


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Military Technology in Developing Countries

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CAMBRIDGE • MASSACHUSETTS

C/64-5  
April 15, 1964

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by

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This report was prepared under a contract with the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The judgments expressed in this report are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or any other department or agency of the United States Government.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### Approaching the Problem: The Military in Developing Countries.

Armaments and the underdeveloped world are two preeminent contemporary concerns, and circumstances have drawn attention to the ways in which they interact. Compelling as the nuclear aspect of the armament problem may be, the interest shown by many of the emerging nations in global disarmament negotiations has led to a certain amount of self-searching about the military facts of life. Even as they have urged the great powers to put aside their arms, these countries have found themselves facing urgent security needs at home.

At the same time, whether armed forces are inherited from a colonial past, indigenously generated, or the result of co-optation into the Cold War, they are among the attributes of nation-statehood eagerly sought by young nations. Once established, the military have frequently intervened in the political affairs of their countries. To Americans, this has represented a vexing policy problem and a disturbing departure from the liberal democratic tradition we would like to see embraced by these young nations.

In the resulting search for patterns and doctrine, a distressing, if understandable, gap exists in the literature,<sup>1</sup> for little attention has been given to the current state of the military art in these smaller powers, per se. Their military problems and technology are usually dealt with peripherally, either in the discussions of the political role of the military, or in strategic considerations of Cold War Problems in the so-called "grey areas". In the latter case, the problem is generally viewed in terms of the proximity of these countries to the Communist bloc, and it is only coincidental that they are also underdeveloped.<sup>2</sup> More recently, the geographic focus has broadened

already sizable forces. Even under favorable conditions, in a modern industrial state with high-grade skills and a carefully determined policy, it can take years to effect significant changes in force structure. Although the political and economic constraints that affect large scale mobilizations or demobilizations of manpower may not be the same as in countries with advanced economies, some undoubtedly exist in the underdeveloped countries. The ability of local forces to cope with modern weapons technology and the relationship of that technology to indigenous problems needs to be better understood, as do the means for acquiring such technology.

This is not as simple as knowing whether a five-foot tall Vietnamese can cope with a rifle designed for a six-foot American, or whether an African with a relatively limited education can learn to fly and service a jet fighter--although these are clearly relevant. It also entails the discovery of uses for weapon systems that may never have been considered in their design. Examples are the counter-insurgency uses of napalm, or the use of air traffic control equipment for tactical air control in fighting guerrillas. No small amount of experience has been gained in such problems through the Military Assistance Program (MAP), as well as the efforts of departing colonial powers to provide new nations with security forces. Little of this experience, however, has been set forth and analyzed in the open literature.

Events have served to direct special attention to the roles played by the military in the emerging countries and this thus becomes the third necessary input. In spite of the start that has been made in looking at this problem much of it remains at the broadly theoretical stage. There are no acceptable criteria by which to judge the long-term effects of a military coup on the process of nation-building. Such evidence as has accumulated suggests that the concentration of power and or-

or appear in repeating patterns. Their bearing upon the type and size of individual military establishments must be considered.

The most basic and uniting of these factors is the common task of political and economic development. This may influence the military requirements in a variety of sometimes competing ways. The expense of maintaining a military establishment is a prime reason for holding its size to a minimum. While even the American Secretary of Defense is seeking the best ways of reducing an enormous defense budget, Africans and Latin Americans have pertinently asked themselves "against whom do we arm--ourselves?"<sup>6</sup> (The antagonist's role is unfortunately more easily filled in the case of the Middle East or the Asian perimeter.) The competition for scarce resources is an acute problem in these countries, although they have often found it possible to shift the main burden of supporting their armed forces onto external aid programs, thereby lessening domestic pressures to hold down the levels.

The political elite may regard the military with suspicion as potential competitors for political power, but they often cope with this by integrating the army into their system of control, as Nkrumah has done in Ghana. When the army becomes a part of a mass party system<sup>7</sup> incentives are increased for further recruitment, rather than its diminishment. Costa Rica, on the other hand, successfully abolished its army in 1948 and has succeeded in avoiding the troublesome Latin American problem of military domination since that time.

Pacificist ideological concerns have occasionally shaped policy to minimize the size of the armed forces. India has found, however, that such ideals sometimes have less than practical effect in the real world. It remains too early to tell whether professions of pacific intent will have any real

insurgency problem as a more realistic contribution to hemispheric defense than the old World War II style armies. These changes must, however, be accomplished in the face of different and well-entrenched traditions of military practice. At the same time, the geographical proximity of the vast power of the United States, while causing important political repercussions, represents a factor that is relatively unusable in dealing with regional security problems. Although the Organization of American States is one of the oldest regional organizations and has a history of peace-keeping concerns, its influence upon military policies and levels of armament has hitherto been negligible.

In the much newer nations of Africa, nationalism, potential intra-African conflicts, and other factors are causing increases in the level of the armed forces from initially very low levels. The ability to rely upon metropolitan powers for security assistance may help keep this in hand, but African pride seems to be seeking ways out of this dependence. Failure to find a collective formula, such as in the Organization for African Unity, could well lead to even larger individual military efforts.

The complexity of Middle East politics needs no reiteration to emphasize the severity of the arms problem in this area. Conflicts within the area, both intra-Arab and Arab-Israeli, tend to be expressed as arms races, drawing assistance from any country willing to grant it. Turkey and Iran receive Western support for their military establishments through their involvement in the Cold War. Economic limitations are often the only factors tending to moderate the arms problem in this region.

The perimeter of Asia is most prominently influenced in its security needs by the dominating figure of China and the Cold War. It is also one of the few areas of the underdeveloped world

The security difficulty is compounded in the case of underdeveloped countries by the notorious unreliability of any data which are available. Statistical competence is thinly spread even where records have been kept. Local sensitivities are frequently served by the invention, inflation, or deflation of figures; and statistics about armed forces and defense efforts are particularly sensitive to the service of political needs. These may be the desire to put pressure upon a neighbor, or, conversely, to assume a pacific posture in international politics.

There should thus be few illusions about the accuracy of the available data in detail, but it should adequately provide some feel for the range and dynamics of the problem. Accuracy, reasonability, and consistency have been the general criteria of choice for this paper, but specific reasons for the selection of data and the occasional use of alternative data may be made clear in each case. [See the appendices -- especially the introduction to Appendix II -- for further discussion of technical difficulties associated with the data.] A few inconsistencies or errors may have crept into the tables, too. Hopefully, it will prove possible in the future to improve on the data and methodology used here, and the author would appreciate having any errors brought to his attention.

Finally, it is well to recall the great variety represented by these eighty-odd nations. The diversity of backgrounds, problems, and conditions means that they cannot be forced into a single mold. Although at such policy levels as AID and the Defense Department these diversities have led to increased use of the country approach,<sup>11</sup> a search for doctrine requires the more general approach as well. The body of this paper emphasizes more general considerations while the appendices contain detailed data on each country and region.



efforts are more usefully compared with those of their neighbors, either as potential antagonists, or as countries facing similar internal security problems. To make such comparisons manageable quantitative data are absolutely essential.

#### Security and Mobilized Manpower.

In this study the comparative index of mobilized manpower is expressed in terms of the percentage of the population under arms. Some studies have attempted to refine similar data to the extent of expressing force levels as ratios of certain productive age groups<sup>2</sup> or of the military-aged male population.<sup>3</sup> These efforts have their utility especially when dealing with more developed countries or in seeking to express the economic benefits foregone by using productive manpower for military purposes.<sup>4</sup> In the latter case, however, this refinement implies certain assumptions concerning economic productivity which are not necessarily sustainable. Certainly, devoting skills to the building of armed forces means that these skills will not be available for other developmental tasks, unless, that is, civic action work is made an important military function. But the interaction between the armed forces and the manpower market in less-developed countries is somewhat more complex than this. An army position is often regarded as a relatively secure and well-paying job in a primitive economy. On the other hand, rapid economic development can make it difficult to recruit even minimal force levels without some form of conscription. Presently, young economies are often unable to absorb those whose skills are not specifically related to their needs, and this can put pressures upon the military to absorb these men to prevent idleness leading to agitation. These varying problems make it difficult to compare

days of the Cold War with American aid. Only recently have they seriously been turned toward internal security as a major factor in shaping their characteristics. At the same time a whole new dimension has been added to the internal security problem by the need to deal with new kinds of insurgency movements. Counter-insurgency needs encompass a wide range of responses, depending upon the characteristics and stage of development of the insurgent movement. [See below.]

The other area where armed forces are most likely to be focused on internal security problems is Sub-Saharan Africa. The new African states have not approached stable force levels yet, and indications are of continued and rapid expansion. [See Part III, Resources for Military Efforts, for a discussion of these indications.]

The utility of statistics is affected by which categories are included in them. If internal security is to be examined in detail, the armed forces are not the only group which should be included in the index; one would want to also look at the ratio of the total personnel engaged in maintaining law and order. It would also be desirable to set certain standards of domestic peace as a yardstick against which to measure the effectiveness of these forces; the accepted level of violence in the remoter areas of Colombia would not be viewed as domestic peace and tranquility by many people, yet Colombia is relatively underarmed by general Latin American standards.

It is also possible to view the percentage of the population under arms as an index of perception of external threats. Thus it is not surprising that national rivalries in the Middle East have resulted in high force levels by this index, or that very high levels occur in the case of some Asian states. Using this as an index of threat-perception, however, is not without its difficulties. The United States is by this index a relatively threatened nation, and spends about

teresting finding; for such percentage orientations are seldom explicit in the thinking of defense planners. Moreover, most models of international relations assume that the activities of other states are the main stimulus in determining a nation's security effort. Our data indicates, however, that outside of brief transitional periods during which a country may change its level of effort, these models do not seem to apply to relations among the developing countries. Considering the behavior of the United States and the Soviet Union in this respect may indicate that this is equally true of all countries; for the relationship between their defense efforts, widely assumed to be very closely tied, shows similar stability and independence.

The reasons for these apparent stabilities in levels of defense efforts are not at all clear. They may involve recruiting or training techniques that place constraints upon the percentage of the general population which the armed forces can absorb. They may reflect stable national policies toward public expenditure and investment, either through stable political control (as in a one-party system) or stable national--or bureaucratic--consensus through successive changes of government. In many cases it is hard to tell without more detailed analysis whether a country's behavior represents a choice based upon preference, or one imposed by constraints over which it has no control. The limitations, for example, on the diversion of resources from economic development or from an economy of scarcity to defense, or the trade-off between investments in defense and in development, are little understood at present.

The stability may even be derived from unconscious processes quite unrelated to security considerations, or to fixation upon a figure regarded as an acceptable burden at one time and not varied over years of changing circumstances. The fixation of some Central American powers on certain

Force Requirements.

It is impossible to give an accurate assessment of the actual requirements of the emerging nations for military forces at this time. The variety of individual problems is too great to generalize without being more certain of the categories into which it can be broken for more systematic treatment. Such a schema for treating security threats to developing countries might eventually appear along these lines:\*

1. Direct great power threats (e.g., China to India and Taiwan).
2. Threats by local coalitions or great power proxies (e.g., to Israel, South Korea).
3. Threat of local aggression or border conflict with a single local power (e.g., Indonesia to Malaysia, between Somalia and Ethiopia). /This category would surely spread out of two dimensions: the size of the powers involved, and the degree of external aid./
4. Externally aided insurgencies--especially "Wars of National Liberation," i.e., Communist-aided (e.g., in South Vietnam, Venezuela, and some aspects of the Congo /LpvI/).
5. Indigenous insurgencies (e.g., in Colombia, Iraq). /These often include some element of Type 4./
6. Sporadic outbreaks of violence and rioting (e.g., as in Uganda, Tanganyika, Panama). /This is often an early stage of an insurgency problem./
7. Ordinary police functions.

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\*A more rigorous treatment of this typology used to classify the data available in Appendix II might provide some firmer indicators on security requirements. The methodological problem is a formidable one, however.

picture is important to keep in mind in the consideration of any attempts to control the armament problem in underdeveloped areas by formal means, for such efforts would have great impact on current policy programs attempting to deal with the insurgency problem. The "Special Group", established to survey American policies relating to CI, regards the entire globe as being within the area to be considered. A number of so-called "Internal Defense Plans"(IDPs) have been drawn up for various countries with current or latent insurgency problems and more are under way. The probability of continued nuclear stability between the United States and the Soviet Union means that CI operations will represent a growing portion of United States and Western operations in the Cold War. Whether Soviet- or Chinese-sponsored, insurgency is certain to become a major disrupting problem in coming years.<sup>10</sup>

It is generally recognized that the CI problem is not susceptible to a purely military solution, but even the military means required to deal with it remain unclear. Estimates of the superiority required for coping with an advanced insurgency, such as that in Vietnam, range from about 9 to 1 to 16 to 1.<sup>11</sup> Great emphasis is now being put on dealing with the problem before it gets well started, and police, intelligence, and communications systems receive special attention.

To summarize, the lack of consensus on the manpower needed for CI operations, the range of statistical evidence available, and the wide range of security threats which exist, point up the difficulties of establishing firm prescriptive manpower levels needed for security, both external and internal, in the underdeveloped areas. Lacking institutionalized facilities, such as a UN Peace Force, to assist them in dealing with at least some of these security problems, each

nations as they do in advanced countries, if not more. Particularly in countries where the armed forces comprise an active part of the political and governmental processes, as in Indonesia, Burma, Algeria and the like,<sup>12</sup> explanations for changes in policies and in the indices presented in this paper may be found that are unrelated to the usual concepts of national security.

One curious example of such effects is suggested, although in need of confirmation, by the case of Dahomey, where the armed forces decreased by 200 men (one-fifth) according to our data between 1963 and 1964, contrary to the previous upward trend. This change followed a November, 1963, coup by the military in that country, and one may suggest that the decrease may have been caused by the transfer of military men to civilian positions of authority. There are, of course, two ways in which a military coup could have effect on the number of men in the armed forces: the number will rise if the military choose to incorporate the civilian bureaucrats into their organization, and go down if the military choose to become civilian bureaucrats themselves. Subtler effects seem more likely, however, such as increased recruitment authorization, or a higher defense budget.

Political considerations such as this are equally demanding of attention in any comprehensive attempt to treat military problems in these countries.

budget, about \$9 million, to that country in aid.<sup>2</sup> Thus the budgetary data represents an indicator of the burden of the defense effort on the Malagasy economy, but it does not reflect the size of the military effort. In other cases a trade-off occurs where substantial economic aid permits a country to divert more of its own resources to military effort than would otherwise be possible.

In spite of the difficulties associated with budgetary data in the developing countries, some calculations involving defense budget figures produce very interesting results. Appendices I and II in this study present statistics on Defense Expenditures as a percent of the Gross National Product, and Appendix III on defense expenditure per capita of population, and per member of the armed forces.

#### Level of Defense Expenditure

Annual defense expenditure as a percentage of the Gross National Product is probably the best figure to use as an aggregate index for comparative purposes. This should be particularly true in these countries where the total amount of economic resources available is relatively small and allocation problems very difficult and competitive. A case can be made for the percentage of the national budget as an index of the government's attention to security matters, since the total budget represents the resources available to the government. However, widely different practices exist depending upon the role which the government plays in the economic life of the society, as in the case of socialist or mixed economies, and so the percentage of the national budget is not a useful comparative index.

Forces as percent of Population and defense Budget as per cent of GNP. It is quite clear, for example, that India is in an arms race with China--not Pakistan; for the real shift in the level of India's military effort has come since the border hostilities with the Chinese. In terms of absolute numbers, of course, the efforts of Israel and Egypt particularly represent significant levels of armament, if not direct interaction on this basis. The quite high involvement of defense activities in these areas also indicates that economic consequences of some magnitude would attach to any attempts to control their armaments.

Defense Expenditure per Capita.

For some reason this is a very popular statistic in comparisons of defense efforts.<sup>4</sup> In most cases, however, it is not particularly helpful unless it can be compared with some index of the economic resources available (on the average) to the members of a society: i.e., the GNP per capita. In terms of dollars and cents this has the advantage of painting very starkly the slice which each person's share of the defense effort takes out of the very small GNP per capita which characterize the underdeveloped economy. As a percentage, of course, the population cancels out, giving our previous indicator: Defense Expenditure as Percent GNP.\*

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\*The mathematics involved are as follows:

$$\frac{\text{Def. Bud.}}{\text{Population}} \times \frac{\text{GNP}}{\text{Pop.}} \times 100 = \frac{\text{D.B.}}{\text{Pop.}} \times \frac{\text{Pop.}}{\text{GNP}} \times 100 = \frac{\text{D.B.}}{\text{GNP}} \times 100 = \text{Defense Budget as \% GNP.}$$



The results of this calculation appear to have exceeded expectations. Not only does this index appear to provide a good indicator on the average of well-versus-poorly equipped armed forces, but it indicates periods of re-equipment and intentions regarding expansion.

Details of equipment are very sketchy for the developing countries, but a good example of a country which has engaged in expensive equipment programs is Venezuela, which has one of the best air forces in Latin America. Probably as a consequence of this program, (for air equipment is a very expensive commodity), Venezuela emerges at the top of the Latin American rank orders on the basis of this variable, outdistancing Colombia, the next highest, by a factor of two.

An example of a re-equipment phase is shown by the Australian case (included in Appendix II for comparative purposes rather than as an underdeveloped country). Australia's defense forces are now going into a period of re-equipment including the projected purchase of American F-111 fighter-bombers (TFXs). The financing for this purchase includes some immediate payments. For this and other reasons, the latest data on Australian defense budgets indicates a jump of about \$700 in the DX/AF figure.

The most interesting result of all, however, is shown by the remarkable difference between the regional averages for Latin America, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, on the one hand, and that for Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter is \$2805 per military man, while the others are: Latin America, \$1701; North Africa, \$1582; the Middle East, \$1889; and Asia, \$1304. This disparity of at least 50% above the next highest region is remarkable for an area where manpower probably comes as cheaply as anywhere else in the world.

#### IV. THE DIFFUSION OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY.

##### Local Capabilities.

The high price which African states appear to be paying in order to provide an equipment base for their armed forces is indicative of an important factor in the military programs of the underdeveloped world. Because the emerging nations lack an industrial base, few of them are capable of sustaining their military equipment needs without resort to outside suppliers. Although this means that the character of their military efforts will be very sensitive to the kinds of armament made available to them by such suppliers, some local capabilities do in fact exist and must be taken into account. Differing levels of economic development mean that these local capabilities, although generally small, can be of some significance.

Information on local arms industries is not readily available, but there are known to exist numerous small arms and ammunition plants in countries such as Nigeria and even Afghanistan.<sup>1</sup> More advanced facilities including aircraft assembly and repair plants are available in India, Argentina and Egypt. The latter country has been developing its aeronautics capability with the assistance of European technicians, with Nasser already in a position to make sales of military aircraft to a few states:<sup>2</sup> locally produced rockets have been prominently displayed during parades celebrating the revolution and the U.A.R. claims to have built a submarine with local capabilities.<sup>3</sup> India's Hindustan Aircraft Industries is capable of assembling foreign airframes and of

American capabilities, on the other hand, are the concomitant of a mature economy.<sup>5</sup>

Even among the developed countries it is an expensive and difficult procedure to attempt a detailed local ordnance capability. The British aircraft industry is having trouble maintaining momentum; while laboriously developed local aeronautics capabilities in Australia and Canada are nearly moribund, placing these countries in a partial client-state relationship with the United States in filling their military aircraft needs. This does not neutralize the potential nuisance of Nasser's air industry, but it does mean that even the widespread local small-arms factories are of less significance in the armament situation in underdeveloped countries than the possibilities of externally-procured weapons.

These local capabilities are roughly summarized in the tables in Appendix I. The four-unit scale used for this purpose is qualitative rather than quantitative; i.e., it gives no estimate of the magnitude to which these capabilities could be developed, only the degree of sophistication. Due to the lack of available information it is a very rough estimate and in need of much refinement.

#### The Client State and the Obsolescence of Great Power Equipment.

If the underdeveloped countries must turn to external sources for most of their arms, the question arises, of their ability to absorb and cope with the technology entailed. The skills required to deal with many modern weapons systems are derived from industrial society, a type of society which does not exist in most of these nations. The state of a country's economic

models. When a threat becomes evident, any added resources made available tend to be used to perfect this model rather than to deal with the threat.<sup>7</sup>

The demands upon technical competence are closely related to the problem of availability. The ordnance catalogues of both East and West are filled with sophisticated machinery of destruction. Some of this is available on a current basis, while some is available as it becomes obsolete in the great power arms race. Such availability, however, is subject to a variety of factors and can easily be over-rated. Although even small numbers of modern weapons systems can represent large increments of power to most countries in the world, few, if any, of these systems are sold on the open market.

Some Soviet aid practices have led to great concern that the underdeveloped world may eventually be flooded with weapons of considerable sophistication that nonetheless are becoming obsolete in the arsenals of the super-powers. Indonesia has acquired Soviet light and medium bombers and a cruiser with capabilities which only ten years ago very much piqued the curiosity of the Royal Navy.\* In some instances, even the most modern weapon systems available were delivered to developing countries. For example, deliveries of MiG-21 aircraft to India have occurred before all Soviet forces were re-equipped with this plane.

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\*The Indonesian cruiser "Irian" is believed to be the former Soviet "Ordzhonikidze," which brought Khrushchev and Bulganin to the United Kingdom in 1954. The transverse propulsion feature of this ship, which allowed it to "park" at dockside without any assistance was the supposed item of interest behind the ill-fated night diving expedition of Commander Crabbe.

Most of this material, however, is under the control of governments, and in the case of the West its dissemination is likely to be based upon political considerations often focussed on the stabilization of an area. Private concerns are not entirely at liberty to survey arms to all comers, as embargoes on arms to South Africa illustrate.<sup>9</sup>

### The Arms Traffic.<sup>10</sup>

The hardware diffusion problem thus relates to two aspects of the arms traffic: government aid and sales policies, and that of private or covert sources. Both are subject to a high degree of control by governments, being almost inseparable in the case of most Western industrial countries. Governments' licensing procedures and participation in the armaments industry (which is often a government monopoly) give them an effective voice in determining who is given access to most developments in weapons technology. Besides government monopolies, export licenses must be obtained for most large shipments of arms. In the case of very large items, such as ships, governments have a monopoly on the supply of those available due to obsolescence, while new building is subject to obvious constraints, including the economic factor of expense.

Underdeveloped countries typically receive most of their arms through aid programs negotiated with principal supplier nations--the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. Other powers capable of producing and supplying arms include Belgium, West Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, Israel, Canada and Australia. The ability of Communist China to be a major supplier is somewhat problematical, although China has been

"barons", such as Col. Julian, "The Black Eagle of Harlem," who turned up in Haiti<sup>11</sup> while the Duvalier regime was facing a period of instability.

In terms of security, these weapons are the tools of the insurgent. It has been suggested, for example, that the Latin American insurgent is able to get a much better product for his purpose by writing away to a Chicago mail order house than by relying upon covert shipments of Soviet bloc weapons. Such clandestine supply lines require no export license and appear to be able to slip through the customs arrangements either openly or by devious means.<sup>12</sup>

In sum, then, the dissemination of most non-nuclear weapons technology is largely subject to factors affecting overall inter-governmental relations among nations, but at the lower end of the arms scale the influx of weapons is highly sensitive to the effectiveness of a national government's control over the routes of ingress. For both types of situations, however, the war potential of developing countries is dependent upon client-state relationships. These relationships are currently taking on the characteristics of a chain, with such aid-receiving states as Algeria and Cuba becoming middle-men and themselves giving assistance to other countries. This may increase the restraints on aid donors, representing as it does a loss of control over the equipment turned over to these states. The aid given by both the United States and the Soviet Union is affected in this respect by security considerations, while the United States has also placed restrictions on the political usage of some of the equipment it gives away--i.e., to be used against external aggression only--although the restriction may, in practice, be difficult to enforce.

can city would be very great, but American society would be able to continue with only minimum effects. A selectively located nuclear explosion in Addis Ababa or Caracas, on the other hand, could very effectively decapitate Ethiopian or Venezuelan society.

Very small nuclear development programs can therefore take on greater significance in the underdeveloped world than in great power relations. Nevertheless, the "buy-in" price of even a very limited program is estimated to be very high and the technology requires outside assistance in the case of most developing countries.<sup>13</sup> Through this necessity most countries are subjected to the bi-lateral controls which generally attach to nuclear reactor programs aided by the nuclear powers. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) theoretically has certain regulatory powers over material in its charge, but many of the underdeveloped countries have resisted undertaking these obligations as long as the great powers were unwilling to subject themselves to similar controls. As a consequence, bilateral arrangements are the common pattern, and the IAEA initially found its major role to be one of serving as a depository for information on nuclear energy.<sup>14</sup>

Only two of the countries included in this study are regarded by a recent study of the problem of diffusion as having significant nuclear potential: India and Israel. Both are regarded as being in the process of creating the option of acquiring nuclear weapons on their own by developing their nuclear establishments to the degree where this option can be exercised at any time with a minimum of delay.<sup>15</sup> More recently there have been reports of Egyptian efforts to produce a nuclear contamination weapon.<sup>16</sup> Otherwise most nuclear programs in the underdeveloped

regarding a nuclear capability as feasible and worth their while have refused, while the option to withdraw from the treaty is always open to signers for reasons of compelling national security. Response to a Swedish proposal for a "non-atom club" elicited results of only fifty percent of U.N. members in favor of this type of commitment.<sup>18</sup>

The generally very low nuclear potentialities of the developing countries have been summarized in Appendix I on a four point scale. None of them is currently listed as having reached the highest grade (3) of actually engaging in a weapons program, although persistent rumors would put both Israel and Egypt in that category.



Vietnam is eloquent testimony of the persistence of the problem.<sup>1</sup> On the basis of our data, however, it does not appear that any solid consensus on actual security requirements has yet emerged, although more certain results may emerge from subsequent analysis. What does appear to be of interest, however, is the tenacity with which these countries pursue certain fixed levels of expenditure and armament once these have been determined upon. These levels vary greatly from country to country, but the reasons for the selection of given levels seem worth pursuing in further research. Among the younger nations of Africa, which are still apparently in the process of selecting appropriate levels for themselves, the key question is whether they are likely to act on the conviction of some observers that they ought to keep their force levels small, supplementing them with outside help when necessary.<sup>2</sup>

Arms control represents one framework within which the armament and security problems of these countries might be resolved. However, the wide range of security programs among the developing countries suggests that a consensus on arms control measures may be harder to reach than public pronouncements by their governments would indicate. It has been easy to be pro-disarmament in negotiations emphasizing great power armaments. But serious attempts to apply arms control measures to themselves will require a long period of discussion and thought to draw together the disparate perceptions of security needs among the developing countries. Attempting less than global approaches to the arms problem, such as dealing with arms control on a regional basis, might enhance the prospects for reaching such consensus.

interests of the great powers, and so some aspects of arms control in the developing areas must be taken up by the larger powers. But where the super-powers once thought of limiting the area of conflict, they now seek other means of competition in these areas, feeling that the nuclear balance is currently fairly stable. Competition between East and West results in very different views of the security needs of the new nations, and the importance of "Wars of National Liberation" in the Sino-Soviet rivalry is a complicating factor. Thus, limited approaches again seem most promising.

All these difficulties notwithstanding, it remains possible that certain arms control arrangements can be usefully applied to the developing areas. These measures should attempt to use the arms control framework to bring three aspects of the military situation in these countries into viable relationships. If current capabilities, security requirements, and the role of military groups in these societies can be effectively integrated into an arms control approach, a real contribution may be made to the difficult developmental process which the emerging nations are undergoing.

