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OCCASIONAL PAPERS

On the Practice and Theory of Affluence and Poverty: some reflections

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183.

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A desalambrar, a desalambrar,
esta tierra es de mosotros,
es la tierra de Pedro, Maria, de Juan y José

Take away the fences, take them away
this land is ours, it is the land of
Pedro, Maria, of Juan and José
(From an Uruguayan song)

1. One of the major contradictions in the world of today surely is the fact that most third World countries, although the majority of their population is involved in agriculture, are not in a position to feed themselves and have to import food on a large scale. While agricultural and food exports from the rich to the poor countries have been rising in response to increased productivity, exports from the poor to the rich countries have been diminishing. While prices of products from the rich countries have been rising, those of products from the poor countries have declined or tend to decline.[1]

While the rich countries prevent the poor as much as possible from entering their own markets and succeed in this, the poor (have to) accept the products of the rich. Why is this? Clearly these imports respond to an emergency situation. Without these imports there would be hunger. If the poor countries would be able to produce enough food, such imports would not be necessary. Yet they seem to be necessary. Are the poor countries really unable to solve themselves the food problem? If they are, food imports must have a different reason. Undoubtedly, taking conditions as they are, such imports respond to an urgent need.
If there were no imports, more people would die, protest and political instability would increase. Would food imports then perhaps be necessary from the point of view of the interests of the rich in their relation to the poor? Could food problems be solved if the present conditions would be changed? Which conditions would have to be changed and how?
For the time being, there is the rich countries' agriculture, well equipped, productive and protected and there is the poor countries' agriculture, weak in productivity and unprotected.[2]

2. Leaving all sophistications of development theory aside, millions of people die every year and thousands every hour because of starvation and malnutrition. If they continue to survive, what is the impact of their condition on their productivity and creativity ? In what ways can they still live a human life ? Too many studies have given us ample evidence of the all-pervasive disabling effects on the human being from hunger and malnutrition. When children are seriously affected in their earliest years, they become disabled in their most elementary potential for a human life. Is it possible for us to understand what hunger is ? Perhaps it is impossible for us who live in affluence, at a safe distance from those who starve and try to survive.

Will hunger be accepted as an inevitable phenomenon which some time in the future may perhaps be solved when agricultural growth has advanced substantially and the poor may have their share, the balance after the higher income groups have taken their part ?

Is it responsible to assume that such sharing will take place ? Somehow ? Or is it more realistic to admit that hunger as an expression of impoverishment is an inevitable concomitant and even a condition of prevailing and increasing inequality in power and the control over resources, their appropriation and utilization?

If we would rely on the first proposition, we should have confidence in the tendencies towards inequality, impoverishment and

(Based on a speech given at the closure of the Social Policy Programme, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, 1972).

hunger, visible in most dependent societies, since the imbalances generated and resulting in hunger would redress themselves somehow, sometimes. Equilibrium would come about.

If we reject this proposition as irresponsible, we might have to drastically review our understanding of the problems of hunger and impoverishment as particular expressions of underdevelopment and we might be obliged to reconsider the way development will or should come about. Is it possible to plan effectively for the production and distribution of goods in such a way that hunger, disease and impoverishment will be effectively eliminated ?

These are elementary questions which must be answered. If we would not be able to answer them, what meaning does our work have ? What justification can we find in it ? How can we answer them? How should we answer them ? Our answer will depend on the way in which we approach the problem. Where do our ideas come from ? What are the source and the inspiration of our question ? Are we in a position at all to formulate the relevant or pertinent questions ?

Are we enough close to experience the experience of poverty and hunger, to be able to understand it and seek for true answers to them or does our alienation from the poor and hungry and from ourselves indeed present us from asking the right questions?[3]

From what perspective do we look at the problem of hunger and poverty and its relation to development ? From our own standpoint inevitably. But 'we', you and me, are not defined by ourselves but by our relation to the society in which we live, what we do and the culture to which we belong.

3. There have always been hunger and poverty. Perhaps for some of us they were in some way natural. They belonged to our world as much as we belonged to it. Who of us was not taught or was led to believe that poverty was somehow a given, even a good thing since it was taught that man would purify himself, by accepting life and also since it gave 'the haves' a chance to be charitable. It is not so long ago that some or most of us in their family, from their parents, school, community and religion learned that inequality was given by God or by fate and that people should learn to accept their destiny and state while it was considered sinful, imprudent and 'inappropriate' to speak or even to think of protest, not to speak of rebellion or revolution, in the face of impoverishment and starvation. In the same way, by and large, authority and 'the authorities' of whatever type, whether political, religious, scientific or intellectual, went unquestioned as to their legitimacy in as far as they were the expression of a transcendent order and harmony. Of course there <u>was</u> plenty of protest and dissension but somehow they could be 'managed' and people creating 'problems' would be incorporated. Now authority, any authority, has become the subject of critical scrutiny, either openly or in thought. And if authorities become more authoritarian it is not because there is not a heightening of critical consciousness but just as a response to it, to deal with it, to neutralize it and bring it under control.

4. But why and how is it that our ideas and theories are changing ? How do we arrive at the insight that they are valid ?

How do we validate our theoretical propositions ? Which criteria do we apply ? If we assume that poverty and hunger are problems which can be solved, this question is of vital importance.

"The history of human knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected. That is why practice is the criterion of truth and why "the standpoint of life", of practice, should be the first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge. The truth of any knowledge and theory is determined not by subjective feelings, but by the objective results in social practice. Only social practice can be the criterion of truth". [4]

Do we really accept that (valid) theory has to be verified and validated in practice ?

I suggest that the answer to this question is determined by our position in society. All people in society belong to a certain class and this belongingness shapes in turn their culture. No consciousness is therefore not shaped by the hic and nunc of the particular class situation in which people are. So that when people are confronted with problems which present themselves to them as questions, it is not possible to conceive a so-called "free" consciousness which would work by its own impulse, from its own interiority. [5]

If we would accept that development theory aimed at bringing about development can only legitimize itself by practice, the question arises: who are verifying theory on whose behalf ? If in practice development theory would lead to the contrary of what it proposes, can it still be maintained as valid or should it be rejected ? Who will determine this ? If it is nevertheless maintained, there must be a reason for it, if we at least accept that no theory can validate itself by itself.

May it be proposed that such a theory is maintained since it is formulated by those in a society or on behalf of them who have an interest in it because it justifies their position and therefore helps to consecrate prevailing conditions ? If development theory is founded in valuations [6] and valuations are in turn shaped by the interests of people as belonging to a particular class, it would seem reasonable to submit that all and any development theory is historically, situationally and relationaly determined. The answer then to the question, which development theory is to be considered more valid: that which in theory proposes the elimination of poverty and hunger but in practice leads to the contrary, or that which proposes the same but in practice brings it about, cannot be given in abstracts. The answer to these propositions depends in its outcome on the respective position in society and the interests with which people associate or become associated with.

