

Declaration and Statements

Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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Statement 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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Summary

This is a study of regional security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies perspective. The main aim of the thesis is to provide an account of the pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the Middle East cognisant of the relationships between the three in one's thinking as well as practices. This is achieved through the threefold structure of the thesis, which looks at Cold War pasts (Part I), post-Cold War presents (Part II) and possible futures (Part III). The thesis also has a set of more specific aims. First, it aims to present a critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice with reference to regional security in the Middle East and point to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics. Second, the thesis aims to explore the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security. And finally, it aims to show how Critical Security Studies might allow one to think differently about the futures of regional security in the Middle East. The overall thesis is that the Critical Security Studies perspective presents a fuller account of regional security in the Middle East; it offers a comprehensive framework recognising the dynamic relationships between various dimensions and levels of security, as voiced by multiple referents.

Regional Security in the Middle East :
A Critical Security Studies Perspective

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Several papers based on the thesis were presented at British International Association (BISA) annual conferences at Sussex (1998) and Manchester (1999); Contemporary Research in Political Theory (CRIPT) workshops at Bristol (1997) and London (1999); European Consortium on Political Research (ECPR) joint sessions of workshops at Mannheim (1999); the Nordic Society for Middle East Studies conference at Oslo (1998); and a faculty seminar at the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara (1998). I am grateful to all the participants for comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank numerous workshop/conference organisers for providing me the space to present my ideas and receive feedback.

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Introduction

Although I have been an observer of Middle Eastern politics since my days as an undergraduate student of International Relations, it is my interest in Critical Security Studies that led me to embark on a research project the end-result of which is this thesis. The appeal of Critical Security Studies for me—strong enough to bring me to Aberystwyth from another part of the world—could partly be explained by my aversion to all that was presented under the title Security Studies or Strategic Studies when I was an undergraduate student at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara. For example, I remember avoiding courses on security and opting instead for those on political theory, social and economic history or, my favourite, political anthropology. What was on offer under the label security was nuclear strategy and, in particular, deterrence. Turkey being a non-nuclear state beleaguered by perceived conventional threats, the emphasis put on nuclear deterrence only added to my puzzlement as to the way these courses were set up.

As a Master's student at Bilkent University, Ankara, I was introduced to critical theories of International Relations and gradually began to make more sense of what I had been studying in the previous four years. There, I remember dropping a Master's course on crisis management not being able to grasp the

exclusive focus given to superpower conflict, and feeling uncomfortable with the lack of critical reflection in the 'problem-solving' approaches to conflict resolution, the course I took in its place. A year later, when writing up my Master's thesis I began working for a government department as a junior researcher on affairs related to security in the Middle East. It was during that brief period that I began to think more deeply about the need to broaden our conceptions of security, problems involved in zero sum thinking and practices, and the ways in which security thinking was constitutive of the very 'reality' to which it responded. However, I did not know how to put such thoughts into words. To learn that, I had to wait until I came to Aberystwyth to find out more about Critical Security Studies.

Critical Security Studies

Critical Security Studies represents a convergence of numerous trends that have emerged since the 1960s, such as the works of Peace Researchers to broaden the concepts of violence and peace;¹ the endeavours of alternative security thinkers to focus on 'common security' and ways of mitigating the security dilemma;² alternative practices promoted by the likes of the US 'Freeze' movement, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) based in Britain, and END (European Nuclear Disarmament);³ the efforts of Third World specialists to

¹ Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' Journal of Peace Research 6:3 (1969) 167-92; Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).

² Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Program for Disarmament (London: Pan, 1982).

³ David J. Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies,' in New Thinking on Strategy and International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins, 1991) 56-72; Jim Garrison and John Francis Phipps with Pyare Shivpuri, The New Diplomats: Citizens as Ambassadors for

broaden the security agenda and emphasise the structure of the international economic system as a source of insecurity in the Third World;⁴ the works of feminists that underlined the relationship between the personal, the political and the international;⁵ and the important inroads post-positivist approaches made into International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular.⁶ Thus, Critical Security Studies could be viewed as an attempt to combine the insights of these trends with a particular set of meta-theoretical principles and precepts derived from Critical Theory⁷ to develop an explicitly emancipation-oriented approach to security in theory and practice.⁸

It should be noted that the specific approach adopted here is only one of a variety of approaches to Critical Security Studies. Keith Krause and Michael Williams, for instance, view Critical Security Studies as an umbrella term covering a number of approaches that are critical of Cold War Security Studies in one way or another.⁹ Krause's definition in particular embraces work produced by, among

Peace (Devon: Green Books, 1989).

⁴ Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985); Caroline Thomas, In Search for Security: The Third World in International Relations (Boulder, CO: Wheatsheaf, 1987).

⁵ Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

⁶ R.B.J. Walker, 'Security, Sovereignty and the Challenge of World Politics,' Alternatives 15:1 (1990) 3-28; David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Bradley S. Klein, Strategic Studies and World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁷ Throughout the thesis 'critical theory' refers to post-positivist approaches to international relations, one of which is 'Critical Theory' of the Frankfurt School tradition. On the latter, see Max Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory,' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell and others (New York: Continuum, 1982) 188-243; Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990); Jürgen Haacke, 'Theory and Praxis in International Relations: Habermas, Self-reflection, Rational Argumentation,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 25:2 (1996) 255-89; Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

⁸ Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' Review of International Studies 17 (1991) 313-26; Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, ix.

⁹ Keith Krause and Michael Williams, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases Keith Krause,

others, James Der Derian, who stresses the impossibility of being 'secure,' and calls for a strategy to 'celebrate' the anxiety and insecurity of the contemporary world;¹⁰ Ole Wæver, who questions the usefulness of a broader security agenda and makes a case for 'desecuritization' instead;¹¹ and Mohammed Ayoob who has adopted a 'subaltern realist perspective' to study security in the Third World.¹² The specific approach adopted here—following Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones—favours broadening and deepening our conceptions of security to have fuller agendas as part of an attempt to achieve security conceived as a process of emancipation.¹³

Understood as such, Critical Security Studies provides a new framework to study security; it is a framework that is fundamentally different from Cold War Security Studies. First, Critical Security Studies challenges the ways in which security has traditionally been conceptualised by broadening and deepening the concept and by rejecting the primacy given to the sovereign state as the primary referent for and agent of security. It also problematises the militarised and zero

'Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of "Critical Security Studies," Cooperation and Conflict 33:3 (1998) 298-333; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, eds. Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases (London: UCL Press, 1997).

¹⁰ James Der Derian, 'The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, Baudrillard,' in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 24-45.

¹¹ Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' in On Security, ed. Lipschutz, 46-86.

¹² Mohammed Ayoob, 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 121-46; idem, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

¹³ Booth, 'Security and Emancipation'; idem, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations,' South African Perspectives No.30 (1994); idem, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 84-7; idem, 'Three Tyrannies' in Human Rights in Global Politics, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31-70; idem, 'Nuclearism, Human Rights and Constructions of Security (Part I),' The International Journal of Human Rights 3:2 (Summer 1999) 1-24; Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 329-58; Richard Wyn Jones, "'Message in a Bottle"? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies,' Contemporary Security Policy 16:3 (December 1995) 299-319; idem, "'Travelling Without Maps": Thinking About Security After the Cold War,' in Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World, ed. Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995) 196-218; idem, Security, Strategy

sum practices informed by prevailing discourses and calls for re-conceptualising practice. Second, Critical Security Studies rejects the conception of theory as a neutral tool, which merely explains social phenomena and emphasises the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. That is, the way we (the community of students of security) think and write about security informs practice; it privileges certain practices whilst marginalizing others, thereby helping constitute what human beings choose to call 'reality.' Theory is itself a form of practice; theorising is recognised as a political activity. Finally, Critical Security Studies adopts an explicitly normative, emancipation-oriented approach to security in theory and practice.

Middle East

The thesis adopts a Critical Security Studies perspective to study regional security in the Middle East. The Middle East is arguably a hard case for Critical Security Studies to engage in. It has for long been viewed as a region that 'best fits the realist view of international politics';¹⁴ or 'an "exceptional" case eternally out of step with history and immune to trends affecting other parts of the world.'¹⁵ Indeed, it has been argued that whereas critical approaches to security may have relevance within the Western European context, in other parts of the world—such as the Middle East—more traditional approaches retain their validity.¹⁶ The Gulf War, the frustratingly slow pace of Arab-Israeli peace-making and the seeming

and Critical Theory.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York: Harper Collins, 1993) 147.

¹⁵ Paul Aarts, 'The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?'

lack of enthusiasm for addressing the problem of regional insecurity, especially when viewed against the backdrop of increasing regionalisation in security relations in other parts of the world, does indeed suggest that the Middle East is a place where traditional conceptions and practices of security still prevail.

The point I am trying to make is that the main purpose behind my choice of the Middle East as the empirical referent for this thesis (apart from my previous interest in Middle Eastern politics, which was critical in that I did not start with a clean slate when making this choice) was to see whether a Critical Security Studies perspective can indeed provide a fuller account of regional security in this conflict-ridden part of the world. The thesis will try to show that it can. Contesting such approaches that present the Middle East as only amenable to realist readings, the thesis will argue that the Critical Security Studies perspective is indeed relevant in the Middle East, while accepting that some of the items of the traditional agenda also retain their pertinence and should be addressed, but within a comprehensive framework cognisant of the dynamic relationships between multiple dimensions of regional security.

Regional Security

The thesis seeks to expand the Critical Security Studies approach to the study of regional security by suggesting that both concepts—‘region’ and ‘security’—should be opened up when studying regional security from a Critical Security

Third World Quarterly 20:5 (1999) 911.

¹⁶ Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 8-12.

Studies perspective. In this sense, the thesis pays attention to the 'regional' component in 'regional security' and seeks to explore what Simon Dalby has called the 'politics of the geographical specification of politics.'¹⁷ The aim here is to question the politics behind the invention of the 'Middle East' as well as that of other alternative spatial representations (such as 'Arab Regional System,' 'Euro-Med Region' or 'Muslim Middle East') that have been adopted by different actors. Towards this end, I will make use of the burgeoning literature on critical approaches to Political Geography (or Critical Geopolitics) that has emphasised the 'invented' character of regions as opposed to some earlier conceptions that viewed regions as 'eternal.'¹⁸

Indeed, there is nothing 'natural' or 'neutral' about geographical assumptions or language. Throughout history, the driving purpose behind the identification and naming of geographic sites has almost always been military strategic interests. Indeed, as Kären Wigen and Martin Lewis note, 'some of the most basic and taken-for-granted "regions" of the world [such as Southeast Asia and Latin America] were first framed by military thinkers.'¹⁹ In other words, the

¹⁷ Simon Dalby, 'Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference and Dissent,' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 9 (1991) 274. Also see his Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter, 1990) for elaboration on this theme with reference to the conflict between the 'East' and 'West.' For similar approaches to security in Europe, see Ole Wæver, 'Visions of Conflict: Conflicts of Vision,' in European Polyphony: Perspectives Beyond East-West Dialogue, eds. Ole Wæver, Pierre Lemaitre and Elzbieta Tromer (New York: StMartin's Press, 1989) 283-325; Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Contending Philosophies About Security in Europe,' in Strategy and Security in the New Europe, ed. Colin McInnes (London: Routledge, 1992) 3-36.

¹⁸ P.J. Taylor, 'A Theory and Practice of Regions: The Case of Europe,' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 9 (1991) 183-95. For the emerging literature on critical approaches to Political Geography (or Critical Geopolitics) see John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 1995); John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998); Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds., Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998); Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge, eds., The Geopolitics Reader (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹⁹ Kären E. Wigen and Martin W. Lewis, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography

origins of regions have had their roots in the security thinking and practices of their inventors.²⁰ To anticipate the argument I will be making in Chapter 2, the reason why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa have been lumped together in the mind's eye and labelled as the Middle East is because this particular representation helped British (and later US) strategists think about and organise action for maintaining security in this part of the world.

The significance of questioning the 'politics of the geographical specification of politics' becomes apparent once one recognises that the current state of regional (in)security in the Middle East has its roots in practices that have been informed by this representation. As John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge argued, 'to designate an area as "Islamic" or "Western" is not only to name it, but also brand it in terms of its politics and the type of foreign policy its "nature" demands.'²¹ Throughout the twentieth century representations of the Middle East have underwritten security practices that were deemed fit for the 'character' of the region. The enunciation of statements such as the one quoted above (that the Middle East 'best fits the realist theory of international politics')²² has had the effect of privileging certain security practices (such as the 1998-1999 bombing campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme) whilst marginalizing others (such as the adoption of a more comprehensive long-term policy of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East). To recap, in seeking to maintain security in the

(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997) xiii.

²⁰ Yves Lacoste, Coğrafya Savaşmak İçindir [Geography is for Waging War] trans. Ayşin Arayıcı (Istanbul: Özne, 1998); "Questions of Geography," Interview with Michel Foucault,' in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1980) 63-77.

²¹ Agnew and Corbridge, Mastering Space, 48.

Middle East, British and later US policy-makers adopted certain security practices that were informed by this dominant representation. What informed this particular representation was the conception of security adopted by its inventors. Hence the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security.

Becoming aware of the 'politics of the geographical specification of politics' and exploring the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. Such awareness, in turn, would enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security to help constitute an alternative future whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent object(s), and how they think security should be sought in this part of the world.

Whilst admitting that the 'Middle East' is a contested term, it will still be employed throughout the thesis. Following Kären Wigen and Martin Lewis, it is assumed that problems of language are inescapable in a project involving the deconstruction of existing representations of world politics. In the words of Wigen and Lewis, 'in order to continue talking about the world, we must have the cake of metageography while deconstructing it too.'²³ As with the use of 'women' in some feminist writing, the purpose behind continuing to use the 'Middle East' is to highlight the multiplicity of meanings attached to the concept, its fluidity and

²² Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, 147.

²³ Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 17.

indeterminacy, whilst searching for the roots of its multiple representations.²⁴ The goal, then, is not to present a 'brand new' alternative representation to replace that of the 'Middle East,' but to draw attention to the relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security.

Aims

The main aim of the thesis is to provide an account of the pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies perspective. This is achieved via the threefold structure of the thesis which looks at Cold War pasts in Part I, and post-Cold War presents in Part II. Part III looks at possible futures of regional security in the Middle East. The intention here is to emphasise the dynamic relationships between pasts, presents and futures in thinking as well as practices. 'We endlessly create the past as we make the future,' as Philip Allott put it.²⁵ 'As we walk into the future it becomes the past,' wrote Kenneth Boulding.²⁶ Presents, the time frame in which this thesis is being written, is that walk during the course of which people(s) re-create their pasts and invent their futures.

The thesis has three more specific aims that correspond to the three tasks of Critical Security Studies identified above. First, it aims to present a

²⁴ See, for example, Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) esp. pp. 1-19. Also see Marysia Zalewski, 'The Women/"Women" Question in International Relations,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23:2 (1994) 407-23.

²⁵ Philip Allott, 'The Future of the Human Past,' in Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, ed. Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 332.

²⁶ Kenneth Boulding, 'Part I: Introduction,' in The Future: Images and Processes, Elise Boulding

critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice with reference to regional security in the Middle East and point to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics. Second, the thesis aims to explore the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security via its structure. Finally, it aims to show how Critical Security Studies might allow one to think differently about futures of regional security in the Middle East.

Parts I and II are further divided into three chapters: representations, theories, practices. Having one chapter each on theories and practices was intended to investigate the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice. The idea behind having a chapter on spatial representations, in turn, is to investigate the relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security; the point is that when re-thinking regional security, it is not enough to open up the concept 'security' in itself, but, both concepts 'region' and 'security' need to be opened up. Part III has a different chapter layout. It elaborates upon Critical Security Studies thinking about the future as well as other future scenarios and their practical implications. It also investigates the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East.

The adoption of the Cold War/post-Cold War divide as a juncture where pasts end and presents begin may require justification. Admittedly this is a disputable choice, not the least because it reinforces the prevalent tendency to see an unproblematic dividing line between Cold War and post-Cold War eras. As Fred Halliday noted, one's understanding of when the Cold War ended and

and Kenneth E. Boulding (London: Sage, 1995) 2.

the post-Cold War began depends on his/her conception of what the Cold War was all about.²⁷ Cynthia Enloe echoes Halliday when she questions whether the Cold War has come to an end at all, say, for women who live next to military bases in the Philippines or for women in Afghanistan doing daily 'battle' under a militarist regime. Her point is that some Cold War structures still remain despite the end of the conflict between the United States and (former) Soviet Union. The Cold War is bound to have not one, but 'a multitude of endings,' concludes Enloe, each ending resulting from the pulling down of yet another structure (such as the Berlin Wall) that helped sustain the Cold War.²⁸

The adoption of the Cold War/post-Cold War divide as defining the juncture between Part I and Part II, pasts and presents, could be viewed as an attempt to reinforce the points made by Halliday and Enloe and to provide a critique from within. Thus, the thesis will seek to destabilise the prevalent tendency in Security Studies literature to present the emergence of critical thinking about security issues as a post-Cold War phenomenon, the implication being that what is being criticised was exclusive to the Cold War and therefore long past and gone. Instead I will seek to present an array of spatial representations, security theories and practices adopted by different actors. It will be argued that some critical thinking existed during the Cold War, just as much traditionalist thinking remains in the post-Cold War era.

²⁷ Fred Halliday, 'The Ends of the Cold War,' New Left Review 180 (1990) 5-23.

²⁸ Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993) 3. Also see Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind,' in Statecraft and Security, ed. Booth, 29-55.

The foregoing is a very broad-brush picture of the thesis. Before proceeding to explain the thesis structure in greater detail, an account of the sources on which it is based is in order.

Sources

The thesis is the product of a library-based research project. Its claim to originality is not rooted in heretofore untapped material; on the contrary, it is based entirely on secondary sources. Rather, the contribution the thesis makes is in the way the information provided by these sources is brought together in a fundamentally new framework to provide fresh insight into the study of regional security in the Middle East. I utilised a wide range of sources (in Turkish and English) from a variety of disciplines (including area studies, critical geopolitics, ecology, economics, futurology, history, literary criticism, political anthropology, political theory, sociology and religion) as well as studies that could be found on library shelves reserved for Security Studies and International Relations. I have also made extensive use of Internet sources. An ever increasing number of actors in the Middle East and diaspora in North America and Western Europe are grasping the opportunities provided by the leap in information technology to get their voices heard, to exchange information and to organise action across borders. I found Internet-based research invaluable not only for getting up-to-date information (which has to be treated with extreme caution) but also for gaining insight into the main concerns of those peoples who are active in cyberspace.

During the course of my research, I came across a surprisingly large number of studies putting forward arguments that echoed the call of Critical Security Studies for broadening and deepening security, and looking below and beyond the state level for other referents and agents. Some of this material is produced by scholars who would not otherwise consider themselves as addressing security issues (such as Palestinian born professor of English literature Edward Said and Moroccan feminist sociologist Fatima Mernissi). Yet it is such scholars who often voice the diverse security concerns of different actors at multiple levels.

Preliminary findings and conclusions of the thesis have been presented at conferences, workshops and seminars in Bristol, Sussex, London and Manchester in Britain; Mannheim, Germany; Oslo, Norway; and Ankara, Turkey to audiences that included scholars from the Middle East as well as Western Europe and North America. At the Oslo 1998 Conference of the Nordic Society for Middle Eastern Studies, I presented a paper outlining the main contours of the argument on the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, theories and practices of security. By coincidence, of the three other papers on the panel, one looked at politics in the 'Arab homeland,' another traced the historical trajectory of the 'Greater Middle East,' and a third focused on the 'Euro-Med Partnership Process.' Competing representations of the Middle East coming together on the same panel reinforced my own confidence (as well as the audience's, it seemed) in the argument I was developing.

At the British International Studies Association (BISA) conferences in Sussex (1998) and Manchester (1999), the European Consortium on Political Research (ECPR) joint sessions of workshops in Mannheim (1999) and the Contemporary Research in Political Theory (CRIPT) workshop in Bristol (1997) I presented different aspects of the Critical Security Studies perspective developed in the thesis by using illustrations from the Middle East. At each and every one of these occasions the discussions centred on the issue of broad versus narrow security agendas and the value of 'securitization.' This led me to develop my thinking on the issues of agency, practice and constitutive theory that I felt were sidelined in these discussions.

A more developed version of the argument of the thesis was presented to a faculty seminar at Bilkent University, Ankara (1998). The audience's response, whilst overall receptive to the call for broadening and deepening security in the long run, was sceptical regarding the presence of a potential for a security community to be created in this of all regions. This led me to think harder about the issue of practice, and to search for and point to instances of cooperation and collaboration—the immanent potential in which a Critical Security Studies approach to the future could be anchored. All the feedback received at the aforementioned conferences has been worked into the thesis as noted in the Acknowledgements.

Thesis Structure

Following an overall introduction to the thesis provided in the Introduction, **Chapter 1** presents a Critical Security Studies perspective which is then utilised in Parts I and II to criticise Cold War and post-Cold War theories and practices of security. The aim of this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive overview of the origins and development of Critical Security Studies. Rather, it seeks to clarify the key concepts that will be used throughout the thesis such as 'Cold War Security Studies,' 'Statism' and 'Referents for Security,' and seeks to explain some key analytical moves, namely, 'Broadening Security,' 'Deepening Security,' 'Re-conceptualising Agency' and 'Re-conceptualising Practice.' Being self-conscious and open about one's own assumptions and normative predisposition is central to Critical Security Studies; opening the thesis by clarifying my own perspective is true to this spirit.

The rest of the thesis has a threefold structure looking at pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the Middle East. Part I: 'Pasts' looks at regional security in the Middle East during the Cold War period and investigates the relationship between representations of the region (Chapter 2), theories (Chapter 3) and practices of security (Chapter 4). **Chapter 2** traces the trajectory of the emergence and development of the dominant representation, that is, the Middle East, by focusing on British and US security practices. It argues that the Middle East was invented to help British and later US policy-makers to think about and organise action in this part of the world. Chapter 2 also presents critiques of the 'Middle East' as a representation and an alternative, that of 'Arab Regional System.' I will argue that the latter is rooted in the security thinking and

practices of actors whose practices were informed by an alternative approach to regional security, that of Arab national security. Contending approaches to security that shaped these representations will be looked at in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 opens by historicizing and contextualising the growth of Cold War Security Studies as a discipline. The argument here is that 'Security Studies,' as we came to know it, was a product of the Cold War. It will further be argued that Cold War Security Studies helped constitute the Cold War whilst responding to it. This mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, the chapter will argue, was obscured by an objectivist conception of theory. The chapter further argues that Cold War Security Studies focused on the security of states, emphasised the military dimension and privileged the status quo. Chapter 3 also presents critiques of Security Studies in the attempt to show that alternative ways of thinking about security existed all throughout the Cold War period.

Another focus of Chapter 3 will be regional security thinking. Here I look at the approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle East (hereafter referred to as 'Middle Eastern security discourse') in juxtaposition to some regional actors' approach to security in the Arab Regional System: the 'Arab national security discourse.' I argue that the Middle Eastern security discourse was informed by top down thinking that privileged the security of states and military stability. The Arab national security discourse, in turn, put stress on non-military dimensions of security (such as the security of 'Arab' identity²⁹ and

²⁹ The definition of 'Arab' is hugely contested among 'Arab' peoples themselves, and the landmass covered by this alternative spatial representation is home to a considerable number

economic independence) but nevertheless privileged state and regime security. I conclude by maintaining that notwithstanding the differences between these two contending approaches, both were united in their embrace of an outward-directed and statist conception of security. This, as Chapter 4 will argue, was illustrated by the security practices of different actors.

Chapter 4 concludes Part I by bringing together the arguments made in Chapters 2 and 3 in the attempt to further illustrate the relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security. Towards this end, the chapter is organised along spatial lines; practices are grouped according to the spatial representations they shape and were shaped by. First, the chapter will look at a set of security practices shaped by the dominant representation, the Middle East. I argue that these practices were informed by the Middle Eastern security discourse. These practices privileged the security of states (or certain states), emphasised the military dimension, and sought to maintain stability. Then, the chapter turns to look at those practices shaped by an alternative representation, that of Arab Regional System and argue that these were informed by the Arab national security discourse. This latter set of practices, I argue, was designed to emphasise the Arab character of this part of the world, and prioritised issues such as the struggle against colonialism, economic and political independence and the plight of Palestinian peoples. Finally, the chapter also provides an account of the practical manifestations of the competition between the two discourses.

of other peoples including Kurds and Turks, Berbers, Copts and Jews (depending on one's definition of 'Arab'). For a discussion, see Bassam Tibi, 'From Pan-Arabism to the Community of Sovereign States: Redefining the Arab and Arabism in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War,' in The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Michael

To recap, Part I aims to historicize and contextualise Cold War Security Studies and the spatial representation this approach helped shape by way of informing security practices. It presents other approaches and representations that existed throughout this period in the attempt to introduce an alternative reading; it also shows how the Cold War security discourse prevailed over the others. This reading, I contend, is cognisant of the choices that were made in the past to bring regional (in)security in the Middle East to its present state. Lastly, Part I sets up a framework to investigate the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions, theories and practices of security—a framework adopted in Part II: 'Presents.'

Part II, Chapters 5-7, is structured along the same lines as Part I. Chapter 5 continues to trace the trajectory of spatial representations the 'Middle East' and 'Arab Regional System' that were looked at in Chapter 2. It looks at two more representations, those of 'Euro-Med Region,' and the 'Muslim Middle East.' I argue that although the Middle East still prevails over other representations, this has more to do with the decline of the Arab national security discourse for Arab policy-makers, especially following the Gulf War and the establishment of the US-backed Middle East Peace Process, than it has to do with the appeal of Middle East itself as a representation. I further argue that in the post-Cold War era, it has been mostly non-state actors who shaped the spatial representations Muslim Middle East and Arab Regional System. The

Middle East and the Euro-Med Region were shaped, respectively, by the United States and the European Union and their local allies.

Chapter 6 looks at security thinking in the post-Cold War period and traces its development in the attempt to see its differences from as well as similarities to Cold War approaches. The chapter opens by sketching the development of thinking about Arab national security, which emerged during the Cold War as a critique of Middle Eastern security discourse. Next, it looks at the contributions made by the students of Third World³⁰ security. The chapter also focuses on two key debates in the attempt to present an overview of issues that have been raised by post-Cold War critics of Cold War Security Studies. These are: 'broadening security' and 'appropriate referent(s) for security.' Finally, I point to those issues that were sidelined by these debates—issues I identify as the silences of post-Cold War debates, namely, agency, practice and constitutive theory. This argument will be further developed in Chapter 8 where I present a Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the future.

Chapter 7 concludes Part II. Like the previous 'practices' chapter (Chapter 4) this one is also organised along spatial lines, looking at security practices within the context of the spatial representations they shaped and were, in turn, shaped by, namely, the '(New) Middle East,' 'Arab Regional System,'

³⁰ It has become less and less meaningful to speak of the Third World since the term was first coined during the 1950s when their under-developed economies was thought to bring this otherwise diverse group of states together under the banner 'Third World.' Throughout the years, as they began to diversify in economic terms, and especially after the dissolution of the 'Second World', the use of the term 'Third World' has become increasingly problematic. It is equally problematic to use the term within the security context; despite certain similarities like low levels of social cohesion and weak political infrastructures, it still makes little sense to put India, Kuwait and Somalia all in the same basket. See Thomas, *In Search of Security*, 1-2, for a discussion of the problematic character of the term. Also see the debate in Third World

'Euro-Med Region,' and 'Muslim Middle East.' Here I argue that in the post-Cold War era, the competition between these four representations has taken place at multiple levels with the practices of non-state actors shaping and being shaped by the spatial representations Arab Regional System and Muslim Middle East. Practices shaped by the US approach to regional security in the Middle East and the EU approach to security in the Euro-Med Region have remained top down and privileged the status quo whereas the other two representations have shaped and been shaped by the practices of non-state actors that have sought to alter the status quo.

Part II therefore looks at security thinking and practices in the post-Cold War period as well as the spatial representations they shaped and, in turn, were shaped by. Having considered these four contending representations and their practical implications, I conclude that it would be highly unlikely for their proponents to come to an agreement on one of them. The question then becomes, if they cannot agree on the definition of the region how could they ever agree on common security practices? This is where the argument comes back full circle, for conceiving the relationship between (inventing) regions, theories and practices of security as mutually constitutive enables me to make the analytical move and argue that an alternative approach to security (that of Critical Security Studies) could inform alternative practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. This argument is fully developed in Part III: 'Futures.'

Chapter 8 introduces Part III. Here I seek to develop Critical Security Studies thinking about the future by focusing on three main themes identified in Chapter 6 as the silences of post-Cold War debates on security, namely, constitutive theory, practice and agency. The aim here is to show how Critical Security Studies allows one to think and act differently towards shaping alternative futures. Chapter 8 also makes a case for the adoption of a security community approach, arguing that from a Critical Security Studies perspective, processes of imagining, creating and nurturing security communities constitute emancipatory practices.

Cognisant of the existence of other ways of thinking about the future, **Chapter 9** looks at other plausible future scenarios and their potential practical implications within the Middle Eastern context. Here I look at 'globalisation,' 'fragmentation,' 'regionalisation,' 'clash of civilizations' and 'democratic peace.' This chapter is also intended to show that Critical Security Studies thinking about the future does not evolve in a vacuum and that it is concerned with exposing the limitations of other scenarios as well as presenting its own 'desired' future.

Chapter 10 returns to discussing 'desired' futures and investigates the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. Here I present the security community approach as developed by Karl Deutsch et al. and, more recently, by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. Adopting the framework of Adler and Barnett for the study of security communities as a checklist, I investigate the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. The chapter maintains that it is indeed possible to imagine the

creation of a security community in the Middle East, but there are significant hurdles to be overcome on the way. The overall conclusion is that even the very act of investigating the potential for the creation of a security community constitutes a first step towards its achievement by way of pointing to unfulfilled potential immanent in world politics and emphasising the problems that would have to be addressed on the way.

The **Conclusion** returns to the question asked in the Introduction that is whether the Critical Security Studies perspective does indeed provide a fuller account of regional security in the Middle East. After summing up the main arguments developed in the thesis, I answer the question in the affirmative, maintaining that a Critical Security Studies perspective provides a more 'realistic' understanding of regional security in the Middle East than other perspectives (including realism).

Chapter 1 : A Critical Security Studies Perspective

The aim of this chapter is to introduce a Critical Security Studies perspective, which will then be utilised to criticise Cold War and post-Cold War conceptions and practices of security (Parts I and II). As a result, this chapter does not provide an exhaustive overview of the origins and growth of Critical Security Studies. Rather, I seek to clarify the key concepts and analytical moves central to Critical Security Studies and most relevant to this thesis. Here I will look at 'Cold War Security Studies,' 'Broadening Security,' 'Deepening Security,' 'Statism,' 'Referents for Security,' 'Re-conceptualising Practice,' and 'Re-conceptualising Agency.' Critical Security Studies thinking about the future will be addressed in Chapter 8 (which introduces Part III: 'Futures') where three themes, namely, constitutive theory, practice and agency will be further developed.

Cold War Security Studies

What is referred to here as Cold War Security Studies was mostly called 'National Security Studies' in the United States and 'Strategic Studies' in Britain. Notwithstanding the difference in titles, the focus on states as the primary

referent (to whom security refers), the emphasis put on the military dimension of security, and the privilege accorded to the status quo united the two traditions.¹ This, of course, is not to suggest that Cold War Security Studies was unified in its approach to international phenomena. On the contrary, there were major differences among its students as witnessed in the many debates that took place throughout this period.² However, as Hugh Gusterson has argued, these debates served to 'reinforce the foundational precepts of strategic discourse' by

channelling disagreements into certain frameworks within which the act of disagreement obscures actors' shared allegiance to deeper structures of thought that contain their disagreements. Thus, in the act of debating, members of a discourse reproduce the categories, taken for granted, that make disagreement possible.³

Accordingly, despite the differences, two characteristics shared by its students justify treating their otherwise diverse contributions as a body of thought under the label Cold War Security Studies. These are their embrace of realism and the Cold War context in which they were produced.

The first characteristic students of this otherwise rich and diverse body of thought shared was the realist outlook. The realist theory of International Relations emphasised a state-centred outlook, a military-focus, and a scientific-objectivist understanding of theory and the theory/practice relationship to the

¹ Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' Review of International Studies 17:4 (1991) 318.

² See Hedley Bull, 'Strategic Studies and its Critics,' World Politics xx:4 (July 1968) 593-605, for a discussion of and response to some of the criticisms brought against academic strategists during the 1950s and 1960s. For other critics of the Cold War Security Studies, see Philip Green, Deadly Logic: The Logic of Nuclear Deterrence (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966); idem, 'Strategy, Politics and Social Scientists,' in Strategic Thinking and its Moral Implications, ed. Morton A. Kaplan (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973) 37-68; Anatol Rapoport, Strategy and Conscience (New York: Shcoken, 1964).

³ Hugh Gusterson, 'Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security,' in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 326-7.

study of security.⁴ Contemporary critics of realism are sometimes (rightly) criticised for caricaturing an old and sophisticated body of thought. Such a fallacy is partly in the nature of the task of summarising a rich and diverse tradition; crucial details and nuances inevitably get lost in the process. But, as Chapter 3 will argue, sometimes realists themselves presented such simplistic pictures of their own thinking. Furthermore, from the mid-1950s onwards, students of realism moved away from the more sociological approaches of classical realism. Indeed, as the Cold War waxed and waned, classical realism was obscured by its more simplified and purportedly 'scientific' variant. Within the context of Security Studies this shift manifested itself in the discipline becoming increasingly state-centric and non-military dimensions of security being marginalized in favour of a military-focused security agenda.⁵

Realism's state-centred outlook introduced a degree of neatness and clarity to the study of the complexity of international phenomena. However, as with all simplifications, many crucial aspects were lost in the process.⁶ Moreover, despite this focus on states, state building was under-theorised; states were taken to be 'black boxes' the internal components of which were not considered worth investigating. As Georg Sørensen has argued, the problem with

⁴ Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 95; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,' in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (London: UCL Press, 1997) 36-43.

⁵ David Baldwin, 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,' World Politics 48 (October 1995) 117-23. Also see Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31-2; J. Ann Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists,' International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997) 618.

⁶ Cynthia Enloe, 'Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of Power in the Study of International Relations,' in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 186-202.

International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular has had 'less to do with an exaggerated focus on the state than a lack of analysis of the state.'⁷ The military-focus of realism manifested itself in a search for militarised solutions to problems that could have been addressed through non-military means. Indeed, there came a time when it was simply common sense to think that 'deterrence was foreign policy.'⁸ The title of an article by Michael MccGwire, a long-time critic of Cold War thinking and the associated practices of security, summarised it well: 'Deterrence: The Problem, not the Solution.'⁹ The scientific-objectivist understanding of theory and the theory/practice relationship, in turn, resulted in essentially (but not always openly) normative theories of Cold War Security Studies masquerading as 'objective' approaches to international phenomena and being viewed as 'knowledge,' whilst the explicitly normative approaches of their critics were presented as 'propaganda' (Chapter 3 will further develop this theme).

In addition to this particular set of ontological and epistemological assumptions imported from realism, Cold War Security Studies shared a second characteristic: it was a product of the Cold War. This is not meant to be a tautological statement. Rather, the point here is that Cold War Security Studies, as with all academic approaches, should be understood with reference to the historical context in which it emerged, developed and helped sustain.¹⁰ This is

⁷ Georg Sørensen, 'Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal Problem,' Security Dialogue 27:4 (1996) 371. Also see Fred Halliday, 'State, Society and International Relations: A Second Agenda,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16:2 (1987) 215-29.

⁸ Alexander George quoted in Joseph Nye, 'The Contribution of Strategic Studies: Future Challenges,' Adelphi Papers 235 (Spring 1989) 25.

⁹ Michael MccGwire, 'Deterrence: The Problem, Not the Solution,' International Affairs 62:1 (1986) 55-70.

¹⁰ On the impact of the Cold War on US academia, see Noam Chomsky et al., The Cold War and

especially necessary in order to understand why a rich and diverse body of thought such as classical realism was obscured during this period by its rather simplified variant. As Chapter 3 will argue, the development of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular should be understood within the context of Cold War fears and policy interests in the West in general and United States in particular.¹¹

Accordingly, my preference for the term Cold War Security Studies (rather than 'traditional,' 'mainstream,' or '[neo-]realist' Security Studies)¹² to refer to this body of thought should be viewed as an attempt to stress the historical context in which it developed; and not necessarily a statement about it being a unified body of thought (notwithstanding some significant common characteristics identified above) or its unique approach to security matters. On the contrary, as the thesis will argue, there were elements of critical thinking during the Cold War (Chapter 3); and much traditionalist thinking remains in the post-Cold War era (Chapter 6).

the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years (New York: The New Press, 1997). Also see Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 83-119, for an autobiographical account.

¹¹ Ekkehart Krippendorf, 'The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16:2 (1987) 207-14; Steve Smith, 'Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16:2 (1987) 189-206; Baldwin, 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,' 117-41; Ken Booth, '75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past—Reinventing its Future,' in International Theory, eds. Booth, Smith and Zalewski, 328-39; Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security,' 51; Stanley Hoffman, 'An American Social Science: International Relations,' in International Theory: Critical Investigations, ed. James Der Derian (London: Macmillan, 1995) 212-41.

¹² Ken Booth ('Security and Self,' 118 n.38) and Richard Wyn Jones (Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 94) distinguish between Traditional Security Studies and Critical Security Studies invoking Horkheimer's distinction between traditional and critical theory. See Max Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory,' in Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell and others (New York: Continuum, 1982) 188-243. Keith Krause ('Critical Theory and Security Studies,' 299) uses the terms 'mainstream,' 'traditional,' 'orthodox' and 'neo-realist' interchangeably to refer to the same body of thought. Bill McSweeney (Security, Identity and Interests, 23-78) looks at Cold War Security Studies together with some post-Cold War critics under the title 'Objectivist Approaches to International Security.'

Broadening Security

As an analytical move, broadening security entails questioning the military-focused security agendas of Cold War Security Studies and calling for opening up the agenda to include other non-military threats. In making this move, students of Critical Security Studies have followed in the footsteps of Peace Researchers who, from the 1960s onwards, had gradually widened their conceptions of peace and violence. Distinguishing between 'negative' and 'positive' peace, John Galtung argued that peace defined as merely the absence of armed conflict is 'negative peace.' 'Positive peace,' maintained Galtung, means the absence of not only direct physical violence but also indirect (and sometimes unintentional) 'structural violence'—that is, those socio-economic institutions and relations that oppress human beings by preventing them from realising their potential. Galtung also emphasised that to attain 'positive peace,' it is not enough to seek to eliminate violence; existing institutions and relations should be geared towards the enhancement of dialogue, cooperation and solidarity among peoples coupled with a respect for the environment.¹³ It is also worth noting here that for Galtung peace is not a static concept; it is rather a process (as with security and emancipation for students of Critical Security Studies).¹⁴

¹³ These ideas were first aired in Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' Journal of Peace Research 6:3 (1969) 167-92. For further elaboration see his Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage with PRIO, 1996) 31-3, 197-9.

¹⁴ Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means, 265.

Building upon Peace Researchers' broadening of the concepts violence and peace that took human beings as the referent, students of Critical Security Studies broadened security to include—in Ken Booth's words—'all those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.'¹⁵ Such constraints may include human rights abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarisation of society, environmental degradation and economic deprivation as well as armed conflict at the state- and sub-state level. Accordingly, the purpose behind broadening security, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, is to become aware of threats to security faced by referents in all walks of life and approach them within a comprehensive and dynamic framework cognisant of the interrelationships in between.

Understood as such, broadening security does not simply mean putting more issues on governments' security agendas, but opening up security to provide a richer picture that includes all issues that engender insecurity. In other words, although the broadening of governmental security agendas is an offshoot of broadening security, it is not its main purpose. After all, the US Central Intelligence Agency also broadened its agenda in the 1990s, but sought to address them through its traditional practices.¹⁶

Moreover, presenting the broadening move simply as one of adding more issues to governmental security agendas would be misleading in that those who

¹⁵ Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' Review of International Studies 17:4 (1991) 319; idem, 'Three Tyrannies,' in Human Rights in Global Politics, eds. Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 40.

¹⁶ Loch K. Johnson, 'Smart Intelligence,' Foreign Policy (1993) 53-69.

drew up Cold War security agendas were never totally ignorant of non-military dimensions of security.¹⁷ Although broader conceptualisations of the earlier years had been replaced, by the mid-1950s, by more military-focused approaches, economic, political and even environmental issues were never totally excluded from national security agendas as noted above. For instance, water scarcity has always been considered a security issue in the Middle East. Likewise, the issue of unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices was successfully securitized by US policy-makers in post-World War II period. As Bill McSweeney has argued, the problem with Cold War Security Studies was not only that it emphasised the military dimension of security to the neglect of other dimensions, but also that it focused on military and non-military issues from a statist perspective.¹⁸

Therefore, it was the narrow conception of security adopted by Cold War Security Studies, compounded by its statist outlook and zero sum thinking and practices that was the problem. Singling out one of these dimensions (i.e. narrow security agendas) and identifying it as the problem whilst neglecting others betrays an underestimation of the problems involved in Cold War approaches to security—some of which are still apparent in post-Cold War thinking and practices. It could further be argued that the debate about broadening security and especially the calls for 'desecuritization' are all rooted in such an underestimation. These themes will be further developed in Chapter 6, when discussing post-Cold War security thinking. It should suffice to say here that conceptualising security in a narrow, military-focused manner has so far helped

¹⁷ David Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security,' Review of International Studies 23:1 (1997) 5-26.

¹⁸ McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 35. Also see R.B.J. Walker, 'The Subject of

gloss over other structurally based (economic, political, societal or environmental) security concerns. Dealing with the military security agenda is always necessary, but the adoption of military-focused and determined security agendas (coupled with zero sum conceptions and practices of security) have so far caused a diversion of valuable resources into the military sector in the Middle East. The ensuing militarisation of the region not only made it difficult to meet traditional (i.e. military) challenges, but also undermined regional states' capacity to provide welfare to their citizens thereby exacerbating non-military threats to security as voiced by various actors.¹⁹

Deepening Security

From a Critical Security Studies perspective, re-thinking security also requires deepening one's conception of security to be able to see the links between security discourses and the worldviews from which they derive.²⁰ Concepts such as 'national security', 'security policy,' and 'Security Studies' are all inter-subjectively constituted. As Booth has maintained, different worldviews and political philosophies deliver different discourses about what 'security' is or may be.²¹ Or, as R.B.J. Walker argued, 'questions about security cannot be separated from the most basic questions of political theory.'²² For example, if the

Security,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 75-6.

¹⁹ For a political economy perspective, see Yahya Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993). For a feminist perspective, see Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (London: Virago, 1993), esp. pp. 1-10; idem, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1996) vii-xv.

²⁰ Booth, 'Security and Self,' 111. Also see, idem, '75 Years On,' 337.

²¹ Booth, 'Security and Self,' 110-12.

²² Walker, 'The Subject of Security,' 63.

conception of Arab national security adopted by Middle Eastern actors is different from the US conception of regional security in the Middle East (see Chapters 3 and 6), this is because the two are rooted in different world views. Becoming able to grasp the ways in which the two are different, rather than explaining away the differences solely with reference to the promises of Arab nationalism requires students of Security Studies to embrace the deepening move and understand security as a derivative concept.

By way of deepening security, Critical Security Studies takes inspiration from two sources. The first is Robert Cox's maxim, 'theory is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose,'²³ and the second is the feminist motto, 'the personal is political.'²⁴ These formulations seek to reveal the linkages between theorist and theory, and thinking about security and acting for security. From a Critical Security Studies perspective, whether they are self-conscious and open about it or not, all approaches to security have normative concerns embedded within them. Such concerns may include the maintenance of the status quo in the international system or the promotion of state sovereignty, at times to the detriment of individual and group rights. Critical Security Studies, on the other hand, favours an explicitly normative security agenda based on human emancipation. This is in contrast to Cold War approaches to security, which, under the guise of objectivism, privileged the security of the state (or certain

²³ Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10:2 (Summer 1981) 182.

²⁴ Or, 'the personal is international,' in Cynthia Enloe's formulation. See Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990) 195-201.

states), and, in Walker's words, 'allowed questions of political theory to curdle into caricature.'²⁵

Furthermore, viewing alternative conceptions of security as rooted in alternative understandings of 'what politics is and can be all about'²⁶ serves as a reminder that having a better grasp of security requires students of security to question—in Walker's words—'how the modern subject is being reconstituted and then ask what security could possibly mean in relation to it.'²⁷ The point here is that conceiving security in a narrow manner merely with reference to military issues and the state betrays a statist approach (embedded in realism) that could only help produce more of the same. Embracing statism affirms the centrality of the state as the primary referent of and agent for security, thereby challenging the 'possibility of referring to humanity in general—and by extension, to world politics or world security—in any meaningful way.'²⁸ Deepening security, on the other hand, leaves open the possibility of the transformation of political community (this theme will be further developed in Chapter 8).

Lastly, deepening security enables students of security to further broaden the security agenda. A broader conception of security was defined above as inclusive of 'those physical and human constraints which stop people [as individuals and groups] from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.'²⁹ The key phrase here is 'what they would freely choose to do'; for, it suggests an element of choice. People, however, may not be presented with choices. Or, to

²⁵ Walker, 'The Subject of Security,' 63.

²⁶ Booth, 'Security and Self,' 111.

²⁷ Walker, 'The Subject of Security,' 78.

²⁸ Walker, 'The Subject of Security,' 73.

put it differently, their choices may not be apparent to them because of the way security discourses are set up. The deepening move, however, enables students of Critical Security Studies to investigate how security discourses are constructed. Depending on the theory or theories employed, security discourses close off certain possibilities whilst opening others; they lay the groundwork for the practices of politicians, soldiers and 'ordinary people' by providing the assumptions on which they operate and the norms with which they judge.³⁰ Realism, for example, helped produce the Cold War discourse in the United States. Its statist norms helped legitimise certain security practices whilst marginalizing calls for 'common,' 'cooperative' or 'global security.' Critical Security Studies, in turn, seeks to present peoples with a different reading of their situation, taking into account issues that were marginalized if not rendered invisible by Cold War security discourses; it points to choices that were made in the past and unfulfilled potential that could have been tapped.

The task of presenting peoples with choices that have been obscured by prevailing discourses should not be interpreted as a claim to know about peoples' 'real interests.' The argument here is *not* that students of Critical Security Studies can point to what peoples' 'real interests' are. Rather the argument is that, given the ways in which dominant discourses shape security agendas, one could reasonably assume that regional security agendas could have been set up differently, had other discourses come to prevail. For example, during the Cold War 'female illiteracy' was not treated as a threat to security in the Middle East although it was (and still is) at the root of problems such as population rise,

²⁹ Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' 319.

³⁰ See Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter,

unemployment, lack of awareness of health issues, and women's low life expectancy.³¹ This, however, could not be taken as evidence that women in the Middle East chose not to define illiteracy as a threat to their security. It cannot be assumed that Middle Eastern women made such a choice, especially if they were not aware of the choices available to them. As Fatima Mernissi has argued, many Arab women were discouraged from making any 'radical' demands from their governments; such 'radical' demands included the right to basic education. Thus, by way of continual invocation of the need to divert resources into the military sector in order to eradicate the last remnants of colonialism and/or address the threat posed by Israel, policy-makers made women feel unpatriotic if they asked for more resources to be put into their own well-being. The point is that women's choices were obscured by prevailing security discourses that emphasised state security and privileged the channelling of meagre resources into the military.

By presenting female illiteracy as a security issue that was kept off regional security agendas, I do not claim to know what Middle Eastern women's 'real interests' were/are (although one could reasonably argue that many would prefer not to remain illiterate if given the choice).³² Rather, by pointing to feminist thinking about security that embraced broader conceptions of security, I argue that had Cold War security discourses not prevailed, the issue of 'female illiteracy' could have been raised as a security issue. *Critical Security Studies*, by

1990) esp. pp. 4-29, for further elaboration on this point.

³¹ For example, female illiteracy rate in Morocco is 78.3 percent; Algeria 63.1 percent; Egypt 79.8 percent; North Yemen 74.8 percent; and South Yemen 96.6 percent (note that the figures are from pre-unification period). Iraq, the 'rogue state' of the Middle East, has 12.5 percent female illiteracy. See Mernissi, *Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory*, 58.

³² High illiteracy rate is included in Galtung's definition of 'structural violence.' See Galtung,

way of deepening security and pointing to the links between theory and theorist, security thinking and practices, aims to raise peoples' awareness of their choices—those that were made in the past and those that are available at present.

Statism

Statism is understood here as 'the concentration of all loyalty and decision-making at the level of the sovereign state.'³³ As Abdul Monem Al-Mashat notes, statist approaches to security provide the state apparatus with strong reasons to be superior over the society. He writes:

By so doing, [statism] strengthens the psychological dependency on the state organism and confronts social powers with a real challenge to their functions and their very existence. Society's sacrifices are perceived as obligations, but the state's privileges justified as necessary to survival. Individual initiatives and creative group interactions are confronted by the limits of manoeuvres laid down by the state.³⁴

Understood as such, statism is different from state-centrism; the latter entails focusing on states as referents and agents of security without necessarily giving primacy to their well-being. However, the difference between the two is often blurred. For, adopting a state-centric approach in studying security may end up reinforcing statism by way of rendering invisible other potential referents and agents. Then, according primacy to the state in our studies does not simply reflect a 'reality' out there, but helps reinforce statism in Security Studies by

'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' 169.

³³ Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind,' in Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, ed. Ken Booth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 52.

³⁴ Abdul Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) 33-4.

making it harder to move away from the state as the dominant referent and agent where all loyalty and decision-making is concentrated (this argument will be further developed in Chapter 6).

In Security Studies, the state has traditionally been viewed as the primary referent ('security is about the state') and agent ('the state is about security').³⁵ As noted above, although non-military issues were allowed on security agendas during the Cold War, this was always done from a statist perspective, by prioritising the needs of sovereign states. This is why, broadening security without questioning statist and military-focused thinking and practices characteristic of Cold War years will not suffice. Hence, the call of Critical Security Studies that security should be about referents other than the state, such as individuals, social groups or global society (see the next section on 'Referents for Security'). States, in turn, 'should be treated as means not ends'—to quote Booth.³⁶ It should also be noted that the limits of relying on the agency of states to provide security in a globalising world are becoming increasingly apparent. In this sense, it is worth qualifying Booth's statement above by noting that states should be treated as means, but not the only means. The issue of the agency of non-state agents would be further discussed below in the section on 'Re-conceptualising Agency.'

³⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998) 37.

³⁶ Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' 319.

Referents for Security

Questioning the statism of Cold War Security Studies, and asking basic (yet crucial) questions such as 'what is security?' and 'whose security should we be concerned with?' has been central to Critical Security Studies. As Booth has argued:

If security is conceived in terms of a wide variety of threats to human life and well-being then it is necessary to consider not just the threats which are relevant at the state level, but at all the levels appropriate for individual and group living.³⁷

Cold War Security Studies, on the other hand, treated the state as the primary referent. It should be noted here that in its initial formulations, the ultimate referent for security was assumed to be human beings. 'It is from the human need to protect human values,' maintains McSweeney, 'that the term "security" derives its meaning . . . [and] a security policy derives its legitimacy and power to mobilise resources.'³⁸ Indeed, in theory, human beings were (and still are) taken to be the ultimate referent. However, in Cold War practices, means were allowed to become the end, and the state was treated as the primary referent of security.³⁹ Why and how means were allowed to become the end could be explained with reference to two things: the underlying assumption that the sovereign state provides security for its peoples, and the disciplinary aim of building a 'science' of Security Studies.

First, the treatment of the state as the primary referent could be explained with reference to the assumption that the state provides security for all those over

³⁷ Ken Booth, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations' South African Perspectives No.30 (1994) 4.

³⁸ McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 33.

³⁹ Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' 319.

whom it has jurisdiction. 'Security comes from being a citizen,' as Keith Krause and Michael Williams have written; insecurity, on the other hand, is assumed to be caused by citizens of other states towards 'individuals qua citizens (that is, toward their states).'⁴⁰ However, states do not always fulfil their side of the bargain and act as providers of security. For, although they are there, in theory, to provide security for their citizens, there remain the practices of a significant number that are constant reminders of the fact that some are worse than others in fulfilling their side of the bargain. Added to this is the case of 'gangster' states that constitute a major threat to the security of their own citizens.⁴¹

Furthermore, as J. Ann Tickner reminds us, the policies of those states that fare better in providing security for their citizens 'might be challenged by marginalized groups, such as women and minorities, whose economic security is often compromised when military security takes priority.'⁴² Some invaluable insights into these processes are provided by Cynthia Enloe's works where she has laid bare how the United States has built its security on the insecurities of some women at home and abroad. A case at hand is institutionalised sexism. This affects not only women who live near US bases, but also helps disempower women's peace efforts.⁴³ In short, privileging states irrespective of their record in fulfilling their duties is confusing means and ends.

⁴⁰ Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security,' 43.

⁴¹ Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: The Ethical Claims of International Society Revisited,' *Political Studies* 44:1 (March 1996) 123-36.

⁴² J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security,' in *International Relations Theory Today*, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995) 186. Also see idem, 'You Just Don't Understand,' 627.

⁴³ Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*; idem, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

Second, the focus of Cold War Security Studies on the security of states could also be viewed as an attempt to introduce some neatness and clarity into the complexity of studying international phenomena for the purposes of building a 'scientific' discipline. As McSweeney notes, if human beings had been taken as the main focus in Security Studies, 'the quantification of their behaviour for scientific analysis would [have been] complicated by the obvious difference in their interests and preferences.'⁴⁴ Given the perceived urgency of Cold War concerns (and against the backdrop of the experience of pre-World War II Europe) students of Cold War Security Studies did not see themselves in a position to afford the luxury of conducting such daunting and complex analyses.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the complex task of dealing with human beings (as referents or agents) would not have produced the neat and tidy analyses a 'science' of Security Studies (modelled after natural sciences) was taught to demand.⁴⁶ Although Cold War Security Studies never really aspired to the 'iron laws and inescapable forces' of natural sciences, the desire to control and predict—which was further perpetuated by the Cold War—resulted in its embrace of the realist project of 'uncovering' the causes and laws of state behaviour.⁴⁷

Arguably, this ambition to have a 'scientific' discipline of Security Studies is one of the reasons why the focus of Critical Security Studies on human beings

⁴⁴ McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 34.

⁴⁵ Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand,' 618.

⁴⁶ See Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory (101) and 'The Nuclear Revolution,' (in Fin de Siècle: Meaning of the Twentieth Century, ed. Alex Danchev [London: Tauris Academic Press, 1995] 90-110) where he notes that the very scientific paradigm to which the science of Security Studies aspired (i.e. Newtonian paradigm) was at the time under challenge by the Einsteinian paradigm. Perhaps ironically, the latter's challenge was based on the very scientific discoveries that enabled the construction of nuclear weapons (for the study of the threat and use of which a 'science' of Security Studies was being constructed).

⁴⁷ Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199) 50.

as referents of security has generated controversy.⁴⁸ For, what worries some critics of alternative approaches to security, such as Stephen Walt, is that a study of security in the Middle East, for example, that takes into account people (as individuals and social groups) as well as states would not produce as neat and tidy an analysis as one that focuses solely on states, thereby making it more difficult to find solutions.⁴⁹ Leaving aside the problematic character of Walt's conception of the theory/practice relationship (that fails to recognise how theories help constitute the very 'reality' they seek to respond to) one should ask whether it is worth forsaking deeper insight for tidiness in research design. One possible answer is to say that the world is complex, so must be our analyses. Indeed, the world is more complex than the simplifications of state-centric analyses would allow. It could further be argued that the choice is not between studying the security of states *or* individuals, but between studying more of the same (that is, states) or the dynamic interrelationships in between myriad actors (referents and agents) including individuals, social groups, states and a potential global society. This would necessarily mean adopting a complex framework to study security (more complex than the simplifications of neo-realism would allow). However, as McSweeney has argued, this is

*the key to understanding social action and to explaining the self-evident fact that we can never succeed in generating the kind of stable explanations of human behaviour espoused by objectivists aspiring to cumulative knowledge—such as the practitioners of security studies orthodoxy.*⁵⁰

In sum, the justifications students of Cold War Security Studies provide for focusing on states as primary referents of security are far from convincing.

⁴⁸ See Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 112-7 for an overview of this debate.

⁴⁹ Stephen M. Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies,' International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991) 212-13. See Chapter 6 for further discussion on Walt.

⁵⁰ McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 148. His emphasis.

As noted above, Critical Security Studies favours looking at multiple referents and adopting a sociologically adequate conception of security that takes into account how different actors (agents and referents) are constituted, for what purpose, how they interact over time, and may be re-constructed in the future. In this sense, referents for security, such as states, social groups, or individuals, are never taken as given, as finished projects like states were (and to an extent still are) taken to be by Cold War Security Studies.⁵¹ Indeed, as will be seen below, Critical Security Studies stresses the importance of understanding change towards constituting alternative futures. This, in turn, is in contrast to state-centrism (or indeed statism) of Cold War Security Studies, which could only promise more of the same. It should also be noted that in this task of inventing alternative futures, Critical Security Studies gives priority to considering the predicament of 'those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security.'⁵²

Re-conceptualising Practice

The issue of re-conceptualising practice has been central to Critical Security Studies. Given the emphasis put on the theory/practice relationship by its students, they are expected to suggest alternative or emancipatory practices. However, in fulfilling this task, they have not received much help from Critical

⁵¹ Martin Shaw, 'There is no Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies,' Review of International Studies 19 (1993) 159-75.

⁵² Richard Wyn Jones, "'Message in a Bottle"? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies,' Contemporary Security Policy 16:3 (December 1995) 309.

International Theory. As Richard Wyn Jones maintains, the absence of 'systematic considerations of how a Critical Theory of international relations could help generate, support or sustain emancipatory politics'⁵³ has meant that Critical International Theory has yet to fulfil its promise of becoming a 'force for change'⁵⁴ in world politics. Despite the limited nature of guidance provided by Critical International Theory, students of Critical Security Studies have chosen not to remain silent on the issue of re-conceptualising practice. In the attempt to find and suggest ways in which Critical Security Studies can 'orient toward political practice in a manner that encourages and supports emancipatory transformation,'⁵⁵ its students have so far put emphasis on theory as a form of practice, the point being that by informing actors' practices, theories help shape the world in line with their tenets. This is in contrast with Cold War Security Studies' conception of theory as an explanatory tool. From a Critical Security Studies perspective, theories do not just explain; they are constitutive of what we may choose to call 'reality.' This is not to suggest that theories create the world in a philosophical idealist sense of the term. Rather, theories help organise knowledge, which, in turn, enables, privileges, or legitimises certain practices whilst inhibiting or marginalizing others. Different theories produce different security discourses by way of laying down the rules that enable one to 'write, speak, listen and act meaningfully.'⁵⁶ Depending on the theory or theories employed, discourses close off certain possibilities whilst opening others, and lay the groundwork for the practices of various agents.

⁵³ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 151.

⁵⁴ Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16:2 (1987) 233.

⁵⁵ Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 153.

⁵⁶ John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 1995) 45.

Perhaps the best example of the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice is the relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War. As argued above, Security Studies is a product of the Cold War. It developed as a specific answer to the problems of that era and attempts to understand its evolution require an awareness of the context in which it originated and, in turn, shaped. For, Security Studies not only originated in but also thrived upon the Cold War environment. The concepts, assumptions and findings of Cold War Security Studies helped sustain the Cold War. As Chapter 3 will argue, Mary Kaldor's The Imaginary War is an excellent account of the symbiotic relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War.⁵⁷

Revealing the mutually constitutive relationship between security theories and security practices, in this sense, is more than an 'intellectual' exercise; it is a form of practice in itself. Thus, the purpose of Critical Security Studies in pointing to the normative character of theory and the theory/practice relationship is to undermine Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over practice. Furthermore, the task of Critical Security Studies is not only to uncover the workings of the theory/practice relationship of days gone but also be self-conscious and open about the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice when thinking and writing about security at present. As argued above (see sections on 'Statism' and 'Deepening Security'), those students of Security Studies who produce state-centric analyses do not just explain a world where states are the main referents of and agents for security; but they also help

⁵⁷ Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding East-West Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

perpetuate statism in world politics by feeding 'common sense' back into the system thereby marginalizing other potential referents and agents and making it harder to invent alternative futures.

One implication of conceiving theory as a form of practice is that theorising itself is recognised as a political act. As Richard Devetak has argued: 'Theory-as-practice . . . defines a task that is simultaneously theoretical and practical, philosophical and political.'⁵⁸ Once theorising is recognised as a political act, then the role of the theorist could no longer be viewed as that of an 'objective' or 'neutral' observer but an actor with his/her own normative agenda to pursue. As opposed to most (but not all) of their Cold War counterparts, students of Critical Security Studies recognise and are open about the normative character of the relationship between theory and practice, theorist and what is being theorised.

Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies is only a first step. In other words, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of Critical Security Studies to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. The

⁵⁸ Richard Devetak, 'Theories, Practices and Postmodernism in International Relations,' Cambridge Review of International Affairs xii:2 (1999) 72.

issue of how Critical Security Studies could contribute to shaping futures will be further developed in Chapter 8. Suffice it to say that, cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero sum thinking and practices, students of Critical Security Studies have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices.⁵⁹

Needless to say, at this point Critical Security Studies treats the security community approach as a starting point, a necessary step on the road of emancipation. In other words, the creation of security communities is not an endpoint in itself. For, emancipation is not a static concept; it is rather a process. Hence the stress put on the adjectival form, 'emancipatory,' which implies movement.⁶⁰ This theme will be further developed in Chapter 8.

Re-conceptualising Agency

The state, as noted above, has traditionally been viewed as both the primary referent of and agent for security in Cold War Security Studies. Students of Critical Security Studies, by posing the question 'whose security are we concerned with?' have challenged the primacy accorded to the state as the primary referent for security. However, although the privileged status of the state as the primary referent has been challenged, Security Studies continues to

⁵⁹ Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 338; Booth, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa.'

⁶⁰ Booth, 'Three Tyrannies,' 41.

accord the state a central position largely due to its status as the dominant agent for security. This is partly because states have had the license to legitimate use of violence and are therefore better endowed than any other agent to provide for certain dimensions of security (such as military defence).⁶¹ But perhaps more significant is the fact that students of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular have not been orientated to look at the agency of actors other than the state concerning security issues.⁶² The prominence of the state's agency in the economic and financial sectors has for long been challenged, but it is yet to be de-throned in (certain types of) security matters.

The point is that a broader security agenda requires students of security to look at agents other than the state, such as social movements, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and individuals, instead of restricting his/her analysis to the state's agency. This is essential not only because states are not always able (or willing) to fulfil their side of the bargain in providing for their citizens' security, as noted above, but also because there already are agents other than states—be it social movements or intellectuals—who are striving to provide for the differing needs of peoples (themselves and others). This is not meant to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the contrary, they remain significant actors with crucial roles to play.⁶³ Rather, the argument is that the state's dominant position as an actor well endowed to provide (certain dimensions of) security does not justify privileging its agency.

⁶¹ It should be noted that states increasingly resort to collective defence and alliance warfare as experienced in the Gulf War (1991).

⁶² Scott Turner, 'Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging Paradigm,' *Journal of Peace Research* 35:1 (1998) 25-42.

⁶³ What roles states might assume in meeting a broader security agenda, however, is an empirical question and will be addressed in the following chapters with reference to empirical illustrations.

Furthermore, broadening the security agenda without attempting a re-conceptualisation of agency would result in falling back upon the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats. The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. In other words, the state being the most qualified actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all. This is why students of Critical Security Studies aim to re-conceptualise agency and practice.

Critical Security Studies views non-state actors, in particular, social movements and intellectuals as potential agents for change.⁶⁴ This echoes feminist approaches that have emphasised the role of women's agency and maintained that 'women must act in the provision of their own security' if they are to make a change in a world where their security needs and concerns are marginalized.⁶⁵ This is not necessarily wishful thinking on the part of a few academics; on the contrary, practice indicates that peoples (as individuals and social groups) have taken certain aspects of their own and others' security into their own hands.⁶⁶ Three successful examples from the Cold War era—the

⁶⁴ Mark Hoffman, 'Agency, Identity and Intervention,' in Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention, eds. Mark Hoffman and Ian Forbes (London: Macmillan, 1993) 194-211; R.B.J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice,' in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, eds. R.B.J. Walker and Saul Mendlowitz (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 159-85; Wyn Jones, 'Message in a Bottle'; idem, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory; Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders'; idem, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order,' Review of International Studies 25:1 (1999) 3-28.

