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## Heidegger's Conception of Freedom 1927-1930: Guilt, Transcendence, Truth

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A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the Manchester Metropolitan University for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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### Abstract

This thesis investigates Heidegger's concept of freedom between 1927 and 1930. In it, I argue that Heidegger advocates a radical reinvention of the positive concept of freedom in confrontation with Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson. I also argue, against the grain of recent literature, that this conception remains the same as it is found in *Being and Time* and in the key texts concerning freedom from the period immediately after its publication: 'The Essence of Ground' [*WG*], *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26], *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], and 'On the Essence of Truth' [*WW*].

In Chapter 1, I interpret the argument of the lecture course *The Essence of Human Freedom* as Heidegger's attempt to dismiss the question of the freedom of the will. In doing so, I argue, he critically repeats the arguments that Bergson provides in *Time and Free Will.* In Chapter 2, I turn to *Being and Time* to follow the thread of Heidegger's argument, leading to the claim that Dasein is fundamentally free but, as inauthentic, also typically unfree. In Chapter 3 I investigate this apparent paradox further, showing that Heidegger, without using the term, is advocating a positive, rather than a negative, conception of unfreedom in evaluating inauthentic Dasein as unfree. In Chapter 4, I show how this positive conception also arrives as a critical confrontation with Kant and Bergson, where authenticity is conceived as Dasein's being-its-self in an ontological sense.

In Chapter 5, I build on the above to demonstrate that the arguments in *Being and Time* concerning guilt, the arguments in *WG* and GA26 concerning transcendence, and the arguments in *WW* concerning truth all complement each other in a single concept of freedom: Dasein's being its self by choosing to be the ground of its world, rather than fleeing from this existential responsibility. To Peter and Jane

### Acknowledgements

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## **Abbreviations of Cited Texts by Heidegger**

I have followed the convention of Heidegger scholarship of referencing German texts directly, to avoid confusion over different translations and titles. Where a translation is available, I have provided the German and English pagination, e.g. [12/15], in that order. The exception to this is *Being and Time*, where I have followed the convention of citing the German pagination only.

# Heidegger, M. (2006) Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. SΖ Heidegger, M. (1967) Being and Time. Translated by: Maquarrie, J. & Robinson, E., Oxford: Blackwell. Heidegger, M. (1971) Schellings Abhandlung Über Das Wesen Der Menschlichen Freiheit (1809). Edited by: Feick, H., Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. SaF Heidegger, M. (1985) Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. Translated by: Stambaugh, J., Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. Heidegger, M. (2010) Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt - Endlichkeit - Einsamkeit. 4. - 5. Tsd edn. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann. GM Heidegger, M. (1995) The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Translated by: McNeil, W. & Walker, N., Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

### Non-Gesamtausgabe Books

## Books from the Gesamtausgabe

GA3	<ul> <li>Heidegger, M. (2010) Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 3. Edited by: Herrmann, FW.v., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.</li> <li>Heidegger, M. (1997) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Translated by: Taft, R., 5th edn. Bloomgington: Indiana University Press.</li> </ul>
GA20	Heidegger, M. (1994) <i>Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe,</i> Edited by: Jaeger, P., Bd. 20 edn. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (1992) History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
GA22	Heidegger, M. (2004) <i>Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie. Martin</i> <i>Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 22</i> . Edited by: Blust, FK., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (2008) <i>Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy.</i> Translated by: Rojcewicz, R., Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
GA24	Heidegger, M. (1997) <i>Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 24.</i> Edited by: Herrmann, F.W., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (1982) <i>The Basic Problems of Phenomenology</i> . Translated by: Hofstadter, A., Bloomington: Indiana Universty Press.
GA26	Heidegger, M. (2007) Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 26. Edited by: Held, K., 3., durchges. Aufl edn. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (1992) <i>The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.</i> Translated by: Heim, M., Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

GA27	Heidegger, M. (2001) <i>Einleitung in die Philosophie. Martin Heidegger:</i> <i>Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 27.</i> Edited by: Saame, O., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
GA31	Heidegger, M. (1994) Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie. Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 31. Edited by: Tietjen, H., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (2005) <i>The Essence of Human Freedom.</i> Translated by: Sadler, T., London: Continuum.
GA34	Heidegger, M. (1997) Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet. Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 34. Edited by: Mörchen, H., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (2013) <i>The Essence of Truth.</i> Translated by: Sadler, T., London: Continuum.
GA40	Heidegger, M. (1983) <i>Einfürung in die Metaphysik. Martin Heidegger:</i> <i>Gesamtausgabe,</i> Edited by: Herrmann, FW.v. & Schüßler, I., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (2000) Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by: Fried, G. & Polt, R., London: Yale University Press.
GA49	Heidegger, M. (2006) <i>Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Martin</i> <i>Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 49.</i> Edited by: Seubold, G., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.

GA65	Heidegger, M. (2003) <i>Beiträge zur Philosophie: vom Ereignis. Martin</i> <i>Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 65.</i> Edited by: Herrmann, FW.v., Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
	Heidegger, M. (2012) <i>Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event).</i> Translated by: Rojcewicz, R. & Vallega-Neu, D., Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

## Essays

ВН	Heidegger, M. (2013) 'Brief über den "Humanismus"', <i>Wegmarken</i> . Frankfurt, M: Klostermann, pp. 313-364.
	Heidegger, M. (1967) 'Letter on "Humanism"', <i>Pathmarks</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 239-276.
FdT	Heidegger, M. (1999) 'Die Frage nach der Technik', Vorträge und Aufsätze (1936-1953). Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, pp. 5-36.
	Heidegger, M. (2008) 'The Question Concerning Technology', <i>Heidegger: Basic Writings</i> . London: Routledge, pp. 217-238.
NGT	Heidegger, M. (2015) 'Nietzsches Wort "Got ist Tot"', <i>Holzwege: Vol. 73.</i> 9., unveränderte Auflage ed. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, pp. 209- 267.
	Heidegger, M. (2002) 'Nietzsche's Word: "God Is Dead"', <i>Off the Beaten</i> <i>Track</i> . Translated by: Young, J. & Haynes, K., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157-199.

SdU	Heidegger, M. (2000) 'Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität', <i>Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges (1910–1976)</i> . Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, pp. 107-117.
	Heidegger, M. (1985) 'The Self-Assertion of the German University and The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts', <i>Review of Metaphysics</i> , 38(3).
WG	Heidegger, M. (2013) 'Vom Wesen des Grundes', <i>Wegmarken</i> . Frankfurt, M: Klostermann, pp. 123-175.
	Heidegger, M. (1967) 'The Essence of Ground', <i>Pathmarks</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 97-135.
WM	Heidegger, M. (2013) 'Was ist Metaphysik?', <i>Wegmarken</i> . Frankfurt, M: Klostermann, pp. 103-122.
	Heidegger, M. (1967) 'What is Metaphysics?', <i>Pathmarks</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 82-96.
ww	Heidegger, M. (2013) 'Wom wesen der Wahrheit', <i>Wegmarken</i> . Frankfurt, M: Klostermann, pp. 177-202.
	Heidegger, M. (1967) 'On the Essence of Truth', <i>Pathmarks</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 136-154.

# Introduction

In this dissertation I argue that Martin Heidegger advocates a reinvention of the positive conception of freedom, which is expressed through his related concepts of "authenticity" in *Being and Time*, "transcendence" in the essay *The Essence of Ground*, and "truth" in the essay *The Essence of Truth*. This assertion runs contrary to the dominant thesis in recent literature, which is that the texts I have just listed name two separate concepts of freedom, one "ontical" and one "ontological". In other words, one conception relates to the weighty and dramatic decisions we make about how to live our lives, and the other is an esoteric and abstract metaphysics of conditions of possibility of consciousness. As such, this thesis is located securely within the history of modern philosophy, advancing a position within Heidegger scholarship about Heidegger texts. It is not motivated by a desire to advocate for the philosopher's concept of freedom, provide an evaluative comparison between Heidegger's philosophy other philosophers of freedom. It seeks only to clarify Heidegger's position and correct an understandable misreading of some of his most obscure texts from the late 1920s and early 1930s.

This obscurity presents a problem. The arguments are not obscure because they are hard to follow. They are obscure because it is difficult to find the correct context in which to discuss them. Heidegger follows a tradition of talking about freedom only after having already dismissed the question of the freedom of the will. This leads to a concept of freedom that, although grounded in the history of philosophy, is unfamiliar and different from how questions of freedom are usually spoken about.

The arguments Heidegger gives concerning freedom need to be situated to each other; to the rest of his work; and in relation to the history of philosophy. However, Heidegger provides no definitive statement on how his concept of freedom relates to his project at the time or the history of philosophy as a whole. He does provide some clues, but these are themselves obscure, use different language, and are not explicitly linked together. This has, naturally, lead the scholarly community to read the statements chronologically, as though Heidegger is honing or changing his position from text to text. As stated above, I argue that, on the contrary, the concept remains the same during this period. And, while the demonstration of my specific thesis, that Heidegger's concept of freedom is a positive concept of freedom that is the same in the discussions of authenticity, transcendence, and truth, will take only two chapters to accomplish, a great deal stands in the way of even beginning to discuss the arguments he provides adequately. To clear the way, my Chapters 1, 2 and 3 will be focussed on developing the problem of freedom, as Heidegger sees it, in order that Chapters 4 and 5 can determine his solution.

I will introduce this thesis in four stages. First, I will give a brief overview of key terms in debates concerning free will. Second, I will map out the course of the concept of freedom in Heidegger's work. Third, I will show the key positions within the secondary literature on Heidegger concerning what his concept of freedom is. Fourth and finally, I will give an overview of the discussion.

#### i.1 – Key Distinctions in the Philosophy of Freedom

The concept of freedom is one of the oldest and most highly contested in the history of philosophy. The contestability of the concept is perhaps the only thing about which the debate's interlocutors agree. Robert Kane begins his textbook on the contemporary debates concerning free will with a citation from Jalalu'ddin Rumi, a twelfth-century Persian poet: 'There is a disputation that will continue till mankind is raised from the dead, between the necessitarians and the partisans of free will.' (2005:1). Immanuel Kant speaks of 'the difficulty by which the question of the possibility of freedom has been beset' (2007:A534/B562). Isaiah Berlin speaks of 'the history of this protean word or the more than two hundred senses of it recorded by historians of ideas' (2002:168).

This is a natural result of the length of time that this debate has endured. As Thomas Pink puts it, 'The free will problem is an old one. Like anything old, it has changed over time.' (2004:vii). The concept has changed over time, as the debates have changed. For this reason, a comprehensive account of Heidegger's place within this debate would require a monograph in its own right, since the only places he gives any account of this himself focuses on individual philosophers and not traditions.<sup>1</sup> However, it is useful to introduce two specific distinctions from the debates on freedom in order to understand the problems Heidegger does and does not see as legitimate. These distinctions are: the positions of libertarianism, compatibilism, and determinism; and the difference between positive and negative freedom.

To begin with the three possible positions of libertarianism, determinism, and compatibilism, it is important to recognise that the debate about freedom is not a debate about one question. It is actually a debate about two distinct questions. As Robert Kane (2005) points out, the Free Will Debate is really about 'the Determinism Question' and 'the Compatibility Question'. The 'Determinism Question', asks 'whether determinism is true' (7), in the sense of the world being determined in accordance with the law of cause and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], Heidegger distinguishes his position from Kant. I will go into detail about this in Chapters 1 and 4. In the lecture course *Schelling's Treatise on Human Freedom* [*SaF*], Heidegger gives a critical reading, which is ultimately ambiguous as to whether he advocates Schelling's position or not. This lecture course is from 1936, and beyond the scope of this thesis. Nonetheless, I will give an account of some of the views on it in the next section of my introduction, where I will map out the course of Heidegger's concept of freedom, as it constitutes useful wider philosophical context.

effect. Those who answer yes, believe that events in the world happen according to the law of causation. This case can be made through the claims of physics, chemistry, or biology. Science seems to be able to predict the course of events reliably, such that we can confidently say that any event happened because of a mechanical cause that is understandable and predictable.

However, what is sometimes passed over in discussions of the free will, is that it is entirely possible to believe in determinism and free will at the same time, so long as freedom is not defined in such a way that it is a violation of causal law. Indeed, as Robert Sleigh et. al. point out, while 'all the major philosophers of the seventeenth century – with the possible exception of Malebranche – were determinists', they each 'held that being free is logically compatible with being causally determined.' (Sleigh et. al., 2000:1195). This popular view is isolated by answering "no" the Compatibility Question: 'The Compatibility Question: 'whether determinism really does conflict with free will' (7).

Both libertarians and determinists answer yes to the Compatibility Question. A libertarian will say that free will and determinism are incompatible, and argue that determinism is false. Determinists agree that free will and determinism are incompatible, but argue that determinism obtains. Compatibilists will disagree with both, and claim that free will and determinism are not compatible, but that freedom has to be redefined. David Hume, the archetypal compatibilist, expresses the problem in terms of the liberty of indifference and spontaneity in his *Treatise on Human Nature*:

Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of *spontaneity*, as it is call'd in the schools, and the liberty of *indifference*; betwixt that which is oppos'd to violence, and that which means a negation of necessity and causes. The first is even the most common sense of the word; and as 'tis only that species of liberty, which it concerns us to preserve, our thoughts have been principally turn'd

towards it, and have almost universally confounded it with the other. (Hume, 1990:407-6)

Here, Hume distinguishes between a concept of freedom that simply means a lack of violence and coercion, spontaneity, and one that negates causal determination, liberty of indifference. Hume argues that defining the action of the will as a negation of determinism is incomprehensible, and instead defends the idea that we are free if our will is the cause of our actions, whether or not our will was determined by some other cause. Compatibilists may vary on the specific reason why a free will violates the law of causality, but they all follow this pattern.

The 'Determinism Question', whether the world is causally determined, and the 'Compatibility Question', whether free will and determinism are incompatible, create three plausible positions within the debate. Libertarians deny determinism and uphold its incompatibility with free will; determinists affirm determinism and uphold its incompatibility with free will; and compatibilists, who affirm determinism but deny its incompatibility with free will, so long as free will is redefined.

What this reveals is that libertarians and determinism have something in common: they both subscribe to the idea that if determinism existed, it would preclude freedom. The compatibilists only vary from this position slightly, because they argue that if freedom was as the libertarians describe it, then it would be precluded. The whole debate, therefore, accepts a common premise: that determinism is a challenge to freedom, and either freedom or determinism needs to be either redefined or eliminated in order to settle the debate. One reason that Heidegger's treatment of freedom is hard to contextualise is that he rejects this debate entirely. In his lecture course entitled *Schelling's Treatise on Human Freedom* [*SaF*], he dismisses it entirely:

The usual discussions about freedom of the will and the attempts to prove its existence or nonexistence all fail in the fundamental error of taking the aforementioned preliminary questions [concerning the phenomenon of freedom, prior to its conceptualisation as a property of the will] too lightly or else not asking them at all. If they were seriously asked, the illusory question about freedom of the will which continually plays havoc in doctrines of morality and law would have long since disappeared, and it would become evidence that the real question about freedom is something quite different from what is talked about in "the problem of the freedom of the will." [SaF 18-19/15-16]

Heidegger calls the question of the freedom of the will an "illusory question". This could be evidence that he subscribes to a compatibilist position, since this is a clear attempt to redefine the way that freedom is spoken about. However, as I argued above, a compatibilist has to answer yes to the Determinist Question and no to the Compatibilist Question; compatibilists believe that determinism holds but is not incompatible with freedom. However, I will argue in Chapter 1 that Heidegger disavows causal determination. More than that, he argues that causation is not an adequate lens through which to think the problem of freedom at all. This results in the complete rethinking of freedom required by a compatibilist and the complete rethinking of the world required by a libertarian.

Heidegger's position cannot be captured adequately by the two questions, since it rejects them at the outset. Heidegger addresses a different problem of freedom to the question of the freedom of the will, meaning that his philosophy of freedom does not "contribute" to this debate: it undermines it instead. He is not, however, the first to do this. Henri Bergson advocates a similar position in his 1989 book, *Time and Free Will*. In Chapter 1, I will argue how Heidegger uses similar arguments to Henri Bergson in order to dismiss the Free Will Debate, and its three implied positions. Having discussed the concepts of libertarianism, determinism, and compatibilism, I will now turn to the distinction between positive and negative freedom, which will be discussed in my Chapters 3-5. In brief, negative freedom means "freedom from…" and positive freedom means "freedom to…" or "freedom for…". Ian Carter sums up the distinction as follows:

Negative liberty is the absence of obstacles, barriers or constraints. One has negative liberty to the extent that actions are available to one in this negative sense. Positive liberty is the possibility of acting — or the fact of acting — in such a way as to take control of one's life and realize one's fundamental purposes. While negative liberty is usually attributed to individual agents, positive liberty is sometimes attributed to collectivities, or to individuals considered primarily as members of given collectivities. (Carter, 2018)

Negative freedom is fairly simple to satisfy, since it only refers to the absence of any obstacle; it means that my actions are my own and that I am able to make them. Positive freedom, however, is a more nuanced concept that looks at freedom as a particular type of action that can only be gained by achieving one's potential. Today, this distinction is typically discussed in political philosophy alone, and not as part of the metaphysical debate on the freedom of the will. Indeed, Pink (2004) and Kane's (2005) otherwise comprehensive textbooks on free will omit explicit discussion of this distinction.<sup>2</sup> Further, the most frequent reference point to this distinction is Isaiah Berlin's 1958 lecture 'Two Concepts of Liberty' (2002), which is a work of political theory, not philosophy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Pink does briefly discuss political freedom as 'importantly different' from the metaphysical question of 'action control', defining political liberty negatively has having 'to do with our relation to the state, and so too to a wider community of people of which we form a part' (2004:3). Kane touches upon related topics in his discussion of 'Freedom of self-determination and self-formation' (2005:171-174), but does not mention or explain their relation to negative and positive freedom.

Despite this disciplinary split, the distinction between positive and negative freedom is found at least as early as Kant, and there the distinction between the metaphysical problem of the freedom of the will and the political and moral problem of negative and positive freedom are indistinguishable. Freedom, negatively understood, is satisfied as long as an agent is judged to act without interference or coercion. However, positive freedom requires the agent to act in a specific way, which springs from their true nature. In his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in elaboration of his working definition of freedom as 'a kind of causality of living beings in so far as they are rational [...] as it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it'. He describes this definition as 'negative and therefore unfruitful for gaining insight into its essence'. By contrast, a 'positive' concept of freedom can be developed that is 'richer and more fruitful' (2011:IV 446). This positive conception is 'autonomy, i.e. the property of the will being a law unto itself' (2011:IV 447). The transition from viewing freedom negatively as "acting independently of alien causes" to viewing it positively as "self-legislation" allows Kant to establish a much higher criterion of freedom where I act as my 'real self' (IV:457). In the terms Berlin uses, positive sense means 'being one's own master' (Berlin, 2002:178) spiritually. Berlin draws out the specifically positive character of this concept as follows:

> 'I am my own master'; 'I am a slave to no man'; but may I not (as Platonists or Hegelians tend to say' be a slave to nature? Or to my own 'unbridled' passions? Are these not so many species of the identical genus 'slave' – some political or legal, others moral or spiritual? Have not men had the experience of liberating themselves from spiritual slavery, or slavery to nature, and do they not in the course of it become aware, on the one hand, of a self which dominates, and, on the other, of something in them which is brought to heel? This dominant self is then variously identified with reason, with my 'higher nature', with the self which calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run, with me 'real', or 'ideal', or 'autonomous self, or with my self 'at its best'; which is then contrasted with irrational impulse, uncontrolled desires, my 'lower' nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures, my 'empirical' or 'heteronomous' self, swept by every gust

of desire and passion, needing to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the full height of its 'real' nature. (Berlin, 2002:179)

Positive freedom is, then, not a freedom from mastery such that I can do as I please. It is a freedom towards self-mastery, so that my higher self becomes master rather than my lower, baser self. Berlin is apt to refer to Plato as one of the originators of this concept, who in the *Phaedo* has Socrates say: 'the philosopher frees his soul from association with the body, so far as is possible, to a greater extent than other men' (1996:64e-65a), and that,

> the man who pursues the truth [is more likely to succeed] by applying his pure and unadulterated thought to the pure and unadulterated object, cutting himself off as much as possible from his eyes and ears and virtually all the rest of his body, as an impediment which by its presence prevents the soul from attaining to truth and clear thinking. (Plato, 1996:66a)

Freedom in the positive sense means acting from a higher self, allowing one's better nature to achieve mastery over the passions. I will argue that Heidegger, through the idea of authenticity, is advocating such a position. He describes this position in an innovative way that does not mean mastery of the passions and external world by the rational will, but rather Dasein choosing its being as the transcendening ground of all phenomena and meaning in its world. Further, the philosophers I will demonstrate are most important to the development of this concept, Kant and Bergson, also develop a positive concept of freedom. This will be the particular focus of Chapters 4 and 5.

#### i.2 – Phases of Heidegger's Work on Freedom

Günter Figal, in his *Martin Heidegger: Phaenomenologie der Freiheit* argues that 'The thought of Heidegger is until its close a thought about freedom, even as much as it is a

thought about time.' (1988:274)<sup>3</sup>. But, as Ruin (2008) points out, his work does not constantly speak about freedom. While, according to Ruin, Figal develops 'with such good results' the question of how 'freedom could be used as a heuristic concept in the course of an interpretation of Heidegger's work as a whole', the question still remains 'to what extent Heidegger *explicitly* seeks to elaborate something like a philosophy of freedom, literally evoking this word and its particular implications' (280). In truth, it is generally recognised that Heidegger only explicitly discusses freedom in this thematic way in a specific period of his work. The French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy speaks of this disappearance in his 1988 book *The Experience of Freedom* as part of a general trend of philosophers abandoning the concept.<sup>4</sup> Twenty years later, Ruin contributes towards this latter problem, making it the task of his essay. He argues that,

[T]here is indeed a phase in the course of Heidegger's path of thinking during which he tries to ground his entire philosophical aspiration on an understanding of freedom in a qualified sense, but that he also abandons this attempt. This phase is manifested primarily by two texts in particular, the essays "Vom Wesen des Grundes" [*WG*] and "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" [*WW*], both from 1929. This attempt, as well as its eclipse, is intimately linked to his intense engagement with German idealism in general, and with Kant and Schelling in particular, a confrontation which follows upon the completion of SZ. More specifically, it begins with the 1929 lectures on Kant and the question of freedom [GA31], over

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> My translation

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Nancy argues: 'Since Heidegger, philosophy has no longer viewed freedom thematically at least not as its guiding theme, except in historical studies. But in fact it was with Heidegger that an interruption occurred. Freedom was no longer thematized by him, after having been thematized on a par or with a rank *at least* comparable to that which Spinoza, Kant, Schelling, or Hegel conferred upon it—namely, as "*the fundamental question of philosophy, in which even the question of being has its root.*" [...] In order for these assertions not to be gratuitous or merely formal, a lengthy work would obviously have to be undertaken here, devoted exclusively to the question of freedom and its interruption or withdrawal in the course of Heidegger's thought.' (Nancy, 1993:33)

the 1936 lecture course on Schelling [*SaF*], culminating with the 1942 lecture course on German idealism [GA49]. (Ruin, 2008:281)<sup>5</sup>

While the concept of freedom does occur in other texts of the period, such as the untranslated 1928 course, *Einleitung in die Philosophy* [GA27], these are the places where Heidegger makes freedom a major theme. However, I will also add the 1927 lecture course *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26] which expresses similar arguments to *WG*. Further, to adequately capture the differences of how the literature as a whole has treated Heidegger's concept of freedom, it is also necessary to divide these into three distinct phases: 1. *Being and Time* [*SZ*]; 2. the lecture courses and essays between 1927 and 1930 [GA26, *WG*, *WW*, GA31]; and 3. the engagement with Schelling in 1936 [*SaF*] and German idealism in 1942 [GA49].

Phase 1 consists of the arguments in *Being and Time*. In this book, Heidegger investigates the nature of the entity that each of us are, which he terms 'Dasein'. Freedom in this text is bound up with the question of authenticity. In Division I, Dasein is described in its 'average everydayness' as typically unfree. It has no identity of its own, living, acting, and thinking as "they" live, act and do. Not only is it described as conforming to social norms, it also falls into its world, reifying itself, acting as though it is an unremarkable object among others when in fact it is not. Dasein is, according to Division II, the ground of all meaning in its world. And, only if it chooses to at last be its authentic self, propelled by an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ruin does argue, contra Nancy, that 'the problem of freedom does not disappear from his horizon. Instead it can be said to emerge as the hidden ethos of this thought' (281). Although verification of this claim is beyond the remit of my thesis, I find his arguments convincing, and helpful in understanding statement in the later Heidegger, such as when he makes the stated aim of his reflection in the essay, published in 1953, 'The Question Concerning Technology, as 'to prepare a free relationship to' the essence of technology [*FdT* 7/217]. It also paves the way for further research into claims made by Haar (1990) and Zimmerman (1990) that the later Heidegger is a fatalist or historical determinist. For a discussion of this issue, see Sinclair (2011).

anticipatory resoluteness towards its own mortality, will it gain a 'freedom towards death'. As such, *Being and Time* provides a positive conception of freedom, insofar as it describes Dasein as typically failing to be its authentic self, and speaks of a path by which it can become authentic.

In Phase 2, however, freedom seems to take a fundamentally different meaning. Heidegger starts to speak explicitly about freedom, not as something Dasein may or may not eventually gain, but rather as the ground of philosophy as such. Heidegger argues that the question of freedom is more fundamental even than the question of being and time. In the next section of this introduction, I will discuss how this has led many in the secondary literature to deduce that there is a radical break between Phases 1 and 2. In this thesis, however, I will argue that there is no break at all between Phase 1 and 2 on the concept of freedom, which after all covers a period of four years.

Phase 3, which starts with the 1936 lecture course on Schelling [SaF], occupies an ambiguous space in relation to the rest. On the one hand, it does not seem to offer a substantive change from the concept of freedom presented in Phase 2, but with the important difference that it becomes a lot less clear whether Heidegger actually subscribes to the position he is describing. Certainly, it is characteristic of his work to speak exclusively through a critical confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*) with historical figures, but as Heidegger's thinking develops in response to "the turn", he seems more cautious of the subject matter. In response to this waning enthusiasm, Nancy claims that Phase 2 is evidence of 'a program of work' being 'sketched out' that would place freedom at the core of Heidegger's philosophy as the 'archi-foundation' with *SaF* intended to 'constitute the completion of the intended research'. But, in the end, *SaF* failed to satisfy:

[T]his course offered nothing other than a kind of continuous harmonic composition, where Heidegger's own discourse would create an incessant counterpoint to Schelling's, without making the matter explicit on its own, and without the latter's discourse being given a clear interpretation by that of the former (as was the case with Kant [in GA31] or Leibniz [in GA26]). (Nancy, 1992:36)

Nancy claims that 'Heidegger abandons' Schelling (37), rather than continuing along the path. Heidegger's engagement with idealism, rather than confirming the position argued for in Phase 2, actually leads him to abandon it. A similar line has been advanced by Bret Davis in his *Heidegger and the Will* (2007). Davis argues that Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, does not place the concept of the will in a foundational position, at least officially.<sup>6</sup> Instead, 'The Essence of Ground' [WG] and The Essence of Human Freedom [GA31] show an ever more foundational role for the will, reaching its zenith with Heidegger's 1933 *Rektoratsrede* [SdU], where he tied his philosophy to the political project of the Nazi government, where 'the language of the will is explicitly and without reservation employed at the center of Heidegger's thought'. (2007:65). After this political disaster, Heidegger begins to develop a critique of the will in confrontation with Nietzsche, and finally moves his philosophy away from a foundational will. In this schema, the 1936 lecture course [SaF] would occur just at the point of Heidegger's complete abandonment of a foundational will. Ruin seconds this reading of Phase 3 of Heidegger's discussions of freedom and willing, saying that the ultimate conclusion of Phase 3 is the dismantling of the project:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Davis does, however, argue that the will has an ambiguous role in *Being and Time*, and that "care" can be read as a prototype of the concept of will that Heidegger develops in the 1930s: '[I]t is possible to read the term "care" not as an alternative to or deeper dimension *than* the will but as a deeper dimension *of* will, and thus Dasein not as an utter disruption of the subject but as a curious sort of finite-transcendental "subject," then, far from disrupting the centrality of willful subjectivity, the text would appear to remodel it into a peculiar synthesis of the transcendental will of idealism and an existential voluntarism.' (2007:38)

[...] the decisive point of disagreement is not human freedom as such, but the inevitable failure of trying to construe an ontological freedom as a *foundation*. [...] When the non-foundational freedom is made into a foundation it inevitably lead [sic.] to a metaphysics of the will. But the solution to this aporia is not to abandon will and freedom, but to think them in their character of what it means to stand open for the event of being and of truth. (Ruin, 2008:298-299)

So, the path Heidegger follows alongside German idealism ultimately leads him to move to 'the event of being and of truth' characteristic of Heidegger's work in response to the turn. Indeed, the role once reserved for freedom as the source of meaning starts to be attached to history and the clearing of being as that which, in Niall Keane's explanation, 'gives what has been traditionally defined as the being-of-beings and the meaningful entities throughout the history of metaphysics' (2016:312). Frank Schalow (1998) has, for example, argued that, in *SaF*, Heidegger grounds the insights of *Being and Time* on a more radical footing, 'marking the historical place for being's unconcealment' between freedom and destiny (54).

This does not mean that Phase 3 has nothing of value. On the contrary, as its readers have argued, it is key to understanding the development of Heidegger's thought in the late 1930s and early 1940s. However, it is not a new stage in Heidegger's concept of freedom, but one where it seems to lose its foundational position in his work. It will not be the subject of this thesis, which aims to clarify the original development of this concept in Phases 1 and 2, the period that has received the most attention in the scholarship in recent years. I will, however, speak to some of the implications my thesis has to new research in this area in my conclusion.

#### i.3 – Overview of Secondary Literature

I have split Heidegger's discussions of freedom into three phases. Phase 1 consists of *Being and Time*. Phase 2 contains lecture courses and essays between 1927 and 1930 [GA26, *WG*, *WW*, GA31]. Phase 3 consists in the engagement with Schelling in 1936 [*SaF*] and German idealism in 1942 [GA49]. In the last section, I elaborated on the consensus that Phase 3 results in Heidegger abandoning the task he set himself in Phase 2, and that Phase 1 and 2 would be the focus of this thesis. Further, I stated my intention to prove that Phase 1 and 2 have a unified concept of freedom, but that the consensus in the literature here is that Phase 1 and 2 offer distinct concepts. The position I will establish in this thesis, therefore, is that Heidegger's statements about freedom in the lecture courses and essays that deal with the topic in the period immediately following *Being and Time*'s publication, elaborate that concept rather than replace it. Before arguing this, it is naturally necessary to explain why scholars have taken the opposite position.

The claim that Phase 1 and 2 represent different concepts of freedom has been made most recently by Schmidt (2016), but the claim has also been made by Michel Haar (1989), François Jaran (2010), Charles Guignon (2011), and Han-Pile (2013). It is also implied by Nancy when he elaborates the change from mere mentions of freedom in *Being and Time* to the prospect of freedom as the foundation of everything in Phase 2:

After the freedom of *Dasein "*for its proper possibility" had furnished a repeated motif, though hardly developed for its own sake, of the analyses of *Being and Time* (1927), the course of 1928, *Metaphysiche Anfangsgrunde der Logik* [GA26], proposed a circumstantial examination of the proposition according to which "the transcendence of *Dasein* and freedom are identical," and beginning in 1929, *The Essence of Reasons* [*WG*] thematically accounts for freedom as the "freedom to found.' Freedom is then qualified as "foundation of foundation" and thus "because it is precisely this *Grund* [ground/foundation], freedom is the *Abgrund* [abyss] of human reality." (Nancy, 1992:35)

The consensus is that *Being and Time* mentions freedom, and that authenticity can be understood as a type of freedom, but that Phase 2 initiates a brand new project and new conception. However, scholars disagree on exactly what the difference is and when it takes place. There are three distinct versions of the thesis: 1. that Heidegger in *Being and Time* argues for an absolute, voluntaristic freedom, but gradually comes to reject it in favour of a "freedom of being" that is ultimately a fatalism; 2. that Phase 2 is a result of a substantive change in position that makes freedom more absolute than it was in *Being and Time*; and 3. that Heidegger maintains two distinct conceptions of freedom simultaneously.

The first claim, that Heidegger moves from a voluntarism to a fatalism, is held by Michel Haar (1990) and Michael Zimmerman (1990). Haar sees the shift from Phase 1 to 2 as part of Heidegger's shift to the later Heidegger, which he takes to be an abrupt change:

For with the Turn, it seems that we have a total *inversion*, a pure and simple reversal (the *Kehre* is, in spite of what Heidegger affirms often at first an *Umkehrung* [a reversal]), of subjectivism, anthropomorphism and of the question—undertaken by *Sein und Zeit*—of absolute self-possibilization. All freedom is first made possible by Being. In opposition to existentialism, the new Heideggerian thesis states: man is not the possibility of freedom; it is rather the freedom of Being that makes man possible. What is this portion of freedom we do not possess, but which passes through us and which we catch up with? In what sense can it still be called "human"? (Haar, 1990:3)

For Haar, the 'reversal' that Heidegger makes towards his later work is away from Dasein as the ground of reality to being. As such, being becomes the foundation, with the human being only a property of it. This is further interpreted to mean that there is no human freedom, only freedom of being. This is in line with Zimmerman's claim, published in the same year, that Heidegger offered a 'deterministic conception of history' (1990:250) and that he 'discounted the possibility of human freedom' (256). Phase 2, while not the completion of this transition, is already a step in this direction for Haar: The essay *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1929) still presented freedom as transcendental, as "foundative transcendence." However, contrary to "freedom towards death," which was hyper-transcendental, this liberty already escaped the mastery of *Dasein*. (Haar, 1990:2)

However, the idea that Heidegger is a determinist or a fatalist in the later work has not survived the test of time, and has been comprehensively refuted by Bret Davis' *Heidegger and the Will* (2007). As I argued in the discussion of Phase 3 in my last section, Davis argues that it is only possible, and not necessary, to read a voluntarism into *SZ*, though the official position is indeed not voluntaristic. Only in the early 1930s does Heidegger develop a voluntarism that is quickly abandoned in favour of looking for a "middle voice," which expresses a way of speaking in neither the active nor the passive voice, and which intimates an "activity" prior to or other than that which can be articulated in a subject/object predicate grammar and a subject/object ontology.' As such, the later Heidegger arrives at a point neither active nor passive, neither voluntaristic nor fatalistic.

(15-16).<sup>7</sup> Davis argues:

When Heidegger denies that nihilation, errancy, the will, and evil have their origin in ontic human doing, freedom and responsibility appear to have been deferred to being. And yet, man essentially *is* in correspondence to being, just as the essencing of being needs human participation. (Davis, 2007:300)

The claims that Heidegger was determinist in the later work and held a 'hypertranscendental' (Haar, 1990:2) concept of freedom in *Being and Time* have, therefore, not withstood the test of time, with more recent scholarship calling them into question.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Davis' focus is on the will, rather than freedom, but he does address the implications of this 'middle voice' in a short section towards the end of his monograph: 'What happens to the question of human freedom and responsibility in Heidegger's step beyond idealism's system of the Absolute to a thinking of the finitude of being? Rooting the origin of evil in being itself, has Heidegger relieved humans of their burden of responsibility? In displacing the power of negation from subjectivity, did Heidegger manage to leave space in his thought for a peculiarly human freedom?' (2007:298).

However, only the specific idea that Heidegger switches from libertarian to determinist has been abandoned. The idea that he changes position, however, is still maintained.

This first form of the thesis that Phase 1 and 2 of Heidegger's philosophy of freedom are different, therefore, has passed out of vogue. However, the second and third forms have only recently been advocated. These two forms are similar, only differing in that one camp takes Phase 2 to be a development in Heidegger's thought, while the other believes he holds two positions simultaneously. The former position is held by François Jaran (2010) and Stefan Schmidt (2016). Both make the similar claim that the new arguments about freedom are symptomatic of Heidegger's switch from 'Fundamental Ontology' in Being and Time to a new project. As Schmidt puts it, 'on the one hand, the project of Being and Time was considered to have failed, on the other it was continued in the form of a new revision of Fundamental Ontology' (2016:78).<sup>8</sup> While the 'central objects of Fundamental Ontology are Dasein's understanding of being and its rootedness in temporality' (79), Heidegger's new project of 'the metaphysics of Dasein', has 'the concept of freedom' as its 'central object' (81). Similarly, Jaran argues that 'the progression Heidegger's thought went through' during the years immediately after the publication of *Being and Time* was 'from the redefining of care and being-in-the-world in terms of transcendence to the understanding of transcendence in terms of freedom' (2010:211).

Jaran and Schmidt are evidently correct in marking the appearance of freedom at the fundament of Heidegger's philosophy in Phase 2. Equally, they provide helpful clarification to this arguments. However, their decision to acknowledge a distinction between, in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> My translation.

Schmidt's terms, an 'existential' freedom in *Being and Time* and a 'transcendental freedom' in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, seems only to be based on Heidegger's claims about the change in methodology from Fundamental Ontology to metaphysics of Dasein and metontology. Aside from the question of how great this change is (indeed as McNeill emphasises, Heidegger regards this change as a 'radicalisation of Fundamental Ontology' (1992:74), not a replacement—a change in methodology), a change in methodology is not evidence of a change in concept. Naturally, these scholars are aware of this, and the reason they presume that the concept changes is that the accounts of freedom in Phase 1 and 2 seem different. The burden of proof is clearly, therefore, on me to demonstrate otherwise in this thesis.

That the burden of proof lies with me is a fact reinforced by the work of Guignon (2011) and Han-Pile (2013). As I said above, this third position in the literature also takes Heidegger to be advancing two concepts of freedom. However, these scholars maintain these positions simultaneously and deliberately. Their concern, therefore, is not with the temporal span of the arguments, but rather that the content of the concepts are different. Guignon describes the separation in the following way:

[...] the word "freedom" has two key meanings in the writings of the late 1920s and early 1930s. The first is a distinctive conception of human freedom, a conception that undercuts our ordinary understanding of this word in mainstream debates about "the problem of free will." The second is a very idiosyncratic use of the word that makes it intelligible to say that freedom is the essence of ground and the essence of truth. (Guignon, 2001:80)

So, Guignon takes it that there are two uses of the word freedom in Heidegger: two concepts that are not necessarily incompatible, but must be distinguished in order to make sense of anything he says on the subject. Guignon is certainly correct in that we can, on the one hand, group one collection of statements that more easily relate to ordinary debate on freedom, and, on the other, group a different set of statements that seem esoteric. However, I will argue that what Guignon has done, with great clarity, is to state the problem, not solve it. This is equally the case with Han-Pile, who raises a more specific point about the concepts' compatibility:

Anything that has the structure of being in the world *must* be free: freedom is co-extensive with Dasein. Yet Dasein is often pictured in *Being and Time* as anything but free: it "ensnares itself", is "lost", "alienated", and needs to be "liberated". Thus comparison between *Being and Time* and other texts on freedom yields an important paradox: although by definition it transcends toward the world, the Dasein of Division I [of *SZ*] is deprived of freedom. It must be free, and yet phenomenological analysis shows that it is not free. (Han-Pile, 2013:291)

Han-Pile's solution to 'square this circle' (291) is to distinguish between two layers of choice in Heidegger's argument. There are two concepts of choice at play. The arguments from Phase 2 that seem to say Dasein is free *a priori* are 'pertaining to Dasein's ontological structure' and the 'phenomenological descriptions' of Dasein as typically unfree and potentially free when facing its mortality in Phase 1, are 'relevant to Dasein's ontic situation' (292). Han-Pile further claims that this is a philosophical advantage that 'allows Heidegger to account for the difference between authenticity, inauthenticity, and undifferentiatedness in a way that a single choice could not' (296), because it allows Heidegger to say that Dasein is free (in an ontological sense) to choose to be unfree (in an ontical sense).

So, as far as the literature on Heidegger's concept of freedom in Phase 1 and 2 is concerned, there is a substantive difference between the concepts. Jaran and Schmidt argue that this difference is chronological, where Phase 2 replaces Phase 1. Guignon and Han-Pile, however, argue that the two phases complement each other, but that Heidegger is talking about two distinct phenomena under the same name. My thesis will demonstrate, however, that, while the above scholars have eloquently stated an exegetical problem, the concepts are not actually different. As Heidegger says in *The Essence of Human Freedom*, 'When confronted by opposing statements we must always exert ourselves to understand the underlying problem.' [GA31 267-268/186] The 'underlying problem' that maintains the unity of Heidegger's concept of freedom is to be found by placing arguments in their proper context as a response to the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson, forcing an interpretation of *Being and Time* and the lectures and essays from Phase 2 that brings them together.

#### i.4 – Overview of the Thesis

This thesis will demonstrate that, in the period spanning the publication of *Being and Time* to the lecture course *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], Heidegger advocates a positive concept of freedom. I will demonstrate this by combining the arguments from the texts I have described above as Phase 1 and Phase 2. However, this reading requires significant contextualisation. The secondary literature, as I outlined above, regards these two phases as providing distinct concepts of freedom. The reason for this, as I will show, is that two key arguments that Heidegger makes have not been lent sufficient weight.

Firstly, Heidegger dismisses of the Free Will Debate as an illusory question. This means any attempt to apply the familiar categories of libertarianism, determinism, and compatibilism, or even to treat his positive claims about freedom as interacting with the idea of a free will, will distort what he is saying. Heidegger's arguments for this are found in *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], and I will examine this in Chapter 1. Secondly, Heidegger is offering a radical existentialist *positive* concept of freedom, where contemporary metaphysics tends to think exclusively of negative freedom or ignore the distinction entirely. When a positive conception of freedom is interpreted without regard to the distinction between positive and negative freedom, absurd results follow. This is because positive freedom means, in a special sense, choosing to be determined; it is not licence to do anything one want with no master, but is instead the choice to become one's own master and act from one's authentic being. Heidegger does not explain his connection to this distinction, but it is deployed in *Being and Time*. However, I will demonstrate that Heidegger is responding to Kant and Bergson's positive conceptions of freedom. Chapters 2 and 3 will demonstrate that Division I provides an account of positive unfreedom. Chapter 4 will show that Heidegger forms his concept of positive freedom in confrontation with claims made by Kant and Bergson, even though he does not ever give an account of this engagement.

This will provide the appropriate context for demonstrating the unity of the claims in Phase 1 and 2 in Chapter 5. For Heidegger, Dasein is free only if it is authentic. But, because the essence of truth is freedom, rather than necessity, Dasein is not bound to its being, it is freed for it. While this position rules out any possibility of determinism, it also rules out libertarianism as commonly construed: freedom is not a property of the will or any human faculty; humanity is freed to its being by freedom. Further, this predisposes Dasein towards unfreedom, since its being as this possibility is given to it through the mood of anxiety. Dasein flees its being, rather than taking it up. For this reason, it is, proximally and for the most part, not itself: it is negatively unfree. Positive freedom occurs only when Dasein heeds the call of conscience back to itself and chooses to be the being it is: transcendence, which is the ground of all the meaning in its world.

# Chapter 1: The Context of Heidegger's Philosophy of Freedom

## 1 – Introduction

The lecture course translated as *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy* [GA31] is vital in understanding Heidegger's philosophy of freedom, even though it is not somewhere that he spends much time explaining his own concept of freedom in detail. He says very little in this lecture course about what he thinks freedom is, and what he does say is very brief and not very clear if one is not already familiar with the arguments of *Being and Time* [*SZ*], the essay translated as *The Essence of Ground* [*WG*], and its companion lecture course *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [*MAL*], where Heidegger says more about how freedom should be thought.

However, what Heidegger says about freedom in these three texts is very difficult to situate within the history of the philosophy of freedom. As I outlined in my Introduction, this has lead the literature to tend to downplay the relevance of Heidegger's concept of freedom to any other debate, treating it as esoteric and anomalous. In Chapter, I will argue that Heidegger's concept of freedom is directly relevant to the traditional problem of the freedom of the will, insofar as it springs from a criticism of the limits of its foundation. Heidegger is not speaking in a vacuum about freedom, but is rather addressing the problem in a manner he conceives of as more fundamental and applicable to human experience. GA31 is the place where Heidegger provides this criticism. And, while within it he says very little about the novel concept of freedom he wishes to introduce, this is because his intention is to differentiate himself from the traditional problem through a confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*) with Immanuel Kant.

Now, while GA31 serves this crucial role as the place where Heidegger situates his philosophy of freedom in response to the traditional problem of the freedom of the will, clarifying the ambiguities in his account of freedom in *SZ*, *WG*, and GA26, the text is itself ambiguous. While Heidegger, in the opening chapters, does say quite clearly that he intends to examine the legitimacy of the problem of freedom in confrontation with Kant, the first half of the lecture course actually deals with Aristotle. The second half, which does engage with Kant, turns quickly into a dense reading of Kant's philosophy, and is only related back to the first half and the official aim of achieving a new grounding for the philosophy of freedom in a two-page long section at the very end. This brief section states, rather than argues, that Kant's philosophy of freedom, as based on a concept of causality, fails to reckon with the true nature of freedom. As such, in an initial reading, one learns a great deal about what Heidegger thinks about Aristotle and Kant, but very little about what he thinks about freedom.

In this Chapter, I wish to clarify Heidegger's intentions in GA31, in order to allow it to clarify Heidegger's philosophy of freedom as a whole. I will demonstrate, that the "missing link" that can help us understand exactly what Heidegger is doing in this lecture course is the 1889 book by Henri Bergson, *Essai sur les données immédiates de le conscience*, the authorised English translation of which is called *Time and Free Will*. Bergson, in this book, also provides a novel conception of freedom that is quite different to the familiar positions within the Free Will Debate of libertarianism, determinism, and compatibilism. This is because, like Heidegger some decades after him, Bergson wishes to argue that the Free Will Debate as such needs to be overturned, and the libertarian and determinist positions

springing from it are equally unacceptable.<sup>9</sup> It is easier to see how Bergson fits into the traditional debate, more so than Heidegger, because he spends a great deal of time describing the positions within that debate and trying to show that they all share a common error: an identical and faulty concept of inner time that leads to a concept of freedom and determinism totally unrelated to the experience of freedom and action itself.

Recent research has shown the influence of Bergson on Heidegger during the formation of his concept of time. In his *The Origin of Time* (2015), Heath Massey demonstrates that Heidegger was far more concerned with the philosophy of Bergson than has previously been assumed.<sup>10</sup> In his own words,

While I would not claim that Heidegger's thinking about time was influenced solely or even primarily by Bergson, I do hope to show that the casual, offhand way that Heidegger deals with Bergson in *Being and Time* conceals a deep, almost subterranean influence. (3)

This 'casual, offhand' treatment of Bergson is found in a footnote, where Heidegger states that Bergson, rather than being original in his own right, simply inverts the philosophy of Hegel. However, Massey points us to the fact that the lecture course translated as *History of Concept of Time* [GA20], whose translator, Theodore Kisiel, argues

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> This is more than the compatibilist trope of accusing libertarians of having a faulty concept of freedom, a claim found at least as early as Hume (2000:257-262). Bergson frames freedom as a false-problem grounded in a misunderstanding of the phenomenon of time, which is, for Bergson, a matter of psychology. Time, or duration, is a matter of our inner life and requires a different conceptual approach to discussions of the outer world Compatibilism, which argues for a redefinition of freedom that is not precluded by determinism, also misses the point since determinism, a natural concept, is not an appropriate way of discussing the self.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See, in particular, the section 'On the Verge of *Being and Time*' (45-47), where Massey gives an overview of the places Heidegger speaks of Bergson, empirically demonstrating that his philosophy is a concern for Heidegger. Bergson, argues Massey, was an important influence on Heidegger with a distinctive place: 'Heidegger does not just drag Bergson into the net with other philosophers of life, but uses Bergson's distinction between time and duration as a foil for his own interpretation of temporality' (47).

convincingly is a first draft of *Being and Time*, plans to dedicate significant space in the 'Destruction of the History of all Ontology' to a study of Bergson. Massey argues that, far from being unimpressed by Bergson, Heidegger has engaged with him in detail, in so much detail that his prime concern is to distance himself from the French philosopher when he does write about him. He argues that the 'attempts on Heidegger's part to distance himself from Bergson are actually what makes it possible to see their proximity' (7). As such, the absence of a detailed engagement with Bergson of the level promised in GA20 is not evidence against the influence, but for it.<sup>11</sup> Massey describes Heidegger's attitude to Bergson most helpfully in saying that,

Heidegger uses Bergson as a touchstone, returning to his thought over and over again. However, he disagrees with Bergson's account of duration as primordial time on many points. More precisely, Heidegger *comes to disagree* with Bergson on many points over the course of an engagement with his thinking that lasts more than a decade. (16)

If Heidegger uses Bergson as a touchstone, then we as readers can do the same. Thus, GA31 can be productively interpreted as a response to or critical repetition of this argument from *Time and Free Will*. By demonstrating the conceptual link between these two texts, I will be able to clarify Heidegger's method and intentions in GA31 as a Bergsoninfluenced attempt to deviate from previous debates about freedom, which in turn will allow me to proceed in coming chapters to clarify Heidegger's own concept.

In §1.1, I will give a brief introduction to Bergson's philosophy of time as presented in *Time and Free Will*. As the English title suggests, this discussion of time is essential to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> As Michel Foucault once said in an interview, it is hardest to write about those philosophers that one is closest to in thought, 'I think it's important to have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but on whom one doesn't write. Perhaps someday I'll write about them, but at that point they will no longer be instruments of thought for me.' (1996:470)

Bergson's argument concerning freedom, and must be established first. In §1.2, I will describe Bergson's argument against the traditional positions within the debate concerning the freedom of the will, and show how he applies the philosophy of time discussed in §1.1 to this problem, claiming that both determinists and libertarians have missed the genuine phenomenon of human action. In §1.3, I will turn to GA31. I will argue that Heidegger too takes issue with the concept of time that Kant employs to articulate both the libertarian and determinist positions in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. And, finally in §1.4, I will argue that Bergson and Heidegger have a structurally similar argument, although Heidegger does attempt to go further by raising the question of being in addition to the question of time, and more specifically how the answer to the problem of the relation between being and time requires an investigation into a new, more profound question of freedom.

