

**The Crime-Terror Continuum:  
Modelling 21<sup>st</sup> Century Security Dynamics**

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D.

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31 March 2005

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DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Si ..... (candidate)

Date..... *30 September 2005* .....

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.

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## **Abstract**

The main aim of this thesis is to introduce a new way of thinking about security within International Relations by developing a model that can be used to explain the relationship between terrorism and organised crime. Referred to as the crime-terror continuum (CTC), the model identifies six major points of convergence between the terrorist and criminal worlds. The crime-terror continuum seeks to move away from the traditional confines of International Relations as encapsulated within realist thought. After providing an overview of the limitations of traditional theories, and a working definition of terrorism and organised crime, this thesis applies an alternative conceptual framework - based on a combination of applicable assumptions about security presented by the Copenhagen School, Ken Booth and Mohammed Ayoob – to an understanding of the threats posed by terrorism and organised crime. It also incorporates the understanding of the contemporary security environment provided by the globalisation and netwar proto-paradigms as a way to go beyond debates about concepts by seeking to understand the operational and organisational dynamics of contemporary security threats. Paying special attention to the argument that non-state actors can be equal to state actors in the security domain, this thesis highlights that competition over state functions and territory continues to play an integral role. The alternative view of security and the CTC are subsequently applied to two case studies: Russian Organised Crime and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. Despite illustrating different aspects of the CTC, these case studies highlight the ability of the conceptual framework and the CTC to explain and understand the post-Cold War security environment.

## Acknowledgements

This thesis began as a personal quest to develop a model that could illustrate, and thus help understand, the relationship between organised crime and terrorism. A childhood interest in crime, and subsequently political violence, unknowingly set me on a path which I have been addicted to for 13 years. The conclusions drawn within these pages are a culmination of my reading, personal travels to destitute countries experiencing forms of the nexus, and vibrant discussions with numerous people that have shared this interest with me.

The number of individuals that helped, encouraged, and supported me through the years – in one way or another - are numerous. First and foremost I extend my humble gratitude to Daphne Biliouri, a dear friend who is family in every sense of the word. Her confidence in my abilities gave me the drive needed to overcome many personal and mental hurdles that stood in the way of completing this project. Always my proverbial light, she never failed to come to the rescue when needed! I would also like to thank my parents, William and Larysa Makarenko for their unending support, understanding and direction from the first day I entered this world. Your confidence in me in all I ever choose to do has been my foundation. For you, I hope that this thesis acts as proof that gentle parental reminders do eventually pay off. I would also like to thank the rest of my supportive family network: my sister and brother, Natalia and Paul, just for being themselves; my maternal grandparents for making my initial ‘academic’ venture to do my M.Litt. at St. Andrews University possible and my paternal grandparents for constantly highlighting the importance of education.



An enormous thank you to my supervisor – Dr. Jenny Mathers - for her own unfailing support, legendary patience, and most generous (albeit sometimes harsh) comments; and a thank you to Dr. Steve Hobden for finding ways to get me to Aberystwyth to embark on my doctoral studies, and for commenting on my first chapters. I would also like to thank the Adams family and the Department of International Politics for awarding me the Caroline Adams scholarship. To all my friends and colleagues for their help and listening to me droning on about work – Svante Cornell, Chris Aaron, Rosemary Muir-Wright, Gillian McIlwaine; and, the students of REOC and the American University in Kyrgyzstan for questioning...

I must also extend a special thank you to my mentor, colleague and friend, Professor Paul Wilkinson, for inspiring me to try and make a difference. And for those whose names I cannot write because they are engaged in constant battles against various facets of the crime-terror nexus, I thank you for sharing your insights and experiences with me.

Finally, a grin of gratitude to MB for providing me with last minute incentive!

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## Introduction

Within popular Western culture, the saying: 'money makes the world go around' is often used to reflect the perception that an innate relationship exists between money, power and influence. Related to the study of International Relations, and more specifically International Security, these concepts and the relationship between them are widely debated. Therefore, unlike the general public's acceptance that these ideas are interdependent, universal conclusions have not been reached within academic discourse. In fact, it is often the case that money and power, and subsequently political influence, are treated as distinctly independent phenomena. Applied to the context of 'security' this perception is reflected in the fact that politically-motivated activities are commonly isolated from activities driven by profit-maximisation. The academic norm has therefore been to treat studies of conflict (including terrorism) separately from that of organised crime. In fact, organised crime has rarely been the focus of discourse within International Relations because it has been historically classified as a law enforcement problem, and not a problem of national or international security.

It is the absence of detailed studies combining economic and political motivations for conflict that form the overarching impetus for this thesis. This, however, is coloured by debates about the role of the state in the post-Cold War environment. With evidence pointing to the expanding role and influence of non-state actors, limiting investigations about economic and political motivations for conflict to state actors fails to provide an accurate picture of security as it exists at the start of the twenty-first century. The main research questions I therefore pose are: is there a nexus



between organised crime and terrorism, and if there is, what are the implications for our understanding of security? In other words, can the inclusion of organised crime and terrorism within debates about security contribute to the development of a more accurate and flexible understanding than that which is offered by traditional approaches?

As with any political or military activity, it is self-evident that terrorist groups require funding in order to coordinate and perpetrate acts of terrorism. Although there are numerous sources of revenue from which terrorist groups can accrue support (i.e. donations and state sponsorship), the post Cold-War environment has facilitated access to criminal activities. At the same time, instability in politically weak states throughout the world has produced an environment in which organised crime has found it beneficial to enter the political realm. As a result, it may be preliminarily concluded that the international environment has created a predicament in which the use of terror tactics and organised crime by non-state actors has become so prevalent that pinpointing a group's motivations or aims is an increasingly complex task. In other words the interaction between political dynamics (i.e. control over state functions) and personal dynamics (i.e. profit maximisation) has resulted in blurred distinctions about the nature of 21<sup>st</sup> century security threats primarily because the threats that emerge from both have proven to undermine the stability of sovereign states.

My own personal interest in the relationship between organised crime and terrorism, and the impact violent non-state actors had on international security emerged in 1992 at the start of my undergraduate studies. Although I argued then that a distinct

relationship existed between terrorism and criminal activities, the degree of the extent of these relations remained a mystery as they were not addressed in any academic studies at the time (apart for Ehrenfeld, 1990). This question has therefore preoccupied my mind for 13 years, turning into a personal quest for evidence that either confirmed or refuted my early beliefs. It was this quest to understand how and why threats converge that inspired me to contribute my arguments to the existing literature on security, terrorism and organised crime. My goal was not solely to question the relevance of traditional approaches to these concepts, but to provide an alternative conceptual framework that gives an additional understanding of how they can be related to the post-Cold War environment. In addition to compiling theoretical components that are applicable to an explanation of the threats posed by non-state actors, I have sought to take a step further by building a model that illustrates the evolving nature of security by tracing the various types of relationships that exist between organised crime and terrorism. By doing this, my intention coincides with Robert Nisbet who wrote:

Beyond a certain point, it is but a waste of time to seek tidy semantic justifications for concepts used by creative minds. The important and all-too-neglected task in philosophy and social theory is that of observing the ways in which abstract concepts are converted by their creators into methodologies and perspectives which provide new illuminations of the world.<sup>1</sup>

## **Methodology**

The inherent difficulties associated with researching security issues such as organised crime and terrorism reveals a need to reflect on the assumptions that underpin this individual research project. This is a valuable exercise precisely because it establishes research parameters that will be used to navigate through the complexities of this

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<sup>1</sup> Robert Nisbet, Makers of Modern Social Science: Emile Durkheim (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 39.



specific social world, while outlining potential weaknesses and strengths associated with studying this subject area. Based on this requirement, what follows is a summary of my position on questions of ontology, epistemology and methodology as they relate to my work.

Beginning from a positivist perspective, reality exists independent of theory and therefore is merely awaiting observation.<sup>2</sup> Following this line of thinking it may be concluded that organised crime and terrorism unquestionably exist within the social world, as with any other concept labelled by researchers. However, this is a very simplistic way of asserting the existence of these phenomena, and it does not provide answers to questions related to the nature of existence claims in this thesis. Given the nature and political use of the terms 'organised crime' and 'terrorism', the task of this thesis is not only to reveal their existence as threats in the security realm, but to be able to ascertain the difference between facts and illusions. For this reason, positivism does not necessarily provide a solid ontological framework.

Adopting the approach of critical realists, there are three levels of reality in the context of my research: the empirical, actual, and real/deep.<sup>3</sup> As outlined by Smith, the empirical consists of perceptions, impressions and sensations; the actual consists of events and states of affairs; and the real/deep level encompasses structures, mechanisms and powers/liabilities.<sup>4</sup> This highlights the importance of various aspects in determining the nature of their existence. Making a distinction between these levels

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<sup>2</sup> Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: an introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 64.

<sup>3</sup> Mark J. Smith, Social Science in Question (London: Sage Publications, 1998), p. 299.

<sup>4</sup> As outlined in Smith, 'states of affairs' refers to the normal conditions within which events take place, such as within the institutions of a liberal democracy. For a description of structures, mechanisms and powers/liabilities, see *Ibid.*

is thus necessary in order to build a complete understanding of the phenomenon in question.

Based on this ontological understanding of reality, it could be argued that 'terrorism' exists as a 'real' social phenomenon. On the empirical level terrorism is defined by the perceptions, impressions and sensations experienced by society. Thus terrorism is partially defined by the fear and terror felt within a specific segment of society, or it may also be understood as a tool used by groups who have the impression that the use of terror tactics are an effective means of attaining specific goals. Furthermore, after assessing numerous events that produce fear/terror within a society, another characteristic of terrorism may be uncovered. From this a definition of terrorism should include a reference to actions that are intended to produce fear/terror. On this level, without action terrorism cannot materialise. Finally on a real/deep ontological level of reality, terrorism does not disappear just because a specific group within society does not experience it on the first two levels. Generally speaking, this is because structures can exist independently of our knowledge of them, "structures are a property of being and not just a property of our discourse about being."<sup>5</sup>

Within this example, it is evident that a careful examination of each level of reality is capable of revealing how specific phenomena work and are understood. Furthermore, this ontological view of the nature of existence claims made within research is based on the assumption that perceptions and events are distinguishable. As Outhwaite wrote, "Realism is, then, a common-sense ontology, in the sense that it takes seriously

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<sup>5</sup> Raymond A. Morrow and David D. Brown, *Critical Theory and Methodology* (London: Sage Publications, 1994), p. 155. Although this is an oversimplified example, it does show the importance of the three levels of reality outlined by critical realism, for answering questions that relate to the nature of the existence of phenomena discussed in this thesis.



the existence of the things, structures and mechanisms revealed by the sciences at different levels of reality.”<sup>6</sup> This ontological view is revealed throughout my research as I build an alternative understanding to security based on the threats posed by organised crime and terrorism.

Aside from providing an answer to questions relating to ‘what there is’ in the social world, it is equally important to outline how this knowledge can be realised. For the most part, empiricism forms the basis of the epistemological claims made throughout this thesis. According to empiricists, knowledge is derived from experience; therefore what we know of the world ultimately comes from our senses. Knowledge is “regarded as representation – doubtless sometimes erroneous or incomplete – but a representation none the less, corresponding to the external world.”<sup>7</sup> This position, however, does not completely represent the assumptions about knowledge present in this thesis. In order to overcome weaknesses of empiricist epistemology, elements of post-realism (i.e. critical realism) have been incorporated. For critical realists epistemology is not solely about a scientific method based on logic and empirical data, but reality can exist independently of our consciousness. Thus according to Morrow and Brown, “The continuously changing and diverse nature of scientific concepts and practices does not, therefore, call into question confidence in scientific knowledge because there is no need for concepts to correspond to reality in order to be justifiable.”<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> William Outhwaite, New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and Critical Theory (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), p. 19.

<sup>7</sup> Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York, Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 181.

<sup>8</sup> Morrow and Brown (1994), p. 78.



Despite arguing that knowledge does not only come from experiences, the epistemology of empiricism takes precedence in this thesis. The study of organised crime and terrorism is, in a sense, dependent on the belief that there are ‘facts’ that can be gathered in the social world. More specifically, this thesis uses the definition of empiricism as a “conception of social research involving the production of accurate data – meticulous, precise, generalisable – in which the data themselves constitute an end for research. It is summed up by the catchphrase ‘the facts speak for themselves’.”<sup>9</sup> Research does not end here, but incorporates an understanding that knowledge also arrives from the interpretation of these ‘facts’. This interpretation is based on an analysis of the historical context, paying attention to the importance time and space has for producing such knowledge claims.

Following this thinking, knowledge about terrorism and organised crime emerges from a combination of human action, language, human practice, and the models of the world and society produced by societal actors.<sup>10</sup> Therefore “actions cannot be explained by statistics alone,”<sup>11</sup> however statistics provide the basis of any knowledge claim. Regardless of the epistemology used within specific research projects, although ‘facts’ can be ascertained, Martyn Hammersley correctly pointed out that “we must recognise that absolute certainty is not available about anything.”<sup>12</sup> Although this truth is important to remember throughout the research process as a way of testing knowledge claims made, it does not present an obstacle to asserting the probabilities

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<sup>9</sup> M. Bulmer, The Use of Social Research: Social Investigation in Public Policy-Making (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 31 as quoted in Tim May, Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition (Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press, 1997), p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Hollis (1994), p 144.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 183.

<sup>12</sup> Martyn Hammersley, The Politics of Social Research (London: Sage Publications, 1995), p. 17.

of knowledge being true. Bhaskar summarised the epistemology that underlies the research undertaken in this thesis when he wrote:

Things exist and act independently of our descriptions, but we can only know them under particular descriptions... Science ... is the systemic attempt to express in thought the structures and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of thought.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, the methodology used to compile the arguments made in this thesis is based primarily on positivist accounts of methodology as tools used to identify regularities in the behaviours of research objects. Although this positivist foundation is made explicit in the following chapters, unlike positivist methodology, the underlying structures, forces and causal necessities are also taken into consideration.<sup>14</sup> This is done by combining scientific methods with an understanding that the natural and social world operate differently.

At a basic level, the research in this thesis follows five steps: the study of relevant information sources, formulating a hypothesis, developing a research design, collecting data, and analysing the data.<sup>15</sup> More accurately the methodology used closely follows that which emerged from the work of Roy Bhaskar. Thus in line with Bhaskar's conception of scientific discovery, my research follows three steps. First, I identify and describe the convergence between organised crime and terrorism. Second, I construct various hypothetical mechanisms (i.e. the way in which the structure of an object can generate an observable event) which, if proven to exist, will explain why the crime-terror nexus poses a security threat. Third, I attempt to

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<sup>13</sup> Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Brighton: Harvester, 1978), p. 250.

<sup>14</sup> Positivism does not believe that underlying structures exist.

<sup>15</sup> Charles C. Ragin, Constructing Social Research: the Unity and Diversity of Method (London: Pine Forge Press, 1994), p. 15.



demonstrate the existence and operation of the mechanisms through a combination of experimental activity and by eliminating alternative explanations.<sup>16</sup>

The specific research methods used in this thesis combine the analysis of information sources with case studies. Information sources (i.e. primary and secondary sources and statistics) are critical to advancing the epistemological claim that there is a convergence between organised crime and terrorism on various levels. Based on reading and analysing literature, press releases, news releases, and statistics from a variety of sources, the data required to support my hypothesis was collected and collated. I have not incorporated personal experiences of the events as they happen, but have instead focused on reading a combination of divergent sources about a single event. Subsequent analysis and observing linkages over time thus leads to efficient assessments of 'truth'. Unlike the empiricists' claim that facts speak for themselves, I also acknowledge the need to analyse written 'facts' based on their origin; thus accounting for propaganda and disinformation given the sensitive nature of both organised crime and terrorism in the post-Cold War world.

With reference to the case studies chosen to illustrate the conceptual frameworks developed in this thesis, by presenting two distinct countries in very different regions of the world (i.e. the Former Soviet Union and South America), I illustrate that the relationship between organised crime and terrorism has become a characteristic of the post-Cold War security environment. Although the detailed logic for choosing each case study will be provided in Chapter Four and Five respectively, the comparative process that takes place within this thesis reveals that, despite regional differences, the

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<sup>16</sup> Outhwaite (1987), p. 33.

object of this study can be tested on other cases throughout the world (i.e. in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia).

The philosophical underpinnings of this thesis are highly influenced by empiricism; however, it also relies on post-realist thought in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the social phenomena that are being investigated. Although the arguments herein are based on assumptions that there are real, observable facts in the social world, they also acknowledge that these facts do not necessarily 'speak for themselves' as empiricists would have us believe. Instead, once certain facts are uncovered, they should be placed under scrutiny and judged according to the three ontological levels of reality discussed earlier. Given the nature of social science enquiry, weaknesses and criticisms can be pitted against the ontological, epistemological and methodological framework used in this thesis. However, confronting the assumptions that inevitably affect my research an understanding of how the evidence is treated in the following chapters is necessary because it allows the reader to 'see where I am coming from' and assess subsequent arguments from more common ground. Truth and knowledge are philosophical concepts that will never share widespread agreement; the social world presents a different experience for everyone in it. As such, as long as I know what I know, my research will add to the understanding of my world.

## **Thesis Structure**

*Chapter One: The Limitations of Traditional Security Concepts and Mindsets* is a literature review of traditional theories of International Relations, terrorism literature and literature on organised crime. The first part of the chapter begins by discussing



the changing context of the international security environment in the aftermath of the Cold War, focusing on the impact of globalisation. It continues by examining realism and neorealist assumptions about security, followed by providing a critique of these traditional approaches based on the new security environment. The chapter moves into assessing theories that have attempted to overcome realism's limitations, concentrating especially on the work of Barry Buzan. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of the literature on terrorism and organised crime, providing a working definition of each concept that will be applied within the parameters of the thesis. It concludes by noting the need for an alternative view of security that is capable of accounting for non-state security threats.

*Chapter Two: Reconceptualising Security: the Promise of Critical Security Studies* explores contemporary theories and paradigms of International Relations that can contribute to an alternative security framework. The chapter begins with a discussion on critical security and post-realism, focusing on the work of the Copenhagen School, and Ken Booth and Mohammed Ayoub respectively. It continues by arguing that the globalisation and netwar proto-paradigms contribute to an understanding of post-Cold War security. This section primarily uses the work of James Mittelman, and John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. The second half of the chapter uses assumptions highlighted in the previous discussions to formulate an alternative theory of security that is subsequent applied to an explanation of how terrorism and organised crime pose security threats.

*Chapter Three: Explaining and Understanding the Crime-Terror Continuum* builds on the conceptual framework presented in Chapter Two by developing a new model



that can be used to explain the relationship between terrorism and organised crime. Referred to as the crime-terror continuum in this thesis, the model identifies six major points of convergence between the terrorist and criminal worlds. After presenting an overview of literature that has sought to introduce an understanding of the convergence between these two phenomena, the model is introduced and each point is explained with the aid of contemporary illustrative examples. The crime-terror continuum seeks to move away from the traditional confines of International Security Studies, and thus reveals how the key limitations of traditional theory can be overcome.

*Chapter Four: (Re)Establishing Power Through Terror: The Hybrid Nature of Russian Organised Crime* is the first of two case studies used to test the conceptual framework and utility of the crime-terror continuum in explaining and understanding threat as they have come to exist in the post-Cold War security environment. This chapter begins with a historical account of the nature of organised crime in the Soviet Union, followed by a discussion of how the end of the Cold War impacted organised crime in the context of the Russian Federation. The chapter proceeds by providing evidence from the activities of Russian organised crime that illustrate various points of the crime-terror continuum, beginning with alliances, but focusing on Russian organised crime's adoption of terror tactics for operational purposes. It concludes by arguing why Russian organised crime should be considered a hybrid (i.e. simultaneously criminal and terrorist) entity. Throughout the chapter, the relevance of the alternative security framework in explaining the threat posed by Russian organised crime is highlighted.

*Chapter Five: Travelling the Length of the CTC: the Evolving Nature of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia from Terror Group to Criminal Organisation* is the second case study that is also used to test the utility of the conceptual framework and crime-terror continuum developed in Chapter's Two and Three, respectively. This chapter, however, illustrates the full potential of the crime-terror continuum because the example of FARC reveals how an entity situated on one of the continuum (i.e. a traditionally defined terrorist group) can evolve into an entity situated at the opposite end of the continuum (i.e. organised crime group). The chapter predominantly charts the evolution of FARC, highlighting how the group illustrates each point of the continuum, from entertaining alliances, using organised crime for operational purposes, to focusing on organised crime as their a priori motivation. As with Chapter Four, the alternative view of security developed in Chapter Two is also incorporated into this case study to show how the relationship between organised crime and terrorism in Colombia pose a formidable security threat.

The concluding chapter *The Crime-Terror Continuum as a Model of 21<sup>st</sup> Century Security* provides a broader analysis of the conceptual frameworks developed in the thesis, while highlighting how the case studies provided contextual illustrations. It argues that a new approach to security that regards non-state and state actors equally, while affirming the continued importance of the state primarily because it remains the focus of conflict in the post-Cold War era. The chapter concludes by highlighting the importance of the crime-terror continuum outside of an academic/theoretical context, by providing a brief discussion about its implications for the formation of security policies.



## Chapter One

### The Limitations of Traditional Security Concepts and Mindsets

Changes taking place within international society and the international system since 1989 have challenged the dominant understanding of security which has tenaciously focused on 'traditional' theories of International Relations that gained authority during the Cold War period. Unfortunately, it took academics some time before they recognised that the meaning of security had evolved significantly. In fact, it may be concluded that state officials were among the first who publicly commented about emerging non-military security threats such as environmental degradation, uncontrolled migration, terrorism and organised crime. An indication of this recognition of the evolution in security threats in the post-Cold War world is illustrated in a quote released by an official of the U.S. State Department in 1997:

Foreign policy as we have known it is dead...because it is no longer foreign. The world has invaded us and we have invaded it...The distinctions between domestic and foreign are gone. Look at the issues: The principal preoccupation of Americans is on drugs and crime. And the fight against drugs and crime has major international components. Our stolen cars end up in El Salvador or Guatemala, or Poland. Our drugs come from Peru or Pakistan or Burma or elsewhere and transit almost anywhere. Crime cartels spread tentacles from Nigeria or Russia or Colombia. Today it is inconceivable to consider a coordinated attack on crime without working a part of the strategy in the international arena....International terrorism has reached our shores....We cannot deal with the threats to our environment, to assaults on biodiversity with domestic policy. Ozone layer depletion and global warming cannot be addressed by domestic environmental regulations alone. Over and over again we find issues that are domestic in consequence but international in scope. These are the consuming issues of the twenty-first century.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Craig Johnstone, Director of the Office of Resources, Plans, and Policy at the U.S. State Department, "Strategic Planning and International Affairs in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century", address to the Conference Series on International Affairs in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., 18 November 1997, as quoted in Maryann K. Cusimano, "Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign Problems," in Maryann Cusimano, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, (Belmont, CA: WadsworthGroup/Thompson Learning, 2000), p. 7.

This disjuncture between academia and the policy world not only reveals changing threat perceptions, but changing attitudes about the nature of security threats and security itself.<sup>2</sup>

The impetus to rethink the concept of security has primarily emerged as a result of two factors. First is the growing importance of globalisation and the pressures it produces on states, communities, and individuals. The general result of globalisation is that world politics has increasingly become interdependent through a series of events, ideas, institutions and decisions.<sup>3</sup> Second, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union uncovered a plethora of issues previously overshadowed by balance of power politics. This emerging environment has had unforeseen implications that have raised questions about the way academics and policy-makers understand security. For example, the centrality of the state is regularly challenged; non-state actors have, in many countries, acquired a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence – a privilege once held solely by the state; and, international politics are increasingly dictated by intra-state and regional conflicts. Having significantly affected most sovereign states, it may be concluded that these phenomena have simultaneously altered the international security environment. Not only is the international community faced with an overabundance of domestic security threats, but the changing international environment has also given rise to an explosive ‘Molotov cocktail’,<sup>4</sup> turning the new global security agenda into a subject of particular concern. Among the most challenging and worrying threats to emerge from the post-

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<sup>2</sup> Paul Stares (ed), The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey, (Tokyo, New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> Mel Gurtov, Global Politics in the Human Interest, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> Sergei Medvedev, "Former Soviet Union," in Paul B. Stares, The New Security Agenda: A Global Survey, (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1998), p. 75.



Cold War security environment has been a combination of terrorist and criminal activity, which has evolved with the growing prevalence of weak and failing states.

In light of this predicament, the aim of this chapter is to highlight the inadequacy of 'old' ways of thinking about security in a 'new' international environment. To begin with, the inter-related processes of globalisation and the end of the Cold War will be introduced as the dominant factors responsible for transforming national and international structures and processes. Against this background it will be argued that little has been done within the academic discipline of International Relations – specifically International Security Studies - to adapt the understanding of security to meet these new challenges. Furthermore, overshadowed by Cold War dynamics and largely ignored within contemporary security literature, terrorism and organised crime will be introduced as two security threats that merit special attention within the evolving international environment. As is the case with the study of international security, however, the dominant literatures which focus on terrorism and organised crime have so far failed to produce an adequate response to the changes that have emerged from the process of globalisation and the end of the Cold War. Despite their shortcomings, recent attempts made within academia to address security, terrorism and organised crime in the changing international security context will be introduced.

This chapter argues that traditional mindsets are no longer capable of explaining or understanding the security threats which individuals, states, regions and the international system currently face. In order to understand twenty-first century security, the concept of security itself must be reconceptualised. Unlike the Cold War era when security threats were easily identifiable, in the post-Cold War environment it



is increasingly difficult to differentiate the origin and motivation driving various security threats. In fact, most regions of the world experience hybrid threats emanating from a combination of para-military groups, terrorists, criminal organisations, regular military forces, mercenaries and private military companies.<sup>5</sup>

### **The Changing International Security Environment**

Although the concept of ‘globalisation’ emerged in the 1980s, it was not until the 1990s that it became a term widely-utilised by policy-makers, academics and the popular media to describe the spread of ideas, culture, and commercial products throughout the world. Regardless of whether the process of globalisation began at “the dawn of history”<sup>6</sup> or more recently as a phenomenon “unprecedented in history”,<sup>7</sup> its significance for the purposes of this thesis is in its contemporary impact. A general overview of both globalisation and more specifically, globalisation in the context of the post-Cold War period will reveal that the environment in which people and states operate has fundamentally changed. For example, these historical processes have directly challenged the primacy of the state, and they have given rise to a host of new justifications for the emergence of inter-state and intra-state conflict. In addition to assessing the evolving post-Cold War security environment, the following section will highlight the trends which are responsible for calling traditional ways of thinking about security, terrorism and organised crime into question.

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<sup>5</sup> Mary Kaldor, “Beyond Militarism, Arms Races and Arms Control,”

[http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kaldor\\_text\\_only.htm](http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/kaldor_text_only.htm) (downloaded 26 July 2002), p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Malcolm Waters, Globalization, (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 4. Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, (London: Sage, 1992) and Jan Aart Scholte, Globalization: a critical introduction, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000) also treat globalisation as a historical process. The idea that globalisation is a timeless concept, however, is not accepted by everyone writing about the subject, for example Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) sees globalisation as a relatively modern phenomenon.

<sup>7</sup> Kaldor (1999).

The term 'globalisation' has been used in numerous contexts, and has been defined in several ways. Although a universally-accepted definition of the term does not exist, Jan Aart Scholte has perceptively argued that most existing definitions of globalisation can be divided into five broad categories.<sup>8</sup> The first category includes the most straightforward definitions that describe globalisation simply as cross-border relations that emerge from the growth in international exchange and interdependence.<sup>9</sup> Second, globalisation has been used synonymously with liberalisation, or the "process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an 'open', 'borderless' world economy."<sup>10</sup> Extending this idea that globalisation is solely about economic integration, the third category equates globalisation with universalisation, or the process by which the same objects (i.e. automobiles, fashion) and experiences (i.e. decolonisation) are spread throughout the world. Fourth, globalisation has often been defined as westernisation or modernisation.<sup>11</sup> This definition of globalisation focuses on the universal spread of predominantly Western ideas such as capitalism, democratisation, rationalism, and industrialism.<sup>12</sup> Finally, globalisation is often regarded as deterritorialisation, or the "reconfiguration of geography, so that social space is no longer wholly mapped in terms of territorial places, territorial distances, and territorial borders."<sup>13</sup> Initially attributed to advances in communications and transportation technology, this

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<sup>8</sup> Scholte (2000).

<sup>9</sup> This understanding of globalisation has been advanced by Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question: the International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

<sup>10</sup> Scholte (2000), pp. 15-16.

<sup>11</sup> Globalisation as westernization is argued by authors including: H.I. Schiller, "Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era," Critical Studies in Mass Communications, vol. 8, no. 1 (March 1991), pp. 13-28; T. Spybey, Globalization and World Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); and P.J. Taylor, "Izations of the World: Americanization, Modernization and Globalization," in C. Hay and D. Marsh, eds., Demystifying Globalization, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 49-70.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. This aspect of globalisation has been advanced by David Held and Antony McGrew, "Globalisation and the Liberal Democratic State," Government and Opposition, vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 261-85; and Leander (2001, 2002).



interpretation of globalisation as the process of breaking down territorial boundaries through integration also presumes that the shrinking of social and political space has subsequently threatened the primacy of the Westphalian<sup>14</sup> nation-state.

Regardless of the focus taken in defining globalisation, it may be concluded that, although globalisation has often resulted in "presenting opportunities and benefits to many, it has also brought new risks and costs."<sup>15</sup> Among the most serious consequences of globalisation for international security is the resulting diminution of state legitimacy and the state's capacity to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence where a sovereign state is granted the sole authority over the use of force within its borders, and externally to protect the territorial integrity of the state.<sup>16</sup>

In an international system which continues to place priority on states and the maintenance of state control by state actors, globalisation has introduced an environment characterised by competition for control over the state by non-state actors. Historically state control was challenged by external states and groups of legitimate internal actors (i.e. the military), as exemplified in coup d'états and the creation of empires. Increasingly, however, states are being challenged by non-state actors, including terrorist and criminal groups, which have taken advantage of the benefits and opportunities presented to them through globalisation.

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<sup>14</sup> The Westphalian state refers to the modern state system that emerged from the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Integral to the Westphalian state system is the notion that the international community is composed of sovereign state actors. For arguments focusing on the decline of the Westphalian state, see, Caporaso, ed., International Studies Review, vol. 2, no. 2 (2000), special issue: Continuity and Change in the Westphalian Order; and, Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>15</sup> Stares (1998), p. 12.

<sup>16</sup> Anna Leander, "Globalisation and the Eroding State Monopoly of Legitimate Violence," Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper, No. 24, (2001).

As a point of clarification, and because the term ‘non-state’ actors is frequently referred to throughout this thesis, a working definition is necessary. Non-state actors generally refer to a group of actors that are independent from the state and from state authority. More specifically, non-state actors are organisations:

largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control; emanating from civil society, or from the market economy, or from political impulses beyond state control and direction; operating as or participating in networks which extend across the boundaries of two or more states – thus engaging in ‘transnational’ relations, linking political system, economies, societies; acting in ways which affect political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international institutions – either purposefully or semi-purposefully, either as their primary objective or as one aspect of their activities.<sup>17</sup>

On a primarily political level, phenomena such as terrorism and organised crime have developed to such an extent that they are beyond the capacity of states to deal with through traditional diplomacy. These phenomena are transnational in nature, and thus necessitate a coordinated, multinational and multifaceted response. Furthermore international society is witnessing the spill-over of problems across state borders (i.e. the cross-border movement of refugees and illicit smuggling networks); the interrelationship of political-economic phenomena (i.e. the linkage between hunger, overpopulation, deforestation, the greenhouse effect, and regional conflict); and, the growing number and importance of transnational movements and institutions that have emerged in response to globalisation.<sup>18</sup> Some of these non-state actors have played an important role in bringing non-traditional security threats, such as environmental degradation, onto the political agenda of state actors.<sup>19</sup> However, there

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<sup>17</sup> Daphne Josselin and William Wallace, “Non-State Actors in World Politics: a Framework,” in Josselin and Wallace, eds. *Non-State Actors in World Politics*, (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 3-4.

<sup>18</sup> Gurtov (1991), pp. 9-11.

<sup>19</sup> In terms of bringing environmental issues on political agendas, the work of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace has met with sporadic success. For an overview of how environmental pressure groups and non-governmental organizations have introduced environmental issues into the political realm, see:



are also non-state actors which, by embracing the various dynamics of globalisation specifically referred to below, now pose one of the most serious challenges to international security.

Since the 1960s technological breakthroughs have accelerated the growth of international transfers of money, labour and information. As a result of this 'shrinking financial world', regional actors (such as the Association of South East Asian Nations, the North American Free Trade Association, and the European Union) emerged to consolidate the integration of economic activities, thus building entities with varied sources of political strength and economic vitality.<sup>20</sup> Despite growing trends towards international economic integration, it was not until the 1980s that structural changes emerged to produce what is commonly referred to as the period of economic globalisation. In essence, the free movement of capital deepened what Mittleman labels "commodified forms of political and social integrations".<sup>21</sup> Thus not only could production be transferred globally in order to reduce costs and thereby to drive out competitors, but the frequent relocation of production simultaneously globalised the distribution of commodities and raised consumption patterns in many parts of the world.

The globalisation of trade and investment was initially welcomed as a phenomenon that could redistribute wealth globally, however it was not long before the effects of globalisation revealed an inherent contradiction. Many academics have argued that

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Neil Carter, *The Politics of the Environment*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Paul Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996).

<sup>20</sup>James Mittleman, "How Does Globalization Really Work?", in James H. Mittleman (ed), *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 229.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 231.

globalisation has produced a social polarisation both among and within countries. According to Robert Cox, the world has a three-part hierarchy: the upper echelon consists of people integrated in the world economy (i.e. those involved in the production process and those who buy commodities); the middle consists of people who serve the economy in more 'precarious employment' (i.e. prostitutes, criminals); and at the bottom are those who are excluded from the global economy because of a lack of opportunities (i.e. most of Africa and many parts of the former Soviet Union).<sup>22</sup> For the most part, the last two groups are potentially destabilising forces because, as 'losers' in the globalisation process, they have been forced to locate ways to redefine their roles in an emerging order. This is already evident in the realm of organised crime which has taken advantage of global financial services (i.e. electronic transfer of credit and info-technology<sup>23</sup>) to such an extent that crime is being transformed to something "beyond people, places and even identifiable victims."<sup>24</sup> Criminal organisations have recognised opportunities presented by open borders and modern communications and transportation technologies to increase their operations and to enter new areas of activity, such as the illegal traffic in human beings. Furthermore, globalisation has opened access to a largely unregulated international financial system to such an extent that actors previously excluded for political reasons have been able to obtain unimpeded access. For example, Abdullah Ocalan – leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) – noted that the market economy was "very useful for us. If you have money you can find anything on the market."<sup>25</sup> In the current international financial environment, ease of money laundering coupled with rising numbers of tax havens and the abuse of more traditional bank secrecy, has

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<sup>22</sup>Robert W. Cox, "A Perspective on Globalization", in Mittelman (ed), Globalization: Critical Reflections, p. 26.

<sup>23</sup>Mark Findlay, The Globalisation of Crime, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 2.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

<sup>25</sup>Quoted in Leander (2002), p. 21.



made it “very difficult for public authorities to trace illegal activities and it makes it relatively easy for movements to organise their financing far from public authorities.”<sup>26</sup>

In addition to ushering in new opportunities in the legal market economy for criminal and terrorist groups, globalisation has also expanded the operations of parallel economies in regions where “new forms of legal and illegal ways of making a living have sprung up among the excluded parts of society”<sup>27</sup>, and have thus legitimised new forms of criminal activity. Kaldor argues that these parallel economies are produced from the neo-liberal economic policies pursued by international organisations, forcing states within the former Soviet Union (FSU), Africa and Latin America to undertake macro-economic stabilisation, deregulation and privatisation. These forced economic programmes have also increased unemployment, depleted natural resources, and generated greater income disparities – creating conditions conducive to terrorism and criminality. In this context it may not be concluded that the victory for capitalism and free markets in the 1990s implies peace as “free enterprise can easily dovetail into economic violence, and self-help into helping oneself.”<sup>28</sup>

Although the expanding market economy has given non-state actors, such as terrorist and criminal groups, many new opportunities, it has also been used as a focus of and incentive for political backlash. For example, extremist organisations have gained support in some regions because of globalisation and the perceived spread of a 'global community' based on western liberal democratic values that threaten their cultural and/or religious existence. In this context the inherent dichotomies of globalisation

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<sup>26</sup> Susan Strange, *Mad Money*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).

<sup>27</sup> Kaldor (1999), pp. 78-79.

<sup>28</sup> Keen (1998), p. 44.



(creating integration and fragmentation, homogenisation and diversification, globalisation and localisation) have mobilised non-state actors to react to what is commonly perceived as the “growing incompetence and declining legitimacy of established political classes.”<sup>29</sup> In many cases this mobilisation is executed in various forms of public demonstrations, usually led by extremist organisations; however weak states run the risk that this mobilisation will take on a violent form – such as terrorism. Partly because extremist organisations do not have the membership base or resources required to launch a full-scale military attack on their enemies, some of these groups have utilised terror tactics to defend their beliefs. As one Islamic scholar asserted, “The world as it is today is how others shaped it ... We have two choices: either to accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or to destroy it, so that we can construct the world as Islam requires”.<sup>30</sup> This political aspect, combined with technological developments, has enabled terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda to conduct mass-casualty terrorist acts globally.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to using globalisation as a mobilising force to recruit a membership base, terrorists have utilised another by-product of globalisation: the spread of media. Since the mid-twentieth century, the media has increasingly become a tool utilised by state and non-state actors to help establish their political authority within the general public. This is primarily because the media plays “a crucial role in opinion formation

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<sup>29</sup> Kaldor (1999), p. 78.

<sup>30</sup> Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: The Inside Story of Islamic Terrorism (London: Sphere, 1987), pp. 7-8.

<sup>31</sup> Under the leadership of Osamah bin Laden, Al-Qaeda has been responsible for four major terrorist attacks: the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the bombing of USS Cole off the coast of Aden in 2000, and the simultaneous September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks on New York and Washington in 2001. For an excellent assessment of how Al-Qaeda was able to establish an international network by manipulating the post-Cold War environment, see: Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, (London: C. Hurst and Co. Ltd., 2002).

and information spread among the parties to conflicts.”<sup>32</sup> Since the 1980s terrorist groups have relied on the media to report their actions in order to spread their political message to a wider audience.<sup>33</sup> As will be discussed later in this chapter, this reliance on media outlets (i.e. newspaper, television) has declined since the early 1990s and has been replaced by more overt attempts by terrorist and criminal organisations to develop their own media and information technology capabilities. For example, groups such as Hezbollah have successfully used the internet as their primary propaganda tool. Hezbollah manages three websites: “one for the central press office ([www.hizbollah.org](http://www.hizbollah.org)), another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets ([www.moqawama.org](http://www.moqawama.org)), and the last for news and information ([www.almanar.com.lb](http://www.almanar.com.lb)).”<sup>34</sup> Prior to and following the al-Qaeda led terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 11 September 2001, the group’s leader Osamah bin Laden released several home-taped videos to spread his messages both to the followers of his radical form of Salafist Islam and to the wider international community. This reduced<sup>35</sup> the reliance of terrorist groups on journalists, enabling them to avoid potentially vulnerable interview situations and to maintain control over the way in which a message is recorded. Furthermore, following the September attacks and the subsequent U.S. led counter-terrorist campaign against Afghanistan, a “virtual al-

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<sup>32</sup> Leander (2001).

<sup>33</sup> For more on the relationship between terrorism and the media, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Terrorism and the Media: Problems, Solutions and Counter-Problems,” Political Communication and Persuasion, vol. 6 (1989), pp. 311-89; David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmidt, eds., Perspectives on Terrorism and the Media, (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1992); and Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapter nine.

<sup>34</sup> For an overview of the various ways in which terrorist groups utilize the internet, see, Michele Zanini and Sean Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Information Age,” in John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, (Santa Monica: RAND Publication MR-1382-OSD, 2001), pp. 29-60.

<sup>35</sup> Complete reliance on the media has not been eliminated because in order for messages to reach the widest possible audience, these groups remain dependent on the media to broadcast. The groups can maintain complete control over the taping and transmission of messages using the internet (i.e. web-based), although the audience for such messages may be limited to like-minded individuals.



Qaeda” continued to post radical messages to its followers via websites such as [www.alneda.com](http://www.alneda.com)<sup>36</sup> and [www.jihad.net](http://www.jihad.net).<sup>37</sup>

The success of non-state actors in taking advantage of the various dynamics of globalisation, as briefly described above, has also directly challenged the state’s monopoly over the use of violence in the Westphalian state system. In the post-Cold War era, non-state actors compete for state control by establishing their own monopoly on violence – an action facilitated by the expansion of the international market in arms since 1990.<sup>38</sup> Although establishing a monopoly is difficult to attain throughout a country, there are examples of non-state actors having success in this respect in isolated regions or provinces, as has been the case in Colombia with the FARC, and in Turkey with the PKK. In both cases, a central component of the groups’ activities – in addition to directing violence against the state – is symbolically to attack the state. As a result, they regularly seek to:

impose their own taxes, issue their own passports/identification documents and often require foreigners to obtain visas with them. They provide alternative social structures (schools, hospitals, credit systems). They also impose alternative controls over organised

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<sup>36</sup> Paul Eedle, “Al-Qaeda Takes Fight for ‘Hearts and Minds’ to the Web,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, vol. 14, no. 8 (August 2002).

<sup>37</sup> Edmund Blair, “Islam Takes to the Web in the Aftermath of 9/11,” *Reuters.com*, 10 September 2002. Despite U.S. and Western European attempts to revoke the rights of websites operated by terrorist groups, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda use hackers to break into websites and create secret pages that send messages to their followers. Al-Qaeda, for example, posted messages on a science fiction website of an unsuspecting owner. “Al Qaeda hackers break into websites to post messages: experts,” *ABC News Online*, Sunday 27 October, 2002.

<sup>38</sup> For accounts of the expansion of the international weapons market after the Cold War, see, for example: James Adams, *Engines of War: Merchants of Death and the New Arms Race*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990); Graham T. Allison, et. al., *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996); Phil Williams and Paul N. Woessner, “Nuclear Material Trafficking: An Interim Assessment,” *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Summer 1995). For excellent background information on arms smuggling and the prevalence of illicit arms on the international market, refer to the following websites: The Small Arms Survey at <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org>; The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers at <http://www.nisat.org>; the Bonn International Centre for Conversion at <http://www.bicc.de>; The Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at <http://cns.miis.edu>; and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research at <http://www.unidir.ch>.



violence. They have alternative “police” forces and alternative “drafts” for their own armies.<sup>39</sup>

In situations where the state is successfully challenged, the “efficiency, attractiveness and legitimacy” of the state is subsequently undermined.<sup>40</sup> In extreme cases, such as Afghanistan, an environment emerges in which it is difficult to hold any one actor accountable in the political process – thus subsequently producing a state of anarchy, ruled by tyranny. This directly complicates security because if tyranny is identified as “government that is not held to give account of itself,” the absence of a ruler in an anarchic state “is clearly the most tyrannical of all since there is no one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done.”<sup>41</sup> The environment that this breeds is one wherein violence necessarily begets more violence.

The cycle of violence that ensues in states threatened in their authority and legitimacy occurs for two reasons, according to Leander (2001). First, in order to defend their position within the state, governments attempt to hold onto their authority – referring to a “person or institution which legitimizes acts or commands; as such it must be differentiated from power which indicates capacity rather than right”<sup>42</sup> - by reverting to violence and repression. This situation has been the most obvious reason for the escalation of intra-state violence, and has thus been well documented throughout most of modern history. Second, violence is prevalent in an environment characterised by competition for state control for economic gain. For example, economic processes that emerged from globalisation have transformed violence into an “important means

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<sup>39</sup> Leander (2001).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

<sup>41</sup> Hannah Arendt, On Violence, (New York: A Harvest Book Harcourt, Brace & World Inc., 1969), p. 39.

<sup>42</sup> ‘Legitimacy’, on the other hand, refers to acquiring recognition based on popular support. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics: A reference guide to concepts, ideas and institutions, (Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).

of social control and an economic resource in and by itself.”<sup>43</sup> Furthermore, through the expansion of information, technology, finance and manufacturing, globalisation has given rise to “warlords, mafias and mercenary groups, many of which have an interest in the perpetuation of conflicts.”<sup>44</sup> Especially in the context of weak states (described in further detail below), the dynamics caused by the spread of information technology and market liberalisation have helped create a “situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart”, thus creating conditions where the hold on power is increasingly divided between “what is left of the formal institutions of the state (which are invariably corrupt), local warlords and gang or mafia leaders.”<sup>45</sup>

Paradoxically, the very fact that there are numerous examples of non-state actors challenging the state – expanded further in the case studies of this thesis – demonstrates that control over state functions remains an important feature in the current security environment. The state, for example, is the only organised institution that can symbolically assert legitimacy and authority. Most importantly, however, within the current international system, states have the right to make a claim of ‘sovereignty’. State sovereignty is generally understood as a concept that encompasses two components: first, it incorporates the ability of a state to enforce rules within its borders and to monitor and control what happens within its territory. This concept is often incorporated in definitions of state sovereignty that focus on control over violence, such as that employed by Charles Tilly when he defined sovereignty as “controlling the principal means of coercion within a given

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<sup>43</sup> Leander (2001), p. 29.

<sup>44</sup> Barbara Harris-White, “Globalisation, Insecurities and Responses: an Introductory Essay,” in Barbara Harris-White, ed., Globalisation and Insecurity: Political, Economic and Physical Challenges, (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Publishers, Ltd., 2002), pp. 1-3.

<sup>45</sup> Harris-White summarizing an argument initially presented by Susan Willett, *ibid.*, p. 11.



territory.”<sup>46</sup> Morgenthau defined the concept a decade earlier in reference to “the appearance of a centralised power that exercised its lawmaking and law-enforcing authority within a certain territory.”<sup>47</sup> Second, state sovereignty commonly refers to state relations with external actors.<sup>48</sup> The governments of sovereign states can subsequently claim ultimate control over how their territory interacts with the world and how it should be internally regulated. This claim allows states to decide what activities they should focus their resources on: be it economic development, or illegally selling arms. Instead of making the state a defunct actor, globalisation has thus merely intensified the competition for control over state functions by creating a host of non-state actors seeking to assert territorial authority and monopoly over the use of violence.

Globalisation, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union contributed to the emergence of a transitional security environment that was initially characterised by the virtual disappearance of the bipolar world and an identifiable enemy for the West. These historical events subsequently ushered in an international environment in which the threat of inter-state conflict diminished significantly. As a result, academics began to herald the emergence of an era of democratic peace, the ‘end of history’,<sup>49</sup> and the rise of a single superpower (the

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<sup>46</sup> Charles Tilly, ed. The Formation of National States in Western Europe, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 638.

<sup>47</sup> Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 312-313.

<sup>48</sup> These points are expanded in: Stephen Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), and Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1985). Although this general view of sovereignty is used in this thesis, it is important to note that the concept is contested within International Relations literature.

<sup>49</sup> Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: The Free Press, 1992); Michael Doyle, “Kant, liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, nos. 2/3 (1983), pp. 205-35; Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds. Debating the Democratic Peace,



United States) that would ensure international stability to maintain its own political and military supremacy. This had a profound impact on Soviet client states that were previously used by Moscow to train and channel funding to terrorist groups that impeded Western interests. Countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria, and Libya lost the indirect protection afforded to them by the Soviet Union – thus complicating the rationale for these states to protect or support terrorism.<sup>50</sup> The fall of the Soviet Union thus indirectly changed the operational dynamics of terrorist groups operating in the Cold War period, forcing them to seek alternative sources of protection and financing.<sup>51</sup>

Although inter-state conflict diminished, intra-state tensions increased substantially in the post-Soviet period, especially within the states of the FSU. Within these newly independent states, historically suppressed ethnic and nationalist tensions were unleashed, often resulting in the use of violence as the only available tool that could be effectively used in the process of state building.<sup>52</sup> As intra-state conflict flourished, it highlighted several factors of the post-Cold War security environment. First, although most intra-state conflicts during the Cold War were proxy wars manipulated by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, neither the U.S. or the newly independent Russian

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(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996); Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post Cold War World, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>50</sup> For example, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was, since the early 1980s, based in Lebanon and Syria. Because Syria had a treaty of friendship with the Soviets, it was not in Ankara's interest to push Syria on the PKK question. However, immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkey placed troops on the Syrian border and demanded action be taken against the PKK. This directly led to the ousting of the PKK from both Syria and Lebanon.

<sup>51</sup> This topic will be covered as a central component of Chapter Three.

<sup>52</sup> The following provide a good introduction to post-Cold War ethnic and nationalist conflict: Arjun Appadurai, "Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of Globalisation," Public Culture, vol. 10, no. 2 (1998), pp. 225-47; Michael Brown, Steven Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, eds., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001); Ted Robert Gurr, People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2000); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (University of California Press, 2000); David Lake and Donal Rothchild, eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Hakan Wiberg and Klaus Schlichte, eds. Ethnicity and Intra-State Conflict, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).

Federation had a reason to continue supporting warring factions in places like South America (i.e. Peru's Sendero Luminoso) and East Asia (i.e. the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia). The removal of financial support thus forced warring factions to secure alternative sources of finance, a task that was facilitated by replacing a "top-bottom economy with a bottom-up one" which entailed a greater degree of predatory behaviour against citizens, and growing criminalisation of society.<sup>53</sup> In this context predatory behaviour involves looting and diverting resources from the civilian population – often resulting in a humanitarian crisis. Although the emergence of a humanitarian crisis is often a by-product of predatory behaviour, it may also be purposefully created in order to attract external humanitarian aid which is subsequently used to "secure economic and political power and survival" under unstable conditions.<sup>54</sup> The criminalisation of society, on the other hand, refers to the convergence between political action and organised crime. In other words, at some point "a symbiosis between the two occurs where illegal activities become both political and economic capital."<sup>55</sup> In many scenarios, it could be concluded that criminality and the search for power through the acquisition of profit provided a new ideological impetus and justification for criminal and terrorist actions.

Second, although intra-state conflicts during the Cold War were contained within states by Moscow and Washington, in the post-Cold War period, such conflicts have often posed a security threat beyond their borders. Whereas domestic, regional and

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<sup>53</sup> Jean-Christophe Rufin, "Les Economies de Guerre dans les Conflits Internes," in Fracoise Jean and Jean-Christophe Rufin, eds., Economie des Guerres Civiles, (Paris : Hachette, 1993), pp. 19-59, as quoted in Leander, (2001), p. 30.

<sup>54</sup> Mark Duffield, Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, "Conclusion," in Joanna Macrae, Anthony Zwi, Mark Duffield and Hugo Slim, eds. War and Hunger. Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies, (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 222-232.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. This encompasses a central component of the argument presented in the case study on FARC in Chapter Five.



international problems could be fairly easily differentiated during the Cold War, today it is difficult to distinguish between these levels of analysis with a high degree of confidence. In newly independent states and states which previously enjoyed superpower support, this mounting environment of military instability has created conditions conducive to the rise of criminal and terrorist groups, thus complicating the security predicament at both a national and international level by placing non-state actors at the centre of protracted conflicts.<sup>56</sup> It can be further argued that the relationship between collapsed states and globalisation inevitably contributed to this prevailing security environment.<sup>57</sup> Security-related agencies with no effective central authority or dependable state-funding are able to take advantage of alternative markets and opportunities to secure funding for their organisational structures. In the absence of legitimate sources of financing, security agencies often become complicit to organised crime. This predicament further contributes to the already eroding capacity of the state to respond to security threats enhanced by globalisation such as those emanating from non-state actors (i.e. organised crime and terrorism).

Ethnic tensions, the resurgence of nationalism, and rising political and religious extremism have not only led to an increase in civil wars and criminality, they have also facilitated the spread of terror tactics. Groups which have used terror tactics in such circumstances include the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Chechen militants, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Sierra Leone's Revolutionary Unity Front (RUF), and Sendero Luminoso of Peru. With specific reference to the FSU, by

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<sup>56</sup> There are numerous examples of this scenario, including Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Russian Federation (Chechnya), and Tajikistan. For an excellent overview of Macedonia's experience, see John Phillips, *Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in the Balkans*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002).

<sup>57</sup> These points are discussed in Alexander Cooley, "Globalisation and National Security in the Post-Soviet Space," International Studies Association Annual Conference, 17-20 March 2004, Montreal, Canada.



1995 Russia's security services expressed concern that the region was "on the way to becoming one of the world leaders in the number of violent acts involving the use of arms, explosives, and incendiaries; kidnapping and hostage taking; as well as attempts of nuclear blackmail and the threat of nuclear blackmail and the threat of chemical and biological weapons use."<sup>58</sup> The potential dangers posed by these phenomena at the end of the Cold War rose exponentially in the FSU due to widespread border porosity, lack of coordination and resources within law enforcement, and the declining ability of the state to respond to global pressures. Furthermore, combined with global trends, what has classically been "defined as 'terrorism' has clearly interwoven with what has been classically identified as 'organised crime'".<sup>59</sup>

A third trend that emerged as a result of the end of the Cold War is that Communism as an ideology has lost much of its appeal. This was a significant development for both the FSU and other countries that were either allied to the Soviet Union, or confronted terrorist groups which espoused Communist ideals. During the Cold War, many terrorist groups were ideologically connected to the "communist-anticommunist competition".<sup>60</sup> More specifically, terrorist organisations used their commitment to communism to justify their own campaigns against non-communist governments. The collapse of Communist Party rule in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union dealt a blow to the image of Communism as an ideology of power and undermined the claim to legitimacy of such movements. For example, the virtual disappearance of Communism as an organising ideology was an important factor in the post-Cold War evolution of Marxist-Leninist groups in Latin America. On a practical level, leftist

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<sup>58</sup>Medvedev (1998), p. 94.

<sup>59</sup>Myles Robertson, "Internal Security: Terrorism, Government, Business and European Trends," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 4, no. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 91.

<sup>60</sup> Donald M. Snow, UnCivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p. 55.

terrorist groups in the region lost their rear bases in Nicaragua and Cuba, and suffered from their newly “discredited ideological underpinnings.”<sup>61</sup> These factors thus drove groups such as El Salvador’s Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional (FMLN), Guatemala’s Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), Uruguay’s Tupamaros and the Argentine Montoneros to overcome their propensity for violence and become political parties.<sup>62</sup> Although many Marxist-Leninist groups did renounce their ideology and the use of violence, others continue to operate in Colombia, Peru and Mexico. This, however, does not suggest that they remain entirely committed to Communist ideals. On the contrary, groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Peru’s Sendero Luminoso have adapted to the fact that their ideological foundations have been globally discredited. Although these entities continue to espouse political motivations, for the sake of group survival the FARC and Sendero Luminoso have focused most of their post-Cold War attention on criminal activities, such as producing and trafficking drugs, and kidnapping for ransom.<sup>63</sup>

Offering a somewhat different, yet related example is the experience of the states within the FSU. In this environment disillusioned members of the former Communist Party sought to replace their failed political ideology with the ideology of capitalism. As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four, individuals’ attempts to secure their positions in the emerging – and largely unregulated - market economy of Russia led many former Communist officials to organised crime. This is especially true of members of state security services who have used their positions to further penetrate

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<sup>61</sup> Michael Radu, “Latin American Challenges: The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas,” *Orbis*, vol. 44, No. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 363.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Rohan Gunaratna and Magnus Ranstorp, “Taking on the Kidnappers,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, vol. 13, no. 5 (May 2001).



government institutions. It has thus been argued that the corrupting influence of organised crime in Russia has undermined the government to such an extent that “government structures fail to protect their citizens because they are collusive and complicit in the organised crime activity.”<sup>64</sup>

The Cold War and the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union obscured a set of threats and dangers that were exacerbated by globalisation and enhanced in an environment that has done little to control their existence. For example, issues associated with human rights violations, migration, and environmental degradation gained widespread attention from academia, policy-makers and society at a time when these issues were already out of control in many parts of the world. The growing importance finally accorded to non-state threats was eventually exemplified in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the 1997 and 1999 International Conventions For the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, and for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism<sup>65</sup> (respectively), and the 2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime.

In the context of globalisation and the post-Cold War era, it is not difficult to see how states have lost some of their autonomy, at least with reference to territorial sovereignty and their ability to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. As Richard Falk notes, "Territorial sovereignty is being diminished on a spectrum of issues in such a serious manner as to subvert the capacity of states to govern the internal life of society, and non-state actors hold an increasing proportion

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<sup>64</sup> Louise Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organised Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism," Transnational Organised Crime, vol. 2, no. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 123.

<sup>65</sup> It should be noted that prior to 1997, ten conventions dealing with some facets of terrorism were adopted by the United Nations, however, none of these were exclusively written to solely deal with terrorism. All of these conventions are accessible at: <http://www.odccp.org/odccp/terrorism.html>.



of power and influence on the shaping of world order."<sup>66</sup> This loss of territorial power has also resulted in a widespread tendency toward the decomposition of civil society that is revealed in the fragmentation of social forces and the growing gap between citizens and the political leadership.<sup>67</sup> In a growing number of states - including Russia and Colombia - politicians are seen as serving their own interests.<sup>68</sup> Although this is not unique to the post-Cold War period, the decline of citizens' confidence in politics reflects not only a disgust with corruption but also a concern that the state alone is no longer capable of resolving the major problems confronting their society.

Although the power of the state has been called into question,<sup>69</sup> globalisation has not significantly undermined the Westphalian interstate system. Globalisation, however, has succeeded in detaching security from territoriality and instead, it has enmeshed security in global networks. It has also created a new security agenda in its own right, and it has diminished the capacity of the state to provide security for its citizens.<sup>70</sup> As a result of state borders that are increasingly open to external penetration, the autonomy of governments is declining over a range of issues including economic planning, social ideas and cultural choice. In essence, the prosperity and fate of nations, communities, and individuals are bound together through the world economy,

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<sup>66</sup>Richard A. Falk, Predatory Globalization, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 35.

<sup>67</sup>Cox (1996), p. 27.

<sup>68</sup> This point will be covered in detail in the respective case studies of Chapter Four and Chapter Five.

<sup>69</sup> This argument is made in numerous sources, including: Joseph Camiller and Jim Falk, End of Sovereignty?: the Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press, 1992); Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jean-Marie Guehenno, The End of the Nation-State, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2000); and, Kenichi Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: the Rise of Regional Economics, (London: HarperCollins, 1996).

<sup>70</sup> Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 111. The idea that security has been detached from territoriality refers to the growing belief that many security threats do not simply affect individual states. For example, environmental issues threaten regions and global society. This aspect will be dealt with in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

the global communications network, and regional and supranational organisations.<sup>71</sup> The post-Cold War environment thus can be summarised as one that highlights the inability of some governments to adequately provide for their citizens, to secure their own territorial borders, and respond to the rise of non-state actors. This predicament has subsequently intensified the spread of weak, failing and failed states throughout the international system. Although there is little consensus as to what constitutes a weak or failing state,<sup>72</sup> states generally fail because they are no longer capable of delivering “positive political goods”<sup>73</sup> to their people, and therefore the government, and ultimately the state itself, is regarded as illegitimate by a growing percentage of citizens.<sup>74</sup> Complete state failure, on the other hand, is often declared when internal violence is paramount, “when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms their responsibilities.”<sup>75</sup> As will be illustrated in subsequent chapters, the growing number of failed or failing states provide – both directly and indirectly – a hospitable environment for criminal and terrorist groups. Examples of failed states providing de facto safe havens include Afghanistan, Liberia and Sierra Leone; however, Chechnya, Colombia, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, and Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province

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<sup>71</sup>For example, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations.

<sup>72</sup> There is a vast and growing literature on the failure of states, including Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Kal Holsti, “International Theory and War in the Third World,” in The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States, edited by Brian Job, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); William Zartman, ed. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

<sup>73</sup> Robert I. Rotberg, “The New Nature of Nation-State Failure,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002) notes that political goods primarily consist of security, education, health care, economic opportunity, a legal framework and judiciary, and infrastructure requirements such as a system of transportation and communications.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 85.

<sup>75</sup> Rotberg (2002), p. 86.



are also examples of the connection between state failure and the rise of criminality and/or terrorism.

Despite the changes that have developed in the international environment, security, terrorism and organised crime largely remain understood in their traditional contexts. The next three sections of this chapter will therefore survey the dominant literature associated with these issues with the view of revealing weaknesses, in addition to highlighting the inadequacy of their responses to the changes international society and the international system have been experiencing since the 1990s. At the same time key tenets that could contribute to building an understanding of the contemporary and ever-evolving security environment will also be highlighted. However, these factors are relevant only when incorporated into a reconceptualised security framework. As a result, this will form the background for introducing an alternative conceptual framework that can be used to explain and understand terrorism and organised crime as security threats in Chapter Two.

### **International Security and the 'Traditionalists'**

In the security vacuum created by the virtual disappearance of the Soviet threat, traditional ways of thinking about international security have faced considerable criticism. By the late 20<sup>th</sup> century security was synonymous with the definition of that term provided by realism, the principal paradigm within the field of International Relations. Realist thought can generally be divided into two strands: traditional realism,<sup>76</sup> and neorealism.<sup>77</sup> The common thread between them is that they are

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<sup>76</sup> For an in-depth overview of traditional realist thought, see: Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).

<sup>77</sup> For an overview of neorealism, see: Robert Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

predominantly based on three tenets: “namely the assumptions of anarchy, of statism, and of politics as the struggle for power and peace.”<sup>78</sup>

For traditional realists, the meaning of security is fundamentally subsumed under the rubric of power and self-preservation. Thus as Arnold Wolfers writes,

Self-preservation calls forth...a variety of attitudes toward power because countries which are satisfied to let things stand as they are have no immediate incentive for valuing power or for wishing to enhance it. Whether they become interested in power at all, and the extent to which they do, depend on the actions they expect from others. It is a responsive interest which takes its cue from the threats, real or imagined, directed at things possessed and valued. If policy is rationally decided, the quest for power here increases or decreases in proportion to these external threats.<sup>79</sup>

Threats here refer to forces that place in danger the territorial integrity of a state, its right to self-determination and its economic well-being. This state-centric definition of security is based on the assumption that one can distinguish between domestic 'order' and international 'anarchy', and the belief that the potential for war is ever-present because states are in the first instance concerned about maintaining their power, thus creating a self-help system characterized by the security dilemma.<sup>80</sup>

One of the most detailed accounts of traditional realism was fashioned by Hans Morgenthau in his famous *Politics Among Nations*,<sup>81</sup> originally published in 1948.

Morgenthau was primarily responsible for packaging the “practical realist maxims of

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<sup>78</sup> John Vasquez, *The Power of Politics: From Classical Realism to Neotraditionalism*, *Cambridge Series in International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 37.

<sup>79</sup> Arnold Wolfers, “The Role of Power and the Power of Indifference,” in Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays in International Politics*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1965), p. 97, as quoted in Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” in Benjamin Frankel, ed., *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers Ltd., 1996), p. 99.

<sup>80</sup> Ann J. Tickner, “Re-visioning Security,” in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *International Relations Theory Today*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 176.

<sup>81</sup> Morgenthau (1948).



scepticism and policy prescriptions into a rational 'scientific' approach."<sup>82</sup>

Furthermore his work introduced the argument that power was not necessarily an innate human drive, but instead the necessity for power emerged from pressures of socialisation within the international system. According to traditional realism:

security has involved assuring the physical survival of a political unit and of the individuals or groups populating it. Security has also included maintaining (and often expanding) the territorial domain of the unit, protecting its basic institutional structure against change imposed from outside, and assuring that domestic systems of command, control, production, and distribution are not disrupted by external forces.<sup>83</sup>

Based on this straightforward summary it is clear why realism, with its focus on the power-political situation of a state, is also commonly referred to as the 'power-politics model'.<sup>84</sup> As Guzzini notes, the core subject matter of realism is "the study of war and the conditions of peace."<sup>85</sup>

In an attempt to address the changes taking place within the international system, and thus re-work traditional realism to respond to the post-Cold War security environment, neorealism has asserted itself to take the place of realism as the dominant paradigm within the study of security.<sup>86</sup> One of the most influential writings on the neorealist understanding of contemporary security is Walt's "Renaissance of Security Studies" published in International Studies Quarterly in 1991. In this article Walt notes that the purpose of security studies is for scholars who follow the rules of

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<sup>82</sup> Stefano Guzzini, "The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations," Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper, (2002).

<sup>83</sup> James Broadus and Raphael V. Vartanov, eds., The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives, (Washington: Island Press, 1994), p. 6.

<sup>84</sup> Steve Smith and Martin Hollis, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p. 27.

<sup>85</sup> Stefano Guzzini, "'Realisms at War': Robert Gilpin's Political Economy of Hegemonic War as a Critique of Waltz's Neorealism," COPRI Working Paper, 11/2002, p. 4.

<sup>86</sup> This is not to say that neorealism is a post-Cold War phenomenon. Neorealism emerged in 1979 after Kenneth Waltz published Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Nevertheless, it was not until neorealists began to address the post-Cold War environment that the theory itself began to gain prominence in relation to traditional realist views of the world.

scientific research to investigate the role of military force. He therefore defines security as "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force."<sup>87</sup> According to Walt, any attempt to bring non-military issues onto the security agenda will render the subject of security indistinct and meaningless.<sup>88</sup> It is only when other issues (i.e. environmental) intrudes the military realm that they could conceivably be considered a security threat.

Prior to the writings of Walt, Kenneth Waltz laid out the foundational principles of neorealism in his book *Theory of International Politics*. According to Waltz, the key concern of neorealism is how capabilities between states are organised. Strictly differentiating between the structures of domestic politics and international politics, Waltz notes that whereas domestic politics is centralised and hierarchical, the international system is anarchic.<sup>89</sup> Neorealism shares with traditional realist thought the assumption that the international system is anarchic and therefore based on self-help because state survival is entirely dependent on a state's own efforts. In other words, "fear of unwanted consequences therefore stimulates states to behave in ways that tend towards the creation of balances of power."<sup>90</sup> It is the anarchic structure of the system that subsequently determines which states survive and which states fail. Those that fail do so primarily because they are not successfully socialised into the

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<sup>87</sup>Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1991), p. 212.

<sup>88</sup>This view is not held by all neorealists. Levy, for example, argues that adding non-military threats to the security agenda is a cynical ploy to attract more public attention and resources to their cause [Mark Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?," *International Security*, vol. 20, no. 2 (1995), pp. 35-62.], while Deudney [Daniel Deudney, "Environment and Security: Muddled Thinking," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 47, no. 3 (1991), pp. 22-28.] and Soroos [Marvin Soroos, "Global Change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoners' Dilemma," *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 31, no. 3 (1994), pp. 317-332.] believe that there is a danger in adding non-military issues to the security agenda because, keeping with the realist tradition, they will ultimately illicit a military response.

<sup>89</sup>Waltz (1979), p. 88.

<sup>90</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 118.



international system, and thus are eliminated as actors through competition.<sup>91</sup> Furthermore, neorealism posits that states are largely rational actors, and thus can be expected to respond to external constraints and incentives in certain ways. According to Waltz, empirical justification is not possible in the study of international politics, and as such neorealism is theoretically the most sound.

As with realism, neorealism includes similar foundational claims about how the world is, where threats originate and how they are to be dealt with. Neorealism, in this context, has not considerably changed how security is understood in the post-Cold War era, and as a result it faces critiques similar to those aimed at its traditional realist predecessor. Critiques of both forms of realism can be generally divided into five areas: assumptions, methods, ethics, ethnocentrism, and narrowness.<sup>92</sup> In the context of this thesis, however, it is primarily the narrow assumptions of realist thought that present an obstacle to explaining and understanding the specific threats of terrorism and organised crime.

Realist assumptions about security are weak on several fronts. On the one hand, by focusing on international threats to the state, realists exclude threats posed by states to groups and individuals. Thus, they inherently disregard the insecurity caused by state terrorism or by situations of internal ethnic cleansing by military forces. The ability of realist thought to explain the conflicts that have raged in Somalia, Afghanistan, or Bosnia throughout the 1990s can thus be questioned. In addition, because realism focuses on the state as the central political actor, it ignores the growing relevance of

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<sup>91</sup> In most scenarios competition takes the form of war; war, according to Waltz, emerges from one of three levels: human nature, type of political regime, or from conditions of the international system (anarchy). Guzzini, (2002) "Realisms at War...", p. 5.

<sup>92</sup>Neta C. Crawford, "Once and Future Security Studies," *Security Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1991), pp. 294-6.

armed actions and claims of non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations.<sup>93</sup> Based on this tenet, a strict understanding of realism cannot provide an explanatory framework for the success of non-state actors such as FARC and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in wresting control of Colombian and Sri Lankan territory from the sovereign Colombian and Sri Lankan states.

The state centrism of realism has also been criticized because it is reductionist and presents a view of the state as a concrete entity with interests.<sup>94</sup> According to critical security theorists,<sup>95</sup> the state does not exist in any concrete sense; it emerges and changes as a result of various internal and external pressures and entities. This is precisely the case for states that have been formed as a result of external military action and direct and prolonged political interference, such as post-2001 Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989 the country entered a condition of almost constant civil war.<sup>96</sup> There was no effective government authority until the emergence of the Taliban and its consolidation of power throughout much of Afghan territory in 1996. Instead Afghan territory was divided amongst groups of warlords who engaged in a variety of illicit activities including drug trafficking, extortion and mass rape.<sup>97</sup> Within this environment the country soon became a haven for organised criminals and terrorist groups seeking territory to conduct training and establish international contacts. Among the most notorious

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<sup>93</sup>Edward A. Kolodziej, "Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector!", International Studies Quarterly, vol. 36 (1992), p. 422.

<sup>94</sup>Stares (1998), p. 108.

<sup>95</sup>Refer to chapter 2 for a summary of critical security studies and its dominant theorists.

<sup>96</sup> For an excellent overview of the Soviet-Afghan war, see, Mohammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin. Afghanistan – the Bear Trap: the Defeat of a Superpower, (Barnsley UK: Leo Cooper, 2001, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition).

<sup>97</sup> For good sources that describe the post-1989 environment in Afghanistan, including the rise of the Taliban, see, Kamal Matinuddin, The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan 1994-1997, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition); Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); and Patrick Karam, Asie Centrale: le nouveau grand jeu, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002).



groups operating from Afghanistan was Al-Qaeda. In response to Al-Qaeda's orchestrated attacks on American territory in September 2001, Washington embarked on a 'war on terrorism' that was initially directed at destroying Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, and rooting out the Taliban for granting Al-Qaeda a safe haven. Following a concentrated bombing campaign that successfully dispersed both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces, the U.S. led counter-terrorism coalition sought to establish a friendly and democratic Afghan government. Thus the current government operating in Afghanistan could be viewed as little more than a creation of the international community following an external intervention, as opposed to an entity that naturally emerged from within Afghanistan. As a result, it would be difficult to argue that Afghanistan is a sovereign state as defined by the Treaty of Westphalia.

A further critique of realism's state centrism focuses on its presumption that only state actors can attain political authority and legitimacy. These two principles generally encompass the idea that the state is given power and legitimate social purpose because the "body politic recognizes its right to rule and voluntarily submits to its power."<sup>98</sup> Conversely, where the state has no authority, citizens do not accept the state's right to rule, and thus the only reason citizens comply with state institutions is because they fear the state's power to punish. Although this observation appears valid in many contemporary cases, the state is not the only political actor capable of obtaining widespread consent from a specific polity. For example, although Hezbollah does not enjoy legitimacy as a political actor throughout Lebanon, the group was able to attain a degree of authority in the Bekaa Valley, essentially by providing basic social welfare and services to the people of that area which the state was unable to do. In this

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<sup>98</sup> Ann C. Mason, "Colombian State Failure: The Global Context of Eroding State Authority," paper presented at the conference on 'Failed States,' Florence, Italy (10-14 April, 2001), pp. 4-5.

context authority was passed on to (or taken over by) a non-state actor. This example therefore reveals that while the state's effectiveness in confronting challenges deteriorates, non-state actors are becoming increasingly capable of addressing acute internal crises.<sup>99</sup> As discussed in subsequent chapters, the state remains an important actor – however, this context stresses the desire for non-state actors to attain control over state functions as a way towards attaining authority and legitimacy.

Finally, realism fails to provide an adequate account of the relationship between units and the international system, thus undermining the capacity of states to promote international change. Realism therefore describes a self-perpetuating cycle: an anarchic international system in which the actors (states) are engaged in a never ending security dilemma that they have no ability to change, but can only reduce the insecurity they feel through the acquisition of military power.<sup>100</sup> In an era where military power is no longer the sole guarantor of security, this tenet loses much of its explanatory appeal. As a result of globalisation and the various dynamics of the post-Cold War era, states are no longer dependent on building military power for internal security – instead, they can ensure internal security by participating in other aspects of the international system, such as the international market economy. Thus for example, the more external states depend on a single domestic economy, the greater the chance that these states will ensure that the economy in question is secured. The U.S. decision to fight Iraq on behalf of Kuwait during the Gulf War can thus be explained by Washington's need to secure oil prices for the American economy. Using the

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>100</sup> Some neorealists, including Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), argue that economics has taken the place of military power - thus in the post-Cold War era it is economic power that determines the balance of power.



motivation of securing Kuwaiti sovereignty America was able to justify its military intervention. As Ayoob argues:

It was unfortunate for Saddam Hussein that Iraq and Kuwait happened to be located within a region defined by U.S. strategists as having intrinsic importance for U.S. security regardless of the state of great power relations at a particular point in time. Had such an invasion taken place in another, less strategically important region of the Third World, and had it involved countries that lacked the massive oil reserves controlled by Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the U.S. outcry would have been much diminished, and the outcome would almost certainly have been very different.<sup>101</sup>

A similar argument can also be made in the context of non-state actors. For example, terrorist and criminal organisations can secure their operations and survival by gaining control over the domestic economy of the country of their primary operations. This has been the case in Colombia with FARC gaining control over a large proportion of the illicit narcotics trade (a staple of the Colombian economy); and in Russia with Russian organised crime attaining a considerable degree of control over the Russian banking sector and natural resources. This highlights that security is no longer solely about territorial control, but incorporates the ability of the state to secure all legitimate sectors considered detrimental to political stability (i.e. political, judicial, and economic institutions).

A second critique of realist thought centres around the fact that it has a shallow normative foundation. This is evident, for example, in the common practice of realists in isolating the issue of the use of force from the central question of whether or not the use of force is legitimate in each specific situation.<sup>102</sup> For realists the end justifies the means, therefore force may be used as long as it produces security for the state. A

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<sup>101</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System, (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 122.

<sup>102</sup> Kolodziej (1992), p. 429.

comparable argument could be used by terrorists and criminal organisations, who like states in the realist context, are equally interested in statism, survival and self-help. However, because realism prioritises the state as a referent object, it is not surprising that realism does not take into consideration security at the individual, regional, international or global level. Ethics are therefore discarded in the name of policy interests, and national security. This further acts as an antecedent to the level of analysis problem that is inherent in all realist theory – not only with respect to agents that can be threatened, but also with respect to which actors are capable of threatening the state. Although domestic threats are relatively straightforward to identify, without accepting that external nonstate actors are capable of posing a security threat, realism is incapable of explaining how, for example, the United States could have secured its territory from terrorists based in Afghanistan. This significantly undermines Waltz's opinion that the Westphalian system has not been challenged in the post-Cold War era, and that there is thus no need to shift away from a focus on the state system to a transnational system where non-state actors are playing an increasingly important role.<sup>103</sup>

A final key criticism made of realism concerns its quest for scientific objectivity. Realists themselves admit that their research does not necessarily meet the scientific standards they have set, and that their "use of interpretation to validate theoretical propositions raises questions about the quest for transhistorical, acontextual, generalizable theory."<sup>104</sup> Largely since the end of World War II, realist thought required little justification, it claimed that it understood reality 'as it is', and given the

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<sup>103</sup> Leander, (2001), p. 3.

<sup>104</sup> Keith Krause and Michael Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 40 (1996), p. 237.



dynamics of the international system at the time, few questioned its explanatory powers. However, in light of the changing international system ushered in by the end of the Cold War, realism has been faced with the task of justifying its approach – this task has proven difficult, and realism has subsequently lost “its persuasiveness in times of a rational debate it decides not to address.”<sup>105</sup> The perpetual defence that realist world-views are natural and should thus be taken for granted, according to Guzzini, is precisely what is responsible for its demise.

Although the realist paradigm has given priority to security, it has devoted little effort to producing an accurate definition of the concept itself. Instead of providing a comprehensive account of what security is, realists have provided oversimplifications. For example, Waltz merely describes security as survival - a definition that would render policy goals indistinguishable from each other.<sup>106</sup> This narrowness in definition is also evident in the fact that realism ignores factors that play a role in understanding security, such as psychological and organisational issues.<sup>107</sup> Thus as

Leander notes:

if we try to understand international politics in general and violence, war and peace in particular (the classical IR topics), we had better not define away the non state actors and no-state realm from the outset. This is likely to blind us to the many important questions deriving from the changing boundaries of the political, but also to make it hard to adequately analyse traditional questions of international politics since it is not the case that the state system somehow continues unaffected by what is happening in other spheres of international politics.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Stefano Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations,” <http://www.copri.dk/publications.html> (2003).

<sup>106</sup> David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” *Review of International Security*, vol. 23 (1997), p. 21.

<sup>107</sup> Crawford (1991), p. 295.

<sup>108</sup> Leander (2001), p. 13.

Traditional realism and neorealism have unquestionably dominated the International Relations and the International Security agenda throughout the Cold War. For much of Western academia and governments, the realist paradigm provided answers that explained the Cold War period. This however is not true in the post-Cold War world where a new set of imminent dangers presented themselves; dangers that were not confined to the politico-military realm. Thus to remain focused on a definition of security that privatised military terms, attention is drawn away from non-military threats that promise to undermine the stability of nations.<sup>109</sup> Traditional realist-neorealist perceptions of security therefore cause paralysis in understanding and responding to security threats as they continue to evolve.

Considering the dynamics of the international drugs trade for example, the realist paradigm is unable to account for the fact that something considered 'low politics'<sup>110</sup> could determine the fate of a nation, an entire region, and potentially the course of international politics. Andreas and Sharpe argue that the issues that will determine the fate of Latin America, "foreign debt, economic crisis, civilian-military relations, human rights, democratization, and guerrilla insurgencies" will be determined by cocaine politics.<sup>111</sup> This quote also highlights the fact that the drug trade challenges the realist notion of state sovereignty. Given the presence of intricate international trafficking routes that extend through the region, coupled with the rising demand for illicit narcotics, the drug phenomenon cannot be successfully curtailed independently by any one country. States in Latin America have therefore lost a degree of control

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<sup>109</sup>Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. Global Dangers: Changing Dimensions of International Security, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1995), p. 19.

<sup>110</sup>Defined by Mandy Bentham, The Politics of Drug Control, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998), p. 14 as "issues that do not affect security and diplomatic prestige, do not involve the highest decision-makers in government, do not lead to crises and are not dominated by states".

<sup>111</sup>P.R. Andreas and K.E. Sharpe, "Cocaine Politics in the Andes," Current History, vol. 91 (February 1992), p. 74.



over what or who crosses into their territory. For this simple reason, realist theories do not directly apply to an explanation of drug trafficking on any other criminal activity that crosses national borders.

The limitations of realist thought as outlined in this section provide a glimpse into why realism's inability to explain post-Cold War security has led to significant theoretical debate within International Relations. Although it has been increasingly argued that realism would be unable to provide a direct understanding of the security threat posed by non-state actors, there are a few key realist tenets that would be applicable if they existed in an adapted framework. If realist theorists accepted the argument that non-state actors are equally important to the state in the international system, then there are several positions that would continue to have resonance in the current international environment. For example, the assumption that states that cannot be socialised within the international system is eliminated as actors via competition could also be applied to non-state actors, including organised crime and terrorist groups. The failure of non-state groups to socialise themselves as a legitimate authority would also consequently lead to the group's ultimate demise as it would fail to have attracted a support base necessary to conduct operations and attain its goals. Developing social programmes and seeking to advance other functions otherwise associated with the state have therefore become a priority for many non-state actors as illustrated throughout this thesis. However, as with the state, should non-state actors attain recognition to rule by people within specified territorial boundaries, either via cooperation or fear, they too would be seen as having acquired political authority and legitimacy. This is connected to the notion that only a state actor can attain political

authority and legitimacy because people recognise its right to rule and therefore voluntarily submit to its power.

Furthermore, as is the case with state actors, non-state actors are caught in a self-help environment characterised by the security dilemma. The survival of non-state actors is associated with their own ability to secure group survival. As with a state, a non-state group seeks its physical survival as a political unit and it seeks the survival of the individuals populating it. Connected to this is the search for territorial control and the protection of the group's basic institutional structures against external pressures. Although non-state actors are unlikely to engage in outright war, traditionally defined as violence conducted between two identifiable armed forces, their survival can be threatened by the state security agencies. Thus in order to attain a sense of security, the actions of non-state actors often reflect the belief that the end justifies the means. As a result, the use of force can be justified as a tool that is adopted to provide security. On a very basic level, security in relation to non-state actors can be seen using similar lenses as those that explain security of states. Security in this context is thus about actor survival. These realist tenets will be discussed in the context of a reformulated conceptual understanding of security that is provided in Chapter Two.