⁶⁵ Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand,' 624. Also see Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

⁶⁶ Pearl-Alice Marsh, 'Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens' Challenges to U.S. National Security Policy,' in On Security, ed. Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 130-5; Turner, 'Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance.'

Nestlé boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign for South Africa and the campaign against nuclear missile deployments in Europe—are often viewed as having inspired the social movements of the post-Cold War era.⁶⁷ Christine Sylvester has also pointed to the examples of the Greenham Common Peace Camp in Britain (1980-9) and women’s producer cooperatives in Harare, Zimbabwe (1988-90) to show how women have intervened to enhance their own and others’ security.⁶⁸ These are excellent examples of how a broader conception of security needs to be coupled with a broader conception of agency.

It should be noted here that the call of Critical Security Studies for looking at the agency of non-state actors should not be viewed as allocating tasks to preconceived agents. Rather, Critical Security Studies aims to empower non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their own potential to make a change) to constitute themselves as agents of security to meet this broadened agenda. Nor should it be taken to suggest that all non-state actors’ practices are emancipatory. As the thesis will show, Middle Eastern history is replete with examples of non-state actors resorting to violence and/or adopting zero sum practices in the attempt to capture state power. In fact, it is often such violent practices of non-state actors (that is, terrorism or assassination of political leaders) that are mentioned in security analyses. Such examples also serve to remind us that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking reliance on non-state actors as agents of security or an uncritical adoption of their agendas. Nevertheless, the fact that not all non-state actors are fit to take up the role of

⁶⁷ George A. Lopez, Jackie G. Smith and Ron Pagnucco, ‘The Global Tide,’ in Peace and Security: The Next Generation, eds. George A. Lopez and Nancy J. Myers (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) 230-1; Marsh, ‘Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens’ Challenges to U.S. National Security Policy.’

serving as agents of emancipatory change should not lead one to downplay the significant work some have done in the past, and could do in the future. After all, not all states serve as providers of security; yet Security Studies continues to rely on their agency.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was ground-clearing. It sought to introduce a Critical Security Studies perspective, which will then be utilised to critique Cold War and post-Cold War theories and practices of security in Parts I and II. Such ground-clearing is considered crucial given the novelty of Critical Security Studies and its somewhat contested character. Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, the Critical Security Studies perspective introduced here is only one of a variety of approaches to Critical Security Studies. What will be referred to as Critical Security Studies in the rest of the thesis is the perspective introduced here.

The chapter discussed seven key concepts and analytical moves central to Critical Security Studies and most relevant for the thesis, namely, 'Cold War Security Studies,' 'Broadening Security,' 'Deepening Security,' 'Statism,' 'Referents for Security,' 'Re-conceptualising Practice' and 'Re-conceptualising Agency.' It was argued that re-thinking security entails re-conceptualising security in both theory and practice by broadening and deepening; looking below and beyond states for other referents and agents; and suggesting emancipatory practices towards shaping alternative futures. The Critical Security Studies

perspective on thinking about the future will be the focus of Chapter 8 where issues of constitutive theory, agency and practice will be taken up and further developed.

Part I : Pasts

Chapter 2 : Representations of the Middle East During the Cold War

One of the central arguments put forward in the thesis is that when re-thinking regional security from a Critical Security Studies perspective, both concepts—‘region’ and ‘security’—should be opened up to investigate the relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security. Part I of the thesis is devoted to investigating the workings of this relationship during the Cold War. Chapter 2 opens the discussion by tracing the trajectory of the Middle East from its origins in Britain’s security policies during the late nineteenth century into the Cold War era when reference to this part of the world as the Middle East became ‘common sense.’ This is intended as a further illustration of the point (also reinforced in Chapter 5) that regions are geopolitical inventions that have their roots in the security discourses of their inventors. This chapter will argue that the Middle East was invented to help British and later US policy-makers to think about and organise action in this part of the world. Chapter 2 will also present critiques of the Middle East as the dominant representation, and an alternative, that of the ‘Arab Regional System.’

The 'Cartographic Slipperiness'¹ of the Middle East

There is an agreement in the literature on the Middle East² to ascribe the invention of the Middle East as a geopolitical concept to Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, US naval officer and author of key works on naval strategy.³ In an article published in The National Review in 1902, Mahan suggested that Britain should take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the (Persian) Gulf and its coasts—an area that he labelled as the 'Middle East'—so that the route to India would be secured and Russia kept in check.⁴ However, despite this seemingly unanimous agreement in the literature to ascribe the coinage of the term to Captain Mahan, the first reference to the Middle East could be found in article entitled 'The Problems of the Middle East' by General Sir Thomas Edward Gordon published in 1900 in The Nineteenth Century.⁵ General Gordon was an officer of the British Army who was assigned to India for over four decades and his article was written from the perspective of a person who had spent most of his life thinking about India's defence. It is not known whether General Gordon

¹ Kären E. Wigen and Martin W. Lewis, The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) 71.

² See, for example, Roderic H. Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' Foreign Affairs 38 (1960) 665-75; Marwan R. Buheiry, 'Alfred T. Mahan: Reflections on Sea Power and on the Middle East as a Strategic Concept,' in The Formation and Perception of the Modern Arab World: Studies by Marwan R. Buheiry, ed. Lawrence I. Conrad (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press Inc., 1989) 157-69; Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East: Regional Dynamics and the Superpowers, 1967-91, trans. Clare Krijzl (London: Macmillan, 1993); James Derrick Sidaway, 'Geopolitics, Geography, and "Terrorism" in the Middle East,' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12 (1994) 357-72; Roger Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power and War, 1902-1922 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Rashid Khalidi, 'The "Middle East" as a Framework of Analysis: Re-mapping a Region in the Era of Globalisation,' Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East xviii:1 (1998) 74-81.

³ Philip A. Crowl, 'Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian,' in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; reprint, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) 444-77 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

⁴ Alfred Thayer Mahan, 'Persian Gulf and International Relations,' The National Review (September 1902) 27-45.

⁵ T.E. Gordon, 'The Problems of the Middle East,' The Nineteenth Century xlvii:277 (March 1900) 413-24.

himself coined the term or merely adopted it; he does not offer a definition let alone some explanation. Assuming that he would have included a definition had he been the inventor, it could be argued that the term's origins go back further. However, no earlier reference has yet been found.⁶ What is beyond doubt is that the geopolitical concept Middle East was invented when thinking about and organising action for India's security. Then, the Middle East has its origins, via Gordon and Mahan's descriptions, in British policy-makers' conceptions and practices of security in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

Notwithstanding its origins in the British India Office, the term Middle East seems to have entered public discourse via Mahan's use in 1902.⁷ The term took off from then onwards but as time progressed, the area so designated shifted westwards. During the inter-war period, the discovery of considerable quantities of oil in the Arabian peninsula and the increasing pace of Jewish migration into Palestine linked these chunks of territory to Mahan's Middle East. During World War II, British policy-makers began to use the term with reference to all Asian and north African lands to the west of India. No definite boundaries were set to the region during this period. In line with changes in British wartime policies 'Iran was added in 1942; Eritrea was dropped in September 1941 and welcomed back again five months later.'⁸ Towards the end of World War II the United States got involved in the Middle East adopting British wartime definition. These switches from one definition to another took place so swiftly that it prompted a well-known

⁶ Clayton R. Koppes, 'Captain Mahan, General Gordon, and the Origins of the Term "Middle East,"' *Middle Eastern Studies* 12:4 (1976) 95-8.

⁷ Sidaway, 'Geopolitics, Geography, and "Terrorism" in the Middle East,' 357.

⁸ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 669.

historian of the region, Roderic Davison, to ask in the pages of Foreign Affairs: 'Where is the Middle East?'⁹

Writing in 1960, Davison's concern was with the 'cartographic slipperiness' of the Middle East.¹⁰ For, he thought that this lack of a precise definition of the region resulted in an ambiguity in US foreign relations in that US policy-makers, by way of changing their definition of the region to suit different policy purposes, were giving contradictory signals as to where they were prepared to act if there need be. For instance, in 1957, when the Eisenhower Doctrine was declared, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles defined the Middle East as 'the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian peninsula to the south' plus the Sudan and Ethiopia.¹¹ Davison noted that Dulles was hesitant to provide a more precise definition, for he felt that drawing a 'defence perimeter' could be considered as issuing an invitation to Soviet policy-makers to seize anything outside that line. One year later, in 1958 when Eisenhower addressed the United Nations General Assembly (following the crisis in and intervention into Lebanon and the revolution in Iraq), the region had shrunk considerably; now its definition covered Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms only. Considering the fact that the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 was still in practice, this change in the definition of the Middle East further complicated the matter. In criticism, Davison argued that although a degree of ambiguity could be considered useful for deterrence purposes, it was also 'important to

⁹ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?'

¹⁰ Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 71.

¹¹ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 665.

know where the United States . . . [was] prepared to do something and presumably to let other governments to know.’¹²

In order to bring an end to this confusion, Davison suggested that the term should either be properly defined or abandoned altogether. Without wishing to underplay the significance of Davison’s concerns regarding the pitfalls of ambiguity in policy-making, it should nevertheless be noted that such ‘cartographic slipperiness’ is not isolated to the Middle East. There exist contending definitions of Central Europe as well, as Timothy Garton Ash explained in an aptly titled article: ‘The Puzzle of Central Europe.’¹³ The point here is that the presence of multiple definitions of regions such as the Middle East and Central Europe stem from the fact that they are geopolitical inventions rooted in the security thinking and practices of their inventors. As these conceptions and practices change, the definitions of these regions also change. For instance, during the first half of the twentieth century, the area represented as the Middle East shifted in tandem with the changes in British security conceptions and practices (this will be explained in further detail in the next section). Contra Davison, therefore, there is nothing unusual about the ‘cartographic slipperiness’ of the Middle East.

It could further be argued that coming to an agreement on a more precise definition of the Middle East, although useful for policy purposes, would bring a premature end to a potentially fruitful discussion on the reasons behind the coinage of the Middle East as a term and its adoption to represent the landmass

¹² Davison, ‘Where is the Middle East?’ 675.

¹³ Timothy Garton Ash, ‘The Puzzle of Central Europe,’ New York Review of Books, 18 March

to the south-west of Asia and the north of Africa as a 'region.' The key point is that questions such as 'why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa were lumped together to constitute a region?' and 'why "Middle East" but not, for instance, "Southwest Asia and North Africa" was adopted to represent this part of the world?' could be answered only by looking at the security thinking and practices of Western policy-makers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Whilst accepting Davison's argument that it may be necessary for practical purposes to adopt a common and more precise definition of the Middle East, it will be argued that it is also imperative to raise one's awareness of the region's character as a geopolitical invention in order to understand how the region has developed in the past and could change in the future (this theme will be elaborated upon in the final section of this chapter).

The argument so far should not be taken to suggest that it was solely the military strategic interests of Western powers that have been the driving force behind the production of such geopolitical concepts. Throughout history, all societies have produced their own representations of the world. The term 'Maghreb' (meaning 'the West' in Arabic) has its origins in the geopolitics of an earlier era, that of the first waves of Arab invaders who came to the north of Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries.¹⁴ However, not all societies have been able to impose their maps onto others. This is where relative endowment of material resources comes into play in deciding whose discourse emerges as the dominant one. To put it in other words, the reason why the lands to the southwest of Asia and north of Africa have been lumped together in the mind's

1999, 19-23.

¹⁴ Dale F. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, 2nd ed. (New Jersey:

eye and labelled the Middle East has its roots not merely in the strategic interests of Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also in Britain's material and representational power.

It is not only the relative endowment of material resources of rival powers but also the changes in communications and transportation technologies that have had an impact on the way geographical categories are invented and adjusted. During the nineteenth and twentieth century, as the military strategic interests and capabilities of the major geopolitical actors changed (such as the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the Royal Navy's switch from coal to oil in 1912) the Middle East shifted in tandem with these changes (see the next two sections). Indeed, technological, economic as well as political changes alter the way actors 'see' the world thereby helping shape their practices. For instance, the idea of Europe began to take firmer root in the minds of people living in this part of the world with the 'discovery' of other continents in general and America in particular.¹⁵ Likewise, it became possible for peoples to begin thinking and acting globally only after they were able to imagine the world they lived in as a globe—thanks to the developments in astronomy and geographical discoveries.¹⁶

Having noted the way spatial representations are shaped by the theories and practices of security adopted by their inventors, the following sections will seek to further illustrate this process. The next section will provide a brief history of the evolution of the dominant representation—the Middle East—until the

Prentice Hall, 1989) 3.

¹⁵ Jacques Attali, *1492*, 2nd ed., trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbay (Ankara: Imge Yayınları, 1999) esp. pp. 15-136. Also see Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, rev. ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968).

beginning of the Cold War. The third section will trace its development during the Cold War era. Finally, the chapter will look at the critiques of the Middle East and the alternative representations that emerged during this period.

The Middle East as a Geopolitical Invention

Notwithstanding its origins in the British India Office, the term Middle East, as made clear in the previous section, entered public discourse via Mahan's use in 1902.¹⁷ Mahan had made his reputation with The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, published in 1890. He had soon become a public figure sought out by magazine editors for articles on naval affairs and strategy.¹⁸ In this article entitled 'The Persian Gulf and International Relations' Mahan called for Britain to take up the responsibility of maintaining security in the Gulf in order to secure the route to India and hold Russia in check. He wrote:

The Middle East, if I may adopt a term which I have not seen, will some day need its Malta as well as its Gibraltar; it does not follow that either be in the Gulf. Naval force has the quality of mobility which carries with it the privilege of temporary absences; but it needs to find on every scene of operation established bases of refit, of supply, and, in cases of disaster, of security. The British Navy should have the facility to concentrate in force, if occasion arise, about Aden, India, and the Gulf.¹⁹

Mahan had used the term Middle East to refer to the (Persian) Gulf and its coasts. It was Valentine Chirol, head of the foreign department of the Times (London), who adopted and popularised the term by using it in a series of twenty

¹⁶ John Agnew, Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998).

¹⁷ Sidaway, 'Geopolitics, Geography, and "Terrorism" in the Middle East,' 357.

¹⁸ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 667.

¹⁹ Mahan, 'The Persian Gulf and International Relations,' 39. According to Koppes, Mahan had very little knowledge of the affairs of this part of the world and had to be persuaded by the editor of The National Review to write this piece. See Koppes, 'Captain Mahan, General Gordon,' 95.

articles entitled 'The Middle Eastern Question' (1902-03).²⁰ Chirol's Middle East represented an area larger than the one conceived by Mahan. This new definition included not only the Gulf and its coasts (Mahan's Middle East) but all land as well as sea approaches to India.²¹ In this way Chirol adopted the term invented by Mahan but changed the area designated as the Middle East. Mahan's Middle East was essentially a naval concept; Chirol's definition, on the other hand, was drawn up to call for the maintenance of the security of all land and sea approaches to India. This was to become the first of the many changes in the definition of the Middle East.

By the time the Times finished publishing Chirol's articles in 1903, it had ceased to place Middle East in quotation marks.²² However, although the term Middle East gradually became common sense from then onwards, the definition of the region changed in tandem with the security thinking and practices of British policy-makers. One thing that remained constant throughout this period was that the Middle East as a region was tied to the defence of India.

In the aftermath of World War I, the definition of the region changed due to the expansion of the British Empire and the incorporation of the former Ottoman territories of Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq. In 1921, the Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill set up a Middle Eastern Department in the Foreign Office to supervise Palestine, Jordan and Iraq. The reasoning behind this westwards shift was that these chunks of territory had become linked, in the

²⁰ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 667-8.

²¹ Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 24.

²² Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 26.

minds of British policy-makers, to the defence of India.²³ Moreover, another factor, that of oil had also entered the picture. By 1912, oil had begun to replace coal in the British Navy, and British policy-makers were anxious to find 'dependable sources of oil.'²⁴ Although the significance of the oil reserves in this part of the world were still to be discovered, and notwithstanding the fact that the United States still supplied about 80 percent of British demand for oil at this stage, the politics of oil was not totally absent from British policy-makers' calculations.²⁵

However, this broad definition of the region adopted by Churchill failed to win broader approval either in Britain or in the United States for a long time. At this stage, US policy-makers' interest in the region was still peripheral (despite the increasing pace of Jewish migration into Palestine). Officially, they preferred to adhere to an earlier term, the Near East (the definition of which included former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Africa and Asia Minor, the Arabian peninsula and most of Iran). The Mediterranean was also used to represent this part of the world in US strategic discourse well until the end of World War II.²⁶ During the inter-war period, Middle Eastern (and to a certain extent European) affairs constituted peripheral interests for an isolationist United States. Knowledge of the region as studied in the universities or disseminated in the

²³ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 668; Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 26.

²⁴ Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 97-100.

²⁵ Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971, rev. ed. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1981) 95-115.

²⁶ See, for example, William Reitzel, The Mediterranean: Its Role in America's Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1948) esp. pp. 94-101.

media depended largely on travellers' accounts and the information provided by their continental counterparts.²⁷

In Britain as in France, Germany and the Netherlands, there has been a tradition of studying the East, or the 'Orient.' The study of and accounts on the 'Orient' and imperial policy-making had a symbiotic relationship, as portrayed by Edward Said in Orientalism.²⁸ The study of lands far away was funded by either governments or private entrepreneurs who had business interests in these lands. For instance, the University of London's School of Oriental Studies (which later became the School of Oriental and African Studies) was founded in 1917 for the study of Asian and African languages in order to meet the needs of an expanding empire. Until then, 'Oriental Studies' was offered in the universities of London, Oxford and Cambridge, among others, but these programmes mainly focused on the study of ancient texts rather than the study of contemporary languages, the knowledge of which was becoming increasingly necessary to maintain the British presence in the East.²⁹

In sum, it was not solely British policy-makers but also students of the East (including members of the Royal Geographical Society) as well as other opinion-makers who helped invent and establish the Middle East in the minds of British public. The role played by Chirol (and the Times) has already been noted. The Royal Geographical Society, for its part, decided in the early 1920s that,

²⁷ Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978; reprint, London: Penguin, 1995) 290.

²⁸ Said, Orientalism.

²⁹ The School opened one year after the conclusion of the Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France partitioning the former Ottoman territories in the Middle East. See Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 62. On the Sykes-Picot agreement, see Monroe,

'henceforth the Near East should denote only the Balkans; the lands from the Bosphorus to the eastern frontiers of India would be named the Middle East.'³⁰

With this definition Turkey was being moved from its earlier position in the Near East into an expanding Middle East.

In the late 1920s another British institution, the Royal Air Force, created its own Middle East comprising Egypt, the Sudan, and Kenya. During the late 1930s, with the crisis in Europe looming on the horizon, it was decided that in the case of a war breaking up, the Middle East Air Command should cover not only the aforementioned territories in Africa, but also Palestine, Jordan and Iraq (that were included in Churchill's Middle East) as well as Aden and Malta. The British Army followed suit in 1939 by consolidating the heretofore separate commands of Egypt, the Sudan and Palestine-Jordan, whilst adding Cyprus, Iraq, Aden, British Somaliland and the Persian Gulf. General Archibald Percival Wavell was sent to Cairo to take up the post of Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. With the outbreak of the war, especially the fall of France and Italy's entry into the war, the Middle East Command became a significant part of the war effort, thereby contributing to the Middle East as a term and as a region becoming common sense. As the German expansion continued, the Middle East Command stretched to cover Ethiopia, Eritrea, Libya, Greece and Crete as well.³¹

Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 32-7.

³⁰ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 668. On the role played by some members of the Royal Geographical Society during WWI, see Michael Heffernan, 'Geography, Cartography and Military Intelligence: The Royal Geographical Society and the First World War,' Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 21:3 (1996) 504-33.

³¹ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 669.

During the War, the allies established a Middle East Supply Centre based in Cairo and Britain created the post of Minister of State for the Middle East. The areas over which the Centre and the Minister had control over were not the same, 'but in general they stretched from Malta to Iran and from Syria to Ethiopia,' noted Roderic Davison.³² This broadest yet definition of the Middle East largely corresponded with the early definitions of the Near East (with the exception of Turkey, which was not yet a party to the War).

The War helped further reinforce the term Middle East as a representation of this part of the world. By the end of the 1950s, the term Middle East had replaced Near East in British official documents.³³ At this stage, the area represented as the Middle East had changed to the extent that Mahan would not have recognised it. Notwithstanding these changes in its definition, and the shift in its centre of gravity from India to Cairo, the Middle East of World War II Britain, like Mahan and Chirol's Middle Easts before that, remained a geopolitical concept imposed from outside in line with external actors' thinking and practices of security.

However, although the Middle East as a spatial representation had yet to enter peoples' consciousness within the region itself, the lumping together of these chunks of territory under the Middle East Command during World War II made a significant material impact. The establishment of the Middle East Supply Centre to supervise the flow of goods within the region to compensate for the break-up of the communication and transportation links with Europe during the

³² Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 669.

³³ Ritchie Owendale, The Middle East Since 1914, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1998) 320.

War, helped re-institute the intra-regional trade links that had been interrupted during the colonial period.³⁴ These links were once again to be broken at the end of the War, but the inter-personal and inter-institutional relations that were established especially among Arab actors during this period contributed to the development of Arabism and the spatial representation Arab Regional System in the years to come.

Middle East During the Cold War

Towards the end of World War II, the United States, alongside Great Britain, got more closely involved in the Middle East. During the War the Middle East had become a part of the public discourse in the United States largely due to the US press that adopted the British wartime definition. Although the Department of State continued to operate with an Office of Near Eastern Affairs, some US policy-makers had already begun to make references to the Middle East. In 1957, when the Eisenhower Doctrine was declared promising to provide US military and economic aid to the states in 'the general area of the Middle East,' the Department of State still did not officially use the term in its organisational structure.³⁵

As noted in the previous section, during Congressional meetings on the Eisenhower Doctrine, in response to a question on the definition of the Middle

³⁴ Roger Owen, 'Inter-Arab Economic Relations During the Twentieth Century: World Markets vs. Regional Market?' in The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Michael C. Hudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 217-32.

³⁵ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 666-9.

East, Secretary of State Dulles provided a broad definition that stretched from Libya to Pakistan and from Turkey to the Arabian peninsula including the Sudan and Ethiopia. One year later the definition provided by the Department of State designated a much more restricted area (covering Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms). This, in turn, created an ambiguity as to where the United States was prepared to act when putting the Eisenhower Doctrine into practice. Further complicating the matter was the definition adopted by the newly created (1958) 'Aegean and Middle East Division' of the Office of Research, US Department of State. This definition covered Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan only.³⁶

These three different definitions adopted and used by actors working for the same government (who presumably functioned with similar conceptions of regional security) could be explained with the confusion of a transitory era where some still used the Near East as a representation (such as the Department of State) whereas others adopted the Middle East to designate either the same area (as did the Secretary of State Dulles) or a more narrow one (as with the Office of Research). Although the use of such significantly different definitions might have been a deliberate tactic adopted by US policy-makers to create ambiguity in the minds of their Soviet counterparts as to where they were prepared to act, the multiplicity of Middle East seemed to reflect more confusion than resolve.

During World War II, oil had become a more significant factor in both US and British policy-makers' calculations regarding the Middle East, but there were

³⁶ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 666.

considerable differences between the stress placed upon it by the policy-makers of Britain and the United States. Although the politics of oil was not totally absent from British security practices, US interest in the region surpassed that of Britain by the end of the War.³⁷ In the beginning of the twentieth century US production not only met its own consumption but provided above 80 percent of what Britain needed as well. At that stage, the United States still produced 140 times more oil than did Iran (where the first discovery of oil was made).³⁸ This was to change during the inter-war period when major quantities of oil were discovered in Iran and the Arabian peninsula, and US oil-production companies began to take over from British firms in the region. By the 1950s, the reserves of Saudi Arabia alone had overtaken that of the United States³⁹ and ARAMCO (Arab-American Oil Company) had replaced British companies in many Arab countries. US policy-makers' interest in the region during this period had less to do with its domestic needs than the needs of its Western European allies. For, during the 1950s it had become clear that the United States did not have enough reserves to 'oil another war' beyond a year or two, if need be.⁴⁰ As Britain began to withdraw from the region and British oil-production companies started to be replaced by their US counterparts, US interest in this part of the world expanded.

The formation of Israel in what once was Palestine also helped increase US policy-makers' as well as peoples' interest in the Middle East. It was in such a climate of rising interest in world affairs in general and that of the Middle East in

³⁷ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 95-115.

³⁸ David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-1922 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1989) 29.

³⁹ George Philip, The Political Economy of International Oil (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994) 68.

⁴⁰ Quoted in Geoffrey Kemp, The Control of the Middle East Arms Race (Washington, DC:

particular that Area Studies was established in the United States. In the US the study of foreign cultures and societies remained, until the 1940s, an intellectual enterprise pursued largely by 'amateur enthusiasts.'⁴¹ During the War the US Army had set up a school of languages to meet the needs of the war effort. The framework created for these schools was later adopted by the Social Sciences Research Council when founding Area Studies.⁴² In the 1950s half a dozen Area Studies associations were created with the help of government funding. The Middle East Institute was founded in 1946 under the aegis of the US government.⁴³ Out of that grew the Middle East Studies Association, established in 1966. The first academic programme was opened at Princeton in 1947 (under the title 'Near Eastern Studies') with support and encouragement from the government as well as private sources (such as the Ford Foundation).⁴⁴

The point here is that since US intellectual circles did not have much experience of direct contact with the region, when Middle East Studies began to flourish during the 1950s, students of Area Studies, with no historical legacy to draw upon, allowed their research to be shaped directly by the interests of their funding institutions and governmental agencies that had Cold War concerns on top of their agenda.⁴⁵ The Cold War origins of Middle East Studies in the United

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991) 47.

⁴¹ Robert A. McCaughey, International Studies as an Academic Enterprise: A Chapter in the Enclosure of American Learning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) 34.

⁴² Immanuel Wallerstein, 'The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies,' in The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years, Noam Chomsky et al. (New York: The New Press, 1997) 195-231.

⁴³ Said, Orientalism, 295.

⁴⁴ Tareq Y. Ismael and Jacqueline S. Ismael, 'Middle Eastern Studies in the United States,' in Middle East Studies: International Perspectives on the State of the Art, ed. Tareq Y. Ismael (New York: Praeger, 1990) 3.

⁴⁵ Judith Tucker, 'Middle East Studies in the United States: The Coming Decade,' in The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures, ed. Hisham Sharabi. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988) 312-21. Also see, Said, Orientalism, 301-2; Lisa Anderson, 'Policy-making and Theory-building: American Political Science and the Islamic Middle East,' in Theory, Politics and the Arab World:

States distinguished it from British and French approaches to the region. Although the concerns of their respective governments and business interests did shape the studies of British and French scholars to some extent, they also retained their literary, philological and religious-text oriented approaches to the study of the East. The US area experts, with limited pre-Cold War experience or knowledge to draw upon, concentrated on language (that is, the use of contemporary languages) and technical knowledge as instruments of influence and control.⁴⁶ As a result, to quote Edward Said, students of the Middle East in the United States tended to reduce the region to “attitudes,” “trends,” statistics: in short, dehumanized.’⁴⁷

Although other disciplines such as Latin American Studies were also influenced by Cold War concerns, the presence of Israel in this particular region and the influential role played by the Jewish lobby in the society in general and the US Congress in particular introduced a uniqueness to Middle Eastern Studies in that it ended up being more policy-driven than some other disciplines in which there seemed to be relatively little public interest. Soviet Studies in the United States was perhaps the only other discipline shaped mostly by policy concerns.⁴⁸ As a result, when, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Latin American, East Asian and African Studies were undergoing a critical phase reflecting upon their Cold War origins, Middle Eastern Studies remained, to quote Judith Tucker, the ‘Rip Van Winkle’ of the Area Studies scene.⁴⁹ This, however, is not to suggest

Critical Responses, ed. Hisham Sharabi (New York: Routledge, 1990) 52-80.

⁴⁶ Said, Orientalism, 288- 93.

⁴⁷ Said, Orientalism, 291.

⁴⁸ See Wallerstein, ‘The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies,’ 195-231 for an overview.

⁴⁹ Tucker, ‘Middle East Studies in the United States,’ 312-13.

that there was no self-reflection and criticism by students of the Middle East. Indeed, some of the challenges brought against the representation of this part of the world as the Middle East came from within the discipline itself. The next section will present the criticisms of and the alternatives provided to replace it.

'Is There a Middle East?'⁵⁰

The question heading this section was put by a well-known student of Iran, the anthropologist Nikki Keddie, in an article published in the International Journal of Middle East Studies in 1973.⁵¹ By asking this question, she went one step further than Davison (who had asked where the Middle East was) and challenged the existence of a region called the Middle East. Following an analysis of the factors that worked for and against making the Middle East a 'real historical entity'⁵²

Keddie concluded that

what probably keeps the strange term 'Middle East' (What is Morocco supposed to be in the middle of?) alive today is the cumbersomeness of any more scientific designation thought of thus far.⁵³

The 'cumbersome' designation Keddie had in mind was 'South West Asia and North Africa' (SWANA). One could add Marshall Hodgson's 'Nile to Oxus' to the short list of such alternatives.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Nikki R. Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East?' International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973) 255-71.

⁵¹ It is interesting to note that US-based journals and institutions mostly use the Middle East in their titles: Middle East Journal, International Journal of Middle East Studies, and Middle East Policy. Those with a more critical perspective, however, have opted for titles such as the Arab Studies Journal, Arab Studies Quarterly, and The Journal of Palestine Studies. An exception is the Middle East Report (published by MERIP [Middle East Research and Information Project]) which remains critical.

⁵² Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East?' 257.

⁵³ Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East?' 267.

⁵⁴ Marshall Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, vol. I

Keddie's critique could be summed up in two main points. First, the term Middle East is Eurocentric and has its origins in Western strategy. Second, the region is not a 'real historical entity,' and there are relatively little number of common characteristics that could be used to view this group of states together as a region.

Without wishing to downplay Keddie's criticism regarding the Western strategic origins of the term, it should be noted that this is not a phenomenon unique to the Middle East. For, throughout history, the naming of land has often implied control of that land.⁵⁵ Colonial powers in the Middle East and Africa as well as the settlers in the Americas and Australia mapped the areas they set foot on; invented places when naming them engaging in acts of 'imaginative geography';⁵⁶ and then wrote histories of these lands rendering authority to the new names and constructs that were instituted often in neglect of what they replaced. Ghana, for instance, was known as the 'Gold Coast' until its independence. The people of Guinea, on the other hand, chose to retain the name, which is another 'colonial relic.'⁵⁷ Latin America was called 'Latin' by France as a colonial power to emphasise the notion of a 'Latin' character linking France with Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking south American peoples in the attempt to outdo its (non-Latin) rivals in the competition for colonies in the south

of The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974) 60.

⁵⁵ Keith W. Whitelam, The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History (London: Routledge, 1996) 40.

⁵⁶ Said, Orientalism, 49.

⁵⁷ Amir Taheri, The Cauldron: The Middle East Behind the Headlines (London: Hutchinson, 1988) 2.

of America.⁵⁸ Furthermore, peoples of the Middle East have once been at the other (not receiving but giving) end of this relationship. As noted above, the term 'Maghreb' was coined by Arab invaders of the north of Africa in the seventh and eighth centuries and is therefore vulnerable to a similar set of criticisms. The Middle East, in this sense, is no exception; it is just another representation (like Maghreb) which has its origins in the security thinking and practices of external actors.

Neither should the Eurocentric character of the term Middle East constitute a sufficient reason to do away with it. It is true, as some critics note, that the Middle East could be viewed as being in the middle only in terms of latitude; viewed in terms of longitude part of the region lies to the west of Greenwich. Moreover, viewed from India, for instance, the region could be regarded as in the middle west. Indeed there has been an attempt in India to adopt 'Western Asia' to replace the term Middle East.⁵⁹ The problem with this alternative is that—as Bernard Lewis, another well-known student of the Middle East noted—it is no less misleading to view the region as the west of an entity called Asia than as the Middle East of another unspecified entity.⁶⁰ The ambiguous character of the lines dividing continental Europe from Asia further reinforces Lewis' argument.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 181.

⁵⁹ Davison, 'Where is the Middle East?' 675.

⁶⁰ Bernard Lewis, The Shaping of the Modern Middle East, rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) 4.

⁶¹ Hay, Europe, xvi. For an account questioning the representation of Europe as a 'continent', see Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 35-8.

Thus, Keddie's first set of criticisms regarding its Eurocentric character and Western strategic origins is not unique to the Middle East. Throughout the history the naming of land has always been done by some people who at the time were in a position to exercise power over the land and its peoples. In this sense, the answer to the question set in the beginning of the chapter, namely 'why "Middle East" but not, for instance, "Southwest Asia and North Africa" was adopted to refer to this part of the world?' is power—be it military, economic or representational. Edward Said's Orientalism is an exceptional account of the workings of the unequal relationship between Western colonial powers and peoples of the Middle East during the nineteenth and twentieth century and how this manifested itself in the production of knowledge about this part of the world which, in turn, helped keep the distance and further reinforce the inequality between the two.⁶² In sum, the reason why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa have been lumped together in the mind's eye and labelled as the Middle East has its roots not merely in the strategic interests of Britain in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, but also in Britain's material and representational power.

The second set of criticisms advanced by Keddie arguing that the Middle East is not a 'real historical entity' and that there are relatively few common characteristics linking this group of states together as a 'region' is more difficult to dismiss. Leaving aside the problematic character of Keddie's use of the phrase 'real historical entity' (there are very few if any 'real historical entities' as such; what makes constructs seem 'real' is the myths created through the stories

⁶² See Said, Orientalism.

people tell themselves)⁶³ it should be noted that her second point goes to the heart of the other question set in the beginning of the chapter that asked ‘why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa were lumped together to constitute a region?’ Keddie maintained that the answer could not be found in historical experience or religion. For, although the area roughly corresponds to the three largest Muslim empires—those of the Umayyads, the Abbasids and the Ottomans—as Keddie noted, ‘for pre-Islamic times the Middle East as defined by its current borders has no meaning.’⁶⁴

The point here is that the reason why the answer to this question cannot be found in historical experience or religion is necessarily because the origins of the region lie in the security thinking and practices of actors external to the region. The Middle East was invented because it served as a convenient geopolitical concept to help British (and later US) strategists think about and organise action in this part of the world—not because General Gordon or Captain Mahan thought this part of the world shared a history and culture and therefore constituted a region. If, to paraphrase Robert Cox,⁶⁵ all regions are for someone and for some purpose, the Middle East, for most of the nineteenth and twentieth century, has been for Western strategists and has served their purposes. When, in the late 1960s, Soviet policy-makers re-conceptualised their approach to Arab countries within the framework of ‘collective security in Asia’ it was still the military

⁶³ See, for example, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁶⁴ Keddie, ‘Is There a Middle East?’ 257.

⁶⁵ Cox’s formulation is ‘all theories are *for* someone and *for* some purpose.’ See Robert Cox, ‘Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10:2 (Summer 1981) 182.

strategic interests of an external actor that was behind this representation, it was still an outward directed conception of security adopted to secure 'Asia.'⁶⁶

In one sense, then, dwelling upon the Eurocentric character of the term Middle East, or the lack of shared characteristics that make it a region is a rather futile exercise. Such criticism misses the point. It hardly matters if the region is called the Middle East or 'Southwest Asia and North Africa.' For, the latter term also represents the same part of the world; the strategic purposes behind viewing *this* group of states together as a region is still there. The argument that the latter is devoid of any Western strategic background and therefore constitutes a development upon the former also does not hold water when one considers the fact that continents such as Asia, Africa and Europe are also constructs; they were invented by someone and for some purpose as Kären Wigen and Martin Lewis demonstrate in their aptly titled book, The Myth of Continents.⁶⁷

If the reasoning behind viewing this group of states together and presenting them as a region called the Middle East is not indigenously generated but invented by actors outside the region, adopting a new label to represent the same area would not constitute too much of an improvement. This, however, should not be taken to suggest that there is no need to question the origins of the Middle East. Rather it is to argue that while doing this, one should go beyond simply stating the 'obvious' (i.e. that the Middle East is a geopolitical invention

⁶⁶ Ian Clark, 'Collective Security in Asia: Towards a Framework for Soviet Diplomacy,' The Round Table (October 1973) 473-81; Ken Booth and Lee Dowdy, 'Soviet Security Interests in the Indian Ocean Region,' in Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, ed. David R. Jones, 6 (1982) 342.

⁶⁷ Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents.

rooted in British colonialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century) and question the reasoning behind the invention of such a region.

Keddie was not alone in questioning the existence of a region called the Middle East.⁶⁸ In 1978 Mohammed Heikal, editor of Egyptian daily Al-Ahram and one-time advisor to President Nasser, gave voice to such concerns. To put it in a nutshell, Heikal's argument was that the representation of this part of the world as the Middle East marginalized Arab peoples living in these lands.⁶⁹ Instead, Heikal opted for another representation, 'Arab System' which was based, he maintained, on the unity of religion, history and culture. According to Bahgat Korany, Heikal's words exemplified the mood of the time in the Arab world where many refused to be 'reduced'⁷⁰ to become a part of a 'hinterland laying between Europe and Asia, a mere geographical expansion.'⁷¹ The Arab System, submitted Heikal, could be better conceived as 'one nation having common interests and security priorities distinct from those of the West.'⁷²

One year later, two Egyptian authors, Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar put forward a thesis similar to Heikal's when they introduced the representation 'Arab Regional System' to replace that of the Middle East, in their

⁶⁸ See, for example, A.E.H. Dessouki and Jamil Matar, The Arab Regional System: An Examination of Inter-Arab Political Relations [in Arabic] (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1979) summarised in F. Gregory Gause III, 'Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations,' International Studies Journal 1:1 (1999) 11-31; Abdel Monem Said Aly Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,' in Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: Croom Helm, 1986) 197-8.

⁶⁹ Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy,' Foreign Affairs 56 (July 1978) 712-27.

⁷⁰ Bahgat Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East,' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: Macmillan, 1997) 139.

⁷¹ Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy,' 719.

⁷² Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy,' 719.

'standard and widely read' Arabic work entitled The Arab Regional System: An Examination of Inter-Arab Political Relations.⁷³ Originally published in 1979, the book was reprinted twice in 1980 and 1983 and has since become a 'popular' textbook in Arab universities.⁷⁴ The following quotation represents the core of their argument:

(1)the term Middle East does not refer to a geographical area but rather it represents a political term in its creation and usage; (2)the term is not derived from the nature of the area or its political, cultural, civilizational and demographic characteristics; for when we use the term 'Middle' we have to ask 'middle' in reference to what?; (3)the term tears up the Arab homeland as a distinct unit since it has always included non-Arab states.⁷⁵

The first two points made by Dessouki and Matar echoed Keddie's critique, but the third point went one step further and challenged the reasoning behind the representation of the Middle East as a region. Elaborating upon this latter point, Dessouki and Matar maintained that the reasoning behind Western usage of the term Middle East was to portray the region as an ethnic mosaic thereby weakening the cause for Arab nationalism and discrediting the calls for Arab unity. The spatial representation Arab Regional System could have served better, argued Dessouki and Matar, as a key for the analysis of 'interactions among Arab states, with their neighbours and with the international system at large.'⁷⁶ In other words, by proposing an alternative, Dessouki and Matar challenged not only the colonial origins or Eurocentric character of the Middle

⁷³ For useful summaries, see Gause, 'Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations,' 13-17; Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 47-8; Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,' 197-9; Abdel Monem Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus—Arab Perceptions of Security,' The International Spectator xxxi:4 (October-December 1996) 26-8.

⁷⁴ Gause, 'Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations,' 13.

⁷⁵ Abdel Aal, 'Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,' 197-8.

⁷⁶ Dessouki and Matar included all members of the Arab League when drawing their mental map of the 'Arab Regional System,' namely: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, PLO, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates.

East, but the conception of security behind lumping this part of the world together to constitute a region.

It should be noted that there existed other terms, before Dessouki and Matar coined the term Arab Regional System, to represent the lands where Arab peoples have historically lived. 'Arabian peninsula' and 'Arab homeland' had been widely used to refer to these lands that stretched from the Gulf in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west. What distinguished the spatial representation Arab Regional System from these others was the fact that the former was rooted in a state-centric perspective whereas the latter predated the independence of Arab states and the emergence of the Arab state system, and were therefore reminiscent of an earlier era (when Arab peoples were not divided into states) or a future dream (that of Arab unification).⁷⁷ In short, the Arab Regional System as a representation not only emphasised the Arab character of this part of the world thereby de-legitimising the roles played by non-Arab actors (such as Britain, the United States, Iran, Israel and Turkey) but was also state-centric.

Adopting the Arab Regional System to replace the Middle East could be considered to have one advantage; it is an indigenously generated representation—not 'a euphemism for secure spheres of influence for any outside power,' to use the words of Dessouki and Matar.⁷⁸ However it still is not an improvement over the Middle East. For one thing, it does to non-Arab peoples of

⁷⁷ See Paul Noble, 'The Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities,' in The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, eds. Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (Boulder: Westview, 1984) 49-102; Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed,' International Affairs 67:1 (1991) 487-507; Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

⁷⁸ Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,' 198.

the region what the term Middle East does (according to Heikal, Dessouki and Matar) to Arab peoples: it downplays their existence. For another thing, it neglects the roles played by Iran, Israel and Turkey in the affairs of this part of the world. Lastly, the portrayal of the region as an Arab Regional System overemphasises its Arab character. Non-Arab peoples (including Berbers and Kurds) make up nearly half of the population in the area represented as the Middle East. Moreover, the definition of who is and is not Arab is highly contested among Arab peoples themselves.

The fact that the Arab Regional System is no less ambiguous a representation and that it does not necessarily constitute an improvement over that of the Middle East should not be taken to suggest that it should be neglected. On the contrary, as noted above, the arguments Heikal, Dessouki and Matar made in justifying their choice of term go to the very heart of the argument of this thesis. For, by way of criticising the spatial representation Middle East, Dessouki and Matar laid bare the (Western) conception of security at the root of this representation and presented an alternative, that of Arab Regional System, which has been shaped by the Arab national security discourse. This point will be further developed in Chapter 3.

The juxtaposition of these two spatial representations Middle East and Arab Regional System in this chapter should not be taken to mean that no other alternatives existed. There emerged at least two more representations during this period, namely, the 'Euro-Med Region', and the 'Muslim Middle East.' From the late 1960s onwards, particularly following the 1967 war and the ensuing

decline of pan-Arabism, other representations came to the fore.⁷⁹ For instance, although Egypt's Mediterranean identity had been mentioned in debates, following the 1967 defeat voices were raised suggesting that 'Egypt should stop fighting the wars of the Arabs and turn to its Mediterranean roots.'⁸⁰ The decline of pan-Arabism coincided with the efforts of European Community (later the European Union) to distance itself from US policy towards the Middle East and adopt a more equivocal attitude by way of initiating a Mediterranean policy. Although some progress was made in creating a Euro-Mediterranean framework that would bring together EC-member states and Mediterranean-rim countries towards strengthening economic and cultural relations, the onset of the Second Cold War meant reverting back to the domination of the superpower agenda and the shelving of the Mediterranean policy to be revived once again in the post-Cold War era. Then, despite its origins being in the Cold War era, the Euro-Med Region will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5 in view of the fact that it was then when it came to prominence.

Another alternative that emerged during this period was that of the Muslim Middle East, which was shaped by the Islamist security discourse. Its proponents consider the Middle East a representation designed to downplay the region's Muslim character and legitimise Israel's presence. As is the case with the Euro-Med Region, the spatial representation Muslim Middle East came to prominence in the post-Cold War era and will be discussed in Chapter 5.

⁷⁹ Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, 'Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy,' Kurasat Istratijiya [Strategic Papers of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies] 4: 27 (1995); available from <http://www.acpss.org/ekuras/ek27/ek27a.html>; Internet; accessed September 19, 1999.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to trace the development of the spatial representation 'Middle East' as well as an overview of the criticisms to it and the alternatives that emerged during the Cold War. It tried to answer the two questions set in the beginning, namely: 'why the lands to the south-west of Asia and north of Africa were lumped together to constitute a region?' and 'why "Middle East" but not, for instance, "Southwest Asia and North Africa" was adopted to refer to this part of the world?' Answers to both questions were found in the security thinking and practices of Britain and later the United States.

British policy-makers adopted the term Middle East to designate an area (then under Ottoman control) that was viewed as crucial in maintaining the security of British interests in India. The term Middle East became common sense afterwards, but the definition of the region changed as the security conceptions and practices of its inventors changed. When US policy-makers got more closely involved in regional affairs this group of states had already become linked in the minds of many people in the West. In many Western languages, terms similar to the English—Middle East—are used: *El Medio Oriente* (Spanish) and *Le Moyen-Orient* (French). In German, the older terms, *Vorderasien* (Anterior Asia) or *Naher Osten* (Near East) are used.⁸¹ Throughout time, regional peoples themselves have also adopted the spatial representation Middle East. *Al-sharq al-awsat*, *khavare mirayeh*, *orta doğu*, and *ha mizrakh a tikhan*,

⁸⁰ Selim, 'Mediterraneanism.'

⁸¹ Wigen and Lewis, The Myth of Continents, 235.

represent its Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Hebrew equivalents, respectively.⁸² *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* (Middle East in Arabic) is the name of a newspaper with international circulation published in London.⁸³

However, the fact that it has become 'common sense' to represent this part of the world as the Middle East should not hide its Western strategic origins. As this chapter tried to argue, emerging alternatives such as the Arab Regional System challenged not only the Middle East's colonial origins or its Eurocentrism, but also uncovered its character as a geopolitical invention. By examining these alternative representations, and in particular that of Arab Regional System, the chapter tried to lay bare the way representations of regions are rooted in the security thinking and practices of their inventors. Chapter 3 will present conceptions of security that lay behind these representations before turning, in Chapter 4, to practices of security that they shaped and were, in turn, shaped by.

⁸² 'The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East,' in Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. Elise Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995) 12.

⁸³ Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East (London: Penguin, 1991) 1.

Chapter 3 : Security Thinking During the Cold War

The aim of Chapter 3 is to draw the contours of security thinking during the Cold War. The first section of the chapter will historicize and contextualise the growth of Cold War Security Studies as a discipline in the attempt to show the Western and Cold War origins of the concept of 'security.' The next section will present Cold War critiques of Security Studies in an attempt to show that alternative ways of thinking about security existed all throughout this period. The chapter will also look at the conceptualisation of theory and the theory/practice relationship in Cold War Security Studies in an attempt to understand how the Cold War security discourse prevailed whilst its critics remained on the margins. In the final section I will look at the approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle East in juxtaposition to some regional actors' approach to security in the Arab Regional System (or the Arab national security discourse) in an attempt to illustrate how different conceptions of 'region' and 'security' are rooted in contending approaches to regional security.

Western Origins of Cold War Security Thinking

It may come as a surprise to some that security is a relatively new concept in International Relations. The term 'national security' has begun to be used in the aftermath of World War II in the United States and Great Britain, where the academic field of Security Studies originated. The first reference to the term 'national security' in US official documents may be traced back to the National Security Act of 1947, which aimed at providing 'for integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security.'¹ The National Security Council was established with the same act 'to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security.'² The Office of Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs was also established with this act.

Walter Lippmann, in U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic, provided the following (and reputedly the first) definition of national security (1943):

A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war.³

Lippmann used the terms 'security' and 'national security,' 'state' and 'nation' interchangeably, without problematising either term. It was such uncritical use of the concept 'national security' that Arnold Wolfers pointed to, in an essay entitled

¹ P.G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 'The Emerging Field of National Security,' World Politics 19 (1966) 122-36. Also see Peter Mangold, National Security and International Relations (London: Routledge, 1990) 3.

² Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, 'National Security,' in The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David Sills (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968) 40.

³ Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (New York: Pocket Books, 1943) 38.

'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol' (1952). Wolfers made the following observation:

Statesmen, publicists, and scholars who wish to be considered realists, as many do today, are inclined to insist that the foreign policy they advocate is dictated by the national interest, more specifically, national security interest. This should not be surprising. Today any reference to the pursuit of security is likely to strike a sympathetic chord.⁴

Wolfers' essay is one of the first sustained analyses of and, to quote Barry Buzan, 'the best known conceptual piece' on security.⁵ For, although the term had begun to be used frequently from the 1940s onwards, its meaning had been left unquestioned.

During the Cold War, then, national security became a key concept used to justify policy-making. As P.G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz noted, at the time there was 'hardly a national policy that [had] not been publicly justified by an almost ritualistic appeal to some mystical "national security interest."⁶ This was what Wolfers was critical of in his above-quoted essay: this uncritical acceptance and employment of what he regarded as an 'ambiguous' concept. His point was that, by presenting national security as an unproblematic policy guide, the meaning of which was clear to all, policy-makers kept their normative projects hidden behind its veil. Wolfers maintained that 'security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.'⁷ By emphasising the

⁴ Arnold Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,' Political Science Quarterly lxxvii: 4 (December 1952). This article was later published in Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962) 147 (page references are to the 1962 edition).

⁵ Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 4.

⁶ Bock and Berkowitz, 'The Emerging Field of National Security,' 132.

⁷ Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,' 150-65. The quotation is from p.150.

subjective dimension of the task of defining security, Wolfers wanted to point to the normative character of any policy justified in national security terms.

Wolfers' argument was not that he thought national security policies should not be guided by normative concerns. On the contrary he emphasised that

no policy, no human act in general, which calls for the sacrifice of other values, as any security policy is bound to do, can escape being made subject of moral judgement—whether by the conscience of the actor himself or by others.⁸

Wolfers' criticisms, then, were directed against the 'misleading' character of the manner in which national security was presented as the ultimate policy guide as if its meaning was clear to all who used it or were affected by its use. Put in other words, Wolfers thought national security was too 'ambiguous' a concept to be adopted as a guide in policy-making without reflecting upon its normative dimension. As will be argued below, such self-reflection was largely absent from many analyses undertaken during the Cold War.⁹

It could be argued that the ambiguity that surrounded the concept national security during this period stemmed partly from the fact that it was of relatively recent origin. Until the end of World War II, neither the United States nor any of its European counterparts had (what later came to be known as) 'national security policies' that '[involved] the framing of coherent objectives, and their pursuit by the coordination of the military and non-military instruments of

⁸ Wolfers, 'National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,' 162.

⁹ Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist,' in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (London: UCL Press, 1997) 83-119; James Der Derian, 'The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,' in On Security, ed. Ronnie Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 24-45.

statecraft.¹⁰ The study of strategy, until this period, usually took the form of the study of military history.¹¹ Wolfers' essay was an early attempt to clarify this relatively new concept, the systematic study of which took off during the Cold War. Needless to say, as with Area Studies that also flourished during this period, the Cold War origins of the study of security made a significant impact on the way it was conceptualised and practised.

As already noted in Chapter 1, in the United States, security was studied under the title 'National Security Studies'; in Britain it was 'Strategic Studies.'¹² Notwithstanding the difference in the titles, the focus on states as the primary referent of security, the emphasis put on its military dimension, and the privilege accorded to the maintenance of the status quo as an endpoint for security united the two academic traditions to constitute Cold War Security Studies.¹³ This, of course, is not meant to gloss over the differences between its many students. After all, the security community approach of Karl Deutsch et al. (see Chapter 10) was also a product of the Cold War.¹⁴ However, notwithstanding such differences, two common characteristics shared by its students justify bringing

¹⁰ Ken Booth, 'American Strategy: The Myths Revisited,' in American Thinking About Peace and War, eds. Ken Booth and Moorhead Wright (Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1978) 3.

¹¹ Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1959) 39; Ken Booth, 'Strategy,' in Contemporary International Relations: A Keyguide to Theory, eds. A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (London: Pinter, 1994) 109.

¹² Michael Howard, one of the founders of the Institute of Strategic Studies noted that he initially suggested that the Institute be called the 'Institute for the Study of International Security.' Its current name was adopted, according to Howard, thinking that it would 'sell' better. See Michael Howard, 'IISS-The First Thirty Years: A General Overview,' Adelphi Papers 235 (Spring 1989) 12. The Soviet Union, having its own 'nationalities question,' opted for the term 'state security' instead of 'national security.' See Caroline Thomas, 'Southern Instability, Security and Western Concepts: On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce,' in The State and Instability in the South, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (London: Macmillan, 1989) 176.

¹³ Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' Review of International Studies 17:4 (1991) 318.

¹⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical

their otherwise diverse contributions under a single label. Let us look at these two common characteristics in more detail.

First, Cold War Security Studies was a product of the Cold War. The significance of this apparent truism is that the growth of the discipline should be understood with reference to the historical context in which it emerged, developed and helped sustain. This is especially necessary in order to understand why a rich body of thought such as classical realism was obscured during this period by its rather simplified variant. Accordingly, the development of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular should be understood within the context of the Cold War fears and policy incentives in the West in general and the United States in particular. The adoption of a state-centric approach to the study of security, for instance, was done in the attempt to introduce some neatness and clarity to the complexity of studying international phenomena for the purposes of building a 'scientific' discipline. This was not only because the complex task of dealing with human beings would not have produced the neat and tidy analyses a 'science' of Security Studies was thought to demand, but also because the perceived urgency of Cold War concerns made it difficult for its students to undertake the complex analyses the study of peoples (individuals and social groups) required.¹⁵

The second characteristic students of Cold War Security Studies shared was the realist outlook. John Garnett expressed the realist position as follows:

Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹⁵ J. Ann Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists,' International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997) 618.

Realists tend to be conservative in their views . . . [they] tend to accept a world subdivided into independent sovereign states as being the normal, if not permanent, condition of international society, and they consider realpolitik an inescapable feature of the international environment. . . .

. . . The realists also emphasise the ubiquity of the power struggle, and their literature is dominated by the concepts of national power and interest. Conflict is regarded as an inescapable condition of international life. This simple assumption is the starting point of realism.¹⁶

Contemporary critics of realism are sometimes criticised for caricaturing an old and sophisticated body of thought. But, as the above-quoted text shows, realists themselves sometimes presented such simplistic pictures of their own thinking. Indeed, from the mid-1950s onwards, realist theory of International Relations moved away from the more sociological approaches of classical realism towards a more simplified and purportedly 'scientific' variant. Within the context of Security Studies this shift manifested itself with the discipline becoming increasingly more state-centric and non-military dimensions of security being marginalized in favour of a military-focused security agenda.¹⁷

Cold War Security Studies embraced realism's scientific objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship as well. Indeed, even some critics of Cold War approaches to security such as those who participated in the 'traditionalist vs. behaviouralist' debate of the 1950s and 1960s, shared realism's ontological and epistemological outlook.¹⁸ As Steve Smith noted, this debate focused on methodology (the methods through which the subject should

¹⁶ John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions,' in Contemporary Strategy, 2nd rev. and enl. ed., eds. John Baylis et al. Vol.I. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987) 9-10.

¹⁷ Baldwin, 'Security Studies and the End of the Cold War,' World Politics 48 (October 1995) 117-23. Also see Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 31-2; Tickner, 'You Just Don't Understand,' 618.

¹⁸ See Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach,' in Contending Approaches to International Politics, eds. Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (Princeton, NJ:

be studied) to the neglect of ontology (what is there to be studied) and epistemology (what constitutes knowledge about the subject of study).¹⁹ In sum, in line with realism's precepts, Security Studies adopted a state-centric ontology, a military-focused security agenda, and a scientific-objectivist understanding of the theory/practice relationship.²⁰ The conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship adopted by Cold War Security Studies will be the focus of the third section of the chapter. The remainder of this section will trace the development of Cold War Security Studies by focusing on the other two aspects identified above, namely, state-centrism and military-focus.

State-centrism could be defined as treating state as the central actor in world politics and concentrating on states' practices when studying international phenomena. The state-centric outlook of realism introduced a degree of neatness and clarity to the study of the complexity of international phenomena. However, as with all simplifications, many crucial aspects were lost in the process.²¹ During the Cold War, the state-centric character of security thinking manifested itself in the notion that security is about the state and the state is about security.²² Though this may come as an oversimplification to some, it is nevertheless difficult to deny the way the state was viewed as both the primary referent and agent in Security Studies. As will be seen in the next section, even

Princeton University Press, 1969) 20-38.

¹⁹ Steve Smith, 'Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory,' in International Theory, eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 33.

²⁰ Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 95; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 36-43.

²¹ Cynthia Enloe, 'Margins, Silences and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of Power in the Study of International Relations,' in International Theory, eds. Booth, Smith and Zalewski, 186-202.

²² Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder,

some students of Third World security, who were otherwise critical of the Cold War security discourse, produced state-centric analyses.²³ However, although the referent for security remained the state throughout the Cold War, the conceptual focus of security thinking showed slight variations over time and space, as will be seen below.

Over the years, then, security thinking increasingly came to privilege the state as the primary referent and agent, and emphasise the role of the military instrument in maintaining stability. Stability was understood as the strategic balance between two groups of states: 'the East' and 'the West.' Military factors were paid more and more attention in threat assessments and policy calculations of states as the East-West conflict intensified during the 1960s. The military dimension of security was always dominant, but in an era of détente and oil shocks (1969-76) a broader range of issues was added to the agenda, cognisant of the economic and environmental dimensions of security. However, this constituted more of a parenthesis rather than a break; things returned to security-business-as-usual with the re-intensification of the Cold War in the late 1970s.

During the first decade of the Cold War (1945-55) security analyses concentrated on issues of offence and defence, deterrence and aggression, massive retaliation and limited war, surprise attack and arms racing. The

CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998) 37.

²³ Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon, 'Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: The "Software" Side of Third World National Security,' in National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats, eds. Edward E. Azar and Chung-In Moon (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1988) 77-101; Mohammed Ayoob, 'Regional Security and the Third World,' in Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies From Southeast Asia and the

emphasis put on the nuclear dimension of strategy during this period is difficult to exaggerate.²⁴ Theoretical development between 1955-65 focused on four major themes, namely, deterrence, disarmament and arms control, crisis management and limited war. In the following two decades (1965-85), the same issues were addressed through more rigorous attempts to establish new standards of analysis and productivity and to attain new levels of strategic rationality.²⁵

However, despite such common concerns that crossed the Atlantic to occupy the minds of the members of both academic traditions in the United States and Great Britain, conceptions and practices of security were far from being uniform in the West. As the East-West conflict intensified, whilst US security thinking came to focus more and more on military stability and the problems encountered by the United States and its allies, the produce became less and less relevant to those states and peoples with alternative worldviews, less complacent attitudes towards the status quo and different conceptions of security. France's withdrawal from NATO's (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) military wing in 1962 and the rift between the United States and some Western European governments and peace movements over the placement of Cruise and Trident in Europe in the 1980s were exemplary of these cross-cutting differences in the West.

Middle East, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: Croom Helm, 1986) 3-23.

²⁴ See, for example, Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983); Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1989).

²⁵ See, for example, John Garnett, ed., Theories of Peace and Security: A Reader in Contemporary Strategic Thought (London: Macmillan, 1970); Phil Williams, Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age (London: M. Robertson, 1976); Roman Kolkowicz and Niel Joeck, eds., Arms Control and International Security (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984); Kenneth Waltz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better,' Adelphi Papers 171 (1981) 1-32; Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York : Wiley, 1963).

During the 1970s, Cold War Security Studies saw some emphasis put on area studies, history and political psychology.²⁶ It was during this period that economic and political—in addition to military—aspects of security began to find some space, however limited. The 1973 OPEC oil embargo further accelerated this process. In 1975, a prominent realist thinker, then US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, noted that ‘progress in dealing with the traditional agenda’ was no longer enough, because a

new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the issues of space and the seas now rank with the questions of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.²⁷

With the onset of the second Cold War the security agenda of the superpowers returned to its nuclear focus once again. This time there was a difference, for some non-state actors’ agenda did not follow suit. Some (such as Alternative Security thinkers, see below) refused to return to security-business-as-usual as debates between the superpowers of the period once again focused on issues of nuclear war, prevailing strategies, nuclear winter, ballistic missile defence and nuclear blackmail. Nevertheless, the strategic defence initiative (‘Star Wars’) and Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) (1987) stole the limelight during the 1980s.²⁸

To summarise, what is referred to here as Cold War Security Studies emerged as a product of the Cold War. The embrace of realism by its students

²⁶ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979).

²⁷ quoted in Trevor Salmon, ‘The Nature of International Security,’ in International Security in the Modern World, eds. Roger Carey and Trevor Salmon (London: Macmillan, 1996) 1-2.

as well as the context provided by the Cold War unified this otherwise rich body of thought. In line with realism's state-centric, military-focused and stability-oriented outlook Cold War Security Studies focused on the security of states, emphasised the military dimension and privileged the maintenance of the status quo. By the end of the 1980s Cold War security thinking could no longer account for the developments taking place in Eastern Europe let alone other parts of the world. This was because the students of Cold War Security Studies expected the future to be more of the same: a ceaseless power struggle, balancing and bandwagoning of sovereign states. As Hugh Gusterson argued, the 'telling failure' of Cold War Security Studies was not that 'it did not predict what actually happened, but that [it was] to a striking degree unable to even entertain the possibility of its happening.'²⁹ The 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe caught Cold War Security Studies unaware, laying bare not only its limitations but also the lack of grounds for its claim to 'knowledge.'

Cold War Critics of Security Thinking

The prevalence of Cold War Security Studies notwithstanding, alternative ways of thinking about security had begun to emerge from the 1960s onwards. This section will discuss three main strands of criticism brought against the mainstream thinking by students of Alternative Security, Peace Research and Third World security.

²⁸ Simon Dalby, Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics (London: Pinter, 1990).

²⁹ Hugh Gusterson, 'Missing the End of the Cold War in International Security,' in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

Alternative Security Thinking

Among those who refused to return to security-business-as-usual with the onset of the Cold War from the mid-1970s onwards was a school of thought that came to be known as the Alternative Security thinkers. Students of Alternative Security took up the issues raised during the détente era and carried them further by seeking ways of mitigating the security dilemma and focusing on non-offensive defence (NOD), nuclear freeze, military confidence-building, democracy and disarmament, individual security and human rights, and alternative security orders.³⁰

Olof Palme, in the introduction he wrote to Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (prepared by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), outlined the main tenets of the arguments put forward by the Alternative Security thinkers. Palme wrote:

Our alternative is common security. There can be no hope for victory in a nuclear war, the two sides would be united in suffering and destruction. They can survive only together. They must achieve security not against the adversary but together with him. International security must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.³¹

In this way, Alternative Security thinkers were rejecting zero sum approaches to security, that is, thinking and practices based on the assumption that in an adversarial relationship one's gain is the other's loss. Most of Cold War security

324. Also see Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

³⁰ Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (London: Pan Books, 1982); Bjorn Møller, Common Security and Non-offensive Defence : A Neorealist Perspective (London: UCL Press, 1992); Gene Sharp, Making Europe Inconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defence (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985); idem, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980); Colin McInnes, 'Alternative Defence,' in Security and Strategy in the New Europe, ed. Colin McInnes (London: Routledge, 1992) 130-1.

thinking, particularly nuclear strategic theorising, was based on this zero sum conception of security.³²

Criticising the fashioning of defence policies on zero sum conceptions of security, Alternative Security thinkers argued that, since both sides stand to lose in the event of a nuclear war, it was in the interest of both sides to work together to prevent it from happening. They further argued that the security dilemma could be mitigated through confidence-building, adopting NOD postures and stabilising inter-state relations through strengthening interdependence.³³ By way of showing how security practices need not be zero sum in order to further security, students of Alternative Security attempted to address one of the issues central to Critical Security Studies: alternative security practices.³⁴

However, it should be noted that much of the thinking done on Alternative Security and especially non-offensive defence during this period was in reference to European security. As was the case with the rest of Cold War security thinking, little research was undertaken on the applicability of ideas, originally conceived for the Western European context, to other parts of the world.³⁵ Indeed, in order to make the adoption in the Third World of the principles of common security and in particular the NOD postures possible, a major re-thinking

³¹ Common Security, ix.

³² A significant exception to zero sum thinking among the 'golden-age' strategic thinkers is Thomas Schelling. See Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); idem, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Also see Richard Ned Lebow, 'Thomas Schelling and Strategic Bargaining,' International Journal (Summer 1996) 555-76.

³³ Møller, Common Security and Non-offensive Defense.