The data collected for this study needs to be refined and extended, both by going further back than the decade spanned by this research effort and by up-dating the material. The data also need further rigorous analysis in order to check out some of the tentative findings they suggest concerning security efforts and the inter-action between nations.

## FOOTNOTES

### I Introduction.

1. Books such as John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), and Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Harper and Row, 1959) all focus upon the role played by the military in the political life of these countries.
2. See, for example, Amos A. Jordan, Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), and Gene M. Lyons, Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).
3. Guy J. Pauker, "Southeast Asia as a Problem Area in the Next Decade," World Politics, Vol. XI, No. 3, April 1959, pp. 325-345.
4. New York Times, March 19, 20, 1964.
5. See Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in Johnson, op. cit., pp. 69-73, and Janowitz, op. cit., Introduction and Chapter 1.
6. An interesting parallel can be noted in the words of former Colombian President, Eduardo Santos, "Against whom are we Latin Americans arming ourselves? Why are our countries ruining themselves buying arms which they will never use? . . ." (quoted in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and Reduction of Armaments, Final Report and Annexes, October 13, 1958, p. 328.) and Nigerian Chief Obafemi Awolowo, "Whom are we arming against, ourselves or our neighbors? . . . At the moment, we have no need for considerably enlarged armed forces . . ." (quoted in William Gutteridge, Armed Forces in New States, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 31.)
7. Janowitz presents a typology of civil-military models using five different types of relationships which may emerge: authoritarian-personal; authoritarian-mass party; democratic-competitive; civilian-military coalition; and military oligarchy. Op. cit., pp. 6-8, 10, 11.

10. See, for example, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's statement (pp. 111, 187), and Dr. Harold Brown's statement (pp. 379-84) in U.S. Senate, Committee on Appropriations and Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authorizations, Fiscal Year 1965. Hearings, February, 1964. Also, Rostow in The West Point Conference..., op. cit., pp. 5-12.

11. Depending upon the types of forces counted, 9 or 10 to 1 was the rough ratio of superiority in Algeria and Malaya (see A. H. Peterson et al., (eds.) Symposium on the Role of Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, Memorandum RM-3651-PR, Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, July 1963, p. 12), while 16-1 is a working number for the Vietnamese case (see William H. Hessler, "Southeast Asia in Ferment" in Frank Uhlig, Jr. /ed./, Naval Review, Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1963, pp. 98-123).

12. See Janowitz's classifications, op. cit., pp. 6-8, 10-11.

### III. Resources for Military Efforts.

1. Africa--1964, No. 3 (February 7, 1964), pp. 3-4; New York Times, January 25-28, 1964. The cases are Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika.

2. Africa Report, January 1964, p. 13.

3. An average based upon data for 1962 in the I.S.S., The Military Balance, 1963-1964, op. cit., p. 32.

4. See, for example, ibid., p. 33.

5. Based on a figure of \$240 million from July, 1960, through June, 1962. Africa Report, op. cit., p. 8.

6. Africa Report, loc. cit.

### IV. The Diffusion of Military Technology.

1. Africa Report, January 1964, p. 15; S. H. Steinberg (ed.), The Statesman's Yearbook: 1960-61 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1960), p. 795.

2. Africa Report, op. cit., pp. 19, 21.

Editorial Comment: "The Development of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy," American Journal of International Law, April 1960.

15. See Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., esp., pp. 136-50, 168-81, 189.
16. New York Times, April 13, 1963; see also Leonard Beaton, "Poor Man's Nuclear War?" Survival, July-August, 1964, pp. 166-69.
17. Beaton and Maddox, op. cit., p. 203.
18. New York Times, September 12, 1962.

#### V. Summary and Conclusions

1. See The West Point Conference. . ., op. cit., p. 16.
2. See, for example, Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 2.
3. New York Times, February 13, 1964.

APPENDIX I

Summary of Current Military Capabilities in Developing Countries

## INTRODUCTION

This appendix summarizes the most current available data on military capabilities in eighty-four developing countries. The countries are listed alphabetically under five regional groupings. Unless otherwise noted, the data is the most recent available for the 1962-1964 period. For material covering a number of consecutive years, see Appendix II.

\* \* \*

### General Notes

Armed Forces: Where a country is known to have naval or air force capabilities but no specifics are available, the sign # appears in the appropriate column. Particularly in the case of new African states, this may imply that that branch is just being organized or exists only in a small support capability. Where no information is available a blank space appears in the tables. An "E" following a number indicates that it is the author's estimate. % Pop'n indicates the percentage of the population in the regular armed forces.

Police: An estimate of police and other security forces than the military. Parentheses indicate that a figure is partial, while a plus sign (+) means that the true number is slightly higher than the one given, but not sufficiently to term the number partial.

Defense Budget: Current Def. Bud. (in M US \$) = Estimate of current defense budget in millions of US dollars. % of GNP = Percentage of GNP devoted to defense expenditure.

Munitions Manufacturing Capability: This column gives a rough estimate of the indigenous munitions manufacturing capability in these countries. It is done on a four unit scale as follows:

- 0 = No capability
- 1 = Manufacture and repair of simple small arms and ammunition
- 2 = Manufacture of small arms and assembly and repair of larger weapons
- 3 = Assembly and/or manufacture of heavy weapons and/or aircraft

from Leonard Beaton and John Maddox The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 185-200. The reactor data is largely as of 1960 [See source notes below.]

Major Defense Ties: Country has defense arrangements with the following organizations or countries:

1. NATO
2. OAS (Organization of American States)
3. CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)
4. SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)
5. Union Africaine et Malgache
6. Equatorial Defense Council (France, Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo [Bzvl.], Chad)
7. Arab League
8. United States
9. United Kingdom (and Commonwealth)
10. France (and Communauté)

Sources: Sources for these data are largely the same as for Appendix II (see Appendix II, pp. 6-8). In addition, material was used from:

Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

Christoph Hohenemser, "The Nth Country Problem Today" in Seymour Melman (ed.)

Disarmament: Its Politics and Economics (Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1962).

For special notes, see page following each regional table.



LATIN AMERICA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Current Def. Bud. in M US \$</u>	<u>% of GNP</u>	<u>Local Mun. Mfg. Cap.</u>	<u>Aid Sources</u>	<u>U.S. Aid</u>	<u>Nuclear Potential</u>	<u>Defense Ties</u>
Argentina	193.4	1.82%	3	1	48	1	2
Bolivia	5.0	1.38	2(1)	1	8	0	2
Brazil	214.7	1.53	3	1	231	1(2)	2
Chile	148.0	3.05	3	1	76	0	2
Colombia	37.9	.68	2	1	60	0	2
Costa Rica	2.5	.48	2(1?)	1	1	0	2
Cuba	221.0	7.68	2	3	11	0	
Dominican Rep.	23.1	3.20(1961)	2(1?)	1	11	0	2
Ecuador	23.3	2.31	2(1?)	1	34	0	2
El Salvador	6.2	1.13(1961)	2(0)	1	3	0	2
Guatemala	8.9	1.20	2(1)	1	7	0	2
Haiti	6.3	1.48	1(0)	1	6	0	2
Honduras	3.8	.93	1(0)	1	5	0	2
Jamaica	0.1	.07	1(0)		None	0	9
Mexico	105.6	.86	3(2)	1	6	0	2
Nicaragua	4.2	1.30(1961)	2(1?)	1	5	0	2
Panama	1.0	.27(1959)	2(1?)	1	1	0	2
Paraguay	6.6	3.04	1	1	2	0	2
Peru	45.5	3.17(1959)	2(1)	1	97	0	2
Trinidad & Tobago	0.9	.23(1959)	1(0)		None	0	9
Uruguay	12.6	1.02(1960)	3(1)	1	30	0	2
Venezuela	133.7	1.66	3(1)	1	64	1	2

AFRICA

## Armed Forces

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total A. Forces</u>	<u>% Pop'n</u>	<u>Police</u>
Burundi	800	None		800	0.03	850
Cameroun	2,700	#	#	2,700	0.06	5,900
C.A.R	500	None		500	0.04	1,450
Chad	400	None		400	0.01	1,950
Congo (Bzvl)	700			700	0.08	500
Congo (Lpvl)	35,000	#	#	35,000	0.23	15,000
Dahomey	800	#		800	0.03	1,700
Ethiopia	29,000	650	350	30,000	0.19	30,000
Gabon	600	#	#	600	0.13	900
Ghana	7,500	200E	300E	8,000	0.11	9,000
Guinea	5,000	#	#	5,000	0.15	3,300
Ivory Coast	4,000	#		4,000	0.11	2,280
Kenya	2,650	#		2,650	0.03	11,500
Liberia	3,580	80	#	3,660	0.27	700
Malagasy	2,600	#	#	2,600	0.04	5,900
Mali	3,100	#		3,100	0.07	1,250
Mauritania	500		#	500	0.06	400
Niger	1,200			1,200	0.04	1,500
Nigeria	7,100	850	50	8,000	0.02	23,000
Rhodesia & Nyasaland	7,800	None	1,050	8,850	0.09	15,000
Rwanda	900	None		900	0.03	650
Senegal	2,500	#	#	2,500	0.08	4,000
Sierra Leone	1,850	#		1,850	0.07	2,000
Somalia	6,000	#	#	6,000	0.27	4,800
South Africa	19,000	2,000	4,000	25,000	0.15	29,646
Sudan	11,000	#	#	11,000	0.09	10,000
Tanganyika	1,350		#	1,350	0.01	5,000
Togo	1,000	#		1,000	0.06	280
Uganda	1,000			1,000	0.01	5,500
Upper Volta	1,000			1,000	0.02	1,335
Zanzibar & Pemba	250			250		

Regional Total

170,910

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICASpecial Notes

Congo (Lpvl): These figures do not include the U.N. Peace Force, which was 20,000 at its peak.

Rwanda: The per cent GNP figure is an estimate based on combined data from Rwanda and Burundi (See Appendix II).

South Africa: South Africa's 25,000-man regular force does not give a very accurate picture of the military situation in that country, since there are numerous other forces in several categories. There is also a 60,000 Citizen Force, roughly comparable to the U. S. reserve forces, and another 60-80,000 "Kommandoes" which are a mixture of reserves, a national guard and vigilantes. It is estimated that 145,000 men will be under varying degrees of arms by the end of 1964. (See the New York Times, March 26, 1964).

Tanganyika: The development of an air force is anticipated.

Rhodesia and Nyasaland:

Figures included in the table represent the situation prior to the break-up of the Federation. Following the break-up, the distribution is estimated as follows:

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Police</u>
Southern Rhodesia	3400	900	5000
Northern Rhodesia	2932	150	7000
Nyasaland	1500		3000

NORTH AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

<u>Country</u>	<u>Current Def. Bud. in M US \$</u>	<u>% of GNP</u>	<u>Local Mun. Mfg. Cap.</u>	<u>Aid Sources</u>	<u>U.S. Aid</u>	<u>Nuclear Potential</u>	<u>Defense Ties</u>
<u>North Africa</u>							
Algeria	98.0	4.22	1	3,4,17	None	0	7
Libya	14.0	14.43	0	1,2,5,16,20	7	0	7,9
Morocco	93.0	4.28	1	1,3,4	C	0	7
Tunisia	11.4	1.46	1(0)	1,2,4	C	0	7
<u>Middle East</u>							
Cyprus	1.2	.52	1(0?)	2	None	0	9
Iran	170.0	6.22	2(1)	1	633	1	3,8
Iraq	121.6	8.14	2(1)	1,2,3	46	0	7
Israel	193.3	6.75	3(2)	1,4,5	5	2(1*,1=2)	7
Jordan	59.1	21.03	1	1,2	30	0	7
Kuwait	33.6	4.53	0	2	None	0	7
Lebanon	21.7	3.49	2(0)	1,2	9	0	7
Saudi Arabia	150.0	14.19(1958)	1(0)	1	C	0	7
Syria	68.3	8.91	2(1?)	1,3	*	0	7
Turkey	235.0	1.08	3	1,2	2,403	1	1,3,8
U.A.R.(Egypt)	317.3	7.67	3	3	None	1	7
Yemen			1(0)	1,3,6,17	*	0	7

ASIA

## Armed Forces

<u>Country</u>	<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Total A. Forces</u>	<u>% Pop'n</u>	<u>Police</u>
Afghanistan	90,000	None	#	90,000	0.64	21,000
Burma	60,000	3,000	900	63,900	0.27	
Cambodia	28,800	1,200	#	30,000	0.50	
Ceylon	5,300	1,980	1,600	8,880	0.08	9,267
China (Taiwan)	400,000	62,000	82,000	544,000	4.65	
India	550,000	16,000	18,000	584,000	0.13	504,016
Indonesia	350,000	26,000	20,000	396,000	0.40	
Japan	171,500	34,000	44,000	249,500	0.26	
Korea (South)	570,000	42,000	15,000	627,000	2.31	
Laos				80,000	4.15	
Malaysia	6,900	1,000E	100E	8,000	0.11	28,500
Nepal	9,000	None		9,000	0.09	
Pakistan	230,000	7,700	15,000	252,700	0.26	
Philippines	20,000	4,000	6,000	30,000	0.10	
Thailand	90,000	22,000	22,000	134,000	0.46	
Vietnam (South)	201,000	10,000	5,000	216,000	1.42	
Regional Total				3,322,980		

ASIA

Special Notes

Ceylon: Police figure is for 1960.

India: India's armed forces are currently undergoing expansion and re-equipment. A five-year development plan anticipates the addition of six mountain divisions. (New York Times, March 24, 1964).

Police figure is for 1960.

Japan: Japan is included in this study primarily because of its geographical position, filling out the Asian periphery. It is not an underdeveloped country, although it has some characteristics of a developing country.

Laos: The 80,000 men under arms in Laos are estimated to be divided as follows:

50,000	Nationalist (Rightist)
20,000	Pathet Lao
10,000	Neutralist

Malaysia: Indonesian pressures on the new Federation are causing an increase in the armed forces, with a conscription program anticipated. New York Times, February 27, 1964.

Police figure is for 1959 and for the Federation of Malaya only.

APPENDIX II

Defense Statistics on Developing Countries: 1955-1965

## INTRODUCTION

The following tables provide a detailed set of statistical material and analysis on defense data for eighty-four less-developed nations during the period from 1955-1965. The tables are arranged alphabetically, and are preceded by summaries by region (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia) of some of the averages derived in the analysis. Each country table contains special footnotes to clarify the material in it, especially where some estimates deviate markedly from those selected for inclusion in the table. Some general comments on the reading and usage of the tables follow. More specific analysis will be found in the body of the paper.

The annual (upper) portion of a country table is divided into two parts containing the following categories:<sup>1</sup>

POP(TH)	=	Population, in thousands of persons.
A. FORCES	=	Armed Forces (total), in thousands of servicemen. <sup>2</sup>
PERCENT	=	Armed Forces expressed as a percentage of the total population.
DX/AF	=	Defense Expenditure per member of the Armed Forces, in U.S. dollars.
GNP(TH\$)	=	Gross National Product, in thousands of U.S. dollars.

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<sup>1</sup>A schematic representation of the labelling scheme may be found before the first country table (Afghanistan).

<sup>2</sup>Insofar as possible, these figures designate only the number of the true armed forces, and not of any police or paramilitary groups. The distinctions between these two categories are sometimes very fine, and separate figures are not always available. Data known to combine the categories was excluded from the calculations and is footnoted by country.



were made only where closeness of years or the consensus of other data made them seem reasonable, and they are indicated by a preceding minus (-) sign. The same sign precedes other figures in the annual portion of the table derived from such estimates. Interpolations were made only in the case of Armed forces--not in Defense Budgets, and minus signs have this significance only in the annual portion of the tables--not below among the averages.

A major purpose of this program was to give some picture of the thrust of developments over time; however, some qualifications must be made concerning continuity. Several different sources are generally involved in any series of data on a given country over the years covered by the analysis. This is because attributable figures have been used for any year for which such figures could be found that did not seem unreasonable in view of other available data. (In case of differing estimates, the most realistic figure was included in the program, and the other estimates are mentioned in the notes appearing at the bottom of the table, providing there was no other reason for discarding the datum.) This consensus criterion of selection does not mean, however, that the methods and accuracy of different sources are precisely comparable. Fluctuations in defense budget and armed forces figures over time may therefore represent slight methodological differences between sources rather than changes in a country's situation or policies. These effects should be small and have little effect upon the overall analysis.

By taking the analysis over a constant period of eleven given years a problem arises in dealing with major discontinuities in national policies. A sudden radical change in the level of

that the forces or budget increased  $10\frac{1}{2}\%$  in any given year, although that may be a good approximation.

The caveat concerning small samples is especially applicable to this calculation. Where there are few consecutive years of data to provide differences, one significant change in policy can produce a disproportionate effect in this figure. For example, there are four years of data on defense budgets in Paraguay, but only two of these are consecutive. The difference between these two figures happens to represent over 50% of the average of the four budgets. Over the six years between the first and last figures, however, the budget increased only a bit more than 100%. Averaged over the six years, the difference between the first and last figures represents only 11.4% of the average budget. (This would be an alternative way to indicate changes in the eleven- or less-year period, but it would be very sensitive to the characteristics of the first and last years of data [whether they happened to be high years or low years]. It would say nothing about fluctuations between the first and last years, which may be very significant in terms of the trend.) The number of differences (one less than the number of consecutive years' data) involved is indicated in the regional summary tables (See below, page 9.) and the reader is advised to regard the increase/decrease index for any given country accordingly.

In any event, these indices are best treated as a comparative statistic rather than attempting to attribute any absolute interpretation to them in the case of any one country. It is thereby particularly noteworthy that the vast majority of these indices are positive numbers and, in many cases, relatively large positive numbers, the implication being that defense efforts absorb

Armed Forces Data:

Africa Report, January, 1964, pp. 4-21. (Entire issue on "The Armies of Africa")

Victor Alba, "The Stages of Militarism in Latin America," in J.J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).

Raymond V.B. Blackman, (ed.), Jane's fighting Ships: 1962-63. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962).

Britannica Book of the Year--1958 (--1963). Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1958-1963).

Current Periodicals, especially, The New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, Africa 1963, and 1964, etc.

Manfred Halpern, "Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class" in J.J. Johnson, op. cit. (These figures tend to seem high and were generally excluded from the final calculations.)

Institute for Strategic Studies, The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliance: The Military Balance, 1962-1963, and The Military Balance: 1963-1964. (London: I.S.S., 1962 and 1963).

International Affairs (Moscow), "Readers' Questions Answered: The Armed Forces of the Latin American Countries," January 1964 (No. 1), pp. 103-105.

Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). (These figures deviated widely -- both high and low--from other figures in many cases and were seldom included in the final calculations.)

Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America. (New York: Harper and Row for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1959).

S.H. Steinberg (ed.), The Statesman's Yearbook: 1962-63 (and others). (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962 and others).

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and reduction of Armaments, Final Report and Annexes, August, 1958.

Regional Summaries of Data

The following pages summarize the averages of data contained in this Appendix. They are alphabetically listed by country, the countries being divided into five geographical regions. The first two pages for each region summarize the numerical data, while the third page gives rank orders for each category.

In the numerical tables, the figure in the column headed "Yrs. Data" indicates the number of years of data included in those averages to its left as far as the preceding "Yrs. Data" column. In the case of African countries, a "Yrs. Data" figure in parentheses indicates that, although the average figures were computed on the basis of that number of years of data, a preceding figure of zero ("0") was a meaningful point of departure. That is, that no armed forces existed at that time, the intermediate figures generally having been interpolated between that zero and a fixed figure for some later year. Comparable to the "Yrs. Data" column is the "Number of Differences" given in the case of the Average Increase of the Defense Budget or Armed Forces (see pages 4-6 of this appendix). Figures derived from small data samples as indicated by these columns should be regarded with reservations. Where it is meaningful a regional average is included at the bottom of the table, while "ND" in any column indicates No Data available.

In the rank order tables the countries of each region are ranked from highest to lowest in each category. Where no data exists, the countries are listed as "Not Ranked." Brackets around two or more countries indicate that they are tied for that particular ranking. Their rank

LATIN AMERICA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Avg. A.F.</u>	<u>Avg. A.F. as % Pop.</u>	<u>Yrs. Data</u>	<u>Avg. Def. Bud.</u>	<u>Avg. D.B. as % GNP</u>	<u>Avg. DX/Cap.</u>	<u>Yrs. Data</u>
Argentina	138,055	.675%	9	\$ 190.3m	2.61%	\$ 9.16	9
Bolivia	13,944	.409	9	4.0	1.16	1.14	7
Brazil	194,911	.280	9	279.8	2.40	4.17	7
Chile	41,488	.558	9	100.2	2.43	13.40	9
Colombia	23,588	.167	9	59.8	1.32	4.42	9
Costa Rica	1,200	.107	9	2.3	.53	2.07	9
Cuba	42,200	.605	10	28.2	4.65	18.17	5
Dom. Rep.	15,687	.543	8	28.0	4.12	9.32	6
Ecuador	17,455	.422	9	17.8	2.10	4.24	9
El Salvador	6,812	.278	8	7.1	1.40	2.90	8
Guatemala	8,328	.228	7	9.1	1.37	2.47	9
Haiti	5,264	.128	9	5.9	1.57	1.45	9
Honduras	3,700	.210	8	4.3	1.18	2.43	8
Jamaica	ND	ND	-	.1	.02	.07	1
Mexico	51,675	.154	8	73.3	.74	2.11	9
Nicaragua	4,500	.310	6	4.1	1.38	2.76	2
Panama	3,380	.313	5	1.0	.27	.98	1
Paraguay	9,394	.537	9	5.0	2.53	2.80	4
Peru	39,966	.370	9	59.6	3.42	5.59	9
Trin. & Tob.	ND	ND	-	.9	.23	1.12	1
Uruguay	8,113	.288	9	12.6	1.02	4.45	1
Venezuela	22,577	.312	9	138.8	2.10	19.58	9
<u>Regional Averages</u>		.345%			1.75%	\$ 5.22	

LATIN AMERICARank Orders

<u>Avg. A. Forces</u>	<u>Avg. Def. Bud.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Avg. A.F. as % Pop.</u>	<u>Avg. D. B. as % GNP</u>	<u>Avg. DX/Cap.</u>	<u>Avg. DX/AF</u>
Brazil	Brazil	1	Argentina	Cuba	Venezuela	Venezuela
Argentina	Argentina	2	Cuba	Dom. Rep.	Cuba	Colombia
Mexico	Venezuela	3	Chile	Peru	Chile	Cuba
Cuba	Cuba	4	Dom. Rep.	Argentina	Dom. Rep.	Chile
Chile	Chile	5	Paraguay	Paraguay	Argentina	Costa Rica
Peru	Mexico	6	Ecuador	Chile	Peru	Uruguay
Colombia	Colombia	7	Bolivia	Brazil	Uruguay	Dom. Rep.
Venezuela	Peru	8	Peru	{Ecuador	Colombia	Brazil
Ecuador	Dom. Rep.	9	Panama	{Venezuela	Ecuador	Peru
Dom. Rep.	Ecuador	10	Venezuela	Haiti	Brazil	Argentina
Bolivia	Uruguay	11	Nicaragua	El Salvador	El Salvador	Mexico
Paraguay	Guatemala	12	Uruguay	Nicaragua	Paraguay	Honduras
Guatemala	El Salvador	13	Brazil	Guatemala	Nicaragua	Haiti
Uruguay	Haiti	14	El Salvador	Colombia	Guatemala	Guatemala
El Salvador	Paraguay	15	Guatemala	Honduras	Honduras	Ecuador
Haiti	Honduras	16	Honduras	Bolivia	Mexico	El Salvador
{Nicaragua	Nicaragua	17	Colombia	Uruguay	Costa Rica	Nicaragua
{Honduras	Bolivia	18	Mexico	Mexico	Haiti	Paraguay
Panama	Costa Rica	19	Haiti	Costa Rica	Bolivia	Panama
Costa Rica	Panama	20	Costa Rica	Panama	Trin. & Tob.	Bolivia
	Trin. & Tob.	21		Trin. & Tob.	Panama	
	Jamaica	22		Jamaica	Jamaica	

Not Ranked

Jamaica	Jamaica					Jamaica
Trin. & Tob.	Trin. & Tob.					Trin. & Tob.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Avg. DX/AF</u>	<u>Yrs. Data</u>	<u>Avg. Inc. A.F.</u>	<u>Number of Differences</u>	<u>Avg. Inc. D.B.</u>	<u>Number of Differences</u>
Cameroun	\$8078	4	21.55%	3	16.29%	3
C.A.R.	4829	1	49.01	2	198.06	1
Chad	5769	1	51.27	2	--	-
Congo (Bxvl)	6491	1	47.00	2	5.39	1
Congo	333	1	7.62	4	--	-
Dahomey	1110	1	17.78	3	--	-
Ethiopia	757	2	-3.30	6	--	-
Gabon	3958	2	29.63	3	50.00	1
Ghana	4521	6	24.00	5	22.43	7
Guinea	1427	1	16.36	5	--	-
Ivory Coast	2719	1	24.06	3	--	-
Kenya	214	1	3.55	2	-13.90	5
Liberia	471	2	1.00	5	--	-
Malagasy	2115	2	44.44	2	11.81	1
Mali	2900	1	3.28	1	--	-
Mauritania	4097	2	49.01	2	193.51	1
Niger	2176	3	33.33	2	53.68	2
Nigeria	3295	2	7.67	3	39.54	1
Rhod. & Nyas.	2926	1	8.85	1	12.79	8
Rwanda/Burundi	ND	-	12.71	2	--	-
Senegal	3600	1	40.91	2	10.53	1
Sierra Leone	1189	1	55.48	2	--	-
Somalia	870	2	20.55	2	6.18	2
South Africa	6680	1	--	-	20.97	10
Sudan	1446	8	3.69	7	15.22	8
Tanganyika	875	1	12.98	3	8.05	5
Togo	2316	1	57.69	2	60.81	1
Uganda	579	2	17.21	2	-5.02	7
Upper Volta	2800	1	--	-	--	-
Zanzibar & Pemba	ND	-	ND	ND	ND	ND

Regional Averages \$2805

NORTH AFRICA - MIDDLE EAST

<u>Country</u>	<u>Avg. A.F.</u>	<u>Avg. A.F. as % Pop.</u>	<u>Yrs. Data</u>	<u>Avg. Def. Bud.</u>	<u>Avg. D.B. as % GNP</u>	<u>Avg. DX/Cap.</u>	<u>Yrs. Data</u>
<u>North Africa</u>							
Algeria	58,750	.506%	4	\$ 82.0m	3.59%	\$ 6.93	2
Libya	4,650	.373	8	9.0	9.77	7.25	2
Morocco	27,187	.236	8	63.3	3.11	5.35	6
Tunisia	13,062	.310	8	11.7	1.59	2.79	4
Regional Averages		.356%			4.52%	\$ 5.58	
<u>Middle East</u>							
Cyprus	1,215	.205	4	\$ .6m	.27%	\$ 1.02	2
Iran	189,416	.920%	6	143.7	6.06	7.02	10
Iraq	69,500	1.047	6	97.4	7.80	14.92	7
Israel	65,833	3.038	6	173.4	8.20	83.04	9
Jordan	39,500	2.330	7	47.2	19.31	28.15	9
Kuwait	2,400	1.086	2	58.8	8.45	255.02	2
Lebanon	9,783	.586	6	15.2	2.66	9.31	9
Saudi Arabia	30,333	.454	6	150.0	14.19	24.11	1
Syria	62,520	1.287	5	51.8	7.36	11.23	8
Turkey*	449,500	1.600	6	235.8	1.81	8.71	10
U.A.R. (Egypt)	100,222	.394	9	213.5	5.80	8.31	9
Yemen	10,000	.222	5	ND	ND	ND	-
Regional Average		1.097%			7.45%	\$ 40.99	
* The following figures are in accordance with the second set of data for Turkey and are not included in relevant calculations: (see notes on country table for Turkey):							
Turkey	449,500	1.600%	6	\$ 648.5 m	4.47%	\$ 23.58	9



NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

<u>Rank Orders</u>						
<u>Avg. A. Forces</u>	<u>Avg. Def. Bud.</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Avg. A. F. as % Pop.</u>	<u>Avg. D. B. as % GNP</u>	<u>Avg. DX/Cap.</u>	<u>Avg. DX/AF</u>
<u>NORTH AFRICA</u>						
Algeria	Algeria	1	Algeria	Libya	Libya	Libya
Morocco	Morocco	2	Libya	Algeria	Algeria	Morocco
Tunisia	Tunisia	3	Tunisia	Morocco	Morocco	Algeria
Libya	Libya	4	Morocco	Tunisia	Tunisia	Tunisia
<u>MIDDLE EAST</u>						
Turkey	Turkey	1	Israel	Jordan	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia
Iran	U.A.R.	2	Jordan	Saudi Arabia	Israel	Israel
U.A.R.	Israel	3	Turkey	Kuwait	Jordan	U.A.R.
Iraq	Saudi Arabia	4	Syria	Israel	Saudi Arabia	Lebanon
Israel	Iran	5	Kuwait	Iraq	Iraq	Iraq
Syria	Iraq	6	Iraq	Syria	Syria	Jordan
Jordan	Kuwait	7	Iran	Iran	Lebanon	Syria
Saudi Arabia	Syria	8	Lebanon	U.A.R.	Turkey*	Iran
Yemen	Jordan	9	Saudi Arabia	Lebanon	U.A.R.	Turkey*
Lebanon	Lebanon	10	U.A.R.	Turkey*	Iran	
Kuwait	Cyprus	11	Yemen	Cyprus	Cyprus	
Cyprus		12	Cyprus			
<u>Not Ranked</u>						
	Yemen			Yemen	Yemen	Cyprus
						Kuwait
						Yemen

\* Turkey: By using alternative available data (See note in Appendix II, Turkey.), the rank of Turkey would be changed as follows (with corresponding changes for other countries between the old and the new ranking of Turkey):

Avg. D. B. as % GNP:	9th
Avg. DX/Cap.:	5th
Avg. DX/AF	5th

ASIA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Avg.</u> <u>DX/AF</u>	<u>Yrs.</u> <u>Data</u>	<u>Avg. Inc.</u> <u>A.F.</u>	<u>Number of</u> <u>Differences</u>	<u>Avg. Inc.</u> <u>D.B.</u>	<u>Number of</u> <u>Differences</u>
Afghanistan	\$ 217	1	18.36%	4	--	
Burma	1880	2	--	-	4.14%	8
Cambodia	1059	3	- 3.75	8	- 1.40	2
Ceylon	3266	8	22.51	7	8.78	7
China (Taiwan)	346	2	.34	7	-23.28	1
India	1328	9	5.22	8	23.02	9
Indonesia	1289	5	6.80	7	4.49	5
Japan	2238	9	3.44	9	5.55	9
Korea (South)	292	9	- 0.98	8	- 4.91	9
Laos	551	2	17.81	7	--	-
Malaysia	4205	9	1.69	8	- 3.15	9
Nepal	141	1	-10.35	6	--	-
Pakistan	870	8	3.96	7	4.41	8
Philippines	1596	8	- 3.69	7	- 0.74	9
Thailand	492	8	4.79	7	7.38	8
Vietnam (South)	1086	2	5.56	7	1.38	1

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Regional Averages \$1304

Countries included in Appendix II (with programming identification codes):

10. Afghanistan	290. Guatemala	610. Pakistan
20. Algeria	300. Guinea	620. Panama
30. Argentina	310. Haiti	630. Paraguay
40. Australia <sup>1</sup>	320. Honduras	640. Peru
50. Bolivia	330. India	650. Philippines
60. Brazil	340. Indonesia	660. Rhodesia and Nyasaland
70. Burma	350. Iran	670. Rwanda (with Burundi) <sup>2</sup>
80. Burundi <sup>2</sup>	360. Iraq	680. Saudi Arabia
90. Cambodia	370. Israel	690. Senegal
100. Cameroun	380. Ivory Coast	700. Sierra Leone
110. Canada <sup>1</sup>	390. Jamaica	710. Somalia
120. Central African Republic	400. Japan	720. South Africa
125. Ceylon	410. Jordan	730. Sudan
130. Chad	420. Kenya	740. Syria
140. Chile	440. Korea (South)	750. Tanganyika
150. China (Taiwan)	450. Kuwait	760. Thailand
160. Colombia	460. Laos	770. Togo
170. Congo (Bzvl)	470. Lebanon	780. Trinidad and Tobago
180. Congo (Lpvl)	480. Liberia	790. Tunisia
190. Costa Rica	490. Libya	800. Turkey
200. Cuba	500. Malagasy	810. Uganda
210. Cyprus	510. Malaysia	820. U.A.R. (Egypt)
220. Dahomey	520. Mali	830. United Kingdom <sup>1</sup>
230. Dominican Republic	530. Mauritania	840. United States <sup>1</sup>
240. Ecuador	540. Mexico	850. Upper Volta
250. El Salvador	550. Morocco	860. Uruguay
260. Ethiopia	560. Nepal	870. Venezuela
270. Gabon	580. Nicaragua	890. Vietnam (South)
280. Ghana	590. Niger	900. Yemen
	600. Nigeria	

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<sup>1</sup>Included for comparative purposes only.

<sup>2</sup>The figures for Rwanda and Burundi are combined (see Burundi and Rwanda, note).

AFGHANISTAN

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	10
55	12800.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	13300.	43.000	.323	0.00	
59	13500.	50.000	.370	0.00	
60	13600.	60.000	.441	216.66	
61	13800.	-77.000	-.557	0.00	
62	14000.	90.000	.642	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	619000.	0.	0.000	0.00	48.35
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
58	666000.	0.	0.000	0.00	50.07
59	683000.	0.	0.000	0.00	50.59
60	700000.	13000.	1.857	.95	51.47
61	721000.	0.	0.000	0.00	52.24
62	743000.	0.	0.000	0.00	53.07
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 64.000 YEARS= 5.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .467 YEARS= 5.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 18.359  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 13000. YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.857 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= .95 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 216.66 YEARS= 1.

ARGENTINA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	30
55	19000.	147.500	.776	715.25	
56	19300.	147.500	.764	979.66	
57	19700.	147.000	.746	1048.29	
58	20100.	145.000	.721	836.55	
59	20400.	145.000	.710	1366.20	
60	21100.	130.000	.616	2195.38	
61	21400.	130.000	.607	2437.69	
62	21800.	120.500	.552	1604.14	
63	22200.	130.000	.585	1487.69	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	4057000.	105500.	2.600	5.55	213.52
56	4806000.	144500.	3.006	7.48	249.01
57	6205000.	154100.	2.483	7.82	314.97
58	4535000.	121300.	2.674	6.03	225.62
59	7216000.	198100.	2.745	9.71	353.72
60	9496000.	285400.	3.005	13.52	450.04
61	9852000.	316900.	3.216	14.80	460.37
62	10222000.	193300.	1.891	8.86	468.89
63	10605000.	193400.	1.823	8.71	477.70
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 138.055 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .675 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.= -1.584  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 190277. YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 2.605 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 5.774  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 9.16 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 1407.87 YEARS= 9.

BØLIVIA

50

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF
55	3230.	12.000	.371	137.50
56	3270.	17.000	.519	73.52
57	3310.	17.000	.513	164.11
58	3360.	12.000	.357	0.00
59	3410.	12.000	.351	580.83
60	3450.	12.000	.347	0.00
61	3500.	14.000	.400	347.85
62	3550.	14.500	.408	353.10
63	3620.	15.000	.414	333.33
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	316000.	1650.	.522	.51	97.83
56	320000.	1250.	.390	.38	97.85
57	324000.	2790.	.861	.84	97.88
58	328000.	0.	0.000	0.00	97.61
59	332000.	6970.	2.099	2.04	97.36
60	336000.	0.	0.000	0.00	97.39
61	344000.	4870.	1.415	1.39	98.28
62	353000.	5120.	1.450	1.44	99.43
63	362000.	5000.	1.381	1.38	100.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 13.944 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .409 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 2.689  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 3950. YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.160 YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 8.037  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 1.14 YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 284.32 YEARS= 7.

Ind. - 4 January 1948

BURMA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	70
55	19700.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	19900.	33.000	.165	2241.81	
57	20100.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	20300.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	20500.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	20700.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	22700.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
62	23200.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
63	23700.	63.900	.269	1517.84	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	1028000.	69550.	6.765	3.53	52.18
56	1096000.	73980.	6.750	3.71	55.07
57	1132000.	77110.	6.811	3.83	56.31
58	1120000.	85180.	7.605	4.19	55.17
59	1155000.	84280.	7.296	4.11	56.34
60	1254000.	90510.	7.217	4.37	60.57
61	1304000.	84780.	6.501	3.73	57.44
62	1356000.	83360.	6.147	3.59	58.44
63	1411000.	96990.	6.873	4.09	59.53
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	48.450	YEARS=	2.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.217	YEARS=	2.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	0.000		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	82860.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	6.885	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	4.139		
AVG. DX/CAP=	3.90	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	1879.82	YEARS=	2.

Notes: Wolf uses figures of \$112 million and \$113 million for the 1958 and 1959 defense budgets respectively; but these may include foreign aid. His resultant percentages are 10.3% and 10.0% of GNP respectively.

Ind. - 8 November 1949

CAMBØDIA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	90
55	4220.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	4360.	40.000	.917	0.00	
57	4600.	36.000	.782	0.00	
58	4740.	36.000	.759	0.00	
59	4850.	35.050	.722	1064.19	
60	4950.	35.050	.708	961.48	
61	5050.	-31.500	-.623	-1152.38	
62	5750.	28.100	.488	0.00	
63	5860.	28.100	.479	0.00	
64	5970.	30.000	.502	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
56	402000.	0.	0.000	0.00	92.20
57	456000.	0.	0.000	0.00	99.13
58	449000.	0.	0.000	0.00	94.72
59	461000.	37300.	8.091	7.69	95.05
60	490000.	33700.	6.877	6.80	98.98
61	505000.	36300.	7.188	7.18	100.00
62	520000.	0.	0.000	0.00	90.43
63	535000.	0.	0.000	0.00	91.29
64	551000.	0.	0.000	0.00	92.29
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 33.311 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .664 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= -3.752  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 35766. YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 7.385 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= -1.397  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 7.22 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 1059.35 YEARS= 3.



## CANADA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	110
55	15700.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	16100.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	16700.	121.000	.724	14793.38	
58	17100.	118.900	.695	14634.14	
59	17500.	119.900	.685	12593.82	
60	17900.	121.300	.677	12695.79	
61	18300.	119.800	.654	12353.92	
62	18600.	124.000	.666	12177.41	
63	18900.	124.000	.656	12661.29	
64	19200.	122.000	.635	12393.44	
65	19500.	120.000	.615	11758.33	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	27377000.	1710000.	6.246	108.91	1743.75
56	31214000.	1820000.	5.830	113.04	1938.75
57	34125000.	1790000.	5.245	107.18	2043.41
58	32784000.	1740000.	5.307	101.75	1917.19
59	36000000.	1510000.	4.194	86.28	2057.14
60	35859000.	1540000.	4.294	86.03	2003.29
61	37293000.	1480000.	3.968	80.87	2037.86
62	38785000.	1510000.	3.893	81.18	2085.21
63	40336000.	1570000.	3.892	83.06	2134.17
64	41950000.	1512000.	3.604	78.75	2184.89
65	43628000.	1411000.	3.234	72.35	2237.33

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	121.211	YEARS= 9.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.667	YEARS= 9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	-.103	
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	1599363.	YEARS= 11.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	4.519	YEARS= 11.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	-1.869	
AVG. DX/CAP=	90.85	YEARS= 11.
AVG. DX/AF=	12895.72	YEARS= 9.

Ind. - 4 February 1948

CEYLON

YR	PØP(TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	125
55	8720.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	8930.	1.050	.011	6066.66	
57	9170.	-2.170	-.023	-3852.53	
58	9390.	-3.290	-.035	-4085.10	
59	9630.	-4.410	-.045	-3442.17	
60	9900.	-5.530	-.055	-2669.07	
61	10200.	-6.650	-.065	-2332.33	
62	10400.	-7.770	-.074	-2066.92	
63	10700.	8.880	.082	1617.11	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP(TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	1161000.	0.	0.000	0.00	133.14
56	1068000.	6370.	.596	.71	119.59
57	1120000.	8360.	.746	.91	122.13
58	1181000.	13440.	1.138	1.43	125.77
59	1259000.	15180.	1.205	1.57	130.73
60	1323000.	14760.	1.115	1.49	133.63
61	1363000.	15510.	1.137	1.52	133.62
62	1404000.	16060.	1.143	1.54	135.00
63	1446000.	14360.	.993	1.34	135.14
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 4.968 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .049 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.= 22.512  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 13005. YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.009 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 8.776  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 1.31 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 3266.49 YEARS= 8.

CHILE

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	140
55	6760.	41.500	.613	2233.73	
56	6940.	41.500	.597	2171.08	
57	7120.	40.500	.56	2+66.-6	
58	7300.	40.400	.553	1925.74	
59	7470.	41.000	.548	2117.07	
60	7380.	41.000	.555	2531.70	
61	7940.	41.000	.516	2763.41	
62	8000.	44.500	.556	2015.73	
63	8170.	42.000	.514	3523.80	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	9287000.	92700.	.998	13.71	1373.81
56	2952000.	90100.	3.052	12.98	425.36
57	3194000.	99900.	3.127	14.03	448.59
58	2937000.	77800.	.648	10.	400.32
59	3842000.	86800.	2.259	11.61	514.32
60	4412000.	103800.	2.352	14.06	597.83
61	4555000.	113300.	2.487	14.26	573.67
62	4703000.	89700.	1.907	11.21	587.87
63	4856000.	148000.	3.047	18.11	594.36
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 41.488 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .558 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.= .150  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 100233. YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 2.431 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 6.896  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 13.40 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 2416.55 YEARS= 9.

## CØLØMBIA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	160
55	12700.	11.700	.092	9264.95	
56	12900.	16.700	.129	6868.26	
57	13200.	14.800	.112	3270.27	
58	13500.	18.800	.139	2255.31	
59	13800.	16.900	.122	2544.37	
60	14100.	17.900	.126	2642.45	
61	14400.	40.000	.277	1530.00	
62	14800.	-38.500	-.260	-901.29	
63	15100.	37.000	.245	1024.32	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	5364000.	108400.	2.020	8.53	422.36
56	5829000.	114700.	1.967	8.89	451.86
57	2945000.	48400.	1.643	3.66	223.10
58	2792000.	42400.	1.518	3.14	206.81
59	3539000.	43000.	1.215	3.11	256.44
60	4863000.	47300.	.972	3.35	344.89
61	5082000.	61200.	1.204	4.25	352.91
62	5311000.	34700.	.653	2.34	358.85
63	5549000.	37900.	.683	2.50	367.48
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	23.588	YEARS=	9.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.167	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	13.406		
AVG. DEF. BUD.-	59777.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	1.319	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	-14.742		
AVG. DX/CAP=	4.42	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	3366.80	YEARS=	9.

Notes: International Affairs (Moscow) gives a 1963 defense figure of \$52 million. Although this was the source used for the 1963 armed forces level, the budget figure was not included because of the uncertainties involved.

Ind. - 30 June 1960

CØNGØ (LPVL)

YR	PØP (TH)	A.F.ØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	180
55	12500.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	14100.	25.000	.177	0.00	
61	14500.	37.000	.255	0.00	
62	14800.	37.000	.250	0.00	
63	15000.	30.000	.200	333.33	
64	15300.	35.000	.228	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
60	1245000.	0.	0.000	0.00	88.29
61	1257000.	0.	0.000	0.00	86.68
62	1270000.	0.	0.000	0.00	85.81
63	1283000.	10000.	.779	.66	85.53
64	1296000.	0.	0.000	0.00	84.70
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 32.800 YEARS= 5.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .222 YEARS= 5.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 7.621  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 10000. YFARS= 1.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= .779 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= .66 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 333.33 YEARS= 1.

## CUBA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	200
55	6130.	13.400	.218	0.00	
56	6260.	13.400	.214	0.00	
57	6390.	19.400	.303	2628.86	
58	6520.	19.400	.297	2886.59	
59	6660.	19.400	.291	0.00	
60	6800.	46.000	.676	2173.91	
61	6930.	48.000	.692	0.00	
62	7070.	48.000	.678	0.00	
63	7200.	95.000	1.319	2242.10	
64	7360.	100.000	1.358	2210.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	2228000.	0.	0.000	0.00	363.45
56	2427000.	0.	0.000	0.00	387.69
57	2769000.	51000.	1.841	7.98	433.33
58	2556000.	56000.	2.190	8.58	392.02
59	2556000.	0.	0.000	0.00	383.78
60	2556000.	100000.	3.912	14.70	375.88
61	2633000.	0.	0.000	0.00	379.94
62	2712000.	0.	0.000	0.00	383.59
63	2793000.	213000.	7.626	29.58	387.91
64	2877000.	221000.	7.681	30.02	390.89
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	42.200	YEARS= 10.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.605	YEARS= 10.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.=	22.801	
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	128200.	YEARS= 5.
AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	4.650	YEARS= 5.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	5.070	
AVG. DX/CAP=	18.17	YEARS= 5.
AVG. DX/AF=	2428.29	YEARS= 5.

Ind. - 1 August 1960

DAHØMEY

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	220
55	1620.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	1930.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	2050.	-.400	-.019	0.00	
62	2200.	-.800	-.036	0.00	
63	2240.	1.000	.044	1100.00	
64	2320.	.800	.034	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
60	177000.	0.	0.000	0.00	91.70
61	182000.	0.	0.000	0.00	88.78
62	188000.	0.	0.000	0.00	85.45
63	193000.	1100.	.569	.49	86.16
64	199000.	0.	0.000	0.00	85.77
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= .750 YEARS= 4.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .033 YEARS= 4.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 17.777  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 1100. YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= .569 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= .49 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 1100.00 YEARS= 1.

Notes: The 200 man decrease in the armed forces between 1963 and 1964 may be due to the effects of a November 1963 coup.

ECUADOR

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	240
55	3690.	19.800	.536	856.06	
56	3800.	19.800	.521	800.50	
57	3930.	17.800	.452	978.08	
58	4050.	17.800	.439	948.87	
59	4180.	17.800	.425	816.29	
60	4320.	17.800	.412	1078.65	
61	4460.	17.800	.399	975.84	
62	4600.	17.800	.386	1067.41	
63	4730.	10.700	.226	2177.57	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	716000.	16950.	2.367	4.59	194.03
56	727000.	15850.	2.180	4.17	191.31
57	775000.	17410.	2.246	4.43	197.20
58	803000.	16890.	2.103	4.17	198.27
59	836000.	14530.	1.738	3.47	200.00
60	909000.	19200.	2.112	4.44	210.41
61	941000.	17370.	1.845	3.89	210.98
62	974000.	19000.	1.950	4.13	211.73
63	1008000.	23300.	2.311	4.92	213.10
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 17.455 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .422 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= -6.516  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 17833. YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 2.095 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 4.450  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 4.24 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 1077.70 YEARS= 9.



ETHIØPIA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX AF	260
55	14400.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	14800.	36.000	243	0.00	
59	14900.	29.000	194	917.21	
60	15000.	29.000	193	0.00	
61	15100.	29.000	192	0.00	
62	15200.	29.000	190	0.00	
63	15400.	30.000	194	596.66	
64	15500.	30.000	193	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	1084000.	0.	0.000	0.00	75.27
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
58	1147000.	0.	0.000	0.00	77.50
59	1209000.	26600.	2.200	1.78	81.14
60	1263000.	0.	0.000	0.00	84.20
61	1288000.	0.	0.000	0.00	85.29
62	1314000.	0.	0.000	0.00	86.44
63	1340000.	17900.	1.335	1.16	87.01
64	1367000.	0.	0.000	0.00	88.19
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 30.285 YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .200 YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= -3.301  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 22250. YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.767 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 1.47 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 756.95 YEARS= 2.

Ind. - 6 March 1957

GHANA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.F ØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	280
55	4620.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	4690.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	4760.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	4840.	1.700	.035	5929.41	
59	4910.	1.700	.034	5764.70	
60	6780.	5.300	.078	2590.56	
61	6960.	7.300	.104	3836.98	
62	7150.	7.500	.104	4593.33	
63	7250.	8.000	.110	4412.50	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (T \$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	930000.	0.	0.000	0.00	201.29
56	961000.	6440.	.670	1.37	204.90
57	1008000.	9240.	.916	1.94	211.76
58	1191000.	10080.	.846	2.08	246.07
59	1348000.	9800.	.727	1.99	274.54
60	1503000.	13730.	.913	2.02	221.68
61	1541000.	28010.	1.817	4.02	221.40
62	1579000.	34450.	2.181	4.81	220.83
63	1619000.	35300.	2.180	4.86	223.31
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	5.250	YEARS=	6.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.078	YEARS=	6.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	24.000		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	18381.	YEARS=	8.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	1.281	YEARS=	8.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	22.429		
AVG. DX/CAP=	2.89	YEARS=	8.
AVG. DX/AF=	4521.25	YEARS=	6.

Notes: It has been reported that Ghana is expanding its armed forces toward a figure of 13,000, but no time schedule is available. In 1965, this would represent 0.174% of the population, high for Africa.

Ind. - 2 October 1958

GUINEA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	300
55	2570.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	2980.	2.000	.067	0.00	
60	3070.	-2.700	-.087	0.00	
61	3180.	-3.400	-.106	0.00	
62	3260.	-4.100	-.125	-1426.82	
63	3360.	4.800	.142	0.00	
64	3430.	5.000	.145	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
59	157000.	0.	0.000	0.00	52.68
60	162000.	0.	0.000	0.00	52.76
61	167000.	0.	0.000	0.00	52.51
62	172000.	5850.	3.401	1.79	52.76
63	177000.	0.	0.000	0.00	52.67
64	182000.	0.	0.000	0.00	53.06
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	3.666	YEARS=	6.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.112	YEARS=	6.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	16.363		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	5850.	YEARS=	1.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	3.401	YEARS=	1.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	0.000		
AVG. DX/CAP=	1.79	YEARS=	1.
AVG. DX/AF=	1426.82	YEARS=	1.

HONDURAS

YR	PØP (TH)	A.F.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	320
55	1590.	3.700	.232	864.86	
56	1630.	3.700	.226	1256.75	
57	1680.	3.700	.220	1202.70	
58	1730.	3.700	.213	1486.48	
59	1790.	3.700	.206	1256.75	
60	1840.	3.700	.201	1108.10	
61	1890.	3.700	.195	1027.02	
62	1950.	3.700	.189	1027.02	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	314000.	3200.	1.019	2.01	197.48
56	320000.	4650.	1.453	2.85	196.31
57	343000.	4450.	1.297	2.64	204.16
58	363000.	5500.	1.515	3.17	209.82
59	383000.	4650.	1.214	2.59	213.96
60	384000.	4100.	1.067	2.22	208.69
61	396000.	3800.	.959	2.01	209.52
62	407000.	3800.	.933	1.94	208.71
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 3.700 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .210 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 0.000  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 4268. YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.182 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 2.007  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 2.43 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 1153.71 YEARS= 8.

Notes: 3700 is the ceiling on armed forces allocated to Honduras by the 1923 Convention on Arms Limitation in Central America. How accurate it is in describing the real situation could not be determined, since nearly all sources give this figure.

India: Notes (continued).

1956	\$523.9 million	2.12% GNP
1957	582.8	2.26
1958	656	2.36
1959	630	2.17

1956 and 1957 are from Modelski, p. 249;  
1958 and 1959 are Wolf's figures.

IRAN

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	350
55	18300.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	18800.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	19200.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	19700.	147.000	.746	751.70	
59	19700.	157.000	.796	1176.43	
60	20200.	208.000	1.029	1027.40	
61	20700.	208.000	1.004	830.76	
62	21200.	208.500	.983	917.50	
63	21600.	208.000	.962	912.98	
64	22100.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	1810000.	49200.	2.718	2.68	98.90
56	1920000.	69910.	3.641	3.71	102.12
57	2079000.	85210.	4.098	4.43	108.28
58	2262000.	110500.	4.885	5.60	114.82
59	2305000.	184700.	8.013	9.37	117.00
60	2335000.	213700.	9.152	10.57	115.59
61	2428000.	172800.	7.116	8.34	117.29
62	2526000.	191300.	7.573	9.02	119.15
63	2627000.	189900.	7.228	8.79	121.62
64	2732000.	170000.	6.222	7.69	123.61
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	189.416	YEARS=	6.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.920	YEARS=	6.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	6.440		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	143722.	YEARS=	10.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	6.064	YEARS=	10.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	9.339		
AVG. DX/CAP=	7.02	YEARS=	10.
AVG. DX/AF=	936.13	YEARS=	6.

Notes: Halpern gives a figure of \$440 million defense expenditure in 1957 (21.2% GNP.) which may include extensive outside aid. The Institute for Strategic Studies, the source for the 1964 figure, gives \$125 million for 1963.

Ind. - 15 May 1948

## ISRAEL

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	370
55	1750.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	1830.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	1940.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	2000.	65.000	3.250	2504.61	
59	2060.	65.000	3.155	2769.23	
60	2110.	65.000	3.080	2973.84	
61	2190.	65.000	2.968	3281.53	
62	2290.	65.000	2.838	3410.76	
63	2380.	70.000	2.941	2761.42	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	1193000.	77210.	6.471	44.12	681.71
56	1446000.	100500.	6.950	54.91	790.16
57	1685000.	218300.	12.955	112.52	868.55
58	1926000.	162800.	8.452	81.40	963.00
59	2227000.	180000.	8.082	87.37	1081.06
60	2473000.	193300.	7.816	91.61	1172.03
61	2597000.	213300.	8.213	97.39	1185.84
62	2726000.	221700.	8.132	96.81	1190.39
63	2863000.	193300.	6.751	81.21	1202.94
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	65.833	YEARS=	6.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	3.038	YEARS=	6.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	1.518		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	173378.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	8.203	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	8.369		
AVG. DX/CAP=	83.04	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	2950.23	YEARS=	6.

Notes: Estimates of the Israeli defense budget vary widely, the public budget figures (U.N. Statistical Yearbook) being between one-half and one-third of those used here, which have been provided by the Harvard Center for Middle East Affairs. Estimates range as high as \$385 million for 1964 (New York Times, December 24, 1963), which would be

Ind. - 7 August 1960

IVØRY CØAST

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	380
55	2890.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	3230.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	3300.	-1.600	-.048	0.00	
62	3380.	-3.200	-.094	-2718.75	
63	3470.	4.500	.129	0.00	
64	3550.	4.000	.112	0.00	
0	^.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
60	323000.	0.	0.000	0.00	100.00
61	333000.	0.	0.000	0.00	100.90
62	343000.	8700.	2.536	2.57	101.47
63	353000.	0.	0.000	0.00	101.72
64	364000.	0.	0.000	0.00	102.53
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 3.325 YEARS= 4.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .096 YEARS= 4.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.= 24.060  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 8700. YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 2.536 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 2.57 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 2718.75 YEARS= 1.



