

Who fires ministers?

**A principal-agent approach to
ministerial deselection**

Cristina Bucur BA, MA

School of Law and Government,
Dublin City University

Supervisors: Prof. Robert Elgie & Dr. Iain McMenamin

September 2013

Dissertation submitted for the award of PhD to Dublin City University

Declaration of Work

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of PhD is entirely my own work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed:

ID:

No:

Date:

Acknowledgements

Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the support granted by the Irish Research Council between 2009 and 2012 to write this thesis. The financial assistance offered by the School of Law and Government in Dublin City University has also been invaluable, as it allowed me to undergo specialised methods and language training. I am equally grateful for all the encouragement and advice that the Law and Government staff have always generously given me. To my friends in the postgraduate research rooms, thank you for your tolerance, support, and friendship.

I am extremely indebted to my supervisors, Professor Robert Elgie and Dr. Iain McMenamin, for their patience, wholehearted support, and excellent supervision. Thank you for setting me on the right track and for getting me where I am today. But most of all, thank you for your unwavering determination to teach me how to do things right.

I would have never been able to stand where I am today without the unfaltering support of my family and friends. My husband, Bogdan, has suffered the most. Thank you for putting up with an unthinkable amount of whining, for never allowing me to take a step back and for being there for me every step of the way. I cannot thank my parents, my brother, and my grandparents enough for their incredible faith in me. I am very lucky to have always been supported by a family who has gone to great lengths to allow me pursue my dreams, and for this I will never be able to thank you enough.

Contents

Abstract.....	vii
Tables and Figures.....	viii
List of Tables	viii
List of Figures.....	ix
List of abbreviations	x
Introduction	1
The puzzle: Why do some ministers keep office longer than others?	2
The argument: ministers are accountable to multiple principals in government and in the party	5
Original data	9
The structure of the thesis.....	11
Chapter One: The literature on ministerial resignations.....	14
1.1 Ministerial termination events	15
1.2 Individual resignations	18
The doctrine of ministerial responsibility	19
Breaches of collective ministerial responsibility	23
1.3 Individual dismissals.....	26
One-step demotion strategy: outright dismissal	26
Gradual demotion strategy: cabinet reshuffle.....	31
1.4 Patterns of ministerial termination events.....	34
Ministerial resignations and dismissals in Westminster systems	35
Ministerial resignations and dismissals in Western and Eastern Europe....	37
1.5 Conclusion.....	39
Chapter Two: A principal-agent account of ministerial deselection	41
2.1 Agency theory in representative democracies.....	42
2.2 Semi-presidentialism and its sub-types.....	44
2.3 Executive scenarios in semi-presidential sub-types.....	50
2.4 The interaction of executive scenarios and party politics	52
2.5 Ministerial deselection, executive scenarios, and party politics.....	57
2.6 Conclusion.....	60
Chapter Three: Research design.....	62
3.1 The comparative method.....	62
3.2 The countries selected for examination and the time period under study...	67
3.3 Quantitative case studies	72
3.4 Event history analysis	74
3.5 The dependent variable: the length of ministerial tenure.....	77
3.6 The independent variables.....	78
Conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals	78

Resignation calls	79
Fixed characteristics.....	80
Other control variables.....	82
3.7 Conclusion.....	83
Chapter Four: Ministerial deselection in France	86
4.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in the France	87
4.2 Party relationships in the French executive.....	93
The president-party relationship in the RPR (1995-2002).....	93
The president-party relationship in the UMP (2007-2012).....	96
The PM-party relationship in the PS (1995-2002).....	98
4.3 The data set on French ministers	100
4.4 Political background of French ministers	105
Cabinet experience.....	105
Parliamentary experience	107
Experience in local administration	109
Party experience.....	113
4.5 Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, and ministerial durability in France... ..	115
4.6 Conclusion.....	125
Chapter Five: Ministerial deselection in Portugal.....	127
5.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in Portugal	128
5.2 Party relationships in the Portuguese executive	136
The PM-party relationship in the PSD (2002-2005).....	136
The PM-party relationship in the PS (2005-2009).....	139
5.3 The data set on Portuguese ministers.....	141
5.4 Political background of Portuguese ministers	149
Cabinet experience.....	149
Parliamentary experience	150
Experience in local administration	152
Party experience.....	154
5.5 Fixed characteristics, events, and ministerial durability in Portugal	156
5.6 Conclusion.....	164
Chapter Six: Ministerial deselection in Romania.....	166
6.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in Romania	167
6.2 Party relationships in the Romanian executive	173
The president- and PM-party relationships in the PSD (2000-2004)	174
The president-party relationship in the PD/PDL (2004-2008).....	177
The PM-party relationship in the PNL (2004-2008).....	180
6.3 The data set on Romanian ministers	181
6.4 Political background of Romanian ministers	188
Cabinet experience.....	188
Parliamentary experience	190
Experience in local administration	191
Party experience.....	193

6.5	Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, and ministerial durability in Romania.....	197
6.6	Conclusion.....	209
Chapter Seven: Ministerial deselection in France, Portugal, and Romania.....		211
7.1	The pooled data set on French, Portuguese, and Romanian ministers.....	212
	Cabinet experience.....	221
	Parliamentary experience	221
	Experience in local administration	222
	Party experience.....	223
7.2	Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, party relations, and ministerial durability across countries.....	224
7.2.1	Nonparametric estimation and model specification.....	224
7.2.2	The length of ministerial tenure and executive scenarios	228
7.2.3	The length of ministerial tenure and party relations	235
7.3	Conclusion.....	246
Conclusion.....		250
	Political institutions, parties, and ministerial accountability.....	250
	The findings	253
	Ministerial accountability, party government, and the presidentialisation of politics.....	256
	Future research.....	261
Appendices		263
	Appendix A - Robustness tests and graphs (Chapter 4).....	264
	Appendix B - Robustness tests, supplemental models, graphs (Chapter 5).....	268
	Appendix C - Robustness tests, supplemental models, graphs (Chapter 6).....	274
	Appendix D - Supplemental models and graphs (Chapter 7).....	287
Bibliography		309

Abstract

Despite extensive research on government and ministerial duration, there are still relatively few comparative studies of ministerial survival and accountability. This thesis uses the analytical tools provided by the agency theory to study the variation in the length of ministerial tenure and makes an original contribution to the study of this topic from two points of view. First, whereas earlier literature studied cabinet members solely as prime ministerial agents, this thesis explicitly adopts a three-principal-agent model to analyse the accountability of cabinet ministers to their own parties, directly-elected presidents, and prime ministers. For this reason, the variation in the length of ministerial tenure is analysed in countries with semi-presidential constitutions, which maximise the intra- and inter-case variation in principal-agent relationships. Adopting an interactionist view on the factors that explain the variation in the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and parties to control cabinet members in semi-presidential systems, we expect that the ministers' survival in office depends on the interaction between institutional scenarios and party relationships between the minister, the president and the prime minister. The second contribution of this thesis is empirical. A unique data set on the tenures of French, Portuguese and Romanian ministers during two legislative terms has been collected in order to test these theoretical expectations. In addition to fixed characteristics at the moment of appointment, the data set records resignation calls and conflicts between ministers and their principals. This data allow one to measure the variation in the political influence of presidents, prime ministers and political parties that is not easily observable. The results indicate that principals who act as *de facto* party leaders are more likely to control the process of ministerial deselection under certain institutional scenarios. Such a study is important because it addresses the link between institutional design and political accountability and emphasises the extra-constitutional factors accounting for the variation in political practices across and within similar institutional frameworks over time.

Tables and Figures

List of Tables

Table 1.1 A typology of ministerial termination events	15
Table 2.1 Presidential, prime ministerial, and party influence over cabinet ministers...	59
Table 3.1 Countries, cabinets, time period, and executive scenarios	70
Table 3.2 Executive scenarios and <i>de facto</i> party leadership positions.....	70
Table 4.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (France).....	100
Table 4.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (France).....	102
Table 4.3 Average fixed characteristics and events across cabinets (France)	103
Table 4.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in France	120
Table 4.5 Principal-agent relationships under different executive scenarios (France).	122
Table 5.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (Portugal)	142
Table 5.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (Portugal)	145
Table 5.3 Average fixed characteristics and events by cabinet (Portugal).....	146
Table 5.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in Portugal.....	160
Table 6.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (Romania)	182
Table 6.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (Romania)	184
Table 6.3 Average fixed characteristics and events by cabinet (Romania)	185
Table 6.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in Romania.....	201
Table 6.5 Principal-agent relationships under unified executive (Romania).....	203
Table 6.6 Principal-agent relationships under divided executive (Romania)	204
Table 6.7 Principal-agent relationships under cohabitation (Romania)	206
Table 7.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics.....	213
Table 7.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics.....	213
Table 7.3 Average events and fixed characteristics across countries.....	216
Table 7.4 Average events and fixed characteristics across executive scenarios.....	217
Table 7.5 Resignation calls for ministers facing resignation calls across countries	219
Table 7.6 Resignation calls for ministers facing resignation calls across scenarios	219
Table 7.7 Resignation calls by reason across countries.....	220
Table 7.8 Resignation calls by reason across scenarios.....	220
Table 7.9 Ministerial durability across executive scenarios	230
Table 7.10 Principal-agent relationships and the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy after elections	237
Table 7.11 Principal-agent relationships and the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy before elections	239
Table 7.12 Principal-agent relationships and the presidents' position in the party hierarchy before elections	244

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Dual-executive sub-types in semi-presidential systems.....	49
Figure 4.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (France).....	105
Figure 4.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (France).....	106
Figure 4.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (France)...	108
Figure 4.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival (France)	110
Figure 4.5 Local elections contested by ministers (France).....	111
Figure 4.6 Success in local elections and survival in cabinet office (France)	112
Figure 4.7 Party experience across governments and by survival (France)	114
Figure 4.8 Party promotions across governments and by survival (France).....	115
Figure 4.9 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across scenarios (France).....	116
Figure 4.10 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival by scenario (France)	117
Figure 4.11 Impact of conflicts under unified executive	123
Figure 4.12 Impact of conflicts under cohabitation.....	123
Figure 5.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (Portugal)	148
Figure 5.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (Portugal)	150
Figure 5.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (Portugal)	151
Figure 5.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival (Portugal)	153
Figure 5.5 Party experience across governments and by survival (Portugal).....	155
Figure 5.6 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival (Portugal)	157
Figure 5.7 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across cabinets (Portugal)	158
Figure 5.8 Impact of principal-agent relations (Portugal)	164
Figure 6.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (Romania)	187
Figure 6.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (Romania)	189
Figure 6.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (Romania)	190
Figure 6.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival (Romania).....	192
Figure 6.5 Party experience across governments and by survival (Romania).....	194
Figure 6.6 Party promotions across governments and by survival (Romania)	196
Figure 6.7 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across scenarios (Romania).....	198
Figure 6.8 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival by scenario (Romania).....	199
Figure 6.9 Conflicts and resignation calls under unified executive (Romania).....	204
Figure 6.10 Conflicts and resignation calls under divided executive (Romania)	205
Figure 6.11 Conflicts and resignation calls under cohabitation (Romania).....	208
Figure 7.1 Hazard rate for ministerial survival across countries and scenarios.....	225
Figure 7.2 Kaplan-Meier plots of ministerial survival across countries & scenarios ..	225
Figure 7.3 Comparison of estimated baseline hazards	227
Figure 7.4 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive	232
Figure 7.5 Impact of principal-agent relationships under divided executive.....	233
Figure 7.6 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation	234
Figure 7.7 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation when prime ministers are party leaders before elections	240
Figure 7.8 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation when prime ministers are not party leaders before elections	242
Figure 7.9 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation when presidents are party leaders before elections	245

List of abbreviations

CDR	Convenția Democrată Română (Romania)
CDS	Centro Democrático Social (Portugal)
CDS-PP	Centro Democrático e Social - Partido Popular (Portugal)
CEE	Central and Eastern Europe
CPUN	Consiliul Provizoriu de Uniune Națională (Romania)
CSAT	Consiliul Suprem de Apărare a Țării (Romania)
EU	European Union
FDSN	Frontul Democrat al Salvării Naționale (Romania)
FSN	Frontul Salvării Naționale (Romania)
PD	Partidul Democrat (Romania)
PDL	Partidul Democrat Liberal (Romania)
PDSR	Partidul Democrației Sociale din România (Romania)
PLD	Partidul Liberal Democrat (Romania)
PNL	Partidul Național Liberal (Romania)
PS	Parti socialiste (France)
PS	Partido Socialista (Portugal)
PSD	Partido Social Democrata (PSD)
PSD	Partidul Social Democrat (Romania)
PSDR	Partidul Social Democrat din România (Romania)
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République
UMP	Union pour la majorité présidentielle (France)
UMP	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (France)

Introduction

Nicolas Sarkozy gave up running for the presidency of the Gaullist party in 1999, after President Chirac warned him that the leader of the majority party would not be prime minister in 2002. Chirac had nevertheless appointed Alain Juppé as prime minister in 1995 although he was the leader of the majority party. Sarkozy's abandonment of the party leadership race did not lead to him being appointed as prime minister in 2002, when Jacques Chirac was re-elected as President of France. He was nevertheless appointed as minister of economy and finance and second in the hierarchy of PM Jean-Pierre Raffarin's cabinet. However, President Chirac could not dissuade Sarkozy from contesting the presidency of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) in 2004, when Alain Juppé stepped down amid accusations of embezzlement of public funds. Before new party elections were organised, though, Chirac warned that ministers who are elected as party leaders must give up their cabinet seats to prevent any damage to the prime minister's authority over cabinet ministers. As a result, Sarkozy stepped down from government in November 2004, when he was elected as president of the UMP. Six months later, the Raffarin government resigned following the rejection of the referendum on the European Constitution and Sarkozy, who was still party leader, was re-appointed in government as Minister of the Interior, the only state minister in Dominique de Villepin's newly formed cabinet. Why did President Chirac appoint the leader of the majority party as prime minister in 1995, but refused to do so in 2002 and in 2005? And why was Nicolas Sarkozy asked to step down in 2004 as a result of his election as UMP leader, only to be re-appointed in government six months later when he was still a party leader? President Chirac's concern about the personal loyalty of prime ministers and leaders of the majority party and his refusal to allow a party leader sit at the cabinet table indicate that party relationships are an important explanatory factor of the variation in the influence of presidents, prime ministers, and political parties over cabinet composition.

The puzzle: Why do some ministers keep office longer than others?

Although ministerial resignations attract considerable public attention and media coverage, little is known about the reasons why some ministers resign while others do not under similar political circumstances. The rules concerning the simultaneous holding of party and cabinet responsibilities change from one government to another, depending on the circumstantial interests of the political actors involved. The doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility does not explain why only some of the ministers who pass critical judgements on their governments' decisions resign while others do not. Individual ministerial responsibility also fails to explain why personal and departmental errors and scandals bring down some ministers, but not others. By and large, departures from ministerial office are viewed as part of the hazards of the job (Blondel, 1985, p. 3) and few studies have inquired what makes some ministers more durable than others (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2012, p. 1).

Studies of ministerial careers have focused on the personal, social and political background of the individuals who serve in government. There have been extensive analyses of the routes to ministerial office in individual countries, such as the UK (Berlinski et al., 2012; Heady, 1974a; Rose, 1971; Theakston, 1987), Canada (Kerby, 2009), Australia (Weller, 2007), New Zealand (McLeay, 1995), the United States (Burstein, 1977), France (Dogan, 1967, 1986, 1987; Gaxie, 1986; E. G. Lewis, 1970), Spain (P. H. Lewis, 1972), Portugal (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002; P. H. Lewis, 1978), Sweden (Ruin, 1969), Japan (Cheng, 1974), India (Jha, 1974), the Soviet Union (Rigby, 1977) and the post-communist Russian Federation (Shevchenko, 2005). Other works have looked at patterns of ministerial careers in geographic clusters. Several collective works have put forward a broad perspective on the patterns of ministerial recruitment, deselection, and executive decision-making in Europe (Blondel & Thiébault, 1991; Dowding & Dumont, 2009a; Heady, 1974b; Herman & Alt, 1975; Laver & Shepsle, 1994), others have analysed ministerial careers separately in Western Europe (Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 1997; Blondel & Thiébault, 1991), Southern Europe (P. T. de Almeida, Pinto, & Bermeo, 2003), and Eastern Europe (Blondel, Müller-Rommel, & Málova, 2007; Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009). A few groundbreaking works have also studied the world-wide variation in the social background of ministers and in the routes to ministerial office (Blondel, 1985).

The durability of individual ministers in office has also been studied across different regions of the world (Blondel, 1985) and with regard to the duration of the cabinets in which they serve (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2004). The impact of political institutions on the length of ministerial tenure has also been taken into account. Blondel (1985) has analysed the impact of regime change and military takeovers on ministerial tenure and has compared the length of tenure under military and constitutional presidential systems, and under communist systems, prime ministerial systems, and monarchical systems. This large-n study found that “Institutions do have an impact on ministerial duration, even if it is sometimes difficult to measure precisely the extent of the impact” (Blondel, 1985, p. 136). The impact of democratic transition on ministerial turnover has also been considered in studies of Central and Eastern European countries (Blondel et al., 2007; Shevchenko, 2005). Other works have considered the impact of institutional factors on the length of ministerial tenure, such as government types, the constitutional powers of prime ministers, the durability of prime ministers, coalition attributes, and party-specific variables (Budge & Keman, 1990; Budge, 1985; Dewan & Myatt, 2010; Dowding & Dumont, 2009b; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Quiroz Flores, 2009). Scholars have attended to differences in ministerial mobility, cabinet ranks and the importance of portfolios (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2007; Blondel, 1985; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridason & Kam, 2008; Shevchenko, 2005). Some of these studies found that ministerial durability is independent of cabinet durability and that the institutional factors that influence cabinet duration, such as investiture votes and party systems, have no effect on individual turnover (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). Whether ministers serve in single-party or multi-party governments has also been found irrelevant for ministerial durability (Bakema, 1991). In general, party politics variables have emerged as better predictors of ministerial longevity in office. Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008) have shown that whether ministers are from the prime minister’s party or from other parties in a coalition government makes a difference for the amount of time they survive in office.

Compared to the body of literature that considers the impact of institutional factors and personal characteristics on the length of ministerial tenure, considerably fewer studies have incorporated the events experienced by ministers during their time in office as determinants of longevity in office. Resignation calls are the most popular measure of ministerial performance and have been used in the estimation of ministerial

longevity in the UK (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2010; Berlinski et al., 2012; Dewan & Dowding, 2005; Dowding & Kang, 1998), Germany (Fischer, Kaiser, & Rohlfing, 2006), and Iceland (Kristinsson, 2009). Adopting a principal-agent approach to study the relationship between prime ministers and cabinet members, Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2010, 2012) have used resignation calls as an indicator of the information that prime ministers acquire during the ministers' time in office to decide how long ministers can serve under them. This analysis has shown that resignation calls are a good indicator of the ministers' performance in office and a strong predictor of ministerial deselection. However, this relationship has only been studied in the case of British ministers. The lack of institutional variation within a single-country study has made it impossible to test whether this effect varies across institutional environments (Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 570).

Overall, the study of ministerial duration has been acknowledged as a different research programme than that of government duration (Fischer, Dowding, & Dumont, 2012, p. 516). In contrast to the study of government duration, though, the study of ministerial longevity lacks a firm theoretical foundation. A growing body of literature has advanced the theoretical study of ministerial accountability by analysing the relationship between cabinet members and prime ministers within a principal-agent framework (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012). However, due to institutional, parliamentary, and party differences across countries, these authors believe that the agency relationship between cabinet members and prime ministers is likely to vary across different institutional structures (Fischer et al., 2012, p. 516). Additionally, the exclusive focus on the relationship between prime ministers and cabinet members neglects the role of political parties as principals for their agents in government and the important role of backbenchers (Lord Wilson, 2013). The position of political parties as principals for cabinet members is borne out by the resignation of prime ministers from government when they are defeated in party leadership ballots, as illustrated by the cases of Margaret Thatcher and Julia Gillard. This research aims to build on the principal-agent approach to suggest a theoretical framework that takes into account the ministers' accountability to the complete range of political actors who can hold cabinet members accountable across institutional settings.

The argument: ministers are accountable to multiple principals in government and in the party

This project aims to contribute to the study of ministerial turnover by focusing on the decision-making process that leads to the recalling of ministers. The relationships between ministers and their superiors in the government and in the party hierarchy are modelled with the use of agency theory, which provides a single framework for the study of representative democracies and emphasises who is accountable to whom at each stage in the process of delegation across national and institutional contexts (Strøm, 2000). This is not the first work to employ a principal-agent model for the study of ministerial resignations and dismissals. The agency theory has been used to study the durability of British ministers (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012) and as an underlying theory in the strategic study of cabinet reshuffles and resignation calls (Berlinski et al., 2010; Indridason & Kam, 2007; Kam & Indridason, 2005). This is also not the first work to theorise the subordination of cabinet ministers to more than one principal. Rudy Andeweg (2000) has described cabinet ministers as double agents, due to their position in the chain of democratic delegation as both members of government and heads of department. Andeweg (2000, p. 389) also argued that only a direct link from parties to individual ministers can prevent the problem of agency loss and circular delegation. However, he found little evidence that the link between parties and their minister-agents goes beyond the appointment of party members to ministerial office and argued that only the use of recalls and reshuffles could indicate that parties effectively control their agents in ministerial office. Overall, political scientists like Andeweg (2000) and Muller (2000) have long stressed the role of parties in the process of political delegation and the existence of a double chain of delegation from voters and political parties to governments. However, the extent to which political parties control their agents in government following their appointment has hardly ever been tested empirically and comparatively. This thesis is the first to adopt a multiple-principal-agent approach to study ministerial longevity in office and to test this model empirically across several countries.

The competing-principals model adopted in this study starts from the assumption that in everyday politics cabinet ministers are accountable not only to prime ministers, but also to their own parties outside public office and, under certain circumstances, to directly-elected presidents. Thus, the principal-agent approach can be

used to study ministerial deselection in any democratic system, regardless of the number of political actors who are granted the formal powers to fire cabinet members. However, the largest intra- and inter-case variation in principal-agent relationships occurs in countries with semi-presidential constitutions, where a directly elected president shares the executive power with a prime-minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the parliament. Thus, presidents, prime ministers, and political parties act as competing principals for cabinet members in this political system. Therefore, to take full advantage of the principal-agent approach and highlight the impact of different agency relations on ministerial accountability, this research studies the process of ministerial deselection in semi-presidential systems.

While agency theory has become a standard tool of analysing ministerial longevity in office, this topic is not usually studied within the context of institutional debates that are discussed in the party government literature. By studying the variation in ministerial accountability to presidents, prime ministers, and political parties, this thesis speaks to the debates concerning the operation of political institutions in semi-presidential systems and the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers across semi-presidential countries despite their similar constitutional design (Cheibub & Chernykh, 2008; Elgie, 2009; Roper, 2002; Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Siaroff, 2003).

The theoretical argument tested in this thesis generates several expectations regarding the institutional circumstances under which presidents, prime ministers, and party principals are expected to control the process of ministerial deselection in semi-presidential systems. The main argument is that the impact of principal-agent relations on ministerial accountability depends on the interaction between executive scenarios and party relationships between presidents, prime ministers and cabinet members. This idea builds upon the link identified by Samuels and Shugart (2010) between the separation of powers and party organisation and behaviour and tests the hypothesis that the presidents' influence over the government derives from their de facto position as party leaders (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). Since political parties have no ex-post control mechanisms for their agents in a directly elected presidential office, a highly valued presidency may loosen the party-government relationship (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668). The pursuit of the presidency is likely to introduce a tension between the executive and legislative branches of the party and decrease the accountability of party leaders (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 16). As a result, party leaders who win the presidency are able to use their informal partisan authority to

control the political system as *de facto* leaders of their former parties. Presidents who act as *de facto* party leaders reverse the party-leader principal-agent relationship by turning prime ministers into their own agents, depriving political parties of the ability to control either of their two agents (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). If this happens, then parties should also lose the ability to control their ministers, who become presidential agents.

The concept of *de facto* partisan authority is operationalised by taking into account the positions held by presidents and prime ministers in the party hierarchy before they take office. Presidents who step down as party leaders, only to be sworn in as heads of state are expected to continue to control their parties. By contrast, presidents who did not contest the presidential race as party leaders are expected to have little or no impact on cabinet composition. Consequently, we do not expect them to control the cabinet either. Similarly, prime ministers who are not party leaders are expected to be less influential than prime ministers who come to office as party leaders. Due to their centrality in the chain of democratic delegation in representative democracies, party principals should retain a certain amount of influence over the cabinet under all circumstances, as long as they can hold accountable their agents in government, including the president and the prime minister. Thus, if neither the president, nor the prime minister is a party leader, then we expect party principals to keep a tight grip over cabinet ministers.

Apart from party leadership roles, institutional context also matters for the extent of presidential and prime ministerial powers over the cabinet. The variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence over the political system as a function of institutional context was first noted by Duverger (1980, 1996). He suggested that the president's authority over the political systems depends on whether he or she is the leader, a disciplined member, or opposes the parliamentary majority. To account for the variation in presidential influence as a function of institutional context, we operationalise the "modalities" of presidential influence identified by Duverger according to the political affiliation of presidents and prime ministers. Thus, institutional context varies according to whether the president and the prime minister are from the same party (a situation known as unified executive), or whether the president and prime minister are from different parties but the president's party is in government (a scenario known as divided executive), or whether the president's party is not in government (a situation defined as cohabitation). Institutions are expected to interact

with party relationships and to modify their impact on presidential and prime ministerial authority. All else equal, we expect that presidents who act as *de facto* party leaders are able to influence the process of ministerial deselection when they are in the same party with the prime minister. The extent of their control over cabinet composition is expected to decrease when they are not in the same party with the prime minister and even more so under cohabitation, when their party is not in government. However, we do not expect presidents who are not *de facto* party leaders to have any impact on cabinet composition, regardless of whether or not their party is in government.

The results of this thesis confirm the expectation that presidents and prime ministers who control their parties are also able to hold accountable the party's agents in government under certain institutional circumstances. The analysis of ministerial turnover in France and in Romania, where presidents usually come to office as party leaders, has shown that political parties are not likely to control cabinet members under unified executive. By comparison, political parties are in a better position to hold ministers accountable across executive scenarios in Portugal, where presidents do not usually act as *de facto* party leaders. In this case, the extent of party influence over the government depends on the strength of prime ministerial leadership and on the autonomy of prime ministers relative to their parties. Therefore, as far as semi-presidential systems are concerned, if political parties undergo a process of presidentialisation, then we expect party principals to lose control over cabinet members, who become presidential agents when the president and the prime minister are from the same party. In other words, presidents who act as *de facto* party leaders are expected to take control over the cabinet when they are in the same party with the prime minister. When the president and the prime minister are not from the same party, we expect intraparty politics to influence more the process of ministerial deselection. Presidents are expected to have the least amount of influence over the cabinet when their party is not in government, as in this case they lack both formal and partisan means of influence over the cabinet. Under these circumstances, ministers no longer act as presidential agents and both prime ministers and parties should regain control over the cabinet.

In addition to the debates surrounding the operation of semi-presidential systems, this research also speaks to the debate regarding the challenges faced by party government in modern democracies (Katz, 1986, 1987; Mair, 2008; Webb, Farrell, & Holliday, 2002; Webb & White, 2007a). Regardless of the definitions given to the

concept of party government, one of the conditions for parties to be able to influence government requires that political leaders are selected within parties and held responsible for their actions and policies through parties (Katz, 1986, 1987; Mair, 2008; Rose, 1969). The parties' ability to place their agents in public office is seen as a form of institutional control that operates for the benefit of the party organisation (Kopecký & Mair, 2012a, p. 7). However, the literature on party government has also emphasised that simply having party members appointed to government is in itself a weak measure of party control over the government (Andeweg, 2000, p. 389). Thus, the extent to which parties are able to recall ministers is a question that still needs to be assessed empirically. Due to the challenges inherent in the recruitment of party leaders by, but not necessarily through parties (Mair, 2008, p. 227), the political parties' ability to contain agency loss and fire ministers is a good complementary test for the extent of their control over the executive decision-making process.

Original data

This study argues that the length of ministerial tenure depends on the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to sanction agency loss under different political circumstances. The principals' control over cabinet composition is estimated as a function of party relationships and institutional context. For an effective test of this argument we need to observe the process of ministerial deselection under different political circumstances within and across national contexts.

The research question set out above is studied in France, Portugal, and Romania, due to the variation in institutional context that these countries have experienced over time. The analysis of ministerial turnover in France is carried out for the most recent periods of cohabitation and unified executive, which occurred between 1997 and 2002 and between 2007 and 2012 respectively. The time period under analysis in the case of Portugal spans from 2002 until 2009. With the exception of a short period between 2005 and 2006, when President Jorge Sampaio and José Sócrates of the Socialist Party shared executive power, the deselection of Portuguese ministers is observed under conditions of cohabitation. Romania presents the greatest variation in institutional context. During the time interval under analysis, which spans from 2000 until 2008, there was a period of unified executive between 2000 and 2004, one of divided executive between 2004 and 2007, and one of cohabitation between 2007 and 2008. To capture the variation in the party relationships between ministers and their principals we focus on the position

held by presidents and prime ministers in the party hierarchy before taking office. Our expectation is that presidents and prime ministers who come to office as party leaders are in a better position to fire ministers who deviate from their preferred position. The alternation of dual executive scenarios within the countries selected for comparison allows us to verify whether the impact of party relationships on the length of ministerial tenure varies across national contexts under similar political circumstances.

This study makes an empirical contribution to the study of ministerial turnover. A new data set has been collected for each country under study based on content analysis of print press news. Apart from the information related to the fixed characteristics of the ministers at the moment of appointment, each data set records resignation calls, as a measure of ministerial performance, and disagreements with principals, as a measure of principal-agent relationships. Similar to previous studies that have relied on agency theory to study the relationship between prime ministers and their cabinets (Berlinski, Dewan, & Dowding, 2010, 2012), we see resignation calls as indicators of the ministers' performance in office. Consequently, we expect that principals use this information when they decide to end ministerial appointments and we expect that the occurrence of resignation calls increases the ministers' risk of losing office. To compensate for this measure's exposure to noisy signals of the minister's performance (Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 561), we also take into account the direct relationship between ministers and their principals. Our assumption in this case is that the risk of losing office increases when the occurrence of conflicts between ministers and their principals is made public. The accumulation of conflicts between ministers, presidents, prime ministers and parties is therefore a proxy for agency loss that each principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to fire agents, then they should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with their agents increases. If the ministers' risk of losing office does not increase in the presence of conflicts with principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the ability to sanction agency loss. The indicator of conflicts between ministers and principals is the number of times the former are criticised by the latter during their time in office, as reported in the press. Similarly, resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign, as reported in the press. If they are asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded only if new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. The issue at stake for both resignation calls and conflicts with principals may be related to the ministers' performance in executive or party office

or to their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues. Since the occurrence of conflicts and resignation calls is unrelated to the variation in institutional context and party relationships we can investigate which conflicts are more likely to lead to deselection and under which circumstances this is more likely to happen within and across countries.

The structure of the thesis

Chapter One reviews the normative expectations derived from the doctrines of individual and collective ministerial responsibility and the empirical studies that have studied their relevance in concrete cases of ministerial resignation and dismissals across different parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to Central and Eastern European democracies. This analysis shows that although the British doctrines of ministerial responsibility have travelled to other political systems and aspects of ministerial office, the current literature has not identified a set of clear-cut rules that one can use to predict what kind of faults or responsibility breaches are likely to cost ministers their jobs.

The second chapter argues that agency theory can supply the theoretical power that the study of ministerial survival has so far lacked and situates this topic within the broader area of studies that focus on the process of delegation and accountability in representative democracies. This analysis shows that while agency theory can be used to study ministerial deselection across national and institutional contexts, a semi-presidential environment maximises the intra- and inter-case variation in principal-agent relationships. Using the principal-agent framework, this chapter argues the length of ministerial tenure depends on the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to sanction agency loss under different political circumstances. Using insights from the literature on semi-presidentialism and party politics, this analysis argues that certain political circumstances increase the ability of principals who act as *de facto* party leaders to sanction agency loss.

Chapter three explains the research design used in this study. This chapter justifies the adoption of a small-n comparative approach and the selection of cases where the theoretical argument is tested. Subsequently we present the use of quantitative case studies for the collection, validation, and analysis of the new data collected for the purpose of this study and we explain the operationalisation and measurement of the dependent and independent variables.

Chapters four, five, and six analyse the process of ministerial turnover in France, Portugal, and Romania. These chapters have an identical structure. First we outline the data, the time period, the institutional context, and the determinants of ministerial duration that are captured by the analysis of ministers in each country. Then we focus on intraparty politics and we inquire to what extent holding the presidency of a political party before taking office allows presidents and prime ministers to play a *de facto* party leadership role after they formally step down as party leaders in each country. Subsequently we describe the data sets and we explain the measurement of fixed characteristics and events in each country. The chapters conclude with a multivariate analysis that evaluates the impact of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure and estimate the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to control the process of ministerial deselection under different executive scenarios.

Due to the limited variation in party relationships in individual countries, the case studies do not allow us to estimate the variation in the ability of principals to control the process of ministerial deselection as a function of the party leadership roles they play. However, the three case studies indicate a link between party systems and ministerial accountability. The French and the Romanian cases show that institutional context makes a difference for the ability of presidents and prime ministers to control the process of ministerial deselection when they act as *de facto* party leaders. Conversely, the Portuguese case suggests that when political parties do not regard the presidency as the most important political contest, cabinet ministers are more likely to be accountable to prime ministers and their parties independently of institutional context. Additionally, the Romania case indicates that inter-executive conflicts may reduce the presidents' influence over the government even under a scenario of unified executive and even when they are perceived as *de facto* party leaders. Similarly, a high level of intra-executive conflict during periods of divided executive may decrease the ability of both presidents and prime ministers to fire cabinet members. Both situations lead to an increase in the ability of the party principal to control cabinet ministers.

Chapter seven presents a comparative analysis of ministerial turnover in France, Portugal, and Romania. Due to the variation in both institutional context and party relationships across the three countries, this analysis can estimate the authority of presidents and prime ministers over cabinet composition as a function of both party leadership positions and executive scenarios. This chapter highlights the impact that

formal and informal hierarchies of party leadership have on the ability of presidents and prime ministers to influence the process of ministerial deselection and emphasises the political circumstances that are likely to strengthen this effect. The results presented in this chapter confirm our theoretical expectations and show that the *de facto* party leadership roles played by presidents and prime ministers explain the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual influence over the cabinet.

The concluding chapter relates the findings obtained in the empirical chapters to the research question and discusses their implications for a general theory of ministerial turnover. These findings also emphasise a broader link between the literature on ministerial turnover and the literature on party government. In this context we highlight the relationship between institutional design and political accountability and we emphasise the extra-constitutional factors accounting for the variation in political practices across and within institutional frameworks over time.

Chapter One: The literature on ministerial resignations

Two Polish ministers lost their jobs in April 2013. Donald Tusk, the Polish prime minister and Civic Platform leader, fired Mikołaj Budzanowski, the non-partisan minister of treasury, for failing to inform him about a memorandum signed between Gazprom and the Polish gas company EuRoPol regarding the construction of a new branch of the pipeline transporting gas to Poland. Jarosław Gowin, the Civic Platform's Justice Minister, was also fired in April after stating, while the prime minister was in a state visit in Germany, that Polish fertilization clinics were selling embryos in Germany for scientific experiments. PM Tusk accused the minister of indiscipline and of repeatedly overstepping his jurisdictional competences. Mr Gowin had criticized the state funding for IVF treatment and had voted against the government's draft bill on same-sex civil partnerships in February. Sławomir Nowak, the Civic Platform's Transport Minister, also found himself in the hot seat in April 2013, when the lower house of parliament tabled a motion of no confidence against him. The motion was initiated by the conservative party United Poland following the European Commission's decision to freeze funds for road-building amid allegations of price-fixing. Apart from the opposition parties, the motion was also voted by three MPs from the Polish Peasant Party, a junior coalition partner to PM Tusk's Civic Platform. The minister of transport survived the no-confidence motion. However, by the end of the month he got involved in several other media scandals. First he was accused of friendship with businessmen who secure important government contracts. Then he also hit the headlines for flashing an expensive collection of watches, which he later on claimed to have borrowed. Mr Nowak did not lose his job this time either, although the ruling party continued to fall in the opinion polls. What explains the prime minister's decision to keep in office a cabinet member who had received a negative vote in the parliament from a coalition partner and who came under heavy media fire, after having shown his decisive leadership in firing ministers who had created far less problems for the government? This is the sort of question that this thesis aims to answer.

This chapter is organised in four sections that deal with different aspects of ministerial termination events. The first section puts forward a typology of ministerial termination events that focuses on their collective or individual nature, as well as on

their voluntary or forced character. This section discusses both collective resignations and dismissals and justifies their exclusion from this study. The second and third sections of the chapter deal with individual resignations and dismissals separately. This section draws on primary and secondary literature and uses historical accounts, theoretical works, and concrete examples to illustrate the various weaknesses of normative expectations about ministerial termination events. The fourth section focuses on the literature that analyses patterns of resignations and dismissals across different parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to Central and Eastern European democracies. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the current literature's ability to answer to the question 'when do ministers resign?', locates the gap in the academic endeavour to explain ministerial termination events and emphasises the contribution of this study to the understanding of one of the key features of parliamentary and semi-presidential government and to the current literature on ministerial responsibility.

1.1 Ministerial termination events

This section presents a typology of ministerial termination events focusing on the collective or individual form that they may take, as well as on their voluntary or forced character. For purposes of simplification, only the clear-cut categories of resignations as voluntary departures and dismissals as forced exits from the cabinet are illustrated in Table 1.1. Although ministerial careers may be ended by other unpredictable events, such as illness, personal problems or even death, these possibilities are not covered here since they are independent of political factors.

Table 1.1 A typology of ministerial termination events

	Collective	Individual
Resignations	Cabinet resignation after general elections and PM dismissal, resignation, or death.	Ministers step down because of a political, administrative or personal scandal.
Dismissals	Cabinet dismissal by presidents or legislatures.	Ministers fired by presidents, prime ministers, or legislatures (through individual no-confidence motions).

The first column in Table 1.1 refers to collective termination events, while the second one indicates individual exits from the cabinet. Since collective ministerial terminations are simultaneous with cabinet terminations, it is possible to classify them using the three classes of termination modes put forward by Budge and Keman (1990, p. 160) for the analysis of Western European cabinet duration. Consequently, collective exits from the cabinet are expected after general elections (either fixed or anticipated) or prime ministerial resignations, and when specific political procedures are used to bring down the government, such as a change in the cabinet's party composition leading to the mass resignation of ministers belonging to that party, the loss of a vote of confidence, and constitutional interventions, such as the president's decision to dissolve the assembly and call new elections (Budge & Keman, 1990, p. 164). By and large, the cabinet can be dismissed only in parliamentary systems, where the two branches of power can remove each other. Since all parliamentary systems are characterised by what is known as a "responsible executive" (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1), the assembly can dismiss the cabinet by passing a no-confidence motion. Although the degree to which this basic feature of parliamentarism can be enforced depends on the structure and organisation of political parties (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1), it has remained the most important mechanism of collective ministerial dismissal. Additionally, in certain political systems where a directly elected president coexists with a responsible executive, the president may also influence cabinet duration (Shugart & Carey, 1992, p. 24).

The causes of collective ministerial terminations can be inferred from the literature dealing with government survival. The main theories that seek to explain the causes of cabinet terminations in Western European parliamentary democracies have traditionally focused on "structural attributes" (Warwick, 1979), "critical events" (E. C. Browne, Frensdreis, & Gleiber, 1986) or "strategic interactions" (Budge & Keman, 1990; Damgaard, 2008; Lupia & Strøm, 2009). In order to use the insights of the "attributes" and "events" approaches, King et al. (1990) put forward a model of cabinet survival that, while being essentially stochastic, assumed that the probability of cabinet terminations is also a function of several country, party-system and cabinet attributes. Additionally, by relating government duration to party system fractionalisation, the existence of an investiture requirement, the polarisation of the opposition and the number of attempts for each government formation, the authors emphasised the key relevance of the bargaining environment for the durability of coalition cabinets (G. King et al., 1990, p. 869). Similarly, Lupia and Strøm (Lupia & Strøm, 2009) focused on the

bargaining power of political parties and modelled the hazard rate of coalition cabinets as a function of two overlapping games, the coalition-building process and the bargaining process in anticipation of the next election's outcomes. They argued that electoral incentives influence the parliamentary decision-making game and that electoral expectations have a critical impact on cabinet stability (Lupia & Strøm, 2009). Using a similar argument, Damgaard (2008, p. 306) differentiated between technical terminations, which occur in the aftermath of regular elections or when prime ministers resign for non-political reasons; and discretionary terminations, which involve strategic actions decided by party leaders and include early elections, voluntary cabinet enlargement, cabinet defeat in parliament, intra-party conflict, inter-party conflict, inter-party policy conflict and inter-party personal conflict. Damgaard's analysis has emphasised that with the exception of enlargement terminations, which have so far occurred rarely and mostly in Finland, the remaining types of discretionary terminations are triggered by political conflicts and occur when the cabinet is defeated by one of the cabinet's principals, presidents or political parties (Damgaard, 2008, p. 307). To sum up, most approaches to cabinet duration have in common a strong focus on political bargaining.

The bargaining dimension of cabinet politics is also relevant for the distinction between the voluntary and forced character of ministerial termination events, which sets resignations apart from dismissals. As far as individual ministers are concerned, drawing a line between requested resignations and dismissals is particularly difficult given the fact that in both cases ministers leave office against their will (Brazier, 1997, p. 289). As a matter of fact, some authors believe that the proper term for a minister being "fired" is "resignation", since the decision to dismiss is only taken if ministers refuse to resign (Dewan & Dowding, 2005, p. 47). However, by paying attention to the role played by ministers faced with resignation issues, Brazier (1997, p. 290) differentiated between ministers who take the initiative to resign over a collective responsibility matter and ministers who are punished for personal or departmental errors. In the first case external pressures for resignations are rare, while in the second case ministers resign involuntarily, as a result of media, assembly or party pressures. Although it may not always be easy to clearly recognise ministerial promotions and demotions, the reallocation of ministers to other posts through cabinet reshuffles is a similar response to ministerial insubordination, unwanted initiatives, or mistakes. In any case, when faced with a resignation issue, whether a minister resigns voluntary, is

constrained to resign, sidelined in the cabinet, or dismissed is likely to depend on his bargaining position within a given political climate.

By and large, although the factors that trigger collective ministerial terminations are to a large extent unpredictable at the beginning of a government's mandate, the smooth resolution of such situations is guaranteed by constitutional provisions, which ensure that in case the prime minister vacates office, the entire cabinet must step down. By contrast, an individual exit from the government, on grounds of either personal or departmental faults, is often likely to follow a unique course of action that varies according to the different factors that brings it into public attention and the institutional mechanisms that are allowed to interfere in the process.

To sum up, collective ministerial terminations are simultaneous and mutually exclusive with cabinet resignations and dismissals, as a fall of government automatically attracts the end of all ministerial tenures. Individual terminations, on the other hand, are generated by the actions and responsibilities of individual ministers and strongly influenced by institutional and political relationship between ministers and other political actors involved in executive politics. Since the focus of this study is on the dynamics of power relations that tie line ministers to prime ministers, party leaders and presidents and aims to determine the impact of these interactions on the length of ministerial tenure, we do not deal with the problem of collective ministerial terminations. The next sections of this chapter analyse separately resignations, dismissals and regional patterns of these events in different types of parliamentary systems.

1.2 Individual resignations

This section focuses on the individual exits from the cabinet that take the form of resignations. Apart from discussing the literature that classifies and looks into the causes of ministerial resignations, this section analyses the British constitutional doctrines of collective and individual ministerial responsibility and emphasises their expansion to other political systems and aspects of ministerial office, as well as the attempts made to change their operation. Following a review of the literature dealing with ministerial resignations, attention is drawn to the inability of accountability theories to explain why some breaches of the responsibility conventions are followed by resignations while others are not. The section concludes with a summary of the roles played by resignations within complex political environments, ranging from voluntary

or upward moves that benefit ministers, to sanctions and demotions that reflect the cost-benefit equation for other political actors.

In a restricted sense, resignations can be defined as the course of action taken by line ministers who decide to pull up stakes and leave office as a result of political disagreements with their superiors (Brazier, 1997, p. 290). Such principled resignations are “the right and duty of a Minister who finds himself in disagreement with his colleagues on fundamental issues of principle and each man must decide for himself whether an issue is one of principle or judgement” (*The Manchester Guardian*, 8 January 1959). However, in a broader sense, resignations may also function as a disguise for sanctions that ministers receive either as a result of insubordination towards the head of government or as a consequence of media, assembly or party pressures to resign, which are usually triggered by personal or departmental scandals (Brazier, 1997, p. 290). It is for this reason that more detailed research on ministerial resignations is required in order to determine whether the factors that are responsible for bringing the resignation issue on the political agenda are also responsible for the final act of resignation.

Although they are not a perfect indicator of accountability, resignations are one of the few indicators that are part of the public record, notwithstanding the fact that it would be difficult to tell whether a large number of resignations indicates a good level of accountability or an excess of ministerial misdeeds (Woodhouse, 1993, p. 290). At the same time, in order to understand when ministers resign one has to be aware of the instances in which they do not resign, since the same conditions that led some ministers to resign might have also occurred in other cases when ministers were able to avoid resignations (Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). From this perspective, non-resignations can be defined as “any case where the press, a non-political organization or MPs in the House have suggested the minister should resign” (Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). Consequently, in order to understand the causal process of resignations and the evolution of theoretical expectations, it is necessary to pay equal attention to both resignations and non-resignations.

The doctrine of ministerial responsibility

The concept of “ministerial responsibility” indicates an executive branch of government that is answerable and removable by the legislature and sets parliamentarism apart from presidential government, where the two branches of power are independent of each

other (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1). The convention of ministerial responsibility is an old British constitutional principle that grew out of Westminster political practices between 1780 and 1815, when the principles of unanimous agreement of ministers on major policies, unity of cabinet under the control of the Prime Minister and the requirement to resign following defeat on a confidence vote imposed themselves as unwritten but firm rules (Birch, 1989, p. 27). The consolidation of these practices has led to the development of two concepts of ministerial responsibility: collective responsibility of the prime minister and cabinet members for government policies and personal responsibility of each of the ministers for their own political, administrative or personal errors.

The principle of collective responsibility binds cabinet ministers to share responsibility for all government policies and confines the expression of any critical views to cabinet meetings (Doig, 1993, p. 167). Therefore, the theoretical expectation derived from this convention is that ministers failing to obtain cabinet approval for their preferred policies have only two options left: resign from the cabinet or conform to the common decision. If they choose to publicly voice disagreement with governmental decisions or policies, one would expect either a resignation or a dismissal, since “the unanimity requirement turns the cabinet into a formally unitary actor from which each minister cannot dissociate without resigning” (Palmer, 1995, p. 173). A textbook example in this regard is that of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a former French minister who chose to step down three times from the departments of Technology and Industry (1983), Defence (1991) and Internal Affairs (2000) to protest against his government’s decisions. Chevènement is famous for having outlined the attitude that line ministers must adopt in the cabinet: “a minister has to keep his mouth shut and if he wants to open it, he has to resign” (Méritens, 2005). After he left the department of technology and industry in 1983 over the policy that locked the franc to the mark, Chevènement compared the situation in government with the debate within the Socialist Party, emphasising why he considered necessary to resign from the cabinet: “My decision to resign from the government was the only possible option, since there cannot be two political views within the government. But it is possible to have them both within the party” (Chevènement, 1983, p. 1). Additionally, the principle of collective responsibility plays a double political function as it can be used by the prime minister in the parliament in order to defend a minister under attack and in the cabinet in order to give

dissenting ministers the ultimatum of accepting a policy or resign (Sutherland, 1991, p. 95).

The convention of individual responsibility covers “a minister’s responsibility both for his or her actions and for actions undertaken in the minister’s name and with the minister’s authority or approval” (Doig, 1989, p. 319). For this reason, individual responsibility is twofold, covering both personal and departmental faults. However, the boundaries of both types of resignations generated by breaches of individual responsibility principles have been constantly expanded. While personal fault resignations could be expected over political misjudgements that “arise from a minister’s official position but do not involve his or her department” (Woodhouse, 2004, p. 1), ministers have often been constrained to resign over private indiscretions, such as sexual scandals (Doig, 1993; Woodhouse, 1993, p. 282). Rather than sanctioning inappropriate conduct for cabinet members for which no formal rules exist, this kind of resignation has the role of minimising the detrimental effects that negative mass media coverage can have on the government and the respective minister’s party (Doig, 1993, p. 178).

The second type of personal fault resignations, related to a minister’s duty to resign over departmental and administrative mismanagement, has been defined as the “major element of uncertainty in the doctrine of individual ministerial responsibility” (Marshall, 1989a, p. 7), given that political practices have rarely acknowledged it. Even in Sir William Dugdale’s case, whose resignation in 1954 over the Crichel Down Affair is often cited as a textbook example of a minister who took full responsibility for departmental errors, it was the hostility of his own party’s backbenchers to the land disposal policy that eventually triggered the resignation (Finer, 1989, p. 124; Jones, 1987, p. 89; Marshall, 1991, p. 464; Woodhouse, 2004, p. 7). Nevertheless, this precedent motivated ministers to separate actions in which the minister is personally involved from actions carried out by officials (Chester, 1989, p. 111), thus trying to revise the doctrine and turn its application in their favour. Examples in this regard include James Prior, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and Kenneth Baker, Home Secretary, who refused to resign over the escape of IRA prisoners in 1983 and 1984 respectively, unless it was proved that the escape had occurred because a governmental policy had failed or had been badly implemented. Such arguments have been interpreted as an attempt to reformulate the individual responsibility convention so that it would not

be possible to ask ministers to resign unless matters of high policy are involved (Woodhouse, 1993, p. 286).

Because of its floating boundaries, efforts are being made to eliminate the category of departmental resignations either by making public servants responsible for their own actions, or by placing all types of individual responsibility resignations under a unique category. The first approach was at the core of an extensive debate on the operation of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility and the requirement to revise the responsibilities assigned to ministers and civil servants alike, which was generated by the Westland Affair in 1986. This debate opposed traditionalist-academics to realist-politicians, contesting and defending the need for civil servants to assume responsibility for their own actions (Robinson, 1987, p. 64). On the one hand it was argued that a political class of civil servants should be set up in order to render ministers able to come to grips with the modern demands of executive decision-making (Shepherd, 1987, pp. 74–77). On the other hand, academics stressed the role of the ministerial responsibility principle in ensuring political control over the bureaucracy, a key aspect of democratic government that would be loosened if ministers retained purely managerial functions (Jones, 1987, p. 88). The second approach was adopted by Diane Woodhouse (2004), who analysed the resignations of Stephen Byers, a British Secretary of State for Transport, and Estelle Morris, the State Secretary for Education. Woodhouse (2004, p. 2) argued that as these resignations had been triggered by departmental errors rather than political misjudgements, it was necessary to reconsider the constitutional and political aspects of the convention. She emphasised that if departmental fault resignations are based on the acceptance of a causal responsibility, then it is possible to identify in all instances of British resignations in the twentieth century a causal link between the error in question and the minister who should have known what was happening in his department. As the exclusion of administrative duties from ministerial responsibilities makes it difficult to use causal responsibility as a basis for determining constitutional fault, Woodhouse argues that more attention should be given to the minister's role responsibility in managing the department, which includes the capacity to prevent and correct mistakes (Woodhouse, 2004, p. 11). Should this classification be adopted, ministerial role responsibility would group together political, policy-making and supervisory duties, with no need to distinguish between different types of responsibilities.

The principle of collective responsibility has influenced the course of action sought by individual ministers in order to set the executive agenda and implement policies in their own departments. Frequent evaluation of the consequences associated with the breach of collective responsibility and tacit support given to controversial decisions is a common attitude adopted by ministers in Westminster systems. For example, Bertie Ahern, the Irish Minister of Finance in the Albert Reynolds cabinet (1992-1994), has explained in his autobiography why he eventually decided to accept the prime minister's decision regarding a tax amnesty bill that he had initially strongly opposed: "The only choice for me was to swallow it, or make a lone stand. That would have meant having to walk, because if I say we're not doing it and then the cabinet decides to do it anyway, that's a resignation issue" (Ahern & Aldous, 2009, p. 153).

The principle of ministerial responsibility has not been limited to Westminster systems, such as Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For example, the Portuguese constitution includes the principle of collective responsibility (article 189), according to which cabinet members are bound by the government's programme and its collective decisions. Additionally, the case of Jean-Pierre Chevènement mentioned above reinforces the idea that the principle of ministerial responsibility continues to shape ministerial behaviour and political practices in Western Europe. However, accountability theories have usually failed to explain why only some of the responsibility breaches are sanctioned. The next section presents further examples of their inability to account for the complex situations that surround ministerial termination events.

Breaches of collective ministerial responsibility

The hypothesis that accountability doctrines fail to provide a satisfactory account to ministerial resignations and dismissals has been acknowledged once academics decided to verify empirically the existence of departmental fault resignations, which imply that ministers take upon themselves the blame for the mistakes of their civil servants. The first systematic analysis of British ministerial resignations forced by parliamentary criticism during 1855-1955 was carried out by Samuel Edward Finer (1989). Having noticed the exceptional nature of resignations, Finer emphasised that a breach of ministerial responsibility triggered resignations provided two conditions were met: minority government or backbench revolts (Finer, 1989, p. 121). Additionally, resignations could still be avoided if the prime minister decided to reshuffle the cabinet.

As a result, Finer concluded that actual charges of incompetence were rare, arbitrary and unpredictable and neither the circumstances of the offence nor its gravity were decisive for the imposition of resignations, since no matter how serious or trivial a reason, the minister concerned was likely to lose parliamentary support and be forced to resign only “if the Minister is yielding, his Prime Minister unbending, and his party out for blood” (Finer, 1989, p. 126). Finer’s conclusion was also backed by Dawn Oliver (1994, p. 631) and Geoffrey Marshall (1989b, p. 130) who found no example of a post-war British minister forced to step down for civil service errors. These findings emphasised the discrepancy between the smooth resolution of ministerial responsibility breaches prescribed by constitutional conventions and the complexity of political contexts within which some ministerial careers seemed randomly terminated by personal or departmental faults, while others were not.

Despite his extensive analysis of ministerial resignations over a long period of time, Finer adopted a traditional approach to study these events, selecting only the events that matched his initial assumptions, without taking into account non-resignations and paying excessive attention to famous cases, such as Crichton Down (Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). The key relevance of non-resignation events in understanding the causal process as well as the nature and changing conditions of the conventions and expectations surrounding ministerial resignations was emphasised several decades later by Dowding and Kang (1998, p. 424), who showed that ministers who resigned or were reshuffled had often been previously confronted with resignation issues. However, whether and under what circumstances ministers resign as a formal requirement of the individual responsibility convention, or as a result of the political cost-benefit equation of the political climate remained an unsettled issue (Palmer, 1995, p. 178).

A famous example of how the classic responsibility doctrine interacts with political factors is that of the Westland Affair, where Michael Heseltine is famously reported to have resigned over both policy disagreements and prime ministerial leadership style (Woodhouse, 1993, p. 278). The Westland Affair has called into question the convention of collective responsibility, as Heseltine’s struggle to find an European solution for Westland’s financial difficulties also reflected his fight “for more governmental involvement in industry, for the rights of ministers to run their own departments with less back-seat driving from Downing Street, and, most of all, for the right of ministers to bring departmental policy issues to the full cabinet” (*The*

Economist, 4 January 1986, p. 18, cited in Dunleavy, 1990, p. 36). Heseltine's refusal to accept the rules of ministerial solidarity and his eagerness to turn an inter-ministerial dispute into a deep political crisis was also decoded as a leadership challenge to Margaret Thatcher (Dunleavy, 1990, p. 50), which was supposed to attract the approval and support of party members (*The Times*, 10 January 1986). As a result, his resignation focused attention on the leadership struggles in the Conservative Party at the expense of the policy disagreements at stake (James, 1994, p. 672). All in all, this episode "reduced old constitutional nostrums to rubble" (P. Hennessy, 1989, p. 80), given that ministerial dissent was followed by the naming and blaming of civil servants and the leaking of official documents. However, it also proved that a minister may be able to turn a resignation situation to his or her advantage and thus avoid the demotion costs usually attached to the loss of ministerial office.

Resignations are often perceived as "euphemistic words of use" when some ministers have to be moved out to make room for others (Arnold, 1986). To put it differently, while some resignations may precede promotions outside the cabinet, most of them follow overt criticism from political actors and mass media and are seen as "pushed" resignations (Fisher, Kaiser, & Rohlfsing, 2006, p. 712). The reasons that motivate this kind of "push" range from political to non-political reasons and may be subdivided in personal errors, departmental errors, policy disagreements, personal enrichment and third party favouritism (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 713). Depending on the gravity of their errors, ministers may be expected to step down. However, as emphasised in numerous political memoirs of prime ministers who have dealt with situations of ministers accused of various offences, resignations are not imposed as sanctions for the doctrine's sake, but to allow the cabinet to conserve its political and moral authority in the eventuality of ministers having to undergo judicial inquiries (Balladur, 2009, p. 313). Since "resignations are not always what they seem" and "some that seem to be without fault may be in anticipation of future dismissal", while "some others that are on the face of it stout-hearted withdrawals as the alleged result of policy differences may in reality be polite expulsions or prudent subterfuges" (Marshall, 1989b, p. 127), it is difficult to differentiate between resignations and dismissals in practice.

The concept of ministerial responsibility can be better grasped if one looks separately at the roles that ministers play in relations to prime ministers, cabinet colleagues and departmental subordinates. Using this approach, Weller (1999, pp. 62–

64) identified three ministerial responsibility categories that generate different resignation types: the superior-subordinate relations that characterise the relationship between cabinet members and prime ministers bring about behavioural resignations; collegial relationships among cabinet members trigger collective responsibility resignations; while ministerial departmental management approaches are associated with individual responsibility resignations. However, the situations where ministers resign exclusively on the ground of collective or individual responsibility infringements, either voluntary or at the request of their political superiors are rare. Even clear-cut examples of resignations generated by the infringement of classic doctrines, such as the Westland Affair, emphasise the fact that “politics, not theories of accountability, determine the fate of ministers” (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 49). As a result, further research is necessary in order to determine what circumstances and combination of political factors translate a resignation issue into a ministerial termination event. The next section of this chapter focuses on individual dismissals and emphasises several ways of terminating a ministerial appointment based on different institutional arrangements that characterise various political systems.

1.3 Individual dismissals

As far as dismissals are concerned, there are two ways in which ministers can be fired: they can be either removed from the cabinet altogether, or sidelined to less important portfolios. This section focuses on both strategies of ministerial demotion. The aim of this analysis is to determine whether the relationship between breaches of ministerial responsibilities and career sanctions is as straightforward as theories of accountability imply. Nonetheless, attention is also called to situations where ministerial faults are not sanctioned by dismissals and contradict theoretical expectations.

One-step demotion strategy: outright dismissal

Depending on the institutional framework that characterises every political system, cabinet members may be dismissed by prime ministers, legislatures, presidents, or a combination of these actors. Nevertheless, prime ministers are usually credited with the key role in dismissing or forcing ministers to resign (Brazier, 1997, p. 290; Dewan & Dowding, 2005, p. 47; Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 425). For this reason, before focusing on the literature that deals with ministerial dismissals and emphasising the

range of powers that prime ministers, legislatures and presidents can use to fire cabinet members, this section provides several examples that illustrate the universe of situations in which prime ministers decide to fire cabinet members. These examples have been selected from the Irish government. The Taoiseach is generally considered more powerful than any other prime minister, with the exception of his British counterpart (O’Leary, 1991, p. 159). For this reason, one may expect Irish prime ministers to have full control over cabinet composition under most circumstances.

The “Arms Crisis” scandal occurred in 1970 during the Fianna Fáil government led by Jack Lynch and led to the dismissal of two cabinet ministers, Charles Haughey and Neil Blaney. At the beginning of this crisis and throughout his time in government, Jack Lynch renounced force as a means of resolving the ethno-political conflict in Northern Ireland and supported the idea of an Irish union rooted in consent (Desmond, 2000, p. 82). However, Ministers Haughey and Blaney disapproved this cautious policy and were suspected of orchestrating a government-IRA response to the crisis behind Lynch’s back (Desmond, 2000, p. 82). As a result, when they were accused by the opposition of importing arms illegally for the IRA in April 1970, Jack Lynch did not hesitate to fire both of them when they refused to resign (Reynolds, 2009, p. 67).

This example illustrates a clear-cut situation where ministers were put under official accusations and the prime minister had no choice but to terminate their appointment. However, not all decisions to dismiss are grounded on official accusations, and not all official accusations lead to dismissals. For example, Charlie Haughey’s decision to dismiss Brian Lenihan, one of his closest friends and political partners, during the 1990 presidential elections campaign was perceived as a shocking albeit not totally unjustified action (Desmond, 2000, p. 109; Reynolds, 2009, p. 134). After Lenihan’s involvement in Fianna Fáil’s attempt to persuade President Hillery to refuse the Dáil’s dissolution that was sought by Taoiseach FitzGerald in January 1982 hit the headlines, he kept changing stories about the telephone call he had made to the President in 1982 (J. Walsh, 2008, pp. 474–484). Eventually, he gave an interview to the *Irish Times* confirming his participation to this event. As a result, the Progressive Democrats who formed a coalition government with Fianna Fáil threatened to bring down the government if Lenihan was not fired (O’Brien, 1991). Under these circumstances, “Haughey, although insisting he would put no pressure on Brian Lenihan, his friend of thirty years, drew up a letter of resignation for him to sign. It was a grave demand and Brian, who had a lot of support within the party, refused to comply.

In the end Haughey sacked his old friend Lenihan from the cabinet” (Reynolds, 2009, p. 134). Rather than emphasising a situation where a minister is punished for trying to tamper with constitutional decision-making rules, since Lenihan was actually acting at the request and on behalf of Haughey, this example illustrates a prime minister’s ability to take advantage of his power to fire cabinet ministers and make a demonstration of strong party and government leadership.

Additionally, the same Taoiseach managed to use his unlimited power over cabinet composition in order to sanction ministers not for constitutional breaches of ministerial errors, but as a result of their attempt to challenge his party leadership. Such an event occurred in November 1991 when Albert Reynolds and Pádraig Flynn, the Irish ministers of Finance and Environment respectively, were sacked after Reynolds challenged Haughey’s party leadership by supporting an internal no-confidence motion against the leader (Murdoch, 1991). This course of action is confirmed by Albert Reynolds in his autobiography: “As I anticipated, my support for the motion of no confidence led Haughey to demand my resignation from the cabinet; and when I refused he sacked me, along my supporters Flynn, Geoghegan-Quinn, Brendan Smith and Noel Tracy” (Reynolds, 2009, p. 142). This example shows that prime ministerial powers to fire are not exclusively used to sanction personal or administrative errors, but also to preserve strong leadership over both the party and cabinet. In this case, ministerial dismissals may indicate the length that prime ministers go to defend their leadership positions. Had the Taoiseach not been a party leader as well, the ministers in question might have kept their jobs.

Last, but not least, ministers committing a constitutional breach may not always have to face dismissal. A controversial episode of this kind took place in Ireland in 1976, when a conflict between the president and a line minister resulted in the former’s resignation. In July 1976, following the IRA’s assassination of Christopher Ewart-Biggs, the British ambassador to Ireland, the government passed an Emergency Powers bill in order to secure additional legal powers to confront the IRA. Acting in accordance with the Constitution, President Ó Dálaigh decided to refer the Emergency Powers bill to the Supreme Court to test its constitutionality before enacting it into law. However, Minister of Defence Patrick Donegan criticised severely this action during a military function in Mullingar in October 1976 and characterised the President as a “thundering disgrace” for the state (J. Walsh, 2008, p. 415). Subsequently, Fianna Fáil, the main opposition party, called for the minister’s dismissal on the ground of constitutional

breach by challenging the Constitutional authority of the President (D. Walsh, 1976a). Following the Taoiseach's refusal to take any action against the Minister of Defence, Fianna Fáil tabled a motion of no confidence requesting Donegan to resign, given that the conflict opposed one office of the state to another rather than being a mere clash of personalities (D. Walsh, 1976b). When the government won the no-confidence vote with a five-vote majority, President Ó Dálaigh tendered his resignation as the "only way to protect the Presidency", given that his relationship with the Minister of Defence had been irreparably breached because of the circumstances and the persons before whom the minister had made his criticism (*The Irish Times*, 23 October 1976). The opposition laid the blame for the President's resignation on Taoiseach Cosgrave, accusing him of tolerating a "gross breach of the Constitution" and standing "over a serious denigration of the highest office of the State" (*The Irish Times*, 23 October 1976). Patrick Hillery, the newly elected President on 3 December 1976, praised Ó Dálaigh's decision to resign defending his constitutional responsibilities and commented that "in any other country the insulter would have been the one to resign" (J. Walsh, 2008, p. 428).

Any attempt to understand the reasons why the Irish Minister of Defence was not dismissed must start from the institutional rules that regulate the termination of ministerial appointments. According to the Irish Constitution, the president cannot ask a minister to resign and may accept the resignation of a minister only upon the advice of the Taoiseach (Article 13). The parliament also lacks the capacity to fire an individual minister, as the government is collectively responsible to the legislature (Article 28). Only the Taoiseach has the power to ask a cabinet member to resign and may advise the President to terminate a ministerial appointment in case the minister concerned refuses to comply with the resignation request (Article 28). It is for this reason that as soon as the Minister of Defence was accused of a constitutional breach, the responsibility of action was considered to have moved in the Taoiseach's hands, the only one who could have re-established the primacy of the Presidency by urging the minister to resign (*The Irish Times*, 25 October 1976). The President's decision to resign took place in the context where it would have been difficult to tolerate a situation where the Taoiseach and the Government upheld the action of a minister who had gravely offended the office of Presidency (*The Irish Times*, 25 October 1976). However, any attempt to understand why this dispute did not result in the minister's dismissal cannot be satisfactorily carried out by a simple reading of constitutional rules. Quite the contrary, it requires a more complex evaluation of the relationship between the political actors involved in this

constitutional conflict and a deeper understanding of the institutional relationship between the government and presidency. The suggestion that one of the reasons why Donegan was spared dismissal was related to Cosgrave's reluctance to see Ó Dálaigh acting akin to a third house of parliament (Fanning, 2006), offers a starting point for the analysis of the consequences of institutional rivalry for the length of ministerial tenure.

Comparative analyses of prime ministerial powers among different political systems have emphasised the existence of three main factors that are responsible for the variation of authority over cabinet composition: institutional constraints, government types and individual leadership styles (Rose, 1991, p. 10). Given that a prime minister's career-control ability depends on the type of government that is formed in the aftermath of elections, it is widely agreed that prime ministers of single-party governments are more influential than prime ministers of multi-party coalition governments, the latter having to share authority over cabinet with coalition party leaders (A. King, 1994a, p. 154; Rose, 1991, p. 16). This explains why the British prime minister's overwhelming power over the government has been linked to his or her total control over cabinet appointments, promotions, demotions and dismissals, as well as to his or her ability to intervene in departmental business at any time (A. King, 1994b, p. 212). In comparison, the Dutch prime minister's powers to dismiss or reshuffle the cabinet are considerably more limited (Andeweg & Bakema, 1994, p. 59; Andeweg, 1991, p. 117). Additionally, any assessment of prime ministerial authority over cabinet composition needs to take into account their relationship with presidents, a complex aspect that led King (1994a, p. 152) to omit French and Finnish prime ministers from his ranking of prime ministers because of their "idiosyncratic" power-sharing with the head of state.

In addition to prime ministers, presidents and legislatures may also have the power to dismiss cabinet ministers individually. As far as presidents are concerned, they have full ministerial appointment and dismissal powers only in those political systems where they are also formal heads of government. Outside pure presidential systems, presidents may have the power to dismiss the cabinet as a whole, but they can only appoint and remove individual ministers at the proposal of the prime minister. The legislature's prerogative to terminate ministerial careers is not confined to one regime type. Firstly, the principle of responsible government, which is valid in any parliamentary system, allows the legislature to dismiss the cabinet at any time, provided some technical conditions are satisfied. Secondly, in some parliamentary regimes, such as Croatia, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Sweden, the

parliament can pass an individual no-confidence vote and discharge the minister concerned without triggering the fall of the entire cabinet (Fish & Kroenig, 2009). Additionally, even if the legislature cannot remove the government as a whole in presidential systems where the executive and legislative branches of power are independent of each other, in certain Latin American countries, such as Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, it may still censure cabinet members through ministerial interpellations (Fish & Kroenig, 2009).

The remaining of this section is devoted to the analysis of the second strategy that heads of government can use in order to sideline a minister who is no longer considered an asset for the executive but for various reasons cannot be eliminated through a one-step procedure such as dismissal.

