

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIOURALISM & CONSTRUCTIVISM: ANY IMPERATIVE TO MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE?

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ABSTRACT

Three broad paradigms initially dominated the deliberations among political analysts on what best mode of analysis exists when it comes to analyzing political issues and phenomenon. Recent studies however reveal that evolving trends of thoughts in political science and generally in the social sciences - with regards to the questions above - now exist among contemporary thinkers in the 21st Century. Consequently, against the existing institutionalists', pluralists' and elitists' approaches to political analysis, contemporary thinkers have proposed the behaviouralists' and the constructivists' approaches, among other new modes of analysis, as a more empiric method of analysis which increases the scientificity of deductions made during political analysis. This study, in the light of the various criticisms presented against these new approaches, examines via critical and analytical philosophical methods, all available literature on the behaviouralists' and constructivists' approaches with the view to identifying the vivid imperatives which these new approaches offer researchers in political science and in the social sciences. The study concludes that the behaviouralists approach in practice totally embraces all that lends to a scientific character. The constructivist approach on the other hand takes into consideration the various complexities that now exist in human phenomenon.

Key Words: *Behaviouralists', Constructivists', Elitists', Institutionalists', Pluralists'.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Recent studies conducted in the direction of finding pathways to further understanding modern political thought and behaviour, revealed that trends of thoughts have moved from the initial focus on the three broad paradigms or approaches which initially dominated the discussion amongst political analysts and thinkers, on the subject of what best mode of analysis there are when it comes to analyzing political issues and phenomenon in the twentieth and twenty-first century. The paradigms or approaches initially in perspective include: Institutionalism, Pluralism and Elitism. These paradigms reflect to a certain degree, different ontological and epistemological positions in the study of politics. However, it is important to note that the focus of their enquiry and their differences were more directed at the level of analytical division. The institutionalists for instance, directed their analytic efforts to constitutions and institutional

issues only. For the pluralist on the other hand, their focus was to be on groups and bargaining. For the elitists however, their focus was on elites and power.

Studies also revealed that the three main approaches mentioned above were to a large extent, ridden with various challenges with regards to analyzing political issues. The old institutionalists approach for instance was known to be characterized by a focus on formal rules and organization rather than the informal conventions and on official structures of government rather than broader institutional networks of governance.^[1] As such, the institutionalists approach was often perceived as structuralist in the sense that it held that structures determine political behaviour in the same way that the legalist sees law as having a major role in governing. This same approach was also perceived to assume functionalist roles and tendencies in that, there were some assumptions that principal institutions were always perceived to be present because they help the political system to work well. Studies in

the past have therefore revealed that understanding the constitutional and institutional basis of different forms of government is not a bad starting point when it comes to political analysis and political science but the whole approach has increasingly found itself ridden under so many challenges.

A number of recent literature are unanimous in their resolve of the need to look beyond the formal arrangements of power in the light of the above mentioned approaches in order to understand politics. It was already clear that the division within political science have gotten more varied and also more profound. They had moved beyond the status of analytical differences to take into account different ontological and epistemological positions. These differences were mostly in the areas of (1) what to study, (2) How to study, (3) and the why of the study. Therefore in responding positively to the contemporary questions that now looms political scientist in the face, thinkers and recent political analysts are of the opinion that “ In order to explore these broad approaches that political scientists adopt in their recent works, we will need to step outside the confines of the earlier mentioned approaches: (Institutionalism, Pluralism and Elitism) which presently are known to have so many complications, and explore the new approaches which political scientists now adopt in their daily study and investigations.

This paper shall therefore explore two new approaches to political analysis: (The Behaviorists Approach also known Behaviouralism and the Constructivist Approaches, which is also known as Constructivism) with the view to first identifying the philosophical foundations of these approaches to the study of political analysis. We shall ultimately identify and state the relevance and significances of these approaches - if any- to the study of modern political science and political analysis.