### **Applying 'Plasters': overcoming realism's inefficiencies**

Beginning in the 1980s, some writers<sup>112</sup> attempted to address the inherent weaknesses of the realist paradigm in addressing non-military threats by calling for a broader and more comprehensive approach to security. Their attempts, however, were largely ignored and overshadowed by the dimensions of the Cold War. It was not until the

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<sup>112</sup>Included in this group are Richard Ullman and Arthur Westing.



end of the Cold War when the threat of Soviet attack on the West disappeared, that such arguments resurfaced and gained an audience.<sup>113</sup> Approaches that revisited the usefulness of realism were broadly divided into two approaches: the 'widener' debate, and the debate seeking to 'deepen' the meaning of security. The first merely broadened the neorealist conception of security to include a wider range of threats;<sup>114</sup> whereas the second not only broadened the range of threats, but attempted to deepen the security agenda by including the individual or human security level, and/or the international or global level, with the regional or societal levels used as intermediate points.<sup>115</sup>

The 'widening' approach to security largely grew out of the literature on environmental security which fundamentally argued that, because of environmental imperatives, the focus of security needed to be shifted away from military threats. For example, security was as much threatened by migration caused by resource scarcity as it was threatened by external military force. Furthermore, by adding an environmental dimension to security this approach placed "societal values in a more appropriate hierarchy".<sup>116</sup> The state was therefore no longer considered the only political actor or agent that needed to be 'secured', and security was redefined as "an action or sequence of events that (1) threatened drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatened significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, non governmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within

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<sup>113</sup>Stares, (1998), p. 13.

<sup>114</sup>Included in this group are Ullman (1983), Mathews (1989), Deudney (1991), Crawford (1991), Haftendorn (1991), Homer-Dixon (1993), and Soroos (1994).

<sup>115</sup>Krause and Williams (1996), "Broadening the Agenda...", p. 229. Also included in this group are Tickner (1992), Gurtov (1991), Buzan (1991), Griffith (1994), and Waever et al (1998).

<sup>116</sup>Soroos (1994), p. 319.

the state."<sup>117</sup> This definition of security expanded the traditional range of threats to include military, economic, resource, food, and environmental issues.<sup>118</sup>

Theoretical arguments of the early 'wideners' also commonly focused on the potential of major environmental change to generate and intensify conflict between and within states.<sup>119</sup> Gleick argued that security was threatened when resource and environmental problems reduced the quality of life and resulted in a range of conflictual situations among subnational or national groups, whereas Homer-Dixon concentrated on the connection between environmental scarcity and acute conflict (i.e. conflict involving a substantial probability of violence).<sup>120</sup>

This approach to (environmental) security only sought to add the environment into the traditional security framework and thus incorporate it into already existing issue-areas of 'high politics'.<sup>121</sup> The problem with these approaches is that, in continuing to use realist rhetoric, none of them attempted to deconstruct of the term 'security' so that it may then be reconstructed to specifically deal with the nature of environmental – or any other emerging – security issues. Although definitions of security, such as that provided by Ullman, include a range of actors, they still remain too general to provide any sufficient understanding of security, who should be secured, and by what means.

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<sup>117</sup>Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1983), p. 133.

<sup>118</sup>Mathews, (1989) defines security in very similar terms as Ullman, she argues that the traditional definition of security should be expanded to include environmental, resource and demographic issues.

<sup>119</sup>Soroos (1994), p. 318.

<sup>120</sup>See Peter Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Freshwater Resources and International Security," *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2 (Summer 1993). Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, *Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and Security*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Ltd., 1998). Thomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991).

<sup>121</sup>Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 19, no.3 (1990) argues that placing the environment into 'high politics' is not a negative thing, but it "has a sound goal - to get people to react as urgently and effectively to the environmental problem. If people took the environmental problem as seriously as, say, an attack by a foreign power, think of all that could be done to solve the problems!"p. 465.



Broadening the security agenda without seriously reconceptualising how security is and should be understood in the post-Cold War is an incomplete exercise. The problem with the dominance of the realist paradigm is that it has failed to account for the pressures of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, thereby making the 'widener' approach vulnerable to similar criticisms. In an effort to overcome this weakness of simply adding issues to the traditional security agenda, some academics in the field of International Relations made an attempt to deepen the meaning of security while broadening the range of threats included on the security agenda. Among the most influential literature that falls into this category is the book: People, States and Fear.

Originally written by Barry Buzan in 1982 People, States and Fear defined security as the pursuit of freedom from threat<sup>122</sup>, asserting that there was no point in struggling over a more accurate definition of security or trying to come to general agreement on its definition. The reason behind this statement largely arose from Buzan's belief that people basically understood what security referred to. Buzan argued that security must be investigated through the lens of national security; however he did not concede that individual and international dynamics could affect it. Therefore, in trying to specify referents of security, Buzan argued that the state consisted of three components: the idea of the state; the physical base of the state; and the institutional expression of the state - and it was these components that composed the primary referent objects of security. From this point, Buzan concluded that relevant threats are mostly those that affected the self-determination and sovereignty of the nation-state.<sup>123</sup> Coming from a neorealist perspective, Buzan still believes that the security problems of states could

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<sup>122</sup> Buzan (1991), p. 18.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

not be understood without reference to the anarchic system, and the dynamics of the anarchic system in turn could not be understood without making specific reference to states.

Aside from framing security in relation to the military, Buzan extended the notion of security to include the political, economic, environmental and societal sectors.<sup>124</sup> His argument for including these sectors was that although security begins as a military field, it is increasingly challenged by other interlinked sectors. It is here that Buzan contributed a great deal to the study of security. As far as Buzan is concerned, the "full richness and meaning of security is to be found in the interplay among [the sectors] rather than the primacy of one."<sup>125</sup> Following from this, an understanding of complex security threats such as terrorism and organised crime need to consider how they emerged and operated among the three levels of analysis (individual, state, system). In his conclusion, Buzan suggested that an integrative security policy would work simultaneously on the three levels of analysis, while paying attention to the positive and negative linkages across sectors.<sup>126</sup> The appeal of such a policy formulation is that it requires policy makers to consider the perspective and views of other actors - in this way Buzan concluded that it may be possible to elicit collective measures among the members of the system so that everyone achieved security.

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<sup>124</sup> Buzan, (1991), pp. 19-20 generally describes military security as the interplay between offensive and defensive capability of states, and how states perceive each other's perceptions; political security concerns the organisational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy; economic security refers to the access of resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain levels of welfare and state power; societal security concerns sustainability of traditional patterns of culture, religion, language, national identity and custom; and environmental security concerns the maintenance of local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system of all human life.

<sup>125</sup>Buzan (1991), p. 368.

<sup>126</sup>Ibid., p. 377.



One of the most obvious critiques of Buzan is that he depends on maintaining the primacy of the state, and thus denies the possibility of change being attributed to sub and supra-state actors.<sup>127</sup> Buzan's position loses credibility when considering the role of sub-state actors since the late 1980s (for example, in Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan) in bringing about change within both the state and the system. Furthermore in paying respect to neorealism in People, States and Fear, Buzan adamantly argues that the security of individuals and the international system can ultimately only be guaranteed by the state.<sup>128</sup> In light of this argument Buzan cannot account for two trends in contemporary society. First, Buzan is unable to account for a situation in which non-state actors become the primary guarantors of security. FARC, for example, has provided security from government forces for people within their area of influence. The same is also true in Central Asia's Ferghana Valley where the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb ut-Tahrir allegedly provided security for followers of Islam who have been targeted by government forces. And in Russia, some Russian organised crime groups have provided security functions for the public where the state has been unable to. Second, Buzan's thesis does not explain the fact that a number of states, including many in Africa, Latin America and the FSU, are unable to guarantee their citizens basic security, or meet their citizens' basic social and welfare needs. A counter-argument could be produced to highlight that in this context, a state should not be considered a real state if it is unable to provide for the basic security needs of its citizens. If this is the case, then

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<sup>127</sup>Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School", Review of International Studies, vol. 22 (1996), p. 92.

<sup>128</sup> Although state centrism has received considerable criticism within this chapter, the importance of the state as an organizing entity and an institution capable of providing security has never been called into question. On the contrary, although this thesis argues that non-state actors are increasingly important for the study of international security, non state actors cannot be prioritised to the detriment of the state – this would essentially repeat the same fundamental mistake made by realists. The degree to which the state remains important will be addressed in greater detail in Chapter Two.

the same counter-argument should be applied to non-state actors able to provide basic security needs to the people, indicating that the provision of this function makes them de facto states. Another problem that beset Buzan was his persistence in keeping strategic studies as a distinct core of scholarship within the field of international studies. This however goes against his argument that collective security could be achieved if it is simultaneously sought within the three levels of analysis. Firmly rooted in the realist tradition and primarily concerned about the technicalities of war and the predominant role of the state in bringing about any change, security studies contradicts the concept of security and any attempt to achieve it. Not only does it seek to maintain the status quo, but its very existence has threatened to bring about a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Buzan may also be criticised for the way he chooses to divide and define the security sectors included in his study. Although he discussed military, political, environmental, economic and societal security, he focused on the state, and paid less attention to non-state actors than he afforded them in his introduction and conclusion. Buzan appeared careful not to use examples of security threats that emanated from non-state actors, thus when he explained the notion of military security, Buzan assumed that the threat of force only originated from other states. This narrow understanding of military security excludes the threats that are posed by international terrorism and criminal organisations, threats that cannot be entirely deterred by professional militaries. Considering Buzan's definition of political security as a second example, it is evident that he again failed to consider the role of non-state actors in the security predicament. Political security refers to any threat aimed at the organisational stability of the state. The definition itself could include non-state actors, such as criminal organisations



pressuring the government on certain policy issues, however it does not appear as though Buzan intended the term to be used in this way. As with military security, for Buzan a state's political security is only threatened by other states for the sole purpose of weakening it prior to military attack.<sup>129</sup>

Although Buzan argued that states could cause disruption in other states, he did not seriously consider the possibility that a non-state actor could upset the social or political fabric of a state by creating chaos from within. This, however, has occurred on several occasions throughout the post-Cold War period, as will be argued in the case studies of this thesis.<sup>130</sup> Russian criminal organisations, for example, have successfully disrupted the social fabric of territory within the FSU (such as the Russian Far East) in order to create an environment that they could control and ultimately use to conduct their criminal operations with little interference. Similar arguments can be made in response to the societal, economic and environmental sectors that Buzan describes. Generally speaking, for Buzan, each of these sectors are relevant only in relation to state actors competing for power in an anarchic international system. Thus Buzan, as with other realists and neorealists, failed to adequately account for the consequences and trends emerging from globalisation and the end of the Cold War. However, although Buzan's work continues to face a considerable amount of criticism, the impact People, States and Fear has had on the security debate should not be ignored.

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<sup>129</sup>Buzan (1991), p. 121.

<sup>130</sup>Aside from Afghanistan, Burma, Peru and Tajikistan, this is also increasingly evident in the Russian Federation (including Chechnya), and Colombia (these last two examples will be expanded in Chapter 4 and 5). Furthermore, once the organisational stability of the state is completely in question, criminal organizations or terrorist groups can legitimize their criminal endeavours by harnessing control of the political framework of the state as exemplified in the case of Colombia.

Despite the changes brought on by globalisation and the end of the Cold War, the nature of international security as defined by traditional realists and neorealists has fundamentally remained unchanged. Continued focus on the state as the primary level of analysis, coupled with the adamant belief that military dimensions of security remain paramount, stand in the way of developing a more methodical understanding of contemporary security. The rise of non-state actors, integration of economic systems, and the opening of borders are a few realities of the current international system that cannot be directly accounted for by the dominant paradigm of international relations. With reference to threats emerging from globalisation, Falk notes that the "...rise of transnational crime and political violence ... is difficult to regulate so long as one relies so heavily on the political will and coercive capabilities of traditional sovereign states. The imagination of government bureaucracies is ill-adapted to meet the disruptive, extraterritorial threats being mounted."<sup>131</sup> Therefore one task of this thesis is to provide an adapted conceptual framework that incorporates realist tenets that have relevance if they are understood in a different context from that offered by traditional scholars of the theory.

### **Terrorism: the absence of definitional consensus**

Given that terrorism is a tool used primarily by non-state actors, a direct application of the dominant realist paradigm does not provide an adequate explanation of its existence. This however does mean that terrorism should not be considered part of the security agenda. In light of the destructive events<sup>132</sup> through which terrorism is

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<sup>131</sup>Falk (1999), p. 4.

<sup>132</sup>Select examples include the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland (December 1988) killing 259; the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system (March 1995), killing 12 people and injuring over 5,000; the bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma (April 1995), killing 168 people; a string of suicide bombings in Israel that killed 60 people between February and March 1996; the attacks against the World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington (September



revealed, the extent to which it poses a threat to security is clear, and will be explained in greater depth in Chapter 2. However, as with the notion of 'security' in the study of International Relations, 'terrorism' has not received adequate explanation in the dominant literature – at least with respect to defining the concept.<sup>133</sup> As Andrew Silke notes, “It seems relatively clear that terrorism research exists in such a state and that after over 30 years of enquiry, the field shows little evidence that it is capable of making the leap to consistently producing research of genuine explanatory and predictive value.”<sup>134</sup> This section thus provides an overview and critique of some definitions of terrorism, while simultaneously illustrating why traditional security mindsets, in their current form, are unable to provide an explanation of this phenomenon.

Through the centuries, the understanding of what constitutes terrorism has evolved largely in response to changing political environments. Believed to have originated in the first century with the Sicari,<sup>135</sup> terrorism was used almost exclusively as a tool of

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2001), killing around 3,000; and the bombing of nightclubs in Bali (October 2002), killing approximately 200.

<sup>133</sup> Reuben Miller, “The Literature of Terrorism”, *Terrorism: an International Journal*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1988), divided terrorism literature in two general categories: traditional studies and behavioural studies. Traditional studies generally deal with historical questions, such as who terrorists are and why they use terrorism. Behavioural studies of terrorism, on the other hand, attempt to explain the emergence of terrorism and subsequently how it can be countered. For the most part these studies concentrate on psychological profiles of terrorists and terrorist groups, and socioeconomic studies seeking answers to the roots of the emergence of terrorist groups and patterns of conflict. Apart from these studies of terrorism, the other collection of literature which has attempted to deal with terrorism is criminology and criminal justice which actually attempt to deal more specifically with the power and implications of terrorism and how it should be countered. For the most part, however, there has been little consensus on defining the concept itself - thus allowing for a wide range of literature to emerge which is collectively placed under the subject of ‘terrorism’.

<sup>134</sup> Andrew Silke, “The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vo. 13, no. 4 (Winter 2001), p. 2.

<sup>135</sup>The Sicari were an extreme Jewish faction that emerged after the Roman occupation of Palestine. They reportedly attacked their enemies (usually high priests) in broad daylight using a short dagger (sica) hidden under their coats. For a more complete discussion of these early terrorists see David C. Rapoport, “Religion and Terror: Thugs, Assassins, and Zealots,” in Charles W. Kegley, ed. *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes and Controls*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1990).

religious extremist movements. In the eighteenth century, terrorism took on a new form as it emerged in France, and elsewhere, amid national tension, revolution and social upheaval. It was also during this time that the modern words *terror* and *terrorism* emerged.<sup>136</sup> During the French Revolution in the 1790s, terrorism was associated with revolutionaries who sought to employ the systematic use of terror to further their views in France. This understanding would later define the tactics of the Russian Narodnya Volya (People's Will) which employed a strategy of political assassination against the tsarist regime, and to revolutionaries who emerged from secret societies in Italy, Ireland, the Balkans, Turkey and Egypt.<sup>137</sup> It may generally be concluded that, prior to the twentieth century, terrorism was a tool employed against the political establishment by a minority of revolutionaries who believed that killing opponents was more cost effective than any other form of political action.<sup>138</sup> However, in response to the rise of revolutionary terrorism, many state authorities also subscribed to using terrorism as a means of eliminating potential opposition movements.

The past sixty years has witnessed an explosion of contemporary terrorist motivations. Beginning with the 1940s and 1950s, terrorism largely applied to violence conducted by nationalist groups fighting against the status quo of colonialism.<sup>139</sup> Predominantly taking place in Muslim countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, terrorism became almost synonymous with national or religious struggle. In the 1960s, terrorism was employed by nationalist groups, such as the IRA (Irish Republican

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<sup>136</sup>These words derived from the Latin verb *terrere*, to cause to tremble, and *deterre*, to frighten from.

<sup>137</sup>Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 12.

<sup>138</sup>Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>139</sup>During this period terrorism was a common tactic used by groups in Malaya, Cyprus, Algeria and Palestine.



Army) and ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty), who were seeking political self-determination. Again, in response to a changing political environment, terrorism became a tool of ideological<sup>140</sup> groups in the 1970s and 1980s when extreme left and right wing groups emerged to try and change the political or economic system of their homeland.<sup>141</sup> Although specific terrorist motivations dominated certain segments of history, in the 1980s terrorism began to take on an entirely new dimension. From the early 1980s through the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, nationalist, religious and millennial, ideological, state, and single-issue terrorism operated simultaneously with no single one dominating the scene. In essence terrorism has become a weapon used by a wide range of actors around the world.

But although it may be easy to point to examples of terrorist acts, defining terrorism itself is not straightforward. To begin with, the term 'terrorism' has become intertwined with 'values'. For example, associating the term 'terrorism' with a preconceived judgement (i.e. bad and evil) has clouded the academic exercise of seeking to explore roots, causes, organisational dynamics, and security implications with minimum prejudice. "Misconceptions and prejudices born in the wake of the amorality of terrorist acts – the suffering of victims and the wanton destruction of property" can subsequently influence government counter-terrorist policies and attitudes.<sup>142</sup> The term 'terrorism' has also been subject to a double standard based on an in-group, out-group distinction. As a result, the intricacy of the issue is often

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<sup>140</sup> In the context of International Relations, ideology generally refers to a "set of assumptions and ideas about social behaviour and social systems" which are often referred to as doctrines. Political ideologies are vast and include everything from Marxism, Liberalism and Conservatism, to religious fundamentalism, nationalism, and environmentalism. Evans and Newnham, (1992).

<sup>141</sup> The Red Army Faction in Germany, the Italian Red Brigade, and the Weathermen are examples of such groups.

<sup>142</sup> Andrew Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorism Research," in Andrew Silke, ed. Terrorism Research: Trends, Achievements and Failures, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 11.

undermined in the oversimplified phrase 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. Finally, terrorism has become embellished with political agendas<sup>143</sup>, thus complicating any attempt made at establishing a widely accepted definition. This is evident when states such as the U.S. label some groups terrorist, while ignoring the terrorist nature of other groups because of political interests. An overview of national (i.e. U.S. and U.K.) lists of proscribed terrorist organisations highlights this predicament. Another weakness of most existing definitions of terrorism is that they tend to be based on the very specific political agendas of the author – in many cases coloured by personal experiences or professional affiliation (i.e. retired military officer). As a result, political interests continue to be perpetuated. Furthermore, terrorism has mistakenly been associated with everything from common crime to the massacre of civilians by military units to the bombing of buildings by anti-government dissidents. This imprecise use of the term can largely be attributed to the media "whose efforts to communicate an often complex and convoluted message in the briefest amount of air-time or print space possible have led to the promiscuous labelling of a range of violent acts as 'terrorism'."<sup>144</sup>

A survey of a wide sample of literature on terrorism makes it clear that academics and policymakers find defining terrorism a difficult intellectual task. Unfortunately, unlike other concepts within the study of International Relations, scholars of terrorism cannot be divided into distinct bodies of thought because common assumptions about terrorism are not necessarily shared, and most accounts and attempts to define terrorism emerge from government bureaucrats or from people with personal

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<sup>143</sup>R. Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem", in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart, eds. *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), p. 24.

<sup>144</sup>Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998), p. 13.



experience. Furthermore, because the majority of terrorism research is based primarily on secondary information, “it is difficult to build theories and paradigms for this subject area”.<sup>145</sup> As a result, individuals have created their own definitions that tend to be framed according to specific political goals and beliefs – a problem noted in the previous paragraph. Thus, in the absence of distinct bodies of thought, one of the most coherent ways of assessing existing definitions is by examining the most common themes discussed in the literature surveyed,<sup>146</sup> which include: the use of violence; the groups’ aims and motivations; the choice of targets; the identification of the terrorists themselves; and organisational dynamics.

### Violence

Although most definitions of terrorism mention violence, there is no agreement on what violence is and how it should be understood in relation to the phenomenon of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson, one of the first scholars in the field of International Relations who attempted to define terrorism, referred to the violence committed by terrorists as indiscriminate, unpredictable, arbitrary and ruthlessly destructive.<sup>147</sup> He later refined his description of terrorist violence to include premeditated violence that aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror. Furthermore, Wilkinson stated that the “acts of violence committed [by terrorists] are seen by the society in which they occur as extranormal, in the literal sense that they breach social norms, thus creating a sense of outrage.”<sup>148</sup> Richard Falk's definition followed this line of thinking when he

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<sup>145</sup> Avishag Gordon, “Terrorism and the Scholarly Communication System,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 13, no. 4 (Winter 2001), p. 119.

<sup>146</sup>It should be noted that the literature on terrorism surveyed is in no way exhaustive and that a consideration of every definition of terrorism is beyond the parameters of this thesis. Nevertheless, the literature selected and discussed within this section includes the work of some of the most prolific writers on the subject.

<sup>147</sup>Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, (London: Macmillan Press, 1974), p. 17.

<sup>148</sup>Paul Wilkinson, “The Challenge of Terrorism”, Conflict, Options and Strategy, (1994), p. 83.

asserted that terrorist violence "lacks an adequate moral and legal justification".<sup>149</sup>

The definition provided by Wilkinson and Falk highlight the assumption that terrorism is often understood through the political context of the reader's own identity and personal values by innately linking the concept to social norms. This view of terrorism feeds the notion that terrorism has become intertwined with values, an issue previously discussed in relation to the detriment of the field of study. Despite this inherent weakness in the definitions provided by Wilkinson and Falk, this understanding of terrorism inadvertently critiques realism in that it defies the belief that the international system is composed of rational actors who act in specific ways when confronted by external pressures. The suggestion that terrorism is 'unpredictable, arbitrary and ruthless' implies that it is also irrational, and thus does not fall into the rational-actor model of realism.

The idea that terrorist acts have been condemned by the society in which they occur as extranormal, and even amoral is only exclusively true for violent acts committed in the international domain. For example, the bombing of a French passenger jet over Chad in 1989 by Islamic Jihad caused moral outrage throughout France because it resulted in 179 fatalities.<sup>150</sup> For groups that operated nationally such a generalisation could not always be made. In Peru, Colombia<sup>151</sup> and Lebanon, for example, terrorist organisations were able to gain public support (to varying degrees) because, in these countries state violence was considered to be a historical norm; therefore terrorist groups represented a segment of society that sought to overcome state oppression and state terror. Some of these terrorist groups also gained legitimacy by providing social

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<sup>149</sup>Richard A. Falk, "Revolutionaries and Functionaries: the dual face of terrorism", in Kegley, (1990), p. 39.

<sup>150</sup>Hoffman (1998), p. 190.

<sup>151</sup> The case of Colombia will be dealt with in detail in Chapter Five.



welfare programs to targeted communities, programs that the government was either unwilling or unable to provide. Historical accounts generally do not argue that groups such as M19 and Sendero Luminoso (also referred to as the Shining Path) breached social norms within Colombia and Peru respectively, at least during the initial years of operation. The opposition to these terrorist groups chiefly came from those who wanted to maintain the status quo within their countries, and as a result, subsequently found themselves victims of violence perpetrated by the terrorists. The ability of terrorist groups to provide an alternative social structure directly questions the realist assumption that only the state can guarantee the welfare of its citizens. In this context, a terrorist group (i.e. non-state actor) is seen to exhibit the behaviour of a state by providing (alternative) social structures, thus underscoring the need to adapt realist tenets to accommodate this scenario.

A second way of relating violence to terrorism emerged from the early works of Brian Jenkins. One of his initial definitions described terrorism as including "the threat of violence, individual acts of violence, or a campaign of violence designed primarily to instill fear".<sup>152</sup> Ronald Crelinsten evoked similar understandings of the relationship between terrorism and violence by writing that terrorism "is the deliberate use of violence and threat of violence to evoke a state of fear".<sup>153</sup> By associating the threat of violence with terrorism, as opposed to suggesting that violence is a precondition for an act to be considered terrorist, both Jenkins and Crelinsten explicitly highlighted the existence of a psychological dimension. After violent acts have been utilised, the threat of violence can become a more effective tool than violence itself. This focus on

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<sup>152</sup>Brian Jenkins, International Terrorism: a new mode of conflict, (LA: Crescent Publications, 1975), p.1.

<sup>153</sup>Ronald Crelinsten, "Terrorism as Political Communication: the Relationship Between the Controller and the Controlled", in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart, eds. Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1986), p. 6.

the psychological dimension of terrorism (i.e. that terrorism is a form of psychological warfare) builds on previous attempts made at understanding the nature of the terrorism-violence relationship. As a result, the notion that terrorism simultaneously incorporates violence and the threat of violence to evoke a sense of fear is a theme now used by most academics studying the subject. Comparing this perception of terrorist violence with a traditional military understanding of 'psychological warfare' highlights the relatively sophisticated nature of the threat posed by non-state and internal threats to state security. Contrary to the realist position, the state does not only need to be secured from adversarial external states. This embodies the evolution of security from a concept that was based on the realist notion of a sharp division between the internal and external, to a concept which recognises that the distinction between internal and external political dynamics is blurred.

Despite offering a comprehensive understanding of the role of violence in terrorism, both Jenkins and Crelinsten do not clearly draw a distinction between terrorism and criminality. Their definition therefore suffers from a degree of imprecision. This is evident when Jenkins includes "individual acts of violence" within his definition thus implying that isolated incidents of violence, such as arson, murder and armed robbery can be terrorist in nature. Jessica Stern makes a similar statement by suggesting that a definition of terrorism should be all-inclusive, thus even referring to "murder for its own sake."<sup>154</sup> The intention of neither of these ordinary criminal acts is necessarily to produce terror, in many cases they just happen to terrify. On a basic level, such an exercise complicates policy prescriptions by confusing the priorities of law enforcement and essentially ignoring the larger forces at work in terrorist

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<sup>154</sup> Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 11.



operations.<sup>155</sup> Given that the general aim of terrorism is to "generate a prolonged condition of anxiety", in order to achieve this aim, acts of violence necessarily have to be repeated.<sup>156</sup> The deliberate use of a sustained policy of terror carries with it the threat that if certain demands are not met, the violence will continue. Isolated violent incidents, on the other hand, pose no further risk to society beyond their immediate danger.<sup>157</sup>

More recent definitions written by academics and policy-makers seek to overcome the tendency to use value laden terms and to conflate terrorist violence with ordinary criminality. Schmidt and Jongman created a relatively comprehensive definition after conducting an in-depth analysis of 109 definitions of terrorism from surveys sent to academics studying the subject. Although their definition falls prey to numerous difficulties that will be discussed later, they do provide some further insight into the role of violence. According to Schmidt and Jongman, terrorism "is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action".<sup>158</sup> This statement builds a more complete understanding of violence used by terrorists by highlighting that terrorism is a repeated action - an isolated act therefore does not constitute terrorism.

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<sup>155</sup> Broadening the definition of terrorism to include all forms of criminality defeats the purpose of attempting to identify the intricacies of the terrorist phenomenon. By even suggesting, in an academic context, that rape can "be seen as a constituent element of an autonomous crime of terrorism, just as terrorism can be seen as a necessary ingredient in a violent rape" [H.H.A. Cooper, "Terrorism: the Problem of Definition Revisited," in Harvey Kushner, ed. Essential Readings on Political Terrorism: Analyses of Problems and Prospects for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, (Lincoln, Nebraska: Nebraska University Press, 2002), p. 5.], the academic merely adds to the misperceptions about terrorism that are advanced throughout society. Furthermore, this exercise merely undermines the sophistication required for authorities to counter the persistence of truly violent and destructive terrorism, such as the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks which resulted in the death of over 3,000 people.

<sup>156</sup> Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: the evolving dynamic, (New York: St. Martin's Press Inc., 1996), p. 16.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>158</sup> Alex Schmidt and Albert Jongman, Political Terrorism, (SWIDOC: Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1988), p. 28.

Although this was not clear in earlier attempts at defining terrorism, violence is an essential characteristic. However, in order not to confuse terrorism with other forms of violence it is important to establish some parameters. In light of more recent attempts to provide an accurate description of violence and terrorism it may be concluded that three elements must be present: the use of violence, the threat of violence, and repeated violent acts. Regardless of the form that the violence takes (bombings, hijackings, kidnapping, extortion or assassination), terrorism, based on its psychological dimensions, continues to work according to the tactical principal, "Kill one, frighten a thousand."<sup>159</sup> In protracted terrorist campaigns, it is the extent to which a group utilises violence that can potentially pose a direct threat to state monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Thus, as will be discussed in the case studies of this thesis, contrary to the theoretical assumptions of realism, it is possible for nonstate actors to impinge upon the state's authorised and legitimate monopoly on the use of violence.

### Targets

A second theme commonly identified within the literature in relation to defining terrorism is target selection. Targets are commonly divided into primary and legitimate targets. Primary targets represent the ultimate audience over whom the terrorists want to exert their influence; this is normally a government or a specific national or religious group. Legitimate targets are best described in traditional military terminology as 'operational targets'. They are relatively vulnerable and unprotected targets that are considered to be worthy of destruction because of the resultant impact it would have on the primary target. For example, Western tourists are considered

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<sup>159</sup>Chalk (1996), p. 19.



legitimate targets in Egypt by radical Islamist militant groups seeking to influence economic and political policies of Western states. Generally speaking then, terrorist groups have a primary target audience whom they are trying to influence (i.e. in this case Western governments) by perpetrating violence against an operational target (i.e. Western tourists). Within the literature on terrorism, writers generally fall into two categories when they describe terrorist targets as part of a general definition of terrorism. The first group point to specific segments in society as primary terrorist targets, whereas the second group attempts to be more general and inclusive.

At its most simplistic, terrorist targets are divided into non-combatant (civilian) and military personnel. On the one hand Israeli academics tend to focus on the former, therefore defining terrorism as "the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets"<sup>160</sup> and "the deliberate and systematic assault on civilians."<sup>161</sup> By targeting civilians, they argue that the political and ethical norms of states that support human welfare are inherently violated. Aside from pointing to civilians as the primary targets of terrorism, in many instances academics and policy-makers further stipulate that terrorism is only directed against democratic societies.<sup>162</sup> Military personnel, on the other hand, form a dichotomous target. Although military targets are normally considered legitimate within a legal context, they are considered victims of terrorism when acts of violence are perpetrated against troops not in

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<sup>160</sup>Boaz Ganor, "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom Fighter?", [www.isn.ethz.ch](http://www.isn.ethz.ch) (December 6, 1998).

<sup>161</sup>Benjamin Netanyahu, Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat Domestic and International Terrorism, (New York: Noonday Press, 1995), p. 8.

<sup>162</sup>Thackrah (1987), "Terrorism: a Definitional..." asserts that the primary aim of terrorists is to cause "instability within democracies." (p. 41); and Netanyahu (1995), Fighting Terrorism..., regularly notes that terrorism is a "form of organised violence directed against democratic societies", p. 7.

combat,<sup>163</sup> thus referring to soldiers that are killed "when on leave, eating out in restaurants or sleeping in their barracks."<sup>164</sup> Although it may be argued that military personnel are civilians when they are off duty, the reason for isolating them as a separate target is to highlight that non-combatants are the focus of most terrorist campaigns. Combined with the notion that terrorist violence is usually indiscriminate and unpredictable, "all must assume themselves to be potential future targets."<sup>165</sup>

Attempting to identify and isolate specific groups within society as primary terrorist targets adds an unnecessary complication to the understanding of the targeting factor. By stating that civilians and off-duty military personnel are the only targets, many other potential targets are excluded. For example, can law-enforcement personnel, the judiciary, government officials and diplomats be considered 'civilian' together with the population at large? If not, does this mean these individuals are never targeted by terrorists? Furthermore, by using the term 'civilian' a value judgment is inherently made because it exhumes connotations of 'innocent' bystanders, which is not always the case (i.e. a prosecutor involved in a case against individual terrorists may not be considered 'innocent' by the terrorist group suffering the loss). One way of getting around this difficulty of semantics is to use the term 'noncombatants' – thus suggesting that terrorist targets are not directly engaged in military combat but that

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<sup>163</sup>Acts of violence perpetrated against soldiers on duty are not considered terrorist because soldiers on duty are prepared and trained as targets of violence. By arguing that combatants are legitimate targets, terrorism becomes confused with guerrilla tactics. The primary difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is that 'guerrilla' groups have a larger membership of armed individuals "who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military forces, and seize and hold territory" whereas terrorists generally "do not function in the open as armed units, generally do not attempt to seize and hold territory, deliberately avoid engaging enemy military forces in combat". Hoffman (1998), Inside Terrorism, p, 41.

<sup>164</sup>Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmidt, "Western Responses to Terrorism: a Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 4, no. 4 (Winter 1992), p. 317. Of the most infamous attacks against military personnel was the 1983 Hizbollah suicide-bombing of the US Marines barracks in Beirut, killing 241 people.

<sup>165</sup>Chalk (1996), p. 14.



terrorism is primarily interested in directly targeting referent objects other than the state. This therefore highlights the importance of the notion of human security that will be discussed in the next chapter.

Finally, in suggesting that democracies are the primary targets of terrorist groups, the literature implies that undemocratic countries facing terrorism are of no interest. In addition to ignoring a history of terrorism in Burma, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Uzbekistan the potential for terrorism to emerge in other non-democratic countries is largely overlooked. This is a dangerous mistake given the nature of the international system today. Taking authoritarian countries in the FSU, Latin America and Africa as examples, should formidable terrorist groups emerge and pose a serious domestic and regional threat, it is highly probable that consequences will spill over into the democratic world. For example, relatively easy access to former Soviet arsenals and scientists would make nuclear, chemical or biological blackmail a possibility.<sup>166</sup> Unhindered access to the triborder area in Latin America has also created a location where criminals and terrorists can cooperate and/or coordinate international activities to the extent that disparate entities and interests could conceivably converge.<sup>167</sup>

The problem of identifying specific terrorist targets can be overcome by developing a more inclusive understanding of targeting practices. This can generally be done through establishing a distinction between the immediate victim and wider audience,

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<sup>166</sup> For more information on the potential use of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons by terrorist groups, see Nadine Gurr and Benjamin Cole, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); Lacqueur, (1999); and Stern (2000). And for an excellent account of the availability of weapons of mass destruction from the former Soviet Union, see R.W. Lee, Smuggling Armageddon: the Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

<sup>167</sup> John Daly, "The Suspects: The Latin American connection", Jane's Terrorism & Security Monitor, October 2001 and Library of Congress, Terrorism and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America, Washington, DC, July 2003.

and between symbolic targets and targets of opportunity. In his definition of terrorism, Wilkinson notes that terrorism is directed at a wider audience than the immediate victim, who is chosen as a target randomly or symbolically.<sup>168</sup> A random target thus presumes that the immediate victim was merely caught in the 'wrong place at the wrong time', whereas a symbolic target suggests that the immediate victim was targeted because they represented something larger than themselves – for example a diplomat might be targeted because he or she represents a particular state. In discussing terrorist targets, Jenkins simply states that normally the intended targets of terrorism are the "people watching".<sup>169</sup> Although these are important distinctions to make, a more nuanced definition of targeting would permit a greater understanding of the subtleties behind the choice of targets by terrorists. Furthermore, it would expand the general understanding of terrorist targeting to incorporate the idea that terrorist groups carefully select targets that will help them achieve their goals. Historical accounts consistently reveal that terrorist groups often chose targets to ensure that their message is directed to the intended groups of people, usually the ruling class or an opposing religious or ethnic group. For example, Narodnya Volya specifically targeted the Tsarist authorities in an attempt to spur a peasants' revolution; the Marxist Red Army Faction aimed its actions at the German ruling class by targeting businessmen and military officers; and to show their discontent with government in the United States of America, militias in the U.S. directly targeted officials of any form of government above the county level.<sup>170</sup> By targeting a specific adversarial group, terrorists directly inflicted damage on their enemy while sending out a wider message. ETA, FARC, the Tamil Tigers and the Red Brigades all assassinated high

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<sup>168</sup> Wilkinson (1994), p. 83.

<sup>169</sup> Jenkins (1975).

<sup>170</sup> Hoffman (1998), p. 111.



ranking government officials - thus revealing their ability directly to attack their primary target (the government).

A focus on terrorist targeting is an integral component of the definition of terrorism because it reveals that there are always multiple audiences for any terrorist act. Referred to as 'propaganda of the deed' since the time of the *Narodnya Volya*, this aspect of terrorism highlights that one of the major motivations for utilising the tool of terrorism is precisely because it:

captures the attention of a variety of audiences and allows the terrorist to communicate more specific messages tailored to each one. The message need not be articulated in words; it can be symbolic (conveyed by the target selected, for example) or simply shocking (conveyed by the indiscriminate act).<sup>171</sup>

A significant contribution was made with reference to developing an understanding of terrorist target selection in the 1980s, with Schmidt and Jongman's distinction between symbolic targets (selected) and targets of opportunity (random).<sup>172</sup> This is an important advancement because it did not assume that terrorists only directed their violence towards innocent bystanders, but also targeted groups of individuals that represented their main audience. Furthermore by stating that targets are used to "manipulate the main target of attention, turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of symbolism"<sup>173</sup> it becomes evident that terrorists carefully select their targets so that they can be manipulated in order to convey a "complex nexus of messages that are clear to everyone."<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>171</sup> Ronald Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: a Communication Model," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer 2002), p. 84.

<sup>172</sup> Schmidt and Jongman (1988), p. 28.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid.

<sup>174</sup> Crelinsten (2002), p. 84.

Target selection is not only an important component of terrorism as a concept; it illustrates some important limitations of realism's ability to directly account for this phenomenon. First, it shows that the state is not the only actor that needs to be secured. Equally important in this respect are individuals, groups of individuals, and the international community. This also relates to the destruction of objects by terrorists, because targeting buildings or the food chain also creates fear.<sup>175</sup> Second, it illustrates that there is an undeniable interplay between the levels of analysis: although the primary targets of terrorist acts may be individuals or groups of individuals, the symbolism inherent in terrorism has implications that reverberate nationally and at times regionally and internationally.

### *Aims and Motivations*

Behind the terrorist violence that is directed against targets of opportunity or symbolic targets, all terrorist groups are motivated by distinct factors and are trying to achieve certain aims through the use of terrorism. Aims and motivations, as they are discussed in much of the literature on terrorism, are often differentiated between: short term and long term, and between specific and general.

Considerations of immediate aims are one of the few aspects about terrorism that has received widespread agreement - terrorism is primarily used to create a climate of "extreme fear or terror".<sup>176</sup> More specifically, the short-term objectives of terrorism include attention (focused on the terrorists and their cause through violence); acknowledgement (of the terrorist cause); recognition (of the terrorist group as a

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<sup>175</sup> Jack P. Gibbs, "Conceptualization of Terrorism," American Sociological Review, vol. 54 (June 1989), p. 331.

<sup>176</sup> Wilkinson, (1974), p. 17. This is a very basic view that is generally agreed upon within the community of terrorism academics and analysts.



legitimate spokesman for the cause they represent); authority (to make changes in society according to the terrorist group aims); and governance (to eventually consolidate their political control).<sup>177</sup> Added to this, shorter term aims of terrorists have been defined as “exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience.”<sup>178</sup> Following on from the last point, an associated short-term aim is to publicise the group’s goals. In this respect, terrorism has been specifically defined as “a form of coercive, violent communication”.<sup>179</sup> Thus whether or not terrorists directly take responsibility for their actions by releasing a communiqué – as was the case for most of the 1970s and 1980s – their actions in and of themselves are good indicators of the aims and motivations of terrorist groups. For example, the September 11, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Centre and the attack against the Pentagon could immediately be understood – without a verbal or written claim of responsibility - as the result of a grievance against American economic and military power.<sup>180</sup>

Although the accuracy of these two short-term aims is rarely disputed, academics engaged in the study of terrorism do not entirely agree on the long-term goals of terrorist groups. Among the most common ways of uncovering these goals has been to concentrate on specific typologies, thus essentially arguing that every type of terrorism ultimately has different aspirations. Thus unlike the short-term aims, it is arguably not possible to pinpoint a common long-term goal that ties all terrorist groups together. Despite the many typologies that have been developed over the years, six types of terrorism appear most frequently: nationalist/separatist; extreme

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<sup>177</sup> Hoffman (1998), pp. 183-84.

<sup>178</sup> Stern (2000), p. 11.

<sup>179</sup> Ronald D. Crelinsten, (2002), p. 83.

<sup>180</sup> In fact, in statements released by Osama bin Laden following the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks, American military and economic power in Middle East and American-Israeli relationship were stated as justifications for the selected targets. These communiqués can be accessed on the Al Jazeera website, and translations can be accessed on the Site Institute website.

left-wing; extreme right-wing; religious; single-issue; and state terrorism. Generally speaking, nationalist-separatist terrorism seeks national self-determination or separation (for example, the Irish Republican Army). Extreme left-wing groups normally seek Marxist or Maoist objectives, such as an international revolution by the proletariat (for example, the Italian Red Brigades). Right-wing groups seek to maintain the status quo or defend what they believe to be the national interest (for example, militias in the U.S.). Religious groups generally follow an extreme religious dogma, which can include purifying society of 'infidels' or bringing about Armageddon (for example, Islamic groups like Hezbollah and millenarian cults like the Aum Shinrikyo).<sup>181</sup> Not interested in changing society as a whole, single issue groups promote a single cause that arises within society during a specific time and place. The most common examples of single-issue groups include militant environmental groups (Earth First!), some animal rights groups (Animal Liberation Front) and various anti-abortion groups that operate in the United States. State terrorism, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with government attempts at maintaining total control by suppressing and instilling fear within specific segments of that society – usually potential opposition groups.<sup>182</sup> Given the actions of each of these groups, it is evident that each presents a formidable threat to state security. However, none can be identified exclusively as a threat emanating from outside the state, and in most cases they do not necessarily pose a direct military threat to state

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<sup>181</sup>This summary was taken from Chalk, (1996), West European Terrorism, Hoffman, (1998), Inside Terrorism, Kegley, (1990), International Terrorism, and Laqueur (1999), The New Terrorism.

<sup>182</sup> For background reading on state terrorism, see, William D. Perdue, Terrorism and the State: A Critique of Domination Through Fear, (Praeger Publishers, 1989), and Michael Stohl and George Lopez, eds. The State as Terrorist: the Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression, (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1984). Specific accounts of state terrorism in Latin America and Europe, respectively, are covered extremely well in: Jeffrey Sluka, ed. Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), and Paddy Woodworth, Dirty Wars, Clean Hands: ETA, the GAL, and Spanish Democracy, (Cork: Cork University Press, 2001). And for an excellent account of state terrorism in the Soviet Union, see, B. Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: soviet secret police 1917-1970, (New York: Coward McCann and Geoghegan Inc., 1972).



survival – therefore confirming that a strict interpretation of realism is incapable of explaining the threat posed by terrorism.

Discerning various terrorist aims and motivations according to a typology may be most useful for a comparative project that seeks to build a more accurate understanding of specific groups of terrorists. Such a long list of goals, however, hinders any attempt to establish a coherent definition and understanding of the terrorist phenomenon in general. As a result, some academics have attempted to pinpoint the one, common aim held by all terrorist groups. Crelinsten notes that the main motivation of terrorism is simply to maintain or weaken allegiance, Thackrah argues that terrorists seek to change the politico-economic balance of the world, and Schmidt and Jongman conclude that terrorism is used “for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons.”<sup>183</sup> Attempts to uncover a single aim inherent to all terrorist groups are unsuccessful largely because they are so broad. For example, Thackrah makes the mistake of assuming that all terrorists want to change the world. Aside from a few millenarian groups that began operating in the early 1990s, and the threat emanating from the Global Salafist Jihadi Movement, few terrorist groups seek global change - for the most part they are only interested in changing the situation within a nation, or at most, a region.

Distinguishing between aims and motivations can help provide a more straightforward working definition of terrorism with regard to this component. Boaz Ganor has clarified the concept of terrorism by focusing on the political nature of terrorist aims. In doing so he notes that the motivation behind the political object is irrelevant to

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<sup>183</sup>Schmidt and Jongman (1988), p. 28.

understanding the terrorist phenomenon because motives, be they religious, ideological or financial, are "empirical regularities"<sup>184</sup> that although they are associated with terrorism, they often confuse the analysis of the term. Therefore regardless of whether a group is motivated by the word of God, animal rights, or profit maximisation, the fact that all such groups use terror tactics to change or maintain certain aspects within the domestic, regional or international political system is the thread that links all terrorist groups together. As Hoffman asserts, "Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little."<sup>185</sup>

Following on from this assertion, regardless of broad aims and motivations, terrorist groups primarily seek to ensure that their "influence and control over their constituent communities" is never damaged because they depend on a support base – whether that be active or passive, direct or indirect.<sup>186</sup> In order to establish and subsequently maintain influence over targeted communities, terrorist groups often utilise what Silke refers to as 'power resources'. Power resources include: personal power (often emerging from a charismatic leader); physical power (using force to 'influence'); resource power (controlling something that the community wants/needs); and position power (also known as 'legitimate' or 'legal' power).<sup>187</sup> It is the extent to which terrorist groups are able to assert a combination of all these forms of power that will ultimately dictate not only their position within specific communities, but also how effective their activities are. Thus as long as a terrorist group successfully asserts power via these various avenues, the need to be well-armed in order to be powerful

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<sup>184</sup>Ganor (1998).

<sup>185</sup>Hoffman (1998), p. 44.

<sup>186</sup> Andrew Silke, "Beating the Water: The Terrorist Search for Power, Control and Authority," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 12, no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 76.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 78-88.



diminishes, as power can be successfully accrued by being “an attentive and aware opportunist.”<sup>188</sup> Acquiring power resources also contribute to the authority and legitimacy attained by a terrorist group within their immediate area of operations.

Regardless of the motivation of a terrorist group, it is important to understand that the aim has always remained constant - terrorism is political. This factor is highlighted in Harmon’s definition of terrorism:

terror is not an end in itself, but a means to political power and a way to hold political power. The general fear that pervades a political and social order, the psychological state of imbalance, and the particular and material damage to life and property done by terrorists are intended to advance some political purpose, be it short or long-range, limited or unlimited.<sup>189</sup>

In attempting to attain various aims and motivations, it may be concluded that most terrorist groups in fact seek to assert control over specific segments of territory, or over an entire state. As previously stated, this facet further compounds the difficulty which realism has in addressing terrorism as a threat that primarily originates from non-state actors. Considering terrorist aims and motivations, it is apparent that non-state actors are as *political* as the state itself. This, in turn, significantly debilitates the realist assumption that the state is the only paramount political actor. The need to overcome this limitation of realism is further highlighted in the next section.

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<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>189</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. xv. Harmon does offer a more sophisticated assessment of the aims of terrorism. In an article published in 2001, he argues that there are five strategies of terrorism: the creation of societal dislocation or chaos; discrediting or destroying a government; rendering economic damage; rendering military damage; and, spreading fear for international effects. These aims are covered in depth in Christopher C. Harmon, “Five Strategies of Terrorism,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 39-66.

## The Terrorists

Although violence, targets, and aims and motivations constitute the defining characteristics of terrorism, the ability to identify who is a terrorist further aids in clarifying what terrorism is. Unfortunately, as with other aspects of terrorism, academics have not reached a consensus on this issue - some argue that individuals not attached to a larger group can be terrorists, while others concentrate on organised groups. In his book Terrorism and Criminal Justice, published in 1978, Crelinsten based his understanding of terrorism on the idea that terrorists are "individuals or groups of individuals".<sup>190</sup> Schmidt and Jongman also considered terrorists to be "(semi-) clandestine individual, group, or state actors".<sup>191</sup> The argument that an individual can be a terrorist faces the same difficulties as the argument that individual acts of violence can be terrorism. By using the word 'individual', this definition risks the possibility of allowing terrorism to be confused with common criminality, such as mass murder and serial rape. According to this criterion, individuals like the Unabomber and Carlos the Jackal would be considered terrorist. The Unabomber was merely a disgruntled citizen who disagreed with the establishment.<sup>192</sup> To argue that he terrorised American society or that he had any considerable long-term aims that seriously jeopardised the security of the American state would be difficult.<sup>193</sup> Carlos the Jackal, on the other hand, was a classic example of an assassin-for-hire, working

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<sup>190</sup>Ronald D. Crelinsten, Terrorism and Criminal Justice (DC Heath and Company, 1978), pp. 5-6

<sup>191</sup> Schmidt and Jongman (1988), Political Terrorism, p. 28.

<sup>192</sup> For in-depth treatment of the Unabomber and his motivations and actions, see, Ron Arnold, Eco Terror: the Violent Agenda to Save Nature – the World of the Unabomber, (Free Enterprise Press, 1997), Alston Chase, Unabomber: the Making of an American Terrorist, (W.W. Norton, 2003), and John Douglas, The Unabomber, (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1999).

<sup>193</sup> Although it has been argued (in the sources above) that the Unabomber did, in fact, send messages to a wider audience through his actions and communiques, because he worked alone the wider terrorizing effects of his actions can be compared to those of a mass murderer who leaves written messages at their crime scenes and only victimizes women with specific characteristics, such as Ted Bundy. Arguably both individuals created a similar degree of terror within society.



for the highest bidder.<sup>194</sup> The violent act of an ordinary criminal is not designed to have consequences beyond the act itself, nor is it intended to provide a message for a wider audience. Instead, the motivations of ordinary criminals are purely selfish and personal.<sup>195</sup>

Although some scholars of terrorism argue that a terrorist organisation can consist of one individual, over the past decade, that view has commonly been replaced with the idea that a group of individuals compose a terrorist organisation. However, consensus has not been reached about what types of groups are prone to becoming terrorist. Falk argues that terrorists are predominantly revolutionary groups or governments, whereas Hoffman argues that they consist of subnational groups and non-state identities.<sup>196</sup> By focusing on revolutionary groups as constituting a portion of terrorist organisations, Falk excludes a range of other actors. According to Falk's logic groups such as Earth First! and Aum Shinrikyo would not be classified as terrorist. Earth First! could not be considered terrorist because they are not a revolutionary group in that they do not call for a major restructuring of society, but simply want governments and corporations to follow strict environmental regulations. Aum Shinrikyo also would not be classified as terrorist because it is not revolutionary, nor does it aspire to establish its own government; it is a millennial cult advocating the end of the world, and is not interested in the restructuring of society, but wants to usher in its complete

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<sup>194</sup> This is highlighted in J. Follain, Jackal: the secret wars of Carlos the Jackal, (London: Weidenfeld, Nicolson, 1998). For more information on the activities of Carlos the Jackal, see also, John Follain, Jackal: the Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal, (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2000), and David Yallop, Tracking the Jackal: the Search for Carlos, the World's Most Wanted Man, (New York: Random House USA Inc., 1993).

<sup>195</sup>Hoffman (1998), p. 41.

<sup>196</sup>Subnational groups refer to ethnic, nationalist or religious groups that either seek their own state or seek to overthrow the status quo. Non-state identities, on the other hand, refer mostly to groups that are motivated by something other than ethnicity or religion such as single-issue groups or criminal organisations.

destruction. Falk is also unable to account for the use of terror as an operational tactic by other non-state groups, such as the Italian mafia and the drug cartels of Latin America.

For the most part contemporary terrorism is equated with non-state actors; however, governments are also capable of engaging in the use of terror tactics – thus de facto constituting a terrorist group.<sup>197</sup> Historically when terror tactics were used by the state, they were employed as a tool of military policy to repress the population, eliminate opponents and/or break down the enemy. Possessing a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence combined with the authority to assess threats to domestic security, states can initiate campaigns of terror at home or abroad as part of their security doctrine.<sup>198</sup> Furthermore, when a government's authority and legitimacy is directly threatened, they may engage in terrorism as a way of reasserting control over their domestic population. This type of state terrorism has most often been identified with the Reign of Terror (1793-94) during the French Revolution when the Jacobins guillotined and arrested thousands of people in order to eliminate any internal counter-revolutionary elements. A more recent example of state terrorism is Stalin's Great Purge.<sup>199</sup> This however does not preclude the support of terrorism and terrorist groups by both state officials and states themselves in order to further certain shared

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<sup>197</sup>Aside from Falk many other academics believe that governments may be terrorists, including Michael Stohl, and Yonah Alexander.

<sup>198</sup>Despite international conventions and international law, military campaigns commonly utilise terror tactics as part of their effort to weaken the enemy. Although certain acts such as mass rape may seem brutal and unnecessary they are unofficially a normal part of warfare. Furthermore, although the strategic bombing of power grids, communication centres, and other sites deemed strategic is a tactic used by terrorist groups, this does not translate into terrorism if a similar scenario is played out by armed military units representing a state.

<sup>199</sup>For an excellent account of state terror during the time of the Soviet Union, see Levytsky, (1972).



aims.<sup>200</sup> The terrorists that benefit from state support "should not be confused with the bureaucratized agents of state coercion which totalitarian states routinely use to induce submission from their own citizens."<sup>201</sup> An example of state support of terrorism is the activities of the Khomeini regime in Iran,<sup>202</sup> which illustrates how states can mirror the illegitimacy of terrorist groups, "ignoring the rule of law and using stealth and surprise to spread a message of terror and subjugation throughout the populace."<sup>203</sup> The fact that agents of the state can present the greatest single threat to citizens, and ultimately the future survival of the state itself, presents yet further support for the argument that realism is unable to adequately explain terrorism. .

### Organisational and Operational Dynamics

In contrast to the themes in the terrorism literature surveyed in this chapter so far, there has been widespread – albeit not total - agreement about how terrorist groups are organised, and how their operations are structured.<sup>204</sup> Although the intricacies of terrorist groups' organisation do not entirely constitute an integral defining characteristic, organisational dynamics are important because they provide good indicators of changes taking place within such groups. Awareness of group organisation therefore becomes an essential tool that can be used to identify emerging trends in the study of terrorism. Furthermore, as will be illustrated in detail in Chapter

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<sup>200</sup> For accounts of state sponsored terrorism, see also, Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare, (New York: Hero Books, 1986), and Raymond Tanter, Rogue Regimes: Terrorism and Proliferation, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

<sup>201</sup> Chalk (1996), p. 21.

<sup>202</sup> Roberta Gurr, The Soviet Union and Terrorism, (London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), pp. 11-12.

<sup>203</sup> Crelinsten, (2002), p. 87. Less severe versions of state terrorism include the use of torture, political killings and disappearances, as exemplified in numerous post-Cold War states, such as Uzbekistan.

<sup>204</sup> As discussed in the section on 'the terrorists', the only area of significant disagreement surrounds the question of whether or not individuals could be considered terrorists, or whether terrorism is inherently a group dynamic.

Three, organisational dynamics reflect more significant changes occurring within terrorist groups, such as their aims and motivations.

Prior to the end of the Cold War terrorist groups were commonly organised along well-defined hierarchical command and control structures, often with an identifiable charismatic leader.<sup>205</sup> Even when terrorist groups utilised cell structures, these cells were directly connected with one another. The cell structure of traditional terrorist groups has many variations, but tends to be primarily organised around the same simple principle wherein each cell is:

part of a hierarchy and is responsible to a single point of contact above. Within each cell, which is typically three to ten persons, a member may not even know all of his or her compatriots. When an action is in preparation and execution, a person or a cell or a group of cells may act in ignorance of the strategic purpose of the action, or even about the full dimensions of the organisation which can act decisively and quickly.<sup>206</sup>

Despite being organised in cells, the central organisational structure of traditional terrorist groups is hierarchical and has an identifiable leadership.

Because members of traditional terrorist groups belong to an identifiable organisation, their objectives are also clearly defined.<sup>207</sup> Furthermore, these groups have always been relatively small with most limiting membership to fewer than 50 members.

Some groups with wider territorial agendas, such as ETA and the IRA, have professed to have between 200 and 400 members. A very few – Abu Nidal for example - had

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<sup>205</sup> Thomas Copeland, "Is the 'New Terrorism' Really New?: An Analysis of the New Paradigm for Terrorism," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, vol. 21, no. 2 (Winter 2001). Hoffman (1998), p. 43, directly argues that this organisational aspect of terrorist groups is integral to defining the terrorist phenomenon.

<sup>206</sup> Harmon (2000), p. 98.

<sup>207</sup> It is worth noting that it is not the intention of this thesis to argue that traditional terrorist groups no longer exist – on the contrary, traditional groups like ETA continue to operate. However, even traditional groups evolve over time, and may therefore find it in their interest to evolve. Furthermore, a 'new' group of terrorist groups have emerged as a result of the changes which have occurred in the international system.



over 500 members.<sup>208</sup> Professional training was a requirement for members of terrorist groups to ensure that operations were not to be compromised by amateurs. As a result these traditional terrorist groups often depended on state sponsors to cover the financial costs involved in terrorist training, and to organise terrorist acts.<sup>209</sup> For example, Iran sponsored Hizbullah to conduct terrorist operations in Lebanon during the 1980s under the name of 'Islamic Jihad.'<sup>210</sup> Finally, it was common for these groups to issue communiqués after conducting acts of terrorism taking credit for the action and describing it in great detail.<sup>211</sup> Some of these stereotypical traditional groups, which are no longer operational, included the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhoff Gang. Traditional groups that continue to operate today include Sendero Luminoso and ETA.

Taking advantage of the information revolution as it developed through globalisation, terrorist groups have learned how to use technological developments to maximise their organisational and operational effectiveness. As a result, many groups operating in the early years of the twenty-first century increasingly organised themselves in networks<sup>212</sup> which are believed to be "more flexible and responsive than hierarchies in reacting to outside developments, and to be better than hierarchies at using information to improve decision-making."<sup>213</sup> These emerging networks are

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<sup>208</sup> Hoffman, (1998), p. 206, cites these figures from the United States Defense Department.

<sup>209</sup> Throughout the 1990s various terrorist training camps were identified throughout the world, including several training camps in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon, in Yemen, the Sudan, and Afghanistan.

<sup>210</sup> Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'allah in Lebanon: the Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis, (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 1997).

<sup>211</sup> An excellent account of communiqués issued by various European terrorist groups operating in the 1980s is, Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky, Europe's Red Terrorists: the Fighting Communist Organisations, (London: Frank Cass, 1992).

<sup>212</sup> The network model of terrorism will be presented in detail in Chapter Two as a part of a larger paradigm seeking to explain and understand the changing nature of security in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

<sup>213</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds. Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 46.

“transnational, amorphous and diffuse”<sup>214</sup> therefore allowing terrorists to engage in a wider range of activities.<sup>215</sup> At the same time, however, the motivations of ‘new’ terrorist groups appear to be less comprehensible than traditional groups and their structure and membership is scattered<sup>216</sup> throughout the region in which they operate, if not throughout the world. Increasingly terrorist groups are treating decentralisation as the “prized key”<sup>217</sup> of future success. For this very reason the realist security paradigm is especially ill-equipped to provide an explanation of the emerging nature of terrorism. With networked organisations the blurring between the domestic and international levels of analysis becomes even greater, demonstrating that the state can no longer focus only on exogenous threats if it is to ensure security. On the contrary, states are increasingly forced to focus on threats that emanate inside as well as outside of state borders.

Another important development in the post Cold-War evolution of terrorist groups is that a new cadre of terrorist has emerged. Referred to as ‘amateur terrorists’ by Hoffman, these terrorists lack professional training, but have access to resources and others methods of terrorism through a host of informal sources, such as through the internet, bookstores, or mail-order publishers.<sup>218</sup> In comparison with their professional counterparts, amateur terrorists are equally deadly in their actions, however because of their indirect linkages, they have proven even more elusive to track and anticipate.<sup>219</sup> Furthermore, the absence of a strict organisational framework means

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<sup>214</sup> Copeland (2001).

<sup>215</sup> This is expanded in John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar and Information Age Terrorism,” in Ian Lesser, et al., eds, Countering the New Terrorism, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).

<sup>216</sup> Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism Trends and Prospects,” in Lesser, et al. (1999), p. 9.

<sup>217</sup> Harmon (2000), p. 124.

<sup>218</sup> Hoffman (1998), p. 203.

<sup>219</sup> Hoffman (1999), p. 21. The exemplary example of successful amateur terrorist is Aum Shinrikyo and their efforts leading to the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995.



that amateur terrorists have fewer constraints placed on their actions. Equally interesting is the point that professional terrorists appear to have manipulated the presence of amateur terrorists – using them as pawns or as expendable operatives.<sup>220</sup>

At the same time, however, professional terrorists have become increasingly sophisticated and operationally competent. Even more than in the past, these professionals are:

demonstrably more adept in their tradecraft of death and destruction; more formidable in their capacity for tactical modification and innovation in their methods of attack; and more able to operate for sustained periods while avoiding detection, interception, or capture.<sup>221</sup>

In other words, terrorist groups appear to be constantly learning from their predecessors. This, combined with the fact that contemporary groups have developed networks that utilise both professional and amateur terrorists, has strengthened the efficiency and security of terrorist operations, thereby posing a growing threat to states.

Increasingly since the 1990s this terrorism has revealed a capacity to mirror traditional military threats, especially in the context of terrorist groups successfully manipulating weak or failed states. For example, the safe haven that Afghanistan provided to a variety of terrorist groups made it a likely target of military retribution if terrorism posed a threat to Western powers (i.e. the U.S.). This was the case in former U.S. President Bill Clinton's order of missile attacks on Afghanistan following the

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<sup>220</sup> Hoffman, (1999) argues that this was the case with a wave of attacks that were perpetrated in France between July and October 1995 by the Algerian GIA. Although the professional terrorists of the GIA were believed to be responsible for the initial bombings, "like-minded amateurs – recruited by GIA operatives from within France's large and increasingly restive Algerian expatriate community – were responsible for at least some of the subsequent attacks." (p. 27). For more detailed accounts of the bombing campaign, see Susan Bell, "16 hurt in Paris nail-bomb blast," *Times (London)*, 18 August, 1995; Alex Duval Smith, "Police fight 'war' in French suburbs," *Guardian (London)*, 01 November 1995; Craig Whitney, "French Police Arrest Suspected Leader of Islamic Militant Group," *New York Times*, 03 November 1995.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; and the U.S. led 'war on terrorism' that was initiated by Washington following the September 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks that were perpetrated by the Afghanistan-based al-Qaeda network.

Finally, another characteristic of post-Cold War terrorism is the fact that terrorist groups no longer regularly claim credit for their actions. As noted earlier, issuing communiqués was common for most traditional groups operating in the 1970s and 1980s – especially if the attack was particularly spectacular.<sup>222</sup> Few of the several significant terrorist attacks that have taken place since the early 1990s have been “credibly claimed – much less explained or justified as terrorist attacks – by the groups responsible.”<sup>223</sup> As Hoffman succinctly notes:

The implication of this trend is that violence for some terrorist groups is perhaps becoming less a means to an end (that therefore has to be tailored and explained and justified to the public) than an end in itself that does not require any wider explanation or justification beyond the group's members themselves and perhaps their followers. Such a trait would conform not only to the motivations of religious terrorists but also to terrorist “spoilers” – e.g., groups bent on disrupting or sabotaging negotiations or the peaceful settlement of ethnic conflicts.<sup>224</sup>

Although violence, targets, aims and motivations, the identification of terrorists, and organisational dynamics are common themes raised in definitions of terrorism, it is evident that most academics do not arrive at the same conclusions. This selective survey of existing definitions reveals the confusion surrounding analysis of the terrorist phenomenon. Since 1989, the search for a common definition unfortunately

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<sup>222</sup> 'Spectacular' attacks generally refer to acts of terrorism that are especially destructive or lethal.

<sup>223</sup> Hoffman (1999), pp. 27-28. Included among the attacks that were never claimed were the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system; the bombing of the Alfred Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma; and the series of Bombay car bombings that killed 317 people in 1993. For a more in-depth discussion of why terrorists are no longer claiming credit for their attacks, see Bruce Hoffman, “Why Terrorists Don't Claim Credit – An Editorial Comment,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Spring 1997).

<sup>224</sup> Hoffman (1999), p. 28.



has received little attention, and it appears as though academics and policy-makers have agreed to disagree. The inability to reach definitional consensus has been worsened as a result of changes occurring within terrorist organisations as a result of globalisation and the end of the Cold War.

Globalisation, for example, has directly altered the terrorist phenomenon in a number of ways,<sup>225</sup> the most evident being that through the speed and ease of transportation and communication systems terrorism has become an international phenomenon. Aside from giving terrorists the opportunity to conduct violent acts with ease in several different countries, terrorists have utilised the media as a way to broadcast their aims and heighten the feeling of terror produced. The international nature of terrorism and media coverage of incidents has also arguably resulted in a 'copy-cat' effect, wherein a wide-range of previously non-violent groups turn to the use of terrorist tactics to advance their own political goals. This has been the case in the United States where militias turned to the use of terrorism against the state – epitomised in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City which killed 168 people.<sup>226</sup>

One of the greatest dangers associated with the evolution of the nature of terrorism is that the term itself has become increasingly complex. As previously mentioned, acts ranging from murder and rape to armed robberies and hijackings are commonly included as part of the terrorist phenomenon – especially by the popular press. Not

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<sup>225</sup>This is not a new argument, Hoffman (1998) and Laqueur (1999), for example, discuss the impact of international changes on terrorism.

<sup>226</sup> Bruce Hoffman, "Change and Continuity in Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 24, no. 5 (2001), p. 427. The development of domestic terrorism in the United States is covered well in, James Motley, *U.S. Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism*, (Diane Publishing Company, 1993), and Robert Snow, *Terrorists Among Us: the Militia Threat*, (Perseus Books, 2002).

only has this weakened the ability of most states to deal with terrorist incidents, but the absence of a concrete understanding of what constitutes terrorism has placed society in general at the mercy of those who intentionally use the term to gain support for their own political ends. For example, prior to their second military campaign in Chechnya in 1999 Russian authorities regularly referred to the need to counter the emergence of destructive terrorist forces without being able to prove the existence of terrorist groups or connect alleged terrorist attacks on Russian soil with these groups.<sup>227</sup>

If the notion of terrorism is to be clarified, it must be approached with as few preconceptions as possible, and viewed with less emotion. As with murder, assassination and kidnapping, there should be no misunderstanding as to what constitutes terrorism - regardless of who the terrorists are, where they conduct their operations, and what motivates them. With the knowledge that, through the process of globalisation, terrorism in one state has repercussions in others, it is in the interest of the international community to have a clear understanding of the term. At the very least, a list of common characteristics that are essential for differentiating terrorism from other forms of criminality or warfare should be a priority for academics and policy makers. Thus based on the changing nature of the international system and international society, a working definition<sup>228</sup> of terrorism can be outlined. Terrorism,

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<sup>227</sup> More explicit examples of this will be presented in Chapter Four.

<sup>228</sup> The importance of outlining a working definition of terrorism cannot be underestimated. As Stern (2000), p.12 notes, definitions are essential for two reasons: they determine the data researchers collect and analyse, thus influencing our understanding of trends and predictions for the future; and, definitions influence how we respond to terrorism.



within the context of this thesis, explicitly refers to a phenomenon that includes the following five characteristics:<sup>229</sup>

- 1) Terrorism is the conduct of premeditated violent acts or the threat of violence that is perpetrated by members of an organised group.<sup>230</sup> As a result, an isolated incident caused by an individual is not referred to as terrorist.
- 2) Terrorism is designed to create fear among an adversary or specific segment of society.<sup>231</sup> Fear is the intended result of terrorism, not a by-product.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, terrorism is a tool of intimidation and/or coercion.
- 3) Terrorism is used to achieve a predetermined political objective, normally an attempt to influence political behaviour.<sup>233</sup>
- 4) Because terrorism is political in nature it is often discretionary, therefore terrorists will often choose their targets carefully.<sup>234</sup>
- 5) Although the ultimate goal of terrorism may be to destroy the group's opposition, terrorism is primarily concerned with breaking the will of its enemy and forcing it to submit to the group's demands.

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<sup>229</sup> As Cooper (2002), p.3 accurately notes in his discussion of the problems of terrorism definitions: "whatever the discrepancies detected by others, the definitions at least provide starting points for debate." Given the sheer volume of definitions of terrorism that abound in a variety of academic disciplines, this caveat should necessarily accompany any attempt to define terrorism.

<sup>230</sup> An organised group refers to two or more people who come together to plan and execute acts of violence. More specifically, terrorist organisations are normally hierarchical in nature and organised into cells. Not only does this ensure greater secrecy, but it also protects the identity of the leadership.

<sup>231</sup> This characteristic emerges from the arguments of the Copenhagen School and Post-Realism (explained in greater detail in Chapter Two) which assert that the state is not the only referent object with respect to security. Thus, as this point implies, referent objects can include specific individuals, social groups, the state itself, or components of international society.

<sup>232</sup> Based on this characteristic, although ordinary criminality (arson, murder, rape, etc.) may terrorise the direct victim, they may not be considered terrorist because fear is only a by-product of the criminal act itself.

<sup>233</sup> This characteristic highlights the importance placed on the element extracted from Subaltern Realism (explained in detail in Chapter Two) which asserts that the state remains an essential component of security despite the changing international environment. Although terrorism may be perpetrated against individuals, groups, the state or international society in general, most terrorist groups conduct their actions in order to influence the political behaviour of a specific state or group of states. It is therefore important to highlight the fact that the state continues to play an important role in understanding what terrorism encompasses.

<sup>234</sup> Although terrorist targets may appear to be randomly chosen by the victims of the attack, targets are normally carefully chosen depending on the message the terrorist group wants to send.

## **Organised Crime: the 'Godfather Syndrome'**

As with the concepts of 'security' and 'terrorism', outdated perceptions about the term 'organised crime' also persist. Understood in a traditional framework, organised crime is still largely viewed as groups of criminals motivated solely by the prospect of financial gain with the assumption that the implications of their actions are restricted to the state in which they operate. Defined as such, organised crime does not present an international security threat; nor does it present a threat to the sovereign state because it is not in its interest to replace the state or its functions. After providing an outline of the dominant understanding of organised crime, this section will assess the impacts of globalisation and the end of the Cold War have had on it, and argue that the evolving nature of organised crime can no longer be explained using traditional mindsets. Taking advantage of international changes, organised crime in the post-Cold War era poses a threat to security at every conceivable level: individual, state, and regional and to international society itself.<sup>235</sup> As with the previous section, the inadequacies of realism in contributing a direct explanation of the threat posed by organised crime will be simultaneously presented, where applicable.

A survey of early literature addresses organised crime reveals that it was largely understood from a classic criminology perspective.<sup>236</sup> As a result, developments in international society or the international system were not considered important enough to warrant a change in the way that organised crime was understood by

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<sup>235</sup>This aspect will be expanded in Chapter 2. The main purpose of this section is to question the traditional understanding of organised crime given the opportunities that have emerged for criminal enterprises from globalisation and the end of the Cold War.

<sup>236</sup> Classic criminology refers to an academic discipline that focuses on crime and criminality within the state, and specifically within communities. As a result of focusing on micro-levels of analysis, criminology generally defines crime as any action that defies the criminal code of the state in question.



governments and most academics who studied the subject.<sup>237</sup> Organised crime was, and largely remains, commonly viewed as one of a number of criminal deviances that occur at a local level. Historically, it is a concept that emerged in the United States on the eve of prohibition, coined by the Kefauver Commission on interstate criminal commerce. The definition of the term almost exclusively emphasised “the pursuit of illicit profits through a group activity.”<sup>238</sup> This focus on the economic dimension of organised crime persisted and was further emphasised when the United Nations adopted the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Despite international developments, the UN adopted a traditional definition of organised crime that is outlined in Article 2 of the convention as “a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crime or offences [...] in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”<sup>239</sup>

Most of the academic literature on organised crime appeared in the 1970s and largely emanated from North America and Italy. North American academic literature was mainly based on investigations into the mafia as it emerged and developed in the United States. As a consequence of these origins, organised crime was understood as a centralized, family based group that controlled specific illegal markets to gain financial profit.<sup>240</sup> This view, promoted by Abadinsky, argues that organised crime groups have ethnic consistency, further suggesting that organised crime is used as an

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<sup>237</sup>Emilio C. Viano, Global Organised Crime and International Security, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1999), p. 2.

<sup>238</sup>Fabio Armao, “A ‘Standard’ Crime: Why Mafia Win Success,” paper presented at the Workshop on Organised Crime and the Challenge to Democracy, EPCR 29<sup>th</sup> Joint Sessions Conference, Grenoble, France, 6-11 April 2001.

<sup>239</sup>United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, Article 2; this document can be accessed at: [http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime\\_cicp\\_convention.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/crime_cicp_convention.html) (February 2005).

<sup>240</sup>Maria Luisa Cesoni, “Mafia-Type Organizations: the Restoration of Rights as a Preventive Policy,” in Viano, *ibid.*, p. 158-9.

instrument of social advancement for underprivileged minorities.<sup>241</sup> Italian literature, on the other hand, was based on socio-economic models of the national mafia, wherein criminality was an indulgence of the powerful to be used as a business undertaking that was almost entrepreneurial in nature.<sup>242</sup>

The term 'mafia'<sup>243</sup> itself has been traced back to ninth century Sicily when it was under the rule of Arab invaders, and the mafia came to be known as a patriotic clandestine society that conducted guerrilla warfare from the hillside against foreign invaders. The 'mafia' remained a politically motivated secret society throughout the nineteenth century when its primary purpose was to offer justice and protection to the peasants of Italy<sup>244</sup> from wealthy absentee landlords. At this stage, primarily because of its political focus, the Sicilian mafia could be considered more terrorist than criminal in nature. However by the end of the century the mafia found it financially advantageous to work with the landowners, thus beginning a long relationship between mafia groups and the Italian bureaucracy.<sup>245</sup>

Despite considerable political experience with organised crime groups,<sup>246</sup> Italian academics viewed the mafia simply as a group of people organised around 'familial'

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<sup>241</sup> Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, (Chicago, Illinois: Nelson Hall, 1990).

<sup>242</sup> Joseph Albin, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, (New York: Appleton, 1971), p. 12.

<sup>243</sup> 'Mafia' is an Arabic word that translates to 'place of refuge', originally referring to the hillside refuges where oppressed Sicilian inhabitants fled to escape their Arab rulers. The same thing happened during the eleventh and fifteenth centuries when the Sicilians were faced with Norman and Spanish invaders, respectively. See Jay Rober Nash, World Encyclopedia of Organized Crime (London: Headline Book Publishing, 1995, 2nd edition), p. 476.

<sup>244</sup> This is true for the two oldest mafia groups in Italy, the Sicilians and the Calabrians.

<sup>245</sup> For accounts of the rise of the Sicilian mafia, see, A. Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village: 1860-1960, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private Protection, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996).

<sup>246</sup> The political nature of organised crime throughout its history in Italy will be discussed in Chapter Three.



syndicates in order to profit from illegal enterprise.<sup>247</sup> Organised crime, and more specifically the term 'mafia', referred to the methods or modus operandi of criminal endeavour with three components: the use of force, intimidation or threats; a hierarchical structure that was maintained through the use of secrecy; and the assurance of political protection from the legal structure to ensure continuity over time.<sup>248</sup> As a result the Italian penal code finally defined organised crime in 1982 as a group whose

members make use of intimidation derived from their association, and the ensuing subjection and 'gagging' in order to commit crimes or to manage either directly or indirectly, or otherwise control, business activities, concessions, authorizations, public markets or public services, or to obtain unfair profits or advantages for themselves or others.<sup>249</sup>

The American experience with organised crime, on the other hand, began in the late 1800s. Although the Italians did not form the first organised crime groups in the U.S., the extent of violence and activities perpetrated by Italian groups convinced the American government that organised crime was solely a problem brought to the United States from Italy. Thus the first official definition of organised crime was therefore based on the Italian model. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, included in the United States Federal Statutes, defines organised crime as "the unlawful activities of members of a highly organised, disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including but not limited to gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, labour racketeering, and other unlawful activities of members of such associations."<sup>250</sup> More advanced academic

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<sup>247</sup>David L. Carter, "International Organised Crime: emerging trends in entrepreneurial crime," in Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds. Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: a reader, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1997), p. 136.

<sup>248</sup>Albini (1971), p. 88.

<sup>249</sup>Cesoni (1999), pp. 160-1.

<sup>250</sup>Quoted in Sabrina Adamoli, Andrea diNicola, and Ernesto U. Savona, Organised Crime Around the World, (Helsinki: HEUNI, 1998), p. 4.

research into the organised crime phenomenon in the United States, however, did not emerge until the early 1970s when a group of scholars began to question the notion that organised crime was an entirely Italian enterprise. As a result academics including Joseph Albin, Francis Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni began to look at other ethnic criminal groups<sup>251</sup> in order to find common defining characteristics. On a general level, four essential characteristics can be extracted from their work: the use of violence; the use of corruption; continuity over time; and engagement in a variety of types of crimes.<sup>252</sup>

Given the rising interest in defining and understanding the notion of organised crime, especially within American academia, quite comprehensive definitions of organised crime eventually emerged. One of the definitions most commonly referred to within texts on organised crime originated in the works of criminologist Howard Abadinsky.

According to Abadinsky, all organised crime groups may be defined as:

A non-ideological enterprise that involves a number of persons in close social interaction, organized on a hierarchical basis for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities. Positions in the hierarchy and positions involving functional specialization may be assigned on the basis of kinship or friendship, or rationally assigned according to skill. Permanency is assumed by the members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in pursuit of goals. It eschews competition and strives for monopoly over particular activities on an industry or territorial basis. There is a willingness to use violence and/or bribery to achieve ends or maintain discipline. Membership is restricted, although non-members may be involved on a contingency basis."<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>251</sup>The organised crime groups primarily researched were Irish, American, Jewish, African, Colombian and Chinese.

<sup>252</sup>Compiled from Albin (1971) and Francis Ianni and Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni, A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime (New York: Russell Sage, 1972).

<sup>253</sup>Abadinsky (1990), p. 7.



Following along the lines of Abadinsky's definition, a survey of the work of a group of other academics<sup>254</sup> suggests that a more specific list of common characteristics of organised crime exists. First, as Abadinsky quickly points out, organised crime groups are non ideological. Second, because they are able to adapt in order to meet demands for their services, organised crime groups have continuity over time. Third, the adaptability of organised crime is facilitated by a social history of corruption and a significant control over given territory in which it can operate freely and profitably. Fourth, organised crime is at its most efficient when membership is restricted, commonly along ethnic ties. Finally, organised criminal groups are hierarchical in nature with a top command that is able to coordinate and implement a variety of tasks including the use of force, recruitment, control of profits, corruption of key government officials and civil society, and the enforcement of group loyalty.

Although the identification of the essential characteristics of an organised criminal group largely emerged from the United States based on the American experience with such groups, the common definitional characteristics discussed above were also relevant to organised crime as it exists elsewhere in the world. Thus similarities between the Colombian drug cartels, Japanese Yakuza, Chinese Triads, and other groups based in Nigeria, Turkey, and even Albania can be discerned.<sup>255</sup> What the

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<sup>254</sup>Anthony Maingot, "The Decentralization Imperative and Caribbean Criminal Enterprises," in Tom J. Farer, ed. Transnational Crime in the Americas: An Inter-American Dialogue Book, (New York: Routledge, 1999) p. 150. The references he uses to compile his list of characteristics are F. Hagan, "The Organized Crime Continuum: a further specification of a new conceptual model," Criminal Justice Review, no. 8 (1983): 52-58; M. Maltz, "On Defining Organized Crime," Crime and Delinquency, no. 22 (1976): 338-46; Dennis J. Kenny and James O. Fluckenaer, Organized Crime in America (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995); and Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia, (Harvard University Press, 1996).

<sup>255</sup> For some examples of similarities between traditional criminal groups, see, Gambetta, (1996), David Kaplan and Alec Dubro, Yakuza: the Explosive Account of Japan's Criminal Underworld, (London: Robert Hale Press, 2003), Robert Kelly, Encyclopaedia of Organized Crime in the United States: From Capone's Chicago to the New Urban Underworld, (New Haven, Connecticut: Greenwood

above definitions of organised crime have in common is that they regard organised crime as a domestic problem – one that emerges within a state, and conducts criminal actions within state borders. This understanding of organised crime, however, is outdated in light of the changes that have occurred in the world since 1989.

The growth of economies of production and the evolving financial infrastructure, the decline of the sovereign nation-state, immigration, border porosity, trends in technology, and the relative disorganisation of law enforcement in newly independent states have presented significant opportunities for 'old' and emerging criminal organisations alike.<sup>256</sup> And while the operational success of many groups was improved by taking advantage of at least one of these factors, those that took advantage of several changes in the international system experienced an unprecedented evolution. As will be seen from the discussion that follows, it can be concluded that the traditional understanding of organised crime no longer accurately describes organised crime in the early years of the twenty-first century. The threat posed by organised crime has escalated from that of local menace to security threat, posing a direct challenge to national and international security.

