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
OCCASIONAL PAPERS

Recent Developments in Development Studies
Some Reflections on the Message of Futuribles,
Social Accounting and Social Indicators

by

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE MESSAGE OF FUTURIBLES, SOCIAL ACCOUNTING AND SOCIAL INDICATORS

I

In the course of the years, those engaged upon development have shown a variety of preoccupations. Mostly, these referred to development as a process in need of understanding as much as to development as a systematic effort. Not so long ago, one kind of planning after another used to keep the minds busy. More recently, evaluation was topical. Currently, social indicators and such-like concerns have the limelight. A longer-lived preoccupation behind some of these is the quest for measurability and measurement.

In due course the historians of the "period of development" will deal with this curious sequence of diverse preoccupations. In a preliminary attempt at explanation they may be tempted to assume that, development being recognizedly complex and problematic, those concerned will single out one or a few features or issues at a time. Facing a subject matter of this magnitude, people will chew off a bit here or there. No doubt this assumption may lead to a valid explanation of the emergence, whether sequential or otherwise, of a number of preoccupations. Next to be explained, two questions would crop up, both relating to the fact that preoccupations shift in the course of time. One refers to the nature of each specific preoccupation, the other to the circumstances triggering and conditioning the emergence of each. Together, the answers to these questions may clarify what is now bound to appear, to many, as a bizarre spectacle of "fads and foibles" (to borrow Sorokin's terms) in development studies and development work.

This paper is meant to render some assistance to these future historians. It is primarily an exercise in stocktaking, with particular regard to three currently fashionable trends in development studies. But it will go beyond mere stocktaking in that it is meant to offer some interpretation or assessment of the significance of current trends, both as results of developments hitherto and as pointers, in their turn, towards further developments.

The argument will be built upon three successive theses. The first of these (Section II) is that what may appear as a random sequence of unrelated preoccupations is in fact neither random nor unrelated. The second thesis (Section IV) is that the three currently predominant trends (briefly presented in Section III) concur in significant respects and that, in so doing, they mark a major shift in general outlook both in development studies and, perhaps, more generally in the social sciences at large. For brevity's sake this shift will be referred to, below, as a move away from a predominantly economic towards a more broadly social perception. The

third thesis (Section V) is that measurement plays a most notable role in this shift. As a potential link between the social sciences, it would seem to acquire a significance well beyond that which its persistently instrumental function would appear to warrant.

The purpose of the three theses together is to raise the question whether the reading of current developments that they seem to suggest could be correct and, if so, to what extent. This question will be discussed briefly, with special reference to the discipline of sociology as an illustrative case.

II.

The first thesis was born out of a hunch. Systematic consideration of futuribles, social indicators and social accounting leads to the impression that there is more in common between the three than meets the eye. This could barely be shrugged off as a mere coincidence. But what if it is no coincidence? The tentative answer is in the thesis - more correctly, hypothesis - which postulates that the several preoccupations that have manifested themselves in the field of development studies are neither random nor indeed unrelated. Were the thesis to prove acceptable then the matter of their relatedness is bound to emerge as something deserving attention in its own right.

To begin with, the assumption that these preoccupations should be random occurrences can be dismissed out of hand. The possible degree of randomness that could occur in the given case is a function of the degree of (un)relatedness. In what is to follow, it will be argued that the apparent unrelatedness is illusory. Anticipating the outcome of that argument, the degree of randomness that can be admitted at this point is bound to be low, not high, as might appear at a first blush. There is, moreover, a further consideration that makes it appear even lower. It is reasonable to assume that some of not all of the shifts in preoccupations occur in consequence of feed-back emerging from development work determined by preceding preoccupations. If so, they do not form a random sequence but a concatenation.

Thus, the argument proceeds immediately to the more basic postulate that these preoccupations are fundamentally related. What they have in common is that they are instances, incidental manifestations, of man's basic effort to master his context through understanding. In the last resort, the concerns with specific kinds of planning, with goals or evaluation or indicators of development, are so many exercises in establishing a definitional basis for action. In this attempt, preceding moves usher in subsequent ones: the concatenation already suggested.

The demonstration of this thesis will shape up as a systematic taxonomy. It will show the several preoccupations listed, along with certain others not yet mentioned, as instances or variants of the same basic definitional concern, distinguishable from one another according to certain criteria to be introduced for the purpose. Once presented, this taxonomy will offer occasion for a few remarks about how people's predilections may move from one or some of the items it contains to another or others.

The first need is for setting out what exactly the proposed "taxonomy of special concerns with regard to development" shall refer to. Development being a recognizedly elusive concept, this is not the easiest of exercises: indeed it will cause the argument to detour into deep waters for a short while. However, there should be a pay-off in the form of clarification, not just about the taxonomy but about development proper.

We start by looking beyond development to that of which it somehow is an aspect or a particular case, namely reality as such. This apparently complicating procedure is in fact adopted for purposes of expediency. It permits a more sweeping perspective. This in its turn provides the latitude needed to envisage the desired taxonomy along with its underlying principles of systematization. In this perspective, the taxonomy appears as a systematic listing of instances (not necessarily all instances) of what it is now proposed to call the man-reality relationship. The term is unusual but simple enough¹ to be readily understood, as a capsule presentation of basic human experience¹.

The man-reality relationship is as fundamental as it is complex. This complexity will feature as a plurality of instances. It can be understood as the joint result of a number of considerations that apply to the relationship. Since taxonomy is complexity made transparent, the same conditions (but again not necessarily all of them) are likely to feature once more, as distinctive criteria underlying its systematics.

Now consider three² of these criteria for differentiating between instances - or, more correctly phrased, for identifying various specific instances - of the man-reality relationship.

(1) In qualifying the relationship as a relation between its two constituents, primacy may be postulated for man³ or it may not. If it is, the relationship may feature as a subject-object dichotomy, by virtue of which the natural stand for man would be to dominate reality. Classical Greek tragedy calls this hybris: but it is also the Promethean perception of man which is typical of modern and largely also contemporary Western thought. If it is not, the relationship may feature as interrelation and interdependence. Primitive ritual is in many cases exemplary for this variant: but so is, in theological phrasing, the "trust in God" (tawakkul) attitude of Muslims which is so often misrepresented as fatalism, and, a fortiori fatalism in the classical sense of the word. Seeking illustrations in Western scholarship, one may refer to the nineteenth-century idea of "knowledge is power", in at least some of the uses to which it was put, as typical of the former variant, and to current cybernetic ideas as typical of a tendency to prefer the latter without entirely sacrificing the former.

(2) The nature of the relationship, as experienced by man, may be qualified either mainly as understanding or mainly as action⁴. Plato's concern with The Good, as compared with that of the Peace Corps volunteer, will readily illustrate the contrast. But Marx's philosophy of revolution, as wed to the proletarians' act of revolt, raises questions about the degree to which the two are separate. The same can be said with regard to economic development planning⁵.

(3) The nature of the relationship, again as experienced by man⁶, may be qualified in yet another way, according to the manner in which man will attempt, rationally, to come to terms with it. There are mainly two ways that deserve to be mentioned here, namely the pars pro toto fashion on the one hand and the piecemeal, enumerative fashion on the other. Both are essentially definitional procedures: the exclusive reliance on the operational pattern of reason makes it so. The one, whilst purporting to deal with the whole, substitutes a part, which then is implicitly assumed to stand for, indeed to be virtually identical with, the whole, at least for given purposes¹⁰. Thus, whilst partial, it is simple, being a one-act procedure. The other, in attempting to deal with the whole, is aimed at optimal coverage. In serial, itemizing fashion it will list components, aspects, features, or whatever means of itemization may be selected, to end up with a listing that will be acceptable as representing the comprehensive whole as a totality. To the former approach, the whole may feature as the universe of physics, or the world of beauty, or, to take an example closer to the present subject, "development". To the latter, it will feature as the nations of the world, a box of tools, or, again with an example relevant to this paper's topic, "national accounting".

It is possible, once again, to quote examples that straddle the fence between the two types or represent combinations of both¹¹. Thus, models for economic development planning in which factors or indicators are employed. Thus again, in Parsonian sociology, the summary presentation of sociocultural reality as action which in its turn is broken down in itemizing fashion^{12,13}.


The proposed taxonomy uses primarily the distinction sub (3); but, as will be discussed later, one finds evidence, here and there, of the other two distinctions. This appears to an extent in the way specific items listed will shape up; it is even more traceable in the way the attention of those concerned will move from one combination of items to another.

In the attached chart, the primary distinction is between the pars pro toto and the serial distinction. This makes for countervailance between the upper and lower halves, but not necessarily for close similarity.

The upper half shows a sequence of steps in repeated pars pro toto procedure. People will use one or more of these steps in order to identify the universe of their concern at a particular moment. For the identification of a given topic, the succession of steps is irrelevant: any of the pars pro toto definitions of reality shown has the same validity as a topic for human understanding and action. Regardless of the question at which step it features, any definition adopted is, in principle, one out of many possible ones, but this is of no concern to the person who adopts it.

After these general observations on the upper half of the chart, two rather more specific remarks are due. As regards the last step shown, it seems worth realizing that the preoccupation, in some circles, with matters like development assistance or development planning equals, or comes close to being a case of, pars pro toto concern. In the penultimate column, social development has been listed as a possible third variant. This could raise doubts, as the term is unclear and may well be typical of serial rather than of pars pro toto concerns. This point will be discussed below.

GENERAL TAXONOMY OF SOME OF THE MAIN TOPICS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES



The bottom half of the chart details the serial, itemizing approach. For present purposes it is shown not as relating to reality as such but rather as relating to development as one of its instances¹⁴. The various distinctive criteria used in the successive steps of refinement have been listed in the chart and need no further explanation. The resulting list shows a number of topics of immediate importance to the current scene of development studies and action. In a few cases, secondary distinctions have been added; these in their turn are self-explanatory.

The lower half of the chart brings together a considerable number of concerns generally recognized as specifically developmental, along with others that are broader. This is appropriate: the two are equally valid elements of the list, given the manner in which it is construed.

Now that the chart has been presented, it seems warranted to state that the relatedness of all these concerns, which was postulated in the preceding, is firmly established. They are all variants, in one way or another, of one basic underlying concern. And there is more to be said in respect of both the upper and the lower half of the chart. The items listed are not merely related more or less distantly. They are never mutually exclusive¹⁵. Practice proves this. In dealings with development, people will usually rely on a combination of elements taken from the listings provided in the chart. Practice also shows that the combinations used will vary in the course of time. Indeed this paper is given up to a discussion of such shifts.

III.

For the rest of this paper, the taxonomy will provide the basis for a presentation and discussion of current change - not to say reorientation - in development studies.

It appears that there are mainly two such changes. One is a shift in accent, from economic to social, in many discussions of development in general. The other is the already noted upsurge of some fairly specific interests amongst development experts and students of development. Whilst theoretical and even academic to a degree, these are manifestly action-oriented and future-oriented. By way of illustration, mention may be made of interests like futuribles, social accounting and as quoted above, social indicators. In presenting and discussing these changes, it is proposed to take the latter first and the former afterwards. This will facilitate the attempt to provide an interpretation or evaluation¹⁶.

The interest in the future took a new form when Bertrand de Jouvenel started what first looked like a new fad but is by now a respectable working procedure: futuribles, the study of possible future developments¹⁷. His thinking about the future differs from the thinking of most people in that he has made a point of reversing the accent on the two components of any kind of expectations, wishful thinking or utopianism on the one hand and level-headed extrapolation from the present on the other hand. Instead of the former, he systematically stresses the latter. The attempt is to take the guesswork out of

envisaging the future; prognostication is intended to become a controllable exercise, even when it expands beyond simple statistical extrapolation. It is perhaps not without significance that the standard procedure thus far is basically anecdotal: publications tend to shape up as incidental reports on selected topics. The current acceptability of the procedure is apparent in the enthusiastic adoption and elaboration of the French initiative by Americans, individually and in "think tanks"¹⁸.