³⁴ Many of the ideas produced by alternative security thinkers were similar to those voiced by the feminists. See, J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

³⁵ Bjørn Møller and Håkan Wiberg, 'Introduction,' in Non-offensive Defence for the Twenty-first

would be required as to how to make them compatible with sustainable development in the Third World.³⁶

The policies advocated by the Alternative Security thinkers that sought greater mutual transparency and a shift from offensive to non-offensive military postures helped shape Gorbachev's 'new thinking' during the late 1980s. Gorbachev's embracing of the policies advocated by the Alternative Security thinkers, in turn, helped revolutionise threat perceptions and political relations across Europe. Towards the end of the 1980s, there came a time when Soviet policy on arms control and disarmament was proceeding more quickly than the treaties being negotiated.³⁷

Peace Research

Although it was Gorbachev's adoption of the precepts of Alternative Security thinking that made the headlines, such critical thinking had also begun to manifest itself in the practices of non-state actors such as the US 'Freeze' movement that attempted to halt the nuclear arms race, the UK based Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and END (European Nuclear Disarmament) which prompted a debate centred on the nature of peace and security in Europe after détente.³⁸ According to the 'maximal' approach introduced by Peace Researchers, peace did not just mean the absence of war; it was also related to

³⁶ Century, eds. Bjørn Møller and Håkan Wiberg (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994) 4-7.
³⁶ Møller and Wiberg, 'Introduction,' 6-7; L. Mosjov, 'Common Security and the Third World,' in Policies of Common Security (London: Taylor & Francis with SIPRI, 1985) 77-9.
³⁷ Jane O. Sharp, 'Disarmament and Arms Control,' in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins, 1991) 121.
³⁸ David J. Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies,' in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Booth, 57. For a brief overview of the debate on the concept of and conditions for peace, see Emanuel Adler, 'Condition(s) of Peace,' Review of International Studies 24 (December 1998) 165-91.

the establishment of the conditions for social justice. The distinction Johan Galtung drew between 'personal' and 'structural violence' pointed to the futility of the task of trying to achieve peace without tackling the structural causes of insecurity.³⁹ Kenneth Boulding's conception of 'stable peace,' in turn, was invaluable in emphasising that peace maintained through the threat and use of war cannot be stable.⁴⁰

Although students of Alternative Security had introduced concepts such as individual security and human rights to the security agenda, students of academic Peace Research focused with vigour on individuals and social groups as well as a potential global society as referents for security. They also suggested alternative (non-military, non-zero sum, non-violent) security practices putting special emphasis on peace education and the role of the intellectuals.⁴¹

Where many Peace Researchers were less successful was when they failed to challenge the claim to knowledge heretofore commanded by Cold War Security Studies. Although many valuable works were produced during this period on the causes of war, disarmament, conflict theory, violence and social transformation, the empiricist epistemology adopted by many Peace Researchers did not enable them to credibly contest Cold War Security Studies' claim to knowledge. Academic Peace Research has been a rich tradition and has had students that adopted empiricist epistemologies as well as those with an explicit

³⁹ Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' Journal of Peace Research, 6:3 (1969) 167-92; idem, Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization (London: Sage with International Peace Research Institute, 1996).

⁴⁰ Kenneth Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978).

⁴¹ Paul Smoker, Ruth Davies and Barbara Munske, eds., A Reader in Peace Studies (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1995); Dunn, 'Peace Research versus Strategic Studies,' 56-72.

commitment to normative approaches. However, since neither of these two groups contested the objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship adopted by Cold War Security Studies, they failed to mount a credible challenge to Cold War Security Studies on this epistemological ground.⁴² By failing to adequately lay bare the normative character of Cold War security thinking, students of Peace Research were themselves pushed to the margins whilst their research was labelled as 'propaganda.' This theme will be further developed in the next section.

Third World Security Thinking

Whereas Cold War security thinking in the United States and Western Europe was under challenge by the likes of Alternative Security thinkers, there was relatively little evidence of interest in concepts such as common security or practices such as non-offensive defence in the Third World. This is not to suggest that there were no attempts to adopt non-violent resistance techniques. Mahatma Gandhi remains a noteworthy example of the successful employment of non-violent resistance techniques in a Third World context.⁴³ Indeed, many Third World actors, including some from the Middle East, conducted non-violent political struggles against former colonial powers or their own governments.⁴⁴ It is also worth noting that the *Intifada*, Palestinian peoples' uprising against the

⁴² For a recent attempt to incorporate Critical Theory into Peace Research, see Lee-Anne Broadhead, 'Beyond the Traditions: Casting a Critical Light on Peace Research,' in Issues in Peace Research, 1997-98: Theory and Practice, ed. Lee-Anne Broadhead (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1997) 1-18.

⁴³ Rex Ambler, 'Gandhian Peacemaking,' in A Reader in Peace Studies, eds. Smoker, Davies and Munske, 199-205.

⁴⁴ Brad Bennett, 'Arab-Muslim Cases of Nonviolent Struggle,' in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, eds. Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant and Saad E. Ibrahim (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 41-57; Stephen Zunes, 'Unarmed Resistance in the Middle East and North Africa,' in Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective, eds. Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz and Sarah Beth Asher (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) 41-51.

Israeli regime in the occupied territories, began as non-violent resistance in the late 1980s.⁴⁵ However, as Third World states gained their independence, they also embraced more conventional methods of defence—a process dubbed as the ‘internationalization of the National Security state’ by A.W. Singham.⁴⁶

Where the Third World security discourse differed was the emphasis put on development. The writings of academic Peace Research, especially Galtung’s stress on the structural causes of insecurity struck a chord in the Third World in an era marked by the formation of the non-aligned movement, the Group of 77 and the calls for a New International Economic Order in the United Nations.⁴⁷ The non-aligned movement was composed of a group of states which proclaimed their refusal to ally themselves with either one of the superpowers during the Cold War—though some were closely aligned in practice (such as Egypt). The ideology of the movement constituted a fundamental challenge to mainstream thinking at the time.⁴⁸

During the 1980s, some Third World security experts took up these issues once again. Caroline Thomas, for instance, noted that

a great gulf exists over the basic issue of what constitutes security, and therefore over what constitute the most legitimate, desirable and appropriate methods of pursuing the goal of

⁴⁵ Philip Grant, ‘Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Occupied Territories,’ in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, eds. Crow, Grant and Ibrahim, 59-73; Souad Dajani, ‘Nonviolent Resistance in the Occupied Territories: A Critical Reevaluation,’ in Nonviolent Social Movements, eds. Zunes, Kurtz and Asher, 52-74.

⁴⁶ A.W. Singham, ‘The National Security State and the End of the Cold War: Security Dilemmas for the Third World,’ in Security of Third World Countries, eds. Jasjit Singh and Thomas Bernauer (Aldershot: Dartmouth with UNIDIR, 1993) 7.

⁴⁷ Mosjov, ‘Common Security and the Third World,’ 73-82.

⁴⁸ Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985) 11.

creating a more secure international environment and more security for each individual and state within it.⁴⁹

Thomas differentiated between two different approaches to security. The first approach was adopted by those states in the developed world that were (relatively) satisfied with the status quo and saw security mainly in terms of its maintenance. They privileged the maintenance of stability of the existing system as a foremost security concern.

The second and more holistic approach, argued Thomas, was adopted by those states in the Third World that included economic, political and environmental issues in their security agenda. The search for security in the Third World, noted Thomas, was about maintaining domestic security through state building, establishing secure systems of food, health, money and trade as much as it was about military build-up.⁵⁰ Accordingly, many Third World states saw a change in the status quo not as a threat to but as conducive to security—provided that change came in the desired direction, that is, towards the creation of an international economic structure sensitive to the needs of Third World states.

Although the distinction Thomas drew between the security needs and interests of developed and developing states is helpful to a certain extent, it should be stressed that not all developing states were against the status quo. As Chapter 4 will argue, throughout the Cold War, the conservative regimes of oil-rich Gulf states, especially that of Saudi Arabia, remained suspicious of the anti-

⁴⁹ Caroline Thomas, 'Introduction,' in Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Savaranamuttu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 3.

status quo rhetoric of Egyptian president Nasser, a leader of the non-aligned movement. Furthermore, it was not always the case, as Thomas put it, that '[Western] conception of security was basically top down, while the other [Third World] was bottom up.'⁵¹ Rather, there were both developed states as well as developing states among those that propagated top down views on security. For instance, when some Third World policy-makers spoke of the need to address the non-military dimension of insecurity, they often meant the need to curb down the right to exercise democratic freedoms in the attempt to strengthen the state. The practical implication of this statist approach to security was the state's domination over society where, 'society's sacrifices are perceived as obligations, but the state's privileges justified as necessary to survival,' in Abdul Monem Al-Mashat's words.⁵² Accordingly, those who dared to challenge the security practices of their states were marginalized at best, and accused of treachery and imprisoned at worst.

Bottom up views of security, in turn, were voiced by Western European peace movements. The views of non-state actors in the Third World did not get heard unless they adopted violent practices in the attempt to form a state (as in the case of the Palestine Liberation Organisation) or capture state power in their own countries (as with the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hizbullah). Academic Peace Research provided some—albeit limited—forum for non-state actors' views to be voiced.⁵³

⁵⁰ Thomas, In Search for Security, 1.

⁵¹ Thomas, 'Introduction,' 4.

⁵² Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33.

⁵³ See Abdul Aziz Said, 'A Middle Eastern Peace Strategy,' in Rethinking Peace, eds. Robert Elias and Jennifer Turpin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 166-72; Johan Galtung, Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine (Honolulu: Institute of Peace, University of Hawaii, 1989).

In criticising Cold War Security Studies, students of Third World Security mainly focused on its Western origins. In particular, they drew attention to the fact that it was realism with its black box conception of states that shaped Cold War conceptions and practices of security. Their argument was that in the developed West, threats to security were (and to an extent still are) conceived to stem from outside the state whereas in most parts of the Third World threats to security emanated from inside thereby rendering Western conceptions of security of limited analytical utility within the Third World context.⁵⁴

They further argued that Cold War Security Studies focused on East/West stability and its maintenance through nuclear deterrence and nuclear power balancing, whereas some Third World states had been trying to reject the automatic categorisation of their problems into an East/West framework—as was the case with the non-aligned movement. Cold War security practices will be the focus of Chapter 4. Suffice it say that some Third World states, such as Iran and Syria, were all-too-happy to accept the nuclear umbrella provided by the two superpowers. In other words, not all Third World states were either able or willing to escape the Cold War template. Moreover, as noted above, the economic and military aid provided by the superpowers to their respective allies provided enough incentive for some (such as Turkey) to jump on the bandwagon.

Third World security thinking, then, focused on the Western origins of Cold War Security Studies, which, they argued, rendered its produce less useful

⁵⁴ Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33; Azar and Moon, 'Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity,' 77-101; Ayoob, 'Regional Security and the Third World.' See Chapter 6 for

in other contexts. Their criticisms emphasised the need to look at the domestic sources and non-military dimensions of insecurity in the Third World. Al-Mashat criticised the almost exclusive focus in Cold War Security Studies on crises and conflicts often to the neglect of 'longitudinal security processes' so that

only indicators of power such as military expenditures, weapons systems, types of defence strategies, nuclear capabilities, and deterrence of adversaries have been on the priority list of security studies.⁵⁵

This was a concern Al-Mashat shared with Western European peace movements as well as Peace Researchers, who maintained that Cold War security thinking had become less and less relevant for the security concerns of individuals and social groups in the West.

Much of the critical thinking surveyed above remained on the margins throughout the Cold War. Critics of Cold War security thinking were themselves criticised for their 'normative' or 'political' approaches to international phenomena. The essentially normative approaches of students of Cold War Security Studies, in turn, were presented as 'objective' or 'apolitical.' Such reasoning was substantiated by the commonly held assumptions as to who had relevant 'expertise' to talk about issues related to security. The assumption was that policy-makers, military elite and academic Security Studies knew best when it came to security issues. Feminists, Peace Researchers, Alternative Security thinkers and Third World security experts as well as participants to myriad peace movements around Europe challenged such assumptions. But their views were marginalized by Cold War security experts whose claim to knowledge was

further discussion on this issue.

⁵⁵ Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33.

licensed by an objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship.⁵⁶ The following section will further elaborate on this theme.

Theory/Practice in Cold War Security Thinking

As noted above, the adoption of an objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship resulted in essentially normative theories of Cold War Security Studies masquerading as 'objective' approaches to international phenomena and being viewed as 'knowledge' whilst the writings of their critics were presented as propaganda. The following quotation by John Garnett illustrates how Cold War approaches to security failed to reflect upon the normative character of strategic theorising. Garnett maintained that the moral dimension of military power is

a quite separate subject from strategic studies in that it requires a quite different expertise, and it is therefore unfair to blame specialists in the latter for their lack of competence in it.⁵⁷

Though research in a subject does not necessarily imply approval of it, it would nevertheless be wrong to overlook the normative baggage strategists bring to their subject. For, issues of morality are not optional extras to be left, as Garnett suggested, to 'theologians, philosophers, and political scientists'⁵⁸ only. By choosing to privilege the security of states, often to the detriment of individuals and groups whose security the state, in theory, is there to provide for, state-centric approaches already have intrinsic (if not always explicit) normative commitments. In Garnett's case this commitment manifests itself as statism. In

⁵⁶ Ken Booth, 'War, Security and Strategy: Towards a Doctrine for Stable Peace,' in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Booth, 335-76.

⁵⁷ Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions,' 13.

other words, the moral choice is not in choosing to study nuclear strategy or not, but in deciding what to say about it; and decisions always have moral choices embedded in them.⁵⁹

The objectivist conception of the theory/practice relationship adopted by students of Cold War Security Studies not only helped gloss over the normative character of strategic theorising but also proved crucial in that it did not reveal the mutually constitutive relationship between the two.⁶⁰ Perhaps the best example of the constitutive relationship between security theories and practices is the symbiotic relationship between Security Studies and the Cold War. As noted above, Security Studies is a product of the Cold War. The academic field not only originated in but also thrived upon the Cold War environment. The concepts, assumptions and findings of Cold War Security Studies, in turn, helped sustain the Cold War.

Mary Kaldor's The Imaginary War is an excellent illustration of how Cold War security discourses expressed and legitimised power relationships worldwide, and helped maintain social cohesion within the two blocs thereby sustaining the conflictual relationship between them.⁶¹ Throughout her analysis, Kaldor stressed the role played by strategic theories, explaining how they became representations of politics instead of playing the objective or neutral role

⁵⁸ Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions,' 13.

⁵⁹ Philip Green, 'Strategy, Politics and Social Scientists,' in Strategic Thinking and its Moral Implications, ed. Morton A. Kaplan (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1973) 39-68.

⁶⁰ See Michael C. Williams, 'Identity and the Politics of Security,' European Journal of International Relations 4:2 (1998) 204-25, for an elucidation of how the adoption of an objectivist conception of theory by (neo-)realists was a political practice that helped constitute the world in line with their wishes.

⁶¹ Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

of explanation assigned to them by realist Strategic Studies, and maintained that 'evolving strategies did not necessarily bear much relation to actual military capabilities.'⁶²

Kaldor's argument was that 'the very unreality of strategic discussions contributed to the imaginary nature of the East-West confrontation, allowing it to become a deep, ongoing, unrealisable fear.'⁶³ The role theories play, however, should not be over-emphasised. The growth of actual military capabilities was also influenced 'by institutional factors such as inter-service rivalry, technological innovation or industrial pressure'⁶⁴ that fed into strategic theorising via institutions such as the RAND Corporation which was a major scene of strategic theorising in the United States especially during the 1950s and 1960s.⁶⁵

Not all authors re-considering Cold War history would reach the same conclusions as Kaldor. Colin Gray, for instance, blamed the propagation of 'erroneous' or 'shoddy' ideas, such as stable deterrence, collective security, and arms control, for what he termed Cold War policy 'errors.'⁶⁶ In contrast to Kaldor's starting point, that 'any explanation of natural and social phenomena . . . is partial,'⁶⁷ Gray viewed the theory/practice relationship as one of the prior informing the latter, but very little else. He accordingly saw the academic study of strategy as an objective enterprise that 'can and should provide knowledge useful

⁶² Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 192.

⁶³ Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 192-3.

⁶⁴ Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 192.

⁶⁵ Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon.

⁶⁶ Colin Gray, 'New Directions for Strategic Studies? How Can Theory Help Practice?' Security Studies 1:4 (Summer 1992) 612.

⁶⁷ Kaldor, The Imaginary War, 7.

for official practitioners of strategy.⁶⁸ Consider the following statement by Garnett: 'We need more, not less, objectivity if we are to survive.'⁶⁹ Gray concurred: 'Strategic study (unlike the strategist) is value-neutral and topic-indifferent.'⁷⁰

The positions of Gray and Garnett regarding the theory/practice relationship are similar to that of their conception of theory. Both authors are in favour of and open about the role theories play in informing practice. However, their conception of practice is restricted in that they understand practice as policy-making and implementation at governmental level. In this sense, those who do not engage in issues directly relevant for policy-making are not considered to be engaging with practice. This position hints at a narrow view of politics where it is considered only to do with governance at the state level. This, in turn, flows from the objectivist position adopted by the authors where the study of strategy in particular and academic enterprise in general is viewed as a politics-free zone. This is a powerful move, for once an approach is regarded as 'objective,' others that are critical of it are immediately labelled at best 'subjective' or 'political' in a derogatory sense, and at worst 'propaganda.'

It is not only the conception of practice adopted by Gray and Garnett but also that of theory that is restricted in that that both conceive theory as 'problem-solving theory,' in Robert Cox's terms;⁷¹ it is there to assist policy-makers in

⁶⁸ Gray, 'New Directions for Strategic Studies?' 611.

⁶⁹ Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions,' 22-3.

⁷⁰ Gray, 'New Directions for Strategic Studies?' 626.

⁷¹ Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders.'

solving problems.⁷² Security Studies, in this sense, is supposed to deal with issues that are deemed problematic by policy-makers,⁷³ leaving untouched other issues that do not make it to governmental agendas. This, in turn, created a vicious circle where issues to be put on the security agenda were decided by policy-makers and analysed by those they considered 'experts.' Those who propounded alternative views were dismissed as mere propagandists and the issues they identified, such as 'structural violence,' were not allowed on security agendas. As Chapter 6 will argue, this position is still prevalent in certain strands of security thinking in the post-Cold War era.⁷⁴

Moreover, Garnett argued that strategists, even if they adopted a critical stance (and were allowed to get their voices heard) would not make much difference. He maintained that:

if a conflict-oriented view of international politics has caught the public imagination . . . this is not because it is propagated by strategists but because it offers the man in the street a more plausible interpretation of international reality than any of the alternatives to which he has been exposed.⁷⁵

This statement is yet another manifestation of Garnett's restricted notion of theory (which, in turn, is representative of Cold War thinking on security). After all, what the 'man in the street' views as 'a more plausible interpretation of international reality'⁷⁶ is shaped by theories and discourses that were/are dominant at the time.⁷⁷

⁷² Gray 'New Directions for Strategic Studies?' 629-31.

⁷³ Steve Smith refers to those issues that are considered as 'problems' by policy-makers as 'the tip of the iceberg' in 'Power and Truth: A Reply to William Wallace,' Review of International Studies 23:4 (October 1997) 509.

⁷⁴ See, for example, Steven Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies,' International Studies Quarterly 35:2 (June 1998) 211-39.

⁷⁵ Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions,' 22.

⁷⁶ Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions,' 22.

⁷⁷ For an exploration of this process within the Middle Eastern context, see Edward W. Said's

Garnett's statement also hints at an underestimation of the power of theories in informing not only governmental policies, but also individuals' conceptions of the world. These conceptions that individuals absorb, accept and live uncritically constitute what Gramsci calls 'common sense' which helps sustain the status quo by 'making situations of inequality and oppression appear to them as natural and unchangeable.'⁷⁸ To go back to Kaldor's argument regarding the Cold War, it was the 'imaginary war' discourse of realist Security Studies that informed men and women in North America and Western Europe of the relevance, legitimacy and inescapability of power politics, tough responses, and brinkmanship.

In sum, it was these objectivist conceptions of theory and the theory/practice relationship, a restricted notion of theory as 'problem-solving theory' and practice as governmental policy-making that have, for long, sustained an underestimation of the role theories play in helping constitute 'reality' and narrowed the ethical and political horizons of security thinking and practice. Contra Garnett, the role of theories is not to take these conceptions as given but to try and enter into people's 'common sense' and to present them a critical understanding of their own situation. In order to substantiate this point, the next section will look at the approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle East in juxtaposition to regional actors' approach to security in the Arab Regional System. This is intended as a further illustration of the general

trilogy: Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978; reprint, London: Penguin, 1995); The Question of Palestine, 2nd ed. (London: Vintage, 1992); Covering Islam: How the Media and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, rev. ed. (London: Vintage, 1997).

⁷⁸ David Forgacs, ed., A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935 (London: Lawrence &

point that different peoples with different worldviews have different approaches to security. From a Critical Security Studies perspective, when re-thinking security in the Middle East there is a need to pay attention to what has often been ignored so far—that is, regional peoples' conceptions of security, what they view as the referent(s), how they think security should be sought.

Cold War Thinking About Regional Security

Chapter 3 has so far argued that Cold War security thinking had its origins in the security concerns and interests of Western states, mainly the United States. The implication of this Western bias in Cold War security thinking within the Middle Eastern context has been that much of the thinking done on regional security in the Middle East has been based on Western conceptions of 'security' and 'region'.

Middle Eastern Security Discourse

The approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle East—referred to here as the Middle Eastern security discourse—was designed primarily to maintain the security of Western (mostly US) interests in the region and its military defence against any other external actors (such as the Soviet Union that could jeopardise the regional and/or global status quo). Western security interests in the Middle East during the Cold War era could be summed up as the unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices, the cessation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon, and

Wishart, 1988) 421.

the maintenance of 'friendly' regimes that were sensitive to these concerns. This was (and still is) a top down conception of security that was directed outwards and privileged the maintenance of stability. This section will look at each of these characteristics in turn.

The approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle East was top down because threats to security were defined largely from the perspective of external powers rather than regional actors. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threats to security in the Middle East during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. As will be explained in Chapter 4, three regional security schemes, the Middle East Defence Organisation (1951), the Northern Tier (1953) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the 1978-79 revolution) and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ.⁷⁹

This top down approach to regional security in the Middle East was compounded by a conception of security that was directed outwards—that is, threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the region whereas inside was viewed as a realm of security. Given the number of inter- and intra-state wars in the region during the Cold War, it might seem as an exaggeration to argue that the region was peaceful. The argument here is that the regional status

⁷⁹ Majid Khadduri, 'The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East,' Middle East Journal 11 (Winter 1957) 11-22.

quo was considered to serve the interests of Western policy-makers. Indeed, with the crucial exception of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was generally assumed that threats to security in the Middle East took the form of Soviet intervention and communist infiltration.

Stephen Walt's study, The Origins of Alliances is a good example of how Western conceptions of security were put into use in the attempt to understand security in the Middle East.⁸⁰ Walt's main argument in this study, which was an analysis of alliance patterns in the Middle East, was that in order to maintain security in the Middle East, alliance behaviours of regional states had to be understood. Walt was particularly critical of US policy towards maintaining security in the Middle East via the construction of anti-Soviet alliances, for he believed that regional policy-makers were not as concerned with the threat posed by the Soviet Union as were their Western counterparts. However, although critical of US approaches to security in the region, Walt's conception of regional security remained outward-directed. In other words, he also understood security in the Middle East as one of making the region inviolable to Soviet intervention and communist infiltration. Walt's criticism, in this sense, stemmed from his rejection of the argument that it was necessary to bring regional states under the roof of anti-Soviet alliances (or 'pactomania' as it is referred to in the literature),⁸¹ in order to secure Western interests in the region.⁸² Instead, he maintained that given the fact that most regional policy-makers were more concerned with each other than the Soviet threat (which was the main preoccupation of their Western counterparts) the best the United States could do, in order to maintain the

⁸⁰ Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁸¹ Ken Booth, 'Alliances,' in Contemporary Strategy, eds. Baylis et al., 664.

security of its interests, was to understand the alliance patterns of regional states and manipulate them in accordance with its own concerns.

Walt's conception of regional security did not constitute a deviation from top down, outward-directed and military focused security thinking of mainstream approaches. True to his neo-realist perspective, Walt assumed that international anarchy conditioned regional states to endlessly seek to balance each other in the attempt to maintain security. In fairness to him, it should be noted that he did show some awareness of how non-military factors seemed to shape regional states' alliance behaviours. He noted, for instance, how non-military dimensions of power had an impact on the threat perceptions and alliance behaviours of Arab states. He also noted, albeit with a hint of surprise, how 'a different form of balancing . . . occurred in inter-Arab relations.'⁸³ What he meant by 'a different form of balancing' was that Arab policy-makers chose not to invest primarily in the military sector in the attempt to balance each other. Instead, noted Walt, 'in the Arab world, the most important source of power has been the ability to manipulate one's own image and the image of one's rivals in the minds of other Arab elites.'⁸⁴ In other words, rather than fuelling regional arms races, many Arab policy-makers got involved in a war of images, where, to quote Michael Barnett, 'sticks and stones had little effect, but words could really hurt.'⁸⁵ This is not to suggest that security relations in the region were somehow different from other parts of the world. Rather the argument is that the conception of security adopted by Walt to understand security in the Middle East—which privileged the

⁸² Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 3.

⁸³ Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 149.

⁸⁴ Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 149.

⁸⁵ Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York:

military dimension of security to the neglect of its other dimensions and focused on states as the primary referent—did not suffice in understanding regional security dynamics.

Chapter 3 has so far argued that Cold War security thinking was rooted in the experiences and interests of Western states (and in particular the United States). What was missing from Cold War thinking about regional security in the Middle East was an understanding of regional actors' thinking; that is, what they perceived as threats and how they sought to achieve regional security. Although it could be argued that this was what Walt was trying to do—i.e. bringing regional actors' perspective into his analysis of alliance behaviour—by way of failing to move away from a mainstream (top down, outward-directed and military-focused) conception of security, he ended up neglecting the alternative conceptions and practices of regional actors. Looking at regional actors' conceptualisation of Arab national security should help clarify the argument here.

Arab National Security Discourse

The concept of Arab national security was developed in the aftermath of World War II in reaction to Cold War approaches to regional security in the Middle East that were viewed as a 'euphemism for secure spheres of influence' for either Moscow or Washington.⁸⁶ As Chapter 2 noted, the Arab national security discourse maintained that the representation of this part of the world as the Middle East was intended to underplay the Arab character of this part of the world

Columbia University Press, 1998) 3.

⁸⁶ Abdel Monem Said Aly Abdel Aal, 'The Superpowers and Regional Security in the Middle East,' in Regional Security in the Third World, ed. Ayoob, 198.

and to 'tear up' the 'Arab homeland' as a distinct unit.⁸⁷ The spatial representation Arab Regional System, Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar argued, could serve better as a key for understanding the interactions among Arab states, with their neighbours and with the international system.⁸⁸

There were two assumptions behind Dessouki and Matar's argument. One is that the security concerns and interests of Arab states could be better understood when viewed in relation to one another. Second, that these concerns were different from if not opposed to those of non-Arab states. These two assumptions, in turn, were rooted in the precepts of pan-Arabist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that shaped Arab peoples' conceptions of 'nationhood.' During this period of incessant struggle against Ottoman and later British and French domination, Arab policy-makers shaped their policies in line with the assumption that their 'shared Arab identity generated a common definition of what threatened their interests.'⁸⁹

The argument above should not be taken to suggest that a pre-existing Arab identity preceded and shaped Arab actors' interests. Although the peoples living on the lands that have historically been called the 'Arabian peninsula' have shared a common language, culture and traditions, the myth of a shared Arab identity was invented in the struggle against colonialism and for political independence during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.⁹⁰ While this

⁸⁷ Abdel Monem Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus: Arab Perceptions of Security,' The International Spectator xxxi:4 (1996) 26-7.

⁸⁸ Summarised in Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus,' 26-27.

⁸⁹ Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, 223. Also see Gamal Abdel Nasser, 'The Egyptian Revolution,' Foreign Affairs 32:2 (1955) 199-211.

⁹⁰ See, Maxime Rodinson, The Arabs, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (London: Croom Helm, 1981)

notion of a shared Arab identity helped organise resistance at the state as well as sub-state level against external actors, it, at the same time, restrained their actions in that demands made in line with the precepts of Arab national security often clashed with that of state security. Indeed, as Abdel Monem Said Aly argued, 'it is very difficult to find any conceptualisation of security perceptions that is not coloured by a pan-Arab perspective.'⁹¹ It is worth quoting him at length:

Most of the Arab literature on security perceptions is based on the notion that Arabs have common security needs, even when the much narrower security perceptions of one or another Arab state are being represented. Major research centres in the Arab world take it as a point of departure and analysis. The annual Arab Strategic Report of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo takes the Arab world as a point of departure for analysis of Arab relations with neighbours and the world; The States of the Arab Nation, annual report of the Center for Arab Unity Studies in Beirut, takes a similar approach, the studies of the Arab Thought Forum in Amman do not deviate from the same tradition.⁹²

It should be noted that early conceptualisations of Arab national security referred to the security of the society of Arab peoples, i.e. the trans-state entity of the Arab nation. However, as more and more Arab states became independent, there emerged a tension between the demands of 'state security' and 'societal security.' Practical manifestations of this interplay between state security and societal security will be explored in Chapter 4. Suffice it to say that during the 1950s and 1960s, when Nasser was at the peak of his popularity, he adopted the early, more societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security and used the Arab national security discourse as a tool in the attempt to nudge his fellow

esp. pp. 1-47. Fatima Mernissi relates how the Berber identity of Moroccan peoples was downplayed in favour of an Arab identity that was perceived to be a better tool to fight French colonialism. See Fatima Mernissi, Peçenin Ötesi: İslam Toplumunda Kadın-Erkek Dinamikleri [Beyond the Veil: Male-female Dynamics in Muslim Society], trans. Mine Kürkçü (Istanbul: Yayınevi Yayıncılık, 1995) 41.

⁹¹ Said Aly, 'Shattered Consensus,' 26.

⁹² Said Aly, 'Shattered Consensus,' 27. Also see Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism,' in The Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO:

Arab policy-makers into his line. In the long run, Nasser's interventionism led to the decline of his conceptualisation of Arab national security; conservative Arab regimes of the Gulf felt threatened by his moves and in reaction adopted more and more statist approaches.

These developments informed theory; in time, a more state-centric conceptualisation of Arab national security developed in the literature. When putting forward the Arab Regional System as an alternative representation, Dessouki and Matar were also laying down the precepts of this more state-centric conceptualisation of Arab national security.⁹³ However, the societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security did not disappear; it remained in the background, continuing to shape and be shaped by the practices of non-state actors, especially intellectuals and grassroots organisations.

Arab national security discourse constituted a development over Cold War approaches to regional security in two ways. First, it was generated by peoples in this part of the world and reflected (some, if not all of) their security concerns that did not make into the agendas set by the Middle Eastern security discourse. Issues such as food, economic and water security were invariably presented as Arab national security issues. However, as will be seen in Chapter 4, these issues were almost always viewed from a statist perspective.

Lynne Rienner, 1994) 161-78.

⁹³ Also see Abdullah Toukan, 'Arab National Security Issues: Perceptions and Policies,' in Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East, Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) 33-72.

Second, the Arab national security discourse partially did away with the top down perspective of the Cold War approaches—only partially because it substituted the top down perspective of the United States with the statist and top down perspectives of the Arab states that often acted in defiance of the concerns of peoples and social groups. Indeed this state-centric conceptualisation of Arab national security left little room for the concerns of individuals and social groups that chose to define themselves with reference to other dimensions of their identity such as gender or (in the case of non-Muslims) religion. This thinking stemmed basically from an outward-directed conception of security that assumed threats to Arab national security to stem from outside the Arab Regional System, that is, from non-Arabs. Inside was assumed to be a realm of peace and security.⁹⁴ In this sense, the criticisms the Arab national security discourse voiced against that of Middle Eastern security stemmed not so much from its state-centric or outward-directed conception of security, but from its referent, the Middle East.

In sum, albeit cognisant of non-military dimensions of security, students of Arab national security embraced the state-centric and zero sum approach of the Cold War security discourse. Students of Arab national security called for a broader conception of security to study the security needs and concerns of Arab *states*. This amounted, on the one hand, to the privileging of (military and non-military) threats to the security of Arab *states* thereby marginalizing the concerns of individuals and social groups. On the other hand, this meant that the relations between Arab states and their non-Arab counterparts (the Arab-Israeli

⁹⁴ Also see Toukan, 'Arab National Security Issues,' 33-72.

relationship, for instance) were understood as being governed by the outward-directed, zero sum and military-focused conceptions and practices of security characteristic of Cold War security discourse—an approach of which they were otherwise highly critical.⁹⁵

Conclusion

Chapter 2 argued that regions are geopolitical inventions that have their roots in the security conceptions and practices of their inventors. The Middle East, it was argued, was invented to serve the security interests of Britain and later the United States. Chapter 3 has sought to historicize and contextualise Cold War security thinking and showed how Cold War Security Studies had its origins in the security concerns and interests of the very same states that invented and shaped the Middle East. The chapter explored the Cold War and Western (mainly US) origins of the concept of security. It was argued Cold War Security Studies focused on the security of states, emphasised the military dimension and privileged the status quo.

The chapter also presented a brief overview of critiques of Cold War Security Studies provided by Alternative Security thinkers, Peace Researchers and Third World experts. The aim was to show how, despite the prevalence of the Cold War security discourse, alternative ways of thinking about security

⁹⁵ For an incisive overview of Israel's security thinking see Dan Horowitz, 'The Israeli Concept of National Security,' in National Security and Democracy in Israel, ed. Avner Yaniv (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993) 11-53; Yaiv Evron, 'Deterrence Experience in the Arab-Israeli Conflict,' in Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge, eds. Aharon Kleiman and

existed during the Cold War. Emphasis was put on the critiques presented by Alternative Security thinkers and Peace Researchers of zero sum conceptions and practices of security, which were characteristic of the Cold War security discourse. Their efforts to suggest alternative practices to provide security for referents other than states was also emphasised. Third World security experts, in turn, emphasised the Western origins of Cold War security discourse, and emphasised the need to look at the domestic dimension of security, especially state-building.

Another focus of Chapter 3 was conceptualisations of the theory/practice relationship in Cold War Security Studies. The argument was that a scientific-objectivist conception of theory and theory/practice relationship gave Cold War Security Studies its command over knowledge, whilst its critics, many of whom shared a similar understanding of theory, failed to challenge it on this epistemological ground. It was also argued that the objectivist understanding of the theory/practice relationship adopted by the students of Cold War Security Studies obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between Cold War security thinking and practices, the ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the Cold War whilst seeking to explain it. A final implication of adopting an objectivist conception of theory was that the Western bias in Cold War security thinking was obscured and was presented as 'scientific' knowledge with universal validity.

The final section of the chapter analysed the approach of Cold War Security Studies to regional security in the Middle East in juxtaposition to the Arab national security discourse, the point being that much of the thinking done on regional security in the Middle East has been based on Western conceptions of what 'security' and the 'region' were. The chapter further maintained that even the very act of thinking about security in the Middle East, but not security in the Arab Regional System, gives away the Western origins of one's thinking about regional security.

The Arab national security discourse, the chapter argued, criticised the top down, outward-directed and pro-status quo approach of the Middle Eastern security discourse. Instead it emphasised the need to look at the domestic economic and political dimensions of security. Students of Arab national security further maintained that the relationship between Arab states could not be understood as one of black box states balancing each other through military build-up. Their shared Arab identity, they argued, rendered the relations between Arab states different from any other group of states which did not share such similar characteristics.

Whilst welcoming their critique of Cold War security discourse, the chapter argued that students of Arab national security, notwithstanding their awareness of the significance of domestic political and economic dimensions of security in accounting for the security needs and concerns of Arab states, nevertheless adopted an outward-directed, military-focused and zero sum conception of security when thinking about the security relations between Arab

states and their non-Arab neighbours. Furthermore, it was argued, non-military dimensions of security were almost always studied from a statist perspective, which resulted in the privileging of military and non-military threats to the security of Arab *states* whilst marginalizing the concerns of individuals and social groups. As Chapter 4 (practices) will show, issues such as food and water security were almost always approached from a statist perspective by treating states as primary referents and agents. This, in turn, is an illustration of the broader Critical Security Studies point that broadening security is not enough in itself; it should be compounded by the deepening move to become aware of the political character of thinking about security, moving below and beyond the state for alternative agents and referents, and suggesting alternative practices to meet a broadened agenda.

Chapter 4 : Practices of Security During the Cold War

Chapter 4 concludes Part I by bringing together the arguments made in Chapters 2 and 3 in an attempt to illustrate further the relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security during the Cold War. Here I will look at Cold War security practices in the Middle East to show how they shaped and, in turn, were shaped by contending security discourses and spatial representations. The purpose here is not to compress all actions taken by numerous actors during this period into a chapter—with the risk of gross over-generalisation—but to direct attention to those practices that were designed to achieve regional security. As a result, not all practices will be covered. Rather, the chapter will focus on those attempts to address the problem of regional security.

The chapter is organised along spatial lines. Security practices will be grouped in line with the spatial representation they shaped and were shaped by. The chapter will first look at security practices that were adopted within the framework provided by the dominant spatial representation, 'Middle East.' These practices, it will be argued, were informed by a regional security approach shaped by Cold War Security Studies: the Middle Eastern security discourse. Then, the chapter will turn to look at the practices of regional actors that were

adopted to achieve security in the Arab Regional System in line with the precepts of the Arab national security discourse. The final section of the chapter will provide an account of the practical manifestations of the rivalry between these two contending discourses.

Security in the Middle East

This section will seek to show how the Middle Eastern security discourse shaped the practices of Britain and later the United States in their attempts to secure the Middle East. Although the focus of the discussion here will be on Cold War security practices, it is imperative to provide a brief account of the practices of British policy-makers during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the Middle East was invented.

Britain in the Middle East until the Cold War

Because of the significance of India for British interests, Britain had been concerned with the security of land and sea routes that led to the south of Asia since the very early days of its engagement. Indeed, as Elizabeth Monroe noted, it is difficult to exaggerate how significant India was for Britain until the Indian Independence Act of 1947.¹ Britain's interest in the security of the Gulf increased gradually from the sixteenth century onwards in tandem with the intensification of its involvement in India. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further added to the strategic importance of Egypt as well as the Gulf. The practices British

¹ Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1971, rev. ed. (London: Chatto & Windus, 1981) 11.

policy-makers adopted during this period to secure the Middle East included signing a 'General Treaty of Peace' with Arab tribes of the Gulf to suppress piracy and slave traffic, the capture of Aden (1837) and assuming the responsibility for Bahrain's external affairs in return for the Sheikh of Bahrain's pledge not to prosecute war, piracy and slavery by sea (1880).² In the years to come, Aden and Bahrain (together with Cyprus) were to become significant staging posts to carry out air operations in the Middle East.³ Then, from the late nineteenth century onwards, Britain's grip over the Gulf began to strengthen with the rulers of the emirates and sheikhdoms along the Gulf coast beginning to follow Bahrain's example and choosing to conduct their foreign relations through the British government. In 1899 a treaty was concluded with the Sheikh of Kuwait recognising it as an independent state under British protection.

Britain's search for bases in the region culminated in its occupation of Egypt in 1882, symbolising a shift in British practices from, in Monroe's words, 'security by influence to security by occupation.'⁴ Following Germany's acquisition of a concession from the Ottoman Empire to build a Berlin-Istanbul-Baghdad railway (1903), British policy-makers agreed with their French counterparts that Britain would exchange a 'free hand' in Egypt with a 'free hand' for France in Morocco (1907). This constituted a further shift in British security practices in that British policy-makers had, until then, avoided partitioning Middle Eastern interests with their rivals, preferring to maintain a weak but nevertheless

² Ritchie Owendale, Longman Companion to the Middle East Since 1914, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1998) 3-4.

³ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 183-4.

⁴ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 18.

intact Ottoman Empire.⁵ The agreement with France was followed by a deal with Russia to divide Iran (Persia) into spheres of influence.⁶ By the time World War I broke up, Britain had firmly established its control over the Middle East. The strengthening of British control over the Gulf and Egypt was followed by the construction of railways and roads in the region strengthening the links between the Mediterranean and the Gulf coasts.⁷ These developments not only helped lump these chunks of territory in the minds of British policy-makers but also led to an increase in the region's strategic significance.

The main reason for Britain's interest in securing the Middle East remained India's defence throughout this period. It should also be noted that by 1914 oil discoveries had been made in Iran as well as the Arabian peninsula, which further increased the significance of the area in the eyes of British policy-makers. The Royal Navy had switched from coal to oil in 1912 and although it was the United States that supplied 80 percent of British demand at this stage, and notwithstanding the fact that it still was not known how rich the Middle Eastern reserves were, British policy-makers were nevertheless determined to keep a check on the region's oil reserves.⁸ In 1914, the British government became the majority shareholder in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.⁹ The Anglo-Turkish Oil Company, which exploited the 'hypothetical' oil fields of Iraq, was also controlled by Britain. The Iraqi oil fields were hypothetical because there had yet

⁵ İlber Ortaylı, İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı [The Longest Century of the Empire] (Istanbul: Hil, 1983); Alan Palmer, The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire (London: John Murray, 1992).

⁶ Ovendale, Middle East Since 1914, 6; Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 19.

⁷ C.G. Smith, 'The Emergence of the Middle East,' The Journal of Contemporary History 3:3 (1968) 5.

⁸ Roger Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East: Money, Power and War, 1902-1922 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995) 97-100.

⁹ In 1954, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company became the British Petroleum Company. See Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 98.

to be discovered commercial quantities of oil. Still, this did not prevent British policy-makers from keeping Mosul (where some of these hypothetical oil wells were located) in Iraq when drawing the Iraqi-Turkish border (1926).¹⁰

With the outbreak of World War I, British and French policy-makers sought to support the war effort against the Ottoman Empire by encouraging Arab peoples in the region to revolt against the *Sublime Porte* (the imperial centre). At the same time, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot agreement (1916), partitioning the Arabian peninsula into zones of influence, with France assuming control in the north and Britain in the south.¹¹ The terms of the agreement were not disclosed to Arab peoples who had agreed to incite the revolt in return for the promise of independence.

It is difficult to exaggerate the disappointment Arab peoples who joined the revolt felt when they found out about the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement (which were disclosed by the Bolsheviks after they took power in Russia in 1917). The creation of separate states—Iraq, Jordan (under British mandate), Syria and Lebanon (under French mandate)—further deepened the disappointment of those Arab nationalists who assumed that Arab peoples would become independent as a unified entity after the war.¹² Needless to say, neither British nor French policy-makers were in favour of Arab unification. This was not necessarily because they opposed it in principle, but rather because each feared

¹⁰ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 103-4; Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi [Atatürk's Principles in Foreign Policy-Making and Diplomacy] (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991) 126-31; George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980) 123.

¹¹ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 32-7.

¹² Ahmed M. Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States: Wartime Diplomacy and

the other might enhance its influence if Arab peoples were to unite. Moreover, the partitioning of Arab peoples into separate states and the creation and consolidation of local nationalisms served the purposes of the mandate powers by making it easier to maintain stability.¹³

The inter-war period in the Middle East was dominated by two interrelated themes, namely, the struggle for Arab independence and the emerging deadlock over Palestine. Following the consolidation of the mandate system, the struggle for independence had become the main purpose of Arab nationalists, resulting in the marginalization of the calls for Arab unity.¹⁴ The aim of the Jewish movement at this stage was to ensure unlimited immigration and settlement in Palestine. National independence within Palestine was also the aim of Palestinian Arabs. The point here is that although the urge to independent statehood took precedence over unification among Arab actors, the latter was never kept off the agendas for reasons to do with the salience of the Palestine issue. For, it was not only the fear of an emergent Jewish state, but also the plight of the Palestinian peoples that bolstered the Arab national security discourse. As will be seen in the next section, the strength of Arab peoples' feelings on the Palestinian issue made it impossible for regional policy-makers (even those who were rather sceptical of pan-Arabism such as the Saudi leadership) to ignore it.

Inter-Arab Politics, 1941 to 1945 (London: Longman, 1977) 3; David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: Creating the Modern Middle East, 1914-22 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1989).

¹³ Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 26-9.

¹⁴ Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 5.

In order to cope with Arab actors' increasingly vociferous calls for independence and a solution to be found to the Palestinian conflict, British policy-makers followed a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they granted nominal independence to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan and encouraged their leaders to consolidate their own regimes, the assumption being that the region would be easier to control if it remained divided into smaller units. In 1921, when setting up Jordan and Iraq as separate states, Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill had reached an understanding with their leaders that they would contain the Arab nationalist movement and help maintain the status quo in the region.¹⁵ On the other hand Britain also sought to ensure the co-existence of two separate communities in Palestine by perpetuating existing divisions and appearing to favour both sides. In other words, British efforts to stall Arab unification efforts were also designed to prevent the formation of a unified Arab front to confront the Jewish agency that represented the Jews in Palestine.¹⁶

Although the policy of divide-and-rule seems to have worked for a while, as the pace of Jewish migration into Palestine quickened in the mid-1930s, Arab disgruntlement over the existing situation reached its peak, which culminated in the Palestine Arab revolt of 1936 that lasted intermittently until 1939. By the time World War II broke out, an 'uneasy truce'¹⁷ prevailed in Palestine. Outlining the situation in the region at the outbreak of the War, Ritchie Ovendale wrote the following:

On outbreak of war against Germany, Iraq breaks off relations with Germany. Turkey is neutral. Those areas of the former

¹⁵ Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 26.

¹⁶ Mohammed Heikal, Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations (London: Harper Collins, 1996) 50-85.

¹⁷ Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 16.

Ottoman Empire under British or French control are non-belligerent but within the war zone. The Suez Canal and retention of India is of strategic and political importance to Britain. Protection of oil supplies from Iraq is also important. Egypt is Britain's Mediterranean base. The Allies regard the Middle East as secure.¹⁸

Judging by the top down, military-focused and outward-directed conception of regional security adopted by British (and other allied) policy-makers, the Middle East could indeed have been considered 'secure'; regional stability was not under threat by any local or external actor.

At the end of World War II, the significance of the Middle East further increased in the eyes of Western policy-makers. For Britain, following the India Independence Act of 1947 the Middle East had ceased to be important for where it was, that is, on the route to India, but what it was—a region housing a significant portion of the world's known oil reserves. Following the declaration of the Marshall Plan (1947), the stable flow of oil from the Middle East rose higher on the US security agenda as well. By now, the Middle East's contribution to world oil production had increased considerably. In 1938, one year before the start of World War II, the region's production amounted to less than one-twentieth of the world oil output. By 1948, the ratio had become one-eighth.¹⁹ The security of the stable flow of oil, together with checking Soviet expansion and the well-being of the state of Israel, were to become the pillars of US approach to regional security in the Middle East.

This period of increasing US interest in Middle Eastern oil coincided with the advances the Soviet government made to Iran and Turkey in the immediate

¹⁸ Ovendale, The Middle East Since 1914, 15.

aftermath of World War II. Although it could be (and has indeed been) argued that there was sparse evidence of Soviet expansionism in the Middle East until well after Khrushchev's ascent to power,²⁰ security assessments of British and US policy-makers suggested otherwise. Indeed, the demands the Soviets made from Iran and Turkey in the immediate aftermath of World War II were considered as instances that signalled the emerging tension between the Soviet Union and the United States—a tension that culminated in the Cold War.²¹

Securing the Middle East During the Cold War

The demands Soviet policy-makers made from Turkey in the aftermath of World War II included making the renewal of its 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with Turkey conditional on the latter's surrendering of Kars and Ardahan, two eastern provinces, and the revision of the Montreaux convention governing the Turkish Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) so that they would gain a say in their control. Although Soviet policy-makers retreated from their demands, and denied any breach of Iranian sovereignty or attempts to change its regime during its occupation of the north of Iran towards the end of the War, both Iran and Turkey soon joined anti-Soviet alliances with the West.²² This is not to suggest that it was purely Stalin's threats and demands that caused these two states to ally with the West. On the contrary, the Soviet threat seems to have

¹⁹ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 95.

²⁰ Adeed Dawisha, 'The Soviet Union in the Arab World: The Limits to Superpower Influence,' in The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Perspectives and Policies, eds. Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha (London: Heinemann, 1982) 8-23.

²¹ Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980). Also see Malcolm Yapp, 'Soviet Relations with Countries of the Northern Tier,' in The Soviet Union in the Arab World, eds. Dawisha and Dawisha, 25-6.

²² Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East; Rouhollah K. Ramazani, 'Iran and the United States: An Experiment in Enduring Friendship,' Middle East Journal 30 (Summer 1970) 324-5.

been used by both Iranian and Turkish policy-makers for domestic security purposes, to curb down the 'extreme' left and re-inscribe Iranian and Turkish state identities as staunch Western allies thereby strengthening their economic as well as military relations with the United States.²³

Although both Iran and Turkey had their own reasons to join anti-Soviet alliances, the same could not be said about the Arab states of the region. Nor did Soviet policy-makers pursue a consistent policy towards Arab states well until the mid-1950s. It should also be noted that the Soviets had little direct economic interest in the region other than disrupting those of the West,²⁴ and complicating the US strategic position thereby drawing Western capability away from the Soviet Union.²⁵

Even during the mid-1950s when Egypt turned to the Soviet Union, or the late 1960s when Soviet policy-makers adopted the policy of 'Collective Security in Asia,'²⁶ it was more the pressure US and British policy-makers put on regional states to join anti-Soviet alliances or to grant military bases, rather than mere Soviet inducement that enabled it to become a force in Arab politics.²⁷ For, the policy-makers of the newly independent Arab states in the Middle East had

²³ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğu'suna Karşı Politikası [Turkish Policy Towards Arab Middle East] (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972) 36-7; Ramazani, 'Iran and the United States.'

²⁴ Sharam Chubin, 'Soviet Policy Towards Iran and the Gulf,' in Regional Security in the Middle East, ed. Charles Tripp (Aldershot: Gower with the IISS, 1984) 125-74; Dawisha, 'The Soviet Union in the Arab World,' 10.

²⁵ Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987) 222. Also see pp. 183-210 and 220-6.

²⁶ Ian Clark, 'Collective Security in Asia: Towards a Framework for Soviet Diplomacy,' The Round Table (October 1973) 473-81; Ken Booth and Lee Dowdy, 'Soviet Security Interests in the Indian Ocean Region,' in Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual, ed. David R. Jones, 6 (1982) 342.

²⁷ Dawisha, 'The Soviet Union in the Arab World,' 8.

already made it clear that they did not wish to enter into an alliance with any Western power. With the exception of Iraq, most Arab states did not perceive the Soviet Union or communist infiltration to be the most significant threat to their security. Indeed, many assumed that sheer geographical distance would deter the Soviet Union from undertaking any military attack.²⁸

Even in Iraq (which was geographically closer to the Soviet Union) the anti-colonial and anti-Western mood of the public made it difficult to enter into an alliance with the West. The experience of the 1948 Treaty of Portsmouth signed between Iraq and Britain, which had to be repudiated within a week because of public outcry in Iraq, had showed how strong Arab public opinion was on the issue of any concessions given to former colonial powers. The event also showed how security conceptions of Iraqi peoples differed from their regime, which was in favour of the sustenance of close military links with Britain for domestic security purposes. It is also worth noting here that the 1948 protest by Iraqi peoples was one of the few instances of the successful employment of non-violent action.²⁹

When it became clear that regional states would no longer be as subservient to British security interests as they were in the past, British policymakers decided to adopt an alternative approach. Instead of seeking to maintain military bases by conducting bilateral agreements, they sought to create a regional security organisation to which Britain would be a party. It was hoped

²⁸ Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, 'Egyptian Foreign Policy,' *Foreign Affairs* 56 (July 1978) 720.

²⁹ Brad Bennett, 'Arab-Muslim Cases of Nonviolent Struggle,' in *Arab Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East*, eds. Ralph E. Crow, Phillip Grant and Saad Eddin Ibrahim (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 47-8.

that this would not only enable Britain to maintain access to military bases in the Middle East, but also do this in a cost-effective manner whilst avoiding the animosity of an increasingly bitter Arab public opinion. They also hoped that creating a region-wide defence organisation would be more attractive to Arab policy-makers than the maintenance of purely British military bases and bilateral alliances. The idea of forming a Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) modelled after the British Middle East Command of WWII emerged when thinking along these lines.³⁰

British policy-makers were not mistaken in their calculations. The Iraqi government embraced the idea of re-packaging its treaty with Britain by putting it into a multilateral format as opposed to its current form (a bilateral treaty with a former colonial power).³¹ Turkish policy-makers were also keen in participating in the formation of MEDO not so much because they believed such an organisation would help maintain regional security, but rather because they wished to strengthen their relations with the West (the United States in particular). As a part of the deal British and Turkish policy-makers struck in the aftermath of World War II, the former was to help Turkey become a NATO member in exchange for the latter helping set up a regional security organisation in the Middle East. During this period, Turkish policy-makers also sought to present Turkey as a 'bridge' between the West and Middle East, an actor that could persuade half-hearted Arab policy-makers to join an alliance with the West. In other words, for

³⁰ Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 155-6; John C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958) 40.

³¹ Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 284; Ara Sanjiyan, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact,' Middle Eastern Studies 33:2 (April 1997) 235-7.

Turkish policy-makers the proposed Middle East regional security schemes constituted means to an end—that is, becoming a NATO member.³²

It is significant to note here that in Spring 1951 Turkey was invited by the Egyptian government to join an alternative regional security scheme that would have brought together Turkey with the members of the Arab League to create a professedly non-aligned bloc in the region. The proposal failed to generate any interest among Turkish policy-makers who did not consider non-alignment a feasible policy option and had already set their eyes on NATO membership.³³ Later in 1951, soon after its refusal of the Egyptian proposal, Turkey joined Britain, France and the United States to formulate a proposal for the creation of a Middle East Defence Organisation. The aim was to initially establish MEDO with five members (Britain, Egypt, France, Turkey and the United States) and gradually increase the membership. Egypt's participation in the scheme was crucial for its success, but this never occurred. The Egyptian government rejected the proposal within two of days of receiving it, making it evident that it was not given much consideration.³⁴

Notwithstanding the Egyptian refusal, both Britain and Turkey were still in favour of setting up the Organisation basing it in Cyprus instead of Egypt. The United States, on the other hand, was sceptical as to whether a Middle East

³² Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğu'suna Karşı Politikası, 36-7, 71-2. Also see Kemal Karpat et al., Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975); Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976); Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan, eds., Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987); Sûha Bölükbaşı, Türkiye ve Yakınındaki Ortadoğu [Turkey and the Nearer Middle East] (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1992).

³³ Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 520.

³⁴ Campbell, Defence of the Middle East, 43.

Defence Organisation without Arab participation would serve the purpose of making the Middle East inviolable to Soviet intervention.³⁵ At this stage US policy-makers had become aware of the hesitance on the part of Arab states of entering into an alliance with their former colonial powers, France and Britain. However, they were still oblivious to the degree to which Arab governments did not accord the same significance to the Soviet threat as they did.

The argument here is that behind Egypt's rejection of the MEDO proposal lay the discrepancy between contending approaches to regional security: Nasser's Arab national security discourse and the Middle Eastern security discourse of the United States. The MEDO initiative helped crystallise the differences between these two contending approaches in a way that had not become clear before, solidifying the Arab/non-Arab distinction that was to become central to Arab national security thinking. The regional actors' practices (which were shaped by the Arab national security discourse) will be looked at in the next section. It should suffice to note here that the fact that Nasser extended an invitation to Turkey, in early 1951, to join a non-aligned pact with the Arab League members indicated that he intended to construct a more inclusive regional security scheme with the inclusion of some non-Arab states.³⁶ In other words, at this stage, Nasser's Arab national security discourse was defined against former colonial powers, and not all non-Arab states. It took two more episodes, namely, the Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact, for the Arab/non-Arab distinction to become more central to his discourse.

³⁵ George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (New York: StMartin's Press, 1990),153-4.

The proposal for the creation of a Northern Tier scheme was put forward by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who came to conclude that those states that had the Soviet Union as their northern neighbour were more 'conscious' of the Soviet threat and were therefore more ready to enter into bilateral or multilateral military assistance agreements, if not to join regional security scheme with the West.³⁷ The assumption behind Dulles' thinking, an assumption shared by Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, was that those Arab states (such as Egypt) that did not prioritise the Soviet threat were not aware of what the 'real' threats to their security were and therefore not ready for cooperation with the West.³⁸ Dulles hoped that Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Pakistan could be convinced to enter into an anti-Soviet alliance, thereby creating the Northern Tier, a regional security scheme made up of an association of local forces under an indigenous command.³⁹ The provision of US military assistance was hoped to constitute enough of a reason for these states to join the scheme.

US policy-makers were encouraged in their thinking by their Turkish and Iraqi counterparts who were keen to receive US military and economic aid.⁴⁰ Indeed, following Dulles' tour in 1953 of the Northern Tier, Turkish and Iraqi policy-makers took the initiative and began to look for ways of cooperation. In April 1954 Turkey and Pakistan signed a defence cooperation agreement. In February 1955 Turkey and Iraq signed a separate text agreeing to 'cooperate for their security and defence.' Later in the year, the Turco-Iraqi agreement became

³⁶ Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact,' 238.

³⁷ Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 283.

³⁸ Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, 70; Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact,' 231; McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection.

³⁹ Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact,' 227.

⁴⁰ Sanjian, 'The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact.'

the Baghdad Pact, with Pakistan, Britain and Iran's adherence. In short, initiatives made for the creation of a low-profile Northern Tier scheme led to the formation of the more ambitious Baghdad Pact. Hesitant to further alienate the Egyptian government the United States declined to join the Pact, but maintained 'full cooperation,' which meant that it provided economic and military aid.⁴¹ With US membership to the Baghdad Pact not forthcoming, Britain's membership put the Iraqi government in a very difficult position by exposing it to the criticism that the Pact allowed Britain to 'leave by the door but come back by the window.'⁴² The disgruntlement among Iraqi population culminated in the Iraqi coup of 1958 and the fall of the Hashemite dynasty that had been installed in power by Britain in 1921.

Following the Iraqi revolution, Baghdad Pact headquarters was moved from Baghdad to Ankara. The name was changed from the 'Baghdad Pact' into 'Central Treaty Organisation' (CENTO).⁴³ It is difficult to know whether the Baghdad Pact/CENTO ever served as a deterrent against potential Soviet attack. It is highly likely that its main contribution remained in the field of development, by providing economic as well as technological aid transfer to member states.⁴⁴ It supported member-states in their state building efforts thereby helping raise the standard of living as well as maintaining regime security.

⁴¹ Nigel John Ashton, 'The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-1958,' Review of International Studies 25 (1993) 123-37.

⁴² Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 286.

⁴³ Guy Hadley, CENTO—The Forgotten Alliance: A Study of the Central Treaty Organisation (Sussex: Institute for the Study of International Organisation, University of Sussex, 1971).

⁴⁴ Hadley, CENTO, 36-8.

Although the Baghdad Pact/CENTO had little practical impact from 1959 onwards, it remained a symbol of the discrepancy between the two contending approaches to regional security in the years to come. Writing in 1978, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal pointed to the Iraqi coup and the demise of the Baghdad Pact as a decisive moment of clash between the two security discourses. In the following three decades, the Arab national security discourse failed to prevail over that of the Middle East or put the aims behind the formation of the Arab League Collective Security Pact into practice (see the next section). US policy-makers made no more attempts to create an all-encompassing regional security scheme, but concentrated on key states, namely Iran, Turkey and Israel (increasingly on the latter from the 1970s onwards) whilst trying to prevent the prevalence of Nasser's approach to regional security.

The argument so far should not be taken to suggest that the practices of British and later US policy-makers were designed purely to divide-and-rule and to maintain regional stability. On the contrary, British practices during the colonial period included building up an infrastructure as well as enhancing transportation and communication links between different parts of the region. Although these were done partly to make the control of the region easier, enhanced communication and transportation facilities also helped strengthen the pan-Arab movement by enabling peoples to become more aware of their shared characteristics and cooperate and collaborate at the grassroots level.⁴⁵ Later, during the 1950s, successive US governments poured military as well as economic aid into the region in the attempt to win hearts and minds. The

⁴⁵ Cecil A. Hourani, 'The Arab League in Perspective,' Middle East Journal 1 (April 1947) 127.

economic development of Turkey, for instance, owed a lot to US aid. However, notwithstanding such constructive attempts to enhance Western influence in the region, other practices such as the maintenance of the mandate system or attempts to bloc Arab unity efforts alienated many Arab actors who ranked de-colonisation through closer cooperation and collaboration among Arab actors high on their security agenda. The next section will look at the practices of regional actors that were shaped by and, in turn, shaped the Arab Regional System, before presenting, in the third section, an overview of the practical manifestations of the competition between two contending security discourses.

Security in the Arab Regional System

It has so far been argued that the security practices adopted by the United States and its allies during the Cold War were shaped by and, in turn, shaped the Middle East security discourse. It was further argued that some, such as Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish policy-makers, also shaped their practices in line with the Middle Eastern security discourse, albeit for reasons of their own—be it rapid development with the help of US economic and military aid and/or regime security. Arab policy-makers, on the other hand, with the exception of their Iraqi counterparts, were rather hesitant to enter into anti-Soviet alliances with the West. There were three main reasons for this. First, they did not consider the threat posed by the Soviet Union so significant as to be ranked above all other security concerns. In response to Dulles' invitation to join the Northern Tier scheme, Nasser is reported to have said:

How can I go to my people and tell them I am disregarding a killer with a pistol sixty miles from me at the Suez Canal to worry about someone who is holding a knife 5000 miles away?⁴⁶

Nasser clearly saw the cessation of British presence in Egypt as the priority as far as the stability of his regime was concerned. This ties into the second reason why Arab policy-makers were hesitant to join anti-Soviet alliances in that they were more concerned with issues of de-colonisation and achieving political and economic sovereignty.⁴⁷ Saudi Arabia and Yemen did not have a colonial history, but were also interested in issues of de-colonisation, particularly because of their interest in the Palestinian peoples' predicament, which constituted the third reason why the Soviet threat did not dominate regional security agendas. The Palestine issue occupied many Arab peoples' minds making it very difficult for even conservative regimes not known for their pan-Arab credentials (such as that of Saudi Arabia) to keep it off their own security agendas.

Indeed, as Edward Said has noted, the issue of Israel/Palestine has been 'a symbol for struggle against social injustice' in the Arab world. During the Egyptian student demonstrations of the early 1970s, wrote Said, a frequent slogan was: 'We are all Palestinians.'⁴⁸ The Israel/Palestine issue and the very inability of Arab regimes to find a solution to the plight of the Palestinian peoples was used to voice a number of other issues such as development, economic and social justice, democratisation. Given the linkages Arab peoples established between the question of Israel/Palestine and that of regional security, it is no

⁴⁶ H.W. Brands, Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918-1961 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 277.

⁴⁷ Steve Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,' in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugo Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 147-72.

⁴⁸ Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, 2nd ed. (London: Vintage, 1992) 125.

wonder that schemes such as MEDO or the Baghdad Pact (which were not only initiated by the former colonial powers but also threatened to marginalize issues that were on top of regional peoples' security agendas) were deemed unacceptable. So much so that, even those more conservative states, which practically distanced themselves from the Arab national security discourse from the late 1950s onwards, found it difficult to publicly denounce its precepts. The Iraqi regime, which did denounce the main principle of Arab national security by joining the Baghdad Pact, was toppled by its own peoples in 1958.

As noted in Chapter 3, during their struggle against former colonial powers, many Arab actors assumed that their 'shared Arab identity generated a common definition of what threatened their interests.'⁴⁹ The leaders of the pan-Arab movement, when they agreed to rebel against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, believed that Arab peoples would become independent as a unified entity in exchange for their efforts. The partitioning of the Arabian peninsula into separate (but not yet sovereign or independent) states and their allocation to Britain and France as the mandatory powers, and the reluctance of British policymakers to prevent the inflow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine or purchase land away from the Palestinians, only added to the disillusionment of Arab peoples and increased the calls for a unified Arab front to be formed to address these issues.

However, although the appeal of Arab unification for Arab peoples made it difficult for regional regimes to openly oppose it, they made little effort to think

⁴⁹ Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 223.

of ways of achieving Arab unity. On the contrary, Arab leaders were busy minimising the threats posed to their regimes by their fellow Arab leaders. In 1936, to minimise such interference in each others' internal affairs, Saudi Arabia and Iraq concluded the 'Treaty of Arab Brotherhood and Alliance' to which Yemen acceded one year later. Although the treaty was presented as comprising 'collective security arrangements,' it did not amount to more than an affirmation of respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and a declaration of intention to cooperate closely on all fields, including security (understood as defence).⁵⁰ The formation of the Arab League was to constitute a firmer step taken in the same direction.

