

Stellingen

behorende bij het proefschrift

Do ut Des: Incentives,  
Reciprocity, and  
Organizational Performance

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1. An employer who pays a relatively low total expected compensation does not necessarily signal that he does not care about the worker's welfare. (Chapter 2)
2. Promotion incentives lead to more efficient outcomes than individual incentives when workers are reciprocal towards management attention. (Chapter 3)
3. Sales contests with intermediate performance feedback only stimulate workers to exert more effort as long as they still have a reasonable chance of winning a bonus. (Chapter 4)
4. In elimination tournaments, variability in performance dilutes incentives to perform. (Chapter 5)
5. In two-stage elimination tournaments, a more convex prize-spread improves performance in the second period at the expense of performance in the first period. (Chapter 5)
6. The fact that opinions on whether people can generally be trusted widely differ, illustrates that the common knowledge assumption is problematic.
7. Altruism, defined as a selfless concern for others, is a *contradictio in terminis*: when an individual cares about another's welfare, he benefits himself by helping others.
8. No one disputes that the assumptions of a theoretical model should be as intuitive as possible, but the same is not true for the results.
9. When we circumscribe "welfare" as "being on the right way", it immediately becomes clear that the welfare implications of economic models are not free of value judgements.
10. Unfortunately, the effect the researcher has on the outcomes of his empirical research cannot be corrected for by including a researcher-dummy variable in the regressions.
11. Aangezien een verkeersboete zelden boetedoening bewerkstelligt, is "verkeersaflaat" een accuratere omschrijving voor het financiële offer dat van overheidswege van wetsovertreders geëist wordt.