### *Economies of Production, The Financial Infrastructure & Global Markets*

The idea of economies of production<sup>257</sup> related to criminal organisations is not a new concept. For example, since the 1970s peasant farmers in Latin America have been growing drug crops for the drug cartels because they were more profitable than other agricultural commodities, and there was a stable demand for drug-crops as consumer

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Press, 2000), and Dian Murray and Qin Baoqi, *The Origins of the Tiandihui: the Chinese Triads in Legend and History*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).

<sup>256</sup> Ibid., pp. 28-30.

<sup>257</sup> This concept generally refers to the notion that people and corporations will choose to produce a commodity that is the most profitable.



demands rose. Economies of production, in the context of the international drug trade, have produced an extremely lucrative commodity sold on the black economy. Similar to the Latin American predicament, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the introduction of a market economy led to an unprecedented growth in the informal economy in the FSU. Although the informal economy existed throughout the Soviet era, by the early 1990s it had arguably become the cornerstone of the livelihood of communities in many post-Soviet states. This can partially be attributed to the growth of the global market for illicit narcotics during the 1990s,<sup>258</sup> resulting in increasing demands for raw materials used in drug production. For example, with the dissolution of the Soviet empire, the Central Asian republics experienced a rapid growth in the number of organised criminal groups operating within the region to gain a foothold in the expanding drug trade.<sup>259</sup> Given the dire economic situation within Central Asia, organised criminal groups easily persuaded local farmers to grow and cultivate drug-crops, or to act as drug 'mules'. The situation grew to such an extent that, in and around the city of Osh, Kyrgyzstan alone, tens of thousands of people became involved in the growing, processing and transportation of raw opium.<sup>260</sup> Although illicit narcotics provide the most obvious example of economies of production in relation to criminal markets, a list of other commodities are also relevant to this argument. For example, given the lucrative nature of the diamond trade in several African states, such as Angola and Sierra Leone, the illicit trade in diamonds (with the

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<sup>258</sup> For specific statistics illustrating rising global drug demand, see the United Nations Annual Drug Reports available at: <http://www.odccp.org>.

<sup>259</sup> The drug trade expanded in Central Asia because of increased cultivation and production originating from Afghanistan. By the mid-1990s Afghanistan was responsible for supplying over 80 per cent of global opium stocks. More information about the expansion of the Afghan market can be found in the various publications on Afghanistan released by the United Nations Drug Control Programme annually. These reports are available on <http://www.odccp.org>.

<sup>260</sup> Alexander Zelichenko, "Drug Situation in Central Asia," *The Times of Central Asia*, vol. 1, no. 11 (20 May 1999), p. 12.

illegal trade in timber) formed a cornerstone of the informal economy in these areas.<sup>261</sup>

Another important component of the global economy that has provided unprecedented opportunities for organised crime is its financial infrastructure. The emergence and development of a global financial system and offshore banking has provided opportunities for the transfer of legal and illegal funds in an environment that is extremely difficult for governments to control or track. Facilitated by improvements in communication, computer technology and transportation, the offshore banking world has become a "Bermuda Triangle".<sup>262</sup> In other words, because of sophisticated technology that has emerged relatively recently, criminal organisations are able to "set up a complex system of concealment by e-mail, fax, and phone from anywhere in the world. If a government is hot on the trail of a criminal's assets, skilled launderers can move it from one financial maze to another in seconds."<sup>263</sup> As a result of taking advantage of these technological advances and prevailing financial environment, organised crime has progressively posed an increasing threat to the sovereign state. The ability of criminal organisations to coordinate transnational operations directly challenges the ability of the sovereign state to control non-military security threats within its borders. This further highlights the need for realism to overcome its

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<sup>261</sup> Nicholas Shaxson, "Transparency in the International Diamond Trade," Global Corruption Report 2001, (Transparency International). For more information, refer to: Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds: Tracing the Deadly Path of the World's Most Precious Stones, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2002); Christian Dietrich, "Blood Diamonds: Effective African-Based Monopolies," African Security Review, vol. 10, no. 3 (2001); and, Assis Malaquias, "Diamonds are a Guerrilla's Best Friend: the impact of illicit wealth on insurgency strategy," Third World Quarterly, vol. 22, no. 3 (2001).

<sup>262</sup> Jack A. Blum, "Offshore Money," in Farer, (1999), p. 62.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.61-62. For a detailed account of the intricacies of the money-laundering process, see, Peter Lilley, Dirty Dealing: the untold truth about global money laundering, (London: Kogan Page Ltd., London, 2000).



predilection for an exclusive focus on the state as the only actor in security, and treat non-state actors equally in the security equation.

### *Immigration & Border Porosity*

In addition (and to some degree associated with) transformations in the global economy, immigration and the porosity of borders has also significantly altered the ways in which organised crime operates and is organised. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the reduction of regional barriers to trade and financing, the establishment of free trade zones and the lowering of passport controls throughout Europe and the former Soviet Union have all added to the opportunities seized upon by organised crime, and the challenges posed to the primacy of the nation-state in the realm of international politics.

Although, for example, Italian mafia groups and Chinese triads have taken advantage of immigrant communities in the United States throughout the twentieth century, increases in immigrants after the Cold War proved to be an important resource and an additional lucrative source of income for various other organised criminal groups. For example, Russian communities in North America and Israel have provided the foundation for Russian organised crime to extend their activities into these countries.<sup>264</sup> Border porosity, on the other hand, has essentially guaranteed the ease and speed of cross border travel, thus providing new market opportunities for criminals and making it easier for them to avoid arrest – especially given that their only adversaries are states that “still conduct most of their activities through

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<sup>264</sup>See Mark Galeotti, "Russia's criminals go global", and "Israel - Mafiya Promised Land", Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 2000).

functional and geographic bureaucratic hierarchies.”<sup>265</sup> This freedom of mobility has allowed Russian organised crime to enter markets in Europe and Asia and develop easy smuggling routes for contraband, thus strengthening their position as leading actors within the world of organised crime. The emerging nature of organised crime is therefore inherently free of state boundaries, “in that they trail their activities across several jurisdictions.”<sup>266</sup>

Similarly, Colombian drug cartels have also taken advantage of the opening of borders to find alternative ways to secure their drug production and trafficking operations and to expand the global cocaine market.<sup>267</sup> Since the early 1990s Colombian cartels began to penetrate their neighbours’ borders – namely Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru - to diversify their risks.<sup>268</sup> As a result, the entire region is finding itself faced with a similar threat; a threat that may emanate from one particular state, but necessarily affects the others as a result of its actions. Furthermore, Colombian cartels have also successfully taken advantage of the opening of borders in the European Union<sup>269</sup> and throughout the FSU to expand the global cocaine market. Historically cocaine has not been a common drug in Europe or the FSU, and demand is relatively low in comparison with the U.S., but there have been indications that Colombian attempts have met with success. This indicates that it would be a mistake

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<sup>265</sup> James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989).

<sup>266</sup> Jamieson (2001), p. 378.

<sup>267</sup> For an excellent overview of how the opening of borders, combined with the deregulation of the transportation and financial sectors have helped the illicit drug trade, see, Stephen E. Flynn, “The Global Drug Trade Versus the Nation State: Why the Thugs are Winning,” in Cusimano (2000), pp. 49-53.

<sup>268</sup> The impact of the movement of Colombian cartels is illustrated in the following articles: “Bolivia: War on Coca, Discredited Political System,” Geopolitical Drug Watch, no. 7 (April 2002), and “Peru: Disastrous Legacy,” Geopolitical Drug Watch, no. 2 (November 2001).

<sup>269</sup> “Spain: the New Route of Colombian Traffickers,” Geopolitical Drug Watch, no. 1, (July/August 2001). See also the United Nations World Drug Report, (Vienna: Office for Drugs and Crime Prevention, 2002).



to continue to believe “that the international system is the sum of its nation-states” because drugs and other illicit commodities are “trafficked by nonstate actors who find borders essentially meaningless.”<sup>270</sup> Furthermore the existence of state borders in light of an increasingly interconnected world creates numerous other opportunities for the expansion of crime by “generating variations in levels of taxations, ‘subsidisation’, and prohibition, by creating problems of legal jurisdiction, and by raising investigative costs.”<sup>271</sup>

### International Ungovernability

International ungovernability is probably the most important factor that has transformed the understanding of contemporary organised crime. Generally speaking this refers to the growing inability of states to govern, manage, and provide adequate or effective services to its citizens,<sup>272</sup> thus directly calling into question the relevance of the Westphalian state system in the twenty-first century. According to William Olson, there are twelve common features of the nature of ungovernability<sup>273</sup> that highlight the potential problems associated with such a crisis of governance. These include the declining ability of governments to build and maintain infrastructure (from social services to roads and railways); collapsing economies giving rise to informal and illegal economies; increasing government corruption; incompetent state institutions that can no longer protect individuals; bloated government sectors that

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<sup>270</sup> Flynn (2000), pp. 45-46.

<sup>271</sup> Monica Serrano, “Transnational Organised Crime and International Security: Business as Usual,” in Matts Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. Transnational Organised Crime and International Security, p. 16.

<sup>272</sup> Roy Godson and William J. Olson, “International Organized Crime,” Society, vol. 32, no. 2 (1995), p. 29.

<sup>273</sup> These features of ungovernability are not entirely new as nation-states throughout the past have experienced a crisis of governance based on a combination of these factors. However, since the fall of the Soviet Union, as opposed to the last century, the world has experienced a rising number of states faced with the inability to govern. Exacerbated by the fall of the Soviet Union, international ungovernability seems to be becoming the norm within Latin America, Africa, and the FSU.

absorb more resources but produce less service; rising levels of social violence; disappearance of the rule of law with a simultaneous rise in arbitrary government authority; the personalisation of politics wherein politics is not seen as a shared experience but as something used for personal gain; declining sense of shared values or purpose; growing risk of separatist, religious or ethnic identities; lack of willingness to compromise; and the decline of any credible means to mediate interparty disputes. As discussed above, ungovernability in this context is one factor responsible for the rise in the number of weak, failing and failed states in the international system.

The connection between the crisis of governance and the evolution and growth of organised crime can be highlighted, more specifically, within the context of the former Soviet Union (notably the Russian Federation), and Latin America; but also in Africa and South/Southeast Asia. For example, although the traditions and sources of criminal grievances in Russia were established and developed before the fall of the Soviet Union,<sup>274</sup> the collapse of the existing structures of authority and legitimacy provided a necessary opportunity for the emergence of Russian organised crime (ROC). For example, the rapid erosion of central authority - reducing the ability of the government to build and maintain the state's infrastructure - played an important role in opening the doors for ROC. Centrally controlled law enforcement deteriorated and the entire criminal justice system essentially collapsed, thus granting criminal

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<sup>274</sup>For more information on the historical arguments explaining the emergence of Russian organised crime see Joseph D. Serio and Vyacheslav Razinkin, "Thieves Professing the Code: The Traditional Role of Vory v Zakone in Russia's Criminal World and Adaptations to a New Social Reality," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 4, no. 1 (Summer 1995), Joseph Serio, "Organised Crime in the Soviet Union and Beyond," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 1, no. 2 (Autumn 1992), Mark Galeotti, "Organised Crime in Moscow and Russian National Security," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 1, no. 3 (Winter 1992), and Phil Williams, "Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?" Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 2, nos. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996).



organisations an ideal opportunity to take advantage of minimal border controls, inconsistent legal norms, and limited coordination among the justice systems of the successor states.<sup>275</sup>

Furthermore, the failure of Russia and the other Soviet successor states to provide a regulatory framework for the transition to and management of a new economic system resulted in the collapse of a number of domestic economies. The transition to a market economy and initial efforts at privatisation therefore invited criminal participation because criminal structures were the only ones with the capital required for investment. This allowed ROC to infiltrate and control key sectors of the national economies of the former Soviet republics. Thus aside from gaining a considerable foothold over the illicit economy, Russian organised crime has made considerable inroads in the legitimate economies of the FSU. Successes in illegal business conducted largely by Russian criminal groups led to growth in the Russian black economy by a factor of two between 1994 and 1996, whereas the formal economy decreased by ten per cent.<sup>276</sup> As will be argued in Chapter Four, the rise of ROC has directly threatened the survival of the Russian state on a number of fronts, including economic, social and political. More importantly at this point, the dynamics of ROC and other criminal organisations operating in the world has reduced the ability of realism – in its dominant form - to explain security in the prevailing international environment. Not only does the impact of organised crime cross the domestic-international divide of realist thought; but criminal organisations as nonstate actors pose a considerable threat to state security – which is no longer confined to the

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<sup>275</sup>Louise I. Shelley, "Transnational Organized Crime: An Imminent Threat to the Nation-State?", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 484.

<sup>276</sup>U.S. Agency for International Development, "Maintaining Country Progress in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States," Washington, D.C., September 1997, p. 30.

military sector, but also threatens the “identity, and by inference, the cohesion” of a society.<sup>277</sup>

It is evident that changes in international society and in the international system as discussed in this chapter have created a number of opportunities that organised criminal groups have taken advantage of, and which have challenged the utility of the realist paradigm. As David Carter notes, "Ironically, the same factors that promise greater human rights and a better quality of life for many in the world also bring increasing criminal activity and creative illegal initiatives from organised crime groups."<sup>278</sup> In spite of this new post-Cold War environment, few academics have endeavoured to adapt the traditional understanding of organised crime. Instead the term continues to be associated with “the Prohibition era in the United States and Mario Puzo’s *The Godfather*”, and thus “obscures the magnitude of what has become a critical challenge to democratic governance, to transition and modernisation processes in many parts of the world, and to national and international security.”<sup>279</sup>

Criminal organisations have essentially been left free to take advantage of globalisation and the uncertainty following the end of the Cold War to consolidate their activities worldwide. As Alison Jamieson argues, there have been three major changes to organised crime since the early 1990s: “it has become more transnationally organised, has de-regulated and de-localised.”<sup>280</sup> These changes have, for the most

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<sup>277</sup> Crelinsten (2002), p. 103.

<sup>278</sup> David L. Carter, “International Organized Crime: Emerging Trends in Entrepreneurial Crime” in Patrick J. Ryan and George E. Rush, eds. Understanding Global Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997), p. 138.

<sup>279</sup> Roy Godson and Phil Williams, “Strengthening Cooperation Against Organised Crime: A New Security Imperative,” in Cusiman (2000), p. 113.

<sup>280</sup> Alison Jamieson, “Transnational Organised Crime: A European Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24, no. 5 (2001), p. 378.



part, taken place in the context of the wider transformations occurring within the international system – however, the definitional *godfather syndrome* of organised crime still persists. In addition to the traditional characteristics of organised crime, it is essential that a number of other features be considered in order to understand how the evolving international environment has altered this phenomenon. Thus, generally speaking, for an organised crime group to be considered transnational,<sup>281</sup> it must: conduct major operations across national borders; violate the laws of more than one state; possess the ability to move large quantities of cash virtually freely world-wide; have developed strategic alliances with other major criminal groups to enhance their own operations; and be capable of penetrating governments and business internationally to protect and promote its transnational operations.<sup>282</sup>

Transnational organised crime (TOC) groups are thus more sophisticated than local organised crime groups. They also have more capital at their disposal, and they use whatever means are necessary (for example, violence, bribery or intimidation) to promote their activities in a world that has become increasingly open. Although organised crime is not new, its evolution through

the dispersion of technology, global mobility, expertise skills for hire, cheap and easily acquired weapons of mass lethality, and the vast illicit capital and financial resources of modern organised crime permit it to threaten, rival, and undermine the stability of nation-states, and to corrupt civil society in many parts of the world.<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>281</sup> This thesis will use the term ‘transnational organised crime’ instead of international organised crime, global crime, or multinational crime because it is a term that is most accurate in describing the phenomenon in question. The word ‘transnational’ correctly focuses on the fact that it is the nature of TOC to engage in organised illicit activity that crosses borders.

<sup>282</sup> These characteristics have been compiled from the works of the following authors: Alison Jamieson, Peter Lupsha, Louise Shelley, Emilio Viano, and Phil Williams.

<sup>283</sup> Peter Lupsha, “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation-State”, Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 23.

More specifically, the hierarchical pyramid-shaped structures once characteristic of organised crime have been replaced by “less visible criminal networks in which national identity is subordinate to function or skill” and which commonly outsource services (money-laundering, high-tech crime) to specialised agents.<sup>284</sup> Furthermore, as previously discussed, it has the necessary elements to undermine democratic institutions, to stand in the way of economic development, and to undermine interstate relations. In other words, TOC now poses a formidable security threat.

Despite this predicament, few governments or international organisations have attempted to account for the evolution of organised crime in their official definitions so that both traditional and transnational criminal groups are covered. To date, the most encompassing definition of organised crime emerged from the Expert Group on Organised Crime of the Council of Europe in 1997.<sup>285</sup> It is therefore this definition of organised crime – with one exception - that will be used as the working definition of TOC in this thesis. According to the European Commission, for a group to be considered an organised criminal group, it must fulfil four mandatory criteria, and at least two of seven optional criteria.<sup>286</sup> The mandatory criteria are that an organised criminal group must consist of a collaboration of at least three people that are gathered for a prolonged or indefinite period of time. Furthermore they must be suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences with the objective of pursuing profit and/or power. The optional criteria include: having a specific division

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<sup>284</sup>Jamieson (2001), p. 378.

<sup>285</sup> Although this definition will be used in this thesis, several weaknesses have been noted by Fabio Armao, (2001). He notes that most existing definitions of both organised crime and TOC “decontextualise organised crime from political and social reality” and thus are unable to fully comprehend the origins or development of the phenomenon itself; and they ignore the inherent differences among different types of organised crime, such as white collar crime and street gangs. As a result, it is inferred that organised crime can be political in nature. This line of reasoning will be expanded in Chapter Three.

<sup>286</sup>Adamoli et al (1998), p. 9.



of labour; using some form of internal discipline and control; exerting influence on the public and private sectors; using commercial or business-like structures; engaging in money-laundering; and operating on an international level. Although the Council of Europe include using violence or other means suitable for intimidation as an optional criteria, for the purposes of this thesis, the use of violence will be treated as a mandatory criteria of organised crime. Within the academic literature there exists disagreement as to whether or not violence should be included as a mandatory or optional criterion, however the arguments in favour of including violence appear to be the strongest. As Naylor, Maltz and Berdal and Serrano argue, it is precisely the reliance on corruption and the threat or use of force as a feature that “distinguishes organised crime from ‘ordinary criminality’.”<sup>287</sup>

Historically the presence of organised crime and its associated operations were difficult to uncover within communities and the nation-state. This difficulty has merely increased as a result of the evolution of organised crime into transnational crime. Regardless of where they operate, criminal organisations – like terrorist groups - are not necessarily immediately distinguishable from civilian populations. This is a cause for concern because the activities of organised crime undermine the political, economic, and societal security of states in ways that only become apparent when the process is well advanced.<sup>288</sup> These implications are best understood in the context of the international drug trade, as noted by Griffith in the following quote:

The international narcotics industry is, in fact, not an industry at all, but an empire. Sovereign, proud, expansionist, this Underground Empire, though frequently torn by internal struggle, never fails to

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<sup>287</sup> Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. Transnational Organised Crime and International Security, p. 19; Naylor, (1997), p. 33; and Maltz, (1976), p. 341.

<sup>288</sup> Roy Godson and Phil Williams, "Strengthening Cooperation Against Transnational Crime," Survival, vol. 40, no. 3 (Autumn 1998), p. 69. The case for considering transnational crime a security threat will be discussed later in this chapter.

present a solid front to the world at large. It has become [today] as ruthlessly acquisitive and exploitative as any nineteenth-century imperial kingdom, as far-reaching as the British Empire, as determinedly cohesive as the American republic. Aggressive and violent by nature, the Underground Empire maintains its own armies, diplomats, intelligence services, banks, merchant fleets, and airlines. It seeks to extend its dominance by any means, from clandestine subversion to open warfare.<sup>289</sup>

### **Conclusion: Terrorism, Organised Crime & Limitations of Traditional Concepts**

Changes since the 1990s have given rise to what Max Manwaring calls the 'grey area phenomenon'. Although this concept was adopted to refer to the changing nature of low intensity conflict, it has become synonymous with "threats to the stability of nation-states by non-state actors and non-governmental processes and organizations"<sup>290</sup> which involve "immense regions or urban areas where control has shifted from legitimate governments to new half political, half-criminal powers."<sup>291</sup> This notion exemplifies the evolving character of terrorism and organised crime, highlighting the propensity for terrorism and TOC to be bound together by "their willingness to pursue their goals by attacks on individuals, ethnic groups, or other states to frighten and coerce a large number of others to impose their particular beliefs."<sup>292</sup> Terrorism and organised crime therefore have the potential to become one of the most significant problems for international security in the new millennium, if they have not already done so.

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<sup>289</sup> James Mills, *The Underground Empire*, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1986), p. 3, as quoted in Ivelaw Griffith, "From Cold War Geopolitics to Post-Cold War Geonarcotics," *International Journal*, (Winter 1993-94), p. 5.

<sup>290</sup> Peter Lupsha, "Gray Area Phenomenon: New Threats and Policy Dilemmas," unpublished paper presented at the High Intensity Crime/Low Intensity Conflict Conference, Chicago, Illinois, September 27-30, 1993, pp. 22-23, as quoted in Edwin G. Corr, ed. "Introduction," *Gray Area Phenomenon: Confronting the New World Disorder* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1993), p. xii.

<sup>291</sup> Xavier Raufer, "Gray Areas: A New Security Threat," *Political Warfare*, (Spring 1992), as quoted in *ibid.*

<sup>292</sup> Scott B. MacDonald, "The New 'Bad Guys': Exploring the Parameters of the Violent New World," in *ibid.*, pp. 41-42.



As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, globalisation and the fall of the Soviet Union have introduced unprecedented changes to international society and the international system. Aside from affecting economic, political, and social relations within and between states, the notion of security as understood prior to 1991 by the realist tradition has been undermined. Once relegated to 'low politics' and largely examined within a domestic context, issues such as terrorism and TOC have evolved considerably as a result of the international environment in transition. Consequently, not only has the ability of the dominant literature on security, terrorism and organised crime been challenged, but it also appears as though these dominant views are unable to directly address the potential for these concepts to converge as depicted within the notion of grey area phenomenon. Having identified common characteristics that define terrorism and organised crime, these concepts can be placed in a framework of reference that provides guidelines that are necessary to evaluate the nature of twenty-first century violence. Furthermore, adopting and/or periodically reviewing what is understood by the use of the terms terrorism and organised crime supports the notion that issues change depending on space and time.<sup>293</sup> This allows for an evolving, and consistently coherent, understanding of phenomena that affect international security.

Considering the problems associated with the traditional ways of conceptualising security, terrorism and organised crime in a decade characterised by uncertainty and change, a 'new' framework for conceptualising security threats in the twenty-first century is needed to develop an understanding of the emerging security environment. Any reconstituted framework will need to account for factors that are now considered to be prevalent in the international environment, and thus have an impact on how

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<sup>293</sup>Thackrah (1989), "Terrorism: a Definitional Problem," p. 25.

security is explained and understood. Some of these factors include the blurring of boundaries between external and internal security, and the challenge posed to state sovereignty by nonstate actors. Focusing on these factors will either reinforce the limitations of realism in explaining threats emanating from non-state actors, or highlight the need to re-visit the main tenets of realism by adjusting key beliefs to account for non-state actors. Although realism may have had explanatory power during the Cold War period, it would be academically irresponsible merely to reinforce realism in a fundamentally different international environment. As Kolodziej notes:

Neither scientific inquiry nor human self-knowledge is promoted by blind commitment to a singular philosophical view, or to group-think canons that substitute assertion for reflection and discerning judgement in deciding what security is, what security problems are, and how they should be studied or resolved. ...

...Let the limits of the problem to be solved determine the scope and parameters of empirical and normative theory rather than impose a particular theory of politics and security that defines what has to be described, explained, and rationalised ... Critical to the task of the security scholar and practitioner is the challenge of defining those dimensions as inclusively as possible.<sup>294</sup>

It will therefore be the task of Chapter Two to present an alternative view of security that will help develop an understanding of the security threats specifically posed by terrorism and TOC as independent phenomenon, and as phenomena that are increasingly converging as a result of the national, regional and international environments in which they operate.

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<sup>294</sup>Kolodziej (1992), pp. 435-36.



## Chapter 2

### Reconceptualising Security: the promise of critical security studies

Based on the arguments presented in Chapter One it may be concluded that the traditional ways of looking at security are not sufficient to explain security threats in a post-Cold War, globalised world. As a result academics in International Relations have been rethinking and reassessing the nature of threats that dominate the contemporary security environment. The purpose of this chapter is thus to introduce a 'new' way of thinking about security. Elements from the current debate (the third debate<sup>1</sup>) about security in the field of International Relations will be isolated and used to argue that terrorism and organised crime are no longer solely domestic concerns but affect security on various levels of analysis, and across a number of sectors. The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section, concepts from recent theoretical debates in International Relations literature referred to collectively as 'critical security studies' and 'post-realism', will be used to assess 'new' security threats. In the second section, these concepts will be placed in the context of two emerging strands of thought that present globalisation and the concept of 'netwar' as proto-paradigms<sup>2</sup> that can be used to help clarify the nature of the post-Cold War security environment. Sections three and four will apply these conceptual elements to terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC) respectively. By applying criteria from these theories that attempt to explain and understand contemporary security and using them to reconceptualise these phenomena, the twenty-first century nature of terrorism and TOC as security threats can be illustrated. Finally the chapter will

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<sup>1</sup> Within the field of international relations, there are currently three commonly recognised theoretical debates: the first debate was between realism and idealism; the second was between realism and neo-realism; and the third is generally regarded as a debate between structuralists and post-structuralists.

<sup>2</sup> According to James H. Mittelman, "Globalization: An Ascendant Paradigm?", *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 3 (2002), a 'proto-paradigm' can be used to describe an intellectual line of thinking that has the potential to become a well 'worked-out framework'.

highlight the overall benefits of the ideas selected from critical security studies, which also enhance key applicable realist tenets highlighted in Chapter One and how they can be used to explain the convergence of security threats (i.e. as illustrated in the crime-terror continuum) presented in Chapter Three. The reformulated understanding of security presented in this chapter will constitute the analytical framework applied to the two case studies in Chapters Four and Five.

### **Critical Security and Post-Realism: understanding security in an evolving world**

Critical security studies (CSS) takes the individual as the true point of reference for security (human security). Although primacy is given to the individual, critical approaches do not necessarily deny the centrality of the state as the locus of obligation and effective political action. Instead, critical theory generally strives to understand more fully the dynamics, structures, possibilities and reorientation of the state.<sup>3</sup> Most critical security approaches believe it is necessary to rethink who must be secured, the agenda of threats, and the role of the state in the emerging security order.<sup>4</sup>

CSS encompasses a variety of branches that begin from similar assumptions about security, but diverge into several different methodologies and conclusions. With respect to establishing a general understanding of security most critical theories, including post-structuralism and post-realism, advocate similar basic claims. The most important in relation to this thesis are that security is not regarded as an objective condition; that disparities in material forces (such as the extent of a state's military or economic power) are not the only causes of insecurity; and that the object

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<sup>3</sup> Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. xvi.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xvii.



of security is neither stable nor unchanging.<sup>5</sup> Based on these claims, critical approaches tend to focus on how objects to be secured are constituted, and how particular issues are labelled security threats. These key questions are encompassed in the core CSS propositions about critical security.<sup>6</sup> CSS thought generally regards security as a socially constructed phenomenon that changes as a result of perceptions in specific times and places. This is drawn from the belief that knowledge about subjects, structures and practices of international politics is not objective because the world is constructed by observers and actors. As a result, research should concentrate on using interpretive methods that examine how actors understand the organisation of their social world; leading to the development of a contextual understanding and practical knowledge as opposed to predictive theory.<sup>7</sup>

Taking the above as the common assumptions of critical security studies, two distinct approaches that fall under the broad field of critical theory will be assessed in greater detail because of the relevance of their perspective on security to the concerns of this thesis. These approaches are the Copenhagen School, and what may broadly be referred to as Post-Realism. Each of these strands of thought will be treated as separate entities in order to uncover characteristics that will be used to build a conceptual framework for this thesis. This section will present the benefits of these approaches for explaining and understanding the prevailing dynamics of twenty-first century security - especially in relation to organised crime, terrorism and their

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<sup>5</sup> Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods," *Mershon International Studies Review*, vol. 40 (1996), p. 242.

<sup>6</sup> These propositions form a basic core of critical security. However, because critical security studies include a wide range of perspectives, it is possible that not *all* critical security theorists will agree with *all* the propositions.

<sup>7</sup> Krause & Williams (1996), p. 243.

convergence – and highlight the reasons why these schools of thought have greater explanatory potential than traditional realism.

### The Copenhagen School

Primarily associated with the 'widener' debate described in Chapter One, it may be argued that the Copenhagen School also falls under the category of critical security. This is largely because the Copenhagen School not only broadens the range of threats to be included within security, but also attempts to deepen the security agenda by including a number of levels of analysis and actors. The 'Copenhagen School' was given its name by Bill McSweeney,<sup>8</sup> who used the label to refer to the works on security produced collectively by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap deWilde at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. This group of academics began working on joint projects on security in an attempt to respond to the criticisms pitted against Buzan's People, States and Fear. The basic difference between the Copenhagen School and other 'wideners' is the former's distinction between state and society. The Copenhagen School contends that security must combine both state security (i.e., concerned with sovereignty) and societal security (i.e., concerned with identity).<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the Copenhagen School also differs from traditionalists and earlier 'wideners' in that they argue that security is not only about war and the use of force. On the contrary, in the view of Copenhagen School theorists, issues which are not directly related to war and the use of force can nevertheless be considered security threats.

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<sup>8</sup> Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," Review of International Studies, vol. 22 (1996).

<sup>9</sup> Krause and Williams (1996), p. 243.



The Copenhagen School seeks to go beyond merely broadening the issues included within security by exploring the logic of security itself, to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitisation from the politicisation of a security threat.<sup>10</sup> Securitisation refers to the instance when an issue is presented as an existential threat that requires emergency measures, thus justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. It answers the questions when, why and how elites label issues and developments as security problems. Politicisation, on the other hand, refers to the process through which issues become part of public policy, and thus require government decision and resource allocation. Copenhagen School theorists therefore define security as a 'speech act' that gains its content through discourse and political constellations. Thus in order for an issue to become a security threat, it must go through a distinct process, beginning with gaining recognition as an existential threat.<sup>11</sup> The issue must also be granted emergency action by the authorities, and to become ultimately securitised, the audience must accept it as such.<sup>12</sup> Although the Copenhagen School accepts that security is a subjective concept (i.e. it is determined by actors), they go one step further by stating that security is intersubjective and socially constructed. They arrive at this conclusion by asking the following questions:

Does a referent object hold general legitimacy as something that *should* survive, which entails that actors can make reference to it, point to something as a threat, *and* thereby get others to follow or at least tolerate actions not otherwise legitimate? This quality is not held in subjective and isolated minds; it is a social quality, a part of a discursive, socially constructed, intersubjective realm.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Barry Buzan, "Rethinking Security After the Cold War," Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 32, no. 1 (March 1997).

<sup>11</sup> According to the Copenhagen School, an existential threat refers to something that threatens the 'definition of what constitutes' a group as a collectivity (or a state as a state) and is therefore warranted emergency action. As Buzan et al write, "If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)." Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap deWilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 24.

<sup>12</sup> Buzan et al. (1998), pp. 23-27.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Buzan et al further believe that the most important question security studies needs to ask is whether or not an issue *should* be securitised. Because they regard security as a socially constructed concept, the Copenhagen School raises questions about the relationship between actors and analysts in defining and understanding security, and placing responsibility on them for ultimately framing something as a security issue.<sup>14</sup> In addition to offering a relatively new way of looking at security, two specific points raised by the Copenhagen School particularly help explain the contemporary nature of security. One is their rather sophisticated multisectoral approach to security. The other is the continuing importance they assign to the state.

As Buzan did in his book People, States and Fear, the Copenhagen School also list and define five security sectors: military; environmental; economic; societal; and political. Unlike Buzan, however, the Copenhagen School makes a greater effort to include non-state actors within these sectors, thus eliminating much (but not all) of the state-centrism in Buzan's earlier work and in the realist paradigm. These sectors, although treated independently, are interrelated parts of complex wholes. Therefore in order to understand them, their relationship to each other needs to be understood.. By utilising five security sectors and accounting for the increasing role of non-state actors, the Copenhagen School overcomes one of the major pitfalls of realist attempts to explain contemporary security: it acknowledges that a military threat posed by an exogenous state is not the only way in which security can be threatened. Unfortunately the Copenhagen School does not give each sector equal weight at any given time. According to Buzan et al the societal sector has increasing significance in the post-Cold War world because they believe that identity claims and disputes (i.e.

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<sup>14</sup> Buzan (1997), p. 15.



akin to the Balkan conflict) are likely to flourish. Furthermore, the Copenhagen School has been inefficient in the way they have arrived at their five security sectors. The environmental and economic sectors are fairly inclusive and comprehensive; however there is considerable overlap between the military, political and societal sectors. With a focus on security issues that emerge from migration, horizontal and vertical competition and depopulation, the societal sector fits more appropriately under military security as defined by the Copenhagen School. Finally, the political sector can easily become more focused by eliminating the overlap with the military sector. Although some overlap between these sectors may be unavoidable, if the reason for separating them in the first place is to make analysis more accurate, then the individual sectors should be as comprehensive as possible. Although the five sectors are underdeveloped, the multisectoral approach itself is important in understanding the security threats presented in this thesis. For organisational and explanatory purposes, each of these five sectors will be dealt with independently, but where applicable the relationship between sectors will be highlighted.

According to the Copenhagen School, and echoing realism, the military security agenda essentially deals with the ability of states to maintain their territorial integrity against internal<sup>15</sup> and external<sup>16</sup> military threats. However, unlike realism, the Copenhagen School also acknowledges the ability of states to secure themselves against non-military threats such as rival ideologies, and ultimately threats such as TOC and terrorism. Furthermore, whereas traditionally only the state served as a

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<sup>15</sup> Internal threats are primarily concerned with the ability of the ruling elite to maintain civil peace, territorial integrity, and the machinery of the government when challenged by citizens taking the form of revolutionary movements, militant separatists, and terrorist or criminal organisations. Buzan et al (1998), p. 50.

<sup>16</sup> External threats to military security include the interplay between actual armed offensive and defensive capabilities of the state and the perception of capabilities and intentions between the two states. Ibid., p. 51.

referent object for military security, recognising the existence of tensions between the state and civil society in many areas of the world, the Copenhagen School has incorporated additional referent objects. With reference to this specific sector, referent objects can be divided into four loosely grouped categories: non-state referent objects (i.e. groups seeking statehood); prestate referent objects (i.e. tribes/clans characteristic of the Caucasus/Central Asia and Africa); abstract referent objects (i.e. balance of power, international society, weapons nonproliferation and international law); and 'other' referent objects (religion, revolutionaries, militias and criminal organisations).<sup>17</sup> Despite the range of actors that have the potential to influence the dynamics of the military sector, the logic of threats and vulnerabilities is limited to the interplay between the military capabilities of any two actors (i.e. state and non-state alike), and the degree of amity and enmity - which Buzan et al define as the outcomes of the (de)securitisation process.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, the establishment and maintenance of military security is dependent not only on military strength, technology and strategy, but also on traditional factors including geography, history, and political relations.

Although it has been increasingly argued that in the post-Cold War era<sup>19</sup> military security is not a leading international concern (i.e. because there is no longer a threat of nuclear confrontation between superpowers), the Copenhagen School recognises that military security has merely shifted from the global-national level to the regional and local levels. For example, in many of the newly independent regions of the FSU, conventional weapons still pose a significant danger and thus fuel the potential for

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 52-55.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 58. According to Buzan et al., "Once the process of securitisation has locked into enmity as the framework of relations, threats and vulnerabilities will be perceived primarily in terms of the military capabilities of possible aggressors."

<sup>19</sup> This argument largely developed from the literature on Democratic Peace Theory. For an overview of these arguments see Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).



conflicts to emerge and escalate, as has been the case in Chechnya and Tajikistan. A similar situation exists in Africa, where the proliferation of conventional weapons is often considered a major factor for the escalation of tensions into violence. In these areas the danger is not necessarily one of external military intervention, but of the international community ignoring events that may eventually disrupt the regional and international system by “creating holes in the fabric of international society”.<sup>20</sup> This has already occurred in Central Asia as a result of the instability in Afghanistan from the drugs trade and widespread militancy.<sup>21</sup> As criminal organisations in Central Asia have increasingly turned to narcotics trafficking as a source of profit, they have created regional instability in order to ensure that smuggling routes from Afghanistan are protected. In 1999 and 2000, two significantly large incursions occurred on the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan during which trafficking groups engaged in armed battles with regional border posts in order to distract authorities as large shipments of narcotics were escorted over the border.<sup>22</sup>

The relationship between environmental sector and security, on the other hand, is less obvious. Different scholars<sup>23</sup> have presented environmental security as ranging from a political and military issue to an issue of social welfare. Considering the wide range

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<sup>20</sup> Buzan et al (1998), p. 70.

<sup>21</sup> In spite of the belief that the U.S. led ‘war on terrorism’ would create regional stability by eliminating the Taliban and installing a democratic government, Central Asia is still faced with the continued prospect of instability because of the continued operations of the regional drug trade, and growing indications of a radical Islamic backlash against countries seen as being overly cooperative with Washington.

<sup>22</sup> See Svante Cornell and Regine Spector, “Central Asia: More than Islamic Radicals,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 1 (Winter 2002).

<sup>23</sup> For a survey of the prevalent views on environmental security see the following references: Jessica Blitt and Thomas Homer-Dixon, eds. Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population and Security (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998); Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” Millennium, vol. 19, no. 3 (1990), pp. 461-476; P.H. Gleick, “Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security,” International Security, vol. 18 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Stephan Libiszewski, “What is Environmental Security?”, ENCOP Occasional Paper No. 6, Centre for Security Studies and Conflict Research, ETH Zurich/Swiss Peace Foundation, 1992; Norman Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability, (London: Island Press, 1995).

of actors attempting to securitise the environment (including social movements, government departments, and international organisations) Buzan et al explain the environmental sector as one that consists of two overlapping agendas: the scientific and the political. The scientific agenda is largely used as evidence to legitimise securitisation moves; the political agenda, on the other hand, is concerned with three areas. First, it seeks to increase state and public awareness of environmental issues on the scientific agenda; second, it attempts to promote the acceptance of political responsibility for dealing with these issues; and third, it attempts to answer political management questions (including problems associated with international co-operation, free riders, and enforcement).<sup>24</sup> Within these areas of concern, the environmental agenda addresses a host of issues including energy problems (such as the depletion of natural resources and pollution), population problems (for example, politically and socially uncontrollable migration), civil strife caused by war-related environmental damage and violence related to environmental degradation.<sup>25</sup> Referent objects in the environmental sector include the environment itself and/or the nexus between civilisation and the environment (i.e. the risk of losing achieved levels of civilisation as a result of environmental degradation). Buzan et al conclude that only threats from the relationship between human activity and the ecosystem has a logical connection with security, including, for example, greenhouse gas emissions and environmental exploitation that disturbs the economic base and social fabric of society.<sup>26</sup> Based on this argument, terrorist groups could threaten the environment through the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, while criminal organisations could threaten environmental security through activities including

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>25</sup> See Ibid., pp. 74-75 for a more comprehensive list of what is included in the environmental sector of the Copenhagen School.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 80.



illegally dumping waste, trafficking in nuclear materials and exploiting natural resources. Because environmental security largely emerges as a result of the struggle between human power and the “dynamics of its own culture - a civilisational issue that expresses itself mainly in economic and demographic dimensions and that potentially affects the degrees of order in the international system and its subsystems”,<sup>27</sup> the Copenhagen School asserts that the key to understanding this sector is in the notion that it is within human power to break the connection between environment and security.

As with the environmental sector, the economic sector is controversial and highly politicised.<sup>28</sup> For the Copenhagen School, the liberal agenda dominates the economic sector. Thus in seeking the consolidation of a global economy, the primary question that emerges is how the widening gap between the rich and poor can be handled, while simultaneously removing many state powers and functions.<sup>29</sup> In an attempt to address this question, the agenda of the economic sector concentrates on several issues<sup>30</sup> including fears that a strengthening global economy will empower criminal organisations, fears that trade in certain types of military technology will proliferate, and fears that the spread of industrialisation and mass consumption will place further pressures on the global environment. With the opening of the Russian economic market immediately following the fall of Communism, for example, criminal organisations were among the only entities in Russia that could afford to purchase the state corporations which were being privatised. As a result, it may be concluded that

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> According to the Copenhagen School, this controversy largely arises from the fact that in a capitalist system, the actors in a market are supposed to feel insecure so that the market produces its efficiencies. Ibid., p. 95.

<sup>29</sup> Buzan et al (1998), pp. 96-97.

<sup>30</sup> For a discussion of all the issues that have been termed in conjunction with economic security, see Ibid., p. 98.

Western pressures for Russia to quickly integrate into the international market actually helped Russian organised crime (ROC) gain control of several lucrative economic sectors within the Russian Federation, such as the aluminium and banking industries.

The idea of economic security, as presented by Buzan et al, also incorporates a vast number of referent objects, including the state, (groups of) individuals, and the global market itself. Although the Copenhagen School admits that it is difficult to make an argument for economic security in relation to individuals and firms, they do acknowledge that there are specific scenarios in which these actors can be referent objects. For example, if a particular firm is the economic cornerstone of a community, its demise would have an immediate effect on the economic security of the community and individuals in that community. Furthermore, a specific firm could be considered a referent object if its collapse directly affects the stability of the national and/or the international economy (for example, large manufacturing firms or banks).<sup>31</sup>

Economic sector security threats also illustrate the inter-relationship between levels of analysis. For example, the trend towards global financial liberalisation can undermine the welfare state, attack national currencies, and force the deregulation of interest rates and fiscal policy, thus severely damaging the domestic economy in question. These consequences can, in turn, affect security at a local level by threatening the provision of basic human needs or the survival of the state.<sup>32</sup> The rise of ROC and FARC – as depicted in Chapters Four and Five - provide excellent illustrations of the ways in which non-state actors can impede national economic policy by claiming control over leading domestic economic sectors. This power over the economic

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<sup>31</sup> For a more comprehensive discussion, see *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.



resources of the state then threatens the survival of the state and the welfare of its citizens. Based on this understanding of economic security, the Copenhagen School further asserts that

economic activity fairly easily triggers survival issues in all of the other sectors - sometimes on the basis of economic failures (e.g. negative development and the rise of black economies) and sometimes on the basis of economic successes (e.g. cultural homogenisation, loss of autonomy in military production, pollution, the gutting of state functions). This overspill quality means that much of what is talked about as “economic security” has in fact to do with logics of survival in other sectors.<sup>33</sup>

In most instances, the sector threatened by economic instability is the societal sector. Although the societal sector has received the greatest attention by the Copenhagen School, it will be treated as equal to the other four security sectors in this thesis. Buzan et al argue that, in the context of international security analysis, the key to society is “those ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity [...] individuals identifying themselves as members of a community.”<sup>34</sup> According to this, many forms of organised crime and terrorism as discussed in Chapter One directly pose a threat to the security of specific groups, in addition to the security of nation-states. The strength of incorporating the societal sector in an understanding of security lies in the fact that it draws attention to emerging security threats before they pose a direct threat to the state. Although TOC and terrorism may ultimately pose a direct threat to the security of the state, the potential threat they pose is initially revealed at a lower level of analysis (i.e. individual or community).

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 116.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 119.

Threats to societal security can be grouped into two general categories: migration, and rival identities. Large-scale migration potentially threatens the home identity due to a shift in population composition, such as that caused by refugee movements. Rival identities occur through horizontal and vertical competition. On the one hand, horizontal competition refers to the penetration of “values and practices from an outside culture [that] can distort or even destroy an indigenous culture.”<sup>35</sup> This situation occurred in Afghanistan with the penetration of the Taliban – a group that imported a foreign system of beliefs that threatened the social and cultural make-up of the nation. Vertical competition, on the other hand, refers to integration or disintegration projects that “threaten to submerge or fragment existing identities.”<sup>36</sup> For example, the rise of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone threatened and fragmented targeted sections of the local population in an attempt to gain widespread territorial control. Referent objects potentially threatened by horizontal and vertical competition include tribes, clans, nations, ethnic minorities, civilisations, religions and race. Thus, for example, given that organised crime in some regions of the former Soviet Union (such as Central Asia and the Caucasus) have emerged along clan lines, violent rivalries between criminal organisations could represent a threat to the existence of other clans.

The final sector the Copenhagen School includes in their approach to security is the political, which generally refers to the ability of specific actors to ensure the stability of their social order. From the onset it should be noted that this sector is the widest sector in that it may be argued that all security is political - securitisation for Buzan et

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<sup>35</sup> Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Liberalism and Security: The contradictions of the liberal Leviathan, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, Working Paper No.23 (1998), p. 22.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid.



al, after all, is a political act. However, this sector can be isolated to specifically deal with threats to the legitimacy or recognition of political units (including the loss of the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of violence), or the essential patterns among political units (such as structures, processes and institutions).<sup>37</sup> The threats posed by terrorism and organised crime are especially relevant to the political sector because of the impact their activities have on the political realm. For example, both phenomena directly threaten the legitimacy of states and political institutions – this is evident in the use of political corruption by criminal groups. Terrorism and organised crime can also challenge the ability of the state to maintain a monopoly over the use of legitimate violence; as illustrated by terrorist groups who attain control over parcels of territory. Furthermore, the political sector is threatened when an adversarial non-state actor threatens the processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation. This is often the case when governments engaged in counter-terrorism circumvent the human rights of all citizens in the name of eradicating terrorists.

Although the main referent object of the political sector is the state – as argued by realism – the Copenhagen School admits that other political organisations can also act as referent objects. Emerging quasi-suprastates like the European Union would qualify; some self-organised, stateless societal groups such as clans, tribes and minorities can serve as referent objects if they have strong political institutions; and transnational movements that are able to mobilise a strong following, such as religious and ideological movements, can also serve as referent objects.<sup>38</sup> In addition to these actors, political security also includes a host of systemic referent objects that include institutions, structures and processes in the international system. The

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<sup>37</sup>Buzan et al (1998), p. 142.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., pp. 145-146.

Copenhagen School refer, for example, to sovereignty, human rights, self-determination and racial equality as principles that warrant action in their defence.<sup>39</sup>

Despite treating the military, environmental, economic, societal and political sectors as distinct entities, it is evident that all five sectors can be linked in a variety of different ways. As Buzan et al themselves highlight, a key advantage of this sectoral approach to security is that it does not completely discount traditional security studies but “maintains interoperability between the old and new approaches, enabling the latter to incorporate smoothly the insights of the former.”<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, this approach is considerably more inclusive than traditional approaches, not only because it allows for a wide variety of issues to be carefully considered as security threats, but because it creates room for the role of non-state actors in the security process. The Copenhagen School therefore contributes to an understanding of the contemporary security environment primarily because of this sectoral approach to security, and because it considers the interplay between the individual, state and international.<sup>41</sup> In breaking down the concept of security into sectors, a more in-depth study of terrorism and organised crime can be achieved in order to illustrate why these evolving phenomena constitute threats to security in the twenty-first century. However because looking at individual sectors is not enough, the Copenhagen School also highlights the importance of cross-sectoral analysis. As Buzan et al note,

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 147-149.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 196.

<sup>41</sup> It is not my intention to suggest that the Copenhagen School is able to perfectly deal with the notion of security in the post-Cold War world, on the contrary, the purpose of this section was to highlight the benefits of using their mutlisectoral approach to security. It is therefore important to note that many criticisms can be made of this school of thought. For a preliminary overview of such criticism see McSweeney (1996), “Identity and Security...”, and Michael C. Williams, “Modernity, identity and security: a comment on the ‘Copenhagen controversy’”, Review of International Studies, vol. 24, no. 3 (July 1998), pp. 435-439.



Disaggregating security into sectors has been helpful in distilling distinctive patterns of vulnerabilities and threats, differences regarding referent objects and actors, and different relationships to territorializing and deterritorializing trends in the system. The number of cross-linkages, however, stands as a massive warning against treating the sectors as closed systems.<sup>42</sup>

Thus, in linking the sectors together, the multisectoral approach advocated by the Copenhagen School also illustrates the extent to which post-Cold War security issues threaten all realms of society.

### Post-Realism

In response to the continuing primacy of the realist paradigm, largely in the policy arena, any reconsideration of international security needs to come to terms with realism. More specifically, it needs to come to terms with the way that realism produces and limits knowledge of foreign affairs, how it describes and structures political practice, and how it needs to be adapted to meet the changes in international politics and security.<sup>43</sup> As such most individual academics regarded as post-realists maintain some realist assumptions (such as the primacy of the state and the idea of international anarchy) while attempting to make realism more applicable to the contemporary era. Two distinct forms of post-realism will be considered in this section: Utopian Realism, and Subaltern Realism. Both of these approaches have the potential to provide insights into the contemporary nature of security, specifically its ability to account for evolving issues such as terrorism and organised crime.

Utopian Realism is a relatively new, and thus underdeveloped, strand of thought within the study of International Relations that has its origins in the work of Ken

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<sup>42</sup> Buzan et al (1998), p. 167.

<sup>43</sup> Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman (eds), Post-Realism: the rhetorical turn in international relations, (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1996), p. 3.

Booth. The premise behind Utopian Realism is to contribute to the development of a more comprehensive framework for international security in response to changes<sup>44</sup> that have slowly taken place throughout the world since 1989, and in response to the diffusion of threats.<sup>45</sup> Utopian Realism incorporates the World Society School, alternative security thinking, classical international relations, critical theory, peace research, strategic studies and neorealism,<sup>46</sup> as a means of moving beyond the limits of realism by offering a more thorough understanding of the forces that shape who gets what, when and how.<sup>47</sup> Booth argues that humans are the ultimate referent objects, but at the same time he does not ignore the importance of the state as an influential conduit in the distribution of social, political and economic goods and as the primary actor responsible for regulating the lives of its citizens.<sup>48</sup> This point is one of the strongest components of Booth's Utopian Realism because it acknowledges that the state has certain functions that "are rarely performed by other organisations", such as being:

- the major collective unit processing notions of *threat*;
- the mantle that cloaks the exercise of elite power;
- the organisational expression that gives shape to communal 'identity' and 'culture';
- the chief agglomeration of competence to deal with issue areas out of jurisdictional boundaries;

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<sup>44</sup> These changes include the growth of complex interdependence, the erosion of sovereignty, advances in communications, the declining utility of force, degradation of nature, population growth, the growth of the global world economy, the dissemination of world weaponry, growing scope of non-state actors and the growth of more local and global identities. See Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," *Review of International Security Studies*, vol. 17 (1991), p. 315.

<sup>45</sup> In describing threats, the following quote provided by Booth illustrates the fact that he is determined to build a theoretical framework within which many 'new' but pressing issues can be included. "...threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations across the world derive primarily not from a neighbour's army but from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political oppression, scarcity, overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease." See Booth (1991), p. 318.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>47</sup> Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Realism in Theory and Practice," *International Affairs*, vol. 67, no. 3 (1991), p. 534.

<sup>48</sup> Ken Booth, ed. *Statecraft and Security: the Cold War and Beyond*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 340.



- the manager of territory/geographical space – including functioning as the ‘receptacle’ for income; and
- the legitimiser of authorised *action* and *possession*.<sup>49</sup>

Precisely because the state remains the only institution believed to be capable of performing the above functions, non-state actors threaten the state in part because they want to gain control over these functions themselves. As Holsti rightly argues, although internal conflict is the most important type of conflict in the post-Cold War era, wars are still about the control of the state apparatus and territory.<sup>50</sup> This may partially explain why a non-state actor which successfully gains control over parcels of territory, such as the FARC, can be considered a ‘state within a state’.

The guiding principle of security, however, should not be to increase the power of one's own state, because the inherent danger of focusing on the state, as revealed in the realist tradition, is that the state is falsely treated as “an actor with humanoid qualities.”<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, Booth's perspective on the role of the state improves on realist thought because it does not build the “illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through.”<sup>52</sup> Instead Booth asserts that states need to begin acting, as Hedley Bull writes, as “local agents in the world common good.”<sup>53</sup> Booth thus avoids one of the inherent problems of realism by overcoming the assumption that security can only be defined in terms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity without including people.

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<sup>49</sup> Olav F. Knudsen, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritising Securitisation,” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 32, no. 3 (September 2001), p. 363.

<sup>50</sup> Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>51</sup> Knudsen (2001), p. 364.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Booth (1991), “Security in Anarchy...”, p. 539.

Aside from the notion that the state remains an integral actor in international politics, but that it necessarily acts among a host of other referent objects such as international law and diplomacy, the assertion made by Utopian Realism that “[T]he personal, the political, and the international are a seamless web”<sup>54</sup> also provides insight into the nature of contemporary security, especially with respect to the post-Cold War understanding of terrorism and TOC. Thus regardless of whether these phenomena initially appear to be local, national, international or global in scope, their actions regularly have an effect on the levels of analysis just above and below their immediate target. For example, although the activities of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) in Sierra Leone sought to replace what was considered to be a defunct and corrupt government, RUF rebels often collaborated with government forces to coordinate “movements to rob civilians, transfer of arms from one side to the other, the avoidance of pitched battles”, and both sides have “exploited diamond resources and cash crops at the expense of the civilians” and at the expense of the establishment of a peaceful political order.<sup>55</sup> Regardless of the violent and exploitative activities of the RUF, the moral authority of the state and international community was ultimately threatened because the former was complicit in RUF activities, whereas the latter remained silent.

Finally, the way in which Booth uses the term ‘utopia’ in defining his theoretical approach to international relations gives legitimacy to the development of policy prescriptions used to counter security threats. Booth does not use this term in an absolutist sense as good but unachievable in society, but defines ‘utopia’ as something

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<sup>54</sup> Ken Booth, "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist," in Krause and Williams (1997), *Critical Security Studies*, p. 83.

<sup>55</sup> David Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," in Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 36-37.



that represents the idea that the world does not have to look like the one we are familiar with, instead it can be used as the basis for a critical re-evaluation of what is believed to exist (reality) while allowing us to envision a better way of being and living.<sup>56</sup> Although Booth uses the term 'utopia' he does not set high standards for what to expect in the near future, instead he argues for the necessity of establishing minor reformist steps that will slowly produce the likelihood of a better future.<sup>57</sup> This relatively basic point forms the foundation of any policy framework that is developed to counter security threats, such as terrorism and organised crime, which are deeply entrenched within societies such as those within the FSU and Latin America. Commenting on the Italian mafia, a comment by judge Giovanni Falcone may also be used in the context of the FSU, and Latin America:

No one will understand that we are facing a phenomenon so serious, so deeply rooted in the social fabric of our society and so much part of the system that it is impossible to expect tranquillizing answers within a short period. That should be our starting point.<sup>58</sup>

Booth's Utopian Realism presents a relatively open approach to security that can absorb, and thus deal with, a range of threats. The fact that it stresses the interrelated nature of the three units of analysis provides an excellent platform from which to specifically explain the threats posed by TOC and terrorism – something the realist paradigm is unable to do.

As with Utopian Realism, Subaltern Realism was developed by an individual: Mohammed Ayoub. The primary motivation for reformulating realism, according to Ayoub, was because it did not explain issues of conflict as they exist in the Third

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<sup>56</sup> Booth (1991), "Security in Anarchy...", pp. 534-536.

<sup>57</sup> As far as Booth is concerned this can be done through the gradual improvement of human rights, the attempt to spread economic justice, and by trying to reduce the risk of war and conflict every year.

<sup>58</sup> Alison Jamieson, 'The Modern Mafia: its role and record,' quoted in Alison Jamieson, ed. Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in the 1990s (Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd., 1994), p. 66.

World. Ayoob argues that traditional theories of international relations are weak on at least three accounts. First, they cannot explain the fact that two of the major military powers today (Russia and China) share characteristics of "prototypical" Third World countries, "especially in the political arena where their state boundaries, state institutions, and governing regimes are under challenge to significant degrees."<sup>59</sup> With their distorted economies, these countries are vulnerable to internal disruption, and potentially to chaos, as has been the case throughout much of the Third World. This is evident in Latin America with the rise and evolution of the FARC regardless of the shape of the government in Bogota or Washington, and regardless of their various coordinated attempts to disrupt FARC's control over Colombian territory and over the production and distribution of cocaine. A similar situation also emerged in the Russian Federation where Moscow has attempted to assert its influence over Chechnya, allegedly to bring order to a region where terrorism and organised crime has run rampant. Second, given the consequences of globalisation, including border porosity and increasing economic interdependence, the industrialised democratic countries can no longer guarantee their ability to "insulate themselves against Third World conflict and disorder",<sup>60</sup> or conflict and disorder in newly independent states. Given the control that ROC holds over Russian society, for example, the United States was unable to protect itself from the economic threat caused by a leading Russian criminal group in 1999 when it used the Bank of New York to launder billions of dollars.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, "Subaltern Realism: International Relations Theory Meets the Third World," in Stephanie G. Neuman, ed. International Relations Theory and the Third World, (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 33.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> The Bank of New York scandal is now considered one of the largest financial scandals to hit the U.S. It is estimated that the Bank of New York was used to launder up to US\$15 billion. Raymond Bonner and Timothy L. O'Brien, "Activity at Bank Raises Suspicions of Russian Mob Tie," New York Times, 20 August 1999, p. 1.



Finally, traditional theories of international relations are unable to account for the effects of threats, other than politico-military ones, to security. As Ayoob writes, "acts of terrorism and drug smuggling, both intimately linked, either as cause or as effect, to conditions of domestic disorder and conflict in parts of the Third World (for example in Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan and Latin America), can target, and have targeted, major powers in the global North, as well as countries in the global South."<sup>62</sup>

The fact that instability in Afghanistan provided a safe haven for criminal and terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda, highlights the inherent linkages between levels of analysis in the world today. Left to operate freely, Al-Qaeda was able to coordinate large-scale acts of terrorism culminating in the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. Considering the international response that emerged from these attacks, the role of non-state actors in the international political domain is now irrefutable, and must be accounted for by scholars of international relations and security.

Thus in an attempt to overcome the weaknesses inherent in realism and to account for these factors Ayoob developed Subaltern Realism around four primary assumptions.<sup>63</sup>

In contrast to realist assumptions, he asserts that issues of domestic and international order are linked, and issues of domestic order must receive analytical priority if current conflictual situations in the world are to be understood. This is largely premised on the point that most conflicts in the world are primarily the by-products of state-making. Ayoob also asserts that issues of domestic order and conflict do not exist independently of external influences (regional or international). As a result of the permeability of most states by outside political and economic actors (including

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<sup>62</sup> Ayoob (1998), p. 34.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

non-state actors), external variables need to be integrated into any explanation of order and conflict. Finally, links between the domestic and international explain "the nexus between intrastate and interstate conflicts and the intertwining of state-making enterprises with regional balance of power issues."<sup>64</sup> These assumptions indicate that Ayoob primarily places security in the political realm. As he writes in *The Third World Security Predicament*, security is:

used in the restricted sense of applying to the security of the state – in terms of both its territory and its institutions – and to the security of those who profess to represent the state territorially and institutionally. In other words, security-insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities – *both internal and external* – that threaten or have the potential to bring down or weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and governing regimes.<sup>65</sup>

Although Ayoob presents a very specific form of realism in an attempt to explain the Third World predicament, which in itself is open to criticism, he succeeds in highlighting some factors that merit consideration in the post-Cold War environment. Of greatest importance, as with Booth, is his assertion that the state "as the linchpin of the political realm"<sup>66</sup> remains an essential component in understanding contemporary security issues.

Within the context of Subaltern Realism, the importance of the state will persist for "as long as the international system continues to be primarily a system of states, and state interests continue to be the primary motivation for international interactions."<sup>67</sup> The state therefore remains the only actor that can logically provide domestic order. Thus for states that find themselves entrenched in the state building process of the post-Cold War world, the primary goal is to develop credible and legitimate political

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ayoob (1995), pp. 8-9.

<sup>66</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, "Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective," in Krause and Williams (1997), pp. 139.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.



structures that can provide order, as they do in consolidated states.<sup>68</sup> Despite focusing on the importance of the state in the provision of security, Ayoob does acknowledge that other realms of human and social activity cannot be ignored. As he writes:

when developments in other realms, ranging from the economic to the ecological, threaten to have immediate political consequences, or are perceived as having the potential to threaten state boundaries, political institutions, or governing regimes, then these other variables have to be taken into account as a part of the state's security calculus.<sup>69</sup>

The view that the state continues to dominate international security is also advanced by Sorensen, who argues that a strong state is required for creating and sustaining individual and national security.<sup>70</sup> Not only is this true with regard to military issues, but it holds true for other security issues including terrorism and TOC. The state is the most important macro institution in deciding how 'old' and 'new' threats will emerge, and what their consequences will be for individuals, groups, the state itself, and potentially the region or international system. Without a stable political order, "social and individual values are meaningless; they cannot be realised, nor can they be protected from assault, violence and chaos."<sup>71</sup> For these reasons, the contemporary security environment has been characterised by competition for control over the state and its functions – a competition no longer limited to state actors.

An equally important contribution, useful within the context of this thesis, is that although emphasis is placed on the state, Ayoob recognises the significance of other referent objects. For example, in his definition of security quoted above, threats can be posed to 'those who profess to represent the state' as well as to state structures

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<sup>68</sup>Ibid., p. 131.

<sup>69</sup>Ibid., p. 129.

<sup>70</sup>Georg Sorensen, "Individual Security and National Security: the State Remains the Principal Problem," *Security Dialogue*, vol. 27, no. 4 (1996), p. 374.

<sup>71</sup> Gabriel Ben Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Post-Colonial State*, (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 244, as quoted in Ayoob (1995), p. 183.

themselves. In this case, the targeting of civil servants by transnational criminal groups or terrorist groups would equate to a direct threat to the integrity of the state they represent. Furthermore, Ayooob highlights the fact that a government or territory does not have to be directly taken over by an enemy, but merely has to be threatened with being 'weakened'. Thus any issue can become part of the security calculus of a state if it threatens "to have political outcomes that either affect the survivability of state boundaries, state institutions, or governing elites or weaken the capacity of states and regimes to act effectively in the realm of both domestic and international politics."<sup>72</sup>

Finally, Ayooob's work on Subaltern Realism helps to illuminate a fundamental shift in the post-Cold War security environment from a situation in which states perpetrate violence to one in which violent conflict is predominantly waged by non-state actors against states. In many cases this conflict originates in weak, failing or failed states where several groups vie for control over the institutional and material resources of the state. As discussed in Chapter One, non-state actors are increasingly seeking to establish their positions in an environment characterised by an absence of legitimacy on the part of the state and the ruling regime. Thus Ayooob is able to account for the conclusion that "'Hobbesian wars' (*bellum omnium contra omnes*) may almost supercede the 'Clausewitzian wars' fought by states against other states."<sup>73</sup> As will become evident in the two case study chapters, non-state actors in the form of TOC

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<sup>72</sup> Ayooob (1995), p. 9. An earlier attempt made by Ayooob to define security in political and state-centric terms while maintaining that security is simultaneously multifaceted and thus connected to other social realms, see, Mohammed Ayooob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 257-83.

<sup>73</sup> Bjorn Moller, "The Concept of Security: The Pros and Cons of Expansion and Contraction," Paper presented at the 18<sup>th</sup> General Conference of the International Peace Research Association, Tampere, Finland, 5-9 August 2000. Also see, Donald Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Pattern of Internal War, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); William Zartman, ed. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); and William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).



and terrorism have successfully hi-jacked the activities required for successful state-making. Thus the FARC, and to a certain degree ROC, have: expanded and consolidated territorial and demographic control; maintained order among/over the population where their order has been imposed; and extracted resources from the territory and population in order to support their activities.<sup>74</sup>

As the discussion in this section reveals, both the Copenhagen School and 'Post-Realism' have promulgated a view of security that begins to effectively account for components of the current security environment. The multisectoral approach of the Copenhagen School, combined with Booth's alternative view of anarchy, the nexus between the personal, political and international, and the assumption that the state remains an essential (albeit not the only) component of security, are able to begin accounting for the security threats posed by terrorism and TOC. Although these theoretical strands undoubtedly provide a better understanding of security threats than the realist tradition, their explanatory power is heightened when placed alongside two emerging 'proto-paradigms': globalisation and netwars.

### **Globalisation and Netwars: Emerging Security 'Proto-Paradigms'**<sup>75</sup>

As discussed in Chapter One, the globalisation process has had a significant impact on the evolution of security in the post-Cold War era. Although the academic study of globalisation has only received serious attention for little more than a decade,

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<sup>74</sup> These three points are quoted in Ayoob (1995), pp. 22-23 as being activities essential for state-making. If these activities are impeded by criminal and terrorist groups, it follows that (a) these groups have posed a direct threat to the state's ability to maintain a legitimate monopoly over the use of violence, and to fail on the essential state task of securing the future of the population; and (b) these groups represent a legitimate challenger to the state if they are subsequently able to fulfill these components of state-making and ultimately assume control and power over the territory in question.

<sup>75</sup> 'Proto-paradigm' is a term used by Mittelman (2002) to describe the vast grouping of globalisation literature – which combined, he argues, encompasses a coherent body of literature which has the potential of becoming a paradigm in its own right.

globalisation does offer a relatively new concept through which analysts can “seek to comprehend reality.”<sup>76</sup> Despite the diversity found in globalisation writings, according to Mittelman there appears to be general academic consensus that globalisation allows for “multiple globalising processes, including at the macroregional, subregional, and microregional levels as well as in localities”, and as such globalisation inherently “blurs many dualities – state and non-state, legal and illegal, public and private, and so on – that are customary” in the discipline of International Politics.<sup>77</sup> It is this general outlook on how the emerging dynamics of the world operate that gives theoretical discussions about globalisation contribute to the development of a conceptual framework of security.

As is the case with critical security theories, the globalisation approach to international relations seeks to correct the anomalies that persist within the discipline due largely to the continued primacy of realist traditions. As discussed in Mittelman (2002), there are five major points of contention that plague the understanding of international politics. First, the term ‘international studies’ falsely suggests a focus on the relation between nations, when in fact the field is predominantly focused on the relation between states; second, the field inaccurately separates national from international spheres of activity; third, the discipline mistakenly continues to focus exclusively on the centrality of the state; fourth, territoriality remains central to the understanding of international politics, as reflected in the importance placed on state borders and state sovereignty; and fifth, the discipline is preoccupied with “engaging in intramural studies over concepts, often without sufficient attention to the

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<sup>76</sup> Mittelman (2002), p. 2.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., p. 4.



phenomena themselves.”<sup>78</sup> These weaknesses that persist within the realist tradition have been the focus of many scholars writing on globalisation. Thus despite representing a young theoretical tradition in itself, there are several shared propositions of globalisation studies. One of these shared propositions is that many contemporary problems are global in nature and thus cannot be explained by focusing on a particular nation-state. Although, for example, the origins of a criminal organisation can be traced back to a specific territory, if its operations are transnational then that group can only be effectively countered via a coalition that includes all states in which that group is known to operate. Globalisation also constitutes a structural transformation in world order, thus suggesting that it is not always beneficial to study the “here and now”, but an understanding of the security environment requires placing it into historical context. It also constitutes a series of continuities and discontinuities with the past – although the globalisation process itself may have begun centuries ago, it is important to note that it has been accelerated by contemporary history. Furthermore, suprastate and substate forces are believed to dictate the need for new ontological priorities that constantly take into consideration forces from above and below. In response to the shifting nature of the international system, the state is searching for ways to reinvent itself either by embracing globalisation or resisting it. Finally, underpinning the emerging order is a “set of new, deeper, tensions”<sup>79</sup> which are highlighted by the disunity between the fundamental principle of state sovereignty – territoriality – and the fundamental principle of globalisation – deterritorialisation. As Mittelman notes: “with the development of new technologies, especially in communications and transportation, the advent of a ‘network’ society (Castell, 1996), and the emergence of a ‘nonterritorial region’

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<sup>78</sup> Ibid., pp. 6-7.

<sup>79</sup> These propositions are explained in greater detail in Ibid., pp. 7-8.

(Ruggie, 1993), there is a marked shift toward a more deterritorialised world.”<sup>80</sup> This trend further questions the ability of the realist tradition to offer an explanation of the security environment that can adequately account for these developments.

The development of a ‘deterritorialised’ world is very evident in the post-Cold War operations and organisation of TOC and terrorism. However, the nature of this defining characteristic of contemporary society is succinctly explained in the context of ‘netwars’.<sup>81</sup> Generally defined, netwars are used to refer to contemporary wars which seldomly involve military confrontation between states, but involve combatants that:

come from bomb-making terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, drug smuggling cartels like those in Colombia and Mexico, and militant anarchists like the Black Bloc that ran amok during the Battle of Seattle. Other protagonists are civil-society activists fighting for democracy and human rights – from Burma to the Balkans. What all have in common is that they operate in small, dispersed units that can deploy nimbly – anywhere, anytime. They know how to penetrate and disrupt, as well as elude and evade.<sup>82</sup>

Expanded as an explanatory concept of emerging conflict and international security dynamics by Arquilla and Ronfeldt of the RAND think tank in the U.S., netwars are presented as entities that are intrinsically dual in nature. They are composed of conflicts waged on the one hand by terrorists, criminals and ethnonationalist extremists, and on the other hand by civil-society activists. Although civil-society activists are increasingly important sub-state actors in international politics, the

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<sup>80</sup> Mittelman (2002), p. 6. M. Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996); John Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in International Relations,” *International Organisation*, vol. 46 (Summer 1993), pp. 561-83.

<sup>81</sup> ‘Netwars’ is a concept developed by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. For their early discussions of ‘netwars’ see, *The Advent of Netwar*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-789-OSD, 1996) and *In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-880-OSD/RC, 1997).

<sup>82</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds. *Networks and Netwars: the Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-1382-OSD, 2001), p. v.



discussion here will focus on the use of netwar by terrorists and criminal organisations.

According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, netwars emerged from the ongoing information revolution, which – as proponents of globalisation also argue – has altered the nature of conflict in two major ways. First, by “favouring and strengthening network forms of organisation”<sup>83</sup> to the detriment of hierarchical forms of organisations, the rise of networks has facilitated the migration of power to non-state actors. This is primarily because non-state actors find it easier to organise into “sprawling multiorganisational networks more readily than can traditional, hierarchical, state actors.”<sup>84</sup> Second, as the information revolution deepens, Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that the conduct and outcome of conflicts increasingly depends on access to information and the ability to communicate information. Furthermore, in order to operate effectively, actors engaged in netwars must incorporate five levels of theory and practise into their operations: narrative; doctrinal; technological; social; and organisational.

The narrative level refers to the way in which the group portrays its “experiences, interests, and values” to communicate a sense of “cause, purpose, and mission.”<sup>85</sup> The purpose is to connect their membership, and generate an external perception that the group – be it terrorist or criminal – is not entirely a negative entity. For this reason Colombian drug traffickers view themselves “in a positive light as anarchonationalists who do good for their communities, for example through financial donations to churches, hospitals and schools.”<sup>86</sup> Doctrines, in this context, explain why members

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), p. 328.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 329.

of networks operate strategically and tactically without necessarily resorting to a central command or leader. The focus here, therefore, according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, is on the existence of shared principles and practises. Operationally a shared doctrine is important because it provides the motivation for groups to engage in swarming: “a campaign of episodic, pulsing attacks by various nodes of [the] network – at locations sprawled across global time and space where [the network] has advantages for seizing the initiative, stealthily.”<sup>87</sup> The technological level assesses the capacity of networks to disperse information and communications, and coordinate their activities – either via advanced technologies or by traditional capabilities such as human couriers. Of all theoretical levels of the netwar, the social level is inherently the weakest in all networks. This level refers to the ways in which network members are connected to one another, suggesting that strong personal ties are required to hold the network together. According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “compared to tribal/clan and hierarchical forms of organisation, networks have more difficulty instilling, and enforcing, a sense of personal identity with and loyalty to the network.”<sup>88</sup> Finally, the organisational level explicitly defines how the network is organised – i.e. what does the network look like. Although all levels are equally important, Arquilla and Ronfeldt argue that the defining characteristic of netwars is their organisational design.

Netwars are organised into one (or any combination) of three basic network designs: the chain or line network; the hub, star or wheeled network; and/or the all channel or full-matrix network. The chain or line network (Figure 2.1) is the simplest form of network and is best described as a smuggling chain “where people, goods, or

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
<sup>87</sup> Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), p. 367.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p. 342.




information move along a line of separated contacts, and where end-to-end communication must travel through the intermediate nodes.”<sup>89</sup>

**FIGURE 2.1**<sup>90</sup>



The hub, star, or wheeled network (Figure 2.2), on the other hand, is more sophisticated, and thus requires a higher degree of organisation. This form of network is best described as a “franchise or a cartel where a set of actors are tied to a central (but not hierarchical) node or actor, and must go through that node to communicate and coordinate with each other.”<sup>91</sup>

**FIGURE 2.2**<sup>92</sup>



Finally, the all-channel network (Figure 2.3) is the most intricate form of network that operates among sub-state actors. Arquilla and Ronfeldt suggest that this type of network exemplifies militant groups where “everybody is connected to everybody else.”<sup>93</sup> This network best describes the organisation of emerging breeds of terrorist

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.


<sup>91</sup> Ibid.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 8.

groups, such as al-Qaeda, which operate a collaborative transnational network of militants. With minimum hierarchy, groups such as al-Qaeda allow for decentralised decision-making and operations, local initiative and autonomy. As such, all-channel networks in general, may appear “acephalous (headless), and at other times polycephalous (Hydra-headed).”<sup>94</sup>

FIGURE 2.3<sup>95</sup>



The intricate nature of the all-channel network dictates that, of the three designs, it is the most difficult to sustain over a protracted period of time. It is believed that effective performance is dependent upon the presence of “shared principles, interests, and goals – at best, an overarching doctrine or ideology – that spans all nodes and to which the members wholeheartedly subscribe.”<sup>96</sup>

It is important to note that regardless of the form of network utilised by a netwar actor, each network generally operates according to the same overriding principles and organisational design. For example, each node in the diagrams above can refer to an individual, group, organisation or even a state. The nodes may differ in size and membership (inclusive or exclusive); they may be segmentary or specialised (engaged

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

<sup>96</sup> Arquilla, Ronfeldt, Zanini (1999), p. 51.



in similar activities or they may undertake a division of labour); and the boundaries between nodes, or of the network itself, may be either well defined or blurred and porous.<sup>97</sup> In addition to these characteristics, networks have three basic sets of features. First, communication and coordination within networks tend to change according to the activity at hand. Second, internal networks often develop links outside the network (often crossing national boundaries). Third, internal and external ties are usually facilitated by shared norms and values<sup>98</sup> – whether they are based on ideology (as is the case for terrorist groups) or economics (in the case of organised criminal groups). All of this means that networks far exceed the capabilities of the traditional hierarchical state actor tied by defined boundaries and actions. Networks “defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between state and society, public and private, war and peace, war and crime, civilian and military, police and military, and legal and illegal.”<sup>99</sup> The advent of netwars and networked actors poses a significant challenge to realism, primarily because realism is formulated to address the hierarchical state actor.

As with globalisation, the advent of networked actors in the context of netwars represents a critical aspect of post-Cold War security that realism is incapable of explaining: the rise of a new generation of non-state actors in a world that is no longer strictly defined by territorial boundaries. Although neither of these ‘proto-paradigms’ represents a refined body of academic knowledge, the concepts of globalisation and netwars both bring several important and pressing arguments into the current theoretical debate about the changing nature of security. In many ways the literature

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<sup>97</sup> Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), p. 8.

<sup>98</sup> Zanini and Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Information Age,” in Arquilla and Ronfeldt, (2001), pp. 31-32.

<sup>99</sup> Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001), p. 14.

on globalisation and netwars identify “silences and establish new intellectual space – certainly one criterion by which to gauge an ascendant paradigm.”<sup>100</sup> Combined with the advances made by critical security studies described above, the work on globalisation and netwars bring practical components to a debate traditionally focused on conceptual frameworks. Thus the specific combination of the Copenhagen School, Post-Realism, globalisation and netwars, provides a solid framework that can be used to reconceptualise terrorism and TOC as they exist in the twenty-first century.

### **Criteria for Assessing Security Threats in the Post-Cold War Era**

Based on the specific claims extracted from the critical security studies literature and the globalisation and netwar proto-paradigms overviewed above, this section isolates five criteria to help illuminate the ways in which TOC and terrorism pose threats to contemporary security. After providing a summary of these criteria, their utility will be tested by directly applying them to the concepts of terrorism and TOC as they have evolved since 1991 in order to establish whether these phenomena truly constitute security threats.

The first claim, extracted from the Copenhagen School, is that a multisectoral approach to security provides greater insights into the post-Cold War security environment than traditional theories of security. A multisectoral approach bestows upon analysts and academics the following benefit:

By working from the inside of the classical discussion, we can take the concepts of national security, threat, and sovereignty, and show how, on the collective level, they take on new forms under new conditions. We can then strip the classical discussion of its preoccupation with military matters by applying the same logic to other sectors, and we can de-link the discussion from the state by applying similar moves to

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<sup>100</sup> Mittleman (2002), p. 10.



society. With this we maintain a mode of thinking, a set of rules and codes from the field of “security” as it has evolved and continues to evolve.<sup>101</sup>

Taking this argument a step further, if it can be established that terrorism and TOC directly threaten a combination of the military, societal, political, economic and environmental sectors, they should - de facto - qualify as security threats.<sup>102</sup> This overcomes much of realism’s predisposition to argue that threats are solely defined in military terms – a characteristic which does not account for the subversive political activities of terrorism and TOC.

The second element that can help understand terrorism and TOC is the nexus between the personal, political (domestic) and international (promoted by the Copenhagen School, Utopian and Subaltern Realism, and globalisation). This linkage across units of analysis is important because, in an era characterised by the process of globalisation, it highlights the fact that security threats have implications beyond the immediate target. For example, a terrorist attack that occurs in the heart of Moscow threatens the individuals directly targeted; however it also threatens the state’s ability to provide security for its citizens. The international system may also be threatened by the same incident if, for example, the terrorists represented a foreign group, or if Russian terrorists attacked an international target such as the Russian headquarters of the International Monetary Fund, or a foreign embassy in Moscow. The acknowledgement that there is an interplay between units of analysis permits the recognition that isolated domestic events can pose threats to regional and ultimately

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<sup>101</sup>Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1995), p. 51.

<sup>102</sup> Given that there is no agreed formula within International Relations for deciding which issues should be considered security threats, the Copenhagen School’s multisectoral approach will be privileged in this thesis. Concluding that a specific phenomenon threatens so many sectors within society (national and international) suggests that it should be regarded as a threat in general. Given that traditional threats, such as war, also threaten each of the five sectors, it is logical to label any issue that threatens each sector a security threat.

international security, thus overcoming realism's refusal to accept that domestic order and conflict are inextricably linked to regional and international order and conflict. Furthermore, accepting the link between levels of analysis also accounts for nonterritoriality – the premise that something can occur everywhere and nowhere. Based on this assumption, it may be argued that state officials in Washington prior to September 11, 2001 were unable to recognise that terrorist groups thriving in Afghanistan had the capability to pose a direct threat to the U.S. As such, they were theoretically incapable of explaining how sub-state actors thousands of miles away were able to coordinate a violent attack on American territory. Although he focused on the immediate territorial surroundings and not the international system, Ayoob was correct to assert that:

Since no state lives or dies in complete isolation, what happens within the borders of failed or failing states can have major implications for nearby states. As Liberia, Afghanistan, and Somalia demonstrate, anarchy within individual Third World states is bound to spill over state boundaries in the form of refugees, sanctuaries for warring groups, gun running, drug trafficking, and other fallouts that are likely to heighten tensions between neighbours.<sup>103</sup>

Another criterion that will be used to provide an understanding of contemporary terrorism and TOC is that the state is no longer the only referent object. Bringing additional referent objects to the fore – such as people, widely accepted rules, norms and values - improves our understanding of the nature of security. According to this view of security, TOC and terrorism would easily classify as security threats because both phenomena directly threaten individuals, international law and sovereignty by nature of their activities and existence. Although the state remains an important referent object, undermining the integrity of state institutions and established social

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<sup>103</sup> Ayoob (1995), p. 174.



norms and values can create a far more devastating attack on the survivability of the state than a direct military attack.

