

Clearly actions do not occur outside of a social and historical context and human freedom operates, at least partially, through social institutions and practices. For this reason these institutions and practices should be subject to our own standards of ethics and freedom; those that block or undermine the conditions of our own freedom, or hamper fully ethical relations with others, are not fully rational and should be subject to reform. This normative standard represents the second practical application of our commitment to love as a cosmopolitan ethos: love as a basis of critique.

Offering a cosmopolitan ethos of love as an evaluative tool for critical social theory involves committing to the critique and transformation of practices and institutions that pervert the dynamic of ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). It provides us with a normative standard with which to indict forms of ethical habituation, institutions and practices, for being obstacles to a full appropriation of that which makes us human: the depth phenomena of our existence – our experiences of freedom, our self-actualisation, and our participation in different communities.

One obvious target for such criticism would be the exclusivity of the nation-state, since it relies on the exclusion of non-citizens in order to safeguard the protections that it can provide its own subjects, often forcibly and violently. Yet criticism would also be extended to other material and ideational structures that foster divisions between people, alienate self from other, and stand as obstacles to fully free and ethical relations between people. As well as the state, poverty and extreme inequality are examples of the latter, while exclusive religions or political ideologies that suppose self-regarding traditional communities and their institutional expressions to be natural and eternal (structural realism, for instance) or those which treat particularist identities as singular, exclusive and superordinate

27. Frederick Neuhouser makes a related argument for using Hegel's characteristic understanding of freedom, which Neuhouser refers to as 'social freedom' as an evaluative tool for critical social theory. See Frederik Neuhouser, *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Frederik Neuhouser, "Hegel on Life, Freedom, and Social Pathology" (Paper presented at the Philosophies of Right: Philosophical Conceptions of Right from German Idealism to Critical Theory, New York, 2011).

to the extension of empathy and solidarity across cultural boundaries, can also be subject to critique.

Material and Ideational Practices of Indifference

Affirming love as a cosmopolitan ethos also invites criticism to be directed towards material and ideational practices that generate and sustain forms of indifference towards others. We saw in Chapter 7 that a radical degree of co-responsibility arises on account of our being bound together in a community of fate. This co-responsibility does not compromise the autonomy of the individual - every person remains fully responsible for his or her own actions - but, as for Scheler, this co-responsibility must lead to a form of a radical questioning:

When another person commits an act of hate or violence, the questions implied in solidarity are how such acts are possible and how have I participated in creating a world wherein such acts are possible. The existence of hate necessarily implies that I have not loved enough.²⁸

The central idea is that social space is always constituted ethically and normatively, it is a space in which human beings are formed or deformed, freed or oppressed, through the structures in which we interact with others. Within this space we cannot ethically harm another without ethically harming ourselves, and others cannot be harmed without ourselves bearing co-responsibility for that harm.²⁹

In light of this, material and ideational practices that disavow this radical co-responsibility and foster feelings of indifference towards others, or discourage us from feeling obliged to those beyond our immediate circle of concern, confining

28. Max Scheler. *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by Maria Scheler and Manfred S. Frings., Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1986., II,526. Zachary Davis and Anthony Steinbock, *Max Scheler*, Winter 2011 ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/scheler/>, 2011).

29. J.M. Bernstein, "Early Theological Writings," *Lectures on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* The New School. New York City. 13th September (2006): <http://bernsteintapes.com/lectures/Hegel/03EarlyTheologicalWritingA.mp3>.

our attentive care only to our local groups – towards compatriots or towards fellow believers – are liable to censure. As are more individualistic social ideologies such as libertarian ideas of absolute individual responsibility, extending even to those cosmopolitanisms predicated on the idea of the individual as subject, where the subject has to be *moved into* action in order to comply with universal duties or obligations that have been theoretically derived.

No Stale Fraternity

Advocating the role of love in responding to our current actuality should not then be considered a romantic idealism inappropriate to the public realm and hopelessly diluted when applied to world politics, but rather as an argument concerning the appropriate response to the singular others that we encounter in our day-to-day existences; one that compels us to act in spite of our limited ability to do so wholly effectively and alleviate these conditions. It should be thought of as an antidote to the temptation to over-rationalise our responses to migrants, refugees, the global poor, or towards those with whom we perceive a relation of enmity, since this over-rationalisation often leads to a practical paralysis due the overwhelming nature of the response (such as the case in the alleviation of global poverty): an alienation from the other that results in our acquiesces to their detainment in detention facilities (such as in the case of migrants or asylum seekers); or the sanctioning of their inhumane treatment (such as in cases of the torture or extra-judicial killings of 'enemy non-combatants'). While this is a first order ethical concern, it is also politically relevant since, through the recognition of life as life in its separated yet connected forms, love 'upholds life in its manifold differences' and thus 'constitutes the vehicle of future cognitive determination between the philosophical, the political and the economic, and there from, the active promise of future polity.'³⁰

30. Richard Beardsworth, "A Note to a Political Understanding of Love in Our Global Age," *Contretemps* (2006), 8.

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It should also be clear that this is not a pacifying and conciliatory vision of human relations. Love does not lead to the preaching of a stale fraternity, nor does it ignore the existence of relations of power and exploitation: rather, it demands that 'the injustice and cowardice of power must be denounced and, in their turn, negated.'³¹ Loving is risky, it involves linking ourselves to the interests of another, 'exposing oneself to another's vicissitudes,' and it manifests itself as struggle.³² Yet it is love that constitutes perhaps the deepest phenomena of our existences, and we have argued that it represents the highest appropriation of our freedom. This makes it an integral, yet hitherto neglected, part of any emancipatory politics - a crucial and central aspect of an emancipatory cosmopolitanism.

31. Jean-Luc Nancy, *Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 62.

32. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Taking Ourselves Seriously and Getting it Right" (Paper presented at the Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Stanford University, 2004), 195.

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