JAPAN

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	400
55	89000.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	90000.	197.200	.219	2079.10	
57	90700.	203.500	.224	2041.76	
58	91500.	209.800	.229	2323.64	
59	92400.	216.100	.233	2063.85	
60	93200.	222.400	.238	2042.71	
61	94100.	228.700	.243	2240.92	
62	94900.	235.000	.247	2463.40	
63	95900.	249.500	.260	2280.56	
64	96900.	259.000	.267	2606.17	
65	97800.	268.000	.274	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	22633000.	426600.	1.884	4.79	254.30
56	24920000.	410000.	1.645	4.55	276.88
57	27501000.	415500.	1.510	4.58	303.20
58	28639000.	487500.	1.702	5.32	312.99
59	33299000.	446000.	1.339	4.82	360.37
60	38848000.	454300.	1.169	4.87	416.82
61	41179000.	512500.	1.244	5.44	437.60
62	43650000.	578900.	1.326	6.10	459.95
63	46269000.	569000.	1.229	5.93	482.47
64	49045000.	675000.	1.376	6.96	506.14
65	51987000.	0.	0.000	0.00	531.56

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 228.920 YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .243 YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.= 3.436  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 497530. YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.442 YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 5.547  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 5.34 YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 2238.01 YEARS= 9.

Ind. - 16 December 1963

KENYA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	420
55	6360.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	6510.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	6670.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	6820.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	6970.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	7130.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	7290.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
63	8810.	2.800	.031	214.28	
64	8940.	2.650	.029	0.00	
65	9210.	3.000	.032	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	507000.	0.	0.000	0.00	79.71
56	542000.	3980.	.734	.61	83.25
57	577000.	6130.	1.062	.91	86.50
58	582000.	5040.	.865	.73	85.33
59	599000.	4790.	.799	.68	85.93
60	628000.	4590.	.730	.64	88.07
61	630000.	1350.	.214	.18	86.41
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
63	668000.	600.	.089	.06	75.82
64	688000.	0.	0.000	0.00	76.95
65	709000.	0.	0.000	0.00	76.98

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	2.816	YEARS=	3.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.031	YEARS=	3.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	3.550		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	3782.	YEARS=	7.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	.642	YEARS=	7.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	-13.904		
AVG. DX/CAP=	.55	YEARS=	7.
AVG. DX/AF=	214.28	YEARS=	1.

Notes: Kenya's army was recently reported to cost about \$7 million per annum (New York Times, March 21, 1964), but the basis for this figure was not made clear. It would represent 1.02% of the GNP and \$2641 per serviceman.

KUWAIT

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	450
55	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	219.	2.400	1.095	0.00	
60	223.	2.400	1.076	0.00	
61	227.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
64	240.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
59	648000.	0.	0.000	0.00	2958.90
60	659000.	0.	0.000	0.00	2955.15
61	679000.	84000.	12.371	370.04	2991.18
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
64	741000.	33600.	4.534	140.00	3087.50
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	2.400	YEARS=	2.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	1.086	YEARS=	2.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.=	<u>0.000</u>		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	58800.	YEARS=	2.
AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	8.452	YEARS=	2.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	0.000		
AVG. DX/CAP=	255.02	YEARS=	2.
AVG. DX/AF=	0.00	YEARS=	0.

Ind.- 22 November 1943

LEBANON

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	470
55	1470.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	1500.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	1530.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	1570.	8.500	.541	1697.64	
59	1610.	9.000	.559	1512.22	
60	1650.	9.800	.593	1547.95	
61	1680.	9.800	.583	1906.12	
62	1720.	10.800	.627	1906.48	
63	1760.	10.800	.613	2007.40	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	540000.	8220.	1.522	5.59	367.34
56	557000.	11880.	2.132	7.92	371.33
57	591000.	12370.	2.093	8.08	386.27
58	521000.	14430.	2.769	9.19	331.84
59	537000.	13610.	2.534	8.45	333.54
60	553000.	15170.	2.743	9.19	335.15
61	575000.	18680.	3.248	11.11	342.26
62	598000.	20590.	3.443	11.97	347.67
63	622000.	21680.	3.485	12.31	353.40
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	9.783	YEARS=	6.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.586	YEARS=	6.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	4.701		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	15181.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	2.663	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	11.082		
AVG. DX/CAP=	9.31	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	1762.97	YEARS=	6.

Ind. - 24 December 1951

LIBYA

	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	490
55	1110.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	1150.	2.600	.226	0.00	
59	1170.	2.600	.222	1569.23	
60	1200.	4.500	.375	0.00	
61	1210.	4.500	.371	0.00	
62	1240.	5.000	.403	0.00	
63	1270.	5.000	.393	2800.00	
64	1290.	6.000	.465	0.00	
65	1320.	7.000	.530	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
58	72000.	0.	0.000	0.00	62.60
59	80000.	4080.	5.100	3.48	68.37
60	86000.	0.	0.000	0.00	71.66
61	89000.	0.	0.000	0.00	73.55
62	93000.	0.	0.000	0.00	75.00
63	97000.	14000.	14.432	11.02	76.37
64	101000.	0.	0.000	0.00	78.29
65	105000.	0.	0.000	0.00	79.54

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 4.650 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .373 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 13.517  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 9040. YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 9.766 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 7.25 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 2184.61 YEARS= 2.

Ind. - 31 August 1957

MALAYSIA

YR	PØP(TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	510
55	5920.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	6090.	10.000	.164	5245.00	
57	6280.	17.800	.283	2719.10	
58	6500.	20.000	.307	2624.00	
59	6700.	20.000	.298	2715.50	
60	6910.	20.000	.289	2325.00	
61	7140.	15.000	.210	4246.00	
62	7330.	10.000	.136	6229.00	
63	7530.	8.000	.106	7337.50	
64	7730.	-12.000	-.155	-4400.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP(TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	2094000.	68660.	3.278	11.59	353.71
56	2178000.	52450.	2.408	8.61	357.63
57	2265000.	48400.	2.136	7.70	360.66
58	2356000.	52480.	2.227	8.07	362.46
59	2601000.	54310.	2.088	8.10	388.20
60	2814000.	46500.	1.652	6.72	407.23
61	2927000.	63690.	2.175	8.92	409.94
62	3044000.	62290.	2.046	8.49	415.27
63	3165000.	58700.	1.854	7.79	420.31
64	3292000.	52800.	1.603	6.83	425.87
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	14.755	YEARS=	9.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.216	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.=	1.694		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	56028.	YEARS=	10.
AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	2.147	YEARS=	10.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	-3.145		
AVG. DX/CAP=	8.28	YEARS=	10.
AVG. DX/AF=	4204.56	YEARS=	9.

Notes: Population and GNP figures are based on Federation of Malaya alone  
 Russett's figure of 2.70% GNP for the 1959 defense budget would be the equivalent of \$70.2 million.

Ind. ~ 28 November 1960

MAURITANIA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	530
55	615.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	759.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	765.	<u>-0.170</u>	-0.022	0.00	
62	799.	-0.340	-0.042	-194.11	
63	827.	.500	.060	8000.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
60	69000.	0.	0.000	0.00	90.90
61	71000.	0.	0.000	0.00	92.81
62	73000.	66.	.090	.08	91.36
63	75000.	4000.	5.330	4.83	90.69
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= .336 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .041 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 49.009  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 2033. YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 2.710 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 193.507  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 2.45 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 4097.05 YEARS= 2.

Ind. - 2 March 1956

MØRØCCØ

YR	PØP(TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	550
55	10100.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	10400.	20.000	.192	1.65	
57	10700.	-23.500	-.219	0.00	
58	11000.	27.000	.245	1666.66	
59	11300.	27.000	.238	3148.14	
60	11600.	27.000	.232	0.00	
61	11900.	27.000	.226	2777.77	
62	12200.	-31.000	-.254	-2645.16	
63	12400.	35.000	.282	2657.14	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP(TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
56	1835000.	33.	.001	0.00	176.44
57	1882000.	0.	0.000	0.00	175.88
58	1824000.	45000.	2.467	4.09	165.81
59	1931000.	85000.	4.401	7.52	170.88
60	2020000.	0.	0.000	0.00	174.13
61	2070000.	75000.	3.623	6.30	173.94
62	2122000.	82000.	3.864	6.72	173.93
63	2175000.	93000.	4.275	7.50	175.40
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 27.187 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .236 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.= 7.881  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 63338. YEARS= 6.  
 AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 3.105 YEARS= 6.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 30.523  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 5.35 YEARS= 6.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 2149.42 YEARS= 6.



NICARAGUA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	580
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	1330.	4.300	.323	0.00	
58	1380.	4.300	.311	0.00	
59	1420.	4.500	.316	886.66	
60	1480.	4.500	.304	0.00	
61	1530.	4.500	.294	922.22	
62	1580.	4.900	.310	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
57	213000.	0.	0.000	0.00	160.15
58	241000.	0.	0.000	0.00	174.63
59	274000.	3990.	1.456	2.80	192.95
60	310000.	0.	0.000	0.00	209.45
61	319000.	4150.	1.300	2.71	208.49
62	329000.	0.	0.000	0.00	208.22
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	4.500	YEARS=	6.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.310	YEARS=	6.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.=	2.666		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	4070.	YEARS=	2.
AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	1.378	YEARS=	2.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	0.000		
AVG. DX/CAP=	2.76	YEARS=	2.
AVG. DX/AF=	904.44	YEARS=	2.

Notes: Alba and Lieuwen give figures of 11,300 for the armed forces in 1956 and 1957, or about 0.9% of the population.

Ind. - 1 October 1960

NIGERIA

YR	P2P (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	600
55	32000.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	34400.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
62	36500.	7.000	.019	2857.14	
63	37200.	7.500	.020	3733.33	
64	37300.	8.000	.021	0.00	
65	38400.	8.800	.022	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
56	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
57	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
58	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
59	2753000.	12700.	.461	.36	80.02
60	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
61	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
62	3009000.	20000.	.664	.54	82.43
63	3099000.	28000.	.903	.75	83.30
64	3192000.	0.	0.000	0.00	84.44
65	3288000.	0.	0.000	0.00	85.62

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	7.825	YEARS=	4.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.020	YEARS=	4.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	7.667		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	20233.	YEARS=	3.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	.676	YEARS=	3.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	39.538		
AVG. DX/CAP=	.55	YEARS=	3.
AVG. DX/AF=	3295.23	YEARS=	2.

Notes: A new census in March 1964 sets Nigeria's population at 55.7 million (New York Times, March 4, 1964.)

PANAMA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	620
55	944.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	1020.	3.300	.323	0.00	
59	1050.	3.400	.323	302.94	
60	1080.	3.400	.314	0.00	
61	1110.	3.400	.306	0.00	
62	1140.	3.400	.298	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	323000.	0.	0.000	0.00	342.16
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
58	367000.	0.	0.000	0.00	359.80
59	382000.	1030.	.269	.98	363.80
60	423000.	0.	0.000	0.00	391.66
61	436000.	0.	0.000	0.00	392.79
62	449000.	0.	0.000	0.00	393.85
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 3.380 YEARS= 5.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .313 YEARS= 5.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= .739  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 1030. YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= .269 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= .98 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 302.94 YEARS= 1.

PERU

YR	PØP(TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	640
55	9400.	17.500	.186	1858.85	
56	9650.	17.500	.181	3205.71	
57	9920.	-29.200	-.294	-1953.76	
58	10200.	40.900	.400	1262.34	
59	10500.	41.600	.396	1092.54	
60	10900.	42.300	.388	1319.14	
61	11100.	43.000	.387	1593.02	
62	11400.	54.700	.479	1307.12	
63	11700.	73.000	.623	1335.61	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP(TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP(\$)	GNP/CAP(\$)
55	1501000.	32530.	2.167	3.46	159.68
56	1664000.	56100.	3.371	5.81	172.43
57	1773000.	57050.	3.217	5.75	178.72
58	1507000.	51630.	3.426	5.06	147.74
59	1432000.	45450.	3.173	4.32	136.38
60	1790000.	55800.	3.117	5.11	164.22
61	1853000.	68500.	3.696	6.17	166.93
62	1917000.	71500.	3.729	6.27	168.15
63	1985000.	97500.	4.911	8.33	169.65
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	39.966	YEARS=	9.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.370	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.=	17.358		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	59562.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	3.423	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	13.634		
AVG. DX/CAP=	5.59	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	1658.68	YEARS=	9.

Notes: Peru has recently announced that a 1961 Census estimated the population at 10.4 million, (New York Times, April 12, 1964.)

RHØDESIA AND NYASALAND

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	660
55	7760.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	7970.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	8190.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	8420.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	8650.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	8890.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	9130.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
62	9380.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
63	9570.	8.100	.084	2925.92	
64	9760.	8.850	.090	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	1059000.	7280.	.687	.93	136.46
56	1101000.	9800.	.890	1.22	138.14
57	1145000.	11480.	1.002	1.40	139.80
58	1191000.	12320.	1.034	1.46	141.44
59	1239000.	17930.	1.447	2.07	143.23
60	1289000.	15410.	1.195	1.73	144.99
61	1341000.	24090.	1.796	2.63	146.87
62	1394000.	22400.	1.606	2.38	148.61
63	1450000.	23700.	1.634	2.47	151.51
64	1508000.	0.	0.000	0.00	154.50
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	8.475	YEARS=	2.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.087	YEARS=	2.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	8.849		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	16045.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	1.255	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	12.791		
AVG. DX/CAP=	1.81	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	2925.92	YEARS=	1.

Notes: The 1964 armed forces figure represents the total armed forces after the break-up of the Federation. See Appendix I for breakdown.

Rwanda (\*with Burundi): Notes (Continued).

	Armed Forces	Def. Bud.
1962		\$1.3 million
1963	900	
1964	900	

Ind. - 20 August 1960

SENEGAL

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	690
55	2220.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	2970.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	2980.	-1.000	-.033	0.00	
62	3050.	-2.000	-.065	0.00	
63	3120.	2.500	.080	3600.00	
64	3200.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
60	240000.	0.	0.000	0.00	80.80
61	247000.	0.	0.000	0.00	82.88
62	255000.	0.	0.000	0.00	83.60
63	262000.	9000.	3.435	2.88	83.97
64	270000.	10000.	3.703	3.12	84.37
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 1.833 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .059 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 40.909  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 9500. YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 3.569 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 10.526  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 3.00 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 3600.00 YEARS= 1.

Ind. - 1 July 1960

SOMALIA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	710
55	1920.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	2130.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
62	2150.	4.000	.186	892.50	
63	2170.	4.600	.211	847.82	
64	2190.	6.000	.273	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
61	78000.	3450.	4.423	1.61	36.61
62	79000.	3570.	4.518	1.66	36.74
63	81000.	3900.	4.814	1.79	37.32
64	82000.	0.	0.000	0.00	37.44
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 4.866 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .224 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 20.547  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 3640. YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 4.585 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 6.181  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 1.69 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 870.16 YEARS= 2.

**Notes:** Somalia is reported to be seeking to build a 20,000 man army with the help of Soviet aid. This would be the fourth largest army in Sub-Saharan Africa and would represent 0.90% of the population, the highest in the region.



Ind. - 1 January 1956

SUDAN

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	730
55	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	10300.	8.500	.082	983.52	
57	10800.	-8.500	-.078	-865.88	
58	11100.	-9.000	-.081	-903.33	
59	11500.	-9.500	-.082	-1512.63	
60	11800.	10.000	.084	1661.00	
61	12100.	10.000	.082	1868.00	
62	12500.	11.000	.088	1820.90	
63	12831.	11.000	.085	1954.54	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	861000.	5230.	.607	0.00	0.00
56	947000.	8360.	.882	.81	91.94
57	953000.	7360.	.772	.68	88.24
58	982000.	8130.	.827	.73	88.46
59	1095000.	14370.	1.312	1.24	95.21
60	1097000.	16610.	1.514	1.40	92.96
61	1124000.	18680.	1.661	1.54	92.89
2	1153000.	20030.	1.737	1.60	92.24
63	1181000.	21500.	1.820	1.67	92.04
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 9.687 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .083 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 3.686  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 13363. YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.237 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 15.218  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 1.21 YEARS= 8.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 1446.22 YEARS= 8.

Ind. - 9 December 1961

TANGANYIKA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	750
55	8450.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	8610.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	8790.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	8920.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	9080.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	9240.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	9400.	.800	.008	0.00	
62	9560.	-1.500	-.015	0.00	
63	9730.	2.000	.020	875.00	
64	9860.	1.350	.013	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	586000.	7250.	1.237	.85	69.54
56	604000.	7980.	1.321	.92	70.15
57	622000.	8680.	1.395	.98	70.76
58	640000.	9770.	1.526	1.09	71.74
59	659000.	10580.	1.605	1.16	72.57
60	679000.	10500.	1.546	1.13	73.48
61	699000.	0.	0.000	0.00	74.36
62	720000.	0.	0.000	0.00	75.31
63	742000.	1750.	.235	.17	76.25
64	764000.	0.	0.000	0.00	77.48
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 1.412 YEARS= 4.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .014 YEARS= 4.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 12.979  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 8072. YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 1.266 YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 8.051  
 AVG. DX/CAP= .90 YEARS= 7.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 875.00 YEARS= 1.

Notes: The drop in armed forces between 1963 and 1964 was due to discharge of men involved in riots in January, 1964 (New York Times, January 26, 1964, and Africa - 1964, No. 3, February 7, 1964).

Ind. - 27 April 1960

TØGØ

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	770
55	1080.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	1480.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
62	1520.	.250	.016	2316.00	
63	1560.	.700	.044	0.00	
64	1590.	1.000	.062	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
61	63000.	309.	.490	.20	42.56
62	65000.	579.	.890	.38	42.76
63	66000.	0.	0.000	0.00	42.30
64	67000.	0.	0.000	0.00	42.13
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= .650 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .041 YEARS= 3.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 57.692  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 444. YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= .690 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 60.810  
 AVG. DX/CAP= .29 YEARS= 2.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 2316.00 YEARS= 1.

Ind. - 20 March 1956

TUNISIA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	790
55	3900.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	3940.	5.000	.126	0.00	
57	4000.	-5.500	-.137	0.00	
58	4050.	6.000	.148	0.00	
59	4110.	12.000	.291	1000.00	
60	4170.	-16.000	-.383	-937.50	
61	4220.	20.000	.473	425.00	
62	4300.	-20.000	-.465	-570.00	
63	4390.	20.000	.455	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
56	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
57	676000.	0.	0.000	0.00	169.00
58	663000.	0.	0.000	0.00	163.70
59	682000.	12000.	1.759	2.91	165.93
60	745000.	15000.	2.013	3.59	178.65
61	764000.	8500.	1.112	2.01	181.04
62	783000.	11400.	1.455	2.65	182.09
63	802000.	0.	0.000	0.00	182.68
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	13.062	YEARS=	8.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.310	YEARS=	8.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	16.404		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	11725.	YEARS=	4.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	1.585	YEARS=	4.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	-1.705		
AVG. DX/CAP=	2.79	YEARS=	4.
AVG. DX/AF=	733.12	YEARS=	4.

TURKEY

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	800
55	24100.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	24800.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	25500.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	26200.	460.000	1.755	1037.17	
59	27000.	460.000	1.703	1694.78	
60	27800.	435.000	1.564	1665.74	
61	28600.	435.000	1.520	1576.09	
62	29100.	455.000	1.563	1904.39	
63	30300.	452.000	1.491	2254.40	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	7521000.	366300.	4.870	15.19	312.07
56	8690000.	478800.	5.509	19.30	350.40
57	10902000.	439400.	4.030	17.23	427.52
58	13750000.	477100.	3.469	18.20	524.80
59	20145000.	779600.	3.869	28.87	746.11
60	18674000.	724600.	3.880	26.06	671.72
61	19421000.	685600.	3.530	23.97	679.05
62	20198000.	866500.	4.290	29.77	694.08
63	21006000.	1019000.	4.850	33.60	693.26
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	449.500	YEARS=	6.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	1.600	YEARS=	6.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	-.355		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	648544.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	4.471	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	12.580		
AVG. DX/CAP=	23.58	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	1692.09	YEARS=	6.

Notes: Scholars at the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies have criticized the statistics given for Turkey on the preceding page on the grounds that currency conversion is not realistic and the calculations should be carried out entirely in the local currency. Since this would minimize the comparative value of the study if done for all countries, it is a weakness with which we must live. Nonetheless, this table is made available as an

Ind. - 9 October 1962

UGANDA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	810
55	5900.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
56	6050.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
57	6200.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
58	6360.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	6510.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
60	6680.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
61	6850.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
62	7020.	.650	.009	86.15	
63	7120.	1.400	.019	1071.42	
64	7210.	1.000	.013	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	393000.	0.	0.000	0.00	66.61
56	397000.	2020.	.508	.33	65.61
57	411000.	2180.	.530	.35	66.29
58	411000.	1930.	.469	.30	64.62
59	419000.	2040.	.486	.31	64.36
60	425000.	1900.	.447	.28	63.62
61	450000.	224.	.049	.03	65.69
62	463000.	56.	.012	0.00	65.95
63	477000.	1500.	.314	.21	66.99
64	491000.	0.	0.000	0.00	68.09
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	1.016	YEARS=	3.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.014	YEARS=	3.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	17.213		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	1481.	YEARS=	8.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	.352	YEARS=	8.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	-5.015		
AVG. DX/CAP=	.22	YEARS=	8.
AVG. DX/AF=	578.79	YEARS=	2.

UNITED KINGDOM

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	830
55	51200.	900.000	1.757	0.00	
56	51400.	848.000	1.649	5615.56	
57	51600.	-765.000	-1.482	-5895.42	
58	51800.	682.000	1.316	6571.84	
59	52100.	630.200	1.209	7112.02	
60	52500.	582.500	1.109	7838.62	
61	52900.	541.700	1.024	9204.35	
62	53400.	500.200	.936	9296.28	
63	53800.	484.500	.900	9944.27	
64	54200.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
65	54600.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	53796000.	0.	0.000	0.00	1050.70
56	58251000.	4762000.	8.174	92.64	1133.28
57	61421000.	4510000.	7.342	87.40	1190.32
58	64028000.	4482000.	7.000	86.52	1236.06
59	66352000.	4482000.	6.754	86.02	1273.55
60	70664000.	4566000.	6.461	86.97	1345.98
61	73491000.	4986000.	6.784	94.25	1389.24
62	76430000.	4650000.	6.083	87.07	1431.27
63	79487000.	4818000.	6.061	89.55	1477.45
64	82667000.	5140000.	6.217	94.83	1525.22
65	85974000.	5594000.	6.506	102.45	1574.61

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 659.344 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= 1.265 YEARS= 9.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= -7.877  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 4799000. YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= 6.738 YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 1.926  
 AVG. DX/CAP= 90.77 YEARS= 10.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 7684.80 YEARS= 8.

Ind. - 5 August 1960

UPPER VØLTA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	850
55	3340.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
63	4590.	1.000	.021	2800.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
63	421000.	2800.	.665	.61	91.72
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES= 1.000 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP= .021 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.= 0.000  
 AVG. DEF. BUD.= 2800. YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP= .665 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.= 0.000  
 AVG. DX/CAP= .61 YEARS= 1.  
 AVG. DX/AF= 2800.00 YEARS= 1.



VENEZUELA

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	870
55	6150.	17.200	.279	5970.93	
56	6390.	17.200	.269	6459.30	
57	6640.	17.400	.262	8488.50	
58	6880.	17.600	.255	9761.36	
59	7120.	22.700	.318	8321.58	
60	7360.	22.900	.311	7397.37	
61	7610.	23.000	.302	4700.00	
62	7870.	30.200	.383	3844.37	
63	8144.	35.000	.429	3820.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF. BUD.	PCT. GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	4772000.	102700.	2.152	16.69	775.93
56	5352000.	111100.	2.075	17.38	837.55
57	6148000.	147700.	2.402	22.24	925.90
58	6713000.	171800.	2.559	24.97	975.72
59	6918000.	188900.	2.730	26.53	971.62
60	7151000.	169400.	2.368	23.01	971.60
61	7437000.	108100.	1.453	14.20	977.26
62	7735000.	116100.	1.500	14.75	982.84
63	8044000.	133700.	1.662	16.41	987.72
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	22.577	YEARS=	9.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.312	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG. A.F.=	9.854		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	138833.	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DEF. BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	2.100	YEARS=	9.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	2.791		
AVG. DX/CAP=	19.58	YEARS=	9.
AVG. DX/AF=	6529.27	YEARS=	9.

Notes: International Affairs (Moscow) gives a figure of \$175.7 million defense expenditure in 1963 (2.16% GNP).

YEMEN

YR	PØP (TH)	A.FØRCES	PERCENT	DX/AF	900
55	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
59	4400.	10.000	.227	0.00	
60	4450.	-10.000	-.224	0.00	
61	4500.	-10.000	-.222	0.00	
62	4550.	-10.000	-.219	0.00	
63	4600.	10.000	.217	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	
0	0.	0.000	0.000	0.00	

YR	GNP (TH\$)	DEF.BUD.	PCT.GNP	DX/CAP (\$)	GNP/CAP (\$)
55	164000.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
59	308000.	0.	0.000	0.00	70.00
60	360000.	0.	0.000	0.00	80.89
61	367000.	0.	0.000	0.00	81.55
62	375000.	0.	0.000	0.00	82.41
63	382000.	0.	0.000	0.00	83.04
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00
0	0.	0.	0.000	0.00	0.00

AVG. ARMED FØRCES=	10.000	YEARS=	5.
AVG. A.F. AS PCT. ØF PØP=	.222	YEARS=	5.
AVG. INCREASE ØF A.F. AS PCT ØF AVG.A.F.=	0.000		
AVG. DEF. BUD.=	0.	YEARS=	0.
AVG. DEF.BUD. AS PCT ØF GNP=	0.000	YEARS=	0.
AVG. INCREASE ØF D.B. AS PCT ØF AVG. D.B.=	0.000		
AVG. DX/CAP=	0.00	YEARS=	0.
AVG. DX/AF=	0.00	YEARS=	0.

Notes: This data does not seem to reflect the current civil war in Yemen.

APPENDIX III

Projections of Armed Forces and Defense Budgets in Developing Countries: 1961-1975.

## INTRODUCTION

This appendix consists of tables for each of eighty-four underdeveloped countries<sup>1</sup> showing their projected populations and Gross National Products from 1961 to 1975. Accompanying these figures in each table are seven columns of figures representing varying modal percentages of these indices which are commonly devoted by nations to their defense efforts in accordance with their perception of threats to national security. Round percentage figures have been chosen to bracket the range of typical national behavior emerging from the data contained in Appendix II, although high extremes have been omitted.

By making certain assumptions about the behavior of a country to place it on the scale of modes, one may read off an estimate of the manpower and economic resources which that country might be devoting to its defense effort over the next dozen years. This is, needless to say, a hazardous procedure, but there are some guidelines that may be used to give meaning to the tables.

These guidelines may be derived from previous national behavior and historical examples. Any historical case is necessarily bound up with a wide range of particulars associated with the given situation. What does emerge from the data in Appendix II, however, is that multi-variant analysis of each case is not necessary in situations which cover the majority of cases. Most countries show considerable stability in their defense behavior over time, at least as shown in the variables we have selected. Nations seem to become oriented toward either a numerical figure or a

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<sup>1</sup>Countries in the Appendix are the same as those found on page 23 of Appendix II; but omitting the four developed countries.

Although there are seven modes in each table, one should not attempt to relate these on a one-to-one basis from the armed forces extrapolations to the budgetary tables. While it is likely that a shift in modes along one set of indices will produce a shift in the same direction on the other, the exact correlation will be determined by a complicated variety of factors. Among these will be the relative emphasis put on manpower as opposed to equipment, pay scales (a raise in military pay would change the budgetary picture while not necessarily changing the manpower index), availability of foreign aid and equipment, and so forth. India, for example, has spent an average of 2.2% of its GNP on defense in recent years, nearest to the fifth mode, but its mobilized manpower has run about 0.1% of population, the seventh mode.