## **1.1 – Bergson's Philosophy of Time**

In this section, I will provide a brief introduction to Bergson's concept of duration (*durée*), as presented in *Time and Free Will*. This concept is central to the book's arguments concerning freedom, which have import for the interpretation of Heidegger's lecture course, *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy*.

Bergson's prime treatment of freedom is found in his first book, *Time and Free Will*. This book seeks to demonstrate that free will can be understood only through a radical rethinking of time as *duration*. As Bergson puts it, it is only an 'inaccurate psychology' (2001:165) that leads to both determinist and traditional libertarian positions. Massey points out the implications of this position as follows:

> What is radical about Bergson's thinking on the issue of freedom is the strategy by which he counters the notion that free will is an illusion. His approach is not

simply to defend a conception of the will as a faculty of choice undetermined by any causal antecedents. It is to show that the very terms in which the debate is conducted rest on certain misconceptions about temporality. (2015:79)

What is distinctive and innovative in Bergson's account of freedom is more its critical motion, rather than its positive solution: he rejects all of the positions in the debate in order to carve out his own in response to all positions rather than simply adopting one of the positions already available.<sup>12</sup>

Naturally, Bergson's argument hinges on his own "accurate" psychology and that for him requires a re-thinking of time. The reason for this is a development of a claim that Kant makes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', Kant argues that space is the form of outer appearance and that time is the form of both outer and inner

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> *Time and Free Will* is not the only place Bergson speak about freedom, but it is his longest treatment of the issue and this book itself contains specific arguments that Heidegger was acquainted with, which are similar to arguments he later makes himself. The relation between Heidegger and Bergson's later books is somewhat more complicated, although I will draw on Bergson's later clarifications of *Time and Free Will* published in *The Creative* Mind (2007). A comparison between Heidegger's full concept of freedom and the discussions of mechanistic and teleological causality in *Creative Evolution* (1998:1-97) is an intriguing topic I would like to explore in later research, but is beyond the scope of the present thesis. Ultimately, Bergson argues for a 'vital impetus' (*élan vital*) as a new form of causality that Heidegger does not discuss. While *élan vital* does not provide a problem for Heidegger per se, Bergson may offer an alternative account of freedom, not totally abandoning the concept of causality, which, for that very reason, is less obscure and, by extension, more plausible. For a discussion that works to relate the concepts of causation in Time and Free Will and Creative Evolution, see the chapter on freedom in Vladimir Jankélévitch's Henri Bergson (2015), recently translated into English. For a thorough account of the relationship between Heidegger and Bergson regarding the concept of time, see Heath Massey's The Origin of Time (2015).

appearance.<sup>13</sup> This means that things in the natural world are conditioned by space and time, but that the inner experience of the rational being, its relation of itself to itself is conditioned by time alone. Kant thus makes time more fundamental than space and intrinsically bound up with human lived experience. While Bergson argues that Kant has not gone far enough, he agrees that time belongs to the inner self, making chronology and psychology synonymous; where Bergson speaks of an 'inaccurate psychology', it is the concept of time that has gone awry.

For Bergson, time is nothing like space, in spite of our tendency to understand time spatially, that is, as a fourth dimension: a line heading into the past and towards the future. But, such thinking is only to hold the past and future in the present as if they were simultaneous, co-existing with the present. Our tendency to think in this way is what makes it possible for us to imagine 'time-travel' where the past and future are destinations or places we might go to. In other words, they are spatial locations. This way of thinking about the experience of time is problematic. It forces us to understand the human psyche as a series of independent psychic states. Rather than seeing an action in its pure durational unity, we cut it up in to isolated moments that are before, after or contemporaneous with each other. Bergson positions himself in relation to Kant on this particular issue as follows:

> Kant's great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium. He did not notice that real duration is made up of moments inside one another, and that when it seems to assume the form of a homogeneous whole, it is because it gets

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> More specifically, Kant argues that time is the form of inner appearance, and only also outer appearance because *all* appearance belongs to inner experience itself, as something that happens to us. 'Time is the formal *a priori* condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of all *outer* intuition, is so far limited; it servers as the *a priori* condition only of outer appearances. But, since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to our inner state; and since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belongs to time, time is an *a priori* condition of all appearance whatsoever.' (2007: A34/B51)

expressed in space. Thus the very distinction which he makes between space and time amounts at bottom to confusing time with space, and the symbolical representation of the ego with the ego with itself. (Bergson, 2001:232)

So, Kant's 'great mistake' is ultimately not to recognise the subjectivity of the subject, treating it as another form of objectivity, corrupting his interpretation by applying concepts appropriate only to nature, not consciousness. This claim is parallel with some of the claims Heidegger makes in GA31, when he accuses Kant of deriving his concept of freedom from natural causality, rather than through a genuine interrogation of the finitude of human existence. Heidegger says that, for Kant, 'Freedom is nothing other than *absolute natural causality*, or as Kant fittingly says, it is a concept of nature that transcends all possible experience. Freedom does not thereby lose the character of a concept of nature, but retains this, precisely as broadened out and raised up to the unconditioned.' [GA31 214-5/148]. And, even when Kant, in his practical philosophy, attempts to derive a concept of freedom from the concept of the "personality" of the rational subject, Heidegger argues that this only results in a distortion of the genuine content of the problem, arguing that the question of freedom is raised,

[...] only in the specific *form* of an inquiry into the possibility of the unity of freedom and natural causality. This makes it look as if the possibility of freedom is a problem only insofar as freedom is a kind of causality. Once freedom is conceived in this fashion, the question of its possibility can concern nothing else but the compatibility of this causality with natural causality. However, the possibility of freedom precisely does not become a problem [for Kant] such that the specific being of the beings to be unified through the two causalities is genuinely interrogated.' [GA31 301-2/206-7]

In other words, by allowing nature to be conceived as primary, the naturalness of the concepts involved conceal what needs to be thought about. In content, this argument is different to Bergson's claim that spatial thinking distorts the durational character of phenomena, but in form it is identical.

To return to Bergson's critique, he similarly takes issue with Kant. While Kant is right to ascribe time to the ego and space to nature, his conception of time misrepresents it. Kant does not go far enough for Bergson in that he treats simultaneity as a mode of time, not space, 'Only on the presupposition of time can we represent to ourselves a number of things as existing at one and the same time (simultaneously)' (2007:A31/B46) and because he still interprets time in spatial terms. 'Time has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but successive (just as different spaces are not successive but simultaneous' (A31/B47). Bergson, therefore, pushes Kant's claim further. Time is indeed the form rather than the matter of inner sense. That is, it is what unfolds subjectivity rather than being something the subject projects onto itself.

In this line, Keith Ansell Pearson (2002) defends Deleuze's suggestion that Kant's theory of time is the condition of the possibility of Bergson's duration, insofar as it 'emancipates' time from its position as the measure of movement (of things), making providing 'a topological structure which enfolds the intensive character of our becoming in time' (202-203). In other words, Bergson's philosophy of time furthers the Kantian project, even if it takes it to a place the latter could not recognise

*Time and Free Will* proposes that we think of space and time as two completely different types of 'multiplicity', viz. two completely different ways in which a multiplicity of perceptions are given to us. Bergson attributes opposing qualities to the two multiplicities: duration is qualitative, space quantitative; duration is heterogeneous, space homogenous; duration discontinuous and given in instinct, space continuous and a property of the intellect.

Bergson provides many examples to try and prove this distinction, but the essential argument remains the same: if we turn to what is immediately given to perception, viz. what is not mediated by the intellect, we can encounter the pure duration of lived experience, of pure change and becoming. In this genuine experience, everything is heterogenous, saturated by qualitative differences. The trouble is that the intellect, as part of its natural function, extracts these pure perceptions in order to perform its basic operations. One of the clearest examples he gives is of a shepherd counting his sheep. Bergson claims that, in order to count his flock, the shepherd must bracket out the differences between sheep through an intellectual abstraction that completely neglects their individual differences:

> No doubt we can count the sheep in a flock and say that there are fifty, although they are all different from one another and are easily recognized by the shepherd: but the reason is that we agree in that case to neglect their individual differences and to take into account only what they have in common. On the other hand, as soon as we fix our attention on the particular features of objects or individuals, we can of course make an enumeration of them, but not a total. We place ourselves at these two very different points of view when we count the soldiers in a battalion and when we call the roll. Hence we may conclude that the idea of number implies the same simple intuition of a multiplicity of parts or units, which are absolutely alike. (Bergson, 2001:76)

So, in order to count the flock or take a roll call, we need to posit intellectually the entities involved, each with their factually experienced heterogeneity, as identical. At this point, the argument gives us a standard account of abstraction, and does not include a problematization of time. Bergson pushes the example further, however, to claim that the abstraction involves a transition out of duration and into space. The reason for why Bergson thinks that should be considered to be in space rather than duration is, Bergson goes on, that the form of such a calculation is space, since it is necessary to put these pure ideal and

identical units side by side in order to perform the arithmetic, and that it is not possible to perform the calculation through duration:

Either we [when performing the addition] include them all in the same image, and it follows as a necessary consequence that we place them side by side in an ideal space, or else we repeat fifty times in succession the image of a single one, and in that case it does seem, indeed, that the series lies in duration rather than space. But we shall soon find out that it cannot be so. For if we picture to ourselves each of the sheep in the flock in succession and separately, we shall never have to do with more than a single sheep. In order that the number should go on increasing in proportion as we advance, we must retain the successive images and set them alongside each of the new units which we picture to ourselves: now, it is in space that such a juxtaposition takes place and not in pure duration. (Bergson, 2001:77)

Bergson's argument here is an interpretation of intellectual abstraction as an ossification of an enduring temporal experience into a spatial intellection. Duration gives experience a heterogenous experience where each object experienced is tied uniquely to that particular moment, and cannot be transferred.<sup>14</sup> By contrast, as soon as we apply the intellect we need to set those differences aside and hold them in a pure moment of space, placing "side by side" a durational experience that, left in this experience, does not admit of spatiality at all. The experience of a sheep looking up from the grass it is eating and looking around while it chews is not, in its experience, a set of moments "side by side", but an event that endures moment by moment. The immediately previous moment of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The singularity of durational experience, such that each durational moment is different to another in a 'heterogenous multiplicity', is underlined in a later passage of *Time and Free Will*. Bergson speaks about our familiarity with the area in which we live, how my image of it and my durational experience of it start to fall out of alignment. 'When e.g. I take my first walk in a town in which I am going to live, my environment produces on me two impressions at the same time, one of which is destined to last while the other will constantly change. Every day I perceive the same houses, and as I know that they are the same objects, I always call them by the same name and I also fancy that they always look the same to me. But, if I recur, at the end of a sufficiently long period, to the impression which I experienced during the first few years, I am surprised at the remarkable, inexplicable, and indeed inexpressible change which has taken place.' (2001:129-130)

sheep with its head down and biting at the ground is not "side by side" with the moment where the sheep looks around, it is gone, and if we try bring it back to analyse this process, we lose its singularity by abstracting it from the duration it previously inhabited.<sup>15</sup> This is no doubt necessary for the shepherd; if he only successively looked at the sheep, he would not be able to count. He must intellectually extract them from their durational singularity with the intellect and hold them in space side by side. This movement allows him to count the sheep, but it does force him to forget their particularity. When the intellect reckons with entities, it leaves something of their nature behind. This is the case with all thinking about duration. By spatializing what is immediately given to us in duration as a heterogeneous multiplicity, we have lost the true phenomenon. This is essential for the work of mathematics, science, and indeed social life. It is, however, a dangerous illusion for the philosopher.

The task of the philosopher, therefore, is to draw the thinker's attention back to durational multiplicity to see its truth. The method of philosophy, intuition, becomes a zigzagging between the spatializing representation of the intellect and the unmediated heterogeneity of duration. Where a philosophy begins without recognising this distinction, confusion reigns. This is why Deleuze (1991) is able to say that a key component of intuition is the application of 'the test of true and false to problems themselves':

> We are wrong to believe that the true and the false can only be brought to bear on solutions, that they only begin with solutions. [...] this prejudice goes back to childhood, to the classroom: It is the school teacher who "poses" the problems; the pupil's task is to discover the solutions. In this way we are kept in a kind of slavery. (Deleuze, 1991:15)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Kant makes the opposite claim in the First and Second Analogies, which I will discuss in §1.3. With an example of a ship travelling downstream, he argues that such a succession can only be experienced if something remains permanently present throughout.

This 'slavery' of false problems prevents the philosopher from engaging with reality appropriately, and Bergson spends a great deal of time rejecting problems proposed by his contemporaries; he claims that the confusion of time with space, of the psychological with the physical, leads to the major sources of contention in philosophy as a whole. In short, the failure to think duration *qua* duration prevents philosophy from authentically grasping the truth. As Jankélévitch claims in the voice of Bergson, 'Practically all pseudo-problems have to do with this untimely approach.' (2015:17) This is particularly the case with freedom, the topic of the final chapter of *Time and Free Will*. Indeed, in a later text translated as *The Creative Mind*,<sup>16</sup> Bergson says that the problem of freedom is one of the chief instances of the confusion between duration and space, and that, in accord with the duty of philosophy, he needed to turn people to their experiences to dissolve it:

[...] the duty of philosophy, it seemed to me, was to lay down the general conditions of the direct, immediate observation of oneself by oneself. The inner observation is warped by the habits we have developed; the chief example of this warping is doubtless the one which created the problem of liberty—a pseudo-problem born of a confusion of duration with extension. (Bergson, 2007:15)

As such, the problem of time is not one issue among others for Bergson. Rather, it is the central problem of philosophy. Bergson believes that most, if not all, seemingly irresolvable problems of metaphysics can be traced to a faulty concept of time in which time is not allowed to take place, to endure. This concept of time amounts to a spatialization of real duration, which takes the lived flux of human experience and ossifies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> It will be noted that *The Creative Mind* was published after lecture course recorded in GA31 was given. However, as has been said above, we are not concerned with what the man Heidegger may have psychologically thought about Bergson. Further, Bergson is consistent in *The Creative Mind* with his earlier views. The only difference between Bergson's claims in the later work and in his first is that, in the later work, he is able to be much clearer and emphatic about his aims and views.

them into a single moment of pure presence. Bergson, in the final chapter of *Time and Free Will*, applies this concept to the problem of the freedom of the will, through arguments I will turn to in the next section.

## 1.2 – Bergson's General Critique of the Free Will Debate's Concept of Time

In the last section, I explained that Bergson develops a novel concept of time, duration, in an attempt to do more justice to human experience of time. He argues that time has typically been understood through space, which is to say as a homogenous medium where each part is indifferent and interchangeable with each other. Instead, duration is a heterogeneous multiplicity. Each event in time is qualitatively different from other events. Events are tied to the detailed experience of my self and the world as they happen, and while I can cut up this time into pieces and rearrange it to perform calculations, to do so is to extract the moments from time and remove their truly temporal character.

Bergson argues the failure to recognise the durational nature of time has lead to false problems in metaphysics, where debates circle endlessly, based on a faulty presupposition. In the final chapter of *Time and Free Will*, he attempts to show that this is the case concerning the problem of the freedom of the will. The way that he goes about this is by arguing that both determinists and libertarians have conceived the problem of freedom in spatial terms. They attempt to understand human action statically and spatially when it should be understood in our experience of it in duration. Bergson discusses several different dominant positions in his time by dividing them into classes. The first major distinction he draws is between physical and psychological determinism. Physical determinism is the main form of determinism prevalent today. As the name suggests, it is rooted in a mechanistic theory of the world, arguing that, since the human is part of that world, it too must be mechanically determined. He sums up this mechanistic view as follows:

The universe is pictured as a heap of matter which the imagination resolves into molecules and atoms These particles are supposed to carry out unceasingly movements of every kind [...] and physical phenomena, chemical action, the qualities of matter which our senses perceive, heat, sound, electricity, perhaps even attraction, are thought to be reducible objectively to these elementary movements. (Bergson, 2001:143)

The position that Bergson is reconstructing, is the one commonly referred to as "Laplace's demon", although he does not use the term himself. Pierre-Simon Laplace was a French astronomer and mathematician active in the early nineteenth century. He is often referred to in debates about absolute causal determination because of claims made in his *A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities*, which are very close to the image outlined by Bergson above. Laplace argued, 'All events, even those which on account of their insignificance do not seem to follow the great laws of nature, are a result of it just as necessarily as the revolutions of the sun.' (1902:3) He extends this claim, which he takes to be a result of the principle of sufficient reason,<sup>17</sup> to move to the idea of the complete predictability of everything that ever happens:<sup>18</sup>

We ought then to regard the present state of the universe as an effect of its anterior state and as the cause of the one which is to follow. Given for one instant an intelligence which could comprehend all the forces by which nature is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> In his own words, 'Present events are connected with preceding ones by a tie based upon the evident principle that a thing cannot occur without a cause which produces it. This axiom, known by the name of the *principle of sufficient reason*, extends even to actions which are considered indifferent; the freest will is unable without a determinative motive to give them birth' (LaPlace, 1902:3)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Carl Hoefer, in his article for the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2016), emphasises that causal determination and absolute predictability are two separate claims that are 'easily to comingle', as they are in Laplace's argument.

animated and the respective situation of the beings who compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the same formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to its eyes. (Laplace, 1902:4)

This 'intelligence', which is seemingly plausible with the advent and success of computer technologies, is what is referred to as Laplace's demon: the idea that if the laws of nature are known, and the position and direction of every particle in the universe is known<sup>19</sup>, then the entire past and future can be calculated with complete certainty. This information would be sufficient to work out everything that happened to bring the universe to its present state and also sufficient to work out every state it will enter into in the future. This apparent regularity of the physical universe only makes itself more self-evident as science develops. We can accurately predict the motions of the planets in our solar system into both the past and future, such that with the right software even someone with no great competence in mathematics could see a representation of where the stars were in the sky during any historic event and where they will be on a later date. It is a natural development that the apparent regularity of the universe combined with the increased success of the sciences would lead us to believe that even our own actions, which occur in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Heisenberg's uncertainty principle renders this impossible, since it is impossible to know the location and motion of said particles at the same time. For this reason and many others, quantum theory is often discussed as a potential response to causal determinism in the contemporary literature. If, as quantum theory shows, the activity of the fundamental "particles" is random and knowable only in terms of probabilities rather than certainties, then nature is not causally determined after all. As is typically pointed out, however, randomness is not freedom. It is not necessary to go into detail about the impact of this issue for Bergson, since his argument against physical determinism is neutral to the metaphysical interpretation of it. His point is that, no matter how the physical universe operates, it is a psychology not a physiology that leads the deterministic thesis. For a further discussion of the way quantum theory does and does not shift the Free Will Debate, see Kane (2005:132-146). See also Hoefer (2016:§4).

this universe, should be just as regular and predictable, and therefore unavoidable and necessary.

Bergson's dismissal of Laplace's demon is swift, however. He argues that the proponent of physical determinism has failed properly to address the mind and body problem, pointing out that the only way we can draw conclusions about the mind from the body is if we have taken up a position on how mind and body interact, what their respective nature is, and if indeed either exist. Bergson points to the plethora of answers to this question to rhetorically strengthen his claim:

Leibniz ascribed [the strict correspondence between states of consciousness and modes of extension] to a preestablished harmony, and would never have admitted that a motion could give rise to a perception as a cause produces an effect. Spinoza said that the modes of thought and the modes of extension correspond with but never influence one another: they only express in two different languages the same eternal truth. But the theories of physical determinism which are rife at the present day are far from displaying the same clearness, the same geometrical rigour. (Bergson, 2001:147)

The issue of the relation between mind and body must be settled as part of any argument for physical determinism, but as Bergson points out there are many ways of resolving this issue. Descartes argues for a causal connection, but is unable to prove it or explain it. Hume and Locke take the causal connection for granted. Berkeley says that body does not exist. Leibniz, Spinoza and Malebranche claim there is no direct causal connection at all. In our own time, the philosophy of mind is split between debates concerning the identity of mind and brain, whether this identity is "type" or "token", whether mind is an "emergent property" or whether it can be said to "supervene" on the body or be "reduced" to the body or be "eliminated" altogether from the philosophical lexicon.<sup>20</sup> In short, there is no consensus on the answer to the mind and body problem, and physical determinism

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> For a review of the nuances in these positions, see Smart (2017).

can only obtain if it is proven that what happens in the body causes what happens in the mind, such that all of our thoughts, perceptions, decisions, hopes, and desires are the result of the matter that makes us up.

Bergson does not stop with this negative claim, however. Not only is the jury still out on a key component of the physical determinist's world-picture, the fact it is dependent on the interpretation of mind means that it is only an extension of a psychological hypothesis. One must demonstrate that psychological phenomena are themselves determined in order to accept that physical causes are what determines them. In a move similar to Kant's reduction of the cosmological argument to the ontological, then, Bergson claims that physical determinism is just a story intended to give rhetorical force to a determinist theory of mind that is quite suspect. As such, Bergson could very well have used Kant's words to claim that physical determinism 'professes to lead us by a new path, but after a short circuit brings us back to the very path which we had deserted at its bidding' (Kant, 2007: A609/B637).

The real meat of physical determinism is, therefore, psychological determinism: a theory of mind showing that our thoughts, feelings, and sensations determine our actions regardless of their physical correspondents. This means that the proper domain of the question of free will is psychology. Regardless of the truth of this claim, it is tactically sound for Bergson to push the Free Will Debate into the domain of philosophical psychology since he has already, in *Time and Free Will*, presented an innovative philosophy of mind grounded in the concept of duration, arguing that the spatial language of the natural science has no place in our interpretation of inner life. Further, Bergson is going to argue that this very application of spatial language and concepts to inner life is what results in the determinist hypothesis, so that his true refutation of determinism is simply to refer the

reader back to the second chapter of the book, which purports to have demonstrated this point already.

So, having argued that all physical determinism includes a psychological claim, Bergson is able to claim that all determinism is reducible to psychological determinism. The issue is to be settled in an examination of the experience of psychic life. Several arguments are levied against psychological determinism, but Bergson's main focus is to criticise what he calls 'associationism', which he takes to be the 'latest and most recent shape' of psychological determinism (2001:155). Associationism argues that human action is determined insofar as different discrete ideas in the mind (perceptions, motives, reasons, and emotions) are causally connected and impel the individual to act. In short, my "feeling hungry" causally determines me to "choose" to eat. Bergson articulates the position as follows:

The existing state of consciousness is first thought of as necessitated by the preceding states [...] experience is appealed to, with the object of showing that the transition from one psychic state to another can always be explained by some simple reason, the second obeying as it were the call of the first. (Bergson, 2001:155-156)

So, associationism conceives of the internal life of the mind as discrete, self-contained events that can have some form of causal relationship. Thus, I can say that I have a state of "being tired" followed by a state of "thinking about bed" and finally "choosing to sleep". The psychological determinist would say that these successive states are causally linked. For Bergson, such a view is only possible upon the basis of the individual extracting these events from the lived experience of duration and placing them into space side by side, giving the illusion that they are distinct, contemporaneous and can have a causal relationship. As such, we are not getting a description of the facts, but an intellectual abstraction; the 'association is the work of the associationist philosopher who is studying my mind, rather than of my mind itself.' (165)

The tradition that Bergson has in mind is grounded primarily in British empiricism, particularly Hume, who makes much of the 'association of ideas'. Although the latter is a compatibilist libertarian, the doctrine Bergson attacks here pushes the "imagist" interpretation of thinking of Locke, Berkeley and Hume to what is arguably its natural conclusion. If the experience of thinking, feeling, and sensing is reduced to the mind's perception of an idea or image that is within it but distinct from it, it is inevitable that a determining causal relationship be posited between them. Hume and Locke frequently speak of ideas being "conveyed" or "impressed" onto the mind, most particularly in their accounts of sensory perception. Locke argues that the simple ideas of perception cannot be made by the mind and 'must necessarily be the product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural way, and producing therein those Perceptions' (1979:564). Hume names sense data 'impressions', in contrast to ideas, both of which are said to 'strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.' (2009:1). From here, it is a short step from 'impress upon the mind' to 'determines the mind', placing them in a passive role in relation to the world. As Bergson puts it,

> By giving first the person and then the feelings by which he is moved a fixed form by means of sharply doubled words, it deprives them in advance of every kind of activity. It will then see on the one side an ego always self-identical, and on the other contrary feelings, also self-identical, which dispute for its possession; victory will necessarily belong to the stronger. But this mechanism, to which we have condemned ourselves in advance, has no value beyond that of a symbolic representation: it cannot hold good against the witness of an attentive consciousness, which shows us inner dynamism as a fact. (Bergson, 2001:171-172)

For Bergson, this interpretation of psychic life as made of discreet packages is an abandonment of the immediate data of consciousness *par excellence*, extracting what is a

qualitative process and ossifying it in the homogenous medium that is space, such that one fluid event of action that takes up a duration can be cut up and each moment represented side by side simultaneously. Jankélévitch puts this well, saying that to 'remain faithful to Bergson's thought' we must 'distinguish between two views of volition'. These are the view of the associationist on the one hand, who looks at volition 'through the prism of deliberation' in which 'deliberation appears determined'. Jankélévitch's second 'view' of volition is to when volition is, '[I]ooked at as it ripens, by way of a meditation that is truly contemporaneous with its growth' (2015:56). In other words, Bergson asks us to view volition in its durational event rather than distorting it. With the first view, my deliberations appear to determine my choice, but 'deliberation generally is actually posterior to the decision' (2015:55). In Bergson's own words,

Associationism thus makes the mistake of constantly replacing the concrete phenomenon which takes place in the mind by the artificial reconstruction of it given by philosophy, and of thus confusing the explanation of the fact with the fact itself. (Bergson, 2001:163)

This constitutes the negative aspect of the claim. To prove positively that associationism is mistaken, Bergson directs us to our lived experience.

What is most inventive about Bergson's treatment of associationism, however, is not that he provides a refutation of its psychology, but that he shows that libertarianism shares its basic premise: that the mind and its ideas are discrete entities. In truth, the problem is not the libertarian and determinist conclusions drawn from this thesis, but the very atomisation of the mind presupposed by both parties. To establish this, he cites and criticises the definition of free will as the "ability to do otherwise".<sup>21</sup> The source Bergson uses for this definition comes from John Stuart Mill's *Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy*<sup>22</sup>, where Mill sums up the libertarian position as 'To be conscious of free-will, must mean, to be conscious, before I have decided, that I am able to decide either way.' (Mill, 1979:449). This is, for Bergson, something that the libertarian and determinist take for granted, although drawing different conclusions from the framework:

The argument of [Mill] implies that there is only one possible act corresponding to given antecedents: the believers in free will assume, on the other hand, that the same series could issue in several different acts, equally possible. (Bergson, 2001:175)


So, the determinist claims that for us to have chosen X rather than Y, there would have to have been something different in the events leading up to the moment of decision, such as a less strong desire for Y or a temptation for X. The libertarian, however, takes them to be equally possible. The libertarian is Bergson's immediate target here, since he is suspicious of the notion of the "equal possibility" of the two actions, since this would be to understand them as inert, static entities. Characteristically, Bergson interprets the experience of indecision as a durational whole instead.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> This definition is popular among libertarians and their opponents, and found in many places, not least Descartes who, in his 'Fourth Meditation', calls freedom of the will 'the ability to do or not do something' (1996:40). Timothy O'Connor refers to this type of freedom as 'ultimate origination', and discusses it at length (2016:§3.2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> This is a curious citation for Bergson to use, since within it Mill only goes on to 'dispute altogether that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest present desire or volition' and ultimately rejects as a 'figment' the 'direct consciousness of the freedom of the will' (452-453). Hamilton himself, by Mill's testimony, 'is of the opinion that Free-will and Necessity are both inconceivable' (441). Mill is not a determinist, but a compatibilist, who takes what knowledge of freedom we can have to be found in moral responsibility instead, as discussed by MacLeod (2017:§3.5). Although, Mill does give a description of the process of deliberation (450-452), which seems to have been highly influential on Bergson's own argument in the section 'Real Duration and Contingency' (2001:175-183), which is currently under discussion.

I hesitate between two possible actions X and Y, and I go in turn from one to the other. This means that I pass through a series of states, and that these states can be divided into two groups according as I incline more towards X or in the contrary direction. Indeed, these opposite inclinations alone have real existence, and X and Y are two symbols by which I represent at their arrival- or termination-points, so to speak, two different tendencies of my personality at successive moments of duration. (Bergson, 2001:175)

For Bergson, hesitation consists in inclinations to the two alternatives. I at one moment incline towards X and at another towards Y. Each moment occurs durationally and in the durational moment I am the inclination towards X or the inclination towards Y. I eventually choose X or Y and become, in my whole durational self, the choice I have made. Bergson claims that Libertarianism, in claiming that freedom is consciousness of an ability to do otherwise, misses the content of the experience and mistakes a representation of the free act with the free act itself. He draws



this representation in Figure 1.

Hence, [common sense] will picture a self which, after having traversed a series MO of conscious states, when it reaches the point O finds before it two directions OX and OY, equally open. These directions thus become *things*, real paths into which the highroad of consciousness leads, and it depends only on the self which of them is entered upon. In short, the continuous and living activity of the self, in which we have distinguished, by abstraction only, two opposite directions, is replaced by these directions themselves, transformed into indifferent inert things awaiting our choice. (Bergson, 2001:176-177)

This spatial extraction of lived activity is what the determinist and libertarian have in common. Even though the libertarian takes the consciousness of these options to be evidence of freedom, this very consciousness is an illusion and abstraction from the experience of freedom itself. By taking our inclinations to be separate entities, both libertarians and associationist determinists fail to grasp the true nature of freedom. This, then, is Bergson's attack on the Free Will Debate.<sup>23</sup> Physical determinists, those who think the natural sciences prove that our actions are necessitated by the physics of our bodies, are only distracting us from their presupposed psychological determinism. Psychological determinism itself fails to grasp the durational experience of the free act. It freezes what is a durational whole into discrete moments: feelings, ideas, desires, and temptations that cause us to act in certain ways. But, these moments are not separate from the self at all; they are part of us. Libertarianism is itself no help, since it presupposes the same static, spatial psychology as the determinist. The only difference is that it concludes from the coexistence of possibilities, which are themselves associationist abstractions from the process of hesitation, that alternatives existed. But, for Bergson, the alternatives do not exist at all, if existence means to be present, in the present, as entities distinct from the self.

In short, *Time and Free Will* argues that an insufficient philosophy of time leads the Free Will Debate completely on the wrong track. Rather than observing a durational process, both libertarian and determinist ossify the phenomenon of freedom into the temporal mode of presence. What takes time, or, more properly, endures, is paused, suspended in an intellectual intuition of total presence, complete coexistence, and homogeneity. By turning to a different concept of time, Bergson is able to reject entirely the Free Will Debate and think the phenomenon anew. As I will now go on to argue, a similar attempt at rejection is the main motivation of Heidegger's GA31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> I will speak about Bergson's positive account of freedom in Chapter 4, where I will use it to show its influence on Heidegger's own positive position on freedom in *Being and Time*.

## 1.3 – Heidegger's Specific Critique Kant's Philosophy of Freedom and Determination

In the previous section, I showed that Bergson's attack on the status quo concerning the Free Will Debate consists in the identification of a faulty concept of time common to both. In this section, I wish to show that Heidegger's critical analysis of Kant's Analogies of Experience and Third Antinomy, found in the lecture course translated as *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], does the same thing. Heidegger's aim with Kant here is to show that Kant presupposes, rather than argues, that the fundamental problem concerning freedom is causality, whilst interpreting causality as an ordered, temporal succession occurring in the temporal mode of the present. Similarly, Bergson criticises the Free Will Debate as he finds it as sharing a concept of time as limited to an ossified moment of presence.

The most obvious difference in method between them is that Bergson treats a wide range of arguments whereas Heidegger treats Kant alone. This permits Bergson to speak more broadly, and Heidegger to speak in more detail. But, both argue that determinism and libertarianism are grounded in the same concept of time, a concept of time in which nothing really changes. That both of these positions (determinism and libertarianism) are treated and even defended in Kant's philosophy is a testament to Kant's thoroughness. Indeed, Heidegger claims that Kant treats the problem of freedom in relation to the concept of causality 'in a manner more radical than anyone else' [GA31 299/205].<sup>24</sup>

Kant treats the problem of "transcendental freedom" (as opposed to practical freedom) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Transcendental Freedom, in Kant, refers to the absolute possibility of an uncaused event, as opposed to natural causality, where all effects have causes. Kant defines it as 'the power of beginning a state spontaneously' (2007:A533/B501). Practical freedom refers to the freedom of a rational will to be rationally driven rather than mislead by sensation and emotion: 'Freedom in the practical sense is the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses' (A534/B502). Kant focusses on the transcendental freedom in *Critique of Pure Reason*, claiming that the true antagonism between libertarianism and determinism is to be found therein: 'It should especially be noted that the practical concept of freedom is based on this *transcendental* idea, and that in the latter lies the real source of the difficulty by which the question of the possibility of freedom has always been beset.' (A533/B501)

In an argument called The Second Analogy, Kant argues that nature is always causally determined, such that every event that occurs must *a priori* be determined by a cause. In another section, the Third Antinomy, he discusses how this creates a contradiction in thought. Freedom, which he understands as an "uncaused cause", violates the principle of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> This is borne out in that Kant is simultaneously advocates causal determinism and absolute libertarianism. One might be tempted to regard him as compatibilist, but he specifically denies that liberty and natural determinism are compatible in nature, which is not an exact fit for what is meant by the term in modern literature. Compatibilism usually describes a position like that of David Hume, where freedom is defined out of incompatibility with causal determination. Hume, as the exemplar of this position, argues that the free will cannot possibly refer to a violation of the causal chain. Kant does not easily fit into the modern schema of positions, which makes him an easy target for accusations of incoherence on this question.

causation advocated in the Second Analogy. But, causation is also violated if there is not an initial cause, at least at the beginning of time, since the causal chain that makes itself would, it seems, need its own cause to bring it about.

In this section, I will be interpreting Heidegger's reading of these section as a specific repetition of Bergson's general critique of the Free Will Debate. Heidegger aims to show that both the position of determinism and the position of libertarianism, as discussed by Kant in the Analogies of Experience and Third Antinomy, presuppose a concept of time that is unjustified.<sup>25</sup> Kant presupposes this concept of time in order to determine causation as temporal succession, but fails to justify the time concept itself. I will first give a background to the Analogies of Experience, before interpreting Heidegger's reading of the First and Second Analogies, and then finally the Third Antinomy. It is in this discussion of the Third Antinomy that the relationship with Bergson will become explicitly clear. My focus in this section, however, will be in clarifying Heidegger's position, but, in the next section, I will argue in detail how I conceive the relationship between *Time and Free Will* and *The Essence of Human Freedom*.

Before I can discuss Heidegger's reading of Kant's Analogies, it is necessary to give some background to Kant's project in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. I will give a brief overview of Kant's central aim, before going into more detail about how the problem of the Analogies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Heidegger does go on to talk about Kant's own resolution of the Third Antinomy, and in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, further demonstrating that this temporal concept remains the same. But, since, as I will argue, this is also precursor for Heidegger's concept of authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*), I will delay discussion of these sections until Chapter 4 of this thesis.

occurs. This will allow me to move on to Heidegger's critique of the Analogies, which will in turn introduce the Third Antinomy, which arises out of them.

The aim of Kant's *First Critique* is to assess the limits of philosophical thinking through a tribunal that aims at the "self-knowledge" of metaphysics. In short, Kant believes that metaphysics has gone awry only because it does not know what it cannot speak about. The *Critique* aims to demonstrate the nature and limits of knowledge so that we can know what is and is not knowable. Kant eventually talks about this as the 'land of truth' that is 'surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion' (2007:A235-6/B294-5).

I have already spoken briefly about the section of the *Critique* called the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. Here, Kant argues that space and time are *a priori* forms of intuition, a part of the human mind and not things in the external world. Space and time are parts of our constitution as subjects rather than entities that actually exist, i.e. the matter of sensation. Space and time form this matter into such that it is experienceable in perception. Thus, the conditions of sensibility are established: nothing can be experienced unless it is in space and time. Space and time, as *a priori* forms of intuition, are conditions of any *a posteriori* intuition.

Moving onto the section called the 'Transcendental Analytic', Kant attempts to establish more transcendental conditions, this time of knowledge. These are the 'pure concepts of understanding', more famously named 'the categories'. These are *a priori* concepts or "innate ideas" in the language of Descartes. Contrary to Rationalist principles, Kant argues that the innate ideas exist only to be applied to experience. They cannot be used to demonstrate the existence of anything, and in their "pure" form they give us no knowledge at all. Kant claims, 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.' (2007:A51/B75)<sup>26</sup>

The task of proving this falls to the section called the 'Transcendental Deduction', an argument Kant himself admits is a 'matter of such extremely difficulty' that he provides addition introductory sections to 'prepare rather than instruct the reader' (A98). Although there are major differences in presentation between the first and second editions, and it is still debated if the content changes, the aim of the Deduction remains the same in both: Kant wishes to show that experience is determined by the categories acting as rules. For us to experience anything, not only must it be spatio-temporal, it must also be in accordance with the rules of the twelve categories. The example Kant most prominently leans on in the Deduction is causation. For anything to appear to experience, it must accord with the category of cause and effect.

Immediately after the Transcendental Deduction, however, Kant himself points to and attempts to solve a problem with this explanation in the section called the 'Schematism'. Kant argues that intuitions and concepts are entirely unalike. Since only like can affect like, exactly how pure concepts of understanding (categories) are *applied* to intuitions is difficult

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> This oft-cited statement is rarely put into its full context, where Kant pushes the point even further. 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.' (2007:A51/B75)

to see.<sup>27</sup> Similar to Descartes' problem of how two substances of different attributes (mind and body) can ever enter a causal relationship, Kant raises the question of how concepts and intuitions can relate at all.

Kant's solution is that there must be a third member in the relationship, a medium in which the relation between concepts and intuitions occurs, functioning as a "schema". This third member in the relationship between intuition and concept is time, which is both pure like the categories and at the same time an intuition, making it similar enough to both to relate them. So, Kant claims that the way in which the concepts are applied to intuitions is through a process of temporalization. As such, each of the twelve categories has a complementary "schema", which is its temporalized form acting as a rule in experience. The name that Kant gives to the schemata that concern the related categories of substance, cause and effect, and community is the Analogies of Experience.

The Analogies of Experience are transcendental principles that *regulate* possible experience. More specifically, analogies are principles that are concerned with 'the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Gardner (2005) interprets this by saying that 'it is not enough for the Deduction to have told us that the sensible and the conceptual must be connected, and that the connection is effected in a priori synthesis, for we have as yet no notions of what the sensible instantiation of a pure concept could amount to' (167). The section is, however, controversial in Kant studies. Henry Allison (1983) points out that 'it is sometimes argued that the account of the Schematism is superfluous because the desired results, if they are established at all, must already have been established in the Transcendental Deduction' (174). At the other end of the spectrum, Paul Guyer (1987), who is quite critical of the 'Transcendental Deduction', argues that the schematism, more than an addendum to the 'Deduction', actually 'contain the basic materials for his only successful deduction of the categories' (157).

*existence* of such appearances<sup>28</sup> and their *relation* to one another in respect of their existence.' (2007:A178/B221). Heidegger provides a useful clarification of this claim.

In Kant's terminology, the Analogies are a specific set of principles<sup>29</sup> relating to the 'the existence of appearances', i.e. the being-present of beings, 'nature' as accessible to us. [GA31 148/107]

Kant's analogies are principles of "being-present" or "existence". Not principles of the

"what" or content of appearances, but of the "that" or the condition of the possibility of

appearances, what allows them to be experienced. For Kant, all experience is of

appearances. That is, experience is the product of the synthesis of intuitions with the

categories acting as rules governing their representation in time. In other words, the

Analogies regulate how beings come to exist or, in Kant's words, how appearances appear.

They are specifically concerned with the existence of beings, not their essence.

So, an analogy 'does not tell us how mere perception or empirical intuition in general

comes about', that is it does not tell us how things come into existence. Rather, it is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> "Appearance" (*Erscheinung*) is the name Kant gives to an object of experience, i.e. an object in relation to a subject as contained within space and time, as described in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'. He says in a footnote to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', 'That which, while inseparable from the representation of the object, is not to be met with in the object in itself, but always in its relation to the subject, is appearance.' (2007:B70) Heidegger's equivocation of the Kantian term 'the existence of appearances [Dasein der Erscheinungen' as, in Heideggerian terminology, 'the being-present of beings [Vorhandensein der Seinden]' [GA31 148/107], is helpful. He does this not just to clarify the different uses of the word "Dasein" (he equates his own term, Vorhandensein, to Kant's use of Dasein [GA31 160/114]). But, to emphasise to his students and the reader that appearances carry being; they are not illusions or mere copies of reality. As Howard Caygill (2000) puts it, 'it is not simply illusion - the deceptive semblance of sensible perception but rather the experience within limits of human intuitions of space and time.' (79) <sup>29</sup> The name can be misleading, but the Analogies are principles rather than arguments. Although, for simplicity's sake, scholarship often says 'The First Analogy' rather than 'The argument for the First Analogy'. Kant's choice of name is applicable. Just as analogical arguments utilise a relation between examples, the Analogies in Kant's sense are regulative principles of how appearances relate to each other.

'regulative principle' that tells us how such appearances relate to each other, such that they occur in an experience ordered and informed by the understanding.<sup>30</sup> Heidegger articulates this by saying what the analogies determine is, 'the way something must be if it is to be at all experienceable in its existence.' [GA31 170/120] So, these principles are concerned with the possibility of the existence of appearances as they appear, what the fact that they appear in the way they do tells us about how they must be ordered.

The task of the section entitled 'Analogies of Experience' is therefore to provide the rules that determine the manner in which appearances appear to experience in an ordered way according to the three categories of relation: inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, and community (2007:A80/B106). These three categories, in the Analogies of Experience, will be mapped onto what Kant calls the 'three modes of time' respectively: [permanence]<sup>31</sup>, succession, and coexistence (A177/B219). These are modes of time, as is to be expected since the Analogies are a temporalisation of the categories. Heidegger draws attention to this, not to prove that they are temporal as such, but to show the way

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> When speaking of experience, Kant goes beyond brute sense perception as discussed by the empiricist tradition. Beck (1978) articulates this concept by distinguishing between L-Experience and K-Experience—in other words, experience in the Lockean sense of passive sense data imposed upon the soul and the full Kantian sense. While Kant sometimes talks about experience in the "L" sense, i.e. raw sense data or impressions, his real interest is in accounting for the origin of "K" experience: experience in its full, ordered unity that has *a priori* conditions that order it and regulate it.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> There is an error in the Kemp Smith translation of the first *Critique* that has been repeated in Sadler's translation of GA31, since, for good reasons, he has defaulted to the classic translation of the Kant text, rather than re-translating it himself. The error is from A177/B219, with the German reading, '*Die drei Modi der Zeit sind* Beharrlichkeit, Folge *und* Zugleichsein'. The Kemp Smith reads, 'The three modes of time are *duration*, *succession*, and *coexistence*.' But, as Kemp Smith usually translates it, *Beharrlichkeit* should be rendered 'permanence'. Where I have had to replace the word, I will signal this with square brackets.

in which Kant's specific way of thinking about time determines the way in which he thinks the implementation of these categories, including the idea of causation as succession.

Having provided an introduction to the task of the Analogies of Experience, I can begin to interpret Heidegger's critique of them, which I am advocating to be a repetition of Bergson's critique in *Time and Free Will*. Heidegger begins with the Analogies, rather than the Third Antinomy itself, because the Second Antinomy provides Kant's concept of causal determinism. Without understanding this concept, it is not possible to understand how the problem of freedom as captured in the Third Antinomy even arises.

Heidegger's aim in his critique of Kant's Analogies is to show how Kant's concept of time determines the way in which he interprets the phenomena in question. Most important to the question of freedom is between causality and temporality in §16, which Heidegger most helpfully addresses when he raises questions about Kant's interpretation of causation as temporal succession:

The law of causality yields a *fundamental principle of temporal succession*. Causality is itself related to *temporal succession*. How does causality come into a relationship with temporal succession? What does temporal succession mean? A cause is always the cause of an effect. That which is brought about we also call the *outcome*. An outcome is something that follows on from something else. So to bring about [sic], to effect, means to let-follow, and thus is itself prior. The cause-effect relation thus involves priority and outcome: the following-on of one thing from another, succession, which Kant conceives as temporal succession. [GA31 149/107-108]

In this passage, Heidegger shows the temporal content of the idea of causation. Causation is already a determination of time involving priority and outcome, which Kant interprets as temporal succession. Heidegger goes onto clarify that temporal succession itself means 'literally' that 'one time follows-on from another time', but that Kant 'does not mean a sequence of times belonging to time itself, but the succession of that which is in time'. [GA31 150/108] Kant, therefore, understands causation as the succession of things within time. In later section, Heidegger translates Kant's concept into more phenomenological language: 'This relation is temporal in the sense that *causality (as causation)* [Kausalität als Ursachesein] *means: running ahead in time as determining letting follow on*' [GA31 188/132]. Causality is therefore a temporal determination of what happens in experience such that it is conceived as a present following on from a past.

Further, Heidegger raises questions about this temporal determination because Kant's concept of time privileges the present to the point of ignoring the past and future entirely. In §17, he points out that succession is one of three modes of time identified by Kant: permanence, succession and simultaneity, referring to Kant's statement about this at the beginning of the First Analogy (A177/B219). But, these three modes are not the three modes we usually expect, i.e. the past, present and the future, they are three modes of the present. In other words, past and future do not appear here because it is only the present that matters to Kant. It is for this reason that Heidegger begins with the First Analogy, even though the Second Analogy, with its discussion of causality, is more obviously relevant to a discussion of freedom. Heidegger claims, however, that to do so 'is really unavoidable, for the First Analogy, in a certain sense, provides the foundation [*das Fundament*] for the others.' [GA31 165/117]

The First Analogy 'provides the foundation for the others' because it establishes the view of all change as contained in the permanence of the present. The First Analogy rules out the possibility of the future and the past having any being at all. Heidegger raises several questions to call Kant's decision use these three concepts belonging to the present as the modes of time into question:

Kant calls temporal succession *a mode* of time, and indeed *one* mode among others. "The three modes of time are [permanence], succession, and simultaneity." *What is a mode of time* and how do these modes relate to one another? Are they at the same level or does one have priority? What kind of modalization of time is involved here? Why just these *three* modes? The three modes of time are seemingly different to the three parts of time generally recognized, i.e. present, past and future. What kind of temporal characteristics are these latter, and how do they relate to the so-called modes of time (to which temporal succession belongs, and in relation to which is causality conceived)? [GA31 150-151/108]

Since the Analogies are all modes of the present, the First is the archetypal Analogy, principles which, in Heidegger's words, Kant's Analogies of Experience are transcendental principles that regulate possible experience, conditioning how appearances relate to each other. As Heidegger puts it, the 'Analogies are a specific set of principles relating to the "the existence of appearances", i.e. the being-present of beings, "nature" as accessible to us.' [GA31 148/107] The Analogies are attempts to show how the being-present of beings is regulated and made possible, and are as such bound to the present. The First Analogy 'lays the foundation' by attempting to prove that all change is really modification of what is permanently present.

Ultimately, Kant argues that the First Analogy makes all genuine change, creation and destruction inconceivable. Nothing new will be created, nothing old will diminish. Everything that can be already is, has always been, and will always continue to be. Kant presents us with an ontology of absolute presence in the present. It privileges, like all concepts of substance, the temporal mode of the present and argues against all possibility of change. Heidegger chooses to begin with the First Analogy, not out of textual fidelity or as a mere curiosity, but because this determination of time as presence allows us to see that the Second Analogy, despite attempting to describe how succession comes about, presupposes a picture of reality in which nothing can come about at all, since all generation,

destruction and change have been relegated to the mere alteration of an underlying

substance. The 'specific characteristics' of the Second Analogy that can 'come to light' only

through an examination of the First can be summed up as its attitude towards time.

To go into more detail of the First Analogy, Kant phrases the First Analogy as follows in the first and second editions respectively:

[A:] All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination that is, as a way in which the object exists. (Kant, 2007:A182)

[B:] In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished. (B224)

In both formulations, we can see an opposition between permanence and transience, between that which is fully and permanently given in the present, and that which is only sometimes and perhaps never given. In the A formulation, with which Heidegger deals exclusively, we are told that the transitory is just a determination of a permanent object. In other words, a mode of something underlying, rather than an entity in its own right. The second edition is more clearly phrased in the terms of a traditional philosophy of substance, but drops the specifically Kantian content of the problem: the claim that permanence is present in experience. Both, however, claim that the transitory is a mere determination of an underlying permanence (substance). Kant puts this more clearly in the following paragraph,

In all appearances the permanent is the object itself, that is, substance as phenomenon; everything, on the other hand, which changes or can change belongs only to the way in which substance or substances exists, and therefore to their determinations. (Kant, 2007: A183-4/B227)

As well as interpreting change from one thing to another as mere alteration, Kant goes on to say that generation and destruction, or coming to be and ceasing to be, are also alterations of substance:

Coming to be [*Entstehen*] and ceasing to be [*Vergehen*] are not alterations of that which comes to be or ceases to be. Alteration is a way of existing which follows upon another way of existing of the same object. All that alters persists, and only its state changes. Since this change thus concerns only the determinations, which can cease to be or begin to be, we can say, using what may seem a somewhat paradoxical expression, that only the permanent (substance) is altered, and that the transitory suffers no alteration but only a change, inasmuch as certain determinations cease to be and others begin to be. (Kant, 2007: A187/B230-1)

Already, any real concept of freedom has been precluded, since freedom is, by Kant's

causal definition, the unprecedented: the ability to cause without being caused, 'the power of beginning a state spontaneously' (A533/B561). This is confirmed in the Second Analogy,

which attempts to establish that everything that happens is the effect of some cause.<sup>32</sup> It

does this by building upon the claim of the First Analogy that the occurrence of change in

time is only possible upon the basis of something permanent underlying all transience.