As noted above, the accelerating pace of Jewish immigration into Palestine during the 1930s had further increased the calls for Arab unity and accelerated Arab actors' efforts to come up with ideas as to what shape Arab unification should take. The 1936 Arab revolt in Palestine was one manifestation of the struggle on the part of Arab actors to come up with ways of countering the increasing pace of Jewish immigration and land purchases which signalled the establishment of a Jewish state. Conferences organised by Britain during the 1930s and 1940s to discuss the Palestine issue increased Arab representatives' awareness of their differences whilst helping them realise the need to create an Arab body to represent their views.⁵¹

⁵⁰ It is interesting to note here that the draft of the treaty included a stronger clause on security cooperation, which was removed from the final agreement following objection by British Foreign Office. See Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 7.

⁵¹ Paul Seabury, 'The League of Arab States: Debacle of a Regional Arrangement,' International Organization 3:4 (1949) 636; Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 8-10.

The Alexandria Protocol marked the beginning of the road that led to the establishment of such a body, the League of Arab States (LAS). The Protocol was signed in 7 October 1944 at a meeting of a preparatory committee comprising representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.⁵² It was declared that the signatories to the Protocol were

anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and aspirations.⁵³

As Ahmed Gomaa noted, the document, agreed after long deliberations, was partly a statement of intentions, and partly an attempt to appeal to Arab public opinion.⁵⁴ The above-quoted article, when considered together with the signatories' pledge that 'in no case the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed' is an early manifestation of the interplay between state security and societal security in the Arab world (see Chapter 3). The point here is that the Alexandria Protocol had given priority to the principle of sovereignty but nevertheless mentioned Arab unity as a long-term objective. The LAS Pact was to put further emphasis on the former whilst omitting the latter⁵⁵—an act that indicated how jealously the principle of sovereignty was guarded by Arab policy-makers. Even the declaration of intent to coordinate foreign policies, which was stipulated in the Protocol, was removed from the LAS Pact.

⁵² For a detailed account of the negotiations, see Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 153-234.

⁵³ 'The Alexandria Protocol'; available from <http://192.203.180.62/mlas/alex.html>; Internet; accessed October 8, 1999.

⁵⁴ Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 226.

⁵⁵ Hourani, 'The Arab League in Perspective,' 132-3.

The League of Arab States was set up a year later, with the Pact of the League being signed on 22 March 1945 by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Yemen signed later in the year. It was noted in the preamble that the League was being formed in response to 'the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab lands.' The Pact stipulated that the League would

support and stabilize [the ties which link the Arab states] upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to direct their efforts towards the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the realization of their aspirations and hopes.⁵⁶

Regarding the issue of inter-Arab relations, the main principle was that of non-intervention in the internal affairs of member states. Since it was the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention that were given priority, as noted above, debates on the issue of peaceful settlement of disputes proved controversial. After a lengthy debate between those in favour of establishing a strong machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and those who opposed to the idea, it was agreed that the League's jurisdiction would not be compulsory over such disputes.⁵⁷ This relatively little evidence of attention paid to dispute-resolution within the region betrayed an outward-directed conception of security. As will be seen below, the Arab League Collective Security Pact, signed in 1950 in the attempt to relieve the deficiencies of the LAS Pact, also focused on the defence of Arabs (inside) from non-Arabs (outside).

⁵⁶ 'The Charter of the Arab League'; available from <http://192.203.180.62/mlas/charter.html>; Internet; accessed October 9, 1999.

⁵⁷ Gomaa, The Foundation of the League of Arab States, 251-5; Hussein A. Hassouna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts (New York: Oceana Publications, 1975) 9. Also see Kamal Shehadi, 'The Poverty of Arab Diplomacy: Conflict Reduction and the Arab League,' in Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: Selected Essays, ed. Paul Salem (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1997) 216-33.

However, notwithstanding this stress on statist concerns, in 1948 the Arab states joined forces to fight on behalf of the Palestinians—an action that showed how Arab policy-makers could not afford to be seen as leaving other Arab peoples to their fate. The argument here is not that the 1948 campaign undertaken by Arab states to help Palestinian peoples (or the 1967 and 1973 wars, for that matter) constituted an act of altruism that put the security of their respective states in danger—although the war did nothing to enhance their credibility regarding their ability to undertake effective military action. Rather the argument is that although Arab policy-makers prioritised the security of their respective states, they nevertheless found it difficult to act in total defiance of the concerns voiced by Arab non-state actors.

Indeed, although Arab policy-makers' practices were mostly statist, undertaken to enhance their own regime security under the mantle of state security, it is impossible to deny the fact that they were also concerned, if only at the discursive level, with the well-being of Arab peoples. The place accorded to the Palestine issue on top of Arab national security agendas (stated repeatedly at the end of LAS meetings since the 1940s) when viewed against the background of the decrease in the number of concrete actions taken to find a solution to the plight of the Palestinian peoples, could indeed be viewed as an indication of this delicate balancing act many Arab policy-makers have engaged in the second half of the twentieth century.

The Palestine issue was not only a flag non-state actors raised in voicing their multiple security concerns, but also the source of a military threat, that is,

the state of Israel. The unsuccessful military experience of 1948 and the formation of Israel in 1949 duly led LAS-members to re-think the military dimension of their organisation. This culminated in the signing of the Arab League Collective Security Pact (ALCSP) in 1950. However, although the ALCSP was partly a response to the realisation of the need to create an effective collective security scheme to face an increasingly intransigent Israel, it was also a reaction to the advances Britain and the United States made to Arab policy-makers for the creation of the MEDO. In this sense, the ALCSP was aimed to emphasise the intention of LAS-members to remain non-aligned. Lastly, another consideration behind the conclusion of the ALCSP was to integrate the principles and vocabulary laid out by the United Nations so that the LAS would qualify as a 'Regional Arrangement' according to the UN Charter.⁵⁸

Thus, ALCSP sought to turn LAS into a collective security organisation to organise joint defence against external threats. Accordingly a Joint Defence Council (comprising the foreign ministers and ministers of defence of the signatory states), a Permanent Military Commission (composed of representatives of the general staffs of the signatory states) and a Consultative Military Council (composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the signatory states) were established. An annex to the ALSCP in 1950 provided for the appointment of a joint Arab commander-in-chief in the event of a war. The Pact did not envisage the creation of a permanent military command.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Hassauna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes, 13.

⁵⁹ Hassauna, The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes, 15.

Given the competition between the Middle Eastern and Arab national security discourses, the creation of the League of Arab States and especially the signing of the ALCSP signalled Arab actors' determination to prevail. The following section will present an account of the practical manifestations of the rivalry between the two discourses.

A Struggle for Prevalence

The attempts to create regional security schemes that have been looked at so far were intended to illustrate how the two contending approaches to regional security solidified in the early years of the Cold War. The Middle East Defence Organisation, the Northern Tier, and the Baghdad Pact were all designed to secure the Middle East, maintain access to bases in the region, and to make the region inviolable to Soviet influence or intervention. With the entry of the Soviet Union into the Middle East following the Egyptian-Czech arms deal struck in 1955, checking Soviet influence among Arab states became an ever higher priority for US policy-makers.

As noted in Chapter 3, Nasser, following his rise to power, adopted a more societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security, which 'came to coincide with the discourses of insecurity that informed the many pan-Arabist groups and activists who were challenging regional elites and Western colonial rule,' as Steve Niva has noted.⁶⁰ It could be argued that it was British and US policy of making economic and military aid conditional on Egypt's joining regional

security schemes that led Nasser to adopt a broader security agenda, defining anti-colonialism, political and economic sovereignty as well as the plight of Palestinian peoples as Arab national security issues.⁶¹ As was the case with many non-state actors, Nasser also used the Israel/Palestine issue to flag other security concerns.

It should be noted here that until the mid-1950s, US policy-makers had shied away from selling arms to Israel or its Arab counterparts in accordance with the Tripartite Declaration agreed among British, French and US policy-makers (1950). Assuming that the conflict could be managed if the parties to the Israel/Palestine conflict were prevented from entering into an arms race the three allies had agreed to consider all applications for arms or war materials by these countries in view of their needs for the purposes of 'legitimate self-defence.'⁶² However, each of the three parties had different ideas as to what 'legitimate self-defence' might constitute, and France continued to ship arms (through non-official means) to Israel. According to Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki, this added to Nasser's disillusionment with the United States, leading to the 1955 Czech arms deal.⁶³

Space does not allow me to go into the details of how the tension caused by the Soviet arms deal, US refusal to fund the Aswan dam project and Nasser's

⁶⁰ Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,' 161.

⁶¹ Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,' 161. Also see Majid Khadduri, 'The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East,' Middle East Journal 11 (June 1957) 12-22.

⁶² Owendale, The Middle East Since 1914, 236.

⁶³ Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for Independence,' in Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, eds. Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 36.

nationalisation of the Suez Canal culminated in the 1956 War.⁶⁴ It should suffice to say that the war further increased Nasser's standing in the Arab world and gave credence to his conceptualisation of Arab national security discourse in the competition between two contending discourses. The support Soviet policy-makers provided to their Egyptian counterparts during the war, in turn, made it relatively easier for them to enhance their influence over some other Arab states.

However, the increase in Nasser's stature, perhaps paradoxically, enabled the United States to enhance its own influence over conservative Arab regimes. The policy-makers of conservative Arab states were sceptical of Nasser's broader conception of security and felt threatened by the emphasis he put on its societal dimension. Indeed, following Suez, Nasser adopted increasingly more interventionist practices in an attempt to nudge conservative regimes into line with his policies. Nasser's interventions were not military but 'symbolic.' They were designed to use his influence over Arab public opinion to shape the practices of other governments.⁶⁵ In his addresses to Arab peoples broadcast on Radio Cairo, Nasser urged Arab peoples to rebel against their leaders whenever the latter engaged in a policy that threatened Arab national security.⁶⁶

By the end of the 1950s, the increase in Nasser's standing in the Arab world resulted in a division of Arab regimes into two camps: conservative (Saudi

⁶⁴ Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for Independence,' 31-41.

⁶⁵ Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*.

⁶⁶ According to Rana Kabbani, in order to increase the number of listeners to his broadcasts, Nasser used to ask for the programmes of famous Egyptian singer Umm Khaltum to be scheduled immediately before or after his addresses. 'Distant Divas,' on BBC Radio 4, 24 October 1998, 11:00pm.

Arabia, and other Gulf states, Iraq [until the 1958 coup]) and radical (Egypt, Syria, Iraq [after the coup]).⁶⁷ Saudi Arabia took the lead in distancing itself from the Arab national security discourse and adopting that of the United States. The period of Saudi-US rapprochement also coincided with the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) that was designed to reassure regional states that their sovereignty and independence would be protected by the United States 'against the predatory desires of "international communism," i.e. the Soviet Union.'⁶⁸ The Doctrine symbolised a shift in US policy-making from seeking to maintain regional security via constructing regional security schemes to that of supporting critical allies in the attempt to maintain regional stability. The United States pledged to provide military and economic aid to Middle Eastern states in return for their endorsement of the Doctrine. Eventually, Baghdad Pact-members together with Lebanon and Libya endorsed the doctrine and received aid. Jordan denounced 'international communism' but avoided endorsing the doctrine. Israel, at this stage, was not supplied with arms by the United States so as not to destroy what was trying to be achieved with the new policy aimed to gain the friendship of conservative Arab regimes. Although the Saudi policy-makers did not publicly endorse the Doctrine, they took up the opportunity provided by this shift in US policy-making. King Saud visited the United States in January 1957 and was 'persuaded to reassess his policy.'⁶⁹

The Saudi change of heart constituted another turning point in the struggle for prevalence between the two competing discourses. The division of

⁶⁷ At this stage many Gulf states were not yet independent. Jordan, on the other hand, tried to balance the two camps.

⁶⁸ Campbell, Defense of the Middle East, 122.

⁶⁹ Adeed Dawisha, 'Saudi Arabia's Search for Security,' in Regional Security in the Middle East,

Arab states into 'conservative' and 'radical' camps was followed by the members of the conservative camp moving to shape their practices more in line with the Middle Eastern security discourse whilst purporting to uphold the Arab national security at the discursive level. This, in turn, led to the emergence of what Bahgat Korany called the gap between 'say and 'do' in Arab politics, the discrepancy between the discourse of Arab national security and the practice of state security.⁷⁰ The practices Saudi policy-makers adopted from the late 1950s onwards included concluding significant arms deals with the United States and Britain. They also launched a diplomatic campaign to alienate other Arab policy-makers from the 'radical' camp.⁷¹

Saudi policy-makers also sought to introduce another discourse, namely an Islamist discourse on security. Instead of using LAS summits to discuss issues, King Faisal began to call for the convening of an Islamic summit. Despite Nasser's objection, he took the opportunity provided by the fire at Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque to convene an Islamic Conference in September 1969, seeking to create an anti-Israeli bloc under its leadership.⁷² Considering the centrality of the Israel/Palestine issue to the Arab national security discourse, the Saudi action constituted an attempt to appropriate it by interpreting the issue within its self-styled Islamist security discourse.⁷³ Although the origins of what is referred to here as the Islamist security discourse go back as early as the mid-1960s, it will be dealt with in further detail in Part II, the point being that it was in the post-Cold

ed. Tripp, 2.

⁷⁰ Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism,' in The Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 174.

⁷¹ On Saudi policies, see Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).

⁷² Dawisha, 'Saudi Arabia's Search for Security,' 3-4.

War era that this perspective became more prominent. It should suffice to say here that Saudi security practices shaped by the Islamist discourse included providing aid to Islamist groups and movements abroad. In the 1970s, when Saudi Arabia was experiencing a boom in its oil-based income, the total value of grants and soft loans it promised to Third World states was second only to that of the United States.⁷⁴

The 1960s also witnessed US policy-makers' re-conceptualisation of the Middle Eastern security discourse (already signalled by the Eisenhower Doctrine) to put more emphasis on the regime security of the conservative states. This re-conceptualisation resulted in a compartmentalisation of US regional security thinking and practices in that they increasingly began to treat the regional status quo and the security of oil reserves in isolation from their other concerns, those of the Israel/Palestine issue and Israel's security. The crystallisation of this policy was observed during 1973-74 when US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tried to de-link his efforts to bring an end to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and the lifting of the OPEC oil embargo (which symbolised a rare moment of collaboration between the members of the radical and conservative camps).⁷⁵ This policy of de-linking different dimensions of regional insecurity also had to do with increasing Israeli influence on US policy-making. Israel's influence on US policies had been on the rise since the 1967 war, when it proved itself to be a strong and dependable ally. Israeli policy-makers had for long sought to de-link the Israel/Palestine issue from other issues of concern to the United States and

⁷³ Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,' 165-70.

⁷⁴ Dawisha, 'Saudi Arabia's Search for Security,' 19.

⁷⁵ R.K. Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement: Towards an Integrated U.S. Policy in the Middle East,' *Middle East Policy* vi: 4 (1998) 49-50; Heikal, *Secret Channels*, 214-

its Arab allies. The US policy-makers' compartmentalisation of their security thinking and practices to suit Israel's interests showed how detrimental Israel's military successes in 1967 and 1973 had been for the prestige of Arab states.

The beginning of the end for Arab national security discourse was marked by Egypt's decision following the 1973 war, to break ranks with other Arab states and sign a separate peace deal with Israel.⁷⁶ Considering the fact that Egypt had flown the flag of Arab national security during Nasser's presidency, its move towards more statist policies constituted a more significant blow than the 'loss' of Saudi Arabia.

The final decisive blow to the Arab national security discourse was struck by the members of the conservative bloc who decided to form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981.⁷⁷ Although the formation of the GCC followed a heightening of the tension in the region as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1978), the Iranian revolution (1978-79) and the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), it could be argued that its formation would not have been considered possible had the Arab national security discourse not lost its grip over Arab public opinion. Although GCC-members maintained that their action did not constitute a breach of the precepts of Arab national security, the security interests of the Gulf states clearly were more in tune with the Middle Eastern security discourse that prioritised the maintenance of the secure flow of oil and military

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⁷⁶ Heikal, *Secret Channels*, 180-289.

⁷⁷ *Gulf Cooperation: The Path to Progress, Prosperity and Unity* (n.p.: Ministry of Information, State of Qatar, 1983).

stability. One bone of contention between the United States and GCC-members remained the status of Israel in the region.

During the 1980s, the Gulf policy-makers sought to set a clear blue line between state security and Arab national security. Arguably, even the massive amounts of economic aid they provided to the Palestinian cause could be explained by their concerns about regime security. Given the centrality of the Palestinian issue to the Arab national security discourse, to be seen to be backing the PLO was one way of enhancing their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens as well as other Arab actors. Such legitimacy was urgently needed given their stance towards the predicament of their poorer brethren during the 1980s. Indeed, during this period the practices of Arab policy-makers increasingly discredited the spirit of Arab national security; their discursive practices remained the only way to uphold the idea of Arab national security at the governmental level.

Conclusion

This chapter concludes Part I: 'Pasts,' which has been devoted to an investigation of the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security in during the Cold War. Chapter 2 (representations) introduced two spatial representations, the Middle East and the Arab Regional System, which, it was argued, were rooted in contending approaches to regional security. Middle East is a geopolitical concept, the

chapter argued, invented to help British and later US policy-makers to think about and organise action in that part of the world. Two Egyptian scholars, Dessouki and Matar, pointed to the Western strategic origins of the Middle East and proposed an alternative, that of the Arab Regional System, which, in turn, was shaped by an alternative approach to security, that of Arab national security.

Chapter 3 (theories) sought to provide an account of the security discourses that shaped these representations. The Middle East, it was argued, was shaped by Cold War Security Studies with its military-focused, outward-directed and stability-oriented approach to security in theory and practice. Chapter 3 also presented Cold War critiques of Security Studies in an attempt to show that alternative ways of thinking about security existed all throughout this period. The Arab national security discourse was one such alternative, generated by those Arab actors critical of US approach to regional security. The Arab national security discourse criticised military-focused and outward-directed character of the Middle Eastern security discourse and called for more attention to be paid to issues such as economic and political sovereignty, decolonisation, and state building.

Chapter 4 (practices) looked at the practical manifestations of these contending approaches to security. The aim here was to show how different security practices were shaped by and, in turn, shaped contending security discourses and spatial representations. It was argued that the three regional security schemes attempted to be created by the United States and its allies were all military alliances designed to secure the Middle East from outside often

regardless of local actors concerns. The British and US policy-makers' reasoning behind the creation of such regional security schemes, instead of backing the League of Arab States, it was argued, was to prevent the prevalence of the Arab national security discourse, which stressed issues such as de-colonisation, state-building, economic and political sovereignty, and the plight of Palestinian peoples—none of which were high on the US regional security agenda.

The 1950s and 1960s, argued Chapter 4, were characterised by a struggle for predominance between these two contending approaches, which were competing to shape the practices of multiple regional actors. Nasser's security practices during this period were designed to nudge conservative regimes into adopting his own broader and societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security—a direction that they were hesitant to take. This policy backfired in the long run with the policy-makers of the conservative Gulf regimes breaking rank with their more radical Arab counterparts and choosing to shape their practices in line with the US Middle Eastern security discourse.

Following Nasser's death, a more statist conceptualisation of Arab national security prevailed. Many Arab policy-makers, including those in the Gulf, nevertheless continued to use the language of Arab national security in the attempt to enhance regime security. Such legitimacy was urgently needed given their stance towards the predicament of their poorer brethren during the 1980s. As Yezid Sayigh noted, during this period 'famine was allowed to sweep Sudan and Somalia, locusts and drought to attack Yemen and Tunisia. Sudan and

Egypt tottered constantly on the edge of bankruptcy.⁷⁸ In the attempt to prioritise state and regime security Arab policy-makers failed to adopt long-term policies that could have addressed the inter-related issues of water and food security that were high up on the security agendas of regional peoples. The ways in which the Arab policy-makers tried to cope with these issues were manifestations of regional policy-makers' zero sum and statist conceptions and practices of security. This argument begs further clarification.

There are two dimensions to the problem of food security in the Middle East. On the one hand there are the oil-rich states of the Gulf such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which are not self-sufficient but have the financial resources to pay for the feeding of their population. For example the Saudi policy-makers, as a part of the effort to achieve food security, sought to increase the country's wheat production to the point of self-sufficiency by paying their farmers six times the world market price. Needless to say, whilst doing this they caused further depletion of scarce non-renewable water resources in this arid region.⁷⁹

On the other hand there were states such as Egypt and Sudan that had a less-developed agricultural sector and a weaker economy.⁸⁰ These poorer Arab countries suffered from policy failures of the past such as lack of support for and heavy taxation of agriculture, as well as the increase in population, which has made it impossible for them to feed their population however much they increase

⁷⁸ Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed,' International Affairs 67:1 (1991) 501.

⁷⁹ Martha Wenger and Joe Stark, 'The Food Gap in the Middle East,' Middle East Report (September-October 1990) 15.

⁸⁰ Karen Pfeifer, 'Does Food Security Make a Difference? Algeria, Egypt and Turkey in Comparative Perspective,' in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, eds.

food production.⁸¹ The issue of water scarcity only added to the predicament of these countries' already troubled agricultural sectors.

Therefore, one dimension of food security in the Arab world was that faced by the poor peoples of the region, such as those in Sudan who sold their labour to purchase food necessary for survival.⁸² The other dimension was the case of some Arab regimes, which were worried that the 'food weapon' might be used against them (as was the case with Iraq during the Gulf crisis) and therefore have adopted not-so-cost-effective techniques and have sought to grow water-intensive products to achieve agricultural 'self-sufficiency' and food security.⁸³ The significance of all this is that, notwithstanding the premises and promises of the Arab national security discourse, the practices through which regional states tried to address threats to water and food security was symptomatic of their unilateral (as opposed to cooperative), zero sum (as opposed to common), and statist (as opposed to societal or individual-focused) conceptions and practices of security.⁸⁴ This is also an illustration of the Critical Security Studies point that adopting broader conceptions of security is not enough in itself. After all, the Saudi regime was cognisant of the economic, political as well as environmental dimensions of security, but conceptualised them from a statist perspective and adopted unilateral practices to address them. Taking re-thinking security seriously involves seeking to identify and overcome the shortcomings of Cold

Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (London: Macmillan, 1993) 127-44.

⁸¹ Mark Duffield, 'Absolute Distress: Structural Causes of Hunger in Sudan,' Middle East Report (September-October 1990) 4-5; Pfeifer, 'Does Food Security Make a Difference?' 138.

⁸² Duffield, 'Absolute Distress,' 4-5.

⁸³ Pfeifer, 'Does Food Security Make a Difference?' 142.

⁸⁴ See, for example, Rana Haidar, 'Women and Food Security,' Civil Society 55:6 (1996) [On-line journal]; available from http://www.ned.org/page_3/ICDS/1996/aug/woman.html; Internet; accessed March 3, 1998.

War approaches to security in theory and practice. Part II will further develop these points.

Part II : Presents

Chapter 5 : Representations of the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era

Chapter 2 (representations) traced the trajectory of the Middle East' from its invention in the late nineteenth century into the Cold War era and argued that the Middle East had its origins in British and US security thinking and practices. Chapter 5 will continue to follow the trajectory of spatial representations 'Middle East' and 'Arab Regional System.' I will also look at two more representations, those of the 'Euro-Med Region' and 'Muslim Middle East.' It will be argued that these representations have shaped and been shaped by the European Union's discourse on security in the Euro-Med Region and the Islamist discourse on security, respectively. This is intended as a further illustration of the point (made in Chapter 2) that the origins of regions have had their roots in security thinking and practices of their inventors. It will further be argued that in the post-Cold War era, the competition between these four representations took place at multiple levels with non-state actors playing more active roles than they did during the Cold War.

Contending Representations

In an article entitled 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' Saad Eddin Ibrahim identified four approaches competing to shape the future of regional security in the Middle East. These four approaches are, to quote Ibrahim, 'four different visions of the future and four parallel geopolitical-economic projects: an Arab, an Islamic, a Middle Eastern, and a Mediterranean one.'¹ Ibrahim notes that of these four approaches, the first two are 'indigenous' to the region; 'both have roots reaching deep into the historical consciousness of Arab actors.'² The third one, that of the Middle East, is the most established of them all and is currently identified with the Peace Process launched after the Gulf War. What Ibrahim identified as the Mediterranean approach is the most recent of the four and has lately been receiving a lot of attention due to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership scheme initiated by the European Union.

Each of these approaches give primacy to different kinds of threats and adopt an alternative spatial representation, namely, the Arab Regional System, Muslim Middle East, Middle East and Euro-Med Region. This is not to suggest that these four representations exhaust the possibilities. One might add to the list of alternatives the so-called 'Greater Middle East'—currently in vogue within some US circles.³ The 'Greater Middle East' was invented after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It is used to represent those states that are included in the Middle East as well as the former Soviet republics

¹ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' Security Dialogue 27:4 (1996) 425.

² Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 425.

³ See Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer, eds., Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Robert Pelletreau et al., Advancing

of Central Asia. This, arguably, is indicative of the security conceptions and practices of its inventors that include securing the route to Central Asian oil resources (in which there is now much interest) whilst holding Islamism in check (which has become a persistent anxiety in the United States since the 1978-79 revolution in Iran). This new representation is yet to become established in the minds of people other than its inventors.

Another alternative that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War is that of 'Middle East and North Africa' or MENA. This label is used to represent the same area covered in Cold War definitions of the Middle East, i.e. members of the Arab League plus Israel, Iran and Turkey. The fact that there is no change in the definition but its label could be taken as an indication of a yearning on the part of north African policy-makers to emphasise their difference from the rest of the Arab world. It could also be taken as an indication of their increased bargaining power—a power they derive from their close economic cooperation with the European Union as a part of the Euro-Med partnership scheme (see the section on the Euro-Med Region). This representation will therefore not be treated separately.

In the following sections I will trace the development of the aforementioned four representations of the region, namely, the Middle East, the Arab Regional System, the Euro-Med Region, and the Muslim Middle East. These representations have been shaped by the four contending approaches to regional security identified by Ibrahim, and have been competing to shape the

future of regional security in the post-Cold War era. First, the Arab Regional System.

The Arab Regional System

As Part I argued, the Arab Regional System and the Arab national security discourse were developed in the aftermath of World War II in reaction to the Middle Eastern security discourse. Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar have argued that the Arab Regional System could serve better as a key for understanding the interactions among Arab states, with their neighbours and with the international system.⁴ As opposed to early representations such as the Arab homeland or the Arabian peninsula that downplayed the existence of sovereign Arab states, the Arab Regional System as conceived by Dessouki and Matar was a state-centric representation and therefore appealed to Arab policy-makers who were concerned with consolidating their sovereign statehood and reducing their exposure to external influences.⁵ As Chapter 4 argued, since the late 1960s, Arab policy-makers, especially the more conservative Gulf leaders, have been moving away from the Arab national security discourse. Indeed it has been mainly non-state actors whose practices have shaped and been shaped by the Arab national security discourse.

⁴ Abdel Monem Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus: Arab Perceptions of Security,' The International Spectator xxxi:4 (1996) 26-7.

⁵ Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed,' International Affairs 67:1 (1991) 489.

Arab peoples have for long been collaborating across borders in order to escape intervention by their own governments that restrict their political activities at home. Given many Arab regimes' unwillingness to lift restrictions on political participation, Arab peoples have been making use of each others' human and technical resources when trying to bring about change at home. Although there are some signs of cooperation with their Turkish and Iranian counterparts as well, if one is to judge by the titles of the organisations they set up, it is clear that the Arab Regional System, not the Middle East, that has shaped their practices.⁶ Such organizations include the Arab Association of Sociologists, the Arab Association of Political Scientists, Association of Arab Historians (1974), Association of Arab Universities (1964), the pan-Arab Organisation of Human Rights, the Beirut based Center for Arab Unity Studies (1975), and the Jordan based Arab Thought Forum (1985), among others. Arab women's organisations have also been active in strengthening civil society in the Arab world.⁷

Although such non-state organisations existed during the Cold War as well, what has changed in the post-Cold War period is that they now tend to take less the form of stereotypical pan-Arabist movements that called for Arab unity during the 1950s, than the form of civil societal groupings that emphasise Arab identity, culture, homeland and nationhood whilst working towards democratisation and social justice at home. Ibrahim notes that the number of Arab NGOs and other civil associations have nearly doubled between 1990 and

⁶ Elise Boulding, 'Hope for the Twenty-first Century: NGOs and People's Networks in the Middle East,' in Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. Elise Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 319-29.

⁷ See 'Interview with Salim Nasr—A View from the Region: Middle East Studies in the Arab World,' Middle East Report (October-December 1997) 16-18; 'The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East,' in Building Peace in the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 43.

1995.⁸ As will be explained in Chapter 7, the activities of these non-state actors are more often than not designed to bring about change in the Arab Regional System by way of focusing on political and economic issues, calling for democratisation, increased political participation, an end to restrictions on human rights and better provision in fields such as health and education.

In the 1990s such sensitivity regarding the region's Arab identity has been more common among non-state actors than policy-makers. Indeed, the post-Cold War era witnessed the latter joining the Middle East Peace Process, The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic forum convened as a part of the Peace Process, and discussing potential membership to a Middle East Regional Development Bank, all of which involved the participation of Israel, Turkey and the United States.

Furthermore, there are some signs that the salience of the spatial representation Arab Regional System is beginning to fade even among some non-state actors, such as some Egyptian intellectuals who began to emphasise the Mediterranean dimension of Egypt's identity whilst others have emphasised the Islamic dimension. As the next section will argue, the debate over the Mediterranean, Arab and Islamic dimensions of Egyptian identity amongst Egyptian elite dates back to the early twentieth century but had come to a halt following Nasser's rise to power in the early 1950s.⁹

⁸ Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 427-8. See Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) for a more sceptical view on the potentialities of civil societal groupings in the Arab World.

⁹ Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, 'Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy,' Kurasat Istratijiya [Strategic Papers of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies] 4: 27 (1997); available from <http://www.acpss.org/ekuras/ek27/ek27.html>; Internet; accessed

As Chapter 4 argued, since the 1960s, the tendency among conservative Arab policy-makers has been that of distancing themselves from the Arab national security discourse and the Arab Regional System. What has changed in the aftermath of the Cold War (and especially the Gulf War) is that regional policy-makers' references to the Arab national security discourse became even more sparse; at the same time they became less hesitant to identify with the Middle Eastern security discourse of the United States. Two reasons could be teased out to explain this development.

First, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has rendered it rather problematic to propound openly the Arab national security discourse. The fact that an Arab state (Iraq) invaded another (Kuwait) and threatened a third (Saudi Arabia) showed that threats to the Arab Regional System could be posed by Arab states from within the region as well as external actors (such as Iran, Israel, Turkey and the United States). This, in turn, challenged the outward-directed conception of security that has been at the root of the Arab national security discourse.

Second, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War further discredited the arguments in favour of greater cooperation and collaboration among Arab actors. Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the term 'Arab nation' (*al-umma al-arabiyya*) has come to be identified with Iraqi pan-Arab expansionism.¹⁰ The Iraqi aggression also strained the relationships among the members of the Arab League. For years, the Arab League has served as the backbone of the

August 1, 1999.

¹⁰ Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-91: Regional Dynamics and the

Arab national security discourse and the main institution that contained the Arab Regional System. The Gulf conflict, however, has left the Arab League divided.¹¹

The deepening of the rifts between Arab states resulted in a relaxation of the Arab/non-Arab distinction that drew the boundaries of the Arab Regional System, to accommodate the increasing influence of non-Arab actors such as Iran, Israel and Turkey, as well as Britain, France and the United States.¹² The aforementioned tendency among Arab policy-makers to join institutions and organisations framed in line with the Middle Eastern perspective had already signalled such a relaxation of boundaries.

In sum, although the increasing involvement of non-Arab actors and especially the United States in the affairs of the Arab Regional System may not have too many opponents at the governmental level, the same cannot be said about actors at the sub-state level. As noted above, many non-state actors' practices continue to shape and be shaped by the spatial representation Arab Regional System. The increasing prevalence of the Middle East or the 'New Middle East' has been worrying such actors who fear their Arab identity would be marginalized.

Superpowers, trans. Clare Krjzl (London: Macmillan, 1998) 51.

¹¹ Ibrahim Awad, 'The Future of Regional and Subregional Organization in the Arab World,' in The Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 147-60.

¹² Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 97.

The Euro-Med Region

Mediterranean littoral peoples and societies were conceived as part of a total called the 'Mediterranean' in ancient Greece. Indeed it is argued that the first uses of the concept the 'West' referred to peoples, societies and states surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, whereas the territories further to the east and south constituted the 'East.' Later, with the Muslim invasion of the territories to the south of the Mediterranean, as well as Asia Minor, Malta and Spain, and the entrenchment of the idea of Europe, the construct referred to as the 'West' shifted further to the west and those Mediterranean littoral peoples, societies and states to the south and east of the Mediterranean Sea came to be included in the (now vast) entity called the 'East' (and later the Middle East) therefore dissolving the unity of the 'Mediterranean.'¹³ This past unity of the Mediterranean was remembered rather recently to aid the EU-backed project of constructing a Euro-Med Region.

Among Mediterranean littoral states of the Arab world, Egypt and Lebanon are the ones that have been more in touch with the Mediterranean dimension of their identity than some others such as Syria. In Egypt, in the 1920s and 1930s, many Western educated and/or oriented intellectuals advocated the Mediterranean identity because it was viewed as 'neither completely European or Western nor completely divorced from the Arab-Islamic

¹³ Thierry Hentch, Hayali Doğu: Batının Akdenizli Doğuya Politik Bakışı [Imagined East: The West's Political View of the Mediterranean East] trans. Aysel Bora (Istanbul: Metis, 1996). Also see, Paul E. Salem, 'Arab Political Currents, Arab-European Relations and Mediterraneanism,' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: Macmillan, 1997) 23-42. It should also be noted that the terms 'East' and 'West' gained new meanings during the Cold War when they were used to refer to the two blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

world,' to quote Paul Salem.¹⁴ However, Egypt's Mediterranean identity was de-emphasised in the post-World War II era when it joined the League of Arab States and later took part in the 1948 war as a part of the Arab force fighting Israel. Gamal Abdel Nasser's advent to power (1954) was also decisive in this respect. During Nasser's presidency, the prevalent view was that any kind of affiliation with a Mediterranean institution would lead to dependence on the former colonial powers.¹⁵

The debate between the proponents of Egypt's Mediterranean identity and those who emphasised the Arab and Islamic dimensions was revived following Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war.¹⁶ Nasser's death and Anwar al-Sadat's rise to power in the early 1970s further encouraged some intellectuals to dust off the arguments about the Mediterranean dimension of Egypt's identity and revive the early debate. Some well-known Egyptian intellectuals, disappointed with the losses against Israel and the lack of support provided by other Arab states for the Palestinian cause, had already begun to argue that 'the time had come for Egypt to stop fighting the battles of the Arabs.'¹⁷

Another factor that enabled Mediterraneanism to see the light of the day once again was the peace treaty Sadat signed with Israel, which resulted in Egypt's isolation from Arab and Islamic institutions. As a result, Egyptian policy-makers sought alternative paths, one of which was 'Mediterraneanism.' It should

¹⁴ Salem, 'Arab Political Currents,' 38.

¹⁵ Selim, 'Mediterraneanism.'

¹⁶ Nasser himself emphasised the Arab, Islamic and African dimensions of Egypt's identity. See Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'Nasser and the Struggle for Independence,' in Suez 1956: The Crisis and its Consequences, eds. Wm Roger Louise and Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) 31-41.

also be noted that since the independence of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, there emerged more independent non-European Mediterranean-littoral states with which Egypt could collaborate within a Mediterranean framework. Lastly, its break with the Soviet Union in 1972 also enabled Egypt to re-establish close relations with the West in general and Mediterranean-littoral European states in particular.¹⁸

Egyptian intellectuals were not alone in propounding Mediterraneanism. During the 1950s some forthcoming thinkers of Lebanese nationalism also had voiced arguments favouring identification with the Mediterranean. Given Lebanon's multi-confessional and multi-ethnic make-up, such identification with the Mediterranean could potentially have provided Lebanese policy-makers a solution to the dormant conflicts that threatened to break the society. Moreover, as did their Egyptian counterparts during the 1930s, they viewed the Mediterranean identity as a tool to de-emphasise their links with the Arab-Islamic world and claim affinity with Europe and the West. Lastly, some north African intellectuals also favoured Mediterraneanism as a way of reinforcing the uniqueness of the Maghreb's Arab-Berber ethnic mix and its historical links with Europe in general and France in particular.¹⁹

However, although the idea of the unity of the Mediterranean world dates back centuries, what is referred to here as the Euro-Med Region began to take shape from the 1970s onwards, largely in line with changing security conceptions and practices of the European Union (formerly the European Community). The

¹⁷ Selim, 'Mediterraneanism.' Also see Salem, 'Arab Political Currents,' 37-8.

¹⁸ Selim, 'Mediterraneanism.'

EU's close interest in Middle Eastern affairs, in turn, was provoked by the OPEC oil embargo and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. During this period, a change-of-heart on the part of some European policy-makers to adopt a more equivocal attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict resulted in the establishment of the Euro-Arab dialogue in 1973.²⁰

The relationship between the EU and Arab states did not achieve much during the Cold War, partly because of the mistrust caused by some European states' colonial past and partly due to the atmosphere created by the superpower conflict. It should be noted that this period was also characterised by a change in the character of the EU itself, which travelled a long since the European Coal and Steel Community. The Euro-Arab dialogue was attempted to be re-activated after the end of the Cold War. Although the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) interrupted the process, the dialogue resumed in 1992.²¹ The links established as a part of the Euro-Arab dialogue formed the backbone of the Euro-Med Partnership Process in the following years.

It was not only the end of the Cold War but also a re-thinking on the part of some EU members that caused the re-activation of the Euro-Arab dialogue and the re-emergence of the Mediterranean discourse. In the 1980s, changes in the societies of EU-member states as a result of the growth of the Middle Eastern

¹⁹ Salem, 'Arab Political Currents,' 38.

²⁰ Haifaa Jawad, The Euro-Arab Dialogue: A Study in Collective Diplomacy (Reading: Ithaca, 1992).

²¹ Gary Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach,' in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, ed. Gerd Nonneman (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1992) 7-13, for an overview of the collective Euro-Arab relationship from 1973 onwards. Also see Jawad, The Euro-Arab Dialogue. For developments since 1992, see Selim 'Mediterraneanism'; Stephen C. Calleya, 'The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?' Mediterranean Politics 2:2 (1997) 1-22.

diaspora in Western Europe led EU policy-makers to re-think their priorities and come to consider stability in the Middle East (and especially the geographically closer north Africa) an integral part of their own security.

Over the years, Euro-Med cooperation schemes have taken various forms including the aforementioned Euro-Arab dialogue as well as the EU's 'Overall Mediterranean Policy,' agreements with sub-regional organisations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and more recently the still-born 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean,' and the ongoing 'Euro-Med Partnership' process.²² The Euro-Med Partnership scheme is hoped to encourage inter-state cooperation and increase regional interdependence as a way of maintaining security (understood as stability) in the Middle East towards enhancing European security. This theme will be further developed in Chapter 7. It should suffice to note here that the Gulf War only helped reinforce the view that 'regional economic solidarity among all the peoples of the region' is 'a cornerstone for peace, stability, and development in the Middle East' which is, in turn, viewed as a necessary component of security in Europe.²³

The European Union's conceptualisation of the Euro-Med Region does not so far include non-Mediterranean Middle Eastern states (such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the Gulf states, Yemen and Iran). Moreover Mediterranean-rim states such as Turkey and Israel have participated only in some of the Euro-Med schemes. This is partly because the EU's delineation of the Euro-Med Region

²² Jawad, The Euro-Arab Dialogue; George H. Joffé, ed., Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 1999).

reflects its aforementioned security concerns that have had less to do with the Gulf than the geographically closer north African states. Israel and the other Eastern Mediterranean states have come into the picture due to EU interest in finding a peaceful solution to the Israel/Palestine issue.

The fact that non-Mediterranean Middle Eastern countries (such as Saudi Arabia or Iran) are not included in the Euro-Med Region does not seem to bother the north African partners. This is arguably because the policy-makers of those Arab states that are a part of the Euro-Med process are interested in economic cooperation with the EU, not with their fellow Arab countries with whom they have attempted several projects of cooperation in the past. The only country that has so far expressed reservations about the exclusion of the Gulf countries has been Egypt. Egyptian policy-makers have suggested that membership to the Euro-Med Partnership scheme should be left open so that non-Mediterranean Middle Eastern countries could become members in the future.²⁴ It is difficult to know whether the Egyptian policy-makers are genuinely interested in including all other Arab countries, or whether this was a tactical move designed to allay the worries of some non-state actors in the Arab World in general and Egypt in particular who fear that 'Mediterraneanism will dilute the Arab identity of the Arab Regional System and lead to its dismantling.'²⁵ It is significant to note here that such concerns again echo the critiques of Heikal, Dessouki and Matar voiced during the Cold War (see Chapter 2).

²³ Miller, 'An Integrated Communities Approach,' 13.

²⁴ Selim, 'Mediterraneanism.'

²⁵ Selim, 'Mediterraneanism.'

However, although the exclusion of some Arab and/or Muslim countries from the Euro-Med Region has its problems, their inclusion could also be considered problematic. It was such concerns that resulted in the shelving of another Mediterranean-focused scheme initiated by two EU-member states, Italy and Spain. The proposal for the creation of a 'Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean' was introduced in 1991, but failed to take off largely because it was considered too ambitious in terms of both its objectives and scope.²⁶ The idea has been criticized on the grounds that it covered a very wide area (the proposal mentioned inviting any state with 'any substantial interest'). This would have meant bringing together all twelve members of the EU, the 17 non-EU-Mediterranean littoral states (Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Romania, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and [former] Yugoslavia) nine Gulf states (including Iran and Iraq), three others (Canada, the Soviet Union and the United States), and one UN-recognised entity (Palestine).²⁷ The CSCM proposal will be further discussed in Chapter 7. Suffice it to note here that the objectives of the scheme that included addressing issues areas such as 'security, economic cooperation and human rights' were found too difficult to achieve for such a large and diverse group of states.²⁸

Currently, Mediterraneanism does not have many proponents but it does not have many against it either. Both Syria and Israel have responded positively

²⁶ Miller, 13; Tim Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM),' in The Middle East and Europe, ed. Nonnemann, 245-51.

²⁷ Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East,' 247.

²⁸ Roberto Aliboni, 'Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-

to invitations issued for the Euro-Med Partnership activities. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted,

unlike the Middle Eastern paradigm, the partnership has not generated active hostility in the Arab world. This may be due to the absence of the USA and the fact that the Israeli question does not play dominant parts.²⁹

Indeed, some Egyptian policy-makers view Mediterraneanism as a way of bringing Arab states as well as Israel together without moving too many stones. Indeed, the strength of the Euro-Med Region as an alternative spatial representation comes not from its supporters who are not too many or too enthusiastic, but from the fact that unlike the 'new' or 'Muslim' Middle Easts, it does not have too many enemies.

The Muslim Middle East

The spatial representation referred to here as the Muslim Middle East is rooted in the Islamist discourse on security. The Islamist actors' own preferred term is the 'Muslim world.' However, defined as the sum of Muslim peoples around the world (the *ummah*), the 'Muslim world' is a trans-state community that encompasses a significant portion of the globe. As a result, the adoption of the term 'Muslim world' as an alternative to the other three representations looked at in this chapter is problematic for mainly two reasons. First, two of the states with the largest Muslim populations, Indonesia and Bangladesh are remote from the Middle East. Second, there are more Muslims in Central Asia, China, India, Southeast Asia and Africa than there are in the Middle East. As Nikki Keddie

Mediterranean Partnership,' Perceptions (December 1997-February 1998) 73-86.

maintained, if the 'Middle East is unsatisfactory as an entity, the Muslim world is scarcely more so.'³⁰

My preferred term Muslim Middle East is rooted in the observation that when Islamist actors in the Middle East refer to the Muslim world, they have a Middle East-centred definition in mind.³¹ This is also discernible from their practices, which suggest that notwithstanding the global character of their discourses, they address themselves to a Muslim Middle East when it comes to taking action. What is meant by the globalist discourse is the rhetoric that has been employed by some Islamist actors (such as Ayatollah Khomeini or the Hizbullah in Lebanon), which indicates that they imagine all Muslims to be their audience. Theoretically, then, all areas on which the world's Muslims live are included in their definition of the Muslim world. During the first decade following the Iranian revolution, Iran's practice seemed to live up to its discourse with its anti-Israeli and anti-US rhetoric being matched by the support it provided for the PLO, the Afghan Mujahedeen and other Islamist movements around the world. This has begun to change following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the end of the Iran-Iraq war. Since then, Iran has mellowed its globalist revolutionary discourse, and concentrated on mending fences at the international arena and emphasising domestic development whilst keeping the revolutionary spirit up at the home front.³²

²⁹ Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 431.

³⁰ Nikki Keddie, 'Is There a Middle East?' International Journal of Middle East Studies 4 (1973) 269.

³¹ 'Abdul Hamīd A. AbūSulaymān, Towards An Islamic Theory of International Relations: New Directions for Methodology and Thought, 2nd rev. ed. (Hendon, VA: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993) xv.

³² John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 151; John Esposito, ed., The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1990).

Likewise, despite their globalist discourse, most Islamist grassroots movements aim to bring about change at home—even though they may occasionally undertake action abroad to achieve this aim. Indeed, practice indicates that the self-consciously Islamist regimes of Iran and Sudan, and non-state actors such as Hamas, Hizbullah, and Algerian FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) all address themselves first and foremost to the localities they live in (see Chapter 7 for further discussion on this theme).³³ In other words, the globalist outlook of the Islamist actors at the discursive level becomes locally oriented in practice. Hence my use of the label Muslim Middle East to refer to the spatial representation that has shaped and has been shaped by the practices of Islamist actors.

The Islamist discourse on security was initially introduced by Saudi leadership, as Chapter 4 noted, to help maintain the regional status quo. The 1978-79 revolution in Iran, however, led to anti-status quo actors' appropriation of the Islamist discourse. They not only appropriated but also re-conceptualised the Islamist discourse by focusing, to quote Steve Niva, on 'the need to establish an authentic cultural basis from which to assert the sovereignty of Arab states and to achieve true decolonisation.'³⁴ This re-conceptualised Islamist discourse perceives threats as stemming from 'un-Islamic' influences that could stem from inside as well as outside the Muslim Middle East. However, when it comes to

³³ See Esposito, 'Islamic Organisations: Soldiers of God,' in The Islamic Threat, 119-87, for a brief overview of Islamist organisations.

³⁴ Steve Niva, 'Contested Sovereignities and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,' in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 167.

defining what constitutes 'Islamic' or un-Islamic,' there is more agreement amongst Islamist actors as to what they are against than what they are for. Some would consider 'Western' influence over and intervention into the region as 'un-Islamic'. Some Islamists criticise the existing political and religious establishments (such as the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that allowed US troops on the 'holy lands') as well as the forces of Arab nationalism as being 'un-Islamic'.³⁵ Lastly, there are those who define 'structural violence' as 'un-Islamic' and call for its erosion.³⁶

It is worth stressing that this conception of security is not a purely outward-directed one as suggested by prevalent conceptualisations of *dar-us-salam* ('land of peace') and *dar-ul-harb* ('land of war'). It is indeed true that the Islamist discourse considers threats to security as 'un-Islamic' influences mainly stemming from the 'West,' but it also emphasises how 'external threats have been internalised in the very practices of Middle Eastern states.'³⁷ In this sense, the Islamist discourse that informs these actors' practices is more complicated than Samuel Huntington's conceptualisation of a world order based on civilisations would allow for (see Chapter 9). For, there is by no means a unanimous agreement among the proponents of the Islamist discourse as to the ideal state of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, *salaam* is a very rich concept that has multiple meanings within the Islamic context (as is the case for both concepts *security* and *peace* in the Western

³⁵ Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, 'Editor's Introduction,' in Islamic Resurgence: Challenges, Directions and Future Perspectives—A Roundtable with Professor Khurshid Ahmad, ed. Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi (Lahore: Institute of Policy Studies, 1996) 24.

³⁶ Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 'The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Action,' in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant and Saad Eddin Ibrahim, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 28. Also see, AbūSulaymān, Towards

context). One important point made by some Muslim authors on this issue is that in order to make peace, the elimination of war (understood as inter-state violence) is not enough; it is only a beginning. Echoing peace researchers' broader conception of peace, Chaiwat Satha-Anand has maintained that, working towards peace includes the elimination of 'structural violence' as well.³⁸ Such a view, in turn, renders it rather problematic to present the Muslim world as the 'land of peace,' or the rest of the world as the 'land of war'; for, structural violence does not recognise such conventional boundaries.

The proponents of the Islamist discourse have their reservations about the other three representations. Indeed, the very concepts region and regionalism invoke territoriality, which some Islamist actors consider to be offensive to the concept of the *ummah*. Some argue that the existing system which divides believers into separate (nation-)states is against 'Islam' and that the *ummah* should be revived as the primary political unit.³⁹ Building upon such assumptions Abid Mustafa labelled regionalism as the 'disease of the twentieth century.' He argued that 'establishing or promoting such ideas will never allow the *ummah* to revive and regain her status as the number one nation in the world.'⁴⁰ As is the case with some other projects propounded by the Islamist actors, the specifics of how this potential could be fulfilled is not clear. What is emphasised is that it cannot be achieved through the construction of a (New) Middle East, a Euro-Med Region, or the strengthening of the Arab Regional

An Islamic Theory of International Relations, 160.

³⁷ Niva, 'Contested Sovereignties and Postcolonial Insecurities in the Middle East,' 168.

³⁸ Satha Anand, 'The Nonviolent Crescent,' 25-28.

³⁹ For a discussion of and an argument against this view, see James P. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation-States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 1-21.

⁴⁰ Abid Mustafa, 'Regionalism: Disease of the 20th Century,' Khalifah Magazine 9:1 (Rajab

System. However, the proponents of such ideas often fail to note the fact that many Islamist actors have already accepted the reality of the state; they look toward the *ummah* when emphasising their common Muslim identity, but direct themselves to their own milieu in practice.⁴¹

Pointing to the gap between the discourses and practices of Islamist actors, and their lack of consistent strategies is not meant to suggest that their critiques are not worth listening to. Rather the point here is that the violent practices of certain Islamist actors such as the Hizbullah that aim to capture states mechanism obscure their otherwise significant criticisms of the other discourses. Indeed, the greatest strength of the Islamist discourse stems from its critique of the other representations and the security discourses they shape and are shaped by. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim noted, although the proponents of the Islamist discourse do not have the power to put their own visions into practice to realise their own visions, they have the power to stall the others.⁴²

The (New) Middle East

The Middle East is currently the strongest amongst the four contending representations. Its strength stems partly from its backers that include the United States, Israel and Turkey. But more significantly, its strength stems from the post-Gulf War environment that has seen the further decline of the Arab national

1419/October 1998) [journal on-line]; available from <http://www.khalifah.comnaufame2.html>; Internet; accessed May 31, 1999.

⁴¹ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 433.

⁴² Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 433.

security discourse. As the section on the Arab Regional System argued, during the Gulf crisis three non-Arab states, Iran, Israel and Turkey played active roles in the US-led coalition formed against Iraq, whilst the United States took up this opportunity to strengthen its relations with conservative Gulf regimes. The ensuing broadening of the Arab Regional System to include Israel, Iran and Turkey and to accommodate the increasing influence of the United States (and to an extent the European Union) resulted in the blurring of the Arab/non-Arab divide, and dissolution of the distinction between Arab Regional System and Middle East, which Heikal, Dessouki and Matar, among others, tried to establish. Increasingly since the end of the Gulf War, non-Arab actors have been playing significant roles in inter-Arab relations.

It was not only the role non-Arab actors played during the Gulf War but also the Arab-Israeli Peace Process set in motion in the aftermath of the War that enabled the consolidation of the Middle Eastern security discourse. In the aftermath of the War, the United States was able to re-introduce itself to the region and be accepted largely due to the constructive role it played in the making of the Madrid Peace Process. The Madrid Peace Conference (1991) was convened after the Gulf War as a part of the pre-war deal the US policy-makers struck with the international public opinion in general and regional policy-makers in particular. The pace generated by the Madrid talks opened the way to the Palestinian-Israeli Accords signed in Oslo (1993). The role US policy-makers played in the Peace Process, in turn, enhanced their credibility thereby lessening the criticisms voiced against the Middle Eastern security discourse.⁴³ As Chapter

⁴³ Muhammed Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) 93-6.

7 will explain in greater detail, US policy-makers took this opportunity to encourage regionalism in the Middle East. Towards this end, a Regional Economic Development working group was set up as a part of the multilateral track of the Middle East Peace Process. Other US and World Bank sponsored activities included the convening of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic forum, and proposing the formation of a Middle East Regional Development Bank.

During the Madrid talks, the Middle Eastern perspective received a boost by Egyptian intellectuals as well. The ideas they put forward in support of regionalisation in the Middle East as a way of maintaining security is referred to as Middle Easternism. Although there are very few Arab policy-makers who would openly advocate Middle Easternism, the fact that most have so far participated in the Middle East Peace Process is indicative of their changing policy preferences. One could tease out two main reasons for some Arab policy-makers' hesitance to openly back Middle Easternism. The first reason stems from the opposition of the proponents of the Arab and Islamist perspectives at the sub-state level. Many non-state actors view Middle Easternism as a project that would de-emphasise the Arab and/or Islamic character of the region. Some even go so far as to warn that Middle Easternism might end up replacing Arabism. As Michael Barnett noted, opponents of Middle Easternism in the Arab world tap into 'long-standing fears of the West and Israel.'⁴⁴ This point takes us to the second

⁴⁴ Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 231-2.

reason behind Arab policy-makers' hesitance to openly back Middle Easternism, that is Shimon Peres' vocal advocacy of Middle Eastern regionalism.⁴⁵

In 1993 Peres published a book entitled The New Middle East in which he called for a 'regional-based' approach to security.⁴⁶ The adoption of such an approach, he stressed, was crucial in the face of the threats posed by the weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile delivery systems against which there exist no foolproof means of national defence other than a wide-ranging regional arrangement.⁴⁷ 'Outdated' approaches to security based on the concept of 'national defence, which depend mainly on military and weapons systems,' argued Peres, should be replaced by a 'modern' concept 'which is of necessity based on political accords, and embraces international security and economic considerations.'⁴⁸ Peres expected regionalisation in economic relations to have a spillover effect into political relations thereby paving the way for the creation of a 'New Middle East' which he envisioned as a 'regional community of nations, with a common market and elected centralised bodies, modelled on the European Community.'⁴⁹

Although Peres' blueprint for the future was received favourably outside the region, to some in the Arab world the idea of becoming a part of the New Middle East is a precursor to an emerging Israeli hegemony. Israel's economic might, which Peres considers a magnet to pull other regional countries towards cooperation, seems to have made a contrary effect on some regional actors who

⁴⁵ Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, The New Middle East (Dorset: Element, 1993).

⁴⁶ Peres, The New Middle East, 33-4.

⁴⁷ Peres, The New Middle East, 83.

⁴⁸ Peres, The New Middle East, 33-4.

hear 'dependence' when Peres says 'interdependence.'⁵⁰ Indeed, the opponents of Middle Easternism invoke Arab peoples' age-old suspicions when they argue that the idea of constructing a New Middle East is an attempt at 'imperialism by regionalism.'⁵¹ I will come back to this debate in Chapter 7 when discussing post-Cold War security practices.

One major reason behind the late-found popularity of Middle Eastern security discourse among Arab policy-makers is the fact that there are significant financial and political resources available for strengthening regionalism in the Middle East. However, although this may constitute good enough a reason to convince many policy-makers regarding the virtues of cooperation within a Middle Eastern framework, it may not be that easy to persuade many non-state actors. For, as noted above, unlike the Cold War years when it was Arab policy-makers and some intellectuals that challenged Middle Eastern security discourse,⁵² it is now mainly non-state actors and especially grassroots movements informed by intellectuals that oppose it. In other words, however attractive creating links of interdependence in the Middle East as a way of building peace may seem to some, others oppose it for the same reason; they do not want to be a part of and/or dependent on any non-Arab or non-Islamic entity.

According to Bahgat Korany, if regional policy-makers were to embrace Middle Easternism against the wishes of their peoples, this could produce a divisive effect in the Arab world. Korany warns that

⁴⁹ Peres, The New Middle East, 62.

⁵⁰ Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics, 231; idem, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' Political Science Quarterly 111:4 (1996-1997) 604.

⁵¹ Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 604.

a return to the concept of the Middle East as a mosaic region, a pure agglomeration of different races and cultures—where Arabs are to be treated interchangeably with other groups like Kurds, Berbers or Armenians—would revive old and powerful memories of ‘divide and rule tactics.’⁵³

Such concerns echo those that were voiced by Heikal, Dessouki and Matar during the late 1970s. What has changed since then, according to Korany, is that it is no longer tenable to present this issue as a matter of making a choice in between the two competing representations. The end of the Cold War and the marginalization of many Arab actors, the alienation of many Arab regimes from one another, and the globalisation of economic relations, argues Korany, have created what he calls ‘a regional Arab vacuum’ which may result in the ‘triumph’ of the ‘new Middle East . . . not because of its own merit but rather by default.’⁵⁴ Given non-state actors’ misgivings about the (New) Middle East, such a development has already started to create divisions in the Arab world.

In sum, the debates on the Middle East in the post-Cold War era have focused on two major concerns: the future of the Arab and Islamic dimensions of regional peoples’ identity, and the future of regional economies. The latter concern rates above that of the prior on many Arab policy-makers’ agendas, but the vocal opposition of non-state actors against Middle Easternism has so far made it difficult for them to embrace it openly. Currently, the stall in the multilateral talks in the mid-1990s seems to have caused the debate on Middle Easternism to die down.

⁵² Mohamed Heikal, ‘Egyptian Foreign Policy,’ *Foreign Affairs* 56 (July 1978) 714-27.

⁵³ Bahgat Korany, ‘The Old/New Middle East,’ in *The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation*, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: Macmillan, 1997) 143.

⁵⁴ Korany, ‘The Old/New Middle East,’ 145.

Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was follow the trajectory of four alternative representations in the post-Cold War period, namely the (New) Middle East, the Arab Regional System, the Euro-Med Region and the Muslim Middle East. It was argued that in the post-Cold War era the competition between these four representations took place at multiple levels. The Middle East is currently the prevalent representation at the governmental level thanks to US encouragement of Middle Eastern regionalism. However, certain segments of the Arab and/or Islamist elite as well as some grassroots organisations have opposed regionalisation in the Middle East. The chapter argued that this little evidence of enthusiasm for regionalisation in the Middle East is not because of a lack of regionalism, but rather because of the presence of a multiplicity of regionalisms, initiated, supported and (at times) stalled by myriad actors at multiple levels. In other words, the proponents of the other three spatial representations oppose Middle Easternism not because they are against regionalisation in itself, but because they are against regionalisation within the Middle Eastern framework. As the chapter argued, many have voiced their concern that the economic might of Israel, coupled with the political, economic and military backing it receives from the United States, would enable it to dominate an integrated Middle East if the 'New Middle East' project were to be put into practice.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East, 135-50; Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' 428-30.

Among the three alternatives, the Euro-Med Region is the more clearly defined one and has so far received positive response at the state as well as sub-state level. This is also because it is a relatively neutral representation. The other two representations, Arab Regional System and Muslim Middle East are popular among non-state actors some of whom actively oppose Middle Easternism. The debates between the proponents of these representations have showed that the main divide of the post-Cold War period is not one of Arab versus non-Arab or Arab Regional System versus Middle East, but pro-status quo actors who seek to maintain security by encouraging economic regionalisation and anti-status quo actors that seek radical change. The proponents of the Arab Regional System and Muslim Middle East do not offer clear-cut alternatives in the form of regionalisation projects, but unite in opposing Middle Easternism. They nevertheless pose a significant challenge in that although they do not have the necessary resources to put their own ideas into practice, they have the power to stall others.

Chapter 6 : Security Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era

Chapter 6 will trace the development of post-Cold War security thinking in the attempt to see its differences from as well as similarities to Cold War approaches. The chapter will begin by sketching developments in Arab national security thinking, which, as Chapter 3 argued, emerged as a critique of and an alternative to the Cold War security discourse. The chapter will also look at the contributions made by students of Third World security. Another aim of Chapter 6 is to offer a glimpse of post-Cold War efforts directed towards re-thinking, re-visioning, re-conceptualising security. Two key debates will be focused on: 'broadening security' and 'appropriate referent(s) for security.' The arguments will be brought together in the concluding section where I will point to some issues that were sidelined in these debates.

Arab National Security Thinking

Students of Arab national security have for long maintained that Cold War approaches to security failed to account for the political and developmental dimensions of insecurity in the Arab world. As Chapter 3 argued, Arab national security discourse, as developed in Ali Eddin Hillal Dessouki and Jamil Matar's

works, was based on two assumptions. First, that security concerns and interests of Arab states could be better understood when viewed in relation to one another. Second, that these concerns were different from if not opposed to those of non-Arabs, particularly the ex-colonial powers. It was further argued that Dessouki and Matar's critique of the Cold War security discourse was based not so much on the way security was conceived and practiced, but on its referent, the Middle East. Their preferred referent was the society of Arab states. Although it could be debated whether the Arab state system qualifies as a society or not, it nevertheless is difficult to deny the fact that those cultural, linguistic, historical and religious factors that cross borders to tie Arab peoples have made the relationships between Arab states different from any other group of states whose citizens may not share such common characteristics. In other words, the Arab world is not merely a 'conglomeration of hard-shelled, billiard-ball, sovereign states,' as Bahgat Korany noted.¹ It is such linkages that exist at sub-, inter- and trans-state levels that make it difficult for Arab states to neglect the views and concerns of the others, thereby rendering the Arab state system more than the sum of its parts.

Chapter 3 also argued that, as more Arab states became independent, the early and more societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security was replaced with a state-centric conceptualisation, a process dubbed as the 'internationalisation of the national security state' by A.W. Singham.² The early conceptualisation, however, remained alive at the sub-state level, constituting a

¹ Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism,' in The Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 173.

² A.W. Singham, 'The National Security State and the End of the Cold War: Security Dilemmas for the Third World,' in Security of Third World Countries, eds. Jasjit Singh and Thomas Bernauer

constraint upon the increasingly statist practices shaped by the later conceptualisation.

As Chapter 4 noted, security practices of Arab policy-makers did not always match the premises and promises of Arab national security. This is because Arab policy-makers, especially those of conservative Gulf states, have increasingly adopted statist practices in the attempt to maintain regime security. However, although far from adopting the trans-state society of the Arab nation as their referent for security, Arab policy-makers nevertheless have found it difficult to totally disregard its concerns. In other words, although their security practices have always been statist, it is impossible to deny that they have also expressed concern with the security of other Arab actors. The place accorded to the Israel/Palestine issue on top of Arab national security agendas, when viewed against the background of the decrease in the number of concrete actions taken to find a solution to the plight of Palestinian peoples could be viewed as an indication of this delicate balancing act many Arab policy-makers have engaged in the second half of the twentieth century. The point here is that the Arab national security discourse has often been at odds with, and have constituted a constraint upon the practices of those Arab policy-makers that have prioritised regime security. Consequently, the argument that Arab states have always prioritised state security as reflected in the Charter of the League of Arab States (see Chapter 4) only reflects one dimension of this interplay between state security and societal security in the Arab world.

(Aldershot: Dartmouth with UNIDIR, 1993) 7.

This interplay between the demands of state security and societal security—the ‘dualism’ of Arab national security to use Bahgat Korany’s phrase—began to receive more attention in the literature in the 1990s.³ From the first establishment of the Arab state system onwards, argued Korany, the prevalence of the former among policy-makers has been checked by the popularity of the latter amongst non-state actors, especially intellectuals. According to him, the enduring popularity of this early conceptualisation of Arab national security among non-state actors could partly be explained by the resilience of the interconnections between Arab peoples and a high degree of permeability of state borders in the Arab world. Indeed, notwithstanding the efforts of Arab policy-makers to fortify state boundaries and strengthen sovereignty, ‘state frontiers have been less important as barriers in collective psychology than has the distinction between Arab and non-Arab,’ argued Korany.⁴

Critical of state-centrism, Korany proposed that the Arab civil society be treated as the referent for Arab national security. His argument was that in order to understand security in the Arab world, one needed to move away from a state-centric perspective. Stressing that Arab states did not look like the textbook model nation-states of Cold War Security Studies, Korany emphasised the roles played by Arab civil societal actors and the need to consider their concerns. He maintained that ‘the analysis of security issues in the Arab world should not be limited only, or even primarily, to the *raison d’état* of the territorial state’ but pay

³ Korany, ‘National Security in the Arab World,’ 164.