The fourth point that will be used to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the security threat posed by TOC and terrorism within the framework of this thesis is the assumption that the state remains an essential, although not the only, component of security. Based specifically on the Subaltern Realism idea of the state, two generalisations can be made. First, the state is the primary referent object of most threats. If a state is incapable of responding to challenges that significantly undermine its authority, legitimacy (including its inability to maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence) and stability (thus resulting in the collapse of effective governance), it may result in insecurity for the individual and international levels of analysis. Therefore, should the governments of Colombia and the Russian Federation and their respective state institutions increasingly be undermined by organised criminal activities, they risk becoming ‘criminal-syndicalist’ states. According to the Russian Organised Crime Task Force at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, such a state consists of interactions among corrupt officials, professional criminals, and businessmen with little interest in complying with existing laws.<sup>104</sup> Already present to some degree in both states, such a ruling coalition would definitely not place a high value on the interests of the general population – thus simultaneously posing a direct threat to the individual level of security. Limitless state resources would continue to be diverted through mass embezzlement, and a perfect environment would be created for lucrative illicit activities such as trafficking in drugs, arms or natural resources – thus posing a direct

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<sup>104</sup> William H. Webster et al., Russian Organized Crime (Washington, DC: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), p. 21.

threat to international society at large.<sup>105</sup> Thus in this thesis it is argued that the state remains the linchpin of the political realm because it remains the only actor able to attain and hold power and legitimacy. This is the primary reason why non-state actors seek control over state functions. For example, drug cartels operating in Colombia in the 1980s gained community influence by building more public housing than the government, building schools and clinics, providing rural electrification, repairing local sewage systems, and even providing physical protection from terrorist groups operating in parts of the countryside.<sup>106</sup> Even the Yakuza in Japan continuously attempt to portray themselves in a positive light to the community – for example, it was the Yakuza and not the Japanese government who were the first to assist the victims of the 1995 Kobe earthquake.<sup>107</sup>

With the acknowledgement that state and non-state actors are equal referent objects, an adapted realist approach could be used to highlight non-state actors' interest in gaining or seeking to gain control of the state. Although the idea of the state as a sovereign all-powerful entity is losing merit, by realising the continued importance associated with functions of the state, non-state actors can (and have, as will be demonstrated in Chapters Four and Five) successfully manipulate the prevailing national environment.

Given the continued importance of the state in providing security for its citizens, and in engaging with the international system, it follows that the state is a central

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<sup>105</sup> In this example international society is threatened in each sector specified by the Copenhagen School: politically, economically, militarily, environmentally, and on a societal level.

<sup>106</sup> Angela S. Burger, "Conundrum: Illicit Narcotics and Theoretical Approaches in International Politics," Paper presented at the 40<sup>th</sup> Annual International Studies Association Convention, Washington D.C. (16-20 February, 1999).

<sup>107</sup> Mark Galeotti, "Underworld and Upperworld: Transnational Organised Crime and Global Society," in Josselin and Wallace (2001), p. 211.



component in the quest for security and stability from the individual to the global level. Regardless of the initiatives that citizens or the international community implement to counter threats such as terrorism and TOC, without considerable support from state institutions, such as the judiciary and law enforcement, it would be difficult to ensure the security of citizens, state security, and ultimately regional and international stability. Thus it is evident that the importance of the state has not entirely diminished in the realm of security. However, it would be naïve to conclude that the state has not fundamentally changed as a result of contemporary international developments – such as those accompanying globalisation. With respect to the state, “the core circumstances remains entrenched while some of its major features have altered.”<sup>108</sup> For example, state sovereignty has been called into question and states have been forced to redirect their attention to meet both supraterritorial and territorial interests.

Despite the continued importance of the state, the state cannot exclusively be regarded as the only referent object in the study of security. Thus the Copenhagen School, Booth’s Utopian Realism and the globalisation ‘proto-paradigm’ all bring to the ongoing debate on international security an “effort to incorporate a broader ontology of structures and agents.”<sup>109</sup> This is partially done by focusing on alternative referent objects and actors and by presenting a redefinition of security that includes the ability of the state to protect its people. To begin with, the arguments presented in these writings highlight the importance of understanding that the world is ‘polycentric’<sup>110</sup> and it consists of linked processes. As a result, economics, politics and society are treated as a seamless web, and explanatory levels consistently include levels above

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<sup>108</sup> Scholte (2000), p. 133.

<sup>109</sup> Mittelman (2002), p. 6.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

and below the state. As noted by Buzan et al (1998), but equally attributable to most theoretical positions represented in this chapter:

We do not take the state or sovereignty as representing fixed limits, but we are skeptical of individualism as the traditional alternative to state centrism. We therefore form a picture of a world of multiple units, which might be called postsovereign realism. Thus units can be overlapping (in contrast to the exclusivity of sovereign territorial states), but this does not necessarily lead to any benign transnationalism in which the focus is on the multiple identities of individuals relativising all units and collectivities. Although each individual in a world of overlapping units is a 'member' of several units, instead of focusing on any such softening effects produced by overlap, we study how the units can continue to conduct power politics [...] Each unit has a possibility of becoming the reference for security action, but since the different units overlap and are placed at different levels, there is no fixed line between the domestic and international – what is internal to one unit can be interunit when one thinks of other units.<sup>111</sup>

These viewpoints also improve on realist thought which strictly places security in the context of a state protecting its government and territory. The slight definitional alteration of including the ability of a state to protect its population can in itself subsequently account for the “destruction and death caused by non-state actors, from terrorist to drug traffickers”.<sup>112</sup> As Wisgerhof argues, this is important when:

the objective of the non-state actors is not to beat an army in the field, but to kill or cause panic within the civilian population itself. These actors may have no interest in ‘threatening’ the survival of the state, either in the form of government or the international recognition of its boundaries. However, by taking the battle directly to the people, these non-state groups pose a challenge to the state’s ability to protect its residents from other actors.<sup>113</sup>

We will see in the case studies discussed in Chapters Four and Five that the primary threat from non-state actors is initially focused on the individual level. However, each

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<sup>111</sup> Buzan, et al. (1998), p. 47, fn 7. It is equally important to note that Buzan et al believe domestic security relations may be interunit precisely because “in these places the most powerful referent objects are smaller than the state.”

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Amy E. Wisgerhof, “International Non-State Terrorism and the Transstate Paradigm,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 8, no. 2 (Summer 1999), p. 77.



case study will reinforce the argument that the state remains an important security target.

The fifth and final criterion incorporated into this thesis' framework for understanding twenty-first century terrorism and TOC is that security cannot be understood without going beyond the academic debates about concepts, and explicitly focusing on the phenomena themselves. In this view, therefore, the study of international security is not about philosophising, but it is about engaging in a debate that is focused on finding ways at least to ensure international order, if not ultimately ensuring international peace. Thus by understanding the operational (globalisation) and organisational (networks) dynamics of contemporary security threats, attempts to understand how they threaten security on various levels of analysis and how they can be countered becomes, in practise, a less obfuscated exercise. It is therefore essential that International Relations scholarship be reflexive in the sense that explanatory levels are shifted above and below the state.<sup>114</sup> Based on the extensive literature attempting to define security, Kolodziej is correct to observe that "those working in security studies can no longer assume that others share their views about what security is and how to study it."<sup>115</sup> The extracted assumptions about the nature of security provided here will be tested in the following two sections by applying these claims to terrorism and TOC. This conceptual framework will also be used in the next chapter to formulate an alternative way of explaining the complex nature of the various relationships that have developed between TOC and terrorism, and the subsequent implications this has for security.

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Edward A. Kolodziej, "Security Studies for the Next Millennium: Quo Vadis?," in Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff, eds. Critical Reflections in Security and Change, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 18.

## Reconceptualising Terrorism as a Security Threat

Terrorism as a concept has received little more than token attention in the security studies literature. As Fred Halliday states, "The hypostatization of terrorism in academic writing on IR has been one of the discipline's more sloppy chapters. Terrorism, in the sensational sense in which it has normally been used, is a subaltern feature of International Relations."<sup>116</sup> However, given the nature of contemporary terrorism, this phenomenon provides an example of the changing nature of security as it is outlined in the conceptual framework described in the previous section. Based on the notion of existential threat presented by Buzan et al, the most straightforward way of demonstrating that terrorism constitutes a security threat is to illustrate the threat it poses to the five security sectors identified by the Copenhagen School.

Terrorism poses a threat most obviously to the military, political and societal sectors. If military security is seen as the ability of "the ruling elite to maintain civil peace, territorial integrity, and [...] the machinery of government in the face of challenges from its citizens"<sup>117</sup> (a definition that corresponds to the conceptual framework of this thesis), there exist numerous examples of terrorism posing a direct security threat. Groups including the Italian Red Brigades, Hizbollah, the Shining Path, FARC and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) have all waged intense campaigns of violence which were sporadically successful in disrupting civil peace and the operation of government. Laqueur notes of the Red Brigades,

The Red Brigades engaged in some 14,000 terrorist attacks within their first ten years. [...] The legal system was almost paralysed, since jurors

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<sup>116</sup> Fred Halliday, " 'The sixth great power': on the study of revolution and international relations," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 16 (1990), p. 209, fn. 7.

<sup>117</sup> Ayoob (1995).



were afraid to fulfil their duty; not all judges were prepared to be heroes, and the police were by and large unprepared to deal with this unprecedented challenge.<sup>118</sup>

In this situation it is evident that the attacks of the Red Brigades could be considered a direct military threat against the state – through the use of violence, state institutions and agents were directly targeted. This example, however, is further evident in the operations of the IRA.

The IRA, operating for decades from Northern Ireland, has based its operational doctrine on the strategy of ancient military strategists such as Sun Tzu. As Harmon summarises: the IRA “strike hard but then disengage; concentrate for attacks but disperse quickly; move fast; ...[are]...adaptable; change methods constantly; surprise is key; master intelligence.”<sup>119</sup> For this very reason the IRA is often considered to be one of the world’s most challenging and innovative terrorist groups. Although this basic strategy has been adopted by many terrorist groups, the operational successes of the IRA reveals that the group has posed a military threat to the United Kingdom – if not to the territorial integrity of the entire state, then at least to the ability of the state to control the use of violence in Northern Ireland, and to maintain civil peace. This military dimension to the IRA threat is exemplified in the following quote:

British helicopters are capable of considerable range, high speed, and night operations, and they have often cornered ‘Provos’. But the IRA has responded, with heavy machine guns and even mortars, downing several helicopters and threatening all others. In one striking case, the IRA bombed an army convoy – but only after correctly predicting that when it did so British reinforcements would arrive by helicopter and land at an obvious and appropriate spot. All went as the IRA expected, so its second bomb at the landing site inflicted even more casualties than the earlier explosion.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Laqueur (1999), p. 29.

<sup>119</sup> Harmon (2000), p. 84.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

Furthermore, in the case of the IRA, the extent to which the British government fails in their task to maintain peace within society in Northern Ireland as a whole is also illustrated. Aside from the perpetual presence of armies and gunmen on the streets, the “Republican strategy [since the mid-1980s] required a certain level of violence - but only enough to distort the private and public life of the North, and to make sure that the military arm was properly exercised.”<sup>121</sup> In this sense the IRA has posed a formidable threat in the military sector.

The threat posed to the military sector is also evident within the FSU. A considerable amount of terrorist activity occurred during the Chechen conflict of 1994-1996. Apart from military engagement between Chechen and Russian forces, Chechen groups were responsible for a number of significant terrorist incidents that flowed over Chechen borders into Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Russia itself. Thus the seizure of Russian towns and a series of bombings considerably complicated the attempts made by an already-weak Russian military to maintain its territorial integrity and bring order to the Caucasus.<sup>122</sup>

Aside from posing a threat to the military sector, the political nature of terrorism would presuppose that it poses a threat to the political security of a state. According to the Copenhagen School, political security is “about the organisational stability of

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<sup>121</sup> Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, *The Provisional IRA*, (London: Corgi, 1989), p. 387.

<sup>122</sup> Dennis Pluchinsky, “Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union: A Primer, A Puzzle, A Prognosis,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 21 (1998), p. 126. Pluchinsky cites a number of examples including the June 1995 seizure by over 100 rebels of the Russian town of Buddenovsk in which over 100 people were killed, and hundreds more held hostage; and a series of bombings in June and July 1996 during which trains, train stations, subways, and trolleys were targeted in Moscow, Volgograd, and Trubnaya.



social order(s)".<sup>123</sup> It concerns non-military threats to states and political units other than states, and to system-level referents (for example, international society or international law). As outlined in the previous section, political threats are essentially about "giving or denying recognition, support, or legitimacy."<sup>124</sup> Although the overlap with the military sector is quite apparent here, there are examples of a terrorist group posing a threat to the actual existence of entire national political structures (as opposed to the mere ability of a state to control the machinery of government). During the campaign in the 1970s by Uruguay's Tupamaros, which was aimed at destroying the capitalist economic system of the country, this group kidnapped and murdered several businessmen, diplomats and government leaders. Although the Tupamaros' leadership never gained control over Uruguay, they were indirectly responsible for changing the national political structure. The wave of terrorist activity in Uruguay "resulted in a drift from democracy toward authoritarianism as ultra-conservatives intensified repressive measures against the Left. Terrorism was destroyed, but so too was the democratic state."<sup>125</sup>

Terrorism conducted within Imperial Russia between 1861 and 1907 also illustrates the political threat posed by terrorism. During this span of fifty years, terrorist groups including Narodnya Volya (People's Will) engaged in campaigns of violence against the Tsarist government in the hope that they would lead Russia into the modern world by forcing reform, beginning with the replacement of autocracy with a form of elite democracy. The violence perpetrated by the terrorists contributed to the downfall of the Tsarist government. As Norman Naimark notes:

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<sup>123</sup> Buzan et al. (1998), p. 141.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid., p. 142.

<sup>125</sup> Paul Wilkinson, Political Terrorism, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p. 115.

the terrorists forced the empire to change its course, alter its laws, and abandon the hopes and plans of its best representatives. [...] In order to conquer terrorism, the state undermined and ultimately abandoned some of its own educational, legal and military programs. In other words, the autocracy subverted its own progress, contributing to the revolutionary storm in which it ultimately collapsed.<sup>126</sup>

The final direct threat posed by terrorism is to the societal sector, which is generally defined as the ability of members of a social group to protect their “ideas and practices”.<sup>127</sup> Throughout the history of terrorism various ethnic and religious groups have been the targets of terrorist organisations. The potential for terrorism to continue to threaten this sector is especially evident in the post-Cold War era as clashes between ethnic and religious groups have become almost characteristic of newly independent states, weak and failed states. Well into 2004 Hamas remained committed to eliminating Israel and all Jews. Imam Sheik Ahmad Ibrahim Yassin reportedly declared, “Six million descendants of monkeys (i.e. Jews) now rule in all the nations of the world, but their days, too, will come. Allah! Kill them all, do not leave even one.”<sup>128</sup>

In addition to radical and militant Islamist terrorist groups, Jewish and Christian terrorism has also proliferated over the past decade. Buzan et al directly acknowledge the societal threat posed by the growth of militias in the United States which have emerged to “defend the ‘true America’ against what their members regard as a coalition of all kinds of decadent racial and sexual minorities and liberal state lovers

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<sup>126</sup>Norman N. Naimark, “Terrorism and the Fall of Imperial Russia,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1990), p. 188.

<sup>127</sup>Buzan et al. (1998), p. 119.

<sup>128</sup>ADL Special Background Report, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Muslim Brotherhood, p. 4, as quoted in Hoffman, (1999), p. 98.



who curb the autonomy of straight, white Americans to live a 'real' American life."<sup>129</sup>

Finally, within the former Soviet Union acts of terrorism also illustrate societal threats as groups from Russia and Central Asia – both of which are ethnically and religiously diverse - are increasingly hostile towards one another. This is true, for example, of Chechnya and Dagestan where acts of terrorism are increasingly targeted against ethnic Russians – often on Russian territory. An example of this occurred in October 2002 when a group of Chechen terrorists took hundreds of people hostage at a Moscow theatre, demanding an end to the war in Chechnya and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechen territory.<sup>130</sup>

Other than the direct threat posed to the military, political and societal sectors, terrorism, in certain instances, can also pose a threat to the environmental and economic sectors. This is especially true in the post-Cold War era given developments in technology and the globalisation and integration of economic systems as discussed in Chapter 1. Terrorism can potentially threaten the environmental sector through its use of nuclear, biological and/or chemical weapons. The millennial cult Aum Shinrikyo conducted the first successful terrorist attack using chemical agents in March 1995 when they unleashed a nerve gas attack in the subways of Tokyo.<sup>131</sup> Given access to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and technology (largely from within the former Soviet Union),<sup>132</sup> it is not difficult to foresee terrorists

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<sup>129</sup>Buzan et al. (1998), p. 130.

<sup>130</sup> "Kremlin Blames Chechen Leadership for Theatre Crisis," *Russia Reform Monitor*, no. 980 (28 October 2002).

<sup>131</sup>Hoffman (1999), pp. 121-127.

<sup>132</sup>For a very comprehensive account of the nuclear black market see Rensselaer W. Lee, *Smuggling Armageddon: The Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998).

attempting to contaminate water sources in urban areas, or attempting to produce a nuclear capability - the environmental effects of which would be self-evident.<sup>133</sup>

Finally, terrorist organisations can threaten the economic sector by pursuing an economic strategy, normally for financial gain, in order to obtain funding for more traditional terrorist operations. Terrorist groups may also directly target the economic security of individuals and a state. For example, terrorist groups engaging in kidnapping, money-laundering and political corruption directly and negatively affect the national economy of the state in which they are operating.<sup>134</sup> This has been the case with the National Liberation Army and FARC which have damaged the Colombian economy through their involvement in the narcotics industry, kidnapping, and money-laundering.<sup>135</sup> Aside from posing a threat to the economic sector through criminal activities, terrorist organisations also directly affect economic security as a result of the targets they choose, and where they choose to conduct their terrorist acts. In targeting tourists in Egypt and hotels frequented by tourists, Ja'maat Islamiya seriously affected Egypt's tourist industry - one of the most lucrative industries in the state. Finally, responding to technological advances in communications, terrorist groups may acquire the potential to destroy banking systems, wreak havoc on stock markets, or destroy electrical power grids, all in the name of achieving political objectives.

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<sup>133</sup> For a continuously updated list of illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological material, see the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Centre for Nonproliferation Studies at: <http://cns.miis.edu>.

<sup>134</sup> An explanation of how these activities directly result in a loss to the legitimate national economies of Russia and Colombia are covered in Chapters Four and Five respectively.

<sup>135</sup> It is believed that these two terrorist organisations have the economic power of some of the largest commercial entities in Colombia. Their activities, which also regularly include bank heists, theft of highway cargo, bombing oil pipelines, and taxing construction and public works projects, result in a direct loss to the national economy. Furthermore the government faces additional costs associated with securing strategic targets, and funds extorted by the both ELN and FARC. For additional information see Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), pp. 64-65.



The few examples selected to illustrate the argument that terrorism is a threat to security further reveal the intricate nature of terrorism. Terrorism is not only a threat directed at nation-states. The fact that terrorist groups have targeted individuals, their home state, and international targets, demonstrates that security threats in the post-Cold War era link individual, national and international structures and actors. This merely illustrates the significance of Utopian Realism's argument that the "personal, political and international are a seamless web". It also confirms that the state is not the only referent object, but is one referent object among many others. Furthermore, terrorism threatens not only tangible entities (the state, and the individual), but also are intangible concepts related to states and society, such as human rights and international law. Furthermore, specific terrorist organisations and/or activities cannot be isolated in one security sector. Thus although the example of the IRA was used to illustrate the military sector, this specific organisation simultaneously poses a threat to other sectors. Through their bombing campaigns which have destroyed buildings and infrastructure, the Irish Republican Army has indirectly threatened the economic security of Northern Ireland and the UK. Furthermore, by targeting the Protestant community, the Irish Republican Army also poses a threat to the societal sector.

This section has thus shown that terrorism threatens the five security sectors presented by the Copenhagen School: military; political; societal; environmental; and economic. Considering that terrorist groups can successfully threaten these sectors, it may be concluded that terrorism does, in fact, pose a threat to security.

## Reconceptualising Organised Crime as a Security Threat

Organised crime has received even less attention than terrorism within the field of International Relations primarily because it was believed to be solely a problem of domestic, if not only community, politics. Furthermore, International Relations theory has not considered organised crime as posing a significant threat to either national or international security, nor has it seriously considered the ability of criminal organisations to affect the political and economic balance of a state or region.<sup>136</sup> As a result of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, there is considerable evidence suggesting that this oversight should be rectified and that organised crime – or more specifically, TOC - be given more attention by the field of International Relations. This section therefore seeks to use the multisectoral approach of the Copenhagen School to illustrate why organised crime constitutes a threat to security. As with the previous section, this will simultaneously illustrate how the conceptual framework established in this chapter can account for the presence of TOC as a security threat.

Like terrorism, TOC has the potential to threaten the military, political, societal, environmental and economic sectors of security.<sup>137</sup> Beginning with the military sector, TOC has already played a role in the emergence of regional instability, suggesting that transnational criminal organisations pose a direct military threat to national and regional security and stability. For example, fighting over the ‘Green Line’ in Lebanon was primarily about control over the drugs trade rather than a conflict in which two religions were pitted against one another. In the FSU TOC has also played a role in the emergence of regional instability in Chechnya, the Crimea

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<sup>136</sup> It should be noted that some IR theorists have made reference to organised crime as a security threat, but without expanding on how or why organised crime poses a threat.

<sup>137</sup> All of the examples mentioned in the following paragraphs will be dealt with more thoroughly in the case studies presented in Chapters 4-5. The examples provided in this section are intended for general illustrative purposes only.



and arguably within the states of Central Asia. Organised crime in Chechnya, for example, arguably pushed politicians in Moscow to revert to armed force in 1994 and to maintain a much more vigilante and assertive foreign policy in Georgia and Azerbaijan.<sup>138</sup> Furthermore, should ROC gain greater control over Russian politics, a non-democratic, criminal government in Moscow could pose a significant threat to the independence of its near abroad.<sup>139</sup> In these cases ROC represents an external danger to the security of other former Soviet states.

Politically, organised crime poses a threat through its widespread use of corruption and its penetration of political institutions at home and abroad. These activities inherently weaken government control, which subsequently works to corrode public confidence in the ruling government. Prior to serious attempts to counter the Mafia in Italy, the Italian government faced significant challenges to its legitimacy and ability to govern.<sup>140</sup> In postcommunist Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic, “the state itself [became] an exponent of organised crime” and organised crime subsequently became the “central pillar of economic and political power.”<sup>141</sup> As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4, the ROC also significantly challenges Russia’s attempts at democratisation. Furthermore, other government structures, including law enforcement and the judiciary, are losing their legitimacy in the face of rampant organised crime throughout the Russian Federation. In several cases, including that of

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<sup>138</sup> Galeotti (2001), p. 212.

<sup>139</sup> Such has been the case with warlords in Somalia, and the effects organised crime has had in provoking military confrontations in Sierra Leone. Criminal organisations involved in the drugs trade have also used their own military capabilities to engage with government forces in order to protect their interests. This has been evident in Colombia, Peru, Burma and Afghanistan.

<sup>140</sup> For a comprehensive assessment of the Italian Mafia and Italy’s attempts to fight its increasing power see Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia: Italy’s Fight Against Organised Crime, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000).

<sup>141</sup> Berdal and Serrano, “Transnational Organised Crime and International Security: the New Topography?”, in Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano, eds. Transnational Organized Crime and International Security: Business as Usual?, (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 199.

Colombia, Russia and Italy, criminal organisations have also posed a considerable challenge to the state by engaging in a concerted campaign of violence and undermining the ability of the state to provide basic security and welfare services.

Apart from the threat posed to the political sector on a state level, TOC also challenges the political security of states throughout the international system. This is largely accomplished by the ability of transnational criminal groups to penetrate international borders virtually undetected. As a result the concept of state sovereignty is losing much of its validity. Not only are states increasingly unable to stop criminal organisations from penetrating their borders, they are also unable to control the activities conducted by international criminal organisations within their borders. For example, more than one-third of all crimes committed in Berlin between 1991 and 1998 have been attributed to Russian organised crime.<sup>142</sup>

The impact which organised crime has on the societal sector is more difficult to capture than its impact on the military and political sectors. Based on the definition of the societal sector provided in the first section of this chapter, however, TOC can pose a formidable threat. Buzan et al argue that migration-related organised crime can exacerbate the “cycle of poverty in the South”,<sup>143</sup> in addition to creating tensions between the perceived ethnic identity of the organised criminal group with that of their host country. The influx of Russian immigrants to Canada and the United States after the Cold War, for example, provides an illustration of this phenomenon.<sup>144</sup> As

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<sup>142</sup> Jeffrey Robinson, The Merger: How Organised Crime is Taking Over Canada and the World, (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Inc., 1999), p. 177.

<sup>143</sup> Buzan et al. (1998), p. 138.

<sup>144</sup> Robert Friedman, Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America, (Boston, Little Brown, 2000) and U.S. Department of Defense, The Rise of a Criminal Superpower: Organized Crime in Russia, Report prepared by Mark Galeotti, December 1995.



Russian communities emerged in various parts of North America, the appearance of ROC closely followed. Based on increasing incidents of violence perpetrated by these criminal organisations, the Russian community itself is increasingly becoming a target of discrimination as all ethnic Russians – regardless of age or occupation - are assumed to be part of the Russian criminal epidemic.

Organised crime also potentially threatens the environmental sector. As Louise Shelley notes, “Because organised crime groups are oriented toward immediate profits, their activities (cultivating drugs on unsuitable soil, harvesting and selling of protected species and illegally overfishing sturgeon for the lucrative caviar trade) often lead to serious environmental damage.”<sup>145</sup> The *Camorra* of Italy has included the illicit disposal of toxic and industrial waste as one of their newest sectors of criminal activity.<sup>146</sup> Furthermore, potentially the greatest danger to the environmental sector emerges from illegal trafficking in radioactive materials. Evidence already exists that criminal organisations, including those based in Italy and Russia, have trafficked in weapons-grade material.<sup>147</sup>

Given the extremely large amounts of money involved in the activities of organised crime, it is not difficult to see that the economic sector is seriously threatened by transnational organised criminal activity. Apart from the effects of fraud on

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<sup>145</sup>Louise Shelley, “TOC: An Imminent Threat to the Nation State?,” *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 48, no. 2 (Winter 1995), p. 471.

<sup>146</sup>It is interesting to note that the Italian Environment Ministry reported in 1995 that of the 26 million tonnes of solid waste produced in Italy, only 19 million was disposed of officially. The Italian government estimates that this business brings criminal organisations an annual revenue between US\$3-3.6 billion. Ministero dell’Interno, *Rapporto sulla Criminalita Organizzata in Italia* (1995) Rome June 1996; U. Marchetti, G. Ganza, A. Pansa, “Impegno Investigativo e strategie inquirenti in Italia,” in *The Waste Industry: Italy-America Achieving a Crime-Free Market*, New York, 5-6 June 1997, conference papers published by New York University School of Law and Eurispes, Rome, December 1997, pp. 62-81, as quoted by Jamieson, (2000), p. 239.

<sup>147</sup>For more specific examples of Italian examples, see *Ibid.* For examples of the involvement of Russian groups see Chapter 4.

individuals, large fraud operations have affected national financial systems and have the potential to destabilise the international capital market.<sup>148</sup> Finally, the existence of enormous profits from organised crime “may also make economic management a much more difficult task, due to their impact on inflation, their distortion of sectoral development and the diversion of the wider distribution of scarce resources within society.”<sup>149</sup>

Considering the examples provided,<sup>150</sup> it is evident that organised crime does pose a threat to the security sectors described by the Copenhagen School. As with the threat posed by terrorism, organised crime also constitutes a security threat within the realm of International Relations – as recognized by the emerging field of critical security studies. Combined with the fact that TOC has evolved considerably over the past decade, it is becoming increasingly difficult to argue that this phenomenon remains a national law enforcement problem. In fact, given the evolutionary nature of both terrorism and TOC, it follows that any attempts to understand and subsequently counter these threats must also be adapted to the post-Cold War environment.

### **Conclusions: Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and the Underlying Assumptions of Twenty-First Century Security**

In an attempt to overcome the difficulties that traditional International Relations theories have had in addressing security in the post-Cold War environment, this chapter has argued that a combination of elements extracted from the Copenhagen School and selected Post-Realist writers can be used to aid in explaining and

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<sup>148</sup> Examples illustrating this argument are plentiful, and include: the BCCI Affair, the Bank of New York Scandal, and the indirect implications of the annual turnover in the illicit drug trade.

<sup>149</sup> John McFarlane and Karen McLennan, Transnational Crime: the New Security Paradigm, Strategic Defence Studies Centre Working Paper No. 294 (May 1996), The Australian National University, p. 7.

<sup>150</sup> More in-depth examples of how terrorism and organised crime threaten the five security sectors will be provided in the case studies.



understanding the threats to security posed by organised crime, terrorism, and their convergence. More specifically, this chapter has briefly illustrated how terrorism and organised crime pose independent threats to security based on the criteria extracted from the broad school of critical security studies, combined with emerging paradigms. These elements include: a multilateral approach to security; the interconnectedness of the three levels of analysis (individual, state, and international); the assumption that the state remains an essential (but not the only) component of security; the fact that the state is no longer the only legitimate referent object, but is considered equal to a host of additional referent objects including the individual, groups, the international system, and intangible concepts such as shared norms and values (i.e. as exhibited in international law and diplomacy); and the assumption that theory is not static and must therefore be continuously measured because of the ever-evolving nature of the security threats that they must account for.

Based on the discussions provided in this chapter, it may be concluded that the elements isolated in the conceptual framework presented here have several advantages over realism:

First, the multisectoral approach of the Copenhagen School provides the necessary tools with which specific issues can be assessed as potential threats to security. As the previous two sections revealed, a strong case can be made for arguing that terrorism and transnational organised crime, as they exist in the current international environment, should be considered security threats.

Second, the theoretical approaches chosen here do not necessarily stray from the traditional understanding of security in that they accept the importance of the state as an actor within international politics. Threats against the state, therefore, should still be considered important for three reasons. First, the state remains the only actor that can adequately provide its citizens with security based on the fact that, in most cases, the state maintains a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Second, given the continued primacy of the state in international politics, it remains an important element in terms of countering threats to its security and that of its citizenry. Third, the conceptual framework introduced in this chapter addresses the inherent weaknesses within traditional theories by accounting for the increasing relevance of non-military threats and non-state actors in the arena of international relations.

By establishing that terrorism and TOC each pose a general threat to security, it may be deduced that the convergence between terrorism and TOC would thus, in theory, present a security threat of exponential magnitude. Furthermore, the convergence of these two threats would suggest the importance of ensuring that any initiatives developed to counter it can account for the evolving nature of the international system, which can generally be described in the following manner:

the 1990s have demonstrated that terrorism has heartily survived the atrophication of communism and the end of the Cold War. Terrorism flourishes as a small-group activity, as a component of insurgency and revolutionary warfare, and as an adjunct of the new organised crime.<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>151</sup>Christopher Harmon, Terrorism Today (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 139.



A 'new organised crime' that promises to "undermine fragile new democracies, sap the strength from developing countries, threaten our efforts to build a safer, more prosperous world."<sup>152</sup>

The arguments provided in the first two chapters of this thesis provide the basis for a detailed investigation into the nexus between security threats. A study of the relationship between threats brings with it the potential to further illustrate the intricate nature of post-Cold War security. Chapter Three will therefore explain the logic and dynamics behind the relationships that have emerged between TOC and terrorism. Using the conceptual framework developed here, the next chapter will bring together theory and the actual phenomena that are responsible for producing insecurity throughout the entire spectrum of levels of analysis, presenting a model that provides an understanding of terrorism and TOC in the context of twenty-first century security.

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<sup>152</sup> U.S. President Bill Clinton as stated in his address during the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the United Nations, U.S. Information Agency Wireless File, 23 October 1995, as quoted in MacFarlane and McLennan (1996), p. 15.

## Chapter Three

### Explaining and Understanding the Crime-Terror Continuum (CTC)

The purpose of this chapter is to build on the conceptual framework presented in Chapter Two by proposing a new model capable of explaining the contemporary security threats of terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC). Referred to as the *crime-terror continuum (CTC)* in this thesis, this model identifies six major relationships that exist between the terrorist and criminal worlds, from strategic cooperation and alliance formations to the complete convergence of motivations. The CTC seeks to move away from the traditional confines of International Security Studies, and thus reveals how the key assumptions of the International Relations discipline to explain and understand conflict and instability have, in fact, been eroded. For example, the CTC illustrates that: the state can no longer be considered a unitary actor but is one actor among many that compete for control over state functions; the state no longer exclusively maintains a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence; the state is incapable of guaranteeing individual security; the idea of anarchy defined in relation to states has lost its explanatory power; and it is superficial to continue dividing the world along territorial boundaries – whether national or regional – because levels of analysis have become interdependent and interchangeable.

To explain the CTC, this chapter will begin by discussing the existing International Relations literature that has addressed components of the CTC. The chapter will then explore the six aspects of the crime-terror continuum, outlining the major characteristics of each, followed by a more detailed overview of what is referred to as the ‘convergence thesis’. Finally, this chapter will outline the organisational and



operational similarities emerging between terrorism and TOC as a result of the nexus that has developed between the two phenomena. The relevance of the conceptual framework presented in Chapter Two will thus be further highlighted.

The evolving international security environment has created a situation in which numerous scenarios – once unthinkable – have become common occurrences. For example, criminal and terrorist groups regularly engage in strategic alliances to provide goods and services for one another. Russian organised criminal groups have cooperated with FARC to exchange drugs for arms, and allegedly to provide money-laundering opportunities. Criminal and terrorist groups have also taken advantage of territory inadequately controlled by states - such as the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan, the tri-border area in South America, and Afghanistan – to advance mutual interests and areas of potential cooperation. In addition to groups taking advantage of uncontrolled territory abroad, criminal groups in, for example, Russia, Chechnya, Kosovo and Albania, have successfully taken advantage of widespread instability in their own countries to increase their criminal operations and secure political aspirations. Finally, terrorist groups including Abu Sayyaf (Philippines) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have used the veneer of political motivations to engage in lucrative criminal operations.

These developments highlight the dynamic characters of terrorism and TOC, as both phenomena have evolved significantly as a result of a combination of factors, many of which are associated with globalisation and the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, the shifting operational and organisational dynamics of these threats since 1991 has received little attention within academic or policy-making communities, and thus

remain poorly understood. The relative inability of government analysts and policy-makers to respond to the changing nature of post Cold War security has thus left the world unprepared to address major transnational challenges. Thus as contemporary security threats continue to evolve, and phenomena such as terrorism and TOC continue to learn from each other's strengths and weaknesses, individuals, states and the international community are left to deal with a host of culminating threats – as exemplified in the unprecedented terrorist attacks perpetrated by al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 in the United States.

In the current international environment, security must be understood as a cauldron of traditional and emerging threats that interact with one another, and at times, converge. It is this condition that this chapter will explain.

### **Background to the Crime-Terror Continuum**

The existence of links between organised crime and terrorism is not a completely new phenomenon. Aspects of bilateral relations have existed since the 1970s in the Middle East (Lebanon) and Asia (the Golden Triangle), and since the 1980s in Latin America, where drug cartels and terrorist groups have engaged in de facto strategic alliances.<sup>1</sup> During the 1970s and 1980s terrorist and criminal groups entered into cooperative relationships primarily for operational purposes. In Colombia, for example, the cocaine cartels based in Medellin and Cali regularly hired FARC and guerrillas from

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<sup>1</sup> The alliance created between drug traffickers and terrorist groups in Latin America is specifically referred to as 'narco-terrorism', and has generated some academic attention. Key to the study of narco-terrorism was the seminal book (Narcoterrorism) written by Rachel Ehrenfeld in 1990 (New York: Basic Books). Despite the inroads made by Ehrenfeld in introducing links that exist between TOC and terrorism, many academics and policy-makers dismissed her writing because it failed to account for the differences between organised crime and terrorism. Critiques include: Abraham Miller and Nicholas Damask, "The Dual Myths of Narcoterrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, (Spring 1996); and R.T. Naylor, "From Cold War to Crime War," *Transnational Organised Crime*, (Winter 1995). Ehrenfeld's arguments are increasingly relevant and persuasive in the international environment which has developed since the end of the Cold War.



the April 19th Movement (M19) to provide security at cocaine plantations. The terrorists received revenues which they used for their operations, and the cartels found an efficient way to secure their lucrative illicit business. Throughout the 1980s the Colombian security predicament was one that was succinctly summarised by Max Manwaring as a “‘Hobbesian Trinity’ of illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary organisations [which] are creating a situation in which life is indeed ‘nasty, brutish, and short.’”<sup>2</sup>

Although these early relations between politically motivated and criminal entities could be considered extremely clinical and business-like in nature, such ties are one of the most important transformations in international relations that have had a growing impact on the nature of contemporary security. The relationship between organised crime and terrorism grew in importance after 1991 as a result of various strategic factors, including the end of the Cold War and the most recent wave of globalisation – as described in Chapter One. Although there have been some post-1991 attempts made within the field of International Relations to understand the strengthening ties between TOC and terrorism, most of this literature has focused more generally on the nexus between crime and political violence in the context of civil wars, and not specifically between TOC and terrorism.

The most prolific early attempt to understand the nexus between crime and politically motivated violence was made by Mary Kaldor who introduced the concept of ‘new wars’. Although Kaldor continued to use the term ‘wars’ when discussing post-1991 conflicts in order to place emphasis on their political nature, she stressed that new wars

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<sup>2</sup> Max Manwaring, Non-state actors in Colombia: threat and response, Strategic Studies Institute, (Carlisle PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2002), p. 1.

“involve a blurring of the distinction between war (usually defined as violence between states or organised political groups for political motives), organised crime (violence undertaken by privately organised groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organised groups against individuals).”<sup>3</sup> Thus Kaldor focused on the changing nature of security, one in which the traditional explanatory models did not apply because new wars involved actors with transnational connections in which distinctions between levels of analysis could not convincingly be made. According to Kaldor, analysts looking at post-1991 conflict could not distinguish between “what is private and what is public, state and non-state, informal and formal, between what is done for economic or political motives”.<sup>4</sup>

Another attempt to understand the evolving international security environment was made by Donald Snow in his book Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts. Arguing that the post-Cold War context is fundamentally different from the Cold War era, Snow introduces his concept of ‘uncivil wars’. These wars are:

less principled in political terms, less focused on the attainment of some political ideal. They seem more vicious and uncontrolled in their conduct; one cannot find the restraining influence of Maoist or other political philosophies. Instead, these wars often appear to be little more than rampages by groups within states against one another with little or no apparent ennobling purpose or outcome; they are, indeed, uncivil wars.<sup>5</sup>

In acknowledging that the ideological basis for traditional insurgent warfare (notably Communism or Maoism) has largely disappeared, Snow suggests that the post-Cold War era is characterised by two predominant forms of non-ideological conflict:

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<sup>3</sup> Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Donald M. Snow, Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts, (Boulder, CO. and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1996), pp. 1-2.



criminal insurgencies and ethnic insurgencies.<sup>6</sup> According to Snow, the main purpose of criminal insurgencies is to destabilise parts of a country by “forcing the removal of government authority” and then terrorising the local population “as a preface to engaging in criminal activity.”<sup>7</sup> Examples of this are abundant and include conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bolivia and Colombia. Ethnic insurgencies, on the other hand, have received widespread attention within the International Relations literature, and simply refer to violent conflict that emerges as a result of ethnic differences. However, what makes post-Cold War ethnic insurgencies especially concerning is the lack of purpose or intent to create any form of peace. As in the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda, their purpose is merely to cause destruction. As Snow concludes:

The criminal insurgents, including the narco-insurgents, have *their own* economic gain as their motive, not some ennobling societal goal to which an appeal can be made. Ethnic violence may be waged for political gain (keeping anti-Tutsi Hutus in power had something to do with incitement of the Rwandan slaughter), *but its purposes are hardly ever ideological* in the sense of offering an alternative, and presumably superior, form of governance.<sup>8</sup>

Writing earlier than Snow and Kaldor, but bringing similar contributions to this study of the crime-terror nexus, was Steven Metz. In a working paper published by the Strategic Studies Centre of the U.S. Army War College in 1993, Metz argues – as Snow does – that post-Cold War insurgencies are different than those that existed during the Cold War. According to Metz, the key to understanding emerging insurgencies is to acknowledge that they are based on psychological components.<sup>9</sup> In other words, the inability of primarily Third World states to meet the psychological (social welfare) needs of their populations results in growing frustration and discontent

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp. 55-56.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 56.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. Emphasis added.

<sup>9</sup> Steven Metz, “The Future of Insurgency,” Strategic Studies Working Paper, (U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1993).

– which could subsequently be manipulated by insurgent groups. The key to Metz’s argument, and of particular relevance for this thesis, is the distinction he makes between *spiritual insurgency* and *commercial insurgency*. Spiritual insurgency is considered to be a left-over of the Cold War era, and remains driven by “the problems of modernisation, the search for meaning, and the pursuit of justice.”<sup>10</sup> Commercial insurgency, on the other hand, is driven by a psychological foundation that may be summarised as a “warped translation of Western popular culture which equates wealth, personal meaning, and power.”<sup>11</sup>

Although Kaldor, Snow and Metz do not focus exclusively on the relationship that has developed between terrorism and TOC, their work is important because it considers the loss of ideological motivations in relation to post-Cold War conflict. Furthermore, they suggest that there is a blurring between economic and political motivations of violence. The same contribution is also inherent in other academic attempts to illustrate the nexus between crime and terrorism. For example, Max Manwaring added to this debate by suggesting the existence of a ‘grey area phenomenon’<sup>12</sup>, especially in territory not under state control. ‘Grey area’ refers to the inability to pinpoint the exact nature of a threat – be it criminal, ideological, or violence without cause. However, instead of extrapolating the dynamics of a ‘grey area phenomenon’ to produce a more vivid and comprehensive understanding of the nature of the converging threats he alluded to, Manwaring focused on providing policy guidance to U.S. government actors. In fact, it is worth noting that some policy-makers have also attempted to

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Max Manwaring, ed. Grey Area Phenomenon: Confronting the New World Disorder, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); the foundations of which were developed in Max Manwaring, ed. Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).



highlight the existence of a nexus between organised crime and terrorism. For example, before a hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director of the Criminal Intelligence Directorate of the International Criminal Police Organisation discussed the threat posed by the convergence of organised crime, drugs trafficking and terrorism.<sup>13</sup> Although Mutschke focused on structural links that existed between the groups, he did mention groups considered to be hybrid in nature (i.e. simultaneously criminal and political) – such as Albanian organised crime and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Chris Dishman of the U.S. Commission on National Security, writing in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, also acknowledged that politically motivated terrorist groups could transform into criminal entities, and vice versa, given changing circumstances. Some of his findings will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

Apart from the work of the academics noted above, who focus more generally on the nature of international security, other recent writings touching on the relationship between politically-motivated violence and criminality have emerged from ongoing debates about civil wars. Scholars contributing to these debates have largely drawn on the importance of the post-1991 environment in creating conditions that have changed internal conflict, and thus call for a revolutionary change in thinking about civil wars. Most of these works focus on the interaction between greed and grievance as motivations. Some regard greed as the single motivating factor for civil war, whereas others focus on grievance - while recognising the importance of the dynamics of greed in sustaining conflict. Although their work has been groundbreaking in many respects, it still lacks the required detail and explanatory power needed to address the various

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<sup>13</sup> Ralf Mutschke, "The Threat Posed by the Convergence of Organised Crime, Drugs Trafficking and Terrorism," Annual Report, (Lyons, France: International Criminal Police Organisation, December 2000).

levels of relations that exist between terrorism and TOC. These works are most relevant to one aspect of the CTC ('black hole syndrome'), but can also be applied to the evolution of terrorist groups into criminal organisations – both of which are explained in detail in the next section.

Among the first academics to focus on the political economy of internal wars after the Cold War was Mark Duffield, as exemplified in his contribution to the book War and Hunger: Rethinking International Relations.<sup>14</sup> In his chapter Duffield argues that the post-Cold War era has ushered in an age of “protracted and complex emergencies,”<sup>15</sup> premised on the decline and collapse of formal economic structures in many parts of the world – notably Africa. In this environment, Duffield argues that dominant groups and classes can only ensure political survival if they engage in “parallel and extra-legal activities which themselves promote inter-ethnic tensions, asset transfer, conflict and population displacement.”<sup>16</sup> Duffield refined his arguments through the 1990s to focus on an analysis of war economies – these, Duffield argues, are “adaptive structures based on networked forms of parallel transborder trade.”<sup>17</sup> Duffield recognises the impact of the decline of the state and the rise of globalisation and networked structures. He notes:

The ending of the Cold War changed this situation [superpower rivalry] and has had a big impact on the strategies of existing violent actors and those that have emerged subsequently. Lacking external patronage, warring parties have been forced to develop their own means of economic sustainability. Reflecting the logic of globalisation, this has

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<sup>14</sup> Mark Duffield, “The Political Economy of Internal War,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi, eds. War and Hunger: Rethinking International Relations, (London: Zed, 1994).

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Mark Duffield, “Globalisation, Transborder Trade, and War Economies,” in Mats Berdal and David Malone, eds. Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 69; also see: Mark Duffield, “Post-Modern Conflict: Warlords, Post-adjustment States and Private Protection,” Civil Wars, vol. 1, no. 1 (Spring 1998).



often meant moving beyond the state in the pursuit of wider alternative economic networks.<sup>18</sup>

Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler have also argued that economic motivations of civil wars have become increasingly important in the current international environment. Economists by trade, Collier and Hoeffler have written several reports for the World Bank which focus on the economic motivations of civil war.<sup>19</sup> In their research they divide civil war into two categories: the quest for 'justice', and the quest for 'loot'.<sup>20</sup> The justice model focuses on motivations for rebellion that are commonly cited in the International Relations literature, for example, "the rectification of perceived injustice"<sup>21</sup> which may include innate hatreds between racial or national groups, and socio-economic inequality. The looting model, on the other hand, suggests that the motivation of certain civil wars is solely "the capture of loot".<sup>22</sup> In this situation, capturing loot is not determinate upon victory, but is dependent on the perpetuation of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler cite the rebellions in Angola and Colombia as examples of rebellion remaining "economically profitable for very long periods despite having little prospect of military victory."<sup>23</sup> In essence, it is argued that rebel leaders use grievance (or a sense of perceived injustice) to recruit followers, and continue to "incite grievance for their business to be profitable."<sup>24</sup> In this instance the political is blatantly manipulated for economic gain.

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 73-74.

<sup>19</sup>For example, see: Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 50, no. 4 (1998), pp. 563-73; Collier and Hoeffler, Loot-Seeking and Justice-Seeking in Civil War, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Development Research Group, 1999); Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Development Research Group, 2001).

<sup>20</sup> Collier and Hoeffler (1999), p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 6.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Paul Collier, "Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 44, no. 6 (December 2000), p. 850.

The importance of economic motivations in explaining civil war has been further developed by William Reno.<sup>25</sup> Key to Reno's argument is that internal warfare needs to be understood "with reference to economic motivations that are specifically related to the intensification of transnational commerce in recent decades, and to the political economy of violence inside a particular category of states."<sup>26</sup> Although Reno does not suggest that economic gain is the only motive that drives conflict in weak states, he does point out:

some internal warfare, and the rise of so-called warlords and other armed factions, develops out of a particular Cold War-era relationship between private power, commerce, and state institutions in weak states. It is this dynamic that shapes and guides the pursuit of interests and that enhances the salience of economic interests in this equation.<sup>27</sup>

Following on from the suggestion that political and economic motivations exist simultaneously in conflict scenarios, David Keen explicitly argues that the political and economic necessarily interact.<sup>28</sup> Although Keen discusses in detail the economic functions of warfare, he focuses his attention on the interaction of political and economic agendas and stresses the importance of investigating "how violence is generated by particular political economies."<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, because civil wars evolve over time, Keen presents evidence indicating that a

growing proportion of civil wars appear to have started with the aim of taking over or retaining the reins of the state or of breaking away in a secessionist revolt and appear to have subsequently mutated (often very quickly) into wars where immediate agendas assume an increasingly important role. These immediate agendas (notably economic agendas) may significantly prolong civil wars: Not only do

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<sup>25</sup>William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States*, (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), and Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars," in Berdal and Malone, eds. (2000).

<sup>26</sup> Reno (2000), p. 44.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> This argument was initially introduced in David Keen, "The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars," *Adelphi Paper*, No. 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), and developed further in: Keen, "Incentives and Disincentives for Violence," in Berdal and Malone, eds. (2000).

<sup>29</sup> Keen (2000), p. 22.



they constitute a vested interest in continued conflict, they also tend to create widespread destitution, which itself may feed into economically motivated violence.<sup>30</sup>

The above arguments allude to a multisectoral approach to security by focusing on the interplay between economics, politics, and military threats. They also highlight the linkages between units of analysis by discussing the state in reference to non-state actors – thus indicating that the state can no longer be treated as the only actor that matters in International Relations. Taking advantage of the inherent confusion embedded within the transitional post-Cold War environment, non-state actors - specifically TOC and terrorist groups - have come to epitomise the threats posed to security in the twenty-first century.

### **Explaining the Crime-Terror Continuum**

Thus far there has been no thorough academic analysis specifically addressing the relationship between organised crime and terrorism. Within the context of the contemporary security environment numerous points in the relationship between organised crime and terrorism can be isolated, each of which is intended to highlight the evolving nature of security. The CTC is referred to as a *continuum* precisely because it may be used to trace past, current and the potential future evolution of security threats. It also alludes to the fact that a single group can slide up and down the scale depending on the environment in which it operates. The most unstable and threatening point along the CTC is the fulcrum point, where criminal and political motivations simultaneously converge and are displayed in the actions of a single group. What the CTC primarily demonstrates is that the differences commonly identified between transnational organised crime and terrorism are currently defunct.

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
<sup>30</sup> Ibid., pp. 24-25.

When assessing contemporary security threats, the reality is that it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between political and criminal motivations. As summarised by Schweitzer,

Such distinctions that had existed [between organised crime and terrorism] are fading fast. A few terrorist and criminal organisations already rely on the same global infrastructures for their illegal ploys, take advantage of the same breakdowns in authority and enforcement in states under siege, and seek increasing shares of the fortunes generated from narco-trafficking and other crimes. Whether mercenaries are hired to do the bidding of drug lords or of terrorist kingpins, the hit teams share a single motive in employing violence – earning their financial keep.<sup>31</sup>

Taking this as a starting point, the CTC in its most basic form can be illustrated as follows:

**Figure 3.1: The Crime-Terror Continuum**



As depicted in figure 3.1, organised crime and terrorism traditionally exist at opposite ends of a threat spectrum based on motivation. Traditional organised crime is motivated by profit-maximisation, whereas terrorism has traditionally been motivated by political aims. Placed at opposite ends of a continuum of motivations, the motivations driving the two phenomena are thus theoretically capable of converging at a central point. Transnational organised crime is situated on the far left, with


<sup>31</sup> Glenn E. Schweitzer, A Faceless Enemy: the origins of modern terrorism, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Perseus Publishing, 2002), p. 288.



traditional terrorism situated on the far right – each holding distinct and separate positions. At the fulcrum of the continuum lies the point of ‘convergence’, where a single entity simultaneously exhibits criminal and terrorist characteristics. The relationship between organised crime and terrorism, however, is significantly more complex than figure 3.1 suggests. In assessing the relationship that has developed between criminally and politically motivated groups, seven points along the continuum, as depicted in figure 3.2, are discernible. These points, however, can be divided into four general groups: alliances (1), operational motivations (2), convergence (3), and the ‘black hole’ syndrome (4).

Points 1 through 3 strictly illustrate the relationship that exists between organised crime and terrorism as concepts. Thus point 1 highlights scenarios where two distinct groups come together, whereas points 2 and 3 reflect two degrees of convergence of organised crime and terrorism within a single entity. Point 2 is based on the convergence of tactics only, whereas point 3 is based on the convergence of all related group factors, including: organisational dynamics, tactics, motivational drives and membership composition. Movement between the points, as illustrated in the two case studies of this thesis, is based on a combination of external pressures, changing environmental contexts, and strategic decisions made within the group. Point 4, on the other hand, illustrates the environment that is created when the convergences highlighted in point 3 thrive. Explained in greater detail on page 210, the Black Hole syndrome, facilitated by the existence of weak states, ensures that the most complex relationships between organised crime and terrorism are allowed to persist and eventually take over territorial control.

**Figure 3.2: The Crime Terror Continuum**



Point 1: Alliance formation

The first level of relationship that exists between organised crime and terrorism is the alliance. As illustrated in diagram 3.2, alliances exist on both ends of the CTC spectrum: criminal groups forming alliances with terrorist organisations, and terrorist groups seeking alliances with criminal organisations. The nature of alliances between groups varies, and can include one-off, short-term and long-term relationships. Furthermore, alliances include ties established for a variety of reasons such as seeking expert knowledge (i.e. in money-laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making) or operational support (i.e. access to smuggling routes). In many respects alliance formations are akin to relationships that develop within legitimate business settings. They may be characterised as practical – in terms of time and finances – efficient, and entertained only for as long as required to fulfil a specific goal. As Shelley succinctly concludes, “cooperation with terrorists may have significant benefits for organised



criminals by destabilising the political structure, undermining law enforcement and limiting the possibilities for international cooperation.”<sup>32</sup>

Alliances between criminal and terrorist groups emerged as early as the 1980s in very specific cases that saw both groups benefit from such a relationship. As previously mentioned, the first documented alliances were created in Latin America between terrorist groups such as Colombia’s FARC and the Shining Path of Peru, and the infamous drug cartels. In exchange for securing drug laboratories, these terrorist groups collected a local tax from the drug trade. A similar situation existed in Southeast Asia during the 1980s when the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) established ties with the Indian mafia.<sup>33</sup> In exchange for weapons, the LTTE sold illicit narcotics on behalf of their Indian partners.

The relationship that exists between criminal and terrorist groups has become increasingly sophisticated. The most commonly-cited alliances operate in the realm of the international drug trade. For example, Colombian authorities have reported that the Medellin cocaine cartel hired the ELN to plant car bombs in 1993 because they did not have the capabilities to conduct terrorist acts themselves.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, FARC has entered into alliances with criminal groups outside of Colombia, including Mexican drug trafficking groups. Although FARC has denied this relationship, multiple sources indicate that FARC sends cocaine to Mexico in return for arms shipments.<sup>35</sup> A similar

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<sup>32</sup> Louise Shelley, “Identifying, Counting and Categorizing Transnational Organised Crime,” *Transnational Organised Crime*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 12-13.

<sup>33</sup> This alliance is discussed in Kshitij Prabha, “Narco-Terrorism and India’s Security,” *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 24, no. 10 (January 2001).

<sup>34</sup> Patrick Clawson and Rensselaer Lee, *The Andean Cocaine Industry*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 53.

<sup>35</sup> See: “Colombian Rebel Connections to Mexican Drug Cartel,” Statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman for the U.S. Department of State, 29 November 2000, <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2000/11/irp-001129-col.htm> (Downloaded 03 November 2002); and Luis

relationship was established by FARC with Russian criminal groups who sent arms to Colombia in exchange for cocaine shipments.<sup>36</sup>

In addition to relatively straightforward alliances based on the provision of specific services, more sophisticated relationships have emerged between criminal and terrorist groups. This is best exemplified by international smuggling operations (chain networks) that move various commodities ranging from illicit narcotics and weapons to human cargo between countries and continents. For example the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) entered into a strategic relationship with the Afghan drug mafia and Central Asian criminal groups to ensure that shipments of heroin could be safely transported between Afghanistan and the Russian Federation and the Caucasus. It is also believed that militants linked to al-Qaeda established connections with Bosnian criminal organisations to establish a route for trafficking Afghan heroin into Europe via the Balkans,<sup>37</sup> and that criminal networks in southern Thailand have smuggled small-arms into Sri Lanka and the Indonesian conflict zones of Aceh, Sulawesi and Maluku<sup>38</sup> – to arm terrorist groups.

A similar relationship is evident in the Balkans between the Albanian mafia and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) before and during the conflict in Kosovo. After the fall of the Albanian government in 1997, the Albanian mafia secured its authority over heroin trafficking routes through the Balkans. At approximately the same time, the

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Gutierrez Esparza, "La Mafia Rusa en Mexico," Memorando, 29 July 2001, <http://latamcent.org.mx> (Downloaded 03 November 2002).

<sup>36</sup> Jerry Seper, "Mexicans, Russian Mob New Partners in Crime," The Washington Times, 20 August 2001; "Peru: a spy story replete with arms, drugs-dealers and bears," CNN, 08 September 2000; and, "Farclandia," a discussion of narco-states cited in the transnational crime section of the Centre for the Study of International Security website (Washington, D.C.): <http://www.csis.org>.

<sup>37</sup> Kurt Eichenwald, "A Nation Challenged: the Money," The New York Times, 10 December 2001, p. A1.

<sup>38</sup> Anthony Davis, "The Complexities of Unrest in Southern Thailand," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 14, no. 9 (September 2002).



KLA was established to seek an independent state from Serbia. As noted in a report published in the *Washington Times*, a very specific relationship developed between the political wing of the KLA – the Kosovo National Front (KLF) - and Albanian criminal groups to smuggle heroin. These ties thus “provided a well-oiled arrangement: the profits from the Pristina cartel, estimated to be in the ‘high tens of millions’, were funnelled to the KLA, where they were used primarily to buy weapons, often in ‘drugs for arms’ arrangements.”<sup>39</sup> This relationship, however, is significantly more complex than the straightforward alliance discussed here. As will be illustrated in subsequent sections, both the Albanian mafia and KLA could be considered hybrid groups based on the nature of their activities throughout the 1990s.

As illustrated in the examples cited above, in most instances the ties which have developed between organised crime and terrorism have been isolated to specific geographic regions. This indicates that it is in the interest of criminal and terrorist groups - invariably within unstable regions - to form alliances to ensure that an environment conducive to both their needs is sustained. Political instability is in the interest of terrorists because it diminishes the legitimacy of governments in the eyes of society – the audience from whom terrorists seek to gain support. Political instability is also in the interest of criminal groups seeking to maximise criminal operations. This is especially true for groups engaged in wide-scale smuggling of licit or illicit commodities. For this reason, crime-terrorist alliances have been especially common in Latin America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus.

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<sup>39</sup> “KLA Buys Arms with Illicit Funds,” *The Washington Times*, 04 June 1999.

Increasingly, however, alliances between organised crime and terrorist groups have evolved to include a greater international dimension. As a result ties have been formed between splinter groups in the FARC and Russian Organised Crime; and between ETA and the Italian Mafia.<sup>40</sup> Furthermore, the ongoing activities in Paraguay's triple border area highlight the extent to which criminal and terrorist groups have found it in their interest to seek mutually beneficial partnerships.<sup>41</sup> These examples illustrate the benefits to terrorists and TCOs of participating in alliances. However, they also reveal that alliances inherently constitute a greater threat to security than terrorism or TOC as independent phenomena. Manwaring summarises this threat:

Together, the alliance has the economic and military power equal to or better than that of most nation-states in the world today. This alliance also has another advantage. All three groups possess relatively flat organisational structures and sophisticated communications systems that, when combined, create a mechanism that is considerably more effective and efficient than any slow-moving bureaucratic and hierarchical government system. That combined organisational advantage is a major source of power in itself.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the existence of alliances between organised crime and terrorist groups – and the operational purposes they have served in the past – such groups will avoid forming alliances if they can. Instead as the 1990s progressed, it became increasingly apparent that criminal and terrorist groups were seeking to “*mutate* their own structure and organisation to take on a non-traditional, financial, or political role, rather than cooperate with groups who are already effective in those activities.”<sup>43</sup> The primary reason for acquiring in-house capabilities was to ensure organisational security, and to secure organisational operations. In doing so criminal and terrorist groups could avoid

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<sup>40</sup> For example, see: Martin Arostegui, “ETA has drugs-for-weapons deal with Mafia,” United Press International, 03 October 2002.

<sup>41</sup> See: Mutschke (2000); and Mario Daniel Montoya, “War on Terrorism Reaches Paraguay's Triple Border,” Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 13, no. 12 (December 2001), pp. 12-16.

<sup>42</sup> Manwaring (1993), p. 8.

<sup>43</sup> Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24 (2001), p. 48.



the inherent problems present in all alliances, including: differences over priorities and strategies; distrust; the danger of defections; and the threat that alliance could create competitors.<sup>44</sup> Thus, as illustrated in the next section, several criminal and terrorist groups operational since the 1990s can effectively and efficiently engage in both criminal and terrorist activities.

### Point 2: Organised Crime and Terrorism as Operational Tools

Criminal groups using terrorism as an operational tool and terrorist groups taking part in criminal activities as an operational tool constitute the second component of the CTC. Although the use of terror tactics by criminals can be traced back into the history of organised crime,<sup>45</sup> as a generalisation terrorist engagement in organised crime to secure profits for future operations did not seriously emerge until the early 1990s.<sup>46</sup> In both cases, however, the post-Cold War era drove many criminal and terrorist groups to shift their operational focus. As a result, criminal groups have increasingly engaged in political activity in an effort to manipulate operational conditions present in the rising numbers of weak states; whereas terrorist groups have increasingly focused on criminal activities to replace lost financial support from state sponsors.

Traditional criminal organisations and several transnational criminal groups have regularly used terror tactics in order to fulfil specific operational aims. Although these groups have, at times, apparently engaged the political – it is essential to clarify that their intention was not to change the status quo, but merely to secure their operational

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<sup>44</sup> Phil Williams, “Criminal Cooperation: trends and patterns,” Jane’s Conference on Transnational Organised Crime, 20-21 September 2000.

<sup>45</sup> As will be discussed later in this chapter, the rise of the Sicilian Mafia was completely intertwined with a political agenda that included attaining territorial control over much of the region of Sicily, and subsequently Neopolitana by the Camorra.

<sup>46</sup> The exception to this is the criminal operations conducted by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1970s and 1980s as a source of fundraising.

environment. As Dishman notes, criminal organisations use “selective and calibrated violence to destroy competitors or threaten counternarcotic authorities. As such, a violent attack directed by a TCO is intended for a specific ‘anti-constituency’ rather than a national or international audience, and it is not laced with political rhetoric.”<sup>47</sup> Despite utilising terror tactics, such as bombings and assassinations, the primary motivation of these groups remained illicit profit-maximisation. The attacks conducted by the Medellin drug cartel in Colombia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, resulting in over 500 deaths,<sup>48</sup> was comparable to (if not outweighed by) the violence perpetrated by Colombian terrorist groups such as the FARC and ELN during the same period. Prior to this period of violence, the FARC declared war on the government of Colombia in the early 1980s in response to a widespread government attempt to crack down on the cocaine trade. A communiqué issued by the Medellin cartel demonstrates the group’s own dedication towards the overt use of terrorism:

We declare total and absolute war on the government, the industrial and political oligarchy, the journalists who have attacked and outraged us, the judges who have sold themselves to the government, high court extraditing judges and presidential and sectorial (social, business and labour) associations, and all who have persecuted and attacked us.<sup>49</sup>

A similar situation was associated with the rise of the Italian Mafias in the early twentieth century. In order to consolidate their operations in the first half of the twentieth century, the Mafia took military control (via the use of violence) over territory in western Sicily, which created a system of power in direct confrontation with the state. Not only did the Mafia undermine state sovereignty by taking military and judicial control over parts of Italy, but it also hindered the “ability of the Italian state to develop by taking possession of state functions, notably the monopoly over

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<sup>47</sup>Dishman (2001), p. 45.

<sup>48</sup> Clawson and Lee (1996), p. 51.

<sup>49</sup> “Drug Lords Vow War on Colombia,” The Los Angeles Times, 25 August 1989.



violence, taxation and law; and by taking away the ability of the state to provide for its citizens.”<sup>50</sup> The ability to legitimise its use of violence, at least within the confines of specific territories, guaranteed the existence of the Mafia system, which was “functional to the accumulation of resources to invest in illicit markets, but also to gain consent necessary to infiltrate legitimate society.”<sup>51</sup>

The practise of obtaining political objectives through the use of terror tactics became common once again in the 1990s as a result of a relatively successful government drive to counter the influence of the Italian Mafia in the country.<sup>52</sup> As early as 1990, the Italian government’s AntiMafia Commission reported that because the Mafia controlled political, institutional and economic powers and threatened the state with the use of violence, it was evident that “the present strategy of the Mafia is no longer cohabitation with the legal power, but its progressive evisceration.”<sup>53</sup> Further illustrating this point, Jamieson argues that a bombing campaign directed at tourist attractions by the Italian Mafia in the early 1990s revealed a distinct deviation from the understanding that organised crime sought to remain unnoticed by the majority of the population. Instead:

The traditional Mafia groups have learned to use the magnifying glass of symbolic violence to reach a wider audience: in 1993 the Sicilian Mafia carried out a series of car bomb attacks in the Italian mainland near historic sites such as the Uffizi Galleries in Florence and the church of St. John Lateran in Rome; plans were laid to blow up the Leaning Tower of Pisa. The aim was not to eliminate an enemy, but to intimidate public opinion and Parliament into abrogating recently passed antimafia legislation.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Fransesco Marelli, “The State Policy, the Sicilian Mafia and Political Violence,” Paper presented at the 29<sup>th</sup> ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 6-11 April 2001, Grenoble, France, p. 1.

<sup>51</sup> Fabio Armao, “A ‘Standard’ Crime: Why Mafia Win Success,” paper presented at the 29<sup>th</sup> ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 6-11 April 2001, Grenoble, France, p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> For an excellent account of Italy’s fight against organised crime, see: Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia, (London and New York: Macmillan Press Ltd and St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000.)

<sup>53</sup> Marelli, (2001), p. 9.

<sup>54</sup> Alison Jamieson, “Transnational Organised Crime: A European Perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 24 (2001), p. 379.

Terror tactics were thus used by the Mafia to “subvert anti-Mafia actions and legislative moves, these bombings were meant to openly challenge the political elite and send a message to the ‘powers-that-be’.”<sup>55</sup> Comparable with any traditional terrorist group, the Mafia engaged in terrorism as a tactical tool to “force government leniency and negotiation.”<sup>56</sup> In relation to the CTC, the Mafia could easily be regarded as an entity that naturally “seeks to have its own power, at times acting from within the institutions, at times combating these institutions. It is an organisation that skilfully switches register between order and disorder, so as to increase its own sphere of dominion.”<sup>57</sup>

Similar to criminal groups engaging in terrorism, many terrorist groups have become well versed in the conduct of criminal operations. In response to the virtual elimination of state support after the end of the Cold War, criminality was the most pragmatic avenue to secure finances for future terrorist operations. Equally important to note is that terrorists who engage in criminal activities “ostensibly retain paramount political objectives, and as such, ill-gotten monies serve only as a means to effectively reach their political ends.”<sup>58</sup> The illicit drug trade is the most common criminal activity in which terrorist groups have been involved. Since the 1970s groups such as FARC, Basque Homeland and Freedom movement (ETA), the PKK, and Sendero Luminoso have all been linked to the drugs trade by well-documented evidence.<sup>59</sup> These groups

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<sup>55</sup> Sebastyen Gorka, “The New Threat of Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor (2000).

<sup>56</sup> Dishman (2001), p. 47.

<sup>57</sup> Renate Siebert, “Mafia and Anti-Mafia. Concepts and Individuals,” Paper presented at the 29<sup>th</sup> ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 6-11 April 2001, Grenoble, France, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> Dishman (2001), p. 47.

<sup>59</sup> For a good overview of the pre-1991 involvement of terrorist groups in the drug trade see Mark Steinitz, “Insurgents, Terrorists and the Drug Trade,” The Washington Quarterly, 1985.



remain involved in the drug trade, and were joined in the 1990s with a new following including Hizbullah and the IMU. It is alleged that Hizbullah protects heroin and cocaine laboratories in the Bekaa Valley,<sup>60</sup> and evidence strongly indicates that the IMU (prior to the September 11, 2001) controlled drug trafficking routes into Central Asia from northern Afghanistan.<sup>61</sup> Although the evidence is fragmentary, researchers and journalists have reported that the LTTE has also trafficked heroin from the Golden Crescent through India and Sri Lanka to the West.<sup>62</sup>

As depicted in previous paragraphs, terrorist groups have commonly been associated with trafficking in illicit narcotics. However, they have also engaged in a wide variety of other crimes such as fraud and human smuggling. According to Rohan Gunaratna, al-Qaeda's financial network in Europe, dominated by Algerians, is largely reliant on credit card fraud.<sup>63</sup> Estimates given to Gunaratna by security and intelligence agencies indicate that nearly US\$1 million a month has been raised from these alternative criminal avenues.<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, European security agencies have admitted that prosecuting terrorists engaged in credit card fraud has been a daunting task because "al-Qaeda's cadres are continually learning new techniques to evade detection"<sup>65</sup>—

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<sup>60</sup> *The Jerusalem Post*, "US May Hit Hizbullah Drug Trade," 17 June 1997; and International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, US Department of State, 1996.

<sup>61</sup> This connection was confirmed in a report commissioned by the United Nations Drug Control Programme in 1999. Alexander Zelichenko, Analiticheskiy Obzor Narkosituatsia v Zone Deistviya Mezhdynarodnoho Antinarkotikovoho Proyektu OON 'Oshskiy Yzel', Unpublished report; see also: "CACI Forum Summary: Drugs: A Threat to Central Asian Security," available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/ForumSummaries/Drug\\_Conference.htm](http://www.cacianalyst.org/ForumSummaries/Drug_Conference.htm) (accessed 11 May 2000); and, Scott Peterson, "Fabled Silk Road Now Paved With Narcotics," The Christian Science Monitor, 01 August 2001.

<sup>62</sup> Daniel L. Byman, et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements, (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 2001); Stefan Leader and David Wiencek, "Drug Money: the Fuel for Global Terrorism," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 12, no. 2 (February 2000).

<sup>63</sup> This is also discussed by Michael Radu, "Terrorism After the Cold War: Trends and Challenges," Orbis, vol. 46, no. 1 (Spring 2002).

<sup>64</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaeda: Global Networks of Terror, (London: Hurst & Company, 2002).

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

illustrating the extent to which al-Qaeda has manipulated processes of globalisation and its networked organisation.

Factions of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) have also been involved in various organised criminal activity including smuggling cars, tobacco and drugs, running extortion rackets and prostitution rings, and engaging in fraud. It has, for example, been reported that the IRA funds its arms deals with approximately £7 million annual profits made primarily from tobacco smuggling from Eastern Europe.<sup>66</sup> Clawson and Lee described the IRA's involvement in monopolizing the taxi and bus market of Belfast by purchasing large numbers of cabs and buses and threatening the competition. The actions of the IRA forced the Belfast bus service to retire over 300 buses, thus costing the city an estimated US\$15 million.<sup>67</sup>

The LTTE, on the other hand, has gained attention because of the inroads the group has made in smuggling human cargo. In fact, the smuggling of human beings has become the mainstay of LTTE financial procurement.<sup>68</sup> LTTE members knowingly traffic people to the West via their networks in Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, they have also utilised Thailand as a major transshipment point, and a centre for obtaining forged identification.<sup>69</sup> The extent of LTTE involvement in human smuggling is exhibited in a single example cited by Byman et al: "in June 2000, the Sri Lankan Criminal Investigation Department uncovered one

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<sup>66</sup> Liam Clark and David Leppard, "Photos Link More IRA Men to Colombia," The Sunday Times, 28 April 2002, p. 10; also quoted in Nick Fielding, "Ulster's £18 million Terrorist Gangs Turn to Smuggling," The Sunday Times, 07 July 2002, p. 10. For further details of the links between terrorism and organised crime in Northern Ireland, see: The Threat Assessment 2002: Serious and Organised Crime in Northern Ireland, (Belfast: Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force, 2002); and Richard Evans, "Organised Crime and Terrorist Financing in Northern Ireland," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 14, no. 9 (September 2002), pp. 26-29.

<sup>67</sup> James Adams, The Financing of Terrorism, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 173.

<sup>68</sup> Byman et al. (2000).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.



major LTTE smuggling ring, involving an estimated 600 to 700 people who had been trafficked to the European Union on forged visas.”<sup>70</sup> Given that the LTTE charge between US\$18,000 and US\$32,000 per transaction, the profits of such operations are substantial.<sup>71</sup>

### Points 3 to 5: The Convergence Thesis

As the 1990s progressed and both criminal and terrorist groups combined economic and political capabilities, it became apparent that many groups had lost sight of their original motivations and aims. Thus at the start of the twenty-first century a growing number of groups simultaneously displayed characteristics of transnational organised crime and terrorism. Furthermore, in assessing the development of these hybrid organisations, it is evident that the motivations, organisation, and operations of criminal and terrorist groups have also converged – thus making it analytically difficult to make a distinction between the two phenomena.

The ‘convergence thesis’ refers explicitly to the idea that criminal and terrorist organisations could converge into a single entity which initially displays characteristics of both groups simultaneously; but has the potential to transform itself into an entity situated at the opposite end of the CTC from which it began. Transformation thus occurs to such a degree “that the ultimate aims and motivations of the organisation have actually changed. In these cases, the groups no longer retain the defining points that had hitherto made them a political or criminal group.”<sup>72</sup> In an article written on ‘grey area’ threats, Xavier Raufer’s explanation of the new world

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Dishman (2001), p. 48.

disorder that emerged following the end of the Cold War reinforces this point. Using Karl Marx's analogy of "revolution as water on the stove," Raufer writes:

Until it reaches the boiling point, the water changes only in terms of degree. Once it hits 212° and become steam, it changes its nature. Compared to a revolt, or a riot, a revolution represents a change in the nature, not the degree, of a country's socio-political reality. The same is true of the new threats. In scientific parlance, the end of the bipolar order has caused the mutation of a host of organisms that used to be purely terrorist groups or purely criminal groups. In other words, they have abruptly and unexpectedly shifted from machines to lifeforms.<sup>73</sup>

According to Raufer 'machines' represent strategic-level violence perpetrated by non-state actors which were funded, and thus ultimately controlled, by state actors. Thus most terrorist groups that operated during the Cold War could be classified 'machines' because their dependency on state support was almost complete. 'Lifeforms', on the other hand, refer vaguely to "complex entities that are very hard to identify, understand and define within inadequately explored territories and movements."<sup>74</sup> It is these entities that encompass the notion of 'converging threats'.

In its most basic form, the convergence thesis includes two independent, yet related, components. First are criminal groups that display political motivations; and second, terrorist groups which are equally interested in criminal profits, but ultimately begin to use their political (ideological) rhetoric as a façade for solely perpetrating criminal activities. The direct implication of arguing that ideological rhetoric may become a façade for criminal activity is that these groups should no longer be considered terrorist, but simply referred to as criminals. In the context of this thesis, it is important to remember that groups are capable of sliding up and down the CTC – and depending

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<sup>73</sup> Xavier Raufer, "New World Disorder, New Terrorisms: New Threats for Europe and the Western World," Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 11, no. 4 (Winter 1999), p. 35. Raufer first introduced his thoughts about grey area threats in: Xavier Raufer, "Grey Areas: a New Security Threat," Political Warfare (Spring 1992).

<sup>74</sup> Raufer (1999), p. 36.



on the environment in which they operate they are also capable of transforming themselves. An associated purpose of introducing the CTC is to acknowledge and simultaneously to prioritise the need to understand the changing dynamics of terrorist or criminal groups as they engage with their environment and vice versa; and because, as will be illustrated in the case studies, it is possible that both crime and politics will continue to colour aspects of the group's existence, such as recruitment. Understanding how the group manipulates its criminal and political nature in various circumstances will help policy-makers locate the group's strengths and weaknesses. The same is true in the context of criminal terrorism. Although it could be argued that criminal terrorist groups should merely be referred to as terrorist, this would be to ignore the hybrid nature of this threat. Despite focusing predominantly on the acquisition of illicit profits, these groups still depend on the use of terror tactics to secure their criminal positions. This means that to understand the evolution of these entities, both criminal and political aspects must be acknowledged and analysed continuously.

The first category of the convergence thesis can further be subdivided into two parts. First, it includes groups that have used terror tactics to gain political leverage beyond the disruption of judicial processes or attempts to block anti-crime legislation (which is a common tactic utilised by organised crime in order to secure their operations). Instead they are interested in attaining political control via direct involvement in the political processes and institutions of a state. Second, it includes criminal organisations that initially use terrorism to establish a monopoly over lucrative economic sectors of a state. In controlling economic sectors – including strategic natural resources - and financial institutions, these entities aim ultimately to gain political control over the

state itself. This is based on the premise that in a contemporary world dominated by the dynamics of the free market economy, economic strength is the obvious prerequisite for political power; and political power subsequently sustains both the life of the organisation and its activities – be they criminal and/or political. As Raufer further notes, “Grabbing control of financial institutions can both bring home the cash and advance political ambitions. Many groups, of course, will retain narrow portfolios of objectives, targets, and methods; others are becoming conglomerates of causes.”<sup>75</sup> In this situation it is integral to be able to determine “if an ostensibly criminal gang is engaged in crime for personal gain or whether this criminal activity is an adjunct to political violence.”<sup>76</sup>

The second component of the convergence thesis addresses terrorist groups that become so engaged with their involvement in criminal activities (as discussed in the previous section) that they merely maintain their political rhetoric as a façade for perpetrating criminal activities on a wider scale. There is growing evidence to indicate that, despite increasingly focusing on criminal activities, terrorist groups “maintain a public façade, supported by rhetoric and statements, but underneath, they have transformed into a different type of group with a different end game.”<sup>77</sup> No longer driven by a political agenda, but by the proceeds of crime, these formerly traditional terrorist groups continue to engage in the use of terror tactics for two primary reasons. The first is to keep the government and law enforcement authorities focused on political issues and problems, as opposed to initiating criminal investigations. Based on the general observation that governments appear more adept at fighting crime than

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 289.

<sup>76</sup> Ronald Crelinsten, “Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy,” in Lesser and Hoffman, et al., eds. (1999), p. 85.

<sup>77</sup> Dishman (2001), p. 48.



fighting terrorism, this is viewed as an important advantage. Second, terror tactics continue to be used as a tool for these groups to assert themselves amongst rival criminal groups. Furthermore, by continuing to portray their political component to the public, these terrorist groups are able to manipulate the terrorist support network that had previously been put in place. For example, they continue to focus on political grievances (combined with financial rewards) in order to attract recruits – providing justifications for what would normally be regarded as purely criminal acts. Thus by simultaneously focusing on criminal and political goals, these groups are able to use two sets of networks which allow them to “shift focus from one application of terrorism to another, or to pursue multiple applications simultaneously.”<sup>78</sup>


The greatest single threat to international security emerging from the CTC, however, is exhibited at the fulcrum point of the continuum. Identified as the ‘Black Hole’, it is at this point where the convergence between criminal and political motivations within a single group allows that group to subsequently gain economic and political control over a state. Should this situation occur there are two prevailing environments that may threaten to emerge. First, the ‘black hole’ can produce a failed state – such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Liberia - that lacks central authority, and thus displays the characteristics of anarchy. Second, the ‘black hole’ can produce a criminal state, such as North Korea, Myanmar, and potentially the Russian Federation. Using terror tactics to retain their power and control over these states, government elites of these countries use their official positions to engage in lucrative illicit activities for personal enrichment or to create a territorial safe haven for other transnational criminal organisations. Essential to the emergence of a black hole syndrome is a weak or failed state where government authority, legitimacy and territorial control does not exist or

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<sup>78</sup> Lesser et al., eds. (1999), p. 98.

has been significantly challenged to the point where the state is fragmented and therefore various components of the state (i.e. economic or political system, legitimate monopoly over the use of violence) become vulnerable to the relative power exerted by commercial terrorist or political crime groups.

**Figure 3.3: Converging Threats**



### *Political Crime*

The first threat subsumed under the convergence thesis is political crime. Political crime refers to the situation in which a criminal organisation - in addition to engaging in criminal activity - seeks overt political objectives through the use of terrorism. Thus, political criminal groups simultaneously display the characteristics of both TOC and terrorist entities according to the definitions provided in Chapter One. It would therefore be inaccurate to identify these groups as being either solely criminal or terrorist, thus necessitating new thinking about the actual threat they pose.

Most academic literature on organised crime continues to argue that criminal organisations are entirely motivated by economic gains. Although this conclusion may remain true for traditional criminal groups operating in the world today – such as the Japanese Yakuza and most Chinese Triads – this narrow argument fails to



acknowledge the emergence of transnational organised crime and the evolving international security environment. Affected by the dynamics emerging from globalisation and the end of the Cold War, growing numbers of criminal organisations have evolved into new entities. Thus in addition to displaying the characteristics of transnational organised crime noted in Chapter One, these groups have further adapted to the post-1991 environment by transforming their structures, strategies and activities. These latter additions to the characteristics of transnational criminal groups have, in many ways, created hybrid entities that simultaneously seek criminal and political objectives through the use of terrorism. These groups can be distinguished from TOC in general by specifically referring to them as political criminal organisations (PCOs).