Two things are hard to ascertain. One is the impact of these groups and of their style of thinking and working on the actual conduct of public affairs, and again on societal developments at large. The other is whether the futuribles approach results in an identifiable cumulative effect, a recognizable thrust; the alternative being, of course, that it would remain eclectic and incidental. The beginnings of an answer to the second question could perhaps be gleaned from a systematic content analysis of both the French and the American publications thus far.

There is reason to believe that futuribles is a purposive attempt to deal with the future on a broader front than is customarily done in economic planning¹⁹. If anything, the approach is in terms of public affairs. Besides, it is geared to what appears probable rather than what is considered desirable, as in planning. But these considerable differences between the two are blurred by what they share in common, namely the present as the only available frame of reference for creative thinking: present conditions, present knowledge and techniques, the present perception of reality.

There exists another convergence of minds upon an exercise that in attempting to pave the way towards the (invariably better) future, is mostly concerned with the changing present. It has various names, amongst them social accounting. Bertram Gross, a leading protagonist, has stated that it is meant "as an instrument of prediction and control"²⁰. There is a manifest concern with efficacy. Social accounting experts tend to see themselves as the mentors of the policy makers; or at least some of them do. There are others who at first sight appear less involved with policy-making and development action. More academic in their immediate goals, they are mainly concerned with comparing nation-states²¹. That makes their work, in certain ways, a potential alternative to the comparison of cultures which, in the hands of anthropologists, has yielded few results that could be put to practical use for purposes of managing the newly emerged One World of nations²². Seen in another perspective, it is an attempt to do better than the economists in a field that was once called the wealth of nations and that is currently called, instead, the widening gap between rich and poor nations. In other words, there are ulterior motives, at least as ambitious as those of the social accounting experts who propose to guide the national planners.

Again we ask what is the thrust of social accounting? At a first glance the cumulative effect is impressive. Announced as systems thinking, it appears as a readily available, fully serviceable instrument for policy making and policy execution. Upon closer inspection, systems thinking turns out to embrace a broad range of quite varied exercises in the enumeration of system elements. Rather than one comprehensive and firm grip on the totality that is to change or to develop, social systems accounting amounts to the very itemization that the word accounting connotes²³. In other words, the product is perhaps

somewhat different than the label suggests. This does not make it a bad product. How good or bad it will be depends on other factors. The first of these is the inner systematics that would underly the enumeration, so as to warrant its consistency and indeed its substance, - in other words, to vindicate the systems claim. Over and beyond this, it resides in the possibility it offers to proceed from conceptual schemes speculatively produced towards effective action. Those in support of social accounting, and others as well, hold that a bridge between the two is available, in the form of measurement. If they are right, the efficacy with which the social accounting expert will direct the development planner will depend on the results achieved in measuring²⁴.

Again, it is hard to assess the impact that this kind of thinking exerts. No doubt these ideas are heard in academic circles. But they may prove to be at a handicap in the arena of political decision making. As a tool, social accounting seems somewhat formidable and unwieldy. On the other hand, it is not hard to envisage an influential role by the back door. There exists an affinity between this style of thinking and some of the more sophisticated administrative procedures.

There is considerable overlap between the advocates of social accounting and the third group in this review, the protagonists of social indicators²⁵. There is also considerable similarity in orientation and intentions. But there are differences that warrant keeping them separate for the purposes of this review.

A first point of difference is that the concern with indicators is in certain respects somewhat more restricted than that with social accounting. A set of indicators functions as a barometer, which is not quite the same as an "instrument of prediction and control".

A second point of difference is in the degree of reliance on the viewpoint and procedures of economics. Social accounting is an expansion of national accounting, a procedure of economics²⁶, into the extra-economic realm. The attempt is to broaden the scope of economic planning so as to safeguard it from running into unforeseen obstacles. The economically determined pars pro toto of reality is not merely left intact: it is given a new lease of life. In their turn, the advocates of social indicators will likewise expand techniques of economics into the extra-economic realm. Their stated attempt is to tackle more aspects of reality than the economic one, but they avoid an exclusively economic approach. The preference for terms like "social" and "levels of living" makes this clear. It does not make clear what alternative perception, if any, will henceforth be adhered to for purposes of coming to terms with the fullness of reality. There is no advance commitment, whether to the economic, traditional viewpoint or to a new, alternative one, except for the manifest shift from a pars pro toto to a more inclusive, enumerative procedure.

These are the differences; it is clear that they will become obscured when social indicators are integrated as elements in^a social accounting procedure.

Using the same questions as asked previously, we may now inquire into cumulative effect or thrust, and into impact.

As regards the former, in this case as in the two earlier ones we are dealing with a basically enumerative procedure: the attempt is to grasp as much as possible of reality by enumerating as many as possible of its significant elements or aspects. Indeed the point in the exercise is to expand the list of items. Recently some concern has arisen about the inner systematics of such listings, and thus indirectly about cumulative effect or thrust. For the time being this concern shapes up, curiously, in the statisticians' manner: the search is on for correlations between items provisionally listed, and the inclination seems to be to discard items that do not fit the emerging pattern²⁷. It is to be foreseen that the effect of this new concern with consistency will limit the number of acceptable items; it is too early to determine whether this in its turn will limit the scope²⁸.

For impact, some of those working on indicators are quite favourably placed, namely in the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) at Geneva. Whether this will, in the long run, prove an asset or a liability remains to be seen. In academic circles the subject attracts at least as much attention as social accounting; sometimes the two are hardly distinguishable.

IV.

These, then, are some of the salient features of the currently fashionable cluster of preoccupations in development work. The next step in the argument will be to assess their significance as emergent concerns. It is in this context that the other major issue raised above will be taken up for consideration, namely the shift from a mainly economic to a mainly social definition of development.

Two observations must be interjected at this point to preface the discussion that is now in order and again to prevent misunderstandings.

First, it should be pointed out in so many words that the current shift from a primarily economic to a primarily social perception of development has been initiated by economists from a relatively early moment in development studies. Names like W. W. Rostow, G. Myrdal, E. E. Hagen, J. Drewnowski will be remembered in this connection. It will also be remembered that the initiative for the establishment of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, just mentioned, was taken by econometrician J. Tinbergen. At no time that the present writer can recall²⁹ have members of other disciplines effectively challenged the primacy of economics in so many words. Such doubts as were voiced usually took the form of pleas in favour of multidisciplinaryity. If at this time this primacy stands challenged anyway, the credit for having mustered the courage to do so goes mainly to those economists who felt that economic development planning, although manifestly beneficial, has not really come up to their expectations. Part of the phenomenon, no doubt, is to the credit of nobody in particular as it simply reflects experience gained in development work done, over a number of years, under economic guidance. Credits apart now, the real question is what this widening of the scope means: for economics, for the other social sciences, for development work. At the appropriate point, the argument will have to return to this question.

The second remark is entirely different. The reader will have noticed that the publications that have appeared on the topics briefly reviewed do not exclusively refer to the so-called developing countries. Many of them, not to say the majority, refer to so-called developed countries. This is only correct: development is not the monopoly of underdeveloped areas. But there is a lesson in it, too.

At one time, the standard ideas and techniques prevailing in the developed countries were "exported" through experts and by training provided to students from developing countries, for use on problems of underdevelopment in the "third world". (The term seems curiously obsolete.) But the problems encountered were such that gradually alternative procedures, and to an extent theories, have been developed - largely by people from the developed countries who realized that their tools did not fit the job, i.e., specific use in development situations. For a while, it could look as if a bifurcation of efforts and interests was about to take place. Even now, anxieties about such problems as the widening gap will occasionally cause some people, especially in developing countries, to think along such lines.

However, a countervailing tendency appeared soon, in the form of an almost unbelievable proliferation of interest in development problems among social scientists. A peak was reached at the 1962 World Congress of Sociology, where an innocent onlooker might have been tempted to believe he was seeing three thousand development experts in action³⁰. Since then, much of this impetus has moved into other channels, but not without a new confluence taking place.

It now appears as if some of the experience gained in developing countries is being put to use with respect to some of the problems - not necessarily identified as developmental - in developed countries. Some of the expertise that was first fairly naively exported is returning after a thorough shake-up of testing and revision. Probably this will be to the benefit of the developed countries. It is also to be hoped that this circular movement of ideas, having touched the developing countries, will remain effective there as well³¹ as a catalyzer for ideas which, in becoming more and more congenial to the setting into which they have been introduced, should become increasingly usable.

Resuming the thread, it will now be argued that the three emergent interests presented in the previous section relate to the shift from a predominantly economic to a predominantly social definition of development in a manner that deserves full attention. This is the second thesis of this paper. Besides being valid and useful concerns, the interests reviewed are symptomatic, in their emergence, of something much larger and much more significant. This "something" appears, to an extent, in the reorientation from economic to social. As will be suggested in due course, there is more to it. But first, consider what has happened to economic development.

Economic development, as a school of thought and action, is based on a perception of (sociocultural) reality according to which you see and control all of a given state or society if you see or control its economics. This vision harks back to the days when economics was the one social science;

it has never quite stopped fascinating the minds. We know that at a certain time and place this vision was reasonably well matched with the actual operational pattern of society. We also know, but are slow to recognize to the full extent, that in the West, where it obtained once, the match is not as snug as it used to be and that elsewhere in the world, the assumption of a match between the prevailing operational pattern and the economist's image is hard to vindicate³².

In order to cope with this difficulty, some have explicitly introduced the consideration of so-called extra-economic facts and factors for their own sake rather than as additional matters that could be implied tacitly³³. In order not to upset the basic perception, however, they were compelled to describe them as prerequisites for economic development. When this caused doubts in its turn, some began to speak of obstacles to development. But the intent was, all the time, to see that the prerequisites should be met and the obstacles removed. In other words, the end would bring the vindication of economic development as the decisive moment or element of development. Others again have been liberal enough to postulate that any other development goals could be realized once economic development would be a given fact. This, surely, is yet another way to maintain the pivotal significance of economic development. As the matter stands, there is considerable willingness, amongst economists, to concede the importance of what they like to call extra-economic considerations, but rather less readiness to draw the fundamental consequences. These, no doubt, relate to the validity of a viewpoint that hinges on the primacy of economic phenomena: a viewpoint that, as some economists do not tire to remind their colleagues and others, is fully daté et situé, conditioned by the circumstances of a specific time and place³⁴.

Amidst the confusion of economists pulling away from the strictly economic approach and economists yet maintaining, by any other names, the primacy of economics as a viewpoint, there exists a recognizable and to all appearances irreversible tendency away from the "economocratic" orientation. The search is on for a new image, provisionally indicated by the fairly meaningless term "social"³⁵. Whatever the outcome of this search, it is bound to be a major factor in determining a new role for economics and for the economist, in the social sciences as well as in public affairs. One attractive aspect of this change may well be that it could render unnecessary some of the claims, made on behalf of economics, that appear not effectively tenable under conditions other than those under which they arose.

This trend away from the "economocratic" orientation is signalled by the three emergent interests that have been reviewed in Section III. As stated, some economists have played a key role in getting this trend under way. At this point it is only fair to recognize, on the other hand, that scholars of other disciplines contributed their share in pushing it along.