Gradual demotion strategy: cabinet reshuffle

While to a certain extent resignations and dismissals may be contrasted as ministerial voluntary and involuntary termination events, cabinet reshuffles resist a clear-cut inclusion in either of the two categories. These events may be interpreted as both promotions and demotions of ministers (Kam & Indridason, 2005, p. 327). Since we are primarily concerned with ministerial termination events, this section focuses exclusively on the demotion function of cabinet reshuffles. For this reason, they will be seen as consequences of errors sanctioned by switches to different posts rather than by outright dismissals (Brazier, 1997, p. 281).

Cabinet reshuffles have been defined as tools that prime ministers use in order to maintain power and improve their odds of winning re-election (Kam & Indridason, 2005, p. 354). Aiming to identify the political function of cabinet reshuffles in Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia and New Zealand during 1960-2001, Kam and Indridason (2005, p. 327) showed that prime ministers use the option of reshuffling their cabinets as strategic devices to retain power in the face of both intraparty and electoral challenges to their leadership. This study has confirmed an earlier hypothesis, according to which prime ministers decide to reshuffle as a way of dealing with politically or administratively incompetent ministers (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 57).

However, the questions raised in this section do not concern the role of cabinet reshuffles in empowering prime ministers or increasing cabinet popularity. Instead, the emphasis here lies on the circumstances under which a minister may expect to be demoted through a shift of responsibilities. At this point, one should be aware that the

task of accounting for cabinet reshuffles is not unlike that of explaining resignations, to the extent that sometimes reshuffles punish ministers who achieved good results in their portfolio, while promoting ministers with rather modest performances. For example, in a cabinet reshuffle that took place in Ireland in September 2004, a minister who had successfully carried out his task to restructure several semi-state transport companies was relegated to a different portfolio despite his public protests (McGee, 2004), while a minister whose performance in the Communication portfolio had placed Ireland on the second worst place in EU for broadband was promoted to the Foreign Affairs Department (McManus, 2004). Seamus Brennan's demotion from the Department of Transport attracted a good deal of attention as it seemed that his success in breaking-up Aer Rianta and opening Dublin Bus up to competition had cost him his job. Furthermore, the stark contrast with the promotion earned by the Communication Minister's "lacklustre performance" indicated that the reshuffle did not reflect the ministers' success in delivering on governmental election promises, but something utterly different (McManus, 2004). According to Brennan's biographer, the Transport Minister considered that he was being moved from his department because he had rattled the trade unions' vested interests with his efforts to reorganise the aviation and public transport (Lahiffe, 2009, p. 127). Although the prime minister rejected any claim that Brennan had been demoted in the reshuffle (M. Hennessy & Humphreys, 2004), the minister declared that he had felt shafted out of Transport and had been hugely disappointed by the Taoiseach's decision (Lahiffe, 2009, p. 126).

Additionally, while some ministers seem to have no choice but to accept the prime minister's decision to move departments, other ministers may be able to stay firm and reject prime ministerial reshuffle plans. This situation may be illustrated by contrasting the case of Seamus Brennan, who was reshuffled in 2004 despite his good performance and efforts to oppose the Taoiseach's decision (McGee, 2004), and Barry Desmond, whose demotion in a cabinet reshuffle was avoided at last moment in 1986 (V. Browne, 2000). In February 1986, Garret FitzGerald, the Irish Prime Minister leading a Fine Gael – Labour coalition, decided to reshuffle Barry Desmond, the Labour Minister of Health and Social Welfare, because of the unpopularity attracted by his measures during his three-year mandate (V. Browne, 2000). However, Desmond felt that "to throw in the towel in the health portfolio would be an abject surrender to the hard core of reactionary backbenchers on the government and opposition benches" (Desmond, 2000, p. 315) and threatened to resign rather than change office. As opposed

to a prime minister presiding over a single-party cabinet, FitzGerald had limited powers over the composition of his coalition cabinet and Desmond was aware that if the prime minister had decided to fire him at all costs, he would have brought down the entire government (Desmond, 2000, p. 319). When the Taoiseach was persuaded to agree to a compromise solution and allow Desmond to stay in Health, while assigning the Social Welfare portfolio to a different minister, political commentators characterised the prime minister as a weak leader and pointed towards the minister's success in sweeping away a prime ministerial decision (Arnold, 1986). Furthermore, the opposition tabled a motion of no confidence as soon as the reshuffle was announced. Charles Haughey, the leader of the opposition, declared that no Taoiseach whose freedom to rearrange his cabinet had been disrupted by a single minister should be allowed to continue in office (Desmond, 2000, p. 328). However, while some political commentators admired Desmond's decision to stay firm against the prime minister's decision or resign from the cabinet (Arnold, 1986), other observers wondered why this episode of self-interested obstinacy was necessary, since nowhere in his own account of the events did he suggest that there was any issue of policy or principle involved (V. Browne, 2000). Desmond himself declared in retrospect that he was aware of the credibility damage his resistance inflicted on the government by exposing a Taoiseach unable to exercise his most important constitutional power of hiring and firing ministers (Desmond, 2000, p. 319). He was nevertheless able to count on the Taoiseach's lack of authority over the ministers of a coalition party (Desmond, 2000, p. 319), which made all the difference compared to Brennan, who was subordinated to the Taoiseach on the party line.

One may therefore conclude that cabinet reshuffles, just like resignations, cannot be fully explained by institutional arrangements and responsibility relations as it is rarely possible to determine a straightforward relation between ministerial performance and the likelihood of being dropped out or moved to other departments. The fact that reshuffles may also take place when they are by no means necessary, such as when the government is united, "working well as a team", "taking tough decisions, sticking with them, and riding out storms of unpopularity" and showing "no glaring weaknesses", (Arnold, 1986), shows that performance alone is not a strong indicator of a reshuffle's timing and extent. As a result, in order to understand the role of a ministerial demotion or promotion when it is operated through a cabinet reshuffle, one should better pay attention to power-relations between prime ministers, line ministers and party leaders,

as ministers may not necessarily be dropped because of weakness, “but in order to fulfil the ambitions of others, and give a new shape to the overall structure” (Arnold, 1986).

So far, this literature review has focused on the expectations generated by the classic doctrines of ministerial responsibility, emphasising the expansion in their use and their adoption in different types of political systems. The next section builds on the latter approach and deals with the literature that analyses patterns of resignations and dismissals across different parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

1.4 Patterns of ministerial termination events

Cabinet ministers have traditionally been studied from two broad perspectives: personal characteristics, such as age, education, social background, profession, and career characteristics, such as duration and mobility (Blondel et al., 2007; Blondel & Thiébault, 1991; Blondel, 1985). This trend continued throughout the 1990s and 2000s, focusing more on ministerial careers and technical organisation of portfolios than on the roles played by ministers in the process of executive policy-making (Blondel & Müller-Rommel, 1997, 2001). Nevertheless, during the 1990s, another wave of ministerial studies started to develop, aiming to identify patterns of ministerial selection and deselection using dedicated datasets and a single case-study approach (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002; Berlinksi, Dewan, Dowding, & Subrahmanyam, 2009; Berlinksi et al., 2007; Blondel et al., 2007; Dewan & Dowding, 2005; Dowding & Dumont, 2009b; Dowding & Kang, 1998; Fisher et al., 2006; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2004, 2008; Indridason & Kam, 2008). Subsequently, a growing literature that takes a comparative approach to the study of ministerial resignations has emerged, especially for the analysis of Westminster systems and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (Blondel et al., 2007; Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009; Indridason & Kam, 2008; Kam & Indridason, 2005; Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999). On the one hand, the significance of the ministerial responsibility convention in the British political system explains the special focus on the comparative analysis of Westminster systems. On the other hand, the relative freshness of the East European democracies accounts for the emphasis of most comparative studies on the institutional procedures that regulate the hiring and firing of ministers. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the emergence of comparative research, several frameworks for analysis have been put forward, emphasising the necessity to take into account both structural and strategic factors that affect the hiring

and firing processes (Dowding & Dumont, 2009b, p. 4). This section focuses on patterns of ministerial resignations in parliamentary democracies and takes separate looks at Westminster systems, and Western and Eastern European democracies.

Ministerial resignations and dismissals in Westminster systems

The first study that has ever looked at all instances of resignations that took place between 1903 and 1986 in the UK recorded the primary reasons that caused them and compiled a list of 98 resignations that have been triggered by unwillingness to accept collective responsibility, budget leaks, private scandals, non-political, or unworthy acts for a minister (Butler & Butler, 1989, p. 102). A thorough examination of this list showed that about 80% of the resignations in Britain during most of the twentieth century had been caused by disagreements of principle in the cabinet (Sutherland, 1991, p. 106). Later on, Dowding and Kang (1998, p. 424) signalled the importance of taking into account non-resignation events for an accurate understanding of the causal process of resignations and for the expectations regarding the punishment of ministerial breaches of collective and individual responsibility doctrines.

As far as Australia is concerned, academics argue that the link between departmental actions and ministerial resignations is weak (Mulgan, 2002, p. 121; Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 50). Analysing patterns of ministerial resignations from 1990 to 1998 at federal level and from 1941 to 1998 in New South Wales, Thompson and Tillotsen (1999, p. 53) found out that Australian ministers do not resign and are actually not expected to resign over policy or administration errors in their departments or for the mistakes of their subordinates if they share no personal responsibility for the blame. Rather than considering themselves bound to resign by the principle of individual responsibility, ministers stick to the “tough-it-out” strategy as long as possible. However, while Australian ministers are unlikely to resign over departmental failures, empirical analyses showed that they regularly resign when they infringe the principle of collective responsibility, for matters of personal impropriety and after knowingly misleading the parliament (Mulgan, 2002, p. 122). Additionally, political judgements also tip the balance in Australia, as the prime minister has to weigh the “comparative political costs of either defending the minister and ‘toughing it out’ or ‘lancing the boil’ by letting the minister go” (Mulgan, 2002, p. 122). Turning to the expectations generated by the convention of collective responsibility, failure to support collective cabinet solidarity indicates an intense level of conflict between the minister

and the prime minister and resignations occur only when the conflict is so intense that it cannot await a cabinet reshuffle (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 55). To sum up, while it is agreed that the infringement of collective responsibility principle is usually sanctioned by resignation, the issue of whether ministers should resign for departmental failures usually calls in the question of how appropriate is to use the Westminster model to understand Australian constitutional and political practices (Mulgan, 2002, p. 122).

The convention of individual ministerial responsibility is also considered a myth in Canada (Sutherland, 1991, p. 91). However, some authors believe that the convention is still built into the Canadian constitution because of the answerability component and despite the frailty of its resignation component (Kernaghan, 2009, p. 392). That said, the political importance of resignations for individual errors is also considered to be lower than that of collective solidarity resignations, as in Canada nobody expects ministers to resign for maladministration by officials (Sutherland, 1991, p. 101). In an empirical study focusing on ministerial resignations between 1867 and 1990, Sutherland (1991, p. 104) found that no Canadian minister had been forced to resign for errors attributable to public servants.

Comparative quantitative analyses of ministerial resignations in Westminster systems support the claim that resignations for errors of public servants are not part of the political practice in these political systems, while collective responsibility is the most frequent reason offered for refusal to resign (Sutherland, 1991, pp. 106–107). However, the proportion of ministers resigning for disagreements of principle was found to be similar in Britain in Canada, averaging 80% (Sutherland, 1991, p. 106), while in Australia the frequency of resignations depends on whether there is a single-party or a coalition cabinet (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 56). Thus, the party system makes a difference for the extent and degree of authority that the legislative branch has over the executive (Marshall, 1989a, p. 1). One of the reasons why the responsibility convention is considered a major element of the British unwritten constitution resides in its emergence from the single party cabinet system (Marshall, 1989a, p. 2). Other Westminster systems that are characterised by coalition cabinets developed laxer rules (Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 56). This also explains why the protection role of collective responsibility is limited in Australian minority governments where the cabinet cannot protect a minister whom the opposition has decided to bring down (Sutherland, 1991, p. 106).

Ministerial resignations and dismissals in Western and Eastern Europe

The convention of ministerial responsibility has also been challenged by studies of ministerial resignations in West European cabinets. Fisher et al. (2006) analysed German resignations during 1969-2005 and argued that ministerial resignations follow a systematic cost-benefit political logic (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 709). These authors analysed resignation and non-resignations events in Germany during more than 35 years and found that the Federal Chancellor and the minister's own party are central for the outcome of resignation debates. On the other hand, Fisher et al (2006) could not find empirical evidence for their "threshold hypothesis", according to which "ministers do not have to resign as a consequence of singular events that imply costs for the government but can accumulate resignations events, which reach a threshold at which the ministers' power to resist is so much weakened, and political costs so much increased, that they are forced to leave office" (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 710). One of the reasons why this hypothesis was not supported by empirical data may reside in the restrictive definition of policy disagreement resignations, which are thought to occur only when "the opposition demands the resignation of a minister so as to express its discontent with his policies or performance" (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 710). As a result, the analysis fails to take into consideration collective responsibility resignations, which occur when ministers resign over principled policy disagreements, irrespective of their party membership.

While the comparative study of ministerial selection and deselection in Central and Eastern European democracies is still in its early stages, current research has emphasised that as opposed to Western Europe where ministerial duration is, on average, twice as long as cabinet duration, the average ministerial tenure in Eastern Europe is almost the same as the average duration of cabinets (Blondel et al., 2007, pp. 50–51). The same observation applies to prime ministers, whose duration in office is only slightly longer than that of cabinets and on average does not overcome three years. However, as far as individual countries are concerned, the relationship between cabinet duration and ministerial and prime ministerial survival is directly proportional. At the same time, it has been shown that, similarly to West European cabinets, despite the fact that most ministers finish their mandate on time, prime ministers and political parties usually decide if a minister needs to leave the cabinet (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, pp. 221–222).

Fettelschoss and Nikolenyi (2009) carried out an extensive quantitative study that analysed ministerial resignations that took place between 1990 and 2007 in the twelve newest EU member states and noticed several trends. First of all, they found that more than 80% of ministers in CEE cabinets leave office as a result of government termination and in every new cabinet which comes into office one minister out of three has already served in the preceding cabinet (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 220). On the other hand, out of the remaining 20% of ministers who decide to leave office before the end of the government, 15.3% do so because of external pressures coming from the prime minister and political parties, as well as from mass media (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, pp. 221–222).

Fettelschoss and Nikolenyi (2009) were also interested to determine whether the differences between single countries are related to constitutional rules. As far as ministerial duration is concerned, they have shown that where the prime minister is free to decide the composition of his or her cabinet, as in Latvia, Slovenia and to a certain extent in Bulgaria, the number of ministers who regularly finish a term is high (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 222). These authors have also asked whether the constitutional powers that presidents, prime ministers and parliaments have to control the cabinet are causally related to the influence of these political actors on the deselection of cabinet members. Their intuition is to a certain extent confirmed. Thus, presidents have been able to shorten ministerial appointments in Poland and Estonia, where their constitutional role is enhanced. However, these are not the only East European countries where presidents have executive powers. While on average the parliament does not appear to play a key role in the firing of cabinet ministers, this study shows that in Slovenia, Poland and Romania the legislature has actively exercised its influence. This finding is rather surprising if one takes into account that in Slovenia and Romania the parliament cannot vote individual ministers out of office. Finally, prime ministerial influence is decisive in Hungary, Latvia and Poland, which is explained by their constitutionally prominent position concerning the organisation of government. Although constitutional rules appeared to capture fairly well the variation in ministerial turnover across Central and Eastern Europe, this study has emphasised that additional variables related to governmental stability and political practices need to be taken into account in order to explain all differences between single countries (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 226).

1.5 Conclusion

This literature review has emphasised the strengths and weaknesses of normative expectations for ministerial resignations and dismissals. Despite their relevance in Westminster systems and although they have been extended to other political systems and aspects of ministerial office, British constitutional doctrines of ministerial responsibility are unable to explain why some breaches of responsibility conventions are followed by resignations while others are not, even in what may seem to be clear-cut constitutional infringements, such as the Westland Affair. This review has also focused on the literature that analyses comparatively resignations and dismissals across different parliamentary systems, ranging from Westminster systems to Central and Eastern European democracies. This analysis has emphasised that the current literature has not identified a set of clear-cut rules that one may use in order to predict what kind of faults or responsibility breaches are likely to cost ministers their jobs.

This research will advance the study of ministerial resignations in three ways. Firstly, it will contribute to the literature discussing the effects of political institutions, as it aims to explain ministerial resignations in parliamentary democracies as a function of different hierarchical and transactional relationships that take place between presidents, prime ministers, party leaders and line ministers under different cabinet configurations and party systems. In this regard, this literature review has emphasised the gap between the popular, media and political attention given to resignations and non-resignations, and the lack of a systematic academic focus on this matter. However, the scarcity of academic literature is explained precisely by the absence of an encompassing theory that could fuel a rigorous and systematic analysis of resignations.

Secondly, the majority of empirical studies testing theoretical expectations against concrete examples of resignations take a single case-study approach and focus on Westminster systems of government, although the collective responsibility principle has long been incorporated as the cornerstone of parliamentary systems in general. By contrast, this study will extend the scope of current research by carrying out a comparative analysis of ministerial resignations in both West and East European parliamentary democracies.

Thirdly, the literature acknowledges that theories of accountability, both collective and individual, fail to explain individual terminations of ministerial appointments and suggests that the outcome of each case depends on additional political

factors, such as the minister's reputation and attitude, party and prime ministerial support for the minister in question, and the electoral prospects of governing parties. However, the causal relationship between these conditions and individual terminations is yet to be pinned down. We aim to put forward a theoretical framework that isolates the causal effects of political factors on ministerial durability focusing on the accountability of cabinet members to prime ministers, party leaders and presidents. This approach enables us to make a significant contribution, both theoretically, by developing a framework for the understanding of ministerial termination events, and empirically, by carrying out a systematic and comparative analysis of the variation in the length of ministerial tenure.

Chapter Two: A principal-agent account of ministerial deselection

This study aims to solve the puzzle of ministerial termination events – why do some cabinet ministers lose their jobs while others do not under what would seem to be similar political circumstances. This chapter suggests an alternative way of studying the variation in the length of ministerial tenure by focusing on the place cabinet ministers hold in the chain of delegation from voters and political parties to public office holders. This is a topic of significant relevance that crosses the boundaries of regime types or geographic regions. However, to emphasise the impact that the variation in power relations has on political accountability, this study analyses ministerial turnover in semi-presidential systems, which for various reasons maximise the variation in the principal-agent relationships that define the position of ministers in the chain of delegation from voters and political parties to governments.

The chapter opens with a presentation of principal-agent models and their applications in the study of economic, bureaucratic, and political organisations. This section argues that the agency theory can supply the theoretical power that the study of ministerial survival has so far lacked and situates this topic within the broader area of studies that focus on the process of delegation and accountability in representative democracies. This analysis shows that the largest variation in principal-agent relationships is found in semi-presidential systems and justifies this study's focus on ministerial turnover in this regime-type.

The second section of this chapter discusses the institutional sources of variation in the operation of semi-presidential governments and identifies the institutional and intraparty factors that are used in this study to capture the variation in the powers of principals on cabinet composition systematically within and across semi-presidential countries over time. In the third section, we use a principal-agent approach to model the relationship between ministers, presidents, prime ministers, and parties in different semi-presidential sub-types as a function of both institutional and partisan factors. This analysis justifies this study's exclusive focus on ministerial turnover in premier-presidential systems, due to the lack of variation in institutional context under president-parliamentarism. The fourth section of the chapter argues that in order to identify the impact of principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure one should

take into account both institutional context and the party relationships between presidents, prime ministers and cabinet members. The chapter concludes with a model of relations between the agent-ministers and their principals which sums up the conditions under which presidents, prime ministers, and party principals are more likely to control the process of deselection.

2.1 Agency theory in representative democracies

The idea of using formal analysis and principal-agent models for the study of political organisations is rooted in the new economics of organisation. Principal-agent models were first used to analyse contractual relationships and solve control problems generated by conflicts of interest and asymmetric flows of information at different levels in the hierarchical structure of private economic organisations. Terry Moe (1984, p. 756) defined this framework of analysis as “an analytic expression of the agency relationships, in which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, the agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce outcomes desired by the principal”. Moe suggested that the principal-agent model could also be used to solve the problem of administrative accountability and identify the institutional mechanisms that allow politicians to hold bureaucrats accountable. His interpretation of democratic politics in principal-agent terms was as follows: “Citizens are principals, politicians are their agents. Politicians are principals, bureaucrats are their agents. Bureaucratic superiors are principals, bureaucratic subordinates are their agents. The whole of politics is therefore structured by a chain of principal-agent relationships, from citizen to politician to bureaucratic superior to bureaucratic subordinate and on down the hierarchy of government to the lowest-level bureaucrats who actually deliver services directly to citizens. Aside from the ultimate principal and the ultimate agent, each actor in the hierarchy occupies a dual role in which he serves both as a principal and as agent” (Moe, 1984, pp. 765–766). The contractual interpretation of democratic politics emphasises that the notion of hierarchical control can be used for the study of institutional mechanisms, monitoring devices and incentive structures that officials use at every level of government to control and hold their subordinates accountable for their actions.

In political science, the contractual paradigm refers to the logic of governance that all democratic regimes share. Representative democracy is a form of government based on mechanisms of delegation (from citizens to individual politicians and

collective actors, such as political parties) and accountability (Müller, Bergman, & Strøm, 2003, pp. 3–4). From a principal-agent perspective, delegation takes place when “one person or group, called a *principal*, relies on another person or group, called an *agent*, to act on the principal’s behalf” (Lupia, 2003, p. 33). Accountability, the complementary process of delegation, is measured by weighting the relationships between principals and agents: “an agent is accountable to a principal if the principal can exercise control over the agent and delegation is not accountable if the principal is unable to exercise control” (Lupia, 2003, p. 35). By and large, if a political system operates according to a clear system of delegation and accountability, then it can be classified as a representative democracy. Thus, agency theory provides a single analytical framework for the study of representative democracies that emphasises who is accountable to whom at each stage in the process of delegation across national and institutional contexts (Strøm, 2000).

Different types of democratic regimes can be recognised depending on the number of political actors empowered by voters to act on their behalf and according to their powers to make and break cabinets (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009b, p. 874). While parliamentary systems are characterised by a single and unitary chain of delegation, whereby every principal delegates power to just one agent, presidential systems are characterised by complex and indirect chains of delegation (Strøm, 2003, p. 65). Despite the different shape that the chain of delegation takes under parliamentary and presidential systems, a common characteristic of these systems is the government’s subordination to a single agent: the parliament or the president. This is not the case in semi-presidential systems, where a directly elected president shares executive power with a prime-minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the parliament. From a principal-agent perspective, the position of cabinets in semi-presidential systems is that of an agent facing two principals (Protsyk, 2006, p. 221; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668) as both presidents and assemblies may be involved in the appointment and dismissal of the executive. Regardless of the variation in institutional rules, though, a principal-agent approach can be used to study ministerial deselection in any democratic system as soon as the number of political actors who are granted the power to fire cabinet members is known. Since the same formal logic can be used to describe the ministers’ accountability to different principals under different political systems, various hypotheses regarding the impact of institutional and partisan factors on

ministerial survival can be derived and tested empirically across a wide range of countries.

Due to the double chain of delegation from political parties and heads of government to cabinet members, ministers must respond to competing principals (Carey, 2007) in all democratic systems. However, the largest intra- and inter-case variation in principal-agent relationships is likely to occur in countries with semi-presidential constitutions, where presidents, prime ministers, and political parties act as competing principals for cabinet members. This is the ideal setting where the principal-agent approach can be used to capture the impact of different power relations on ministerial accountability. However, semi-presidential regimes are characterised by considerable variation in both constitutional rules and political practices. The next section discusses the institutional sources of variation in the operation of semi-presidential governments. This analysis singles out the institutional and contextual factors that are used in this study to capture the variation in the powers of principals on cabinet composition within and across semi-presidential countries over time.

2.2 Semi-presidentialism and its sub-types

Although it had already been in use for several decades in both journalistic and academic environments, the concept of semi-presidentialism was formally introduced as a new regime type in 1980, when Duverger defined it as a situation where “the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage, he possesses quite considerable powers and he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” (Duverger, 1980, p. 166). At that time, only a few Western European countries could fit into this regime category and Duverger focused on the constitutional framework and political practices that characterised the Fifth French Republic in order to define this new regime type. This is one of the reasons why France continues to be considered the archetypal example of such a system, despite the wide variation among semi-presidential constitutions (Elgie, 2009, p. 249). The number of countries adopting semi-presidential constitutions has increased after the fall of communism in 1989. The proliferation of semi-presidentialism across different continents has led to a significant heterogeneity among both constitutional frameworks and political practices within this regime type. Under these circumstances, the ambiguity of Duverger’s criteria regarding the president’s election by “universal

suffrage” and the “quite considerable” presidential powers has led to confusion over the countries that can be classed as semi-presidential. The concept of semi-presidentialism was then reformulated so that a list of countries that can be included in this category can be unequivocally established. Robert Elgie (1999, p. 13) has put forward a purely constitutional definition of this regime, which can be recognised where “a popularly elected fixed-term president exists alongside a prime-minister and cabinet who are responsible to the parliament”. This is the standard definition used by most studies of semi-presidential politics (see for example Amorim Neto & Strøm, 2006, p. 620; Cheibub & Chernykh, 2008, p. 273, 2009, p. 206; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a; Shugart, 2005; Siaroff, 2003, p. 293; Skach, 2007, p. 93).

Although the institutional definition of semi-presidentialism allows the identification of this political system through a simple constitutional reading, it is usually not sufficient to understand how a semi-presidential system operates. The heterogeneity of political practices among semi-presidential regimes has raised several questions. Why do similarly designed constitutions entail so many divergent practices? (Cheibub & Chernykh, 2008) What explains the variation in the relationship between presidents, prime ministers, and assemblies among semi-presidential regimes (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart, 2006). To solve this kind of puzzle, several typologies of semi-presidential regimes that capture the variation in several institutional variables have been put forward.

Most classifications of semi-presidential regimes have been inspired by the variation in presidential powers among the countries that can be included in this category. Focusing on the presidents’ involvement in the origin and survival of cabinets, Shugart and Carey (1992) differentiated between premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, depending on whether the cabinet is responsible solely to the assembly or dually accountable to the president and to the assembly¹. In premier-presidential systems, presidents may have powers related to the formation of governments, such as the selection of the prime minister and the appointment of cabinet members, but they lack the power to dismiss the government collectively, or to fire the

¹ Shugart and Carey (1992) initially rejected the notion of semi-presidentialism because of the “misleading” implication that this political system is located “midway along some continuum running from presidential to parliamentary” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 23). Instead, they adopted Duverger’s definition of a new regime type and stated that the regime type originally described by Duverger referred to a situation where “there is both a premier (prime minister), as in a parliamentary system, and a popularly elected president” and should be called “premier-presidentialism” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 23). As a matter of fact, premier-presidentialism and pure presidentialism were initially defined as “ideal types of democratic regimes with popularly elected presidents” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 24).

prime minister or other cabinet members individually. Instead, a situation where “the president both appoints and dismisses cabinet ministers and the ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence” is typical of president-parliamentarism (Shugart & Carey, 1992, p. 24). Other scholars who focused on the variation in presidential powers have suggested a differentiation between parliamentary-like, dual presidential/prime ministerial and presidential-like semi-presidential subtypes (Elgie, 2005, p. 102). The high variation in presidential powers across semi-presidential systems has also been used as an argument against the use of this concept altogether, given that “there is no such thing as a semi-presidential system when viewed through the prism of presidential powers” (Siaroff, 2003).

The relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities is another key explanatory variable used in the differentiation between different types of semi-presidential governments. Duverger used this factor to capture the variation in presidential influence within and across national contexts: “In the countries without a parliamentary majority, there is the greatest coincidence between the constitution and practice, the latter putting the president in an intermediary position, neither figurehead, nor all-powerful. In the countries where coherent and stable majorities are normally found, there is a disparity between the constitution and practice, the latter placing the president either in a dominant position, or in the situation of a parliamentary Head of State, reduced to a symbolic status” (Duverger, 1980, p. 182). Focusing on the relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities, Duverger (1996) identified three different scenarios that capture the variation in presidential influence over the political system depending on whether the president is the leader, a disciplined member, or opposes the majority. According to Duverger (1996, p. 516), the prime minister’s constitutional powers are weakened when the president leads the parliamentary majority as a *de facto* leader of the dominant party in the assembly. However, if the president is just a disciplined member of the majority or if he or she opposes the parliamentary majority then the prime minister may use the full extent of his or her formal prerogatives (Duverger, 1996, p. 517). Although Duverger’s “modalities” of presidential influence explain well the variation in presidential influence over the political system in France, other studies have emphasised that this schema of presidential/parliamentary relations does not capture the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers in other national contexts (Elgie, 2009; Skach, 2005, 2007).

Focusing on the relationship between presidents, prime ministers, and parliamentary majorities, Cindy Skach (2005) has singled out the circumstances that are likely to generate constitutional crises and undermine democratic consolidation. She differentiates between three electorally generated subtypes of semi-presidentialism: consolidated majority, divided majority and divided minority governments (Skach, 2005, pp. 15–19). A consolidated majority government corresponds to a situation where the president and the prime minister belong to the parliamentary majority; during periods of divided majority or cohabitation government the prime minister is part of the majority and the president is opposed to it; and when divided minority government occurs, neither the president, nor the prime minister have the support of the parliamentary majority. The latter scenario combines “the gridlock of presidentialism’s divided minority government with the cabinet instability of parliamentarism’s minority government” (Skach, 2005, p. 7). The absence of a clear majority is considered a source of instability “characterised by shifting legislative coalitions and cabinet instability and a strong incentive for presidential active participation in the government process at the expense of political parties” (Skach, 2005, pp. 17–18). Under these circumstances, the risk of democratic breakdown is also likely to increase.

The problem with the classification of presidential/parliamentary relationships put forward by Duverger (1996) and Skach (2005) is that they do not capture enough of the variation across the entire population of semi-presidential cases, or do not apply exclusively to semi-presidential systems. Duverger’s account of the variation in presidential influence as a function of the president’s relationship with the parliamentary majority has little explanatory value beyond the case of France (Elgie, 2009, pp. 260–261).

The combination of institutional factors is not mutually exclusive in the three electorally generated semi-presidential sub-types identified by Skach. For example, the consolidated majority sub-type includes both scenarios where the president and the prime minister belong to the same party or to different political parties. However, the president’s ability to intervene in the governmental process when he or she is a party leader is likely to differ significantly from that of presidents who are only simple members of the coalition. The variation in presidential influence makes it difficult to identify a constant effect of presidential influence on governmental stability under this scenario. As far as the divided minority government sub-type is concerned, the absence of any indication regarding the inclusion of the president’s and/or the prime minister’s


party in the governing coalition makes its occurrence possible under both minority coalition governments and cohabitation. Thus, just because the president and the prime minister belong to different political parties that do not hold a majority of seats does not rule out the possibility that these parties form a minority coalition government. Consequently, the government could still function along the lines of a consolidated majority, given that by and large even a minority cabinet retains the support of a majority of the legislature (Laver & Shepsle, 1996, p. 40). Under these circumstances, the president could be a member of the parliamentary majority. If the president's party is not represented in the minority government, the president could be an opponent of the government coalition, just as in a cohabitation situation. As a result, depending on political context, divided minority governments may deal with problems that are typical for both minority governments and cohabitation. Consequently, it would be difficult to decide whether the problems that divided minority governments encounter are generated by minority governments or cohabitation situations. To sum up, since none of the three scenarios identified by Skach respects the condition of unit homogeneity with regard to presidential powers, they cannot be used to analyse the principal-agent relationship between presidents and cabinet members at different levels of presidential influence.

Following Shugart and Carey (1992), this study adopts the distinction between premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. To account for the variation in presidential influence as a function of institutional context, we also operationalise the "modalities" of presidential influence identified by Duverger according to the political affiliation of presidents and prime ministers. Following Elgie (2011, pp. 56–57), if the president and the prime minister are from the same party, then we define this situation as unified executive. If the president is from one party and the prime minister is from another party, then two situations may occur. If the president's party is in government, then we recognise a situation of divided executive, while the situation where the president's party is not in government is defined as cohabitation. The latter scenario can only occur in semi-presidential systems and is substantively different from both minority government under parliamentarism, which takes place when the prime minister lacks the support of the parliamentary majority, and divided government under presidentialism, where the president remains the head of government (Hellwig & Samuels, 2007, p. 70).

Figure 2.1 illustrates the conditions that characterise the occurrence of executive scenarios in semi-presidential regimes. The situations of unified executive, divided

executive, and cohabitation can be clearly identified, are mutually exclusive, and can occur in either of the two semi-presidential sub-types. Their variation within and across countries over time allows us to analyse the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers over the cabinet as a function of institutional context.

Figure 2.1 Dual-executive sub-types in semi-presidential systems



The next section uses a principal-agent approach to conceptualise the relationship between ministers, presidents, prime ministers, and parties in different semi-presidential sub-types as a function of both institutional and partisan factors. This analysis confirms that institutional factors alone do not explain the variation in presidential power across premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes and that institutional context captures better the president's control over the cabinet within and across semi-presidential sub-types. Due to the lack of variation in institutional context in president-parliamentary regimes, though, this section argues that a systematic and unbiased analysis of ministerial deselection and principal-agent relations can only be carried out in premier-presidential systems.

2.3 Executive scenarios in semi-presidential sub-types

Semi-presidential constitutions maximise the variation in the principal-agent relationships that define the position of ministers in the chain of delegation from voters and political parties to governments. In contrast to parliamentary and presidential regimes, the position of cabinets in semi-presidential systems is that of an agent facing two principals, as both presidents and assemblies can decide on their appointment and dismissal (Protsyk, 2006, p. 221; Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668). However, the involvement of both presidents and assemblies in the origin and survival of cabinets blurs the lines of ministerial responsibility and accountability. Are ministers more inclined to conform to the president's or to the assembly's position? Do institutional rules and institutional context make a difference for the extent of their accountability to competing principals?

To answer these questions, Oleh Protsyk (2003, p. 1078) has drawn on the distribution of dismissal powers to predict the cabinet's behaviour towards the president or the parliament. From a purely institutional perspective, he argued, cabinets should conform to the interests of legislatures in premier-presidential systems, where the assembly has exclusive dismissal powers, and should follow presidential preferences in president-parliamentary systems, where both presidents and assemblies have the power to dismiss the government. Similarly, Shugart (2005) has argued that the relationship between the president and the cabinet is strictly transactional in premier-presidential systems due to the exclusive formal accountability of the former to the assembly. In president-parliamentary systems, though, the president and the assembly need to engage in transactions over the composition and direction of the cabinet as both have the constitutional power to end its appointment (Shugart, 2005, pp. 333–334).

However, Shugart (2005) points out that the purely institutional definition of semi-presidential sub-types fails to take into consideration the president's informal authority over the cabinet, which varies depending on whether or not he or she is on the same ideological side with the parliamentary majority or an outsider to the parliamentary majority. Consequently, once the institutional variation between the two semi-presidential sub-types is situated in the party system context in which they operate, the behavioural patterns followed by political actors and the overall operation of the two systems may diverge from institutional expectations (Shugart, 2005, p. 335). For example, although Austria is a president-parliamentary system from an institutional

point of view, because the president has the constitutional power to dissolve the assembly, it operates like a parliamentary system due to the particular development of its post-war party system that has considerably limited the presidential sphere of action. Conversely, presidents have been shown to hold the cabinet accountable even in some premier-presidential systems, where they lack formal dismissal powers (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, 2009c; Shugart, 2005). Using examples from France, Finland, and Romania, Samuels and Shugart (2010, pp. 103–104) have shown that presidents have been able to fire prime ministers when they were on the same side of the parliamentary majority.

Overall, these authors find sufficient evidence to conclude that the influence of presidents over the deselection of prime ministers in premier-presidential systems during periods of unified government is “systemic and not limited to their own party” (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 105). These findings indicate that the presidents’ authority over cabinets is not constant within semi-presidential sub-types and that institutional factors alone do not fully capture the variation in presidential and prime ministerial authority over the cabinet. Instead, the type of executive scenario emerges as a better explanatory factor for the variation in the powers of presidents and prime ministers within as well as across semi-presidential sub-types. While presidents have been able to fire prime ministers during periods of unified government, no instances where presidents were able to force prime ministers out of office have been found during periods of cohabitation in either of the two semi-presidential sub-types (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 107).

That said, it is clear that there is also less institutional variation within president-parliamentarism relative to premier-presidentialism. Here, the constitutional format of president-parliamentary systems increases considerably the formal and informal sources of presidential influence. Presidents are likely to dominate the political system not only when they are on the same side of the parliamentary majority due to their formal power to dismiss the government, but also when they are opposed to the parliamentary majority, due to their constitutional right to dismiss the assembly. The analysis of ministerial turnover in semi-presidential regimes carried out by Samuels and Shugart (2010, p. 101) has shown that the reasons for prime minister termination under president-parliamentary systems were due to presidential factors in almost 60% of the cases. Thus, one may expect that prime ministers have more incentives to act as presidential agents than as party agents in this semi-presidential sub-type. The same

study has shown that cohabitation occurred less than 1.5% of the time under president-parliamentarism between 1945 and 2004. As a result, this semi-presidential sub-type offers fewer opportunities to observe the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence as a function of institutional context.

The fact that president-parliamentary systems operate mostly under unified and divided executive scenarios, where presidents command parliamentary majorities and have the upper hand over the selection of prime ministers, does not rule out the subordination of line ministers to multiple principals. However, the impact of different principal-agent relations on ministerial deselection cannot be observed in the absence of variation in executive scenarios. By contrast, the fact that unified executive, divided executive and cohabitation stand a good chance of alternation at every electoral cycle in any premier-presidential system allows us to capture the impact of institutional context on the ability of presidents and prime ministers to control cabinet composition. Because of the lack in variation in institutional context in president-parliamentary systems, this study will focus on ministerial turnover in premier-presidential regimes. The selection of premier-presidential cases allows us to control for the formal powers enjoyed by presidents and prime ministers and to estimate their ability to control cabinet ministers under different executive scenarios.

2.4 The interaction of executive scenarios and party politics

This section aims to identify what explains variation in ministerial deselection within premier-presidentialism. To do so we focus on the factors that account for the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence over the political system. Three research approaches are available. The first one adopts a purely institutional view on the relationship between institutional scenarios and the extent of presidential and prime ministerial influence over the political system. This idea has been inspired by the operation of semi-presidentialism in France. Even before the first occurrence of cohabitation in France, there was an expectation that if the president ever had to put up with an opposing parliamentary majority, then semi-presidentialism would work not as a synthesis of parliamentary and presidential systems, but as an alternation between presidential and parliamentary phases (Vedel, 1978 cited in Duverger, 1980, p. 186). The idea of alternating phases of presidential and parliamentary government was also adopted by Arend Lijphart, who argued that semi-presidential governments could be classified as either presidential or parliamentary by asking the question of “who is the

real head of government – president or prime minister (Lijphart, 1992, p. 8, his emphasis). According to Lijphart, the answer to this question depends on whether the president's party has a majority in the legislature. As a result, Lijphart defined semi-presidential systems as an alternation of presidential and parliamentary phases where the political power shifts from the president to the prime minister accordingly (Lijphart, 1992, p. 8, 2004, p. 102).

This argument, according to which presidents are powerful when they are on the same side of the parliamentary majority and weak when they oppose the majority, has been embraced by many French scholars. For example, typologies of French prime ministers have differentiated between prime ministers appointed during periods of cohabitation and outside cohabitation (Parodi, 1997a; Portelli, 1997). The former are defined as “institutional and political subordinates of a president who is the leader of the majority”, while the latter belong to the category of dominant prime ministers, who are indisputable leaders of the majority (Portelli, 1997, p. 21). Periods of cohabitation are defined by “prime ministerial supremacy”, while “ordinary times” are characterised by “presidential supremacy” (Ardant & Duhamel, 1999, p. 8). In other words, we should expect presidential leadership under unified executive and prime ministerial leadership under cohabitation. Alain Peyrefitte, a former minister who served under Charles de Gaulle and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, believed that French presidents are weaker under cohabitation than the presidents of the Third and Fourth Republics, who were able to influence the appointment of prime ministers and cabinet members at all times (Peyrefitte, 1999, p. 28). During periods of cohabitation, Peyrefitte argued, French presidents are just as weak as the King of Sweden, who must appoint as prime minister the leader of the party who wins the general election (Peyrefitte, 1999, p. 28). However, the emergence of prime ministerial leadership during periods of cohabitation has not entailed a “de-presidentialisation” of government outside this executive scenario (Parodi, 1997b, p. 310). François Mitterrand and Jacques Chirac were able to regain full control over the government at the end of their experience with cohabitation in 1988 and 2002 respectively. Nevertheless, the occurrence of cohabitation has contributed to an unparalleled increase in the authority of prime ministers over their cabinets and parliamentary majorities, incomparable with the influence of prime ministers under the Third and the Fourth Republics or even with that of other European prime ministers (Parodi, 1997b, p. 310).

Despite its popularity in France, the thesis regarding the increase in presidential powers during periods of unified executive and their weakening under cohabitation has not received unanimous support in the literature. For example, Margit Tavits (2008) reckons that presidents have few incentives to be politically active during periods of unified or divided executive, when policy preferences are likely to be compatible across all branches of government. She thinks that presidents are likely to pursue their objectives more actively during periods of cohabitation, when their party is not in power and they face opposition both in the government and parliament (Tavits, 2008, p. 16). Cindy Skach (2005, 2007) also expects presidents to be more active when they do not enjoy the support of the legislature and during periods of minority government. The range of competing explanations and empirical findings regarding the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence under different executive scenarios indicates that their impact on the powers of presidents and prime ministers should not be taken at face value. Moreover, the occurrence of unified executive and cohabitation may not make any difference for the extent of presidential and prime ministerial authority. For example, in countries like Ireland, Austria, Iceland, or Slovenia, presidents are always weak and prime ministers have full control over the cabinet regardless of the relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities (Elgie, 2009, p. 261). Therefore, executive scenarios do not fully capture the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence in premier-presidential systems, although they do seem to explain it to a certain extent.

Secondly, one may wish to focus on contextual factors in order to capture the variation in the powers of presidents and prime ministers over the cabinet. For example, Tavits (2008) does not believe that whether presidents are directly elected or not makes a difference for the extent of their activism. In other words, she does not think that semi-presidentialism explains why some presidents are more powerful than others. Instead, this author believes that the level of presidential activism depends on the framework of political opportunities. According to this view, presidents are more likely to be active when the level of political consensus is low, during periods of cohabitation and divided government. The incentives for activism should be even stronger under conditions of minority government, irrespective of whether the cabinet is ideologically opposed to the president, as the other policymaking institutions, the government and parliament, are likely to be weak and fragmented under these circumstances (Tavits, 2008, pp. 39–40). Using the share of non-partisan ministers as a measure of presidential

activism in both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, Tavits (2008, p. 49) finds that presidents are more active in the case of minority government and during periods of cohabitation irrespective of their mode of election. Therefore, the determinant for the variation in presidential authority is not believed to reside in the institutional structure of semi-presidentialism.

Another example of a context-related factor that may account for the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers is that of inter-executive conflict. Several studies have found that the level of inter-executive competition between presidents and prime ministers over the control of the executive is likely to be considerably higher in president-parliamentary systems than under premier-presidential systems. (Protsyk, 2006; Sedelius & Berglund, 2012; Sedelius & Ekman, 2010; Sedelius, 2006). However, these studies have also found that the level of party system development and fragmentation, electoral systems, the temporal proximity of presidential and legislative elections, the party affiliation of presidents and prime ministers, the extent of presidential legislative powers, and the level of support enjoyed by prime ministers in the legislature also affect the presidents' ability to control the executive.

Our third option is to take into account the impact of both institutional scenarios and contextual factors on the range of presidential and prime ministerial powers. In this thesis we focus on the impact of intraparty politics on the extent of presidential and prime ministerial influence over the government. The party relationships between presidents, prime ministers, and cabinet members are an important part of the principal-agent analysis of delegation and accountability in representative democracies. Although political parties take part in each step of the delegation process from voters to elected politicians and bureaucrats, their direct intervention to control agents in public office is often limited by legitimate public concern regarding the independence of national institutions from anonymous party machines (Müller, 2000, p. 311). Consequently, party principals must share their authority over cabinet members with presidents and prime ministers who own the formal power to contain agency loss.

The range of ex-post intra-party mechanisms through which party agents can be held accountable by their principals depends on the delegation regime that characterises a political system. For example, in parliamentary systems intraparty politics determines who runs the government. Here, parties retain the power to fire prime ministers (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 94; 121). By contrast, since political parties have no ex-post control mechanisms for their agents when there is a directly elected presidential

office, a highly valued presidency is expected to loosen the party-government relationship (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668).

The idea that the extent of presidential influence over the political system depends not only on the relationship between presidents and parliamentary majorities, but also on the authority of presidents over their own parties is also part of Duverger's work. According to his schema of presidential modalities, one may expect that presidents are considerably more powerful when they are on the same side as the parliamentary majority and there is a unified executive. Under these circumstances, the power of prime ministers should be limited. Conversely, under cohabitation, which occurs when the president is opposed to the parliamentary majority, the prime minister's authority over the government is expected to increase at the expense of the president's authority. However, Duverger also emphasises that, under certain circumstances, presidents may be weak even under unified government: "If the president is not the head of the majority party, while belonging to it or coming under it, this means that the party has decided to give its leader the office of prime minister, to whom the real power then belongs" (Duverger, 1980, p. 184). This is how Duverger explains the figurehead positions of Austrian and Irish presidents, who have never been regarded as leaders of parliamentary majorities, although they have usually been part of it (Duverger, 1980, pp. 184–185). So, the president's position in the party hierarchy makes a difference for the extent of his or her influence over the government even during periods of unified executive.

Several authors expect presidents to retain considerable authority over the cabinet even when the president and the prime minister belong to different parties that are both in government. This is the scenario of divided executive. For example, while examining a large-n sample of reasons for prime minister terminations in semi-presidential regimes, Samuels and Shugart (2010, p. 101) have shown that presidents have been able to dismiss prime ministers who were not their co-partisans. The president's unexpected capacity to hold accountable the agent of a different party is put down to the functions of alliance-formation: "In multiparty systems, parties sometimes form coalitions in which one party gets the presidency while another gets the premiership. When entering such alliances, parties apparently accept a deal in which the president determines how long the premier and the cabinet stay in office" (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 105). Another example is that of Hellwig and Samuels (2007, p. 70), who assume that the president is the effective head of government when the president

and prime minister belong to the same coalition, regardless of whether or not they are from the same party. Therefore, even though we may expect presidents to be less powerful during periods of divided executive, relative to periods of unified executive, we would still expect them to be more powerful than under cohabitation. Similarly, we would expect the prime minister's influence to increase under divided executive and even more so under cohabitation.

Following Duverger, Samuels and Shugart (2010) show that presidents are likely to have more control over the political system if they are the *de facto* party leaders. From a principal-agent perspective, "when presidents are *de facto* party leaders, the importance of parliamentary confidence to the chain of delegation [...] vanishes, because the premier becomes an agent of the president" (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 43). Thus, presidents who carry on in their role as *de facto* party leaders reverse the party-leader principal-agent relationship by turning prime ministers into their own agents, which deprives political parties of the ability to control either of their two agents (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). If this happens then parties should also lose the ability to control cabinet ministers, who become presidential agents during periods of unified executive. All the same, the delegation relation varies as a result of executive scenarios. So, intra-party politics matter more under cohabitation, when presidents lack both formal and partisan means of influence over the cabinet. Under these circumstances, ministers no longer act as presidential agents. The relationship between political parties and their agents in government is therefore an important explanatory factor for the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence over the cabinet. The following section emphasises that the interaction between executive scenarios and party relationships can also capture the variation in ministerial accountability towards presidents, prime ministers, and party principals.

2.5 Ministerial deselection, executive scenarios, and party politics

This study argues that the impact of principal-agent relations on ministerial accountability depends on the interaction between executive scenarios and party relationships between presidents, prime ministers and cabinet members. This idea builds upon the link identified by Samuels and Shugart (2010) between the separation of powers and party organisation and behaviour and tests the hypothesis that the presidents' influence over the government derives from their *de facto* position as party leaders (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). To do so, we operationalise the concept of

de facto partisan authority by taking into account the positions held by presidents and prime ministers in the party hierarchy before they take office. Thus, we expect that presidents who step down as party leaders, only to be sworn in as heads of state continue to control their parties. By contrast, we expect that presidents who did not contest the presidential race as party leaders have little or no impact on cabinet composition regardless of whether they take office during a period of unified executive, divided executive, or cohabitation. Consequently, we do not expect them to control the cabinet either. If the president is a *de facto* party leader, then his or her authority over the cabinet should increase under a divided executive and even more so under a unified executive. However, unless the president enjoys some formal constitutional powers over the government and/or individual ministers, we do not expect that partisan sources of authority matter for his or her ability to hold cabinet members accountable under cohabitation.

Similarly, we expect party leadership positions to render prime ministers more influential than prime ministers who are not party leaders. If prime ministers are not party leaders, then we expect them to be weak irrespective of whether there is a unified executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. However, as opposed to presidents, prime ministers enjoy a range of formal powers over the cabinet, including the right to fire ministers. Due to this institutional feature, we expect that prime ministers who are party leaders take advantage of both constitutional powers and intraparty mechanisms of control and hold cabinet members accountable irrespective of executive scenarios. However, the authority of prime ministers may decrease during periods of divided executive if they share executive power with presidents who also act as *de facto* party leaders.

Due to their centrality in the chain of democratic delegation in representative democracies, party principals should retain a certain amount of influence over the cabinet under all circumstances, as long as they can hold accountable their agents in government, including the president and the prime minister. Thus, if neither the president, nor the prime minister is a party leader, then we expect party principals to keep a tight grip over cabinet ministers regardless of whether there is a unified executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. However, if the president and the prime minister are both party leaders, then we do not expect party principals to control the cabinet during periods of unified executive and divided executive. If presidents are *de facto* party leaders under these scenarios, then parties have no means of sanctioning

agency loss. However, party principals should be more influential under cohabitation even when the president and the prime minister are party leaders. In this case, the president is opposed to the parliamentary majority and has fewer means to compete for control over the cabinet, while parties retain the power to sanction agency loss by replacing the prime minister.

Table 2.1 summarises the variation in the authority of presidents, prime ministers and party principals over the cabinet as a function of both executive scenarios and party relationships.

Table 2.1 Presidential, prime ministerial, and party influence over cabinet ministers

PRESIDENT		Unified	Divided	Cohabitation
President party leader?	Y	+++	++	+
	N	0	0	0
PM		Unified	Divided	Cohabitation
PM party leader?	Y	+++	++	+++
	N	0	0	0
PARTY		Unified	Divided	Cohabitation
President and PM party leaders?	Y	0	0	+
	N	+++	+++	+++

Thus, to capture the full impact of party relationships between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers on the length of ministerial tenure we need to take into account not only the hierarchy of party relations during their term of office, but also their positions in the party hierarchy before taking office. This approach allows us to determine to what extent and under what circumstances a *de facto* party leadership position may account for the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual influence over the decision-making system. The interactive relationship between executive scenarios and party relationships differentiates this study from other works that associate the variation in the authority of presidents and prime ministers over cabinets with the occurrence of executive scenarios. A systematic analysis of ministerial termination events will reveal whether the risk of losing office increases when cabinet members enter into conflict with their principals in the party hierarchy and whether institutional context makes a difference for their longevity in office.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a theory-driven way of analysing the process of ministerial deselection. Building upon the use of agency theory for the study of delegation and accountability in representative democracies, we have emphasised the link between the deselection of ministers and their place in the chain of delegation from voters and political parties to public office holders. Seen from a principal-agent perspective, cabinet ministers respond to competing principals (Carey, 2007) in the government and party hierarchy. As a result, the length of ministerial tenure can be estimated as function of their principals' ability to sanction agency loss.

Due to the ministers' subordination to competing principals in any institutional environment, the principal-agent approach is a valid and reliable analytical tool for the formulation of testable hypotheses across national and institutional contexts. However, semi-presidential systems, and in particular its premier-presidential sub-type, constitute an ideal setting to study the impact of different power relations on ministerial accountability, due to the intra- and inter-case variation of principal-agent relationships in this political regime. As a result, we can study which principal-agent relationships associate with longer and shorter lengths of ministerial tenure. To capture the variation in the impact of different principal-agent relationships on ministerial durability we focus on institutional context and party relationships. We expect that the length of ministerial tenure depends on the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to sanction agency loss under different political circumstances.

The principals' control over cabinet composition is estimated as a function of party relationships and executive scenarios. We know that the president's and the prime minister's influence over the political system increases under certain circumstances. However, the political circumstances under which they become more influential vary across countries. This study argues that the party relationship between presidents and prime ministers captures the variation in their influence over the political system and that presidents and prime ministers who act as *de facto* party leaders are more powerful than presidents and prime ministers who do not. However, the extent of political influence is not independent of institutional context. Due to their limited range of constitutional powers, we expect that presidents who are *de facto* party leaders have more control over the cabinet during periods of unified executive than under divided executive or cohabitation. Nevertheless, presidents who act as party leaders during

periods of divided executive and cohabitation may be more influential than presidents who take office during a period of unified executive, but are not regarded as *de facto* party leaders. Similarly, prime ministers who are party leaders will have more control over the cabinet under cohabitation, than under divided executive and unified executive, when the president's party is in government. However, we expect that the influence of presidents and prime ministers over the political systems decreases when they do not act as party leaders. It is under these circumstances that we expect the influence of party principals over the cabinet to rise.

Chapter Three: Research design

This thesis aims to explain the variation in the length of ministerial tenure and focuses on the role that political institutions and intraparty politics play in determining why some ministers survive in office longer than others. The first section of this chapter justifies the adoption of a small-n comparative approach to test the principal-agent theory. The second section accounts for the selection of case studies and the time period under analysis. The third section explains the method of quantitative case studies used in this project and outlines the qualitative and quantitative techniques used at different phases in the research process to collect, analyse and validate the data. The fourth section presents and operationalises the dependent and independent variables used in the analysis. The chapter concludes by presenting the expected outcomes of this research and emphasises the external validity of the results obtained using the methods discussed in this chapter.

3.1 The comparative method

This thesis adopts a comparative approach. The principal-agent approach is an abstract framework of analysis that can be used to study the process of ministerial deselection in any representative democracy. The aim of this study is to show that the implications of this theory are generalisable across the population of premier-presidential systems. This argument can be tested comparatively across countries or investigated in-depth in a single country.

A single case study permits the intensive study of a theory and aims to shed light on the entire population of cases where this argument applies (Gerring, 2004, p. 344). Thus, the analysis of ministerial turnover in a single country allows one to probe the causal roots of this political process in a particular national context using both deductive logic and contextual knowledge (Gerring, 2007, p. 172). However, a single case study is not a useful technique for testing deductive theories because it often hinders the evaluation of alternative explanations (G. King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 211). Although it aims to generalise to a population of cases, the single case study is focused on within-case variation (Gerring, 2007, p. 21). Here, the main hypothesis is that the

ability of presidents and prime ministers to fire cabinet ministers depends on the interaction of institutional context and party relationships. This hypothesis can only be tested if we observe variation in both executive scenarios and in the party leadership roles played by presidents and prime ministers. This argument could be studied in a single case study which presents variation in these explanatory factors across time. However, no crucial case can test whether a hypothesis is generally true due to the multicausal and probabilistic nature of political phenomena (Coppedge, 2007, p. 2). According to Coppedge (2007, p. 2), “the kind of generalization that one does in a case study is not *testing* generalizations, but *hypothesizing* them”. Thus, although relevant or crucial cases relate to the population by proposing relationships that *might* be generally true, they cannot reveal if they are generally true. The researcher cannot rule out the possibility that the causal significance of an event or structure depends on other features of the case than those under investigation (Ragin, 1987, p. xiii). Thus, case-oriented research may be able to avoid the simplifying assumptions of the variable-oriented approach, but cannot explain similarities and differences among many cases (Ragin, 1987, p. xiii).

Overall, the single case research is considered more useful for generating new hypotheses, and more concerned with internal validity and the investigation of causal mechanisms (Gerring, 2007, p. 38). However, if the aim is to test a general hypothesis and if the researcher is concerned about external validity and aims to gain insight about average causal effects and generalise on the basis of new results, then the case study research is associated with several comparative weaknesses (Mahoney, 2007, p. 8). As this research aims to test a general theory of ministerial deselection and reveal its potential for generalisation across the entire population of premier-presidential countries, the comparative method appears as a more adequate choice.

The comparative approach is regarded as a method of “discovering empirical relationships among variables” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 683) and “controlling whether generalisations hold across the cases to which they apply” (Sartori, 1991, p. 244). However, the goal of testing theories and establishing general empirical generalisations between two or more variables is shared by both large-n and small-n research. According to Lijphart (1971, p. 684), the difference between the statistical and the comparative method resides in the method of control they use: while the statistical method resorts to partial correlations and accounts only for certain key variables that are considered to exert substantial influence on the phenomenon under investigation, the

comparative method deals with a number of cases that is not large enough to permit systematic control by means of partial correlations. Thus, the main difference between the two approaches comes down to the number of cases available for analysis.

Ragin (1987) discusses the differences between small-n and large-n studies in terms of case-oriented and variable-oriented research strategies. The former is seen as an evidence-oriented strategy, while the latter is theory-centered (Ragin, 1987, p. 53). Theory plays an important role in both approaches. However, while its main role is to guide the identification of causal factors in case-oriented studies, variable-oriented studies test hypotheses derived from theory (Ragin, 1987, p. 55). Although this approach fits the aim of this thesis, which is to test whether the principal-agent model can work as a general theory for the study of ministerial turnover, the variable-oriented approach includes several caveats. According to Ragin (1987, p. 69), its main weakness is its tendency towards abstract generalisation and its reliance on conjunctural causal arguments. Large-n studies are also thought to give insufficient attention to causal mechanisms and to depend heavily on untested assumptions (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010a, p. 155). In contrast with single-case studies, cross-national studies are likely to be biased in favour of structural explanation at the expense of social processes and human agency (Ragin, 1987, p. 70).

To overcome the limitations of both single case and large-n studies, this thesis combines the two research methods using a small-n comparative approach. The main advantage of the small-n method stands in its ability to use the leverage afforded by the differences and similarities of comparable cases drawing on the deep background knowledge of the countries being examined (Tarrow, 2010, p. 243). The small-n comparison differs from single-case studies through its ability to compare the impact of a single variable or mechanism on outcomes of interest (Tarrow, 2010, p. 244). However, the advantages of focusing on just a few cases must be weighed against the costs which include “forgoing large-n tools for measurement validation and losing the generality that might be achieved if a wider range of cases is considered” (Brady, Collier, & Seawright, 2010, p. 22). To compensate for the analytical leverage that characterises large-n studies, one must employ strong tools of within-case analysis (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010b, p. 10).

A further choice that we need to make regards the logic of inquiry based on which the cases are selected and compared. The strategy of small-n comparison requires us to choose between John Stuart Mill’s (1846) methods of agreement and difference. A

research design that is based on as many similar cases as possible and adopts a method of difference to focus on intersystemic similarities and differences is known as a “most similar systems” design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 32). Conversely, a research design that is based on dissimilar countries and adopts the method of agreement to identify common causal relationships for the social phenomenon under study is known as a “most different systems” design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, p. 34). Our choice of a most-similar systems analysis is determined by the scope of the theory tested in this thesis, as well as by the quantitative case studies method used for the small-n comparison. First, this thesis proposes an abstract theory regarding the accountability of cabinet ministers to competing principals in government and in the party. Thus, we focus on the chain of delegation and accountability as the main similarity that all representative democracies share. We assume that these political systems have many circumstances in common and we aim to interpret the variation in the process of ministerial deselection by concentrating on the variation in the process of delegation and accountability across cases. Therefore, this study adopts a logic of inquiry that is based on the co-variation between political institutions, intraparty politics and ministerial deselection and focuses on cross-system differences (Pennings, Keman, & Kleinnijenhuis, 2006, p. 39). Second, the techniques employed for data collection and analysis allow us to control for variation in institutional context across the countries under analysis. The validity of our quantitative measures is increased by the qualitative method of data collection, which ensures that the independent variables are highly context-specific. As a result, the mix of qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis balance the trade off involved by the most similar systems design between internal and external validity.

The quantitative and the case study analyses are also clearly integrated. The case studies speak to each other and do not simply test or illustrate the theory. Each country study opens with a brief narrative illustrating the kind of puzzle that this research aims to answer. These examples emphasise the differences between apparently similar political circumstances under which some ministers have had to resign, while others continued in office. The case-study chapters also include fine-grained analyses of intraparty politics and examine the organisational transformation undergone by presidential and prime ministerial parties. These extended qualitative sections explore the validity of coding decisions corresponding to the *de facto* party leadership roles

played by presidents and prime ministers even though they do not test directly the process of ministerial deselection predicted by the principal-agent theory.

Furthermore, the quantitative analyses carried out in the case studies do not simply reproduce the cross-country statistical analysis. The case studies are an integral part of the investigation and they deepen the analysis in two different ways. First, the country-based quantitative analyses pay attention to the impact of country-specific factors on the length of ministerial tenure. For example, in the case of France we take into account the importance of the local route to ministerial office and the practice of combining local and national offices in this country and we control for the impact of local electoral defeats on the ministers' risk of losing office. Second, the qualitative analyses of intraparty politics single out the conditions under which the main explanatory variables are likely to have an impact on the length of ministerial tenure. For example, the cross-country analysis confirms that presidents who act as *de facto* party leaders during periods of unified executive are more likely to exert control over cabinet members than presidents who are not party leaders. The case study analyses address this issue by contrasting the impact that a directly elected presidency has on the organisation and behaviour of political parties in different countries.

A research design is able to fit the case-oriented and the variable-oriented types of investigations closely together when they are both anchored by the same explicit model (Ragin, 1987, p. 78). This is the role played by the principal-agent theory in this study, which guides both qualitative and multivariate analyses and aims to explain the process of ministerial turnover generally in representative democracies. As a result, the thesis aims to interpret the results more in light of their generality than toward appreciating the complexity and specificity of the case studies. At the same time, particular attention is given to the impact that country-specific factors have on the length of ministerial tenure. The generality of the findings is borne out by the cross-country analysis, which shows that the relationship posited between the dependent and independent variables still holds when country-specific factors are not taken into account. As a result, the integration of case-oriented and variable-oriented comparison methods allows us to use a middle path between complexity and generality to test the internal validity of a theoretical argument using the same method that would be applied for its analysis across a large population of cases.

3.2 The countries selected for examination and the time period under study

The universe of cases to which the theoretical expectations developed in Chapter 2 apply consists of premier-presidential countries, where directly elected presidents share executive power with cabinets and prime ministers who are collectively responsible to assemblies alone. The only condition used to restrain this universe of cases is that of democratic consolidation, as the agency theory on which this analysis relies only applies to representative democracies. Further limiting the present analysis to European states does not violate any of the case selection conventions, as this sample of countries has not been selected by a rule correlated with the dependent variable of ministerial termination events (Geddes 1990: 131; King et al. 1994: 129). Since the number of European semi-presidential systems has increased after the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the universe of European premier-presidential systems presents substantial variation in democratic experience. Thus, the population of European premier-presidential countries satisfies the assumption of unit homogeneity or constant causal effects underlying the method of comparative case studies (King et al. 1994: 93).

The in-depth analysis of ministerial termination events is structured around the examination of executive politics in three countries, France, Portugal, and Romania. These countries have been selected according to the principles of the most-similar system design outlined above. They are all premier-presidential systems, where ministers are accountable to presidents, prime ministers and party principals. The empirical analysis will emphasise the factors responsible for the variation in the length of ministerial tenure within and across cases despite the common institutional framework they share. The scope conditions of the theoretical argument are also progressively tested through the selection of cases that vary with respect to the age of democracy (Tarrow, 2010, p. 251). The analysis includes a country that was a consolidated democracy at the end of the Second World War, a country that democratised during the 1970s and a country that started the transition to democracy during the 1990s. This strategy works as a way of testing for omitted variable bias and verifies that the scope conditions within which this theory is developed work in other national contexts irrespective of their democratic experience (Tarrow, 2010, p. 249).

The three countries vary in ways that illustrate and put to the test the theoretical expectations set out in Chapter 2. Keeping in line with the most important research

design convention regarding the intentional selection of cases for small-n analysis (Geddes, 1990, p. 13; G. King et al., 1994, p. 137), France, Portugal, and Romania have been selected due to the significant variation in the key explanatory variables of dual-executive scenarios and party leadership roles played by presidents and prime ministers within and across these countries. The intentional selection of case studies is consistent with the justification that this study offers for its exclusive concern with ministerial termination events in premier-presidential countries: the assumption that the scenarios of unified executive, divided executive and cohabitation stand a good chance of alternation at every electoral cycle holds true for each of the countries under study. One can therefore look in each of these case-studies for empirical evidence that the alternation of dual-executive scenarios in conjunction with party leadership roles played by different political actors introduces variation in the impact of principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure. Additionally, no attention has been paid to the distribution of ministerial termination events in any of these countries. Thus, in agreement with the strategy advocated by King, Verba and Keohane (1994), it is only during the research that the values of the independent variable will be discovered. This strategy allows the formulation of “causal inference by examining the differences in the distribution of outcomes on the dependent variable for given values of the explanatory variables” (G. King et al., 1994, p. 140).

The time period under analysis in each country has been selected so that the process of ministerial deselection can be observed under different political circumstances within and across national contexts. To determine which principal-agent relationships are associated with shorter and longer spells of ministerial tenure, we have focused on the most recently completed periods of unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation. The neutral selection of beginning and endpoints is not correlated with the values taken by the dependent variable and should not bias the conclusions of this study.

The analysis of ministerial turnover in France is carried out for the most recent periods of unified executive and cohabitation. The former occurred between 2007 and 2012, when President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister François Fillon of the Union for a Popular Movement shared executive power. The last time a French government operated under a period of cohabitation was between 1997 and 2002, when the Gaullist President Jacques Chirac and the Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin shared executive power.

The time period under analysis in the case of Portugal begins with the cohabitation between President Mário Soares of the Socialist Party and the centre-right coalition governments led by Manuel Durrão Barroso and Pedro Santana Lopes of the Social Democratic Party between 2002 and 2004². The second time interval included in the analysis of Portuguese ministers is the first Socialist government formed by PM José Socrates between 2005 and 2009. Two executive scenarios characterised this period of time. The unified executive between President Mario Soares and José Socrates lasted until March 2006, when Ánibal Cavaco Silva of the Social Democratic Party succeeded Mário Soares as President of Portugal. The cohabitation between PM Socrates and President Cavaco Silva lasted until a new government was formed after the 2009 legislative election.

The analysis of ministerial turnover in Romania focuses on the governments that were formed between 2000 and 2008. The Social-Democratic government that took office in December 2000 operated under a scenario of unified executive, as President Iliescu and PM Năstase of the Social Democratic Party shared executive power until 2004. The new government formed after the 2004 elections started off under a scenario of divided executive, as President Traian Băsescu of the Democratic Party appointed Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu of the National Liberal Party as the prime minister of a coalition cabinet that was dominated by the two parties. The period of divided executive ended in April 2007, when President Băsescu's party left the government coalition. This event triggered the onset of a period of cohabitation that lasted until new legislative elections were organised in December 2008. Table 3.1 maps the cabinets, the occurrence of executive scenarios, and the time period under analysis in the three countries.

The impact of principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure is assessed by focusing on the variation in the party leadership positions held by presidents and prime ministers before and after they took office. According to the theoretical argument set out in Chapter 2, the presidents' and the prime ministers' *de facto* partisan influence is one of the main explanatory factors accounting for the extent of their control over cabinet composition. The concept of *de facto* party leadership is operationalised as the position held by presidents and prime ministers as party leaders before taking office. Table 3.2 classifies the cabinets under study according to executive

² The caretaker government led by PM Santana Lopes between December 2004 and March 2005 has been excluded from the analysis for several theoretical and methodological reasons explained in Chapter Five.

scenarios and the party leadership positions held by presidents and prime ministers before taking office.