⁴ Korany, ‘National Security in the Arab World,’ 167. Also see Bahgat Korany, ‘The Arab World and the New Balance of Power in the New Middle East,’ in The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Michael Hudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 35-59; Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble, ‘The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context: Restating the State of the Art,’ in The Many Faces of

due attention to the security of the trans-state community of Arab civil society.⁵ These concerns differ depending on the socio-economic background of the actors voicing them. In general, those higher up on the economic ladder push for democratisation and respect for human rights, while those at lower levels of the ladder are primarily concerned with achieving daily economic needs such as jobs, socio-economic equality, health provision, and in some cases daily food subsistence.⁶

In sum, Korany not only paid attention to the non-military dimensions of security but also presented a powerful critique of state-centrism in Arab national security thinking. However, although Korany's approach constituted a significant improvement over Dessouki and Matar's state-centric conceptualisation of Arab national security, he failed to problematise another dimension, that of an outward-directed conception of security according to which threats to Arab national security are assumed to stem from outside the Arab Regional System whereas inside is viewed as a realm of peace and security.

One practical implication of this approach has been the emphasis put on unilateral as opposed to common security practices in managing the Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, as Chapter 4 noted, the relations between Israel and its Arab counterparts have been textbook examples of worst-case thinking and zero sum conceptions and practices of security. The gap between the security perceptions of the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict was pointed to by Jordanian scholar

National Security in the Arab World, eds. Bahgat Korany, Paul Noble and Rex Brynen (London: Macmillan, 1993) 1-23.

⁵ Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World,' 173.

⁶ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Arab Elites and Societies After the Gulf Crisis,' in The Arab World Today,

Abdullah Toukan and his Israeli colleague Shai Feldman in their path-breaking study, Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East. In this study the two co-authors tried to raise both sides' awareness of the dynamics of the security dilemma. They also proposed ways of mitigating the security dilemma by building on the work done by the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group of the multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process (see Chapter 7).⁷ It is significant to note here that in the mid-1990s, as Israeli and Arab policy-makers moved towards adopting common security practices such as confidence building measures and non-offensive defence postures, the dearth of literature on this subject with reference to the Third World in general and Middle East in particular became more and more apparent. Toukan and Feldman's study, in this sense, constituted a significant step in making up for this growing need.

The feminist sociologist Fatima Mernissi, in turn, challenged the outward-directed conceptions and militarised practices of Arab national security. She argued that in the attempt to secure the Arab world against external threats, security concerns of myriad actors inside were marginalized. Writing in the aftermath of the Gulf War, Mernissi reminded women of the sacrifices they have made for the purposes of Arab national security and asked of what use years' investment into the military sector had been if security in the Arab region was to be maintained by the United States (i.e. non-Arabs). She wrote:

The Gulf War showed the obscenity of the Arab state: its function was not to defend the interests of the citizen, it was to crush any chance of building a civil society and to censure any attempts to

ed. Tschirgi, 77-89.

⁷ Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).

check on what the chiefs were doing. The Gulf War showed, for example, that although the military expenditures in our Arab world were the highest in the world . . . they were grotesque in their uselessness during the Gulf conflict.⁸

In other words, Mernissi was critical of not only the drawing of a boundary between Arabs and non-Arabs in an attempt to secure inside from outside, but also the way security was sought at the expense of women, by prioritising the military dimension and marginalizing women's concerns.

Mernissi's critique of Arab national security is penetrating because of the way it challenges the ways in which the Arab national security discourse has been employed to justify policy-making, to privilege statist and militarised practices whilst marginalizing human rights in general and women's rights in particular. Mernissi has sought to emphasise that not only did this investment into the military sector cause meagre resources to be diverted away from other issues such as education and health care, but also that it failed to deliver what it promised, that is securing the Arab Regional System. What is also significant about Mernissi's critique is that she echoes the Critical Security Studies argument that the prioritisation of the military dimension of security and the ensuing militarisation of the society not only makes it difficult to meet traditional challenges, but also undermines the capacity of states to provide welfare to their citizens thereby exacerbating non-military threats.

Clearly, not all would agree with Mernissi's critique (or that of Critical Security Studies, for that matter). Indeed, in the 1990s, the literature on Third

⁸ Fatima Mernissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1996) viii. Also see her Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (Reading, MA: Perseus Books, 1992) esp. pp. 1-21.

World security in general and Arab national security in particular chose to focus not on the similarities and interrelationships, but the differences between the security needs and interests of states in the developed world and the developing world—a tendency traces of which was also discernible in Korany's approach to Arab national security.⁹

Third World Security Thinking

'Third World Instability, Security and Western Concepts: On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce,'¹⁰ the title of an article by Caroline Thomas summed the main argument put forward by most of the post-Cold War produce on security in the Third World. Thomas, along with other students of Third World security such as Mohammed Ayoob, Brian Job and Yezid Sayigh, maintained that the concepts of Cold War Security Studies were far from being able to provide a full account of (in)security in the Third World.¹¹ This, she argued, was because

⁹ Also see Korany, Brynen and Noble, 'The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context'; Paul Noble, Rex Brynen and Bahgat Korany, 'The Changing Regional Security Environment,' in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World, eds. Korany, Noble and Brynen, 275-302.

¹⁰ Caroline Thomas, 'Third World Instability, Security and Western Concepts: On an Unhappy Marriage and the Need for a Divorce,' in The State and Instability in the Third World, eds. Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu (London: Macmillan, 1989) 174-91.

¹¹ Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1987); idem, 'Third World Instability, Security and Western Concepts'; idem, 'New Directions in Thinking About Security in the Third World' in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Ken Booth (London: Harper Collins, 1991) 267-89; Caroline Thomas and Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, eds. Conflict and Consensus in South/North Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Mohammed Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); idem, 'Security in the Third World: Searching for the Core Variable,' in Seeking Security and Development: the Impact of Military Spending and Arms Transfers, ed. Norman A. Graham (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 15-28; idem, 'Defining Security,' in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (London: UCL, 1998) 121-46; Brian Job, ed. The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Yezid Sayigh, 'Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries' Adelphi Papers 251 (Summer 1990).

the character of the security problems faced by the Third World states were different from those faced by their developed counterparts. This led her to call for an alternative approach to study security in the Third World, an approach that puts more emphasis on the domestic political and developmental dimensions of security.

Yezid Sayigh maintained that it was the 'crisis of the state' that was the major source of insecurity for developing states. Cold War Security Studies, despite all its state-centrism, had been surprisingly silent when it came to conceptualising states, state formation and consolidation. This neglect of the domestic dimension of insecurity, in turn, failed to provide fuller accounts of security in the Third World, concluded Sayigh.¹²

Brian Job took up this point and pushed it further when he argued that the concepts of Cold War Security Studies, such as the security dilemma, were not helpful in accounting for the security problems faced by developing states; for threats to their security emanated from inside, not necessarily outside the state. The conception of security adopted by the students of Cold War Security Studies, argued Job, needed to be turned on its head within the Third World context. Job's conclusion was that the concept of 'insecurity dilemma' would be more helpful in understanding security in the developing world.¹³

However, notwithstanding the strength of Job's argument regarding the limits of the security dilemma in accounting for the security predicament of the

¹² Sayigh, 'Confronting the 1990s.'

¹³ Brian L. Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime, and State Securities in the Third

Third World, his assumption of a certain degree of external security entertained by Third World states is contestable. Put in other words, Job's assumption holds only when security is conceived in purely military terms. As Thomas has maintained, Third World states are very vulnerable vis-à-vis their external environment when economic or environmental dimensions of security are concerned.¹⁴

Furthermore, it would be misleading to suggest that it is developing states alone that are concerned with the domestic dimension of security. Ethnic conflicts that have haunted developed states of the West indicate that the security dilemma has limited analytical utility anywhere in the world when accounting for the domestic dimension of security.¹⁵ Lastly, it should also be noted that 'states are never finished as entities.' As David Campbell argued:

The tension between the demands of identity and the practices that constitute it can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of identity can never be fully revealed. This paradox inherent to being renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming.¹⁶

As Campbell showed in his study on the constitution of US identity, it is through the making of foreign policy that the United States has re-inscribed its identity. Seen in this light, it is not only developing states but also developed states (such as the United States) that constantly busy themselves with state building.¹⁷ In

World,' in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Job, 11-35.

¹⁴ Thomas, In Search for Security.

¹⁵ For a neo-realist explanation of ethnic conflict see Barry Posen, 'The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,' Survival 35 (Spring 1993) 27-47.

¹⁶ David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) 11.

¹⁷ Also see, Richard Devetak, 'Incomplete States: Theories and Practices of Statecraft,' in Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations, eds. John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater (London: Pinter, 1995) 19-39.

sum, deepening our insight into state building and consolidation, as called for by Sayigh, would help enhance our understanding of security not only in the developing world, but also in the world as a whole.

On the more conservative end of this critical spectrum was Mohammed Ayooob who emphasised the ways in which the predicament of Third World states are different from the West, and made a case for prioritising the security of states. In a deliberate echo of the distinction Barry Buzan drew between weak and strong states,¹⁸ Ayooob maintained that Third World states are 'junior' states; they are at an early stage of state-making, and 'as the European experience has shown, violence and conflict are inevitable at this stage.'¹⁹ States in the West had centuries to reach their current stage, argued Ayooob, and if Third World states are going to grow up and become 'proper' states, they should be allowed to prioritise state security for a while. Accordingly, Ayooob defined security

in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes which preside over these structures and profess to represent them internationally.²⁰

Note here that Ayooob's definition does not include a reference to the security of other potential referents such as individuals or social groups. He maintained that the security of state is of prime importance within the Third World context and that individuals and groups might have to endure some insecurity if the ultimate purpose is the enhancement of the security of the state. By arguing that state security should be prioritised on the way to becoming a 'proper' state, Ayooob not only presented a state-centric analysis, but also called for more, not less, statism.

¹⁸ Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991) 96-107.

¹⁹ Ayooob, The Third World Security Predicament, 115.

If one is to follow Ayoob's logic, the security of other referents are deemed of significance so far as this has an impact upon the legitimacy and stability of the state/regime, and the policy-making and implementation capacity of the government. This is why, argued Ayoob, those approaches that focus on individuals' security (such as Critical Security Studies) are 'far removed from Third World realities,' for in the Third World it is the security of the state that is the priority.²¹ In reply to Booth's call for conceptualising security as emancipation, Ayoob wrote:

It may be . . . possible to equate emancipation with security in Western Europe (although grave reservations are in order even on that score). But it would be extremely far-fetched and intellectually disingenuous to do the same in the case of the Third World, where basic problems of state legitimacy, political order, capital accumulation are far from being solved and may even be getting worse.²²

The statist assumptions that underpin Ayoob's argument will be discussed in greater detail in the final section of the chapter. Suffice it to make three brief points here. First, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, emancipation is not an added extra, something to be aspired for after all other aspects of security are achieved, as Ayoob seems to suggest. As Chapter 1 argued, defining security as emancipation means adopting an alternative conceptualisation of security that incorporates the environmental, societal, economic as well as political and military dimensions of security faced by multiple referents. Indeed, Ayoob's preference for focusing on the political and economic dimensions of state security is challenged by some other students of Third World security such as Abdel-Monem Al-Mashat who maintained that the practical implication of such

²⁰ Ayoob, 'Security in the Third World,' 15.

²¹ Ayoob, 'Security in the Third World,' 16.

statist approaches is the state's domination over society at the expense of individuals and social groups' concerns.²³ Second, the problems identified by Ayoob, such as state legitimacy, political order and capital accumulation are not isolated to Third World states. All states have had to cope with similar problems, albeit with varying degrees. The third and related point is that, following Thomas, it is not possible to account for (let alone address) such problems faced by developing states without searching for some of its roots in the practices of developed states.²⁴ Hence the call of Critical Security Studies for a comprehensive approach that takes into account multiple dimensions of threats to the security of myriad referents in different parts of the world.

The overall point here is that although the critiques students of Third World security present are helpful in pointing to the limited analytical utility of the concepts of Cold War Security Studies in understanding the security predicament of developing states, their conclusion that security in the Third World should be looked at through different analytical lenses is not helpful. This is not to deny the differences between security problems faced by developing states and their more developed counterparts. The argument here, to take up Thomas' analogy, is that if the marriage between Third World states and Western concepts has been an unhappy one, the solution may be found in counselling for both sides rather than a divorce.

²² Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 11.

²³ Abdul Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985) 33.

²⁴ Thomas, 'New Directions in Thinking About Security in the Third World.' Also see Mustapha Kamal Pasha, 'Security as Hegemony,' Alternatives (1996) 283-302.

Indeed, students of Third World security often underestimate the degree to which their critique of Cold War Security Studies have contributed to a re-thinking of security by helping reveal its limitations in accounting for the domestic political and developmental dimensions of security and the need for broader agenda, as well as emphasising the linkages between security needs of myriad actors in different parts of the world. Failing to realise the contributions they have made in the past and could potentially make in the future, most students of Third World security have so far tended to restrict their conclusions to developing states, refraining from commenting on the implications of their analyses on the bigger picture of Security Studies. However, as Amitav Acharya maintained

the security predicament of Third World states provides a helpful point of departure for appreciating the limitations of the dominant understanding and moving it toward a broader and more inclusive notion of security. This redefinition is crucial to understanding the problems of conflict and order in the post-Cold War period.²⁵

Notwithstanding Acharya's call, the mainstream tendency has been one of focusing on the different character of Third World states and their security needs. As a result, the critiques presented by students of Third World security regarding the underdeveloped state of core concepts such as state and security have yet to be fully incorporated into Security Studies. This point will be further developed in the next two sections, which trace the development of Security Studies in the post-Cold War era by focusing on two major debates, broadening security and appropriate referent(s) for security.

²⁵ Amitav Acharya, 'The Periphery as the Core: The Third World and Security Studies,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 301.

Broadening Security

As Chapter 3 argued, calls for a broader conception of security began to be voiced during the Cold War period by Third World experts as well as students of Alternative Security and Peace Researchers. These voices began to gain strength in the post-Cold War era with a proliferation of works that attempted to re-think, re-define, and re-conceptualise security.²⁶ Barry Buzan's People, States and Fear was a seminal work that brought together the ideas of aforementioned critics in a sustained analysis that questioned the core concept of the field: security. Maintaining that those conceptions and practices of security 'bound to the level of individual states and military issues' were 'inherently inadequate,' Buzan called for broadening the concept beyond its purely military focus and looking below and beyond the state for other referents.²⁷ The issue of proper referent(s) for security will be addressed in the next section. What follows is an overview of the debate on broadening security.

In People, States and Fear, Buzan proposed to broaden security in order to come to grips with its multidimensional character by taking into consideration four other dimensions, namely the political, economic, societal and environmental

²⁶ See *inter alia* Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 'Redefining Security,' Foreign Affairs 68:2 (Spring 1990) 162-77; Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' Review of International Studies 17:4 (1991) 313-26; idem, 'The Interregnum: World Politics in Transition,' in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Booth, 1-28; Buzan, People, States and Fear; idem, 'Is International Security Possible?' in New Thinking About Strategy and International Security, ed. Booth, 31-55; Edward A. Kolodziej, 'What is Security and Security Studies?: Lessons from the Cold War', 1-31; Martin Shaw, 'There is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism in International Security Studies,' Review of International Studies 19 (1993) 159-75; Ronnie Lipschutz, ed. On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning security,' in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Oxford: Polity, 1995) 175-97. See also Ken Booth and Eric Herring, Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies (London: Mansell, 1994) esp. pp. 120-38, for a critical overview of some of these works.

²⁷ Buzan, People, States and Fear, 6.

in addition to that of the military. The military dimension, maintained Buzan, had so far been paid 'disproportionate' attention. This has had two consequences. First, other dimensions were paid inadequate attention. Second, by concentrating primarily on the military dimension of security, analysts had become too preoccupied with 'national' security perspectives 'where competitive self-interest dominates perceptions, and consequently discourages analyses of security interdependence and the systemic aspects of the concept.'²⁸ Cold War approaches to security, with their zero sum conceptions and practices, offered little insight into issues such as environmental threats let alone enable cooperative action to be taken to address them.

It should be noted here that Cold War Security Studies was never totally ignorant of the non-military dimensions of security. Indeed, as David Baldwin noted, the multidimensionality of security is 'not a discovery';²⁹ Arnold Wolfers dwelt upon similar issues (see Chapter 3).³⁰ However, as the Cold War waxed and waned, broader security agendas of the early years were replaced by more narrow and military-focused ones. Furthermore, although some of the ideas Buzan put forward had been around for a long time, the difference was that his was a voice from within the discipline (that is, Security Studies) as opposed to that of 'outsiders' (Peace Researchers, Third World experts) whose ideas were not taken as seriously.

²⁸ Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible?' 36.

²⁹ David Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security,' Review of International Studies 23:1 (1997) 5-26.

³⁰ Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962) esp. pp. 147-65.

Building upon Peace Researchers' broadening of the concepts violence and peace that took human beings as the referent, Ken Booth proposed broadening security to include 'all those physical and human constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do.'³¹ Such constraints may include human rights abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarisation of society, environmental degradation and economic deprivation as well as armed conflict at the state- and sub-state level. Accordingly, to adopt a broader conception of security is to become aware of threats to security faced by myriad referents in all walks of life and approach them within a comprehensive and dynamic framework cognisant of the interrelationships in between.

The arguments developed by Buzan and Booth calling for broadening security have been criticised on various grounds. One major criticism from within the ranks of Security Studies came from Stephen Walt as presented in his much-cited 1991 article, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies.'³² Walt opposed broadening security on two grounds. First, he seemed to worry that a broader security agenda will result in less attention being paid to military threats, which he was keen to stress, have not yet been eliminated despite the end of the superpower conflict. Second, argued Walt, a broader conception of security will undermine the coherence of Security Studies as a field of academic study. He believed that broadening the concept would 'destroy [the field's] intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important

³¹ Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' 40.

³² Stephen Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies,' International Studies Quarterly 35:2 (June 1991) 211-39.

problems.³³ In short, Walt's argument was that although non-military issues deserved attention, Security Studies was not the place to address them.

Leaving aside the inconsistency of Walt's own position of arguing against broadening but nevertheless drawing up his own broad research agenda,³⁴ it should be noted that his arguments are representative of Cold War Security Studies in the way they need to have a clear (that is, military) focus and intellectual coherence is emphasised. As Chapter 3 argued, these issues were also at the core of attempts during the early 1950s to create a 'scientific' field of Security Studies. Faced with the perceived Soviet threat and the memories of inter-war era still fresh in people's minds, having a 'scientific' field of Security Studies to produce cumulative knowledge on security issues was deemed vital at the time, and the setting up of Cold War Security Studies in the way it was done should be understood within this context. However, it does not follow that those statist, military-focused and zero sum thinking and practices that characterised most (but not all) of Cold War Security Studies should be maintained, as Walt seems to suggest.

Moreover, Walt is indeed correct to point out that military threats have not been eliminated. But the proponents of broadening security have never claimed this to be the case. Contra-Walt, those who are in favour of broadening security do not start with the assumption, as he seems to suggest, that the end of the superpower conflict has eliminated most military threats. Rather they maintain that broadening security would enable analysts to view an array of threats in a

³³ Walt, 'The Renaissance of Security Studies?' 213.

³⁴ Booth and Herring, Keyguide to Information Sources in Strategic Studies, 126-7.

comprehensive fashion cognisant of the dynamic interrelationships in between. Accordingly, by way of putting non-military threats on the security agenda, it would be possible to prioritise and address them before they become militarised. Then, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, one purpose behind broadening security is to be able to find non-military solutions to a broader range of issues. In other words, Walt's worry regarding a diminution of the attention paid to military issues is misplaced.

It should also be noted that given post-Cold War state practices, Walt's apprehension that broadening security would cause the discipline to lose its theoretical rigour is not grounded. Be it the Central Intelligence Agency that broadened its agenda in the 1990s or governments that opted for 'comprehensive security' from the 1980s onwards, numerous actors have practically been broadening security. A case at hand is Third World policy-makers who have been calling for broader conceptions of security since the 1960s. Indeed, not even governmental practices sustain Walt's arguments.

On the other side of the spectrum of critics of broadening security were Ole Wæver and Daniel Deudney.³⁵ Their argument was mainly against the 'securitization' of non-military issues, which, they worried, would become intractable if put on governmental security agendas. Wæver argued that once issues get labelled as 'security' issues, not only a sense of urgency, but also

³⁵ Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' in On Security, ed. Lipschutz, 46-86; Daniel Deudney, 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 19:3 (1990) 461-76. Also see Jef Huysmans, 'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitizing Societal Issues,' in Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, eds. Robert Miles and Dietrich Thränhardt (London: Pinter, 1995) 53-78.

conflictual, zero sum, militarised mind-sets are invoked thereby rendering them intractable. The point here is that Wæver's worries stem from a misunderstanding which is rooted in his conflation of broadening security and 'securitization,' which, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, are not the same thing. Let me clarify this point.

In his 1995 essay, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' Wæver presented a critique of the broadening move whilst seeking to maintain a distance from those such as Walt who were also in favour of a military-focused security agenda, but for a different reason. Wæver built his argument by setting up a 'straw person' he called the 'traditional progressive' approach to security against which he positioned himself. This 'traditional progressive' approach, according to Wæver, is

(1)to accept two basic premises of the established discourse, first that security is a reality prior to language, is out there (irrespective of whether the conception is 'objective' or 'subjective,' is measured in terms of threat or fear), and second the more security, the better; and (2)to argue why security should be *more* than is currently the case, including not only 'xx' but also 'yy,' where the latter is environment, welfare, immigration and refugees, etc.³⁶

Stated as such, Wæver's argument constituted a crucial corrective to those who actually belonged to the camp of 'traditional progressive' scholars. Exactly who these people are is not clear; Wæver does not name names. It is implied that those who are in favour of broadening security all fall into this camp. My argument here is that although setting up this 'straw person' does enable Wæver to clarify his own position, it is not useful in that it obscures the differences

³⁶ Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' 46-7.

between multiple voices who called for broadening security some of whom would not fit comfortably into the 'traditional progressive' straitjacket tailored by Wæver.

For instance, feminist critics of Security Studies such as Cynthia Enloe and Ann Tickner have both criticised the military-focus of Cold War Security Studies and emphasised the ways in which statist and militarised thinking and practices constituted a threat to women's security.³⁷ However, neither of the two would fit Wæver's category in that both would reject the notion of security being a 'reality' prior to language. Neither would Booth's approach fit into Wæver's category. For, he views security as a derivative concept rooted in the philosophical worldview of those who define it.³⁸ In sum, not all of those who call for broadening security fit Wæver's classification. By way of setting up a 'straw person' that has significant exceptions, Wæver has weakened his otherwise rather convincing case for 'desecuritization.'

To go back a couple of steps, Wæver argues that security is a 'speech act'; that is, threats to security do not exist outside discourse, and that a particular issue is constituted as a threat to security via the agency of state elites who 'utter' security in reference to that issue.³⁹ Presented as such, Wæver's speech act theory is not necessarily any different from the deepening move of Critical Security Studies, whereby the prevailing conception of security is recognised as deriving from Cold War Security Studies which embraced realism and sought to

³⁷ Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999); Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security'; idem, Gender in International Relations: Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); idem, 'You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists,' International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997) 611-32.

³⁸ Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist,' in Critical Security Studies, eds.

serve those in power. In other words, the 'contrast' Wæver tries to establish between his 'speech act' approach and others (such as students of Critical Security Studies) who seek to broaden security, does not exist.

However, although Wæver and Critical Security Studies start from a similar point, they build different arguments and arrive at radically different conclusions. Wæver defines 'securitization' as a process through which state elites '[claim] a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it' or 'to gain control over it.'⁴⁰ Securitization is a 'conservative mechanism' for Wæver. This is different from what students of Critical Security Studies mean by broadening security. From a Critical Security Studies perspective, the security agenda could indeed be broadened by state elites for the purposes mentioned by Wæver. But it could also be broadened by non-state actors who challenge the statist concerns that shape governmental security agendas and seek address their own and others' concerns that have been marginalized (if not perpetuated) by states. In other words, Critical Security Studies takes into account the agency of non-state actors who may seek to broaden security to include non-military issues regardless of states' preferences.⁴¹ Wæver, on the other hand, maintains that securitization is a 'conservative mechanism' operated by state elites, and that it should remain as such. His conclusion is that in the long run security analysts should be seeking to de-securitize issues, by bringing into the realm of 'ordinary' politics.

Krause and Williams, 106.

³⁹ Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' 55.

⁴⁰ Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization,' 54-5.

⁴¹ Chapter 8 will further elaborate on the issue of agency.

Viewed as a critique of Cold War approaches to security, Wæver's essay is a welcome contribution. For during the Cold War securitization has indeed been used by state elites to keep issues outside the realm of 'ordinary' politics, to justify the mobilisation of resources into addressing military and non-military issues. Middle Eastern oil, for instance, was securitized in the United States in the immediate aftermath of World War II. This enabled the Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) to play up the 'communist threat' faced by the Saudi regime in the attempt to ensure US government's financial support in meeting Saudi demand for 50 percent share of the oil royalties. This act (which amounted on the part of the US government to channelling funds to a private firm from the national budget to help maintain its share in Middle Eastern oil markets) was made possible by the prior securitization of oil.⁴² The point here is that by helping reveal such examples of securitization as a 'conservative mechanism' whereby state elites use it to move issues outside the realm of 'ordinary' politics, or to justify the allocation of meagre resources into one area, Wæver has made a significant contribution to post-Cold War debates on security.

However, the move Wæver makes to associate all proponents of broadening security with state elites and their practices of securitization is not equally welcome, because it is misleading. There is a difference between merely broadening governmental security agendas but relying on traditional practices in addressing them (what Wæver may describe as the 'traditional progressive' approach that approves of securitization as a 'conservative mechanism') and

⁴² George Philip, The Political Economy of International Oil (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994) 23, 108.

Critical Security Studies move of broadening security. The latter also deepens security and seeks to re-conceptualise agency and practice.

Indeed, feminists as well as students of Critical Security Studies not only broaden but also deepen security cognisant of the political and constitutive character of thinking and writing about security. Furthermore, both have sought to re-conceptualise security in the attempt to move away from statist, military-focused and zero sum thinking as well as practices. Two cases pointed to by Christine Sylvester in her work on feminist approaches to security and cooperation are the Greenham Common Peace Camp and women's cooperatives in Harare, Zimbabwe.⁴³ Students of Critical Security Studies have also emphasised theory as a form of practice. In other words, both feminists and students of Critical Security Studies are aware of the ways in which security has functioned as a 'conservative mechanism' but nevertheless favour broadening security whilst at the same time seeking to find ways to avoid falling back on traditional mind-sets and practices. This, I submit, amounts to taking broadening more seriously than Wæver's 'traditional progressive' 'straw person' would allow. To recap, the argument here is that, by way of failing to recognise other responses to securitization, Wæver weakens the case he makes for desecuritization (taking issues outside the realm of security to address them through 'ordinary' politics) as a more effective way of dealing with issues heretofore not considered as threats to security.

⁴³ Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Daniel Deudney's argument against broadening security is based on concerns similar to that of Wæver. Deudney's worry is that the securitization of issues evokes an 'us versus them' mentality whereas in the environmental sphere 'we' not 'they' are the enemy. This is because, as Ulrich Beck argues, human agency has been complicit in perpetuating if not creating environmental threats.⁴⁴ Viewed as such, Deudney's response to the broadening move is rooted in his worry that the Cold War security discourse, which remains prevalent to this day, would be used to address a broader security agenda thereby perpetuating existing threats. As noted above, the Cold War security discourse was characterised by militarised, zero sum conceptions and practices of security whereby security was sought *against* an adversary. However, as Chapter 3 noted, during the 1980s Alternative Security thinkers pointed to the problems involved in such approaches and called for the adoption of common security practices whereby security is sought *with* the adversary not *against* him/her, the point being that security maintained through the threat and use of war has not proven to be stable. Then, if the problem Deudney identifies with adopting a broader conception of security stems from a particular approach to security in theory and practice, an alternative approach that embraces common security would enable environmental issues to be tackled within a security framework but without rendering their solution intractable.

This is not to deny that Wæver's preferred strategy of 'deseuritization' may constitute a solution in the attempt to avoid meeting environmental threats through traditional statist, military-focused and zero sum practices. However, this

⁴⁴ Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 1992).

would amount to leaving a useful tool (in terms of its mobilisation capacity) such as security to the monopoly of state elites who have not, so far, proven to be sensitive towards the security concerns of peoples (individuals and social groups).⁴⁵ It would also mean remaining uncritical of the ways in which military threats have traditionally been dealt with. As noted above, Alternative Security thinkers as well as feminists have presented valuable critiques of as well as alternatives to such traditional practices. Taking up from where they have left, the students of Critical Security Studies sought to re-conceptualise agency and practice (see Chapter 8).

To summarise, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, broadening security does not simply mean putting more issues on governmental agendas but re-thinking what security is (or may be) all about. The prior is an offshoot of the latter, but not its main purpose. Security may mean different things to different peoples depending on where they come from, where they are and what they want to do with their lives. This brings us to the question of what the appropriate referent(s) for a broadened security agenda should be.

Referent(s) for Security

A plethora of works produced in the post-Cold War era critical of Cold War Security Studies have argued that security should be about referents other than the state, such as individuals, social groups, or a potential global society. Ken

⁴⁵ Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) 108-12.

Booth submitted that, following Kant, 'we should treat people as ends and not means. States, however, should be treated as means and not ends.'⁴⁶ Martin Shaw called for a 'sociologically adequate' approach to the study of security when he wrote that

individual and collective human security do not depend overwhelmingly on the state and/or ethnic-national context. . . . Security issues are faced at all levels of social life.⁴⁷

On the more conservative end of this critical spectrum was Barry Buzan who called for looking upwards to the systemic level and downwards to the individual level in order to move beyond statist Cold War conceptions of security.⁴⁸ Buzan's position is a curious one, for he, whilst critical of statism in Security Studies, nevertheless argued for state-centric analyses thereby ending up reinforcing statism (albeit unintentionally). The argument here needs further clarification.

In People, States and Fear, Buzan presented a broader framework for studying security, a framework that covered its economic, societal, environmental, political as well as military dimensions. As regards the referent for security, Buzan maintained that

security has many potential referent objects. These objects of security multiply not only as the membership of the society of states increases, but also as one moves down through the state to the level of individuals, and up beyond it to the level of the international system as a whole.⁴⁹

Buzan's study (first published in 1983) marked a crucial corrective to statist Cold War conceptions of security prevalent at the time. However, Buzan, whilst mentioning other potential referents at the sub- and supra-state levels,

⁴⁶ Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' 319.

⁴⁷ Shaw, 'There is No Such Thing as Society,' 110. Also see Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁴⁸ Buzan, People, States and Fear.

nevertheless made a case for focusing on the security of states. He built his argument in two moves. First, argued Buzan, the anarchic structure of the international system rendered the units the 'natural focus of security concerns.' Since states were the 'dominant' units, reasoned Buzan, 'national security' was 'the central issue.'⁵⁰

Buzan's second move was to look at the state's agency ('at the end of the day security policy still has to be made by states', he wrote)⁵¹ and infer from its privileged position as a security agent that its security should be prioritised over other potential referents. 'Because policy-making is very largely an activity of states,' argued Buzan, 'there is an important political sense in which national security subsumes all of the other security considerations found at the individual and systemic levels.'⁵² This argument, in turn, hints at a confusion between agents and referents. I will come back to this point later. Let us now look more closely at these two moves Buzan made to build up his argument.

Buzan's first move could be criticised first, for its depiction of the international system as anarchical (and therefore the realm of insecurity) and second, for identifying individuals' security with citizenship and the state (the realm of security). This (neo-realist) stance adopted by Buzan has been criticised forcefully by Alexander Wendt among others and will not be dealt with here in detail.⁵³ Suffice it to note that the anarchical conception of the

⁴⁹ Buzan, People, States and Fear, 26.

⁵⁰ Buzan, People, States and Fear, 19.

⁵¹ Buzan, People, States and Fear, 328.

⁵² Buzan, People, States and Fear, 328.

⁵³ Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,' International Organization 46:2 (1992) 391-425; J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security';

international system derives from assumptions made by neo-realists about subjectivity and sovereignty, and the reasoning that the absence from the international arena of what makes order possible at the domestic arena (i.e., a central government) is what renders the latter anarchical.⁵⁴ There is indeed no world government; but it does not necessarily follow that this makes international security impossible.

Furthermore, the anarchy/order, inside/outside divides introduced by this argument are problematic for, as Keith Krause and Michael Williams maintained, both are built upon the assumption that 'security comes from being a citizen, and insecurity from citizens of other states' and that 'threats are directed towards individuals qua citizens (that is, toward their states).'⁵⁵ However, although states are there, in theory, to provide security for their citizens, there remain the practices of many states, which are constant reminders of the fact that some are worse than others in fulfilling their side of the bargain. Added to this is the case of 'gangster' states that constitute a major threat to the security of their own citizens.⁵⁶

Moreover, as Ann Tickner reminds us, the international arena is not the only realm characterised by the absence of mechanisms of order and there may be construed yet another anarchy/order divide—that of the 'boundary between a public domestic space protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law and the

Richard Wyn Jones, "Travel Without Maps": Thinking About Security After the Cold War,' in Security Issues in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Jane Davis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995) 196-218; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 33-59.

⁵⁴ Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security,' 41.

⁵⁵ Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security,' 43.

private space of the family' which is not always as well protected particularly concerning the case of domestic violence.⁵⁷ In sum, the first move Buzan makes to justify the privileged position of the security of states is contested in both theory and practice.

Buzan's second move, that of underlining the dominant agency of the state to fortify the case for state-centred analyses of security, has been the less contested amongst the two. This is partly because states have had the license to legitimate use of violence and therefore are better endowed than any other agent to provide for (certain aspects of) security. But, perhaps more significant is the fact that students of International Relations have not been orientated to look at the agency of actors other than the state concerning security issues.⁵⁸ The prominence of the state's agency in the economic and financial sectors has for long been challenged, but it is yet to be de-throned in (military-focused) security issues. Hence the prevalent focus on states as central actors in world politics, i.e. state-centrism.

A broader security agenda, such as the one propounded by Buzan, on the other hand, requires the analyst to look at agents other than the state, such as transnational corporations, grassroots movements, and individuals, instead of restricting his/her analysis to the state's agency. This is essential not only because states, as noted above, are not always able (or willing) to fulfil their side of the bargain in providing for their citizens' security, but also because there

⁵⁶ Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: The Ethical Claims of International Society Revisited,' *Political Studies* 44:1 (1996) 123-36.

⁵⁷ Tickner, *Gender and International Relations*, 57.

⁵⁸ Scott Turner, 'Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging

already are agents other than states—be it social movements or intellectuals—who are striving to provide for the differing security needs of peoples (themselves and others).⁵⁹ In other words, a broadened conception of security such as that of Buzan should be coupled with moving away from state-centrism and paying attention to the agency of non-state actors. This is necessarily because broadening security without attempting a re-conceptualisation of agency would result in falling back on the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats to security. The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting such threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. The state being the most equipped actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean that it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all.

Related to Buzan's argument regarding the state's dominant agency in security matters is Mohammed Ayoob's interjection into the debate. He has been prominent amongst critics of Cold War Security Studies with his submission that in the case of Third World states, what is needed is more not less state-centrism. In The Third World Security Predicament, Ayoob emphasised the need for adopting an 'explicitly state-centric' definition when studying security in the Third World on the grounds that the state is *the* provider of security. It should be pointed out that Ayoob does not neglect other dimensions of security such as the economic or environmental. He rather thinks these other dimensions should be taken into consideration only if they 'become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival.'⁶⁰ This is necessarily because, argues Ayoob, the Third World states, as opposed

Paradigm,' Journal of Peace Research 35:1 (1998) 25-42.

⁵⁹ See Chapter 7.

to states in the developed world are still busy with state-building and therefore in need of being given the time and space to construct 'credible and legitimate political apparatuses with the capacity to provide order—in many respects, the foremost social value—within the territories under their juridical control.'⁶¹

Ayoob's analysis constitutes a crucial corrective to the outward-oriented Cold War conceptions of security, and a reminder of the often neglected domestic political dimension of the (in)security problem in the Third World. Nevertheless, criticisms made above regarding the problematic character of Buzan's assumption about the state being the provider of security in the domestic arena are valid for Ayoob's stance as well and need not be repeated here. Moreover, as noted above, by way of taking Western developed state as a finished project, Ayoob fails to push his argument to its logical conclusion and call for a more comprehensive conception of security that is cognisant of the character of the state as an 'unfinished project.'⁶² After all, state building is an on-going process; its identity in need of re-inscription, its sovereignty in need of reaffirmation by the recognition of other states and the symbolic acts of diplomacy.⁶³ Furthermore, as Georg Sørensen has argued, the problem with realist-dominated International Relations theory in general and Security Studies in particular, has had 'less to do with an exaggerated focus on the state than a lack of analysis of the state.'⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Ayoob, The Third World Security Predicament, 9.

⁶¹ Ayoob, 'Defining Security,' 131. It is worth noting here that Ayoob, like Buzan, is influenced by the ideas of the International Society approach of Hedley Bull.

⁶² Devetak, 'Incomplete States.'

⁶³ Campbell, Writing Security; idem, Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993).

⁶⁴ Georg Sørensen, 'Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal Problem,' Security Dialogue 27:4 (1996) 371.

To put it in a nutshell, Ayoob's argument is that if Third World states were given the time to grow up to become 'adequate' states, the problem of security at the international as well as domestic levels could be better addressed.⁶⁵ This argument, in turn, echoes Buzan's call for the establishment of 'mature anarchy' through creating 'strong states.'⁶⁶ One crucial problem with the logic of this type of argument is that it is rooted in a statist conception of security that privileges the security of states over that of other referents. Viewed through such statist lenses, the security concerns of individuals and social groups are marginalized if not rendered invisible. The argument here is not to suggest that 'weak' states of the world need not strengthen their infrastructures or try and boost their legitimacy. Rather, the argument here is that a conception of security that privileges the security of the state to the extent suggested by Ayoob may not be helpful in understanding the problem of security in the Third World. The practical implication of Ayoob's (and Buzan's) argument is that security at the domestic and international level should be sought through strengthening the infrastructure and boosting the legitimacy as well as coercive power of the state, which, in turn, would have detrimental effects on the security of other potential referents at the sub-state level.⁶⁷

Moreover, Ayoob's position not only neglects the security of other potential referents, but also fails to establish crucial connections between the problem of security in the Third World and those individuals and social groups in

⁶⁵ Ayoob, Third World Security Predicament, 4.

⁶⁶ Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible?' For critiques of Buzan, see Steve Smith, 'Mature Anarchy, Strong States and Security,' Arms Control 12:2 (September 1991) 325-39; Bill McSweeney, 'Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School,' Review of International Studies 22 (1996) 81-93; Pasha, 'Security as Hegemony.'

⁶⁷ See Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World, 33-4.

the world as a whole, whose security is threatened directly or indirectly by the policies of states. After all, as noted in the previous section, those states that provide security for their citizens are able to do so largely due to their privileged position in the international economic system, which further deepens the security predicament of some others who live in the peripheries of the world. As Tickner argued,

Buzan's claim that strong states can successfully provide security might be challenged by marginalized groups, such as women and minorities, whose economic security is often compromised when military security takes priority. . . . even strong states implement dubious policies that are not always formulated democratically.⁶⁸

Some invaluable insight into these processes is provided in Cynthia Enloe's works where she has laid bare how the United States—a strong state which is supposed to provide for its citizens' security—has built its security on the insecurities of some women at home and abroad.⁶⁹ In other words, the record of strong states does not always back Buzan and Ayoob's arguments.

Added to these is the fact that the process of building strong states defies underestimation or being viewed with rose-tinted spectacles; for, it is a long, brutal and often violent process. In this sense, remembering how state building in Western Europe 'cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labour,' should serve as a reminder that there is very little in the Western European state building experience to be idealised.⁷⁰ Furthermore, there is no guarantee that building up strong states in the Third World would lead to 'stable, liberal democratic governance,' as Ayoob

⁶⁸ Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security,' 186.

⁶⁹ Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases; idem, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).

⁷⁰ Charles Tilly quoted in Georg Sørensen, 'Individual Security and National Security,' 376.

seems to expect.⁷¹ There is also the impact made by the forces of globalisation and fragmentation that often mitigate against the creation of strong states.⁷² And lastly, but perhaps most importantly, these statist approaches foreclose alternative non-statist conceptions of security at the international level thereby making it more difficult to imagine alternative futures that are not built around states as the primary focus of loyalty, decision-making power, and practice. This is necessarily because the attempts to achieve security via establishing strong-states at the domestic level are often detrimental to community building at the global level for it diminishes peoples' respect for difference. This brings us back to the point made earlier about the continuing reign of statism in Security Studies.

As mentioned above, statism in Security Studies has taken many guises. Some, such as Ayoob, are self-conscious and open about their statist credentials. Some, such as Buzan, on the other hand, argue against statism but nevertheless end up reinforcing it. As noted above, Buzan's argument (that since it is states that act for security, their security should be given primacy in our analyses) is a clear indication of his confusion of agents and referents. By way of this rather uncritical acceptance of the state's agency as being central, the agency of non-state actors are at best marginalized and at worst rendered invisible.

In a recent work co-authored with Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Buzan tried to address this problem of the confusion between referents and agents that obfuscated his analysis in his previous work.⁷³ Pointing to the difference between

⁷¹ Ayoob, 'Defining Security,' 135.

⁷² Sørensen, 'Individual Security and National Security,' 376.

⁷³ Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).

adopting a 'state-centric approach' and operating in a 'state-dominated field,' Buzan et al. clarified their position as that of the latter. Consider the following quotation:

We do not say security is only about the state (although there is much truth to the argument that the state is the ideal security actor) nor that security is equally available to all—states and other social movements. Security is an area of competing actors, but it is a biased one in which the state is generally privileged as the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the purpose.⁷⁴

To be fair, this explanation does indeed acknowledge 'the difference between a state-centric approach and a state-dominated field.'⁷⁵ Furthermore, there is no denying that the state has for long been the agent best endowed to meet (certain types of) challenges to security (as it remains to be the sole agent that has the license to legitimate use of violence). However, I still find contestable Buzan et al.'s argument that their analysis is not state-centric.

Since Buzan et al. do not look at the agency of actors other than the state when it comes to decision-making and especially taking action, it could be inferred that they assume states to be the agents of peace and security. Non-state actors do crop up in their analysis to try and force an issue onto the security agenda (such as the environmental groups lobbying for action to be taken against a pollutant factory), to defend themselves when charged for constituting a threat to security (such as the company that owns the pollutant factory) or as referents whose security is under threat (as with individuals and social groups that are affected by this pollution), but no actor other than the state is considered to have the potential to act towards actually meeting this threat (whereas nowadays it is

⁷⁴ Buzan et al., Security, 37.

⁷⁵ Buzan et al., Security, 37.

often the case that environmental groups would take action themselves or try and reach out for support from international environmental groups like the Greenpeace or the Friends of the Earth before trying to invoke the agency of the state that may or may not choose to step in afterwards). Then, it is by way of looking solely at the agency of the state that Buzan et al. end up moving only partially away from presenting a state-centric analysis.

Furthermore, if Security Studies is dominated by states—as Buzan et al. suggest—it is partly because security analysts got it that way, not because there are no other potential referents and agents that challenge the state's dominance. In other words, the difference between these two positions which Buzan et al. try to establish—the difference between state-centrism and operating in a state-dominated field—dissolves when the theory/practice relationship is conceived as mutually constitutive. State-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a state-dominated field, but also help constitute it. The argument here is not meant to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the contrary, they remain to be significant actors with crucial roles to play. Rather it is to argue that the state's dominant position as the actor best endowed to provide (certain dimensions of) security does not justify privileging its security; nor does it warrant adopting a state-centred conception of security in our studies. Accordingly, Buzan et al.'s approach, by way of failing to recognise the important role that is already being played by non-state actors, ends up giving the state's agency more credit than it deserves. This is also why the distinction between state-centrism and statism blurs. To accord primacy in our security analyses to the state (i.e., state-centrism) does not simply reflect a 'reality' out there, but

helps reinforce statism in Security Studies by way of making it harder to imagine non-statist futures.

Conclusion

This chapter was devoted to drawing the contours of post-Cold War security thinking. The first section looked at developments in Arab national security thinking. In the 1990s, the literature on Arab national security was characterised by a move away from statist and zero sum thinking of the Cold War years. Here I presented Korany's critique of state-centrism and the need to pay attention to the concerns of Arab civil society, and Toukan and Feldman's stress on the effects of the security dilemma and the need for adopting common security practices. Mernissi's critique was utilised to point to the outward-directed and military-focused approaches prevalent even among post-Cold War critics of Arab national security. It was argued that Mernissi's critique is also significant because of the way it echoes Critical Security Studies argument that the prioritisation of the military dimension of security and the ensuing militarisation of Arab societies not only made it difficult meet traditional challenges, but also undermined the Arab states' capacity to provide welfare to their citizens thereby exacerbating non-military threats to security.

The next section turned to look at the contributions made by students of Third World security some of which echo those by students of Arab national security, especially regarding the critique of top down and military-focused

conceptions and the stress put on the need to understand the domestic dimension of security in the Third World. It was argued that by pointing to the underdeveloped state of core concepts such as 'state' and 'security,' writers like Thomas, Sayigh and Job have made significant contributions to the post-Cold War effort in re-thinking security. Ayoob's emphasis on the need for privileging state security in the Third World, on the other hand, was criticised. It was argued that Ayoob's stance is symptomatic of the tendency among some students of Third World security to stress how the security problems faced by developing states are different from those faced by developed states without necessarily realising the inadequacies of traditional conceptions of security within the context of the developed world. Following Acharya, it was argued that deepening our insight into the security needs and concerns of developing states would enrich our understanding of security in general.

Chapter 6 also looked at the debates on 'broadening security' and 'appropriate referent(s) for security' in the attempt to offer an idea as to which issues were problematised in post-Cold War debates (and which were not). First, I looked at the debate on broadening security. Walt's argument for keeping a military-focused agenda was criticised for his prioritisation of the coherence of Security Studies as an academic discipline at the expense of gaining insight into the security needs and concerns of peoples (individuals and social groups). Regarding Wæver and Deudney's critique of broadening security, it was noted that their worries stem from the adoption of a particular Cold War mindset characterised by statist, zero sum and militarised thinking and practices. It was argued that Critical Security Studies, cognisant of the problematic nature of

meeting a broadened agenda through such traditional practices, has attempted to re-conceptualise practice. The chapter suggested that the issue of re-conceptualising practice was sidelined in the debate on broadening security.

It was further argued that although Wæver's call for desecuritization might actually constitute a way of avoiding meeting non-military threats through militarised practices, this would also mean leaving a useful concept like security to the monopoly of state elites. Furthermore, it would amount to remaining uncritical of their zero sum and militarised approaches to military threats. As the Alternative Security thinkers have noted during the Cold War, security maintained *against* the adversary through traditional practices does not tend to be stable. Hence the call of Critical Security Studies call for re-conceptualising practice to emphasise common as opposed to zero sum, and cooperative as opposed to unilateral practices.

The final section of the chapter argued that the debate on appropriate referent(s) for security reflected the continued reign of statism in security thinking. The argument Buzan makes for state-centrism was criticised for his confusion of referents and agency. It was argued that states may be the dominant agents, but this does not justify privileging their security. For one thing, not all states act as agents for security; many states' practices show that they often act in defiance of peoples' concerns. For another thing, those states that do provide for their own citizens create insecurity for those in the margins and peripheries at home and abroad. Following Booth, it was argued that states should be treated as means and not ends. Furthermore, states should be treated as not the only means.

This is not only because the state's agency has become less and less central in an increasingly globalising world, but also because there are agents other than states that strive to provide for their own and others' security.

The foregoing review of developments in post-Cold War security thinking shows that merely broadening security without attempting to re-conceptualise agency and practice does not allow students of security to move away from state-centric analyses, thereby ending up reinforcing statism in Security Studies (albeit unintentionally). From a Critical Security Studies perspective, broadening security in itself would not suffice so long as our conceptions of security remains statist, our practices zero sum and militarised. One problem with simply broadening the security agenda from a statist perspective without re-conceptualising agency and practice is that these new issues are approached not from the perspective of individuals or social groups but from states and tried to be addressed through traditional practices, which may indeed end up perpetuating them. This, I argued, was also characteristic of Arab national security and Third World security thinking in that both emphasised the issue of narrow security agendas and the need to pay attention to the domestic dimension. As a result, the issues of statism and appropriate practices to meet a broadened agenda were sidelined in these debates. The point here is that taking the broadened security agenda seriously requires paying attention to the issues identified above, namely, agency, practice and constitutive theory—issues I term as the silences of post-Cold War debates. This argument will be further developed in Chapter 8 when discussing the Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the future.

Chapter 7 : Practices of Security in the Post-Cold War Era

Chapter 7 concludes Part II by bringing together the arguments developed in Chapters 5 (representations) and 6 (theories). As was the case with Chapter 4 (practices) this chapter is also organized along spatial lines, looking at security practices within the context of the spatial representations they have been shaped by and, in turn, have shaped. Here I will look at four alternative representations, namely, the 'Arab Regional System,' 'Euro-Med Region,' 'Muslim Middle East,' and '(New) Middle East.' The aim here is not to cover the complete range of security practices, but rather focus on those practices that were adopted to address the problem of regional security.

Security in the Arab Regional System

The Arab Regional System as a spatial representation is rooted in the Arab national security discourse, which has shaped and, in turn, been shaped by security practices of Arab actors, as noted in Chapters 2 and 5. Security practices of Arab actors during the post-Cold War era have taken different forms. On the one hand were Arab policy-makers whose references to the Arab national

security discourse became more and more sparse. Although Gulf regimes had begun to make this shift from the Arab national security discourse to that of Middle Eastern security in the 1960s (see Chapter 4), as far as the rest of Arab states were concerned, the watershed event has been the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Since the Gulf War, conservative Gulf regimes have openly distanced themselves from the rest of the Arab world and expressed their reservations regarding the concept of Arab national security—something unheard of until the 1990s. Jordan and the PLO took up the opportunity to break away from the rest of Arab states and sign individual peace treaties with Israel. Egypt consolidated its ties with the United States. Even Syrian policy-makers, long-time contenders for the leadership of the radical camp, agreed to engage in bilateral peace negotiations with Israel. Turkey and Israel grasped this opportunity to strengthen the strategic ties they established during the Cold War but kept under covers for fear of Arab reaction. As the Arab/non-Arab divide that once was the backbone of Arab national security discourse became less and less meaningful, Iran re-introduced itself to regional politics and sought to assume the leadership of Muslim states particularly since 1997 when it took over the presidency of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC).

On the other hand were Arab non-state actors whose practices continued to shape and be shaped by the Arab national security discourse. Whilst intellectuals and grassroots organisations cooperated across borders to demand increased political participation and respect for human rights from their governments, those economically worse off focused on issues such as unemployment, better health provision and education. This section of the chapter

will seek to show how non-state actors have continued, in the post-Cold War world, to uphold Arab national security discourse seeking to shape and constrain the practices of their policy-makers, who have adopted increasingly more statist practices shaped by the Middle Eastern security discourse.¹

The Gulf Crisis was a decisive event for inter-Arab relations. Its decisive character mainly stems from the fact that the security practices of Arab governments, during and after the crisis, came to focus increasingly on the concept of *amn qutri* (the territorial state) as opposed to the concept of *amn kawmi* (the Arab nation). As Bahgat Korany wrote:

At the root of the Arabs' different alignments during the Gulf War were differing perceptions of security requirements—and these, in turn, were determined by whether Arab actors thought of security primarily in terms of the individual territorial state (*Amn Qutri*) or in terms of the broader collectivity: Arabs versus non-Arabs.²

As Chapter 4 argued, there had already emerged during the Cold War a gap between 'say' and do,' or 'the *doctrine* of (pan-)national security and the *practice* of territorial state security' in Arab politics.³ However, notwithstanding this discrepancy, many Arab policy-makers, until the early 1990s, continued to uphold the Arab national security discourse, whilst the rest of their security practices increasingly focused on maintaining state and regime security. Then, what has changed with the Gulf War is that since then not even the discourses employed by Arab policy-makers uphold Arab national security. Note the following

¹ See Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism,' in The Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 161-78; Michael Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' Political Science Quarterly 111:4 (1996-97) esp. pp. 598-606.

² Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World,' 164.

³ Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World,' 174.

statement by the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States (LAS) made in December 1992:

Each state determines the needs and boundaries of its security on its own, because this concerns its people and its future. We should basically assume that there should be no interference in any country's security. We must acknowledge and proceed from this basic principle.⁴

This is not necessarily what one would consider a controversial statement; rather a pronouncement of a statist approach to security. Nevertheless it would have been unthinkable to utter such a statement publicly during the 1950s and 1960s, when Nasser was in power and Arab nationalism was at its peak. The Gulf War, in this sense, helped bridge the gap between 'say' and 'do' in Arab politics; representatives of Gulf states and others no longer feel the need to resort to the language of Arab national security to justify their practices.⁵

The Gulf War has constituted a watershed in Arab politics also because this was the first time, in the history of the LAS, an Arab state invaded another Arab state. Although there had been instances in the past such as Saudi Arabia providing financial backing to Islamist movements in other Arab states, or Syria's intervention into Lebanon during the civil war, respect for each other's sovereignty and especially territorial integrity had been a closely guarded rule.⁶ By invading Kuwait, Iraq not only broke this rule, but also sought to destabilise other Arab regimes by legitimising this action with reference to Arab national security in a way reminiscent of Nasser's 'symbolic' practices during the 1950s and 1960s (see Chapter 4).⁷ In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, Iraqi

⁴ quoted in Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 602.

⁵ Yezid Sayigh, 'The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed,' International Affairs 67:1 (1991) 489; Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 605.

⁶ Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 602.

⁷ On 'symbolic' practices of Arab politics, see Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics:

president Saddam Hussein suggested that the Iraqi action was part of a large-scale process to attain Arab national security which—in his view—included the re-distribution of Arab oil wealth equitably between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots.’⁸ This attempt to present the conflict between Kuwait and Iraq as one of Arab ‘haves’ against ‘have nots,’ thereby playing up the resentment felt by the peoples of poor Arab states against their oil-rich neighbours did not prove to be very credible, not the least because Iraq itself was a ‘have’ state (with oil reserves second only to that of Saudi Arabia)⁹ enjoying a GNP that was nine times that of Somalia, five times that of Sudan, and just less than four times that of Egypt.¹⁰ Saddam Hussein’s claim was made all the less credible by the fact that he had not come up with the idea of distributing oil wealth until the Gulf War.¹¹

Bahgat Korany likened the Iraqi attempt to legitimise Kuwait’s invasion with reference to Arab national security to a ‘fatal bear hug,’ maintaining that Saddam Hussein’s reference to the Arab national security discourse only helped ‘downgrade’ the ideal itself.¹² Gulf policy-makers were particularly vocal in expressing their disillusionment with the Arab national security discourse, especially its core assumption that threats to the security of Arabs come from non-Arabs. In a statement made after the Gulf War, the Secretary General of the

Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

⁸ Korany, ‘National Security in the Arab World,’ 165; Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, 61.

⁹ Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) 12.

¹⁰ Korany, ‘National Security in the Arab World,’ 165-6. These are pre-war and pre-UN sanctions figures.

¹¹ Korany, ‘National Security in the Arab World,’ 166; also see Faour, Arab World After Desert Storm, 5.

¹² Korany, ‘National Security in the Arab World,’ 166. For a similar point, see Michael Barnett and F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State, and the Development of Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council,’ in Security Communities, eds. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 181.

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Abdallah Bishara expressed his conviction that the basic threat to the security of the Gulf states emanated not from Israel, but from some Arab states:¹³

We in the Gulf and the people of Kuwait have paid the price of fixed emotional positions and of basing our policy on so-called solidarity . . . My view of the Arab future is based on a concept which destroys the myth of Arab fraternity, the myth of Arab security, and the myth of the one homeland. Future Arab links should be based on the Arab dimension of civilized interests, not on futile emotional theories.¹⁴

As noted above, the very fact that an Arab policy-maker did make such a statement, which would have been considered heretical if made a decade earlier, signalled the diminishing hold the Arab security discourse had over Arab policy-makers' practices.

Another example of Gulf policy-makers' increasingly bold disregard of the premises of Arab national security was observed when they decided to punish those states that they saw as taking Iraq's side by banishing their migrant workers. Following the liberation of Kuwait, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, Iraqis, Yemenis and Jordanians were forced to leave their homes in Gulf states. It should also be noted that Iraq and Jordan also sent migrant workers back because of their own economic decline.¹⁵

Gulf policy-makers' banishment of Arab migrant workers becomes all the more striking when it is put in its historical context; for until the 1990s labour migration had been perceived as 'a dimension of Arab economic

¹³ Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World,' 166.

¹⁴ quoted in Bruce Maddy Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? Regional Security After the Gulf War,' *Orient* 34:2 (1993) 225.

¹⁵ Nader Fergany, 'Arab Labor Migration and the Gulf Crisis,' in *The Arab World Today*, ed. Tschirgi, 95-6. Also see Faour, *The Arab World After Desert Storm*, 82-3; Karawan, 'Arab

interdependence and an example of regional integration.'¹⁶ The 'have not' governments, which exported work force, viewed this as a way of claiming a share of the oil revenues of the 'have' states. Workers' remittances not only helped feed their families back home but also helped ameliorate the financial troubles of their governments. Those 'have' states, which were on the receiving end of labour migration, in turn, benefited from the services of their poor brethren.¹⁷ Although they were always very cautious about the potential destabilising effects of the migrant workers in their societies, not allowing them to become a permanent part of the socio-economic fabric, they had never before used migrant workers explicitly as a foreign policy tool—not even during periods of strain.¹⁸ The Gulf War, then, brought the securitization of labour migration out into the public realm. Since 1991, the issue has been treated openly by Gulf regimes as 'a matter of national security, state sovereignty and regime stability.'¹⁹ This, in turn is a good illustration of how non-military issues, when put on the security agenda, could be approached from a statist perspective and met by traditional practices unless alternative practices are adopted in addressing them.

Another example of the 'atomisation'²⁰ of the Arab region and decline of the Arab national security discourse was observed when the Damascus Declaration (signed in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War by Arab members of the US-led coalition) was allowed to wither. The Declaration was agreed on in

Dilemmas in the 1990s,' 444-6.

¹⁶ Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s,' 445.

¹⁷ See Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997) for an elaborate analysis of the workings of this relationship within the context of Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Also see Fergany, 'Arab Labor Migration and the Gulf Crisis,' 93.

¹⁸ Ibrahim A. Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s: Breaking Taboos and Searching for Signposts,' Middle East Journal 48:3 (Summer 1994) 445.

¹⁹ Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s,' 446.

March 1991 between Egypt, Syria and GCC-member states in the attempt to take the issue of Gulf security in the hands of Arab states from those of the United States.²¹ The declaration was based on the principles embodied in the UN and LAS charters with special emphasis being put on state sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the economic sphere, the intention to establish an 'Arab economic grouping' was declared. Regarding defence, the Declaration envisaged the constitution of a 'nucleus Arab peace force' which was to be based on existing Egyptian and Syrian forces already stationed in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with the stated aim of safeguarding the Gulf as well as serving as 'an example that would guarantee the effectiveness of the comprehensive Arab defence order.'²² By this way, Egypt and Syria were committing themselves to the security of Gulf states, whilst the latter were pledging \$5bn in economic assistance to Egypt and Syria as part of a projected \$10-15bn package.²³

The misgivings of Gulf policy-makers regarding the Declaration began to surface shortly, as they repeatedly postponed its ratification.²⁴ It soon became clear that in the eyes of the Gulf policy-makers the real value of the Damascus Declaration, as the Kuwaiti ex-Secretary-General of the GCC Abdallah Bishara put it, was 'its recognition of the legitimacy of the Arab states' borders, the right of each state to arrange its own security, and the exclusive claim to its resources.'²⁵ When Egypt and Syria withdrew their forces from the Gulf, tired of waiting, this served the purposes of Gulf states, which 'seemed intent on watering down the

²⁰ Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm, esp. pp. 77-97.

²¹ Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 602.

²² Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab order?' 226-7. Also see Faour, Arab World After Desert Storm, 86-8.

²³ Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order?' 227.

²⁴ See Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions,' 181-6, for a discussion on the

signed document without scrapping it outright.²⁶ Finally, on 16 July 1991 the foreign ministers of signatory states met and issued a revised version of the Declaration that no longer mentioned a 'nucleus Arab peace force.'²⁷

A few months later Kuwait signed a ten-year security accord with the United States (September 1991). Bahrain (October 1991) and Qatar (June 1992) followed suit. Kuwait also sought to broaden the net by signing 'defence cooperation accords' with the other four members of the UN Security Council.²⁸ In other words, the Gulf states were quick to turn away from an 'Arab collective security' scheme and towards a 'go it alone defence strategy' as Michael Barnett and Gregory Gause argued, with each seeking to buy security by concluding colossal defence contracts and negotiating individual security guarantees with the United States.²⁹ They did not seek to coordinate their efforts even within the GCC framework let alone with other Arab states. Nor did they show any 'desire to come to understandings about burden-sharing, avoidance of duplication, or inter-operability' with other GCC-member states.³⁰ The point here is that in stark contrast to the premises of Arab national security, Gulf policy-makers were not willing to allow any other Arab actor to shape their policies.

However although the fate of the Damascus Declaration did indeed highlight the 'collapse'³¹ of Arab national security discourse as far as Arab

Damascus Declaration and politics in the Gulf Cooperation Council in its aftermath.

²⁵ Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 602.

²⁶ Faour, *Arab World After Desert Storm*, 88.

²⁷ Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order?' 227-8.

²⁸ Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions,' 182.

²⁹ Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions,' 183; also see Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 608.

³⁰ Barnett and Gause, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions,' 182.

³¹ Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*, 227.

governments were concerned, this should not lead one to gloss over its continuing popularity as observed in the practices of individuals, grassroots organisations and other civil societal actors.³² For instance, when Saddam Hussein resorted to Arab national security discourse to justify Iraqi actions, his views were echoed by the demonstrators in the streets of the Arab world. He was received favourably by many when he appealed to Arab peoples and called for a unified Arab stance against the foreign (non-Arab) elements that have been usurping Arab oil and their regional allies who provided services such as keeping the oil prices down and helping maintain a stable international economy without eliciting a political quid pro quo (such as a less pro-Israeli stance in the Israel/Palestine conflict).³³ When he made his 12 August 1990 speech explaining Iraqi presence in Kuwait by establishing linkages with Israeli presence in Palestine, southern Lebanon and the Golan, and Syrian presence in southern Lebanon, his arguments struck a chord with many people both within and outside the Arab world.³⁴ As Rouhollah Ramazani argued, the fact that Saddam Hussein chose to justify his actions with reference to these linkages did not mean that they did not exist.³⁵

Non-governmental actors' protests against the US-led coalition took the form of street demonstrations, conferences, and the formation of delegations to try and solve the problem within an Arab framework. The demonstrators in Arab

³² For a discussion on the reactions of Arab policy-makers and intellectuals to the end of the Cold War and the Gulf Crisis, see Karawan, 'Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s,' 433-54.

³³ Walid Khalidi, 'Why Some Arabs Support Saddam,' in The Gulf War Reader eds. Michael L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (New York: Times Books and Random House, 1991) 161-71; Edward W. Said, 'Behind Saddam Hussein's moves,' in The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994), 278-82.

³⁴ Khalidi, 'Why Some Arabs Support Saddam,' 170.

³⁵ R.K. Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement: Towards an Integrated U.S.

streets expressed support for Iraq not necessarily because they condoned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but because they were, as Walid Khalidi noted, '[disillusioned] with the Arab status quo—political, social and economic—as well as with the regional policies of the United States.'³⁶ In their eyes, the Iraqi action 'constituted a deserved blow to the status quo (with all its domestic, political, socio-economic, and international dimensions) . . . which Kuwait was seen to symbolise.'³⁷ Their protests were 'not so much pro-Saddam or anti-Kuwait as anti the socio-economic status quo, despite the merits of the Kuwaiti case.'³⁸ To a certain extent, then, the pro-Iraq demonstrations of the Arab masses were a way of voicing their opinion against their governments that otherwise refused to listen to their concerns.³⁹

Many Arab intellectuals, among them Edward Said, also refused to condone the Iraqi action, but at the same time opposed the US-led coalition and its resolve to bring an end to the crisis through the use of force.⁴⁰ Arab intellectuals felt frustrated when the Arab world could not cope with an inter-Arab dispute by itself, that it displayed signs of dependence on the West (especially the United States), and that Iraq was allowed to be destroyed.⁴¹ Said expressed the feelings of many when he wrote:

No Arab country today can adequately defend itself or its borders, yet national security arguments are used to justify gigantically large outlays of money for imported weapons, standing armies, praetorian guards. Above all, the movement

Policy in the Middle East?' Middle East Policy vi: 1 (June 1998) 50.