For methods, the paper shall adopt the method of conceptual analysis to clarify the major concepts in the paper: (Behaviouralism, Constructivism). The reconstructive methods of philosophy shall be employed to synthesize the existing basic elements of the behaviouralists’ and the constructivists’ modes of thought with the view to establishing the existing relevance of the approaches in the light of the subject of this paper. At the end of the study, we shall be offering a critical analysis of the relevance of both approaches to the study of modern political science.

2. MAIN FEATURES & FOUNDATIONS OF BEHAVIOURALISM

2.1. Historical Background to The Study of Behaviouralism

Behaviouralism rose partly as a reaction against the traditional approaches of political inquiry and partly as a result of the quest in search for a more ‘Scientific’ knowledge about politics. Consequently, political scientists have in recent times, come out with a variety of approaches to meet their needs. The first breakthrough came with the emergence of the ‘Behavioralists Movement’ in political science.

Behaviouralism, or the behavioural approach to the analysis and explanation of political phenomena, is particularly associated with the work of American political scientists after the Second World War, but its origins can be traced back to the works of Graham Wallas (*Human Nature in Politics*) and Arthur Bentley (*The Process of Government*), both published as early as 1908. Both Wallas and Bentley were inclined to lay greater emphasis on the informal processes of politics and less on political institutions in isolation. Wallas sought to introduce a New Realism in political studies in the light of new findings in Contemporary Psychology. The new psychology had revealed that man was not totally a rational creature and that his political actions were not totally guided by reason and self interest. Wallas therefore insisted on exploring facts and evidence for understanding human nature and its manifestations in human behavior.

Arthur Bentley, on the other hand, a pioneer of group approach to politics, primarily sought not to describe political activity, but to provide a set of new tools of investigation in the social sciences. Greatly inspired by Sociology, he proceeded to undertake a study of the role of pressure groups, political parties, elections and public opinion in the political process.

Charles E. Merriam was another pioneer of the behavioural approach. He is also famous as the founder of the ‘Chicago School’ which made substantial contribution to the Behaviorists movement. In the article ‘The Present State of The Study Of Politics’ published in *American Political Science Review* (1921) and in his book *New Aspects of Politics* (1925), Merriam criticized contemporary political science for its lack of scientific rigour. In his presidential address to American ‘Political Science Association’ (1925), Merriam exhorted political scientists to look at political behaviour as one of the essential objects of inquiry.

George E. Catlin in his *Science and Method of Politics* (1927) advanced the case for a value-free pure science. He treated ‘power’ as the essence of politics and argued that analysis of power should not be inclined in favour

of any particular value-system. Harold D. Lasswell, (1902-78), in his celebrated work '*Politics: Who Gets What, When and How*' (1936) proved to be a landmark in the empirical approach to politics as the study and analysis of power.

Despite these early attempts, Behaviouralism in political science was systematically developed only after the Second World War, particularly through the writings of American Political Scientists. David B. Truman, Robert Dahl, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, David Easton, Heinz Eulau; are some of the most prominent personalities of the Behavioral movement in political science.

Behaviouralism as such came to be understood as something wider than the study of political behaviour, yet political behaviour was its main focus. Behaviouralism as a movement in political science did not remain confined to the study of individual based political behaviour, but developed into a set of orientations, procedures and methods of analysis. In practice, it embraced all that lends a scientific character to the modern political science. According to David Easton,^[2] the intellectual foundations of Behaviouralism consist of eight major tenets:

1. Regularities: Discoverable uniformities in political behaviour which can be expressed in theory-like statements.
2. Verification: Validity of such theory like statements can be verified.
3. Techniques: Means for acquiring and interpreting data.
4. Quantification: Precision in the recording of data.
5. Values: Objective scientific inquiry has to be value free or value neutral.
6. Systematization: Close interrelationship between theory and research.
7. Pure Science: Directed towards forging a link between theoretical understanding of politics and application of theory to practical problem- solving.
8. Integration: Integration of political science with other social sciences.

