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09 November 2007

THE BIRTH OF THE 'TAIWANESE'
**A DISCURSIVE CONSTITUTION OF THE 'TAIWANESE' AS A
NATIONAL IDENTITY**

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of
the requirements for
the degree of PhD

DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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STATEMENT 1

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Summary

This thesis provides a genealogical account of ‘Taiwanese’ as a national identity. Genealogy is a way of writing a history of the present that de-familiarises us from what we now take for granted by revealing in detail how things were otherwise. As argued in this thesis, Taiwanese identity, in ontological terms, exists only in discourse. It is a way of talking and doing things relative to what sort of people the Taiwanese are; every word and action contributes to the idea that there is such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and helps to substantialise the qualities/features attached to it. This thesis conceptualises Taiwanese identity as having no fixed, essential, or permanent identity; rather, it is formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways people talk and act. This thesis investigates various social practices/events in post-authoritarian Taiwan that incited people to talk about Taiwanese-ness. Certain things, with different positions, forms and organisations, were said and done, while other alternatives disappeared or were omitted and repressed. With various power relations, different discourses mutually intersected, interacted and competed. The social practices/events selected in this thesis include the production of knowledge, the publication of a comic book, an election campaign, and a political demonstration. It is crucially noted that the social practices/events analysed in this thesis are just a few of the numerous events that occur periodically or repeatedly. This thesis, in sum, is an attempt to understand how various social practices/events enable or disable certain ways through which people make sense of their past and their political lives, thereby coming to terms with their belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness. Taiwanese-ness is spoken of, not only literally but also symbolically, and it is this process of being ‘spoken of’ that constitutes the Taiwanese-ness – the birth of the ‘Taiwanese’.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could not have been written without the encouragement, support, and guidance of a number of people. I owe a great deal to my two supervisors, Hidemi Suganami and Jenny Edkins, for their solicitude, intelligence, and generosity. Hidemi always pushed me to think in more nuanced and sophisticated ways with his painstaking, critical and invaluable comments. Jenny not only taught me how to approach intellectual endeavour with critical and humanitarian sensibility, but also gave me unwavering support, mentally and emotionally. This thesis was produced in the process of continuing dialogues with both of them. I thank them for putting up with my naivety, mindlessness and anxiety. I can only hope that this thesis, at least in a small way, warrants their generous support and trust.

In each step of my graduate studies, teachers and friends at the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University influenced and enhanced my intellectual growth and personal life. Andrew Linklater taught me critical theory of International Relations in my Masters year when I knew nothing about it. Jonathan Joseph's introduction to social theory inspired me to engage in a further exploration of it. Martin Alexander's constructive comments on my departmental presentation provided the opportunity to further develop my project. I have learned much from them. I must thank Edmund Frettingham, Joao Nunes, Patrick Carlin, Tom Lundborg, Silviya Lechner, Frazer Egerton, Angela Setterlund, Owain Llyr Ap Gareth, Marie Suetsugu, Ilan Baron, Chen Ching-chang, Andreja Zevnik, and Claudia Hillebrand for being good colleagues, trusting friends, and drinking buddies. They have all been more than generous with their time in helping me, in academic terms, to complete this thesis, and in making my graduate school life in Aberystwyth bearable. I am grateful for their comradeship and friendship.

I would also like to thank Yen Chen-shen, Kan Yi-hua, and Cheng Tuan-yao for encouraging me to do postgraduate courses while I was working at Legislative Yuan in Taiwan. Several scholars I have met at various occasions have affected, directly and indirectly, my thinking and writing. I would like to acknowledge Chang Lung-chi, Shih Chih-yu, Chang Mau-kuei, Chen Fang-ming, Chao Kang, Chen I-Chung, Jens Damm, Stephane Corcuff, Dafydd Fell and Phil Deans. I am grateful for their comments, support and encouragement.

Last but not least, members of my family, especially my mother Ho Tsui-hua and my wife Mari Nakamura, have been my foremost supporters. Without their sacrifices and understanding, I could not have completed this manuscript.

Abbreviations

Parties and Countries

CCP	Chinese Communist Party
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
KMT	Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party)
PFP	People's First Party
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
TSU	Taiwan Solidarity Union

Periodicals

<i>CP</i>	<i>China Post</i> (English)
<i>CT</i>	<i>China Times</i> (Chinese)
<i>CTE</i>	<i>China Times Evening</i> (Chinese)
<i>LT</i>	<i>Liberal Times</i> (Chinese)
<i>TT</i>	<i>Taipei Times</i> (English)
<i>TN</i>	<i>Taiwan News</i> (English)
<i>TDN</i>	<i>Taiwan Daily News</i> (Chinese)
<i>UDN</i>	<i>United Daily News</i> (Chinese)
<i>ZEN</i>	<i>Zili Evening News</i> (Chinese)

Notes on the Romanisation of Taiwanese and Chinese words

This thesis uses the Pinyin system to render Mandarin Chinese words into the Roman alphabet. Proper names begin with family names followed by given names. Some of the figures whose names were commonly used in the English texts are Romanised in the Wade-Giles system (e.g. Lee Teng-hui).

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1-1. 'I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother...'

On the morning of 3 June 1835, a dreadful murder was discovered in Calvados, Normandy (France). Three corpses were found. The head of a pregnant middle-aged woman had been slashed and nearly severed; the skull of an eight-year-old boy had been scored and crushed; the face of a dead eighteen-year-old girl had been carved up and mutilated as well. The murderer was immediately found. It was Pierre Riviere, a twenty year-old peasant, who had slaughtered his mother, his sister, and his brother.

The case initially was not a notable crime. Riviere was soon sentenced to death. However, for various reasons psychiatric experts in Paris drew attention to the case and decided to intervene, appealing for mercy. During this period of time, a series of medico-legal experts, which included a country general practitioner and an urban physician in charge of a large asylum, made reports. A report was also signed by leading figures in psychiatry and forensic medicine. Moreover, a fairly large number of testimonies were collected, including statements made by witnesses – the villagers. And most importantly, Riviere himself had also prepared an explanatory memoir that was submitted to the judges during his detention, giving an explanation of his criminal behaviour. All the aforementioned materials were collected by the French philosopher Michel Foucault and were later published in 1973, as a book entitled '*I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother...*' The book became the whole of the dossier on the case.

To Foucault, Riviere's case, as an affair and as an event, provided an occasion in which different discourses that differed in origin, form, organisation and function, intersected, interacted and competed.¹ 'All of them speak, or appear to be speaking, of one and the same

¹ According to Foucault, Riviere's case is situated in the middle of a debate on the use of psychiatric concepts in criminal justice. It was a debate between some of the leading figures in psychiatry and forensic medicine such as Esquirol, who advanced the psychiatric concept of 'monomania', and

thing; at any rate, the burden of all these discourses is the occurrence on June 3 [1835]' (Foucault 1978a, x). Hence, Foucault argues, the whole event actually manifested 'a contest, a confrontation, a power relation, a battle among discourses and through discourses' (ibid., x). Moreover, the event cannot simply be described as a single battle. In effect, several separate yet intersecting battles were being fought out at the same time. Foucault writes,

The doctors were engaged in a combat, among themselves, with the judges and prosecution, and with Riviere himself (who had trapped them by saying that he had feigned madness); the crown lawyers had their own separate combat as regards the testimony of the medical experts, the comparatively novel use of extenuating circumstances, and a range of cases of parricide that had been coupled with regicide...; the villagers of Aunay had their own combat to diffuse the terror of a crime committed in their midst and to 'preserve the honour of a family' by ascribing the crime to bizarre behaviour or singularity; and, lastly, at the very centre, there was Pierre Riviere, with his innumerable and complicated engines of war; his crime, made to be written and talked about and thereby to secure him glory in death, his narrative, prepared in advance and for the purpose of leading on to the crime, his oral explanations to obtain credence for his madness, his text, written to dispel this lie, to explain, and to summon death, a text in whose beauty some were to see as a proof of rationality (and hence grounds for condemning him to death) and others a sign of madness (and hence grounds for shutting him up for life). (Ibid. x-xi)

Since the whole event manifested a number of complicated and multileveled battles among discourses, Foucault therefore decided to publish this dossier in order to 'draw a map,' to speak of those combats, 'to reconstruct these confrontations and battles,' and 'to rediscover the interaction of those discourses as weapons of attack and defence in the relations of power and knowledge' (ibid. xi).

After the intervention of expert psychiatrists, Riviere's sentence was commuted to life in prison. Riviere's case became a realm in which different discourses – including medical institutions, legal authorities and police apparatuses – competed with each other. This dreadful event suddenly became a discursive realm of power struggle. Each force, by adopting different tactics, endeavoured to grasp the power to define, determine, and above all, reconstitute the body, the psyche and the life of this monstrous figure, 'Pierre Riviere'.

The aim of this thesis, drawing closely on Foucault, is to scrutinise a number of (un)related events/episodes in the contemporary society of Taiwan that incited people to

others including some lawyers, doctors, the prosecutors, the judges and the courts, who very strongly resisted the concept (Foucault 1978a, ix).

talk about Taiwanese-ness (Taiwanxing), examining how different discourses, with different positions, forms and organisations, and what power relations, mutually intersecting, interacting and competing with each other, have eventually led to the formation of *a* Taiwanese national identity in the period since the 1990s. This was the birth of ‘the Taiwanese’.

1-2. A Discursive Proliferation of Taiwanese Identity Since 1990

Since the second half of the 1990s, Taiwan has become a global focal point. The ‘extraordinary’ presence of Taiwan in the global political arena, in which it had long been neglected, is a consequence of Taiwan’s role as a ‘troublemaker’ with the potential to lead the region into an actual warfare (Cabestan 2000). But why is Taiwan – a relatively small country (compared to other players in the region such as China, Japan and the US) with a supposedly democratic government – considered a disturber of world peace? Most political commentators attribute ‘the threat’ of this small island to the formation of its distinctive national identities – the formation of Taiwanese national identity or the rise of Taiwanese nationalism (Campbell et al, 2001).

Indeed, since the early 1990s, people in Taiwan have increasingly claimed themselves as nationally Taiwanese, and have sought international recognition of Taiwan’s status as an independent sovereign state. This political development has not been welcomed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which upholds a ‘One China Policy’, that is: there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. Consequently, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism may engender a substantial conflict among the great powers in the region, including the US, Japan and China. Therefore, not surprisingly, this small island has become ‘attractive’ among diplomatic practitioners as well as academics. Many scholarly studies, both on the island and abroad in many different disciplines, have devoted themselves to this subject – the rise of Taiwanese nationalism.

Nevertheless, a rapidly growing body of literature on Taiwanese nationalism has been part of a broader trend, the formation of ‘Taiwan Studies’, a newly established subject. Since the second half of the 1980s, a novel body of Taiwan-centred research has focused exclusively on the island’s political, social, and economic transformations. During the last

two decades, the study of Taiwan both on the island and abroad has undergone a dramatic change. In the West, most notably in the US but also to some extent in Europe, not only has the number of studies increased greatly but the substance of those studies has also shifted from being one component of the encompassing category of Sinology/China Studies to being Taiwan-centred.² Increasing numbers of scholars began to examine the island itself: its distinctive history, culture, politics, geography, society, and so on. Likewise, in Taiwan, a vast amount of research has been produced and a great number of scholars and graduate students have devoted their energy to the study of 'Taiwan'. According to Wang Fu-Chang's statistic, the number of publications on Taiwan studies in Taiwan increased from fewer than 50 volumes (per year) in 1985 to over 450 volumes (per year) in 1995 (Wang 2003, 154). In the same manner as the West, the contents of these publications altered. More and more studies are focussing on the island's indigenous and colonial past, rather than its post-war 'Economic Miracle'. The important aspects of the present ranging from ecology to economic development to national identity were to be found in Taiwan's distinctive heritage. Indeed, academia has put more and more emphasis on so-called 'Taiwan Studies'.

This mushrooming growth of Taiwan studies in academic circles has its institutional incitements. Universities and academic associations hold conferences on the subject of 'Taiwan'. Through the efforts of some Taiwanese scholars, the North American Taiwan Studies Association (NATSA), sponsored mainly by the Taiwanese government, was inaugurated at Yale University in 1994, and this marked a new epoch of Taiwan studies. It holds an annual conference in different institutes in the US, with about one hundred participants taking part each year. Submissions have been encouraged regarding any topic of interest within the collective field of Taiwan Studies, which may include politics, economics, and social developments as well as issues related to Taiwan's cultures, languages, history, environment and education.³ Moreover, it is not only academic associations that have been established – several research institutes have also been set up in the last decade. For instance,

² Taiwan Studies was once being incorporated in the greater category of Sinology/China Studies during the Cold War, and was subject to the new political framework of the America-China relationship following rapprochement in the 1970s.

³ Likewise, in Europe, a similar association that based at the London School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) – the European Association of Taiwan Studies – was also established in 2004 (please see EATS website: <http://www.soas.ac.uk/academics/centres/taiwanstudies/eats/european-association-of-taiwan-studies.html>). In Japan, The Japan Association for Taiwan Studies was established at Tokyo University in 1998 (please see JATS website: <http://wwwsoc.nii.ac.jp/jats>).

following the first Graduate Institute of Taiwanese Literature, which was founded at National Cheng-Kung University in Taiwan in 2000, there are now at least fifteen academic institutes throughout Taiwan established under the title of ‘Taiwanese’ (Taiwanese Literature, Taiwan Studies, Taiwanese History) doing the research and teaching of Taiwanese literature or history. The establishment of those institutions fostered and increased the localised research concerning Taiwan’s politics, economy, society and culture. Indeed, Taiwan has become a significant focus in various academic disciplines, locally and globally. Its history, its culture and its people have been intensively studied. There has clearly been a ‘Renaissance’ of Taiwan Studies since the 1990s.

Moreover, it is noted that ‘Taiwan’ has become a hot topic not only in academic circles, but outside them as well. In Taiwanese society, people have been enthusiastic and passionate in talking about it. Numerous utterances and statements concerning ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in terms of culture, history, and people have been made during this period. Politicians/political practitioners, political commentators, and journalists have eagerly spoken of it. People from every walk of life – doctors, students, businessmen/women, etc. discuss ‘Taiwanese-ness’ on websites, on TV talk shows, on the radio, as well as in their daily conversations. Numerous magazines and books on the subject of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ have been widely published; TV programmes, dramas, and films concerning ‘Taiwan’ have been extensively produced; arts exhibitions relating to ‘Taiwanese culture’, ‘Taiwanese history’ or ‘Taiwanese aesthetics’ have been held; architecture has appeared, such as monuments commemorating ‘Taiwan’s past’; political demonstrations with reference to Taiwan’s politics have been conducted.

It is not possible to indicate all forms of the way people talk about ‘Taiwan’. Taiwan, since the 1990s, has apparently experienced a steady proliferation of discourses on the subject of ‘Taiwan’, in which ‘Taiwan’, ‘Taiwanese-ness’, or ‘Taiwanese identity’ came to be talked about in large amounts. Four points regarding this wave of discursive proliferation can be identified at the inception of this thesis.

1-2-1. ‘Taiwanese’ as a National Identity

The Taiwanese identity that has been articulated in this discursive proliferation is a *national* rather than an ethnic or other identity. ‘National’ here simply means that the people in Taiwan identify themselves as a *nation*, which is bounded within those who inhabit or have inhabited the Taiwan Island, whether under the name of the Republic of China (ROC), the

official diplomatically recognised name of Taiwan, or under the name of the Republic of Taiwan – the political objective sought by pro-independence advocates. This signifies that the people in mainland China are excluded from this self-identification as co-nationals. Taiwanese people are thus distinct from the Chinese (Zhongguoren).

It should be noted that, crucially, the specific meanings of Taiwanese-ness and its significance vary, vertically across time, and horizontally across individuals and ethnic groups. Earliest references to Taiwan in extant Chinese historical documents date from the third century. By the fourteenth century during the Ming Dynasty of Chinese history, Han-people (Hanren) from China's coastal areas began to migrate to the island. Yet, it is noted that the island was inhabited by groups of aborigines before Han-people settler's emigration. Human dwellings appeared on the island as early as six or seven thousand years ago. In the sixteenth century, Taiwan started to be known to the West after the Portuguese 'discovery' of the island. In the following century, the Dutch controlled Taiwan for a while until they were expelled in 1662 by Zheng Cheng-Gung, a general of the former Ming dynasty. Twenty years later in 1683, the grandson of general Zheng pledged allegiance to the rule of the Qing (1616-1912), which had replaced the Ming as the ruling dynasty in China. A large-scale migration of Han-people from the coastal provinces of China began after the Dutch colonisation and was vastly accelerated during the Qing Dynasty until Taiwan came under Japanese control following the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Japan's colonial rule ended in 1945 with its defeat in the Second World War. Taiwan once again became a province of China. Four years later in 1949, the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party, KMT) relocated the capital of the ROC to Taipei when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gained ascendancy in mainland China.⁴

The complexity of Taiwan's history is reflected in its ethnic make-up. It has frequently been said since the 1990s that Taiwan has four ethnic groups: the Minnan, Hakka, Aboriginal people, and Mainlanders. Nevertheless, none of these four ethnic groups formed naturally; they are all socially constructed (Wang, 2003). The aboriginal people are Taiwan's first inhabitants. Although they are discussed as a single group of people, the Aborigines are

⁴ For general history of Taiwan, please see: Rubinstein (1999).

in fact composed of at least nine tribes.⁵ Each tribe has its own language, custom and kinship, and there was no common language among the aboriginals.⁶ Besides this, there was no shared identity among different tribes before the 1980s. Prior to this period, the differences between different tribes, from the perspective of aboriginal people, were perceived as more significant and extensive than the differences between aboriginal people and Han-Chinese.⁷ The Aboriginals compose only 1.7 percent of the population of Taiwan. The Minnan,⁸ who constitute more than 73 percent of the population, are people whose ancestors were from southern Fujian and immigrated to Taiwan from the seventeenth century to the inception of Japanese colonisation. They speak Minnan dialect (also known as Hoklos). The Minnan ethnic group is not a perennial and homogeneous ethnicity. Although they all came from southern Fujian, their language, custom and culture diverged greatly among them since Fujian is mountainous. People from different places possessed the identity of their town or region (Wang 2003, 25-42).⁹ The Hakka, making up 12 percent of the population, is a distinct ethnic group in China who have their own cultural identity, language and custom. The Hakka immigrants in Taiwan came from different parts of China, mainly southern Fujian and northern Guangdong. Hakka people with different origins speak different dialects of the Hakka language – Hailu and Sixian – and reside in different regions of Taiwan. They did not intimately interact with each other until the end of the 1980s (ibid., 121-43).¹⁰ The Mainlanders is the term by which the native Taiwanese labelled those ethnic Chinese who

⁵ They are thought to have strong biological and linguistic similarities to Malay peoples, being categorised ethnographically as Malayo-Polynesian (Roy, 2003, 3).

⁶ Different tribes, for example, communicated through the Japanese language under Japanese rule (Wang 2003, 102-3).

⁷ The pan-aboriginal identity formed in the early 1980s after a series of political mobilisations of the aboriginal movement. The activists accused the society of Han Chinese's repression and exploitation. In the 1990s, they even requested an autonomous status in a certain region of Taiwan where the aboriginal people live. This kind of request, according to Sun Da-Chan (1995), indicates that the aboriginal identity has reached a level of 'national' consciousness.

⁸ The term literally means 'southern Fujian.' Fujian is a province of China just across the Taiwan Strait.

⁹ During the Qing Dynasty, there were many armed-fights among different groups with different origins among the Minnan immigrants in Taiwan. Even nowadays, there is a distinction between southern Minnan and northern Minnan.

¹⁰ According to Wang (2003), the pan-Hakka identity in Taiwan is derived from the political movement in the late 1980s, which appealed for the preservation of Hakka culture. The Hakka activists criticised the Minnan-centred representation of Taiwan's history, culture and language.

settled in Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek's KMT regime after 1945, and their descendants. However, there was no shared identity among those new immigrants coming from different parts of China at that time. They normally identified themselves under the name of their respective provinces, counties or cities. In addition, there was no shared language among those new immigrants and most of them were not able to speak Mandarin – the national language in Taiwan and in China. Chiang Kai-shek's Mandarin itself was notoriously difficult to understand.¹¹ Moreover, the new immigrants did not all support Chiang's KMT; quite a few Mainlanders were murdered and arrested by Chiang's KMT regime during the White Terror in the 1960s. Not until the early 1990s did the Mainlanders form a collective identity and became a 'singular' and 'unitary' ethnic group.¹² This group of people now makes up around 13 percent of the population.

Due to the complexity of its history and ethnicity, the connotations of the term 'Taiwanese' differs across different historical periods. What it meant to be a Taiwanese in the nineteenth century is different from what it meant in the twentieth century, and in the 1970s it is different from in the 1990s. For instance, during the Japanese colonial period, the term 'Taiwanjin' ('Taiwanese' in Japanese) was synonymous with the Japanese term 'Hontoujin' (the islander) in Taiwan, in contrast to another Japanese term 'Naichijin' (people from Japan proper). While the term 'Hontoujin' referred to Aborigines, Minnan and Hakkas, 'Naichijin' indicated Japanese residents (ethnic Japanese) in Taiwan. However, during the period of martial law imposed by the KMT (1947-87), the term 'Taiwanese' became a regional or provincial affiliation. The term was by then interchangeable with another Chinese term 'Benshengren' (lit., people from within Taiwan Province, translated as 'native Taiwanese' in English), which had reference to those Han-Chinese whose ancestors came to Taiwan before the colonisation by Japan: Minnan and Hakkas (Brown 2004, 9-10). The term was used in

¹¹ This is the reason why almost every TV program, even nowadays, has Chinese subtitles. And in this sense, the National Language Policy (Mandarin policy) enacted by the KMT regime in the 1960s targeted not only the native Taiwanese but also the Mainlanders.

¹² As for the question why the so-called Mainlander identity emerged in the 1990s, current studies (e.g. Wang 2003) on this issue can be summarised into two points: firstly, the Mainlanders' collective identity derived from their shared feeling of being excluded from the society of Taiwan during democratisation; secondly, it is a result of the political mobilisation which is led by Mainlander political elites in the KMT and the New Party.

contrast to another term ‘Waishenren’ (lit., people from outside the province), which refers to the Mainlanders.¹³

Entering the 1990s, the term ‘Taiwanese’ changed its meaning again. It is now often used in Taiwan to speak of the ethnic majority, the Minnan people (Brown 2004, 9), though this conception of the term was later, particularly after 2000, challenged by some Taiwanese politicians and scholars who have contended that ‘Taiwanese’ should incorporate ‘the Four Ethnic Groups’: the Aborigines, Minnan, Hakka, and Mainlanders (also termed as ‘New Residents’, albeit much less frequently used). For instance, Taiwan’s former president Lee Teng-Hui promoted a new conception of ‘Taiwanese’ – the so-called ‘New-Era Taiwanese’. He called for the residents of the island to look upon Taiwan as their shared home, unifying together and establishing a shared future. Anyone who identifies with his appeal can then become Taiwanese – a ‘New-Era Taiwanese’ (Lee 2005). One could tentatively argue that this ostensibly all-inclusive discourse of conceptualising ‘Taiwanese’ in effect signifies a formation of Taiwanese national identity; that is, the pursuit of self-determination by all residents on Taiwan.¹⁴ In short, the meaning of ‘Taiwanese’ has not always been consistent and it is no surprise that that the concept of Taiwanese-ness continues to lack any definitional consensus among the population of Taiwan.

1-2-2. China as ‘the Other’

While the people in Taiwan identify themselves as co-nationals, the people in mainland China are then excluded from this self-identification. This expulsion of ‘Chinese-ness’ (Zhongguoxin) is clear in observing this wave of discursive proliferation of Taiwanese national identity. Anti-Chinese sentiments can be easily found in the society of Taiwan since the 1990s. For instance, in a demonstration to commemorate the 2-28 Incident on 28 February 1997,¹⁵ the protesters held banners that spelled out the political motto ‘Remember 2-28, Don’t Become Chinese’. The texts written on the banners were as follows:

¹³ The non-Han Aborigines were simply ignored, as if they did not exist on the island. They were neither ‘Taiwanese’ nor ‘non-Taiwanese.’

¹⁴ Although this political rhetoric ostensibly includes all residents of Taiwan, it is not exactly all-inclusive. Some groups of people residing on the island are still excluded, e.g. foreign spouses.

¹⁵ The 2-28 Incident took place on 28 February 1947, Taiwan having previously been returned to Nationalist China in 1945. The uprising was directed against the KMT administration in Taipei, tarnished by its corruption and incompetent government of the island. The incident led to weeks of

Wake up from the dream of the motherland (China), be independent and be reborn.
Cut the umbilical cord, be independent and be reborn.
Besides Taiwan, there is no motherland. (cited in Edmondson 2002, 41)

The wording on display in the rally is not anomalous. This sort of political rhetoric was seen frequently in pro-independence political events in the 1990s in Taiwan and appeared regularly in the mass media. Likewise, much more recently, Taiwan's Education Ministry dispatched an official document on 20 January 2005 to nine private academic and educational institutions in Taiwan, whose names included the word 'Chinese' ('Zhongguo' or 'Zhonghua').¹⁶ The document adjured those institutions to alter their names from 'Chinese' to 'Taiwanese'. This incident is part of a whole project enacted by the Exclusive Yuan (the Cabinet) of Taiwan in 2003, which demands that all government bodies (including diplomatic missions and representative offices) and state-owned enterprises should 'correct' their names from 'Chinese' to 'Taiwanese'. Since then, many overseas missions as well as state-owned enterprises have altered their names, completing this so-called 'name-correcting' project.

The examples noted above are just two of many similar incidents that show an ongoing process of de-sinicisation which has taken place in Taiwan. Indeed, when the Taiwanese people think of themselves as a people, they nowadays do so in contradistinction to the Chinese people, and therefore China is their main object of alienation/disassociation. However, it is important to note that these two concepts – 'Taiwanese' and 'Chinese' – are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The two words actually mean different things to different people. The popular connotation of the two concepts involves a variety of elements, such as ethnic origin, language, culture, residency, citizenship, identification, and so on. There is no space in this thesis to deal with the concept of 'Chinese'. Yet, it must be noted that if the term 'Taiwanese' changes its meaning, its relationship with the term 'Chinese' will alter accordingly. While some view them as mutually exclusive categories, others find them compatible or even complementary.

violence throughout Taiwan, and was followed by military repression of the KMT army despatched from the mainland.

¹⁶ Those institutions include: 'Chinese' Cultural University, 'China' Medical University, 'Chung Hua (Chinese)' University, 'China' College of Maritime Technology, and etc. Among them, the last China College of Maritime Technology has changed its name. It is now named 'Taipei' College of Maritime Technology.

The tendency for the two not to be mutually exclusive was clearly seen during the period of Japan's colonization of Taiwan. A historian Wang Xiao-Bo (1999) suggests that the notion of 'Chinese' or 'Chinese consciousness' during that period existed among the Taiwanese elites. Wang does not deny the existence of 'Taiwanese consciousness', but he argues that Taiwanese consciousness during the Japanese colonial period was intertwined, albeit tentatively and thinly, with the Han-Chinese national consciousness (1999, 11-67). Another example can be shown in the debate in the 1970s about native Taiwanese literature. It should be noted that some of the main advocates such as Chen Ying-Zhen, who stand for nativisation of Taiwanese literature, supported a quick unification with mainland China.¹⁷

Nevertheless, when the concept of 'Taiwanese' (and the 'Chinese' as well) transforms itself into a 'national' level, they necessarily have to be mutually exclusive. The ambiguity, inter-changeability, and inclusiveness of these two concepts need to be clarified and divided. The people of Taiwan are accordingly compelled to 'become' either Taiwanese or Chinese; any other political possibilities in the middle ground or a grey area were not permitted. China as the recurring contrasting image of the Other conversely helps to re-define and re-construct the 'Self' – the Taiwanese. No matter how people in Taiwan interpret their own history, tradition and culture, the most important and fundamental task is that of demonstrating how 'Taiwanese-ness' is different from 'Chinese-ness'. It is plausible to argue that there is no 'homogeneous' Taiwan, but that if such a 'homogeneous' Taiwan does exist, its precondition is that there is an existent China to encounter. Moreover, in this discursive proliferation, 'China' as the other, internally, often refers to 'the Mainlander' and the political parties (such as New Party), the regime (KMT regime) or the country (the ROC) closely associated with the Mainlanders. Externally, it refers to a China that is now represented by the Communist regime in Beijing.

In short, the presence/absence and spectre of 'China' is a crucial aspect of an understanding of the discursive proliferation of Taiwanese national identity. China in fact is economically the greatest potential market for Taiwan; it is historically the source of its ethnicity, culture and languages; it is politically a contestant or enemy; and it is one of Taiwan's deepest and most recurring images of 'the Other'. China, as Taiwan's contrasting image, has indeed helped the Taiwanese to define what Taiwan is itself. In this sense, 'China'

¹⁷ Chen is a native Taiwanese (Minnan ethnicity) and an anti-KMT political dissenter.

is not simply a physical site but a discursive space in which different forms of solidarity, affinity and identity are constructed and contested. The political possibilities for Taiwan in relation to China are ambiguously undecided and un-decidable.

1-2-3. Political Context of the Discursive Proliferation about Taiwanese-ness

It should be noted that this discursive proliferation about Taiwanese national identity is a relatively recent phenomenon. It occurs, in effect, during the process of democratisation.

Taiwan's political transition from hard totalitarianism to soft totalitarianism to quasi-democracy was made possible, to a great degree, by a conjunction of changes in the international system and changes in Taiwan's domestic politics, economics and society. Those changes created a political climate conducive to democratisation (Wachman 1996; Hughes 1997; Roy 2003). Towards the end of the 1960s, political opposition to the KMT – the Mainlander-dominated regime – was not permitted and was repressed viciously. However, at the very beginning of the 1970s, Taiwan faced a series of foreign crises that brought the KMT regime's (ROC) legitimacy into question, and in turn led to challenges to the authority of the KMT within Taiwan.¹⁸ One of the most significant events was the normalisation of US-PRC relations. The US, Taiwan's closest ally, in the late 1960s opened secret contacts with the PRC. Taiwan (the ROC) was then, in 1971, expelled from the United Nations, thereby losing its legitimate status representing China. Signals of the US-PRC rapprochement opened a floodgate of diplomatic defeats for Taiwan. In 1968, Taiwan had formal relations with 64 countries. Yet, by mid-1975, the number of countries having diplomatic relations with Taiwan had dropped to 26, compared with the PRC who had normalised relations with 112 countries (Roy 2003, 132). The US-PRC relationship was officially normalised in 1979. Under these circumstances, the oppositional forces raised increasingly public questions about the KMT's right to monopolise the definition of the collective national popular will and to dominate the systems of laws, values, education, media,

¹⁸ Taiwan is, in the KMT's view, the location of the legitimate government of all of China. And the US and most of the rest of the world acceded in this until 1970s. It was not until the early 1990s the national political bodies, such as Legislative Yuan and National Assembly, kept in place delegates representing Mainland districts even though they were divorced from their constituents.

popular culture and political activities. Domestic calls for democratic reform became more frequent and stronger.¹⁹

In the light of changes in the political and social environment, then-president Chiang Ching-Kuo (the son of Chiang Kai-Shek) gradually began to loosen his grip in an effort to strengthen the regime's legitimacy. In 1987, six months before his death, Chiang lifted martial law, followed by the end to a ban on the formation of political parties and newspaper restrictions. Political liberations had begun, setting in motion other changes leading to democratisation. After Chiang's death, Lee Teng-Hui assumed the presidency and continued implementing democratic reforms. Lee promoted a series of constitutional reforms that paved the way for full re-election of the legislatures at all levels of the government.²⁰ In 1996 the people in Taiwan for the first time cast their direct votes in a presidential election. In 2000, then-oppositional Democratic Progress Party (DPP) candidate Chen Shui-Bian captured Taiwan's second direct presidential election, realising the first rotation of the ruling party in Taiwan's political history. The first change of ruling party signified the accomplishment of democratisation in Taiwan (Wu Yu-Shan 2001).

It is, however, noted that along with political liberalisation, either in Lee's KMT presidency in the 1990s or in Chen's DPP presidency after 2000, there was a serious political power struggle, entangled with partisan, ethnic and ideological confrontations. Lee was the first so-called 'native Taiwanese' president.²¹ After he succeeded Chiang as the president, Lee was confronted with various political challenges from, mainly, the ethnic-Mainlander political elites within the KMT (Wu Rwei-Ren 2002, 203-9).²² The alleged 'Taiwanese

¹⁹ Alongside aforementioned challenges, the development of economics gave birth to a well-educated and politically conscious middle class, which also demanded large-scale socio-political change. It became a major social force that pressed the KMT regime to reform itself and accelerate its pace to democratisation (Rubinstein, 1999).

²⁰ Since the KMT regime claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all China, it justified postponing full national elections until it recovered the Mainland. So the national parliaments were filled with politicians elected on the Mainland in 1947, who were frozen in office with indefinite terms of office. Only a limited number of seats – with less than a third of seats – were opened up for direct election after 1969.

²¹ The Mainlanders, a minority of the population, had held onto power in a proportion far outweighing their numerical strength, in the central government, media, the army, and parliament.

²² The other challenge was from the native Taiwanese elites outside the KMT, which was taken up by a new-formed political party – the DPP. It should be however noted that opponents within the KMT

consciousness' is then deemed as a trump card for Lee to consolidate his power within the KMT regime. The use of 'Taiwanese consciousness' was twofold. It was employed, on the one hand, to expel the Mainlander elite from the core of power within the KMT, and on the other hand, to tackle DPP's challenges in elections as well as to maintain its tacit alliance (Wu 2002). The political struggle in Taiwan in the 1990s was indeed characterised by the confrontation between Lee's KMT (plus the DPP) and anti-Lee factions of the KMT (plus the New Party²³). During this period, Lee and other native Taiwanese politicians, in both the KMT and the DPP, came increasingly to use the terms 'Taiwanese' or 'Taiwanese consciousness' as political weapons to distinguish 'them', the 'Chinese' or 'Chinese consciousness', from 'us'. It is in this sense that democratisation in Taiwan is intimately intertwined, interacted and overlapped with the indigenisation/ Taiwanisation.

However, it would be misleading if one categorises those politicians who opposed Lee as purely ethnic Mainlander. In fact, a great number of them were native Taiwanese. It was particularly noticeable in the second half of the 1990s after many ethnic Mainlander politicians in the KMT (as well as in the central government) were replaced by native Taiwanese politicians. Thus, a better way to draw the line on this political division is to consider 'Taiwanese sympathisers' as opposed to 'Chinese sympathisers'. The former refers to those pro-independence people, calling for a Taiwanese consciousness distinct from the Chinese, and pushing for formal independence if possible. The latter refers to the people who insist that Taiwanese consciousness interchanged with the Chinese one; they are possibly in favour of eventual reunification with China or at least oppose anything that seems like a move towards independence. However, it cannot be denied that most of the Mainlanders are Chinese sympathisers, while many native Taiwanese are Taiwanese sympathisers.

After 2000, the political situation turned into a confrontation between the so-called 'Pan-Green' and 'Pan-Blue', two political coalitions so named because of their respective party colours that remained roughly equal in strength. Pan-Green politicians are made up of mainly 'Taiwanese sympathisers', while the Pan-Blue camp consists of largely the 'Chinese

posed a more formidable challenge to Lee than the DPP, since the KMT then controlled most of the social and political resources inherited from its past authoritarian party-state system.

²³ In 1993, some members of the KMT broke away from the party and established the New Party. Most of them were ethnic-Mainlanders.

sympathisers'. The green camp consists of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). The TSU was established in 2001 after Lee Teng-Hui was forced to resign from the KMT leadership after the defeat of the presidential election in 2000. Lee was deemed to be a 'spiritual leader' in the TSU. The blue camp consists of the KMT, the People First Party (PFP),²⁴ and the New Party. The major battle in this procedure of political struggle has been the highly frequent election campaign at all levels of government. The frequency of the election campaigns increased rapidly as the pace of democratisation since 1990 has risen. There has been an election campaign almost every year since 1995. Moreover, since the election campaigns in Taiwan have been entangled with ethnic, ideological and identity confrontations, they are often extremely intense. Both sides thought that losing would mean being consigned to a permanent minority status. Therefore, regardless of local or national elections, both camps have regarded each political contest as a final showdown. Both sides mounted frenetic and indeed excessive mobilisation efforts that looked at times like the acting-out of a vast national neurosis.

In addition, the increasing frequency of the election campaigns was accompanied with media liberalisation. The political restrictions on newspapers were lifted in 1987. By the mid-1990s the democratic transition and media liberalisation had basically been completed and all restrictions on freedom of speech removed (Roy 2003, 175). This media liberation offered political parties and candidates new opportunities for communicating with voters. In the election campaign, politicians from all parties have to use every means to gain publicity, attracting voter attention. Among many, one of the most significant means was the use of the cable TV channels.²⁵

The number of cable channels has shot up since the mid-1990s. This new media offers politicians in Taiwan a new range of campaigning methods to reach the ordinary people. One such method was election advertising. Making good election TV ads has become a prerequisite of a successful campaign. According to Gary Rawnsley and Dafydd Fell (2007, 12-18), the degree of change is clear from the comparison of the 245 minutes of free

²⁴ PFP was established in 2000 after the popular independent presidential candidate Song Chu-Yu lost the election to DPP's candidate Chen Shui-Bian.

²⁵ The growth of cable television during the 1990s was very rapid. In 1990 only 16.1% of households subscribed to cable, however this had risen to 75.9% by 1996 and 84.3% in 2003 (Please see Rawnsley and Fell 2007).

television campaign ads shown in 1991 with 56,043 minutes of purchased advertising time in 2000. The amount of election advertisements has meant that it is almost impossible to avoid exposure. Another major consequence of the rise of cable TV has been the proliferation of politics talk shows. In Taiwan, there are at least ten talk shows each night, in which politicians from the major political parties debate the issues of the day. The fact that so many of these politics talk shows are able to survive in the market suggests they must be profitable for the cable channels to conduct them. Many people watch them. Also, the rise in 24-hour cable news has had an impact on dissemination of political rhetoric. In Taiwan, there are at least ten Taiwan-based 24-hour news channels. While in the past no more than a few sound bites from a speech would be shown on the TV news, since the late 1990s the cable news channels have broadcast speeches live. It is however noted that the intensification of media reports does not mean that people just sit on the sofa of their living room (*ibid.*, 19). In fact, citizen participation in outdoor political activities has actually increased. The political rallies became exceedingly common and popular in this period. The use of street rallies appears to have actually reached a climax in 2004, with the clear battle for which party can run the largest outdoor activities. The DPP's keynote political event was a Hand-in-Hand human chain linking the far north with the far south of Taiwan that was attended by at least one and a half million people.²⁶ In contrast, the KMT also held a series of simultaneous anti-Chen rallies on 13 March under the slogan of 'Change the President, Save Taiwan', in which up to three million people participated. Those mass rallies were all televised, with different TV channels having live reports on different rallies.

The large number of newspaper advertisements, the regularity of political talk shows, and the intensive media coverage of campaign issues ensure that political rhetoric disseminates throughout the whole of society. Politics becomes the common subject of people's daily conversation. The very frequent political elections contributed to the high exposition of political rhetoric. And those political wordings/actions are often associated with the issues of ethnicity, ideology and, above all, national identity.

In short, the various discourses (statements, utterances and actions), which had been so long suppressed by the KMT regime, were finally liberated amid the process of democratisation. The democratisation and more 'open' civil society that possessed a greater

²⁶ The thesis will discuss this event in detail in Chapter Five.

degree of freedom of expression provided a political context for the discursive proliferation of Taiwanese national identity.

1-2-4. Not Everything Can Be Spoken Of

The aforementioned political environment prompts people to talk about ‘Taiwan’, ‘Taiwanese-ness’, and ‘Taiwanese national identity’. Those subjects have become a common object of the people’s talk – the various statements, rhetoric, knowledges, analyses, conducts, etc. Although there is a discursive proliferation concerning Taiwanese identity, it does not mean everything can be uttered or conducted. Conversely, this discursive explosion simultaneously excludes other statements, utterances or actions on the subject. Many alternatives are dismissed, have disappeared, or are prohibited and repressed. The most widespread and ‘authorised’ discourse in this wave of discursive proliferation represents Taiwanese national identity as an inevitable consequence of historical and political developments of Taiwan. It is argued that the consolidation of Taiwanese national identity possesses a double guarantee from historical and political developments over the last one hundred years at least.

The historical guarantee refers to Taiwan’s Japanese colonial history and the ruthless and autocratic rule of the KMT in Taiwan in the post-war period (Chang 2003; Wu Rwei-Ren 2001, 2004; Shih 1972; Dai 1994; Chu et al. 2001; Edmondson 2002). It contends that ‘Taiwanese identity’ was formed in the first place during the Japanese colonisation, and Taiwanese discourse of political nationalism was gradually formulated in the situation, in which the Taiwanese were abandoned by China but were unable to be Japanese since the Japanese governor in Taiwan refused to grant the same citizenship to the Taiwanese as Japanese citizens. Taiwanese political elites therefore strove for an autonomous status under Japanese colonisation. This autonomous status implies the rights to self-determination of the Taiwanese people. It is the burgeoning of Taiwan’s political nationalism. Moreover, the KMT’s autocratic governance, was shown in the 2-28 Incident in 1947 and the White Terror in the 1950s and 1960s inevitably led the Taiwanese to deeply question their Chinese self-identification. The convergence of Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s autocratic rule made the imagination of Taiwan as a nation possible. And the new wave of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s came as a result of this lineage of Taiwan’s modern historical development.

Juxtaposed with the historical guarantee, the political guarantees focus on Taiwan's democratisation under Taiwan's former president Lee's presidency as well as China's attempt to intimidate (politically and militarily) Taiwan in the 1990s (Lin Chia-Lung 1998, 2001, 2002). It is argued that 'democratisation' is the main cause of the transition of Taiwan's national identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. The practice of democracy in Taiwan creates a shared political identity, common values and a sense of achievement. Increasing numbers of Taiwanese realise that 'Taiwan's democratic liberalism' is different from 'China's authoritarianism'. The gap dividing Taiwan and China emanates not in cultural or ethnic differences, but in institutional differences: democracy versus authoritarianism. In addition to these, the Chinese military threat against Taiwan and its diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan in international society furthermore unifies Taiwanese people and produces a shared identity. Thus, the practice of democracy 'pulls' Taiwanese people together from the inside of the island, while China's threat and oppression 'push' Taiwanese people together from outside the island. National identity in Taiwan is not ethnic identity at all, but a political and territorial identity. According to this strand of thought, Taiwanese nationalism or Taiwanese identity should be conceived of as civic nationalism (Lin Chia-Lung 2001), liberal nationalism (Wu 2001), and/or state identity (Chiang 1999).

Consequently, it is commonly assumed that these historical and political developments led to the formation of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s. This line of reasoning implies an assertion of causation; that is, Japanese colonisation, the KMT's autocratic rules, democratisation and the PRC's intimidation caused the formation of Taiwanese national identity. Taiwanese national identity can thus be legitimised since it is the inevitable outcome of the historical and political development of Taiwan.

From these aforementioned two perspectives, the formation of Taiwanese national identity was firstly represented as an anti-colonial national movement (Shih 1972; Wu, 2001), whenever it is applied to Japanese colonisation on Taiwan in the first half of twentieth century or the KMT's re-colonisation in the second half of twentieth century.²⁷ Secondly, it was conceived as resistance towards authoritarianism, either being concerned with KMT's

²⁷ Some people argue that the KMT's rule in the post-war era is a kind of recolonisation in order to distinguish it from the Japanese colonisation before WWII. KMT's rule is also described as a quasi-colonial situation, in which the colonisers are on Taiwan Island and there is no colonial motherland.

authoritarian rules or the PRC's political and military intimidation. As a result, the formation of Taiwanese national identity is always evaluated in the mainstream of society as a sort of resistance towards colonialism, a revolt against authoritarian regime and an emancipation of the subject. 'Taiwan's experience' in the 1990s in the political respect is deemed as a model for developing countries in the Third World. It is said to be a 'Political Miracle' in the West.

Everyone in Taiwan is presumed to feel comfortable to be Taiwanese and to claim that they are Taiwanese. Taiwanese-ness or Taiwanese national identity is fixed and taken-for-granted. Any statements, rhetoric, knowledges, analyses, conducts, etc. that oppose this line of thought are conceived as bizarre, incorrect, and even unethical. Social activities that are against this line of thought are not approved. For example, the care of the mainlander Chinese spouses, the elimination of ethnic or racial discrimination or the protection of foreign labourers from South-Eastern Asia are hindered, or to some degree restricted. There is very little choice of identity for individuals in Taiwan; in some cases there is no choice at all.

1-3. Research Questions

The phenomenon described above – discursive proliferation and discursive exclusion – encourages this thesis to reconsider the role of 'discourse' in the constitution of Taiwanese national identity. Hence, it is necessary to revisit the formation of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s through an exploration of the discourses or discursive formations about Taiwanese national identity. The thesis will thus ask how 'Taiwanese' has been discursively constituted as a national identity since 1990. This means that the thesis will examine the social/discursive practices through which people are being incited to talk about a specific 'Taiwanese-ness' or 'Taiwanese national identity'. Moreover, it will look at what exactly the 'Taiwanese-ness' refers to. It will also examine the social practices through which such discourses are disseminated: how a specific discourse about 'Taiwanese-ness' takes precedence over alternative discourses, and what alternatives have been repressed, forgotten, or neglected. Finally, it will try to contemplate the possibility of resistance: how it emerges in the process of this discursive constitution; how counter-discourses get formed or reformed.

1-4. Genealogical Method

The term ‘genealogy’ is the single concept that best explains the methodology adopted in this thesis. The German philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was the first to propose this methodology. In his *On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic*, published in 1887, Nietzsche aims to present a critique of moral concepts, which were then taken for granted, by providing an ‘actual’ history of morality showing ‘the *descent* of our moral prejudices’ (Nietzsche 1994, 4; emphasis in original).

Nietzsche asks: ‘under what conditions did man invent the value judgements good and evil? *And what value do they themselves have?*’ (ibid., 5; emphasis in original)? In other words, what is required in genealogical studies of morality is ‘a revaluation of all values.’ For Nietzsche, the value of these values (good and evil) themselves must be called into question. He states:

We need a *critique* of moral values, *the value of these values should itself, for once, be examined* – and so we need to know about the conditions and circumstances under which the values grew up, developed and changed... (Ibid., 8; emphasis in original)

Since people have taken the *values* of these values as given and beyond all questioning, nobody has doubted or hesitated ‘in placing higher value on “the good man” than on “the evil”, higher value in the sense of advancement, benefit and prosperity for man in general.’ But what if, writes Nietzsche, the reverse way were true.

[What] if a regressive trait lurked in ‘the good man’, likewise a danger, an enticement, a poison, a narcotic, so that the present *lived at the expense of the future?* Perhaps in more comfort and less danger, but also in a smaller-mind, meaner manner... So that morality itself was the danger of dangers. (Ibid., 8; emphasis in original)

Nietzsche therefore asks us to overturn all that we have believed about good and evil. What Nietzsche tells us in his genealogy is that the idea of truth is itself a kind of fiction. Everything that we hold as solid, taken-for-granted, and certain about the world is, upon closer examination, accidental and contingent. Genealogy in this regard is a way of writing a history of the present that de-familiarises us from what we now take for granted by revealing in detail how things were otherwise. Inspired by Nietzsche, Foucault proposes his distinctive genealogical method. He elaborates his genealogical methods by elucidating a number of its characteristics.

First of all, genealogy rejects the possibility of fixed essences, underlying laws,

interiority, or metaphysical grounds for historical entities. Genealogy therefore avoids the quest for foundations and argues that it is not possible to understand anything by postulating deep hidden meanings or unreachable heights of truth. If one listens to history, Foucault writes, one finds that there is no ‘timeless and essential secret’, but ‘the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’ (Foucault 1984, 78). ‘Deep meaning’ exists, gets produced and reproduced in so far as there are proliferating surface practices. We are nothing but the exteriority of our history. We must read our history in terms of our exterior practices. Genealogical method thus opposes any supra-historical perspective that seeks to totalize history, but instead looks for and discovers the meaning of things in their surface practices. Moreover, genealogy opposes itself to the search for ‘origins’ (*Ursprung*). This assertion is based on three reasons: firstly, such a quest incorrectly assumes the existence of immobile forms or primordial truth taken to be already there; secondly, it implies, inappropriately, that ‘origin’ is the moment of the ‘greatest perfection;’ and thirdly, it mistakenly identifies origins as ‘the site of truth’ (ibid., 79). On all these counts, tracing the gradual curve of the evolution of history seems a problematic enterprise which genealogy refuses to engage in. The true objective of genealogy should be a search for ‘descent’ (*Herkunft*), that is, according to Foucault, involves a quest for ‘the subtle, singular and sub-individual marks that might possibly intersect in them to form a network that is difficult to unravel’ (ibid., 81). The genealogist sets out to study the beginnings – numerous beginnings – rather than a unitary beginning or ‘origin’.

It is in this sense that Foucault opposed the (traditional) form of writing history that dedicates itself to the search for essences and origins of historical entities.²⁸ Foucault here continues his critique, earlier developed in his archaeological works, of traditional historical studies. The traditional form of history, according to Foucault, sees the past as a linear, continuous, and totalised development from a supra-historical perspective assumed by historians. The historian therefore attempts to reorganise the mass of documents and to filter out the abundance of material about the past, in order to conform to the teleological interpretation of their progressive, evolutionary, totalized, and linear history. They try to link disparate events, to establish causal succession between them; to make the continuity or

²⁸ Here Foucault refers to the historians of Annales of School such as Marc Bloch, who studies history by searching its deep structural level that reveals a large continuity of the historical events.

overall significance which they possess, and to define a totality (Foucault 1972a, 3-7). Yet, Foucault argues, since traditional historians focus on the origins, continuity and totality of history, not only do they fail to reconstitute the original features of the past (and it is in fact an impossible task), but also constrain their domains of analysis to a few selected subjects and events and distort the meaning of events and the contents of documents. As a consequence, many events are erased and many documents are distorted. Foucault therefore argues that the historian verbalises something that is not verbalised but remains silent about something that is actually verbalised in the document. To Foucault, the traditional form of history attains its narrative totalisations in an illegitimate way through the construction of abstractions that obscure more than they reveal. Hence, Foucault rejects traditional historical studies that seek to totalise history, to trace its internal development, and to offer the reassurance of an end toward which history moves. Foucault writes that once the historian's senses are mastered by a supra-historical perspective, it 'can bend it to its own purpose' (Foucault 1984, 87).²⁹ The world that Foucault presents is a place full of discontinuity, difference, conflict, contradiction, diversity and rupture.

In contrast to the traditional form of history, genealogy aims to write what Nietzsche terms 'effective history' (*wirkliche Historie*).³⁰ According to Foucault, while traditional history always assumes a supra-historical perspective that 'finds its support outside of time and pretends to base its judgments on an apocalyptic objectivity,' effective history seeks to put everything in a historical motion, and dissolve this comforting illusion of identity and firmness and solidity (ibid., 87). The genealogist endorses no constants. Moreover, while traditional history perceives the past as a continuous development and thereby tends to dissolve the singular event into an ideal continuity, a linear succession, and a natural process, effective history reveals the gap in continuity, exposes the contradiction in unity, and overthrows the determination of history. Effective history dismantles the continuity of

²⁹ Nevertheless, although genealogists oppose a traditional form of writing history that provides a linear, continuous, totalised narrative of the past, it should admit that the work by genealogists also give their own narrative account of history. The main difference between them is that, whereas the traditional historians provide inevitable ends towards which history moves, genealogist on the contrary intends to problematise the current world as it is, demonstrating that configurations of the world are contingent, and can always be otherwise. On this account, both the traditional and the genealogical forms of writing history are political interventions.

³⁰ In German, the term 'wirklich' means 'actual, real, true' (*Oxford Duden German Dictionary*). Yet, the English translation of Foucault's article 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in *Foucault Reader* (1984) translates it as 'effective'.

history by dealing with events in terms of their most unique characteristics, and most acute manifestations (ibid., 88). It seeks to make sense of history from the surfaces of events: its small details, minor shifts, and subtle contours. Genealogy is therefore ‘a study of details,’ a ‘grey, meticulous, and patiently documentary,’ requiring a knowledge of details that depends on the accumulation of a vast scope of materials (ibid., 76). Genealogy only looks at subtle, minute and meticulous practices – the surface practices.

This way of doing history that pays attention to the surface practices was manifested in Foucault’s conception of ‘discourse’. The term ‘discourse’ in common usage means ‘a coherent or rational body of speech or writing’ (*Penguin Dictionary of Sociology: Discourse*). Foucault however uses this term with a much broader meaning. Firstly, it does not only refer to the language, but also to other forms of expression, e.g. visual expression. Secondly, it is not restricted to linguistic acts, but also includes the material expressions of those acts. Linguistic acts themselves have a material/physical foundation, e.g. printed words. Thirdly and most importantly, discourse is understood as, in effect, a social practice that can be elucidated in two aspects. The first aspect refers to the way in which discourses are produced by various practices, which are, by nature, dispersed, fragmented and heterogeneous, including both discursive/linguistic (what people say) and social/non-linguistic (what people do) practices. Those practices are diffused in every domain of society. The second aspect refers to the way in which discourses get disseminated in society. On the one hand, they systematically form the objects/subjects of which they speak – the constitution of social entities – and, on the other hand, they reproduce/reshape discourses itself. The social entities are accordingly constituted in discourse. It should be however stressed that the use of words/statements has limits. According to Foucault, one cannot just ‘say’ and ‘do’ what one wishes to ‘say’ and ‘do’. The discourse involves a complex set of practices that keep certain statements, utterances, and conducts in circulation but take other statements, utterances and conducts out of circulation. A specific discourse thus limits or excludes alternative ways in which objects/subjects can be constituted. Discourse in Foucault’s thoughts is therefore understood as a set of practices that constitute certain social entities while at the same time excluding other alternatives. The object/subject – the discursive formation of the social entity – in nature is thus contingent.

Nevertheless, those limited and contingent social entities are generally regarded as complete and absolute. Genealogy therefore problematises forms of knowledge, rationality, and subjectivity that seem given naturally but in fact are contingent socio-historical constructs of discursive practices. It aims to provide a critique of our historical era. This leads to the final feature of the genealogy: the focus on power and on the subject (body).

To Foucault, while discourse produces certain social entities and excludes other alternatives, the practice of discourse, in effect, entails power relations. Human history, in Foucault's understanding, is a constant struggle between different power blocs that attempt to impose their own system of domination. The talk of meaning and value, virtue and goodness conceals strategies of domination. The genealogist's task is to reveal these dominations. It is to investigate the play of power and thus to discover subjection, domination and conflict. The history of men in the end is not progressive, evolutionary and continuous, but power-oriented, contingent and discontinuous. Moreover, Foucault centres the impact of power struggles on the human subject, particularly its body. The human subject for Foucault is at the centre of the struggle between different power blocs. It is both shaped and reshaped by different forces acting upon it. Foucault writes, 'the body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration' (Foucault 1984, 83). And the task of the genealogist is then to expose the subject totally imprinted by history and the destruction of other forms of the subject by the processes of history.

As a consequence, according to Foucault, the genealogist is called to destroy those unwarranted beliefs that were taken for granted. The purpose of a genealogical account of knowledge therefore should be the act of dismantling truths. The knowledge produced by the genealogist 'is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting' (ibid., 88). Foucault here echoes Nietzsche's way of writing history that de-familiarises us from what we now take for granted. Moreover, since Foucault pays attention to the human subject, the core task of genealogy is to challenge any form of subjectification of human being. In other words, genealogy challenges people's understanding of who they are in ways that lead them to resist their attachment to their social identities. One needs to renounce oneself. And his genealogical studies form part of a strategy of renunciation of oneself, exposing the

beginnings and developments of the discourses and practices through which human beings are subjectified. As long as we know how they were made, ‘they can be unmade’ (Foucault 1988, 37).

To conclude, Foucault’s genealogy rejects the possibility that history has a deep meaning, fixed essence or that it reflects primordial truth and instead locates its meaning in surface practices, but aims to discover the history from its surface practices; it refuses to view history as a linear development that has traceable origins, but aims to perceive history which is full of ruptures and discontinuity that has numberless beginnings; and finally it does not aim to construct truths, but aims to dismantle truths that are taken to be unproblematic.

1-5. Key Arguments

Drawing closely from the genealogical method, the thesis, firstly, does not seek a deep meaning, distinctive quality and fixed essence of ‘Taiwanese-ness’/being ‘Taiwanese’; rather, it aims to discover how those meaning/quality/essence in substance are constituted in the surface practices. Secondly, it refuses to view such an identity formation as a linear development of history that has origins; rather, it tries to seek the emergence of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ from numerous points. And thirdly, it does not aim to prove the existence of ‘Taiwanese-ness’; rather, it aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-ness’.

No Deep Meaning, Distinctive Quality and Fixed Essence of “Taiwanese-ness”

To elucidate, with regard to the first point, this thesis does not assume that ‘Taiwanese-ness’ exists beforehand out there waiting to be discovered; rather, the thesis intends to explore how it is discursively constituted. First of all, this thesis does not deny that there is such a thing as Taiwanese-ness and does not contest prevailing ideas about the substance of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, i.e. democratic-ness, civil-ness, anti-colonialism/imperialism and so on. Indeed, ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is whatever substantive quality that is held to be attaching necessarily to being Taiwanese. Nevertheless, admitting the existence of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ does not suggest that this concept is fixed, predetermined, defined, indefinite, taken-for-granted and unproblematic or that we can probe further to discover its origins, characteristics, nature and qualities. This thesis rather attempts to challenge this way of thought.

It is argued: there was no such thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in the first place; nor is ‘Taiwanese-ness’ a single thing; it is subject to different practices – people’s speech and actions. The idea that there is such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ grew gradually. What this thing amounts to is subject to different kinds of practices. Each practice has an input, making it possible to talk about ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and attaching a specific substance (i.e. qualities, features) to it. And this process of construction is not simply one way, either. Particular discourses of Taiwanese-ness in turn make certain actions possible, sustaining or undermining what people say and do. Accordingly, Taiwanese national identity is conditional, lodged in contingency. It has determinate conditions of existence, including the material and symbolic resources required to sustain it. The concept of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ should be seen as a dynamic and fluid rather than as a static concept. It alters all the way down. Taiwanese-ness is not naturally given, but exists in the way people talk and act. In short, there is no such thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ outside of this process of constitution; Taiwanese-ness only exists in discourse. Taiwanese national identity is itself *a discursive entity*. This thesis in this regard is a refusal of the belief that nation or national identity has a fixed, predetermined, and defined ontology.

The following question, accompanying this line of thought, is: How do various practices contribute to ‘Taiwanese-ness’? The proposed answer is that it is constructed through meticulous, varied and heterogeneous practices. ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is accordingly constituted in the most minute and local practices. This argument is then related to the second point.

Neither Origins nor a Linear Development of History

This thesis opposes itself to the search for *origins* of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and refuses to trace the *evolutionary* courses of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ as it is formed. Such an enterprise is problematic, since it, on the one hand, assumes the existence of immobile forms or primordial truth taken to be already there. On the other, it perceives the past as a continuous development, tending to dissolve the singular event into an ideal and, indeed, comporting continuity as a natural process. This thesis therefore rejects a particular storyline that makes it sound as though Taiwanese-ness has its origins and develops ineluctably to the present state of affairs. The thesis by contrast sets out to study numberless beginnings of the formation of Taiwanese identity and attempt to make sense of the proliferating surface

practices. It involves a quest for the subtle, singular and sub-individual marks that might possibly intersect in the formation of a network that is difficult to unravel in the process of identity formation. This thesis, in short, is a study of details.

As mentioned above, ‘discourse analysis’ is the best manifestation of this sort of meticulous work, and the term ‘discourse’ is understood as a domain in which discursive/social practices are exercised. The discursive formation of a Taiwanese identity involves two steps. Firstly, a discourse organised around ‘Taiwanese-ness’, understood as a national identity, is constituted through various social practices; secondly, a discourse of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ becomes disseminated in society via various social practices, on the one hand transforming the discourse itself and, on the other, forming the subjects of which they speak – that is, ‘the Taiwanese’. An analysis of discourse in this regard is threefold: the formation of discourse, the practices of discourse, and the constitution of subjects in discourse. It should be stressed however that not every discourse can be circulated; only certain discourses are disseminated in society, thereby only certain forms of subject are formed accordingly. This thesis argues that identity formation in Taiwan is situated in a realm in which different historical, cultural and political discourses have mutually interacted, intersected and competed. This is then linked with the final point, claiming that the thesis aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-ness’ that is seen as an unproblematic truth in Taiwan.

Dismantling ‘Taiwanese-ness’

There are two grounds for this *political* assertion. Firstly, since many other alternative discourses and political possibilities are omitted, repressed and made to disappear in the discursive formation of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, the concept itself on that account needs to be critically interrogated. Indeed, a complex set of practices that keep certain statements or utterances in/out of circulation involves the play of power, thereby implicating the production of exclusion and inclusion. ‘Discourse’ is a political site of social actions and interventions, where power relations are both established and potentially unsettled. Therefore, the study of discourse involves exposing the relations of power that exist within society at any given moment in order to consider how marginal and subordinate groups are oppressed; or alternatively, they might secure or win, however temporarily, space from the dominant group. The thesis accordingly lays greater stress on the following question: How

does a specific discourse take precedence over other alternatives, leading the people in Taiwan to conceive themselves as Taiwanese.³¹

Secondly, since the modern individual is not naturally born as a subject but is subjectified in discourse, subjectivity itself is then conditioned through power relations. The individual is interpreted as an effect of the political technologies through which its very identity, desires, body, and soul are shaped and constituted. The ultimate goal and effect of power is to normalise and to eliminate all social and psychological irregularities, producing useful and docile subjects through a refashioning of minds and bodies. Thus, control/domination is achieved not through direct repression but through more invisible forces, aiming to produce a particular type of subject. It is power that makes individuals subjects. The modern subject is thus a construct of domination. As such, this thesis intends to create a history of the different modes that the people residing in the island of Taiwan are made subject and to expose the beginnings and developments of current subjectifying discourses and practices. In other words, this thesis always asks how we become who and what we are in our present form.

1-6. The Outline of the Thesis:

In short, this thesis is juxtaposed against conventional forms of writing history that aim to search for an origin of Taiwanese-ness, to trace the path of a linear development of Taiwanese identity formation, and to seek out a ‘hidden’ nature of Taiwanese that is assumed exists out there, waiting to be discovered. This thesis, instead, aims to discover how the ‘nature’ of Taiwanese-ness is constituted in social practices, to seek the emergence of Taiwanese-ness from innumerable practices; and finally, it aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-ness’, which has come to be seen as an unproblematic truth in Taiwan. This thesis sees the

³¹ As argued in this thesis, the method of genealogy is to de-familiarise and de-comfort from what we now take for granted. However, in contrast to Foucault’s analysis in *History of Sexuality*, in which he tried to reveal the content of marginalised discourses, this thesis focused mostly on enabling discourses and their production, rather than disabling practices. The thesis argues that production automatically involves exclusion. When power enables people to talk, it concurrently expels other alternative voices. The thesis therefore tried to demonstrate how the dominant discourse of Taiwanese-ness has emerged in contemporary Taiwanese society, coming to occupy discursive spaces, thereby disabling alternative ways of speaking about identity on the island. The thesis places itself in a sub-tradition of Foucauldian genealogy.

reality of social phenomena residing in their appearances. There is no origin, no essence, and no stable process of internal development, thus the thesis focuses only on surface practices, arguing that this is all there is. What this thesis is trying to do is to trace various social practices, in which certain things were said and done, things which in turn underpin the production of a particular kind of Taiwanese identity. ‘What Taiwanese-ness is’ is constituted in and through a variety of subtle social practices, and in which discourses mutually interact, intersect and compete. Yet, it is not possible to undertake an exhaustive enquiry of the process, examining each and every social practice that may affect its formation. Consequently, the thesis, alternatively, explores only certain events involved.

The thesis, apart from Introduction, theoretical framework (Chapter Two) and Conclusion, is composed of four independent essays. Each essay examines an individual social practice/event/incident. The selection of each example is not made chronologically. The thesis does not intend to provide *the* linear development, or *the* grand narrative, of the formation of Taiwanese national identity.

Chapter Three investigates the close relationships between the production of knowledge and the constitution of Taiwanese identity. It concentrates on two forms of knowledge: historians’ narrations of Taiwan’s history and political theorists’ explorations of political lives. The chapter argues that the idea of the human subject as Taiwanese is produced in the domains of knowledge. Historians play a significant role in identity formation since identity formation in Taiwan is intimately associated with how one narrates one’s past, what one excavates from one’s memories, and how one interprets one’s history. Likewise, political theorists also contribute greatly to the formation of Taiwanese national identity given that they are concerned with the questions of what one *ought to be* and in which way one should live together in the future. The production of knowledge should be regarded as a sort of social practice that helps to constitute what ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is.³²

³² To a certain extent, the analysis conducted in Chapter Three is different from those in the subsequent two chapters (Chapter Four and Five). Whereas the later chapters scrutinised specific events, demonstrating how the historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s authoritarian rule have emerged again, Chapter Three did not investigate the processes and the procedures of knowledge production. Such efforts can be done through studies that, for instance, examine specific academic institutes or associations to see how institutions enable and disable certain forms of knowledge production. The limited aim of Chapter Three is to identify several widespread ‘explanations’ of the formation of Taiwanese identity in the current scholarly literature – in the form

Chapter Four scrutinises the controversy surrounding the Japanese Cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori's manga [comic book], *On Taiwan* published in 2001. It attempts to understand how the publication of a manga, as a social practice, helps constitute people's self-identification in Taiwan. This chapter focuses on how the manga has been received in Taiwanese society, identifying the issues/ideologies that have emerged and how they have been discussed. It also examines which alternatives, if any, have been repressed, silenced and made to disappear in the process.

Chapter Five deals with political ritual and ceremonies associated with identity formation in Taiwan. It focuses on an election campaign rally in the 2004 presidential election – the 228-Hand-in-Hand Rally. This chapter provides a thick description of the rally, arguing that in a specific political context, the 2-28 Incident was represented both as a warning of the potential consequences of unification with China, and as a symbol of the reconciliation of different ethnic groups in Taiwan. As a result, the 2-28 Incident must be commemorated as a trauma in order to differentiate Taiwan from China on the one hand. However, on the other hand, it is also necessary to forget the 2-28 Incident in order to form a united and harmonious Taiwanese nation. Thus, Taiwanese nation-building is very much intertwined with 'remembering' and 'forgetting' the history of the 2-28 Incident.

Chapter Six investigates the so-called Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006. It is argued that the movement should be understood as a resistance to the formation of Taiwanese national identity for three reasons. The first of these is that it opposed the idea that everything under the name of 'Love Taiwan', 'Nation-State-Building', or 'localisation' can be legitimised. The second is that the campaigners deliberately rejected all talk of identity issues. This rejection itself should be understood as an act of resistance. Finally, it attempted to resist the dichotomy of Green/Blue, Independence/Unification, and Taiwanese/Chinese, aiming to invoke higher universal values. This movement, however, ultimately failed because it unwittingly became trapped in the confrontation between the two political camps, two ideologies, and two national identities.

of historical narratives as well as political rhetoric – that pave the way for further analysis undertaken in Chapters Four and Five, which aimed to show how those historical narratives and political rhetoric were replicated in various social practices and events while silencing other alternatives.

The limits of this thesis need to be pointed out at this point. The focus of this thesis is on discursive strategies that manifested in social practices/events, rather than on the material structures that make the constitution of Taiwanese national identity possible. This means that the material resources (i.e. finances) that each force obtains are not within the remit of this thesis to tackle. Moreover, the population of Taiwan in this thesis is reductively classified as Taiwanese sympathisers versus Chinese sympathisers. Other forms of categorisation – say, class, gender, generation, etc – are excluded and the analysis of internal differences within respective categories is omitted.

To conclude this Introduction, this thesis seeks to examine what people say and do and how that constitutes certain subjectivities and political possibilities. Taiwanese-ness or Taiwanese national identity exists only in discourse, as Pierre Riviere ‘exists’ only in a dossier. And if the concept of ‘Taiwanese’ is not an essentialism problem of thought but in fact exists only on the surface, it follows that it may also be only a transient preoccupation of contemporary thought. When people stop talking about ‘Taiwanese-ness’, it will herald the end of the subject, the death of the ‘Taiwanese’, in the same way that Foucault writes of man being erased, ‘like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’ (Foucault 1970, 387)

CHAPTER 2

The Discursive Constitution of National Identity

A Theoretical Investigation

2-1. Introduction

This chapter aims to justify the methodology adopted in, and to pave the way for the analysis to be undertaken in this thesis. It particularly intends to clarify some key concepts – namely, discourse, power relations, and subject – which the analysis throughout the whole thesis will refer to. Drawing closely on Foucault, these concepts are understood differently from the conventional usage in the scholarly literature on nationalism and/or national identity. The term ‘discourse’ is understood as highly divergent, fragmented and heterogeneous in nature, and as dispersed in the domain of society through various discursive and non-discursive (social) practices. The term ‘power’ is perceived not as possessed by particular individuals solely, but as diffused through more devious and invisible forms of forces that constitute people’s subjectivities. ‘Subject’ is therefore always *subjected*, and is constituted in power relations.

This chapter will be divided into three sections. The first section will survey the current literature on nationalism and national identity in general, and identify gaps in those studies. The second section will then turn to the discussion of Foucault’s conception of discourse. The final section will deal with the concepts of power and the subject.

2-2. On ‘National identity’

2-2-1. Identity

The concept of identity has provoked widespread discussion across many academic disciplines. It would be impossible to provide a detailed survey here of all the most

important theories of identity. Instead, this chapter will focus on the fluidity and changing nature of this given identity.

At first sight, the term 'identity' refers to 'sameness' and 'oneness'. In the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED), the term is defined as 'the quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness' (OED, 'identity'). This sameness/oneness makes reference to a person or a thing at all times or in all circumstances. The concept therefore indicates a condition that 'a person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, personality' (ibid.). John Locke in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1975), explains the concept of identity as follows:

[When] considering any thing as existing at any determin'd time and place, we compare it with it self existing at another time, and thereon form the *Ideas* of *Identity* and *Diversity*...one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning...That therefore that had one beginning is the same thing, and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is not the same but divers (1975, 328).

One of the deviations of the term indicates a sense of 'belongingness'. When one identifies the sameness/oneness with others, then one forms a sense of belongingness with those others. OED also defines the term 'identity' as 'belonging or relating to identity, as in identity crisis, a phase of varying severity undergone by an individual in his need to establish his identity in relation to his associates and society as part of the process of maturing' (OED, 'identity').

However, such an absolute criterion – sameness or oneness – is highly contestable. Everything changes constantly. Individual persons change in the course of their lives physically and mentally. Likewise, an object changes ceaselessly in terms of its material constitution, as a microscopic examination reveals. Aristotle gives a good example when discussing whether a *polis* (city-state) ought to be spoken of as the same or as different when it changes its constitution, say, a democracy replacing an oligarchy or a tyranny. He states:

For if the city is a type of partnership, and if it is a partnership of citizens in a regime, if the regime becomes and remains different in kind, it might be held that the city as well is necessarily not the same. At any rate, just as we assert that a chorus which is at one time comic and at another tragic is different even though the human beings in it are often the same, it is similar with any other partnership and any compound, when the compound takes a different form – for example, we

would say that mode is different even when the notes are the same, if it is at one time Dorian and at another Phrygian. If this is indeed the case, it is evident that it is looking to the regime above all that the city must be said to be the same; the term one calls it can be different or the same no matter whether the same human beings inhabit it or altogether different ones. (Aristotle 1984, 88-9)

The problematic of the absolute ‘sameness’ and ‘oneness’, briefly discussed above, demonstrates an important line of argument in the studies of ‘identity’. That is: the concept of identity (apart from the formal sense of the term used in logic and mathematics) never signifies anything static, unchanging, or substantial, but rather always an element situated in the flow of time, ever changing, something involving a process. By acknowledging the changing and fluid nature of ‘being identical’, this chapter then turns its gaze to the concept of ‘nation’ or ‘nationality’, which by its nature is highly unstable and ambiguous.

2-2-2. Conceptualising ‘Nation’ – Competing Discourses in Defining ‘Nation’

Nation (or nationality) is the most universally taken-for-granted, and perhaps legitimate, value in the political life of our time. Ernest Gellner in his *Nation and Nationalism* (1983) states that the idea of man without nation goes beyond people’s imagination in the modern era. He interprets Peter Schlemieh – a man who lost his shadow – of the French writer Adelbert von Chamisso’s proto-Kafkaesque novel as a man without nationality. And that of a man without nation as if a man without shadow in effect, according to Gellner, ‘defies the recognised categories and provokes a sense of uncomfortable-ness’ (1983, 6). Gellner describes this necessity for modern human beings being required to have a nationality as they must have ‘a nose and two ears’ (ibid.). Gellner writes, ‘a deficiency in any of these particulars is not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but only as a result of some disaster, and it is itself a disaster of a kind’ (ibid.). Having a nationality as ‘an inherent attribute’ of human kind has come to be naturalised in the modern era.

In fact, not only is ‘nation’ indispensable, but it is also powerful. Rupert Emerson (1960) points to the overwhelming dominance of national allegiance as compared with all other forms of identity, such as the family, the tribe. The nation, states Emerson, is ‘today the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands men’s loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it...In this sense the nation can be called a “terminal community” with the implication that it is for present purposes the effective end of the road for man as a social animal, the endpoint

of working solidarity between men' (1960, 96-7). Any other grouping/community, although it may have vanished from the scene, 'yields pride of place to the nation in the sense that for constantly growing numbers of men the claims of the nation have come to act as taking priority over claims coming from any other source' (ibid., 95-6). Indeed, those other group loyalties have been absorbed into the nation.

Nevertheless, although the nation is pervasive, indispensable and dominant in all human affairs, it is a fact that neither 'nation' nor 'nationality' has a clear, comprehensive or satisfying definition/connotation, or of what it is. Carlton Hayes notes that the word 'nation' is 'tantalizingly ambiguous' (1926, 89). Everyone has his/her own different ideas. Likewise, E. H. Carr points out that 'the nation is not a definable and clearly recognizable entity' (1945, 40). Benedict Anderson also writes, 'nation, nationality, nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone to analyse' (1991, 3). Harold Isaac argues that it depends on who is looking. He writes, 'One distinguished scholar after another has made the safari over time and come back to describe what he has seen; but each, like an artist, has painted his own vision of what he saw, and no two portraits have been quite alike' (1975, 173). Indeed, there is no agreement of and no commonly accepted view of what precisely 'nation' is, what it looks like, and more substantially, what it is composed of. As Isaacs describes,

Everyone has his own list of the parts that go into the making of a nation...usually mentioning shared culture, history, tradition, language, religion, some adding 'race' as well as the elements of territory...that all go in their varying measures into the making of what is called a 'nation'. (Ibid., 174)

'On closer examination' however, continues Isaacs, 'it seems no single part could be shown to be unique or indispensable to nationhood' (ibid.). No one can ever really be confident 'what it is that makes the existence of a singularly important national *We* which is distinguished from all others who make up an alien *they*' (ibid.; emphasis added). As Isaacs describes, nation – being 'so formidably real in the real world of everyone's everyday existence' – is indeed an 'abominable snowman', which has 'eluded all efforts of scholars to agree on what precisely it is' (ibid.).

As Isaacs describes, many scholars have made a concerted effort to understand what the 'nation' is. Those scholars can be roughly categorized into two pairs of contending

schools of thought: the first is Primordialism versus Liberalism while the second is Modernism versus Ethnic-Symbolism.

Primordialism vs. Liberalism

One of the earliest nationalist thinkers, the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder, developed the idea of '*Volk*'. For Herder, *Volk* is 'a community bound together by blood-ties and characterised by a particular language, culture, religion, and set of customs' (Musgrave 1997, 5). Herder understands *Volk* in organic terms, as if 'a family', but 'only spread more widely' (Herder 1911 XIII, 384; cited in Llobera 1994, 169). Herder particularly emphasises the prominence of language. The world for Herder is composed of a variety of linguistic nations. Each language grows naturally over a long period of time on the basis of the particular natural and cultural environment in which it is situated. 'A language for Herder,' as Josep R. Llobera summarises, 'is not only the most distinctive expression of the spirit of a nation, but also the only way in which the latter can manifest itself' (Llobera 1994, 168). It is 'the royal path to the identity of nation; *Volk* and language cannot be conceived independently of each other' (ibid.). The nation therefore is one composed of a single people disclosing its own unique national character, which is expressed in terms of a shared language. Moreover, Herder argues that nationhood should be the basis for statehood. He writes, 'the family is a product of nature. The most natural state is, therefore, a state composed of a single people with a single national character' (Herder 1911 XIII, 384; cited in Llobera 1994, 169). For Herder, each nation should have the right to possess its own separate state, uninfluenced and unimpeded by others. While Herder thought of ethnic-ties as one of the elements constituting a nation, the socialist Joseph Stalin focuses only on cultural attributions but abandoned ethnic ties. He argues that a nation is not racial or tribal such as the modern Italian nation, but 'a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' (Stalin 1973, 60).