³⁶ Khalidi, 'Why Some Arabs Support Saddam,' 167.

³⁷ Walid Khalidi, Palestine Reborn (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992) 204.

³⁸ Khalidi, 'Why Some Arab Support Saddam,' 168.

³⁹ Maha Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis: Perceptions of the Muslim World,' International Affairs 67:1 (1991) 471.

⁴⁰ Edward W. Said, 'A Tragic Convergence,' in The Politics of Dispossession, 283-6; 'Intellectuals and the War: Interview with Edward Said,' Middle East Report (July-August 1991) 15-20.

⁴¹ Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order?' 225.

toward war today has overridden any rational consideration of what as Arabs we want our future to be. Where is the real discussion of 'Arab' wealth, poverty, society? All of us feel connected to an Arab nation, yet we allow massive amounts of polemic to cover hypothesized Arabs, while not enough detailed attention and care are given to individual, actual Arab lives and bodies.⁴²

Fatima Mernissi voiced similar concerns, but from a feminist perspective, when she wrote:

It is true that Mecca is still the centre of the world, even though it needs the American air force to protect it. But what can such a force protect against, against what deviation and confusion? What about the women in the city? . . . What will become of the women in a city where the defence of the *hudud* [boundary] is in the hands of foreigners?⁴³

Mernissi sought to emphasise how the Gulf War only added to the predicament of Arab women. As Chapter 6 argued, the Arab national security discourse has privileged militarised practices by way of invoking the need to secure Arabs (inside) from non-Arabs (outside). This, in turn, has resulted in the marginalization of women's concerns. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, women found themselves once again on the margins, unable to voice their concerns let alone put them on Arab national security agendas, because the boundary dividing Arabs from non-Arabs is once again under challenge.

Notwithstanding such criticisms regarding security practices that have been justified by regional governments' pro-Arab rhetoric, a more societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security is still upheld by Arab intellectuals as the main tool in the attempt to shape and constrain their governments' actions. They take action within the spatial bounds of Arab Regional System in collaboration with activists in other Arab countries to put

⁴² Said, 'A Tragic Convergence,' 286.

⁴³ Fatima Mernissi, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland

pressure on their governments. Although not much cooperation is visible with their Iranian and Turkish counterparts,⁴⁴ Arab intellectuals regularly come together to address those problems overlooked (if not perpetuated) by their governments.⁴⁵ Saad Eddin Ibrahim has observed that those of the socialist conviction put 'social justice' on top of their agenda; those with liberal convictions prioritise 'democracy'.⁴⁶ Human rights is another significant issue upheld by Arab intellectuals and social activists.⁴⁷

It should also be noted that the late 1980s and especially 1990s saw the relative strengthening of civil society in the Arab world with an increase in the number of relevant organisations.⁴⁸ Arab civil society is argued to be more vibrant than ever, with grassroots organisations of all sorts emphasising their Arab character. Many Arab non-governmental organisations work on relief and survival issues, human rights, provision of health care and education. Lebanese and Palestinian NGOs have been doing crucial work in trying to alleviate the difficulties of life in civil war (Lebanon) or under occupation (Palestine) by

(Reading, MA: Persesus Books, 1992) 9.

⁴⁴ An exception to this tendency is the increasing collaboration between Israeli, Palestinian and other Arab peace movements and especially women's movements that cross the conceptual borders of the 'Arab regional order' to work with the Israeli women. See Simona Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord: Feminist Approaches to International Politics,' in Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996) 107-26.

⁴⁵ 'Interview with Salim Nasr—A View From the Region: Middle East Studies in the Arab World,' Middle East Report (October-December 1997) 16-18; Hisham Sharabi, 'Introduction: Patriarchy and Dependency in the Future of Arab Society,' in The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988); 'The Commission Document on Peace-building in the Middle East,' in Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. Elise Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 43.

⁴⁶ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Arab Middle East,' Security Dialogue 27:4 (1996) 428. Also see Sharabi, 'Introduction,' 6-7.

⁴⁷ Sanàa Osseiran, 'The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East,' in Building Peace in the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 86-7.

⁴⁸ For a discussion on civil society in theory and practice with a specific focus on the Arab states, see Jillian Schwedler, 'Civil Society and the Study of Middle East Politics,' in Toward Civil Society in the Middle East?: A Primer, ed. Jillian Schwedler (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995) 1-30.

'nurturing a sense of community, solidarity and hope.'⁴⁹ These are also excellent examples of non-state actors acting to provide for their own and others' security where governments fail to do so.

Security in the Euro-Med Region

Chapter 2 argued that the Mediterranean as an alternative spatial representation began to take shape from the 1970s onwards largely in line with the development and changing security conceptions and practices of the European Union (previously the European Community). The EU's close interest in Middle Eastern affairs, as discussed in Chapter 5, goes back to the early 1970s—a period marked by the OPEC oil embargo that intertwined with the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Over the years, the EU's policies toward the Middle East have been shaped around three major concerns: energy security (understood as the sustained flow of oil and natural gas at reasonable prices);⁵⁰ regional stability (understood as domestic stability especially in the countries in the geographically north Africa); and the cessation of Israel/Palestine conflict.⁵¹

In the 1980s, changes in the societies of EU-member states as a result of the growth of the Middle Eastern diaspora in Western Europe led EU policy-makers to re-think their priorities, and come to consider stability in the Middle

⁴⁹ 'The NGO Phenomenon in the Arab World—An Interview with Ghanem Bibi,' Middle East Report (March-April 1995) 26.

⁵⁰ Eberhard Rhein, 'Europe and the Greater Middle East,' in Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East, eds. Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) 49.

⁵¹ Volker Perthes, 'Europe, the United States, and the Middle East Peace Process,' in Allies Divided, eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 89-90.

East (especially north Africa) as an integral part of their own security.⁵² Accordingly, EU policy-makers have sought to create co-operative schemes with the Mediterranean-rim countries of the Middle East to encourage and support economic development and growth.⁵³ Although non-EU actors such as the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), the IPRA Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East, and the European Peace Research Association (EUPRA) have also encouraged and supported the search for security within a Euro-Med framework,⁵⁴ the EU has almost single-handedly sought to construct a Euro-Med Region to meet its own domestic economic, societal, and, to a much lesser extent, military security interests.

This, however, is not to suggest that the members of the European Union have adopted a single common approach or that EU policy-makers speak with one voice regarding Middle Eastern issues. On the contrary, EU-members do not all share the same sense of urgency or the need to adopt an independent and common European foreign policy towards the Middle East, or to assume a prominent role in the Arab-Israeli Peace Process. Whilst France and other southern European states press for more assertive policy-making and implementation, Germany, the Netherlands and UK have cautioned against it.⁵⁵

⁵² See Ghassan Salamé, 'Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era,' Middle East Journal 48:2 (1994) 226-49.

⁵³ Robert Satloff, 'America, Europe, and the Middle East in the 1990s: Interests and Policies,' in Allies Divided, eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 19. Also see Barry Buzan and B.A. Roberson, 'Europe and the Middle East: Drifting Towards Societal Cold War?' in Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre et al. (London: Pinter, 1993) 131-47.

⁵⁴ See 'The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East,' 7-66; James Calleja, 'Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean: A Strategy for Peace-Building,' in Building Peace in the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 279-85.

⁵⁵ Perthes, 'Europe, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process,' 87.

The shift in EU's priorities towards adopting a Mediterranean-centred approach, then, should be understood within a context created, over the years, by the convergence of domestic societal as well as economic concerns.⁵⁶ The presence of a large and growing Middle Eastern diaspora in the EU has meant that the de-stabilisation of Middle Eastern societies, especially those in north Africa, could be detrimental to security and stability in the EU.⁵⁷ In short, EU's turn towards a more Mediterranean-centred approach has its roots in the domestic societal concerns of the EU-member states and a re-thinking of security in the European Union against the backdrop of migration from the Middle East; the increasing restlessness within the Middle Eastern diaspora in the EU that has at times taken the form of militant activism; and the civil war in Algeria, which accelerated the pace of the first two processes.⁵⁸

What is also new in the post-Cold War era is the gradual emergence of a division of labour between the United States and the European Union over regional security in the Middle East⁵⁹—a division of labour based on the differences between EU and US priorities. Put simply, US policy-makers concentrate on maintaining security the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli peace process (see the final section of this chapter) whereas the EU has put emphasis on security and stability in geographically closer north Africa.

However, these differences in priorities should not obscure the common interests that remain. Both the United States and the European Union still share

⁵⁶ Rhein, 'Europe and the Greater Middle East,' 41-59.

⁵⁷ Perthes, 'Europe, the United States, and the Middle East Peace Process,' 92.

⁵⁸ Trevor Parfitt, 'Europe's Mediterranean Designs: An Analysis of the Euro-Med Relationship with Special Reference to Egypt,' *Third World Quarterly* 18:5 (1997) 865-81.

an interest in the sustained flow of oil (and natural gas for the EU) at reasonable prices. EU-members (with the exception of the UK) are considerably more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than the United States. The latter imports only 20 per cent of its total energy consumption from the Middle East whereas it is 50-90 per cent for some European states.⁶⁰ Indeed oil is the only Middle Eastern issue over which transatlantic relations have been relatively 'concentric and coherent' since the end of the Cold War.⁶¹ The cooperative relationship established between the two during the Gulf War could be viewed as an example of this phenomenon.⁶²

It should nevertheless be noted that although it is true that the EU, like the United States, seeks to maintain military stability in the Gulf, when security in north Africa is concerned it emphasises economic development and democratisation as well as stability. EU policy-makers are very sceptical about what military practices could achieve in influencing north African countries (that are included in the Euro-Med Region), but they still follow US lead in the Gulf in an attempt to maintain military stability. Indeed, there seems to be a tacit agreement between EU and US policy-makers that security in the Gulf (understood as the maintenance of stability through keeping friendly regimes in power) is to be maintained through the threat and use of force if necessary.

⁵⁹ Satloff, 'America, Europe, and the Middle East in the 1990s,' 7-39, esp. pp.8-9.

⁶⁰ Rhein, 'Europe and the Greater Middle East,' 49.

⁶¹ quoted in Perthes, 'Europe, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process,' 88.

⁶² François Heisbourg 'The United States, Europe and Military Force Projection' in Allies Divided, eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 277-97; Richard L. Kugler, 'Military Force Projection,' in Allies Divided, eds. Blackwill and Stürmer, 253-75.

On the issue of security in the Euro-Med Region, EU-members have maintained that 'economic, political, and diplomatic engagement can be of greater relevance.'⁶³ François Heisbourg expands upon this statement:

Although the Europeans are just as prone—and possibly even more so, for reasons of proximity—as the Americans to emphasize the combined regional dangers of militant fundamentalism and terrorism (not least in Algeria, a prime French security concern), they do not usually see these as essentially military challenges.⁶⁴

In other words, EU's practices towards achieving security in the Euro-Med Region are based on a broader conception of security that takes into account its non-military dimensions and seeks to adopt non-militarised practices.

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership that shaped the Euro-Med Region was institutionalised at the Barcelona Conference (November 1995) that brought together Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, and Turkey.⁶⁵ The Conference agreed on establishing a partnership between Mediterranean littoral states in three areas: political and security relations, economic and financial relations, and social, cultural and human relations. In order to give practical expression to this scheme, the Conference agreed on a work programme of activities in a multilateral framework that brought in the private sector to play a role in transferring additional resources, both technological and financial. The cornerstone of the Euro-Med partnership is the creation of a free-trade zone in industrial goods and services over a twelve-year period. The purpose behind this

⁶³ Heisbourg, 'The United States, Europe and Military Force Projection,' 284.

⁶⁴ Heisbourg, 'The United States, Europe, and Military Force Projection,' 285.

⁶⁵ Libya was excluded from the conference.

formation is stated as not only one of creating an expanded trading bloc, but also providing

incentives for sound economic and financial decision-making by Middle Eastern participants, to create a framework for labour-intensive European-funded development projects, and even reduce intra-Middle Eastern conflicts by providing a non-threatening forum for participation across divides.⁶⁶

In this sense, the Euro-Med partnership scheme is based on liberal assumptions as can be deduced from British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind's address to the Barcelona Conference where he said that the Euro-Med had 'two main themes: political stability . . . and economic growth. In reality these are actually only one subject.'⁶⁷ A similar logic was at the roots of the establishment of the multilateral negotiations of the Arab-Israeli peace process (see the final section of this chapter).

The programme agreed at the Barcelona Conference, although less ambitious compared to a CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) type organisation (see below) nevertheless envisaged that the partners would discuss issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The partner states also called for exchanges at civil societal level as a key element of the implementation of the partnership programme.⁶⁸ So far, one key achievement of the partnership has been to bring together Syria and Lebanon with Israel as part of a multilateral scheme. Syria has boycotted the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) summits organised as a part of the Madrid Peace Process.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Satloff, 'America, Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s,' 23.

⁶⁷ quoted in Satloff, 'America, Europe and the Middle East in the 1990s,' 23.

⁶⁸ 'Bulletin EU 6-1996'; available at <http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9606/i1038.html>; Internet; accessed November 25, 1998.

⁶⁹ Perthes, 'Europe, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process,' 95.

The proposal to create a CSCE type organisation in the Middle East, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was an earlier attempt by two EU-member states, Italy and Spain to create 'a stable system of regional cooperation' in the Mediterranean (1990).⁷⁰ Later in the year a meeting on security and cooperation was held in Cairo, attended by representatives from Algeria, Egypt, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia. The long-term objectives and principles of the CSCM discussed at this meeting were modelled after the CSCE and aimed to achieve consensus, among the participant states, on a set of principles and rules dealing with issues of security, economic cooperation and human rights.⁷¹ Although the CSCM proposal was well received by the International Peace Research Association, among others,⁷² it was not followed up.⁷³ Arguably, the formation of a CSCM was considered too ambitious a project. A CSCM would have set certain criteria to be met in terms of inter-state relations as well as state-society relations and would have created responsibilities which very few of the potential CSCM-member states were willing to assume.⁷⁴ Furthermore, European policy-makers were more eager to adopt policies that would show immediate economic effects. This is because the European Union's conception of security in the Euro-Med Region takes the EU itself as the referent. EU policy-makers have broadened security

⁷⁰ Tim Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM),' in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, op. cit., 246.

⁷¹ Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM),' 246-7.

⁷² 'The Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East,' 49.

⁷³ Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, 'Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy,' Kurasat Istratijiya [Strategic Papers of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies] 4:27 (1997); available from <http://www.acpss.org/ekuras/ek27c/ek27e.htm>; Internet; accessed August 1, 1999.

⁷⁴ For a critique of the CSCM proposal, see Roberto Aliboni, 'Confidence-Building, Conflict Prevention and Arms Control in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,' Perceptions (December 1997-February 1998) 73-86.

not from regional peoples' but from the EU's perspective in the attempt to stop Middle Eastern problems from becoming European problems.

Although a Helsinki-type process was not initiated in the Euro-Med Region, non-state actors from Western Europe have been active in conducting people-to-people diplomacy. In February 1992 a meeting was organised in Paris entitled the 'Citizens of the Mediterranean' bringing together the peoples of the region and the Helsinki Citizens' Association.⁷⁵ A similar bottom up approach was the organisation of the three-day UNESCO-supported meeting of the Consultation on Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean that took place in Malta in November 1991. A network of peace educators has begun to be built by the Peace and International Education Programmes of the Foundation for International Studies at the University of Malta. Later in the year the 1991 Conference of the European Peace Research Association in Florence became the occasion for a workshop on this theme.⁷⁶

Since it is relatively new, the Euro-Med partnership scheme does not have too many proponents at the sub-state level; nor does it have many enemies. Its main strength stems from the fact that it has managed to bring together Syria and Israel as well as a wide spectrum of NGOs together. Another one of its strengths is the assistance the EU has provided to NGOs. Between 1995-99, the EU has set \$5.528bn to be granted to regional NGOs.⁷⁷ The point here is that although the Euro-Med partnership scheme does not have too many backers, if

⁷⁵ Osseiran, 'The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East,' 87.

⁷⁶ Calleja, 'Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean,' 282.

⁷⁷ 'European Union Funding for the Middle East NGOs,' Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East 7:4 (Winter 1998/99) 15.

the EU policy to take civil societal actors on its side bears fruit in the long run, it may come to prevail over the other three approaches.

Security in the Muslim Middle East

The Islamist discourse on security is the most controversial among the four approaches looked at in Part II. This partly stems from the anti-status quo discourses and violent practices of some Islamist actors that include the Islamic Republic of Iran, Sudan, and organisations such as the Hizbullah in Lebanon and Hamas in Israel/Palestine that constitute a challenge to military stability the United States and its regional allies have been keen to maintain. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, a major US ally and a pro-status quo actor, does not only resort to the Islamist discourse to enhance legitimacy, but it has also been a major financial supporter to many Islamist organisations⁷⁸ often regardless of their anti-status quo practices. This was done partly to weaken the grip of Arab national security discourse over Arab peoples' practices, and partly to prevent Iran from dominating the Muslim Middle East.⁷⁹ Such practices have, over the years, helped maintain regime security for a Saudi leadership that has not been keen to allow political participation. However it is also such Islamist organisations that challenge the regional status quo. In other words, the very same practices

⁷⁸ John L. Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation and U.S. Foreign Policy,' in Riding the Tiger: The Middle East Challenge After the Cold War, eds. Phebe Marr and William Lewis (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993) 188; See Dale E. Eickelman, 'Trans-state Islam and Security,' in Transnational Religion and Fading States, eds. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997) 37-8.

⁷⁹ Cary Fraser, 'In Defense of Allah's Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi Foreign Policy Strategy,' in Transnational Religion and Fading States, eds. Rudolph and Piscatori, 212-40.

designed to enhance Saudi security have at the same time challenged regional instability.

The way Saudi practices seem to have rebounded could partly be explained with reference to the different and at times contradictory conceptualisations of security adopted by Saudi policy-makers and the Islamist actors it has chosen to support. Indeed, there is more agreement amongst Islamists as to what they are against rather than what they are for. They often define 'un-Islamic influences' as the major threat to Muslims' security, but there is little agreement as to what constitutes 'un-Islamic' (or 'Islamic' for that matter). Some would consider Western influence over and intervention into the region as 'un-Islamic'. Some others would criticise existing political and religious establishments (such as the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia that allowed US troops to step on the 'holy lands') as well as the forces of Arab nationalism as being 'un-Islamic.'⁸⁰ Lastly, there are those who define 'structural violence' as 'un-Islamic'. This point will be further developed towards the end of this section.

The practices of Islamist actors range from militant activism (such as the New York Trade Centre bombing in 1993) to grassroots activities providing welfare services (such as the activities of FIS—the Islamic Salvation Front—in Algeria), and to advocating political violence aimed at establishing an 'Islamic' state (as with the Hizbullah in Lebanon).⁸¹ From the perspective of the governments of the United States, Egypt, and Israel, most Islamist organisations

⁸⁰ See Eickelman, 'Trans-state Islam and Security,' 27-46, for an overview.

⁸¹ Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratization and U.S. Foreign Policy'; idem, Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Dale E. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); Eickelman, 'Trans-

constitute threats to regional security due to their anti-status quo discourses and (at times) violent practices. However, viewed through the lenses of some regional peoples, these organisations serve as major security agents by providing welfare services that the state fails to provide its peoples. Indeed, their practices indicate that some Islamist organisations aim primarily at bringing about change at home although they do, at times, take action abroad to achieve their aims. Some Islamist organisations that target the United States, for instance, aim to bring pressure upon the US government so that it would cease supporting its regional allies some of which (such as Egypt) suppress Islamist opposition at home. The point here is that the globalist outlook and discourses of some Islamist actors become locally oriented in practice.

The difference between an Islamist actor with a domestic and reformist approach, and one with a more universal and revisionist orientation could be seen in the examples of AMAL (Lebanese Resistance Army) and Hizbullah (Party of God), both of which have used violence to achieve their aims that included fighting Israeli forces in south Lebanon. AMAL initially emerged as the military wing of the 'Movement for Dispossessed' that was founded in Lebanon in the 1960s to bring about political and economic parity for the Lebanese Shii community. The military wing (AMAL) eventually absorbed the socio-political movement, but it also adopted the political wing's goals and has concentrated on demanding reform at home. The Hizbullah, on the other hand, was founded in the 1980s following Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982). It is an umbrella movement comprising like minded groups and militias whose aims converge in

dismantling of the Lebanese state and the creation in its place of an Islamic state; the acceptance of Khomeini and Iran as the model to be emulated; a consensus that the enemies are the Lebanese government, other confessional groups, the United States, and France, as well as pro-Western Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; and the belief that it is a religious duty to destroy the 'enemies of God' through *jihad*, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice.⁸²

Amongst those Islamist organisations that have acted as agents of security, the case of FIS is a telling example of how an Islamist organisation can muster domestic support notwithstanding the violent practices of some of its members.⁸³ FIS emerged as a political actor in Algeria during the social upheavals in the late 1980s, which were generated by the fall in oil prices and the economic crisis that ensued. In 1988 the Algerian government faced massive student protests and food riots.⁸⁴ As the protests were brutally suppressed, FIS emerged as the 'self-proclaimed voice of the oppressed masses'⁸⁵ and went on to gain electoral victories in local elections in 1990 and the first round of the general elections in 1991. When it became clear that FIS won the majority of seats in the parliament, the army intervened, the second round of the elections of cancelled, and President Chadli was forced to resign in January 1992 to be replaced by an army-backed government.

In achieving such popularity with the masses, FIS followed a two-pronged strategy. One part of this strategy was pointing to the failures of the state in fields

⁸² Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 148.

⁸³ On FIS, see Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 163-83.

⁸⁴ quoted in Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 167.

⁸⁵ Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 167.

such as education, housing and employment as well as governmental corruption—criticisms that found receptive ears in a society like Algeria with more than 60 per cent of the population under 25 years of age and high levels of unemployment.⁸⁶ Another popular FIS critique was that the government spent too much on arms. Slashing the defence budget to make more money available for social expenditures was one of its election promises.⁸⁷ The second part of the FIS strategy was to proclaim 'Islam's message of social justice and call for an 'Islamisation' of the society as a solution to the current ills. To get its message across FIS undertook grassroots activism and set up a network of medical clinics and charitable associations to serve the poorest and most crowded neighbourhoods, provided housing, opened shops, created jobs, and cleaned up neighbourhoods.⁸⁸ Following the 1992 coup, the military wing of FIS has engaged in violent activism in defiance of this non-violent past.

As seen in the case of FIS, Islamist movements and organisations do not merely criticise the state for its failures in meeting the socio-economic needs of peoples, but also propose visionary solutions, adopt creative practices and provide tangible economic, social and moral support to their members as well as others who have otherwise been neglected by their state for political or infrastructural reasons.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 168.

⁸⁷ Yahya Sadowski, 'Scuds versus Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Arab World,' *Middle East Report* (July-August 1992) 5.

⁸⁸ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 174.

⁸⁹ Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 23, 100; Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation, and U.S. Foreign Policy,' 191-2.

However, the fact that these organisations act as agents of security for some should not obscure the ways in which they constitute a major threat to women's security. For, it is women who get caught in the middle when Islamist actors—be it the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Hizbullah or HAMAS—play up their 'Islamic' credentials.⁹⁰ This, in turn, could be taken as an illustration of the point made by students of Critical Security Studies that the very same actors that could be considered as engaging in emancipatory practices could, at the same time, create insecurity for others.

In sum, it would be a mistake to generalise about Islamist actors, for they have different and at times contradictory aims; they also adopt divergent practices. However, notwithstanding such differences, what seems to unite AMAL, Hizbullah, FIS, the Islamic Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Saddam Hussein is that they all resort to an Islamist discourse to legitimise their practices, garner support for their own policies, or mobilise action to stall others'. For them, 'Islam' provides a discourse of politics to reach Muslims, although they may seek to communicate radically different messages when using the same symbols. The ways in which the concept *jihad* was used during the Gulf War is a good example of the point I am trying to make here.

The Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's practices during the Gulf Crisis were not limited to invoking the Arab national security discourse. He also employed symbols such as *jihad* or the 'holy lands' in the attempt to de-legitimise the US-led intervention and to put pressure on the Arab governments that

⁹⁰ Eleanor Abdella Doumato, 'Women and Work in Saudi Arabia: How Flexible Are Islamic Margins?' Middle East Journal 53:4 (1999) 568-83.

cooperated with the United States.⁹¹ In one instance he addressed the peoples of other Arab/Muslim states as follows:

Oh, Arab, oh, Muslim and believers everywhere, this is your day to rise and defend Mecca, which is captured by the spears of the Americans and the Zionists. . . . Keep the foreigner away from your holy shrines.⁹²

As the leader of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party with its commitment to secularism and a record of suppression of Islamist groups in Iraq, Saddam Hussein was an unlikely leader to resort to Islamic symbolism. Yet he chose to refer to the 'infidels' of the West that arrayed against him and called for *jihad* to combat them.⁹³ Perhaps even more significant was the fact that notwithstanding his past record, his call was heeded by peoples in the streets of the Muslim world. It was not only Muslim peoples in the Arab world, but also those in Malaysia, Iran, and Turkey, among others, that reacted to his calls.

Arguably it may not necessarily have been Saddam Hussein's invocation of Islamic symbolism that enabled him to receive a sympathetic hearing, but the alacrity of the manner in which the United States decided to come to Kuwait's aid and assembled a large number of troops in Saudi Arabia. In the eyes of some, the massive build-up of US troops transformed what was initially viewed as a defensive operation to free Kuwait into an offensive one set to 'destroy Iraq politically and militarily.'⁹⁴ Some, with the experiences of Western colonialism at

⁹¹ Mohamed Heikal, Illusions of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War (London: Harper Collins, 1992) 295.

⁹² quoted in Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 15.

⁹³ Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 13.

⁹⁴ Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation, and U.S. Foreign Policy,' 192-194.

the back of their minds, viewed this as 'threatening,'⁹⁵ others viewed it as an indication of a 'lack of respect for the sanctity of holy places.'⁹⁶

Saddam Hussein's calls received support from the policy-makers as well as peoples in Arab streets.⁹⁷ Some of the Iranian politico-clerical elite, the Jordanian *ulama* and Muslim Brotherhood also joined Saddam Hussein in calling for a *jihad* against 'foreign intervention.'⁹⁸ The London-based think-tank, the Islamic Council criticised the involvement of the United States in what was seen as an inter-Arab matter and the Saudi policymakers' cooperation with the United States.⁹⁹

In the attempt to counter the anti-Saudi assault undertaken by some actors, Saudi policy-makers adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, they invited troops from other Arab and Muslim countries to provide what Mohammed Heikal referred to as an 'Islamic cover' to obscure its reliance on US troops.¹⁰⁰ Egypt and Morocco both sent troops to join the US forces amassed in Saudi Arabia. King Fahd invited Syria to send forces as well, to add a 'radical Arab' dimension to the 'Islamic cover.'¹⁰¹

⁹⁵ Eickelman and Piscatori, Muslim Politics, 15; Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis,' 479.

⁹⁶ Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, 28.

⁹⁷ Maha Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis,' 476; Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) 241; Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation, and U.S. Foreign Policy,' 192-3.

⁹⁸ Esposito, The Islamic Threat, 226; Esposito, 'Islamic Movements, Democratisation and U.S. Foreign Policy,' 192-3; on the attempts to engage in 'collective Islamic diplomacy' during the Gulf War, see Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, 'The Impact of Islamism on the Arab System,' in The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, ed. Laura Guazzone (Berkshire: Ithaca Press, 1995) 259-60.

⁹⁹ Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis,' 480.

¹⁰⁰ Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, 282.

¹⁰¹ Heikal, Illusions of Triumph, 266-7; Khadduri and Ghareeb, War in the Gulf, 131-3.

The second prong of Saudi strategy was to minimise the effect of Saddam Hussein's call for *jihad*. Saudi policy-makers sought to get a counter-*fatwa* to sanction their own practices. The contradiction between Saddam Hussein's call for *jihad* and the Saudi *fatwa*—the latter seeking to de-legitimise the former—triggered a theological debate over the religious dimension of the presence of non-Muslim troops in the Holy Lands. The Grand Mufti of Egypt sanctioned that the invitation extended by Saudi Arabia to foreign troops did not breach Muslims laws because it was 'in conjunction with an invitation to Muslim troops' and served 'the greater good'.¹⁰² The Mufti of Saudi Arabia went even further and declared that 'even non-Muslims participating in the war were participating in *jihad*.'¹⁰³

Thus, during the Gulf War 'Islamic' symbols were used by both sides in line with their discrepant aims, to legitimise their divergent practices and to de-legitimise each other's policies. Islamist actors resorted to 'symbolic exchanges' rather than arms races or gunboat diplomacy in the attempt to prevail over each other.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, there is little agreement among Islamist actors as to what security in the Muslim Middle East might look like. As Saad Eddin Ibrahim argued, the Islamist security discourse is at present 'more a promise than reality; it can "break" but does not "make."¹⁰⁵ However, the practices of some Islamist actors suggest that there is more potential in the Islamist discourse than Ibrahim gives credit for.

¹⁰² Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis,' 481.

¹⁰³ Azzam, 'The Gulf Crisis,' 481.

¹⁰⁴ Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*.

¹⁰⁵ Ibrahim, 'Future Visions of the Middle East,' 433.

Security in the (New) Middle East

The US approach to regional security in the Middle East has remained military-focused and stability-oriented in the post-Cold War era. US policy toward Iraq before and after the Gulf War (1990-91) and particularly the 1998-89 bombing campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme could be viewed as examples of this phenomenon. Furthermore, US policy towards regional security in the Middle East remains top down. In following a policy of dual containment (see below) US policy-makers present Iran and Iraq as the main threats to security in the region mainly due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that are not subservient to US interests.¹⁰⁶ This top down perspective, while revealing certain aspects of regional insecurity in the Middle East, at the same time hinders others. Women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for example, are made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours' military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict women's rights under the cloak of religious tradition.¹⁰⁷ Their concerns rarely make it into security analyses; certainly not into the Middle East security discourse.

Although the US approach to regional security has remained true to the precepts of the Middle Eastern security discourse, what has changed in the 1990s is that the United States reintroduced itself into Arab politics. It was,

¹⁰⁶ Anthony Lake, 'Confronting Backlash States,' *Foreign Affairs* 73:2 (1994) 45-55.

¹⁰⁷ Mernissi, *Islam and Democracy*, 1-10; Doumato, 'Women and Work in Saudi Arabia.'

however, not only the 'atomisation' of the Arab regional order, or the enhanced credibility of the United States in the aftermath of the Gulf War that enabled the Middle Eastern security discourse to prevail. It was also a reflection of the change in the practices of US policy-makers which broke with the tradition and expressed recognition of the linkages between two major US security concerns, that is the Gulf and Israel—linkages they had until then refused to acknowledge (see Chapter 4). During the Gulf crisis, in the attempt to garner support for the US war effort against Iraq, Secretary of State James Baker chose to break with this compartmentalised approach and acknowledged the linkages between Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Israel/Palestine issue—linkages Saddam Hussein pointed to.¹⁰⁸

However, although Baker's acknowledgement of the linkages between the multiple dimensions of regional security seemed to signal a change of policy, the overall conduct of the US government during the War was more in line with its traditional approach. For, the United States sought to bring an end to the threat posed by Iraq to the security of Gulf oil by defeating Iraq with the help of an international coalition which it itself formed, forged and sustained, without inquiring into the roots of the Iraqi action. In other words, Baker's acknowledgement constituted a parenthesis rather than a break in the US approach to regional security in the Middle East, with the rest of US policy establishment carrying on with business-as-usual. It is significant to note here that during the 1997-98 standoff between the United States and Iraq over the issue of Iraq's non-cooperation with the UN inspection team, Secretary of State

¹⁰⁸ Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement,' 50; Yezid Sayigh, 'Arab Regional Security: Between Mechanics and Politics,' RUSI Journal (Summer 1991) 38-46.

Madeleine Albright remained loyal to the tradition and refused to acknowledge the linkages between the stalled Arab-Israeli peace process and the difficulties the United States was facing in organising an Arab coalition supportive of US stance.¹⁰⁹

The strategy of the US-led coalition during the war was to achieve air superiority, minimise coalition casualties, and expel Iraq from Kuwait.¹¹⁰ These aims were achieved by the end of the war. There was another less pronounced aim, that of debilitating the Iraqi military machine to minimise the threat it would pose to regional security in the future.¹¹¹ In the aftermath of the war, as a part of the cease-fire agreement and in accordance with relevant UN resolutions which Iraq had agreed to comply with, a UN investigation on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme was put into effect. With the experience of the Gulf War in mind (in the course of which Iraq fired Scud missiles to both Israel and Saudi Arabia) US policy-makers made it a priority to eradicate the Iraqi WMD program and prevent other Middle Eastern states—but Israel—from developing nuclear weapons. They also sought to restrict existing chemical and biological weapons silos.¹¹²

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, US policy-makers moved away from statements they had made during the crisis regarding the desirability of arms control and practicing self-restraint on arms sales to the region. They banned

¹⁰⁹ Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement,' 49.

¹¹⁰ Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, 'How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War,' *International Security* 16:2 (Fall 1991) 23.

¹¹¹ Sadowski, 'Scuds or Butter,' 5.

¹¹² See Rosemary Hollis, 'Western Security Strategy in South West Asia,' in From the Gulf War to Central Asia: Players in the New Great Game, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Exeter: University

arms sales to the two 'rogue states' (Iran and Iraq) whilst supporting the arms build-up of GCC states.¹¹³ The massive rearmament policies of the Gulf states enabled the Israeli and Iranian policymakers to follow suit by providing a justification for further arms purchases.¹¹⁴ Turkey and Egypt have been rewarded by the United States for their services during the Gulf War, in the form of military (and economic) aid. Israel and Turkey, in turn, chose to solidify their existing security cooperation.¹¹⁵ What seems to bring Israel and Turkey together, apart from their cooperation in the military and intelligence fields is the issue of scarce water resources. Indeed, the triangular relationship between Turkey, Syria and Israel is a textbook example of worst-case thinking, zero sum conceptions of security and reliance on the military instrument to meet threats that are political (the Kurdish issue), or environmental (water resources) in character.¹¹⁶

As argued above, it was partly the acknowledgment of multiple dimensions regional insecurity that led the United States together with Russia to convene the Madrid Peace Conference on 30 October-1 November 1991, bringing together, for the first time, the representatives of all major parties to the

of Exeter Press, 1994) 188-207.

¹¹³ Hollis, 'Western Security Strategy in South West Asia'; Joe Stark, 'The Middle East Arms Bazaar After the Gulf War,' Middle East Report (November-December 1995) 14-19.

¹¹⁴ Sadowski, 'Scuds versus Butter,' 11.

¹¹⁵ Alan Makovsky, 'Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish "Periphery Strategy"?' in Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) 147-70. On the background of the Turkish-Israeli relations, see Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the Eastern Mediterranean (London: Frank Cass, 1987).

¹¹⁶ Nimet Beriker-Atiyas, 'The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties, and Prospects,' Security Dialogue 28:4 (1997) 439-52; Murhaf Jouejati, 'Water Politics as High Politics: The Case of Turkey and Syria,' in Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996) 131-46; Makovsky, 'Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish "Periphery Strategy"?' 147-70.

Israel/Palestine conflict.¹¹⁷ At the Madrid Conference bilateral negotiations were set up between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Subsequently, Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian negotiations were separated. The bilateral talks concentrated mostly on territorial control and sovereignty, border demarcations, the security arrangements, and the political rights of the Palestinians.¹¹⁸

At the Madrid Conference it was also decided to set up multilateral Arab-Israeli negotiations alongside the bilateral track to bring the participants to the bilateral talks together with other regional states as well as those outside the region wishing to make a contribution (financial, technical, political).¹¹⁹ The multilaterals were also hoped to help build confidence among participants and facilitate progress at the bilateral level.¹²⁰ Furthermore, they were intended to permit the discussion of issues that were perceived to be affecting the region as a whole.¹²¹ The assumption behind the establishment of the multilateral track alongside the bilateral was the perception that the need for cooperative arrangements to foster economic development, to preserve and enhance the supply of water, and to check environmental degradation is shared by all states in the region. It was felt that many of these issues did not demand, nor could they

¹¹⁷ For an insider's account of the Madrid Conference and its aftermath, see Barbara Victor, Hanan Ashrawi: A Passion for Peace (London: Fourth Estate, 1995).

¹¹⁸ Joel Peters, Pathways to Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Peace Talks (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), 5.

¹¹⁹ Peters, Pathways to Peace, 6. Invitations to the bilateral track were issued to Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestinian representatives, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Sudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Yemen, the European Union, Turkey, Canada, EFTA representative, Japan and China.

¹²⁰ Peters, Pathways to Peace, 2.

¹²¹ Peter Jones, 'Arms Control in the Middle East: Some Reflections,' Security Dialogue 28:1 (1997) 57; Peters, Pathways to Peace, 5.

wait for, a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹²² It should be noted that this was a rather functionalist view of international cooperation in that progress in the multilateral track, where only the 'technical' issues were discussed, was hoped to have spillover effects on the bilateral track, which was reserved for 'political' issues. This point will be further developed later.

The first organisational meeting for the multilateral talks was held in January 1992 in Moscow. Five working groups were set up: 'Water Resources,' 'Environment,' 'Regional Economic Development' (REDWG), 'Refugees,' and 'Arms Control and Regional Security' (ACRS). Each working group included actors from both within and outside the Middle East. Setting up a working group on human rights was also discussed but eventually rejected.¹²³ Arguably, this showed how parties to the negotiations were not ready to acknowledge all dimensions of regional insecurity, especially those pertaining to the security of individuals and social groups. Indeed, the issues that were allowed on the agendas, as will be seen below, were those considered as 'security' issues by policy-makers and non-military issues were approached from a statist perspective. Let us briefly consider the progress made by the five working groups.

The working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS) was intended to compliment the multilateral negotiations more than the other working groups by helping build confidence among the parties. The main difficulties between the parties during the negotiations emerged over the issue of nuclear

¹²² Peters, Pathways to Peace, 5.

¹²³ Peters, Pathways to Peace, 15.

weapons with Arab states under Egypt's leadership seeking to put the issue of Israel's nuclear capabilities on the agenda. Israel, on the other hand, emphasised the need to develop a set of confidence-building measures as the first steps in a long process at the end of which the issue of nuclear weapons could be discussed. The absence of Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya and Syria from the negotiations also added to Israel's hesitance to discuss the issue.¹²⁴ At the end, the setting up of the ACRS working group, which was the first region-wide attempt to address issues of arms control and confidence-building, remained its main outcome.¹²⁵

The working group on the environment focused on establishing codes of conduct, prepared 'The Bahrain Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle East,'¹²⁶ and formulated an Upper Gulf of Aqaba oil spill contingency plan. The working group on refugees was fraught with difficulties from the beginning, largely to do with the fact that the issue of refugees is a highly sensitive one. The issue was nevertheless included in the multilateral track for it concerns a number of countries and requires the support of actors outside the region. The discussions remained focused on the so-called 'technical' aspects of the issue such as databases, public health, child welfare, job creation and vocational training, human resource development, family reunification and economic and social infrastructure.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Peters, Pathways to Peace, 38; Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, 'Bridging the Gap: Resolving the Security Dilemma in the Middle East,' in Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East, Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan (Lanham, MA: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) 76-8.

¹²⁵ See Feldman and Toukan, 'Bridging the Gap,' 73-96; also see the statement prepared by the ACRS working group in Bridging the Gap, Feldman and Toukan, pp. 103-7.

¹²⁶ For the text, see, 'Appendix 3: The Bahrain Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle East,' in Peters, Pathways to Peace, 89-93.

¹²⁷ Peters, Pathways to Peace, 29-35.

The working group on regional economic development (REDWG) was the largest of the five groups and made substantial progress in formulating principles and defining region-wide projects. A major outcome of the REDWG was the convening of four Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic summit meetings in Morocco (1994), Jordan (1995), Egypt (1996), and Qatar (1997). The first MENA summit in Casablanca, Morocco was attended by the representatives of 61 countries including Israel and the PLO (as well as 1114 business leaders).¹²⁸ The reasoning behind the setting up of the REDWG lay in the assumption that 'the rewards of economic cooperation will drive the search and strengthen the foundations for political agreements.'¹²⁹ The group also took on the responsibility of addressing the economic needs of the Palestinians in addition to establishing the Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association, and the Middle East Business Council.¹³⁰

The water resources working group was fraught with troubles from the beginning because of the absence of Syria and Lebanon. This thwarted the hopes for an agreement to be reached on either the Tigris-Euphrates or the Jordan river basins. The discussions were also impeded by the disagreement between Israel on the one hand and Jordan and the Palestinians on the other, as to whether 'water rights' should be included in the agenda. Arab states viewed the consideration of water rights as a precondition to cooperation and any regional water management agreement. The Israeli side, however, wanted to

¹²⁸ Syria, Lebanon, Iran and the Sudan boycotted the summit.

¹²⁹ Peters, Pathways to Peace, 46.

separate what they viewed as the 'technical' and 'political' aspects of the water issue and wanted to limit the working group to technical issues and joint water management. The Israeli policy-makers maintained that the issue of water rights was a 'political' issue and had to be addressed at the bilateral negotiations.¹³¹ Later the dispute was settled with Israel agreeing to set up a 'water rights' working group as a part of the bilateral negotiations.¹³²

Although substantial progress was achieved in the multilateral negotiations in terms of promoting dialogue, by the end of 1997 the stall in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations led to a halt on both tracks. Progress in the multilateral negotiations was stalled in the late 1990s for three main reasons. First, Arab policy-makers thought not enough progress had been achieved in the bilateral negotiations. Second, they were worried about Israel's domination in the economic and technological fields if they agreed to strengthen Middle Eastern regionalism. And thirdly, they were frustrated with US policies, for they remained convinced that not enough pressure was being put on Israel which continued to ignore UN resolutions on Palestine, whilst Iraq faced the threat of air attacks because of its lack of cooperation with the UN inspection team. US policy-makers' refusal to acknowledge the linkages between the two has been viewed as 'double standards' by many in the Arab world.¹³³

Then, the multilateral negotiations failed to produce the spillover effect as suggested by the logic of functionalism, for lack of progress on bilateral

¹³⁰ Peters, *Pathways to Peace*, 46-60.

¹³¹ Peters, *Pathways to Peace*, 17.

¹³² Peters, *Pathways to Peace*, 16-22.

¹³³ Ramazani, 'The Emerging Arab-Iranian Rapprochement,' 51.

negotiations. The argument here is that the problem with the set up with the two-track diplomacy was not that the linkages between several aspects of the problem of regional insecurity in the Middle East were not addressed, but rather that this was not done in a way that was acceptable to both sides. The multilateral negotiations were reserved for discussions on 'technical' issues, whilst the 'political' issues were discussed at the bilaterals to which not all Arab states participated. As the negotiations in the working group on water resources showed, the 'political'/'technical' divide did not prove to be sustainable. Moreover, some issues, such as that of nuclear weapons, were left out of the negotiations, and only certain 'technical' aspects of the other issues, such as water or refugees, were discussed. In this sense, the multilateral negotiations showed that neither the US nor Israel were ready to acknowledge as many linkages as the Arab side would have liked to establish. They also showed that no regional policy-maker was ready or willing to establish interrelationships between all aspects of regional insecurity as non-state actors would have wanted.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to investigate the relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security by looking at how post-Cold War security practices have been shaped by and, in turn, shaped contending security discourses and spatial representations. The first section of the chapter looked at those practices that were shaped by the representation 'Arab Regional System.'

It was argued that in the post-Cold War era it was mainly non-state actors that continued to uphold the Arab national security discourse. Although the Gulf War caused further alienation of Arab governments from one another, the chapter argued that the practices of Arab peoples and civil societal actors have continued to shape and be shaped by the Arab national security discourse. Focusing on issues such as political participation, respect for human rights, unemployment, better health provision and education, they sought to shape and constrain the practices of their policy-makers, who have adopted increasingly more statist practices.¹³⁴

The chapter also looked at the security practices of the EU, the locomotive of the Euro-Med partnership process. It was argued that it was the EU's adoption of a broader conception of security that led to its involvement in this process. In the attempt to prevent Middle Eastern problems from becoming European problems, EU policy-makers sought to maintain stability in the geographically closer North African countries. However, this was different from their approach to stability in the Gulf. In the case of the latter, they continue to follow the US lead and to rely on militarised practices whereas in the case of the former they seek to maintain stability by encouraging Euro-Med regionalism. It is hoped that encouraging economic liberalisation and accelerating economic growth would eventually lead to increasing political participation and democratisation. However, since it was the security of the EU rather than that of

¹³⁴ See Bahgat Korany, 'National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism,' in The Arab World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 161-78; Michael Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' Political Science Quarterly 111:4 (1996-97) esp. pp. 598-606.

north Africa that was the referent for this approach, priority was given to maintaining stability via non-military measures.

The third section of the chapter turned to look at the security practices of Islamist actors. It is difficult to generalise about the practices of the Islamist actors, which range from Saudi Arabia's pro-status quo practices to the Hizbullah's search for state power in Lebanon; from FIS grassroots activities in Algeria to provide basic services to peoples, to the bombing of the New York Trade Centre in the United States. It was further argued that what is common to all these Islamist actors is their employment of Islamic symbolism, although they may seek to achieve radically different aims through invoking the same symbols. The example of the concept *jihad* was used to illustrate this point. The chapter concluded that in the post-Cold War era, the Islamist discourse has been appropriated by anti-status quo actors who have sought to bring about radical change at home. It was further argued that notwithstanding the global character of their discourses, Islamist actors concentrate on bringing about changes at home. The practices of grassroots organisations that provide for many peoples' needs, notably education and health care, attest well to this.

The last section of the chapter looked at those practices shaped by the Middle Eastern security discourse. It was argued that many Arab policy-makers joined the anti-Iraq coalition and later the Madrid Peace Process; this indicated the prevalence of the US approach to regional security at the expense of the Arab national security discourse. It was argued that despite a momentary acknowledgement by Secretary of State Baker of the linkages between the

problem of regional stability and the Israel/Palestine issue, the US approach to regional security remained top down and compartmentalised.

The difficulty of sustaining this compartmentalised approach was illustrated well in late 1997 when the MENA economic summit convened in Doha to discuss regionalisation coincided with a stall in the peace process because of Netanyahu government's intransigence and US bombing of Iraq in the attempt to attain Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions. Many Arab policy-makers refused to attend the summit; others sent low-level delegations. The overall message was that there was a limit to which Arab policy-makers could overlook the suffering of other Arab peoples (such as those of Iraq who continue to suffer under UN sanctions) and carry on cooperating with Israel (that remains defiant of UN resolutions) and the United States (which punishes Iraq for not abiding by other UN resolutions). This, in turn, showed that even at a time when Arab inter-governmental relations were at a low, Arab policy-makers could not completely disregard the concerns raised by non-state actors at home and abroad. It is also significant to note that the multilateral ('technical') track, which was hoped to have a spillover effect on the bilateral ('political') track through strengthening regionalism, not only failed to generate the expected spillover effect but also came to a stop itself because of lack of progress in bilateral negotiations.

As noted in Chapter 5, the main post-Cold War divide in the region emerged not between the Arab national security discourse and that of Middle East, but between pro-status quo approaches of the United States and its allies and the anti-status quo discourses of myriad non-state actors. The launch of the

Euro-Med partnership process and the two-track negotiations of the Madrid Peace Process, the chapter argued, marked attempts by the EU and the US to use economic tools to increase economic regionalisation and maintain stability in the region. Both processes prioritised stability over other concerns such as democratisation and human rights as emphasised by non-state actors. Concerning stability in the Gulf, both the US and the EU prioritised military stability and privileged militarised practices, as was the case with the Gulf War and subsequent bombings of Iraq. It was noted that such stability oriented practices that privilege the stable flow of oil and market economies over human rights and political participation evoke memories of a colonial era in Arab peoples' minds. This, in turn, makes it difficult for their governments to participate in region-wide schemes, as the stall of the multilateral negotiations showed.

Having considered these multiple approaches to regional security and the discrepancies between the security needs and concerns of actors that adopt them, it could be highly unlikely for their proponents to come to an agreement on one of them. The question then becomes, if they cannot agree on the representation of the region, how could they ever agree on common security practices? This is where the argument comes back full circle; for, conceiving the relationship between (inventing) regions, and theories and practices of security as mutually constitutive enables me to make the next step. This is to argue that an alternative approach to security—Critical Security Studies—could inform alternative practices and thereby help to constitute a new region in the form of a security community. This argument will be fully developed in Part III: 'Futures.'

Part III : Futures

Chapter 8 : Thinking About the Future: A Critical Security Studies Perspective

Chapter 8 introduces Part III: 'Futures,' which looks at alternative ways of thinking about the future and their potential implications within the Middle Eastern context. The aim of this chapter is to present a Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the future. Here I will build upon the arguments made in Chapter 1, where a Critical Security Studies perspective was introduced, and seek to develop it further. I will focus on three themes, namely, constitutive theory, practice and agency, which were identified as the silences of post-Cold War debates on security (in Chapter 6). These three themes have also been central to Critical Security Studies thinking about the future. The chapter will also make a case for adopting the security community approach. The arguments developed in Chapter 8 will then be utilised to criticise other future scenarios (Chapter 9) and investigate the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East (Chapter 10).

Why Think About the Future?

Whether s/he is aware of it or not, one always has some ideas about the future that inform his/her practices. For instance, those who think that the future will be no different from the past shape their practices based on this premise, which constitutes some kind of knowledge based on one's understanding of what the past was like. For instance, students of Cold War Security Studies, who conceive world politics as an endless process of balancing and bandwagoning in the struggle for power would expect future to be more of the same. In other words, we all operate based on our (often unthinking and unquestioned) knowledge about the future. This is because, as Kenneth Boulding wrote, 'unless we at least think we know something about the future decisions are impossible, for all decisions involve choices among images of alternative futures.'¹

Thinking about the future becomes all the more relevant given the conception of theory adopted by students of Critical Security Studies as constitutive of the 'reality' it responds to. Our knowledge about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—may become self-constitutive. This, however, is not to suggest that it is totally in our hands to shape the future. 'Men make their own history,' wrote Marx, 'but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.'² Furthermore, thinking about the future is only one form of shaping the future, and, admittedly, is not enough in itself. It should be compounded by other forms of practice. As

¹ Kenneth Boulding, 'Part I: Introduction,' in The Future: Images and Processes, Elise Boulding and Kenneth E. Boulding (London: Sage, 1995) 1.

Fatima Mernissi wrote, 'it is by and through action that the future is shaped.'³ Having said that, Mernissi herself would endorse the argument that thinking (and writing) about the future is a crucial task if the aim is to shape the future.⁴

Towards this end, that is, shaping the future, students of Critical Security Studies have so far looked at 'desired' futures: security as emancipation.⁵ This is partly because 'being able to picture a desired future is empowering in the present'—as Elise Boulding argued.⁶ In order to be able to make a change, one has to have some knowledge as to what s/he wants to achieve, to shape his/her practices in the attempt to shape that desired future. This, however, is not to suggest that emancipation is an endpoint. As Ken Booth has maintained, 'emancipation is best likened to a political horizon: something to aim for, something that establishes perspective, but something by definition can never be reached.'⁷ Nor does the security community approach necessarily constitute a blueprint. The security community approach will be discussed later in the chapter. It should suffice to note here that the creation of security communities could constitute only a beginning. The security community approach, in this sense, should be viewed as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future.

² Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,' [1852] in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 300.

³ Fatima Mernissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1996) 8.

⁴ Fatima Mernissi, 'Writing is Better than a Face-lift,' in Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory, 1-7.

⁵ Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation,' Review of International Studies 17:4 (1991) 313-26; Richard Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory (Boulder, CO: Lynno Rienner, 1999) esp. pp. 145-63.

⁶ Elise Boulding, 'Image and Action in Peace Building,' in The Future, Boulding and Boulding, 97.

⁷ Ken Booth, 'Three Tyrannies,' in Human Rights in Global Politics, eds. Tim Dunno and Nicholas Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 41.

Thinking about the future from a Critical Security Studies perspective need not be limited to 'desired' futures only. Students of security could also try and shape the future by pointing to what some futures may bring if no preventive action is taken in the present—as Ulrich Beck has done in Risk Society.⁸ According to Beck, if threats to security are 'threats to the future,' as is the case with many environmental threats (such as depletion of natural resources), then, it is imperative that they be addressed in the present. 'As conjectures, as threats to the future, as prognoses, [such threats] have and develop a practical relevance to preventive actions,' notes Beck.⁹ However, one problem with trying to mobilise action to meet such threats is that they only exist in the future as conjectures. It is only through thinking and writing about such threats that one could raise peoples' awareness regarding what the future may bring, and what needs to be done in the present to prevent them from happening. When issues such as threats to the environment are concerned, thinking (and writing) about the future becomes crucial; otherwise they have the potential to cause destruction on 'such a scale that action afterwards would be practically impossible.'¹⁰

Although Beck's thesis is about the environment, the points he makes in explaining the way human agency has been complicit, via the production of knowledge, in exacerbating (if not creating) 'threats to the future' could be adopted and adapted to further develop the critique students of Critical Security Studies present of prevailing security discourses in general and Middle Eastern security discourse in particular. Beck writes:

⁸ Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter (London: Sage, 1992).

⁹ Beck, Risk Society, 34.

¹⁰ Beck, Risk Society, 34.

In contrast to all earlier epochs . . . the risk society is characterized by a *lack*: the impossibility of an *external* attribution of hazards. In other words, risks depend on decisions . . . Risks are the reflection of human actions and omissions, the expression of highly developed productive forces. That means that the sources of danger are no longer ignorance but *knowledge*; not a deficient but a perfected mastery over nature.¹¹

Beck's point is made within the context of environmental politics, where the grip of 'scientific' knowledge over practice is even stronger than is the case for less 'scientific' Security Studies. Nevertheless, as noted above, knowledge about the future presented in terms of obstacles and opportunities both constrains and informs actors' practices thereby helping constitute the future. Then, given the ways in which the Middle Eastern security discourse has, in the past, been complicit in shaping regional insecurity in the Middle East, it could be argued that uncritical adoption of existing knowledge produced by prevailing discourses that do not offer anything other than more of the same does itself constitute a 'threat to the future.' Accordingly, students of security who fail to reflect upon the self-constitutive potential of their thinking would be complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the Middle East.

In sum, given the conception of theory adopted by students of Critical Security Studies as constitutive of a future 'reality,' it is vital that its proponents do not limit their thinking to 'desired' futures but criticise existing knowledge about the future that informs myriad actors' practices in an often unthinking manner. Indeed, the thinking of the students of Critical Security Studies does not evolve in a vacuum. All approaches to security in the Middle East incorporate some image of the future, which constitutes the knowledge that informs practices at present. Thus, if Critical Security Studies hopes to help invent alternative futures, the task

¹¹ Beck, Risk Society, 183.

for its students is both to produce knowledge about desired futures, and present critiques of existing knowledge in terms of its emancipatory potential. Chapter 9 will present other future scenarios and discuss their potential practical implications within the Middle Eastern context. The remainder of the chapter will try to develop a Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the future by focusing on three key themes, namely, constitutive theory, practice and agency. These are the themes I identified as silences of post-Cold War debates in Chapter 6.

Shaping Futures: Constitutive Theory

Critical Security Studies rejects the scientific-objectivist conception of theory and theory/practice relationship adopted by students of Cold War Security Studies. Accordingly, theory is viewed as constitutive of the 'reality' it seeks to explain. As Steve Smith has argued:

Theories do not simply explain or predict. They tell us what possibilities exist for human action and intervention; they define not merely our explanatory possibilities but also our ethical and political horizons.¹²

The argument here is not that theories 'create' the world in a philosophical idealist sense of the term, but that theories help organise knowledge, which, in turn, informs, enables, privileges or legitimises certain practices whilst inhibiting or marginalizing others.

¹² Steve Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond,' in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 13. Also see idem, 'Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory,' in International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (Oxford: Polity Press,

In Mastering Space, John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge explain how geopolitical discourses inform spatial practices thereby helping shape geopolitical (dis)orders. 'Geopolitical discourse,' write Agnew and Corbridge, 'signifies the rules and conceptual resources that political elites use in particular historical contexts to "spatialise" the international political economy into places, peoples, and disputes.' By way of identifying and naming a place, a series of narratives, subjects and understandings come into being. 'Labelling' or 'naming' an area not only brands it in terms of its politics and the type of foreign policy its character demands, but helps constitute its very character.¹³ A similar argument could be made regarding the relationship between security discourses and regional (in)security in that security discourses, by informing actors' practices, help constitute the region they seek to secure. The invention of the Middle East, as Chapter 2 argued, is a good example of how this process works.

As noted in the previous section, given this self-constitutive potential of security thinking, critical self-reflection becomes crucial for its students. The role of the students of security, in this sense, is to try and be self-conscious about the normative and mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice in their thinking and writing rather than feeding 'common sense' back into the system hiding behind a notion of 'objectivity.'

It should be noted that one advantage of feeding 'common sense' into the system is that it is readily accepted by those who are in a position of power. Indeed, as Steve Smith maintains,

1995) 26-8.

¹³ John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International

once established as common sense, theories become incredibly powerful since they delineate not simply what can be known but also what it is sensible to talk about or suggest. Those who swim outside these safe waters risk more than simply the judgement that their theories are wrong; their entire ethical or moral stance may be ridiculed or seen as dangerous just because their theoretical assumptions are deemed unrealistic. Defining common sense is therefore the ultimate act of political power.¹⁴

In other words, although theory/practice relationship is one of mutual constitution, not all theories get to shape practices. Then, the answer to the question why theorising may become self-constitutive in some cases (such as the Cold War security discourse) but not in others (as with Peace Research) is rooted in the power/knowledge relationship. More often than not, it is theories that are picked up by those in positions of power that get to shape what men and women in the street view as 'a more plausible interpretation of international reality'—as John Garnett wrote when explaining the way realism has prevailed over the years.¹⁵ Furthermore, 'dominant discourses, especially those of the state, become and remain dominant because of the power relations sustaining them.'¹⁶ In this sense, it is difficult to underestimate the power of theories in informing not only governmental policies, but also individuals' conceptions of the world. Here, Kaldor's argument regarding the Cold War is again instructive in accounting for the ways in which Cold War security discourse informed men and women in North America and Western Europe of the relevance, legitimacy and inescapability of power politics, tough responses and brinkmanship.¹⁷

Political Economy (New York: Routledge, 1995) 48.

¹⁴ Smith, 'Positivism and Beyond,' 13.

¹⁵ John Garnett, 'Strategic Studies and its Assumptions,' in Contemporary Strategy, 2nd ed., rev. and enl., eds. John Baylis et al. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987) 22.

¹⁶ Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall, 'Introduction: Constructing Insecurity,' in Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, eds. Jutta Weldes, Mark Laffey, Hugh Gusterson and Raymond Duvall (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) 18.

¹⁷ Mary Kaldor, The Imaginary War: Understanding East-West Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

The competition between theories over shaping practices and therefore the future never takes place on a level playing field. To understand theory as constitutive of 'reality' is not to suggest that once we get our theories right the rest would follow. What shape the future might take would depend on whose theories get to shape practices. For example, it was argued that the reason why the lands to the southwest of Asia and north of Africa were lumped together in the mind's eye and labelled the Middle East, but not something else, had its roots in the dominance of British and US security discourses. The sources of their dominance could, in turn, be found in the material (military and economic) as well as representational power of these states.

I distinguish between the representational and material dimensions of power for analytical reasons in an attempt to stress that the workings of the power/knowledge relationship cannot be accounted for by adopting a narrow or purely material conception of power. Rather, our conception of power should account for its representational dimension as well; that is, the power to shape ideas. One potential problem involved in trying to account for the representational dimension of power is that it cannot be observed in the same way as the material dimension can be; the latter is often utilised to keep issues outside security agendas, thereby averting conflict. In the absence of overt (or latent) conflict, no observable behaviour change takes place. However, the absence of an observable power relationship does not necessarily mean there is not one.

To be able to account for such instances of power relationships, I adopt, following Steven Lukes, a 'three-dimensional view of power' that 'allows for consideration of the many ways in which *potential issues* are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions.'¹⁸ Adopting a conception of power that stresses both its material and representational dimensions enables me to account for the ways in which some discourses come to dominate others, shaping 'reality' by informing certain practices whilst marginalizing others. 'Our liberation will come through a rereading of our past,' wrote Fatima Mernissi when discussing the future of women in the Arab world and the need for writing alternative accounts of the Islamic and pre-Islamic past to point to instances of women's struggle and triumph.¹⁹ Indeed, one task of Critical Security Studies is to present alternative readings of the past and to account for choices that were made—or were obscured due to the way security agendas were set up by keeping certain issues out (as was the case with female illiteracy as argued in Chapter 1).²⁰

It should also be stressed that neither material nor representational dimensions of power could be monopolised by one actor only. This is more so in the case of the latter. For, although it is true that it is a combination of ideas and material resources that has enabled some discourses to dominate others, nevertheless, history is replete with examples of the ideas of the weak coming to power (by being taken up by those who are in power, or directly through revolutions). One example of this phenomenon is the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the role played by Polish Pope Joan Paul II and the Catholic

¹⁸ Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974) 24. His emphasis.

¹⁹ Mernissi, Islam and Democracy, 149-71. The quotation is from p. 160.

Church.²¹ It is perhaps ironic that this Pope, whose predecessor Stalin famously ridiculed for not having enough material power when he quipped, 'how many divisions has the Pope?' played a major role in the 1989 revolutions that eventually culminated in the dissolution of the Soviet Union.²²

Another example of the ideas of the weak coming to power was observed when Gorbachev reinterpreted Soviet domestic situation and external relations and decided to change the course of Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s and adopted the ideas of Peace Researchers, Alternative Security thinkers and peace movements who have been propounding ideas about common security and non-offensive defence since the 1960s.²³ As Ken Booth has noted,

the Berlin Wall did not fall: it was pushed. It was thought up, unthought and pulled down. This most symbolic material structure of the Cold War was demolished by people changing their minds.²⁴

Without such ideas being floated by some (in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) Gorbachev would not have had the intellectual resources to tap into when he decided to change course. Those who floated such ideas, on the other hand, needed Gorbachev for their ideas to be put into practice. The end of the Cold War, in this sense, evolved as a symbiosis of top down and bottom up approaches to security, neither of which would have been successful without the other.²⁵

²⁰ Also see Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind,' in Statecraft and Security, ed. Booth, 29-55.

²¹ The Catholic Church is not exactly a powerless institution. The character of its power, however, is different from that of states.

²² Jim Garrison and John-Francis Phipps with Pyare Shivpuri, The New Diplomats: Citizens as Ambassadors for Peace (Devon: Green Books, 1989) 76-84.

²³ Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures and the End of the Cold War,' in International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War, eds. Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 187-222.

²⁴ Ken Booth, 'Security Within Global Transformation?' in Statecraft and Security, ed. Booth, 353.

²⁵ Johan Galtung, 'Europe 1989: The Role of Peace Research and the Peace Movement,' in Why

In sum, Critical Security Studies suggests putting into use the constitutive role played by theories by presenting a fundamentally different approach to security in theory and practice in the attempt to open up space for political action to take place and help shape alternative futures. The roles students of security could play as agents of security will be further developed in the final section of this chapter. Suffice it to say that there should be some self-reflection on their part as to the fact that their theories do not leave the world untouched. In other words, students of security should reflect upon the constitutive implications of their own thinking and writing—to the extent that they can be aware of them.

Shaping Futures: Practice

As Chapter 1 argued, Critical International Theory has so far not offered much guidance on the issue of how Critical Theory could become a 'force for change' in world politics as it was promised in the 1980s.²⁶ Proponents of Critical Security Studies, not remaining silent on this issue, stressed theory as a form of practice. But what is meant by theory functioning as a form of practice? Richard Devetak, writing from a postmodernist perspective, maintains that theory makes a change through disturbing and problematising prevailing discourses, that is, 'how we conceive of theory, the "real world" and agency.' 'Little by little,' he writes, 'one

the Cold War Ended: A Range of Interpretations, eds. Ralph E. Sunney and Michael A. Salla (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995) 91-105; Mary Kaldor, 'The Revolutions of 1989,' in Peace and Security: The Next Generation, eds. George A. Lopez and Nancy J. Myers (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997) 243-8.

