

## **DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION**

### **Language, Subjectivity and Individuality**

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(A chapter in *Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson: Rhizomatic Connections*, edited by Robinson, K. and to be published by Palgrave some time in 2007.)

It is clear that within Deleuze and Whitehead's work, there is an important re-description of the time, place and status of all subjectivity, a subjectivity which is not limited to the 'human'. Both writers provide compelling reasons as to why, and how, contemporary analyses should avoid positing the human person as either an object or a subject. Rather, 'human' individuality is to be envisaged as an aspect within the wider, processual effectivity whereby the virtual becomes actual (Deleuze), or the solidarity of the extensive continuum becomes actualized into individuality (Whitehead). It may appear that I am eliding or confusing the distinction between subjectivity and individuality here. However, one of the arguments that I wish to set out in this chapter is that the validity and complexity of such a distinction can be helpfully re-thought through a sustained engagement with the work of Whitehead and Deleuze.

Broadly speaking, the invitation is to analyse those processes by which subjectivity and matter conspire to instantiate actuality. Neither subjectivity (nor individuality) are simple effects of former processes nor are they it creative forces in themselves. For both Whitehead and Deleuze, enduring 'objects', insofar as they are substantial items of existence, are 'persons'. For Whitehead: "Societies of the general type, that their realized nexūs are purely temporal and continuous, will be termed 'personal'." (Whitehead, 1967, p. 205). Further: "a dog is a 'person'" (Whitehead, 1967, p. 206). As long as it is remembered that such persons (or objects) are not self-identical, self-sufficient, Newtonian entities. Deleuze puts it thus:

All objects = x are 'persons' and are defined by predicates. But these are no longer the analytic predicates of individuals determined within a world which carries out the *description* of these individuals. On the contrary, they are predicates which *define* persons synthetically, and open different worlds and individualities to them as so many variables or possibilities. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 115).

So, as stated above, both Whitehead and Deleuze have very specific conceptions of that which constitutes individuality. Further, they insist that to render humans as the only mode of personhood is to falsely render the processual character of the universe. But as this Deleuze quote above suggests, something of language or the linguistic (through the 'predicate') will also be implicated in this. And it is this that I wish to approach in this chapter.

### **Whitehead on Language**

Although Whitehead does not develop a specific theory of language within his work, there are four points that I would like to raise with regard to the place and status of language and the linguistic within his writing.

Firstly, toward the end of his first detailed discussion of his own version of propositions within *Process and Reality*, Whitehead uses examples of 'verbal' propositions to illustrate his point concerning how "the actual world...enters into each proposition" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 194) For, of the ('linguistic') proposition "Caesar has crossed the Rubicon" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 195), Whitehead states: "this form of words symbolizes an indefinite number of diverse propositions." That is, if uttered roughly two thousand and fifty one years ago, 'Caesar' would have referred to a contemporary structured society and 'Rubicon' to a contemporary society which were in the actual world of both the person who made the statement and the person for whom the proposition was an element to be judged.

Or:

one of Caesar's old soldiers may in later years have sat on the bank of the river and meditated on the assassination of Caesar, and on Caesar's passage over the little river tranquilly flowing before his gaze. This would have been a different proposition (Whitehead, 1978, p. 196).

His conclusion is that "Nothing could better illustrate the hopeless ambiguity of language since both propositions could fit the same verbal phraseology" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 196). Whitehead then goes on to list other possible propositions to which such a verbal statement could refer. And his general conclusion is that he has demonstrated "the futility of taking any verbal statement...and arguing about *the* meaning" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 196).

Second, Whitehead is also keen to distinguish between language and 'philosophical' propositions. So, once again, he states that: "Language is thoroughly indeterminate, by reason of the fact that every occurrence presupposes some systematic type of environment" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 12). This statement, made early on in *Process and Reality*, establishes the core of Whitehead's attitude towards language. However, at this point of the argument he is discussing 'propositions' as usually understood within philosophy, for example, 'Socrates is mortal'. He does not believe that such propositions immediately represent, express or correspond to the facticity of the world. However, the reason why he does not believe this is of some importance; it is because every 'occurrence', i.e. actual entity or event, in itself, can only be understood in relation to the environment from which it proceeds. So: "A proposition can embody partial truth because it only demands a certain type of systematic environment, which is presupposed in its meaning. It does not refer to the universe in all its detail" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 11). However, this does provide a first indication of the manner in which Whitehead envisages language or the linguistic as implicit in existence.