Table 3.1 Countries, cabinets, time period, and executive scenarios

Scenario	France		Portugal		Romania	
	Cabinet	Time period	Cabinet	Time period	Cabinet	Time period
Unified executive	Fillon	17/05/2007	Socrates	12/03/2005	Năstase	28/12/2000
		10/05/2012		11/03/2006		28/12/2004
Divided executive					Tăriceanu 1	29/12/2004 05/04/2007
			Barroso	17/05/2002 17/07/2004		
Cohabitation	Jospin	2/06/1997	Santana Lopes	17/07/2004	Tăriceanu 2	06/04/2007
		6/05/2002		13/12/2004		22/12/2008
				Socrates		11/03/2006 26/10/2009

Table 3.2 Executive scenarios and *de facto* party leadership positions

	SCENARIO			
	Unified	Cohabitation	Divided	
LEADERSHIP	PR	(RO) Năstase (2000/04)		
		(FR) Fillon (2007/12)		
	PM	(PT) Socrates (2005/06)	(PT) Barroso (2002/04) (PT) Santana Lopes (2004) (PT) Socrates (2006/09)	
			(FR) Jospin (1997/02)	(RO) Tăriceanu 1 (2004/07)
PR, PM		(RO) Tăriceanu 2 (2007/08)		
Neither				

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 validate the grounds on which the three countries have been selected and based on which they are compared. Table 3.1 shows that institutional context varies within and across the three cases. Each of them includes a period of unified executive and cohabitation. The Romanian case also includes a period of divided executive. Table 3.2 shows that party relationships also vary within and across countries. The theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2 suggests that if the presidency is a highly valued office, then political parties are likely to nominate their leaders as presidential candidates. Table 3.2 confirms this expectation in France and Romania,

where the heads of state contested the presidential race as party leaders. Party relationships do not vary in Portugal, where political parties do not nominate their leaders as presidential candidates. Although the Portuguese presidents covered by this study had also been party leaders at some point during their political career, they had not contested the presidency of the country from this position. The importance of party leadership roles in Portugal is nevertheless confirmed by the fact that all prime ministers included in the analysis held the presidency of their parties before and after elections, regardless of the executive scenario under which their government operated. The situation of French and Romanian presidents differs from that of Portuguese presidents, as all of them contested the presidential race from the position of party leaders. The French and the Romanian cases also vary as far as the party leadership positions held by prime ministers before and after elections are concerned. While Lionel Jospin stepped down from the presidency of the Socialist Party upon his appointment as prime minister, Adrian Năstase succeeded Ion Iliescu as president of the Social-Democratic Party after he was appointed as prime minister. The variation in party relationships across and within countries create a favourable framework to estimate their impact on the length of ministerial tenure when the independent variable of institutional context is held constant, as well as when it varies across and within countries.

The variation in ministerial durability is analysed within and across countries. The selection of case studies respects the three assumptions underlying the concept of conditional independence (G. King et al., 1994, p. 94): the endogeneity problem and selection bias are ruled out as the values taken by explanatory variables are independent of the values assigned to the dependent variable of ministerial termination events. The risk of omitted variable bias is considerably reduced by the inclusion of a battery of control variables that capture the impact of additional determinants of ministerial durability in office highlighted in other studies of ministerial turnover. The selection of control variables is also independent of the values taken by dependent variables in the three countries under study. The operationalisation and measurement of the control variables is explained in the last section of this chapter.

The comparative analysis of the principal-agent approach to ministerial deselection gains analytical leverage from a variety of methods that allow us to investigate the research question from different angles (Tarrow, 2010, p. 250). In addition to quantitative analyses, the case studies include short narratives, descriptions of intraparty mechanisms of accountability and leadership selection processes, and

detailed analyses of different routes to ministerial office. The cases speak to each other, they highlight country-specific factors that differentiate the three countries from one another, and they discuss new findings in light of the results obtained in the other single studies. The cross-country findings are also strengthened by the replication of the general hypothesis at a smaller scale. As a result, the research design localises the general argument tested in this thesis and strengthens it (Tarrow, 2010, p. 252).

The next sections of this chapter explain the range of quantitative and qualitative research methods that have been used to collect and analyse the data.

3.3 Quantitative case studies

Using a small-n comparison, this study examines the effect of institutions and parties on ministerial deselection through the use of quantitative case studies. This approach consists in combining a data collection method that generates a large number of observations from the context with a quantifying technique that relies on the qualitative analysis of each observation before it is transformed into a number. We carry out a qualitative content analysis of print press news as a method for collecting data on the events experienced by ministers during their time in office. The analysis carried out in each case study draws on large-n data sets that include up to 2,815 observations. The increase in the number of data points available for analysis increases the analytical leverage of single studies and is one of the solutions given to the “many variables, small-n problem” associated by Lijphart (1971, p. 685), with the comparative method (Collier, Brady, & Seawright, 2010c, p. 183). As a result we can use the same data to test whether the causal relationships posited by the theoretical argument are replicated within and across case studies.

The data on cabinet ministers has been collected through a detailed analysis of newspaper content. An original data set has been compiled for each country under analysis. The data sets cover the cabinet ministers who served in government during the time period indicated above and contain information regarding the events they experienced during their time in office. Taking into account the fact that cabinet politics receive high coverage in the media, we use the coverage that ministerial termination events, resignation calls and conflicts between ministers, presidents, prime ministers, and political parties receive in well-known quality newspapers in each of the countries under study. Due to the popularity and widespread use of online newspaper archives, the press is the most tractable media source in all countries under study (Elgie &

McMenamin, 2005, p. 547). As a result, a well-known daily national newspaper that can be treated as an independent and reputable media source has been identified for each country. The three newspapers are *Le Figaro* (for the French ministers), *Diário de Notícias* (for the Portuguese ministers), and *Evenimentul zilei* (for the Romanian ministers).

Although *Le Monde* is seen as the French newspaper of record in France, *Le Figaro* was preferred for data collection because *Le Monde* was not included in the LexisNexis database when this project started. However, the correlation scores between the number of minister-related articles in *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* for the time period under analysis indicate negligible differences in news reporting between the two newspapers. As a result, the right-wing orientation of *Le Figaro* was not considered problematic, given that the observations recorded in the data set are related to the occurrence of events and draw exclusively on the newspaper's reporting function and not on the political stance it takes with regard to the events reported. In addition to its reputation as one of the most important Portuguese dailies, *Diário de Notícias* was chosen as the primary source for data collection due to the extensive online archive that is available on its website. The archive offers full text access to the entire *Diário de Notícias* collection published since 2000. Similarly, apart from its reputation as one of the most important Romanian dailies, *Evenimentul zilei* was chosen as the primary source for data collection due to its extensive online archive that offers full text access to all articles published since 1994.

Irrespective of the source used for data collection, similar keywords were employed to select the newspaper articles containing information related to the events experienced by ministers. A validity test of this method was carried out for the case of Luís Campos e Cunha, the Portuguese Minister of Finance who stepped down in July 2005 after serving in José Sócrates government for four months. Two searches were carried out, one with keywords and another one without keywords. The keyword search returned 34 articles, while the simple search returned 112 articles. However, the information contained in the 34 articles returned by the keyword search led to the identification of the same number of terminal and non-terminal events as the simple search: one resignation, one resignation call and four episodes of policy disagreements. Overall, 50,291 articles were selected from the three newspapers used for data collection. Based on these articles, 5,072 observations were recorded. The France data set contains 2,815 observations coded on the basis of 50,291 articles; the Portuguese

data set includes 540 observations coded from 3,500 articles; and the Romanian data set includes 1,717 observations that were coded based on 23,724 articles.

The internal validity of the data collected using the method indicated above is further assessed in the next sections of this chapter, which explain the operationalisation and the measurement of the independent variables. However, the use of identical units of measurement for all the cases included in the analysis ensures that the basic criteria for internal validity of the new data collected are met by this study (Pennings et al., 2006, pp. 11–12). Furthermore, the fact that the indicators used in this study have been conceptualised for the purpose of testing the specific argument formulated in this project maximise the validity of our measurements (G. King et al., 1994, p. 25). The collection of data using the content analysis of print press news increases the reliability and internal validity of the quantitative data sets that serve as the basis for within-case and cross-case statistical modelling. The adoption of such a labour-intensive method of data collection has involved a trade off between the internal validity of the quantitative measures and the replicability of the data collection process. However, we believe that the advantages of using reliable data to test a general theory in a way that is consistent with the context outrank the disadvantages of exact replications of data sets. The conceptual and external validity of the data collected derives from the hypothesis testing role served by case studies in this research. The theoretical argument tested in this thesis has been developed deductively and is thought to apply to the entire population of premier-presidential countries, not only to the three countries included in this study.

3.4 Event history analysis

To estimate the impact of independent variables on the length of ministerial tenure across countries and over time we will use the method of event history analysis, which involves the “statistical examination of longitudinal data collected on a set of observations” (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 1). Due to their focus on the impact that the variation in independent variables has on the values of the dependent variable over time, event history models are explicitly comparative statistical models (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 3). Since every event history model contains longitudinal data across many observations, we will compare the results obtained by the duration models that use single-country data sets with the results obtained by a pooled model that uses the data collected for the three countries. This approach allows us to

identify the factors that increase the ministers' risk of losing office in certain national contexts and to reach a conclusion regarding their generalising effect across countries.

Duration models are preferred over other types of regression models due to their advantages in modelling survival in a given state and transition to a subsequent state, which is the event under analysis (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 8). For example, regression-based approaches are unable to account for time-varying covariates, which are a characteristic of this study since the independent variables (such as institutional context and party relationships) are likely to change values across the time period under study. By contrast, the event history approach provides several solutions to incorporate information on time-varying covariates and determine the risks associated with changes in the values of key covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 116). Since the aim of this research is to gain a deeper understanding of the relationship between the dependent variable and covariates rather than focus on a particular form of duration dependency, the multivariate analyses carried out in the country-studies use the Cox proportional hazards model. This model does not impose any restriction on the shape of hazard function and appears as an appropriate model choice since we have no reason to assume that a minister's risk of losing office increases or decreases as time passes. As a result, the analysis focuses on how the events experienced by ministers push the slope of the hazard function up and down.

However, simply summing up events and conflicts between ministers and their principals as a measure of the principal-agent relationships might overestimate the extent of career-control powers. For example, when presidents are unable to influence executive affairs during periods of cohabitation they are likely to adopt a going-public tactic to pass judgements about the government's performance. In this context, a simple additive model is completely oblivious to the passing of time and fails to take into account the relativity of the principals' powers because it has no capacity to "forget". As a result, the influence of a particular conflict on the resulting risk of ministerial deselection cannot be observed since all conflicts are equipotent. The additive model can nevertheless be improved by adding a specification that allows it to "forget" events when the time of their occurrence is sufficiently far back into the past with respect to the moment of ministerial deselection. As a result, the impact of any event on the hazard of ministerial termination events is no longer equipotent but weighted by the following exponential decay function

$$e^{-\lambda(t-t_{\text{conflict}})}$$

The value of lambda is determined with respect to the event half-life, defined as the period of time after which the likelihood of being fired because of that event drops to 50%. As a result:

$$\lambda = -\frac{\log(0.5)}{t_{\text{half}}}$$

The only remaining issue is how to choose a good estimate for the event half-time. The resolution of ministerial scandals often involves the set up of special investigations to determine the personal responsibility of the ministers in question. For example, this was the case of Eric Woerth, who was promoted as Minister of Labour, Solidarity and Civil Service in François Fillon's cabinet in March 2010. Woerth was involved in a financial scandal during the summer of 2010 after he had been accused of receiving illegal campaign donations in 2007. Although an inquiry into these corruption allegations was immediately commenced, Woerth left the government only several months later in the context of a major reshuffle. To account for similar situations where the outcome of some events depends on the intensity with which they are followed up by the public and authorities alike, it seems reasonable to allow a three-month time-span before the weight of an event on the risk of sacking drops by half. As a result, the value of lambda is 0.0077 (for a half-life value equal to 90 days). This value is used to compute the cumulative impact of any type of event that ministers may experience on their risk of failure. The fact that the statistical models are specified in such a way as to allow the importance of events to diminish in time, as it would happen in real life, renders this analysis considerably more fluid and dynamic than most statistical models that focus on static characteristics of governments and ministers alike.

The empirical design of this study creates the conditions for an effective use of duration models. The use of new data collected and recorded for the purpose of duration analysis ensures that the method of event history modelling is correctly implemented and avoids problems related to poor measurement of events (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 197). Nevertheless, while the event history models used in this study will provide information regarding the factors associated with an increase in the risk of losing office, this information needs to be backed out of the statistical model (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 197). The combination of the formal logic of the theoretical argument provided by the principal-agent model and the multivariate

analysis provides a strong research design to study the variation in the length of ministerial tenure across countries and over time.

3.5 The dependent variable: the length of ministerial tenure

This study argues that the deselection of line ministers, which is conceptualised as the termination of a principal-agent relationship, reflects the variation in the influence of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals over the cabinet. We expect each principal's ability to fire ministerial agents to vary as a function of political institutions and party relationships. In other words, the length of ministerial tenure can be regarded as a dependent variable that can be used to explain the variation in the political practices we want to explain (Cheibub & Chernykh, 2008, p. 292).

The data sets cover all ministers who held a full cabinet position in their respective governments. In addition to standard cabinet members the data sets also includes ministers of state, a position that indicates the most senior members of cabinet in each country under study, and delegated ministers, a position that features in the French and the Romanian governments. State secretaries from all countries have been excluded from the analysis because of their direct subordination to a single principal. As opposed to state secretaries, the French and the Romanian delegated ministers participate in cabinet meetings and respond directly to the prime minister. All individuals who have served as ministers, senior ministers or junior ministers during the time period under study have been identified from official sources.

The data sets include the exact dates when ministers take and leave office. The dependent variable records the length of ministerial tenure. The ministers' observed tenure is right-censored if they leave office collectively as a result of a government termination or general elections. Ministers are also right-censored if they are still in office at the end of the time period under study. The duration in office is not interrupted if ministers are assigned to different portfolios, if there is a change of prime minister, or if the government receives a vote of investiture in the parliament after a reshuffle. However, if the same ministers leave the cabinet and return after a certain period of time, they are recorded as new cases.

3.6 The independent variables

While the units of observation in the data set are the individual ministers the units of analysis are the events experienced by ministers. The events included in the analysis are the independent variables that are expected to affect the length of ministerial tenure. In addition to the events experienced by ministers, the analysis also controls for the ministers' fixed characteristics at the moment of appointment.

Conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals

To measure the variation in principal-agent relationships, we collect data on disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and party principals. We assume that the risk of losing office increases when the occurrence of conflicts between ministers and their principals is made public. The accumulation of conflicts between ministers, presidents, prime ministers and parties is therefore a proxy for agency loss that each principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to fire agents, then they should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with their agents increases. If the ministers' risk of losing office does not increase in the presence of conflicts with principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the ability to sanction agency loss³. The indicator of conflicts between ministers and principals is the number of times the former are criticised by the latter during their time in office, as reported in the press. The issue at stake may be related to the ministers' performance in executive or party office or to their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues.

The information contained by the three explanatory variables that record disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties is

³Several alternative explanations regarding the conditions under which we are actually able to observe conflicts between ministers and their principals must be considered. While public evidence of a conflictual relationship between ministers and their principals is a strong indicator of agency loss, we cannot rule out the possibility that principals may see it in their interest not to make public some conflicts. For example, presidents, prime ministers and parties outside public office may not wish to harm their electoral chances by publicly exposing the mismanagement errors of their representatives in government. In this case, the reasons for the ministers' demotion may be difficult to observe. Unpopular principals may also find it disadvantageous to criticise or sanction popular ministers. Principals who lack the formal power to fire ministers, such as presidents under a situation of cohabitation, may criticise cabinet members simply to draw attention upon themselves. By contrast, principals who can actively exercise the power to fire may choose not to choose their ministers in public. Nevertheless, although the publicness of conflicts may often be strategic, their systematic recording can still provide valuable information about the timing and the circumstances under which principals decide to make public their perception of agency loss.

used to estimate the influence of each principal on the deselection of ministers in the country studies as well as in the cross-country analysis. Some country-specific information is included in two of the case studies. The analysis corresponding to Portuguese ministers includes the president's ability to veto executive decrees in addition to parliamentary bills. Similarly, the analysis corresponding to Romanian ministers includes the Romanian president's power to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members and to request their suspension from office. To make sure that the pooled analysis is not driven by idiosyncratic elements, any country-specific factor that is not encountered in each of the case-studies is excluded from the comparative analysis of ministerial turnover.

Resignation calls

To understand why some ministers lose their jobs while others do not under similar circumstances, it is important to pay equal attention to both instances of deselection and non-deselection (Dowding & Kang, 1998, p. 412). Similar to previous studies that have relied on agency theory to study the relationship between prime ministers and their cabinets (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012), we see resignation calls as indicators of the ministers' performance in office. Consequently, we expect that principals use this information when they decide to fire ministers and we expect the relationship between the number of resignation calls and the length of ministerial tenure to be negative.

Resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign. If they are asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded only if new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. The proximate reasons for resignation calls are grouped into four categories:

- (i) Personal errors – ministers held responsible for their own mistakes, errors of judgement, gaffes, involvement in personal or financial scandals, or seen to be performing badly over a long period of time;
- (ii) Departmental errors – when serious mistakes occur in the minister's jurisdiction or department;
- (iii) Policy disagreements – ministers asked to resign because of the policies they initiated and/or implemented;

- (iv) Breaches of collective responsibility – ministers called on to resign because they challenged a decision already made by cabinets or prime ministers;

In cases where ministers were asked to step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. Cross-references have been made to interviews, biographies, autobiographies and any other sources available in order to reach a decision regarding the categorisation of termination reasons. Some debate may remain about the coding of some cases where personal and departmental errors may overlap, while performance and policy disagreements may be closely related. Due to the sample size of resignation calls, though, the advantages of estimating the combined effects of closely related reasons for resignation, such as personal errors and performance, instead of estimating the separate impact of several very small categories of reasons for resignation outweigh the disadvantages.

The non-deselection cases are considered essential for a correct understanding of the causes of ministerial firing, particularly given the puzzling nature of ministerial termination events, which sees some ministers surviving in office under similar circumstances that cost other ministers their jobs. From this point of view, previous immunity to resignation issues could indicate a set of political circumstances under which ministers may expect to survive resignation debates, as well as the existence of a “threshold” of resignation issues that ministers may accumulate before they are constrained to leave office (Fisher et al., 2006, p. 710). Additionally, non-resignation instances may also indicate the circumstances under which the decisions to resign and dismiss depend on the agency relationship established between ministers and different principals and are not necessarily a consequence of the offence committed.

Fixed characteristics

The existing literature on ministerial turnover provides extensive analyses on the background of ministers and inquires whether differences in individual characteristics explain the variation in the durability of cabinet members. The range of fixed characteristics included in these studies contains information on the age and gender of ministers as well as on their social, educational, and political backgrounds. This thesis takes a different stance on the analysis of ministerial careers. We believe that personal characteristics play an important role for ministerial selection. However, this study focuses on the dynamic aspect of ministerial careers and aims to reveal the impact that

the events experienced while in office have on the length of tenure. We believe that static characteristics, such as social and educational backgrounds, are less likely to play a determinant role for the amount of time that ministers survive in office. As a result, our data does not include this kind of information.

Due to the importance attached to the impact of party relations on ministerial durability, the range of fixed characteristics included in the analysis focus on indicators of political experience that are likely to be valued by party principals. These characteristics are grouped along the four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are compared across the country studies: cabinet experience, parliamentary background, experience in local administration, and involvement in party organisations.

Previous appointments to government in either full or junior positions are the main indicator of previous experience of serving in office. The weight of legislative careers on the length of ministerial tenures is assessed by taking into account not only the ministers' recruitment from the parliamentary pool, but also their previous experience as members of parliament. Within case-study analyses, the latter indicator measures the number of terms ministers served in the parliament prior to appointment in government. To avoid the possibility that different perceptions associated with the status of national representatives within individual countries drive the relationship between parliamentary experience and ministerial durability across countries, the comparative analysis takes into account the number of times ministers had previously been elected in the parliament only for those cabinet members who held a parliamentary seat at the moment of appointment.

Depending on the importance of a background in local politics, the country studies control separately for the impact of mayor and councillor positions and prior experience in local administration on the length of tenure. To compensate for the variation in the role of local politics for the advancement of political careers at national level, the comparative analysis only looks at whether ministers held an elective position in local administration at the moment of appointment.

Involvement in party politics is captured by two variables. The first one indicates whether ministers held a position in the party's national executive bodies, while the second one indicates whether they were leaders of local party organisations. We also compare the party offices held by ministers at the moment of appointment with the party roles they played at the end of tenure in each of the three countries under study. Similarly to the assessment of parliamentary and local administration experience,

the cross-country analysis does not take into account the ministers' positions in the party hierarchy prior to the moment of appointment.

Other control variables

Large-n studies of ministerial turnover have also considered the impact of cabinet-related characteristics on ministerial durability (Budge & Keman, 1990; Budge, 1985; Dewan & Myatt, 2010; Dowding & Dumont, 2009b; Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Quiroz Flores, 2009). While there is little doubt that the ministers' survival in office depends to a certain extent on government and coalition attributes, the small-n research design adopted in this study and the limited period of time covered by this analysis has not generated sufficient variation in these explanatory variables. As a result, they have not been included in the statistical tests of ministerial turnover.

One of the explanatory factors included in the country studies takes into account the formal link of delegation between parliaments and cabinets and controls for the impact of parliamentary control on the risk of deselection. However, while an indicator of parliamentary control on individual ministers has been identified in each country, there is significant variation in the type of parliamentary pressure that ministers experience in each case. Romanian MPs can table simple motions against individual ministers and may recommend their removal from the cabinet. These recommendations are, however, not binding for the government. Although Portuguese MPs cannot vote on individual motions of no-confidence, they can request ministers to attend urgency debates when they wish to discuss unexpected polemical issues and to put pressure on the government. French MPs can neither vote on individual no-confidence motions nor request individual ministers to take part in special debates. However, the roll-call records of the French National Assembly can be used to identify policy disagreements between cabinet members and parliamentary majorities by analysing the abstentions and the votes cast against ministerial bills. Each of these indicators of parliamentary control is included in the country-based analyses to test the impact of parliamentary pressure on the risk of losing office. However, since each form of parliamentary pressure relies on a different aspect of the relationship between parliaments and cabinets, their impact on ministerial careers cannot be compared across countries.

Ministers do not experience the same range of events during their time in office in the three countries. For example, while Portuguese ministers must step down if they want to compete in local elections, the French and the Romanian ministers are not

required to do so. In practice, though, Romanian ministers are expected to resign before engaging in electoral campaigns. As a result, we only analyse the impact of defeats in local elections on the risk of losing office in France. Additionally, although there is no legal or party ban on the mobility of Portuguese ministers in the party hierarchy while they are in office, in practice no cabinet member has been demoted or promoted in the party hierarchy during the time period under study. Consequently, we only verify whether promotions in the party hierarchy are used as compensatory moves for ministerial deselection in France and in Romania.

As emphasised in Chapter 1, cabinet reshuffles sometimes play a demotion role and can be used by prime ministers as a way of dealing with incompetent or hostile ministers (Brazier, 1997, p. 281; Thompson & Tillotsen, 1999, p. 57). This study takes into consideration the demotion function of cabinet reshuffles and controls whether shifts in individual portfolios are associated with shorter lengths of tenure.

The literature on ministerial turnover has also shown that ministerial resignations have a corrective effect on government popularity (Dewan & Dowding, 2005, p. 46). Taking into account the frequency of strikes and protests triggered by the introduction of new policies and reforms and the fall in government popularity they may cause, it is worth testing if social unrest jeopardises the ministers' survival in office. For this reason, a variable that measures the level of social unrest generated by specific reforms and policies that can be associated with individual ministers is incorporated in the analysis.

3.7 Conclusion

This thesis adopts a comparative approach to test the principal-agent model of ministerial deselection. The three countries where this theory is comparatively tested have been selected according to the principles of the most similar research design. France, Portugal, and Romania share the similar institutional framework, which subordinates ministers to presidents, prime ministers and political parties. Since we expect that party relationships and political institutions affect the principals' ability to fire ministers, these countries and the period under analysis have been selected based on the variation they present in the main independent variables.

The investigation of the theoretical argument at both case-study level and across countries combines the advantages of case-oriented and variable-oriented research strategies and allows us to test a parsimonious explanation of ministerial turnover in

different national contexts. Additionally, this research design allows alternative explanations of this process to emerge in different national settings. Since both research strategies are guided by the principal-agent theory, we can test whether the causal relationships are replicated both at case study level and across cases.

The country-based investigations of the theoretical argument and the multivariate analyses are fully integrated. The data used in both types of analysis are generated qualitatively through an in-depth analysis of newspaper content. However, the use of such a labour-intensive method of data collection has involved a trade-off between the breadth and the scope of the quantitative analysis. While the qualitative method of data collection allows us to test the theoretical argument using quantitative methods of analysis in a way that is consistent with the political context, the cross-country analysis is limited to the three countries selected for the small-n comparison. Nevertheless, the qualitative and quantitative analyses carried out in the country studies add to our understanding of ministerial careers in national contexts and deepen the multivariate analysis. When conducted at the country-level, the quantitative analyses take into account political factors that are specific to each national context. The case studies are also accompanied by short narratives of ministerial termination events and descriptions of intraparty politics in each country, which back up the adequate use of the principal-agent model to study this topic outside of the statistical models. The fact that the theoretical argument is validated by the cross-country analysis which excludes country-specific factors is a strong indicator for the external validity of this research.

Based on the variation in the independent variables described above we can hypothesise their impact on the length of ministerial tenure. Overall, we do not expect fixed characteristics to emerge as a strong explanatory factor for the variation in the length of ministerial tenure. We believe it is unlikely that fixed characteristics at any moment in a minister's career can explain a dynamic phenomenon like survival in a particular office, which depends primarily on what ministers do while they hold that office. However, due to the importance attached to individual characteristics in the literature of ministerial turnover it is necessary to control for fixed characteristics that might provide an alternative explanation regarding the variation in ministerial tenure.

The main expectation of this study is that the accumulation of conflicts between ministers, presidents, prime ministers and parties is a proxy for agency loss that each principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to fire agents, then they should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with their agents increases. If

the ministers' risk of losing office does not increase in the presence of conflicts with principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the ability to sanction agency loss. The principals' control over cabinet composition is estimated as a function of executive scenarios and party relationships. Overall, we expect that the principals' ability to sanction agency loss increases when they are perceived as *de facto* party leaders, but only under certain circumstances.

Chapter Four: Ministerial deselection in France

The British doctrine of collective ministerial responsibility has been adapted to the French context by Jean-Pierre Chevènement, who stepped down as Minister of Research and Industry in 1983 to protest against the economic change of course undertaken by François Mitterrand saying that “A minister has to keep his mouth shut. If he wants to open it, he has to resign” (Courtois, 2000). Jean-Pierre Chevènement followed this rule in two more occasions – first in 1991, when he walked out of the Ministry of Defence in protest against the French engagement in the Gulf War; and again in 2000, when he stepped down as Minister of Interior in disagreement with Lionel Jospin’s autonomy plan for Corsica. However, Chevènement’s example was not followed by his colleagues in Lionel Jospin’s government. For example, Dominique Voynet, the Green party’s minister for environment, and Marie-George Buffet, the Communist party’s minister for youth and sports, sided with unemployment movements against the policies put forward by one of their cabinet colleagues and protested against the government’s policy for the regularization of illegal immigrants. However, neither of them resigned over their publicly assumed differences with their government’s policies, nor were they asked to do so by Lionel Jospin as a result of breaching the rule of collective responsibility. What may explain then the different courses of action taken by cabinet ministers under similar political circumstances?

This chapter uses a principal-agent approach to capture variation in the tenure of French ministers. Within this theoretical framework, ministers are conceptualised as subordinates to principals in the government and party hierarchy. As a result, the ministers’ survival in office depends on the kind of relationships they establish with each of the principals and on the ability of principals to use career-control powers to sanction agency loss. Thus, although the political context surrounding the resignation of Jean-Pierre Chevènement and the non-resignations of Dominique Voynet and Marie-George Buffet may seem identical at first sight, they are quite different from a principal-agent perspective. While the minister of interior disagreed with the prime minister, the latter two ministers clashed with cabinet colleagues on an equal standing.

This chapter is organised into four parts. The first section outlines the data, the time period, the institutional context, and the determinants of ministerial duration that

are captured by the analysis of French ministers. The second section focuses on intraparty politics and examines the organisational transformation undergone by the Gaullist and Socialist parties during the time period under analysis. This analysis highlights how and to what extent holding the presidency of a political party before taking office allows presidents and prime ministers to keep on playing a *de facto* party leadership role after they formally step down as party leaders. The third section describes the data collected for the France case study and explains the measurement of fixed characteristics and events in this context. The last section of this chapter completes the study of ministerial turnover in France with a multivariate analysis that estimates the length of ministerial tenure as function of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent relationships between cabinet members, presidents, prime ministers, and party principals.

4.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in the France

France is a good case for the study of principal-agent relationships and their impact on the ministers' length of tenure due to the variation in institutional context according to whether the president and the prime minister are from the same party and whether the president's party is in government. For a direct comparison of ministerial survival under different political circumstances the analysis focuses on the length of ministerial tenure during the most recent periods of cohabitation and unified executive. The most recent cohabitation occurred between 1997 and 2002, when the Gaullist President Jacques Chirac and the Socialist PM Lionel Jospin shared executive power. The most recently completed period of unified executive took place between 2007 and 2012, when President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed François Fillon of the UMP as prime minister. The data set includes all ministers of state, the most senior members in any given cabinet, ministers and delegated ministers who served in the two governments. State secretaries have been excluded from the analysis due to their direct subordination to cabinet, which rules out their accountability to multiple principals. As opposed to state secretaries, delegated ministers participate in cabinet meetings and report to the prime minister. Overall, the France data set covers 75 ministers.

While the units of observation in the data set are the 75 ministers, the units of analysis are the events experienced by ministers while in office. Overall, 2,815 observations related to the events experienced by ministers were recorded from 23,060 articles published in *Le Figaro* during the time period under analysis. The articles were

accessed through LexisNexis. They were selected using 24 keywords related to major events, such as resignations, dismissals and reshuffles, and to conflictual situations involving scandals, ministerial responsibility, disagreements, ministerial performance and errors, protests and strikes. Each observation includes the type of event recorded, the political actors involved, and the reasons that caused it. The events experienced by ministers may be terminal, such as resignation and dismissals, or non-terminal. The key non-terminal events that are analysed in order to explain the variation in the ministers' length of tenure are resignation calls, as a measure of ministerial performance, and conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals, as a measure of principal-agent relationships. Other non-terminal events taken into account are reshuffles, electoral defeats, promotions and demotions in the party hierarchy, policy disagreements between ministers and majority deputies, and national-level strikes and protests related to specific ministerial jurisdictions. The proximate reasons used for coding the events range from policy disagreements, personal or departmental errors, personal or financial scandals, political and electoral performance, appointments outside cabinet, intra-cabinet and intra-party conflicts to non-political reasons.

According to the theoretical framework put forward in Chapter 2, the principals' ability to influence the deselection of ministers is expected to depend on their relationship with parliamentary majorities. As a result, the extent of presidential and prime ministerial influence over the cabinet should depend on whether the president's party is in government, during periods of unified and divided executive, or in opposition, during periods of cohabitation. Due to the process of presidentialisation undergone by French political parties following the introduction of the directly-elected presidency in 1962 (Clift, 2003, 2005; Knapp, 2004; Samuels & Shugart, 2010) presidents are expected to reverse the principal-agent relationship with their parties during periods of unified executive (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). However, ministerial autonomy from party decisions is expected to decrease during periods of cohabitation, when presidents have no political authority over the parliamentary majority. According to Thiébault (1994, pp. 141–142), it is under these circumstances that party leaders are more likely to be involved in the conduct of executive politics, either directly by joining the cabinet or indirectly by monitoring their ministers closely. Consequently, the president's influence over cabinet composition is expected to increase during periods of unified executive, while the prime minister's control over cabinet members is expected to increase under cohabitation.

Regardless of the institutional context in which conflicts occur, the ministers' risk of being fired should increase when they clash with principals who are perceived as *de facto* party leaders. The relationship between leadership in the party and in the government was singled out by William Schonfeld (1983), who argued that membership in the party elite shapes and forms the behaviour of national leaders. As a training-ground for governmental positions, political parties transfer the patterns of behaviour and interaction established between the members of their elite to the national level when they gain control over the government. Thus, given the recruitment of governmental leaders from party elites, it is reasonable to expect a certain continuity in their behaviour since working relations are not likely to change just because the context of the interaction changes (Schonfeld, 1983, pp. 495–496). This is a plausible explanation for the ongoing authority of presidents and prime ministers over their parties even when they are formally required to step down as party leaders. Schonfeld's expectation is confirmed by Duverger's observation that the variation in presidential influence in the Fifth Republic has been caused more often by intraparty factors than by institutional ones (Duverger, 1996, p. 542). Similarly, Samuels and Shugart (2010) argue that the presidents' ability to control executive politics in some premier-presidential systems, where they lack formal powers to do so, is explained by their ability to maintain *de facto* control over political parties even when they formally step down as party leaders.

Notwithstanding its ability to account for the discrepancy between the range of formal prerogatives enjoyed by some political actors and their actual influence over the political system, the informal nature of *de facto* leadership makes it difficult to measure. Little is known about the circumstances that allow presidents and prime ministers to continue playing the role of party leaders after they step down from party office, or for how long they can rely on this resource. To understand the relationship between parties and their agents in government we can analyse the organisational way in which parties deal with the dilemma of restoring their internal leadership when their leaders take national office. This approach has its limitations. As pointed out by Panebianco (1988, p.35), party statutes do not reveal more about how political parties work than written constitutions do about the operation of political systems. However, the adjustment of party statutes as a result of leadership transfers may indicate the type of hierarchical relationship that parties aim to establish with their agents. The second section of this chapter focuses on the changes introduced in the organisation of the Gaullist and Socialist parties following the inauguration of their leaders as presidents and prime

ministers during the time period under study. This analysis emphasises the formal and informal means that presidents and prime ministers can use to continue in their role as *de facto* party leaders after they formally give up their party responsibilities.

The analysis of ministerial turnover also accounts for the impact of fixed characteristics on the length of tenure. The analysis takes into account standard measures of ministerial recruitment, such as prior appointments to government, parliamentary background, as well as experience in local administration and in party organisations. Additionally, particular attention is given in the French context to the simultaneous holding of multiple elective offices at national and local level, which is widespread among both members of the parliament and cabinet ministers.

The *cumul des mandats* is often regarded as the defining feature of French politicians (Dewoghélaère, Berton, & Navarro, 2006; Mény, 2008). The generalisation of this practice in France has been put down to the past centralisation and territorial organisation of the French state, to the electoral rules used in local elections, to the weakness of party organisations, and ultimately to the absence of a legal ban on holding more than one elective mandate, as is the case for example in Portugal and Romania, as well as in Ireland, Belgium or Luxembourg (Decamp, 1995; Dogan, 1967; François, 2006; Knapp, 2004; Mabileau, 1995; Olivier, 1998; Sadran, 2000). However, the absence of legal interdictions in other European democracies, such as Spain, Germany, Denmark, or Norway has not led to similar levels of multiple-office holding (Bach, 2012; Decamp, 1995; Sadran, 2000). According to Knapp (2004), the strong centralisation of the French state and weakness of political parties explains why directly elected local government institutions came to be regarded as the only legitimate intermediaries between citizens and central authority. The levels and numbers of local institutions exploded under the Third Republic. Even nowadays France has over 36,550 communes that elect a mayor and a council. Nevertheless, despite the increase of power granted to municipalities and the introduction of the one-person, one-vote method for the election of municipal councils and mayors under the Third Republic, the practice of simultaneously holding national and local offices is a rather recent phenomenon. As shown by Bach (2012, pp. 27–29), the percentage of French deputies who were also mayors or departmental councillors decreased by 40 per cent and 25 per cent respectively between the Third and the Fourth Republic. However, the number of deputies holding a mayor or another local position doubled in the early days of the Fifth Republic and rose above 80 per cent in the early 1990s, before it went down again to 70

per cent during the 2000s (Bach, 2012, p. 30). This rising trend indicates that the causes of multiple-office holding have more to do with the institutional configuration of the Fifth Republic, than with the Napoleonic system of territorial organisation. According to Mabileau (1995, p. 10) the personalisation of local powers was also the consequence of using direct elections for the election of both presidents and mayors, which established a sort of constitutional mimicry between the two positions.

Paradoxically, the attempt to limit this practice by law made it even more systematic. The legal ban introduced in 1985 and reinforced in 2000 on holding more than one elective mandate in addition to that of a deputy or senator⁴ has not only strengthened the practice of multiple-office holding (Olivier, 1998) but also stimulated politicians to seek an optimal configuration of the multiple offices allowed by law (Sadran, 2000, p. 93). This development singled out the importance of holding a mayoral position for the advancement of political careers at national level. For example, while French deputies have always tended to combine the positions of departmental or regional councillors and mayors, the restriction in the number of offices that can be legally held simultaneously has resulted in an increase in the number of parliamentarians who gave up any additional mandate in order to keep the mayor position. As a result, the most common combination of offices in the National Assembly became the *député-maire* (Nakano, 2000; Sadran, 2000). According to Dewoghélaère et al. (2006), in 2006 almost 90 per cent of all French deputies held one or more additional elective offices and 50 per cent of them were mayors.

The opportunity of combining national and local elective offices has important consequences for the range of political resources that are available to cabinet ministers. Notwithstanding the constitutional ban on the simultaneous holding of cabinet and parliamentary seats and despite a certain tendency in the early days of the Fifth Republic to recruit ministers from among top civil servants, the National Assembly remains the most common pool for ministerial selection (Berstein, 1986; O. Costa & Kerrouche, 2009; Dogan, 1986). While ministers must choose between the cabinet seat and the legislative mandate, the only local office they can be legally asked to give up is the presidency of the regional council of the Île-de-France (Carcassonne, 2011, pp. 133–134). An inquiry carried out in 1997 showed that 25 per cent of the city mayors who

⁴Pursuant to the LO 2000-294 of April 5, 2000, a parliamentary mandate is incompatible with holding more than one of the following offices: regional councillor, councillor to the Corsican Assembly, departmental councillor, councillor of Paris, municipal councillor of a commune with more than 3,500 inhabitants (Avril & Gicquel, 2010).

were in office at that time had held executive responsibility as ministers or state secretaries, while three of them had also been prime ministers (Sadran, 2000, p. 97).

The combination of national and local executive offices as well as the possibility of holding party leadership positions adds another layer of complexity to a minister's relationship with his or her three principals, presidents, prime ministers and parties. Bach (2012, p. 17) notes that the selection of cabinet members is often based on the range of political resources displayed by various candidates to ministerial portfolios. It is therefore reasonable to assume that ministers who are direct representatives of local strongholds have a better chance of survival in office. Due to the weak organisation of political parties, the deselection of ministers with a strong electoral base is not likely to be easily accepted by party principals. The importance of local offices for the advancement of ministerial careers is also emphasised by the ministers' involvement in second-order elections during their time in office, as French ministers do not have a legal obligation to resign before they can engage in electoral contests. Moreover, presidents and prime ministers may encourage or prevent ministers from running in local elections (Bach, 2012, p. 17). In this case, electoral victories and defeats may have direct consequences for the length of ministerial tenure. For this reason, compared with the Portuguese and the Romanian cases, where the analysis must be limited to prior local government experience, the analysis of French ministers also considers the impact of incumbency in local office and of electoral performance in second order-elections, such as municipal and regional contests. The absence of a party ban on holding party leadership positions while in office allows a similar test of the impact of promotions and demotions in the party hierarchy on the length of ministerial tenure. To sum up, the range of political resources covered in the third section of this chapter captures the traditional career-path of French political elites, which is usually characterised by the pursuit of a national mandate, the implantation in a local stronghold, and involvement in a party organisation (Sadran, 2000, p. 99).

The last section of the chapter analyses the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of fixed characteristics, events experienced by ministers while in office, and principal-agent relationships. We also verify to what extent the principals' influence on the process of ministerial deselection depends on institutional context. To do so their ability to sanction agency loss is estimated separately during periods of unified executive and cohabitation. The multivariate analysis emphasises that the ministers' personal background at the moment of appointment does not explain why

some ministers survive in office longer than others. Conversely, we obtain strong evidence that, depending on institutional context, some principal-agent relationships are more likely to influence the ministers' durability in office than others. Specifically, the analysis shows that conflicts with presidents and party principals increase the risk of losing office during periods of unified executive, while conflicts with prime ministers pose a high risk of deselection under cohabitation.

4.2 Party relationships in the French executive

This section focuses on intraparty politics and examines the organisational transformation undergone by the Socialist and the Gaullist parties during the time period under analysis. This analysis highlights the interdependence between changes in a political actor's ability to control the party and her authority over the cabinet. The analysis focuses on adjustments of party presidencies, leadership structures, and voting methods used for intraparty elections. For example, the suspension of the party president position or its temporary replacement with a collegial structure of leadership for as long as former party leaders assume the presidency of the country or the prime ministership indicates that presidents and prime ministers are allowed to continue in their role as *de facto* party leaders. Similarly, if new electoral rules are adopted for the election of party executive bodies, then it is also possible to determine their impact on the principal-agent relationship between former leaders and their parties depending on whether they are meant to increase or to reduce intraparty democracy. The two intraparty sources of variation in the principal-agent relationship between presidents, prime ministers and their parties are used in the comparative analysis of the leadership recruitment procedures employed by the Gaullist and the Socialist parties in the aftermath of the 1995, 1997, and 2007 elections.

The president-party relationship in the RPR (1995-2002)

Between 1995 and 2002 the RPR organised internal elections for the selection of its national leaders on four different occasions. Following his election as President of France in 1995, Chirac nominated Alain Juppé, one of his closest collaborators, for the presidency of the RPR and appointed him as prime minister. Juppé, who had assumed the caretaker presidency of the party in November 1994, was formally elected as party president by the RPR's executive body in October 1995. Chirac's ability to impose his

own choice not only in government but also as his successor in the party, despite Juppé's unpopularity and against the Gaullist barons' concern regarding the simultaneous holding of government and party offices, suggests a strong presidential grip on the RPR between 1995 and 1997 (Bell, 2000; Clift, 2005; Knapp, 1999).

Juppé's premiership (1995-1997) is a good example of the impact that the indiscipline of majority backbenchers can have on the president's influence even during a period of unified executive. Although Chirac's decision to dissolve the Assembly in 1997 confirmed his institutional ascendancy over the Right (Portelli, 1999, p. 63), the RPR's defeat in the ensuing elections exhausted his authority over the party. His loss of control was confirmed by Alain Juppé's immediate replacement as party leader with Philippe Séguin at a special conference convened in July 1997. One year later, Séguin initiated and carried out a statutory reform widening the election of the party president to all party members. The establishment of a democratic chain of delegation from party members to national leaders should strengthen the party principal's authority over its agents in governmental office. However, the increase in the Gaullist party's internal democracy was motivated by factional infighting and was aimed at legitimising the new leadership at the expense of the old one (Clift, 2005, p. 228; Knapp, 2004, p. 265). Ultimately, Séguin's confirmation as party leader by a "Soviet-style 95 per cent of the vote" (Knapp, 1999, p. 138) was not enough to prevent the RPR's further fragmentation and his own resignation after only six months in office.

The election of the next leader of the Gaullist party in 1999 marked the final turning point in the party-president relation before the 2002 presidential elections. The key moment in the party leadership race was Nicolas Sarkozy's decision not to enter the competition. Although he did not doubt his chances of winning the party race, Sarkozy was unwilling to assume this position as long as Chirac remained the party's best option for the next presidential elections (Sarkozy, 2001, pp. 57–58). However, the 1999 party contest did not turn into a one-horse race as a result of Sarkozy's pulling out (Knapp, 2004, p. 266). In the first round, the party members rejected the candidate supported by Jacques Chirac, the RPR senator Jean-Paul Delevoye. Although it looked like the incumbent president could no longer aspire to simply delegate the party leadership position to one of his supporters, Michèle Alliot-Marie, the candidate who won 63 per cent of the vote in the run-off, fell in line behind him and designated Chirac as the RPR's *présidentiable* in the 2002 elections soon after her election.

Despite the Gaullist party's embrace of his presidential candidacy, Chirac was aware that the formal support of the RPR could no longer work as a powerful resource of political influence. To widen his base of support Chirac decided to pursue the unification of the entire Right into a single party (Chirac & Barré, 2011, pp. 267–272). The main organisational task was delegated to Jérôme Monod, a former RPR general-secretary and Chirac's lasting political advisor, who had also been instrumental in the setting up of the RPR during the 1970s as a vehicle for Jacques Chirac's personal pursuit of power. The unification project of the Gaullist, centrist and liberal families proceeded with the set up of the Alternance 2002 association during 2000-2001, the creation of the Union en Mouvement in April 2001 as an electoral coalition, and the official founding of the Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle (UMP) as a political party in April 2002, renamed as Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP) in November 2002. The election of the first UMP leader with almost 80 per cent of the votes cast by party members at the 2002 founding congress did not weaken the tacit understanding that the UMP was a party created for the support and under the command of the head of state (Fillon, 2006, p. 19).

To sum up, the different rules adopted for the election of the Gaullist party's leadership between 1995 and 2002 illustrate the variation in Jacques Chirac's authority over his party. His ability to install a self-designated successor as president of the RPR, coupled with the absence of any organisational changes at the national leadership level between 1995 and 1997 indicate his ongoing authority over the party during this period of time. However, his marginalisation in the party following the onset of cohabitation in 1997 and the introduction of direct internal elections for the position of the party presidency in 1998 suggest that Chirac's authority over the RPR decreased significantly between 1997 and 1999. Between 1999 and 2002, though, he was able to turn the increase in intraparty democracy to his own advantage and regain control over his former party. The variation in the principal-agent relationship established between the head of state and the RPR suggests that presidents go to great lengths to safeguard a *de facto* leadership of their party even during periods of cohabitation and even when their grip on the party loosens after elections.

The president-party relationship in the UMP (2007-2012)

Compared to Jacques Chirac's relationship with the Gaullist party from 1995-2002, Nicolas Sarkozy's ongoing authority as a *de facto* party leader following his election as President of France in 2007 comes across much more clearly. Even before taking office in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Fillon displayed their agreement about the *de facto* leadership of the head of state in two programmatic books they published in 2006 (Fillon, 2006; Sarkozy, 2006). Speaking at the UMP convention on the institutions of the Fifth Republic on April 5, 2006, Sarkozy also pleaded for the acknowledgement of the presidential style of government as the French executive's *modus operandi*, despite the leadership role conferred to the prime minister in the constitution. As a result, following Sarkozy's accession to the presidency and Fillon's appointment as prime minister, there was no confusion about the head of state's authority over the government and the majority party (Copé, 2009, pp. 178–180).

Just as he assumed openly his intention to take control over the government, Nicolas Sarkozy also institutionalised the abandonment of the Gaullist doctrine of the presidency above parties. Elected as party president with 85 per cent of the votes expressed by the UMP members in November 2004 and designated as the party's candidate by over 97 per cent of the members who participated to a primary-like campaign organised in January 2007, Sarkozy was determined not to allow the majority party overshadow his authority. To do so, he demanded a revision of the party statutes and obtained the replacement of the party president position with an unelected collegial leadership in charge of the daily management of the party. In exchange for giving up the power to elect their president, UMP members were guaranteed a say in the selection of their party's candidate before the 2012 elections. The statutory reform was first approved by a large majority of the national council on July 7, 2007 and endorsed by the UMP voters through electronic voting. Thus, not only did Nicolas Sarkozy manage to suspend the practice of direct internal elections for the party president, but he also had his *de facto* leadership formally acknowledged in the revised statutes of the UMP.

The democratic deficit displayed by the reorganisation of the UMP party in 2007 raised hardly any opposition. No concerns about the eradication of the democratically elected presidency of the party were even voiced until the majority party was defeated

in the 2008 municipal elections⁵. Following this electoral defeat, Sarkozy carried out a minor reshuffle of executive responsibilities by appointing several ministers and presidents of parliamentary commissions in the UMP's executive bodies (Waintraub, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e). At the same time he also strengthened his influence over the parliamentary majority by organising informal meetings not only with the UMP leaders and the leaders of the majority parties, but also with cabinet ministers in the absence of the prime minister (Bouilhaguet, 2009; Jaigu, 2008b; Waintraub, 2008b, 2008g).

The first official reorganisation and redistribution of party leadership roles in the UMP took place in January 2009. On this occasion, Patrick Devedjian, the increasingly unpopular secretary-general, swapped places in government with Xavier Bertrand, a minister of Labour in François Fillon's cabinet who had been defeated in two consecutive local elections. The new appointments and redistribution of roles operated by Sarkozy in the UMP's first and second-order leadership structures raised hardly any internal debates⁶. By comparison, Sarkozy's freedom of manoeuvre in the second reorganisation of the party leadership was considerably more limited. As a matter of fact, Jean-François Copé, the leader of the UMP group in the National Assembly, launched a party leadership bid following Nicolas Sarkozy's announcement that a second party reorganisation would take place before the end of 2010 (Huet, Jeudy, & Jaigu, 2010). However, despite his ongoing rivalry with Sarkozy and although he did not refrain from calling publicly for the reorganisation of the party (Copé, Baroin, Jacob, & Le Maire, 2010), Copé did not demand an increase in the party's internal democracy or a reversion to the direct election of the secretary-general by the party members⁷. Under clear pressure to appoint one of his main rivals in the party as the next secretary-general (Garat & Waintraub, 2010b, 2010c), Sarkozy eventually agreed to hand the party over to Jean-François Copé. He nevertheless made clear that any other appointments would be made at or in agreement with the Élysée (Garat & Waintraub, 2010a, 2010b; Waintraub, 2010b).

In conclusion, the analysis of the president-party relationship in the case of the UMP provides strong evidence that the position held by presidents in the party

⁵ See for example the concerns raised by Christian Estrosi, one of the few ministers who managed to win a mayorship in the 2008 elections (Jaigu, 2008a; Jeudy & Waintraub, 2008; Jeudy, 2008a; Waintraub, 2008a).

⁶ Several examples of public endorsements of Sarkozy's legitimacy to change the composition and political hierarchies in the UMP executive bodies can be found in (Garat & Waintraub, 2008; Garat, 2008; Geisler & Garat, 2008; Huet et al., 2010; Jeudy, 2008a, 2008b; Waintraub, 2008h, 2008i, 2008j, 2008a, 2008e, 2008f, 2008g)

⁷ For a couple of exceptions to this rule see (Hamladji & Goulliaud, 2010; Waintraub, 2010a).

hierarchy before taking office strengthens their authority over the cabinet. The institutionalisation of Nicolas Sarkozy's power over the majority party through the party statutes provides strong evidence for his ability to reverse the principal-agent relationship between the party's representatives in government and turn the prime minister and cabinet members into his own agents.

The PM-party relationship in the PS (1995-2002)

Lionel Jospin emerged as an undisputed leader of the Socialist party following his unexpectedly successful performance in the 1995 elections, when he was narrowly defeated by Chirac in the run-off but managed to draw the largest number of first-round votes. Jospin also increased the Socialist party's internal democracy by forcing the party leadership to open up the selection of presidential candidates to party members in 1995. He not only won more than two-thirds of the votes cast in the first primary elections organised by the PS in 1995, but also defeated the party leader, Henri Emmanuelli. Subsequently he also insisted on the adoption of the one-member, one-vote method for intraparty elections. His election as party leader with over 94 per cent of the party members' vote in 1995 conferred him an ascendancy over the party that none of his predecessors had enjoyed since he had left the leadership in 1988.

Lionel Jospin owed his sudden rise in the party hierarchy in 1995 to the rank-and-file. Had he taken the standard route of advancement on the party ladder, his bid for the party presidency would have been most likely unsuccessful. The composition of the Socialist party's national council and of the executive bureau is decided by proportional representation according to the votes party members cast on the motions submitted by the party *courants*. However, for the election of the first secretary a majority of votes in the executive bureau is required. This leadership structure has been defined as "presidentialised factionalism", as each *courant* is led by a *présidentiable* and the intra-party factionalism revolves around the presidential nomination (Bell & Criddle, 1994; Haegel, 1998). Lionel Jospin was not in a position to win the support of any *courant* in 1995, as he had been marginalised in the party after losing both his cabinet portfolio and his parliamentary seat between 1992 and 1993. Thus, the increase in the Socialist party's internal democracy was Jospin's only chance to win the party leadership without having to negotiate with the *courants* (Allègre, 2000; Vaillant, 2001). As party leader, though, Jospin did not try to strengthen his own faction. The composition of his national secretariat exposed his commitment to include all party factions in the decision-making

system (Le Monde, 1995; Noblecourt, 1995a, 1995b). According to his closest collaborators, he also chose François Hollande to succeed him as first secretary in 1997 due to his lack of involvement in factional infighting and his lack of interest in becoming a *chef de courant* (Allègre, 2000; Vaillant, 2001). Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude whether Jospin led the PS from a position of authority or whether he was more concerned with circumventing and neutralising the competing factions.

Jospin's resignation as party leader before taking office as prime minister, a decision that emulated François Mitterrand's determination to separate national and party office following his election as head of state in 1981 (Jospin, 2010, p. 88), reveals his intention to establish a president-type relation with the majority party (Clift, 2003, p. 102). As prime minister, Jospin aimed to come across as a head of government free from both party and coalition constraints (Jospin, 2010, p. 229). Although he was recognised as the uncontested leader of the parliamentary majority and unifier of the Left (Cole, 1999, p. 83; Gaffney, 2002, p. 315; Glavany, 2001, p. 45; Voynet, 2003, p. 63), Jospin insisted on presenting himself as the head of government, rather than as the *chef de la majorité* (Hollande, 2009, p. 90; Schrameck, 2001, p. 33; Vaillant, 2001, p. 180). The distance he had taken from the parties of the majority at the beginning of his term widened as the 2002 elections approached. For example, Jospin would not coordinate with his coalition partners before announcing highly divisive decisions, such as the reform of the presidential term and the reversal of the election calendar. The relationship between the prime minister and the PS first secretary also came under particular strain when Jospin refused to consider Hollande's proposals for a strategic cabinet reshuffle in 2000. Shortly before the elections Jospin moved even further away from his party in an attempt to appeal to a broader range of voters. As a result he refused to involve the first secretary of the PS in his campaign, made a public statement that he was not running on a Socialist program, and encouraged Socialist mayors to endorse rival candidacies on the left (Hollande, 2009, pp. 185–191).

Although Lionel Jospin resigned as party leader before taking office as prime minister, he continued to act as a *de facto* leader of the majority party. The Socialist party consented to Jospin's choice of his own successor, re-elected him twice during his prime ministership and did not attempt to change the leadership structure or the rules of leadership selection. While Jospin's rise to the party presidency in 1995 due to popular support as well as his decision to step down as party leader and to keep the new

leadership at a distance may indicate his disaffection with the party, there can be hardly any doubt that his ability to maintain a strong grip over cabinet members was rooted in his unquestioned authority over the majority party.

4.3 The data set on French ministers

This section begins by describing the variables included in the France data set and the distribution of data according to the cabinets included in the analysis. Subsequently we discuss the measurement of fixed characteristics and events experienced by ministers according to the cabinets in which they served and with respect to survival. This analysis is structured along four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are common to the country-studies included in the present work, such as prior appointments to government, parliamentary background, as well as experience in local administration and in party organisations.

The France data set covers 75 ministers. 32 of them served in Lionel Jospin's government and 43 in François Fillon's cabinet. Over the time period under analysis there have been four state ministers, 54 cabinet ministers and 17 delegated ministers. The data set contains 29 individual termination events. The fixed characteristics included in the analysis indicate the ministers' prior appointments to government, their legislative experience and incumbency or past experience in local administration, and their involvement in party organisations at national and local level. Table 4.1 provides definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers.

Table 4.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (France)

Variable	Definition	Mean
Executive experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who had previously held full cabinet positions.	0.39
MP/SEN	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who won a seat in last general elections.	0.73
Parliamentary experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who have won at least 2 parliamentary mandates during their career.	0.61
Mayor	Dummy variables equal to one for ministers who are mayors.	0.48
Local administration experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who have held a position in local administration during their career (local or regional councillors, mayors, and presidents of general or regional	0.84

Party executives	councils). Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are members in their parties' national executive bodies.	0.25
------------------	--	------

The main events variables included in the France data set record disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties and resignation calls. Apart from testing the impact of conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers on the risk of deselection, we also consider the interaction between ministers and parliamentary majorities due to the formal delegation link between parliaments and cabinets. To test the expectation that the autonomy of French ministers is not constrained by the threat of legislative sanctions (Thiébaud, 1994, p. 140), the analysis controls for the impact of policy disagreements between ministers and majority deputies using records of votes against and abstentions on ministerial bills. Another control variable takes into account the impact of individual shifts from one portfolio to another on the length of ministerial tenure.

The weight of political experience on ministerial durability is not only captured by fixed characteristics at the moment of appointment, but also monitored during the ministers' time in office. Two control variables verify whether defeats in local elections increase the risk of losing office and if promotions in the party hierarchy are used as compensatory moves for ministerial deselection.

The literature on ministerial turnover has also shown that ministerial resignations have a corrective effect on government popularity (Dewan & Dowding, 2005, p. 46). Taking into account the frequency of strikes and protests triggered by the introduction of new policies and reforms in France and the fall in government popularity they may cause, it is worth testing if social unrest jeopardises the ministers' survival in office. For this reason, a variable that measures the level of social unrest generated by specific reforms and policies that can be associated with individual ministers is incorporated in the analysis. Table 4.2 provides definitions for the events variables and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers.

Table 4.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (France)

Variable	Definition	Mean	St. dev.	Range
Tenure	The length of ministerial tenure is measured in days.	759.55	504.49	(32, 1816)
PR Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and presidents.	1.69	2.55	(0, 11)
PM Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and prime ministers.	1.47	2.24	(0, 14)
PARTY Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and parties.	2.96	4.04	(0, 18)
Resignation calls	Number of times ministers have been asked to resign.	1.13	2.40	(0, 13)
Reshuffles	Number of times ministers have been reshuffled during current mandate.	0.51	0.92	(0, 4)
Local elections lost	Number of defeats in local elections during current mandate.	0.29	0.51	(0, 2)
Party promotions	Number of promotions in the party hierarchy during current mandate. Includes elections and re-elections as party leaders or presidents of local party organisations as well as promotions in national executive bodies.	0.28	0.67	(0, 3)
Legislative defeats	Policy disagreements between ministers and parliamentary majorities. Votes against/abstentions from party and/or coalition deputies on the minister's bills.	3.85	6.72	(0, 27)
Protests	Number of national-level strikes and protests organised during current term.	12.04	17.61	(0, 80)

*Source: Obtained from the roll-call records of the votes cast in the *scrutins solennels* organised in the French National Assembly for the adoption of government bills. The roll calls are published in the *Journal officiel* and list the names and votes cast by deputies.

Table 4.3 provides summary statistics for personal characteristics and events across and within the government in which the ministers served. The two governments operated under different executive scenarios and lasted an equal period of time. Thus, the chance of observing ministerial deselections under each scenario should be similar and independent of the presence of exogenous shocks. However, if the occurrence of unified executive and cohabitation makes a difference for the dismissal powers of presidents, prime ministers and party principals, then the impact of principal-agent relationships on the risk of deselection should be different under the two scenarios.

Table 4.3 Average fixed characteristics and events across cabinets (France)

Variables	Jospin (Cohabitation)		Fillon (Unified executive)		Overall	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
N. Ministers		32		43		75
N. Failures		10		19		29
Length of tenure (days)	1059.69	566.91	790.14	446.68	905.15	515.65
<i>Fixed characteristics</i>						
Cabinet experience	0.38	0.49	0.40	0.49	0.39	0.49
MP/SEN	0.81	0.40	0.67	0.47	0.73	0.45
Parliamentary experience	0.59	0.50	0.63	0.49	0.61	0.49
Mayor	0.53	0.51	0.44	0.50	0.48	0.50
Local admin. experience	0.81	0.40	0.86	0.35	0.84	0.37
Party executives	0.22	0.42	0.28	0.45	0.25	0.44
<i>Events</i>						
Conflicts PR	1.41	2.56	1.91	2.55	1.69	2.55
Conflicts PM	2.13	2.92	0.98	1.41	1.47	2.24
Conflicts PARTY	3.09	4.16	2.86	4.00	2.96	4.04
Resignation calls	1.50	3.03	0.86	1.79	1.13	2.40
Reshuffles	0.19	0.54	0.74	1.07	0.51	0.92
Local elections lost	0.31	0.54	0.28	0.50	0.29	0.51
Party promotions	0.06	0.25	0.44	0.83	0.28	0.67
Legislative defeats	3.50	6.90	4.12	6.65	3.85	6.72
Protests	19.00	23.00	6.86	9.56	12.04	17.61

The data in Table 4.3 shows that the mean length of tenure and the frequency of deselections vary under different scenarios. The mean observed tenure is nine months longer under cohabitation than under unified executive. The increase in ministerial durability under cohabitation may be explained by the number of actors whose agreement is necessary for the operation of cabinet changes under different executive scenarios. Due to their ascendancy over the parliamentary majorities, presidents are likely to control the executive decision-making process during periods of unified executive. Despite the shift from presidential to prime ministerial leadership under cohabitation, presidents may still preserve some influence over cabinet composition, as prime ministers are formally required to propose cabinet changes to the president. The increase in the number of political actors who must agree on ministerial appointments and deselections may explain why periods of cohabitation are likely to reduce the likelihood of changes in the cabinet (Indridason and Kam 2007: 8).

The data in Table 4.3 indicates that not only resignations and dismissals, but also reshuffles are more frequent under unified executive. The data also show that the

frequency of individual deselections and shifts from one portfolio to another is smaller in Jospin's cabinet despite an increase in the number of conflicts between ministers and principals. The most conflictual principal-agent relationship under both cabinets is the minister-party one, which confirms the party principal's endeavour to minimise agency loss independently of institutional context. The level of pressure coming from the parliamentary majority does not vary significantly from one cabinet to the other either.


The frequency of resignation calls has a similar distribution. Ministers were more often asked to resign under cohabitation despite losing office less frequently. Overall, 89 resignation debates were recorded. Figure 4.1 illustrates the frequency and the types of resignation calls across the two governments and their correlation with deselection events. The proximate reasons for resignation calls are grouped into four categories: personal errors, when ministers are held responsible for their own mistakes, gaffes, personal or financial scandals, or are seen to be performing badly over a long period of time; departmental errors, when serious mistakes occur in the minister's jurisdiction or department; policy disagreements, when ministers are asked to resign because of the policies they initiated and implemented; and breaches of collective responsibility, when ministers are called on to resign because they challenged a decision already made by cabinets or prime ministers. In cases where ministers were asked to step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. This is why the total number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses on the exact number of calls or on the reason given for their occurrence.

Figure 4.1 indicates that the number of veto players involved in the policy-making process can also influence the type of resignation calls experienced by cabinet members. The data reveals a considerably higher number of resignation calls related to policy errors and breaches of collective responsibility experienced by the ministers who took office in Lionel Jospin government, which was a four-party coalition and operated under a period of cohabitation. By contrast, the vast majority of resignation calls experienced by ministers who belonged to François Fillon's government, which was made up by the UMP and its satellite parties and operated during a period of unified executive, were related to personal errors.

Another difference in the distribution of events regards the level of social unrest experienced by two governments. Jospin's Socialist cabinet was confronted with many more protests than Fillon's conservative government. If social unrest makes a difference

for ministerial durability in office, then one may expect its impact to be stronger when it is directed against a left-wing government.

Figure 4.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (France)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while numbers inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category. Both percentages and numbers refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis and not to the total number of resignation calls recorded across cabinets. *Source:* Own calculations.

The remaining parts of this section focus on the four types of political experience that are relevant for ministerial recruitment in France: prior appointments to government, experience as national legislators or local officials, and party careers. Overall, the analysis of descriptive statistics does not indicate a strong correlation between fixed characteristics and the length of tenure.


4.4 Political background of French ministers

Cabinet experience

The information related to cabinet experience concerns the ministers' previous appointments as junior or full cabinet members. While the Portugal study also takes into account the ministers' ranking in the cabinet, the absence of any state ministers in

Lionel Jospin’s cabinet does not allow us to observe the impact of this characteristic under different executive scenarios. Figure 4.2 illustrates the distribution of cabinet experience across governments and with respect to survival. There is a remarkable similarity of recruitment patterns among Jospin’s and Fillon’s governments from this point of view: only one third of the ministers lacked prior experience in any kind of portfolio, about one quarter could claim some expertise as junior ministers, and almost 40 per cent had already held a full ministerial portfolio.

Figure 4.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (France)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

The correlation between cabinet experience and durability in office indicates that experienced ministers incur a higher risk of deselection. While experienced ministers make up 40 per cent of government composition, they account for almost 60 per cent of those who leave office prematurely. Although one may expect that experience correlates with ability and greater durability, this finding is in line with similar evidence produced for the survival of British ministers, which shows that ministers without previous experience are less predisposed to a premature departure from office (Berlinksi et al., 2009). From a principal-agent perspective, the longevity of less experienced ministers may be accounted for by the longer period of time they need to master their

jurisdictions. Under these circumstances, inexperienced ministers may be less likely to deviate from the preferred positions of their principals during the course of their first term in office and as a result less prone to conflictual relationships.

However, the range of political resources possessed by ministers is not limited to cabinet experience. For example, none of the eleven ministers who had never held a cabinet portfolio before joining Lionel Jospin's government was a non-partisan cabinet member. Additionally, only three of them had never been elected in the parliament, namely Claude Allègre, Hubert Védrine and Pierre Moscovici. Similarly, out of the fifteen ministers who could not claim any cabinet experience prior to their appointment in the Fillon government, only one was not politically affiliated and only five had never been elected as deputies. Only Frédéric Mitterrand belonged to both of these categories. Thus, in order to understand the full extent of the experience required from potential ministers it is necessary to consider their parliamentary background, as well as their local roots and party credentials.


Parliamentary experience

Despite the strict separation between government and parliament intended by the 1958 Constitution, the patterns of ministerial recruitment under the Fifth Republic reveal a re-parliamentarisation" of ministerial careers (O. Costa & Kerrouche, 2009). Although the majority of cabinet ministers serving under de Gaulle and Giscard d'Estaing had followed a career in central administration, parliamentary experience has gradually re-emerged as a prerequisite for ministerial appointments (Dogan, 1986). While on average less than 15 per cent of the ministers appointed during the first years of François Mitterrand's presidency could claim some parliamentary background (Gaxie, 1986, p. 64), the proportion of ministers recruited from the parliamentary pool increased to 63 per cent in the next two decades (Kam & Indridason, 2009, p. 44). Overall, the amount of time spent by ministers in the parliament before their first appointment to government increased from three years in 1962 to seven years by 2002 (O. Costa & Kerrouche, 2009, p. 342).

Figure 4.3 confirms the parliamentarisation of ministerial careers for the two governments under analysis. More than three quarters of the ministers invited to join the Jospin and Fillon cabinets had been elected at least once to the National Assembly. The proportion of ministers recruited from the parliament is higher in the case of Jospin's government, which included only six non-parliamentary members during its entire

course. Moreover, only four of these ministers had never held any parliamentary mandate. The higher proportion of non-parliamentary ministers in François Fillon’s government is explained by Nicolas Sarkozy’s *ouverture* policy, which resulted in the appointment of several professionals and civil society representatives, such as Christine Lagarde and Frédéric Mitterrand, as well as personalities associated with the centre-left parties, such as Bernard Kouchner, the founder of Médecins sans Frontières. Overall, Fillon’s government included fourteen non-parliamentary ministers, ten of whom had never held a legislative mandate.

Figure 4.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (France)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

The data in Figure 4.3 indicates that parliamentary background makes a difference for the length of ministerial tenure, as ministers who had received at least one legislative mandate are likely to survive longer in office. Conversely, non-parliamentary ministers are more likely to leave office prematurely. As a matter of fact, both non-parliamentary ministers and very experienced ministers, who had been elected at least five times to the parliament, incur a higher risk of losing office. This counterintuitive correlation may be explained by an increase in the independence of highly experienced ministers. Similarly to the case of ministers with a strong executive background, ministers who have already developed a career as deputies may be less inclined to

engage in policy compromises with their principals than their less experienced peers and more preoccupied to protect their professional reputation.

The prerequisite of democratic legitimacy to gain access and preserve a cabinet seat may also explain why ministers contest legislative elections even when they are determined to choose their cabinet post over the assembly seat. Furthermore, prime ministers may condition the ministers' permanence in office on their performance in national elections. This is the case especially when presidential elections proceed shortly before the legislative elections and a new cabinet is appointed before the legislative contest. For example, François Fillon made it clear ahead of the 2007 general election that none of the cabinet ministers who were appointed in the cabinet formed following Nicolas Sarkozy's election as head of state in May 2007 would continue in office if they failed to win a seat in the legislative elections scheduled one month later. According to Fillon, a minister's defeat at the polls meant that he or she had not been endorsed by the people to represent them in government (Jeudy, 2007). The first victim of this canon was Alain Juppé, a minister of state and second in the cabinet hierarchy, who resigned after failing to win a parliamentary seat in his Bordeaux stronghold. However, the rule of conceding ministerial office as a result of electoral defeats does not always apply in the elections for the second chamber of the parliament. For example, out of the three ministers who ran in the senatorial elections of September 2011, only two were successful. While Chantal Jouanno, the Sports Minister, was constrained to give up her cabinet seat in exchange for the Senate one, Gerard Longuet was not asked to step down as Defence Minister. Nor was Maurice Leroy, the Minister of Cities, asked to resign as a result of his failure to win a seat. This episode illustrates the multiple roles that ministers are asked to play during their time in office and the context-dependency of their survival in government following both electoral victories and defeats. In general, though, it is reasonable to expect a correlation between electoral defeats and ministerial deselection.

Experience in local administration


The data related to experience in local administration is considerably richer in the French study compared to the Portuguese and the Romanian cases, where ministers are not allowed to hold simultaneously any other office and are also not permitted to contest local elections during their time in office. Thus, in addition to prior local government experience, the analysis of French ministers also takes into consideration the impact of

incumbency in local government positions and of electoral performance in second-order elections on the length of ministerial tenure.