²⁶ The phrase is Mark Hoffman's. See his 'Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 16:2 (187) 233.

can begin to influence modifications to the ways in which we conceive political problems such that at least the givens of a problem are changed.²⁷

Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes Critical Security Studies conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Ken Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth writes:

Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing. . . . Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs.²⁸

In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies is only a first (albeit crucial) step. As noted in Chapter 1, it is vital for the students of Critical Security Studies to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting alternative, emancipatory practices. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero sum practices, students of Critical Security Studies have suggested that imagining, creating and nurturing of creation of security communities constitute emancipatory practices.

²⁷ Richard Devetak, 'Theories, Practices and Postmodernism in International Relations,' Cambridge Review of International Affairs xii:2 (1999) 73.

²⁸ Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallon Realist,' in Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, eds. Keith Krause and Michael Williams (London: UCL Press, 1997) 114.

Karl Deutsch and his colleagues developed the concept of security community in the 1950s. What Deutsch et al. were interested in was finding ways of creating a community characterised by the cessation of inter-state violence and the creation of dependable expectations of peaceful change by way of strengthening relationships among a group of states. Accordingly, Deutsch et al. defined a (pluralistic) security community as 'one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.'²⁹ Their conviction was that once the conditions and processes that give rise to security communities were identified, it would be possible to replicate them in different parts of the world so that (preparations for and the idea of) war would not enter into calculations of those states.³⁰ Although Deutsch et al. were positive regarding the potential for security communities to travel to different parts of the world, their ideas remained largely on paper for four decades until Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett revived them in the late 1990s.³¹ Deutsch's original conception and the revamped version of the security community approach developed by Adler and Barnett will be further discussed in Chapter 10. What follows is an account as to why the process of imagining, creating and nurturing security communities constitutes emancipatory practices from a Critical Security Studies perspective.

²⁹ Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957) 5.

³⁰ Deutsch et al., Political Community, vii, 3, 20-1.

³¹ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

The preference of students of Critical Security Studies for the security community approach builds upon the emphasis the proponents of Critical Theory in International Relations have put on the transformation of political community. Common to both Mark Hoffman and Robert Cox is the stress they put on the agency of social forces towards creating a future world order where the boundaries of political community extends beyond that of sovereign states.³² In a series of studies, Andrew Linklater has sought to fortify the case for the creation of more inclusive communities cognisant of peoples' multiple identities.³³

Linklater's argument is that the twin processes of globalisation and fragmentation are already transforming political communities around the world, thereby constituting a potential for creating more inclusive communities. The creation of more inclusive communities has been considered desirable but not attainable for a long time. As Linklater has noted, this had to do with the perceived need to organise within states for economic and military purposes. His argument is that although the Westphalian state system and its cornerstone, the sovereign state have served these purposes for long, the reasons for persisting with the system of sovereign states as an organising principle of world politics have been gradually eroding in that, given the impact made by the forces of globalisation and fragmentation, the state is no longer able to fulfil these roles.

³² Mark Hoffman, 'Agency, Identity and Intervention,' in Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, eds. Mark Hoffman and Ian Forbes (London: Macmillan, 1993) 199; Robert W. Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order,' Review of International Studies 25:1 (January 1999) 3-28.

³³ Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1990); idem, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990); idem, 'Community,' in Fin de Siècle, ed. Danchev, 177-97; idem, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).

The realisation of these developments, maintains Linklater, constitutes an immanent potential for the transformation of political community.³⁴

The case Linklater makes for the transformation of political community echoes the call Booth and Vale make for

moving away from simple patterns of statism to complex structures and processes characterised by shifting power away from the state level (upwards to regional community institutions and downwards to local community bodies) and moving away from nineteenth century notions of identity towards more complex answers to the question 'who am I?'³⁵

From a Critical Security Studies perspective, transformation of political community is desirable not only because the twin processes of globalisation and fragmentation have made it more difficult for existing forms of political community (that is, states) to fulfil their roles; or that there already exist some potential for this transformation to take place; but also that the creation of security communities would help directly address the problem of regional security. Indeed, the security community approach emphasises the need to organise at the regional level by way of forming an inclusive community—a community that takes security issues seriously.

One point of strength for the security community approach is that it directly addresses the problem of achieving security, rather than treating it as a side effect of increasing globalisation or regionalisation. It also puts emphasis on the political project behind the construction of a community. Furthermore, the security community approach provides an explicit account of the potentialities of

³⁴ Linklater, 'Community,' 178; idem, The Transformation of Political Community.

³⁵ Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa,' in Critical Security Studies, eds. Krause and Williams, 352.

human agency. Lastly, it provides (however imperfect) the start of a path from an insecure past to a more secure future. This, in turn, provides a good starting point for re-conceptualising regional security in theory and practice and investigating the potential for the creation of security communities in different parts of the world.

Shaping Futures: Agency

Chapter 6 identified the issue of agency and especially the roles non-state actors play as agents of security as one of the silences of post-Cold War debates on security. This section aims to discuss the roles non-state actors play as agents of security in shaping futures. I will begin by looking at the agency of social movements. Second, I will turn to look at the roles intellectuals and in particular students of security could play as agents of security by using illustrations from the Middle East. It will be argued that paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors will enable students of security to see how, in the absence of interest at the governmental level (as is the case with the Middle East) non-state actors could imagine, create and nurture community-building projects and could help in getting state-level actors interested in the formation of a security community. It should, however, be noted that not all non-state actors are community-minded—just as not all governments are sceptical of the virtues of community building. Indeed, looking at the agency of non-state actors is also useful because it enables one to see how non-state actors could stall community-building projects.

In the Middle East, women's movements and networks have been cooperating across borders from the beginning of the *Intifada* onwards. Women's agency, however, is often left unnoticed, because, as Simona Sharoni has argued, the eyes of security analysts are often focused on the state as the primary security agent.³⁶ However, the *Intifada* was marked by Palestinian and Israeli-Jewish women's adoption of non-zero sum, non-military practices that questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political communities as they dared to explore new forms of political communities.³⁷ Such activities included organising a conference entitled 'Give Peace a Chance—Women Speak Out' in Brussels in May 1989. The first of its kind, the conference brought together about 50 Israeli and Palestinian women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip together with PLO representatives to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The follow-up event took place in Jerusalem in December 1989 where representatives of the Palestinian Women's Working Committees and the Israeli Women and Peace Coalition organised a women's day for peace which, Sharoni noted, 'culminated in a march of 6,000 women from West to East Jerusalem under the banner 'Women Go For Peace.'³⁸ Aside from such events that were designed to alert the public opinion of the unacceptability of the Israel/Palestine impasse as well as finding alternative ways of peace-making, women also undertook direct action to alleviate the condition of Palestinians whose predicament had been worsening since the beginning of the *Intifada*.³⁹ In this process, they were aided by their Western European counterparts who provided financial, institutional as well as

³⁶ Simona Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord: Feminist Approaches to International Politics,' in Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996) 107-26.

³⁷ Simona Sharoni, Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi, This Side of Peace (New York: Touchstone and Simon & Schuster, 1995).

moral support. In sum, women's agency helped make the *Intifada* possible on the part of the Palestinian women, whilst their Israeli-Jewish counterparts helped enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli state.

The *Intifada* is also exemplary of how non-state actors could initiate processes of resistance that might later be taken up by policy-makers. The *Intifada* began in 1987 as a spontaneous grassroots reaction to the Israeli occupation and took the PLO leadership (along with others) by surprise. It was only some weeks into the *Intifada* that the PLO leadership embraced it and put its material resources into furthering the cause, which was making occupation as difficult as possible for the Israeli government. Although not much came out of the *Intifada* in terms of an agreement with Israel on issues of concern for the people living in the occupied territories, the process generated a momentum that culminated in 1988 with the PLO's denouncement of terrorism. The change in the PLO's policies, in turn, enabled the 1993 Oslo Accords, which was also initiated by non-state actors, in this case intellectuals.⁴⁰ The point here is that it has been a combination of top down and bottom up politics that has been at the heart of political change, be it the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, or *Intifada* in Israel/Palestine.

Emphasising the roles some non-state actors, notably women's networks, have played as agents of security is not to suggest that all non-state agents' practices are non-zero sum and/or non-violent. For instance, there are the cases

³⁸ Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord,' 107.

³⁹ Mikhail-Ashrawi, This Side of Peace.

of Islamist movements such as FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and Hamas in the Occupied Territories that have resorted, over the years, to violent practices as a part of their strategies that were designed to capture the state mechanism. However, although they may be construed as threats to security in the Middle East in view of their violent practices, what needs to be remembered is that both FIS and Hamas function as providers for security for some peoples in the Middle East—those who are often neglected by their own states.⁴¹ In other words, some Islamist movements do not only offer a sense of identity, but also propose alternative practices and provide tangible economic, social and moral support to their members. However, the treatment women receive under the mastery of such Islamist movements (which could otherwise be construed as agents of emancipatory change due to the services they provide to peoples) serve to remind us that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking reliance on non-governmental actors as agents for peace and security or an uncritical adoption of their agendas.

In order to be able to fulfil the role allocated to them by Critical Security Studies, non-state actors should be encouraged to move away from traditional forms of resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to capture state power or that adopt zero sum thinking and practices. Arguably, this is a task for intellectuals to fulfil. This is not to suggest that intellectuals should direct or instruct non-state actors. As Richard Wyn Jones has noted, the relationship between intellectuals and social movements is based on

⁴⁰ Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord.'

⁴¹ John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 162-83.

reciprocity.⁴² The 1980s' peace movements, for instance, are good examples of intellectuals getting involved with social movements in bringing about change—in this case, the end of the Cold War.⁴³ The relationship between intellectuals and peace movements in Europe was a mutually interactive one in that the intellectuals encouraged and led whilst drawing strength from these movements.

Edward Said, the well-known scholar of English and comparative literature and champion of the Palestinian cause, has also stressed this reciprocal relationship between the intellectual and social movements.⁴⁴ Said views the role of the intellectual as one of representing the ideas and experiences of 'the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless.'⁴⁵ To fulfil this role, argues Said, the intellectual should be connected with a movement, a people, where s/he is 'responsible to and responsible *for* certain things'⁴⁶—as he has done with the Palestinian cause.⁴⁷ Looking at the role Said himself has played as an intellectual within the Palestinian struggle is as informative as his many writings on the role of the intellectual as agent. This is what the chapter will turn to now.

Said has had an undeniable impact as a public intellectual on the political discourse in the United States. His main struggle in the US domestic political

⁴² Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 162.

⁴³ Galtung, 'Europe 1989'; Kaldor, 'The Revolutions of 1989.'

⁴⁴ The best known of his writings on the role of the intellectual is the collection of the BBC Reith lectures Said gave in 1993 entitled Representations of the Intellectual—The 1993 Reith Lectures (London: Vintage, 1994).

⁴⁵ Said, Representations of the Intellectual, 84.

⁴⁶ Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-determination, 1969-1994 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1994) 316.

⁴⁷ See Edward W. Said, 'American Intellectuals and Middle East Politics,' in Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics and Academics, ed. Bruce Robins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990) 146.

arena has been against the mainstream anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian discourses fed by the media and certain parts of the academic community, which help shape US foreign policy. His practices of 'speaking truth to power' have included public lectures, appearances on television, lectures to college audiences, and opinion pieces in newspapers. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that since the 1970s, Said's voice has provided a significant 'antidote' to the common-sense assumptions about Israel/Palestine prevalent in the mainstream media in the United States as well as the rest of the world.⁴⁸

In addition to 'representing, embodying, and articulating' the Palestinian side of the story to US audiences, Said also assumed the job of educating Palestinian and Arab audiences on a broad range of issues including US foreign policy mechanisms, the domestic context in which US policies are made, and the representations in Western public discourse of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, he helped organise a series of seminars on US foreign policy aimed at Palestinian intellectuals, students, and policy-makers. More recently, he has been contributing articles to newspapers published in the Arab world. These articles have been aimed at informing and educating Arab audiences, who remain, after all these years, argues Said, ill informed about the functioning of US politics and society and know very little as to how to get their voices heard to counter the mainstream discourses in the United States.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Rashid I. Khalidi, 'Edward W. Said and the American Public Sphere: Speaking Truth to Power,' *Boundary 2* 25:2 (1998) 162.

⁴⁹ Edward W. Said, Peace and its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho, 1993-1995 (London: Vintage, 1995) xxiii.

Over the years, therefore, Edward Said's agency as an intellectual ranged from getting directly involved in Palestinian politics⁵⁰ to taking a 'critical distance' to question the very leadership he served under for over a decade.⁵¹ Since 1991 and especially since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, he became even more critical of the Palestinian leadership's failure to reap the benefits of the *Intifada*.⁵²

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that to make a change intellectuals should get directly involved in political action. They could also intervene to provide a critique of the existing situation, what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in world politics. Students of security could help create the political space that would enable the emergence of a Gorbachev, by presenting such critique. It should, however, be emphasised that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. In other words, intellectuals should be informed by the practices of social movements themselves (as was the case in Europe in the 1980s). The hope is that non-state actors such as social movements and intellectuals (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents when presented with an alternative reading of their situation.

⁵⁰ Said served as a member of the Palestine National Council (PNC) between 1977 and 1991, and played a direct role in Palestinian political and diplomatic initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1991 he resigned from the PNC due to personal health reasons as well as his disillusionment with the PLO leadership's policies during and following the Gulf Crisis (1990-1991).

⁵¹ Said, 'American Intellectuals and Middle East Politics,' 146-8.

⁵² Said, Peace and its Discontents.

Lastly, intellectuals could make a change even if they limit their practices to thinking, writing and self-reflection. During the Cold War very few security analysts were conscious and open about the impact their thinking and writing could make. Wyn Jones cites the example of Edward N. Luttwak as one such exception who admitted that 'strategy is not a neutral pursuit and its only purpose is to strengthen one's own side in the contention of nations.'⁵³ Still, such explicit acknowledgement of the political dimension of strategic thinking was rare during the Cold War. On the contrary, students of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular have been characterised by limited or no self-reflection as to the potential impact their research could make on the subject of research.⁵⁴

To go back to the argument made above about the role of the intellectual as an agent of security and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, students of Critical Security Studies could function as agents of security by way of reflecting upon the practical implications of their own thinking and writing. Self-reflection becomes crucial when the relationship between theory and practice is conceptualised as one of mutual constitution. As Chapter 6 argued, state-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a reality 'out there' but help reinforce statism. Although it may be true that the consequences of these scholarly activities are sometimes 'unintended,' there nevertheless should be a sense of self-reflection on the part of scholars upon the potential consequences of their research and teaching. The point here is that critical approaches that show an awareness of the socially constructed character of

⁵³ quoted in Wyn Jones, Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, 150.

⁵⁴ Wyn Jones, Security Strategy and Critical Theory, 148-50.

'reality' need not stop short of reflecting upon the constitutive relationship between theory and practice when they themselves are theorising about security. Otherwise, they run the risk of constituting 'threats to the future,' as noted in the first section of this chapter.⁵⁵

Conclusion

Emphasising the need for Critical Security Studies to produce its own ideas about the future, this chapter has sought to show how Critical Security Studies allows one to think and act differently towards shaping alternative futures. Focusing on three themes identified in Chapter 6 as silences of post-Cold War debates on security, I discussed the ways in which Critical Security Studies could get to shape alternative futures. It was argued that students of Critical Security Studies could make use of the constitutive role played by theories to inform alternative emancipatory practices. Following Booth, it was argued that such practices should include 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing.' The imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities was presented as a prime example of 'thinking about doing.' Regarding agency, the chapter stressed the roles non-state actors, especially social movements and intellectuals have played in the past (and could play in the future) in a mutually interactive relationship.

Chapter 8 also underlined the roles students of security could play by not only informing emancipatory practices, but also by self-reflection. This point was

⁵⁵ Vendulka Kubálková, 'Reconstructing the Discipline: Scholars as Agents,' in International Relations in a Constructed World, eds. Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert

developed by building upon Beck's argument regarding 'threats to the future.' It was argued that it is only by thinking and writing about the future that one could raise actors' awareness of what the future may bring, and what needs to be done in order to prevent them from happening. It was also argued that, as ideas about the future both shapes and constrains practices thereby helping constitute the future, uncritical adoption of existing knowledge produced by the prevailing discourses that have been complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the Middle East in itself is a 'threat to the future.' The chapter concluded that students of security who fail to reflect upon the self-constitutive potential of their own thinking would be complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the Middle East.

(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) 193-201.

Chapter 9 : Plausible Futures

Chapter 9 looks at alternative future scenarios and their potential implications within the Middle Eastern context with the aim of investigating what non-Critical Security Studies futures may bring. Each one of the scenarios looked at here raises an alternative set of possibilities on thinking about the future of regional security. Despite certain overlaps, they present quite distinct images and would prescribe different policies as to how to achieve and maintain security in future worlds. The arguments developed in Chapter 8 will be utilised here to criticise other future scenarios. As Chapter 8 noted, given their conceptualisation of theory as constitutive of a future 'reality,' it is vital that students of Critical Security Studies do not limit their thinking to 'desired' futures but also criticise existing ideas about the future that informs actors' practices in an often unthinking manner. By looking at the strengths and weaknesses of other ideas about the future the chapter will seek to identify the difficulties facing a Critical Security Studies future. It will also seek to point to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics. The first section of the chapter will canvass five future scenarios, namely, 'globalisation,' 'fragmentation,' 'clash of civilizations,' 'regionalisation' and 'democratic peace.' The next section will investigate the potential practical implications of these scenarios within the Middle Eastern context.

Future Scenarios

In the 1990s, it has become commonplace to present the future of world politics as one of increasing **globalisation**, with the term itself becoming a 'buzzword'—often invoked but rarely defined.¹ Here, globalisation is understood as a process of increase in the extensity and intensity of relations between peoples, social groups, organisations and institutions that has been leading towards a global interpenetration of political as well as economic and military sectors.² Although it is often the economic factors, in particular the global integration of production and finance, that are viewed as the driving forces behind globalisation, the impact that has been made by the revolution in communications and information technologies (especially the expansion of the world-wide web) in increasing peoples' awareness of each other whilst diminishing the significance of the physical distance separating them (time-space compression) is also recognised as a crucial factor in accelerating this process.

As opposed to those who remain sceptical regarding the impact made by the global integration of production and finance in the peripheries of the world,³

¹ Jan Aart Scholte, 'Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalisation,' in Globalisation: Theory and Practice, eds. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (London: Pinter, 1996) 44-5.

² William L. Robinson, 'Beyond Nation-state Paradigms: Globalisation, Sociology, and the Challenge of Transnational Studies,' Sociological Forum 13:4 (1998) 561-94; David Held and Anthony McGrew, 'The End of the Old Order? Globalisation and the Prospects for World Order,' Review of International Studies 24 (1999) 219-43.

³ See, for example, States of Disarray: The Social Effects of Globalisation (UNRISD [United Nations Research Institute for Social Development] Report prepared for the World Summit for Social Development) (London: UNRISD, 1995); Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, 'Globalisation and Inequality,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 24:3 (1995) 447-70; Caroline Thomas, 'Globalisation and the South,' in Globalisation and the South, eds. Caroline

those who firmly believe in its virtues maintain that increasing globalisation fosters economic efficiency and helps provide a remedy to the very problems it perpetuates. In this new world united in its search for new markets and higher profits, the argument goes, markets would demand and help produce common ways of thinking or even a new global culture, and peoples' identities as producers and consumers will overshadow most, if not all, other interests and identities.⁴ In such a world, myriad actors are expected to solve their conflicts via non-military means, not only because they would achieve common ways of thinking but also because a break-down in business relations would simply be regarded as too costly.⁵ Hence the expectation of global security as a side-effect of further globalisation.

One problem with such interpretations of globalisation is that they bear striking resemblance to the neo-functionalist writings of earlier decades with regard to the emphasis placed on cooperation over certain (technical) issues eventually leading to the emergence of a 'superstructure of political behaviour.'⁶ Moreover, they often ignore how increasing globalisation also leads to a perpetuation of inequalities worldwide.⁷ Indeed, the proponents of increasing

Thomas and Peter Wilkin (London: Macmillan, 1997) 1-17.

⁴ This new global culture is referred to as 'McWorld' by Benjamin Barber. Thomas Friedman calls it 'DOScapital.' See Benjamin R. Barber, 'Jihad vs. McWorld,' The Atlantic Monthly 269 (March 1992) 53-63; idem, Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995); Thomas L. Friedman, 'DOScapital,' Foreign Policy (Fall 1999) 110-16; idem, 'DOScapital 2.0,' Foreign Policy (Fall 1999) 121-5.

⁵ Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace (London: HarperCollins, 1990; reprint, London: Collins, 1994) 13-14 (page references are to the reprint edition).

⁶ Ian Clark, Globalisation and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) 18. For an overview of neo-functionalism, see Jeppe Trankholm-Mikkelsen, 'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC,' Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20:1 (1991) 1-22. For a critique see McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, 133-7.

⁷ States of Disarray; Hurrell and Woods, 'Globalisation and Inequality'; Thomas, 'Globalisation and the South.'

globalisation do not account for the processes of 'structural violence' perpetuated by the globalising forces so far as the latter do not disrupt the course of the former. In this sense, what they mean by the attainment of global security is the creation of some form of 'macropeace'⁸ based on the maintenance of the status quo by way of exercising social control through the global communication and information networks and the entertainment industry.⁹ The kind of security that could be achieved as such would at best amount to an absence of war—'negative peace' in Johan Galtung's terms.¹⁰

Leaving aside such reservations regarding the desirability of a 'negative peace' established through further globalisation, it should also be noted that not even 'negative peace' may be within reach given the process of fragmentation that goes hand in hand with globalisation. Notwithstanding Thomas Friedman's claim that 'the wretched of the earth want to go to Disneyworld, not to the barricades,'¹¹ Robert D. Kaplan maintains that the very uniformity that is imposed by the global communication and information networks and the entertainment industry has, at the same time, given rise to a proliferation of particularisms that manifest themselves as cultural and racial clash, increasing erosion of states and inter-state borders, and refugee flows. Although Kaplan is not alone in his conception of globalisation and fragmentation as two mutually reinforcing processes,¹² his approach is singular in its celebration of globalisation in the

⁸ Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, 62.

⁹ See James Der Derian, *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) esp. pp. 19-39. On communication and knowledge as power, see Robert W. Cox, 'Civilizations in World Political Economy,' *New Political Economy* 1:2 (1996) 149-50.

¹⁰ Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research,' *Journal of Peace Research* 6:3 (1969) 167-92.

¹¹ Friedman, 'DOSCaptial 2.0,' 124.

¹² See, for example, Clark, *Globalisation and Fragmentation*, 4; James N. Rosenau, 'Distant Proximities: The Dynamics and Dialectics of Globalisation,' in *International Political Economy*:

developed world and warning about the 'coming anarchy' in the developing world.¹³

Kaplan's thesis is that environmental dynamics could, in the future, further reinforce the process of fragmentation.¹⁴ As a result, argues Kaplan, the lines dividing the realm of globalisation (represented by the travellers of his metaphorical stretch limo) and the realm of fragmentation (made up of the majority of world's peoples who travel on foot and are therefore more amenable to the effects of environmental degradation) would further deepen, leading towards a future which would be characterised by spreading diseases, population upsurges, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, increasing erosion of states and inter-state borders, and the augmentation of private armies, security firms and transnational criminal organisations (such as drug cartels).¹⁵

While certain elements of Kaplan's argument remain valid—such as the need to pay more attention to developments in those parts of the world that are suffering from environmental and societal stress—he suggests very little as to how to alter these dynamics to prevent the 'coming anarchy.' In fact, given the tone of environmental determinism hidden between his lines, it is not clear

Understanding Global Disorder, ed. Björn Hettne (London: Zed, 1995) 49. It should, however, be noted that Rosenau uses the term 'localisation' to refer to the process what is referred to here as fragmentation.

¹³ Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy,' The Atlantic Monthly (1994) 44-76. Kaplan later turned his piece into a book (The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century. London: Papermac, 1996) and, despite its many shortcomings, received much acclaim in the mass media and was quoted by US policy-makers (included President Clinton) on numerous occasions. See Simon Dalby, 'The Environment as Geopolitical Threat: Reading Robert Kaplan's "Coming Anarchy,"' Ecumene 3:4 (1996) 472-4, 492 nn. 12-14.

¹⁴ Kaplan bases his thesis on Homer-Dixon's conclusions in his 1991 article that had traces of environmental determinism. See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 'On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict,' International Security (1991) 76-116.

¹⁵ Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy,' 46.

whether he deems these dynamics to be alterable at all. For, by way of presenting the causes of the 'coming anarchy' as mere 'environmental' (i.e. 'natural') dynamics, as opposed to human decisions, actions and omissions (as seen in Beck's analysis), Kaplan glosses over the role human agency has played in exacerbating them. To put it in other words, Kaplan is oblivious to the ways in which the developed world (the passengers in the stretch limo), through economic interactions usurped raw materials, depleted natural resources and polluted rivers in the developing world.¹⁶

By way of failing to account for the role human agency has played in perpetuating these problems, Kaplan also fails to see how human agency may intervene to reverse these trends. Even NGOs (that are treated as agents of security from a Critical Security Studies perspective) are allocated with the task of 'wound-binding' in Kaplan's scenario.¹⁷ This has partly to do with Kaplan's fatalism—a trait he shares with Huntington, as will be seen below—and partly from his problem-solving approach to international phenomena as opposed to the Critical Security Studies approach that points to unfulfilled human potential and calls for change.

Robert W. Cox's conception of fragmentation as a form of 'resistance' to globalising forces is exemplary of the 'critical' (as opposed to 'problem-solving') approach to international phenomena. To put it in a nutshell, Cox's argument is that globalisation's perpetuation of inequalities worldwide could set social forces (such as social coalitions, labour movements, democratisation struggles) that

¹⁶ Dalby, 'The Environment as a Geopolitical Threat,' 489.

¹⁷ Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth, 432-3.

might in the future lay down the groundwork for an alternative ('postglobalisation') world order. Although Cox is not unaware of the potential for disintegration and violent conflict dormant in the struggles led by such social forces, he maintains that the disintegration of some units could result in the formation of new alliances thereby bringing about a new order.¹⁸

What is significant about Cox's scenario is that it introduces an element of human agency to reverse the trends set by the forces of globalisation—a factor that is missing from Kaplan's approach. As Chapter 8 argued, critical theories of International Relations in general and Critical Security Studies in particular share Cox's stress on the role social forces could play as agents for change. However, if the efforts of these actors are to add up to constitute a transformative force, Cox's scenario would need to incorporate an image of a broader community to which these smaller groups could attach themselves. Cox indeed recognises the need to organise at the 'national, regional and world levels' for 'the creation of a vibrant civil society inspired by a strong spirit of solidarity at the community level and, by linkage with other strong communities in other countries, at the transnational or global level.'¹⁹ The point here is that, in its absence of (the image of) a broader political community to which social forces could attach themselves, the agency of non-state actors may fail to add up to create a counter-hegemonic bloc as Cox expects them to do.

¹⁸ Robert W. Cox, 'Towards a Posthegemonic Conceptualisation of World Order: Reflections on the Relevancy of Ibn Khaldun,' in *Approaches to World Order*, 156. For a further elaboration on this point, see Robert W. Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order,' *Review of International Studies* 25:1 (January 1999) 3-28.

¹⁹ Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,' 27.

Not all are as positive (as Cox) regarding the transformative role social forces could potentially assume. Samuel P. Huntington is one who shares Kaplan's fatalism regarding the future of world politics. As the universalism of the West fostered by the globalising forces brings it into conflict with non-Western states, argues Huntington, the latter would increasingly choose to form coalitions to stand against the West thereby challenging the Western civilization—hence his scenario of the future of world politics as a **'clash of civilizations.'** Huntington maintains that this clash would not remain at the macro (inter-state) level only; at the micro-level groups belonging to different civilizations vying for power would also clash with each other. Accordingly, submits Huntington, the future of world politics would be characterised by cooperation within and conflict between civilizations.²⁰

It is significant to note here that, as opposed to Kaplan, Huntington does suggest a way to reverse this trend. The two-pronged strategy Huntington recommends requires the West to hold on to its own in the short-term by promoting close cooperation and further integration within its own civilization, whilst exploiting the differences within and between other civilizations thereby preventing the formation of anti-Western coalitions.²¹ For the long-term Huntington prefers a more accommodationist policy and calls for developing a more profound understanding of other civilizations to identify the elements of commonality in between. The adoption of the long-term strategy is a must, maintains Huntington, or else the futures of both peace and Civilization

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' *Foreign Affairs* 72:3 (Summer 1993) ; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Touchstone, 1998).

²¹ Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?' 48-9; idem, The Clash of Civilizations, 19-39, 301-21.

(understood as the opposite of Kaplan's 'coming anarchy') would come under threat.²² What is surprising is it does not seem to strike Huntington that the two prongs of his strategy are contradictory; the pursuance of the short-term policies he advocates may make it harder to follow the long-term policies. Put crudely, if the West holds on to its own and seeks to sow the seeds of division within and between non-Western civilizations, it may end up alienating them thereby making it more difficult—if not impossible—to follow the long-term policy of accommodation.

Leaving aside the contradictions within Huntington's argument (that have been pointed to by others)²³ it is his conception of theory that should be criticised. Huntington's is a 'problem-solving' approach to international phenomena (as was the case with Kaplan's approach). He conceives the role of theory as one of explanation. When presenting the future of world politics as a 'clash of civilizations' he assumes that he is representing what he sees, albeit in an admittedly 'simplified' fashion.²⁴ However, his is too 'simplified' a representation that, for the sake of explanation, glosses over many important aspects of international phenomena and leaves 'a great deal of dignity . . . on the cutting room floor,' to use Cynthia Enloe's words.²⁵ Lastly, by way of failing to reflect

²² Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 321.

²³ See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, 'The Dangers of Decadence: What the Rest Can Teach the West,' Foreign Affairs 72:4 (1993) 10-14; Liu Binyan, 'Civilization Crafting: No Culture is an Island,' Foreign Affairs 72:4 (1993) 19-21; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, 'The Modernizing Imperative: Tradition and Change,' Foreign Affairs 72:4 (1993) 22-4; Richard E. Rubenstein and Jarle Crocker, 'Challenging Huntington,' Foreign Policy 96 (Fall 1994) 113-28; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'Samuel Huntington and the "Civilizing of Global Space,"' in The Geopolitics Reader, eds. Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Simon Dalby and Paul Routledge (London: Routledge, 1998) 170-6.

²⁴ Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 37.

²⁵ Cynthia Enloe, 'Margins, Silences, and Bottom Rungs: How to Overcome the Underestimation of Power in the Study of International Relations,' in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, eds. Ken Booth, Steve Smith and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 188.

upon the potential of his thinking to become a self-fulfilling prophecy, Huntington fails to see how his scenario could contribute to a deepening of the differences between civilizations that have historically had porous borders.²⁶ The reaction his thesis has received within the Middle Eastern context attests well to this (see the next section).

Fragmentation is not the only process that is viewed as going hand-in-hand with globalisation. Processes of **regionalisation** worldwide have been accelerated in the attempt to come to terms with increasing globalisation.²⁷ The processes of regionalisation and globalisation, the argument goes, are mutually reinforcing in that the rising density of economic, social and military relations among myriad actors, at the same time increases their vulnerability and leads them to seek a degree of stability by pooling their resources at the regional level.²⁸ The end of the Cold War and the removal of the bipolar template through which world politics was viewed for over four decades are also considered to have contributed to regionalisation in the economy and security spheres.²⁹

²⁶ For a similar point, see Rubenstein and Crocker, 'Challenging Huntington,' 128. Also see, Robert W. Cox, 'Civilizations in World Political Economy,' 144.

²⁷ Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne, 'Conclusion: The New Regionalism,' in Regionalism and World Order, eds. Andrew Gamble and Anthony Payne (London: Macmillan, 1996) 253; Andrew Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,' in Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organizations and International Order, eds. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 54-8; Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, 'The New Regionalism Approach,' Politeia 17:3 (1998) 6-21.

²⁸ Held and McGrew, 'The End of the Old Order,' 223; Björn Hettne, 'The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace,' in The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security, eds. Björn Hettne and András Inotai (Helsinki: Forssan Kirjapaino Oy [UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research] 1994) 10.

²⁹ Muhtiah Alagappa, 'Regionalism and Conflict Management: A Framework for Analysis,' Review of International Studies 21:4 (1995) 359-87; Louise Fawcett, 'Regionalism in Historical Perspective,' in Regionalism in World Politics, eds. Fawcett and Hurrell, 9-36; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 208; Arthur A. Stein and Steven L. Lobell, 'Geostructuralism and International Politics: The End of the Cold War and the Regionalization of International Security,' in Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, eds. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 108, 120; Richard Rosecrance, 'Regionalism and the Post-Cold War Era,' International Journal 46:3 (Summer 1991) 393.

What is significant for the purposes of the thesis is that common to most of the literature on the re-emergence of regionalism is a relative lack of interest in problematising the concepts 'region,' 'regionalism' and 'regionalisation.' Indeed, very few words are spent on conceptualising what is a 'region.'³⁰ Although most analysts would affirm Joseph S. Nye's statement that 'there are no absolute naturally-determined regions,'³¹ there still is a lack of in-depth analysis historicising and contextualising the construction of regions across time and space.³²

Moreover, most of the existing studies tend to focus on regionalism as a state project informed by intellectuals (mostly state elites). What seems to be absent from many analyses is the role non-state actors have played in (accelerating or stalling) processes of regionalisation. Indeed, very few look at the role played by actors such as NGOs as agents of regionalism. Here it is important to note the often neglected distinction between regionalism as a project and regionalisation as a multi-layered process.³³ Regionalism as a project may emerge as the outcome of a process of bargaining and negotiation among political actors (mostly at the governmental level). Regionalisation, on the other

³⁰ For an exhaustive overview of the literature and its treatment of these three concepts, see Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,' 37-73.

³¹ Joseph S. Nye, 'Regional Institutions,' in Regional Politics and World Order, eds. Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlowitz (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman & Company, 1973) 80.

³² Iver B. Neumann's Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999) is an exception to this statement; so is the emerging critical geopolitics literature. For an introduction into the latter, see John Agnew Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics (London: Routledge, 1998); Gearóid Ó Tuathail and Simon Dalby, eds. Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 1998); P.J. Taylor, 'A Theory and Practice of Regions: The Case of Europe,' Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 9 [1991] 183-95.

³³ For similar conceptualisations, see Hettne and Söderbaum, 'The New Regionalism Approach,' 9-10; Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,' 39-45; Gamble and Payne, 'Conclusion.'

hand, is a process that develops as a combination of historical as well as emergent relations and interactions. In other words, regionalisation, like globalisation, is a 'complex articulation of established institutions, rules and distinctive new patterns of social interaction' between (state and non-state) actors.³⁴ Then, focusing merely on the roles states (and state elites) play in processes of regionalisation may not enable one to understand parts of the world such as the Middle East where there is very little sign of interest in or commitment to regionalism at state level. In the absence of regionalism at the governmental level, non-state actors could create and nurture processes of regionalisation.

The last scenario that will be looked at here, that of '**democratic peace**,' is not a new one.³⁵ The so-called democratic peace theory has been prominent since the 1970s, but after the end of the Cold War it has become more and more commonplace among US policy-makers to refer to the democratic peace phenomenon—that very few democracies in the last hundred years or so have gone to war with one another—to justify US policy of supporting the spread of democracy.³⁶ For instance, Anthony Lake, former Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs, has maintained that what should replace the policy of containment is a 'strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world's . . .

³⁴ Gamble and Payne, 'Conclusion,' 250. Also see Hurrell, 'Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective,' 40.

³⁵ Michael W. Doyle, 'Liberalism and World Politics,' *American Political Science Review* 80:4 (December 1986) 1151-69; Bruce Russett (with William Antholis, Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember and Zeev Maoz) *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995; reprint, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³⁶ Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld*, 14, 313 n.22-3; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, 'Politics and Peace,' *International Security* 20:2 (Fall 1995) 123.

community of market democracies.'³⁷ President Clinton concurred: 'democracies rarely wage war on one another.'³⁸

There are two main assumptions behind US policy-makers' statements. First, that free markets and democracy are twins, and that the spread of one strengthens the other—hence the popularisation of the term 'market democracies.'³⁹ Second, that democracies do not fight each other—the core argument put forward by democratic peace theorists. Although the democratic peace theory has come under criticism in the literature, especially regarding the definitions of its two core concepts—'democracy' and 'war'⁴⁰—this second assumption has nevertheless acquired the 'status of a received truth'⁴¹ in that it has been used to encourage transition to free markets and democracy worldwide.

More recently, Thomas Risse-Kappen provided a constructivist explanation of the democratic peace phenomenon. Shared norms, maintained Risse-Kappen, renders the security dilemma far less significant among democracies in that the element of ambiguity and uncertainty that is characteristic of the security dilemma could be played down when states perceive each other to be bound by similar rules and norms.⁴² However, as Tarak Barkawi and Mark

³⁷ Anthony Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement' (Address at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, September 21, 1993) Dispatch (September 1993); available from <http://www.state.gov/www/publications/dispatch>; Internet; accessed February 10, 1999.

³⁸ William J. Clinton, 'Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World,' (Address to the UN General Assembly, New York City, September 27, 1993) Dispatch (September 1993); available from <http://www.state.gov/www/publications/dispatch>; Internet; accessed February 10, 1999.

³⁹ For a critique, see Robert W. Cox, 'Global Perestroika,' in Approaches to World Order, 303-5.

⁴⁰ Christopher Layne, 'Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace,' International Security 19:2 (Fall 1994) 5-49; David A. Spiro, 'The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace,' International Security 19:2 (Fall 1994) 50-86.

⁴¹ Raymond Cohen, 'Pacific Unions: A Reappraisal of the Theory that "Democracies do not Go to War with Each Other,"' Review of International Studies 20:3 (July 1994) 207.

⁴² Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist

Laffey have pointed out, what is missing from Risse-Kappen's argument (along with some other proponents of democratic peace theory) is an account as to how peaceful relations between democracies have historically been made possible by the threat and use of force against non-democracies. Barkawi and Laffey maintain that by way of failing to historicize and contextualise the emergence of the 'zone of peace' or account for the absence of democracies elsewhere, the democratic peace literature 'betrays a deeply unreflexive attitude to analysis.'⁴³

The future scenario drawn from the democratic peace theory is that the encouragement of more consensual modes of social control under the rubric of democratic peace would help maintain domestic stability thereby smoothing the process of opening up heretofore protected markets. Worldwide transition to free market economies, in turn, is expected to contribute to global security (as noted above when discussing globalisation). Viewed as such, the future scenario presented by the proponents of the democratic peace theory may not be very different from that of increased globalisation in that peace is defined as the absence of war (i.e. 'negative peace') and issues such as 'structural violence' are sidelined. Moreover, the very definition of democracy adopted by those who propound this scenario is a 'limited' or 'exclusionary' one. In order for free markets to operate freely in the developing world, what is required is not necessarily fully-fledged democratic systems that could render the freedom of market forces vulnerable by imposing restrictions in line with the demands of

Interpretation of the Liberal Argument,' European Journal of International Relations 1:4 (1995) 491-517.

⁴³ Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, 'The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalisation,' European Journal of International Relations 5:4 (1999) 423.

political groups, but rather 'low-intensity democracies'⁴⁴ that would enable the restriction of decision-making power to 'elements acceptable to the financial market.'⁴⁵ As will be seen below, US policy in the Middle East has so far been to favour increasing political participation whilst supporting 'limited' or 'exclusionary' democracies (such as Egypt and Jordan) along with Gulf sheikhdoms (who allow for no or very limited political participation) that help maintain the status quo and make the region secure for the transition to free-market economy.

Future Implications

After having presented a brief overview of plausible future scenarios, this section will investigate their potential practical implications within the Middle Eastern context. First, the future of world politics as further globalisation.

The Middle East has so far had an uneven balance sheet in keeping up with an increasingly globalising world. On the one hand, it is closely linked to world markets via oil sales, financial flows and arms purchases. The Gulf being the hub of world oil production means it is fully integrated into the world economy. On the other hand, the level of integration of the Middle East in general is still below the expectations of the proponents of increasing globalisation. This being the case despite the increase in the density of financial and trade connections between the Middle East and world markets especially since the 1970s boom in

⁴⁴ The term 'low-intensity democracy' is from William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1-12.

⁴⁵ Cox, 'Global Perestroika,' 304.

oil prices suggests that the region has had very little to offer with the exception of oil. The point here is that in a globalised future where oil may not be as significant a commodity as it currently is, the future of the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular may be rather bleak.⁴⁶

The relatively low level of integration between world markets and Middle Eastern economies has had partly to do with the fact that the latter were geared towards import-substitution in the post-colonial era. Although some (such as Tunisia and Turkey) have switched to export-promotion in the last two decades, many others have either hesitated or failed to make this shift.⁴⁷ As Chapter 4 noted, Syrian and Saudi policy-makers have chosen to seek self-sufficiency in basic foodstuffs production for reasons of food security—that is, fear of having to rely on external supplies at times of crises. For others, such as Egypt, the transition from import-substitution to export-promotion has been hampered by the lack of infrastructure and financial resources. Furthermore, some regional actors' negative disposition towards the forces of globalisation has also played a role in delaying this shift. Indeed, many regional actors, with the memories of the colonial era still fresh in their minds, feel threatened by the very enmeshing and interpenetration that is part and parcel of the process of globalisation. The growth of so-called 'Islamic banking' is exemplary of some regional actors'

⁴⁶ The economies of Gulf states are wholly oil-based. If oil is excluded from calculations, regional states participation into global trade (with the exception of Israel, Tunisia and Turkey) is not very significant. The ratio of non-oil merchandise to gross domestic product (GDP) in the Middle East—excluding Turkey and Israel—is 6.1 percent. Compared to 11.5 percent in Latin America (another oil-producing region) this is very low. See Kemal Derviş and Nemat Shafik, 'The Middle East and North Africa: A Tale of Two Futures,' *Middle East Journal* 52: 4 (1998) 505-16. Also see Doug Henwood, 'Global Economic Integration: The Missing Middle East,' *Middle East Report* 172 (September-October 1993) 8.

⁴⁷ Roger Owen noted that Lebanon during the 1950s and 1960s was another exception. See Roger Owen, 'Inter-Arab Economic Relations During the Twentieth Century: World Markets vs. Regional Market?' in *The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab*

misgivings regarding the process of globalisation which some view as a 'colonisation of the future.'⁴⁸ On the other hand, the satellite networks and other information technologies that underpin the communications revolution have been dubbed by one author as 'cybernetic colonialism.'⁴⁹

Although the proponents of increasing globalisation are not wholly unaware of regional actors' misgivings, their response would be to say that Middle Eastern regimes would sooner or later have to give in. This is necessarily because, they would argue, 'the only thing worse than being a part of the evolving economic hierarchy is being excluded from it.'⁵⁰ If this statement is taken to its logical conclusion, it could be argued that if Middle Eastern actors were to go against the wishes and expectations of the forces of globalisation, they would find themselves marginalized in an increasingly globalising world. For example, in a hypothetical future world where oil prices fell drastically, the Middle East (with the possible exception of Israel, Tunisia, and Turkey) would find itself on the margins of the world economy with the marginalization of Gulf economies resulting in a loss of crucial financial support for the rest of the Arab countries.⁵¹

If oil prices were to remain stable, the Gulf would remain a part of the globalised world economy. Southern Mediterranean states should also be expected to integrate with the global markets largely due to the European Union's

Integration, ed. Michael C. Hudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 224.

⁴⁸ Ziauddin Sardar, Islamic Futures: The Shape of Ideas to Come (London: Mansell, 1985) 10.

⁴⁹ Al Miskin (pseud.), 'Globalisation and Its Discontents,' Middle East Report 193 (March-April 1995) 28.

⁵⁰ Henwood, 'Global Economic Integration,' 8. Also see Joel Beinin, 'The Working Class and Peasantry in the Middle East: From Economic Nationalism to Neoliberalism,' Middle East Report (Spring 1999) 22.

⁵¹ This support is provided through economic aid as well as workers' remittances. See Atif A. Kubursi, 'Prospects for Arab Economic Integration After Oslo,' in Middle East Dilemma, ed.

interest in and continued resource input into their economies.⁵² In this hypothetical world, only Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran should be expected to become marginalized—unless, that is, they agree to adopt the recommended stabilisation and structural adjustment packages and open up their markets. In such a future world, one should not expect much improvement in regional security. Given the intimate links between Arab societies, it would be very difficult to conceive of security being established in some Arab states whilst the rest is still on the margins.

In the 1990s it was this threat of marginalization in an increasingly globalising world that helped persuade regional governments such as those of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco to remove the obstacles in front of free trade.⁵³ So far this has involved the implementation of stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes by regional governments in line with the 'Washington consensus.'⁵⁴ Some Gulf economies have also taken steps towards privatisation and reducing governmental subsidies.⁵⁵ However, the fact that many Middle Eastern actors seem to have given in to the forces of globalisation should not be taken to suggest that the outcome is likely to lead to security (understood as stability) as the proponents of increasing globalisation hope. On the contrary, the recent trend towards economic liberalisation in the Middle East could also be viewed as

Hudson, 301-11. Also see Derviş and Shafik, 'The Middle East and North Africa.'

⁵² Libya and Algeria are also oil and natural gas producers.

⁵³ Karen Pfeiffer, 'How Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and even Egypt became IMF "Success Stories" in the 1990s,' Middle East Report (Spring 199) 23-7.

⁵⁴ The 'Washington consensus' entails a series of measures such as fiscal discipline, tax reform, financial and trade liberalisation, privatisation and promotion of foreign direct investment that are designed to deal with the economic problems of developing countries. See Diana Hunt, 'Development Economics, the Washington Consensus and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative,' in Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, ed. George Joffé (London: Frank Cass, 1999) 18.

⁵⁵ Alan Richards, 'The Global Financial Crisis and Economic Reform in the Middle East,' Middle

a sign of helplessness and fear of being marginalized, and not necessarily commitment to achieving security by way of doing business. There has indeed emerged some local resistance against the presentation of increased globalisation as the only option to escape marginalization. Hasan Hanafi expressed his frustration as follows:

There are only two alternatives: to compete or to retreat, to produce or to consume, to create or to imitate, to invent or to assimilate, to give or to take, to export or to import, to be in the center or to be in the periphery.⁵⁶

The point here is that the problem with presenting increased globalisation as the only option is that it constitutes a 'primary form of alienation'⁵⁷ and could lead to further fragmentation and instability—the very developments the proponents of increasing globalisation would want to avoid. To put it in other words, the excesses caused by the uncontrolled character of globalisation not only constitute a major obstacle on the road to further integration but also feeds into the tendency towards fragmentation as explained in the previous section.

At the first glance, the Middle East does not seem a likely candidate for **fragmentation** in the way depicted in Kaplan's scenario. After all, many Middle Eastern countries have got rich oil and natural gas resources, are better off economically than some relatively deprived parts of the world and could therefore be expected to remain largely immune to the effects of such fragmentary forces that affect other parts of the Third World. On the other hand, it could be argued that environmental factors could push the Middle East into the realm of fragmentation with, for example, the scarcity of water in quantitative terms

East Policy vi:3 (1999) 65.

⁵⁶ Hasan Hanafi, 'The Middle East, in Whose World? Primary Reflections,' Opening Address to the 4th Conference of the Nordic Society of Middle Eastern Studies, Oslo, August 13-16, 1998.

coupled with a deterioration in its quality (due to excessive use) fuelling already existing divisions between parties that share the same river basins.⁵⁸ Although the impact changes in the global climate would make cannot be predicted, it is estimated that the Middle East would emerge as one of the problem areas in the not-so-distant future.

Furthermore, fragmentation could also be caused by a crisis in the economies of the oil-rich countries of the region that currently desalinate and/or import water at very high costs. A fall in the oil prices could push Saudi Arabia, for instance, into the club of water-scarce countries.⁵⁹ In other words, not even the capital-rich countries of the Middle East would be immune to the kinds of dynamics emphasised in Kaplan's scenario if the existing scarcity were to be compounded by environmental factors (such as the 'greenhouse effect') and demographic trends (unchecked population growth coupled with rapid urbanisation). The future may indeed bring 'water wars' if no preventive action is taken.⁶⁰ Or, alternatively, the world may witness a Middle East where some are living in cities and suburbs leading comfortable lives, whereas the shanty-town dwellers or rural populations that sustain themselves by agriculture are 'doomed by a lack of water to drink, soil to till, and space to survive in'—a future in line with

⁵⁷ Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,' 27.

⁵⁸ Iraq, Syria and Turkey share the Tigris-Euphrates basin, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority share the Jordan basin, and Egypt and Sudan share the Nile basin. See Peter H. Gleick, 'Reducing the Risks of Conflict Over Fresh Water Resources in the Middle East,' in Water and Peace in the Middle East (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1994) 41-50; Maher F. Abu-Taleb, 'Regional Cooperation in Water Resource Management,' in Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society, ed. Elise Boulding (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994) 253.

⁵⁹ It is argued that Middle Eastern countries have the highest median cost of water supply and sanitation in the world. See Abu-Taleb, 'Regional Cooperation,' 254.

⁶⁰ J. Starr, 'Water Wars,' Foreign Policy 82 (Spring 1991) 17-36; John Bulloch and Adel Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (London: Gollancz, 1993); Peter H. Gleick, 'Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security,' International Security 18:1 (Summer 1993) 79-112.

Kaplan's stretch limo analogy.⁶¹ And, as Kaplan reminds us, such environments would be likely to become a breeding ground for particularisms.

However, although the emerging particularisms and the challenge they pose to the state system may seem like the 'coming anarchy' to some, the same processes could be viewed as novel forms of resistance that could constitute a solution to the very problems perpetuated by the economic straitjacket forced onto regional economies in line with the Washington consensus. As noted in the previous section, Cox thinks it would be possible for such social forces to form alliances and challenge the hegemony of the liberal economic order. Part of the problem with relying on the agency of social forces is that when faced with economic hardship, they may show little resistance against the globalising forces' attempts to buy them off in an attempt to strengthen their grip over the populace (as was the case with the EU effort to channel resources into north African NGOs to harvest support for its project of constructing a Euro-Med Region).⁶² In sum, given the fact that they have to operate under the double burden of restraint exercised by both their own governments as well as the pressure put by external actors (such as the United States or the EU) for increasing globalisation, social forces in the Middle East face a difficult task if they are to fulfil Cox's expectations from them.

Although it is always possible to be sceptical about the relevance of Cox's thinking within the Middle Eastern framework given the restraints imposed

⁶¹ Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy,' 59.

⁶² See Cox, 'Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennium,' 11; 'European Union Funding for the Middle East NGOs,' Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East 7:4 (Winter 1998/99) 15.

upon the activities of non-state actors by regional governments, there exist examples from the region's recent past where non-state actors undertook crucial roles in working towards alternative futures. As Chapter 8 argued, in the case of Israel/Palestine, for instance, women's agency helped make the Intifada on the part of some Palestinian women, while some of their Israeli counterparts helped enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli state.⁶³ This, however, is not to suggest that all such social forces would be fit to be considered as agents for emancipatory change. Indeed, an unthinking reliance on social forces as agents for change and uncritical adoption of their agendas would be problematic.⁶⁴

Huntington's '**clash of civilizations**' scenario denies the very possibility of the formation of such an alliance among social forces (as anticipated by Cox) unless, that is, it is formed by actors that all belong to the same civilization. Although Huntington's thesis has come under criticism as noted in the previous section, its implication for the Middle East stems not necessarily from its consistency (or lack of it) but from the fact that it is by building upon the declarations of Islamist actors, examples of terrorism and inter-denominational conflicts from within the Middle East that Huntington substantiates his argument on the need for a new world order based on civilizations. It is worth noting that Huntington borrowed the phrase '**clash of civilizations**' from Bernard Lewis, a

⁶³ Simona Sharoni, Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995) 131-49; idem, 'Middle East Politics Through Feminist Lenses: Toward Theorising International Relations From Women's Struggles,' Alternatives 18 (1993) 5-28; Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, This Side of Peace (New York: Touchstone, Simon & Schuster, 1995).

⁶⁴ P.J. Simmons, 'Learning to live with the NGOs,' Foreign Policy 112 (1998) 82-96.

noted student of Middle Eastern history.⁶⁵ Thus, Huntington's scenario could 'unwittingly play into the hands of the fundamentalists,'⁶⁶ and/or be utilised to license interventions and violent practices by extra-regional actors (from other civilizations). The argument here needs further clarification. I will make two points:

First, the propagation of Huntington-type arguments have so far played into the hands of such Islamist actors who have been trying to convince their supporters that the 'Western' and 'Islamic' civilizations cannot peacefully coexist and that they should seek to strengthen their side to prepare for the coming clash by rallying around their own civilization⁶⁷—a call Huntington would recognise as one of his own. The failure of the mass media in the West in general and in the United States in particular to distinguish between Islam as a religion and Islamism as an ideology and political movement only adds to the sense of siege prevalent among some Muslims and substantiates the claims of some Islamist actors that Muslims have been chosen as the enemy to replace the communist threat and that they will be victimised no matter what they do.⁶⁸

Second, Huntington's scenario not only plays into the hands of Islamist actors in propagating their own perspective on regional security, but it also licenses certain kinds of security practices whilst marginalizing others. If people

⁶⁵ Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage,' The Atlantic Monthly (September 1990); available from <http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm>; Internet; accessed November 12, 1999.

⁶⁶ Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Order (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998) xii.

⁶⁷ Abdel Monem Said Aly [Abdel Aal], 'The Shattered Consensus—Arab Perceptions of Security,' The International Spectator xxxi:4 (October-December 1996) 38.

⁶⁸ On depictions of Islam and Muslims in the West, see Edward Said, Covering Islam: How Media and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, revs. ed. (London: Vintage, 1991). On the problems involved in failing to distinguish between Islam and Islamism, see Tibi, The

do indeed 'rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language and values, and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones,' as Huntington thinks they would,⁶⁹ then the best US policy-makers, for instance, could do would be to seek to maximise friction among the Muslims on the one hand, and the Muslims and peoples of non-Muslim civilizations on the other, whilst holding the West together. Within the Middle Eastern context this may amount to upholding the policy of dual containment in the effort to prevent the emergence of any regional hegemon, keeping Muslim/Arab states divided whilst making sure the regional balance of power tilts toward Israel. Otherwise, a closely coupled community of Muslim/Arab Middle East, if it were to emerge, could challenge US dominance in the region (this may or may not constitute a challenge to Israel's security depending on the conceptions and practices of security adopted by actors on both sides). Although it may be argued that this has for long been the practice of the United States and does not necessarily require a license by Huntington, it nevertheless is true that Huntington's scenario could be used to explain, for instance, the futility of the search for a region-wide peace agreement or help legitimise reliance on the use of militarised practices in the Middle East whilst other (non-military) practices are becoming the norm in some other parts of the world.

As noted in the previous section, the literature on regionalisation depicts a future where regional security institutions would shoulder the task of maintaining security in different parts of the world. The Middle East, however, has so far been treated in the literature as an 'exception' to these trends. It has,

Challenge of Fundamentalism.
⁶⁹ Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 126.

furthermore, been dubbed 'a region without regionalism.'⁷⁰ Indeed, the seeming lack of enthusiasm for the US-backed Middle East Peace Process and the slow progress of the Euro-Med Partnership scheme, especially when viewed against the backdrop of increasing regionalisation in other parts of the world, could be viewed as substantiating such assertions. The argument put forward in this thesis is that the problem in the Middle East is not necessarily a lack of interest in regionalism per se, but rather the presence of a multitude of approaches to regional security propounded by different actors. The relatively little evidence for regionalism-from-above should not lead one to turn a blind eye to the efforts of myriad non-state actors that attempt to put their own perspectives into practice (regionalism-from-below).

So far, the staunchest supporter of regionalism-from-above has been the former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, who has maintained that regionalisation in economic relations would have spill-over effect into political relations thereby paving the way for the making of a 'New Middle East' modelled on the European Community.⁷¹ However, as noted in Chapter 7, the very idea of becoming a part of the 'New Middle East' of Peres is viewed by suspicion by many in the Arab world. Israel's economic might, which Peres considers a magnet to pull other regional countries towards cooperation, so far seems to have made a contrary effect on some regional actors who consider the 'New Middle East' an attempt at 'imperialism by regionalism.'⁷²

⁷⁰ For the prior view, see Helena Lindholm-Schulz and Michael Schulz, 'The Middle East— Exception or Embryonic Regionalism,' *Polietia* 17:3 (1998) 95-111; for the latter see Paul Aarts, 'The Middle East: A Region Without Regionalism or the End of Exceptionalism?' *Third World Quarterly* 20:5 (1999) 911-25.

⁷¹ Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (Dorset: Element, 1993) 33-4.

⁷² Barnett, 'Regional Security After the Gulf War,' 604. For a summary of the views that oppose

Such worries are further reinforced by the fact that some Arab states (such as Jordan) have moved towards normalisation in economic relations with Israel whereas Egypt has strengthened the links that were established after Camp David. Given the current state of weak economic relations among Arab countries, these developments are observed with a degree of alarm by some. For, it is feared that once Arab states normalise their relations with Israel, there will be very few cards left in the hands of Arab policy-makers to push Israel to make concessions on various aspects related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and that any regional cooperation scheme that includes Israel would mean the end of hopes for Arab integration (economic or political). It should, however, be noted that given the size of the Israeli economy, it is questionable to what extent such worries are well founded.⁷³ It could also be argued that if Arab policy-makers were to put their house in order and approach Israel having settled some of their inter-Arab disputes, there would be little room left for Israel to take advantage of.⁷⁴

One major problem with this scenario is that given the state of weakening ties between Arab governments (see Chapter 7) it is not easy to foresee Arab economic integration taking root. On the contrary, the tendency on the part of many Arab policy-makers in the aftermath of the Gulf War has been one of strengthening bilateral ties with non-Arab actors (such as Israel, the United States, and the EU). It should nevertheless be noted that although enthusiasm

Middle Easternism, see Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus,' 37.

⁷³ Said Aly, 'The Shattered Consensus,' 44.

⁷⁴ Baghat Korany, 'The New/Old Middle East,' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London:

for regionalism is low among Arab policy-makers, there nevertheless exist strong links between Arab non-state actors (regionalism-from-below).⁷⁵ Indeed, it has so far been such non-state actors that have pushed for increasing regionalisation in the Arab Regional System. As Michael Hudson has maintained, in the recent years, there emerged 'a great deal more sociocultural integration than the naïve Arab nationalists of the 1940s and 1950s ever imagined.'⁷⁶ In this sense, the problem here is not that there is little or no cooperation, integration or interdependence, but that exist very little in terms of institutions. As Hudson argued, 'interdependence does not lead directly to the growth of political community.'⁷⁷

In sum, there clearly is some potential for further regionalisation in the Middle East. Given the trends in other parts of the world, there is also the understanding among some regional policy-makers that they need to cooperate at the regional level in order not to be marginalized in an increasingly globalising world. The case for Middle Eastern regionalism so far seems to have struck a chord among Egyptian and Jordanian policy-makers, whereas the Euro-Med project of the EU is backed by most north African countries. In the future, the main obstacle that would face regionalisation in the 'Middle East' is not necessarily an absence of regionalism but the presence of a multitude of regionalisms (identified in Chapter 7).

Macmillan, 1997) 135-50.

⁷⁵ Nemat Shafik, 'Labour Migration and Economic Integration in the Middle East,' in The Middle East Dilemma, ed. Hudson, 287.

⁷⁶ Michael C. Hudson, 'Arab Integration: An Overview,' in The Middle East Dilemma, ed. Hudson, 5-6.

⁷⁷ Hudson, 'Arab Integration,' 5-6.

The last scenario that will be looked at here is that of **democratic peace**. As explained in the previous section, the democratic peace theory suggests that democratic states do not go to war with each other. The implication of this within the Middle Eastern context is the assertion that in a future Middle East where democracy has taken root, this could have a pacifying effect. One could identify two problems with this argument. The first and widely acknowledged problem is that it would be rather difficult to envision the establishment of democratic peace in the Middle East, as the region has so far proven to be rather 'resistant to democratisation.'⁷⁸ However, although it is true that the region (with the exception of Israel and Turkey) has so far remained relatively immune to democratisation, to assert that the Middle East could be an exception to the democratic peace phenomenon is to let one's thinking be trapped in the present state of affairs, not realising the potential for change that exists. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Cold War, there has been some movement towards democratisation in the Middle East with some Arab policy-makers responding to their populations' demands for the adoption of liberalisation and democratisation measures. In the last decade or so, multi-party competition for elected legislative assemblies have been either introduced or expanded in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestine Authority and Tunisia.⁷⁹

However, although it is possible to argue that a beginning has been made, there are significant problems with these developments. For one thing, executive posts in some of these countries remain uncontested or at times

⁷⁸ James Lee Ray, 'The Future of International War: Global Trends and Middle Eastern Implications,' in Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East, eds. David Garnham and Mark Tessler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995) 3.

⁷⁹ Mustapha K. al-Sayyid, 'The Third Wave of Democratisation in the Arab World,' in The Arab

unelected. Moreover, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia still do not have universal suffrage.⁸⁰ Libya does have universal suffrage but elections are never held. In Kuwait suffrage is limited to males aged (who resided in Kuwait before 1921) their sons, and sons of naturalised citizens. Finally, the few elections that have been allowed to take place with limited suffrage are often engineered in line with the wishes of the ruling elite.⁸¹ Indeed, it has been suggested that the elected assemblies are there not to enable genuine political participation but to enhance domestic and international legitimacy. Still, even engineered elections are elections and they constitute a deviation from past practices by handing a certain degree of control to the public over the executive's actions and lending them an opportunity to get their voices heard. It is also worth noting that even those regimes that engage in electoral-engineered democracy are viewed as threats to regime security by Saudi policy-makers who have so far shied away from such reforms.⁸²

The second problem with the democratic peace theory within the Middle Eastern context is that it is difficult to know whether giving Arab peoples, for instance, more say in policy-making would have led to more or less clashes with Israel. It could be argued that, if Arab non-state actors had more say in their countries' policy-making, they could have pushed for more support for the Palestinian cause, not less. Likewise, they could have demanded (and indeed achieved) some degree of integration between Arab countries and/or more

World Today, ed. Dan Tschirgi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 194) 179-89.

⁸⁰ 'National Elections in the Middle East and the Arab World Since 1980,' Middle East Report (Winter 1998) 16.

⁸¹ Marsha Pripstein-Posusney, 'Behind the Ballot Box: Electoral Engineering in the Arab World,' Middle East Report (Winter 1998) 12-15.

⁸² Pripstein-Posusney, 'Behind the Ballot Box,' 13.

uniform responses to Israel's actions. Accordingly, if the future was to bring increasing political liberalisation and democratisation in the Middle East, this could lead to strained relations with both Israel and the United States. Indeed, it is this very unpredictability of democratic systems that has so far led the United States to shy away from supporting democratisation whilst backing 'friendly tyrants'⁸³ and 'low-intensity democracies' that have helped maintain the status quo and make the region secure for the transition to free-market economies. This, in turn, provides empirical backing to the point made by Barkawi and Laffey (see the previous section) that the establishment of a 'zone of peace' in Western Europe should be understood within the context of 'low-intensity democracies' or authoritarian regimes elsewhere in the developing world.

Conclusion

The previous chapter (Chapter 8) presented a Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the future. It argued that students of Critical Security Studies could make use of the constitutive role played by theories to shape 'desired' futures. The emphasis placed upon the need to produce images of 'desired' futures should not however be taken to mean that students of Critical Security Studies are unaware of existing ideas about the future. In an attempt to show that Critical Security Studies does not evolve in a vacuum, Chapter 9 has looked at other possible future scenarios. This chapter, therefore, presented a critical overview of existing ideas about the future and their potential practical

⁸³ Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle, eds. Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma (London: Macmillan, 1991).

implications within the Middle Eastern context. By looking at the potential practical implications of these scenarios, the chapter has sought to identify the difficulties facing a Critical Security Studies future. This also enabled me to point to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics—a potential the ‘problem-solving’ approaches of some (but not all) of these scenarios have tended to overlook.