In contrast to the objective (consanguineous and cultural) aspects of 'nation', another line of thought, as termed liberalism, stresses the subjective facets in defining what 'nation' is. One of the most important works of this kind is by Ernest Renan. Renan views natural conceptions of the nation with great suspicion. He contends that man should not be restricted to one race, language or religion. 'Man is the slave neither of his race, nor his

language, nor his religion, nor the windings of his rivers and mountain ranges' (Renan 1939, 205). He, instead, describes a nation as 'a soul, a spiritual principle', which is made up by the two things that lie in the past and in the present respectively. The former refers to the common possession of 'a rich heritage of memories,' and the latter speaks of an 'agreement, the desire to live together, and the will to continue to make the most of the joint heritage – a willingness to make a common life together' (ibid., 202-03). Regarding the latter, Renan famously contends the existence of a nation 'is a daily plebiscite' (ibid., 203). Renan's elaborations of 'nation' reveal an important element for liberalism in its efforts to define what is 'nation', that is, people's political willingness to be grouped together and the right to freedom of association. This *subjective* criterion is in sharp contradistinction to the primordialist emphasis on *objective* factors like common language, religion or race. In this regard, a nation for liberalists is legitimate only when the people join it voluntarily.

More recently, liberals such as Habermas (1996) have identified the 'nation' with its citizens. He defines a 'nation' as a political community of people that share and obey the same laws and institutions within a given territory. In the civic nation, members are related through territorial birth and residence; they possess citizenship in a territorial political community, and are integrated by a unified legal system and a mass public culture. Liberals therefore emphasise people's 'institutional' or 'constitutional' identity rather than their 'cultural' or 'ethnic' identity. When analysing the tension between republicanism and nationalism, Habermas writes that 'the constitutional principles of human rights and democracy give priority to a cosmopolitan understanding of the nation as a nation of citizens over and against an ethnocentric interpretation of the nation as a pre-political entity' (1996, 286-7). Moreover, the emphasis on institutional or constitutional identity helps Habermas to transcend the limits of nation-state and to achieve a supranational ideal. The formation of 'European constitutional patriotism' therefore becomes possible (Habermas 1992, 12).

The two different conceptions of 'nation' introduced above are manifestations of a longstanding tendency in the scholarly literature to split the conception of 'nation' or 'nationality' into two fundamentally different traditions – primordialism and liberalism. Primordialism is used to describe scholars who hold that nationality is a 'natural part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and that nations have existed since time immemorial' (Ozkirimli 2000, 64). The scholars from this line of thought lay their stress in

the antiquity and naturalness of the nation. They argue that the nation is a primordial category, that is founded upon shared primordial attachments, including genetic (i.e. ethnical) and cultural ties (i.e. historical, religious and linguistic). In contrast, the liberal conceptualisation of ‘nation’, often described as a ‘civic’ model of the nation, refers to several components of what it possesses: historical territory, laws and institutions, legal and political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology (Smith 2005, 178-9).

The dichotomy seems to be widely accepted.³³ Interestingly, it is generally made alongside the West-East division,³⁴ and this often seems to lead to normative evaluations, i.e. ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Musgrave adopts this dualistic approach when considering a people’s right to self-determination. He argues that the right to self-determination in the Western tradition ‘drew its inspiration primarily from the Enlightenment ideas of popular sovereignty and representative government,’ inherited from John Locke, Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Musgrave 1997, 2). The concept in the Eastern tradition, by contrast, was based on the ‘phenomenon of nationalism’, influenced by Herder and Giuseppe Mazzini (ibid., 2-13). This means that, writes Musgrave, ‘in Western Europe and United States the concept had a political orientation which generally did not take ethnic considerations into account, whereas in Central and Eastern Europe the concept was much more strongly linked to ethnic and cultural factors’ (ibid., 2). The right to self-determination in the Western tradition occurred ‘within the pre-existing boundaries of the state, and was exercised by all citizens of the state, whatever their ethnic or linguistic attributes’ (ibid., 13). Self-determination in the East conversely took place whenever a ‘nation’ – which is generally defined as sharing the same ethnic and cultural attributes – aimed to create its own nation-state.

However, diverging from the dichotomy being made, some scholars instead attempt to blur this division. Yael Tamir (1993) for instance argues that liberalism and nationalism are not irreconcilable. She offers a theory she describes as ‘liberal nationalism’, which, she claims, allows each set of values to accommodate the other. She contends that

The liberal tradition, with its respect for personal autonomy, reflection, and choice, and the national tradition, with its emphasis on belonging, loyalty, and solidarity,

³³ Different terminology is often used, such as nationalism versus liberalism, or ethnic nationalism versus civic nationalism, or communitarianism versus liberalism, though.

³⁴ Anthony D. Smith, for instance, speaks of the Western conception of the nation being equivalent to ‘civic nationalism,’ whereas the non-Western one is ‘ethnic’ in nature (2005, 177-83).

although generally seen as mutually exclusive, can indeed accommodate one another. The liberal can acknowledge the importance of belonging, membership and cultural affiliations, as well as the particular moral commitments that follow from them. The nationalist can appreciate the values of personal autonomy and individual rights and freedoms, and sustain a commitment for social justice both between and within nations. (1993, 6)

Likewise, David Miller (1995) suggests a theory of national identity that incorporates some ingredients extracted from both primordialism and liberalism while rejecting others. Miller defined the 'nation' as 'the ethical community' (1995, 11). He argues that there are five elements constituting a 'nation', which include: a shared belief and mutual commitment, historical continuity, active identity, a particular geographical place, and a common public culture. He emphasises people's common will and rejects the conventional nationalist definition of 'nation', which is based on biological descent. In this regard, he clearly adopts some features of the liberals' conceptualisation of nation, arguing that a nation only exists when its members 'recognise on another as compatriots,' and 'believe they share characteristics of the relevant kind' (ibid., 22). Also, he believes that a nation is a community in which its members 'do things together, take decisions...and so forth.' This is what he called 'active identity' (ibid., 24). However, he also inherits the traditional nationalists' political claims that emphasise the need for shared culture. He writes, 'a national identity requires that the people who share it should have something in common, a set of characteristics that in the past was often referred to as a *national character*...' (ibid., 25; emphasis added), though he tries to reformulate the idea of 'national character' as 'a public culture' being seen as 'a set of understanding about how a group of people is to conduct its life together' (ibid., 26).

Modernism vs. Ethnic-Symbolism

Different from the aforementioned two traditions, another line of thought concerning the concept of 'nation' emphasises the social construction of 'nation', or 'nationality'. Orthodox examples of this line of thought are often described as modernist approaches to the nation. According to Anthony D. Smith (2000), this line of thinking argues that, nation, together with nationalism and the international system of nation-states, are all the 'product of specifically *modern* conditions, namely, capitalism, bureaucracy, industrialism, urbanisation, secularism and the like' (2000, 4). In other words, the common denominator of modernist

approaches is a belief in the modernity of nations. One of the most original exponents of modernism is Ernest Gellner.

Gellner in his *Nation and Nationalism* (1983) contends that the nation is a product of modernity. According to him, a nation is not given in nature, nor is it an intrinsic component of the human condition; rather, it is sociologically and economically necessary in the modern world, the one he called the age of 'industrial society'. Gellner argues that in industrial society, due to its thirst for affluence and growth, the population has to be mobile and literate. People therefore need a shared culture – a literate, sophisticated and homogeneous culture – in order that they might communicate with each other impersonally over increasing geographical distances. In this circumstance, people gradually formed a shared high culture. And it is this high culture, sustained and enacted by the state and co-extensive with society, which united the mass and the elites, transforming the villagers into effective modern citizens. Nationalism is subsequently formed in this social and economic context. The formation of high culture in the industrial society is visible outwardly as the coming of nationalism. Gellner writes:

When general social conditions make for standardised, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. Only *then* does it come to appear that any defiance of their boundaries by political units constitutes a scandal. (Gellner 1983, 55; emphasis in original)

'Nationalism' is thereby understood as 'the striving to make culture and polity congruent, to endow a culture with its own political roof, and not more than one roof at that' (ibid., 43). This line of argument leads to Gellner's most famous statement: 'nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it *invents* nations where they do not exist' (Gellner 1964, 19). In other words, it is not nations that engender nationalism; rather, it is nationalism that invents nations. The nation, in this regard, is invented to act as a cement for mobile populations in the modern world. And while states and nations do not often coincide, the principle of 'one nation, one state' is being applied. Gellner writes that 'nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983, 1).

Similarly emphasising the ‘invented’ nature of the nation by nationalism, Benedict Anderson’s *Imagined Communities* (1991) has also been an influential contribution to this line of thought. He argues that nation is an ‘imagined community’. A nation, defined by Anderson, ‘is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (1991, 6).³⁵ Anderson argues that ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ and ‘nationalism’ are all ‘cultural artefacts of a particular kind’ (ibid.,4). He contends that the construction of these ‘artefacts’ towards the end of the eighteenth century was ‘the spontaneous distillation of a complex “crossing” of discrete historical forces’ (ibid., 4). However, once they were created, Anderson continues,

They became ‘modular’, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations. (Ibid., 4)

According to Anderson, the convergence of capitalism, print technology, and the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, setting the stage for the formation of the modern nation (ibid., 37-46). He argues that these imagined communities developed following the collapse of the sacred languages of the Middle Ages (such as Latin, Arabic, and Chinese), and the substitution of original, vernacular languages which were standardised and spread through the printed word in novels and newspapers. The development of print technologies enabled millions of individuals to conceive of their fellow readers as compatriots. The emergence of the newspaper, in particular, enabled the formation of a co-national imagination through a simultaneous and constant reading of the same texts among people who never actually met each other. Moreover, this new form of imagined community originally developed in Latin America, and was then widely ‘pirated’ in North America, in Europe, and subsequently in the rest of the world. The nation, as Anderson describes it, is ‘an invention on which it was impossible to secure a patent’ (ibid., 67).

What Anderson aims to demonstrate is that belonging to or identifying with a nation is a process of mental-construction rather than an objective fact or a timeless loyalty to the

³⁵ As he states, it is *imagined* because members of nations never meet most other members; it is *limited* because even the largest of them has limits; it is imagined as *sovereign* because the concept was born in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution ‘destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm;’ it refers to *communities* because the nation is always conceived of in terms of deeply felt comradeship (Anderson 1991, 6-7).

land and the people. He avoids the swamp of discussion of the objective criteria of a nation but points out the cognitive process of collective identity as a nation. In other words, he characterises nations not by their authenticity but by the way in which they are imagined. For Anderson, any existing national identity is the product of historical developments. In this regard, nation is not a fabricated consciousness but a real social entity. Anderson's work therefore should not be deemed as an attempt to problematise a holistic view of the nation, even though he pointed out the man-made attribute of it. His studies on nationalism, says Anderson himself, is to understand how nations 'have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy' (ibid., 4).

Modernist arguments have however been challenged by those who advocate understanding the nation in terms of a so-called ethnic-symbolism. This approach focuses on the role of pre-existing ethnic ties and sentiments in the formation of the nations. The term ethnic-symbolism is used to 'denote scholars who aim to uncover the symbolic legacy of pre-modern ethnic identities for today's nations' (Ozkirimli, 2000, 168). It aims to propose 'a compromise', or 'a kind of midway', between primordial-nationalism and modernism (ibid., 168). The proponents of ethnic-symbolism argue that modernists systematically overlook or underestimate the 'ethnic' origins of a nation. The term 'ethnic origins' here refers to 'the persistence of earlier myths, symbols, values and memories in many parts of the world and their continuing significance for larger numbers of people' (ibid., 167).

Anthony D. Smith is one of the leading exponents of this line of thought. In his article 'The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?' (1993), Smith argues that the emergence of modern nations cannot be understood properly without taking their pre-existing ethnic attributes into accounts. In other words, a nation cannot be constructed on the basis of pure 'invention' or 'imagination' without any solid ethnic grounds. As opposed to modernist arguments, Smith contends that nations are in effect 'reconstructed'. He states:

Where the modern nation claims a distinctive ethnic past, as so often happens, 'invented traditions' turns out to be more akin to 'reconstruction' of *aspects of that past*. The latter acts as a constraint on 'invention'. Though the past can be 'read' in different ways, it is not any past, but rather the past of that particular community, with its distinctive patterns of events, personages and milieux. It is not possible to

appropriate or annex the past of another community in the construction of the modern nation. (1993, 358; emphasis in original)

Following this line of argument, 'nation' is then defined in his *National Identity* (1991) as 'a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members' (1991, 14). For Smith, the nation-building project relies on their ethnic attributes.³⁶ The lack of those would create a serious impediment to the project. It is however important to note that to Smith the nation is still socially or historically constructed. This way of understanding 'nation' is apparently shared with modernists. Yet, in contrast to the modernists, his arguments emphasise the importance of ethnic attributes as the essential ingredients in the construction of the modern nations. His theory of nation/nationalism is therefore seen as a concession to primordial-nationalism.

The modernist way of conceptualising 'nation', which points out the man-made attributes of the nation no matter how it is invented or imagined, has assumed the status of orthodoxy within the study of the emergence of modern nations. Their argument might be amended by ethnic-symbolism. Yet it is generally agreed in the current scholarly literature on nationalism that the nation is a product of the modern imagination and a historical invention. This line of conceptualising 'nation' provides a starting point for many empirical studies of the construction of national identities. Those scholarly works on 'nation' or 'nationalism' indicate the constitutive nature of the modern nation: for instance, Krishan Kumar (2003), Alexander Grant et al. (ed.) (1995), Geoffrey Cubitt (ed.) (1998), and Bernard Crick et al. (ed.) (1991).

2-2-3. The Social Construction of Nationality: Invention of Tradition vs. Discursive Formation

If the nation is a modern construction, or if, as Anderson contends, an imagined community, a mental construct, and an imaginary complex of ideas containing the defining elements of collective unity and equality of boundaries and autonomy, this imagination is then real to the extent that one is convinced of it and believes in it emotionally. Whether a nation is imagined, invented or reconstructed, an important question has arisen following

³⁶ Smith defines ethnic community (or *ethnie*, the French term used by Smith) as follows: 'a collective proper name', 'a myth of common ancestry,' 'shared historical memories,' 'common culture,' 'homeland,' and 'a sense of solidarity' (Smith 1991, 21).

this argument. That is: how does this community reach the minds of those who are convinced of it and how is it sustained? There are two approaches in the current scholarly literature which draw particular attention to answer this question. The first is related to a series of studies on the 'Invention of Tradition', developed by the historian Eric J. Hobsbawm and other proponents. They all pay great attention to various social practices, such as commemorations, political rituals, and ceremonies. The second approach concerns the works of Stuart Hall and his followers, which argue that a nation is constructed and conveyed in discourse, or discursive practice, predominantly in narratives of national culture. National identity to them is thus the product of discourse.

Invention of Tradition

In his introduction to the book *The Invention of Tradition* (1983), which he co-edited with Ranger, Hobsbawm provides a theoretical discussion of what he means by 'invented tradition'. The term, according to Hobsbawm, refers to two forms of 'tradition'. One is those '*traditions* actually invented, constructed and formally instituted,' and the other is 'those emerging in a less easily traceable manner with a brief and dateable period – a matter of a few years perhaps – and establishing themselves with great rapidity' (Hobsbawm 1983a, 1; emphasis in original). Therefore, those 'traditions' which claim to be old are actually invented, or quite recent in origins. Hobsbawm defines the term as follows:

[a] set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies *continuity* with the past. In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to establish *continuity* with a suitable historic past. (Ibid., 1; emphasis added)

According to this definition, 'invented tradition' has significant ritual and symbolic function, and is by nature a process of 'formalisation' and 'ritualisation', characterised by reference to the past, being imposed by continuity and repetition. And moreover, Hobsbawm argues that the continuity of these traditions is largely fictitious; they are a reaction to new social and political needs. He states:

[Invented traditions] are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition. It is the contrast between the constant change and innovation of the modern world and the attempt to structure at least some parts of social life within it as unchanging and invariant...(ibid., 2)

Hobsbawm hence takes heed of the break in continuity which is often overlooked. He indicates the rupture between the past and present. What is a 'novel situation' then? Here Hobsbawm particularly makes reference to the nation-building in the modern era. He contends that the nation and its associated phenomena are the most prevalent of such invented traditions. Those invented traditions have come into existence as part of nationalist movements. Hobsbawm indicates three overlapping types of invented tradition, which include:

- a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion or the memberships of groups, real or artificial communities, b) those establishing or legitimising institutions, status or relations of authority, and c) those whose main purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of behaviour. (ibid., 9)

These three types manifest a fact that 'communitarian' invented traditions were the basic type (ibid., 10). And for Hobsbawm, 'communitarian' mainly refers to 'nation' or 'nation-state' (ibid., 13-4).

In another article, 'Mass-Producing Tradition: Europe, 1870-1914' (1983b), Hobsbawm provides a historical analysis of those invented traditions. He contends that the period from 1870 to 1914 can be considered as the climax of invented traditions. The invention of traditions was enthusiastically practised during this period. While some were enacted by states (what he calls 'political' traditions), others were practiced by social groups such as clubs and fraternities. The mass-produced traditions during this period, according to Hobsbawm, reflect profound social transformation – rapid industrialization and political mobilisation. This transformation made the traditional forms of ruling by authorities more difficult and impracticable, requiring 'new methods of ruling' or 'establishing bonds of loyalty', so as to control the newly enfranchised masses in an era of popular mobilisation and democratisation (1983b, 263). The invention of tradition in this respect was the main strategy adopted by the ruling class to counter the threat posed by this social transformation, to maintain or even establish the loyalty, obedience and cooperation of its subjects and members, and its own legitimacy among them. While Hobsbawm examined a large number of invented traditions in the Third Republic of France, the Second German Empire and the United States, he singles out various innovations of the period as particularly relevant, including the creation of official public holidays, the invention of public ceremonies, the construction of public monuments, massive public buildings and sculptures. Those

innovations all aim to produce a wide and genuine popular resonance. Hobsbawm writes, 'invention succeeded mainly in proportion to its success in broadcasting on a wavelength to which the public was ready to tune in' (ibid., 263). Moreover, those invented traditions – formal and informal, official and unofficial, political and social – were all taken over by the 'nation-state'. As a result, the nation-state 'increasingly defined the largest stage on which the crucial activities determining human lives as subjects and citizens were played out' (ibid., 264). In the nineteenth-century, according to Hobsbawm, politics was essentially nation-wide politics, and nationalism became the most important agent of social control.

In short, for Hobsbawm, the nation is constructed in the process by which political and cultural elites participated in waking the people by reminding their 'co-nationals' of their common past and destiny, through practices such as cultural festivals, political rituals, education, and so on. The ruling elites engineered 'invented traditions' of a largely fabricated national historical symbolism and mythology, thereby being able to channel the energies of the masses into new forms of state system and new kinds of community. It is therefore in the interests of ruling elites to foster such sense of continuity, so as to internalize the mass and instil new values of order and hierarchy. Only by this means can the ruling elites retrieve their control over the dangerous and dislocating processes of social transformation which threaten to over turn the existing social order. The historical continuity of the nation and nation itself is therefore, for Hobsbawm, invented. His approach underlines the strongly instrumentalist nature of the invention of the very nation.

Hobsbawm's theoretical and historical analysis on the relations between the invention of tradition and the formation of nation of the modern era reflect a fairly great number of historical studies that devote themselves to the investigation of the construction of the modern nation through the invention of tradition. Hugh Trevor-Roper (1983), for instance, when discussing Scottish national identity, argues that the so-called the 'Highland Tradition of Scotland', such as the kilt woven in a tartan whose colour and pattern indicates the clans, which are generally ascribed 'great antiquity', are actually very recent. They were developed after, sometimes long after, the Union with England.³⁷ According to Trevor-Roper, Scotsmen did not form a distinct people. They were simply the immigrants from Ireland, and these two Celtic societies (Ireland and Highland), politically and culturally merged into each

³⁷ The construction of the Scottish nation in this sense should be seen as resistance to the Union.

other. It was not until later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries that an independent Highland tradition and the Scottish Nation were created.³⁸ Likewise, Prys Morgan (1983) in his studies of Welsh nation-building contends that Welsh nationalists put great effort into recovering its tradition. However, while the old way of life had disappeared and the past had become tattered and threadbare, a great deal of invention was then required. According to Morgan, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Welsh intellectuals ‘rediscovered the past historical, linguistic and literary traditions, and where those traditions were inadequate, they created a past which had never existed’ (Morgan 1983, 44-5). Therefore, the intellectuals ‘who noted the decay,’ writes Morgan, ‘were the ones who recreated the past’ (ibid., 45). Morgan in his lengthy chapter painstakingly examines the creations of Welsh tradition in terms of its language (Welsh), religion (Druidism), clan (Celts), music (the Land of Song), national dress (the style of Mother Goose), national heroes (Owain Glyndwr and Madoc Gwynedd), landscape (the great beauty of the Mountain Land), heraldry (leek, three ostrich plumes, red dragon, daffodil, triple harp, and Welsh mountain goat). Morgan not only pays attention to the role of individuals (such as bards), cultural festivals (such as eisteddfod), and associations (such as ‘Welsh Society’ or the ‘Cymmrodorion Society’), but also to events (such as ‘The Treason of the Blue Books’).

This line of scholarly literature all focuses on the relationship between the past and the present, and between memory and identity. The questions they ask, most commonly, are, for instance, how do people understand the past? Or, how is public memory shaped (or controlled) through various social practices presenting the past to the public? While some of these studies give the general accounts of how the past is (re)created in nation-building as demonstrated above, others examine carefully various specific social practices or institutions charged with presenting the past to the public. For instance, a number of studies particularly examine the national museum, asking how museums – including national expositions, galleries and archives – construct narratives and histories through processes of collection, preservation and exhibition.³⁹ Those studies aim to explore the ways in which such

³⁸ Trevor-Roper argues this process occurred in three stages: (1) the cultural revolt against Ireland, (2) the artificial creation of new Highland traditions presented as ancient, original and distinctive, and (3) the imposition of that new tradition on the lowlands.

³⁹ Carol Duncan is a pioneer in seeing the museum’s exhibition as an ideological practice. In her two essays – ‘The Museum of Modern Art as Late Capitalist Ritual: An Iconographic Analysis’ (1978) and

institutions shape public memory and national identity, engage with some of the key debates surrounding ideas of nation and national identity; the presentation of history in, and the cultural politics of, museums and heritage; and of public memory.⁴⁰ Some scholars are interested in various forms of commemoration, such as historical sites or public sculpture. The Book, *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity* (1994), edited by John R Gillis, represents this sort of scholarly effort. As Gillis writes, we – the modern subject – all live in ‘a forest of monuments’ (1994, 15). Placing commemorations in their historical settings, the contributors shed light on the contested nature of these monuments by showing how groups and individuals struggle to (re)produce the past for their own purposes.

Discursive Construction of National Identity

Juxtaposed with Hobsbawm’s ‘invention of tradition’, Stuart Hall provides another account in theorising the social construction of national identities. For Hall, a nation is constructed and conveyed in discourse.

According to Hall, national identities are ‘not things we are born with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to *representation*’ (Hall 1995, 612; emphasis in original). He said, ‘We only know what is to be “English” because of the way “Englishness” has come to be represented, as a set of meanings, by English national culture’ (ibid. 612). Nation is therefore for Hall ‘a system of cultural representation’. The term ‘discourse’ is employed by Hall to equate to his notion of ‘cultural representation’.⁴¹ A national culture is thereby a *discourse*, which constructs the meaning of a nation, influencing and organising both people’s behaviours and their conception of themselves. The discourse of ‘Englishness’ for instance, writes Hall, ‘represents what “England” is, gives meaning to the identity of “being English”’,

‘Art Museums and the Ritual of Citizenship’ (1991) – she respectively studies the Museum of Modern Arts in New York and the Louvre Palace as two different prototypes, demonstrating how ‘museums, as modern ceremonial monuments’ are particularly ‘dedicated exclusively to ideology,’ and how every element of an exhibition can be packaged to signify the ideology of the organisers and the sponsors (Duncan and Wallach 1978, 28).

⁴⁰ See Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum* (1995), Robyn Gillam, *Hall of Mirrors: Museums and the Canadian Public* (2001), and David Boswell and Jessica Evans, eds., *Representing the Nation: A Reader, Histories, Heritage and Museums* (1999).

⁴¹ Borrowing from Foucault, Hall defines the term ‘discourse’ as ‘a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of presenting – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, this discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed’ (Hall 1992, 291).

and fixes “England” as a focus of identification in England’ (ibid., 613). National cultures construct identities by producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which one can identify. In other words, a national culture as a discourse constructs national identity.

Hall particularly emphasises five fundamental aspects of the representation of national culture, including: ‘the narrative of the nation’, ‘the emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness’, ‘the invention of tradition’, ‘a foundational myth’, and ‘the idea of pure original people or folk’ (ibid., 613-5). Those narrations of national culture, according to Hall, are told and retold in national histories, literatures, the media, and popular culture, providing ‘a set of stories, imagines, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols, and rituals which stand for, or represent, the shared experiences, sorrows, and triumphs, and disasters which give meaning to the nation’ (ibid. 613). Hall further argues that with help of representations of national culture, the construction of national culture conceals the real differences between people’s class, gender, race, and so on. No matter how different its members may be, ‘a national culture seeks to unify them into one cultural identity, to represent them all as belonging to the same great national family’ (ibid. 616). Cultural power in fact unified a nation as a unit so that the differences of its members can be neglected. Thus, the discursive construction of unitary and homogeneous national culture is constituted through various inventions, imaginations, representations, interpretations and narratives; and the national unity exists only as a discursive construct.

In addition to the discursive construction of national culture, Hall also brings attention to the importance of ‘the Other’ in the constitution of ‘Self’. He argues that the construction of national identity depends not only on the homogeneity of the community the people imagined, but also on their opposition to the ‘Others’, those who cannot be included within it. The identification of ‘Self’ is thus produced by the existence of ‘the Other’. Hall therefore claims that ‘identities are constituted through, not outside difference’ (Hall 1996, 4). It is noted that, for Hall, the role of ‘the Other’, just like ‘homogeneous’ national culture, is represented/constituted in discourse as well. This ‘Other’ can be further subdivided into the *external* Other and the *internal* Other. Edward Said’s (1978) discussion on *Orientalism* and Toni Morrison’s (1992) study on the construction of ‘White American culture’ discuss respectively how the external Other and internal Other play a role in the construction of Self. Said is concerned with the Orient (which lay outside Europe or the West) as the most recurring

images of the Other, as the West's 'contrasting image, idea, personality, and experience, help to define West' (Said 1978, 1-2), whereas Morrison contemplates blackness (which exists inside the United States) as the Other that helps American White writers to identify what White America is.⁴²

The construction of a nation is therefore dispersed over many fields, through representations (discursive constitutions) of a homogeneous national culture as well as representations contrasting the identity of the nation with Others. National identities are constructed within, not outside, discourse. Many scholarly works have devoted themselves to the studies of the discursive construction of national identity. And indeed, the concept of 'nation' as 'socially constructed through discourse' has gained increasing importance in the relevant scholarly literature. One of the important attempts of this kind is made by sociolinguistics.

The book, *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* (1999), written by Ruth Wodak et al., argues, like Hall's, that national identities are produced, reproduced, transformed, and dismantled *discursively*. However, it attempts to place on an empirical, rather than merely theoretical, footing what Hall means by the discursive constitution of national identities. The book should be regarded as a scholarly attempt to investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the courses of the discursive construction of national identity, particularly, in the case of Austrian national identity.

Adopting the Vienna School's approach to Critical Discourse Analysis within the tradition of Critical Linguistics, as propounded by Wodak, Fairclough and Van Dijk, the authors develop their own method.⁴³ It focuses on the three closely interwoven dimensions of analysis: contents, strategies, and linguistic means and forms of realisation. As for the dimension of contents, it distinguishes several thematic areas, including the linguistic

⁴² Morrison (1992, 38-9) argues that the existence of white American culture is constructed by the representation of subordinated Black Americans as slave. Morrison analyses American literature, such as Ralph Emerson's novel, and sees how the representation of blackness helps American white writers to identify what 'white culture' is.

⁴³ The Vienna School of Discourse Analysis has roots in the sociolinguistic approach as well as within the tradition of Critical Theory. The main concern of the Viennese School is to 'establish the linguistic relations between specific linguistic subsystems and social structures...in order to explore the specific social significance and function of a concrete linguistic or grammar option' (Wodak et al. 1999, 9).

construction of the *homo Austriacus*, of a common culture, of a common political present and future, of a ‘national body’ (e.g. territory, landscapes, physical national artefacts), and of a common political past. As for the dimension of strategies, it is defined as a plan ‘adopted to achieve a certain political, psychological or other kinds of objectives’ (Wodak et al. 1999, 31). However, according to the authors, it is not necessarily ‘strictly instrumentalist’. In other words, discerning and documenting the actual (objectively oriented) goals pursued by social actors is not the primary concern of these studies. Examples of strategies analysed in this book are: constructive strategies that aim to construct a certain national identity, strategies of perpetuation that intend to maintain a threatened national identity, strategies of transformation that attempt to convert a national identity into another one, and finally dismantling strategies that aim at denaturalizing parts of an existing national identity construct. The last dimension, linguistic means and forms of realisation, is focused ‘primarily on lexical units and syntactic devices, which serve to construct unification, unity, sameness, difference, uniqueness, origin, continuity, gradual or abrupt change, autonomy, heteronomy and so on’ (ibid., 35).

The book looks at different types of discursive act, including both political speeches and media discourse made by powerful elites and group conversations and qualitative interviews with ordinary people. The concept of ‘political’ for the authors is ‘far broader than that in common usage and not only concentrates on the language of the power elites, but also...non-official and informal ones’ (ibid., 3). Chapters Four, Five, and Six of the book are devoted to using the authors’ model to analyse three sets of empirical data involved in the discursive construction of Austria’s evolving national identity.⁴⁴ According to the authors, the model of national identity construction is a complex of ‘common conceptions’ and ‘shared emotional dispositions’. The former, on the one hand, includes ‘ideas of a *homo Austriacus*; of a common culture, in the past, present and future; of a distinctive national territory; and of notions of and attitudes towards other national communities and their

⁴⁴ Chapter Four explores data from the public sphere in the form of speeches by political elites, such as president, prime minister, opposition politicians, on the subject of Austria’s national identity. Chapter Five relies on focus groups, aiming to summarise and analyse the so-called ‘semi-public’ discussions on the components of Austria’s national identity involving a cross-section of Austrians from several regions of the country. It observes the processes through which important concepts like ‘nation’ are being co-constructed during the discussion. Chapter Six uses qualitative interviews to develop and analyse, as it is named, ‘private’ opinions by individual Austrians on their country’s national identity.

culture, history, and so on' (ibid., 4). On the other hand, the latter is related to 'the attitudes members of a given ingroup have towards other members of that ingroup, as well as those towards members of an outgroup' (ibid., 4). In other words, it is through discourse that national uniqueness and inter-national differences can be produced, sustained, transformed and dismantled.

In short, what this book tries to do is to demonstrate the process of how national identities are constructed in discourse; which topics, which discursive strategies, and which linguistic devices are employed to construct national sameness and uniqueness on the one hand, and differences to other national collectives on the other hand. The theory and the methodologies developed in the book are influential and are employed in the studies of other national identities. For example, Thomas Ricento's studies of American identity (2003)⁴⁵ and Elaine Hewitt's thesis on the topic of construction of Gibraltarian Identity (2006)⁴⁶ can be regarded as similar attempts.

With respects to the studies of the discursive construction of Taiwanese national identity, a fairly great number of works are made in various disciplines, such as in Culture Studies, History, Sociology, and Political Science. Thomas B. Gold's article, 'Taiwan's Quest

⁴⁵ In his article 'The Discursive Construction of Americanism' (2003), Ricento, as opposed to those who propose a differentiation between a 'symbolic' and 'real' America, argues that the place 'America' where people live and work does not exist apart from discourses that assign cultural and social meaning to it. The ideas of America are constructed and conveyed in discourse. The author examines a number of (official and unofficial) statements about Americanism that emerged during the Americanization campaign, roughly 1914–1924, including some political speeches, bulletins, memoranda, being produced by government, industry, education, and civic organisations participated in the campaign, in order to characterise national identity and to 'educate' the population about the reasons the U.S. was fighting in a European war. He argues that they are the founding texts that evolved as part of a national narrative and were employed in the construction of what 'America' is.

⁴⁶ The thesis, under the title 'The Discursive Construction of Gibraltarian Identity in the Printed Press: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Editorial Articles on the Gibraltar Issue, submitted to the Department of English Language and Literature at the University of Granada, aims to investigate how the distinctive Gibraltarian identity is constructed and represented through discourse. The thesis examines a numbers of editorial articles from the mass media, dated surrounding the two referendums being held in 1967 and 2002. Those two referendums are, argues Hewit, the important events in the historical evolution of Gibraltar. The thesis attempts to illustrate the process of competition among discourses articulated by, on the one hand, the local press in Gibraltar, which attempted to defend and construct a positive representation of Gibraltar, and on the other hand, the press from Spain and Britain, which sought to destroy it or present a negative image. Moreover, the thesis also tries to identify which discursive strategies were employed by each side to construct their own representation of the situation, and argues that their respective strategies – Gibraltar, Spain and Britain – reflect their own views, interests and political intentions.

for Identity in the Shadow of China' (1993), attempts to examine the process of crafting Taiwanese identity through his analysis of artistic works, literary and various other cultural activities.⁴⁷ Gold's article is marked as one of the pioneering works of this kind of effort. The scope of his analysis is impressively extensive but the contents are over-simplistic. More recently, plenty of academic papers and books dealing with identity issues by analyzing literary, cultural activities, and artistic works, have been produced. For example, three Chinese volumes that widely collect this kind of academic papers can be identified here: *The Realms of the Other: Cultural Identities and Politics of Representation* (2001), *Eleven Outlooks on World Literature* (2004), and *Writing Taiwan: Strategies of Representation* (2000). It is not possible in this chapter to discuss in detail all of these scholarly works. Rather, I will attempt only to summarise them into two strands of argument.

The first strand of argument addresses itself to the 'presence' and 'representations' of Taiwan's history or culture in Taiwanese literary and artistic works and how this presence or these representations further help define and constitute a collective sense of being Taiwanese. Through the analysis of primary texts in the form of words, visual images, and sounds, those works aim to investigate how the literary works, paintings, monuments, or artistic exhibitions (re)construct and (re)forge a shared memory or imagination of 'Self', and create connections between individuals and specific historical events, subsequently (re)fashioning a collective identity. The second strand of argument revolves around the representation of the 'Others' in Taiwanese literary and artistic works and cultural activities. It argues the continual production of national identity works through the binary oppositions of Self and the Other. In this scholarly literature, they all centre around the representation of China as 'the Other' in comprehending the transformation/formation of Taiwanese national identity. Those studies suggest that China as 'the Other' helps to define and construct the 'Self', the Taiwanese-ness. The notion of 'China' is referred to both as the Mainlanders inside Taiwan and the China outside Taiwan (the historical China and the PRC). Regarding the Mainlanders,

⁴⁷ Gold in the article, examines some efforts made by Taiwanese artists and intellectuals to fashion a distinct Taiwanese identity in the various cultural realms including film, popular music, folk arts, performance arts, and literature. He writes, 'those popular and academic works vary in their attempt either to link Taiwan with the greater stream of Chinese tradition or to attempt to sever it' (Gold 1993, 190). According to Gold, they all engaged in a debate over the strength of ties to Taiwan versus China as a whole and the concomitant sense of a Taiwan consciousness as opposed to a Chinese consciousness.

as many studies (e.g. Lu Jian-Rong 1999, 85-129) have identified, those people are often described in Taiwanese literature, films and pictures as old-fashioned, conservative, patriarchal and anti-democratic, in contrast to the modern, open-minded, liberal and democratic characteristics of the native Taiwanese. Similarly, the political ideologies, political parties and regimes associated with the Taiwanese Mainlanders are depicted as characterised by a fanatical Chinese nationalism or imperialism, in contrast to a pragmatic Taiwanese nationalism and anti-imperialism. The Taiwanese Mainlanders are represented as colonisers, and the Taiwanese people as colonised. As for the China outside Taiwan, many studies have suggested that China, whether it refers to historical China or the PRC, is represented as a backward, dirty, authoritarian, corruptive, poor, imperialist and uncivilised realm, in contrast to the progressive, clean, democratic, peaceful and rich domain of Taiwan. 'China' is out there in contrast to Taiwan. People in Taiwan obtain self-esteem, self-affirmation and self-identification through representation of China as the Other.

The aforementioned scholarly literature convincingly demonstrates the validity of a discursive perspective on the social construction of national identity, and provides important discussions and empirically based analyses of key ways in which the national identity is constructed in terms of contents, strategies, and linguistic means and forms, used by various participants in the process of building national identity. Their works should be evaluated as important attempts to make explicit the connection between the concept of 'nation' and the term 'discourse'. Nevertheless, their understanding of the term 'discourse' is, to a certain extent, incomplete. Although they indeed examine different types of 'discursive practices,' they basically pay most of their attention to linguistic acts. It is true that it is language that makes it possible for members of a community to enter into relation with one another, and it is precisely through the use of language in narratives that the differences and values of a collectivity are expressed. However, as Hobsbawm and those who have followed him have demonstrated, we should not neglect the constructive roles of other, 'non-linguistic practices', e.g. the invention of tradition in the formation of national identities.

This thesis therefore attempts to incorporate the aforementioned two approaches – the invention of tradition and the discursive constitution of national identity. The former addresses itself to the social practice while the latter draws attention to the discursive in the social construction of national identity. Foucault's conceptualisation of 'discourse' in this

regard is instructive since it synthesises the discursive and social practices. The following section therefore addresses itself to Foucault's conception of 'discourse'.

2-3. Foucault's Conception of 'Discourse'

The term 'discourse' plays a crucial role in each of Foucault's major works. Yet, his conception of discourse is frustratingly ambiguous. At one extreme in his archaeological investigations of scientific statements in post-Renaissance Western human sciences, Foucault treats discourses as autonomous systems of internal rules that constitute scientific statements. At the other extreme in his genealogical accounts of the birth of prison and sexuality, discourses are related to non-discursive practices and processes, such as economic and political changes.

This section firstly explores the term 'discourse' in Foucault's archaeological phase. It then illustrates Foucault's re-elaboration of the term in his genealogical phase. It is however important to note that there are continuities with respect to the method and substance between these two phases.

2-3-1. 'Discourse' in Archaeology

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972a), Foucault clarifies, formalises, and reflects on the results of his earlier works⁴⁸, intending to explore comprehensively the concept of discourse at a theoretical level. Foucault defines the term 'discourse' as follows:

[I] believe that I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements. (Foucault 1972a, 80)

From this definition of 'discourse', we can see that the elementary unit of discourse is the 'statement'. According to Foucault, the statement is neither the same kind of unit as 'proposition', nor as 'sentence' or 'speech act' (ibid., 80-4).⁴⁹ The statement for Foucault is a

⁴⁸ Those works include: *Madness and Civilization* (1965), *The Birth of Clinic* (1973), and *The Order of Things* (1970).

⁴⁹ Firstly, it is not the same as 'proposition' because the same sentence with the same meaning can be different statements, depending on the context – set of statements – in which sentences appear (Foucault 1972a, 80-1). Secondly, it is not equivalent to 'sentence' because, on the one hand, several

‘function’ that operates in relation to these various units, and a function that ‘cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete contents, in time and space’ (ibid., 87). Foucault identifies five distinctive features of the statement.

Firstly, a statement cannot operate on its own; it rather functions and reveals its meanings in the network in which enunciations, propositions, sentences and speech acts interact and intersect. Secondly, there exists a special relationship between the statement and the subject of the statement. The subject here refers to one who produced the various elements conveying meaning (ibid., 93). For Foucault, the subject does not simply refer to the *author* (writing) or the *speaker* (enunciating); rather, it is a ‘vacant space’ that may, in effect, be filled by different individuals (ibid., 95). For example, a stewardess who explains an airline’s safety procedures is not the subject of the statement since anyone can occupy this ‘space’. Thus, from this line of reasoning, while we study statements in a novel, an academic paper or a political speech, we should not ask ‘who’ is the author or speaker, but ask what context and which relations enable ‘someone’ to take this position of subject.

Thirdly, every statement must have a material existence. They might be a voice recorded in a tape or a text printed in a newspaper. The statement is always given through material medium, even if those mediums are concealed, or soon disappear. Additionally, the statement not only needs this materiality, it is actually made up of this materiality. Therefore, even though a sentence is composed of the same words, bears exactly the same meaning, and preserves the same syntactical semantic identity, it does not constitute the same statement if it is spoken in the course of ordinary people’s daily conversation, or enunciated by the politician in a speech, or printed in a novel or school textbooks. They are all different statements. Materiality is therefore constitutive of the statement itself (ibid., 101). Furthermore, the materiality of a statement in its nature is repeatable but those repeated material are not necessarily regarded as the same statement. For example, a text can be reprinted several times, but those reprinted texts in different occasions, times and spaces

different sentences can be the reiteration of one identical statement (for example, a stewardess explains an airline’s safety procedures in several different languages); and on the other, the statement is not even a grammatical entity restricted to sentences (ibid., 81-2). Something like maps can be statement if they are used for representations of a geographical area (Dreyfus et al. 1983, 45). And thirdly, it cannot be interchanged with ‘speech act.’ A speech act, as an action, requires more than one statement. A contract, for instance, requires a certain number of distinct formulas or separate sentences (Foucault 1972a, 82-4).

might be different statements. This repeatable materiality of statements reveals the fact that the statement is an object that men/women produce, manipulate, use, transform, exchange, combine, decompose, recompose and even destroy, since a statement is not something said once and for all. Foucault states:

[the] statement, as it emerges in its materiality, appears with a status, enters various networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced. Thus, the statement circulates, is used, disappears, allows or prevents the realisation of a desire, serves or resists various interests, participates in challenge and struggle, and becomes a theme of appropriation or rivalry. (Ibid., 105)

Fourthly, the statement in its nature is rarified. It seems at first glance that statements can proliferate superabundantly and thereby the amount of statement is both plenitude and endless wealth. However, statements are always in deficit regardless of how numerous they may be. According to Foucault, nothing is ever being said fully. Foucault therefore aims to single out the principle of rarefaction, and to make know of this limited system of presences of statements (ibid., 119). The rarity of statements manifests a fact that statements are not an infinite transparency as the air we breathe. Instead, they are ‘things that can be transmitted and preserved, that have values, and which one tries to appropriate; they are repeated, reproduced and transformed’ (ibid., 120).

Fifthly, the statement in character is accumulative without origins. It is always in a process in which they repeatedly compete, accumulate and overlap with each other. The emergence of one specific statement is always contingent. Thus, Foucault suggests, while one tries to analyse a discourse one should not trace an origin of a discourse. That is to say: one should not describe it as a closed totality of a meaning, but an incomplete, fragmented figure; nor should one delineate it with reference to the interiority of an intention, a thought, or a subject, but in accordance with the dispersion of an exteriority; nor should one investigate it through tracing its origins, but by virtue of discovering the specific forms of accumulation. In short, one should not attempt to uncover an interpretation, to discover a foundation of discourse, or to embrace a teleology; but to establish what Foucault calls ‘positivity’ (ibid. 125).

Followed by his elaborations of ‘statements’, Foucault then explains how and by what criteria one should individualise various and diverse statements as *a* group of statements – a

discourse. Foucault proposes four tentative approaches/hypotheses. The first approach is to identify statements ‘when they refer to one and the same object’ (ibid., 32). Foucault however soon abandons this approach. It is because, firstly, the object itself (such as ‘Taiwanese’) is in effect *constituted* ‘by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, and traced its development’ (ibid., 32). And secondly, the object that the group of statements refers to changes its connotation all the way down. Hence, Foucault argues that ‘the unity of a discourse is based on space in which objects emerge and are continuously transformed’; and that what enables us to individualise a group of statements is ‘the rule of simultaneous or successive emergence of the various objects that are named, described, analysed and appreciated’ (ibid., 32). The second approach is that we can then individualise those statements as a group if they adopt identical forms and types of analysis. For example, medical science since the nineteenth century was characterised as a discourse not by its objects or concepts, but by ‘a certain *style*, a certain constant manner of statements’ – descriptive statements (ibid., 33). Yet, again, this approach must fail since, for instance, the ‘descriptive’ statements in the case of medicine are not the only formulation presented in medical discourse, and moreover, its formulations are constantly displaced. Foucault therefore contends that if there is a unity of form or style in discourse, its principle is not a determined form of statements but a group of rules that make this form and style of statements possible. The third approach is to identify statements by reference to a set of permanent and coherent concepts used. However, this approach also has its limitations, because while one analyses a discourse, one would soon find that new concepts would appear, and some of them might be heterogeneous or even incompatible with the original one. Foucault accordingly suggests that ‘one might discover a discursive unity if one sought it not in the coherence of concepts, but in their simultaneous or successive emergence, in the distance that separate them and even in their incompatibility’ (ibid., 35). The fourth approach is that the unity of a discourse could be based on ‘the identity and persistence of themes’ (ibid., 35). One can suppose that a certain thematic is able to link and animate a group of discourses, as an organism with its own needs, its one internal force, and its own capacity for survival. However, this approach, like the previous three, is problematic since on the one hand, the same thematic can be articulated on the basis of two sets of concepts, two types of analysis, two perfectly different fields of objects; and on the other hand, a different thematic can be expressed by the same sets of concepts, types of analysis and field of objects.

The four aforementioned approaches demonstrate four attempts, four failures, as well as four successive hypotheses. Foucault here problematises the notion of 'a' discourse. The unity of 'a' discourse, firstly, is not based on a full, tightly packed, continuous object; instead, it is full of gaps, intertwined with one another, interplays of differences, distances, substitutions, transformations. Secondly, it does not rest on a definite, normative type of statement; rather, the formulations of a discourse are all very different, various and heterogeneous, and thus this is impossible to link those as a single style. Thirdly, it does not stem from a set of well-defined concepts; alternatively, 'a' discourse is composed of many competing, different and excluded concepts which cannot be unified in a logical architecture. And finally, a discourse does not have the permanence of a thematic. What one finds in 'a' discourse are various strategies that permit the activation of incompatible themes or the establishment of the same theme in different groups of statement.

Because a discourse is so divergent, dispersed, fragmented, heterogeneous and full of gaps, Foucault suggests that we should attempt to describe these dispersions, and to discover whether one can discern a regularity, that is, 'an order in their successive appearance, correlations in their simultaneity, assignable positions in a common space, a reciprocal functioning, linked and hierarchised transformations' (ibid., 37). Foucault writes:

Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, transformations), we will say...that we are dealing with a *discursive formation*. (ibid., 38)

Discursive formations in this respect are treated as systems of dispersion, established by 'discursive practices'. The latter is defined as 'a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the enunciative function' (ibid., 117). Foucault consequently gives a full meaning to the definition of 'discourse'. It is, according to Foucault:

[a] group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable, whose appearance or use in history might be indicated; it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of conditions of existence can be defined. (ibid., 117)

Discourse, in its nature, is dispersed. It is systems of dispersion.⁵⁰ Following this line of conceptualising ‘discourse’, Foucault in his archaeological works proposes description of systems and their complex interrelationships. In doing so, he particularly takes the forms and internal regularities – the rules of formation – that govern the production of statements as his primary object of his investigation, and sets out to examine the way they structure the formation of objects, styles, concepts and themes of a discourse. Archaeology in this respect aims at the ‘pure description’ of discourse (ibid., 27). Foucault therefore intends to, as if an archaeologist, ‘unearth’ the rules of formation that structure the production of discourses. An example of this is shown in *The Order of Things* (1970), in which Foucault tries to identify distinctive discursive regularities – or what he terms as ‘episteme’ (1970, xxii), defined as a structure that defines the conditions both making knowledge possible and restricting its scope.⁵¹

It is not possible to expatiate on his analysis of epistemes here.⁵² However, one point needs to be touched upon briefly at this point. That is: in *The Order of Things*, Foucault only identifies the distinctive epistemes and asserts that there is rupture in the form of discontinuities between those distinctive epistemes; he however does not demonstrate how epistemes shift from one to another.⁵³ He only suggests that change ‘probably begins with an erosion from outside, from that space which is, for thought, on the other side, but in which it has never ceased to think from the very beginning’ (Foucault 1970, 50).

Foucault here very briefly indicates the conundrum of the relationship between discourse and its exterior – or more specifically speaking, the relationship between discursive

⁵⁰ Foucault therefore avoids using notions such as ‘ideology’, since these notions are inadequate to indicate this system of dispersion.

⁵¹ Foucault states that his analysis of episteme is ‘an enquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what historical *a priori*, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, sciences be established, experience be reflected in philosophies, rationalities be formed, only perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards’ (Foucault 1970, xxi-xxii).

⁵² Basically, Foucault (1970, xv-xxiv) differentiates three epistemic systems that underlie three major epochs in Western thought, namely, the Renaissance, the Classical Age, and Modernity. He isolates and describes them respectively. He argues that ‘man’ as a subject and object of human sciences (psychology, sociology and literature) was constituted in those sciences.

⁵³ To Foucault, discontinuity/rupture refers to a situation that ‘within the space of a few years a culture sometimes ceases to think as it had been thinking up till then and begins to think other things in a new way’ (Foucault 1970, 50).

practices and other non-discursive (social) practices. The latter includes institutions, social or economic conditions, etc. which enable the emergence and extension on the one hand, and the dissolution and dwindling on the other, of discourse. He however does not further investigate this in his archaeological works. Such a gap in the account of the relationship between discourse and its exterior engenders a line of criticism, which contends that Foucault treats discursive practices as if they were taking place outside their social, cultural and political contexts. For instance, Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) argue that Foucault's archaeology founders for two reasons:

Firstly, the causal power attributed to the rules governing discursive systems is unintelligible and makes the kind of influence the social institutions have... incomprehensible. Second, insofar as Foucault takes archaeology to be an end in itself he forecloses the possibility of bringing his critical analyses to bear on his social concerns. (1983, xxiv-xxv)

Likewise, McNay (1994, 65) argues that Foucault's analysis of 'discourse' as if it is a 'close universe', gives the impression that they exist in isolation, irrelevant to their social contexts, and exempted from any interventions from other social practices. She writes that 'discursive formation becomes a hermetically sealed, self-sustaining expressive totality' (ibid., 65). As a result, an understanding of discourse as culturally and socially specific formation is precluded; and issues raised by a consideration of the necessary social embedded-ness of discourse – such as the question of how individuals come to occupy certain discursively constructed subject positions – are neglected. To those critics, the ignorance of other non-discursive (social) practices, say, institutions, political events, economic practices and processes, and its interplay with discursive practices become the major deficiencies of Foucault's analysis of discourse in archaeology. On the one hand it fails to provide a further and deeper analysis of the production, transition, transformation and exclusion of the discourse; on the other, it fails to take the notion of power into account in his analysis.

Nevertheless, Foucault in his archaeological phase has actually noticed the significance of social embedded-ness of discourse (the intimate linkage between discursive practices and social practices). To take Foucault's discussion of the clinical medicine as an example, he writes that 'archaeology also reveals relations between discursive formations and non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices and processes)' (Foucault 1972a, 162). Foucault states that the establishment of clinical medicine at the end

of the eighteenth century is synchronous with a number of political events, economic phenomena, and institutional changes. He then argues that it is easy enough to deduce the existence of certain links between them. Foucault subsequently asks how such links can be analysed. Instead of providing an interpretative explanation or a causal analysis, Foucault situates archaeological analysis at another level. He writes:

[Archaeology] wishes to show not how political practice has determined the meaning and form of medical discourse, but how and in what form it takes part in its conditions of emergence, insertion, and functioning. (ibid., 163)

In other words, Foucault's archaeology does not aim to show how social practices constitute or modify the medical discourse, discovering a causal sequence described point by point; rather, he intends to demonstrate how social practices function and penetrate in the formation of medical discourse.⁵⁴ This line of argument in effect indicates the direction to be taken by his future analysis of power, or power relations, in his genealogical phase. Foucault concludes:

The autonomy of discourse and its specificity nevertheless do not give it the status of pure ideality and total historical independence; what [archaeology] wishes to uncover is the particular level in which history can give place to definite types of discourse, which have their own type of historicity, and which are related to a whole set of various historicities. (Ibid., 164-5)

In short, the relationship between discursive practices and social practices should be seen as synchronised coexistence in a locus in which a discourse is formed. The latter – social practices – become the main object of Foucault's analysis in his subsequent works on prison and sexuality, termed his genealogical phase, to which this chapter now turns.

2-3-2. 'Discourse' in Genealogy

Foucault in his genealogical phase shifts his focus from a purely formal style of analysis of discourse and takes the social contexts of the discursive formation into consideration. He pays much greater attention to the impact of social practices on the discursive formation. The emphasis on social practices not only marks the changes of Foucault's analysis of

⁵⁴ It may be useful to view this causality in terms of what Foucault is working against – that is, (orthodox) Marxism. Foucault's view of ideology might be useful in this context and it maybe that the 'cause' avoided is precisely that of Marxism, that is of reduction to social and economic practice which then 'explain' medical practice and institution. This is the cause and effect of Marxist theory in that it shapes the answer by its own presuppositions (by its pseudo-scientific discourse). Problems of ideology for Foucault are precisely those of truth but also of 'cause'.

discourse but also the re-conceptualisation of discourse. It is however important to note that although the turn to genealogical approach shifts his focus of analysis, Foucault does not abandon his archaeological perspective; rather, he further develops some ideas that have already been discussed in his archaeological works. One of the most important issues is the 'rarefaction' of discourse.

As demonstrated above, Foucault in his archaeological works has identified the paucity of statements – the principle of rarefaction. McNay elucidates it as follows:

In any era, everything that can be said is never said; that in relation to the wealth of possible statements that can be formulated in natural language, only relatively few things are actually said. (1994, 74)

Foucault afterwards expounds on this principle in the lecture under the title 'Order of Discourse', which signalled the shift from an archaeological to genealogical style of analysis. In the lecture, Foucault highlights a series of external social forces – process of control, selection, organisation and distribution – that govern the rarefaction of discourse (or production of discourse).⁵⁵ Juxtaposed to the archaeological approach, which inclines towards pure description of the state of rarefaction, Foucault here intends to elucidate how there are relatively few statements made at any given point.

Foucault first of all proclaims that the production of discourse in every society 'is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with change events, to evade its ponderous, awesome materiality' (Foucault 1972b, 216). According to him, those procedures of exclusion (or production) of discourse include three groups of rules: (1) external systems of exclusion, (2) internal rules, and (3) a rarefaction or a delimitation of speaking subjects.

Firstly, discourse is controlled through procedures of exclusion which function via strategies of 'prohibition', 'division', and 'the opposition between true and false'. As for 'prohibition', Foucault refers to three types of prohibition: the taboo of objects; ritual with its surrounding circumstances; and the privileged or exclusive right to speak of a particular

⁵⁵ It is noted that for Foucault the production of discourse and exclusion of discourse are two sides of one coin. According to Foucault, the production of a discourse simultaneously excludes the possibility of the production of any other alternative discourse concerning the same subject. Discourse in its nature is therefore exclusive.

subject. Foucault states that ‘we are not free to say just anything, that we cannot simply speak of anything, when we like or where we like; not just anyone, finally, may speak of anything’ (ibid., 216). As for the ‘division’, Foucault here reiterates his analysis in *Madness and Civilization*, which focuses on the opposition of reason and folly. He argued that the words of the madman are considered worthless and void, without truth or significance. As for ‘opposition between truth and falsity’, Foucault centres his discussion on the rejection or the imposition of a ‘will to truth’. He argues that, any society (specially modern industrial societies) is typified by a ‘will to truth’ which establishes a distinction between truth and falsity and hence determines how knowledge is put to work, valorised and distributed (ibid., 217-20).

Secondly, corresponding to these external processes of discursive regulation is a series of internal rules of rarefaction that control and delimit discourse. These internal rules include ‘commentary’, ‘author’ and ‘discipline’. The idea of ‘commentary’ controls discourse through a constantly revised process of differentiation between primary and secondary works that sets up a textual hierarchy determinant of what can be said or thought about the texts. Similarly, the category of the ‘author’ confines reception of texts to the terms of authenticity, intentionality and creativities. Foucault states, ‘Commentary limits the hazards of discourse through the action of an identity taking the form of repetition and sameness. The author principle limits this same chance element through the action of an identity whose form is that of individuality and the I’ (ibid., 222). ‘Discipline’ – the third internal principle – constitutes an anonymous system that makes both the production and elimination of statements or discourses possible, through identifying a collection of propositions regarded as true and regulating a set of rules and definitions, techniques and legitimised instruments. Discipline is a principle of control in the production of discourse.

Thirdly, the final set of procedures which control the social production of discourse operates through a rarefaction or a delimitation of speaking subjects. An individual is incapable of taking up a certain discursive position without fulfilling a series of specific requirements. Constraints are exerted, firstly, through the imposition of speech rituals, which defines the qualifications, gestures to be made, behaviour, etc. of the speaker; secondly, through belonging to societies of discourse (which aims to produce or preserve discourse within a closed community, according to strict regulations, such as the groups of

Rhapsodists) or doctrinal groups (which bind individuals to certain types of enunciation and eventually forbid all others, but they also use these types of enunciation to bind individuals together); and lastly, through the social appropriation of discourse (for example, systems of education determine the extent of such appropriation).

Although Foucault in this lecture reiterates some of the themes of the archaeological approach, it offers a significant new inflexion to these themes. The principle of rarefaction is further elucidated by taking the social contexts of asymmetrical relations in which any discursive formation is situated into account. And moreover, by trying to elucidate the rarefaction of discourse, Foucault is committing himself to the task of describing power relations in his analysis of discourse. McNay comments:

The emphasis on discourse as an internally regulating formation is replaced by a notion of discourse as determined by and also constitutive of the power relations that permeate the social realm. The rarefaction of discursive formations is fundamentally related to the maintenance of asymmetrical social relations. Entry to these discursive formations is influenced by relations of power which over-determine access to certain social goods and resources. This is, then, a decisive move from the archaeological postulation of the anteriority of discourse to an understanding of non-discursive relations forming the conditions of possibility of discourse. (1994, 87)

Indeed, since Foucault characterises the nature of discourse as rarified (or exclusive) and identifies those procedures of exclusion, he then turns his analysis of discourse to the genealogical approach, which pays more attention to other social practices and power relations implied.

Foucault subsequently in this lecture proposes an alternative set of methodological principles. The first is the principle of *reversal*, which means that we must regard the conventional notions of the author, discipline and will to truth not in a positive relation to meaning but in a negative relation that excludes the production of alternative discourses – the rarefaction of discourse. The second principle, *discontinuity*, suggests that the existence of systems of rarefaction does not imply that there is an enormous, silent and continuous discourse that lies over and beyond our utterances and speeches. We must not imagine some unsaid thing about the world that would interlace with its forms and events. ‘Discourse must be treated as a discontinuous activity, its different manifestations sometimes coming together, but just as easily unaware of, or excluding each other’ (Foucault 1972b, 229). The third

principle is *specificity*, which signifies that there is no pre-discursive fate disposing the word in our favour. Discourse therefore must be seen as ‘a violence that we do to things, or at all events, as a practice we impose upon them’ (ibid., 229). The fourth principle, *exteriority*, means that discourse should not be analysed in terms of its hidden core of meaning. Rather, it should be examined in terms of ‘its external conditions of existence’ (ibid., 229).⁵⁶

As shown above, Foucault here claims that discourse must be analysed in its external conditions of existence. This claim implies that the external conditions of existence – social practices – determine the production and exclusion of discourse, and vice versa. The concept ‘discourse’, at this phase, becomes a synthesis or an amalgam, which encompasses discursive practices and social practices. This synthesis is best manifested in the concept of ‘*Dispositif* (apparatus),’ as Foucault termed it.

Although the concept itself is ambiguous and has not been spelled out, the domain to which it refers is relatively clear. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow:

Dispositif is distinguished from *episteme* primarily because it encompasses the non-discursive practices as well as the discursive. It is resolutely heterogeneous, including ‘discourse, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements...’ Drawing from these disparate components, one seeks to establish a set of flexible relationships, and merge them into a single apparatus in order to isolate a specific historical problem. (1983, 121; emphasis in original)

To take ‘*Dispositif* of sex’ as an example, it designates the complex of psychiatric, medical, and legal discourses and practices that produced sexuality as a pivotal element in a network of social control. I shall not elaborate this concept further since the aim here is only to explain that the notion of discourse at this stage, for Foucault, has been extended and that it encompasses both discursive and social practices (non-discursive practices). To borrow McNay’s words, ‘discourse, or a particular discursive formation, is to be understood as an amalgam of material practices and forms of knowledge linked together in a non-contingent relation’ (McNay 1994, 108).

Discourse as a result is a synthesis that encompasses discursive practices and social practices; it is a domain in which discursive practice and social practice are exercised; and it is a realm that bounds both linguistic and non-linguistic acts. They are mutually subsumed

⁵⁶ The four principles that are mentioned here also manifest the propositions of Foucault’s genealogical approach that I have indicated in the Introduction.

and included in the domain of discourse. And since they are mutually constitutive, the distinction between discursive practices and social practices becomes ambiguous. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) further elaborate on this point as they argue that the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices is meaningless. The distinction is itself a differentiation that can only be made within discourse. To them, language is always embedded in practices including linguistic and non-linguistic practices; thereby the unity of language, actions and material objects is indissoluble (Laclau et al. 1985, 108). Discourse is thus comprised of both linguistic and non-linguistic elements, and of both discursive and social practices.

To conclude, ‘discourse’ in Foucault’s analysis should be understood as dispersed, fragmented and heterogeneous in nature; it is diffused in the domain of society through the various and diverse discursive/social practices. These dispersed and diffused features of discourse indeed not only reflect Foucault genealogical method that look at subtle, minute and meticulous practices – the surface of practices; but also designate his microphysics of power, to which the next section turns.

2-4. Power Relations and Subject

This section aims to, on the one hand, elucidate what Foucault means by ‘power’ and how one can analyse it; and on the other hand, to spell out his conception of ‘the subject.’ The section firstly demonstrates Foucault’s opposition to the two conventional ways of understanding power – economic and juridical forms of power. Then, it elaborates how Foucault re-conceptualised it by identifying its distinctive features: omnipresence, pluralism and productiveness. The discussion of the final feature – productiveness – leads to Foucault’s conception of ‘subject’.

2-4-1. The Economic and Juridic-discursive Models of Power

Foucault opposes two prevailing theories that see power as anchored in macrostructures or ruling classes, and as repressive in nature: the former is the economic model while the latter is the juridical-discursive model of power (Foucault 1980a).

The first model – the economic model of power – as espoused by the traditional Marxist, understands all types of power relations as derived phenomena, in that they are

merely the consequences of other economic and social processes: forces of production, class struggle, and ideological structures. In addition, this model views power as centralised and possessed by the state and its apparatuses. Power is, on the one hand, the instruments possessed by the bourgeoisie to repress and to exploit the proletariat; and on the other hand, it also serves the proletariat in its resistance to oppression and exploitation. In this respect, power is reduced to secondary effects of a fundamental class struggle. The traditional Marxist therefore urges the proletariat to struggle for control of the state apparatus, which is seen as the centre and source of power.

In short, from the viewpoint of this model, power is something that can be acquired, seized, shared and held; it is a possession of the elites or the logic of bureaucratic institutions; it is exercised from a single political centre or source that can be contested; and finally it is governed by a single over-arching project. Yet, this way of conceptualising power is rejected by Foucault for its reductionistic subordination of power to class domination and economic imperatives. As Foucault states in his article ‘Two Lectures’:

I don't believe that anything can be deduced from the general phenomenon of the domination of the bourgeois class. What needs to be done is something quite different. One needs to investigate historically, and beginning from the lowest level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function...We need to identify the agents responsible for them, their real agents (those which constituted the immediate social entourage, the family, parents, doctors etc.) and not be content to lump them under the formula of generalized bourgeoisie. (1980a, 100-1)

In other words, power is neither the property of elites nor structural forces.

The second model of power – the juridico-discursive model – analyses power in terms of law, legal and moral right, and political sovereignty. According to Foucault, this juridico-discursive model possesses five principal features. Firstly, it regards power as purely negative. In the case of sexuality, power does nothing except negate, reject, exclude, refuse, and block sex (Foucault 1978, 83). The second feature is ‘the insistence of the rule’. Power exercises by virtue of laying down the law. Power functions ‘through language, or rather through the act of discourse that creates...a rule of law’ (ibid., 83). Power is therefore articulated by means of juridical language and is in character juridico-discursive. The third feature is ‘the cycle of prohibition’, that is, power employs nothing but a law of prohibition (ibid., 84). The fourth feature is ‘the logic of censorship’. The banning is thought to take three forms: affirming that something (sex for instance) is not permitted, preventing it from being said, denying that it

exists (ibid., 84). The fifth feature is ‘the uniformity of the apparatus’. Power is exercised in the same way at all levels. It takes effect from top to bottom; it acts in a uniform and comprehensive manner; it operates according to the simple and endlessly reproduced mechanisms of law, taboo, and censorship: from state to family, from prince to father. One finds a general form of power, only varying in scale. This form of power is law and its effects are obedience (ibid., 84-5).

Under this conception of power, one can then distinguish the master who makes law and the subject who must be obedient to law. ‘A legislative power on one side, and an obedient subject – who is *subjected* – on the other’ (ibid. 85). In short, this juridical-discursive model of power is essentially repressive; it ‘is poor in resources, sparing of its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, and incapable of invention;’ it produces nothing but saying ‘no’; and finally ‘all the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience’ (ibid., 85). This model of power is what Foucault terms ‘king’s power.’

According to Foucault, the western monarchies were constructed ‘as systems of law, they expressed themselves through theories of law, and they made their mechanisms of power work in the form of law’ (ibid., 87). He continues, although the people in the modern era have abandoned these monarchic institutions and endeavour to disengage the juridical sphere from the monarchic institutions, they, however, did not challenge the principle which held that ‘law had to be the very form of power, and that power always had to be exercised in the form of law’ (ibid., 88). The representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. We still have not yet ‘cut off the head of the king’ (ibid., 89). Therefore, the theory of power still gives priority to the issues of ‘right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially state and sovereignty’ (ibid., 89). Yet, Foucault argues, this juridical form of power is merely one of many forms of power. The juridical form of power has gradually been penetrated by new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law. Those new mechanisms of power are not ensured ‘by right but by technique;’ they do not operate ‘by law but by normalisation;’ and they do not act ‘by punishments but by control’ (ibid., 89). Those mechanisms go beyond the state and its apparatus. As Foucault states, ‘we have been engaged for centuries in a type of society in

which the juridical is increasingly incapable of coding power, of serving as its system of representation' (ibid., 89).

Foucault hence urges us to 'cut off the head of the king', that is, we must break off an analytical method that privileges law and sovereignty, which attaches to a certain image of power-law, of power-sovereignty. If we wish to analyse power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation, 'we must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code' (ibid., 90). In other words, we must conceive power without the king. Hence, Foucault here again rejects this form of power conception.

It is however very important to note that even though Foucault opposes these two forms of power conception, he does not deny the existence of these two forms of power. We must distinguish the forms of power from model of power analysis. It would be misleading if one considers that Foucault negates the existence of those two forms of power. They are both still at work, though their influences are gradually decreasing. In other words, neither does Foucault's conception of power deny the form of power possessed by the ruling class nor does it neglect the repressive form of power. Rather, it only opposes giving them a theoretical primacy. Foucault's urge to conceive of power without king should be limited to a sense that he intends to show us a more devious and discreet form of power. According to Foucault, both juridico-discursive and economic model of power analysis leads to an oversimplified and functionalist understanding of power. It is therefore necessary to avoid the limited field of state institutions and juridical sovereignty.

Following Foucault's critique of the conventional understanding of power, this section will then analyse his own view of power. Foucault's conception of power can be summarised into two points that are elucidated, respectively, in the following two sub-sections.

2-4-2. Omnipresent, Local, Anonymous, Spontaneous, Immanent & Pluralistic

In opposition to the Marxist understanding of power as shown above, Foucault attempts to conduct an ascending and micro analytic of power – a *microphysics* of power. This is to say: if power generates a multiplicity of effects, then it is only possible to discern these effects by analysing power from below, at its most precise points of operation. A few points elucidate upon this conception and analytics of power.

First of all, power is *omnipresent*. It is exercised from innumerable points at every minute without failure and interval. Power is present everywhere in society, in every relation between human beings and between human beings and things. It is dispersed, diffused, and spread over time and space at varying densities: power relations permeate all levels of social existence. Yet, it is important to note that power as omnipresent does not come from the top as unified forces such as a structure, which embrace everything; rather, it ‘comes from below’ (Foucault 1978, 94). Power is dispersed within society, and exercised in a domain where detailed, meticulous and multiple movements intersect and where heterogeneous, diverse and various forces intertwine. Foucault states:

The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in ever relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. (ibid., 93)

Therefore, Foucault adopts an *ascending* rather than *descending* analysis, which perceives power as circulating throughout the de-centred field of institutional networks. This de-centred and dispersed form of power might be taken up by larger structures or institutions such as the class or the state apparatus. Yet, these macro-forces are only the ‘terminal’ forms that power takes (Foucault 1978, 92; 1983, 213).

Moreover, this omnipresent and ascending power is exercised *anonymously* and *spontaneously*. In his discussion of the effect of Bentham’s Panopticon,⁵⁷ Foucault explicitly illustrates this feature of power. The Panopticon induces in the inmate (the object of power) a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power (Foucault 1977, 201). Power hence should be ‘visible’ and ‘unverifiable’.

Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may always be so. (ibid., 201)

⁵⁷ According to Foucault, Bentham’s *Panopticon* offers a paradigmatic example of disciplinary technology. It is a correction facility whose architectural design is simple. A tower stands at the centre, surrounded by an annular building at the periphery which is divided into cells. In the annular building, one is totally seen, without ever seeing, while in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen (Foucault 1977, 200). Such a facility is to induce a state of conscious and permanent visibility in the inmate that assures the automatic functioning of power.

Accordingly, power is not so much possessed in a person, but is 'in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up' (ibid., 202). Thus, the presence of power might reside in a design of building or an arrangement of a timetable. As a consequence, Foucault states that power 'is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery' (ibid., 177). It is the apparatus as a whole that produces 'power' and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field.

On that account, power is *immanent* in the domains in which it is exercised. It is not something that represses the object of power from outside institutions or mechanisms, but is exercised within institutions or mechanisms internally. Power therefore is both indiscreet and discreet. According to Foucault,

It is indiscreet since it is omnipresent and always alert. It leaves no zone of shade but constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of supervising. It is discreet because it functions permanently and largely in silence. (Ibid., 177)

Since it is omnipresent, meticulous and is dispersed everywhere at anytime, power thereby is *pluralistic* and *heteromorphous*. It is exercised from innumerable points, rather than from a single political centre, as the possession of an elite or the logic of bureaucratic institutions. It is not governed by a single over-arching project. It is highly indeterminate in character.

As a consequence, power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away, as King's power is. Foucault opposes a binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled when analysing power. Power might be centred in an institution (such as a state apparatus), or in a person (such as a king); but it definitely does not merely reside in these specific loci.

Since Foucault perceives power no longer as a property of one specific individual, nor a group of people being used to maintain social hierarchies, his analytic of power extracts the forms of power and the techniques of power from the power relations and aims to attack those forms and techniques of power, rather than condemning any specific institution, class, group of people, or individual (Foucault 1983, 212).

In short, instead of regarding power as merely an institution, a structure, and a certain strength we are endowed with, it is the name that one attributes to ‘a complex strategical situation’ in a particular society (Foucault 1978, 93). Foucault thus urges that, in the analytic of power, we should not look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither should we search for the elite groups which govern the people, enact the policy, and control the state apparatus. Rather, the task of the analytic of power is to identify the complex strategical situation. On this account, the object of Foucault’s analytics of power is power relations, rather than power itself. Foucault says ‘what I am attentive to is the fact that every human relation is to some degree a power relation. We move in a world of perpetual strategic relations. Every power relation is not bad in itself, but it is a fact that always involves danger’ (Foucault 1988, 168).

To summarise, the notion of power conceptualised by Foucault is essentially omnipresent, local, anonymous, spontaneous, immanent and pluralistic. It is therefore not something that can be acquired, shared and seized. And the analytics of power focuses on how power is exercised in asymmetrical power relations.

2-4-3. Constitutive and Positive

As mentioned earlier, Foucault opposes the conventional conception of power that tends to perceive power in an essentially negative manner, totally repressive forces. When discussing the juridico-discursive model, Foucault puts forward a question: why is this juridical notion of power so readily accepted? The reason is that: power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself – the constitutive-ness of power. The success of power is ‘proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms’ (Foucault, 1978, 86). Foucault here substitutes the conventional way with a new conception of power as an essentially productive, constitutive and positive force which permeates all levels of society, engendering a multiplicity of relations.

In Foucault’s model, power is constitutive in the sense that it works to produce particular types of bodies and minds.⁵⁸ He writes, a power ‘bent on generating forces, making

⁵⁸ Another aspect of the productivity of power is that it aims to enhance the capacity of social production. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault argues that the establishment of modern penal reform systems aim to set up a new *economy* of power that was better distributed, more efficient and less costly in both economic and political terms. Similarly, in *History of Sexuality*, Foucault argues that the

them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them' (ibid., 136). In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault describes how docile bodies are produced by organising individuals in practices of surveillance which train comportment according to classifications of normal and abnormal. Modern disciplinary power is not exercised through physical force or representation by law, but through the normalisation, political technologies, shaping the body and soul.

This notion of power is then a sort of *normalising* force. In Foucault's understanding, 'norms' do not 'refer to the force of tradition, collectively generated systems of values or patterns of moral action. Rather, it refers to the routinised modes of behaviour that are so deeply inscribed on the body by disciplinary modes of power that they seem natural and normal' (McNay 1994, 112). Foucault illustrates this form of power at length in his discussion of psychoanalysis in *The History of Sexuality*.

Foucault first of all conceives psychotherapy as the paradigm of the secularised and modern confessional (Foucault 1978, 129-31). He then discusses the irony that in trying to liberate him/herself in therapy, the analysand is actually subjecting him/herself to a strategy of normalisation which produces the very subject who should free him/herself in this way. In psychoanalysis, one is conceived as a subject who possesses secret desires that the subject itself is not aware of, secret desires which must be uncovered in order to achieve liberation and salvation. The object of confession is thus no longer concerned solely with 'what subjects wish to hide', but with 'what was hidden from him/herself, being incapable of coming to light except gradually and through the labour of a confession in which the questioner and questioned each had a part to play' (ibid., 66). It seems to us that the truth of ourselves, lodged in our most secret nature, demands to surface. We therefore need to confess ourselves so as to know, and then liberate, ourselves.

The double contradiction, according to Foucault, emerges here: firstly, the disclosure of one's inner self and desires does not lead to greater and deeper self-knowledge; instead, one just constitutes one's 'inner self' and 'desires' – the 'truth' of oneself – in the practices of psychoanalysis. Secondly, confession in this regard is not extracted from the subject in the

discourse of sexuality since the seventeenth century had the tacit aim of reducing or excluding forms of sexuality that were not amenable to the strict economy of reproduction, constituting 'a sexuality that is economically useful and politically conservative' (Foucault 1978, 37).

process of psychoanalysis; rather, the urge to confess is so deeply embedded in the subject, so that it is no longer perceived as coerced but is regarded as a voluntary act of liberation from psychical repression. Foucault writes,

[The] obligation to confess is...so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constraints us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, 'demands' only to surface; that if it fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds it in place, the violence of a power weights it down. (ibid., 60)

Moreover, the constitution of the subject in psychoanalysis takes place in a relationship of power in so far as the analysand's speech, thoughts, and dreams must be interpreted by the analyst, who is positioned as an authority in the discourse of psychoanalysis. The analyst, Foucault describes, is not simply 'the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile' (ibid., 61-2). The 'truth' of oneself on this account does then not reside in the subject who speaks but belongs to the analyst, the one who listens. It is the analyst's job to verify this obscure truth of the analysand – the subject. Foucault writes, 'the one who listened was not simply the forgiving master, the judge who condemned or acquitted; he was the master of truth' (ibid., 66-7).

Furthermore, the analyst is required to have a particular kind of knowledge – a 'qualified' knowledge. The understanding of the 'truth' of oneself is then also closely associated with knowledge that aims to produce 'true' discourses concerning oneself (ibid., 67-9). Yet, knowledge – social sciences particularly – for Foucault is not objective at all; rather, it has an intimate relationship with power and is, in fact, a product of power relations. Foucault elsewhere describes a circular relationship between knowledge and power, or what he terms 'power-knowledge complex'.

Foucault argues that knowledges (*savoir*) emerge within the context of power relations through practices and technologies of exclusion, confinement, surveillance, and objectification; but they in turn contributed to the development, refinement, and proliferation of new techniques of power. He states:

[Power] produces knowledge; that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. (Foucault 1977, 27)

Knowledge is thus in-dissociable from the regimes of power. Foucault uses the term 'discourse' to signify those systems of 'quasi-scientific' knowledge, which refer to those various disciplines of social science such as psychiatry (Foucault 1972a, 178). As argued in the previous section, it is important to note that, for Foucault, the term 'discourse' incorporates both discursive and social practices. Thus, 'knowledge' is then not only the sum of what is said (the discursive) but also what is done (the social). Foucault writes:

Knowledge is that of which one can speak in a discursive practice, and which is specified by that fact...⁵⁹ knowledge is also the space in which the subject may take up a position and speak of the objects with which he deals in his discourse...⁶⁰ knowledge is also the field of coordination and subordination of statements in which concepts appear, and are defined, applied and transformed...⁶¹ lastly, knowledge is defined by the possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse...⁶² (ibid., 182-3)

Knowledges only exist within particular discourses, rather than in any transcendental or timeless sense. There is 'no knowledge without a particular discursive practice; and any discursive practice may be defined by the knowledge that it forms' (ibid., 183). And while power is constitutive, discourses in this regard have an inherent constitutive role in producing reality.