This is not a fortuitous occurrence. The matter is not a matter of economics only, neither in its upsurge nor in its prospects. In retrospect, it has never been. But it has taken some rather peculiar circumstances to bring the point home to those concerned. What is peculiar about the circumstances is that there is in fact not one shift - away from the primacy of economics - but a combination of three. The newly emerging concerns reviewed above signal all three of them. Since they obviously will signal compound effect rather than

separate inputs, the necessity at this point is to distinguish them from one another. The easiest way to do so is to offer a brief listing.

First, there is a shift in definitional procedure, from the pars pro toto definition in one act, towards serial definition through itemization. The presentation offered in Section II has another use in addition to taxonomy proper. It provides the map on which it is possible to identify a trend. The trend leads away from the upper to the lower half of the chart; more specifically from economic development as one of the items on the upper half to some combination of items on the lower half³⁶. As yet, no stable combination has appeared: people are groping their way.

Secondly, there is the shift, just discussed, from a perception in terms of a primacy of economics to an alternative perception, whether in terms of an alternative primacy or in terms of a refusal to accord primacy.

The third shift runs from one appreciation of man's place and role in the world to another. According to the one, man is dominant and the world is amenable to his action; according to the other, man interacts with the world of which he is a part.

It should be possible to show that these shifts have nothing to do with one another; but to do that would be a wasted effort. What matters is that the three happen simultaneously. The impact of this coincidence is not to be underrated. Take the second shift. In principle the option between some alternative primacy or no primacy seems open; but not so in practice. The coincidence of the first and the second shifts listed will in all probability cause the second to skip the moment of choice and to head straight for the no-primacy option. For a long time, there have been many waiting in the wings, hoping to find a receptive audience for their thesis that development is a total phenomenon, affecting literally every aspect or segment of the human collectivity concerned. In similar fashion, the third shift is bound to prove a strong force making the other two happen much faster than they might otherwise.

As suggested, the upsurge of futuribles, social accounting and social indicators is clearly a matter of the joint effect of the three tendencies now distinguished. The three are alike in that they represent an attempt to liberate the mind from what is increasingly experienced as the constraints of the economic approach, and to reach out for the fullness of reality. They are again alike in that, being thus totalistic³⁷, they adopt the same enumerative procedure at the expense of the pars pro toto. These things are clearly visible. Less clearly visible, they are again alike in that they imply, rather than postulate, the third tendency. Without its impact, they are inconceivable; but not all the writings in these fields bring this out.

This being so, a few more remarks on the third trend are in order, more so since the other two have been detailed above. In this case as in the other two, the trend is not specific to development: it features on a broader front, so to speak. The broader relevance is, in fact, more in evidence in the developed than in the developing countries. Accordingly, the presentation will begin in rather general terms, such as are usually applied when Western writers refer to Western conditions. That done, the development perspective will be introduced more or less as an application or a particular variant.

A fundamental reorientation is gradually taking place as regards man's role in respect of the reality that surrounds him. Reality is less and less conceived in what used for a long time to be the standard manner, namely in terms of a subject-object division, supposed to function by way of human control over man's context, both human and non-human, which in its turn was supposed to be fully amenable to such control. Nowadays, one can hear this operational model decried as repression; a sure sign that its credibility is waning and that by consequence its usefulness is bound to wither away. A likely candidate to take its place is an intersubjectivity model of cybernetic inspiration, with steering and feed-back as its salient features. The hard-and-fast model for unconditional effectuation is giving way to a virtually experimental model of creative impulses. Likewise, the hierarchical connotations of the subject-object division are making room for virtually egalitarian intercommunication patterns³⁸. Giving credit where credit is due, it must be said that the experience gained with economic planning has contributed considerably to this reorientation³⁹.

With specific reference to development, this tendency leads away from a categorical and prescriptive approach towards an alternative that, in being necessarily more sophisticated, is likely to prove somewhat elusive for the time being. The speed with which these changes occur is truly amazing. In less than twenty years, we have built something like a budding routine or pattern for development work. It is far from finished and it has not yet had the time to harden into anything like a definitive shape. So much is clear, though, that it is based on fairly categorical notions both as regards development and as regards society as the unit or frame of development. But already, the very categorical nature of these notions, and consequently the chief characteristics of the procedure that they seem to imply, are coming under critical reconsideration.

Instead of dealing, categorically, with society or the nation-state as the unit that is developing or to be developed, the development worker or agency turns out to be dealing with one very specific instance of the species "development situations". Likewise, it transpires that development work at any time is but one specific instance, one highly specific configuration, of needs, tendencies, possibilities and efforts: not repeatable - not even with a mutatis mutandis clause - from one case to the next. A vague and elusive prospect? Yes, for him who is out for the readily applicable standard formula. No, for anyone realistic enough to see that the solutions for difficult matters cannot be easy.

It is interesting to compare, point for point, the direction in which development work seemed to be going until a few years ago with the direction that it appears to be taking at this time. Of course, such an exercise in contrast does no justice to the quite gradual nature of the transition as it is actually occurring. But then, its purpose is clarification of issues involved. The left column offers an overly schematic presentation of some of the salient features of development theory and practice as they appeared to crystalize some five years ago⁴⁰. The right column, equally schematic, suggests, point for point, the alternative trend that appears to be in the cards at the time of this writing.

1. Development is a matter of the present period and one that has come to attention fairly recently.
2. It occurs, both as a problem and as an effort, in particular parts of the world, somehow in connection with the achievement of political independence.
3. It is a matter involving a relatively short span of time: it should somehow be achieved in the near future, and those involved are handicapped by a lack of time.
4. It involves relatively - indeed, optimally - large human collectivities, usually organized as sovereign nation-states.
5. Its manifestation refers to the material well-being of the members of these units, and by implication to the technological and organizational state of affairs: the point being that all these feature as being in need of improvement or remedy.
6. By way of a more remote perspective, it also involves their entire way of life and the full range of conditions under which they exist.
7. It connotes, furthermore, that within a given developing unit - whether state, economy or society - there will exist a distinct agent of development (not seldom the government and its agencies), which will act in respect of the people at large in such a manner as to effectuate development.
1. Development is the current label for situations where a systematic and more or less institutional effort is made to steer sociocultural (including economic, political, etc.) changes.
2. It can occur anywhere in the world, under various names. Its occurrence in the so-called third world does not constitute more than one, crudely defined, class of variants of the phenomenon as such.
3. It relates to the future so far as foreseeable with existing means, without ignoring the general prospects of the more remote future; more importantly, it is a matter of relentless action in the ongoing present to which the past, particularly the recent past, contributes by way of feed-back.
4. It may relate to human collectivities of various sizes and aspects; thus diversified as to unit of reference, it is equally variable as to range and type of purposes served.
5. It reflects the awareness, of those actively involved, that change and development relate in principle to the total human condition and that consequently whenever one or a few salient issues are accorded special attention or treatment, their relationship to everything else must be accounted for.
6. The general urge is meliorative, and this with regard to all aspects of sociocultural life⁴¹:
7. Part of the institutionalization mentioned above - sub 1 - implies that certain people or agencies will fulfill special development roles and functions. Both the roles and the actors are variable: several different ones may occur at one time and place, and they may change or be replaced in the course of time.

8. This agent, in its turn, is assumed to operate in accordance with some existing model or paradigm, reasonably adjusted to the peculiarities of the situation he faces.
8. These roles and functions are basically a matter of interaction of those concerned with all others making up the development situation concerned, resulting in optimally joint efforts to identify, determine and implement relevant goals.
9. This model is, furthermore, assumed to be at its disposal, whether as ready know-how or in the form of expert advice available from outside.
9. By implication, this model for improvement of conditions is fully specific to these conditions themselves, even if it may contain ingredients derived from other contexts. What is more, it is an emergent model.

This, in brief, is what appears now as the immediate prospect for development action. It seems beyond doubt that futuribles, social accounting and social indicators, if put to use in this kind of framework as "information for development", should achieve their optimal usefulness⁴².

V.

But what about development studies? The central question of this paper is what these new developments in the field of development will mean for the study of development as conducted in several of the social sciences. More specifically, the question is whether anything can be said, in the light of these new trends and fashions, that might either dismiss or substantiate and spell out the claim, too often and too easily repeated by many, that development studies must be multidisciplinary or, better still, interdisciplinary.

The trouble about the interdisciplinarity thesis is that it is so irrefutable. It was irrefutable before development studies emerged, it has become more irrefutable since. In development studies, it was irrefutable before these new orientations came up; it is more irrefutable since they did. The increased totalistic sensitization amongst scholars can but translate itself into a renewed assurance that you need the full range of intellectual disciplines, complete with these respective tools, fully concerted, if you are ever to measure up against the sheer bulk of that which you have chosen to confront. But beyond this, what?

Attempts have been made, in line with the expansiveness that some attribute to economics as a discipline, to recruit other social sciences, notably sociology, into its service, so as to clear away any "adverse effects" of extra-economic factors. Given the circumstance that these "adverse effects" were defined in advance and strictly in terms of economics, arrangements like these did not have a reasonable chance to succeed, on the whole, they were short-lived and seldom reported.

In retrospect, one can only say that there was no ground for such attempts in the first place. In order to start them it would have to be assumed that between the several social sciences a degree of affinity or parallelism exists, to serve as a common ground. This assumption, as is generally known though rarely recognized, exists only in hypothetical fashion. Indeed it is not as if each of the social sciences perceives, and then deals with, its particular part or aspect of sociocultural reality (whether in pars pro toto or in segmentary fashion, is yet another matter) in such a way that together they deal with all of it. That would be so if the parts or aspects concerned would all be determined in basically the same manner, so as to form a set of one kind. But it is one of the basic facts of the historical growth of the social sciences that in emerging and growing, each has at its own time and in its own manner (whether regardless of the others or in incidental contradiction to some of them) identified (that is, selected and defined) a morsel of sociocultural reality to be, henceforth, its own⁴³. Moreover, what applies to disciplines applies, unabated, for schools of thought within disciplines⁴⁴. In short, the idea to co-ordinate all the social sciences around one of them is a kind of uninformed wishful thinking. Most of those who have dreamed about it, one time or another, have meanwhile awakened, - some, it is to be feared, with a start.

Co-ordination of the social sciences with none of them in a central, co-ordinating position is, for the very same reasons, even more of an illusion. So long as multidisciplinary or interdisciplinarity is to be seen as a matter of co-ordination, the condition arises that a basic parallelism must be available to begin with. Such parallelism could come about only as the fruit of much painful reconsideration and redefinition in the bosom⁴⁵ of each of the social sciences, with due regard for what goes on in others⁴⁵. In other words, co-ordination is needed in order that co-ordination may come into existence. Try to envisage this in a perspective of academic freedom, and the conclusion is clear. On this score, the present writer has at one time been dreaming some dreams; he has awakened in his turn, perhaps wiser, certainly sadder.

It is against this backdrop that the emergent interests in futuribles, social accounting and social indicators acquire special significance. It is possible to detect an implicit claim in the three, to the effect that we may yet get out of harm's way and succeed in doing the trick; - and a trick it will be. The claim has, to this writer's knowledge, not been made fully explicit; nonetheless it comes through loud and clear, and little reading between the lines is needed to spell it out. What it amounts to is that the problems resulting from the basic diversity of the social sciences can be avoided, whilst gearing each and everyone to the same task, if the proper measures are taken.

These measures, in their turn, amount to an exercise - as it happens, a remarkably simple one basically - in reduction. In lieu of relying on each discipline, lock, stock and barrel, it is proposed to rely merely on such measuring procedures as it has made and will be making available. A clear case of substitution, and in many ways the basic act of substitution that precedes, and perhaps warrants, an unlimited sequence of acts of further substitution; substitution being a central feature of the three schools of thought under review.