An appointment to national government is seen as the pinnacle of a political career which normally starts at local level. French politicians who wish to advance their careers at national level are expected to advance in the hierarchy of local administration before contesting general elections and aim for a cabinet seat (Copé, 2009, p. 17). The explanation for such a strategic planning of political careers resides in the incentives generated by the French political system, which has traditionally encouraged the recruitment of candidates for general elections from among local representatives and the selection of ministers from the parliamentary pool (Dogan, 1967).

Figure 4.4 indicates that the ministers who were appointed in the Jospin and Fillon governments had strong local roots. Only a small proportion of cabinet members ministers had never been elected locally. Additionally, more than half of the ministers had been elected at least once as mayors or presidents of departmental or regional councils. On the other hand, the data in Figure 4.4 does not indicate a correlation between experience in local administration and the length of ministerial tenure.

Figure 4.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival (France)




Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations.

The accumulation of political resources at local and national level not only increases one’s chances of being appointed to government, but also strengthens their position in the cabinet. As noted by Duhamel (2011, p. 604), the extent of ministerial authority depends not only on the importance of the portfolio assigned, but also on political patronage and local strongholds. The ministers’ interest in running for local offices while in government is explained by the “baobab strategy”, according to which more elective offices help French politicians obtain more resources and power in executive decision-making (François, 2006, p. 269)


As mayors and presidents of departmental or regional councils, cabinet ministers are held responsible for the electoral performance of their parties at local level. Due to their notoriety at national level, ministers are often asked to head party lists in second-order elections. As a result, they are responsible for both victories and defeats. Figure 4.5 indicates the proportion of ministers who contested local elections in each government. The higher percentage of ministers who did not contest any election in the Fillon government is explained by the increased presence of non-partisan ministers in this cabinet. Figure 4.6 shows the relationship between electoral success and survival in office.

Figure 4.5 Local elections contested by ministers (France)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

Figure 4.6 Success in local elections and survival in cabinet office (France)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations.

Although second-order elections are usually seen as tests for the popularity of governments (Collard, 2002; Gougou & Labouret, 2011; Gougou, 2008), several factors increase the difficulty of accurate predictions about how electoral victories and defeats may affect the length of ministerial tenure. As a matter of fact, both situations may lead to deselection. Ministers may be asked to choose between the cabinet seat and the local office if their parties adhere to a non-cumul rule. However, if the enforcement of such non-cumul rules is not preserved throughout the duration of a given cabinet, some ministers may be subjected to double standards. For example, Lionel Jospin conditioned the appointment of his cabinet ministers in 1997 on their giving up of high local executive offices. However, an exception to this rule was made for the 2001 municipal elections. On this occasion, while some members of the cabinet decided not to run in the elections in order to protect their executive seat, many of the high-profile ministers who continued to stand as heads of their local party lists were defeated. Given the Socialist party's defeat in many urban areas, the non-cumul would have forced Jospin to fire successful and popular ministers, while allowing the unsuccessful ones to continue in office, which ran against the French political tradition of rewarding electoral successes (Chevallier, Carcassonne, & Duhamel, 2009, p. 466). Under these

circumstances, both successful and unsuccessful ministers were allowed to keep their seats, as the data in Figure 4.6 indicates.


The ministers serving in François Fillon's government had a different experience with the non-*cumul* rule. While the accumulation of national and local offices was allowed at the moment of appointment, a non-*cumul* rule of cabinet and local offices was announced ahead of the 2010 regional elections. However, all ministers who run in the elections were defeated. The data corresponding to the Fillon government in Figure 4.6 suggests a strong correlation between electoral defeats and deselection.

Party experience

The importance of political militancy as a channel for ministerial appointments has gradually increased since the early days of the Fifth Republic. The proportion of national party elites appointed to cabinets has almost tripled from 1958 until the mid-1980s, and reached a peak of 77 per cent under Mitterrand's first presidency (Gaxie, 1986, p. 64). A high proportion of party executives in government is also confirmed by Kam and Indridason (2009, p. 45) for the time period up to 2005. This trend confirms the hypothesis put forward by William Schonfeld (1983), regarding the symbiotic relationship between national and party elites. Figure 4.7 confirms this expectation for the Jospin and Fillon governments.

The data in Figure 4.7 shows that the composition of both governments was dominated by incumbent or former party executives. While no independent minister sat in the Socialist government, a small number of non-partisans joined the UMP cabinet as a result of *ouverture* policy taken on by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. However, Figure 4.7 does not indicate a strong correlation between the ministers' positions on the party ladder and their length of tenure. One may also expect local party leaders to survive longer in government. As the control of a local party organisation strengthens considerably the standing of the respective ministers within their parties, prime ministers may be more cautious about ousting them. However, this expectation is not confirmed by the data in Figure 4.7.


Figure 4.7 Party experience across governments and by survival (France)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations.

Similar to the interdiction of holding national and local office simultaneously, French parties may also ask ministers to choose between cabinet and party positions. The decision to separate the two offices was introduced by François Mitterrand in 1981 and revived by Lionel Jospin in 1997. Although never formally adopted, a similar practice could also be noticed in the UMP after Nicolas Sarkozy's election in 2007. For example, Xavier Bertrand and Patrick Devedjian swapped their positions in the government and party leadership in late 2008, following the former's defeat in two consecutive local elections and the latter's growing unpopularity in the UMP's general secretariat. A more straightforward adoption of the party-government *non-cumul* rule was noticed after Jean-François Copé became the UMP secretary-general in November 2010, when most UMP ministers were excluded from the new leadership of the party (Rovan & Garat, 2010). In this case, one may expect that promotions in the party hierarchy are used as compensatory moves for ministerial deselection. Figure 4.8 shows the relationship between the ministers' promotion in the party hierarchy and their length of tenure.

Figure 4.8 Party promotions across governments and by survival (France)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

The data in Figure 4.8 confirms Lionel Jospin’s determination to separate political and governmental responsibilities. Few ministers were promoted on the party line between 1997 and 2002 and with little consequences for their longevity in office. The data corresponding to François Fillon’s cabinet shows a different picture. There were more party promotions during this period of time and the data clearly indicates that an increase in party responsibilities was more likely to cost ministers their cabinet seats.

4.5 Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, and ministerial durability in France

This section presents a multivariate analysis of ministerial tenure in France. Apart from assessing the impact of fixed characteristics on the length of tenure, the analysis also takes into account a range of alternative hypotheses drawing on the explanatory power of cabinet reshuffles, resignation calls, legislative sanctions, and social protests. The statistical estimation of the impact of these factors on the risk of ministerial deselection is carried out using survival analysis. Since there is little theoretical and empirical insight into the distribution of the ministerial failure times, a semi-parametric Cox

model that imposes no restriction on the shape of the hazard function appears as an appropriate model choice.

The data set includes the exact dates when ministers take and leave office. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the minister experienced an individual terminal event and zero otherwise. The ministers' observed tenure is right-censored if ministers leave office collectively, as it was the case in 2002 and 2012 when the prime ministers offered the resignation of their cabinets in the aftermath of parliamentary elections. The duration in office is not interrupted if ministers are assigned to different portfolios during their tenure. However, if the same ministers return to the cabinet after a period of time during which they have not served in the government, they are recorded as new cases.

Figure 4.9 shows the unconditional probability that ministers will survive beyond a certain time when no covariates are taken into consideration. Overall, ministers have a 50% chance of surviving 1,275 days in office.

Figure 4.9 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across scenarios (France)





Figure 4.10 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival by scenario (France)



The survivor functions across the two executive scenarios are plotted in Figure 4.10 to assess the impact of different political circumstances on ministerial survival. This data shows that the risk of deselection is higher under a unified executive scenario. The result of the log-rank test presented in Figure 4.10 indicates that the assumption of proportional hazards across the two scenarios is not violated at the 0.05 level. These results indicate that the survival of ministers varies in proportional ways as far as the scenarios of unified executive and cohabitation are concerned and confirm that the data can be analysed using a Cox model. Additional diagnostic tests for the non-proportionality of hazards in the models used for the analysis of French ministers are provided in the Appendix (A1-A4). They include the Wilcoxon test, which focuses on earlier failure times, and tests based on the analysis on Schoenfeld residuals to verify that the explanatory variables included in the statistical models presented below have a proportional and constant effect that is invariant to time. The specification of the models with regard to the nonlinearity of the explanatory variables is assessed using link tests (reported at the bottom of Table 4.4).

Table 4.4 presents three models. Model 1 estimates the impact of fixed characteristics on ministerial durability, while Model 2 takes into consideration both fixed characteristics and events. Model 3 estimates the impact of principal-agent

relationships on the risk of deselection as a function of institutional context. To do so, Model 3 includes a contextual variable that tests the ability of principals to reduce agency-loss under unified executive and cohabitation. *Cohabitation* equals 1 to indicate the occurrence of cohabitation and 0 in the case of unified executive. The model specification adopts the chained-interaction technique, which is employed when one variable (in this case cohabitation) is believed to modify the effects of other variables (the impact of conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers), without conditioning each other's effects (Kam and Franzese 2007: 39–40). Thus, Model 3 includes three two-way interactions that separate the impact of principals on the deselection of ministers under unified executive and cohabitation and respects the recommendations regarding the inclusion of all constitutive terms in the case of multiplicative interaction models (Braumoeller 2004; Brambor et al. 2006). To adjust for within-minister correlation without biasing the cross-minister estimators we use cluster-robust standard errors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 335). The observations are clustered by ministers and the data set includes 75 clusters. The models present coefficients from Cox regressions and report standard errors clustered by ministers. Positive coefficients indicate that the risk of deselection increases and indicate a shorter length of tenure, while negative coefficients decrease the hazard rate and are expected to increase the length of tenure.

Model 1 emphasises the limited explanatory power of personal characteristics variables. Furthermore, the robustness of these results across the three models confirms their limited impact on the length of ministerial tenure. The models present some evidence that the risk of losing office increases for ministers with previous experience in the government and in the legislature, while ministers recruited from the parliamentary pool are safer in office. However, these results are not robust across the three models.

Models 2 and 3 estimate the ministers' risk of losing office taking into account the impact of both fixed characteristics and events and as a function of executive scenarios. Both models confirm the explanatory power of *Resignation calls* as indicators of ministerial performance and durability in office. However, the statistical significance corresponding to this variable in both models suggests that resignation calls offer only a partial account of why some ministers resign why they are asked to do so and others do not. By comparison, the variables corresponding to principal-agent relationships have a stronger explanatory power.

The positive and statistically significant mean coefficients of *Lost elections* and *Party promotions* confirm that electoral defeats and promotions in the party hierarchy increase the risk of a premature departure from the cabinet. Given the debates regarding the elimination of the simultaneous holding of government and party responsibilities, this finding suggests that party promotions may be used as compensatory measures for ministers who are fired.

Apart from downright dismissals, the literature suggests that prime ministers may use cabinet reshuffles to sanction ministers who deviate from the preferred positions of their principals (Indridason and Kam 2008). The negative and statistically significant coefficients on *Reshuffles* in Models 2 and 3 indicate that ministers who change portfolios are likely to survive longer in office. This result suggests that in France reshuffles are used as means of promotion rather than demotion.

The results concerning the relationship between ministers and parliamentary majorities indicate that policy disagreements between ministers and the deputies representing their parties or coalition partners are not likely to endanger their careers. This result is consistent with the expectations put forward in two different literatures. On the one hand, the literature focusing on the place of parties in the democratic chain of delegation argues that while the deputies retain the ability to hold chief executive accountable, prime ministers usually preserve the prime responsibility for monitoring and sanctioning other party officials, including cabinet ministers (Müller, 2000). On the other hand, according to an extensive survey of legislative powers, the overall influence of the French parliament over the government has been rated among the weakest among European countries, surpassing only the Russian and Cypriot parliaments (Fish & Kroenig, 2009). Consequently, the fact that the parliamentary majority's policy discontent has no consequences on ministerial longevity is not surprising, given the absence of any parliamentary procedures for the dismissal of individual ministers and the subordination of parliamentary majorities to the *de facto* leaders of dominant parties.

The explanatory power of the variables capturing the interaction between ministers and their principals is confirmed in Models 2 and 3. The positive coefficients of *PR Conflicts*, *PM Conflicts*, and *PARTY Conflicts* indicate that, in general, the more conflicts ministers have with their principals the more likely they are to fail. Nevertheless, the statistical significance associated with the three principal-related variables in Model 2 indicates that, overall, only clashes with presidents have an impact on the risk of deselection. The model also provides some evidence that conflicts with

Table 4.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in France

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Fixed characteristics			
Cabinet experience	0.84* (0.44)	0.95** (0.49)	0.37 (0.58)
MP/SEN	-0.90* (0.50)	-0.49 (0.63)	-1.31* (0.68)
Parliamentary experience	0.47 (0.51)	0.67 (0.60)	1.62* (0.91)
Mayor	0.35 (0.52)	0.42 (0.54)	0.31 (0.58)
Local administration experience	0.10 (0.70)	0.13 (0.96)	-0.81 (0.87)
Party executive	0.17 (0.41)	-1.02 (0.79)	-0.50 (0.84)
Events			
Local elections lost		3.53** (1.22)	4.10*** (1.16)
Party promotions		5.83*** (1.25)	7.09*** (1.34)
Legislative defeats		-0.08 (0.18)	-0.14 (0.19)
Social unrest		-0.08 (0.17)	0.06 (0.15)
Reshuffles		-5.99** (2.61)	-11.53** (3.88)
Resignation calls		0.86* (0.48)	0.75* (0.41)
PR Conflicts		2.76*** (0.68)	3.59*** (1.01)
PM Conflicts		1.22* (0.71)	-0.30 (1.43)
PARTY Conflicts		0.67 (0.42)	1.74** (0.73)
Executive scenarios			
Cohabitation		-0.56 (0.52)	-0.28 (0.69)
PR Conflicts × Cohabitation			-1.83 1.59)
PM Conflicts × Cohabitation			3.87** (1.63)
PARTY Conflicts × Cohabitation			-2.59** (0.91)
<hr/>			
N Ministers	75	75	75
N Observations	2815	2815	2815
N Failures	29	29	29
Log likelihood	-96.651	-56.576	-51.583
Linktest hat(squared)	-0.09 <i>p</i> =(.85)	-0.06 <i>p</i> =(.18)	-0.04 <i>p</i> =(.44)
Proportional hazards	5.37(6 df)	7.24 (16 df)	5.93 (19 df)
Assumption global test chi(2)	<i>p</i> =(.50)	<i>p</i> =(.97)	<i>p</i> =(.99)

Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (75 clusters).

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

prime ministers may also increase the risk of losing office. However, based on the literature on semi-presidentialism and on the operation of the French political system under the Fifth Republic (Duverger, 1996; Elgie, 2009; Samuels & Shugart, 2010) we expect conflicts with presidents to have a significant impact under unified executive and a low impact under cohabitation. Conversely, conflicts with prime ministers are expected to have a significant impact under cohabitation and a considerably lower impact under unified executive.

To verify this hypothesis, Model 3 assesses the impact of conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals on the ministers' risk of losing office as a function of executive scenarios. To do so, the three conflict variables are interacted with an institutional variable, *Cohabitation*. The impact of interaction terms on the risk of deselection is not directly revealed by regression coefficients. For example, to assess the impact of conflicts with the president we need to take into account the coefficients corresponding to both *PR Conflicts* and *PR Conflicts × Cohabitation*. When *Cohabitation*=0, which basically means under a scenario of unified executive, the impact of conflicts with the president is directly given by the coefficient associated with *PR Conflicts*. As this coefficient is both positive and statistically significant, we can conclude that presidents have a significant influence on the process of ministerial deselection during periods of unified executive. Under cohabitation, when *Cohabitation*=1, the impact of conflicts with the president is the sum of the coefficient associated to the *PR Conflicts* and *PR Conflicts × Cohabitation* variables. In this case we have a positive coefficient since this sum is equal to 1.75 (3.59-1.83). However, the standard error of this sum of coefficients, which is calculated from the standard error of the two separate coefficients, gives a figure of about 1.28, which corresponds to a Student t-value of 1.37, which is not a statistically significant coefficient.⁸ This result indicates that presidents do not have a strong influence on cabinet composition during periods of cohabitation. The substantive effect of conflicts with the president under different executive scenarios is illustrated in the Appendix (A.5).

⁸ The standard error $\hat{\sigma}$ is calculated using the formula $\hat{\sigma} = \sqrt{\text{var}(\hat{\gamma}) + Z^2\text{var}(\hat{\delta}) + 2Z\text{cov}(\hat{\gamma}\hat{\delta})}$, where γ is the coefficient of *PR Conflicts*, δ is the coefficient of *PR Conflicts × Cohabitation*, and Z is the dummy *Cohabitation*.

The impact of conflicts with prime ministers and party principals on the risk of losing office under different executive scenarios is calculated in a similar way. Table 4.5 presents the values of coefficients associated with the conflict variables (when *Cohabitation*=0), the sum of the conflict variables and their interaction with the cohabitation variable (when *Cohabitation*=1), and their level of significance. This presentation allows us to compare the impact of conflict variables on the risk of deselection directly.

Table 4.5 Principal-agent relationships under different executive scenarios (France)

Executive scenario	PR Conflicts	PM Conflicts	PARTY Conflicts
Cohabitation=0	3.59***	-0.30	1.74**
Cohabitation=1	1.75	3.57***	-0.84

The results presented in Table 4.5 confirm that conflicts with prime ministers do not pose a risk to deselection during periods of unified executive. However prime ministers are shown to control the process of ministerial deselection under cohabitation. Similarly to presidents, and as opposed to prime ministers, the results presented in Table 4.5 indicate that party principals have a significant influence on cabinet composition during periods of unified executive, but not under cohabitation.

The substantive effects of conflicts with prime ministers and party principals under different executive scenarios are included in the Appendix (A.6-A.7). The data presented in Figures 4.11 and 4.12 sum up the impact of conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals on the risk of deselection under unified executive and cohabitation respectively.

Figure 4.11 Impact of conflicts under unified executive





Figure 4.12 Impact of conflicts under cohabitation



The comparative analysis of ministerial survival in France under both unified executive and cohabitation confirms that institutional context matters for the ability of presidents and prime ministers to dominate the executive decision-making process: presidents are in a better position to influence the deselection of ministers during periods of unified executive, while prime ministers regain control over cabinet members under cohabitation.

Our results indicate that the influence of the party principal also varies as a function of institutional context. The party principal is shown to have a significant impact on ministerial deselection under unified executive, but not under cohabitation. However, the discussion in the second section of this chapter has shown that the president maintained a strong grip over the party under unified executive, which was expected to reduce the influence of the party principal over cabinet composition. By contrast, Lionel Jospin's resignation as party leader during the scenario of cohabitation should have increased the party's authority over the cabinet.

According to the descriptive statistics in Table 4.3, parties criticised ministers almost twice as much as presidents and prime ministers altogether. However, the results presented in Table 4.4 suggest that this criticism did not have an impact on deselection under cohabitation, where parties do not have to compete with presidents for control over the cabinet. Thus, although party principals were more vociferous, they were less able to contain agency loss than presidents and prime ministers, despite their 'pole' position in the chain of delegation. Although Lionel Jospin stepped down as party leader before taking office as prime minister, he has nevertheless been recognised as the uncontested leader of the Socialist Party and the parliamentary majority by political actors (Chirac & Barré, 2011, p. 213; Glavany, 2001, p. 45; Schrameck, 2001, p. 33) and scholars alike (Chevallier et al., 2009, p. 436; Duhamel, 2011, p. 576; Portelli, 1997, p. 21). Jospin's ability to sideline the party principal in the competition for control over the cabinet during the period of cohabitation is explained by his *de facto* leadership over the Socialist Party. This finding has important implications for the study of political accountability at the level of cabinet ministers and indicates the circumstances under which informal hierarchies of party leadership can indicate more accurately who is accountable to whom than the formal chain of political delegation from political parties to their representatives in government.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the determinants of ministerial durability in France, where the alternation of dual-executive scenarios generates considerable variation in principal-agent relationships between ministers and presidents, prime ministers and party principals. The empirical investigation has confirmed the variation in the influence of principals over ministerial deselection under different institutional scenarios. While presidents are in a better position to influence the deselection of ministers during periods of unified executive, prime ministers regain control over cabinet members under cohabitation. At the same time, the expectation that parties regain control over their agents in the executive branch of government during periods of cohabitation, when presidents are not in a position to dominate the parliamentary majority, is not confirmed in the French case. This finding is nevertheless in line with the literature analysing the operation of French political parties, which emphasises their weak organisation and dependence on strong leaders (Knapp, 2004).

Similarly to the impact of conflicts with the party principal, the multivariate analysis suggests that personal background has a limited effect on the length of ministerial tenure. This finding is surprising since we expect political parties to place a premium on political experience when selecting ministers. Previous appointments in government, as well as experience in local administration, a strong parliamentary record, and party service should correlate with longevity in office if parties have a say over cabinet composition. However, among the variables related to the ministers' political background in our data set, only incumbency in the parliament has emerged as a significant determinant of ministerial durability.

The party principal's inability to influence ministerial longevity under cohabitation, an institutional scenario that should increase the parties' control over cabinet composition, confirms that party leadership positions make a difference for the principals' ability to influence the process of ministerial deselection. The variation in presidential influence over the government as a function of the president's grip on the majority party has been highlighted in the literature of semi-presidentialism (Duverger, 1996; Samuels & Shugart, 2010). Similarly, a strong grip on the majority party has been recognised as the determinant

of the British prime ministers' extensive control over their cabinets by the literature on parliamentary government (A. King, 1994b, p. 210). Our results substantiate and complement these arguments by showing that the authority of prime ministers over cabinet members also depends on whether they are perceived as uncontested leaders of their parties even when they do not formally hold a party leadership position. Thus, as far as the operation of the French political system is concerned, the findings of this chapter confirm that the principals' ability to fire ministers depends on both executive scenarios and their *de facto* position as party leaders.

Chapter Five: Ministerial deselection in Portugal

Luís Campos e Cunha, a minister of finance in the Socialist government led by PM José Sócrates, resigned in July 2005 after criticising the government's plan to invest in major infrastructure projects, such as a new airport serving Lisbon in Ota⁹. In March 2007, President Cavaco Silva of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), also intervened in the debate and asked the government to consider alternative locations, such as Alcochete. Mário Lino, the minister for public works, ruled out Alcochete as the location of a new airport, calling it a “desert” that lacked schools, hospitals, and big cities and had no potential for commerce and tourism. Opposition parties and local authorities asked the minister's resignation over his impartiality and offensive remarks. A few months later, José Sócrates announced the government's decision to undertake the construction of the new airport in Alcochete. The prime minister defended Mário Lino against new calls for resignation and cleared him of any direct responsibility within the collective decision-making process¹⁰.

Why did only one of the two ministers who commented on decisions that required the cabinet's collective endorsement lose his job? Moreover, why did minister Campos e Cunha's concerns about the quality of government investments, which were shared by economists and public opinion alike, triggered his resignation, while minister Lino's offensive remarks and poor expertise had no impact on the length of his tenure, although he was contested by many professional organisations, local communities, President Cavaco Silva and even within José Sócrates' Socialist party? Despite the similarity of political circumstances, a principal-agent perspective on the nature of executive conflicts that

⁹ More details about the circumstances leading up to the resignation of Luís Campos e Cunha can be found in Antão, 2005; Cabral, 2005; Costa, 2005; Costa & Cabrita, 2006; Coutinho, 2005; Delgado, 2005; Diário de Notícias, 2005; Silva & Costa, 2005; Suspiro, 2007; Vaz, 2005; Viana, 2005.

¹⁰ The detailed development of this story from March 2007, when the government made public the calendar of works for the construction of the new airport in Ota, until January 2008, when José Sócrates announced the government's decision to change the new airport's location from Ota to Alcochete can be followed in Cabral, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e; Cabral & Negrão, 2007; Candoso, 2008; Diário de Notícias, 2007a, 2007b; Francisco, 2007; Francisco & Henriques, 2007; G. Henriques & Correia, 2007; J. P. Henriques, 2009; J. P. Henriques & Correia, 2007; J. P. Henriques & Leite, 2007; J. P. Henriques & Negrão, 2007; Leite, 2007; Leite & Cardoso, 2007; Leite & Fox, 2007; Leite & Sá, 2008; Marcelino, 2008; Marcelino & Baldaia, 2008; Matias, 2007a, 2007b, 2008; Moura, 2007; Paula Sá, 2007; Silva, 2007; Suspiro & Santos, 2007; Sá, 2009.

characterised the two situations reveals a significant difference between them. Luís Campos e Cunha confronted the prime minister on a policy matter of primary importance for the majority party, while Mário Lino acted in agreement with the prime minister. As the president's party was not in government and both ministers were non-partisans, the prime minister was able to exercise freely his career-control power over cabinet members.

This chapter is organised as follows. First we outline the research design of the Portuguese case-study and we identify the endogenous factors that differentiate the operation of semi-presidential institutions in Portugal from their French and Romanian counterparts. The second section of the chapter analyses the relationships between parties, presidents and prime ministers in the two main political parties in Portugal, the Socialists and the Social Democrats, from a principal-agent perspective. This discussion emphasises the reasons why the growing influence and the autonomy of Portuguese prime ministers with respect to presidents and political parties has not been constrained by executive scenarios. The third section of the chapter describes the data collected for the Portugal case study and explains the measurement of fixed characteristics and events in this context. The last section of this chapter completes the study of ministerial turnover in Portugal with a multivariate analysis that estimates the length of ministerial tenure as function of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent relationships between ministers, presidents, premiers, and party principals.

5.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in Portugal

The dataset for the Portuguese case-study covers the centre-right government that was formed in 2002 by the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the People's Party (CDS-PP) and the Socialist government that took office in 2005. The PSD-CDS government is followed from April 2002 until December 2004, when President Sampaio dissolved the parliament and called early elections. The government formed by the Socialist Party (PS) in March 2005 is covered until the formation of the next government in October 2009. Both governments operated mostly under cohabitation. President Jorge Sampaio of the Socialist party, first elected in late 1995 and re-elected in 2000, was succeeded by President Ánibal Cavaco Silva of the PSD in 2006. Thus, with the exception of one year, between March

2005 and March 2006, when both President Sampaio and Prime Minister José Sócrates were from the Socialist party, ministerial tenures are observed under cohabitation.

The PSD-CDS government that was in office between 2002 and 2005 experienced a change of prime minister in July 2004, when Manuel Durrão Barroso of the PSD stepped down to become president of the European Commission. Following his resignation as prime minister and party leader, the PSD elected Pedro Santana Lopes as party president and nominated him for the prime minister position. The change of prime minister did not affect the government coalition between the PSD and the CDS-PP. There is also no reason to believe that the agency relationships between the president, the prime minister and the cabinet ministers were affected by the change of prime minister. As a result, uninterrupted ministerial tenures in the Durrão Barroso and Santana Lopes governments are recorded as single spells and individual changes that were made in the passing from one cabinet to another are recorded as dismissals or reshuffles. The data set also excludes the caretaker government formed by Santana Lopes in December 2004, when President Sampaio dissolved the National Assembly and called early elections. The inclusion of a caretaker government in the analysis of ministerial survival is considered problematic for several reasons. First, caretaker governments have been shown to have different hazard rates and determinants of durability than common governments (E. C. Browne et al., 1986; Grofman & Van Roozendaal, 1994, 1995, 1997). As a result, the determinants of ministerial turnover are also likely to vary across common and caretaker governments, since the duration of collective ministerial survival is fully determined in the latter case. Second, the opportunities for the occurrence of stochastic events are also minimised in the case of caretaker cabinets. Since the ministers' ability to introduce new policies during a caretaker period is considerably reduced, they are also less likely to enter into conflict with their principals. Therefore, the absence of conflicts between ministers and principals during the caretaker period would bias individual survival positively. As the composition of Santana Lopes' caretaker cabinet did not change and the media coverage of its three months in office has revealed only one episode of conflict, we can be sure that no information is missed if this period of time is excluded from the monitoring of ministerial tenures.

The data set includes ministers and state ministers. State secretaries are excluded from the analysis because they do not sit in the Cabinet¹¹, as it is also the case of the French *Secrétaires d'État*. In addition, the Portuguese Constitution states that state secretaries are subordinate to a single principal and requires them to be recalled when their minister leaves office (article 186).¹² Overall, the data set for the Portuguese study covers 56 ministers.

While the units of observation in the data set are the 56 ministers, the units of analysis are the events experienced by ministers during their time in office. Overall, 540 observations related to the events experienced by ministers were recorded from approximately 3,500 articles published in *Diário de Notícias* during the ministers' time in office and accessed through the online archive which is available on the newspaper's website. The articles used for data collection were selected with 12 keywords related to major events, such as resignations, dismissals and reshuffles, and to conflictual situations involving scandals, disagreements, ministerial performance and errors, protests and strikes. Each observation includes the type of event recorded, the political actors involved, and the reasons that caused it. The events experienced by ministers may be terminal or non-terminal. Terminal events refer to individual termination events, such as resignations and dismissals. Non-terminal events cover conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers (recorded each time one of the principals criticises ministers publicly), resignation calls, cabinet reshuffles, special parliamentary debates, and national-level strikes and protests that occurred within each minister's area of responsibility. The proximate reasons used for coding the occurrence of events include personal and departmental faults or scandals, policy disagreements, performance, appointments outside cabinet, intra-cabinet and intraparty conflicts, and non-political reasons.

Similar to France, the analysis of ministerial turnover in Portugal aims to capture the variation in the influence of presidents and prime ministers over cabinet composition. However, in contrast to France, in Portugal the coincidence between the parliamentary majority and the original party of the president is expected to reduce the president's

¹¹ An exception to this rule is made for the Portuguese state secretary to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (*Secretário de Estado da Presidência do Conselho de Ministros*), the only state secretary who has a permanent seat in the cabinet and who answers directly to the prime minister.

¹² The presidential decrees that appoint new ministers are always accompanied by a full list of state secretaries appointed to act under the respective ministers, even if some of them had already been in office up to that moment.

influence (Martins, 2006, p. 94). None of the three presidents elected since 1986 was perceived as a *de facto* leader of the parliamentary majority when they shared executive power with a prime minister from their own party (Magalhães, 2007, p. 266). Despite the confrontational style that characterised his second cohabitation with the PSD government since 1991, Mário Soares assumed a low-profile role as soon as the 1995 legislative elections returned a Socialist majority. President Soares was succeeded in 1996 by Jorge Sampaio, the mayor of Lisbon and a secretary general of the Socialist Party from 1989 to 1992. Although most of Sampaio's presidency took place under a scenario of unified executive, due to the Left's consecutive election victories in 1995 and in 1999, the president did not emerge as a leader of the majority during this period of time (Martins, 2006, p. 94; Morais, 1998, p. 157).

The absence of a presidentialised executive in the Portuguese case has been put down to the curtailment of presidential powers in the 1982 Constitution, when the government ceased to be politically responsible to the president and the parliament's power to control the cabinet was considerably strengthened (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, p. 240). The subsequent decrease in presidential influence over the political system has led some scholars to define Portugal as a parliamentary system (Bruneau, 1997; Villaverde Cabral quoted in Cruz, 1994, p. 259; Sartori, 1994). According to various measurements, though, the range of presidential powers laid down in the 1982 Constitution equals the European semi-presidential average (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Siaroff, 2003). Other studies have also emphasised that the powers held by the Portuguese president render him an influential actor at all times (Amorim & Lobo, 2009; Frain, 1995). For example, President Sampaio dissolved the Assembly and called early elections in 2004, although the government still enjoyed the support of the majority. The presidents' ability to veto both executive and parliamentary bills and to shape the public agenda is also seen as an efficient way of wearing down opposing governments (Araújo, 2003, pp. 91–93). The increase in presidential activism under cohabitation also explains why Portuguese presidents seem considerably stronger than their French counterparts under cohabitation, despite their weakness during periods of unified executive (Amorim, 2003, p. 560; Jalali, 2011). However, while the variation in the French presidents' influence across scenarios is due to their informal authority over parliamentary majority, the variation in the powers of the

Portuguese presidents across periods of unified executive and cohabitation is fully accounted for by their range of constitutional prerogatives.

Similar to the variation in presidential influence across time and political circumstances, the variation in prime ministerial leadership follows different rules in Portugal compared to France. Portuguese prime ministers are not weaker during periods of unified executive than under cohabitation, nor are they seen as subordinates to presidents under any political circumstances. The president's and the prime minister's influence over the political system vary independently of one another in Portugal. The reduction of presidential powers in 1982 is not considered the main explanatory factor for the reinforcement of the prime ministerial position in Portugal (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, p. 235). The sources of prime ministerial leadership are rather seen in the consolidation of the party system and the increase in the autonomy and power resources of prime ministers as party leaders (Lobo, 2005a, 2005b).

The Portuguese case confirms the theoretical expectations put forward in Chapter 2, according to which the variation in the influence of presidents and prime ministers over the political system depends on the interaction of executive scenarios and party relationships. Similar to France, the personalisation of party politics in Portugal explains why holding the presidency of a political party before taking office makes a difference for the extent of presidential and prime ministerial influence. An analysis of the 2002 legislative elections has shown that party leaders matter more for the electorate of the three centrist parties, the PS, the PSD and the CDS than any other social and ideological factors and they become absolutely crucial when voters have to decide between the PSD and the CDS (Lobo, 2006). However, unlike in France, the personalisation of politics in Portugal is not rooted in the adoption of direct presidential elections. Gunther (2003, 2007) and Jalali (2007) explain the personalisation of Portuguese politics as a consequence of the catch-all nature of the main Portuguese parties, whose ideological positioning and establishment of mass organisations was constrained by their emergence in a revolutionary context.

The difference in the influence of French and Portuguese presidents over the political systems is explained by their position in the party hierarchy ahead of presidential elections. While French parties nominate their leaders as presidential candidates, none of the Portuguese presidents ran in the elections as party leaders. As a result, we have no

reason to code them as *de facto* party leaders during the time period under analysis. However, as opposed to French prime ministers, all Portuguese prime ministers were party presidents ahead of general elections. Therefore, the Portuguese prime ministers are coded as *de facto* party leaders. From a principal-agent perspective, though, it is important to analyse in more detail the extent to which the three prime ministers were autonomous of their respective parties so that we can determine the kind of agency relationship established between parties and their representatives in government. The second section of this chapter focuses on the leadership power of the three prime ministers during the time period under study. The analysis reviews the rules governing the internal distribution of power resources within the PSD and the PS during 2002-2005 and 2005-2009 respectively, and evaluates the ways in which party leaders were able to enhance their intraparty resources and act as principals for cabinet ministers.

The third section of this chapter focuses on the political *cursus honorum* of the ministers covered by the Portuguese data set. This section analyses the parliamentary experience of the ministers who joined the PSD-CDS and the PS governments between 2002 and 2009, their involvement in local politics prior to appointment, as well as their membership in the national elite of their respective parties. The patterns of ministerial careers in Portugal since 1976 have revealed a relative unimportance of local politics, a declining role for parliamentary experience, an increasing overlap between membership in party executive bodies and national governments, and a growing presence of independent ministers in government (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002; Lobo, 2002).

The traditional career-path taken by French politicians, who must establish themselves locally and develop their career within a party organisation, is not usually encountered in Portugal. The different routes that French and Portuguese ministers take to advance their political careers at national level may also account for the differences in the agency relationship established between parties, presidents, prime ministers and their minister-agents in the two countries. Although there are few explicit bans on the multiple-office holding, the *cumul des mandats* is not common in Portugal. The horizontal combination of offices is formally restricted, as the Constitution forbids the simultaneous

holding of cabinet and parliamentary seats.¹³ However, ministers can resume their parliamentary seats when they leave the government. The limitation of the vertical combination of elective offices is relatively recent. It is only since 2001 that deputies who are mayors or local councillors at the time of their election to the National Assembly have had to choose between their national and local government mandate.¹⁴ As a result of this ban, most mayors have decided to give up their parliamentary seats and resume their career in local politics. However, this rule has not significantly influenced the composition of the Portuguese parliament, since less than 5 per cent of deputies elected since 1976 have actually combined the two types of office (M. A. P. de Almeida, 2008, p. 366). Similarly, cabinet members have not traditionally been recruited from among the number of mayors and local councillors. Less than 5 per cent of the ministers appointed during 1976-1999 served as mayors or local councillors, while the highest percentage of local officials invited to join the government corresponds to the First Republic, when it reached 13 per cent (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31). The relative unimportance of local administration experience for the advancement of political careers at national level is put down to the traditional administrative centralisation (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 30). Consequently, local strongholds are not among the range of political resources that Portuguese ministers are likely to rely on, as opposed to their French counterparts.

Portugal contrasts with many other European democracies in that fewer than half of all first-time ministers appointed between 1976 and 2005 had previously been elected to the parliament (Pinto & Almeida, 2009, p. 151). The recruitment of so many cabinet ministers from outside the parliamentary pool can be explained by the subordinate position of parliamentary groups within their party's internal balance of power. A comparative analysis of party statutes and of the composition of national executive bodies across Portuguese parties has revealed a relatively small margin of autonomy of parliamentary groups with respect to extra-parliamentary parties and their under-representation among the party's national bodies (Van Biezen, 1998). On the other hand, the comparison between the composition of governments and that of executive party bodies has emphasised a growing

¹³ Constitution of the Republic of Portugal, Seventh Revision (2005), article 154. Available from <http://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Paginas/ConstituicaoRepublicaPortuguesa.aspx>.

¹⁴ Statute of Deputies, article 20. Available from http://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/Legislacao_Anotada/EstatutoDeputados_Simples.pdf.

presence of senior party members in government since 1976, irrespective of whether the Socialists or the Social-Democrats were in power (Lobo, 2002, p. 270). Political parties are also involved directly in the executive decision-making process, since most decisions are taken by an inner cabinet formed around prime ministers and the holders of key ministerial portfolios, which are usually allocated to senior party members (Lobo, 2005b, p. 279). Thus, while parliamentary experience is not a prerequisite for ministerial appointments, party experience does seem to favour the advancement of political careers in Portugal. The “governmentalisation” of political parties, which denotes the appointment of a high number of senior party members in government (Lobo, 2005a, pp. 168–175), suggests that party principals have a strong grip on cabinet composition irrespective of institutional context.

Particular attention needs to be given in the Portuguese context to the significant frequency of non-partisan ministerial appointments. This was a common practice during the 1976-1986 period, when President Eanes imposed several “presidential-inspired” cabinets (Lobo, 2000, p. 160). However, the share of non-partisan ministers has remained significant even after President Eanes was replaced by a civilian president in 1986, and irrespective of the minority or majority status of governments, or whether parties governed alone or in coalition. The weak institutionalisation of parties and the negative perception of politicians in the Portuguese society explains to a certain extent the opening of cabinet appointments to academics, professionals, and policy experts who are not politically affiliated (Pinto & Almeida, 2009, p. 153). Such appointments blur the lines of ministerial accountability, as it is more difficult to determine which of the three principals controls non-partisan ministers.

A comparative analysis of semi-presidential and parliamentary systems carried out by Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) showed that non-partisan appointments are more common under directly-elected presidents and increase with the powers of the president relative to the prime minister. Analysing the Portuguese governments formed between 1976 and 2004, Amorim Neto and Lobo (2009) showed that the share of independent ministers is higher in minority cabinets. However, the number of independent ministers has also been seen as an indicator for the autonomy of prime ministers with respect to their parties. Lobo (2000, 2005a, 2005b) argues that the Portuguese prime ministers’ ability to appoint cabinet members from outside their parties emphasises their ability to govern above parties. Political parties have also encouraged the appointment of independent ministers, as a means

of increasing their legitimacy and the their governments' technical expertise (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 36; Lobo, 2005a, p. 170). Independent candidates are invited to join party lists in order to run in the elections, as the Constitution allows political parties to include non-partisans on their electoral lists but does not allow independent candidacies in the legislative and municipal elections (M. A. P. de Almeida, 2008, 2010). In conclusion, there are reasons to believe that each principal can benefit from non-partisan appointments and can gain control over independent ministers under certain circumstances.

5.2 Party relationships in the Portuguese executive

This section focuses on intraparty politics. As neither of the two presidents who were in office during the time period under study ran in the elections as party leaders, we concentrate on the party resources available to prime ministers to assert their leadership over the government and within their own parties. This analysis aims to determine whether any rules or practices that aimed to curb or to enhance the authority of prime ministers were introduced in the Social Democratic Party and in the Socialist Party following their accession to power in 2002 and in 2005 respectively.

The PM-party relationship in the PSD (2002-2005)

The Social Democratic Party returned to power in February 2002 following a seven-year period in opposition. Between 1995 and 2002 the Social Democratic Party experienced a series of electoral defeats that also attracted several changes of leadership. Manuel Durrão Barroso was elected as president of the PSD only five months before the 1999 legislative elections. Although he was not expected to defeat the Socialists so soon after his election, Barroso's internal support eroded rapidly as a result of his inability to lead the PSD into government and deliver power quickly (Jalali, 2006, p. 362). Nevertheless, his popularity improved when the Social-Democrats won a number of important cities in the 2001 local elections and the 2002 early legislative elections that were triggered by the resignation of the Socialist government. In the absence of a parliamentary majority, the PSD formed a coalition government with the CDS. Despite the animosity between the two parties, the coalition was stable until Durrão Barroso stepped down to become president of the

European Commission in July 2004. After much hesitation, President Sampaio decided to accept the formation of a second PSD-CDS government led by Pedro Santana Lopes, who succeeded Durrão Barroso as the PSD leader. However, this government proved so unpopular that President Sampaio dissolved the parliament and called early elections in December 2004. Notwithstanding the low popularity of both prime ministers, there is nevertheless little indication of intraparty challenges to their leadership. As it will be shown below, no programmatic or organisational changes were introduced and no attempt was made to alter the position of the national leader within the party organisation or the prime minister's relationship with the party during the time period under analysis.

The organisation of the Social Democratic Party is the least centralised of all the Portuguese parties (Corkill, 1995, pp. 69–70; Frain, 1997, p. 85; Lobo, 2002, p. 256). All national executive bodies are elected by party delegates during the national congresses, with the exception of the party president, who has been directly elected by the party members since 2006. However, the PSD's dependence on a strong and charismatic leader as the basis for its unity, coherence and stability has constantly been emphasised as the party's characteristic since its creation in 1974 (Corkill, 1995; Frain, 1996, 1997; Magone, 1995). Despite the involvement of activists in the selection of national elites, party presidents have always been able to count on the obedience of the party apparatus once they were elected. As pointed out by Jalali (2006, p. 365), generalised rebellions against the party leadership are unlikely to take place in the PSD. No incumbent leader has ever been ousted or even defeated in a party congress. Notwithstanding the charismatic power exercised by leaders such as Sá Carneiro, Pinto Balsemão and Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the prevalence of PSD leaders within their party has been contingent on the electoral success and the power resources delivered to the party, rather than on the leader's personality (Jalali, 2006, p. 367). Once in office, the PSD prime ministers are usually given considerable autonomy over the formation and composition of governments, the party's election programme and the selection of candidates for parliamentary elections (Lobo, 2005b, pp. 273–274). By contrast, when the party is defeated in elections, the national leadership is likely to be challenged and the PSD leaders find it difficult to assert their authority over local barons (Jalali, 2006, pp. 368–370).

The consolidation of Durrão Barroso's authority within the party was confirmed by his re-election as party leader in the 2002 and 2004 party congresses. Compared to 2000, when he had to defend his leadership after the 1999 electoral defeat, Barroso's bid for re-election was unchallenged in July 2002 and May 2004, when the Social-Democrats were in government (Jalali, 2006, p. 368). Barroso reasserted his authority over the party in July 2004 when he designated Pedro Santana Lopes, a vice-president of the party and the mayor of Lisbon since 2001, as his successor (Lobo & Magalhães, 2002, p. 78). Although Santana Lopes' election as party leader in the absence of an extraordinary congress was not regarded as the best course of action by the PSD leadership, Barroso's proposal was approved in the National Council with 98 votes in favour and only three votes against.¹⁵

While Barroso's resignation as prime minister did not trigger a political crisis, the poor performance of Santana Lopes' cabinet did. According to a newspaper poll published in November 2004, 55 per cent of the respondents evaluated the prime minister's performance as extremely bad and 52 per cent considered that the president should not have appointed Santana Lopes as prime minister (Lourenço, 2004). President Sampaio's decision to call early elections was also influenced by the negative evaluation of the government's performance articulated within the Social Democratic Party (G. Henriques, 2004; Sousa & Alvarez, 2004). Just a few days after the cabinet reshuffle operated in November 2004, Aníbal Cavaco Silva published an article in the weekly *Expresso* which demanded the replacement of incompetent politicians (Cavaco Silva, 2004c). Santana Lopes' response, comparing the government with a baby who, while still in the incubator, is "smacked and kicked" by older siblings, was seen by the president as a confirmation of the confidence crisis underwent by the prime minister even within his own party (Público, 2004b).

Despite this wave of intraparty criticism, Santana Lopes asserted his legitimacy as a party leader at the PSD Congress organised in November 2004. While four months before Santana Lopes had been elected party president by the National Council, the party delegates' vote at the Barcelos Congress fully legitimised his election. Moreover, his leadership was not challenged by any other candidature for this position (Público, 2004a). Following President Sampaio's decision to dissolve the assembly, though, Santana Lopes' opponents in the party did ask that the party be led by a different president in the next

¹⁵ For more details about this episode see (TSF, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e, 2004f, 2004g, 2004h).

elections (Lopes, Ferreira, Lourenço, & Pereira, 2004; Pereira, 2004; Público, 2004d). However, the National Political Commission decided unanimously to contest the elections with Santana Lopes as the party's prime ministerial candidate (Público, 2004c, 2004e, 2004f). The Political Commission's decision was also endorsed by the National Council, the party's legislative body, by more than 90 per cent of the votes cast (Público, 2004g). Santana Lopes did step down as president of the PSD, but only after the Social-Democrats were defeated in February 2005. His resignation was therefore no different from that of his predecessors', Pinto Balsemão, Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Fernando Nogueira and Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, who assumed personal responsibility for failing to deliver electoral success. Overall then, the institutional perspective on the prime minister-party relationship does not reveal any reason why Santana Lopes should not be coded as a *de facto* party leader. Although his initial election as party leader in July 2004 was internally contested on the grounds that he had not been elected by the National Congress, his leadership was legitimised at the Barcelos Congress, where he was elected as party president by the party militants, and by the PSD's endorsement as future prime minister in the 2005 elections.

The PM-party relationship in the PS (2005-2009)

The 2005 legislative elections returned the Socialist party in government with an absolute parliamentary majority. As a result, José Sócrates, the Socialist leader, formed the first single-party majority government in the PS history (P. T. de Almeida & Freire, 2005, p. 458). Sócrates had held the presidency of the Socialist party since 2004, when President Sampaio's decision to appoint Santana Lopes as prime minister instead of calling early elections triggered the resignation of the PS leader, Ferro Rodrigues. A former minister in António Guterres' governments between 1997 and 2002, José Sócrates then contested the party leadership against the more leftist factions in the Socialist party represented by Manuel Alegre and João Soares. He was elected secretary general in September 2004 with 78.6 per cent of the party members' vote, while his list for the National Commission obtained 81.74 per cent of the vote in the 2004 party congress (Acção Socialista, 2004; TSF, 2004j). José Sócrates' authority was nevertheless consolidated by his ability to deliver an absolute majority for the party in the 2005 elections.

The personalisation of leadership in the Socialist party has both historical and institutional sources. The founding context, as well as the top-down administrative approach imposed by Mário Soares, the PS founding president (1973-1986), explains the pre-eminence of the leader in the internal balance of power (Magone, 1995, p. 96; Sablosky, 1997, p. 62). The existing level of personalisation was nevertheless enhanced by the mode of election of the party leader (Lobo, 2005b, p. 283). In 1998, the PS was the first Portuguese party to adopt the direct election of the president by party members using the one-person, one-vote method¹⁶. The increase in the party's internal democracy has nevertheless increased the centralisation and the concentration of power at the level of national leadership (Lobo, 2002, p. 256). The election of the national secretariat through the closed-list method on the proposal of the secretary-general, as well as the latter's control over the composition of the political commission and the selection of candidates for general elections, explains the leader's authority within the party's national bodies (Lisi, 2006, p. 390). However, similar to the PSD, the influence of the PS leaders has become increasingly contingent on their electoral success (Lobo, 2005b, p. 283).

Several factors bear out José Sócrates' unchallenged leadership of the Socialist party between 2005 and 2009. First, he belonged to the inner circle of new Socialist leaders, such as António Guterres and Ferro Rodrigues, who aimed to steer the party towards the centre and had campaigned on a "third way" ideological platform since 1992 (Lobo & Magalhães, 2001). Consequently, he received the full support of the new leadership when he competed against the PS historical leaders grouped around Mário Soares and Manuel Alegre in 2004 (TSF, 2004i). However, Sócrates' election as party leader by over 70 per cent of the militants in 2004, when the Socialist party was in opposition, also demonstrated his personal base of support among the PS rank-and-file. José Sócrates' personal authority over the party was boosted by the electoral victory delivered in 2005 and by his effectiveness as a prime minister. His unquestioned authority over the cabinet and the promptness with which he punished any deviation from the government's programme, as emphasised by the abrupt resignation of the Finance Minister Campos e Cunha, did not

¹⁶ The 1998 PS statutes required 1,000 signatures from the party members in order to enter the party leadership race (article 59). However, the number of signatures required to run for the secretary-general position has been considerably reduced after 2003 and has generally varied between one and two hundred since then.

leave any room for the emergence of a second source of authority within the government or in the party (F. S. Costa & Cabrita, 2006; Lopes, 2006). As a result, not only was his bid for party leadership unopposed by rival candidatures in 2006, but he was re-elected as secretary-general by 97 per cent of the party members who participated to this contest (Diário de Notícias, 2006; J. P. Henriques, 2006; M. Silva, 2006). Similarly, he was re-confirmed as leader at the 2009 Socialist Congress by over 96 per cent of the party members, who also endorsed him as the party's prime ministerial candidate.

José Sócrates' base of support within the party did not show any sign of weakening four years after he had been appointed as prime minister and in spite of the unprecedented waves of street protests raised by the austerity reforms that his government had to introduce (Diário de Notícias, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c). The lack of competing candidatures as well as the near unanimity of José Sócrates' second re-election as party leader prompted several historical leaders, such as Manuel Alegre, to voice concerns regarding the impact of direct elections on the quality of debates within the party (Diário de Notícias, 2009d; J. P. Henriques, 2009a). However, the possibility of changing the mode of election of the party leader did not grow into a dominant theme of debate.

5.3 The data set on Portuguese ministers

This section focuses on the political background of the ministers covered by the Portugal data set. We begin by describing the variables included in this data set and by discussing the measures of fixed characteristics and events in the Portuguese context. Subsequently, we compare the distribution of data in the two governments under study. This analysis is structured along the four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are compared across the country studies: cabinet experience, parliamentary background, experience in local administration, and involvement in party organisations.

The Portugal data set covers 56 ministers, 35 of whom served in the PSD government led by Manuel Durrão Barroso and Pedro Santana Lopes, and 21 in the Socialist government led by José Sócrates. Over the time period under analysis there have been eight state ministers and 48 cabinet ministers. The data set contains 30 instances of individual termination events. The fixed characteristics included in the analysis indicate

whether or not the ministers had a senior status in the cabinet and their previous experience in a full ministerial position and if they were recruited from the parliamentary pool or from the local administration pool. Involvement in party politics is captured by two variables. The first one indicates whether ministers were politically affiliated to a party organisation, while the second one indicates the ministers' position in the party hierarchy. Table 5.1 provides definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers.

Table 5.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (Portugal)

Variable	Definition	Mean
Seniority	Dummy variable equal to one for state ministers.	0.14
Executive experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who had previously held full cabinet positions.	0.25
MP	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who won a seat in last general elections.	0.39
Parliamentary experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who have won at least 2 parliamentary mandates during their career.	0.41
Local administration experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who held a position in local administration at the moment of appointment (mayors and members of local executive bodies or municipal assemblies).	0.13
Independents	Dummy variable equal to one if the minister is not affiliated to a political party.	0.27
Party executives	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are members in their parties' national executive bodies.	0.21

The main events variables included in the Portugal data set record disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties, as indicators of principal-agent relationships, and resignation calls as measures of ministerial performance.

Similar to the French study, conflicts between ministers and presidents, prime ministers and parties are recorded each time cabinet members are criticised in public by one of the principals, as reported in the newspaper used for data collection. The issue at stake may be related to the ministers' performance in executive or party office or to their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues. In addition to the French case, the pressure exercised by presidents on cabinet ministers includes a legislative

component, due to the ability of Portuguese presidents to veto both parliamentary bills and executive decrees and refer legislation for constitutional review (Article 136, Portuguese Constitution). While the president's veto on a parliamentary bill may be overturned by the absolute majority of the deputies, the political veto on executive decrees is definitive. Portuguese presidents use their veto and constitutional referral powers frequently. President Sampaio vetoed 55 executive decrees and eight parliamentary bills during his second term (2001-2006). In addition, he also referred eight parliamentary bills to the Constitutional Court (Freire & Pinto, 2010, p. 108). President Cavaco Silva did not veto any executive decree during 2006-2009, but he returned 13 bills to the parliament and he referred another 12 to the Constitutional Court (Freire & Pinto, 2010, p. 108). The use of legislative veto powers is worth taking into account as it does seem to constrain and subject governments to greater public scrutiny and debate, while asserting the president's influence over the formulation of policies (Jalali, 2011, p. 170). The dataset includes 28 instances when an executive decree or a parliamentary bill initiated by one of the cabinet members covered by this dataset was vetoed or referred to the Constitutional Court by the president.

The non-legislative component of presidential pressure is related to the Portuguese presidents' "going-public tactics" (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, p. 247) of setting the public agenda. These tactics have ranged from president Soares' open presidencies and "magistracy of influence" to public speeches made at public events or in other common occasions (Araújo, 2003, p. 95; 96-97; Cruz, 1994, p. 256; Soares, 2002, p. 221). The literature has also emphasised the effectiveness of these soft powers in wearing down governments and increase opposition to cabinet proposals (Amorim & Lobo, 2009, pp. 247-250; Jalali, 2011, pp. 170-171). The blocking and reinforcing effects of legislative and soft presidential powers on the government's activity are discussed by Aníbal Cavaco Silva in his autobiography (Cavaco Silva, 2004a, pp. 403-444).

Resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign. If they are asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded only if new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. Overall, the data set includes 70 resignation calls. They are grouped in four categories, according to the proximate reasons that led to their occurrence: personal errors – when ministers are held responsible for their own mistakes, errors of judgement, gaffes, involvement in personal or

financial scandals, or are seen to be performing badly over a long period of time; departmental errors – when serious mistakes occur in the minister’s jurisdiction or department; policy disagreements – when ministers are asked to resign because of the policies they initiated and/or implemented; and breaches of collective responsibility, when ministers are called on to resign because they challenged a decision already made by cabinets or prime ministers.

The analysis also controls for the impact of parliamentary control on the risk of deselection. The pressure exercised by the parliament on individual ministers is captured by the number of “urgency debates” that ministers are summoned to attend. Created in 1991, the “urgency debates” are plenary parliamentary sessions where unexpected polemical issues are dealt with in an expeditious way (Leston-Bandeira, 2000, 2004). Each parliamentary group is allowed to request the set up of a limited number of urgency debates in a given legislative session. They represent a useful and increasingly popular mechanism for opposition parties to put pressure on the government in general and on individual ministers in particular, given that the parliament cannot vote on individual motions of no-confidence. They also offer a good opportunity for opposition to intervene in the policy-making process in a visible way because urgency debates are extensively reported in the mass-media (Leston-Bandeira, 2004, p. 87). The data set includes 37 urgency debates.¹⁷

Other control variables take into account cabinet reshuffles and the impact of social unrest on the length of ministerial tenure. Table 5.2 provides definitions for the events variables and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers.

¹⁷ Data collected from the official records of the Portuguese National Assembly, including the *Diário da Assembleia da República* and the online archive of parliamentary debates. Available at: http://debates.parlamento.pt/search.aspx?cid=r3.dar_s2; <http://av.parlamento.pt/Default.aspx?s=0&a=Debate+de+actualidade&o=Pinho%2c+Manuel&l=10&fnd=0>;

Table 5.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (Portugal)

Variable	Definition	Mean	St. dev.	Range
Tenure	The length of ministerial tenure is measured in days.	783.48	562.54	(57, 1690)
PR Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and presidents.	0.66	1.39	(0, 7)
PM Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and prime ministers.	0.07	0.26	(0, 1)
PARTY Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and parties.	0.25	0.84	(0, 5)
Resignation calls	Number of times ministers have been asked to resign.	1.25	2.96	(0, 16)
Resignation calls (personal)	Number of times ministers have been asked to resign due to personal faults.	0.68	2.27	(0, 16)
Resignation calls (departmental)	Number of times ministers have been asked to resign due to departmental faults.	0.16	0.46	(0, 2)
Resignation calls (policy disagreements)	Number of times ministers have been asked to resign due to policy disagreements.	0.50	1.68	(0, 9)
Resignation calls (collective responsibility)	Number of times ministers have been asked to resign due to breaches of collective responsibility.	0.04	0.27	(0, 2)
Reshuffles	Number of times ministers have been reshuffled during current mandate.	0.20	0.44	(0, 2)
Urgency debates*	Number of times minister have been asked to attend urgency debates.	0.66	0.92	(0, 4)
Protests	Number of national-level strikes and protests organised during current term.	1.88	2.91	(0, 12)

*Source: Obtained from the official records of the Portuguese National Assembly, *Diário da Assembleia da República*, and the online archive of parliamentary debates.

Table 5.3 provides summary statistics for personal characteristics and events experienced by ministers within and across the governments in which they served. The data shows that the length of ministerial tenure differs significantly in the two cabinets. The mean observed tenure is 485 days in the PSD-CDS coalition and 1,281 days in the Socialist government. Two events explain the variation in the length of ministerial tenure in the two governments. The first one is Durrão Barroso's resignation as prime minister in July 2004, 833 days after he took office in April 2002. The second one is the collective resignation of

the PSD-CDS government, 149 days after Santana Lopes succeeded Durrão Barroso as prime minister. Only six of the ministers who served under PM Barroso continued in office under PM Santana Lopes.

Table 5.3 Average fixed characteristics and events by cabinet (Portugal)

Variables	Barroso/Lopes		Socrates		Overall	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
N. Ministers	35		21		56	
N. Failures	17		13		30	
Length of tenure (days)	484.86	340.93	1281.19	506.44	783.48	562.54
<i>Fixed characteristics</i>						
Seniority	0.09	0.28	0.24	0.44	0.14	0.35
Cabinet experience	0.20	0.41	0.33	0.48	0.25	0.44
MP	0.43	0.50	0.33	0.48	0.39	0.49
Parliamentary experience	0.46	0.51	0.33	0.48	0.41	0.50
Local admin. experience	0.17	0.38	0.05	0.22	0.13	0.33
Independents	0.11	0.32	0.52	0.51	0.27	0.45
Party executives	0.20	0.41	0.24	0.44	0.21	0.41
<i>Events</i>						
Conflicts PR	0.34	1.28	1.19	1.44	0.66	1.39
Conflicts PM	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.40	0.07	0.26
Conflicts PARTY	0.11	0.32	0.48	1.29	0.25	0.84
Resignation calls	1.09	2.86	1.52	3.17	1.25	2.96
Resignation calls (personal)	0.71	2.72	0.62	1.24	0.68	2.27
Resignation calls (departmental)	0.20	0.53	0.10	0.30	0.16	0.46
Resignation calls (policy disagreements)	0.20	0.72	1.00	2.55	0.50	1.68
Resignation calls (collective responsibility)	0.06	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.27
Reshuffles	0.20	0.47	0.19	0.40	0.20	0.44
Urgency debates	0.46	0.66	1.00	1.18	0.66	0.92
Protests	1.69	2.83	2.19	3.09	1.88	2.91

The distribution of events across the two governments is relatively symmetrical. The most conflictual principal-agent relationship under both governments is the president-minister one, seconded by the party-minister relationship. The relatively high number of conflicts with presidents is explained by their frequent use of veto powers and “going-public tactics” to wear down opposing governments during periods of cohabitation. By

comparison with presidents and party principals, the amount of conflicts with prime ministers was low. As a matter of fact, no conflicts were identified with the two Social-Democrat prime ministers, Durrão Barroso and Santana Lopes. The lack of conflicts in this case may be explained by the code of conduct set by Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who had been the Social Democratic Party's previous prime minister during 1985-1995. Cavaco Silva (2004b, p. 126) believed that prime ministers should refrain from criticising ministers in public or in front of anybody else and respected this rule throughout his time in office as prime minister. The lower frequency of conflicts recorded during Manuel Barroso' and Pedro Santana Lopes' time in office as prime ministers contrasts with the high number of conflicts recorded for José Sócrates' government¹⁸.


The data in Table 5.3 indicates that José Sócrates' government experienced more resignation calls than the centre-right coalition government led by Durrão Barroso and Santana Lopes. Figure 5.1 presents the distribution of resignation calls in the two governments, according to the proximate reasons of their occurrence and with respect to the deselection of the ministers who experienced them. In cases where ministers were asked to step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. This is why the total number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses on the exact number of calls or on the reason given for their occurrence. Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while white figures inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category.

The data in Figure 5.1 shows that most resignation calls occurred as a reaction to personal errors and policy disagreements. However, the data also indicates that ministers serving in the PSD-CDS coalition were more often asked to resign over personal errors, while members in the PS government faced more policy-related calls for resignation. The increased frequency of policy-related resignation calls in José Sócrates' government mirrors the higher number of urgency debates that these ministers were summoned to attend by the deputies and the greater number of protests generated by their reforms. Policy-related resignation calls also increased the risk of losing office to a considerably

¹⁸ Another reason why we may be less likely to observe conflicts between ministers and prime ministers during periods of cohabitation in general is related to the strategic occurrence of these events. For example, prime ministers may refrain from criticising their ministers in public lest that the president's party should capitalise on the mistakes of the government.

greater extent than personal errors or departmental faults. The higher number of resignation calls experienced by the Socialist government corresponds to a higher frequency of social protests that were directed against this government. Similarly, José Sócrates' ministers were more often summoned to attend urgency debates than ministers in Durrão Barroso's and Santana Lopes' government. The number of resignation calls triggered by breaches of collective responsibility is too low to generalise their impact on the length of tenure. However, the fact that the minister who experienced two resignations calls of this type also lost office is indicative of their cost for ministerial durability.

Figure 5.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (Portugal)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while numbers inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category. Both percentages and numbers refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis and not to the total number of resignation calls recorded across cabinets. *Source:* Own calculations.

The remaining parts of this section focus on the four types of political experience that are relevant for ministerial recruitment in Portugal: cabinet experience, parliamentary experience, experience in local administration and involvement in party organisations.

Similar to France, the analysis of descriptive statistics does not indicate a strong correlation between fixed characteristics and the length of ministerial tenure.

5.4 Political background of Portuguese ministers


Cabinet experience

The information related to cabinet experience is captured by two measures. The first indicates the senior ministers in the two governments. Out of the 56 ministers under study, eight were appointed as state ministers. While seniority may capture the political weight of certain ministers, it is not necessarily a good indicator of political experience. For example, half of the state ministers covered by the Portugal data set had never been served in government before. A few of them were non-partisans and had never been elected to parliament. As a result, a second indicator of cabinet experience is needed to indicate the ministers who have previously held a seat at the cabinet table.

Figure 5.2 presents the level of cabinet experience in each government and with respect to ministerial survival. The data indicates that cabinet experience was not a prerequisite for ministerial recruitment in either of the two governments. Although half of the ministers in José Sócrates' government were non-partisans, the proportion of ministers who were at their first appointment was considerably higher in the PSD-CDS government. Only one fifth of the ministers who were appointed in the latter government and one third of the members in the Socialist government had previously been full cabinet members. An average of 19 per cent of all ministers had some previous experience as junior ministers. This data does not diverge significantly from the patterns of ministerial recruitment observed in Portugal between 1976 and 1999 (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31).

Cabinet experience does not seem to make a difference for durability in office. Similar to France, we find that the lack of cabinet experience does not pose a threat to ministerial longevity. Another common finding is that experienced ministers survive in office less than their less experienced colleagues. The instability of experienced ministers in both cases may be accounted for by the stressful nature of ministerial jobs and by the experienced ministers' tendency to deviate from the preferred positions of their principals.

Figure 5.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (Portugal)




Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

Parliamentary experience

Among Western democracies, Portugal has one of the lowest rates of ministerial recruitment from the parliamentary pool. Since 1976, only 51.5 per cent of the Portuguese ministers could claim some legislative experience (Pinto & Almeida, 2009, p. 152). Figure 5.3 confirms this long-term pattern for the two governments under study and shows that almost half of the ministers included in the Portugal data set had no parliamentary background. The proportion of ministers who lacked any kind of parliamentary experience is higher in the Socialist cabinet because of the high number of independents appointed in this government.

Figure 5.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (Portugal)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

The data presented in Figure 5.3 also indicates an increase in the parliamentarisation of Portuguese cabinets. Compared to the 1976-1999 period, when almost 40 per cent of the ministers had been elected only once in the National Assembly (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31), the proportion of ministers in this situation dropped to just ten 10 per cent between 2002 and 2009. Among the number of ministers with a parliamentary background, 43 per cent had been elected twice, 18 per cent three times, and almost 22 per cent more than three times. Additionally, only seven per cent of the ministers who were elected only once had never actually served in parliament due to their promotion in the cabinet. By comparison, the proportion of ministers who had actually never served in the parliament due to their appointment to government reached 38 per cent during the 1976-1999 period (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31).

Despite the increasing trend in the recruitment of ministers with a strong legislative background, longer parliamentary careers do not necessarily minimise the risk of

ministerial deselection. The data in Figure 5.3 does not indicate that ministers without any parliamentary background were more likely to lose their job than experienced ministers. Similarly, the number of legislative mandates won does not seem to make a difference for the length of ministerial tenure.


Experience in local administration

Involvement in local and regional politics does not matter as much for the advancement of political careers at national level in Portugal as it does in France. In the latter case, deputies and ministers usually start their political careers at local level, as political parties value local roots and select their candidates for general elections and cabinet positions based on the range of political resources they possess (Bach, 2012, p. 17). The same practice does not occur in Portugal, where there is a long tradition of separation between national and local politics (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 37). However, compared to the average of just five per cent of ministers recruited from among local officials between 1976 and 1999 (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 31), the ministers appointed between 2002 and 2009 had stronger local roots. Figure 5.4 presents the data corresponding to the experience in local administration of the 56 ministers under study. The difference in the composition of the two governments is once again accounted for by the high number of independent ministers appointed in José Sócrates' cabinet.

The data in Figure 5.3 provides some evidence that ministers who have started their career at local level before being appointed in government are likely to survive longer in office. However, this finding is hardly generalisable, since only a few ministers were actually recruited from among local officials. The separation between intraparty politics at national and local level may be explained by the personalisation and factionalisation of party politics at the start of the democratic transition. For example, the Social Democratic Party was initially dominated by local and regional barons, who provided the foundation for the national organisation (Corkill, 1995, p. 69). Under these circumstances, the unity of the party could only be assured by powerful leaders, such as Sá Carneiro, Pinto Balsemão and Aníbal Cavaco Silva, who were able to neutralise the power of local barons. However, as the PSD evolved from a party dominated by local notables to a modern party with a large

grassroots membership, the barons' influence on national leadership, gradually diminished (Magone, 1995, p. 96). The national leaders' increase of authority when the party is in government also explains the strengthening of the centre with regard to local party notables and territorial party units (Bosco & Morlino, 2006, p. 353).

Figure 5.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival (Portugal)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

The formal incompatibility between holding simultaneously a local government position, such as that of a mayor or a councillor, and a cabinet seat (Decamp, 1995, p. 136) does not allow us to examine the impact of electoral victories and defeats in second-order elections on the length of ministerial tenure. Incumbent ministers who wish to contest local elections must resign before announcing their candidacy. The decision to leave office in order to contest elections is nevertheless rarely taken by Portuguese ministers. During the time period under study, only António Costa, a state minister for interior administration in

José Sócrates' cabinet, stepped down in order to contest the snap elections organised in Lisbon when the incumbent PSD mayor stepped down in April 2007. These elections were regarded by the Socialist party as an opportunity to assert its popularity after one year in office, at a time when the government's key social reforms were raising unprecedented waves of social protests. Thus, the candidature of António Costa, the most popular minister in the PS government and second only to José Sócrates in the party hierarchy, should be interpreted as a strategic move for the benefit of the party rather than as an indicator of a change in the patterns of mobility between different levels of government.¹⁹

Party experience


Despite their factionalism and weak social infiltration, the PS and the PSD have controlled the major routes to executive office since 1976. Almost half of the ministers and state secretaries appointed between 1976 and 1999 were senior party members (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002, p. 32). The parties' control over the government also increases when senior positions in the cabinet are allocated to national party executives, as most political decisions are taken by an "inner cabinet" that includes the premier and senior ministers (Lobo, 2005b, p. 279).