Thus Behaviouralism came to accord primacy to higher degree of reliability vis-à-vis higher degree of generality. In short, Behaviouralism focused on micro level situations rather than attempting macro level generalizations.

2.2. Conceptual Clarifications and Analysis of Behaviouralism As a Mode of Thought

Behaviouralism is not a clearly defined movement for those who are thought to be behaviouralists. It is more clearly definable by those who were opposed to it, because they were describing it in terms of the things within the newer trends that they found objectionable. Consequently, some would define behaviouralism as an attempt to apply the methods of natural sciences to human behavior. Others would define it as an excessive emphasis upon quantification. Others conceive of it as individualistic reductionism. From the inside, the practitioners were of different minds as to what it was that constituted behaviouralism. By this we can see that from inception, behaviouralism resisted a single definition. Dwight Waldo emphasized that behaviouralism itself is unclear, calling it "complicated" and "obscure."^[3] Easton agreed, stating, "Every man puts his own emphasis and thereby becomes his own behaviouralist" as such, attempts to completely define behaviouralism have been fruitless.^[4] So instead of defining behaviouralism, it is much easier to say what behaviouralism does or seeks to achieve.

Behaviouralism seeks to examine "the behavior, actions, and acts of *individuals* – rather than the characteristics of institutions such as legislatures, executives, and judiciaries – and groups in different social settings and explain this behavior as it relates to the political system"^[5]

For Britannica encyclopedia,^[6] Behaviouralism is the view that the subject matter of political science should be limited to phenomena that are independently observable and quantifiable. It assumes that political institutions largely reflect underlying social forces and that the study of politics should begin with society, culture, and public opinion. To this end, behaviouralists utilize the methodology of the social sciences — primarily psychology — to establish statistical relationships between independent variables (presumed causes) and dependent variables (presumed effects). For example, behaviouralists might use detailed election data to argue that voters in rural areas are likely to vote for Mr. 'A' and not Mr. 'B' as a result of so and so reasons.

The behavioural approach to social science and political analysis, in all, are guided by two distinctive principles: these principles have been known to differentiate the behaviouralist from other social sciences. These principles include: their insistence on the mere fact that observable behaviour, whether it be at the level of the individual or the social aggregate, should be the focus of their analysis at any point in time. They also insist that any explanation offered for that behaviour should be susceptible to empirical testing. In all these diverse contexts, the central questions which the behaviouralists seeks to answer are quite clear and simple. In

Sanders' own words, ^[7] "What do actors involved actually do? How can we best explain why they do it?" while we know that these are not just the only questions that behaviouralist tackle, they however in fact believe that as far as behaviouralists are concerned, they believe that these two questions are the most important ones when it comes to analyzing issues in political science.

2.3. Some Major Characteristics of Behaviouralism

One of the most outstanding features of the behavioural approach is the fact that its philosophical origins are found in the writings of August Comte ^[8] (Comte, 1947) of the 19th Century and also in the Logical Positivism of the Vienna Circle in the 1920's. These philosophical foundations held that analytical statements made about the physical or social world falls into one of the following categories:

- a. That such statement can only amount to useful tautologies, i.e. that they could be purely definitional statements that assign a specific meaning to a particular phenomenon or concept.
- b. Statements could be empirical, that is to say, they could be tested against observations in order to see if they were true or false.
- c. Statements that fall into neither of the first two categories were devoid of analytical meaning. For the positivist in short, meaningful analysis could only proceed only on the basis of useful tautologies and empirical statements: Metaphysics, Theology, Aesthetics, and Ethics merely introduce meaningless obfuscation into the process of inquiry.

It is important to note however, that behaviouralism as an approach in political science did not entirely adopt all the philosophical precepts of the positivist thought. The precepts which were known to have been one of the major reasons for which Logical Positivism have attracted various attacks' from other opposing schools of thought. This notwithstanding, Sanders ^[9] notes that the behaviouralist view of the nature of empirical theory and explanation were strongly influenced by the positivist tradition. That stated, we wish to note that the behaviouralists insistence on empirical observation and testing of all theories etc, is what have earned the approach its characteristic feature for which the behavioural approach to social enquiry is known for today.