Discourses, said Foucault, are practices that 'systematically form the objects of which they speak' (ibid., 49). The meanings attached to things depend upon power relationships, thus reality/truth itself can be said to be discursively constituted. Knowledge as discourse is thus not knowledge of a 'real' world as it is in fact constituted in discourse. And while the discourse involves a complex set of practices that keep certain statements/actions in

⁵⁹ For example, 'the knowledge of psychiatry in the nineteenth century is not the sum of what was thought to be true, but the whole set of practices, singularities, and deviations of what one could speak in psychiatric' (Foucault 1977, 182).

⁶⁰ For example, 'the knowledge of clinical medicine is the whole group of functions of observation, interrogation, decipherment, recording, and decision that may be exercised by the subject of medical discourse' (ibid., 182).

⁶¹ For example, 'the knowledge of Natural History, in the eighteenth century, is not the sum of what was said, but the whole set of modes and sites in accordance with which one can integrate each new statement with the already said' (ibid., 183).

⁶² For example, 'the knowledge of political economy, in the Classical period, is not the thesis of the different theses sustained, but the totality of its points of articulation on other discourses or on other practices that are not discursive' (ibid., 183).

circulation but take others out of circulation, a specific discourse thus limits or excludes alternative ways in which subjects can be constituted.

Moreover, seeing as power is regarded as a sort of *normalising/ disciplinary force*, knowledge is then implicated in the production of docile bodies and subjected minds. The connotation of the term ‘discipline’ for Foucault turns to possess a double meaning. It refers not only to a branch of knowledge (i.e. political science) but also to a control of people’s behaviour via punishment and training. The knowledge produced in disciplines in fact reinforces and refines the *disciplinary forces* of society. It is precisely for this reason that Foucault opposes two forms of understanding the notion of knowledge: positivism and Marxism, owing to the fact that the former regards knowledge as being neutral and objective while the latter views knowledge as a force of emancipation. Power, knowledge and discourse should be perceived as trinity in unity. The interrelationship among power, knowledge, discourse and reality can be summarised as follows: all knowledge, as a form of discourse, on the one hand is the effect of power relations; on the other, forms of knowledge constitute the social reality which they describe and analyse.

In short, Foucault sees power as a fundamentally enabling force. And since power is constitutive, it becomes a positive rather than a totally negative phenomenon. Yet, the claim that power is positive does not imply it is ‘good’. Power is positive only in a limited, technical sense.

2-4-4. Foucault’s conception of Subject

What the case of psychoanalysis shows, as discussed above, is that subjectivity itself, the very possibility of having a self of which one is aware, of saying ‘I’ with some degree of self-knowledge, is then conditioned on the exercise of power. It is an example of our imbrications in a network of power relations. Individuals regulate themselves through a constant introspective search for their hidden ‘truth’, held to lie in their innermost identity. The confessional practices that are supposed to reveal ‘true’ meaning only lead to an endless explication and production of the proliferating discourse of ‘Self’ – the speaking subjects, thereby being produced in discourse. Hence, control is achieved not through direct repression but through more invisible strategies of normalisation; the behaviour of individuals is regulated not through overt repression but through a set of standards and values associated with normality. It is this conception of power as a normalising rather than

a repressive force that lies at the base of Foucault's assertion that power is constitutive. Self – the subject – in psychoanalysis, as a result, is not really *discovered* but *produced*. Subjects are produced in discourses and in power relations, positioning them as speakers in possession of self-consciousness and an unconscious that determines desire.

The concept of subject in Foucault's thought becomes *the constituent subject*. That is to say: we are not naturally born as a subject; we are constituted in discourses and are subjectified in power relations. The modern individual became a subject of power and knowledge, not repressed, but positively shaped and formed within power relations. The ultimate goal and effect of power is to normalise and eliminate all social and psychological irregularities, producing useful and docile subjects through a refashioning of minds and bodies. Self-knowledge is a strategy and effect of power whereby one internalises social control. The individual as a result is interpreted as an effect of political technologies through which its very identity, desires, body, and soul are shaped and constituted. It is power that makes individuals subjects. The modern subject is thus a construct of subjection. The term 'subject', according to Foucault, has two meanings. The first is that it 'is subject to someone else by control and dependence;' the second is that it is 'tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge' (Foucault 1983, 212). The former apparently refers to what he means by a juridical-discursive conception of power, while the latter signifies his constitutive notion of power. Foucault argues that 'both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to' (ibid., 212). The subject is thus subjected. It is in terms of subject that Foucault departs from the dominant Western modern thought, the Enlightenment tradition, which perceives the subject as the source of intentional meaning, self-reflexive, unified, and rational. To be a subject, for Foucault, is always to be subjected.

Nevertheless, it will be misleading if one conceives Foucault's constituent subject merely as an *illusionary* representation generated in discourses rather than a substantial/actual/material existence. It is crucial to note that for Foucault the reality of social phenomena resides in their exteriority, and that this is all there is. There is no essence, no ontology, of social world, and there is no other reality underneath the discourse. If one conceives the constituent subject as an illusionary representation, one in effect presumes that there is another 'true' self – an ontological existence of Self, thereby falling into the trap of

identifying between ontology and representation, and between true-representation and misrepresentation.

To take Edward Said's 'Orientalism' as an example to elucidate this point, Said conceives Orientalism as a discourse in the Foucauldian sense of term – as systems of discursive practices that constitute the objects of which they speak. Orientalism therefore discursively produces 'Orient' as 'the Other,' so as to help to define the West itself. 'Orient' in the West is therefore man-made – a European invention. However, Said argues that it is wrong to conceive the Orient in essence as an idea, or a creation with no corresponding reality' (Said 1978, 5). He writes:

One ought never to assume that the structure of Orientalism is nothing more than a structure of lies or of myths...Orientalism...is not an airy European fantasy about the Orient, but a created body of theory and practice in which, for many generations, there has been a considerable material investment. Continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same investment multiplied – indeed, made truly productive – the statements proliferating out from Orientalism into the general culture. (Ibid., 6)

Therefore, since Orientalism is 'a cultural and a political fact,' it then 'does not exist in some archival vacuum' (ibid., 13). In this respect, to Said, the subject – Orient – is an actual existence in the West, rather than a fantasy. And moreover, from a Foucauldian perspective, because all social realities reside in their appearances and this is all there is, the representation of 'Orient' should be *the* Orient. Orient is constituted in discourses, and there is no other Orient outside this constitution in the West.

Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to interweave the 'Orient' of Orientalism in the West and the 'Orient' of peoples or cultures whose location is in the East. David Howarth, for instance, questions Said's treatment of the ontological status of Orient or Orientalist discourse. He contends that Said is unclear whether Orientalism is a discourse representing an 'Orient' that exists, or whether the discourse as a practice plays a constructive role of bringing the 'Orient', the object of which it speaks, into existence (Howarth 2000, 68-71). It is important to note that when referring to the 'Orient' Howarth actually indicates the Orient located in the East.

This Orient, however, has never actually been the main concern of Said's *Orientalism*. To Said, there are of course peoples and cultures located in the East, but, writes Said, his study

of Orientalism 'has very little to contribute' to it (1978, 5). The phenomenon of Orientalism he studies 'deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and his ideas about the Orient despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a "real" Orient' (ibid. 5). Said's two fears are 'distortion' and 'inaccuracy' (ibid. 8). In this regards, Said is justified in claiming 'Islam' to be 'fundamentally misrepresented in the West' (ibid., 272), if he refers this false representation to those made within Orientalist discourse in the West. In the latter case, Said does not assume that there is an ontological existence of the Orient, but admits that in a limited sense there might be representations of the Orient by the people residing in Islamic world. The real issue is then, to Said, who can legitimately represent 'the Orient' (an ethical issue), other than whether or not there can be a true representation of it. From this perspective, Orientalism is in effect a discourse representing the 'Orient', and at the same time a practice playing a constructive role of bringing into existence of 'Orient' – the object of which it speaks – though it only exists in the West. It is not possible to provide a comprehensive discussion of this issue here; the important point is that the discursive objects constructed by the statements made about them, from a Foucauldian perspective are actually the real subject of social world. The constituent subject is not a fantasy but an actual entity, though it exists only in discourses.

A theoretical difficulty derived from this conception of the subject is how is resistance possible and what is it for? As mentioned above, the social world, to Foucault, is constituted in a wide range of discourse and practices within a field of power-knowledge complexes; there is no pre-existing social world made up of objects with essences; the social world that gets constituted in discourses is the only one we have. Following this line of thought, the notion of subject is then comprehended as merely an empty container, a place filler, or a recipient of moral directives which issue from some other source of authority. In this scenario, there is nothing to be liberated from, and more importantly, power can just provide the contents of this empty container. Power is diffused throughout the social field, constituting the subjectivities of individuals, forming their knowledge, self-identification and pleasures, colonising the body itself, and utilizing its forces while inducing obedience and conformity. Following this illustration, every individual is caught within a complex grid of disciplinary, normalising, panoptic powers that survey, measure and correct their move. This depiction provides a concept of society with no space for progressive change, with no

possibility of meaningful individual freedom, and with no possibility of resistance. The notion of subject becomes arbitrarily constructed and manipulable docile bodies. This way of understanding human history is, indeed, enervating. The fatal consequence is that any kind of resistance seems impossible and ultimately pointless. Foucault's thoughts then become nihilism, disregarding any form of resistance.

Yet, the concept of resistance is ever-present in Foucault's work and vital. For Foucault, where there is power, there is resistance. Resistance emerges where power is exercised. Where there is no possibility of resistance there can be no relations of power. Resistance is then in a position of interiority in relations of power (Foucault 1978, 95).

In his discussion of 'the perverse implantation', Foucault explains how resistance and counter-discourses emerged. According to Foucault, the sexed body is to be understood not only as a primary target of the techniques of disciplinary power, but also as a point where these techniques are resisted and thwarted. The 'perverse implantation' of the nineteenth century – the massive proliferation of discourse on 'deviant' sexualities – served to advance social control in the area of 'perversity' and to legitimate a notion of 'normal' heterosexuality. However, this very multiplication of controlling discourses in effect also made possible the formation of a 'reverse' discourse. Foucault states:

Homosexuality began to speak in its own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturalness' be acknowledged, often in the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified. (Ibid., 101)

Indeed, those discourses on the species and subspecies of homosexuality, inversion, pederasty and psychic hermaphroditism were used by those considered 'deviant' to establish their own identity and to demand certain rights. Foucault thus contends that:

Discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. (ibid., 101)

In short, to Foucault, resistance emerges in the rupture of the exercises of power. The exercise of power is not always coherent, all-embracing and overwhelming without any break, contradiction, or interval. Rather, one can always find incoherences, ruptures and contradictions where power is exercised, and it is in those incoherences, ruptures and contradictions occurring in the exercise of power that resistance finds a space.

Nevertheless, although Foucault convincingly indicates the possibility of resistance and the emergence of counter-discourse, in most of his historical studies, whether *Madness and Civilization*, *Discipline and Punish* or *History of Sexuality*, Foucault gives an impression that the subject presents no material resistance to the operations of power. And indeed, his works emphasise domination over resistance in a significantly unbalanced way. Some critics therefore contend that Foucault overrides his emphasis on the ways in which individuals are classified, excluded, objectified, individualized, disciplined and normalised. However, one should not regard Foucault's unbalanced analysis as a fallacy. In fact, Foucault exaggerates the effects of power as a tool of convenience in order to caution us that everything is dangerous. Certainly, Foucault's elaboration of dominatory power provides us with a very powerful explanation of social phenomena. As Foucault demonstrates, power operates and thus produces a situation of domination not only through physical violence, repression in the form of law, or ideological brainwashing, but also through more devious and discreet disciplinary and normalising strategies that constitute the bodies and minds of the subject. This explanation is very powerful. It actually provides us with a very useful tool to write a vivid critique of our historical era. It shows us that modern forms of knowledge, rationality, social institutions, and subjectivity that seem given and natural are in fact constructed in relations of power and domination. One should not regard oneself as being free when they remove the repression; one is in fact still in the trap of power. Whenever we think we obtain freedom, we are in fact in another form of domination.

Since subjects are produced within power relations, the core task of the social movements in contemporary society is therefore to challenge all forms of subjectification. Resistance accordingly refers to the challenge of subjectification, or what Foucault calls desubjectification or desubjugation. It signifies a renunciation of the Self – to get rid of the subject itself, the constitutive subject. Foucault therefore claims that the subject must be 'stripped of its creative role and analysed as a complex and variable function of discourse' (Foucault 1977a, 138). He calls for the deconstruction of the subject, and sees this as a key political tactic. Foucault urges us to dispense with the subject. He writes,

One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. (1980b, 117)

In other words, we should always ask how we become who and what we are with this present form. Hence, ‘the target nowadays,’ writes Foucault, ‘is not to discover what we are, but to refuse what we are’ (1983, 216).

While Foucault emphasises that ‘human beings are made subject’, his goal is then to create a history of the different modes that human beings are made subject by and to expose the beginning and development of current subjectifying discourses and practices. In ‘Subject and Power’, Foucault argues that there are three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects. The first mode gives itself the status of science; the second mode is called ‘dividing practices’ (the mad/the sane, the sick/the healthy, the criminals/the ‘good boys’); the third one is the way that a human being turns him/herself into a subject. Foucault here systematically categorises his whole body of works into these three modes. *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* are the study of the first mode; his studies on clinic and prison are in the second mode; and finally his studies on sexuality belong to the third one (ibid., 208-9). Foucault’s works should be read as challenges to people’s understanding of who they are in ways that lead them to resist their attachment to their social identities. This is the political task of genealogy. In this regard, Foucault studies actually form part of a strategy of resistance, exposing the beginnings and developments of the discourses and practices through which human beings are subjectified. This de-subjectification task, in short, is demonstrated by a single concept – genealogy, as already discussed in the Introduction.

2-5. Conclusion

In terms of discourse, I began with the thought that I should define the discourse of Taiwanese national identity by its underlying reasoning. But since the discourse itself is highly divergent, fragmented and heterogeneous in nature and is diffused and dispersed in the domain of society through the various and diverse social practices, the task is in fact inappropriate and impractical. Alternatively, it is more appropriate and practical to delimit the discourse, including not only discursive but also non-discursive practices (social practices), regarding Taiwanese-ness or Taiwanese national identity. The social practices selected in this thesis are the production of knowledge, the publication of a book, the commemoration of historical event, and the political demonstration. The discourse of

Taiwanese national identity thus should not be perceived as a composition of a set of utterances or statements that have a line of reasoning, but a domain of dispersion in which discursive practices and social practices intersect, intertwine and interact. It is the domain not only where the discourse is formed by various social practices but also where the discourse is disseminated throughout the whole society in Taiwan and where the dissemination further reproduces the discourse of Taiwanese national identity itself.

In terms of power, I began by thinking that power is in the possession of the politicians, and the construction of Taiwanese national identity is a consequence of the politician's manipulation of power over the ordinary people in Taiwan for the sake of their own benefits. Yet, this understanding of power is too simplistic and too superficial. The notion of power as Foucault demonstrates is much more complex. Power is not exercised only through the hands of political elites but also through more devious and invisible forms of forces that normalise our behaviours and thoughts, and constitute our bodies, desires, pleasures and identities. Thus, my inquiries will move less toward the power which is possessed by the political elites than toward other forms of disciplinary and normalising forms of power. Yet, this does not mean that the politicians play no part in the formation of Taiwanese national identity, but it means that politicians' manipulation is only one of the ingredients among many others that help constitute the people's national identity in Taiwan.

In terms of genealogy, my initial thought was that the formation of Taiwanese national identity was the result of an evolutionary Taiwanese history with a traceable origin. Yet, this way of understanding history is problematic since it is interpretative in essence and it only legitimises the current world without questioning it. Many events or ingredients in history that do not fit into a specific interpretation are therefore filtered out and neglected. Thus, this thesis instead provides a genealogical account of 'Taiwanese' as a national identity. It refuses to view such an identity formation as a linear development of history that has traceable origins; it rejects the possibility that the idea of being Taiwanese has a deep meaning, fixed essence or that it reflects primordial truth and instead locates its meaning in surface practices. In contrast, the thesis attempts to discover the constitution of the meaning of 'Taiwanese' from its surface practices; it tries to seek the emergence of 'Taiwanese' from numberless points.

In short, this thesis aims to dismantle 'Taiwanese', which is seen as an unproblematic truth in Taiwan. In this regard, the thesis does not ask the question 'who am *P*' (which implies the search for essence), nor does it question 'where do *I* come from' (which implies the search for origins); rather, it asks 'how did *I* come to be in this present form'. This is a genealogical interrogation.

Essay on Knowledge Productions & Subjectivity Formation

Historical and Political Knowledge in the Discursive Constitution of Taiwanese National Identity

3.1. Introduction

The formation of Taiwanese national identity in the 1990s is commonly regarded as a creation of the subjectivity of Taiwan. This way of understanding the nature of Taiwanese identity derives from three prevailing strands of arguments in the current scholarly literature. Firstly, the formation of Taiwanese identity is narrated as resistance against Japanese colonisation and the KMT's re-colonisation of Taiwan. Secondly, it is interpreted as a consequence of democratisation in Taiwan in the 1990s. Thirdly, it is comprehended as a revolt against Communist China's military intimidation and its authoritarianism. The formation of Taiwanese identity in the end is gauged as an emancipation of the subject or a creation of the subjectivity of Taiwan/Taiwanese. Nevertheless, the notion of 'subject' elaborated by Foucault, as shown in Chapter Two, not only refers to subjectivity and subject-matter; but more importantly, it also signifies a state of subjection. That is to say, the production of knowledges plays a constitutive role in the process of subjectivity constitution or the formation of subject. Knowledges are practices that systematically form the objects/subjects of which they speak. The subjectivity/subject is then subject to the domain of knowledges.

Drawing upon Foucault's work, this chapter aims to investigate the close relationships between the knowledge and constitution of Taiwanese identity. To this end, this chapter scrutinises two forms of knowledge: historical strategy and political strategy.⁶³ With respect

⁶³ The term strategy is employed here because this chapter presumes that no legitimate and objective approach, as such, could ever exist to produce a 'correct', 'complete' and 'neutral' analysis of the nature of the Taiwanese identity (even though many approaches claim to do so). Each approach not only gives an explanation or depiction of Taiwanese identity, but, more importantly, they also engage in the process of the (trans)formation/destruction of it. Each approach hence demonstrates one

to historical strategy, it addresses the historical dimension of the formation/transformation of Taiwanese identity. This strategy attempts to yield *the* history of Taiwan, aiming at delineating the process and elucidating the origins of the formation of Taiwanese identity. This kind of history is devoted to producing a *correct, continuous* and *complete* history of Taiwan. This includes the history of the early settlers in Taiwan, colonial experiences under the Japanese administration (1895-1945), and the KMT's autocratic rule in Taiwan in the post-war period (1945-1987). In contrast to the historical strategy, the political strategy stresses the political dimension of the formation of Taiwanese identity. It expounds the reasons why people in Taiwan have formed a shared identity as being Taiwanese in the process of democratisation. This strategy emphasises political institutions, ideology, way of life, and shared values by focusing on Taiwan's political reforms – its democratisation at the end of the twentieth century – as well as the PRC's attempts to intimidate Taiwan politically and militarily.

The significant role intellectuals – the producers of knowledge – played in the construction of Taiwanese national identity has long been investigated in scholarly literature on Taiwanese nationalism. For instance, Gunter Schubert (1999) argues that there are three intellectual discourses in Taiwan attempting to construct the meaning of 'being Taiwanese'.⁶⁴ Another work concerning the role of intellectuals in the formation of Taiwanese national identity is provided by Daniel Lynch (2004), in which the author discusses intellectuals' efforts to construct a Taiwan nation. He argues that the most fundamental mission for the Taiwanese nationalist intellectuals is to cultivate a sense of 'Taiwanese subjectivity'. Two approaches are required: firstly, rewriting history from a Taiwanese perspective; and secondly, recasting Taiwanese culture.⁶⁵ Juxtaposed with the aforementioned two studies, a more

analytical strategy (among many others) to explore the whole picture of the formation of Taiwanese identity with the certain aims of legitimating/de-legitimating or constructing/deconstructing it.

⁶⁴ The first one is what Schubert terms 'Taiwanese ethno-cultural nationalism', which describes Taiwan as a historically and culturally distinct community, sometimes even suggests the existence of a specific Taiwanese ethnicity or race. The second one, 'multi-ethnic nationalism', promotes the idea of a nation that is composed of 'four great ethnic groups' with equal rights and status, in attempts to overcome the old provincial conflict and making ethnic harmony. The third one, political or state nationalism, tries to transcend ethnicity and argues for a Taiwanese nation based on constitutionalism and the liberal state.

⁶⁵ As for the first approach, Lynch argues that independence-minded historians attempted to rewrite Taiwanese history and then used this newly formulated history to socialize children into the concept of a Taiwanese nation. As for the second approach, Lynch elucidates the efforts made by intellectuals

comprehensive and important work of this sort is provided by Hsiao, A-Chin.

In *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* (2000), which is rewritten from his Ph.D. dissertation, Hsiao attempts to offer a comprehensive study of the intellectuals' efforts to construct a Taiwanese (national) identity. According to Hsiao, the role being played by the humanist intellectuals, including 'writers, literary critics, linguists, activities of language revival movements, and amateur and professional historians', has been indispensable in thinking about the creation of Taiwanese identity (2000, 2). Hsiao respectively discusses three important realms of intellectual activities, namely, literature, linguistics and history, in an attempt to understand how the ideology of Taiwan's cultural peculiarity has been developed. Hsiao argues that those intellectual endeavours helped to substantiate a *uniqueness* of Taiwanese culture set against Chinese culture, and subsequently form a 'Taiwan nation' in opposition to a 'China nation'. This cultural uniqueness is manifested in the production of collective symbols and the representation of historical memory and cultural tradition, i.e. Taiwan's *tragic* history.⁶⁶ Moreover, it is noted that, for Hsiao, the uniqueness of Taiwanese culture and history involves not only non-deliberate construction but also 'deliberate' invention. Cultural nationalism thus is 'basically a politically induced phenomenon' (ibid., 20). This is the reason why Hsiao uses the term 'ideology' to describe the nature of the discourse of Taiwanese cultural nationalism, since the term 'ideology' implies 'not simply as the *reflection* of social and historical reality, but as a means for contesting the representation and interpretation of that reality' (ibid., 20). And since it is ideological, Hsiao concludes that Taiwanese national identity is a 'false identity' (ibid., 184-7).

Hsiao's book provides a systematic analysis of the role of humanist intellectuals in nation-building in Taiwan. He rightly depicts the significance of cultural elites' efforts in the construction of Taiwanese national identity, and convincingly demonstrates that a specific Taiwanese national consciousness is formed through the creation of a literary tradition, a major local language revival, and forging a new sense of the past.

to 'recast' or 'renovate' Taiwanese culture. For those Taiwanese nationalists, according to Lynch, nations are all 'constructed entities' (Lynch 2004, 533). There is a need to put more effort towards cultivating a distinctive Taiwanese identity among the broader public.

⁶⁶ Hsiao contends that the articulation of a distinct Taiwanese historical experience – being colonized by and struggling against different alien regimes – constitutes an important part of Taiwanese nationalist discourse. Taiwanese history or Taiwanese culture is therefore *tragic* in nature.

This chapter will push Hsiao's studies further, in particular, by demonstrating knowledges with various analytical strategies, mutually intersecting, interacting and competing with each other. The chapter argues that without those knowledges no Taiwanese identity, as such, would exist. There was no such thing as 'Taiwanese-ness' in the first place. 'Taiwanese-ness' is subject to different historical narrations and political discourses; and each narration and discourse has input in making it possible to talk about 'Taiwanese-ness' and attach a specific substance to it. In other words, many narrations and discourses all contribute to the idea that there is such a thing as 'Taiwanese-ness', and help substantialise the qualities, features and characteristics attached to it. 'Taiwanese-ness' becomes a discursive realm in which different historical narratives and political rhetoric interact, intersect and compete.

Finally, this chapter does not intend to encompass the entire scholarly literature/knowledges concerning the formation of Taiwanese identity. For instance, discussion of cultural dimensions of Taiwanese identity is completely omitted from this chapter. It is not within the remit of this chapter to tackle that body of knowledge. This chapter examines, respectively, historical and political knowledge. The conclusion briefly indicates how the discussion in this chapter could help us to rethink, revisit and reorient current studies on Taiwanese identity.

3-2. Historical Strategy

3-2-1. Japanese Colonisation and the KMT's Authoritarian Rule in the Narratives of Taiwanese Identity Formation

One of the important works concerning identity formation of the early Han-Chinese settlers in Taiwan is Chen Qi-Nan's article, 'Becoming Native and Becoming Inland: On the Development of the Society of the Taiwan Han Folks' (1984). In the article, Chen contends that social attachment to regional community in Taiwan developed among the early settlers. Citing evidence of changing patterns of inter-group rivalries or conflicts, Chen demonstrates that after settling in Taiwan for more than a century, people gradually developed a shared territorial identity rooted in Taiwan. The population in Taiwan was gradually less divided by their differences in ancestral lineage linked to different hometowns in the Mainland than by their pragmatic interests around their territorial and local bases. In other words, the settlers

began to identify with their settlements in Taiwan and make their settlement their new homeland. Similar to Chen's argument, Shih Ming (1979) and Wu Rwei-Ren (2001, 2004) both suggest that 'Taiwanese consciousness' can first be traced to early Han settlement in Taiwan. They, however, additionally stress the momentousness of Japanese colonisation in Taiwan (1895-1945).

Shih Ming, a staunch opponent of the KMT regime since the early 1940s, in his massive book, *Taiwan's Four Hundred Years History*, provides a Marxist anti-colonial nationalist account of Taiwan's subjugation and resistance to successive 'foreign' regimes. Shih locates national awakening among the Taiwanese as early as the native revolt against the Dutch in 1652. According to Shih, Taiwanese national consciousness is a product of the peculiar historical development of Taiwan. For more than four hundred years, the people of Taiwan have been governed by external and invading forces including the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Dutch, the Qing Empire, the Japanese, and the KMT. Political and cultural resistance from the local people to these forces throughout these periods formed a distinctive *island culture* that differs very much from the *continental culture* of mainland China, evoking a distinctive Taiwanese identity. It should be emphasised that Shih gives very positive and constructive accounts of the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. The relationship between China and Taiwan prior to Japanese colonisation, conceived by Shih, is a relationship between oppressor and the oppressed. The rule by the Qing Dynasty is 'feudalistic' and 'colonial' in nature. It was Japanese colonisation that led Taiwan to secede from the rule of a feudalistic Chinese society. This capitalist development under Japanese colonisation completely disengaged Taiwan from a 'pre-modern', 'semi-feudalistic' and 'stagnant' Chinese society, expanding rapidly the gap between the two societies. The shift from Qing to Japanese rule was accompanied by a transformation of Taiwan from a 'feudal colonial society' to a 'modern colonial society'. Japanese colonialism on this account is described as a kind of 'necessary evil' in terms of socioeconomic development. To Shih, Japan was imperialist but also capitalist: coloniser but also modernizer. Thus, the rapid pace of capitalist development under Japanese rule, from Shih's point of view, played a decisive role in the formation of a distinct Taiwanese consciousness. The KMT's subsequent brutal rule over Taiwan just further reinforced people's alienation from China.

Likewise, a contemporary political theorist, Wu Rwei-Ren, provides another series of

important works on the origins of Taiwanese identity with the emphasis on Japanese colonisation. In his article, 'Fragment of/f Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism' (2004), Wu argues that modern Taiwanese nationalism is a case of peripheral nationalism that 'emerged, submerged, and re-emerged' in successive yet unfinished state-making and nation-building projects by various imperial centres – the Qing Empire, the Japanese Empire and the American Empire (post-WWII era) (2004, 16). According to Wu, for a long period under Qing rule, Taiwan was divided by sub-ethnic animosity among Han settlers from different ancestral places. Yet, toward the 1860s, signs of integration as a distinct Taiwanese people began to manifest themselves. The local literati with Confucian education in Taiwan were among the first to articulate the earliest idea of an island-wide Taiwanese identity. After taking over Taiwan in 1895, the Japanese Empire attempted to incorporate Taiwan, albeit hierarchically and unequally, into the Japanese national body by its tremendous efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese – the colonial subjects. The consequences of Japan's colonisation in Taiwan are threefold. Firstly, it politicised the regional space of Taiwan, thereby creating the territorial basis for the rise of Taiwanese consciousness. Secondly, it forced Taiwanese nationalists to adopt a modernist strategy – mainly the notion of self-determination – to construct their own identity. Thirdly, after the aggressive assimilation project of the Japanese government – *kominka* (Japanisation)⁶⁷ – signs of partial success of Japanisation appeared, constraining the rise of Taiwanese nationalism. Taiwan became a second Okinawa, assimilated, though with shreds of residual identity. In addition, Wu emphasises that Taiwan was ceded to Japan before China's transformation from empire to nation, so that the subsequent rise of Chinese nationalism after the Sino-Japan War in 1894 did not imagine Taiwan as part of a Chinese nation, and Taiwanese nationalism that surged during the Japanese colonial period *only* referred to the residents of the island. Hence, Taiwanese and Chinese nationalism are 'parallel to – yet separate and different from – each other' (ibid. 17). After the defeat of Japan in WWII, Taiwan was again transferred by the victors to the KMT regime. The KMT aimed to 'colonise' Taiwan by weakening the Japanese influences in Taiwan. Yet, it is noted that the KMT was a coloniser without a *metropole* after it retreated from the mainland China in 1949. The *émigré* KMT regime was

⁶⁷ The Kominka Movement aimed to assimilate the people in Taiwan into 'Japanese' culturally. There are many different English translations of this term. While Wu translates this term as 'Japanisation', others like Leo Ching (2001) translate it as 'imperialisation'.

‘nothing but a flickering candle’ (ibid. 18). It was the American Empire of the Cold War that created a geopolitical space for the KMT regime’s existence. Wu terms this situation as ‘dual colonial structure’. Taiwanese nationalism has thus been severely influenced by changing American national interests, both enabling and constraining its development. And this dialectic of dual colonialism eventually gave rise to the growth of a ‘liberal Taiwanese nationalism’ while constraining its further development into a formal declaration of the independence of Taiwan.

Apart from the aforementioned narrative, Wu in another article (2001) addresses more specifically the impact of Japanese colonisation on the surge of Taiwanese nationalism. According to Wu, Taiwanese identity was formed in a series of confrontations with Japanese colonialism. A Taiwanese discourse of political nationalism was gradually formed in this situation, in which the people of Taiwan were abandoned by China, but were unable to be Japanese since the Japanese governor in Taiwan refused to grant the same citizenship to the Taiwanese as to the Japanese citizens. The people in Taiwan became Japanese politically, but not Japanese in terms of culture and ethnicity, and were Chinese in terms of culture and ethnicity though not Chinese politically. Under this identity dilemma, Taiwanese political elites resorted to striving for an autonomous status under the Japanese Empire. This autonomous status, according to Wu, implied the rights to self-determination of the Taiwanese people. Moreover, despite the fact that political movements campaigning for autonomous status demanded it on legal and economic grounds, they were in fact cultural nationalist movements, since incentives to seek autonomous status are cultural concerns: those proponents regarded themselves, and indeed were treated by the Japanese, as a *different people* in opposition to the Japanese. As it happened, those proponents asserted that Taiwan possessed a peculiar cultural system and particular sentiments and customs that were different from the Japanese, arguing that the particularity of Taiwanese culture needed to be preserved. To Wu, Taiwanese national consciousness originated from this series of political and cultural movements. And the new wave of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s, which imagined Taiwan as a weak nation possessing a right to self-determination and to future sovereign rights, directly derived from this strand of Taiwanese nationalism.

To Shih and Wu, Taiwanese identity can be traced back to the early Han-Chinese settlement in Taiwan, though they both draw particular attention to the prominence of

Japanese colonisation.

Unlike Shih and Wu, Taiwanese sociologist Chang Mau-Kuei (2003) insists that a Taiwanese identity did not appear until 1895. Chang suggests that the origin of Taiwanese nationalistic ideas can be traced back to the 1920s when Taiwan was the colony of the Japanese Empire. However, it did not evolve into a full-fledged nationalistic movement overnight. The maturation of Taiwanese identity did not take place until the late 1980s. Chang's article aims to present the zigzag course of the development of Taiwanese identity. He identifies four stages of the *successive* process of identity formation: the early Han-Chinese settlement, Japanese colonisation, the KMT's authoritarian rule, and democratisation in the 1990s.

Regarding the first stage (Chang 2003, 26-8), and in contrast to Shih who claims that the concept of 'being Taiwanese' can be traced back around 'four-hundred-years', Chang suggests that the collective imagination of 'being Taiwanese' cannot be found until 1895. The first settlers and their descendents before 1895 all looked to China as their place of origin, political centre, and source of cultural practices and ancestral lineage. Thus, the early settlers as a whole could not perceive themselves as one larger group called 'Taiwanese', which is substantially different from the Han-Chinese. According to Chang, it was not until the 1920s that the people in Taiwan formed a collective identity.

In 1895, Taiwan was ceded to Japan in the *Treaty of Shimonoseki* after China was defeated by Japan. The Han settlers had responded to the Japanese troops with bloody resistance in the first two years, although the resistance, Chang argues, was not guided by modern national consciousness, but by traditional-Han-folk-consciousness. Also, in Taiwan at the early stage of colonisation, Han Chinese was regarded as a different race from Japanese by the Japanese colonial government. The decade from 1918 to 1928 is, however, crucial in the course of Taiwanese identity formation. Inspired by the Wilsonian principle of self-determination as well as the realisation of the fact that there was no other choice but to accept the status of having Japanese nationality with Chinese origin, some of the Taiwanese cultural elite, such as Chiang Wei-Shui [Jiang Wei-Shui] and members of the 'Taiwan Cultural Association', organised a political campaign to strive for autonomous status under the Japanese Empire. One of the most noted movements was the petition movement for establishing a Taiwanese Parliament (also known as 'The Movement for the Establishment

of a Taiwanese Parliament' 1921-1935). Chang argues that it is at this point that 'Taiwanese identity' formed. Chang writes:

[It] should be clear that both the origins of the idea of Taiwanese nationalism and the ways of turning that idea into substantive reality were conceived during this period. (ibid., 31)

Since then, people defined the Taiwanese people as a collectivity, a distinct *nation* ruled by the Japanese colonial government. 'Taiwan' as a signifier for the place and the people as a whole had been widely adopted. Yet, Chang argues, although Taiwanese identity was formed during this period, this call for distinctiveness was 'definitely not relevant to the calling for an unequivocal separation from China and the Chinese' (ibid., 32). This series of campaigns for autonomous political status, however, fell apart soon after the Kominka Movement was enacted in 1935 (ibid., 34-42). The success of the movement manifested itself in the phenomenon that some Taiwanese were eager to join the Imperial Forces, risking their lives for the Japanese emperor. The mentality of the Taiwanese people had changed. All forms of resistance were almost completely silenced after 1935. As a result, when the war ceased and Taiwan was returned to its 'ancestral country' – mainland China – in 1945, the Taiwanese and the Chinese became different *peoples*. Taiwan and China went on their respective paths of change in two different political fields with different identities.

The subsequent authoritarian rule by the KMT, according to Chang, further transformed features of Taiwanese identity (ibid., 42-50). After WWII, Taiwan's return to the ROC, the painful and lingering memories of the 2-28 Incident in 1947, the overwhelming pressure to assimilate, and the opposition movement against authoritarianism since the 1970s, helped to crystallise the meaning of *authentic* Taiwanese, as opposed to 'the Chinese'. The 2-28 Incident in particular marked a watershed for Taiwanese nationalism. Following the incident, the call for self-determination and a categorical Taiwanese identity as opposed to a Chinese one, was clearly conceived. Moreover, after it retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the KMT regime was determined to maintain its claim to be the sole legitimate ruler of all China, which had been 'stolen' by the communists. They desperately needed patriotism and loyalty from both the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders for their mission to retake the Chinese Mainland. The fundamental goal of nationalistic teaching in Taiwan was to instil Chinese loyalty into the whole population, despite their origins, to undertake this anti-communist

mission of reunification.⁶⁸ Official Mandarin traditions were upheld as the high culture in Taiwan. Taiwanese dialects (of all sorts), traditional customs, folk religious practices, opera and music were soon defined as 'local', 'backward', and 'superstitious'. Thus, ironically, as Chang describes, for many Taiwanese the process of de-colonisation was in fact the course of re-colonisation. The dominant Japanese high culture was simply replaced by hegemonic Chinese codes. The people in Taiwan after the War entered into another kind of humiliating situation through its reunification with the motherland. The KMT regime was considered by many Taiwanese to be just another colonial regime, albeit much more backward, poorer, and worse than the Japanese. The notion of a categorical Taiwanese identity in opposition to the Chinese was planted in the minds of many Taiwanese during the post-war period, even though they could not speak out under the authoritarianism until the 1980s.

According to Chang, Taiwanese identity transformed its meaning again in the democratisation of the 1990s (*ibid.*, 50-4). Due to the considerable success of indigenisation and democratisation, people in Taiwan tended to support the institutional arrangement of the ROC, though the ROC institution was limited within the boundary of Taiwan Island (not a sole legitimate government of China). Most people in Taiwan did not think that there was a need to declare independence since the ROC institution as a whole had already been indigenised; and moreover, they did not want to give up Taiwan's economic prosperity or to endanger themselves as a price for the independence of Taiwan. The democratic political institution of the ROC seems to be the preferred overarching consensus among Taiwanese with different opinions about their preference for either unification or independence. Taiwanese identity for Chang is thus 'pragmatic', 'moderate' and 'democratic' in nature.

To summarise Chang's argument, the collective imagination of 'being Taiwanese' did not exist before 1895; it emerged for the first time during the Japanese colonial period, though it was not relevant to the calling for an unequivocal separation from the Chinese; the notion of a distinctive Taiwanese identity as opposed to the Chinese one was formed in the

⁶⁸ Likewise, Christopher Hughes (2000) argues that the KMT's attempts to cultivate loyalty among the population consisted of propagating 'symbols and institutions', aiming to make individuals identify themselves as Chinese. For instance, 'the calendar...began counting from 1912, the year of the establishment of the ROC'; 'maps of the national territory included the whole of the Chinese mainland'; streets in most cities in Taiwan 'were renamed after mainland places'; children in school had to memorise the names of all the railways stations in mainland China as they had existed before the KMT regime retreated to Taiwan in 1949 (2000, 67).

minds of many Taiwanese during the KMT's authoritarian period; and Taiwanese identity transformed its meaning again during democratisation in the 1990s as a civic identity under the ROC institutional arrangement.

It is worthwhile at this stage to briefly compare and contrast the aforementioned three scholars' works. Shih and Wu both trace the origins of Taiwanese identity back to an early period of Han-Chinese immigration, whereas Chang opposes this view. Nevertheless, they all indicate the significant role of Japanese colonisation in the formation of Taiwanese identity. The ambivalent identity that the residents of Taiwan possessed – the Taiwanese 'were' Japanese, yet Taiwanese culture was opposed to Japanese culture – helped to form Taiwanese national identity.

Indeed, most studies on Taiwanese identity agree on the profound influences of Japanese rule in Taiwan in stimulating the surge of Taiwanese consciousness, whether this consciousness exists in opposition to the Japanese nation, to the Chinese nation, to neither of them, or to both of them. In fact, any attempts to re/narrate or to re/interpret the history of the Japanese colonial period are all highly contestable in contemporary Taiwan. While some argue that the people in Taiwan had formed a unique Taiwanese consciousness in opposition to a Chinese one due to Taiwan's colonial experience and the distinct socioeconomic development under Japanese colonisation, others hold that there might be a so-called Taiwanese identity which emerged during Japanese colonisation, but it is subsumed under the wider identification of an all-inclusive Han Chinese ethno-national consciousness. The latter further argue that any post-war Taiwanese independence movement or identity formation in the 1980s in fact has its own origins, such as corruption and the autocratic rule of the KMT regime. The most representative scholar who advocates this line of argument is the historian Wang Xiao-Bo, a Taiwanese pro-unification intellectual.

In his *Taiwanese History and Taiwanese* (1988), Wang suggests that the notion of 'Chinese' or 'Chinese consciousness' during that period existed among the Taiwanese elites. Identification with Chinese nationalism was an essential impetus for Taiwanese appeals for colonial liberation. Wang argues that although there were various groups of immigrants from mainland China, they all shared a consciousness of Han-Chinese. To support his argument, Wang provides a historical account of 'The Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament', in which Taiwanese intellectuals repeatedly submitted petitions to the Imperial

Diet (Japanese Parliament) between 1921 and 1935, asking for the establishment of a parliament on the island. The political movement was widely interpreted (e.g. Chang Mau-Kuei 2003) as an origin of the Taiwanese national movement. By describing the works and attitudes of the strongest proponents of this movement, Wang shows that they all had a strong affinity towards the classical tradition of China (e.g. their refusal to wear Japanese clothes) and an allegiance and indebtedness to mainland China (e.g. their associations with Chinese nationalist thinkers) (Wang 1988, 11-67). Wang does not deny the existence of something called 'Taiwanese consciousness'. But he claims that Taiwanese consciousness is directly related to the universal generality of Chinese ethno-national consciousness because of the specific status of colonial Taiwan. To Wang, throughout the Japanese colonial period, 'Chinese-ness' as a cultural, ethnic and political imaginary, loomed greatly in the political rhetoric of Taiwanese intellectuals.

Although Wang's interpretation of the Taiwanese political resistance during the Japanese colonial period differs from Shih, Wu and Chang, all of them explicitly indicate that the KMT's autocratic and ruthless rule after WWII – illustrated by the 2-28 Incident in 1947 and the White Terror in the 1950s and 1960s – inevitably led the Taiwanese to deeply question their Chinese-ness.

Following Wang's argument, some intellectuals stress that it was not Japanese colonisation, but the KMT's authoritarian rule in the post-WWII era that led to the formation of Taiwanese identity. Dai Guo-Hui (1994), for instance, traces the rise of Taiwanese identity back to the ten years between 1945 (when Taiwan returned to Nationalist China) and the first half of the 1950s (when the White Terror struck out against the intellectual elites). Dai emphasises that there would never have been a conflict between Taiwanese and Chinese identity if the KMT regime had a good government after the retrocession of Taiwan to KMT rule. According to Dai, there was at the outset no doubt among the residents of Taiwan that China was their motherland. But when it became clear that the new leadership started to rule in the same way as the Japanese, or even worse, the people became disappointed and alienated from the KMT regime. More recently, Chu Yun-Han and Lin Jih-Wen (2001), by analysing the similarities and differences between Japanese rule and the KMT's rule over Taiwan, also suggest that Taiwan under Japanese colonial rule showed 'no tangible social support for a political struggle for national sovereignty and

Taiwan had not yet emerged as a self-contained political community with a distinctive political identity' (Chu et al. 2001, 103). According to Chu and Lin, a vibrant Taiwanese nationalist movement with growing and broad-based social support surfaced with the demise of KMT authoritarian rule in the 1970s. More importantly, with the indigenisation of the KMT power structure, the island was eventually 'converted from a cultural agent of Chinese nationalism into an incubator of a "re-imaged community" based on a new Taiwanese identity' (ibid., 103). As these two authors show, the two cycles of regime evolution – the Japanese and the KMT – despite their comparability, produced substantially different outcomes in terms of the development of political society and the construction of collective identity.

To sum up at this point, most scholars agree in general, despite their various emphases and priorities, that the convergence of Japanese colonisation and KMT's autocratic rule made the imagination of Taiwan as a nation possible. And the new wave of Taiwanese nationalism in the 1990s came as a result of this lineage of Taiwan's modern historical development.

3-2-2. Comments on the Historical Approach

The past, or the memory of the past is one, if not most, of the key grammars of identity formation. The merit of the historical approach is that it provides a 'meaningful' historical description of political, economic and social developments in the formation of Taiwanese identity. Yet, the weakness of the approach is that its understanding of causality between the past (causes) and the present (effects) is overly simplistic.

The historical approach implicitly suggests, as shown above, that Japanese colonisation and the KMT's authoritarian rule are causes that *directly* and *spontaneously* led to the solidification of current Taiwanese consciousness as an outcome. The formation of Taiwanese identity is therefore the consequence of historical development. In addition, it also suggests the history of Taiwan was a *continuous* and *linear* development from Japanese colonisation to KMT's re-colonisation, and afterwards to de-colonisation or post-colonisation in the 1990s. Taiwanese identity eventually emerged *naturally* from this historical development. Nevertheless, if Taiwanese identity in its present form as a national identity, as opposed to its past forms in either Japanese colonial times or in the KMT's authoritarian period, was formed or moulded in the 1990s, we then should be more attentive to the *politics*

of narrations, representations and interpretations of the past in the 1990s.

It is crucial to note that the past cannot speak by itself; rather, we speak for it. The past in fact can always be narrated in various ways since historians select a small number of historical events relatively (from numerous events), and subsequently give their own account of interpretations/meanings to the historical events by virtue of 'a' specific historical contextualisation. A different contextualisation would lead to a different selection of events and dissimilar, or sometimes conflicting, interpretations of those historical events. As a result, there are always different, and sometimes conflicting, narrations and interpretations of the past.⁶⁹ Indeed, we always arrange our histories to make the present a fulfilment of past necessity and a promise toward a particular future. Also, it should be stressed that the gaps between what actually happened and what is said to have happened are always involved the intervention of power and interest. The relationships between Japanese colonisation (or the KMT's authoritarian rule) and the solidification of Taiwanese identity in this regard should not be thought of as direct, spontaneous and continuous, because this kind of understanding conceals the intervention of power and interest. Furthermore, while most historians' works are merely forms of narrative, they in practice demonstrate their account of the past as *actual* contents of the past to their audience/reader, and then go on to problematically treat such a narrative as an essence shared by both the historical representation and the set of events in the past. While historians' works are deemed as 'true accounts' (not narratives), those historical works, to a great degree, help construct reality. Hence, the function of history and historical work is not only to explain identity formation but in fact to help form that identity. As shown in Chapter Two, many nationalism theorists, such as Hobsbawm (1983a, 1983b) and Hall (1996a, 1996b) have suggested that 'a shared past' is crucial to the formation of the national identity. Indeed, historians and their works have played a decisive part in the discursive constitution of Taiwanese identity.

Consequently, it is problematic to see the formation of Taiwanese national identity as a result of historical development (i.e. Japanese colonisation and the KMT's autocratic rule afterwards) and a linear process, as many historians suggested. Taiwanese identity does not derive from what *actually* happened in the past, but how the people in Taiwan *narrate, represent*

⁶⁹ The debate between the pro-independence historians and pro-unification historians in Taiwan over the history of Taiwan exemplifies this phenomenon.

and *interpret* their ‘past’. The ‘past’ is clearly a discursive realm in which different forces compete with each other. We therefore need to subject this view to methodological scrutiny, and see history or historical work as narrative or discourse. There is therefore a need for a further investigation of the relationship between different interpretations/narrative productions – why a specific narrative/interpretation of Taiwan’s history takes precedence over alternative ones – as opposed to discovering a *true* account of the past and exploring the relationship between the past and the interpretation/narration of the past.

To reiterate, since the causality between the past and the formation of Taiwanese identity is not as simple as the aforementioned historians suggests, the important task to investigate the formation of Taiwanese identity is neither discovering the *facts* (or *true accounts*) of the past nor finding out which narratives of Taiwan’s modern history are more accurate. Rather, the series of questions that I put forward in the following is crucial: how a specific narrative/interpretation of Taiwan’s history takes precedence over other alternative ones; how some narratives/interpretations disappear and were silenced in a specific period; and how history and other ingredients of the past have been used to help constitute Taiwanese identity through a much more complex process of meaning-making, deployment, and ritualisation. Following this line of thinking, it is appropriate to say that the formation of Taiwanese identity does not exist outside Japanese colonisation or the KMT’s ruthless governance, but it is unsuitable to claim that Taiwanese identity was naturally formed and developed from those historical ‘facts’.

To summarise, it is important for us to go beyond merely pointing out the truism that the formation of Taiwanese identity is the outcome of historical developments. We need to examine the processes and the procedures by which the category of ‘Taiwanese’ is produced by specific narrations and interpretations of the past, and how they are mobilised in turn by the regime in power in contemporary Taiwan.

3-3. The Political Strategy

Along with historians, many political scientists/theorists have also devoted themselves to this issue. Three analytical strategies from those works are identified here. While the first indicates that ‘democratisation’ is the main cause of the transition of Taiwan’s national

identity from Chinese to Taiwanese, the second one takes the economic factors and Beijing-imposed diplomatic isolation and the military threat toward Taiwan into account. The third one highlights the role of politicians in the process of constructing Taiwanese national identity.

3-3-1. Democratisation and Civic Taiwanese Nationalism Arguments

One of the earliest comprehensive efforts focusing on the role of democratisation in the formation of Taiwanese identity is Alan Wachman's *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratisation* (1997). In the book, Wachman argues that Taiwanese consciousness and society's quest for separate international identity were long suppressed under the authoritarian KMT regime, which justified its ruling legitimacy and political dominance by the Mainlander elites on the basis of the 'One China' principle. Taiwanese consciousness and identity were thus unleashed by the democratic opening. Democratisation offered space for the free expression of a 'repressed' identity.

Another representative effort upholding this line of argument is Lin Chia-Lung's series of works (1998, 2001, 2002). Lin indicates that 'democratisation' is the main cause of the transition of Taiwan's national identity from Chinese to Taiwanese. He argues that political democratisation in Taiwan and threats from the PRC are the two most critical explanatory factors that have contributed to the sudden growth of a civic national identity among the people of Taiwan during the last decade of political transition. According to Lin, democratisation serves as 'a pulling force', drawing people together through the process of political participation. The practice of democracy accustoms people to participating in the deliberation and decision-making of *national* affairs and makes them implicitly or explicitly accept the island as the legitimate boundary of that deliberation and decision-making. Constant political participation has indeed gradually formed a collective consciousness among the people, transforming the term 'Taiwan' into a *geographic location* and a *political society*, and metamorphosing the term 'Taiwanese' from an *ethnic* term for 'native Taiwanese' to a *civic* term for 'citizens of Taiwan' (Lin 2001, 219-20). In other words, the practice of democracy in Taiwan creates a shared political identity, common values and a sense of achievement, and this imagination of a shared community is moreover limited within the island of Taiwan, excluding the people of mainland China. More and more Taiwanese realise that 'Taiwan's democratic liberalism' is different from 'China's authoritarianism'. The gap

dividing Taiwan and China emanates not from cultural or ethnic differences, but institutional differences: democracy versus authoritarianism. Along with the democratisation argument, Lin contends that the constant threat from the PRC has been a very important element in Taiwan's recent state- and nation-building. Lin uses public opinion surveys to show the positive correlation between the escalation of the cross-strait tension and people's self-identification as Taiwanese. He contends that the long-existing and ever-growing threat from China is fostering 'a sense of common suffering' among all people of Taiwan regardless of their ethnicity (Lin 2002, 219). The Chinese military threat against Taiwan and its diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan in international society unifies Taiwanese people and produces a shared identity. The Chinese communist regime's increasing hostility towards a democratising Taiwan has obviously served as 'a pushing force'.

Thus, Taiwanese identity according to Lin is not inborn, but a socially and politically constructed sentiment. More significantly, this newly formed Taiwanese identity by its nature is *liberal* and *plural* since three aspects of this identity – an ethnic origin (the Han), a cultural identity (Chinese), and a political identification (Taiwan) – can cohabit peacefully. A significant portion of the population in Taiwan actually has multiple identities, claiming to be 'politically Taiwanese but culturally Chinese' (Lin 2001, 261). Taiwanese identity is thus not only an ethnic identity, but also a citizen/territorial-based political identity. Based on this strand of thought, Taiwanese nationalism should be conceived of as civic nationalism, and Taiwanese identity, above all, is *civic* in nature.

Lin's identification of the political/territorial/civic nature of the Taiwanese identity echoes with Christopher Hughes' (2000) prominent finding: the people in Taiwan identify themselves as culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese. Hughes describes Taiwan as moving towards a 'post-nationalist' political settlement. He argues that the epic changes in the international system since the 1970s first precipitated the state legitimacy crisis and later aroused Taiwanese aspiration for independent statehood. Yet, this newly emerged nationalism movement has gone beyond the nationalist principle, as set out by Gellner in 1983, that 'the political and the national unit should be congruent'. According to Hughes, Taiwan has developed a situation in which it retains the special links with China in terms of culture, kinship and economics, while the island simultaneously maintains control over its own sovereignty through developing democratic politics, albeit within the constraints of the

one-China policy imposed by the PRC. Hughes obviously distinguishes political identity from cultural identity and holds that the residents of Taiwan possess Taiwanese identity politically without abandoning their Chinese-ness culturally and ethnically.

Lin's assertion of the civic nature of Taiwanese identity and Hughes' observation of the features of Taiwanese nationalism (politically Taiwanese but culturally Chinese) both manifest the mainstream argument of scholarly works produced by political scientists/theorists who are concerned with the issues of Taiwanese national identity. For instance, Gunter Schubert (2004), by analysing Taiwan's major parties' cross-strait policy, illustrates that Taiwan has formed an overarching consensus, that is, 'Taiwan and Mainland are both parts of China, which is currently divided into two sovereign states' (Schubert 2004, 538). This overarching consensus has been shared as well as shaped by Taiwan's most important parties since the late 1980s. Although Taiwan's mainstream parties clearly differ on the best strategy to de-escalate the tensions in the Taiwan Strait and to engage mainland China, they all agree that 'the liberal constitutional state of the Republic of China must be protected and internationally strengthened' (ibid., 535). Hence, Schubert concludes that a Taiwanese nation already exists albeit *civic* in nature. And sovereignty and democracy are the pillars of an overarching consensus among both the people and the political parties on what constitutes the Taiwanese nation.

Likewise, T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu (2004) also suggest, using evidence from opinion surveys they conducted, that the majority of the population in Taiwan identify themselves as culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese. In their article, Wang and Liu firstly distinguish political identifications and cultural orientations, and then respectively assess respondent's attitudes toward these two aspects of national identity (2004, 574). The results of the survey suggest that political and cultural identities are not congruent in the context of Taiwan, since 80% of respondents view Taiwan as their own country but only one-fourth view Taiwanese culture as different from Chinese culture. Wang and Liu therefore conclude that a substantial number of island residents now believe they can be both Chinese culturally and Taiwanese politically. To outward appearances, it seems that Wang and Liu have successfully tested Hughes' observation – culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese – via a 'scientific' and 'objective' survey research design. This section does not intend to discuss Wang and Liu's

survey design in detail.⁷⁰ Yet, it should be pointed out that the people in Taiwan do not necessarily agree with each other as to what the term ‘nation’ means to them.

Indeed, as shown in Chapter Two, the term ‘nation’ is highly contestable and ambiguous and it is surely lacking an overarching consensus on its definition among people in both academia/non-academia, and the West/non-West. In the West, the debate between nationalism (which highlights cultural or ethnic ingredients of nation) and liberalism (also termed ‘liberal constitutionalism,’ which focuses on legal and institutional rights of the nation) has long attracted great scholarly attention. In Taiwan, the dispute between cultural/ethnic-based national identity and political/civil-based national identity is also noticeable. Many political theorists in Taiwan have engaged in and devoted themselves to re/defining the term ‘nation’, ‘Taiwanese nation’ or ‘Chinese nation’. Some people consider these concepts mostly in cultural terms while others hold that the ‘nation’ *ought to* be civic, constitutional or political in nature. Indeed, the definition of the term ‘nation’ in Taiwan is a realm of politics and can be used for making different political claims, serving different ideologies.

Given that most people in Taiwan, as Hughes suggests, identify themselves as culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese, this section should centre its discussion on the scholarly literature that contends with the *civic* nature of (the Taiwanese) nation. It is noted that the aim here is not to judge the credibility of their arguments, for example, that liberalism as a way of thinking about the ‘nation’ is ‘better’ than ‘nationalism’, or vice versa. Instead, it intends to demonstrate the political impacts of this re/definition of the term ‘nation’ on identity formation in the context of Taiwan.

Most intellectuals who are classified as ‘liberalists’ argue that the solely legitimate foundation of a nation *ought to* be political, rather than ethnic and cultural. Chen Qi-Nan (1992) for instance, a respected intellectual in Taiwan, emphasises the importance of ‘citizen conscience’ in the construction of national identity. For Chen, political pragmatism, way of life, and ideology are much more important ingredients in nation-state-building than the

⁷⁰ The problem of Wang and Lin’s design of survey research is that they in fact help the people of Taiwan conceptualise the notion of ‘nation’ or ‘Taiwan nation’, since the people of Taiwan in the first place do not necessarily distinguish the cultural and political aspects of the nation. Nor do they prioritise either cultural or political aspects. Wang and Lin’s research thus can be regarded as a political intervention that in actuality (pre)defines the meaning of ‘Taiwanese’.

ingredients of ethnicity, culture or history. Only through the principle of democratic autonomy developed by an evolving civil society can Taiwanese national identity be legitimised. It is this civic liberty that makes Taiwan a strong and widely accepted nation.

Chen's line of reasoning about civic conscience or civic liberty manifests the central point of so-called liberalist thinking as to the nature of Taiwanese identity. We can find parallels between Chen's argument and those of the aforementioned political scientists, since all of them differentiate the cultural from the political identity and give priority to the latter. To them, 'nation' is a political, territorial and civil entity/community; and national identity ought to be political and civil in nature. Nevertheless, not many so-called liberalists can easily get rid of the shadow of nationalist ways of thinking considering what constitutes a nation, since they all face a theoretical and practical predicament: how to decide who is the *people* in the first place (in other words, who is eligible to be a member of the 'Taiwan nation?'). Very few people in Taiwan can accept, for instance, that a Thai labourer in Taiwan would become a member of a 'Taiwanese nation'. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Two, Anthony D. Smith has indicated a nation in practice cannot be 'invented' or 'imagined' without taking ethnic, or at least cultural, attributes into account.

Facing these predicaments, most intellectuals in Taiwan who study Taiwanese nationalism or national identity therefore attempt to combine liberalist with nationalist elaborations of the nation, and to resort to cultural, ethnical and historical attributes so as to decide who *ought (not) to be* included into the Taiwan nation in the first place, though they might put different weighting in the spectrum between nationalism and liberalism. The series of efforts by Chiang Yi-Hua (1998, 2001), Tsai Ying-Wen (1997), Hsiao Kao-Jen (1996), Wu Nai-Teh (1996), and Chang Mao-Kui (1993) can be regarded in this way. They all attempt, on the one hand, to theoretically synthesise nationalism and liberalism; on the other, they try to empirically demonstrate the coexistence of cultural/ethnic identity and political/civil identity in the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism, or the dual (cultural and political) identity that the people of Taiwan possess.

To summarise what has been discussed so far, 'democratisation' is the main cause of the formation of Taiwanese identity since constant political participation has indeed gradually formed a collective consciousness among the people in the island. Taiwanese nationalism/identity should be conceived of as civic, liberal or state nationalism/identity,

and the residents of Taiwan possess Taiwanese identity politically without abandoning their Chinese-ness culturally. Also, all the scholars upholding this line of thinking seek to de-essentialise the ethnic attributes of Taiwanese-ness and provide a more syncretistic reading of Taiwanese identity, although, to a certain degree, they also resort to cultural and ethnic attributes of nationhood.

Brief comments on the above-mentioned ‘democratisation’ argument and civic nationalism can be offered here. First of all, what does it mean to be a *civic* nation-state without being able to decide whether one is part of another national community, or legally, as well as civically, separate and distinct? In other words, this strand of thought provides a limited answer to the question of who should be included (and excluded) in the first place in nation/state formation. To put the question differently, who is eligible to be granted civic rights if citizenship is the cornerstone of nation-building? Secondly, to what extent does this line of argument explain the ethnic mobilisation that often occurred and was repeated in Taiwanese society in the last decade, particularly during the election campaign? As some researchers have suggested, political manipulation and ethnic mobilisation also play a significant part in the consolidation of Taiwanese consciousness.⁷¹ Thirdly, how well can the distinction between political and cultural identities hold up in the face of the ongoing efforts at ‘de-Sinification’ and the construction of the Taiwanese culture movement launched in the last decade in Taiwan? While quite a few scholars argue the formation of Taiwanese identity has been more a matter of political re-identification than cultural de-Sinification or cultural re/construction, we should not overlook the importance of the ongoing movement of de-Sinifying Taiwan’s culture. A vigorous de-Sinification movement has been launched that clearly targets Taiwan’s culture and intends to purge it of any Chinese content (Hsiao 2000; Lynch 2004). And finally, we should question to what extent those arguments stressing the democratisation or civic nationalism, as a discourse, in fact help to define what/who ‘Taiwanese’ is and constitute the contents and meanings of ‘Taiwanese-ness’.

3-3-2. Public Opinion Survey Method, Economic Integration and Chinese Threats in (Re)shaping Taiwanese National Identity

Since quite a few scholars consider that Taiwanese identity is formed in the process of democratic practices, ‘the will of the people’ becomes a central concern of some researchers’

⁷¹ The final part of this section will demonstrate this line of argument.

studies. Survey research is generally regarded as one of the best approaches in assessing people's self-identification. In actuality, a fairly large number of these kinds of works have been produced in the last decade. They all aim, by adopting the survey technique, to uncover attitudes toward people's self-identification and to examine which factors might affect these attitudes. It is worthwhile here to briefly review those scholarly works.

Researchers have experimented with various methods for measuring people's preferences regarding identity issues. Among them, the two most popular approaches are: firstly, to measure the respondents' position on the unification/independence spectrum, and secondly, to ask whether their self-identification is Taiwanese or Chinese. For many political scientists, however, these two approaches have their own flaws, so that they are unable to correctly show the real orientation of people's attitudes towards their self-identification. These political scientists therefore propose more 'sophisticated', 'precise', 'reliable', 'accurate' or 'advanced' ways of conducting surveys. As mentioned above, T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu propose a new method to examine identity issues by distinguishing political identifications from cultural orientations. Yet, a more influential survey method is proposed by Wu Nai-Tel (1993, 1997, cited in Marsh 2002, 144-6). Wu reformulates the survey questions as follows:

1. If Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with the Chinese communist government after it announced its independence, then Taiwan should become an independent country. Do you agree?
2. If mainland China and Taiwan were to become similar in economic, social, and political conditions, then the two sides of the strait should be united into one country. Do you agree?

Wu then categorised the respondents into four types of national identification preferences: 'Taiwanese nationalists', 'Chinese nationalists', 'pragmatists', and 'conservatives'.⁷² Since Wu devised this new measure, the researchers began to use this formulation annually to trace the

⁷² 'Taiwanese nationalists' refers to the people who support Taiwanese independence and 'oppose unification with China even if China becomes as democratic and economically developed as Taiwan.' 'Chinese nationalists' refers to the people who 'favour unification with Mainland and oppose Taiwanese independence even if Taiwan could have peaceful relations with the PRC after independence.' People in the category of 'pragmatists' support both 'Taiwanese independence (providing that does not provoke a military attack from the PRC)' and unification with China ('if the PRC catches up with Taiwan's level of democratic and economic development'), depending on which ideal condition occurs first. The category of 'conservatives' rejects both Taiwanese Independence and unification with China since they prefer the status quo in which Taiwan is and will remain the ROC (Marsh 2002, 145).

trends of people's self-identification as well as their preference towards Taiwanese independence/unification with China. The outcomes of those surveys since 1993 to the present show that, not surprisingly, *pragmatists* are much more numerous than the others.

Academic works have been produced that rely on such survey data and try to give their own accounts of the political implication. For instance, Robert Marsh (2002), following Wu's categorisation, investigates further the extent to which two factors – China's determination of the use of force toward Taiwan, and the future prospect of China's political democratisation and economic development – intervene in people's self-identification. For Marsh, the future trends of people's self-identification in Taiwan should be analysed in terms of these two factors. Emerson M. S. Niou (2004) conducts very similar research. Echoing Marsh's findings, Niou observes that a significant portion of the respondents could accept either independence or unification because a majority of respondents (72%) could support independence if it does not lead to war, and a majority of respondents (64.2%) could support unification if the two sides become compatible economically (Niou 2004, 559). Yet, compared to Marsh, Niou tries to go further to explore 'what factors might influence respondents to move away from the status quo towards either independence or unification?' (ibid., 557). Niou considers the following four factors as hypotheses: (1) China's threat of using force, (2) the willingness of the US to defend Taiwan, (3) the possibility that China will become more moderate once it develops economically, and (4) the willingness of Taiwan to fight. Niou's findings suggest that all three players in the game, the PRC, Taiwan and the US can influence Taiwanese people's orientations on identity issues. Niou thus concludes with the following policy suggestion:

For Taiwan, strengthening its will to fight is an effective strategy to boost for independence. For China, the threat of using force against Taiwan can effectively deter many people from moving toward independence...If China can also convince people in Taiwan that it is becoming more prosperous, open, and democratic, then more people in Taiwan would find unification an acceptable choice. For the U.S., showing some degree of commitment to defend Taiwan could deter China. But showing too strong a commitment might encourage people in Taiwan to move toward independence. (ibid., 566)

Marsh's and Niou's analysis of the economic factors in shaping Taiwanese self-identification is shared by political observers in both the US and Taiwan. In the US, proponents of peaceful reconciliation such as Morton Abramowitz, Stephen Bosworth (2003)

and Nancy Tucker (2002) have all suggested that the growing economic and social ties across the Taiwan Strait would improve political antagonism and would discourage public opinion on the island from seeking formal independence. In Taiwan, a political scientist, Chu Yun-Han, also pins much of his hopes on this possibility that political support for separatism will gradually decline as economic and social ties grow.

In his article (2004), Chu argues that if democratisation qua ethnic mobilisation is now the primary mechanism in a vicious cycle imperilling cross-strait relations, what drives the countervailing benign cycle is the powerful magnet of economic integration. Chu first of all describes Taiwan's former president Lee Teng-Hui's efforts to thwart a tidal wave of cross-strait economic integration, along with his endeavours to reengineer the cultural orientation of the island. Chu states:

Leaders [Lee] reasoned that a full-scale economic integration would eventually compromise Taiwan's political autonomy. The acceleration of cross-strait exchange was deemed detrimental to Taiwan's political independence because it would...lead to the erosion of a separate Taiwanese identity. (2004, 500)

Therefore, according to Chu, Lee was determined to re-establish the state's regulatory power over the pace of cross-strait economic exchange, exert dominance over public debate on mainland policy, and reassert the supremacy of national security priorities over economic pragmatism in the conduct of cross-strait relations, in order to affect people's self-identification. Lee's most notable mainland policy, 'Go Slow, Be Patient', has been enacted under this political consideration. Lee's policies, according to Chu, were superficially quite successful in consolidating the trend of Taiwanese identity formation, given the fact that the surge of exclusive Taiwanese identity and popular aspiration for a separate nationhood was dramatic. Nevertheless, as Chu argues, Lee failed to fully accomplish his will (2004, 502).

This failure derived from the fact that, firstly, despite all the measures enacted by Lee's government, economically, Taiwanese businesspeople still looked for investment opportunities in mainland China, albeit indirectly or illegally. Secondly, with respect to identity, Lee was unable to manipulate it at will. This incapacity is manifested in three ways. Firstly, as Marsh and Niou have already identified, while fewer and fewer people retain an exclusive Chinese identity, more people have acquired a dual identity, identifying themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese. Secondly, under the first term of the DPP Chen Shui-Bian administration, the tidal wave of emerging Taiwanese identity visibly reached a plateau. And

thirdly, the most targeted generation for state-sponsored re-socialisation – the younger generation – turned out to be least susceptible to the incubation of an exclusive Taiwanese identity (ibid., 502). Chu therefore concludes that it is hard to assert that there is a solid foundation that guarantees eventual success for the political project of Taiwanese nation-building. The existence of a sizable number of ‘rationalists’, as Chu terms it, would in the short run serve as a healthy buffer to mitigate the polarised conflict over national identity and could, in the long run, shift the political equilibrium in either direction, depending on whether external conditions, such as economic integration between the two sides of the strait, become more favourable to unification or independence. Chu’s findings, together with Marsh and Niou’s, contradict some widely held perceptions that Taiwanese national identity is generally accepted by the people in the island; he calls into question the belief that the Taiwanese nation has already formed.

The aforementioned strand of analysis focuses on economic factors in shaping people’s self-identification. Their arguments are derived from the theory of neo-functionalism and Deutsch’s concept of a ‘security community’ respectively. The former argument is that economic integration will eventually lead to some sort of political accommodation, possibly political integration such as the European Union, while the latter is that growing functional interdependency will make war too mutually costly to be feasible. It is true that mainland China has rapidly evolved into Taiwan’s largest export market, its single most important source of trade surplus, and an indispensable manufacturing platform for its export-oriented sector. Nevertheless, empirically, increasing economic integration and social contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait contribute very little to arrest the trend of rising Taiwanese identity and dwindling Chinese identity among the island’s public. Also, researchers (e.g. Corson 2004; Peterson 2004) find very little evidence to support the claim that there is a positive correlation between economic integration and relaxation of political and military tension in the case of the cross-strait relationship. Ironically, political and military tension is generally regarded as one of the main causes of the surge of Taiwanese nationalism.

In addition to Lin Chia-Lung as mentioned earlier, this argument that the Chinese military threat against Taiwan and its diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan serve to unify the Taiwanese people and produce a shared identity is made by Ho Szu-Yin, Liu I-Chou (2002)

and Wu Yu-Shan (1996). Ho and Liu contend that the escalating tension between the PRC and Taiwan leads to a continuous decline of Chinese identity and concomitant rise of Taiwanese identity in the island. Likewise, Wu argues that 'Chinese' as a concept has been successfully monopolised by the PRC's efforts to politically and diplomatically isolate Taiwan, so that people in Taiwan fail to demonstrate internationally that they are 'Chinese' since the idea of 'Chinese' refers exclusively to the citizens of the PRC. Taiwanese people are deprived of their Chinese-ness, which they recognise as having been pre-empted by the Mainland Chinese under the Beijing regime. This cognition is in part based on Taiwanese peoples' exposure to international reports on Chinese affairs in which China is mainland China and Taiwan is a separate entity. People in Taiwan see themselves and their relationship with the mainland Chinese through the prism of the international media.

To summarise those works that highlight the PRC's role in the formation of Taiwanese identity, they all attempt to claim, explicitly or implicitly, that the PRC's threat or its diplomatic isolation towards Taiwan gives rise to the formation of Taiwanese identity. It is true that we should not overlook the poisonous effects of Beijing's intensive efforts to isolate Taiwan politically and diplomatically from the international community and its hostile reunification campaign. Nevertheless, to assume a facile causality in the relationship between China's military threat/diplomatic isolation and Taiwanese identity formation is problematic for three reasons. Firstly, since the hostility between Taiwan and China in the 1960s and 1970s was much more severe than in 1990s, why did people in Taiwan not form a collective identity in the 1960s or 1970s? Instead, they formed a collective identity in the 1990s after the animosity between China and Taiwan had subsided, relatively speaking.⁷³ Secondly, it is difficult to clarify whether the PRC's military threat/diplomatic isolation toward Taiwan (as a cause) leads/led to the creation of Taiwanese identity (as an outcome), or the creation of Taiwanese identity (as a cause) engenders China's military reactions and political measures toward Taiwan. This causal relationship can be easily reversed. Some scholars (e.g. Christensen 2002) even argue that it is the PRC's military threat that intimidates the residents of Taiwan from seeking independence and therefore constrains the trend towards Taiwanese identity. Thirdly, assuming a facile causal relationship between China threat/diplomatic

⁷³ The cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and China was normalised after the KMT government abolished the Period of Mobilisation for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion (Roy 2003, 174-5).

isolation and Taiwanese identity formation masks the complex connection between the actuality and its representation, as well as concealing the intervention of power and interest. It is crucial to note, for Taiwanese residents, how *real* the Chinese threat is does not come directly from the *actuality* of the Chinese threat (given that no residents of Taiwan directly see the missiles deployed on the other sides of Taiwan Strait) but from how ‘the threat from China’ is represented in the media, literature, political rhetoric and so on in Taiwan. Indeed, the representation of a ‘Chinese threat’ is manipulatable.⁷⁴ The issue then becomes not so much *a true account* of the Chinese threat, but rather a representation of it in Taiwan. Consequently, it is problematic to see the formation of Taiwanese identity as a result of China’s threat or its diplomatic/political isolation, as many political scientists have suggested. We need to pay more attention to the *politics* of representation.

3-3-3. The Mobilisation of Political Elites

Apart from the aforementioned arguments, scholars also focus on politicians’ role, political mobilisation and political competition in the formation of Taiwanese national identity. They investigate how, during democratisation, struggles over democratic reform and redistribution of political power between the Mainlanders and native Taiwanese became entangled with the national identity conflict and the clash of different visions of Taiwan’s future political relations with mainland China. Wang Fu-Chang made one of the earliest works upholding this argument.

In one of his journal articles (1996), Wang argues that Taiwanese consciousness was produced in the process of the political mobilisation and competition between the KMT regime and the oppositional forces. According to Wang, before 1980 the Taiwanese oppositional movement focused on the ethnic inequalities between the Mainlander and native Taiwanese under the KMT’s authoritarian rule. Nevertheless, unexpectedly, the movement developed into a nationalist project in the early 1980s. According to Wang, the reasons why the opposition forces resorted to nationalist rhetoric are, on the one hand, the KMT’s successive and continuous repression of the opposition movement, which led to its radicalisation. On the other hand, and more importantly, the opposition proponents

⁷⁴ We can observe empirically how the government of Taiwan manipulates the representation of the China threat. For example, the Ministry of Defence normally releases news concerning China’s missile deployment to the media right before the Legislative Yuan reviews its defence budget.

recognised that the bedrock of KMT authoritarian rule was chauvinistic Chinese consciousness, officially promoted by the KMT, which justified the ethnic inequalities between Mainlander and native Taiwanese. Therefore, they began to challenge this Chinese chauvinist ideology by developing a political and cultural discourse of Taiwan-centred nationalism, and launched numerous mass demonstrations and street protests to mobilise, and increase, public support for the movement.

Peter Yu Kien-Hong (2001) contributes to this strand of scholarly literature in his studies of the courses of Taiwanisation in the 1990s. He defined 'Taiwanisation' as a 'process by which political figures, especially those born in Taiwan [native Taiwanese], try to preserve Taiwan's political independence from any Mainland Chinese rule in the future' (2001, 30). According to Yu, there are many reasons behind the Taiwanisation process. The then-ruling KMT under Lee Teng-Hui wanted to legitimise its rule.⁷⁵ And Lee also took advantage of the Taiwanese consciousness to deal further blows to the non-mainstream faction within the KMT, which was mainly composed of Mainlanders. For the DPP, it is also in favour of Taiwanisation. Yu argues, besides using Taiwanisation as a tactic to win votes, the DPP has also been under heavy pressure from some party fundamentalists calling for the creation of a Republic of Taiwan as the only way out for Taiwan in the cross-strait impasse.

Likewise, Lin Tsong-Jyi in his article titled 'The Evolution of National Identity Issues in Democratising Taiwan: An Investigation of the Elite-Mass Linkage' (2002) contends that Taiwanese national identity is formed in the interaction between the political elite and the masses, and between the political calculations of the politicians and public opinion towards identity issues. The article is divided into two parts. It begins with discussing 'why and how political elites raise national identity issues in the 1990s' (2002, 123). According to Lin, identity issues in the 1980s were mainly promoted by the DPP (then the opposition party), while it attempted to mobilise mass support during the election campaign. Yet, entering the 1990s, the ball was in the KMT's court. After Lee Teng-Hui took office as president, he decided to make efforts to reduce Taiwan's diplomatic isolation in order to regain legitimacy

⁷⁵ To Lee, for the KMT to be accepted by the native people of Taiwan, it had to be Taiwanised first.

for the KMT's rule in Taiwan.⁷⁶ These diplomatic efforts are generally termed as 'pragmatic diplomacy policy'.⁷⁷ This policy gained the consonance of most people in Taiwan. Yet, this shift of the KMT's foreign policy unavoidably encountered external challenges, particularly from the PRC and the US.⁷⁸ Those international reactions in turn required political elites of different parties in Taiwan to pull back their actions. Particularly for the DPP leaders, they were forced to adjust their mainland policy and to modify their appeal for the independence of Taiwan if their ambition was to win a majority of the votes and to become the ruling party of Taiwan. In the end, the DPP accepted the maintenance of the status quo without abandoning the ideal of independence.⁷⁹ In the second part of Lin's article, with reference to survey data, he demonstrates that the majority of the people in Taiwan identify themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese and that the maintenance of Taiwan's current *de facto* independence is the favourite option of the Taiwanese people. Hence, Lin concludes that Taiwan's two major political parties indeed follow the direction of public opinion and there is no huge gap between the elite and the mass in regard to national identity issues.