Structurally, PCOs resemble traditional terrorist groups in that they are cell and network based (as described in Chapter Two). Furthermore, in response to the prevalent international environment, these groups are no longer hierarchical, but increasingly appear non-hierarchical, decentralised and fluid in their organisation.<sup>79</sup> As a result, leaderships are easily replaceable, enabling the groups to fulfil their aims well into the future. Partly because of their non-hierarchical nature, PCOs are extremely flexible and professional in their operations. This professionalism has led to the more efficient and effective exploitation of economic and political developments in numerous states – especially weak states. For example, PCOs have exploited flaws in legal, banking and tax systems not only to find new criminal opportunities, but also to locate and secure financial and physical safe havens. It is the desire to secure a safe haven that has subsequently produced a stepping-stone for PCOs to focus on political

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<sup>79</sup> Ground breaking work on the changing organisational dynamics of organised crime has been made by Phil Williams on transnational organised crime in general, and Mark Galeotti on Russian and Chechen criminal structures. A useful illustration of network-based organized crime structures is provided by Mark Galeotti, "Globalising Crime: Networks and Alliances in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Underworld," Cross Border Control, Issue 14 (2000), p. 35.

objectives. Securing political power within a state has become an effective avenue that inevitably leads to more lucrative criminal endeavours that circumvent methods of national detection because most state security organs and government bodies have been successfully, and directly, penetrated.

A second scenario that has provided the impetus for PCOs to seek political objectives emanates from the argument that economic power and political power are inseparable. A PCO is hybrid for the very reason that it has a membership base that has historically associated money with political power and vice versa. This situation is most apparent in the former Soviet Union and many African states. Some of the most powerful criminal organisations that emerged in the Russian Federation in the 1990s, for example, included the same people who held prominent positions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As former officials of the Communist Party, these individuals naturally continued to associate political power with economic advantages. As will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Four, the structure of some of the most powerful Russian criminal organisations simultaneously (and consciously) sought overtly political objectives alongside their criminal aims.

As a result, PCOs operate their criminal and political strategies in tandem to produce an environment once only associated with terrorism: to “break or ruin the sense of social and political calm in a country”.<sup>80</sup> In successfully producing such a climate, PCOs can proceed to build an alternative or parallel government. This is evident in several regions of the Russian Federation – including the Maritime Province of the Russian Far East. In many ways, organised criminals in Russia – and similarly in

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<sup>80</sup> Harmon (2000), p. 54.



Albania – have found that “in order to mobilise sufficient power to resist the state, they must move their organisations beyond pure criminalism with its limited appeal to most citizens and add elements of political protest.”<sup>81</sup> Commenting specifically on the rise of the Albanian Mafia, officials of the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) have called it a ‘hybrid’ group because their activities indicate that its “political and criminal activities are deeply intertwined.”<sup>82</sup> Mutschke further notes that the Albanian mafia is intrinsically linked to “Panalbanian ideals, politics, military activities and terrorism,” explaining why Albanian criminal organisations used their criminal profits to purchase arms and military equipment for the KLA from 1993.<sup>83</sup> Contributing to the convergence between crime and politics in Albania is the fact that Albanian criminal and terrorist groups have an interchangeable membership and recruitment base – essentially posing as terrorists by day and criminals by night.

The most striking example of a PCO is the Colombian drug cartels. Although details will be provided in Chapter Five, the following quote exemplifies the hybrid nature of these groups:

The attachment of drug traffickers to their country, and to their regions of origin, goes beyond strategic calculation. They were/are deeply rooted in their cultures, traditions, and regional societies. Not only have they shared their wealth with their cities, and invested a significant amount (but not most) of their fortunes in their country, but they have also revived local cultures, rebuilt rural life, strongly affirmed their religious feelings, and their beliefs in local saints and miracles, supported musical folklore (and were rewarded with laudatory songs from Colombia bards), made Colombian football teams (traditionally poor) the pride of the

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<sup>81</sup> Metz (1993).

<sup>82</sup>Ralf Mutschke, Assistant Director, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, International Criminal Police Organisation, “The Threat Posed by Organised Crime, International Drug Trafficking and Terrorism,” Written testimony to the General Secretariat Hearing of the Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 13 December 2000.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid.

nation, and revitalised the dormant economies and social scenes of Medellin and Cali.<sup>84</sup>

### *Commercial Terrorism*

The second part of the convergence thesis is termed commercial terrorism. Commercial terrorism generally refers to a situation in which traditional terrorist groups that initially engaged in criminal activities to secure funding for their operations, have over time primarily sought to secure and focus on their criminal activities. Organised crime thus becomes either (a) the primary concern of the terrorist group in question,<sup>85</sup> or (b) is given equal priority with the group's political aims. The concept of commercial terrorism fills a gap in the academic literature by highlighting the point, as Schweitzer notes, that equally "propelling terrorists is the power of their most recent prop – money".<sup>86</sup> This context can best be summarised as 'fighters turned felons' who adopt "drugs, arms, illegal migrants, and even diamonds" as their new 'best friend.'<sup>87</sup>

An example that highlights the transformation of a staunch political group into a predominantly criminal one is that of FARC.<sup>88</sup> By the mid-1990s, following the death of Jacobo Arenas – the groups' ideological leader – FARC deepened its involvement in the regional drugs trade from that of the protector of drug crops on behalf of cocaine cartels to 'middleman' between farmers and cartels. This shift directly resulted in the group acquiring more profits from the trade, and subsequently more power within Colombia. Thus, by 2000, it was believed that FARC controlled 40 per cent of

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<sup>84</sup>Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. III, End of the Millennium, (Malden, Mass.: Blackwood Publishers, 1998), p. 199.

<sup>85</sup> See FN 76.

<sup>86</sup> Schweitzer (2002), p. 33.

<sup>87</sup>Jamieson (2001), p. 382.

<sup>88</sup> This example will be expanded on in Chapter Five.



Colombian territory, and received revenues of US\$500 million annually from illicit narcotics. Supplementing its bankroll from drugs, FARC also engaged in other criminal activities, including kidnapping and extortion. Referring to both FARC and the ELN, Wilkinson concludes that because of the level of their involvement in organised crime,

...it is clear that this has made them, both in reality and popular perception, little more than a branch of organised crime, decadent guerrillas rather than genuine revolutionaries, irredeemably corrupted by their intimate involvement with narco-traffickers and their cynical pursuits of huge profits from kidnapping and from their 'protection' of coca and opium production, processing and shipping facilities.<sup>89</sup>

In Colombia, groups once considered to be "impassioned and ideological", such as FARC and ELN, have "lost their old revolutionary 'purity' and turned their terrorism in a new direction – development as criminal cartels."<sup>90</sup>

Two groups in Europe appear to have followed a similar transformation to that of FARC: the Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (i.e. the Ulster Defence Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force) and the KLA. Despite observing cease-fires since the mid-1990s, the growing involvement of loyalist groups in serious and organised criminal activity (i.e. drug supply, smuggling contraband goods, and extortion) raises questions about their true motivations. As with FARC, loyalist paramilitaries seek to maintain instability because they are unwilling to relinquish their criminal interests; or endanger an environment that has proven to be conducive to their criminal activities. Since the 1970s the loyalist terrorist groups began to engage in criminal activities as their primary source of revenue. Over the decades, however, a subsidiary engagement in crime for operational funding grew to become the focus of

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<sup>89</sup> Wilkinson (2001), p. 113.

<sup>90</sup> Harmon (2000), p. xvii.

these groups. Silke concludes that loyalist financing has always been a means to an end (i.e. political violence), however, as loyalist terrorist groups continue to focus on funding through organised crime during ceasefire years, there is a danger that financing has become a group end in itself.<sup>91</sup> This concern has been highlighted in the annual threat assessments of the Organised Crime Task Force of the U.K. government.<sup>92</sup> Loyalist terrorist groups in Northern Ireland therefore provide a prime example of a “*mutated* terrorist group who invested significant energies into committing profit-driven criminal acts.”<sup>93</sup>

The KLA is a terrorist organisation which finds itself in an environment full of criminal opportunities. Confusion between political and criminal interests has been created within the KLA’s membership and its splinter group the National Liberation Army (NLA).<sup>94</sup> Situated at the heart of the ‘Balkan Route’, which is known for its role in shipping Asian opiates to the European market, the KLA/NLA quickly seized the opportunity embedded in conflict to become involved in criminal activities. Thus, as conflict in the Balkans created increasingly deteriorating conditions, it became evident by the end of 1999 that the KLA manipulated its political rhetoric for criminal intentions. As with FARC and IRA factions, the KLA/NLA was interested in armed conflict primarily to secure smuggling routes.<sup>95</sup> For example, Interpol has noted the KLA as a “key player” in the drugs-for-arms business in the late 1990’s, helping to

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<sup>91</sup> Andrew Silke, “Drink, Drugs and Rock’n’Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland Part II,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 23 (2000), p. 124.

<sup>92</sup> See the annual threat assessments available on the OCTF website: <http://www.octf.gov.uk>

<sup>93</sup> Dishman (2001), p. 49.

<sup>94</sup> For more information on the criminal-political nexus in the Balkans, see: National Security Council, International Crime Threat Assessment, (Washington, D.C.: National Security Council, 2000); and Xavier Raufer, La Mafia Albanaise, (Lausanne: Favre, 2000) provides a very detailed argument about how the Albanian mafia is political by nature and thus seeks political objectives.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.



transport US\$2 billion worth of drugs into Western Europe annually.<sup>96</sup> The extent to which the KLA exhibits criminal-political motivations is aptly described by Raufer in the following quote:

There's not such a thing as rebels and militias on the one hand and the Albanian mafia on the other. In the Albanian world – in Albania and in Kosovo and in the Albanian-populated part of Macedonia – you have clans and in those clans you have a mix of young men fighting for the cause of national liberation, young men belonging to the mafia. It's absolutely impossible to distinguish between them. They obey the same clans, they have the same logic, the same world-view, and to discriminate between one guy who's one day selling heroin and the next day fighting in the mountains is absolutely impossible.<sup>97</sup>

A similar situation is also evidently occurring in Asia, where groups such as Abu Sayyaf and the IMU have increasingly focused their attention on financial motivations. Since 2000 Abu Sayyaf was primarily engaged in criminal activities such as kidnapping operations, and most recently, operating marijuana plantations in the Philippines. The group was originally founded in 1991 with the financial support of Al Qaeda, officially ascribing to the same revolutionary Islamism as Osamah bin Laden (i.e. radical Salafism). However, following the death of the group's founder Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998, Abu Sayyaf factions increasingly focused on crime.<sup>98</sup> As a result, the group was seen to “straddle the divide between revolutionary Islamism and common criminality” to the point that the jihadist ideology of Al Qaeda merely “served to provide a veneer of ideological legitimacy to a movement that is heir to a centuries-old tradition of Muslim Tausog resistance to Christian colonialism and a time-honoured local kidnap-for-ransom industry.”<sup>99</sup> The IMU, on the other hand, was

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<sup>96</sup> Mutsche (1999).

<sup>97</sup> Interview with Xavier Raufer on Radio Netherlands, 03 August 2001.

<sup>98</sup> Anthony Davis, “Resilient Abu Sayyaf Resists Military Pressure,” Jane's Intelligence Review, internet version posted 12 August 2003 at <http://www.janes.com>.

<sup>99</sup> Anthony Davis, “Philippines Fears New Wave of Attacks by Abu Sayyaf Group,” Jane's Intelligence Review, internet version posted 24 March 2005 at <http://www.janes.com>.

always involved in the regional drugs trade – specifically in trafficking Afghan opiates into Central Asia. Although the group strongly voices its intentions to overthrow the government of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and establish an Islamic state in the region, IMU operations since 1999 indicate that its primary motivation was to secure smuggling routes. Between late 1999 and the end of 2001 the IMU was responsible for transporting up to 70 per cent of the heroin and opium transiting through Central Asia – which is significant given that an estimated 60 per cent of opiates produced in Afghanistan were trafficked via Central Asia during those years.<sup>100</sup> Following developments in Afghanistan – notably since the US led ‘war on terrorism’ began in 2001 – and the alleged death of Juma Namanganiy, military commander of the IMU, it is even more likely that a disenfranchised and dispersed IMU will focus on its criminal operations. As was the case with the evolution of FARC following the death of Arenas, the IMU has also lost the ideological foundation - found in Namanganiy’s leadership – that was required at least to portray the façade of a group dedicated to Islamic ideals.

### *The ‘Black Hole’ Syndrome*

The third and final component of the convergence thesis - the ‘black hole’ syndrome – is the epitome of the CTC. This part of the continuum specifically refers to situations in which weak or failed states foster the convergence between TOC and terrorism, and ultimately create a safe haven for the continued operations of criminal-terrorist groups. The ‘black hole’ syndrome encompasses two situations: first, where the primary motivations of groups engaged in a civil war evolves from a focus on political aims to a focus on criminal aims; second, it refers to the emergence of a ‘black hole’ state – a

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<sup>100</sup> Mutschke (1999); see also references quoted in FN 62.



state successfully taken over by a hybrid group as defined in the previous two sections. What these two scenarios have in common, and the reason why they perfectly illustrate the most extreme point along the CTC, is that they reveal the ultimate danger of this new security threat: the creation or promotion of a condition of civil (or regional) war to secure economic and political power. States that fall within this category include Afghanistan, Angola, Myanmar, North Korea, Sierra Leone, and Tajikistan. Furthermore, areas in Pakistan (the Northwest Frontier Province), Indonesia and Thailand – where government control is extremely weak – are also in danger of succumbing to the ‘black hole syndrome’.

To begin with, evidence suggests that the dynamics of civil wars, just like the dynamics of traditional organised crime and terrorism, have changed. They have evolved from wars fought for ideological or religious motivations to wars hijacked by criminal interests and secured by terror tactics. As David Keen comments, “Increasingly, civil wars that appear to have begun with political aims have mutated into conflicts in which short-term economic benefits are paramount. While ideology and identity remain important in understanding conflict, they may not tell the whole story.”<sup>101</sup> The end of the Cold War, coupled with the decline of superpower support (proxy wars) indirectly caused a decline in the strength of revolutionary political ideologies in groups such as UNITA, the Khmer Rouge and Myanmar’s Khun Sa. All of these groups thus have “gravitated from a strong ideological agenda to one dominated by economic aims.”<sup>102</sup> Comparable to terrorist groups which have lost sight of their political ideology as a result of having to depend on criminal activity for their survival, these groups also appear to have betrayed their ideological ideals in the

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<sup>101</sup> David Keen, *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 11.

<sup>102</sup> Keen (1998), p. 34.

interest of holding on to power at whatever cost.<sup>103</sup> Two examples that illustrate this aspect of the ‘black hole’ syndrome are Afghanistan and North Korea.

Afghanistan could be considered a ‘black hole state’ since the 1989 withdrawal of Soviet troops for several reasons. First, although factions fighting in the Afghan civil war (i.e. the Northern Alliance) officially articulated ideological goals, their involvement in criminal activities and frequent changes in group allegiances and alliances, indicates that group survival was their paramount concern. In the absence of any central authority capable of establishing widespread stability and order, warlords were able to divide<sup>104</sup> the country into local fiefdoms to secure territorial control through which they could sustain activities such as the production and trafficking of opiates and the smuggling of weapons and a variety of licit commodities (i.e. pharmaceuticals) across the border with Pakistan. Second, as a result of incessant instability sustained by rival warlord factions, Afghanistan became an important safe haven, congregation, and training point for a number of terrorist groups including Al Qaeda, the GIA, and numerous Pakistan-based groups such as Sipah-e-Sahaba and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, as well as transnational criminal organisations involved in illicit trafficking, such as the Dawood Ibrahim Group (Pakistan), Central Asian-based criminal groups and ROC implicated in arms trafficking. The cauldron of terrorist and criminal interests converging and cooperating in Afghanistan therefore illustrates the dangers inherent in the ‘black hole syndrome’. Not only was Afghanistan destroyed by incessant domestic instability, its very essence as a ‘black hole state’ meant that it

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<sup>103</sup> The betrayal of revolutionary ideals is not a new phenomenon in and of itself. The leaders of many revolutionary movements throughout history (French, Russian) betrayed their ideals in order to hold on to the power they acquired. What is being argued here, however, is that an apparently new dynamic has been added to the equation – one that sees ideological groups not only engage in state terrorism to hold on to power, but use the state monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in order to profit from illicit activities, such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling.



directly threatened the security of the wider region. Furthermore, Afghanistan proved to be a direct security threat to the United States, Southeast Asia, and the rest of the world, primarily because it fostered the rise and global reach of al-Qaeda.

While it exhibits some characteristics of a weak state, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is most illustrative of a criminal state. Officials of the DPRK have been directly engaged in criminal activities since the 1970s. For example, in 1976 the Norwegian government expelled all the staff of the North Korean embassy, alleging they were involved in the smuggling of narcotics and unlicensed goods.<sup>105</sup> The DPRK intensified its criminal activities since the late 1990s – arguably because the leadership in North Korea has been replaced “by a younger group, less committed to the dogma of socialism and seemingly more eager to experience the good life.”<sup>106</sup> An indication of this development is the government's establishment of ‘Bureau 39’, an official government body tasked with generating hard currency by any means, including drug trafficking, counterfeiting, money laundering and piracy.<sup>107</sup>

The second scenario, on the other hand, refers to the situation where political-criminal organisations (PCOs) or commercial terrorist groups perpetuate their existence and activities by promoting domestic and/or regional instability. Although political goals may have played a role in the initial emergence of instability, after time it becomes evident that economic motivations take precedence. Terror tactics are utilised to sustain criminal activities, and it may be concluded that many ongoing civil wars are merely draped in ideological rhetoric to gain legitimacy and to ensure a steady supply

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<sup>105</sup> Mark Galeotti, “Criminalisation of the DPRK,” *Jane's Intelligence Review*, vol. 13, no. 3 (March 2001), p. 10.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>107</sup> Douglas Farah and Thomas Lippman, “North Korea ‘Cashes in on Drugs,’” *The Washington Post*, reprinted in *Guardian Weekly*, 04 April 1999, p. 16.

of new recruits. There is growing evidence that these non-state actors are producing alternative economic and political structures in the absence of a strong state. In fact, criminal and terrorist groups in weak states have already constituted de facto governments which imitate the characteristics of formal state activities, despite perpetuating their involvement in activities considered illegal by formal state structures.<sup>108</sup> These groups are ultimately able to exercise their authority “through established power structures and obedience is rewarded and disobedience is punished often with the use of violence. The pervading culture of violence undermines attempts at conflict resolution and peace-building.”<sup>109</sup>

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, elements of this part of the ‘black hole’ syndrome were introduced by Steven Metz in his division of future insurgencies as either spiritual or commercial. Spiritual insurgencies are akin to traditional revolutions in that they are intricately linked to the search for ideological meaning. These insurgencies are commonly organised around the rejection of a regime – more specifically the rejection of the social, economic and political system associated with the regime.<sup>110</sup> Although the struggle for the leadership of spiritual insurgencies is about power, the followers of these movements are commonly motivated by the search for personal meaning. Based on this basic description, the most pure form of a contemporary spiritual insurgency is militant religious fundamentalism as displayed in the Middle East.

Commercial insurgencies, on the other hand, define personal meaning by material possessions – not by spiritual needs. Metz describes commercial insurgencies as

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<sup>108</sup> Willett (2002), p. 191.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Steven Metz, The Future of Insurgency, (U.S. Army War College, 10 December 1993).



“widespread and sustained criminal activity with a proto-political dimension that challenges the security of the state.”<sup>111</sup> Following this line of argument, it may be suggested that this aspect of the ‘black hole’ syndrome is the natural progression of PCOs or commercial terrorist groups gaining economic and political control over a parcel of territory or an entire state. In an effort to secure an environment conducive to their criminality, these entities may seek to wreak havoc and instability in the areas of their main operations. A successful PCO or commercial terrorist group, however, will effectively challenge the legitimacy of a state, and ultimately replace the state in many (if not all) of its functions. In this situation, the state’s monopoly over legitimate violence is overtaken, state sovereignty is directly challenged, and the role of non-state actors in international relations is highlighted as a primary – as opposed to secondary - state actor. The basic characteristics are evident in numerous examples, including ongoing instability in the Balkans,<sup>112</sup> the Caucasus,<sup>113</sup> southern Thailand and Sierra Leone.<sup>114</sup>

Taking Sierra Leone as an example, the descent into state terrorism was not accompanied by an exclusive “logic of political violence,” but it was intertwined with the “logics of banditry, hedonism and brutality” and was intrinsically linked to the illicit trade in diamonds.<sup>115</sup> Crime was an integral component of the Revolutionary United Forces (RUF) that took precedence over any political aim. Any belief in the

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<sup>111</sup> Metz (1993).

<sup>112</sup> Mueller, (2002) and Kaldor, (1999) provide detailed accounts of the criminal-political nexus in Yugoslavia and Sarajevo respectively.

<sup>113</sup> On the political nature of organised crime in Chechnya, or conversely the criminal nature of Chechen politics, see: Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998); and Anatoliy Kulikov, “Trouble in North Caucasus,” Military Review, (July-August 1999).

<sup>114</sup> For an excellent analysis of the convergence of terrorism and organised crime in southern Thailand, see: Anthony Davis, “The Complexities of Unrest in Southern Thailand,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, vol. 14, no. 9 (September 2002), pp. 16-19.

<sup>115</sup> Yusuf Bangura, “Understanding the Political and Cultural Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War,” Africa Development, vol. 22, nos. 3/4 (1997), pp. 130-133.

existence of a political component to the violence that penetrated Sierra Leone throughout the 1990s is amply eradicated once the following points are considered:

The 'rebellion' has had no known spokesmen or political program; it does not seem to have the goal of gaining political power. It has no reason to appeal politically to the population in the areas in which it is active; its 'strategy' is marauding terror of the subject population and denying control to the government so that the government cannot suppress its lawlessness. The fact that government forces have been known to act as atrociously as the rebels does not improve matters.<sup>116</sup>

In both aspects of the 'black hole' syndrome, it may be concluded that war has provided "legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war. The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their positions of power and for access to resources."<sup>117</sup> Thus regardless of whether these civil wars were initially ideological and transformed into a criminal struggle, or emerged because of the successful operations of PCOs or commercial terrorist groups, they share several common characteristics.

To begin with, conflict that besets the 'black hole syndrome' has no clear military objective and lacks political purpose. Instead, military units constitute "little more than marauding bands acting quite independently of any order and showing no discipline whatsoever in the actions they were committing."<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, where political motivations do follow the criminal activities of belligerents in violent conflicts, it is evident that the perpetuation of conflict, as opposed to victory, becomes a priority in order to create ideal conditions for TOC to flourish.<sup>119</sup> Groups that thrive within 'black

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<sup>116</sup> Snow (1996), p. 78.

<sup>117</sup> Kaldor (1999), p. 110.

<sup>118</sup> Snow (1999), pp. 109-111.

<sup>119</sup> Berdal and Serrano, eds. (1999), p. 199.



hole' environments are all equally motivated by the "accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy. Together, these elements represent usable power – power to allocate values and resources in society."<sup>120</sup>

### **Converging Characteristics**

For reasons discussed in detail in Chapter One, the dynamics of the post-Cold War environment have, in many ways, enabled a convergence between transnational organised crime and terrorism on several levels. Given the various levels of convergence discussed in this chapter, it is further evident that each group has adapted and transformed to mirror the characteristics of the other. In seeking alliances and cooperation, criminal and terrorist groups have increasingly learned from one another, thus emulating activities (i.e. smuggling and money-laundering) and/or organisational dynamics (i.e. networks, cell-structure) because other groups' success in using them. As a result, both criminal and terrorist groups operating in the world today increasingly exhibit a similar structure, and are often simultaneously engaged in similar criminal and political activities. Considering how terrorism and TOC have transformed since the early 1990s, six similarities between contemporary forms of TOC and terrorism can be identified.

One of the most obvious similarities between contemporary TOC and terrorist groups is that they both utilise cell-based structures. Traditionally associated with terrorist groups, cell-based structures were adopted by many criminal groups in the 1990s, predominantly because they provided additional security for the group's leadership.

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<sup>120</sup> Manwaring (1993), pp. 7-8.


Harriss-White has concluded that TOC in weak states have responded to the evolving post-1991 international environment by incorporating the structure of traditional terrorist groups into their own. Referring specifically to criminal organisations involved in the drug trade in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Afghanistan, she notes that these groups “consist of specialised cells separately managing production, transport, distribution, money-laundering, communications, physical protection and recruitment. The most advanced telecommunications, weapons, means of transport and counter-intelligence technologies are used to enforce property rights.”<sup>121</sup> A common structure of a cell-system used by transnational criminal organisations is illustrated in Diagram 3.4, depicting Colombian cartels in the 1990s. Both types of groups, however, also increasingly utilise networks as described in detail in Chapter Two.

**Diagram 3.4: Cell-Based Criminal Structures**

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<sup>121</sup> Harris-White (2002), p. 31.





A second similarity between TOC and terrorism is that the activities of both groups cross the national-regional-international divide. The criminal and political activities perpetrated by either TOC or terrorist groups often cross all the levels of analysis – although they may occur locally, their implications may resound nationally and even globally. One example of this was the September 11, 2001 terrorist acts in the U.S., although the impact of illicit smuggling by TCOs (i.e. arms, drug and human smuggling) is equally illustrative. Details of how criminal and terrorist activities cross the levels of analysis will be discussed in detail in Chapters Four and Five.



Third, for operational and tactical reasons, both TOC and terrorism commonly take advantage of safe havens and diaspora communities. Safe havens are primarily valued by transnational organised crime and terrorism because they invariably serve as a forum in which ideas, contacts and operational know-how can be exchanged between groups. Considering this function of safe havens (in association with failing and failed states), it would be difficult to argue that places including Afghanistan, the Tri-Border area of Paraguay, and Lebanon did not facilitate the development of criminal and terrorist groups. As with safe havens, diaspora communities<sup>122</sup> are also manipulated by terrorist and criminal groups to support their operations. Although diasporas have overtly collected funds for terrorist groups in Algeria, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Kosovo, for example, both TOC and terrorist groups are known to extort money from their diaspora communities, and coerce them into providing additional services such as safe houses.<sup>123</sup> The fourth notable similarity between TOC and terrorism is that both groups use similar targeting and deployment techniques, and thus are dependent on sophisticated intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities.

Fifth, the operations of both terrorist and transnational criminal organisations are dependent on establishing relations with the government and public. Apart from corrupting state authorities as a way to secure their operations, both types of groups have increasingly sought either to secure collusive relations with governments or to penetrate government institutions directly. Equally important for both terrorists and TCOs is to build a relationship with communities whether at the local, regional, national or international levels – a function that depends on the type of group and the

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<sup>122</sup> According to Byman et al. (2001), diasporas merely refer to immigrant communities established in other countries.

<sup>123</sup> Byman et al. (2001).



kind of legitimacy they seek. As a result, they regularly seek to control media outlets, and establish charities to increase their own legitimacy in the eyes of the general public. The extent to which both terrorists and TOC groups seek to incorporate a sophisticated programme of government and public relations will be detailed in the case studies of this thesis.

Sixth, and central to the focus of this thesis, is that contemporary terrorism and TOC both depend on external sources of funding in order to perpetrate their activities. Thus regardless of where a group falls on the CTC, it will utilise terror tactics to make its criminal actions secure. Associated with this is the premise that the defining characteristic of 'converging' threats is that all operations and leadership aspire to secure four things: profit; control over territory and people; the ability to conduct their activities without obstacle; and legitimacy. Contemporary security threats such as TOC and terrorism have been able to attain most of these aims by adapting to the environment in which they operate. As a result, they have also transformed their organisational and operational dynamics in order to sustain their existence into the twenty-first century.

### **Conclusion: Understanding the Crime-Terror Continuum**

The CTC seeks to provide an explanation of the changing dynamics of the post-Cold War security environment as it relates to TOC and terrorism. In doing so, its primary purpose is to highlight that security threats are not static phenomena, but are continually in a state of flux. It is therefore evident that the nature of TOC and terrorism – which is converging - are dictated by the continuously evolving environment in which they are found, and by the relationships in which they are

engaged. Thus depending on the prevailing operational and international environment, groups can – and evidently do – slide across the continuum. Furthermore, the CTC illustrates that security is no longer solely about military objectives, but has been joined by “economically driven interests in continued fighting and the institutionalisation of violence at what is for some clearly a profitable level of intensity.”<sup>124</sup> The combination of political and economic motivations and a group prepared to attain them through the use of terror tactics reveals the inherent dangers of the CTC and of contemporary security threats. These dangers are exacerbated by the interplay between levels of analysis. Not only do transnational criminal and terrorist groups cross national borders as a consequence of their existence, but the impact of the activities in which they are engaged inherently affect a range of levels from the individual to global.

In addition to the fact that the security threats posed by terrorism and TOC inherently cross levels of analysis, the CTC also highlights the importance of relinquishing a state-centric approach of International Relations because the state is losing, and in some cases has lost, its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Once this happens, it exacerbates conditions in which conflict merely becomes a continuation of economics (not politics) by other means.<sup>125</sup> The role of some non-state actors and their successes in taking state functions from the state thus necessitate closer analytical attention and gives credence to the argument that the state is in decline.<sup>126</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Berdal and Malone, eds. (2000), p. 2.

<sup>125</sup> David Keen, ‘Incentives and Disincentives for Violence’ in Berdal and Malone, eds. (2000), p. 27.

<sup>126</sup> Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. vii.



Despite arguing that the state is in decline, control over state functions remains an integral component of international politics today. As a result, an increasing number of state and non-state actors are continuously seeking to gain control over functions once limited to the state. The result of this diffusion of authority to non-state actors is that state is losing its capacity to retain the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence.<sup>127</sup>

Contributing to this are the implications of the rise of the economic imperatives of the post-Cold War era. Facilitated by the spread of capitalism and market-based economies, non-state actors are realising that “economic aims can be furthered by controlling the state.”<sup>128</sup> In this context it is understandable to see that criminal and political motivations have become intertwined. Furthermore, considering growing evidence that non-state actors have taken on a host of roles once reserved exclusively for the state, such as imposing and collecting taxes, issuing and providing alternative social structures<sup>129</sup>, the state can only be seen as one actor among many equals.

It is therefore evident that the CTC, as presented in this chapter, builds on the conceptual framework presented in Chapter Two. In light of the changing nature of post-Cold War security, it is important that International Relations theory adapt in order to be able to address security threats that have transformed to the prevailing environment in which they seek to operate. The CTC was thus introduced as a way to explain the changing nature of security in the twenty-first century – specifically the threats of terrorism, TOC, and their convergence. Using the key assumptions about contemporary security presented in this thesis, along with the CTC model, the next two chapters will gauge the extent to which this ‘new’ way of thinking about security

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<sup>127</sup> Anna Leander, ‘Globalisation and the Eroding Monopoly of Legitimate Violence,’ Conference paper presented at ‘The Global Constitution of Failed States, University of Sussex, 18-20 April 2001.

<sup>128</sup> Keen (1998), p. 15.

<sup>129</sup> Leander (2001), p. 7.

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can explain security developments on two continents. Chapter Four will measure this model against the transformation of organised crime in the Russian Federation – seeking to answer whether or not Russian organised crime simultaneously constitutes a form of terrorism that can be called ‘political crime’. Chapter Five will focus on the development of FARC in Colombia to discover whether or not a traditional terrorist group can exchange a political ideology for a financial ideology, thus constituting an example of ‘commercial terrorism’. Within each chapter, every aspect of the CTC will be outlined in relation to the specific case studies.

## Chapter 4

### (Re) establishing Power through Terror: The Hybrid Nature of Russian Organised Crime

“In today’s world, mafias are becoming more aggressive than ever.”<sup>1</sup>

“While organised crime in the West occasionally collaborates with certain incumbents, Soviet organised crime was, from the outset, inextricably enmeshed in the system of power. It operated in full compliance with the official pattern of political and economic incentives.”<sup>2</sup>

When discussed in the context of the Russian Federation, terrorism is commonly isolated either to the historical realm of ‘Narodnya Volya’<sup>3</sup> and the imposition of state terror introduced by Vladimir Lenin and refined by Josef Stalin<sup>4</sup>, or it is discussed in the contemporary context of combined nationalist-separatist and Islamist militant actions, primarily emanating from the case of Chechnya. Although these examples indicate that the Russian Federation has had experience with terrorism, it is the country’s experience with organised crime in the post-Cold War period that demonstrates how the nature of security has evolved within the realm of the CTC. In tracing the rise of Russian Organised Crime (ROC)<sup>5</sup> it is apparent that this phenomenon illustrates a criminal group that mirrors a traditionally defined terrorist

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<sup>1</sup> A. Korchak, Totalistic Organizations: From Mafia to Global Terror, (Boulder, Colorado: Social Sciences Monographs, 2002), p. 87.

<sup>2</sup> Virginie Coulloudon, “The Criminalization of Russia’s Political Elite,” East European Constitutional Review, vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1997), p. 74.

<sup>3</sup> An excellent study of Russian terrorism by revolutionary extremists is: Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> For a comprehensive overview of Soviet state terrorism, see: Roberta Goren, The Soviet Union and Terrorism, (London, Boston and Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), and Boris Levytsky, The Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police 1917-1970, (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1972.)

<sup>5</sup> There is limited agreement within the academic community that studies the emergence of organised crime within the FSU on how it should appropriately be labelled – terms used have included the Russian ‘*mafiya*’ and post-Soviet organised crime. Most authors on the subject (Galeotti, Williams, Shelley), however, normally refer to organised crime in the region as ‘Russian’ organised crime, focusing on the one common characteristic among the vast majority of groups operating in the FSU, the shared ability to speak Russian.



group through its operational use of terror tactics, and its interest in dictating the political agenda of the state. Although this chapter will not argue that ROC has travelled the length of the CTC from a criminal to terrorist group, it does reflect a security threat that was convergent from inception. Thus by occupying point three of the CTC (Diagram 3.2), ROC revealed the capacity to simultaneously occupy points one (alliance formation) and two (operational use of terror tactics). Based on this premise, this chapter will make three inter-connected arguments. First, through an overview of the rise of ROC it will demonstrate that ROC is a criminal organisation in accordance with the definition of organised crime provided in Chapter One. Second, the disposition of ROC as it developed from the Soviet period into the post-Soviet era reveals that it is an entity simultaneously exhibiting economic and political motivations – thus allowing it to be plotted on the CTC. Third, the relevance of the alternative view of security discussed in Chapter Two will be highlighted in reference to the security threats posed by ROC as a hybrid security threat.

Although other criminal organisations, such as the Albanian mafia<sup>6</sup>, the Italian mafia<sup>7</sup>, and D-Company (India), may be used to illustrate the CTC, ROC stands out as a leading example of ‘political crime’ (CTC – point 3) for three primary reasons, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections. First, the Russian model of organised crime is extremely ruthless and sophisticated in its methods. Since the early 1990s, ROC was distinguished from other criminal organisations by its uninhibited

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<sup>6</sup> The political nature of the Albanian mafia is described in Xavier Raufer, *Le Mafia Albanaise*, (Lausanne: Editions Favre S.A., 2000), Uros Komlenovic, “Crime and Corruption after Communism – State and Mafia in Yugoslavia,” *East European Constitutional Review*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1997), accessed at [http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/stateand mafia.html](http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/stateand%20mafia.html) (20 April 2000).

<sup>7</sup> The political nature of the Italian mafia at various points in history are discussed in detail in: Tom Behan, *See Naples & Die: The Camorra and Organised Crime*, (London and New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), John Dickie, *Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia*, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2004), Henner Hess, *Mafia and Mafiosi: Origin, Power and Myth*, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers Ltd., 1998), Alison Jamieson, *The Antimafia: Italy’s Fight Against Organised Crime*, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000).

use of intimidation and violence to promote and protect its operations. Second, ROC is considered among the most 'international' criminal organisation, operating on most continents. At the same time, however, ROC has maintained considerable influence at the local level. Third, this form of organised crime historically held a special relationship with political authorities and political parties, thus providing a precedent from which organised crime in contemporary Russia became enmeshed within the corridors of power. The combination of these three factors contributed to the emergence of a scenario wherein organised crime had the ability to "mobilize the forces of the state when necessary to attain its goals."<sup>8</sup>

### **ROC: Defining Key Characteristics from Lenin to Putin**

Despite the common Western belief that organised crime is a new phenomenon in Russia and the republics of the former Soviet Union, organised crime operated in the region for at least a century. Several accounts of the rise of ROC note that the phenomenon itself is deeply rooted in Russian tradition<sup>9</sup> and Soviet practice.<sup>10</sup> As Galeotti noted, the rise and evolution of ROC in historical and political context reflect four key factors integral to understanding organised crime in Russia.<sup>11</sup> First, the political culture in Russia has a tradition of using crime and terrorism. Second, a sense of political and economic government alienation of the mass population created a base from which ROC could recruit. Third, an almost 'traditional' link between criminals and rulers has always existed in modern Russia. Fourth, a deliberate 'strategy of

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<sup>8</sup> Roy Godson, Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World, (London: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p. 5.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example: Mark Galeotti, "The Mafiya and the New Russia," Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 44, no. 3 (1998), pp. 415-429; Coulloudon, "The Criminalization of Russia's Political Elite," East European Constitutional Review, 6:4 (Fall 1997), pp. 73-78.

<sup>10</sup> Among the most notable academic contributions that discuss the rise of organized crime in the context of the Soviet system are: Konstantin Simis, USSR: the Corrupt Society, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1982); A. Vaksbery, The Soviet Mafia, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991); W.A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1991).

<sup>11</sup> Galeotti, (1998), pp. 416-417.



tension' was created with organised crime on the part of certain political actors throughout modern history. This inherent connection between criminality and political interests/power could be traced from the Tsarist period to the post-Cold War era, reflecting the importance of this dynamic in the Russian context and confirming that ROC has an innate political component that ultimately facilitated its inclusion in the CTC as an example of political crime.

### *The Rise of the Russian Criminal-Political Nexus: the Soviet Experience*

Throughout the long history of the Russian Federation, at no point has the Russian state been characterised by the rule of law. On the contrary, Russia is usually described as an absolutist state that preferred to exercise absolute power “over the lives of subjects and willingly sacrificed them in its own interests, regardless of the letter or spirit of the law.”<sup>12</sup> As a result, Russian history is scattered with accounts of resistance (in the form of banditry as well as passive resistance) that formed in opposition to widespread suppression and oppression at the hand of state officials and institutions. It is this development of resistance, comparable with the rise of the Sicilian mafia, which likely formed the historical roots of ROC.<sup>13</sup> More specifically, the success of resistance often depended upon an ability to accrue finances through criminal activity. For example, the pre-revolutionary Bolsheviks financed themselves through bank robberies, and via alliances they formed with bandit groups who provided safe houses and armed force at a price.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, bands of criminals also allied themselves with the authorities. For example, the Cheka secret police drew

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<sup>12</sup> Galeotti (1998), p. 417.

<sup>13</sup> Victor Chalidze, *Criminal Russia*, (New York: Random House, 1977), Chapter 1.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, Chapter 2.

heavily on criminals as informers and executioners, and Vladimir Lenin enlisted criminal groups to “swell the treasury of the fledgling Communist Party.”<sup>15</sup>

Despite the absence of detailed historical accounts referring to pre-Soviet relations between criminal gangs and political actors, it is evident that there was an explicit interest by political actors to harness the benefits that criminals could bring to their quest for unrivalled power. In the 1920s criminal gangs were strategically used by the Russian authorities to consolidate the internal physical prowess of the Communist Party. Under Josef Stalin, criminals in gulags<sup>16</sup> were initially used to maintain order among political prisoners, and ultimately used to help the state expand its capacity to “intimidate and eliminate enemies.”<sup>17</sup> Stalin also used Soviet criminal groups to help destabilise Western economies by printing massive quantities of counterfeit money.<sup>18</sup> This relationship ultimately paved the road to the creation of new criminal elite in Russia with direct ties to the Communist Party and the secret police.<sup>19</sup> In learning how to harness the emerging criminal underworld, which was often understood as “the most organised expression of the anarchic-libertarian spirit in Russian history”,<sup>20</sup> the Communist Party was able to ensure that organised crime did not divert energy into political protest, as was the case in 19<sup>th</sup> century Sicily.<sup>21</sup>

The criminal gangs that formed alliances with government authorities during the Soviet era were collectively known as the *Suki* (‘bitches’). This group of criminals

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<sup>15</sup> Coulloudon (1997), p. 75.

<sup>16</sup> Federico Varese, “What is the Russian Mafia?”, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1996), p. 129.

<sup>17</sup> Shelley in Godson (2003), p. 207.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Chalidze (1977), Chapter 2.

<sup>20</sup> Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Gilinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 112, pp. 303-304.

<sup>21</sup> See: John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2004).



broke away from the notorious *Vorovskoi mir* (Thieves' World or *vory*), who sought to ensure stability within the criminal underworld, and to co-ordinate the various criminal elements emerging from the prison system. Forming an ideological opposition to the state, this collection of criminal gangs maintained order throughout the criminal world by developing numerous self-governing laws, including forbidding members to take up arms on behalf of the state.<sup>22</sup> In an attempt to lead the criminal underworld the *vory* fulfilled four functions: the collection and dissemination of intelligence; the organisation of criminal groups in the execution of activities; the regulation of inter-group activities; and decision-making.<sup>23</sup> Although the *Vorovskoi mir* was an important force in the criminal underworld, internal fractures developed during the Second World War between members who violated the criminal code by taking up arms on behalf of the state (*Suki*), and those who decided to remain in prison. As a result of collaborating with the state during the War, the *Suki* introduced an alternative code to that of the *Vorovskoi mir*: one that promoted cooperation with the state authorities.<sup>24</sup>

Over the next sixty years the links between Soviet organised crime and the Soviet bureaucracy became very close.<sup>25</sup> The *Suki* increasingly cooperated with Party bureaucrats and thus lost the respect of their fellow criminals. As a result the *vory* regained an important role in the criminal underworld. However criminal cooperation

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<sup>22</sup> Joseph D. Serio, "Thieves Professing the Code: The Traditional Role of Vory v Zakone in Russia's Criminal World and Adaptations to a New Social Reality", Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 4, no. 1 (Summer 1995), p. 73.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., pp. 80-81. Furthermore, according to Frederico Varese, The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 146-147, members of the *Vorovskoi mir* were governed by strict regulations that included defined rituals for initiating new members and a rudimentary court system.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

<sup>25</sup> For excellent historical overviews of the rise of Soviet organised crime, see K. Simis, USSR: Secrets of a Corrupt Society (London: J.M. Dent, 1982), A. Vaksberg, The Soviet Mafia, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991) and W.A. Clark, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

with the state did not intensify until after the death of Stalin in 1953.<sup>26</sup> At this time criminals recognised that the traditions of the *Vorovskoi mir* were interfering with the ability of organised crime to adapt to the prevalent economic and political conditions. The principle of operating in opposition to the authorities became overshadowed by financial motivations, and the institution of the *vory* declined significantly. This transition within the criminal world occurred primarily during the era of Leonid Brezhnev<sup>27</sup> (1964-1982) when the black market grew exponentially, as did the willingness of state administrators to accept bribes and goods in exchange for patronage.<sup>28</sup> Involvement in the black market, which exacerbated product shortages in the Soviet Union, brought enormous benefits to illegal private entrepreneurs and ROC, thus by “the late 1980s the dominant figures were the *avtoriteti* – self-made men who had come to power by acquiring money, prestige, and personal followers, not by undergoing initiation rites or adhering to a code of conduct.”<sup>29</sup> The interconnection between state, business and crime ensured that the black market was not simply tolerated, “but actively encouraged the development of a symbiotic relationship between members of the party apparatus and various kinds of traffickers and illicit entrepreneurs.”<sup>30</sup> An authoritarian regime seeking to secure its own interests combined with a command economy to create an environment that could be characterised as a giant kleptocracy – or a “system whose dominating features [were] force, extortion and tribute, rather than voluntary exchanges on a market.”<sup>31</sup> Due to

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<sup>26</sup> Vsevolod Sokolov, “From Guns to Briefcases: the Evolution of Russian Organised Crime,” *World Policy Journal* (Spring 2004), p. 69.

<sup>27</sup> For more details of organized crime under Brezhnev, refer to J. Millar, “The Little Deal: Brezhnev’s Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism,” *Slavic Review*, vol. 44, no. 4 (1988), pp. 694-706.

<sup>28</sup> Sokolov (2004), p. 69.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>30</sup> Williams (2002), p. 52.

<sup>31</sup> Stefan Hedlund, *Russia’s ‘Market’ Economy: a bad case of predatory capitalism*, (London: University College London Press, 1999), p. 19.



the authoritarian nature of the Communist Party, power within the political-criminal nexus at this point favoured the political elements.

The balance between the political-criminal nexus, however, changed with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev and his introduction of *glasnost* and *perestroika* (political transparency and economic reform respectively). Both of these policies contributed to the transformation of organised crime in the Russian Federation from “a covert feature of Soviet life to a highly visible feature of Russian life.”<sup>32</sup> Partially due to the decline of the *vory* and the intricate relationships established between the profiteering underworld and the state, Soviet organised crime consolidated and grew throughout the uncertainties of the 1980s. As Galeotti noted, “it used its wealth, its contacts and, ultimately, coercive power to redefine its relationship with the new political elite and economic structures.”<sup>33</sup> In fact, between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, ROC began to exhibit new characteristics as a result of the emerging environment in which it was operating. The transition to a market economy, for example, attracted more people to the criminal underworld, who ultimately were able to secure greater financial resources than the traditional *vory* could accrue within the Soviet gulag system.<sup>34</sup> As a result, even many of the *vory-v-zakone* (the leadership cadre of the *Vorovskoi mir*) dropped the crucial requirement that a true member could only enter this criminal fraternity after serving a long prison sentence. In fact, by the early 1990s the prison system no longer functioned as a check on who was eligible to join the *Vorovskoi mir*. Not only were younger criminals initiated into the *Vorovskoi mir* as a result, but the

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<sup>32</sup> Williams (2002), p. 52.

<sup>33</sup> Mark Galeotti, “The Russian Mafiya: Economic Penetration at Home and Abroad,” in A. Ledeneva and M. Kurkchiyan (eds), *Economic Crime in Russia*, (Kluwer Law Press, 2000).

<sup>34</sup> Varese (2001), p. 169.

overall barriers to joining had deteriorated significantly.<sup>35</sup> The impact Gorbachev's reforms had on weakening the power of central government ultimately undermined the state's legitimacy, a predicament that came to plague the newly-independent Russian Federation. The state became weaker, while "criminal enterprises multiplied and expanded."<sup>36</sup> This would prove to have important implications for state-ROC relations after the fall of the Soviet Union.

Rising financial benefits promised by the introduction of elements of a market economy, inflated criminal ranks, and sustained political interest in maintaining criminal alliances created a predicament by the end of the 1980s that was described by the official government newspaper, *Pravda*, as 'social entrepreneurship'. This phenomenon thrived in an environment in which newly created commercial entities and joint ventures with companies inside the Soviet Union and abroad worked to legitimise illicit relationships, and as a result, in the final months of the Soviet Union's existence "there was a re-shaping of traditional alliances from relationships based on power to those based on money and access to state resources."<sup>37</sup> This predicament was facilitated and compounded by the further collapse of the central state in 1991. The successor state in the Russian Federation was "unable to enforce the rule of law, or provide the market with such essential services as property protection and contract enforcement".<sup>38</sup> ROC immediately sought to fill the void created by the emergence of de facto 'anarcho-capitalism',<sup>39</sup> and thus sought to undertake state functions. Thus by the time that the Soviet Union collapsed in

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> Sokolov (2004), p. 70.

<sup>37</sup> Shelley in Godson, (2003), p. 211.

<sup>38</sup> Sokolov (2004), p. 70.

<sup>39</sup> This is a term used by Sokolov (2004) to describe the anarchic (i.e. unregulated) economic conditions of the post-Soviet attempt to engage with market capitalism.



December 1991, the balance within the political-criminal nexus began to sway in favour of the criminal elite, providing a further demonstration of the symbiosis of economics and politics within the Russian context.<sup>40</sup>

*Taking Advantage of Uncertainty: the rise of a 'new' and influential ROC*

The *Vorovskoi mir* and the *Suki* played an important role in the development of ROC, not least of which because their existence highlights the traditional relationship between crime and politics in the Russian Federation. But by the mid-1990s they were no longer illustrative of the new wave of organised crime evolving in the post-Soviet environment. Although this emerging form of ROC, generally speaking, does comply with the definition of organised crime used by the Council of Europe,<sup>41</sup> a brief outline of characteristics unique to post-Soviet groups will make clear, that ROC is a phenomenon that is distinct from most organised crime groups that operate elsewhere in the world, a phenomenon that is complex and diverse, and “not always well organised and is not invariably criminal in all its aspects.”<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, it will establish a framework that will be used to further argue that organised crime in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) has culminated in the creation of a new breed of security threat that, for various reasons, cannot be dealt with in the same manner as more traditional criminal organisations such as the Japanese Yakuza or Posse Comitatus.

To begin with, unlike the Italian mafia or the Chinese Triads, ROC is not exclusively comprised of a single ethnic group - despite being commonly referred to as ‘Russian’ organised crime by state officials, media and academia throughout the world. Instead

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<sup>40</sup> Coulloudon (1997), p. 73.

<sup>41</sup> See Chapter One, pp. 57-58.

<sup>42</sup> Williams (1996), p. 12.

ROC was originally divided into groups commonly based on territorial ties, not only within the Russian Federation, but throughout the former Soviet Republics.<sup>43</sup> Even this organising principle, however, can lead to confusion as the names of many criminal groups no longer coincide with their present headquarters or area of operation (i.e. ‘Tambov’, St. Petersburg’s leading group, is named after the city from which its first members originated). Even in the few cases that ROC groups were composed of members of a dominant ethnic base, such as the ‘Chechen mafiya’, they evolved to include “Georgians, Dagestanis, Kazakhs and even Slavs.”<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, having already “actively colonised the underworld of other post-Soviet states, encouraging local criminality”,<sup>45</sup> the groups’ membership becomes increasingly multiethnic as ROC penetrated countries beyond the FSU. Thus, for example, Russian criminal groups operating in the United States and the United Kingdom absorbed American and British nationals into their operations. It should, however, be noted that despite a multiethnic and multinational membership, the most important (i.e. powerful) criminal groups remain based predominantly in Russia. This reveals how vast the threat of contemporary ROC is: by its very nature it is international and thus cannot be confined to or dealt with by a single state.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> The names groups adopt, for the most part, represent the region or city district from where they began operating. Some common groups in Moscow city, for example, are: Tsentralnaya, Solntsevskaya, and Podolskaya; in St. Petersburg: Tambovskaya, and Kazanskaya; in Yekaterinburg: Uralmashskaya and Tsentralnaya.

<sup>44</sup> Mark Galeotti, “Inside the Russian Mafiya,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, vol. 12, no. 3 (March 2000), p. 9.

<sup>45</sup> Mark Galeotti, “Organised Crime in the Former Soviet Union: Roots, Resources and Responses,” unpublished manuscript.

<sup>46</sup> The international nature of ROC is also true of other criminal groups operating in the world today, such as the Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza, and Chinese Triads. Differentiating ROC from these other groups, however, is the fact that the original membership of organised crime groups in post-Soviet Russia was commonly international (for example, bringing together citizens from Russia, Georgia, and the United States to form a single group). Other criminal organisations, on the other hand, were usually exclusively built around a single ethnic base - and subsequently expanded their operations by closely following immigration flows of their own people to countries including Canada and the United States.



The elusive character of ROC is compounded by its organisational dynamics, which emerged as an operational necessity in the post-Soviet period. ROC is not structured according to the historically dominant mafia model which has a formal hierarchy (i.e. a godfather flowing down to a general membership). Instead it has a fluid structure that forms around territorial or industrial interests<sup>47</sup>, usually on an ad hoc basis. Figure 4.1 illustrates the prevalent structure of ROC, highlighting how divergent interests come together. This network closely resembles the all-channel network described by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) and illustrated in Figure 2.3. According to Galeotti, the core of the structure is defined by a loose notion of 'group identity', essentially referring to anything that all members may share, including ethnicity or town of origin – these individuals are brought together through 'internal links', including an interest in conducting a specific operation or to respond to a mutually identified threat. Within the network, a 'strategic ally' represents a long-term alliance or short-term partnership with another network or criminal organisation – this is contrasted to a 'component partner' who is part of a small-scale alliance between an isolated part of the network and elements of another network or criminal group that operates independent from any strategic alliance. In the context of this thesis, an alliance created within the CTC would occupy one of these two positions. The position of 'client' and 'supplier' refers to the networks' need to hire external expertise (i.e. for money laundering or assassins), or the networks' ability to provide services or goods to customers. As a result of this networked dynamic, ROC has the organisational flexibility to form various "transgroup and transnational linkages, each with its own characteristics."<sup>48</sup> Furthermore, the advantage of a networked organisation is that it is "explicitly

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
<sup>47</sup> The structure of ROC is discussed in depth in: Andrei Konstantinov, Banditsky Peterburg, 1703-2003: Itogi Epokhi (St. Petersburg: Bibliopolis, 2004), and Andrei Konstantinov and Malcolm Dixelius, Banditskaya Rossiya (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2001).

<sup>48</sup> Mark Galeotti, "Globalising Crime: Networks and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Underworld," Cross Border Control, Issue 14 (2000), p. 35.



inclusive, working freely across national borders and with gangs cooperating transnationally to maximise profits and minimise risks”.<sup>49</sup>

Figure 4.1 Network-Based Organised Crime Structure<sup>50</sup>



Another key difference between ROC and traditional organised crime groups is that the most powerful groups in the FSU, and therefore those most relevant to this thesis, are what are often referred to as 'composite criminal groups', or 'conglomerates'.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Mark Galeotti argues that there exist six types of organised crime groupings in the former Soviet Union, 'gangsters', 'specialists', 'traders', 'pseudo-businessmen', 'conglomerates', and 'co-ordinators or authorities'. Gangsters generally refer to the traditional type of organised crime that concentrate their activities on a combination of illegal activities and are commonly used as 'muscle' by other groups. As their name suggests, specialists exploit a single resource or skill, such as money launders (with time these groups normally diversify or are incorporated into larger groups), 'traders' on the other hand focus their efforts on dealing in illegal and legal merchandise. 'Pseudo-businessmen' concentrate on financial crimes, and normally attempt to hide their operations behind legal endeavours; and, 'co-ordinators' and 'authorities' are the elite of criminal organisations and mostly act as the arbitrators of the criminal world. Finally, Galeotti uses the term 'conglomerates' instead of 'composite-criminal' groups. See Mark Galeotti, "Mafiya: Organised Crime in Russia," *Jane's Intelligence Review - Special Report*, No. 10 (1996). Frank Cilluffo and Gerard Burke, eds., *Russian Organised Crime: Global*



The importance of these groups emanates from the uniqueness of their membership base at inception, incorporating professional criminals (*Vory v Zakone*), former members of the Communist Party elite, former and serving members of the state security organs, and the new class of entrepreneurs. Stefan Hedlund summarises this group of individuals very succinctly when he writes:

They are defrocked communists and their scions, who are trying to reconstitute and plutocratically expand the elite privileges and status they enjoyed as party members and state servants under Soviet socialism in conjunction with other aspirants, especially the Mafia. They are a new breed of Czarist servitor in the sense that their power derives from state service, or state solicitude, but they lack the security that comes with hereditary wealth, titles and entitlements.<sup>52</sup>

Conglomerates are regarded as “mature and diversified criminal organisations which operate across the whole array of mafiya activities and usually also across regional and even national boundaries.”<sup>53</sup> These groups grew from the relatively chaotic environment that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, and have successfully maintained, “one foot in the black market, the old criminal world, and another foot in the official world, the world of politics and the old structure of the party.”<sup>54</sup> As the authority and power of the state in the Soviet Union declined and then collapsed, the individuals who ran the Soviet bureaucratic structures and industrial enterprises were left in possession of vast human, material and administrative resources. In retrospect, it is apparent that the former Communist political elites “decided that, in keeping with the Soviet tradition of uniting political and economic power, they could

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Organised Crime Project, CSIS Task Force Report (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 1997), uses the term ‘composite criminal groups’.

<sup>52</sup> Hedlund (1999), p. 21, quoted from S. Rosefelde, Russian Market Kleptocracy (unpublished manuscript).

<sup>53</sup> Galeotti (1996), p. 7.

<sup>54</sup> Statement of Louise Shelley to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Restoration Watch No. 2: Russia’s Organised Crime,” Decision Brief No. 94-D 39, Washington D.C.: The Center for Security Policy (1994), p. 13.

simultaneously occupy political office and own newly privatised companies.”<sup>55</sup> Thus, the confusion of the immediate post-Soviet period allowed these individuals to maintain control of state resources, which further granted them the financial position required to obtain unfair business advantages during the initial stages of privatisation in Russia and in other former Soviet countries in transition.

Immediately prior to Russia’s privatisation drives in the early 1990s, several fraudulent activities were perpetrated by conglomerate groups in an attempt to destabilise economic institutions within Russia while simultaneously providing additional capital that would eventually be used to purchase state assets.<sup>56</sup> Access to capital and an environment formed by Russian Democrats who pushed “for an accelerated transition to the market economy without social and institutional control”,<sup>57</sup> created the conditions for “the take-over of one of the largest, and naturally wealthiest countries of the world”.<sup>58</sup> Thus once the government decided to begin privatising its industries in 1992,<sup>59</sup> ROC was placed in an advantageous position as it was one of the only groups in Russian society that had access to significant amounts of free capital. Furthermore, ROC capitalized on ‘insider’ information as a result of its government ties. Privatization was subsequently easily manipulated, not only because

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<sup>55</sup> Coulloudon (1997), p. 75.

<sup>56</sup> Manuel Castells, End of Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998), p. 188.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 189.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> The official logic behind privatisation was to “relocate the ownership of large state enterprises to managers, workers and the remaining populace, the latter acting as outside shareholders. This was initially carried out through a citizen-wide distribution of vouchers intended to stimulate the economy in a competitive, self-motivated environment.” Patricia Rawlinson, “Russian Organised Crime: moving beyond ideology,” in Vincenzo Ruggiero, et al. (eds), The New European Criminology: Crime and Social Order in Europe (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 255-256. Although the Russian privatisation drive looked ideal in theory, in practice it produced a situation wherein organised crime, with excess capital, could easily acquire vouchers and stocks from Russian citizens to gain a controlling interest in valuable properties. As Rawlinson notes, faced with serious inflation and price liberalisation, many ordinary citizens who had used their personal savings to keep pace with price increases were forced to sell their vouchers at well-below their market value.



of the nature of ROC, but because the government lacked any interest in putting a legal and/or supervisory framework in place.

The unregulated privatization process had two major consequences. First, state assets were sold at unreasonably low prices. For example, the six largest aluminium enterprises were sold for U.S. \$62.2 million; and, of the 500 largest Russian enterprises privatised by sale at auction, 324 went for a dismal average of US\$4 million.<sup>60</sup> As a result of these 'sale' prices, the government's income from privatisation between 1992 and 1996 was only 0.012 per cent of the total budget receipts - revealing the extent to which privatisation was conducted, "hastily, unsystematically, without scientific foundation, ignoring foreign experience and in a number of cases completely flouting elementary legality".<sup>61</sup> Second, the law in the Russian Federation, and most former Soviet republics, allowed for the 'real owners' to conceal their identities by using front men and front companies, and a maze of subsidiary firms.<sup>62</sup> This environment subsequently helped create a situation in Russia wherein by 1994 ROC was believed to control 55 per cent of capital in the country, and 80 per cent of all voting stock.<sup>63</sup>

In addition to gaining preferential treatment during the privatisation process, the ties which ROC had to the state and its power-wielding institutions also provided access to a plethora of foreign networks that were developed during the Soviet period. This

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<sup>60</sup> R.W. Dellow, "Russian Organised Crime," Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Paper, E97 (March 1998), p. 6. More specific example of privatisation scandals are included in Stefan Hedlund, Russia's 'Market' Economy: A bad case of predatory capitalism (London: UCL Press Ltd., 1999). For example, Hedlund (p. 236) notes that Norilsk Nickel, valued at more than US\$1.4 billion, should have attracted starting bids of at least US\$530 million once the government announced that it would be privatised. The winning bid, however, was only US\$251 million.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>62</sup> Williams (2002), p. 53.

<sup>63</sup> Reported by Viktor Ilyukhin, Chair of the Russian Parliamentary Security Committee to ITAR-TASS, 13 May 1994.

established network significantly helped ROC gain advantages in their quest to conduct illicit activities<sup>64</sup> on an international scale - an opportunity that was not accorded to traditional criminal groups during initial stages of their development. One of the most important ROC networks emerged from links established when the Red Army was stationed in various European and African countries, links that proved to be easily exploitable for criminal purposes.<sup>65</sup> Thus the relationship that developed between emerging criminal organisations and members of the former Soviet elite has given ROC the trade craft and resources needed to pursue additional objectives to profit maximisation, which in turn has provided them with the ability to exploit, and essentially integrate themselves into state institutions, structures and the civil service.

The relationship that existed between ROC and state security organs was a significant asset to organised criminal groups in their search for involvement in the licit and illicit world. For example, ROC was purportedly in a position to access and plunder military arsenals; use state aircraft for smuggling purposes; and avoid customs inspections at the borders with little problem during the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union. This was one instance of a relationship that is extremely complex, but for analytical purposes could be divided into three categories.<sup>66</sup> First, direct relations were established between state security personnel and criminal organisations because these authority figures were simultaneously members of an organised crime group. Second, there are criminal groups that originated from the ranks of the military, commonly referred to as 'gangs with shoulder-boards'. With intricate links to government

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<sup>64</sup> These include, but are not limited to, trafficking in illicit commodities (women and children, narcotics, arms, antique art, precious metals); prostitution; gambling; and widescale money laundering.

<sup>65</sup> Guy Dunn, "Major Mafia Gangs in Russia," Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 2, nos. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 63.

<sup>66</sup> Mark Galeotti, "The Challenge of 'Soft Security': Crime, Corruption and Chaos," chapter in D. Averre and A. Cottey, eds., Ten Years After 1989: new security challenges in Central and Eastern Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 73.



officials and criminal organisations, these groups remained quite independent, taking advantage of the resources and opportunities presented to them as members of the armed forces. For example, during an investigation into the murder of a known organised crime figure and former Warrant Officer in the military Valery Dlugach (a.k.a. 'Globus'), in March 1993, investigators from the Russian Ministry of Security uncovered a group of senior military officers engaged in selling combat arms.<sup>67</sup>

The third form of relationship derives from military units, and/or military personnel that provided services and resources to criminal groups. For example, the 201st Motor Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, reportedly used military transport to smuggle narcotics to distribution centres in the Russian Federation<sup>68</sup>; and the 16th Spetsnaz Brigade in Chuchkogo were reputed to be a source of contract killers for contract murders ordered by ROC.<sup>69</sup> The most important aspect of the relationship between ROC and security organs is that, in return for providing non-traditional means of support<sup>70</sup> that was lacking as a result of the power vacuum created from the demise of the Soviet Union, ROC was able to take advantage of a large pool of extremely specialised resources and expertise.<sup>71</sup> Therefore, not only is the 'conglomerate' composition of ROC a unique characteristic, but the special relationship with security

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<sup>67</sup> "Mafia is Recruiting Hired Killers Among Men in Shoulder Boards," The Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press, vol. XLV, no. 37 (1993), p. 26.

<sup>68</sup> This connection was confirmed in a report commissioned by the United Nations Drug Control Programme in 1999. Alexander Zelichenko, Analiticheskiy Obzor Narkosituatsia v Zone Deistviya Mezhdynarodnoho Antinarkotikovoho Proyekta OON 'Oshskiy Yzel', Unpublished report; see also: "CACI Forum Summary: Drugs: A Threat to Central Asian Security," available at [http://www.cacianalyst.org/ForumSummaries/Drug\\_Conference.htm](http://www.cacianalyst.org/ForumSummaries/Drug_Conference.htm) (accessed 11 May 2000); and, Scott Peterson, "Fabled Silk Road Now Paved With Narcotics," The Christian Science Monitor, 01 August 2001.

<sup>69</sup> Galeotti (2000).

<sup>70</sup> This support mainly refers to the money paid to security personnel for their tacit cooperation in the provision of goods and/or services. Given that the Russian government has been unable to adequately provide for their soldiers and law enforcement personnel throughout the 1990s, ROC did not have a difficult time in finding collusive participants.

<sup>71</sup> Graham H. Turbiville Jr., "Weapons Proliferation and Organised Crime: the Russian Military and Security Force Dimension," INSS Occasional Paper, no. 10 (June 1996).

organs further differentiated ROC from most other criminal groups operating in the world.<sup>72</sup> Although organised crime groups in other countries have developed connections with state institutions, the extent of these connections did not compare with the Russian predicament. According to Anna Repetskaya, “At one fine point, two lines - the power ministries and the criminal world - intersected. The criminal world was admitted to secret facilities. The power ministries - to the criminal world.”<sup>73</sup>

In addition to differences in composition and relations with the state and its security organs, ROC may also be differentiated from the majority of traditional organised crime groups in that its primary goal is not exclusively the search for profit maximization. Organised criminal groups in the FSU also have political objectives, evident through the types of links they established with legitimate business and bureaucracy and through their direct involvement in the political processes of Russia and former Soviet republics. Argued in subsequent sections of this chapter, many of the activities of ROC were conducted with the aim of achieving political legitimacy, or at least political acceptance, and lobbying their respective national governments for legislation favourable to their interests. Traditional criminal organisations, on the other hand, generally avoid drawing unnecessary attention to themselves or their operations, and therefore merely attempt to induce select politicians to covertly protect their interests (i.e. through the use of corruption).<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> It should be noted that several criminal groups in Thailand, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Pakistan display similar ‘conglomerate’ characteristics.

<sup>73</sup> Anna Repetskaya, “85 Suspected Criminals Run for Duma Elections,” OMRI Daily Digest, no. 193 (04 October 1995),

<sup>74</sup> On a basic level parallels can be drawn between ROC and the Colombian cartels at this stage, however, as a thorough understanding of ROC is developed in this chapter and those that follow, the inherent differences will become apparent. Despite comparable experiences it should be noted that the most important difference between these two case studies is that Russia is a former superpower that still possesses dangerous weapons arsenals and expertise that can be accessed by criminal elites.



As has been argued thus far, it is evident that from its very inception, the post-Soviet variant of ROC was not only given a perfect membership base with which to conduct illicit business ventures, but its members innately strove for political power and control. After conducting an intricate study of crime and corruption, Coulloudon insightfully asserted: "While organised crime in the West occasionally collaborates with certain incumbents, Soviet organised crime was, from the outset, inextricably enmeshed in the system of power. It operated in full compliance with the official pattern of political and economic incentives."<sup>75</sup> Although this statement was written to describe organised crime in the Soviet Union, it appears to be one of few characteristics that Soviet and post-Soviet organised crime continue to share.

Furthermore, in their bid for political power, ROC has also influenced the ideology, culture and moral values of modern Russian society as it began to develop in the newly democratic state.<sup>76</sup> As Maximenkov and Namiesnowski wrote, this was already visible in the influential role criminal groups played in the print media, electronic media, and entertainment industries. For example, the glorification of organised crime was exhibited in the Russian movie industry where several movies promoting unity between law enforcement and criminal figures were produced in the early 1990's.<sup>77</sup> In addition to the entertainment industry, a notable proportion of the print and electronic media in Russia have been used to disseminate 'propaganda of the

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<sup>75</sup> V. Coulloudon (1997).

<sup>76</sup> Leonid Maximenkov and C. Namiesniowski, "Organized Crime in Post-Communist Russia", *Commentary*, no. 48 (September 1994), p. 5.

<sup>77</sup> The hit film *Prison Romance*, for example, depicted a romance between a male prison inmate and a female police investigator, and featured a prison escape arranged by the investigator who fled with the inmate. The underlying message was that there can be a "happy marriage between law enforcement and organised crime." This glorified depiction of organised crime in Russian popular media is compounded by the speculation - argued by Maximenkov and Namiesniowski - that the Russian movie industry has been used to launder money. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

criminal subculture.’<sup>78</sup> According to Ovchinsky, this included the conscious glamorisation of the criminal world and the creation of a positive image of criminal structure representatives and corrupt state officials.<sup>79</sup> This influence on the media indirectly supported the power gained by ROC in several ways, including: promoting criminal elite into elected bodies of power; discrediting economic legislation that ran counter to criminal interests; and, disseminating false information about criminal representatives and state officials to influence public opinion in the political arena.<sup>80</sup> Based on these preliminary observations, it could be suggested that ROC actively sought to become a major player not only within government, but within society in general.<sup>81</sup> This interest was indirectly facilitated by the failure of the new Russian state, and other newly independent post-Soviet states, to meet most social obligations deemed to be the responsibility of a sovereign state. The failure of the state to address the social necessities of their citizens fed into the power acquired by organised crime, which subsequently became “a reflection of the absence of credible and legitimate mechanisms to control social interaction and create some sense of common order.”<sup>82</sup> In other words, this highlights the ability of non-state actors, in the post-Cold War era, to directly challenge the state for territorial and bureaucratic dominance.

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<sup>78</sup> Vladimir Ovchinsky, “Corruption, Media and Law Enforcement Agencies,” conference paper presented at Corruption Within Security Forces: A Threat to National Security, cosponsored by The George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 14-18 May 2001, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Although traditional organised crime groups have commonly been portrayed in the popular media elsewhere in the world, this has not directly influenced national ideology or culture. Quite the opposite, in fact, is the case as groups such as the Chinese Triads, Japanese Yakuza and Italian Mafia are normally portrayed in a negative light.

<sup>82</sup> Galeotti (1998), p. 418.



Finally, the post-Soviet model of organised crime is considered more egregious than other criminal organisations because it displayed an uninhibited use of intimidation and violence to promote and protect its operations.

Part of this ruthlessness could be attributed to the fact that the lower operational levels of ROC were relatively disorganised, however, as Mark Galeotti noted, "this does not mean that it is not efficient, but that it is characterised as a series of networks rather than formal structures."<sup>83</sup> In other words, aside from the leadership, most criminal groups in the FSU used mobile lower levels made up of members who were not necessarily loyal to their own groups. Although these groups may have had oaths of membership in the past (ie. the *vory v zakone*), most groups in the post-Soviet environment discarded the requirements for such a loyal basis. As a result internal discipline was not as rigid as in traditional organised crime groups, thus allowing members more freedom in their actions - which further explains the rampant violent nature of ROC. This was exacerbated by the experience of fighting in the Afghan War, common among many lower rank criminals. Active military duty in which there was permanent exposure to the risk of death "reduced the sense of danger and created a specific readiness to die."<sup>84</sup>

Given the prevailing post-Soviet criminal environment, it is evident that ROC does possess a number of characteristics that differentiate it from traditional criminal organisations. Although criminal groups in the Russian Federation are distinct entities within the global criminal underworld, it is a position that ROC has worked to gain

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<sup>83</sup> Mark Galeotti, "The Russian Mafiya: Economic Penetration at Home and Abroad", in A. Ledeneva and M. Kurkchyan, Economic Crime in Russia. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000)

<sup>84</sup> Vadim Volkov, Violent Entrepreneurs: the use of force in the making of Russian Capitalism (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 11.

since 1991. In the early years of its evolution, ROC successfully took advantage of privatisation, protection rackets and other illegal activities that brought it considerable wealth. This wealth, however, was not directly or immediately translated into power, thus forcing larger groups to seek ways to influence the decision-making process of government and eventually secure “a new position within the Russian hierarchy.”<sup>85</sup> This was made increasingly possible as the conglomerate criminal groups solidified their membership base, thus creating a new elite that “naturally reoccupied the power structures, forging their own links with industry and the military”<sup>86</sup> and creating a network of “vested interests, special pleading, and patronage”<sup>87</sup> deep within the political system. Combining ROC’s composition, political aspirations and willingness to use violence, it can be concluded that it is “the intermingling of all of these factors that makes the criminal activities [of ROC] so ‘untouchable’...”,<sup>88</sup> and that subsequently gave ROC the impetus – directly and indirectly – to engage with the terrorist realm.

### **Entertaining Alliances: discerning economic from political agendas**

As argued in Chapter Three, the first ‘type’ of relationship that often emerges between terrorism and organised crime is an alliance. Alliances allow each group to remain committed to their defined aims, normally because of the short-term, business-like nature of such associations. The notion of an alliance is not a new phenomenon to Russia, but has roots in the Soviet system under Josef Stalin. Stalin used organised

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<sup>85</sup> Peter Daniel DiPaola, “The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafiya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union,” <http://www.law.indiana.edu/gisj/vol4/no1/dippgp.html> (14 October 1998).

<sup>86</sup> Coulloudon (1997), p. 77.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Margaret E. Beare, “Russian (East European) Organised Crime Around the Globe,” a conference paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Customs Service, and Australian Federal Police Transnational Crime Conference, Canberra, 9-10 March 2000.



crime to help maintain order by conducting violent intimidation in lieu of the state to such an extent that criminals aided in state purges. In retrospect it may be concluded that this historical dimension laid the foundation for the emergence of allegations about a contemporary relationship between state terrorism and organised crime. It has been argued that, in an effort to attain state control over the population while pushing certain domestic security policies, President Boris Yeltsin and President Vladimir Putin both used criminal groups in conjunction with state security services to perpetrate major bombings against the civilian population.<sup>89</sup> Despite the historical precedent of state terror using organised crime, the certainty about these allegations remains elusive and difficult to substantiate, and will therefore not be dealt with in this thesis.

In addition to allegations of forming an alliance with the state's use of terrorism, ROC has engaged in alliances with terrorist entities in order to continue to expand its operations globally. Since the early 1990s, ROC has thus engaged in alliances with Chechen militants, Afghan mujahideen and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Al Qaeda. It is through these alliances that the dynamics of the first point of the CTC, in relation to the Russian context, is best illustrated.

By nature, ROC is a regional phenomenon – as discussed in previous sections. However, in addition to establishing operations throughout the Russian Federation

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<sup>89</sup> Many of these allegations are outlined in Yuri Felshtinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, Blowing Up Russia: Terror From Within (New York: S.P.I. Books, 2002). In addition to arguing that the special services were instructed to foment war in Chechnya, Felshtinsky and Litvinenko argue that the FSB were ordered to conduct acts of terrorism that would be blamed on Chechen militants in order to gain public support for Russian actions in Chechnya. Bombings for which the FSB has been accused of orchestrating include the 1999 attacks in Ryazan, Buinaksk, Moscow and Volgodonsk.

and in other former Soviet states, ROC simultaneously established a global foothold. Facilitated by a membership willing to travel and harness personal networks (including networks that extended through diaspora communities), it was an interest to build alliances with licit and illicit political entities that expanded ROC operations into some of the most unstable, yet lucrative, regions of the world. The search to maximise profits, combined with an innate attraction to manipulate the political environment, provided ROC with both an interest and opportunities to become involved with terrorist elements. Three key examples of alliances created between ROC and terrorist groups include the relationships developed between ROC and Chechen militants (as discussed in subsequent sections), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Al-Qaeda.<sup>90</sup>

The relationship between ROC and FARC began in the early 1990s after one of the leading drug trafficking groups – the Cali cartel – reportedly discovered a potentially lucrative cocaine market in Russia.<sup>91</sup> It was reported that FARC-member Julian Castano, with representatives of Mexican organised crime, met with representatives of the Solntsevo gang in Russia from 1992.<sup>92</sup> These meetings allegedly formed a large-scale network that used Russian ports, Moscow and St Petersburg to distribute cocaine into the Russian Federation. By 2001, government sources (i.e. the Federal Security Services) were quoted as stating that Russia was a principal market for Colombian

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<sup>90</sup> Given word constraints placed within this thesis, only the relationship between ROC and FARC will be discussed here, and in Chapter Five. For an overview of the relationship established between ROC and Al Qaeda see: John Daly, “Viktor Bout: From International Outlaw to Valued Partner,” Terrorism Monitor, vol. 2, issue 20 (21 October 2004); “No Information About Russian Arms for Al Qaeda,” The Associated Press (21 February 2002); “Al Qaeda Linked to Russian Arms Broker,” Los Angeles Times (16 February 2002); and, “Revealed: Al Qaeda’s Arms Dealer,” Sunday Times (17 February 2002).

<sup>91</sup> “Mafia Rusa Conectada a Carteles Colombianos (Russian Mafia Connections to Colombian Cartels),” La Prensa, 28 February 2001, accessed at <http://www-ni.laprensa.com.ni/archivo/2001/febrero/28/nacionales/nacionales-20010228.html> (03 November 2002).

<sup>92</sup> “Russia Becoming Principal Market for Colombian Cocaine,” Johnson’s Russia List, No. 5581 (05 December 2001).



cocaine, attracting an estimated 40 tons of cocaine per year.<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, evidence suggests that Russian groups supplied FARC with weapons since the early 1990s in exchange for cocaine.<sup>94</sup> It may be suggested that the FARC's successes (as discussed in further detail in Chapter Five) after 1995 were in part due to their involvement with Russian organised crime. Russian weapons, for example, allowed the FARC to arm its nearly doubled membership base of 15,000.<sup>95</sup> Thus, not only have Russian criminal syndicates affected the political environment of the FSU, but they appear to have engaged in providing resources that contributed to the sustained instability experienced in Colombia.

### **An Internal Capacity for Terrorism: Responding to Operational Necessities**

The discussion above of the relationship between ROC and various terrorist groups has confirmed that alliances are entertained primarily for practical purposes. In most cases described in the previous section, alliances opened additional opportunities for ROC, while simultaneously (and not necessarily intentionally) extending their reach across borders. Although the evidence reveals an interest on the part of terrorist groups and ROC to cooperate in criminal operations, there have been no recorded instances of ROC seeking reciprocal services (i.e. seeking a terrorist group to conduct an act of terrorism on a pre-determined ROC target). Instead of soliciting external entities to conduct acts of violence at their bequest, ROC has willingly engaged in the use of violence and intimidation to promote and protect their interests. The use of

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<sup>93</sup> "Russia Becoming Principal Market for Colombian Cocaine," Johnson's Russia List, No. 5581 (05 December 2001).

<sup>94</sup> See Sue Lackey and Michael Moran, "Russian Mob Trading Arms for Cocaine with Colombian Rebels," MSNBC.com, 19 April 2000, accessed at <http://www.msnbc.com/news/391623.asp?m=-13N>, and Kirk Semple, "The Submarine Next Door," The New York Times Magazine, 03 December 2000.

<sup>95</sup> Bruce Michael Bagley, "Globalisation and Transnational Organised Crime: The Russian Mafia in Latin America and the Caribbean," Mama Coca, 31 October 2001, accessed at [http://www.mamacoca.org/feb2002/art\\_bagley\\_globalized\\_organized\\_crime\\_en.html](http://www.mamacoca.org/feb2002/art_bagley_globalized_organized_crime_en.html) (19 April 2002).

terror tactics has been employed by other criminal groups (i.e. the Italian mafia and drug cartels in Colombia)<sup>96</sup> as a way to disrupt the activities of government and law enforcement that threaten their operations.<sup>97</sup> This relationship is best summarised by

Alison Jamieson:

In many cases the line which separates terrorism from organised crime has become blurred, in that both forms of criminality use violence or the threat of violence to achieve their ends, both sustain themselves financially through control of 'criminalized' resources such as drugs and arms, and both have a political strategy. Nonetheless, one can generally distinguish between the *ideological* content of political terrorism and the *pragmatic* goals of organised crime: whereas the primary aim of politically inspired violence is the pursuit of specific objectives involving the overthrow of a government and/or the status quo. The political agenda of an organised crime group is determined by the quest for power, impunity and profits. Organised criminals seek to penetrate and suborn the state and cohabit with it, using terrorist tactics to intimidate the State when their privileges are at risk...<sup>98</sup>

Despite a history of organised crime engaging with terrorism as an operational tool, ROC's use of terror tactics has been more egregious than any other criminal group in history. As will be demonstrated below, the use of terror tactics by ROC has been used to attain "power, impunity and profits", however, the Russian experience can be distinguished from others because ROC has sought to alter the prevailing status quo.

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<sup>96</sup> With some groups, other than ROC, there also appears to be a thin line between their criminal operations and their use of terrorism to acquire political influence. This is especially true for the Colombian drug cartels who are known to have penetrated state power wielding institutions. The primary difference, however, between ROC and the Colombian case is that the Colombian cartels were able to utilise domestic terrorist groups (ie. FARC) in their favour. ROC, on the other hand, has only been able to depend on its own resources with respect to conducting violent operations. This argument - which falls under the rubric of 'narco-terrorism' has been covered extensively in Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narco-Terrorism (London: HarperCollins, 1990).

<sup>97</sup> For a general overview of how these groups have used violence, refer to the following sources: Alison Jamieson, "Mafia and Political Power, 1943-89," International Relations, vol. 10, no. 1 (May 1990); Alison Jamieson, "Mafia and Institutional Power in Italy," International Relations, vol. 12, no. 1 (April 1994); David Scott Palmer, ed., Shining Path of Peru, (London: Hurst, 1992); Charles Bergquist et al., Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective, (Delaware: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992); Mark Galeotti, "The Albanian Connection," International Police Review, no. 10 (1998).

<sup>98</sup> Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia: Italy's Fight Against Organised Crime, (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 1.