Figure 5.5 presents the partisan composition of the PSD and the PS governments. On average, about one fifth of the ministers appointed in both governments were senior party members.²⁰ The data also includes two presidents of local party organisations, who are not visible in Figure 5.5 because their national and local leadership roles overlap.

¹⁹ More details about the political context of António Costa's resignation from government to run in the 2007 mayoral election in Lisbon can be found in J. P. Henriques, Sá, & Morais, 2007; J. P. Henriques, 2007; Hortelão & Fragoso, 2007; Santos, 2007; Sá, 2007b.

²⁰ In this case seniority denotes membership in national executive bodies such as the Socialist Party's National Political Commission and National Secretariat, the PSD's National Political Commission and the CDS-PP's National Political Commission and Executive Commission. Presidents of parliamentary caucuses are also considered senior party members.

Figure 5.5 Party experience across governments and by survival (Portugal)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations.

Taking into account the increase in the authority of national leaders when their party is in power, high positions in the party hierarchy should correlate with longer ministerial tenures (Bosco & Morlino, 2006, p. 353). This expectation is confirmed by the data presented in Figure 5.5. The presence of senior party members in government and their longevity in office is a strong indicator for the party principal's authority over the cabinet.

Apart from the presence of senior party members in government, Figure 5.5 also reveals that a high number of non-partisan ministers were offered a cabinet seat between 2002 and 2009. The high number of independent ministers appointed in José Sócrates' government stands out because the Socialist party enjoyed an absolute majority in the parliament between 2005 and 2009. A precedent for the increase in the number of independent ministers in the cabinets formed by the PS had been set by the previous Socialist Prime Minister, António Guterres. Ahead of the 1995 general election, Guterres set up the *Estados Gerais*, a political forum that aimed to bring together party members and

non-partisans and facilitate their work on a future government programme that could present the Socialist Party as a viable alternative to the Social-Democratic Party. The legacy of the *Estados Gerais* for the composition of Guterres' cabinets translated into 31 per cent of independent ministers in the government formed in 1995 and 28 per cent of non-partisan appointments in the 1999 cabinet (Ferreira-Pereira, 2008; Lobo, 2002).

Figure 5.5 suggests a correlation between non-partisanship and forced exits from government. Independent ministers were more likely to lose their job than party members or senior party members. Another interesting pattern visible in Figure 5.5 regards the correlation between the number of non-partisan ministers and that of senior party members appointed in the cabinet. While the composition of the PSD government is dominated by party members without leadership experience, there are more senior party members than ordinary party members in the PS government. The increased presence of senior party members in a government where half of the seats are given to independent ministers can be an indicator for the party principal's grip over the executive decision-making process that takes place in the inner cabinet.

To sum up, the relative unimportance of local politics and parliamentary experience and the unusual number of non-partisan ministers suggest that the party principal's influence over the government is not exercised through the usual channels of representation in Portugal. However, party principals manage to keep a tight grip on the cabinet due their presence in government and to the concentration of the decision-making system in an inner cabinet formed around the prime ministers and senior party members.


5.5 Fixed characteristics, events, and ministerial durability in Portugal

This section assesses the impact of fixed characteristics and principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure in Portugal. The data set includes the exact dates when ministers take and leave office. The ministers' observed tenure is right-censored if they leave office collectively, as happened in December 2004 when Santana Lopes and his cabinet resigned after President Sampaio's dissolved the assembly and called early elections. Ministers are also right-censored if they are still in office at the end of the time period under study. This is the case for several ministers in José Sócrates' government who

were reappointed in the PS government formed after the 2009 elections. Ministers who were not reappointed in the 2009 government are recorded as failed observations. Additionally, the length of tenure is not interrupted for ministers who continue in office when Durrão Barroso was succeeded as prime minister by Santana Lopes. The duration in office is also not interrupted if ministers are assigned to different portfolios during their time in office. The Portugal data set includes 56 ministers who were appointed between 2002 and 2009. 30 ministers stepped down before the collective end of their cabinets or were not reappointed when their government returned to power after general elections.

Figure 5.6 shows the unconditional probability that ministers will survive beyond a certain time when no covariates are taken into consideration.

Figure 5.6 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival (Portugal)



Overall, Portuguese ministers have a 50% chance of surviving 1,053 days in office. However, the length of ministerial tenure varies significantly in the two governments. As shown in Figure 5.7, ministers who served in the Socialist government had a 50% chance of

surviving 1,689 days in office, while those who were appointed in the PSD-CDS coalition had a 50% chance of surviving only 833 days in office. The difference in the ministers' length of tenure is explained by the dissolution of the assembly and the calling of early elections in December 2004, 22 months after Manuel Durrão Barroso was appointed as prime minister and just four months after he was succeeded in office by Pedro Santana Lopes. The result of the log-rank test presented in Figure 5.7 indicates that the survival of ministers varies in proportional ways in the two governments.

Figure 5.7 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across cabinets (Portugal)




Table 5.4 presents three models. Model 1 focuses on personal characteristics variables, while Model 2 takes into consideration only events variables. Model 3 estimates the joint impact of political background and events on ministerial longevity. The models present coefficients from Cox regressions and report standard errors clustered by ministers. The observations are clustered by ministers and the data set includes 56 clusters. Positive coefficients imply that the risk of deselection rises and indicate a shorter length of tenure,

while negative coefficients decrease the hazard rate and are therefore expected to increase the length of tenure. The specification of the models with regard to the nonlinearity of the explanatory variables is assessed using link tests (reported at the bottom of Table 5.4). The diagnostic tests verifying that the explanatory variables included in the models have a proportional and constant effect that is invariant to time are reported in Appendix B (B.1, B.3, and B.5). The analysis of Schoenfeld residuals has revealed that several variables violate the assumption of proportional hazards. To address their non-proportionality and increase the models' accuracy in assessing their effects, these variables were interacted with the natural logarithm of time (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001, p. 978). As a result, the three regressions presented in Table 5.4 are extended applications of the Cox model. The Appendix includes a comparison of the results obtained before and after the treatment of non-proportional variables for each of the three models (B.2, B.4, and B.6). All variables that have been found to violate the proportional hazard assumption at the 0.05 level in one model have been interacted with the natural logarithm of time in all models for the ease of comparative interpretations of their effects across the three models. The results presented in the Appendix show that the treatment of non-proportional variables does not affect significantly the size of the estimated coefficients or their sign.

Model 1 confirms the limited impact of fixed characteristics on the length of ministerial tenure. Ministers recruited from the parliamentary pool seem to survive in office longer than their non-elected peers. However, this finding is not robust and the statistical significance of this variable disappears in Model 3, which estimates the joint impact of fixed characteristics and events on the length of tenure. Similarly, ministers with a stronger parliamentary background appear more prone to deselection in Model 1, but not in Model 3. The only robust finding related to the impact of political background on ministerial durability concerns the ministers' position in the party hierarchy. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of *Party experience* indicates that senior party members appointed in the cabinet are likely to survive longer in office. This finding confirms the expectation regarding the increase in the authority of senior party members over the government and party organisations when they are in power (Bosco & Morlino, 2006, p. 353).

Table 5.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in Portugal

	Model 1	Model2	Model3
Fixed characteristics			
Seniority	0.53 (0.85)		0.72 (0.69)
Cabinet experience	-0.05 (0.45)		0.09 (0.41)
MP#	-0.12* (0.08)		0.02 (0.10)
Parliamentary experience	0.95* (0.52)		0.69 (0.69)
Local administration experience	0.65 (0.50)		0.64 (0.40)
Party executive	-2.15** (0.82)		-2.48** (0.93)
Independent	-0.66 (0.55)		-0.19 (0.47)
Events			
Urgency debates		3.79*** (0.58)	3.11*** (0.81)
Protests#		0.14*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.05)
Reshuffles#		-0.19 (0.39)	0.16 (0.39)
Resignation calls (personal)		-1.19** (0.50)	-1.90** (0.89)
Resignation calls (departmental)		-5.18** (1.90)	-5.50** (2.39)
Resignation calls (policy disagreements)		1.45*** (0.32)	1.37** (0.44)
PR Conflicts		1.83*** (0.46)	0.85 (0.61)
PM Conflicts		3.92** (1.55)	4.83** (2.30)
PARTY Conflicts		3.43*** (0.76)	4.64** (1.49)
N Ministers	56	56	56
N Observations	540	540	540
N Failures	30	30	30
Log-likelihood	-85.488	-73.319	-69.144
Linktest hat(squared)	-0.14 $p=(.57)$	-0.09 $p=(.57)$	-0.08 $p=(.53)$

Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (56 clusters).

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Variables interacted with the natural logarithm of time to address their non-proportional effects.

The variation in the weight of party roles on the durability of French and Portuguese ministers points towards a relationship between different types of party systems and ministerial turnover. The organisational weakness of French political parties and their operation within a presidentialised party system explains why experienced ministers, who have fewer incentives to put up with policy compromises that may endanger their re-election at national and local level, are not willing to cling to office at any cost. By contrast, the governmentalisation of Portuguese parties, which control both cabinet appointments and the executive decision-making process that takes place in the inner cabinet, explains the longer durability of ministers with senior positions in the party hierarchy.

Model 2 estimates the impact of events on the risk of deselection, while Model 3 estimates the joint impact of fixed characteristics and events on the length of tenure. The results corresponding to the impact of cabinet reshuffles, resignation calls, parliamentary control and social unrest are robust and hardly change from one model to another. While all variables corresponding to different types of resignation calls are statistically significant, only the coefficient corresponding to policy-related resignation calls is positive.²¹ Thus, only policy-related resignation calls increase a minister's risk of losing office. Resignation calls related to personal faults and departmental faults have not cost ministers their jobs. For example, recurring resignation calls did not lead to the dismissal of Paulo Portas, the CDS leader and state minister who was involved in several scandals of financial embezzlement such as the *Moderna Affair* and the *Portucale case*. Similarly, Jaime Silva, the minister for agriculture in the PS government, did not lose his cabinet seat although he was repeatedly called on to resign by backbenchers on account of his negative performance in office. Instead, ministers who initiated unpopular reforms and attempted to reduce spending in their departments, such as the education minister Pedro Lynce in the PSD-CDS cabinet, or the health and education ministers in the Socialist cabinet, Maria de Lurdes Rodrigues and António Correia de Campos, were either dismissed or not re-appointed when their government returned to power after the 2009 elections.

The detrimental effect of unpopular reforms on ministerial longevity is confirmed by the results corresponding to the impact of social protests and urgency debates on

²¹ The resignation calls related to breaches of collective responsibility have not been included in the analysis because only two episodes of this kind were recorded for the time period under study.

deselection. The positive and statistically significant mean coefficient on *Protest* in Models 2 and 3 indicates that social unrest increased the risk of deselection, despite the high popularity ratings of the Socialist government and prime minister (Dores, Fonseca, & Cabrita, 2007; V. J. Silva, 2007).

Similarly, ministers summoned by deputies to attend urgency debates, mostly related to unpopular reforms, were also more likely to lose their jobs. The impact of parliamentary pressure on ministerial longevity is not entirely surprising. As far as its institutional autonomy is concerned, the weakness of the Portuguese parliament is outranked in Europe only by the French, Russian and Cypriot assemblies (Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 755). On the other hand though, the National Assembly's influence over the executive is one of the strongest among European parliaments, as Portuguese deputies have extensive powers of control, investigation, oversee and interpellation over the executive branch of government (Fish & Kroenig, 2009, p. 545).

The positive and statistically significant coefficients corresponding to the conflict variables in Model 2 confirm that ministers who are at odds with their principals are more likely to lose their jobs. The only principal-agent relationship that loses statistical significance in Model 3 is the minister-president one. The positive and statistically significant coefficient corresponding to *PR Conflicts* in Model 2 indicates that conflicts with presidents increase the risk of deselection. However, when the ministers' political background is also taken into account the statistically significant impact of conflicts with presidents disappears. As the only personal characteristic that reaches statistical significance in Model 3 concerns the ministers' position in the party hierarchy, the impact of presidential pressure on ministerial survival may be taken over by the combined effect of the variables recording party-related personal characteristics and events. Thus, while party executives do not suffer any repercussions over clashes with presidents, they are still under the control of prime ministers and party principals outside the government.

In general, though, there is evidence to suggest that conflicts with presidents are not entirely consequence free. An example of the effective way in which presidents can use both means of influence to block or at least slow down the reforms pursued by cabinet ministers is visible in the policy record of Mário Lino, the minister for public works in José Sócrates' cabinet. President Cavaco Silva was a prominent actor in the public debates


generated by minister Lino's policy initiatives, most of which failed or were withdrawn (J. P. Henriques, 2009b). Within less than a year after the president expressed his doubts regarding the location of a new international airport in Ota, the government reversed minister Lino's original decision and eventually postponed the construction of the new airport altogether. Another two projects that President Cavaco Silva held up by expressing his reservation, as well as by asking the government to revise Mário Lino's decrees in January 2009, regarded the construction of four high-speed railway routes and the re-evaluation of the highway concession arrangements to Estradas de Portugal. Mário Lino was constantly weakened by the president's interventions in the policy process, which constrained his ability of action and made him the subject of increased public scrutiny and debates (Sá, 2009). Shortly before the 2009 elections, minister Lino announced his decision not to continue in office if the government returned to power. Thus, Portuguese presidents are sometimes able to influence both the policy-making process and the length of ministerial tenure.

The results presented in Model 3 confirm the undisputed authority of Portuguese prime ministers over the cabinet executive decision-making process and emphasise the considerable extent of influence that the party principal retains over the cabinet composition. The effects of the conflict variables are graphically interpreted in Figure 5.8. Separate illustrations of the impact of conflicts with each principal on ministerial durability are included in the Appendix (B.7-B.9).

Figure 5.8 confirms the significant variation in the ability of each principal to influence the length of ministerial tenure. Overall, conflicts with any of the three principals are more likely to cost ministers their jobs in the early days of their appointment than later on. The intensity of control increases in the first two years following appointment and then declines. A final increase in the risk of deselection occurs towards the end the ministers' term in office, as the next electoral cycle comes closer. The results in Figure 5.8 clearly emphasise that the party principal's authority over cabinet ministers outweighs both presidents and prime ministers. Compared to presidents and prime ministers, conflicts with party principals have a considerably stronger impact on deselection immediately after appointment. The maximum impact of conflicts is reached within the first year after appointment and then decreases gradually. Overall, these results emphasise a direct

relationship between the governmentalisation of Portuguese parties and ministerial turnover. Thus, the presence of senior party members in government and their inclusion in the inner cabinet formed around the prime minister does make a difference not only for their own longevity in ministerial office, but also for the party principal's ability to keep a tight grip on cabinet composition in general.

Figure 5.8 Impact of principal-agent relations (Portugal)



5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the determinants of ministerial survival in Portugal. The patterns of ministerial recruitment in Portugal stand out because of the relative unimportance of local politics, the declining importance of parliamentary experience and the frequent non-partisan appointments in government (P. T. de Almeida & Pinto, 2002; Pinto & Almeida, 2009). This chapter has confirmed that the two governments under study make no exception to these patterns. The empirical analysis has also shown that with the exception

of the ministers' position in the party hierarchy, no other fixed characteristics affect their length of tenure. This finding suggests that although the Portuguese parties have less control on the usual channels of representation that place a premium on political experience, they are able to keep a tight grip on governments due to their increased presence in government and to the concentration of the decision-making process in the inner cabinet.

In stark contrast with France, the analysis of principal-agent relationships in Portugal has confirmed the standard wisdom that Portuguese presidents have considerably fewer means of influencing the process of cabinet deselection compared to prime ministers. The weakness of Portuguese presidents and the tight grip of prime ministers over cabinet members have proved robust with regard to institutional context. However, this chapter has also emphasised that under certain circumstances presidents can use both legislative powers and "going-public" tactics to wear down individual ministers. The analysis has also confirmed the general assumption that the Portuguese government operates under the rule of party leadership (Colomer, 1996). We have presented empirical evidence that substantiates the extensive involvement of parties in the process of cabinet appointments, as well as in the deselection of ministers. The multivariate analysis has also shown that the governmentalisation of political parties has important consequences for the process of ministerial turnover in Portugal.

The comparison of the variation in the impact of different principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure in different national contexts reveals a direct link between different types of party systems and ministerial accountability. The French case shows that when the party system undergoes a process of presidentialisation, cabinet ministers are likely to fall under the direct control of presidents or prime ministers, depending on the institutional context that favours the pre-eminence of one or the other within the political system. Conversely, the Portuguese case suggests that when the party system undergoes a process of governmentalisation, cabinet ministers are more likely to be accountable to prime ministers and their parties regardless of institutional context.

Chapter Six: Ministerial deselection in Romania

On 29 June 2006, Teodor Atanasiu, the National Liberal Party's (PNL) minister of defence, urged the Supreme Defence Council (CSAT) to order the withdrawal of the Romanian military forces from Iraq. The decision had been taken by the central leadership of the PNL, which included Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, as the prime minister and leader of this political party. The minister also sent a telegram to the Romanian military attaches abroad, asking them to inform the authorities of the countries in which they served that the Romanian troops would be withdrawn from the US-led coalition in Iraq. This initiative had not been discussed with coalition partners or with the president, who is the commander-in-chief of the army, and none of Romania's allies had been previously informed about the troop pullout plan. Although the plan was eventually rejected by the CSAT and strongly criticised by the president, the minister remained in office (Ruse, 2006).

In October 2006, two Romanian workers were detained for taking pictures without permission on a US military base close to Mosul. They were subsequently transferred to Baghdad where they were debriefed by the Romanian authorities. When this information appeared in the media at the end of January 2007, President Băsescu declared that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had informed him about the workers' situation in November 2006. PM Tăriceanu, who had not been informed about this issue, urged the foreign affairs ministers to resign. Ungureanu resigned two days later, despite the internal and international appreciation of his competency (Pora, 2007).

Why was minister Ungureanu sacked for failing to inform the prime minister about a regular consular issue, while his colleague at the department of defence was not sanctioned for not informing the president, who is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, about a fundamental military situation? A principal-agent perspective captures the essence of such a situation, which cannot be accurately decoded by a constitutional reading of this political scenario. The foreign affairs minister's failure to keep the prime minister informed on the evolution of the release operation may not have had an impact on the success of the release operation, but it gave the president a personal

edge over the prime minister in executive affairs (Popescu et al. 2007). Conversely, the Iraq troop pullout plan had been drawn by the defence minister with the tacit approval of the prime minister, his principal in the government as well as the party hierarchy. Of the two ministers in the wrong, it was the one who had the support of the prime minister that survived, while the one who was supported by the president stepped down. The different resolution of two conflicts between cabinet ministers and the two principals in the executive allows us to single out the circumstances under which presidents and the prime ministers can sanction agency loss.

This chapter is structured into four parts. The first section outlines the data, the time period, the institutional context, and the determinants of ministerial duration that are captured by the analysis of Romanian ministers. The second section focuses on intraparty politics and examines the organisational transformation undergone by the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), the National Liberal Party (PNL) and the Democratic Party (PD/PDL) during the time period under analysis. This analysis reveals to what extent holding the presidency of a political party before taking office allows presidents to control their parties even after they formally step down as party leaders. The third section describes the data collected for the Romanian case study and explains the measurement of fixed characteristics and events in this context. The last section of this chapter completes the study of ministerial turnover in Romania with a multivariate analysis that estimates the length of ministerial tenure as function of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent relationships between ministers, presidents, premiers, and party principals. This analysis also estimates the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to control the process of ministerial deselection under different executive scenarios.

6.1 Determinants of ministerial durability in Romania

The data set corresponding to the Romania case-study covers 101 ministers who were in office between 2000 and 2008. Each of the three dual-executive scenarios that can be used to describe the relationship between presidents and prime ministers in semi-presidential systems occurred during this period of time. The scenario of unified executive occurred as a result of the Social-Democratic Party's (PSD) victory in the presidential and parliamentary

elections of 2000. President Iliescu and PM Năstase, both of whom were PSD members, remained in office until November 2004, when new presidential and parliamentary elections were organised. The scenario of divided executive, which is defined as the situation when the president and the prime minister belong to different political parties and the president's party is in government, started in December 2004, when President Băsescu of the Democratic Party (PD) appointed Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu of the PNL as prime minister. The period of divided executive ended in April 2007, when President Băsescu's PD/PDL party left the governing coalition. This political event triggered the onset of a period of cohabitation, which lasted until the 2008 election. The alternation of the three executive scenarios between 2000 and 2008 provides a good opportunity to test the impact of different president-prime minister relations on ministerial turnover in the same country.

Similar to the French and the Portuguese studies, the Romanian data set includes ministers and state ministers, but does not cover state secretaries due to their exclusive accountability to line ministers. While the units of observation in the data set are the 101 ministers, the units of analysis are the events experienced by ministers during their time in office. Overall, 1,717 observations related to the events experienced by ministers were recorded from approximately 23,724 articles published in *Evenimentul zilei* during the ministers' time in office and accessed through the online archive which is available on the newspaper's website. The articles used for data collection were selected using keywords related to major events, such as resignations, dismissals and reshuffles, and to conflictual situations involving scandals, policy disagreements, personal and departmental faults, breaches of collective responsibility, and protests. Each observation includes the type of event recorded, the political actors involved, and the reasons that caused it. The events experienced by ministers may be terminal or non-terminal. Terminal events refer to individual termination events, such as resignations and dismissals. The non-terminal events cover conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers (recorded each time one of the principals criticises ministers publicly), resignation calls, cabinet reshuffles, simple motions tabled in either of the two parliamentary chambers against individual ministers, and national-level strikes and protests that occurred within each minister's area of responsibility. The proximate reasons used for coding of events include policy

disagreements, personal and departmental errors, performance in office, appointments outside cabinet, intra-cabinet and intra-party conflicts, and non-political reasons.

Like in France, and in contrast to Portugal, the institutional framework adopted after the fall of communism has led to the presidentialisation of Romanian parties. The directly elected presidency was introduced in 1990, in the context of a weakly institutionalised party system dominated by a single political organisation, the National Salvation Front (FSN). The FSN was set up during the Revolution of December 1989 as an umbrella movement designed to act as a provisional body of state power until new elections were organised. Its decision to contest the first post-communist elections was considered unfair and sparked countrywide protests (S. Stoica, 2010, p. 28). The FSN also controlled a majority of seats in the Provisional Council of National Union (CPUN) that administered the country ahead of the first free elections. The CPUN set out Romania's semi-presidential framework by passing the Electoral Law of 14 March 1990, which established that the presidency should be directly elected and set a common date for presidential and parliamentary elections in May 1990 (Verheijen, 1999, p. 195). The concurrent date for presidential and legislative elections focused politics on national leadership. The results of the first presidential and parliamentary elections, where Ion Iliescu won 85 per cent of the vote and the FSN more than two-thirds of the mandates, established the figure of the head of state as the *de facto* leader of the parliamentary majority.

The presidentialisation of intraparty relations explains the presidential working mode of the Romanian political system during periods of unified executive, when presidents act as *de facto* leaders of their former parties and are able to turn prime ministers into their agents (Samuels & Shugart, 2010, p. 121). As a result, we expect that the president's authority over cabinet ministers increases during periods of unified executive. Comparative studies of presidential and prime ministerial power in post-communist countries have also singled out the weakness of prime ministers when they belong to the same party as the president (Baylis, 1996, 2007, p. 97). However, presidents should have fewer opportunities of intervening in executive affairs during cohabitation, when they lack both formal and informal means of controlling the parliamentary majority. Under this executive scenario, prime ministers should assume a strong leadership role over their cabinets. In addition to the unified executive and the cohabitation scenarios, which are also

present in the French and Portuguese country-studies, the Romanian data set also covers a period of divided executive. Due to the president' and the prime minister's affiliation with different parties during periods of divided executive, presidents are less likely to succeed in altering the principal-agent relationship between prime ministers and their parties. If prime ministers no longer act as presidential agents, then the head of state's informal influence may only extend to ministers who belong to his or her former party. Overall then, presidents should be less influential under divided executive than under unified executive, but more powerful than under cohabitation. Similarly, the prime minister's control over the cabinet should be stronger under divided executive than under unified executive.

The second section of this chapter analyses the party relationships between presidents and prime ministers. The considerable influence of Romanian presidents over the government has been put down to their authority over their former parties in spite of a limited range of formal executive powers (Krouwel, 2003, pp. 13–14; Pîrvulescu, 2000, p. 11). This section emphasises the intraparty organisational resources that allow presidents to continue in their role as *de facto* party leaders after they formally given up their party responsibilities. To emphasise the circumstances that allow presidents to turn prime ministers and cabinet members into their own agents, the analysis focuses on the inclusiveness and the competitiveness of the leadership selection process in the Social-Democratic Party between 2000 and 2004 and in the Democratic Party between 2004 and 2008. This analysis shows that presidents who are allowed to organise their own succession in the party are able to control not only the party organisation, but also the parliamentary parties and their representatives in government if their party is in power. Similarly, we also emphasise to what extent the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy matters for the extent of their authority over the cabinet. To do so we analyse the relationship between prime ministers and their parties in the Social-Democratic Party between 2000 and 2004 and in the National Liberal Party between 2004 and 2008. This approach allows us to compare the influence of a prime minister who was elected as party leader after his appointment as head of government with the authority of a prime minister who came to power as a party leader. The analysis emphasises the difference that holding the presidency of a party makes for the autonomy of prime ministers with respect to their own party and for their ability to act as principals for cabinet members.

The third section of the chapter focuses on the political background of the ministers covered by the Romania data set. Although the reproduction of the old nomenklatura elite during the first years of regime transition reached one of the highest rate in Romania compared to other East European countries²², the patterns of ministerial careers have undergone a gradual process of institutionalisation. Similar to other European democracies, the standard route to ministerial office in Romania includes some experience acquired at different levels of the national government or in local administration and may be the culmination of a long parliamentary or party career (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 39). The third section of this chapter analyses the salience of each political resource for government appointments and looks at the correlation between different types of political experience and the length of tenure. In addition to discussing the individual weight of political resources for the appointment and durability of cabinet ministers, this section also emphasises the variation in their importance in different governments and political parties.

The analysis of different types of political experience reveals significant differences between the composition of the centre-left and centre-right governments. The Social-Democratic Party's presence in power between 1990 and 1996 explains why the level of political professionalisation and executive experience in the PSD government is considerably higher than that of the PNL-PD government (Ionaşcu, 2006a, p. 47). Similarly, the parliamentary background of the PSD ministers is stronger than that of the PNL or PD/PDL ministers. However, the parliamentary route has not been the single most important path to ministerial office in post-communist Romania, although the combination of parliamentary and cabinet positions is the only type of multiple office-holding legally permitted²³. Only 50 per cent of the ministers who took office between 1990 and 2008 had been elected at least once to either of the two parliamentary chambers (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 40). The separation between the parliamentary and the executive elites of the Romanian parties has been put down to the indiscipline of parliamentary groups (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 611). The deputies selected for ministerial appointments are those who have a senior position in the parliamentary hierarchy, such as the presidency or the vice-presidency of

²² While the rejuvenation of political elites in most other East European countries had largely been carried out by 1993 (Szelényi & Szelényi, 1995, p. 629), it was only after 1996 that the presence of former communist office-holders in the Romanian governments dropped below 40 per cent (Grosescu, 2004, p. 120).

²³ Law no. 161/2003, art. 81.

parliamentary commissions (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 40). Since the allocation of these positions is made on a political basis, their holders are usually high-ranking party officials. As a result, the potential for agency loss is considerably reduced.

Party experience emerges as the single most successful route to executive office. The majority of cabinet ministers appointed between 1990 and 2008 were members in their parties' executive bodies (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 603). By comparison, the parliamentary route accounts for little more than 50 per cent, while only 12 per cent of the post-communist ministers have had any experience in local administration (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 603). The legal ban on the simultaneous holding of local and national offices²⁴ has prevented the emergence of a similar *cumul de mandats* phenomenon as in France and explains the separation between the local and the national levels of decision-making. A separation between national and local leadership also exists within political parties, as few leaders of local party organisations have been offered a seat at the cabinet table. Thus, national party leaders are both the selectorate and the main contenders for high public office.

The presence of senior party members in cabinet depends on the political parties that are in power. In general, the PSD governments have included fewer senior party members than the centre-right governments. While the PSD values party seniority, this party has also actively pursued the recruitment of outsiders with no party credentials, such as technocrats, popular figures, businessmen, and potential donors (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 243). The combination of two different patterns of recruitment has increased the circulation of party elites and the central leadership's grip over the party's representatives in public office. Among all Romanian parties, the Democratic Party places the highest premium on party experience as a criterion for appointment in government. The explanation for this pattern of ministerial recruitment has been put down to the stability of the PD's national elite, which underwent just one major overhaul in 2001 (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 240). In contrast, the high rate of leadership turnover and factionalism in the National Liberal Party has resulted in the appointment of ministers with high political visibility and governmental experience, but shorter party careers (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 245).

To sum up, despite the variation in patterns of ministerial recruitment, the constant presence of senior party members in cabinet suggests that Romanian parties may have

²⁴ Law no. 161/2003, art. 84.

undergone a similar process of governmentalisation as the Portuguese parties. If this is true, then party principals should be in a good position to control the process of ministerial deselection. To verify this hypothesis we need to examine to what extent a high position in the party hierarchy makes a difference for the length of ministerial tenure. This is the aim of the third section of this chapter, which provides descriptive statistics for the relationship between fixed characteristics and the length of ministerial tenure.

The last section of the chapter analyses the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of fixed characteristics, events, and principal-agent relationships. We also verify to what extent the principals' influence on the process of ministerial deselection depends on institutional context. To do so their ability to sanction agency loss is estimated separately during periods of unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation. The multivariate analysis emphasises that fixed characteristics do not explain why some ministers survive in office longer than others. Depending on executive scenarios, some principal-agent relationships are more likely to influence the ministers' durability in office than others. This analysis confirms the standard wisdom that the authority of prime ministers increases considerably under cohabitation. However, the analysis also provides strong evidence that under certain circumstances presidents may have a bigger impact on ministerial deselections under cohabitation than during periods of unified executive. Another intriguing finding is that the influence of party principals over cabinet ministers outweighs the authority of the president and the prime minister under divided executive even though both of them acted as *de facto* party leaders.

6.2 Party relationships in the Romanian executive

This section analyses the impact that different party relationships between presidents and prime ministers have on their authority over cabinet members. As both presidents included in the analysis won elections as party leaders, the analysis discusses to what extent and under what circumstances holding the presidency of a political party increases a president's authority over the government in Romania. To emphasise the intraparty organisational resources that allow presidents to continue in their role as *de facto* party leaders after they formally step down from party office we focus on the inclusiveness and the

competitiveness of the leadership selection process in the PSD and in the PD/PDL between 2000-2004 and 2004-2008 respectively. We also discuss the intraparty resources that prime ministers can use to assert their leadership over the government and within their own parties. This analysis indicates that whether or not prime ministers come to office as party leaders makes a difference for the extent of their authority over the cabinet. To do so we analyse the relationship between prime ministers and their parties in the PSD between 2000 and 2004 and in the PNL between 2004 and 2008.

The president- and PM-party relationships in the PSD (2000-2004)

The leadership of the Social-Democratic Party (PSD), also known as PDSR, FDSN, or FSN until 2001, was remarkably stable until 2004. Since 1992, the president of the party was elected by party delegates at a national conference convened every two years, unless special circumstances called for an extraordinary national conference. It was only after 2010 that the statute of the Social-Democratic Party was changed to introduce the election of the president by all party members and the organisation of primaries for the selection of presidential candidates (Partidul Social Democrat, 2010, art. 135). Until 2005, when a majority run-off formula was introduced, the president was elected through one round of voting, provided two-thirds of the delegates were present at the National Conference (Partidul Social Democrat, 2005, art. 77). Alongside territorial delegates, *ex-officio* delegates representing the central leadership also participated to national conventions (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 517). Before 2005, the number of territorial delegates representing each local party organisation was determined by an algorithm of representation decided by the national Executive Bureau (Partidul Social Democrat, 2005, art. 46). The central leadership's control over the delegate selection process explains the centralisation of the party and the inability of local organisations to influence the outcome of leadership contests until 2005 (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 527). Party leadership elections also displayed a low degree of competitiveness, as only one candidate contested the presidency of the party until 2005 (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 526). Moreover, the candidate for this position was either Ion Iliescu, or a successor whom he hand-picked.

Except for the short period of time that preceded the first free elections of May 1990, Ion Iliescu was an actual president of the Social-Democratic Party only between 1997 and 2000. However, there was never any doubt that the main party in government was headed in all but name by the incumbent head of state between 1990 and 1996 (Evenimentul zilei, 2002f; Shafir, 1997a). Iliescu's re-election as party leader in January 1997, after his party lost the presidential and legislative elections in November 1996, was a mere formality (Dimancea, 2005; Tismăneanu & Mihăieş, 2011). Similar to 1992, when the FSN split as a result of the pressure put on the party leadership to endorse a different presidential candidacy than Iliescu's, the reformist groups who challenged Iliescu's leadership in 1997 were excluded from the party (Shafir, 1997a, 1997b). Iliescu was re-elected as party president and presidential candidate one year before the 2000 elections, at the National Conference organised in October 1999. Iliescu's control over the party ahead of the 2000 elections is therefore unquestionable.

Following the presidential and legislative elections of 2000, Iliescu was also able to organise his succession in the party before taking office again as President of Romania. He handed over the leadership of the party to his second-in-command, first deputy president Adrian Năstase, and appointed him as prime minister. Iliescu's choice for the leadership of the party was ratified in January 2000, when Adrian Năstase was unanimously elected as a new party president by the 869 delegates to the extraordinary National Conference (RFE/RL, 2001). From this moment on, the two leaders engaged in a competition for the control of the party and the government.

Adrian Năstase was re-confirmed as party leader when the PDSR merged with the Social Democratic Party of Romania (PSDR) to form the Social Democratic Party in June 2001. He was unanimously elected as party leader by the 4,030 delegates who participated at the party congress approving the merger between the two parties in June 2001 (Dimancea, 2005). The prime minister's authority over the ruling party was considerably enhanced by his uncontested election as leader of a new political party, with a different statute and leadership structure than those inherited from Ion Iliescu.

As prime minister, Adrian Năstase was determined to limit the president's interference in government affairs (Evenimentul zilei, 2002b; Frison-Roche, 2011, p. 70; Tismăneanu & Mihăieş, 2011, p. 391). Their relationship between 2000 and 2004 was

marked by several conflicts triggered by their competition for control over the party and cabinet (Crowther, 2004, p. 390; Dima, 2009, p. 44; Sedelius & Ekman, 2010, p. 529; Sedelius, 2006, p. 146). Furthermore, Năstase aimed to redefine the formal role of the presidency so that the working mode of executive politics could shift from presidential to prime ministerial leadership. For example, Năstase suggested the elimination of direct presidential elections.²⁵ In response, not only did Ion Iliescu turn down the proposal, but he also announced that Năstase was the Social-Democratic Party's best placed candidate for the 2004 presidential elections and that he intended to take over the party at the end of his presidential term. To avoid this scenario, Năstase proposed that Iliescu be allowed to remain in office for a fourth presidential term (Evenimentul zilei, 2002g, 2002h; Teodorescu, 2002). The head of state condemned this idea. As a last resort, the prime minister pleaded for the organisation of early elections in 2003, so that the government could rely on a stable majority while carrying out the reforms required for Romania's EU accession in 2007 (Braileanu & Zanfir, 2002; Evenimentul zilei, 2002j, 2002l, 2002m). This scenario was also vetoed by President Iliescu, who had no interest in disconnecting presidential from parliamentary elections (Culcer, 2002; Evenimentul zilei, 2002i, 2002k).

The relationship between the president and the prime minister took a turn for the worse after the 2004 local elections, which plunged the ruling party into a major leadership crisis. PM Năstase threatened to resign as party president after Ion Iliescu criticised the party for its electoral performance. Eventually, Năstase reconsidered his decision to step down in exchange for a free hand in reshuffling both the cabinet and the party leadership. First, he banned the simultaneous holding of party and cabinet positions and removed all ministers holding a high position in the party hierarchy from the government. Then he dissolved the party's national executive body and replaced it with a co-ordination bureau dominated by his allies. The main task of the co-ordination bureau was to convene an extraordinary congress for internal elections. Adrian Năstase was unanimously elected as the party's presidential candidate by the 1,200 delegates who participated to this congress in August 2004. The delegates also approved Iliescu's return as party leader after the 2004

²⁵ More details about the proposals for constitutional reform debated in between 2002 and 2003 can be found in Cornea, 2002; Evenimentul zilei, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e; Preda, 2002; RFE/RL, 2002; Sofronie, 2002; V. Stoica, 2005; Tănase, 2002b.

presidential election. Thus, in exchange for temporary control over cabinet composition, Năstase virtually agreed to step down as party president regardless of whether or not he won the 2004 presidential elections.²⁶

The compromise reached by Iliescu and Năstase ahead of the 2004 elections reveals the importance of party resources for the extent of a prime minister's authority over the government. Overall, the analysis of the party relationship between the president and the prime minister has emphasised the subordination of the latter to the former on the party line. The president's ability to choose his successor for the party leadership and his plans to resume this position at the end of his presidential term indicates his *de facto* authority over the ruling party. Although the double electoral defeat suffered by the PSD in 2004 prevented his reinstatement as the PSD president, his future in the party was the main theme of debate in the national congress organised in 2005 (Institutul "Ovidiu Sincai," 2005). In contrast, although the prime minister succeeded the president as party leader, he constantly competed with him for control over the party and government. Overall, this analysis provides strong evidence that whether or not presidents and prime ministers come to office as party leaders makes a difference for the extent of their influence over the government.

The president-party relationship in the PD/PDL (2004-2008)

The Democratic Party (PD) was the name adopted by the National Salvation Front (FSN) after Iliescu's supporters split up in 1992 and formed the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN). The leader of the party until 2000 was Petre Roman, who was chosen by Ion Iliescu as his successor at the party leadership in May 1990, when he stepped down to become President of Romania. Petre Roman's durability as a party leader is explained by the method used in the PD for the election of the party president. While in theory the election of the party president is conceived as a competition between motions, the requirement that motions be supported by more than half of the party organisations or by a third of the members in the National Co-ordination Council (Partidul Democrat

²⁶ More details about the leadership struggles occasioned by the extraordinary congress of the PSD in 2004 can be found in Adevărul, 2004; Dimancea, 2005; Hotnews, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d; Radulescu, 2004; RFE/RL, 2004d, 2004e, 2004f, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c; Ziu, 2004.

Liberal, 2012, art. 79) has resulted in only one motion being presented to the National Convention until 2000. As a result, Petre Roman ran alone for the party president position and was easily re-elected in 1994, 1997, and 2000 (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 523; Pantelimon, 2006, p. 420).

After the party's defeat in the 2000 elections the election rules were relaxed²⁷ and three motions were presented to an Extraordinary National Convention convened in May 2001. The winner of this competition was Traian Băsescu, the incumbent mayor of Bucharest. Băsescu gathered twice as many votes than Roman and became the Democratic Party's second leader since the party had been set up in 1993. This was the first time in the history of Romanian post-communist parties when an incumbent party leader ran in and lost an internal election.²⁸

Băsescu's legitimacy as a party leader was reinforced in 2004, when he was re-elected to the mayor's office after crushing the ruling party's candidate in the first round of local elections. However, it was the victory in the presidential elections six months later that cemented Băsescu's authority over the PD. Not only did he win the presidential race in 2004, but he also took government formation out of the ruling social-democrats' hands by nominating his coalition partner, the president of the National Liberal Party, as prime minister (Downs & Miller, 2006; Stan & Zaharia, 2007). As the Democratic Party owed its presence in government together with the National-Liberals to the president, its subordination to the head of state can hardly be doubted. Two additional events indicate the party's subsequent transformation into a "presidential machine" (Thiébaud, 1993).

First, Băsescu had no difficulty in imposing Emil Boc, his second in command, as the new president of the PD. Boc's appointment as a caretaker president was unanimously endorsed by 5,000 party delegates in December 2004 (Evenimentul zilei, 2004b; Istodor, 2004). Six months later, Boc ran unopposed and was elected as a party president by over 4,000 party delegates. Moreover, his bid to withdraw the PD from the International

²⁷ Since 2001, a motion needs to obtain the support of only ten local organisations in order to be debated in the National Convention (Partidul Democrat Liberal, 2012, art. 74). A two-round system is used to select the winning motion at the National Convention – if none of the motions debated receives 50 per cent of the delegates' votes then a second round is organised for the first two motions that obtain the most votes. The leader of the winning motion becomes the new president of the party (Partidul Democrat Liberal, 2012, art. 79).

²⁸ More details about the 2001 election in the Democratic Party can be found in Csiki, 2001; Evenimentul zilei, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2004a; Pantelimon, 2006; Radu, 2004.

Socialist Organisation and adopt a centre-right doctrine was also unanimously approved.²⁹ Boc's virtually unanimous election as party leader was hailed as the birth of a presidential party, whose electoral future depended on the popularity and power resources of the head of state (Cochino, 2005). As a matter of fact, a few days before the National Convention Emil Boc publicly thanked the president for the party's surging popularity in the opinion polls, which for the first time showed that the PD was ahead of the PNL (Evenimentul zilei, 2005j). That the PD's main purpose was to serve as an organisational resource for the president (Clift, 2005, p. 225) also transpired from its early pledge to support Bănescu's candidacy for a new presidential term in 2009 (Evenimentul zilei, 2005k).

Second, the president was able to decide almost single-handedly on the future of the party by engineering the merger with a splinter group from the PNL. The new Democrat Liberal Party (PDL) was formed under the leadership of Teodor Stolojan, the PNL's initial candidate for the 2004 presidential elections (Stan, 2005, pp. 7–8). The decision was taken behind closed doors and involved only the head of state and the leaders of the two parties, without consulting the party's local organisations, which were particularly unenthusiastic about sharing their resources with the newcomers. The PD and the PDL leaders declared that the unification of the two parties had not been possible without the involvement of the head of state and pointed out that the aim of the new party was to obtain a presidential majority in the next general elections. The merger of the two parties was unanimously approved in a common congress that also elected Emil Boc as the leader of the new party.³⁰

The set up of the PDL was compared in the Romanian media with the Gaullist party and with Sarkozy's UMP. Romanian analysts emphasised that the creation of a presidential party was as a typical phenomenon for a semi-presidential system, where presidents are *de facto* leaders of their former parties and of the government (Kivu, 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2007). As no elections were organised in the PDL until the end of 2008 and given that Emil Boc's leadership and Traian Bănescu's ascendancy over the party were never under question during this time period, we have no reason to believe that the president's *de facto* authority over his party was challenged. Traian Bănescu's ability to control his party's

²⁹ More details about the 2005 National Convention and the change of ideology can be found in Evenimentul zilei, 2005a, 2005b, 2005m, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2005f, 2005g, 2005h, 2005i, 2005l; Hriban, 2005.

³⁰ More details about the context in which the Democratic-Liberal Party was set up can be found in Dinu, 2007; Evenimentul zilei, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f; Fati, 2007; Nicolae, 2007; Oprea, 2007a, 2007b; România liberă, 2007b, 2007c; Stan & Zaharia, 2008; Vaida, 2007b.

agents in government was also enhanced by the fact that the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party was not appointed in the cabinet.

The PM-party relationship in the PNL (2004-2008)

The National Liberal Party has experienced more leadership changes, has been more factionalised and has had to deal with more party splits than any other Romanian parliamentary party (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011; De Waele & Ionaşcu, 2008). Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, the prime minister appointed by Traian Băsescu in 2004, succeeded Theodor Stolojan as the president of the party when the latter pulled out from the 2004 presidential race. Tăriceanu's leadership was reconfirmed in early 2005, when he was officially elected as president by the party delegates. He ran unopposed and won the vast majority of the votes cast. His control over the party was also strengthened by the list system used for the election of national leaders in the PNL, which allows presidents to hand-pick the members of the national executive body team (România liberă, 2006; Telegraf, 2007). Given the prime minister's ability to run unopposed for the presidency of the party and the overwhelming majority of the delegates who endorsed his political platform, there is hardly any reason to doubt that at the beginning of the time period under study the newly appointed prime minister maintained a strong grip over his party³¹.

Tăriceanu was re-elected as party leader in 2007. Following the split of Theodor Stolojan's faction, which merged with the PD, he called for the organisation of an extraordinary congress to legitimise his leadership. The party's internal crisis can be traced back to the 2005 congress, when a small group of notable party members backed President Băsescu's project to create a strong centre-right party by merging the PNL and the PD. To facilitate the merger, the PD had also switched from social-democracy to a centre-right political orientation in June 2005. The negotiations between the PNL and the PD leaders continued throughout 2005 and 2006. However, the two parties had different stances on the unification project: while the PD presented a calendar for the merger in February 2006, the liberals advocated the continuation of the PNL-PD alliance until after the 2009 presidential elections. The PNL's division over the merger project led to the split of the faction led by

³¹ For a detailed analysis of the 2005 PNL congress see Evenimentul zilei, 2005a, 2005b; Mihalache & Huiu, 2011; RFE/RL, 2005a, 2005b.

Theodor Stolojan. To counteract the erosion of his legitimacy as a party leader, PM Tăriceanu not only called for the organisation of new elections, but also replaced the list system with a plurality formula. According to the statute adopted at the extraordinary congress organised in January 2007, the delegates elected the president and a 30-member national executive body based on the number of votes each candidate obtained (Partidul National Liberal, 2007, art. 61). Similar to the 2005 congress, Tăriceanu ran unopposed for the presidency of the PNL. Only 61 of the 1,300 delegates to the congress voted against him. The overwhelming majority obtained by the PNL leader for the second time within two years and the absence of challengers for the national leadership presented the liberals united behind their leader³².

Overall, although the 2004-2008 period revealed the same struggle for leadership between competing factions that has characterised the PNL since 1990 (De Waele & Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 89; Stanomir, 2007), there is little evidence that the national leader lost control over the party. On the contrary, Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu's unopposed and virtually unanimous re-election following the party statute change operated in 2007, which aimed to decentralise the party and increase the competitiveness of the leadership selection process, indicates his confidence regarding his authority over the party. The comparison of Năstase's and Tăriceanu's record as prime ministers indicates that whether or not prime ministers come to power as leaders of their parties makes a difference for their ability to control the government as *de facto* leaders.

6.3 The data set on Romanian ministers

This section focuses on the political background of the ministers covered by the Romania data set. We begin by describing the variables included in this data set and we discuss the measures of fixed characteristics and events in the Romanian context. Subsequently, we compare the distribution of data in the governments under study. This analysis is structured along the four aspects of ministerial career-paths that are compared across the country

³² For a detailed analysis of the PNL split and the 2007 extraordinary congress see Anghel, 2006; Ciobanu, 2006; Dinu, 2006; Evenimentul zilei, 2007b, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e, 2006f, 2007a; Hotnews, 2007; Lupea, 2007; Radu, 2010; România liberă, 2006.

studies: cabinet experience, parliamentary background, experience in local administration, and involvement in party organisations.

The Romania data set covers 101 ministers. 48 of them served under PM Adrian Năstase (2000-2004) and 53 under PM Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu (2004-2008). Over the time period under analysis there have been ten state ministers, 73 cabinet ministers, and 18 delegated ministers. The data set contains 61 instances of individual termination events. The fixed characteristics included in the analysis indicate whether or not the ministers had previously held a cabinet seat in either full or junior positions and if they were recruited from the parliamentary pool or from among local officials. Involvement in party politics is captured by two variables. The first one indicates whether ministers held a position in the party's national executive bodies, while the second one indicates whether they were leaders of local party organisations. Another variable indicates the ministers' party affiliation. Table 6.1 provides definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers.

Table 6.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics (Romania)

Variable	Definition	Mean
Cabinet experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who had previously held a full or junior ministerial position.	0.45
MP/SEN	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who won a seat in last general elections.	0.50
Parliamentary experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who have won at least 2 parliamentary mandates during their career.	0.50
Local administration experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who held a position in local administration at the moment of appointment (mayors and members of local executive bodies or municipal assemblies).	0.10
Party executives	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are members in their parties' national executive bodies.	0.29
Local party leaders	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who lead local party organisations.	0.20
PM Party	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are from the same party as the prime minister.	0.71

The main events variables included in the Romania data set record disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties, as indicators of principal-agent relationships, and resignation calls as measures of ministerial performance. Similar to the French and the Portuguese studies, conflicts between ministers and presidents, prime ministers and parties are recorded when cabinet members are criticised in public by one of the principals, as reported in the newspaper used for data collection. The issue at stake may be related to the ministers' performance in executive or party office or to their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues. The variable measuring the president-minister relationship also takes into account the constitutional right of Romanian presidents to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members and to request their suspension from office if such an action is taken (Art. 109). The dataset includes nine conflicts of this type between presidents and cabinet ministers.

Similar to the analysis of French ministers, the weight of political experience on ministerial durability is not only captured by fixed characteristics at the moment of appointment, but also monitored during the ministers' time in office. The analysis of Romanian ministers verifies whether promotions in the party hierarchy are also used as compensatory moves for ministerial deselection, as in the case of France.

Resignation calls are recorded each time ministers are asked to resign. If they are asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded only if new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. Overall, the Romania data set includes 241 resignation calls.

Parliamentary pressure is captured in the Romania data set by the number of simple motions tabled in the parliament against individual ministers. These motions may be initiated by at least 50 deputies or senators who wish to express their position on a matter of domestic or foreign affair policy (Constitution of Romania, Art. 112). Both deputies and senators may use simple motions to criticise governmental policies and recommend the removal of individual ministers; however, their recommendations are not binding for the government not even when they are adopted by a majority of the deputies or senators attending the debate. Due to the symmetry and congruence of the Romanian bicameralism, the present data set includes all simple motions tabled between 2000 and 2008 regardless of whether they were initiated in the Chamber of Deputies or in the Senate. According to the

online records of the Chamber of Deputies³³, 20 simple motions were tabled between 2000 and 2004 in the Chamber of Deputies and another 14 in the Senate. Similarly, 15 simple motions were tabled in the Chamber of Deputies between 2004 and 2008, and 13 in the Senate. Out of a total of 62 simple motions that were tabled in the Romanian Parliament between 2000 and 2008, the current data set includes 52 motions that clearly targeted the work of an individual minister.

Other control variables take into account cabinet reshuffles and the impact of social unrest on the length of ministerial tenure. Table 6.2 provides definitions for the events variables and shows basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers.

Table 6.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics (Romania)

Variable	Definition	Mean	St. dev.	Range
Tenure	The length of ministerial tenure is measured in days.	638.16	638.16	(23, 1461)
PR Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and presidents.	1.06	2.04	(0, 10)
PM Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and prime ministers.	1.03	1.95	(0, 12)
PARTY Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and parties.	1.68	2.89	(0, 21)
Resignation calls	Number of times ministers have been asked to resign.	2.31	2.99	(0, 13)
Reshuffles	Number of times ministers have been reshuffled during current mandate.	0.21	0.52	(0, 2)
Party promotions	Number of promotions in the party hierarchy during current mandate.	0.39	0.73	(0, 3)
Simple motions	Number of simple motions tabled against ministers in the parliament	0.51	0.94	(0, 5)
Protests	Number of national-level strikes and protests organised during current term.	0.81	1.66	(0, 7)

*Source: Obtained from the official records of the Romanian Parliament. Available online from <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/motiuni.lista>.

Table 6.3 provides summary statistics for personal characteristics and events. While the PSD government (2000-2004) operated only under a scenario of unified executive, two executive scenarios occurred between 2004 and 2008. The 2004 elections triggered a period of divided executive, as President Băsescu of the PD appointed the leader of the PNL as prime minister. The period of divided executive ended in April 2007, when President

³³ <http://www.cdep.ro/pls/parlam/motiuni.lista>

Bănescu's party left the governing coalition, beginning a period of cohabitation. Romania's first cohabitation ended in December 2008. The data presented in Table 6.3 indicates the distribution of data by executive scenarios.

Table 6.3 Average fixed characteristics and events by cabinet (Romania)

	Năstase (Unified executive)		Tăriceanu I (Divided executive)		Tăriceanu II (Cohabitation)		Total	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
No Ministers	48		37		24		101	
Termination events	24		29		8		61	
Tenure (days)	751.17	469.60	446.34	267.70	643.92	444.73	638.16	431.29
<i>Fixed characteristics</i>								
Cabinet experience	0.54	0.50	0.28	0.45	0.46	0.51	0.45	0.50
MP/SEN	0.50	0.51	0.52	0.51	0.46	0.51	0.50	0.50
Parliamentary experience	0.40	0.49	0.24	0.44	0.25	0.44	0.32	0.47
Local administration experience	0.06	0.24	0.17	0.38	0.08	0.28	0.10	0.30
Party executives	0.17	0.38	0.38	0.49	0.42	0.50	0.29	0.45
Local party leaders	0.17	0.38	0.21	0.41	0.25	0.44	0.20	0.40
PM Party	0.98	0.14	0.34	0.48	0.63	0.49	0.71	0.45
<i>Events</i>								
PR Conflicts	0.25	0.70	1.03	1.94	2.71	2.88	1.06	2.04
PM Conflicts	0.65	0.96	1.45	2.56	1.29	2.46	1.03	1.95
PARTY Conflicts	1.56	3.41	1.55	1.99	2.08	2.75	1.68	2.89
Resignation calls	2.65	3.35	2.10	2.66	1.88	2.59	2.31	2.99
Reshuffles	0.25	0.53	0.03	0.19	0.33	0.70	0.21	0.52
Party promotions	0.54	0.77	0.14	0.35	0.38	0.92	0.39	0.73
Simple motions	0.56	1.03	0.45	0.78	0.50	0.98	0.51	0.94
Protests	0.88	1.76	0.59	1.52	0.96	1.65	0.81	1.66


The data in Table 6.3 shows that the mean length of ministerial tenure between 2000 and 2008 was approximately 21 months. This result suggests an increase in the stability of ministerial personnel, as the average length of ministerial tenure between 1990 and 2004 was only 14.85 months (Ionaşcu, 2006a, p. 44). The length of ministerial tenure

differs under divided executive compared to the other two scenarios. The mean observed tenure is 25 months under unified executive, 15 months under divided executive, and 22 months under cohabitation. The considerably shorter length of tenure under divided executive is explained by the break-up of the PNL-PD coalition in April 2007, which was responsible for the resignation of a significant number of ministers and also ended the period of divided executive. The data indicates a similar length of tenure under unified executive and cohabitation, although the period of unified executive lasted three times longer than that of cohabitation. Thus, similar to France, the evidence suggests that ministerial durability increases under cohabitation.

The level of conflict between ministers and each of their three principals varies significantly across executive scenarios. The data in Table 6.3 indicates that the president-ministers relationship was particularly tense during the cohabitation between PM Tăriceanu's second cabinet and President Băsescu. This finding seems to confirm the hypothesis that cohabitation increases the likelihood of executive deadlock (Fabbrini, 1995, p. 133; Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 286; Sedelius & Ekman, 2010, p. 519; Sedelius, 2006, p. 193; Stepan & Suleiman, 1995, p. 399). According to the data in table 6.3, though, the cabinet members' relationship with the prime minister was also particularly tense during the divided executive scenario, when President Băsescu's PD/PDL formed a coalition government with PM Tăriceanu's PNL. By contrast, the level of conflict between ministers, presidents and prime ministers was considerably lower during the unified executive scenario that characterised Năstase's governing period.

The data indicates a relatively similar frequency of resignation calls across the three scenarios. Figure 6.1 presents the distribution of resignation calls in the two governments, according to the proximate reasons of their occurrence and with respect to the deselection of the ministers who experienced them. In cases where ministers were asked to step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded. This is why the total number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses on the exact number of calls or on the reason given for their occurrence. Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while white figures inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category.

Figure 6.1 Resignation calls across governments and by survival (Romania)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate the percentage of resignation calls, while numbers inside the bars indicate the number of resignation calls recorded under each category. Both percentages and numbers refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis and not to the total number of resignation calls recorded across cabinets. *Source:* Own calculations.

Figure 6.1 indicates that personal faults have attracted the majority of resignation calls in both governments under analysis. Three quarters of the calls for resignation made for the PSD ministers were generated by personal faults. Many of them were the consequence of the corruption scandals exposed by the mass media. The small proportion of resignation calls motivated by departmental faults and policy disagreements, and the absence of resignation calls due to breaches of collective responsibility is explained by the single-party composition of the social-democratic government. Conversely, the higher proportion of policy disagreements and collective responsibility calls experienced by the ministers who took office in Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu's government is explained by the high level of intra-executive conflict that characterised the PNL-PD coalition during the scenarios of divided executive and cohabitation. The sacking of the PD ministers from

government in April 2007 also explains why the majority of ministers who were asked to resign over departmental faults, policy disagreements and breaches of collective responsibility lost office. A similar pattern for the frequency and types of resignation calls across executive scenarios and different types of cabinets was also found in France. While Lionel Jospin's four-party coalition government experienced more policy-related resignation calls, most resignation calls issued for the UMP government were generated by personal errors. Similar to Portugal, the data indicates a correlation between a high number of policy-related calls for resignation and an increase in the number of simple motions tabled against individual ministers in the parliaments and in the occurrence of protests.

Two patterns emerge as far as the variation in the ministers' personal background is concerned. While the PSD cabinet had considerable more executive and parliamentary experience, the PNL-PD cabinet was more experienced in local administration and more likely to have a high position in the party hierarchy than the PSD ministers. Additionally, the appointment of non-partisan ministers became more common after 2004 and particularly after the Democratic Party left the coalition government in April 2007. The next sections analyses in more detail the patterns of ministerial recruitment across the two governments under study. Similar to France and Portugal, the descriptive statistics do not indicate a strong correlation between fixed characteristics and the length of tenure.

6.4 Political background of Romanian ministers


Cabinet experience

The information related to cabinet experience concerns the ministers' previous appointments as junior or full cabinet members. We do not take into account the ministers' ranking in the cabinet this time, because of the incidental appointment of state ministers in Adrian Năstase's government. Only two state ministers were appointed and only within the last six months of this cabinet. Figure 6.2 illustrates the distribution of cabinet experience across governments and with respect to survival.

Figure 6.2 confirms our expectation that the PSD ministers had more executive experience than the PNL-PD ministers. The political professionalisation of the PSD's elites due to the party's presence in government between 1990 and 1996 explains why this party

could rely on more experienced personnel. Nevertheless, both governments included a significant number of ministers who had never been appointed to government. Almost half of the PSD ministers were in this situation. However, cabinet experience does not seem to make a difference for durability in office. Similar to France and Portugal, we find that the inexperienced ministers and junior ministers are likely to survive longer in office than more experienced ministers.

Figure 6.2 Cabinet experience across governments and by survival (Romania)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.


Figure 6.2 confirms our expectation that the PSD ministers had more executive experience than the PNL-PD ministers. The political professionalisation of the PSD's elites due to the party's presence in government between 1990 and 1996 explains why this party could rely on more experienced personnel. Nevertheless, both governments included a significant number of ministers who had never been appointed to government. Almost half of the PSD ministers were in this situation. However, cabinet experience does not seem to make a difference for durability in office. Similar to France and Portugal, we find that the

inexperienced ministers and junior ministers are likely to survive longer in office than more experienced ministers.

Parliamentary experience

Parliamentary experience does not play the most important role in the Romanian patterns of ministerial recruitment. Although the parliamentary and executive offices are not incompatible, only half of the Romanian ministers who took office between 1990 and 2005 had been elected at least once in a post-communist legislature (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 619). Thus, the parliamentary background of Romanian ministers is considerably weaker than that of French ministers, but similar to that of Portuguese ministers. Furthermore, Romania’s case is less of an outlier among other Central and East European countries, where only 41.8 per cent of all ministers appointed after the breakdown of communism had been elected first in the parliament (Fettelschoss & Nikolenyi, 2009, p. 217).

Figure 6.3 Parliamentary experience across governments and by survival (Romania)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

This pattern is confirmed in Figure 6.3, which indicates that less than half of the ministers had no legislative experience. The slightly higher proportion of ministers with no parliamentary record in the PSD government confirms the separation between this party's selection pools for parliamentary and executive office (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 611). However, the PSD ministers who were recruited from the parliament were more experienced: almost 40 per cent of the PSD ministers had been elected more than once, compared to only 25 per cent of the PNL-PD ministers. This pattern confirms the premium placed by the PSD on senior positions in the parliamentary hierarchy (Ionaşcu, 2011, p. 40).

The data in Figure 6.2 does not indicate a strong correlation between parliamentary experience and durability in ministerial office. However, there is some evidence that non-parliamentary ministers are likely to survive longer in office. This result may be explained by the stability of non-partisan ministers who were appointed in both governments. Similar to France, more experienced ministers seem more likely to leave office sooner rather than later. This finding suggests that professional deputies may be less inclined to engage in policy compromises and therefore more susceptible to be sanctioned for agency loss.


Experience in local administration

Similar to Portugal, involvement in local politics is not essential for Romanian politicians who want to play a role in national politics. In Romania, as in Portugal, national and local politics have remained separated in the first decade after the fall of communism. Up to 1996, when the Social-Democratic Party lost a general election for the first time since the beginning of the democratic transition, less than five per cent of the ministers had held a position as councillors or mayors. Between 1996 and 2008, the average ministerial experience in local administration increased to over 17 per cent (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 619). The patterns of ministerial recruitment changed mainly as a result of the Democratic Party's presence in government. Recognised for most of its existence as a "party of mayors" (Chiru & Gherghina, 2011, p. 522), the PD regards long party membership and localism as the most important criteria for the selection of its parliamentary and ministerial elite (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 241). In contrast to other parliamentary parties where politicians without a high-ranking position in the party hierarchy can only aspire to local

offices, the PD has used the same selection pool for both types of office. The intake of local office-holders into the central party leadership has been low in centralised parties like the PSD and the PNL, where ministers and state secretaries have been promoted in the party hierarchy soon after their appointment to government (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 222). The Democratic Party's more decentralised structure and the premium this party places on experienced local administrators explains why more local leaders were invited to join the government at the expense of high-profile national leaders (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 241).

Figure 6.4 confirms these patterns of ministerial recruitment for the two governments under study. While less than 15 per cent of the PSD ministers had previously held a position in local administration, the cabinet formed by Călin Popescu Tăriceanu in 2004 included more ministers with experience in local administration than any other Romanian cabinet: more than one quarter of the ministers had held local office and almost 6 per cent were incumbent mayors at the moment of their appointment.

Figure 6.4 Experience in local administration across governments and by survival (Romania)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. Source: Own calculations.

Overall, the data in Figure 6.4 does not indicate a strong correlation between local roots and ministerial survival. Interestingly, though, none of the ministers who were incumbent mayors at the moment of appointment completed their term in office. To a certain extent, this result may be explained by the Democratic Party's pull out from government in April 2007. However, ministers with strong local roots, such as a mayoralty, may be more difficult to control by their principals. Since their political influence is due more to their work in the constituency than to their position in the party hierarchy, these ministers may be more willing to step down from government rather than to conform to their principals' preferred positions. Perhaps due to the instability of Romanian governments, when asked to choose between a mayoralty and a cabinet seat, Romanian politicians are more likely to choose the former over the latter. A good example in this regard is that of Emil Boc, President Bănescu's successor in the Democratic Party, who turned down a cabinet seat in the 2004 government to maintain the mayoralty of Cluj that he had won earlier that year.

Although local and national offices are incompatible in Romania, ministers are not required to step down from government if they want to run in local elections. They must only choose between the cabinet seat and the local office in case they are successful. Only four out of the 101 ministers covered by this data set contested local elections. Two of them resigned at the beginning of the electoral campaign, the other two did not. Although both ministers who remained in office while contesting local elections were defeated, this is too small a sample to control for in a statistical model.


Party experience

Similar to Portugal, Romanian parties have controlled the main route to executive office after 1989. However, in contrast to France and Portugal, the proportion of senior party members in the Romanian cabinets varies as a function of the parties in government. Thus, while fewer than 40 per cent of the ministers appointed in the left wing governments formed between 1990 and 2008 held a position in one of their party's national bodies, almost 70 per cent of the ministers who were appointed in the governments formed by centre-right during 1996-2000 and 2004-2008 had a senior position within their parties

(Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 619). The lower incidence of party executives in the PSD governments is explained by this party's reliance on two different recruitment strategies that target both party veterans and outsiders without party credentials (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 243).

The data in Figure 6.7 shows a similar trend. The proportion of senior party members in the PNL-PD government is twice that of the PSD government.

Figure 6.5 Party experience across governments and by survival (Romania)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

The composition of the PSD government also reflected the prime minister's concern to renew the Social-Democratic Party's image and dissociate it from the anti-democratic reputation of the previous left-wing cabinets. As a result, instead of experienced party leaders, Năstase favoured the appointment of former secretaries of state whose experience in public office was a valuable asset for the government and who lacked public visibility (Ionaşcu, 2006b, p. 347). This strategy also explains the higher incidence of cabinet members with previous experience as junior ministers in the PSD government (Figure 6.2).


As far as the presence of non-partisan ministers in government is concerned, the Romanian cabinets seem to resemble more the French than the Portuguese cabinets. Figure 6.5 indicates that none of the PSD ministers was independent, while less than eight per cent of the ministers appointed between 2004 and 2008 were non-partisans. However, the data in Figure 6.5 only takes into account the ministers' political affiliation at the end of their tenure. In fact, three of the ministers who joined the PSD government between 2000 and 2004 were independent at the moment of their appointment. However, they all joined this party soon after their appointment and were also promoted in the party's national executive. This phenomenon indicates that the goal of non-partisan appointments differs across Romanian and Portuguese parties. The latter regard non-partisan appointments as a way of counterbalancing their weak institutionalisation and the negative public perception of politicians (Pinto & Almeida, 2009, p. 153). In contrast, the Romanian PSD uses non-partisan appointments to increase and diversify its personnel resources and to intensify the circulation of party elites (Stefan-Scalat, 2004, p. 243). This is another characteristic that sets the PSD apart from the PNL and the PD, as none of independent ministers who joined the centre-right government between 2004 and 2008 became a party member by the end of their term. On the contrary, one of the liberal ministers gave up his party membership so that he could continue in office after the 2008 elections³⁴. From a principal-agent perspective, the rapid ascension of non-partisans to national leadership positions indicates a strong centralisation of the party and a considerable influence of the party leadership on the recruitment of executive elites.

The data in Figure 6.5 indicates a correlation between high positions in the party hierarchy, at both national and local level, and forced exits from government. In contrast, independent ministers were more likely to complete their term in office. The inability of senior party members and leaders of local organisations to survive longer in office than their less experienced colleagues indicates the concentration of the decision-making process in the hands of the national leadership and party presidents.

³⁴ This was the case of Cătălin Predoiu, who was appointed as Minister of Justice by PM Tăriceanu in February 2008. Predoiu was a member in the National Liberal Party. He ran for a seat in the 2008 election on the PNL list but was not elected. After the formation of the PSD-PDL coalition government in late 2008, Predoiu self-suspended his membership in the PNL so that he can maintain his position as a minister of justice. Predoiu remained in office until February 2012, when Emil Boc's government was dismissed by a non-confidence vote in the parliament.

Figure 6.9 focuses on the circulation of ministers between cabinet and national party bodies. None of the three parties analysed in this chapter has adopted a policy of separating positions in the party hierarchy from public office at the beginning of a government term. Cabinet positions have actually been a springboard for promotion in the Social-Democratic Party's central leadership since the early 1990s (Ionaşcu, 2008, p. 601). The increased factionalisation of the national liberals and the struggles for party leadership between factions also explains the promotion of cabinet members in the party hierarchy. Thus, ministerial recruitment and promotion in the party hierarchy should be positively correlated. The Romania data set confirms this expectation only partially.

Figure 6.6 Party promotions across governments and by survival (Romania)



Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

Overall, the data in Figure 6.9 does not indicate a strong correlation between party promotions and ministerial longevity. However, the PSD ministers who advanced on the party ladder do seem to have been more prone to deselection. This tendency is explained by

the way in which Adrian Năstase handled the leadership crisis triggered by the 2004 local elections in the PSD. After he first threatened to resign as a result of President's Iliescu interference in party affairs, Năstase reshuffled both the party's national executive and the government. The PSD's main executive body was dissolved and replaced with a coordination bureau made up of Năstase's allies, including some of the politically inexperienced ministers he had appointed in 2004. The ministers who had been promoted in the party hierarchy were then removed from the cabinet.³⁵ The context in which PM Năstase took this decision suggests that the separation of public and party responsibilities was motivated by the need to strengthen the prime minister's authority over the party at the expense of the president and his allies in the national leadership.

To sum up, the analysis of the ministers' political experience has emphasised that in Romania, as in Portugal, there is an increased presence of party executives in government. However, in contrast to Portugal, we find that party executives are more likely to lose their jobs than cabinet members without political experience. This finding indicates that the authority over cabinet composition belongs to national leaders, such as presidents and prime ministers, rather than to the extra-parliamentary and extra-governmental party.