In Lin's view, Taiwanese national identity is formed in the interaction between the elites and the mass, and it is more or less a consequence of the electoral calculations of the political elites. The problematic of Lin's argument is that he runs the risk of virtual circularity because public opinion in Lin's argument can be both a cause and an outcome.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, Lin is right to identify the significance of political calculations in the rise of Taiwanese national identity. Indeed, popularly elected political leaders in Taiwan have been

⁷⁶ As mentioned in the Introduction, the KMT regime suffered from legitimacy crises abroad and at home in the early 1980s after the US recognised the Beijing regime as the solely legitimate government of China.

⁷⁷ Lee tried to develop either official or unofficial relations with other countries, made efforts to participate in international organisations, and conducted official or unofficial visit to countries that did not have official ties with Taiwan.

⁷⁸ After Lee's six-day trip to the US in 1995, China decided to make concrete warnings by conducting several rounds of missile exercises near Taiwan's waters. Facing a potentially immediate conflict with China, the US also indicated that it would not support Taiwan if the island unilaterally claims its *de jure* independence.

⁷⁹ Lin indicates that the DPP only needs to modify its approach to fostering independence rather than completely abandon it, since it is unwilling to lose its supporters in the independence movement.

⁸⁰ In Lin's argument, politicians bring up identity issues because of supportive public opinion, but identity issues raised by the politicians subsequently shape public opinion. Public opinion in this regard becomes both a cause and an outcome.

often motivated to arouse a sense of Taiwanese consciousness as well as a popular desire for self-determination for their political benefit. Many political commentators in Taiwan uphold this line of argument when analysing the incumbent president Chen's administration's policies. For instance, they contend that the element of political calculation explains why Chen and his campaign strategist went ahead with their pledge to hold an unprecedented referendum in conjunction with the 2004 presidential election. In academia, some scholars also endorse this line of thought. To give an example, Kao Mily Ming-Tzu (2004) examines the interrelations among the referendum, the political calculations during the election campaign, and Taiwanese national identity formation.

Kao's article investigates politicians' manipulations of identity issues to create a favourable environment for their own interests during election campaigns. She argues that the referendum was vital for Chen's presidential campaign for the following reasons. Firstly, it permitted Chen to take credit for being the democratic vanguard by driving the referendum movement. Secondly, the referendum provided a convenient instrument for Chen not only to mobilise his supporters and spark discussion about domestic politics, but also to distract people's concern with Chen's poor performance in economic matters during his presidency. Third, it helped improve voter turnout for Chen's presidential campaign by holding the referendum on the same day with the presidential election. In short, the issue of national identity in the guise of referendum was aroused to create a favourable environment for Chen's re-election. Yet, the exercise of the referendum, according to Kao, also works in reverse to help consolidate Taiwanese national identity. First of all, by holding the referendum in the name of an imminent military threat from the PRC, Chen was trying to establish a state of political coherence amongst the people of Taiwan; and such political coherence can be read as a form of distinctive identity. Second, Taiwan's distinctive consciousness is characterised by the living memory evolving from the island of Taiwan and continued resistance to mainland China. The 'defensive' referendum, by its name, seeks to demonstrate that people in Taiwan are constantly threatened by oppression from the mainland. Third, the content of the referendum intended to draw a dividing line, differentiating Taiwan from China. Voters were asked to choose between the two. Voting on the referendum suggested that one was acting to prioritise Taiwan. Accordingly, 'Taiwan first' can be seen as one definition of Taiwanese consciousness.

While some political commentators and scholars like Kao focus on the incumbent President Chen, more people centre their studies on the Former President Lee. George Tsai Woei (2001), for example, argues that all major political parties were trying to exploit identity issues for their own interests. Tsai particularly lashes out at Lee for promoting the idea of Taiwanese national identity for the sake of his own interest. Lee was found using his position as president to fasten the pace of Taiwanisation (e.g. Lee changed the contents of school textbooks), aiming, on the one hand, 'to win the support of the public to broaden his power base', and on the other, 'to serve his own personal ideological preference' (Tsai 2001, 18). Lee's influence in this regard cannot be underestimated. Under Lee's leadership, Tsai writes:

[the] growing Taiwanese consciousness entered a new phase of development. Although the majority of people...still believed that they were both Chinese and Taiwanese ...a different sense of 'we Taiwanese' and 'they Chinese' kept growing... it was under the government's tacit understanding and the opposition's active encouragement. (Ibid., 18-9; emphasis in original)

For Tsai, Taiwanese consciousness and Chinese consciousness ought not to be mutually exclusive. Yet, due to Lee's political manipulation, the identity problem in Taiwan becomes very sensitive, emotional, and indeed, controversial. Likewise, Stephane Corcuff and Wu Rwei-Ren also pay great attention to Lee's role in the formation of Taiwanese national identity, though they give Lee's efforts a much more positive evaluation.

Corcuff's article, 'The Symbolic Dimension of Democratisation and the Transition of National Identity under Lee Teng-hui' (2002), shows how national identity and its related political symbols have been transformed under Lee's presidency. According to Corcuff, Lee, as a leader of the KMT, of Taiwanese origin, initiated reforms of the political system and the symbolic environment. Corcuff concentrates on the changes of identity-related political symbols under Lee's presidency. For Corcuff, those political symbols (e.g. banknotes, national flower) acted as 'sources of legitimacy, indications of policy directions, tools of political socialisation, or objects of national identification' (2002, 73). By demonstrating the four 'reform items' as examples – state doctrine, political commemorations, textbooks and banknotes – Corcuff argues that the transition of national identity was already proceeding at a fast pace under Lee's presidency. He contends that the changes in different symbolic fields show different stages of the process of Taiwanisation/indigenisation of Taiwan's polity, and

that the specific nature of each symbolic field naturally produces different patterns of change or political strategies to get them to change under the Lee's presidency. However, those changes have one thing in common, that is, the accompanying historical movement is a process of 'reform' but not of 'revolution'. This attribute can be generalised to most of the reforms initiated and implemented during Lee's presidency.

Wu Rwei-Ren echoes Corcuff's argument characterising Lee's reforms as moderate. Wu in his article, 'Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism: Democratisation and Taiwan's Passive Revolution' (2002) asks a question – why did Lee's moderate line towards the identity issue, rather than the DPP's radical line, come to dominate the process of democratisation and indigenisation? For Wu, Lee is 'reform-minded, but he is no revolutionary...he is a gradualist reformer' (Wu 2002, 203). The success of Lee's moderate line is based on three factors: firstly, Lee, being the first native Taiwanese president (in contrast to the Mainlanders) was highly legitimated; secondly, concern about the PRC's military threat made people in Taiwan hesitant to supporting the DPP's radical line – the independence of Taiwan; and thirdly, the need to incorporate the Mainlanders discouraged the backing of radical line. The impact of the victory of the gradualist approach, manifested in Lee's victory in the 1996 presidential election, is the formation of a specific type of 'national identity' – a so-called ROC-style Taiwanese independence or independent Taiwan. That is, Taiwan is *de facto* and *de jure* independent though it is not under the name of 'Republic of Taiwan'. According to Wu, Lee's successful formalisation of the equivalence between the 'Republic of China' and 'Taiwan' is a dramatic evolution, since it helps Taiwanese people to terminate the colonial situation. Democratisation is thus the outcome of a synthesis of the DPP's radical line and Lee's moderate line. Both of them committed to the goal of creating a new, sovereign, native-dominated democratic state.

A question stemming from this elaboration of Lee's role in the formation of Taiwanese national identity is: why was Lee so determined to initiate his Taiwanisation project? This question is one of the main concerns of Corcuff's later publication - *Light Breeze and Warm Sun: Mainlanders in Taiwan and their Transition of National Identity*, published in Chinese in Taiwan in 2004.⁸¹ In the book, Corcuff analyses how the Mainlanders in Taiwan had dealt

⁸¹ This book is a Chinese translation of Corcuff's Ph.D. thesis, originally written in French and successfully defended in December 2000.

with and transformed their national self-identification during the intensive process of democratisation and Taiwanisation between 1988 and 1997 under Lee's administration. According to Corcuff, Taiwanisation is a *historical imperative*, which derived from a long-run historical and political development of Taiwan; the result of this development was a newly formed community. From Corcuff's point of view, Lee's initiation of the Taiwanisation project was not derived from Lee's political calculations in favour of his own interests, but from the ineluctable and predetermined historical trends that Lee faced in his presidency. In other words, Taiwanisation (as well as the formation of Taiwanese national identity) is an inevitable and irreversible outcome of historical developments, rather than a consequence of politicians' mobilisation and manipulation.⁸² As for those Mainlanders in Taiwan, Corcuff argues, while Taiwanisation is inevitable and imperative, they have to alter their self-identification from Chinese to Taiwanese. Corcuff in the last two chapters of his book illustrates the necessity and imperative for Mainlanders to alter their self-identification. He argues that any opposition to the project of Taiwanisation upheld and advocated by the Mainlanders would only trap them in a state of dilemma, a circumstance of identity crisis, that is, living in Taiwan but rejecting themselves as being Taiwanese (2004, 143). Corcuff clearly employs a structural explanation to illustrate a predestined, inexorable formation of Taiwanese national identity.

To conclude this section, the merit of the aforementioned line of argument is that, if Taiwanese national identity is not inborn but is a socially and politically constructed sentiment, it is subject to change, especially under the intensive mobilisation of political elites. The importance of political elites and their mobilisation in the development of nationalism has been stressed in the recent scholarly literature on nationalism (see: Paul Brass, 1991; John Breuilly, 1993).⁸³ Yet, if political elites play an important role in the construction of Taiwanese national identity, we must then ask, through which social mechanism, political platform or cultural apparatus political elites can actualise people's self-identification in Taiwan. As many scholars mentioned above have suggested, one of the approaches is to gain

⁸² This is why Corcuff insists on using the term 'phenomenon' rather than 'movement' to describe Taiwanisation, since the term 'movement' implies that it is initiated by a specific politician (2004, 73).

⁸³ According to this literature, neither historical roots or foreign threats nor system-level changes can directly alter group identity. The effects of these historical, political and economic forces on people's self-identification must be actualised through states' actions, competing elites' strategies, and their mutual influences and compromises.

control over the governing apparatus, erecting a distinct cultural hegemony and imposing its own vision of nation-building, either in the direction of Taiwanisation or Sinicisation. Nevertheless, the effects of the mobilisation or manipulation of the political elites should not be overly emphasised.

Foucault's elaboration of the notion of power as discussed in the previous chapter is worthwhile to reiterate here. According to Foucault, power does not exercise itself only through the hands of political elites, but also in the more devious and invisible forms of forces that normalise our behaviours and thoughts, and constitute our bodies, desires, pleasures and identities. Moreover, although certain political consequences were produced through political mobilisation and manipulation, politicians cannot fully accomplish their will. Furthermore, it is always difficult to clarify whether politician's mobilisations lead to the formation of Taiwanese consciousness, or the existing Taiwanese consciousness encourages politicians to utilise identity issues to gain popular support, or both. This is the major inadequacy, if not the flaw, of the line of argument that focuses on the role of politicians in the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism. Above all, it is fairly right to argue that politicians' mobilisation is one ingredient, among many others, that helps constitute people's national identity in Taiwan.

3-4. Conclusion

Several plausible explanations of the formation of Taiwanese identity in the current literature were identified in this chapter: the legacy of Japanese colonisation, the ramifications of the KMT's authoritarian rule, the practices of democratisation, China's political and military intimidation, and politician's mobilisations. Those plausible explanations can be categorised as two strategies: historical and political. Yet, as this chapter argued, these two strategies demonstrate not only two tactics of analysis and two forms of knowledge in understanding the formation of Taiwanese identity, but also two manners of construction/destruction of people's self-identification in Taiwan. While knowledge concerns 'Taiwanese-ness', 'Taiwanese-ness' becomes a subject of knowledge and as a subject, it is in fact constituted in the domain of knowledge.

In respect to historical narrative, issues of identity are intimately associated with how we

subjectively narrate 'our' past, what we *selectively* excavate as 'our' memories, and how we *partially* interpret 'our' history. Identity is thus constituted in the narration of the past, excavation of memories, and interpretation of history. Identity formation to some degree truly possesses *retrospective* characteristics. In respect of political discourse, it is concerned with the questions of what 'we' become and in which way 'we' shall live together in the future. In other words, it asks where 'we' shall draw the boundaries of 'our' nation and why 'we' need to draw them in this way. This position admits deep and significant differences among 'us' within a community; 'we' therefore do not seek a shared past, a common experience or a collective memory; instead, 'we' search for a joint future. Identity formation in this respect is an ongoing process in which we, at present, can decide what we will become. Identity is formed in this shared sentiment of searching for a common future within the community. Political discourse participates in this ongoing process of identity formation by providing an illusion of what we will become, what sort of life style we shall look for in the future. This aspect manifests the *prospective* features of identity formation.

Indeed, identity formation in Taiwan is embedded in and diffused by several historical and political conditions. Yet, we should not regard there to be a straightforward causality between those historical/political conditions and the formation of Taiwanese identity as much scholarly literature discussed above suggests. The process of the constitution of Taiwanese identity is much more complex. Taiwanese identity is in fact constituted in the dissemination of specific historical narratives and certain political discourses. Through various social practices, those historical narratives and areas of political discourse take precedence over other alternatives, so that the latter disappear and are excluded and silenced. Identity formation in Taiwan is indeed situated in a realm in which different historical, cultural and political discourses have mutually interacted, intersected and competed.

This chapter suggested that the important tasks of current studies on Taiwanese identity are, firstly, an illustration of the process of how and through which social practices, specific narratives/discourses/interpretations take precedence over other alternatives; and secondly, an elucidation of how historical narrative and political ideology are used to help constitute Taiwanese identity through various social practices – a much more complex and drawn-out process of determining significance, deployment and ritualisation. In short, there is a need to create a history of the different modes to which the people residing in the island of Taiwan

are made subject, and to expose the beginnings and developments of current subjectifying discourse and practices. Therefore, the following two chapters (Chapter Four and Chapter Five) look at two events – respectively, the turmoil over the publication of a Japanese manga, and a political demonstration in commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in 2004 – in an attempt to demonstrate how the historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s authoritarian rule have *selectively* emerged again as an ongoing structuring force in the creation of a certain form of identity among the population in contemporary Taiwanese society.

CHAPTER 4

Essay on the Turmoil over Kobayashi Yoshinori's *On Taiwan*

'Japan' as 'Self' or 'the Other'?

4-1. Introduction

4-1-1. 'Japan' in Contemporary Identity Conflict in Taiwan

When my wife, who is Japanese, visited Taiwan for the first time in 1997, we made a trip to Tainan, a historical town located in Southern Taiwan. When we visited an old temple, there were some old Taiwanese men sitting and chatting in the courtyard, and one of them approached us and asked me in Minnan dialect if the lady with me was Japanese. Once he knew she was from Japan, he turned to my wife and started talking to her in Japanese. A few minutes later, my wife was surrounded by five or six old Taiwanese men. They all showed enthusiasm and hospitality towards her, and I was left out and excluded from their sight as if a 'foreigner'. A few days later, we visited my grandparents in Taichung, a city in central Taiwan. My grandparents were born and educated during the Japanese colonial period, and they only speak Minnan dialect and Japanese, with little knowledge of Mandarin, the official language in Taiwan. I introduced my wife to my grandparents. They were pleased about her Japanese nationality and started chattering about the beauty, politeness and cleanness of the Japanese people. I was puzzled at that time by their good impression of the Japanese, since my grandmother sometimes spoke to me about her unpleasant experiences dealing with Japanese policemen in her childhood during the colonial period. Another unforgettable memory concerning 'Japan' comes from my time as an elementary school pupil in Taipei in the 1980s. I was taught how brutally Chinese citizens were treated by the Japanese army during WWII, with the aid of some repulsive photos. Nevertheless, the school textbook taught us that we, as Chinese, should return Japan's brutality with generosity and benevolence, though the class teacher (a Mainlander) still referred to the Japanese as 'Japanese devils'.

Only much later did I realise that these personal experiences in different times and places are embedded in and shaped by several historical conditions: Japan's colonial rule over Taiwan (1895-1945), the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Cold War, and the KMT's authoritarian dominance in Taiwan (1945-1987). 'Japan', as a coloniser of the native Taiwanese for fifty years, as an antagonist towards the Chinese (as well as the Mainlanders) during the Sino-Japanese War, as a crucial ally of Taiwan during the Cold War, and as a major competitor towards China in the wake of the Cold War, plays a crucial but controversial and contradictory role in the society of Taiwan. And this multifaceted role played by 'Japan' in Taiwanese society produces contradictory emotional responses in the Taiwanese people. The ambivalent relationship has served to make 'Japan' one of the most sensitive and emotive subjects in the post-authoritarian era particularly. Japan-related issues have always been intensely debated in Taiwan for some time, and lie at the heart of the country's ethnic feud. Any attempts to (re)evaluate, (re)narrate or (re)interpret the history of the Japanese colonial period are all highly contestable, sensitive and politicised in contemporary Taiwan. Also, any public remarks by a Taiwanese/Japanese person on 'Japan/Taiwan', 'the Japanese/the Taiwanese', or 'Japanese-ness/Taiwanese-ness' immediately become fodder for ethnic debate in Taiwanese society.⁸⁴

It is obvious that people in Taiwan hold ambivalent, conflicting and widely divergent opinions and feelings concerning 'Japan'. The straightforward explanation for this phenomenon is that, as many studies have demonstrated (Ching 2001; Chen Kuan-Hsing 2001), not everyone shares a common and collective historical memory about Japan due to her/his different ethnic, class or gender identity. For instance, while some native Taiwanese see Japan as a modernizer that is crucial for the socioeconomic development of Taiwan, the Mainlanders and their descendants, who fled to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1949, still harbour painful memories of 'Japanese aggression' during WWII. Indeed, it is not difficult to understand why Taiwanese such as former president Lee Teng-Hui who belong to the Japanese-educated generation (or Japanese-language generation, as they are termed) are so nostalgic about the Japanese colonial period. As a member of the intelligentsia who grew up

⁸⁴ For example, the uproar caused by the controversial discussion of the 'sadness of being Taiwanese' by former president Lee Teng-Hui in his interview with Japanese author Ryotaro Shiba, and at the time of the publication of the Japanese sex-tour guidebook *Paradise in Taiwan*, is an indication of the sensitivity and controversy of Japan's role in the society of Taiwan.

during the Japanese occupation, Lee experienced the 2-28 Incident and the strict ‘Sinification’ imposed by the KMT regime in the wake of Japanese rule. Yet it is also possible to understand the ‘hate Japan’ sentiments of those people who followed the KMT to Taiwan, or students who were, if not affected by their experiences of direct combat with the Japanese, instilled with hatred for the Japanese during their schooling.

The native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, with their respective psychological states and emotional structures produced by different experiences and memories of the past regarding ‘Japan’, in fact stand on parallel historical trajectories in mentality, even though they have all lived together in Taiwan for over sixty years. These divergent mentalities revolving around the image of ‘Japan’ should be understood as the bedrock of the opposition between native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, between advocates of independence and unification and, above all, between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity. They can also be perceived as the essence (if any) of an immanent contradiction within the so-called ‘Taiwanese national identity’. Indeed, the Japan-Sino War and Japanese colonisation had the result of propelling native Taiwanese and Mainlanders on different developmental courses in different political fields with different identities – two different subject positions.

Nevertheless, even without reference to native Taiwanese or Mainlanders, ‘Japan’ equally plays a considerable and indispensable role, being one of the most important ingredients in the identity formation or the subject constitution of people in Taiwan. For the native Taiwanese, Japanese colonialism and its related disciplines have been imbedded in the psycho-structure of the constituent subject and become one of the most significant historical layers of the subject constitution. For Mainlanders, on the other hand, war experiences with Japanese army that subsequently caused them to be exiled from their motherland also had profound impacts on their body and mind. Moreover, Sino-chauvinism and the anti-Japanese mode of propagandistic education imposed by the KMT’s state apparatus on the descendants of either ‘the imperial subject’ (the native Taiwanese) or ‘the combatant of the Japan-Sino War’ (the Mainlanders) during the authoritarian period further exaggerates and intensifies the already ambivalent and divergent feelings about ‘Japan’ among the population of Taiwan. Those various historical forces (or ‘discourses’) are profoundly inscribed on the mind and body of the population of Taiwan, individually and collectively. In other words,

the Taiwanese as a subject is produced in those conflicting, contradicting and competing historical forces/discourses, layer upon layer. And the axis of those historical forces/discourses in the subject constitution is 'Japan'.

Furthermore, the abrupt dissolution of the Japanese empire and the new world order configured after WWII assisted in deterring and deferring the exploration and interrogation of the colonial experience and subsequent war. Leo Ching (2001) rightly identifies Taiwan's lack of a decolonisation process in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Japanese Empire in 1945.⁸⁵ In addition, the subsequent configuration of the Cold War system after WWII also prevented Taiwan from reconsidering colonial problems and war issues associated with Japan. Many scholars (e.g. Chen 2001; Tetsushi 2004) have indicated that a problem of the Cold War system is that the management of the problems of colonialism and war was frozen in order to avoid internal opposition within the West camp.⁸⁶ In Taiwan under the authoritarian KMT regime, discussion of Japanese colonialism was completely forbidden. Hence, various emotions and sentiments towards 'Japan' or Japanese colonialism were suppressed both among native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. Yet, those complex and ambivalent sentiments would not disappear through this external repression, particularly when those sentiments were intimately associated with people's self-identification. Consequently, the return of those sentiments was inevitable after the 1990s when the Cold War ceased and when Taiwan became democratic. It is precisely for this reason that, following the dissolution of the Cold War system and the decline of the KMT's authoritarian rule, nostalgia about the Japanese colonial period is explicitly expressed by some native Taiwanese political and cultural elites, alongside active demands for compensation and protests against the Japanese government by former Taiwanese soldiers employed in Japan's Imperial Army and by the 'comfort women' pressed into service by the military. The contemporary society of Taiwan is directly facing the legacies of the fifty-year Japanese

⁸⁵ According to Ching, decolonisation in Taiwan was neither the result of a metropolitan political decision nor a new form of nationalist assertion, as was common in European decolonisation experiences. The people of Taiwan found themselves suddenly 'liberated' and they 'reverted' to China after Japan's military defeat (Ching 2001, 34-8). Thus, the problem of Japanese colonisation was not really overcome in Taiwan.

⁸⁶ In the 1950s, the complete split between the Communist world and the liberal world in East Asia further averted serious reflection on Japanese colonialism and WWII in East Asia. Japan, Taiwan and South Korea became major allies of the US in the confrontation with communist countries. Historical issues of colonialism were repressed, becoming a political taboo in those countries.

colonisation and Japan-Sino War, after the nearly fifty-year long absence (1945-1990s) of colonial and war-related issues.

In short, although the current identity conflict in contemporary Taiwan is a post-Japanese phenomenon, Japanese colonisation and the Japan-Sino War in the early twentieth century remain a powerful subtext in which the questions of ‘Taiwanese identity’ and ‘Chinese identity’ are embedded and contested. The aim of this chapter is to investigate how the historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation has emerged again as an ongoing structuring force in the creation of a certain form of identity among the population in contemporary Taiwanese society.

4-1-2. Literature Review

Many scholars have indicated the profound influences of Japanese colonial rule on Taiwan in stimulating the surge of Taiwanese consciousness. Some historians, as shown in the previous chapter, contend that Japanese colonisation directly, continuously and spontaneously led to the solidification of current Taiwanese consciousness. Juxtaposing with those historical studies, Joyce Liu (2003d, 2004b) and Leo Ching (2001) adopt different approaches, in which they both devote themselves to investigating the psychological ramifications of Japanese rule during the colonial period.

Liu’s approach aims to explore the psychic impacts of Japanese rule on the people in Taiwan during the colonial period. For Liu, the discourse of the ‘xin’ – the heart, psyche, or immanent essence – plays an important role in constituting the ‘imperial subject’. According to Liu, ‘xin’ is constituted in discourse and serves as a token to be invested and exchanged for various political values and ideologies in the process of nation-building. Through this process, it eventually helps to attach every individual to the whole body of the nation. In other words, it is something that can be manipulated through the modern techniques of government; and when certain abstract qualities of ‘xin’ are predetermined, they serve as the external delineation of the nation. Individual differences are accordingly discursively erased, and a historical process of homogenization is conducted.⁸⁷ In her article, ‘Immanentism, Double-abjection and the Politics of Psyche in (Post) Colonial Taiwan’ (2003d), Liu

⁸⁷ Liu (2001b, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2004a, 2004b) has produced a series of works investigating the changes of ‘xin’ in the process of nation-building during modernisation in the twentieth-century in both China and Taiwan.

particularly focuses on Japan's assimilation scheme in Taiwan – the Kominka Movement – in an attempt to understand how a specific subject – the 'imperial subject' – was constructed in colonial times. Liu examines the discourse of kominka and argues that the discourse made a success of the islander (the inhabitant of Taiwan) metamorphosing from Han-Chinese (the aboriginals as well) into the imperial subject. According to Liu, the central concern of the kominka discourse was: how the islander could become 'Japanese' given that they are different to ethnic Japanese in consanguinity. Liu argues that the only way to solve these predicaments is to alter the immanent essence – the 'xin' – of the subject. There are three ways to change it.

Liu explains that the concept of 'Japanese' in the discourse of kominka is defined not by its consanguinity, but by its 'spiritual inheritance' (Japanese spirits) and 'national language' (Japanese language). The former – spiritual inheritance – is said to be shared by every member of the Japanese nation. Liu analyses that in this discourse the inborn interior essence of every individual can be removed and subsequently replaced by an abstract spirituality, which is fitted to the spiritual inheritance of the Japanese nation as a whole. In other words, the colonial subject has to cleanse his/her 'barbarian heart' so that the spiritual inheritance, the purity of the Japanese spirit, can be reconstructed. As for the latter, Japanese spirits and lifestyles can only be presented through mastery of Japanese language. Japanese language in this respect is not just a device for communication, but has a theological orientation. Japanese language is described as the 'spiritual blood' of the Japanese nation.⁸⁸ Through sharing this 'spiritual blood', the individual can partake of the life of the nation and thus become a national subject. Moreover, apart from the aforementioned two ways to become 'Japanese', Liu also identifies that joining the Imperial Army, serving the Japanese Emperor, is also imperative to be a 'complete' Japanese. To give oneself up to the emperor means to efface the unclean parts in one's heart. Serving the Imperial Army is the way to obtain salvation and leap into the realm of the gods. This spiritual leap of faith would transcend the limitations set up by blood genealogy and would enable the subject to communicate with the Japanese spirit.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ According to Liu (2003d), the concept of 'spiritual blood' was introduced firstly by Ueda Kazutoshi in 1894 and later by the philosopher Tokieda Motoki while he developed the concept of a 'trinity', to define the equivalent relationship among the nation, the people and the national language.

⁸⁹ Three psychic impacts of the kominka discourse on the colonial subject, which is revealed in

For Liu, Japanese colonisation and the practices of kominka discourse are the key to understanding identity politics in contemporary Taiwan. Liu argues that the subjectivity of the ‘imperial subject’ was constituted in this kominka discourse. While her paper mainly discusses the psychological politics in the Japanese colonial times, she emphasises that such politics of psyche recurred in an uncanny way in post-colonial Taiwan, especially in the last decade.

Along with Joyce Liu’s studies, Leo Ching’s *Becoming Japanese* (2001) provides another influential work in understanding the legacies of Japanese colonialism. The book demonstrates an attempt to understand how historical events during the Japanese colonisation ‘have enabled, or disabled, certain ways in which people make sense of and come to terms with their belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness’, and to understand ‘how these formations of identity in turn rearticulate and redefine historical events and the way people imagine political possibilities’ (Ching 2001, x). Ching examines the formation of Taiwanese political and cultural identities under the dominant Japanese colonial discourse of doka (assimilation) and kominka from the early 1920s to the end of the Japanese Empire in 1945. He also analyses the ways in which the residents of Taiwan struggled, negotiated and collaborated with Japanese colonialism, and delineates the shift from a resistance to Japanese colonisation into a personal and inner struggle to ‘become Japanese’. Ching draws particular attention to the triangulation between colonial Taiwan, imperialist Japan and nationalist China as a prerequisite to understanding the struggle over identity. He argues that, while Japanese colonialism attempted to delineate and delimit the relationship between China and Taiwan, China or Chinese nationalism has played an important role, at first as the necessary impetus for emancipation of colonial Taiwan and subsequently as the main object of resistance in post-colonial Taiwan. Taiwanese identity is apprehended as a contradictory and irreducible ‘triple consciousness’. As a result, the

Taiwanese literature during the colonial period (known as kominka literature), are identified. First, the islander was self-imagined as an ‘incomplete’, ‘impure’, and ‘immature’ man. According to Liu (2003d; 2004b), one striking feature of this literature is its multiplicity of self-debasing bodily images, such as ‘unmanliness’, ‘incompleteness’, ‘rotteness’, ‘diseased blood’, ‘stinking odour’, etc. Then, the effacement and abjection of the old self is required. The strong demand to purify themselves through blood-cleansing and transcendence is found in those literary writings. In this sense, joining the holy battle in the Pacific War for many Taiwanese was not only to conquer the barbarian West, it was more a battle against oneself – to purify our barbarian hearts. And finally, after the cutting off and effacing of the alien within oneself, one becomes an empty container; and the Japanese spirit subsequently occupies the locus of self. One can then become a ‘complete’ and ‘decent’ man.

formations and transformations of colonial identities during Japanese colonial times inherently possess irreducible tensions and contradictions. And those identity positions, Ching argues, continue to mark and remark the cultural politics of post-war Japan, mainland China, and postcolonial Taiwan.

The book in general is more a work of historiography and literary critique than a work of history. Ching does not aim to produce a comprehensive history of colonial identity; rather, he paints a vivid picture illustrating that the legacy of Japanese colonialism remains crucial in current Taiwanese political discourse and serves as a marker in differentiating contemporary Taiwanese identity from mainland Chinese identity. Thus, the focus of the book, as Ching (2001, 10; emphasis in origin) notes, is the ‘*cultural* dimension of Japanese colonialism and its legacy’, rather than the structure or history of Taiwan’s economic, political, and military domination.

4-1-3. Research Questions, Methodology & Key Arguments

Joyce Liu’s series of works and Leo Ching’s influential book contribute immensely to the growing body of new scholarship that has begun to explore the rich colonial experiences heretofore buried in the dustbin of history. Indeed, it is undeniable that Japanese colonisation as a past is acknowledged, but remains latent, in Taiwanese contemporary society, and people’s self-identification is formed and regulated with reference to this past. Nevertheless, as it is argued in the previous chapter, the present does not directly, continuously and spontaneously derive from what actually happened in the past, but from how the past is narrated, represented and interpreted in the present. We should therefore be more attentive to the politics of narrations, representations and interpretations.

Consequently, there is a need for further investigation of the conflictual and competitive interrelationships between different interpretations/narrative productions, as opposed to discovering a true account of the past or examining the accuracy of a specific interpretation/narration of the past. Hence, this chapter does not aim to provide a grand narrative of Japanese colonial history, as many historians cited in Chapter Three have already done. Nor does it aim to illustrate how and why the people of Taiwan were forced to become ‘Japanese’ during the Japanese colonial administration or to elucidate the psychic structure of the ‘imperial subject’ during the colonial period, as Leo Ching and Joyce Liu have convincingly demonstrated. Instead, this chapter pushes their studies further and asks

how and through which practices the past is replicated in a certain way and what other alternatives are excluded from this process. In other words, the chapter is not interested in discovering exactly what happened in the past; rather, it is more concerned with how the past is represented and is revived in certain forms that constitute a specific type of identity in contemporary Taiwan.

In terms of methodology, this chapter scrutinises the controversy surrounding the Japanese cartoonist Kobayashi Yoshinori's *manga*, *On Taiwan* in 2001.⁹⁰ *On Taiwan* is a book about Taiwan's history, culture, ethnicity, politics and national identity based on Kobayashi's own observations in Taiwan.⁹¹ The work presents itself as both a travelogue and a history book, and is presented in a lively, somewhat exaggerated manga style. Kobayashi himself appears in the book as a reporter, visiting many places in Taiwan and interviewing various Taiwanese people. He wants to present Taiwan as the site that remains the perfect embodiment of the 'Japanese spirit' that he would like the Japanese to salvage. In this aspect, although Kobayashi's comments are on Taiwan, he in fact addresses his Japanese contemporaries, aiming to revive national pride and to reignite the Japanese spirit, so as to reconstruct Japanese national identity among young Japanese people. This manga could therefore serve as a tour guide for the Japanese seeking the lost home of Japanese virtues.

The book was firstly published in Japan in 2000, which was a part of the author's serialised comic, 'New Arrogantist Manifesto', issued in the Japanese magazine SAPIO. In February 2001, a Chinese translation of the book was brought out in Taiwan, which immediately aroused strong reactions and touched on some very sensitive nerves, inspiring serious debate and identity-related conflict in Taiwanese society. On the one hand,

⁹⁰ The term 'manga' is the Japanese word for print 'cartoons, comic books, and animated films with a science-fiction or fantasy theme' (Oxford English Dictionary: manga). The term is composed of two words in Japanese: 'man', which literally means 'indiscriminate', and 'ga', which literally means 'picture'. In Japan, manga are read by people of all ages. Therefore, a wide scope of topics and themes are covered in manga, including violence, romance, sports, historical drama, sex, science fiction, fantasy, and etc (Gravett 2004).

⁹¹ Kobayashi is a founding member of the Liberal Historiography Study Group (Jiyushugi shikan kenkyukai), a right-wing organisation in Japan that seeks to recast Japan's wartime history in a positive light. Kobayashi received a remarkable amount of attention in the wake of his earlier publication *On War* (*Senso ron*) in 1998, which was a bestseller in Japan. *On War* is also in a comic form, and argues that modern Japan's inability to take pride in the history of the war has led to a crisis of national consciousness. For a further introduction to Kobayashi's *On War* and the Liberal Historiography Study Group, please see Rebecca Clifford (2004).

protestors went into the streets. Some extremists even burned copies of the book as well as the Japanese flag. Loud and angry voices in the media called for the book to be banned and used phrases such as ‘traitors’, ‘enslaving education’, and ‘generations of the imperial subjects’ to attack those who voiced support for Kobayashi. On the other hand, equally strong voices welcomed Kobayashi’s idealistic and nostalgic depiction of Taiwan. They distributed the book in the street, arguing that Kobayashi had presented a convincing case for colonial modernity and demonstrated his understanding and appreciation of the virtues of the Taiwanese people. To them, Kobayashi’s view presented a ‘Taiwanese perspective’. Despite the controversy, the book undeniably sold well both in Taiwan and in Japan.

The debate over *On Taiwan* lasted almost three months from late December 2000 to early April 2001. During this period, newspapers, magazines and broadcasters of all political stances gave extraordinary attention to the event. Politicians also fiercely debated about it in the parliament of Taiwan. Numerous reports, comments and essays on the topic appeared in newspapers and on the Web, and two volumes collecting these debates have been published.⁹² The event also attracted some scholars’ attention in academic circles.⁹³ The manga apparently unleashed all kinds of feelings that the people of Taiwan had had towards Japan, and politicians – both opponents and proponents of the manga – also seized the opportunity to fan up the flames of conflict and to vilify their political enemy, in order to strengthen their political interests. The event became a discursive realm of a political battle, in which different discourses interact, intersect and compete with each other.

This chapter aims to analyse those reports, commentaries, essays, articles and statements. Through analysing those texts made by people taking various positions (i.e. native Taiwanese vs Mainlander, pro-independence advocates vs pro-unification advocates, Taiwanese sympathisers vs Chinese sympathisers), the chapter attempts to comprehend how the discourses of Japanese colonialism and Sino-chauvinism reciprocally conflict and

⁹² *The Storm of Yoshinori Kobayashi’s On Taiwan* (Taipei: Qianwei, 2001), and *The Three-Legged Person: the Komin Faces in Yoshinori Kobayashi’s On Taiwan* (Taipei: Haixia Xueshu, 2002).

⁹³ In Japan, the principal criticism of the content of the book was made in *Beyond Kobayashi’s ‘On Taiwan’* (East Asia Writers’ Network Japan, 2001), edited by some young Japanese researchers who are involved in the East Asia Literary, Historical and Philosophical Network. In Taiwan, a series of forums concerning Kobayashi’s work were held by the academic journal *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Science* in 2001. The forum minutes were collected in the book *Reflections on Thesis of Taiwan: Dialogues between Critical Circles in Taiwan and Japan*, published in 2005.

compete with each other in ways that affect people's self-identification, producing a particular form of subjectivity of Taiwan. In other words, the primary concern of this chapter is not whether or not (or to what degree) what Kobayashi said about Taiwan is accurate in depicting the politics and history of Taiwan. Rather, it focuses on how the book has been discussed in Taiwanese society, including which issues/discourses/ideologies have been raised and how they have been discussed, as well as what other alternative issues/discourses/ideologies, if any, have been repressed, silenced and made to disappear in the process of the event.

In short, this chapter is an attempt to understand how a social event enables or disables certain ways in which people make sense of their past and thus come to terms with their belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness. It is also an attempt to understand how people's self-identification in turn rearticulates and redefines the social event and the way people imagine political possibilities. The chapter wishes to argue that the emerging dominant Taiwanese national identity is not a static or fully-constituted identity, but a contradictory and conflicting identity. The embodiment of contemporary Taiwanese national identity must be apprehended and articulated in the contradictory and irreducible triangular interrelation among residual Japanese colonialism during the colonial time, the once-dominant Chinese nationalism during the KMT's authoritarian period and the currently dominant Taiwanese nationalism in the democratic era.

Section Two elucidates how Kobayashi in his manga *On Taiwan* represents 'Taiwan', the 'Taiwanese nation' or the 'Taiwanese identity'. Section Three discusses the debates stirred by the publication of its Chinese version in Taiwan in 2001. Through an exploration of the debate, this section aims to answer the following questions: What issues were raised/omitted? What statements and utterances were made and who spoke? Whose voices and what statements were repressed and therefore disappeared? Also, it attempts to understand how the image of 'Japan' had been partially represented in Taiwan as being rightist, conservative, and nationalistic.

4-2. Yoshinori Kobayashi's On Taiwan

4-2-1. 'Japanese Spirit' in Taiwan

The book cover of the Chinese edition is dominated by an image of a peanut, a symbol of the Taiwanese spirit, mounted by a Japanese samurai (Figure 4-1). On the back cover is a peanut that has been split and filled with white rice, a red plum in the centre, readily conjuring up the Japanese national flag (Figure 4-2). The design of the book cover indicates the main theme of this manga – the 'Japanese spirit'. According to Kobayashi, the term 'Japanese spirit' refers to pre-war Japanese virtues, values and moralities that have been lost in post-war Japan but preserved in contemporary Taiwan. In the book, he painstakingly illustrates what the 'Japanese spirit' is, albeit not directly through his own words, but through the mouths of the Taiwanese.

Originally, the concept of 'Japanese spirit' in Taiwan was related to nostalgia for the Japanese colonial period. According to Jin Mei-Ling, a pro-independence advocate, the concept has a more general meaning of 'the qualities of cleanliness, justice, honesty, diligence, politeness, trustworthiness, responsibility, lawfulness and service to the state' – all attributes of modernity that a good modern citizen of the nation should display (Jin et al. 2001, 152-3). However, in Kobayashi's rhetoric, the 'deeper' meaning of the concept is emphasised, that is, an implementation of a slogan – commitment to the public good and the annihilation of self. Every member of a collective Self should forsake his/her own private/selfish interests for the sake of the public good. Borrowing from the former president Lee Teng-Hui, Kobayashi says promoting the public good means the 'death of self': 'If one wants to lead a meaningful life, one has to consider the question of death constantly. It is not physical death but absolute negation of the self. One needs to totally negate oneself, thereby devoting oneself to the public good' (*On Taiwan* [OT], 39). It is worth noting that the public good in this context is directly and exclusively regarded as identical to the 'state', 'country' and 'nation' – a collective Self (OT, 57).

Throughout the course of his interviews with former president Lee and pro-independence business entrepreneurs (such as Xu Wen-Lung), Kobayashi found that such Japanese virtue was preserved in Taiwan, particularly among the Japanese-language generation in Taiwan. The book repeatedly praises Lee as a great leader who devoted himself to his nation, Taiwan. Kobayashi argues that Lee demonstrated the perfect spirit of 'self-

sacrifice for the sake of the country.’ For example, Kobayashi writes that ‘the peaceful transfer of political power accomplished by Lee is the best performance of forsaking private personal need for the sake of the public good so that the nation has a larger space for development’ (OT, 38). He compliments Lee as the best inheritor of the Japanese spirit, describing Lee as an authentic samurai who exemplifies ‘the death of the self’ (OT, 206).⁹⁴

In contrast to Taiwan, Chinese society is incapable of cultivating a concept of ‘public good’. The Chinese seemingly lack any concept of ‘public’ (OT, 79). Kobayashi criticises the Chinese for only being aware of themselves but not of the public. That feeds an attitude amongst the population that public affairs are none of their business, resulting in a lack of public morals. Chinese people are traditionally concerned with relationships between people but not relationships between individuals and society, which has bred a national character where power is exercised without corresponding accountability. The Chinese people do as they see fit with reference only to individuals. The possession of the concepts ‘public’, ‘public good’ and ‘public morals’ by the Taiwanese people inherited from the Japanese has made the society of Taiwan nowadays much more developed than that of China. This is also the main differentiation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlander (of Taiwan) since the native Taiwanese, again, due to their Japanese colonial experience, is more concerned with the public good than the Mainlander is, despite the fact that both of them share the same Han-Chinese ethnicity (OT, 75).

Notwithstanding his comments on Taiwan, Kobayashi actually addresses his Japanese contemporaries. He wants to represent Taiwan as the perfect embodiment of the ‘Japanese spirit’ that he would like the Japanese to revive. He criticises Japan’s loss of ‘Japanese spirit’ and its lack of patriotism. The prevailing ‘left-wing thoughts’, as Kobayashi terms them, in post-war Japan have led to the deprivation of a sense of duty to the nation. The primary societal ill for Japan is its abundance of selfish interests with a dearth of consideration for the public good – the national interest.⁹⁵ He writes, ‘Japan no longer exists; there is no citizen

⁹⁴ Lee regards himself as the way Kobayashi describes. Lee expressed on several occasions his willingness to visit Japan to give lectures for Japanese students on the essence of the Japanese spirit. He also published a book in 2004 on the spirit of the samurai, entitled as *Wushidao Jieti*.

⁹⁵ Also, Kobayashi refers to the concept ‘public good’ to legitimise Japan’s participation in WWII. He disapproves of those ‘left-wing’ thoughts that condemn Japan’s assaults on Korea and China during the WWII as a succession of aggressive and immoral acts. Conversely, he argues that Japan waged

but a selfish individual' (*OT*, 51). The lack of a desire to die willingly for Japan is indicative of an impure and morally corrupt society. It is precisely to this end that Kobayashi claims that the 'past' of Japan is frozen in Taiwan;⁹⁶ he intends to introduce Taiwan to his compatriots in order to enlighten the Japanese youth about what 'Japanese-ness' is. In short, Kobayashi takes Taiwan as a mirror that, he hopes, reflects authentic Japanese spirit.

4-2-2. Taiwan's Modernisation

Alongside the 'Japanese spirit', another prominent inheritance of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan is the country's modernisation. In the manga, Kobayashi repeatedly alludes to modern development under Japanese colonial administration: building infrastructure in agriculture, transportation, communication, etc. As Kobayashi tries to convince his readers, the course of modernisation that the Japanese embarked on transformed Taiwan into a modern civilised society. The Taiwanese people under his pen are grateful for Japanese colonial rule. He goes to some lengths to find supporting evidence. For instance, Kobayashi quotes the Taiwanese businessman Xu Wen-Long, saying that Japanese rule in Taiwan actually helped people in Taiwan to experience the 'taste of happiness' (*OT*, 134). According to Xu, the people in Taiwan were not concerned about who their rulers were. Their true concern was whether rulers would protect their economic interests and improve their livelihoods and living conditions. By virtue of this perspective, in Xu's view, 'Japanese rule over Taiwan is indeed a conscience...policies enacted by the Japanese government led to the modernisation of Taiwan society' (*OT*, 134). Xu is also quoted as saying, 'we certainly need to appreciate the Japanese colonisation and grant them a positive appraisal' (*OT*, 135). The former president Lee echoed this line of thought. In the book, Kobayashi quoted Lee as saying that, 'if not for Japan's fifty years of rule, Taiwan would be as underdeveloped as Hainan Island...It is important to let young Japanese understand what an excellent job their ancestors had done in Taiwan' (*OT*, 23). Apart from Xu and Lee's remarks, Kobayashi also provides a few examples to illustrate this nostalgic sentiment of the ordinary Taiwanese people by referring to many respectable Japanese officers (policemen, soldiers,

war for justifiable reasons. As he writes in the book, 'If we take the public interest of the totality of Asia into consideration, the invasion into China can be justified...The interest of public good through Japanese occupation can bring better happiness to Asian countries' (*OT*, 90).

⁹⁶ He intriguingly describes in the book the flight between Taiwan and Japan as though a time traveller (*OT*, 65).

schoolteachers and architects) who devoted their lives to the people of Taiwan during the colonial era and are still enshrined in temples or commemorated in local ceremonies in Taiwan today (*OT*, 130-33 ;191-96).

Kobayashi therefore contends that Japan should be remembered as a benevolent colonial country that brought positive results for its subjects: 'Japanese rule over Asian countries during the Pacific War brought greater well-being to Asian people' (*OT*, 90). Accordingly, Kobayashi suggests that Japan should abandon the so-called 'masochistic historiographical perspective' and 'apologetic diplomacy' that have over-emphasised and demonised pre-war and wartime militarism. Moreover, he also believes that those Japanese who feel guilty about Japan's wartime behaviour should alter their attitudes and take pride in their ancestry. He writes in the book, 'unlike those pre-war Japanese who are still being enshrined in Taiwan's temples, their descendants in Japan contrarily lost their self-confidence, thereby distorting a sense of national consciousness of being Japanese' (*OT*, 196).

Kobayashi here aims to remind his Japanese readers that they should cherish the values of being Japanese. The Japanese people today do not need to feel ashamed of their fathers or grandfathers. The conviction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was just. Here, Kobayashi reiterates his argument in his earlier book *On War* that modern Japan's inability to take pride in its wartime history has led to a crisis of national consciousness – which echoes the arguments of the Liberal Historiography Study Group, a right-wing organisation that seeks to recast Japan's wartime history in a positive and deeply nationalistic light.

4-2-3. Taiwanese National Identity

Kobayashi in the book frequently emphasises the imperative for the modern subject to consider the issues of self-belongingness and self-identification. He keeps asking himself the following questions – 'where do I belong?', 'who am I?' and 'what is my existence?' Such questions for him are different formulations of the self-identification problem.⁹⁷ Only by assuring one's self-belongingness is one capable of interacting with others, thereby establishing an ethical relationship with the society as a whole. He writes, 'If there is no

⁹⁷ Identity is defined here as 'sameness', 'belongingness', and 'the foundation of existence' (*OT*, 61).

sense of belonging, how can there be any ethical differentiation' (*OT*, 58)? This line of thinking apparently echoes with the modern political ideas of communitarianism.⁹⁸

Nevertheless, what makes Kobayashi's line of thinking particularly striking is that he makes self-belongingness interchangeable with national identity. The question of self-identity is the same as that of national identity. The meaning of one's existence is therefore solely defined by one's nation. For Kobayashi, identity, existence, a sense of belonging, and ethics all make sense only in the context of the nation. National belonging or national identity is imperative for the modern subject to define the meaning of Self, thereby to exist. Therefore, Kobayashi claims that 'the time being is an era of nationalism, which is indispensably required' (*OT*, 52). Without national belongingness, the life of individuals became meaningless. Kobayashi writes:

As a human being, it is necessary to seek self-belongingness, which is defined as national identity. Those individuals who lost their belongingness would inevitably perish themselves and become fortune-seeking materialists. (*OT*, 83)

Thus, everyone should forsake their selfish interests for the sake of the 'public good' – the interests of the nation.

On this basis, Kobayashi further elaborates the concept of 'nation'. He opposes efforts to define nationality, nationhood, or national identity by consanguinity; rather, they should be defined by 'spiritual inheritance' and 'national language' (*OT*, 78). Kobayashi suggests that nationalism does not come from blood ties or racial homogeneity; rather, it is nurtured from a joint history thereby fashioning a shared spirit, and a common language on the same plot of land.⁹⁹ As Joice Liu (2003d, 2004b) has analysed, Kobayashi's understanding of the nature of nationality requires that the spiritual essence that constitutes the nation is the spiritual inheritance said to be shared by everyone in the community, and that the partaking of such abstract spirituality demands the voiding of the interior of an individual – the death of self – so that it can be replaced by the abstract spirit. In other words, in order to become a subject defined by the nation, one has to renounce/dissolve one's self so that one can enter the

⁹⁸ The political ideas of communitarianism referred to here are developed in Michael Sandel's *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (1982), Alasdair MacIntyre's *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (1984), and Michael Walzer's *Sphere of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality* (1983) and 'Liberalism and the Art of Separation' in *Political Theory* 12 (1984).

⁹⁹ In this regard, Kobayashi is clearly influenced by philosophically idealist thoughts.

domain guarded by the constitution of the nation. Consequently, the subject position in terms of modernity is a non-I subject, directed toward the aims of the nation.

This is how Kobayashi considers the essence of the ‘Taiwanese nation’. Since the spiritual inheritance, national language and common history take precedence over blood ties and racial homogeneity in determining the boundary of a nation, people in Taiwan should not embrace ‘consanguineous nationalism’ as Kobayashi terms it, identifying themselves as Chinese; instead, they should be unified by their common history (Japanese colonial experience), shared spirit (Japanese spirit) and distinctive language (Minnan dialect), upholding their self-identification as Taiwanese.

In his manga, Kobayashi provides a specific interpretation/narration of modern Taiwanese history. Like many Taiwanese nationalists, Kobayashi also contends that the modern history of Taiwan is a story of alien rule and foreign occupation: the Dutch, the Japanese, the KMT, etc. Notwithstanding the fact that those alien ethnic groups/foreign forces are all ‘foreign regimes’, Kobayashi sharply distinguishes between the ‘good governance’ and ‘bad governance’ of those foreign regimes.

Kobayashi especially juxtaposes Japanese colonisation – good governance – with the KMT rule over Taiwan – bad governance – in his illustrations and elucidations in the manga. First of all, while the Japanese generated modernisation for Taiwan, the ‘Mainlander KMT regime’ only brought about the massacre of the people of Taiwan, i.e. the 2-28 Incident (*OT*, 146). Secondly, on several occasions (*OT*, 19, 143, 144, 145) Kobayashi portrays the Chinese Mainlanders, both in the text and in the illustrations, as dirty, cheating, greedy, lazy, brutal, superstitious, ill-educated, lawless and irresponsible, in opposition to the Japanese (the soldiers/officers in particular) who epitomise the qualities of cleanliness, justice, honesty, diligence, politeness, trustworthiness, responsibility and lawfulness (Figure 4-3). Kobayashi approvingly quotes the Taiwanese proverb, ‘when the dog leaves, the pig comes’ – wherein ‘pig’ was used in the post-war period by the Taiwanese as a degrading term for the Chinese (the Mainlander), as ‘dog’ was used for the Japanese – as the best demonstration of the viewpoint of the Taiwanese people towards Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s authoritarian rule. Kobayashi elucidates that this proverb signifies that ‘the dog is at least somehow useful while the pig – being greedy, lazy and dirty – is futile’ (*OT*, 19, 145).

Alongside his juxtaposition of the KMT's brutal rule with Japan's better-natured governance, Kobayashi emphasises the momentousness of the Japanese colonial period in forming a collective and shared identity among the people of Taiwan. Japan's colonisation over Taiwan helped to forge a shared identity in four aspects. Firstly, Taiwanese rebellion against the Japanese in the early stage of the Japanese colonial period unified different ethnic groups that were previously antagonistic towards one another, cultivating a shared consciousness for the first time (*OT*, 126). Secondly, although the Taiwanese suffered discrimination and exploitation under Japanese rule, Taiwan took major strides towards modernisation at many levels that helped produce a shared identity. An island-wide transportation network and the free flow of information, in particular, helped enable various ethnic groups to become a unified and integrated 'people' – a Taiwanese nation (*OT*, 125-35). Thirdly, Taiwan under Japanese rule cultivated a shared spirit – the 'Japanese spirit' – thereby acquiring modernised/civilised socio-cultural values and systems that are different from Chinese ones, which are pre-modernised/uncivilised (*OT*, 75). Fourthly, the spread of the Japanese language as the national one during the colonial period eliminated the hurdle of communication caused by the lack of a common language shared by the different ethnic groups in Taiwan (*OT*, 76-7). As mentioned above, Kobayashi emphasises the importance of a common language as being one of the foremost ingredients in forming a shared identity. His great emphasis on language in this respect serves a double function. Kobayashi on the one hand implies that those who are termed 'Japanese-language generation' possess a residual Japanese identity/Japanese-ness. They are to some extent Japanese, or, at least, once were Japanese, as opposed to being Chinese. On the other hand, he highlights the importance of creating a writing system of a 'Taiwanese Language' in order to purge Taiwanese minds of 'Chinese cultural contaminants' and to represent 'authentic' Taiwanese culture, thereby consolidating an emerging Taiwanese national identity (*OT*, 165). Kobayashi sheds light on Japan as an exemplification. He notes that the affirmation and consolidation of a distinctive Japanese identity/Japanese-ness in their history is derived from the utilisation of archaic Chinese characters without abandoning their own (Japanese) language. Nevertheless, the 'Taiwanese language' for Kobayashi seems to solely refer to the Minnan dialect. Other languages (such as the Aboriginal language) or dialects (such as Hakka) are ignored.

Above all, the fifty years of Japanese colonisation had made ‘the Taiwanese’ and ‘the Chinese’ become different ‘peoples’ and ‘nations’. Japanese colonisation in Taiwan with its legacies of the Japanese spirit and modernisation gave the people of Taiwan a vibrant and advanced personality. A vast cultural gulf separated Taiwanese from China’s feudal, stagnant society. This difference in cultural characters played an important role in the subsequent development of Taiwanese national identity. The inherited Japanese spirit and shared Japanese colonial experience had become the most important ingredients of ‘Taiwanese-ness’.

It should be noted that, although Kobayashi’s line of thinking opposes defining the (Taiwanese) nation by its blood-ties but instead by socio-cultural attributes, he still intends to argue that the ‘Taiwanese’ are genetically distinct from the ‘Chinese’. He claims that the root of the Taiwanese in consanguinity is a hybrid of the Han-Chinese and the Aborigines. As he describes, the aboriginal tribes were the primary inhabitants of the plains of the island before the Dutch first established a colony in Taiwan. After establishing a colony, the Dutch encouraged Chinese immigrants to settle and farm in Taiwan. Most Chinese immigrants were young, able-bodied men and there were very few women, children or the elderly. As a result, men consistently outnumbered women among the Chinese immigrant population in Taiwan’s early modern history. Marriages between Chinese bachelors and Aboriginal women produced a large number of the mix-blood ‘Taiwanese’ – the origin of the Taiwanese people (*OT*, 123).

In short, the successive periods of colonisation under those foreign regimes respectively heralded different physical and mental impacts on the populace of Taiwan, forging a distinctive Taiwanese-ness, a Taiwan nation and Taiwanese identity. Kobayashi writes in the final frame of the chapter on ‘Taiwan’s History’, ‘what are the authentic Taiwanese people? The authenticity of the Taiwanese people cannot be traced back in consanguinity. Only by facing and assessing one’s own history sincerely one can find the truths of the fact’ (*OT*, 156). Finally, it is again noted that, although Kobayashi’s comments are on Taiwan, his primary concern is that of Japan.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ He writes, ‘I just hope young men in Japan can understand that people in Taiwan think hard every day about their identity and survival. Japanese do not have to worry if they are Japanese or not, and they want to be so-called global citizens. I want to propose the question “What if I am a Taiwanese?” to Japanese people, to show them they should cherish the values of being Japanese. And only when

4-2-4. Modernisation Discourse

Kobayashi's political rhetoric manifested in the manga demonstrates a specific form of modernisation discourse. This discourse is threefold. First, Taiwan under Japanese colonisation had reformed 'pre-modern/backward' Chinese culture, transforming it into a 'modernised' Taiwanese culture. The people in Taiwan accordingly evolved from the 'uncivilised Chinese' to the 'civilised Taiwanese'. Chinese cultural contaminants in this respect must be purged. The Taiwanese figures represented in the manga display their strong willingness to embrace the values of the 'Japanese spirit', thereby demonstrating themselves as being 'modernised'. In addition, for Kobayashi, the Chinese-led KMT's rule over Taiwan not only deterred and deferred Taiwan's modernisation, but, more seriously, it engendered a sorrowful and brutal catastrophe for the Taiwanese. When the 'civilised' and 'modernised' Taiwanese people were governed by an 'uncivilised' and 'pre-modern' Chinese regime, it inevitably led to a massacre such as the 2-28 Incident. Meanwhile, it is clear that, from this point of view, the unification with Communist China, which is regarded as a 'benightedly authoritarian regime', would, of course, cause another 2-28-Incident-like tragedy for the Taiwanese in the 21st century. Second, for Kobayashi, the modernisation project under Japanese rule helped to form a shared identity. This line of argument in fact recapitulates a modernist argument, shown in Chapter Two, which argues that the course of modernisation created the possibility for a new form of imagined community – the morphology of modern nation. Following this line of argument, it is not difficult to appreciate Kobayashi's remarks that the different aspects of Taiwan's modernisation under Japan's colonisation, such as the building of an island-wide transportation network, the free flow of information and the spread of Japanese as a common language, all made significant contributions to the formation of a Taiwanese identity. Third, the modernisation discourse suggests that the only way to achieve modernisation is to comply with the regime of the nation-state. National belonging or national identity is imperative for the modern subject to define the meaning of Self, so as to exist. Everyone in the modern era should therefore possess a nationality; and only with a nationality would a group of people achieve progress and modernisation. In this regard, nationalism is not merely engaged in the modernisation project; rather, nationalism is in fact part and parcel of the modernisation project itself.

Japan retrieves her glory and awakening can she lead Asia into the next generation' (*OT*, 59).

Under this modernisation discourse, the positive image of, and even nostalgia towards, Japanese colonialism held by many native Taiwanese becomes intelligible. Unlike Koreans, who vehemently detested and tenaciously opposed the Japanese and their colonial occupation, the Taiwanese are said to have retained a positive image of the Japanese and approvingly recollect the virtues of Japanese rule. If Koreans speak of oppression and resistance, the Taiwanese speak of modernisation and development, as Kobayashi has demonstrated in his manga.

Moreover, this modernisation discourse in fact profoundly shapes, if anything, boundaries and connotations of a 'Taiwan nation'. A series of dichotomies is created to mark the striking difference between the people in China and the people in Taiwan. The 'Chinaman' is perceived as inflexible, feudalistic, reactionary, oppressive, and lacking any sense of the 'public good', while the Taiwanese, who benefited greatly from Japan's colonisation, is flexible, modern, progressive, democratic and full of 'public good'. No matter how ill-defined these descriptive terms are, the set of dichotomies in practice indeed helps to form a distinctive Taiwanese national identity. Representing the two cultures – 'Chinese' and 'Taiwanese' – in terms of the pre-modern/modern polarity, the people in Taiwan essentialise the difference between the two. Consequently, modernisation discourse operates in a particular way in Taiwanese national identity formation, serving the practices of marking 'us', the Taiwanese, and 'them', the Chinese.

In summary, *On Taiwan* is a comic text in which Kobayashi introduces and comments on Taiwan's history, politics and culture. His illustrations and comments on Taiwan advocates not only legitimising past Japanese imperial history but also his intention to reignite the pre-war 'Japanese spirit' among young people in contemporary Japanese society. Taiwan under his pen is more or less like 'Jurassic Park'. The dinosaur ('Japanese spirits') that is considered to be extinct is now 'rediscovered' living on an island (Taiwan). No matter whether Kobayashi's illustrations are accurate or not, if one can truly examine them, his remarks not only provide an interesting, and somehow convincing, perspective to introduce Taiwan to his compatriots; but, more importantly, his discourse in practice has had real political ramifications for Taiwanese society which this chapter deals with in the following parts. Yet, it is important at this stage to indicate the problematic features of his manga.

The major problem with his manga is that its image of Taiwan is in fact to a great extent partial, if not distorted. The representation of Taiwan under his pen is incomplete and limited. Firstly, Kobayashi purposefully over-embellishes or over-beautifies the image of Taiwan in order to manifest the glory of the 'Japanese spirit'. Japanese people might be disappointed when they come to see the 'real' Taiwan. In the end, Japanese readers would have a biased understanding of contemporary Taiwan and, quite possibly, Japan itself. Secondly, Kobayashi ignores all other experiences and opinions of Japan that are particular to ethnic groups, classes, genders and so on in Taiwan. The historiographical perspective presented in the manga is solely enjoyed by the so-called 'Japanese-language-generation', or more precisely speaking, a small group of Minnan-based (as opposed to Hakka, Aborigines, the Mainlander, etc.), masculinist-oriented (as opposed to feminine, homosexual, etc.) and aristocratic-centred (as opposed to proletarian, tenant farmer, etc.) people who were once 'Japanese'. As a result, it is not surprising that, after the Chinese translation of *On Taiwan* was published, it soon prompted strong outrage among different *peoples* in Taiwanese society.

4-3. The Turmoil over On Taiwan

4-3-1. The Early Stage of the Turmoil: Publication of the Manga in Japan and in Taiwan

The Japanese version of the manga *On Taiwan* was published as a paperback in November 2000. The book soon became a bestseller in Japan, with more than 250,000 copies being sold in the country in the first two months alone (*IT* 12/02/01, 11). The widespread publication of the manga attracted Taiwanese media's attention. *China Times*, a leading newspaper in Taiwan, initiated the first wave of reports concerning the manga. The newspaper's political correspondent in Japan, Liu Li-Er, gave an exclusive series of reports on the manga at the end of December 2000.

In those reports, Liu first of all portrays Kobayashi as one of Japan's most controversial cartoonists and labels him as a right-wing opinion leader, who advocates rewriting Japan's modern history and to abandon the so-called masochistic historiographical perspective. Liu then provides a general account of the contents of the manga. Particularly in her 4,000-word-long article issued on 25 December, Liu comprehensively introduces the contents of the book, summarising each chapter, spelling out the purposes and the context of the book.

The role played by Taiwan's former president Lee in the manga is specially stressed in Liu's report. Lee's comments in interviews appear in the manga and his recommendations for it are especially quoted.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the report also illustrates the popular support enjoyed by this manga in Japan. She describes how it was very influential in Japan among the youth since the medium of the manga is a highly effective means of communication in Japan for an author who wishes to target the youth as his or her principal readership. Liu therefore warns that Taiwan should not overlook the cultural and political ramifications of this book.

Those reports were followed by a flurry of criticism in the press of Taiwan. One of the first commentaries, written by a senior political commentator Peng Hui-Xian, appeared in *China Times* on 25 December 2000. In her article, Peng censures Taiwanese politicians and entrepreneurs who appear in the manga. She argues that their remarks that endorse Kobayashi's arguments would legitimise Japanese colonialism. Peng specially condemns the former president Lee for his remarks that Kobayashi's perspective presents every aspect of Taiwan. Peng writes that it is 'absurd', 'pitiful', 'lamentable' and 'dangerous' to hear what Lee had said, especially when he frequently advocates constructing Taiwan's subjectivity. Peng further casts aspersions on those figures' double standards towards Japan's and the KMT's rules over Taiwan. She asks why those Taiwanese did not draw attention to Japan's cruelty to Taiwan, which included comfort women and the Musha Uprising¹⁰² during the colonial period if they were to condemn the KMT's brutality in the 2-28 Incident; and why they did not appreciate the KMT's contributions to Taiwan's economic development if they gave great credit to Japan's involvement in the modernization of Taiwan (*CT* 25/12/00).

Peng's criticism of Lee's sympathies with Kobayashi was reiterated by other commentators. A senior journalist, Chen Shi-Chang (*CT* 25/12/00), for example, describes Lee as an 'aged-Japan-junky', a 'guardian of the Japanese spirit', who, being mentally disordered, tends to seek imaginary roots, thereby misplacing his self-identification. Likewise, Huang Jing-Juan (*CT* 26/12/00), a professor at National Sun Yet-san University, also wrote an article, sneering at the shallowness of the Taiwanese people's Japan-admiring-mentality.

¹⁰¹ Lee said that since there is this manga, the people do not need textbooks on Taiwan's history anymore. The manga has represented every aspect of Taiwan.

¹⁰² The uprising occurred in 1930 when 139 Japanese were slaughtered by a tribe of Aborigines at an Aboriginal school sports day. The Japanese army subsequently cracked down on the uprising. More than 644 Aborigines were killed in the incident (Zhou 1997, 130).

She ridicules the fact that the so-called 'Japanese spirit' in Taiwan had been limitedly comprehended as committing hara-kiri (a ritual suicide under the Japanese samurai code of honour).

Along with the aforementioned series of criticisms aimed at Taiwanese figures that were included in the manga, another line of commentary dwelled upon the linkage between Taiwan's independence corps and Japan's right-wing forces. Zheng Xiu-Juan (CT 26/12/00), a Taiwanese PhD student at the University of Tokyo, suggests that the publication of *On Taiwan* in Japan is not a coincidence but a consequence of the mobilisation by some native Taiwanese who reside in Japan, aiming to attract the notice of the Japanese populace to Taiwan. Zheng admits that it indeed successfully 'advertised' Taiwan in Japan. Nevertheless, writes Zheng, if the volume remains merely at the level of promulgating an image of Taiwan in Japan, it would not be the target of criticism among intellectuals in both Japan and Taiwan. The problematic of this attempt, according to Zheng, springs from Kobayashi's arbitrary interpretation of Taiwan's history, ascribing the development/modernisation of Taiwan solely to the Japanese (or Japanese colonialism). This way of thinking that praises Japan's role played in East Asia prior to WWII, however, has a warm reception among many Japanese youth since the right wing forces in Japan are steadily and progressively emerging. Zheng reprimands those trying to build a distinctive Taiwanese identity upon the basis of the legacy of Japanese colonialism (i.e. the Japanese spirit) as being 'too shallow and dangerous'. This attempt, Cheng suggests, negates the Mainlanders' contribution to Taiwan on the one hand and overlooks the condescending face of the former coloniser on the other.

Dai Guo-Hui, a renowned Taiwanese scholar residing in Japan for over forty years, holds a similar opinion. In an interview conducted by the Chinese newspaper *United Daily News* (27/12/00), Dai contended that the cooperation between Taiwan's independence advocates and Japan's right wing forces would not only limit Taiwan's further development, but would also sharply deteriorate the relations between China and Japan. Like Zheng and Dai, Peng Hui-Xian (CT 25/12/00) also disagrees that Taiwan should, while facing China's military intimidation, act jointly with Japanese right-wingers and approve of Japanese colonisation in Taiwan, since by doing so the people in Taiwan would internalise Japanese colonialism, thereby failing to take the opportunity to reflect on the complex and ambivalent impacts of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan. To those commentators, the publication of

Kobayashi's manga and the warm reception it received signify the revival of Japan's right wing forces and militarism.

In short, during this period, the focus is on Kobayashi's interpretation of history, the legacy of Japanese colonisation in Taiwan, and the revival of Japanese militarism. While some commentators provided a critique of the Japanese-language-generation's longing affections towards Japan, others regarded the publication of Kobayashi's manga as a tie-up of Taiwan's independence movement and the ghost of Japan's militarism.

4-3-2. Disputes over Issues of 'Comfort Women'

After the Chinese version of *On Taiwan* was published in Taiwan, several human rights/women's rights groups including the Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation, a non-governmental organisation long dedicated to fact-finding on Taiwanese comfort women,¹⁰³ held a press conference in Taipei on 21 February 2001, launching a campaign against *On Taiwan*, which included a call on the public to boycott it.

In the manga, Kobayashi quotes Taiwanese business leader Xu Wen-Long¹⁰⁴ as contending that the Japanese government could not possibly have forced comfort women to work against their will. As Xu said in the book, according to his personal investigation, working in a Japanese military brothel had been the best possible thing for many Taiwanese women. He continued that the women were often sold into prostitution by impoverished parents but worked in sanitary conditions and were able to save money. The Japanese military at that time was very concerned about human rights. Also, hygiene standards there could not have been better. The job of comfort woman was a lucrative one and all women therefore entertained a hope to enter the military in this way – far from being coerced to join it (*OT*, 203-4). Xu's comments are illustrated with a drawing of Taiwanese women cheerfully

¹⁰³ Historians say some 200,000 young women, mostly Koreans but also women from Taiwan, China, the Philippines, and Indonesia, were forced to serve as sex slaves in Japanese army brothels during the Second World War. Japan has so far refused to pay compensation or to offer an official apology to those women. The Japanese government instead set up a 'private' Asia Women's Fund for those ageing victims. Most of them, however, refused to accept its help, calling instead for direct state compensation from the Japanese government.

¹⁰⁴ Xu is the president of Chi-Mei Electronics Corp. He is normally labelled as a pro-independent tycoon and was invited by President Chen after his victory at the presidential election in 2000 to be a senior advisor to the president. Xu spent the first 17 years of his life under colonial rule – and received a Japanese education – until the island was given to the KMT government in China following the end of WWII in 1945.

lining up to be recruited by a seated Japanese officer (Figure 4-4). Xu is quoted asking Kobayashi that, 'It simply takes an investigation to bring the whole truth to light, so why has Japan not conducted any probe into the event' (*OT*, 204)? According to Xu, the Japanese government has only made the uproar bigger by blindly offering apologies. Xu subsequently adds that the Nanjing Massacre is in a similar vein. The massacre was an American and Chinese invention. He suggests that the Japanese government should interrogate those allegations by itself, thereby finding out the truth.

The aforementioned illustration of comfort women in the manga sparked strong anger in Taiwan. Human rights groups accompanied by female scholars and opposition legislators in the press conference not only condemned Kobayashi's twisted representation of the history of Taiwanese comfort women, but also lambasted the senior national advisor Xu and another Taiwanese entrepreneur Cai Kun-Can, who was also interviewed by Kobayashi.¹⁰⁵ They refuted Kobayashi's statements on the basis of their own research on Taiwanese comfort women. According to their research, while the recruited comfort women indeed included a few already working as prostitutes, the majority of them were recruited against their will, either by means of coercion, force or deception carried out through colonial government-sponsored corporations, notably the Taiwan Colonial Trade Corporation, at the request, and with the assistance, of the Japanese military forces (*CTE*, 21/02/01; *TT* 22/02/01, 2).¹⁰⁶

The protest against the manga quickly spread across the political arena of Taiwan. On the following two days, a series of press conferences were held by various opposition legislators in Legislative Yuan,¹⁰⁷ expressing their profound disapproval of Kobayashi, Xu and Cai's remarks. One of the legislators even dramatically tore the book in half at a press conference (*TT* 23/02/01, 2). The demands made by those legislators are twofold. Firstly,

¹⁰⁵ Cai was also quoted on a different occasion as saying he found it incomprehensible that a court in Yamaguchi Prefecture ruled in favour of the comfort women in a lawsuit. Cai said if these women could get compensation, then Japanese women who were compelled to prostitute themselves to US soldiers in order to ensure the safety of all Japanese women, should also get state compensation (*OT*, 102).

¹⁰⁶ Aside from the Taiwan Colonial Trade Corporation, as human groups claimed, the Japanese government also used prefectural officers and local police to recruit comfort women by forcible means.

¹⁰⁷ Opposition parties include KMT, PFP, and New Party.

they asked that Xu and Cai apologise for their comments on the comfort women and requested that President Chen remove Xu from his position as a senior national advisor to the President. Secondly, the opposition legislators requested that the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) start a probe to see if any government officials have been involved in what they called ‘practices disgracing the nation’. They criticised Taiwan’s representative to Japan, Luo Fu-Quan, and the national policy adviser, Jin Mei-Ling.¹⁰⁸ The former is featured in the comic as singing songs praising Japanese militarism in Kobayashi’s receiving banquet, the latter arranged Kobayashi’s tours to Taiwan (*CT* 23/02/01; *TT* 23/02/01, 2).

Along with those press conferences, two eighty-year-old former comfort women were organised to have an informal meeting with the premier Zhang Jun-Xiong on 23 February during a break in an interpellation session at the legislature, asking him to protect the dignity of Taiwan’s comfort women. Two former comfort women presented their case to the Premier, condemning Xu for his distortion of the history of the comfort women. The legislators pressed Premier Zhang to make a public, official refutation of the book’s contents during an interpellation. Premier Zhang finally asked the Japanese government to offer a formal apology for the humiliation inflicted on Taiwanese comfort women during WWII (*CTE* 23/02/01; *TT* 24/02/01, 2).

The public resentment towards the manga not only appeared in parliament but also in the streets. A book-burning ceremony outside Taipei’s biggest bookstore was hosted on 25 February by a Mainlander legislator, Feng Hu-Xiang, who is widely known for his hatred of the Japanese. Protests also occurred in the city of Taichung and Keelung, where demonstrators protested in front of a chain store appealing to the public not to purchase products from Xu’s food company. In addition, a big demonstration against the manga took place in Taipei Main Railway Station on the same day, calling for a boycott of the manga and demanding an apology from Xu and Cai (*CT* 26/02/01; *TT* 26/02/01, 2). Scenes of weeping ex-comfort women and indignant book-burning sympathisers demonstrating in protests intensively graced the television news in those days.

¹⁰⁸ Jin Mei-Ling is a former exiled Taiwanese dissident and had herself been blacklisted by the KMT between 1961 and 1992. She is a native Taiwanese ethnically and was born in Taiwan in 1934 during the Japanese colonial period. She grew up in a wealthy Taiwanese family and received her education in Taiwan until she moved to Japan in 1959, doing her higher education in Waseda University. She also appeared in Kobayashi’s manga as a friend who accompanies Kobayashi to visit the former president Lee, incumbent president Chen, and Taiwanese entrepreneur Xu Wen-Long.

Under such heavy pressure from the public, both Xu and Cai primarily refused to comment on the issue or confirm if they were correctly quoted in Kobayashi's book. Yet, after public discontent increased, Xu responded for the first time to the controversy on 25 February. At the conference he denied ever having said that comfort women had willingly accepted their work as sex slaves for the Japanese or used it as a way of raising their social status. Yet, as Xu expressed his sympathy for those comfort women who were not voluntary, he reiteratively stressed that 'the Japanese military did not force those women to become comfort women, rather it was their own parents that forced those women' (*TT* 26/02/01, 2). Xu then went on to claim that if the public was really interested in what happened to the comfort women, they would also look into similar violations by the KMT military on the outlying island Kinmen and Matsu in the past fifty years and the circumstances of the military prostitutes who were employed there by the armed forces.¹⁰⁹ In addition, Xu also suggested that Taiwan should not jeopardise its relationship with Japan due to this manga since Japan, as an important business partner of Taiwan, actually contributes greatly to the development of Taiwan's economy. And finally, he dismissed cries from the opposition legislators who called for him to step down from his post as a senior adviser to the president (*CT* 26/02/01; *TT* 26/02/01, 2).

Xu's responses to the public in his press conference did not calm the public fury but only triggered another fiercer wave of protest. While some people publicly castigated Xu as being a businessman who 'runs after the cash by discarding his dignity', 'earns money from his compatriots to flatter the Japanese', others accused Xu of intending to divert the public gaze by inappropriately comparing comfort women in the Japanese army with the military prostitutes in the KMT's army. People condemned Xu as undeserving of being Taiwanese (*CT* 26/02/01). A few protestors gathered around the publisher of the manga on 26 February, burning a Japanese national flag and demanding that Kobayashi be banned from visiting Taiwan again. Derogatory terms such as 'Japanese-dog', 'slaver-of-the-Japanese', 'Han-Chinese-traitor' and 'aged-imperial-subject' were widely used to refer to Xu, Cai and the former president Lee – the Japanese-language-generation – in the media and on the Internet. A mass of complaints swamped Xu's and Cai's companies. The Presidential Office

¹⁰⁹ For decades, it was common practice on the outlying island groups of Kinmen and Matsu to provide soldiers with prostitutes. Some women who were employed at such brothels were reportedly forced into their occupation. The practice was halted in the mid-1980s.

and the DPP headquarters, which had been tight-lipped about the controversy, also became the target of complaints. Some prosecutors even expressed the idea of putting Xu on trial for his libel of the comfort women (*CTE* 26/02/01).

Xu was then forced to issue another statement on the following day (26 February) in an attempt to silence the firestorm of criticism over comments he made earlier. The statement explained that modern people are unable to fully understand the life of people in Taiwan in the early part of last century, lack a sufficient understanding of historic events, and cannot judge whether the women were forced into prostitution or not. Xu uttered in the statement:

Modern people are clueless about the historic background of that era [during WWII]; neither do [people today] understand the thoughts and concepts of the Taiwanese who were once governed by the Japanese. These factors all triggered a gap of historic interpretation between Taiwan's older and younger generations. (*TT*, 27/02/01, 3)

However, Xu insisted in the statement that, in accordance with what he had heard and saw during Taiwan's colonisation by Japan, comfort women were indeed not coerced. Xu therefore suggested that the Taiwanese should spend more time and energy solving existing problems – such as issues concerning child prostitutes as well as Aborigines who have succumbed to poverty and become prostitutes (*ibid.*).