Occurrences, which is to say events of change, creation, and destruction, are only the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Bayne (2004) points to a question in Kant scholarship of the meaning of the causal principle. He distinguishes between two interpretations: "every effect has some cause" (EESC) and "same cause, same effect" (SCSE). These two doctrines could be described as an occasional doctrine (SCSE) and general doctrine (EESC) of necessary connection: is Kant arguing that the principle of causation proves that each particular effect is brought about by some particular cause, or the broader claim that if there is an effect it has a cause, but that cause itself is not determinable *a priori*. The reason this is raised as an issue in Kant literature is within the desire to assess whether the argument successfully demonstrates its conclusion. However, as I said at the beginning, I have no intention of validating Kant's philosophy or of validating Heidegger's interpretation of it. My interest is in showing what Heidegger takes Kant's general intentions to be, viz. the interpretation of causation as a mode of time. My thesis and Heidegger's are neutral with respect to the specific interpretation of causality that Kant is using. Bayne's monograph, however, does provide a thorough assessment of the arguments on this question in particular and Kant's causality in general.

modification or *alteration* of a substance that remains permanently underlying these epiphenomena. There is no absolute change, creation, or destruction. This means that every occurrence, everything that takes place, must be understood as "alteration".

When Kant, in the Second Analogy, turns to causality, he is attempting to further explain the nature of this alteration in terms of temporal succession. The link between the First and Second Analogy is most visible in the formulation of the rule in the B edition. As Heidegger points out, there 'Kant takes up the concept discussed at the end of the proof of the First Analogy' [GA31 175/123]:

All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect. (Kant, 2007:B232)

He will claim that all alteration, every event given in perception, is a causally determined succession. Heidegger puts this claim in the following way:

The given always somehow announces itself as *following on* from something. What follows on can only show itself as such if the perception of the directly encountered object already looks back upon what went before, upon that which can be followed on *from*. What we encounter in perception is thus only experienceable as an event if it is already represented according to a rule referring back to something that conditions it, i.e. to something from which the event necessarily follows. [GA31 177/125]

So, Heidegger takes Kant to be showing that alteration is always causally successive.

Every alteration must happen in such a way that it follows on from something prior to it.

This is corroborated by the way that Kant phrases the principle of the First Analogy in the

first edition of the Critique:

Everything happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule. (Kant, 2007:A189)

As Heidegger points out himself, this formulation of the principle makes it 'clear that

the problem is about relating an encountered event back to something determining.' [GA31

174-175/123] Every event can always be traced back to a previous event that is its cause.

This is more than a typical statement of the law of causality, however, as it is interpreted

in terms of temporal succession rather than logical dependence.<sup>33</sup> Heidegger is strongly

emphasising the 'back' in his phrase 'can always be traced back'. As he goes on to say,

[Causality] is a relation which does not just occur in time, but which *is determined in its relational character as a temporal relation,* as a mode of being-in-time. 'Succession' is a relation which represents in advance, and as such makes possible the experience of intra-temporal occurrences [GA31 188/131]

Kant's proof relies on the "temporal irreversibility" of succession, that effect follows

from cause and not cause from effect. Kant argues this through the image of a ship sailing

down a river:

[...] in an appearance which contains a happening (the preceding state of the perception we may entitle A, and the succeeding B) B can be apprehended only as following upon A; the perception A cannot follow upon B but only precede it. For instance, I see a ship move downstream. My perception of its lower position follows upon the perception of its position higher up in the stream, and it is impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance ship should first be perceived lower down in the stream and afterwards higher up. The order in which the perceptions succeed one another in apprehension is in this instance determined, and to this order apprehension is bound down. (Kant, 2007:A192/B237)

We see that the ship is moving from A to B. In the language of the First Analogy, this

constitutes an alteration of underlying substance. But, bringing in the Second Analogy, Kant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> As Heidegger says on this point, 'What is decisive in this case is likewise a relation, conceived by Kant as a fundamental relation, which belongs to the nature of understanding as expressed as the logical relation of ground and consequence. Just as a consequence necessarily implies a ground, so what occurs later in temporal succession is a causal consequence of what occurs earlier. However, *the principles of causality cannot be logically derived from the logical principle of ground*. Instead, its necessity is grounded in the fact that it is a *necessary element of the whole that makes experience as such possible*. This experience is neither just logical determination of objects, nor just the apprehension of representations as subjective occurrences in time, but is a specific unity of temporally guided perception and thought which determines what is perceived.' [GA31 187/131]

is seeking to demonstrate that this alteration is a temporal succession on the grounds that its appearance is irreversible. The occurrence of the ship sailing downstream is temporally ordered in an order that is irreversible. As Heidegger puts it, 'the perception of events, the succession of apprehensions is not arbitrary but fixed [*nicht beliebig, also gebunden*].' [GA31 185/130] As Kant says, it is impossible to say that the ship went from B to A in this instance. The event of the ship being downstream is made possible only by its previously being upstream and travelling in that direction.

To pry out Kant's specific point, it might be helpful to dwell for a moment on what he is definitely *not* saying. He is not advocating a mechanical determinism or a fatalism whereby it is *a priori* necessary that the ship was sailing downstream rather than upstream, that the helmsman was prevented via natural or psychological forces from turning the ship around, or that he could have chosen to do otherwise at the beginning of the chain of events. Kant's interest, rather, is in the idea that whatever happened had to happen successively. Upstream, downstream, or anchored, the ship's movement had to occur in a manner of following on from what was past:

While I can think of something which comes later without attending to its character as later-than, I cannot conceive it precisely *as later* except by reference to what preceded it. The earlier time necessarily determines the subsequent time. The subsequent time *cannot be* without the earlier time. But does the reverse apply? [Not at all.] *Time is an irreversible succession, i.e. it has a definite direction*. So if an intra-temporal occurrence is to be determined in experience, this determination must hold to the direction of succession. [GA31 186/130]

This is important for Heidegger's temporal interpretation of the analogies: Kant's thesis is that time is an irreversible succession, i.e. it has a definite direction. Kant's concept of causation is not about logical dependence, association of ideas, or empirical-mechanical chains of cause and effect. It is about the nature of time as the alteration of an underlying, permanent substance (First Analogy) happening successively as a sequence of events

(Second Analogy). Now, it might be argued that all versions of the law of causality must imply temporal succession, since all events time, and therefore that to emphasise the temporal moment in Kant's argument is to state the obvious. But, this goes against a point that Kant makes explicitly himself: that causes can be simultaneous:

Now we must not fail to note that it is the *order* of time, not the *lapse* of time, with which we have to reckon; the relation remains even if no time has elapsed. [...] If I view as a cause a ball which impresses a hollow as it lies on a stuffed cushion, the cause is simultaneous with the effect. But I still distinguish the two through the time-relation of their dynamical connection. For if I lay the ball on the cushion, a hollow follows upon the previous flat smooth shape but if (for any reason) there previously exists a hollow in the cushion, a leaden ball does not follow upon it. (Kant, 2007: A203/B248-9)

This claim may seem odd, however. If causality is succession, how can it be simultaneous? Because permanence and succession are both modes of the present. Heidegger puts this by saying, 'what Kant intends is perception of the ship sailing down the river, i.e. of the ship in its movement [...] What is perceived is the occurrence in its being-present [*Vorhandensein*]' [GA31 184/129-130]. Succession does not mean 'duration', whether in the classical or the Bergsonian senses.<sup>34</sup> It occurs in the present. Emphasising the temporal nature of Kant's concept of causality along with Heidegger makes clearer why Kant is so concerned to make the point about apparent irrelevance of duration in a temporal concept of causality, i.e. that time is not essentially something that endures. Kant is not interested in the 'lapse of time' but the 'order of time', and this distinction is only

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> As Heidegger puts it, 'we must always bear in mind that [Kant's concept of succession] pertains not to (indeterminate) perceptions as such but specifically to the perception of events, *present* occurrences.' [GA31 183/129]. In emphasising this distinction, Heidegger (intentionally or not) separates the Kantian concept of succession from Bergson's account of duration, which is precisely the facts of consciousness as indeterminate perceptions flowing in a heterogeneous multiplicity. Kant's concept of succession is the opposite of this (or rather, Bergson's concept is its opposite). Events are successive occurrences of in the present, conceived of as precisely the sort of frozen, spatial "now" that Bergson identifies with space.

meaningful if he has already limited the concept of time to presence. The aim of the Analogies is to establish this point, that all change, creation, destruction, and movement are modifications of the present. So, while *succession* is raised as the explanation of causation, we should not be surprised if there is no *duration*. Duration, or the 'lapse of time', is of no philosophical interest, since only the 'now' truly exists. Heidegger emphasises this frozen concept of time in his closing remarks on the Second Analogy:

[The causal relation] is temporal in the sense that *causality (as causation)* [Kausalität als Ursachesein] *means running ahead in time as determining letting follow on* such that what runs ahead is itself and event that refers back to something earlier that determines it. As such, a relation, causality necessarily involves the temporal character as this going before. Whatever follows depends on something which *was*. Nothing ever follows on from something which absolutely was *not*. An occurrence is not 'an original act'. However, we saw that this determination of essence is reached through *a determination of the inner possibility (essence) of experience as the finite human knowledge of that which is present in the contexture of being-present*. [GA31 188/131-132]

Kant has to say nothing ever follows on from something that was not, and everything follows on from something that was, because he conceives of the present as the successive alteration of a permanent substance. Causation for Kant *is* temporal, but only within the context of an interpretation of experience as exclusively about the present, more specifically the permanently present. That is why Kant's three modes of time are all modes of the present and not the three "dimensions" of past, present and future. Only the present is ontologically significant because only the present *is*, as the permanent underlying substance. In its purest conception, time has no duration or lapse, only an ordered succession of alteration.

In such an ontology, the past and future are by necessity no longer and possible alterations of a static present. Causal determination is, therefore, not simply an extension of the principle of sufficient reason, but a consequence of the belief that nothing new can become, because everything is already present in the present. Just as Bergson identifies the ossifying, spatial thinking involved in libertarianism and determinism, Heidegger is interpreting the doctrine of causality as the basis of transcendental freedom *and* determinism in the Third Antinomy. But, this specific concept of causality is part of a concept of time, and more specifically it is a mode of presence. For this reason, Heidegger begins with the Second Analogy, which provides the concept of permanence on which Kant's concept of succession (causation) is based. In such an ontology, therefore, it is difficult to see where the room is for what Arendt calls 'an organ of the future, and identical with the power of beginning something new' (1978:II.29), the will.

And so, the First and Second Analogies both already seem to preclude freedom. Kant conceives of freedom as an uncaused cause. It is an action that is not determined by any previous event in time, a violation of the causal principle argued for in the Second Analogy. Furthermore, since 'Freedom', as Heidegger interprets Kant, 'is the *power of the self-origination of a state*' [GA31 22/16], it also violates the First Analogy, which argues that all origination in experience is only the alteration of a substance; genuine coming to be is impossible.

Thus, when Kant explicitly deals with freedom as a problem, it is a concern regarding causality. The place where he does this *Critique of Pure Reason* is called the Third Antinomy. The Antinomies are a section of the first *Critique* in which Kant discusses several often debated and apparently irresolvable dilemmas in philosophy. The Third Antinomy in particular deals with the possibility of freedom. The literary structure of these sections

consists of two equally strong contrary arguments written side by side: a thesis and an antithesis. In the Third Antinomy, initial statements of these arguments are as follows:

Thesis [pro freedom]

Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom. (Kant, 2007:A444/B472)

Antithesis [contra freedom]

There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature. (Kant, 2007: 445/473)

These two sides to the antinomy are contradictory, but seem to have equally convincing reasons for being true. Against freedom, as we already saw in the discussion of the analogies, Kant takes it to be impossible for anything to come into existence *ex nihilo* and that this further means that everything that comes to be must have a cause. Freedom is a cause that has no cause. But having a cause is a principle of any possible experience. It is an *a priori* necessary condition of any possible experience. Therefore, it is *a priori* impossible for an uncaused cause to come into being because there is no cause. As Kant phrases it,

[...] But every beginning of action presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause; and a [...] beginning of the action, if it is also a first beginning, presupposes a state which has no *causal* connection with the preceding state of the cause, that is to say, in nowise follows from it. Transcendental freedom thus stands opposed to the law of causality; and the kind of connection which it assumes as holding between the successive state of the active causes renders all unity of experience impossible. (Kant, 2007: A446-7/B474-5)

So, freedom is absolutely contrary to natural law. As Heidegger puts it, 'as an absolute beginning, freedom demolishes the law of the determination of occurrences.' [GA31 222/153] If it were possible to experience freedom, this would prove the natural law

incorrect. If the natural law is incorrect, then, since Kant has shown it is a necessary condition of experience, experience would be impossible. As experience *is* possible, we have to assume that freedom is impossible. And, in no way could anything like freedom exist in experience because it would have to conform with natural law and, 'If freedom were determined in accordance with laws, it would not be freedom; it would simply be nature under another name.' (A447/B475)

In spite of the rationality of the claim that freedom is incompatible with the principle of causality, there also seem to be convincing reasons for saying that there *must* be freedom in order to avoid absurdities.

Let us assume that there is no other causality than that in accordance with laws of nature. This being so, everything which *takes place* presupposes a preceding state upon which it inevitably follows according to a rule. But the preceding state must itself be something which has taken place (having come to be in a time in which it previously was not); [...] [There will therefore] always be only a relative and never a first beginning, and consequently no completeness of the series on the side of the causes that arise from the one from the other. But the law of nature is just this, that nothing takes place without a cause *sufficiently* determined *a priori*. The proposition [...] is therefore self-contradictory; and this cannot, therefore, be regarded as the sole kind of causality (Kant, 2007:A446/B474)

So, the law of causality says that every event must have a cause that determines it as

it is. But, if this is true, then there cannot be a cause to start off the series, because it would violate the law. But, the law also *demands* that there be a cause of the series, but no caused cause can satisfy this demand. As such, there is an inner contradiction in the principle of causality and we must suppose that free uncaused causality exists.

We must recognise that Kant takes the pro-freedom thesis to be just as convincing as

the anti-freedom antithesis. Heidegger warns us that 'it is vitally important to see that the

Thesis and its proof are in accord with the principle of reason and do not involve anything

forced or artificial.' [GA31 221/152] Kant is not playing devil's advocate as we, who are too ready to believe that there is no freedom and that the world is totally determined by causality, might expect. Both thesis and antithesis are equally valid and rational. As Heidegger puts it, 'Thesis and Antithesis are equally necessary, equally true, and equally provable. Their antagonism is a dissension within reason itself, a dissension which cannot be simply torn out of human nature and abolished.' [G23 223/153]

The question of freedom, therefore, arises out of a contradiction in reason itself, which has good grounds for believing in either answer. Interestingly, unlike with modern treatments, if Kant has a vested interest in one side of the argument, it is the side that proves freedom. As Heidegger points out, Kant is both concerned to demonstrate freedom as 'the condition of the possibility of responsibility and thus of morality', which carries clear ethical and political motivations for deciding its favour, and also speculative interest, in that only uncaused causation can provide 'a satisfying answer' to the question of the origin of 'the totality of what is present' [GA31 224/154]. If an uncaused cause is not possible, we can in fact never have a rationally satisfying explanation of events as we see them. Leaving aside the question of human agency, ruling out uncaused causation leads us down an infinite regress if we ever attempt to ask the cause of the current arrangement of bodies in the universe.

The problem of freedom in Kant does not just contain the egoistic question of whether or not I am responsible for my actions, but the possibility of metaphysics as such. Freedom is, on the one hand, absolutely necessary for a rationally satisfying explanation of what is, even if there is no human freedom. On the other, it upends rational determination. It conflicts the fundamental principles that govern how Kant has determined the nature of experience. Everything is at stake for the philosopher in that, not just human agency, but our ability to have metaphysical knowledge itself is in question.

So, the Third Antinomy introduces the problem of the possibility of freedom as Kant defines it, a form of causation that is itself not caused. But, this is not simply a problem of freedom, but one of the possibility of any knowledge of nature. The idea of causation out of nothing is simultaneously the pre-condition of the principle of causation (thesis) and a violation of that principle (antithesis). All change happens in the form of temporal succession, but Kant has defined temporal succession to mean alteration of pre-existent substance. A temporal succession that is unprecedented, a genuine temporal origination, seems to be impossible. Causation *ex nihilo*, or more simply put, the possibility of generation or anything new happening seems both to be a condition of possibility of nature and a refutation of any concept of nature we could have.

Emphasising the temporal nature of Kant's concept of causality allows Heidegger to elaborate the two statements of the Second Analogy found in both editions, neither of which emphasise the idea of time,<sup>35</sup> with the statement, 'The earlier time necessarily determines the subsequent time. The subsequent time *cannot be* without the earlier time.' [GA31 186/130] Causal determination means that the past brings about the present, and every present *must* have its past. In arguing that everything that happens can only be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> 'Everything happens, that is, begins to be, presupposes something upon which it follows according to a rule.' (Kant, 2007:A189) 'All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect.' (Kant, 2007:B232)

alteration of an absolutely present substance, Kant cannot allow for anything new to happen.

I argue that, by interpreting Kant's concept of causation as being reliant on the idea of experience as 'that which is *present* in the contexture of being-*present* [My emphasis]', i.e. as in the present alone and not the past or future, Heidegger repeats, within his own philosophical framework, Bergson's own attack on Kant in *Time and Free Will*: that 'Kant's great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium' (Bergson, 2001:232). Kant errs by remaining within the context of the purely present, that which Bergson calls space. To develop this further, I will in this section demonstrate the parity between Bergson's critique of determinism and libertarianism and Heidegger's critique of Kant's discussion of freedom in its three moments: 1) that the concept of freedom misapplies concepts based in a failure to think time; 2) that the question of the freedom of the will arises because of this faulty time concept; and 3) that the solution accepted to this problem maintains the faulty time concept.

## 1.4 – Freedom and Temporal Determinations of Being

So far in this chapter, I have presented Bergson's criticism of both libertarianism and determinism and Heidegger's criticism of the same as they appear within Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Both thinkers attempt to identify a common denominator in both positions. For Bergson, it is a concept of time that does not endure. He argues that both libertarianism and determinism presume that human action can be cut up into discreet moments and presented as simultaneous without losing something of their nature. I certainly can rationally distinguish between my desires, my decisions, and my performance of an act, but

in the reality of their experience, they are all part of one, enduring event. Only by ridding a temporal act of its temporality could one make a distinction between these moments.

Heidegger also criticises the temporality involved in the pictures of libertarianism and determinism, as found in Kant. Kant argues that causation is a transcendental condition of any event being experienceable. For something to exist in nature, it must happen in a temporally successive way, a succession Kant interprets as causal. This temporal succession is, as argued in the First Analogy, a rule determining how events take place as the alteration of a static substance. This means that every temporal succession is a succession in which no being is created or destroyed but is constantly conserved. Heidegger emphasises that this concept of succession is entirely determined by the temporal mode of the present. And, when it comes to freedom, what causes the Third Antinomy is the definition of freedom as a type of causality, i.e. a temporal succession, that has no cause. Because freedom is a modified concept of natural causality, understood as a non-originary succession, neither freedom nor determinism seem possible. Kant does eventually resolve the antinomy with an argument I will discuss in Chapter 4. But, in such a way that preserves the concepts of causality and freedom. Kant sees the failure to resolve the problem of the freedom of the will as a failure to subscribe to Transcendental Idealism, 'the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting upon the reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom.' (A537/B565) So, for Kant, the problem is ontological in the classical sense. By counting appearances as beings instead of appearances of beings, one presumes the rules that apply to them as having being themselves, rather than being transcendental conditions of experience found in the mind. I will return to this in Chapter 4.

Both Bergson and Heidegger dismiss libertarianism and determinism, rather than attempting to defend one of the positions or offering a synthesis (compatibilism). Both argue that time has something to do with how freedom and causality are being misinterpreted. And both find this problem in the failure to think time as more than presence, a failure that prevents philosophy from doing justice to the phenomenon. As Massey puts it, 'Heidegger and Bergson are united in not only challenging the way philosophers have traditionally thought about time, but also indicating new directions for philosophy by thinking through time.' (2015:3) By rethinking time, the phenomenon of freedom itself can be reinvented.

To emphasise the problematic relationship between time and freedom, I will draw on the thesis of Felix Ó Murchadha, in his book *The Time of Revolution: Kairos and Chronos in Heidegger* (2013). Ó Murchadha argues that Heidegger's work on time can be most productively understood as an engagement with two Ancient Greek time concepts, which he describes as *'kairos'* and *'chronos'*. Chronological time is time as it is typically understood, as the measure of events that have happened. It is the continuation of order. Kairological time, however, is an opening up in which something new can arrive. It is the disruption of order. Ó Murchadha makes the further claim that kariological time is harder for thinking to retain, since it is represented through chronological time:

The relation between *chronos* and *kairos* is, nonetheless, problematic. While the occasion for the emergence of a kairological moment is to be found in the chronological – in time as continuity – the *kairos* also finds itself subsequently integrated into *chronos*. In *kairos*, there occurs a forgetting of *chronos*. Only the one who forgets *chronos* can act effectively in the *kairos*, because *kairos* suspends the authority of the existing normality.' (Ó Murchadha, 2013:16)

This distinction between the innovative disruption of the kairological and the order and continuation of the chronological is a helpful way to see the problem that Heidegger and Bergson share, although they do not explicitly use the terms, and the terms they do use differ. A central problem with what Heidegger calls the 'Aristotelian Concept of Time' and Bergson calls 'time as a homogenous medium', is that it makes the new impossible. It is order, stasis, and continuation. It does not allow the disruption of human action, as Ó Murchadha describes at the beginning of his book:

Human beings normally live and act in accordance with the self-evident assumption that the future will mark a continuation of the order with which they are familiar. However, human action itself opens up the possibility of the new; it can open up a possible future, which will be other than the past. We do not know what this future will bring. [...] This is because the time of such novel emergence is a decisive, critical time – a kairological time – in which a new order becomes possible, in which new possibilities for life, knowledge and the whole of human conduct open up, but it is also a time in which new misfortunes become possible.' (Ó Murchadha, 2013:1)

When Kant, in the First and Second Analogies, ties events down to be the successive

alteration of a substance wholly given in the present, he precludes the possibility of a

kairological moment 'in which a new order becomes possible'. Freedom is impossible in

such an image of time. Ó Murchadha mentions Bergson, alongside Kierkegaard, as a

'precursor' to this realisation,

Each of these three philosophers share a basic, fundamental thought in common: if we are to understand possibility on the basis of freedom, then it can no longer be thought of as a realm of present options which can be chosen, but rather must be thought of in terms of a future which is neither present nor preformed in the present. (Ó Murchadha, 2013:24)

Even though when Heidegger speaks of the nature and limits of Kant's concept of

freedom in the terms of causality, repeatedly pointing out that 'Kant sees freedom as the

power of a specific and distinctive causation' [GA31 28-29/20], and even though this is the

issue he raises at the end of the text, his real concern is with why, not that, Kant thinks

freedom in terms of causality.

In the penultimate section, Heidegger sums up the issue with Kant saying that he 'treats the problem of causality as such, as well as the problem of freedom as a particular kind of causality', going on to say 'Once freedom is understood as a metaphysical problem, the question is already raised as to whether freedom is a kind of causality, or whether, on the contrary, causality is a problem of freedom.' [GA31 299/205]. He then goes on, in the final section, to claim that '*Causality is grounded in freedom*. The problem of causality is a problem of freedom and not vice versa' [303/207]. But, while the fact of the problem with Kant's treatment may be expressed by speaking about causality, the way Heidegger demonstrates the explanation for it is through the concept of time, since Kant's definition of causation as ordered succession rather than, for example, logical dependence, renders it a temporal concept.

Focussing only on causality can lead to problems. For example, Sacha Golob argues that Heidegger is in the 'weak' position of claiming that 'freedom has explanatory priority since it is a condition in our understanding of causation.' He goes on to say that the 'burden of proof' here is with Heidegger to show that his offering is a stronger explanation, which *Being and Time* 'does not even attempt to do' (2014:211). However, Heidegger's claim is not that causation is less fundamental than freedom, it is that is a context of thinking about the world that has not been justified and is the result of a metaphysics that fails to ask the question of freedom first. The argument is that the question of freedom that is more fundamental than the question of causality, not that the phenomenon of freedom is more fundamental than the phenomenon of the causal chain.

To speak of freedom as a causal concept is to speak of how Kant himself sees the issue, when in fact the important issue is with the 'fundamental contexture' that Kant has uncritically accepted. Specifically, Kant thinks natural and free causation under the same concept of temporal succession. This is an argument formally identical to Bergson's in *Time* and Free Will. And, by comparing it with *Time and Free Will*, we can see that what really condemns Kant is not a concept of freedom as a type of causation, but of causation as a type of temporality: the successive alteration of the present, in which nothing new happens and nothing old ceases to be. Both thinkers argue that human action cannot be understood within the framework of the Free Will Debate, libertarian or determinism, because the *temporal determination of being* is inadequate.

Heidegger does, however, go beyond Bergson. As I have just said, both argue that there is a shared, inadequate temporal determination of being at work; that is, a shared way of thinking about being in a temporal way that fails. Bergson speaks of the vulgar concept of time as a homogenous medium, where we determine the being of human action as static, spatial and interchangeable moments. In place of this, Bergson argues for a different temporal determination of being. Instead, the being of human action is to be understood as a durational whole, the moments of which cannot be swapped out without changing their essence. Every event takes place in its own time, and its time is a part of what it is.

This is definitely a step forward, but while Heidegger does attack Kant for having an inadequate temporal determination of being, he does not provide the alternative temporal determination of being that should be used. Instead, he calls temporal determination of being into question as such, insofar as they indicate a lack in our understanding of the relationship between being and time. In the first half of *The Essence of Human Freedom*, Heidegger provides a genealogy of the causal concept of freedom, demonstrates that it

presupposes the temporal determination of being as presence, but then questions how time and being are related such that we can determine being in terms of time in the first place. I will follow this argument, and show how it points us towards the book *Being and Time* as the place to look for Heidegger's own concept of freedom.

Heidegger's argument in the first half of *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31] follows a methodological concern about whether and how we can ask a philosophical problem adequately, 'can the problem of human freedom be simply set before us and demonstrated? Or must we ourselves be led *into* the problem, in order that we subsequently remain firmly within it? We ourselves, not someone else, not some arbitrary other person!' [GA31 18/13]. In this statement, we get the first clear statement of method in GA31. In order to contribute to the philosophy of freedom, we need to be led into the problem itself by examining what related problems the question of freedom implies. Only by examining the particular nature of the problem, as it is asked by we ourselves in particular, can we make any progress.<sup>36</sup> Following on from the above-cited claim that 'Kant sees *freedom* as the *power of a specific and distinctive causation*' [GA31 28-29/20], Heidegger begins to dig deeper into what causality means, and to ask about it in a more fundamental way, '*Freedom is discussed within the perspective of causation* [...] Thus to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> In the introduction to the lecture course, in which he reflects on the nature of an 'Introduction to Philosophy', Heidegger argues that philosophy cannot be introduced through a general analysis, but must engage in particular problems, and allow philosophy to be encountered through those particular problems, 'However we twist and turn, we cannot avoid the fact that an introduction to philosophy guided by the problem of freedom takes ona specific and particular orientation. In the end, this is not an inadequacy. Even less does it require any apology, e.g. by appealing to the fragility of all human endeavour. Perhaps the *strength and strike-power* [*die* Stärke und Schlagkraft] *of philosophizing* rests precisely on this, that it *reveals the whole only in properly grasped particular problems*.' [GA31 10/14]

inquire into the essence of human freedom means to make the *essence* of causality, of causation, into a problem.' [GA31 27-28/21]

In the second half of the lecture course, where Heidegger argues that the immediate ground of Kant's concept of time is succession, but in this more general-historical mode, Heidegger argues that causation, grounded first of all in the problem of movement [*Bewegung*]:

Causation means, among other things, letting follow on, origination. It belongs in the context of that which runs ahead, relating to processes, events, occurrences, i.e. to what we call *movement in the broader sense*. [GA31 28/21]

Causation is an attempt to understand the movement of beings. Although Heidegger does not make this point explicitly, this can be seen in Kant's Second Analogy; causality is introduced to explain the ordering of the ship's movement downstream, which Kant interprets as successive alteration of an underlying substance. Movement itself, however, does not become a problem for Kant or indeed for anyone, according to Heidegger. movement as such does not become a problem for Kant. This is not unique to Kant, for Heidegger. The latter claims that no one has raised movement as a problem since Aristotle:

[...] the philosophical situation in regard to the clarification of movement is miserably inadequate. Since Aristotle, who was the first and last to grasp the *philosophical* problem, philosophy has not taken a single step forward in this area. On the contrary, it has gone backward, because the problem is in no way grasped as a problem. Here too Kant completely fails. That the problem of causality was central for him makes this all the more remarkable. It is easy to see that the problem of the essence of movement is the presupposition for even posing, not to speak of solving, the problem of causality. [GA31 30-31/22]

Kant and others fail by presupposing causation as primary without any critical evaluation of that presupposition. Causation and freedom are linked to movement, but movement is itself not raised as a problem.<sup>37</sup> In §§8-9, Heidegger discusses the concepts involved in change using terms from Aristotelian philosophy. He argues that, for Aristotle, the 'fundamental nature of movement is *metabolē*, change. This is change from... to...' [GA31 59/41]. He clarifies the specific form of change he has in mind with an example concerning a particular being, chalk:

If, for example, this piece of chalk for some reason (*genesis*) becomes red, we can take this in two ways: as a change from white-coloured to red-coloured, or as a becoming-red of the chalk. In the latter case white does not become red, but the white piece of chalk becomes a red piece of chalk [GA3159/41]

In order to explain how this becoming-red of the chalk, or the movement from, Aristotle has recourse to a 'third principle' called the *hupomenon*. This is, as Heidegger puts it, 'what *stays the same* throughout the change' [GA31 59/41-42]. This must be supposed if we are to understand how the change can take place while still maintaining that the white chalk and the red chalk are the same being. This account of change is structurally the same as the one provided in Kant's First Analogy, which I discussed in §1.3. Kant argues that all events, creations, destructions and, crucially, successions, are alterations of an underlying substance. In this context, however, the problem of being rather than time is more evident. Heidegger goes on to draw out the ontological implications of this concept of change:

[...] the chalk has a twofold *eidos*: first its being-chalk, which does not necessarily involve being-white, and secondly this being-white itself. These must be *different* if change is to be possible, namely change as a going-over to something different to and absent from the initial state [...] [GA31 59/42]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Another example of this in the tradition is David Hume, who does mention movement in relation to the will, 'I desire it may be observ'd, that by the *will*, I mean nothing but *the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or a new perception of our mind*.' (2000:257)

So, we must draw a distinction between the accidental or transient properties of an entity (the chalk's being-white) that are subject to change and the substantial properties that are not (the chalk's being-chalk). In Kant's First Analogy, the former is what is proper to appearances and the latter what is proper to substance. All change in experience is only alteration of substance, all transient being is change in permanent being. Within this context of the problem of movement, Heidegger's claim that the First Analogy 'provides the foundation for the others' [GA31 165/117] gains a more fundamental significance. Because Kant repeats the Aristotelean concept of movement without a fundamental confrontation with it, he is doomed to interpret freedom as a problem of causality and pose it as an antinomy.

However, Heidegger does not stop with movement. Freedom is contained within a problematic of causation, which is itself contained within a concept of change as an interpretation of movement. He argues that, because movement is interpreted as change in substance, i.e. change in an entity, it is contained within the philosophical question of what a being is: 'Movement, i.e. being moved or resting (as a mode of movement), emerges as a fundamental determination of that to which we attribute being [*Sein*], namely beings [*Seienden*]. [...] The problem of movement is grounded in the question concerning the essence of beings as such' [GA31 31/22]. Indeed, Aristotle says himself in the *Physics*, 'there is no motion apart from things [*pragmata*]' (2004:200b).

Movement, change, causation, and freedom all determine beings. Therefore, if we are to continue digging down into more profound contexts of problems, our next step is to, as Heidegger puts it, turn to 'the very same question from ancient times has counted as the primary and ultimate question of philosophy – the *leading question* [Leitfrage] *of philosophy*: *ti to on*, what are beings?' [GA31 31/22]. This is, naturally, home territory for Heidegger, hitting upon the project of *Being and Time* [*SZ*] itself. I will turn to how this connects to *SZ* in my next chapter. At the moment, however, it is important to see how Heidegger links this 'leading question', the question that has guided metaphysics since its inception, to a more fundamental question of freedom.

To recap, Heidegger began with the traditional question of the freedom of the will. This question, as interpreted by Kant at least, is interpreted within the concept of causality. Causality is itself an interpretation of movement, which is typically interpreted, according to Heidegger, as change occurring within a being. To go further, the question of what is meant by "being" in the first place must be asked. This will take us to an innovative sense of the question of the freedom that has nothing to do with causation or willing, but is instead the ground of such questions.

So, Heidegger has traced the origin of the problem of freedom, through the problems of causality, movement and change, to the guiding question (*Leitfrage*) of metaphysics: what are beings? On the one hand, this is the same question as is posed at the start of *Being and Time*, the *Sinnseinsfrage*, the question of the meaning of being. However, the way Heidegger poses it in GA31 is within a more explicitly historical remit. The question is not so much "what is being *as such*", but "how does the history of philosophy understand being?" Therefore, unlike in *SZ*, Heidegger is gives a fairly concrete answer to this question quite quickly: what philosophy means by being is 'constant presence [*ständige Anwesenheit*]' [GA31 52/37].

Heidegger argues that the word that Ancient Greek philosophy uses for being is *ousia*. Though this has traditionally been translated as "substance", Heidegger argues that, while it would literally translate as "beingness" (Seindheit), it should be translated as Sein and

further argues that *ousia* is a word that predates its philosophical usage:

ousia tou ontos means in translation: the beingness of being [Seiendheit des Seienden]. We say, on the other hand: the being of beings [Sein des Seienden]. 'Beingness' is a very unusual and artificial linguistic form that occurs only in the sphere of philosophical reflection. We cannot say this, however, of the corresponding Greek word. ousia is not an artificial expression which first occurs in philosophy, but belongs to the everyday language and speech of the Greeks. Philosophy took up the word from its pre-philosophical usage. [GA31 50/35-36]

So, rather than being a word that was invented by a philosopher, such as Aristotle's

entelecheia, ousia is a word that comes out of Ancient Greek everyday understanding. Since

it comes out of the everyday understanding of the Greeks, this means that its ordinary

usage is likely to have informed its philosophical usage, as indeed Heidegger will attempt

to prove. Heidegger explains the pre-philosophical usage of the term as follows:

We see soon: in everyday use of language there exists no sharp distinction between 'beings' and 'being'; being [*Sein*] often means a being [*das Seiende*]. So also in Greek. *ousia* means beings. To be sure, not just any beings, but such as are, in a certain way, *exemplary in their being*, namely the beings that belong to one, one's possessions, house and home, the beings over which one has disposal. These beings stand at one's disposal because they are fixed and stable, because they are *constantly attainable and at hand* in the immediate and proximate environment. [GA31 51/36]<sup>38</sup>

So, in everyday Greek discourse, the word philosophers would use to speak about what

we call being (ousia) was not a word that could ordinarily be applied to any old thing.

Rather, it was only applied to those things that were most reliably available to them, or

most typically present. These were one's house and home, one's property:

In fact, by *ousia* nothing else is meant but *constant presence* [*ständige Anwesenheit*], and just this is what is understood by beingness [*Seinheit*]. By being [*Sein*] we mean nothing else but constant presence, enduring constancy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Translation modified.

What the Greeks address as beings proper is what fulfils this understanding of being: constant presence, what always is at hand [*vorhanden*]. [GA31 52/37]<sup>39</sup>

So, Heidegger wishes to argue that *ousia*, whether it is used to mean estate in ordinary language or being in philosophical language, is understood as that which is most readily available and present, which is to say that which is present *constantly* at all times. Heidegger goes further than discussing etymology, however, by returning to the topic of Aristotle's concept of change as an interpretation of the motion of beings.

Aristotle, says Heidegger, understands motion as change. Further, change is understood with reference to something that does not change but remains (*hupomenon*). This is already a sign of the Greek understanding of being creeping into Aristotle's analysis, since the alterations of a being are interpreted with reference to something constantly present (*ousia*). Indeed, if being is constant presence then the being of a being, in the proper sense, cannot change because to change is for one thing to become absent and another to present itself in its place. Or, in Kant's terminology, it is for one thing to be destroyed and another to come to be. As Heidegger puts this, in referencing Aristotle, 'it suffices for the possibility of change that one thing displaces another, i.e. that change is brought about simply by *apousia* (absence) or *parousia* (presence) [GA31 60/42].' If change involves moving from presence to absence, then something constantly present cannot change because to do so would be to lose its being and cease to exist. This is because ceasing to exist is merely to become absent. From this, Heidegger draws the following conclusion:

> Change in colour, for example, is conceived as the *disappearance* of one colour and the *appearance* of another. In the case of processes, i.e. of what we call 'becoming' in the narrower sense—a white piece of chalk becoming a red piece of chalk—there is something which underlies this change: *hupo*, something

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Translation modified.

remains: menon. The interpretation of the essence of movement proceeds through determinations of remaining and not-remaining, of remaining present and remaining absent. [GA31 61/43]

So, when Aristotle and Kant come to interpret philosophically the meaning of motion, change and becoming, they do so through the concepts of absence and presence, although this is clearer in the language used by Aristotle than Kant. Yet, the point of the First Analogy is still that substance is permanently present in appearances: 'All appearances contain the permanent (substance) as the object itself, and the transitory as its mere determination that is, as a way in which the object exists' (Kant, 2007: A182/B224).

So, Heidegger has provided an interpretation of the meaning of being in philosophy, which is *ousia* in Aristotle, *Dasein* in Kant, and *Vorhandensein* in Heidegger, as truly meaning 'constant presence'. This is provided as part of a genealogy of the concept of freedom as traditionally understood as a form of causality, which is an interpretation of movement via the concept of change. What "move" in freedom are beings, which lead us to the question of how being is being interpreted. Being is interpreted as constant presence, leading us to the question of what more-basic problem is at work in this determination. Heidegger goes on to argue, as he does in *Being and Time*, that it is time that is 'the horizon' for the understanding of the meaning of being:

If being stands in the illumination of constancy and presence, what light is the source of this illumination? Presence is a character of *time*. And 'constant'? Constancy means endurance, always enduring in every now. The now is likewise a determination of time. Constant presence therefore means the whole present, the now, that which is now, constantly in every now. [...] Within the illumination which allows being to be understood as constant presence, the light which expends this illumination is *time* itself. Being, whether in ordinary understanding or in the explicit ontological problematics of philosophy, is *understood in the light of time*. [GA31 114-5/81]

So, as constant presence is a determination through time, time itself is the horizon that is providing understanding to being. Being is understood in terms of time. Or, to use the language of *Being and Time*, time is the transcendental horizon for the question of being. In the same way that freedom is nested in causality, and causality in movement, being is nested in time as that which makes it encounterable and understandable. As such, this relationship between time and being must be investigated in order to proceed in the investigation.

The leading question—what are beings?—must itself be transformed into the fundamental question [*Grundfrage*], i.e. into the question which inquires into the 'and' of being and time and thus into the ground *of both*. This fundamental question is: *what is the essence of time, such that it grounds being, and such that the question of being as the leading question of metaphysics can and must be unfolded within this horizon*? [GA31 116/82]

So, the fundamental question of philosophy, the *Grundfrage*, is the question of the relationship between being and time. As Heidegger emphasises in the above passage, the "and" here is key. The question is not asking after being or time individually, but about their relationship. However, in order to perform this task, Heidegger must investigate time itself. Naturally, the discussion he provides in *The Essence of Human Freedom* is nothing near the detail of his discussion in *Being and Time*. But, what he does do is emphasise a claim that he made in that book. Time is something belonging to the human:

Soul, spirit, the *human* subject, are the loci of time. If we inquire into the essence of time we must inquire into the essence of the human being. The fundamental question concerning being and time forces us into the question concerning the human being. [GA31 121/85]

As time is something belonging to the human, the human must be investigated. This is

confirmation, if Heidegger's insistence on this point in Being and Time were not enough,

that the task of an existential analytic of Dasein is not an end in itself but fits within a wider

project investigating the relationship between time and being. Proceeding with his method of attempting to dig into deeper and more fundamental problems, the human is then said to be grounded in its understanding of being:

Not only does the understanding of being pervade all comportments to beings, in the sense that it is present everywhere, but it is the *condition of the possibility of any comportment to any beings whatsoever*. [...] [Without it] *Man would be impossible in his essence. Accordingly, the understanding of being is the ground of the possibility of the essence of man.* [GA31 125/89]

So, the human is grounded in its understanding of being. The understanding of being is what makes the human a possibility. However, Heidegger has here shifted direction. It is not the case that Heidegger takes time to be grounded in the human and the understanding of being. Instead, time must be understood 'as the *ground of the possibility of the understanding of being*, i.e. *as the ground of the possibility of the ground of the essence of man.*' [GA31 121/88] This displacement is important, because it means already that the human is not the most fundamental thing but, as grounded in the understanding of being, it is in fact grounded in the relationship. He does not make this point in full in the lecture course, but it seems that the human is to be understood as only one among many possibilities of Dasein.

The final stage of this genealogy is argued for both in §14 of the lecture course and in its conclusion, as Heidegger feels it necessary to go through the reading of Kant before establishing it. However, it can be put as follows. The relationship between being and time, the understanding of being, is grounded in freedom:

[...] the essence of freedom only comes into view if we seek it as the ground of the possibility of Dasein, as something prior even to being and time. With respect to the scheme, we must effect a complete repositioning of freedom, so that what now emerges is that the problem of freedom is not built into the leading and

fundamental problems of philosophy, but, on the contrary, the leading question of metaphysics is grounded in the question concerning the essence of freedom. [GA31 134/94]

It is with this startling claim that we finally come to Heidegger's "esoteric" understanding of freedom. Rather than being the psychological freedom of a human, or even the cosmological freedom as espoused by Kant, freedom is here presented, at the end of a genealogy that grounds problems in more fundamental and basic problems, as *the* most basic problem. Freedom is the ground of Dasein, of being and time, of any encounter with being at all and of all the other problems of philosophy. In the conclusion of the lecture course, Heidegger gives some further clarification as to how freedom is to be understood as the ground of the understanding of being:

[...] the understanding of being, has the character of letting-stand-over-against. Letting something stand-over-against as something given, basically the manifestness of beings in the binding character of their so- and that-being, is only possible where the comportment to beings, whether in theoretical or practical knowledge, already acknowledges this binding character. But the latter amounts to an originary self-binding, or, in Kantian terms, the giving of a law unto oneself. The letting-be-encountered of beings, comportment to beings in each and every mode of manifestness, is only possible where freedom *exists*. *Freedom is the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being*. [GA31/ 207]

Any encounter with beings presupposes that the possibility of encountering them has been allowed to be possible. This allowing to be encountered is an act of freedom. Therefore, freedom is required for any encounter or understanding of being. Freedom, then, is not a worry about the possibility of an uncaused cause. It is instead what makes possible all possibility. Freedom is here understood in a way close to sentience. It is not a question of a will and its obstacles but of being able to encounter being understandingly. Freedom is, truly, ground, since without it nothing else could be. Further, as Heidegger argues in *Vom Wesen des Grundes,* 'this understanding of being first makes possible the "why" [G9 65/130].

In this section, I began by drawing out the role of time in Bergson and Heidegger's critiques of the Free Will Debate. Both argue that libertarians and determinists both subscribe to a concept of time that renders freedom impossible insofar as it only accepts what is presently present as being worthy of enquiry. If time is only considered in its present moment, then the future is necessarily only a continuation of that present, and all creation and destruction and willing can only be thought as a continuation or, in Kant's language, succession of this present, altering.

And so, both Heidegger and Bergson claim that the temporal determination of being involved in the concept of a causally determined will or even a causally free will is inadequate. Bergson swaps out the concept of time he finds in his contemporaries and antecedents with a new concept, duration. This concept allows for processes to be understood in motion, and for the appearance of the new. As such, a new concept of freedom, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, is possible by determining being as becoming through duration rather than being in a static, homogenous time.

However, I argue that Heidegger's critique goes deeper. Rather than identifying problems with the concept of time and trying to provide a new concept, although there is no doubt that he does have a novel concept of time, he raises questions about the role of time in such determinations of being as such. Rather than swapping out one concept of time for another to allow a more productive interpretation of freedom, he asks why it is that we use time to determine beings in their being. He asks the question that he calls the *Grundfrage*, the grounding question of metaphysics: what is the relationship between being and time?

Surprisingly, this question is slightly modified to become a new question of freedom: how is it that beings are manifest to us such that we can encounter them? However, the claim that '*Freedom is the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being*' [GA31/ 207] is not explained here, and this requires me to turn to the book dedicated to that precise problem: *Being and Time*.

## 1 – Conclusion

The intent of this chapter has been to situate Heidegger's seemingly-esoteric concept of freedom within the familiar debate concerning the freedom of the will. The reason to begin here was to ensure that expectations were managed. Although Heidegger does have a lot to say about the will in later periods of his work, he is not ever interested in the *freedom* of the will. The place in which he explains why is the lecture course translated as *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31]. This lecture course provides a critique of the way that freedom is typically thought of, whether by libertarians or determinists. He argues, through a detailed reading of Immanuel Kant's philosophy, that freedom is, in the modern form of the problem, treated as a problem of causality, even though it has not been adequately established that causation is more metaphysically primordial than freedom itself.

However, while GA31 clarifies the way in which Heidegger treats the problem elsewhere, it requires clarification itself. I argued that the place to go to help situate Heidegger's intentions in dismissing the free will problem is Henri Bergson's *Time and Free*  *Will.* This book argues that both libertarians and determinists share a faulty concept of time that freezes actions that take time, enduring through a process of becoming, and freezes them into a single intellection that shares more in common with the concept of space than time. I discussed these aspects of Bergson's thought in §§1.1-1.2.

In §1.3 I returned to Heidegger to show that his headline claim in GA31 is misleading. While the fact that freedom is treated as a problem of causality rather than a question of freedom without justification is the reason why Heidegger does not accept the Kantian determination of freedom, it is not the explanation. This explanation is to be found in the concept of time that Kant is using to determine causation itself. Kant argues in the Second Analogy that causation is temporal succession. This is further determined by the First Analogy, which argues that any change or action has to be the transient alteration of an underlying substance rather than a change in its own right. As with Bergson, the problem here is that the concept of time was limited to what exists in the present. This lead to the problem of freedom as expressed in the Third Antinomy, where it seems impossible to claim that there can ever be an effect without a cause, but if this were the case then the law of causation itself would break down, since the causal chain would have no beginning.

In §1.4, I showed how the criticisms from Bergson and Heidegger of the concept of free will were similar, both advocating that the temporal determination of being involved in explaining what freedom and causality are involved a suspect concept of time. For Bergson, this was spatialized time. For Heidegger, it was the idea of a temporal succession as a mode of the present alone, ignoring other dimensions of time. However, I argued, Heidegger does not swap out one concept of time for another, as does Bergson. Instead, he argues that the very possibility of temporal determinations of being needed to be investigated. He establishes this by showing how the false problem of freedom, the question of the freedom of the will, is interpretation through causation, which is grounded in movement, which is a determination of being.

I then showed how Heidegger argues that being is interpreted through time, insofar as what philosophers really mean when they say being is "constant presence", i.e. that which is eternally given, substance. He asks how time and being are related such that time can clarify the meaning of being, and claims further that the answer to this question is to be found in an investigation into the very being that experiences being in a temporal fashion: Dasein. This means, according to Heidegger, that the question of Dasein's understanding and ability to encounter being in terms of time needs to be understood in order to proceed. But, Heidegger immediately states rather than explains that this is the genuine problem of freedom in the first place: how it is that Dasein can encounter and act within a world full of beings whose being it understands. This means that my investigation must turn to *Being and Time* to clarify this stated link between freedom and the understanding of being, which I will do in the next chapter.

## Chapter 2: The Understanding of Being and Dasein's Lack of Freedom

## 2 – Introduction

In Chapter 1, I provided the historical and philosophical context of Heidegger's philosophy of freedom through an interpretation of his lecture course, The Essence of Human Freedom [GA31] as a repetition of Bergson's Time and Free Will. Heidegger's discussions and arguments concerning freedom presuppose a rejection of the Free Will Debate and turn to the question of the meaning of being, properly transformed into the question of the relation of being and time. For Heidegger, the problem of freedom is not a question of whether or not the human will has 'the ability to do or not do something' (Descartes, 1996:40). It is also not a question of the transcendental possibility of 'the power of beginning a state spontaneously' (Kant, 2007:A533/B501) or the possibility of 'the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses' (A534/B502), which are Kant's transcendental and practical concepts of freedom respectively. As Heidegger says himself, 'Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of [the human], but [inversely] [the human] as a possibility of freedom.'40 [GA31 134/94] Humanity is a possibility of freedom, not freedom a possibility of humanity. This inversion certainly takes us to a concept of freedom that, first of all, does not immediately make sense with respect to the Free Will Debate, and second of all is expressly stated as not a property of the will. Freedom is not something we possess, but something that makes us possible in the first place:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> I have modified the translation here. Sadler consistently translates *Mensch* as 'man' rather than 'human', unnecessarily gendering an ungendered term. Moreover, in this case it actively reduces the rhetorical force of Heidegger's statement. Heidegger is inverting the genitive: 'human freedom' does not refer to the freedom that belongs to humanity but refers to the idea of humanity as belonging to and being grounded in freedom. The original in full reads: '*Menschliche Freiheit heißt jetzt nicht mehr:* Freiheit als Eigenschaft des Menschen, sondern umgekehrt: *der Mensch als eine Möglichkeit der Freiheit*'.