It is fairly easy to see how this basic act of substitution could be argued. Once having taken out of each discipline that operational aspect or segment which all disciplines share in common, one can afford to disregard the

totally different backgrounds against which this aspect features in each discipline separately and by which it is, and remains, fundamentally determined.

The practical implications of this reasoning tend to make it very attractive. What it really says is that you can "getrennt marschieren, vereint schlagen": make a hit jointly after having moved separately. Nor are precedents lacking. They seem abundant in science, at all levels of research. One example that must have had a particularly great significance for those promoting these new interests, occurs on the border between science and social sciences: cybernetics⁴⁶.

The ultimate implication is that if the message of futuribles, social accounting and social indicators is correct, everything will, henceforth, depend on measurement. Measurement, with substitution as its necessary corollary, is not just instrumental: indeed it is central and crucial, not to say fundamental. All stakes are on one card. The card, as it happens, has been drawn out of the semidarkness of secondary concerns into the limelight of prime interest. This, one assumes, is why the prima facie review of the three in Section III, did not immediately reveal it.

The first thesis of this paper (see, Section II) said that the three tendencies reviewed are related, together and also with other approaches to development. The second (Section IV) said that they are symptoms of a fundamental and far-reaching reorientation that affects much more than development alone. At this point, the third and final thesis appears. It says that, as developments in their own right, they represent yet another reorientation, this one relating to the style of pursuing the social sciences, both severally and - main innovation - jointly.

As a result of this reorientation, the relative significances of concepts and theory on the one hand and methods and techniques on the other are about to be reversed. If these new tendencies have their way, the accent will henceforth be on the latter and not, as has been the case customarily, on the former. At the same time, methods and techniques will be redefined to an extent, so as to accord primacy to measurement, in the broadest sense, including quantification, substitution and comparison.

If this reading is correct, two standard questions are in order. Is it acceptable? Where will it lead? It would not be unreasonable to decline to answer them. It is too early to see where these things will lead and surely their acceptability is better assessed later, in the light of experience, than now, in an inevitable response to the occasionally high-pitched claims made on their behalf. Yet to desist from so much as an attempt at assessment equals letting the movement proceed without the benefit of critical reflection to which, after all, its promoters are fully entitled. In short, some tentative remarks are due.

The answer to the question concerning acceptability involves at least two different considerations. One refers to the alleged scientific character of the approach, the other to the hotly debated issue of measurement as such.

The urge to be scientific is an inherent problem of the social sciences⁴⁷. It is impossible and unnecessary here to try and do justice to the full range of controversial issues. For present purposes the matter may be summed up, in capsule rendering, by stating that the approach would be scientific if only the subject matter were amenable. In other words, the current position of the social scientist is such that he has a choice as to which horn of a dilemma he would rather be caught on: values on the one hand, measurement on the other⁴⁸. Tertium non datur. So long as this state of affairs will remain characteristic of the social sciences - and this includes all of the foreseeable future - the same pair of questions is bound to be raised about every new venture: how scientific is it?, and: how scientific can we afford to be given the implications of what we attempt to do for the humans, that is ourselves, to whom it refers?

In the preceding, some observations have been offered, for example about the inclusion and exclusion of items to serve as indicators, that relate directly to this kind of questioning. There is no need to repeat or to list them at this point.

The three developments reviewed above clearly represent yet another step in the ongoing effort to become more scientific. That, with due respect, is not what could be new in them. Nor is there much reason, at this stage, to expect that they should constitute the definitive break-through towards the achievement of the lofty goal of scientificity. Their only claim in this connection is the postulate as to the primacy of measurement, about which more will be said presently. Even granting the newness of this claim, there is nothing that could be seen to represent an actual or potential modification, whether in basic outlook or even in procedure, that might warrant the expectation that from now on the social sciences will be altogether different.

In writing down a judgment like this, one is subject to considerable trepidation. After all, the major breakthroughs do not really show their significance when they occur: they dawn upon the minds slowly, and to a large extent only in retrospect. There is no reason really to exclude such a possibility now. On the other hand, this paper in offering an analysis, must perhaps imply a little prognostication, but certainly nothing more. Were it to express hopes, as the promoters of these new approaches will naturally do, the position would be very different. The judgment just passed seems to represent the kind of prognosticative evaluation that is possible with the means now available to this writer.

Now that the moment has come to say something more on measurement, part of the remarks that should find a place here have been anticipated as the argument developed. The main point, it seems, repeats that which has just been said with regard to the attempt at scientificity. According primacy to measurement does not really alter the basic fact that in the social sciences, measurement is one of the two horns of the fundamental dilemma facing the scholar. That, surely, is and remains far from making it an unequivocally attractive proposition.

There is no point here in rehashing all the debates that have been and can be conducted on the merits and drawbacks of measurement. Trying another capsule presentation, it may perhaps be said that there is nothing to suggest that in the case of the social sciences measurement as a scientific procedure would

not be subject to the law of diminishing returns⁴⁹. Indeed if it were, this might well be considered to be a symptom of the difference between science and social sciences.

At least two reasons can be quoted why this may be the case. One is that, as some maintain, the statistical runs in the social sciences are too short. They say it is a difficulty characteristic for the social sciences that relative to an infinitely large number of variables, as currently identified, (i.e., perceived and defined), the statistical runs per variable are very short⁵⁰. If and insofar as this is so, even the most sophisticated computer is to little avail: this would be a fundamental rather than a practical difficulty.

The second is that measurement as a procedure is not neutral in respect of the qualitative aspects of phenomena measured. Before comparison of established quantities becomes a workable proposition, quantification must have been attended to. This is a matter of reduction. Phenomena as found in the raw are submitted to a treatment that accords primacy to their quantitative over their qualitative aspects, virtually to the point of eliminating things qualitative: these are supposed to be subsumed under such quantitative features as are retained for consideration. In many cases, this is not enough to yield the desired manageability of phenomena. Then, people will resort to a more forcible kind of reduction, usually called substitution. If the phenomenon someone wishes to quantify resists quantification for one reason or another, he will substitute another one, that can be accepted as a fair replacement for the given purpose. This replacement may mean various things. Occasionally, another phenomenon is selected, considered equally symptomatic for that in which the scholar is interested. Or it may be decided to concentrate on one aspect, factor or segment of the desired phenomenon, which happens to be quantifiable, and to use this as a substitute for the whole that is not. All these procedures are fully accepted by now; they provide the basis for the quantitative analysis and model building that are considered by many to be the truly important side of the social sciences. Accordingly, there is rather less readiness to realize that for the convenience of quantifying reduction and substitution we are in fact paying a price every time we reduce or substitute.

It is hard to say what exactly this is going to mean in the end. The fact is that the loss incurred in reduction and substitution is in many cases hard, if not impossible, to account for. Yet the solidity of any model, theory or indicator produced in this manner is bound to be weakened to a degree exactly proportional to this loss. It might therefore be worth attempting to assess it, or at least its order of magnitude (to use a quantifying expression, for a change).

In order to prevent misunderstanding, let it be recognized that losses are incurred any time the analyzing mind attempts to come to terms with instances of reality, regardless whether the procedure applied is quantification or something else. That is not the point at issue. Such concern as is being expressed here relates to the quite specific state of affairs under review, where primacy is accorded to measurement.

Everything is staked on measurement, for better or worse. This means that the opportunities offered by measurement are significantly enlarged; it also means that its inherent problems are enlarged by exactly the same factor. In view of the current mood to laud the enhanced possibilities, it seems reasonable

to promote a more balanced appreciation. The only way to do this is by drawing attention to some drawbacks ensuing from unresolved issues.

In an attempt to articulate this concern somewhat further still, the following remarks, made with special regard to indicators, may be helpful. It is conceivable that the relentless effort at expansion of the range and scope of indicators will, in the course of its progress, run into increasing difficulties of reduction and substitution. In other words, as the search for indicators moves further and further away from the realm of economics, it may face phenomena that could well prove increasingly resistant to quantification. To make it worse, it is also conceivable that these phenomena would turn out to have proportionally more, and therefore more problematic, significance for the designing of effective development policies.

At the time of this writing, those working on indicators can probably still afford to feel little concern about a possible future problem like the one here suggested. This, however, should not give them the conviction that their problem has been licked in principle. A sociologist would foresee trouble in regard to the deeper recesses of social existence: those things that unify and diversify, stabilize and destabilize. An anthropologist, in his turn, might worry about culture conditioning of human ideas and actions.

So much for the first question, whether these new developments are acceptable. Obviously they are acceptable, coming from serious and highly qualified scholars. In addition, they are acceptable once again in the light of the critical appraisal attempted thus far. Such weaknesses as they appear to have are found in earlier schools of thought as well, and often in greater measure.

This leads to the second question, where these new developments may lead. Even more than the earlier one, this sounds like an impossible question to answer and therefore an unfair one to ask. There is occasion, however, for two brief remarks, the one on realism and the other on relevance.

One of the common traits of futuribles, social accounting and social indicators is a renewed insistence on realism. This applies in two perspectives, namely that of the present state of affairs and that of the prospective state of affairs. In the case of futuribles the accent is on the latter, in the other cases it is on the former; but the two perspectives, in complementarity to one another, can be detected in all three.

The insistence on more, and more effective, realism in respect of the future is not a new development in itself. It continues, perhaps gives a new lease of life to, something that has been a typical preoccupation of Western thought for some time now. It also marks a point of difference between current Western and certain kinds of traditional non-Western thinking. It is generally recognized by now that this difference entails a possibility of fairly serious misunderstandings as planning is introduced into developing countries. Given the difference between the practice of planning on the one hand and the prospect of reasonably indubitable prognostication on the other, it seems possible that new questions may arise, later rather than sooner, about old problems, such as determinism and the self-fulfilling prophecy. However, this is not likely to become urgent so long as the kind of prognostication done in the way of futuribles

has no better prospect than being put to use as one more ingredient in the production of plans.

On the other kind of realism, in respect of the present state of affairs, so much has been said above that next to nothing remains to be said here. As a reaction to that which precedes it, it is a normal occurrence and a sign of life. As a hoped-for corrective to that which precedes it, it still has to prove its mettle. The decisive issue, in this respect, may well be whether or not the spell of economics will be broken and, if so, in which manner⁵¹.

Relevance is the other consideration that comes to mind. In Western developed countries there is, these days, an outcry for relevance. What it purports is not easy to ascertain. Societal concern is a major component but it is one out of several. Something like psychological subjectivism is another one, and, bien étonnés de se trouver ensemble, anarchism is yet another one. Be this as it may, it appears that a case can be made for the validity of the demand for relevance, once the effort would have been made to spell out what, then, should be relevant to what or whom. In the developing countries a recognized problem of relevance occurs in that some of the prescriptions applied in combating underdevelopment and its symptoms prove less than reasonably effective. In retrospect it often appears that their relevance had been insufficiently ascertained in the first place.

In the preceding, it has been argued that futuribles, social accounting and social indicators are inconceivable unless as belonging in a broader framework of thought determined by the cybernetic conception of reality. If and insofar as this ascription will stand, this should imply that they represent something like a new beginning as regards relevance. They would differ from earlier approaches to development in that to them relevance would be basic, indeed their true starting point. As an innovation, this is bound to elicit high hopes on the part of many people. On the other hand, there is no getting away from the recognition that, if all this is correct, it yet remains to take effect. The probable reason for this somewhat disconcerting state of affairs is that those constituting the vanguard of these three new developments are primarily engaged in other directions. They are busy scanning the future, producing social accounts charts and establishing ever new sets of social indicators, and they are trying to convince the planners of the usefulness of all these new tools.