The question thus becomes: Who make development theory ? Where does it have its genesis ? In whose interests ? Also, any theory assuming basic identity and harmony of interests between the rich and the poor, between those who control power and those who do not, will necessarily be fundamentally different from a development theory, which does not assume such identity and harmony but on the contrary sees the interests of different interest groups as

possibly in opposition to each other and the prevalence of enrichment and impoverishment, of accumulation and marginalisation, as mutually conditioning phenomena.

5. What may be a good theory from the point of view of the rich, may be a bad one for the poor. What is to the advantage of one group, may be damaging to another. What seems rational in the understanding of the one will appear irrational in the eyes of the other, depending on their interests. The existence of opposite interpretations becomes more manifest and explicit in periods in which deep alterations in the social order or the established structure of relationships are announcing themselves and exercise pressure on the existing mould of a society, than in periods of relative tranquility. Simply think of the position of classes during the French Revolution in which certain things which appeared as very logical and rational to the revolutionary class, were conceived as chaotic and irrational by the previous ruling classes and their sympathizers. At the same time what appeared an irrational view point of the previous feudal class in the period, had appeared as rational and consistent in the time of Thomas Aquinas.[7]

Or think of the 'Rebels' who fled from England and established New England. Their Declaration of Independence included among the natural rights of man the right to revolt. The greatest of American Democracy's Founding Fathers, Thomas Jefferson, may be considered the first theoretician of the 'Permanent Revolution'. "God forbid, said he, we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion. What country ever existed a century and a half without rebellion ? and what country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not warned from time to time that this people preserve the spirit of resistence".[8]
Surely, the rationality of this view must have seemed most irrational and outrageous to the British Crown at the time, and would also cause the indignation and embarrassment of most authorities in present day societies, belonging to the 'establishment of nations' or to the establishments in dependent poor society.

What was in fact the interpretation of the establishment at the time of the American Revolution which defended the old order? The Revolution had been stirred up by a few crafty men who played upon the ignorance and the passions of the mob; by a handful of conspirators was the "draught to cheat and fascinate mankind". And these conspirators were "an infernal, dark-designing group of men... obscure petty-foggy attorneys, bankrupt shopkeepers, outlawed smugglers, wretched banditti... the refuse and dregg of mankind."[9] This is what was said about George Washington and his friends and combattants at the time of the American Revolution.
Such qualifications have with great regularity and consistency been applied to all who in history have stood for a better and more human society. Such qualifications stand in profound contrast to interpretations of a process of transformation rooted in an identification with the people seeking a way out of their inhuman condition: "Russia had a great many cultured and determined men who entirely gave up the happiness of living with their families and not fearing

bitter hardships...went to the villages of the countryside to spread the principles of humanism and socialism. Sometimes they used their leisure periods to talk with village people, and at other times they bled and swet together with them. Sometimes they gathered together the old and the young, the women and children, and talked with them before candlelight, discussing their hardships and advancing their knowledge.
When the police discovered them, they either fled or were imprisoned. But in the Russia of those days, where was the new heaven and earth, where these young men were active ? It was in the villages of Russia".[10] Or let us take a more recent example, an interpretation of the peasant movement in Hunan in China in the nineteen twenties. While the landlords and those associated with them, qualified the actions and achievements of the movement as 'something terrible', the observer who obviously identifies with the interests of the peasantry calls what happens 'fine'."It is obviously a theory of the landlord class for preserving the old order of feudalism and obstructing the establishment of a new order of democracy. What the peasants are doing is absolutely right. What they are doing is fine."

The same peasant movement was considered by the more well-to-do as 'going too far'. "Yes, peasant associations [a major achievement of the movement] are necessary, but they are going rather too far", was the standpoint of these groups. But what is the actual situation, asks the sympathizing observer. "True, the peasants are in a sense 'unruly' in the countryside. Supreme in authority, the peasant associations allow the landlords no say and sweep away their prestige. They find the local tyrants and evil gentry, they demand contributions from them, and they smash their sedanchairs. People swarm into the houses of local tyrants and evil gentry who are against the peasant associations, slaughter their pigs and consume their grain. They even loll for a minute or two on the ivory inland beds belonging to the young ladies in the households of the local tyrants and evil gentry. At the slightest provocation they make arrests, crown the arrested with paperhats, and parade them through the villages, saying: You dirty landlords, now you know who we are. Doing whatever they like, and turning everything upside down, they have created a kind of terror in the countryside. This is what some people call 'going too far', or exceeding the proper limits is 'wrong' or 'really too much'. Such talk may be plausible but in fact it is wrong. First, the local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords have themselves driven the peasants to this. For ages, they have used their power to tyrannize over the pesants and trample them underfoot. This is why the peasants have reacted so strongly. The most violent revolts and the most serious disorders have invariably occurred in places where the local tyrants, evil gentry and lawless landlords perpetrated the worst outrages. The peasants are clearsighted. Who is bad and who is not, who is the worst and who is not so vicious, who deserves severe punishment and who deserves to be let off lightly? The peasants keep clear accounts, and very seldom has punishment exceeded the crime. Secondly, a revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a

picture or doing embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous."[11]

These views were surely not shared in Hunan by those deriving benefits from and trying to maintain the existing 'order'.

6. Thus we come to make the proposition that thinking always depends on a social situation and that when the historical tide turns and changes in social relations occur, divergencies in terms of the interpretation, appreciation and theory with regard to the structure of relationships and the evolution of society are bound to occur.

In final instance, our valuations, determined and inspired by interests, go back to the issue of what is good and what is bad. We should then ask the question: "How can we tell the good from the bad?, by the motive, (the subjective intention) or by the effect (social practice)?". What has primacy, motive or effect, or is this a false dilemma and is it imperative to "insist on the unity of motive and effect" Is there any theory which avoids the breach between the subjective and the objective knowledge from practice [12] If a development theory with regard to the solution of the problems of hunger and poverty claims unity of motive and effect, insight and social practice, it cannot but start from the real interests of the poor and hungry. Thereby it would only legitimate itself, as development theory, in the service of the poor, the marginalized, the disinherited, the exiled from their own society, the same who by the dominant groups in their own society are called children, peasants, people from the interior, people who have no needs,[13] the ungrateful, the useless, people who are dead weight, the ones likely to "disturb the order", the ones who have too many children and who work too little, the indolent and apathetic, the ones who are resistant to change,[14] that change which is expected from them not in view of their own vital interests but in function of the interests of those on whom they depend and who need them in spite of not wanting them. [15]

Thus people qualify each other through the perception which they acquire from each other in relation to their position.