2.4. Analysis of Some Criticism of Behaviouralism

These distinguishing characteristics for which the behavioural approach is known, has in recent times, attracted various criticisms from all and sundry. One of the major

criticisms of the behavioural approach rests on the fact of association and influence which the Logical Positivist school of thought exerts on the behavioural approach. This positivist influence claims that statements which are neither definitions nor empirical are meaningless in its entire ramification. By implication, it has been argued by certain scholars that since the behavioral approach share the same mode of thought with logical positivism, it invariably becomes vulnerable to any weakness inherent in positivism.

We have already inferred in the sections above that these scenario may not necessary follow or apply with the behaviouralists approach. This is because among the large class of statements that the positivist declare to be 'meaningless' contains in fact, many ideas that can add very significantly to our understanding of social behaviour and the human condition. Where positivism seeks to exclude these forms of reflections as means through which human behaviour can be analyzed, it will amount to great error. As such, in these recent times, we have had contemporary behaviouralist researchers reject the notion that there can be no role for normative theory, aesthetics or hermeneutics in political and social analysis. They would argue instead that these approaches yield a different form of knowledge or understanding but not that they are 'meaningless'.

Another major criticism against the behaviouralist approach is that there is a tendency amongst the behaviouralist, to tilt towards *mindless empiricism* as a result of their influence on positivism. David Sanders ^[10] again reports that one of the earliest claims of the positivists was that theoretical understanding could be obtained only through the process of inquiry that began with theory free observations of all the facts in an experiment for instance, from which law like generalizations are derived from the empirical regularities that were observed. Later positivist like Hempel ^[11] and Popper were known to have argued strongly that "enquiries could only proceed if the researchers' effort to observe 'relevant facts' where guided either by clear theoretical expectations or, at a minimum, by some kind of explanatory hunch" the positivist by this position, moves away from Inductivism as a method of science.

But on the contrary, we see the behaviouralists' emphasis of data and the concomitant downgrading of *apriori* theoretical reasoning which in turn produce specific tendencies among behavioural researchers. One of which is the tendency to emphasize on what can easily be measured rather than what might be theoretically important. The tendency to play down on the potential importance of phenomena that are intrinsically difficult to measure has thus become the matter of concern to both critics and advocates of behavioural research. This scenario has been exceptionally

true in relation to the analysis of electoral behaviour. Behaviouralists now thus pay closer attention to issues such as ‘electorate’s social profiles’, partisan identifications, policy preferences and economic perceptions. To this end, complex models have been devised to aid showing how the relative importance and causal ordering of different aspects of various phenomena influence the determination of a vote during and after elections.

3. MAIN FEATURES & FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

3.1. Conceptual Clarifications and Analysis of The Constructivist Mode of Thought.

According to Craig Parson ^[12], A constructivist argument simply holds that “people do one thing and not the other due to certain ‘social constructs’: ideas, beliefs, norms, identities or some other interpretative filters through which people perceive the worlds” by this, it means that the world we inhabit in is in fact a ‘world of our making’ ^[13]. It also means that the actions that individuals take at any point in time are structured by the meanings that particular groups of people develop to interpret and organize their identities, relationships and environment.

By implication, None-constructivist scholarship, on the contrary, suggests that our interpretative filters do not greatly affect how we act, instead we inhabit a real landscape of features like geography, resources and relative power, to which we respond fairly directly. Typical examples of the groups that fall into this class include: “The Behaviouralists Approaches”, “The Rational Choice Approaches” and “The Marxian or Marxist Approach”. Let us also note that some institutionalists also make none constructive arguments though other institutionalists tend to overlap with constructivism. Therefore, the main feature of the constructivists approach in this study is that whenever we are able to establish a case where subjective interpretations of some sort exists, we are clearly known to be responsible for influencing or affecting the way people behave or react to both internal and external factors, then and only then can we establish the existence of the constructivist approach.