Apart from an obvious interest in acquiring profits, the criminal elite of the FSU have also sought – at various times - to gain direct control over the political and economic spheres of the Russian Federation, and other former Soviet republics. This not only worked to ensure that power was attained, but it also promoted the maintenance of an ideal criminal environment. With these objectives in mind, ROC adopted the use and the threat of terrorism to ensure that society – at various levels - was both incapable and afraid of interfering with criminal operations conducted by conglomerate criminal groups. The ability of ROC to use terrorism as a tactic to promote its own interests can be highlighted and measured against the five characteristics of terrorism outlined in Chapter One. These characteristics include: the use or threat of premeditated violence; the creation of fear among an adversary or specific segment of society; careful target selection; political objectives which normally include an attempt to influence political behaviour; and, the goal of breaking the will of the opposition and forcing it to submit to specified demands. Taking these as the basic requirements for any terrorist organisation, it may be argued that ROC had not only come to comply with these requirements, but also succeeded where traditional terrorist groups have not.

### *Targeted Violence and the Spread of Fear*

Violence and/or the threat of violence do not emerge in a vacuum, but are dependent on the success of targeting strategies employed by a criminal or terrorist group. As outlined in Chapter One, Schmid and Jongman (1988) provided the most useful understanding of targets by distinguishing between symbolic targets and targets of opportunity. This argument was taken a step further by C.J.M Drake who classified targets according to four categories - symbolic, functional, logistical and expressive -

each of which is loosely based according to terrorist motives.<sup>99</sup> Symbolic<sup>100</sup> targets are chosen to directly solicit a response or reaction in the psychological target (i.e. high-ranking government officials); functional targets are people or objects who represent a direct threat to the existence of the terrorist group (i.e. police or intelligence officers or headquarters); logistical targets generally include individuals or installations that are attacked to “provide or safeguard the group’s resources”<sup>101</sup>; and, expressive targets refer to “an emotional response to a situation, rather than a part of an overall strategy.”<sup>102</sup>

Upon analysing the activities of ROC it becomes evident that it has strategically used all four categories of targeting to create an environment in which it has overseen, and continues to oversee, the transfer of state power to its own interests. Successful targeting, as this section will illustrate, has also ensured that ROC – through its actions - displays the first three characteristics required to be considered a terrorist group: the use or threat of violence; careful target selection; and the spread of fear among specified segments of society. Furthermore, ROC’s successful use of target selection, violence, and the subsequent manipulation of fear throughout the Russian Federation, has produced a sense of insecurity that can be understood with reference to the alternative view of security outlined in Chapter Two.

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<sup>99</sup> C.J.M Drake, Terrorists’ Target Selection, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 9. It should be noted that these targets are not exclusive, thus a target can be chosen for more than one reason.

<sup>100</sup> These include attacks against prominent individuals; low-level attacks aimed to create an inconvenience and act as a reminder that the terrorists will continue to perpetrate violence until their demands are met; and ‘spectacular’ attacks which are intended to cause serious damage in order to place inflated attention on the terrorists presence. Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>101</sup> Included in this category are criminal activities (ie. robberies, kidnapping, hijackings) used for strictly financial purposes. Ibid., pp. 12-14.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., p. 14.



Using violence and the threat of violence to ensure the success of their goals, ROC created an undeniable sense of fear within key segments of society. The primary target of ROC, as with many other traditional terrorist and criminal groups, has been state authorities, especially politicians and those in the judiciary, law enforcement, and military institutions. In addition to these more obvious targets, criminal organisations in the FSU also successfully targeted the business community and the general public. The following quote, describing a relatively quiet week in Russia in the early 1990s, sets the tone for this section:

A huge bomb blast killed a St. Petersburg businessman; masked assassins murdered a businessman from Bratsk in front of his family; an aide to the speaker of the Russian parliament was shot in the back of the head; and a gang from the Yaroslavl region were reported to have murdered at least 15 people and buried them in concrete so that they could steal [and sell] their homes.<sup>103</sup>

### *Symbolic Targeting: Government Representatives*

Regarded as symbolic and/or functional targets, politicians are generally targeted by ROC for two main reasons. First, because they have the power to directly influence legislation that is presented and passed in parliament. Second, because they hold the potentially powerful positions which criminal elites themselves want to control. Thus, by using terror tactics, ROC has placed itself in a position in which it could deter or block any potentially destructive government policy, and ultimately influence the electorate and government officials into electing or appointing their members into potentially powerful government positions. Since 1991 there have been a significant number of political representatives that have been assassinated while serving in office.

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<sup>103</sup> James Meck, "Russia sinks as crime wave rises," *Guardian Weekly*, 08 November 1998. Note that the news stories used in this quote only represent killings that made the news during the week, a large percentage of violent crimes perpetrated by criminal organisations is not necessarily reported.

Although it is difficult to tie all of these deaths to ROC, in an overwhelming majority of cases (especially the most news worthy), the available evidence points to ROC.

Three examples will serve to illustrate ROC's ability to target leading state officials seeking to circumvent their activities.<sup>104</sup> In April 1994 a Duma deputy from Khimki, Andrei Aizderdzis, was murdered. Despite having six eyewitnesses to the murder, the police were unable to compile an identification of the assassin.<sup>105</sup> With no known links to the criminal world, and no evidence that Aizderdzis collected a second income (i.e. from illicit activities), the authorities still ascribed his death to a contract murder resulting from business contacts. Despite this official explanation of his death, the most logical reason – as indicated in press reports – emerges from his membership in the New Regional Policy Group of Deputies where Aizderdzis took responsibility for publishing a newsletter entitled “Kto yest kto (Who is who)?” which included a long list of “crime kingpins” in the FSU.<sup>106</sup> This suggests that retribution at the hands of ROC was the most likely explanation for his murder.

The second example – and the most publicised cases of a government official killed as a result of attempts to uncover the operations of criminal organisations and their links to government leaders - is that of the murder of Duma deputy Galina Starovoitova in St. Petersburg in November 1998. During her political career, Starovoitova reportedly offended a number of high-ranking officials, including senior members in the General Prosecutor's Office and the Federal Security Service, as well as St. Petersburg

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<sup>104</sup> Since 1994, there have been 9 assassinations against leading Liberal Russian Duma deputies. These are the murder of Andrei Aizderdzis and Valentin Martemyanov in 1994; Sergei Skorochkin and Sergei Markidonov in 1995; Lev Rokhlin and Galina Starovoitova in 1998; Mikhail Sirota in 2001; Vladimir Golovlev in 2002; and, Sergei Yushenkov in 2003.

<sup>105</sup> Vadim Belych, “A Deputy to the State Duma is Killed,” *Izvestia*, 26 April 1994, p. 1.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*



Governor Vladimir Yakovlev as a result of her anti-corruption crusade. At the time of her death, Starovoitova was investigating ties between government officials and criminal groups in St. Petersburg, while publicly opposing the election of known criminal deputies to the local legislative assembly.<sup>107</sup> Part of this investigation included an attempt to uncover Yakovlev's alleged ties to organised crime, during which she had reportedly come into possession of an audio tape<sup>108</sup> linking Yakovlev to one of the leading mafia groups in the city.<sup>109</sup>

Apart from her independent investigations into criminal-government links, Starovoitova was also actively involved in the upcoming elections to the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly as the chairperson of the 'Northern Capital', a coalition of democratic forces.<sup>110</sup> Although she was not a candidate in the elections herself, Starovoitova was openly seeking to have as many 'Northern Capital' democrats elected into the local legislative assembly as possible. As Viktor Ilyukhin, Chairman of the Duma Security Committee noted,

Galina Starovoitova had thoughts of controlling the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly. But St. Petersburg is a rather criminalised city. Criminal groups have carved up spheres of influence. I am firmly convinced that some serious conflicts and frictions arose between power-hungry criminal elements and Starovoitova's interests...<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> "Dead State," *Izvestia*, 24 November 1998, p. 1.

<sup>108</sup> It is important to note that although the tape did not contain direct conversations with Yakovlev, the conversations did suggest that he was directly linked to criminal groups. David Satter, "Black Russians: the mob makes a bid to rule Russia," *National Review*, 21 December 1998, p. 29.

<sup>109</sup> Brian Whitmore, "The Strange Investigation of Galina Starovoitova's Murder," *PRISM: A Biweekly on the Post-Soviet States*, vol. 5, issue 2 (29 January 1999), p. 1. Starovoitova was also investigating criminal-government-business ties in the establishment of a private commercial company to be called the National Security Academy. In connection with this company several people had been murdered, including a close friend of Starovoitova and former head of the Petersburg tax service, Dmitry Filippov. If Starovoitova did possess information about criminal involvement in the National Security Academy, this merely provides an additional motive for her murder. For details of this hypothesis, see: Viktoria Voloshina, "A Fatal Choice," *Moskovskiye novosti*, no. 46 (22-29 November 1998), p. 2.

<sup>110</sup> Viktor Paukov and Vadim Tyagniryadno, "Galina Starovoitova Was Being Tailed and Her Phones Were Tapped," *Vremya MN*, 23 November 1998, p. 1.

<sup>111</sup> "Politicians on Starovoitova's Murder," *Kommersant*, 24 November 1998, p. 2.

Starovoitova's activities in the period leading up to her death gives credence to the theories about her murder that focus on her attempts to counter criminal influence in St. Petersburg. Regarded as the centre of criminal penetration of political structures, the fact that Starovoitova was murdered during the time of the St. Petersburg legislative assembly elections suggested that her death could be attributed to "one of the dirtiest political campaigns in recent Russian history [that] featured some unprecedented methods of political struggle.", and an election in which an estimated 50 per cent of candidates were connected to criminal groups.<sup>112</sup>

Finally, the assassination of Sergei Yushenkov provides a third illustration of how leading politicians seeking transparency within the political system were targeted by ROC. Yushenkov, like Aizderdzis, was considered a leading liberal politician who sought to uncover political corruption in Russia and release evidence in support of allegations that the Russian Security Services were responsible for a wave of bombings in apartment blocks in 1999 that resulted in the death of hundreds of Russian citizens.<sup>113</sup> These bombings acted as a catalyst for Moscow's decision to begin its second campaign in Chechnya – an act that Yushenkov also publicly denounced as illegal. The absence of any evidence linking him to criminal structures or business dealings further suggests that his assassination was the result of his search for government transparency and accountability. Grigorii Yavlinsky, leader of the liberal Yabloko party, stated in an interview regarding Yushenkov's death: "This is

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<sup>112</sup> Victor Sergeev, "Organized Crime and Social Instability," in Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. Breslauer, eds. *Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?* (Oxford: Westview Press, 2001), pp. 165-6.

<sup>113</sup> "Russian MP's death sparks storm," [www.rusnet.nl](http://www.rusnet.nl) (19 April 2003); Michael Wines, "Leader of Western-style liberal party slain outside Moscow home," *New York Times*, (18 April 2003); and, Nabi Abdullaev, "Liberal Russia's Yushenkov Shot Dead," *Moscow Times* (18 April 2003).



undoubtedly a political assassination. It would be political in any version because it shows that criminal structures threaten politicians at every level.”<sup>114</sup>

Another group of politicians commonly targeted by ROC – especially in the transitional period of the 1990s - were those who sought to place greater controls and transparency over economic programmes at the local, regional or national levels. Legislative economic controls threatened to limit the ability of criminal groups to infiltrate legitimate economic sectors. In the case of ROC, this represented a direct challenge to their apparent aim of gaining authority and legitimacy within Russian society. With respect to Drake’s classification of targeting strategies, in addition to being symbolic and functional, these targets were also logistical in nature. The assassination of vice Governor Mikhail Manevich, head of the St. Petersburg City Property Committee, in August 1997 illustrates this point. Over the course of three years, Manevich was intent on pushing ahead economic reforms and privatisation in St. Petersburg. Displeased with the results of Russian privatisation since 1991, he increasingly campaigned for the rule of law to be respected and implemented in the business world.<sup>115</sup> With his evident personal ethic, combined with his ability to have a “large say in who became the owner of former state assets”,<sup>116</sup> Manevich had become a significant obstacle for criminal organisations seeking to expand their legitimate business interests in the city.

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<sup>114</sup> Gregory Feifer, “Russia: Assassination of Liberal Lawmaker Seen as Attack on Democratic Values,” Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, (18 April 2003), accessed at <http://www.rferl.com> on date of publication.

<sup>115</sup> St. Petersburg Times, 25 August 1997. Manevich also advocated the selling of St. Petersburg municipal properties for the going market prices - unlike previous privatisation drives throughout Russia that commonly sold state property and factories at prices well below fair market value. For an insightful account of Russia’s experience with privatisation, refer to Stefan Hedlund, Russia’s ‘Market’ Economy: A bad case of predatory capitalism, (London: UCL Press Limited, 1999).

<sup>116</sup> The Daily Telegraph, 19 August 1997.

Despite the inclusion of government officials in the composition of conglomerate criminal groups, ensuring that ROC enjoyed preferential treatment since 1991, ROC continued to target political representatives to protect their interests and existence from government initiatives. Attempts to secure control over political representatives through campaigns of violence became so widespread that in 1994, Iosif Kobzon, a singer with links to the key criminal groups, suggested in an interview with the newspaper *Komsolmolskaya Pravda* that the State and criminal structures should call a truce: “it is necessary to sit down at the table, so to speak, and negotiate through mediators, public councils, or the press.”<sup>117</sup> Public statements of this type – commonly associated with government attempts to seek dialogue with terrorist groups - illustrated the presence ROC had gained in Russian society by the mid-1990s, suggesting that ROC had successfully assumed the role of a non-state actor that had the potential to become a political force.

### *Functional Targeting: The Judiciary and Law Enforcement*

In addition to directing violence against politicians, ROC also singled out the judiciary<sup>118</sup> and law enforcement as functional targets in order to promote and protect its interests. On an operational level, these officials were targeted when seen to pose an immediate threat to ROC, either by threatening apprehension, by initiating a criminal investigation into a group (especially with the purpose of uncovering criminal connections to government personnel), or simply by refusing to accept a bribe. In 2000, the Russian Interior Ministry estimated that seven to 15 internal affairs

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<sup>117</sup> Frederico Varese, “What is the Russian Mafia?,” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, vol. 5, no. 2 (Autumn 1996), pp. 135-136.

<sup>118</sup> In St. Petersburg and Astrakhan, 2 judges were murdered in 1998, and 5 were severely beaten between 1995 and 2000. *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, 21 August 2000.



employees died daily during the performance of their duties.<sup>119</sup> Although lack of evidence means that all of these deaths have not officially been attributed to criminal organisations, media reports have speculated that many, in fact, were.<sup>120</sup> The evidence which is discussed below suggests that the ROC ensured that judicial investigators attempting to seriously undermine criminal groups were either intimidated or murdered, thus successfully instilling a general sense of insecurity throughout both professions.

One of the first recorded incidents of ROC displaying ruthless tactics towards the judiciary, and subsequently creating widespread terror, occurred in Dagestan in 1993 during a court case at the Supreme Court building. While judges were hearing a case against members of a Chechen criminal organisation, gangsters broke into the court room and opened fire. Several persons were subsequently injured, and when court reopened, the prosecutor instantly reduced the charges.<sup>121</sup> An attack similar in nature occurred in February 1999 in the region of Samara, which is noted for having one of the highest crime rates in the Russian Federation. The regional police department embarked on a major campaign to curtail the fighting between criminal groups. As a result of this attempted anti-crime effort, it is believed that criminal organisations retaliated by setting the regional police department building on fire, resulting in over 60 deaths and the destruction of documents that could have been used to indict

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<sup>119</sup> Interfax, 30 August 2000.

<sup>120</sup> Some of the most famous contract murders on law enforcement personnel in Russia include: the October 1999 murder of Colonel Mikhail Biryukov, deputy head of the Tambov Regional Internal Affairs department and previous head of the Tambov Regional Criminal Investigation Department (Itar-Tass, 06 October 1999); the October 1999 murder of Major Sergei Fillipov, head of the department for combating banditry at the Novosibirsk Regional directorate for countering organised crime (Itar-Tass, 03 October 1999); and the July 2000 attack against Lieutenant General Vladimir Shults, deputy director of the Federal Security Service and Major General Aleksandr Morozov, head of the Northwest Regional Directorate for Combatting Organised Crime and Corruption (BBC Worldwide Monitoring, SU/3902 B/1, 26 July 2000).

<sup>121</sup> MVD press release, 26 October 1993, as quoted in Stephen Handelman (1995), Comrade Criminal..., p. 24.

members of organised criminal groups.<sup>122</sup> Other examples include the assassinations of: Radik Yagutyan, Chief of Samara regional Prosecutor Investigations department<sup>123</sup>; Anatoly Stepanov, Deputy Minister of Justice<sup>124</sup>; Galina Borodina, acting head of Moscow region Justice Department<sup>125</sup>; and A. Sinitsyn, deputy prosecutor of Bratsk, Eastern Siberia.<sup>126</sup> Although they have made a concerted effort to fight ROC in spite of inadequate manpower, equipment shortages, inadequate training, and pay shortages, the retribution which law enforcement personnel and the judiciary have faced from ROC has created an environment in which very few investigations are investigated thoroughly..

### *Logistical Targeting: Legitimate Business Sectors*

A third group of individuals commonly targeted by ROC have been people connected to the licit business world - especially in economic sectors of interest to criminal organisations. The legitimate business sector represents a logistical target for ROC because, in addition to criminal activities, ROC is aware of its economic benefits and the associated political power which results from success in licit business. Furthermore, legitimate business plays a vital role in the operations of illicit criminal activities - especially because the tacit cooperation of banks and business enterprises is needed to facilitate the laundering of illicit profits. Interested in maximising their

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<sup>122</sup> "Organized Crime is Suspected in Samara Fire," The Russian Journal, vol. 4, no. 4 (22 February 1999).

<sup>123</sup> Boris Belyakov, "Samara Regional Prosecutor Investigations Department Chief Killed," Itar-Tass (26 June 1994).

<sup>124</sup> Stepanov handled matters pertaining to the offices of the defence attorney and notary, and therefore was privy to documentation that revealed links between government officials and organised crime. Unwilling to succumb to alleged corruption attempts, it was likely Stepanov's determination to prosecute the guilty that led to his death. Grigory Sanin, "Anatoly Stepanov's Skull is Crushed With a Hatchet," Segodnya, 24 May 1996, p. 1, as quoted in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 48, no. 21 (19 June 1996).

<sup>125</sup> "Moscow Regional Official Found Shot Dead," Deutsche-Presse Agentur (25 June 1996).

<sup>126</sup> A. Sinitsyn, was killed in January 1999 allegedly because of his successful fight against members of the Bratsk criminal group. The Bratsk were allegedly the most influential group in Eastern Siberia in 1999. "Press Surveys," Organized Crime Watch, vol. 1, no. 4 (May/June 1999), p. 6.



financial standing, criminal elites in the 1990s embarked on a campaign to gain direct control over lucrative and legitimate business ventures in Russia. This was accomplished through three strategies.<sup>127</sup> First, with its large capital reserves, ROC extended loans to entrepreneurs in return for placing their own people in controlling positions within the new enterprise in order to influence the decision-making process directly. Second, ROC indirectly influenced business by gaining control of banks; and third, business executives were threatened if they failed to cooperate with the criminal group that established control over the geographic area in which the business was located.

Logistical targeting - through the combined use of careful target selection and the indiscriminate use of violence to spread fear - became such a priority by 1992 that the Russian media noted how “orders began to be placed [by criminal elites] for the elimination of ‘recalcitrant’ bureaucrats, prominent commercial dealers, entrepreneurs, and bankers, with the aim of penetrating their business.”<sup>128</sup> As the discussion below illustrates, these orders were carried out to an extreme, transforming the dynamics of fair market competition into a zone of violent conflict. Successful targeting of private industry at all levels created an environment in which an estimated 70-80 per cent of businesses operating in Russia paid 10-20 per cent of their profits for protection (‘krysha’) to ROC.<sup>129</sup> Furthermore, the ways in which ROC targeted legitimate business sectors underscores the differences between ROC and traditional criminal organizations. Unlike traditional groups who are primarily interested in short-term, speculative and liquid investments, ROC has shown a keen interest in businesses that supply commodities which are in high demand on the international

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<sup>127</sup> Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 20 July 1995.

<sup>128</sup> Izvestia Analytical Centre, “Criminal Russia,” Izvestia, 21 October 1994, p. 5.

<sup>129</sup> Galeotti (2000), p. 8.

market (i.e. heavy industry).<sup>130</sup> ROC's evident desire to achieve dominance over key economic enterprises suggests they were always interested in long-term profit maximisation, while simultaneously highlighting their indirect political agenda through attempts to gain a degree of control over the national economy.<sup>131</sup>

The private banking industry was among the first business sectors targeted by ROC, especially during the first half of the 1990s, because control over banking would greatly simplify money-laundering and provide important information for groups involved in protection rackets.<sup>132</sup> The inherent power ascribed to banks within market economies also meant that gaining control over banks would indirectly contribute to the potential political power ROC gained,<sup>133</sup> by intertwining "its activities and influence into the foundations of the emerging Russian state."<sup>134</sup> A premeditated campaign against the Russian banking community arguably began in December 1993 with the murder of Nikolay Likhachev, Chairman of Rosselkhozbank<sup>135</sup>, and

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<sup>130</sup> Rensselaer W. Lee III, Smuggling Armageddon: the Nuclear Black Market in the Former Soviet Union and Europe, (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1998), p. 52.

<sup>131</sup> The implications of this will be discussed in Chapter Four.

<sup>132</sup> Direct control over banks was an important source of intelligence for ROC through the 1990s because bank records provided detailed personal information on customers, allowing for careful target selection with respect to extortion and protection rackets.

<sup>133</sup> In addition to the political and economic power associated with owning banks, gaining control over the industry also has pragmatic reasons that contribute to the overall success of ROC. Given that Russian banks lack considerable regulatory controls and legislation, such extensive control over the banking industry by ROC is not essential, especially since money can easily be deposited without question of its origin - thus making money laundering an extremely obstacle free venture. There are, however, three primary reasons that adequately explain the importance of gaining influence in the sector. First, control provides advantages and protection in the long term should the government ever seriously impose and enforce regulations. Second, if ROC groups directly control a bank, its capital resources can be used for the groups' own purposes; and if they do not entirely own the bank, criminal organisations can easily demand preferential credit (this has been a key reason for the murder of many bank managers who refuse to cooperate). And third, control over the banking sector helps facilitate extortion and corruption. For example, access to business details helps ROC groups identify potential blackmail targets. These points are expanded in Phil Williams (1996), "Introduction...", pp. 16-17.

<sup>134</sup> Nicola J. Lowther, "Organised Crime and Extortion in Russia: Implications for Foreign Companies," Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1997), p. 32.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.* p. 15.



continued through the decade.<sup>136</sup> Utilising violence, therefore, as the key tool for acquiring economic control and subsequently political power, resulted in 116 bankers being threatened between 1993 and 1997 - 79 of which were subsequently killed, and 36 wounded.<sup>137</sup> From 1997 to 1999 the number of bankers killed increased to over 100.<sup>138</sup> In August 1995, the MVD All-Russian Scientific Research Institute estimated that criminal groups operating in Russia alone controlled over 400 banks and 47 exchanges.<sup>139</sup> By 1999, it was ascertained that ROC had a controlling interest in 50-85 per cent of all Russian banks.<sup>140</sup>

Although penetration of the banking industry granted ROC ample opportunity to launder their profits and gain a foothold within the state's economic structures, criminal groups also attempted to gain control of legitimate business for the same reasons. As a result, businesses unwilling to enter into a partnership, or simply unwilling to succumb to extortion threats, were commonly targeted with violence both to remove them as an obstacle to ROC and to serve as an example to others. Carefully orchestrated contract murders had a significant impact on the business community in the years following privatisation. For example, of the 521 confirmed contract killings

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<sup>136</sup> Officials of the Russian Central Bank who have attempted to initiate regulations that would threaten the activities of criminal groups have also been targeted by ROC. Sergei Dubinin, Chairman of the Central Bank survived a bomb attack in March 1996. It is believed that ROC wanted to eliminate him because Dubinin revoked the licenses of several commercial banks controlled by criminal organisations for violating banking regulations. Violence and contract murders in the industry subsequently led the Association of Russian Banks to release a statement highlighting the following concern, "the terror that criminals have unleashed [...] Is becoming broader in scope and assuming extremely brutal forms." For a more detailed account refer to "Yugorsky Bank president Oleg Kantor and bodyguard Oleg Nepravda murdered," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 47, no. 30 (20 July 1995), p. 19.

<sup>137</sup> These statistics were combined from data presented by Antonio Nicaso and Lee Lamothe, Global Mafia and the New World Order of Organized Crime, (Toronto: Macmillan Canada, 1995), p. 44. and Phil Williams, "Introduction: How Serious a Threat is Russian Organized Crime?," Transnational Organized Crime, vol. 2, nos. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 12, in addition to news releases supplied by Interfax, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, and Itar-Tass. In 1994, authorities estimated that between 10 and 12 bankers were kidnapped every month. See Tom Hunter, "Russia's Mafiyas: the New Revolution," Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 9, no. 6 (June 1997).

<sup>138</sup> Reported by the Russian Interior Ministry to BBC World Service, 31 August 1999.

<sup>139</sup> Izvestia Analytical Centre (1994), "Criminal Russia," p. 5.

<sup>140</sup> Interfax, 10 November 1999.

in 1999, the Russian Interior Ministry noted that the majority of victims were businessmen.<sup>141</sup> This is in contrast to 1994 when an estimated 35 businesspersons were murdered.<sup>142</sup> Between 2000 and 2004, the average number of recorded contract killings involving commercial and criminal rivals was 500-700.<sup>143</sup> In the Vladivostok region alone, between May 2002 and May 2003, over 50 businessmen were killed.<sup>144</sup> The Russian Interior Ministry, however, believes that the real number of annual contract killings is three to four times higher than that which is recorded, leading Interior Minister Valentin Stepankov to conclude that ‘Gangster Capitalism’ reigns in Russia.<sup>145</sup>

As mentioned above, a second key industry targeted by ROC through the 1990s was heavy industry. One of the first targeted factories – Uralmashzavod – is also an excellent illustration of the lengths to which ROC had gone to attain control over key industries. Uralmashzavod, a former Soviet machine works factory, was privatized in 1992 for the undervalued price of U.S. \$3.73 million.<sup>146</sup> Located in Yekaterinburg – noted as the capital of Siberian crime – the privatisation of Uralmashzavod played a central role in the rise of the Uralmash group, a criminal entity that successfully gained a significant degree of regional political and social influence. The Uralmash phenomenon is best summarised in the following quote:

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<sup>141</sup> Segodnya, 17 February 2000. There have been discrepancies in the number of contract killings of business people reported in 1999. The St. Petersburg Times reported on 25 June 1999 that in the first five months of the year 567 business people were assassinated, compared with 232 in the same period in 1998. Despite these discrepancies, the statistics used in the text of this thesis will be those quoted from official government sources and representatives, unless otherwise noted.

<sup>142</sup> “More Crime than Punishment in Russia,” Jane’s Foreign Report, 08 December 1994.

<sup>143</sup> Carl Shreck, “Fall off in contract killings illusory as numbers rise,” St. Petersburg Times (24 August 2004); and, Chris Stephen, “Hitmen who play roulette with Russian society’s elite,” The Scotsman (24 August 2004).

<sup>144</sup> “Businessman killed,” Associated Press (28 May 2003).

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> R.W. Dellow, “Russian Organised Crime,” Conflict Studies Research Centre Occasional Paper, no. E97 (March 1998), p. 6.



[Uralmash] had become a network occupying the pre-eminent position in the shadowy world of business and crime in the Sverdlovsk region. Their criminal activities were broad ranging, including everything from rackets to trading in rare metals. Particularly lucrative was their export trade in nonferrous metals and titanium. They continued to help the Uralmash industrial plant – which suffered severely from the loss of state guaranteed markets for its products – by bringing up its finished products for marketing. The diversified interests of the Uralmash group included the local soccer team, restaurants, automobile dealerships, hotels, and other commercial enterprises, including their own brokerage firm.<sup>147</sup>

Although the Uralmash group did not initially gain control over the factory, they did gain a monopoly on the sale of products produced at the plant. With no access to the capital required to continue plant operations and pay staff wages, it is believed that Victor Korovin – the director of Uralmashzavod – entered into a relationship with the Uralmash group.<sup>148</sup> The Uralmash group facilitated this relationship by registering with the local justice ministry as “OPS Uralmash”.<sup>149</sup> As a legally registered business entity, OPS Uralmash established an estimated 100 front companies used to sell the products produced at the plant.<sup>150</sup> Furthermore, the legal registration of their enterprise could be interpreted as an attempt by the Uralmash group to gain public legitimacy. This move was closely followed by a growing interest in entering regional politics.<sup>151</sup> Although their efforts in the 2000 elections were unsuccessful, Russian analysts predicted that OPS Uralmash members would seek to enter the political realm in future years. This prediction was borne out in February 2003 when Uralmash crime boss, Aleksandr Khabarov, sought a position in the State Duma.

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<sup>147</sup> James Finckenaure and Yuri Voronin, “The Threat of Russian Organised Crime,” National Institute of Justice (June 2001), <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles1/187085.txt> (accessed 20 August 2002).

<sup>148</sup> Rose Brady, *Kapitalizm: Russia’s Struggle to Free its Economy*, (New Haven, 1999), pp. 33-34. See also Varese, (2001).

<sup>149</sup> “Russia Economy: Business Outlook for the Urals,” *Economist Intelligence Unit*, (20 August 1999), <http://www.viewswire.com>. It is ironic to note the group’s logic for using the name ‘OPS’. Technically OPS is an acronym that stands for ‘social-political union’, however, the letter combination ‘OPS’ could also stand for ‘organised crime group’.

<sup>150</sup> “Mafiya Murder and the Russian Power Struggle,” <http://www.stratfor.com>, 12 July 2000.

<sup>151</sup> The successful penetration of Uralmash in regional politics is discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections.

The relationship that emerged between Uralmashzavod and OPS Uralmash did not translate into greater productivity at the factory, although it did ease practical operations. This situation, however, began to change in 1999 with the appointment of a new director, Oleg Belonenko. During a press conference in July 2000, Belonenko announced that the factory had received enough orders to increase metal production by an estimated 70 per cent, compared to the previous year.<sup>152</sup> Between his appointment in 1999 and July 2000, the majority of profits accrued from rising productivity went to OPS Uralmash as a result of the monopoly it held over distribution and sales. This situation ultimately led Belonenko to embark on a campaign to eliminate criminal influence from Uralmashzavod. Belonenko was murdered on 10 July 2000, an action that was strongly believed to have been ordered by OPS Uralmash.<sup>153</sup> Uralmashzavod was not important to OPS Uralmash solely because of its potential profitability, but more likely because it produced the majority of Russia's mining equipment, nuclear power and drilling equipment, in addition to producing strategic alloy and military hardware. The scope and range of the company's output meant that Uralmashzavod was crucial to the regional economy, and soon OPS Uralmash bore the same responsibility. As the group amassed profits from Uralmashzavod, unlike most traditional criminal groups which are only interested in taking from society, OPS Uralmash recognised the power associated with investing in society. The group thus began a legitimate investment arm (albeit supported by the use of violence), investing in a wide range of businesses, thus

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<sup>152</sup> <http://www.lenta.ru>, 10 July 2000. Since Belonenko's instalment as director of Uralmashzavod, overall annual productivity increased by 57 per cent, and sales increased by 90 per cent. "Mafiya Murder..." (2000).

<sup>153</sup> [Itar Tass](#), and [Agence France Presse](#), 10 July 2000.



ultimately increasing “incomes and the degree of control.”<sup>154</sup> Regional police data recorded that by the mid-1990s, the Uralmash group established over 200 companies and 12 banks, and had shares in another 90 companies.<sup>155</sup>

Belonenko was not the first person who was allegedly killed by the Uralmash group as a result of his attempts to diminish the influence it exercised in Uralmashzavod or in Yekaterinburg. On the contrary, 18 members of the group arrested in May 2000 claimed responsibility for 25 unsolved contract murders.<sup>156</sup> Unlike many criminal groups, which conduct targeted violence discreetly, OPS Uralmash regularly carried out murders “in public places and in daylight for the sole purpose of intimidating local people and police.”<sup>157</sup> Not only does this highlight their confidence in operating in the city without obstacle, it also reveals their sense of superiority established over the local authorities, as evidenced when they fired grenades into government buildings, “killing no one but terrorising the city.”<sup>158</sup>

The example of Uralmashzavod is not an isolated case; the experience of other businesses connected with heavy industry and natural resources reveals that they have also confronted very similar scenarios in the immediate post-privatisation period. For example, while ROC was establishing a high degree of control over the export of aluminium<sup>159</sup>, coal<sup>160</sup> and petroleum products<sup>161</sup>, several industry officials were

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<sup>154</sup> Volkov (2002), p. 116.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid, p. 119.

<sup>156</sup> Giles Whittell, “Russian mobsters caged at last,” *The Times*, 26 May 2000.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> In the region of Tyumen alone, at least four known aluminium executives were murdered or seriously injured between April and June 1995. *Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*, (20 July 1995).

<sup>160</sup> For example, in November 1998, Aleksandr Gontov (advisor on coal industrial matters to Aman Tuleyev, Kemerovo Provincial Governor) was murdered. It is believed that his death was a result of the ongoing division of criminal spheres of influence in the coal industry because prior to his murder, Gontov was involved in an investigation into the closure of coal mines in the province that were

eliminated. By 1997 ROC's penetration into the aluminium industry became so obvious that Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Kulikov remarked in a speech to the Duma that the aluminium sector was completely criminalised, despite remaining competitive in the world market.<sup>162</sup> Successful penetration of the Russian heavy industry and natural resource sectors has given ROC access to parts of the economy that are commonly regarded as strategic assets to national security. These very sectors are also attacked by traditional terrorist groups because of the strategic economic importance they play within a country. This, de facto, placed ROC in a position with a potentially significant degree of political influence. A desire to gain control over all aspects of the Russian economy, however, also led ROC to penetrate the consumer industry, including alcohol and tobacco<sup>163</sup>, the construction industry<sup>164</sup>, the computer

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considered to be profitable. The findings of this investigation directly threatened those who stood to financially gain from their closure. "Tuleyev on the Murder of his Advisor," Nezavisimaya gazeta, 20 November 1998, p. 2.

<sup>161</sup> ROC has developed intricate operations in its drive to vie for influence in the petroleum sector, including stealing oil from pipelines and pumping it to depots and refineries controlled by criminal groups. In the article, "Vladimir Rushailo is Launching a War - for Gasoline," Kommersant, 18 June 1999, p. 3, cited in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 15, no. 24 (July 1999), p. 8., the Interior Ministry was recorded as stating that by 1998 a considerably percentage of oil refineries and terminals were controlled by ROC as a result of their targeted campaign of violence between 1995 and 1998 - resulting in 29 recorded murders or attempted murders on the lives of oil industry executives. Violence in this lucrative sector continued well into 2000 with the successful contract hit against Vitaly Filippov, an executive of Gazprom. Reuters, 13 November 2000.

<sup>162</sup> Boris Boiko, "Anatoly Kulikov Comes to Anatoly Chubais's Defense," Kommersant Daily, 25 February 1997, p. 6.

<sup>163</sup> For example, in January 2000 Ilya Vaisman, the financial director of Baltika Breweries in St. Petersburg was assassinated. See: <http://policy.house.gov/Russia/ch7.html>. Baltika is one of the most successful Russian breweries who made an enviable recovery following the 1998 financial crisis - in fact, between 1998 and 2000 Baltika's directors pursued a policy of expansion by purchasing small, regional breweries. The beer industry has been regarded as one with growing potential, for example, in 1999 production rose 30 per cent compared with the previous year. Agence France Presse, 10 May 2000.

<sup>164</sup> Between 1999 and 2000 the construction industry experienced a number of significant losses. For example, in December 1999, Nikolay Andreyev, president of the financial-construction company Rosyugstroy was killed. Itar-Tass, 12 December 1999. His company dealt with the highly criminalised regions of Volga, Chechnya and the northern Caucasus. In March 2000, Sergei Krijan, manager of a construction supplies company, owner of ten additional businesses, and rising figure in Russia's financial markets, was murdered. [Agence France Presse, 23 March 2000.] It is likely that Krijan's death was a result of his business ventures, in addition to the fact that he was a strong supporter of St. Petersburg's pro-reform parties.



market<sup>165</sup>, and the automobile sector. For example, the extent to which ROC infiltrated the automobile sector, partially a result of a concerted campaign of violence, is best exemplified by the case of the Avtovaz car plant in Togliatti.

Avtovaz became a joint-stock company in 1992 after it could no longer depend on the state trade network to deliver its products. The necessity of seeking the services of private automobile dealers – many of which were linked to ROC - inevitably created a relationship that favoured the rising influence of organised crime.<sup>166</sup> In exchange for funnelling capital into Avtovaz, ROC was able to strategically place group members in the Avtovaz plant to gain immediate control over where vehicles were shipped off the assembly line.

Local crime groups had gained almost complete control of the processes of shipping vehicles from the plant and selling them, and partial control of deliveries of spare parts and raw materials to VAZ. [...] More than 360 firms involved in the auto business had been set up around the plant. Clearly, most of them were controlled by gangsters. As a result, about 90% of the Zhigulis produced at the plant were being sold in Togliatti itself.<sup>167</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> Given its potential to expand throughout the FSU, combined with its lucrative nature in other parts of the world, the computer industry is increasingly being marked by ROC as an industry of interest. Most likely a result of this, Veter Veka, the leading Russian computer company that produces personal computers for the Russian market, experienced two significant losses in 2000 alone when the company director, Aleksandr Ridko, and co-owner David Dvali were killed. [[www.russiatoday.com](http://www.russiatoday.com), 28 April 2000.] The December 1999 assassination of Mikhail Postnikov, vice-president of the VISTA computer company reveals another side of ROC's penetration of legitimate business. It is believed that following the financial crisis VISTA was in debt to the sum of US\$15 million to companies including Samsung and Microsoft. [[Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty](#), 30 December 1999.] Instead of borrowing money from accredited financial institutions, Postnikov sought credit from private individuals and companies. His death therefore falls into a common pattern wherein ROC provides low-interest credit as a way to eventually take over a legitimate enterprise. Assuming that Postnikov did not want to lose control over VISTA, it is likely that his death was the result of a disagreement with creditors.

<sup>166</sup> Alexandr Golubev, "Zhiguli Loses its 'Roof' - But That Doesn't Make it a Convertible," [Kommersant-Daily](#), 17 December 1997, p. 1.

<sup>167</sup> Aleksei Grishin, "Gangster Industry's Auto Giant - In the Past Two Months, More Than 100 Criminal Cases Have Been Initiated at the Volga Automotive Plant," [Segodnya](#), 23 December 1997, p. 5., cited in [The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press](#), vol. 59, no. 50 (1997), p. 11.

Because ROC took control over most vehicles produced at the plant, by the end of 1997 Avtovaz owed the federal government approximately 13 trillion rubles in unpaid taxes and added penalties.<sup>168</sup>

The local office of the regional administration for combating organised crime reported in 1997 that between seven and nine criminal organisations were active in Togliatti, most of which emerged locally, although all had known criminal and business ties to Moscow.<sup>169</sup> Despite the fact that so many groups were interested in Avtovaz, media reports<sup>170</sup> suggested that group leaders allegedly came to an arrangement in which the total number of cars coming off the assembly line were divided according to prearranged agreements. Preliminary data concluded that Togliatti-based auto firms transferred about US\$300 million to Western banks from transactions with Avtovaz in 1997 alone.<sup>171</sup> The degree of cooperation among criminal groups and between the criminal underworld and plant executives, however, should not be overstated. Influence was a significant prize that was won by a handful of criminal organisations that survived a violent turf war for control that left 65 criminal bosses dead, along with several Avtovaz executives.<sup>172</sup>

At the same time that the automobile industry found itself facing a war for control, the hotel industry and the cemetery and funeral business also became priority sectors for criminal groups. As ROC sought to gain control of the hotel industry, which invariably included gaining control over lucrative gambling ventures, several large

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<sup>168</sup> "Deputy premier says that he will join Avtovaz probe," New Europe, 14-20 December, 1997.

<sup>169</sup> "Forbes: Paul Klebnikov, The Rise of an Oligarch," Johnson's Russia List, No. 4466 (22 August 2000).

<sup>170</sup> See, for example, compilation of relevant news reports: Russia Regional Report, 04 December 1996.

<sup>171</sup> Grishin (1997), "Gangster Industry's Auto...".

<sup>172</sup> "Deputy premier says..." (1997).



hotel directors and owners became targets of contract murders.<sup>173</sup> Criminal interest in the cemetery and funeral business, on the other hand, began a few years earlier. Since 1992 ROC has been attempting to infiltrate and control this sector because it was regarded lucrative for the very reason that it is a service required by most members of society. In the last months of 1998 alone, 13 people directly connected to the city's cemetery business were murdered, and several others were assaulted or 'disappeared'.<sup>174</sup> The severity of this predicament was evident in the case of St. Petersburg, where the Kazan criminal group had been credited for running local cemeteries since 1992.<sup>175</sup> However, by 1998 the St. Petersburg police initiated a campaign to try and put an end to criminal control over the cemetery business. This initiative was believed to have been prompted by the murder of Yevgeny Agarev, the deputy chairman of the City Consumer Market Committee.<sup>176</sup> Agarev was finding ways to increase the presence of the state in the funeral sector, in addition to embarking on a campaign to control corruption in the business. Although the available evidence is limited, investigative journalists reporting on Agarev's death strongly believe that it was ordered by the Kazan group, which already controlled a significant portion of the funeral industry.<sup>177</sup>

Business in post-Soviet Russia also faced the persistence of criminal groups seeking to maximise their profit potential, and presence within society. This has meant that business leaders have often shared the fate of members of the government, judiciary

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<sup>173</sup> For an overview of ROC targeting the hotel industry, refer to "Blood in the Suites: the Russian Hotel Wars," *Business Week*, 26 January 1998, p. 27.

<sup>174</sup> Satter (1998), p. 30.

<sup>175</sup> Johan Varoli, "Cemetery Business Infected by Crime," *St. Petersburg Times*, 04 April 2000. One of Kazan's members, and former official with the Bureau of Funeral Services, Vladimir Korolyev (aka Father Funeral), was charged with embezzling approximately US\$2 million in state funds between 1994 and 1997.

<sup>176</sup> This committee was also in charge of managing the Bureau of Funeral Services, an organisation owned by the city that had a near monopoly on the local funeral business.

<sup>177</sup> Varoli (2000).

and law enforcement who have stood in the way of ROC. It appears increasingly evident that the successful spread of intimidation presented criminal organisations in Russia with unprecedented advantages which they used to gain control over many of the state's most lucrative sectors. According to a U.S. inter-agency report on international crime published in December 2000, ROC had acquired a strategic controlling interest in the economic sectors depicted in Figure 4.2.<sup>178</sup> Not only has this had a devastating impact on the national economy, but it also had implications on an international scale. Sharon Cornwell, representative of the United States-born billionaire Kenneth Dart<sup>179</sup>, summarised the situation for business in Russia very succinctly, "Who is going to put money in if companies are just run into the ground...and you have this pervasive atmosphere of fear?"<sup>180</sup>

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
<sup>178</sup>International Crime Threat Assessment (December 2000), <http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/pub45270/pub45270chap3.html> (accessed 20 February 2001). This document was prepared by a U.S. Government interagency working group in support of President Bill Clinton's International Crime Control Strategy.

<sup>179</sup> Kenneth Dart is one of the largest private investors in Russia.

<sup>180</sup> Sharon LaFraniere, "A Crisis of Control in Russian Far East," Washington Post Foreign Service, 02 May 2000, p. A16.



Figure 4.2: ROC Penetration of Key Economic Sectors



Indiscriminate Bombings – Criminal Retribution or Civilian Targets?

In addition to the selective and careful targeting exemplified in the majority of contract killings discussed above, there are indications that ROC has also used indiscriminate tactics as an example of symbolic and expressive targeting. Given the ability of ROC to use selective targeting to eliminate individuals who threaten their operations and rise to power, it appears puzzling that ROC has apparently also targeted populated public locations. Considering the characteristics unique to ROC since its inception, combined with its willingness to freely contract murders as a primary tool of problem-solving, it may be argued that bombings have been selectively and strategically used to spread a general sense of fear throughout society.



Commonly used by terrorists, bombs send very clear political messages “while containing physical damage to an immediate circle.”<sup>181</sup>

Among the first apparent incidents of ROC displaying ruthless tactics in an effort to create a general sense of terror throughout Russian society while making a statement to government authorities occurred during two consecutive days in July 1996 with the bombing of trolley-buses in Moscow. The first blast injured five people and twenty-eight were hurt in the second explosion.<sup>182</sup> Although several different explanations<sup>183</sup> were presented by the media and state officials, the absence of evidence to back initial assumptions that Chechen rebels were responsible for the attacks suggests that there was an alternative motivation for the bombings.<sup>184</sup> Shortly before the bombings, the Russian government passed the ‘Decree on Combating Organised Crime’, in an effort to show a concerted effort – publicly and internationally – to reduce the further infiltration of organised crime throughout society. It thus seems likely that the trolley bombings represented a response from ROC. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov referred to the blasts as “a blatant system of forcible pressure on the capital’s authorities and Muscovites by certain criminal structures.”<sup>185</sup> This incident could be compared to the wave of Italian mafia attacks conducted in 1993, in response to intense anti-mafia

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<sup>181</sup> Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 161.

<sup>182</sup> Izvestia, 12 July 1996, pp. 1-2.

<sup>183</sup> The Federal Security Service blamed the bombings on Chechen terrorists without even waiting for all the evidence to be collected - many local journalists saw this as an attempt by the authorities to manipulate the effects of the explosions regardless of who was responsible. Kommersant Daily, 12 July 1996, p. 14, and Rossiskaya Gazeta, 16 July 1996, pp. 1-2.

<sup>184</sup> Given tense relations with Chechnya, Russian government officials commonly blame Chechen terrorists for crimes perpetrated in Russia, regardless of whether they are in possession of evidence to back their accusations. Similarly with the 1996 bombings, officials were quick to lay blame on the August 2000 bomb that exploded in the Pushinskaya metro station in Moscow, killing eight people and injuring over 100. Failing to uncover evidence to support the official view that Chechen terrorists were responsible, investigators turned to alternative explanations. The most plausible theory was that the bombing was a result of an ongoing battle between criminal groups to gain control of the retail points in the underpass that allegedly bring in a revenue of at least US\$10,000 per month. For further details of this theory refer to: Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and Itar-Tass press releases on 09 August 2000 and 11 September 2000; and Agence France Presse, 11 August 2000.

<sup>185</sup> Izvestia, 13 July 1996, p. 1.



measures implemented by the Italian government. Jamieson refers to the use of terror tactics by the Italian mafia as ‘bombs of dialogue’ that were “not intended to cause loss of life – although that eventuality was necessarily part of the equation – but to weaken Italy’s anti-mafia resolve by demonstrating that the *Costa Nostra* could strike where and whom it wished.”<sup>186</sup>

A few months later, in December 1996, an explosion in Kaspiinsk, Dagestan destroyed a block of flats housing the officers (and their families) serving in the local detachment of the Transcaucasus Border District. The blast which reportedly killed 67 people<sup>187</sup> was initially believed to be a terrorist incident perpetrated by Wahhabists,<sup>188</sup> however after investigators collected evidence, it was unofficially concluded that the explosion was specifically intended to kill Valery Morozov, the head of the detachment. Journalists following the incident reported that Morozov was involved in disputes with the leadership of criminal organisations that were involved in smuggling arms and caviar. Members of his troops reported that local crime groups had repeatedly and regularly threatened Morozov in the past. The likely catalyst of the bombing was the seizure of half a ton of black caviar heading for the United Arab Emirates by border troops at the airport.<sup>189</sup> The Kaspiinsk incident illustrates the lengths to which ROC has gone to discourage uncooperative and obstructive

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<sup>186</sup> Jamieson (2001), p. 216.

<sup>187</sup> Kommersant Daily, 19-20 November 1996.

<sup>188</sup> In the context of the FSU Wahhabis are not true followers of Wahhabism - the puritanical sect of Sunni Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia in the mid-eighteenth century by Abdu I-Wahhab. The term Wahhabism was adopted by Soviet authorities after the 1970 Revolution in Iran because they feared that Islamic militancy could eventually cross over into the regions of Central Asia. As a result, the Soviet regime generally used the term Wahhabi to refer to Islamic militants. It appears as though the present leaders of the FSU have continued to use Wahhabism and Islamic militancy interchangeably. It is therefore important not to mistake Islamic revivalism in the FSU with Saudi Arabian Wahhabism as they have little to do with one another. For a good and succinct discussion of the revival of Islam in the FSU see Igor Rotar, “Wahhabism in the Former Soviet Union: A Real Threat, or Just an Excuse to Settle Accounts With the Opposition?,” Prism: A Biweekly on the Post Soviet States, vol. 4, no. 10 (07 August 1998), <http://www.jamestown.org>.

<sup>189</sup> Segodnya, 19 November 1996, cited in The Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, vol. 58, no. 46 (11 December 1996), p. 15.

behaviour and also highlighted the willingness of ROC to engage in activities that inevitably threaten the lives of innocent civilians (i.e. the families of the border troops). The use of indiscriminate bombings occurred again in 2002 when ROC detonated a car bomb near a McDonald's restaurant in Moscow, allegedly because the restaurant refused to succumb to extortion demands.<sup>190</sup> This behaviour was further evident in 2004 when a dispute for control over the Kirovsky market in Samara resulted in the detonation of a bomb that killed 10 people and injured over 50.<sup>191</sup> Government officials in Moscow quickly attributed responsibility for the blast to Chechen militants, but local law-enforcement officials "categorically rejected" any explanation involving a "Chechen trail" and focused in criminal intimidation.<sup>192</sup>

Orchestrating indiscriminate bombings has not been an evident priority of ROC; however, the lack of interest in conducting spectacular public attacks can be contrasted with ROC's success in perpetrating bombings in public that cause limited damage. The use of bombings as a tactic is reflected in state statistics between 1991 and 1996 that documented known links between bombs that have exploded and organised crime. Throughout all the regions of the FSU, there were 260 criminal bombings in 1991;<sup>193</sup> in 1992 there were 240 criminal bombings in Russia alone; over 300 in 1993; between January 1995 and July 1996 there were 449 reported criminal explosions (resulting in over 1000 deaths); and 886 explosions in 1996.<sup>194</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Although the bombing did not kill anyone, it did injure several people and damaged the building, and instilled a sense of fear amongst the visiting public. "Explosion rocks Moscow McDonald's," BBC News, 19 October 2002, accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2342219.stm> on 31 October 2002.

<sup>191</sup> Charles Gurin, "Samara and Stavropol Bombs: Chechen 'Terrorism' or Russian Business Disputes?" Eurasia Daily Monitor, 1:25 (7 June 2004).

<sup>192</sup> Interfax, 5 June 2004 and Ekho Moskvyy, 5 June 2004.

<sup>193</sup> These figures do not include incidents judged to be accidents such as explosions caused by gas leaks, but refer solely to incidents that the authorities concluded were criminal in nature.

<sup>194</sup> These statistics were compiled from Interior Ministry statements reported by Itar-Tass, Reuters, and in Russian media reports cited in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press.



ROC has primarily used bombings – some of which have been indiscriminate – as a business tactic. In doing so, bombings have served a dual purpose: to make a statement to a specific audience (i.e. rival gang members or uncooperative business or government personnel), and to create a wider sense of fear within society. As with most terrorist groups, ROC appears to have adopted the logic that their power and control could be maximised via the spread of fear - as opposed to gaining the respect of society through legitimate means. The use of (indiscriminate) bombings therefore indirectly contributed to the growing status of ROC while highlighting the fact that the actions of ROC revealed to the public that ROC is more powerful than the state in Russia. As outlined in Chapter Two, this predicament can be explained by the alternative view of security by accounting for the equal importance of non-state actors competing for state control. It also underscores the conclusion that political authority and legitimacy can also be attained by acquiring voluntary public submission to power through the orchestrated use of fear. In this way the state monopoly over the legitimate use of violence is called into question because the state is seen to have lost its ability to control violence within its territory and protect the rights of its citizens.

#### *Targeting Civil Society: spreading terror to the periphery*

Violence directed against state authorities and the business sector reveals the propensity of ROC to use terror tactics in order to gain or secure operational requirements. These targets were carefully chosen to create fear among specific groups of people - mostly those with power and authority, or access to money. As briefly described in the previous section, ROC has also sporadically shown that it is willing to engage in a much broader campaign of violence. ROC's attempts to

terrorise society in general is an issue that necessitates further attention, as this is an important crossover with traditional forms of terrorism. As a result, ROC's activities reflect a concerted effort to undermine and co-opt a central component of a strong, legitimate state – civil society.

As discussed in detail in the following paragraphs, there are many ways in which ROC has sought to dominate civil society, including establishing charity funds as fronts for laundering money and creating a positive image for ROC at the community level. Comparable to 'traditional' terrorist groups, such as Hizb'allah and Hamas which have established social welfare programmes within their areas of domination, the social activities of ROC have also appeared to fill voids in state provision at the local and regional level. The creation of charity organisations and the funding of performance groups, sports teams, and other community activities have helped to create an aura of group legitimacy in the eyes of the population. At the very least, the majority of the public has ignored the violent and illegal activities of criminal groups - partially in recognition of their attempts to fill the social welfare gap that the government has not. In conjunction with supporting the community through social welfare programs, ROC has also sought to block an independent civil society from emerging. This can be seen through ROC's use of terror tactics against the media and non-governmental organisations to instil a sense of fear. As a result, although ROC can be considered among Russia's greatest social threats, anti-mafia groups formed to counter its influence or criminal activities have yet to emerge.

Since 1991, individuals who have spoken out against criminal organisations and those who attempt to uncover the relationship between ROC, big business and the



government have often faced intimidation. For example, journalists investigating criminal connections have regularly been assassinated. At least ten journalists have been killed a year between 1991 and 2000.<sup>195</sup> In 1994 eleven journalists were killed,<sup>196</sup> while several others were seriously beaten; between 1998 and 1999, 25 journalists - the majority of whom were investigating links between government officials and ROC - were killed.<sup>197</sup> This trend declined after 2000, with “only” 15 journalists assassinated between May 2000 and August 2004.<sup>198</sup> There are several explanations for this apparent decrease in contract murders against journalists. Given trends in previous years, it is possible that journalists are less willing to investigate these links for fear of reprisal. Although the spectre of organised crime had not disappeared in 2000, media coverage devoted to its activities was reduced significantly – as evident in cursory media surveys of the Russian press. This reversed trend can also be explained by the fact that the Russian media was placed under greater government control with the rise of President Vladimir Putin in 2000; thus suggesting that stories of ROC-government connections had been indirectly prohibited.

One of the most notorious examples of the murder of journalists is the 1994 killing of Dmitri Kholodov, a prominent investigative journalist who was attempting to uncover corruption and illicit activities in the Russian Ministry of Defence. Media reports suggested that Kholodov discovered evidence of illegal arms sales by the Western Group of Forces withdrawing from Germany, implicating senior officers including

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<sup>195</sup> See figures compiled by the International Press Institute (<http://www.freemedia.at>) and the Committee to Protect Journalists (<http://www.cpj.org>).

<sup>196</sup> Stephen Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafiya, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

<sup>197</sup> Associated Press, 18 January 2000.

<sup>198</sup> Chris Stephen, “Hitmen who play roulette with Russian society's elite,” The Scotsman, 24 August 2004.

Matvei Burlakov, former Commander of the Soviet forces in Germany, and Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. Kholodov was killed on 17 October 1994 by the explosion of a briefcase which he was led to believe contained documents confirming illegal weapons trading in the military.<sup>199</sup> Although in February 2000 the office of the Prosecutor-General finally charged five paratroopers and security guards with murdering Kholodov,<sup>200</sup> questions surrounding his death remain unanswered, including the paratroopers' motivation, and the identity of those who ordered his death.

Another high-profile murder of a journalist occurred in July 2000, when Sergei Novikov was shot to death in what the Interior Ministry described as a contract killing.<sup>201</sup> Novikov ran the radio station *Vesna*, which regularly reported on corruption in the Smolensk area. He also attempted to air a television programme in 1999 entitled 'The Other Side of the Mirror', reporting corruption in the regional administration, judiciary and law enforcement. Although the programme was never broadcast, Novikov wrote an open letter to the governor of Smolensk, Aleksandr Prokhorov, naming people whom he suspected of corruption. It was this letter that is believed to have led to Novikov's death.<sup>202</sup> Two years later, in March 2002, a reporter from *Nashe Vremia* was killed in Rostov-on-Don. The journalist, Natalia Skryl, was believed to have been targeted as a result of ongoing investigations into the activities

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<sup>199</sup> "Was the Military Involved in Journalist's Murder?" The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. XLVI, no. 42 (November 1994), p. 1. Kholodov's associates have maintained over the years that the briefcase was given to Kholodov by a source in the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

<sup>200</sup> These gentlemen confessed to killing Kholodov stating that they were trying to advance their own careers by impressing their superiors who were facing scrutiny for suspected corruption. Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 07 February 2000.

<sup>201</sup> Agence France Presse 30 July 2000.

<sup>202</sup> Agence France Presse, 27 July 2000 and Itar-Tass, 27 July 2000.



of several large corporations, including an investigation into the struggle for control over the local metallurgical plant, Tagmet.<sup>203</sup>

A further high profile alleged contract killing was responsible for the murder of the American editor-in-chief of the Russian edition of *Forbes*, Paul Klebnikov in July 2004. Most accounts of Klebnikov's death focus on his work as a journalist investigating corruption and organised crime, including ties between Russia's oligarchs and ROC.<sup>204</sup> In addition to his journalism, Klebnikov wrote two books: *Godfather of the Kremlin* (2000) argued that businessman Boris Berezovsky made his fortune from manipulating the privatisation programme, and suggested that he was involved in the murder of television anchor-man Vladimir Listyev in 1995, and had a relationship to Chechen criminal groups<sup>205</sup>; and, *Conversation With a Barbarian* (2003) was based on a series of interviews with separatist leader Khozh Akhmed Noukhayev that dealt with organised crime in Russia's ongoing war in Chechnya.

In addition to utilising violence and the threat of violence to intimidate the media, ROC has gained significant control over the press by directly purchasing media enterprises. The acquisition of direct control over radio, television and newspapers is, according to Harmon, a mark of "terror group sophistication and financial

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<sup>203</sup> *Itar-Tass*, 09 March 2002; Commission for the Protection of Journalists, [http://www.cpj.org/killed/Ten\\_Year-Killed/2002\\_list.html](http://www.cpj.org/killed/Ten_Year-Killed/2002_list.html) (accessed 10 April 2004); and, *Kommersant*, 09 October 2003. It has been reported that Skryl told several colleagues at the paper that she had obtained sensitive information about Tegmet that she was planning to publish in an article. In the same year, editor of the Togliatti newspaper *Tolyatinskoy Obozreniye*, Valery Ivanov, was also killed. The paper was known for its reports on official corruption and organised crime, and Ivanov was also a deputy in the local Legislative Assembly. A year later, in October 2003, Ivanov's replacement, Aleksey Sidorov was also murdered in a killing that was described by the Prosecutor's Office of the Samara region as bearing the "hallmarks of a contract killing".

<sup>204</sup> <http://www.mosnews.com/mn-files/klebnikov.shtml> (accessed 03 December 2004).

<sup>205</sup> *Agence Free Presse*, 27 July 2000 and *Itar-Tass*, 27 July 2000. It was reported that Listyev was murdered because he made a habit of reporting corruption on his television programme.

strength”.<sup>206</sup> Control over several media outlets has therefore given ROC an important tool that was used to influence the opinion of legislators and the general public by carefully filtering what news was released, and how it was reported. Control over media outlets also limited the amount of information the public received, especially in relation to the most egregious offences perpetrated by criminal organisations in the FSU. The acquisition of television stations and newspapers by ROC not only continued to inhibit the media from reporting details about ROC and its activities, but it restricted public access to objective coverage of economic and political news.

Charities are a second group within civil society which have commonly been targeted by ROC, although for significantly different reasons. Given the activities of ROC, charitable organisations were primarily targeted because of the associated economic benefits that accompanied them. During President Boris Yeltsin’s presidency, charities were given tax exemption - even when engaged in the import and export of lucrative commodities – and therefore presented an opportunity for ROC to maximise profits. Charities also presented an ideal way through which illicitly gained profits could be laundered, a trend commonly utilised by terrorist groups. ROC, however, also sought to co-opt civil society by giving the impression that they were providing social welfare programmes which a weak state was unable to offer, giving ROC a veneer of legitimacy within communities. This example stresses the continued importance of the state in international security, especially in relation to competition between state and non-state actors. For example, during the Soviet period, the government financially supported sports programmes, a luxury that the Russian government could not afford after 1991. As a result, ROC used its resources to

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<sup>206</sup> Harmon (2000), pp. 57-8.



finance sports schools and clubs, and to organise charitable foundations to support amateur athletes.<sup>207</sup> In many respects, the ability of ROC to fill a gap in government social programming indirectly provided criminal groups with an efficient recruitment base. By 1996, an interest in sport “became almost a sure sign that one belongs to the mafia.”<sup>208</sup>

One example that clearly illustrates the lengths to which ROC had gone to penetrate this sector of society is its concerted effort to target sports organisations.<sup>209</sup> Based on the activities of ROC throughout the 1990s, the most direct way in which control was gained was by ordering contract killings against the directors of groups refusing to allow criminal groups to manipulate their charities’ tax-free status. For example, Valentin Sych - chairman of the Russian Hockey Federation - was shot dead in May 1997 after publicly criticising the expanding influence of ROC in national sports. Sych focused not only on ROC’s attempts to control the Hockey Federation’s rights for duty free imports, but also claimed that players were being intimidated into deliberately losing games.<sup>210</sup> The director general of the Spartak football club Larisa Nechayeva was killed in June 1997. Her death was allegedly the result of her

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<sup>207</sup> Ol’ga V. Kryshtanovskaia, “Illegal Structures in Russia,” Sociological Research, (July-August 1996), p. 64. The known leader of a criminal organisation in Moscow, O. Kvantrishvili, established several charitable sports organisations, including: the Lev Iashin Foundation for the Social Protection of Athletes, the Fighting Gloves Association of Professional Boxers, and the Association of Wrestlers.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> In addition to sports organisations, ROC has also penetrated more traditional charity organisations such as the Russian Fund for Invalids of the Afghanistan War (RFIVA). Established in 1991 to provide social protection to disabled veterans, RFIVA initially began as an organisation with honourable intentions. However, after the government granted RFIVA tax exemption to import rapid turnover commodities (ie. alcohol and tobacco) as a source of fundraising, it soon attracted criminal interests and after a period of violence and assassinations, was controlled by ROC. For more information on the criminal penetration of RFIVA refer to the following sources: The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. 58, no. 45 (04 December 1996), p. 7.; Geory Savelyev, “An Explosion at Kotlyakovskoye Cemetery Claims 13 Lives,” Segodnya, 11 November 1996, p. 1.; Penny Marrant, “Cemetery Bombings: NGOs and the Mafia,” Open Media Research Institute Analytical Brief, no. 456 (11 November 1996).

<sup>210</sup> Jane’s Foreign Report, 01 May 1997. The practise of intimidating Russian hockey players not only occurred in Russia, but Russian players in the National Hockey League (North America) were also targeted for extortion. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four.

reluctance to sign a television rights deal with a company controlled by a leading criminal group.<sup>211</sup> Although high profile killings in Russian sports had dissipated by the end of the 1990s, “league administrators, team officials and star players” have continued to be targeted in the early years of the twenty-first century, apparently in order to stress the influence of ROC within the sports realm.<sup>212</sup>

### *Gauging Success: Operational Benefits from the use of Terrorism*

The prevalence of premeditated violent crime perpetrated by ROC, especially at its peak between 1991 and 2000, against various segments of society successfully created a climate of fear. Although the perceptions of state officials and the business community are important to consider given the intensity of attacks perpetrated against them, it is the perception of the general public that shows how successful ROC’s use of terror tactics has been. As early as 1994, a poll conducted by the independent Institute of the Sociology of Parliamentarism revealed that 91 per cent of a representative sample of 1000 Moscow residents felt a sense of fear on account of the level of crime.<sup>213</sup> Given the steady rise of contract killings since 1991,<sup>214</sup> it may be surmised that this pervasive feeling of fear correspondingly increased with every year throughout the decade. As cited in an unofficial report on crime in Russia in 1993, “The magnitude of the crime wave that has swept over Russia in the past few years is

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<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

<sup>212</sup> Jeff Merron, “Russians regroup on the other side of the red line,” ESPN News (14 February 2002), accessed at <http://www.espn.com> on 19 June 2003.


<sup>213</sup> “Crime in the Capital: Only 6% of Muscovites Aren’t Afraid of It,” Izvestia, 17 May 1994, p. 4.

<sup>214</sup> Statistics for Figure 4.3 are from MVD reports cited in the following sources: Kimberley Maren Zisk, “Institutional Decline in the Russian Military: Exit, Voice and Corruption,” PONARS, Memo No. 67 (September 1999), <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Zisk67.html>; and “Contract Murder Boom in Russia,” Izvestia, 25 June 1999, p. 1.



something that we no longer merely guess at; we feel it every day, if not every hour.”<sup>215</sup>

**Figure 4.3 Contract Murders in Russia, 1991-1999<sup>216</sup>**



In addition to creating widespread terror, the extent to which ROC intimidated and subsequently infiltrated the political, economic and civil spheres created a general public perception that the most powerful criminal groups were gaining control over the state apparatus. For example, a 1992 poll indicated that one-third of residents in the Russian Far East believed that criminal structures “determined the course of events in the region.”<sup>217</sup> The following year a poll conducted in Yekaterinburg revealed that three-quarters of residents believed the city was ruled by organised crime, while 14 per cent of police openly admitted that they believed the same.<sup>218</sup> In public opinion surveys conducted by the Institute for the Sociology of

<sup>215</sup> Excerpts from the 1993 RAU Corporation’s “White Book” on crime in Russia, cited in “Crime Wave, Corruption: What Can be Done?,” *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, vol. 55, no. 6 (1993), p. 12.

<sup>216</sup> Figures for this chart were compiled from data provided in: Handelman (1995), Klebnikov (2000), and the Ministry of Interior as quoted in Russian media reports

<sup>217</sup> Stephen Handelman, “The Russian Mafiya,” *Foreign Affairs*, (March-April 1994), supra note 12, pp. 21-22.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid.



Parliamentarism in 1994 and 1997, a representative sample of 6,000 respondents throughout Russia revealed an increase in the numbers of people who believed that ROC exercised the most state power.<sup>219</sup> The most common answers to the question “Who do you think really exercises state power in the Russian Federation?” in 1994 were ‘criminal structures, the mafia’ (43 per cent), followed by the state apparatus and bureaucrats (30 per cent). Near the end of the decade, the proportion of people who thought that organised crime controlled the state increased to 52 per cent, with only 21 per cent believing that the state apparatus maintained any control.<sup>220</sup> By 2003 this figure dropped quite significantly, at least according to a poll of 1500 respondents in 32 regions conducted in 2003 by the Agency of Regional Political Studies. Responding to the question “Who are the bosses in Russia?”, 37 per cent believed that power was exclusively held by the oligarchs and corporate enterprises, whereas only 19 per cent still maintained that organised crime continued to assert significant political control over the state.<sup>221</sup> In part this could have been influenced by less media coverage of ROC, and the fear perpetrated by criminal groups forcing public complacency in light of widespread knowledge that retribution would be sought. The apparent or perceived power gained by ROC is comparable to that of traditional terrorists, who often do not seek to change the law or the polity “but they propagandize and attack to perpetuate a social atmosphere in which their own rights and privileges remain paramount vis-à-vis other social or racial classes.”<sup>222</sup> The rise of conglomerate groups throughout this period reflects the paramount interest of ROC in

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<sup>219</sup> “Poll: 52% Believe Mafia is Running the Country,” The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, vol. XLIX, no. 36 (1997), p. 11.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.

<sup>221</sup> Igor Yelkov, “Who are the bosses in Russia?” WPS Monitoring Agency (20 August 2003), accessed at <http://www.wps.ru> on 10 January 2004.

<sup>222</sup> Harmon (2000), p.44.



attaining and subsequently maintaining power by harnessing the combined forces of power and money.

The actions of ROC described in this section, especially during the period 1991 to 2000, demonstrate that ROC exhibits three key characteristics of terrorism: the use of premeditated violent acts or the threat of violence in order to promote or protect its interests; careful target selection; and attempts to create a sense of fear – both within specific sections of society (i.e. law enforcement and the banking sector), and among the general public. Journalist Pamela Constable portrays the reality of this ‘new’ form of terrorism in Russia when she wrote, “everyone in Russia is extremely afraid of them [the mafiya], and they have all the power. They don’t even have to say they will kill you. You just know.”<sup>223</sup> The evidence thus strongly indicates that ROC are employing a form of terrorism, comparable to that which is exemplified by traditional terrorist groups:

the ability to destroy or punish is an extreme manifestation of the exercise of influence. It is, in a sense, the terrorists’ way of saying that they have the ability to exercise ultimate influence and determine, consequently, the limits to which others may function.<sup>224</sup>

### **ROC: A Political-Criminal Actor**

...in keeping with the Soviet tradition of uniting political and economic power, [ROC] could simultaneously occupy political office and own newly privatised companies.<sup>225</sup>

By spreading fear throughout society, ROC was able to influence political behaviour in Russia. Concentrating their efforts on careful target selection - especially among

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<sup>223</sup> Pamela Constable, “From Russia With Chutzpah,” Washington Post, 18 August 1996, p. F4.

<sup>224</sup> Gressang, “Terrorism in the 21st Century,” p. 88.

<sup>225</sup> Coulloudon (1997), p. 75.

government officials, notably the judiciary, law enforcement, and members of parliament<sup>226</sup> - organised crime directly challenged the state's ability to claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of force (i.e. because the state had proven unable to control violence perpetrated by ROC within Russian borders) and it has imposed "a level of harm that probably exceeds the damage resulting from the activities of most terrorist groups."<sup>227</sup> More specifically, ROC has used terror tactics to influence political institutions into subscribing to, and supporting their short and long-term goals, including the ability to operate with impunity, unhindered access to state resources, and the eventual attainment of the sort of power and status usually only accorded to senior members of a government. As defined in point three of the CTC, ROC is illustrative of 'political crime' precisely because it integrates an economic and political agenda to the extent that they have become often indistinguishable. The operational use of terror tactics extended beyond a pragmatic rationale to incorporate political motivations. As a result, ROC's drive for profits was simultaneously accompanied by characteristics that are terrorist by nature – a combination that resulted in conglomerate groups establishing economic monopolies while infiltrating state institutions to the extent that some policies of the Russian government have arguably been impaired, if not manipulated. According to Rawlinson,

Organised crime did more than block the evolution of a healthy political system. It became a leading determinant in the direction the country started to move after the first wave of reforms in 1992, that is, it assumed a proactive role in policy making, and more importantly, policy breaking, furthering governmental disunity and destroying public credibility in the democratic process.<sup>228</sup>

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<sup>226</sup> These are also the most common targets for traditional forms of political terrorism.

<sup>227</sup> Phil Williams and Ernesto Savona, "Problems and Dangers Posed by Organised Crime in Various Regions of the World," *Transnational Organised Crime*, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1995), p. 34.

<sup>228</sup> Mary Patricia Rawlinson, *Hunting the Chameleon: the problems of identifying Russian organised crime* (London School of Economics, Political Science and Department of Social Policy and Administration, Ph.D. Thesis, September 1997), p. 188.



### *Breaking Into Politics: corruption versus state capture*

Throughout the 1990s Russian criminal groups successfully created a perpetual state of fear, ensuring that their potential for ruthlessness was understood by society. This fear facilitated the ability of ROC to use corruption as a secondary method of neutralising efforts directed against them, and as another way of attaining control and power at the highest political levels. Adopting the policy of offering the choice made infamous by the Italian mafia between ‘silver or lead’ (*‘plomo o plata’*), ROC has relatively easily enticed those officials who are not already part of conglomerate groups to accept bribes in lieu of a violent end to their lives, or the complete destruction of their homes or workplace. Furthermore, the successful perpetration of corruption reflects the importance of incorporating an alternative view of security to understanding the threat faced by ROC because it highlights the importance of additional referent objects such as social norms and values.

The Russian state has faced two types of corruption inflicted by ROC: administrative corruption and state capture. According to the World Bank, administrative corruption refers to the “intentional imposition of distortions in the prescribed implementation of existing laws, rules and regulations to provide advantages to either state or non-state actors as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private gains to public officials.”<sup>229</sup> This essentially refers to the corruption of members of state institutions through acts of bribery. State capture, according to the World Bank, refers to “the actions of individuals, groups or firms both in the public and private sectors to influence the formation of laws, regulations, decrees and other government policies to their own advantage as a result of the illicit and non-transparent provision of private

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<sup>229</sup> World Bank (2000), pp. xvii-xviii.

benefits to officials.”<sup>230</sup> Although administrative corruption has a detrimental impact on society, state capture contributes to an environment conducive to a nexus between organised crime and terrorism. The impact which state capture has had on Russia was evident after the resignation of President Yeltsin in 1999, with evidence of “institutionalised corruption at all levels of government and possibly irreversible damage to key Russian institutions.”<sup>231</sup>

Initial evidence of the extent of corruption in Russia is reflected in estimates that ROC allocated 30 to 50 per cent of its revenues to corrupt officials.<sup>232</sup> This was highlighted in the 1996 MVD ‘Report on the Performance of the Internal Agencies’, which detailed the extent of corruption throughout all branches of the government and bureaucracy by breaking down the distribution of corruption based on indictments. The report found that 41.1 per cent of personnel in ministries, committees, and local government structures were corrupt; 11.7 per cent of personnel in the credit and finance system were corrupt; 8.9 per cent of personnel in the regulatory agencies; 0.8 per cent of deputies; 26.5 per cent of personnel in law enforcement agencies; 3.2 per cent of personnel in customs service; and 7.8 per cent of public servants working in other departments.<sup>233</sup> The perception of corruption displayed in official statistics has also been highlighted in annual Transparency International corruption reports.<sup>234</sup> In

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<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> Louise Shelley, “Crime and Corruption,” in Stephen White, Alex Pravda and Zvi Gitelman (eds), *Developments in Russian Politics 5*, (Houndsmills, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 244.

<sup>232</sup> Emilio Vanio, “The Russian Mafia and its Impact on the Privatisation of Markets,” The American University, Washington DC, 20016-8043 USA, p. 12, as quoted in Samuel Porteous, “The Threat From Transnational Crime: an Intelligence Perspective,” *Commentary*, No. 70 (Winter 1996), p. 5.

<sup>233</sup> “MVD Report: Latest Data on the Performances of Internal Affairs Agencies and Internal Troops in 1996,” *Rossiyskie vesti* (Moscow), 20 February 1997, pp. i-iv, as quoted in William Webster, et al., *Russian Organised Crime* (Washington, DC: The Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1997), pp. 79-88.

<sup>234</sup> Transparency International is an internationally recognised non-governmental anti-corruption organisation based in Berlin, but with offices located globally. The organisation, its work and publications can be accessed at <http://www.transparency.org>.



1999, Russia was rated the 16<sup>th</sup> most corrupt country out of 99 following Cameroon, Nigeria, Indonesia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan; in 2000 it was ranked as the ninth most corrupt country out of 90 entries; in 2002 it fell to 52<sup>nd</sup>, only to rise again to 45<sup>th</sup> in 2003 and to be named the 47<sup>th</sup> most corrupt country in 2004.<sup>235</sup> Although corruption within Russia appeared to be declining, based on Transparency International's findings, the public perception of corruption within the state has remained relatively constant, averaging an annual rating of 2.5 out of 10 according to Transparency methodology.<sup>236</sup> Combined perception and reality of corruption in Russia brings a degree of undisputable truth to the conclusion that:

Corruption has affected state structures, the credit-and-finance system and business like rust. It has become a dangerous brake on democratic transformations, it is nullifying the effectiveness of all state programs, and it is creating a real threat to the constitutional rights and liberties of citizens. Corruption has become a reliable cover for organised crime, which encourages and protects it.<sup>237</sup>

### *Adopting an Overt Political Agenda*

Unlike traditional criminal organisations which primarily seek to influence political decisions through engaging in corrupt practises, conglomerate criminal groups have sought to expand their control throughout Russia by infiltrating the government to directly influence policy. This line of argument is supported by Aleksandr Gurov, director of the Ministry of Security's security research institute, who asserted, "Before, the criminals tried to influence officials with bribes. Today they already have

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<sup>235</sup> For the complete TI corruption index, and an explanation of how ratings are compiled, see <http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org>. The year Russia was regarded the most corrupt by TI was in 1997 when it was ranked the fourth most corrupt out of 52 countries ranked.

<sup>236</sup> In addition to assessing levels of corruption which are compiled in a final listing of the world's most corrupt countries, Transparency International also assigns a corruption perception index to each country assessed. The corruption perception index is based on a number between 1 and 10, with 1 representing the most corrupt, and 10 the least. Thus a consistent rating of 2.5 reveals that the Russian public continues to perceive its society as extremely corrupt. Details of annual corruption perception indices can be accessed at <http://www.transparency.org>.

<sup>237</sup> Izvestia Analytical Centre, "The Unknown War Against Corruption," *Izvestia*, 22 October, 1994, p. 5.

their own lobby in the government and the parliament - not to mention the police and prosecutor's office."<sup>238</sup> Evidence of criminal penetration exists at all levels of government: local, regional (oblast) level and national. Thus, as representatives of leading criminal organisations assume key positions in the legislatures responsible for creating the legal framework for Russia and its regions, ROC comes closer to realising its political goals.

Although the search for immunity has played a role in the attempts by members of organised crime groups to gain election to government positions, ROC activities indicate that it cannot be considered the only factor affecting decision-making. Government posts can be considered safe havens for criminals due to the 98th clause of the Russian Constitution, which ensures that serving state Duma deputies, senators, judges, the incumbent President and first President, "cannot be detained, arrested, subjected to search, except cases of detention at the crime site...".<sup>239</sup> In 1999 sources at the Interior Ministry reported that 15-20 per cent of candidates seeking seats in the State Duma had a known criminal past.<sup>240</sup> The mere presence of criminal elites in government subsequently ensured that criminal interests could be advanced to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation. It also directly discouraged – for fear of reprisal - other members of parliament from voicing their opinions, or suggesting legislation that threatened to interfere with the activities of ROC.

However, if ROC is believed to have acquired control over state institutions through the widespread use of violent intimidation and corruption – therefore making the

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<sup>238</sup> Barbara von der Heydt, "Corruption in Russia: No Democracy Without Morality," Heritage Committee Brief, no. 13 (21 June 1995), <http://www.heritage.org>.

<sup>239</sup> "Immunity: New Cause of Troubles Found in Russia," Izvestia, 05 July 2000.

<sup>240</sup> This figure does not include the candidates who are known to have direct ties to criminals. Izvestia, 05 November 1999.



likelihood of prosecution almost non-existence – why would they worry about gaining political immunity? The answer to this question is that the motivations of ROC are not entirely criminal, but also incorporate political objectives as criminal elites increasingly seek to maximise their power within society. Taking this into consideration, the evidence below of ROC's direct penetration into government structures at all administrative levels is representative of their attempts to gain political power. These attempts became blatantly obvious when media reports observed that "gangsters are so interested in becoming part of the government that by October 1995 over 100 suspected criminals had already declared their candidacy for the Duma elections in December of that year."<sup>241</sup> This predicament was stressed by Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov who had established approximately 1600 linkages between high officials and ROC.<sup>242</sup> A year later experts consulted by the United States Congress maintained that over 30 per cent of the Russian Duma were directly linked to ROC, suggesting that the relationship was so close that "today it is truly impossible in many cases to differentiate between Russian organised crime and the Russian state."<sup>11</sup>

Evidence of direct criminal involvement in the Russian government emerged as early as 1991 when a known criminal, Gregori Mirshnik, was appointed economic advisor to the Vice President of the Russian Federation.<sup>243</sup> The Mirshnik case acted as a catalyst for the State Security Committee to report that state officials were actively being drawn into criminal activity, noting that over 50 per cent of crimes reported

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<sup>241</sup> Inga Saffron, "Russian Crooks Stay Out of Jail by Seeking Office in Parliament," Houston Chronicle, 29 October 1995, p. 32.

<sup>242</sup> Anna Repetskaya, '85 Suspected Criminals Run for Duma Elections," OMRI Daily Digest, no. 193, Part I (04 October 1995).