Xu's second statement attempted to highlight the cognitional gaps between those who once were 'Japanese' and those who were brought up under the KMT's propagandistic education. In addition, he also implicitly indicated that the voices of his generation were repressed in Taiwanese society. However, this explanation did not receive much sympathy. His attempts seem only to have added to the fury. Opposition legislators and women's groups still stood firm that Xu should resign from his post as a presidential advisor. On 27 February Xu finally released a written apology (*TT* 28/02/01, 3). In this written apology, Xu said he felt 'terribly sorry' for the hurt done to the victims by his remarks, which he admitted were 'biased' because of his 'limited experience'. He said he never meant to insult the victims. The comfort women episode, writes Xu, was a historical tragedy as inhumane as the war itself and he promised to support research on the issue as well as on that of the prostitute system which used to exist in the KMT's military. This was the first time Xu apologised for his remarks made in the manga. After Xu admitted his 'limited experience', the fury of the public eventually calmed down somewhat, though some still insisted that Xu need to show

his sincerity by offering a face-to-face apology to the comfort women and continued to argue that Xu should resign his post as a national senior advisor.

During this period, voices from the pro-Kobayashi camp including DPP politicians and Taiwan independence advocates were very restrained and low-key. Their earliest response to the public fury over the comfort women issue was made by DPP legislator Cai Tong-Rong on 24 February, calling for attention to the KMT's military prostitutes as constituting a similar example of human rights/women's rights violations. On the same day, the author of the manga, Kobayashi, also reacted to the criticism he received from Taiwan by saying that the issue of comfort women had already become a political means manipulated by the opposition politicians (*CT* 25/02/01). Similarly, Taiwan's Vice President Lu, when interviewed by the press on 25 February, also attributed the entire public fury to ideological conflict between independence and unification advocates. She said that, if the person quoted in the manga had not been Xu, who rather supported the DPP and possessed such 'strong Taiwanese consciousness', public discontent would not have been intensive in the same way (*CT* 26/02/01). Briefly, from the viewpoint of the DPP government, the attacks against the manga and Xu, while ostensibly in the name of comfort women, have in fact been very political and ideological. They accused the opposition politicians of seizing an opportunity to wage political warfare, using the issue to wage attacks against pro-DPP or pro-independent figures for their own political purposes.

Anti-Kobayashi Rhetoric in the Press

When the debate revolved around the comfort women issue, hundreds of articles had been widely issued in Taiwan. In the mainstream of the press, most commentators still found it hard to accept the fact that Kobayashi's reactionary nationalistic arguments found sympathy in Taiwan. A large number of articles continued to blame pro-Japan attitudes upheld by the Japanese-language-generation, though a small number also targeted the Japan-fever phenomenon among the Taiwanese youth (the so-called 'Japan junkies'). For instance, an article written by a renowned member of the Academia Sinica contends that those 'imperial subjects' (i.e. the former president Lee and Xu) had been nurtured in the Japanese culture and felt they are superior to others. He further criticised that those imperial subjects have neither been accepted by mainstream Japanese society nor understood the profundities of Japanese culture. Such a pro-Japan attitude possessed by those imperial subjects, as those

commentators bitterly described, is a sort of a ‘mentality of the colonised’, ‘identity disorder’, or ‘humiliation of the Taiwanese’. Similar to the earlier critics, those commentators also showed their reservation, if not total refutation, of ‘Taiwanese national identity’ if it is based upon an ‘unabashedly pro-Japanese account of Taiwan history’. A senior political commentator, Xia Zhen, for instance, argued that a subconscious nostalgia for Japanese colonial rule, possessed by the older generation, could have twisted the understanding about the history of Taiwan, such as the history of comfort women. She claimed that the older generation who had been educated under Japan’s rule had little experience of Japanese atrocities tended to side with Japan; and they came to miss Japanese rule especially after the brutalities of the 2-28 Incident and the White Terror. She then strongly urged that Taiwanese identity ‘should not be built upon the Japan-nostalgia mentality’ (Xia, *CT* 25/02/01).

Along with the aforementioned articles that revolve around Taiwan’s affectionate and nostalgic attitudes towards Japan, some articles directly attacked Japanese colonialism and Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. This line of criticism contends that, no matter how different aspects of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan were exercised, their oppressive nature is identical. The dignity and human rights of the colonised people are similarly deprived and infringed. A column in *China Times* (27/02/01), for instance, suggested that, although Japan’s colonial regime indeed contributed greatly to the modernisation of Taiwan, it was the same group of people that destroyed the native culture of the Taiwanese, absorbed the natural resources of Taiwan’s economy, and exploited the people of Taiwan. Far from bringing the enlightenment of modernisation to the people of Taiwan through education, Japanese colonisation was a process that involved enslaving the Taiwanese people. Likewise, Huang Wei-Fung, a research fellow at Academia Sinica, criticises the immorality of Japanese colonisation through reflecting the case of comfort women (*CT* 01/03/01).¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ As Huang elaborated, the most direct power relationship is that the Japanese colonial rulers directly coerced the women to become comfort women. A less direct relationship exists when the colonial rulers control the options of colonised people’s behaviour (i.e. the comfort women who were sold by their family because of unbearable economic burdens), thus the latter would rather opt for what the rulers prefer. A third relationship occurs when comfort women not only voluntarily served, but thought such acts were morally justified – serving as comfort women for the Japanese army brought not only economic benefits but also the pride and prestige in being associated with the rulers. By identifying these three asymmetrical power relationships, Huang concluded that Japan’s colonial government should be condemned, whether or not facts prove the women were coerced.

While some articles concentrated upon Japan's colonisation of Taiwan, others lashed out at the 'Japanese nation' itself (or 'the Japanese people' themselves). Ho Sheng-Fei (*TT* 26/02/01, 8), for instance, criticises Japan for its refusal to apologise sincerely and to face up to its past wrongdoings. He attributes to Japan's national character its reluctance to express its regret to its neighbour countries. Ho employs American cultural anthropologist Ruth Benedict's famous but controversial book, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, which argues that Japanese society is moulded by a 'shame culture', as opposed to a 'guilt culture' possessed by the West. In a shame culture like Japanese society, people believe that, once mistakes are made, no amount of atonement can do any good. But one does not have to worry unless one's wrongdoing is discovered. They therefore try to escape responsibility by erasing and blurring their history of conquest. Benedict's analysis of the Japanese national character, for Ho, indeed correctly explains Kobayashi's attempt to gloss over, or even beautify, their wrongdoing in the past.

Ho's psychoanalysis of 'Japan's national character' indeed reflected a phenomenon that anti-Japanese sentiment was widely disseminated in the society of Taiwan amid the wave of debate over the comfort women issue. Although some commentators tried to convince the public that the fringe status Kobayashi enjoyed in Japanese society and rightist disposition represents a very small minority of the Japanese, most showed their disapproval of Japan's attitudes and behaviours while facing war crimes during WWII. Those commentators contended that the majority of the Japanese people are not aware of their government's appalling wartime criminal record. Not only do schoolchildren not learn the truth, the Japanese government has done its very best to ensure that all citizens grow up thinking that they were the victims, not the perpetrators of WWII.

The image of 'Japan' in Taiwan during this period, then, was represented as right-wing, nationalistic, and somewhat militaristic. Ironically, this image is produced by the collaboration of both pro-independence and pro-unification advocates. While pro-independent proponents appealed only to Japan's right-wing arguments in order to get public support from the society of Japan and to differentiate Taiwanese-ness from Chinese-ness, pro-unification proponents in return used the same materials to attack independence advocates' remarks. The image of 'Japan' represented in Taiwan as a result was limited to those reactionary voices of Japanese society. Other voices were simply left out. It is precisely

for this reason that some political commentators in both Taiwan and Japan call for creating more comprehensive communication between the two societies, rather than solely relying on the interaction between Taiwan's Japanese-language generation and Japan's right-wingers.¹¹¹ As a matter of fact, the promotion and maintenance of the relations between Taiwan and Japan have indeed heavily relied on Taiwan's intelligentsia from the Japanese-language generation. Subsequent generations in both Taiwan and Japan lacked a kind of intimate mutual understanding since both sides' intelligentsia had begun to emulate trends in Western countries (in the US, particularly) in the post-war period. It is indeed easier for the old intelligentsia like former president Lee to interact with Japan on the basis of their personal relationships.¹¹²

Yet, this manner of interaction between Taiwan and Japan causes the mutual understanding of both societies to become unbalanced, since the Japanese-language generation only constitutes a small part of society of Taiwan and they enter into dialogue with only one of the two poles of Japan's political spectrum. Moreover, this *incomplete* and *unbalanced* dialogue between Taiwan and Japan not only affects the Japan-Taiwan relationship, but, more importantly, it profoundly fashions the characteristics of Taiwan's collective identity. Owing to the fact that 'Japan' played a significant role in the formation of Taiwanese national identity, the unbalanced representations of Japan then turn out to be a thorny issue for many Taiwanese in forming a shared identity. The constitution of Taiwanese national identity as a result is regarded as somehow intimately associated with Japan's right-wing forces or militarism. This way of identity formation is totally distasteful for those Mainlanders who went through traumatic experiences of war with Japan during WWII and those subsequent generations (of both the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders) who were instilled with loathing for 'Japan' and Japanese colonialism/militarism during their schooling. They therefore tend not only to refute the colonial intelligentsia's Japanese experiences as well as their interpretations of Taiwan's history stressing the momentousness of Japanese

¹¹¹ Please see Yang Yong-Min (CT 26/02/01) Hsu Tung-Ming (TT 21/03/01, 8) and Takefumi Hayata (TT 28/05/01, 8; TT 07/11/02, 8).

¹¹² Undeniably, Lee is attractive to many Japanese in some ways. First, Lee's goodwill towards the Japanese has satisfied their nostalgia for the old days. In addition, while Japan has constantly been reproached by the world for its wartime invasions, Lee has been the only foreign leader who praises Japan. Also, many Japanese are deeply attracted to Lee's personal charm, his erudition in Japanese culture and his fluent Japanese.

colonisation, but also to attack their elaborations of the connotation of Taiwanese-ness that insist upon Japanese-ness existing significantly within it. They urged that, if the KMT has had to face a painful re-examination of its fifty-year rule over Taiwan, the fury caused by the publication of *On Taiwan* had shown that the attitudes held by some people about the Japanese colonisation need to be re-examined as well.

In consequence, the Japanese-language generation's interpretations of history as well as their elaborations of Taiwanese-ness are refuted in the mainstream of Taiwanese society. This refutation is paradoxical and sarcastic because their voices in fact have been dominant in the courses of Taiwanese identity construction and have played a significant role in Taiwan's political discourse. In fact, there is always a collective anxiety circulated in the native Taiwanese community, agonising that the voices of native Taiwanese would be suppressed by the Mainlanders, though the latter are actually even more marginalised. This collective anxiety is clearly manifested in the pro-independence proponents' opinions over the comfort women issue amid this wave of debate over comfort women.

Pro-Kobayashi Rhetoric in the Press

The pro-independence proponents published their articles in pro-independent newspapers (such as *Liberal Times*, *New Taiwan Magazine*, *Taiwan Daily News*, and *Taipei Times*) responding against those who condemned Kobayashi and the figures cited in the manga. Their viewpoints can be summarised as follows. First of all, they refer to the so-called 'Military Paradises' – military prostitution in the KMT's army – operated during the authoritarian period, questioning the double standards held by those opposition parties and human rights/women's rights groups.

According to those articles (Yao Chi, *TT* 27/02/01, 8; Lin Zhao-Yi *The Storm of Yoshinori Kobayashi's On Taiwan* [*Storm*], 62-3, also in *TDN* 24/02/01; Lin Zhao-Yi *Storm*, 67-8, also in *TDN* 26/02/01; Wei Rui-Ming *Storm*, 64-6, also in *TDN* 24/02/01; Li Xiao-Feng *Storm*, 74-6, also in *ZEN*, 26/02/01), after the KMT government and its army of six hundred thousand soldiers retreated to Taiwan in the late 1940s, the government set up 'Military Paradises' to fulfil the sexual needs of its soldiers, who were mostly *Mainlander lads*, in order to 'stabilise the army's heart'. Particularly, those military brothels mushroomed in front-line islands like Kinmen and Matsu. The reports portray that the largest source of the 'Military Paradises' was perhaps illegal prostitutes who were caught by the police and subsequently

sent to the military camps. Such operations gradually ended as the generation of Mainlander soldiers aged in the 1960s and 1970s. Those pro-independence proponents questioned that, while those opposition politicians, human rights groups and media lambasted Kobayashi and Xu, they simply overlooked the existence of the KMT's 'Military Paradises' as well as other violations of human's rights such as the 2-28 Incident and the White Terror. Meanwhile, many commentaries also expressed suspicions that, while the comfort women issues had been in the news for quite a few years since 1992, those issues became a hot topic after the row over *On Taiwan* put a political gloss on the issue. They thus concluded that those human rights and women's rights groups criticising Kobayashi and Xu's remarks on the comfort women were not sincere in their concerns. Under this rhetoric, the comfort women issue turned from a human rights issue into a political one. Thus, from the views of those pro-independence proponents, the rise of the comfort women issue was apparently a conspiracy, initiated by opposition parties, the pro-unification human rights/women's rights groups, and the pro-unification media. As a result, the controversy over comfort women (and the manga *On Taiwan*) in Taiwan in the end was interpreted as an ethnic clash between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders, as a political confrontation between the ruling party and the opposition parties, an ideological conflict between pro-independence and pro-unification, a friction between pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese sentiments, and, above all, an identity collision between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity.

A renowned pro-independence writer, Song Ze-Lai, issued a series of articles in *Taiwan Daily News*. Song contended that the furore against *On Taiwan* is a stratagem launched by the Mainlander-led media, which he referred to as comprising *China Times* and *United Daily News*, intending to suppress the 'aged-native-Taiwanese' from telling the truth about Taiwan's history and proposing to demolish the historiographical perspective of the native Taiwanese. According to Song, the old generation of the native Taiwanese who experienced Japanese colonial rule would agree with the former president Lee's and entrepreneur Xu's remarks quoted in Kobayashi's manga (*Storm*, 60-1, also in *TDN* 23/02/01). In another article, Song challenged the justification of those Chinese Mainlanders' criticisms by saying that those ill-fated-aged-native-Taiwanese-women (the comfort women) are used as a political implement to struggle against the native Taiwanese, stirring up the internal conflict within the native Taiwanese community (*Storm*, 77-9, also in *TDN* 27/02/01). The issue of the comfort women from this point of view turned out to be exclusively a matter of the native Taiwanese

community. The Mainlander, as an outsider, should not engage in this affair. This line of thinking, surprisingly, found sympathy in contemporary Taiwan. A fairly large number of articles manifested similar arguments. While some (e.g. Hu Chang-Song *Storm* 148-52, also in *LT* 03/06/01) suggest that the ethnic group of the Mainlanders is not entitled to comment upon Taiwan's national affairs like the comfort women issue because Taiwan was ceded to Japan by their (the Mainlanders') ancestors one hundred years ago, others contend that the Mainlanders, while trying to 'take advantage of the comfort women issue to serve their own party political agenda', should not forget that 'their predecessors also committed heinous crimes against humanity in more than fifty years of autocratic control of Taiwan' (Jennifer Chen, *TT* 28/02/01, 8).

In addition, along with the aforementioned commentators ascribing the rise of criticism over the comfort women issue to the ethnic conflict, others (pro-independence proponents) associated it with the political struggle between the pro-independence ruling party and pro-unification opposition parties. Many articles (Editorial *Storm*, 80-2, also in *TDN* 27/02/01; Wang Mei-Xiu *Storm*, 94-6, also in *TDN* 28/02/01; Sun Qing-Yu *Storm*, 100-3, also in *TDN* 02/03/01) suggested that opposition politicians had tried to exploit the comfort women issue to embarrass the incumbent president Chen and the ruling party DDP. For them, those issues such as comfort women or Japanese colonialism/militarism were used by pro-unification parties or media to incite the public's resentment towards the DPP government and other pro-independence supporters like Xu. In this respect, the hidden agenda of protest against Kobayashi's book is nothing but a political struggle.

The Vanishing of Comfort Women in the Confabulation of 'Comfort Women'

In respect to the turmoil over comfort women issues during this period, the nature of the debate owes very little to human rights/women's rights but to national/ethnic identity. When women's groups first went public with their complaints against the manga, they presumably addressed a worthwhile and serious issue. However, since comfort women were a product of Japanese colonisation, the subject immediately converted to a sensitive subject of national identity in the eyes of many Taiwanese people. In this respect, the pro-independence proponents are fairly right to interpret the turmoil over comfort women as an ethnic or identity conflict. Nevertheless, this transformation of the nature of the turmoil does not come innately; rather, it is what both sides – pro-independent/Taiwanese

sympathisers and pro-unification advocates/Chinese sympathisers – made of it, since they are all imprisoned in a masculinism-based nationalist way of thinking.

The gender aspects of nationalism have, until recently, been rarely addressed in the scholarly literature on nation and nationalism (Walby 1996, 235). However, in recent decades, feminist scholars have begun to investigate nations and nationalisms from feminist perspectives.¹¹³ Most of them agree that nations and nationalisms are themselves gender formations. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias (1989) provide pioneering and influential research on the role of women in the nation and nationalism. In the introduction of their volume *Woman-Nation-State*, they summarise women's roles in the nation and nationalism as follows:

- (1) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;
- (2) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups;
- (3) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as the transmitters of its culture;
- (4) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences;
- (5) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. (1989, 7)

On this account, the implications of masculinism-based nationalism are twofold. First, women are urged to take their jobs as mothers more seriously for the good of the nation. If women's role as public citizens is defined by their ability to produce children, then those women who use sex for other ends necessarily threaten this assumed role. Second, for a long time the concept of nation has commonly been given maternal imagery and the virginity of the female sex has been perceived as the purity of the nation. Virginity – the purity of women's body – is a metaphor of the purity, dignity and integrity of nation. Therefore, invasions of a nation by foreign forces are analogised as intrusions into a woman's body thereby contaminating her purity and stealing her virginity.

Under this masculine-nationalist discourse, some Chinese sympathisers regarded the mentality behind Kobayashi's illustrations of the comfort women in *On Taiwan* as a variant of Japanese jingoism and called the book an insult to the dignity of the Chinese/Taiwanese

¹¹³ Please also Silvia Walby (1996), Andrew Parker et al. (eds.) (1992), Partha Chatterjee (1993), Anne McClintock (ed.) (1995), Nira Yuval-Davis (1997), Joan B. Landes (2001), and Tricia Cusack and Sighle Bhreathnach-Lynch (eds.) (2004).

people. It was even more unacceptable for Chinese sympathisers when they found some native Taiwanese siding with Kobayashi in such disputes. Many Chinese sympathisers had long held suspicions that the native Taiwanese had betrayed their Chinese roots during the Japanese colonisation. This explains why some of those politicians who had never been concerned with women's rights issues before were so outraged when they were faced with the manga, and strongly condemned Kobayashi's illustrations of comfort women and Xu's pro-Japanese mentality.

For the pro-independence camp, their responses to the furore over comfort women also manifest its masculine-nationalist way of thinking. Bringing the 'Military Paradise' matters forward to the public not only shows their anti-Chinese/KMT/Mainlander sentiments but more importantly, it also demonstrates different subject positions (as opposed to 'the Chinese') associated with 'Japan' when considering their self-identification. For those native Taiwanese who were once 'Japanese', 'Japan' is the object that the Self intends to be, thereby being part of the Self. This sort of mentality of the colonised is depicted vividly by Albert Memmi:

The first attempt of the colonised is to change his condition by changing his skin. There is a tempting model very close at hand – the coloniser... The first ambition of the colonised is to become equal to that splendid model and to resemble him to the point of disappearing in him. (Memmi 1965, 120)

Once one conceives of 'Japan' as part of the Self and China/the KMT/the Mainlander as out of the Self, it is then intelligible that one does not condemn the operation of comfort women by the Japanese army during the war period but censures the KMT's exercise of 'Military Paradises'. Moreover, it also explains why those who were once 'Japanese' like Xu Wen-Long or Cai Kun-Can said that working in a Japanese military brothel had been the 'best possible thing' for many Taiwanese women.

Under this masculine-nationalist discourse, those comfort women in Taiwan endure double shackles: the virginity of a woman and the virginity of a nation. Those severe gender discriminations have been imposed on them for over fifty years. They are not able to utter their voices since their purities as women and as national subjects were 'contaminated' by men and by 'foreigners'. This explains why the plight of comfort women during WWII (and the KMT's 'Military Paradises') came to light in the 1990s. Here, we can see overlapping impositions between nationalism and masculinism. Furthermore, since masculinism and

nationalism were so dominant in the debate over comfort women, the real issues concerning women's rights/human rights had been overlooked. The voices of the real victims – comfort women – were hardly heard in the media of Taiwan. And some important issues that needed to be addressed were missed out, such as demanding compensation from the Japanese government, or government complicity in acting as an agent to recruit women to serve the troops' sexual needs.

4-3-3. Disputes over Human Rights/Speech of Freedom and National Identity

The government of Taiwan announced on 2 March 2001 that it would ban Kobayashi from visiting Taiwan. The decision was made in a committee meeting reviewing the case of Kobayashi. The committee was organised by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) in accordance with Immigration Law, which states that foreigners might be banned from entering Taiwan if they 'are believed to endanger national interests, public security, public order, or the good name of the State' (Item 13, Article 17). The Vice Minister of the MOI explained the reasons of the decision to the press as follows:

The opinions and viewpoints depicted in the comic book...have triggered strong criticism in Taiwan. It has damaged our country's image, damaged our national dignity, affected what the international community thinks of us and endangered our national interests...and posed a threat to public safety. (*CTE* 02/03/01; *TT* 03/03/01, 1)

Critics arose immediately after the order was issued. They argued that the contents of the manga belonged in the realm of free speech and should not be cited as a reason for the government to ban the author's visit. Keeping the author out of the country is an infringement on personal freedom. Some pro-independence advocates, Huang Fu-San for instance, contended that the move was a step too far and could damage Taiwan's image as a democracy. Huang said,

Kobayashi is only a cartoonist. Because of this small book, the government has decided to ban him from visiting. I think some might therefore *equate Taiwan with a communist country where free speech is banned*. (*TT* 03/03/01, 1; emphasis added)

He further claimed that the government's move was meant for domestic consumption, a response to demands made by pro-China politicians from the opposition parties. Huang further predicted that, since most of the book depicted Taiwan's spirit as a sovereign and autonomous country, the decision would trigger protests from pro-independence supporters.

Likewise, the vice president Lu, who is often regarded as a pro-independence fundamentalist in the DPP's government, also denounced the decision. She said in the press:

The DPP has praised itself for advocating reform in the field of human rights in the past, and president Chen has also pledged to rule the country on the basis of human rights...whether to protect freedom of speech is a very important index by which to judge the standard of human rights in the country and, therefore, neither the decision [to bar the controversial cartoonist] nor to burn his comic books conforms to the principle. (CT 04/03/01; TT 04/03/01, 1)

Lu insisted that Taiwan should not jeopardise its hard-won reputation as a 'liberal-democratic country' in the international community. From the viewpoint of pro-independence advocates, the furore over comfort women issues (and *On Taiwan*) was shepherded by pro-China/unification politicians and the decision made by MOI was a concession to pro-China/unification voices, violating freedom of speech, thereby infringing human rights and harming Taiwan's national reputation as a democratic country in international community.

This line of argument was not only upheld by the pro-independent camp. Some notable scholars and human rights activists also proclaimed that Taiwan was overreacting to the manga. Bo Yang – the renowned author of *The Ugly Chinaman* and also a member of the president's human rights advisory group – made a remark that:

We could refute his opinions, or we could choose not to read his book, but that's only as far as we should go. Anything else is unnecessary or inappropriate (CT 03/03/01; TT 03/03/01, 2).

He said in the press that such conduct does not make any sense and simply reminds the Taiwanese people of the *White Terror era* when freedom of expression was strictly suppressed.

The decision to ban Kobayashi from entering Taiwan was then represented in the media of Taiwan as an affront to freedom of speech and, subsequently, as reminiscent of the repression of the martial law era. When Taiwan was still under the grip of martial law, the exiled Taiwanese dissidents were not permitted to come back to their own country. The mechanism that produced the list of the island's *persona non grata* – known as 'blacklist' – during that time was blurred and hazy, controlled mostly by the country's secret police as well as other related national security agencies. But when the KMT-led government in the 1990s began gradually to democratise, calls for establishing a transparent mechanism to

review the blacklist emerged. In a similar manner, the critics of the decision to ban Kobayashi questioned the mechanism at play behind the decision and demanded that the government make the whole process transparent. They lashed out at the officials' insistence in keeping names of non-officials who had attended the discussion confidential. Since the critics threw doubt on the process leading up to the committee's decision to bar Kobayashi, the decision itself was then analogised with the 'blacklist' during the KMT's authoritarian period. This analogy is, however, somewhat unfitting and ironic since 'the blacklist' during the authoritarian period targeted Taiwanese residents rather than foreigners, and the mechanism (the then-two-year-old Immigration Law) that made the decision to bar Kobayashi was in fact a consequence of the demands for transparent mechanisms when the island's 'black list' was reviewed in the 1990s.

Following a chorus of criticism from Taiwan's public opinion, the cabinet on 3 March formally backtracked, saying that the decision to bar Kobayashi was 'not definite' and should be reconsidered in order to avoid damaging 'Taiwan's democratic image' in the international community (*TT* 04/03/01, 1). The Interior Minister Zhang Bo-Ya became the subject of condemnation. She was forced to amend the decision, albeit reluctantly, saying in the legislature:

I did not hear any criticism of the Japanese government nor the US government for violating human rights when they refused to allow Taiwan's former president Lee Teng-Hui into their countries. (Ibid.)

The subjects of the controversy over *On Taiwan* at this point deviated from the comfort women issue and interpretations of Taiwan's colonial history, turning to the issues of the breach of human rights, the violation of freedom of speech, the harm of national reputation as a 'democratic country', as well as the reexamination of KMT's authoritarian history in the past decades. This trend of metamorphosis of the nature of the controversy was reinforced and accelerated after Jin Mei-Ling – a Japan-based national policy adviser who is also a longstanding supporter of Taiwan's independence – returned to Taiwan to defend Kobayashi and his right to visit Taiwan. She held a press conference on 4 March.

In the press conference, Jin expressed bemusement at criticising Kobayashi, an action she characterised as jumping on a bandwagon, and for which she finds the interior and foreign ministers particularly at fault, and called on both ministers to step down. Jin

emphasised Kobayashi's 'affections' towards Taiwan and the Taiwanese people, and demanded that the government should issue a formal apology to Kobayashi. She also argued that, while Taiwan's international space is constrained by the PRC, the only selling point for Taiwan to appeal for a formal recognition of Taiwan's statehood is 'liberty' and 'democracy'. Banning Kobayashi from entering Taiwan would seriously damage Taiwan's democratic image (*CTN* 04/03/01; *TT* 05/03/01, 3).

Although she returned to Taiwan to defend Kobayashi, Jin herself however created a new furore. The opposition legislators were particularly outraged after Jin stated on a television talk show that she does not recognise the 'Republic of China' and considers herself as 'an adviser to president Chen,' not 'a national policy adviser of the Republic of China'. At various legislative sessions, the opposition legislators fiercely interrogated the cabinet. While some still questioned the decision to ban Kobayashi from entering Taiwan, most of the uproar turned to issues over national loyalty and the national identity of the members of the cabinet and national advisors in particular. They called for the president to remove Jin from the post as national advisor.

In the Home and Nations Committee, while some legislators gave support to the MOI by arguing that the government should put the significance of 'national dignity' or 'sovereignty' ahead of an insistence of the observation of 'human rights' or 'freedom of speech', others conversely held that human rights as 'cosmopolitan values' should take priority over other issues in the administration led by President Chen, who had been long advocating those values. Interior Minister Zhang, when fielding questions from the legislators, proclaimed that the recommendation to block Kobayashi's visit was prompted by concerns for his personal safety rather than displeasure over the contents of his book. Yet, Zhang promised to the legislators to take 'human rights' into consideration before handing down a final decision. She said that MOI would reconvene a committee at a later date to reconsider the case as to whether or not to deny Kobayashi's entry (*TT* 06/03/01, 3). Likewise, Premier Zhang, in responding to a legislator's question at a routine interpellation session, said that he had already instructed the MOI to re-evaluate the government's policies and regulations related to denying entry to blacklisted persons. Zhang said that although Kobayashi's controversial manga 'twisted the truth' in sections about comfort women, Taiwan's international image and human rights track record would suffer and could be

sullied if the government were to name the right-wing writer a *persona non grata* simply because it does not agree with his opinions (*TT* 07/03/01, 2).

Meanwhile, in the Organic Laws and Statute Committee, the opposition legislators strongly demanded the dismissal of the two presidential advisers. New Party Legislator Lai Shi-Bao requested a full investigation over national advisor Jin's national allegiance, so as to determine whether her loyalty lay with Japan or Taiwan. Lai said that, Jin's inappropriate remarks had signified 'an insult to Taiwan by the Japanese', and it was mortifying that the administration did not refute her remarks (*CTE* 05/03/01). In a similar manner, at a Routine National Affairs Forum, legislators were particularly incensed by Jin's statements that she did not recognise the Republic of China. PFP legislator Qin Hui-Zhu, for instance, said that if Jin continued to say that she does not recognise the Republic of China, then the president should not simply sit by while she 'tramples all over the Republic of China,' but should instead dismiss her from her post (*TT* 07/03/01, 2). Taking a step further, New Party legislator Feng Ding-Guo suggested removing both Xu's and Jin's posts from the government payroll (*TT* 06/03/01, 3). Some legislators even intended to revise the laws relating to the Presidential Office by adding a provision to the statute on the organisation of the national policy advisers committee requiring recognition of the ROC (*CT* 07/03/01). To those legislators, only dismissing Jin from the post as national advisor could rescue Taiwan's dignity.

Fielding the opposition legislators' onslaught on national advisor Jin, the deputy presidential secretary-general Chen responded by insisting upon the protection of freedom of speech. He said, 'whatever Jin says reflects merely her personal opinions', but her freedom of speech should be guarded (*ibid.*). Also, in response to the opposition attack, some pro-independence legislators retaliated in the legislature by questioning the opposition's national identity. For instance, DPP legislator Zhang Chuan-Tian remarked:

Those who criticised Kobayashi's book are all Chinese. They are not Taiwanese...an authentic Taiwanese would not insult Xu and Jin if they read On Taiwan through the perspective of the Taiwanese. (CT 06/03/01; emphasis added)

Alongside questioning national advisor Jin's national allegiance, the opposition legislators also interrogated other members within the cabinet who were associated with Japan. The controversy to some extent escalated into all-out anti-Japanese sentiment. The

General Secretary of National Security Council Zhuang Ming-Yao, who was born during the Japanese colonial period and has a Japanese spouse, was demanded to make known his position towards the manga (CTE 07/03/01). Another prominent 'Japan-associated official' being scrutinised by the opposition legislator is Taipei's *de facto* representative to Japan, Luo Fu-Quan.¹¹⁴

Luo had come to the spotlight earlier because he had been featured in Kobayashi's manga as singing a Japanese martial chant and praising Japanese militarism in a banquet receiving Kobayashi. He was invited to give a report on 'Taiwan's Current Relations with Japan' and 'Taiwan's Comfort Women Case Proposal' on 7 March at a legislative committee meeting of Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs. Although Luo had rebutted charges in public earlier of singing a Japanese martial chant at the banquet, he was challenged by New Party legislator Feng Hu-Xiang to sing the ROC national anthem to demonstrate his patriotic credentials and to illustrate his loyalty to the country. Lo retorted: 'is it a mark against me *because I was educated during Japanese colonial rule?*' (CTE 07/03/01; TT 08/03/01, 4; emphasis added). In the legislature he was also asked to declare where he stands in the controversy over *On Taiwan*. Luo responded by stating that the contents of the manga were 'very improper' but fell within the realm of freedom of speech. He added that he was surprised about the fuss surrounding its publication. 'It never occurred to me that a manga could cause such a tremendous impact in Taiwan', said Luo (ibid.). Moreover, opposition legislators also urged Luo to refute the contents of the manga and condemn Kobayashi officially as a representative to Japan. He, however, refused to do so, saying that it was up to the government to decide how the issue should be handled. Luo's explanation and continued refusal elicited a tirade of angry responses by legislators. KMT Legislator Lin Hong-Zong deplored Luo by saying that fifty years of Japanese colonisation of Taiwan had produced two types of people: one is the beneficiary such as national advisor Jin, and the other is the victim such as comfort women. The Legislator criticised Luo as a representative of Japan's lack of courage to condemn Kobayashi (ibid). Indeed, Luo's Japanese experiences and his participation in the Taiwan independence movement during the 1970s incited some doubts

¹¹⁴ Luo Fu-Quan worked as the Deputy Director of the Tokyo-based Institute of Advanced Studies at the United Nations University before taking up the post as Taiwan's *de facto* ambassador to Tokyo. He was blacklisted in the authoritarian period due to his support for Taiwanese independence and had his passport revoked until 1992.

over his national allegiance. Another KMT Legislator, Chen Xue-Sheng questioned Luo's ability to do his job as Taiwan's *de facto* ambassador to Japan in light of his past Japanese experiences (ibid.).

It is also noted that the controversy during this time had fanned the flames of ethnic strife between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. While the debate over comfort women was taking place, the already existing ethnic tensions had been boosted further. For instance, some Taiwanese independence advocates from the Taiwan Nation-building Forum held a rally on 1 March to protest against opposition parties. They displayed a placard saying 'When the dog leave, the pig comes' as a figurative expression, to satirise the Mainlanders' (KMT's) uses of *Taiwanese women* to serve as prostitutes for its army, in comparison with the Japanese Imperial Army's use of comfort women. Likewise, it was reported in Taiwan's press on 8 March that several ethnic-assaulting banners, 'Chinaman and dog not permitted to enter' and 'Get Out! China Pig', were found in a communal park in the city of Kaohsiung (CTE 08/03/01).

Commentaries in the Press

Most political commentators during this time, whether they were working in the mainstream or pro-independence media, focused on freedom of speech and human rights issues. Those opinions (Xia Zhen, *CT* 03/03/01; Editorial, *CT* 03/03/01; Yu Zheng, *CTE* 03/03/01; Editorial, *TT* 03/03/01, 8; Hu Wen-Hui, *LT* 09/03/01) can be categorised into the following ways of reasoning.

First of all, although the manga had indeed triggered an uproar and many people found it hard to accept Kobayashi's right-wing views, many commentators proclaimed that Xu's and Kobayashi's freedom of speech must be respected since it is protected by Taiwan's Constitution. The use of government authority to ban Kobayashi from entering Taiwan constitutes a violation of his freedom of speech. Voltaire's renowned remark – I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it – was frequently quoted in the press of Taiwan during that time (e.g. Editorial, *CT* 03/03/01). The commentators further contended that, since virtually all of the high-ranking officials in the DPP-led government fought hard against the KMT in the past to win this precious democratic freedom, they should not be so willing to let it go now. One of the columnists questioned whether the DPP would 'leave behind its human rights insurances with which they fought

with KMT's authoritarian regime after it came to power' (Zheng Xiu-Juan, *CT* 05/03/01). The MOI's move reminds them of those 'not-so-long-ago days of martial law, when Taiwan's political dissidents were banned from returning home' (Editorial, *TT* 03/03/01, 8). The recollection of the so-called 'black list' had been resurrected. If the DPP-led government did not correct its own mistake, not only would Taiwan destroy its hard-won democratic image, but also its path of democratisation would be backtracked to the level of 'China'. For those commentators, Taiwan and China are diametrically opposite of each other in many aspects. Yet it appears to them that the two have actually integrated in at least one way when Taiwan's government decided to place the author of the manga on the list of unwelcome persons and prohibited his entry. One of the commentators stated: 'How will the government be able to argue that the two sides of the [Taiwan] Strait are different because Taiwan is a democracy and China is a totalitarian regime?' (*ibid.*). This line of argument was, however, challenged by the following two alternatives.

A major competing rhetorical argument stressed the imperatives of national dignity, the national interest and sovereignty. This alternative line of argument asked the following questions (Sandy Yeh, *TT* 11/03/01, 8): 'Does the government have to grant permission to all foreigners who wish to visit the island if those foreigners potentially endanger the interests of Taiwan?' 'Does the government have the obligation or the capacity to protect the human rights/freedom of speech of all local residents, both the ROC nationals and foreigners, who obey the law and pay taxes here?' 'Does this obligation extend to cover nationals who do not even reside in Taiwan?' Above all, 'Is the government really 'backtracking on democratic politics and violating human rights by making the decision?' The prototype of those series of questions is whether the national interest/dignity/sovereignty takes precedence over human rights/freedom of speech, or the other way round. This line of argument (Xia Zhen, *CT* 09/03/01; Sandy Yeh, *TT* 11/03/01, 8) therefore suggested that the MOI's move was a legitimate exercise of Taiwan's national sovereignty, if the ban on Kobayashi's entry was a decision made by government agencies through a legal procedure. They argued that, whether or not Kobayashi really loves Taiwan as he claims, his status as a 'foreigner' to Taiwan is unquestionable. And the decision is made by the review committee, which consists of representatives from relevant government agencies, in light of the Immigration Law. Moreover, they contended that international norms have never required countries to issue visas to all foreigners, just as we do not

necessarily have to allow all visitors who ring the doorbell to come into our houses. The rationale behind this line of thought is that national interests or sovereignty should take priority over considerations of human rights/freedom of speech.

Another alternative approach (Xia Zhen, *CT* 09/03/01; Editorial, *TT* 09/03/01, 12; Wang Jian-Xuan, Liu Guang-Hua, *CT* 11/03/01) took the ideas of ‘ethics of speech’ or ‘position of speech actor’ into account when reviewing the controversy. It suggested that ‘ethics of speech’ and ‘positions of the speech actor’ do matter when considering freedom of speech. One is not free to say just anything; one cannot simply speak of any thing, when one likes or where one likes. In respect of Xu’s remarks on comfort women, some commentators argue that it is simply not morally right to make such comments on the basis of his personal experiences. Even though Xu enjoys freedom of speech, it does not mean that he can legitimately say anything that might cause others harm. Likewise, the case of national advisor Jin’s open denial of the legitimacy of the ROC – saying she does not recognise it – can also be viewed through the prism of this argument. For those commentators, free speech is not an issue here; what is at stake is the government’s political accountability towards its people. They urged that Jin must not forget that the ‘ROC on Taiwan’ has, through democratisation, become a government derived from the consent and free will of the people to whom it owes political accountability. How can the government be politically accountable when its members do not even concede the government’s legitimacy? They argued that if Jin had been an ordinary citizen, rather than a member of the government, she would have been free to make such a statement. But she was not. They therefore called on Jin to do the right thing – either retract her statement or resign as presidential advisor.

‘Human Rights’ as an Identity

Those concerns that lay stress on ‘ethics of speech’ or ‘position of speech actor’ are particularly worthy of consideration when reflecting on the whole event, though they are not the focus of this chapter. This final section instead argues that the turmoil over *On Taiwan* at this stage shows us the significant role played by ‘human rights’ in the formation of Taiwanese national identity. ‘Human rights’ in Taiwan is in fact a function of identity, serving as a mechanism to differentiate Taiwan from China.

It is noted that national identity in Taiwan has always been defined in terms of its relationship with ‘mainland China’. As Shih Chih-Yu (2000) argues, for decades, anti-

communism ideology played the role of laying a foundation of distinctive (Chinese) national identity in Taiwan to differentiate it from Communist China. The KMT propaganda before the 1980s concentrated on the question not 'why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was evil, but how it was evil', for instance, highlighting its suppression of the freedom of the Chinese people under the CCP totalitarian regime, elimination of the Chinese cultural tradition during the Cultural Revolution, etc. (Shih 2000, 230). Internationally, the Cold War system helped to legitimise the KMT's practices of human rights abuses, since, whenever violations of human rights met overseas criticism, the KMT appealed to anti-communist ideology. Domestically, the KMT's struggles to maintain its goal of recovering the mainland gave people in Taiwan a clear objective and a distinctive sense of self-identification. As a result, human rights issues seemed trivial for Taiwan at that stage of maintaining its distinctive national identity and were of course not germane to political legitimacy before 1980s.

Nevertheless, according to Shih (*ibid.*, 231-2), several developments challenged this anti-Communist identity to which the KMT had long subscribed. Firstly, as most countries in the world began to recognise the PRC as the sole representative of China in the 1970s, not only did the KMT's claim to recover the mainland China become increasingly untenable but Taiwan (ROC) also lost its orthodox status representing China in world politics. Secondly, when the Cultural Revolution ended at the end of the 1970s, the CCP opened its market to the world and initiated economic reform. In a definite, albeit limited sense, China became capitalist. Thirdly, the ideologically-based confrontation of the Cold War ceased at the end of the 1980s, and Taiwan's anti-communist ideology came to be meaningless. Those developments as a result made anti-communism in Taiwan a trivial matter. Anti-communism lost its function economically, internationally, politically and culturally, to maintain an identity distinctive from China. The task to maintain a distinctive national identity for the Taipei regime then became extremely difficult. According to Shih, Taiwan's official position on human rights issues consequently transformed. In order to redefine Taiwan's national identity *vis-à-vis* China, the KMT under the presidency of Lee Teng-Hui began to use the concept of 'democracy' or 'human rights' not only to struggle against his political rivals domestically – Mainlander politicians of the KMT – but, more importantly, to further differentiate Taiwan from China 'internationally'. The Taipei regime now looked for signs of anti-democratic/human rights incidents in mainland China in order to firmly establish the

differences between China and Taiwan. 'Human rights' under this circumstance came to be seen as an identity, and play a significant role in the discourse of Taiwanese nationalism. Moreover, for the DPP regime after it came to power in 2000, human rights issues also served as a differentiation of 'New Taiwan' under the DPP's administration from 'Old Taiwan' under the KMT's rule.

To summarise this section, the debate over *On Taiwan* at this phase demonstrates how human rights issues help to constitute a distinctive Taiwanese identity. As this section has shown, those remarks made by either politicians or commentators who appeal to freedom of speech or human rights are more concerned with Taiwan's differentiations with China. And in reaction pro-unification politicians or commentators use nationalist terms, such as 'national dignity' or 'sovereignty'. Human rights concerns, borrowing Shih's words, became 'a showcase of the new identity' (ibid., 243). They serve to draw a boundary between insider and outsider. Under this circumstance, the real issues of human rights then were being neglected. This explains why, as some Taiwanese political commentators had already questioned, while the president and vice president of Taiwan had spoken on Kobayashi's behalf several times in the name of free speech, the DPP government still filed a slander suit against some members of the Taiwanese media. Also, they questioned why, while the government proclaimed the importance of protecting Kobayashi's human rights, they spoke very little of their concerns about the rights of former comfort women, e.g. of assisting them to demand compensation from the Japanese government (e.g. Wang, *TT* 28/03/01, 8). In short, the discussion of Kobayashi's freedom of speech does not reflect a convergence toward universal standards such as human rights but is better viewed as a reflection of identity politics in Taiwan.

4-4. Conclusion

By way of conclusion, to summarise the episode of the turmoil over *On Taiwan*, when the manga was for the first time published in Japan, it drew public attention to the legacies of Japanese colonialism. Subsequently, after its Chinese version was issued in Taiwan, the controversy turned to the subject of comfort women, as women's rights groups refuted Kobayashi's remarks saying that Taiwanese comfort women had volunteered to become sex slaves. As the uproar continued with the decision of the Taiwanese government to bar

Kobayashi from entering the country, the situation reversed dramatically. People started to attack the government's decision from a so-called universal standpoint, appealing, for example, to human rights or freedom of speech. It is noted that even though the debate over *On Taiwan* revolves around Japanese colonialism, the history of comfort women and the issue of freedom of speech, the nature of the debate concerns ethnic (Native Taiwanese *vis-à-vis* the Mainlander), ideological (pro-independence *vis-à-vis* pro-unification), and above all, identity (Taiwanese *vis-à-vis* Chinese) conflicts. People make arguments either for or against Kobayashi by virtue of their own sense of identity.

After a fierce three-month-long discussion over the manga, the uproar seems to have gradually receded from people's thoughts in Taiwan.¹¹⁵ On 23 March 2001, the Ministry of the Interior lifted the ban on Kobayashi from entering Taiwan. Yet, the turmoil, as a social practice, has in fact been profoundly inscribed in the mentality of many people in Taiwan concerning their self-identification and the country's relations with 'Japan'. As this chapter has argued, through the publication of a manga, Taiwan's past Japanese colonial experience had been discursively constituted in a certain way, with the exclusion of alternative voices. The historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation has emerged again as an ongoing structuring force in the creation of a certain form of identity among the population in contemporary Taiwanese society. The event became a discursive realm of a political battle, in which different discourses interact, intersect and compete with each other. Whereas this chapter focused on the Japanese colonisation, the next chapter will cast its gaze at the KMT's authoritarian rule, examining how the 2-28 incident, a historically concluded traumatic event, 'emerged' again in contemporary Taiwanese society.

¹¹⁵ *On Taiwan* is a bestseller in Taiwan. It has sold more than 130,000 copies – a record-breaking number since the publisher – Avant Garde – was launched in 1982. The profits gained from this manga were reported to have helped the publisher pay off a big portion of his debts.

CHAPTER 5

Essay on Traumatic Memory, Commemoration & Subjectivity Formation

The 2004 Hand-in-Hand Rally

5-1. Introduction

The Great Wall of China

The Great Wall of China has been completed at its most northerly point. From the south-east and the south-west it came up in two sections that were united here. This system of piecemeal construction was also followed within each of the two great armies of labour, the eastern army and the western army. It was done by forming gangs of about a score of labourers, whose task it was to erect a section of wall about five hundred yards long, while the adjoining gang built a stretch of similar length to meet it. But after the junction had been effected the work was not then continued, as one might have expected, where the thousand yards ended; instead the labour-gangs were sent off to continue their work on the wall in some quite different region. (Kafka 1973, 1992, 1)

The paragraph above, describing the peculiar way of building the Great Wall through a system of piecemeal construction, is from Franz Kafka's fictional short story, 'The Great Wall of China'. The authorities, Kafka writes, deliberately chose this way of building. Having completed five hundred metres of the Wall, the workers were exhausted and demotivated. Hence they were dispatched to a farther location of the empire where they could meet new subjects, feeling that through their work they were achieving something of significance, which demanded their personal sacrifice. This atmosphere tuned the strings of their souls and calmed their impatience. They were reinvigorated. In addition, when the workers were sent up and down the Wall they saw how great, rich and beautiful their country was. Their work became meaningful. As Kafka writes:

Each fellow-countryman was a brother, for whom one was building a protecting wall, and who returned his thanks for that throughout his life with all that he had and all that he was; Unity! Unity!, shoulder to shoulder, a great circle of our people, our blood no longer confined in the narrow round of the body, but sweetly rolling yet ever returning through the endless leagues of China. (ibid. 5)

They then left their homes and families to continue working on the Wall to protect their compatriots.

However, the major problem with this method of construction was that the Wall comprised a combination of built-up sections and empty space. Most of these openings were closed gradually and slowly and some did not at all. The Wall, as generally believed, was meant to ward off the invasion of barbarian nomads from the North. One problem was that only a continuous construction can offer such a protection. But the Wall, Kafka argues, would not have provided a sound defence even if it had been fully continuous because it could easily be destroyed in its remote areas. The structure was in constant danger. But why was the Wall built then? For Kafka, this is the central issue and the answer he gives is that it was designed to bring people within the boundaries of the empire together, through a large-scale effort of collective labour. The wall was supposed to provide the people with a sense of unity or a common purpose. While human nature is fragmented, Kafka suggests, collective labour, such as erecting a de facto useless Great Wall, was the best way for Chinese rulers to unify the people within a political community, and to maintain the existence of the Chinese empire itself. Indeed, the authorities chose a piecemeal construction because a continuous build-up was unnecessary for their practical purpose.

For Kafka, moreover, the Great Wall reveals the nature of the empire. The decision to construct such a wall had been taken at some undefined time and by an undetermined authority – it was not ‘the admirable innocent emperor’ who gave orders to begin construction. This ambiguity surrounding the origins of the Wall reflects the nature of the empire itself. For Kafka, the empire is ‘immortal’ and ‘ceaseless’, while emperors and even dynasties cannot escape death. There is, then, a higher authority that exists above and beyond emperors and dynasties, its power operating ceaselessly within the boundaries of the empire. In effect, Kafka refers to the contemporary notion of sovereignty. Kafka goes on to argue that the empire itself was also an ambiguous institution whose presence was not immediately felt by the subjects. However, this ambiguity helped it to preserve its power even in the most remote areas. On the other hand, though, it also prevented the empire from acquiring direct symbolic sway over the subjects. The Wall construction was meant to serve this goal, by serving as a physical reminder of the existence of an ambiguous but also immortal empire. The Great Wall is thus a physical symbol of the presence of sovereignty –

and indeed of the Chinese Empire.

Kafka's story poses fascinating questions about the relationship between physical action such as mass labour and symbolic order, expressed in great architectural projects, and how the two contribute to the institution and reproduction of political community. Kafka's narrative about Ancient China can be extended to the present world of sovereign/nation states. Notwithstanding that as a physical artefact there is only one Great Wall, there are numerous constructs or symbolic 'Great Walls'. One such example is to be found in the politics of contemporary Taiwan, where citizens were mobilised into a 'Great Wall of Democracy'—an edifice whose materials were not stone or bricks but living human beings.

A Commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in 2004: 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally

On 28 February 2004, three weeks before the contested presidential election, an estimated two million people formed a human chain of 486 kilometres, running from the island's northernmost point to its southernmost cape. The event, dubbed the '228 Hand-in-Hand Rally', was the biggest mass demonstration ever held in Taiwan. The people, mobilised or spontaneous participants, joined the rally where strangers held hands with other strangers. The incumbent Taiwanese president Chen Shui-Bian urged protesters to oppose China's military threats and create the 'Great Wall of Taiwan's Democracy'. The event was meant to convey a festive atmosphere of national unity. It was timed to coincide with the 57th anniversary of the 2-28 Incident of 1947.

This incident took place on 28 February 1947, when Taiwan had just returned to the ROC after the defeat of the Japanese Empire in the Second World War.¹¹⁶ The incident was triggered after a native Taiwanese woman was arrested in a Taipei City street for selling contraband cigarettes. The KMT's police shot at a crowd who were attempting to protect the woman. The story spread quickly and overnight the whole island was boiling with rage. Angry native Taiwanese stormed police stations and government agencies, seeking out and beating up the Mainlanders. A few organised military revolts occurred across Taiwan. In response, the KMT governor of Taiwan asked Chiang Kai-shek in Nanjing to send troops to Taiwan. When the troops arrived in Keelung (a port in Northern Taiwan) in early March, they entered Taipei and then headed south, quelling riots across the island. During this

¹¹⁶ For the most comprehensive scholarly studies on the Incident in English, please see Lai Tse-Han et al. (1991), and George Kerr (1965)

period, individuals who had participated in the riots were arrested or killed. Privately owned newspapers and magazines were shut down. The crush of rebellious activity was followed by a ‘Qing-xiang’ (literally ‘to clean up hometowns’) campaign. People were forced to hand over weapons, and many were jailed and executed without due legal process, accused of ‘conspiring with Chinese communists’.¹¹⁷

A great number of Taiwanese died during the incident, though there is no accurate count of the total number of those killed or injured. The most frequently mentioned figure ranges between 10,000 and 20,000. Although the incident was officially declared to be over on 15 May 1947, it seems to have lasted longer. The brutal suppression not only enabled the KMT regime to establish an authoritarian rule of unchallenged power based on martial law (lasting until the late 1980s) but it also produced a collectively traumatic memory for many Taiwanese. It has often been pointed out that the incident has had implications for Taiwan beyond the tragic break-up of families and the huge death toll. Aside from being a traumatic memory for those who directly experienced the catastrophic event and their descendants, it has had a psychological impact on the Taiwanese people as a whole.¹¹⁸ Indeed, the 2-28 Incident can be seen as a collectively traumatic memory for many Taiwanese even today.

Research Question, Methodology & Outline of the Chapter

This chapter aims to explore how, in the context of an election campaign, the commemoration of the 2-28 Incident in 2004 – the ‘228 Hand-in-Hand Rally’ - produced a specific collective memory of a traumatic historical event. The key questions addressed in the chapter are: What has been remembered and forgotten, or remembered but forgotten again during this process of commemoration? And, how has this commemoration – a set of

¹¹⁷ The generally accepted causes of the incident are not only the cultural and political alienation of the native Taiwanese people from their ‘motherland’ after 50 years of Japanese colonial rule, but the extreme dissatisfaction with the corrupt KMT regime, which was subjecting people in Taiwan to even more difficult political, social and economic conditions than they had experienced under pre-war Japanese colonial rule.

¹¹⁸ For instance, the pro-independence writer Li Qiao (1998) suggests that certain patterns of behaviour that the Taiwanese have had, i.e. a tendency not to become involved in political affairs, mark the traumatic affects and effects of the incident on the collective psyche of the Taiwanese. Another well-known psycho-impact of the event on the Taiwanese, elaborated by psychiatrist Lin Yi-Fu (2004), is the so-called ‘Stockholm syndrome’, which refers to an ironic situation that the victims of a traumatic event sympathise with the perpetrator. This explains why the native Taiwanese as victims/masochists who suffered greatly from the KMT’s massacre during the 228 Incident have been supporting its perpetrator/sadist – the authoritarian KMT regime/party.

recollections and oblivions constituting a social practice – discursively constituted people’s self-identification as Taiwanese? What characterises this national self-identification? The chapter’s goal is to contribute to an increased understanding of the particular ways in which subjectivity is constituted in contemporary Taiwanese society.

Methodologically, the following pages seek to provide a ‘thick description’ of the 2004 demonstration. Thick description as employed here refers to a methodology that sets an event, the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally, within its historical and political context, and by examining a multitude of significant details comprising it as a meaningful event. The term thick description was first used by philosopher Gilbert Ryle and later elaborated by anthropologist Clifford Geertz. It reflects the assumption that human behaviour cannot just be explained via abstract analysis but that it demands researchers to consider its social context.¹¹⁹ By doing so, the behaviour becomes meaningful action that an outsider (i.e. the anthropologist) can understand. David Cannadine, for example, employs this approach in his studies of the British Monarchy. He argues that political rituals ‘cannot be interpreted merely in terms of their internal structure’ (Cannadine 1983, 105). In order to discover the meaning of ritual, ‘it is necessary to relate it to the specific social, political, economic and cultural milieu within which it was actually performed’ (ibid., 105). Analogously, Cannadine writes that locating an event in a context is ‘not merely to provide the historical background, but actually to begin the process of interpretation’ (ibid., 105). More radically, one can argue that locating an event within different contexts would lead to a variety of differing interpretations of the event.¹²⁰ Contextualising an event becomes *political*.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Geertz uses Gilbert Ryle’s discussion of a ‘wink of an eye’ as an example to clarify this point. As Geertz illustrates, when boys rapidly contract the eyelids, it might mean ‘an involuntary twitch’, ‘a conspiratorial signal to a friend’, a ‘malicious amusement to his cronies’, or anything else (Geertz 1973, 7). Therefore, Geertz points out that without a context we do not know what people’s behaviour means to us. And as the context changes, the meaning of the behaviour also changes. In discussing the role of the ethnographer, Geertz claims that the ethnographer’s aim is to observe, record, analyse, and interpret a culture. More specifically, he or she must interpret human behaviour to understand its meaning within the culture itself. Only through this ‘thick description’ one can see all the possible meanings of human behaviour, thereby, Geertz hopes, opening and/or increasing the dialogue among different cultures.

¹²⁰ Similar kinds of arguments are made in some empirical studies concerning the case of 2-28 Incident in Taiwan. Some studies devoted themselves to an investigation of the changing meaning of the 2-28 Incident in different historical contexts/periods: for instance, Robert Edmondson (2002); Steve Phillip (2006); Stefen Fleischauer (2006).

¹²¹ In contrast to the conventional use of the term ‘politics’, which refers to ‘politics’ taking place in

Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that our understanding of an event is also shaped by the political, historical or cultural context in which we are situated when we recall that event. Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945), a French Durkheimian sociologist, while studying human memory, provided an instructive theoretical insight that highlights how social contexts – or ‘social frameworks’, as Halbwachs terms them – construct the memory of the individual. In his ‘Social Frameworks of Memory’ (1992a), Halbwachs first dismisses the idea that the past is in itself preserved within individual memories. Rather, every individual memory is always socially constructed as a product of collective and social frameworks. According to Halbwachs, people appeal to their memories only when they try to answer questions which are asked, or which are supposed to be asked, by others. People place themselves in others’ perception and consider themselves as being part of the same group or groups as the others. Thus, Halbwachs asserts: ‘There exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory’ (1992a, 38). Memories require ‘the support of society’ – or a social contact with other people. ‘In order to remember, one must be capable of reasoning and comparing and of feeling in contact with a human society that can guarantee the integrity of our memory’ (ibid., 41). In other words, memories depend on those of our fellows, and on the wider social background of memory production. As Halbwachs expresses it, ‘it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognise, and localise their memory’ (ibid., 38). Thus, a social framework is the instrument for (re)constructing an individual’s memories.

Moreover, any and every individual is located in numerous and various groups – social frameworks. Halbwachs does not suggest that it is groups which remember; it is of course individuals who remember. Yet, these individuals, being located in a specific group, draw on the collective context in remembering or recreating the past. Accordingly, there are as many

parliaments, political parties and governments, the *political*, from a post-structuralist point of view, and as elaborated by Laclau (1990), signifies a ‘power to definition’. For Laclau, society as is discursively constituted is an unstable system of differences. Meanings of words/things in general are never closed and finalised; instead, they are open, unstable, and contingent, always in a process of being articulated in one form or another and always negotiable. The *political* turns out to be possible, unavoidable, and necessary in this process. Any choice of definition involves the issue of power insofar as it requires the repression of alternatives, with the consequence that these alternatives then become more difficult to emerge. There is politics wherever there is repression. However, the possibility of resistance also emerges in the domain of the *political*, since it involves opening up the possibilities that are repressed in the constitution of any taken-for-granted way of thinking (Laclau 1990, 31-6).

collective memories as there are groups, institutions, or communities in a society. Different families, ethnic groups, social classes construct different memories. Such recollections are richer when they reappear at the junction of a greater number of those frameworks. In effect, different social frameworks compete, interact and intersect each other, overlapping in part. More importantly, frameworks of memory are not static but fluid or in the process of transformation. They exist both *within* and *outside* the passage of time.¹²² Forgetting is then explained by the disappearance of those frameworks or of part of them, or the transformation of those frameworks from one period to another (ibid., 172-3).

Furthermore, for Halbwachs memories of the past are affected by the mental images an individual employs to solve present problems. In effect, memories are reconstructions of the past in the light of beliefs, interests, and aspirations of the present. In his 'The Legendary Topography of the Gospels in the Holy Land' (1992b), Halbwachs elaborates this presentist approach in greater detail. Through his studies of the modification of the story of Jesus, of the conversion of the meaning of the Gospel and of the changing images of Jerusalem in the course of history, Halbwachs asserted that collective memory (of Christianity) is always 'selectively' 'reconstructed' in accordance with a social group's 'present needs', thereby distorting the original features of the past. He writes:

...in each period the collective Christian memory adapts its recollections of the details of Christ's life and of the places where they occurred to the contemporary exigencies of Christianity, to its needs and aspirations. (1992b, 234)

These 'present needs' are determined by the 'predominant thoughts of society', produced and disseminated by various dominant groups and hegemonic discursive powers. As a result, social frameworks accord with the predominant mode of thinking and acting in society. There is no continuity between the past and the present: the past is always silent, totally open to presentist appropriation and manipulation. Once the 'present needs' have changed, the 'collective memory' of a group will be transformed accordingly. In other words, the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present. And social thought is essentially 'a memory and...its entire content consists only of collective recollections or

¹²² As Halbwachs elaborates, 'External to the passage of time, they communicate to the images and concrete recollections of which they are made a bit of their stability and generality. But these frameworks are in part captivated by the course of time' (1992a, 182).

remembrances' (ibid., 189). It follows that only those recollections which are in accordance with present needs can be re/constructed.

Halbwachs' argument about the social construction of collective memories in the light of present needs offers insight into the various forms of remembering the past. Drawing on Halbwachs' legacy, this chapter will explore how the coupling of the 2-28 commemoration with the presidential election was motivated by electoral strategy and how political calculations – the concerns of present needs – got involved in the process of commemorating the 2-28 incident. The chapter argues that the beliefs, interests, and aspirations that entered into political calculations during the 2004 Taiwanese election campaign shaped the views of the past as they are manifested and conditioned by the political possibility for the remembrance of the 2-28 Incident. Hence, the memory of 2-28 Incident must be regarded as a constructed process as opposed to a retrieved process.

The contextualisation in this regard functions in two ways: on the one hand, it serves, methodologically, as a tool to begin a *political* interpretation of the event; on the other hand, as a social framework, it produces and shapes the very features of the demonstration and the memory of the incident.

In addition, this chapter also asks: what is the role of sovereign power in remembering, or shaping through memories of the past, the 228 Incident as a *traumatic* event? It suggests that the memory of the 2-28 Incident is in effect selectively constituted in favour of sovereign power. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally as a mass mobilisation was designed to remember the incident as a historical trauma in order to be forgotten, thereby constituting people's self-identification as Taiwanese. In addressing these issues, my discussion builds upon Jenny Edkins's writings on trauma and memory.

In her book, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics* (2003), Edkins brings the role of sovereign power into the studies of traumatic memories. She investigates how the memorialisation of traumatic events often constitutes a form of forgetting. Since memories of traumatic events ruin the legitimacy of sovereign power and threaten the existence of contemporary forms of political community – state/sovereign state, in the end they must be forgotten. According to Edkins, modern sovereign nation-states have an ironic and intricate connection with traumatic events. As she asserts, 'sovereign power produces and is itself produced by trauma'

(2003, xv). To understand what Edkins means by this claim, it is pertinent to elaborate on her notion of ‘trauma’.

Trauma, Edkins suggests, has three dimensions. Firstly, events that we categorise today as trauma generally involve violence – that is, a threat to people’s lives and integrity. Secondly, trauma refers to those situations in which a threat of violence comes from the ones who are supposed to protect the victims, give them security, and act as their trustees – such as the political community towards its citizens or the family towards its children. The trauma occurs when the ones who are meant to offer protection are ‘no longer a source of refuge but a site of danger’ (ibid., 4). Thirdly, and in a more profound sense, the notion also refers to the sudden change of a social order that previously gave ‘meaning’ and ‘dignity’ to our existence in relation to the outside world, but which no longer provides this. Trauma, thus, is a menace to one’s own self-identification. Human beings, for example, participate in a group, a political community, as members; they situate themselves as citizens of this political community, acquiring an identity through it. ‘The traumatic’ takes place when this community betrays them. They are not and cannot be who they used to be. Above all, a traumatic event has to involve ‘a betrayal of trust’; it is a suspension of ‘safety’ and ‘security’ (ibid., 3-4). The aforementioned three dimensions of ‘trauma’ all indicate that the state as sovereign power is the key, if not the only, source of human suffering. While states are on the one hand ‘a promise of safety, security and meaning’, they are also sources of ‘abuse, control and coercion’ (ibid., 6). People need states to fulfil their sense of security and belonging. But states can also murder their own citizens, as in the case of the concentration camps in Nazi Germany, and send their citizens to the battlefields in the cases of the World Wars and Vietnam.

Moreover, sovereign power does not only produce but, more importantly, is and has to be produced and reproduced through the traumatic. It is first of all importantly noted that Edkins differentiates *linear* time from *trauma* time. While the latter refers to ineffable experiences of horror, repeatedly re-experienced by the victims, which are often incoherent, fragmented, and purposeless, the first, favoured by the sovereign power, gives/produces a meaning to the suffering of the victims as part of its own ‘continuous’ and ‘grand’ narrative. As Edkins argues, the sovereign power encapsulates those incoherent, fragmented, and purposeless traumatic memories in a ‘coherent’, ‘integrated’ and ‘meaningful’ narrative. The

modern state remembers its lost lives in the traumatic events as accounts of heroism, sacrifice and redemption, in order to tell the story of the founding of the state, a linear narrative of glorious origin - thereby reinforcing the legitimacy of the state itself and preserving its power. The cases of the Holocaust and the birth of the State of Israel clearly demonstrate this. In this vein, the sovereign power not only writes its history as a linear narrative, it also justifies itself through this linear narrative; in effect, it exists and survives in a linear notion of time frame. Therefore, the forms of statehood, Edkins contends, 'are themselves produced and reproduced through practices of trauma and memory' (ibid, 11). Yet, as mentioned earlier, trauma is generated by the sovereign power. As a result, the sovereign power must reveal the trauma it produces, but also conceal it.¹²³ In this way, intense remembering often turns to intentional forgetting.¹²⁴

To summarise, this chapter aims to investigate how and in which forms a collective memory of trauma in Taiwan is produced in the commemoration of 2-28 Incident in 2004 in the context of the election campaign, and how this traumatic memory production – remembering and forgetting – leads to the formation of Taiwanese national identity in the process of nation-building in Taiwan. To this end, two aspects of the event will be stressed:

¹²³ While the memorialisation process is a search for meaning and the state has a propensity to use this process as a method for *establishing* meaning, Edkins accordingly pays great attention to different forms of memorialisation through her studies on the Great Wars, Vietnam War, the Holocaust, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and September 11. Her study demonstrates that various practices of memorialisation, conducted by the sovereign power, aim to insert meaning into traumatic events by providing a specific narrative of the past in the light of a linear notion of time. Many of these practices seek to contain and appropriate traumatic experience for the purposes of reproducing sovereign power. Sovereign power intends to both expose and conceal the trauma that it produces, so as to legitimise itself. Edkins therefore questions the role of commemorations, arguing that they simply reinforce sovereign power – the nation-states. Yet, for Edkins, resistance is always possible. The book in short is an exposition of the competence (domination) and incompetence (resistance) of the sovereign state's efforts to fix the collective memories of traumatic events. She clearly exhibits deep scepticism towards the role of sovereign power in memorializing the traumatic events of human beings. Her works on the memories of trauma should themselves be perceived as resistance to the power of the sovereign state.

¹²⁴ Similar to Edkins' argument, Chen Hsiang-Chun (2005) investigates in her thesis the collective forgetting of the traumatic. In her empirical work, she asks why people in Taiwan so easily remember to forget the 2-28 Incident. She examines the commemorative art exhibitions in Taiwan since the 1990s, and in particular an exhibition in 1997 – '*Sadness Transformed: 2-28 Commemorative Art Exhibition*', and the materials related to these exhibitions, such as some artists' aesthetic works, curatorial statements, category essays, and so on. Chen argues that this way of commemoration – a collective oblivion – cannot resolve the long-term affects and effects of the historical trauma. As she suggests, only through witnessing to and listening to the wound can this collective sadness in Taiwan be transformed.

the political context of the mass-rally and the precise manner of the performance. The former refers to the political competition during the election campaign in 2004 against the background of identity politics in Taiwan since the 1990s, while the latter deals with the actual performance in the campaign, including a series of press conferences and rehearsals in the run-up to the demonstration, the itinerary of the demonstration on 28 February 2004, the location of the assemblage, the design of the geographical route of the human chain, the decoration of the venue, the activities of the campaign and the list of the invitees.¹²⁵

This chapter firstly contextualises the demonstration. The analysis of the political calculations of the organisers in the 2004 presidential election campaign, and, more broadly, the political environment of identity politics since the 1990s is briefly discussed here. Next, it portrays the actual performance of the demonstration, including a series of activities in the run-up to the demonstration and the precise performance of the ‘human chain’ on 28 February 2004. The chapter’s final section examines the role of sovereign power in commemorating the traumatic event in the case of Taiwan.

5-2. Contextualising the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally

5-2-1. Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential Election

On 20 March, 2004, the DPP incumbent president Chen Shui-Bian, along with his running mate Lu Xiu-Lian (also known as Annette Lu), was reelected president of Taiwan by a slim margin (29,518 out of 13 million votes cast), defeating their opponent, the Pan-Blue

¹²⁵ This method of meticulous description was employed in Bernard S. Cohn’s ‘Representing Authority in Victorian India’ (1983). In this article, Cohn explores how the British governor established his authority over India after the uprising of 1857, by adopting and revising a series of ceremonies of the Mughal Empire. In particular, Cohn focuses on the Imperial Assemblage in 1877. He contends that the assemblage, as a symbolic ritual or ceremonial performance, constructed the British colonial authority in India. Cohn provides a meticulous description of the assemblage, including the intention of the planners of the imperial assemblage, the list of the invitees and their dresses, the location of the assemblage, the physical planning of the camps, the design and decoration of the amphitheatre, and so on. Cohn concluded that although many people treated it as ‘a kind of folly, a great *tamasha*, or show’ (Cohn 1983, 207), the assemblage, to a great degree, successfully constructed British authority over India, and through its representations of British and Indian culture, among the British itself and the Indians. Through his meticulous description, Cohn’s study demonstrates how a political ritual or ceremonial performance facilitates the colonizer to govern its colonized, and helps to construct people’s self-identification, for both the colonizer and the colonized.

coalition, composed of the KMT's Lian Zhan as presidential candidate and the PFP's Song Chu-Yu (also known as James Soong)¹²⁶ as vice presidential candidate.

The result of the election surprised many political observers. Most analysts, along with the opinion polls conducted prior to the election, had predicted the triumph of Pan-Blue. Such a prediction was based on two assumptions. Firstly, in the 2000 presidential election, the DPP-nominated Chen was elected by capturing only 39 percent of the popular vote, compared with the KMT's Lian's 23 percent and the KMT-abandoned independent candidate Soong's 37 percent of the total vote. For many, the KMT's split allowed Chen to win the election without capturing a majority vote. However, in 2004, the two losers of the previous round cooperated in placing a common bid for the presidential election campaign, with Lian as presidential and Soong as vice-presidential candidate in a grand Pan-Blue alliance of three political parties: the KMT, the New Party and the PFP. This coalition teamed up against a Pan-Green coalition formed by the DPP and the TSU. Under this new political umbrella, a joint ticket consisting of Lian and Soong was forged, whose combined vote tallies in 2000 would have garnered 60 percent of the votes cast had they run together (Bedford et al. 2006, 29). Secondly, analysts also felt that the economic and government organisational problems experienced during Chen's first term (2000-2004) – a weak economy, increased cross-Strait tension, assorted administrative and political missteps, and corruption – would possibly serve to diminish public support for Chen.

Despite these obstacles, Chen was able to win his bid for reelection in March 2004. It is, of course, hard to gauge what factors determined the results of the actual vote. Most political analysts attributed this unanticipated result to a number of events: Taiwan's first-ever nationwide referendum, large political demonstrations, and a shooting incident that injured the incumbent candidates (Mattlin 2004; Chu 2005; Bedford et al. 2006).¹²⁷ Yet, behind the

¹²⁶ James Soong, who had left the KMT because of its failure to nominate him as the party's presidential candidate, reached the second place in the presidential election; and soon after formed his own political party, the PFP.

¹²⁷ One day prior to the election, Chen and vice-president Lu were shot and slightly wounded while riding in a motorcade through the large south-western port city of Tainan. The injuries were not life threatening, and both Chen and Lu were released from hospital on the same day. Nevertheless, the attack provoked shock and unease among the population. Subsequently, all candidates agreed to cancel all campaign activities. Supporters of Pan-Blue doubted the authenticity of the attack. After the election, hundreds of thousands of furious Pan-Blue protesters ringed the Presidential Office to demand an immediate recount and an independent investigation into the shooting. The Pan-Blue also

scene of those decisive events, one should not neglect Chen's well-designed campaign strategy – controlling the political agenda by focusing on appropriating the so-called Taiwanese identity (or Taiwanese consciousness).

Identity politics has been played out in Taiwan since the late 1990s. Identity conflict/cleavage between the Taiwanese and the Chinese has been one of the most notable developments in Taiwan's politics since the 1990s. While some residents identify themselves as Taiwanese, others consider themselves to be Chinese. Related to this polarisation over the question of national identity are unsettled questions about Taiwan's sovereign status within the international system – whether the island constitutes a *de jure* independence under the name of Republic of Taiwan, a *de facto* independence under the name of Republic of China (the home of the legitimate albeit exiled government of all China). The most acknowledged manifestation of this identity/ideological conflict is the battling between two political coalitions throughout the years – the Pan-Green and the Pan-Blue. Pan-Green voters tend to call for a Taiwanese national identity distinct from the Chinese, and push for formal independence if possible. In contrast, supporters of the Pan-Blue incline to the view that Taiwanese are Chinese, opposing anything that seems like a move toward independence. Each side fears that the other seeks power in order to impose its own political agenda and make irreversible changes in the way in which national identity is construed. Identity politics is a hugely divisive issue in Taiwan.

Above all, these confrontations all gave the 2004 presidential election an unfortunate bent. As a political scientist describes,

Die-hard supporters of either camp saw the contest as the final showdown. The DPP desperately needed a convincing victory to consolidate its shaky hold on power. Leaders of the KMT feared that their party's cohesion would not survive another electoral debacle. Both thought that losing would mean being consigned to permanent minority status. In this sense, winning indeed was – or at least seemed to be – everything. (Chu 2005, 50-1)

Both sides mounted excessive mobilisation efforts that looked at times like the acting-out of a vast national neurosis. 'All of society became hyperpoliticised'. 'No corner of daily life seemed safe from outbreaks of partisan acrimony' during the campaign season. 'Emotions

filed a lawsuit to nullify the results. On 4 November, 2004, the High Court ruled against the Pan-Blue and in favour of upholding the election result.

rose to fever pitch while tempers frayed to the breaking point' (ibid. 51). In this political atmosphere, the nature of the election as a zero-sum national identity battle had been predetermined. Indeed, the 2004 presidential election cannot be understood without reference to the background of these identity politics.

The successful union of the Pan-Blue and the poor performance of Chen's first term placed Pan-Green under enormous pressure. As expected, Pan-Blue's election strategy was to focus on the question of the state of domestic economy. Facing severe challenges from the opposition parties, the most, if not the only, effective tactic Chen used was to 'play the identity card' – as a way of reversing his declining support prior to the election and of diverting voters' attention away from a sagging economy. The Pan-Green was obviously trying to define the 2004 election as a duel between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity, nourishing the island's burgeoning sense of separate identity and pro-independence sentiment. Chen, ostensibly, advocated the advance of democracy in Taiwan, which was interpreted as a move toward independence and the construction of Taiwanese national identity. Indeed, 'developing Taiwanese consciousness was the key to advancing the DPP agenda' (Bedford et al. 2006, 20)

In fact, it was not the first time that the 'identity card' was being played in Taiwan's election campaign. From early on, when the DPP was an opposition party, its leaders built up their electoral support by highlighting the shared sense of suffering and deprivation among the native Taiwanese, mainly Minnan-speaking people, the ethnic majority in Taiwan. Pan-Green politicians perceived that 'Taiwanese identity' in terms of ethnicity was the ultimate weapon with which to unite non-KMT supporters of different social and economic interests under this shared ethnicity, challenging the KMT's authoritarian rule (ibid., 85). Identity politics is therefore likely to play a role for some time to come. The ethnic conflict between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders seemed to characterise domestic politics in Taiwan throughout the 1990s.

Nevertheless, there was also a danger in over-emphasising the ethnicity of the native Taiwanese. After nearly five decades of social integration, mostly through intermarriages, work and school, most native Taiwanese have relatives, friends and neighbours who are Mainlanders, which makes it too costly and nearly impossible for the DPP to pursue the building of a Taiwanese state on an island that politically excludes Mainlanders. In addition,

there exists a sub-ethnic division between the Minnan-speaking and Hakka-speaking native Taiwanese. If the DPP overplays the ethnic tone, which has been essentially Minnan-centric, it is bound to lose favour among the Hakka-speaking native Taiwanese (Chu et al. 1998). As pointed out by Juan Linz (1985), in a heterogeneous society such as post-Franco Spain where people of various primordial backgrounds are mixed-living, building a nation-state solely on primordial ties is nearly impossible and always too costly. Therefore, most nationalists who promote separatism are eventually forced to put more emphasis on territoriality and to focus less on primordial characteristics. People's self-identification evolves accordingly from 'primordial' criteria such as language, culture to more 'objective' indicators, e.g. territoriality. However, it is noted that, as Linz reminds, nationalists would, to a certain degree, still persist with primordialism, because they find the absolute territorial definition would endanger their nationalism claims. It 'dilutes the distinctiveness of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, national identity' (1985, 250).

The case of Taiwan's 2004 presidential election bears out Linz's argument. In the 2004 presidential campaign, the Pan-Green, instead of playing up ethnic identity, laid stress on gaining a separate territorial identity for Taiwan, distinguished from that of the Chinese.¹²⁸ In order to nourish the island's burgeoning sense of separate consciousness, the Pan-Green decided to make the PRC/China an issue. President Chen began to raise his tone of criticism against the PRC, playing to his people's resentment of Taiwan's international isolation and China's military threat to Taiwan.¹²⁹ The rationale behind this campaign strategy is threefold.

Firstly, to highlight the significance of Taiwanese national identity and the need to seek independence for Taiwan would provoke China. Yet, increased hostility from China could be used to give rise to a sense of shared destiny among the people of Taiwan, consolidating anti-Chinese sentiment. Secondly, it would also provide the opportunity to label those against such efforts as willing to 'sell out Taiwan', and cast them as being the same as the Chinese communists. If China has ill intentions, then the Pan-Blue that adhered to Chinese

¹²⁸ Another reason for not highlighting native Taiwanese ethnicity was that the KMT president candidate Lian Zhan is a native Taiwanese as well.