To summarise, Chapter 9 looked at plausible futures of the Middle East, namely, ‘globalisation,’ ‘fragmentation,’ ‘clash of civilizations,’ ‘regionalisation’ and ‘democratic peace.’ It was argued that those who view the future of world politics as one of increasing globalisation maintain that globalising forces foster economic efficiency and encourage the solution of problems through international cooperation. In this new world united in its search for new markets and higher profits, the argument goes, markets would demand and help produce common ways of thinking, and peoples’ identities as producers and consumers will overshadow all other interests and identities. It was based on assumptions such as these that a series of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic summits were organised with the intention of creating a ‘Middle East Common Market.’ A major obstacle facing policies based on such expectations is not only limited to the relatively weak participation of many Middle Eastern countries in global production and finance, the chapter argued, but also the bias shared by some regional actors toward the forces of globalisation that is shaped by historical and cultural dynamics. With memories of the colonial era still fresh in their minds, some feel that they must protect themselves against those forces that have historically dominated the region.

Such views sceptical of the globalisation process feed into Samuel Huntington's broader thesis that the future world politics would be characterised by cooperation within and conflict between civilizations. According to Huntington, although states would remain to be the major actors, their practices would increasingly be shaped by their civilizational identity. The chapter pointed to two potential practical implications of Huntington's thesis. First, it may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. For, Huntington's thesis is very well received within certain Islamist circles that have for long maintained that 'Western' and 'Islamic' civilizations cannot peacefully coexist. The world view from such arguments derive befits Huntington's arguments to the extent that one could indeed imagine the clash of civilizations scenario becoming a 'reality.' The second and interrelated implication is that Huntington's scenario licenses certain security practices (such as 'dual containment' in line with the compartmentalised approach to regional security adopted by US policy-makers) whilst marginalizing others (such as encouraging Israel to give up its nuclear capability by refusing to acknowledge the linkages between the nuclear programmes of Iraq, Iran and Israel).

Chapter 9 also looked at the future of world politics as one of regionalisation. It was argued that peoples of a globalising world, in search of some degree of control over their external environments, have started taking action within their own milieu in cooperation with other actors sharing similar problems. The chapter argued that the Middle East has remained relatively immune to such trends not because there is a lack of interest in regionalisation

projects, but because there exist multiple approaches to regionalisation competing to shape the future of regional security in the Middle East. As the thesis has argued, each of these approaches adopted an alternative representation of the region that is rooted in one of the four contending security discourses. The literature on regionalism, it was argued downplays the agency of non-state actors. As a result, it not only fails to account for how non-state actors could nurture alternative projects or stall those of governments, but also fails to present ideas as to how regionalisation could be achieved in the absence of governments interested in cooperating on a common project.

Another future scenario Chapter 9 looked at was that of democratic peace. Building upon the so-called democratic peace phenomenon, it is argued that expanding the zone of democracy would help minimise inter-state wars, for democratic states tend not to fight each other. The chapter argued that democratic peace theorists, although correct in pointing to certain principles and characteristics of democratic systems (such as constitutionalism, the rule of law and settled conflict resolution practices) that enable the solution of inter-state disputes through non-violent means, nevertheless commit the fallacy of equating peace with the absence of war thereby sidelining the issues of 'structural violence' which also threaten peoples' security. It was also argued that they fail to consider the roles played by the structural relationships between democracies and non-democracies and the ways in which peace among the prior relies, to a certain extent, upon the absence of peace among the latter. Arms transfers from EU-member states to the Middle East and US policy of encouraging 'low-intensity

democracies' could be viewed as examples of this phenomenon within the Middle Eastern context.

Finally, Chapter 9 looked at fragmentation as a plausible future. Here I presented two alternative ways of looking at the fragmentary tendency in world politics. First, the chapter looked at Robert Kaplan's scenario of the future of world politics as the 'coming anarchy.' Kaplan, it was argued, endorsed Huntington's thesis when he suggested that the kind of cultural and civilizational clash Huntington foresaw could be further accelerated by increasing environmental degradation and the privatisation of political violence thereby pushing the world towards further fragmentation and even to the brink of anarchy. The chapter argued that although factors such as the scarcity of natural resources (such as water), and the (at times) violent activism of Islamist militants do seem to substantiate Kaplan's thesis, he fails to account for the role human agency has played in exacerbating these problems. As a result, he also fails to see how human agency may intervene to reverse these trends, the chapter concluded.

The chapter presented a second way of looking at the fragmentary drive in world politics, that of Robert Cox. It was argued that although it is possible to view the emerging particularisms and the challenge they pose to the state system as a 'coming anarchy,' following Cox the same processes could also be viewed as novel forms of resistance that have the potential to initiate a possible transformation of world order. The chapter noted that given the emphasis students of Critical Security Studies have put on the agency of non-state actors,

Cox's thinking about the future is in line with the overall argument of the thesis. However, it was also noted that in order for such social forces to constitute themselves as agents of emancipatory change, they would need to be brought together in the overall framework of an idea of a community, a community that takes security issues seriously. The potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East will be investigated in the next chapter.

Chapter 10 : Towards Creating a Security Community in the Middle East?

Chapter 10 concludes Part III: 'Futures.' It investigates the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. Chapter 8 argued that, from a Critical Security Studies perspective, the process of imagining, creating and nurturing security communities could constitute emancipatory practices. Indeed, given global changes and the effects of the twin processes of globalisation and fragmentation, the argument for regionalism is fairly strong. The end of the Cold War and the marginalization of many Arab actors, the 'atomisation' of the Arab regional system, and the globalisation of economic relations have indeed led some to conclude that it may no longer be possible to avoid regionalisation in the Middle East.¹

What shape should such a process take, on the other hand, is a point of contention. Since, the issue of choosing between contending approaches to regional security (or competing regionalisms) is a contentious one, one way of avoiding the problem of choosing between them is to come up with an alternative.

¹ Baghat Korany, 'The Old/New Middle East,' in The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, ed. Laura Guazzone (London: Macmillan, 1997) 135-50; Michael Hudson, 'Arab Integration: An Overview' in The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration, ed. Micheal C. Hudson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999) 1-32; Laura Guazzone, 'A Map and Some Hypotheses for the Future of the Middle East,' in The Middle East in Global Change, ed. Guazzone, 237-59; Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? Regional Security After the Gulf War,' Orient 34: 2

This is where the argument of the thesis comes back full circle; for, conceiving the relationship between (inventing) regions, theories and practices of security as mutually constitutive enables me to make the analytical move and argue that an alternative conception of security could give rise to a new approach to regional security that could be acceptable to all. This new approach could be based on the perception of a common threat, that is, regional insecurity, and the need for the creation of a security community.

It is one thing, of course, to state this in abstract terms, it quite another to try and envision how this might happen. This chapter will try and present a preliminary assessment of the potential for the creation of a security in the Middle East. The first section of the chapter looks at the origins of the security communities approach as developed by Karl Deutsch. Next, the chapter will explain the constructivist twist Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett gave to the security communities approach. The final section will try and evaluate the potential for the creation for a security community within the Middle Eastern context. For this purpose, the chapter will adopt the three-tier framework developed by Adler and Barnett and use it as a checklist to assess the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East.

Karl Deutsch and the Security Communities Approach

What Karl Deutsch and his colleagues were interested in when formulating the idea of a security community in the 1950s was the cessation of inter-state

violence and the creation of dependable expectations of peaceful change by way of strengthening relationships among a group of states. In The Political Community in the North Atlantic Area, Deutsch and his colleagues set out to map the road to the creation of security communities. Their conviction was that once the conditions and processes that give rise to security communities were identified, it would be possible to replicate them in other parts of the world so that (the preparations for and the idea of) war would not enter into the calculations of those states.²

In this pioneering work, Deutsch and his associates defined a security community, as 'one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.'³ They distinguished between two types of security communities, 'pluralistic' and 'amalgamated.' While both developed based on expectations of peaceful change, the latter emerged when states decided to merge (as in the case of the United States of America) whereas in the case of the former members retained their independence. Some kind of integration (defined as the creation of a sense of community and the construction of institutions and practices to sustain that 'we feeling') took place in both cases, but it is in the case of the prior that states decided to forego their independence and merge under a unitary or federal government.⁴

² Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957) vii, 3, 20-1.

³ Deutsch et al., Political Community, 5.

⁴ Deutsch et al., Political Community, 6-9.

Although Deutsch et al. were positive regarding the potential for security communities to travel to different parts of the world, their ideas remained largely on paper for four decades until they were revived by Adler, Barnett and the other contributors to their edited volume, which came out in 1998.⁵ In the meantime, the security communities approach was 'often cited but rarely emulated.'⁶

The Constructivist Turn in the Study of Security Communities

The recently revamped literature on security communities also busied itself with the creation of pluralistic security communities. This is largely because Adler and Barnett deem pluralistic security communities as 'theoretically and empirically closest to the developments that are currently unfolding in international politics and international relations theory.'⁷ However, Adler and Barnett, while adopting and re-working Deutsch's conception of a pluralistic security community, dropped his behaviouralist outlook, giving the study of security communities a constructivist twist.

Adler and Barnett argued that one of the reasons why Deutsch's study was not replicated was because Deutsch, despite his initial collaboration with historians in the project, remained behaviouralist in outlook and prioritised

⁵ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁶ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,' in Security Communities, eds. Adler and Barnett, 9. This, of course, is not to suggest that no attempts were made to construct security communities. Western Europe, for instance, is often viewed as close as it gets to a security community. See Ole Wæver, 'Insecurity, Security and Asecurity in the West European Non-War Community,' in Security Communities, eds. Adler and Barnett, 69-118.

⁷ Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,' 5.

quantitative methods in his research into international transactions in the attempt to understand the processes and conditions that foster the creation of security communities. Deutsch maintained that transactions generate responsiveness, reciprocity and mutual predictability of behaviour and lead to the discovery of new areas of interest and identifications thereby resulting in the creation of security communities. However, as Adler and Barnett argue, although focusing on quantitative research into transactions may help establish the relationship between increased transboundary movements and greater interdependence, it would not help 'detect a greater sense of cohesion and community based on mutual responsiveness, value orientation, and identity.'⁸ In other words, Deutsch's emphasis on quantitative methods when analysing the relationship between transactions and the shaping of interests and identities, although constituting a major contribution, nevertheless did not enable him to develop a better understanding of the 'social relations that are bound up with and generated by those transactions,' or the complex and dynamic way in which identities and interests are shaped and reshaped to enable, further or forestall future transactions.⁹

Thus, Adler and Barnett justified the need for the adoption of a constructivist approach with reference to the need to have a better understanding of the 'relationship between structure, social interactions, and the possible transformation of that structure that leaves its mark on security practices.'¹⁰ In other words, they maintained that in the absence of an account as to how actors'

⁸ Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' in *Security Communities*, eds. Adler and Barnett, 48-9.

⁹ Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,' 7-8.

¹⁰ Adler and Barnett, 'Security Communities in Theoretical Perspective,' 15.

willingness to enter into transactions with each other could be moulded by transnational forces, interactions and structures that emerge and evolve due to the actions of the very same (state and non-state) actors, the potential for the creation of security communities worldwide could not be fulfilled.¹¹

Evaluating the Potential for the Creation of a Security Community

In the attempt to understand the emergence and development of security communities, Adler and Barnett developed a three-tier framework: precipitating conditions (tier one), facilitating conditions (tier two), and necessary conditions (tier three).¹² Here I shall adopt their framework and use it as a checklist to evaluate the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East.

Tier One: Precipitating Conditions

Tier one comprises what Adler and Barnett term the 'precipitating conditions.' These may include a change in the external environment, technology, demography, and economics. Such changes, argue Adler and Barnett, 'can propel states to look in each other's direction and attempt to coordinate their policies to their mutual advantage.'¹³ Adler and Barnett are aware that not much may come out of these initial interactions; but, alternatively, states may succeed in developing social bonds, which could lead them to further improve their relations and proceed to tier two.

¹¹ For a further elaboration on this point, see Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹² Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' 37-48.

¹³ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' 38.

Some of the following developments in the post-Cold War Middle East could be viewed as constituting precipitating conditions for the formation of a security community in the region:

- Recent changes in the **external environment** caused by the end of the Cold War and the ensuing dissolution of the Soviet Union could be viewed as having contributed to a re-thinking of security relations in the Middle East. The demise of the external threat posed by the Soviet Union brought about a relaxation in regional security relations not only because of a relative decline in external interventions (direct or indirect, by the United States or the Soviet Union) but also due to the end of Soviet support for anti-status quo forces (such as Iraq, the PLO or Syria). A relative decline in the strategic importance of some regional states (such as Turkey and Egypt) for US post-Cold War security policies also helped foster a feeling of marginalization in the Middle East (perhaps with the exception of oil-producing states and Israel) thereby presenting some regional states with a reason to move towards closer security cooperation.¹⁴

- Changes in the **regional environment** caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War could be considered to have precipitated a re-thinking of regional security relations. In the 1990s, Gulf policy-makers became increasingly convinced that they should pay more attention to military threats posed to their security stemming from inside the Arab world (as was the case with the Iraqi

¹⁴ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, 'A New Arab Order? Regional Security After the Gulf War,' *Orient* 34: 2 (1993) 225.

aggression). This accelerated the decline of the Arab national security discourse, thereby providing an opportunity for other approaches to gain further ground.¹⁵

The Madrid Peace Process set in the aftermath of the Gulf War helped break many taboos by bringing about Arab states' recognition of Israel and the gradual Israeli acceptance of the PLO. The multilateral negotiations organised as a part of the Peace Process brought many regional states together to discuss 'arms control and regional security,' 'water,' 'environment,' 'refugees' and 'regional economic development' (see Chapter 7). The initial progress of multilateral negotiations, in turn, helped strengthen the voices of those who call for common security practices.¹⁶

However, it is important to note here that not all regional policy-makers would benefit from a decisive end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Especially those front-line states (such as Syria) or hard-line actors in most states that have, over the years, derived legitimacy from this conflict could be expected to stall the progress of the peace process. Furthermore, actors (such as Egypt) that have assumed the role of the only open channel of communication between the Arab states and Israel also stand to lose some stature if a region-wide peace settlement was to be agreed upon.¹⁷

¹⁵ Muhammed Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) 77-97. Also see Michael Barnett and F. Gregory Gause III, 'Caravans in Opposite Directions: Society, State, and the Development of Community in the Gulf Cooperation Council,' in Security Communities, eds. Adler and Barnett, 161-97.

¹⁶ Shai Feldman and Abdullah Toukan, Bridging the Gap: A Future Security Architecture for the Middle East (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).

¹⁷ Bruce W. Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye, 'Security Status: Explaining Regional Security Cooperation and its Limits in the Middle East,' Security Studies 8:1 (Autumn 1998) 204-38; Guazzone, 'A Map and Some Hypothesis for the Future of the Middle East,' 239.

- **Changes in the natural environment** is another factor that could bring regional actors together if they choose to interpret, for instance, global warming and the increasing scarcity of water resources as a threat to their security. After all, these are what Beck terms 'threats to the future,' to cope with which action would need to be taken in the present. However, although a working group addressing this issue was formed as a part of multilateral track of the Madrid Peace Process, there currently is very little evidence of regional actors' willingness to adopt cooperative practices. On the contrary, changes in the global environment so far seem to have stiffened some actors' positions (as is the case with the conflict surrounding the use of the Tigris-Euphrates river basin shared by Iraq, Syria and Turkey). In sum, there is some potential for cooperation on this issue should regional actors choose to think more seriously about the long-term future and adopt cooperative practices that could enhance their gains. Environmental politics need not be a zero sum game where one side's gain is the other side's loss. All parties stand to gain if they agree to cooperate, for instance, on the optimisation of water transportation and irrigation techniques, and minimisation of evaporation.

- **Technological changes** could have contradictory effects in the Middle Eastern context. The increase in the range of surface-to-surface missiles, for instance, could be viewed as bringing regional states together by making it difficult to defend against them.¹⁸ However, they could also be viewed as increasing suspicion and threatening stability thereby pushing for more balance of power politics and arms build-up instead of cooperation.

¹⁸ Peres, The New Middle East.

Another example of this phenomenon is the revolution in communications technology, which has enabled non-state actors to join efforts and cross (physical and psychological) boundaries, and organise coalitions pushing for more political participation, democracy and respect for human rights.¹⁹ If such non-state actors, with their creative practices, could be channelled towards constituting a security community, they could indeed help build and sustain it. Still, it is conceivable that the very same factors could accelerate the process of fragmentation (as Kaplan suggests).

- Transformations in **economic patterns** such as the increasing pace of globalisation of production and finance has also made an impact on regional politics. Faced with the danger of marginalization in a globalising world economy, some regional policy-makers have chosen to adopt structural adjustment and liberalisation programs to integrate themselves into world markets. The threat of marginalization in an increasingly globalising world economy could indeed be viewed as a precipitating condition for the creation of a security community should actors choose to view it as such. There is some potential for increased economic integration (in trade as well as agricultural and industrial sectors) should regional actors choose to tap them.

- Finally, **demography** is another factor that could be viewed as a precipitating condition. On the one hand, it could be argued that the population explosion in many Arab states, coupled with the effects of (internal and cross-border)

¹⁹ Jerrold D. Green, 'The Information Revolution and Political Opposition in the Middle East,' MESA Bulletin 33 (1999) 21-7.

migration would strengthen the forces of fragmentation in the Middle East. Moreover, issues such as birth control could create a divisive effect by polarising activists of Arab nationalist and Islamist convictions who view the increase in Arab/Muslim population in this part of the world as a point of strength vis-à-vis Israel. On the other hand, the issue of birth control could be viewed as a potential common ground for women's movements throughout the Middle East to form coalitions. As Fatima Mernissi notes, the issues of women's illiteracy, future life prospects, and health (which are all closely related to increasing birth-rate) are seldom mentioned let alone put on the security agenda by regional governments.²⁰ This could, potentially, constitute a fertile ground for women's movements throughout the region to form coalitions around.

As has become clear from the preceding discussion, most of the factors enumerated above could indeed precipitate the creation of a security community; they could also lead to fragmentation and even chaos. To put it in less dramatic terms, the same set of factors could both encourage increasing cooperation and collaboration, or lead regional states to resort to militarised practices such as balance of power politics, deterrence and arms build-up. The point here is that in order for new interpretations of such dynamics to emerge in a way that would 'propel states to look in each other's direction and attempt to coordinate their policies to their mutual advantage' as Adler and Barnett expect,²¹ there is a need for human agency to intervene and provide actors with an alternative reading of

²⁰ Fatima Mernissi, 'Population Planning Without Democracy? The Conflict Between the Muslim State and Women: Thoughts on the Morocco Demographic and Health Survey,' in Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory (London: Zed, 1996) 46-62.

²¹ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' 38.

their situation—a reading that would need to be informed by an alternative conception of security. This is because the threat of further marginalization of Arab countries, or increasing scarcity of water as a result of global warming exist as ‘threats to the future,’ to use Beck’s phrase. Since they only exist in the future, the only way to prevent such threats from becoming ‘reality’ is to take action at present. In the absence of human agents that could provide such alternative readings, actors may choose to remain oblivious to drastic changes such as massive population increase, increasing globalisation of world economy or global warming, thereby failing to take cooperative measures that could indeed be to their ‘mutual advantage.’ To present such alternative readings and point to unfulfilled potential immanent in world politics is a task for the students of Critical Security Studies, as noted in Chapter 8.

Tier Two: Facilitating Conditions

In Adler and Barnett’s framework, tier two comprises factors that facilitate the creation of a security community. Adler and Barnett categorise these factors under structure (power and knowledge) and process (transactions, organisations and social learning).

Following Deutsch et al., Adler and Barnett stress power and knowledge as structures central to the development of security communities. Their conception of power includes the conventional understanding of power (i.e. the size and strength of states in terms of material resources) as well as the power of shared meanings (such as a ‘we feeling’). Knowledge, in turn, refers to shared meanings and understandings that license and legitimate practices. Adler and

Barnett maintain that the interplay between power and knowledge has an impact on the construction of security communities in that some understanding into the workings of the relationship between the two is essential.²²

Regarding the category of process, Adler and Barnett look at transactions, organisations, institutions and social learning as contributing towards the development of trust between members as well as the creation of collective transnational identities and shared understandings. Adler and Barnett expect tier two to help create trust and collective transnational identities that make transition to tier three possible. I will now look at these facilitating conditions in more detail with reference to the Middle Eastern context.

- In Adler and Barnett's framework, the significance of power stems from the fact that those politically, administratively, economically or educationally more advanced states could form the core around which a security community might develop. These states could create a 'magnet' effect by attracting other members, getting the existing-members to agree on certain issues and creating an overall we-feeling in the community. As noted in Chapter 7, Shimon Peres sees Israel as a candidate for this job.²³ Another candidate would be the Israeli-Turkish alliance. The human as well as material resources and experiences in cooperation these two states have could indeed be considered to have the potential to constitute the core for a security community.

²² Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' 39-41.

²³ Peres, The New Middle East.

One major problem with relying on these two states constituting the core is that their relationship is based on military strategic cooperation (alongside its non-military dimensions) and its anti-Arab image has already generated suspicion at best and hostility at worst.²⁴ In other words, Israel and Turkey lack the non-material sources of power such as the ability to generate a we-feeling. Arguably, this could be compensated if they were to be joined by an Arab state such as Egypt that has the necessary credentials to attract other Arab actors into the community.

Here, the role third parties (non-members) could play in creating the magnet effect should also be emphasised, for, the involvement of and commitment by third parties such as the United States and the European Union would considerably enhance the project's chances for success. This is not only because US and/or EU involvement (in one form or another) would encourage many regional actors to join in (due to the attraction of their material resources) but also because the two have the power to use carrot and stick policies to nudge regional actors in the desired direction when negotiations become stalled, or help maintain stability in the region by taking up the role of a 'pacifier' to enable reconciliation to continue without interruption (the United States played this role in Western Europe after WWII).²⁵

Arguably, it would be better if both the United States and the European Union were involved, because they appeal to different actors at multiple levels.

²⁴ Alan Makowsky, 'Israeli-Turkish Relations: A Turkish "Periphery Strategy"?' in Reluctant Neighbour: Turkey's Role in the Middle East, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1996) 147-70.

²⁵ Josef Joffe, 'Europe's American Pacifier,' Survival 26:4 (1984) 174-81.

Whilst the support of the United States is crucial for the participation of Israel and the Gulf states, the EU ranks higher in the eyes of the policy-makers of the north African states, Syria and the Lebanon, who have so far preferred to participate in the Euro-Med partnership process. Moreover, the EU has so far proven itself willing and better endowed to conduct people-to-people diplomacy, which has served to strengthen its position vis-à-vis a significant portion of NGOs in the Arab world (especially in North Africa).

Lastly, the power of non-state actors should not be underestimated, for they could contribute to community building. Their power largely stems from their ability to work at the grassroots level and familiarity with the needs and concerns of people on the ground. Intellectuals could also play important roles by presenting regional actors with alternative readings of their situation and imagining alternative futures. As noted above, this is especially relevant in parts of the world such as the Middle East where there is little support for the formation of a security community at the governmental level. However, the issue of the agency of non-state actors is a subject the framework developed by Adler and Barnett is relatively weak on. The role non-state actors could play is potentially larger in the Middle Eastern setting than some other parts of the world where there is evidence of enthusiasm for regionalisation at the government level. Still, at the end of the day, action on the part of both state and non-state actors would be required if a security community is to be created.

- Non-state actors could also assume important roles in the production and dissemination of the kind of **knowledge** that would be required for the formation

and the nurturing of a security community. In Adler and Barnett's framework, liberalism and democracy are expected to constitute the shared meanings and understandings that would form the basis of communication and trust in a security community. In the absence of shared knowledge based on liberalism and democracy argue Adler and Barnett, (as is the case in the Middle East) regional actors could build their community based on an alternative ideology such as developmentalism (as with South East Asia) or put emphasis on their shared project (i.e. the creation of a security community).

Thus, it could be argued that in the absence of shared meanings and understandings to shape actors' practices and legitimate their activities, the most promising option for community-minded actors in the Middle East is to build their security community based on their one commonality, i.e. their desire to address the problem of regional insecurity. However, as noted above, in order for them to come to view the problem of 'regional insecurity' as a commonality, regional actors would need to be presented with an alternative reading of their situation. To put it in other words, given the competition between four approaches to regional security, regional actors would need to be made aware of their shared interests and how a coordination of their policies could be to their 'mutual advantage.' The production and dissemination of knowledge on futures of regional security, what futures may bring, and alternative strategies that could be adopted to meet 'threats to the future' could help propel states to each others' direction.

A step in this direction has already been taken as a part of a project entitled 'The Search for Common Ground in the Middle East,' undertaken by two non-governmental organisations: US-based 'Search for Common Ground and 'The European Centre for Common Ground.' The title of the initiative is 'Vision 2020' and comprises a series of eleven newspaper articles written by intellectuals from across the Middle East on their visions of the region's future in the year 2020 and beyond. The articles were published over October-December 1999 simultaneously in nine newspapers and five languages and reaching millions across the Middle East. The series, funded by the Search for Common Ground together by UNESCO, was designed to enable peoples of the Middle East to become aware of other regional peoples hopes, dreams and fears about the future. It was also hoped that the series would raise peoples' awareness of their common humanity and common interests in cooperating for a better future.²⁶ Building upon the experiences of this project, a similar one could also be launched to facilitate the creation of a security community in the future.

It should also be noted that although their shared project could constitute the minimal common ground required to initiate the project in the short-run, in the medium to long-run shared meanings and understandings as well as knowledge and practice of conflict resolution and non-violent action techniques would have to be generated and disseminated in order to create dependable expectations of peaceful change. One challenge that would be facing actors is that of generating this knowledge whilst remaining sensitive to different conflict cultures that exist in the region. There is some knowledge and experience of conflict-resolution and

²⁶ See the first eight articles at http://www.sfcg.org/mideast_media/vision2020__index.html; Internet; accessed November 15, 1999.

non-violent techniques generated outside the region which regional actors could tap into. But they would also need to turn to their own heritage to anchor this knowledge if they wish these practices to be widely adopted by different actors at multiple levels. This is not meant to suggest that grounding knowledge of conflict-resolution, and non-violent resistance techniques in regional actors' own (cultural and historical) heritage would automatically help solve the problem of regional insecurity. However, the hope is that pointing to unfulfilled potential in terms of knowledge that already exists in the region could help popularise the cause for a security community and facilitate its creation.

Arguably, a beginning has already been made in the field of inter-faith dialogue to try and find a common ground for believers of different religions to peacefully coexist.²⁷ Communication on such issues could help develop the shared meanings and intersubjective understandings that could generate the knowledge on which the project of creating a security community could be based. One significant contribution some Islamist actors have made is the little-pronounced but potentially significant re-definition of *jihad* (holy war) as a struggle against 'structural violence'. As Chaiwat Satha-Anand notes, there exists in the Islamic tradition, 'fertile sources of non-violent thought' should Muslims choose to tap them.²⁸ Then, although it is possible to view some Islamist actors as uncompromising (thereby blocking the way to the creation of common identities that cross confessional borders) should they choose to re-

²⁷ This was the theme of the 1998 Conference entitled 'Religion and Pluralism' organised by the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, held at the Centre for the Study of Islam & Christian-Muslim Relations, Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, UK.

²⁸ Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 'The Nonviolent Crescent: Eight Theses on Muslim Nonviolent Action,' in Arab Nonviolent Political Struggle in the Middle East, eds. Ralph E. Crow, Philip Grant and Saad E. Ibrahim (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990) 28.

think some key precepts of Islam, a concept such as *jihad* that is often viewed as an obstacle to peaceful co-existence today could become the common ground for tomorrow's debates between the Islamists and other actors on issues such as the structural causes of economic insecurity, human rights, identity, human dignity and equality—that is, the nexus of security and emancipation.

This, of course, is not meant to downplay the existing structures that make it difficult for people to re-think their cultural and religious heritage and choose reconciliation and coexistence instead of conflict and war. Here, the role of the students of Critical Security Studies is to step in and present peoples with alternatives that exist, possibilities immanent in world politics. By way of doing this, students of Critical Security Studies aim to challenge the claim to knowledge monopolised by the prevalent discourses. This, in turn, requires paying more attention to the workings of the power/knowledge relationship than Adler and Barnett do. As noted above, Adler and Barnett define power with reference to its material dimension as well as the power of ideas, the power to generate a 'we feeling' among actors. However, as Chapter 8 argued, in order to prevail over other prevalent discourses, the students of Critical Security Studies need to resort to the potential constitutive role their theories could play. Here, the adoption of a three-dimensional view of power to point to choices that have been made in the past is crucial in order to be able to make the point that the future is open.

- The use of processes (transactions, international organisations and institutions, and social learning) to entrench security communities was the point emphasised

by Deutsch et al. when initially writing about the subject. Deutsch's particular focus was on the significance of **transactions** and the spillover effects the establishment of trust in one sector could have in other sectors thereby strengthening mutual identification and contributing towards the gradual emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change. As noted above, the Middle East ranks very low in terms of intra-regional transactions. Accordingly, relying on transactions to transform social relations could prove to be futile in the Middle East. In fact, it is the very links of interdependence that are created through international transactions that some regional policy-makers want to avoid. The solution to this problem could be found in the creation of an organisational framework for such transactions to take place. With the involvement of third parties such as the United States or the European Union, the issue of Israel's potential hegemony could be checked until regional actors build relationships of mutual trust.

Indeed it is conceivable that if successful cooperation over one core issue area could be developed, cooperation over other issues would follow. This argument does not necessarily entail buying into the logic of spillover that emphasises the deterministic power of cooperation in one sector leading states to upgrade their interests to enable cooperation in another sector. Following Bill McSweeney, the argument is that successful cooperation over one issue area may not only persuade other states to upgrade their interests but also persuade domestic actors to redefine their identities within the framework of a common identity by 'seducing' them into further cooperation and collaboration. McSweeney maintains that the concept of seduction does away with the

mechanical, material and deterministic connotations of spillover by way of integrating an element of human agency (conceptualised with reference to the state as well as sub-state level) and stressing the 'processual character of the project in question . . . rather than the discrete moment suggested by spillover.'²⁹

Accordingly, if cooperation over one issue area, such as arms control, for instance, were to successfully take place, this could not only persuade governments to upgrade their interests, but also seduce non-state actors (such as individuals, social groups and grassroots organisations) to redefine their identities within the framework provided by the common identity of the security community thereby making further cooperation and enmeshment possible.³⁰

This, in turn, requires paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors—more than Adler and Barnett's framework would allow.

- Without wishing to de-emphasise the significance of transactions, Adler and Barnett underline the role institutions/organisations and social learning play in helping build trust and collective identity. Building upon the CSCE/OSCE experience in Europe, Adler and Barnett stress the role **organisations** could play in disseminating knowledge, contribute to the development of trust and mutual identification, and "engineer" the very conditions that assist in their development' by fostering a regional culture that in turn helps fortify their links.³¹

Suggestions have already been made for the creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) to deal with issues of

²⁹ McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 169.

³⁰ See McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests*, 166-72, for a further elaboration on this point.

³¹ Emanuel Adler, 'Seeds of Peaceful Change: the OSCE's Security Community-Building Model,' in *Security Communities*, eds. Adler and Barnett, 119-60; Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for

'security, economic cooperation and human rights'.³² Coupled with a Helsinki Citizens' Assembly-type organisation to ensure peoples' involvement, the CSCM could provide the much-needed setting for regional actors to come together, exchange views, build mutual trust and develop bonds. In other words, the creation of a CSCM could be a good starting point for the creation of a security community. The institutional power of the CSCM could not only work as a magnet to pull other members but it could also help reinforce the belief of the already existing members in the value and viability of the project. Lastly, institutions such as the CSCM also help disseminate knowledge necessary for the creation of a non-violent conflict culture.

- **Social learning** is another process that is crucial in the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change. It involves not only the dissemination of knowledge of conflict resolution and non-violent techniques but also the moulding of existing identities within the framework provided by the common identity of the security community. Adler and Barnett expect social learning processes to promote 'shared definitions of security, proper domestic and international action and regional boundaries' as well.³³ However, as suggested above, the emergence of common conceptions of security is something that cannot be left to emerge and be disseminated at such a late stage. For, it is through the adoption of a new conception of security that new interpretations of the social reality could emerge thereby helping precipitate the making of a security community.

the Study of Security Communities,' 42?

³² Tim Niblock, 'Towards a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (CSCM)' in The Middle East and Europe: An Integrated Communities Approach, ed. Gerd Nonneman (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1992) 245-8.

In the non-so-distant past, some exploratory steps were taken to promote peace and reconciliation through education as Chapter 7 noted.³⁴ Such meetings, at the moment, should not be expected to generate any substantive product other than help parties get used to communicating with each other and exchange views in a non-confrontational setting. Indeed, the first few meetings of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group of the Middle East multilateral negotiations was spent on introducing parties to each other and making general statements. Given the achievements of the first three years that surpassed parties' expectations the issue of arms control could be viewed as a potential core area to bring regional governments back to the negotiating table (see below).³⁵ Although it is possible to be pessimistic about the potential for such a development, it is worth remembering that the setting up of a working group on arms control and regional security is a development few would have predicted a few years ago.

Tier Three: Necessary Conditions

In Adler and Barnett's framework, tier three builds upon the dynamics generated by the previous two tiers. It is expected that mutual trust and a common identity, which Adler and Barnett view as the 'necessary conditions' of dependable expectations of peaceful change would flourish at this stage. The assumption here is that if actors start trusting each other, they would also start identifying with each other, which would, in turn, feed into the development of a common identity.

³³ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' 45.

³⁴ James Calleja, 'Educating for Peace in the Mediterranean: A Strategy for Peace-building,' in Building Peace in the Middle East, ed. Boulding, 282.

³⁵ The negotiations broke down in 1994 for reasons to do with the set up of the agenda (that did

The defining feature of this tier is that the relationships that are created through tier two is expected to be strengthened and actors are expected to begin to identify with each other so that they would 'no longer rely on concrete international organizations to maintain trust but do so through knowledge and belief about each other.'³⁶ This, however, would take time as well as effort. As noted above, collective identity formation in a security community is a process that requires the agency of community-minded actors. Moreover, the process involves the creation of a common identity as well as the moulding of existing (individual, group, national, ethnic) identities by inscribing the common identity of the security community into other identities.

Although it is difficult to imagine such progress taking place given the current state of inter-community relations in the Middle East, there still are no grounds to assume that Middle Eastern peoples cannot show the flexibility required to remould their identities and commit to the creation of a new and more inclusive common identity (as did their Western European counterparts after WWII). After all, peoples of Saudi Arabia, for instance, have already moved from being Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire to being (albeit half-hearted) Arab nationalists in the 1920s, and then *khalijin* ('of the Gulf' in Arabic) in the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, in Egypt, the forerunner of Arab nationalism under Nasser's presidency, the Arab identity has never been beyond contention. Some Egyptian intellectuals have stressed the Mediterranean and African dimensions of Egyptian identity, downplaying the Arab and Muslim dimensions. In other words, there could always be found some element within peoples'

not include nuclear weapons). See Chapter 7.

³⁶ Adler and Barnett, 'A Framework for the Study of Security Communities,' 46.

existing identities to enable identification with a more inclusive community should peoples choose to do so (and provided that the necessary material resources, some of which have been outlined above, are put into effect).³⁷

Lastly, becoming a member of and identifying with a security community need not mean the 'betrayal' of Arabism, or the downplaying of the Muslim character of some regional peoples. For example, the common identity of a security community could be a part of the identity of a Coptic woman living in Egypt whose other identities may include being an Arab, woman, Christian and Egyptian.

Indeed, as noted above, one strength of the security communities approach stems from the fact that it enables one to avoid the problem of the incommensurability of the four competing perspectives on regional security by way of coming up with an alternative perspective, the adoption of which need not mean the rejection of the others. There is no reason why the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Conference, MENA Common Market, CSCM, and a Helsinki Citizens Assembly-type organisation should not coexist (as is the case in Western Europe). After all, each would address different aspects of regional insecurity in the Middle East. However, in order for these alternative perspectives to peacefully coexist, a broader framework of non-violent culture of conflict would need to be created within which myriad actors could put their perspectives into practice without depriving the others of their own security.

³⁷ Iver Neumann makes a similar point with reference to region building. See Neumann, Uses of 'The Other' in European Identity Formation, 139-40. Also see McSweeney, Security, Identity

The membership of the community is a matter to be decided with reference to the core issue(s) actors choose to focus on. One major problem involved in imagining the formation of a security community in the Middle East is that there is yet to be found a core issue over which initial negotiations and cooperation could begin. In other words, Middle Eastern actors have yet to come up with their own version of the European Coal and Steel Community, which marked the beginning of cooperation in Western Europe. Indeed, the very absence of such a core issue in the Middle East could prove to be the biggest obstacle on the road to the formation of a security community.

So far, the issue of arms control has proven to be the most fertile among the five issue areas addressed by the multilateral negotiations of the Madrid Peace Process. Indeed, the progress made in its initial years 'was greater than many expected, or even deemed possible,' as Bruce Jentleson and Dalia Dassa Kaye have argued.³⁸ It is also noted that 'compared to other regional security processes such as the European Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in its early stages, ACRS progress was noteworthy.'³⁹

The issue of arms control is a promising core area where cooperation could be initiated. It is relatively promising not necessarily because regional policy-makers are committed to achieving regional security via arms control, but rather because they (Arab policy-makers in particular) view arms control as a way to deny their adversaries those weapons they cannot afford themselves.⁴⁰ In

and Interests, 196.

³⁸ Jentleson and Dassa Kaye, 'Security Status,' 205.

³⁹ Jentleson and Dassa Kaye, 'Security Status,' 205.

⁴⁰ Yahya M. Sadowksi, Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle

other words, the reasoning for arms control could be found in the economic dimension of security within the Middle Eastern context. However, it should be pointed out that the logic behind this approach to arms control is still not based on common security thinking where security is sought *with* the adversary in an attempt to achieve stable security.

It is widely known that the Middle East has the highest military expenditure as percent of GNP in the world.⁴¹ The Middle East also includes some of the most indebted countries of the world (such as Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Algeria, Syria and Yemen). Even oil-rich states have been facing difficulties since the 1980s; they began to post regular budget deficits in the recent years. Yet they continue to pour money into arms purchases often under encouragement by major arms sellers that include the United States and some EU-member states. The point here is that given the willingness of arms sellers to sell and the willingness of buyers to buy notwithstanding their economic conditions, it would be very difficult to break of this cycle of increasing debt and armament in the Middle East.

A promising development took place in the 1990s when Jordan decided to break out of this arms and debt cycle and opted for unilateral arms reductions. Seeking to make the most of unilateral arms reductions (and in the attempt to avoid further weakening of their military vis-à-vis their neighbours') Jordanian policy-makers proposed an 'arms-for-debt swap' in line with which states that

East (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993) 40.

⁴¹ The rate for the Middle East is 8.8 percent. For the US it is 6.3, for Europe 6.1, for South Asia 3.8. See Sadowksi, Scuds or Butter? 12.

agree to become a part of a region-wide arms control process would qualify for a reduction of their debts.⁴²

Emphasising the state of Middle Eastern economies, Yahya Sadowski argues that the 'arms-for-debt swap' could prove to be the long-sought incentive necessary to get regional policy-makers commit to arms control. He wrote:

What has been missing in the Middle East is not some vision of what arms control arrangements are possible but the appropriate milieu for putting them into effect. Regional security plans and economic incentive programs supply the missing ingredient. They could foster an environment in which states approach arms control talks with less fear and more favour.⁴³

Sadowski's argument resonates with the call by students of Critical Security Studies for adopting a broader conception of security, cognisant of the security concerns of myriad actors at multiple levels. For this vision to be put into practice, external actors (such as the United States and the EU) and non-state actors across the region would need to be brought in. The involvement of external actors is crucial, for they would be instrumental in cancelling the debts of Middle Eastern countries that agree to get involved. It is also them that stand to lose valuable business if and when Middle Eastern arms market contracts as a result of an agreement. In this sense, the United States and other arms producing states would also need to adopt broader conceptions of security cognisant of the interrelationships in between the security concerns of actors at multiple levels if they are to agree to support such a process. Lastly, the involvement of the United States would be crucial in securing Israel's involvement in the process. Israel's nuclear status is likely to cause disagreements and US

⁴² Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? 46.

⁴³ Sadowski, Scuds or Butter? 55.

involvement and guarantees to both Israel and its Arab counterparts would be crucial to facilitate cooperation.

The involvement of non-state actors across the region would also prove crucial because, as noted above, in order for cooperation over arms control to generate interest in and cooperation about other issue areas, peoples' interest in and identification with a broader community would have to be generated. Non-state actors, especially women's movements and networks, could assume crucial roles in this process. For, it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarisation and the channelling of valuable funds into defence budgets instead of education or health.⁴⁴

Conclusion

The aim of Chapter 10 was to investigate the potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. Adopting the security community approach—generated by Deutsch and developed by Adler and Barnett—as a checklist, I pointed to conditions that could be viewed as conducive to the creation of a security community. It was argued that the same conditions that could be viewed as propelling regional states towards each other (such as the end of the Cold War, globalisation of production and finance or global warming) could also be viewed as pushing them apart from each other thereby making cooperation more difficult. It was argued that in order for such factors to be

⁴⁴ Mernissi, Women's Rebellion and Islamic Memory; idem, Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World, trans. Mary Jo Lakeland (London: Virago, 1993).

viewed by actors as conducive to the creation of a security community, they would need to be presented with an alternative reading of their situation in the light of an alternative conceptualisation of security. This, the chapter argued, would require the framework developed by Adler and Barnett to be re-worked from a Critical Security Studies perspective by adopting a broader and deeper conception of security, paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors, and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice.

Summary and Conclusion

In the Introduction the main aim of the thesis was stated as that of providing an account of the pasts, presents and futures of regional security in the Middle East from a Critical Security Studies perspective. This I tried to achieve via the threefold structure of the thesis, which looked at Cold War 'pasts' in Part I, post-Cold War 'presents' in Part II and 'futures' in Part III.

The thesis also had three more specific aims corresponding to three of the tasks of Critical Security Studies identified in the Introduction. The first aim was to present a critique of prevailing security discourses in theory and practice with reference to regional security in the Middle East and point to the unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics. The second aim was to explore the mutually constitutive relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security. The third aim was to show how Critical Security Studies might allow one to think differently about futures of regional security in the Middle East.

These aims were furthered through a structure based on dividing Parts I and II into three chapters: representations, theories and practices. The chapters on representations showed how alternative representations of the region have

shaped and, in turn, been shaped by contending approaches to security in theory and practice. The chapters on theories and practices investigated the mutually constitutive relationship between the two. Seeking to develop Critical Security Studies thinking about regional security, the thesis argued that when re-thinking regional security from a Critical Security Studies perspective, it is not enough simply to open up the concept 'security' itself. Rather, both concepts —'region' and 'security'—need to be opened up in order to reveal the mutually constitutive relationship between them.

Chapter 1 explained what would be taken in the thesis as a Critical Security Studies perspective. It looked at seven key concepts and analytical moves central to Critical Security Studies, namely, 'Cold War Security Studies,' 'Broadening Security,' 'Deepening Security,' 'Statism,' 'Referents for Security,' 'Re-conceptualising Practice,' and 'Re-conceptualising Agency.' It was argued that from a Critical Security Studies perspective, re-thinking security entails re-conceptualising security in both theory and practice by broadening and deepening; looking below and beyond the state for other referents and agents; and suggesting emancipatory practices toward shaping alternative futures. The Critical Security Studies perspective presented in Chapter 1 was then utilised to criticise theories and practices of regional security in the Middle East.

Part I: 'Pasts' looked at the Cold War pasts of regional security in the Middle East, and investigated the relationship between representations of the region (Chapter 2), theories (Chapter 3) and practices (Chapter 4). Chapter 2 traced the trajectory of the Middle East as a geopolitical invention from its origins

in the British India Office into the Cold War, when the term entered the public discourse within the region itself. It was argued that the Middle East was invented to help British and later US strategists to think about and organise action in maintaining security in this part of the world. Chapter 2 also presented an alternative representation, that of 'Arab Regional System,' which challenged not only the colonial origins of the Middle East, but also the Cold War security discourse by which it was shaped. By way of looking at this alternative representation, the chapter laid bare the way regions are shaped by the security thinking and practices of their inventors. It was argued that the spatial representation Arab Regional System was shaped by an alternative security discourse, that of Arab national security.

Building on this discussion, Chapter 3 explored security thinking during the Cold War era. It was argued that Cold War Security Studies focused on the security of states, emphasised the military dimension and privileged the maintenance of the status quo. Cold War Security Studies, it was further argued, was not only a product of the Cold War, but also helped constitute it. This mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, however, was obscured by the adoption of an objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship, and a restricted—'problem-solving'—notion of theory as governmental policy-making.

Another aim of Chapter 3 was to point to some alternative ways of thinking about security that existed during the Cold War, but which had been marginalized by the prevalent Cold War security discourse. The latter, 'armed'

with an objectivist conception of theory, claimed command over knowledge, labelling the views of its critics as 'political' at best and 'propaganda' at worst. By presenting an overview of the contributions of Alternative Security thinkers, Peace Researchers and Third World experts, the chapter sought to show that the origins of critical thinking could be traced to their works. It was noted that Alternative Security thinkers and Peace Researchers criticised the military-focused and zero sum thinking and practices of the Cold War security discourse whilst Third World security experts pointed to the Western origins of the dominant Cold War concept of security.

Chapter 3 also discussed an alternative approach to regional security, that of the Arab national security discourse. This criticised the top down, outward-directed and pro-status quo approach of Cold War Security Studies. Instead it emphasised the need to look at the domestic political and developmental dimensions of security. Students of Arab national security maintained that the relationships between Arab states could not be understood simply as one of 'black box' states balancing each other through military build-up. Their shared Arab identity, they argued, rendered relations between Arab states different from any other group of states which did not share such similar characteristics.

Whilst welcoming their critique of the Cold War security discourse, the chapter argued that students of Arab national security adopted this alternative conception of security when studying the security needs and interests of Arab states only, but remained content with an outward-directed, military-focused and

zero sum conception when thinking about security relations between Arab states and their non-Arab neighbours. It was further argued that non-military dimensions of security were almost always approached from a statist perspective, which resulted in the privileging of military and non-military threats to the security of Arab states whilst marginalizing the concerns of individuals and social groups.

Chapter 4 concluded 'Cold War pasts' by bringing together earlier arguments in the attempt to further illustrate the relationship between representations, theories and practices. Towards this end, the chapter was organised along spatial lines. It looked at sets of security practices within the framework of the spatial representations they were shaped by. It was argued that the practices of Britain and the United States shaped and were, in turn, shaped by the Middle Eastern security discourse. These practices, the chapter argued, were designed to secure the Middle East against threats from outside. MEDO, the Northern Tier, and the Baghdad Pact were all regional security schemes designed to maintain access to bases in the region and to make it inviolable to Soviet influence or intervention.

The chapter further argued that the reasoning of British and US policy-makers behind the creation of such regional security schemes, instead of backing the League of Arab States, which was an indigenously-generated regional security organisation, was to prevent the prevalence of the Arab national security discourse. The latter stressed issues such as de-colonisation, state building, economic and political sovereignty and the plight of the Palestinian peoples.

Needless to say, none of these issues were high on the agenda shaped by the Middle Eastern security discourse. Chapter 4 continued by examining practices that shaped and were shaped by the Arab national security discourse. It was argued that during the 1950s Egyptian president Nasser adopted a broader and societal-focused conceptualisation of Arab national security, and sought to use his influence over Arab public opinion to shape the security practices of other Arab governments so that the last remnants of colonialism could be eradicated from the Arab Regional System. The issue of the plight of the Palestinian people became a 'symbolic' tool that helped Nasser (along with other proponents of Arab national security) to voice numerous concerns such as de-colonisation, sovereignty and economic development. Nasser's evident popularity among Arab peoples, perhaps paradoxically, led to the decline of Arab national security discourse; Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states distanced themselves from Nasser's 'radical' approach and moved closer towards the pro-status quo approach of the United States.

Following the failure of MEDO, the Northern Tier and the Baghdad Pact, US policy-makers sought to re-conceptualise their approach to regional security in the Middle East. Rather than trying to create regional security schemes, they focused on key states such as Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. They also adopted a compartmentalised approach, refusing to acknowledge the linkages between different dimensions of regional security such as the Israel/Palestine conflict, oil and military stability. Considering how central these linkages were to the Arab national security discourse, the adoption of this compartmentalised approach in US policy, coupled with Gulf policy-makers' increasingly statist

approaches, and Egypt's decision to break ranks with the rest of the Arab states to sign an individual peace treaty with Israel, marked the decline of the Arab national security discourse at the governmental level. Indeed the 1980s were characterised by more statist practices, with the Israel/Palestine issue being pushed further to the background.

Overall, therefore, Part I sought to advance the aims of the thesis by presenting a critique of the Cold War security discourse in theory and practice, based on an overview of Cold War critiques of Security Studies as well as a Critical Security Studies critique. The issue of the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice was central to the latter. It was argued that the relationship between theory and practice is never neutral, and that security discourses help shape 'reality' by privileging certain practices whilst marginalizing others. In these ways, Part I sought to present an alternative reading of the pasts of regional security in the Middle East. It was argued that the region took its current shape not because there were no alternatives, but because choices were made in history, which resulted in the Cold War security discourse prevailing over other discourses and consequently shaping security practices.

Part II: 'Presents,' which examined regional security in the Middle East in the post-Cold War era, adopted a parallel structure to Part I. Chapter 5 began by tracing the development of the Middle East and the Arab Regional System in the post-Cold War period. It introduced two more spatial representations that came to prominence during this period, the 'Euro-Med Region' and 'Muslim Middle

East.' These, it was argued, have been shaped, respectively, by the European Union's discourse on security in the Euro-Med Region and an Islamist discourse on security.

Chapter 5 argued that the Middle East as a spatial representation has prevailed over the others in the post-Cold War era not only because of the constructive role the United States has played in the Madrid Peace Process, but also because of the further decline of the Arab national security discourse among Arab policy-makers. The Euro-Med Region also gained some backing among Arab actors, partly due to it being a relatively neutral representation and partly due to the resources the EU poured into constructing it. It was noted that the other two representations, Arab Regional System and Muslim Middle East, have been shaped mainly by the practices of non-state actors, many of whom actively oppose the other two representations.

The overall conclusion of the chapter was that the competition between the contending representations of the region took a different turn in the post-Cold War period. The main divide is no longer between the proponents of the Arab Regional System versus Middle East (as was the case during the Cold War), but one between pro-status quo actors who seek to establish security by increasing regionalisation (such as the United States and the EU via their respective projects) and anti-status quo actors that seek radical change. It was further argued that this competition no longer takes place mostly at the governmental level. The pro/anti-status quo divide cuts through boundaries forming coalitions between state and non-state actors in a struggle for prevalence.

Chapter 6 offered a critical overview of developments in security thinking in the post-Cold War era. It looked at the development of Arab national security and Third World security thinking as well as post-Cold War developments in Security Studies in general. It was argued that post-Cold War debates in Security Studies focused on the issue of broad versus narrow security agendas, and appropriate referent(s) for security. The chapter also identified three issues as silences in post-Cold War Security Studies; those over issues of agency, practice and constitutive theory.

Following a summary of the arguments put forward by the critics of broadening security, such as Wæver and Deudney (who have argued against adopting broader security agendas to prevent non-military issues from being addressed through traditional practices) the chapter suggested that re-conceptualising practice would allay their worries. The argument was that this would enable students of security to suggest ways in which the use of traditional (statist, zero sum, militarised) thinking and practices to meet non-military threats could be avoided. The need for re-conceptualising practice becomes all the more acute when one considers the fact that Third World policy-makers in general and Arab policy-makers in particular have for long adopted broad conceptions of security but have approached non-military issues such as food and water security from a statist perspective, and have sought to address them through traditional practices. The fact that some governments have already broadened their security agendas, the chapter argued, not only challenges Walt's call for a narrow

military-focus, but also underlines how essential re-conceptualising practice becomes when non-military issues are put on the security agenda.

Although it is possible to question, as Wæver does, whether 'desecuritization,' or taking issues out of the realm of security, may be a better strategy, the chapter argued that this would amount to leaving a useful tool (in terms of its mobilisation capacity) to the monopoly of state elites. They have not always been concerned with the security of individuals and social groups. It was further argued that desecuritization would amount to remaining uncritical of the ways in which the military dimension of security has been addressed. Here, Feldman and Toukan's approach was used to point to how the unilateral and zero sum approaches of the Cold War years have only served to deepen mistrust and have led to the further militarisation of societies in the Middle East. Mernissi's critique was utilised to point to the effects military-focused thinking and practices have had on women's lives by sidelining their concerns.

Turning to the issue of re-conceptualising agency, the chapter argued that this would enable students of security to move away from state-centrism. The chapter suggested that it is because of the state's unchallenged status as the main agent for security that it is still treated as the primary referent. Following an overview of Buzan's state-centric approach to the study of security, the chapter suggested that Buzan's thesis (since it is states that act for security, their security should be central to our analyses) could not be sustained. This is not only because states often fail to fulfil what they promise, but also because there already are non-state agents striving to provide for their own and others' security.

The chapter also noted that producing state-centric analyses does not only reflect a world 'out there' but ends up reinforcing statism in Security Studies by making it difficult to move away from the state as the main agent and referent. This, in turn, underlines the need to pay more attention to the relationship between theory and practice.

Chapter 6 also considered Ayoob's call for more not less statism in Security Studies. It was argued that the argument Ayoob makes to justify privileging the security of states in the developing world is symptomatic of the tendency among students of Third World security to emphasise the different security needs and interests of developing states. The chapter suggested that by emphasising the different 'nature' of developing or 'weak' states and the need for them to 'grow up' and become 'strong' states, Ayoob failed to explore the interconnections between state building and security maintenance in different parts of the world. Following Thomas, it was argued that in order to be able to understand the problem of insecurity in the developing world, some of its roots should be sought in the developing world and especially in the structural relationships between the two.

In sum, Chapter 6 argued that merely broadening security without attempting to re-conceptualise agency and practice, and without reflecting upon the constitutive role played by theories would not allow students of security to move away from state-centrism, thereby ending up reinforcing statism in Security Studies. The ways in which these three issues were left unquestioned in post-Cold War debates serves to reinforce the point that much traditionalist thinking

remains in the post-Cold War era, just as much critical thinking existed during the Cold War.

Chapter 7 brought together the arguments developed in the previous two chapters to investigate the relationship between representations, theories and practices. Like the previous 'practices' chapter (Chapter 4) it was organised along spatial lines; security practices were looked at within the framework of the security discourse and spatial representation they shaped and were, in turn, shaped by. It was argued that the US approach to regional security in the Middle East remains top down, military-focused and pro-status quo. The Gulf War, the subsequent bombings of Iraq and the Madrid Peace Process were used as illustrations to make the point that the compartmentalised approach to regional security in the Middle East adopted by US policy-makers could not be sustained if the aim is to achieve stability in the long run. The chapter maintained that although Arab policy-makers did participate in the Madrid Peace Process, little progress was made in the attempt to create regional institutions (such as a Middle East Common Market) or in arms control negotiations, because of US (and Israeli) policy-makers' refusal to acknowledge the linkages between the multiple dimensions of regional security. In this regard, it is important to remember that, notwithstanding the decline in the Arab national security discourse, the interplay between state and societal security makes it very difficult for Arab policy-makers to totally overlook the concerns of other Arab peoples (such as those in Iraq who continue to suffer under UN sanctions), and to carry on cooperating with an Israel that remains defiant of numerous UN resolutions,

and the United States (which punishes Iraq for not abiding by other UN resolutions).

The chapter also reinforced the argument made in Chapter 5 that the post-Cold War era has been characterised by a pro/anti-status quo divide. The US policy of encouraging economic regionalism in the Middle East and the European Union's approach to security in the Euro-Med Region were pointed to as being top down and stability oriented. It was argued that both the US and EU have designed their respective regional security agendas by keeping their own pro-status quo concerns in mind, leaving those of regional peoples to be addressed in time as a side-effect of economic liberalisation and regionalisation. It was noted that such approaches (that sideline regional actors' concerns) evoke memories of a colonial past; as a result they strengthen the anti-status quo rhetoric of the proponents of Arab national security and Islamist discourses. The latter put issues such as social and economic justice, human rights, identity, and democratisation as well as more basic needs such as subsistence, illiteracy and unemployment on their security agendas. It was argued that these are all security concerns for some people, and would need to be addressed by putting them on security agendas, by adopting alternative practices, and by making use of the agency of non-state actors to address them.

Overall, therefore, Part II sought to advance the aims of the thesis by presenting a critique of post-Cold War security thinking and practices. This was attempted by drawing the contours of post-Cold War debates on Security Studies and offering a critique from a Critical Security Studies perspective. Taking 're-

thinking security' seriously requires not only broadening security, but also considering the practical implications of adopting a broader security agenda. One problem with simply broadening the security agenda from a statist perspective without re-conceptualising agency and practice is that these new issues are approached not from the perspective of individuals or social groups but from states and are addressed through traditional practices. The Gulf states' approach to the issue of labour migration was identified as an example of adopting a broader security agenda from a statist perspective. The European Union's approach to security in the Euro-Med Region was criticised for broadening security but not from the perspective of regional actors.

Part II also pointed to non-state actors' practices and argued that they not only voice but also seek to address their own and others' concerns. It was argued that there exists unfulfilled potential in terms of human as well as material resources that could be tapped towards constituting alternative futures. Grassroots organisations (such as the FIS in Algeria and Hamas in Palestine) were pointed to as potential agents to meet a broadened security agenda. However, reliance on their practices could be problematic, it was noted, not the least because some seek to achieve security by creating insecurity for women. This, in turn, highlighted the need for studies to inform the practices of non-state actors and empower them to constitute themselves as agents for emancipatory change. This point was developed in Part III: 'Futures.'

Chapter 8 introduced Part III and presented a Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the future. In the attempt to show how Critical

Security Studies would allow one to think and act differently to shape 'desired' futures, the chapter focused on three themes; these were the three issues identified in Chapter 6 as the silences of post-Cold War Security Studies, namely, constitutive theory, agency and practice. It was argued that students of Critical Security Studies could make use of the constitutive role played by theories to shape alternative emancipatory practices. Following Booth, the chapter argued that such practices should include 'thinking about doing' as well as 'thinking about thinking.' The imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities was presented as a prime example of the former. Regarding agency, the roles played by non-state actors, especially social movements and intellectuals were pointed to. It was argued that Critical Security Studies could produce knowledge to create space necessary for such non-state actors to take action, inform them of their own potential to make a change and empower them to constitute themselves as agents of security towards bringing about emancipatory change. Finally, the roles students of security could play as agents of security were emphasised. It was argued that students of security could act as agents of change by either producing the knowledge required to shape such emancipatory practices, or by reflecting upon the potential constitutive effects of their thinking and writing.

Chapter 8 also utilised Beck's argument regarding 'threats to the future' to make two interrelated points. First, it was argued that it is only by thinking and writing about the future that one could raise actors' awareness as to 'threats to the future,' what future outcomes may result, and what needs to be done in order to prevent them. Second, the chapter suggested that, as knowledge about the

future both shapes and constrains practices, thereby helping constitute the future, an uncritical adoption of existing knowledge produced by prevailing discourses—those that have been complicit in perpetuating regional insecurity in the Middle East—could in itself be construed as a ‘threat to the future.’

Indeed, given the conception of theory adopted by students of Critical Security Studies (that it is constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to explain) it is vital that its proponents do not limit their thinking to ‘desired’ futures, but also criticise existing knowledge about the future that informs actors’ practices in an often unthinking manner. The latter task was taken up in Chapter 9, which looked at other plausible futures.

Chapter 9 looked at other plausible future scenarios and their potential practical implications. These were globalisation, fragmentation, ‘clash of civilizations,’ regionalisation, and democratic peace. It was argued that those who present the future of world politics as one of increasing globalisation or regionalisation treat the search for regional security as a side-effect of increasing liberalisation and integration of production and finance. As a result these approaches sideline issues such as the perpetuation of global inequality by the very same processes. The chapter further argued that both approaches gloss over the structural relationships between different parts of the world, and how state building, democratisation and security maintenance in one part of the world depends (to a certain extent) on keeping other parts of the world non-democratic and insecure. The literature on globalisation and regionalisation as well as the democratic peace thesis neglect issues such as the emphasis US policy-makers

have put on encouraging 'low-intensity democracies' in the Middle East or the issue of arms transfers between North America, Western Europe and the Middle East.

The chapter also looked at Huntington's vision of the future as a 'clash of civilizations,' and that of Kaplan as a 'coming anarchy.' It was argued that Kaplan's 'problem-solving' approach to world politics, by overlooking the ways in which human agency has been complicit in creating the dynamics he has identified, has failed to see how human agency may again intervene and alter them. Huntington's thesis was criticised for adopting a similar fatalistic attitude (as well as his failure to understand the fluid character of civilizations and the porous nature of the boundaries between them). It was argued that both fail to reflect upon the potential constitutive effects of their own theorising.

Following an evaluation of other plausible futures, Chapter 10 turned to the theme of 'desired' futures, and presented a preliminary inquiry into whether there exists a potential for the creation of a security community in the Middle East. Adopting the three-tier framework developed by Adler and Barnett as a checklist to assess the potential for the creation of a security community, the chapter pointed to the conditions that could indeed be viewed as conducive for such a development to take place. It was also argued that the very same conditions that could be viewed as propelling regional actors to look towards each other (such as the end of the Cold War, integration of world markets and global warming) could also be viewed as pushing them further apart from each other. It was argued that in order for such factors to propel regional actors to turn

towards each other, as Adler and Barnett expect them to do, actors would need to be presented by an alternative reading of their situation—a reading informed by an alternative conception of security which shows them as ‘victims of regional security’ rather than each other. The chapter noted that this would require the security community approach developed by Adler and Barnett to be re-worked from a Critical Security Studies perspective by adopting a broadened and deepened conception of security, and by paying more attention to the agency of non-state actors and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice.

Part III, therefore, tried to further the aims of the thesis by presenting a Critical Security Studies perspective on thinking about the futures of regional security and a critique of other plausible future scenarios. Part III also considered whether unfulfilled potential exists in the Middle East for a security community to be created. Drawing upon the arguments developed in Parts I and II, which sought to point to unfulfilled potential in regional politics, it was argued that there indeed is some potential in terms of both material and human resources that could be tapped to create a security community in this of all regions. Indeed, even the very act of investigating the potential for the creation of a security community constitutes a first step towards its creation by way of pointing to unfulfilled potential immanent in regional politics and emphasising the problems that would have to be addressed on the way.

A security community may be formed by community-minded agents who agree to pool their resources to address security problems by adopting

cooperative security practices. The creation of a security community does not require the pre-existence of physical, linguistic or cultural ties among potential members. As Deutsch and his colleagues emphasised, security communities may have humble origins. Actors' willingness to work together to form a community may constitute the necessary conditions initially required to form a security community. Getting the potential members to view regional insecurity itself rather than each other as the threat to their security, in turn, could generate this willingness. Non-state actors such as intellectuals, who are in a mutually interactive relationship with social movements, could also play crucial roles in helping construct identities that cross physical and psychological borders.

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation.

Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is conceptualised as constitutive of the 'reality' it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more 'realistic' picture of the future becomes 'real' through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a 'desired' future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a 'reality' through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a 'desired' future empowers people(s) in the present.

Presenting pictures of what a 'desired' future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the thesis indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalization of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as 'threats to the future' to use Beck's terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, Critical Security Studies presents not an 'optimistic,' but a more 'realistic' picture of the future. Considering how the 'realism' of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world 'out there,' but also when judged by the standards of Critical Security Studies, as the thesis has argued, it could be

concluded that there is a need for more 'realistic' approaches to regional security in theory and practice.

The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the 'realistic' picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, Critical Security Studies offers a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of Critical Security Studies have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the 'Middle East' by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that 'theories do not leave the world untouched.'

The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the 'politics behind the geographical specification of politics' and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and theories and practices of security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of Critical Security Studies, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that 'everything is socially constructed' or that 'all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them' is a significant *first* step that does not by itself help us adopt emancipatory practices. As long as we rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse—which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era—we help constitute a 'reality' in line with the tenets of 'realist' Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a Critical Security Studies perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the 'reality' 'out there,' foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a Critical Security Studies perspective that emphasizes the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what we choose to call 'reality.' Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable us to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending

conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world.

After decades of statist, military-focused and zero sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalizing the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a 'threat to the future,' or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic' vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a 'desired' future but is also cognisant of 'threats to the future.'

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