<sup>243</sup> Aaron Lukas and Gary Dempsey, "Mafia Capitalism or Red Legacy in Russia?," <http://www.cato.org/dailys/03-04-00.html>, 04 March 2000.

during the year involved state officials.<sup>244</sup> This trend was a common occurrence during the first years after the fall of the Soviet Union,<sup>245</sup> however it was not until 1994-1995 that criminal elites regularly sought political office. It may be argued that this was primarily because in the first half of the 1990s criminal groups were focused on asserting their position within society and also between themselves. Thus it was not until after the end of the 'mafia wars' that the most powerful groups ascertained their presence, and thus sought ways to consolidate their power.<sup>246</sup> Furthermore, during this period state officials also became more willing to establish ties with criminal groups, in all likelihood because:

When it is useless to combat the mafia, one must become its head. This thought - absurd, at first glance - has evidently become a reality. The way that representatives of all categories of Russia's population, without exception, are being killed, robbed and raped convinces us once and for all that *terror and crime have become component parts of state policy.*<sup>247</sup>

The organisation of the Russian parliamentary environment eased ROC's attempts to penetrate federal government. For example, in 1997 over 15,000 people were officially registered as aides to parliamentarians, despite the fact that fewer than 2,000 people were registered as official staff members receiving a state salary.<sup>248</sup> The reason

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<sup>244</sup> Pravda, 21 August 1991, p. 2.

<sup>245</sup> For example, in 1994 the Federal Counter-Intelligence Service uncovered links between high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and ROC. The FSB directly implicated Major General Igor Shilov, the First Deputy Director of the Interior Ministry's Administration for Criminal Investigations, as having links to known members of an organised crime group. Shilov, however, maintained that the FSB investigation was a ploy against him and the entire criminal investigation system by ROC via their connections to the FSB. Regardless of the truth behind the case, ROC's official ties are not under question because either Shilov or senior FSB officials who initiated the investigation evidently acted on the orders of a criminal group. For background information on this case see: Stanislav Zolotov, "Criminal Proceedings Have Been Instituted Against Major General Igor Shilov," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 11 May 1994, p. 1.

<sup>246</sup> The years between 1990 and 1995 have been noted for the violence perpetrated between criminal groups seeking to assert their authority over the others. As a result of the violence, a status quo began to emerge, initially in the major cities (i.e. Moscow and St. Petersburg), producing "a rough balance of terror". Galeotti, "The Mafiya and the New Russia," p. 427.

<sup>247</sup> Nikolai Chaplygin, "Power in Russia: The Criminals Are Applauding," Argumenty i fakty, November 1994, p. 2.

<sup>248</sup> Anatoly Stepanov, "Access to Okhotny Row," Izvestia, 01 March 1997, pp. 1-2.



for the additional 13,000 aides is a result of the inherent inadequacies of the 'Law on Status of Deputies' which states that every parliamentarian may appoint five aides at the expense of the state but which did not place any restrictions on the number of unpaid aides he or she appointed. This oversight directly contributed to criminal access to the Duma in the early 1990s when identification badges for Duma aides were allegedly sold on the black market for U.S. \$4000-\$5000, thus granting direct access to officials in decision-making positions. As a result, Duma members in 1997 had, on average, 34 aides.<sup>249</sup> The pervasive presence of ROC in the State Duma affected the course of events within the early years of post-Soviet Russia, this is illustrated during a 1994 debate in the Federation Council. Debating whether or not to pass a proposed crime bill, several members enquired, "Why should we adopt a resolution which actually okays a decree spearheaded against ourselves?" while others blatantly opposed the bill because it would "cut off money-laundering channels for the mafia."<sup>250</sup> This quandary is made even more significant by the knowledge that senior ROC figures sporadically attempted to legalise the leaders of ROC and political intentions.<sup>251</sup> Infiltration at this level leads to questions about the true "motivations, intentions and legitimacy of the state itself. In such cases, what is criminal – and what is not – as well as issues of sovereignty and legitimacy become blurred or distorted."<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

<sup>250</sup> Yelena Tregubova, "Federation Council is Against Banditry Decree," *Segodnya*, 25 June 1994, cited in Peter Daniel DiPaola, "The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian Mafiya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union," <http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/vol4/no1/dippgp.html> (14 October 1998).

<sup>251</sup> Kryshtanovskaia, (1996), p. 75.

<sup>252</sup> Robert Bunker and John Sullivan, "Cartel Evolution: potentials and consequences," *Transnational Organised Crime*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 57.

State infiltration at the federal level can also be measured according to the responses of central government to those officials who sought to promote a focused policy against ROC. In Russia between 1991 and 2000, efforts to counter the rising dominance of ROC were hindered at the most senior political levels. For example, after informing President Boris Yeltsin in 1992 of criminal activity within Yeltsin's inner circle, internal security chief Viktor Ivanenko was fired and replaced by long-time Yeltsin crony, Viktor Barannikov. Barannikov was an MVD General who did little to combat ROC or corruption.<sup>253</sup> After warning Western governments that economic aid and loans were being manipulated to undermine reform, Finance Minister Boris Fedorov was forced out of government in 1994 and replaced by Vladimir Panskov, a former first deputy chief of the State Tax Committee who was under investigation for large-scale bribe taking, and misuse of public funds.<sup>254</sup> It may also be argued that Boris Nemtsov, former Minister of Fuel and Energy and Deputy Prime Minister, and Sergei Kiriyenko, acting Prime Minister in 1998, were removed from office because of their interest in rooting out corruption at the highest political levels.<sup>255</sup> The extent to which ROC penetrated government was so great that at two separate press conferences in 1998, Interior Minister Anatoly Kulikov and the head of the organised crime division Vladislav Selivanov both admitted that ROC had successfully penetrated the Russian government at all levels.<sup>256</sup> These types of remarks, combined with an attempt to act on information received about money laundering and financial activities in foreign countries by some of Russia's leading government officials in foreign countries likely played a leading role in Kulikov's

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<sup>253</sup> J. Michael Waller and Victor Yasmann, "Russia's Great Criminal Revolution: The Role of the Security Services," *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*, vol. 11, no. 4 (December 1995), p. 171.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>255</sup> *Interfax*, 14 April 1998.

<sup>256</sup> *Reuters*, 07 January 1998 and *Interfax*, 22 July 1998.



own dismissal in 1999.<sup>257</sup> Even near the end of President Yeltsin's term in office, he attempted to fire Prosecutor General Yuri Skuratov, and successfully ousted Prime Minister Primakov, reportedly in part because they were conducting investigations into criminal allegations that involved members of Yeltsin's immediate circle. The fact that Primakov was fired confirmed to Skuratov that "his 'clients' had long tentacles and that resistance was useless."<sup>258</sup>

As discussed above, political ambivalence about supporting investigations or introducing legislation harmful to ROC's existence and activities was in part the result of organised crime's direct and indirect infiltration of the government. An example of this is the long and drawn-out process surrounding attempts to pass the legislation 'On the Fight Against Organised Crime', initially introduced to the State Duma in 1992. After ten drafts the Duma accepted the legislation in 1993, only to have President Yeltsin and his associates send it back for revisions - not to be adopted by the Federation Council until 1999, at which point President Yeltsin refused to sign it.<sup>259</sup> This example illustrates the way in which the sporadic attempts made to counter ROC merely provided a smokescreen for the ongoing activities of criminal groups.

There is sporadic evidence available in open-sources that outline the direct infiltration of ROC in federal government structures, but evidence of ROC's political manipulations at the regional level is much more common. As noted earlier, Moscow has been increasingly losing its control over regional and municipal centres since the

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<sup>257</sup> Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, 09 September 1999.

<sup>258</sup> Elena Dikun, "Public Prosecutor Caught in a Trap," PRISM: A Biweekly on the Post-Soviet States, vol. 5, no. 8 (23 April 1999).

<sup>259</sup> Margaret E. Beare, "Russian (East European) Organized Crime Around the Globe," paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology, Australian Customs Service, and the Australian Federal Police Transnational Crime Conference, Canberra, 9-10 March 2000.

1980s – a situation made worse by the fall of the Soviet Union. The decline of central government control over Russia's regions presented ROC with an opportunity to directly enter into competition with the state by consolidating control over regional government structures. As the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies asserts,

The subsequent collapse of the Russian banking system greatly reduced Moscow's influence in the regions. The private banking sector had been Moscow's main link to the regions, and this link was now diminished. With no ability to collect the tax payments due to Moscow, the regional governors were forced to take matters in their own hands. Regional industries adapted to this cashless existence by exploiting existing systems of exchange and barter, with the cooperation and participation of corrupt regional authorities.

Russian organised crime adapted well to this new reality. The power vacuum created by Moscow's waning influence in the regions was quickly filled by corrupt officials and armed criminals. ROC syndicates quickly stepped into the role of facilitator in exchanges and arrangements within the barter economy, meting out swift and severe punishment to those who crossed them. Regional authorities now operate either in collusion with, or in opposition to, ROC groups, depending on the particular circumstances.<sup>260</sup>

The government therefore was the last sector of society left for ROC to penetrate at a regional level as they already successfully gained control over a large percentage of banking, production facilities, trade organisations, commodity production networks and nuclear arsenals.<sup>261</sup>

Based on this line of argument, it can further be ascertained that ROC played a role in pushing certain regions to seek greater independence from the central government in Moscow so that ROC could continue to benefit from the associated opportunities that autonomy provided for their criminal activities and acquisition of political power. As Varvarin argued, this is not equal to the decentralisation sought by promoters of

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<sup>260</sup> William Webster and Arnaud De Borchgrave, eds., Russian Organised Crime and Corruption: Putin's Challenge, (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2000), p. 5.

<sup>261</sup> Yuriy Voronin, "Organised Crime: Its Influence on International Security and Urban Community Life in the Industrial Cities of the Urals," (March 1998), <http://www.american.edu/transcrime.html>



democracy from the United States, but represented the rise of “local fiefdoms, protected by armed bandits loyal to local leaders who seek economic and political control over regions.”<sup>262</sup> Some of these regions exemplify the nature of political crime to such an extent that they display characteristics of the ‘black hole syndrome’ (point four of the CTC).

Commonly cited as the capital of crime in Russia, connections between ROC and government structures in the region and city of St. Petersburg are believed to run very deep. An example commonly used to illustrate this is the allegation that regional governor Vladimir Yakovlev won the 1996 election with the explicit aid of ROC. This allegation was corroborated by a story released by the television station NTV, which suggested that President Putin won Yakovlev’s support and loyalty as mayor of St. Petersburg in 2000 by threatening to publicly uncover his link to local crime groups.<sup>263</sup> Further indications of the interest on the part of organised crime in influencing the state emerged during the 1998 election campaign with suggestions that ROC used ‘shadow candidates’ - candidates who were registered namesakes of the leading contestants - in an effort to get their representatives elected. The purpose of this technique was “to confuse voters with multiple candidates with the same last name and first initials, thereby splitting the vote.”<sup>264</sup> Some journalists suggested that up to 50 per cent of the registered candidates in the 1998 St. Petersburg elections were connected to criminal groups, further blurring the distinction between the legitimate and criminal state.

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<sup>262</sup> Ibid.

<sup>263</sup> Agence France Presse, 19 April 2000.

<sup>264</sup> Sergeev (2001), p. 166.

A similar scenario emerged during the 1997 by-elections for the State Duma in Yekaterinburg where at least 17 of the registered candidates were linked to the Uralmash crime group.<sup>265</sup> For example, the leading candidate Aleksandr Khabarov was officially known as the vice-president of the Uralmash basketball team and director and founder of approximately ten businesses<sup>266</sup>, unofficially he was a founding leader of the Uralmash group.<sup>267</sup> Khabarov's involvement in politics extended to the central government, evident in his efforts to organise 'The Worker's Movement in Support of Boris Yeltsin', for which he received a personal letter of gratitude from the President.<sup>268</sup> Furthermore the governor of Yekaterinburg, Eduard Rossel, has also been tied to the Uralmash group through construction and investment deals that he conducted with their front companies; and through his former chief of regional internal affairs who regularly attended social gatherings of known criminals. Given this personal relationship, it may be concluded that the Uralmash group sponsored Rossel's 1999 campaign for regional governor – during the same period that it registered itself as a political organisation under the name of the Social-Political Union of Uralmash (i.e. OPS Uralmash). Furthermore, as OPS Uralmash, the group extended its involvement with the community in an effort to increase its public support, and underscore that it was "a political organisation with ambitions of becoming a party that defends the interests of regional industry – a substantial part of which is the property of its members."<sup>269</sup> Like many terrorist groups seeking to find legitimacy for their political agenda, OPS Uralmash married a political platform with

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<sup>265</sup> "Mafiya Murder and the Russian Power Struggle," <http://www.stratfor.com>, 12 July 2000.

<sup>266</sup> Grigory Kavokin, "Once again, candidates with a dubious past," *Izvestia*, 02 December 1997.

<sup>267</sup> Volkov (2002), p. 119.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 119-120.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.



social outreach, a combined policy that was highlighted on its official website, <http://www.ops-uralmash.ru>.<sup>270</sup>

The penetration of ROC into regional structures of government was partially a result of local governments recognising their dependence on ROC because it had gained control over a significant portion of the most lucrative economic sectors. Local governments were thus “loath to pass legislation attacking organised crime for fear they will lose the economic benefits associated with the mafiya.”<sup>271</sup> In addition to economic practicalities, regional and local officials had been forced to find their own approach to counter the influence of ROC because Russian legislation did not offer specific guidance.<sup>272</sup> The reality has been that local and regional officials are unable to “enforce the laws against organised crime because prosecutors must show concretely who did what and define the consequences of these actions. Such tasks are extremely complicated when criminals have high-level protection from state officials.”<sup>273</sup> Unlike in many other societies of the world, “criminals [in Russia] did not have to neutralise the enforcement of the laws. Instead, the only needed to ensure that laws and oversight mechanisms were not adopted.”<sup>274</sup> What better way to do so than to successfully infiltrate the political realm?

Cooperation with ROC, especially in regions far from Moscow, has thus become the most effective approach for government authorities – at least those not directly tied to ROC - to maintain a semblance of local or regional order. With access to political

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<sup>270</sup> As of late 2004, the OPS Uralmash website was accessible only by password.

<sup>271</sup> DiPaola (1998).

<sup>272</sup> This was a conclusion highlighted during a conference on organised crime held at Yaroslavl University in January 2004. Other key findings are reported in the Russian Regional Report, vol. 9, no. 1 (03 February 2004).

<sup>273</sup> Ibid., pp. 1-2.

<sup>274</sup> Shelley in Godson, (2003), p. 212.

structures, criminal leaders who have consolidated their positions in the criminal underworld shifted their efforts to consolidating their position in legitimate sectors of society, thus turning into “respectable capitalists with political aspirations”.<sup>275</sup> This motivational shift mirrors an old dictum of the Soviet Union where economic and political control naturally went hand-in-hand. The notion of what is ‘respectable’ in this context is offset by evidence indicating that ‘political aspirations’ often focus on securing the status quo attained by ROC in this position – maintaining the capacity to react violently to opposition.

By successfully influencing political behaviour at all political levels, ROC complies with the fourth characteristic of terrorism which demands that groups considered as terrorist must display political objectives. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, increasingly powerful ‘conglomerate’ groups in Russia have established a considerable degree of control over the licit and illicit economy, leaving the political sphere the only sector of society that did not exhibit a significant degree of direct criminal penetration. Thus, to ensure the security of their economic interests and that their personal power would continue to expand, criminal elites embarked on a campaign to control the political life of Russia - not only through bribery and corruption, but by attempting to merge with government structures. Although ROC intimidated citizens, its main target has been the state, turning itself into “one of the greatest and most effective lobbyists in Russia.”<sup>276</sup> As a result, ROC has essentially

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<sup>275</sup> Vadim Volkov, “Security and Rule-Enforcement in Russian Business: the Role of the Mafia and the State,” PONARS Memo, no. 79 (October 1999), <http://www.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/Volkov79>. Volkov illustrates this point by discussing the example of Krasnoyarsk Aluminum Factory owner, former boxer and ROC elite, A. Bykov; and Moscow entrepreneur and founding leader of the Solntsevskaya criminal organisation, S. Mikhailov.

<sup>276</sup> Victor Sergeyev, “Organised Crime and Social Instability in Russia: the alternative state, deviant bureaucracy, and social black holes,” in Bonnell and Breslauer, Russia in the New Century (2001), p. 158.



forged a new political system where the notions of rule of law and the public good are secondary to the necessity of keeping power and managing the state's wealth. They have adorned this system with democratic trappings, including a constitutional court, a democratically elected parliament, and a free press. But they reject the idea of a real alternation of power in the Kremlin.<sup>277</sup>

The fact that ROC has political aspirations indicates the continued importance of including the state as a referent object in defining security threats. As Ayoob argues in his theory of Subaltern Realism, the state is the only actor that can provide national security. Thus given that the Russian state, in certain aspects, is being dominated by criminal structures, it may be concluded that the future of Russian national security will be determined by a regime that is primarily interested in safeguarding their criminal interests. Unlike traditional criminal groups who target the private citizen, ROC followed the route of terrorist organisations by targeting the state. Unlike most terrorist groups, however, the activities of ROC have had an impact on the emergence of a civil society that is dual in nature, “formally sovereign but informally criminalised.”<sup>278</sup>

### *Neutralising the State and Adopting State Functions*

The successful use of terror tactics, combined with the penetration of criminal elite into federal, regional and local government institutions, impaired the ability and capacity of the state to fulfil required state functions. This was most evident during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1991-1999), however continued under Vladimir Putin. ROC established a political community encompassed in a new form of “non-state based authoritarianism. Citizens still live in fear but are now intimidated by non-state actors in the form of organised criminal groups. The coercive apparatus of the

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<sup>277</sup> Virginie Coulloudon, “Crime and Corruption After Communism: the Criminalisation of Russia’s Political Elite,” East European Constitutional Review, vol. 6, no. 4 (Fall 1997).

<sup>278</sup> Sergeyev (2001), p. 159.

state (the KGB and MVD) has been privatised to organised crime.”<sup>279</sup> This authoritarianism has revealed itself in six ways, as discussed in the previous section, by: achieving a degree of domination over the economic and ruling structures; intimidating citizens; intimidating the media; privatising state resources; subverting civil society; and privatising state coercion. ROC thus represents “an abnegation of the state’s obligations to its citizenry and reflects its inability to protect them from threats against their life, livelihood, or economic security.”<sup>280</sup> At the same time, ROC has fulfilled the five key strategies of terrorism by: creating societal dislocation or a sense of chaos; discrediting or destroying a particular government; rendering economic and property damage; ‘bleeding’ the state security forces; and spreading fear across state borders.<sup>281</sup>

It is evident that the activities of ROC have, to a certain degree, neutralised the Russian state through its use of terrorism. Having ascertained that ROC complies with the first four characteristics of terrorism (the use or threat of premeditated violence; the creation of fear among an adversary or specific segment of society; careful target selection; and political objectives), it may also be argued that ROC has fulfilled the fifth basic requirement of any terrorist organisation - breaking the will of the opposition and forcing it to submit to certain demands. The non-state type of authoritarianism Shelley describes suggests that ROC has evolved to “affect all

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<sup>279</sup> Louise Shelley, “Post-Soviet Organised Crime,” *Transnational Organised Crime*, vol. 2, nos. 2/3 (Autumn 1996), p. 122.

<sup>280</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 123.

<sup>281</sup> Christopher Harmon, “Five Strategies of Terrorism,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2001), p. 39.



aspects of society including economic relations, political structures, legal institutions, citizen-state relations and human rights.”<sup>282</sup>

As ROC competed for control over the economy and the state, it evolved while organising and arming itself, drawing state structures into its orbit, and penetrating the structures of power and administration throughout the Russian Federation. In doing so, ROC represented something very distinct from the “quintessentially political terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s or the clichéd mafia syndicates we are all too familiar with.”<sup>283</sup> ROC has instead produced a state in which terrorism and organised crime are indistinguishable, but in which the line between the criminal and political is also blurred.

### **Conclusion: Bringing in the Conceptual**

The empirical evidence presented in this chapter reveals two essential points in understanding how ROC is simultaneously criminal and terrorist in nature. Firstly, the examples highlight that ROC has met with success in its use of terror tactics, and has gained a degree of power within society as a result of the widespread fear it has created. Secondly, the examples provided also demonstrate the relevance of the conceptual framework provided in Chapter Two when measured against actual events in the ‘real’ world. More specifically, the empirical evidence validates four conceptual points: the interplay between the individual, state and international community; the existence of an alternative form of anarchy that highlights additional referent objects; the idea that non-state actors can be as important as state actors in security

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<sup>282</sup> Louise Shelley, “Post-Soviet Organised Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism,” Transnational Organised Crime, vol. 2, nos. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), p. 123.

<sup>283</sup> Sebastyen Gorka, “The New Threat of Organised Crime and Terrorism,” Terrorism and Security Monitor, (June 2000).

considerations; and the relevance of a multisectoral approach in determining the nature of security threats.

As discussed in the previous chapter, once a state is no longer capable of responding to challenges that threaten its authority, legitimacy and stability, it can no longer be considered the sole referent object. Instead, the individual, group and international levels of analysis take precedence as they cannot depend on the state to be the main guarantor of security. In the case of Russia, the inability of the state to control the rise of ROC has resulted in insecurity for the individuals and groups of individuals described in this section. Selective targeting also highlights the interplay between levels of analysis, and the relevance of alternative referent objects. For example, the murder of Starovoitova was symbolically directed at the individual Duma deputy; the ideas of democratisation and individual freedoms that her work represented; and it had repercussions on Russia's international image.

The third conceptual point corroborated by the empirical evidence presented in this section is that an alternative form of anarchy - as argued by Booth - does exist. In the case of Russia, however, an alternative anarchy exists in the negative sense. Given ROC's success in spreading fear throughout society in general, Russian citizens' support of the state has been deteriorating. This predicament is directly related to the idea of subsidiarity where political decisions are to be taken at the lowest possible level. The 'subsidiarity' component of Booth's alternative anarchy necessitates a strong civil society that is prepared to ensure that the government creates conditions of security - this is absent from Russia. ROC's use of terrorism has also broken down the notion of 'community' by delineating society into two camps: the criminal troika



(traditional criminals, government collaborators and new entrepreneurs) versus the rest of society. Given the successes of ROC to the detriment of the Russian state, the overarching question is whether or not it is ever possible for the government to gain back the confidence of its citizens. Furthermore, the use of terror tactics by criminal organisations in Russia against Russian society has undermined the emergence of reciprocal obligation, mutual self-interest, sense of loyalty and moral obligation between the government and its citizens - conditions necessary for the creation of a secure environment. In some situations, the absence of the state has been replaced by ROC as a non-state actor. Although the authority and legitimacy acquired by ROC is based on its use of violence and intimidation, in the context of some regions (i.e. the Russian Far East), this has produced public submission to the power claimed by criminal elites. As such, the importance of the state (specifically state functions) clearly remains an integral component when assessing security.

Finally, the empirical evidence in this section validates the utility of employing a multisectoral approach to security. As indicated in this chapter, the rise of ROC and its successful use of terror tactics have threatened the political, military, economic, environmental and societal sectors. The impact on the political realm is evident when considering the level of criminal penetration in government. Military security, although not dealt with explicitly in this chapter, is reflected in the example of Chechnya as a 'black hole'. In this context, the activities of ROC directly contributed to the prolonging of a conflict zone, directly through its involvement in the illicit arms trade that supplied weapons to militants, and indirectly by contributing to the creation of a criminal-political class with an invested interest in shaping Chechnya to suit their specific needs. Furthermore, economic security was evidently threatened by ROC via

capital flight, money laundering, corruption and the pilfering of state resources during privatisation. These activities directly contributed to undermining economic infrastructure because they directly and indirectly harmed property owners, and the ability of the government to collect taxes to pay for social welfare programmes. This economic strategy has also been commonly employed by traditional terrorist groups.<sup>284</sup>

Considering that the characteristics of terrorism as defined in Chapter Two have been fulfilled by ROC, it may be concluded that ROC has been using terror tactics not only to safeguard their own criminal interests, but to secure itself a position of power within Russia. This has been done by revealing the weakness of Russian state institutions while simultaneously attempting to fill the voids created by a weak Russian state. As Victor Sergeyev argued, this created an alternative state wherein groups such as ROC privatise state power. Ayoub therefore was correct in asserting the importance of a strong state to ensure individual and national security. Without strong state non-state actors can become a “clear threat to political stability”<sup>285</sup> - as is the case with ROC in the Russian Federation. In doing so, ROC has exhibited the “most surprising form of political action for a terrorist group” by folding into the established political process.<sup>286</sup>

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<sup>284</sup> Harmon (2000), 64.

<sup>285</sup> Victor M. Sergeyev, “Organised Crime and Social Instability in Russia: The Alternative State, Deviant Bureaucracy, and Social Black Holes,” in Victoria E. Bonnell and George W. Breslauer (eds), Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder? (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), p. 169.

<sup>286</sup> Harmon (2000), 63.



## Chapter 5

### **Travelling the Length of the CTC: The Evolving Nature of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) From Terror Group to Criminal Organisation**

“We belie our pretension of being a civilised, moral, and dignified people when, under the most futile pretexts, we appeal to arms or we proceed to commit acts of violence.”<sup>1</sup>

“Despite the group’s Marxist rhetoric, it seems to have more in common with Al Capone and the darker aspects of Clausewitz than with any leftist hero.”<sup>2</sup>

This chapter focuses on the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as an example of a terrorist group that has traversed the crime terror continuum (CTC), evolving from an entity motivated by political interests, to one that exhibited a high predilection towards advancing criminal aims. The chapter will make three interconnected arguments. First, an overview of the development of FARC will demonstrate that the group was terrorist in nature in accordance with the definition of terrorism provided in Chapter One. Second, the dynamics of FARC during the period 1991-2003 illustrate that it increasingly came to display characteristics of an organised crime group. Finally, while plotting its development along the CTC, this chapter will illustrate how the evolution of FARC in Colombia can be explained by the alternative view of international security provided in Chapter Two. This case study will thus argue that organised crime and terrorism should be incorporated into the security agenda because they are necessary and relevant to the study of international security. These threats, as they are illustrated in the Colombian context, derive not from state strength, military power and geopolitical ambition, but rather

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<sup>1</sup> President Manuel Menillo Toro, 1874 as quoted in Lawrence Boudon, “Guerrillas and the State: the role of the state in the Colombian peace process,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 28, no. 2 (May 1996): 279.

<sup>2</sup> James F. Rochlin, *Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, Colombia, Mexico*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), p. 1.

from state weakness and the absence of political legitimacy; from the failure of states to provide minimal conditions of public order within their borders; from the way in which domestic instability and internal violence can spill into the international arena; and from the incapacity of weak states to form viable building blocks for a stable regional order and to contribute towards the resolution of broader common purposes.<sup>3</sup> The evolution of FARC, and the related convergence of security threats in Colombia illustrates important features of security in the post-Cold War environment, including the multisectoral nature of threats, the nexus between levels of analysis, and the continued relevance of the state and its functions as something to which many non-state actors aspire to control.

Although other terrorist groups, such as the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Sendero Luminoso (a.k.a. Shining Path), and Abu Sayyaf could be used to illustrate this aspect of the CTC (i.e. moving to the opposite end of the continuum), FARC stands out as the leading example for several reasons. Operationally, FARC is one of the oldest terrorist groups with a significant membership base of an estimated 12,000 to 18,000 followers.<sup>4</sup> Its endurance and strength have provoked U.S. officials to conclude that it is the “best trained and equipped terrorist group in Colombia, [and] asserts influence and varying degrees of control on large areas of Colombia’s eastern lowlands and rain forest, which are the primary coca cultivation and cocaine producing regions in the country.”<sup>5</sup> It is this co-location with coca fields that defines a second unique aspect of FARC. The rise of the

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<sup>3</sup> Andrew Hurrell, “Security in Latin America,” *International Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 3 (Summer 1998):541.

<sup>4</sup> Asa Hutchinson, DEA Administrator, Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, 24 April 2002. Accessed online at <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02042403.htm> on 05 February 2003.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*



Colombia drug trade in the 1970s and 1980s created an environment commonly referred to as ‘Colombianization’<sup>6</sup> - the dominance of narcotics traffickers in territory that is no longer under state control, or state-controlled economic, political and social structures. An absent state thus permitted the emergence of a degree of political chaos (i.e. a black hole) wherein power has most commonly been attained and maintained through the use of violence, and financed through participation in illicit activities. Exemplifying *commercial terrorism* weighed in favour of organised criminal behaviour, the development of FARC gives credence to the quote: “today many of the greatest threats are generated by the growing nexus between internal political violence and international criminal activities.”<sup>7</sup> This point is at the heart of the perpetual instability and violence that characterises Colombia in the contemporary post-Cold War security environment.

### **Colombia’s Tradition of Violence**

The history of Colombia is intimately interwoven with periods of sustained violence and weak government authority. Whether describing the civil wars of the nineteenth century,<sup>8</sup> or the enduring era of violence between 1948 and 1965 – collectively referred to as ‘La Violencia’ – the most revealing conclusion to be drawn about Colombia is that “from the beginning, governments in Colombia have been weak, and periods of intense, mutual bloodletting have punctuated the country’s history.”<sup>9</sup> As a

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<sup>6</sup> Joseph R. Nunez, “Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia,” Strategic Studies Institute Working Paper, U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA (April 2001).

<sup>7</sup> Richard L. Millett, “Colombia’s Conflicts: the Spillover Effects of a Wider War,” Strategic Studies Institute Working Paper, U.S. Army War College: Carlisle Barracks, PA (October 2002), p. 27.

<sup>8</sup> Nineteenth century Colombia is often referred to by regional historians, such as Gonzalo Sanchez, as a “country of permanent war”. In fact, following 14 years of the Wars of Independence, Colombia suffered from eight civil wars, 14 local civil wars, numerous small uprisings, two wars with Ecuador, and three coup d’etats. Gonzalo Sanchez and Ricardo Penaranda, eds. Pasado y presente de la violencia en Colombia, (Bogota: CEREC, 1984).

<sup>9</sup> Phillip McLean, “Colombia: Failed, Failing or Just Weak?” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002), p.124.

result of the frequency and intensity of civil wars in Colombia, violence has historically come to represent a relatively legitimate and accepted way to settle political differences, even if political balance has never been achieved.<sup>10</sup> Although violence in Colombia has had a very close connection to party politics, especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the structure of economic development from the mid-twentieth century onward played a formative role in shaping the nature of contemporary discontent.<sup>11</sup>

In many respects, the security problems in Colombia today are rooted in the crises of the past. A unique history has built a country that is simultaneously regarded as a Latin American success story (due to its economic growth, a large middle class and relative political stability), while remaining notorious for the activities of the drug trade and violence perpetrated by indigenous terrorist groups. As Jenny Pearce argues, the Colombian paradox can be partially explained by recognising that there is a distinction between the 'formal' Colombia and the 'real' Colombia. The formal Colombia refers to the Colombia characterised as the most democratic state in Latin America, whereas the real Colombia refers to the "Colombia of the people, where the rule of law barely holds, deprivation and poverty are the norm and democracy is just a word on a historic document."<sup>12</sup> The link between these two personalities of the state is loyalty to the two traditional political parties (the Liberal<sup>13</sup> and the Conservative<sup>14</sup> parties), for which the people of Colombia have regularly fought, both on behalf of

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<sup>10</sup> Rochlin (2003), p.90.

<sup>11</sup> For an excellent investigation into the dynamics of Colombian party politics, and subsequent ties to economic structures, see Robert H. Dix, *Colombia: the Political Dimensions of Change*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967). Jenny Pearce, *Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth*, (London: Latin America Bureau Limited, 1990) also provides a good overview of the various dynamics which have worked to undermine the ability of the country to govern itself.

<sup>12</sup> Pearce, (1990), p.4.

<sup>13</sup> The Liberals supported free trade, mercantile capital, a secular state, and federalism.

<sup>14</sup> Conservatives promoted feudal agrarian production, economic protectionism, and emphasised the importance of religion in the state.



the ruling elite and as a result of their own feelings of party allegiance. As Robert Dix concludes, “Most Colombians – even those who have known and cared nothing of doctrines and programs – evidence a profound psychic attachment to one or the other.”<sup>15</sup> At the same time, however, political dualism in Colombia has also been explained as “rival bands of brigands fighting over literal loot.”<sup>16</sup> Within this context the importance placed on client-patron relations in the state is evident (i.e. the party in power ensures that all levels of government positions are filled by their own members, thus almost entirely excluding members of the other party).<sup>17</sup> Thus, in Colombia, as in Russia, control over economic and financial resources eventually contributed to the acquisition of political power by non-state actors.

The Colombian tradition of having two principal political parties vie for political dominance regularly culminated in political violence, which came to a head during “the last great civil war between the parties: *La Violencia*.”<sup>18</sup> Discussed in greater detail in the next section, *La Violencia* is important because it highlighted the nature of competition between the two political parties, and unleashed a host of additional conflicts whose roots lay in a combination of economic, social, and personal factors. It may thus be concluded that *La Violencia* helped instil a sense of criminality into the political order of contemporary Colombia – acting as a catalyst for the rise of revolutionary, and subsequently terrorist, groups seeking leftist political change

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<sup>15</sup> Dix, (1967), p. 203. Dix provides a very thorough argument about how Colombians are socialised into partisanship – making allegiance to a party closely related to family and inheritance. As a result, “The Colombian is very early socialized into enmity toward one and loyalty to the other historic party.” p. 211.

<sup>16</sup> For this particular view, see Vernon Lee Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*, (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 1957), p. 23.

<sup>17</sup> Dix (1967), pp. 179-182.

<sup>18</sup> Pearce (1990), p. 5.

explicitly through violent struggle; and, laying the ground for the emergence of groups driven by the accumulation of illicit profit.

Although political ideology played a role in the formation of the Colombian state, by the 1990s socio-economic concerns were being replaced with predominantly economic ones. Thus the most common route to attaining control over the state was no longer focused on converting support based on an ideological platform, but acquiring power through financial strength. In contrast to the trend in more stable democracies, increased attention to the role of the economy in Colombia did not result in the growth of licit economic activity. On the contrary, Colombia's violent history suppressed the growth of the legitimate economy and contributed to the emergence of an intricate web of illicit actors competing for state resources and territorial control. Organised criminal groups, illegal armed groups (i.e. paramilitaries), urban gangs, and terrorist entities thus incessantly confronted state authorities and acted as a significant obstacle to the creation of political stability at the local, national, and increasingly at the regional level. As will be discussed further in this chapter, the competition over state resources and territorial control emphasizes the relevance of the argument that the state itself can no longer be considered the only significant political actor, but should be regarded on an equal footing with non-state actors which have also come to seek the same functions.

In search of their own power bases, these illicit groups came to rely on the country's position as the world's leading producer and distributor of refined cocaine as a definitive route to establish control over the state's economic and political institutions. In many ways, the Colombian predicament mirrored, and then surpassed the



experience of the Russian Federation (*political crime*) discussed in the previous chapter. Beginning at the opposite end of the CTC, the case of Colombia illustrates how politically motivated terrorist groups have evolved into a hybrid entity, subsequently developing into an organisation that displays aims and motivations clearly located at the opposite end of the continuum from which it began: in this case FARC ultimately came to favour the criminal over the political. A rising dependence on illicit activities to secure power and finance political activities has contributed to the decline of political ideology as the primary motivating force in the Colombian context.

### **The Birth of FARC: 1966-1982**

Formed in the mid-1960s under the leadership of Pedro Antonio Marín, also known as Manuel Marulanda Vélez<sup>19</sup> or ‘Tirofijo’ (Sureshot), the legacy of FARC dates back to the period of *La Violencia*. This period of intense violence acted as a catalyst for the establishment of guerrilla groups in Colombia, and it also aggravated feelings of political discontent, especially throughout the peasant populations. More specifically, as the government increasingly targeted people associated with the Colombian Communist Party (CCP), and blocked their access to legitimate participation in politics, frustration among Communist guerrillas intensified. In many respects, as will become evident in the following sections, *La Violencia* and its immediate aftermath created the conditions in which many people were willing to engage in violence to improve their situation. *La Violencia* also produced conditions that were subsequently used by the FARC leadership to create an aura of political legitimacy. As a result, it

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<sup>19</sup> Marín changed his name to Marulanda in honour of a union leader of the same name who was killed by the security forces. See “El viejo guerrillero y su delfín,” *El Mundo* (Madrid), 11 July 1998, as quoted in Peter Chalk, et al. *Colombian Labyrinth: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability*, MR-1339-AF, (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001), p. 23, FN 1.

was during this timeframe – from the mid-1960s to 1982 – that the group was in its purest political form, thus organisationally and operationally terrorist in nature.

### La Violencia<sup>20</sup>

The actual origin of *La Violencia* remains an issue of great debate. However, what is rarely contested is that *La Violencia* was sparked by an intensification of rivalry between the Liberal and Republican parties that came to a head with the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in 1948. Gaitán, a presidential candidate and the leader of a land-reform movement, was a popular member of the Liberal party primarily because of his dedication to secure rights for landless Colombians. Gaitán was also known for voicing criticism of the exaggerated misdistribution of wealth, and the concentration of political power in the hands of an elite oligarchy.<sup>21</sup> His death was significant because it highlighted the end of a long-running period of Liberal administrations (1930-1946) that introduced land reform restricting ancestral privileges – a factor that was considered important to the Conservatives. A new Conservative government came to power in 1946 and unleashed a wave of political violence to regain land for the elite, and subsequently remained in power.<sup>22</sup> The assassination of Gaitán in 1948 highlighted the centrality of control over land and land ownership to political power in

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<sup>20</sup> For an excellent, all inclusive, overview of *La Violencia*, refer to David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia: a Nation in Spite of Itself, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993), and James D. Henderson, When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima, (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1985).

<sup>21</sup> Harvey Kline, Colombia: Democracy Under Assault, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), p. 43. At the time, three-quarters of the Colombian population were peasants, and an estimated three per cent of landowners controlled over 50 per cent of agricultural territory.

<sup>22</sup> Alfredo Molano, "The Evolution of the FARC: a guerrilla group's long history," NACLA Report on the Americas, (September/October 2000), downloaded from: <http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/molan.htm> on 16 June 2003.



Colombia, stressing that land was not a resource that was to be divided amongst the people.<sup>23</sup>

Gaitan's assassination acted as a catalyst for the onset of a decade-long struggle that resulted in the deaths of over 200,000 Colombians.<sup>24</sup> Seeking to control the Liberal outbreaks of 1948, the Conservative government armed Conservative peasants throughout the country and provided unprecedented levels of financial support to the National Police. Historical accounts of *La Violencia* have concluded that the militant peasant groups, supported by the Conservative party and backed by wealthy landowners and industrialists, were responsible for a significant proportion of the atrocities which were committed against civilians.<sup>25</sup> Liberal peasants, in turn, armed themselves with the aid of the CCP, creating numerous self-defence groups. These groups in turn formed rural communities referred to as 'Independent Republics'.<sup>26</sup> The most popular Independent Republics included El Pato, Rio Chiquito, Sumapaz, and Marquetalia, most of which are located in the southern departments of Colombia, where the violence of *La Violencia* was the most severe (Figure 5-1: Map of Colombian Departments). Violence was centred in the department of Tolima - where many Liberal guerrilla bands and Communist self-defence forces operated. In fact, it was in Tolima that Marulanda, the future leader of FARC, began his career as a Liberal guerrilla.<sup>27</sup> Eventually a conglomeration of these Liberal and Communist

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<sup>23</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 52. It was not until the "political winds shifted" that property was subsequently reclaimed.

<sup>24</sup> Manwaring (2002), p. 2. For a thorough discussion of this period in Colombian history, refer to Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Penaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez eds. *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1992).

<sup>25</sup> Victoria Garcia, "In the Spotlight: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia," Centre for Defence Information Terrorism Project Information Sheet (7 May 2002), accessed at: <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/farc-pr.cfm> on 14 June 2003.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Chalk (2001), p. 23.



groups combined forces to form FARC.<sup>28</sup> During this period, violence became the norm throughout rural Colombia, as it constantly fed on “traditional partisan hatreds and on the political ‘law of the jungle’ which stipulated that one’s good, one’s honour, and even one’s life depended on who controlled the government.”<sup>29</sup>

**Figure 5.1 Map of Colombian Departments**



<sup>28</sup> It is important to note that these self-defence groups were supported by a political policy implemented by the CCP in response to the rising number of civilian victims. The object of the CCP was to organise “peasants into autonomous safe havens that could defend themselves against the situation of generalized violence, and particularly against the Conservative armed groups” Lacking the required manpower, the Communist activists were forced to form an agreement with the Liberal party to help organise the peasant communities into self-governing structures, and into a resistance of guerrilla units. See: Roman D. Ortiz, “Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: the Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 25, no. 2 (March-April 2002), pp. 131-132, and Pearce (2000), pp. 52-56.

<sup>29</sup> Dix (1967), p. 363.



Initially, *La Violencia* was the result of political differences where “rural bosses mobilised their peasant clients in bloody vendettas against neighbouring villages; and Liberal landowners organised peasant-guerrilla armies which engaged the Conservative forces of the state in ‘hit and run’ actions.”<sup>30</sup> However, with every year that *La Violencia* continued, the political focus of the fighting appeared to diminish. Several historical accounts of this period even noted that *La Violencia* was exacerbated and prolonged by other motivations and causal factors. For example, Robert Dix argues that soon after the start of *La Violencia*, “economic motives for violence were mixed with the political.”<sup>31</sup> Thus during *La Violencia*, ‘political losers’ were often prevented from owning land.

In addition to political and economic dimensions of the violence, it was not long before political and social factors were intermixed with criminality.<sup>32</sup> For example, in western parts of Colombia ‘entrepreneurs’ commonly hired gunmen to terrorise local populations and destroy their agricultural crops, thereby “inducing the abandonment of farms or their sale at minimum prices.”<sup>33</sup> It also became common practice for coffee crops to be seized by armed bands just before the harvest so that these illicit groups could profit from their cultivation and establish protection rackets. As Dix notes, “violence was thus used to gain wealth and power by a rising rural middle class which otherwise found social ascent difficult in a quasi-feudal society.”<sup>34</sup> This highlights the existence of an historical interplay between illicit (and often violent)

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<sup>30</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 52.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 54.

<sup>33</sup> Dix (1967), p. 364.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

wealth accumulation and the search for political power, an interplay that has always played a determining role in the history of Colombia.

Another important dynamic that contributed to the prolongation of *La Violencia* was the socialisation of violence among boys who witnessed atrocities within their families and their communities. This was a significant factor in drawing new recruits to illicit armed groups because membership provided an escape from an agricultural lifestyle and from personal vulnerability to armed groups. Long after clear political objectives had disappeared, “motives of revenge, hard experience, and a yearning for adventure and self-assertion”<sup>35</sup> ensured that the violence that characterised *La Violencia* continued. It is this combination of political, socio-economic and criminal factors that ultimately created an environment in Colombia facilitating the emergence, and eventual growth, of a crime-terror continuum.

The dynamics of *La Violencia* took a turn in 1953 when General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla took control of Colombia by force. An anti-communist, Pinilla gained backing from elements in the Conservative and Liberal parties and the U.S. administration. Shortly after seizing office, he declared an amnesty which was welcomed by armed peasants primarily based in eastern Colombia.<sup>36</sup> This amnesty, however, did not include the CCP, “although they would have readily accepted it.”<sup>37</sup> The General was subsequently chosen as President of Colombia in 1954, with the support of both parties – a position he held until 1958. By 1955, despite his rhetoric of seeking a peaceful resolution to conflict, the General declared the CCP illegal and launched a military operation against rural areas that remained strongholds of peasant and

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<sup>35</sup> Dix (1967), p. 365.

<sup>36</sup> Molano (2000).

<sup>37</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 60.



Communist guerrilla groups. This new period of violence resulted in the death of an estimated 16,000 people, including many who had accepted Pinilla's initial amnesty.<sup>38</sup> Financially supported by the U.S., the Colombian army attacked and bombed guerrilla and peasant positions, forcing them to retreat to the jungles of the Andean foothills.<sup>39</sup> Amongst the guerrillas was Marulanda, who himself had joined the Communist Party in 1952 after many Liberal guerrilla leaders began to collaborate with the Colombian army against Communist forces.<sup>40</sup> By the early 1960s, Marulanda commanded the self-proclaimed independent republic of Marquetalia in the Central Andes, but he was forced to leave Marquetalia in 1964 when the government re-established control.<sup>41</sup> In many respects, during *La Violencia*, the peasants came to see the Communist guerrillas as their defenders because they were the same people who "saved them from being killed by the *chulavitas* in 1950, which enabled them to confront the army in 1955"<sup>42</sup> and who would go on to defend them from the landowner uprisings of the 1960s and 1970s.

In 1958 General Pinilla was forced out of government by a newly formed 'civic front' called the National Front. The National Front was a pact agreed upon by the Conservative and Liberal parties, "in which they would alternate in power every four years during a minimum period of 16 years."<sup>43</sup> This agreement formed the basis for *La Violencia* drawing to a close as its first priorities were "political peace and the restoration of the constitutional order, taking precedence over any objectives of

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<sup>38</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 60.

<sup>39</sup> Molano (2000).

<sup>40</sup> Pearce, (2000), p. 56. Liberal support for General Pinilla did not last long, and dissipated after Pinilla attempted to prolong his rule by interfering in the next elections that the Liberals hoped to win. At this point demonstrations spread throughout Colombia – most of which were violently repressed by the government who blamed the Communist Party for disrupting public order. Molano, (2000).

<sup>41</sup> Jenkins (2001),p. 50.

<sup>42</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 60.

<sup>43</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 61.

economic development or social reform.”<sup>44</sup> However, it soon became clear that the success of the National Front depended not only on its ability to achieve peace between the two main parties and strengthen democratic institutions, but also to

stimulate economic development and forge the structure of a modern society not divided by the tremendous inequalities which today characterize it, which offers to all its members remunerative employment, a decent standard of living, protection against risks, free access to education, and broad opportunities to rise to positions of leadership both in the sphere of private activity as well as in the field of public affairs.<sup>45</sup>

The emergence of the National Front, however, did little to resolve widespread violence in the rural areas of Colombia. Instead of seeking to form an inclusive system of government, the National Front’s official policy was to recognise modern liberal groups, and repress “those that asked for ‘excessive’ reform.”<sup>46</sup> In addition to excluding the emerging middle class, the educated, the poverty stricken, and the majority of the population,<sup>47</sup> all Liberal and Communist self-defence groups that emerged during *La Violencia* were specifically excluded from political talks. As Ann Mason concludes, “political reconciliation, internal order and economic growth were achieved, yet bipartisan rule by its very nature provided for the institutional exclusion of third parties from political power.”<sup>48</sup> Although the National Front succeeded in ushering in a period of relative stability with restored public order, by neglecting to further strengthen law enforcement and the judiciary, their policy of exclusion fuelled the discontent of many rural-based groups. In this situation, as had happened in earlier historical periods in Colombia, the state contributed to producing an environment that threatened societal security as defined by the Copenhagen School. As a result,

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<sup>44</sup> Dix (1967), p. 147.

<sup>45</sup> Programa del Frente Nacional, 1962, (Bogota: Editorial ARGRA, 1962), p. 4, as quoted in Dix, (1967), p. 147.

<sup>46</sup> Serres (2000), p. 194.

<sup>47</sup> Rochlin (2003), p. 96.

<sup>48</sup> Ann C. Mason, “Colombian State Failure: the Global Context of Eroding Domestic Authority,” Paper presented at the Conference on Failed States, Florence, Italy (10-14 April 2001), p. 11.



violence continued throughout Colombia over the next two decades. The violence of the early 1960s took another guise, with many guerrilla groups espousing largely nationalistic aims, or aims tied to various international centres of power.<sup>49</sup> Many Colombian guerrilla movements, for example, found inspiration and encouragement from the Cuban Revolution. According to Buscaglia and Ratliff, the spread of violence at this time could be attributed to “the Colombian political system’s incapacity and unwillingness to open itself to all interested parties and to serve the public interest [and] the foreign support for insurgents.”<sup>50</sup>

Crime was a further problem associated with the instability of *La Violencia* that continued to grow even after the emergence of the National Front. By 1964 robbery, burglary, and the kidnapping of prominent people was common, leading the middle and upper classes to pay patrols of night watchmen for protection from bandits.<sup>51</sup> Rising crime rates at this time reflected the weak nature of the state. Public confidence in the institutions of state authority (i.e. law enforcement, judiciary, and government leaders) was extremely low, and the failure of the state to provide sufficient social services required of a modern state (i.e. education, public works and social welfare) undermined the government’s legitimacy. As a result, most Colombians were no longer able to “identify their own well-being with that of the nation and with their own responsibility for the nation’s welfare.”<sup>52</sup> Although the state existed in principle, the authorities were unable to attain effective control over state functions, thereby leaving a vacuum that non-state actors sought to fill.

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<sup>49</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 3.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Dix (1957), p. 175.

<sup>52</sup> Dix (1957), p. 179.

The consequences of the weakness of the state and the policy of political exclusion practised by the National Front in the post-*La Violencia* period were demonstrated in a series of events in 1964. The Colombian army had been targeting Communist forces in armed raids since 1958 because they were considered elements of subversion, and launched one of these events ('Plan Lazo') in May 1964 with the advice and financial support of the United States. This campaign sent 16,000 Colombian troops to encircle "the narrow valley of Marquetalia,<sup>53</sup> where a small group of peasants (42 according to the testimony of the group's leader Manuel Marulanda) were working, while the airforce dropped bombs."<sup>54</sup> This pinnacle of government violence was conducted against Communist strongholds despite the fact that the CCP, and Manuel Marulanda, made several attempts to cooperate with the National Front, explicitly stating that they were not interested in engaging in an armed struggle.<sup>55</sup> However, as government directed violence continued, the armed groups were forced to take refuge in the mountainous areas of southern Colombia. In September 1964 several of these armed groups came together in a conference of the 'Bloque Sur de Guerrilla', forming a military wing of the CCP.<sup>56</sup> The principal aim of the Marxist armed militants, under the leadership of Marulanda, was to focus on land reform.<sup>57</sup> Two years later, during a second conference of the 'Bloque Sur', the militants renamed themselves the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia or FARC. Ideologically driven by Marxism, FARC maintained ties to the Communist Party until the end of the 1970s.

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<sup>53</sup> Marquetalia, located in the southern department of Tolima, was established as a Communist-oriented 'independent republic' in early 1964. Other similar independent republics established by the Communist Party in the department of Tolima included: Rio Chiquito, El Pato-Guayabero and Santa Barbara. All of these were eradicated by the Colombian army by 1966. Chalk, (2001), p. 24. See also Serres (2000), pp. 193-195.

<sup>54</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 64.

<sup>55</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 64.

<sup>56</sup> Chalk (2001), p. 21.

<sup>57</sup> Phillip McLean, "Colombia – Thinking Clearly About the Conflict," CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas, vol. XIII, study 7 (October 2002), p. 2.



The origins of FARC were intrinsically linked to the political violence that characterised *La Violencia*, and its immediate aftermath.<sup>58</sup> Experiences of state repression and a culture of peasant rebellion, coupled with the desire to seek appropriation and stabilisation of land ownership, served as key elements for gaining and holding peasant support.<sup>59</sup> This was exacerbated by the physical absence of the state in many regions, along with the inability of the state to provide key social services throughout Colombia. The emergence of FARC was therefore unlike the rise of other leftist revolutionary groups in Latin America. Although the group was partially influenced by the success of Fidel Castro in Cuba,<sup>60</sup> FARC was not a by-product of the Cuban revolution. Instead, the group emerged from struggles for land “characteristic of a dependent economy passing from traditional forms of land exploitation to modern capitalism.”<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, despite engaging in the use of violence as will be demonstrated in the next section, FARC - at its birth - was largely forced to use violence in order to secure its existence. In this way the group was engaged in a cycle of self-help characterised by the security dilemma which is comparable to the actions of a sovereign state. As Monica Serres concludes, “The status of FARC in 1966 was a combination of vague calls for revolution and armed struggle mixed with reformist agrarian demands.”<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Serres (2000), pp. 193-195.

<sup>59</sup> Serres (2000), p. 200.

<sup>60</sup> Rochlin (2003) argues that the Cuban Revolution inspired the FARC leadership in principle. For example, the fact that a small island so close to the U.S. could achieve a Communist revolution was considered inspiring. Furthermore, the Cuban revolution proved that popular forces could win against national armies, and that successful struggles began in the countryside.

<sup>61</sup> Serres (2000), p. 194.

<sup>62</sup> Serres (2000), p. 195.

### *A Political Agenda Materialises*

Initially created under the rubric of the CCP which sought to organise peasants into armed defence units, the original premise behind FARC was not to use violence against the state to attain their political aims. On the contrary, in the first years of FARC's existence, armed struggle remained "subordinate to a broader political strategy, which included electoral participation."<sup>63</sup> FARC leadership, which wholly adopted a Marxist ideology, were careful to note that a revolutionary situation did not exist in Colombia, and therefore a guerrilla struggle was not a legitimate course of action. Instead, the group was primarily interested in advancing an agenda that focused on agricultural and land reform. FARC therefore called for the nationalisation of strategic industries, and for "breaking the yoke of imperialist domination."<sup>64</sup> This platform was reflected in early membership patterns, which primarily incorporated landless peasants and small rural landowners. These paramount interests, combined with a Marxist foundation that "offered a global vision that helped the revolutionaries design their political agenda to attract followers, find a social power base, and develop their strategy for gaining power,"<sup>65</sup> appeared to preclude the use of sustained violence. That is not to say, however, that FARC was accepted by the authorities as a legitimate political actor. With all legitimate means to power ultimately blocked by the Government, FARC's leadership recognised that using legal means to break through Colombia's political and agrarian structure was impossible. The only option which the leadership believed remained was to eventually declare an armed rebellion.

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<sup>63</sup>Pearce (1990), p. 167.

<sup>64</sup>Rochlin (2003), p. 97.

<sup>65</sup>Ortiz (2002), p. 128.



During the Third FARC Conference at the end of the 1960s, the group's primary focus was on strengthening its organisational capacity. It thus established a national ideological training centre to train leaders and ensure political cohesion within the group. Furthermore, with a continued interest in avoiding the use of violence against the state, it sought ways to utilise political activism by planning political and mass organisations, distributing propaganda, and consolidating a social base.<sup>66</sup> After the Third Conference a national FARC command structure began to take shape, and was further reinforced during the Fourth and Fifth Conferences when a central general staff under a secretariat was established to head the group's armed movement, and "to provide political direction."<sup>67</sup> The chain of command, however, was not completed until the Sixth FARC Conference in 1978.<sup>68</sup>

Although the group dispersed mobile guerrilla units into several regions, including the middle Magdalena valley, FARC remained a defensive organisation "with roots among peasant colonisers for whom Communism was less a political ideology than a strategy for survival."<sup>69</sup> Peasants who were unable to protect themselves from the harassment of large cattle ranchers (who received military backing) depended on FARC for protection. Focused on winning popular support, FARC combined the provision of protection with basic social services.<sup>70</sup> This policy played a large role in spreading FARC influence throughout the regions of Colombia, becoming, in some cases, the de facto governing authority for large numbers of peasants where the state

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<sup>66</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 133.

<sup>67</sup> Chalk (2001), p. 24.

<sup>68</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 133. During the Sixth FARC Conference, the group approved statutes, disciplinary requirements, command guidelines, established the responsibilities of the general staff for running different fronts that acted as tactical units.

<sup>69</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 167.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

was either negligent or absent.<sup>71</sup> In providing these services to communities, the FARC was granted a degree of authority and legitimacy – once relegated to the state - that allowed them to strengthen their rural foothold throughout this period.

With the National Front still dominating the economic and political life of Colombia in the 1970s, the government of Misael Pastrana (1970-1974) adopted a rural development model that aimed to eliminate obstacles to investment in rural areas.<sup>72</sup> This fuelled FARC's political agenda by further concentrating land ownership and undermining small-scale peasant producers. Thousands of peasants were thus organised by FARC to invade rural properties (i.e. large haciendas) as a form of backlash. Property owners, with the support of the local political leadership, responded to this tactic by unleashing a combination of public and private force against the peasants.<sup>73</sup> This repression directed against organised peasants was accompanied by the expulsion of tenants from the lands they cultivated, and an associated expansion of commercial agriculture to less populated areas of Colombia. Many of these locations were conveniently situated in the same areas where FARC maintained a strong presence. As a result of Pastrana's policy, which neglected the peasant population, FARC was able to further consolidate its influence and acquire support in new areas. It was during this period that FARC membership expanded to include students, intellectuals, workers and peasants.<sup>74</sup> A non-state actor, FARC demonstrated that it had the components necessary to directly challenge the state.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Molano (2000).

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.



It is clear that FARC influence and expansion proceeded, albeit slowly, from its inception in 1966. Focused on defensive actions in its early stages, including conducting ambushes against Colombian military units, the main military objectives were to capture equipment, secure food and supplies, and capture hostages and informers.<sup>75</sup> In other words, FARC was predominantly interested in securing its own survival against external influences in much the same way the Colombian state had done. This initial consolidation of activities was eventually highlighted by the group's interest in acquiring accoutrements of an army by beginning to wear uniforms and insignia, and establishing a disciplinary code for members engaged in banditry, crimes of passion and informing.<sup>76</sup> Strict internal discipline was introduced to keep the group members focused on political aims, and to ensure that FARC was not associated with bands of criminals. Focused efforts to strengthen the foundation of FARC, combined with a general backlash against the Pastrana administration, helped expand the groups' territorial presence three-fold between 1979 and 1983, from nine to 27 fronts.<sup>77</sup>

### *Adopting Terrorist Tactics*

With an organisational structure in place, FARC leadership were able to shift the focus of their Seventh Conference, held in May 1982, to discuss how the group could further spread its influence. The proceedings of the Seventh Conference concluded that this could be accomplished by systematically expanding their fronts. Each existing front was to produce another front, until there was a front located in each of

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<sup>75</sup> Chalk (2001), p. 24.

<sup>76</sup> Richard Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia, R-0630-ARPA (Santa Monica: RAND, 1971), pp. 28-41.

<sup>77</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 173.

the country's approximately 50 departments.<sup>78</sup> The Conference also conceded that a revolutionary situation did exist in Colombia, thereby noting that FARC was officially in favour of adopting offensive military tactics to transform itself in response to "strong state repression and the growing lack of legitimacy of the Colombian regime."<sup>79</sup> Illustrating this operational shift, FARC added the letters 'EP' (*Ejercito del Pueblo*, People's Army) to its name. In doing so, the group revealed a determination to replace its focus on political strategy with a military strategy that would not preclude building alliances with other illicit armed groups in order to ultimately seize political power. The immediate result of this strategic shift in FARC policy was the unleashing of a wave of "chronic political violence."<sup>80</sup> In addition to conducting kidnapping operations, FARC claimed responsibility for exploding nine bombs against U.S. targets in Cali and Bogota in May 1984, and for setting off a series of bomb attacks against U.S. business targets in Bogota and Medellin in February and September 1985.<sup>81</sup>

This drive towards the use of violence by FARC was met by an equally violent response from the Colombian authorities, and used by president-elect Belisario Betancur to present a political platform to the Colombian public that focused on initiating peace talks. With no real previous government attempt to negotiate with FARC, the promise of peace talks resulted in an electoral victory for Betancur (1982-1986). After taking office, Betancur declared an amnesty for armed groups – without the accompanying requirement to disarm – as well as initiating a 'national dialogue' through the creation of a Peace Commission that sought to reshape the Colombian

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<sup>78</sup> Chalk,(2001), pp. 24-25.

<sup>79</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 196.

<sup>80</sup> Serres (2000), p. 197.

<sup>81</sup> Memorial Institute for the Protection from Terrorism (MIPT) Database, University of Oklahoma, accessed May 2002 at <http://www.mipt.org>.



political system.<sup>82</sup> FARC was seen to engage the peace process when its leaders signed a ceasefire in 1984 and renounced kidnapping. It also created a political arm in 1986 (with the CCP and other left-wing organisations) called the Union Patriótica (UP), to present candidates for elections. In direct contradiction to the policy announced at the Seventh FARC Conference, this move suggested that, despite its rhetoric the group never gave “real predominance”<sup>83</sup> to military objectives over political ones. Or, it merely reflected the success of FARC terrorist tactics in forcing the government to seek compromise and include FARC in the political process to avert future violence. Either way, it was evident that FARC “oscillated between the project of seizing power, and the possibility of accepting the present institutions of the state, as long as it was possible to modify them through dialogue with the government.”<sup>84</sup>

As a direct result of establishing the UP, FARC was permitted to participate in the 1986 local elections, where they won the majority of votes in numerous municipalities and also gained 12 congressional seats.<sup>85</sup> The immediate political success of the UP, however, was regarded as a direct threat by landowners who did not want land ownership issues – a FARC priority – to be discussed in a legitimate political setting. Landowners thereby contracted paramilitary units to assassinate influential UP members. Often with the tacit or open support of the Colombian Armed Forces, these paramilitary groups unleashed “a systematic campaign of extermination against UP

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Serres (2000), p. 198.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Jonathan Hartlyn, “Drug Trafficking and Democracy in Colombia in the 1980s,” University of North Carolina Working Paper, No. 70 (1993), p. 18.

officials.”<sup>86</sup> Between January 1986 and April 1988, it is estimated that approximately 334 UP members were killed, including local government officials and a UP presidential candidate.<sup>87</sup> These actions posed a significant obstacle to FARC’s efforts to re-engage in a purely political struggle, and provided rhetorical ammunition that could be used by the group as justification for retaliatory violence. At this point, political engagement as an option for FARC was severely hampered as the FARC leadership and membership would naturally be extremely sceptical of an proposed government accommodation in the future.

Complicating this situation were government allegations that FARC units regularly violated their ceasefire agreement, thus giving the impression that some FARC members were not serious about engaging in a purely political struggle. Placed in the context of a rise in the incidence of paramilitary operations against the UP, FARC violations of the ceasefire could be regarded as a necessity as the group naturally felt that their political participation was unwelcome. As a result, however, the FARC-EP was politically compromised as a “self-reinforcing cycle of polarization appeared to be operating whereby UP leaders, lacking trust with regard to their personal safety and the democratic process, remained ambiguous with regard to the guerrilla option and the use of force; this in turn, helped right-wing groups to justify the use of violence against them.”<sup>88</sup> The landowner-sponsored campaign against the UP was directly responsible for preventing FARC from involvement in public life with any degree of normality, thereby blocking the leadership from legitimate electoral

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<sup>86</sup> Michael Shifter, “Colombia on the Brink: there goes the neighbourhood,” *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no. 4 (July/August 1999), [http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/issuebriefs/readingnotes/fa\\_shifter.html](http://www.foreignpolicy2000.org/library/issuebriefs/readingnotes/fa_shifter.html), accessed 05 March 2002. See also: Mason, (2001).

<sup>87</sup> Hartlyn (1993), p. 19. It was in fact during the newly elected Virgilio Barco administration (1986-1990) that the majority of violence against the UP was conducted.

<sup>88</sup> Hartlyn (1993), pp. 19-20.



participation.<sup>89</sup> Most importantly, however, is that violence against FARC-UP members left the group sceptical about any future peace negotiations, especially if they involved subscribing to a ceasefire. With their military structure intact, FARC emerged from this experience with the belief that offensive military tactics were the only way in which political influence could be secured in Colombia.

As a result of acknowledging the utility of violence as a legitimate tool for political struggle, FARC conducted sporadic terrorist operations between 1986 and 1990. In terms of generating public condemnation against the government's inability to ensure personal security, the group focused its efforts on perpetrating kidnap-for-ransoms and ambushing military convoys. However, as will be discussed in greater detail below, this careful target selection was not done solely to advance political goals but had much to do with the associated profits the group collected from these activities. FARC fronts also conducted more attacks against small towns outside the group's immediate influence, or which appeared to support the government and paramilitary units. These operations, however, did not preclude the group from considering participation in peace talks, once again, under a new Colombian administration led by Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994). Although the Gaviria administration successfully negotiated peace with several small guerrilla groups, including the People's Liberation Army, it proved unsuccessful in persuading FARC to disarm. This failure reflected FARC's previous experiences with peace negotiations which caused the group's leadership to demand a broad agenda from the outset. In addition to a guarantee that the group could maintain forces in areas where it had exerted significant influence, FARC also demanded that the government disband the

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<sup>89</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 134.

paramilitaries and restructure the armed forces.<sup>90</sup> Although Gaviria agreed to outlaw paramilitary groups, the government measures adopted in this respect were regarded as more symbolic than real because the government was unable to exert complete control over these entities. As a result, the paramilitaries continued to grow and the army “continued to facilitate paramilitary seizures of the most important economic, political and military regions, including: Uraba, the banana plantation area; the Panama border; and Montes de Maria, an area of big farms near Cartagena.”<sup>91</sup> The failure to reach common ground for beginning peace talks under the Gaviria administration acted as a catalyst for FARC’s more focused engagement with terrorism. As part of its guerrilla campaign against the Colombian government, FARC began to utilise terror tactics against select targets in what appeared to be an attempt to directly influence political behaviour within the state. The use of terror tactics in this situation is commonly associated with influencing political behaviour when compared with historical accounts of terrorism (refer to Chapter 1). From 1992 onwards, FARC’s reliance on the use of terrorism intensified, combining kidnapping operations – periodically resulting in the deaths of hostages - with sporadic bombings of government and business targets.

Between 1966 and 1986 FARC activities reveal that the group was primarily focused on consolidating itself as a formidable political organisation, and expanding its presence and influence – preferably through legitimate political means - throughout the Colombian countryside. During these two decades the group was almost exclusively focused on its political agenda and showed little interest in adopting the use of terror as its primary tactical tool. FARC’s decision to use violence offensively

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<sup>90</sup> Chalk (2001), p. 72.

<sup>91</sup> Alfredo Molano, “The Evolution of the FARC,” *NACLA Report on the Americas*, (Sept/Oct 2000), <http://www.derechos.net/paulwolf/colombia/molano.htm>, accessed 24 February 2002.



was perceived by the group as its only remaining option. The failure of its attempts to effect change through the Colombian political process resulted in a growing disillusionment among FARC leadership and membership base, reinforcing the long-held Colombian experience – as previously discussed - that violence was the only avenue to power for groups blocked from legitimate politics. This feeling was further supported by the common knowledge that the Colombian state failed to “assert exclusive authority over all its territory or monopolise the recourse to violent force.”<sup>92</sup> It is thus evident that the breakdown of peace talks in 1986, 1991 and 1992 contributed to the continued reliance on violence by state and non-state actors. Furthermore, the inherent weakness of the Colombian state, combined with the existence of active illicit armed groups, also facilitated the rise of a parallel criminal environment that would become a significant factor in the perpetuation of the use of violence by non-state actors seeking economic, political, and social power.

### *Illicit Drugs and the Proliferation of Violence*

The influence of FARC and other non-state actors in Colombia<sup>93</sup> grew in parallel to the country’s expanding illicit drug economy. Drug trafficking became “one of the factors that is most closely related to the persistence and intensification of Colombian conflict”.<sup>94</sup> The rise of the modern illicit drug trade can be traced back to the mid-1960s when small-scale drug traffickers organised shipments – primarily of marijuana - to an expanding U.S. market. The wealth amassed by these traffickers allowed them

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<sup>92</sup> Miguel Ceballos and Gerard Martin, “Colombia: Between Terror and Reform,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, (Summer/Fall 2001), p. 88.

<sup>93</sup> Such groups include the ELN, the EPL, and M-19.

<sup>94</sup> Fabio Sanchez, et al. “Conflict, Violent Crime and Criminal Activity in Colombia,” Economics and Politics of Civil War Working Paper, (Yale University, November 2002), p. 14. Roberto Steiner and Alejandro Corchuelo drew the same conclusion, writing: “the drug trade is one of the best examples of an organisation where success is based on the permanent, systematic and cumulative use of violence.” Quoted in “Economic and Institutional Repercussions of the Drug Trade in Colombia,” CEDE Working Paper, (Universidad de los Andes, December 1999), p. 1.

to respond to a global surge in drug demand in the late 1970s by expanding their operations in the processing and exporting of cocaine.<sup>95</sup> The two groups that gained a monopoly over illicit drug exports, and ultimately emerged as the largest producers and distributors of cocaine worldwide, were the Medellin and Cali cartels. Cocaine demand in the U.S. coupled with the emergence of the drug cartels produced a chain of events that resulted in the growth of Colombian coca cultivation by an estimated 50 per cent between 1966 and 1999 - the source of three-quarters of global cocaine supplies.<sup>96</sup> By the late 1980s, the Medellin and Cali cartels controlled an estimated 80 per cent of cocaine exported from Colombia, profiting as much as U.S. \$3-4 billion.<sup>97</sup> Placed in a national context, according to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates, the Colombian drug trade amassed several billion dollars profit annually, thereby directly contributing to the economic, political and social power attained by leading illicit drug trade actors.<sup>98</sup>

Led by Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the Medellin cartel showed an interest in combining their drug wealth with overt political power, and therefore “waged war on the Colombian government, killing hundreds of judges, police investigators, journalists and public figures.”<sup>99</sup> In 1989 alone, the Medellin cartel was responsible for killing more than 550 people in a concerted bombing campaign;<sup>100</sup> and during a six month period in 1990, the Medellin cartel was blamed for killing approximately 1,700 people

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<sup>95</sup> Winifred Tate, “Colombia’s Role in the International Drug Industry,” *Foreign Policy in Focus*, vol. 4, no. 30 (June 2001), p. 1.

<sup>96</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, “Narcotics Threat from Colombia Continues to Grow,” GAO/NSIAD-99-136 (June 1999), p. 6.

<sup>97</sup> Lee (2002), p. 542.

<sup>98</sup> GAO, (1999), p. 6.

<sup>99</sup> Tate (2001), p. 1.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid.



and 400 police officers in 200 bomb explosions,<sup>101</sup> including the bombing of a domestic airliner in 1989 that resulted in the death of all 107 passengers.<sup>102</sup> This operational use of terrorism by the Medellin cartel (point 2 on the CTC), combined with their in-depth involvement in the drugs trade, resulted in the group's acquisition of enough power to "replace the state either functionally or geographically."<sup>103</sup> Functionally the cartel provided an alternative economic structure to farmers, and geographically, the cartel was able to exert near exclusive control over territory it used to grow coca crops and refine coca paste into cocaine, and traffic the final product through the region. Thus while the Colombian government was seeking ways to secure territorial control throughout the country in the face of the growing opposition posed by armed groups such as FARC, the "power and violence of the drug industry came to permeate all facets of Colombian society, as signified by the saying "plata o plomo" – silver or lead – meaning 'take the bribe or take the bullet.'<sup>104</sup> This environment, often referred to as the 'Colombianization' of society, is generally characterised by the collapse of state structures and a permanent state of violence, including political assassinations, executions and human rights violations."<sup>105</sup>

As a result of government counter-narcotics efforts, significantly aided by the support of the U.S., the Medellin and Cali cartels were disrupted in 1993 and 1994 respectively. Because these groups controlled the vast majority of the Colombian drug trade, the death of Pablo Escobar and the incarceration of the heads of the Cali cartel

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<sup>101</sup> Sayaka Fukumi, "The Impact of Andean Cocaine Trafficking: The Cases of Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico," 29<sup>th</sup> Joint Sessions of Workshops, ECPR, Grenoble, France (6-11 April 2001), p. 9.

<sup>102</sup> Douglas D. Davids, Narco-Terrorism: a Unified Strategy to Fight a Growing Terrorist Menace, (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2002), p. 24.

<sup>103</sup> Roberto Steiner and Alejandra Corchuelo, "Economic and Institutional Repercussions of the Drug Trade in Colombia", Cede, Universidad de los Andes, (December 1999), p. 16.

<sup>104</sup> Tate (2001), p. 1.

<sup>105</sup> David C. Jordan, Drug Politics: Dirty Money and Democracies, (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), p. 83.

were intended to significantly reduce illicit drug operations. Instead, these law enforcement successes merely replaced large drug syndicates with “smaller, more vertically integrated trafficking organisations whose nimble, independent traffickers are much more difficult to detect and infiltrate. These traffickers employ new and constantly changing shipping routes through Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean for moving cocaine and, increasingly, heroin.”<sup>106</sup> These new groups,<sup>107</sup> operating in small, autonomous cells, often contracted work out to specialists who were not always part of any integrated structure.<sup>108</sup> Adopting a network approach to their organisation as depicted in Figure 5.2, it is evident that contemporary Colombian drug trafficking organisations learned from the past mistakes of the large, hierarchically structured Cali and Medellin cartels, and recognised that “decentralised structures are much less vulnerable.”<sup>109</sup> As of 2002, Colombian authorities confirmed that an estimated 162 drug trafficking organisations with over 4,000 members and ties to over 40 international criminal syndicates operated in Colombia.<sup>110</sup> Seeking to avoid the inherent vulnerabilities of traditional hierarchical cartel structures, the new Colombian drug trafficking organisations evolved by incorporating new technologies into their operations, and by constantly responding to the shifting political landscape.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Tate (2001), p. 1.

<sup>107</sup> For a very good overview of the evolution of drug trafficking groups in Colombia, see: Michael Kenney, “When Criminals Out-Smart the State: Understanding the Learning Capacity of Colombian Drug Trafficking Organisations,” *Transnational Organised Crime*, vol. 5, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 97-119.

<sup>108</sup> Peter Chalk, “Heroin and Cocaine: a global threat,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, (January 1998), p. 6.


<sup>109</sup> Geopolitical Drug Watch, “A Drug Primer for the Late 1990s,” *Current History*, vol. 97, no. 618 (1998), p. 151.

<sup>110</sup> Cope 2002:8.

<sup>111</sup> Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences,” *Transnational Organised Crime*, vol. 4, no. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 55.



Figure 5.2 Drug Cartel Network<sup>112</sup>



Criminal organisations, like the large cartels of the past, however, did not hold exclusive participation rights to the drugs trade in Colombia. Since the decline of the cartels, drug trafficking groups have often found it necessary to cooperate with other

<sup>112</sup> “Colombia’s New Crime Structures Take Shape,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, vol. 14, no. 4 (April 2002).

illicit actors, a situation made easier by the fact that the state was unable to control all its territory. The growth and success of any drug cartel therefore grew to depend on relations developed with corrupt local, departmental and national officials, and with terrorist groups which acquired armed control over key cultivation or transit territory. For example, because these smaller, diffuse groups lacked their own resources, they quickly came to depend on FARC militants to provide protection.<sup>113</sup> As discussed in greater detail in the next section, these relations provided the initial catalyst for the emergence of a crime-terror nexus.

### **Entertaining Alliances: a friend of the narco-traffickers, 1982-1994**

Aware that the illicit drug trade in Colombia was growing, FARC's leadership initially attempted to distance itself from drug cartels because they feared that illicit narcotics represented an 'imperialist' invasion. The predominant belief was that if peasants prospered from their involvement in the drug trade, they would stop supporting FARC's revolutionary struggle.<sup>114</sup> FARC thus "forbade the cultivation of coca and marijuana, which they considered counter-revolutionary."<sup>115</sup> This sentiment, however, did not last long because elements within FARC recognised that banning coca would eventually result in the loss of support from the growing number of peasants engaged in coca-farming.<sup>116</sup> This realisation was highlighted during the Seventh FARC Conference (1982), during which the group openly discussed their

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<sup>113</sup>Mark S. Steinitz, "The Terrorism and Drug Connection in Latin America's Andean Region," CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas, vol. 13, study 5 (July 2002), p. 9.

<sup>114</sup> Molano (2000).

<sup>115</sup> Chalk (2001), p. 26.

<sup>116</sup> Molano (2000).



involvement in the drug trade as a necessary source of funding that could be used to build a 'true democracy.'<sup>117</sup> Narcotics would be exploited

to create and sustain a liberation army, recruited from marginalized parts of society and equipped to be capable of defeating security forces, controlling territory in order to isolate cities, undermining legitimacy of government at all levels, weakening societal will to resist, and ultimately winning the revolutionary struggle.<sup>118</sup>

Faced with the prospect of losing popular support and receiving only limited logistical and financial aid from the Communist regimes in the region or the Soviet Union,<sup>119</sup> involvement in the drug trade was rationalised as an organisational necessity for financing and support.

FARC involvement in the Colombian drug trade, however, began on a very limited scale, initially restricted to "taxing all facets of the drug trade"<sup>120</sup> and "protecting and controlling production areas." The relationship that subsequently developed between FARC and the Colombian drug cartels also included FARC protection of the cartels' landing strips and cocaine refining and processing laboratories hidden in the jungles. This formed an important strategic alliance because, as outlined above, FARC needed to ensure organisational security and the cartels needed a security force that had knowledge of the coca-growing territories. Furthermore, because FARC already controlled a significant portion of territory the drug cartels needed access to, cooperation was more cost effective for the drug cartels than attempting to eliminate

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<sup>117</sup> Howard LaFranchi, "Guerrilla Commanders says, 'This is a means'," Christian Science Monitor, 19 July 1999.

<sup>118</sup> John A. Cope, "Colombia's War: Toward a New Strategy," Strategic, no. 194 (October 2002), p. 2.

<sup>119</sup> Serres (2000), p. 204.

<sup>120</sup> Taxes imposed on drug traffickers and prosperous coca farmers were locally referred to as 'gramaje'. In most cases, the tax amounted to a fixed rate of 10 per cent of the profits made from transactions in return for protection from the authorities. For more details see: Jorge Orlando Melo, "The Drug Trade, Politics and the Economy: the Colombian Experience," in Elizabeth Joyce and Carlos Malamud eds. Latin America and the Multinational Drug Trade, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 80.

FARC fronts.<sup>121</sup> The alliance (point 1 on the CTC) that was created between drug cartels and FARC thus facilitated FARC's access to "cash and lines of transportation and communication"<sup>122</sup> possessed by organised crime while the cartels received help to "protect their assets and project their power within and among nation-states."<sup>123</sup>

In assessing the relationship that existed between FARC and Colombian narcotics traffickers, evidence indicates that ties were "mixed and fluid, containing elements of conflict and competition, as well as cooperation and coordination."<sup>124</sup> For example, drug cartels allowed FARC to use their criminal connections to obtain weapons. On the one hand, cooperation was evident in a case uncovered in December 1988 when Jamaican authorities seized a vessel containing 10 tons of weapons destined for FARC militants. Following investigations into the seizure, Jamaican and Colombian authorities concluded that Colombian cocaine dealers who worked with FARC had underwritten the operation.<sup>125</sup> An example of the tensions between them, on the other hand, was a conflict that developed between FARC and the Medellin cartel in northern and central Colombia. In order to facilitate its drug operations, the Medellin cartel began to force peasants off their land in the late 1980s and simultaneously attempted to dislodge FARC in order to cease paying revolutionary taxes. Because the militants had a relatively weak presence in these areas, the cartels were able to dislodge parts of the group by supporting the rise of small private armies.<sup>126</sup> By the 1990s the FARC-cartel alliance was best understood geographically: tense relations

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<sup>121</sup>It is, however, important to note that the cartels did attempt to eliminate the FARC by supporting paramilitary groups. Although the paramilitaries inflicted damage on the FARC, they were unable to remove FARC from the southern regions of Colombia.

<sup>122</sup>Manwaring (2002), p. 8.

<sup>123</sup>Ibid.

<sup>124</sup>Steinitz (2002), p. 2.

<sup>125</sup>Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege*, (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), p. 155.

<sup>126</sup>Steinitz (2002), pp. 4-5.



dominated the northern and central regions, and high levels of cooperation prevailed in the south where a FARC presence was especially strong.

FARC's decision to become involved in the illicit narcotics trade generated several organisational and operational benefits not previously experienced by the group. The greatest immediate significance was that the profits generated from collecting taxes provided the necessary financial base for expanding the size of the group's membership. Throughout the 1970s, lack of resources limited FARC to maintaining an armed strength of 100, whereas by the mid-1980s, the group grew exponentially into a force of 2,000-armed militants and an estimated 5,000 political supporters.<sup>127</sup> Discussed in further detail in the next section, FARC's expanding involvement with criminal activities in the 1990s further contributed to a growing membership base, culminating in an estimated 18,000 militants by 2001.<sup>128</sup> Douglas Davids highlighted the importance of this development when he wrote: "So vital to FARC's existence were drugs that in May 1984, when a government commission met with FARC leaders in the Alto de la Mesa rain forest to negotiate peace, the effort failed because the two sides could not reach an agreement on a cessation of drug trafficking."<sup>129</sup> In addition, FARC slowly acquired the knowledge, links and resources needed to play a more direct role in the Colombian drug trade after the downfall of the Medellin and Cali cartels. FARC, alongside emerging smaller drug networks, moved to fill the vacuum left by the demise of the large cartels and used criminal activities to gain maximum political and economic benefits.

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<sup>127</sup> James Adams, The Financing of Terrorism, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 217; and Sanchez et al, (2002), p. 16.

<sup>128</sup> Manwaring (2002), p. 5.

<sup>129</sup> Davids (2002), p. 24.