*Freedom is not some particular thing* among and alongside other things, but is *superordinate and governing in relation to the whole*. But if we are seeking out freedom as the ground of the possibility of existence, then *freedom must itself*, *in its essence, be more primordial than* [*humanity*]. Humanity is only an administrator of freedom, i.e. it can only let-be the freedom which is accorded to it, in such a way that, through humanity, the whole contingency of freedom becomes visible. [GA31 134/94]

Heidegger calls for a 'complete repositioning of freedom', placing it at the fundament

of philosophy, rather than a cursory problem occurring late in the problematic once the movement of beings has been understood as causality, and the ability of the human being to become a cause is called into question. But, in placing freedom so fundamentally, Heidegger makes some surprising claims about freedom with respect to the claims he has already made in the book *Being and Time* [*SZ*]:

[...] the essence of freedom only comes into view if we seek it as the ground of the possibility of Dasein, as something prior even to being and time. With respect to [this], we must effect a *complete repositioning of freedom*, so that what now emerges is that *the problem of freedom is not built into the leading and fundamental problems of philosophy, but, on the contrary, the leading question of metaphysics is grounded in the question concerning the essence of freedom.* [GA31 134/94]

This is a striking claim to make. As Dallmayr (1984) puts it, by assigning 'to freedom an ontological status that even antedates the correlation of being and time' (220), Heidegger seems to be completely repositioning his earlier text that bears that problem as its title. In line with this, Hans Ruin (2008), in response to claims about freedom and transcendence in 'The Essence of Ground', suggests that 'at least at this point [Heidegger] was prepared to see SZ as one long elaboration of the problem of freedom' (2000:2). However, Craig Nichols has gone further than suggesting an implication:

> Being and Time itself is fundamentally concerned with the problem of freedom more so perhaps than with the problems of being or time! One might even say that primordial freedom is the meaning of the unifying "and" of Being and Time,

and hence more fundamental than either of the two concepts considered alone. (Nichols, 2000:2)

I wish to follow this theme. *Being and Time* is already a book about freedom, although it seldom uses the term. And, if Nichols means, when he says that 'freedom is the meaning of the unifying "and" of *Being and Time*', Heidegger's concept of freedom is another word for understanding the relationship Dasein has with being, then I am in full agreement [*SZ 42*]. Indeed, I will argue that Heidegger is attempting to clarify his position in *Being and Time* here, rather than trying to undermine it. He is not heading towards a 'massive voluntarism' by developing an 'existential voluntarism'. To turn to Dallmayr again,

[...] to treat freedom as the grounding of philosophy does not denote a simple subjectivism or a relativization of metaphysics, but rather a *reduction hominis*, that is, an attempt to return Dasein to its ontological essence or condition. (Dallmayr, 1984:220)

Heidegger's comments in GA31 underwrite the critique of subjectivity found in *Being* and *Time*, and will demonstrate this through the coming chapters. Concerning the present chapter, I must turn to *Being and Time* itself; for two reasons that I will now outline.

Firstly, Heidegger's 'complete repositioning' of freedom in GA31 interacts with claims he has already made in the earlier work. In stating that '*Freedom is the condition of the possibility of manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being*' [GA31 303/207], Heidegger seems to be equating freedom to what he called, in §4 of *Being and Time*, Dasein's "*vorontologische Seinsverständnis*", its "pre-ontological understanding of being". In *Being and Time*, it is because Dasein has a pre-ontological understanding of being, i.e. it can discover being and encounter beings in terms of their being, that it is able to have any comportment with beings at all, it is, in the terms of GA31, the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of beings. However, the link between this fundamental concept of freedom and the pre-ontological understanding of being is not clear, and needs to be explored. This is especially the case since, in GA31, Heidegger dedicates almost no time to clarifying this concept in itself, focussing entirely on its importance and priority over the Kantian problem.

Secondly, by defining the pre-ontological understanding of being as freedom, Heidegger seems to have introduced a contradiction into *Being and Time*. This is best expressed by Béatrice Han-Pile:

Anything that has the structure of being in the world *must* be free: freedom is co-extensive with Dasein. Yet Dasein is often pictured in *Being and Time* as anything but free: it "ensnares itself", is "lost", "alienated", and needs to be "liberated". Thus comparison between *Being and Time* and other texts on freedom yields an important paradox: although by definition it transcends toward the world, the Dasein of Division I [of *SZ*] is deprived of freedom. It must be free, and yet phenomenological analysis shows that it is not free. To understand the specific meaning of freedom in *Being and Time*, one has to square this circle. (Han-Pile, 2013:291)

Even though Heidegger expressly states that freedom is not a property of Dasein, it seems that, if Dasein is made possible by freedom, freedom must be prior to Dasein such that Dasein is free *a priori*. And yet, *Being and Time* emphatically claims that Dasein is rarely free, as Han-Pile elaborates above. This is the second motivation of this chapter: to examine the account of pre-ontological understanding of being and inauthenticity in *Being and Time* in order to search for a clue to the resolution of this seeming contradiction. I will now briefly outline the order of discussion.

In §2.1, I will turn to the beginning of *Being and Time* to introduce the relationship between the question of the meaning of being and how the argument transitions from the fundamental ontological question of "What is the meaning of being?" to the existential analytical question "How is the one who is asking the question able to ask it in the first place?" This will serve as an introduction to the problematic of *Being and Time*, and allow me, in §2.2, to show that Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of the meaning of being is indeed what Heidegger was referring to as freedom in GA31 through a reading of §9 of *SZ*. In §2.3, I will turn to the first detailed elaboration of inauthenticity, the account of "*das 'Man*", the "they". It is here that Heidegger describes Dasein as unfree in the strongest possible terms, but Heidegger still maintains that this is an extension of Dasein's freedom, rather than a negation of it. This will prepare the way for the argument to continue in Chapter 3, where I will examine the relationship between Dasein's ability to act in spite of and indeed because of its inauthenticity to determine exactly in what sense Heidegger regards this everyday comportment as unfreedom.

### 2.1 – The Meaning of Being and the Need to Interrogate Dasein

In this section, I will introduce the project of *Being and Time* as the attempt to lay the ground for answering the question of the meaning of being through an interrogation of the nature of the being asking the question in the first place: Dasein. I will begin by looking at the introduction, in order to show the specific way in which Heidegger raises the question there, and how it quickly leads to Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being as its distinctive characteristic. This will allow me, in the next section, to turn to how this characteristic informs the basic description of Dasein found in §9.

Being and Time [SZ] begins where our discussion of The Essence of Human Freedom [GA31] ends, with the question of the meaning of being [Der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein]: 'Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of *Being.*' [*SZ* 1] As such, what in GA31 is presented as the true question of the essence of human freedom only after a long genealogy, is in *SZ* the official theme.

Heidegger begins the introduction of *Sein und Zeit* by considering and refuting three common objections to asking the question of the meaning of being on the grounds that this cannot or need not be answered. The three objections are: that being is the most universal concept, and therefore is always already understood; that being is indefinable, and therefore the answer would be unintelligible; and finally that being is self-evident, and therefore no answer is required. In all three cases, Heidegger agrees with the proposition, but argues that it is not a reason against asking but actually a reason for so doing. In the case of being as the universal concept, he argues that this by no means implies 'that it is the one which is clearest', but rather that its universality makes it 'darkest of all' [SZ 3]. With regard to being's indefinability, Heidegger argues that from this we 'can infer only that "Being" cannot have the character of an entity', being is not a being. But, as most metaphysics and logic does treat being as a being, this fact 'demands that we look [the question of being] in the face' [SZ 4]. Most important for my purposes is the third objection, which states that there is no question of being because it is a self-evident concept that everyone understands:

Whenever one cognizes anything or makes an assertion, whenever one comports oneself towards entities, even towards oneself, some use is made of 'Being'; and this expression is held to be intelligible 'without further ado', just as everyone understands 'The sky *is* blue', 'I *am* merry', and the like. [*SZ* 4]

Everyone understands the word "is", and as such there is no real philosophical question at stake. There is no problem, because being is clearly understood by all. However, says Heidegger, this understanding is only 'an average kind of intelligibility, which merely demonstrates that this is unintelligible' [*SZ* 4]. For Heidegger, that everyone seems to

understand being in everything they do is precisely why the question of the meaning of being must be asked:

[This objection] makes manifest that in any way of comporting oneself towards entities as entities—even in any Being towards entities as entities—there lies *a priori* an enigma. The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again. [*SZ* 4]

This third response contains the first mention of the understanding of being that Dasein always already has: the very fact that we always already live in an understanding of being that is nonetheless veiled in darkness. This phenomenon is also the origin of the previous two objections; the universality and indefinability of the meaning of being are grounded in the obscure self-evidence of the understanding of the meaning of being.

The phenomenon of *Seinsverständnis* is the clue around which Heidegger structures the investigation of *Being and Time*. In §2, he argues that philosophical inquiry 'as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way' [*SZ* 5]. This is a development of the insights he brought against the self-evidence objection. That some sort of understanding of the meaning of being exists is a "fact" that can be interrogated philosophically:

We do not *know* what 'Being' means. But even if we ask, 'What *is* "Being"?', we keep within an understanding of the 'is', though we are unable to fix conceptionally [*sic*] what that 'is' signifies. We do not even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be grasped and fixed. *But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact.* However much this understanding of Being (an understanding which is already available to us) may fluctuate and grow dim, and border on mere acquaintance with a word, its very indefiniteness is itself a positive phenomenon which needs to be clarified. [*SZ* 5-6]

The phenomenon of Seinsverständnis, argues Heidegger, leads us to the necessity of a

preparatory analytic of Dasein:

Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity—the inquirer—transparent in his own Being. [*SZ* 7]

This task is the matter of the remainder of the book. Before moving onto the analysis,

however, Heidegger makes some additional claims about what it means to say that this

understanding of being is a feature of Dasein's being in §4. First of all, he argues that

Seinsverständnis makes Dasein a peculiar entity:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of Dasein's being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it. [*SZ* 12]

To say that Dasein understands being is to say, more primordially, that it has a relationship with Being. More importantly it has a relationship with its own being, which it encounters as an issue. We encounter our own being as a problem because a fundamental aspect of that being is to have an understanding relationship with it. Heidegger here calls the relationship between ourselves and our being 'one of being' because, as he says in §5, 'we *are* it' [*SZ* 15]. Being is not, primarily, something we know intellectually, but is rather what we are. The upshot of these compacted statements is that being able to understand being is not just one property among others that Dasein happens to have indifferently, but is rather the basic constitution of its being:

It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this being is disclosed to it. *Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being* [Seinsbestimmtheit des Daseins]. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological. [*SZ* 12]

Ontically, which means in terms of it being an existing entity, Dasein is ontological, which means it always already operates in a *logos* of being, an understanding of being, even before it signs up to a course in philosophy. However, this characteristic of its being does not equal an ontology in the sense of having a theoretical concept of being, but is something more primal. To emphasise the preliminary nature of this understanding of being, he chooses to use the term 'pre-ontological [*vorontologische*]' understanding of being, referring to Dasein's 'being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being' [*SZ* 12] rather than its ability to engage in the science of ontology.

In other words, the reason why we understand being sufficiently enough to use the word in conversation and to ask a question about its meaning is that in our innermost constitution, in our being, we have a pre-ontological understanding of being. Heidegger goes on to call our pre-ontological understanding of being an 'essential tendency-of-Being [*wesenhaften Seinstendenz*]' [*SZ* 15], it is something that our being itself tends us towards doing. While this is a description of a basic characteristic that needs to be clarified, and by no means a definition of Dasein, it should resonate with previous definitions of the human being as it, along with those definitions, is another answer to the question of the being of the human. When Descartes interprets our being as *res cogitans*, the thinking thing, he speaks of the characteristic Heidegger is trying to describe.<sup>41</sup> For Descartes, we are minds that think and, in thinking, we are aware of our own existence. However, as Heidegger goes on to remark, Descartes' answer is insufficient.

With the 'cogito sum' Descartes had claimed he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began in this 'radical'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> 'But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understandings, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.' (Descartes, 1996:19)

way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the *res cogitans*, or—more precisely—*the meaning of the being of the 'sum'*. [SZ 24]

In contrast, Heidegger makes the meaning of the being of the "sum" and its way of understanding being the task of his book. Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being is the question of *SZ*. This is a preliminary articulation of a phenomenon that can only be interrogated further by asking after the being of Dasein itself. The understanding of Being is a basic characteristic of the sort of entity that we are, and as such we must analyse ourselves in order to come to any clarity about it.

In this section, I have explained how Heidegger begins *Being and Time* with an attack on reasons against asking about the meaning of being. The most important was the third, which claimed that we all already understand the term, and therefore the investigation is not required. Heidegger turns this criticism against itself, however, pointing out that it shows exactly how vague our grasp of the concept is, and actually gives us a 'fact' to interpret. Dasein, the being we each are ourselves, must be interrogated in its being to learn more about this vague understanding of being that it has. Heidegger, in §4, explains what he means in more detail, defining this vague understanding as a 'pre-ontological understanding of being', a non-conceptual understanding that must be a basic characteristic of it. In the next section, I will show how this characteristic is developed further in §9, where Heidegger, although he does not use the word, infers from this preontological understanding of being that Dasein has a free relationship with that being.

# 2.2 – Dasein's Pre-ontological Understanding of Being as a Freedom of Being

In the last section, I showed how Heidegger moves from the general question of the meaning of being to the existential analytical question of the nature of Dasein's being. This is because Dasein is distinctive in having a pre-ontological understanding of being already. As Dasein already has a vague understanding of being, the obvious place for the investigation to begin is with a phenomenological analysis of *how* Dasein has this understanding relationship with being. In this section, I will offer a close reading of §9 of *Being and Time*, to demonstrate that it already offers the sort of concept of freedom that Heidegger was talking about in *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], as the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of being. This will legitimate treating discussions of Dasein's understanding of being as grounded in the concept of freedom he advocates, though does not argue for, in GA31. I will do this by examining in detail the 'two implications' Heidegger draws from the fact that Dasein has being 'as an issue' [*SZ* 41-42].

After the long introduction to *SZ*, Heidegger begins the book with a restatement of the phenomenon of Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being in different words, saying that the entities which we each are 'in their being, comport themselves towards their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. *Being* is that which is an issue for every such entity' [*SZ* 41-42]. This latter statement, that Being is as an issue or something at stake for Dasein (rather than an object of indifference) is a claim we already saw him make in §4 of *Sein und Zeit*. We can now see that this is the way in which we are to interpret Dasein's pre-ontological characteristic: the understanding of being is

not the possession of a concept, but the fact that Dasein is bound up with being, that it is implicated with it. Or, to adapt the language of *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], this understanding is not a 'property' of Dasein, but rather Dasein 'administrates' it, being a possibility of that understanding rather than the other way around.

The understanding of being is a basic character of Dasein that Heidegger chooses to describe as Dasein's 'being as an issue'. This is important to dwell on, since an 'issue' is not a rational or conceptual grasp, but something more fundamental. By way of contrast, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* [GA3], Heidegger interprets Kant's discussion of the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgements as a response to the same problem at stake here: the possibility of ontological knowledge, how it is that we know about and are able to talk about being. However, Heidegger clearly distinguishes his own path in *Being and Time* by arguing that Kant stays 'in keeping with the tradition' by interpreting this question as a matter of rational judgement:

Kant reduces the problem of the possibility of ontology to the question 'How are a priori synthetic judgements possible?" The interpretation of this formulation of this problem makes it clear that the laying of the ground for metaphysics is carried out as a critique of pure reason. The question concerning the possibility of ontological knowledge requires its preliminary clarification. In keeping with the tradition, Kant understands knowing in this formula as judging. What kind of knowledge is under consideration in ontological understanding? It is that knowledge in which the being is known. [...] Knowledge which brings forth the quiddity of the being, i.e., knowledge which unveils the being itself, Kant calls "synthetic." Thus the question concerning the possibility of ontological knowledge becomes the problem of the essence of a priori synthetic judgements. [GA3 13-14/9]

Heidegger does not wish to elaborate our understanding of being through rational judgement. Instead of calling being an object of judgement, he calls it an "issue". From this fact alone, we should expect an interpretation of human being that is quite different to those in the tradition. Drawing out this idea, Heidegger speaks about two implications: that Dasein's being is only a possibility and that this possibility is always something about which it can and has to make a decision. Here, then, Heidegger has already presented a conception of freedom, since it is free in relation to its being in these two ways: that it is a possibility that only it can actualise, and that this actualisation can only occur as a result of a decision it may or may not make. I will discuss both in turn, before discussing them in their intended unity since, in truth, they are the same thing described with different emphases.

The idea that Dasein's being is a possibility for it is first expressed with the phrase 'the "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence' [*SZ* 42]. However, as Heidegger himself says in *Letter on Humanism* [*BH*], to misread this through the lens of Sartre's 'existence comes before essence' (2001:17) would be an error. He says this statement by Sartre 'has nothing at all in common with the statement from *Being and Time*' [*BH* 329/250]. He emphasises the formulation 'the "substance" of the human being is ek-sistence', which he interprets as saying 'nothing else but that the way that the human being in his proper essence becomes present to being is ecstatic inherence in the truth of being' [*BH* 330/251].<sup>42</sup> In other words, Heidegger's statements in *Being and Time* that sound like Sartre's statement 'existence precedes essence' are claims about the "truth of being", how being becomes manifest to Dasein, an interpretation of the understanding of being rather than a depiction of the metaphysical structure of human being. It is beyond the scope of my thesis to assess whether this is an adequate rejection of Sartre.<sup>43</sup> I believe this later clarification, however,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> In order to further distinguish his concept of *Existenz* from the classical *existentia*, Heidegger starts to hyphenate the term: *Ek-sistenz* as a noun and *ek-sistieren* as a verb.
<sup>43</sup> For an in assessment of Heidegger's critique of Sartre in the *Letter on Humanism*, see Chapter 6, 'Humanism: The Lecture and the Letter' in Fell (1979:152-187).

is sufficient to prove that we need to tread carefully when interpreting Heidegger's precise meaning in §9 of *Being and Time*.

The reading I am about to provide of this claim is important for my overall argument, since I will show that Heidegger's claim is not, like Sartre, that Dasein can always negate its being, such that it is only ever itself 'in the mode of not-being' (2006:56). Nor is Heidegger's claim, like Ortega y Gasset (1991), to say that it has no nature at all. Rather, Heidegger is trying to summarise a crucial ontological claim that he does not clarify until *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26]: that whatever being it has, it is only a possibility given to Dasein to take up or leave, and that any descriptive claims Heidegger makes do not apply to some free-floating eternal genus. Instead:

Neutral Dasein [as it is described by Heidegger's philosophy] is never what exists [*Neutrale Dasein ist nie das Existierende*]; Dasein exists in each case only in its factical concretion. But neutral Dasein is indeed the primal source [*Urquell*] that springs up in every existence [*Existieren*] and makes its existence [*Existenz*] possible. [GA26 172/137]

This primal source is freedom, understood as the condition of the possibility of the

manifestness of all entities or, in what can only now be seen as a provisional term, the pre-

ontological understanding of being. This is implied rather than explicitly stated in §9, but I

will demonstrate that this has to be his intention if we examine the separate formulations

of the idea in detail. I have numbered them as follows:

A. The 'essence' of this entity lies in its "to be".

B. Its what-being (*essentia*), so far as we can speak of it at all, must be conceived in terms of its Being (*existentia*)

C. The "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence.

D. [...] those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not 'properties' present-at-hand [...] they are in each case possible ways for it to be.

E. All the so-being which this entity possess is primarily being. So when we designate this entity by the word "Dasein", we are not expressing its "what" but its Being.

F. [...] the primacy of "existentia" over "essentia" [...] [SZ 42]

Notwithstanding Heidegger's claims in distancing himself from Sartre, *existentia* and *essentia*, the distinction between "whether something is" and "what something is", clearly play an important role in what Heidegger is doing here. Postponing discussions of formulations C and F for the moment, Heidegger is arguing that both *existentia* and *essentia* cannot be used to understand Dasein's being. He uses the German word *Existenz* for Dasein's being, naming a new ontological concept that will be understood in terms of existential possibility. He translates *existentia* as *Vorhandenheit*, presence-at-hand, a concept he will use exclusively for inanimate objects. As for *essentia*, Heidegger typically has "*Wesen*" in quotation marks when applying it to Dasein, a practice he explicitly refers to in *BH*:

[...] the sentence cited from *Being and Time* (p. 42) is careful to enclose the word "essence" in quotation marks. This indicates that "essence" is now being defined neither from *esse essentia* nor from *esse existentiae* but rather from the ek-static character of Dasein. [*BH* 327/249]

It is, however, plausible for someone such as Sartre to read statements A-F as an inversion of the relationship of *essentia* and *existentia*. But, to turn back to the *Letter on* 

*Humanism* [*BH*], Heidegger dismisses such an attempt by saying the following:

Sartre expresses the basic tenet of existentialism in this way: Existence precedes essence. In this statement he is taking *existentia* and *essentia* according to their metaphysical meaning, which from Plato's time on has said that *essentia* precedes *existentia*. Sartre reverses this statement. But the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement. [*BH* 328/250]

Sartre remains within the metaphysical language that Heidegger is attempting to overcome. In another place in the *Letter*, Heidegger says, 'here [in §9 of *SZ*] the opposition

between *existentia* and *essentia* is not what is at issue, because neither of these metaphysical determinations of being, let alone their relationship, is yet in question'. He then goes on to say that both Medieval philosophy and Kant conceive of *existentia* as *'actualitas'*, actuality. And, finally, he suggests that this category is not even sufficient: 'the being of a stone or even life as the being of plants and animals is adequately thought.' [*BH* 325-326/248]. As such, the *Letter* warns against reading the above statements about Dasein's being as anything other than a rejection of describing it in terms of *existentia* and *essentia*.

Now, while BH is a much later text than Being and Time from 1947, Heidegger is actually repeating, in brief, arguments he had already made in a lecture course in 1927, the same year as his masterwork's publication. In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology [GA24], Heidegger treats the distinction between existentia and essentia as one of four major ontological theses, one deriving from medieval philosophy. He argues that this distinction between a being's "what" and "that" is based on an 'inadequate foundation', which is ultimately grounded in 'productive comportment'. The concepts of possibility and actuality only clarify essentia and existentia because they refer to the nature or plan of a product before it is completed (essentia / possibilitas) and its eventual completion (existentia / actualitas). In other words, essentia refers to the intended nature of the product by the producer, as what can potentially be brought about, and the existentia refers to the actual product produced. This way of thinking, in GA24 and in Being and Time, is something Heidegger claims is totally inappropriate for Dasein: 'Dasein cannot at all be interrogated as such by the question What is this? We gain access to the being only if we ask: Who is it?' [GA24 169/120]. This claim also expressed as a conclusion to the above

statements about Dasein's being in §9 of *Being and Time*: 'any entity is either a "who" (*Existenz*) or a "what" (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense)' [*SZ* 45].

These statements, A-F, concerning Dasein's being are all therefore attempts to begin to describe its relationship with its being in terms of its "who" and not its "what". So, when he says that the "*Wesen*" of Dasein lies in its "to be [*zu Sein*]" (A), the point is that we can only talk about its "what" in terms of its directedness towards its being (B and D). Being is at stake for Dasein; its being is something it is implicated with, that is an issue for it. This understanding distance from being means, *a fortiori*, that its being is something *for it to be* rather than *what it already is*. As Heidegger puts it in a later chapter, what Dasein is, its self, is not stable but volatile:

[...] if the Self is conceived 'only' as a way of being of this entity, this seems tantamount to volitizing the real 'core' of Dasein. Any apprehensiveness however which one may have about this gets its nourishment from the perverse assumption that the entity in question has at bottom the kind of being which belongs to something present-at-hand, even if one is far from attributing to it the solidity of an occurrent corporeal Thing. Yet man's 'substance' is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence. [*SZ* 117]

In short, any attempt to stabilise Dasein's essence retreats back into the 'present-athand' (*vorhanden*), which Heidegger describes as being-present (*Vorhandensein*) in *The Essence of Human Freedom*. There, the issue was Kant's failure to take account of aspects of human action that cannot be contained within the dimension of the present. Here, the issue is the failure of philosophical thinking to grasp the temporal volatility of Dasein itself, such that it only looks at what is true about it in this present, treating it as a thing.

Heidegger is seeking to depart from the ontological thesis that being can be divided into existence and essence at all. So, in C and F, where *existentia* and *essentia* are referred to in the quotation marks, Heidegger is helping us by using the traditional terminology, but shattering that schema in the same moment. Ultimately, the most lucid statement of this unfamiliar idea is D: that Dasein's characteristics are to be understood as ways for it to be. Dasein's being is a possibility for it, not an already actual catalogue of properties.

The second implication that Heidegger draws out of the insight that Dasein's being is an issue for it is that its being is in each case mine to be one way or another. It is a possibility, yes, but not just any anonymous possibility. It is *my* possibility, my being is *my* possible ways to be. He names this characteristic in-each-case-mine-ness (*Jemeinigkeit*). Our existence is our own, which is why it can never be an object of absolute indifference. Heidegger elucidates this by a comparison between those entities we would typically label "inanimate", or the present-at-hand:

To entities such as these, their Being is 'a matter of indifference''; or more precisely, they 'are' in such a way that their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, not the opposite. [SZ 42]

Heidegger then moves on from in-each-case-mine-ness to the sometimes controversial concept, authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*). In this term, Heidegger's emphasis is on the *Eigen*- in this word, meaning "own", hence the related expressions translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "ownmost possibility" (*eigensten Möglichkeit*) and "something of its own" (*sich zueignen*). <sup>44</sup> As William Blattner (2006) puts it, 'the phenomenon Heidegger is trying to capture with this language is not a matter of being true to anything, but rather of owning who and how one is.' (15). On an initial reading, it may not be clear how this question of 'owning oneself' is tied to the previous point Heidegger

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> As Michael Inwood (2000) clarifies, *'eigentlich*, when used as a technical term, is close to "authentic", which comes from the Greek *autos*, "self, etc." and originally meant "done by one's hand", hence "reliably guaranteed".' (22-23).

made, concerning Dasein's being as a possibility. However, William Large articulates the

connection between the two as follows:

I can either own or disown my existence. I can choose to be who I am or just live my life without choosing at all. This is the real ontological difference between me and the acorn. It cannot choose to be its possibilities. It just is them, or they fail to happen. And this is the same for my dog. It just is its possibilities, or not. It might not wish to go for a walk in the pouring rain, but it cannot decide that it does not want to live this life any more in its totality. I might suddenly despair being a student or a teacher, or any other human possibility, because I realise that I never made a decision to be this anyway, but just went ahead because everyone else did it. (Large, 2008:38)

Authenticity and inauthenticity are implications of Dasein's being as possibility.

Because it is only a possibility, it is something that can fail to come into existence insofar

as I can win myself and fail to win myself. To have your being as a possibility that is your

own is to say that your being is something you must choose or deny as it is never actualised

by itself:

[...] in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another [*in dieser oder jener Weise zu sein*]. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility [*eigensten Möglichkeit*]. In each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it *can*, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. [*SZ* 42]

The authentic/inauthentic distinction is, therefore, an implication of Dasein's existential structure; its being is never an "actual" property, but only ever a possibility for it to choose. When Dasein chooses its being, which it encounters as its ownmost or most proper possibility, it is authentic. However, for the most part, Dasein does not choose to be its being, it "loses itself". It is in this latter state that Heidegger claims Dasein lives ordinarily. However, this is not presented as an ethical failure, but as part of the ordinary

course of things. Authenticity would then be better understood as a form of positive freedom, rather than as a moral excellence (although these two terms are admittedly not mutually exclusive). To be authentic is to have become Dasein in the truest sense, by choosing Dasein's ownmost possibility, by choosing to be the being it already is. By binding Dasein to a choice, it therefore becomes an expression of freedom.

In this section, I have argued that Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being is interpreted, in §9, through an implied concept of freedom. Heidegger does not, as he accuses Kant of doing, develop this pre-ontological awareness as a form of rational judgement or even knowledge. Instead, he speaks about how Dasein encounters being, specifically its own being, through this pre-ontological "understanding".

Heidegger's position is that Dasein encounters its being as an issue, since the preontological understanding delivers it over to that being. The two implications of this "delivery" are that its being is a possible way for it to be, not an actual, determined way that it always already is, and that its being "is mine" in each case to have and make a decision about. This amounts to saying that Dasein, in its most basic constitution, is delivered over to its own possible being, over which it must make a decision. Though he does not use the term, this has to be understood as a preliminary description of a state of freedom in the sense pointed at in *The Essence of Human Freedom*. This freedom is not a property that Dasein has, but is what allows it to be in the way that it is at all, and gives it a choice over how to be the sort of being it is and, in the sense of authenticity, to win that being or lose that being. But, as I argued in the introduction to this chapter, the concept of inauthenticity seems to create a paradox within being and time. Already in §9, Dasein is presented as free insofar as it makes decisions at the most fundamental level. Heidegger states that 'Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine' [*SZ* 42], but he immediately draws out the concept of authenticity and inauthenticity as hanging on what that decision is. Han-Pile points out that the later account of inauthenticity explicitly describes Dasein as 'anything but free' (2013:291), and yet here in §9 it seems that inauthenticity is only the result of a decision. In the next section, I will explore the picture of Dasein as unfree in Chapter 4 of *Being and Time*.

## 2.3 – The Real Dictatorship of the "They": How Dasein is Typically Unfree

In §9, Dasein is described in terms that, even though Heidegger does not use the word, can only be described as 'free'. In its innermost constitution, Dasein makes decisions about its being and how to be that being. But, as Han-Pile (2013) has pointed out, later sections in *Being and Time* seem to contradict that claim. In Chapter IV, Heidegger elaborates on the concept of inauthenticity he introduced in §9. Beginning with a discussion about the nature of Dasein's "self", he begins to argue that Dasein is, proximally and for the most part, never itself. Heidegger paints a picture of Dasein as diminished and dominated by 'the real dictatorship of the "they" [*SZ* 126]. In this section, I will discuss Heidegger's concept of the they-self, and argue that unfreedom has been defined as Dasein's "not-being-its-self (*Nichtesselbstsein*). This will be the beginning of the argument of the rest of my thesis, which is to claim that we should take Heidegger literally when he says that Dasein is 'not itself'. The they-self is not free because it is, in an ontological sense, not Dasein. This is a

claim that will take the rest of this thesis to demonstrate. But, the argument must begin by showing that it is Dasein's not-being-itself that is the criterion of unfreedom, which is a positive claim, rather than the negative claim that the Other somehow traps Dasein.

The second implication of the fact that Dasein encounters its being as an issue, as I described in §2.2, is authenticity. Because Dasein's being is only a possibility, it is something that can be won or lost. But, Heidegger is not clear in §9 about what he thinks Dasein is 'winning' or 'losing'. He begins to clarify this issue in Chapter IV of *Being and Time*, which presents Heidegger's discussion of social cognition: how it is that we have knowledge of and relate to other humans? However, this is not the official aim of the chapter. Within the context of a preparatory existential analytic of Dasein, the question is not initially "how do we relate to others" but "who are we?". Heidegger says, 'the question of the "who"'' of Dasein leads to 'certain structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with Being-in-the-world: *Being-with* [Mitsein] and *Dasein-with* [Mitdasein]. In this kind of Being is grounded the mode of everyday being a self<sup>45</sup> [*alltäglichen Selbstseins*]' [*SZ* 114].

Heidegger's argument begins by harking back to §9 of *SZ* and the discussion of in-eachcase-mine-ness (*Jemeinigkeit*). He points out that this existential is an initial answer to the question of exactly who Dasein is. 'Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine.' However, he goes on to claim that this is only a 'rough and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> I have opted for Stambaugh's translation of *Selbstsein* as "being a self" rather than Macquarrie and Robinson's "Being-one's-Self". Introducing the indefinite pronoun muddies the waters, especially as it is deployed by Heidegger as a technical term in these passages (*das Man / Man-Selbst*). I will also be arguing in §4.3, along with Wrathall (2014) that what Heidegger means by the self is precisely not one's self, but the existential structure of Dasein as such.

ready' negative assertion that merely tells us that 'in each case an "I"—not Others—is this entity' [*SZ* 114]. Although he does not explicitly invoke Descartes, he does allude to his philosophy and this is, I believe, a reference back to Heidegger's claims about him in the introduction:

With the 'cogito sum' Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began in this 'radical' way, was the kind of Being which belongs to the res cogitans, or—more precisely—the meaning of the being of the 'sum'. [SZ 24]

For Heidegger, there are many ways in which Descartes "left undetermined" the being of Dasein. In the context of Dasein's ability to say I, however, Heidegger follows many thinkers in saying that this capacity presupposes something about which Descartes does not talk.<sup>46</sup> Firstly, our capacity to say "I am me, myself" is grounded in a distinction between us and others, hence Heidegger's phrasing above: 'in each case an "I"—not Others—is this entity' [*SZ* 114]. To say "I" is to say "not others". So, the *cogito* at least presupposes the existence of other Dasein. This is the reason for the focus of *Mitsein* in this chapter of *SZ*, but it is not the most fundamental criticism of the *cogito* Heidegger makes.

For Descartes, the *cogito* is a clear and distinct intuition of our own nature. For Heidegger, this intuition is not only derivative of our encounter with others, but, whether or not it is clear and distinct, it does not give us any intuition of the self.

[...] What is more indubitable than the givenness of the "I"? [...] The kind of "giving" we have here is the mere, formal, reflective awareness of the "I"; and perhaps what it gives is indeed evidence. [...] [But] is it then obvious *a priori* that access to Dasein must be gained only by mere reflective awareness of the "I" of actions? What if this kind of 'giving-itself' on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, indeed, in a manner grounded in the Being of Dasein itself? Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Hegel's "Master Slave Dialectic" is perhaps the most obvious, but Kant's "Refutation of Idealism" is also relevant in this regard.

to itself, it always says "I am this entity", and in the long run says this loudest when it is 'not' this entity. [SZ 115]

Heidegger argues that the *cogito*, our ability to say "I" and affirm our own existence, is grounded in *Jemeinigkeit*. It is grounded in the fact that Dasein is always mine: it always belongs to someone as their possibility to be one way or another. But, immediately repeating the arguments of §9, the implication of this is Dasein's ability to be inauthentic or authentic, something not of its own or something of its own, to lose itself or win itself. 'Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein *is not itself*?' [*SZ* 115-6]

And so, we hit upon inauthenticity as the "not itself", but clarified. Heidegger means this term literally. When he says Dasein is "not itself", he does not mean this in the sense that we might say that our friend who is in a mood is "not themselves". In such a case, we mean that they simply are not acting in the way they usually act, but they are still the same person. In contrast, Heidegger's depiction of Dasein's capacity to be not itself is meant to demonstrate that Dasein is "not itself" existentially: Dasein is not Dasein. For this reason, Heidegger distinguishes between the authentic self and the everyday being a self mentioned above. The everyday self is the "they-self".

The Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self* [Man-Selbst], which we distinguish from the *authentic Self* [eigentliche Selbst]—that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. As they-self, the particular Dasein has been *dispersed* into the "they", and must first find itself. [*SZ* 129]

The "they", a translation of "*das 'Man*", is how Dasein lives for the most part, its inauthentic self. Theoretically speaking, "*Man*" translates as "one", but Macquarrie and

Robinson use "they" to allow for more idiomatic English.<sup>47</sup> Heidegger's argument is that, when inauthentic, Dasein does not live in a way that is not true to its own authentic way of being, which is to say it does not live like an entity whose existence lies in its "to be", that has its being to be one way or another, an entity that is free. Rather, it loses itself in an "identity" that is anonymous and unfree. Heidegger articulates this phenomenon most clearly with the example of using public transport:

In utilizing public means of transport and in making use of information services such as the newspaper, every other is like the next. This Being-with-one-another [*Miteinandersein*] dissolves one's own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of 'the Others', in such a way, indeed, that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more. In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real dictatorship of the "they" is unfolded. We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as *they* take pleasure; we read, see, and judge about literature and art as *they* see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as *they* shrink back; we find 'shocking' what *they* find shocking. The "they", which is nothing definite, and which we all are, though not as the sum, prescribes the kind of Being of everydayness. [*SZ* 126-7]

It is hard not to read this passage as pejorative. Indeed, it is easy to believe that Heidegger the man felt he was putting the world to rights with such a description. The literature is split on exactly how to read Heidegger's intentions here. It is generally accepted that he is not intending to decry his age morally in any normal sense, although it has been suggested that this is an unintentional side effect. Dreyfus (1991), for example, suggests that Heidegger fails to distinguish between 'constitutive *conformity* from the evils of *conformism*' and further 'does everything he can to blur this important distinction.' (154) So, for Dreyfus, while Heidegger is really trying to talk about how our shared being allows

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> I will be following Maquarrie and Robinson's translation choice. I am aware many have opted for other translations to try and maintain some etymological consistency, but I think this is a red herring. English expresses the indefinite differently to German, and no one word can translate "*Man*". Further, it is not the word "*Man*" that is at issue for Heidegger; we are not only immersed in the "*Man-Selbst*" when we use the indefinite third person pronoun. It is the phenomenon, not the word that needs our attention.

us to understand each other, he also distorts this claim through an attack on when we choose to conform rather than critically find our own path. However, some have completely rejected the idea that the "they" has a proscriptive moment. William Large (2008) argues that 'we should not take this difference between myself and others as being a moral or social one. Heidegger is not bemoaning the fact that none of us today is really an individual [...] but is describing the way of Being of Dasein.' (51-52) Mahon O'Brien (2011) tells us that the account of inauthenticity is 'part of a structural approach to the question of being; it was not an unwitting or hidden existentialist ethic' (1). But, perhaps, the strongest rejection of the moralistic reading is found in Michael Gelven's commentary:

As a philosopher and *not* as an advocate of social or moral change, Heidegger needs to distinguish between the ways in which the meaning of our existence is revealed and the ways in which it is concealed or covered up. As an inquirer he is indifferent to whether his reader conceals or reveals; rather the distinction is made in order for the reader to *understand*: its goal is to reveal the truth, not to change the person or preach a new religion. (Gelven, 1989:51-52)

A further issue, aside from the question of whether Heidegger is simply decrying the shallowness of everyday life, is the question of what precisely has happened when Dasein is 'dominated' by the "they". Heidegger is clear that Dasein has failed to be its self, it is characterised by not-being-its-self (*Nichtesselbstsein*), but is not clear about what is the nature of the "self" as he sees it. The question then becomes exactly what is meant by "self" in *Being and Time*. This is something that I will only be able to clarify in Chapter 4, which I will do in response to different positions within the secondary literature. What is clear, however, is that whatever is meant by Dasein's authentic "self", whether it be, with Guignon, 'an accomplishment that is realized in one's "Being-a-whole" (1984:330), or, with Wrathall, a misleading name that Heidegger gives to Dasein's structure of being, which

provides a 'background to action' (2014:212), it is something that Dasein has lost when dominated by the "they".

Heidegger's key thesis in the discussion of the "they" is that key behaviours of Dasein are not free because, when it demonstrates them, Dasein is not itself but is rather the "they" self. One might be tempted to consider the ability to read and judge literature and access to other such higher pleasures as grounded in freedom. One could even talk about the ability to travel on public transport, thus allowing one to visit many places for work or leisure as key freedoms of our time. Yet, argues Heidegger, throughout these comportments, Dasein is dominated by the 'real dictatorship [*eigentliche Diktatur*] of the "they"'. In its everyday activity, Dasein is wholly unfree because it does not live out its ability to choose its own being, it rather falls into a mode of being that does not even belong to anyone. As he puts it in a slightly earlier passage, 'Everyone is the other, and no one is himself.' [*SZ* 123]

The "they" is an existential of Dasein in which it is unfree. It is essentially negative, as is evident when Heidegger describes its structural components under the term 'publicness [*Offentlichkeit*]' [*SZ* 127]. Publicness is an activity, but one that moves Dasein away from its authentic self and towards its inauthentic everyday self. It does this by rendering everything unspectacular and hackneyed. That is, taking Dasein's potential to be what it is—in each case mine, free and pure potentiality—and turning it into its opposite:

Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right [...] because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the 'heart of the matter'. By publicness everything gets obscured, and what has thus been covered up gets passed off as something familiar and accessible to everyone. [*SZ* 127]

Heidegger says Dasein is 'disburdened (*entlassen*)' by the "they". In publicness, the "they" disburdens its Dasein of its freedom, of its responsibility for its being and itself. And further, 'by thus disburdening it of its Being, the "they" accommodates Dasein if Dasein has any tendency to take things easily and make them easy' [*SZ* 127-9]. By falling into the literal anonymity of the "they", Dasein does not have to be free, and is unfree; it reposes in its unfreedom.

Heidegger presents the publicness of the "they" in terms of three structural moments: distantiality (*Abständigkeit*); subjection (*Botmässigkeit*) to others; and averageness (*Durchschnittlichkeit*). Distantiality refers to Dasein's 'constant care as to the way one differs' [*SZ* 126] from the others. The way in which this manifests is as subjection or dominion by these others onto Dasein. Here Heidegger's language explicitly invokes unfreedom, as though we are prisoners of other people:

[Dasein] itself *is* not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. Dasein's everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please. These Others, moreover, are not *definite* Others. On the contrary, a n y Other can represent them. What is decisive is just that inconspicuous domination [*Herrschaft*] by Others which has already taken over unawares from Dasein as Being-with. One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. [...] The "who" is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The 'who' is the neuter, *the "they"*. [*SZ* 126]

And so, Dasein's care over the difference between it and other Dasein (distantiality) results in it becoming no different from those others insofar as it becomes the anonymous they-self. The distance between each other is closed down and levelled out by the reign of "how *they* are". This results in the third moment, averageness, which is the 'levelling down [*Einebnung*] of all possibilities of Being' [*SZ* 127]. In averageness, all difference and uniqueness is levelled out to make Dasein, that being which is always responsible for its being, its opposite: utterly anonymous and indistinct.

Thus the "they" maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not, and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional [*vordrängende*] that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. [*SZ* 127]

Again, with this imagery, it is very tempting to read this language as railing against a culture in which nothing new ever happens, in which everything is superficial. However, this is not because things within the world, such as consumerism, newspapers, or public transport, are somehow obstacles to Dasein's freedom. Rather, it is because Dasein has somehow failed to be itself. In the language of §9, it has failed to win itself [*SZ* 42]. Dasein falls into a way of being that is inauthentic by "losing itself" in the they-self. By living as *they* live, Dasein does not feel the burden of its freedom. Implicit already are the claims Heidegger will make later in *SZ*. The "they" "frees" Dasein of its freedom, but to be disburdened is not to be liberated. For Dasein, true freedom is to be itself, and true unfreedom is not to be itself.

In this section, I have shown that Heidegger's concept of unfreedom is not, for example, a determinism, or indeed any form of negative unfreedom, wherein obstacles stand in the way of Dasein's ability to act. Rather, what Heidegger is concerned with, and valuing as unfreedom, is its not-being-itself (*Nichtesselbstsein*). This is a positive determination of unfreedom, in that it refers to the constitution of the self, such that it can act autonomously, rather than to any exterior obstacle. This does not negate the description of Dasein's free relationship with its being in §9 of *Being and Time*, described

in my §2.2. Rather, it is an extension of it, at least as Heidegger sees it. Nevertheless, further investigation is required, and will be taken up in the next chapter.

#### 2 – Conclusion

The last chapter contextualised Heidegger's concept of freedom in relation to Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson. Heidegger argued, in *The Essence of Human Freedom* GA31, that freedom should not be understood as a problem of a particular kind of causality which may or may not be a property of the human will. Rather, freedom should be seen as the fundament of both philosophy and Dasein. Human freedom therefore means not that freedom is a property of humanity but that humanity is made possible by freedom. Freedom, for Heidegger, is the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of being and beings. It is, as he calls in the introduction to *Being and Time*, Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being.

In §2.1, I showed how this latter concept arises from Heidegger's investigation into typical arguments against discussing the problem of the meaning of being, the theme of *Being and Time* as a whole. Heidegger reasons, from the objection that we all know what the word "is" means anyway, that we must have a vague understanding of being that still requires investigation.

In §2.2, I argued that Heidegger interprets this understanding of being, not as a form of intellectual or judgement, but as the way in which Dasein is given access to its being at all, as the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of its being 'as an issue'. This is sufficient to demonstrate that Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being is in line with the concept of freedom that Heidegger points to but does not defend or elaborate on in GA31. I then followed Heidegger's elaboration of Dasein's relation to its being, which by extension is an elaboration of the concept of freedom in GA31, which describes Dasein as unequivocally free with regard to its being. Dasein's being is a possibility, not an actuality: a possible way for it to be. Further, its being is given to it to choose to be one way or the other, leading to authenticity and inauthenticity described as extensions of its freedom, not in opposition to it.

However, in §2.3, following Han-Pile, I discussed Chapter IV of *Being and Time*. There, Heidegger describes Dasein as not being free at all, but rather, in its inauthenticity, given over to a they-self that dominates it and prevents it from being singular, all as part of what Heidegger calls the real dictatorship of the "they". However, what specifically makes Dasein unfree, under the they-self, is not an obstacle in the world, but rather its failure to 'win itself'. Unfreedom is interpreted as Dasein's not-being-itself, which indicates that Heidegger views freedom in line with some kind of "positive" rather than "negative" conception. To refer back to the discussion of traditional concepts of freedom in my introduction, negative concepts of freedom focus on what stops an agent from acting, whilst positive concepts focus on the quality of the agent to act legitimately from itself rather than from some other motivation. This distinction is grounded in Kant's concept of practical freedom, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.

Because Heidegger conceives of "not-being-its-self" as unfreedom, and therefore "being-its-self" as freedom, we should expect freedom to require an act on the part of Dasein rather than something it has as an *a priori* property. But, the problem still remains, as Han-Pile has articulated well, that Heidegger does seem to describe Dasein as something essentially free, insofar as freedom is another name for its pre-ontological understanding of being, and therefore something it has not accidentally but in its being. This means further investigation into the specific nature of the "positive unfreedom" that Dasein has for the most part, which will be my main aim in the next chapter.

So, to this point, I have demonstrated that Heidegger does not want to engage in a debate about the freedom of the will. He further does not want a concept of freedom that has anything to do with causality. However, the concept of positive freedom is definitely a causal concept, since it is concerned with the origin of an act: does it come from a motivation that is authentically mine, or does it come from somewhere else? The next two chapters will address this problem, which does need to be addressed before the question of the apparent contradiction between Dasein's ontological freedom and ontical inauthenticity can be dealt with.

In Chapter 3, I will start this work. I will look at the description of action provided in Chapter 5 of *Being and Time*, and again show how Heidegger does not regard it as free, even though it certainly shows a Dasein that is free in the negative sense. I will then turn to Heidegger's description of falling to show how he reinforces the idea that Dasein's lack of freedom is the result of a failure to be itself, aligned broadly with the positive idea of freedom.

# Chapter 3: Inauthenticity and Dasein's Negative Unfreedom

#### 3 – Introduction

In Chapter 1, I argued that Heidegger's concept of freedom can only be understood within the context of his rejection of the problem of the freedom of the will as developed in *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31]. In that text, Heidegger argues that freedom is not a problem pertaining to some property of the human being, but rather the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of beings. As a problem, freedom is prior to the problems of being and time and the question of the meaning of being, because freedom is the condition of all such questioning. I then turned, in Chapter 2, to *Being and Time* with the intention of clarifying the relationship that this new problem and concept of freedom has with what Heidegger had already said about the question of the meaning of being in this book.

I have argued that the phenomenon Heidegger calls Dasein's "pre-ontological understanding of being" in the introduction to this work is a preliminary concept of freedom. In §9 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger develops this idea further. He drops the term 'pre-ontological understanding of being' [*SZ* 12] and starts to talk about being as 'an issue' [*SZ* 42] for Dasein instead. Dasein's mode of encounter with its being is not an epistemological or metaphysical judging, but something more fundamental. Dasein encounters its being as an issue insofar as it is a possible way for it to be one way or another. Dasein is said to make a decision about how to take up this possibility, such that it can win itself or lose itself. But, at this point, Heidegger has not explained what he means by 'losing itself'. Thus, this chapter will follow this argument further to get a surer understanding of what it means for Dasein to lose itself.

In Chapter IV of *Being and Time*, Heidegger begins to add detail to his concept of inauthenticity. He does this by questioning the nature of Dasein's "self". His answer is that Dasein is typically not itself, and exhibits a state he calls "not-being-its-self" (*Nichtesselbstsein*). Dasein, rather than existing in a way of its own (authentically), exists how "they" exist (inauthentically). Heidegger argues that we typically are the they-self, everyone acting how "they" act and doing the things "they" do. Chapter IV of *Being and Time* paints a picture of Dasein that is, as Han-Pile puts it, 'anything but free' (2013:291).

This seems to leave us with something of a paradox. In §9 and in GA31, Dasein seems to be described as free a priori. However, in the description of the "they", Heidegger describes it as unfree. While I have not yet shown how this apparent paradox can be resolved, I have been able to interpret something of its nature. In examining Heidegger's claims about the they-self, I was able to argue that the state that identifies Dasein as inauthentic is "not-being-itself".<sup>48</sup> Dasein is dominated by 'the real dictatorship of the "they" [SZ 126] insofar as it exists as they exist rather than being something of its own. While I have not yet made the case for the precise meaning of this statement, this is enough to determine that Heidegger views freedom in line with its positive conception - as something Dasein can achieve through a certain comportment rather than something it has by definition of being Dasein, as is the case with negative conceptions of freedom. This means freedom is an achievement rather than a property. However, it is still not clear what this achievement is, what the self is, or even if Heidegger can legitimately claim that Dasein is unfree: Dasein may be inauthentic, but there is no reason in principle why inauthenticity cannot be the result of a choice, and therefore a freely chosen condition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> See Section 2.3

In this chapter, I will argue that Heidegger is consistent in describing Dasein as unfree in its inauthentic state, and consistent in regarding inauthenticity as a failure to make a choice rather than a decision to be inauthentic. For example, in Chapter II of Division II, Heidegger describes the 'bringing-back' involved in heeding the call of conscience to become authentic as having 'that kind of Being *by the neglect of which* Dasein has lost itself inauthenticity' [*SZ* 268]. It may be that another philosophy of freedom is possible that regards this 'neglect' as a free act in itself, but Heidegger wants to regard this neglect as unfree by definition.