7. Now we have to come back to the question of why hunger and poverty, once taken by many for natural and even desirable, is now being looked at with growing concern. Is it because we have changed? Surely. But I would submit that we have changed because of a change in the extent and intensity of poverty and hunger, that is to say a change in the objective conditions. Whereas in earlier days poverty and hunger seemed 'manageable' and the poor, hungry could somehow be 'taken care of' and incorporated, now it seems that a rising tension is mounting between the problems of misery and the capacity by dominant groups to keep it under control. It becomes the apparently vital concern of those in control in as far as it threatens them. True, this is not the first time that people in history have experienced misery. But it is the first time that hundreds of human beings have

become aware that their misery is not an inevitable natural phenomenon. In Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, that conviction is growing. And the people of these lands are determined to solve their problem.[16] With the growing abundance and affluence resulting from the use of advanced technology, resulting in increased productivity, awareness of poverty and hunger is growing. This can only be the case in as far as prevailing inequalities are being maintained or increased. Do the increased use of technology or the changes from low to high organic composition of capital take place in order to meet the basic needs of all people or does such a movement rather take place because it responds to the need to maximize surplus value and profit ? We will have to examine the movement of these conditions, how they have come about. How can we otherwise understand the relationship between production and consumption ? "The economists explain to us the process of production under given conditions. What they do not explain to us, however, is how these conditions themselves are being produced i.e. the historical movement that brings them into being." (Frederich Engels)

8. The existence of either some necessary dichotomy between development and equality or on the contrary, of some necessary link between the two, cannot be postulated a priori. It has to be ascertained through an analysis of the relationship between the class structure of a society and its economic development at each historical juncture.[17]

The primacy in development theory, placed either on growth or on equality as conditions for development, reflects the basic contradiction between the interpretation of rationality from the point of view of the private, individual interest, as implying and leading to the wellbeing and welfare of the whole community, and the judgement of economic development from the criterion of its concrete service to the basic needs and interests of the population at large.

From a formal point of view, it is difficult to maintain that inequality is imperative for growth where such a thesis proposes that more equality would imply a decline in saving, would weaken the incentive to produce and would therefore lead to a decrease in growth. If that would be true, it should mean that the rich in the poor countries would productively invest a substantial part of their income and that where a country is less poor than another, there would be a positive association between inequality, saving and investment. Such a contention is not borne out by a concrete comparison[18] and is also not supported by the performance in the economies of the socialist countries which have on the whole shown higher growth rates than the free market countries.[19]

9. Is the cost for equality too high and can the price for it not be paid by the poor dependent countries? Or are these countries poor and dependent because of the maintenance of inequality in relationships between people and regions inside and inequality in their relations with the rich industrialized countries? Is the insistence on production before distribution no more than a plausible

cliché used as a cloak for a policy which its protagonists find it difficult to avow openly?[20] Is a plan a good plan from the economic point of view if it aims definitely "at the wellbeing and advancement of the people as a whole, at the opening out of opportunity to all, and the growth of freedom and methods of cooperative organization and action",[21] or must we rather reject such a point of view as romantic and idealistic. But even then, if such a view would prevail, would it mean that it would be turned into practice? The very adoption of such a view and the insistence on it by the political leadership may serve to facilitate the development of an economic structure in the service of the ruling classes which adhere in word and even in practice to such a socialist oriented policy in as far as such a policy supports their own interest. There may then be a contradiction between theory and practice[22] but it is only formal since in reality the very function of theory from an objective point of view is to avoid its own realization. From the point of view of practice, social reality, is there any more evidence needed that the insistence of giving in practice primacy to growth in the context of dependence and the maintenance of feudal, semi-feudal and subsistence economies[23] has only led to the increase of inequality and the rising disparity of living conditions between the rich and affluent and the poor? It would rather seem that the increase of poverty and hunger is a necessary condition and outcome for processes of monopolization. While the maintenance of prevailing agrarian structures is rational from the point of view of the rural bourgeoisie as well as to those from the urban bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie who through banking, lending and trade[24] profit from the freezing of the existing social structure, it is the urban bourgeoisie which, in alliance with foreign investment, orients the industrialization process to supply consumer goods to a minor section of the population, both in the urban and rural areas, which has higher incomes, and which is induced to diversify its production in view of the limited market, and intensifies monopolization practices in order to control that market and at the same time maximize profit.[25] In such a way private rationality has as a necessary outcome the loss of social rationality if by this is understood the opportunity of the majority of the population to find in their life and work a response to their legitimate interests and basic needs.

10. If in this context modernization of agriculture takes place, it is not in order to respond to the requirements of social rationality but on the contrary to intensify the advantages of private rationality, as is demonstrated by the problems engendered by the effects of the green revolution in terms of increasing income disparities, intra- and interregional disparities, unemployment and social and political instability.[26] Such modernization takes then place as the necessary complement of the maintenance of the traditional social structure, the break up of which would not only be disadvantageous but also engender increased pressure for equality. Such pressure is engendered nevertheless by the very impact of the modernization process which unintendedly sharpens the contradictions in the countryside in the same way as the extension of capital-intensive industry in the

cities augments the contradictions between a labour force which increasingly becomes a labour 'aristocracy' (and by that fact is forced to identify itself with the interests of those by whom they are incorporated into the privileged part of the population) and the working population with no or a low income. Are the poor societies poor because they are poor or are they poor because the processes of control, appropriation and utilization of existing resources make them poor and impede the rational utilization of their actual and potential resources as well as the possibility for people to be productive and creative ?

11. If they would not have been rich in resources, would there have been any reason to incorporate them into the economy of the countries on which they are now dependent? It is proposed that their poverty as well as the poverty of a major part of their population, aside from being a product of relations with the rich countries, results from the improductive utilization of the actual surplus produced as well as from the non-utilization of their potential surplus, represented by the increasing underutilization of the productive and creative capacities of a large section of the population, their greater wealth. The question is: Do we accept the existence of such an actual social surplus product, composed of the export of profits by foreign investment, the accumulation of wealth by landlords, merchants, traders and usurers and through the unnecessary expenditures of army and armament and operations of the 'lumpenbourgeoisie'.[27]

12. The agricultural surplus product amounts in a number of countries to 30 to 50% of the agricultural product and the latter often exceeds 50% of the national product.[28]
Within the agricultural surplus the amount of surplus realized through ground rent,[29] of which the increase historically has been greatly influenced by the increased pressure by the population on the soil as a consequence of the blockage of alternative forms of production and which is heightened by the process of modernization in agriculture and one of its concomitants, speculation,[30] is often a major share. As to the underutilized people's productive and creative capacity which appears a consequence of the direction of the modernization process in the dependent countries, can it be mobilized? Can people whose subordination has been institutionalized into the very mode of production which shapes their life be mobilized against their own interest?[31] Is it realistic to think of them as a potential resource if what they produce will serve to increase the surplus appropriated from them? The failure of all those programmes designed to achieve such a participation under the prevailing conditions of an inequitable social agrarian structure, prove the futility of such a proposition.
On the other hand, can it be expected that such a mobilization will lead to development if it is realized on the basis of the interests and in response to the basic needs of the peasantry and rural workers?

There is evidence that such a mobilization (which resembles forced labour as long as the traditional agrarian structure is maintained) is only possible as the outcome of a social revolution which will release all the latent potential of productive and creative capacities in people if they will have the guarantee and security of a fair and equitable share in what they produce.