It may be useful to remind the reader of some actual cases that can be associated with each of these modal percentages as an additional guide in using this appendix.

(See following two pages)

Defense Expenditure as % GNP

<u>Mode</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Examples</u>
I	20%	U.S. in World War II (nearly twice this: 41% in 1943, 1944) Soviet Union (unofficial estimates)
II	15%	United Kingdom in 1939 U.S. in 1953 (Korean War and rearmament)
III	10%	U.S. in recent years Soviet Union (Official estimates)
<u>Average Middle Eastern state: 7.45%</u>		
IV	5%	Smaller NATO countries: Canada, Greece, Italy, Norway India in 1964 Somalia Average North African state Average Asian state
V	2.5%	Argentina Australia Brazil Canada India (until recently) New Zealand Thailand
<u>Average Latin American state: 1.75%; Average Sub-Saharan African state: 1.67%</u>		
VI	1.0%	Philippines Liberia Ceylon
VII	0.5%	Costa Rica Some Sub-Saharan African states (but rising)

AFGHANISTAN

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES		(THOUSANDS)			
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	13800.	690.00	414.00	207.00	138.00	69.00	41.40	13.80
62	14000.	700.00	420.00	210.00	140.00	70.00	42.00	14.00
63	14200.	710.00	426.00	213.00	142.00	71.00	42.60	14.20
64	14400.	720.00	432.00	216.00	144.00	72.00	43.20	14.40
65	14600.	730.00	438.00	219.00	146.00	73.00	43.80	14.60
66	14900.	745.00	447.00	223.50	149.00	74.50	44.70	14.90
67	15100.	755.00	453.00	226.50	151.00	75.50	45.30	15.10
68	15400.	770.00	462.00	231.00	154.00	77.00	46.20	15.40
69	15700.	785.00	471.00	235.50	157.00	78.50	47.10	15.70
70	16000.	800.00	480.00	240.00	160.00	80.00	48.00	16.00
71	16400.	820.00	492.00	246.00	164.00	82.00	49.20	16.40
72	16700.	835.00	501.00	250.50	167.00	83.50	50.10	16.70
73	17100.	855.00	513.00	256.50	171.00	85.50	51.30	17.10
74	17500.	875.00	525.00	262.50	175.00	87.50	52.50	17.50
75	17900.	895.00	537.00	268.50	179.00	89.50	53.70	17.90

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		IN ARMED FORCES		(THOUS\$US)			
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	721.	144200.	108150.	72100.	36050.	18025.	7210.	3605.
62	743.	148600.	111450.	74300.	37150.	18575.	7430.	3715.
63	765.	153000.	114750.	76500.	38250.	19125.	7650.	3825.
64	788.	157600.	118200.	78800.	39400.	19700.	7880.	3940.
65	811.	162200.	121650.	81100.	40550.	20275.	8110.	4055.
66	844.	168800.	126600.	84400.	42200.	21100.	8440.	4220.
67	878.	175600.	131700.	87800.	43900.	21950.	8780.	4390.
68	913.	182600.	136950.	91300.	45650.	22825.	9130.	4565.
69	949.	189800.	142350.	94900.	47450.	23725.	9490.	4745.
70	987.	197400.	148050.	98700.	49350.	24675.	9870.	4935.
71	1027.	205400.	154050.	102700.	51350.	25675.	10270.	5135.
72	1068.	213600.	160200.	106800.	53400.	26700.	10680.	5340.
73	1111.	222200.	166650.	111100.	55550.	27775.	11110.	5555.
74	1155.	231000.	173250.	115500.	57750.	28875.	11550.	5775.
75	1201.	240200.	180150.	120100.	60050.	30025.	12010.	6005.

Notes: Armed Forces data is rising, but should stabilize between 0.5 and 1.0%.  
 Insufficient budgetary data: 1960 expenditure of \$13 million = 1.86% GNP.

ARGENTINA

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP(THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	21400.	1070.00	642.00	321.00	214.00	107.00	64.20	21.40
62	21800.	1090.00	654.00	327.00	218.00	109.00	65.40	21.80
63	22200.	1110.00	666.00	333.00	222.00	111.00	66.60	22.20
64	22500.	1125.00	675.00	337.50	225.00	112.50	67.50	22.50
65	22900.	1145.00	687.00	343.50	229.00	114.50	68.70	22.90
66	23300.	1165.00	699.00	349.50	233.00	116.50	69.90	23.30
67	23700.	1185.00	711.00	355.50	237.00	118.50	71.10	23.70
68	24100.	1205.00	723.00	361.50	241.00	120.50	72.30	24.10
69	24500.	1225.00	735.00	367.50	245.00	122.50	73.50	24.50
70	24900.	1245.00	747.00	373.50	249.00	124.50	74.70	24.90
71	25400.	1270.00	762.00	381.00	254.00	127.00	76.20	25.40
72	25700.	1285.00	771.00	385.50	257.00	128.50	77.10	25.70
73	26100.	1305.00	783.00	391.50	261.00	130.50	78.30	26.10
74	26500.	1325.00	795.00	397.50	265.00	132.50	79.50	26.50
75	26900.	1345.00	807.00	403.50	269.00	134.50	80.70	26.90

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP(M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	9852.	1970400.	1477800.	985200.	492600.	246300.	98520.	49260.
62	10222.	2044400.	1533300.	1022200.	511100.	255550.	102220.	51110.
63	10605.	2121000.	1590750.	1060500.	530250.	265125.	106050.	53025.
64	11003.	2200600.	1650450.	1100300.	550150.	275075.	110030.	55015.
65	11415.	2283000.	1712250.	1141500.	570750.	285375.	114150.	57075.
66	11900.	2380000.	1785000.	1190000.	595000.	297500.	119000.	59500.
67	12406.	2481200.	1860900.	1240600.	620300.	310150.	124060.	62030.
68	12933.	2586600.	1939950.	1293300.	646650.	323325.	129330.	64665.
69	13483.	2696600.	2022450.	1348300.	674150.	337075.	134830.	67415.
70	14056.	2811200.	2108400.	1405600.	702800.	351400.	140560.	70280.
71	14724.	2944800.	2208600.	1472400.	736200.	368100.	147240.	73620.
72	15423.	3084600.	2313450.	1542300.	771150.	385575.	154230.	77115.
73	16156.	3231200.	2423400.	1615600.	807800.	403900.	161560.	80780.
74	16923.	3384600.	2538450.	1692300.	846150.	423075.	169230.	84615.
75	17727.	3545400.	2659050.	1772700.	886350.	443175.	177270.	88635.



BRAZIL

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	P0P (TH0US)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	73100.	3655.00	2193.00	1096.50	731.00	365.50	219.30	73.10
62	75300.	3765.00	2259.00	1129.50	753.00	376.50	225.90	75.30
63	77500.	3875.00	2325.00	1162.50	775.00	387.50	232.50	77.50
64	79600.	3980.00	2388.00	1194.00	796.00	398.00	238.80	79.60
65	81800.	4090.00	2454.00	1227.00	818.00	409.00	245.40	81.80
66	84000.	4200.00	2520.00	1260.00	840.00	420.00	252.00	84.00
67	86300.	4315.00	2589.00	1294.50	863.00	431.50	258.90	86.30
68	88700.	4435.00	2661.00	1330.50	887.00	443.50	266.10	88.70
69	91200.	4560.00	2736.00	1368.00	912.00	456.00	273.60	91.20
70	93800.	4690.00	2814.00	1407.00	938.00	469.00	281.40	93.80
71	96400.	4820.00	2892.00	1446.00	964.00	482.00	289.20	96.40
72	99300.	4965.00	2979.00	1489.50	993.00	496.50	297.90	99.30
73	102300.	5115.00	3069.00	1534.50	1023.00	511.50	306.90	102.30
74	105300.	5265.00	3159.00	1579.50	1053.00	526.50	315.90	105.30
75	108500.	5425.00	3255.00	1627.50	1085.00	542.50	325.50	108.50

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	13465.	2693000.	2019750.	1346500.	673250.	336625.	134650.	67325.
62	14037.	2807400.	2105550.	1403700.	701850.	350925.	140370.	70185.
63	14634.	2926800.	2195100.	1463400.	731700.	365850.	146340.	73170.
64	15256.	3051200.	2288400.	1525600.	762800.	381400.	152560.	76280.
65	15904.	3180800.	2385600.	1590400.	795200.	397600.	159040.	79520.
66	16620.	3324000.	2493000.	1662000.	831000.	415500.	166200.	83100.
67	17368.	3473600.	2605200.	1736800.	868400.	434200.	173680.	86840.
68	18149.	3629800.	2722350.	1814900.	907450.	453725.	181490.	90745.
69	18966.	3793200.	2844900.	1896600.	948300.	474150.	189660.	94830.
70	19819.	3963800.	2972850.	1981900.	990950.	495475.	198190.	99095.
71	20810.	4162000.	3121500.	2081000.	1040500.	520250.	208100.	104050.
72	21851.	4370200.	3277650.	2185100.	1092550.	546275.	218510.	109255.
73	22943.	4588600.	3441450.	2294300.	1147150.	573575.	229430.	114715.
74	24091.	4818200.	3613650.	2409100.	1204550.	602275.	240910.	120455.
75	25295.	5059000.	3794250.	2529500.	1264750.	632375.	252950.	126475.

CAMBØDIA

MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIØNS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION IN ARMED FØRCES (THØUSANDS)							
	PØP(THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	5050.	252.50	151.50	75.75	50.50	25.25	15.15	5.05
62	5750.	287.50	172.50	86.25	57.50	28.75	17.25	5.75
63	5860.	293.00	175.80	87.90	58.60	29.30	17.58	5.86
64	5970.	298.50	179.10	89.55	59.70	29.85	17.91	5.97
65	6080.	304.00	182.40	91.20	60.80	30.40	18.24	6.08
66	6200.	310.00	186.00	93.00	62.00	31.00	18.60	6.20
67	6330.	316.50	189.90	94.95	63.30	31.65	18.99	6.33
68	6460.	323.00	193.80	96.90	64.60	32.30	19.38	6.46
69	6600.	330.00	198.00	99.00	66.00	33.00	19.80	6.60
70	6740.	337.00	202.20	101.10	67.40	33.70	20.22	6.74
71	6880.	344.00	206.40	103.20	68.80	34.40	20.64	6.88
72	7030.	351.50	210.90	105.45	70.30	35.15	21.09	7.03
73	7180.	359.00	215.40	107.70	71.80	35.90	21.54	7.18
74	7340.	367.00	220.20	110.10	73.40	36.70	22.02	7.34
75	7500.	375.00	225.00	112.50	75.00	37.50	22.50	7.50

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIØNS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP(M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	505.	101000.	75750.	50500.	25250.	12625.	5050.	2525.
62	520.	104000.	78000.	52000.	26000.	13000.	5200.	2600.
63	535.	107000.	80250.	53500.	26750.	13375.	5350.	2675.
64	551.	110200.	82650.	55100.	27550.	13775.	5510.	2755.
65	568.	113600.	85200.	56800.	28400.	14200.	5680.	2840.
66	585.	117000.	87750.	58500.	29250.	14625.	5850.	2925.
67	603.	120600.	90450.	60300.	30150.	15075.	6030.	3015.
68	621.	124200.	93150.	62100.	31050.	15525.	6210.	3105.
69	639.	127800.	95850.	63900.	31950.	15975.	6390.	3195.
70	659.	131800.	98850.	65900.	32950.	16475.	6590.	3295.
71	678.	135600.	101700.	67800.	33900.	16950.	6780.	3390.
72	699.	139800.	104850.	69900.	34950.	17475.	6990.	3495.
73	720.	144000.	108000.	72000.	36000.	18000.	7200.	3600.
74	741.	148200.	111150.	74100.	37050.	18525.	7410.	3705.
75	763.	152600.	114450.	76300.	38150.	19075.	7630.	3815.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1230.	61.50	36.90	18.45	12.30	6.15	3.69	1.23
62	1250.	62.50	37.50	18.75	12.50	6.25	3.75	1.25
63	1270.	63.50	38.10	19.05	12.70	6.35	3.81	1.27
64	1280.	64.00	38.40	19.20	12.80	6.40	3.84	1.28
65	1300.	65.00	39.00	19.50	13.00	6.50	3.90	1.30
66	1310.	65.50	39.30	19.65	13.10	6.55	3.93	1.31
67	1330.	66.50	39.90	19.95	13.30	6.65	3.99	1.33
68	1340.	67.00	40.20	20.10	13.40	6.70	4.02	1.34
69	1360.	68.00	40.80	20.40	13.60	6.80	4.08	1.36
70	1380.	69.00	41.40	20.70	13.80	6.90	4.14	1.38
71	1390.	69.50	41.70	20.85	13.90	6.95	4.17	1.39
72	1410.	70.50	42.30	21.15	14.10	7.05	4.23	1.41
73	1430.	71.50	42.90	21.45	14.30	7.15	4.29	1.43
74	1440.	72.00	43.20	21.60	14.40	7.20	4.32	1.44
75	1460.	73.00	43.80	21.90	14.60	7.30	4.38	1.46

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	131.	26200.	19650.	13100.	6550.	3275.	1310.	655.
62	135.	27000.	20250.	13500.	6750.	3375.	1350.	675.
63	139.	27800.	20850.	13900.	6950.	3475.	1390.	695.
64	143.	28600.	21450.	14300.	7150.	3575.	1430.	715.
65	147.	29400.	22050.	14700.	7350.	3675.	1470.	735.
66	152.	30400.	22800.	15200.	7600.	3800.	1520.	760.
67	156.	31200.	23400.	15600.	7800.	3900.	1560.	780.
68	161.	32200.	24150.	16100.	8050.	4025.	1610.	805.
69	166.	33200.	24900.	16600.	8300.	4150.	1660.	830.
70	171.	34200.	25650.	17100.	8550.	4275.	1710.	855.
71	177.	35400.	26550.	17700.	8850.	4425.	1770.	885.
72	183.	36600.	27450.	18300.	9150.	4575.	1830.	915.
73	189.	37800.	28350.	18900.	9450.	4725.	1890.	945.
74	196.	39200.	29400.	19600.	9800.	4900.	1960.	980.
75	203.	40600.	30450.	20300.	10150.	5075.	2030.	1015.

Notes: Armed Forces and Defense Budgets are increasing (See App. II and text).

CHAD

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)					
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	2680.	134.00	80.40	40.20	26.80	13.40	8.04	2.68
62	2720.	136.00	81.60	40.80	27.20	13.60	8.16	2.72
63	2770.	138.50	83.10	41.55	27.70	13.85	8.31	2.77
64	2830.	141.50	84.90	42.45	28.30	14.15	8.49	2.83
65	2890.	144.50	86.70	43.35	28.90	14.45	8.67	2.89
66	2940.	147.00	88.20	44.10	29.40	14.70	8.82	2.94
67	3000.	150.00	90.00	45.00	30.00	15.00	9.00	3.00
68	3060.	153.00	91.80	45.90	30.60	15.30	9.18	3.06
69	3120.	156.00	93.60	46.80	31.20	15.60	9.36	3.12
70	3190.	159.50	95.70	47.85	31.90	15.95	9.57	3.19
71	3250.	162.50	97.50	48.75	32.50	16.25	9.75	3.25
72	3320.	166.00	99.60	49.80	33.20	16.60	9.96	3.32
73	3380.	169.00	101.40	50.70	33.80	16.90	10.14	3.38
74	3450.	172.50	103.50	51.75	34.50	17.25	10.35	3.45
75	3520.	176.00	105.60	52.80	35.20	17.60	10.56	3.52

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	293.	58600.	43950.	29300.	14650.	7325.	2930.	1465.
62	301.	60200.	45150.	30100.	15050.	7525.	3010.	1505.
63	310.	62000.	46500.	31000.	15500.	7750.	3100.	1550.
64	320.	64000.	48000.	32000.	16000.	8000.	3200.	1600.
65	329.	65800.	49350.	32900.	16450.	8225.	3290.	1645.
66	339.	67800.	50850.	33900.	16950.	8475.	3390.	1695.
67	349.	69800.	52350.	34900.	17450.	8725.	3490.	1745.
68	360.	72000.	54000.	36000.	18000.	9000.	3600.	1800.
69	371.	74200.	55650.	37100.	18550.	9275.	3710.	1855.
70	382.	76400.	57300.	38200.	19100.	9550.	3820.	1910.
71	395.	79000.	59250.	39500.	19750.	9875.	3950.	1975.
72	409.	81800.	61350.	40900.	20450.	10225.	4090.	2045.
73	423.	84600.	63450.	42300.	21150.	10575.	4230.	2115.
74	438.	87600.	65700.	43800.	21900.	10950.	4380.	2190.
75	453.	90600.	67950.	45300.	22650.	11325.	4530.	2265.

Notes: Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).  
Insufficient budgetary data to extrapolate.

CHINA (TAIWAN)

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)					
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	11000.	550.00	330.00	165.00	110.00	55.00	33.00	11.00
62	11300.	565.00	339.00	169.50	113.00	56.50	33.90	11.30
63	11700.	585.00	351.00	175.50	117.00	58.50	35.10	11.70
64	12000.	600.00	360.00	180.00	120.00	60.00	36.00	12.00
65	12400.	620.00	372.00	186.00	124.00	62.00	37.20	12.40
66	12800.	640.00	384.00	192.00	128.00	64.00	38.40	12.80
67	13100.	655.00	393.00	196.50	131.00	65.50	39.30	13.10
68	13500.	675.00	405.00	202.50	135.00	67.50	40.50	13.50
69	13800.	690.00	414.00	207.00	138.00	69.00	41.40	13.80
70	14200.	710.00	426.00	213.00	142.00	71.00	42.60	14.20
71	14600.	730.00	438.00	219.00	146.00	73.00	43.80	14.60
72	15000.	750.00	450.00	225.00	150.00	75.00	45.00	15.00
73	15400.	770.00	462.00	231.00	154.00	77.00	46.20	15.40
74	15800.	790.00	474.00	237.00	158.00	79.00	47.40	15.80
75	16100.	805.00	483.00	241.50	161.00	80.50	48.30	16.10

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	1705.	341000.	255750.	170500.	85250.	42625.	17050.	8525.
62	1764.	352800.	264600.	176400.	88200.	44100.	17640.	8820.
63	1826.	365200.	273900.	182600.	91300.	45650.	18260.	9130.
64	1890.	378000.	283500.	189000.	94500.	47250.	18900.	9450.
65	1956.	391200.	293400.	195600.	97800.	48900.	19560.	9780.
66	2029.	405800.	304350.	202900.	101450.	50725.	20290.	10145.
67	2106.	421200.	315900.	210600.	105300.	52650.	21060.	10530.
68	2185.	437000.	327750.	218500.	109250.	54625.	21850.	10925.
69	2266.	453200.	339900.	226600.	113300.	56650.	22660.	11330.
70	2351.	470200.	352650.	235100.	117550.	58775.	23510.	11755.
71	2446.	489200.	366900.	244600.	122300.	61150.	24460.	12230.
72	2543.	508600.	381450.	254300.	127150.	63575.	25430.	12715.
73	2645.	529000.	396750.	264500.	132250.	66125.	26450.	13225.
74	2751.	550200.	412650.	275100.	137550.	68775.	27510.	13755.
75	2861.	572200.	425150.	286100.	143050.	71525.	28610.	14305.

CØNGØ (BZVL)

MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION		IN ARMED FØRCES (THØUSANDS)					
	PØP(THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	810.	40.50	24.30	12.15	8.10	4.05	2.43	.81
62	820.	41.00	24.60	12.30	8.20	4.10	2.46	.82
63	838.	41.90	25.14	12.57	8.38	4.19	2.51	.83
64	856.	42.80	25.68	12.84	8.56	4.28	2.56	.85
65	875.	43.75	26.25	13.12	8.75	4.37	2.62	.87
66	895.	44.75	26.85	13.42	8.95	4.47	2.68	.89
67	914.	45.70	27.42	13.71	9.14	4.57	2.74	.91
68	934.	46.70	28.02	14.01	9.34	4.67	2.80	.93
69	955.	47.75	28.65	14.32	9.55	4.77	2.86	.95
70	976.	48.80	29.28	14.64	9.76	4.88	2.92	.97
71	997.	49.85	29.91	14.95	9.97	4.98	2.99	.99
72	1020.	51.00	30.60	15.30	10.20	5.10	3.06	1.02
73	1040.	52.00	31.20	15.60	10.40	5.20	3.12	1.04
74	1060.	53.00	31.80	15.90	10.60	5.30	3.18	1.06
75	1090.	54.50	32.70	16.35	10.90	5.45	3.27	1.09

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP		(THØUS\$US)					
	GNP(M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	33.	6600.	4950.	3300.	1650.	825.	330.	165.
62	34.	6800.	5100.	3400.	1700.	850.	340.	170.
63	35.	7000.	5250.	3500.	1750.	875.	350.	175.
64	36.	7200.	5400.	3600.	1800.	900.	360.	180.
65	37.	7400.	5550.	3700.	1850.	925.	370.	185.
66	38.	7600.	5700.	3800.	1900.	950.	380.	190.
67	39.	7800.	5850.	3900.	1950.	975.	390.	195.
68	41.	8200.	6150.	4100.	2050.	1025.	410.	205.
69	42.	8400.	6300.	4200.	2100.	1050.	420.	210.
70	43.	8600.	6450.	4300.	2150.	1075.	430.	215.
71	45.	9000.	6750.	4500.	2250.	1125.	450.	225.
72	46.	9200.	6900.	4600.	2300.	1150.	460.	230.
73	48.	9600.	7200.	4800.	2400.	1200.	480.	240.
74	49.	9800.	7350.	4900.	2450.	1225.	490.	245.
75	51.	10200.	7650.	5100.	2550.	1275.	510.	255.

Notes: Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).  
 Defense Budget data are insufficient to extropolate.

COSTA RICA  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1230.	61.50	36.90	18.45	12.30	6.15	3.69	1.23
62	1270.	63.50	38.10	19.05	12.70	6.35	3.81	1.27
63	1340.	67.00	40.20	20.10	13.40	6.70	4.02	1.34
64	1380.	69.00	41.40	20.70	13.80	6.90	4.14	1.38
65	1430.	71.50	42.90	21.45	14.30	7.15	4.29	1.43
66	1470.	73.50	44.10	22.05	14.70	7.35	4.41	1.47
67	1520.	76.00	45.60	22.80	15.20	7.60	4.56	1.52
68	1570.	78.50	47.10	23.55	15.70	7.85	4.71	1.57
69	1630.	81.50	48.90	24.45	16.30	8.15	4.89	1.63
70	1680.	84.00	50.40	25.20	16.80	8.40	5.04	1.68
71	1730.	86.50	51.90	25.95	17.30	8.65	5.19	1.73
72	1790.	89.50	53.70	26.85	17.90	8.95	5.37	1.79
73	1850.	92.50	55.50	27.75	18.50	9.25	5.55	1.85
74	1910.	95.50	57.30	28.65	19.10	9.55	5.73	1.91
75	1970.	98.50	59.10	29.55	19.70	9.85	5.91	1.97

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	488.	97600.	73200.	48800.	24400.	12200.	4880.	2440.
62	503.	100600.	75450.	50300.	25150.	12575.	5030.	2515.
63	518.	103600.	77700.	51800.	25900.	12950.	5180.	2590.
64	533.	106600.	79950.	53300.	26650.	13325.	5330.	2665.
65	549.	109800.	82350.	54900.	27450.	13725.	5490.	2745.
66	569.	113800.	85350.	56900.	28450.	14225.	5690.	2845.
67	589.	117800.	88350.	58900.	29450.	14725.	5890.	2945.
68	609.	121800.	91350.	60900.	30450.	15225.	6090.	3045.
69	631.	126200.	94650.	63100.	31550.	15775.	6310.	3155.
70	653.	130600.	97950.	65300.	32650.	16325.	6530.	3265.
71	679.	135800.	101850.	67900.	33950.	16975.	6790.	3395.
72	706.	141200.	105900.	70600.	35300.	17650.	7060.	3530.
73	734.	146800.	110100.	73400.	36700.	18350.	7340.	3670.
74	763.	152600.	114450.	76300.	38150.	19075.	7630.	3815.
75	794.	158800.	119100.	79400.	39700.	19850.	7940.	3970.

Notes: The Armed Forces are numerically stabilized at a figure of 1200, although this undoubtedly varies somewhat.

CYPRUS

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES		(THOUSANDS)			
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	577.	28.85	17.31	8.65	5.77	2.88	1.73	.57
62	580.	29.00	17.40	8.70	5.80	2.90	1.74	.58
63	589.	29.45	17.67	8.83	5.89	2.94	1.76	.58
64	600.	30.00	18.00	9.00	6.00	3.00	1.80	.60
65	610.	30.50	18.30	9.15	6.10	3.05	1.83	.61
66	621.	31.05	18.63	9.31	6.21	3.10	1.86	.62
67	634.	31.70	19.02	9.51	6.34	3.17	1.90	.63
68	646.	32.30	19.38	9.69	6.46	3.23	1.93	.64
69	659.	32.95	19.77	9.88	6.59	3.29	1.97	.65
70	673.	33.65	20.19	10.09	6.73	3.36	2.01	.67
71	686.	34.30	20.58	10.29	6.86	3.43	2.05	.68
72	701.	35.05	21.03	10.51	7.01	3.50	2.10	.70
73	717.	35.85	21.51	10.75	7.17	3.58	2.15	.71
74	732.	36.60	21.96	10.98	7.32	3.66	2.19	.73
75	748.	37.40	22.44	11.22	7.48	3.74	2.24	.74

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	227.	45400.	34050.	22700.	11350.	5675.	2270.	1135.
62	233.	46600.	34950.	23300.	11650.	5825.	2330.	1165.
63	240.	48000.	36000.	24000.	12000.	6000.	2400.	1200.
64	248.	49600.	37200.	24800.	12400.	6200.	2480.	1240.
65	255.	51000.	38250.	25500.	12750.	6375.	2550.	1275.
66	263.	52600.	39450.	26300.	13150.	6575.	2630.	1315.
67	271.	54200.	40650.	27100.	13550.	6775.	2710.	1355.
68	279.	55800.	41850.	27900.	13950.	6975.	2790.	1395.
69	287.	57400.	43050.	28700.	14350.	7175.	2870.	1435.
70	296.	59200.	44400.	29600.	14800.	7400.	2960.	1480.
71	305.	61000.	45750.	30500.	15250.	7625.	3050.	1525.
72	314.	62800.	47100.	31400.	15700.	7850.	3140.	1570.
73	323.	64600.	48450.	32300.	16150.	8075.	3230.	1615.
74	333.	66600.	49950.	33300.	16650.	8325.	3330.	1665.
75	343.	68600.	51450.	34300.	17150.	8575.	3430.	1715.

Notes: See note in App. II.



DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES		(THOUSANDS)			
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	3110.	155.50	93.30	46.65	31.10	15.55	9.33	3.11
62	3220.	161.00	96.60	48.30	32.20	16.10	9.66	3.22
63	3330.	166.50	99.90	49.95	33.30	16.65	9.99	3.33
64	3420.	171.00	102.60	51.30	34.20	17.10	10.26	3.42
65	3520.	176.00	105.60	52.80	35.20	17.60	10.56	3.52
66	3610.	180.50	108.30	54.15	36.10	18.05	10.83	3.61
67	3720.	186.00	111.60	55.80	37.20	18.60	11.16	3.72
68	3820.	191.00	114.60	57.30	38.20	19.10	11.46	3.82
69	3930.	196.50	117.90	58.95	39.30	19.65	11.79	3.93
70	4050.	202.50	121.50	60.75	40.50	20.25	12.15	4.05
71	4170.	208.50	125.10	62.55	41.70	20.85	12.51	4.17
72	4290.	214.50	128.70	64.35	42.90	21.45	12.87	4.29
73	4420.	221.00	132.60	66.30	44.20	22.10	13.26	4.42
74	4550.	227.50	136.50	68.25	45.50	22.75	13.65	4.55
75	4690.	234.50	140.70	70.35	46.90	23.45	14.07	4.69

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	721.	144200.	108150.	72100.	36050.	18025.	7210.	3605.
62	743.	148600.	111450.	74300.	37150.	18575.	7430.	3715.
63	765.	153000.	114750.	76500.	38250.	19125.	7650.	3825.
64	788.	157600.	118200.	78800.	39400.	19700.	7880.	3940.
65	811.	162200.	121650.	81100.	40550.	20275.	8110.	4055.
66	836.	167200.	125400.	83600.	41800.	20900.	8360.	4180.
67	861.	172200.	129150.	86100.	43050.	21525.	8610.	4305.
68	887.	177400.	133050.	88700.	44350.	22175.	8870.	4435.
69	913.	182600.	136950.	91300.	45650.	22825.	9130.	4565.
70	941.	188200.	141150.	94100.	47050.	23525.	9410.	4705.
71	969.	193800.	145350.	96900.	48450.	24225.	9690.	4845.
72	998.	199600.	149700.	99800.	49900.	24950.	9980.	4990.
73	1028.	205600.	154200.	102800.	51400.	25700.	10280.	5140.
74	1059.	211800.	158850.	105900.	52950.	26475.	10590.	5295.
75	1091.	218200.	163650.	109100.	54550.	27275.	10910.	5455.

EL SALVADØR

MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIONØS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION		IN ARMED FØRCES		(THØUSANDS)			
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50		
61	2500.	125.00	75.00	37.50	25.00	12.50	7.50	2.50
62	2810.	140.50	84.30	42.15	28.10	14.05	8.43	2.81
63	2900.	145.00	87.00	43.50	29.00	14.50	8.70	2.90
64	2990.	149.50	89.70	44.85	29.90	14.95	8.97	2.99
65	3090.	154.50	92.70	46.35	30.90	15.45	9.27	3.09
66	3190.	159.50	95.70	47.85	31.90	15.95	9.57	3.19
67	3290.	164.50	98.70	49.35	32.90	16.45	9.87	3.29
68	3390.	169.50	101.70	50.85	33.90	16.95	10.17	3.39
69	3500.	175.00	105.00	52.50	35.00	17.50	10.50	3.50
70	3620.	181.00	108.60	54.30	36.20	18.10	10.86	3.62
71	3730.	186.50	111.90	55.95	37.30	18.65	11.19	3.73
72	3850.	192.50	115.50	57.75	38.50	19.25	11.55	3.85
73	3970.	198.50	119.10	59.55	39.70	19.85	11.91	3.97
74	4090.	204.50	122.70	61.35	40.90	20.45	12.27	4.09
75	4220.	211.00	126.60	63.30	42.20	21.10	12.66	4.22

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIONØS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP		(THØUS\$UV)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0			5.00	2.50
61	549.	109800.	82350.	54900.	27450.	13725.	5490.	2745.
62	565.	113000.	84750.	56500.	28250.	14125.	5650.	2825.
63	582.	116400.	87300.	58200.	29100.	14550.	5820.	2910.
64	600.	120000.	90000.	60000.	30000.	15000.	6000.	3000.
65	618.	123600.	92700.	61800.	30900.	15450.	6180.	3090.
66	641.	128200.	96150.	64100.	32050.	16025.	6410.	3205.
67	664.	132800.	99600.	66400.	33200.	16600.	6640.	3320.
68	689.	137800.	103350.	68900.	34450.	17225.	6890.	3445.
69	715.	143000.	107250.	71500.	35750.	17875.	7150.	3575.
70	741.	148200.	111150.	74100.	37050.	18525.	7410.	3705.
71	771.	154200.	115650.	77100.	38550.	19275.	7710.	3855.
72	801.	160200.	120150.	80100.	40050.	20025.	8010.	4005.
73	834.	166800.	125100.	83400.	41700.	20850.	8340.	4170.
74	867.	173400.	130050.	86700.	43350.	21675.	8670.	4335.
75	902.	180400.	135300.	90200.	45100.	22550.	9020.	4510.

Notes: Armed Forces seem to have been numerically oriented at about 6800, but are decreasing.

GABØN

MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION IN ARMED FØRCES (THØUSANDS)							
	PØP(THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	448.	22.40	13.44	6.72	4.48	2.24	1.34	.44
62	453.	22.65	13.59	6.79	4.53	2.26	1.35	.45
63	457.	22.85	13.71	6.85	4.57	2.28	1.37	.45
64	460.	23.00	13.80	6.90	4.60	2.30	1.38	.46
65	464.	23.20	13.92	6.96	4.64	2.32	1.39	.46
66	468.	23.40	14.04	7.02	4.68	2.34	1.40	.46
67	472.	23.60	14.16	7.08	4.72	2.36	1.41	.47
68	475.	23.75	14.25	7.12	4.75	2.37	1.42	.47
69	479.	23.95	14.37	7.18	4.79	2.39	1.43	.47
70	483.	24.15	14.49	7.24	4.83	2.41	1.44	.48
71	487.	24.35	14.61	7.30	4.87	2.43	1.46	.48
72	491.	24.55	14.73	7.36	4.91	2.45	1.47	.49
73	495.	24.75	14.85	7.42	4.95	2.47	1.48	.49
74	499.	24.95	14.97	7.48	4.99	2.49	1.49	.49
75	503.	25.15	15.09	7.54	5.03	2.51	1.50	.50

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP(M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	46.	9200.	6900.	4600.	2300.	1150.	460.	230.
62	48.	9600.	7200.	4800.	2400.	1200.	480.	240.
63	49.	9800.	7350.	4900.	2450.	1225.	490.	245.
64	51.	10200.	7650.	5100.	2550.	1275.	510.	255.
65	52.	10400.	7800.	5200.	2600.	1300.	520.	260.
66	54.	10800.	8100.	5400.	2700.	1350.	540.	270.
67	55.	11000.	8250.	5500.	2750.	1375.	550.	275.
68	57.	11400.	8550.	5700.	2850.	1425.	570.	285.
69	59.	11800.	8850.	5900.	2950.	1475.	590.	295.
70	60.	12000.	9000.	6000.	3000.	1500.	600.	300.
71	63.	12600.	9450.	6300.	3150.	1575.	630.	315.
72	65.	13000.	9750.	6500.	3250.	1625.	650.	325.
73	67.	13400.	10050.	6700.	3350.	1675.	670.	335.
74	69.	13800.	10350.	6900.	3450.	1725.	690.	345.
75	72.	14400.	10800.	7200.	3600.	1800.	720.	360.

Notes: Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).  
 Insufficient budgetary data for extropolation.

GUATEMALA

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES		(THOUSANDS)			
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	3890.	194.50	116.70	58.35	38.90	19.45	11.67	3.89
62	4020.	201.00	120.60	60.30	40.20	20.10	12.06	4.02
63	4100.	205.00	123.00	61.50	41.00	20.50	12.30	4.10
64	4230.	211.50	126.90	63.45	42.30	21.15	12.69	4.23
65	4350.	217.50	130.50	65.25	43.50	21.75	13.05	4.35
66	4490.	224.50	134.70	67.35	44.90	22.45	13.47	4.49
67	4640.	232.00	139.20	69.60	46.40	23.20	13.92	4.64
68	4780.	239.00	143.40	71.70	47.80	23.90	14.34	4.78
69	4930.	246.50	147.90	73.95	49.30	24.65	14.79	4.93
70	5070.	253.50	152.10	76.05	50.70	25.35	15.21	5.07
71	5240.	262.00	157.20	78.60	52.40	26.20	15.72	5.24
72	5400.	270.00	162.00	81.00	54.00	27.00	16.20	5.40
73	5570.	278.50	167.10	83.55	55.70	27.85	16.71	5.57
74	5730.	286.50	171.90	85.95	57.30	28.65	17.19	5.73
75	5900.	295.00	177.00	88.50	59.00	29.50	17.70	5.90

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	699.	139800.	104850.	69900.	34950.	17475.	6990.	3495.
62	720.	144000.	108000.	72000.	36000.	18000.	7200.	3600.
63	742.	148400.	111300.	74200.	37100.	18550.	7420.	3710.
64	764.	152800.	114600.	76400.	38200.	19100.	7640.	3820.
65	787.	157400.	118050.	78700.	39350.	19675.	7870.	3935.
66	816.	163200.	122400.	81600.	40800.	20400.	8160.	4080.
67	846.	169200.	126900.	84600.	42300.	21150.	8460.	4230.
68	878.	175600.	131700.	87800.	43900.	21950.	8780.	4390.
69	910.	182000.	136500.	91000.	45500.	22750.	9100.	4550.
70	944.	188800.	141600.	94400.	47200.	23600.	9440.	4720.
71	982.	196400.	147300.	98200.	49100.	24550.	9820.	4910.
72	1021.	204200.	153150.	102100.	51050.	25525.	10210.	5105.
73	1062.	212400.	159300.	106200.	53100.	26550.	10620.	5310.
74	1104.	220800.	165600.	110400.	55200.	27600.	11040.	5520.
75	1148.	229600.	172200.	114800.	57400.	28700.	11480.	5740.

Notes: Armed Forces were numerically stabilized at 8400, although available data shows a drop to 7900 in 1962.

HAITI

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POP (THOUS)	5.00	POPULATION	3.00	IN ARMED FORCES	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	4250.	212.50	127.50	63.75	42.50	21.25	12.75	4.25	4.25	4.25
62	4350.	217.50	130.50	65.25	43.50	21.75	13.05	4.35	4.35	4.35
63	4450.	222.50	133.50	66.75	44.50	22.25	13.35	4.45	4.45	4.45
64	4550.	227.50	136.50	68.25	45.50	22.75	13.65	4.55	4.55	4.55
65	4650.	232.50	139.50	69.75	46.50	23.25	13.95	4.65	4.65	4.65
66	4760.	238.00	142.80	71.40	47.60	23.80	14.28	4.76	4.76	4.76
67	4870.	243.50	146.10	73.05	48.70	24.35	14.61	4.87	4.87	4.87
68	4980.	249.00	149.40	74.70	49.80	24.90	14.94	4.98	4.98	4.98
69	5100.	255.00	153.00	76.50	51.00	25.50	15.30	5.10	5.10	5.10
70	5210.	260.50	156.30	78.15	52.10	26.05	15.63	5.21	5.21	5.21
71	5330.	266.50	159.90	79.95	53.30	26.65	15.99	5.33	5.33	5.33
72	5460.	273.00	163.80	81.90	54.60	27.30	16.38	5.46	5.46	5.46
73	5580.	279.00	167.40	83.70	55.80	27.90	16.74	5.58	5.58	5.58
74	5710.	285.50	171.30	85.65	57.10	28.55	17.13	5.71	5.71	5.71
75	5840.	292.00	175.20	87.60	58.40	29.20	17.52	5.84	5.84	5.84

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	PERCENT OF GNP	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	403.	80600.	60450.	40300.	20150.	10075.	4030.	2015.	2015.
62	415.	83000.	62250.	41500.	20750.	10375.	4150.	2075.	2075.
63	427.	85400.	64050.	42700.	21350.	10675.	4270.	2135.	2135.
64	440.	88000.	66000.	44000.	22000.	11000.	4400.	2200.	2200.
65	453.	90600.	67950.	45300.	22650.	11325.	4530.	2265.	2265.
66	467.	93400.	70050.	46700.	23350.	11675.	4670.	2335.	2335.
67	481.	96200.	72150.	48100.	24050.	12025.	4810.	2405.	2405.
68	495.	99000.	74250.	49500.	24750.	12375.	4950.	2475.	2475.
69	510.	102000.	76500.	51000.	25500.	12750.	5100.	2550.	2550.
70	525.	105000.	78750.	52500.	26250.	13125.	5250.	2625.	2625.
71	541.	108200.	81150.	54100.	27050.	13525.	5410.	2705.	2705.
72	557.	111400.	83550.	55700.	27850.	13925.	5570.	2785.	2785.
73	574.	114800.	86100.	57400.	28700.	14350.	5740.	2870.	2870.
74	591.	118200.	88650.	59100.	29550.	14775.	5910.	2955.	2955.
75	609.	121800.	91350.	60900.	30450.	15225.	6090.	3045.	3045.

INDIA  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP(THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	443000.	22150.00	13290.00	6645.00	4430.00	2215.00	1329.00	443.00
62	453000.	22650.00	13590.00	6795.00	4530.00	2265.00	1359.00	453.00
63	462000.	23100.00	13860.00	6930.00	4620.00	2310.00	1386.00	462.00
64	471000.	23550.00	14130.00	7065.00	4710.00	2355.00	1413.00	471.00
65	481000.	24050.00	14430.00	7215.00	4810.00	2405.00	1443.00	481.00
66	491000.	24550.00	14730.00	7365.00	4910.00	2455.00	1473.00	491.00
67	500000.	25000.00	15000.00	7500.00	5000.00	2500.00	1500.00	500.00
68	510000.	25500.00	15300.00	7650.00	5100.00	2550.00	1530.00	510.00
69	521000.	26050.00	15630.00	7815.00	5210.00	2605.00	1563.00	521.00
70	531000.	26550.00	15930.00	7965.00	5310.00	2655.00	1593.00	531.00
71	542000.	27100.00	16260.00	8130.00	5420.00	2710.00	1626.00	542.00
72	552000.	27600.00	16560.00	8280.00	5520.00	2760.00	1656.00	552.00
73	563000.	28150.00	16890.00	8445.00	5630.00	2815.00	1689.00	563.00
74	575000.	28750.00	17250.00	8625.00	5750.00	2875.00	1725.00	575.00
75	586000.	29300.00	17580.00	8790.00	5860.00	2930.00	1758.00	586.00

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP(M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	31435.	6287000.	4715250.	3143500.	1571750.	785875.	314350.	157175.
62	33007.	6601400.	4951050.	3300700.	1650350.	825175.	330070.	165035.
63	34657.	6931400.	5198550.	3465700.	1732850.	866425.	346570.	173285.
64	36390.	7278000.	5458500.	3639000.	1819500.	909750.	363900.	181950.
65	38209.	7641800.	5731350.	3820900.	1910450.	955225.	382090.	191045.
66	40120.	8024000.	6018000.	4012000.	2006000.	1003000.	401200.	200600.
67	42126.	8425200.	6318900.	4212600.	2106300.	1053150.	421260.	210630.
68	44232.	8846400.	6634800.	4423200.	2211600.	1105800.	442320.	221160.
69	46444.	9288800.	6966600.	4644400.	2322200.	1161100.	464440.	232220.
70	48766.	9753200.	7314900.	4876600.	2438300.	1219150.	487660.	243830.
71	51204.	10240800.	7680600.	5120400.	2560200.	1280100.	512040.	256020.
72	53764.	10752800.	8064600.	5376400.	2688200.	1344100.	537640.	268820.
73	56453.	11290600.	8467950.	5645300.	2822650.	1411325.	564530.	282265.
74	59275.	11855000.	8891250.	5927500.	2963750.	1481875.	592750.	296375.
75	62239.	12447800.	9335850.	6223900.	3111950.	1555975.	622390.	311195.

Notes: India's conflict with China is causing an increase in the Armed Forces, but it is not possible to say where this will stabilize.

It has also resulted in a doubling of the defense budget.

IRAN

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	20700.	1035.00	621.00	310.50	207.00	103.50	62.10	20.70
62	21200.	1060.00	636.00	318.00	212.00	106.00	63.60	21.20
63	21600.	1080.00	648.00	324.00	216.00	108.00	64.80	21.60
64	22100.	1105.00	663.00	331.50	221.00	110.50	66.30	22.10
65	22600.	1130.00	678.00	339.00	226.00	113.00	67.80	22.60
66	23200.	1160.00	696.00	348.00	232.00	116.00	69.60	23.20
67	23700.	1185.00	711.00	355.50	237.00	118.50	71.10	23.70
68	24300.	1215.00	729.00	364.50	243.00	121.50	72.90	24.30
69	24800.	1240.00	744.00	372.00	248.00	124.00	74.40	24.80
70	25400.	1270.00	762.00	381.00	254.00	127.00	76.20	25.40
71	26000.	1300.00	780.00	390.00	260.00	130.00	78.00	26.00
72	26600.	1330.00	798.00	399.00	266.00	133.00	79.80	26.60
73	27300.	1365.00	819.00	409.50	273.00	136.50	81.90	27.30
74	27900.	1395.00	837.00	418.50	279.00	139.50	83.70	27.90
75	28500.	1425.00	855.00	427.50	285.00	142.50	85.50	28.50

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	2428.	485600.	364200.	242800.	121400.	60700.	24280.	12140.
62	2526.	505200.	378900.	252600.	126300.	63150.	25260.	12630.
63	2627.	525400.	394050.	262700.	131350.	65675.	26270.	13135.
64	2732.	546400.	409800.	273200.	136600.	68300.	27320.	13660.
65	2841.	568200.	426150.	284100.	142050.	71025.	28410.	14205.
66	2955.	591000.	443250.	295500.	147750.	73875.	29550.	14775.
67	3073.	614600.	460950.	307300.	153650.	76825.	30730.	15365.
68	3196.	639200.	479400.	319600.	159800.	79900.	31960.	15980.
69	3323.	664600.	495450.	332300.	166150.	83075.	33230.	16615.
70	3456.	691200.	518400.	345600.	172800.	86400.	34560.	17280.
71	3595.	719000.	539250.	359500.	179750.	89875.	35950.	17975.
72	3738.	747600.	560700.	373800.	186900.	93450.	37380.	18690.
73	3888.	777600.	583200.	388800.	194400.	97200.	38880.	19440.
74	4043.	808600.	606450.	404300.	202150.	101075.	40430.	20215.
75	4205.	841000.	630750.	420500.	210250.	105125.	42050.	21025.

Notes: Armed Forces seem stabilized at a numerical strength of 208,000.

ISRAEL  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	2190.	109.50	65.70	32.85	21.90	10.95	6.57	2.19
62	2290.	114.50	68.70	34.35	22.90	11.45	6.87	2.29
63	2380.	119.00	71.40	35.70	23.80	11.90	7.14	2.38
64	2490.	124.50	74.70	37.35	24.90	12.45	7.47	2.49
65	2590.	129.50	77.70	38.85	25.90	12.95	7.77	2.59
66	2690.	134.50	80.70	40.35	26.90	13.45	8.07	2.69
67	2790.	139.50	83.70	41.85	27.90	13.95	8.37	2.79
68	2890.	144.50	86.70	43.35	28.90	14.45	8.67	2.89
69	2990.	149.50	89.70	44.85	29.90	14.95	8.97	2.99
70	3090.	154.50	92.70	46.35	30.90	15.45	9.27	3.09
71	3180.	159.00	95.40	47.70	31.80	15.90	9.54	3.18
72	3270.	163.50	98.10	49.05	32.70	16.35	9.81	3.27
73	3360.	168.00	100.80	50.40	33.60	16.80	10.08	3.36
74	3450.	172.50	103.50	51.75	34.50	17.25	10.35	3.45
75	3540.	177.00	106.20	53.10	35.40	17.70	10.62	3.54

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	2597.	519400.	389550.	259700.	129850.	64925.	25970.	12985.
62	2726.	545200.	408900.	272600.	136300.	68150.	27260.	13630.
63	2863.	572600.	429450.	286300.	143150.	71575.	28630.	14315.
64	3006.	601200.	450900.	300600.	150300.	75150.	30060.	15030.
65	3156.	631200.	473400.	315600.	157800.	78900.	31560.	15780.
66	3314.	662800.	497100.	331400.	165700.	82850.	33140.	16570.
67	3480.	696000.	522000.	348000.	174000.	87000.	34800.	17400.
68	3654.	730800.	548100.	365400.	182700.	91350.	36540.	18270.
69	3836.	767200.	575400.	383600.	191800.	95900.	38360.	19180.
70	4028.	805600.	604200.	402800.	201400.	100700.	40280.	20140.
71	4230.	846000.	634500.	423000.	211500.	105750.	42300.	21150.
72	4441.	888200.	666150.	444100.	222050.	111025.	44410.	22205.
73	4663.	932600.	699450.	466300.	233150.	116575.	46630.	23315.
74	4896.	979200.	734400.	489600.	244800.	122400.	48960.	24480.
75	5141.	1028200.	771150.	514100.	257050.	128525.	51410.	25705.

Notes: There is a numerical stability of 60,000 to 70,000 men for the regular Israeli army.

See note in App. II anent the budgetary data.



JAMAICA

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1630.	81.50	48.90	24.45	16.30	8.15	4.89	1.63
62	1640.	82.00	49.20	24.60	16.40	8.20	4.92	1.64
63	1680.	84.00	50.40	25.20	16.80	8.40	5.04	1.68
64	1710.	85.50	51.30	25.65	17.10	8.55	5.13	1.71
65	1740.	87.00	52.20	26.10	17.40	8.70	5.22	1.74
66	1780.	89.00	53.40	26.70	17.80	8.90	5.34	1.78
67	1820.	91.00	54.60	27.30	18.20	9.10	5.46	1.82
68	1860.	93.00	55.80	27.90	18.60	9.30	5.58	1.86
69	1910.	95.50	57.30	28.65	19.10	9.55	5.73	1.91
70	1950.	97.50	58.50	29.25	19.50	9.75	5.85	1.95
71	1990.	99.50	59.70	29.85	19.90	9.95	5.97	1.99
72	2040.	102.00	61.20	30.60	20.40	10.20	6.12	2.04
73	2090.	104.50	62.70	31.35	20.90	10.45	6.27	2.09
74	2140.	107.00	64.20	32.10	21.40	10.70	6.42	2.14
75	2180.	109.00	65.40	32.70	21.80	10.90	6.54	2.18

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	650.	130000.	97500.	65000.	32500.	16250.	6500.	3250.
62	676.	135200.	101400.	67600.	33800.	16900.	6760.	3380.
63	703.	140600.	105450.	70300.	35150.	17575.	7030.	3515.
64	731.	146200.	109650.	73100.	36550.	18275.	7310.	3655.
65	760.	152000.	114000.	76000.	38000.	19000.	7600.	3800.
66	790.	158000.	118500.	79000.	39500.	19750.	7900.	3950.
67	822.	164400.	123300.	82200.	41100.	20550.	8220.	4110.
68	855.	171000.	128250.	85500.	42750.	21375.	8550.	4275.
69	889.	177800.	133350.	88900.	44450.	22225.	8890.	4445.
70	925.	185000.	138750.	92500.	46250.	23125.	9250.	4625.
71	962.	192400.	144300.	96200.	48100.	24050.	9620.	4810.
72	1000.	200000.	150000.	100000.	50000.	25000.	10000.	5000.
73	1040.	208000.	156000.	104000.	52000.	26000.	10400.	5200.
74	1082.	216400.	162300.	108200.	54100.	27050.	10820.	5410.
75	1125.	225000.	168750.	112500.	56250.	28125.	11250.	5625.

Notes: Insufficient data for any extropolations.

## MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1690.	84.50	50.70	25.35	16.90	8.45	5.07	1.69
62	1730.	86.50	51.90	25.95	17.30	8.65	5.19	1.73
63	1780.	89.00	53.40	26.70	17.80	8.90	5.34	1.78
64	1820.	91.00	54.60	27.30	18.20	9.10	5.46	1.82
65	1870.	93.50	56.10	28.05	18.70	9.35	5.61	1.87
66	1920.	96.00	57.60	28.80	19.20	9.60	5.76	1.92
67	1960.	98.00	58.80	29.40	19.60	9.80	5.88	1.96
68	2010.	100.50	60.30	30.15	20.10	10.05	6.03	2.01
69	2050.	102.50	61.50	30.75	20.50	10.25	6.15	2.05
70	2100.	105.00	63.00	31.50	21.00	10.50	6.30	2.10
71	2150.	107.50	64.50	32.25	21.50	10.75	6.45	2.15
72	2200.	110.00	66.00	33.00	22.00	11.00	6.60	2.20
73	2260.	113.00	67.80	33.90	22.60	11.30	6.78	2.26
74	2310.	115.50	69.30	34.65	23.10	11.55	6.93	2.31
75	2360.	118.00	70.80	35.40	23.60	11.80	7.08	2.36

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	265.	53000.	39750.	26500.	13250.	6625.	2650.	1325.
62	271.	54200.	40650.	27100.	13550.	6775.	2710.	1355.
63	276.	55200.	41400.	27600.	13800.	6900.	2760.	1380.
64	281.	56200.	42150.	28100.	14050.	7025.	2810.	1405.
65	287.	57400.	43050.	28700.	14350.	7175.	2870.	1435.
66	296.	59200.	44400.	29600.	14800.	7400.	2960.	1480.
67	305.	61000.	45750.	30500.	15250.	7625.	3050.	1525.
68	314.	62800.	47100.	31400.	15700.	7850.	3140.	1570.
69	323.	64600.	48450.	32300.	16150.	8075.	3230.	1615.
70	333.	66600.	49950.	33300.	16650.	8325.	3330.	1665.
71	343.	68600.	51450.	34300.	17150.	8575.	3430.	1715.
72	353.	70600.	52950.	35300.	17650.	8825.	3530.	1765.
73	364.	72800.	54600.	36400.	18200.	9100.	3640.	1820.
74	375.	75000.	56250.	37500.	18750.	9375.	3750.	1875.
75	386.	77200.	57900.	38600.	19300.	9650.	3860.	1930.

KØREA (SØUTH)

MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIØNS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION		IN ARMED FØRCES (THØUSANDS)					
	PØP(THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	25400.	1270.00	762.00	381.00	254.00	127.00	76.20	25.40
62	26100.	1305.00	783.00	391.50	261.00	130.50	78.30	26.10
63	27200.	1360.00	816.00	408.00	272.00	136.00	81.60	27.20
64	27800.	1390.00	834.00	417.00	278.00	139.00	83.40	27.80
65	28300.	1415.00	849.00	424.50	283.00	141.50	84.90	28.30
66	28900.	1445.00	867.00	433.50	289.00	144.50	86.70	28.90
67	29500.	1475.00	885.00	442.50	295.00	147.50	88.50	29.50
68	30100.	1505.00	903.00	451.50	301.00	150.50	90.30	30.10
69	30700.	1535.00	921.00	460.50	307.00	153.50	92.10	30.70
70	31300.	1565.00	939.00	469.50	313.00	156.50	93.90	31.30
71	31900.	1595.00	957.00	478.50	319.00	159.50	95.70	31.90
72	32600.	1630.00	970.00	489.00	326.00	163.00	97.80	32.60
73	33400.	1670.00	1002.00	501.00	334.00	167.00	100.20	33.40
74	34200.	1710.00	1026.00	513.00	342.00	171.00	102.60	34.20
75	35000.	1750.00	1050.00	525.00	350.00	175.00	105.00	35.00

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIØNS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP		(THØUS\$US)					
	GNP(M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	2414.	482800.	362100.	241400.	120700.	60350.	24140.	12070.
62	2486.	497200.	372900.	248600.	124300.	62150.	24860.	12430.
63	2561.	512200.	384150.	256100.	128050.	64025.	25610.	12805.
64	2638.	527600.	395700.	263800.	131900.	65950.	26380.	13190.
65	2717.	543400.	407550.	271700.	135850.	67925.	27170.	13585.
66	2799.	559800.	419850.	279900.	139950.	69975.	27990.	13995.
67	2896.	579200.	434400.	289600.	144800.	72400.	28960.	14480.
68	2998.	599600.	449700.	299800.	149900.	74950.	29980.	14990.
69	3103.	620600.	465450.	310300.	155150.	77575.	31030.	15515.
70	3211.	642200.	481650.	321100.	160550.	80275.	32110.	16055.
71	3324.	664800.	498600.	332400.	166200.	83100.	33240.	16620.
72	3457.	691400.	518550.	345700.	172850.	86425.	34570.	17285.
73	3595.	719000.	539250.	359500.	179750.	89875.	35950.	17975.
74	3739.	747800.	560850.	373900.	186950.	93475.	37390.	18695.
75	3888.	777600.	583200.	388800.	194400.	97200.	38880.	19440.