Despite the fact that FARC engaged in limited alliances with the drug trade during the period between 1982 and 1994, its decision to venture into criminality had political implications. For example, during the 1980s the PCC had begun to distance itself from FARC. Although the two groups shared a similar ideological outlook, it became evident that their identities had diverged<sup>130</sup> – suggesting that FARC was no longer ideologically close enough to act as the military arm of the PCC. In response to an interview question posed in 1993 about FARC ideology, Marulanda himself was quoted as saying:

Within our organisation there is a little of everything. There are Marxist-Leninists too. But above all FARC is an armed guerrilla organisation which opens its doors to all political, philosophical, religious and ideological tendencies, and which brings together people with the common ideal of liberating this country.<sup>131</sup>

This relationship was also affected by the decline of communist ideology as a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the death of Jacobo Arenas – the FARC’s ideological commander - in 1990. The death of Arenas, who held major political influence over FARC since the 1970s and acted as a personal link between FARC and the PCC, produced a natural gap in relations between the two organisations.<sup>132</sup> This post-Cold War ideological crisis reduced the credibility of Marxist-Leninism amongst FARC members, thereby creating an ideological void through which increased participation in illicit activities could be justified. This is discussed in greater detail below.

In distancing themselves from their historical affinity to Communist ideology, coupled with rapidly expanding financial resources, FARC leaders attempted to

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<sup>130</sup> Ortiz (2002), pp. 133-134.

<sup>131</sup> Carlos Arango, FARC: Veinte Anos. De Marquetalia a la Uribe, (Bogota: Ediciones Aurora, 1984), p. 120.

<sup>132</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 135.



devise a new structure and programme for political mobilisation. As Ortiz notes, the FARC “separated themselves from the Communist crisis since their new political agenda does not propose the transformation of the state in accordance with certain ideological principles, but rather the construction of a new one that is simply more efficient.”<sup>133</sup> The group thus created a clandestine party based on a network of cells called *Nucleos de Solidaridad* to focus on attaining the FARC’s traditional agricultural claims, “presenting an offer to completely reform the Colombian state and its economy.”<sup>134</sup> Despite acknowledging and benefiting from the lucrative trade in illicit narcotics, FARC’s leadership and membership continued to ascribe to political aims and motivations. This was further reflected in the evolving membership of the group, from predominantly relying on land labourers in the 1980s, to attracting a following with an intellectual background from the urban middle classes,<sup>135</sup> thereby providing “the FARC with the intellectual potential to develop its own differentiated ideological line and to crystallize a political identity distinct from that of the Communist Party.”<sup>136</sup>

Unlike many guerrilla groups operating in Colombia at the time (including M-19 and the EPL), FARC did not choose to end their campaign of violence as a result of the elimination of material and strategic support from abroad after the end of the Cold War. Instead, FARC learned how to harness its alliance with drug cartels, thereby securing finance for their “war efforts by taxing and protecting coca and opium-poppy related production, processing and distribution facilities as well as by kidnapping and

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<sup>133</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 131.

<sup>134</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 134.

<sup>135</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 135.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

extortion.”<sup>137</sup> Providing drug cartels with protection from anti-cartel campaigns perpetrated by the Colombian National Police with the support of the U.S. enabled FARC to purchase weapons, and ultimately support an influx of new draftees.<sup>138</sup> As a result, the two illicit groups with vastly different goals equally benefited from a strategic and tactical alliance. At the point of entering this “marriage of political convenience”<sup>139</sup> both groups shared a common goal, which was to destabilise and undermine the government. For FARC, this was facilitated by the fact that it became “a serious factor due to the power which came from drugs grown by a marginalized population.”<sup>140</sup>

#### **Adopting an Internal Organised Crime Capacity: 1994-1999**

The dissipation of the large drug cartels that operated in Colombia until the early 1990s, combined with a rising global demand for drugs, created a vacuum within the domestic drug trade. Although the new decentralised drug trafficking groups secured their place in the illicit Colombian drug trade, the demise of the cartels, which provided a high degree of order and control in the industry, “emboldened Colombia’s various guerrilla organisations to enter the business of refining, trading, and exporting drugs.”<sup>141</sup> Contributing to this predicament was the simultaneous demise of coca supply from Bolivia and Peru in the 1990s, which resulted in additional crops being moved across the border into predominantly FARC-controlled territories in southern

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<sup>137</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 4.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>139</sup> Ehrenfeld (2003), p. 160.

<sup>140</sup> Thomas Marks, “Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency,” U.S. Army War College – Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute Working Paper (January 2002), p. 8.

<sup>141</sup> Rensselaer W. Lee, “Perverse Effects of Andean Counternarcotics Policy,” *Orbis*, vol. 46, no. 3 (Summer 2002), p. 539.



Colombia.<sup>142</sup> This increased the economic opportunities (in production, processing and marketing of illicit drugs) for large numbers of migrants who were attracted to these coca-growing areas, eventually resulting in numerous migrants accepting the FARC as “the main guardians of their newfound ‘narco-economy’.”<sup>143</sup>

Despite the successful alliances created between FARC and drug trafficking organisations, by 1994 the emphasis on building and maintaining alliances had become less of a priority for FARC. This was due to several factors, including the repercussions of the downfall of the Medellin and Cali cartels on the way that the illicit drug trade in Colombia was structured. Equally relevant, however, was the appearance that FARC’s leadership was keen to eliminate potential vulnerabilities associated with engaging in long-term alliances. For example, the longer alliances operate, the greater the chance that group activities could be compromised via the penetration of informants, or by the other party in the alliance. The FARC activities outlined in the following sections reveal that long-term alliances with drugs cartels were feared because they could compromise some FARC fronts by completely integrating them into the drugs trade. This would have a direct impact on the ability of FARC command to assert control throughout its membership, and it threatened to create confusion over FARC aims and direction.

FARC activities between 1995 and 1999 revealed that the group attempted to seek control over aspects of the illicit drug trade to reduce its dependence on drug cartel

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<sup>142</sup> Sanchez et al., (2002), p. 15. Sanchez cites that in 1990 there were 20,000 hectares of coca cultivated, whereas by 2000, 160,000 hectares of coca were cultivated in the country. See also: U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Washington, D.C., March 2002).

<sup>143</sup> Camilo Echandia Castilla, El Conflicto Armado y las Manifestaciones de la Violencia en las Regiones de Colombia, Presidencia de la Republica de Colombia, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, (Bogota, 2000), p. 79, as quoted in Chalk, (2001), p. 17.

operations and increase its own profit margins. Asserting itself at a time when the major cartels were being targeted by the authorities ultimately elevated FARC to a position of operational advantage because it was one of the only established groups in Colombia that had the resources and knowledge to successfully navigate through the international drugs trade. Thus by 2000 it was estimated that 61 per cent of FARC-controlled territory was directly used for cocaine cultivation.<sup>144</sup>

Prior to the FARC's involvement in the narcotics trade in the 1980s, the group engaged in a variety of other criminal activities – albeit to a very limited extent. For example, FARC began its involvement in crime by extorting protection money from landowners,<sup>145</sup> and conducting kidnap-for-ransom operations.<sup>146</sup> Between 1987 and 1996, the majority of kidnappings were conducted in agricultural and cattle-raising areas in FARC strongholds<sup>147</sup> in eastern Colombia. By focusing on resource-rich areas, FARC derived at least one-fifth of its income from kidnapping operations during this period.<sup>148</sup> Asserting itself as a guerrilla group in the country, kidnapping also appeared to be used as the FARC's primary tool of intimidation. In 1999 alone the group was responsible for conducting 2,465 kidnappings – averaging six per day.<sup>149</sup> Between January 1995 and January 2001, 7748 kidnappings – worth an estimated U.S. \$80 million annually - were reported to the authorities.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> Interpol, (2000).

<sup>145</sup> Pearce (2000), p. 173.

<sup>146</sup> Chalk (2001), p. 33.

<sup>147</sup> According to Chalk, (2001), the FARC grew in the 1980s by expanding their operations in resource rich areas, including: the eastern plains (cattle), Uraba and Santander (commercial agriculture), the middle Magdalena valley (oil), and Antioquia (gold).

<sup>148</sup> Chalk, (2001),p. 34.

<sup>149</sup> Michael Radu, "The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas," *Orbis*, vol. 44, no. 3 (Summer 2000), p. 368.

<sup>150</sup> Rochlin (2003), p. 120. Despite these apparently high numbers, Rochlin noted that most kidnappings actually went unreported for fear of reprisals.



Although considerable profits were amassed through kidnapping, as previously mentioned, it was the drug trade that offered FARC access to an unparalleled source of profit. The potential for profit acquisition was increased between 1995 and 2000 when coca production in Colombia more than doubled in the FARC's southern strongholds of Guaviare, Caqueta and Putumayo.<sup>151</sup> By the late 1990s, Colombian government authorities estimated that the FARC received 48 per cent of its income from drugs, 36 per cent from extortion, 8 per cent from kidnapping, 6 per cent from cattle rustling, and the remainder from bank robberies.<sup>152</sup> Although exact figures of FARC income are not known, the same source estimates that in 1998 combined annual illicit profits from Colombian terrorist groups included: U.S. \$551 million from drugs,<sup>153</sup> U.S. \$311 from extortion, and U.S. \$236 from kidnappings.

Substantial financial resources combined with a growing membership base also facilitated FARC's territorial expansion from 173 municipalities in 1985 to 622 (out of a total of 1050) in 1995.<sup>154</sup> In view of FARC's stated political interest of overrunning and taking over the government, its territorial presence in large parts of the state illustrates how successful FARC was in denying the government of Colombia the traditional functions associated with a state including control over its own territory. Whether intentional or not, by providing peasants with a structure of social support, including provisions that traditionally fell under the responsibility of the acting government, FARC gained a degree of legitimacy that ultimately

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<sup>151</sup> Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society*, (New York: Open University Press, 2002), pp. 362-363.

<sup>152</sup> Alfredo Rangel Sanchez, "Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy in Colombia," *Journal of International Affairs*, 53 (Spring 2000), p. 585.

<sup>153</sup> Jeremy McDermott, Colombia correspondent for the British Broadcasting Corporation has written that the FARC earns at least 60 per cent of its income from drugs trafficking, estimated to be U.S. \$300 million. See: Jeremy McDermott, "FARC and the Paramilitaries Take Over Colombia's Drug Trade," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, July 2004.

<sup>154</sup> "Survey of Colombia," *The Economist*, 21-27 April 2001.

contributed to the political threat it posed. Detailed in the next section, a stable source of finance from the illicit narcotics trade ultimately pushed FARC into playing a more prominent role in the drugs trade, creating more revenue, and posing an even greater threat to the state – economically, environmentally, politically, and militarily.

This period of FARC evolution denotes the beginning of its transformation from an ideological movement to a movement with a “light ideological payload but offering ‘good government’.”<sup>155</sup> This strategy was further facilitated when the government agreed to establish a 13,000 square kilometre demilitarised zone (DMZ) for FARC as a geographic setting (i.e. no go zone) from which peace talks could continue. The DMZ was also a demand set by FARC’s leadership prior to releasing several dozen captured Colombian soldiers they held hostage. In addition to exerting control over territory, securing a DMZ and dictating the terms of peace talks illustrated the group’s ability to exert political pressure on the government. The granting of a DMZ confirmed that sovereignty in Colombia was not a “privilege of the state” but was shared with non-state actors.<sup>156</sup> Although this could be perceived as the group securing its political agenda, FARC actions within the DMZ – as will be discussed in the next section – also revealed that this period acted as a catalyst for the abandonment of FARC’s original political aims and motivations by a significant proportion of the group’s membership.

By finding an alternative source of revenue in the illicit narcotics trade, FARC was able to remain operational in the same immediate post-Cold War environment that witnessed the demise of many other armed left-wing movements in Latin America.

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<sup>155</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 135.

<sup>156</sup> Serres (2000), p. 213.



The group's growing engagement in the drugs trade, however, begs the question of whether FARC used "the discourse of ideological combat", while acting as "an efficient business organisation that takes advantage of the possibilities offered by the drug trade, kidnapping and extortion."<sup>157</sup> Instead of declining into an entity relegated to Colombia's violent history, FARC has "undergone a rapid adaptation to the new strategic scenario which, apart from guaranteeing its survival, has enabled it to corner the Bogota government in political and military terms."<sup>158</sup> In other words, FARC manipulated the Colombian criminal environment to strengthen its capacity for survival, and to continue to pose a serious challenge to the state. It became "an insurgent organisation with a new profile, considerable political flexibility, sophisticated military strategies, and increasing logistic autonomy."<sup>159</sup> Thus, it was not until FARC became a major player in the drug trade that it moved from being a marginal political actor, to a political actor with considerable strength.<sup>160</sup> The successful relationship with organised crime, and specifically the illicit drugs trade, allowed the group simultaneously to integrate criminal and terrorist activities into its operations, supporting political aims with criminal intent and vice-versa (point 3 on the CTC). This convergence of interests and motivations also increased and intensified the security threat posed by FARC to Colombia's neighbouring states and to the international community.

### **An Era of Convergence: 1999 - 2003**

The expansion of FARC's activities into the Colombian drug trade ultimately fostered its evolution into a hybrid organisation that was simultaneously terrorist and criminal.

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<sup>157</sup> Serres (2000), p. 191-192.

<sup>158</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 127.

<sup>159</sup> Ortiz (2002), p.130.

<sup>160</sup> Marks (2002), p. 8.

Facilitated by an environment conducive to illicit activities, the convergence between terrorism and organised crime in Colombia was a logical progression – essentially following the trajectory of a trend that began decades earlier. The overarching question, therefore, that needs to be addressed is whether FARC is an example of a group that simultaneously operates in two distinctly different realms (one political, the other criminal), or whether it has entirely transformed into an entity located at the opposite end of the CTC from which it originally began. Based on the evidence provided in the remainder of this chapter, it will be shown that by the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century FARC exemplified a group that favoured profit-maximisation.

#### *'Black Holes' and the Sustained Use of Terror Tactics*

Although FARC increased its involvement in the Colombian narcotics trade between 1999 and 2003, during this period the group leadership maintained that it was committed to a political agenda – the destruction of the government of Colombia, and the eradication of the U.S. imperialist presence in Latin America. Repeatedly denying that it was primarily interested in securing profits from its criminal enterprise, FARC's leadership consistently stated that the group existed to serve the needs of the people of Colombia.<sup>161</sup> Despite this political rhetoric, however, FARC failed to take advantage of several successive government attempts at initiating peace negotiations since 1991 and it expanded its practice of using terror tactics against the civilian population. Even when FARC seriously considered engaging in a dialogue with the authorities, historical mistrust of the government's inability to follow through on previous commitments fuelled discontent amongst many front commanders who were

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<sup>161</sup> This is confirmed in the various FARC communiqués, reproduced on its website <http://www.farcep.org>. Refer to communiqués of 12 July 2003, 22 June 2003, and 27 May 2003.



no longer willing to secure political legitimacy “at the expense of the profits from drug deals and ransoms.”<sup>162</sup>

There remain some indications that FARC still seeks to espouse a political agenda that it is seeking to fulfil through the use of terror tactics. Officially, its fundamental objective is to take power by winning over the hearts and minds of the people.<sup>163</sup> Unofficially, however, the group’s political agenda parallels that of traditional organised crime groups, which is to secure criminal activities by coercing or co-opting the authorities. Thus the focus on the use of terror tactics by the FARC at the end of the 1990s, and again after 2002, could be viewed as wide-scale intimidation used to elicit submission from the government and civil servants. More practically, the sustained use of terrorism also exacerbated the security threat posed by FARC against the economic, military, political, and societal sectors of Colombia and the wider region.

Between 1994 and 1998 peace negotiations between the government and FARC were at a standstill, in part because of questions raised about the legitimacy of the presidency of Ernesto Samper following revelations that his election campaign was financed by organised crime.<sup>164</sup> Of greater relevance for FARC, however, was the fact that Samper supported the use of state terror by the Colombian military, which led to the rise of paramilitary groups. This period witnessed the targeting of FARC-UP members, resulting in the death of an estimated 2,000 members by 1995. With no recourse other than the use of violence, this development provided an additional

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<sup>162</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff, (2001), p. vii.

<sup>163</sup> Refer to: <http://www.farcep.org>, official FARC website, accessed 22 October 2003.

<sup>164</sup> Jordan (1999), p. 82. It is believed that Samper received approximately U.S.\$6 million. Arlene Tickner, “Colombia: Chronicle of a Crisis Foretold,” *Current History*, vol. 97, no. 616 (1998), p. 64.

reason for FARC to be extremely sceptical of entering into cease-fires.<sup>165</sup> This scepticism was deflected in 1998 with the granting of the DMZ by the newly elected President Pastrana, a measure which reflected FARC's ability to force the government to submit to its demands. Even in the context of peace talks, FARC manipulated the DMZ to sharpen its terror tactics, prepare a focused assault on the government, and expand its criminal activities (this last point will be discussed in the next section).

While the FARC leadership engaged in discussions with the government, the DMZ became "a state within a state, with its own police, courts and administration."<sup>166</sup> Located at the centre of Colombia, the DMZ not only facilitated greater FARC activity in the drug trade, but it also became an exceptional military base from which the FARC launched armed attacks in other regions, while also establishing new coca plantations.<sup>167</sup> This gave FARC a considerable controlling presence in approximately 200 municipalities throughout Colombia, where the group essentially replaced the state's "provision of law, order, and social services."<sup>168</sup> FARC activities within the DMZ, but also in areas with a large FARC presence, highlighted the erosion of the state's ability to "carry out legitimising functions."<sup>169</sup> In challenging the ability of the government to fulfil its obligation of providing goods and services to its citizens (including medical services, water supplies, education, housing and transportation infrastructure), by the end of the twentieth century the FARC had considerably threatened the Colombian political sector.<sup>170</sup> In essence, the DMZ came to represent a

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<sup>165</sup> Serres (2000), p. 198.

<sup>166</sup> Radu (2000), p. 373.

<sup>167</sup> Radu (2000), p. 373.

<sup>168</sup> Alfredo Rangel Sanchez (1998), p. 580.

<sup>169</sup> Manwaring (2002), p. 14.

<sup>170</sup> John Martz, The Politics of Clientelism: Democracy and the State in Colombia, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1997, p. 7.



'black hole' (point 4 on the CTC) that proved essential to FARC's evolution into a criminal actor.

The haven provided to FARC in the shape of the demilitarised zone gave the group an opportunity to evolve strategically. Faced with limited opposition, FARC improved its ability to conduct "larger and more complex operations".<sup>171</sup> The group also conducted premeditated acts of violence, often against targets not explicitly identified as the group's enemies. For example, in comparing FARC capabilities throughout its development, Ortiz (2002) notes that in 1973 the group could only coordinate armed attacks with 50 combatants in a single operation, whereas by 1996 it was able to deploy 400 combatants on five fronts with the support of Special Forces units. By the end of the 1990s, the group consisted of 15,000 militants (rising to an estimated 20,000 by 2002<sup>172</sup>) distributed in 60 fronts located throughout the country.<sup>173</sup> For example, in August 1996 the FARC coordinated a night attack on a Colombian military base in the Putumayo district, killing 54 soldiers, wounding 17, and taking 60 hostages.<sup>174</sup> In March 1998 between 600 and 800 FARC militants destroyed an elite army unit in the southern department of Caqueta, killing 107 of 154 soldiers.<sup>175</sup> By 2000 the FARC was conducting coordinated attacks against several targets, for example in January of that year 800 militants attacked military and police positions in three towns, while simultaneously cutting off land communications between Bogota and Villavicencio.<sup>176</sup> According to Ortiz this increased capability emerged from improved command and control, the introduction of new communications

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<sup>171</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 136.

<sup>172</sup> McLean (October 2002), p. 2. Figures of FARC strength quoted by the Colombian Ministry of Defence, as quoted in Cope, (2002), p. 8, include: 5,000 in 1990, 11,930 in 1998, and 16,980 in 2002.

<sup>173</sup> Mason (2001), p. 12.

<sup>174</sup> Chalk et al (2001), p. 42.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

equipment,<sup>177</sup> the development of special units, and the support that came with employing heavy weapons (i.e. mortars, rocket launchers and surface to air missiles). All of these factors were attained as a result of access to a relatively constant flow of financing provided by the drugs trade, and the training that the FARC was able to exercise in the DMZ. These examples highlight the threat the FARC came to pose against the military sector, demonstrating that the government was unable to maintain itself against internal threats, posing a direct challenge to “the claim of exclusive right to self-government over a specified territory and its population.”<sup>178</sup>

Although the structure of FARC was established well before the group was given a DMZ, three years of relatively unobstructed existence produced organisational changes which contributed to the group’s ability to conduct sophisticated and coordinated attacks. FARC was structured along three hierarchical levels, with fronts (fighting units composed of approximately 100 members) occupying the lowest levels.<sup>179</sup> Fronts were organised into blocks, which controlled FARC operations in specific geographic areas. Finally, the highest level of FARC consisted of a general staff protected by a security force of an estimated 2,000 militants and Special Forces.<sup>180</sup> Although originally organised as a hierarchical structure, by 2000 orders and resources were no longer dictated by the general staff. Instead, decisions came to be increasingly made at the front level. Although the general staff continued to coordinate large-scale attacks, often against government targets, fronts increasingly planned and conducted small-scale attacks at their discretion. The increasing

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<sup>177</sup> An overview of FARC’s use of their financial wealth to purchase more sophisticated weapons and communications equipment is provided in “FARC’s Innovative Artillery,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, (December 1999).

<sup>178</sup> Buzan (1998), p. 49.

<sup>179</sup> Chalk (2001), pp. 27-29.

<sup>180</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 140.



independence of fronts is largely due to their control of the majority of the FARC's economic resources, which also gives fronts some role in determining how resources are divided between units, blocks, and the general staff. FARC has thus developed "a wide range of multiorganisational supporting networks."<sup>181</sup> But while FARC's organisation permitted a high degree of group flexibility, these structural changes also facilitated the emergence of internal factions. This is an extremely important factor which contributed to an increase in the number of FARC fronts which focused their efforts on criminal activities for profit. By 2000 there was nothing within the FARC structure, including a sense of shared ideology, that could stop a front or block commander from appropriating funds at their will, highlighting "a guerrilla organisation characterised by weak ideological cohesion."<sup>182</sup>

Despite advocating political objectives since its inception, FARC's engagement with criminal activities – as discussed in the next section - has marginalized the group from the Colombian political arena. The group has therefore lost any serious interest in becoming involved in the political process because of its distraction by criminal activities and because the public perception of FARC's involvement in the drugs trade began to undermine the legitimacy it had previously enjoyed. In spite of sporadically appearing willing to enter into peace talks, the fact that FARC was increasingly equated with illicit narcotics operations became a symptom of the group's "gradual degeneration."<sup>183</sup> The Colombian government's perception that FARC had become preoccupied with criminality obstructed attempts to secure peace negotiations, and eventually caused the government to lose interest in conducting negotiations with the group. Thus in February 2002, after FARC was held responsible for the hijacking of

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<sup>181</sup> Chalk et al, (2001), p. 37.

<sup>182</sup> Ortiz (2002), p.140.

<sup>183</sup> Serres (2000), p. 198.

an Avianca flight carrying a Colombian senator amongst other passengers, President Pastrana ordered the Colombian armed forces to enter the FARC DMZ and reassert government control.<sup>184</sup> The successful military repossession of the DMZ was possible through the U.S. initiated Plan Colombia.<sup>185</sup> Primarily focused on counter-narcotics and specifically dislodging FARC, through Plan Colombia the U.S. injected hundreds of millions of dollars into Colombia to professionalise the military, provide new military equipment, and train Colombian authorities in the extensive use of surveillance and biological warfare agents (to be used against coca crops).<sup>186</sup> This concerted government backlash against FARC continued after the May 2003 election of President Avaro Uribe on a platform<sup>187</sup> of continuing the military campaign against terrorism. By increasing the Colombian military budget from two per cent to three per cent of gross domestic product, Uribe employed more police and established groups of peasant forces.<sup>188</sup> As a result, by the end of 2003 fewer than 70 municipalities, as opposed to over 150 in the previous year, were without a police presence.<sup>189</sup>

Internal fractures, a growing reliance on organised crime, and the avoidance of legitimate forms of political participation all appeared to accommodate the increased use of terror perpetrated against an expanding list of targets. Government attempts to reassert greater control, with support from the U.S., merely unleashed a wave of

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<sup>184</sup> Testimony of Asa Hutchinson, Drug Enforcement Agency Administrator, before the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, (24 April 2002), <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02042403.htm>, accessed on 05 May 2003.

<sup>185</sup> In addition to providing anti-narcotics aid, the main driving force of Plan Colombia was to debilitate the FARC. See: Rochlin (2003).

<sup>186</sup> Rochlin (2003), pp. 155-157.

<sup>187</sup> Uribe's plan, referred to as his policy of defence and democratic security, was based on four aims: to consolidate state control over terrorism; to protect the population; to eliminate the illicit drugs trade; and, to ensure the efficiency and transparency of contracts and government operations. See: Jeremy McDermott, "Uribe Gains the Upper Hand in Colombia's Guerrilla War," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, December 2003, <http://www.janes.com> (downloaded 20 December 2003).

<sup>188</sup> Ibid.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.



terrorism in Colombia that expanded from the targeting of government forces in rural areas and economic targets<sup>190</sup> (i.e. oil pipelines<sup>191</sup> and electricity pylons), to the targeting of urban centres and directed bombing campaigns against the civilian population. As has occurred in the past, FARC responded to its new operational environment by readjusting its tactics. The absence of a DMZ from which large military campaigns could be organised forced the group to prioritise the use of small units to conduct quick and focused attacks, and then retreat into FARC-controlled areas of jungle and mountain strongholds.<sup>192</sup> For example, in 2002 and 2003 bombs were detonated at restaurants and nightclubs in urban centres, reflected in the examples noted in Table 5.1.<sup>193</sup> FARC attacks against entire villages and public places were indicative of its strategy to “instil fear in the targeted population to either support the group or else suffer horrific consequences.”<sup>194</sup> These tactics contradict FARC claims that it was fighting on behalf of the Colombian people, because most of its victims were neither rich, nor part of the ‘corrupt oligarchy’ the group officially sought to overthrow.<sup>195</sup> The extent of FARC’s interest in targeting civilians was also noted by Human Rights Watch, which criticised the group in 2000 for the documented murder of 496 civilians.<sup>196</sup> In addition to this, FARC has intensified its ‘hit and run’ tactics against state targets (see Table 5.2 for examples) – an ability attained as a result of the reorganisation of the group’s structure into small units.

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<sup>190</sup> Between January and May 2002, the FARC bombed 170 electricity pylons, and have also damaged several reservoirs and water mains. Jeremy McDermott, “FARC Widens Terrorist Targets,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, (May 2002), <http://www.janes.com>, accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>191</sup> FARC targeting of oil pipelines has caused considerable environmental damage. Between 1986 and 2001 an estimated 2.6 million barrels of oil was spilled in Colombia as a result of FARC-bombings – 11 times more than the Alaskan Exxon Valdez disaster. *New York Times*, 16 August 2001.

<sup>192</sup> McDermott (December 2003).

<sup>193</sup> Jeremy McDermott, “FARC Widens Terrorist Targets,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, (May 2002), <http://www.janes.com>, accessed 20 April 2002.

<sup>194</sup> Rochlin (2003), p. 138.

<sup>195</sup> McDermott (May 2002).

<sup>196</sup> Rochlin (2003), p. 138.

**Table 5.1: Civilian Targets<sup>197</sup>**

<u>2002</u>	
May	Mortar bomb explodes at a church in Choco province (117 killed)
August	Mortar fired at President Alvaro Uribe's swearing in ceremony at the presidential palace in Bogotá (21 killed)
October	Bicycle bomb detonated close to a police station in a Bogotá neighbourhood (2 killed, 36 injured)
December	Car bomb detonated in the car park of a Bogotá supermarket (69 injured)
<u>2003</u>	
February	Car bomb detonated at the exclusive El Nogal club in Bogotá (36 killed, 160 injured)
March	Vehicle bomb detonated in a car park of a shopping centre in Cúcuta (13 killed, 70 injured)
August	Bomb detonated in a ferry in Meta province, exploded as boat docked on a busy quay (5 killed, 40 injured)
September	Two bombs exploded simultaneously in Pasto near office buildings (2 killed) Bomb strapped to a horse detonated in a crowded market in the north-eastern Colombian town of Chita (8 killed, 20 injured) Motorcycle bomb detonated outside nightclub in Florencia as people were leaving (11 killed, 46 injured)
October	Car bomb detonated in central Bogotá's commercial area (6 killed, 12 injured) Motorcycle bomb detonated by remote control in a busy district of south Bogotá (10 killed, 50 injured)
November	Bombs detonated in two bars within seconds of one another on the same night in Bogotá (1 killed, 72 injured)

**Table 5.2: State Targets (Military and Political)**

<u>2002</u>	
October	Grenade thrown at a truck carrying policemen (1 killed, 28 injured)
November	Three mortar rounds fired at the headquarters of the Prosecutor General's office (2 injured)
December	Briefcase bomb exploded in Hotel Tequendama, a favourite gathering place for congressmen (23 injured)
<u>2003</u>	
January	Vehicle bomb exploded in car park next to the Prosecutor General's office in Medellin (5 killed, over 40 injured) Car bomb detonated in Arauca province as a military patrol was passing (7 killed)

<sup>197</sup> These examples were compiled from the Jane's Terrorism Watch Report, and from the terrorism database at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University.



February	Bomb detonated in a house in southern Colombia as security forces responded to a call (17 killed, 35 injured)
October	Two local mayors assassinated in Cauca department In the run-up to regional elections, 25 candidates are assassinated – directly contributing to the withdrawal of 160 others

FARC's sustained interest in conducting terror tactics as a way to maintain influence over the people and government of Colombia confirms the group's terrorist nature. Over the years the group has increased its dependence on the use of premeditated violent acts, which created fear within society in general, and within certain levels of government more specifically (i.e. local government). This has been accomplished by carefully selected targeting, often dictated by the level of attention and influence the FARC sought to attract. The strategy that dictates FARC operations is

designed to render parts of the country ungovernable and instil terror in the cities. Attacks on the national infrastructure are intended to damage the government's exchequer and drain funds available to fight the war, as well as sap the urban populations will to support the struggle against insurgency. This strategy has also shown an increasing disregard for civilian casualties and an adoption of the paramilitary technique of targeted massacres.<sup>198</sup>

Sentiments of fear associated with FARC terror tactics have subsequently turned the group into an entity capable of intimidating and coercing a targeted audience into acting according to FARC demands. Most obviously at the local level (i.e. through forcing peasant support), the group has also successfully influenced political behaviour. For example, although Colombia holds regular democratic elections, illicit armed groups including FARC commonly assassinate leaders, candidates and elected politicians. Between 1989 and 1999 the group murdered 138 mayors and 569 members of parliament, deputies and city council, along with 174 public officials in

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<sup>198</sup> "Rebels Kill Six Police," Jane's Terrorism Watch Report, 02 December 2003, <http://www.janes.com> (downloaded 20 December 2003).

other positions.<sup>199</sup> This trend continued in 2002 when FARC specifically demanded the resignation of all departmental, municipal and village officials in the run-up to the elections. As a result of the failure of state power to react to FARC threats against the political participants, over 200 officials “heeded these threats.”<sup>200</sup> Although these attacks produced political results, it could also be argued that the driving motivation behind them was to ease FARC’s ability to conduct criminal activities.

Even though FARC has not destroyed its opposition – the government of Colombia – it has outlived ten administrations which have come to power since its inception. It is primarily FARC’s ability to contribute to breaking the political will of governments unable to secure political legitimacy, state sovereignty, or social stability that is largely responsible for the group’s longevity. The failure of successive governments to significantly undermine or disrupt FARC further contributes to the group’s relative success.

### *FARC as a Criminal Organisation*

Although FARC engages in extortion and kidnapping<sup>201</sup> operations, the group’s main criminal activities are focused on the drug trade. FARC expanded its involvement in the drug trade significantly after 1998 when coca and opium cultivation in Colombia multiplied.<sup>202</sup> Regardless of the group’s political rhetoric, evidence of FARC’s direct involvement in illicit narcotics processing and trafficking reflects its transformation

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<sup>199</sup> Manwaring, (2002), p. 13.

<sup>200</sup> John A. Cope, “Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy,” *Strategic*, No. 94 (October 2002), p. 3.

<sup>201</sup> According to the non-governmental organisation, Pais Libre Foundation, in 2002 alone the FARC were responsible for committing 778 abductions. McDermott, (January 2002).

<sup>202</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff, (2001), p. 16. Coca cultivation increased primarily along the Ecuadorian and Peruvian borders in the departments of Putumayo and Caqueta, and in the northern departments of Bolivar, Norte de Santander and Guaviare. Opium poppy cultivation, on the other hand, increased on the eastern side of the Central Cordillera Mountains in the departments of Cauca, Huila and Tolima.



into a traditionally defined organised crime group that uses terror tactics for operational purposes. FARC has evolved beyond the operational use of criminal activities as a source of financing, to conducting terrorist operations in support of their criminal agenda.

Allegations of the group's direct interest in focusing on criminal enterprises first appeared in 1996 when FARC was accused of pressuring remnants of the Cali cartel to abandon between seven and ten cocaine processing laboratories in Caqueta, and five to six tons of stored cocaine.<sup>203</sup> Caqueta's status as a long-time FARC stronghold ensured that considerable attention was paid to this allegation, which was strengthened after the leading Colombian current affairs magazine, *Semana*, published an investigation in 2000 about the drug activities of the FARC's 16<sup>th</sup> Front, operating from the Guainia department between 1996 and 1998. According to *Semana*, this front was specifically used to traffic narcotics, raising an estimated U.S. \$15 million within the reported two-year period.<sup>204</sup> Despite these early assertions, it was not until after 1999 that there was significant documented evidence of FARC's preoccupation with the drugs trade. This involvement in narcotics has blurred the underlying aims and motivations of the group to the extent that "it is arguable that financial gain has become the overriding motivation, rather than simply a means to support a political agenda."<sup>205</sup>

One of the first indications that FARC was beginning to exhibit a direct interest in conducting crime for profit was revealed in the aftermath of a May 1999 drug raid conducted by the Colombian authorities. The raid resulted in the death of the group's

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<sup>203</sup> Lee (2002), pp. 543-544.

<sup>204</sup> "Se Busca," *Semana* (04 September 2000), pp. 40-42.

<sup>205</sup> Dishman, (2001), pp. 50-51.

financial chief, José Prieto, and revealed a detailed FARC plan to use U.S. \$3 million from cocaine sales to purchase assault rifles.<sup>206</sup> Despite indicating a sustained interest in amassing weapons to continue using terror tactics, this case proved that FARC was directly involved in drug trafficking – a claim that the group’s leadership consistently refuted – and amassing significant profits. The extent to which the group was involved in the drug trade was further reflected in April 2000 allegations that FARC ordered peasants in Caqueta to grow coca, and subsequently forced them to sell their yield to a FARC-controlled monopoly.<sup>207</sup> Instead of forwarding the cultivated coca to laboratories traditionally run by criminal organisations (as had been done in the past), trends that developed throughout 2000 strongly indicated that FARC secured the skills needed to manage their own laboratories to process cocaine base.<sup>208</sup> Furthermore, in November 2000 a FARC member was arrested in Mexico following evidence that he was trading cocaine to the Mexican Tijuana cartel.<sup>209</sup> The implication of this was that FARC was involved in international aspects of the trade, and thus could “represent [a] self-contained or vertical cartel engaged in all aspects of cultivation, production and sales.”<sup>210</sup> Its involvement in the drugs trade no longer limited to securing territory on behalf of criminal groups, by 2000 it was apparent that FARC endeavoured to play a direct role in the international drug trade, making the group comparable to any traditional drug mafia.

The intensified involvement of FARC in the drugs trade directly resulted in rising annual profits. By 2000 Interpol officials estimated that FARC made U.S. \$500

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<sup>206</sup> “Colombia in the Long Shadow of War,” *The Economist*, (17 July 1999), p. 31.

<sup>207</sup> Refer to McDermott (2000).

<sup>208</sup> Lee (2002), p. 544.

<sup>209</sup> *Revista Cambio*, 3-20 November 2000, <http://www.cambio.com.co/20001113/paisl.html> (downloaded 17 January 2001).

<sup>210</sup> Rochlin (2003), pp. 135-136.



million from the drugs trade annually,<sup>211</sup> and U.S. estimates placed annual FARC drug revenues at U.S. \$400 million.<sup>212</sup> In fact, the group's financial reliance on drug production and distribution replaced their previous dependence on extortion and kidnapping operations, illustrated by estimates that 50 to 65 per cent of all FARC fronts were financed from drug related activities by the end of 2000.<sup>213</sup> Colombian authorities also released estimates at this time indicating that the majority of FARC income was accrued from narcotics related activities.<sup>214</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff have also concluded that, in most of these cases, FARC attained direct ownership in the production and distribution of illicit narcotics. This finding is supported by evidence collected by Colombian authorities of FARC involvement in "almost every aspect of the international drug trade."<sup>215</sup> The Spanish authorities also revealed evidence that, since 2000, FARC was directly involved in buying and selling coca products.<sup>216</sup> This is especially important because it highlights the international nature of the drugs trade, and suggests that FARC engaged in alliances with international criminal organisations in order to move cocaine through the global cocaine market (i.e. as it had done with ROC, as described in Chapter Four). Alliances between organised crime groups has become a common tactic used to gain access to new markets.

Although the trajectory of FARC activities throughout the 1990s facilitated their growing involvement in the drugs trade, access to a DMZ acted as an important catalyst for the group to integrate traditional criminal interests into its remit. This de facto 'state within a state' facilitated the emergence of the FARC as the leading

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<sup>211</sup> Mutschke (2000).

<sup>212</sup> Mason (2001), p. 12.

<sup>213</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 5.

<sup>214</sup> Lee (2002), p. 546.

<sup>215</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 5, as quoted from Margarita Martinez, "Rebel Leader Faces Drug Arrest," *Washington Post*, 10 April 2001.

<sup>216</sup> Steinitz (2002), p. 14.

middleman in southern Colombia for narcotics trafficking operations, allowing them to establish control over the purchasing of coca paste and cocaine base from growers to supply cocaine-producing laboratories. The French independent think-tank, Geopolitical Drug Observer thus concluded in their 1999 Annual Report that as a result of manipulating the DMZ, “the FARC seemed to have reached a point of no return on the road to criminalizing their organisation.”<sup>217</sup> Furthermore, at the end of 2000, Interpol announced that approximately 61 per cent of FARC’s operational area was used for the cultivation and processing of cocaine,<sup>218</sup> suggesting that the group was more interested in dominating all aspects of the Colombian and international drug trade (i.e. cultivation, processing and trafficking) than in reaching a political victory over the Government.

Evidence of direct FARC involvement in the drugs trade increased after 2001. For example, the U.S. government passed a federal indictment against three members of the 16<sup>th</sup> Front, including Front Commander Tomas Molina Caracas, for trafficking narcotics along the Venezuelan border and for subsequently selling them to international traffickers responsible for transporting illicit shipments to Brazil, Mexico, Paraguay, Spain, Suriname and the U.S.<sup>219</sup> These findings also provided evidence implicating FARC’s 1<sup>st</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 10<sup>th</sup>, 39<sup>th</sup>, and 44<sup>th</sup> Fronts in trafficking cocaine to the border regions and selling to international traffickers in exchange for money, weapons and other equipment.<sup>220</sup> Additional evidence from the Colombian Armed

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<sup>217</sup> “The World Geopolitics of Drugs, 1998/1999: Annual Report,” (April 2000), p. 143, <http://www.ogd.org>.

<sup>218</sup> Mutschke, (2000). This conclusion was also reflected in Buscaglia and Ratliff, (2001), p. 19, who noted that “although the guerrillas control a small portion of Colombian territory, operations linked to guerrillas working drug production and distribution occur in 50 to 60 per cent of the country.”

<sup>219</sup> Hutchinson (2002).

<sup>220</sup> Ibid.



Forces reveals that 32 of the group's 61 fronts are directly linked to illicit drugs.<sup>221</sup> Furthermore, with the support of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Office in Bogotá, the Colombian National Police were able to seize several tons of cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base laboratories, along with documentation revealing that FARC members "personally sold cocaine base to laboratory operators"<sup>222</sup> in the former FARC demilitarised zone in March 2002. After the breakdown of peace talks in February 2002 and the reassertion of Colombian military control over the DMZ, the Colombian army reported intercepting FARC messages of efforts to move large amounts of stored cocaine to the Pacific coast.<sup>223</sup> By 2003, government operations directed against the FARC regularly resulted in the discovery of FARC-controlled drugs operations. For example, in August 2003, raids conducted by the armed forces against the group uncovered 27 car bombs, and four FARC cocaine-processing laboratories.<sup>224</sup>

In addition to these cases, there have also been reports that FARC intensified its operation of cocaine laboratories, which have subsequently been used to export cocaine to Brazil and Mexico.<sup>225</sup> FARC activity has also been noted in neighbouring countries, with evidence revealing, for example, that the group has spread coca-processing activities to Panama and Venezuela, including the Darien Province border region.<sup>226</sup> Darien Province is believed to have been used for conducting drug transshipments from Colombia, and as a transshipment point for weapons smuggled into

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<sup>221</sup> Chalk et al, (2001), p. 33.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

<sup>223</sup> Steinitz (2002), p. 14.

<sup>224</sup> "Colombia Raids Uncover 27 Bombs," Jane's Terrorism Watch Report, 12 August 2003.

<sup>225</sup> Lee (2002), pp. 541-542.

<sup>226</sup> Hutchinson, (2002), and Luz E. Nagle, "Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security," U.S. Army College, Carlisle Barracks, Strategic Studies Institute Working Paper (December 2002), p. 37.

Colombia. Suriname, on the other hand, is also used as a FARC transshipment point for drugs to the European market.<sup>227</sup>

After extending its internal organisational capacity to encompass all aspects of the illicit narcotics trade, FARC continued to expand its criminal ties to external organised crime groups. This reflects FARC's intention to find ways to increase its hold over drug operations in Colombia. Since 2000, for example, the 16<sup>th</sup> Front cooperated with Brazilian-based drug trafficker Luis Fernando Da Costa (Fernandinho Beira-Mar). Although this alliance was primarily based on drugs for cash transactions, it also included drugs-for-arms.<sup>228</sup> The 16<sup>th</sup> Front is believed to have controlled an entire 'cocaine complex' in Guainia and Vichada, which it is alleged to have sold to the Brazilian Beira-Mar. Reports assert that the 16<sup>th</sup> Front was paid U.S. \$10 million per month, to export an estimated 20-25 tons of cocaine per month.<sup>229</sup> Various FARC Fronts have also established alliances with the Tijuana cartel of Mexico,<sup>230</sup> the Mexican Arellano Felix gang,<sup>231</sup> Russian criminal organisations,<sup>232</sup> Ukrainian organised crime, Croatian and Jordanian criminal groups,<sup>233</sup> and groups based in neighbouring countries. The threat posed by FARC through its criminal activities and associations is transnational in nature, revealing the regional and international implications of a security threat often rhetorically confined to Colombia.

FARC has also provided international terrorist groups based in the Triborder area with criminal services. This is an important development given that FARC is primarily

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<sup>227</sup> Nagle (2002), p. 38.

<sup>228</sup> "Se Busca," *Semana*, (04 September 2000), pp. 40-42.

<sup>229</sup> Lee (2002), p. 545.

<sup>230</sup> Steinitz (2002), p. 12.

<sup>231</sup> Lee (2002), p. 545.

<sup>232</sup> Davids (2002), p. 25.

<sup>233</sup> Ehrenfeld (2003), p. 166.



regarded as a terrorist group – thus indicating, once again, its proclivity for criminality. For example, the group has been implicated in providing false passports to Hizballah – a group with which it shares no ideological association - since the late 1990s, and is believed to have increased its involvement in providing Colombian passports and identities to other militant Islamic groups.<sup>234</sup> Furthermore, as a result of intensifying its engagement with crime, FARC has established a money-laundering network that extends throughout Colombia and beyond, into countries including Panama. Often utilising the ‘black market peso exchange system’, this illicit financial network has subsequently been transferred into a criminal service offered by FARC to other criminal and terrorist organisations.

In many ways the expansion of FARC into securing its role throughout the illicit narcotics supply chain is an example of a successful illicit group taking advantage of its operational environment. FARC initially merely exploited an opportunity presented to them to fill a lucrative vacuum caused by the fall of the Cali and Medellin cartels. However, the group’s very interest in expanding its operations into the narcotics trade on such a large scale is proof that the group’s original motivations were being transformed. The expansion of FARC’s criminal interests, from merely obtaining revenue from protection fees and taxes to profiting from refining, trafficking and the sale of illicit narcotics,<sup>235</sup> strongly suggests that their political goals were set aside in the interest of criminal advancement. This argument is strengthened when FARC’s simultaneous expansion into the growing heroin market is considered. In 2000 the group began to produce heroin in southwestern Colombia, cornering a

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<sup>234</sup> Nagle (2002), pp. 32-38.

<sup>235</sup> Lee (2002), p. 541.

relatively significant share of the U.S. east-coast heroin market.<sup>236</sup> As with Colombian cocaine cultivation, there is now a close correlation between poppy cultivation and areas under FARC control. This development begs the question: why is FARC seeking control over new criminal markets and products if it is solely interested in securing enough profit to sustain its group and conduct operations in support of its political goals?

Notwithstanding persistent FARC rhetoric that it is not interested in crime as an enterprise, but seeks political change, the group's actions illustrate that FARC's ideological commitment and political aims are deteriorating. As the group became increasingly entrenched in the drug trade from the mid-1990s, it was evident that the FARC began to replace Marxism-Leninism with a "less rigid ideological package, labelled as 'Bolivarian'," essentially combining Colombian nationalism with left-wing ideas.<sup>237</sup> This limited ideological focus was likely driven by a sense of pragmatism within FARC's leadership, realising – after three decades of operations – that their chances of seizing the Colombian state were small. As a result the group began to focus on seizing political and territorial power without engaging in an electoral process.<sup>238</sup> By the end of the 1990s, this dynamic changed the group's political agenda, and eventually contributed to transforming the nature of FARC's competition with the state.<sup>239</sup> The group began to focus, once again, on the use of military force, including the use of torture, assassination, kidnapping and other forms of violence and intimidation, instead of ideological appeal, in order to attain and hold power over

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<sup>236</sup> Steinitz (2002), p.10.

<sup>237</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 130.

<sup>238</sup> Serres (2000), p. 203.

<sup>239</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 130.



Colombian territory.<sup>240</sup> Control over territory, especially at the municipal level, was subsequently used by FARC to demonstrate its ability to provide a “viable and credible alternative” form of government that would be able to provide social services to the population.<sup>241</sup> Despite increasingly relying on intimidating the government and public, FARC’s leadership has been seeking to create a parallel state by deserting “the discourse of revolution and socialist order and to concentrate its rhetoric on more modest claims of regional domination.”<sup>242</sup> In political terms the expansion of FARC aims from a municipal to regional level initially appears to reflect a group growing in power. More realistically, however, FARC’s shift to seeking a regional presence more accurately reflects its desire to assert direct control over drug cultivation and trafficking operations. Control over cross-border territory – in addition to territorial control within Colombia – has subsequently helped facilitate FARC’s transition into an organisation with criminal intent. As discussed in the previous section, interest in expanding territorial control was intensified when FARC was given its DMZ – which was used “as a base for kidnapping, drug trafficking, and troop training.”<sup>243</sup>

The use of its DMZ as a base and its focus on more modest political objectives from 1999 gave the appearance that FARC became more pervasive throughout Colombia. As Serres (2000) notes: “The guerrilla movement has descended from ideology to pragmatism, from redemptionism to *realpolitik*. Paradoxically, that renders it more dangerous and destabilising.”<sup>244</sup> The group’s ability to garner support (increasingly dependent on the use of force) at the local level, especially in the coca-growing areas

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<sup>240</sup> Serge F. Kovalski, “Rebel Movement on the Rise of Colombian Guerrillas Use Military Force, Not Ideology to Hold Power,” The Washington Post, 5 February 1999. See also Serres, (2000), pp. 201-202.

<sup>241</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 131.

<sup>242</sup> Serres (2000), pp. 201-202.

<sup>243</sup> McLean (2002), p. 11.

<sup>244</sup> Serres (2000), p. 202.

of the country, provided the group with additional strength. The often-violent penetration of power in communities<sup>245</sup> by FARC militants has translated into political influence at the national level to such an extent that it is believed that the group, both directly and indirectly (i.e. through extortion, kidnapping and revolutionary taxation) “ensures the election of candidates who have made alliances with it; orientates administrative and political decisions by menacing the incumbents, practically decides the way the budget is going to be spent.”<sup>246</sup> As a terrorist group, the primary FARC goal has been to replace the government by attaining direct control. Unable to do so through the use of terror tactics in the past, the combination of the group’s newly acquired financial influence and the known intent to use violence has given FARC the additional ability to influence the political realm through the use of corruption.

As discussed in Chapter One, the use of corruption and intimidation is an important survival technique employed by criminal organisations to ensure that the government does not significantly interfere in the conduct of criminal activities. FARC involvement in these activities thus reveals that it was no longer solely interested in directly overtaking the state, but like other criminal organisations, it used these tools to obtain indirect political influence which could help to secure the survival of the organisation itself and its criminal operations. In seeking to secure its drug operations in rural municipalities, in June 2002 FARC demanded the resignation of all mayors and public officials<sup>247</sup> By the end of the year, 399 mayors resigned, almost 300 relocated to urban centres in the interest of greater security, and 12 mayors were

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<sup>245</sup> In 2000, for example, the FARC was present in 622 of 1,071 Colombian municipalities. Serres, (2000), p. 203.

<sup>246</sup> Serres (2000), pp. 202-203.

<sup>247</sup> T. Roule and M. Salak, “FARC and Colombia’s Intermeshing Economies,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, (January 2003), <http://www.janes.com> (accessed 20 January 2003).



assassinated.<sup>248</sup> Public officials who remained in FARC-controlled areas were faced with rising pressure either to “collude with FARC drug operations, or face death or physical harm.”<sup>249</sup> The group also instigated corruption and intimidation at higher levels of government, including the office of President. There is no substantiated evidence proving that FARC has funded presidential candidates, but there has been a precedent of organised crime funding presidential candidates sympathetic to the narcotics trade since 1982.<sup>250</sup> Although this use of corruption and intimidation is characteristic of organised crime tactics, as discussed in the case of ROC, it also illustrates an active criminal environment. Equally important is the fact that corruption and violent intimidation pose a threat to political security because they directly undermine the legitimacy of political institutions, such as law enforcement, the judiciary, and the authority of the executive.

Furthermore, as indicated in the previous section, the evolved FARC structure has also played a role in facilitating the group’s engagement with organised crime. Today, FARC operates as a “highly decentralised network. Its fronts operate separately and seem to have several different ‘business-plans’ A new front moves into territory with little effort given to making converts. The goal is finding ways to make money.”<sup>251</sup> Indictments and prosecutions against FARC members have, in fact, uncovered evidence indicating that the group’s funding cycle “resembles the methods of traditional criminal organisations, rather than a terrorist network.”<sup>252</sup> Major profits

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<sup>248</sup> Ibid.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid.

<sup>250</sup> Jordan (1999), pp. 158-159. One of the most cited examples surrounds the 1994 election campaign of Ernesto Samper and allegations that drug cartels provided U.S. \$6 million to help him achieve electoral victory. Arlene Tickner, “Colombia: Chronicle of a Crisis Foretold,” *Current History*, vol. 97, no. 616 (1998), p. 64.

<sup>251</sup> McLean (2002), p. 130.

<sup>252</sup> Roule and Salak (January 2003).

from the narcotics trade and kidnap-for-ransom operations forced FARC to become increasingly well versed at money laundering by integrating and investing profits in the Colombian economy. This was often completed through the establishment of front companies, including casinos, holiday resorts, transportation companies and farms. For example, a high-ranking FARC official arrested in January 2000 controlled funds over U.S. \$12 million, including 14 luxury hotels with casinos.<sup>253</sup>

The financial benefits accrued by FARC from criminal enterprise, combined with its expanding ability to launder illicit funds and re-invest in the legitimate economy, has a potentially significant impact on Colombia's economic security if it continues to grow. A large black economy interferes with national economic policy and reduces the amount of money available for the state to collect through taxation. This in turn has a direct impact on the effectiveness of state-supported welfare programmes. FARC's ability to accrue a strong financial position, to the detriment of Colombia's national economy, has subsequently allowed FARC to provide public goods – including healthcare, education and a crude judicial system – which the state has been unable to provide. This has especially been the case in agrarian regions of the country, “where the state is not present” and where it is relatively easy for the FARC to bring order and social regulation because the population is often “exploited and live under high levels of insecurity.”<sup>254</sup> The sentiment that municipal authorities are often corrupt and local authorities incompetent in providing public services helps explain why the public interacts with FARC, which is known to provide a range of public services.<sup>255</sup> The group has therefore been “legitimising their occupation by

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<sup>253</sup> Ibid.

<sup>254</sup> Serres (2000), p. 208.

<sup>255</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 9, quoting the results of surveys conducted in the regions of Putumayo, Caqueta, northern Bolivar, and Norte de Santander, which showed that over 90% of the



institutionalising their presence.”<sup>256</sup> Worth noting, however, is that the areas that FARC provides social services are the same areas where drug cultivation and production are high, suggesting that FARC’s ability to maintain authority was no longer a by-product of its political agenda, but a by-product of the fear it imposed on the peasants responsible for farming coca.

The adaptive structure of FARC combined with its focus on making money, and supporting peasants in drug-producing areas, has also helped it to attract larger numbers of recruits, with members increasingly appearing to join for monetary benefit, as opposed to ideological fulfilment. By 1998 the group was in a financial position to pay its recruits, on average, three times more than the Colombian army paid theirs.<sup>257</sup> This contributed to rising membership numbers from an estimated 7,000 active members in 60 fronts in 1995, to over 15,000 in more than 70 fronts in 2000.<sup>258</sup> This situation altered the combat profile of FARC from a membership primarily composed of altruistic peasants and students, to a membership consisting of “unemployed peasants, ostentatiously showing urban consumer goods as status symbols.”<sup>259</sup>

FARC involvement in organised criminal activities and its organisational dynamics combined to create a group that is a criminal organisation according to the definition

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population though municipal authorities were corrupt and over 60% believed local authorities were incompetent in providing public services. Of those surveyed, approximately 60% used or knew somebody who used informal judicial system run by the FARC, 35% participated in FARC-run public works, and almost 70% admitted to using FARC-operated health services.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid.

<sup>257</sup> Dishman (2000), p. 52; and Mark Falcoff, “Colombia: the problem that will not go away,” AEI Latin American Outlook, (March 2000), p. 1, <http://www.aei.org/lao/lao11476.htm> (accessed 08 April 2002).

<sup>258</sup> Falcoff (2000), p. 1.

<sup>259</sup> Oscar Menjivar, “The Transformation of Low Intensity Conflict in Latin America,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, vol. 10, no. 1 (Spring 2001), p. 80.

provided in Chapter One. To begin with FARC incorporates all five mandatory criteria. First, it consists of a group of over three people. Second, based on its long history and continued operations, FARC has been gathered for both a prolonged and indefinite period of time. Third, FARC members have been suspected, and convicted, of committing criminal offences. Fourth, group objectives include the pursuit of both power and profit; and fifth, FARC relies on the threat and/or use of violence in order to sustain its criminal activities. In addition to these mandatory criteria, FARC also fulfils many of optional criteria. For example, the group is engaged in money laundering and international operations; certain fronts are tasked with specific assignments; and the group exerts influence on both the public and private sector – through the use of corruption and intimidation.<sup>260</sup> In this context there is very little difference between contemporary FARC dynamics and the operations of Russian Organised Crime as discussed in Chapter Four – the FARC and ROC mirror one another on opposite ends of the CTC. Thus regardless of the group’s “egalitarian rhetoric, the group’s actions suggest calculated criminal neoliberalism.”<sup>261</sup>

### **Conclusion: Moving Beyond Convergence, FARC as a Criminal Organisation**

Based on the arguments presented in this chapter, it is evident that FARC has responded to the disintegration of Marxist ideology in the post-Cold War environment by developing a dual terrorist and criminal capability to ensure its survival, a capability that was eventually overtaken by a proclivity towards crime. FARC has successfully adapted to its changing environment – both domestic and international - by taking advantage of new criminal opportunities, the failure of the Colombian government to assert control over all its territory, and by utilising the advantages of

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<sup>260</sup> An example of this is provided on page 273.

<sup>261</sup> Rochlin (2003), p. 145.



networks in daily operations. The group has learned to shift its operational dynamics from large centrally controlled forces, to decentralised cells able to react to any change in environmental (i.e. political, military) conditions. This apparent desire to survive has transformed a group once exclusively focused on an ideological struggle into a “combination of drug crime, rural anarchism, and political sensitivity by the governing classes.”<sup>262</sup> This combination of threats has posed a direct challenge to the state and to internal stability, both of which have been exacerbated by the inability of the FARC leadership to claim “firm control over their own far-flung fronts, some of which appear more as criminal bands operating as FARC franchises rather than as disciplined units in an insurgent army.”<sup>263</sup> Although this may lead to the conclusion that FARC, as a group, has considerably weakened, the group, in fact, continues to operate as a relatively strong – albeit disparate – entity. As a FARC member indicated in an interview, “We have seen 10 presidents come and go. We will strike them when the conditions suit us.”<sup>264</sup>

According to Ortiz (2002), FARC’s ability to continue operating emerges from its ability to manipulate its environment to the point that it was ultimately able to establish autonomy on three levels: complete self-financing; independent capacity for weapons acquisition; and the ability to use new relationships to access technology and training needed to increase the sophistication of its attacks.<sup>265</sup> It is within these capabilities that the criminal nature of FARC is reflected. For example, according to Ortiz (2002) only 15 per cent of FARC income is used to conduct operations, leaving 85 per cent of the group’s annual income to be used towards the acquisition of

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<sup>262</sup> McCaffrey (2002), p.28.

<sup>263</sup> McLean (2002), p. 7.

<sup>264</sup> Jeremy McDermott, “Rebels Bide Their Time,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, <http://www.janes.com>, accessed 24 December 2003.

<sup>265</sup> Ortiz (2002), pp. 137-141.

supplies and invested in the licit economy through a wide FARC money-laundering network. FARC investments could subsequently be used to penetrate the legitimate political system – as in the case of ROC – or to conduct a more concerted terror campaign to apply constant pressure on the government. In neither case does this revenue appear to be exclusively utilised in support of the group’s advocated political agenda. As Rochlin (2003) argued: “The FARC has claimed to be ideologically committed to its own brand of socialism, but the group’s power is largely military, rather than political or ideological, and its military power is rooted in its participation in the booming capitalist enterprise of narco-trafficking.”<sup>266</sup>

Based on this disparity between rhetorical political claims and group actions, FARC’s hybrid nature increasingly appears to lean towards organised crime rather than traditional terrorism. The political realm of the group is limited to the perception that, because violence is historically commonplace in Colombia, “the country’s guerrillas have long since become a major pillar in the establishment they want to overthrow.”<sup>267</sup> This directly contradicts any notion of revolutionary intent, as FARC has come to depend on the perpetuation of the prevailing political system. Furthermore, because Colombia has a “constitutional democracy, non-authoritarian regime, free elections, and free press, there is no clear political dimension to the conflict”<sup>268</sup> and subsequently no reason to believe “that poverty, inequality, and political exclusion should produce stronger forms of violence in Colombia than they tend to produce in other Latin American countries – which sometimes have more serious social problems than Colombia.”<sup>269</sup> The true commitments of FARC’s

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<sup>266</sup> Rochlin (2003), p. 100.

<sup>267</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), pp. 2-3.

<sup>268</sup> Ceballos and Martin (2001), p. 90.

<sup>269</sup> Ceballos and Martin (2001), p. 90.



political aims, therefore, are naturally called into question. In the case of FARC, the struggle to survive in the jungles and mountains of Colombia for decades has turned the act of being a member of a terrorist group into a de facto profession. As Serres argues, “Without accepting the argument that the FARC is the biggest gang in Colombia, we acknowledge that the chronic aspect of the conflict has led many of its members to see in the organisation a way to construct a project of criminal life that has become normalised.”<sup>270</sup> This profession has been “nourished, not only by ideology or a sense of just cause, but increasingly by the reliance on criminal activity such as drug trafficking.” As a result, the driving motivation is to ensure survival, making political dialogue – let alone concessions for peace – a moot point. The Colombian experience can therefore be compared to many other conflict-ridden societies, such as Afghanistan and Northern Ireland – each of which are plagued with breakaway terrorist groups who refuse to entertain political compromise because conflict has become both a business and a way of life.

One of the greatest problems in treating the FARC like a traditional terrorist group emerges from its fragmented organisational nature. Although FARC’s leadership holds influence over its fronts, this influence has been slowly diminished because a growing number of front commanders have attained a high degree of autonomy in the financing and conduct of operations. This is primarily due to front commanders acquiring ownership of drug labs and controlling national and international drug distribution channels.<sup>271</sup> Direct control over their own financial fate has given front commanders greater autonomy in recruiting militants, facilitated by the promise of wages. The fact that recruits are attracted by money “does not guarantee the

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<sup>270</sup> Serres (2000), pp. 212-213.

<sup>271</sup> Buscaglia and Ratliff (2001), p. 22.

development of a political consciousness; instead, it encourages a mercenary mentality that could lead to their criminalisation.”<sup>272</sup> Therefore in Colombia, ideology is no longer a necessary precondition for “taking up arms; the need to solve daily subsistence is usually enough.”<sup>273</sup> Within this context, front commanders have little incentive to engage in peace negotiations, since the acceptance of a political solution to FARC’s demands would effectively mean eliminating the livelihoods and way of life of approximately 15,000 – 20,000 men who have become used to living “entirely outside the law.”<sup>274</sup>

Even the motives of FARC’s support base in rural Colombia raises significant questions about the extent to which FARC is regarded as a political entity among the population it officially seeks to safeguard. Although the group has successfully manipulated the power vacuum and acted as a substitute regulative authority, in rural areas to attract peasant support, this support – whether in the 1960s or 1990s – was not necessarily based on ideology, but on “opportunistic considerations.”<sup>275</sup> Involved in growing drug crops, many of these supporters are motivated almost exclusively by opposition to government campaigns aimed at eliminating the drugs trade.<sup>276</sup> Thus their support for FARC is primarily based on the terrorists’ ability to secure drug operations in rural areas – and its ability to show its power through fear and intimidation - thereby ensuring an important source of peasant/farmer income. Despite this pessimistic view of the FARC support base, this very predicament helps explain why FARC has travelled the length of the CTC. In a 2000 public opinion poll, FARC

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<sup>272</sup> Luis Alberto Restrepo, “The Crisis of the Current Political Regime and Possible Outcomes,” in Bergquist et al., *Violence in Colombia*, p. 286.

<sup>273</sup> Menjivar (2001), p. 74.

<sup>274</sup> McLean (October 2002), p. 11.

<sup>275</sup> Serres (2000), p. 201.

<sup>276</sup> Ortiz (2002), p. 137.



leader Marulanda was noted as the most trusted political figure in Colombia, highlighting the fact that:

Despite their apparent transformation into criminal enterprises that live off kidnappings and the drug trade, tarnishing their reputation as revolutionaries, the guerrillas maintain a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of many Colombians: naturally in the areas where they are the only authority, but also among the dispossessed, the landless, the marginalized, left-wing romanticists and even, and most tellingly, among the general population.<sup>277</sup>

Thus the ““FARC is both a narco-trafficking operation and an insurgent group seeking political power. Its strongholds are the areas that grow 90 percent of the country’s cocaine.”<sup>278</sup> Legitimising their own involvement in the illicit drugs trade, coca-farmers and FARC members have created a façade to pacify their own actions despite evidence revealing that their political motives have largely been replaced by the search for profit secured from crime. Over the past decade the group has become entirely dependent on crime as a primary source of revenue, however its search to acquire criminal, economic and political influence by joining – advertently or inadvertently - criminal and terrorist tactics has resulted in the intertwining of each of these motivations to the point where the criminal motive eventually took precedence.

FARC’s proven ability to conduct sustained campaigns of terrorism against state institutions and the public, and substantially profit from organised crime, has further contributed to the legacy of the weak state in Colombia. Intimidation and corruption have undermined state legitimacy, and the growing brutality of terrorist attacks has undermined institutional capacity and capability.<sup>279</sup> Combined with efforts to provide

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<sup>277</sup> Brian Michael Jenkins, “Colombia: Crossing a Dangerous Threshold,” The National Interest, (Winter 2000/01), p. 49.

<sup>278</sup> Rafael Pardo, “Colombia’s Two Front War,” Foreign Affairs, (July/August 2000), p. 71.

<sup>279</sup> Ceballos and Martin (2001), p. 89.

patronage to the poor (in the form of access to the drugs trade and a social welfare programme), the FARC has had a negative impact on the creation of “responsible government – and against any allegiance to the notion of the public good and political equality.”<sup>280</sup> This impact, however, has not been confined to Colombia, but has begun to extend beyond its borders into neighbouring states. In addition to contributing to the export of cocaine and heroin, which directly threaten human security by contributing to rising addiction rates, the FARC has also made military incursions into Bolivia,<sup>281</sup> Brazil,<sup>282</sup> Ecuador,<sup>283</sup> Panama, Peru<sup>284</sup> and Venezuela.<sup>285</sup> Most of these incursions were connected to arms trafficking, kidnapping, or the expansion of FARC’s participation in the illicit narcotics trade. FARC’s involvement in facilitating smuggling operations “complicates cross-border issues, intermixing national, regional, and international concerns.”<sup>286</sup> Furthermore, these activities challenge “the central governance of countries affected, and [they undermine] the vital institutional pillars of regime legitimacy and stability.”<sup>287</sup> With reference to international security, FARC involvement in criminal activities has also complicated its role in the realm of international terrorism. For example, FARC has been implicated in providing criminal services to terrorist groups present in the triborder area of Latin America. Although these groups, such as Hezbollah, do not directly target regional states with terrorist

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<sup>280</sup> Manwaring (2002), p. 4.

<sup>281</sup> See: Tom Carter, “Colombian Guerrillas Alarm Bolivia,” Washington Times, 05 November 2002; George Gedda, “Colombian Rebels Spotted in Bolivia,” Associated Press, 04 November 2002; Richard Millett, “Colombia’s Conflict: the Spillover Effects of a Wider War,” The North-South Agenda, Paper 57 (September 2002), p. 7.

<sup>282</sup> Chalk et al (2001) and Millett (2002).

<sup>283</sup> George Gedda, “Ecuador Kidnapping Blamed on Rebels,” Associated Press, 16 September 2002; Millett (2002); “Ecuador: Country Summary,” Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, <http://www.janes.com> (downloaded 03 February 2004).

<sup>284</sup> For example, see: Andy Webb-Vidal, “Venezuelan Guns Aiding Guerrillas,” Financial Times, 25 January 2001.

<sup>285</sup> For example, see: “Ammo Headed for Rebels was Made in Peru,” Reuters, 02 August 2000; and Sharon Stevenson, “The FARC’s Fifth Column,” Newsweek International, 21 June 2002.

<sup>286</sup> Millett (2002), p. 4.

<sup>287</sup> Manwaring (2002), p. 11.



attacks, they have used the triborder area to plan significant acts of terrorism worldwide.

The relative successes enjoyed by the FARC over the years, coupled with the reality that the government of Colombia, and the governments of the region, have been unable to ensure their own sovereignty, let alone the security of their citizens, has produced a situation wherein “the connection of financial power and ideology”<sup>288</sup> has become a greatly feared combination. As a result, “trying to explain the Colombian crisis in purely political terms is a dead-end road.”<sup>289</sup> For as long as the FARC continues to find relative success in its combined criminal-terrorist strategy, it will continue to pose a threat to Colombia and the wider region.

The country’s crisis is seen more poignantly in the violence and chaos caused by a thriving illegal drug industry that has become closely linked to the hemisphere’s oldest, and, not coincidentally, only burgeoning armed insurgency.<sup>290</sup>

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<sup>288</sup> Sayaka Fukumi, “The Impact of Andean Cocaine Trafficking: the Cases of Bolivia, Colombia and Mexico,” presented at the 29<sup>th</sup> Joint Sessions Workshop, ECPR, Grenoble, France (6-11 April 2001).

<sup>289</sup> Ceballos and Martin (2001), p. 89.

<sup>290</sup> Edgardo Buscaglia and William Ratliff, War and Lack of Governance in Colombia: Narcos, Guerrillas, and U.S. Policy, (Stanford University: Hoover Press, 2001), p. iii.

## **Conclusion**

Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, terrorism and transnational organised crime (TOC) were relegated to 'low politics' and often isolated to the domestic realm. The subsequent emergence of a highly transitional international security environment, often placed within the context of globalisation and the rise of networked non-state actors, has challenged this perception. Terrorism and TOC, as they have evolved since 1989, can be defined as non-state actors capable of competing for control over state functions and territory. The prominence of violent non-state actors in the contemporary security environment thus questions the dominant traditional views on security (i.e. realism) that elevate the state above all other actors. Unable to directly explain and understand the threats posed by organised crime, terrorism, or their convergence, a 'new' framework for conceptualising security threats in the twenty-first century has become a necessity.

### **Contributions of an Alternative Security Approach**

Any reconstituted security framework must account for factors (i.e. the blurring of boundaries between levels of analysis, and the challenge posed to state sovereignty by non-state actors) that are now considered to be prevalent in the international environment, and thus have an impact on how security is explained and understood. In an attempt to overcome the difficulties that traditional International Relations theories have had in addressing security in the post-Cold War environment, this thesis has argued that a combination of elements extracted from the Copenhagen School and selected Post-Realist writers could be used to develop an alternative understanding of security and threats to security.



The elements of this alternative approach include: the interconnectedness of the three levels of analysis (individual, state, and international); the assumption that the state remains an essential (but not the only) component of security; the fact that the state is no longer the only legitimate referent object, but is considered equal to a host of additional referent objects including the individual, groups, the international system, and intangible concepts such as shared norms and values (i.e. as exhibited in international law and diplomacy); the idea that non-state actors are as important as state actors in security considerations; and a multilateral approach to security;

As discussed in the two case studies, once a state is no longer capable of responding to challenges that threaten its authority, legitimacy and stability, it can no longer be considered the sole referent object. Instead, the individual, group and international levels of analysis take precedence as the state is no longer able to guarantee security. In the case of Russia and Colombia, the inability of the state to control the rise of ROC and FARC respectively has resulted in insecurity for targeted individuals and groups of individuals, but also for domestic society through the implications that the activities of these groups have had on economic, political and societal stability. The interplay between levels of analysis is also highlighted in discussions about targeting techniques used by these entities. For example, in both Russia and Colombia, the murder of key liberal government officials engaged in anti-crime or counter-terrorism initiatives are often simultaneously directed at the individual, the ideas they represented (i.e. democratisation, anti-corruption), and the overall international image of the state.

The third conceptual point corroborated by the empirical evidence presented in this thesis is that an alternative form of anarchy - as argued by Booth - does exist. In the case of Russia and Colombia, however, an alternative anarchy exists in the negative sense. Given the success of ROC and FARC in spreading fear throughout society in general, public support for the state has deteriorated. This predicament is directly related to the idea of subsidiarity where political decisions are to be taken at the lowest possible level. The 'subsidiarity' component of Booth's alternative anarchy necessitates a strong civil society that is prepared to assist the government create conditions of security - this is absent from Russia and Colombia. Furthermore, ROC's use of terrorism has also broken down the notion of 'community' by delineating society into two camps: the criminal troika (traditional criminals, government collaborators and new entrepreneurs) versus the rest of society. This is also evident in Colombia where the FARC and other groups involved in the drug trade have also differentiated themselves from the rest of the state. Given the successes of ROC and FARC to the detriment of the state, the overarching question is whether or not it is ever possible for the governments in question to re-gain the confidence of its citizens.

Furthermore, the use of terror tactics against Russian and Colombian society, combined with involvement in organised criminal activity, has undermined the emergence of reciprocal obligation, mutual self-interest, sense of loyalty and moral obligation between the government and its citizens - conditions necessary for the creation of a secure environment. In some situations, the absence of the state has been replaced by ROC and FARC as non-state actors. Although the authority and legitimacy acquired by these groups is primarily based on their use of violence and intimidation, in the context of some regions (i.e. the Russian Far East and Colombia's



DMZ), this has produced public submission to the power claimed by criminal elites. As such, the importance of the state (specifically state functions) clearly remains an integral component when assessing security.

Finally, the empirical evidence in this thesis validates the utility of employing a multisectoral approach to security. As indicated in Chapters Four and Five, the rise of ROC and FARC, and their successful use of terror tactics and organised crime have threatened the political, military, economic, environmental and societal sectors. The impact on the political realm is evident when considering the level of criminal penetration in government in Russia, and the extent to which FARC has forced their political agenda on the government in Colombia. Military security is especially evident in discussions about 'black holes'. In this context, the criminal and terrorist activities of ROC and FARC have directly contributed to the prolonging of conflict zones directly by arming and financing militants, and indirectly by contributing to the creation of a criminal-political class with an invested interest in shaping the political environment to suit their specific needs. Furthermore, economic security was evidently threatened by ROC and FARC via their involvement in money laundering, corruption and the pilfering of state resources. These activities contributed to undermining economic infrastructure because they directly and indirectly harmed property owners, and the ability of the government to collect taxes to pay for social welfare programmes.

### **Contributions of the Crime-Terror Continuum**

As argued in this thesis, the relationship between transnational organised crime and terrorism encompasses several distinct facets – each of which may be placed along a

continuum that traces the evolution of groups depending on the predominant operational environment. During the Cold War, concerns about a crime-terror nexus were relatively insignificant, as the nexus was almost entirely precluded to the relationship between insurgent groups in Latin America and regional drug cartels. However, the international environment that emerged at the end of the Cold War created conditions that supported the development of criminal and terrorist organisations into increasingly sophisticated and international entities. The result being the strengthening of transnational organised crime, and international networked terrorist groups. Each of these groups have created a state of heightened insecurity within the world as governments accustomed to military threats posed by state-actors were forced to react to the economic and societal destruction increasingly perpetrated by non-state actors.

Growing reliance on cross-border criminal activities – facilitated by open borders, weak states, immigration, financial technology, and a highly intricate and accessible global transportation infrastructure – and an associated interest in establishing political control in order to consolidate and secure future operations, have all contributed to the rise of the crime-terror nexus. As a result, non-state actors, in the guise of transnational organised crime and terrorism, are directly challenging the security of the state by seeking to replace the state – arguably for the first time in history. The realisation that economic and political power enhance one-another, suggests that more and more groups will become hybrid organisations by nature, or will travel the CTC in one way or another. This is enhanced by the fact that criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other's successes and failures. Furthermore, given the unremitting existence of



territory that is not adequately under state control – such as the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, areas within Tajikistan, and the Triborder Region – environments (i.e. ‘black holes’) that provoke and promote strengthened ties between organised crime and terrorism endure.

As the alternative conceptualisation of security seeks to provide an explanation of security in the post-Cold War environment, the CTC more specifically seeks to provide an explanation of the changing dynamics of this environment as it relates to TOC and terrorism. In doing so, its primary purpose is to highlight that security threats are not static phenomena, but are continually in a state of flux. It is therefore evident that the nature of TOC and terrorism, including their convergence, are dictated by the continuously evolving environment in which they are found, and by the relationships in which they are engaged. Furthermore, the CTC illustrates that security is no longer solely about the military objectives of state actors, but has been joined by economically driven interests. The combination of political and economic motivations and a group prepared to attain them through the use of terror tactics reveals the inherent dangers of the CTC and of contemporary security threats. These dangers are exacerbated by the interplay between levels of analysis. Not only do transnational criminal and terrorist groups cross national borders as a consequence of their existence, but the impact of the activities in which they are engaged inherently affect a range of levels from the individual to global as is particularly evident through the activities of ROC and FARC.

In addition to the fact that the security threats posed by terrorism and TOC inherently cross levels of analysis, the CTC also highlights the importance of relinquishing a

state-centric approach of International Relations because the state is losing, and in some cases has lost, its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. In the territorial sense, ROC and FARC have already revealed their ability to thwart the state from territory, as was evident in some Russian provinces and the DMZ in Colombia. Even where non-state actors have not ousted the state from territory, their combined use of terror tactics with criminal activities have directly affected the state's effectiveness in countering threats aimed at deteriorating their authority and legitimacy within society. In both Russia and Colombia this was, in part, illustrated through the initiation of social welfare programmes at the community level. Furthermore, both ROC and FARC have also challenged the state through their proven aptitude of manipulating economic aims to control the state. This is evident in the economic power attained by ROC through its ability to gain control over licit and illicit sectors. The FARC has also attained a significant degree of economic power, as reflected in its annual income from criminal activities. Considering growing evidence that non-state actors have taken on a host of roles once reserved exclusively for the state, such as imposing and collecting taxes, the state can only be seen as one actor among many equals. This confirms that the role of non-state actors within International Relations has not only risen, but has met with successes by proving an ability to take over state functions from the state.

It is therefore evident that the CTC builds on the conceptual framework. In light of the changing nature of post-Cold War security, it is important that International Relations theory adapt in order to be able to address security threats that have transformed to the prevailing environment in which they seek to operate. The CTC was thus introduced



as a way to help explain the ever-changing nature of security in the twenty-first century.

### **Future Dynamics**

In light of the various components of the crime-terror continuum, one consistent and relatively easily identifiable factor is criminality. Regardless of where a group sits along the continuum (apart for traditional terrorism), every point necessitates some degree of involvement with criminal activities. As a result, the continuum inherently implies that focusing on criminal activity, as opposed to political aims and motivations, in formulating policy responses to – especially to terrorism - has been under-utilised. Thus, for example, although it is important to understand the political motivations of terrorist groups, on a practical level counter-terrorist policy and initiatives would likely meet with greater initial success in locating group weaknesses and vulnerabilities if they focused on criminal aspects. Furthermore, limiting access to lucrative profits from illicit activities simultaneously eliminates the operational capacity, and subsequent political influence, of both criminal and terrorist groups. Thus, it is essential that greater attention and resources are given to cutting off funds acquired through crime (i.e. credit card and insurance fraud, money-laundering, smuggling), or on criminal services that terrorist groups depend on (i.e. document and identity fraud).

Understanding the crime-terror continuum expands the security tools that a state can employ in order to respond to the ever-evolving threats of transnational organized crime and terrorism. Acknowledging, and continuously tracing, the crime-terror continuum as it pertains to the evolving dynamics of transnational organised crime

and terrorism will therefore have an explicit impact on the formation of counter-terrorist and anti-crime policies. The crime-terror continuum thus seeks to highlight the importance of overlapping counter-terrorist and anti-crime policies as a way of formulating an effective state response to evolving, and periodically converging, threats.



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*APC Newsgroup*

*Argumenty i fakty*

*Associated Press*

*Atlantic Monthly*

*BBC News*

*BBC World Service*

*BBC Worldwide Monitoring*

*Business Week*

*Centre for Defense Information*

*Christian Science Monitor*

*CNN*



*Crimes of War*

*Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*

*Daily Telegraph*

*Deutsche-Pressre Agentur*

*Economist Intelligence Review*

*Ekho Moskvy*

*ESPN News*

*Eurasia Daily Monitor*

*European Voice*

*Federation of American Scientists*

*Financial Post*

*Guardian Weekly*

*Houston Chronicle*

*Independent on Sunday*

*Independent Review*

*Institute for War and Peace Reporting*

*Interfax*

*International Herald Tribune*

*IOM News*

*ITAR-TASS*

*Izvestia*

*Jane's Defence Weekly*

*Jane's Foreign Report*

*Jane's Intelligence Digest*

*Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre*

*Jane's Terrorism Watch Report*

*Jerusalem Post*

*Johnson's Russia List*

*Kommersant*

*Kommersant Daily*

*La Prensa*

*Lenta.ru*

*Los Angeles Times*

*Memorando*

*Miami Herald*

*Moscow News*

*Moscow Times*

*Moskovskiye novosti*

*MSNBC.com*

*National Post*

*National Review*

*New Europe*

*New York Times*

*New York Times Magazine*

*NewsMax*

*Newsweek International*

*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*

*OMRI Daily Digest*

*Open Media Research Institute Analytical Brief*

*Organized Crime Watch*



*Pravda*

*Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty*

*Radio Netherlands*

*Reuters*

*Rossiskaya Gazeta*

*Russia Insight*

*Russia Today*

*Russian Journal*

*Russian Regional Report*

*Russia Watch*

*Semana*

*Segodnya*

*St Petersburg Press*

*St Petersburg Times*

*Sunday Times (Toronto)*

*Termas a Fondo La Vanguardia Digital*

*Terrorism Monitor*

*The Chechen Times*

*The Economist*

*The Guardian*

*The Guardian Weekly*

*The Nation (US)*

*The Observer*

*The Russia Journal Daily*

*The Russian*

*The Scotsman*

*The Times (London)*

*The Times Online (London)*

*The Times of Central Asia*

*The Toronto Star*

*Tuscan Citizen*

*United Press International*

*USA Today*

*U.S. News and World Report*

*Voice of America*

*Vremya MN*

*Washington Post*

*Washington Post Foreign Service*

*Washington Times*

*WJIN News*

*World Press Review*

*World Today*

*WPS Monitoring Agency*

*Yahoo News (Asia)*

*Yahoo News (UK)*