13. Is it not rational for people to resist to 'participate' in 'development', if such development is realized at their expense and is it not evident that growth under such conditions cannot be expected? This is then not due to a lack in people's capacities but to the structure of monopolization of resources and opportunities which deprives them from equitable participation in society, its resources and fruits.
Thus, the suggested dilemma proposed between investment and consumption whereby either one is realized at the expense of the other, is a fraudulous and false dilemma, not based on scientific but on ideological grounds, namely, the interests of those wishing to preserve the existing order which is the basis of their rationality. We should therefore distinguish between investment and consumption, not as exclusive alternatives but between the existence of the accumulation fund (that what is invested productively), the producers' consumption fund and improductive consumption (that part of the social surplus which is invested and consumed improductively).[32] Thus the dilemma disappears and thanks to the utilization of this latter, both productive investment and consumption can be increased, not at the expense of development, but on the contrary as an absolute prerequisite.[33] Can it be expected that people can and will use their productive and creative capacity unless their elementary needs are first solved (food, health, protection) and is it not reasonable that they will resist working unless this opens for them real perspectives for a reasonable and good life? That under these elementary needs and the perspective for a good life we should not only understand the guarantee for satisfaction of physical needs but also the free participation in the making of own society and in all spheres of productive activity, is illustrated by the problems in those countries which have achieved the elimination of poverty and hunger but where government denies to the working population such elementary right and regulates the productive process through a centralized bureaucracy. The relationship between the emergence [34] of a new class structure in these countries, marked by new forms of inequality and the instrumentalization of the working population in function of production objectives which do not respond primarily to their own needs and interests and are decided without their participation, has produced a form of social rationality which is only social in form but not in reality since it takes away from the people the right to decide about their own life and work and divorces them from their product, thereby undermining their productivity and creativity and thus alienating people from the identification with themselves, both in production and the interpretation of their needs. The recognition of the fact that participation by people in management is crucial in the raising of productivity may be prohibitive and its realization only introduced under the greatest limitations, since doing either might threaten the existing order, that is to say, the inequality of conditions. Or it may lead to experiments which by themselves articulate the contradictions between

awareness of the irrationality of private ownership rights and the increasing understanding of the meaning of labour as the only and ultimate source of wealth and accumulation.[35]

15. The mounting quest for new forms of social control in the highly industrialized countries is further enhanced by the increasing consciousness in the population of its subordination to the requirements of the productive structure, as well as by the effects of this production on the living conditions of the people at large.[36] The increasing stress on limiting further the opportunities for self-realization, provoked by the very process of subordination, promotes movements of protest which fundamentally express the quest and the need for new forms of social organization pointing to demands for a fundamental democratization of all institutions of society. The need for such a democratization based on effective equality of all is in particular induced by the increasing unmanageability and unviability of society in which all groups in competition with each other demand more, thereby stimulated by those groups that have more and that attempt equalization.[37]

16. As to the impoverished dependent societies, if the coming of a social revolution is recognized, it is not because such a revolution in itself is advocated but because it will inevitably arise from the growing contradictions in these societies in which through the process of modernization under conditions of monopolization the majority of the population becomes marginalized. Is there under such conditions a way out without prior transformation of the structure which produces such marginalization?
The increase of poverty and hunger as well as the growing under-utilization of labour find expression in the increasing insistence on population planning which is more and more advocated as a strict priority for the poor dependent countries. The question may be asked whether the increasing insistence on such a policy by the rich is not to be located in avoiding to relate the possibilities for people to live to the full mobilization of all resources, which is conditioned by their own control over their environment. Is not the priority proposed for population planning and then in particular for the poor, and the emergence of the 'ethical' principle that they should control themselves, a necessary concomitant of an economic system which does not give him a chance to live? Even the existence of man has become a pure luxury.[38]
But is not such a view the expression of a particular type of consciousness, expressing the particular position of those sustaining such a thesis, intendedly or unintendedly?[39] If at least we postulate a relationship between consciousness and social position as suggested before.

17. In the face of the present contradictions between and within societies resulting from the increasing contradictions between the immense development of the productive forces and the maintenance of exploitative productive relations, any belief in equilibrium theory or a natural tendency towards balance appears absurd but entirely rational within the context of an ideological position seeking the support of the status quo.

While peaceful co-existence in the world of today has become a condition of sheer survival, this does not mean that the

status quo can be maintained. "As we all know from history, no status quo has ever lasted indefinitely, not even the most partial and localized ones. Will it be broken by devastating military means or will there be adequate social outlets for the manifestation of the rising pressures which are in evidence today even in the most remote corners of our global social environment?"[40]

18. The very fact that a people which stands for and seeks to realize its elementary right for freedom and independence is being submitted to unknown atrocity while at the same moment the president of the richest country of the world, responsible for this atrocity, appeals to the desire for peace expressed as his hope that never more children will be sacrificed, testifies to the real nature of equilibrium theory which needs the practical support of unthinkable violence, in order to maintain the status quo, so as to secure the maintenance and promotion of private rationality. Is there any more sign needed to clarify the human impoverishment and alienation engendered by the defense of freedom on behalf of the right of private rationality, and the privatization of affluence?[41]

The increasing need of the rich countries for strategic materials[42] for which they are dependent on the poor and their efforts to maintain the status quo in their relations with the poor which have awakened and demand increasingly the effective possibility for free, autonomous self-development and the mobilization of their own resources for their own benefit, these two movements create increasing pressures for a transformation of relationships.

The search for the control of strategic materials and markets does not only focus on actual resources and markets but also on potential ones[43] so that the area and intensity of control have to be increased and actual or potential dependence is intensified. The provision of aid has to play a crucial role in facilitating and consolidating such control. Its real purpose and implications become however every day more clear.[44]

The recent UNCTAD Conference in Santiago as well as the Stockholm conference have brought out the desintegration of apparent equilibrium and the increasing movement among the impoverished countries for self-defense. Where there is oppression, there is the need for resistance,[45] and the search for liberation.

19. Only if the right of people and peoples on free and autonomous self-development is not only recognized but supported in practice, can the process of emancipation[46] which is the source and goal of all human development, be a peaceful one and contradictions which inevitably engender conflict can be overcome without leading to violence.

This view may be utopian but then: The existence of a utopia as a utopia is the necessary condition for its eventually ceasing to be a utopia.[47]

But then this utopia remains only human if it is shaped from the standpoint of life, that is to say nurtured and sustained by social practice, in support of liberation from all forms of domination and impoverishment of people by people.

Can social science be of service to this process of emancipation? Such a question requires reformulation, Since social science as such does not exist anymore than philosophy in itself exists. As intelligence, it can serve both ideologies and theories of liberation and repression, it can serve against as well as on behalf of people. The harrow does not define the labour of the peasant.[48]

All of us participate in our society from our concrete position from where we develop our project of life and work, our interests, consciousness, from where we develop our commitment and act. We are all ideologically and politically involved and neither in our practice or theory can we be or hope to be neutral.[49] "Neutrality" is also always commitment and choice.

Only in as far as we can free ourselves, by identifying and associating with those who are in search of liberation, can we work for development and implicitly for a <u>social</u> science approach which responds to the needs of people in our own society.[50]

The practice and promotion of self-criticism and mutual criticism are fundamental both to the development of scientific activity and the creation of a society, based on the practice of equality and solidarity.