I will establish that Heidegger regards the inauthentic comportment of Dasein as unfree, even though it satisfies a negative concept of freedom. In order to do this, it is necessary to understand exactly why Dasein seems to be free before following Heidegger's reasons why it is not. §3.1 will examine the accounts of mood and understanding given in Being and Time respectively. In doing so, I will argue that Heidegger shows that Dasein is thrown into possibilities that it has to be and that therefore its most primordial experience of the world is in terms of these possibilities. In §3.2, I will argue that, although Jean-Paul Sartre was able to construct a concept of absolute freedom on the basis of Heidegger's account of thrown projection, Heidegger does not regard this as sufficient to freedom at all. To do so, I will show how the account of falling can be read as a steadfast demonstration of Dasein's factical unfreedom in the face of its potentiality for freedom. In §3.3, I will show that the very structure that seemed to show Dasein as free actually disposes it towards unfreedom, because Heidegger shows it as filling Dasein with anxiety. This will prepare the way for my next chapter, where I will argue in more detail this is part of Heidegger's deconstruction of the concept of positive freedom.

# 3.1 – Thrown Projection: Possibilities and their Origin

My aim in this chapter is to demonstrate that Heidegger's account of action in Division I of *Being and Time* is intended to be an account of unfreedom rather than freedom. In this section, I will begin with a brief introduction to the relationship between mood and understanding, which is ultimately to be explained as a thrown projection. I will then explore thrownness and disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*) in detail before turning to understanding and projection. Together, they provide an account of action that is immune to determinism as it is usually conceived. But, in the next section, I will show how Heidegger's intention is to show how this structure disposes Dasein towards unfreedom instead.

The arguments in *SZ* that are most explicitly relevant to action are those referring to disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstehen*).<sup>49</sup> These are found in §§29-32 and give both Heidegger's philosophy of action and of knowledge. Indeed, as I will argue in more detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis, for Heidegger there is no real distinction between theory and practice; he argues that understanding and doing, perception and interpretation are aspects of a single structure. However, they can and should be distinguished in analysis.

Heidegger argues that our most primordial interaction with the world is not in the form of intellectual judgement, but in acting within it. As he says when he first introduces this idea in §15,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> My choice to follow Kisiel in translating *Befindlichkeit* is explained below.

What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is in this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. *Before* it does so, a totality of equipment has already been discovered. [*SZ* 69]

The beings within the world that I encounter are primarily given in terms of the possibilities I have to do things with them. With the example of a hammer, Heidegger argues that the hammer is not 'grasped thematically as an occurring Thing' but rather our 'concern subordinates itself to the "in-order-to" which is constitutive for the equipment we are employing at the time.' In other words, the hammer is encountered in terms of what I can do with it, the possibilities it affords me: 'the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become.' [*SZ* 69] The account of disposedness and understanding builds on this insight to show how the possibilities are given through mood and enacted through interpretation.

This is consistent with Heidegger's previous claims, since Dasein's understanding of being has always so far been articulated in terms of possibility. In Chapter 2, I showed that he argues that Dasein's being is nothing but a possibility for it to be one way or another. Dasein is, however, not a subject. Its being is always already outside of itself, in a world. And, as being-in-the-world, it encounters that world in terms of possibilities for it. However, possibility for Dasein is never neutral, but always a possibility for itself. Our most basic encounter with the world therefore, seems to be one of freedom. This is something Heidegger develops in much more detail in his discussion of understanding, which I will turn to in the next section. However, before he starts to talk in detail about how Dasein interacts with the possibilities that the world gives it, he gives an account of their origin through a description of our disposedness to mood. Nevertheless, Heidegger emphasises that both disposedness and understanding are equally fundamental:

Disposedness<sup>50</sup> is *one* of the existential structures in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is *understanding*. Disposedness<sup>51</sup> always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood. [*SZ* 142]

For Heidegger, our basic access to the world, which one would usually expect to be explained through a concept of knowledge, and our ability to do things in that world are one. This emphasises the judiciousness of Heidegger's denomination of the being of Dasein as care (*Sorge*). Care, in its everyday sense, is ambiguous in terms of theory and practice. My care for the other is not simply a theoretical grasp of some fact about them, but is equiprimordially grounded in the possibility of action, in what I would do for them and what they would do for me. In claiming that 'Dasein, when understood *ontologically*, is care' [*SZ* 57], Heidegger already draws attention to the unity of knowing and doing.

The structural moments of care that Heidegger unpacks in Chapter V of *SZ* are disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*), mood (*Stimmung*), understanding (*Verstehen*), and interpretation (*Auslegung*). Disposedness reveals the world to us as possibilities for us through mood. Understanding is not a dispassionate apprehension, but how Dasein "sees" what it can do and how it does what it can do. In Heidegger's concept of understanding, thinking and doing are an inseparable structure grounded on what has already been revealed through mood. This claim is a significant displacement of the classical concept of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> I will consistently replace "state-of-mind" with "disposedness" when quoting the translation. Where a more significant modification of the translation has been required to make the alternate term function, I will point this out in footnotes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Macquarrie and Robinson have here "A [disposedness]", introducing the indefinite article, which is not found in the German original. I will consistently correct this formulation where it occurs in further citations.

mood and emotions, where emotions are something that are an obstacle to the truth rather than the conduit of meaning in the world as such. Ullrich Haase has argued that Heidegger's discussion of mood in *Being and Time* and the lecture course *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* [*GM*] is a critical displacement of the tradition of thinking about emotions. Ultimately, Heidegger demonstrates that mood 'seems to be hybrid, partly objective, partly subjective; yet a hybrid that questions the possibility of analysing its components into those which belong to either pole.' (2000:84) Moods show the 'hybrid' nature of ourselves and the world, of activity and passivity, of knowing and doing.

I will now proceed to give an account of Heidegger's concept of mood and disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*). *Befindlichkeit* is something rare in *SZ*: a neologism. Most of *SZ*'s technical terms are taken from everyday German. *Befindlichkeit*, instead, is an invented word, although it is extrapolated from the German expression "*Wie befinden Sie sich?*", as Macquarrie and Robinson point out in their footnote (Heidegger, 1967:172). This expression translates as "How are you doing?", but literally says something like "How do you find yourself?". *Befindlichkeit* thus says something like "found-li-ness" or, following Richardson, 'having-already-found-ones-self-there-ness' (1963:64), neither of which are acceptable as translations. The former lacks enough grammar to mean anything in English and the latter adds terms including "self" (*Selbst*), "there" (*Da*), and, most damagingly, "one" (*Man*). These are all technical terms, not just in *SZ*, but in the very chapters in which *Befindlichkeit* is found.

The reason Heidegger uses such a term is familiar; he is suspicious of the weight of the tradition involved in other terms he could have used.<sup>52</sup> Heidegger wishes to speak about emotion and mood, but these terms have been used for centuries in inadequate interpretations of the phenomenon. We typically think of emotion as something passive that happens to us, something opposed to reason. Heidegger wishes to talk about emotions radically differently, claiming that it is only through our mood that we can have anything to think about or understand in the first place. The world is primarily given to me through mood. Our concept of emotion is too narrow to cope with this, and so Heidegger coins the term *Befindlichkeit*, as the condition of the possibility of having an answer to the question "How are you doing?". Befindlichkeit is that which is asked about in that question, our capacity for finding ourselves this way or that, in this mood or that mood. This is more than the word "emotion", an object of the consciousness of a neutral subject, can ever express. Mood is not an object for Heidegger, it is that through which the world is understood; its analogue in previous philosophy would be best found, not in the psychology of emotion, but in Edmund Husserl's concept of intentionality. Importantly, Heidegger does not make this allusion himself, but Dreyfus marks it, saying 'moods provide the background for intentionality' and that *Befindlichkeit* is 'an aspect of originary transcendence.' (1991:175)

Because of this, as I will discuss in detail shortly, commentators have pointed out the unsuitability of Macquarrie and Robinson's "state-of-mind", despite admitting the difficulty of any translation at all. The lone point of agreement among the several translators of *Befindlichkeit* is that *Befindlichkeit* is hard to translate. As Gelven puts it, 'I am sympathetic with the difficulties of translators, and in this case I can find no ready substitute.' (1989:80)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Heidegger discusses this issue in §6 of SZ.

Dreyfus articulates the problems with "state-of-mind" as a translation choice well in his commentary on Division I of *SZ*, *Being-in-the-World*.

To translate this term we certainly cannot use the translators' term, "state-ofmind", which suggests, at least to philosophers, a *mental state*, a determinate condition of an isolable, occurrent subject. Heidegger is at pains to show that the sense we have of how things are going<sup>53</sup> is precisely *not* a private mental state. (Dreyfus, 1991:168)

This is a judicious criticism of the translators' choice, but I do not agree with Dreyfus when he says that what 'one needs is an English word that conveys *being found in a situation where things and options already matter.*' (168) This phrase does sum up the concept Heidegger is heading towards. However, it is not necessary that the term selected for the translation literally utter the content of the concept. The German term *Befindlichkeit* itself does not even express its concept on its own, being meaningless outside the context of the text. As the translators of the second edition of the *Beiträge* point out, it is a mistake to 'impose on Heidegger's terminology the extraordinary sense which the ordinary words do eventually assume' rather than to 'invite the reader into the task of disclosing the new sense' by allowing them to read the author's arguments. (Heidegger, 2012:xv-xvi)

Dreyfus settles on 'affectedness' in his commentary, but only reluctantly. This term, for him, 'at least captures our being already affected by things' (1991:168), but this explanation instantly brings in a causal relationship with Dasein as the passive recipient. Heidegger does not only want to say "things affect us". In the second translation of *SZ*, Stambaugh makes the decision to use 'attunement' to translate *Befindlichkeit*, which is also problematic. This is not least because Heidegger also uses the term "*Gestimmtheit*" in the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> This is how Dreyfus, at least at the time, proximally interpreted *Befindlichkeit*.

same passages that Stambaugh also translates as "attunement". Kisiel—though he admits that "attunement" is 'far superior' to state-of-mind, calling the latter 'by far the worst blunder' of the original translation—criticises this decision, not just because it 'conflates with *Gestimmtheit*' on a linguistic level, because, he argues it also conflates the terms philosophically, collapsing the distinction between ontological *Befindlichkeit* and ontical *Gestimmitheit* (2002:67):

In Heidegger's 'formal indication' in first introducing the term, [*Befindlichkeit*] is the existential-ontological expression of the existentiell-ontic [*Gestimmtheit*] of mood. Having a mood may be psychological, but being had by one's situation, being-put-upon by the world, constantly being moved by the 'happening' of life's contexts into 'be-having' in one way or another, is its worldly and ontological counterpart. (Kisiel, 2002:68)

Stambaugh also considered "disposition", but rejected it to 'avoid suggesting that there are psychological connotations carried in Heidegger's analysis of *Befindlichkeit*.' (2010:xxv). Kisiel accepts this, but proposes "disposedness" in order to 'mute its psychological connotations', arguing that '*Befindlichkeit* fully translated refers to *how* one "finds oneself disposed," situated, positioned in and by the world' (68). This decision has since been widely adopted by scholars, including Carman (2007), Blattner (2006), Dahlstrom (2013) and, eventually, even Dreyfus (2011). I will be following this convention.

One clear advantage of disposedness is found when we remember that *Befindlichkeit* is closely tied in with Heidegger's account of possibility. When Heidegger comes to discuss possibility, he explicitly makes the connection between the two concepts: 'As intrinsically disposed [*wesenthaft befindliches*], Dasein has always already got roped into [*hineingeraten*] definite possibilities'<sup>54</sup> [*SZ* 144]. As *befindlich*, Dasein is thrown into possibilities; as being thrown, Dasein is disposed to possibilities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> My translation.

Moving beyond the term, the concept of disposedness is introduced as the ontological companion to mood. 'What we indicate *ontologically* by the term "disposedness" is *ontically* the most familiar and everyday sort of thing; our mood (*Stimmung*), our Being-attuned (*Gestimmtsein*).' [*SZ* 134] The upshot of this statement is that we are dealing with an existential, something 'prior to all psychology of moods' [*SZ* 134], which would only be a description and categorisation of how the moods operate. Heidegger is interested not in how we feel, but in what our being disposed to moods tells us about Dasein's being as such. After emphasising that Dasein always has a mood, as even the 'pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood' [*SZ* 134] that one might experience is grounded in disposedness, Heidegger starts to make ontological claims on the basis of mood. He claims that mood always reveals Dasein's being as thrown and evades it:

In having a mood, Dasein is always disclosed moodwise as that entity to which it has been delivered over in its Being; and in this way it has been delivered over to the Being which, in existing, it has to be. [...] In an *ontico*-existentiell sense, Dasein for the most part evades the Being which is disclosed in the mood. In an *ontologico*-existential sense, this means that even in that to which such a mood pays no attention, Dasein is unveiled in its Being-delivered-over to the "there". In the evasion itself the "there" *is* something disclosed. [*SZ* 134-135]

Dasein's "being-delivered-over to its 'there'" is something Heidegger goes on to term 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*) [*SZ* 135]. Essential to disposedness is the fact that Dasein is thrown into its being. It only 'finds itself [*sich befindet*] in its thrownness' [*SZ* 135]; it does not choose its thrownness, it just is and has to be. As Dreyfus puts it, 'Dasein is thus always given and has to take a stand on what it is.' (1991:173) We could even take this further and say "Dasein is always already given in mood, and only then can take a stand on what it is." Heidegger says that mood is something that discloses 'prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure' [*SZ* 136]. Mood is prior to all choice and intellection. Gelven also emphasises the peculiar "unfreedom" involved in thrownness, putting it that disposedness shows that Dasein always becomes aware of itself in such a way that it is 'influenced by the unalterability of facts' (1989:84). He goes so far as to say that disposedness is 'the mode of awareness by which the *actual* is made significant' (80). This is an apposite phrasing, because disposedness, as Dasein's most basic encounter with being, is the closest we get in *SZ* to an account of perception. Indeed, we are afforded a very brief discussion of the senses in this section:

[...] only because the 'senses' belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of Being is disposed Being-in-the-world [*befindlichen In-der-Welt-sein*]<sup>55</sup> can they be 'touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect. [*SZ* 137]

In other words, disposedness is a fundamental existential of Dasein that is prior even

to the disclosure of the senses, since the senses alone could never have any significance to

Dasein without a mood to make them matter. Mood is that through which Dasein

encounters itself, the world, and others. Heidegger is most clear on this point when he

discusses fear (Furcht). He argues that fear does not result from some high level calculation

of our danger; rather, the object of fear is already disclosed as fearsome by fear itself:

We do not first ascertain a future evil (*malum futurum*) and then fear it. But neither does fearing first take note of what is drawing close; it discovers it beforehand in its fearsomeness. And in fearing, fear can then look at the fearsome explicitly, and 'make it clear' to itself. Circumspection sees the fearsome because it is within the disposedness of fear<sup>56</sup>. Fearing, as a slumbering possibility of disposed Being-in-the-world (we call this possibility 'fearfulness'),

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Macquarrie and Robinson read 'Being-in-the-world with a state-of-mind' and in some cases 'Being-in-the-world in a state-of-mind' (Heidegger, 2010:180). I will always translate "*befindlichen In-der-Welt-sein*" as "disposed being-in-the-world".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> '*Die Umsicht sieht das Furchtbare, weil sie in der Befindlichkeit die Furcht ist.*' Macquarrie and Robinson have 'Circumspection sees the fearsome because it has fear as its state-of-mind'.

has already disclosed the world, in that out of it something like the fearsome may come close. [SZ 141]

Fearing, as a mode of disposed being-in-the-world, is that which reveals the object of fear *as* fearsome, as worthy of fear, in the first place. As Dreyfus puts it, fear is 'an intentional directedness towards something fearsome' (1991:176). Emotions are not something alongside the disclosure of the world, but are a mode of disclosure itself. It is through mood that Dasein has itself, the world, and others disclosed to it, not rationally cognised facts or neutrally perceived sense data, but by being disposed towards their being in a mood that always already makes it matter to Dasein.

I have argued that Heidegger describes Dasein as thrown into its being. Its being is, in thrownness, primarily disclosed by its mood, its disposedness, its *Befindlichkeit*. Mood discloses Dasein's being to itself. It allows its being to be an issue for it because, and only because, Dasein is mood. Understanding is a phenomenon linked to disposedness, 'Equiprimordial with [disposedness] in constituting Dasein's Being is *understanding*. Disposedness always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood.' [*SZ* 142]

Heidegger's account of understanding recalls arguments from §9, along with the account of equipmentality in §15. He has already argued that *Seinsverständnis*, Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being, gives being as a possibility. Dasein's being is a possibility, not actuality. It is Dasein's "ownmost" possibility. This is because its essence lies in its "to be". Dasein is not a static entity present-at-hand and already equal to its being. Its being is a possible way for it to be. As Heidegger will go on to describe it, it is a potentiality-for-Being (*Seinkönnen*). Further, this potentiality-for-Being is not any

possibility, but *je meines*, in each case mine. It always belongs to Dasein as something it can choose or avoid, win or lose, be or fail to be.

When, in §31, Heidegger turns to understanding (*Verstehen*), he gives a fuller philosophical account of the link between being and possibility for Dasein. In doing so, he repeatedly emphasises that understanding is linked to possibility: 'As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities' [*SZ* 145]. But, as with the understanding of Dasein's being, these possibilities belong to it as something it can do. '*Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being and it is so in such a way that this being discloses in itself what its Being is capable of.' [<i>SZ* 144] Understanding for Heidegger is always an understanding of the capacity to act; knowing is primarily "know how",

As such understanding [Dasein] 'knows' *what* it is capable of—that is, what its potentiality-for-Being is capable of. This 'knowing' does not first arise from an immanent self-perception, but belongs to the Being of the "there", which is essentially understanding. And only *because* Dasein, in understanding, is its "there", *can* it go astray and fail to recognize itself. [*SZ* 144]

As argued at the start of this section, Heidegger is arguing that thinking and doing, *theoria* and *praxis*, are a unitary phenomenon that cannot be separated philosophically. Understanding is not an account of knowledge in the sense of epistemology, but of the ontological origin of the fact that Dasein "sees" the possibilities afforded it by mood. The implication here is twofold. It means all understanding is possibility, and all understanding is tied to action or inaction, precisely because these possibilities are possibilities for me. Rhetorically raising the question for the explanation of this, Heidegger introduces the concept of projection:

Why does the understanding—whatever may be the essential dimensions of that which can be disclosed in it—always press forward into possibilities? It is because

the understanding has in itself the existential structure which we call "projection"<sup>57</sup> [Entwurf]. [SZ 145]

Dasein is thrown into possibilities, disposed towards them by its mood. Projection is

how Dasein interprets these possibilities and itself in the world,

The character of understanding as projection is constitutive for Being-in-theworld with regard to the disclosedness of its existentially constitutive state-of-Being by which the factical potentiality-for-Being gets its leeway. And as thrown, Dasein is thrown into the kind of Being which we call "projecting". Projecting has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accord and with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. [SZ 144]

This projection was already implied in the discussion of the hammer. It is because of projection that the hammer can appear as something handy for that for the sake of which I am working. Because understanding is projection onto possibilities, the entities Dasein encounters are so encountered on the basis of how it can help it do what it is doing.

Heidegger develops this ability of Dasein to see or encounter possibilities by talking about three types of sight (*Sicht*): circumspection (*Umsicht*) as the sight that sees the possibilities of concern, of entities within the world; considerateness (*Rücksicht*) as the sight of solicitude, the mode of care dealing with the other; and transparency (*Durchsichtigkeit*), through which Dasein can encounter its own being [*SZ* 146]. Dasein "sees" its possibilities, therefore, rather than cognizing or intuiting them: "Intuition" and "thinking" are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones at that'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> As Maquarrie and Robinson note, *Entwurf* and *entwerfen* have the basic meaning of throwing something away from oneself. As such, it links explicitly with the word translated as thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), such that "thrown projection" (*geworfen Entwurf*) could read "thrown throwing". As the translators point out, although etymologically "projection" has a similar sense of "throwing", it has died out, although it can be heard in terms such as "projectile". See the translators' notes (Heidegger, 1967:185).

[*SZ* 147]. In the following section, Heidegger goes into more detail about how understanding achieves this non-rational insight by introducing a further concept: interpretation (*Auslegung*).

The projecting of the understanding has its own possibility—that of developing itself. This development of the understanding is what we call "interpretation". In it the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it. In interpretation, understanding does not become something different. It becomes itself. Such interpretation is grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from the former. [*SZ* 148]

Interpretation is the process therefore of understanding becoming itself. This is an important addition to the account, as it rules out the possibility of projection being a transcendental activity of Dasein, at least in the Kantian sense. It is not that projection is accomplished *a priori* to experience, but rather that it plays itself out in experience. Understanding happens in time, and the name Heidegger gives to this "happening" is interpretation. However, interpretation is not something we do at the cognitive level. It is constitutive of experience, not something imposed on it:

In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets out by the interpretation. [*SZ* 150]

In interpretation, understanding places entities within the "as structure", i.e, the hammer is interpreted *as* handy for me *in order to* complete building the table that *for-the-sake-of-which* is all of my work. This is the primary form of encounter with the world. 'When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us *as a failure to understand it any more.* This grasping which is free of the "as", is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one *merely* understands.' [*SZ* 149]. Returning then to the question of action, all understanding as projection is a matter of Dasein interpreting the possibilities of

its being. Therefore, projection is, in a negative sense, freedom. But, Heidegger explicitly denies the moniker of libertarian when he rejects the concept of the liberty of indifference, i.e. the ability to select between given options:

Possibility, as an *existentiale*, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being in the sense of the 'liberty of indifference' (*libertas indifferentiae*). As intrinsically disposed, Dasein has always already got roped into definite possibilities. As the potentiality-for-Being which [it] *is*, it has let such possibilities pass by; it is constantly waiving the possibilities of its being, or else it seizes upon them and makes mistakes. But this means that Dasein is Being-possible which has been delivered over to itself—*thrown possibility* through and though. [*SZ* 144]<sup>58</sup>

Having been 'roped into' possibilities by thrownness, Dasein, in understanding, encounters those possibilities as possible ways for it to be and acts on them or avoids them. In one sense of the word, then, we can said that Dasein is free, because we have satisfied the criterion of "ability to do otherwise".<sup>59</sup> Dasein can act and must act. Before any charge of causal determinism can be laid, Dasein already deals with its possibilities, including the possibility of accusing itself of being causally determined. However, things are not so simple. Heidegger continues, 'Dasein is the possibility of Being-free [*Freisein*] *for* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. Its Being-possible is transparent to itself in different possible ways and degrees.' [*SZ* 144] Dasein is the possibility of being free, but *only* the possibility. Dasein is still inauthentic:

Understanding *can* devote itself primarily to the disclosedness of the world; that is, Dasein can, proximally and for the most part, understand itself in terms of its world. Or else understanding throws itself primarily into the "for-the-sake-of-which"; that is, Dasein exists as itself. [*SZ* 146]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Translation modified.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> See Section 1.2

Because Heidegger's depiction of action values it as still only potentially free, and *a fortiori* unfree, it clear that he does not view action and freedom as identical. This means he does not have a negative conception of freedom, as does Sartre. Sartre views freedom in the ultimately Cartesian sense of the ability to do otherwise. This is a negative conception of freedom that is only interested in whether some obstacle in the world or my psyche prevents me from being the causal origin of my actions. Positive concepts of freedom, however, set a higher standard for freedom insofar as they only regard some acts, not all acts, as free.<sup>60</sup> Dasein's thrown projections into its ability to be this way or otherwise in a world that is only manifest in terms of such possibilities is therefore not freedom. External concepts of freedom may interpret Dasein as free, but Heidegger does not.

In this section, I started by giving an overview of the relationship between mood and disposedness on the one hand and understanding and projection on the other. This offers a picture of Dasein as finding itself amongst possibilities that are not of its making, but about which it is ultimately is able to do something about. This satisfies a negative criterion of freedom, but not Heidegger's conception of freedom. This adds further evidence that Heidegger's conception of freedom is positive. To gather more, I must analyse in more detail how Heidegger's argument continues by showing how Dasein's being as thrown projecting care leads to unfreedom, rather than freedom, in the concept of falling.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> See my discussion of positive and negative freedom in the Introduction of this thesis.

#### 3.2 – Falling: Dasein's Typical Unfreedom

In the last section, I argued that Heidegger's description of the basic constitution of Dasein's "there" as thrown projection does not give an account of freedom, but rather only of potential freedom. Dasein is thrown into possibilities and understandingly projects on the basis of them, throwing itself according to what it aims towards, but it is only potentially free in doing so. While an external concept of freedom, i.e. one not shared by Heidegger, could value this comportment as free, he does not. In this section, I will follow Heidegger's thread further to the phenomenon of falling (*verfallen*). I will first give a brief overview of the concept before turning to each aspect of falling in turn. I will show that falling can be read as a consistent attempt, by Heidegger, to demonstrate the unfreedom of care and to isolate its cause.

In Chapter 5 of Division I, Heidegger goes into more detail about how the "they" disburdens Dasein of its being in the discussion of falling (*Verfallen*). Throughout all this, the concept of disclosure (*Unverborgenheit*) is operative, and we are therefore in the vicinity of the Heideggerian concept of truth.<sup>61</sup> This follows on from the discussion of *Bewendenlassen*, in that unfreedom is the "covering up" of the being of an entity, which is only set free when the being is unveiled and disclosed in its proper way. However, whereas the discussion of *Bewendenlassen* deals with entities that are present-at-hand or ready-to-hand, the question of the being of Dasein is always a question of something that is an issue

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> The relation of freedom and truth in *Sein und Zeit* and the later claim in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* that freedom is the essence of truth will be discussed in Chapter 5. It is a matter of controversy in the scholarship and as such cannot be treated in sufficient detail here, where our task is a preliminary reading of the concept of freedom itself rather than its relation to other key concepts.

for it. The being of objects is 'neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite' [*SZ* 42], but for Dasein this issue is critical and is a question of how it lives.

In saying that Dasein is proximally and for the most part inauthentic, Heidegger claims that Dasein's being is usually covered up, that it is usually unfree. However, Dasein's being is not covered up by accident, but covered up by a way of being of Dasein itself: the theyself. The "they" levels down the possibilities of a being that is essentially possibility, and renders average and everyday a being that is essentially something of its own.

Heidegger presents three aspects of falling: idle talk (*Gerede*); curiosity (*Neuier*); and ambiguity (*Zweideutigkeit*). Idle talk and curiosity are both negative moments of existentialia. Both work against the "intention" or authentic possibility of their parent structures to cover up rather than reveal. Idle talk is grounded in discourse (*Rede*). Rather than revealing being and the world to Dasein as in discourse proper, idle talk covers it up and renders it unspectacular and manageable:

> Discourse, which belongs to the essential state of Dasein's Being and has a share in constituting Dasein's disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk. And when it does so, it serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up the entities within-the-world. [...] The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing [*Erchliessen*] into an act of closing off [*Verschliessen*]. [*SZ* 169]

Idle talk is speaking about things how "they" speak about them. '[Idle talk] does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of *gossiping* and *passing the word along*.' [*SZ* 168] In it, language loses its connection with what was originally spoken about and the words themselves are passed on in a common sense that always fails to understand in a genuine way while at the same time appearing to be a genuine understanding,

This closing-off is aggravated afresh by the fact that an understanding of what is talked about is supposedly reached in idle talk. Because of this, idle talk discourages any new inquiry and any disputation, and in a peculiar way suppresses them and holds them back. [*SZ* 169]

As idle talk is grounded in language and works against its potential by covering up rather than disclosing, curiosity is grounded in circumspection and works against it. Circumspection (*Umsicht*) is the form of "sight" that informs Dasein's practical involvements in its environment (*Umwelt*). It is through circumspection that reveals the asand for-structure of being-in-the-world. Through it, Dasein "sees" that the hammer can be used as a tool for making the table for some other. In curiosity, circumspection is used without this practical insight, and Dasein merely gapes at the world and enjoys it:

In rest, concern does not disappear; circumspection, however, becomes free [*frei werden*] and is no longer bound to the world of work [*Werkwelt*]. [...] When circumspection has been set free [*freigewordene Umsicht*], there is no longer anything ready-to-hand which we must concern ourselves with bringing close. [...] Care becomes concern with the possibilities of seeing the 'world' merely as it *looks* while one tarries and takes a rest. [*SZ* 172]

So, as with idle talk, curiosity is a way of running a fundamental existential against the grain, performing its opposite function. Circumspection, in pragmatic concern, is the means of tarrying alongside the entities within the world of work with a clear pragmatic aim. Curiosity, in contrast, 'is characterised by a specific way of *not tarrying* alongside what is closest' [*SZ* 172]. Heidegger also explicitly states that, like idle talk, curiosity functions as a way of avoiding an authentic relationship with being by avoiding understanding: 'When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but *just* in order to see.' [*SZ* 172] Further, idle talk and curiosity perpetuate each other,

Idle talk controls even the ways in which one may be curious. It says what one "must" have read and seen. In being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is

delivered over to idle talk. These two everyday modes of Being for discourse and sight are not just present-at-hand side by side in their tendency to uproot [*Entwurzelungstendenz*], but *either* of these ways-to-be drags the *other* one with it. [*SZ* 173]

Idle talk and curiosity also work with the third moment of falling: ambiguity. Heidegger is not using this term to describe widespread ontical confusion, but general ontological confusion. Idle talk and curiosity pass off inauthentic and groundless assertion and discovery as authentic and sufficient understanding. This makes it difficult for Dasein to determine what is and what is not a genuine insight. 'Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, genuinely taken hold of, genuinely spoken, though at bottom it is not; or else it does not look so, and yet at bottom it is.' [*SZ* 174] Ambiguity also feeds idle talk and curiosity by 'always tossing to curiosity that which it seeks; and it gives idle talk the semblance of having everything decided in it.' [*SZ* 174]

Heidegger describes this phenomenon as falling (*Verfallen*), not out of a 'negative evaluation' but to 'signify that Dasein is proximally and for the most part *alongside* the "world" of its concern' [*SZ* 175]. Dasein is usually immersed in its world, idly talking, being curious, within ambiguity and lost in the "they". This is to say, it spends most of its time living in such a way that its being and the being of its world are covered up rather than disclosed and revealed. It lives in an ontological ignorance, absorbed in its world:

This "absorption in..." has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the "they". Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has falling into the 'world'. "Fallenness" into the 'world' means an absorption in Being-with-on-another, in so far as the latter is guided by idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. [*SZ* 175]

Heidegger is then quick to remind us of what he has already said in §9, which is that inauthenticity does not signify 'really not [*eigentlich nicht*]'. Saying that Dasein has "lost itself" or "is not itself" is not to say that Dasein can 'altogether lose its Being', but that in

its being Dasein has the capacity to hide that being from itself, to act as though it were not the being it is [*SZ* 176]:

Not-being-its-self [*Das Nicht-es-selbst-sein*] functions as a *positive* possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world. This kind of *not-Being* has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part. So neither must we take the fallenness of Dasein as a 'fall' from a purer and higher 'primal status'. Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically, but ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues for Interpreting it. [*SZ* 176]

In truth, Heidegger will not characterise what he means by not-being-itself until his description of the authentic self. His emphasis is deliberately negative here, only warning us not to view authenticity as a form-like essence of which inauthentic Dasein falls short. This interpretation of Dasein's being has already been precluded by the claims in §9: Dasein's essence lies in its "to be", not in a static set of properties present-at-hand. Dasein's being is a possible way of being, not its former, primordial origin.<sup>62</sup>

Dasein's unfreedom is therefore found in its absorption in its world, understanding itself in such a way that its being is covered over. Inauthentic Dasein is not itself, it is the they-self. It acts as "they" act, understands as "they" understand, and maintains itself in idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity, losing itself in the determination of others rather than determining itself. Unfreedom in *SZ* is not-being-its-self. In the next section, I will turn to at Heidegger's account of the authentic self and complete my account of the concept of freedom in *Sein und Zeit*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Here Heidegger is working against the terms he has selected. By describing Dasein's inauthentic state as "fallen", Heidegger invokes "The Fall" in the Judeo-Christian sense of Adam and Eve's expulsion from Eden after gaining knowledge of good and evil. This is not an accident. As we will see in the next section, Heidegger does wish to work within these terms, but in a sense that is beyond good and evil, ridding these terms of their ethical and theological baggage.

In this section, I have discussed Heidegger's concept of falling. Heidegger argues that care disposes Dasein towards unfreedom, rather than freedom. Dasein's world is given to it as possibilities for it, but this does not lead Dasein towards mastery of its world or of itself. Instead, Dasein throws itself into its world, fleeing into it in order to not to be itself. Dasein acts as they act in the world, as they are in the world, in order to disburden itself of freedom. I will conclude this chapter in the next section by examining Heidegger's argument for anxiety as the cause of falling, and therefore unfreedom.

## 3.3 – Anxiety as the Origin of Inauthenticity and Unfreedom

I have shown that Heidegger presents Dasein's basic structure as care and describes this in such a way that it can satisfy some concepts of freedom. Dasein is given to possibilities that it must do something about, not actualities that can do something to it. Nevertheless, Heidegger does not value Dasein as free, but only potentially free. I have developed this idea by following Heidegger's description of falling. Dasein absorbs itself in its world in the mode of not-being-its-self. It immerses itself in a world of things and tries to be as much like a thing as is ontologically possible for it. This is, for Heidegger, the natural consequence of Dasein's being as care. Because it is given to these possibilities, it is disposed to absorbing itself in those possibilities rather than being something of its own. In this section, I will follow Heidegger's initial discussion of anxiety as the explanation for Dasein's fleeing into the world in falling rather than owning itself in freedom.

Heidegger argues that Dasein is for the most part inauthentic, which is to say, it is usually unfree. His descriptions of inauthenticity often seem pejorative, although he insists at several points that this is not a moral doctrine, and that inauthenticity is an inevitable consequence of the sort of being that Dasein is. He goes further to say that *'authentic* existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon.' [*SZ* 179] So, inauthenticity is not a moral failing, it is a necessary feature of existence, and authenticity is only another way of taking up our everydayness.

Dasein encounters its being understandingly as an issue. This means that its being is only possibility, and that this possibility is something that can be won or lost. However, if we follow what Heidegger says about fallenness, not only is the possibility of authenticity versus inauthenticity intrinsic to Dasein, but a tendency towards inauthenticity is too, insofar as anything can be said to be intrinsic to an entity defined in this way.

Dasein tends towards inauthenticity. The reason for this is that Dasein's being is a burden. This is a theme taken up strongly in Division II of *SZ*, but has already been hinted at by Heidegger in the discussion of the "they" and fallenness. Inauthenticity disburdens Dasein of its existence; it relieves it of the burden of its freedom where the primary experience of its freedom is in anxiety. We have seen Heidegger describe falling as "tempting" and "tranquilising". Dasein does not, proximally and for the most part, *want* to be itself. It loses itself in the "they" through the phenomenon of falling:

Dasein's absorption in the "they" and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing before itself<sup>63</sup> [*vor ihm Selbst*]—before itself as an authentic potentiality-for-being-its-Self. [*SZ* 184]

Heidegger's discussion of anxiety adds a concrete foundation to these claims. Dasein's flight from itself is found in the disposedness (*Befindlichkeit*) of anxiety. Heidegger sees fear

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Macquarrie and Robinson have 'fleeing in the face of itself'.

as a mode of disposedness; it is a mood that reveals an object to us. That object is something fearsome within the world, an object detrimental to our existence. Anxiety, as disposedness, must dispose us towards a phenomenon as well. However, Heidegger contrasts fear with anxiety by saying that the "object" of fear is not an entity within the world, but Dasein's being itself:

Out Interpretation of fear as disposedness has shown that in each case that in the face of which we fear is a detrimental entity within-the-world which comes from some definite region but is close by and is bring itself close, and yet might stray away. In falling, Dasein turns away from i t s e l f. That in the face of which it thus shrinks back must, in any case, be an entity with the character of threatening; yet this entity has the same kind of Being as the one that shrinks back: it is Dasein itself. [*SZ* 185]

In drawing a distinction between anxiety (Angst) and fear (Furcht), as Dreyfus points

out (1991:176), Heidegger is following a pattern set by Kierkegaard. He identifies two

characteristics of anxiety as differentiating it from fear. The first, as discussed immediately

above, is that the "object" of fear is Dasein and not an entity within the world. The second

is that whilst fear is a flight away from an entity within the world, anxiety is a flight towards

the entities within the world, the flight of falling:

Thus the [anxious] turning-away of falling is not a fleeing that is founded upon a fear of entities within the world. Fleeing that is so grounded is still less a character of this turning-away, when what this turning-away does is precisely to *turn thither* towards entities within-the-world by absorbing itself in them. *The turning-away of falling is grounded rather in anxiety, which in turn is what first makes fear possible.* [*SZ* 186]

Anxiety is said here to be the condition of the possibility of fear because, in order to so encounter entities within the world that may or may not be fearsome, Dasein must have already fallen into that world. This makes anxiety a fundamentally important phenomenon, as it makes everydayness possible in the first place. In order to live in the world, Dasein must have already fled from its own being towards the world itself. As in fear, in anxiety Dasein is disposed to something threatening: not a potentiality detrimental entity within the world, but to its ownmost possibility, its being; it is not a being within the world but being-in-the-world as such:

That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere*. Anxiety 'does not know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is. [...] Therefore that which threatens cannot bring itself close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already 'there', and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it is nowhere. [...] The obstinacy of the "nothing and nowhere within-the-world" means as a phenomenon that *the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety*. [SZ 186-187]

Anxiety does not relate us to any entity having a definite place, because it relates us to our being, to our capacity to encounter any entities in the first place. As such, it is everywhere and nowhere. Our being has no place because it is the condition of the possibility of place. It is nowhere, but it is 'so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath' [*SZ* 186] because we are it, our being itself is what is "feared". The reason for this, as I will argue in more detail in the next two chapters, is that our being calls us to our existential responsibility for meaning in the world. As I established in Chapters 1 and 2, Heidegger's preliminary description of freedom is as the 'condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings' [GA31 303/207]. This can now be further qualified through Heidegger's account of the relationship between disposedness, understanding, and interpretation. It is we ourselves who are responsible for the meanings we encounter as being-in-the-world, and without us they would have no meaning:

The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the "nothing and nowhere", does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so little importance in themselves that on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself. What oppresses us is not this or that, nor is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the *possibility* of the ready-to-hand in general, that is to say, it is the world itself. [*SZ* 187]

Dasein is the ground of meaning, it is its world. In anxiety, Dasein encounters its own being genuinely, being disposed towards the truth of its position as what Heidegger will go on to call the "null basis of nullity", the ground of all meaning in its world. Dasein grounds its world, but is not grounded itself, it is thrown into its facticity alone. Anxiety is Dasein's weighty sense of its existential freedom as an issue:

> Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being—that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being free for (propensio in...)* the authenticity of its being, and for this authenticity as a possibility which it always is. [*SZ* 188]

Anxiety makes Dasein's 'being-free for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself': anxiety reveals the path towards Dasein's positive freedom. Whilst as an understanding thrown projection, surrounded by its possibilities, 'Dasein is the possibility of Being-free [*Freisein*] *for* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being' [*SZ* 144], in anxiety Dasein has transitioned to this possibility. In this mood, Dasein comes face to face with this "being free for the freedom of choosing itself", being free for freedom.

And yet, the response in anxiety to this freedom is flight from it. Dasein's potential for freedom is burdensome, and the flight of falling relieves it of this burden. The "they", says Heidegger, has the "benefit" of 'disburdening [Dasein] of its Being' [*SZ* 127-9]. Michael Zimmerman puts this point well, saying that when Dasein becomes inauthentic 'it allows its tendency toward concealment to hold sway completely. In falling away from' itself, Dasein conceals from itself the fact that it is Being-in-the-world, i.e., finite, historical power-to-be.' (1975:122)

Thus, Heidegger's discussion of anxiety demonstrates the necessity of falling. Falling must occur because Dasein's being is something about which it is anxious. Falling

disburdens Dasein of this anxiety by covering it up. Were Dasein unable to do this, it would be unable to function in the everyday. Nevertheless, the task now remains to show how Dasein may take up this being in authenticity.

In this section, I have argued that Heidegger sees falling as a result of the basic mood that is anxiety. Dasein's being, as he says in §9, is an issue for it. In this section, I have shown that this is because Dasein is anxious about its being. Care, which seemed to guarantee freedom since it reveals Dasein as a thrown projection into possibilities, leads to its unfreedom. Dasein's responsibility for its world and its being is revealed through mood, but that mood is anxiety. Anxiety is uncanny and uncomfortable, and so Dasein selfmedicates by falling into a world that delivers it from its freedom.

### 3 – Conclusion

This chapter has explored the problem left at the end of Chapter 2: that Dasein, structurally, should be free but Heidegger consistently describes it as anything but free. I have clarified the reason for this by turning to Heidegger's description of care. In §3.1, I showed that Heidegger's depiction of Dasein as a thrown projection satisfies some concepts of freedom. Dasein has always the ability to do otherwise. However, Heidegger insists that Dasein only has the potential to be free rather than actually being free. In §3.2, I argued that Heidegger's depiction of falling explains this. Falling is what Dasein does with its ability to be: it tries not to be itself. It falls into its world trying to be like they are and like things within the world are: not free, not possibility, and not anxious. This latter structure was the topic of §3.3, where I argued that the discussion of anxiety as the reason for falling gives us the explanation of Heidegger's valuation of care as unfreedom rather than freedom. For Heidegger, Dasein's possibilities are revealed to it through mood, and its ownmost possibility, its being, is revealed through anxiety. Because Dasein's being makes it anxious, it flees it, and tries to be as little like it as possible.

At this point, it cannot be doubted that Heidegger conceives of freedom in its "positive" form. Not all acts are free. Only special acts are free. However, the specific nature of this positive conception of freedom is not clear in *Being and Time*. While Division II does talk about a "freedom towards death", this is not illuminating but itself requires illumination. Further, it is not clear how Heidegger can consistently have a positive conception of freedom, since such a concept of freedom typically exhibits the following claims that he has explicitly disavowed: that freedom is a form of causality attributed to the human will; that authentic selfhood is characterised by rational subjectivity; and that emotions are what make us unfree. For Heidegger, freedom is not a causality, not an act of will, and it is given through mood rather than frustrated by it.

Heidegger is acting within the idea of positive freedom, but only through a critical deconstruction of this concept that renders it almost unrecognisable. This latter issue is why Heidegger's concept is so obscure. Where it has been identified as a positive concept, it has been misrepresented as merely another apology for self-actualisation. And, where it has not, it has been split up into separate concepts in order to patch over the inconsistencies that follow from trying to interpret a positive conception of freedom as a negative one. In the next chapter, I will argue that *Being and Time* deconstructs and responds to a positive conception of freedom.

# Chapter 4: *Being and Time*'s Implicit Deconstruction of Positive Freedom

#### 4 – Introduction

In Chapter 3, I argued that Heidegger regards Dasein as unfree, for the most part. Typically, Dasein is inauthentic, and not something of its own. This is in spite of the fact that it encounters its world in terms of possibility, and as such can never be determined by that world. Dasein is thrown into its world as something that it has to be. But, rather than being an obstacle to its freedom, this possibility becomes a reason for its unfreedom. Dasein falls into its world because its being, which is only encountered as its ownmost possibility, fills it with anxiety. Dasein throws itself deeper and deeper into its world, therefore, in order to disburden itself of the weight of this angst. Heidegger values this state as having the potential to be free, but not the actuality. In fallenness, Dasein is inauthentic, and unfree.

Heidegger's position is recognisably a positive conception of freedom, therefore. Negative concepts of freedom regard any capacity to act that is not frustrated by an exterior force as free. Holders of a positive conception of freedom take this latter capacity for granted, but only regard acts as free if they spring from the self. In Heidegger's language, acts must be authentic in order to be free. However, Heidegger has argued that Dasein does not have a self in the sense of character or being a subject. In fact, he claims that when Dasein says "I" the loudest, it is least itself. Further, as I argued in the conclusion to my last chapter, positive freedom also typically exhibits the claims that freedom is a form of causality attributed to the human will and that emotions are what make us unfree. But, as I showed in Chapter 1, Heidegger argues in *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31] that causation cannot interpret human action because it is about relations in the present. Indeed, in the concept of a causal relation, that which relates must be fully actual, or else a necessary connection cannot obtain. Dasein and its world are possibilities, not actualities. Further, in Heidegger's account of mood that I analysed in §3.1, Heidegger claims that mood is the origin of possibility, and therefore of action; mood cannot be an obstacle to freedom.

My aim in this chapter is to defend my claim that Heidegger has a positive conception of freedom by performing a critical reading of arguments of *Being and Time* to show a hidden relation with Kant and Bergson, who both have positive conceptions of freedom. *Being and Time* makes claims that can only be understood as the result of a deconstruction of the positive conception of freedom out of a confrontation with Kant and Bergson. I will show that Heidegger cannot subscribe to either Kant or Bergson's position on their own, but through a critical confrontation with both he develops his own position.

In §4.1, I will give more background to the positive conception of freedom in general and how Kant and Bergson take up the problem of freedom through it. §4.2 and §4.3 will follow Kant's concept of positive freedom, following Heidegger's critique of it in GA31, and show that he conceives it in the categorical imperative as a "pure willing". In §4.3, I will show how Bergson responds to Kant's position in his own way, even through his transformation of the problem of freedom, and develops his own idea of freedom as an act of the "whole self". In §4.5, I will show how Heidegger's concept of authenticity and the task of conceiving Dasein "as a whole" responds and develops these ideas. Once this connection is understood, Heidegger's picture of positive freedom can be understood, and finally be structurally exposed in my final chapter.

#### 4.1 – Positive Freedom, Autonomy, and Authenticity

In this chapter, I will show how Heidegger develops his own concept of positive freedom in confrontation with Kant and Bergson. In this section, I will lay the groundwork for this argument. I will first give an introduction to the positive conception of freedom in general, and then speak broadly about how it is developed in Kant and Bergson, in preparation for the more detailed discussion that follows.

In *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], Heidegger claims that positive freedom is an ambiguous concept because it is removed from the most common experiences of freedom. Freedom, argues Heidegger, is most easily understood and most commonly experienced in its negative form:

Wherever a knowledge of freedom is awakened it is initially comprehended in the negative sense, as 'independence from'. This prominence of *negative* freedom, indeed perhaps of the negative as such, is due to the fact that *being*-free is experienced as *becoming*-free from a bond. Breaking free, casting off fetters, overcoming constrictive forces and powers, must be a fundamental human experience by which freedom, understood negatively, comes clearly into the light of knowledge. [GA31 20/15]

Freedom in the negative sense is easiest to understand. It is freedom from chains, not having any obstacle in one's way. Positive freedom is, however, harder to determine due to the variety of forms it can take: 'In comparison with this clear and seemingly unambiguous definition of negative freedom, the characterization of positive freedom is obscure and ambiguous. The 'experience' of this wavers and is subject to particular modifications.' [GA31 20/15] While the experience of negative freedom is almost universal, the experience of positive freedom differs in particular cases. The reason for this, Heidegger seems to imply, is its relation to selfhood: Negative freedom means freedom from... compulsion, a breaking loose, releasement. Freedom in the positive sense does *not* mean the 'away-from...', but rather the 'toward-which'; positive freedom means being free for..., being open *for*..., thus *oneself* being open for..., allowing *oneself* to be determined through..., determining oneself to... This means to determine one's own action purely through *oneself*, to give to oneself the law for one's action.[GA31 20-21/15]

Positive freedom means self-determination, an experience that is by definition less

universal. Here, Heidegger already has his focus on Kant's concept of positive freedom,

which is appropriate since Kant does give these concepts their name. Positive concepts of

freedom regard the human as being in a typical state of unfreedom that can be overcome

by some form of self-transformation. Isaiah Berlin, the most frequent reference point in

textbooks discussions of positive and negative freedom, defines it, in 'Two Concepts of

Liberty', in the following way:

The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer – deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them. (Berlin, 2002:178)

Positive freedom, then, is about self-legislation or autonomy, being master of one's own self. As Heidegger puts it, 'The positive concept of freedom means *autonomy* of the will, *giving laws unto oneself*.' [GA 24/17] Autonomy, the positive conception of freedom, requires a modification of the self such that it acts from itself, on behalf of itself, through itself alone. As such, positive conceptions of freedom always relate to a concept of the self and valuations of that self as free and unfree, which is why Heidegger's concept of authenticity, which is also about the self, comes out of his reflection on the fundamental freedom of Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being.<sup>64</sup> However, authenticity cannot be any normal concept of autonomy, since Heidegger rejects the idea that freedom is a property of the will and the idea that Dasein has a stable self. Dasein is, instead, volatile and its only stable self is the pseudo-stability of the "they" self, his concept of unfreedom. However, Heidegger has transformed the concept of positive freedom, In the remainder of this section, I will give an outline of the role of Kant and Bergson's concepts of the same in this transformation.

As I will show in §4.2 and §4.3, Kant conceives of practical freedom as a rational agent's ability to legislate itself out of the moral law. The rational agent is free, if and only if, it determines its action out of reason itself, i.e. if it commits to the categorical imperative. This concept of autonomy is essentialist. We are not autonomous when we act out of our individual desires but when we act out of our essence. To be autonomous in Kant is to be purely rational in our actions, to let the universal moral law alone determine our actions in pure practical reason.

Bergson also thinks of freedom in terms of autonomy. However, this autonomy is not essentialist but particularist. As he puts it, 'we are free when our acts spring from our whole personality, when they express it, when they have that indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds between the artist and his work.' (2001:172) In contrast, our actions are not free if they originate in habit or semi-conscious psychological motivations.

Bergson further introduces a dynamic of a 'parasitic self' in contrast to the 'fundamental self' (166). The parasitic self is described as a crust stifling the ineffable

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> See Chapter 2

volatility of the fundamental self, the amalgamation of dogmatic education, advice from friends, and habit. When it is master, we are not free. We are only free in the rare occasion that our fundamental or 'deep-seated' (169) self bursts through this crust. In such a moment, the action is, for Bergson, an act of the whole self, not a part of it.