Notes: Both Armed Forces and budgetary data indicate a changing outlook.

LAOS

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)					
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1850.	92.50	55.50	27.75	18.50	9.25	5.55	1.85
62	1890.	94.50	56.70	28.35	18.90	9.45	5.67	1.89
63	1930.	96.50	57.90	28.95	19.30	9.65	5.79	1.93
64	1970.	98.50	59.10	29.55	19.70	9.85	5.91	1.97
65	2020.	101.00	60.60	30.30	20.20	10.10	6.06	2.02
66	2070.	103.50	62.10	31.05	20.70	10.35	6.21	2.07
67	2110.	105.50	63.30	31.65	21.10	10.55	6.33	2.11
68	2160.	108.00	64.80	32.40	21.60	10.80	6.48	2.16
69	2200.	110.00	66.00	33.00	22.00	11.00	6.60	2.20
70	2250.	112.50	67.50	33.75	22.50	11.25	6.75	2.25
71	2300.	115.00	69.00	34.50	23.00	11.50	6.90	2.30
72	2350.	117.50	70.50	35.25	23.50	11.75	7.05	2.35
73	2410.	120.50	72.30	36.15	24.10	12.05	7.23	2.41
74	2460.	123.00	73.80	36.90	24.60	12.30	7.38	2.46
75	2510.	125.50	75.30	37.65	25.10	12.55	7.53	2.51

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THØUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	137.	27400.	20550.	13700.	6850.	3425.	1370.	685.
62	141.	28200.	21150.	14100.	7050.	3525.	1410.	705.
63	145.	29000.	21750.	14500.	7250.	3625.	1450.	725.
64	150.	30000.	22500.	15000.	7500.	3750.	1500.	750.
65	154.	30800.	23100.	15400.	7700.	3850.	1540.	770.
66	159.	31800.	23850.	15900.	7950.	3975.	1590.	795.
67	164.	32800.	24600.	16400.	8200.	4100.	1640.	820.
68	168.	33600.	25200.	16800.	8400.	4200.	1680.	840.
69	174.	34800.	26100.	17400.	8700.	4350.	1740.	870.
70	179.	35800.	26850.	17900.	8950.	4475.	1790.	895.
71	184.	36800.	27600.	18400.	9200.	4600.	1840.	920.
72	190.	38000.	28500.	19000.	9500.	4750.	1900.	950.
73	195.	39000.	29250.	19500.	9750.	4875.	1950.	975.
74	201.	40200.	30150.	20100.	10050.	5025.	2010.	1005.
75	207.	41400.	31050.	20700.	10350.	5175.	2070.	1035.

Notes: Armed Forces situation is too unstable for extrapolation.  
 Insufficient budgetary data for extrapolation.

LIBERIA  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1330.	66.50	19.90	19.95	13.30	6.65	3.99	1.33
62	1350.	67.50	40.50	20.25	13.50	6.75	4.05	1.35
63	1370.	68.50	41.10	20.55	13.70	6.85	4.11	1.37
64	1390.	69.50	41.70	20.85	13.90	6.95	4.17	1.39
65	1410.	70.50	42.30	21.15	14.10	7.05	4.23	1.41
66	1420.	71.00	42.60	21.30	14.20	7.10	4.26	1.42
67	1440.	72.00	43.20	21.60	14.40	7.20	4.32	1.44
68	1450.	72.50	43.50	21.75	14.50	7.25	4.35	1.45
69	1470.	73.50	44.10	22.05	14.70	7.35	4.41	1.47
70	1480.	74.00	44.40	22.20	14.80	7.40	4.44	1.48
71	1500.	75.00	45.00	22.50	15.00	7.50	4.50	1.50
72	1510.	75.50	45.30	22.65	15.10	7.55	4.53	1.51
73	1530.	76.50	45.90	22.95	15.30	7.65	4.59	1.53
74	1540.	77.00	46.20	23.10	15.40	7.70	4.62	1.54
75	1560.	78.00	46.80	23.40	15.60	7.80	4.68	1.56

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	164.	32800.	24600.	16400.	8200.	4100.	1640.	820.
62	168.	33600.	25200.	16800.	8400.	4200.	1680.	840.
63	172.	34400.	25800.	17200.	8600.	4300.	1720.	860.
64	177.	35400.	26550.	17700.	8850.	4425.	1770.	885.
65	181.	36200.	27150.	18100.	9050.	4525.	1810.	905.
66	186.	37200.	27900.	18600.	9300.	4650.	1860.	930.
67	190.	38000.	28500.	19000.	9500.	4750.	1900.	950.
68	195.	39000.	29250.	19500.	9750.	4875.	1950.	975.
69	200.	40000.	30000.	20000.	10000.	5000.	2000.	1000.
70	205.	41000.	30750.	20500.	10250.	5125.	2050.	1025.
71	210.	42000.	31500.	21000.	10500.	5250.	2100.	1050.
72	215.	43000.	32250.	21500.	10750.	5375.	2150.	1075.
73	221.	44200.	33150.	22100.	11050.	5525.	2210.	1105.
74	226.	45200.	33900.	22600.	11300.	5650.	2260.	1130.
75	232.	46400.	34800.	23200.	11600.	5800.	2320.	1160.

Notes: Insufficient budgetary data for extrapolation.

MALAGASY

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	5580.	279.00	167.40	83.70	55.80	27.90	16.74	5.58
62	5730.	286.50	171.90	85.95	57.30	28.65	17.19	5.73
63	5830.	291.50	174.90	87.45	58.30	29.15	17.49	5.83
64	5930.	296.50	177.90	88.95	59.30	29.65	17.79	5.93
65	6010.	300.50	180.30	90.15	60.10	30.05	18.03	6.01
66	6090.	304.50	182.70	91.35	60.90	30.45	18.27	6.09
67	6180.	309.00	185.40	92.70	61.80	30.90	18.54	6.18
68	6260.	313.00	187.80	93.90	62.60	31.30	18.78	6.26
69	6340.	317.00	190.20	95.10	63.40	31.70	19.02	6.34
70	6440.	322.00	193.20	96.60	64.40	32.20	19.32	6.44
71	6550.	327.50	196.50	98.25	65.50	32.75	19.65	6.55
72	6650.	332.50	199.50	99.75	66.50	33.25	19.95	6.65
73	6760.	338.00	202.80	101.40	67.60	33.80	20.28	6.76
74	6860.	343.00	205.80	102.90	68.60	34.30	20.58	6.86
75	6960.	348.00	208.80	104.40	69.60	34.80	20.88	6.96

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	559.	111800.	83850.	55900.	27950.	13975.	5590.	2795.
62	573.	114600.	85950.	57300.	28650.	14325.	5730.	2865.
63	587.	117400.	88050.	58700.	29350.	14675.	5870.	2935.
64	602.	120400.	90300.	60200.	30100.	15050.	6020.	3010.
65	617.	123400.	92550.	61700.	30850.	15425.	6170.	3085.
66	635.	127000.	95250.	63500.	31750.	15875.	6350.	3175.
67	654.	130800.	98100.	65400.	32700.	16350.	6540.	3270.
68	674.	134800.	101100.	67400.	33700.	16850.	6740.	3370.
69	694.	138800.	104100.	69400.	34700.	17350.	6940.	3470.
70	715.	143000.	107250.	71500.	35750.	17875.	7150.	3575.
71	736.	147200.	110400.	73600.	36800.	18400.	7360.	3680.
72	758.	151600.	113700.	75800.	37900.	18950.	7580.	3790.
73	781.	156200.	117150.	78100.	39050.	19525.	7810.	3905.
74	805.	161000.	120750.	80500.	40250.	20125.	8050.	4025.
75	829.	165800.	124350.	82900.	41450.	20725.	8290.	4145.

Notes: Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).  
 Insufficient budgetary data for extrapolation.

MALI  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)					
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	4210.	210.50	126.30	63.15	42.10	21.05	12.63	4.21
62	4310.	215.50	129.30	64.65	43.10	21.55	12.93	4.31
63	4390.	219.50	131.70	65.85	43.90	21.95	13.17	4.39
64	4480.	224.00	134.40	67.20	44.80	22.40	13.44	4.48
65	4570.	228.50	137.10	68.55	45.70	22.85	13.71	4.57
66	4660.	233.00	139.80	69.90	46.60	23.30	13.98	4.66
67	4750.	237.50	142.50	71.25	47.50	23.75	14.25	4.75
68	4850.	242.50	145.50	72.75	48.50	24.25	14.55	4.85
69	4950.	247.50	148.50	74.25	49.50	24.75	14.85	4.95
70	5040.	252.00	151.20	75.60	50.40	25.20	15.12	5.04
71	5140.	257.00	154.20	77.10	51.40	25.70	15.42	5.14
72	5250.	262.50	157.50	78.75	52.50	26.25	15.75	5.25
73	5350.	267.50	160.50	80.25	53.50	26.75	16.05	5.35
74	5460.	273.00	163.80	81.90	54.60	27.30	16.38	5.46
75	5570.	278.50	167.10	83.55	55.70	27.85	16.71	5.57

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS  
PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)

YR	GNP (M\$US)		DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS					
	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50	
61	392.	78400.	58800.	39200.	19600.	9800.	3920.	1960.
62	404.	80800.	60600.	40400.	20200.	10100.	4040.	2020.
63	416.	83200.	62400.	41600.	20800.	10400.	4160.	2080.
64	429.	85800.	64350.	42900.	21450.	10725.	4290.	2145.
65	442.	88400.	66300.	44200.	22100.	11050.	4420.	2210.
66	455.	91000.	68250.	45500.	22750.	11375.	4550.	2275.
67	469.	93800.	70350.	46900.	23450.	11725.	4690.	2345.
68	483.	96600.	72450.	48300.	24150.	12075.	4830.	2415.
69	497.	99400.	74550.	49700.	24850.	12425.	4970.	2485.
70	512.	102400.	76800.	51200.	25600.	12800.	5120.	2560.
71	530.	106000.	79500.	53000.	26500.	13250.	5300.	2650.
72	549.	109800.	82350.	54900.	27450.	13725.	5490.	2745.
73	568.	113600.	85200.	56800.	28400.	14200.	5680.	2840.
74	588.	117600.	88200.	58800.	29400.	14700.	5880.	2940.
75	608.	121600.	91200.	60800.	30400.	15200.	6080.	3040.

Notes: Armed Forces are increasing (See App. II and text).  
Insufficient budgetary data for extrapolation.

## MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	P0P (THOUS)	1.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	36100.	1805.00	1083.00	541.50	361.00	180.50	108.30	36.10
62	37200.	1860.00	1116.00	558.00	372.00	186.00	111.60	37.20
63	38400.	1920.00	1152.00	576.00	384.00	192.00	115.20	38.40
64	39300.	1965.00	1179.00	589.50	393.00	196.50	117.90	39.30
65	40500.	2025.00	1215.00	607.50	405.00	202.50	121.50	40.50
66	41800.	2090.00	1254.00	627.00	418.00	209.00	125.40	41.80
67	43100.	2155.00	1293.00	646.50	431.00	215.50	129.30	43.10
68	44500.	2225.00	1335.00	667.50	445.00	222.50	133.50	44.50
69	45800.	2290.00	1374.00	687.00	458.00	229.00	137.40	45.80
70	47100.	2355.00	1413.00	706.50	471.00	235.50	141.30	47.10
71	48600.	2430.00	1458.00	729.00	486.00	243.00	145.80	48.60
72	50100.	2505.00	1503.00	751.50	501.00	250.50	150.30	50.10
73	51600.	2580.00	1548.00	774.00	516.00	258.00	154.80	51.60
74	53100.	2655.00	1593.00	796.50	531.00	265.50	159.30	53.10
75	54600.	2730.00	1638.00	819.00	546.00	273.00	163.80	54.60

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	11236.	2247200.	1685400.	1123600.	561800.	280900.	112360.	56180.
62	11741.	2348200.	1761150.	1174100.	587050.	293525.	117410.	58705.
63	12270.	2454000.	1840500.	1227000.	613500.	306750.	122700.	61350.
64	12822.	2564400.	1923300.	1282200.	641100.	320550.	128220.	64110.
65	13399.	2679800.	2009850.	1339900.	669950.	334975.	133990.	66995.
66	14089.	2813800.	2110350.	1406900.	703450.	351725.	140690.	70345.
67	14772.	2954400.	2215800.	1477200.	738600.	369300.	147720.	73860.
68	15511.	3102200.	2326650.	1551100.	775550.	387775.	155110.	77555.
69	16287.	3257400.	2443050.	1628700.	814350.	407175.	162870.	81435.
70	17101.	3420200.	2565150.	1710100.	855050.	427525.	171010.	85505.
71	17956.	3591200.	2693400.	1795600.	897800.	448900.	179560.	89780.
72	18854.	3770800.	2828100.	1885400.	942700.	471350.	188540.	94270.
73	19796.	3959200.	2969400.	1979600.	989800.	494900.	197960.	98980.
74	20786.	4157200.	3117900.	2078600.	1039300.	519650.	207860.	103930.
75	21825.	4365000.	3273750.	2182500.	1091250.	545625.	218250.	109125.



NEPAL

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	9390.	469.50	281.70	140.85	93.90	46.95	28.17	9.39
62	9580.	479.00	287.40	143.70	95.80	47.90	28.74	9.58
63	9770.	488.50	293.10	146.55	97.70	48.85	29.31	9.77
64	9960.	498.00	298.80	149.40	99.60	49.80	29.88	9.96
65	10200.	510.00	306.00	153.00	102.00	51.00	30.60	10.20
66	10400.	520.00	312.00	156.00	104.00	52.00	31.20	10.40
67	10600.	530.00	318.00	159.00	106.00	53.00	31.80	10.60
68	10800.	540.00	324.00	162.00	108.00	54.00	32.40	10.80
69	11000.	550.00	330.00	165.00	110.00	55.00	33.00	11.00
70	11200.	560.00	336.00	168.00	112.00	56.00	33.60	11.20
71	11500.	575.00	345.00	172.50	115.00	57.50	34.50	11.50
72	11800.	590.00	354.00	177.00	118.00	59.00	35.40	11.80
73	12100.	605.00	363.00	181.50	121.00	60.50	36.30	12.10
74	12400.	620.00	372.00	186.00	124.00	62.00	37.20	12.40
75	12700.	635.00	381.00	190.50	127.00	63.50	38.10	12.70

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	491.	98200.	73650.	49100.	24550.	12275.	4910.	2455.
62	506.	101200.	75900.	50600.	25300.	12650.	5060.	2530.
63	521.	104200.	78150.	52100.	26050.	13025.	5210.	2605.
64	537.	107400.	80550.	53700.	26850.	13425.	5370.	2685.
65	553.	110600.	82950.	55300.	27650.	13825.	5530.	2765.
66	575.	115000.	86250.	57500.	28750.	14375.	5750.	2875.
67	598.	119600.	89700.	59800.	29900.	14950.	5980.	2990.
68	622.	124400.	93300.	62200.	31100.	15550.	6220.	3110.
69	647.	129400.	97050.	64700.	32350.	16175.	6470.	3235.
70	673.	134600.	100950.	67300.	33650.	16825.	6730.	3365.
71	700.	140000.	105000.	70000.	35000.	17500.	7000.	3500.
72	728.	145600.	109200.	72800.	36400.	18200.	7280.	3640.
73	757.	151400.	113550.	75700.	37850.	18925.	7570.	3785.
74	787.	157400.	118050.	78700.	39350.	19675.	7870.	3935.
75	819.	163800.	122850.	81900.	40950.	20475.	8190.	4095.

Notes: See note in App. II.

NIGER

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	2990.	149.50	89.70	44.85	29.90	14.95	8.97	2.99
62	3100.	155.00	93.00	46.50	31.00	15.50	9.30	3.10
63	3190.	159.50	95.70	47.85	31.90	15.95	9.57	3.19
64	3280.	164.00	98.40	49.20	32.80	16.40	9.84	3.28
65	3370.	168.50	101.10	50.55	33.70	16.85	10.11	3.37
66	3460.	173.00	103.80	51.90	34.60	17.30	10.38	3.46
67	3560.	178.00	106.80	53.40	35.60	17.80	10.68	3.56
68	3660.	183.00	109.80	54.90	36.60	18.30	10.98	3.66
69	3760.	188.00	112.80	56.40	37.60	18.80	11.28	3.76
70	3870.	193.50	116.10	58.05	38.70	19.35	11.61	3.87
71	3970.	198.50	119.10	59.55	39.70	19.85	11.91	3.97
72	4090.	204.50	122.70	61.35	40.90	20.45	12.27	4.09
73	4200.	210.00	126.00	63.00	42.00	21.00	12.60	4.20
74	4320.	216.00	129.60	64.80	43.20	21.60	12.96	4.32
75	4440.	222.00	133.20	66.60	44.40	22.20	13.32	4.44

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	271.	54200.	40650.	27100.	13550.	6775.	2710.	1355.
62	279.	55800.	41850.	27900.	13950.	6975.	2790.	1395.
63	287.	57400.	43050.	28700.	14350.	7175.	2870.	1435.
64	296.	59200.	44400.	29600.	14800.	7400.	2960.	1480.
65	305.	61000.	45750.	30500.	15250.	7625.	3050.	1525.
66	314.	62800.	47100.	31400.	15700.	7850.	3140.	1570.
67	323.	64600.	48450.	32300.	16150.	8075.	3230.	1615.
68	333.	66600.	49950.	33300.	16650.	8325.	3330.	1665.
69	343.	68600.	51450.	34300.	17150.	8575.	3430.	1715.
70	353.	70600.	52950.	35300.	17650.	8825.	3530.	1765.
71	366.	73200.	54900.	36600.	18300.	9150.	3660.	1830.
72	379.	75800.	56850.	37900.	18950.	9475.	3790.	1895.
73	392.	78400.	58800.	39200.	19600.	9800.	3920.	1960.
74	406.	81200.	60900.	40600.	20300.	10150.	4060.	2030.
75	420.	84000.	63000.	42000.	21000.	10500.	4200.	2100.

Notes: Armed Forces and Defense Budgets are increasing (See App. II and text).

PAKISTAN

MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIØNS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION IN ARMED FØRCES (THØUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	94500.	4725.00	2835.00	1417.50	945.00	472.50	283.50	94.50
62	96600.	4830.00	2898.00	1449.00	966.00	483.00	289.80	96.60
63	98600.	4930.00	2958.00	1479.00	986.00	493.00	295.80	98.60
64	100200.	5010.00	3006.00	1503.00	1002.00	501.00	300.60	100.20
65	102200.	5110.00	3066.00	1533.00	1022.00	511.00	306.60	102.20
66	104400.	5220.00	3132.00	1566.00	1044.00	522.00	313.20	104.40
67	106600.	5330.00	3198.00	1599.00	1066.00	533.00	319.80	106.60
68	108900.	5445.00	3267.00	1633.50	1089.00	544.50	326.70	108.90
69	111100.	5555.00	3333.00	1666.50	1111.00	555.50	333.30	111.10
70	113300.	5665.00	3399.00	1699.50	1133.00	566.50	339.90	113.30
71	115700.	5785.00	3471.00	1735.50	1157.00	578.50	347.10	115.70
72	118100.	5905.00	3543.00	1771.50	1181.00	590.50	354.30	118.10
73	120400.	6020.00	3612.00	1806.00	1204.00	602.00	361.20	120.40
74	122800.	6140.00	3684.00	1842.00	1228.00	614.00	368.40	122.80
75	125200.	6260.00	3756.00	1878.00	1252.00	626.00	375.60	125.20

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIØNS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	6707.	1341400.	1006050.	670700.	335350.	167675.	67070.	33535.
62	6975.	1395000.	1046250.	697500.	348750.	174375.	69750.	34875.
63	7254.	1450800.	1088100.	725400.	362700.	181350.	72540.	36270.
64	7544.	1508800.	1131600.	754400.	377200.	188600.	75440.	37720.
65	7846.	1569200.	1176900.	784600.	392300.	196150.	78460.	39230.
66	8199.	1639800.	1229850.	819900.	409950.	204975.	81990.	40995.
67	8568.	1713600.	1285200.	856800.	428400.	214200.	85680.	42840.
68	8954.	1790800.	1343100.	895400.	447700.	223850.	89540.	44770.
69	9357.	1871400.	1403550.	935700.	467850.	233925.	93570.	46785.
70	9778.	1955600.	1466700.	977800.	488900.	244450.	97780.	48890.
71	10267.	2053400.	1540050.	1026700.	513350.	256675.	102670.	51335.
72	10780.	2156000.	1617000.	1078000.	539000.	269500.	107800.	53900.
73	11319.	2263800.	1697850.	1131900.	565950.	282975.	113190.	56595.
74	11885.	2377000.	1782750.	1188500.	594250.	297125.	118850.	59425.
75	12479.	2495800.	1871850.	1247900.	623950.	311975.	124790.	62395.

PARAGUAY

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1810.	90.50	54.30	27.15	18.10	9.05	5.43	1.81
62	1860.	93.00	55.80	27.90	18.60	9.30	5.58	1.86
63	1900.	95.00	57.00	28.50	19.00	9.50	5.70	1.90
64	1940.	97.00	58.20	29.10	19.40	9.70	5.82	1.94
65	1970.	98.50	59.10	29.55	19.70	9.85	5.91	1.97
66	2010.	100.50	60.30	30.15	20.10	10.05	6.03	2.01
67	2040.	102.00	61.20	30.60	20.40	10.20	6.12	2.04
68	2080.	104.00	62.40	31.20	20.80	10.40	6.24	2.08
69	2110.	105.50	63.30	31.65	21.10	10.55	6.33	2.11
70	2150.	107.50	64.50	32.25	21.50	10.75	6.45	2.15
71	2180.	109.00	65.40	32.70	21.80	10.90	6.54	2.18
72	2220.	111.00	66.60	33.30	22.20	11.10	6.66	2.22
73	2250.	112.50	67.50	33.75	22.50	11.25	6.75	2.25
74	2290.	114.50	68.70	34.35	22.90	11.45	6.87	2.29
75	2320.	116.00	69.60	34.80	23.20	11.60	6.96	2.32

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	205.	41000.	30750.	20500.	10250.	5125.	2050.	1025.
62	211.	42200.	31650.	21100.	10550.	5275.	2110.	1055.
63	217.	43400.	32550.	21700.	10850.	5425.	2170.	1085.
64	224.	44800.	33600.	22400.	11200.	5600.	2240.	1120.
65	231.	46200.	34650.	23100.	11550.	5775.	2310.	1155.
66	238.	47600.	35700.	23800.	11900.	5950.	2380.	1190.
67	245.	49000.	36750.	24500.	12250.	6125.	2450.	1225.
68	252.	50400.	37800.	25200.	12600.	6300.	2520.	1260.
69	260.	52000.	39000.	26000.	13000.	6500.	2600.	1300.
70	267.	53400.	40050.	26700.	13350.	6675.	2670.	1335.
71	275.	55000.	41250.	27500.	13750.	6875.	2750.	1375.
72	284.	56800.	42600.	28400.	14200.	7100.	2840.	1420.
73	292.	58400.	43800.	29200.	14600.	7300.	2920.	1460.
74	301.	60200.	45150.	30100.	15050.	7525.	3010.	1505.
75	310.	62000.	46500.	31000.	15500.	7750.	3100.	1550.

PHILIPPINES

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	28300.	1415.00	849.00	424.50	283.00	141.50	84.90	28.30
62	29300.	1465.00	879.00	439.50	293.00	146.50	87.90	29.30
63	30200.	1510.00	906.00	453.00	302.00	151.00	90.60	30.20
64	30900.	1545.00	927.00	463.50	309.00	154.50	92.70	30.90
65	31500.	1575.00	945.00	472.50	315.00	157.50	94.50	31.50
66	32200.	1610.00	966.00	483.00	322.00	161.00	96.60	32.20
67	32900.	1645.00	987.00	493.50	329.00	164.50	98.70	32.90
68	33700.	1685.00	1011.00	505.50	337.00	168.50	101.10	33.70
69	34400.	1720.00	1032.00	516.00	344.00	172.00	103.20	34.40
70	35100.	1755.00	1053.00	526.50	351.00	175.50	105.30	35.10
71	35900.	1795.00	1077.00	538.50	359.00	179.50	107.70	35.90
72	36800.	1840.00	1104.00	552.00	368.00	184.00	110.40	36.80
73	37600.	1880.00	1128.00	564.00	376.00	188.00	112.80	37.60
74	38500.	1925.00	1155.00	577.50	385.00	192.50	115.50	38.50
75	39300.	1965.00	1179.00	589.50	393.00	196.50	117.90	39.30

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	6209.	1241800.	931350.	620900.	310450.	155225.	62090.	31045.
62	6426.	1285200.	963900.	642600.	321300.	160650.	64260.	32130.
63	6651.	1330200.	997650.	665100.	332550.	166275.	66510.	33255.
64	6884.	1376800.	1032600.	688400.	344200.	172100.	68840.	34420.
65	7125.	1425000.	1068750.	712500.	356250.	178125.	71250.	35625.
66	7410.	1482000.	1111500.	741000.	370500.	185250.	74100.	37050.
67	7706.	1541200.	1155900.	770600.	385300.	192650.	77060.	38530.
68	8015.	1603000.	1202250.	801500.	400750.	200375.	80150.	40075.
69	8335.	1667000.	1250250.	833500.	416750.	208375.	83350.	41675.
70	8669.	1733800.	1300350.	866900.	433450.	216725.	86690.	43345.
71	9015.	1803000.	1352250.	901500.	450750.	225375.	90150.	45075.
72	9376.	1875200.	1406400.	937600.	468800.	234400.	93760.	46880.
73	9751.	1950200.	1462650.	975100.	487550.	243775.	97510.	48755.
74	10141.	2028200.	1521150.	1014100.	507050.	253525.	101410.	50705.
75	10547.	2109400.	1582050.	1054700.	527350.	263675.	105470.	52735.