¹²⁹ Interestingly, China this time pursued a relatively cautious, low-key approach towards the presidential election, especially in comparison with its heavy-handed rhetoric and threatening missile launches of 1995-96 – Taiwan's first presidential election – and Premier Zhu Rongji's stern warnings in the 2000 presidential election.

identity must be condemned for siding with Beijing. President Chen established his party as a 'Taiwan-first' party and branded the Pan-Blue as 'China-first'. Many Pan-Blue politicians feared that anti-Chinese sentiment originally directed at Beijing would be transferred to them by accusations that anyone opposing Chen (and the DPP) was the mouthpiece of Beijing in Taiwan (Bedford et al. 2006, 30). Thirdly, this campaign strategy capitalises on a long trend toward localisation/indigenisation and self-rule by native Taiwanese. As mentioned elsewhere, previously the central government under the KMT regime was almost dominated by Mainlanders. Combined with political liberalisation, however, the dominant trend in Taiwanese society in recent years, as Mikael Mattlin (2004) indicates, has been encapsulated in the expression 'Dangjia zuozhu' (which means, 'to be the master in one's own house'). He adds that 'the Pan-Green took a chance on this trend having already reached a critical mass, and hoped that people would feel an additional need to vote for Chen as an expression of their support for this political claim' (Mattlin 2004, 17). Not surprisingly, 'love Taiwan' was 'one of the key themes of the Chen campaign' (ibid. 17). While the election was viewed as an important battle for 'Dangjia zuozhu', the DPP victory was interpreted as proof that Taiwan had emerged from the shadow not only of the Mainlanders, but also of China. Thus, for many, Chen's victory is more than a construction of Taiwanese national identity; it is a consolidation of Taiwan's democracy. As a political scientist comments, 'The symbolic and emotionally charged cross-Strait issues always help the DPP to paint itself as the true *native* political force' (Chu 2005, 52). As a result, Taiwanese identity as a national one has been clearly highlighted during the election campaign, though this identity in many ways cannot be dissociated from ethnic origins.

With this strategy, the Pan-Green apparently succeeded in defining the election campaign with an issue that the competing side would find hard to counter. Any other alternative political issues or discussion were excluded and de-legitimised. For instance, the advice to put aside disputes over identity issues, suggested by some impartial intellectuals in terms of political affiliation, was disparaged as not in line with the dictum of localisation and as an attempt to denationalise the country and to jeopardise the democracy. And the suggestions that Taiwan should take advantage of China's immense market and cheap labour and speed up the 'three direct links', proposed by some economists and businessmen, were brushed aside as conspiracy to 'marginalise' Taiwan and support China's tactics to 'facilitate unification through economic means.' 'Identification with Taiwan' has become such a

precious commodity that politicians and political parties are competing against each other in order to prove their love of the people and the land. It is something to which the Pan-Blue has found difficult to respond to: it is forced to make concessions and accept policies that have compromised its traditional positions, and it never found a way to effectively counter the DPP accusation that it represented 'alien' interests and values. As a result, the Pan-Blue has been forced to be defensive in this political game of winning the hearts of the whimsical Taiwanese voters.

To summarise, the political goals of Chen's campaign strategy were to stress the threat from China, to rebuke the KMT by affiliating it with China, to show his dedicated efforts in accelerating the localisation movement, and above all, to nationalise 'Taiwan', asserting a separate sovereign status for Taiwan in the international community.

5-2-2. 20 March Referendum

One of Chen's most successful campaign instruments to achieve those goals was Taiwan's first-ever referendum, held on the same day as the presidential election. Two questions were posed in the referendum:

- (1) If China refuses to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan's self-defence capabilities?
- (2) Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiations with China about the establishment of a 'peace and stability' framework for cross-strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides? (*TT* 17/01/04, 1)

The two questions in the end both failed since they did not reach the legal quorum.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, the DPP spoke of a success. They claimed that it was for the first time that the people of Taiwan had the right to express their views through a referendum. In many ways, the result and the questions being asked were of secondary significance. Rather, what mattered most was that the introduction of the referendum opened the window of opportunity for Chen's reelection.

¹³⁰ The two questions only obtained, respectively, 45.15 percent and 45.10 percent of the votes (Mattlin 2004, 11). According to the Referendum Law, at least 50 percent of the entire electorate has to cast their ballots.

The referendum became an election issue in the latter half of 2003, when the Chen administration began pushing for the creation of a Referendum Bill. Referendum issues in Taiwan are highly sensitive. They are intimately associated with issues of independence, since it is claimed by most independence advocates as the best way to justify Taiwan's self-determination claims. Chen repeatedly said on several occasions during this period that a new constitution would be completed by 2006 and implemented by 2008,¹³¹ with its contents being decided by a referendum that was planned for 2004. Many Taiwanese nationalists enthusiastically welcomed this audacious plan. They had long been averse to the mainland-crafted constitution under the name of the 'Republic of China', reviling both the contents and the title as tokens of the last legal chain binding Taiwan to what they viewed as the fictitious notion that Taiwan is a part of China (Chu 2005, 52).

In November 2003, four months before the election, Chen signalled the DPP caucus in the Legislative Yuan to begin pushing hard for passage of the bill in order to carry out his plan to hold an island-wide referendum. Initially, the Pan-Blue was in strong opposition to the move. Yet, its politicians found it hard to oppose this political appeal, especially when the presidential election was approaching. Indeed, as some studies have argued (Mattlin 2004; Chu 2005; Bedford et al. 2006; Lampton et al. 2005), this campaign pledge not only helped Chen to reassert himself as the champion of the Taiwanese-nationalist cause but, more importantly, it also served:

to throw the Pan-Blues on the defensive and to tempt Beijing into sabre-rattling, thereby giving the Pan-Greens a pretext to discuss the 'non-native status' of Lien Chan [Lian Zhan] and James Soong, make insinuations about their alleged lack of loyalty to Taiwan, and perhaps brand them as soft on sovereignty or even as 'collaborators' with Beijing's malicious designs. (Chu 2005, 52-3)

Consequently, the Pan-Blue ended up having no option but to support the referendum legislation, in order to escape the label of 'anti-democratic' and 'collaborators with Chinese communists'. They proposed their own version of a referendum law. At the end of November, the Pan-Blue pushed through its version of the bill, defeating the Pan-Green's one. The adopted version did not contain the controversial clauses in the original proposal

¹³¹ Many Taiwanese nationalists such as the former president Lee believe that 2008 should be the deadline for declaring Taiwan formally independent. As they argue, after 2008, the Beijing regime would be too strong for U.S. containment efforts, and would no longer have its hands tied by worries about spoiling the Summer Olympic Games scheduled to be held in the mainland capital that year.

offered by the DPP, which would have enabled the government to initiate sensitive issues like independence to be decided via referendum; it only permitted referenda in cases relating to reconfirmation of a law, creation of a legislative principle, confirmation of a major policy, or reconfirmation of an amendment to the constitution (Lampton et al. 2005, 4).¹³²

In the beginning, the Pan-Blue believed it had successfully defeated the Pan-Green. Nevertheless, Chen found a loophole in this passed law that allowed him to carry out his proposed referendum. The bill gave the president the right to initiate a ‘defensive referendum’ on national security issues in the event of an imminent threat to sovereignty.¹³³ Three days after the bill was ratified, Chen claimed that the PRC’s build-up of ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan constitutes a national security threat, thereby allowing an island-wide ‘defensive referendum’, which was planned to be held on the day of the presidential election (Bedford et al. 2006, 44). The Pan-Blue, not surprisingly, was angered by this move, not believing that Chen’s proposal fit the criteria outlined in the law. It charged Chen with abusing the newly passed law by interpreting the ‘direct threat’ clause in the bill too broadly; Chen’s intention, the Pan-Blue argued, was to gain votes by mobilising his voters to go to the polls coinciding with the presidential election (Lampton et al. 2005, 4). Therefore, the Pan-Blue decided to boycott the referendum, discouraging its supporters from voting in it.¹³⁴

In retrospect, to many observers, the questions – whether Taiwan should buy more weapons if the PRC refuses to withdraw the missiles and whether Taiwan should negotiate with the PRC on the proposal of peace and stability – did not seem appropriate as referendum questions. Most people would hardly disagree with these statements. Therefore, as many studies show (Mattlin 2004, Chu 2005), the referendum cannot be well understood as an inquiry into voters’ opinions on a policy issue; it was rather a campaign tactic. Mattlin

¹³² For comparison of these two versions (DPP and Pan-Blue), please see Mily Kao (2003, 596); also, for a summary of the Referendum Law passed on 28 November, please also see Kao (2003, 601).

¹³³ In the ‘Referendum Bill’, the Article 17 states that ‘When the nation is threatened by an external force that could cause a change in the nation’s sovereignty, the president may, via a resolution of the Executive Yuan Council, refer a matter relating to national security to the citizens for a vote’ (Lampton et al. 2005, 4).

¹³⁴ Not only the Pan-Blue camp sharply opposed the idea of referendum, but international society also placed huge pressure on Taiwan through the US. Beijing and Washington were both alarmed at the referendum issue, fearing that the referendum was introducing a precedent for a future referendum that would be used to sanction some form of *de jure* independence.

argues that the referendum was used in a highly instrumental way. It drew ‘on tried and successful campaigning methods in Taiwan: mobilising mass rallies to create the impression of strength; demands by politicians that supporters visibly display loyalty/support; and the instrumental use of almost any means that is deemed beneficial to election success’ (Mattlin 2004, 1). And those campaigning techniques embodied in the referendum strategy can be understood as a form of ‘Zaoshi’ – a Chinese concept, which literally means ‘to create circumstances favourable to a desired outcome’ (ibid, 5).

One of the most effective campaign techniques to create circumstances that facilitate the candidate’s desired outcome is to organise mass rallies during the election campaign. As Mattlin indicated, mass rallies were originally linked to opposition movement demonstrations and later to DPP campaign activities. The opposition movement, due to its lack of resources in comparison to the KMT, used street protests to attract public support. Supporters were mobilised via massive and boisterous campaigns (ibid, 7-9). These types of campaign activities became widespread after they proved successful in the 1994 mayoral elections. Every political party, including the KMT, imitated these activities. Campaign activities, especially high-level elections, leaned heavily on mass rallies. As a result, the size of election rallies became larger and their number became more frequent. More election rallies were held and more people took part in such activities throughout each election. In the 2004 presidential election, the scope and nature of the election rallies were record-breaking.

In the run-up to the elections, the DPP and the TSU together organised a huge human chain on 28 February to commemorate the 2-28 Incident, in which two million people took part. With the intention of countering the success of the green camp, the Pan-Blue also planned to stage a rally on 13 March, attracting even more participants. The former event, which is known as the ‘228 Hand-in-Hand Rally’, played a decisive role in the 2004 presidential election.

5-2-3. The Formation of Hand-in-Hand Alliance

The 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally was organised by a nationwide private association supporting president Chen’s reelection, a joint alliance headed by the former president Lee¹³⁵,

¹³⁵ Although he retired after 12 years as president, Lee did not rest on his laurels. After leaving the KMT in 2000, Lee has played an active role in civic movements promoting the establishment of a Taiwan-centric identity and building ‘a complete nation of Taiwan’.

comprising most pro-independence groups, leading independence activists, and Pan-Green politicians. As mentioned earlier, there was an uncertain atmosphere in Taiwan the year before the 2004 presidential election, for the supporters of Pan-Green and Pan-Blue were almost equal in numbers. The Pan-Green thus needed to consider what they could do to get more supporters for Chen. These election considerations finally converged with another pro-independence movement – ‘Rectifying the Name (of Taiwan) Movement’, in which its members greatly overlapped with the association.

The entitled ‘Rectifying the Name Movement’ emerged on 2002 Mother’s Day (11 May) when thousands of protesters marched through the city of Taipei, shouting pro-Taiwan slogans, in a show of support for the campaign to change the official name of the country from ‘Republic of China’ to ‘Republic of Taiwan’. The organisers chose Mother’s Day to express their voices because they wanted to emphasise that ‘Taiwan is Our Mother’. The march was organised by the ‘Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan’, composed of over 70 pro-Taiwan independence groups, which have been promoting the name change to help Taiwan assert its place in the international community. The march was held to demand the entire world call the nation ‘Taiwan’, which should not be confused with ‘China’. The protest, according to their Joint Statement issued on 11 May 2002 (*511 Rectifying the Name of Taiwan* 2002, 21), urged the government to inculcate the concept of ‘being Taiwanese’ in textbooks so the next generations would develop ‘a uniform identification’. Also, they called on authorities to remove designations of ‘China’ and ‘Chinese’, promoting ‘Taiwan’ at all-levels of governmental agencies, embassies, and state-run enterprises (i.e. China Airline). In addition, they appealed to the government to disallow/remove the use of ‘China’ in the titles for all civic organisations to be registered in Taiwan, and private companies that were incorporated in Taiwan. The ultimate goal was to enact a new Constitution for the Republic of Taiwan. The organisers of the movement also arranged to hold the same rally annually until the tasks are completely fulfilled.

In 2003, the parade to rectify the name of Taiwan, which originally designed to take place on 11 May again, was postponed until 6 September due to the outbreak of SARS. The parade on 6 September had more than 150,000 participants taking to the streets in Taipei. It is important to note that through its deferral, the rally became inextricably bound up with the election, which was just five months away. Many people, including the organisers, had

taken election calculations into account while referring to the rally. For instance, a political researcher at the Academia Sinica, Hsu Yung-Ming, said that the rally was drawing the battle lines between the blue and green camps for the 2004 presidential election campaign. According to Hsu's analysis,

The scale of the rally showed that the Pan-green forces performed a successful drill for campaigning in the next presidential election by highlighting the issues of rectifying the nation's name and national identification. Those issues would draw a line that separates supporters of Taiwan-centred awareness, advocated by the Pan-green forces, from the other group that upholds the existence of the ROC as enshrined by the pan-blue parties. (*TT* 07/09/03, 8)

Although the campaign was mobilised mainly by Pan-Green members, president Chen decided to keep a low profile in responding to the name-change campaign, considering the possible negative impact on the DPP in the presidential election. Therefore, the Presidential Office arranged for Chen to attend several activities in southern Taiwan to avoid getting involved. Nevertheless, although Chen did not attend the rally, he had an ambiguous attitude towards the campaign. Chen remarked on the other occasion not only that he would have been there had he not been president, but reiterated that the movement to change the name of the nation required more effort. In addition, DPP Deputy Secretary-General Li Ying-Yuan also paid tribute to the marchers on the president's behalf (*TT* 07/09/03, 3). Indeed, for Chen, his strategy was to back the rally to win the support of the Taiwanese nationalists-hardliners while taking care not to upset the more moderate and swing voters by affirming his acceptance that he was the president of 'Republic of China'.

The success of the two rallies had invigorated the Pan-Green and the pro-independence forces. The organisers of the movement therefore planned to hold another 500,000-people demonstration on Mother's Day in 2004. Yet, when the alliance's co-conveners reported to the former president Lee, Lee reacted by saying that the 2004 presidential election (20 March) would be the most important battle in the fight to safeguard local political power and that only then could they smoothly push forward a campaign to change Taiwan's official name. The main task for the Pan-Green, said Lee, was to think of a way to integrate their local resources and strengths to help DPP candidate Chen in the 2004 Presidential Election (Interview with Wang, 17/08/06). Likewise, the DPP Deputy Secretary and chief event

planner for the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally, Li Ying-Yuan,¹³⁶ when recalling how the idea of organising the Hand-in-Hand Rally came about, also expressed similar concerns. As he recalled asking, ‘after launching this successful “Rectifying the Name of Taiwan” event [6 September 2003], what else can we contribute to Taiwan’ (Interview with Li, 23/08/06)? They therefore began to prepare for the organisation of the biggest-ever mass rally – mobilising one million people – before the presidential election. The event date was set very quickly – 28 February 2004. To the organisers, it was a perfect date for them because it is not only a historically significant date but also a public holiday. Li continued,

Yet, it will be a difficult task to coordinate an event involving one million participants and we must all devote considerable endeavour. For example, finding the perfect location will be difficult. And we have thought of dividing the event into four sections but there will be a huge budget for labour, resources and visual and sound effects. Moreover, we’d have to think of something better than a boring speech. (Ibid.)

Fortuitously, Lee met a friend who lives in the US, who mentioned that the Baltic States once also held a hand-in-hand rally. Li said that he was so touched by the picture of Taiwanese holding hands together when he heard of it. He said that

The Baltic people showed their determination for freedom when they faced military threats. And Taiwanese should not stay silent when facing the missile threats from China. If we want peace, then we should support a referendum. We should also speak out with dignity and tell the world that we will not succumb to military threats! (Ibid.)

Thereafter, Li Ying-Yuan showed the Former President Lee and other independence movement leaders his initial road map blue print of the ‘Hand-In-Hand Rally’ during a gathering meeting in October 2003. Everyone agreed with his idea. On 31 October 2003, the ‘Hand-in-Hand Taiwan Alliance’ was established. The former president Lee was appointed as the General Chairman. He then called for the collaboration of the DPP, TSU, the Alliance

¹³⁶ Li Ying-Yuan was the then-Minister of Council of Labour Affairs, Executive Yuan of Taiwan. He was a political dissident during the KMT’s authoritarian period, being denied entry to Taiwan for advocating Taiwan independence. After returning to Taiwan through illegal channels, he was arrested with other independence advocates. Li was finally released due to the strong pressure from the international community and within Taiwan itself. He started to display his strong leadership in public affairs after being elected to the National Parliament, the Legislative Yuan, in 1996. Following DPP’s successful presidential election in 2000, Li was appointed by President Chen as the Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan.

to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan, The Presbyterian Church in Taiwan as well as various other pro-independence organisations.

When he envisioned the 'Hand-in-Hand Rally', Li Ying-Yuan organised a working team and actively began to plan the various activities. Nevertheless, some difficulties immediately arose. Among many others, one of the most difficult tasks was to mobilise one million participants holding their hands together at a specific moment. Zhang Yi-Shan, one of the key members in Li's working team, was concerned with this difficulty. He recalled that when he was instructed with other staff-members to inspect the planned event route, starting from the northernmost tip of Taiwan and travelling all the way down to the South along the north-south provincial highways, he really thought that mobilising a million people to form a human chain along the road would be an impossible task, especially in sparsely populated areas (Interview with Zhang, 21/07/06). Zhang added,

We have held parades and speeches before but there was always a leading role and a stage. Yet this time, it is a totally new experience and we do not have any visual focus or famous people to inspire each participant. And we do not have any spiritual power to make participants willingly stand in remote areas, and believe that they are part of this event. What kind of inspiration do we need to give the participants to make one million people continuously hold hands for three minutes? (Ibid.)

Indeed, it was not the first time in the history of Taiwan's independence movement that this hand holding idea had been brought up (Interview with Li, 23/08/06). The activists never thought that Taiwan could make it even after seeing the successful campaign in the three Baltic countries. As Li Ying-Yuan said, even after proposing his idea of this hand holding event, people of the working unit still questioned in staff meetings the possibility of carrying it out (Interview with Li, 23/08/06). Since nobody really believed that the idea could be realised, it was not considered a good idea even within the DPP and Chen's Presidential Campaign Office. On the one hand they worried that, since the presidential election was only three weeks away, the failure of this event would have a huge negative impact on the results of the campaign. On the other hand, they were concerned that the extremist position being taken up by former president Lee on issues of Taiwan's independence might force some moderate voters away (*New News* 2004 No.886, 55-6).

Clearly, the DPP was deeply divided over the priority that should be accorded to the independence issue. While some campaigners appeared to recognise that the demonstration

could repel some voters, and were aware of the need to limit the strength of their message in such situations, others contended that such a demonstration was the best tool available to boost Chen's election campaign. In the end, the event took place and was judged to be a great success. The realisation of this idea was due to the determination of former president Lee and the chief event planner Li Ying-Yuan. After the success of the event, there was much praise for their will power in the Taiwanese press of all ideological affiliations (e.g. *CT* 29/02/04, A6). However, the well-designed promotional activities in the run-up to the rally, such as a press conference, fora, rehearsal and so on, and the actual performance on the day of 28 February all contributed to the success of the event, thereby helping to constitute in the citizens a sense of self-identification as Taiwanese nationals. The following section focuses on those activities.

5-3. Representations of the '2-28 Incident' as Threat from China and Ethnic Reconciliation

This section aims to show that the rally defined the 2-28 Incident as a warning about the consequences of Chinese rule for Taiwan, yet was careful to offer the population of Taiwan a message of inclusiveness. The rally now depicted the incident as a cross-strait conflict, rather than as a fight among the island's current inhabitants, as previously perceived. Under this discourse, ethnic harmony, the protection of Taiwan, and the prevention of rule by China represented the greatest gifts from the martyrs of the incident. The people in Taiwan therefore needed to both remember and forget the incident.

5-3-1. Campaign Proposal and the Remarks Made by President Chen and Former President Lee in Hand-in-Hand to Protect Taiwan

The main theme of the rally was clearly manifested in the inception of the campaign proposal. As it states,

On 23 August, 1989, fifty years after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, more than two million people from the three Baltic States – Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania – joined hands to create a 600-kilometre human chain and demonstrated their determination to regain their independence. Their effort received enormous international attention and support. With our third democratic presidential election and first ever 'peace referendum' approaching, China once again instils fear in the Taiwanese public with the military threat. On the 57th anniversary of the 2-28 Incident, we want to remember the past as well as demonstrate our optimistic outlook for the future. We will bring more than a million people together to form a 500-kilometre human

chain along the west coast of Taiwan. This chain will symbolise a wall created by the bare hands of the people – regardless of ethnic background, gender, age, or political differences – to protect the freedom and peace of Taiwan. A lone voice is easily drowned, but more than a million voices will be heard throughout the world. With our hands together, our message is clear. We want peace, not war. We have the right to decide our own future and it is time for us to take Taiwan’s future in our own hands. (Internal document, provided by the organisers in October 2006)

In this statement, the threat from China is highlighted. To counter this threat, the people in Taiwan should stand together to protect the country, regardless of their ethnic background, gender, age, or political differences. President Chen, in the preface of the book *Hand-in-Hand to Protect Taiwan* (HHPT) also gives a similar interpretation of the rally. Under the title of ‘Let the Great Wall Which Protects Taiwan and Democracy Stand Firm Forever’, Chen begins by saying that

For many Taiwanese, 2-28 has been a symbol of taboo and suffering. The 2-28 Incident which happened 57 years ago and the later White Terror kept the Taiwanese silent under an enormous shadow. An invisible barrier was also built up among ethnic groups. Although Taiwan continued to move forward, the shadow still silently surrounded the island and the mental barrier still remained. These common memories of the past affect everyone in Taiwan. Taiwanese went through several generations of efforts, and finally released themselves from the shadow of authoritarianism. They stepped into a country of democracy and law and order. In the process of democratic transformation, the governing party started to learn introspection and sensitivity to public opinion, so the truth of the 2-28 Incident could be exposed to the public gradually. (HHPT, 6)

President Chen then continues by emphasising the importance of ethnic reconciliation when facing such a traumatic past. He writes that

I believe that only by facing the tragedy of history can the wound be healed, and can the people gain new power and encouragement. I also believe that evil cannot stop evil. Only love and tolerance can reconcile us, in the face of the accumulated anger and sorrow of several generations; the 2-28 Incident can thus lose its stigma of suffering and become a new symbol of ethnic harmony and cooperation. In this way, Taiwanese people can tear down the barriers in their minds and stand together for a better future for Taiwan, regardless of political allegiance or ethnic group. And this is the valuable meaning of the 2-28 Hand-In-Hand Rally. (Ibid, 6)

Chen then alters his tone to highlight the intimidation from the PRC. He insists that two million people joining together to form an island-long human chain to protest China’s military threats would give the world a clear message that the people of Taiwan want peace, not war. He writes that

Another significant meaning of the Hand-in-Hand Rally is that, while facing the threat of Chinese authority, millions of Taiwanese showed the willpower of unity by holding hands to make a 'Great Wall of Democracy'. They expressed the firm will to pursue peace to the international community and to China. (Ibid, 6-7)

He then states that this meaningful activity triggered vast power, letting the world know the will of the Taiwanese people. This is the unfinished task of building a country of Taiwanese. In the future, more people will have to be mustered in order to unify 23 million Taiwanese to cultivate the land and protect each individual's future. He concludes that we should let the democratic great wall stand firm forever. 'This day will be remembered in history, because Taiwanese have proved that love can conquer hatred and trust can replace suspicion...We are as a whole, and don't need the mental barriers anymore' (ibid, 7).

Former President Lee also expressed a similar opinion. In his article 'No More Cold Winters', Lee interprets the 2-28 Incident as follows:

After World War Two in August 1945, the Taiwanese were all cheering the dream of 'returning to the mother land' and celebrating the so-called 'retrocession'. Nevertheless, after the retrocession, the political status and the living standards of the Taiwanese never improved, yet corrupted politics, degraded social orders, lawless troops, inflated goods, high unemployment rates, food shortage, plague and so on returned to Taiwan. Sixteen months later, the 2-28 Incident flared. More than ten thousand civilians and educated Taiwanese were massacred in this brutal incident. The incident awakened the souls that were once drunk on happiness of the restoration of China's power over Taiwan. Two years after the incident, a 'settler state' was established after the KMT power totally dissembled in mainland China and retreated to Taiwan. The KMT attempted to assimilate and ruled the Taiwanese in absolute dictatorship. Not long after the '2-28 Incident', another tragedy, the so-called 'White Terror' subsequently happened which resulted in thousands of people being executed and imprisoned over the period of a year...It was truly *the sadness of the Taiwanese*. (Ibid. 3; emphasis added)

Lee then goes on to describe how he seized the chance to reform Taiwanese politics and to promote localisation and democratisation, transforming Taiwan into a true democratic country. The people nowadays living in this 'democratised Taiwan', Lee suggests, should leave behind this sadness, looking forward and moving on to a bright future. Yet Lee cautions that Taiwanese people, while enjoying democracy, should be aware of China's threat. Lee states:

Taiwan, as a democratic nation, should leave deep-seated historical bitterness behind. However, the people of Taiwan also face the trials and tribulations that come from within and outside the community. Particularly China, who always

claims to be our motherland and tries to subsume Taiwan into their regime, have deployed hundreds of missiles on the other side of the strait aimed towards Taiwan, threatening to harm Taiwan's democracy. Taiwan's beautiful dream of the unification with China was dashed fifty-seven years ago after the 2-28 Incident. (Ibid, 4)

He goes on to say,

Taiwan is the one and only fatherland. This year, a new mileage was set in history on the day of 28 February. We have walked out of the shadow cast by the incident in order to guard our democracy and freedom. Taiwanese of all ethnic backgrounds hold hands together from the Northern to the Southern part of Taiwan, forming a human chain of two million people. We said 'No' to China's missiles and said 'Yes' to Taiwan's democratic freedom, demonstrating to the whole world our determination to protect our democracy, and showing China our resolution for freedom and peace. Apart from China and the *old domestic powers* [which referred to the Pan-Blue], everyone would be touched by what we had done. This great event will touch the hearts of our descendants. (Ibid, 4-5; emphasis added)

In short, the aforementioned document interprets the historical lesson of the Hand-in-Hand Rally as the need for Taiwanese people, based on their national identification with Taiwan, to stand up and say 'no' to foreign invaders – namely China, which has said it will not hesitate to use military force to annex Taiwan. In addition, to counter China's invasion, Taiwanese people need to join hands in a demonstration of harmony and solidarity among all ethnic groups. This is the historical significance of the 2-28 Incident.

5-3-2. The Run-up to the Hand-in-Hand Rally

In order to promote the rally, the organisers held a series of press conferences, forums and a sequence of rehearsals.¹³⁷ In what follows, the section investigates a number of representative examples.

Press Conferences

The organisers held a series of press conferences to promote the event. Apart from the press conference that targeted domestic society, the organisers also intended to bring an

¹³⁷ The organisers held a series of rehearsals across the island in the run-up to the rally. The success of these rehearsals not only helped to boost people's confidence and motivate more people from other cities and counties to join the event, but also helped the organisers to gain experience in how to act when the million-strong rally took place on 28 February. One of the most successful rehearsals was held on 1 February, in which more than 70,000 people formed a 63-kilometre-long human chain in Tainan County in the south of the island, the home region of President Chen, in which he received the highest support across the island in the 2000 president election.

international awareness of the people's will for independence in Taiwan. The international media press conference, 'Yes to Peace! Hand-in-Hand with Taiwan' was held on 22 February 2004. The organisers invited foreign reporters to join this conference hosted by Li Ying-Yuan and Xiao Mei-Qin (DPP Legislator and the Director of the DPP International Affairs Department). Various domestic and foreign guests were invited to the press conference, and during the panel discussion they held hands to show their support of the rally. Followed by the release of the campaign theme-song and a candle-lighting ceremony, a question-and-answer session concluded the press conference.

The message that the organisers intended to deliver about the meaning of the mass rally was clearly manifested in their press conference invitation. As it is stated,

Facing the threats of the 496 missiles along the coast of China, Taiwan's 23 million people want to give the world a clear message – 'We want peace, not war!' More than a million people in Taiwan have already made the commitment to join the 500-kilometer long human chain on February 28 – Peace Memorial Day – to protect their rights to peace and liberty (Internal document, provided by the organisers in October 2006).

Xiao Mei-Qin elaborated further the meaning of the event by emphasising the lesson that the Taiwanese people had learned from the historical tragedy of the 2-28 Incident. Xiao said that

This is a historical event, because we are not only commemorating the tragedy that took place in Taiwan, we are also indicating our willingness to move forward. We are calling this event not only to protect Taiwan, but also as an event to promote reconciliation... We are reconciling the oppression and bitterness of ethnic conflicts of the past and moving forward in the spirit of solidarity to protect Taiwan from unwanted external threats. (*TT* 23/02/04, 3)

Xiao added that this spirit of solidarity is reflected in the event's name, because 'holding hands' (*kanchu*) also means 'spouse' in Minnan dialect. 'It not only signifies the literal meaning of holding someone's hands, it also embodies the values of love and partnership,' she explained (*ibid*).

It is important to note that the domestic media were also invited to attend this so-called 'international' press conference. Although this press conference aimed to draw attention from the international community, it was also intended to promote the event domestically, showing the people in Taiwan that the event was receiving support in the international

community. The main feature of this ‘international’ press conference was the story of the ‘Baltic Way.’ Indeed, the story of the three Baltic countries was widely promoted and disseminated in the run-up to the campaign.

As mentioned earlier, the idea of the ‘Hand-in-Hand Rally’ was inspired by the 1989 Baltic Chain. On 23 August 1989 the three Baltic states formed a two million-person human chain covering 600 kilometres to protest against the former Soviet Union’s occupation and to express their opposition to interference by the Russian Army. Following this massive event, the three countries started the process of holding referendums to vote for independence. In 1990, Lithuania became the first to declare its independence by means of a referendum, despite Russia’s military threat. Estonia and Latvia later used the same process to peacefully regain sovereignty that had been lost for more than 50 years. On 22 February 2004, the organisers invited Mart Laanemets to attend a press conference. Laanemets, a then-Taipei-based academic, is a research fellow in the Centre for Oriental Studies at the University of Tartu in Estonia. He made a speech at the press conference under the title of ‘The Expectation from Three Baltic States’. The analogy between the situation of Taiwan and that of Estonia was drawn in the speech. Laanemets stated that the political situation in Taiwan reminds him of his own country a few years ago. Particularly, Taiwan’s internal divisions between pro-unification and pro-independence forces are similar to the situation in Estonia before gaining independence, in which one part of the Estonian public supported independence while the other wanted to remain part of the Soviet Union (*TT* 23/03/04, 3).

Laanemets spelled out this analogy elsewhere. In an article entitled ‘In Estonia, An Example for Taiwan to Draw On’ (Laanemets, *TT* 20/12/03, 8), Laanemets argued that after Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms of the 1980s, democratic movements grew throughout the Soviet Union. As part of this wave of democratisation impulses, the Party for the National Independence of Estonia was established in 1988, calling for a restoration of the independence of Estonia. A Moscow-backed democratic movement, the People’s Front, opposed it and upheld a kind of autonomy within the Soviet Union. In the following years, the pro-independence forces gradually gained the support of the public. They finally seized the opportunity to become an independent country when the conservative wing of the Communist Party in Moscow staged a coup in August 1991, attempting to overthrow Gorbachev’s government. Although the plan failed, it brought to an end Gorbachev’s

political life. A new leader Boris Yeltsin took power in Russia. During these critical days, the Estonian Congress declared the formal independence of Estonia. Yeltsin's new government in Moscow, in need of any diplomatic support it could possibly be offered, quickly recognised it, as it did Latvia and Lithuania. Other countries elsewhere in the world followed. One month later, the three Baltic countries were admitted into the UN.

Thus, in the light of the Baltic experience, Laanemets urged that Taiwan must prepare carefully for the future when the move to full independence would become more likely. He suggested that the people of Taiwan should strive to gain more international support demonstrating their willingness to pursue such independence, because the international community would put pressure on the Beijing government to change its attitude towards Taiwan. In addition, the people in Taiwan also need to acknowledge that Beijing's attitude towards Taiwan would determine the success of the venture. Beijing would recognise the independence of Taiwan only if it is profitable for its leadership to do so. And it is only a matter of time before the communist regime in China collapses, Laanemets stated. Therefore, in the long run, Taiwan is very likely to attain *de jure* independence. The people in Taiwan, Laanemets concluded, 'should not fear China, because we have learnt from experience that even a superpower like Russia...would concede to Estonia's independence drive. The international situation changes and the people quickly learned to use this change to promote the independence movement' (TT 23/03/04, 3).

Academic Fora

In addition to the press conferences, other activities were arranged to foster the event. For instance, Taiwan Advocates, a think-tank founded by the former president Lee to promote Taiwanese national consciousness, held a series of nationwide fora since the beginning of February 2004 to preach the importance of the referendum and the need to create a new constitution for Taiwan. The last in a series of fora was held on 21 February in Hualien, the major city in the eastern Taiwan, which is recognised as a Pan-Blue stronghold. Several pro-independence politicians and intellectuals all joined this event to whip up support for the rally, the referendum and Chen's election campaign.

Chinese dissident writer Cao Chang-Ching, speaking at the opening of a forum, condemned Pan-Blue by linking it with communist China.¹³⁸ Cao stated that the pro-China Pan-Blue, which had no vision for Taiwan's future, had been kowtowing to Beijing throughout the election. If they won, Cao continued, it would be a step back for Taiwan's democracy. The Pan-Blue's policy of not touching the sovereignty issue would only invite Beijing to increase its efforts to impose the 'one country, two systems' policy, which is absolutely not acceptable to the Taiwanese people. He therefore asserted that a vote for the Pan-Blue means a vote for rule by communist China. He said:

This is the first time I have visited Hualien. I went around the place and really liked it. But there are also some Chinese officials who like Hualien a lot and said that if the Lien-Soong [Pan-Blue] ticket won the election, Taiwan might accept the 'one country two systems' concept and Chinese military ships can then come to Taiwan...Let's use our ballots to vote out the candidates that the Communist Party likes. Don't let Hualien become communist China's military port. (IT 22/02/04, 2)

In contrast to the Pan-Blue, according to Cao, the president Chen had a clear plan and timetable of a new constitution for Taiwan. This effort will demand the world to take note of the reality of the existence of Taiwan. Chen's administration has proven that his administration will bring hope and dignity to Taiwan. Cao believed the continuation of the DPP government will further the nation's democratic progress, helping the people to pursue their sovereign rights and promise for Taiwan's future. He remarked:

I came to campaign not for Chen Shui-Bian, but for *the values of democracy and freedom*. (Ibid.; emphasis added)

Contrary to a widespread prediction that a win for Chen would increase instability in the Taiwan Strait, Cao believed that Chen's re-election would bring to a halt and eventually terminate Beijing's decades of delusion and efforts to annex Taiwan. There are three reasons for this belief, according to Cao. Firstly, the victory of Chen would highlight the people's desire for sovereign rights and their decision to determine their own fate. Secondly, it would show the world the inevitability of the establishment of an independent Taiwan. And thirdly, it would force Beijing to face reality and adopt realistic policies toward Taiwan. He therefore urged the people in Taiwan to vote for the re-election of Chen.

¹³⁸ For full transcription of Cho's speech in the fora, please see: <http://advocates.to meet.biz/woooooa/front/bin/ptdetail.phtml?Part=forumE07&PreView=1>

News Editorials

A great number of editorials and opinion pieces were published in the press commenting on the event. One such piece, 'The Historical Significance of the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally', written by Hsu Shih-Kai, a co-founder of the Hand-in-Hand Taiwan Alliance, was published in *Liberal Times* (LT 25/02/04, 15; also TT 28/02/04, 8).

The author writes that since he started taking part in organising the rally, he has been thinking about why 28 February was chosen as the date for this massive event. Hsu said that the 2-28 Incident is a very important collective memory for the Taiwanese people, and a decisive point in Taiwan's contemporary nationalism. There are two historical meanings of this collective memory. The first one, writes Hsu, is

The 2-28 Incident smashed China's pipe dream, helping the Taiwanese people to become aware of the distinction between themselves and the Chinese people, and more decisively strengthening the self-awareness of the Taiwanese people. Then, in the 1990s, Taiwan's localisation developed when China intimidated Taiwan through propaganda and military force, resulting in a great transformation of Taiwanese self-awareness into national self-identification. (Ibid.)

The second one is

At the same time, also starting from the advent of Japanese rule, Taiwanese ethnic groups adjusted their attitudes toward each other, as evidenced in the Wushe Incident [Musha Uprising] in 1930, when Aboriginal people killed only Japanese, not Han people. Provoked by the 2-28 Incident, self-awareness continued to grow. For example, faced with the strength of people with roots in China, other ethnic groups developed attitudes of mutual solidarity. Then in the 1990s, when democratisation was under way, the four main ethnic groups were encouraged to strengthen their identities while at the same time showing respect (not integration and assimilation) toward each other. (ibid.)

Hsu suggests that people's identification with the new nation and harmony inside the nation are two issues of great significance to Taiwan's contemporary nationalism. The 2-28 Incident began the process, which accelerated during the 1990s under the former president Lee's presidency. He then writes that

The historic significance of the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally is that Taiwanese people, based on their national self-identification with Taiwan, will stand up to say 'no' to foreign invaders – namely China, which has said it will not hesitate to use military force to annex Taiwan. Moreover, Taiwanese people joining hands will demonstrate harmony and solidarity among all ethnic groups. (ibid.)

In this vein, the rally is an expression of Taiwanese contemporary nationalism, the growing consciousness of the need to oppose China and the great leap forward in national solidarity. Hsu then concludes that, for the public to reject Chinese influence, there are three concrete measures which need to be followed: First, stand up and join hands. Second, vote for President Chen, who advocates ‘one country on each side’ of the Taiwan Strait, and help him push for a new constitution and eventual realisation of the nation-building goal. Third, vote in the referendum on 20 March. In Hsu’s view, if the Taiwanese people say ‘no’ to China and ‘yes’ to Taiwan, Taiwan’s national security will be ensured.

Theme Song and Logo for the Rally

The organisers also released the theme song and logo for the rally. The song was frequently broadcast in the mass media of Taiwan during that time. The theme song, under the title ‘She is Our Baby’ (伊是咱的寶貝) was written by Chen Ming-Zhang with music composed by Chen Ming-Chang and Xiao Fu-De. The song signifies the fate of Taiwan through the metaphor of a little girl.¹³⁹

A flower comes into the world (一蕊花生落地)
Father and Mother love her all (爸爸媽媽疼尚多)
When the wind blows, keep her warm (風那吹 愛甲被)
Don’t let her fall into the dark world (吳通乎伊墮落黑暗地)
A bud needs our care (勿開耶花需要你我的關心)
Give her a land to grow (乎伊一片生長的土地)
Hand in hand (手牽手)
Heart by heart (心連心)
We stand together (咱站作伙)
She is Our Baby (伊是咱的寶貝)

It is nevertheless important to note that the song was not originally written for the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally. It was written in 1993 for a Christian charity that helps young girls who have suffered from domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation, aiming to raise social awareness of child prostitution and to support the rescuing of child prostitutes in Taiwan.

¹³⁹ The song was originally written in Minnan dialect. English translation is made by Chen Hsiang-Chun (2005, 148).

According to Chen Hsiang-Chun (2005), the ‘flower’ and the ‘bud’ in the lyrics refer to ‘young girls’, and the song ‘calls for parents and society to protect them and treat them well’ (2005, 149). In 2004, this song was used again by the organisers of the Hand-in-Hand Rally. Yet, this time, Chen comments:

The ‘flower’ and the ‘bud’ seemed to signify the ‘fragile’ new Taiwan nation and Taiwan’s democracy that needed to be taken good care of, especially under the missile threat from China seemingly represented by ‘the dark world’ in the lyrics. (Ibid., 149)

As Chen argues, this song was a very successful strategy. ‘Unusual in using a feminine image to represent the new Taiwan nation and Taiwan’s democracy, it effectively raised collective patriotism for Taiwan against China’ (ibid.).

The logo for the campaign was designed as an image of Taiwan, being held by a hand with five fingers. The five fingers of the hand would represent the major ethnic groups of Taiwan – Hakka, Mainlander, Minnan, Aborigines and their foreign spouses – coming together to protect Taiwan (Figure 5-1).

5-3-3. The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally on 28 February 2004

On Saturday, 28 February 2004, around two million people of all ages joined hands to form an island-long (approximately 500km) human chain from Heping Island near Keelung to Changlung in Pingtung County, protesting against China’s military threat. The Chinese characters for ‘hoping’ and ‘changlung’ literally mean ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’.¹⁴⁰

The event began with the official memorial ceremony of the 57th anniversary of the 2-28 Incident in Keelung City, northern Taiwan, where the former KMT government landed its troops from China to begin its bloody suppression in 1947, also the place where many of the victims’ bodies were buried in the incident’s aftermath. The ceremony was solemn and dignified. The venue of the ceremony was decorated with a red and white colour backboard, with some bullet marks embellished, which the three digital numbers ‘2’, ‘2’, ‘8’, attached to it (CT 29/02/04, A3).

¹⁴⁰ The original plan of the route was designed to terminate at Chienkuo Road in Pingtung City. The Chinese character ‘Chienkuo’ means ‘nation-building’. This route, from Heping Island to Chienkuo Road, therefore signifies the road from ‘peace’ to ‘nation-building’. This proposal was abandoned later since it was too controversial, and might deter some more moderate people from joining the campaign (Interview with Zhang, 21/07/06).

At the ceremony, with music played by trumpet and a string quartet, President Chen as well as the family members of the 2-28 victims observed a moment of silence for those who suffered in the incident. Chen then granted recognition to the family members of victims and led them in laying bouquets of flowers on a temporary monument in their honour, located on the stage (*UDN 29/02/04, A4*). Afterwards, the president made some remarks at the ceremony. He said that the 2-28 Incident had been a taboo subject for much of the last fifty-seven years and many people believed that this traumatic past should not be mentioned and that the historical scar should not be revealed, in order to avoid possible ethnic clashes. Yet, Chen stated, he did not see the incident in this way. Stressing ethnic harmony, Chen said that all the peoples of the island had suffered together regardless of their ethnicity; the Taiwanese therefore had to work hard together and support each other. He stressed the importance of the common travails and destiny of all Taiwan's ethnic groups. Despite the fact that tragic massacres and bloodshed perpetrated 57 years ago by the totalitarian KMT government had served as a prelude to decades of white terror and the martial-law era, Chen called on people in Taiwan to reflect on the event with 'love', 'tolerance' and 'introspection'. He stated that

Love for Taiwan, this nation and its people; tolerance for history and each other; introspection about the mistakes of the past and about ourselves; this should be our basic attitude toward the 228 Incident (*TT 29/02/04, 1*).

While urging to commemorate the incident with love, tolerance and introspection, Chen continued by saying that 'since we have come this far together, it should be said that the people of Taiwan are not forgetful, stupid or numb. Rather, they are unrivalled in tolerance and courage' (*ibid.*).

In his speech, Chen struck a positive and conciliatory tone. Yet, he also issued a thinly veiled warning to the nation that only the DPP could continue to safeguard the people's right to determine Taiwan's destiny. He reminded the audience that 'for over 300 years, Taiwan was not a sovereign state and that the people of Taiwan were not the masters of their own household' (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, Chen urged, now was the time for all groups to 'affirm their sovereignty' over the island. And only the DPP, rather than the Pan-Blue, which represented the interests of the PRC, could help Taiwan to be its own sovereign (*ibid.*). This official ceremony was followed by another religious ritual held on Hoping [Peace] Island. Various religious groups, including Buddhists, Taoists and Christians prayed together for the

peace of Taiwan. The organisers released flocks of white doves at the end of the ceremony, which marked the launch of the event.

The Rally, beginning at Hoping Island, was held primarily along the Taiwan National Highway No.1 and partially along Highway No.3 and No.5, stretching down to the south (Figure 5-2). All participants who had signed up to take part were designated to check-in points, where they should assemble at 11 a.m. Those who had not signed up could just stop at any part of the designated route and join the line. People joined hands all the way from northern Taiwan, down along the western coast of Taiwan across bridges, along the beach and mountains, and finally ended at the southern tip of the island of Taiwan. The rally stretched 500 km through 18 cities and counties. Details of the routes were organised by local coordinating groups in each city and county. This route was designed to cross the most densely populated areas, where the majority of the Taiwanese people resided. By crossing these areas, the organisers aimed not just to facilitate the participation of greater numbers of people, but also to promote the incumbent president Chen as part of the election campaign.¹⁴¹

The organisers encouraged the participants to bring three gadgets with them on the day of the rally: cell phones, digital cameras and radios. The cell phones were used to spread text messages about the event, while the digital cameras were used to keep photographic records. The organisers encouraged people to send their pictures of the event to their website to share the information with people around the world. Information regarding the rally was also broadcast on the radio.

The highlight of the event was in Maioli County, the central part of Taiwan, where the National Rally Headquarters was located. President Chen and former president Lee held hands as a symbol of their joint effort to promote Taiwan's independence. The choice of Maioli County for the main stage of the event was not made without conscious decision. It is noted that Maioli County is a remote, mountainous and Hakka-populated area. Hakka

¹⁴¹ As some studies have indicated (Mattlin, 2004), candidate visibility is crucial in Taiwan's election campaigns, although the forms differ slightly depending on the election. In local elections, emphasis is placed on direct contact with voters. Campaign activities in Taiwan's high-level elections lean heavily on mass parade and other forms of mass activities.

community has long been regarded as a loyal supporter of the KMT.¹⁴² Linking the human chain continuously without a break in Miaoli became the most difficult organisational task of the event, as one of those involved testified. They therefore decided to make this area the focal point, aiming to mobilise more participants in this hugely remote area (Interview with Zhang, 21/07/06). A great number of buses was used by the organisers to transport participants from other counties to this area. A high turnout in this area could boost the low morale of the Pan-Green, attract any undecided Hakka ballots in this area, and above all shatter the KMT's monopoly in the Hakka community. Breaking the deadlock presented by the Pan-Blue's dominance in this region was then a huge task for the DPP, and one of the most crucial factors in determining the party's overall electoral outlook in the 2004 presidential election. Moreover, another benefit of setting the main rostrum of the event in Miaoli for Chen's election campaign was that it gave the Pan-Green a great opportunity to boost its support through personal contact between the candidate and the population.

As Chen arrived in the northern headquarters of Miaoli county at 1:00 p.m., he then stood atop a campaign car to greet the people along the human chain heading down to the South. The former president Lee, accompanied by some TSU legislators, began his tour in the southern part of the county, greeting the people as he headed northwards (*CT* 29/02/04, A2). At around 2:15 p.m., Chen and Lee met at the national rally headquarters in central Miaoli as a symbol of their concerted effort to protect Taiwan and to promote democracy. At noon, people of different ages and backgrounds began to form queues along the planned route meandering through scores of towns and cities in Western Taiwan. The two presidents appeared on a performance stage set up at a stadium, joining hands with representatives of Taiwan's ethnic groups, genders, classes, and so on (*UDN* 29/02/04, A3). The human chain formed a circle in the shape of Taiwan on the stage (Figure 5-3; 5-4). At 2:20 p.m., everyone held their hands at once. After a one-minute nationally broadcast countdown, the rally reached its climax at 2:28 p.m. with two million participants lifting their hands. At that moment, Chen and Lee raised their hands, inspiring the two-million crowd across Taiwan through ten huge TV screens that represented ten major venues. In this highly emotional

¹⁴² A common reason why Hakka people feel estranged from the DPP is its extensive use of Hoklo language used by Minnan people. The language barrier is also reinforced by the Hakka community's anxiety about losing their mother tongue and their ethnic minority status, as they have historically competed for land and other resources with the Minnan people.

atmosphere, the two leaders turned to face the Jade Mountain, the highest mountain in the island of Taiwan (3996 metre high), chanted slogans such as ‘Solidifying All Ethnic Groups, Joining Hands To Protect Taiwan’, ‘Believe In Democracy, Insist On Reform’, ‘Love Peace, Oppose Missiles’, ‘Love Taiwan, Wish For Democracy’, and ‘Taiwan Yes, China No’. Following Chen and Lee, the participants of the human chain joined their hands and performed exactly the same actions. They chanted their deep affection for Taiwan, shouted slogans calling for peace and democracy, and urged China to remove missiles aimed at the island. Organisers subsequently released multicoloured ribbons and balloons and launched fireworks.

President Chen then gave a speech to the crowd. He remarked,

More than one million people have joined hands together to form a Democratic Great Wall. This is a historic attempt by the people to show the world their love for Taiwan and the power that people have to write history with their own hands...Our 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally was like a carnival to open our minds and invite everyone to guard Taiwan...The rally showed how Taiwanese love their country...Taiwan’s democracy can never be defeated by China’s authoritarianism, Taiwan’s referendum cannot be defeated by China’s missiles. (CT 29/02/04, A2; TT 29/02/04, 1)

Chen sent his regards to the participants, saying that they had made this event possible, despite the doubts of some regarding the success of the event. Chen said that the people of Taiwan had used the mildest, most joyful and dignified way to proclaim their solidarity and determination for peace to the world. He continued, ‘however, this is just the beginning. We must continue our efforts and cast referendum ballots on the day of election to maintain Taiwan’s security’ (ibid.).

The former president Lee also made a speech following Chen’s remarks. Lee interpreted the success of the rally as signifying ‘the people’s affirmation of Taiwan’s national identity and a rejection of Chinese missile threats’ (ibid.). Lee said,

Seeing a big spectacle like this, in which more than one million people have come out *to show their love for Taiwan*, is the most touching moment...Such is the power of the people, and this is a victory for the people of Taiwan. (Ibid.; emphasis added)

The event was notable for the diversity of people who took part; people of all ages and backgrounds found different ways to express solidarity. It was not only designed to demonstrate the unity of all the different ethnic groups in Taiwan, but also the integration and collaboration of people from different generations, genders, religions and social and

racial backgrounds in opposing China's rule. Prominent members of the Pan-Green all took part in the rally.

In Taipei City, four generations of president Chen's family, including the first lady, all took part in the gathering, holding hands with the masses in Taipei's 2-28 Memorial Park, together with other Pan-Green politicians' families. According to the organisers, more than 100,000 people participated in the nation's capital, including 20 four-generation-families (*IT*, 29/02/04, 3). In Taipei County, ten women and girls, with ages ranging from just a few months to 105 years, came to the rally with Vice President Lu, a woman, to express solidarity. Lu addressed the rally, saying that 'women can stand at the nation's frontline...show concern for Taiwan, bringing about love and peace instead of war' (*ibid*). In Taichung City, the biggest metropolis in central Taiwan, the highlight was around one hundred couples singing a famous Mandarin love song with the then-Premier Yu Shyi-Kun. Yu held hands with his wife, telling the couples that he hoped '2-28' would from now on become a wonderful day to remember instead of a tragic day to mourn. In southern Taiwan, more than 120,000 people turned up for Kaohsiung County's rally. Kaohsiung is a historical stronghold for the DPP. Undaunted by the hot weather, men, women and children began lining up along the planned route around noon, holding small flags and banners saying 'Yes Taiwan' and 'No Missiles'. Taiwan's major religious groups also turned out to support the event. The Taiwanese Presbyterian Church marked the day with prayers for the nation in Taipei County. Among the throngs of participants in the northern city of Miaoli were around 1,000 people, each carrying a statue of Buddha in their arms, to pray for the blessings of the gods on Taiwan. Premier Yu beat a peace gong provided by a Taoist Temple in Tatsoon township, Chunghua County, the midpoint of the 500 km-long human chain (*ibid*).

Despite lingering memories of the tragedy of 2-28, the event proceeded more like a festival, taking on a carnival atmosphere with musicians and dancers performing on open stages. Many participants were dressed in costumes or brought with them elaborately made props and banners to add a festive atmosphere and play down the political overtones of the event. Each area demonstrated its own local specialties. For instance, in Chunghua, around 100,000 participants gathered and many of them carried chrysanthemums.¹⁴³ There were also

¹⁴³ Chunghua has earned its reputation for being at the heart of the nation's flower trade, and chrysanthemums are one of the county's biggest money-making products.

many traditional Taiwanese folk art performances staged during the rally to add to the fun. At Hoping Island, aboriginals performed traditional dances. In the city of Taichung, some city councilors led a group of people wearing bamboo hats with a paper missile bearing the pattern of China's five-starred red flag on top. Written on the missile was the slogan 'Referendum Yes, Missiles No'. A lion dance was performed on the old Xiluo Bridge in Chunghua. In Sangchung, 2,000 supporters stood in formation to create a picture consisting of the numbers '2-28', a hand, and a map of Taiwan. Rock concerts continued for the rest of the afternoon in Taiwan and in the south of Taiwan. The fifth 'Say Yes to Taiwan Music Festival', an event held by the Taiwan Rock Alliance in memory of the 2-28 Incident, took place in front of the Presidential Office following the rally. In addition to local bands including metal stalwarts Chthonic, the punk trio Pangu from China and some other groups from Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and the US attracted a number of young people. A night rally took place in Pingtung's Oluanpi, Taiwan's southernmost tip, marking the end of the event (Figure 5-5; 5-6; 5-7; 5-8; 5-9; 5-10).

5-3-4. The Political Impacts of the Rally

In terms of the political impact of the event on the election, the following section argues that the rally, together with the referendum, was vital to the incumbent president Chen's campaign for the presidency for three reasons. First, the mass-rally set the agenda of election campaign issues. It provided a convenient instrument for Chen not only to spark debate about the topic in favour of the Pan-Green, but also to distract people's attention from Chen's poor economic performance during his presidency. In the run-up to the rally, campaign issues gave way to discussion over ethnic harmony, China's threat, expression of the will of the people, and love of and self-identification with Taiwan, which presumably benefited the Pan-Green side. Topics that the Pan-Blue attempted to bring into the campaign – such as the poor state of the economy, cross-Strait relations, and corruption – failed to define the campaign. The news about the mass rally dominated the major media in Taiwan at that time. Indeed, the Hand-in-Hand Rally received widespread coverage in newspapers and on TV programs.

Secondly, it helped to occupy the moral high ground in defiance of the Pan-Blue's eagerness to accommodate it. The core strategy was to integrate the rally, the referendum and support for Chen based on a growing self-awareness among the people, and to attempt

to associate this triad with concepts such as 'loving Taiwan' and 'democracy'. The Pan-Blue candidates were being positioned as opponents of these concepts. The rally permitted Chen to portray himself as the protector of Taiwan's democracy and identity. The extraordinary spectacle of the event touched the hearts of many Taiwanese people, and these feelings were transformed into support for Chen in the election.

Third, it helped to raise the morale of the Pan-Green during the presidential campaign. The rally obviously boosted the Pan-Green's spirit. The large number of people taking part incited the Pan-Green's confidence. The event was viewed as highly successful. It was estimated that 500,000 participants, standing in one line, would have been enough to form the human chain. Actually, two million people showed up, some of whom had to stand in two, three, and even four lines in many segments of the human chain. While some Pan-Blue campaign organisers at the time were visibly nervous after the rally, the Pan-Green people appeared elated. The then-DPP-Secretary-General Zhang Jun-Xiong said right after the demonstration that the rally would be significant for Chen's campaign, and the passion people showed in turning out in such huge numbers would be reflected in support for Chen (TT 01/03/04, 2). The *esprit de corps* of the Pan-Green and its supporters was indeed strong at that moment. And the high rally turnout also boosted Chen's electoral prospects, having had a great effect on the orientation of the undecided voters in Taiwan's presidential election campaign. Indeed, the public gathering not only consolidated the Pan-Green's traditional support base, but also had the significant effect of swaying undecided voters, expanding the party's voter base. With less than two weeks to go, the inclination of undecided voters was expected to be the key factor in determining the election.

In short, the Pan-Green created an environment in favour of its own interests during the election campaign through commemorating the traumatic history of the 2-28 Incident. The Pan-Green hoped that this 2-28 enthusiasm would continue while it drummed up support and fought cut-throat battles at the grass-roots level in order to gain a lead in the race. They also expected people to remember the rally's spirit and to harness such democratic enthusiasm to support Chen. To keep this momentum, the DPP campaign headquarters organised quite a few medium and large campaign activities in the run up to the election. There were at least two campaign rallies each day, rising up to four every day during the last 10 days of the campaign.

The Pan-Blue, in response, held an event under the title ‘Heart-to-Heart Rally,’ where people donated blood and ran in a torch relay to symbolise reconciliation among the nation’s ethnic groups in remembrance of the 2-28 Incident. The torch relay was brought to an end at Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan, after a two-week journey through 319 cities, towns and villages around Taiwan. They called for reconciliation among the nation’s ethnic groups and chose the act of blood donation to express this ethnic reconciliation. KMT presidential candidate Lian recited a poem in the Minnan dialect describing eternal companionship. The poem, entitled ‘I am in your blood and you are in my blood’, referred to both the blood donation drive and the message of ethnic harmony. Lian made a remark after finishing the poem:

Reconciliation does not mean asking all to have the same opinion, but to harbour respect and treat one another with respect despite having a different opinion...Regardless of whether one is Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlander or Aboriginal, blood keeps life going, and blood does not distinguish between political stance, ethnicity, province of residence, gender or age. (*CT* 29/02/04, A4; *TT* 29/02/04, 4)

As the Pan-Green’s nationwide human chain rally reached its crescendo, the Pan-Blue’s rally offered a much more modest spectacle to mark the day. The Pan-Blue rally of a few tens of thousands in Kaohsiung on the same day looked meagre in comparison.

It is of course hard to determine precisely what the impact of the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally was. The 2004 presidential election result was the best for the Pan-Green in any election up to date. Neither Chen’s personal vote in 2000, nor the Pan-Green vote in previous elections had ever exceeded 50 percent of the total ballots. Of course, there are many other possible reasons for the extra votes garnered by Chen, such as the coupling of the referendum with the presidential elections and the shooting incident. Nevertheless, it is hard to dismiss the fact that, as a result of the success of the rally in the final countdown phase of the presidential election, most opinion polls showed that approval ratings for the blue and green camps were drawing closer, given that Chen had been far behind his counterpart at the beginning of the election campaign.¹⁴⁴ Although the organisers maintained that the rally had been aimed at highlighting Taiwan’s determination to maintain peace using

¹⁴⁴ For instance, the opinion pool conducted by China Times between 1 and 5 March (the result was released on 6 March) shows that DPP Chen’s supporting rate for the first time takes precedence over KMT Lian’s supporting rate (*CT* 06/03/04, A2).

their bare hands and had no direct connection with Chen's reelection campaign, the subsequent opinion polls showed a great boost to Chen's ratings.

5-4. The Commemoration of the 'Traumatic' Event of the 2-28 Incident in the Formation of Taiwanese National Identity

The 2-28 Incident, as many studies have shown, has been interpreted differently at various times and has continuously changed its meaning. The incident, when it first happened, was defined as a Chinese communist conspiracy. Immediately after the uprising in the late 1940s, it was blamed by the KMT regime on communist agitators among some Taiwanese who had received Japanese military training (Phillips 2006, 6-7). In the 1950s, by contrast, the Incident was interpreted among the overseas Taiwan Independence Movement activists as 'a violent struggle for national independence – a failed revolution, which they intended to repeat and bring to a successful conclusion' (Fleischauer 2006, 5). This armed uprising was to be directed against the Mainlanders and yet the PRC was considered to share the same antagonism towards the KMT regime, which made it a potential ally of the Taiwan Independence Movement. The 2-28 Incident was by then conceived as an ethnic confrontation between the native Taiwanese and the Mainlanders. Entering the 1970s, when the democratic movement started in Taiwan, the '2-28' was no longer hailed as a first uprising which had to be repeated. Rather, it was regarded as 'a great calamity and tragedy for the Taiwanese people (including the Mainlanders), for which, of course, the KMT government was blamed' (ibid., 7). The then-opposition forces (against the KMT regime) urged the KMT to rectify its past mistakes by relinquishing its grip on absolute power and allowing a democratic society which provided equal opportunities. The '2-28' came to be regarded as the symbol and most visible manifestation of the KMT's oppression of the Taiwanese. In the process of Taiwan's political liberalisation since 1987, the '2-28' symbol continued to have enormous significance, and its interpretations have been to a great degree shaped by political calculations in electoral politics. Under Lee Teng-Hui, the KMT reversed its former policy of denying the Incident's existence and touched upon the question of '2-28'. Lee offered an official apology and a full rehabilitation to all 2-28 victims in 1995 (Edmondson 2001, 35-7; Phillips 2006, 13). While this yielding by the KMT was mainly due to relentless pressure from public opinion, it was also in the interest of Lee's indigenous

faction of the KMT to do so. Lee regarded the incident's 'clarification' as an opportunity to distance himself from its authoritarian past and depict the KMT as a new democratic party, fitting to compete in a democratic society. As for the DPP, the '2-28' was one of many issues that the DPP could use to mobilise the masses to attack its major rival, the KMT, and to consolidate its public support among the native Taiwanese electorate.¹⁴⁵ Yet, while doing so, they also needed to avoid alienating the undecided, neutral, moderate and non-native Taiwanese voters (such as the Mainlanders).

The 2-28 Incident thus became an emblematic warning against Taiwan's unification with mainland China and a symbol of reconciliation between different Taiwanese ethnic groups.¹⁴⁶ On many occasions, as this chapter has shown above, the organisers of the demonstration highlighted China's military threat, the need to prevent China from governing Taiwan, the protection of Taiwan's democracy, and the ideal of ethnic harmony. The main theme of the rally was the safeguarding of Taiwan's sovereignty and self-awareness, and saying 'no' to China.

Under this discourse, what the historical lessons of the '2-28' had taught the Taiwanese was the ruthlessness of China's rule. The 2-28 Incident was represented as a warning of the consequences that an enforced unification demanded by the PRC would necessarily have. One of the main reasons for the uprising and its brutal suppression by China was the fact that, in 1947, Taiwan and China were divided by a deep cultural and political rift, which led to a friction after the KMT took over the island, finally culminating in the 2-28 Incident. Nowadays, the rifts that separate Taiwan and China run deeper, especially after Taiwan became a democratic country. If Taiwan was forced to agree to a renewed unification with China, a *second* '2-28 Incident' would follow with the same inevitability. Moreover, while the rally organisers emphasised the importance of democracy and freedom to the Taiwanese, the incident also signified Taiwan's suffering from single-party totalitarianism. The totalitarian nature of the Chinese regime has not changed, despite the fact that economic changes have taken place. Due to the adoption of a capitalist economic system and the result of the rapid economic growth of China in the last decades, the gap in living standards between the two

¹⁴⁵ After the incident, KMT was perceived as an occupying force and the Mainlanders were regarded as 'foreign'.

¹⁴⁶ Similar arguments can be found in Chen Hsiang-chun's (2005) studies on arts exhibitions of 2-28 Incident and Stenfen Fleischauer's studies (2006) on Taiwan Independence Movement.

sides of Taiwan Strait has narrowed. Yet, the PRC has never given up its single-party totalitarianism. Therefore, the historical tragedies of '2-28' cannot be forgotten.

To avoid the repetition of this traumatic history, the only way to do so is to safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty. In facing China's military threat, the Taiwanese people must demonstrate their determination to self-defence. Large-scale military exercises are not the sole way that power can be demonstrated, as this task can be fulfilled through the display of people's determination. In this vein, the human chain of 2004 was a means of demonstrating the will of the people of Taiwan to oppose Chinese domination. Holding hands was a way of making a pro-peace and anti-war case and standing up against the Chinese regime. The rally should not therefore be considered the campaign strategy of any particular political party or ethnic group. Popular participation in the rally was a demonstration of popular will, and ultimately, a claim to Taiwanese sovereignty.

To defend the aspirations of the Taiwanese people, the advocates of the human chain held, the country leaders are expected to display courage to counter China's overwhelming diplomatic, military, and economic pressure. Any other thinking is viewed as 'wrong' and 'illegitimate'. Opposing China (and its missiles) and defending Taiwan's sovereignty (love Taiwan) for the rally proponents is the only 'truth' – an unchallenged truth. Any scepticism towards the rally campaign, referendum and, above all, Taiwanese identity was portrayed as the deplorable habit of surrendering to China. Any individual or political party in Taiwan could express differing opinions about public affairs and propose various policies in an effort to win the election. However, no one should disregard the country's national security and sovereignty in advancing their own interests. Acting like this would be irresponsible and would endanger Taiwan and its people. Moreover, any scepticism about the legitimacy of the referendum and the rally, designed to oppose China's missiles, is seen as unacceptable. And, since the rally was interpreted as a display of the solidarity of the Taiwanese people with China and the entire world, those people – mostly supporters of the Pan-Blue – who did not join the event or criticised it, were seen as disloyal. And the Pan-Blue's fear of provoking Beijing, as well as its policy proposal concerning the casting aside of the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty for the sake of peace, run counter to the proper and legitimate way of protecting the collective interests of Taiwan. To those critics of the Pan-Blue, such behaviour totally disregards the sense of national self-identification and community built upon popular will

and national consciousness. On this view, Pan-Blue party members ignore the fact that this sense of political community and national identity has become the core value of democratic Taiwan. Opponents of the campaign are *de facto* against democracy. And politicians who continue to hold illusions about unification completely disregard China's political and military claim to (regional) hegemony. An editorial of a Taiwanese newspaper stated:

The rally clearly showed Beijing the determination of the people of Taiwan to protect the nation, but these Pan-Blue people branded it an activity to create ethnic division. Even though they were intimidating people in order to prevent them from attending the rally, they nevertheless held a 'Heart-to-Heart Rally', which included a blood donation drive to symbolize ethnic reconciliation, marked by the slogan, 'I am in your blood and you are in my blood.' But they have never criticised the Chinese government, which has suppressed Taiwan, undermined its internal solidarity by using the independence-unification issue, and threatened it with missiles. *Does the 'you' (I am in your blood...) in the above slogan refer to the bandit regime across the Strait? Why are they afraid to take Beijing to task? (Lin, TT 05/03/04, 8; emphasis added)*

The significance of the event to those pro-independence advocates is a determination, expressed by the people of Taiwan, to refuse subjugation by China. Moreover, it also served to demonstrate the people's discontent with the Pan-Blue and its 'one China' principle. And finally, the tragic massacres of the Incident also reminded the Taiwanese people of the decades of KMT's totalitarian rule over Taiwan during the periods of white terror and the martial law.

In the face of Beijing's increasing missile threats and diplomatic isolation, pro-independence advocates believe it is time for the 23 million population of Taiwan, and regardless of their ethnicity, gender, political affiliation, generation or class, to speak up and seek an equal treatment by China. To do so, they should stand together, demonstrating the common moral principles shared among them to stand for their homeland Taiwan. 'United we stand; divided we fall.' For those advocates, it is true that in the past many people in Taiwan perceived the 2-28 Incident as a massacre of native Taiwanese by the ruling Chinese regime. Every year since 1990s, there has been discussion of Taiwan's ethnic divisions and problems around the time of 2-28 Memorial Day. However, the 2-28 Incident should not be a taboo topic. People in Taiwan – across all ethnic groups – have come to realise that such an interpretation is an over-simplified depiction of the tragedy. Everyone who lives here is

‘Taiwanese’. What does it mean to be ‘Taiwanese’ then? A newspaper editorial interestingly stated that

They have to be a united group which turn their backs on China. After all, this is why any person of Han origin is in Taiwan. It doesn’t matter if they came to Taiwan in the 1630s to work for the Dutch, the 1940s to escape the Communists or yesterday as an illegal immigrant to escape the hellhole that is China today. All came to Taiwan to get away from China. Turning your back on China and turning toward the opportunity that for 300 years Taiwan has represented – that is a pretty good definition of what it means to be a New Taiwanese. (Editorial, *TT* 01/03/04, 8)

To those advocates, people from all walks of life came together on this historic day of sorrow and turned it into a day of hope for peace and freedom for the future. The rally has put behind the Taiwanese the sorrow and tears of the 2-28 Incident to build a new atmosphere of ethnic harmony. Solidarity amongst the people has been greatly strengthened by the rally, which will definitely help them in their pursuit of a free and democratic society. In fact, it was the intention of the organisers to highlight the theme of ethnic harmony and unity throughout the event – as demonstrated by the participation of people from every ethnic group, and the invitation of representatives of all major ethnic groups in Taiwan to stand next to Chen and Lee. This is also the reason why the rally could attract so many people, because the appeal of ‘protecting Taiwan’ and ‘unifying Taiwan’ touched the hearts of the Taiwanese people. Perhaps this indicates it is time for national reconciliation, for getting beyond the traumatic memories of the past and for moving forward to a bright future. Let there be no more ethnic problems. One Taiwan problem remains: the ambiguity surrounding Taiwan’s relationship with China, which demands a political and diplomatic resolution. Only this can ensure that Taiwan would be granted the formal respect due to a sovereign country. If these aspirations materialise, China would no longer be in a position to ignore the power of the Taiwanese people. Such political ambition was mobilised by the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally to establish and consolidate this ‘post-2-28’ ethnically and politically harmonious utopia where it seemed that the 2-28 Incident was *passé* and Taiwan had embarked on its ‘post-2-28’ future. In effect, the wounds caused by the 2-28 incident, which had for a long time caused a deep hostility and suspicion between the different ethnic groups in Taiwan, now could lead to mutual understanding and solidarity. Through acts of forgiving and reconciliation, the memory of 2-28 could turn into a resource of a renewed strength and unity to safeguard Taiwan’s interests against the mainland.

As a result, this rhetoric employed by the rally activists was indistinguishable from that advocated by the KMT while it was a ruling party in the 1990s. As shown above, the discourse regarding the 2-28 Incident formulated by the KMT government in the 1990s also emphasised the need to move on and look into the future rather than return to the historical scar of the past. Both of them propagated, to some degree, the idea of a post-2-28 united and harmonious 'people' who reside on the island of Taiwan, whether this 'people' is called the Chinese (ROC citizens) or the Taiwanese. This similarity between the KMT and the DPP rhetoric reflects/manifests the role of the sovereign power of the nation state in the construction of the collective memory of the Incident. The collective memory of the traumatic events conducted by the sovereign power always aims to consolidate the legitimacy of sovereign power itself. Those traumatic events therefore need to be remembered but also to be forgotten. In this vein, the power transition from the KMT to the DPP and the identity transformation from Chinese to Taiwanese should not be perceived as unqualified 'progress'.

As a result, the 2-28-incident is regarded as a symbol of the reconciliation of different ethnic groups, a warning about unification with mainland China, and above all, a symbol of autonomous Taiwanese nation and statehood. The mass-rally is designed to produce a harmonious post-2-28 political utopia like a pastoral paradise: a new Taiwan nation. Such political rhetoric brings out the very contradictory nature of the process of remembering the 2-28 Incident, manifesting two necessary elements in the process of nation building. First, the 2-28 Incident must be commemorated as a trauma in order to differentiate Taiwan from China. Second, it is also necessary to forget 2-28 in order to form a united and harmonious Taiwanese nation on the other. Indeed, Taiwanese nation-building is very much intertwined with 'remembering' and 'forgetting' the history of 2-28.

Above all, this chapter suggests that the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally as an event, as a social practice, helps re/constitute Taiwanese national identity. First of all, by holding a mass rally on a military threat from the PRC, the Pan-Green was trying to establish political unity, and such political coherence can be read as a form of distinctive identity. Second, Taiwan's distinctive consciousness is characterised by the living memory evolving from the island of Taiwan and continued resistance to China. The 2-28 Incident, by its name, seeks to demonstrate that people in Taiwan are constantly threatened by oppression from the

mainland. Third, the content of the rally was intended to draw a clear line of separation between Taiwan and China, and voters were asked to choose between the two. Joining the rally suggested that one was acting to prioritise Taiwan.

The mass rally, as a political ritual, is designed to construct/consolidate a shared identity through a mass mobilisation and collective labour of the people. Such a rally has a double focus: it is *a physical object* – a material reality such as a human chain, and also *a symbol* or something of spiritual significance, something shared by the group that is superimposed on this physical reality. The physical display of the human chain would certainly disappear after the campaign. Nevertheless, the fading of the human chain would not dismantle the collective memory of a certain group of people, since they create symbolic representations of those physical objects. Those symbolic representations detach those objects from their physical environment and connect them with the beliefs of the group. The rally should therefore be understood as a physical performance of remembering the Incident itself. It materialized the Incident. The rally, moreover, transformed its materiality to a much more abstract, conceptual and spiritual symbolic representation. And through this symbolic representation, a specific remembrance of the 2-28 Incident was reserved and a political community - the Taiwanese nation - was accordingly kept in existence. Hence, while the actual performance – the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally - was effaced, the group's beliefs became stronger.

5-5. Conclusion

Three observations should be pointed out in concluding this chapter. Firstly, the interpretation of the 2-28-incident as an instrument to oppose the PRC is very problematic. At a first glance, this interpretation might not seem very convincing – considering the fact that the PRC was not even founded until more than two years after the incident occurred. In fact, Chinese communists were involved in the incident, helping the revolt of the Taiwanese against nationalist China under the KMT regime. There might be little evidence to back up the contention that Communists played a major role in the incident. Yet, one cannot deny that some communists, most famously Xie Xue-Hong, were involved in it by resisting Chiang's KMT regime during that time. More importantly, this way of commemoration dismisses those 2-28 victims who were members of Taiwanese Communist Party but fled to

China in the wake of the incident to avoid execution by the KMT. Their experiences/memories/narrations of the incident are silenced. One example is the DPP government's refusal in 2004 to grant an entry visa to an ethnic Taiwanese who escaped to China in 1949, and who as a victim of the 2-28 incident, planned to visit Taiwan for shooting a documentary on the tragic event. Secondly, commemorating the 2-28 Incident in 2004 – remembering and forgetting – conceals a troubling issue: the violence of the sovereign state against its citizens. The problematic aspect of the '2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally' is its state-led nature. The Incident indeed serves a variety of agendas, one of which is that the state-led commemoration evokes the incident as part of a narrative of national awakening. In the final analysis, the rally should not be perceived as a resistance towards sovereign power, but as another concealed form of state violence towards its citizens through the creation of a narrative of a coherent national identity or an oppressive national unity. The case of the rally demonstrates a situation in which the sovereign state inserts meaning into a traumatic event by imposing a specific reading of the past in the light of a present needs – political competition.

In effect, this chapter aimed to understand how the election campaign as a social practice discursively contributed to the process of people's self-identification in Taiwan, inquiring into what elements characterised this self-identification. To do so, it scrutinised a specific election campaign in the 2004 presidential election – the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally. Drawing from Maurice Halbwachs' elaborations of the social construction of memory in the light of present needs and Jenny Edkins's studies about the role of sovereign power in the production of traumatic memory, the discussion investigated how collective memory of trauma was produced in the course of commemorating the 2-28 Incident in the context of the 2004 election campaign, and how this memory production led to the parallel formation of a Taiwanese national identity. This chapter has shown that political considerations during the election campaign as 'present needs' shape the various views of the past as they are manifested. The 2004 demonstration was designed to remember the 2-28 Incident as a historical trauma in order to be forgotten. The remembering of 2-28 Incident must be regarded as a constructive process as opposed to a retrieval process. The memory of the 2-28 Incident was selectively constituted in favour of sovereign power.

The limits of this chapter need to be pointed out at the end. Firstly, the chapter does not intend to investigate how people from different classes, generations, ethnic groups, regions or genders memorise the 2-28 Incident. Each social group from different generations and locations of course has its own memory of the 2-28 Incident which differs from others to a greater or lesser extent. Secondly, this chapter does not claim that either the organisers of the mass-rally or in a more general sense, the sovereign power, can achieve their aims in full. Resistance is always possible, although it is not within the remit of this chapter to tackle this issue. The next chapter will explore the possibility of resistance to sovereign power by looking at a social movement in Taiwan – the Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006.



CHAPTER 6

Essay on Resistance

The Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006 in Taiwan

6-1. Introduction

6-1-1. The Myth of Sisyphus – A Vain Labour of Resistance?

In the painting, a naked man against the red and dark sky is straining to raise the huge stone, rolling it and pushing it up a slope. His face is screwed up, his cheek tight against the stone, his shoulder bracing the mass, his foot wedging it, his arms outstretched upholding the stone. What this painting does not illustrate is that when the man's goal has been attained, he will watch the stone roll back down the slope to the bottom, from where he has to push it up again toward the summit. Works of art are made for the imagination to breathe life into them.