The final word in this section is a note of cautious optimism. Nobody has announced miracles and indeed are not to be expected, for the simple reason that they never are. Improvement of current performance in development work seems likely, on two counts. The transition from the older to the newer ideas and procedures is sufficiently difficult to warrant the expectation that sooner or later some obsolete conceptions and techniques may be discarded, in consequence of the spread of these new developments. On the other hand, it is not so difficult that it could not be made. In other words, such new questions as are likely to be raised, and new attempts undertaken, can start on their proper course without running, from the outset, into too much adversity.

As suggested in the preceding section, one implication of the new developments is the attempt to bypass the insuperable problems arising out of the fundamental diversity that characterizes the social sciences. The attempt, in other words, to meet the need for interdisciplinarity without really trying to solve the problem of interdisciplinarity. As stated, the means to this purpose is reduction, namely to measurement as one element commonly shared by all.

What remains to be considered is the probable implications for each of the social sciences separately. This exercise, if undertaken here, could easily expand this paper far beyond the limits of its theme, wide as they are. It would also be far beyond the limits of this writer's competence. All that can be offered is a few tentative remarks, and these restricted to sociology. It is not impossible that more or less analogous remarks could be made on some other discipline; but the temptation to do so will be resisted.

The starting point for these observations is the recognition that the act of according primacy to measurement reverses the customary distribution of accent, that is, of importance attributed to the several components of the business called sociology. The limelight shifts. Nonetheless, the element that will henceforth be in the shadow is not discarded: it remains a vital part of the discipline as a whole. This has implications, which need now to be considered.

It is hazardous to try and describe, let alone define, the two faces of the coin that is thus being flipped over. Following Sorokin's⁵² lead, one may start out from the common distinction between theories on the one hand and methods and techniques on the other (ignoring, for the moment, the ideologies that he presents as a third category). The decision to accord primacy to measurement could, then, be seen as a pars pro toto manner of ascribing prime importance to the methods and techniques side of sociology. As it happens, this is in keeping with a much more general trend in the discipline. The question that arises refers to the implications.

The answer has two elements. One, just mentioned, is that the face that happens to be in the shadow is as much a part of the coin as the face that receives the light. To stress the one to the point where we would lose sight of the other is therefore a risky affair, more so as it seems impossible to account, let alone compensate, for the loss incurred in the process. The other part of the answer refers to the often ignored fact that not just anything at the methods and techniques end of sociology is a fair match to anything at the theory end. The matter of affinity needs to be considered. Thus, opting for primacy to be accorded to measurement is not really, or at least not effectively, opting out of the con- sternations of theory. It implies a tacit and therefore virtually uncontrollable decision in favour of certain kinds of theory over other kinds. The reason is that some are more supportive of measurement than others and that measurement can in the last resort not do without at least some tacit and implicit bolstering by theory. The implication is not objectionable at all; but its tacit nature is. Any tacit decision or choice is an unscientific act because it avoids rendering account.

The implicit preference for certain kinds or styles of theorizing is considerably reinforced in the present case, where the act to accord primacy to measurement is one out of a set of options made, which together constitute the signal features of these three schools of thought. The - again implicit - commit-

ment to a cybernetic perception of reality is yet another⁵³ force causing more affinity to certain styles of theorizing than to others. This can only mean that any success of futuribles, social accounting and social indicators in capturing the attention of sociologists will somehow translate itself in a budding or growing preference for certain types of theory, that will directly, or, given the implicit nature of these goings-on, perhaps rather indirectly support measurement.

At the present time, a potential trend like this has a peculiar significance. To demonstrate this it is necessary to deviate somewhat from Sorokin's picture. Having listed a number of types of sociological theory, he proceeds to state that the outside observer of so much diversity should nonetheless not succumb to the temptation to decide that the whole thing is a shambles. Sociology is something, even though perhaps potentially rather than actually. He then lists a number of conceptual ingredients that he rates as basic and also common to all known types of theory. Proper interest for these elements could help to integrate the overall image of sociology. This integration would also be furthered by elimination of certain faults inherent in the various types of theory. It appears that Sorokin is open to challenge here, both in what he proposes and in what he rejects. What is more, he begs the question as to the manner or manners in which the elements listed will be integrated together. Given the conditioning impact of "time and place", it seems reasonable to assume that there will be a plurality of ways. If so, the image of one consistent discipline would seem less realistic than that of a congery of (if you like: sub-) disciplines. In fact, Sorokin has suggested this at one point in the same paper, but he does not appear to have followed it through.

This reasoning assumes critical significance for the present period. Nowadays, sociologists are not merely staking much on measurement (or, if Sorokin is right, are on the way back from having staked too much on methods and techniques in general). At the same time, they are acutely uncertain about the style or styles of theorizing on which to concentrate their efforts, in order to achieve optimal results under prevailing conditions. As always when this kind of thing happens, this is partly because the conditions are manifestly subject to drastic change and nobody knows the next move. It is also because the hitherto prevailing constellation of more or less accepted styles of theorizing is losing credibility. A symptomatic phenomenon is the end of the "Parsonian fascination", more exactly the wane of a congery of styles⁵⁴ of theorizing all equally rooted in a particular pattern of conceptualization. No doubt several elements of structural-functionalism will survive this crisis, and in order to persist they are acutely in need of a new frame of reference. The search is on for this new frame of reference, this new style.

Under the present circumstances of Götterdämmerung in sociology, the new trend that appears to be signified by futuribles, social accounting and social indicators is likely to be amongst the forces pointing the direction in which the discipline will move, namely towards a cybernetic style of theorizing. Already there exist several types of theory bearing, more or less legibly, a cybernetics imprint. For the time being, they are likely to receive an equal fillip each from the advancement of these new schools of thought. Eventually, the affinity may prove less indiscriminate.

This is not the occasion to offer, by way of a second taxonomic exercise, a typology of sociological theories with a cybernetics imprint. Just to demonstrate that there is variety, the names of A. W. Gouldner⁵⁵, B. F. Skinner⁵⁶, and A. Etzioni⁵⁷, may be mentioned. Their more recent writings are perhaps more or less typical for what might be considered as three variants of a cybernetical sociology: ideological, manipulative and in terms of grand theory. Each of them has run into more or less severe attack⁵⁸. The reasons why, and the details of the ensuing debates, are less important for present purposes than the fact that there is heated dispute, which is as it should.

In this dispute, one element has to this writer's knowledge been missing thus far. This is the input from development studies and the feedback from development action in the third world. On the part of those scholars whose natural setting is North-America or Western Europe, nor to have sought this input is an understandable oversight, if a regrettable one. On the part of development specialists, it is perhaps partly a matter of isolation in their work spheres abroad and partly a matter of not always finding the channels to communicate with those in so-called general theory⁵⁹, and this is again regrettable.

The earlier this regrettable state of affairs is remedied, the better. It should be clear, from all the preceding, that current developments in development studies are in no way limited, in their relevance, to the third world and that they relate quite closely to goings-on in the field of general sociological theory. Referring to the three types⁶⁰ just sketchily distinguished, there is reason to believe that the outcome of development studies could provide significant reinforcement⁶¹ to one of these types, namely the grand theory approach, and some warning signals for the other two types. This would be the beginning of the more selective support that could reach cybernetic styles of sociology from the side of, particularly, social indicators but to an extent also social accounting and perhaps futuribles.

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NOTES

1. In this phrasing the conditioning impact of specific culture contexts is disregarded for purposes of simplification. As usual, this results in bias: the net effect is a presentation of contemporary-Western colouring. The assumption here is that this will not categorically invalidate the reasoning followed even though it leaves some crucial considerations unaccounted for.
2. The question whether this listing is exhaustive or not does not arise. The three items selected are the ones that seem relevant for present purposes.
3. It is equally possible to envisage an appreciation of the relationship that would accord primacy to reality vis-a-vis man. For present purposes this alternative can be ignored.
4. The complementary or countervailing perception of the relationship, as "experienced" on the part of reality, is diffuse. This is partly because of the pervasiveness of anthropocentric conceptions, as in the case of any perception of the universe in terms of retaliation or countervailance (comp. H.Kelsen, Society and Nature, London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1946). Partly again it is due to the intervening differentiation between the human and the non-human components of reality. So far as fellow-man is concerned, the experience will feature as reciprocal, so that the distinction applied will merely repeat itself, whether with an active or a passive coefficient (according to which of the elements distinguished sub(1) and in note 3 is preponderant). The matter is presented, though somewhat marginally, in a mainly philosophical sense in E. de Vries, ed., Essays in Reciprocity, The Hague (Mouton) 1968, and with reference to various authors, in A. W. Gouldner, "Reciprocity and Autonomy in Functional Theory", in L. Gross, ed., Symposium on Sociological Theory, Evanston, Ill. (Row Peterson) 1959, p.167-195. So far as non-human reality is concerned the matter will oftentimes shape up as retaliation. In contemporary Western thought it appears in fairly rudimentary and partial fashion. For example, it is reflected, yet does not become fully explicit, in current concerns about ecology and overpopulation.
5. As the concluding illustrations in each case show, the distinctions made sub (1) and (2) are not watertight. In neither case could the one element be assumed to rule out the other completely. Rather than constituting alternatives, let alone dilemmas, these distinctions are a matter of relative accent on two ingredients of one complex. The circumstance that in each case the two ingredients are defined so as to appear as one another's logical opposites has clearly to be taken with reservations. To realize this is important in order to achieve the proper appreciation of the distinctions proposed as criteria for differentiation. They do not work out as black-and-white alternatives. Instead, they shape up as typological scales or ranges, each capable of accommodating an unspecified number of specific variants of mix of the two ingredients concerned. This makes them much more powerful devices for systematization than they may appear to be at a first glance.

6. As against this anthropocentric perception, a countervailing "reality-centred" perception can once more be suggested by way of a purely academic exercise and without relevance for present purposes. A fair illustration of this perception may be offered by pointing to the difference between man as a categorical notion on the one hand and the plurality of live human beings, as so many different instances of mankind, on the other.
7. This starts out from the observation that reality encompasses man. It is his context, a halo around his separate identity. It also is the universe of which he is integrally part. But distinctness on the one hand and comprehensiveness on the other are ill matched. Thus, reality is not readily amenable to man's effort at "comprehension" or "coming to terms" (the difference between the two assumedly synonymous expressions is significant!), if this effort is made by means of the analytic procedures of human reason. The possibility of a once-and-for-all, total grasp, by man, of reality as a whole is excluded in advance, except by means other than rational procedure (such as the rapturous moment of unspeakable illumination experienced by the consummate mystic), on which established Western scholarship will not rely. This leaves the possibility of substitution, with the attached disadvantage of unsatisfactoriness in principle. Precisely because none can be fully satisfactory, there will be more than one substitute, each being an approximation, in one particular manner, to that which should, yet cannot, be achieved.
8. It is interesting to note that the usual concern with parts and wholes is rather differently focussed. Mostly the discussion centres on complexity rather than identity. Yet inasmuch as the ultimate concern is often with matters like structure, they end up relating to identity nonetheless, albeit through some of its modalities rather than directly. For more philosophically oriented discussions comp. D. Lerner, ed., Parts and Wholes, New York: (Free Press) 1963, esp. E. Nagel, "Wholes, Sums and Organic Unities", p.135-155; K. E. Tranoy, "Wholes and Structures, An Attempt at Philosophical Analysis", Copenhagen (Hunksgaard) 1959. Most of the sociological discussion occurs in the framework of the currently fashionable topic of systems and subsystems, on which the literature is abundant. One possibly less-known example is O. Ramsøy, Social Groups as System and Subsystem, Oslo (Norwegian U.P.) 1962. In the obverse perspective and with a relevance restricted to a particular order of magnitude, the same sociological concern appears under the label reference groups. With special regard to development, the matter of wholes and parts assumes critical practical importance. This is due to the general inclination to identify the nation-state as the whole, that is to say the natural unit of development, leaving the matter of parts, and also that of larger wholes, for incidental and secondary consideration.
9. The identification procedure that is involved here brings to mind the procedure of so-called primitive classification systems. Comp. E. Durkheim and H. Mauss, Primitive Classification, Chicago (U.P.) 1963.