6.5 Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, and ministerial durability in Romania

This section presents a multivariate analysis of ministerial tenure in Romania. Similar to France and Portugal, the Romania data set includes the exact dates when ministers take and leave office. The ministers' observed tenure is right-censored if they leave office collectively, after general elections. Ministers are also right-censored if they are still in office at the end of the time period under study. This is the case for one minister in Tăriceanu's government, who continued in office under the PSD-PDL government that came to power after the 2008 parliamentary election. The length of tenure is not interrupted for ministers who continued in office after the PDL left the coalition government in 2007, although the new government formed by PM Tăriceanu received a formal vote of investiture in the parliament. Additionally, the duration in office is not interrupted if

³⁵ For a detailed analysis of this episode see Hotnews, 2004a, 2004b; RFE/RL, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d, 2004e.

ministers are assigned to different portfolios during their tenure. The Romania data set includes 101 ministers who took office between 2000 and 2008. 61 ministers stepped down before the collective end of their cabinets. Figure 6.7 shows the unconditional probability that ministers survive in office beyond a certain time when no explanatory factors are taken into account.

Figure 6.7 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival across scenarios (Romania)




Overall, the ministers covered by the Romanian data set had a 50% chance of surviving 826 days in office during the time period under study. However, the length of ministerial tenure varied across executive scenarios. Figure 6.8 shows that ministers have a 50% chance of surviving 903 days and 916 days in office under unified executive and cohabitation respectively, which decreases to only 590 days under divided executive. The difference in the ministers' risk of losing office across scenarios is explained by the dismissal of the PD ministers from government in April 2007, which started a period of cohabitation.

The ministerial survivor functions across the three executive scenarios are plotted in Figure 6.8. The graph indicates that the risk of deselection increases under divided

executive and is similar under unified executive and cohabitation. However, this result should not necessarily be taken at face value, since the period of unified executive lasted three times longer than that of cohabitation. The survivor functions corresponding to the three scenarios also show that the risk of deselection increased faster under divided executive and cohabitation than under unified executive.

Figure 6.8 Kaplan-Meier plot of ministerial survival by scenario (Romania)



The result of the log-rank test presented in Figure 6.8 indicates that the assumption of proportional hazards across the three scenarios is not violated at the 0.01 level. These results indicate that the survival of ministers varies in proportional ways as far as the scenarios of unified executive, divided executive and cohabitation are concerned and confirm that the data can be analysed using a Cox model. Additional diagnostic tests for the non-proportionality of hazards in the models used for the analysis of Romanian ministers are provided in the Appendix (C1-C8). They include the Wilcoxon test, which focuses on earlier failure times, and tests based on the analysis on Schoenfeld residuals to verify that the explanatory variables included in the statistical models presented below have a proportional and constant effect that is invariant to time. The specification of the models

with regard to the nonlinearity of the explanatory variables is assessed using link tests (reported at the bottom of Table 6.4).

The analysis of Schoenfeld residuals has revealed that several variables violate the assumption of proportional hazards (see C.2 and C.4 in Appendix C). To address their non-proportionality and increase the models' accuracy in assessing their effects, these variables were interacted with the natural logarithm of time (Box-Steffensmeier & Zorn, 2001, p. 978). As a result, the three regressions presented in Table 6.4 are extended applications of the Cox model. The Appendix includes a comparison of the results obtained before and after the treatment of non-proportional variables for each of the three models (C.3 and C.5). Variables that have been found to violate the proportional hazard assumption at the 0.05 level in one model have been interacted with the natural logarithm of time in both models to facilitate the comparative interpretation of their effect. The results presented in the Appendix show that the treatment of non-proportional variables does not affect significantly the size of the estimated coefficients or their sign.

Table 6.4 presents two models. Model 1 focuses on personal characteristics variables, while Model 2 estimates the joint impact of fixed characteristics and events on the length of tenure. The models present coefficients from Cox regressions and report standard errors clustered by ministers. The observations are clustered by ministers and the data set includes 101 clusters. Positive coefficients imply that the risk of deselection rises and indicate a shorter length of tenure, while negative coefficients decrease the hazard rate and are therefore expected to increase the length of tenure.

Models 1 and 2 confirm that fixed characteristics have a weak explanatory power for the variation in the length of ministerial tenure. None of the variables related to cabinet experience, parliamentary experience, positions in local administration or in the party hierarchy emerges as a powerful predictor of ministerial durability. The results in Model 2 show some evidence that leaders of local party organisations incur a higher risk of deselection. However, this result is not robust across the two models. The only fixed

Table 6.4 Determinants of ministerial duration in Romania

	Model 1	Model 2
Fixed characteristics		
Cabinet experience	0.54 (0.38)	0.56 (0.43)
MP/SEN	0.15 (0.43)	0.47 (0.48)
Parliamentary experience#	-0.08 (0.07)	-0.12 (0.08)
Local administration experience	0.51 (0.38)	-0.21 (0.46)
Party executive	-0.36 (0.28)	-0.30 (0.38)
Local leader	0.37 (0.34)	0.53* (0.29)
PM Party	-1.08*** (0.32)	-1.29** (0.36)
Events		
Party promotions		2.00*** (0.43)
Protests		-0.63 (0.63)
Simple motions		0.63 (0.82)
Reshuffles		3.20** (1.05)
Resignation calls		0.86** (0.26)
PR Conflicts		0.51** (0.22)
PM Conflicts		0.19** (0.22)
PARTY Conflicts		0.88** (0.29)
No. of ministers	101	101
No. of observation	1717	1717
No. of failures	61	61
Log-likelihood	-221.337	-165.553
Linktest hat(squared)	0.37 <i>p</i> =(.19)	-0.03 <i>p</i> =(.57)

Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (101 clusters).

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Variables interacted with the natural logarithm of time to address their non-proportional effects.

characteristic indicating a significant and stable effect in both models is that of party affiliation. Ministers who are in the prime minister's party are likely to survive longer in office. This result is explained by the exclusion of the president's party from government in April 2007.

Model 2 estimates the joint impact of fixed characteristics and events on the risk of deselection. With the exception of protests and simple motions, all variables included in the analysis emerge as strong predictors of ministerial deselection.

The positive and statistically significant coefficient corresponding to *Reshuffles* suggests that prime ministers use reshuffles to sanction agency loss (Indridason & Kam, 2008; Kam & Indridason, 2005). In general, though, Romanian prime ministers rarely resort to reshuffles, which are regarded in Romania as an acknowledgement of poor ministerial performance (Flonta, 2003, p. 12). Only 15 per cent of the ministers under study were reshuffled and most of them were promoted to a higher position in the cabinet hierarchy. However, their association with an increase in the risk of deselection is explained by the reshuffle carried out by PM Năstase in July 2004, when all cabinet members who were promoted in the party hierarchy lost their cabinet seat. This event also explains why *Party promotions* also emerge as strong predictors of deselection.

The positive and statistically significant coefficients corresponding to resignation calls and conflict variables in Model 2 confirm that ministers who enter into conflict with their principals are likely to lose their jobs. However, we expect that the ability of each principal to sanction agency loss varies as a function of institutional context. To verify this hypothesis we present three models that estimate the effect of principal-agent relationships separately under unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation. To do so, we interact the conflict variables and the resignation calls with an institutional variable corresponding to each executive scenario. To ease the interpretation of results, Table 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 present only the coefficients related to the impact of conflict variables and resignation calls on the risk of deselection under unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation respectively. The full results of the three models are presented in the Appendix (C.9). The Appendix also includes the diagnostic tests that verify the assumption of proportional hazards for the models with interacted variables (C.6-C.8). The specification of the models with regard to the nonlinearity of the explanatory variables is assessed using link tests (reported at the bottom of table C.9). The robustness of the results presented in these models is also

borne out by the fact that the coefficients and signs of the variables that are not interacted are almost identical across the models.

Table 6.5 presents the values of the coefficients associated with the conflict variables and resignation calls (outside periods of unified executive, when the *Unified executive* dummy is 0), the sum of the coefficients corresponding to the conflict variables and resignation calls interacted with the *Unified executive* dummy (when Unified executive is 1), and their level of significance.

Table 6.5 Principal-agent relationships under unified executive (Romania)

Executive scenario	PR Conflicts	PM Conflicts	PARTY Conflicts	Resignation calls
Unified=0	0.48**	0.45**	1.59***	0.15
Unified=1	-0.01	-3.67	0.45	1.39***

The results presented in Table 6.5 are intriguing and show that none of the principal-agent relationships has had a significant impact on ministerial deselection during the period of unified executive. Resignation calls emerge as the only strong predictor of deselection. This result is explained by the high number of corruption scandals in which the members in the PSD government (2000-2004) were involved. The scandals escalated in the media and attracted the attention of EU officials. As Romania was under close scrutiny by the European Union and needed to prove its commitment to reform the judicial system and fight against corruption, the prime minister had no choice than to let the ministers involved in corruption scandals go. Under these circumstances, although the descriptive statistics reported in Table 6.3 indicate that a significant number of conflicts were recorded for the principal-agent relationships between 2000 and 2004, the resignation calls variable captures most of the explanatory power regarding the reasons why ministers lost office. Due to the particular circumstances in which the PSD government operated, this result does not necessarily invalidate our hypothesis regarding the ability of principals to control cabinet composition under unified executive. The substantial impact of resignation calls on ministerial durability compared to that of principal-agent relationships is presented in Figure 6.9.

Figure 6.9 Conflicts and resignation calls under unified executive (Romania)




Table 6.6 presents the coefficients related to the impact of resignation calls and conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals on the risk of deselection under divided executive. In contrast to the scenarios of unified executive and cohabitation, the period of divided executive did not end as a result of an electoral cycle but following the Democratic Party’s pull out from the PNL-PD government. As a result, the impact of explanatory variables on the risk of deselection may be overestimated.


Table 6.6 Principal-agent relationships under divided executive (Romania)

Executive scenario	PR Conflicts	PM Conflicts	PARTY Conflicts	Resignation calls
Divided=0	0.90***	1.60***	0.05	0.73**
Divided=1	0.53*	0.02	1.40***	0.75

According to Table 6.6, resignation calls do not lead to deselection during a period of divided executive. Conflicts with the president increase the risk of losing office, which confirms our hypothesis that they are likely to preserve some influence over the cabinet when this scenario occurs. However, conflicts with the party principal have a stronger impact on a minister’s career than conflicts with both presidents and prime ministers. This result is explained by the political deadlock generated by the

conflictual relationship between President Bănescu and PM Tăriceanu (Stan & Zaharia, 2008). As the president and the prime minister criticised each other's ministers relentlessly, the process of ministerial deselection turned into a zero-sum game. Under these circumstances, the only principal that could offset the balance and decide the ministers' fate was the party. Figure 6.10 presents a graphical interpretation of these results.

Figure 6.10 Conflicts and resignation calls under divided executive (Romania)



As a matter of fact, Figures 6.9 and 6.10 suggest that conflicts with the party principal posed a higher risk for deselection than conflicts with presidents and prime ministers under both unified and divided executive. In both cases, the relationship between the president and the prime minister was characterised by a relatively high level of conflict (Sedelius & Ekman, 2010, p. 529). While President Iliescu and PM Năstase were competing for control over the government and over the party, the confrontation between President Bănescu and PM Tăriceanu often led to political deadlock. All else equal then, these results suggest that the party principal has a better chance to control the composition of government when the president and the prime minister have a conflictual relationship under both unified and divided executive.

Table 6.7 presents the coefficients related to the impact of resignation calls and conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals on the risk of deselection under cohabitation. The results indicate again that resignation calls do not increase the ministers' risk of losing office. The fact that resignation calls do not predict ministerial deselection under divided executive and cohabitation bears out the uniqueness of the events that occurred under the scenario of unified executive, which played down the explanatory power of conflict variables under that scenario and downgraded the explanatory power of resignation calls under the other two scenarios. Table 6.7 confirms our expectation that conflicts with prime ministers have the strongest impact on ministerial deselection under cohabitation. Additionally, the results indicate that the president was also able to control cabinet composition under this scenario, which is an intriguing finding.

Table 6.7 Principal-agent relationships under cohabitation (Romania)

Executive scenario	PR Conflicts	PM Conflicts	PARTY Conflicts	Resignation calls
Cohabitation=0	0.78***	-0.01	0.80**	0.89***
Cohabitation=1	1.55***	3.24***	0.83	-0.28

The result indicating the president's unusual impact on ministerial deselection under cohabitation is explained not only by Traian Băsescu's political activism, but also by the range of powers granted to Romanian presidents. Traian Băsescu has been able to influence the selection of cabinet ministers by vetoing some nominations. For example, he refused to appoint Paul Dobre's promotion from the Interior Ministry where he was a junior minister to a full minister position at the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs in March 2006 (Mediafax, 2012). Băsescu also vetoed Adrian Cioroianu's nomination as Minister of Foreign Affairs in February 2007 and Norica Nicolai's appointment as Minister of Justice in December 2007. The latter case was taken to the Constitutional Court by the prime minister, who argued that the president lacked the constitutional power to refuse ministerial nominations. The Court ruled that the president can decline to appoint a minister once for grounded reasons. This decision set a legal precedent for the president's involvement in the appointment of ministers and formally increased his influence over cabinet composition.

President Băsescu also influenced the deselection of ministers by using his constitutional right to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members for acts committed while holding office and to suspend ministers if such an action is

taken (Art. 109)³⁶. The most famous case was that of Tudor Chiuariu, the PNL Minister of Justice who was charged with corruption in April 2007. President Băsescu asked PM Tăriceanu to dismiss the Justice Minister and allowed an official criminal enquiry to investigate the minister in September 2007. Chiuariu stepped down two months later after Băsescu threatened to suspend him.³⁷

Băsescu also used his power to suspend ministers before the onset of cohabitation. He suspended Teodor Atanasiu, the PNL Minister of Defence, in September 2006, after a criminal inquiry had been set against him for abuse in office. Although he was cleared for any wrongdoing by the prosecutors, Atanasiu eventually stepped down³⁸. During the cohabitation with the PNL-UDMR government, President Băsescu suspended ministers from both parties. Zsolt Nagy, the Hungarian party's Information, Technology and Communications Minister, resigned after President Băsescu asked that a criminal inquiry investigate the accusations of cooperation with a transnational organized crime group and suspended him from office in June 2007³⁹. Paul Păcuraru, the Liberal Minister of Labour, resigned after he was suspended from office by the president in September 2008 over a charge of bribery⁴⁰. These examples emphasise that the presidents' formal powers of control over individual ministers can make a difference for their authority over the government even under an executive scenario that does not create favourable conditions for their authority over cabinet members.

Figure 6.16 presents the impact of resignation calls and principal-agent relationships on the ministers' risk of losing office under cohabitation. Separate graphs for the variation in the impact of conflicts with principals over cabinet composition under different executive scenarios are presented in the Appendix (C.11-C.13).

³⁶ The suspension of cabinet members from office is also regulated by the law on ministerial responsibility 115/1999 (published in the Official Monitor 334/20.05.2002 and re-published in 2007, available at http://www.dreptonline.ro/legislatie/lege_responsabilitate_ministeriala.php).


³⁷ For a more detailed analysis of this episode, see Evenimentul zilei, 2007e; România liberă, 2007a; Simina, 2008; Vaida, 2007a; Ziare.com, 2007.

³⁸ More details about the events and legal procedures that led to Minister Atanasiu's resignation can be found in Evenimentul zilei, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c, 2006d.

³⁹ More details about Minister Nagy's suspension and resignation can be found in Evenimentul zilei, 2007a, 2007b.

⁴⁰ See Dordea, 2008; Georgescu & Simina, 2008; Marian & Georgescu, 2008; Simina, 2008; Vadan, 2008; Ziare.com, 2007.

Figure 6.11 Conflicts and resignation calls under cohabitation (Romania)



Overall, these findings confirm our expectations regarding the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence across executive scenarios. The results also contribute to a better understanding of ministerial accountability under a scenario of divided executive. Due to the rare occurrence of this institutional context, its consequences on the executive decision-making process have remained understudied. Although it is too early to generalise this finding, the results of this chapter indicate that the party principal is more likely to gain control over the process of ministerial deselection when the intra-executive conflict between the president and the prime minister intensifies. Our data also suggest that this phenomenon may take place regardless of whether the president and the prime minister belong to the same party or to different parties, as long as both of them are in government. The analysis of ministerial turnover in Romania has also revealed that if presidents are granted formal powers of control over ministers, then they can play an important role in the process of ministerial selection and deselection even during periods of cohabitation.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the determinants of ministerial durability in Romania. Similar to the previous country-studies, we have shown that fixed characteristics are not strong predictors for the length of ministerial tenure. Like in Portugal, the composition of Romanian governments is dominated by the presence of senior party members. In contrast to Portugal, though, a high-ranking position in the party hierarchy does not increase a minister's chance of surviving longer in office. This finding suggests that the authority over cabinet composition belongs to national leaders, such as presidents and prime ministers, rather than to political parties. As a result, we do not find a similar process of party governmentalisation in Romania as we did in Portugal. Instead, like in France, the Romanian party system has undergone a process of presidentialisation that focuses attention on national leadership. As a result, we have shown that whether or not presidents and prime ministers come to power as party leaders makes a difference for the extent of their authority over the political system. The fine-grained analysis of principal-agent relationships in the Romanian parties has highlighted the organisational resources that allow presidents to control their formal parties as *de facto* leaders after they step down from party office. Similarly, this analysis has also emphasised that prime ministers who come to office as party leaders keep a tight grip on cabinet members.

The alternation of executive scenarios during the time period under study has offered a rare opportunity to test the impact of three types of president-prime minister relations on ministerial turnover in the same country. This analysis has confirmed our theoretical expectations regarding the variation in presidential and prime ministerial authority over the cabinet as a function of institutional context and has highlighted several intriguing findings.

First, the results indicate that inter-executive conflicts may reduce the presidents' influence over the government even under a scenario of unified executive and even when they are perceived as *de facto* party leaders. Similarly, a high level of intra-executive conflict during periods of divided executive may decrease the ability of both presidents and prime ministers to fire cabinet members. Both situations lead to an increase in the ability of party principals to control cabinet ministers. Second, the analysis of presidential influence over the cabinet during Romania's first period of cohabitation has emphasised that presidents can use several constitutional powers to

hold ministers accountable even when their informal partisan authority over the political system is reduced. These powers have never been used in Romania during a period of unified executive. Apart from emphasising the factors that lead to an increase of presidential influence over the cabinet under cohabitation, these findings also indicate the institutional instruments that may increase the accountability of ministers across institutional contexts.

Chapter Seven: Ministerial deselection in France, Portugal, and Romania

This chapter assesses the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of both executive scenarios and party relationships between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers. The country studies have focused on the influence of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals on ministerial deselection as a function of institutional context. Specifically, the France, Portugal, and Romania chapters have shown that the ability of presidents, prime ministers, and party principals to influence the deselection of cabinet members depends on whether the president and the prime minister belong to different parties and on whether the president's party is in government. The chapters focusing on ministerial turnover in France and in Romania have shown that presidents are more likely to have a say over ministerial deselection when the president and the prime ministers belong to the same party, a situation that is defined as unified executive. Each country study has also shown that prime ministers have a stronger grip on cabinet composition when the president's party is not in government, a situation which is known as cohabitation. Additionally, the analysis of Romanian ministers has indicated that the party principal's ability to influence the deselection of ministers increases under divided executive, when the president and the prime minister are from different parties but the president's party is in government.

As each case study focused on the analysis of ministerial turnover in only two governments, the impact of party relationships between ministers, presidents and prime ministers on the length of ministerial tenure has raised several problems of measurement and quantitative assessment. For example, since the French and the Romanian presidents covered by this study have contested the presidential race from the position of party leaders, it was not possible to compare their influence on the process of ministerial deselection with that of presidents who were not party leaders prior to their election. The situation of the French and Romanian presidents contrasts with that of the Portuguese presidents covered by this study, who did not contest the presidency of the country from the position of party leaders. Finally, while only some of the French and Romanian prime ministers under study held the presidency of their parties while holding office, all Portuguese prime ministers were party leaders. As a result, while the

case-study chapters have put forward a finely-grained analysis of the party relationships between presidents, prime ministers and their minister-agents using a wide selection of primary and secondary sources, this aspect could not be studied quantitatively within each country. However, the rich variation in both institutional context and party relationships across the three countries under study allows us to carry out a full empirical test of the two factors accounting for the variation in the influence of the three principals over cabinet composition in this comparative chapter.

This chapter is divided in two parts. The first section provides an overview of the pooled data set of French, Portuguese, and Romanian ministers and describes the variation in independent variables within and across countries and as a function of executive scenarios. This section also reviews the patterns of ministerial selection in each country and offers a general overview of the importance that different types of political experience have for the recruitment of executive elites in different national contexts. The second section of this chapter presents a multivariate analysis of ministerial tenure across the three countries under study. This section highlights the impact that formal and informal hierarchies of party leadership have on the ability of presidents and prime ministers to influence the process of ministerial deselection and emphasises the political circumstances that are likely to strengthen this effect.

7.1 The pooled data set on French, Portuguese, and Romanian ministers

The cross-country data set includes 232 cabinet members who served in the French, Portuguese, and Romanian governments under analysis. While the units of observation in the data set are the 232 ministers, the units of analysis are the events experienced by ministers. Overall, 5,072 observations related to the events experienced by ministers were recorded from 50,921 articles published in *Le Figaro*, *Diário de Notícias*, and *Evenimentul zilei*.

The independent variables included in the analysis are presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, which provide definitions for the variables recording personal characteristics and events and show basic descriptive statistics for the whole sample of ministers. Due to idiosyncratic differences in the patterns of ministerial selection across the three countries, fewer independent variables are included in the cross-country analysis compared to the single case studies.

Table 7.1 Definitions of fixed characteristics and descriptive statistics

Variable	Definition	Mean
Cabinet experience	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who had previously held full cabinet positions.	0.35
Deputies 2 mandates	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who won a seat in last general elections and who were not at their first legislative mandate at the moment of appointment.	0.46
Local office	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who held an elective position in local administration at the moment of appointment.	0.50
Party executives	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are members in their parties' national executive bodies at the end of tenure.	0.40
Local party leaders	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who lead local party organisations at the end of tenure.	0.15
PM Party	Dummy variable equal to one for ministers who are from the same party as the prime minister.	0.72

Table 7.2 Definitions of events and descriptive statistics

Variable	Definition	Mean	St. dev.	Range
Tenure	The length of ministerial tenure is measured in days.	759.55	504.49	(23, 1816)
PR Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and presidents.	1.05	2.06	(0, 11)
PM Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and prime ministers.	0.94	1.88	(0, 14)
PARTY Conflicts	Conflicts between ministers and parties.	1.75	3.17	(0, 21)
Resignation calls	Number of times ministers were asked to resign.	1.75	2.89	(0, 16)
Reshuffles	Number of times ministers were reshuffled during current mandate.	0.30	0.67	(0, 4)
Protests	Number of national-level strikes and protests organised during current term.	4.70	11.34	(0, 80)

Owing to the variation in the patterns of executive recruitment across national contexts, the comparative analysis uses a slightly different range of fixed characteristics to capture the four types of political experience that have proven important to ministerial selection in the three countries. Previous appointments to government in either full or junior positions are still the main indicator of previous experience of serving in office. However, due to the variation in the rules or qualities required for appointment in senior cabinet positions in the three countries, the comparative analysis no longer uses ministerial rank as an indicator of executive experience.

The country studies look at membership in the parliament and prior experience as members of the parliament to assess the ministers' parliamentary background. To compensate for the variation in the role of parliamentary experience for appointments to national government across the three countries, the comparative analysis combines these two indicators of parliamentary experience. In the pooled analysis, experienced ministers are deputies who had previously been elected to parliament.

To compensate for the variation in the role of local politics for the advancement of political careers at national level, the comparative analysis only looks at whether ministers held an elective position in local administration at the moment of appointment. Finally, top executive positions in a party organisation at both local and national level indicate the ministers' experience as party executives in the country studies as well as in the pooled analysis.

Ministers are also unlikely to experience the same range of events during their time in office across different countries. For example, while Portuguese ministers must step down if they want to compete in local elections, the French and the Romanian ministers are not required to do so. As a result of this difference across the three countries, it is no longer possible to analyse the impact of defeats in local elections on the risk of losing office in the pooled comparison. Additionally, although there is no legal or party ban on the mobility of Portuguese ministers in the party hierarchy while they are in office, in practice no cabinet member has been demoted or promoted in the party hierarchy during the time period under study. Consequently, this factor is not included in the cross-country analysis, since it is not possible to verify whether promotions in the party hierarchy are used as compensatory moves for ministerial deselection across all three countries.

Another explanatory factor included in the country studies takes into account the formal link of delegation between parliaments and cabinets and controls for the impact of parliamentary control on the risk of deselection. However, while an indicator of parliamentary control on individual ministers has been identified in each country, there is significant variation in the type of parliamentary pressure that ministers experience in each case. Romanian senators and deputies can table simple motions against individual ministers and may recommend their removal from the cabinet. These recommendations are, however, not binding for the government. Although Portuguese deputies cannot vote on individual motions of no-confidence, they can request ministers to attend urgency debates when they wish to discuss unexpected polemical issues and to put

pressure on the government. French deputies and senators can neither vote on individual no-confidence motions nor request individual ministers to take part in special debates. However, the roll-call records of the French National Assembly can be used to identify policy disagreements between cabinet members and parliamentary majorities by analysing the abstentions and the votes cast against ministerial bills. Each of these indicators of parliamentary control has been included in the country-based analyses to test the impact of parliamentary pressure on the risk of losing office. However, since each form of parliamentary pressure relies on a different aspect of the relationship between parliaments and cabinets, their impact on ministerial careers cannot be compared across countries.

The main explanatory factors used to estimate the variation in ministerial tenure across countries are resignation calls, as a measure of ministerial performance, and disagreements with principals, as a measure of principal-agent relationships. Similar to previous studies that have relied on agency theory to study the relationship between prime ministers and their cabinets (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012), we see resignation calls as indicators of the ministers' performance in office. Consequently, we expect that principals use this information when they decide to fire ministers and we expect the relationship between the number of resignation calls and the length of ministerial tenure to be negative. To compensate for this measure's exposure to noisy signals of the minister's performance (Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 561), we also take into account the direct relationship between ministers and their principals. Our assumption in this case is that the risk of losing office increases when the occurrence of conflicts between ministers and their principals is made public. The accumulation of conflicts between ministers, presidents, prime ministers and parties is therefore a proxy for agency loss that each principal should aim to contain. If the principals have the power to fire agents, then they should be in a position to do so when the level of conflict with their agents increases. If the ministers' risk of losing office does not increase in the presence of conflicts with principals, then we assume that the latter do not have the ability to sanction agency loss. The indicator of conflicts between ministers and principals is the number of times the former are criticised by the latter during their time in office, as reported in the press. The issue at stake may be related to the ministers' performance in executive or party office or to their personal behaviour, as well as to ministerial departments or policy issues.

The information contained by the three explanatory variables that record disagreements between ministers and presidents, prime ministers, and political parties is used to estimate the influence of each principal on the deselection of ministers in the country studies as well as in the cross-country analysis. To make sure that the pooled analysis is not driven by country-specific factors, the observations related to the Portuguese president's ability to veto executive decrees and to the Romanian president's power to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members and to request their suspension from office are excluded from the cross-country analysis.

Table 7.3 provides summary statistics for events and fixed characteristics across the three countries. Table 7.4 presents summary statistics across executive scenarios.

Table 7.3 Average events and fixed characteristics across countries

Variables	France		Portugal		Romania		Overall	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
N. Ministers	75		56		101		232	
N. Failures	29		30		61		120	
Length of tenure (days)	905.15	515.65	783.48	562.54	638.16	431.29	759.55	504.49
<i>Fixed characteristics</i>								
Executive experience	0.51	0.50	0.24	0.43	0.12	0.33	0.35	0.48
MPs & 2 mandates	0.49	0.50	0.33	0.47	0.45	0.50	0.46	0.50
Local office	0.78	0.41	0.11	0.31	0.14	0.35	0.50	0.50
Party executives	0.44	0.50	0.24	0.43	0.37	0.48	0.40	0.49
Local party leaders	0.14	0.35	0.03	0.18	0.21	0.40	0.15	0.36
PM Party	0.75	0.43	0.55	0.50	0.73	0.44	0.72	0.45
<i>Events</i>								
Conflicts PR	1.69	2.55	0.16	0.46	1.06	2.04	1.05	2.06
Conflicts PM	1.47	2.24	0.07	0.26	1.03	1.95	0.94	1.88
Conflicts PARTY	2.96	4.04	0.25	0.84	1.68	2.89	1.75	3.17
Resignation calls	1.19	2.42	1.38	2.99	2.39	3.04	1.75	2.89
Reshuffles	0.51	0.92	0.92	0.44	0.21	0.52	0.30	0.67
Protests	12.04	17.61	1.88	2.91	0.81	1.66	4.70	11.34

Table 7.4 Average events and fixed characteristics across executive scenarios

Variables	Unified		Divided		Cohabitation		Overall	
	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.	Mean	Std. dev.
N. Ministers	105		37		111		253	
N. Failures	44		29		47		120	
Length of tenure (days)	762.64	459.12	446.34	267.70	838.81	556.45	759.55	504.49
<i>Fixed characteristics</i>								
Cabinet experience	0.39	0.49	0.08	0.26	0.39	0.49	0.35	0.48
MPs & 2 mandates	0.53	0.50	0.39	0.49	0.42	0.49	0.46	0.50
Local office	0.51	0.50	0.12	0.32	0.58	0.49	0.50	0.50
Party executives	0.37	0.48	0.45	0.50	0.41	0.49	0.40	0.49
Local party leaders	0.26	0.44	0.20	0.40	0.05	0.22	0.15	0.36
PM Party	0.83	0.38	0.33	0.47	0.73	0.44	0.72	0.45
<i>Events</i>								
Conflicts PR	1.02	1.99	1.03	1.94	1.07	2.17	1.05	2.06
Conflicts PM	0.79	1.19	1.45	2.56	0.93	2.12	0.94	1.88
Conflicts PARTY	2.15	3.72	1.55	1.99	1.47	2.90	1.75	3.17
Resignation calls	1.80	2.84	2.24	2.72	1.59	2.97	1.75	2.89
Reshuffles	0.48	0.86	0.03	0.19	0.23	0.53	0.30	0.67
Protests	3.66	7.27	0.59	1.52	6.63	14.71	4.70	11.34

The comparative data set includes the exact dates when ministers take and leave office. The dependent variable records the length of ministerial tenure. Out of the 232 ministers included in the analysis, 120 stepped down before the end of their term. The statistics in Table 7.3 show that the rate of ministerial turnover is higher in Romania, where only 40 per cent of the ministers completed their term in office. The data also indicates that the mean length of ministerial tenure ranges from 21 months in Romania to 30 months in France. However, if the rate of ministerial turnover across countries (Table 7.3) is compared with the frequency of deselection across executive scenarios (Table 7.4) then it becomes apparent that ministers incur a much greater risk of losing office under divided executive than under both unified executive and cohabitation. The data set includes only one spell of divided executive, which occurred between December 2004 and April 2007 in Romania. However, the data in Table 7.4 also indicates that the chance of observing ministerial termination events under unified executive and cohabitation is similar. Since the Romanian governments included in this analysis were observed under conditions of both unified executive and cohabitation, we can conclude that the variation in the frequency of deselection does not necessarily depend on the countries selected for analysis, but rather on the type of scenario under

which ministers are appointed. If the occurrence of a certain scenario makes a difference for ministerial survival, then the impact of principal-agent relationships on the risk of deselection should also vary as a function of different scenarios.

The occurrence of conflicts between ministers and their principals is balanced across executive scenarios. However, when we compare their incidence across countries, some differences stand out. The most conflictual principal-agent relationship across the three countries as well as across scenarios is the party-minister one. The level of conflicts between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers is similar in France and Romania, but lower in Portugal. The analysis of ministerial turnover in Portugal has nevertheless emphasised that Portuguese presidents rely more on legislative powers and soft presidential powers, such as the open presidencies and the “magistracy of influence”, to wear down governments than on public criticism towards individual ministers (Araújo, 2003, p. 95; 96–97; Cruz, 1994, p. 256; Soares, 2002, p. 221). For the reasons explained above, though, these forms of presidential pressure are not included in the cross-country analysis. Moreover, Portuguese prime ministers from the Social-Democratic Party seem to follow the code of conduct set by *Ánibal Cavaco Silva* during his long prime ministership between 1985 and 1995 and refrain from criticising their ministers in public. The lower frequency of conflicts recorded during *Manuel Barroso*’ and *Pedro Santana Lopes*’ time in office as prime ministers contrasts with the high number of conflicts recorded for *José Socrates*’ government.

Overall, the correlation among the values of the conflict variables across countries presented in Table 7.3 is above 0.90. The correlation coefficients differ when the variation in the level of conflict is compared across scenarios in Table 7.4. Thus, while the correlation between the occurrence of conflicts under the scenarios of unified and divided executive is above 0.99, the correlation of conflict variables between divided executive and either of the other two scenarios is only around 0.50. The variation in the conflicts variables with institutional context and not as a function of the countries selected for analysis strengthens our expectation that the impact of principal-agent relationships on the risk of deselection depends on institutional context.

Tables 7.5-7.8 present a series of descriptive statistics related to the occurrence of resignation calls across countries and executive scenarios. According to Tables 7.5-7.6, at least one resignation call was made for 103 out of the 232 ministers covered by the pooled data set. Of the 103 ministers, 27 were asked to resign only once, 25 were asked to resign twice, 13 were asked to resign three times, and 38 were asked to resign

at least four times. Similar to other works that study resignation calls (Berlinski et al., 2010, p. 562), if a minister is asked to resign repeatedly over the same issue, a new resignation call is recorded for this issue only if new information comes to light or if a different actor asks the minister to resign. In total there are 388 resignation calls in the data. Although the period of analysis is more or less evenly split between the three countries under analysis, Table 7.5 shows that a higher number of resignation calls was recorded in Romania compared to France and Portugal. The number of resignation calls is, however, more evenly distributed when we compare their occurrence across executive scenarios. Table 7.6 shows that the occurrence of resignation calls is remarkably balanced across unified executive and cohabitation, but considerably lower under divided executive. This variation is explained by the shorter time interval occupied by the scenario of divided executive in our data set, as it occurred only in Romania between December 2004 and April 2007.

Table 7.5 Resignation calls for ministers facing resignation calls across countries

Resignation calls	Overall	France	Portugal	Romania
One	27	6	6	15
Two	25	7	6	12
Three	13	4	2	7
Four or more	38	7	5	26
Total	103	24	19	60

Table 7.6 Resignation calls for ministers facing resignation calls across scenarios

Resignation calls	Overall	Unified executive	Divided executive	Cohabitation
One	27	9	5	13
Two	25	12	2	11
Three	13	4	3	6
Four or more	38	17	7	14
Total	103	42	17	44

Tables 7.7 and 7.8 classify the calls for resignation according to the reasons that led to their occurrence. The proximate reasons for resignation calls are grouped into the same four categories, including personal errors, departmental errors, policy disagreements, and breaches of collective responsibility. In cases where ministers were asked to step down over a mix of motives, two or three proximate reasons were coded.

This is why the total number of resignations differs depending on whether one focuses on the exact number of calls, or on the reason given for their occurrence.

Table 7.7 shows that, overall, the majority of resignation calls are related to personal errors. However, the frequency of resignation calls related to personal errors is more balanced in France and in Portugal, compared to Romania. The disproportional occurrence of this type of resignation calls in Romania is to a certain extent explained by the abundance of corruption scandals that occurred during the social-democratic government's time in office between 2000 and 2004. This hypothesis is confirmed in Table 7.8, which shows that a higher number of resignation calls related to personal errors occurred under the scenario of unified executive compared to the other two executive scenarios. The data in Table 7.8 also indicates that the number of resignation calls is likely to increase with the number of actors involved in the policy-making process, as there are considerably more calls for resignation related to policy errors and breaches of collective responsibility under cohabitation, when the president's party opposes the government, than under unified and divided executive, when the president's party is in government.

Table 7.7 Resignation calls by reason across countries

Reason for resignation calls	France	Portugal	Romania	Total
Personal or ministerial error	38	38	163	239
Departmental error	17	9	47	73
Policy error	29	28	45	102
Collective responsibility	8	2	5	15
Total	92	77	260	429

Table 7.8 Resignation calls by reason across scenarios

Reason for resignation calls	Unified executive	Divided executive	Cohabitation	Total
Personal or ministerial error	122	34	83	239
Departmental error	28	15	30	73
Policy error	21	18	63	102
Collective responsibility	1	4	10	15
Total	172	71	186	429

The remaining parts of this section focus on the four types of political experience that have proven relevant for the selection of executive elites in each of the three countries. The following sub-sections discuss various issues related to differences in the types of variables included in the pooled comparison compared to the individual country studies. Overall, the analysis of descriptive statistics shows that the results obtained in the country studies are robust at the cross-country level even when the country-specific factors related to different types of political experience are not taken into account.

Cabinet experience

The information related to cabinet experience in the cross-country analysis concerns the ministers' previous appointment to government as junior or full cabinet members. The measurement of this variable at cross-country level follows the same rules as in the country studies. As a result, the data presented in the Appendix (D.1) show a similar distribution of cabinet experience across countries and with respect to terminations events as the case-study chapters. Regardless of the variation in the professionalisation of executive elites across national contexts, the cross-country data corroborates the results obtained in the individual studies. While the lack of previous appointments in government does not seem to increase the risk of losing office, veteran ministers are more likely to step down than their less experienced colleagues. The correlation between inexperience and durability is hardly surprising taking into account the importance of the cabinet prize for ministers who enter government for the first time. Thus, inexperienced ministers are less likely to enter into conflict with their principals than cabinet members who have held such highly pressured jobs for a longer period of time.

Parliamentary experience

The country studies assess the weight of legislative careers on the length of ministerial tenures by taking into account not only the ministers' recruitment from the parliamentary pool, but also their previous experience as members of the parliament. The cross-country analysis combines the two indicators of legislative experience and takes into account the number of times ministers had previously been elected in the parliament only for those cabinet members who held a parliamentary seat at the moment

of appointment. This measure of parliamentary experience reduces the possibility that different perceptions associated with the status of national representatives within individual countries drive the relationship between parliamentary experience and ministerial durability across countries. However, the use of a slightly different measure of parliamentary experience does not expose a different impact of parliamentary background on the length of ministerial tenure. The data related to the parliamentary background of the ministers who served in the governments under study across countries and with respect to their survival in office until the end of their term is presented graphically in the Appendix (D.2). The relationship between parliamentary experience and survival in office is remarkably balanced. The proportion of ministers with no parliamentary background is equally spread out among the ministers who stepped down and those who completed their term. The data do not emphasise any correlation between the number of legislative mandates held by ministers and their length of tenure either.

Experience in local administration

To assess the extent to which ministers come to executive office from local politics, the comparative analysis looks at whether the members of the governments under study held an elective position as councillors, presidents of local councils, mayors, or presidents of regional at the moment of appointment. As opposed to the country studies, the pooled analysis does not take into account the experience in local administration for ministers who were not holding local office at the moment of appointment in government. The comparative analysis does not take into account whether ministers lost or gained local office during their time in government either, as the simultaneous holding of local and national offices is banned in Portugal and in Romania.

The cross-country data presented graphically in the Appendix (D.3) confirm the results obtained in the country studies and show that the local route to national politics is likely to increase a minister's length of tenure. The ministers who were either councillors or mayors at the moment of appointment were more likely to survive in office than their colleagues who did not hold local office. This finding substantiates the expectation that the authority and durability of ministers depends not only on the

importance of their portfolios, but also on the range of political resources they hold at both national and local level⁴¹ (Duhamel, 2011, p. 604; François, 2006, p. 269).

Party experience

To determine the extent to which being a party executive makes a difference for a minister's durability in office, the comparative analysis controls for membership in national executive bodies as well as for the leadership of local party organisations. We also compare the party offices held by ministers at the moment of appointment with the party roles they played at the end of tenure in each of the three countries under study. Similarly to the assessment of parliamentary and local administration experience, the cross-country analysis does not take into account the ministers' positions in the party hierarchy prior to the moment of appointment. Notwithstanding the differences in the ministers' mobility in the party hierarchy across the three countries, the data presented in the Appendix (D.4) do not suggest a correlation between durability and party seniority. There is hardly any indication that non-partisanship increases the risk of losing office, or that national or local party leaders are likely to survive longer in office. Additionally, the pattern of ministerial survival does not change as a function of whether one takes into account the party positions held at appointment or at the end of tenure.

This summary suggests that, overall, fixed characteristics hold little explanatory power for the variation in the ministers' length of tenure. This pattern does not necessarily mean that they are not an important determinant of the ministers' professional advancement. However, it is unlikely that fixed characteristics at any moment in a minister's career can explain a dynamic phenomenon like survival in a particular office, which depends primarily on what ministers do while they hold that office. For example, the lack of correlation between seniority in the party and durability in ministerial office does not necessarily mean that party positions do not make a difference for the length of tenure. It is more likely that we cannot actually observe this relationship because the ministers' status in the party hierarchy is not fixed during the

⁴¹ The variation in the importance associated to local politics across countries may also explain why some ministers may be more eager to return or to devote more of their time to local politics in some countries than in other. For example, it is not unknown for French ministers to give up their position in the cabinet after winning local elections or even to prepare for local elections. This was the case of Martine Aubry in 2000 when she stepped down from Lionel Jospin's cabinet to prepare for the local elections in Lille where she wanted to run for the mayor position. Although such resignations are not unknown situation in Portugal and Romania either, their likelihood is considerably smaller.

time period under study. Thus, the party principal's ongoing adjustment of the positions held by ministers in the party hierarchy according to their performance in office makes it difficult to measure how a minister's length of tenure varies with their position in the party hierarchy when this quality is observed as a fixed characteristic at the beginning or at the end of tenure.

7.2 Fixed characteristics, events, executive scenarios, party relations, and ministerial durability across countries

The remaining parts of this chapter present a multivariate analysis that estimates the impact of personal characteristics, party relations, institutional context, and party relationship on the length of ministerial tenure. We start with a nonparametric analysis that allows the data set to speak for itself without making any assumption about the functional form of the survivor function or about the effects of independent variables on survival experiences (Cleves et al., p. 91). Then we justify our model choice for the pooled analysis of ministerial turnover and the technique used to estimate the impact of events on the length of tenure. The next two sub-sections present the models that estimate the variation in the length of ministerial tenure first with institutional context and second as a function of the party relationship between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers.

7.2.1 Nonparametric estimation and model specification

The data set of French, Portuguese, and Romanian cabinets covers 232 ministers and includes 5,072 observations related to the events experienced by ministers while in office. Of the 232 ministers included in the pooled analysis, 120 stepped down before the collective end of their governments.

Figure 7.1 shows that the probability of failing climbs rather steeply during the first three years in office and then starts to decline.

Figure 7.2 presents a Kaplan-Meier plot which shows the unconditional probability that ministers will survive beyond a certain amount of time across countries and executive scenarios when no covariates are taken into consideration.

Figure 7.1 Hazard rate for ministerial survival across countries and scenarios





Figure 7.2 Kaplan-Meier plots of ministerial survival across countries & scenarios



According to Figure 7.2, ministers have a 50% chance of surviving 943 days in office. Additional Kaplan-Meier plots reported in the Appendix (D.5-D.6) show that the probability of failing varies significantly across countries and scenarios. Thus, Romanian ministers have a 50% chance of survival beyond 826 days in office (when no explanatory factors are taken into account), while Portuguese and French ministers have a 50% chance of surviving beyond 1,053 and 1,275 days respectively. The probability of losing office also varies as a function of executive scenarios. The shorter survival rates are encountered in a divided executive, where ministers have a 50% chance of surviving only 590 days in office. A situation of unified executive increases the 50% survival probability to 1,168 days, while under cohabitation ministers have a 50% chance of surviving beyond 1,211 days in office. The Kaplan-Meier plots reported in the Appendix also display the results of the log-rank tests that determine whether or not the surviving functions across different countries and scenarios are the same. The p values indicate that there is enough evidence to reject the null of no difference in the survivor functions across countries and scenarios.


A first issue involved in model specification regards the shape of the hazard function. As the pooled data set contains considerably more observations than the country-based data sets, parameter estimates would be able to exploit the available information more efficiently than the semi-parametric method we have used to estimate the risk of losing office in the country analyses (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 223). However, since we do not have any theoretical insight into the variation in the length of tenure as a function of time, it is necessary to assess the goodness of fit for different parametric distributions of the time dependency using the Akaike Information Criterion or AIC (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004, p. 44). The AIC tests for the pooled data set indicate that the Weibull model is the most appropriate for the analysis of this data.⁴²

An alternative method to choose between different parametric models and determine how the hazard rate varies with time is to fit the data using a piecewise-constant exponential (PCE) model. This is a semi-parametric duration model that leaves the shape of the hazard rate unspecified with respect to time. The time interval is divided into discrete units within which the hazard rate is assumed to be constant. The hazard rate may nevertheless vary across different periods of time. If the PCE model reveals that the hazard rate increases monotonically with time, then the Weibull model

⁴² Due to computational problems, the generalised gamma model could not be estimated. As a result the Akaike Information Criterion tests were used to discriminate only between the exponential, the Weibull, the Gompertz, the log normal, and the log-logistic models.

is an appropriate choice for data analysis (Golder, 2011a). Figure 7.3 compares the shape of the baseline hazard estimated with a step function, in which the height of each step is its own model parameter, with a baseline hazard that can only increase at an increasing rate (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 243). Both hazard functions have been estimated after fitting the baseline model presented in Table 7.11. Figure 7.3 shows a reasonable fit, indicating that the hazard increases monotonically with time. As a result, we can be confident that the Weibull model is an appropriate choice for analysis.

Figure 7.3 Comparison of estimated baseline hazards



A second issue we need to consider is how to model the potential correlation between ministers in the same country and the within-minister correlation that may arise when ministers experience more events during their time in office. In the latter case, it would be unreasonable to assume that there is no connection between the events that ministers experience. To adjust for within-minister correlation without biasing the cross-minister estimators we need to use clustered robust standard errors (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 335). In this case, the observations in the data set are clustered by ministers and the data set includes 232 clusters. However, ministers in one country may also have a different hazard rate than ministers in another country. To account for unobserved heterogeneity at country level other studies have modelled ministerial

turnover using shared frailty models, which assume that ministers in one country share a frailty term that differs from country to country (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008). However, this technique can only provide reliable estimates of parameters and standard errors when the data includes a sufficient number of clusters (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 193). Due to the small number of countries included in our analysis, as well as to the difficulties raised by the use of frailty terms for the interpretation of models that rely on the proportional hazards assumption (Golder, 2011b), the Weibull regressions presented in Table 7.9 report standard errors clustered by ministers.

The remaining of this section focuses on the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of institutional context and party relationships.

7.2.2 The length of ministerial tenure and executive scenarios

Table 7.9 presents four models that estimate the impact of personal characteristics, events, and party relationships on the length of ministerial tenure across and within dual-executive scenarios. Model 1 estimates the impact of all variables across executive scenarios and serves as a baseline for comparison. Model 2, 3, and 4 assess the extent to which resignation calls, as performance measures, and conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals, as proxies for the principal-agent relationships, affect the ministers' risk of losing office as a function of institutional context. To do so, the three models include a contextual variable that verifies to what extent resignation calls increase the risk of being sanctioned under different political circumstances and tests the ability of principals to reduce agency-loss under unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation. The model specification adopts the chained-interaction technique, which is employed when one variable (in this case one of the executive scenarios) is believed to modify the effects of other variables (the impact of conflicts with presidents, parties and prime ministers), without conditioning each other's effects (Kam and Franzese 2007: 39–40). Thus, Models 3 and 4 include three two-way interactions that separate the impact of resignation calls and of conflicts with principals on the risk of losing office under unified executive, divided executive and cohabitation and respects the recommendations regarding the inclusion of all constitutive terms in the case of multiplicative interaction models (Braumoeller 2004; Brambor et al. 2006). The models present coefficients from Weibull regressions. Positive coefficients indicate that the risk of deselection increases and indicate a shorter length of tenure, while negative coefficients decrease the hazard rate and are expected to increase the length of tenure.

The four models highlight the overall limited explanatory power of personal characteristics. Furthermore, the robustness of these results across the four models confirms the limited impact of fixed characteristics on the length of ministerial tenure with regard to institutional context. However, the models emphasise that previous experience in full cabinet positions increases the risk of losing office by about 55 per cent.⁴³ This finding confirms the impact of executive experience on the length of tenure across national contexts, as British ministers who come to government with some ministerial experience are also 58 per cent more likely to lose office than those without previous experience (Berlinski et al., 2007, p. 258). The greater durability of inexperienced ministers may be explained by the longer period of time they require before they develop independence with regard to their principals. More experienced ministers are also more likely to disregard their principals' instruction and less inclined to accept policy compromises than their inexperienced colleagues who are "still in hot pursuit of their ambition" (Lord Wilson, 2013). The local politics route to national office also seems to have a significant impact on the length of tenure. The four models in Table 7.9 indicate that the risk of losing office was 40 to 50 per cent lower for ministers who held an elective position at local level. This finding substantiates the expectation that local strongholds increase a minister's standing at the cabinet table, as emphasised in the country studies particularly in the case of France and Romania. The only other fixed characteristic shown to have a significant event on the length of tenure refers to whether ministers are in the prime minister's party. Because prime ministers are expected to have more opportunities to replace cabinet ministers than other leaders, ministers from the prime minister's party are expected to incur a higher risk of deselection than other cabinet members (Huber & Martinez-Gallardo, 2008, p. 171). This expectation is not confirmed by the models presented in Table 7.14, which indicate that being in the prime minister's party increases a minister's chance of surviving in office regardless of institutional context. This finding may suggest that the extent of the prime minister's power over ministers in his or her party depends on the limits imposed on the prime minister's control over the cabinet by the president and the party principal.

The impact of resignation calls and conflicts with the three principals on the length of tenure is analysed across scenarios in Model 1 and within scenarios in Models 2, 3, and 4. The results in Model 1 indicate that, overall, ministers who are asked to resign and who enter into conflicts with any of the three principals are more likely to

⁴³ This value was calculated by exponentiating the coefficients of the *Cabinet experience* variable reported in the four models from Table 7.11 to obtain time ratios.

Table 7.9 Ministerial durability across executive scenarios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Fixed characteristics				
Cabinet experience	0.44** (0.22)	0.45* (0.23)	0.44* (0.23)	0.40* (0.23)
MPs & 2 mandates	-0.06 (0.21)	-0.04 (0.22)	-0.06 (0.23)	-0.01 (0.23)
Local office	-0.67** (0.23)	-0.65** (0.23)	-0.60** (0.25)	-0.87** (0.27)
Party executives	-0.22 (0.22)	-0.26 (0.22)	-0.33 (0.23)	-0.18 (0.22)
Local party leaders	0.16 (0.28)	0.23 (0.29)	0.17 (0.29)	0.01 (0.30)
PM Party	-0.56** (0.21)	-0.58** (0.21)	-0.42* (0.22)	-0.64** (0.21)
Events				
Social unrest	0.07* (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.08** (0.04)	0.11** (0.04)
Reshuffles	1.64 (1.10)	1.56 (1.37)	1.87* (1.09)	1.87* (1.09)
Resignation Calls	0.74*** (0.12)	0.77*** (0.19)	0.79*** (0.14)	0.69*** (0.13)
PR Conflicts	0.82*** (0.11)	0.73*** (0.12)	0.90*** (0.12)	0.88*** (0.18)
PM Conflicts	0.61*** (0.14)	0.58*** (0.16)	1.24*** (0.32)	0.46*** (0.12)
PARTY Conflicts	0.44** (0.15)	0.53** (0.17)	0.11 (0.25)	0.47** (0.18)
Executive scenario				
Unified		-0.07 (0.22)		
Resignation calls × Unified		0.07 (0.24)		
PR Conflicts × Unified		1.25** (0.38)		
PM Conflicts × Unified		-1.32 (0.81)		
PARTY Conflicts × Unified		-0.25 (0.43)		
Divided			1.02*** (0.27)	
Resignation calls × Divided			-0.11 (0.42)	
PR Conflicts × Divided			-0.46* (0.27)	
PM Conflicts × Divided			-0.88** (0.38)	
PARTY Conflicts × Divided			0.47 (0.33)	
Cohabitation				-0.54** (0.22)
Resignation calls × Cohabitation				0.21 (0.24)
PR Conflicts × Cohabitation				0.05 (0.21)
PM Conflicts × Cohabitation				1.36*** (0.27)
PARTY Conflicts × Cohabitation				-0.64**

Constant	-9.70***	-9.59***	-10.56***	(0.29)
	(0.87)	(0.85)	(0.94)	(0.90)
Shape parameter	1.35	1.34	1.44	1.40
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)

N Ministers	232	232	232	232
N Failures	120	120	120	120
N Observations	5072	5072	5072	5072
Log likelihood	-105.126	-101.087	-96.262	-97.546

Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by ministers.


*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

lose office (see D.7 in the Appendix for a graphical interpretation of the impact of principal-agent relationships and the length of tenure across executive scenarios).

Models 2, 3 and 4 in Table 7.9 assess the impact of resignation calls and conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals on the ministers' risk of losing office as a function of institutional context. Model 2 estimates the impact of events variables on the ministers' risk of losing office under unified executive. However, the impact of interaction terms is not revealed directly by the regression coefficients. For example, to measure the impact of resignation calls under a scenario of unified executive it is necessary to sum up the coefficients associated with *Resignation calls* and *Resignation calls* \times *Unified*. This sum reveals a positive coefficient, which is equal to 0.84 (0.77 + 0.07). The standard error of this sum of coefficients is also calculated from the standard error of the two separate coefficients and indicates a highly significant coefficient. Thus, resignation calls are strongly associated with an increase in the risk of losing office under unified executive. The impact of resignation calls outside period of unified executive, when *Unified* is equal to 0, is revealed directly by the coefficient associated with *Resignation calls* and its standard error. The positive and statistically significant coefficient associated with *Resignation calls* in Model 2 indicates that resignation calls increase the risk of deselection outside periods of unified executive as well.

The results in Model 2 show that conflictual relationships with presidents are associated with a shorter length of ministerial tenure during periods of unified executive. This is also the case for party principals, but not for prime ministers. Figure 7.4 illustrates the effects of conflicts with the three principals under unified executive and reveals the considerable influence of the minister-president relationship on ministerial turnover.


Figure 7.4 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive



Although the impact of the conflicts with the party principal on the risk of losing office is statistically significant, the data in Figure 7.4 indicates that its substantive effect is negligible compared to the magnitude of the impact of conflicts with presidents. The country studies have nevertheless revealed that the detrimental effect of conflicts with the president on the length of tenure is mostly limited to the scenario of unified executive. This expectation is confirmed at cross-country level, as detailed in the Appendix (see D.8 for an illustration of the relationship between the length of tenure and conflicts with presidents across executive scenarios).

Model 3 estimates the variation in the length of tenure under a situation of divided executive. However, as this scenario occurred only in Romania, between December 2004 and April 2007, this model does not carry out a cross-country analysis. As a result, the figures in Model 3 replicate the results reported in the models that estimate ministerial turnover in Romania in Chapter Six. Specifically, the regression results show that resignation calls lose their explanatory power under this scenario and that only conflicts with the party principals increase the risk of deselection. Figure 7.5 confirms that the influence of the party principal on ministerial deselection matters more than that of presidents and prime ministers when a scenario of divided executive occurs.


Figure 7.5 Impact of principal-agent relationships under divided executive



As the data related to ministerial turnover under divided executive is limited to just one occurrence of this scenario in only one country, it is premature to generalise this finding. However, the data suggests that the influence of the party principal over the cabinet peaks during periods of divided executive compared to both unified executive and cohabitation (a graphical interpretation of the variation in the influence of conflicts with political parties across executive scenarios can be found in the Appendix, see D.9). The increase in the party principal's influence over cabinet composition during periods of divided executive may be due to high and prolonged inter-governmental dissensions. For example, when President Băsescu of the PD and Prime Minister Popescu-Tăriceanu of the PNL set against each other between late 2004 and 2007, Democratic ministers sided with the president and defied the prime minister, while Liberal ministers did exactly the opposite (Stan & Zaharia, 2007). Consequently, the process of ministerial deselection became a zero-sum game for the president and the prime minister as they criticised the ministers from opposing parties. Our results may indicate that when the president-premier relationship leads to political deadlock, the only principal-agent relationship that has a significant impact on the process of deselection may be the one between ministers and party principals.

The last model in Table 7.9 focuses on ministerial turnover under cohabitation. The results of this model confirm the findings of the country studies and show that a conflictual relationship with the prime minister under this executive scenario increases significantly the risk of losing office. Nevertheless, the fact that conflicts with the president are not completely risk-free under cohabitation confirms Duverger's (1996, p. 517) expectation that although presidents have less power than prime ministers when this scenario occurs, they are still not completely powerless. Figure 7.6 illustrates the substantive effects of conflicts with the three principals under cohabitation and shows that the only relationship that increases the risk of deselection in this case is the one with the prime minister. The expectation put forward in the country studies regarding the decrease in the power of prime ministers under unified and divided executive, is confirmed at the cross-country level (see D.10 in the Appendix for the variation in the impact of conflicts with prime ministers across executive scenarios). Model 3 in Table 7.9 also shows that ministers who are asked to resign during periods of cohabitation are also more likely to step down than ministers who are not.

Figure 7.6 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation



Overall, the results reported by the four models in Table 7.9 confirm the findings obtained in the country studies. The authority of presidents and prime ministers over ministers increases under unified executive and cohabitation respectively, while the influence of the party principal on ministerial deselection reaches a significant level only when a situation of divided executive occurs. The following section examines the variation in the length of tenure as a function of party relationships. Due to the lack of variation in the party roles played by presidents and prime ministers within the countries under study, this relationship could not be analysed in the case study chapters. The following section emphasises that in addition to institutional context, party leadership positions are a good predictor of the presidents' and the prime ministers' ability to influence the process of ministerial deselection.

7.2.3 The length of ministerial tenure and party relations

This section analyses the extent to which the impact of resignation calls and principal-agent relationships on the length of ministerial tenure depends on the interaction between institutional context and the party relationships between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers. The party relationships vary depending on whether the presidents and prime ministers hold a party leadership position or not. However, as explained in the first section of this chapter, in order to account for the informal partisan authority that presidents preserve even after they step down as leaders of their own party, it is necessary to take into account the party leadership positions held by presidents and prime ministers not only after they take office, but also before the elections that brought them into this position. To account for this variation in party relationships, the following analysis assesses the impact that principal-agent relationships have on ministerial deselection according to the leadership positions held by presidents and prime ministers before and after they took office. If the analysis reveals a difference in the impact of formal and *de facto* party relationships on the ministers' risk of losing office, then we will be in a better position to determine to which extent informal or *de facto* party hierarchies matter for a correct assessment of the impact that different principal-agent relationships have on the process of ministerial deselection.

To test whether the party leadership positions held by presidents and prime ministers before and after they take office make a difference for their ability to influence the process of ministerial deselection three sets of models are estimated. First we look at

the formal party leadership roles held by presidents and prime ministers after they take office. In this case we can only estimate the impact of conflicts with prime ministers who act as formal leaders of their parties, since presidents are required to give up their party responsibilities before taking office. The case studies have nevertheless shown that the party leadership positions held by prime ministers before and after elections may vary as well. Lionel Jospin in the case of France stepped down as party leader upon taking office, while Adrian Năstase in the case of Romania was elected as party leader only after elections. To account for the variation that may take place in the party leadership positions held by prime ministers before and after elections, the second set of models estimate the impact of conflicts on ministerial turnover for the case of prime ministers who were party leaders before the elections that preceded their appointment. Finally, the third set of models takes into account the party leadership positions held by presidents before their election. Each set of models estimates the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of institutional context and party relationships, provided there is variation in the party leadership roles held by presidents and prime ministers within each scenario. If there is no difference in the party leadership positions held by presidents and/or prime ministers before and after elections within a certain scenario, then it is not possible to assess the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of institutional context and different party relationships.

Prime ministers and party relationships after elections

First we estimate the impact of principal agent relationships on the length of tenure taking into account the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy after elections. To do so, the conflict variables are interacted with a dummy variable, *PM leader*, which is 1 for prime ministers who were party leaders and 0 for the prime ministers who did not hold a formal party leadership position after elections. For example, Lionel Jospin, who stepped down as party leader when he became a prime minister is coded with 0, while Adrian Năstase, who succeeded Ion Iliescu as party leader after the concurrent elections that took place in 2004 is coded with 1. The other prime ministers covered by the data set who preserved their position as party leaders in the aftermath of elections are coded with 1. The interaction terms indicate the impact of different principal-agent relationships as a function of the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy. For example, if the prime minister is not a party leader, the

coefficient on *PR Conflicts* indicates the impact of conflicts with the president when *PM Leader* is 0. If the prime minister was a party leader, then the impact of conflicts with the president is given by the sum of the coefficients associated to *PR Conflicts* and *PR Conflicts* × *PM leader*. The variation in the length of ministerial tenure is estimated across executive scenarios, as well as separately under unified executive and cohabitation. Due to the lack of variation in the party leadership roles held by prime ministers under unified executive before and after elections, a separate model could not be estimated for this scenario.

To ease the interpretation of results, Table 7.10 presents only the coefficients related to the impact of conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals on the risk of deselection. The full results of this regression model are presented in the Appendix (D.11). The coefficients presented in Table 7.10 correspond to the conflicts variables when prime ministers are not party leaders (PM Leader=0), the sum of conflicts variables and conflicts variables interacted with PM Leader (when PM Leader=1), and their level of significance. Each row in Table 7.10 presents the results corresponding to a particular institutional context. This presentation allows us to compare directly the results for the impact of conflicts with principals when prime ministers are party leaders and when they are not.

Table 7.10 Principal-agent relationships and the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy after elections

Party leadership roles after elections		PR Conflicts	PM Conflicts	PARTY Conflicts
PM Leader =0	Unified, Divided, Cohabitation	0.93**	1.63**	0.02
PM Leader =1	Unified, Divided, Cohabitation	0.62***	0.44***	0.54***
PM Leader =0	Unified=1	2.08**	-0.57	-0.21
PM Leader =1	Unified=1	0.98	-1.62	0.84*
PM Leader =0	Cohabitation=1	0.24	2.23***	0.08
PM Leader =1	Cohabitation=1	1.02***	1.50**	-0.21
PM Leader =0	Divided=0	1.06**	1.73**	0.03
PM Leader =1	Divided=0	0.76***	0.47	0.39

Table 7.10 shows that the results differ within executive scenarios although, overall, all principal-agent relationships are significantly related to the risk of losing office across executive scenarios. The results indicate that a conflictual relationship with prime ministers does not have an impact on the length of tenure under unified executive, regardless of the prime minister's position in the party hierarchy. Conversely, the results

in the third row suggest that conflicts with prime ministers increase the risk of deselection significantly under cohabitation irrespective of whether they are party leaders or not. Due to the lack of variation in the party leadership positions held by prime ministers under the scenario of divided executive, which occurred only in Romania between December 2004 and April 2007, it is not possible to present a model that estimates the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of the party leadership roles held by prime ministers under this executive scenario. We can nevertheless assess the impact of principal-agent relationships outside the scenario of divided executive. If we compare the results of the variation in the length of tenure outside periods of divided executive, reported in the last row in Table 7.10, with the estimated variation in the length of tenure across all three scenarios, reported in the first row of this table, then we notice a significant difference in the impact of conflicts with prime ministers and party principals. Specifically, the comparison of the two sets of results indicates that the increase in the authority of prime ministers and parties over cabinet composition under divided executive is actually driving the estimation results across the three scenarios. The substantive effects of the principal-agent relationships on the length of tenure when prime ministers are party leaders after elections across and within executive scenarios are graphically presented in the Appendix (D.12-D14).

Overall, the results presented in Table 7.10 indicate that the position held by prime ministers in the party hierarchy after elections do not make a difference for their influence over cabinet composition regardless of whether there is unified executive or cohabitation. The relationship with prime ministers is shown to have an insignificant impact on the length of ministerial tenure under unified executive, and a strong impact under cohabitation regardless of their position in the party hierarchy. This is a counter-intuitive finding, as prime ministers who are party leaders are expected to have more control over their cabinets than prime ministers who are not party leaders. These results may indicate either that the influence of prime ministers over cabinet composition is likely to be weak under unified executive and strong under cohabitation regardless of their position in the party hierarchy, or that the party leadership role played by prime ministers is not accurately captured in these models. To answer this question we will estimate the impact of conflicts with prime ministers on the risk of deselection taking into account their position in the party hierarchy before elections.

Prime ministers and party relationships before elections

Table 7.11 presents the coefficients related to the impact of conflicts with presidents, prime ministers and party principals on the risk of deselection according to the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy before elections. In this set of models Lionel Jospin is coded with 1, while Adrian Năstase is coded with 0. The other prime ministers who preserved their positions as party leaders following the elections are coded with 1. The full regression results of these models are presented in the Appendix (D.16).

Table 7.11 presents a more nuanced picture of the relation between principal-agent relationships and the length of ministerial tenure when the position held by prime ministers in the hierarchy of their parties before elections is taken into account. Overall, these results provide consistent evidence that a conflictual relationship with prime ministers poses a risk to deselection only when prime ministers are party leaders before elections. The results in Table 7.11 reveal that this finding does not change as a function of institutional context.

Table 7.11 Principal-agent relationships and the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy before elections


Party leadership roles before elections		PR Conflicts	PM Conflicts	PARTY Conflicts
PM Leader =0	Unified, Divided, Cohabitation	1.97***	-0.74	0.31
PM Leader =1	Unified, Divided, Cohabitation	0.71***	0.56***	0.50***
PM Leader =0	Divided=0	2.00***	-0.71	0.41
PM Leader =1	Divided=0	0.94***	1.84***	-0.08
PM Leader =0	Cohabitation=0	1.61**	-0.98	0.27
PM Leader =1	Cohabitation=0	0.39	0.37**	0.52***

The lack of variation in the party leadership roles held by prime ministers before elections during the periods of cohabitation and divided executive included in our data set, as well as for most of the periods of unified executive, does not allow us to estimate the variation in the length of ministerial tenure separately within each scenario. However, the variation in the prime ministers' positions in the party hierarchy across scenarios allows us to separate the risk of losing office in one scenario compared to the other two scenarios. Thus, while the first row in Table 7.11 estimates the variation in the length of tenure across the three scenarios, the second row focuses on the occurrence

of unified executive and cohabitation and the third row reports the results related to the variation in the length of tenure across unified and divided executive.

Each of the three models reported in Table 7.11 indicate a statistically significant relationships between conflicts with prime ministers and a shorter length of tenure only when prime ministers contested the preceding elections as party leaders. The comparison of the results across and within executive scenarios indicates that the strongest impact of conflicts with prime ministers on the risk of deselection take place under unified executive and cohabitation. This relationship is also illustrated in Figure 7.7 (the relations between principal-agent relationships and the length of tenure in the other two models presented in Table 7.11 are reported in the Appendix, D17-D18). The statistically significant impact of conflicts with prime ministers on the risk of losing office does not disappear when this relationship is estimated outside periods of cohabitation. The results presented in the last row in Table 7.11 indicate that prime ministers are in control of ministerial deselection under unified and divided executive provided they held the presidency of their parties prior to elections.

Figure 7.7 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation when prime ministers are party leaders before elections




These results complement and enhance the findings obtained when the relation between principal-agent relationships and the length of tenure was estimated as a function of the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy after elections. The estimation results presented in Table 7.10 suggest that the positions held by prime ministers in their parties' formal hierarchy do not make a difference to their ability to control the process of ministerial deselection. Moreover, their influence over cabinet composition appears limited to the scenario of cohabitation. However, if we take into account the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy ahead of elections, then it becomes apparent that the authority of former party leaders over their cabinets is not bounded by any political circumstances. This result adds to our understanding regarding the variation in prime ministerial leadership across and within national contexts. For example, the country studies discussed in this work have shown that the authority of Portuguese prime ministers over their cabinets does not vary across executive scenarios as much as the authority of French and Romanian prime ministers does. These results confirm our expectation that the lack of variation in prime ministerial leadership in Portugal is due to the fact that prime ministers always lead their parties in elections in this country. Furthermore, the France and the Romania studies show that prime ministers who are party leaders before elections keep a strong grip over cabinets even if they step down as party leaders before taking office, as shown by the case of Lionel Jospin; while prime ministers who are not party leaders ahead of elections are faced with increased presidential activism even if they are eventually elected as party leaders in the aftermath of general elections, as indicated by the case of Adrian Năstase. This is an important finding, highlighting the circumstances under which informal hierarchies of intraparty relationships may explain the variation in prime ministerial leadership across and within political systems.

Table 7.11 contains strong evidence that the ability of presidents and party principals to control cabinet composition also varies as a function of the party leadership roles held by prime ministers ahead of elections. The results presented in Table 7.11 show that the relationship between conflicts with presidents and the risk of losing office is statistically significant under unified executive and cohabitation regardless of the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy. This finding confirms the expectations formulated in the case studies regarding the ability of presidents to preserve some influence over the political system even under an institutional context that weakens their overall influence over the political system and regardless of the

position of prime ministers in the hierarchy of their parties. For example, the Portugal case study has emphasised that the presidents' use of veto powers and going-public tactics can increase a minister's risk of losing office even under cohabitation and even when prime ministers keep a tight grip over their parties. Similar patterns were also highlighted in the case of France and Romania, where President Chirac and President Băsescu were still able to have their voice heard in resignation debates even during periods of cohabitation. However, the data presented in Figure 7.7 indicates that the risk of losing office because of conflicts with presidents when prime ministers contested general elections as party leaders is not substantial. The coefficients reported in Table 7.11 suggest that the impact of conflicts with the president on the risk of losing office is substantially higher when prime ministers are not party leaders ahead of elections. Figure 7.8 illustrates this relationship under unified executive and cohabitation. In other words, prime ministers who are not party leaders or who are promoted in the party hierarchy after elections will need to put up with a much higher level of presidential activism than prime ministers who won elections as party leaders.