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	5090.	254.50	152.70	76.35	50.90	25.45	15.27	5.09
62	5160.	258.00	154.80	77.40	51.60	25.80	15.48	5.16
63	5240.	262.00	157.20	78.60	52.40	26.20	15.72	5.24
64	5320.	266.00	159.60	79.80	53.20	26.60	15.96	5.32
65	5400.	270.00	162.00	81.00	54.00	27.00	16.20	5.40
66	5480.	274.00	164.40	82.20	54.80	27.40	16.44	5.48
67	5560.	278.00	166.80	83.40	55.60	27.80	16.68	5.56
68	5630.	281.50	168.90	84.45	56.30	28.15	16.89	5.63
69	5710.	285.50	171.30	85.65	57.10	28.55	17.13	5.71
70	5790.	289.50	173.70	86.85	57.90	28.95	17.37	5.79
71	5870.	293.50	176.10	88.05	58.70	29.35	17.61	5.87
72	5950.	297.50	178.50	89.25	59.50	29.75	17.85	5.95
73	6030.	301.50	180.90	90.45	60.30	30.15	18.09	6.03
74	6110.	305.50	183.30	91.65	61.10	30.55	18.33	6.11
75	6190.	309.50	185.70	92.85	61.90	30.95	18.57	6.19

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	351.	70200.	52600.	35100.	17550.	8775.	3510.	1755.
62	358.	71600.	53700.	35800.	17900.	8950.	3580.	1790.
63	365.	73000.	54750.	36500.	18250.	9125.	3650.	1825.
64	372.	74400.	55800.	37200.	18600.	9300.	3720.	1860.
65	379.	75800.	56850.	37900.	18950.	9475.	3790.	1895.
66	387.	77400.	58050.	38700.	19350.	9675.	3870.	1935.
67	399.	79800.	59850.	39900.	19950.	9975.	3990.	1995.
68	411.	82200.	61650.	41100.	20550.	10275.	4110.	2055.
69	423.	84600.	63450.	42300.	21150.	10575.	4230.	2115.
70	436.	87200.	65400.	43600.	21800.	10900.	4360.	2180.
71	449.	89800.	67350.	44900.	22450.	11225.	4490.	2245.
72	462.	92400.	69300.	46200.	23100.	11550.	4620.	2310.
73	476.	95200.	71400.	47600.	23800.	11900.	4760.	2380.
74	490.	98000.	73500.	49000.	24500.	12250.	4900.	2450.
75	505.	101000.	75750.	50500.	25250.	12625.	5050.	2525.

Notes: Armed Forces and Defense Budgets are Increasing (See App. II and text).

SENEGAL  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	2980.	149.00	89.40	44.70	29.80	14.90	8.94	2.98
62	3050.	152.50	91.50	45.75	30.50	15.25	9.15	3.05
63	3120.	156.00	93.60	46.80	31.20	15.60	9.36	3.12
64	3200.	160.00	96.00	48.00	32.00	16.00	9.60	3.20
65	3280.	164.00	98.40	49.20	32.80	16.40	9.84	3.28
66	3360.	168.00	100.80	50.40	33.60	16.80	10.08	3.36
67	3440.	172.00	103.20	51.60	34.40	17.20	10.32	3.44
68	3520.	176.00	105.60	52.80	35.20	17.60	10.56	3.52
69	3600.	180.00	108.00	54.00	36.00	18.00	10.80	3.60
70	3680.	184.00	110.40	55.20	36.80	18.40	11.04	3.68
71	3770.	188.50	113.10	56.55	37.70	18.85	11.31	3.77
72	3870.	193.50	116.10	58.05	38.70	19.35	11.61	3.87
73	3960.	198.00	118.80	59.40	39.60	19.80	11.88	3.96
74	4060.	203.00	121.80	60.90	40.60	20.30	12.18	4.06
75	4150.	207.50	124.50	62.25	41.50	20.75	12.45	4.15

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	247.	49400.	37050.	24700.	12350.	6175.	2470.	1235.
62	255.	51000.	38250.	25500.	12750.	6375.	2550.	1275.
63	262.	52400.	39300.	26200.	13100.	6550.	2620.	1310.
64	270.	54000.	40500.	27000.	13500.	6750.	2700.	1350.
65	278.	55600.	41700.	27800.	13900.	6950.	2780.	1390.
66	287.	57400.	43050.	28700.	14350.	7175.	2870.	1435.
67	295.	59000.	44250.	29500.	14750.	7375.	2950.	1475.
68	304.	60800.	45600.	30400.	15200.	7600.	3040.	1520.
69	313.	62600.	46950.	31300.	15650.	7825.	3130.	1565.
70	323.	64600.	48450.	32300.	16150.	8075.	3230.	1615.
71	334.	66800.	50100.	33400.	16700.	8350.	3340.	1670.
72	346.	69200.	51900.	34600.	17300.	8650.	3460.	1730.
73	358.	71600.	53700.	35800.	17900.	8950.	3580.	1790.
74	370.	74000.	55500.	37000.	18500.	9250.	3700.	1850.
75	383.	76600.	57450.	38300.	19150.	9575.	3830.	1915.

Notes: Armed Forces and Defense Budgets increasing (See App. II and text).

SOMALIA  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)					
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	2130.	106.50	63.90	31.95	21.30	10.65	6.39	2.13
62	2150.	107.50	64.50	32.25	21.50	10.75	6.45	2.15
63	2170.	108.50	65.10	32.55	21.70	10.85	6.51	2.17
64	2190.	109.50	65.70	32.85	21.90	10.95	6.57	2.19
65	2210.	110.50	66.30	33.15	22.10	11.05	6.63	2.21
66	2230.	111.50	66.90	33.45	22.30	11.15	6.69	2.23
67	2250.	112.50	67.50	33.75	22.50	11.25	6.75	2.25
68	2280.	114.00	68.40	34.20	22.80	11.40	6.84	2.28
69	2300.	115.00	69.00	34.50	23.00	11.50	6.90	2.30
70	2320.	116.00	69.60	34.80	23.20	11.60	6.96	2.32
71	2350.	117.50	70.50	35.25	23.50	11.75	7.05	2.35
72	2370.	118.50	71.10	35.55	23.70	11.85	7.11	2.37
73	2440.	122.00	73.20	36.60	24.40	12.20	7.32	2.44
74	2420.	121.00	72.60	36.30	24.20	12.10	7.26	2.42
75	2450.	122.50	73.20	36.75	24.50	12.25	7.35	2.45

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	78.	15600.	11700.	7800.	3900.	1950.	780.	390.
62	79.	15800.	11850.	7900.	3950.	1975.	790.	395.
63	81.	16200.	12150.	8100.	4050.	2025.	810.	405.
64	82.	16400.	12300.	8200.	4100.	2050.	820.	410.
65	84.	16800.	12600.	8400.	4200.	2100.	840.	420.
66	86.	17200.	12900.	8600.	4300.	2150.	860.	430.
67	87.	17400.	13050.	8700.	4350.	2175.	870.	435.
68	89.	17800.	13350.	8900.	4450.	2225.	890.	445.
69	91.	18200.	13650.	9100.	4550.	2275.	910.	455.
70	93.	18600.	13950.	9300.	4650.	2325.	930.	465.
71	95.	19000.	14250.	9500.	4750.	2375.	950.	475.
72	98.	19600.	14700.	9800.	4900.	2450.	980.	490.
73	101.	20200.	15150.	10100.	5050.	2525.	1010.	505.
74	104.	20800.	15600.	10400.	5200.	2600.	1040.	520.
75	107.	21400.	16050.	10700.	5350.	2675.	1070.	535.

Notes: See note in App. II anent Somalia's plans to expand its armed forces.



SUDAN

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	12100.	605.00	363.00	181.50	121.00	60.50	36.30	12.10
62	12500.	625.00	375.00	187.50	125.00	62.50	37.50	12.50
63	12800.	640.00	384.00	192.00	128.00	64.00	38.40	12.80
64	12900.	645.00	387.00	193.50	129.00	64.50	38.70	12.90
65	13000.	650.00	390.00	195.00	130.00	65.00	39.00	13.00
66	13100.	655.00	393.00	196.50	131.00	65.50	39.30	13.10
67	13300.	665.00	399.00	199.50	133.00	66.50	39.90	13.30
68	13400.	670.00	402.00	201.00	134.00	67.00	40.20	13.40
69	13600.	680.00	408.00	204.00	136.00	68.00	40.80	13.60
70	13700.	685.00	411.00	205.50	137.00	68.50	41.10	13.70
71	13900.	695.00	417.00	208.50	139.00	69.50	41.70	13.90
72	14000.	700.00	420.00	210.00	140.00	70.00	42.00	14.00
73	14200.	710.00	426.00	213.00	142.00	71.00	42.60	14.20
74	14400.	720.00	432.00	216.00	144.00	72.00	43.20	14.40
75	14600.	730.00	438.00	219.00	146.00	73.00	43.80	14.60

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	1124.	224800.	168600.	112400.	56200.	28100.	11240.	5620.
62	1153.	230600.	172950.	115300.	57650.	28825.	11530.	5765.
63	1181.	236200.	177150.	118100.	59050.	29525.	11810.	5905.
64	1211.	242200.	181650.	121100.	60550.	30275.	12110.	6055.
65	1241.	248200.	186150.	124100.	62050.	31025.	12410.	6205.
66	1278.	255600.	191700.	127800.	63900.	31950.	12780.	6390.
67	1317.	263400.	197550.	131700.	65850.	32925.	13170.	6585.
68	1356.	271200.	203400.	135600.	67800.	33900.	13560.	6780.
69	1397.	279400.	209550.	139700.	69850.	34925.	13970.	6985.
70	1439.	287800.	215850.	143900.	71950.	35975.	14390.	7195.
71	1482.	296400.	222300.	148200.	74100.	37050.	14820.	7410.
72	1526.	305200.	228900.	152600.	76300.	38150.	15260.	7630.
73	1572.	314400.	235800.	157200.	78600.	39300.	15720.	7860.
74	1619.	323800.	242850.	161900.	80950.	40475.	16190.	8095.
75	1668.	333600.	250200.	166800.	83400.	41700.	16680.	8340.

TANGANYIKA  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	9400.	470.00	282.00	141.00	94.00	47.00	28.20	9.40
62	9560.	478.00	286.80	143.40	95.60	47.80	28.68	9.56
63	9730.	486.50	291.90	145.95	97.30	48.65	29.19	9.73
64	9860.	493.00	295.80	147.90	98.60	49.30	29.58	9.86
65	10000.	500.00	300.00	150.00	100.00	50.00	30.00	10.00
66	10200.	510.00	306.00	153.00	102.00	51.00	30.60	10.20
67	10300.	515.00	309.00	154.50	103.00	51.50	30.90	10.30
68	10500.	525.00	315.00	157.50	105.00	52.50	31.50	10.50
69	10600.	530.00	318.00	159.00	106.00	53.00	31.80	10.60
70	10800.	540.00	324.00	162.00	108.00	54.00	32.40	10.80
71	10900.	545.00	327.00	163.50	109.00	54.50	32.70	10.90
72	11100.	555.00	333.00	166.50	111.00	55.50	33.30	11.10
73	11200.	560.00	336.00	168.00	112.00	56.00	33.60	11.20
74	11400.	570.00	342.00	171.00	114.00	57.00	34.20	11.40
75	11500.	575.00	345.00	172.50	115.00	57.50	34.50	11.50

## DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	699.	139800.	104850.	69900.	34950.	17475.	6990.	3495.
62	720.	144000.	108000.	72000.	36000.	18000.	7200.	3600.
63	742.	148400.	111300.	74200.	37100.	18550.	7420.	3710.
64	764.	152800.	114600.	76400.	38200.	19100.	7640.	3820.
65	787.	157400.	118050.	78700.	39350.	19675.	7870.	3935.
66	819.	163800.	122850.	81900.	40950.	20475.	8190.	4095.
67	851.	170200.	127650.	85100.	42550.	21275.	8510.	4255.
68	885.	177000.	132750.	88500.	44250.	22125.	8850.	4425.
69	921.	184200.	138150.	92100.	46050.	23025.	9210.	4605.
70	958.	191600.	143700.	95800.	47900.	23950.	9580.	4790.
71	996.	199200.	149400.	99600.	49800.	24900.	9960.	4980.
72	1036.	207200.	155400.	103600.	51800.	25900.	10360.	5180.
73	1077.	215400.	161550.	107700.	53850.	26925.	10770.	5385.
74	1120.	224000.	168000.	112000.	56000.	28000.	11200.	5600.
75	1165.	233000.	174750.	116500.	58250.	29125.	11650.	5825.

Notes: Armed Forces level is unstable currently (See App. II)  
Insufficient budgetary data for extrapolation.

TØGØ

MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION IN ARMED FØRCES (THØUSANDS)							
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	1480.	74.00	44.40	22.20	14.80	7.40	4.44	1.48
62	1520.	76.00	45.60	22.80	15.20	7.60	4.56	1.52
63	1560.	78.00	46.80	23.40	15.60	7.80	4.68	1.56
64	1590.	79.50	47.70	23.85	15.90	7.95	4.77	1.59
65	1610.	80.50	48.30	24.15	16.10	8.05	4.83	1.61
66	1630.	81.50	48.90	24.45	16.30	8.15	4.89	1.63
67	1650.	82.50	49.50	24.75	16.50	8.25	4.95	1.65
68	1680.	84.00	50.40	25.20	16.80	8.40	5.04	1.68
69	1700.	85.00	51.00	25.50	17.00	8.50	5.10	1.70
70	1720.	86.00	51.60	25.80	17.20	8.60	5.16	1.72
71	1740.	87.00	52.20	26.10	17.40	8.70	5.22	1.74
72	1760.	88.00	52.80	26.40	17.60	8.80	5.28	1.76
73	1790.	89.50	53.70	26.85	17.90	8.95	5.37	1.79
74	1810.	90.50	54.30	27.15	18.10	9.05	5.43	1.81
75	1830.	91.50	54.90	27.45	18.30	9.15	5.49	1.83

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP (THØUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	63.	12600.	9450.	6300.	3150.	1575.	630.	315.
62	65.	13000.	9750.	6500.	3250.	1625.	650.	325.
63	66.	13200.	9900.	6600.	3300.	1650.	660.	330.
64	67.	13400.	10050.	6700.	3350.	1675.	670.	335.
65	68.	13600.	10200.	6800.	3400.	1700.	680.	340.
66	71.	14200.	10650.	7100.	3550.	1775.	710.	355.
67	73.	14600.	10950.	7300.	3650.	1825.	730.	365.
68	75.	15000.	11250.	7500.	3750.	1875.	750.	375.
69	77.	15400.	11550.	7700.	3850.	1925.	770.	385.
70	79.	15800.	11850.	7900.	3950.	1975.	790.	395.
71	82.	16400.	12300.	8200.	4100.	2050.	820.	410.
72	84.	16800.	12600.	8400.	4200.	2100.	840.	420.
73	87.	17400.	13050.	8700.	4350.	2175.	870.	435.
74	89.	17800.	13350.	8900.	4450.	2225.	890.	445.
75	92.	18400.	13800.	9200.	4600.	2300.	920.	460.

Notes: Armed Forces and Defense Budgets increasing (See App. II and text).

TUNISIA

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	4220.	211.00	126.60	63.30	42.20	21.10	12.66	4.22
62	4300.	215.00	129.00	64.50	43.00	21.50	12.90	4.30
63	4390.	219.50	131.70	65.85	43.90	21.95	13.17	4.39
64	4480.	224.00	134.40	67.20	44.80	22.40	13.44	4.48
65	4570.	228.50	137.10	68.55	45.70	22.85	13.71	4.57
66	4680.	234.00	140.40	70.20	46.80	23.40	14.04	4.68
67	4790.	239.50	143.70	71.85	47.90	23.95	14.37	4.79
68	4810.	240.50	144.30	72.15	48.10	24.05	14.43	4.81
69	4920.	246.00	147.60	73.80	49.20	24.60	14.76	4.92
70	5130.	256.50	153.90	76.95	51.30	25.65	15.39	5.13
71	5270.	263.50	158.10	79.05	52.70	26.35	15.81	5.27
72	5400.	270.00	162.00	81.00	54.00	27.00	16.20	5.40
73	5540.	277.00	166.20	83.10	55.40	27.70	16.62	5.54
74	5670.	283.50	170.10	85.05	56.70	28.35	17.01	5.67
75	5810.	290.50	174.30	87.15	58.10	29.05	17.43	5.81

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	764.	152800.	114600.	76400.	38200.	19100.	7640.	3820.
62	783.	156600.	117450.	78300.	39150.	19575.	7830.	3915.
63	802.	160400.	120300.	80200.	40100.	20050.	8020.	4010.
64	822.	164400.	123300.	82200.	41100.	20550.	8220.	4110.
65	843.	168600.	126450.	84300.	42150.	21075.	8430.	4215.
66	868.	173600.	130200.	86800.	43400.	21700.	8680.	4340.
67	894.	178800.	134100.	89400.	44700.	22350.	8940.	4470.
68	921.	184200.	138150.	92100.	46050.	23025.	9210.	4605.
69	949.	189800.	142350.	94900.	47450.	23725.	9490.	4745.
70	977.	195400.	146550.	97700.	48850.	24425.	9770.	4885.
71	1016.	203200.	152400.	101600.	50800.	25400.	10160.	5080.
72	1057.	211400.	158550.	105700.	52850.	26425.	10570.	5285.
73	1099.	219800.	164850.	109900.	54950.	27475.	10990.	5495.
74	1143.	228600.	171450.	114300.	57150.	28575.	11430.	5715.
75	1189.	237800.	178350.	118900.	59450.	29725.	11890.	5945.

UGANDA

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)					
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	6850.	342.50	205.50	102.75	68.50	34.25	20.55	6.85
62	7020.	351.00	210.60	105.30	70.20	35.10	21.06	7.02
63	7120.	356.00	213.60	106.80	71.20	35.60	21.36	7.12
64	7210.	360.50	216.30	108.15	72.10	36.05	21.63	7.21
65	7310.	365.50	219.30	109.65	73.10	36.55	21.93	7.31
66	7400.	370.00	222.00	111.00	74.00	37.00	22.20	7.40
67	7500.	375.00	225.00	112.50	75.00	37.50	22.50	7.50
68	7590.	379.50	227.70	113.85	75.90	37.95	22.77	7.59
69	7690.	384.50	230.70	115.35	76.90	38.45	23.07	7.69
70	7790.	389.50	233.70	116.85	77.90	38.95	23.37	7.79
71	7890.	394.50	236.70	118.35	78.90	39.45	23.67	7.89
72	8000.	400.00	240.00	120.00	80.00	40.00	24.00	8.00
73	8100.	405.00	243.00	121.50	81.00	40.50	24.30	8.10
74	8200.	410.00	246.00	123.00	82.00	41.00	24.60	8.20
75	8300.	415.00	249.00	124.50	83.00	41.50	24.90	8.30

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	450.	90000.	67500.	45000.	22500.	11250.	4500.	2250.
62	463.	92600.	69450.	46300.	23150.	11575.	4630.	2315.
63	477.	95400.	71550.	47700.	23850.	11925.	4770.	2385.
64	491.	98200.	73650.	49100.	24550.	12275.	4910.	2455.
65	506.	101200.	75900.	50600.	25300.	12650.	5060.	2530.
66	521.	104200.	78150.	52100.	26050.	13025.	5210.	2605.
67	539.	107800.	80850.	53900.	26950.	13475.	5390.	2695.
68	558.	111600.	83700.	55800.	27900.	13950.	5580.	2790.
69	578.	115600.	86700.	57800.	28900.	14450.	5780.	2890.
70	598.	119600.	89700.	59800.	29900.	14950.	5980.	2990.
71	619.	123800.	92850.	61900.	30950.	15475.	6190.	3095.
72	644.	128800.	96600.	64400.	32200.	16100.	6440.	3220.
73	670.	134000.	100500.	67000.	33500.	16750.	6700.	3350.
74	696.	139200.	104400.	69600.	34800.	17400.	6960.	3480.
75	724.	144800.	108600.	72400.	36200.	18100.	7240.	3620.

Notes: Armed Forces and Defense Budgets increasing (See App. II and text).

UPPER VØLTA  
MANPØWER EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF PØPULATION		IN ARMED FØRCES (THØUSANDS)					
	PØP (THØUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	4400.	220.00	132.00	66.00	44.00	22.00	13.20	4.40
62	4500.	225.00	135.00	67.50	45.00	22.50	13.50	4.50
63	4590.	229.50	137.70	68.85	45.90	22.95	13.77	4.59
64	4680.	234.00	140.40	70.20	46.80	23.40	14.04	4.68
65	4770.	238.50	143.10	71.55	47.70	23.85	14.31	4.77
66	4870.	243.50	146.10	73.05	48.70	24.35	14.61	4.87
67	4970.	248.50	149.10	74.55	49.70	24.85	14.91	4.97
68	5070.	253.50	152.10	76.05	50.70	25.35	15.21	5.07
69	5170.	258.50	155.10	77.55	51.70	25.85	15.51	5.17
70	5270.	263.50	158.10	79.05	52.70	26.35	15.81	5.27
71	5380.	269.00	161.40	80.70	53.80	26.90	16.14	5.38
72	5490.	274.50	164.70	82.35	54.90	27.45	16.47	5.49
73	5600.	280.00	168.00	84.00	56.00	28.00	16.80	5.60
74	5710.	285.50	171.30	85.65	57.10	28.55	17.13	5.71
75	5820.	291.00	174.60	87.30	58.20	29.10	17.46	5.82

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPØLATIONS

YR	PERCENT ØF GNP		(THØUS\$US)					
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	397.	79400.	59550.	39700.	19850.	9925.	3970.	1985.
62	408.	81600.	61200.	40800.	20400.	10200.	4080.	2040.
63	421.	84200.	63150.	42100.	21050.	10525.	4210.	2105.
64	433.	86600.	64950.	43300.	21650.	10825.	4330.	2165.
65	446.	89200.	66900.	44600.	22300.	11150.	4460.	2230.
66	460.	92000.	69000.	46000.	23000.	11500.	4600.	2300.
67	474.	94800.	71100.	47400.	23700.	11850.	4740.	2370.
68	488.	97600.	73200.	48800.	24400.	12200.	4880.	2440.
69	502.	100400.	75300.	50200.	25100.	12550.	5020.	2510.
70	517.	103400.	77550.	51700.	25850.	12925.	5170.	2585.
71	536.	107200.	80400.	53600.	26800.	13400.	5360.	2680.
72	554.	110800.	83100.	55400.	27700.	13850.	5540.	2770.
73	574.	114800.	86100.	57400.	28700.	14350.	5740.	2870.
74	594.	118800.	89100.	59400.	29700.	14850.	5940.	2970.
75	615.	123000.	92250.	61500.	30750.	15375.	6150.	3075.

Notes: Insufficient data for extrapolations.

VENEZUELA

MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION IN ARMED FORCES (THOUSANDS)							
	POP(THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	7610.	380.50	228.30	114.15	76.10	38.05	22.83	7.61
62	7870.	393.50	236.10	118.05	78.70	39.35	23.61	7.87
63	8140.	407.00	244.20	122.10	81.40	40.70	24.42	8.14
64	8390.	419.50	251.70	125.85	83.90	41.95	25.17	8.39
65	8640.	432.00	259.20	129.60	86.40	43.20	25.92	8.64
66	8900.	445.00	267.00	133.50	89.00	44.50	26.70	8.90
67	9170.	458.50	275.10	137.55	91.70	45.85	27.51	9.17
68	9440.	472.00	283.20	141.60	94.40	47.20	28.32	9.44
69	9720.	486.00	291.60	145.80	97.20	48.60	29.16	9.72
70	10020.	501.00	300.60	150.30	100.20	50.10	30.06	10.02
71	10320.	516.00	309.60	154.80	103.20	51.60	30.96	10.32
72	10640.	532.00	319.20	159.60	106.40	53.20	31.92	10.64
73	10970.	548.50	329.10	164.55	109.70	54.85	32.91	10.97
74	11310.	565.50	339.30	169.65	113.10	56.55	33.93	11.31
75	11660.	583.00	349.80	174.90	116.60	58.30	34.98	11.66

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP (THOUS\$US)							
	GNP(M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	7437.	1487400.	1115550.	743700.	371850.	185925.	74370.	37185.
62	7735.	1547000.	1160250.	773500.	386750.	193375.	77350.	38675.
63	8044.	1608800.	1206600.	804400.	402200.	201100.	80440.	40220.
64	8366.	1673200.	1254900.	836600.	418300.	209150.	83660.	41830.
65	8700.	1740000.	1305000.	870000.	435000.	217500.	87000.	43500.
66	9048.	1809600.	1357200.	904800.	452400.	226200.	90480.	45240.
67	9410.	1882000.	1411500.	941000.	470500.	235250.	94100.	47050.
68	9787.	1957400.	1468050.	978700.	489350.	244675.	97870.	48935.
69	10178.	2035600.	1526700.	1017800.	508900.	254450.	101780.	50890.
70	10585.	2117000.	1587750.	1058500.	529250.	264625.	105850.	52925.
71	11009.	2201800.	1651350.	1100900.	550450.	275225.	110090.	55045.
72	11449.	2289800.	1717350.	1144900.	572450.	286225.	114490.	57245.
73	11907.	2381400.	1786050.	1190700.	595350.	297675.	119070.	59535.
74	12383.	2476600.	1857450.	1238300.	619150.	309575.	123830.	61915.
75	12879.	2575800.	1931850.	1287900.	643950.	321975.	128790.	64395.

YEMEN  
MANPOWER EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF POPULATION		IN ARMED FORCES		(THOUSANDS)			
	POP (THOUS)	5.00	3.00	1.50	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.10
61	4500.	225.00	135.00	67.50	45.00	22.50	13.50	4.50
62	4550.	227.50	136.50	68.25	45.50	22.75	13.65	4.55
63	4600.	230.00	138.00	69.00	46.00	23.00	13.80	4.60
64	4650.	232.50	139.50	69.75	46.50	23.25	13.95	4.65
65	4700.	235.00	141.00	70.50	47.00	23.50	14.10	4.70
66	4760.	238.00	142.80	71.40	47.60	23.80	14.28	4.76
67	4830.	241.50	144.90	72.45	48.30	24.15	14.49	4.83
68	4890.	244.50	146.70	73.35	48.90	24.45	14.67	4.89
69	4960.	248.00	148.80	74.40	49.60	24.80	14.88	4.96
70	5020.	251.00	150.60	75.30	50.20	25.10	15.06	5.02
71	5110.	255.50	153.30	76.65	51.10	25.55	15.33	5.11
72	5190.	259.50	155.70	77.85	51.90	25.95	15.57	5.19
73	5280.	264.00	158.40	79.20	52.80	26.40	15.84	5.28
74	5360.	268.00	160.80	80.40	53.60	26.80	16.08	5.36
75	5450.	272.50	163.50	81.75	54.50	27.25	16.35	5.45

DEFENSE BUDGET EXTRAPOLATIONS

YR	PERCENT OF GNP		(THOUSANDS)		(THOUSANDS)			
	GNP (M\$US)	20.0	15.0	10.0	5.00	2.50	1.00	0.50
61	367.	73400.	55050.	36700.	18350.	9175.	3670.	1835.
62	375.	75000.	56250.	37500.	18750.	9375.	3750.	1875.
63	382.	76400.	57300.	38200.	19100.	9550.	3820.	1910.
64	390.	78000.	58500.	39000.	19500.	9750.	3900.	1950.
65	397.	79400.	59550.	39700.	19850.	9925.	3970.	1985.
66	409.	81800.	61350.	40900.	20450.	10225.	4090.	2045.
67	422.	84400.	63300.	42200.	21100.	10550.	4220.	2110.
68	434.	86800.	65100.	43400.	21700.	10850.	4340.	2170.
69	447.	89400.	67050.	44700.	22350.	11175.	4470.	2235.
70	461.	92200.	69150.	46100.	23050.	11525.	4610.	2305.
71	475.	95000.	71250.	47500.	23750.	11875.	4750.	2375.
72	489.	97800.	73350.	48900.	24450.	12225.	4890.	2445.
73	504.	100800.	75600.	50400.	25200.	12600.	5040.	2520.
74	519.	103800.	77850.	51900.	25950.	12975.	5190.	2595.
75	534.	106800.	80100.	53400.	26700.	13350.	5340.	2670.

Notes: Armed Forces appear to be numerically oriented at 10,000 (See note in App. II).



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