Heidegger's own arguments about freedom as authentic being-towards-death presuppose a response to the two concepts of autonomy described above. The response to Kant is partially given in GA31, however the response to Bergson, as is typical for Heidegger's dealings with the French philosopher, is never written. It is, rather, part of what Massey refers to as the 'subterranean influence' (2015:3), whereby Heidegger uses Bergson as a 'touchstone, returning to his thought over and over again' (16).<sup>65</sup>

Heidegger's response to Kant and Bergson's treatment of positive freedom has two dimensions. First and foremost, Heidegger rejects the interpretation of freedom offered by both philosophers, as I argued in Chapter 1. Both Heidegger and Bergson regard the problem of the freedom of the will, treated in an exemplary way by Kant, as failing to grasp the phenomenon due to an inadequate concept of time. For Bergson, we need to determine human action through the time of duration rather than the spatialized time of the sciences. For Heidegger, the problems with understanding freedom certainly come from the concept of time, but also from the concept of being; or, more specifically, they

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Massey (2015) raises a similar point, saying 'Although Heidegger says nothing in *Being* and *Time* about Bergson's distinction between two aspects of the self [...] his interpretation of authentic selfhood as self-constancy represents an attempt to think with and against Bergson' (140). However, Massey's focus is on showing the relationship between Heidegger and Bergson in general. As such, he does not clarify the specific problem of Heidegger's concept of self with relation to Kant's concept of autonomy, which is the axis of Heidegger's appropriation.

from the uninterrogated relationship between being and time such that we can use time to illuminate being, but do not understand why.

The second dimension, and the topic of this chapter, concerns an appropriation of the content of both philosophers' claims to his existential philosophy. Starting with Bergson, Heidegger accepts the narrative of finding freedom in relation to a philosophy of selfhood. Although Bergson neglects the question of being and time in favour of the problem of time, Heidegger appropriates his interpretation of the problem of positive freedom: that freedom is when human existence acts "as a whole" insofar as, in such a moment, it is itself authentic. Yet, Bergson's philosophy of freedom is an ontic rather than an ontological account. It is on this issue that Heidegger does carry over the idea that autonomy is a question of a proper alignment with Dasein's "essence" rather than an expression of individuality. In posing existential autonomy as a problem of Dasein's being, Heidegger rejects the individualist approach taken by Bergson.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> The natural objection here is that Dasein's existence lies in its essence. Therefore, and because Dasein is in each case mine, there can be no general essence of Dasein or universal self or autonomy with which Dasein can align. This is certainly the case, but it does not follow from this that Heidegger is an individualist. In Chapter 5, I will discuss this question in depth with reference to *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26], where Heidegger speaks of the metaphysical neutrality of ontological descriptions of Dasein. In short, while Dasein's being is in each case its own, to view the authentic self as Dasein shutting itself off from the other and acting out of its own caprice in an existential narcissism is to mistake the ontological for the ontical. Dasein's becoming itself is not me unearthing my true individuality, but my finally facing my own being and becoming Dasein for the first time.

In this section, I began by elaborating on the concept of positive freedom. While negative freedom, the most familiar conception of freedom, is universally experienced as being released or not being released from chains, the positive freedom is more obscure. It has no reliable common experience, because it is a concept concerning the self's relation to itself. Further, the different philosophers and theorists who advocate it have differing views of the self and of the criterion of being a free self. However, what is common to all is the idea that the self must act from itself and for itself rather than from some other, be that something the world, the emotions, or the ideology of a political power.

Both Kant and Bergson advance positive conceptions of freedom. For Kant, freedom is autonomy, the self-legislation of the pure will. For Bergson is it an act that comes from the whole self. I will show that Heidegger transforms these concepts in order to develop his own concept of authenticity, but before that I will analyse Kant and Bergson in more detail.

# 4.2 – Freedom and Imperatives: Kant's Resolution of the Third Antinomy

In this section, I will show how Kant builds on his resolution of the Third Antinomy to relate freedom with rational imperatives, following Heidegger's critical engagement in *The Essence of Human Freedom*. In the next section, I will show how this thread is taken up in Kant's *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, and how Heidegger interprets this as a defence of an idea of positive freedom as an act of "pure will". With regard to this section, I will begin with a recapitulation of the Third Antinomy and then turn to Kant's resolution of it. The Third Antinomy is a result of a conflict between Kant's conception of natural causality and free causality. In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that everything that happens must have a cause. However, the Third Antinomy identifies two conflicting positions on freedom that arise from this position:

#### Thesis [pro freedom]

Causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of freedom. (Kant, 2007:A444/B472)

#### Antithesis [contra freedom]

There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature. (Kant, 2007: 445/473)

The Thesis argues that, if everything that happens must have some cause, then the whole causal chain of nature must have its own cause, since it is clearly an event. Therefore, there is another type of causation which is itself uncaused, which is called freedom. The Antithesis argues the opposite: because everything has to happen according to the law of cause and effect, there can never be an uncaused causation, and so there can never be freedom. This problem, the problem of 'transcendental freedom', is the question of whether there can ever be a self-origination of a state at all, as distinct from the idea of practical freedom, which is the ability of a rational will to determine itself. Kant claims that 'the practical concept of freedom is based on this *transcendental* idea, and that in the latter lies the real source of the difficulty by which the question of the possibility of freedom has always been beset.' (A533/B501) So, while the Third Antinomy talks about the abstract transcendental question of the origin of a causal chain, Kant sees this as the ground of the

question of the freedom of the will, and therefore what should be investigated prior to practical freedom.

The Third Antinomy hangs on the fact that freedom is contrary to natural law, that is the laws that determine everything that can possibly be experienced. Kant's solution to the antinomy is to claim that freedom *could* exist but not appear in nature. It would be outside of nature and experience, and would produce effects that appear within nature and are experienced, without actually appearing itself. In other words, the argument of the antithesis, that nothing like freedom could appear, does not rule out that freedom could exist and not appear.<sup>67</sup> Thus, Kant interprets freedom as a form of causality that is not natural, and so even when defended, freedom is therefore a causal concept.

Transcendental Idealism is broadly the claim that the objects we experience are only appearances of things in themselves. Kant argued that the opposite belief, that the objects of experience are things in themselves, leads to huge metaphysical dichotomies and paradoxes. The problem of freedom is such an example. He says, 'the inevitable consequence of obstinately insisting upon the reality of appearances is to destroy all freedom. Those who thus follow the common view have never been able to reconcile nature and freedom.' (A537/B565) In other words, both sides of the Third Antinomy take the objects of experience to be things in themselves and doom themselves to an antinomy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> That this is what Kant argues is not particularly controversial. What is controversial is exactly what he means. This argument is essentially an application of the basic principles of Transcendental Idealism to the problem of freedom. But, as we saw earlier, since there is no consensus in the secondary literature as to exactly what Transcendental Idealism is, we are left with alternate explanations of what it means to say that freedom exists but does not appear. While it is not our aim to settle this matter, but to follow Heidegger's interpretation, it is important to dwell on this issue as it is crucial to understanding the Second Way to freedom.

Kant shows the alternative by denying that objects of experience are things in themselves. Instead, they are appearances that not only *can* but *must* have grounds beyond appearances, for to be an appearance is to be an appearance of something that is not itself an appearance.

[If] appearances are not taken for more than they actually are; if they are viewed not as things in themselves, but merely as representations, connected according to empirical laws, they must themselves have grounds which are not appearances. The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, and accordingly can be determined through other appearances, but its causality is not so determined. While the effects are to be found in the series of empirical conditions, the intelligible cause, together with its causality, is outside the series. (Kant, 2007:A537/B565)

So, the fact that appearances are only appearances allows the conceivability of a nonappearing, non-empirical causality: a causality that cannot appear, but whose effects can. Kant calls this character of cause "intelligible". Interpretation hangs on what Kant means by intelligible here, and so I shall discuss this within the context of Kantian secondary literature. Not only because it depends on how we understand Transcendental Idealism, but also, for Heidegger, because the terminology 'is by no means unambiguous and consistent' [GA31 247/168]. Heidegger even goes so far as to call it 'displeasing' [GA31 249/169].

As I discussed in Chapter 1, the positive metaphysical position that Kant develops in the *Critique* is given the name Transcendental Idealism, which is intended to imply Empirical Realism. For Kant, our knowledge of the world is through experience, but that this experience is ordered *a priori* by the understanding in accord with the faculties and concepts of the mind. Against the earlier empiricists, who believed that we perceive brute sense data to which the mind *a posteriori* allocates meaning to that data, Kant argues that experience is always already ordered and understood *a priori* because it has already been worked on by transcendental faculties.

Kant argues for this position using transcendental arguments.<sup>68</sup> These work by establishing a fact and asking about what must be the case in order for the fact to be the case. As such, Kant's arguments tend to claim something about our experience as it factually is. On this basis of this fact, Kant will argue for a transcendental process, faculty, or principle that must be the case in order to bring that fact into being in the first place. The two arguments Heidegger uses to show Kant's relevant metaphysical claims, the First and Second Analogies, take this form. For example, the Second Analogy argues on the basis of the way temporal events unfold, that every experienceable event must have a cause rooted in the category of causality. This is the argument that determines how Kant looks at the problem of freedom.

The upshot of all this for Kant's intended programme—the delimitation of the limits of metaphysics—is that speculative reason can only answer questions that are grounded in experience. The exact sense and metaphysical stakes of this claim are a source of debate within Kantian scholarship. While it is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to end the debate, it is necessary to give some background in order to understand Heidegger's position within it. The interpretation of Transcendental Idealism that Heidegger explicitly positions himself against is what noted Kant scholar Henry Allison calls "The Standard Picture". Allison's definition is as follows:

According to the standard picture, Kant's Transcendental Idealism is a metaphysical theory that affirms the unknowability of the "real" (things in themselves) and relegates knowledge to the purely subjective realm of representations (appearances). It thus combines a phenomenalistic account of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> For a full discussion of Kant's transcendental arguments, see Pereboom (2014)

what is actually experienced by the mind, and therefore knowable, with the postulation of an additional set of entities which, in the terms of the very theory, are unknowable. (Allison, 1983:3-4)

Allison points out that this picture 'can be traced back to Kant's own contemporaries', but that despite being 'repeatedly criticized, it is still widely accepted.' (4) While Allison made this claim in 1983, it certainly still holds for our purposes, and much discussion of Kant outside of Kantian circles still subscribes to this standard picture. Michael Rohlf's more recent overview of the secondary literature on this point (2015) claims that still, 'scholars disagree widely on how to interpret' Kant's claims about Transcendental Idealism to the extent that 'there is no such thing as the standard interpretation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism'. Rohlf limits himself to describing the two most influential interpretations: the two worlds or two objects interpretation; and the one world but two aspects interpretation.

The two worlds interpretation is more or less Allison's "standard picture". In it, 'Transcendental Idealism essentially distinguishes between a world of appearances and another world of things in themselves.' This would bring Kant in line with a broadly representational theory of perception, but stop short of affirming positively that the external world exists. Instead, things in themselves are 'a sort of theoretical posit, whose existence and role are required by the theory but are not directly verifiable.' (Rholf, 2015) Heidegger explicitly criticises this interpretation, claiming that the concepts of appearance and the thing in itself 'do not refer to two classifications of objects arranged one behind the other' [GA3 3/24].

The two aspects interpretation has two distinct types. It may be argued that Kant is offering an epistemological theory that distinguishes between two ways of looking at things. Either we can look at the world as it appears to us, according to the transcendental conditions of experience (appearances), or we can look at the world as it would appear to an intellect with direct intuition of reality (things in themselves). Another version of the two aspects theory is said to accept that Kant is offering a metaphysical theory and claims that 'objects have two aspects in the sense that they have two sets of properties: one set of relational properties that appear to us and are spatial and temporal, and another set of intrinsic properties that do not appear to us and are not spatial or temporal' (Rohlf, 2015). So, there is one object and one world, but it reveals itself to us in different ways.

It is important, therefore, to grasp how Heidegger interprets Transcendental Idealism if it is going to be possible to understand the precise nature of his critique of Kant's resolution of the Third Antinomy. This is also important, since much discussion of Kant on freedom outside of Kant circles subscribes to the 'Standard Picture' or 'Two Worlds' theory. For example, all of the following statements from literature in this century concerning freedom of the will oppose experience and intelligibility as two realms, where the intelligible is the real world: '[For Kant,] our freedom is still real, something that exists beyond appearances as a feature of the world as it is in itself apart from our experience. So our freedom remains something in which we have to believe, and properly may believe. But freedom is still something of which we can have no direct experience, and no experience-based knowledge or understanding' (Pink, 2004:70). Similarly, Kane says: 'Kant tried to lessen this tension [between moral and theoretical reasoning] by claiming that science and reason describe the self only as it appears to us in space and time (the phenomenal self), not the self or person as it is "in itself" (the noumenal self). Our real or noumenal selves can be free, he argues, because they are not subject to the constraints of space and time or the laws of nature.' (2005:44). And, more recently, Baggini states that 'Kant [...] claimed that in addition to the phenomenal world — the world we experience and investigate scientifically — there is the noumenal world, the world as it is in itself. the nature of this noumenal world is almost completely unknown.' (2015:22). However, Kant's entire philosophy is grounded on the idea that the empirical is the real and the transcendental is the real. It is the intelligible, ideal self that is free, not the empirical self. This does not have anything to do with "belief"; it is something Kant has attempted to demonstrate *a priori*.

Heidegger's account of Transcendental Idealism most closely resembles the metaphysical two aspect interpretation. He criticises the "Standard Picture" in order to establish that Kant is not a sceptic. The way he does so is to read Kant ontologically. As he says early on in his *Kantbuch*, 'Transcendental Philosophy' is Kant's term for 'Metaphysica Generalis (Ontologia)' [GA3 16/11]. For Heidegger, Kant is doing ontology, and any argument that the objects of experience are appearances would have to mean that "appearance" is an interpretation of the being of an objective of experience. To be an object of experience is to be an appearance of a thing in itself.

When *Kant* goes on to say that we do not know the thing-in-itself, i.e. that we do not have an absolute intuition of this but only see an appearance, he does not mean that we grasp a pseudo-actuality or something that is only half actual. If that which is present (the beings themselves) is conceived as appearance, this means nothing else but that the actuality of the actual consists in its character as appearance. To appear is to come into view, i.e. into the presence of a look, into the fully determining determinedness of the self-showing beings themselves. [GA31 71/50]

Though Kant never uses this form of expression, Heidegger takes him to be primarily concerned with the being of beings when he defines objects of experience as appearance. This interpretation is unlikely to sit comfortably with Kant scholars as it defines Kant's project within Heidegger's terminology. Yet, Heidegger is not attempting to find the "correct Kant". Heidegger's reading of Kant is not undertaken for its own sake, but because it is necessary within his own project and its attempt to think freedom. As such, we must run with Heidegger's interpretation even if it is controversial, and must understand what he means by saying 'actuality of the actual consists in its character as appearance' [GA31 71/50].

Kant is, for Heidegger, trying to talk about beings, their being, and how they come to being. As such, the problem is turned on its head. It is not that Kant posits things-inthemselves as reality, opposes them to what is given in experience, and then wonders how the experience can possible be reliably linked to the thing-in-itself. On Heidegger's reading, Kant begins with beings given before us. He interprets these beings as the appearance of a thing-in-itself. These beings, understood as appearances, are given empirically. There is no question about their existence. The thing-in-itself is given as a transcendental idea, something that is never experienced in itself, but appears as the beings we encounter. To repeat the claim, the basic character of these beings, the being of these beings, is appearance of a thing-in-itself.

So, Kant's resolution of the Third Antinomy relies on an application of Transcendental Idealism to the problem. This means recognising that the Second Analogy applies to empirical causation and not intelligible causation. Now, Kant claims that intelligible causality, whilst not able to appear, can be the cause of an event that does appear. He goes further to say that an appearance can be simultaneously caused by an empirical, natural cause and an intelligible cause. It is not a matter of saying that 'every effect in the world must arrive *either* from nature *or* from freedom' but rather that 'in one in the same event, in different relations, both can be found' (A536/B564). So, Kant has proven a dual causal relation possible. Heidegger summarises the above argument as follows. From the *essence of appearance* there is deduced the *possibility of this double relation*, and thus the possibility of the applicability of two fundamentally different causalities to one and the same event as effect. The essential double character of every appearance, such that not only is it connected with other appearances but is also the appearance of something which appears (X), involves the fundamental possibility of a relation to both the empirical and the non-empirical. These two fundamentally different relations as such provide the possibility for two fundamentally different relations of causation in the sense of the empirical and intelligible characters. The possibility of the unification of both causalities is thus proven in principle. [GA31 251-252/170]

For Heidegger, that one event can stand in two fundamentally different causal relations is the crux of Kant's argument for a resolution of the Third Antinomy. It allows Kant to say that an 'effect may be regarded as free in respect of its intelligible cause, and at the same time in respect of appearances as resulting from them according to the necessity of nature.' (2007:A537/B565)

Kant's argument so far is abstract, and does not even necessarily refer to human beings. As Heidegger points out, 'the *problem of freedom*, and of the freedom of the will in particular [in Kant], is really a *universal ontological problem within the ontology of the being-present of that which is present*, and does not relate specifically to will-governed or spiritual being.' [GA31 219/150] Kant is treating freedom as a metaphysical problem that raises questions about the rules that govern events in the world. However, Kant does apply the distinction between intelligible and empirical causality to the human being in order to provide a concrete example of this general principle. Kant argues that imperatives are an example of intelligible causality. To recognise that something "ought" to be the case, he argues, cannot be part of empirical, sensible nature. It must therefore belong to the intelligible.

> 'Ought' expresses a kind of necessity and of connection with grounds which is found nowhere else in the whole of nature. The understanding can know in nature only what is, what has been, or what will be. [...] When we have the course of nature alone in view, 'ought' has no meaning whatsoever. it is just as absurd

to ask what ought to happen in the natural world as to ask what properties a circle ought to have. (Kant, 2007:A547/B575)

So, whenever we attempt to express what should or could be the case, we have left the world of nature.<sup>69</sup> These concepts have no place there: nature simply is. However, the imperative, by revealing an "ought", 'expresses a possible action the ground of which cannot be anything but a mere concept' (A547/B575). The ground of an action is a cause. As that ground is a concept, rather than an empirical appearance or event, then it is in Kant's terminology an intelligible cause.

To bring this idea into sharper relief, he uses the example of 'a malicious lie by which a certain confusion has been caused in society' (A554/B582). Kant argues that, while we can quite easily trace this action in a determinist way—he even says we 'proceed in this enquiry just as we should in ascertaining for a given natural effect the series of its determining causes' (A554/B582)—to motives, upbringing and a lack of virtue, the very fact we still blame the liar demonstrates the causality for which he is arguing:

> [...] though we believe that the action is thus determined, we none the less blame the agent, not indeed on account of his unhappy disposition, nor even on account of his previous way of life; for we presuppose that we can leave out of consideration what this way of life may have been, that we can regard the past series of conditions as not having occurred and the act as being completely unconditioned by any preceding state, just as if the agent in and by himself began this action. Our blame is based on a law of reason whereby we regard reason as a cause that irrespective of all the above-mentioned empirical conditions could have determined, and ought to have determined, the agent to act otherwise. (Kant, 2007:A554/B582)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> It is interesting that Kant here hits upon a phenomenon that will be central to Heidegger's philosophy of freedom: that the "ought" of any human comportment is something above and beyond the world and has the ability to determine it. For Heidegger, the "for the sake of which [*Worumwillen*]" is the ground of the significance that the world takes for us. This argument will be fully examined when we come to *SZ* and *G26* in later chapters.

So, the action of lying has empirical determining causes that could appear in experience. In addition to this, the belief that the liar can be blamed for his actions presupposes that the liar could have done otherwise.<sup>70</sup> At first glance, Kant may seem to have contradicted himself. We were told that this intelligible causality never appears, and yet moralisers are clearly aware of it when they pass judgment. It is important to hold onto Kant's terminology. To appear, means to be an object of sensible experience. In this sense, the intelligible would not be considered an appearance, because reason is not an occurrence in nature or even in time, as Kant puts it, 'reason in its causality is not subject to any conditions of appearance or of time.' (A556/B584) Heidegger sums this up as follows.

In brief, just as an appearance always remains related to something (X) that never appears, so the intelligible can be the non-appearing transcendental cause of the empirical and thus be the cause of one and the same appearance as effect. What appears can also be determined by what does not appear, i.e. by what the appearing is an appearance *of*. [GA31 /171]

As such, at least on Heidegger's reading,<sup>71</sup> Kant's solves the Third Antinomy by locating

freedom in the intelligible, although 'the only intelligences we can notice are those of the

will, i.e. those intelligences that we ourselves are.' This essentially means that freedom is

found in reason's consciousness of itself, in the 'possibility of "noticing" our being-in-itself

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> It is important to note that Kant emphasises that this is not intended to be a proof of the argument, but only an illustration. He believes he has already proven the principle, and that 'it is useless to prove transcendental propositions by examples' (A554/B582).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> While controversy exists on the issue of exactly how to interpret Kant on this point, it centres mainly on the issue of how to interpret Transcendental Idealism; that is, on the two worlds/objects vs two aspects/viewpoints reading. As above (§2.2), I believe Heidegger is interpreting this in a metaphysical two aspects mode. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine if Heidegger is correct in doing so, an argument for the opposite view can be found in McCarty (2009).

in a formally "absolute" sense.' [GA31 /171] In other words, freedom is found in the human being's ability to recognise and act upon its being-rational.

In this section, I have described Kant's resolution of the Third Antinomy. Kant argues that the problem of free causality can be resolved if we adopted Transcendental Idealism. Transcendental Idealism claims that experience is of appearances which are regulated by the categories. The categories regulate appearances through laws, such as the law of causation. This means that they do not apply to things in themselves, only to appearances. Thus, another form of causality could occur, although it would not appear in experience. Kant then introduces the concept of an imperative as an example of intelligible, rather than empirical causation. When we recognise that something ought to be the case, we are identifying a lack in the will of another rational agent: they should have willed differently. This means that there is indeed another form of causation, which is freedom, and that it takes the structure of an imperative for a rational will. In the next section, I will show how Kant develops this concept of imperative in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.

## 4.3 – Freedom as the Act of Pure Will: Kant's Categorical Imperative

In the last section, I showed how Kant resolves the Third Antinomy by having recourse to his basic philosophical position: Transcendental Idealism. Kant argues that, because the laws of nature only apply to appearances, which can be described as 'empirical realism', an intelligible, not empirical causality is possible, so long as it does not appear. The law of causation, that every effect must have a cause, holds only for the empirical, not the intelligible. This leads Kant to offer moral imperatives as an example of intelligible causality. When we recognise that something ought to be another way, that someone should have done something, we acknowledge a form of causality that is not empirical: the selflegislation of the rational will. In this section, I will explain Heidegger's critical engagement with Kant's development of this idea in *Critique of Pure Reason* to his "categorical imperative" in *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (2014).

Kant's *Groundwork* is a provisional attempt to found morality on rational grounds, but it also follows the discussion of freedom in *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is safe to say that the arguments in the *Groundwork* are much maligned in Kant circles. Commentators frequently find them unclear, badly posed, and perhaps even contradictory. Guyer refers to the *Groundwork* as a 'deeply perplexing book' (1998:215) with Allison blaming this on 'confusing and sloppy formulations' (1998:215) from Kant himself. Heidegger's characteristic response to these problems is to stick doggedly with the text and try to make it work. Such a method is, however, necessarily violent. Further, unlike the rest of GA31, these final passages feel comparatively rushed and contain few references. This leads to ambiguities between Kant, Heidegger's reading of Kant, and Heidegger's own position.

In his treatment of Kant's practical philosophy, Heidegger is providing a destructive reading of Kant's concept of autonomy to show that, if brought to its full conclusion, pure willing must not be understood simply as the will choosing its own course, but as the will willing its own essence. This is not a position Heidegger holds himself, but is a precursor to his own concept of authenticity, where Dasein chooses its own "essence", i.e. chooses to be its being.<sup>72</sup>

Autonomy for Kant is when the will is 'law to itself' (2011:4:440). In explaining this point, Heidegger refers to his analysis of the theory of action in *Critique of Pure Reason* that I have already discussed.<sup>73</sup> Action is always action according to the law. The will is a faculty that allows us to set our own laws, as opposed to natural laws. Practical action 'is the particular kind of action made possible by a *will*, i.e. such that the relation of the subject of the causation, the determining instance, to the effect, occurs through the will' [GA31/189].

However, the will's ability to set its own laws is not equal to autonomy. Freedom is not equated here to capacity to do anything we want.<sup>74</sup> For Kant, autonomy always means acting according to the moral law. It is impossible for a free will to act immorally. This is what Allison calls the 'reciprocity thesis' found in the *Groundwork*, the thesis that 'freedom of the will and the moral law are reciprocal concepts' (1998:274). Kant states that 'a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same' (2011:4:447), to be free is to be under the moral law. We are autonomous only when we are acting morally. This seems to be a paradox. The free, autonomous will is usually understood to be the one that directs itself, that obeys only itself. Kant, however, claims that to obey the moral law is to be free. When we are free, we seem to have no choice.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Again, this will need to be established in more detail in Chapter 6, since Davis (2007) has suggested that at this point Heidegger has indeed started to embrace this idea.
 <sup>73</sup> See Chapter 1

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Heidegger does not discuss the distinction Kant makes in his later philosophy between *Wille* and *Willkür* that is relevant to this problem. For a discussion of this see Allison (1998) or Reath (2012).

The solution to the paradox is that in autonomy, the will is 'law to itself' (4:440). This is the literal meaning of the term. Kant's point is that the moral law is not imposed on the will externally, but by itself, hence free. There is never any action without laws, but in autonomous action, the law involved is the moral law, and it is given by the will unto itself. There is debate, however, concerning exactly what this means.<sup>75</sup> Schönecker summarises the 'standard reading' as 'once it is shown that we are free it is shown that we are obliged by the [categorical imperative]' (2012:225). On this reading, Kant's idea is that as soon as we conceive our freedom aright we bind ourselves to a moral law.

It is worth dwelling on Schönecker's own reading as Heidegger's position has some overlap. Schönecker argues that what Kant means by the reciprocity thesis is that rational entities, insofar as they are rational, always act morally. For rational beings that do not exist in the world of sensibility, 'the moral law is descriptive, not prescriptive.' Under this reading, Kant's point is that any rational being insofar as it is rational 'always and necessarily wills morally.' (225-226) This idea hinges on Kant's statements in the *Groundwork* that the human being lives in two worlds, the intelligible and the sensible. In a state that Kant calls 'heteronomy' (as opposed to "autonomy"), the will takes its laws from things other than itself, things in the sensible world. In a free, moral act, however, our will can act purely, i.e. 'independent of sensibility' and 'as an intelligence'. In such a moment, we recognise that 'as a human being', i.e. in our physical animality, we are 'just an appearance' of our self, but as an intelligence, we are 'the authentic self [*eigentliche Selbst*]' (Kant, 2011:4:457-458)<sup>76</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> To venture onto this terrain is beyond the scope of the discussion. Debate centres largely around the question of how to understand Section III of the *Groundwork*, Rauscher (2009) provides a good summary of the different positions, alongside his own.
<sup>76</sup> Translation modified.

Schönecker's point is that rational beings intrinsically act morally, but the human being, as part sensible and part intelligible, can succumb to immoral action. This means that freedom or autonomy is independence from the world of sensible things, and when we have it, as rational intelligences, we would always act morally, hence the reciprocity thesis. The free will is the will acting as an intelligence, independently of sensibility. And, as intelligence, the will can only act morally as a feature of its rationality.

Heidegger, in GA31, took a similar line to this, insofar as acting morally is considered to be something that rational beings do intrinsically, i.e. in accord with their essence. Heidegger goes further, however, to say that the free will wills its essence. It is not that, out of some sort of mechanism, the will is determined to act morally; rather; freedom is defined as the state when we choose our essence.

Heidegger's logic rests on Kant's claim that the will can be defined as 'the capacity to act *according to the representation* of laws' (4:412). The will is, therefore, our capacity to act according to a representation or concept rather than simply being governed by natural law. The will can select the representation that will be the basis of our action. As representational, Heidegger emphasises that the will is a type of reason. 'Will and reason belong together as a representing that determines an effect within praxis. *Will is nothing other than practical reason and vice versa*. Practical reason is will, i.e. *a capacity to effect according to the representation of something as principle*.' [GA31 /190]

For Heidegger, what makes the difference between autonomy and heteronomy<sup>77</sup> in Kant is whether the representation is something empirical and sensible or pure and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Heteronomy is the opposite of autonomy for Kant. Where auto-nomy is a will that is a law unto itself, hetero-nomy is a law unto other, external and different agencies.

rational. Heidegger explains the possibility of the will selecting an empirical representation with the example of education.

If I represent to myself possessing a specific kind of education, and if what I thus represent determines my action, then this action is *will-governed*, practical, but not through pure reason. For here the determining instance, this representation of a specific kind of education, is obtained through experience of actually present human beings with definite characteristics. [GA31/190]

In this example, the will uses an empirical concept as the basis of action, it is therefore

heteronomous rather than autonomous as its law comes from something other than the

will. The will is the origin of the law (act in such a way to produce human beings of a specific

kind of education), but not of the content of the law. This is completely empirical.

Heidegger considers the possibilities of a non-empirical willing, and argues that this consists

in the will acting 'not from somewhere else but *from itself*', by willing itself 'in its essence'

[GA31/191]:

[In autonomy, the will] determines itself from what it *is* in itself in its essence. The essence of the will is thus the determining instance for willing. Such a willing is determined solely through itself, not through anything experienceable, i.e. empirical. Such a will is *pure will*. *Pure will is pure reason* which, for itself alone, determines itself to will-governed action, i.e. to praxis. *Pure will is pure reason which is practical only for itself*. [GA31 /190]

So, on Heidegger's reading, the reciprocity thesis, that the free will and the will governed by the moral law are the same thing, means that the free will is the pure will. The pure will does not base action upon the representation of the empirical, but on the rational essence of practical reason (the will) itself: it wills willing. This is equivalent to the Kantian understanding of the moral law. '*Qua* will, i.e. insofar as it only wills willing, a good will is absolutely good. *Qua absolutely good, a good will is a pure will.*' [GA31 /191]

So, for Heidegger, autonomy in Kant is the pure will, understood as 'the willing of one's own essence as will' [GA31/192]. The question of whether or not this is a correct depiction of Kant's position is not something that needs to be verified. Heidegger is explicit that he does not believe that there is such a thing as the "correct Kant"<sup>78</sup>, and clearly signals his intention to read Kant creatively and violently.

What is of interest is the reading itself and how it fits in with the discussion of freedom in *SZ*. In the *Groundwork*, Heidegger has found a discussion of freedom understood as a question of purity of essence. Unfreedom is conceived as action on impure grounds, i.e. those that are external to will rather than the will itself. Freedom is when the will wills its essence, it wills to be rational will.

The concept of authenticity is similar to this in some respects, though radically transformed along three axes. First of all, and as I have already argued in Chapter 1, Heidegger rejects the causal interpretation of freedom. Pure or impure, Kant's will is a causal faculty; it is the causal origin of principles of action. Instead, Heidegger conceives of freedom as a question of being. The question is not "Am I willing my essence as will?" but "Am I my essence?". Second, Heidegger is not interested in the essence of will but in the being of Dasein, which necessitates a third transition, since Dasein cannot be conceived in terms of an "inner" and an "outer", as is the concept of "pure" willing. The pure will is the will not affected by exterior, i.e. outer, influences. Its only influence is itself.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> The full statement reads: '[This interpretation] does not have the pseudo-philological aim of presenting the 'correct' Kant—there is nothing of the sort. All philosophical interpretation is destruction, controversy and radicalization [...] Or else it is nothing at all, mere chatter that repeats more laboriously what was said in simpler and better fashion by the author himself.' [GA31 168/119]

Dasein, in contrast, is always already "outside" of itself. Instead, Heidegger cuts the difference between freedom and unfreedom in terms of the self; authenticity raises the question of Dasein's being-itself and not-being-itself. To understand the reasons for this move, however, we need to go beyond Heidegger's reading of Kant. I will now turn to Bergson's conception of freedom, as the origin of this discussion of the self.

## 4.4 – Freedom as the Act of the Whole Self: Bergson's Free Act

In the previous two sections, I have shown how Heidegger draws out Kant's concept of positive practical freedom as the pure will. A rational agent only becomes free if it wills its own rationality. Such a will is free from experience and emotions, and only wills rationality. The positive conception of freedom in Kant means to choose to be one's own essence. It does not mean the ability to do otherwise than one did, it does not mean the absence of obstacles, it means acting only in accord with that maxim which at the same time can be willed as a universal law, which means only do rational things. The pure will is self-legislation, willing to be the being that one already is: rational cognizer.

In this section, I will show how Bergson offers a concept of freedom that is its own development and radicalisation of Kant's. However, by transforming the concept of time to something that is wholly incompatible with Kant's system, Bergson is able to give a concept of positive freedom that is more attuned to experience and pays attention to the particularities of each individual. But, it still bears the hallmarks of Kant's concept of freedom, swapping 'acts of a pure will' for 'acts of the whole self', i.e. acts that spring from me in my totality without being contaminated by the outside world. Bergson's opposition between the duration of consciousness and the space of the intellect leads him to argue that there are two aspects of the self corresponding to each. The true 'fundamental self' (2001:128) is what is given in our inner experience of duration, untainted by the spatial intellect. However, says Bergson, due to its interactions with space 'a second self is formed which obscures the first' (138). This is the parasitic, mechanical self formed by habit, social interaction and ossifying intellection.<sup>79</sup>

Bergson is, however, quick to point out that he does not wish to 'split up the personality' and that 'it is the same self' (138) that perceives through the spatial and durational multiplicities. To use what Deleuze named the 'Bergsonian leitmotif' (1991:23), these selves are different in degree, but not in kind. When Bergson attempts to clarify the relationship between them, he alludes to the depth of the fundamental self and shallowness of the parasitic self. Indeed, he sometimes calls the fundamental self the 'deep-seated self' (2001:169). The unfree self is part of me, but only on a shallow, superficial level. The free self is the *whole* self, however, it is all of me.

Bergson first makes this distinction through talking about beliefs. He begins by describing the beliefs of the fundamental self. These, he says, 'match the colour of all our other ideas, and from the very first we have seen in them something of ourselves' (135). Because they are a part of us fundamentally, they are qualitatively similar to us. As evidence to this, he points out that the 'beliefs to which we most strongly adhere are those of which we should find it most difficult to give an account, and the reasons by which we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> This distinction between the fundamental self and parasitic self may be influenced by Kant's distinction between the authentic intelligible self and the appearance of the self in the external world, discussed in the previous section.

justify them are seldom those which have led us to adopt them' (135). The reason for this is expressed in an analogy concerning the relationship of the cell to the organism.

The fact is that each of them has the same kind of life as a cell in an organism: everything which affects the general state of the self affects it also. But while the cell occupies a definite point in the organism, an idea which is truly ours fills the whole of our self. (Bergson, 2001:135)

We cannot give an account of our deeply held convictions because they are so much a part of us that we cannot really distinguish them from our personality. The qualification that Bergson provides in the above analogy must not be overlooked. The cell has a spatial relationship with its organism. However, the self is duration, its parts are not distinguishable in terms of space. If the idea truly is ours freely and fundamentally, then it is the whole self in this durational, heterogeneous multiplicity. They are part of the 'whole mass of the self' (166).

In contrast, the ideas and beliefs that we merely inherit by rote, habit, and custom do not fill the whole self. Here, Bergson uses another image, 'Not all our ideas, however, are thus incorporated in the fluid mass of our conscious states. Many float on the surface, like dead leaves on the water of a pond' (135). Such ideas, though they are strictly speaking a part of me, do not truly belong to me, do not bespeak the colour of my whole self, and only affect me superficially. Bergson later says that one source of these ideas is 'an education not properly assimilated, as education which appeals to the memory rather than to judgment.' (166)

So, the parasitic self and its beliefs, ideas and actions do not fill the whole self, they are not a true part of it, or are only superficially so. Bergson continually returns to the fluid metaphor, where the free self is "deep seated" and the parasitic self 'develops on a kind of surface, and on this surface independent growths may form and float.' (166) When he goes on to speak about how these two selves relate to freedom more explicitly, Bergson also speaks of a 'thick crust' (169). The parasitic self is something that actually impedes the action of the fundamental self. Interestingly, similarly to how Heidegger speaks of Dasein's domination by the 'real dictatorship [*eigentliche Diktatur*] of the "they"' [*SZ* 126], Bergson describes this crust as forming through the intervention of others.

When our most trustworthy friends agree in advising us to take some important step, the sentiments which they utter with so much insistence lodge on the surface of our ego and there get solidified in the same way as the ideas of which we spoke just now. Little by little they will form a thick crust which will cover up our own sentiments; we shall believe that we are acting freely, and it is only by looking back to the past, later on, that we shall see how much we were mistaken. (Bergson, 2001:169)

So, habit and our social interactions form a crust on the surface of the true self. Importantly, this is a crust, not a barrier. Bergson's conception of freedom is positive, not negative. It is not that the parasitic self impedes our freedom, but rather it acts in the absence of our freedom. Bergson goes on to say that the free act is only when our fundamental self breaks past this.

Bergson describes the free act, in spite of the crust of opinions and thoughts of others,

in the following way.

But then, at the very minute when the act is going to be performed, *something* may revolt against it. It is the deep-seated self rushing up to the surface. It is the outer crust bursting, suddenly giving way to an irresistible thrust. Hence in the depths of the self, below this most reasonable pondering over most reasonable pieces of advice, something else was going on—a gradual heating and a sudden boiling over feelings and ideas, not unperceived, but rather unnoticed. [...] through some strange reluctance to exercise our will, we had thrust them back into the darkest depths of our soul whenever they came up to the surface. (Bergson, 2001:169)

The free act, then, is something that comes from the depths of the self and employs

the whole self in its undertaking. Unfree acts are, by contrast, habitual. They originate in a

parasitic pseudo-self, living in the superficial "growths" floating on the surface of our soul. Bergson primarily thinks freedom, then, as the act that finds its origin purely in the self with no exterior or foreign influences. His concept therefore operates within Kant's conception of freedom, albeit with important differences. What makes the self unfree is its impurity, its attachment to the world of sense rather than the inner world of the self.

And so, while the concept duration is key to Bergson's articulation of the problem, insofar as this renewed understanding of time leads to a durational account of free will, what makes the difference between freedom and unfreedom is the extent to which the self is contaminated by exterior forces. Duration names the appropriate and space the parasitic, but these are just the categories that allow Bergson to distinguish the free from the unfree; freedom for Bergson is autonomy from foreign influences in a purity of the personality.<sup>80</sup> As such, 'we are free when our acts spring from our whole personality' (172), caused solely by our self and coming from the whole of that self.

The direct point of comparison with Heidegger is the suggestion that there can ever be a pure self. Although it has been alleged that Heidegger considers authenticity as a kind of existential solipsism, the comparison with Bergson brings out the stark contrast between such a view and that presented in *Being and Time*. Heidegger is emphatic that Dasein can never stand alone. It is always already in its world and always already with others. As for the idea that Dasein can find the fundamental self by turning inward, looking for a pure personality, a character cut off from everything else, we have already heard him state that Dasein 'always says "I am this entity", and in the long run says this loudest when it is "not"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> It has been suggested that the core of Bergson's thought may indeed be his personalism rather than duration. See Whiton Calkins (1912).

this entity.' [*SZ* 115] The reason Bergson has to resort to metaphors of the "deep-seated" vs "superficial" self is because, at least in Heideggerian terms, he has failed to clarify the phenomenon of self and remains within the everyday concept.<sup>81</sup>

This problem is, however, only a symptom of a deeper disagreement between Heidegger and Bergson. Bergson's analysis is ontic. It is a psychologistic description of how we each individually can become free or unfree. Heidegger, however, wishes for an ontological interpretation of Dasein. He is philosophically closer to Kant than Bergson on this point. This is why, when Heidegger speaks of authenticity, he is interested in Dasein's ability to enact its existential-ontological being as Dasein, rather than act out of its onticexistential individuality. I will elaborate this in more detail in the next section and fully in the next chapter.

In spite of this disagreement, Heidegger appropriates much of the content of Bergson's analysis of freedom, though he translates it into his own philosophical framework, although this, as Massey points out, has rarely been noticed.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, as my arguments have shown, Massey is entirely correct when he says,

What makes Heidegger's silence on Bergson's recovery of the fundamental self especially problematic is that it conceals the way that Bergson anticipated Heidegger's interpretation of the self in *Being and Time*. As Bergson does with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> This is not to say, however, that Heidegger is "right" and Bergson is "wrong", but only that their philosophies are incompatible on this point. The obvious Bergsonian response to this criticism would be that the self is unclarifiable. It is given in duration and any attempt to conceptualise it would ossify it. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to settle this issue, though. For an interesting critical appraisal of Bergson's concept of self, see Marjorie Harris (1933).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> 'Heidegger's remarks about Bergson in *Being and Time* highlight his concerns with the way Bergson seeks originary temporality by distinguishing duration from space, but Heidegger says nothing about how Bergson attempts to rethink the ego or self (*moi*) in terms of duration. As a result, the similarity between Heidegger's interpretation of "selfhood" (*Selbstheit*) and Bergson's theory of the "two aspects of the self" in *Time and Free Will* has generally been ignored.' (Massey, 2015:137)

the fundamental self, Heidegger presents authentic "beings-oneself" as a phenomenon hidden by public interpretation. The counter-phenomenon, Heidegger's inauthentic "they-self", is analogous to Bergson's spatialized self, both being reflections of the things we encounter in the world that dominate common sense and philosophical thinking. (Massey, 2015:70-17)

Massey is correct that both thinkers make the difference between freedom and unfreedom in the concept of self (they-self / 'parasitic self'). Both thinkers attribute the origin of the unfree self in some part to others: 'When our most trustworthy friends agree in advising us to take some important step, the sentiments which they utter with so much insistence lodge on the surface of our ego and there get solidified' (Bergson, 2001:169). Both thinkers insist that, whether or not freedom is desirable, the unfree self is necessary for everyday comportment, and that this efficacy is a reason that the free self is difficult to unearth: '[The parasitic self] is much better adapted to the requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers it, and gradually loses sight of the fundamental self.' (Bergson, 2001:128) Furthermore, both thinkers claim that unfreedom is the norm and 'free acts are exceptional' (Bergson, 2001:167): 'Many live this kind of life, and die without having known true freedom.' (166)

However, while Massey states this, he does not explore the transition Heidegger makes away from Bergson's depiction through Kant. In the next section, I will show the Bergsonian legacy in Heidegger's concept of authenticity and being-towards-death concretely, demonstrating that the difference between the two is Heidegger's return to ontology. By holding onto the problem on Dasein's being, and not just its time, Heidegger finds a middle ground between the universalist autonomy of Kant's categorical imperative, a state that has more in common with the "they" than freedom for Heidegger, and Bergson's particularistic fundamental self.

# 4.5 – Freedom as Being-a-Whole: Heidegger's Authenticity

In this chapter, I have been arguing that Kant and Bergson's concepts of positive freedom are important precursors to Heidegger's own concept. More than that, Heidegger critically confronts these concepts, transforming them into a position of his own. This is not a history of a development of an idea, but a reading of Being and Time, arguing that its claims about Dasein's authentic self can only begin to cohere if they are seen in the context of Heidegger's differences from, and similarities with Kant and Bergson. So far, I have given an account of Kant and Bergson's concepts of positive freedom. For Kant, freedom is pure willing: a rational will that wills its own rationality. For Bergson, freedom is an act of the whole, particular self. Both reject the interference of habit and the world, but Bergson wants a free act to be one of all consciousness, not just its rational components. I have also indicated in brief, at the end of the discussions of each, how Heidegger responds to these concepts. In this last section of this chapter, I will show how Heidegger's idea of Dasein's "being-a-whole" is a response to the Kantian pure will and Bergsonian whole self that carries over the insights the latter has into the influence the world has on Dasein, but retains some of the ontological commitments of Kant rather than descending into a radical particularism.

Without the Bergsonian context, the opening of Division II of *Being and Time* can catch one off guard. Division I has had Heidegger confidently delivering his preliminary analysis of Dasein in its everydayness. And, while it is not surprising that he now wishes to go beyond everydayness and inauthenticity to speak about authenticity, the way he makes the "official" case for such a move is through a seemingly arbitrary point of method. He reminds us of the purpose of *Being and Time* and Fundamental Ontology: to interrogate Dasein's understanding of Being in order to ask the question of the meaning of being. But, warns Heidegger, 'The understanding of Being, however, cannot be *radically* clarified as an essential element in Dasein's Being, unless the entity to whose Being it belongs has been Interpreted *primordially* in its Being.' [*SZ* 231] Ultimately, Heidegger concludes that Division I has not interpreted Dasein primordially, because an authenticity has not been demonstrated.

One thing has become unmistakable: *our existential analysis of Dasein up till now cannot lay claim to primordiality*. Its fore-having never included more than the *inuathentic* Being of Dasein, and of Dasein as *less* than a *whole* [*als unganzes*]. If the Interpretation of Dasein's Being is to become primordial, as a foundation for working out the basic question of ontology, then it must first have brought to light existentially the Being of Dasein in its possibilities of *authenticity* and *wholeness*<sup>83</sup> [Ganzheit] [*SZ* 233]

So, the immediate lack in the existential analysis is an account of Dasein's authenticity. But, the reason it is required is that Dasein be conceived 'as a whole' (*als Ganzes*). This new criterion, first mentioned in the close of Division I [*SZ* 230] seems to come out of nowhere. It becomes, very quickly, a core concept, and, since characteristics of Dasein are not to be conceived as present-at-hand, it is conceived existentially, as Dasein's 'potentiality-forbeing-a-whole [*Ganzseinkönnen*]' [*SZ* 234]

The question of Dasein's ability to be a whole is best understood in the light of Bergson's discussion of freedom in *Time and Free Will*. For Bergson, we have a parasitic and a fundamental self. For Heidegger, we have an inauthentic they-self and an authentic self. Bergson understands the difference between the two to be that the parasitic self is only a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Translation modified. Macquarrie and Robinson (2010) have 'totality'.

superficial *part* of the self, whereas the fundamental self is the *whole* self. Similarly, Heidegger has introduced the concept of *Ganzheit* (wholeness or totality), to elucidate the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity.

In doing so, however, Heidegger has inherited some of Bergson's ambiguities. Bergson is unclear on whether the parasitic self counts as part of the fundamental self, but it is implied that this is the case since the fundamental self is equated with the whole and the parasitic self is part of the whole. Harris points to this ambiguity in Bergson's concept of self, saying, 'It is hard to understand just how he distinguishes between this superficial self, which is *an* outward manifestation of the inner self, and *the* outward manifestation, which is the free act.' (1933:517) Is the parasitic self part of the fundamental self, or are both selves part of the whole self?

Heidegger has a similar issues. In citations such as the above, he speaks of inauthenticity and authenticity as separate states that make up Dasein's whole. However, he also talks about Dasein's '*authentic potentiality-for-Being-a-whole*' [*SZ* 234], implying that not-being-a-whole is equivalent with inauthenticity. I think the answer for Heidegger can be found by dwelling on the nature of existentiality. Dasein's being is only a possibility for it to win or lose. As such, proximally and for the most part, Dasein can only have a *potentiality* for being a whole; totality is a possible way of being for Dasein. This means that when Dasein is inauthentic, it literally is only part of itself. Only when it becomes authentic does it become a whole. This does not annihilate the possibility of inauthenticity, but it is a reminder that Heidegger does not conceive authenticity as two opposing states, but rather as two different ways of taking up Dasein's being.

The question of Dasein's totality or wholeness, then, is a higher-level clarification of what Heidegger has already been speaking about in terms of authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein is not a whole when it is inauthentic because it shuns and avoids its being. However, when Dasein "owns" its authenticity by becoming itself, it is its whole self. The they-self, like the parasitic self, is distinctive in that it does not complete or exhaust Dasein's being. The fundamental or authentic self, however, does. In becoming authentic, Dasein becomes itself, it "completes" itself. Yet, as possibility, it does not seem that Dasein can ever be complete. We therefore have a problem.

Heidegger says, 'As long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be.' [*SZ* 234] Dasein seems to be *essentially* incomplete because it is potentiality-for-Being. How can an entity whose being is distinctive in that it is a possibility, not an actuality, ever be a whole? Heidegger responds to this problem by invoking death.

The 'end' of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being—that is to say, to existence—limits and determines in every case whatever totality [*Ganzheit*] is possible for Dasein. [*SZ* 234]

Conceived existentially, the limit of Dasein's potentiality is death. In death, we no longer have possibilities. As such, an inquiry into the existential concept of death is necessary. We must, says Heidegger, 'have obtained an ontologically adequate conception of death–that is to say an *existential* conception of it' [*SZ* 243], if Dasein's being-a-whole is ever to be understood.

So, in *SZ*, we started off with the problem of inauthenticity and authenticity. This has been clarified by raising the problem of thinking Dasein as a whole, which has in turn been clarified as a problem of thinking about the Dasein's end, i.e. its death. Freedom, i.e. authenticity, has therefore to do with death. This was already implied in Heidegger's discussion of anxiety. The reason we are disposed to our authentic being through the mood of anxiety is that this being is limited by *death*. Authenticity, anxiety, death and freedom are phenomena so close, that the most explicit, yet obscure, statement about freedom in *SZ* speaks of Dasein's 'freedom towards death', a freedom described as 'certain of itself, and anxious' [*SZ* 266].

An existential conception of death is death conceived existentially, i.e. as a possible way of being of Dasein. So, the question is not one of examining the body to see what causes death, but to exhibit phenomenally how death appears as a possibility to Dasein and must be interpreted in terms of such possibility. It turns out that the possibility of death is not just any possibility, but the "ownmost possibility" that has been frequently mentioned ever since §9 of *SZ*, but never actually defined.

As potentiality-for-Being, Dasein cannot outstrip the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals itself as that *possibility which is one's ownmost, which is non-relational, and which is not to be outstripped.* [SZ 250]

Death is the one possibility Dasein cannot "outstrip" or avoid. It is inevitable, and belongs to it utterly in its being. It is the ownmost possibility, Dasein's being. And so, when Heidegger said in §9, 'That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its being as its ownmost possibility' [*SZ* 42], he was already implying a relationship with death. It is in death that we come face to face with our being as utterly free and utterly finite.