Let us at this point note that constructivists have been known to vary epistemologically by virtue of how they think their claims relate to reality, science and causality. They have also been known to vary substantively and methodologically as well. In other words, just as there are many different behaviouralist claims, so also there are many constructivist

claims. This is because there are different levels of action which they all tend to address from world culture.

3.2. Historical Background To The Study of Constructivism

The basic notions of constructivism originated along side with the discipline of sociology in the late 19th Century as contained in the notable works of Durkheim. ^[14] Durkheim was known to have posited that Human societies are held together by the ‘social fact’ of culture. This means that every particular society creatively inverts different socially constructed identities and beliefs which guide their mode of thinking every now and then.

Another very important reference that ought to be made here with regards to the foundations of constructivism is the notable works of a German Sociologist, Marx Webber. He suggests that ideas are like ‘switchmen’ which often ‘determine the tracks along which actions have been pushed by the dynamics of interest’ ^[15]. For example, Marx Webber was known to have argued in one of his famous works: *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, that “it was the religious ideas of Protestantism that lead indirectly to the rise of capitalism”. ^[16] This claim ‘turned Marx on his head’ reversing Marx’s view that ideas and ideology are just rationalizations that people make up as they pursue wealth and power in a material world. For Marx Webber, ideas and culture deeply define what people see as their ‘interests’. It is important to note that Durkheim and Webber’s focus on the impact of socially-constructed ideas, norms and culture first entered the emerging discipline of political science mainly through the works of the scholar who first translated Webber into English, Talcott Parsons, a Professor in Sociology in the University of Harvard. The best known example was the Civic Culture, Almond and Veba. ^[17]

Other notable thinkers who have influenced work in constructivism include: in continental Europe; we have theorist like, Derrida, ^[18] Michel Foucault, ^[19] Lacan ^[20] who advanced what together became known as “poststructuralist or ‘postmodern’ constructivism. By the turn of the millennium, constructivism was better established in political science than ever. Scholars of social construction from all these lineage held prestigious faculty positions and published in highly regarded avenues. One hand, the thriving variety in constructivism was a sign of strength: much like the many different rational-choice theories, the many different kinds of constructivist arguments displayed the rich range of tools and logic that could be developed out of its basic insights.

3.3. Some Major features and Characteristics of Constructivism.

As mentioned before, “the distinctiveness of constructivism lies in its attention to interpretation in human action” [21] it has also been argued that a focus on social construction connects to even deeper kinds of distinctiveness that locates constructivism in its own realm of reality.

Wendt, [22] a man considered to have attempted to represent the standards of the constructivist approach, has argued that traditional causal-explanatory relationship asks ‘why’ questions about how one set of conditions dynamically produce another, whereas constructivist-style scholarship asks ‘how or what’ questions about the static properties that constitute things. Culture, norms, ideas, and identities do not usually cause things in a dynamic, one-things-knocks-into-another way; instead, they define the properties of the world we perceive. For example, Wendt notes that it doesn’t make sense to say that the norms of sovereignty preceded and caused the rise of the modern state system. In essence for Wendt, most constructivists pursue a different kind of inquiry from non-constructivists.

By the above, Wendt goes on to underscore the fact that ‘constitutiveness’ is indeed central to constructivism. The deepest point of constructivism is that the natural world is meaningless and indeterminate for human beings until we begin to socially construct some shared meanings about it. Constructivists therefore believe that it is social constructions and not organizational landscape that makes the greatest difference in how we ultimately act.

When claims are made about social construction, we do not just make claims about static ‘deontic’ powers of ideas and norms, but when such claims are made, they are made about a process by which people construct themselves into those ideas and norms.