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3. Istvan Mészáros Marx's Theory of Alienation. (London, 1970), on Individual and Society.
Mészáros points to the structural base of our consciousness and the interiorization of the values of commodity society.
Is it possible to positively transcend alienation unless through actualization of social being which creates new consciousness?
How is it possible to acquire free consciousness within the constraints of adjustment to the prevailing order which manipulates consciousness? See Paul A. Baran, The Longer View, Essays towards a Critique of Political Economy (New York, 1969), especially the essays Marxism and Psycho-analysis.
Also Ronald Laing's The Politics of Experience, on the effects of alienation on experience and consciousness. See also Herman Milikowski on non-conformity as a source of creativity. (In praise of Non-Adaption "Lof der onaangepastheid, Amsterdam, 1969).
On "academic" social theory as reflective of the dominant values in societies which have "settled" down and in which the pressure for equilibrium and harmony tends to minimize the recognition of social forces as political forces stemming from inherent contradictions of interest: see Norbert Elias, Introduction to Über den Prozess der Zivilisation (München, 1969).
Also to be considered here is Antonio Gramsci's view on hegemonic values which, contrary to Max Weber's interpretation of "legitimate authority" as a source of domination, are in Gramsci's understanding a set of ideas which are dominant as a consequence of a particular power structure. The socialization of hegemonic values leads then to the acceptance of ideas reflective of these values as "truth".
J. Merrington, "Theory and Practice in Gramsci's Marxism", Socialist Register, 1968; H. Wolpe, "Some Problems Concerning Revolutionary Consciousness", Socialist Register, 1970.

4. Mao Tse Tung, "On Practice, on the relation between knowledge and practice, between knowing and doing", Selected Readings from the Works of Mao Tse Tung (Peking, 1971).

5. Georg Lukács, in: Conversaciones con Lukács, Hans Heinz Holz, Leo Kofler, Wolfgang Abendroth (Madrid, 1971), p. 55.

6. Gunnar Myrdal, The American Dilemma (New York, 1944).

7. Lukács, op.cit., pp. 62-63

8. Roger Garaudy, Turning Point of Socialism, cited in his essay on "The United States and the Consequences of the New Scientific and Technological Revolution" (London, 1970).

9. Paul A. Baran, The Longer View, the Essay "Reflections on the Cuban Revolution" (New York, 1969; quatation from Charles A. and Mary A. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, 1937)

10. Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (New York, 1970), p. 80
Li Ta-Chao, one of the two principal founders of the Chinese Communist Party was professor of history and chief librarian at Peking University. He was the first to interpret Marxism in the Chinese context and inspired many young intellectuals (Mao Tse Tung was his young assistant at Peking University Library in the wintermonths of 1918-19 and was strongly influenced by him). The passage quoted from Li Ta-Chao stems from the interest of Li Ta-Chao in the "go to the people movement" in 19th century Russia which he suggested could serve as a model for the educated youth of China.
Such a movement came indeed. See William Hinton's studies, Fanshen and Iron Oxen. The way in which Li Ta-Chao identifies with the "movement to the people" not only specifies his view on the role of the intellectuals but also brings out his belief that the transformation would have to come from the villages, from the peasantry; he wrote in 1919: "The condition of China today is that the cities and the villages have been made into two opposite poles and have almost become two different worlds .... In periods of agricultural slack we ought to come to the cities to study and in times when the peasants are busy we ought to go to the fields ... then the atmosphere of culture will merge together with the shadows of the trees and smoke of the village chimneys and those quiet, depressed old villages will become transformed into lively, active, new villages. The great unity of the villages will be our 'young China'. We find clearly in Li Ta-Chao's vision the primacy he gives to the peasantry in the process of transformation. In his words we see a vision of China as a society where the "periphery" will turn into the "center". See also: Mireille Marc, Le Maoïsme, sinisation de la Dialectique Marxiste, Etude.

11. Mao Tse Tung, From: "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, March 1927", Selected Works.

12. Mao Tse Tung, His view is that "Idealists stress motive and ignore effect while mechanic materialists stress effect and ignore motive. In contradistinction to both, we dialectical materialists, insist on the unity of motive and effect".
Cf. with Matthew 7-20:
'Every tree that brings forth no good fruits, shall be cut down and cast into the fire, I say therefore to you, it is by their fruits that you shall know them".
Cf. with James in his "universal" Letter: Rash, O Soul, be assured that faith without deeds to show no life in it.

He stresses in "On Practice" that idealism as well as what he calls mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism are "all characterized by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from practice".

13. The view that poor have no needs may be understood as "theoretical" justification for the practice of surplus appropriation. Such a contention always prevails where the mode of production relies on a low organic composition of capital. The higher rate of surplus profit, historically related to the colonial economies with predominance of extractive activity in mining and agriculture, is reflected in the low wages, long working days, work by children and women, absence of social legislation, forced labour and labour in kind and other ways of maximizing profit. The same features predominated during the industrialization process in the now rich countries until changes in the organic composition of capital took place and expanded output required incomes to go up so as to ensure "effective demand", leading to insistence on "basic rights" and "sovereignity" of the consumer.

14. Such qualifications should all be considered as particular forms of consciousness through which the structural relations of dominance/dependence are internalized and reinforced and which in turn help to promote the internalization of dependence relations. They all converge in legitimizing and consolidating a prevailing power structure. They further serve to justify policies which tend to be exclusive. Thus, development of such a consciousness induces the perceivement of "development" as identical to the interests of the dominant classes who acquire control through monopolization of the instruments of socialization, resources and political power, which become mutually supportive.
Transformation of consciousness in the indicated direction naturally leads to the adoption and support of the ruling elite theory and social stratification analysis, both as substitutes for class analysis.

15. It might be argued that with the development of the monopolization process and the advancement of capital-intensive production in the agricultural and industrial sectors and the increasing under-utilization of people, a situation is developing whereby the functionality of the maintenance of a reserve army, achieved by freezing the agrarian structure or, in other words, the maintenance of a limited mobilization of resources by limited utilization of labour, loses its rational and becomes a threat to political stability. This is because the possibilities for peasants to find work in the future are disappearing and because of the increasing contradictions brought about by the emergence of an industrial and rural labour aristocracy with relatively privileged conditions versus the unchanging or deteriorating conditions of those without work.
This process, observable in an increasing number of poor dependent societies, is obviously a very uneven one, depending on the specific conditions and rates of modernization. Cf. the approach to this problem by the Argentinian sociologist José Nun, Marginalidad y Participación Social (Symposium by the Institute for Labour Studies of I.L.O., Mexico, 1969).

16. Quoted in Baran's The Long View, p. 142, from the study by Stringfellow Bar, Let's Join the Human Race (Chicago, 1950).

17. Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa", in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 6, 2, 1968.

18. "Myths about the Pursuit of Development": Bulletin of Development Studies, The University of Sussex, May, 1969

19. United Nations, YearBook of National Account Statistics, 1969. The statistics in this document indicate that over the last decades the overall average annual rate of growth in the centrally planned economies was twice that in developing market economies, and thrice in terms of per capita.

20. D.R. Gadgil, (chief of the Planning Commission of India) quoted in Gunnar Myrdal's The Challenge of World Poverty, chapter on the "Equality Issue".