The protagonist of this oil painting (1920), illustrated by a German Symbolist painter Franz von Stuck (1863-1928), is Sisyphus of Greek mythology. Sisyphus was a king who was punished by the gods for his avarice and deceitfulness. He was compelled for all eternity to roll a huge stone up a steep hill, but before he reached the top of the hill, the rock always escaped him and he had to begin again. This eternal torture that Sisyphus suffered personifies a vain labour. He was bound to an eternity of frustration – pointless and interminable labouring. The situation of Sisyphus, as this chapter tries to argue, symbolises human efforts in pursuit of total freedom and autonomy – the ultimate goal of resistance to domination.

The (im)possibility of resistance¹⁴⁷ was a central theme in the political and social theory of a group of French philosophers in the 1960s and the 1970s. Among others, Foucault

¹⁴⁷ The term resistance that this chapter is concerned with refers to a *critical* resistance. According to Hoy (2005), the word 'resistance' does not distinguish between freedom and domination. It can be against domination, and in the name of emancipation. But it can also be domination's resistance to emancipatory efforts – a reactionary resistance (2005, 12). That is why he puts the word 'critical' to speak of emancipatory resistance.

contends that 'humanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination' (Foucault 1977a, 151). He goes on to argue that the story of the modern era can be narrated in terms of a kind of progress, although ironically progress takes the form of the refinement and spreading of techniques of domination. This position is in fact similar to that of Adorno, who spoke of the disastrous continuity of history 'leading from slingshot to the megaton bomb' (Adorno 1973; cited in Best et al. 1991, 37).

Indeed, Foucault's historical analysis in works such as *Discipline and Punish* and *History of Sexuality* attempt to write the history of 'polymorphous techniques of power', manifesting the delicate and omnipresent exercises of power in the modern era. Power is portrayed as diffused throughout the social field, constituting subjectivities, knowledge and the pleasures of the individual. However, if Foucault is correct in depicting power as being so pervasive and omnipresent, then any kind of resistance seems impossible and ultimately pointless. His own interventions into political struggles and genealogical critiques of the social world would accordingly make very little sense. Fredric Jameson argues that Foucault is trapped in a 'winner loses' logic, that is, the more Foucault wins by portraying power as omnipresent and omnipotent, the more he loses insofar as his critical voice of refusal becomes incompetent (Jameson 1984; cited in Hoy 2005, 9).

It is however arguable, as shown in Chapter Two, whether Foucault's notion of power is as absolutely repressive as many critiques have contended, allowing no possibility of resistance. In fact, Foucault argues that as soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance. Resistance for Foucault refers to the challenge of subjectification. Because the subject/subjectivity is produced within power relations, resistance accordingly signifies a renunciation of the subject. The core task of the social movements in contemporary society is therefore to challenge all forms of subjectification. His studies form part of a strategy of resistance, exposing the beginnings and developments of the discourses and practices through which human beings are subjectified. Hence Foucault does not reject the possibility of resistance, for it is a commitment to this possibility that animates his work.

Nevertheless, one should not neglect the fact that Foucault's works emphasise domination over resistance in a significantly unbalanced way. Indeed, most of his historical

works can be read as a critique of ‘modernity’, a modernity which has produced a set of disciplinary institutions, practices, and discourses which legitimate its modes of domination and control. To Foucault, everything is dangerous, even resistance in the name of ‘emancipation’. What he tries to remind us is that, when one thinks of a successful resistance – the dissolution of an old subjectivity – one merely produces a new subjectivity – another form of domination. Moreover, because resistance can become domination, Foucault avoids providing an adequate account of what it might involve (e.g. the scope, details and tactics of resistance) as he analyses the technologies of power, although he has on occasion pointed to tactics of resistance. What he suggests is a concept of micro-politics, in which numerous local groups contest diffuse and decentred forms of power spreading throughout society. Since power is plural and decentred, so in turn must be forms of resistance. Foucault therefore calls for a plurality of autonomous struggles waged throughout the micro-levels of society, without linking these various struggles to form a unified ‘counter-hegemonic bloc’, in Gramscian terminology.

Indeed, domination and resistance are intimately related to each other. They are inseparable. It is therefore difficult to specify what counts as ‘progress/improvement’ insofar as the relations between domination and resistance can always be reversed. That is, resistance to a form of domination would produce another form of domination - a circular relationship between domination and resistance.

In the case of Taiwan, the formation of Taiwanese national identity/Taiwanese nationalism is commonly regarded as a resistance to various forms of domination. This way of understanding the nature of Taiwanese identity derives, as Chapter Three has shown, from two prevailing strands of arguments in the current scholarly literature. Firstly, the formation of Taiwanese identity is narrated as a resistance to Japanese colonisation and the KMT’s re-colonisation of Taiwan. Secondly, it is comprehended as a revolt against Communist China’s military intimidation and its authoritarianism. The formation of Taiwanese identity in the end is gauged as an emancipation of the subject or a creation of the subjectivity of Taiwan/the Taiwanese.

Nevertheless, the rise of Taiwanese nationalism also turned out to be a form of domination, in the sense that it has blocked many other viable forms of life and identities. Frantz Fanon in *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) and Edward W. Said in *Culture and Imperialism*

(1994) have both indicated the problematic aspects of the rise of nationalism and its complicity in the oppression of people in former colonies of Western nations. Indeed, Taiwanese nationalists often tell the people of Taiwan who they *really* are and what they *really* ought to do – a subjectification of ‘the Taiwanese’, which refers to various ways in which the people of Taiwan are made into a subject of a particular kind. The suspicion arises that this subjectification is itself a form of domination that blocks political alternatives.¹⁴⁸ However, the above-discussion of the connections between resistance and domination suggests that resistance to the rise of Taiwanese nationalism cannot lead to ultimate freedom – the liberation of the subject – but only to another form of domination. Just as Sisyphus rolls the boulder up the hill only to see it roll back down, resistance inevitably produces domination. However, does this mean that resistance is inevitably ineffectual or hopeless? Must we just accept any kind of domination? A consideration of Albert Camus’ discussion of Sisyphus’s situation might be a helpful way of thinking through these questions.

To Camus, life is meaningless, or what he called ‘the absurd’. Yet, if life has no meaning, is life worth living? This is the central question addressed in his philosophical essay, *The Myth of Sisyphus*. The answer he suggested is ‘yes’. Camus is in fact interested in pursuing a third possibility, that is, that we can accept and live in a world devoid of meaning or purpose. To Camus, living with the absurd does not entail suicide but, on the contrary, allows us to live life to its fullest. Camus presents this argument in his discussion of the situation of Sisyphus. As he claims, Sisyphus is the ideal absurd hero and that his punishment is a metaphor for the human condition – a ceaseless and pointless toiling at futile jobs with no hope of success. The fate of human beings is no less absurd and is, indeed, tragic. Nevertheless, according to Camus, acknowledging the truth will conquer it. Camus argues that Sisyphus is truly happy precisely because the futility of his task is beyond doubt: the certainty of Sisyphus’s fate frees him to recognise the absurdity of his plight and to carry out his actions with contented acceptance, which Camus argues to be a form of true happiness. He writes:

Sisyphus, proletarian of the gods, powerless and rebellious, knows the whole extent of his wretched condition: it is what he thinks of during his descent. The lucidity that was to constitute his torture at the same time crowns his victory. There is no fate that cannot be surmounted by scorn. If the descent is thus sometimes performed in sorrow, it can also take place in joy. This word is not too much. Again I fancy

¹⁴⁸ i.e. social identities – gender, class, sexuality, and etc – or other spatial identities – subregional, regional, postnational, transnational, cosmopolitan, and etc.

Sisyphus returning toward his rock, and the sorrow was in the beginning. When the images of earth cling too tightly to memory, when the call of happiness becomes too insistent, it happens that melancholy rises in man's heart: this is the rock's victory, this is the rock itself. The boundless grief is too heavy to bear. These are our nights of Gethsemane. But crushing truths perish from being acknowledged. (1995, 117-8)

Sisyphus, just like the absurd man, keeps pushing. As long as Sisyphus accepts that there is nothing more to life than this absurd struggle, then he can find happiness in it. Camus concludes, 'the struggle itself towards the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy' (ibid, 119).

What Camus tried to say is that the meaning of life is found in life itself. In considering resistance, one can also contend that the meaning of resistance exists in the practice of resisting, in the struggle itself. Resistance in this aspect should be perceived not only as practice, but also an attitude. It is the practice of refusal. It is also an attitude that refuses to give in to resignation.

The aim of this chapter is to contemplate questions about what is meant by resistance and how it is (im)possible. To do so, this chapter investigates the so-called Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006. It is argued that the movement should be regarded as a resistance to the formation of Taiwanese national identity – a specific subjectification of the people of Taiwan as 'the Taiwanese'.

6-1-2. The Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006 in Taiwan

The Anti-Corruption Movement to depose President Chen Shui-Bian and to oppose corruption in the government marks a new chapter in the history of the democratic movement in Taiwan. Chen had been accused of corruption since he was reelected in 2004 for his second term. The term has been plagued by scandals: his close aids and his relatives, including the first lady, all have been indicted for corruption. The president's problems worsened in May 2006 when his son-in-law was detained and later indicted on suspicion of insider trading and taking bribes. Chen publicly apologised for his son-in-law's behaviour. Prosecutors then began looking at whether Chen had misused funds intended for national affairs and questioned him, even though prosecutors have no authority to formally indict

Chen while he is in power.¹⁴⁹ The constitution gives the president immunity. Chen denied any wrongdoing, but his approval ratings fell to about 20% (CT 28/05/06, A3).

Following a series of accusations of corruption against Chen and members of the first family, the Pan-Blue decided to initiate a recall in the legislature in June 2006 to push Chen out of office. The recall motion was, however, defeated. Out of the 221-member legislature, 119 lawmakers from the Pan-Blue and non-partisan legislators supported the recall – 29 votes short of the two-thirds majority (147 ballots needed to pass the motion) (CT 28/06/06, A1).¹⁵⁰ If passed, it would have triggered a national referendum on whether Chen should step down. Chen successfully retained the support of the Pan-Green. DPP legislators refused to cast votes, while TSU cast invalid votes.

After the failure of the recall motion initiated by the Pan-Blue, Chen faced another political challenge when his own camp appeared divided on whether he should step down amid allegations of corruption. Although the DPP did not withdraw its support for Chen, certain elements politely hinted that it would be best for Chen to resign.¹⁵¹ The most significant event was the release by a group of pro-Green academics of a statement on 15 July 2006 – the so-called ‘715 Proclamation’ – calling for Chen to consider stepping down. The second wave of the challenge to Chen was initiated by the former DPP chairman and long-time democracy and independence activist Shih Ming-Teh in early August 2006, when he announced a sit-in protest against Chen, and expressed his determination to remove Chen from his post. The movement went through four major mobilisation peaks, namely the early sit-in protests, the ‘Surround the City’ protest, the ‘Surround the Island’ protest, and the ‘Besiege the Presidential Office’ demonstration respectively. Lasting for two months, and with immense intensity, the movement finally went into an abrupt decline in mid-October.

¹⁴⁹. He was accused of pocketing cash from a Presidential Office expense fund by claiming reimbursement for fake expenditures. Prosecutors found only half the funds for which Chen’s office had declared receipts and suspected that some of the money might have been used illegally.

¹⁵⁰. According to ‘Law Governing Legislators’ Exercise of Power’, one quarter of lawmakers must agree on a recall proposal before it can proceed to the legislature’s Procedure Committee. The consent of two-thirds of lawmakers must be obtained to pass the proposal. The recall motion must then be put to a referendum. If more than half of the electorate casts ballots in the referendum and a simple majority of the ballots cast are in support of the motion, then the recall motion becomes effective.

¹⁵¹. There have been calls from within his own party for his resignation, since there was some fear among the DPP that the scandals would affect the legislative election of 2007 and the Presidential election in 2008.

6-1-3. Research Questions, Key Arguments and Outline of the Chapter

Through a study of the movement, this chapter aims to contribute to an understanding of the particular ways in which subjectivity is resisted, and what kind of alternative subjectivity is produced in contemporary Taiwanese society. It asks four sets of related questions. Firstly, in what sense was the movement a resistance, a resistance to what? And if resistance is to challenge subjectification, then what specific subjectification(s) of 'the Taiwanese' was/were contested in the movement? Secondly, if it was a resistance, what was the movement's discourse? How was it organised; what were their strategies; what actions were conducted and what rhetoric was produced? Thirdly, how did the Pan-Green respond to the movement? In other words, what counter-discourse(s) existed, if any? And fourthly, how did it fail in the end?

Three characteristics of this movement are briefly pointed out at the beginning of this chapter. Firstly, this is an autonomously gathering movement. There was no evidence of mobilisation by any political party (e.g. KMT). Secondly, as many political commentators (e.g. Chao 2006) have indicated, the movement transcended gender, class and ethnic divisions. In terms of gender, it was plain from media coverage that female participants far exceeded their male counterparts. In terms of class, the movement was not simply a middle-class anti-corruption movement. Its participants included people from middle and lower classes of all trades. In terms of ethnicity, the participants were not only the Mainlanders – well represented in most political campaigns organised by the Pan-Blue – but also the native Taiwanese, especially the Minnan people, who are generally regarded as strong supporters of the DPP. Minnan dialect was often heard during the campaign. Thirdly and most importantly, this movement was ostensibly intended to transcend partisan, ideological and identity divisions. Campaign organisers and supporters expressed a strong reluctance to being pushed into either the green (independence, identification with Taiwan) or the blue (unification, identification with China) camps. Campaign organisers argued that many public/social issues, such as corruption, were hijacked by party affiliations and identity politics. The movement therefore intends to establish the possibility of creating grass-roots networks outside the traditional party system and identity politics, expanding the scope and focus of the island's fledgling democracy. However, this non-partisan stand was intensely challenged by the Pan-Green when the movement emerged. Pan-Green politicians argued that one should not neglect the fact that ideology-identity politics were still being played out

within the movement. Although the campaign leaders and supporters did not use any Chinese nationalist rhetoric in this movement, 'Chinese identity' still played important roles in the movement to overthrow the DPP government, the first 'indigenized' regime, thereby dismantling Taiwanese identity.

As a result, the major battlefield between the two sides is clear. That is, how the 'nature' of the movement – the campaign's appeals, its organisers and supporters – is defined and represented. In effect, both sides struggled to either define or counter-define the movement through any possible means – actions and words. Newspapers, magazines and broadcasters gave extraordinary attention to the movement. Academics were also involved in the wrangle. A series of press conferences and forums were held by both sides. Moreover, both sides organised a number of mass rallies, competing with each other. The activities/actions of those mass rallies were carefully designed, including the decoration of the venue, the route of the protest, the choice of theme colour and songs. Those efforts were all aimed at defining the nature of movement. The movement became not simply a physical site but a discursive space in which different forces completed and contested. The whole event was actually a confrontation among discourses and through discourses. This chapter scrutinises those discourses.

Through investigating this event, this chapter argues three things. Firstly, while many people perceived the formation of Taiwanese identity as a resistance towards Chinese chauvinism/nationalism – a post-colonial form (politically and culturally) of resistance – it effectively turned into domination in the name of emancipation/liberation insofar as it prevents other forms of political life. Secondly, the anti-corruption movement should be understood as resisting the formation of Taiwanese national identity for several reasons. The first of these is that it opposed the idea that everything under the name of 'love Taiwan', 'nation-state-building', or 'localisation' can be legitimised. The second is that the campaigners deliberately rejected all talk of identity issues. This rejection itself should be understood as an act of resistance. Finally, it attempted to resist the dichotomy of Green/Blue, Independence/Unification, and Taiwanese/Chinese, aiming to resort to higher universal values. The third point argued in the chapter is that the movement, on the surface, has failed. It failed because, obviously, the president did not step down. And more importantly, the movement failed because it unwittingly became trapped in the

confrontation between the two political camps, two ideologies, and after all, two national identities. The movement eventually ended as a vigorous battle over partisan politics and national identity – just as Sisyphus rolls the boulder up the hill only to see it roll back down.

Nevertheless, the chapter does not draw the conclusion that the movement is meaningless. The movement is both a practice and an attitude of resistance to domination: a certain subjectification of ‘the Taiwanese’. It opens the possibility of alternative forms of political life and is an indefinite political struggle grounded in the belief that things could be otherwise, even if one does not know exactly how. Yet, this chapter does not intend to suggest that this movement of resistance, even if it had succeeded, would offer ultimate freedom for the subject – a total revolution. It is indeed very likely that the movement would turn into another form of domination. While the movement resists a specific subjectification (i.e. becoming Taiwanese), it, in effect, produces another subject. However, although the movement can become another form of domination, this chapter intends to justify its necessity for the creation of an alternative form of life. Meaning is found in the practice of resisting, in the struggle itself.

Section One of this chapter deals with the early stage of the anti-corruption movement. It focuses on a joint-statement – the so-called ‘July 15 Proclamation’ – issued by a group of pro-green academics, as well as the fundraising campaign for the oust- Chen protest initiated by Shih Ming-Teh. In addition, it also investigates the Pan-Green’s counter-strategies and analyses its rhetoric. Section Two investigates the middle stage of the movement. It looks over both sides’ political rhetoric and campaign activities. Section Three explores the final stage of the movement, in which the movement became captured in partisan/identity politics. The conclusion justifies the necessity of this ‘failed’ resistance.

6-2. Pushing Sisyphus’ Stone up a Slope – The Early Stage of the Anti-Corruption Movement (from the ‘July 15 Proclamation’ to Shih-Ming Teh’s Fundraising)

6-2-1. The ‘July 15 Proclamation’

Almost after the controversy created by the presidential recall motion in June had died down, the next wave of calls for Chen to step down gathered force. The difference this time was that it was no longer the Pan-Blue calling for his resignation, but rather a group of pro-

green academics and former political prisoners. On 15 July, 2006, a group of formerly staunch supporters of the DPP held a press conference, issuing a joint statement entitled, 'Democracy and the Moral Crisis of Taiwanese Identity: Our Appeal to the President, the Ruling Party and Taiwanese Citizens' (DMCTI), urging Chen to resign voluntarily. The statement was drafted by Wu Nai-De, an Academia Sinica research fellow, and supported by other academics and social activists, such as Zhang Fu-Zhong, known for his fight for democracy while Taiwan was still under the martial law imposed by the KMT, and some younger scholars associated with the 1990 DPP-led student movement.¹⁵² Together with a signature drive launched earlier, the statement attracted more than 4,000 signatures on the date of the press conference.

In the statement (DMCTI), these scholars said that the scandals that related to the president's close aides and family members are moral and political crises that are not unusual in democratic countries. It said that one should see them as an opportunity for reflection, a chance to elevate the stronger qualities of Taiwan's practices of democracy and seize the chance to reconsider the contents of *what it means to 'be Taiwanese'*. However, the statement noted that the DPP politicians do not do what they ought to do, but rather mobilise and manipulate ethnic sentiments. It indicated:

It is truly regrettable when the DPP leaders, rather than reflecting on themselves, attempted to mobilise and manipulate ethnic sentiments. More seriously, the people in Taiwan and even some academic figures had tried to divert the corruption issues in the direction of ethnic conflicts and national identity issues, aiming to repress the pursuit of democracy through resort to identity politics. As a consequence, the quality of democracy cannot be improved and Taiwanese identity turns to be an empty political motto. (Ibid)

The statement continued:

When the people of Taiwan no longer trust the president because of his alleged corruption involving his aides and family, they will also lose their trust in the government's policies and decisions...As he [the president] has lost the people's trust and dignity, the president should seriously consider resigning from his post. (Ibid)

The statement also indicated that the failed presidential recall vote in June showed that Chen had sufficient muscle to keep his presidency. But if he chose to resign despite his power, he

¹⁵² For the full list of 65 original initiators of the statement, please see *China Times* (16/07/06, A5)

would set a 'precious paradigm' for and make a contribution to Taiwan's democracy. The statement concluded:

To those Taiwanese citizens, we make this appeal: let us use the value and ideal of democracy to enrich the contents of Taiwanese identity. When we abandon our struggle to elevate the quality of Taiwan's democracy, we effectively tarnish our self-identification with Taiwan...The improvement of the quality of Taiwan's democracy is the only foundation that Taiwanese identity should be set upon. (Ibid)

At first glance, the statement is seen as a message to Chen to ask him to resign. Those scholars in the statement accused the president of failing to clear up the corruption charges, and said he has lost the ability to solve the country's crisis as the leader of pro-localisation forces. They therefore urged Chen to take political and moral responsibility and seriously consider stepping down. However, the statement should also be read as a deep reflection on Taiwanese national identity by pro-green academics and activists who once advocated the construction of Taiwanese national identity.

The statement focused on the interrelation between democracy and identity. To those scholars, in the process of the nation's pursuit of democracy, as every step towards democracy, Taiwan has further clarified 'what Taiwan is' and 'who we are.' Democratisation had led to localisation and the formation of a Taiwanese identity. Democratisation and the formation of Taiwanese national identity are intimately intertwined. Good practices of democracy produce good contents of 'Taiwanese national identity'. Hence, corruption that happened in the process of democratisation, particularly when the president wantonly exercised his power in the name of a localised regime, would deteriorate the contents of 'being Taiwanese'. And it would even further lead to the country's identity crisis as people become frustrated and disappointed with the DPP and the president. One article published in a newspaper exemplified this point of view. It states:

I can no longer remember when the term 'localisation' first became popular. The only thing I am sure of is that identity issues have been the focus of every election in Taiwan in recent years. This has brought with it self-proclaimed pro-localisation activists and organisations, although we are never told what their actual contribution to Taiwan is, except that they are always there when the DPP asks for support. In the same way, they will always defend the DPP if someone criticises it...This is how most Taiwanese perceive the pro-localisation forces. The question is whether pro-localisation activists need to be so blind and ignorant? (Lin Yu-Jen, *TT* 19/07/06, 8)

Indeed, the DPP has sought to expand its political map by promoting itself as a native

party devoted to building Taiwan. But this platform has lost its appeal after a spate of corruption scandals came to light. To those scholars, localisation should not be used as a veil by any political party to cover up impotence and corruption. As they claimed at the press conference held on 15 July, the true meaning of localisation is to ensure clean politics and honesty, bringing happiness to the Taiwanese people. Localisation should not be a tool to legitimatise corruption. Allegations of corruption involving Chen became the major culprits undermining the localisation and democratisation of Taiwan. According to this line of thought, it was best for Chen to step down. This is not because clean government is more important than democracy, but because corruption had made Chen unable to represent Taiwan's democracy and Taiwan's national identity. Therefore, Chen must go. Only by his resignation can the quality of democracy be strengthened, thereby enriching Taiwan's national identity (*CT* 16/07/06, A3). The statement indeed points out a predicament in the process of Taiwan's nation-state building.

In addition, it is important to note that these pro-green scholars carefully manoeuvred their petition so as not to fall into the trap of antagonism between green and blue, between pro-independence and pro-unification, and between Taiwanese identity and Chinese identity. They carefully chose their rhetoric. For instance, Wu Nai-De, a chief organiser of the campaign, denied at the press conference the move was an 'anti-Chen movement'. He said their major aim is to improve Taiwan's democracy, not to 'topple' Chen (*ibid.*). He emphasised that seeking a more mature democracy and Taiwanese identity are the ultimate goal. Wu stated, 'Taking down the president is not the objective. The problem is not about pro-Chen or anti-Chen issues. Rather, it is all about *what kind of democracy Taiwan's people want*' (*ibid.*; also *TN* 16/07/06; emphasis added). Another scholar Lin Kuo-Ming who signed the statement expressed similar concerns. He wrote a commentary in the press. The article states:

[I]n trying to ascertain how responsible Chen is for the scandals, we've become stuck in the quagmire of partisan politics. Amid clashes between the pan-blue and pan-green camps, any attempt to show how shortcomings in our legal institutions may have contributed to abuses of power and corruption – and how reform should be implemented – has incited accusations that we were trying to vindicate Chen for his role in recent scandals. This, in turn, has suppressed reasonable efforts to set in motion institutional reforms. (Lin, *TT* 31/07/06, 8)

Indeed, if those scholars and signatories were labelled as blue sympathisers, the power of the statement would be weakened. As the then-KMT Chairman Ma Ying-Jiu said, the Pan-Blue's

views differed very little from those expressed by the pro-DPP scholars. But the same remarks made by the Pan-Blue were described as ‘a political struggle or an attempt to fan ethnic conflicts.’ Ma continued, ‘Now that the pro-green academics have come out and made their statement, it’s easier to see the problem more clearly’ (CP 16/07/07).

The ‘715 campaign’ in short marked the first attempt of the pro-DPP figures’ formal demands, pressing Chen to step down in the wake of a series of alleged corruption. The statement attracted much attention from all sectors of society. It indeed cast a shadow over Chen’s already fragile leadership. It had a more forceful effect on Chen than scathing criticism by the opposition parties, not only because the voice of academics carries some weight in Taiwan’s society, but more importantly, because what they said was seen as domestic critique within the green camp. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a counter-discourse existed. Many other Pan-Preen and pro-independent figures disagreed with those academics’ view. They worried that the threat to Chen’s presidency arose from a scheme orchestrated by the KMT and China to foment chaos in Taiwan. The ultimate goal of this chaos was believed to be the destruction of the democratic regime and of DPP’s efforts to consolidate Taiwanese national identity. It was therefore argued to be necessary to support Chen – the Son of Taiwan – the first ‘native’ non-KMT president.

6-2-2. Shih Ming-Teh’s Fundraising Campaign

The next wave in the green camp to call for Chen’s resignation came in early August 2006, when Shih Ming-Teh launched a fundraising campaign to finance a series of demonstrations, with the objective of ousting him from office.

Shih is a legendary and a highly respected political figure in Taiwanese political circles, dubbed ‘Taiwan’s Nelson Mandela’ for spending years in jail for fighting against the KMT’s authoritarian rule. In 1962, Shih was convicted of sedition for running a cadet discussion group that challenged the KMT’s authoritarian rule, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was, however, released in 1977 following Chiang Kai-Shek’s death in 1975. The amnesty was granted to prisoners, a gesture typically performed at the end of a Chinese emperor’s reign. Once out of prison, he devoted himself full-time to the oppositional movement. Shih was the most radical among other figures. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for sedition for the second time. While in prison between 1985 and 1986, Shih went on hunger strike. Many of his friends wrote articles and letters calling on the

international community to put pressure on the KMT regime. Eventually, he was released in 1990. Chen Shui-Bian acted as his defence lawyer while Shih and the other participants were on trial. Shih spent more than 25 years in total in jail under the KMT's rule. Afterwards, Shih served as DPP chairman between 1994 and 1996 before quitting the party in 2000 (*CT* 10/08/06, A3; Shih 2007, 2).

Shih's campaign was called 'A Million Voices against Corruption – President Chen Must Go'. It began with Shih's private letter to the president. The content of the letter was published in the Chinese-language newspaper *China Times* on 9 August 2006. In the letter, dubbing himself the president's 'old comrade in arms', Shih urges Chen to step down from his post since he had lost the people's trust following the corruption allegations. He writes: 'For the sake of Taiwan and the DPP, I urge the president to step down bravely. Only a truly brave warrior admits his mistakes and gives up what he holds dear' (*CT* 09/08/06, A1).¹⁵³ The letter argued that the leader of an/the 'indigenous' regime is not irreplaceable. 'The value of democracy lies in the fact that the country is unafraid to have a change of leaders' (*ibid*).

Shih told the *China Times* reporters on 9 August 2006 to elaborate his motives for writing the letter. He said that he was agonised over writing it, yet he had to speak on behalf of the ordinary people. Shih urged Chen to step down as soon as possible since the Presidential Office has become a source of social unrest. He said, 'the head of state has the responsibility to solve problems (for the country), and when he becomes the source of the trouble, he has to ponder whether it's time to go' (*CT* 10/08/06, A3; *TN* 10/08/06). Referring to the opposition parties' failed recall motion in July due to the DPP legislators' opposition, Shih said that Chen cannot rely only on his party and supporters to come to his rescue, because if such defence were effective, the trouble would have been over long ago. Shih stressed that he would not want to see 'revolutionary measures', but if the impasse continued, he would not believe that Chen and his administration could stay in peace. He then said, 'Because the people have lost their trust and faith, the country won't be freed from the crisis. This is what motivated me to write the letter' (*ibid*).

Shih announced on the following day that he would intensify his campaign, hoping to

¹⁵³ The content of Shih's letter can also be found in:
<http://www.red.org.tw/index.php?stat=News&DAId=6>

gain the support of at least one million people. He also urged KMT chairman Ma and Vice President Lu to join his effort. Shih appealed to the public to donate NT\$100 (US\$3) each to the campaign, which he said would show their commitment and authorisation in support of the campaign and was a way to examine people's feelings about Chen. All donations would be used to fund the protest. He announced that after collecting the support of one million people the campaign to oust Chen would be launched on 9 September with daily sit-ins in front of the Presidential Office. The unused funds after the campaign would be donated to children from poor families. He added, his campaign was organised after all other measures, including calls from the people, the recall staged by the opposition parties, and pleas by pro-DPP scholars, had failed to unseat Chen.

On 12 August, Shih formally launched his fundraising campaign at Taipei's 2-28 Peace Memorial Park in the company of dozens of academics, doctors and personalities. At the event, Shih said that the campaign was supported by people with various political affiliations and ethnic origins. He said

When one million citizens stand up, it won't be an ethnic clash or political confrontation. Our only goal would be to oppose corruption and depose A-Bian [president Chen's nickname]. (*CT* 13/08/06, A3; also *TT* 13/08/06, 1)

In Taiwan's politicised society, he added, there is neither black nor white but only blue and green. Shih thus vowed to change this situation. He accused Chen of falling into nepotism and cronyism. Giving a thumbs-down to the president, Shih emphasised that he took action on behalf of Taiwan, justice and integrity. He said that the campaign was not launched because he does not love the president or the DPP. 'It's because I love Taiwan, justice and integrity more' (*ibid*). He also noted that if the judicial system can transparently carry out its investigations into the scandals surrounding Chen, then people's discontent with Chen would not be so great.

Shih then called for various social groups to raise their voices and ask Chen to resign. Shih's remarks were echoed widely in Taiwan's society. A group of artists – more than one hundred members of the literary and arts community – backed Shih's call. The famous photographer Xie Chun-De was particularly highlighted (*CT* 16/08/06, A3). Xie helped Chen to campaign for the posts of Taipei mayor in 1994 and president in 2000. Another former DPP chairman Xu Xin-Liang also led a group of former DPP members to show

their support for Shih's campaign (CT 19/08/06, A3). Moreover, representatives of 14 bar associations around the country also launched a campaign, asking their colleagues nationwide to sign their joint statement urging Chen to resign. Wei Qian-Feng, an attorney and the former chairman of the Taiwan Association for Human Rights, and Attorney Luo Bing-Cheng, who served as Chen's defence attorney in the lawsuit over the vote recount after the 2004 presidential election, all joined Shih's campaign (CT 20/08/06, A3; TT 20/08/06, 1).

The target to collect NT\$100 million was accomplished within six working days. Shih's campaign announced that total contributions had hit NT\$100 million as of 22 August. On 24 August, all donation accounts were closed, and the next day Shih announced that the fundraising campaign had raised NT\$109,180,809 (CT 25/08/06, A2). The speed and the scale of the fundraising campaign took many by surprise. Shih argued that the campaign would make Chen realise the great number of people – supposedly more than one million – calling for Chen to voluntarily resign.

Shih's series of initiatives designed to compel Chen to step down came under the local media spotlight. Shih's activities have symbolic significance due to his historical ties with the DPP and his important role in the dissident movement of the Martial Law era and in the nation's democratisation process. Realising the significance of Shih's move, president Chen, in response, aimed to consolidate the Pan-Green, preventing any other Pan-Green heavyweights such as the Former President Lee from joining Shih's camp. In addition, Chen's camp attempted to define Shih's movement as part of the Pan-Blue's attempt to overthrow the 'localised regime' in the context of the confrontation between the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green.

6-2-3. Pan-Green's Counter-Strategies: (I) Consolidating Pan-Green Camp

Earlier on, in response to the call from some pro-Green academics for him to voluntarily resign, Chen had arranged to meet with several presidential advisers, key players within his administration and party, legislators, as well as city and county chiefs, to consolidate their support and solicit their opinions. Although some meetings were called off due to dissatisfaction with Chen within the green camp,¹⁵⁴ Chen successfully secured

¹⁵⁴ For instance, the talk with members of the party and the executive and legislative branches

sufficient backing within his camp by pledging himself to push Taiwan's nation-state building project.

Among them, one of the most decisive meetings was with eleven (former) presidential advisers at the Taipei Guest House, advisers who are generally regarded as the pro-independence hardliners. The meeting came one day after the group of pro-green academics urged Chen to step down on 15 July. After the meeting, Chen showed his determination to forge on as president. According to the then-Presidential Office Secretary-General Chen Tang-Shan (also known as Mark Chen), all eleven advisers told the president that it was not necessary for him to step down because he was elected by the people to serve a four-year term and that he should stay on the job until his term expires. They also advised Chen to establish a sound mechanism to safeguard Taiwan's national security and sovereignty so the nation could be free from fear caused by China's military intimidation, as one of the former senior advisers invited to the meeting told the press (*TT* 17/07/06, 1). Chen in response vowed to spend the rest of his term realising his 2004 campaign platform, including constitutional reform.¹⁵⁵

Chen's pledge to those pro-independence hardliners was soon reflected in his statement issued on 21 July, on the eve of the DPP's national convention, in which he insisted that he would never consider resigning. In his 3,000-word statement, entitled 'Democratic Predicament and Political Ethics', a response to the '715 Proclamation', Chen pledged to uphold Taiwan's national consciousness and implement social justice in his remaining two years as president. He stated:

Insistence on 'Taiwan awareness' and the fulfilment of social fairness and justice are A-Bian's core values for the next two years. Localisation, culture, environmental protection, ecology and the weak will all be the key focuses of efforts. (LT 22/07/06; TN 22/07/06; emphasis added)

Chen then said that creating a suitable new constitution was the key to consolidating and

scheduled on 17 July 2006 was cancelled at the last minute at the suggestion of the then-DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-Kun, while some of the DPP legislators complained that the meetings with the President Chen were only a 'lecture' to them rather than a true communication between two parts. As one of the legislators said, 'no one will take part in such meetings in the future if it turns out to be yet another lecture session' (*CP* 16/07/06, A3).

¹⁵⁵ As stated elsewhere in this thesis, the new constitution has long been seen as one of the most important steps towards the *de jure* independence of Taiwan by most Taiwanese independence proponents.

deepening democracy. 'If Taiwan loses its sovereignty and becomes a second Hong Kong, its democracy will have no opportunity to develop further' (ibid.). In the statement, Chen also pledged to delegate some of his powers to the DPP party, allowing DPP's central standing committee to serve as a platform for policy coordination and consultation between the party, the Executive Yuan and the DPP legislative caucus (ibid.).¹⁵⁶ These measures handing over some of his powers to the other members of DPP were generally believed in Taiwan to be an effort by Chen to seek support within his own party.

After Shih launched his fundraising campaign, Chen in response said on various occasions that he would continue the pursuit of Taiwan's independence. For instance, Chen gave a speech at the Ketagalan Institute on 12 August in response to Shih. The institute was founded by Chen after he became the president in 2000, following in the footsteps of past two authoritarian leaders, Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Teng-Hui. The school was set up to train future national leaders. His choice to give the speech at his own political school was the most risk-free decision possible, and also the most authoritarian. Speaking on the 'Arts of Leadership' (AL),¹⁵⁷ Chen firstly stressed the importance of 'the rule of law in democracy'. He insisted that any moves against him must adhere to the constitution. He stated:

If a president has done a poor job, then the Constitution offers express provisions, including recall, impeachment or even a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet, all of which are very important parts of the constitutional order...Using revolutionary means which lead to the shedding of blood does not produce progress in a democracy, but instead engenders its regression...the issue is by no means who should step down...The core issue is the constitutional system.

Secondly, he also spoke of problems relating to the constitutional system. He said, 'The serious issue is the constitutional system, and we need to make efforts to firmly establish a constitutional system.' He then continued to reaffirm his 'historical mission' of crafting a new constitution for Taiwan. He said that his biggest dream in life is to create a new constitution for Taiwan, and that he would have everlasting regret if he cannot fulfil this dream. He stressed that he would 'shoulder the cross of Taiwan's history,' insisting 'on Taiwan's sovereignty' and pushing 'for constitutional re-engineering' in his remaining time in

¹⁵⁶ During the first recall motion initiated by Pan-Blue, Chen had promised to give the then-Premier Su Zhen-Chang a free rein regarding personnel appointments in the Cabinet.

¹⁵⁷ The full content of Chen's speech can be found in http://www.ketagalan.org.tw/index.php?framework_num=116&CID=151

office. Thirdly, in the speech Chen also spoke of how the issue of a 'national identity' had created numerous political conflicts. He stressed that identifying with Taiwan and sticking to the Taiwanese identity is the right path for the country. He noted that 'Taiwan is Taiwan, and China is China. Taiwan is definitely not China.' He said the identity issue in effect affected Taiwan's UN bid. Instead of asking for representation in the UN under the name of the 'Republic of China', which poses a problem as it competes with the 'People's Republic of China', Chen said Taiwan should seriously consider applying for UN entry under the name of 'Taiwan'.

Likewise, on another occasion when delivering a speech to supporters from his hometown at a gathering in Taipei, Chen made similar remarks. Chen told the people that he was particularly heartened by the boost from his long-term supporters. He stressed that he would follow the path of 'insisting on a separate identity for Taiwan, and the realisation of social justice' (*CT* 20/08/06, A2; *TN* 20/08/06). Similar to the remarks he made at Ketagalan Institute, Chen said that he would stay in office to 'press on with helping the country to join the UN under the name of Taiwan' and 'push for a new constitution' (*ibid*). In addition, Chen also resorted to the social stability rhetoric. He urged people to stay away from politically motivated activities, saying that stability is better for their livelihood from preventing China to take over Taiwan. He noted:

It is dangerous to create a stir in society as chaos may give Beijing an excuse to invade Taiwan. That would do us no good at all. So let's cherish what we have and look forward and join hands in protecting Taiwan. (*Ibid*)

Chen's resort to Taiwanese nationalism rhetoric was clearly the key to his resistance to any form of pressure from the calls for his resignation. Despite a small number of Pan-Green supporters being sceptical about Chen's objection to resigning, most of them lauded Chen's promise to kick off Taiwan's UN bid and introduce a new constitution for Taiwan. Members of the pro-independence groups called for proponents of Shih's campaign to pay more attention to other national issues of greater importance. They said that the name change for Taiwan's offices overseas, Taiwan's bid for joining the UN under the name of Taiwan, engineering of a new constitution, and moving Taiwan towards becoming a 'normal country' would better reflect Taiwan's current realities and better meet the needs of Taiwan.

6-2-4. Pan-Green's Counter-Strategies: (II) 'Red' is 'Blue'

Together with Chen's resort to Taiwanese nationalist rhetoric to consolidate his own camp, Chen's camp also attempted to define Shih's movement as parts of Pan-Blue's conspiracy.

As spelled out elsewhere in this thesis, it is noted that Taiwan's political situation has long been deadlocked because of the confrontation between the blue and green camps, and the two camps are split along lines of national identity (Taiwanese versus Chinese) as well as of ideology (pro-independence versus pro-unification). In green's supporters' mentality, the blue camp refused to respect the results of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections. The Pan-Blue politicians therefore resorted to any means to achieve their goal of unseating Chen, commencing unrelenting struggle to undermine the 'democratically elected' and 'localised' government, including producing stories about the need for Chen to step down such as corruption allegations. Hence, Pan-Green supporters tend to back down or at least hold great reservations about giving support to causes if they are deemed to be Pan-Blue activities, and would hardly back any campaign to oust Chen initiated by or affiliated with the blue camp, even if they were disappointed with Chen's performance on every ground. This kind of mentality was clearly manifested in an article, written by a prominent pro-independence scholar Lee Hsiao-Feng.

The article, under the title 'Building a new country is more important than anything else,' began with the author's dissatisfaction with president Chen's performance. Lee writes:

To be blunt, during his six years in office, Chen has not put all his efforts into building a new country...I have been particularly angered by the increasingly KMT demeanour of the DPP. Good examples of this behaviour can be seen in the alleged corruption of presidential aide...and the president's son-in-law... The scandal surrounding the Presidential Office's special allowances fund further underscores the problem. (*LT* 20/08/06, 15; also in *TT* 22/08/06, 8)

The author however said that he would not be participating in the efforts to force Chen out of office. He noted that the attempts by Pan-Blue to oust Chen were not a new phenomenon. The only difference was that this time, they had found a new excuse – anti-corruption. Yet, he said he never believed that the KMT was working against corruption. In fact, the KMT was 'engaging in political warfare...trying to destroy the image of the localised government in order to restore their old regime' (*ibid*). With this basic

understanding, Lee stated:

It is of course impossible for me to follow up on the failed recall motion by joining hands with the pro-green academics in a continued attempt to accomplish Pan-Blue's unfinished undertaking. It would be even more impossible for me to get up on stage with former DPP chairman Shih and let him use me as his tool, especially after having found that this group of people is filled with those looking for publicity, a platform or benefits. (Ibid)

He added that he actually sympathised with those pro-green '715 scholars', who want Chen to step down. Lee however criticised them for only focusing on the corruption issues. For Lee, considering the overall strategy of nation-state building, this was quite disproportionate. He also questioned Shih for not supporting their side in the past few years when they had been under vicious attack by Pan-Blue and their 'communist backers'. He asked, 'Why is Shih now instead standing on the side of Pan-Blue and calling on the president to step down' (ibid)? According to Lee, those issues all needed to be considered in discussions over whether Chen should step down.

The aforementioned article to great degree represents the collective rationale upheld by the Pan-Green supporters. Under this political situation, there is little room in the nation's politics for so-called 'moderates' or 'impartial figures'. And each side's political figures had no influence over supporters of its counterpart. Particularly for figures with a strong affiliation or background on one side, their original supporters would rightly consider that those figures have betrayed them if they swung rapidly and sharply to the other side. Therefore, although Shih had been a political dissident during the KMT authoritarian era and served as the chairman for the DPP in the 1990s, people were wondering where he stood now, with the green or the blue. If Shih is conceived as being in Pan-Blue, he would then have no influence in the DPP and among Pan-Green voters in general. To put this point differently, although Shih's campaign had gathered a level of support from the general public and garnered great media attention, the crucial question was: 'who exactly?' If the bulk of support came from supporters of the blue camp, then this would hardly have been constructive in terms of making Chen to step down.

Thus, the key question for Shih's camp was whether the campaign could attract support from the wider community of green supporters and civic groups; more accurately speaking, whether the campaign could be defined or interpreted as a transcending-party/colour

movement. Once the characteristics of the movement were determined, it would either draw more (green) supporters to participate in or repel them from it. As a result, as to Shih's camp, the last thing that Shih would want is to have his campaign too closely associated with the Pan-Blue. As to Chen's camp, its main task, reversely, would be to paint Shih's campaign with a blue colour. If Pan-Green successfully defined the anti-corruption movement as a collaborative effort between Shih and Pan-Blue, then the movement would be doomed to failure. It would change nothing, no matter how great the number of people who had participated in it and how great an amount of money people had donated to Shih's campaign. They are just, as described by a pro-independence writer, a group of people 'who can yell and scream as loud as they like and indulge in their desire to create disorder.' But the movement, which began as a heroic tragedy, would 'ultimately end as a farce' (Cho, *TT* 05/10/06, 8).

The first attempt of this kind was initiated by a DPP legislator Wang Shi-Jian. Wang said in a press conference that although the anti-corruption sit-in seemed to be led by Shih, it was actually a political struggle dictated by the blue camp. Wang expressed his suspicion that most of the people making donations to Shih were being driven by the KMT. He said that the KMT recently made a huge fortune by selling its ill-gotten assets, thereby it is only a piece of cake for the party to ask its party members to contribute NT\$100 each to Shih's fundraising account. Wang claimed, '[Former] Chairman Shih, please be careful that you don't accept the KMT's money. If not, it might destroy your reputation' (*TT* 16/08/06, 3).

Wang's accusation was echoed by Shih's ex-wife Linda Gail Arrigo. Arrigo and Shih were married in 1978 and later divorced. She issued a letter to Shih in the press, putting her speculation over Shih's financial support coming from the KMT (*Arrigo, TT* 17/08/06, 8). In her letter, she first praised Shih's earlier struggles to stand up to the dictatorship of the KMT regime in pursuit of democracy in Taiwan. However, according to Arrigo's account of Shih's political life, Shih began to 'lose the idealism and clarity of purpose' after he, when serving as chairman of the DPP, made a deal in late 1995 with the New Party, which advocated unification with China. Shih then began to hobnob with 'former enemies' – the Pan-Blue politicians. Arrigo then continued saying that there has been a clear pattern of the KMT using former DPP figures to attack the DPP, while the KMT, as one of the richest political parties in the world, has the resources to make this ploy attractive. She then harshly

questioned Shih's relationship with Pan-Blue. She writes:

If Shih is to set himself up as the centre of a crusade against corruption, then I think it is fair to ask him to make public his own finances for the last several years, and to face squarely whether he has any financial links to the KMT... (Ibid.)

Likewise, another former political dissident, Gao Jun-Ming, a respected reverend, also speculated that Shih accepted the KMT's money. Gao was jailed by the KMT for four years for giving shelter to Shih in the 1980s when Shih was on the run from the authorities.¹⁵⁸ He criticised Shih as 'greedy' and 'materialistic', for not being able to resist temptations, and accused him of selling out Taiwan. Similar to Arrigo's rhetoric, Gao said that he does not regret aiding Shih 20 years ago because he loves Taiwan. Gao however delivered a stinging critique of Shih's claims to moral authority. 'The reverend said that avarice was the root of vice, and a basic principle for people who truly loved their community was to resist the lure of money, sex and alcohol' (*CT* 24/08/06, A2; *TT* 24/08/06, 1). Gao also made reference to allegations that Shih was receiving money from the KMT, Beijing or both. 'If political figures cannot resist these temptations,' said Gao, 'forcing 100 presidents to step down in the hope of saving Taiwan would be in vain' (ibid.).

Following this line of criticism, the green camp then condemned Shih for betraying those who used to help him in the past but cooperating with, or being the pawn of the KMT, the oppressor. For instance, a DPP Legislator called on Shih to wake up and realise that the KMT had been responsible for the break-up of his family. It is said, 'It is ironic that you [Shih] let the old ghost of an evil regime dictate to you and are willing to go all out to serve the KMT' (*TT* 24/08/06, 3). To those criticisms, Shih's cooperation with the KMT had made him a traitor to the Taiwanese democratic and independence movement. They reminded Shih that Pan-Blue politicians were part of the oppressive KMT regime, being responsible for Taiwan's 38 years of martial law and Shih's own imprisonment. To them, someone like Shih, a man who sacrificed 25 years of his life for the cause of democracy, sacrificing his dignity and becoming a tool of Pan-Blue was totally incomprehensible.

So why did this happen? Why did a democratic pioneer go from being a leader of the anti-KMT democracy movement to cooperating with the KMT? While some argued that it is

¹⁵⁸ In 1979, when Shih was the most-wanted fugitive after the Kaohsiung Incident, Gao gave Shih asylum and helped keep him in hiding.

because Shih has a bad case of Stockholm syndrome, others claimed that Shih had accustomed himself to colonial rule and could never escape from the shadow of this slavish mentality. As to the former, it was said that Shih suffered from Stockholm syndrome, thereby taking the side of those who ‘kidnapped’ him decades ago and turning his wrath on pro-localisation forces (Kuo, *TT* 04/09/06, 8). The latter accused Shih of ‘uncritically and without shame accepting colonial rule’ (Lee, *TT* 29/08/06, 8). Moreover, it is noted that in the latter rhetoric those who accustomed themselves to colonial rule not only refer to Shih himself but also his followers. The article portrayed the supporters of Shih’s campaign as ‘empty, soulless bodies’. They were being described as follows:

[they] generally lack understanding of their national identity and behave as opportunistic immigrants might, defending the colonial system and resolutely rejecting political reform and the nation’s reconstruction...I see that the mutual alienation under colonial rule has led to utilitarianism. I also see that people attach themselves to a foreign power [KMT], disregarding the fact that this power is threatening their country. These people are constantly deceiving and humiliating themselves. (Ibid)

Another line of attack targeting Shih was to question his credentials as a democracy activist. One of the most dramatic moves occurred when DPP legislators claimed that they obtained a letter written by Shih to the dictator Chiang Kai-Shek. In the 1960s, when Shih was sentenced to life on charges of rebellion, he was believed to have written a letter to Chiang asking for a pardon. In the letter, Shih wrote that he was filled with remorse over his past mistakes. He stressed that it was foolish to insist on independence. The contents of the letter were later made public by Shih’s first wife Chen Li-Zhu (*TT* 25/08/06, 1).

Through questioning his relations with Pan-Blue and disclosing the contents of the letter, Shih’s credentials as a democracy pioneer were called into question. A DPP Legislator even said that he wished Shih had been sentenced to death when he was indicted for treason 25 years ago, so that he ‘would have become a Taiwanese hero, earned the respect of the people and been well remembered’ (*TT* 18/08/06, 3). Also, while ‘morality’ was set as the theme in Shih’s campaign and the main reason for demanding Chen to resign, to reveal Shih’s character faults would not only damage Shih’s reputation, but would in turn impair the legitimacy of the anti-corruption movement. Pan-Green politicians had asked Shih to subject himself to stringent public scrutiny of his morals because he had questioned the president’s morality. In this aspect, morality was a doubled-edged sword to Shih.

In addition to those attacks on Shih, Pan-Green also criticised Taipei Mayor Ma, who also serves as the KMT chairman, for giving Shih's group permission to stage an around-the-clock sit-in demonstration on Ketagalan Boulevard. Although an open-ended 24-hour demonstration has never been allowed before, the Taipei City Government granted Shih's camp permits. DPP legislators thus lashed out at Ma for allowing the sit-in to be staged, and put their sceptical wondering over how close the ties are between Shih's campaign and the KMT (*TT* 19/08/06, 3).

The aforementioned political rhetoric was all manifested in Pan-Green's series of street protests, organised to counter Shih's campaign. For instance, a rally, called 'Courage, Peace, Safeguard Taiwan and Encourage A-Bian', took place on 26 August at Taipei's 2-28 Peace Memorial Park when thousands of people took part. The organisers said that they chose the park as the venue because they wanted to tell dissidents who have passed away that the Taiwanese people were determined to defend their homeland. They also condemned Shih for betraying the green camp. As one of the organisers said to the crowd at the start of the rally, 'What terrifies us are not those "Chinese dogs", What is really terrifying are DPP traitors like Shih Ming-Teh' (*TT* 27/08/06, 1). Shih's former wife Chen Li-Zhu, DPP chairman Yu Shyi-Kun and other DPP lawmakers also showed up at the rally. On the same day, another two DPP legislators, together with some DPP city councillors from Tainan and Kaohsiung – a traditional stronghold of the DPP – also organised a protest outside Shih's office in Taipei, asking him to return the NT\$2 million they donated to Shih's three legislative bids. More than 2,000 people from southern Taiwan staged a protest. At the event, one of the organisers who had once served as Shih's campaign manager when Shih was running for legislator tried to present the receipts that he had collected from Shih's donors – totalising NT\$2 million (US\$62,500) – to Shih's office. He used a pair of scissors to cut in half a yellow ribbon that bore the title of Shih's campaign manager, saying 'He is no longer the *Shih Ming-Teh of Taiwan* but has become the *Shih Ming-Teh of China*' (*ibid*; emphasis added).

In short, Shih's campaign came under fire from the green camp. While several DDP members made personal attacks on Shih to challenge his relations with the blue camp, others aimed to dismantle his reputation as a democracy pioneer. Also, they accused Taipei Mayor Ma for giving Shih special treatment by relaxing laws in the expense of public interests. All these efforts were made to imply that Shih's camp was associated with Pan-Blue. 'Red' is

actually 'Blue'. Under this rhetoric, it is easy for the green camp to conclude that Shih has abandoned his convictions and betrayed his former ideals; and most people who signed Shih's petition or donated NT\$100 to his campaign are in fact the Pan-Blue supporters. So it does not matter how many people send donations. One million people come out to only about 4.5 percent of the population in Taiwan. 'Is this really enough to force a head of state to step down?' they questioned (*TT* 28/08/06, 3). Even if half of the voters (about 6 million) participated in Shih's campaign, said a pro-independence academic, the legitimacy of its appeal is questionable as they are just supporters of Pan-Blue (*ibid*). Shih's campaign is thus not representative of a third force, thereby lacked legitimacy.

Pan-Blue and Shih's camp were both clearly aware of the predicament the movement had faced. Pan-Blue in effect attempted to keep its distance from Shih in order to prevent the movement from being labelled as a political conflict between the blue and the green. To Shih, he had earlier described supporters of his campaign as a 'motley crowd'. However, more efforts to represent its campaign as being a transcending-parties/colours movement were demonstrated in Shih's camp's design of its protest, which is the focus of the next section.

6-3. Sisyphus's Stone Reaching the Top of the Hill? Middle Stage of the Movement (From Early Sit-in Protests to 'the Surround the City' Protest)

6-3-1. The Sit-in Protests on Ketagalan Boulevard

Shih's camp held a press conference on 28 August on Ketagalan Boulevard in front of the Presidential Office in Taipei, where they were planning to stage a round-the-clock sit-in. Shih vowed at the press conference that the demonstrations would be a non-stop peaceful demonstration without any 'exit strategy' until Chen has stepped down (*TT* 29/08/06, 3). Although the sit-in officially began on 9 September, Shih's camp launched 'trial sit-ins' first in order to boost public interest in the event. Organisers prepared 230 seats on Ketagalan between 1 Sept and 7 Sept, open to supporters every night. The people were requested to book sit-in seats online or in person. Each person was only allowed to take a seat for an hour. The number of seats however increased to 2,300 when the protest officially began, which symbolised the 23 million people of Taiwan. The organisers claimed that if 2,300

people took a seat in the sit-in each hour, this would mean a total of 41,400 people a day participating in the 18-hour long protests. If those numbers were met, the total number of participants would exceed one million people over a 24-day period (CT 30/08/06, A3; TT 30/08/06, 1). In addition, the organisers asked participants to wear *red* clothes to the protest. The sit-in area was also flanked by curtains painted with red flames. According to the organisers, the flames and red motif were meant to reflect the anger generated by Chen's corrupt government (CT 31/08/06, A3). The selection of 'red' for the theme colour of the campaign was however surprising to many people.

The colour red is generally associated with the Chinese Communist Party and with Mao's Cultural Revolution. For decades after Chiang's KMT regime retreated to Taiwan, 'red' has been taboo in Taiwanese politics. Under martial law, the people who advocated democracy were often labelled as communists, convicted of treason.¹⁵⁹ After democratisation in the 1990s, ironically enough, 'red' is still a political taboo for many Taiwanese. In political circles particularly, most politicians tried to dissociate themselves from this colour, preventing themselves from being labelled as conspiring with the PRC against Taiwan, the betrayers of the Taiwanese nation. Indeed, there was a worry in Shih's camp from the beginning that by choosing the colour red the movement might be labelled as associated with the PRC or with unification with China. He De-Fen, a spokeswoman in Shih's camp, for instance, strenuously objected to the choice of red (CT 02/09/06, A2). However, Shih's camp still decided to use colour red for their theme colour. Shih particularly insisted on it. He said, 'I am a very confident man, and red has been politically labelled for too long in Taiwan. The people have the right to choose any colour' (Bradsher, *International Herald Tribune* 05/10/06). Shih's statement quoted above clearly demonstrated his confidence for not being labelled as conspiring with China against Taiwan due to his sacrifice for Taiwan in his earlier life.

In addition to the choice of the colour red, the four moral principles in traditional Confucianism – *'Li'* (Propriety), *'Yi'* (Righteousness), *'Lian'* (Honesty) and *'Chi'* (Shame) –

¹⁵⁹. Although martial law was lifted in 1987, the deep fear of colour red was still held, being buried within the unconscious of the people in Taiwan in the context of politics. According to an anthropologist, when she in 2005 interviewed a man in his fifties while conducting research on trauma and social memory regarding the White Terror, the word 'communist' and the image 'red flag' instantly caused goose bumps to appear on his arms. 'This indicates his physical fear of communism and its association with the colour red' (Shih Fang-Lung 2007).

were proposed as a main theme for the campaign. The selection of these four virtues was to let the people know that Taiwan's incumbent president Chen has no sense of propriety, righteousness, honesty, and shame (*CT* 31/08/06, A3).¹⁶⁰ To echo the main theme, Shih's camp also decided to ask the protestors to make a pattern visible from the sky, a concept inspired by Peru's Nazca Lines (Figure 6-1). The Nazca Lines are geoglyphs resembling animals that cannot be recognised, except from high above the Earth. They were created more than a millennium ago. Some people believe the lines must not be the work of human creators alone. They said that the creators received help from extraterrestrials in making the lines, because humans could not have seen their work from Earth using human technology at the time. Fan Ke-Qin (also known as Jerry Fan), one of the key organisers in Shih's camp, said that in the spirit of the Nazca Lines, the anti-Chen campaign would position demonstrators in the shape of a giant drawing compass. He explained that the message implicit in the pattern was that President Chen must hold himself to a strict moral standard. This is based on a play-on-words, as the Chinese character for 'compass' (*Yuan-Gui*) and 'rules' (*Gui-Ju*) share the character *Gui*. He went on to say that the compass pattern is 'a ceremony to call on the heavens and earth for strength,' and it also resembles a Taiwanese Aboriginal warrior 'grasping a blade and poised to slash corruption' (*TT* 05/09/06, 3). As the organisers hoped, bringing together Confucian values and the Nazca lines as Chinese and foreign values would help people to highlight the sense of justice and morality lacking in the president.

On Saturday, 9 September, people started to gather on Ketagalan in front of the Presidential Office before the protest formally started at 3pm (Figure 6-2). Shouting 'A-Bian step down!' and giving the thumbs-down sign, tens of thousands of red-clad protesters packed Ketagalan and adjacent roads. The campaign leader Shih arrived on a jeep at 3:30pm, and led the crowd in marching in circles around the boulevard. Protesters were asked to sit down and remain silent at about 6pm. Those who had already registered online were asked to sit in the 'static' area along the boulevard, while others gathered in the 'moving' area along neighbouring roads. The protestors read a 'Million Voices Against Corruption Pledge'

¹⁶⁰ Shih's camp originally planned to wrap the Jing-Fu Men – a traditional-style gate of Taipei City located in a traffic circle in front of the Presidential Office – with 20m-high red cloth, with each cloth carrying one of these four virtues, making it the 'spiritual fortress' of its demonstration. The plan was however abandoned because the Taipei City Government had rejected their application over plans to decorate this historical monument (*CT*, 31/08/06; also *TT*, 01/09/06).

together at 6pm, stating:

I am attending the Million Voices against Corruption Movement, I promise to dedicate myself to democracy...Anti-corruption and demanding A-Bian to step down are my beliefs. I will not tolerate any violence or ethnic issues getting involved. I will try my best to show the strength of silent resistance and set a good example for future generations. (TT, 10/09/06)

As Shih led the crowd to begin the sit-in at around 5pm, rain began to fall. Organisers called on the participants not to let the weather conditions weaken their determination. Many Pan-Blue figures turned up to show their support.

Rain continued as the campaign entered its second day (Sunday, 10 Sept). Undaunted by the pouring rain, tens of thousands of demonstrators on Ketagalan still went on their around-the-clock sit-in rally. A plan for demonstrators to form imitation 'Nazca lines' at 3pm was suspended due to heavy rain. Shih however made an appearance at 5pm to lead the crowd after demonstrators spontaneously tried to form the line. The weather forecast had warned of more rain to come over the next couple of days, but Shih called on supporters to come out and not to miss the historic event. Despite the lower-than-expected turnout due to the bad weather, Shih said that he was touched and satisfied with the success of the protest. He stressed, 'Sit-in participants *across party lines* did not need to be strong-armed or specially mobilised to show up and voice their opposition against the nation's incompetent leader' (TN 11/09/06); emphasis added. As the campaign entered its third day (Monday, 11 September), the number of protestors fell sharply in the morning. The campaign organisers had earlier expected the sharp decline in protest numbers on Monday morning as many people opted to return to work. By evening their ranks had however swelled back to Sunday's numbers when several thousand protestors came back to the protest site after work. The surge of evening arrivals boosted the flagging morale of organisers. As the Taipei City Police put it, the number of people at the protest site was always at around 10,000. The remaining four days (12 Sept to 15 Sept) sustained this level of turnout. The campaign organisers also encouraged people to hang red decoration in cars, houses or offices or simply wear red to show their support for the movement if they wish to join the cause but cannot come to the sit-in site.

During this time, the organisers built a stage at Ketagalan Boulevard, encouraging people – with different ethnic groups, different ages, different classes and different walks of

life – to stand on the stage, sharing their opinions and entertaining the crowd. The organisers particularly welcomed personnel in uniform such as students, lawyers, etc, as well as people dressed in their costumes showing their ethnicities (Figure 6-3; 6-4; 6-5). Various activities were held on the stage, including performances by children reciting an ancient Chinese text, *Daxue*, written by Confucius and his followers talking about how to be a person of high moral integrity. A popular singer composed a jingle in support of the protests. There were many traditional Taiwanese folk art performances, including some by aboriginals, staged during the rally. On the protest site, people could buy T-shirts and key chains featuring the group's thumbs-down logo as well as tiny president Chen's voodoo dolls. Some protesters raised props and banners they had made to express their voice. For instance, a group of young people held up placards ironically describing Chen as 'Son of Scandal,' referring to his alleged involvement in a spate of corruption scandals. Chen used to be termed 'Son of Taiwan' during the president race in 2000. The organisers also called for protesters to tie red ribbons around the trees near Ketagalan.

The atmosphere of the campaign was often described as carnivalesque. For instance, a reporter from the *Taipei Times* (TT 02/10/06, 3) stated:

Shih's red-clad crowd, chanting a variety of slogans in its effort to oust President Chen, is boisterous and energetic. It has become common for political commentators to describe the campaign as sort of like a festival.

It went on describing the venue of the demonstration as follows:

During the day, the majority of the protesters taking part in the sit-in are housewives and retirees. In late afternoon and the evening, students, young adults and office workers often start showing up after school or work. The venue has become a social hot spot, where young people decked out in red outfits can get together. Every 30 minutes or so, the campaign's organisers lead the crowd in chanting slogans such as 'A-bian step down!' and do 'exercise dances' come rain or shine. At nights, the protest becomes a stage performance, with actors, singers and artists taking turns entertaining the crowd with pop songs, dances and comedy...

The article also described the enthusiasm of the protesters:

Participants' enthusiasm was notable during the first week of the protest, during which people brought free food and goods to the site and gave them away to the protesters. In addition to 'Grandpa Chang's' free water booth, which was sponsored by an overseas Taiwanese residing in Canada, people distributed a variety of free goods, including foodstuffs – ranging from traditional deep-fried bread sticks, lunch boxes, stir-fried noodles, cakes and hot ginger tea – raincoats, tents and

newspapers...Around meal time, there is always a long line of participants – and even some homeless people – waiting to get the free food distributed near the campaign’s headquarters on Ketagalan...

While the demonstration was still taking place on Ketagalan, the leadership of Shih’s camp started to show divisions about how they should proceed with the protest, while Chen was still showing no signs of stepping down. One of the issues on which they were divided was a proposal to launch a nationwide strike to increase the pressure on Chen to resign. Jian Xi-Jie, an organiser for the anti-Chen campaign and also a labour movement activist who used to be a legislator nominated by DPP, proposed an idea to initiate a nationwide strike in October if the campaign’s demand was not met. Although Jian insisted that the strike would be the last resort, many other campaign organisers publicly disapproved of the idea, worrying that it would paralyse the country’s economy (*CT* 12/09/06, A2).

Instead of reaching an agreement on whether or not to initiate the strike, Shih’s camp decided to organise a parade on Friday night, 15 September, the so-called ‘Surrounding the [Taipei] City’, which would symbolically ‘besiege’ the Presidential Office and the president’s official residence (Yu-Shan Residence). The decision was a response to the DPP’s move, which successfully booked the Ketagalan from 16 September to 20 September. The DPP and pro-independence organisations were planning to hold a mass rally in the afternoon on 16 September to counter Shih’s campaign and support the president. But the move also effectively drove the Shih’s camp, which had been using the same venue, to terminate their sit-in protest on Ketagalan. Considering the disruption this would cause for their demonstration, Shih’s camp therefore planned to hold a march on the one hand to flex their muscle, and on the other to move sit-in participants to another venue, a much smaller plaza in front of Taipei Railway Station by midnight (15 September), where they could continue their sit-in protest until 21 September before they returned to Ketagalan.

On 15 September, the heavy rain did not deter throngs of people from joining the march. Hundreds of thousands of protesters, donning red clothes and wielding red glowsticks or flash lights covered with red transparent paper,¹⁶¹ poured into the streets to

¹⁶¹. Shih’s camp originally organised the rally with each person holding a candlelight in his hand during the parade, symbolising the public shining an ‘anti-corruption torch’ on the country. Safety concerns prompted the Shih’s camp to cancel the plan and instead encouraged participants to bring flashlights or red-glowing-sticks.

join the mass rally (Figure 6-6; 6-7). The ‘siege’ started at 6pm on Ketagalan, earlier than the scheduled 7pm, as there was no room for more participants at the plaza in front of the Presidential Office. Led by Shih who stood on a jeep, the protestors marched from Ketagalan along a designated route, parading towards the Presidential Office, then onwards around the presidential residence to the new rally site outside the Taipei Railway Station, forming a red circle that stretched for almost 6km. Many protestors, including many housewives, senior citizens and students constantly flashed the thumb-down sign and shouted ‘step down!’ whenever a voice yelled ‘A-Bian.’ The protestors held placards reading ‘Shame on Chen Shui-Bian’ and ‘Oust Corruption and Greed’. Among the crowd were Xu Xin-Liang, another former DPP chairman, the PFP chairman James Soong, and many other Pan-Blue politicians. KMT chairman Ma was however absent from the march for fear it would give the DPP reason to brand the protest a KMT plot. About three hours later around 10:30, Shih arrived at Taipei Railway Station. As he arrived, Shih shed some tears and kneeled down on the stage in front of the crowd to thank the crowd that had been waiting there. At midnight, tens of thousands of protestors remained outside the station for the sit-in protest continued until Wednesday, before the camp moves back to Ketagalan on 20 September.

As for the exact number of the turnout for the ‘Surrounding the City’, it is still a disputed issue. The campaign organisers put the crowd at more than one million, claiming it was a record turnout for a demonstration in Taiwan, but the police had a much lower estimate of 360,000 people attended the march.¹⁶² No matter which number is more correct, the protest apparently made it the largest ever parade in Taipei. Also, about 5,000 riot/special police were deployed to prevent violence erupting during the campaign, and barricades were also deployed around the Presidential Office and the Yushan Residence to maintain security. The march, however, proceeded peacefully. No violence-related injuries were reported.

6-3-2. Rhetoric of Autonomous Citizens

During the movement, some Taiwanese scholars attempted to boost the campaign’s

¹⁶² The turnout was important in demonstrations organised by private groups. For private organisers, the number of participants signifies power. There is often a wide disparity between estimates given by event organisers and city police.

legitimacy by claiming that it transcended the Blue/Green divide. A group of Taiwanese scholars, mainly composed of members of an academic journal, *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies (TRQ)* – the so-called ‘*Taishé*’ in Chinese – engaged in the formation of the rhetorical claiming that the anti-corruption movement transcends the partisan, ideological and identity division. The editors of the journal published a series of articles in Taiwan’s leading Chinese Newspapers, mainly *The China Times* and *United Daily News*. Those articles were later collected as a booklet under the title ‘Autonomous Citizen Entering the Movement’ (ACEM), which was widely distributed on various occasions at Shih’s protest sites. As stated in the booklet, the ACEM are committed to rethinking the notion of democracy and to finding new ways of imagining politics. They dubbed Shih’s campaign ‘New Civil Movement’. Their arguments can be summarised as a political motto, ‘Autonomous Citizen’.

In one representative article entitled, ‘Autonomous Citizens Entering the Movement – Our Appeal to All Citizens,’ ACEM provides a definition of what ‘the autonomous citizen’ means. The article states:

The most obvious characteristics of autonomous citizens are that they: will not support the blue or the green camp through others’ influence; will not take an anti-blue or anti-green stance without thinking; and will not attack one side for the sake of the other side. (ACEM, 3; also in *CT* 31/08/06, A15)

According to this definition, ‘those who want to depose the president to support the blue camp’ or ‘those who are counterattacking those who want to depose the president to support the green camp’ are not real autonomous citizens (*ibid*, 3). The article writes:

They may be respectable citizens, but they surrender themselves to an ulterior motive, giving up the serious reflection on their own belief and action as well as the responsibility of faithfully defending the people’s self-interest...Without self-autonomy, citizens will always be the puppets of existing political forces (incumbent or opposition), being used by others, sacrificing not only their own interest, but also the fundamental civil subjectivity. A system without a body of autonomous citizenship as its basis is invariably not a true democratic system, even if this system may have elections and political parties. (*Ibid*, 3)

The article, however, states that they do not support Shih’s campaign unquestioningly. The key, as it is noted, is whether or not their conducts can be considered *real autonomous citizens’ actions*, which, the article further elaborates, require the organisers and participants

possessing autonomous consciousness and being highly critical of Taiwanese partisan politics (Ibid, 5).

This article demonstrated a total disillusionment with and scepticism towards party and identity politics. It encouraged the anti-corruption movement to transcend the blue-and-green dichotomy, to go beyond ethnic antagonism and to reject the negative rhetoric of identity politics. It called for resistance to the current political framework given by Taiwan's party and identity politics. Those who reject a certain form of subjectivity imposed by two political camps and decline the demand to be either Taiwanese or Chinese, can be called 'autonomous citizens'. Only with the appearance of 'autonomous citizens' can Taiwan form a real democratic society. Under this autonomous citizen rhetoric, the anti-corruption movement, as those scholars contended, is an example of 'real autonomous citizens actions'. Another article – entitled, 'Society Must be Defended' – written by a sociologist Chao Kang, expressed this line of opinion. He writes:

This movement is not only what all people are calling a 'middle-class anti-corruption' movement. Its participants actually include people from middle and lower classes of all trades. It is also a desperate self-help movement; people are forced to participate due to the DDP regime's selling off national assets and collaborating with business conglomerates while facing the decrease of their fortunes, the increase of taxes, unemployment, salary cut-backs and the inability to survive...The most poignant meaning of this movement of which people spontaneously participate is simply the aim to collectively save the imminent breakdown of the infrastructure of Taiwanese society. This is the most humble and basic collective civil action taken to defend our society...(ACEM, 43-4; Chao, UDN 18/09/06, A15)

The article then added:

Once we understand these characteristics, we can truly understand why this is an autonomous gathering that does not need any party's mobilisation as well as grasp the basic meaning of why this movement could 'transcend the labels of green and blue'. For people who used to belong to either the blue or the green camps are converging in this place with the intent of defending themselves, putting their past animosities behind them with a laugh. To everyone's surprise, 'A-Bian' becomes the catalyst for the 'big reconciliation'. Therefore, we can understand why red is the colour people can all accept, because it symbolizes the hot-blooded resistance, the indomitable sense of justice and the people's desire not to engage in the green and blue dog fight but to work together to defend society. (Ibid, 44)

Likewise, another important member of *Taishe*, Chen Kuan-Hsing, a prominent professor in Taiwan, also expressed a similar viewpoint. In his article 'What does "Red"'

Mean?’ Chen firstly gives a description of his observation of the anti-corruption protest while attending the 915 ‘Surrounding the City’ campaign. He writes:

Friday 7 p.m., September 15, 2007, about a dozen members of *Taiwan Radical Quarterly*...participated in a demonstration consisting of over a million people, seeking to depose Bian. However, the place was over-crowded by the people in Red, with some people calling the scene a ‘Red Sea’. We could barely enter Ketagalan, therefore, we walked against the tide and made a detour to Taipei Station...*Later, we realised that such ‘free walking’, without any leadership from ‘centre’ in a traditional political/social movement, is the key point of the whole parade.* We couldn’t hear what was happening from the command platform...More peculiar was the way in which the middle class, who has been criticised as alienated and apathetic by the academics, suddenly changed their demeanour. They got rid of their drained bodies and dull facades, started to greet strangers who were identified as their red companions...(ACEM, 68-9; emphasis added)

In the presentation of the above ‘free walking’ scenes, the author stated that what they had witnessed was not only a transcendence of blue-green dichotomy and ethnic hostility, but also ‘a transcendence of the given frameworks (such as the planned route of the demonstration) and alienated relation among people’ (ibid, 70). The author writes, ‘The participants have actualised their “autonomy” in actions, with mutual support’ (ibid, 70). The author then asked ‘what does the red mean?’ According to him,

The key for identification with the Red was based on a complete and fundamental disappointment and scepticism to party politics. In this sense, transcending the dichotomy of Blue and Green means transcending and abandoning party politics. (Ibid, 70)

He added:

Fundamentally, the Red means rethinking what democracy is. Party politics is no longer the core in the imagination of democratic politics. Democracy is liberation of people’s vitality; it is a confinement and regulation of the State/government/regime by the society. (Ibid, 72)

In addition, according to the author, the ‘red’ also means the emergence of a new form of social subjectivity. He argues that the emergence of a Red subjectivity implies an implosion of the multi-dimensional problems underlying the Taiwan democratic movement since the end of WWII. He points out that ‘Pro-U.S., anti-Communist’ is the main component of Taiwan subjectivity. While the Taiwanese adore the U.S. democratic model and reject other alternative imaginations of democracy; the American two party system has become the fundamental scheme in pursuing and evaluating the democratic movement in

Taiwan. As a result, ‘democratic politics has been reduced to voting. The idea of democracy and politics is then abducted by political parties’ (ibid, 73). Thus, the author states,

The Red is to say goodbye to party politics, with our thumbs-down to depose Bian [President Chen]. At the same time, our thumbs-up is pointing towards the expansion of a social subjectivity. (ibid, 74)

To the author, the complexity of the anti-corruption movement provides the opportunity for the people in Taiwan to question and breakthrough the limitations of their existing political imagination.

In short, the rhetoric of ‘Autonomous Citizen’ indeed had great influence on Shih camp’s political rhetoric and its decision-making. For instance, Shih’s camp afterwards called its campaign a ‘civil movement’ as well. In addition, the aforementioned rhetoric also demonstrated that many people had high expectations of the anti-corruption campaign. They hoped that it would transform from a simple movement to depose Chen to a broad-based effort concerned with protecting social values and a truly ‘new civic movement.’ Their hope is that the movement would be able to transcend partisan divisions and bring civic thinking into people’s daily lives instead of letting them be influenced by ethnic/ideological/identity rifts manipulated for political motives. Nevertheless, this line of thinking, together with Shih camp’s political rhetoric, was strongly challenged by the green camp, in particular in the choice of colour red.

6-3-3. Shih’s ‘Associations’ with China and Pan-Blue

After Shih’s camp urged people to wear ‘red’ – a colour that was associated with communist China – to participate in the demonstration, the Pan-Green began to liken Shih to Mao Zedong, Shih’s supporters to Red Guards, as well as his campaign to the Cultural Revolution.

One of the examples is Pan-Green’s criticism of Shih’s choice of 9 September as the starting date for his campaign. They argued that the date marked the 30th anniversary of Mao’s death. Shih’s ex-wife Arrigo, for instance, urged Shih to stop the demonstration, saying that

9 September is the 30th anniversary of Mao’s death. On that day Chinese people will gather in Tiananmen Square to commemorate Mao by raising Red flags and by distributing Mao’s Little Red Book...If Taiwanese people also use the colour red to

protest against their elected president, this will lead people to associate Taiwan's Ketagalan Boulevard with Red Square. (cited in Shih 2007, 4)

Moreover, they also argued that the tactics of the Shih's camp resembled those used to whip up hysteria and violence in China's most notorious phase of the modern era Cultural Revolution. Lin Bao-Hua, a pro-independence political commentator, claimed that the people would not know what the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s was until they come to Taiwan in 2006. In his article in *Liberty Times*, Lin states that Pan-Blue and its media's 'disclosure' of Chen's corruption are similar to the Cultural Revolution's attitude to 'question and attack everything' (*LT* 13/09/06, 4). Shih and Pan-Blue's latent hatred and resentment harboured towards pro-independence forces allowed them to make irrational accusations against Chen and pro-independence forces. Taiwan's pro-independence forces are now being beaten and forced to apologise just like the 'Five Black Classes' during the Cultural Revolution. Lin writes:

Although there is no Mao here, China's influence is everywhere...I worry that Shih's campaign will bring the Cultural Revolution back from the dead. (Ibid)

While Shih's campaign was analogised to China's Cultural Revolution, Pan-Green politicians also put a dent in the speculation that Beijing is behind this new 'Red Army' in Taipei, having a hand in the anti-corruption movement. They argued that Beijing was interfering in Taiwan's internal affairs, attempting to use Shih's campaign to create political turmoil to divide Taiwan. For instance, a pro-independence group, the Northern Taiwan Society, hosted a forum discussing influences on Taiwan's democratic development in view of Shih's campaign. A Chinese political dissident Ruan Ming, who served as a national policy adviser to the president, said at a forum that Taiwan's current political unrest was a sign that China's power is on the rise and the US' democratic power is ebbing. He noted that Beijing's power has infiltrated Taiwan and the anti-corruption movement is the beginning of Beijing's strategy to divide Taiwan (*TT* 02/10/06, 3). Also, there was a rumoured conspiracy in green circles that claimed that the pro-unification proponents would gradually take over leadership of Shih's camp and eventually hijack it in order to promote unification with China.¹⁶³

¹⁶³. For instance, a DPP Legislator questioned the motives of anti-Chen campaign's consultant Hsu Po-Yun, who travelled to China for attending an academic conference during the protest period. Hsu was accused of reporting to the Chinese authorities on the progress of the anti-Chen campaign on behalf of Shih and receiving further instructions (*TT* 24/09/06, 3).