3.4. Analysis of Some Criticism of Constructivism

Just as we have identified series of variations in the approach discussed above (Behaviouralism), we wish to report that further studies have also revealed that the constructivist approach has been perceived to be plagued with various other variations of the constructivist mode of thought. Much of the preceding arguments have been about epistemological issues: debates about how to define ‘explanation’ and the relationship between causality and constitutiveness are debates about how we acquire knowledge about the world. But part of the points that has been argued is that constructivism is not necessarily distinctive in epistemological terms. Many constructivists however part-ways with non-constructivists in epistemological terms. The distinction between those who do and those who do not is the most common distinction

emphasized in surveys of constructivism, between modern constructivist and ‘post-modern’ constructivist. [23]

3.4.1 Different methods

One of the resultant consequences of the variances that have been discovered to exist in the constructivist mode of thought is the fact that different methods are introduced into constructivism. The methods with which constructivists specify and support their claims are almost as diverse as the arguments they make. The choices that constructivists make in methods connect most strongly to the kind of constructivism in which they are trained, which invariably carries with it, a certain kind of methodological training as well. For instance, constructivists with ‘International Relations’ training usually undertake close process-tracing over time to show how certain ideas or norms inform certain actions. This constant change in methods is responsible for the reasons for the series of objections that have been raised against constructivism as a current and most appropriate method of analyzing current political phenomena.

3.4.2. Different mechanisms and different social constructs

Beyond the abstract epistemological difference that the constructivist display, constructivists have also been known to vary even more widely in terms of concrete arguments they make about how social construction works. In the opinion of Craig Parsons, “one of the clearest kinds of distinction lies in the kind of mechanism that different scholars portray in the process of social construction.” [24] He also noted that the mechanism the scholars emphasize on; go a long way to evoke different views of the results of social construction, by this we mean, how people relate to the social constructs around them. *Socializations* and *Persuasion* has been identified as some of the main mechanisms that have influenced the variations in constructivism. We shall not be going into that in this presentation as it shall be a subject for another paper.

4 THE RELEVANCE OF THE BEHAVIOURALISTS & THE CONSTRUCTIVISTS APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE

4.1. The Relevance of Behaviouralism to Modern Political Science

From all the studies done in the above sections and those not captured in this paper, it is evident that one of the reasons for the emergence of the behavioral approach is to

create an avenue which will project the methods of analysis adopted and practiced in political science as against the seeming advances in the methods that are recorded and practiced in other social science disciplines like sociology and psychology. ^[25] Consequently, behaviouralists, being dissatisfied with the traditionalists' opinions about issues like individual participation and political systems in general, resolved to make scientific methodology and research orientation the new hall-mark of political science. These explain why the behavioural school has consistently sought to make political science very quantitative and scientific and, why they have placed emphasis on micro politics (i.e. study of political actors and process) – rather than the formal institutions of government” ^[26]

These efforts by the behaviouralists in my view constitute nothing but desire for improvement and scientific rejuvenation of political science. This is attested to by the ‘Creed of Behaviouralism’ or, the key ‘behaviouralists’ articles of faith’ ^[27] According to the behavioural creed or articles of faith:

Capability of scientific prediction and explanation is not beyond the scope of political science if political scientists engage in search of political behaviours and their accompanying variables. And that observable phenomenon should be the only concern of political science as opposed to institutionalism. ^[27]

Generally, the birth of the behavioural approach has consistently led to the genesis of scientific research into variables like “political attitudes, role perception, voting behaviours, pressure groups, roles of leaders and elites, individual and group behaviors and their interaction within the system.” ^[28] In short, the rise of this approach within the discipline of political science has brought with it, sophisticated concepts and scientifically sophisticated tools of analysis and evaluation like “tables, graphs, scales, charts statistical and mathematical models” ^[29]

With these, behaviouralism or the behavioral approach (to my mind) was and still is a new thinking about the methodological approach in political science. It has propelled the discipline into a new direction of intellectual inquiry and pursuit of knowledge by charting a new intellectual channel with a capacity to grapple with all issues

relating to political phenomena of the past and present dispensation. In other words, it has made political science more attuned to the changing needs of people and the study of politics within a polity.