21. Jawaharlal Nehru, in his Discovery of India, quoted by Myrdal, ibid.

22. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, Volume II, chapter 16, on Equality and Democracy. Extensive attention is given by Myrdal to the insight by India's planners in the contradiction between the declared socialist objectives of development policy and the primacy given in practive to orthodox growth policy. This contradiction is explained by the prevailing (monopolistic) power structure through which government policy is shaped according to the interests and needs of the private sector, composed of both the urban industrial and the rural bourgeoisie.

23. Ernest Laclau, "Imperialism in Latin America", in New Left Review, 67. Laclau stresses the maintenance of the feudal mode of production in the context of modernization because of its capacity to generate comparatively higher rates of profit due to its particular exploitative forms of appropriation. See also:
Giovanni Arrighi, The Relationship between the Colonial and the Class Structure, a critique on André Gunder Frank's theory of the development of underdevelopment. As to the preservation of subsistence economics, see Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul in "Socialism and Economic Development in Africa", in which they emphasize the relative absence of stimuli to exploit the surplus productive capacity existing in traditional economies, due to the slow growth of the money economy, in turn caused by the high rate of mechanization and automation as well as the discretionary consumption pattern of the labour aristocracy relying on goods from abroad and the native modern sectors.
See also Aart J.M. van de Laar, "Aspects of Foreign Investment in African Development", in Kroniek van Afrika 1971/73, who states: "Within the African scene any change in development strategy in favour of rural development relative to industrial and modern sector interests takes on, of necessity, an anti-foreign enterprise bias in view of present substantial foreign control over the modern sector. Hence the distrust of foreign business interests of any serious movement towards rural development and the concomittant shift which this would entail..... Obviously the larger the share of foreign firms in a developing economy, the greater the constraints on the freedom of action of national governments."

24. Charles Bettelheim, India Independent. See the chapter on Bourgeoisie and Capitalism. Bettelheim stresses the predominance of non-productive capital over productive capital formation and the inter-penetration and fusion of interests and operations in monopolistic terms between the urban and rural bourgeoisie and petit bourgeoisie.

25. Ranjit K. Sau, "Indian Economic Growth, Constraints and Prospects" in Economic and Political Weekly, Bombay, February 1972.
In India the industrial structure is basically geared to the top 10 percent of the population, the richest 10 percent of rural and the richest 10 percent of the urban population. It is estimated that in the big industries, making consumer goods, only 54% of the productive capacity is used which is potentially available, and only 22% in those industries producing means of production. This illustrates the rate of profits.
Cf. for Africa, Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, and for Latin America Celso Furtado, Obstacles to Development in Latin America (New York, 1970), as well as Tertonio dos Santos, La Nueva Dependencia (Lima, 1968).
The two last studies emphasize the accomodation of industrial development to the semi-feudal structure with the concomittant reinforcement of its monopolistic nature and the diversification of its production pattern, to respond to the diversified wants of a limited part of the population instead of the basic needs of the population at large.

26. See A.R. Desai, "Reliance on Rich Farmers for Development, its implications", The Economic Weekly, September, 1965.

Erich H. Jacoby, "Effects of the Green Revolution in South and South-East Asia", Modern Asian Studies, January, 1972.

Michel Cepède, "The Green Revolution and Employment"

Zubeida Manzoor Ahmad, "The social and economic implications of the Green Revolution in Asia".

Both these articles in the International Labour Review, January, 1972.

Jacoby concludes his article by stating that the Green Revolution as a means of social reform and improved conditions has become a myth.
Michel Cepède, by stressing that human labour is not and should not become a commodity and that the food supply of mankind, the fertility of the soil, and the natural wealth of the environment are far too valuable assets to be merely treated as commodities which can be marketed or kept off the market at will, brings out clearly the inherent rational of private rationality against social rationality. The overriding fact is that the green revolution is the consequence of turning land, food and people into commodities, and reproduces in a new way the preceding structure of monopolization, with far more serious consequences.
Zubeida Ahmad also stresses the regional disparities of the Green Revolution and its polarization effects.

Fracine Frankel, India's Green Revolution, Economic Gain and Political Costs (Princeton, 1971).

Fracine Frankel who served as a consultant to USAID in India writes: "The rapid acceptance of Marxist Ideology with its emphasis on unjust capitalist expropriation of resources provided for common use, reflects the emotional, if unarticulated, response to the harsh reality of arbitrary exclusion increasingly imposing itself on the experience of the most disadvantageous sections of the peasantry. Poverty and unrewarded effort are beginning to be perceived as remediable by man and rooted in different access to resources which are necessary for exploiting the opportunities created by modern science."
She stresses: "the tendencies towards social polarization and class conflict which have emerged more quickly than anticipated", and recommends renewed priority for the social and political goals of planning (pp. 200-202).
But once again, in which way can the strong who utilize the State as their instrument be prevented from favouring themselves? The qualification of such a development policy as "betting on the strong" suggests that governments may have more options at their disposal, that there might be a leeway for alternative policies.
Such a view seems more idealist than realistic when private capitalization in agriculture responds to the inherent dynamics of free market economy, the maximization of profit. A recent study on the causes and nature of current agrarian tensions by the research and policy division of the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs suggests that "the opportune moment for a radical reshaping of the agrarian structure has passed", and that the piecemeal reforms which have been accomplished have bolstered the political, social and economic position of the rural upper strata on which the government depends for crucial support. Not only the political influence of this group has increased but also its interest in perpetuating the status quo has been enhanced. Its stake in the existing order is, it is stated in the study, of course, shared by the middle and upper strata of the urban population whose members often own land.
Piecemeal reforms have diminished the prospects for radical reforms in agriculture, "despite the deterioration in the conditions of the poor majority of the rural population" (p. 31). Compare also Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, who, although stressing those characteristics which explain the relative peacefulness of India, does not exclude the possibility that increased polarization will produce "its own antithesis" (p. 409).

27. Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, The Economy of the Transition Period (New York, 1970).

Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, The Concept of Economic Surplus (New York, 1957).

Cf. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. II, where he writes:
The general law is that all expenses of circulation which arise only from a change of form, do not add any value to the commodities. They are merely expenses required for the realization of value or its conversion from one form into the other. The capital, invested in those expenses, including the labour employed by it, belongs to the dead expenses of capitalist production. They must be made out of the surplus product.

28. Ernest Mandel, op. cit., p. 619.

29. Ranjit K. Sau, op. cit. Sau states that the rent extracted from tenants is very high, usually as much as 50%, in some areas even 60 to 65%. He writes further: And what is worse, the rent as a proportion of the produce is higher particularly in those areas where land is irrigated and is more fertile and/or where other developmental activities have been undertaken. Rents in China before the revolution were of the same order. U.N.reports on land reform give similar rents for countries as the Phillippines and Vietnam where rates of interest for loans have been very high. (Mandel, op. cit., p. 474).
In Asian countries only a small percentage of loans is extended by the government and usury prevails.
Although this ruins the peasants, it is a blessing and necessity at the moment they seek it in order to make their family survive.
Unfortunately, increased indebtness results.