10. This is complemented by the tacit refusal to consider any differences or discrepancies between the selected part and the whole for which it is substituted. Under somewhat different conditions, where the matter cannot be handled tacitly and implicitly, one may find it shrugged off. Thus for example, the well-known phrase of economic theory: ceteris paribus, other things being equal.
11. The remark made in note 5 applies here again, with some modification. As defined, the two variants are one another's logical opposites: one-act and partial are diametrically opposed to serial and (optimally) complete, respectively. However, they do not result in a variably stressed mix of opposites, as suggested for the two contrasts to which note 5 refers. The demarcation between the two, which should underpin any model of basic opposition, tends to be blurred. Whilst being partial, the former will yet be more or less inclusive, more or less expansive with respect to the whole. In being optimally complete, the latter will nonetheless fail to achieve adequate coverage of the whole.

Likewise, the distinction between one-act and serial procedures is not rigorous. In the latter case, the list resulting from itemization will be presented as one, albeit complex, proposition representing reality up to a point. In the former, some virtually regressional repetition may occur in identifying the part that will have to stand for the whole. From a pars pro toto perception of reality as development, one easily proceeds to a secondary pars pro toto, such as technical or economic development. This marks the beginning of a different kind of serial procedure; in order to distinguish it one could label it vertical, as against horizontal for the other. But this distinction is of little avail if it comes to the ease with which one serial procedure will get mixed up with the other.

A further addition to the possible confusion in regard to serial procedure arises from something that was mentioned in passing above, namely the range of choices available to those desirous to identify the series of items - or, for that matter, the one part - by which they propose to come to terms with reality: aspect, segment, feature, or whatever else.

They will use only one of these and, whether they account for the fact or not, it is inevitably one chosen from a range or series of possible ones.

The practical importance of these considerations is immediately clear: in discussions on the development of particular sectors of society, any particular sector will appear strictly on and by itself if the one-act pars pro toto procedure is adhered to but as one of a potential or actual range if the itemizing procedure is followed. Since the underlying choice is not always consciously made, confusion and wavering are likely to occur, to the detriment of the understanding or action that follow.

12. More exactly, there is a two-step pars pro toto procedure, with one step (from reality to sociocultural reality) implicit and tacit and the other (from sociocultural reality to action) explicit. The action, in its turn, is broken down in itemizing fashion, and this in various ways,

using various criteria employed to identify the kind of items into which the total phenomenon is broken down for itemizing definition. Part of the often mentioned lack of clarity of the Parsonian system resides in the ease with which the author, and perhaps even more so his followers, shift from one kind to another or combine several kinds. It helps little, to remedy this lack of clarity in the presentation, that the added exercises in itemization are implicitly claimed to have a built-in cumulative effect whereby they are identical, in the end, with the one-act definition of sociocultural reality, as action. Even if system and subsystems, pattern variables and what not are in the last resort synonymous with action, they do not readily show it.

13. The brief statement sub(3), with added notes, evokes a comparative observation. The theologians of Islam have struggled with basically the same definition problem, except that their concern was religious, namely with divinity, instead of secular, as is the case when we are concerned with reality. They have come up with a set of distinctions basically the same as - though apparently different from - the one offered above.

They distinguish between God's essence, properties and names. The first is the equivalent to the "one-act" definition referred to above, with one difference. Since Islamic theology, however rational it be, need not stipulate exclusive reliance on rational procedure, the knowledge, i.e., definition of God's essence is not stated to be inevitably partial. On the other hand it is not assumed to be fully adequate, as the metaphysical act of cognizance that it presupposes, namely faith, is not the same as perfect knowledge. (Note, in passing, the distant similarity between this act of faithful definition and the naming act attributed to man in the biblical myth of creation, and again - quite distant and fully secularized - current concern in the social sciences with things "heuristic". Note also that these are serial).

The Muslim notions of properties and names, in their turn, represent variants of the serial, itemizing kind of definition proposed, in the above, as the alternative to simple one-act definition. The difference between the two is interesting in its own right, as it relates directly to what was said towards the end of Note 11. The identification of properties or features would find its contemporary equivalent in emphatic identification by man. In its turn, the identification by descriptive names, a highly stylized affair in Islam, parallels a rather more elusive contemporary concern, amongst behaviourists and others, to go by observed symptoms or indicators. (Note, again in passing, how elegantly stylized the Muslim presentation really is. The 100th name of God, the ultimate on the list, is said to be unspeakable and unknowable as it is the true name. In other words, the 100th name, were it known, would bring the entire construct full circle, being the act of both simple and adequate definition, to which even faith is an approximation. Unknown, it underscores the God/man dichotomy).

14. The use of the term instances is typical of the serial approach. To start out from development as an instance, in this case, means that some enumerative exercises are tacitly presupposed. One way to envisage these is to refer back to the upper half of the chart and replace the word 'or', every time it occurs, by the word "and". (That, by the way, does not turn the upper half of the chart into an equivalent of the lower half, since it does not state criteria of distinction applied toward enumeration. In the case of the series beginning with TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT, the criterion to be added would be something like "distinction by sectors"; with this added distinction it becomes an interesting counterpart to the listing in the bottom half with its different use of criteria).
15. This is the case notwithstanding the fact that all of them are distinguished from one another by means of one or a series of logical oppositions. The net effect of these distinctions is not mutual exclusiveness but complementarity. The distinctions applied are analytic operations and as such they will not undo the integrity of that to which they refer. Thus, an optimally satisfactory manner of dealing with the underlying (instance of) reality will be seen to result from accumulation of the several aspect-wise procedures corresponding to items analytically distinguished.
16. An earlier presentation of this material was given in my Development, A Challenge to Whom?, The Hague (Mouton) 1969, Chapter 16.
17. Comp. B. de Jouvenel, L'art de la conjecture, Monaco (du Rocher) 1954, English translation The Art of Conjecture, 1966. The study of futuribles is the study of futurs possibles, possible futures, as a plural phenomenon. An excellent, if belated, review of this work has appeared in Tiers Monde XII/47, Paris 1971, p.677-681. The series Futuribles began to appear in 1963 (Geneva, Droz). Currently, the leading periodicals are Analyse et Prévision and Chroniques de l'Actualité.
18. Comp. H. Kahn and A. J. Wiener, The Year 2000, A Framework for Speculation on the Next Thirty-Three Years, New York (MacMillan) 1968, with an unusual same-year translation in French, L'an 2000, Paris (Laffont). See also H. Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable, New York (Horizon) 1962. Among the "think tanks" in the USA where the study of the future is systematically conducted, the Hudson Institute and the RAND corporation are widely known. The general public is reached by periodicals such as The Futurist (since 1967) and Futures, The Journal of Forecasting and Planning (since 1969).
19. Comp. B. de Jouvenel, Arcadie, Essays sur le mieux vivre, Paris (S.E.D.E.I.S) 1969. See also W. Bell and J. A. Mau, "Images of the Future: Theory and Research Strategies", in J. C. McKinney and E. A. Tirykian, eds., Theoretical Sociology, Perspectives and Developments, New York (Appleton-Century-Crofts) 1970; W. Bell and J. A. Mau, eds., The Sociology of the Future, Theory, Cases and Annotated Bibliography, New York, (Russell Sage) 1971; F. L. Polak, The Image of the Future, Enlightening the Past, Orienting the Present, Forecasting the Future, New York (Oceana) 1961, 2 vols.; D. Bell, "Twelve Methods of Prediction, A Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social Sciences", Daedalus XCIII/3 1964, p.845-873.

20. B. M. Gross, The State of the Nation, Social Systems Accounting, London (Tavistock) 1966. Comp. R. A. Bauer, ed., Social Indicators, Boston (M.I.T.) 1966, which contains an earlier version of the paper by Gross, together with other contributions. Summary of same paper, under some title, in F. E. Katz, ed., Contemporary Sociological Theory, New York, (Random House) 1971, p.378-386.
21. Comp. A. S. Banks and R. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey, Cambridge Mass. (M.I.T.) 1963; R. L. Merritt and S. Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations, The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research, New Haven (Yale) 1966; B. M. Russett, H. R. Alker Jr., K. W. Deutsch, H. W. Lasswell, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, New Haven (Yale) 1964.
22. Good surveys relating to comparative sociology mainly but referring to anthropology and, to an extent, political science as well, by R. M. Marsh, "Making Comparative Research Cumulative", and S. Rokkan, "Cross-national Sociology: An Introductory Note", Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, I. Geneva (International Sociol.Assoc.) 1966, p.203-221, 165-172. See also, in the same volume (p.187-201), S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems in the Comparative Analysis of Total Societies. Interesting examples from anthropology are R. Linton, ed., The Science of Man in the World Crisis, New York (Columbia) 1945; idem, Most of the World, The Peoples of Africa, Latin America and the East Today, New York (Columbia) 1949; A. L. Kroeber, Configurations of Culture Growth, Berkeley (California U.P.) 1963, first ed. 1944. Special mention should be made of S. F. Murdock's Human Relations Area Files.
23. Some of these exercises are curiously Parsonian in inspiration and conceptualization. Their sophistication tends to be more readily recognizable, occasionally, than their applicability. Comp. E. A. Tiryakian, "A Model of Societal Change and Its Lead Indicators", in S. Z. Klausner, ed., The Study of Total Societies, Garden City, N.Y. (Doubleday: Anchor) 1967, p.69-97; J. P. Nettl and R. Robertson, International Systems and the Modernization of Societies, The Formation of National Goals and Attitudes, London (Faber & Faber) 1968. At the 1966 World Congress of Sociology some relevant papers were read, e.g., J. J. Leur and A. de Miguel, "Intra-nation Differences and Comparisons; Methodological and Substantive Implications"; S. Bernard, "Note sur l'etude comparative des systemes politiques".
24. On measurement, see Section V, below.
25. With special reference to developing areas, comp. S. P. Hayes Jr., Measuring the Results of Development Projects, Paris (Unesco) 1959; J. Drewnowski and W. Scott, The Level of Living Index, Geneva (UNRISD:Report 4) 1966 (mimeo); Report on International Definition and Measurement of Levels of Living, New York (UN: E/CN.3/179, E/CN5/299) 1954 (mimeo); International Definition and Measurement of Levels of Living, An Interim Guide (UN: E/CN.2/270/Rev. 1, E/CN.5/353) 1961 (mimeo); N. Baster and M. Subramanian, Aspects of Social and Economic Growth, Geneva (UNRISD:Report 1) 1965 (mimeo); J. Drewnowski, Social and Economic Factors in Development, Geneva (UNRISD: Report 3) 1966

(mimeo). See also C. J. L. Bertholet and B. H. Evers, Measuring Socio-Economic Development, A Pilot Study, Tilburg (Ins. f. Dev. Probl.) 1965 (mimeo), restricted; B. Evers, "Arm en rijk", Maandschrift Economie, 31/2, Tilburg, 1966, pp.81-97; I. Galnoor, ed., Social Information for Developing Countries, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 393, Philadelphia, Jan.1971. With special reference to developed areas, comp. E. B. Sheldon and W. E. Moore, eds., Indicators of Social Change, Concepts and Measurements, New York (Russell Sage) 1968; also official U.S. reports Recent Social Trends in the United States, New York, (McGraw Hill) ppl33; Goals for Americans, Englewood Cliffs (Prentice Hall) 1960; B. H. Gross, ed., Social Intelligence for America's Future: Explorations in Societal Problems, Boston (Allyn & Bacon) 1969 (comp. the interesting comments in a review by R. Ross, in Contemporary Sociology I/1, Jan.1972, p.46).