Figure 7.8 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation when prime ministers are not party leaders before elections



The comparison of the results reported in Tables 7.10 and 7.11 indicates that the position of prime ministers in the party hierarchy before and after general elections makes a difference to their authority over cabinets. Furthermore, the party leadership roles played by prime ministers also make a difference for the presidents and the party principals' authority over cabinet composition. Overall, the influence of both presidents and party principals has been shown to increase when prime ministers do not take office as party leaders. Additionally, both sets of models indicate that the influence of party principals over the cabinet increases during periods of divided executive, although this finding cannot be generalised due to the limitation of the data. The next set of models assess whether the presidents' position in the party hierarchy ahead of their election makes a difference for their control over the cabinet and to what extent the authority of prime ministers and party principals over cabinet ministers is affected by the party leadership roles played by presidents.

Presidents and party relationships before elections

Table 7.12 presents the coefficients related to the impact of conflicts with three principals on the risk of deselection according to the presidents' position in the party hierarchy before elections. In this case we are interested to know the extent to which the conflicts between ministers and the presidents who were party leaders before elections increase their risk of losing office and limit the influence of prime ministers and party principals over the process of deselection. In this set of models the French and the Romanian presidents are coded with 1, while the Portuguese presidents are coded 0. The full regression results of these models are presented in the Appendix (D.19).

The limited amount of variation in the party leadership roles held by presidents before elections in the countries selected for analysis allows us to estimate the variation in the length of ministerial tenure separately only under the scenario of cohabitation. However, the variation in the presidents' positions in the party hierarchy across countries allows us to analyse the risk of losing office in cohabitation and one additional scenario. Thus, the first row in Table 7.12 presents the coefficients related to the conflict variables across the three scenarios, while the second row presents the coefficients related to the conflict variables under cohabitation. The next two rows report the coefficients related to the conflict variables jointly under unified executive and cohabitation and under divided executive and cohabitation.

Table 7.12 Principal-agent relationships and the presidents' position in the party hierarchy before elections


Party leadership roles after elections		PR Conflicts	PM Conflicts	PARTY Conflicts
PR Leader =0	Unified, Divided, Cohabitation	1.59*	2.71***	1.41*
PR Leader =1	Unified, Divided, Cohabitation	0.82***	0.62***	0.44**
PR Leader =0	Cohabitation=1	1.15	3.06**	1.80*
PR Leader =1	Cohabitation=1	1.25**	2.01***	0.17
PR Leader =0	Divided=0	1.33	2.51**	1.44*
PR Leader =1	Divided=0	0.96***	1.41***	0.12
PR Leader =0	Unified=0	1.64*	2.85**	1.32
PR Leader =1	Unified=0	0.74***	0.62***	0.65***

The results presented in the first row in Table 7.12 show that all principal-agent relationships have a significant impact on the risk of losing office across executive scenarios regardless of whether or not presidents contested elections as party leaders. However, the results presented in the next three rows suggest that the presidents' position in the party hierarchy ahead of elections makes a difference for the extent of their authority over cabinets. Specifically, these results indicate a statistically significant relationship between conflicts with presidents and shorter lengths of tenure only in the case of presidents who were party leaders ahead of elections.

The presidents' position in the party hierarchy ahead of elections also affects the extent of the prime ministers' and party principals' authority over cabinet members. As cohabitation is part of all the situations within which the variation in the length of tenure was estimated, prime ministers are shown to be in control of cabinet composition regardless of whether or not presidents were party leaders before taking office. Thus, the strength of prime ministerial leadership under cohabitation is driving the four estimations presented in this table. However, a closer look at the reported results reveals that the magnitude of the coefficients associated with the *Conflicts PM* variable is considerably higher when presidents are not party leaders. This result accounts for the variation in presidential involvement in cabinet affairs in Portugal as opposed to France and Romania and for the ability of Portuguese prime ministers to work unhindered by too much presidential activism in contrast to their French and Romanian counterparts. Figure 7.9 illustrates this relationship and shows that although prime ministers keep a tight grip on their cabinets under cohabitation, presidents who contested elections as party leaders are still able to have a say over cabinet composition (the graphs illustrating

the variation in the impact of conflicts with presidents on the length of tenure in the remaining situations presented in Table 7.12 are included in the Appendix, see D20-D22).

Figure 7.9 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation when presidents are party leaders before elections



Similarly to the previous sets of models presented in this section, the strength of party principals during periods of divided executive is driving the results corresponding to the impact of conflicts with parties on the risk of losing office. However, the results in Table 7.12 provide some evidence that the influence of party principals over cabinet composition increases under unified executive and cohabitation when presidents do not contest elections as party leaders.

To sum up, this section has shown that the positions held by prime ministers and presidents in the party hierarchy before and after elections can substantially increase our understanding regarding the variation in presidential and prime ministerial control over cabinet composition across national and institutional contexts. Accounting for the party leadership roles played by presidents and prime ministers explains why institutional context makes a difference for the authority of some presidents and prime ministers

over cabinet composition but not for others. This finding confirms and extends the results obtained in the country studies.

Overall, it has been shown that both presidents and prime ministers have more control over cabinet members if they contest elections as party leaders. Regardless of whether presidents were party leaders ahead of elections, their ability to involve in cabinet affairs will be greater when the prime ministers with whom they share executive powers were not party leaders during the last general elections. This finding provides substantial evidence that *de facto* leadership positions and informal party hierarchies make a difference for the extent of both presidential and prime ministerial leadership in cabinet governments. Institutional factors were also shown to have a considerable impact on the authority of political actors over cabinet members. Due to the institutional configuration of semi-presidential systems, prime ministers were shown to keep a strong grip over cabinet members during periods of cohabitation regardless of their position in the party hierarchy before or after elections. However, the analysis has also shown that prime ministers who led their parties during the preceding general elections were able to control the cabinet under all executive scenarios, not only during cohabitation. This is an important finding that highlights not only the considerable weight of intraparty politics on executive politics, but also the impact of informal hierarchies of party relationships on the extent of political leadership. The influence of party principals over cabinet composition has also been shown to increase when presidents and prime ministers do not hold party leadership positions. However, the results related to the variation in the authority of party principals over cabinet members seem to have been driven by a considerable increase in their strength under divided executive.

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter has presented a comparative analysis of the variation in the length of ministerial tenure in France, Portugal, and Romania. Following the approach taken by the literature on ministerial turnover we have analysed the extent to which the ministers' length of tenure depends on characteristics that are fixed at the moment of appointment. Although the comparative study has used different measures of political experience to prevent country-specific factors from driving the results across countries, the analysis has confirmed that fixed characteristics do not explain why some cabinet members

survive in office longer than others. The comparative analysis has nevertheless highlighted that ministers who have previous experience of serving in government are more likely to leave office sooner than inexperienced ministers. By contrast, it has been shown that ministers who come to national office after serving at local level are likely to survive longer in office. This finding confirms the importance of local strongholds for a successful career in national politics and suggests that the authority and durability of cabinet members depends not only on the importance of their portfolios, but also on the wider range of political resources that they hold at both national and local levels.

The fact that fixed characteristics hold little explanatory power for the variation in the length of ministerial tenure does not necessarily mean that they are not an important determinant of the ministers' professional advancement. However, it is unlikely that fixed characteristics at any moment in a minister's career can explain a dynamic phenomenon like survival in a particular office, which depends primarily on what ministers do while they hold that office. As an example of how some characteristics that are regarded as fixed at the moment of appointment can change repeatedly during the ministers' time in office we have focused on positions in the party hierarchy. The in-depth analysis of the ministers' promotions and demotions in the party hierarchy has shown that these positions do not emerge as strong predictors of the length of tenure because party principals punish and reward their agents continuously as a function of their performance in office.

The comparative analysis has also studied the effect of political events on the tenure of ministers. The analysis has particularly focused on the extent to which resignation calls, as indicators of the ministers' performance in office, and conflicts with presidents, prime ministers, and party principals, as proxies for the principal-agent relationships, influence the risk of losing office. To identify the circumstances under which these events are more likely to cost ministers their office, we have estimated the length of ministerial tenure as a function of executive scenarios and party relationships. The results of the comparative study have confirmed the findings obtained in the country studies: the authority of presidents is likely to increase during periods of unified executive, while prime ministers regain control over their cabinets under cohabitation. Party principals have also been shown to keep a tight grip on cabinet members during periods of divided executive. Resignation calls have also emerged as strong predictors of ministerial deselection under unified executive and cohabitation, but not under divided executive. The second explanatory factor used to identify which principal-agent

relationships are associated with shorter and longer ministerial tenures has revealed that the party relationships between ministers, presidents, and prime ministers account for the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual influence over cabinet members. Specifically, the analysis has shown that the positions held by presidents and prime ministers in the hierarchy of their political parties ahead of the elections leading up to their investiture can accurately predict the extent of their influence over cabinet members during their term of office.

To test whether the presidents' and the prime ministers' positions in the party hierarchy make a difference for their authority over the cabinet we estimated their impact on the deselection of ministers as a function of the party leadership positions they held before and after elections. The analysis has shown that when we pay attention only to the party leadership positions held by prime ministers after elections, their influence over cabinet composition appears limited to the scenario of cohabitation. However, if their position in the party hierarchy before taking office is taken into account, then prime ministers who lead their parties into elections appear able to have a say over cabinet composition at all times, regardless of the executive scenario that occurs during their time in office. Similarly, the authority of presidents has been shown to increase considerably under unified executive, when prime ministers do not hold party leadership positions before elections. Presidents who are party leaders before elections have also been shown to preserve a significant amount of influence over cabinet composition even under cohabitation, although prime ministers are able to keep a tight grip over ministers when this scenario occurs irrespective of their position in the party hierarchy before and after elections.

The findings of this chapter cast a new light on the relationship between ministers, presidents and prime ministers and on the impact that formal and informal party hierarchies have on the nature of ministerial accountability. Our results have shown that institutional factors account to a certain extent for the variation in presidential and prime ministerial influence over cabinet composition. However, institutional factors alone cannot explain why some presidents are more powerful than others under situations of unified executive and why some prime ministers maintain the same amount of control over their cabinets irrespective of the executive scenarios that occur during their time in office. By taking into account both party relationships and executive scenarios, this chapter has shown that the presidents' influence over cabinet composition increases under unified executive only when they control their parties and

parliamentary majorities from a *de facto* party leadership position. Moreover, presidents who act as *de facto* party leaders may be more influential during periods of divided executive and cohabitation than presidents who do not come to office as party leaders under a unified executive scenario. Similarly, this chapter has emphasised that prime ministers who take office as party leaders are likely to keep a tight grip on their cabinets independently of the institutional context under which they take office. This finding bears out the importance of institutional factors in structuring the relationship between political actors. However, prime ministers who take office under a scenario of unified executive without being *de facto* party leaders are likely to be confronted with an increased level of presidential activism. This finding is indicative of the impact that intraparty politics have on the running of parliamentary and semi-presidential cabinets and accounts for the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual influence over the cabinet.

Conclusion

This final chapter draws together the main arguments, findings and implications of this research. First, we reiterate the aim of this thesis to explain the variation in ministerial accountability as a function of institutional factors and party relationships. Then we present the findings corresponding to each country study and we explain their relevance for the comparative study of this topic. This leads to a more general discussion regarding the links between this research and the study of party government, party patronage, and the presidentialisation of politics in contemporary democracies. Finally, we suggest several ways in which the scope of this research may be extended to parliamentary and presidential systems, or deepened for a more focused analysis of the relationship between parties and their agents in government as a function of different party system characteristics.

Political institutions, parties, and ministerial accountability

The amount of time cabinet ministers spend in their post has important consequences for government performance, policy outcomes and political accountability. A recent report published by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the House of Commons (2013) has explored the impact of cabinet reshuffles on the overall effectiveness of the government. The report emphasises that while the appointment prerogatives of British prime ministers are limited by some legislative constraints, there are no restrictions on when, or how often, or for what reasons ministers should be moved around. Cabinet reshuffles have a considerable impact on policy making and delivery. Specifically, frequent moves destabilise the government, damage the effectiveness of individual ministers and are not good for policy continuity and consistent delivery. A research report on the reduction in the average tenure of the British cabinet members over the past thirty years points out that the consequences of ministerial churn are policy short-termism and power imbalances: “first, ministers are moved so frequently that they have little incentive to grapple with difficult policy problems; and second, ministerial shuffling around results in an imbalance of power

between elected ministers and unelected civil servants” (Cleary & Reeves, 2009, p. 5). Additionally, the House of Commons Committee (2013) found that a high ministerial turnover affects the parliament’s ability to hold cabinet members accountable for policy failures.

According to the witnesses interviewed by the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, including former and current Secretaries of State, ministers, and civil servants, ministerial reshuffles are rarely motivated by the prime minister’s wish to change policy. While some changes are unavoidable because of occasional resignations, illness or deaths, “party management” is usually the main reason for most reshuffles. Ben Bradshaw, a former Labour Minister for Health and Secretary of State for Culture, told the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee (2013) that prime ministers resort to reshuffles to “balance governments politically and give ‘big beasts’ jobs”. According to Bradshaw, reshuffles allow prime ministers to: “test and bring on young talent by giving them experience in different departments; resolve problems when ministers get into difficulty and are forced to resign or are sacked; refresh governments or departments that appear tired or underperforming; reward loyalty”. The former Prime Minister, John Major, told the Committee (2013) that one of the objectives he had pursued in any reshuffle was to “bring a regional and political balance to the Government, in order to fairly reflect opinion within Parliament”. Mr Major has also mentioned that, during his time in office as prime minister, the pressure for reshuffles began to build up in the parliamentary party at regular intervals.

The evidence collected by the House of Commons Committee confirms that ministerial changes are very much part of politics. They are responses to political pressures on the government. Many witnesses have also indicated that parliamentary parties put considerable pressure on prime ministers. Even British prime ministers, who are considered more powerful than their European counterparts, are constrained in their ability to decide whom to let go and whom to keep in office by the need to balance their governments politically and keep the “big beasts” happy. What form does this process take in other representative democracies? Do prime ministers have more or less authority over the composition of their cabinets? Do they have to share this prerogative with presidents? Are political parties able to influence this process? What circumstances are likely to increase or decrease each of these actors’ influence over cabinet composition? These are the questions that a comparative study of ministerial accountability and turnover should be able to answer. However, a cross-country

comparison of this political process can only be carried out within a clearly delimited theoretical framework.

This study has adopted a multiple-principal-agent model to study an important question of political delegation in representative democracies: how does the accountability of cabinet ministers vary when more than one principal can influence their longevity in office? To take advantage of the variation in principal-agent relationships that characterises the position of cabinet ministers in political systems where directly elected presidents share executive power with a prime minister and cabinet who are accountable to the parliament, we have studied this question in semi-presidential systems. The idea that practical politics entail both a constitutional kind of delegation to the governmental institutions and a political kind of delegation to political parties (Müller, 2000, p. 310) has allowed us to study cabinet ministers as agents to multiple principals in government and in the party. Thus, we have argued that a principal-agent approach to ministerial deselection should include not only the agency relationship between prime ministers and cabinet members (Berlinski et al., 2010, 2012), but also the agency relationships between cabinet members and other political actors who have the formal or informal power to hold them accountable. To capture the variation in the ability of principals to influence the ministers' survival in office we have focused on the interaction of institutional scenarios and party relationships and its consequences for the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers in semi-presidential systems. Building on the work that has identified a link between the variation in the separation of powers and the organisation and behaviour of political parties (Samuels & Shugart, 2010; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Shugart, 2005), we have started from the assumption that a highly valued presidency loosens the link between parties and their agents in government (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009a, p. 668). Even though political representatives in public office are the agents of the extra-parliamentary party organisations in every representative democracy (Müller, 2000), a directly elected presidency alters the intraparty mechanisms that allow political parties to contain agency loss. According to Samuels and Shugart (2010), a constitutionally separated executive authority decreases the accountability of party leaders. Thus, political parties lose the ability to hold their leaders accountable after they take office as heads of state. Under certain circumstances, party leaders can take advantage of their partisan authority to control the other party agents in office, such as prime ministers and cabinet members.

Controlling for the institutional factors that allow presidents who act as *de facto* party leaders to turn prime ministers and cabinet members into their own agents is important. Not all presidents who take office as party leaders are able to take control of the government. Whether or not the president's party is in government and whether or not the prime minister is in the president's party makes a difference for the extent of the president's influence over the political system. In other words, whether or not governments are formed during periods of unified executive, divided executive, or cohabitation matters for the relationships between presidents, prime ministers, and political parties. That said, countries like Austria, Ireland, Slovenia, or Portugal show no variation in the presidents' influence regardless of the institutional context in which they take office. Instead, these countries have revealed significant variation in the prime ministers' authority over the cabinet and in their autonomy with regard to political parties and parliamentary majorities. All the same, the variation in presidential and prime ministerial powers across countries and over time indicates that the impact of intraparty politics on cabinet politics depends on the institutional context. If this is true, then the accountability of cabinet ministers towards presidents, prime ministers, and political parties should also vary as a function of the same factors that constrain the presidents' and the prime ministers' authority over the political system. This is the theoretical argument that this thesis has set out to test through a comparative analysis of ministerial turnover in semi-presidential systems.

The findings

The hypotheses derived from the principal-agent approach to ministerial deselection have been tested in France, Portugal, and Romania. The three countries were selected according to the principles of the most-similar systems design. They share the same institutional framework of premier-presidentialism, where cabinet ministers are simultaneously accountable to presidents, prime ministers, and political parties. The time period under study has been selected so as to provide variation in the independent variables of party relationships and institutional scenarios. This case selection and time period under study allowed us to observe variation in the dependent variable of the length of ministerial tenure as a function of the interaction between the party leadership roles played by presidents and prime ministers and the institutional context in which ministers take office. Specifically, we expected that the president's influence over the

process of cabinet composition increased under a unified executive if the president was a *de facto* party leader. If the president was not a party leader, then we did not expect him or her to influence this process regardless of whether there was a unified executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. We also expected prime ministers who were *de facto* party leaders to keep a tight grip on the cabinet independently of whether there was a unified executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. We expected the party leader's influence over the cabinet to increase when neither the president, nor the prime minister was a party leader. The influence of party principals was also expected to increase under cohabitation, when the president is opposed to the parliamentary majority and cannot use his or her partisan authority to turn prime ministers and cabinet members into presidential agents.

These hypotheses were tested within and across the three countries. The variation in institutional context within countries allowed us to estimate the influence of principals on ministerial deselection as a function of executive scenarios separately in France, Portugal, and Romania. However, the interaction effect of institutional contexts and party relationships could not be measured within single case studies because of the lack of variation in the position held by presidents and prime ministers in the party hierarchy before taking office. The lack of variation in party relationships within countries is not surprising, since political parties have no reason to change their organisation and behaviour in the absence of institutional reforms. This is one of the reasons why the theoretical framework put forward in this thesis cannot be studied within single case studies, given the slow change in structural variables within individual countries (Ragin, 1987, p. 70). As a result, while the case studies tested separately the impact of institutions and party relationships on the ministers' risk of losing office, the cross-country analyses estimated the length of ministerial tenure as a function of both institutional contexts and party relationships between ministers, presidents, prime ministers and party principals.

The case-study findings largely confirm the theoretical argument. The ability of presidents and prime ministers to influence the process of ministerial deselection varies under different institutional contexts. In France, presidents are in a better position to fire ministers during periods of unified executive than under cohabitation. By contrast, prime ministers are much more powerful under cohabitation than under unified executive. This is not the case in Portugal, where prime ministers are always more powerful than presidents, regardless of the institutional context. Similarly to France,

Romanian prime ministers have more control over the cabinet under cohabitation, than under unified or divided executive. However, the results obtained in this country study suggest that the party principal's influence over cabinet composition increases in the presence of high inter-executive conflict, regardless of whether the president and the prime minister are from the same party or not. Additionally, the Romanian president was shown to have considerable influence over the deselection of ministers during periods of divided executive and cohabitation due to his constitutional power to demand the onset of legal proceedings against cabinet members and to suspend them. The analysis has emphasised that although ministers were involved in corruption scandals under all three executive scenarios, the presidential power to suspend cabinet ministers from office was enforced only outside periods of unified executive.

In contrast to our expectations, party principals did not increase their control over cabinet composition under cohabitation compared to periods of unified executive. This finding indicates that the party principal's influence over ministers does not depend only on whether presidents are able to turn cabinet members into their own agents, but also on the authority and autonomy of prime ministers relative to their own parties. In other words, whether prime ministers come to office as party leaders also makes a difference for the extent of the party principal's authority over cabinet members.

The cross-country analysis has allowed us to test the interactive hypothesis on ministerial turnover. Here we have been able to verify whether a *de facto* party leadership position makes a difference for the extent of presidential influence over the cabinet. The results confirmed our expectations. Only presidents who contested the presidential race as party leaders were able to have a say over the deselection of ministers during periods of unified executive. This finding clarifies why presidents have usually had little influence on cabinets in countries like Portugal, but also Austria, Iceland, Ireland, or Slovenia, where party leaders are not usually nominated as presidential candidates. Presidents who acted as *de facto* party leaders also appeared more influential under cohabitation than presidents who were not party leaders before taking office. However, prime ministers were generally more likely to fire ministers under cohabitation than presidents. This finding confirms that institutions do make a difference for the extent of presidential and prime ministerial influence over the cabinet.

Similarly, we have compared the influence of prime ministers over cabinet composition, depending on whether or not they were party leaders before taking office.

When we did not take into account the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy, they only appeared able to fire ministers under cohabitation. However, when we did take into account their position in the party hierarchy, party leadership emerged as a strong predictor of prime ministerial control over ministerial deselection across institutional contexts.

The analysis of ministerial turnover in France, Portugal, and Romania suggests that the interaction of intra-party politics and institutional factors captures well the variation in the accountability of cabinet ministers to presidents, prime ministers and party principals. Both institutional contexts and party relationships have emerged as strong predictors of the principals' power to fire ministers in individual case studies. However, owing to the limited variation in structural variables, single cases have not been able to explain why some presidents are more powerful than others under situations of unified executive and why some prime ministers maintain the same amount of control over their cabinets irrespective of the executive scenarios that occur during their time in office. Estimating the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of both political institutions and party relationships deepens our understanding of the impact and the circumstances under which partisan politics account for the discrepancy between the formal powers held by political actors and their actual influence over the cabinet.

Ministerial accountability, party government, and the presidentialisation of politics

This thesis has argued that the variation in ministerial accountability in representative democracies is determined by the same factors that affect the variation in the political influence of their principals in government and in the party hierarchy. The use of such a parsimonious account of ministerial survival in office has involved a trade-off between focusing on the events that ministers experience during their time in office and incorporating a wide range of personal and political resources that politicians need to rely on in order to advance their careers at national level in the analysis. However, we believe that the three-principal-agent approach to study ministerial deselection simplifies the complexity of ministerial careers in a theoretically guided manner and adds to our understanding regarding the factors that have a direct impact on the ministers' risk of losing office. While generalisations from case studies are difficult, the

integration of several features of case-oriented and variable-oriented research strategies has allowed us to address a question that is relevant for representative democracies in general, without contradicting the complexity of this political process in individual national settings. The first implication of this study is then that this theory can travel to any political system where the principles of representative democracy apply.

Secondly, the findings of this research indicate that the principal-agent approach to ministerial deselection is an adequate theoretical framework for political systems with considerable variation in democratic experience. By analysing this process in France, Portugal, and Romania, the scope of this theory has been tested through a comparative analysis of political systems that belong to different waves of democratisation. This comparison has allowed us to test whether the accountability of ministers to competing principals in government and in the party varies as a function of democratic development. Our findings suggest that, all else equal and past a certain threshold of democratic consolidation, institutional frameworks and partisan politics have a predictable impact on the process of ministerial accountability.

Thirdly, the findings speak to the debate regarding the evolution of party government in modern democracies. A growing body of literature has identified the challenges faced by party government in modern democracies over time (Katz, 1986, 1987; Mair, 2008) and has set out to determine how well the party government thesis fits contemporary democracies, whether new or long-established (Webb et al., 2002; Webb & White, 2007a). Regardless of the definitions given to this concept, one of the conditions for parties to be able to influence government requires that political leaders are selected within parties and held responsible for their actions and policies through parties (Katz, 1986, 1987; Mair, 2008; Rose, 1969). In this work we have considered one aspect of party government, the personnel involved in the governing process. As the ideological differences between political parties wane, patronage is increasingly seen as one of the sinews of party government (Kopecký, Mair, & Spirova, 2012). Understood as an organisational resource, party patronage represents a “procedural mechanism for ensuring the election of office-holders and the recruitment of personnel [...] mechanism by which the party leadership, or individual elements within the party leadership, can ensure the provision of safe pairs of hands in key corners of the policy-making process” (Kopecký & Mair, 2012a, p. 12). Therefore, the parties’ ability to place their agents in governmental institutional is now seen as a form of institutional control that operates for the benefit of the party organisation (Kopecký & Mair, 2012a, p. 7). The scope of

patronage, and the answer to the question of how far government is party government, refers then to the range of jobs in state institutions where parties are able to appoint their agents.

Although the conditions for party government are challenged by the changing nature of party competition, the existing literature emphasises that political parties continue to dominate the function of political recruitment to public and governmental office in both Western and Eastern democratic systems (Webb & White, 2007b, pp. 363–364; Webb, 2002, p. 445). Thus, the political parties' centrality to national governmental processes and outcomes is not questioned (Webb, 2002, p. 446). Our data has also confirmed that parties are not less marginal to recruitment and governance in Romania than in France or in Portugal. While the frequency of non-partisan appointments to senior governmental posts may suggest that the Portuguese executive is somewhat less partified, our analysis has confirmed that parties retain a central role in cabinet appointments (Jalali, Silva, & Moreira, 2012) and that they are closely associated in the executive decision-making process (Lobo, 2005).

In addition to their role in political appointments, this thesis suggests an alternative way of studying the political parties' capacity for political control by looking at the extent to which they can hold their agents in government accountable. Due to the challenges inherent in the recruitment of party leaders by, but not necessarily *through* parties (Mair, 2008, p. 227), the political parties' ability to contain agency loss and fire their representatives in central government is a good complementary test for the extent of their control over the executive decision-making process. Additionally, we also suggest that the extent of the parties' ability to influence the government should also vary as a function of the institutional contexts that characterise the interaction of political actors.

The theoretical argument tested in this thesis generates several expectations regarding the institutional circumstances under which party principals are expected to control the process of ministerial deselection. In general, we expect that the parties' influence increases under cohabitation relative to periods of unified executive. While during periods of unified executive parties must engage in a transactional relationship with a directly elected president who cannot be held accountable although he or she is a party agent, parties regain control over the government under cohabitation, when there are no constitutional limits to their power of replacing prime ministers. However, we have shown that presidents who are not *de facto* party leaders do not have a substantial

influence over the political system regardless of whether there is a unified executive, a divided executive, or cohabitation. Therefore, in political systems where presidents are not *de facto* party leaders, the influence of parties over the government should depend on their relationship with prime ministers. Our results have confirmed this expectation. The analysis of ministerial turnover in France and in Romania, where presidents usually come to office as party leaders, has shown that political parties do not control cabinet members under unified executive. By comparison, political parties are in a better position to hold ministers accountable across executive scenarios in Portugal, where presidents do not usually act as *de facto* party leaders. In this case, the extent of party influence over the government depends on the strength of prime ministerial leadership and on the autonomy of prime ministers relative to their parties.

The variation in party influence over the government as a function of the president's and the prime minister's leadership resources leads to the fourth implication of this thesis, which regards the trend towards the "presidentialisation" of political leadership in modern democracies (Poguntke & Webb, 2005a). Our findings add to those studies that emphasise an increase in the growth of executive leadership power resources and autonomy from their supporting parties across regime types (Poguntke & Webb, 2005a; Webb, Poguntke, & Kolodny, 2012). By studying the implications of the growing autonomy of leaders within their own parties for the chief executives' ability to control their minister-agents, our results speak to the "executive" and the "party" faces of presidentialisation that characterise the tension between political parties and their leaders (Poguntke & Webb, 2005b).

This thesis has emphasised that prime ministers are more likely to dominate the process of ministerial deselection if they take office as party leaders. The analysis of ministerial turnover in Romania has revealed that a prime minister who takes office during a period of unified executive and is not a *de facto* party leader has fewer means of control over the cabinet than a prime minister who comes to office as a party leader during a period of divided executive. Adrian Năstase, who succeeded Ion Iliescu as the president of the Social Democratic Party after the former stepped down to become the president of Romania, was constrained to compete with the president for control over the cabinet and the party throughout his time in office. By contrast, due to their uncontested leadership over their parties, Portuguese prime ministers do not have to compete with presidents for control over the government regardless of the institutional context in which they take office. The estimation of prime ministerial control over the

cabinet as a function of party leadership roles also explains why the trend towards the presidentialisation of the prime ministerial office in France is contingent on the occurrence of cohabitation (Webb & Poguntke, 2005, p. 343; Webb, 2002, p. 446).

So, what does all this tell us about ministerial turnover and accountability? Three ideas emerge from this discussion. First, ministerial deselection is a key process of executive decision-making. Therefore, we should study the variation in the length of ministerial tenure as a function of the same institutional factors that matter for the variation in the powers of the political actors involved in cabinet politics. If certain institutional scenarios increase the influence of presidents over the political system, then they should have a similar impact on the accountability of cabinet members towards presidents. Similarly, if prime ministers are more influential under certain circumstances, then they should also exert more control over cabinet members when those conditions are met. Having said that, executive decision-making processes should not be dissociated from party politics in those political systems where there are conditions for party government. This leads to the second point. The selection and deselection of ministers should be regarded as twin conditions for party government. To determine whether political parties exert control over the government one should focus not only on their control over political appointments, but also on their ability to contain agency loss. After all, if patronage is regarded as a mechanism by which parties ensure the provision of safe pair of hands in key corners of the policy-making process (Kopecký & Mair, 2012a, p. 12), then parties should also be able to remove the office-holders who deviate from the preferred positions of their patrons. So, the extent to which parties can fire their agents can be regarded as a direct and measurable indicator of party government. It can also be used to validate the “parties-do-matter” thesis in the sense of the management and organisation of policy making (Kopecký & Mair, 2012b, p. 357). Similarly to presidents and prime ministers, the ability of parties to influence cabinet politics should be analysed as a function of institutional factors. Especially when there are constitutional limits on the control that parties can exert over their agents in government, institutional factors should be reliable indicators of the conditions under which they are more likely to influence government. The theoretical framework put forward in this thesis for the study of ministerial accountability assumes that institutions matter and that the influence of political parties over the government matters as well. This study has aimed to highlight their interactive effect on the accountability of cabinet members and their key relevance for a general theory of ministerial turnover.

Future research

Although the argument developed in this thesis has been tested on only three countries, this theory can serve as a starting point for future work. The interactive impact of political institutions and party relationships on ministerial turnover can be tested in other semi-presidential systems within and beyond Europe. The dual chain of political delegation from voters to governmental institutions and to political parties renders this theory applicable in parliamentary and presidential systems as well. A large-n, cross-country test of this theory may compare the variation in the length of ministerial tenure in Western and Eastern European democracies, in European, Asian, and Latin American democracies and in democratic systems across different waves of democratisation.

The focus on political parties as the central mechanism within the chain of delegation and accountability in modern democracies could be exploited for the analysis of the relationship between political parties and their agents in government as a function of different party system characteristics. For example, do different types of intraparty leadership selection procedures have an effect on the durability of party agents in government? Do different mechanisms of intraparty accountability affect the quality of political accountability in the executive branch of government? Do they have different outcomes under different institutional contexts? In particular, the variation in political accountability as a function of both intraparty politics and political institutions offers a rich avenue for future research.

One of the difficulties of replicating this study in other countries resides in the lack of appropriate data that can be used as valid measures of principal-agent relations and in the range of background variables that matter for ministerial longevity. This study has suggested a way of generating data in a way that is consistent with the political context and which maximises the internal validity of the quantitative measures that are developed on this basis. Although this kind of data collection is a labour-intensive method, it has two advantages: one the one hand it allows the study of principal-agent relationships in a way that takes into account the context within which political actors interact; on the other hand, it facilitates the development of reliable indicators that can be compared across a large number of countries. Of course, what constitutes a good indicator for the relationship between ministers, presidents, prime ministers and party leaders may vary from one country to another. Different routes to ministerial office may also prove more successful in some countries than in others.

Crucial factors for the understanding of ministerial durability in different countries should always be included in single studies and may add to our understanding of the complex nature of this political process. However, the development of several standard measures that can be used for cross-country analysis, such as resignation calls and conflicts or policy disagreements between ministers and their principals, will confirm whether we can study this process in a theoretically guided manner or whether we can only understand its mechanisms in a highly personalised context.

Appendices

Appendix A - Robustness tests and graphs (Chapter 4)

A.1 The Wilcoxon test

Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions

Cohabitation	Events observed	Events expected	Sum of ranks
0	73	57.50	1582
1	47	62.50	-1582
Total	120	120.00	0

chi2(1) = 5.02
Pr>chi2 = 0.0250

The Wilcoxon test assesses the equality of survivor functions across the unified executive and cohabitation scenarios. This test is constructed in the same way as the log-rank test but places more weight on earlier failure times than to failures that occur later in the distribution (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 125). Similarly to the log-rank test, the Wilcoxon test confirms that the risk of deselection during periods of unified executive and cohabitation varies proportionally with respect to time.

A.2 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 1

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp3	0.07096	0.49	1	0.4858
mpsen	-0.02144	0.03	1	0.8641
paexp28	-0.01080	0.01	1	0.9403
mayor1	0.10225	0.94	1	0.3327
locmand2	-0.01379	0.02	1	0.8954
partylead3	-0.01375	0.02	1	0.8908
lostraces_w	-0.07971	0.86	1	0.3544
promotions_w	0.11667	0.62	1	0.4307
totparlmaj_w	0.12035	0.42	1	0.5148
totunrest_w	-0.00766	0.01	1	0.9316
totreshuff~w	0.15302	1.84	1	0.1751
totrescall_w	0.06616	0.47	1	0.4908
totallpr_w	-0.07675	0.40	1	0.5281
totallpm_w	0.10479	0.84	1	0.3597
totparty_w	-0.21499	2.64	1	0.1045
cohab	0.15494	1.55	1	0.2127
global test		7.24	16	0.9683

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.

A.3 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 2

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp3	0.07096	0.49	1	0.4858
mpsen	-0.02144	0.03	1	0.8641
paexp28	-0.01080	0.01	1	0.9403
mayor1	0.10225	0.94	1	0.3327
locmand2	-0.01379	0.02	1	0.8954
partylead3	-0.01375	0.02	1	0.8908
lostraces_w	-0.07971	0.86	1	0.3544
promotions_w	0.11667	0.62	1	0.4307
totparlmaj_w	0.12035	0.42	1	0.5148
totunrest_w	-0.00766	0.01	1	0.9316
totreshuff~w	0.15302	1.84	1	0.1751
totrescall_w	0.06616	0.47	1	0.4908
totallpr_w	-0.07675	0.40	1	0.5281
totallpm_w	0.10479	0.84	1	0.3597
totparty_w	-0.21499	2.64	1	0.1045
cohab	0.15494	1.55	1	0.2127
global test		7.24	16	0.9683

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.

A.4 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 3


Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time


	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp3	-0.05894	0.30	1	0.5818
mpsen	-0.13305	0.89	1	0.3442
paexp28	0.11692	0.88	1	0.3473
mayor1	-0.02731	0.04	1	0.8355
locmand2	-0.05489	0.15	1	0.6999
partylead3	-0.17258	2.66	1	0.1030
lostraces_w	-0.01637	0.01	1	0.9217
promotions_w	0.15715	1.36	1	0.2443
totparlmaj_w	-0.12309	0.65	1	0.4216
totunrest_w	0.00081	0.00	1	0.9941
totreshuff~w	0.05151	0.17	1	0.6761
totrescall_w	0.02287	0.03	1	0.8582
totalpr_w	0.02941	0.05	1	0.8270
totalpm_w	0.11731	1.02	1	0.3134
totparty_w	0.01680	0.02	1	0.8912
prcoh	-0.14312	1.11	1	0.2920
pmcoh	-0.04733	0.15	1	0.7019
partycoh	-0.11168	0.70	1	0.4033
cohab	0.24434	2.69	1	0.1011
global test		5.93	19	0.9981

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.


A.5 Impact of conflicts with the president



A.6 Impact of conflicts with the prime minister



A.7 Impact of conflicts with the party principal



**Appendix B - Robustness tests, supplemental models, graphs
(Chapter 5)**

B.1 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 1

Test of proportional-hazards assumption
Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
statemin	-0.14981	1.91	1	0.1665
exp3	-0.17144	2.25	1	0.1335
mpsen	0.12615	0.54	1	0.4611
paexp28	-0.12338	0.56	1	0.4558
locmand1	0.13435	0.59	1	0.4421
partylead3	-0.13942	0.83	1	0.3626
indep	-0.10024	0.75	1	0.3856
global test		5.11	7	0.6465

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.

B.2 Estimations Model 1 with and without interactions with time

	(1)	(2) (log time)
statemin	0.54 (0.85)	0.53 (0.85)
exp3	-0.05 (0.45)	-0.05 (0.45)
mpsen	-0.75 (0.51)	
mpsen_lnt		-0.12* (0.08)
paexp28	0.91* (0.52)	0.95* (0.52)
locmand1	0.63 (0.50)	0.65 (0.50)
party executive end	-2.20** (0.83)	-2.15** (0.82)
indep	-0.64 (0.54)	-0.66 (0.55)
N Ministers	56	56
N Observations	540	540
Log-likelihood	-85.660	-85.488

Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (56 clusters).

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

B.3 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 2

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
Totsimplemot_w	-0.04246	0.04	1	0.8344
totunrest_w	-0.37553	4.38	1	0.0364
totreshuffle_w	-0.38863	14.78	1	0.0001
totcallpers_w	-0.17985	0.21	1	0.6443
totcalldep_w	0.26964	1.51	1	0.2193
totcallpoldis_w	-0.10879	0.16	1	0.6894
totallpr_w	-0.08612	0.11	1	0.7419
totallpm_w	-0.22323	0.35	1	0.5544
totparty_w	-0.10865	0.14	1	0.7106
global test		15.37	9	0.0814

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.

B.4 Estimations Model 2 with and without interactions with time

	(1)	(2) (log time)
totsimplemot_w	3.85*** (0.58)	3.79*** (0.58)
totunrest_w	0.98*** (0.22)	
totunrest_wlnt		0.14*** (0.03)
totreshuffle_w	-0.16 (1.81)	
totreshuffle_wlnt		-0.19 (0.39)
totcallpers_w	-1.12** (0.51)	-1.19** (0.50)
totcalldep_w	-5.54** (1.86)	-5.18** (1.90)
totcallpoldis_w	1.46*** (0.34)	1.45*** (0.32)
totallpr_w	1.85*** (0.48)	1.83*** (0.46)
totallpm_w	3.90** (1.56)	3.92** (1.55)
totparty_w	3.56*** (0.75)	3.43*** (0.76)
N Ministers	56	56
N Observations	540	540
Log-likelihood	-73.287	-73.319

Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (56 clusters).

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

B.5 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 3

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
statemin	-0.02212	0.01	1	0.9049
exp3	0.01777	0.01	1	0.9211
mpsen	0.23147	3.88	1	0.0488
paexp28	-0.19825	2.68	1	0.1015
locmand1	-0.02647	0.01	1	0.9045
partylead3	0.21561	2.32	1	0.1274
indep	-0.04049	0.05	1	0.8203
totsimplemot_w	0.11114	0.71	1	0.4004
totunrest_w	-0.27051	2.66	1	0.1026
totreshuffle_w	-0.30170	6.90	1	0.0086
totcallpers_w	0.21893	2.50	1	0.1140
totcalldep_w	-0.06379	0.13	1	0.7198
totcallpoldis_w	0.05347	0.08	1	0.7810
totallpr_w	-0.05754	0.11	1	0.7437
totallpm_w	-0.24723	2.65	1	0.1038
totparty_w	0.06723	0.16	1	0.6931
global test		11.09	16	0.8036


note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.

B.6 Estimations Model 3 with and without interactions with time


	(1)	(2) (log time)
statemin	0.80 (0.69)	0.72 (0.69)
exp3	0.13 (0.40)	0.09 (0.41)
mpsen	-0.00 (0.73)	
mpsen_lnt		0.02 (0.10)
paexp28	0.79 (0.72)	0.69 (0.69)
locmand1	0.69* (0.42)	0.64 (0.40)
party executive end	-2.64** (0.90)	-2.48** (0.93)
indep	-0.14 (0.49)	-0.19 (0.47)
totsimplemot_w	3.10*** (0.79)	3.11*** (0.81)
totunrest_w	1.42*** (0.31)	
totunrest_wlnt		0.20*** (0.05)
totreshuffle_w	1.43 (1.55)	
totreshuffle_wlnt		0.16 (0.39)
totcallpers_w	-1.99** (0.99)	-1.90** (0.89)
totcalldep_w	-5.53** (2.38)	-5.50** (2.39)
totcallpoldis_w	1.38** (0.46)	1.37** (0.44)
totallpr_w	0.87 (0.62)	0.85 (0.61)
totallpm_w	5.07** (2.50)	4.83** (2.30)
totparty_w	4.63** (1.45)	4.64** (1.49)
N Ministers	56	56
N Observations	540	540
Log-likelihood	-68.517	-69.144

Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (56 clusters).
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.


B.7 Impact of conflicts with presidents



B.8 Impact of conflicts with prime ministers



B.9 Impact of conflicts with party principals



**Appendix C - Robustness tests, supplemental models, graphs
(Chapter 6)**

C.1 The Wilcoxon test

Wilcoxon (Breslow) test for equality of survivor functions

scenario	Events observed	Events expected	Sum of ranks
1	24	37.30	-921
2	29	13.93	923
3	8	9.77	-2
Total	61	61.00	0

chi2(2) = 21.55
Pr>chi2 = 0.0000

The Wilcoxon test assesses the equality of survivor functions across the unified executive and cohabitation scenarios. This test is constructed in the same way as the log-rank test but places more weight on earlier failure times than to failures that occur later in the distribution (Cleves et al., 2008, p. 125). Similarly to the log-rank test, the Wilcoxon test confirms that the risk of deselection during periods of unified executive, divided executive, and cohabitation varies proportionally with respect to time.

C.2 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 1

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp23	-0.00462	0.00	1	0.9592
mpsen	-0.20027	3.64	1	0.0564
paexp28	0.21284	4.79	1	0.0286
locadmin	0.04370	0.10	1	0.7492
partylead3	-0.03009	0.05	1	0.8249
partylocal	0.00851	0.01	1	0.9347
PMparty	-0.02113	0.03	1	0.8569
global test		6.69	7	0.4616

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used.

C.3 Estimations Model 1 with and without interactions with time

	(1)	(2) (log time)
exp23	0.54 (0.39)	0.51 (0.37)
mpsen	0.17 (0.43)	
paexp28	-0.53 (0.49)	
paexp28_lnt		-0.06 (0.05)
locadmin	0.51 (0.37)	0.46 (0.37)
party executive end	-0.35 (0.28)	-0.33 (0.28)
local leader end	0.37 (0.34)	0.37 (0.34)
PMparty	-1.07*** (0.32)	-1.03*** (0.29)
paexp28_lnt		-0.06 (0.05)
N Ministers	101	101
N Observations	1717	1717
Log-likelihood	-221.284	-221.410

Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (56 clusters).

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

C.4 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 2

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp23	-0.03774	0.26	1	0.6082
mpsen	-0.08769	0.81	1	0.3695
paexp28	0.06520	0.52	1	0.4719
locadmin	-0.07744	0.56	1	0.4539
partylead3	-0.04392	0.30	1	0.5848
partylocal	-0.05030	0.24	1	0.6210
PMparty	0.09715	0.87	1	0.3514
allprom_w	-0.02640	0.08	1	0.7722
totunrest_w	-0.01182	0.05	1	0.8319
totsimplemot_w	-0.05023	0.42	1	0.5182
totreshuffle_w	-0.10032	0.63	1	0.4260
totrescall_w	0.01418	0.03	1	0.8542
totalpr_w	0.05181	0.43	1	0.5098
totalpm_w	-0.07702	0.68	1	0.4083
totparty_w	-0.09119	0.94	1	0.3316
global test		7.76	15	0.9330

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used

C.5 Estimations Model 1 with and without interactions with time

	(1)	(2) (log time)
exp23	0.53 (0.43)	0.56 (0.43)
mpsen	0.44 (0.49)	0.47 (0.48)
paexp28	-0.70 (0.54)	
locadmin	-0.21 (0.45)	-0.21 (0.46)
party executive end	-0.28 (0.37)	-0.30 (0.38)
local leader end	0.53* (0.29)	0.53* (0.29)
PMparty	-1.27*** (0.35)	-1.29*** (0.36)
allprom_w	1.98*** (0.43)	2.00*** (0.43)
totunrest_w	-0.62 (0.63)	-0.63 (0.63)
totsimplemot_w	0.66 (0.81)	0.63 (0.82)
reshuffles	3.20** (1.03)	3.20** (1.05)
totrescall_w	0.85*** (0.26)	0.86** (0.26)
totallpr_w	0.51** (0.22)	0.51** (0.22)
totallpm_w	0.20 (0.22)	0.19 (0.22)
totparty_w	0.87** (0.29)	0.88** (0.29)
paexp28_lnt		-0.12 (0.08)

N Ministers	101	101
N Observations	1717	1717
Log-likelihood	-165.713	-165.552

Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (56 clusters).
*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

C.6 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 3

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp23	-0.02738	0.08	1	0.7771
mpsen	-0.12168	1.79	1	0.1812
paexp28	0.06710	0.55	1	0.4594
locadmin	-0.08264	0.36	1	0.5463
partylead3	-0.08043	0.64	1	0.4254
partylocal	-0.00351	0.00	1	0.9757
PMparty	0.00778	0.00	1	0.9485
allprom_w	-0.11590	1.25	1	0.2635
totunrest_w	-0.09325	2.60	1	0.1071
totsimplemot_w	0.01892	0.04	1	0.8398
totreshuffle_w	-0.17479	1.63	1	0.2016
totrescall_w	-0.07079	0.65	1	0.4194
totalpr_w	0.04334	0.19	1	0.6609
totalpm_w	-0.01289	0.01	1	0.9114
totparty_w	0.11547	1.53	1	0.2165
unified	0.22969	3.02	1	0.0821
rescall_uni	-0.00138	0.00	1	0.9898
pruni	-0.01252	0.06	1	0.8095
pmuni	0.11065	2.17	1	0.1403
partyuni	-0.10371	1.31	1	0.2519
global test		10.45	20	0.9592

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used

C.7 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 4

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp23	-0.05393	0.43	1	0.5141
mpsen	-0.06337	0.60	1	0.4403
paexp28	0.07363	0.86	1	0.3532
locadmin	-0.06101	0.30	1	0.5825
partylead3	-0.03440	0.24	1	0.6253
partylocal	0.00366	0.00	1	0.9761
PMparty	0.05134	0.35	1	0.5564
allprom_w	-0.06977	0.49	1	0.4833
totunrest_w	-0.01167	0.07	1	0.7852
totsimplemot_w	-0.02902	0.27	1	0.6058
totreshuff~w	-0.08553	0.29	1	0.5928
totrescall_w	-0.00848	0.03	1	0.8701
totalpr_w	0.01362	0.05	1	0.8191
totalpm_w	0.00793	0.01	1	0.9259
totparty_w	-0.00709	0.01	1	0.9357
divided	-0.00945	0.01	1	0.9221
rescall_div	-0.02021	0.21	1	0.6466
prdiv	0.00502	0.01	1	0.9244
pmdiv	0.01181	0.01	1	0.9119
partydiv	0.04134	0.17	1	0.6813
global test		3.42	20	1.0000

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used

C.8 Test of proportional-hazards assumption for Model 5

Test of proportional-hazards assumption

Time: Time

	rho	chi2	df	Prob>chi2
exp23	-0.08902	2.33	1	0.1272
mpsen	-0.07632	0.63	1	0.4258
paexp28	0.10169	1.84	1	0.1748
locadmin	-0.06406	0.36	1	0.5476
partylead3	0.02301	0.08	1	0.7796
partylocal	-0.07018	0.76	1	0.3843
PMparty	0.06050	0.45	1	0.5016
allprom_w	0.00507	0.00	1	0.9532
totunrest_w	0.03933	0.51	1	0.4760
totsimplemot_w	0.02751	0.16	1	0.6927
totreshuffle_w	-0.10911	0.68	1	0.4113
totrescall_w	-0.06110	0.62	1	0.4310
totallpr_w	0.11497	0.97	1	0.3251
totallpm_w	-0.02874	0.07	1	0.7881
totparty_w	-0.08452	0.97	1	0.3259
cohab	-0.11089	1.52	1	0.2174
rescall_cohab	-0.06396	0.42	1	0.5145
prcoh	0.08089	0.83	1	0.3626
pmcoh	0.10684	1.72	1	0.1901
partycoh	0.02335	0.05	1	0.8175
global test		7.60	20	0.9942

note: robust variance-covariance matrix used

C.9 Determinants of ministerial duration in Romania across executive scenarios

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Fixed characteristics			
Cabinet experience	0.55 (0.38)	0.57 (0.43)	0.49 (0.53)
MP/SEN	0.45 (0.52)	0.18 (0.49)	0.76 (0.53)
Parliamentary experience	-0.32 (0.55)	-0.31 (0.59)	-0.74 (0.58)
Local administration experience	-0.00 (0.42)	-0.39 (0.42)	-0.02 (0.44)
Party executive	-0.59 (0.40)	-0.25 (0.32)	-0.44 (0.39)
Local leader	0.40 (0.29)	0.32 (0.29)	0.25 (0.32)
PM Party	-1.15** (0.39)	-0.63 (0.43)	-1.68*** (0.41)
Events			
Party promotions	2.20*** (0.48)	2.24*** (0.46)	1.96*** (0.49)
Protests	0.43 (0.66)	-0.83 (0.73)	-0.92 (0.63)
Simple motions	1.02 (0.78)	1.20 (0.83)	1.26 (0.78)
Reshuffles	3.55** (0.95)	3.38*** (0.87)	3.25*** (0.96)
Resignation calls	0.15 (0.39)	0.73** (0.33)	0.89*** (0.31)
PR Conflicts	0.48** (0.23)	0.90** (0.33)	0.78** (0.27)
PM Conflicts	0.45** (0.22)	1.60** (0.58)	-0.00 (0.21)
Party Conflicts	1.59** (0.41)	0.05 (0.46)	0.80** (0.32)
Executive scenarios			
Unified executive	-0.51 (0.38)		
Resignation calls x Unified	1.24** (0.44)		
PR Conflicts x Unified	-0.49 (2.11)		
PM Conflicts x Unified	-4.12** (2.01)		
Party Conflicts x Unified	-1.14 (0.60)		
Divided executive		1.53*** (0.44)	
Resignation calls x Divided		0.02 (0.66)	
PR Conflicts x Divided		-0.38 (0.44)	
PM Conflicts x Divided		-1.58** (0.63)	
Party Conflicts x Divided		1.35** (0.63)	
Cohabitation			-2.08** (0.86)

Resignation calls x Cohabitation	-1.18*
	(0.60)
PR Conflicts x Cohabitation	0.77
	(0.56)
PM Conflicts x Cohabitation	
3.25***	
	(0.97)
Party Conflicts x Cohabitation	0.03
	(0.65)


No. of ministers	101	101	101
No. of observation	1717	1717	1717
No. of failures	61	61	61
Log-likelihood	-159.271	-156.880	-157.490
Linktest hat(squared)	-0.01	0.02	0.01
	<i>p</i> =(.82)	<i>p</i> =(.70)	<i>p</i> =(.89)
Proportional hazards	10.45 (20 df)	3.40 (20 df)	7.60 (20 df)
Assumption global test chi(2)	<i>p</i> =(.96)	<i>p</i> =(1.00)	<i>p</i> =(.99)

Note: Cell entries are coefficients computed using the Efron method of resolving ties. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by minister (75 clusters).

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.


C.10 Impact of conflicts with the president across executive scenarios

Impact of conflicts with the president (at maximum level of conflict)




C.11 Impact of conflicts with the prime minister across executive scenarios


Impact of conflicts with the prime minister (at maximum level of conflict)



C.12 Impact of conflicts with the party principal across executive scenarios




C.13 Impact of resignation calls across executive scenarios




Appendix D - Supplemental models and graphs (Chapter 7)

D.1 Cabinet experience across countries and with respect to survival




Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

D.2 Parliamentary experience across countries and with respect to survival




Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

D.3 Local administration experience across countries and with respect to survival




Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.

D.4 Party experience across countries and with respect to survival




Note: Figures above the graph bars indicate percentages and refer to the specific governments indicated on the x axis. *Source:* Own calculations.


D.5 Kaplan Meier plot of ministerial survival across countries




D.6 Kaplan Meier plot of ministerial survival across executive scenarios




D.7 Impact of principal-agent relationships across countries and scenarios




D.8 Impact of the president-minister relationship across executive scenarios



D.9 Impact of the minister-party relationship across executive scenarios



D.10 Impact of the minister-prime minister relationship across executive scenarios




D.11 Ministerial turnover and the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy after elections

Scenario	Model 1 All	Model 2 Unified	Model 3 Cohab.	Model 4 Uni & Cohab
Fixed characteristics				
Cabinet experience	0.48* (0.26)	0.06 (0.45)	0.92** (0.42)	0.37 (0.27)
MPs & 2 mandates	-0.02 (0.21)	-0.42 (0.36)	0.60 (0.41)	0.07 (0.26)
Local office	-0.25 (0.22)	-0.22 (0.50)	-0.12 (0.49)	-0.29 (0.27)
Party executive	-0.28 (0.22)	-0.34 (0.50)	-0.85* (0.49)	-0.55** (0.27)
Local party leader	0.24 (0.30)	0.04 (0.58)	0.49 (0.66)	0.27 (0.40)
PM Party	-0.61** (0.21)	-0.35 (0.47)	-0.65 (0.43)	-0.42* (0.26)
Events				
Social unrest	0.11** (0.05)	0.32** (0.15)	0.12 (0.10)	0.07 (0.06)
Reshuffles	1.68 (1.14)	0.04 (2.71)	1.93 (1.56)	0.99 (1.58)
Resignation calls	0.84** (0.13)	1.05*** (0.29)	0.91** (0.29)	0.87*** (0.16)
PR Conflicts	0.93** (0.40)	2.08** (0.87)	0.24 (1.08)	1.06** (0.42)
PM Conflicts	1.63** (0.38)	-0.57 (1.91)	2.23*** (0.39)	1.73** (0.38)
PARTY Conflicts	0.02 (0.24)	-0.21 (0.94)	0.08 (0.36)	0.03 (0.28)
Party leadership				
PM leader	0.91** (0.32)	0.28 (0.47)	1.55** (0.63)	0.74** (0.35)
PR Conflicts × PM leader	-0.32 (0.42)	-1.10 (1.40)	0.78 (1.10)	-0.30 (0.47)
PM Conflicts × PM leader	-1.19** (0.42)	-1.06 (2.22)	-0.73 (0.71)	-1.26 (0.90)
PARTY Conflicts × PM leader	0.52** (0.23)	1.05 (1.02)	-0.29 (0.52)	0.36 (0.43)
Constant	-10.47*** (0.91)	-11.45*** (1.64)	-13.46*** (1.62)	-11.98*** (1.21)
Shape parameter	1.35 (0.12)	1.58 (0.25)	1.61 (0.21)	1.56 (0.16)
N Ministers	232	105	111	203
N Failures	120	44	47	91
N Observations	5072	2055	2417	4472
Log-likelihood	-96.124	-27.614	-30.795	-71.667


Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by the ministers.

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.


D.12 Impact of principal-agent across scenarios when prime ministers are party leaders after elections (Model 1)



D.13 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive when prime ministers are party leaders after elections (Model 2)




D.14 Impact of principal-agent relationships under cohabitation when prime ministers are party leaders after elections (Model 3)



D.15 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation when prime ministers are party leaders after elections (Model 4)

Party relationships after elections, when PM is party leader
(under unified executive and cohabitation, at max. level of conflict with principals)



D.16 Ministerial turnover and the prime ministers' position in the party hierarchy before elections


Scenario	Model 1 All	Model 2 Uni & Cohab	Model 3 Uni & Divided
Fixed characteristics			
Cabinet experience	0.46** (0.22)	0.34 (0.25)	0.31 (0.33)
MPs & 2 mandates	-0.03 (0.21)	0.12 (0.27)	-0.33 (0.30)
Local office	-0.66** (0.22)	-0.87** (0.29)	-0.46 (0.36)
Party executive	-0.25 (0.22)	-0.43 (0.26)	0.06 (0.30)
Local party leader	0.22 (0.29)	0.11 (0.37)	-0.09 (0.39)
PM party	-0.57** (0.21)	-0.49* (0.26)	-0.23 (0.30)
Events			
Social unrest	0.05 (0.04)	0.09** (0.03)	0.32** (0.12)
Reshuffles	1.57 (1.36)	1.09 (1.65)	1.33 (2.30)
Resignation calls	0.81*** (0.11)	0.80*** (0.11)	0.82*** (0.14)
PR Conflicts	1.97*** (0.36)	2.00*** (0.35)	1.61** (0.49)
PM Conflicts	-0.74 (0.80)	-0.71 (0.71)	-0.98 (0.90)
PARTY Conflicts	0.31 (0.35)	0.41 (0.34)	0.27 (0.45)
Party leadership			
PM leader	0.05 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.25)	0.77** (0.31)
PR Conflicts × PM leader	-1.26** (0.37)	-1.06** (0.37)	-1.22** (0.54)
PM Conflicts × PM leader	1.30 (0.83)	2.55*** (0.75)	1.34 (0.93)
PARTY Conflicts × PM leader	0.19 (0.34)	-0.49 (0.33)	0.25 (0.44)
Constant	-9.65*** (0.83)	-11.22*** (1.13)	-10.26*** (1.20)
Shape parameter	1.34 (0.12)	1.56 (0.16)	1.40 (0.17)

N Ministers	232	203	142
N Failures	120	91	73
N Observations	5072	4472	2655
Log-likelihood	-101.093	-69.555	-51.320


Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by the ministers.

*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

D.17 Impact of principal-agent relationships across scenarios when prime ministers are party leaders before elections (Model 1)



D.18 Impact of principal-agent relationships across scenarios when prime ministers are party leaders before elections (Model 3)




D.19 Ministerial turnover and the presidents' position in the party hierarchy before elections

Scenario	Model 1 All	Model 2 Cohab	Model 3 Cohab&Uni	Model 4 Cohab&Div
Fixed characteristics				
Cabinet experience	0.36* (0.22)	0.55 (0.44)	0.19 (0.26)	0.81** (0.32)
MPs & 2 mandates	0.00 (0.21)	0.72* (0.41)	0.18 (0.26)	-0.03 (0.28)
Local office	-0.62** (0.24)	-0.28 (0.56)	-0.55* (0.29)	-0.47 (0.31)
Party executive	-0.21 (0.22)	-0.75 (0.46)	-0.45* (0.25)	-0.23 (0.28)
Local party leader	0.20 (0.28)	1.20** (0.56)	0.43 (0.35)	0.66** (0.30)
PM Party	-0.58** (0.22)	-0.71 (0.47)	-0.32 (0.28)	-0.84** (0.29)
Events				
Social unrest	0.07* (0.04)	0.10** (0.05)	0.08** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)
Reshuffles	1.71 (1.05)	1.57 (1.54)	1.19 (1.15)	2.80** (0.92)
Resignation calls	0.72*** (0.12)	0.72*** (0.21)	0.76*** (0.14)	0.73*** (0.17)
Conflicts PR	1.59* (0.88)	1.15 (1.12)	1.33 (0.99)	1.64* (0.93)
Conflicts PM	2.71*** (0.79)	3.06** (0.94)	2.51** (0.80)	2.85** (0.96)
Conflicts PARTY	1.41* (0.73)	1.80* (1.08)	1.44* (0.84)	1.32 (0.81)
Party leadership				
PR leader	-0.01 (0.25)	-1.40** (0.51)	-0.43 (0.29)	-0.08 (0.31)
Conflicts PR × PR leader	-0.77 (0.89)	0.09 (1.13)	-0.38 (1.00)	-0.90 (0.94)
Conflicts PM × PR leader	-2.08** (0.79)	-1.05 (0.96)	-1.10 (0.85)	-2.23** (0.96)
Conflicts PARTY × PR leader	-0.97 (0.70)	-1.63* (0.98)	-1.31* (0.79)	-0.66 (0.77)
Constant	-9.52*** (0.85)	-10.91*** (1.34)	-11.11*** (1.13)	-8.72*** (0.81)
Shape parameter	1.32 (0.12)	1.49 (0.18)	1.54 (0.15)	1.20 (0.11)
N Ministers	232	111	203	140
N Failures	120	47	91	76
N Observations	5072	2417	4472	3017
Log-likelihood	-102.069	-27.463	-71.531	-60.354

Note: Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by the ministers.


*Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

D.20 Impact of principal-agent relationships across scenarios when presidents are party leaders before elections (Model 1)




D.21 Impact of principal-agent relationships under unified executive and cohabitation when presidents are party leaders before elections (Model 3)

Party relationships before elections, when PR is party leader
(under unified executive and cohabitation, at max. level of conflict with principals)



D.22 Impact of principal-agent relationships under divided executive and cohabitation when presidents are party leaders before elections (Model 4)



Bibliography

- Acção Socialista. (2004, October 12). Socrates vence em toda a linha. Retrieved from http://www.accaosocialista.net/arquivo_accao/pdf/2004/AS1229.pdf
- Adevărul. (2004, August 28). Adrian Nastase la Cotroceni, Ion Iliescu la partid. Retrieved from <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1259237-adrian-nastase-cotroceni-ion-iliescu-partid.htm>
- Ahern, B., & Aldous, R. (2009). *Bertie Ahern: the autobiography*. London: Hutchinson.
- Allègre, C. (2000). *Toute vérité est bonne à dire: entretiens avec Laurent Joffrin*. Paris: Robert Laffont.
- Almeida, M. A. P. de. (2008). Party politics in Portugal. Municipalities and central government. *European Societies*, 10(3), 357–378.
- Almeida, M. A. P. de. (2010). Partidos e independentes nos vários níveis de governo: Portugal no contexto europeu. *Perspectivas - Portuguese Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 5, 123–145.
- Almeida, P. T. de, & Freire, A. (2005). Two Overwhelming Victories of the Portuguese Left: The 2004 European Election and the 2005 Legislative Election. *South European Society and Politics*, 10(3), 451–464.
- Almeida, P. T. de, & Pinto, A. C. (2002). Portuguese Ministers, 1851–1999: Social Background and Paths to Power. *South European Society and Politics*, 7(2), 5–40.
- Almeida, P. T. de, Pinto, A. C., & Bermeo, N. (Eds.). (2003). *Who Governs Southern Europe? Regime Change and Ministerial Recruitment, 1850-2000*. London: Frank Cass.
- Amorim, O. N. (2003). Portugal: Changing Patterns of Delegation and Accountability under the President's Watchful Eyes. In K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies* (pp. 552–572). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Amorim, O. N., & Lobo, M. C. (2009). Portugal's semi-presidentialism (re)considered: An assessment of the president's role in the policy process, 1976-2006. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(2), 234–255.

- Amorim, O. N., & Strøm, K. (2006). Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-partisan Cabinet Members in European Democracies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 36(04), 619–643.
- Andeweg, R. B. (1991). The Dutch Prime Minister: Not Just Chairman, Not Yet Chief? In G. W. Jones (Ed.), *West European Prime Ministers*. London: Frank Cass.
- Andeweg, R. B. (2000). Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(3), 377–395.
- Andeweg, R. B., & Bakema, W. (1994). The Netherlands: ministers and cabinet policy. In M. Laver & K. Shepsle (Eds.), *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government* (pp. 56–72). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Antão, M. P. (2005, August 2). Calçar os sapatos do outro. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=618294&page=-1
- Araújo, A. de. (2003). El Presidente de la República en la Evolución del Sistema Político de Portugal. In A. Barreto, B. Gómez, & P. Magalhães (Eds.), *Portugal: Democracia y Sistema Político* (pp. 83–112). Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores.
- Ardant, P., & Duhamel, O. (1999). La Dyarchie. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 91, 5–24.
- Arnold, B. (1986, February 15). Reshuffle is little short of disastrous. *Irish Independent*. Retrieved from <http://www.irishnewsarchive.com/Default/Skins/INA/Client.asp?Skin=INA&enter=true&AppName=2&AW=1261324136376>
- Avril, P., & Gicquel, J. (2010). *Droit parlementaire* (4th ed.). Montchrestien: Lextenso.
- Bach, L. (2012). *Faut-il abolir le cumul des mandats?* Paris: Rue d'Ulm / Presses de l'École Normale Supérieure.
- Bakema, E. W. (1991). The ministerial career. In J. Blondel & J.-L. Thiébaud (Eds.), *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe* (pp. 70–90). Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Balladur, F. (2009). *Le Pouvoir Ne Se Partage Pas - Conversations Avec François Mitterrand*. Paris: Fayard.
- Baylis, T. A. (1996). Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe. *World Politics*, 48(3), 297–323.
- Baylis, T. A. (2007). Embattled executives: Prime ministerial weakness in East Central Europe. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 40(1), 81–106.