30. The increase in ground rents in China, India, and other countries in Asia, has been particularly influenced by the forced return to agriculture of people engaged in industry and handicrafts. This process continues to manifest itself everywhere where modernization enters from outside and local industry is either destroyed by the imposition of free trade, nowadays in more sophisticated forms, or by the industries of the centres which undermine agricultural development instead of supporting it, particularly since monopolistic exchange relations emerge which press for minimization of prices of the products of the peasants while seeking maximum profit on consumer goods. The Taiping Revolution in China in the middle of the 19th century, as well as many other peasant movements, had their origin in the disintegrating and ruining effects on the local economy by the process of modernization.
See Henry McAleavy, The Modern History of China (London, 1967), and The Great Road, the Life and Times of Chu Ten by Agnes Smedly (New York, 1956).
On the exploitation of the peasantry through the emergence of a new class of merchants, moneylenders and absentee landlords in India: Romesh Dutt, "The Economic History of India" (quoted in The Political Economy of Growth by Baran, p. 147) and A.N. Bose, "The Basic Problem of the Indian Metropolis, its Continuing Semi-Colonial Character", The Indian Journal of Regional Science, 1, 1971.

Speculation is a characteristic feature of agricultural modernization; it increases land values and draws capital which may lead to increased concentration of unutilized land which, in turn, facilitates the establishment of monopolistic market conditions.
On the disintegrating and mobilizing effects of external forces on rural society, see further Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York, 1969).

31. The established view of most economists that capitalization through labour is of little significance is based on a correct assesment of potential for capital creation under given circumstances or in the

prevailing context. It tends, however, to overlook the concrete possibilities for capital creation if the immense potential of under-utilized and non-productive labour were released and conditions established, the first being that an equitable part of the surplus produced remains for the producers. Cf. the various evaluations of community development in India (see Asian Drama) with the evaluation of rural capital formation in China.
See: E.L. Wheelwright and Bruce MacFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism, Economics of the Cultural Revolution. An agrarian revolution which eliminates the social foundation for the exploitation of the peasantry (land, rent, exploitative trading, usury and other implications of the predominance of merchant capital) creates conditions for the effective transfer of the actual economic surplus to the rural population, such as happened as a result of the Fanshen movement characterizing the agrarian revolution in China. The opening-up of concrete possibilities for the peasantry to benefit from their new position expresses itself in the degree of willingness to participate in their own organization, to decide about their own production, to be able to obtain basic necessities for reasonable prices, not to be burdened by taxes; in short, to benefit from their increased production and productivity. All these factors depend primarily on the political power achieved by the peasantry during the process of transformation and such other factors as the nature of the government and the degree of urbanization and modernization which exists. We see that in the communes in China the process has evolved in such a way that there are no compulsory deliveries, delivery varies with resource endowment, taxes on produce are fixed, decreased if production for good reasons goes down but do not rise when production increases. There is also a reasonable supply of basic consumer goods and people actually participate in planning the work (Joan Robinson, Chinese Economic Policy, essays in the Modern China series of the Anglo-Chinese Institute in London, October, 1971).
In Russia "the problem of agricultural income was only seriously taken up in 1966 and measures were introduced which amounted to a new agrarian reform" (Jacoby, Man and Land, p. 230). Such differences can only be understood in the context of the concrete historical process of each society, its evolving class structure and corresponding development policy.

32. Mandel, The Economy of the Transition Period, op. cit. It seems to me that the non-productive consumption fund not only includes non-productive consumption but also non-productive investment. The insistence on the exclusive alternative between growth or consumption draws attention away from the actual resources available both for improved conditions of the population and for investment. Ranjit K. Sau (op. cit.) has calculated that if the top urban and rural rich in his country would limit their consumption by 50 percent it would be possible to alleviate poverty in India, meaning presumably the elimination of that poverty which keeps 50% of the urban and 40% of the rural population "below the poverty line" (the minimum required in calories and nutritional values).
The strategic role of productive consumption in development is per-

haps best formulated by Mao Tse Tung when he deliniates both the necessity and feasibility of the simultaneous development of heavy industry and a light industry and agriculture, whereby the latter two meet both the basic needs of the population, provide incentives to it, as well as supply capital for heavy industry. See: "The Great Relationships" in Mao by Jerone Ch'en (New Jersey, 1969).

33. Mandel states: "The poorer the country and the lower the standard of living of their producers, the more the rate of economic growth is a function of the producer's consumption and any decline in the producer's standard of living entails a relative decline in his productivity, apart from the resistance and understandable decline in commitment it implies". (The Economy of the Transition Period, op.cit.)

34. Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, "Lessons of Soviet Experience", in 50 Years of Soviet Power (New York, 1967). Stalin's equation of development with maximization of economic growth apparently implied the emergence of centralist authoritarian rule and the primacy of material incentives, resulting in the increasing stratification of society as well as the depoliticization of the population, at the same time required by it.
The re-emergence of class rule in the Soviet Union was directly related to the rejection of the ideal of equality by Stalin, who called it a "reactionary petty bourgeois absurdity" (Paul M. Sweezy, "Toward a Programme of Studies of the Transition to Socialism", Monthly Review, February, 1972).
The apparent convergence in social science theory between the Western countries and the Soviet Union (or the increasing acceptability in the Soviet Union of "Academic Sociology") expresses a common intrest in the search for a theoretical base for the preservation of the existing order and the maintenance of equilibrium and stability (Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology). Consider, however, also support by Russian social scientists for western critical sociology (versus social science in support of social engineering) which, according to the view expressed, is not able to solve the contradiction between social science and the ethical imperative. This critique hopefully reflects another convergence between social scientists in the Soviet Union and the West (Nina Naúmova, Antinomias Morales de la Sociologia Occidental, Ciencias Sociales, Vol. 1970, Academia de Ciencias de la U.R.S.S.

35. There is a close identity between findings in the highly industrialized countries on the strategic role of increased participation in management by staff and workers in order to increase productivity, and the Chinese reliance on the creativity and productivity of workers in an environment which gives them full opportunity to participate in all the phases of the production process. This view led to the progressive elimination of formal hierarchical relationships in all areas of work and spheres of life in the process of the cultural revolution, due to recognition of the strategic function of productive relations in relation to the expansion of productive forces. However, in spite of the formal identity of interest in the same

orientation, the radical difference lies herein, that if new forms of relationships are being induced in modern management in the free market societies, it is not in order to secure redistribution of the surplus, but to maximize profit.
Thus the introduction of human relations techniques serves the purpose of modernizing dependence. In China however, promotion of new forms of relationships serves to promote the formation of a society of free associated producers who have control over their own lives and work and the products they produce, so that their production and productivity will not turn against them.
The development of democratization in productive relationships is obviously not feasible unless in the context of central planning, based on concrete needs and possibilities of the working communities which constitute society, and the effective participation by these communities in the planning of society through effective regional and provincial decentralization.

Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York, 1961).
The Human Organization (New York, 1967).
William Hinton, Turning Point in China, an essay on the Cultural Revolution (New York, 1972).
John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, April-June 1970.
Joshua Horn, Away with all Pests (New York, 1969).
Jean Daubier, Histoire de la Révolution culturelle prolétarienne en Chine (Paris, 1971).