Because of the perceived impact of behaviouralism to political science (though this is debatable), we would argue that behaviouralism is a form of renaissance, - if not in totality - of certain parts of political science. The debate-ability of behaviouralism's impact on political science is exemplified by the views of some of the behaviouralist themselves. For example while accepting the idea that behaviouralism has had pronounced impact on political science, Robert Dalh was cautious when making reference to the subject by referring to it as “the scantiness’ of behaviouralism impact” ^[30]. But, on the other hand, Heinz Eulau seems to be firm about the impact of behaviouralism on political science when he opined that:

The behavioural penetration of political science has had the effect of vitalizing and improving the older forms of writing and research. It has had a salutary influence on the quality of all political science ^[31]

The fact that behaviouralism, since its emergence into the social science arena and more specifically, into the discipline of political, science as an approach to political analysis - instead of disappearing - has continued to reinforces its indelible impact on political science, It has becoming a fact that cannot be over emphasized. Its mere continuation and existence is an incentive to the pursuit of knowledge. We are therefore resolved to infer that behaviouralism or the behavioural approach is an antithesis of traditional political philosophy. Its emphasis on scientific methods and empiricism as opposed to traditional political philosophy justifies this assertion.

Whether the synthesis is about to emerge or has emerged in the form of post behaviouralism, as often observed by the critics of the approach, is indeed a different topic not covered by the scope of the present paper. However, this study notes that despite its impact on political science, behaviouralism has suffered a sort of erosion of wide recognition and acceptability in terms of the criticisms levied against it so far. These criticism notwithstanding, the approach has survived to date due to the evolutionary pattern of human society and its accompanying complexities which necessitate a corresponding sophistication in the knowledge of intellectuals

whose expertise are needed to meet the challenges of these complexities.

4.2. The Relevance Constructivism to Modern Political Science

As highlighted in our arguments so far, constructivism is a broad form of argument built on the notion that people only arrive at certain actions due to their adoption of certain social constructs to interpret their world. By implication, such a method therefore provides a distinct substantive view of how and why the political world forms and 'hangs together' to the ordinary person. This approach might be conceived as just another additional approach alongside the traditional, Marxian, Institutional, or Realist approach that emerges to meet a particular cause of action. But the truth is that social constructs are not just another kind of cause. There is more to it than meets the eye.

Constructivism as an approach to political analysis emerged into the political arena due to some complexities of the human phenomenon. Such complexities takes into consideration, the fact that everybody has an *opinion* which to a large extent, has its own individual merits that must be given due consideration at each point in time. Opinions that are birthed from deeply enshrined values that would reduce the individual to nothing when disregarded. The opinions that simply demands that an entirely new cause of action be created in other to be able to adequately explain new realities that unfolds in daily political life and activities. The opinions that occasionally demands that new and better yardsticks be formulated from what formerly existed in other to adequately account for new and complex realities in the political arena. The opinions that takes into consideration, the multiplicity of identities and how these identities constitute the basis for the development of new constructs to met up with current trends and changing realities.

5. CONCLUSION

Now because these realities are splinters which are typical to each individual actor in the political sphere, who subsequently are also products of social agents working on other social, linguistic, ethnic and social identities in time, the need therefore arise for developing new paradigms and construct to meet each rising need and demand. The emergence of the behaviouralists and the constructivist approach to studies and analysis in the field of politics is indeed a fact, I believe and submit, cannot be overemphasized here in this paper. While affirming that the behaviouralists approach in practice have embraced all that lends a scientific character to the modern political science methods as captured in their eight major tenets, constructivism or the

constructivists approach has via its new ideology and methods of approach, have been able to meet the complex demand in the modern political era. The numerous advantages of the application of these approaches (Behaviouralism & Constructivism) to modern political analysis have made modern political analysts to have the upper hand with regards to the process involved in political analysis.

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