26. In an open letter to the Office of Business Economics, of the U.S. Department of Commerce (reprinted in The Brookings Bulletin, 8/3, Washington D.C., 1972, p.4-7), A. H. Okun argues that it is unwise to attempt to "fix" G.N.P. in an attempt to "convert it into a purported measure of national welfare". He thinks that "Producing a summary measure for social welfare is a job for a philosopher-king" (p.4), and indeed a bigger one than can be handled by redefining a one-dimensional summary measure like G.N.P. (p.7). "There is a big job to be done and national income statisticians and other economists can contribute to it. The experience of the national income accountant can be instructive to those who are working to develop social indicators (...)" (ibid.). The scope of his contribution prevents Dr. Okun from broaching the crucial question that crops up, namely what are the implications of this viewpoint, thoroughly sound as it appears, for the role of economics, economic action and the economists in public affairs and in public policy making. On the other hand, he implicitly levels, at the protagonists of social accounting and social indicators, some of the fundamental questions raised here: assuming that economics is not elastic, how far can we stretch it?
27. Comp. D. V. McGranahan, c.s., Contents and Measurement of Socio-economic Development, An Empirical Enquiry, Geneva (UNRISD: Report No.70-10) 1970 (mimeo), p.10-21. A merely statistical procedure for this purpose is likely to attract criticism, if only because it begs the question about items relegated to the dust bin. A particularly intriguing topic for those venturing upon such a critical exercise would be to inquire into the possible effect of circular definition of items on statistical correlations.
28. If it would, this would constitute a most intriguing phenomenon, countervailing, as it were, the built-in tendency of the enumerative approach towards proliferation of items listed. To assess its significance should, then, prove a worth-while exercise.
29. Comp. my "The Sociology of Development: per aspera ad astra?", Civilisations XXI/1, Bruxelles, 1971, p.67-84.

30. Comp. Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology, Louvain (Internat.Sociol.Assoc.) 1962 (vol.I, II), 1964 (vol.III,IV).
31. This point is likely to gain critical importance in the wake of the current shake-up of the world political map. The cold-war pattern of simple polarization is rapidly falling into abeyance. The three-way variant of it that has been tried occasionally seems bound to prove abortive as it offers ample latitude for lesser powers to adopt, at critical moments, a stance of independence towards those whose clients they are assumed to be.

The demise of the polarized pattern takes the political attractiveness out of development aid: wooing the uncommitted and retaining the allegiance of those assumedly committed are matters acquiring a new significance. There is to be, in this respect, a new game with new rules. In response to this turn of events, some will sigh with relief. The political connotations of development aid have been increasingly suspect. Their relief, however, may soon be followed by anxiety, if they happen to believe that development aid as such is a good and necessary thing.

With the political prop gone, development co-operation becomes fully dependent on the three remaining motives, namely charity or solidarity, commercial self-interest and enlightened common sense regarding matters of the One World, - whether on the part of private agencies or on that of governments and intergovernmental agencies. Of the three, the former two are often considered as hardly more acceptable than power politics, and the third is, alas, a rare commodity in the world of international politics.

Add to this a fairly widespread malaise about the efficacy of development aid, and everything appears to conspire for a gloomy prospect for development co-operation. In the light of such a prospect, the Second Development Decade might prove a let-down of the first magnitude. All this because the frame of reference that had been tacitly supposed in designing these new ventures has vanished overnight.

A gloomy prospect? Not necessarily. It could mean that the umbilical cord that kept many a "young state" tied, for a protracted period, to outside forces fostering and sheltering it, is about to be severed. If so, this could only mean that henceforth, the replacement of "international assistance" by "international co-operation" is not to be taken as another euphemism but as a hard fact of life. This is to be deplored, inasmuch as it is bound to cause hardship. It is also to be applauded, inasmuch as it means that decolonization will no longer be in danger of getting stuck at the half-way mark due to neocolonialism under one guise or another.

As yet, nobody is too certain about the rules of this new game, called "international co-operation in One World". So much is sure that for the new nations, development, exactly like independence, its prerequisite, has already been, will henceforth have to be primarily their own achievement, rather than something bestowed upon them by others.

This could not make things easy, but it should make them more satisfactory.

The net effect of all this for development studies remains to be seen. It is likely that there will be hardship on the financial side: the funds for teaching and research will have to come from sources motivated by considerations other than political expediency. But it is also likely that from a viewpoint of scholarship, the foreseeable end of the hitherto existing preoccupation with aid will do some good. It will help to approach the problems of development in the third world with more of an open mind. It will help, again, to see how these relate to quite a few problems, often differently labelled, in the developed parts of the world. As a consequence, it will be realized that the study of development and the study of society in general are not really all that far apart. This, as it happens, is one of the ideas that this paper is meant to propound.

32. It pays to spell this out with some care, first with regard to the developing non-Western countries and subsequently with regard to the developed countries of the West. In the former, (1) the match between (2) the economically determined image of society held by Western-trained development experts and (3) the actual operational pattern of society leaves much to be desired. As for (1) the match as such, economic development planning and policies have failed to prevent the gap between rich and poor nations from growing wider. As for (2) the image, the primacy of economic considerations in the quest for development has been assumed, not proven. Slowly and inexorably, it is becoming a matter of doubt. As for (3) the actual operational pattern, the change-over of total societies from their own traditional pattern, however distorted by colonialism and other external and internal factors, to a pattern amenable to economic development is not, as many still believe, a mere matter of foreseeable modernization, nor, as others claim, a matter of a revolution that can be triggered and steered at will. To conceive of such a transition, by whatever formula, let alone to implement it, is impossible by currently available means. To assume its possibility, and a fortiori to act upon such an assumption, is either a deception or an act of faith. Conditions in the West are obviously different yet strikingly parallel: a neat demonstration of One World conditions. As for (1) the match, we are almost daily made aware of the fact that economic control over all of society is increasingly difficult. As for (2) the image, the pars pro toto philosophy of the economic vision has gradually turned out to be a partial and in effect partisan way to deal with reality, whether for purposes of understanding or for purposes of action. As for (3) the actual operations pattern, it suffices to recall the mounting concern about the detrimental fall-out of procedures that, in maximizing one aspect of reality, atrophy all the rest. All these realizations add up to grave concerns, amongst economists and non-economists alike. Comp. as one example out of several, A. H. Whiteford, ed., A Reappraisal of Economic Development, Perspectives for Cooperative Research, Chicago (Alding) 1967.

33. Against this background, phrases like ceteris paribus assume an ominous significance.
34. Comp. J. Robinson, Economic Philosophy, London (Watts) 1962.
35. A neat case of positively functional meaninglessness, this, as it keeps all options open. Under the circumstances, latitude to move is perhaps more needed than anything else.
36. At this time, reflection has not yet caught up with progress. As yet, not much of a philosophy is distinguishable underneath the itemizing approach. It will come after the facts. There are in particular two issues that await proper consideration. One is the selection of items. Currently, the desired broadening of the scope is achieved simply by means of occasional addition of items to a roster. Even so, any item to be included must somehow qualify. The matter of criteria for qualification remains, by and large, to be systematically considered, even though it clearly has a fundamental significance. For the time being people are preoccupied methodologically and will require little beyond measurability (see Note 24) and perhaps statistical correlation (see Note 26).

The second moot point is how any item that might be eligible for inclusion is identified in the first place. As of now, this is left to the liberum arbitrium of those interested, but the matter is too important to be left to the personal discretion

of the experts. Indeed it is likely to prove a risky affair since ethnocentrism is bound to come in as a factor in any international settings; and so is its parallel, prejudices of various kinds, in national ones.

Some time ago this writer has made an attempt to find some methodological safeguards against these dangers, by raising the question how to identify development goals. ("On the Identification of Development Goals", Development and Change I/1, The Hague, 1969, p.3-20).

Goals, obviously, is not the same as indicators or as either of the other two procedures reviewed. Still, goal identification is yet another enumerative-totalistic manner of tackling the question what development really is. Thus it might be added as a fourth exercise to the three that we have reviewed. It may have two advantages over them, namely (1) the recognition that development is specific to the given development situation and (2) the refusal to consider the nation-state as the one natural unit of development.

37. There is in fact a double trend. One component is away from the pars pro toto towards the enumerative perception of definition, in other words from the upper to the lower half of the chart. The other is from any given part to that which is seen to be its immediately antecedent whole, in other words from a position in one particular column in the upper half of the chart to a position in the column to the left of it. An example is the shift from economic development as a concern to development at large as an allegedly more appropriate concern. The latter trend is

by no means limited to those interested in development. It is equally visible in some of the so-called protest movements in the developed countries. Consider those who attack the alleged repression exerted by one sector of society (say, the military-industrial establishment) over society as a whole. This construct represents, first, the realization that for all practical purposes the part is the whole; secondly, the realization that this quasi-identity is reflected in an operational pattern (usually called control); and thirdly, the rejection of both (introducing the descriptive term repression for the purpose).

38. In some circles, all this is viewed with eagerness, as a dream about to come true. A countervailing and not less valid appreciation could result from the observation that totalistic and totalitarian are closely related, without a clear line of demarcation to keep them apart.
39. It is interesting to note how transitions like these are in the air. People will make them without showing any signs of awareness as to their fundamental nature and their implications. The following two sentences, taken from V. A. Thompson's paper "Administrative Objectives for Development Administration" (in G. D. Ness, ed., The Sociology of Development, A Reader, New York, Harper Row, 1970, p.518), offer a good illustration. "In a situation of rapid change, control is much less relevant. The ideal must be adaptation, and this involves creativity and looseness of definition and structure". The shift is clear, but it is not stated in so many words that this is a transition from one basic perception of reality to another.
40. It was presented, in a different context, in Civilisations XIX/3, Bruxelles 1969, p.359.
41. It may be hard, occasionally, to draw the line, but development and revolution are not the same. Slogans like White Revolution (used in Iran) are clever but they risk being counterproductive in the end, as they will satisfy neither revolutionaries nor antirevolutionaries. White against red is another matter, of course; but that distinction is not saying all.
42. An interesting example of the new style in development work is E. M. Kulp, Rural Development Planning, Systems Analysis and Working Method, New York, (Praeger) 1970.
43. Comp. G. Gusdorf, Introduction aux sciences humaines, Paris (Belles Lettres) 1960.
44. For sociology, comp. P. A. Sorokin, "Diversity and Unity in Sociology", and A. Touraine, "Unité et diversité de la sociologie", Transactions of the Sixth World Congress of Sociology, Geneva (Internat. Sociol. Assoc.) I, 1966, p.49-64 and II, 1967, p.119-134.
45. An interesting exercise, roughly along these lines, is offered in a paper entitled "Sociology and the Other Social Sciences", published as the first chapter of N. J. Smelser, Essays in Sociological Explanation, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (Prentice-Hall) 1968, p.3-44. Six disciplines,

including psychology and history, are systematically reviewed in an attempt to demonstrate their peculiarities in regard to such of their elements or ingredients as the author considers crucial. The resulting comparison is interesting notwithstanding obvious streamlining and oversimplification. Even so, the prospect of possibilities, hopefully drawn by the author in his conclusion, remains to be vindicated by actual developments.