"La Révolution culturelle a une portée universelle. Les problèmes qu'elle a résolu ne sont pas propres à la Chine. Ce sont deux du monde ouvrier contemporain. La Révolution culturelle constitue aussi un défi général a la conception bourgeoise de la vie, aux societés dites de consommation, au culte de l'argent, à l'elitisme et à l'individualisme. Elle montre que la renaissance du pouvoir bourgeois en URSS n'est pas une fatalité pour les autres pays socialistes et que les valeurs exaltées par l'Occident capitaliste sont historiquement relatives et dépassables." (Préface).
As Roger Garraudy (op.cit.) suggests, the very fact that higher education and creativity are required by the increasing complexity of the productive system, creates people who need more participation in management. For this reason he attributes a particular role to the intellectuals in the process towards transformation, indicating at the same time that the formal distinction between intellectual and other work tends to disappear through the overall rise in specialization.

36. Ibid. Garraudy attempts to explain this increasing subordination as an outcome of the changing nature of the structure of planning which tends to become more and more long term; a process which by itself demands that production is planned with a minimization of risk which, in turn, induces increasing monopolization so as to secure the market. At the same time, attempts to secure the market increase the need for intermediaries to extend and secure the market (public relations, advertising, and other forms of socialization into free market society).

On the need for, and strategies toward, new forms of democratic control in the highly industrialized societies:
André Görz, La Socialisme difficil (Paris, 1967), and Réforme et Révolution (Paris, 1969).

37. Paul A. Baran, The Longer View, essay on the nature of Marxism. While it used to be thought that bourgeois ideology would guard the existing order from man's efforts to satisfy basic human needs - decent livelihood, knowledge, solidarity, cooperation with fellow men, gratification of work and freedom from toil - the actual wants of man in societies of advanced capitalism are determined by aggressive drives, are directed toward the attainment of individual privileges and the exploitation of others, toward frivolous consumption and barren entertainment. With bourgeois taboos and moral injunctions internalized, people steeped in the culture of monopoly capitalism do not want what they need and do not need what they want.

Karl Marx, The Economic and Philisophic Manuscript of 1844 (New York, 1964). His notes on The Meaning of Human Requirements: We have seen what significance, given socialism, the wealth of human needs has, and what significance therefore both a new mode of production and a new object of production have: a new manifestation of the forces of human nature and a new enrichment of human nature. Under private property, their significance is reserved: Every person speculates on creating a new need in another, so as to drive him to sacrifice, to place him in new dependence and to seduce him into a new mode of gratification and therefore economic ruin.
Each tries to establish over the other alien power, so as thereby to find satisfaction of his own selfish need. The increase in the quality of objects is accompanied by an extension of the realm of the alien powers to which man is subjected, and every new product represents a new possibility of mutual swindling and mutual plundering. Man becomes ever poorer as man, his need for money becomes ever greater if he wants to overpower hostile beings. The power of his money declines in inverse proportion to the increase in volume of production: that is, his need grows as the power of the money increases.

38. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (New York, 1964), p. 152

Claude Meillassoux, "From Reproduction to Production, a Marxist Approach to Anthropology" in Economy and Society, I, 1.
Meillassoux argues that population expansion expresses the need for social security, as generated in response to the pressures of the colonial structures (with its disintegrating effects on security).

39. Lucien Goldman, Marxisme et Sciences Humaines; his notes on Conscience réele et conscience possible, conscience adéquate et fausse conscience.

40. Istvan Mészáros, "The Necessity of Social Control" (Isaac Deutch Memoral Lecture at the London School of Economics, January, 1971), p. 12.

41. Michal Kalecki, The Last Phase in the Transformation of Capitalism (New York, 1972); his note on Vietnam and U.S. Big Business.

Gérard Chaliand, "The Peasants of North Vietnam".
This document clarifies how the liberation movement in Vietnam grew out of the resistance movement against repression of the Land Reform, carried out by the legitimate Vietnamese government.
It shows also how, as in China, the Vietnamese government was able to win the confidence of the peasantry and how (the confederation of) the villages, organizing in cooperative units, were able to achieve substantial capitalization and establish a solid agricultural base for overall integrated development.
There is substantial evidence that the peasantry in South Vietnam by and large supported the liberation movement out of fear of losing their rights acquired in the Land Reform and having to return to the past society with its highly exploitative conditions (see among others the essays of J.F. Stone, "Why do we fail as revolutionaries?" in In a Time of Torment, New York, 1966, and "The best guarded secret of the Vietnamese War" in his Weekly, April 1966).

George Alsheimer, Vietnamesische Lehrjahre, Sechs Jahre als Deutscher Artz in Vietnam (Frankfurt am Main, 1968).
The personal history of this German psychiatrist demonstrates how successive authorities in South Vietnam, unsupported by the population, had to rely increasingly on foreign aid and intervention and increasingly recurred to violence instead of effectively realizing basic reforms needed by the rural population, which started to organize itself out of legitimate selfdefense. See also Wolf, Peasant Wars, the chapter on Vietnam (footnote 31.)
Cf. also the contribution by President Richard M. Nixon, "The Real Road to Peace" in U.S. News and World Report, June 26, 1972, in which he writes: "Above all, we have been learning that it is not within our unilateral power to determine the future for these (the developing) countries economically, socially, or politically. We recognize that what is best for us may not necessarily be best for other countries with drastically different histories, traditions and problems; and even more important, we believe in the right of each nation to choose its own system. Thus, however much we cherish our own system, we will not seek to impose it on any other nation."
Compare this statement with another passage in the same contribution where the author cites from his State of the Union Address of January 1972:
"We will act to defend our interests, whenever and wherever they are threatened, any place in the world.
But where our interests or our treaty commitments are not involved, our role will be limited. We will not intervene militarily ..."

42,43. Harry Magdorf, The Age of Imperialism (New York, 1969).

44. Pierre Jalée, The Pillage of the Third World (New York, 1968).

Teresa Hayter , Aid as Imperialism (London, 1971).

Cheryl Payer, "The international monetary fund and the third world", Monthly Review, September 1971.

On the rupture with the world market as a prequisite for (autonomous) self-development: Samir Amin, L'accumulation à l'Echelle mondiale (Introduction).

45. Out of the Speech of the Delegate of the People's Republic of China at the Unctad Conference in Santiago, Peking Review, April 28, 1972.

46. W.F. Wertheim, Evolutie en Revolutie, de Golfslag der Emancipatie (Amsterdam, 1972).

47. Lesley Kolakowsky, Marxisme and Beyond (Oxford, 1971), p. 92.

48. Paul Nizan, Les chiens de garde, les Philosophes et l'Ordre Etabli (Paris, 1960).

49. Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Decolonializing Social Sciences", Human Organization, Winter 1971.

50. Inayatulla, "Towards a Non-Western Development Model", Proceedings of a Seminar on Communication and Change in Developing Countries at the University of Hawai,

Orlando Fals Borda, Ciencia Propria y Colonialismo intellectual (Mexico, 1970).