Meanwhile, Pan-Green legislators expressed similar concerns in the Legislative Yuan. When meeting with Taiwan's intelligence officials, Pan-Green legislators questioned those officials over whether they had found evidence that Beijing was lending support to Shih's protests. Despite the officials' denial, Pan-Green legislators remained dubious, insisting that Beijing had a hand in Shih's campaign, if not directly. One TSU legislator said that China had spent billions of Taiwan dollars to financially support Taiwan's media. 'That's why so many have shown their bias by promoting the anti-Chen campaign' (*TT* 23/09/06, 3). Also, another TSU legislator asked the officials to investigate whether Beijing had sent agents to Taiwan under the guise of tourists to attend the anti-Chen campaign. He noted, 'On 14 September, 467 Chinese tourists came to Taiwan, which was higher than the average of about 100 people. This made me wonder whether they actually came for the anti-Chen campaign's massive march on 15 September' (*ibid*).

Although there is no evidence to prove Beijing is behind the campaign, Pan-Green kept accusing Shih's camp.¹⁶⁴ DPP chairman Yu described Shih's demonstration as 'Red Terror', and interpreted it as 'a sign of Mainland Chinese bullying the Taiwanese.' Yu appealed several times at different occasions to back Chen with this rhetoric. One example is Yu's remarks made in his three-day visit to Washington in mid-September. When speaking to reporters at the National Press Club in the US, Yu complained about China's interference in Taiwanese domestic affairs. Yu said he did not have any evidence. However, he would suggest that 'Pan-Blues and China were coordinating their efforts to discredit Chen and force a wedge between Taiwan and the US' (*TT* 14/09/06, 3). At another occasion when he attended the DPP's weekly Central Standing Committee meeting, Yu told the local media that

¹⁶⁴ While the Pan-Green associated Shih's campaign with the PRC, China's officials ironically kept a low profile. China's media remained silent on Shih's campaign and the 'Taiwan Affairs Office' declined to comment on it, repeatedly saying that it was a domestic affair (Shih 2007). Augustine Tan in the *Asia Times* (17/11/06) argued that China does not want to see Chen being ousted because of his alleged corruption. 'It is apparent that Beijing is afraid that reporting Chen's predicament in the mass media could backfire. The public might raise questions along the lines of "What can we do with official corruption?"' Shih himself dismissed Pan-Green's speculations of his association with China. He said that he never visited China, unlike many DPP heavyweights who formed groups to visit China for business and other causes. Shih added, 'Many people know how much I abhor China, I have even refused to visit Hong Kong since 1997 and Macao since 1999. I will continue to do so until China agrees to abandon the use of military means to resolve cross-strait disputes' (*TT* 31/08/06, 3).

Many people do not want to see Taiwan become a normal country, especially China...It is a shame that *the campaign Shih has become a pawn of the pan-blue camp* and that *the pan-blues have become a pawn of China*. (TT 21/09/06, 3; emphasis added)

The rationale behind the aforementioned statement reflects a common mentality upheld by the Pan-Green politicians and their supporters. That is, Pan-Blue tilts towards China at the expense of the interests of the Taiwanese. Under this rhetoric, PRC and Pan-Blue are interchangeable. And Shih's campaign was bound up with both of them. Shih's campaign – its organisers and followers – was then defined as a movement of Pan-Blue, pro-unification, and after all, Chinese identifiers. Any illusions that Shih's camp tried to create about the protest being a non-partisan affair were therefore absurd.

For instance, a pro-independence proponent issued an article in *Liberty Times* under the title 'Beyond blue and green? You've got to be joking'. The article rebuked the claim that Shih's campaign was a broad-based civic movement, going beyond blue and green. It stated:

Some facts are indisputable. The Pan-Blue rejects Taiwan's right to become a normal and independent country. The pan-green camp wants to lead Taiwan down the path toward a new constitution, a change in its official title and nationhood. If the anti-Chen movement really isn't about mainstream blue-green politics, then it should tolerate people of either political persuasion. *But why is it that people who support an independent Taiwan at the anti-Chen rallies are abused by the red-clad demonstrators...?*¹⁶⁵ Why is it that when the sea of anti-Chen protesters yells 'long live the Republic of China'...Shih is all smiles? Aren't his followers supposed to be above political division? (Cao, TT 11/10/06, 8; emphasis added)

The article added that even though it is true that Shih's movement has green followers in it, its ideology is centred completely around the blue camp's anti-independence stance. Therefore, it stated that Shih's campaign is 'nothing but a cover for yet another episode in the series of anti-Chen and anti-green efforts the KMT has engaged' (ibid.). The article concluded:

In essence, therefore, it is still about blue versus green, the old power versus the reformers, unification versus independence. But this time, they've lined up three different armies for the attack. The first wave is Shih's 'red army,' the second wave is the KMT and waiting behind both is the Chinese Communist Party. (Ibid)

¹⁶⁵ Here the author referred to an incident when Wang Li-Ping, spokeswoman of Shih's camp was booed off the podium in Shih's demonstration when she said that, '*The people of the Republic of Taiwan will not be defeated by some rain.*' Upon hearing Wang's remark, the throng of demonstrators demanded an apology, for they found the term 'Republic of Taiwan' unacceptable. Afterwards, Shih's camp offered apologies to pacify the disgruntled demonstrators.

The article in short indicated that Shih's protest was aligned with pro-unification and pro-Chinese identity. The anti-corruption movement was then interpreted as a combat of national identity. DPP Chairman Yu seems to sympathise with this line of thought, as he described the anti-Chen campaign as 'political strife' and 'fighting over national identification' (*TT* 19/09/06, 1).

Moreover, Pan-Green supporters also accused Shih's camp of receiving help from what they called the 'pro-unification media'. They charged that many media outlets in Taiwan have played the part of a provocateur and instigator, blatantly interfering in the political furore. Some of those media outlets resorted to 'fabricating' or 'running unverified stories as front-page news or broadcasting hearsay' (Editorial, *TT* 24/08/06, 8). The media acted on information they have themselves generated. Also, they condemned the news media of helping prop up the anti-Chen campaign with round-the-clock-news coverage. They particularly referred to a cable channels TVBS for providing 24-hour blanket coverage of the event, interspersed with provocative 'news' features on the Ukraine's 'Orange Revolution' and the Philippine's 'People Power Movement' (Editorial, *TT*, 20/09/06, 8). According to them, while the confrontation between the blue and green camps had become tense, the media intensified social and political confrontation through biased and exaggerated coverage.

Pro-independence groups initiated a series of forums to lash out at Taiwan's media. At the forum, the participants described the campaign as 'the product of the anti-Taiwan media's smear campaign' to paralyse the DPP government (*TT* 10/09/06, 3). They also argued that the DPP administration was the victim of its own evil deeds. One of the participants noted:

The pro-unification media occupy a large portion of the local market. They run misleading reports about the Chen administration and therefore help the anti-Chen campaign gain momentum. Such a phenomenon has a lot to do with the administration's implementation of Chinese colonial education. Since the DPP came to power, it has failed to aggressively push for a Taiwanese education system, instead continuing with China-centric education. (Ibid)

President Chen seemed to concur with this line of criticism. He at different occasions publicly condemned the media for letting false allegations against him circulate. While meeting with local leaders in Hualien, Chen described himself as bearing 'the cross of persecution' as Taiwan's media were unrelenting in their criticism of him. He, however,

refused to step down because of those criticisms and added that he is willing to bear the cross of persecution for the sake of the nation. He noted:

It is like mountain climbing. I am leading the way in the front and I want the people behind me to have an easier climb. Although I may suffer cuts or even bleed along the way, I don't mind. It is not a problem that A-Bian gets hurt. (*TT* 14/08/06, 1)

Some pro-independence advocates even attributed Taiwan's biased media to China's conspiracy to use Taiwan's media to achieve its goal for unification. A former national policy adviser to the president, Huang Tien-Lin, issued a series of articles in the press, arguing that Taiwan has already been drawn into China's 'unlimited war' and in fact finds itself in a state of quasi-war, though most Taiwanese people seem not to realise that they are on the brink of a national crisis. The term 'unlimited war', according to Huang, is a new concept invented by China's People's Liberation Army, whose central presumption is that 'the battlefield is everywhere.' Anything can be turned into a weapon. The media, particularly, is deemed an effective tool to manipulate people's opinions. Huang added that those pro-China media are the platform that China can exploit in its unlimited warfare. Thus, the scandals surrounding Chen that had exploded since 2004 were not spontaneous, as many people in Taiwan had supposed, but as a planned and calculated move initiated by the PRC (Huang, *TT* 18/09/06, 8)

In short, in Pan-Green's political rhetoric, the practices of Shih's camp, the blue camp, and the pro-unification media demonstrated that the anti-corruption movement is not about opposing corruption or seeking to transcend the blue-green divide, but rather that it is just another pro-unification forces' strategy – possibly with supports from the PRC - to topple the DPP government, bullying the Taiwanese. Thus, the green camp must work to protect its interests in its confrontation with those 'pro-unification forces'. The unity of Pan-Green was not needed but imperative. Supporting Chen meant supporting Pan-Green and Taiwan. Neutrality does not exist in politics in Taiwan.

Many elements featured in Pan-Green's rhetoric discussed above are clearly articulated in a pro-Chen demonstration on 16 September, when Ketagalan was handed over to the green camp. This pro-Chen demonstration is called 'Formosa Sunlight Rally'.

6-3-4. The Pan-Green ‘Formosa Sunlight’ Rally

The rally was organised by two pro-independence groups, Northern Taiwan Society and Taiwan Society, and backed by the DPP,¹⁶⁶ showing their support for Chen and their determination to protect Taiwan. The organisers describe the meaning of the rally as follows:

[The rally will be] held to safeguard the Taiwanese government and universal ideals of freedom, democracy, stability and prosperity. We will not allow anyone to infringe upon these universal ideals, nor the authority of the Presidential Office and the [Chen’s] administration. (*TT* 13/09/06, 1)

They then explained that the theme of the rally would be ‘love, hope and light’, which implied that participants in their rally were on the side of ‘the light’ while protestors in the anti-Chen campaign were on the side of ‘darkness’. They said that they want to show ‘the spontaneous and positive energy of the people of Taiwan,’ and offer the people of Taiwan a different option (*ibid*). In contrast to the thumbs-down gesture of the Shih’s camp, The organisers introduced their own campaign gesture: using the index and middle fingers of the right hand to draw a circle in the air before placing them over the heart. The gesture symbolises that Taiwan and its people are always in their hearts. They also released an advertisement shown on TV to encourage people to participate. The message they wanted to get across in the advertisement was, said the organisers:

They opposed Sinicisation but wanted stability, that they opposed revolution but wanted law and order, and that they opposed social unrest but wanted to improve the economy. (*Ibid*.)

On 16 September, despite the rain brought on by a typhoon, thousands of demonstrators packed Ketagalan again. However, this time the rally was to support Chen, and opposing Shih and Pan-Blue. The crowd chanted ‘Go! Taiwan’ and ‘Go! A-Bian.’ They also prominently displayed banners with slogans saying ‘Go Away, Red China!’ and ‘Resist the Red Guard!’. Many high-ranking officials from the Presidential Office, Executive Yuan and DPP legislative caucus as well as activists of Taiwan’s independence movement all attended the rally. DPP Chairman Yu, while leading the crowd in chants of ‘Long Live Taiwan Republic’, called on the people of Taiwan to stand up and support Chen. He accused the anti-corruption campaign of being a tool used by ‘the Chinamen to bully the Taiwanese

¹⁶⁶ The DPP issued a mobilisation order, asking its legislators, local chapters and county commissioners across Taiwan to enlist people to attend the rally (*CT* 13/09/06, A1).

people' (CT 17/09/06, A2). Yu also blamed the KMT chairman Ma for approving Shih's 24-hour sit-in and therefore creating social unrest. He said Ma was fully responsible for the current social instability, and added that the people in Taiwan deserve to return to their normal daily life and the country must focus on improving the economy. Yu concluded that,

Many people braved the bad weather and came here today. It shows your sturdy support for Taiwan...We, Taiwanese people, cannot be ruined nor defeated by the 'red terror' exerted by the anti-Chen campaign. (TT 17/09/06, 1)

While the president decided not to attend the rally but toured the outlying island county of Penghu, he sent Secretary-General of the Presidential Office Chen Tang-Shan to the rally with greetings for the crowd. Chen Tang-Shan said that the president wanted him to convey his regards and appreciations to the crowd, and to tell them that he was determined to safeguard the democratic system established by the 23 million people of Taiwan. Another speaker Zang Gui-Hai, who is the vice president of Taiwan Society, turned his criticism to some local media outlets, including *China Times*, *United Daily News*, TVBS and CTTV – all of them were portrayed as pro-unification media – for painting a negative picture of Taiwan. He told to the crowd, 'If you love Taiwan, don't watch CTTV, TVBS or read *China Times* and *United Daily News*' (ibid).

Zang's remarks were apparently echoed by the pro-Chen protesters. Several news reporters working for those so-called 'pro-China' TV stations were attacked while they broadcast live coverage of the rally. A CTTV anchor and a cameraman, who were trying to hold a live interview with a DPP Legislator on a platform set up in the campaign site, were forced to stop their interview as demonstrators started shaking the platform and pounding it with their umbrellas. One pro-Chen demonstrator jumped up on the platform and tried to speak, eventually unplugging a power cable. CTTV cut off its coverage, cutting back to their news desk. Their colleague, a female news reporter also complained of being assaulted and felt violated by the pro-Chen protesters.¹⁶⁷ Also, an ETTV anchorwoman and cameraman, who were presenting a live broadcast on another raised platform next to that of CTTV, were forced to stop their broadcast after six or seven demonstrators jumped onto the

¹⁶⁷ She said that a middle-aged protester standing next to her told her that he refused to watch her station because he thought the coverage was biased and pro-China. The protester then started to grab her microphone. When she refused to let go, other people around her started cursing her. The man then touched her cheek and asked her not to be upset.

platform and interrupted it. Meanwhile, an FTV cameraman, who was wearing a red T-shirt and had forgotten to peel off an anti-Chen sticker from his camera, was chased by demonstrators (*CT* 17/09/06, A3; *TT* 17/09/06, 1). In addition to the skirmishes that took place between the news reporters and Pro-Chen campaigners, numerous scuffles also broke out in Taipei between supporters of Chen and followers of Shih's camp.¹⁶⁸

The early and middle stages of the anti-corruption campaign had been relatively peaceful and the public's emotions were kept under control apart from some minor incidents. However, after the siege of the Presidential Office on 15 September and the pro-Chen demonstration on 16 September, no one could guarantee whether the movement could continue as before. The battle between anti-Chen and pro-Chen not only became intensified, but more importantly, assumed the form of traditional confrontations between Pan-Green and Pan-Blue, between independence and unification, and after all, between Taiwanese and Chinese identity. This trend of development is, ironically, contradicted by what organisers had claimed in the first place.

6-4. Sisyphus' Stone Rolling Down: The Late Stage of the Movement (from the 'Surround the Island' Protest to the 'Besiege the Presidential Office' Demonstration)

6-4-1. 'Surround the Island' Protest

After a week-long sit-in protest on Ketagalan, most people realised that the sit-in by itself was not going to be enough to force Chen to step down; and it was also not in anyone's interest for the impasse to continue indefinitely. The demonstration was unlikely to achieve anything unless the protest was intensified. This is why Shih's camp was earlier thinking through the possibility of initiating a strike. In addition to the strike plan, they also planned to hold similar kinds of protest outside Taipei, in particular, in Southern Taiwan, which is traditionally a DPP stronghold, the majority of the population being of Minnan ethnicity. As they saw it, if they succeeded in organising a large scale – though not necessarily as large as it had been in Taipei – mass-rally in southern Taiwan, that would demonstrate that their call for Chen's resignation was backed by Pan-Green supporters. Chen then would

¹⁶⁸ Most of the skirmishes took place around Taipei Railway station as the DPP supporters passed by the area on their way home after taking part in a pro-Chen rally on Ketagalan (*CT* 17/09/06, A5).

have no choice but to step down.

One of the first of such attempts was proposed by Fan Ke-Qin, a campaign spokesman for Shih's camp. On 16 September, Fan told a press conference that the anti-Chen sit-in protest would be held in Kaohsiung (the biggest city in Southern Taiwan) on 19 September, followed by a 'Besiege the Kaohsiung City Government' on 29 September. They were also planning to stage anti-Chen demonstrations in most of the major cities in Taiwan. Fan's remarks were, however, subsequently dismissed by campaign leader Shih. Shih said that his camp would not initiate any protests outside Taipei (*CT* 17/09/06, A4; *TT* 17/09/06, 3). After Shih had given the order, the camp called off aforementioned plans. Fan told the press conference later that the decision was made in an impromptu meeting shortly after Pan-Green's rally on 16 September that had caused clashes. Fan noted that during the meeting Shih voiced concerns about social unrest around the country (*TT* 18/09/06, 3). Although Shih's camp decided to back away from expanding protests to other cities, there were a few anti-Chen protests being held in Southern Taiwan by some local politicians, which indeed caused strong opposition from the green supporters and engendered serious confrontations, ending in violence.

At night on 18 September, a former DPP Kaohsiung City councilor held an informal 'Evening Tea Gathering' in downtown Kaohsiung, with approximately 100 anti-Chen protesters sat in. In the beginning, there were just a few hundred of president Chen's supporters gathered to counter the protest. Police used barbed wire barricades to cordon off the site of the altercations. Divided by police barricades, the rival camps traded barbs. A few hours later, thousands of Chen's supporters in this traditional DPP stronghold thronged to the site after watching TV news reports of the standoff. Some of Chen's supporters clashed with police while trying to break through police barricades. While the number of Chen's supporters on the scene continued to increase, the anti-Chen protesters gradually left under police escort. At about 11:30pm, Chen's supporters broke through the police barricades, plunging the scene into chaos. The situation was brought under control by the midnight. The standoff between the two rival camps lasted almost six hours (*CT*, 19/09/06 A5; *TT* 19/09/06, 3).

Following violent clashes in Kaohsiung City, a tense shouting match took place between rival protesters in Tainan City – the second largest city in Southern Taiwan – where about

300 anti-Chen protesters were staging a sit-in. The anti-Chen protesters, led by Tainan city councilor of the KMT, obtained permission from the city government to stage a sit-in from 19 September until 24 September in a parking lot behind the city council building. On the first day, hundreds of police officers were dispatched to the scene and barricades were set up to prevent scuffling between the two camps due to the clash earlier in Kaohsiung. As expected, over a thousand of Chen's supporters were mobilised against the sit-in. Clashes occurred several times during the evening. Twenty-six people were arrested and at least ten were injured in clashes (*CT*, 20/09/06 A6). On the second and the third day, although police were on hand to maintain order, clashes still took place. Several civilians and police officers were injured. To prevent a replay of the past three nights' clashes, the city council finally cancelled the permission for the anti-Chen sit-in (*CT* 21/09/06, A1; *TT* 23/09/06, 1).

While the protest rallies down south turned violent, Shih's camp still decided to hold another demonstration in Taipei. The camp announced its plan to call on protesters, once again, besieging the Presidential Office on 10 October, Taiwan's National Day ('Double Ten Day'). Noting that by convention the government holds a flag-raising ceremony and a series of celebrations in front of the Presidential Office to celebrate the national day, the organisers said that 'a siege on that day would ensure that the people's voices are heard around the world' (*CT* 19/09/06, A3; *TT* 19/09/06, 3). To prepare this mass-rally, Shih's camp also came to a conclusion that Shih would travel around the island of Taiwan, joining forces with other cities and counties and expanding the influence of its 'siege' on the national day. Shih made the announcement when he spoke to his followers, saying that he intends to use the nationwide trip to stir the public to stand up against corruption, 'turning the march in Taipei into one around Taiwan' (*CT* 26/09/06, A1). Shih's camp set off on an eight-day tour, taking off on 29 September. Shih travelled with 24 buses to 16 cities and counties including Hsinchu, Taichung, Kaohsiung, Miaoli and Ilan before returning to Taipei on 6 October. The camp invited 500 volunteers to join them on the tour, though they had to travel at their own expense. The tour was entitled 'Flowers Blossoming Everywhere Peacefully'.

Meanwhile, as Shih's campaign prepared for its nationwide tour, they faced the obstructions enacted by the DPP as many DPP County Commissioners in Southern Taiwan refused to approve the legal requests from Shih's camp to assemble or march in their counties. Shih criticised local DPP government chiefs for suppressing the people's rights to

protest. He said, 'Some local DPP chiefs fought against the government for democracy before. Now that they have power, they would not allow differing voices in their cities and counties' (*TT* 28/09/06, 3). Shih particularly lashed out at DPP Kaohsiung County Commissioner Yang Qui-Xing, for refusing to grant the movement access to certain locations. Shih said, 'Yang used to hold protests around the nation with me, and now he is trying to repress the people's right to express their opinions.' Yang in response accused Shih's 'Red Army' of delivering a blow to his county's economy (*ibid.*).

Shih's camp began a nationwide tour on 29 September, departed from Taipei with Hsinchu City as its first stop. The scene of Shih's departure from Taipei was festooned with red flowers and balloons. Supporters of the campaign waved red flags as 20 tour buses departed from the sit-in area in the southern plaza of Taipei Railway Station. Before leaving Taipei, Shih urged participants to keep the tour 'peaceful and non-violent.' He said that both his supporters and opponents are 'brothers' who simply have different stances on the anti-Chen issue. 'Opposing the president doesn't mean opposing the DPP, and opposing the DPP doesn't mean opposing Taiwan. All of the 2.3 million people love Taiwan deeply' (*CT* 30/09/06, A3; *TT* 30/09/06, 3).

The hurdles that Shih's island-wide-tour faced increased as he moved south. The tour's first few stops in Hsinchu City and Miaoli County in northern Taiwan went through peacefully. In Taichung County, the central Taiwan, Shih's group had to abandon their original plan to stay the night at a temple, because Chen's supporters had threatened the temple not to accommodate them (*CT* 30/09/06, A3). In Tainan County, where the riot took place earlier on 19 September, Shih's group was forced to change course after its route was blocked by the police. The campaign organisers subsequently filed a lawsuit against Tainan County Commissioner Su Huan-Zhi, accusing him of negligence and violating their human rights. As a campaign organiser complained, Su used to be a human rights lawyer, but now as a local commissioner he repressed people's rights and blocked their route so they couldn't enter the city (*CT* 04/10/06, A6). The tour then entered Kaohsiung County, where it held a protest. When the tour passed through Kaohsiung City, Shih's followers and Chen's supporters shouted at each other from across the streets. Several thousand police gathered along the camp's route to separate the two sides and maintain public order. After staying the night in Pingtung County, the southernmost county of Taiwan, the campaign turned to the

East, arriving in the Pan-Blue stronghold of Taitung City. Shih's nationwide tour returned to Taipei on 7 October, before holding a large-scale evening protest in Taichung City, marking the end of the nationwide tour.

While Shih was leading his followers around the island of Taiwan, the sit-in continued at the plaza in front of Taipei Railway Station.¹⁶⁹ The campaign organisers in Taipei organised a series of so-called 'flash mob' protest in Taipei streets.¹⁷⁰ In addition, Shih's camp also called on people to donate their A-Bian memorabilia, such as A-Bian hats and A-Bian dolls (*CT* 25/09/06, A3). Those memorabilia were the items that Chen's campaign team produced to boost his support in Chen's previous elections. The symbolic ten A-Bian dolls were sent to the DPP as 'a gift for the party's 20th anniversary,' urging it to draw a line between the party and Chen. Shih's camp said the dolls had been donated by former supporters of the president. Jian Xi-Jie, a former DPP legislator and deputy commander of Shih's camp, said, 'This is proof that many of Chen's campaign supporters used to support the DPP. Now they have donated the dolls because they are ashamed of the party' (*TT* 29/09/06, 3). Another organiser also said that they want the president to ponder why the people who supported him in 2000 detest him now (*ibid*).

6-4-2. Double Ten Day

Shih's camp on 8 September released the detailed plan of the so-called 'siege' on 10

¹⁶⁹ While clashes were occurring in southern Taiwan, Shih's camp in Taipei also struggled with the Pan-Green to obtain legal rights to continue their sit-in in Taipei. Following the mass rally on 15 Sept, the camp moved its sit-in to Taipei Railway Station, as the Pan-Green received approval to use Ketagalan until 20 Sept. On 21 Sept, anti-Chen protesters moved back to Ketagalan. Yet, they only received a permit to hold protests there until 28 September. The right to use the boulevard was given over to the DPP from 28 Sept to 29 Sept and then to the 'Double Ten Day Ceremony Preparation Committee' from 30 Sept to 12 Oct. Shih's camp originally had refused to move to the station, and had pledged to stay on Ketagalan until they were 'dragged away' by the police. Organisers of the protests lashed out at the DPP for reserving the Ketagalan despite having no plans to hold events. A campaign organiser expressed their dissatisfaction, condemning the DPP's continuous efforts to prevent protesters from exercising their assembly and rally rights (*CT* 26/09/06, A4). Shih's camp finally made a concession, agreeing to move its sit-in protest to the Taipei Railway Station. They said the decision was made considering the pressure both Taipei Mayor Ma and the Taipei City Police Department would face if they refused to leave Ketagalan (*CT* 28/09/06, A5). Shih's camp returned to Taipei Railway Station at midnight on 27 Sept, ahead of setting out on a planned nationwide tour.

¹⁷⁰ A flash mob is a group of people assembled in a public place to do something unusual or notable, and then disperse. Shih's camp called for people to gather at 11:45am on 5 October at the No. 1 Exit of all Taipei tube stations and railway stations in other cities and counties, chanting slogans such as 'A-bian step down' for 10 minutes, and dispersed, before police warned them to move along (*CT* 01/10/06, A4; *TT* 01/10/06, 3).

October. They called on two million protesters to join this protest and encircle the Presidential Office building and nearby Ketagalan, where thousands of foreign and local dignitaries and students were scheduled to hold an official ceremony. As it was announced, the protest rally would take place simultaneously on four gathering points around the fringes of the National Day ceremony zone in front of the Presidential Office building (Figure 6-8). It aims to prevent the ‘embattled’ president from entering or leaving his office on the national day (*TT* 08/10/06, 3). Shih held a press conference on 9 September to give a final call for the public to participate in the protest. He insisted that the siege would proceed with ‘love, peace and non-violence,’ and added that

The only thing we ask for is a government free from corruption and a harmonious nation without divided ethnic communities and confrontations between parties... We would like to establish [a country where we can] teach our children and students what honour and sense of shame is, what sense of responsibility is, what honesty is and what justice is. (*TT* 10/10/06, 1)

President Chen on the day before the national day announced that he would attend celebrations despite the risk of being humiliated by his opponents in the presence of hundreds of foreign dignitaries. In the meantime, the DPP legislative caucus also issued a mobilisation order to its 85 members to be present at the celebrations, and about 60 legislators agreed to show up. As for the Pan-Blue, the KMT chairman and Taipei City Mayor Ma said he would attend the ceremony as local chief, with normal clothing and would not attend the protest. He insisted that the party would not be directly involved, but their members were free to attend the protest as individuals. Many KMT legislators and all PFP legislators said they would wear red attending the ceremony, though they promised that they would not interfere with Chen’s speech during celebrations (*CT* 10/10/06, A1). However, fistfights, vocal protests and minor scuffles marked official national day celebrations.

On 10 October, the official ceremony was marred by scuffles between Pan-Green and Pan-Blue legislators while the president was delivering the National Day speech outside the Presidential Office. The legislators had been invited onto the stage with the president and foreign dignitaries. The seats for legislators were allocated on the two sides of the main podium, with two huge white cloth barriers enacted respectively, in order to separate the legislator’s seats from the president’s grandstand, preventing any interference with the president by legislators. About forty Pan-Blue legislators were further separated into two

sections on each side of the main podium, with DPP legislators being arranged to sit between the Pan-Blue legislators and the president's grandstand. While the white cloth barrier had blocked Chen's view of the legislators, the red-clad KMT and PFP legislators started to beat on the barrier, chanting 'A-Bian step down,' making thumbs-down gestures and holding up red banners that read 'Depose Chen,' as Chen began his address. Security officers stepped in when one opposition legislator attempted to hurl a chair at the grandstand on the main podium. He was carried away by security officers. Legislators began to scuffle with their opposition counterparts, pushing and kicking each other and creating a stir that aroused the attention of the guests including foreign dignitaries on the main podium. As Chen quickly left the grandstand after his address, Pan-Blue legislators led by PFP chairman Soong broke through a cordon of security officers to march into the rally site as honour guards were parading. Furious DPP legislators again tried to stop the opposition from disrupting the parade, resulting in an injury to a KMT legislator, who later filed a lawsuit for assault against the DPP contingent.

President Chen, amid protests staged by opposition lawmakers at the ceremony, addressed a speech to the estimated 50,000 of local and foreign guests invited to the event. Chen appealed for national unity, saying people on the island must work together to overcome various problems in building up Taiwan. He said that freedom of speech is a constitutional right and Taiwan is a free country, but he went on to say that while the government tolerated opposing views, people must not destroy the island's unity. He said,

Different people have different opinions, but they cannot sabotage national solidarity. Different people have different national identifications, but they cannot divide the country nor drive the government into an idle spin. (*TT* 11/10/06, 1)

Chen then added that the 23 million people of Taiwan are all in the same boat, regardless of their differences or political affiliations, and went on saying

We respect the right of free choice, but it is our common responsibility to facilitate the nation's development and growth. Only with greater unity can we weather the storm and sail toward a brighter future. (*Ibid*)

Before making the speech outside the Presidential Office building, Chen delivered a speech to Cabinet officials in the auditorium of the Presidential Office. He described an opposition-initiated recall motion as 'a new chapter in the partisan struggle' which has persisted since the transfer of power in 2000. He said that the political unrest over the past

six years reflects the fact that the opposition parties have refused to cope with the reality that they lost power, adding that the country faces a dilemma common to other emerging democracies. He said that he would try to uphold national dignity rather than take cheap shots at the clowns in red running amok (*ibid.*).

Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of protesters, clad in red, took to the streets to join the 'siege' around the Presidential Office building. The protesters began to gather around the fringes of the ceremony zone in the early morning. They were separated by barbed-wire barricades set up by police to prevent them from coming near the celebration. They tried to block a few lanes of a main road leading to the ceremony zone, to prevent the president's motorcade from entering and leaving the celebration site. Unable to tell which car Chen was in, the crowd rushed onto the road from the sidewalks whenever an official-looking black car appeared. Several of the entrapped vehicles were carrying top government officials and foreign diplomatic guests. Protesters encircled the vehicles, smacking and kicking at the cars. Prior to the start of the ceremony, some DPP legislators had been blocked from entering by protesters, and had to be escorted into the ceremony by police. The protestors also unfurled huge red banners reading 'Shame on You' and 'Oust Chen Shui-Bian.' At the time Chen was giving a speech at the stage, the protesters shouted 'A-Bian step down' and flashed the thumbs down gesture outside the ceremony zone, trying to interrupt his speech and making sure that Chen had heard their voices. Several violent incidents were reported in the morning (*TT 11/10/06, 1, 3*).

After the mock 'siege' of the Presidential Office in the morning, a second wave of rallies was held a few hours later. Shortly after 4pm, Shih led his followers in a parade rally along the main streets of Taipei City before returning to Taipei Railway Station. The protestors then occupied the road next to Taipei Railway Station, blocking traffic as ten thousands of protesters sat or lay on the road. This impromptu parade in the afternoon of course caused traffic chaos. The protest on the day was illegal because the anti-Chen camp organisers had not applied for a permit. Even though it was illegal, the police did not disperse the crowd. Police only focused on not allowing protesters to enter the celebration site, but did not remove protesters parading from several directions as they 'besieged' the Presidential Office. Following a long day of protest, Taipei Mayor Ma, after communicating with Shih, who had agreed to persuade the protesters to refrain from rallying on the road,

requested the protesters disperse by 11pm. However, about 5,000 diehards refused to leave the road or move back to the square outside the station. Riot police were dispatched to the scene at 10pm. At about 4am, with only 400 protesters rallied on the site, 1,400 riot police started their dispersal action. The area was cleared after the last protesters were carried away at about 5am, with a few protesters injured. The organisers claimed 1.5 million people showed up to demand Chen's resignation, while police estimated the turnout at around 500,000.

After the 'Besiege the Presidential Office' demonstration, the movement went into an abrupt decline. Shih's camp was no longer able to mobilise any other mass rally. Although Shih vowed to demonstrate indefinitely outside the presidential office until Chen resigns, he, however, went back on this pledge in December, retiring to an apartment near the train station and promising to remain there until Chen's term was over.

6-5. A 'Failed' Movement? – By Way of Conclusion

Weeks after commencing a high-profile, round-the-clock demonstration, the anti-corruption campaign appeared to have lost its momentum and came under heavy criticism following its 'siege' on National Day. While some critics had condemned the 'illegal' demonstration for disturbing public order, other rebukes came from some of the campaign's own supporters, with some questioning indecisive leadership in Shih's camp.

The campaign started on a high note. It received public donations totalising NT\$111 million when Shih first introduced the campaign in early August, attracting a great number of protesters to its sit-ins and other forms of demonstrations. The campaign reached its peak with hundreds of thousands of people flooding the streets and joining its mock 'siege' of the Presidential Office on 15 September. However, the campaign seemed to lose momentum since then, with subsequent demonstrations attracting a lower number of participants. Along with losing its momentum, more seriously, the campaign became more turbulent.

On the surface, it is obvious that the movement failed. It failed because, firstly, Chen did not step down after two months of intense protest. Instead, the movement went into an abrupt decline in mid-October. Secondly and more importantly, in opposition to what the campaign organisers originally claimed, the campaign unwittingly became trapped in the

confrontation between the two political camps, two ideologies, and two national identities. Shih's campaign originally attempted to put a stop to the squabbling between the blue and green camps and create a space for the rise of a third force. Developments, however, showed no signs of moving in this direction. The movement eventually ended up a more vigorous battle over partisan politics and national identity than ever before.

Indeed, the political tension in Taiwan was greatly intensified during this period. One foreign photographer commented at a conference that he often thinks twice about the colour of his attire before going out, and is careful not to dress in 'red' or 'green' (*TT* 23/09/06, 3). Also, a psychologist noticed more and more people seeking treatment for depression at the hospital where he works. The psychologist attributed this to deepening political tensions. He said,

These kinds of depression cases can be separated into three categories: Anti-Chen patients who are upset that their movement hasn't been successful yet; pro-Chen patients who are upset that the anti-Chen movement hasn't fizzled out yet; and those without a clear political affiliation who are upset by all the disorder and chaos resulting from the political tug-of-war. (Ibid)

In this sense, if the success of Shih's campaign is measured by the extent to which it went beyond traditional political divisions, ideological confrontation, and identity conflict, it must be judged to have failed. It transcended nothing but widened the division between the two camps on the island of Taiwan. It resulted in another wave of social cleavage and partisan wrestling. In effect, Shih's campaign was incorporated into the traditional division based on national identity politics. As a result, the spectre of 'nationalism' or 'national identity' still plays a large part in the confrontation between 'Depose Chen' and 'Against the deposition'.

How did Shih's campaign fail?

In an interview published by *United Daily News*, Shih, when analysing the reasons his campaign had not yet succeeded, lashed out at Vice President Lu's failure to support his campaign. He said, 'Lu is [the president's] biggest accomplice [and the main reason] why Chen hasn't stepped down yet' (*UDN* 14/10/06). Indeed, Shih's comment points out the fact that his camp failed to inspire more green supporters to show up in his campaign. One can argue that president Chen's strategy of manipulating the independence-unification issue was successful in consolidating his support within the green camp. Analysts also said the anti-Chen demonstrations in effect helped the DPP to unite and mobilise its base supporters,

incited a backlash from Pan-Green, restricted room for internal discussion in the green camp and proved to be Chen's saver. In this sense, Shih did Chen a favour by initiating the anti-Chen protest. Chen's failure to uphold higher moral standards and enforce stricter discipline among his family and staff has disappointed a lot of the green supporters.

Indeed, when Shih officially launched the demonstrations on 9 September, the DPP was divided, with some members supporting Chen and others criticising him. However, after the movement transformed itself from anti-corruption to partisan and ethnic confrontation, Chen's critics fell silent. Although some Pan-Green supporters might have lost confidence in the DPP at the beginning of the campaign, they were compelled to defend the party administration as protests became more radical. Some political commentators even argued that Shih's protest had helped Chen to do some 'house-cleaning,' forcing those DPP members who opposed Chen's leadership to leave the green camp. In this sense, although some of the campaign decision-makers are either DPP members or close to the DPP, Chen greatly succeeded in defining/representing the movement as affiliated with Pan-Blue/unification/Chinese identity or even the PRC. The focus of the movement became obscured. The Pan-Green supporters were therefore forced to choose sides.

So, in the end, nothing substantially changed, as if Sisyphus' stone rolled back down the slope to the bottom.

Moreover, as argued in the beginning of this chapter, domination and resistance are intimately related to each other. Every power relation has its resistance dimension, and every resistance has its dominatory facet. Even if the Anti-Corruption Movement had succeeded in resisting a specific subjectification, it would very likely produce another form of domination, just as the rise of Taiwanese nationalism as a resistance to KMT's Chinese chauvinism turned into domination, blocking many other viable forms of life and identities. The interrelation between domination and resistance is always ambiguous and, certainly, reversible. It is reversible in the sense that it is very possible to construe domination and resistance the other way around, by for example interpreting the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally discussed in Chapter Five as being about resistance (rather than about domination, as this thesis argued) and the Anti-corruption Movement analysed in this chapter as being about domination (rather than about resistance). Nevertheless, this chapter intends to justify the interpretation of the Anti-Corruption Movement as a resistance. It argues that the main

target of an effective critical elaboration is always dominant discourses – *authoritative* words and acts.¹⁷¹ Since everyone in contemporary Taiwanese society is presumed to feel comfortable being Taiwanese – claiming that they are Taiwanese and cannot be otherwise, disapproving of social activities that are against this line of thought – the Anti-Corruption Movement opposed this dominant discourse and can justifiably be conceived as a resistance, albeit temporarily and spatially. By all means, the discussion over the circular relationship between domination and resistance can only be attained in a specific contextualisation, in a certain timeframe, and in a particular subjectivity.

Consequently, the chapter does not follow that the movement was meaningless. The movement was both a practice and an attitude to resist domination. It opened the possibility of alternative ways of political life and was an indefinite political struggle grounded in the belief that things could be otherwise, even if one did not know exactly how. The anti-corruption movement is the practice of refusal. It is also an attitude that refuses to give in to resignation. Indeed, the meaning of resistance exists in the practice of resisting, in the struggle itself. As Camus concludes, ‘the struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy’ (Camus 2005, 119).

Indeed, one must imagine Sisyphus happy.

¹⁷¹ On this account, although the thesis acknowledges that the PRC on the one hand, and Pan-Blue on the other are also sources of power that define the political on Taiwan, they are not the foci of this thesis, since they, in the context of contemporary Taiwanese society since 1990, have not defined the dominant discourse.

CHAPTER 7

The Death of ‘the Taiwanese’

‘A’ Conclusion

7-1. The Death of ‘the Taiwanese’

Taiwanese National Identity as a ‘Discursive Entity’

As shown in the previous chapter, the Anti-Corruption Movement should be understood as an example of resistance to a specific form of Taiwanese identity, and opposition to the idea that everything associated with ‘Taiwanese identity’ can be legitimised. The identity being resisted, as argued in this thesis, is itself a ‘discursive entity’. That is to say that Taiwanese identity, ontologically, exists only in discourse.

As shown in Chapter Two, ‘discourse’ was understood in this thesis as highly diverse, fragmented and heterogeneous in nature. It is a realm that includes both linguistic and non-linguistic acts, a synthesis that encompasses discursive practices and social practices, and a domain in which discursive practice and social practice are exercised. The distinction between discursive practices and social practices is highly ambiguous and, indeed, interchangeable. Any social practice has its discursive dimension; any discursive practice has its material foundations and is, in effect, a social practice. The thesis therefore punctuates these two terms with a slash. In view of this understanding, when it was stated that Taiwanese identity is constituted in *discourse*, the term ‘discourse’ refers to a domain of dispersion, in which various discursive/social practices intersect, intertwine and interact. It is the realm in which the discourse concerning ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is formed by various practices, the context in which the discourse is disseminated throughout the society of Taiwan, and the site in which the discourse of Taiwanese national identity is reproduced, forming the subject: the ‘Taiwanese’. In other words, there is a discourse of/about ‘Taiwanese-ness’, and this discourse is constituted, sustained, undermined, or transformed by an intricate web of discursive/social practices; when discursive/social practices ‘speak’ of the ‘Taiwanese’, the Taiwanese are formed as a result of this ‘speaking’.

Accordingly, to treat Taiwanese identity as a *discursive entity* is to make a particular claim: it is to say that Taiwanese identity is a way of talking and doing things relative to what sort of people the Taiwanese are; it suggests that every word and action contributes to the idea that there is such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ and helps to substantialise the qualities/features attaching to it; it proposes that all statements, utterances and actions related to ‘the Taiwanese’ and ‘Taiwanese-ness’ constitute ‘Taiwanese’ as an identity. Moreover, this process of construction is not simply one way. A particular discourse of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, in turn, makes certain statements, utterances, and types of conduct possible, conditioning what people say and do. What people say and do in relation to the issue of Taiwanese identity constrains and enables what people are able to say and do about the issue of Taiwanese identity. In other words, Taiwanese national identity does not exist prior to the processes of this discursive constitution; rather, those discursive/social practices construct and constrict, structure and deconstruct, the ways national self-identification are imagined and represented. This thesis therefore did not enquire into what the residents of Taiwan have lost or been deprived of in the process of this discursive constitution. The Taiwanese-ness is neither naturally given nor premeditated there, but exists in the way people talk and act. At the same time though, it is integral to other things people say and do and is in turn sustained or undermined by these things. Taiwanese identity is therefore a *practice*, which belongs to the realm of discourse, and is determined, sustained, undermined or transformed by various meticulous, varied and heterogeneous practices which are, in turn, discursive.

In short, the discourse of Taiwanese identity represents what ‘Taiwanese-ness’ is, gives meaning to the identity of ‘being Taiwanese’, and fixes ‘Taiwanese’ as a focus of identification in the island of Taiwan. There is no such thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ outside of this process of constitution. Taiwanese-ness – the identity, the practice, and the process of constitution – exists only in discourse.

Social Practices/Events in the Discursive Constitution of Taiwanese National Identity since 1990

The thesis investigated the discursive proliferation of Taiwanese identity as a national identity since 1990. It puts forward a number of arguments on the importance of several selected social practices/events that coalesced around the question and the politics of identity formation in the post-authoritarian environment.

Taiwan since 1990 has experienced a discursive proliferation on the subject of ‘Taiwanese-ness’ (or/and ‘Taiwanese identity’). People in Taiwan from all walks of life have been enthusiastic and passionate in talking about it. Numerous statements, utterances and interventions concerning ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in terms of culture, history, and people, have been made. ‘Taiwanese-ness’ has been articulated as a national identity in this wave of discursive activity; and this identity has been produced through differentiation from that of ‘Chinese-ness’. Notably, this discursive proliferation coincides with Taiwan’s process of democratisation. Various statements, utterances and forms of conduct that had been suppressed for so long by the KMT regime were finally liberated amid the introduction of democracy. The practices of democracy that possessed a greater degree of freedom of expression offered the political conditions of possibility for this discursive proliferation. Moreover, accompanying the democratisation was a redistribution of political power between native Taiwanese and Mainlander elites within and outside the KMT during the 1990s, and this was followed by political competition between the Pan-Blue and Pan-Green in the 21st century. Issues of ethnicity (Mainlander vs. native Taiwanese), of ideology (Unification vs. Independence), and of national identity (Taiwanese vs. Chinese) have often been used to advance one political camp over another. The high frequency of political elections has also encouraged people to talk about these issues, and the intensive media coverage has ensured that political rhetoric is disseminated throughout the whole of society. Consequently, the practice of democracy in, and political competition through, the form of election has indeed contributed to the high exposition of political rhetoric concerning people’s self-identification.

This thesis examined various types of social practices/events amid this wave of discursive proliferation that incited people to talk about Taiwanese-ness. Certain things, with different positions, forms and organisations, were said and done; and with various power relations, they mutually intersected, interacted and competed; the things being said in turn underpinned the production of a particular kind of Taiwanese identity, that is, the birth of the Taiwanese. The social practices selected in this thesis included the production of knowledge (Chapter Three), a book publication (Chapter Four), an election campaign (Chapter Five), and a political demonstration (Chapter Six). Those aforementioned practices are just a few of the many practices that have conjointly contributed to the emergence of a

particular way of talking about the national identity of the Taiwanese people that did not really exist before 1990.

It is crucially noted that the social practices through which the idea of Taiwanese-ness being constituted are *recurring* practices, rather than one-off events. The concept of ‘social practice’ implies a thing that occurs again periodically and repeatedly. For instance, in terms of political demonstration, there are hundreds or even thousands of political demonstrations taking place in Taiwan each year. Methodologically, then, it is therefore difficult to investigate a social practice constantly, in particular when this thesis intended to offer a meticulous description of these practices. As a result, with the exception of Chapter Three (the production of knowledge), the thesis explores only certain representative *events* involved, aiming to show the twists and turns since 1990 which ended up creating a specific sort of Taiwanese identity. The events selected in this thesis should therefore not be taken to have any ‘particular’ significance since they are *recurring*, though in various forms and producing each time different consequences. There is then a certain ambiguity in the distinction between the social practice and the event in this thesis. Moreover, attempting to link those disparate events and establish causal succession between them should be avoided. The world that this thesis tried to present is a place full of discontinuity, difference, conflict, contradiction, diversity and rupture. This thesis opposed a form of writing history seeking to totalise history, tracing its internal development, and to offer the reassurance of an end toward which history moves. It did not aim to provide ‘a’ sequence of events that culminates in the formation of Taiwanese national identity.

On this account, the analysis made in this thesis is both *causal* and *non-causal*. Causal, in the sense that the events discussed in the thesis (have) contributed to constituting Taiwanese national identity with the specific attributes attached to it. Yet it is also non-causal, in that the formation of Taiwanese national identity *cannot* be deducted and deduced, either fully or partly, from a number of events. The social practices/events being selected should be understood as *related* and *unrelated*. Related, for all of them speak, or appear to be speaking, of one and the same thing, at any rate, the Taiwanese-ness. But also unrelated, for this thesis does not intend to provide a chronicle or linear narrative of the formation of Taiwanese

national identity, i.e. an event causing another event.¹⁷² And finally, the research is both a *meticulous* (as it was claimed) and a *selective* study of the formation of Taiwanese national identity. It was meticulous in its detailed description of the selected events. It was selective, in that the events (as well as social practices) demonstrated in this thesis are just a few of the numerous events that occur periodically or repeatedly.

As a result, the selection of these events as examples was arbitrary and contingent. They were intentionally and strategically included (whilst simultaneously excluding alternatives) as texts and events that best present and represent the overlapping and dispersed nature of identity formation in the post-authoritarian Taiwan. It is possible to elucidate the reasons for choosing these events, but it is not possible to 'legitimise' them. The publication of Kobayashi's manga (comic book) and the 2004 commemoration of the 2-28 Incident were selected to demonstrate how Taiwan's past of 'the Japanese colonisation' and 'the KMT's re-colonisation' had been replicated in a certain way, thereby helping to constitute people's self-identification in Taiwan, respectively. It is however important to keep in mind that there are many other social practices/events contributing to the 'restoration' of Taiwan's past, though pulling in different, un-unified and sometimes contradictory, directions.

To summarise, the cases being studied in this thesis, as a practice, an event, or an accident, provided different occasions in which discourses that differed in origin, form, organisation and function, intersected, interacted and competed. They all manifested a number of complicated and multileveled battles, contests, confrontations or power relations among discourses and through discourses. Those events became a discursive realm of power struggle. Each force, by adopting different tactics, endeavoured to grasp the power to define, determine, and above all, reconstitute what Taiwanese-ness is. The aim of this research is to draw a map, to speak of those combats, to reconstruct these confrontations and battles, and to rediscover the interaction of these discourses as weapons of attack and defence in the formation of Taiwanese national identity.

¹⁷² On this account, the order in which events are discussed in this thesis (i.e. the publication of the manga, moving to the 2-28 Hand-in-hand Rally, and to Anti-corruption Movement) can always be reversed or restructured.

Summary of Chapters

Chapter Three investigated the close relationship between the production of knowledge and the constitution of Taiwanese identity. The chapter concentrated on two forms of knowledge: historical knowledge and political knowledge. The former – historical knowledge – attempts to yield *the* narrative of Taiwan’s history, aiming to delineate the process and elucidate the origins of the formation of Taiwanese identity. Its arguments can be summarised as follows: for more than four hundred years the people of Taiwan have been governed by external and invading forces (most importantly, the Japanese and the KMT); political and cultural resistance from the local people to those forces throughout those periods formed a distinctive collective consciousness, producing a ‘people’ that differs very much from that of China. The latter – political knowledge – expounds the reasons why people in Taiwan form a shared identity as Taiwanese, and how this relates to the process of democratisation. Their arguments can be summarised into three lines of argument. Firstly, Taiwanese consciousness was long suppressed under the authoritarian KMT regime; democratisation offered space for the free expression of a pent-up ‘true’ identity. Second, the practice of democracy accustoms people to participating in the deliberation of ‘national’ affairs, thereby creating a shared political identity, common values and a sense of achievement. Third, the long-existing and ever-growing threats from China foster a sense of common suffering, unifying the people of Taiwan regardless of their ethnicity and producing a shared identity. Regarding the aforementioned two forms of knowledge, Chapter Three argued that these two forms of knowledge demonstrate not only two explanations of Taiwanese identity formation, but more importantly, two modes of construction of people’s self-identification. Historical knowledge plays a significant role in the formation of Taiwanese identity since the identity formation is intimately associated with how the people narrate their ‘past’, excavate their ‘memory’, and interpret their ‘history’. Political knowledge in comparison participates in the ongoing process of identity formation by providing an illusion of what a group of people will become, what sort of life style they shall look for in the future. Taiwanese identity is in fact constituted in a dissemination of specific historical and political narratives. Through various social practices, those narratives take precedence over other alternative ones, so that other alternatives are excluded, made to disappear and silenced. The chapter therefore suggested that an important task of current studies on

Taiwanese identity is to illustrate the process of how specific narratives take precedence over alternatives, thereby helping to constitute a Taiwanese identity with specific features attached.

Chapter Four investigated how the historically concluded process of Japanese colonisation has emerged again as an ongoing structuring force in the creation of certain forms of identity among the population in contemporary Taiwanese society. The chapter scrutinised the controversy surrounding a Japanese manga *On Taiwan*, a book which provides a very positive evaluation of the legacy of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan. When the Chinese translation of the book was published in Taiwan in 2001, it immediately aroused strong reactions, inspiring serious debate and identity-related conflict in Taiwanese society. On the one hand, protestors called on the public to boycott it. They went into the streets burning copies of the book. On the other hand, equally strong voices welcomed the author's idealistic and nostalgic depiction of Taiwan. They distributed the book in the street. The event lasted almost three months. During this period, extraordinary attention was focused on this manga in Taiwanese society. A great number of statements, utterances and conducts concerning this manga were produced. The publication of this manga became a discursive realm of political battle, in which different discourses interact, intersect and compete with each other. This chapter analysed those statements, utterances and conducts that were made by those who have various positions (i.e. the Taiwanese sympathisers vs. Chinese sympathisers), in an attempt to comprehend how the discourses of Japanese colonialism and Sino-chauvinism reciprocally conflict and compete with each other in ways that affect people's self-identification, producing a particular form of subjectivity of Taiwan. Which issues/discourses/ideologies have been raised and how they have been discussed; what other alternative issues/discourses/ideologies, if any, have been repressed, silenced and made to disappear in the process of the event. In short, this chapter is an effort to demonstrate how and through which social practices Taiwan's past colonial experiences had been discursively produced in a certain way and what other alternatives had been excluded from this process, thereby helping to constitute people's self-identification in Taiwan. It argued that the embodiment of contemporary Taiwanese national identity must be apprehended and articulated in the contradictory and irreducible triangular interrelation among residual Japanese colonialism during the colonial time, the once-dominant Chinese nationalism during the KMT's authoritarian period and the currently dominant Taiwanese nationalism in the post-democratic era.

Chapter Five analysed how an election campaign, understood as a social practice, contributed to people's self-identification in Taiwan. To do so, the chapter scrutinises a specific election campaign in the 2004 presidential election, the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally, which was designed to commemorate the 2-28 Incident, a traumatic event in Taiwan's modern history. This chapter aimed to understand how a specific collective memory of the incident was produced in the context of an election campaign; and how this specific memorialising of the incident actually contributes to a particular conception of what it means to 'Be Taiwanese'. This chapter gave a thick description of the rally. Two aspects of the event were stressed: first, the political context of the mass-rally, and second, the precise manner of the performance. The former refers to the political competition during the election campaign in 2004 in relation to identity politics in Taiwan since the 1990s. The latter in turn deals with the details of the rally, including a series of press conferences in the run-up to the demonstration, the location of the gathering, the activities of the campaign, etc. This chapter argued that political interests and aspirations from the election campaign shaped the various views of the past, conditioning the political possibility for the remembrance of the 2-28 Incident. As shown in the chapter, the 2-28 Incident was represented in the rally as a warning about unification with China and a symbol of the reconciliation of different ethnic groups. The political message manifested in the event can be summarised as follows: The shadow of the 2-28 Incident has covered Taiwan for over fifty years; besides remembrance and reflection, what the Taiwanese should do today is on the one hand remember the tragic history caused by Chinese rule, and on the other hand move on from the trauma, transform the suffering, and form a unified and solid Taiwanese nation. Such political rhetoric brings out the very contradictory nature of the process of remembering the 2-28 Incident. It manifests two necessary elements in the process of nation building. First, the 2-28 Incident must be commemorated as a trauma in order to differentiate Taiwan from China. Second, it is also necessary to forget 2-28 in order to form a united and harmonious Taiwanese nation on the other. Indeed, Taiwanese nation-building is very much intertwined with 'remembering' and 'forgetting' the history of 2-28.

Although certain political consequences were produced by the Hand-in-Hand Rally, this thesis does not want to suggest that authority can achieve exactly what it wants to achieve. Chapter Six therefore turned its gaze on the possibility of resistance by investigating the so-called Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan. The movement began in the summer of 2006

when groups of people including scholars, social activists and politicians launched a series of protests to force Taiwan's president Chen to resign. The president was accused of corruption. The movement lasted for two months with immense intensity, but it finally went into an abrupt decline in mid-October. It was ostensibly intended to transcend partisan ideological and identity divisions. The organisers of the movement expressed a strong reluctance to being pushed into either the green (identification with Taiwan) or the blue (identification with China) camps. They argued that many public issues (such as corruption) were hijacked by party affiliations and identity politics, leaving people's interests unaddressed. However, this non-partisan stand was intensely challenged by the ruling party. It argued that one should not neglect the fact that identity politics were still being played out within the movement; 'Chinese identity' played important roles in the movement to overthrow the DPP government – the first 'indigenised' regime – thereby dismantling Taiwanese identity. As a result, the major battlefield between the two sides is clear. That is, how the 'nature' of the movement is defined and represented. Both sides therefore struggled to either define or counter-define the movement through any possible means – actions and words. The movement became not simply a physical site but a discursive space in which different forces competed. The whole event was actually a confrontation among discourses and through discourses. Through investigating those actions and words, this chapter argued that the movement should be understood as a resistance to a specific subjectification of the Taiwanese, since it opposed the idea that everything under the name of 'Taiwanese identity' can be legitimised – a prominent feature of Taiwanese national identity formation since 1990. The movement, however, ultimately failed because it unwittingly became trapped in the confrontation between the two political camps, two ideologies, and two national identities. Nevertheless, the chapter did not think that the movement was meaningless. The movement was an indefinite political struggle grounded in the belief that things could be otherwise. In short, this chapter aimed to contribute to an understanding of the particular ways in which subjectivity is contested.

The Death of the 'Taiwanese'

This thesis, in sum, is an attempt to understand how various social practices/events enable or disable certain ways in which people make sense of their past and their political lives that come to terms with their belongings, their allegiances, and their situated-ness. It is

also an attempt to understand how people's self-identifications in turn rearticulate and redefine the social practices/events and the way people imagine political possibilities. Taiwanese-ness is spoken of, not only literally but also symbolically, and it is this process of being 'spoken of' that constitutes Taiwanese-ness – the birth of the 'Taiwanese'. If the concept of 'Taiwanese' is not an essence but in fact a discursive entity, existing only on surface practices – what people said and do, it follows that it may be only a temporary preoccupation of contemporary politics. This leads to the conclusion of this thesis, the end of the subject – the death of the 'Taiwanese'.

That is to say: the Taiwanese is composed of his own figure in the interstices of fragmented words and actions; when people stop talking/doing things about 'Taiwanese-ness, it will disappear one day, being preserved only in the archive. Indeed, if 'Taiwanese' was constituted at a time when language was doomed to dispersion, will he not also be dispersed when language regains its unity, in a development paralleling Nietzsche's death of God and Foucault's prediction regarding 'the end of man'? In Nietzsche's view, the secularisation of modern society and developments in the sciences (in the West) had actually 'killed' God. Nietzsche does not suggest that modern human has proven God's existence to be false, but contended that the Western thought that built upon the Christianity that had served as the bedrock of meaning and value for a thousand years had been replaced by modern philosophical thought. It is in this sense that Nietzsche claims the 'last man' has killed God. Following Nietzsche, Foucault further heralds the end of God's murderer. For Foucault, the modern episteme 'was formed towards the end of the eighteenth century and still serves as the positive ground of our knowledge...which constituted man's particular mode of being and the possibility of knowing him empirically' (Foucault 1970, 385). Yet, 'if this same language (the modern episteme) is now emerging with greater and greater insistence in a unity that we ought to think but cannot as yet do so, is this not the sign that the whole of this configuration is not about to topple, and that man is in the process of perishing...' (ibid., 386). Nietzsche and Foucault here both indicate a sharp rupture of human thoughts. Foucault concludes:

As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility...were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of classical thought

did...then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. (ibid., 387).

7-2. Dismantling ‘Taiwanese’ – An Ethical Aspect of the Thesis

As elaborated above, this thesis was in general an attempt to uncover the discursive nature of Taiwanese identity as the national identity of the people of Taiwan. But what is the broader objective of this sort of effort? The thesis itself has its *political* orientations. To put it plainly, it aims to dismantle ‘Taiwanese-ness’, which is seen as an unproblematic truth in Taiwan.

As was argued in this thesis, Taiwanese-ness is not naturally given, but exists in the way people talk and act. There is no such a thing as ‘Taiwanese-ness’ in the sense of the pure, authentic, quality of a unified community. The subject – Taiwanese-ness/Taiwanese national identity – is conceptualised as having no fixed, essential, or permanent identity. Taiwanese identity becomes what Hall described as a ‘moveable feast’ (Hall 1995, 598). It formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways people talk and act. It is not united around a coherent ‘Self’. Within the ‘Self’ are un-unified, and sometimes contradictory and conflicting, discursive constitutions, pulling in different directions. ‘Being identical’ is in effect continuously being shifted about. The meaning of ‘Taiwanese’ is always deterred and deferred. It never has final or fixed meaning, and each ‘stop’ is arbitrary and contingent. In other words, Taiwanese national identity is conditional, lodged in contingency. Contingency involves a sense of dependence on other practices, events and political contexts. It has determinate conditions of existence – including the material and symbolic resources – required to sustain it.

Moreover, it should be stressed that each ‘stop’ in effect is not only arbitrary and contingent, but more importantly entails power relations. As shown in Chapter Two, the discourse involves a complex set of practices that keeps certain statements, utterances and conducts in circulation, while silencing other statements, utterances and conducts. One cannot just ‘say’ and ‘do’ what one wishes to ‘say’ and ‘do’. The use of words and actions has limits. These complex sets of practices involve the play of power, thereby implying the production of exclusion and inclusion. Indeed, only certain discourses are disseminated in society, thereby only certain forms of subject are formed accordingly. Thus, identity is a

question of which and whose statements, utterances and forms of conduct emerge and which and whose do not; it is a site at which different discourses interact, intersect and compete; and it is about the *politics* of the appearance and disappearance of certain statements, utterances and modes of conduct. The study of discourse therefore needs to get involved in exposing power relations that exist within society at any given moment in order to consider how marginal and subordinate groups are oppressed by the dominant group; or alternatively, how they might secure or win, however temporarily, space. A specific discourse limits or excludes alternative ways in which Taiwanese-ness can be constituted. Since many other alternative political possibilities – subjectivity – are omitted, repressed and made to disappear in the discursive formation of ‘Taiwanese-ness’, the concept itself on that account needs to be critically interrogated.

This thesis therefore problematised ‘Taiwanese national identity’. It put Taiwanese-ness in a historical motion, and dissolved this comforting illusion of identity and firmness and solidity. The political position of identity that one takes up should not be set in stone. One needs to reposition oneself over time and in different circumstances. Once one sees that Taiwanese-ness is constituted in the pervasiveness, dispersion, intricacy, contingency, and layering of our social practices, one also sees that any attempt to sum up what is going on is bound to be a potentially dangerous distortion, and indeed, a violation. This thesis in this regard should be seen as a critique of identity politics as defined in terms of an absolute, undivided commitment to, and identification with, ‘the nation of Taiwan’. It wishes to open up alternative possibilities for politics. This thesis therefore intends to create a history of the different modes in which people residing in the island of Taiwan are made subject and to expose the dispersed beginnings and developments of the discourses and practices through which human beings are subjectified. It aims to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in the construction of Taiwan’s national identity. The thesis always asks how we become who and what we are in our present form. It is intended as a history of the present that de-familiarises and de-comforts us from what we now take for granted by revealing in detail how things can be otherwise.

That is how (and why) the genealogical method was employed in this thesis. Elaborated by Foucault, genealogy forms part of a strategy that challenges people’s understanding of

who they are in ways that lead them to resist their attachments to their social identities. Hence, this thesis rejects a particular storyline that makes it sound as if Taiwanese-ness has its origins and develops ineluctably to the present state of affairs. It rejects any meta-narrative or inevitability thesis. It argued that writing a history of Taiwanese national identity as the result of an evolutionary Taiwanese history with a traceable origin is problematic, since it only legitimises the current world without questioning it. Taiwanese identity as a unified identity is constituted in a comforting story or narrative of the self about itself. On this account, the method developed in this thesis is to be contrasted with the way of writing history that is more conformist, aimed at familiarising us with what we are, though it should not be denied that both methods, conforming and non-confirming, are forms of political intervention.

The thesis therefore does not intend to provide a theory of Taiwanese national identity or national identities in general. It is not by any means intended to replace theories of the formation of Taiwanese national identity with a new one. Such an effort is problematic, since it would simply fix a new notion of Taiwanese-ness that concurrently excludes other alternatives. As argued throughout this thesis, identity is a process over which we must struggle, rather than a static object we can simply describe or provide a grand, overarching, theory of. Identity is a site of ongoing struggle that can never be guaranteed for one side or the other. On this account, the contribution of this thesis does not simply expose the *politics* of identity, but also to reveal the fact that identity is itself *political*.

To summarise, this thesis provided a genealogical account of 'Taiwanese' as a national identity. It refused to view such an identity formation as a linear development of history that has traceable origins; it rejected the possibility that the idea of being Taiwanese has a deep meaning, fixed essence or that it reflects primordial truth and instead locates its meaning in surface practices. In contrast, the thesis attempts to discover the constitution of the meaning of 'Taiwanese' from its surface practices; it tries to seek the emergence of 'Taiwanese' from numberless points.

7-3. 'I' – A Personal Dimension

A final point I want to make is that this thesis is the work of a stranger. The whole thesis was written in Wales. Holding a Taiwanese passport and being categorised as 'foreign student', I am apparently a 'stranger' here. More importantly, I am a stranger in the society of Taiwan as well. Although I am from a Minnan ethnic family, all of my early education (until high school) had been Chinese-centred. Yet, entering the 1990s, ironically enough, I was told to become 'Taiwanese' again. In this sense, I was born as an ethnic 'Taiwanese' but grew up to be a 'Chinese', and then needed to 'return' to a 'Taiwanese' identity. In my life up until now I have had to shift my identity three times. It was infuriating. I was of course irritated at the KMT's propagandist, Sino-centric type of education. Yet, I do not see anything 'progressive' in the establishment of 'Taiwanese subjectivity' since 1990 either. The word 'Chinese' was simply replaced by the word 'Taiwanese'. Nothing substantive has changed. The government (now, the democratic one) uses exactly the same measures to push their own version of nation-state building, establishing people's patriotism. We are still being told to be 'a' particular 'people'. Everyone has been compelled, or has consented, to become 'Taiwanese', regardless of his/her backgrounds, experiences, and feelings. Indeed, there is very little choice of identity for individuals in Taiwan; in some cases there is no choice at all. Identity is always being given. Hence, I have decided to reject, intentionally, being pushed to become either 'Chinese' or 'Taiwanese', though this makes me feel as if I am a 'stranger' in my own country, with a sense of alienation from my community. Yet, when I use the term 'alienation' I do not mean this in an entirely negative sense. On the contrary, it enables me to understand myself and the world I am living in more easily. Much of the personal investment in this thesis derives from this sense of alienation. In other words, this thesis was written in the specific societies and problems I have been living through. I do not think that there is any knowledge production in the human sciences that can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement in his/her own circumstances. The only real things to me are those that we experience physically.

To conclude this thesis, I end with the hope that it would contribute to the scholarly debate in three ways. The first is through the genealogical method developed in this thesis that aims to demonstrate how ideas acquire authority, 'normality', and even the status of 'natural' truth. Second, it provides a critical understanding of the character of Taiwanese national identity formation as a process, which might be applied to emergent nationalisms in

other contexts. If this thesis has any future use, I hope that it will be as a modest contribution to that challenge, and as a warning: that systems of thought like nationalism and patriotism can all too easily be made, applied, and guarded. Third, this thesis should be located in a much broader project that aims to offer an effective critique of state sovereignty, and the harm connected with it. Above all, apart from aforementioned points, I also hope that this thesis will enable me to have better understanding of myself.

Appendix 1 Glossary

Place Name:

Changlung	昌隆
Chunghua	彰化
Chienkuo Road	建國路
Fujian	福建
Guangdong	廣東
Hainan Island	海南島
Hoping Island	和平島
Hsinchu	新竹
Hualien	花蓮
Kaohsiung	高雄
Keelung	基隆
Kinmen	金門
Maioli	苗栗
Matsu	馬祖
Oluanpi	鵝鑾鼻
Penghu	澎湖
Pingtung	屏東
Sangchung	三重
Taichung	台中
Tainan	台南
Taitung	台東
Xiluo Bridge	西螺大橋
Yu-Shan Residence	玉山官邸

Person's Names

Bo Yang	柏 楊
Cao Chang-Ching	曹長青
Cai Kun-Can [Tsai Kuan-tsan]	蔡焜燦
Cai Tong-Rong [Tsai Tung-Jung]	蔡同榮
Chao Kang [Zhao Gang]	趙 剛
Chen Kuan-Hsing [Chen Guang-Xing]	陳光興
Chen Li-Zhu [Chen Li-Chu]	陳麗珠
Chen Ming-Zhang	陳明章
Chen Qing-Bao [Chen Ching-Pao]	陳清寶
Chen Shi-Chang	陳世昌
Chen Shui-Bian	陳水扁
Chen Tang-Shan (Mark Chen)	陳唐山

Chen Xue-Sheng [Chen Hsueh-Sheng]	陳學聖
Chen Ying-Zhen	陳映真
Dai Guo-Hui	戴國輝
Fan Ke-Qin [Jerry Fan]	范可欽
Feng Ding-Guo [Feng Ting-Kuo]	馮定國
Feng Hu-Xiang	馮滬祥
Gao Jun-Ming [Kao Chun-Ming]	高俊明
He De-Fen [Ho De-Fen]	賀德芬
Hsu Shih-Kai	許世楷
Hsu Yung-Ming	徐永明
Hu Wen-Hui	胡文輝
Huang Jing-Juan	黃競娟
Huang Fu-San	黃富三
Huang Tien-Lin	黃天麟
Huang Wei-Fung	黃偉峰
Jian Xi-Jie [Chien Hsi-Chieh]	簡錫皆
Chiang Wei-Shui [Jiang Wei-Shui]	蔣渭水
Jin Mei-Ling [Alice King]	金美齡
Lai Shi-Bao	賴士葆
Lee Teng-Hui [Li Deng-Hui]	李登輝
Lee Min-Yong [Li Min-Yong]	李敏勇
Lee Hsiao-Feng [Li Xiao-Feng]	李筱峰
Li Qiao	李 喬
Li Ying-Yuan [Lee Ying-Yuan]	李應元
Lian Zhan [Lien Chan]	連 戰
Lin Hong-Zong [Lin Hong-Tsung]	林宏宗
Lin, Paul [Lin Bao-Hua]	林保華
Lin Yi-Fu	林毅夫
Lin Zhao-Yi	林朝億
Liu Guang-Hua	劉光華
Joyce Liu [Liu Ji-Hui]	劉紀惠
Liu Li-Er	劉黎兒
Lu Xiu-Lian [Annette Lu]	呂秀蓮
Luo Bing-Cheng [Lo Bing-Cheng]	羅秉成
Luo Fu-Quan [Lo Fu-chuan]	羅福全
Ma Ying-Jiu [Ma Ying-Jeou]	馬英九
Peng Hui-Xian	彭惠仙
Qin Hui-Zhu [Chin Hwei-chu]	秦慧珠

Ruan Ming	阮 銘
Song Chu-Yu [James Soong]	宋楚瑜
Song Ze-Lai [Sung Tse-lai]	宋澤萊
Su Huan-Zhi	蘇煥智
Su Zhen-Chang	蘇貞昌
Sun Da-Chan	孫大川
Sun Qing-Yu	孫慶餘
Wang Fu-Chang	王甫昌
Wang Li-Ping [Wang Lie-Ping]	王麗萍
Wang Jian-Xuan	王建瑄
Wang Mei-Xiu	王美琇
Wang Shi-Jian [Wang Shi-Cheng]	王世堅
Wang Xiao-Bo [Wang Hsiao-po]	王曉波
Wei Qian-Feng [John Wei]	魏千峰
Wei Rui-Ming	魏瑞明
Wu Nai-De [Wu Nai-Teh]	吳乃德
Xia Zhen [Hsia Chen]	夏 珍
Xiao Fu-De	蕭福德
Xiao Mei-Qin [Hsiao Bi-Khim]	蕭美琴
Xie Chun-De [Hsieh Chun-Tel]	謝春德
Xie Xue-Hong	謝雪紅
Xu Bo-Yun [Hsu Po-Yun]	許博允
Xu Wen-Lung [Hsu Wen-Lung]	許文龍
Xu Xin-Liang [Hsu Hsin-Liang]	許信良
Yang Qui-Xing [Yang Chiu-Hsing]	楊秋興
Yang Yong-Min	楊永明
Yu Shyi-kun [You Xi-Kun]	游錫昆
Yu Zheng	余 正
Zeng Gui-Hai [Tseng Kei-Hai]	曾貴海
Zhang Bo-Ya [Chang Po-Ya]	張博雅
Zhang Chuan-Tian	張川田
Zhang Jun-Xiong [Chang Chun-Hsiung]	張俊雄
Zhang Fu-Zhong [Chang Fu-Chung]	張富忠
Zhang Yi-Shan	張益瞻
Zheng Cheng-Gung	鄭成功
Zheng Xiu-Juan	鄭秀娟
Zhuang Ming-Yao [Chuang Ming-Yao]	莊銘耀

Notions, Expressions, Names of Organisation, Movement & Law

Aged-Japan-junky	資深哈日族
Aged-imperial-subject	老皇民
Alliance to Campaign for Rectifying the Name of Taiwan	台灣正名運動聯盟
A Million Voices against Corruption – President Chen Must Go	百萬人民反貪腐倒扁運動
Autonomous Citizen	自主公民
Autonomous Citizen Entering the Movement	自主公民進場
Bondojin	本島人
Benshengren	本省人
China College of Maritime Technology	中國海專
Chinaman and dog not permitted to enter	中國人與狗不得進入
China Medical University	中國醫藥大學
Chinese Cultural University	中國文化大學
Chthonic	閃靈
Chung Hua University	中華大學
Commitment to the Public Good and the Annihilation of Self	捨私為公; 滅私奉公
Daxue	大學
Democracy and the Moral Crisis of Taiwanese Identity: Our Appeal to the President, the Ruling Party and Taiwanese Citizens	民主政治與台灣認同的道德危機
Dangjia Zuozhu	當家作主
Doka	同化
Get Out! China Pig	中國豬滾回去
Go Away, Red China!	紅色中國滾蛋
Gui-Ju	規矩
Hakka	客家
Han-Chinese Traitor	漢奸
'Japanese devils'	日本鬼子
Japanese-dog	日本狗
Jing-Fu Men	景福門
Kominka	皇民化
Law Governing Legislators' Exercise of Power	立法院職權行使法
Mainlanders	外省人
Ming Dynasty	明朝
Minnan	閩南
Musha Uprising	霧社事件
Naichijin	內地人
New Civil Movement	新公民運動
New-Era Taiwanese	新時代台灣人
New Resident	新住民
Northern Taiwan Society	北社
On Taiwan	台灣論
Pan-Blue	泛綠
Pan-Green	泛藍
Pangu	盤古
People First Party	親民黨
Li, Yi, Lian, Chi	禮義廉恥
Qing Dynasty	清朝
Qing-xiang	清鄉

Rectifying the Name (of Taiwan) Movement
Resist the Red Guard!
Slaver-of-the-Japanese
Surrounding the City
Taiwan Colonial Trade Corporation
Taiwan's Comfort Women Case Proposal
Taiwan Cultural Association
Taiwan's Current Relations with Japan
Taiwan Society
Taiwan Solidarity Union
Taipei Women's Rescue Foundation
Taishe
The 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally
The Expectation from Three Baltic States
The Ugly Chinaman
Waishenren
When the dog leaves, the pig comes
Xin
Yuan-Gui
Zaosbi

台灣正名運動
拒絕紅衛兵
日本奴
圍城
台灣拓殖株式會社
台籍原慰安婦案說帖
台灣文化協會
我國與日本關係現況
台灣社
台灣團結聯盟
台北婦女救援基金會
台社
二二八手護台灣
波羅的海三國對台灣的期望
醜陋的中國人
外省人
狗去豬來
心
圓規
造勢

APPENDIX 2 ILLUSTRATIONS



Figure 4-1: Front Cover of Manga *On Taiwan*



Figure 4-2.: Back Cover of Manga *On Taiwan*



Figure 4-3: The Illustrations of Chinese Mainlanders



Figure 4-4: The Illustrations of Comfort Women Cheerfully Lining Up to be recruited by a seated Japanese Officer



Figure 5-1.: Campaign Logo For 2-28 Hand-In/hand Rally



Figure 5-2: Campaign Route For the 2-28 Campaign Rally



Figure5-3 and 5-4: The 2-28 Hand-In-Hand Rally Headquarter in Maioli County and the Highlights of the Main Stage




Figure 6-1: Nazca Lines in Taipei City



Figure 6-2: Red Sea on 9th September



Figure 6-6: Surrounding (Taipei) City on 15 September 2006



Figure 6-7: Surrounding City in Taipei Station 15 September 2006



Figure 6-8: Route of 'Besiege the Presidential Office' Demonstration on 10 October 2006

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'Arts of Leadership' (AL)

(http://www.ketagalan.org.tw/index.php?framework_num=116&CID=151)

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On Taiwan (OT) 台灣論

The Storm of Yoshinori Kobayashi's On Taiwan (Storm) 台灣論風暴

511 Rectifying the Name of Taiwan 511台灣正名說帖

Interview Notes

Interview with Li Ying-Yuan (23/08/06)

Li Ying-Yuan was the then-Minister of Council of Labour Affairs, Executive Yuan of Taiwan. He was a political dissident during the KMT's authoritarian period, being denied entry to Taiwan for advocating Taiwanese independence. After returning to Taiwan through illegal channels, he was arrested with other independence advocates. Li was finally released due to strong pressure from the international community and within Taiwan itself. He started to display his strong leadership in public affairs after being elected to the National Parliament, the Legislative Yuan, in 1996. Following DPP's successful presidential election in 2000, Li was appointed by President Chen as the Secretary-General of the Executive Yuan.

Interview with Zhang Yi-Shan (21/07/06)

Zhang was then the director for The DPP School for Democracy Education. He was a key member of Li Ying-Yuan's working team, which planned the various activities for the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally.

Interview with Wang Xian-Ji (17/08/06)

Wang was then the Chief of Executive Operations for the 'Rectifying the Name (of Taiwan) Movement'. He also actively participated in the planning of various activities for the 2-28 Hand-in-Hand Rally.

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