This has already been described to some extent in the discussion of anxiety; Dasein's flight before itself is simultaneously a flight from anxiety, a flight from death, and a flight from freedom. Conceived existentially, the question of the phenomenon of death is a

question of our response to our fundamental being-towards-death. The inauthentic being towards death has already been discussed as the flight (*Flucht*) from death. This flight is a decision, and Heidegger opposes to it "anticipation" (*Vorlaufen*), being the decision to face itself and anxiously become itself, to become free.

Anticipation, however, unlike inauthentic Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself for accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for one's own death, one is liberated from one's lostness in those possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time one can authentically understand and choose among the factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is not to be outstripped. [*SZ* 264]

Heidegger has here begun to be clear about what the conditions of freedom are. Unfreedom is inauthenticity, which is now clarified to mean not-being-itself, not-being-awhole, falling into the world, fleeing our ownmost possibility as being-towards-death. Anticipation of that death, rather than fleeing it, is presented as the possibility of a liberation from inauthenticity, by liberating us from our lostness in the they-self, individualising Dasein in its recognition that it must die its own death.

It is important to keep hold of the concept of self here, which ties the whole framework together. Unfree, Dasein is not itself. It is not itself because it flees its self, allowing the they-self to become master and cover over the significance of its finitude. Inauthenticity disburdens Dasein of its freedom, it relieves the anxious anticipation of death involved in freedom.<sup>84</sup> Freedom is to be found in becoming the authentic self in a being-towardsdeath, as Heidegger states in his ultimate statement of the thesis.

Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concernful solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death—

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> See Section 3.3

a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious. [SZ 266]

This intimidating statement is Heidegger's conception of freedom condensed almost to the point of unintelligibility. The rest of this thesis is dedicated to expanding the statement made here so that its full implications can be understood. For the present context, I wish only to emphasise the work that the concept of "self" is doing in this short paragraph.

Heidegger begins by telling us that anticipation, as opposed to flight, reveals our lostness in the they-self, bringing Dasein face to face with the possibility of being itself. The final clause emphasises this, telling us that, in freedom towards death, Dasein is 'certain of itself'. I believe it is here that the context of Kant and Bergson is crucial, even if unobvious.

Kant and Bergson both conceive freedom as positive, In Kant, this means autonomy, the will's ability to be a law (*nomos*) unto itself (*autos*), not taking law from any exterior source. Freedom as autonomy in Kant is the *pure will*. In Bergson, autonomy is the *pure act*, an act originating in the *whole* self rather than the superficial parasitic self. The pure, free act is one that originates in ourselves. Although Bergson does not explicitly invoke the idea of "law", and we may therefore say it is not a concept of auto*nomy* in the strict legal sense, the term is still appropriate. Freedom is when the self is in charge, in control, when the will is able to will itself, rather than will something beyond itself. It is a question of the oppression of the external, or the purity of what we in our innermost self want.

As I have already argued, Heidegger does not want to think this problem through causality, but that does not mean he rejects the whole problematic. It is clear that he does think freedom as a problem of self (Kant) and a question of whole/fundamental self vs superficial/partial self (Bergson). However, the concept of "autonomy" is now at best a misnomer, at worst completely misleading. Heidegger's concept of freedom is linked with death, not with law, rule or power.

This is a possible explanation as to why he uses the term *Eigentlichkeit* (authenticity) instead. This term speaks of the self and what is its own or proper to it (*eigen*), without invoking an idea of law, rule or power. The concept "*Eigentlichkeit*", even if not the word, could therefore be translated as "selfiness". Heidegger is concerned with Dasein's beingits-self, not its ability to legislate for itself. Authenticity is a question of whether or not we have owned up to our being, facing our ownmost possibility rather than fleeing from it. Do we win our being or not? Authenticity is therefore a concept of existential autonomy, but only in the loosest sense of autonomy that does not carry the etymological weight of the *nomos*. Dasein does not legislate for itself, it is thrown into itself, experiencing that self as an ownmost possibility. Therefore, the best way of describing it is as existential positive freedom rather than legislative positive freedom.

In this section, I argued that Heidegger transforms the concepts of positive freedom found in Kant and Bergson into the concept of authenticity. Kant sees freedom as an act of pure will, a rational being willing to act rationally. For him, positive freedom means willing one's essence. For Bergson, freedom is an act of the whole self rather than a surface level habitual act. Heidegger combines the two in advocating for an account of positive freedom in which the world can encroach on the self, leading to a habitual and parasitic self, but where the solution is ontological rather than ontical. Rather than willing the whole content of one's spirit, as in Bergson, Heidegger sees freedom as simply being one's self.

## 4 – Conclusion

This chapter has established that *Being and Time*'s discussion of authenticity in its second division is based on a confrontation with Kant and Bergson's concepts of freedom. Both Kant and Bergson develop positive conceptions of freedom. For Kant, freedom is not the absence of an obstacle, but a rational being willing *purely*. When the rational will has no empirical or particular content, i.e. when it acts solely from its essence as rational, it is free. This means that the categorical imperative, the demand that rational beings be rational, is the one maxim that is at the same time a universal law. The will is free because it is free of anything external. It is pure rationality. Bergson is also concerned with purity, but his switching of the concept of time from a homogenous medium to his own idea of duration gives a version of the problem that does justice to the singularity of human experience. Each one of us, and each moment we are in, are completely different for Bergson. When we act out of the whole content of our self, we are free. But, as Heidegger will claim, for the most part we do not do this. We only act on a surface level, from a parasitic self that floats on the top of the pond of our spirit.

Heidegger's concept of authenticity combines these two ideas. While Heidegger does not carry over the idea of a pure will or of self-legislation, he does keep Kant's idea that freedom means conformity with essence: freedom means being-its-self. From Bergson's descriptions, Heidegger takes the further insight that this means being-a-whole, which it never is so long as it falls into its world. But, while Bergson's picture of inauthenticity is about the world infecting the purity of our fundamental selves, for Heidegger, Dasein is being-in-the-world. The distinction between self and world has been overcome in his thought, making the issue one of Dasein's flight from the anxiety involved in freedom. Dasein's being is a burden. And, unlike Kant's rational agent wants to be its rationality, Heidegger's Dasein does not want to be its Dasein; Dasein's being is not revealed to it in a cold, dispassionate rational judgement, but through the fundamental mood of anxiety.

At this point, then, I have established that Heidegger has an ontological positive conception of freedom, rather than a legislative one. He does not see freedom as selflegislation or self-mastery, but as being-its-self. However, I have only shown this in the question of the possibility of authenticity, not its actuality. I have shown where Heidegger has presented freedom-towards-death as a speculative possibility, but I have not shown how this is possible in the structure of Dasein, nor have I established definitively what Heidegger means by authentic self. This will be the task of the next and final chapter.

# Chapter 5: Guilt, Ground and Transcendence: Full Concept of Dasein's Freedom

### 5 – Introduction

In the last chapter, I argued that Heidegger poses the question of authenticity at the beginning of Division II of *Being and Time* in a manner that is recognisably a positive conception of freedom. This concept draws on the work of Kant and Bergson, but deviates from it as well. Heidegger sees freedom as Dasein's potentiality for being something of its own, authenticity or being-its-self. However, what I have not yet articulated is how Heidegger actually conceives of this state. This is the last remaining task in identifying Heidegger's concept of freedom.

Heidegger provides two arguments for freedom, which I will call 'The Guilt Argument' and 'The Transcendence Argument'. The Guilt Argument is presented in Chapter II of Division II of *Being and Time*. The Transcendence Argument is found in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26] and its sister-work 'The Essence of Ground' [*WG*].

The Guilt Argument begins with a critical discussion of moral responsibility leading to a phenomenological account of Dasein's ontological guilt. Heidegger argues that the traditional concept of guilt implies being the ground (*Grund*) of a lack (*Mangel*), being the reason (*Grund*) for a lack in the other. Existential guilt is, taking this concept to the extreme, being the ground of an absolute lack, the 'Being-the-ground of a nothingness'<sup>85</sup> (*Grundsein einer Nightigkeit*) [*SZ* 283].

In the Transcendence Argument, rather than starting with morality, Heidegger begins with the principle of sufficient reason (*principium rationis sufficientis / der Satz vom Grund*). He claims that the principle is best understood as a question about the ground of existence,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> I will render "*Nichtigkeit*" as "nothingness" rather than "nullity", as do Macquarrie and Robinson in *Being and Time* 

which, leaning on what he has already argued in *Being and Time*, is transcendence understood as being-in-the-world, understood as care and ultimately as Dasein's freedom.

The Transcendence Argument seems far from the "existentialist" language of *Being* and *Time*, sounding closer to that of Kant or Leibniz. For this reason, a line has developed in the literature, which I discussed in my Introduction, that Heidegger seems to have abandoned the themes of death and finitude for a transcendental idealist conception of absolute freedom of some sort, a concept he will abandon soon after. However, I will demonstrate that it is not insignificant that the word *'Grund'* is found in both of these discussions of freedom. Rather, this concept is a clue to the unity of both the Guilt and Transcendence arguments, such that they both complement and explain each other, rather than the later surpassing the earlier.

When, in 'The Essence of Ground', Heidegger declares that 'freedom is freedom for ground' [*WG* 165/127], he is not establishing a new position. Rather, he is confirming and elaborating on the discussion of guilt in *Being and Time*. Indeed, the essay was written in 1928, only one year after the publication of *Being and Time*. Further, when in 'On the Essence of Truth', first written in 1930, Heidegger says that the 'essence of truth is freedom' [*WW* 187/143], he was making exactly the same claim, as I will argue in this chapter. Freedom is, using the formulation from *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31], 'the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of the understanding of being.' [GA31 303/207]. This chapter will show that the seemingly distinct claims that pasein is the ground of a nothingness, that freedom is freedom for ground, and that freedom is the essence of truth all make the same claim: Dasein, as care, has its being as an anxious possibility that it can respond to or flee.

I will begin, in §5.1, by explaining what Heidegger means by ground, with reference to *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* and 'The Essence of Ground' In §5.2, I will show that The Guilt Argument uses the concept in the same way. In §5.3, I will turn to The Transcendence Argument, where Heidegger gives a full account of the relation between the ideas of freedom and ground. Finally, in §5.4, I will use the arguments found in 'On the Concept of Truth' to give the final elucidation of Heidegger's ontological positive conception of freedom.

#### 5.1 – Ground and the Reason for Being

In this section, I will provide an introduction to the concept of ground as Heidegger sees it, in preparation for my discussion of the two arguments he uses to link freedom and ground. I will first briefly give an overview of the two arguments, which are the 'Guilt' and 'Transcendence' arguments, before speaking to the idea of ground as Heidegger sees it.

The Transcendence Argument for freedom is genealogical in structure. He begins with a consideration of the principle of sufficient reason (*Der Satz vom Grund*): "why is there something rather than nothing at all?" Heidegger is not the first to use freedom as an answer to the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?", since the theological answer to this question is the choice of God to create creation, as Heidegger argues in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* [GA40]:

[A]nyone for whom the Bible is divine revelation and truth already has an answer to the question "Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?" before it is even asked: beings, with the exception of God Himself, are created by Him. God Himself "is" as the uncreated Creator. [GA40 8-9/7]

Heidegger, in contrast, does not want to have recourse to God's infinite freedom to answer this question. Instead, it is Dasein's finite freedom that provides this answer. This not because Dasein makes some godly decision about how its world will be. Indeed, Dasein is characterised by thrownness. It is thrown into its factical situation and its freedom only matters as a question of how it will be in this situation: i.e., it must decide which possibilities it has been thrown into that it will take up.

Heidegger has therefore changed the inflection of the principle of reason. It is not a question about the ultimate metaphysical origin of the universe, but of why we are able to encounter the universe in the first place: the question of sentience. In doing so, Heidegger follows Kant's Copernican turn. Kant has an answer to why there is anything at all rather than nothing, or at least why the world is the way that it is. This is the task of the Kantian project in the First Critique. The world of experience is one that is ordered, meaningful and coherent: where did this order come from? In Bergson's essay 'The Stating of Problems', he helpfully links Kant's project in the *First Critique* to the principle of sufficient reason. Kant asks questions such as 'How can it be that something exists—matter, mind or God?' The reason for these questions is the Kantian concept of order: 'Why an ordered reality, where our thought finds itself as in a mirror? Why is the world not incoherent?' He does so, not to ask this question, but to call it an insoluble problem that is grounded in the, to him, erroneous belief in the existence of the nothing: 'Never indeed would one be astonished at the existence of something, —matter, mind, God, —if one did not implicitly admit the possible existence of nothing' (Bergson, 2007:46). While Bergson sees this as a deficiency, however, Heidegger does not believe that possibility and nothing can be explained away. Quite the contrary, they are manifest phenomena with which we must

reckon. Indeed, nothingness reveals the role Dasein has with regard to its being, as he says in 'What is Metaphysics?' [*WM*]:

In the clear night of the nothing of anxiety the original openness of beings as such arises: that they are beings—and not nothing. But this "and not nothing" we add in our talk is not some kid of appended clarification. Rather, it makes possible in advance the manifestness of beings in general. The essence of the originally nihilating nothing lies in this, that it brings Da-saein for the first time before beings as such. [*WM* 119/90]

Nothingness brings Dasein face to face with the manifestness of beings in general. As I showed in Chapter 1, *The Essence of Human Freedom* claims that the manifestness of the being of beings finds its condition of possibility in freedom [GA31 303/207]. This means that, further, when Heidegger says in *WM* that 'For human Dasein, the nothing makes possible the manifestness of beings as such', freedom and nothingness have to be closely related. Indeed, already in *Being and Time*, as I noted in the introduction to this chapter, Dasein's freedom is described as 'Being-the-ground of a nothingness' [*SZ* 283].

THus, Heidegger links the principle of sufficient reason to ground, nothing and freedom. Ground is intended to be the clarifying concept, and so must be clarified itself before freedom and nothingness can be shown in their relation. *Grund* is a German word that can be translated, depending on context, as "ground", "basis", or "reason"<sup>86</sup>. The term arrives as a problem for Heidegger when he considers the *principium rationis sufficientis*, which is translated in German as "*der Satz vom Grund*". Hence Terrance Mallick, the original translator of *WG*, gives his translation the title *The Essence of Reasons*.

The principle of sufficient reason runs, "everything must have a reason why it is the way it is rather than something else". Heidegger translates the principle (*nihil est sine* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Specifically, reason in the sense of the motivation or explanation of an action, not in the sense of the faculty of thought.

ratione) itself as 'Nichts ist ohne Grund' (nothing is without ground) or, positively, 'Alles hat seinen Grund' (everything has its ground) [GA26 136/110]. So, everything that is must have a Grund, a ground determines its being the way it is. Heidegger's first step in tracing the meaning of Grund is to go to the Ancient Greek concept of archē. Though traditionally translated as "principle" (Prinzip or Satz in German), via the Latin principium, archē has the broader meaning, according to the Liddel Scott Jones Greek-English Lexicon (1958), of 'beginning or origin', in the sense of that which is the foundation or source of something, such as a 'source of action' or 'the first principle' or 'element' (252). Heidegger's translation of archē as Grund, therefore, works rather neatly, since the word is similarly ambiguous.

Furthermore, since *Grund* is now said to be both reason and the more authentic way of understanding *archē*, this makes "the principle of reason" or "*Der Satz vom Grund*" tautological. 'It is easy to see that the nature of principle as a problem refers to *principium*, to *archē* — thus to ground!' [GA26 138/112]. *Der Satz vom Grund* asks for the principle of principles, the reason for reason, the ground of ground, the foundation of foundations, the origin of origins, the cause of causation and the *archē* of *archē*. Heidegger takes this as evidence that an inquiry is needed, since the 'nature of the principle in this principle is itself to be attained only by clarifying the essence of ground as such.' [138/112]

So, Heidegger attempts to look into the nature of *archē* itself, something he claims has never been adequately reckoned with since Ancient Greek philosophy:

This vagueness [concerning the meaning of the principle of sufficient reason] is connected with the complete lack of clarity about the sense of "principle" in this principle, something which has never since antiquity, posed a problem. [GA26 138/112]

There is sense in this:  $arch\bar{e}$  is one of the oldest philosophical concepts. It was even available to the first people whose thought can be called philosophical, the Milesians. As philosophers of nature (*phusikoi*), they were interested in defining nature, conceived as the *archē*, the ground of things. As an example, Anaximander, in whose remaining fragments we find the earliest remaining philosophical use of the term, argues that this *archē* is *apeiron*, without limit or indefinable.<sup>87</sup> However, this tells us what our particular *archē* is, not what *archē*, ground, is as such; the question of *what is this grounding* relationship between nature and things goes unnoticed.

This also allows us to look at the account of existential guilt in *Being and Time* in a new light: to say that Dasein is the ground of a nothingness, the basis [*Grund*] that is an abyss [*Abgrund*] is to say that Dasein is an *archē* that is anarchic. That is, if anarchy is understood in the sense of Reiner Schürmann:

'Anarchy' here does not stand for a program of action, nor its juxtaposition with 'principle' for dialectical reconciliation. [...] Is not the backbone of metaphysics— whatever the ulterior determinations by which this concept would have to be specified—the rule always to seek a first from which the world becomes intelligible and masterable, the rule of *scire per causas* [knowing through causes], of establishing 'principles' for thinking and doing? 'Anarchy', on the other hand, designates the withering away of such a rule, the relaxing of its hold. (Schürmann, 1990:6)

Dasein's anxiety reveals for it the absence of any such rule to determine its world. It is its own rule, but as it is itself an abyss, the rule is ultimately nothing. The Guilt Argument tells us how Dasein experiences this abyss. The Transcendence Argument gives it full philosophical clarification. However, it is not to be wondered at that these two arguments have been held separate by recent literature, since because they bring together two distinct tendencies in Heidegger's philosophy that are usually kept separate by the external matter of scholars' interests.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> For a detailed discussion of this concept in Anaximander see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield (1983:108-117).

Zimmerman speaks of two impulses driving the early Heidegger: the desire to think ontologically and systematically, and the desire to account for the dramatic and spiritual aspects of human existence. In other words, this is the drive towards an *'Existenz* philosophy' and an 'existentialism', to work with Hannah Arendt's terms, both an ontology and a meditation on finding meaning in life.<sup>88</sup> The obscurity of Heidegger's philosophy of freedom consists in the attempt to bring these two drives into a single expression, but with a thematic clash. When in his ontologist mode, Heidegger speaks of freedom as the essence of ground or the essence of truth. When in his existentialist mode, he speaks of a freedom towards death that is anxious and resolute.

Heidegger the ontologist and Heidegger the existentialist are brought together in the concept of freedom, but they speak different languages which appeal to different Heideggerians differently. If one wishes to read Heidegger as a "serious" ontologist of the school of Husserl, one is unlikely to be interested in the discussion of guilt in Division II of *Being and Time*, hence Dreyfus' infamous decision to dedicate very little time to it at all in his commentary (1991). Equally, if one prefers the existential moment of Heidegger, one is likely to be far more interested in the later discussions of poetry than the intricate discussions of metaphysics in the late 1920s, where Heidegger starts to sound like a transcendental idealist. For this reason, and for others, I understand the temptation to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> In an article for *Partisan Review*, Arendt distinguishes between 'existentialism', which described as a 'French literary movement' and 'Existenz philosophy', which has a 'century-hold history' beginning with 'Schelling in his late period and with Kierkegaard, developed in Nietzsche along with a great number of as yet unexhausted possibilities, determined the essential part of Bergson's thought and of the so-called life philosophy (*Lebensphilosophy*), until finally in postwar Germany, with Scheler, Heidegger and Jaspers, it reached a consciousness as yet unsurpassed, of what is at stake in modern philosophy' (1946:34).

separate these discussions into two separate concepts. Nonetheless, the texts themselves compel us to read them alongside each other.

In this section, I began with a discussion of the problem of ground as Heidegger elaborates it in relation to the principle of sufficient reason. Ground is a concept that Heidegger uses to name that which is responsible for existence as it is, as the answer to why there is something rather than nothing. While the Transcendence Argument takes up this problem from an explicitly metaphysical point of view, the concept actually combines what Zimmerman calls the 'systematic ontological' and 'dramatic spiritual' aspects of Heidegger's thought. Ground is an answer to the question of the origin of sentience and to the meaning of Dasein's being: Dasein is the ground of its world, insofar it is thrown into its possibilities and there is nothing underneath to support it. I will elaborate this concept further as I develop the Guilt and Transcendence Arguments for freedom's relation to ground.

## 5.2 – The Guilt Argument: Ground through Moral Philosophy

In this section, I will give an account of Heidegger's discussion of existential guilt in *Being and Time*. This discussion constitutes a deconstruction of moral philosophy. In it, Heidegger gets to the claim that freedom is being-the-ground (*Grundsein*) insofar as Dasein is responsible for its actions. Here, Heidegger secularises the moral-philosophical claim that to be free is to be worthy of praise and blame.

Heidegger's argument begins with a phenomenological description of conscience (*Gewissen*) as a call (*Ruf*). In Heidegger's own words, his intention is to 'trace conscience back to its existential foundations and structures and make it visible *as* a phenomenon of Dasein' [*SZ* 268-9]. Heidegger argues that conscience is the call of the self back to itself. This sense of call is genuinely discursive. Although conscience does not speak or utter words, it silently summons Dasein back to itself.

The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set going a 'soliloquy' in the Self to which it has appealed. 'Nothing' gets called *to* this Self, but it has been *summoned* to itself—that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. [*SZ* 273]

From this, one can see Heidegger's interest in the phenomenon. The discussion of being-towards-death showed the possibility of Dasein's being-a-whole, i.e. its being-

authentic, but gave no information on how this movement could become actual. Heidegger

sees in conscience a phenomenon that not only points to the possibility of authenticity but

instructs Dasein to become so. Conscience is, for Heidegger, a call of the self that summons

Dasein to its authentic self by suppressing the they-self.

The sort of Dasein which is understood after the manner of the world both for Others and for itself, gets *passed over* in this appeal; this is something of which the call to the Self takes not the slightest cognizance. And because only the *Self* of the they-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the "*they*" collapses. [...] Precisely *in passing over* the "they" (keen as it is for public repute) the call pushes it into insignificance. But the self, which the appeal has robbed of this lodgement and hiding-place, gets brought to itself by the call. [*SZ* 273]

By undermining the publicity that sustains the they-self, the call of conscience reveals the authentic self to Dasein in its silent and private call to itself. Structurally, one can see Heidegger's intentions and how it fits into his argument; akin to the categorical imperative in Kant, the call of conscience is the moment when the human realises its obligation to

choose to be itself, stop not-being-itself, and achieve positive freedom. Or, in Heidegger's

terms, conscience 'calls Dasein forth (and "forward") into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost *potentiality*-for-Being-its-Self' [*SZ* 273].

Structurally, the meaning of these arguments is clear. The purpose of these sections is to prepare the reader for Heidegger's deconstruction of the moral concept of conscience in the second half of the chapter and to establish that experience already tells us that conscience is linked to authenticity. Phenomenologically, however, Heidegger gives little detail about the experience he is talking about and the reader can be forgiven for missing the fact that this is a phenomenological description at all. For all of Heidegger's talk in §7 of avoiding 'free-floating constructions' [*SZ* 28], the description of conscience is quite abstract and difficult to picture. Heidegger presumes a great deal about the reader's ability to relate to the experience he is talking about, spending his time exclusively on the interpretation of the existential structure of the experience of conscience as a call rather than a description of the text or a symptom of the limitations of a theme to which Heidegger does not return in later work, one has a responsibility to dig deep and identify the concrete experience the author is trying to interpret.

We know that the experience Heidegger has in mind is related to the self and is part of the existential structure of Dasein, understood as care. Further, Heidegger turns to this topic out of the context of our experience of our own mortality. As such, we can take Heidegger to be talking about a potent moment of conscience. Bad faith deliberation about an inessential matter, such as whether to buy or illegally download a film, to take an Uber or call a local taxi firm, or to own up about having received too much change is unlikely to qualify. Heidegger has in mind a deep-seated "bout of conscience" that puts our very sense of self into question. As an initial example, I will try to map Heidegger's interpretation onto a simple moral dilemma: having let a friend down. One might be tempted to view this in behavioural terms: I did something bad, this made my friend sad, I see the sadness, now I feel sad. Heidegger in contrast wants us to read the phenomenon existentially as a "calling of the self back to itself". As such, the bout of conscience involved in letting down a friend involves the recognition of a disconnect between how I acted and how I "should" have acted. The negative emotion is just one way of revealing that alternate possibility I "should" have taken. Letting my friend down was a contingent event; it could have been otherwise. Were I to have taken the alternate possibility, to have done what I now feel I should have done, my friend would not be upset. Conscience is the consciousness of this alternate possibility as possible, of the factical possibility as contingent on my action, and my own responsibility for the state of affairs.

Importantly, the structure of conscience is not necessarily about moral disputes. Heidegger does not want to view this structure as moral or theological and argues that the moral and theological concepts of conscience are grounded on the existential concept of conscience, not the other way around.<sup>89</sup> What is key in the example is the access conscience gives to my understanding of myself: my regretted action puts me face to face with my freedom as the one responsible for *this* possibility where I have hurt my friend rather than the preferred possibility where I had not. Non-moral examples revealing the same structure are also available, such as the bitter disappointment of not being selected

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> 'The ontological analysis of conscience on which we are thus embarking, is prior to any description and classification of Experiences of conscience, and likewise lies outside of any biological 'explanation' of this phenomenon (which would mean its dissolution). But it is no less distant from a theological exegesis of conscience or any employment of this phenomenon for proofs of God or for establishing an 'immediate' consciousness of God.' [*SZ* 269]

after a job interview. There, I am faced with the brute facticity of my undesired situation. The possibility of a "better" job has been closed to me, and I am thrown into the fact that perhaps if I had answered the question better or worn a slightly different coloured tie (in short, to all that was contingent on my action) then things might be different. I am further thrown into questions of what I am doing with my life, why I have chosen this career and, ultimately, the absurdity of all this in the face of my own mortality. Moments of regret and guilt strip us of the comfort of inauthenticity and the they-self. In them, we realise we have been carrying-along unthinkingly, since the fact of our responsibility for the situation "disproves" the they-self's suggestion that we are responsible for nothing.

The "they" has always kept Dasein from taking hold of these possibilities of Being. The "they" even hides the manner in which it has tacitly relieved Dasein of the burden of explicitly *choosing* these possibilities. It remains indefinite who has 'really' done the choosing. So Dasein make [*sic.*] no choices, gets carried along by nobody, and thus ensnares itself in inauthenticity. [*SZ* 268]

The they-self makes it ambiguous that our choices matter, that we are responsible for the significance and actuality of our situation. But, the call of conscience, bringing us face to face with our own responsibility, summons us to accept that responsibility. Conscience summons one to 'one's *own Self*. Not to what Dasein counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in being with one another publicly, not to what it has taken hold of, set about or let itself be carried along with' [*SZ* 273]. And, as cited above, the call of conscience 'passes over' the they-self, calling directly to the authentic self to take up the responsibility revealed to it in a fact of freedom.

Heidegger is here returning to the themes of Division I, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. Dasein is thrown into a factical situation experienced as disposedness [*Befindlichkeit*]. We are disposed to a set of possibilities that we are and which are available to us. Dasein is a specific set of possibilities that it did not choose. Dasein can then, in

understanding, project itself onto these possibilities towards some goal that is ahead of itself, in a negative freedom. As Dasein is only possibility, determinism is out of the question. The world is made up of Dasein's possibilities regulated by its project. But, while this is a picture of negative freedom, it is not genuine freedom because Dasein flees from the burden of its ability-to-be (*Seinkönnen*), or as the Macquarrie and Robinson translation puts it, its potentiality-for-Being (Heidegger, 2010:517).

In the face of this potentiality-for-Being, Dasein falls into its world and reposes in the they-self, a non-free, non-volatile way of existence that is more like the entities it finds within the world. Relieved of the burden of freedom, Dasein acts inauthentically: not-being-its-self (*Nicht-es-selbstsein*). The call of conscience cuts through this inauthenticity by isolating Dasein in its self privately and silently, repressing the publicness and hubbub of the world. In addressing Dasein as potentiality-for-Being, its ability to be this or that possibility, its thrownness into this or that possibility, and the contingency of its situation resting on its own choices, conscience is a mood in which Dasein understands itself authentically. The call does not permit the usual retreat to authenticity, because the bout of conscience only makes sense if we understand ourselves as free. Heidegger therefore maps the call of conscience directly onto the existential structure of care, concluding that in conscience, care calls Dasein back to itself.

*Conscience manifests itself as the call of care*: the caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about its potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The one to whom the appeal is made is this very same Dasein, summoned to its ownmost potentiality-for-being (ahead of itself...). Dasein is falling into the "they" (in Being-already-alongside the world of its concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience—that is, conscience itself—has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its being, is care. [*SZ* 277]

Heidegger's mapping of conscience onto the existential structure of Dasein, rather than the existentiell experience of the individual Dasein is a key inflection. Heidegger is not advocating an existentiell solipsism where we retreat from the world to some fundamental individuality.<sup>90</sup> Dasein is in each case mine (*je meines*), and so each Dasein takes over this being it its own way. As Heidegger puts it, 'every Dasein always exists factically. It is not a free-floating self-projection'. But, what is at stake in the call of conscience is not some true individuality in the sense of my own existentiell personality. Rather, it is an ontological realisation, that I am, as Dasein forced to be the being that I am. Dasein must exist 'as an entity which has to be as it is and as it can be'. Conscience brings Dasein 'face to face with the fact that it is, and that it has to be something with a potentiality-for-being as the entity which it is'. [*SZ* 276]

Conscience disposes Dasein towards its being as care, as something that is a thrown potentiality-for-Being. Heidegger goes on to ask what this call actually says such that it communicates Dasein's being to itself. The word that adequately expresses what the call says to Dasein is "Guilty!". When Dasein's being expresses itself to itself, it is an accusation of guilt.

[...] the call either addresses Dasein as 'Guilty!', or, as in the case when the conscience gives warning, referring to a possible 'Guilty!', or affirms as a 'good' conscience, that one is 'conscious of no guilt'? [SZ 281]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Heidegger does sometimes seem as though he is advocating an existentiell individualism, but this is hard to reconcile with the many passages that insist that authenticity is another way of being-in-the-world, rather than a retreat inward. For example, 'The appeal to the Self in the they-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the "external world". The call passes over everything like this and disperses it, so as to appeal solely to that Self which, notwithstanding, is in no other way than Being-in-the world.' [*SZ* 273] On this point, see Guignon (1984) and Zimmerman (1975a).

In conscience, the self calls itself "Guilty!" in silence. While Heidegger seems to take this as phenomenally obvious, he insists that the phenomenon of the "Guilty!" requires existential clarification. Heidegger's analysis of the "Guilty!" in the call of conscience consists in presenting typical ways of understanding "being-guilty" (*Schuldsein*). These are: 'having debts [*Schudlen haben*]' [*SZ* 281]; 'making oneself responsible [*sich schuldig machen*]'; and coming to owe something to others [*Schuldigwerdens an Anderen*]' [*SZ* 282]. What brings these together is the idea of ""being-the-ground<sup>91</sup> [*Grundsein*] of a lack [*Mangel*] of something in the other'. Guilt in all senses is a way of being for Dasein in which it is the ground of a lack. If I upset my friend, I am the ground of, or reason for, their lack of happiness. If I do not repay my debts, I am the ground of a lack of money in the accounts of my creditors. But, Heidegger criticises the idea of "lack" in this conception as referring exclusively to things within the world, the present-at-hand.

[Here] "guilt" is [...] defined as a lack—when something which ought to be and which c a n be is missing. To be missing, however, means not-Being-present-at-hand. A lack, as the not-Being-present-at-hand of something which ought to be, is a definite sort of Being which goes with the present-at-hand. [*SZ* 283]

A lack (Mangel) is a categorial, not existential, concept. As such, it is ontologically

inappropriate to interpret Dasein. While Heidegger is happy to accept a definition of guilt

as being-the-ground for an "absence", it is imperative to interpret that absence in the terms

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Grund is a German word that can mean "ground", "basis", or "reason for". Macquarrie and Robinson consistently translate *Grund* as "basis" and *Grundsein* as being-the-basis. This works well for readability, and Heidegger is not using the term in these sections in any special sense. But, the later discussions of this concept in G26 and *WG* reveal more about exactly what he has in mind and do deliberately play between the above meanings. These later discussions directly relate to the discussion of guilt in *SZ*, so for consistency I will modify the translation to follow the decision by the translators of these later texts to use "ground", which is more able to meet the semantic strain than "basis".

of Dasein. Heidegger introduces nothingness (*Nichtigkeit*) as an existential understanding of lack.

Nevertheless, in the idea of 'Guilty!' there lies the character of a "*not*". If the 'Guilty!' is something that can definitely apply to existence, then this raises the ontological problem of clarifying existentially the *character* of the "not" *as a "not"*. Moreover, to the idea of 'Guilty!' belongs what is expressed without further differentiation in the conception of guilt as 'having responsibility for' — that is, as Being-the basis for... Hence we define formally the existential idea of the 'Guilty!' as "Being-the-ground of a Being which has been defined by a 'not'"—that is to say, as "Being-the-ground of a nothingness<sup>92</sup> [Grundsein einer Nightigkeit]" [SZ 283]

So, existential guilt is being the ground of, not a lack, but of the nothingness distinctive

of Dasein's being: care. Care is guilt because it is the anxious ground of possibilities. To put it bluntly, existential guilt is freedom. This is not a controversial statement insofar as freedom is required to be culpable for our praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. But, Heidegger is radicalising this idea to say that the volatility of Dasein's essence, its potentiality-for-Being, its being as possibility, are experienced as fundamental culpability. Or, rather, when the conscience calls "Guilty!", we are anxiously facing our potentiality-for-Being, something we prefer to avoid by reposing in the they-self.

Heidegger goes on to explain what he means by saying that Dasein is guilty in the sense of being the ground of nothingness: Dasein is the reason its alternate possibilities are *not* and its factical situation *is*.

[...] in having a potentiality-for-Being it always stands in one possibility or another: it constantly is *not* other possibilities, and it has waived these in its existentiell projection. [*SZ* 285]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Following my decision in comparing Heidegger and Sartre in Chapter 3, I will render "*Nichtigkeit*" as "nothingness".

Every decision Dasein makes when it projects onto its thrown possibilities is a denial of the alternative possibilities. Its "actuality" therefore always has a perfume of lost deeds. To return to my examples above, the guilt of having let down a friend is grounded in my being responsible for (*Grundsein*) the nullity of the possibility in which I had done the right thing. My regret at having failed to get a job is possible because I feel myself to be the ground and reason for the nothingness of the possibility in which I was successful. Every choice and every failure to make a choice is at the same time a ground of nothingness. 'Not only is the projection, as one that has been thrown, determined by the nullity of Being-abasis; *as projection* it is itself essentially *null*.' [*SZ* 285] The reason for this is that freedom is finite.

The nullity we have in mind belongs to Dasein's Being-free for its existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, *is* only in the choice of on e possibility—that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. [*SZ* 285]

Freedom means choosing *one* possibility among others, grounding the nothingness of lost alternatives. As Heidegger later puts it in *WM*, 'Without the original manifestation of the nothing, no selfhood and no freedom.' [*WM* /91] Potentiality-for-Being is not simply Dasein's ability to choose to be something, but it is always a choice to be this *and not that*.<sup>93</sup> This leads Heidegger to claim Dasein is guilty by definition: 'Dasein's Being—means, as thrown projection, being-the-ground of a nothingness (and this Being-the-ground is itself null). This means that *Dasein as such is guilty*' [285].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> This is something Heidegger will play on when talking about *Grund* in the sense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (*Der Satz vom Grund*) in *WG* and G26. Heidegger emphasises that the question is not "why is there something" but "why is there something *rather than nothing*". This "*potius quam*" is essential to Heidegger's concept of *Grund*, that being a basis is, in a broad sense, dialectical. To be x is also to be not x. To be is to be nothing. This, as I will show, is repeated in his confrontation with Schelling in *SaF*. Schelling (2006) attempts a dialectical concept of identity that implies difference.

Care is, then, an existential guilt understood as being-the-ground of the nothingness that disposes Dasein to its anxiety. But, it is not an absolute ground, it is a finite ground. Dasein has been 'delivered over' to its 'being-the-ground of its potentiality-for-Being'. We do not choose to be free, but we are nonetheless this finite being-free no matter what we want. But, this never means 'to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up'. 'Although it has *not* laid that basis *itself*, it reposes in the weight of it, which is made manifest to it as a burden by Dasein's mood.' [*SZ* 284] Anxiety brings us face to face with this "fact", but for the most part we flee this burden, and repose in inauthenticity.

Inauthenticity is therefore the existentiell refusal of freedom by being something we are not. The nature of care affords this possibility to us.<sup>94</sup> Returning to §9 and the first words of Heidegger's existentialism, Dasein's essence can only be conceived as a possible way for it to be, if it is its ownmost possibility. Authentic Dasein, however, heeds rather than flees the call of conscience that says "Guilty!". Care is guilt, in the sense of being culpable for what Dasein is, whether it wants to be or not.

The Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can *never* get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis. To be its own thrown basis is that potentiality-for-Being which is the issue for care. [SZ 284]

Again, to return to the language of §9, Dasein can win itself or lose itself. It can deny its freedom, fleeing from its burden. This means, in the present context, not wanting to have a conscience, not wanting to be guilty, not wanting to be-the-ground. If Dasein is to win itself, it must heed that call of conscience and affirm its guilt, choosing to be itself. Heidegger calls this state "wanting-to-have-a-conscience" (*Gewissenhabenwollen*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> 'In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity. This nullity is the basis for the possibility of *in*authentic Dasein in its falling; and as falling, every inauthentic Dasein factically is. *Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through.*' [*SZ* 285]

Understanding the call is choosing; but it is not a choosing of conscience, which as such cannot be chosen. What is chosen is *having-a*-conscience as Being-free for one's ownmost Being-guilty. "Understanding the appeal" means "wanting to have a conscience". [288]

Only once Dasein has affirmed its conscience can it be truly free.

When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this includes its *becoming free* for the call—its readiness for the potentiality of getting appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is *in thrall to its ownmost possibility of existence*. It has chosen itself. [287]

We have here, then, a clear positive conception of freedom: being in thrall to our

being. In resoluteness (Entschlossenheit), Dasein accepts its finite being-the-ground, and

no longer flees itself. This means the "self" in not-being-its-self and being-its-self does not

mean my individual personality. It means care. It means choosing to be the "sort" of being

I am, not choosing to be me as an individual. If the term "authentic self" is taken to mean

"my genuine and sincere self", then no more than Sartre does Heidegger think this exists.

To interpret Dasein's self in such a way would be to describe it as a property present-

at-hand. As Heidegger later argues in 'On the Essence of Truth [WW], which I will focus on

in §5.4, freedom has nothing to do with choosing an entity, but of being disclosed to the

truth of being:

Freedom is not merely what common sense is content to let pass under this name: the caprice, turning up occasionally in our choosing, of inclining in this or that direction. Freedom is not mere absence of constraint with respect to what we can or cannot do. Nor is it on the other hand mere readiness for what is required and necessary (and so somehow a being). Prior all this ("negative" and "positive" freedom), freedom is engagement in the disclosure of beings as such. Disclosedness itself is conserved in ek-sistent engagement, through which the openness of the open region, i.e. the "there", is what it is. [WW 189/145]

Here, Heidegger distances himself from a Kantian conception of freedom. Freedom is not the absence of an obstacle, as with the negative concept. Nor, as with traditional concepts of positive freedom, is it an attainment of a necessary property, such as conformity to the moral law. However, in rejecting this present-at-hand conception of the moment of positive freedom, Heidegger replaces it with one that is existential: Dasein's authentic self is not a being, but its being as a whole, as the ground of the disclosure of beings. Taylor Carman is right, therefore, to warn against any interpretation of the authentic self as an 'achievement of a kind of wholeness or integrity'. Since,

[...] any such ideal of self-realisation, self-actualization, or completion must be impossible for an entity like Dasein, whose being Heidegger describes as a continual "thrown projection", nothing at all like a finished, completed, or even in principle completable thing. (Carman, 2010:287).

For this reason, Carman criticises Charles Guignon in particular, who has written several articles on authenticity. For example, Guignon argues 'For humans, "Being" is a success verb: it is an accomplishment that is realized in one's "Being-a-whole". (Guignon, 1984:330). Equally, however, Guignon tries not to regard this depiction of the self as thing like. In this same essay, he says, 'The "formal" structure of Dasein's existence as a temporal "happening" is the "Authentic self."' (332) For Guignon, emphasis on Dasein as a process is sufficient to escape the problem. More recently, he has emphasised this, and in specific relation to the concept of freedom:

[I]n [Heidegger's] view, the self is not a thing or an object of any sort. Instead the self is understood in *Being and Time* as a movement, a happening, a being-underway that unfolds between birth and death.' (Guignon, 2011:89)

However, this still leads to a definition of authenticity that is very focussed on the particular sincerity of the individual, that reads closer to Bergson's conception of freedom

than that of Heidegger's:

Instead of drifting into the familiar activities approved by the conventions of the public world, the resolute individual fulfils her ability-to-be free by identifying herself with a specific range of choices while recognising that, in doing so, she is renouncing others. (Guignon, 2011:90)

Here the limitation involved in splitting the Guilt and Transcendence Arguments can be seen. While Heidegger does say, in *Being and Time*, that 'Freedom, however, *is* only in the choice of one possibility—that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them' [*SZ* 285], this is not a definition. By turning to the Transcendence Argument in the next section, I will be able demonstrate that the key aspect of the Guilt Argument is Dasein's being-a-ground. This allows for an ontological positive freedom, rather than concerning the affirmation of individuality. This is also indicated by Charles Scott:

> Heidegger's emphasis is not on self-constituting action or intentional action, but is on the (self-)disclosure of Dasein's disclosiveness. In opening to its being and allowing its being, Dasein does not constitute itself. It stands outside of the possibility for self-constitution and finds itself in question in all of its reach and stretch. Dasein's disclosiveness is its being. (1999:220-221)

And, more recently, Mark Wrathall has argued that 'the self, rather than functioning as a foreground entity that plays an explanatory role within the causal production of bodily movements, instead can be understood as a kind of background to purposive action.' (2014:200). To be authentic is to choose to be this background to action, to choose to be the ground of the world, and to choose to be freedom.

*Being and Time* from this point on moves away from the topic of freedom to that of temporality. This develops the concept of care, but not of the topic of freedom understood as existential guilt: being-the-ground of nothingness. In the next section, I will show how *WG* and GA26 offer a clarification of what Heidegger has already said in *Being and Time*. There, instead of using a moral context, Heidegger uses the context of the principle of sufficient reason (*Der Satz vom Grund*) and a fuller interpretation of being-in-the-world as transcendence.

## 5.3 – The Transcendence Argument: Ground through Metaphysics

This chapter scrutinised Heidegger's concept of freedom as Dasein's choice to become its own being, Dasein's choice to be Dasein. In the last section, I followed the discussion of existential guilt in *Being and Time*, what I have termed 'The Guilt Argument' for freedom as freedom for ground. Heidegger argues that Dasein becomes free if it heeds the call of its self back to itself. But, this self is not the personality of an individual, but Dasein's being as such. Dasein's self is its ownmost possibility of being as the null ground of nothingness: Dasein, having a pre-ontological understanding of being, has nothing beneath it to blame or rely on for its existence. It is thrown into an existence that it has to be, but that it did not design or create. Existential guilt is the revelation to Dasein that it is the sort of being that Heidegger describes it as: an entity that has its being as a possibility for it to be one way or another, and that it is not being that being.

However, it is still not clear how this structure is intended to be thought. *Being and Time* continues to elaborate Heidegger's concept of ecstatic temporality, but drops any explicit investigation into freedom. In this section, I will argue that the Transcendence Argument is the place where Heidegger provides full clarification of what it means to say that Dasein is, as free, a null ground of nothingness and existentially guilty.

I have already stated that the Transcendence Argument begins the principle of sufficient reason (*Grund*), leading to an account of freedom. I will now clarify what this has to do with the concept of transcendence. In short, Heidegger's argument is that the explanation of the question of the principle of reason is an inadequate attempt at grasping

the more primordial concept of Dasein's transcendence, the manner in which it surpasses beings, in which it is not a mere inanimate object, but can encounter beings in their being.

Transcendence, Heidegger argues, is best understood as being-in-the-world. For this reason, the principle of sufficient reason and the question "why are there beings at all rather than nothing?" engage in a similar methodological mistake to the question of the reality of the external world, which Heidegger has already dealt with in *Being and Time*. The question of whether or not there is a world that transcends the objects of perception, a material world rather than the one we live in, fails to recognise that we are already in the world before such a question can be answered. Only by presuming that Dasein is trapped in its own sphere do we have a question of how it escapes that sphere, as he argues in §13 of *Being and Time*.

Similarly, asking why there is something rather than nothing fails to recognise that the things are only there insofar as Dasein, as disclosure, is there to encounter them. The question becomes, then, how and in what sense does Dasein surpass or step over beings such that it encounters them: what is transcendence? Heidegger argues that transcendence is the 'primordial constitution [*ursprüngliche Verfassung*]' [GA26 211/165] of Dasein. In other words, transcendence is Dasein's ground.

The first thing that Heidegger does is to give an account of the primary meaning of transcendence in the history of philosophy. But, though the term has been used and has been at work implicitly in philosophy for a long time, Heidegger claims that he is the first to address the problem in a genuine manner. This is not a boast about his abilities, but rather an attempt to impress upon us that 'the problem must not be underestimated and that one must have long wind, so as not to be exhausted just when the problem is first beginning.' [GA26 215/168]

This is interesting to note. While it is not unheard of for Heidegger to talk about moving beyond what has already been said in the tradition, such statements are rare; especially rare is the suggestion that there is a clear break with that tradition. Heidegger, on the whole, prefers to talk about taking up historical philosophical questions in a radically new way, or repetition. Yet, when it comes to transcendence (which also means freedom), he is quite explicit about stepping beyond the traditional content of the problem.

What we mean by transcendence can not be made compatible with the previous formulations of it and is very difficult to see, in the light of the usual deadlocked version of the problem. [GA26 213-214/167]

The finality of this statement must not be overlooked. We are dealing with one of, if not *the*, essential contributions Heidegger has made to philosophy. It is a point where he moves from the mode of a destructive reading of history of philosophy (the majority of this lecture course) to constructive, positive and original phenomenological claims. Furthermore, within the context of developing an understanding of Heidegger's concept of freedom, this is key. This particular step forward, his move to a new understanding of transcendence, is what makes it so difficult to relate his philosophy of freedom with typical discussions, why it has been necessary to contextualise Heidegger's work within a rejection of that tradition in Chapter 1 of this thesis, and why it is only after an examination of the relationship between Heidegger's concept of freedom and the pre-ontological understanding of the meaning of being (Chapter 2) and the positive conception of freedom (Chapters 3 and 4) that the between the Guilt and Transcendence arguments can be identified as arguing for a single concept of freedom. As argued above, Heidegger clarifies his concept of transcendence in relation to previous concepts and positions his as a step forward that 'can not be made compatible with previous formulations'. I will follow Heidegger's account of these previous formulations before asserting his positive contribution. Characteristically, Heidegger begins his account of the concept of transcendence [*Transzendenz*] with its etymology:

The verbal meaning comes from *transcendere*: to surpass [*übersteigen*], step over [*überschreiten*], to cross over to [*hinuberschreiten zu*]. Thus *transendence* means the surpassing [*der Überschritt*], the going beyond [*das Überschreiten*]. [GA26 204/160]

So, transcendence means a stepping over or stepping beyond. Out of this definition, Heidegger derives three components. First, there is the movement of transcendence itself, the stepping over. Then, there is the "transcendent". This is that "towards which" whatever is doing the stepping over steps towards, 'that which requires surpassing in order to be accessible and attainable' [GA26 204/160]. The final component is the entity that actually performs the transcending. In every transcendence, therefore, an entity steps over a barrier in order to gain access to a "transcendent" entity, previously out of its reach.

In turning to the philosophical usage of the term, Heidegger invokes two common examples, though he claims they are not exhaustive. These are what he calls "epistemological transcendence" and "theological transcendence". The former conceives the transcendent in contrast to the immanent, the latter to the contingent.

*Epistemological transcendence* is concerned with the opposition of the mind to the world. That is, it is an opposition between what is in our minds and given to thought and perception directly, and that which is beyond our mind. This issue crops up most explicitly in early modern metaphysics, and Heidegger has already discussed it under the heading of 'knowing' in *Being and Time [SZ* §13]. The problem concerns how a self-contained subject

can escape its limits and get out into the world and apprehend objects outside of itself. René Descartes, for example, wonders whether he can even know if he is 'here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding this piece of paper in [his] hands' (Descartes, 2013:13). Heidegger criticises this conception as follows:

Here the subject is thought of as a sort of box with an interior, with the walls of a box, and with an exterior. Of course, the crude view is not put forth that consciousness is in fact a box, but what is essential to the analogy and what belongs to the very conception of the transcendent is that a barrier between inner and outer must be crossed. This means that the inner is, first of all, really restricted by the barrier and must first break through it, must first *remove the restrictions*. [GA26 205/160]

So, in this conception of transcendence, the subject is first of all conceived as something isolated by some sort of barrier that prevents it from having immediate access to the world of objects. As a solution to this problem, it is either said that the mind passes through the barrier to the world somehow, or that the world somehow passes through the barrier to the mind. From this, 'the problem arises of how to explain the possibility of such a passage. One tries to explain it either causally, psychologically or physiologically' [GA26 205/161]

An example of a philosophical theory that takes this position is the representational theory of perception. According to this, the way the mind gains access to objects is that the object in the world has an effect on the body, for instance by triggering a nervous response via the impact of its reflected light on the retina. This effect generates an image of the object in the mind through some trick of the brain. Here, the essential isolation of the mind is transcended by a mysterious physiological process. However, we are left with the problem of how an essentially isolated mind can be affected by the body in any way whatsoever. This is the classical mind and body problem.