- Bell, D. S. (2000). *Presidential power in Fifth Republic France*. New York: Berg.
- Bell, D. S., & Criddle, B. (1994). The French Socialist Party: presidentialised factionalism. In D. Bell & E. Shaw (Eds.), *Conflict and cohesion in Western European social democratic parties* (pp. 112–132). London: Pinter.
- Berlinksi, S., Dewan, T., Dowding, K., & Subrahmanyam, G. (2009). Choosing, moving and resigning at Westminster, UK. In K. D. and P. Dumont (Ed.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (pp. 58–78). London: Routledge.
- Berlinski, S., Dewan, T., & Dowding, K. (2007). The Length of Ministerial Tenure in the United Kingdom, 1945–97. *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(02), 245–262.
- Berlinski, S., Dewan, T., & Dowding, K. (2010). The Impact of Individual and Collective Performance on Ministerial Tenure. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(2), 559–571.
- Berlinski, S., Dewan, T., & Dowding, K. (2012). *Accounting for ministers: scandal and survival in British government, 1945-2007*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berstein, S. (1986). Le Ministre sous les IIIe et IVe Républiques. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 36, 15–27.
- Birch, A. H. (1989). Responsibility in British Politics. In G. Marshal (Ed.), *Ministerial Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blondel, J. (1985). *Government Ministers in the Contemporary World*. London: Sage.
- Blondel, J., & Müller-Rommel, F. (Eds.). (1997). *Cabinets in Western Europe*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Blondel, J., & Müller-Rommel, F. (Eds.). (2001). *Cabinets in Eastern Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Blondel, J., Müller-Rommel, F., & Málova, D. (2007). *Governing New European Democracies*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Blondel, J., & Thiébault, J.-L. (Eds.). (1991). *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*. London: Macmillan.
- Bosco, A., & Morlino, L. (2006). What Changes in South European Parties? A Comparative Introduction. *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), 331–358.
- Bouilhaguet, A. (2009). *La carpe et le lapin*. Paris: Editions du Moment.
- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Jones, B. (2004). *Event history modeling: a guide for social scientists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Zorn, C. J. W. (2001). Hazards and Proportional Models Duration in Political Science. *American Journal of Political Science*, 45(4), 972–988.
- Brady, H. E., Collier, D., & Seawright, J. (2010). Refocusing the Discussion of Methodology. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (pp. 33–64). Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Braileanu, R., & Zafir, A. (2002, November 18). Alegeri anticipate? 22. Retrieved from <http://www.revista22.ro/alegeri-anticipate-257.html>
- Brazier, R. (1997). *Ministers of the Crown*. Oxford, New York: Clarendon Press.
- Browne, E. C., Frenreis, J. P., & Gleiber, D. W. (1986). The Process of Cabinet Dissolution: An Exponential Model of Duration and Stability in Western Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 30(3), 628–650.
- Browne, V. (2000, November 29). Politicians fall back on shaky principles. *The Irish Times*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Bruneau, T. (Ed.). (1997). *Political parties and democracy in Portugal: organizations, elections, and public opinion*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Budge, I. (1985). Party factions and government reshuffles: A general hypothesis tested against data from 20 post-war democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 13, 327–333.
- Budge, I., & Keman, H. (1990). *Parties and Democracy. Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Burstein, P. (1977). Political Elites and Labour Markets: Selection of American Cabinet Members, 1932-72. *Social Forces*, 56(1), 189–201.
- Butler, D. E., & Butler, G. (1989). Ministerial resignations. In G. Marshall (Ed.), *Ministerial Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cabral, E. (2005, July 20). Campos e Cunha diz que Ota e TGV estão a ser avaliados. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617006
- Cabral, E. (2007a, April 14). Parlamento vai discutir Ota. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=655958
- Cabral, E. (2007b, May 26). Cavaco quer debate profundo sobre localização do aeroporto. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=658316

- Cabral, E. (2007c, May 29). PSD volta a pedir estudos do Parlamento sobre Ota. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658460
- Cabral, E. (2007d, May 29). “Não quisemos ofender Mário Lino com o camelo.” *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658461
- Cabral, E. (2007e, June 7). Lino não vai andar atrás de miragens. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658911
- Cabral, E., & Negrão, L. (2007, May 25). Oposição exige ao ministro que peça desculpa aos portugueses. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658215
- Cameron, C. A., & Trivedi, P. K. (2010). *Microeconomics Using Stata* (Revised Ed.). College Station, Texas: Stata Press.
- Candoso, M. A. (2008, January 6). Finanças quer Alcochete Economia prefere a Ota. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=1000413
- Carcassonne, G. (2011). *La Constitution* (10th ed.). Paris: Seuil.
- Carey, J. M. (2007). Competing Principals, Political Institutions and Party Unity in Legislative Voting. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 92–107.
- Cavaco Silva, A. (2004a). *Autobiografia Política II* (1st ed.). Lisboa: Temas e Debates.
- Cavaco Silva, A. (2004b). *Autobiografia Política I* (4th ed.). Lisboa: Temas e Debates.
- Cavaco Silva, A. (2004c, November 27). Os políticos e a lei de Gresham. *Expresso*. Retrieved from http://iraofundoevoltar.blogspot.ie/2004_11_01_archive.html
- Cheibub, J. A., & Chernykh, S. (2008). Constitutions and Democratic Performance in Semi-Presidential Democracies. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 9(03), 269–303.
- Cheibub, J. A., & Chernykh, S. (2009). Are semi-presidential constitutions bad for democratic performance? *Constitutional Political Economy*, 20(3-4), 202–229.
- Cheng, P. P. (1974). The Japanese Cabinets, 1885-1973: An Elite Analysis. *Asian Survey*, 14(12), 1055–1071.
- Chester, D. N. (1989). The Crichton Down Case. In G. Marshall (Ed.), *In Ministerial Responsibility*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

- Chevallier, J.-J., Carcassonne, G., & Duhamel, O. (2009). *Histoire de la 5e République 1958-2009* (13th ed.). Paris: Dalloz.
- Chevènement, J.-P. (1983, May 20). Se ressaisir pour réussir. *Convention Nationale du PS*. Retrieved from http://www.chevenement.fr/Se-ressaisir-pour-reussir,-par-Jean-Pierre-Chevenement,-29-mai-1983_a284.html.
- Chirac, J., & Barré, J.-L. (2011). *Mémoires 2. Le temps présidentiel*. Paris: NiL.
- Chiru, M., & Gherghina, S. (2011). Keeping the Doors Closed: Leadership Selection in Post-Communist Romania. *East European Politics & Societies*, 26(3), 510–537.
- Cleary, H., & Reeves, R. (2009). *The “culture of churn” for UK Ministers and the price we all pay*. Demos. London. Retrieved from http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Ministerial_Churn.pdf
- Cleves, M., Gould, W., Gutierrez, R., & Marchenko, Y. (2008). *An introduction to survival analysis using Stata* (Second Ed.). Texas: Stata Press.
- Clift, B. (2003). *French socialism in a global era: the political economy of the new social democracy in France*. New York, London: Continuum.
- Clift, B. (2005). Dyarchic Presidentialization In a Presidentialized Polity: The French Fifth Republic. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies* (pp. 221–245). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cochino, A. (2005, June 27). Partidul Prezidential, colector de nemultumiti. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/partidul-prezidential-colector-de-nemultumiti-685228.html>
- Cole, A. (1999). French socialists in office: Lessons from Mitterrand and Jospin. *Modern & Contemporary France*, 7(1), 71–87.
- Collard, S. P. (2002). The municipal and cantonal elections in France, 11 and 18 March, 2001. *Representation*, 38(4), 317–326.
- Collier, D., Brady, H. E., & Seawright, J. (2010a). Critiques, Responses, and Trade-Offs: Drawing Together the Debate. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards* (2nd ed., pp. 135–160). Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Collier, D., Brady, H. E., & Seawright, J. (2010b). Introduction to the Second Edition: A Sea Change in Political Methodology. In H. E. Brady & D. Collier (Eds.), *Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards* (2nd ed., pp. 1–10). Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Collier, D., Brady, H. E., & Seawright, J. (2010c). Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology. In D. Collier & H. E. Brady (Eds.), *Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards* (2nd ed., pp. 161–200). Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Colomer, J. M. (1996). Spain and Portugal. Rule by party leadership. In J. M. Colomer (Ed.), *Political institutions in Europe* (pp. 170–210). London: Routledge.
- Copé, J.-F. (2009). *Un député, ça compte énormément! Quand le parlement s'éveille*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Copé, J.-F., Baroin, F., Jacob, C., & Le Maire, B. (2010, September 4). Les conditions de la victoire en 2012. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Coppedge, M. (2007). Case Studies Are for Intensive Testing and Theory Development, Not Extensive Testing. *Qualitative Methods Newsletter*, 5(2), 2–3.
- Corkill, D. (1995). Party Factionalism and Democratization in Portugal. In R. Gillespie, M. Waller, & L. L. Nieto (Eds.), *Factional politics and democratization* (pp. 64–76). London: Frank Cass.
- Cornea, A. (2002, February 18). “Constitutia Nastase.” 22. Retrieved from <http://www.revista22.ro/constitutia-nastase-43.html>
- Costa, F. S. (2005, July 22). Ministro dá prioridade à redução da despesa. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617241
- Costa, F. S., & Cabrita, R. (2006, March 12). O triunfo do anti-Santana e do anti-Guterres. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=637262
- Costa, O., & Kerrouche, E. (2009). MPs under the Fifth Republic: Professionalisation within a Weak Institution. *West European Politics*, 32(2), 327–344.
- Courtois, G. (2000, August 30). Un nationalisme républicain dirigé contre les particularismes; Pour Jean -Pierre Chevènement, la République est l'autre nom de la France. Et inversement. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Coutinho, M. (2005, July 21). E só passaram quatro meses. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617097
- Crowther, W. (2004). Romania. In S. Berglund, J. Ekman, & F. H. Aarebrot (Eds.), *he Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe* (2nd ed.). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

- Cruz, M. B. da. (1994). O Presidente da República na génese e evolução do sistema de governo português. *Análise Social*, XXIX(125-126), 237–265.
- Csiki, C. (2001, May 21). Basescu: “Pot sa conduc partidul si din parc!” *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-pot-sa-conduc-partidul-si-din-parc-581376.html>
- Culcer, R. (2002, December 30). Mastile presedintelui. 22. Retrieved from <http://www.revista22.ro/mastile-presedintelui-301.html>
- Damgaard, E. (2008). Cabinet Termination. In K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), *In Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- De Waele, J.-M., & Ionaşcu, A. (2008). La cohésion des cadres intermédiaires: un contrepoids aux divisions du parti? *Transitions*, XLVIII(1), 85–103.
- Decamp, A. (1995). La démocratie municipale chez nos voisins: une typologie. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 73, 125–139.
- Delgado, L. (2005, July 22). Um Governo em crise? *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617211
- Desmond, B. (2000). *Finally and in Conclusion: A Political Memoir*. Dublin: New Island.
- Dewan, T., & Dowding, K. (2005). The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(1), 46–56.
- Dewan, T., & Myatt, D. P. (2010). The Declining Talent Pool of Government. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2), 267–286.
- Dewoghélaëre, J., Berton, R. M., & Navarro, J. (2006). “Cumul des Mandats” in Contemporary French Politics. An Empirical Study of the XIIe Legislature of the Assemblée Nationale. *French Politics*, 4(3), 312–332.
- Diário de Notícias. (2005, July 26). “Foi um episódio negativo para toda a gente.” Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617587
- Diário de Notícias. (2006, October 29). Sócrates acima dos 90 por cento. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/Inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=647998
- Diário de Notícias. (2007a, June 7). Os mecanismos de controlo da justiça. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658918
- Diário de Notícias. (2007b, June 12). LNEC avalia Alcochete e compara. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=659215

- Diário de Notícias. (2009a, February 16). Reeleição de Sócrates no PS terá paralelo nas legislativas? Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/Inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=1172820
- Diário de Notícias. (2009b, March 1). Sócrates sem contestação interna dramatiza maioria absoluta. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/Inicio/portugal/interior.aspx?content_id=1157422
- Diário de Notícias. (2009c, March 1). Congresso para relançar a imagem de Sócrates. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/Inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=1173483
- Diário de Notícias. (2009d, March 1). PS/Congresso: Lista de Sócrates à Comissão Nacional recebe apoio de larga maioria. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/Inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=1157381
- Dima, C. (2009). Intraexecutive Conflict in Romanian Semipresidential Regime. *Sfera Politicii*, (139), 44–54.
- Dimancea, L. (2005, April 19). Congres - PSD se antreneaza pentru o noua rocada. *Jurnalul National*. Retrieved February 27, 2013, from <http://jurnalul.ro/stiri/politica/congres-psd-se-antreneaza-pentru-o-noua-rocada-46550.html>
- Dinu, C. (2007, December 4). Băsescu a forțat nașterea Partidului Democrat Liberal cu PLD. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-a-fortat-nasterea-partidului-democrat-liberal-cu-pld-1696.html>
- Dogan, M. (1967). Les filières de la carrière politique en France. *Revue française de sociologie*, 8(4), 468–492.
- Dogan, M. (1986). Filières pour devenir ministre de Thiers à Mitterrand. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 36, 43–60.
- Dogan, M. (1987). Ministres inamovibles et personnages éphémères dans les régimes à instabilité ministérielle. In D. Colas & C. Emeri (Eds.), *Droit, institutions et systèmes politiques: mélanges en hommage à Maurice Duverger* (pp. 283–301). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Doig, A. (1989). The Resignation of Edwina Currie: A Word Too Far. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 42(3), 317–329.
- Doig, A. (1993). The Double Whammy: The Resignation of David Mellor, MP. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46, 167–178.

- Dordea, A.-L. (2008). Aviz de urmărire penală pentru Șereș și Păcuraru. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/aviz-de-urmarire-penala-pentru-seres-si-pacuraru-818095.html>
- Dores, R., Fonseca, J., & Cabrita, R. (2007, December 8). Bases do PS querem mais “debate de ideias.” *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=990696
- Dowding, K., & Dumont, P. (Eds.). (2009a). *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing*. London: Routledge.
- Dowding, K., & Dumont, P. (2009b). Structural and strategic factors affecting the hiring and firing of ministers. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (pp. 1–20). London: Routledge.
- Dowding, K., & Kang, W. (1998). Ministerial Resignations 1945-1997. *Public Administration*, 76(3), 411–429.
- Downs, W. M., & Miller, R. V. (2006). The 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections in Romania. *Electoral Studies*, 25(2), 404–409.
- Duhamel, O. (2011). *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques* (Second Ed.). Paris: Seuil.
- Dunleavy, P. (1990). Reinterpreting the Westland Affair: Theories of the State and Core Executive Decision Making. *Public Administration*, 68, 29–60.
- Duverger, M. (1980). A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government. *European Journal of Political Research*, 8(2), 165–187.
- Duverger, M. (1996). *Le système politique français* (21st ed.). Paris: PUF.
- Elgie, R. (1999). The politics of semi-presidentialism. In R. Elgie (Ed.), *Semi-presidentialism in Europe* (Vol. 1970, pp. 1–21). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Elgie, R. (2005). A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism. Variations on a Theme. *Journal of Democracy*, 16(3), 98–112.
- Elgie, R. (2009). Duverger, Semi-presidentialism and the Supposed French Archetype. *West European Politics*, 32(2), 248–267.
- Elgie, R. (2011). *Semi-Presidentialism. Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Elgie, R., & McMnamin, I. (2005). Credible Commitment, Political Uncertainty or Policy Complexity? Explaining Variations in the Independence of Non-majoritarian Institutions in France. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35, 531–548.
- Evenimentul zilei. (2001a, May 17). Cei trei muschetari. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/Cei-trei-muschetari-581529.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2001b, May 21). Debarcarea lui Petre Roman. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/Debarcarea-lui-Petre-Roman-581392.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2001c, June 18). La PD s-a schimbat garda. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/La-PD-s-a-schimbat-garda-582353.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002a, February 8). Daca propunerea lui Nastase privind instituirea unei republici parlamentare va avea succes, romanii nu-si vor mai alege presedintele. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/daca-propunerea-lui-nastase-privind-instituirea-unei-republici-parlamentare-va-avea-succes-romanii.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002b, February 11). Tara arde, si noi pieptanam republica. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/tara-arde-si-noi-pieptanam-republica-539873.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002c, March 2). Iliescu l-a trimis pe Nastase sa-si faca temele mai bine. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/iliescu-l-a-trimis-pe-nastase-sa-si-faca-temele-mai-bine-538415.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002d, March 7). Cum vede Opozitia revizuirea Constitutiei. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/cum-vede-opozitia-revizuirea-constitutiei-538103.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002e, March 9). Iliescu a hotarit: poporul alege presedintele, nu parlamentul. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/iliescu-a-hotarit-poporul-alege-presedintele-nu-parlamentul-537955.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002f, June 16). Cotrocenii - dupa Ion Iliescu. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/cotrocenii-dupa-ion-iliescu-530540.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002g, August 24). Adrian Nastase si-ar dori ca Iliescu sa se eternizeze la Cotroceni. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/adrian-nastase-si-ar-dori-ca-iliescu-sa-se-eternizeze-la-cotroceni-524586.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002h, August 26). Inca o data, vulpea la struguri! Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/inca-o-data-vulpea-la-struguri-524403.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002i, September 8). Improbabile, dar nu imposibile. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/improbabile-dar-nu-imposibile-523115.html>

- Evenimentul zilei. (2002j, September 11). "Alegerile anticipate ar aduce o majoritate mai stabila." Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/alegerile-antecipate-ar-duce-o-majoritate-mai-stabila-522755.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002k, September 13). Iliescu vs Nastase pe tema alegerilor anticipate. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/iliescu-vs-nastase-pe-tema-alegerilor-antecipate-522467.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002l, September 22). PSD se gindeste la alegeri anticipate. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/psd-se-gindeste-la-alegeri-antecipate-521564.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2002m, October 28). Premierul Adrian Nastase agita tema alegerilor anticipate. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/premierul-adrian-nastase-agita-tema-alegerilor-antecipate-517996.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2004a, June 4). Baronii vechi si noi. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/baronii-vechi-si-noi-582966.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2004b, December 20). "Ultimul mohican" pleaca din PD. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/ultimul-mohican-pleaca-din-pd-670130.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005a, April 29). Videanu, pe urmele lui Basescu. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/videanu-pe-urmele-lui-basescu-680586.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005b, May 8). Concurenta amicala in Partidul Democrat. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/concurenta-amicala-in-partidul-democrat-681134.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005c, May 9). Adi, Emil, Vasile sau Sorin? Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/adi-emil-vasile-sau-sorin-681202.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005d, May 13). Sorin Frunzaverde candideaza la sefia PD. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/sorin-frunzaverde-candideaza-la-sefia-pd-681547.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005e, May 27). Blaga si Boc, secunzii lui Basescu, vor sa preia cirna PD. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/blaga-si-boc-secunzii-lui-basescu-vor-sa-preia-cirna-pd-682678.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005f, May 30). Pregatiri pentru congresul partidului. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/pregatiri-pentru-congresul-partidului-682990.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005g, June 2). In PD jocurile sint facute. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/in-pd-jocurile-sint-facute-683159.html>

- Evenimentul zilei. (2005h, June 7). Partidul Democrat, social si popular. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/partidul-democrat-social-si-popular-683537.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005i, June 9). Boc a cistigat presedintia PD inainte de alegeri. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/boc-a-cistigat-presedintia-pd-inainte-de-alegeri-683706.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005j, June 16). PD ii multumeste lui Traian Basescu pentru procente. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/pd-ii-multumeste-lui-traian-basescu-pentru-procente-684218.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005k, June 25). Boc va fi inscaunat azi. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/boc-va-fi-inscaunat-azi-684995.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005l, June 26). Emil, presedinte. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/emil-presedinte-685097.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2005m, June 27). Boc, legat ombilical de Traian Basescu. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/boc-legat-ombilical-de-traian-basescu-685227.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2006a, September 7). Basescu a dat unda verde urmaririi penale a lui Teodor Atanasiu. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-a-dat-unda-verde-urmaririi-penale-a-lui-teodor-atanasiu-410173.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2006b, September 17). Razboi in Ministerul Apararii. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/razboi-in-ministerul-apararii-411287.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2006c, October 10). Tariceanu ii cere lui Basescu sa-l reabiliteze pe Atanasiu. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/tariceanu-ii-cere-lui-basescu-sa-l-reabiliteze-pe-atanasiu-414407.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2006d, October 12). Basescu il tine pe Atanasiu pe loc repaus. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-il-tine-pe-atanasiu-pe-loc-repaus-414953.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2007a, March 19). Tariceanu, in “cazul Nagy”: Situatia incerta a lui Zsolt Nagy e nefireasca. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/tariceanu-in-cazul-nagy-situatia-incerta-a-lui-zsolt-nagy-e-nefireasca-751286.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2007b, June 11). Traian Basescu l-a suspendat pe ministrul Zsolt Nagy. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/traian-basescu-l-a-suspendat-pe-ministrul-zsolt-nagy-446760.html>

- Evenimentul zilei. (2007c, December 4). Partidul Democrat Liberal ia nastere din fuziunea PD cu PLD. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/partidul-democrat-liberal-ia-nastere-din-fuziunea-pd-cu-pld-786836.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2007d, December 4). Basescu forteaza nasterea Partidul Democrat Liberal. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-forteaza-nasterea-partidul-democrat-liberal-470472.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2007e, December 5). PD si PLD au votat pentru PDL. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/pd-si-pld-au-votat-pentru-pdl-470655.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2007f, December 12). PLD a cedat PD-ului de dragul lui Basescu. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/pld-a-cedat-pd-ului-de-dragul-lui-basescu-471483.html>
- Evenimentul zilei. (2007g, December 28). Demisiile care au mai limpezit clasa politica. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/demisiile-care-au-mai-limpezit-clasa-politica-473008.html>
- Fabbrini, S. (1995). Presidents, Parliaments, and Good Government. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(3), 128–138.
- Fanning, R. (2006, October 29). The many resignations of Ó Dálaigh. *The Irish Independent*. Retrieved from Nexis UK
- Fati, S. (2007). Valeriu Stoica: PDL este un partid prezidential. *România liberă*. Retrieved from <http://www.romanalibera.ro/opinii/interviuri/valeriu-stoica-pdl-este-un-partid-prezidential-113074.html>
- Ferreira-Pereira, L. C. (2008). Mapping the formative dynamics of the 13th Constitutional Government : from General Estates to the governmental mandate and beyond 1. *Portuguese Journal of Social Science*, 7(3), 195–218.
- Fettelschoss, K., & Nikolenyi, C. (2009). Learning to rule. Ministerial careers in post-communist democracies. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (pp. 204–227). London: Routledge.
- Fillon, F. (2006). *La France peut supporter la vérité*. Paris: Albin Michel.
- Finer, S. E. (1989). The Individual Responsibility of Ministers. In G. Marshall (Ed.), *Ministerial Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fischer, J., Dowding, K., & Dumont, P. (2012). The duration and durability of cabinet ministers. *International Political Science Review Online*, 33(5), 505–519.

- Fischer, J., Kaiser, A., & Rohlfing, I. (2006). The Push and Pull of Ministerial Resignations in Germany, 1969–2005. *West European Politics*, 29(4), 709–735.
- Fish, S., & Kroenig, M. (2009). *The Handbook of National Legislatures*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fisher, J., Kaiser, A., & Rohlfing, I. (2006). The Push and Pull of Ministerial Resignations in Germany, 1969–2005. *West European Politics*, 29(4), 709–735.
- Flonta, V. (2003). Remanieri guvernamentale dupa 1989. *Sfera Politicii*, (102-103), 8–12. Retrieved from www.ceeol.com
- Frain, M. (1995). Relações entre o Presidente e o primeiro-ministro em Portugal: 1985-1995. *Análise Social*, XXX(133), 653–678.
- Frain, M. (1996). O PSD como partido dominante em Portugal. *Análise Social*, XXXI(138), 975–1005.
- Frain, M. (1997). The Right in Portugal: The PSD and the CDS/PP. In T. Bruneau (Ed.), *Political parties and democracy in Portugal: organizations, elections, and public opinion* (pp. 77–111). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Francisco, S. (2007, June 1). Apelo de Cavaco sem eco no Governo. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=658597
- Francisco, S., & Henriques, G. (2007, June 10). Alcochete e Ota pairam sobre festejos de Setúbal. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=659108
- François, A. (2006). Testing the “Baobab Tree” Hypothesis: The Cumul des Mandats as a Way of Obtaining More Political Resources and Limiting Electoral Competition. *French Politics*, 4(3), 269–291.
- Freire, A., & Pinto, A. C. (2010). *O Poder Presidencial em Portugal*. Lisboa: Dom Quixote.
- Frison-Roche, F. (2011). Semi-presidentialism in a post-communist context. In R. Elgie & S. Moestrup (Eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe. A Comparative Study* (pp. 56–77). London: Routledge.
- Gaffney, J. (2002). Protocol, image, and discourse in political leadership competition: The case of Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, 1997–2002. *Modern & Contemporary France*, 10(3), 313–323.

- Garat, J.-B. (2008, December 6). La fidélité reconnue d'un grognard du sarkozysme; À 64 ans, le secrétaire général de l'UMP retrouve une place au gouvernement qu'il espérait depuis 2007. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Garat, J.-B., & Waintraub, J. (2008, December 9). Comment Bertrand s'est imposé à la tête de l'UMP; Pour succéder à Patrick Devedjian, le ministre du Travail était prêt à quitter le gouvernement. Brice Hortefeux, lui, voulait y rester. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Garat, J.-B., & Waintraub, J. (2010a, November 5). Karoutchi: «Copé a le bon profil pour l'UMP»; Sarkozyste historique, l'ex-ministre annonce son soutien au président du groupe majoritaire à l'Assemblée, qui brigue le secrétariat général du parti. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Garat, J.-B., & Waintraub, J. (2010b, November 15). Jean-François Copé obtient la direction de l'UMP; Le président a essayé en vain jusqu'à hier de lui faire accepter le ministère de l'Intérieur. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Garat, J.-B., & Waintraub, J. (2010c, November 19). Jean-François Copé: «Je veux rassembler»; Le nouveau secrétaire général de l'UMP ne se sent pas tenu par l'objectif de 500,000 adhérents en 2012. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Gaxie, D. (1986). Immuables et changeants: les ministres de la Ve république. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 36, 61–79.
- Geddes, B. (1990). How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. *Political Analysis*, 2(1), 131–150.
- Geisler, R., & Garat, J.-B. (2008, November 1). Yves Jégo: «Il y a un lien particulier entre le chef de l'État et sa famille politique»; Pour le secrétaire d'État chargé de l'Outre-Mer, ancien porte-parole de l'UMP, cette relation est «forte mais pas juridique». *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Georgescu, R., & Simina, A. (2008, September 24). Nicolăescu a fugit de interimatul de la Ministerul Muncii. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/nicolaescu-a-fugit-de-interimatul-de-la-ministerul-muncii-821946.html>
- Gerring, J. (2004). What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? *American Political Science Review*, 98(02), 341–354.
- Gerring, J. (2007). *Case study research: principles and practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Glavany, J. (2001). *Politique folle*. Paris: Grasset.

- Golder, M. (2011a). Semi-Parametric Duration Models: The Cox Model. Course Notes, Essex Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis. Colchester: University of Essex. Retrieved from <https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/cox.pdf>
- Golder, M. (2011b). Unobserved Heterogeneity and Frailty Models. Course Notes, Essex Summer School in Social Science Data Analysis. Colchester: University of Essex. Retrieved from <https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/frailty.pdf>
- Gougou, F. (2008). The 2008 French Municipal Elections. The Opening and the Sanction. *French Politics*, 6(4), 395–406.
- Gougou, F., & Labouret, S. (2011). The 2011 French cantonal elections: The last voter sanction before the 2012 presidential poll. *French Politics*, 9(4), 381–403.
- Grofman, B., & Van Roozendaal, P. (1994). Toward a theoretical explanation of premature cabinet termination. With application to post-war cabinets in the Netherlands. *European Journal of Political Research*, 26, 155–170.
- Grofman, B., & Van Roozendaal, P. (1995). Exit Models, Hazard Rates and Government Duration with Empirical Application to Government Duration in the Benelux Countries, 1945–94. *ISCORE Institute for the Study of Cooperative Relations, University of Utrecht*, (ISCORE Papers, No. 52).
- Grofman, B., & Van Roozendaal, P. (1997). Modelling Cabinet Durability and Termination. *British Journal of Political Science*, 27(3), 419–451.
- Gunther, R. (2003). La Democracia Portuguesa en Perspectiva Comparada. In A. Barreto, B. Gómez, & P. Magalhães (Eds.), *Portugal: Democracia y Sistema Político* (pp. 11–46). Madrid: Siglo XXI de España Editores.
- Gunther, R. (2007). Portuguese Elections in Comparative Perspective: Parties and Electoral Behavior in Southern Europe. In André Freire, M. C. Lobo, & P. Magalhães (Eds.), *Portugal at the polls: in 2002* (pp. 11–48). Lanham, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Haegel, F. (1998). Conflict and Change in the Rassemblement Pour La République. In P. Ignazi & C. Ysmal (Eds.), *The Organization of Political Parties in Southern Europe* (pp. 26–42). Westport: Praeger.
- Hamladji, S., & Goulliaud, P. (2010, September 10). En bref. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Heady, B. (1974a). *British Cabinet Ministers: the roles of politicians in executive office*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Heady, B. (1974b). The role skills of Cabinet ministers: a cross-national review. *Political Studies*, 22(1), 66–85.

- Hellwig, T., & Samuels, D. (2007). Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(01), 65–90.
- Hennessy, M., & Humphreys, J. (2004, October 1). Government to stick to transport policies. *The Irish Times*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Hennessy, P. (1989). The Westland Affair. In G. Marshall (Ed.), *Ministerial Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Henriques, G. (2004, December 8). Belém desmente Santana Lopes. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=592063
- Henriques, G., & Correia, P. (2007, May 27). Ota: dúvidas de Cavaco preocupam Governo. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658344
- Henriques, J. P. (2006, October 28). Sócrates sem sombra de oposição interna. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/opiniao/interior.aspx?content_id=647961
- Henriques, J. P. (2009a, February 17). Alegre quer fim das eleições directas no PS. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/portugal/interior.aspx?content_id=1146578
- Henriques, J. P. (2009b, September 11). Mudanças forçadas por pressão do PR. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=1358687
- Henriques, J. P., & Correia, P. (2007, May 25). Mário Lino causa mal-estar no PS. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658214
- Henriques, J. P., & Leite, F. A. (2007, June 12). Cavaco satisfeito com recuo do Governo na Ota. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=659213
- Henriques, J. P., & Negrão, L. (2007, June 2). Governo começa a hesitar sobre a Ota. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658710
- Herman, V., & Alt, J. E. (Eds.). (1975). *Cabinet Studies: A Reader*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Hollande, F. (2009). *Droit d'inventaires: entretiens avec Pierre Favier*. Paris: Seuil.

- Hotnews. (2004a, July 9). Nastase a fost convins de presedinte sa nu demisioneze. Retrieved from <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1263721-nastase-fost-convins-presedinte-nu-demisioneze.htm>
- Hotnews. (2004b, July 12). Remaniere: PSD va fi condus de un Birou Coordonator. Retrieved from <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1263502-remaniere-psd-condus-birou-coordonator.htm>
- Hotnews. (2004c, September 1). Invitatii scrise pentru Presedinte. Retrieved from <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1258887-invitatii-scrise-pentru-presedinte.htm>
- Hotnews. (2004d, September 2). Ion Iliescu accepta sa revina in PSD si sa candideze la Senat. Retrieved from <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1258861-ion-iliescu-accepta-revina-psd-candideze-senat.htm>
- Hriban, A. (2005, June 27). Boc, urmasul lui Basescu. *9am News*. Retrieved from www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/2005-06-27/boc-urmasul-lui-basescu.html
- Huber, J. D., & Martinez-Gallardo, C. (2004). Cabinet Instability and the Accumulation of Experience: The French Fourth and Fifth Republics in Comparative Perspective. *British Journal of Political Science*, 34(01), 27–48.
- Huber, J. D., & Martinez-Gallardo, C. (2008). Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 102(02), 169–180.
- Huet, S., Jeudy, B., & Jaigu, C. (2010, July 1). Les confidences de Sarkozy aux députés. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Indridason, I. H., & Kam, C. (2007). Cabinet Reshuffles in the French Fifth Republic. *Presented at the 2005 European Consortium of Political Research joint sessions of workshops, Granada and the 2005 meeting of the American Political Science Association*.
- Indridason, I. H., & Kam, C. (2008). Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift. *British Journal of Political Science*, 38(04), 621–656.
- Institutul “Ovidiu Sincai.” (2005). *Analiza Congresului PSD : semnificatii și consecințe* (pp. 1–12). București. Retrieved from http://www.fisd.ro/PDF/mater_noi/Analiza-Cong_PSD-FINAL.pdf
- Ionașcu, A. (2006a). Analyzing The Romanian Governmental Scene Theoretical and Methodological Difficulties. *CEU Political Science Journal*, 1(4), 38–64.
- Ionașcu, A. (2006b). Instabilité du personnel gouvernemental et continuité décisionnelle en Roumanie postcommuniste. *Romanian Political Science Review*, VI(2), 319–356.

- Ionașcu, A. (2008). Les partis politiques roumains. L’histoire d’un développement inattendu. *Romanian Political Science Review*, VIII(3), 589–622.
- Ionașcu, A. (2011). Les élites politiques en Roumanie postcommuniste 1990-2008 Les voies d’accès au pouvoir exécutif. *Romanian Political Science Review*, XI(1), 27–50. Retrieved from http://dev.ulb.ac.be/cevipol/dossiers_fichiers/6-ionascu.pdf
- Istodor, A. (2004, December 19). Basescu prinde viteza. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/basescu-prinde-viteza-670044.html>
- Jaigu, C. (2008a, April 16). Estrosi: «Le secrétaire général de l’UMP doit être élu»; Le maire de Nice réclame que tous les dirigeants du parti soient choisis par les militants. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Jaigu, C. (2008b, May 21). Sarkozy reprend sa casquette de patron de l’UMP; En marge d’un déplacement à Orléans, le chef de l’État a rencontré des militants de son parti. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Jalali, C. (2006). The Woes of Being in Opposition: The PSD since 1995. *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), 359–379.
- Jalali, C. (2007). The Same Old Cleavages? Old Cleavages and New Values. In André Freire, M. C. Lobo, & P. Magalhães (Eds.), *Portugal at the polls: in 2002* (pp. 49–74). Lanham, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Jalali, C. (2011). The president is not a passenger: Portugal’s evolving semi-presidentialism. In R. Elgie, S. Moestrup, & Y.-S. Wu (Eds.), *Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy* (pp. 156–173). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jalali, C., Silva, P., & Moreira, D. (2012). Party Patronage in Portugal: Treading in Shallow Water. In P. Kopecký, P. Mair, & M. Spirova (Eds.), *Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies* (pp. 294–315). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- James, S. (1994). The Cabinet System Since 1945: Fragmentation and Integration. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47(4), 613–629.
- Jeudy, B. (2007, May 24). Fillon décidé à réformer au pas de charge. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Jeudy, B. (2008a, November 1). Pour Sarkozy, un retour à la tête de l’UMP ne s’impose pas; L’Elysée repousse la proposition de Patrick Devedjian qui souhaite que le chef de l’État redevienne président du parti. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Jeudy, B. (2008b, December 9). La redistribution des cartes dans la majorité n’inquiète pas Fillon; Avec ce jeu de chaises musicales au parti et au gouvernement, le premier

ministre n'est pas mécontent de voir Xavier Bertrand prendre le large. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK

- Jeudy, B., & Waintraub, J. (2008, March 17). L'UMP sous le choc de la défaite; Les résultats forcent l'appareil à renouveler ses leaders dans les grandes villes, mais Patrick Devedjian devrait être confirmé à la tête du parti. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Jha, S. N. (1974). The Union Council of Ministers in India: A Study in Elite Composition. *Political Science Review*, 13(1-4), 40–58.
- Jones, G. W. (1987). Stand Up for Ministerial Responsibility. *Public Administration*, 65, 87–91.
- Jospin, L. (2010). *Lionel raconte Jospin: entretiens avec Pierre Favier et Patrick Rotman*. Paris: Seuil.
- Kam, C., & Indridason, I. H. (2005). The Timing of Cabinet Reshuffles in Five Westminster Parliamentary Systems. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 30(3), 327–364.
- Kam, C., & Indridason, I. H. (2009). Cabinet dynamics and ministerial careers in the French Fifth Republic. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (pp. 41–57). London: Routledge.
- Katz, R. S. (1986). Party Government: A Rationalistic Conception. In F. G. Castles & R. Wildenmann (Eds.), *Visions and Realities of Party Government* (pp. 31–71). Florence & Berlin: EUI & de Gruyter.
- Katz, R. S. (1987). Party Government and its Alternatives. In R. S. Katz (Ed.), *Party Governments: European and American Experiences* (pp. 1–26). Florence & Berlin: EUI & de Gruyter.
- Kerby, M. (2009). Worth the Wait: The Determinants of Ministerial Appointment in Canada, 1935–2008. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 593–612.
- Kernaghan, K. (2009). Power, Parliament and Public Servants in Ministerial Canada: Ministerial Responsibility Reexamined. *Canadian Public Policy*, 5(3), 383–396.
- King, A. (1994a). Chief Executives in Western Europe. In I. Budge & D. McKay (Eds.), *Developing Democracy. Comparative Research in honour of J. F. P. Blondel*. London: Sage.
- King, A. (1994b). Ministerial Autonomy in Britain. In M. Laver & K. A. Shepsle (Eds.), *Cabinet Ministers in Parliamentary Government* (pp. 203–225). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- King, G., Alt, J. E., Burns, N. E., & Laver, M. (1990). A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34(3), 846–871.
- King, G., Keohane, R. O., & Verba, S. (1994). *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kivu, M. (2008, January 5). O fuziune asteptata. *România liberă*2. Retrieved from <http://www.romanialibera.ro/opinii/comentarii/o-fuziune-asteptata-114764.html>
- Knapp, A. (1999). What's left of the French right? The RPR and the UDF from conquest to humiliation, 1993 – 1998. *West European Politics*, 22(3), 109–138.
- Knapp, A. (2004). *Parties and the party system in France: a disconnected democracy?* Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kopecký, P., & Mair, P. (2012a). Party Patronage as an Organisational Resource. In P. Kopecký & P. Mair (Eds.), *Party patronage and party government in European democracies* (pp. 3–16). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kopecký, P., & Mair, P. (2012b). Party Patronage in Contemporary Europe. In P. Kopecký, P. Mair, & M. Spirova (Eds.), *Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies* (pp. 357–375). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kopecký, P., Mair, P., & Spirova, M. (Eds.). (2012). *Party patronage and party government in European democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kristinsson, G. H. (2009). More safe than sound? Cabinet ministers in Iceland. In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing*. London: Routledge (pp. 194–203). London: Routledge.
- Krouwel, A. (2003). Measuring presidentialism of Central and East European countries. In *Working Papers in Political Science* (No 2.). Amsterdam: Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
- Lahiffe, F. (2009). *Séamus Brennan: A Life in Government*. Dublin: Liffey Press.
- Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (Eds.). (1994). *Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (1996). *Making and Breaking Governments. Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Le Monde. (1995). La composition du secrétariat national. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from NexisUK

- Leite, F. A. (2007, June 13). Alegações finais de Carlos Borrego: “Em Alcochete não haverá especulação imobiliária.” *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=659302
- Leite, F. A., & Cardoso, N. (2007, June 23). Manuel Alegre critica falta de PS no Governo. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=660002
- Leite, F. A., & Fox, N. (2007, May 26). Autor de “O Erro da Ota” escreve carta aberta ao ministro Mário Lino. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658315
- Leite, F. A., & Sá, P. (2008, January 11). Cavaco Silva foi determinante. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=1000686
- Leston-Bandeira, C. (2000). A Assembleia da República de 1976 a 1999: da legislação à legitimação. *Análise Social*, XXXV(154-155), 175–205.
- Leston-Bandeira, C. (2004). *From legislation to legitimation. The role of the Portuguese parliament*. London: Routledge.
- Lewis, E. G. (1970). Social Background of French Ministers, 1944-1967. *Political Quarterly*, 23(3), 564–578.
- Lewis, P. H. (1972). The Spanish Ministerial Elite, 1938-69. *Comparative Politics*, 5(1), 83–106.
- Lewis, P. H. (1978). Salazar’s Ministerial Elite, 1936-68. *Journal of Politics*, 40(3), 622–647.
- Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *The American Political Science Review*, 64, 682–693.
- Lijphart, A. (1992). Introduction. In A. Lijphart (Ed.), *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government* (pp. 1–28). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lijphart, A. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. *Journal of Democracy*, 15(2), 96–109.
- Linz, J. J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Lisi, M. (2006). The Importance of Winning Office: The PS and the Struggle for Power. *South European Society and Politics*, 11(3-4), 381–397.

- Lobo, M. C. (2000). Governos partidários numa democracia recente: Portugal 1976-1995. *Análise Social*, XXXV(154-155), 147–174.
- Lobo, M. C. (2002). A elite partidária em Portugal, 1976-2002: dirigentes, deputados e membros do governo. In A. C. Pinto & A. Freire (Eds.), *Elites, Sociedade e Mudança Política* (pp. 249–275). Oeiras: Celta.
- Lobo, M. C. (2005a). *Governar em democracia*. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
- Lobo, M. C. (2005b). The Presidentialization of Portuguese Democracy? In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), *The presidentialization of politics: a comparative study of modern democracies* (pp. 269–288). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lobo, M. C. (2006). Short-term voting determinants in a young democracy: Leader effects in Portugal in the 2002 legislative elections. *Electoral Studies*, 25(2), 270–286.
- Lobo, M. C., & Magalhães, P. (2001). From “Third Wave” to “Third Way”: Europe and the Portuguese Socialists (1975–1999). *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 3(1), 25–35.
- Lobo, M. C., & Magalhães, P. (2002). The Return of the Portuguese Right : The 2001 Local Government Elections and the 2002 Legislative Elections. *South European Society and Politics*, 7(1), 72–89.
- Lopes, A. S. (2006, October 27). E o que pensa António Costa? *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=647944
- Lopes, A. S., Ferreira, C., Lourenço, E., & Pereira, H. (2004, December 1). PSD e CDS concorrem separados às eleições antecipadas. *Público*. Retrieved from <http://www.publico.pt/Política/psd-e-cds-concorrem-separados-as-eleicoes-antecipadas-1209771>
- Lord Wilson. (2013, May 12). Accounting for Ministers: Scandal and Survival in British Government 1945-2007. *LSE Review of Books*. Retrieved from <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/33441>
- Lourenço, N. S. (2004, November 30). Governo bate recordes negativos. *Público*. Retrieved from http://static.publico.pt/Política/governo-bate-recordes-negativos_1209650
- Lupia, A. (2003). Delegation and its Perils. In K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies* (pp. 33–54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lupia, A., & Strøm, K. (2009). Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections. *The American Political Science Review*, 89(3), 648–665.

- Mabileau, A. (1995). De la monarchie municipale à la française. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 73, 7–17.
- Magalhães, P. (2007). What Are (Semi)Presidential Elections About? A Case Study of the Portuguese 2006 Elections. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties*, 17(3), 263–291.
- Magone, J. M. (1995). Party Factionalism in New Small Southern European Democracies: Some Comparative Findings from the Portuguese and Greek Experiences (1974-82). In R. Gillespie, M. Waller, & L. L. Nieto (Eds.), *Factional politics and democratization* (pp. 90–101). London: Frank Cass.
- Mahoney, J. (2007). Particularizing Case Studies: A Critical Review of Gerring's Case Study Research. *Qualitative Methods Newsletter*, 5(2), 6–8.
- Mair, P. (2008). The Challenge to Party Government. *West European Politics*, 31(1-2), 211–234.
- Marcelino, J. (2008, January 12). Sócrates, o estado e a histeria. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=1000771
- Marcelino, J., & Baldaia, P. (2008, February 17). “Estou sempre atento a fazer as correcções de rota necessárias.” *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=1002767
- Marian, M., & Georgescu, R. (2008, August 27). „Da“ pentru „fonfălău“! *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/da-pentru-fonfalau-818218.html>
- Marshall, G. (1989a). Introduction. In G. Marshall (Ed.), *Ministerial Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marshall, G. (1989b). Individual Responsibility: Some Post-War Examples. In G. Marshall (Ed.), *Ministerial Responsibility*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marshall, G. (1991). The evolving practice of parliamentary accountability: writing down the rules. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 44(4), 460–469.
- Martins, A. (2006). Presidential Elements in Government The Portuguese Semi-Presidential System. *European Constitutional Law Review*, 2(01), 81–100.
- Matias, L. (2007a, April 3). Governo admite repensar localização do aeroporto. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=655396

- Matias, L. (2007b, May 2). Maioria dos portugueses é contra a construção de um novo aeroporto. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=656780
- Matias, L. (2008, January 1). Alcochete ficou livre por causa de “F-16.” *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=978453
- McGee, H. (2004, August 11). Brennan does not want to quit Transport. *Irish Examiner*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- McLeay, E. (1995). *The cabinet and political power in New Zealand*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McManus, J. (2004, October 4). Reshuffle shows that success is path to demotion. *The Irish Times*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Mediafax. (2012, May 1). Victor Paul Dobre, la un pas de a fi ministru, după ce în 2006 Băsescu a refuzat numirea sa. Retrieved from <http://www.mediafax.ro/politic/biografie-victor-paul-dobre-la-un-pas-de-a-fi-ministru-dupa-ce-in-2006-basescu-a-refuzat-numirea-sa-9585023>
- Mény, Y. (2008). Des mœurs irréformables? *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 126, 37–46.
- Méritens, P. de. (2005, January 8). C'est une question de caractère...; L'art de gouverner selon Jean-Pierre Chevènement. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Mill, J. S. (1846). *A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive, being a connected view of the principles of evidence and the methods of scientific investigation*. New York: Harper & Brothers. Retrieved from EBSCOhost, PsycBOOKS
- Moe, T. M. (1984). The New Economics of Organization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28(4), 739–777.
- Morais, C. B. do. (1998). As Metamorfoses do Semipresidencialismo Português. *Revista Jurídica*, 22, 141–160.
- Moura, V. G. (2007, May 30). O crime. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=658547
- Mulgan, R. (2002). On Ministerial Resignations (and the Lack Thereof). *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 61(2), 121–127.
- Müller, W. C. (2000). Political parties in parliamentary democracies: Making delegation and accountability work. *European Journal of Political Research*, 37(3), 309–333.

- Müller, W. C., Bergman, T., & Strøm, K. (2003). Parliamentary Democracy: Promise and Problems. In K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies* (pp. 3–32). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2007, December 27). Partidul prezidential si problemele lui. *România liberă*. Retrieved from <http://www.romanalibera.ro/opinii/comentarii/partidul-prezidential-si-problemele-lui-114330.html>
- Murdoch, A. (1991). Haughey set to continue purge after challenge. *The Independent*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Nakano, K. (2000). The role of ideology and elite networks in the decentralisation reforms in 1980s France. *West European Politics*, 23(3), 97–114.
- Nicolae, A. (2007, December 4). PD si PLD fuzioneaza in Partidul Democrat Liberal. *România liberă*. Retrieved from <http://www.romanalibera.ro/actualitate/politica/pd-si-pld-fuzioneaza-in-partidul-democrat-liberal-112763.html>
- Noblecourt, M. (1995a). Lionel Jospin a les mains libres pour former la nouvelle direction du PS; Porté au poste de premier secrétaire par le vote des militants et par la convention du parti, l'ancien candidat à l'élection présidentielle a levé tous les obstacles sur la voie de. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Noblecourt, M. (1995b). Rocard, sénateur (PS) des Yvelines; Je maintiens mon diagnostic: la gauche a besoin d'un vrai big bang. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- O'Brien, C. C. (1991, November 13). Ireland's Machiavelli. *The Times*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- O'Leary, B. (1991). An Taoiseach: The Irish Prime Minister. In G. W. Jones (Ed.), *West European Prime Ministers*. London: Frank Cass.
- Oliver, D. (1994). Parliament, Ministers and the Law. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 47(4), 630–646.
- Olivier, L. (1998). La perception du cumul des mandats. Restrictions contextuelles et politiques à un apparent consensus. *Revue française de science politique*, 48(6), 756–772.
- Oprea, C. (2007a, December 5). Osandite la fuziune. *România liberă*. Retrieved from <http://www.romanalibera.ro/actualitate/politica/osandite-la-fuziune-112879.html>
- Oprea, C. (2007b, December 6). Unificare accelerata cu maraieli in filiale. *România liberă*. Retrieved from 2007

- Palmer, M. S. R. (1995). Toward an Economics of Comparative Political Organization: Examining Ministerial Responsibility. *The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, 11(1), 164–188.
- Panbianco, A. (1988). *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pantelimon, R. V. (2006). “Partidele au murit, traiasca partidele!” Aparitia “partidului-cartel” in Romania. *Romanian Political Science Review*, VI(2), 403–448.
- Parodi, J.-L. (1997a). Le premier ministre sous la Ve République: Une popularité dominée. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 83, 89–99.
- Parodi, J.-L. (1997b). Proportionnalisation périodique, cohabitation, atomisation partisane: un triple défi pour le régime semi-présidentiel de la Cinquième République. *Revue française de science politique*, 47(3-4), 292–312.
- Partidul Democrat Liberal. (2012). *Statutul Partidului Democrat Liberal*. București. Retrieved from <http://www.pdl.org.ro/statut>
- Partidul National Liberal. (2007). *Statutul Partidului National Liberal*. București. Retrieved from <http://www.pnltulcea.ro/statutul-pnl/Toate-paginile.html>
- Partidul Social Democrat. (2005). *Statutul Partidului Social Democrat*. București.
- Partidul Social Democrat. (2010). *Statutul Partidului Social Democrat*. București.
- Pennings, P., Keman, H., & Kleinnijenhuis, J. (2006). *Doing Research in Political Science* (2nd ed.). London: Sage.
- Pereira, H. (2004, December 4). Dirigentes do PSD em guerra com Jorge Sampaio. *Público*. Retrieved from <http://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/dirigentes-do-psd-em-guerra-com-jorge-sampaio-1210036>
- Peyrefitte, A. (1999). Les trois cohabitations. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 91, 25–31.
- Pinto, A. C., & Almeida, P. T. de. (2009). Portugal: the primacy of “independents.” In K. Dowding & P. Dumont (Eds.), *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing* (pp. 147–158). London: Routledge.
- Pîrvulescu, C. (2000). Președinția, o instituție în căutarea echilibrului. *Sfera Politicii*, (86), 9–13.
- Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (Eds.). (2005a). *The presidentialization of politics: a comparative study of modern democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Poguntke, T., & Webb, P. (2005b). The Presidentialization of Politics in Democratic Societies: A Framework for Analysis. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), *The presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies* (pp. 1–25). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. House of Commons. (2013). *Political and Constitutional Reform - Second Report. The impact and effectiveness of ministerial reshuffles*. London. Retrieved from <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmpolcon/255/25502.htm>
- Pora, A. (2007, February 9). Strategii post-Ungureanu. 22. Retrieved from <http://www.revista22.ro/strategii-post-ungureanu-3446.html>
- Portelli, H. (1997). Les Premiers ministres: essai de typologie. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 83, 21–30.
- Portelli, H. (1999). Arbitre ou chef de l'opposition? *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 91, 59–70.
- Preda, C. (2002, October). Presedintele nu are succesori. 22. Retrieved from <http://www.revista22.ro/presedintele-nu-are-succesor-211.html>
- Protsyk, O. (2003). Troubles Semi-Presidentialism: Stability of the Constitutional System and Cabinet in Ukraine. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 55(7), 1077–1095.
- Protsyk, O. (2006). Intra-Executive Competition between President and Prime Minister: Patterns of Institutional Conflict and Cooperation under Semi-Presidentialism. *Political Studies*, 54, 219–244.
- Przeworski, A., & Teune, H. (1970). *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing Company.
- Público. (2004a, November 28). Santana diz que Governo é um bebé que precisa de ser acarinhado. Retrieved from http://static.publico.pt/Política/santana-diz-que-governo-e-um-bebe-que-precisa-de-ser-acarinhado_1209544
- Público. (2004b, December 1). Metafora da incubadora utilizada por Santana caiu mal em Belem. Retrieved from http://static.publico.pt/Sociedade/metafora-da-incubadora-utilizada-por-santana-caiu-mal-em-belem_1209783
- Público. (2004c, December 1). Deus Pinheiro: Santana Lopes é o “candidato natural” do PSD às eleições antecipadas. Retrieved from <http://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/deus-pinheiro-santana-lopes-e-o-candidato-natural-do-psd-as-eleicoes-antecipadas-1209817>

- Público. (2004d, December 2). Macário Correia contra continuação de Santana Lopes no PSD. Retrieved from <http://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/macario-correia-contra-continuacao-de-santana-lopes-no-psd-1209914>
- Público. (2004e, December 2). Direcção do PSD não exclui entendimento com CDS-PP. Retrieved from <http://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/direccao-do-psd-nao-exclui-entendimento-com-cdspp-1209846>
- Público. (2004f, December 2). Santana Lopes considera “imoral” realização de congresso extraordinário. Retrieved from <http://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/santana-lopes-considera-imoral-realizacao-de-congresso-extraordinario-1209924>
- Público. (2004g, December 2). Santana Lopes confirmado candidato a primeiro-ministro pelo PSD.
- Quiroz Flores, A. (2009). The Political Survival of Foreign Ministers. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 5(2), 117–133.
- Radu, A. (2004). Partidele ca organizatii politice. Testul rasturnarii liderului. *Sfera Politicii*, XII(113), 5–8. Retrieved from <http://www.sferapoliticii.ro/sfera/113/art2-radu.html>
- Radulescu, G. (2004, August 28). Congresul PSD oficializeaza „rocada” Nastase - Iliescu. *Curierul National*. Retrieved from <http://www.curierulnational.ro/Politica/2004-08-28/Congresul+PSD+oficializeaza+?roca"+Nastase+-+Iliescu>
- Ragin, C. C. (1987). *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Reynolds, A. (2009). *My Autobiography*. London: Transworld Ireland.
- RFE/RL. (2001, January 22). Nastase elected chairman of Romanian ruling party. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142324.html>
- RFE/RL. (2002, April 4). Romanian president will leave politics only when he dies. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142648.html>
- RFE/RL. (2004a, June 30). Romanian premier likely to run for president. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143191.html>
- RFE/RL. (2004b, July 1). Romanian ruling party draws lessons from local elections failure. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143192.html>
- RFE/RL. (2004c, July 7). Romanian president meets with PSD leadership. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143194.html>

- RFE/RL. (2004d, July 8). Romanian president refuses to comment on premier's intention to resign as PSD leader. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143195.html>
- RFE/RL. (2004e, July 12). Romanian premier announces cabinet reshuffle. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143197.html>
- RFE/RL. (2004f, August 23). Romanian prime minister reveals plans for president's political future. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1143227.html>
- Rigby, T. H. (1977). The Soviet Governments since Krutschev. *Politics*, 12(1), 5–22.
- Robinson, A. (1987). What Are the Implications of Devolved Budgeting for Ministerial Responsibility? *Public Administration*, 65, 61–68.
- România liberă. (2006). Tariceanu dubleaza numarul de functii din PNL. Retrieved March 05, 2013, from <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/politica/tariceanu-dubleaza-numarul-de-functii-din-pnl-24229.html>
- România liberă. (2007a, September 18). Basescu a decis intrunirea comisiei prezidentiale pentru Nagy si Chiuariu. Retrieved February 27, 2013, from <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/basescu-a-decis-intrunirea-comisiei-prezidentiale-pentru-nagy-si-chiuariu-106384.html>
- România liberă. (2007b, December 15). PD si PLD au semnat actul de nastere al PD-L. Retrieved March 03, 2013, from <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/pd-si-pld-au-semnat-actul-de-nastere-al-pd-l-113765.html>
- România liberă. (2007c, December 15). Basescu nu a fost invitat la unificarea PD-PLD. Retrieved March 03, 2013, from <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/eveniment/basescu-nu-a-fost-invitat-la-unificarea-pd-pld-113762.html>
- Roper, S. (2002). Are All Semipresidential Regimes the Same? A Comparison of Premier-Presidential Regimes. *Comparative Politics*, 34(3), 253–272.
- Rose, R. (1969). The Variability of Party Government: A Theoretical and Empirical Critique. *Political Studies*, 17(4), 413–445.
- Rose, R. (1971). The Making of Cabinet Ministers. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1(4), 393–414.
- Rose, R. (1991). Prime Ministers in Parliamentary Democracies. In G. W. Jones (Ed.), *West European Prime Ministers*. London: Frank Cass.

- Rovan, A., & Garat, J.-B. (2010, December 28). Ces ministres qui cherchent leur place à l'UMP; Au gouvernement, certains s'inquiètent de voir les postes clés leur échapper. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Ruin, O. (1969). Patterns of Government Composition in Multi-Party Systems: The Case of Sweden. *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 4, 71–89.
- Ruse, L. (2006, July 10). Civilul Atanasiu de la Apărare – generalul gafelor politice. *Gândul*. Retrieved from <http://www.gandul.info/politic/civilul-atanasiu-aparare-generalul-gafelor-politice.html?3928;261237>
- Sá, P. (2007, March 14). Cavaco Silva exige mais informação. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=654220
- Sá, P. (2009, June 22). Por favor remodelem-nos... ou talvez não. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=1269385
- Sablosky, J. A. (1997). The Portuguese Socialist Party. In T. Bruneau (Ed.), *Political parties and democracy in Portugal: organizations, elections, and public opinion* (pp. 55–76). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Sadran, P. (2000). Le maire dans le cursus politique: note sur une singularité française. *Pouvoirs, revue française d'études constitutionnelles et politiques*, 95, , 87–101.
- Samuels, D., & Shugart, M. S. (2010). *Presidents, parties, and prime ministers: how the separation of powers affects party organization and behavior*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarkozy, N. (2001). *Libre*. Paris: Robert Laffont/XO.
- Sarkozy, N. (2006). *Témoignage*. Paris: Fixot.
- Sartori, G. (1991). Comparing and Miscomparing. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 3(3), 243–257.
- Sartori, G. (1994). *Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes*. New York: New York University Press.
- Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009a). Party government in Europe? Parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies compared. *European Journal of Political Research*, 48(5), 665–693.
- Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009b). Citizens, Presidents and Assemblies: The Study of Semi-Presidentialism beyond Duverger and Linz. *British Journal of Political Science*, 39(04), 871–892.

- Schleiter, P., & Morgan-Jones, E. (2009c). Constitutional Power and Competing Risks : Monarchs , Presidents , Prime Ministers , and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets. *American Political Science Review*, 103(3), 496–512.
- Schonfeld, W. R. (1983). Political Parties: The Functional Approach and the Structural Alternative. *Comparative Politics*, 15(4), 477–499.
- Schrameck, O. (2001). *Matignon, rive gauche: 1997-2001*. Paris: Seuil.
- Sedelius, T. (2006). *The Tug-of-War between Presidents and Prime Ministers. Semi-Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*. Orebro Studies in Political Science 15, Orebro University.
- Sedelius, T., & Berglund, S. (2012). Towards Presidential Rule in Ukraine: Hybrid Regime Dynamics Under Semi-Presidentialism. *Baltic Journal of Law & Politics*, 1(1), 20–45.
- Sedelius, T., & Ekman, J. (2010). Intra-executive Conflict and Cabinet Instability: Effects of Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe. *Government and Opposition*, 45(4), 505–530.
- Shafir, M. (1997a, June 9). Romania: Political Opposition Splits Into Factions. *RFE/RL Research Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1085220.html>
- Shafir, M. (1997b, June 9). Romania: Opposition Party In Turmoil. *RFE/RL Research Report*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1085119.html>
- Shepherd, R. (1987). Is the Age of Civil Service Neutrality Over? *Public Administration*, 65, 69–78.
- Shevchenko, I. (2005). Easy Come, Easy Go: Ministerial Turnover in Russia, 1990 – 2004. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57(3), 399–428.
- Shugart, M. S. (2005). Semi-Presidential Systems: Dual Executive And Mixed Authority Patterns. *French Politics*, 3(3), 323–351.
- Shugart, M. S. (2006). Comparative executive-legislative relations. In E. A. W. Rhodes, S. A. Binder, & B. A. Rockman (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Shugart, M. S., & Carey, J. M. (1992). *Presidents and assemblies: constitutional design and electoral dynamics*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Siaroff, A. (2003). Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. *European Journal of Political Research*, 42(3), 287–312.

- Silva, M. (2006, October 30). "O PS nunca se deixou intimidar por manifestações." *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/Inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=648042
- Silva, M. (2007, March 30). Correia de Campos afunda-se no Governo. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=655194
- Silva, M., & Costa, F. S. (2005, July 21). Campos e Cunha esgotado deixa pasta das Finanças. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617096&page=1
- Silva, V. J. (2007, March 7). Zénite e vazio. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=653933
- Simina, A. (2008, January 17). Opt miniștri dintr-o lovitură. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/opt-ministri-dintr-o-lovitura-3138.html>
- Skach, C. (2005). *Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Skach, C. (2007). The "newest" separation of powers: semi-presidentialism. *International Journal of Constitutional Law*, 5(1), 93–121.
- Soares, M. (2002). *Mário Soarès. Entretien avec Dominique Pouchin*. Paris: Flammarion.
- Sofronie, C. (2002, February 9). PSD, gata sa schimbe Constitutia. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/psd-gata-sa-schimbe-constitutia-539955.html>
- Sousa, T. de, & Alvarez, L. (2004, December 1). Sampaio concluiu que a estabilidade governativa estava corroida. *Público*. Retrieved from http://static.publico.pt/Sociedade/sampaio-concluiu-que-a-estabilidade-governativa-estava-corroida_1209776
- Stan, L. (2005). The Opposition Takes Charge. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 52(3), 3–15.
- Stan, L., & Zaharia, R. (2007). Romania. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(7-8), 1082–1095.
- Stan, L., & Zaharia, R. (2008). Romania. *European Journal of Political Research*, 47(7-8), 1115–1126.
- Stanomir, I. (2007, January 5). De la "platforma" la partidul liberal democrat: o evolutie politica si semnificatiile ei institutionale. 22. Retrieved from <http://www.revista22.ro/de-la-platforma-la-partidul-liberal-democratbro-evolutie-politica-si-semnificatiile-ei-institutionale-3349.html>

- Stefan-Scalat, L. (2004). *Patterns of Political Elite Recruitment in Post-Communist Romania*. București: Ziua.
- Stepan, A., & Suleiman, E. N. (1995). The French Fifth Republic: A Model for Import? Reflections on Poland and Brazil. In H. E. Cheibub & A. Stepan (Eds.), *Politics, Society, and Democracies: A Comparative Study* (pp. 393–414). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Stoica, S. (2010). *Romania dupa 1989: enciclopedie de istorie*. București: Meronia.
- Stoica, V. (2005, September 19). Derapajele republicii semiprezidențiale. *Ziarul Financiar*. Retrieved from <http://www.amosnews.ro/arhiva/derapajele-republicii-semiprezidentiale-comentariu-valeriu-stoica-19-09-2005>
- Strøm, K. (2000). Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies. *European Political Science*, 37, 261–289.
- Strøm, K. (2003). Parliamentary Democracy and Delegation. In K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, & T. Bergman (Eds.), *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies* (pp. 55–108). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Suspiro, A. (2007, March 29). Câmara do Montijo contra construção do novo aeroporto de Lisboa na Margem Sul. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/economia/interior.aspx?content_id=655150
- Suspiro, A., & Santos, G. F. (2007, March 28). João Cravinho admite reavaliar projecto da Ota. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=655058
- Sutherland, S. L. (1991). Responsible Government and Ministerial Responsibility: Every Reform Is Its Own Problem. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 24(1), 91–120.
- Tănase, S. (2002, November 25). Iliescu vs. Nastase. 22. Retrieved from <http://www.revista22.ro/iliescu-vs-nastase-261.html>
- Tarrow, S. (2010). The Strategy of Paired Comparison: Toward a Theory of Practice. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(2), 230–259.
- Tavits, M. (2008). *Presidents with prime ministers: do direct elections matter?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Telegraf. (2007, January 12). PNL isi alege, pentru doi ani, formula de conducere. Retrieved March 05, 2013, from <http://www.telegrafonline.ro/pdf/c91b47653c985d588ca8a24b309448da.pdf>

- Teodorescu, C. (2002, March 4). O Constituție pentru un președinte. *România literară*. Retrieved from http://www.romlit.ro/o_constituie_pentru_un_preedinte
- Theakston, K. (1987). *Junior ministers in British government*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Thiébault, J.-L. (1993). Party leadership selection in France. *European Journal of Political Research*, 24(3), 277–293.
- Thiébault, J.-L. (1994). The Political Autonomy of Cabinet Ministers in the French Fifth Republic. In M. Laver & K. A. Shepsle (Eds.), *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government* (pp. 139–149). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Thompson, E., & Tillotsen, G. (1999). Caught in the Act: The Smoking Gun View of Ministerial Responsibility. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 58(1), 48–57.
- Tismăneanu, V., & Mihăieș, M. (2011). *O tranziție mai lungă decât veacul. România după Ceaușescu*. București: Curtea Veche.
- TSF. (2004a, June 28). «Laranjas» descontentes com eventual sucessão. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/portugal/Interior.aspx?content_id=769025
- TSF. (2004b, July 1). Santana Lopes eleito presidente. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/portugal/Interior.aspx?content_id=769090
- TSF. (2004c, July 1). Santana pode ser pretexto para eleições. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/portugal/Interior.aspx?content_id=769091
- TSF. (2004d, July 1). Divisão à entrada para o Conselho Nacional. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/portugal/Interior.aspx?content_id=769080
- TSF. (2004e, July 1). Grupo parlamentar manifesta apoio a Santana Lopes. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/Interior.aspx?content_id=769078
- TSF. (2004f, July 1). Maioria dá legitimidade ao Governo. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/paginainicial/interior.aspx?content_id=769083
- TSF. (2004g, July 5). Santana Lopes: «o meu Governo é assumidamente do século XXI». Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/paginainicial/interior.aspx?content_id=769115
- TSF. (2004h, July 11). Conselho Nacional reúne para escolher Santana Lopes. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/portugal/Interior.aspx?content_id=769167
- TSF. (2004i, July 15). Líderes do PS apoiam Sócrates. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/portugal/Interior.aspx?content_id=769214

- TSF. (2004j, September 26). Sócrates eleito com quase 80 por cento dos votos. Retrieved from http://www.tsf.pt/PaginaInicial/portugal/Interior.aspx?content_id=769556
- Vadan, A. (2008, September 20). Paul Păcuraru, învinuit oficial de DNA. *Evenimentul zilei*. Retrieved from <http://www.evz.ro/detalii/stiri/paul-pacuraru-invinuit-oficial-de-dna-821435.html>
- Vaida, I. (2007a, November 2). Basescu: “Chiuariu este un tanar mafiot obraznic.” *România liberă*. Retrieved from <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/politica/basescu-chiuariu-este-un-tanar-mafiot-obraznic-110265.html>
- Vaida, I. (2007b, December 17). PD si PLD, disciplinate in PD-L. *România liberă*2. Retrieved from <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/politica/pd-si-pld-disciplinate-in-pd-l-113824.html>
- Vaillant, D. (2001). *C'est ça, ma gauche!* Paris: Plon.
- Van Biezen, I. (1998). Sobre o equilíbrio interno do poder: as organizações partidárias nas novas democracias. *Análise Social*, XXXIII(148), 685–708.
- Vaz, R. (2005, July 28). A tentativa do fontanário. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617709
- Vedel, G. (1978, February). Synthesis or paralysis. *Le Monde*.
- Verheijen, T. (1999). Romania. In R. Elgie (Ed.), *Semi-presidentialism in Europe* (pp. 193–215). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Viana, L. M. (2005, June 26). Pinho defende Ota e TGV em resposta a Campos e Cunha. *Diário de Notícias*. Retrieved from http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_id=617611
- Voynet, D. (2003). *Voix off*. Paris: Stock.
- Waintraub, J. (2008a, March 18). L'UMP va lancer rapidement sa réorganisation; La direction du parti présidentiel devra resserrer encore ses liens avec l' exécutif. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008b, March 19). Jean-Pierre Raffarin favorable à un « comité de liaison » avec le centre. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008c, March 27). Xavier Bertrand, un nouvel homme fort à la direction de l'UMP; Nicolas Sarkozy a supervisé le remaniement qui devrait être annoncé demain. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK

- Waintraub, J. (2008d, March 29). Patrick Devedjian: « l'UMP n'est pas une caserne »; Le secrétaire général promet de « dominer (sa) susceptibilité ». *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008e, March 29). Des ministres sont promus aux postes clés; Les premiers conflits d'ambition se dessinent. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008f, April 10). Sarkozy remet ses troupes en ordre de bataille; L'affaire Kosciusko-Morizet a troublé la réorganisation de l'UMP. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008g, May 5). L'ancien président de l'UMP entend resserrer son emprise sur son parti; Nicolas Sarkozy souhaite une majorité mieux organisée autour de lui. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008h, November 29). Devedjian: « Ma mission à l'UMP est accomplie »; Le secrétaire général de l'UMP prône des listes d'union avec le Nouveau Centre aux européennes. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008i, December 6). Brice Hortefeux est appelé à devenir le nouvel homme fort de l'UMP; La direction du parti ne sera remaniée que le 24 janvier, mais le ministre de l'Immigration devrait en être le n° 1. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2008j, December 22). À l'UMP, le savant dosage Bertrand-Hortefeux; Nicolas Sarkozy espère que le tandem permettra de redynamiser le parti. *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2010a, September 2). Gérard Longuet: « C'est aux adhérents de choisir leur secrétaire général ». *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Waintraub, J. (2010b, November 16). Au parti, Jean-François Copé prépare son équipe; L'entourage de Nicolas Sarkozy fait déjà savoir que « l'organigramme du parti présidentiel se décide à l'Élysée ». *Le Figaro*. Retrieved from NexisUK
- Walsh, D. (1976a, October 19). FF seeks Donegan's dismissal for remark about President. *The Irish Times*. Retrieved from ProQuest Historical Newspapers
- Walsh, D. (1976b, October 22). Five votes decide Donegan should not be asked to resign. *The Irish Times*. Retrieved from ProQuest Historical Newspapers
- Walsh, J. (2008). *Patrick Hillery: The Official Biography*. Dublin: New Island.
- Warwick, P. (1979). The Durability of Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 11, 465–498.

- Webb, P. (2002). Political Parties and Democratic Control in Advanced Industrial Societies. In P. Webb, D. Farrell, & I. Holliday (Eds.), *Political parties in advanced industrial democracies* (pp. 438–460). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Webb, P., Farrell, D., & Holliday, I. (Eds.). (2002). *Political parties in advanced industrial democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Webb, P., & Poguntke, T. (2005). The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes, and Consequences. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), *The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies* (pp. 336–356). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Webb, P., Poguntke, T., & Kolodny, R. (2012). The Presidentialization of Party Leadership? Evaluating Party Leadership and Party Government in the Democratic World. In L. Helms (Ed.), *Comparative Political Leadership* (pp. 77–98). Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Webb, P., & White, S. (Eds.). (2007a). *Party Politics in New Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Webb, P., & White, S. (2007b). Political Parties in New Democracies: Trajectories of Development and Implications for Democracy. In P. Webb & S. White (Eds.), *Party Politics in New Democracies* (pp. 345–370). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weller, P. (1999). Disentangling Concepts of Ministerial Responsibility. *Australian Journal of Public Administration*, 58(1), 62–64.
- Weller, P. (2007). *Cabinet Government in Australia, 1901-2006*. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
- Woodhouse, D. (1993). Ministerial responsibility in the 1990s: When do ministers resign? *Parliamentary Affairs*, 46(3), 277–292.
- Woodhouse, D. (2004). UK Ministerial Responsibility in 2002: The Tale of Two Resignations. *Public Administration*, 82(1), 1–19.
- Ziare.com. (2007, December 31). Marile dosare ale lui 2007, intre Comisia de la Cotroceni, suspendare si restituire. Retrieved February 27, 2013, from <http://www.ziare.com/politica/cotroceni/marile-dosare-ale-lui-2007-intre-comisia-de-la-cotroceni-suspendare-si-restituire-203979>
- Ziua. (2004, August 27). PSD are Congres extraordinar. Retrieved from <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-arhiva-1259310-psd-are-congres-extraordinar.htm>