The problem is not new. A. Comte (Cours de philosophie positive, I, Paris 1907, p.16) has expressed concern about overspecialization and suggested the need for a further specialization for remedial purposes, namely in the matter of relationships between disciplines. N. Elias (Was ist Soziologie?, München, Juventa, 1970, end of Ch.1) quotes Comte because he is facing the same issue; but he sidesteps it with the demand, justifiable in itself, that sociology be seen as a "relatively autonomous discipline".

46. Comp. N. Wiener, Cybernetics, Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, New York (Wiley) 1948.
47. The implication of this statement is that this is a problem for which no ready solution is in sight at the present time. To turn away from this difficulty is one of the less advisable ways of living with it. Therefore the present writer is unable to agree with those who give a presentation of the problem in which the sharp edges are somehow blurred. One example out of many is the following phrase, lifted out of its broader context: "Nor is science to be identified with precise measurement or mathematical calculation. It is better to be exact than inexact, and much of modern science would be impossible without quantitative observations and without the mathematical tools needed to convert its reports into more general statements; but we may measure or be mathematical without being scientific at all, just as we may be scientific in an elementary way without these aids". (B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, New York, Free Press, 1965, p.12).
48. For the sake of completeness some remarks are in order about values, since these were just mentioned as the one horn of the dilemma of which measurement is the other. The values problem, as suggested, is another of the inevitable corollaries of the prevailing conception, vague as it is, of the nature of the social sciences. As such it is bound to feature as a recurrent issue, too important to neglect at any time yet too difficult to allow for real progress in the dealings that scholars have with it as a subject by itself.

Still, in most of its current appearance the matter seems unnecessarily bedeviled by confusion about at least one basic issue that could, in principle, be sorted out. This is the matter of relativity of values, as conditioned by the specificity of culture contexts. Especially in sociology, the claims to generality normally upheld in theory-building risk being at odds with the very specific, time-and-place conditioned nature of that to which it refers in the first place. There is no valid reason why this should be so. The actual reason, as often as not, is that the theorists concerned are far from successful in

achieving a universal perception, as they should if their claim to generality were to stand.

The main advantage of recognizing the cultural specificity of values should be that values would become slightly less difficult to identify. This would be the case particularly if those advocating the historical-philological approach and those advocating the social sciences approach could reach across the barriers that separate them; but that is yet another chapter.

49. A useful summary, with references to arguments to the contrary as brought by the protagonists of quantification in the social sciences, can be found in F. R. Allen, Socio-cultural Dynamics, An Introduction to Social Change, New York (Macmillan) 1971, Ch.9, esp.228 f. The nature of the arguments pro quantification is such that in the last resort one faces the choice between accepting them, whether on authority or in faith, or keeping one's doubts. This being so, the second attitude seems the wiser one, since it does by no means reject quantification as far as it will safely go.

Comp. especially D. Lerner, ed., Quantity and Quality, New York (Free Press) 1961, in which quantification is presented in a positive vein by the editor (p.13) and more sceptically by J. G. Kemeny (p.35f) in a paper entitled "Mathematics without Numbers".

50. One of the main attractions of systems theory is that in presenting reality as a system of systems it suggests a fundamental regularity, that is repetition and repeatability, which might go a long way to remedy the problem of the too short statistical runs. Unfortunately the suggestion is extremely hard to substantiate. In coming down to earth from the lofty generality of general theory, the systems theorist is likely to find himself completely absorbed in the uniqueness of the singular system he happens to be dealing with, and gone are the infinite statistical runs.

51. The symptoms of the decline of "economocracy" in public affairs are matched by symptoms within the realm of economics proper. Amongst these, the growing concern about growth is particularly notable.

The current debate on growth tends to concentrate on the realization that it cannot go on, both because of the increasing significance of adverse implications and, more fundamentally, because in the last resort unlimited growth will not fit in a limited human universe. For the time being it does not yet pay much attention to the question why growth, as one of the main determinants of the Western mind, could have become and remained so predominant, given the fact that in the end it turns out to be such an ominous proposition.

A conceivable way of dealing with this question will be suggested here, on a purely tentative basis. To do so is appropriate in the present connection because it ties in with the argument of this paper. It refers back to the distinction made in the preceding, between the traditional vision of a theoretical model more or less mechanically

applied to reality in order to control and indeed to mould it, and an emergent vision in more or less cybernetic terms.

Consider the earlier construct at closer range. It has a logical peculiarity. On the one hand, the assumption of effective amenability of reality to human manipulation implies a virtual identity between model and reality; but on the other hand the assumption that the theoretical model has to be applied in order to mould reality into proper shape implies a discrepancy between the two. Virtual identity equals non-identity. This conceptual impasse could prove a stumbling block unless its consequences can somehow be evaded. This is impossible conceptually, but by shifting ground from a conceptual to an operational frame of reference it may yet be done.

Note, in parenthesis, what this means: people will find that they have to live with an unresolved logical problem, and by the manner in which they do this they will turn it into a great source of creative action. (The phenomenon is recurrent in Western history and perhaps elsewhere too. It might provide a clue to a little recognized principle of sociocultural action and/or change. Both the idea of social action as the application of cognitive models and that of innovation as a combination of existing elements fail to take effective cognizance of it). The point here is that, translated into operational terms, the contrast inevitably appears as a field of tension; but this does not pose insoluble problems. Its significance can be seen as a challenge to, indeed the reason for the existence of, the planner, policy maker etc.

This interpretation eliminates most of the problem. What remains to be resolved is the circumstance that it entails the time dimension, more exactly time flow, as a crucial consideration: part of the original contrast will shape up as time elapsing. The sociologist W. F. Ogburn, in struggling with social change, has attempted to come to grips with the matter by introducing the concept of cultural lag; in so doing he has tacitly adopted a retrospective stance. (Comp. Social Change, With Respect to Culture and Original Nature, New York, Dell, 1966, p.44). In the same vein it might be argued that economists have addressed themselves to the same discrepancy, whilst adopting a prospective stance, and have labelled it growth. From the rush of publications on the subject, a few may be quoted by way of illustration: J. Forrester, World Dynamics, Cambridge, Mass., (Wright-Allen) 1971; D. H. Meadows et al., The Limits to Growth, A Report for the Club-of-Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind, New York (Universe) 1972. The disequilibrating impact of this emergent concern is illustrated, in its turn, by the remarkable fact that reputable economists will show all the signs of conversion to a standpoint that hitherto they were loth to recognize as valid. An impressive example is J. Pen, "De onbekende consequenties van het model van Forrester - Meadows voor de economische politiek", (The unknown consequences of the Forrester-meadows model for economic policy), Economisch Statistische Berichten 16.2.1972, p.159-162. Even so, this new concern provides only part of the proposed answer. It shifts the problem. The next question is why, out of all concepts imaginable, people should have picked growth. This may have to be seen

as a historical coincidence. The concept of scarcity, already belaboured by the Calvinist ethic and the like - to the point where it shaped up as the maximization of scarce resources (duly supplemented by the assiduous effort to make ever more resources available), could lend itself quite conveniently to a yet further step of specification, in consequence of which it could appear as desired growth. It should not be too difficult for the historian of economic thought to list an array of circumstances that could have proved conducive to just this kind of development.

What is remarkable about the current tendency is that it appears to bring the change in meanings of scarcity full circle: no longer a spur for maximization, but once again a limitation. In retrospect, the circle remains interesting. The original sense of scarcity as limitation, once accepted as a distinct sociocultural category and subsequently as a determinant of Western thinking and acting, has evoked the countervailing value which, for reasons shown, had to shape up as an effort rather than as a mere concept. The countervailing has never obliterated the original value, witness the fact that, as Keynesian theory has it, inflation is a necessary corollary of growth. Still by proving increasingly successful it has reached the point where in its turn it has begun to elicit the need for a countervailing effect. Part of this appears in the various scares of the present day: ecology, population, and so forth. Another part appears in precisely that which is now under review: the return to the original meaning of scarcity.

This return could make no sense unless new ways are found to employ scarcity as an effectively operational principle, whether directly or through a new procedure or countervailing. At this time it appears as if it may be put to use directly, in a framework of cybernetic thought and action. In other words, in this respect again the transition discussed above is crucially important. The reference to cybernetics, at this point, needs further qualification. Business, that is growth economics at the micro level of implementation, has for a long time employed the feed-back loop of the cybernetics model to great advantage in terms of growth: selling what sells and giving it an added boost by skilful promotion. This is why television is as outrageously bad as it is (even in most places where it is not supposed to be commercial, because the effort there to capture the audience will follow the commercial, competitive pattern), and why the worse trash a publisher or record company will put out, the more successful he will be. As against the cynical moneygrabbing operator who adopts this kind of practice as the way of the market place, B. F. Skinner's Walden Two introduces the benevolent operator, the imperceptible big brother, who reinforces that which is good in people and in doing achieves a blissful self-sustained utopia just off the highway. In both variants, the cybernetic model is falsified by means of the tacit and surreptitious super-imposition of the earlier model, of the pre-existent plan or norm that is imposed and effectuated. The falsification is easy because the circular model of cybernetics does inevitably imply that one point on the circle, namely the subject-actor's location, has special significance. To recognize this is one thing; to spell out a cybernetics model that would not be liable to this kind of dangerous distortion is quite another.

52. O.c., comp. Note 44.
53. Sorokin goes so far as to distinguish a cybernetic sociology. This seems acceptable only if it is assumed that the cybernetic perception of reality corresponds to a range of sociological styles, and amongst these most clearly to that which he describes as cybernetic sociology.
54. The reference is to the predominance of timeless/placeless qualitative abstraction as distinct from operational abstraction. Comp. my Social Scientists in Pursuit of Social Change, The Hague (Mouton) 1966.
55. Comp. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, New York (Basic Books) 1970. Another author to be mentioned in this connection is H. Marcuse; comp. especially Eros and Civilization, Boston (Beacon) 1955.
56. Comp. Science and Human Behavior, New York (Free Press) 1953; Beyond Freedom and Dignity, New York (Knopf) 1971.
57. Comp. The Active Society, A Theory of Societal and Political Processes, New York (Free Press), 1968.
58. Comp. J. O'Neill, "The New Sociology and the Advent of Alvin W. Gouldner", The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology/La Revue Canadienne de Sociologie et d'Anthropologie, 9/2, 1972, p.167-175; Review of Etzioni, o.c., by R. M. Cook in American Journal of Sociology, 75/4, Jan.1970, p.564 f, 76/1, July 1970, p.156 ff.; G. Marwell and R. Boguslaw, "Skinner, Pro and Con", Contemporary Sociology I/1, Jan.1972, p.19-29, especially Boguslaw's remarks on p.25.
59. In this respect the emergence of special periodicals for "developmentology" is not an unmixed blessing. Among these periodicals are the following: Civilization, Cultures et Développement, Development and Change, Economic Development and Cultural Change, International Development Review, Journal of Developing Areas, Tiers Monde.
60. As a fourth type, at least one case of a special theory may be quoted, even though it is a weak case. This is conflict theory revised in such a way as to envisage conflict as functional, whether positively or negatively, on and by itself and not merely through its (creative) outcome. (Comp. L. Coser, The Function of Social Conflict, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956). From conflict thus envisaged to cybernetics is a relatively small step. This step does not seem to have been made yet, perhaps because the newer appreciation of conflict came too early in the day.
61. Not without corrective elements.