Heidegger makes the passing criticism that this problematic arises because its thinking is underpinned by 'the notion of the subject, of Dasein, as box-like at its basis. Without it, the problem of crossing a barrier or border would be nonsense! [...] Does this box-notion have any a priori validity at all or not? If not, however, why does it arise with such persistence?' [GA26 206/161]. This repeats his similar claim in *Being and Time*:

Of course we are sometimes assured that we are certainly not to think of the subject's "inside" and its 'inner sphere' as a sort of 'box' or 'cabinet'. But when one asks for the positive signification of this 'inside' of immanence in which knowing is proximally enclosed, or when one inquires how this 'Being inside' which knowing possess has its own character of Being grounded in the kind of Being which belongs to the subject, then silence reigns. [*SZ* 60]

As such, we can say that the epistemological concept of transcendence is what underpins the mind and body problem and its variations in the history of philosophy. Heidegger goes even further by saying that this concept of transcendence is what makes possible having a theory of knowledge or epistemology. As such, if Heidegger successfully moves past this concept of transcendence, then he is rendering both of these classical problems obsolete.

Theological transcendence, rather than being about the relation between the subject and object, is about the relationship between the conditioned and the condition. The basic content of this concept is that humans and other worldly objects are contingent. They are transitory beings that come and go. They are finite, limited, and conditioned by their surroundings and the causes that bring them about. Over and above these contingent entities is another type of entity that exists outside of all time and space, beyond all contingent existence as the condition of its possibility.

The transcendent [...] is what is beyond all this as that which conditions it, as the unconditioned, but at the same time as the really unattainable, what exceeds us.

Transcendence is stepping-over in the sense of lying beyond conditioned beings. [GA26 206/161]

The theological implication is blatant, hence Heidegger's naming of this concept transcendence. This is a traditional Judeo-Christian way of thinking about God. However, Heidegger seems to imply that the idea of transcendence is more primordial, the invocation of God a mere addendum to the basic idea of a being existing beyond all contingency.

Being-beyond, in this case, expresses at the same time a difference in the degree of being, or better the infinite difference of the created from the creator, were we to substitute God, as understood by Christians, for the transcendent, which we need not do. [GA26 206-7/162]

This claim resonates with the earlier one in the Guilt Argument, where Heidegger warns against explaining away the call of conscience theologically or biologically.<sup>95</sup> As such, it would be a mistake to presume that atheism or a natural scientific worldview escape this trap. As we will see, Heidegger takes this conception of transcendence to be present, even if only implicit, in all metaphysical thinking. The transcendent entity invoked need not be God to be theological.

So, we have epistemological transcendence which consists in the relation between the subject and object, mind and world, ideality and reality, and we have theological transcendence that speaks of an unconditioned being that grounds the existence of all contingency.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup> 'The ontological analysis of conscience on which we are thus embarking, is prior to any description and classification of Experiences of conscience, and likewise lies outside of any biological 'explanation' of this phenomenon (which would mean its dissolution). But it is no less distant from a theological exegesis of conscience or any employment of this phenomenon for proofs of God or for establishing an 'immediate' consciousness of God.' [*SZ* 269]

Importantly, Heidegger says that these two concepts are not standalone but occur together and imply each other. He argues that if we affirm epistemological transcendence, we set up a transcendent object outside of the subject. Because we have posited a selfsubsistent object, we must posit an eminent being that is the ground of all such objects, the ground of all contingent being:

It is thus both something over against [the subject] and something which transcends all conditioned beings over against [the subject]. The transcendent, in this double sense, is the Eminent, the being that surpasses and exceeds all experience. So, inquiry into the possible constitution of the transcendent in the epistemological sense is bound up with inquiry into the possibility of knowing the transcendent object in the theological sense. [GA26 207/162]

Again, this double sense of transcendence does not exclusively belong to religious thinking. This eminent being need not be God but could just as well be the world. Even contemporary cosmology, with the Big Bang Theory, must posit transcendent entities in the theological sense that condition the laws that governed the explosion in the first place. Indeed, what is meant by a natural law other than something unconditioned that conditions the behaviour of contingent natural phenomena? In short, this is a problem for

all classical metaphysics. Heidegger goes on to condemn this situation as a confusion arising

from ill-posed problems.

All theological metaphysics, but also all systematic theology, operates through the entanglement of both problems of transcendence. Were we additionally to assign the distinction between the rational and the irrational to that between the transcendent and the contingent, then the confusion would be complete. This tangle of partially and falsely posed problems is continually confused in ontological philosophy and systematic theology; the tangle gets passed along form hand to hand and the state of entanglements gets further confused by receiving a new name. [GA26 207/208]

So, the traditional concept of transcendence is a confusion at the heart of all philosophical thinking prior to Heidegger's attempt at the problem. It consists both in setting up an opposition between the subject and the object, with a barrier in between that must be surmounted, and in the setting up of an external, eminent being that is the condition of all conditioned beings.

This conception is something that Heidegger genuinely feels, at least at this point in his career, we can move beyond. Further, although he frequently states that he does not think he has exhausted the problem, he thinks he has at least adequately formed the problem of transcendence such that we undergo a wholesale change in the way we undertake metaphysics, in which transcendence will be clarified as the authentic locus of the problem of freedom.

After delimiting the traditional concept of transcendence as that which is beyond some form of barrier that separates the human from it, Heidegger goes on to explain what his own concept of transcendence is. The explanation is actually quite brief as it amounts to a statement of the fact that the true concept of transcendence is to be found in his concept of being-in-the-world as articulated in *Being and Time*. Yet, it does go beyond the descriptions in *Being and Time* in that it brings freedom to the fore.

As was argued above, any concept of transcendence must have 1) something that surpasses, 2) something that is surpassed, and 3) that towards which the surpasser surpasses the surpassed. So, one example given was that of 1) the subject 2) surpassing a barrier between it and objects 3) towards objects themselves. The subject surpasses its solipsistic isolation to enter the external world and gain objects. In Heidegger's version, there is no barrier. Instead, 1) the "subject" (*Dasein*) 2) surpasses objects (*entities*) 3) towards the world. Objects are not the goal, they are that which is surpassed. What Dasein gains in its transcendence is not entities but the world as such.

Heidegger insists that transcendence is 'the primordial constitution of the *subjectivity* of a subject (*der* Subjectivität *eines Subjecktes*)' [GA26 211/165] Building on this, transcendence is a matter of the essence of subjectivity, and not a matter of the relationship between the subject and the object. Dasein is transcendence as such.

To be a subject means to transcend. This means that Dasein does not sort of exist and the occasionally achieve a crossing over outside itself, but existence originally means to cross over. Dasein is itself the passage across. And this implies that transcendence is not just one possible comportment (among others) of Dasein toward other beings, but it is the basic constitution [*Grundverfassung*] of its being, on the basis [*Grunde*] of which Dasein can at all relate to beings in the first place. [GA26 211/165]

The being of Dasein is grounded in transcendence as the primordial constitution of subjectivity. However, Heidegger is far from advocating a metaphysics of the subject. In fact, this formulation is intended to destroy the concept of the subject, making the way to replace it with being-and-the-world and Dasein.

It is important to remember that this definition is being given in opposition to a definition of transcendence that considers it to be a matter of stepping over a gap between subjects and objects. To say that transcendence is constitutive of the subjectivity of the subject—how a subject is a subject—is to say that transcendence is prior, not posterior to the subject/object relationship, if the latter exists at all. As he goes on to say, transcendence is what 'first makes it possible' for entities in the world 'to be optically *opposite* [to Dasein] and as opposite be apprehended in themselves.' [GA26 212/166] In other words, in order for there to be any sort of worry about how the subject might get out of itself and apprehend objects, transcendence must have already happened. Transcendence is *a priori*. However, for Heidegger, transcendence is prior to the subject/object relationship, not equal to it:

Because transcendence is the basic constitution of Dasein, it belongs foremost to its being and is not a comportment that is derived later. And because this primordial being of Dasein, as surpassing, crosses over to a world, we characterize the basic phenomenon of Dasein's transcendence with the expression *being-in-the-world*. [GA26 213/166]

It is not about explaining the *a priori* process whereby a subject meets the object through syntheses: the subject *is not* until transcendence has happened, and so is not available to be linked up with an object in the first place. To attempt to sew the subject and object together, therefore, is to attempt to solve *a posteriori* what has already been determined *a priori*.

Again, what is transcended in transcendence is beings as beings, and not a barrier between Dasein and beings. Heidegger describes this as follows by invoking the concept of possibility:

Insofar as Dasein exists, i.e., insofar as a being-in-the-world is existence, beings (nature) have also already been overleapt, and beings thus possess the possibility of manifesting themselves in themselves. Insofar as Dasein exists, objects have already also become accessible to Dasein. [GA26 213/166]

Transcendence is therefore *a priori* responsible for the possibility of any entity becoming manifest at all. That is, the possibility for any understanding of beings, for us to encounter anything, for knowledge as such, is transcendence understood as being in the world. However, this is not simply a passive concept of transcendence. Heidegger explicitly invokes freedom in his description of transcendence. Freedom is needed here because the way in which beings become manifest to Dasein is actually variable:

[...] the mode of possible objectivity by which objects are grasped is completely left open and variable; there are different stages of possibility by which things themselves are discoverable in the way they are in themselves. [GA26 213/166]

On the one hand, this amounts to saying that transcendence does not give us objects

in a positive, invariably pure objective intuition. Rather, the objectivity of the object, the

way in which the object is an object for us, is variable and there are many possible ways for Dasein to encounter it. This becomes explicitly a concern with freedom when Heidegger reveals that Dasein's choice is that which conditions the way that entities manifest themselves (or the objectivity of the object).

Heidegger's concept of transcendence as being-in-the-world is said to be the basic constitution (*Grundverfassung*) of Dasein. Our being is, in its ground, a surpassing of beings towards the world that allows beings to manifest themselves to us in their being. Transcendence or being-in-the-world is the possibility of knowledge as such.

However, being-in-the-world is not a solely epistemological concept. What is at issue is not simply how Dasein, as passive, is given an intuition of entities within the world. It is also about agency, about freedom. In the initial discussion of transcendence in G26, Heidegger only indicates towards the activity involved in being-in-the-world when he says that the objectivity of objects is variable.

Entities are not given in a static actuality present at hand, as would be apparent in by a concept of transcendence that consisted merely in the subject-object relation. Rather, every entity has multiple possibilities of manifestation; there are several ways in which the entity can be shown to us. For example, a hammer can manifest itself as a useful tool when it is in a toolbox or as an object of antiquity if it is in an archaeological museum. A knife can be a handy piece of equipment in the kitchen, or a life-threatening device of death in the hand of a mugger.

The question arises as to what exactly determines which possibilities are actualised. The answer is Dasein's choice. These possibilities are not arbitrary or free-floating objective options that belong to the object in and of itself. They are the possibilities given to Dasein according to what it is going to do. Possibilities of objective manifestation are taken up according to the activity of Dasein as being-in-the-world.

As such, the activity of choice and the passivity of knowledge are co-constitutional of transcendence. *Theoria* and *praxis* are not two separate features of the subject, but are the twin aspects of being-in-the-world. The terms Heidegger uses for this in *Being and Time* and beyond are thrownness and state-of-mind (*Befindlichkeit*) for the "passive" encounter with beings, and projection and understanding for the "active" agency of acting in the world. We can already see, however, that there is no simple divide, as "understanding", which would be traditionally sided with passivity and *theoria* is placed with activity and *praxis*. Each implies the other and cannot be taken away from it. We have not here two separate faculties, but a unitary phenomenon that is Dasein's being-in-the-world.

The inseparability of activity and passivity, or volition and perception is of paramount importance. This is especially the case as we turn to how Dasein's choice conditions transcendence. Every choice is accompanied by a limitation beyond Dasein's control. Beingin-the-world means both activity and choice, and passivity and limitation. However, the opposition between the human being and nature has shifted massively from the traditional mind and body problem implicit in the traditional problem of freedom, as we see from the following quotation:

Dasein is thrown, facital[ly], thoroughly amidst nature through its bodiliness, and transcendence lies in the fact that these beings, among which Dasein is and to which Dasein belongs, are surpassed by Dasein. In other words, as transcending, Dasein is beyond nature, although, as factical, it remains environed [*umschlungen*] by nature. As transcending, i.e., as free, Dasein is something alien to nature. [G26 212/166]

So, while Dasein is different or alien to nature, understood as the totality of entities, because it is beyond them, it is still "environed" by them. Dasein's freedom is not transcendental in the sense of Kant, which means it is forever beyond the world and cannot be manifest within it, but in that Dasein is ontologically different from other entities. Yet, as environed, Dasein does not have unlimited freedom. Its freedom is limited by the possibilities given by the entities within the world. Dasein does not choose to be free and it does not choose what it can do.

Although different to the things in the world, Dasein is among them and committed to its world as the thing that makes its choice possible. We do not here have will versus nature as an opposition or war of forces, but as the co-constitution of each other. Activity and passivity do not conflict with each other, they create each other. Dasein's being, at its ground, is transcendence. It is a thrown projection that provides the basis for its world.

This section has followed what I have called the Transcendence Argument. In it, Heidegger argues that Dasein is transcending essentially, insofar as it steps over beings understandingly to their being. Dasein is, as transcendence, responsible for the manifestness of beings. This is because Dasein's agency conditions how entities appear, making it the ground of its being-in-the-world. In the last section, I showed how Heidegger speaks of the same phenomenon through guilt. In the 'Guilt Argument', Heidegger shows the possibility of Dasein becoming free in it owning up to its role as the ground of its world, or ground of a nothingness. A key to the link between these two arguments is 'What is Metaphysics?' [*WM*], where Heidegger says the following:

Being held out into the nothing – as Dasein is – on the ground of concealed anxiety makes the human being a lieutenant of the nothing. [...] on the ground of concealed anxiety is its surpassing of beings as a whole. It is transcendence. [WM 118/93]

Dasein is the lieutenant of the nothing because there is nothing, no guarantor of the steadfastness of beings. How beings become manifest is entirely down to Dasein's transcendence, and in the call of conscience Dasein becomes aware of that through guilt and anxiety. The Guilt and Transcendence arguments do not describe different concepts of freedom, but the same concept.

However, what does create a difficulty still is the question I raised at the beginning of Chapter 2. As Han-Pile puts the problem, 'Anything that has the structure of being in the world *must* be free: freedom is co-extensive with Dasein. Yet, Dasein is often pictured in *Being and Time* as anything but free: it "ensnares itself", is "lost", "alienated", and needs to be "liberated".' (2013:291) The Guilt and Transcendence arguments seem to be incompatible because one describes Dasein as sometimes free and mostly unfree, and the other seems to put its freedom on such a high metaphysical level that it has always to be free. In the next section, I will argue that Heidegger's concept of freedom, as described in the Transcendence Argument, rather than precluding the concept in *Being and Time*, actually elaborates it, because, as transcendence, freedom only gives Dasein its being as a possibility.

## 5.4 – Truth as Necessity and as Freedom

This chapter has followed Heidegger's conception of freedom as it is elaborated in the Guilt Argument and the Transcendence Argument. In the former, Dasein is the ground of its world and becomes free when it chooses to be that ground, rather that fleeing from it. In the latter, Heidegger seems to say that Dasein is essentially free because it is transcendence. Dasein has always already transcended beings towards their being, and as a feature of how it has transcended, it has also determined how they will appear. These

ideas seem to be in conflict, since the Guilt Argument is recognisable a positive conception of freedom that Dasein may only be a few times in its entire life, the Transcendence Argument seems to make freedom true *a priori*, such that Dasein would be free by definition. However, the concept of freedom that is found in the Transcendence Argument is not a 'transcendental concept of freedom', in the sense of a universal essence of Dasein. It cannot be, since Heidegger consistently attacks this essentialist position. The question that needs to be addressed, therefore, is how these two aspects of Heidegger's conception of freedom relate.

In this section, I will argue the following: freedom, in the Guilt Argument, means Dasein's being-its-self, being something of its own, and taking up its ownmost possibility. Freedom, in the Transcendence Argument, describes Dasein's ownmost possibility in greater detail than *Being and Time*. As such, 'The Essence of Ground' [*WG*] and *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [G26] offer an elaboration of *Being and Time*, not a change of position. This hinges on how we understand Dasein's relationship to its being as transcendence. The place to which I will turn to clarify this is 'On the Essence of Truth' [*WW*], written in 1930.

In 'On the Essence of Truth', Heidegger argues that the Greek *alētheia* be translated as *Unverborgenheit*: unhiddenness [*WW* 188/144]. This is intended to undermine the correspondence theory of truth, which Heidegger refers to as "correctness" (*Richtigkeit*), and show it as derivative. Heidegger argues this by, first, giving an account of the correspondence theory of truth itself as 'what accords' or,

[...] the consonance of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it and, on the other hand, the accordance of what is meant in the statement with the matter. This dual character of the accord is brought to light by the traditional definition of truth: *veritas et adaequatio rei et intellectus*. [WW 179-180/138]

Truth refers to the correspondence of my statement about beings, presupposing the original unconcealment of those beings. Taking the example of 'two five-mark coins lying on the table' [*WW* 182-183/140], Heidegger argues that we can make truth claims about the coins. We can be incorrect and correct in our judgments about entities, and correctness is justly identified as the *adaequatio rei et intellectus*. But, the *rei* are only given in order for us to be right or wrong on the basis of a prior revelation of being: only because the world is pregiven to Dasein can beings be encountered. This pregiving is then defined as freedom:

Only if this pregiving has already entered freely into an open region for something opened up that prevails there and that binds every presenting. To free oneself for a binding directedness is possible only by *being free* for what is opened up in an open region. Such being free points to the heretofore uncomprehended essence of freedom. The openness of comportment as the inner condition of the possibility of correctness is grounded in freedom. *The essence of truth, as the correctness of a statement, is freedom*. [WW 187/142]

This means that, by 1930, Heidegger has decided that freedom can be expressed as the essence of truth as well as freedom for ground. This is not a shift in position, but rather a shift in language because truth is also ground, and an abyssal one for Heidegger. Indeed, *WW* makes claims about ground and freedom that are very similar to those in *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26], 'The Essence of Ground' [*WG*], and *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31]. *WW* still describes freedom in relation to the manifestness of the being of beings. Heidegger says that existence as 'rooted in truth as freedom, is exposure to the disclosedness of beings as such. [*WW* 189/145]. Further, Heidegger alludes to his concept of transcendence when considering the worry one might have in claiming that the essence of truth is freedom, since, in the common understanding, it would mean that truth is in the power of the caprice of the individual: To place the essence of truth in freedom – does this mean to submit truth to human caprice? Can truth be anymore radically undermined that by being surrendered to the arbitrariness of this "wavering reed"? [...] [T]ruth is here driven back to the subjectivity of the human subject. Even if an objectivity is also accessible to this subject, such objectivity, along with all subjectivity, still remains something human and at human disposal. [WW 187/143]

There is no subjectivism or relativism, because both the objective and subjective are

determined by freedom. If compared with the statement Heidegger makes about

objectivity that I cited in §5.3, the claims are very similar, and certainly overlap:

[T]he mode of possible objectivity by which objects are grasped is completely left open and variable; there are different stages of possibility by which things themselves are discoverable in the way they are in themselves. [G26 213/166]

Additionally, Heidegger continues to talk about Dasein's relation to its being in terms

of grounds: 'In Da-sein the essential ground, long ungrounded, on the basis of which human

beings are able to ek-sist, is preserved for them' [WW 189/145]. He also introduces a new

expression of the meaning of freedom: 'Freedom now reveals itself as letting beings be'

[WW 188/144]. The term "letting beings be" develops the explanation of the relation

transcendence has to freedom in determining how beings appear in their being:

To let be – that is, to let beings be as the beings that they are – means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand, bringing that openness, as it were, along with itself. [*WW* 188/144]

Heidegger now speaks of the "open region" to refer to what has been revealed by transcendence, but the freeing character remains. Indeed, Heidegger goes on to speak about this concept as the ground for truth and falsehood as unconcealment and concealment:

However, because truth is in essence freedom, historical human beings can, in letting beings be, also *not* let beings be the beings that they are and as they are. Then beings are covered up and distorted. [*WW* 191/146]

As with Dasein's own being, it can let beings be reveals in their truth or conceal them. This is, again, a repetition of the claim from both *SZ* and GA26 that Dasein, as transcendence, is responsible for the way in which beings manifest. The essay 'On the Essence of Truth' is, therefore, a restatement of what Heidegger calls Dasein's preontological understanding of being. That being is disclosed to Dasein as a possibility is its distinctive feature. In switching the language to the concept of truth rather than of ground, Heidegger is able to begin to emphasise the agency of the history of being that is distinctive of the *Kehre*. Where this path (*Weg*) takes him is beyond the scope of this thesis. But, the concept of freedom has not shifted in *WW* itself, rather the argument becomes clearer.

In describing freedom as the essence of truth, Heidegger inverts the claim that necessity is the essence of truth, a supposition dominating metaphysics. This is clear in that the "necessary truth" is considered the highest form of truth. That which cannot but be the case is the most certain and therefore most true. Of specific import to the discussion of freedom is the truth involved in an essence. An essence is completely binding on its existent. It permits no deviation. It is for this reason that classical theories of evil are able to claim that there can be no evil natural disaster. Todd Calder gives a summary of this in what he designates the 'neoplatonist' theory of evil:

> According to the Neoplatonists, evil does not exist as a substance or property but instead as a privation of substance, form, and goodness. For instance, the evil of disease consists in a privation of health, and the evil of sin consist in a privation of virtue. The Neoplatonist theory of evil provides a solution to the problem of evil because if evil is a privation of substance, form, and goodness, then God creates no evil. All of God's creation is good, evil is a lack of being and goodness. (Calder, 2018:§2.1)

Disease cannot be evil. Disease is bound to the necessary truth of its essence. Evil is only possible as a privation of substance. Evil is therefore only possible where there is freedom, which can only mean the deviation and denial of one's essence. Evil acts are therefore said to be inhuman, a negation of what we are supposed to be. However, if the essence of the human being were merely contingent, it would not be binding at all, or else our freedom would be unlimited. Heidegger's concept of freedom aims to describe a relation to our "what", our being, that is neither necessary nor wholly contingent; a binding that is not absolute, and also finite.

The place that Heidegger takes up this question most explicitly, by raising the question of evil in the context of the concept of freedom, is his lecture course on Schelling's treatise concerning freedom [*SaF*]. There, Heidegger interprets Schelling's text as a reaction to Baruch Spinoza in response to the problem of freedom and system, a problem Heidegger spends significant time attempting to reawaken. The problem of freedom and system is the problem of essential determination, the necessity of truth. A system is more than a world picture, it as an attempt to articulate the conditions of all existence, the ultimate ground of everything, basic truths. Therefore, as Schelling says, the concept of freedom ought to be incompatible with system, since a system, if possible, can permit no deviation since its truth is binding necessarily. Were a comprehensive philosophical system to be true, we would all be like volcanoes: determined, not merely because of external causes, but in essence. It would be ontologically impossible to be anything but what the system prescribes.

Spinoza in this context can be said to have the ultimate system with the ultimate denial of freedom. By arguing that there is one substance, of which we are all modifications, the possibility of any deviation is impossible. What we are is necessary, what we do is necessary, and no existential flexibility is possible. Everything that genuinely exists is already wholly actual. Nothing comes to be, and nothing ceases to exist. There is no possibility. Schelling's response is to attempt to ground a system on freedom. He does so by redefining the concept of identity dialectically, such that all identity implies difference in the sense of *antecedence* and *consequence*. This means that to be grounded in the one substance, God, means to differ from it precisely because one is grounded in Him. Heidegger's *ID* echoes this claim, where the identity of Dasein and Being is the ontological difference is only another way of describing transcendence in the Heideggerian sense.

To remain within the dates that are my primary focus, 1927-1930, Heidegger's aim is to interpret truth as freedom rather than necessity. Heidegger's truth is not an *a priori* binding to necessity, but an *a priori* disclosure of possibility. Truth frees Dasein, it does not bind it. It discloses what it *can* be, not what it always already and can only be. These claims in *WW* are complementary to everything I have discussed so far, they do not supplant it. Whether Heidegger is speaking of truth in 'On the Essence of Truth', ground in 'On the Essence of Ground', or authenticity in *Being and Time*, he wishes to say one thing and one thing only: our being is given to us as a possibility, and only a possibility. It is not a binding to necessity, but a sending toward our being, our ownmost possibility. This is only in the sense that we cannot generate possibilities ourselves, that we are not our own author, are we bound. However, this is not a binding to something inescapable, but rather a being thrown into a finite set of possibilities.

Heidegger does describe transcendence as the basic constitution of Dasein, carefully avoiding the term essence. To say that freedom is the basis of Dasein's existence does not mean that freedom is an essential attribute that is "always the case" of any instance of Dasein. This would be to interpret Dasein as something present-at-hand and freedom as a category to which it applies. To cite Heidegger's claim in 1930, 'Human freedom now no longer means freedom as a property of man, but *man as a possibility of freedom*'. Freedom is not a property of the human. However, it is still not clear how we are supposed to understand this freedom as '*the ground of the possibility of Dasein* [GA31 134/94].

It is helpful here to return to Heidegger's claims about Dasein from early in *Being and Time*, those from §9 discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The first real claim that Heidegger makes in the Existential Analytic is that the being of Dasein always belongs to it and is an issue for it. From this, he draws two critical conclusions. First, there is the infamous claim that 'The essence of Dasein lies in its existence'; second, the claim is that Dasein is 'in each case mine to be in one way or another' [*SZ* 42], thus immediately introducing the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity.

These claims, for Heidegger, already show that Dasein is a 'peculiar' entity and requires a distinctive approach. This leads him to posit a distinction between categories and *existentialia*:

All explicata to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein's existence-structure. Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call the "*existentialia*". [*SZ* 44]

It is important for us to be clear on what Heidegger means here by "existence structure". Taken out of the context of the chapter, one could have in mind a free-floating framework that is true of all instances of Dasein. There is some ground for this reading in that only a few lines beforehand Heidegger has said 'the structure of existentiality lies *a priori*' [*SZ* 44]. We should, though, resist the temptation to take this to be an essentialist statement. If Heidegger had in mind some sort of transendental structure that conditions human existence, then *existentialia* would be faculties and, for all his insistence that they are not categories of an entity present-at-hand, he would not have surpassed Kant.

We must return to the context of these claims. Thinking Dasein in terms of an existence-structure [*Existenzstruktur*] that 'lies *a priori*' is intended to be a response to the 'peculiar phenomenal domain' [*SZ* 43] that is Dasein. It is therefore meant to give us a way of thinking that is entirely different to the way we think about things present-at-hand. The two peculiarities with which Heidegger is concerned are the fact that Dasein's essence lies in its existence ('Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (*essentia*) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be conceived in terms of its Being [*Sein*] (*existentia*)' [*SZ* 42]), and the fact that Dasein is in-each-case mine to be this way or that, viz. having the possibility of being authentic or inauthentic. These two characteristics are meant to be implications of the fact that Dasein has 'in-each-case-mineness' (*Jemeinigkeit*) as a characteristic.

The point that concerns Heidegger the most when introducing the notion of an *a priori* existence-structure is inauthenticity. It is worthwhile citing the passage where the concept is introduced to see the exact way in which it becomes a methodological problem for interpreting Dasein:

Furthermore, in each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine. That entity which in its Being has this very Being as an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its ownmost possibility. In each case Dasein *is* its possibility, and it 'has' this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it *can*, in its very Being, 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only 'seem' to do so. [*SZ* 42-3]

Here, Heidegger claims that Dasein's being is encountered by it as a possibility which it itself is. The methodological problem that arises is, therefore, that *Dasein's being is not an actuality*. The important thing here is not so much that Dasein has a level of choice over its being, but the implications of this fact. Because Dasein's being is only its ownmost *possibility*, Dasein is actually for the most part *not itself*. Although he emphasises that, although the fact that Dasein 'loses itself' in being something that is not its own 'does not signify any 'less' Being or any 'lower' degree of Being' [SZ 43], in a peculiar sense Dasein spends most of its time in non-conformity with this being.

So, existence-structure means the ownmost possibility of Dasein, a possibility that

Dasein, proximally and for the most part, is not,

In determining itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it *is* itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal meaning of Dasein's existential constitution. [*SZ* 43]

In this way, the existence-structure of the *existentialia* is not to be taken as a universal essence true of all cases. Rather, it is the ownmost possibility of each individual Dasein. It is *a priori*, but only insofar as this possibility is always in some way understood by Dasein, even if it strays (or falls) from it:

[...] even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies *a priori*. And here too Dasein's Being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it in the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing *in the face of it* and forgetfulness *thereof*. [*SZ* 44]

As such, Dasein's being is a possibility that belongs to it. It is neither a static actuality nor an indifferent potentiality. It is the "ownmost" possibility of each Dasein, which Heidegger will later go on to describe as its being-towards-death. This means that if freedom is related to Dasein's being, any definition of it would only be a possibility that must then be enacted by a particular Dasein. It would not, therefore, be a characteristic found present-at-hand in all instances of Dasein.

An "objective" metaphysical description is therefore impossible, if by this we understand a demonstration of the nature of the thing in general without regard to its particular manifestations. When it comes to Dasein, the traditional distinction between the general (being) and particular (entities manifesting that being) breaks down. As such, we are not dealing with a traditional modality where, by virtue of coming into being, Dasein is an actual instance of its hitherto merely possible essence. Rather, we are dealing with an *existential modality* in which, though existent, Dasein's "essence" remains a possibility until it enacts that possibility, actualising for itself by choosing itself.

Heidegger provides some clarification of how he understands the relationship of Dasein to its being, insofar as it is a possibility for it rather than an actuality or a binding essence. In one of the lectures, he offers some statements to clarify his position in *Being and Time*. He starts by claiming that the descriptions made in the existential analytic are of what he calls "neutral Dasein" [*neutrale Dasein*] as opposed to its factical concretion (*faktischen Konkretion*); that is, of the being of Dasein as given to philosophical understanding and not of the actual existents (*Existierende*) who instantiate this being. This is an interesting attempt to account for the status of metaphysical statements when the language of metaphysics is geared to speaking about essences in this context. He introduces this distinction in the following way:

The peculiar *neutrality* of this term "Dasein" is essential, because the interpretation of this being must be carried out prior to every factical<sup>96</sup> concretion. [...] [However,] In its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and everybody, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence [*die ursprüngliche Positivität und Mächtigkeit des Wesens*]. [G26 172]

We have here a more thematic treatment of the problem found in §9 of *Being and Time*. Dasein has no essence in the sense of *essentia*. It does not have a timeless, static

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> While Heim usually translates *"faktische"* as "factical", it is here rendered as "factual". I have therefore modified the translation to maintain consistency.

being. Rather, this "essence" lies in its "to be", in the fact that it belongs to it as something that only *could* be taken up, not as something which is always already the case. As such, any attempt at a metaphysics of Dasein, which must speak of its being prior to it becoming concrete in a particular Dasein, must be neutral with respect to that concretion. This neutrality is not the indifference of *das Man*, but as much as can be said about our being without turning to individuals who are committed to this being in a particular way. Neutral Dasein never exists, except as a person:

Neutral Dasein is never what exists [*Neutrale Dasein ist nie das Existierende*]; Dasein exists in each case only in its factical concretion. But neutral Dasein is indeed the primal source [*Urquell*] that springs up in every existence [*Existieren*] and makes its existence [*Existenz*] possible. [G26 172]

Neutral Dasein is, therefore, not nothing, but the origin (Ursprung) of every existent

Dasein. As he said above, it is the 'primary positivity and potency of the essence'. And so,

Heidegger confirms our reading of Section 9 of Being and Time; the being of Dasein "is"

only as the ownmost possibility of Dasein. Further, even this statement is limited to a

"neutral" description and, in reality, can only ever exist in the "factical concretion" of a

particular Dasein. As Heidegger puts it,

[...] Dasein harbors the intrinsic possibility for being factically dispersed into bodiliness and thus into sexuality. The metaphysical neutrality of the human being, inmost isolated as Dasein, is not an empty abstraction from the ontic, a neither-nor; it is rather the authentic concreteness of the origin, the *not-yet* of factical dispersion [*Zerstreutheit*]. [G26 137/173]

All of Heidegger's arguments apply to neutral Dasein. That is, they apply to an originary possibility of existent Dasein that is "not yet". In *Being and Time*, this is articulated as Dasein's ownmost possibility that is not to be outstripped: being-towards-death. If Dasein chooses this possibility, it becomes authentic, "something of its own". In so doing, Dasein

chooses itself and becomes itself for the first time. In authenticity and only in authenticity does existent Dasein finally become its being. Any truth of Dasein is only true if it is lived:

In contrast to truth about extant things, truth about what exists is truth *for* that which exists. The latter truth consists only in being-true qua existing. And questioning too must be understood accordingly, not as an inquiry-about but as a questioning-for, where the questioner's situation is included in the questions. [G26 239]<sup>97</sup>

This demonstrates that we should in no way expect Heidegger to have opposing concepts of freedom, one transcendental and one existential. If Heidegger at any point says that being free is part of the being of Dasein, this in turn must be interpreted as being a claim about neutral Dasein. This means that any existent Dasein would only fulfil this being once it became authentic, because until this point it would not have been itself. It would not have been Dasein in the sense that its being still remained a possibility and not an actuality. The metaphysics of freedom speaks about neutral Dasein. The idea of "freedom-towards-death" describes the possibility of an individual, existent Dasein taking up its own being, choosing itself for the first time and thus, for the first time, fulfilling its essence as something free.

The claim that neutral Dasein and its factical concretion are to be conceived as distinct is underwritten in 'On the Essence of Truth' [*WW*]. There, Heidegger uses the term "human being" to refer to Dasein's factical concretion and Dasein to 'essential ground of the human being' [*WW* 187/143], or what Heidegger called neutral Dasein in GA26. Here, Heidegger clarifies the claim that the human being does not have freedom as a property, which I first discussed in reference to *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31]:<sup>98</sup>

<sup>97</sup> My emphasis

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> See §1.4

But if ek-sistent Dasein, which lets beings be, sets the human being free for his "freedom" by first offering to his choice something possible (a being) and by imposing on him something necessary (a being), human caprice does not then have freedom at its disposal. The human being does not "possess" freedom as a property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, possesses the human being – so originarily that only *it* secures for humanity that distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole as such which first founds all history. [*WW* 190/145-146]

Dasein, as the essential ground of the human, secures its relatedness to beings or transcendences. But, if Dasein as transcendence, is the truth of the human being, this has to imply the possibility of denying this truth, since truth is freedom:

Only because truth and untruth are, *in essence*, *not* irrelevant to one another, but rather belong together, is it possible for a true proposition to enter into pointed opposition to the corresponding untrue proposition. [WW 191/146]

If Heidegger remains consistent in method, therefore, he cannot provide a transcendental account of freedom and an existential account separately. Dasein's being can be described in a neutral manner, but in each Dasein has already chosen how to be its being in one way or another. Dasein, in its factical concretion, lives its being in this way or that, winning it or losing it. The "existential" discussion of freedom, found in the Guilt Argument, gives a possible way for Dasein to encounter its constitution as an abyssal ground, as free. The Transcendence Argument gives a metaphysical description of what Dasein's being must be at its most basic level, but even this must be won or lost, for it is only a possibility.

It is not necessary, therefore, to interpret the cryptic statement, borrowed from Søren Kierkegaard, that Dasein has to "choose to choose" freedom, as positing two levels of freedom, as does Han-Pile (2014). Instead, we can read the relationship between the explicata of the Guilt Argument and Transcendence Argument as a form of existential modality. Speaking neutrally, Dasein is free. But, insofar as this is the ownmost *possibility* 

and not *actuality* of Dasein, it must in each case respond to it. Where Dasein embraces its essence as an abyssal, finite, thrown transcendence, it is free '*in an impassioned* freedom towards death—*a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the "they", and which is factical, certain of itself, and anxious*' [*SZ* 266] Where Dasein flees from its ownmost possibility as an abyssal transcendence, it falls into the dominion of the "they".

Therefore, the Transcendence Argument describes Dasein's freedom in its metaphysical possibility and the Guilt Argument describes one example of it in its existential facticity, an example of Dasein embracing its essence, choosing to be its being, where this being is nothing but finite freedom.

Heidegger's account of freedom is positive insofar as action is always possible, but not all acts are free. The account of freedom provided in The Transcendence Argument lays down a neutral, ontological framework for understanding such a possibility, but lacks an existentiell concretion. This difference is the same as the "two ways to freedom" Heidegger identifies in Kant. In GA31, Heidegger shows how the *First Critique* demonstrates the possibility of transcendental freedom, but only the possibility. The *Groundwork* attempts to demonstrate the actuality of freedom in practical reason: pure willing according to the categorical imperative. Heidegger's terms 'metaphysical neutrality' and 'existentiell concretion' operate in a similar way. But, to describe the two arguments for freedom corresponding to these modes (the Transcendence and Guilt arguments respectively) as two separate concepts of freedom (transcendental and existential) is as inappropriate to Heidegger as it would be to Kant.

Transcendental and practical freedom in Kant are modally connected. Transcendental freedom is the condition of the possibility of practical freedom. The latter is an instance of

the former. The modality involved is one of traditional possibility and actuality: essence and existence. But, Kant thinks their connection in this way because he has not brought human being into sufficient questioning. If it is inappropriate to refer to transcendental and practical freedom in Kant as two concepts, this is doubly so for Heidegger; Dasein cannot be understood in terms of *essentia* and *existentia*, but only as *Existenz*. Dasein's being is forever only a possibility for it to win or to lose. As in Kant, then, we have two *ways* and not *concepts* of freedom.

In this section, I have used Heidegger's claim in 'On the Essence of Truth' that freedom is the essence of truth to explain the connection between the Guilt and Transcendence arguments for freedom as freedom for ground. When Heidegger describes Dasein as transcendence, he is not making a transcendental claim, in the mode of Kant. Instead, he is providing a neutral metaphysical description that can only come into existence in an existent Dasein. This means that the Guilt Argument, which describes how inauthentic Dasein can be called back to itself, deals with the same concept of freedom as the Transcendence Argument. Dasein feels anxiety because it is transcendence, the abyssal ground of its world. It flees this anxiety by falling into its world, acting as though the world grounds it. This is a failure of Dasein to be itself, which really means a failure of Dasein to be Dasein.

This is ontologically possible because the essence of truth is not necessity, it is freedom. Dasein's being does not necessitate that it be Dasein, it enables it to be Dasein by giving it its being as a possibility. Freedom, then, is the ground of Dasein's existence as the possibility of being its self. Heidegger's concept of freedom is positive, since the possibility of freedom is not enforced upon it, but only encountered as an issue, its ownmost possibility.

## 5 – Conclusion

In this chapter, I followed what I have called the Guilt and Transcendence Arguments. These are arguments Heidegger makes that freedom needs to be understood as Dasein's being-a-ground. In the Guilt Argument, Heidegger argues this through an existential concept of guilt. Dasein is responsible for its world, and this makes it anxious, and so it flees this role, acting as though it is not the sort of entity that it is. However, by heeding to the call of conscience it can finally achieve positive freedom by owning up to being that ground. In the Transcendence Argument, Heidegger again speaks of grounds. He argues that Dasein is the ground of the manifestness of beings insofar as it is transcendence. It does not create the world, but it is responsible for how entities appear to it.

I have argued that Heidegger's concept of freedom in these arguments remains the same, even though the first seems to provide a 'dramatic' concept of positive freedom, that is only sometimes enacted, and the other a transcendental concept of freedom that is always true of Dasein no matter what. However, the relationship between Dasein and its being is not the same as the relationship between transcendental and practical freedom in Kant.<sup>99</sup> Dasein's individual freedom is not an instance of transcendence. Rather, Dasein is able to be unfree because transcendence gives it its being as possibility rather than necessity. Because freedom is the essence of truth, and not necessity, to be Dasein means to have the possibility of being Dasein. Dasein is able to lose its being or win its being. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> See Chapter 4, §§4.2-4.3

Transcendence Argument gives more detail about what transcendence involves, and how fundamental a concept it is in Heidegger's philosophy of the period (1927-1930), but it does not indicate a change of position or an abstract concept of freedom. Rather, it explains in more detail what Heidegger had already said in §9 of *Being and Time:* 'These entities, in their Being, comport themselves towards their Being. As entities with such Being, they are delivered over to their own Being. *Being* is that which is an issue for every such entity.' [*SZ* 41-42]

## Conclusion

In this thesis, I have argued that Martin Heidegger's conception of freedom between 1927 and 1930 is a reinvention of the positive concept of freedom, developed in confrontation with Immanuel Kant and Henri Bergson. Further, I have demonstrated that the conception of freedom in *Being and Time* is the same as the conception presented in the texts: 'The Essence of Ground' [*WG*]; *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26]; *The Essence of Human Freedom* [GA31]; and 'On the Essence of Truth' [*WW*]. This is in opposition to the prevailing view in recent scholarship, which argues that there is a difference between the concept of 'freedom towards death' [*SZ* 266], and the account of freedom as 'freedom for ground' [*WG* 165/127], which is taken to be aligned with the statements that freedom is 'the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings' [GA31 303/207] and that the 'essence of truth is freedom' [*WW* 187/143].

Dasein is free, not because it possesses a property, such as a "free will", but because its being is given to it as its 'ownmost possibility' [*SZ* 42]. As a possibility, it must make a decision about how to enact it. It can 'win itself' or 'lose itself'. It can win itself by recognising that its ownmost possibility, its being, is 'Being-the-ground of a nothingness' [*SZ* 283]. Dasein is the ground of its world; its world is not the ground of it. This is because it is 'transcendence as freedom for ground' [*WG* 175/135]. Dasein, in its being, transcends other beings towards their being. This transcendence determines what meaning they have, and applies also to its own being. However, this being, with its responsibility, is a burden for Dasein that is revealed through anxiety. For the most part, it flees from this existential guilt, falling into its world, losing itself in the "they" self. In this state, it is inauthentic, or unfree in the positive sense. However, when it chooses to choose its self, it becomes itself for the first time, enacting its own being as the ground of its world in an ontological reinvention of positive freedom.

I demonstrated this in the following way. In Chapter 1, I argued that Heidegger rejects the Free Will Debate and, along with it, any libertarianism, determinism, or compatibilism. Influenced by Bergson's Time and Free Will, he criticises the role of time in the Free Will Debate, taking Kant as the exemplar apologist for this manner of asking the question of freedom. Kant sees freedom as a problem of causality and causality as temporal succession, a mode of the present. This means that every event can only be an alteration of what was already present in an underlying, eternal substance. Heidegger argues that this is not an adequate way of posing the problem. I argued that the crux of Heidegger's argument is that temporal succession, which privileges the present, is an inadequate temporal determination of being that cannot comprehend the arrival of a future. This claim repeats Bergson's thesis in *Time and Free Will* while going further. Rather than swapping one temporal determination of being for another, as Bergson does by moving from time to duration, Heidegger states the need to investigate the nature of temporal determinations of being themselves; he raises the question of the connection between being and time. This allows him to excavate a more fundamental question of freedom as the origin of the manifestness of the being of beings, which in Being and Time is called Dasein's preontological understanding of being.

Chapter 1, therefore, demonstrated that Heidegger's concept of freedom must be understood as part of an investigation into Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of being. I followed this thread to *Being and Time*, and showed that Heidegger quickly moves from describing Dasein's encounter with its being as a form of understanding to calling it that 'which is an issue' for it [*SZ* 42]. I then argued that Heidegger makes two claims: that Dasein's being is a possibility for it, its ownmost possibility; and that it therefore must decide how to be its being and can win itself or lose itself. When Dasein loses itself, Heidegger calls it inauthentic and when it wins itself, he calls it authentic. This raised an apparent paradox: Heidegger has said that Dasein is fundamentally free insofar as its being is an issue for it to be one way or another, but, as authenticity is elaborated, it is clear that Heidegger regarded Dasein as unfree most of the time. Heidegger describes Dasein as subjugated under the real dictatorship of the "they". Dasein is pictured as free, insofar as its being is its own as a possibility to be one way or another, but unfree insofar as it usually submits to the "they" rather than choosing its ownmost possibility.

To begin to resolve this paradox, in Chapter 3 I showed how Heidegger elaborates Dasein's basic encounter with possibilities in the structure of thrown projection. Dasein is thrown into possibilities through mood and is able to respond to those possibilities through understanding. This state meets the standard of the negative concept of freedom, since Dasein is able to do otherwise than it does and is not under any deterministic coercion. However, Heidegger describes Dasein, in this state, as only potentially free, not actually free. I then gave an account of Heidegger's description of falling, showing that it makes the case for Dasein's unfreedom. Dasein flees its ownmost possibility, and resides in its world, being disburdened of its freedom. I then turned to Heidegger's description of anxiety to show what he takes to be the cause of this flight: Dasein encounters its ownmost possibility, its being, through anxiety, and projects itself away from that possibility, into its world, in an attempt to relieve that anxiety. Thus, I demonstrated Heidegger's positive concept of unfreedom: Dasein falls into its world as the "they" self as a response to the anxiety it feels when confronted with the possibility of being its authentic self, of choosing to be Dasein.

Having established Heidegger's positive conception of unfreedom in Chapter 3, I turned to the problem of an elaboration of his positive concept of freedom in Chapter 4. I

argued that, before the structure of Heidegger's positive conception of freedom could be demonstrated in Chapter 5, it was necessary to contextualise it with regard to the work of Kant and Bergson, as with his critique of the Free Will Debate. I showed that Heidegger takes aspects from both Bergson and Kant's conceptions of positive freedom in order to develop his own. For Kant, freedom is an act of pure will, where the rational will wills its essence as rational. For Bergson, freedom is an act of the whole self rather than the habitual self. Heidegger accepts the idea of two selves found in Bergson, but ontologises it through Kant. For Bergson, a free act was a matter of the whole particular individual in a particular moment. For Kant, it was about conformity to a universal essence. The concept of Dasein's being as its ownmost possibility sits between these two extremes, where Dasein's authentic self is to be the transcending ground of its world. Dasein's being-its-self is not a matter of individual, ontic self-actualisation or genuineness, but of choosing its ontological structure.

Having demonstrated that Heidegger conceives the possibility of freedom in Dasein's choice to be its being, I turned in Chapter 5 to show how he argues for this position. Heidegger offers two arguments for understanding Dasein as free insofar as it is the ground of its world: the Guilt Argument in *Being and Time* and the Transcendence Argument in 'The Essence of Ground' [*WG*] and *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* [GA26]. While the secondary literature argues that these arguments offer different conceptions of freedom, I demonstrated that they both advocate the concept of freedom, and Dasein as being the ground of its world. In the final section, I used the essay 'On the Concept of Truth' [*WW*] and methodological remarks from GA26 to confirm the unity of the two arguments. Because the essence of truth is freedom, and not necessity, Dasein is freed for its being rather than bound to its being. This means that Dasein's being can only, in the first instance,

be a possibility for it to make a decision about. Therefore, the depiction of freedom in the Transcendence Argument, as Dasein's abyssal ground, requires Dasein to have the possibility of not being free; the possibility of inauthenticity is a result of the idea that freedom is the freedom of ground and the essence of truth, and therefore the two concepts are complementary, and not contradictory.

My thesis has been focussed tightly on the problem of the unity of Heidegger's conception of freedom in what I referred to as Phases 1 and 2 of his discussions of freedom.<sup>100</sup> This solution of this problem is crucial for the understanding of Heidegger's concept of freedom, and also in addressing what I have shown to be misconceptions in the secondary literature. I have achieved the demonstration of my thesis within these limits, although the implications of this research go beyond them. I will, therefore, outline briefly four potential future avenues of research.

Phase 3 and the Abandonment of Freedom as an Explicit Theme. My focus on Phases 1 and 2 of Heidegger's conception of freedom was necessary. As I have shown, a fundamental clarification of Heidegger's intentions and context of discussion was needed to demonstrate the unity of these two periods. This does, however, open the way to a revaluation of Phase 3, which contains Heidegger's confrontation with German idealism and his eventual abandonment of freedom as the fundament of philosophy. I believe two specific avenues are now open. First, the question of the relationship between the authenticity and inauthenticity as a positive conception of freedom and the discussion of good and evil in Heidegger's engagement with Schelling. Second, determining whether or not Heidegger's step away from this thematic was because he felt it was impossible to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> See Introduction §2

remove the concept of will from the idea of a fundamental freedom. This would also raise the question of whether or not the later Heidegger's use of the term 'free relation with the essence of technology' [FdT 7/217], is a development of the concept of freedom elaborated here, but with the shadow of the concept of the will removed.

*Freedom and the Will in Phases 1 and 2.* This last point, concerning the role of Heidegger's later critique of the will in his abandonment of freedom after Phase 3, brings me to the next potential avenue. A longstanding accusation against Heidegger's work from *Being and Time* up until the turn is that it is voluntaristic, i.e. it places the will at the fundament of philosophy. This is tantamount to an application of the later Heidegger's critique of the will to his earlier work. I have shown, particularly in Chapter 1, that Heidegger does not associate freedom with the will, insofar as the latter is conceived as a property of the human being and as a causal capacity. However, there is room to examine whether or not Heidegger's later critique of the will can be legitimately applied to his concept of freedom, as clarified in this thesis. This research would, in particular, need to engage with Bret Davis' *Heidegger and the Will* (2007), and assess his claim that the structure of care can be read as an unofficial primal will, even if the official position is that it is not.

*Freedom and History*. I have shown the relationship between the concept of authenticity and freedom. However, Heidegger also discusses authenticity in relation to historicity in *Being and Time* and explicitly relates freedom to history in 'On the Essence of Truth' [*WW*]. Further research could investigate the way that Heidegger transfers this concept over to the question of history, and to what extent authentic historicity, and Heidegger's account of an authentic being-with-others, can be clarified through an understanding of his conception of freedom.

*Freedom and Time*. In Chapter 1, I demonstrated that the concept of time plays a crucial role in Kant, Bergson, and Heidegger's conceptions of freedom. However, I showed that it is with the turn to the question of being and time and Dasein's understanding of being, rather than to time itself, that Heidegger's conception of freedom can be clarified. Future research could build on this, however, and return to the question of time and its relation to the conceptions of freedom in Kant, Bergson, and Heidegger in greater detail. This also would continue work in the field, opened most prominently by Heath Massey (2016), in establishing the proximity of Heidegger and Bergson.

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