Third, although Whitehead does not discuss the materiality of the signifier in relation to language and propositions, he nevertheless insists on the physical

manner in which vocal language is encountered. In this sense, spoken language is an aspect of the 'withness of the body', although Whitehead does not put it in these terms. Rather he states that:

A single word is not one definite sound. Every instance of its utterance differs in some respect from every other instance: the pitch of the voice, the intonation, the accent, the quality of the sound, the rhythmic relations of the component sounds, the intensity of the sound all vary. Thus a word is a species of sounds, with specific identity and individual differences. (Whitehead, 1978, p. 182).

So, like actual entities themselves, words are different amongst themselves but they also obtain a level of 'identity'. Hence: "the meaning of the word...[is]...an event" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 182). This tantalising reference to the relation between language and events is not developed by Whitehead but is by Deleuze, especially in *The Logic of Sense* (and it a reading of this which will make up much of the development of this chapter). For, Whitehead does not develop a specific theory of such linguistic events; they are simply, qua events, another manifestation of the eventfulness of the universe.

It would seem, on this analysis, that Whitehead understands meaning as cohering within individual words. But this is not the case. Meaning comes not from individual words but from their locus within a wider linguistic environment. But this does not explain the means by which language functions as a communicative device, within Whitehead's more general understanding of process. In order to accomplish this, Whitehead describes language in terms of symbolism.<sup>i</sup>

Four: "A word is a symbol" (Whitehead, 1928, p. 12) (Whitehead says). This seems clear enough; but such a statement begs the question; "why do we say that the word 'tree' - spoken or written - is a symbol to us for trees?" (Whitehead, 1928, p. 13). Given Whitehead's previous refusal of the subject/object division and his rigorous attempts to avoid any notion of 'primary substance', this is likely also to be found in his work on symbols and symbolism.

So he distances his version of symbolism from those which predicate a world of distinct objects and subjects in the following way: “Both the word itself and trees themselves enter into our experience on equal terms” (Whitehead, 1928, p. 13). Whitehead thereby retains the democratic element of his general theory of becoming and hence the principle of univocity. In this sense “it would be sensible...for trees to symbolize the word ‘tree’ as for the word to symbolize the trees” (Whitehead, 1928, p. 13). The difficulty is in explaining quite what the role of symbolism is. If Whitehead is simply reasserting the primacy of the inter-relation of items of matter within his philosophy, then symbolism, as a way of explaining the precise role of language, has lost its purchase. That is to say, Whitehead is quite clear that: “Language itself is a symbolism” (Whitehead, 1928, p. 73). The importance here being upon the word ‘a’. Language is an example of the wider mode of symbolism.

Thus, although language is not of interest in itself, for Whitehead, it should be noted that his later account of human consciousness is phrased in terms which resonate with a theory of language or of components of the linguistic within existence. For example, he writes: “all forms of consciousness arise from ways of integration of propositional feelings” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 256) and, ultimately, such propositional feelings rely on the dual terms of “logical subjects of the proposition’...and the ‘predicates of the proposition’” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 186).

So, Whitehead has an implicit rather than an explicit conception of the role of the linguistic within existence but it is one that can be drawn out through a comparison with the work of Deleuze. And, further, such a reading can develop novel approaches to thinking about subjectivity, human individuality, materiality and actualization.

### **Deleuze on Language**

Deleuze argues that language itself is intimately tied up with becoming and materiality. More particularly, it is ‘sense’ which becomes the most important

element in the discussion of the relation of bodies, states of affairs, events and language. So it is the question ‘What is sense?’, that needs to be focussed upon.

Deleuze would make no simple reply, but his position could be summed up as follows:

*Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs.* It turns one side towards things and one side towards propositions. But it does not merge with the propositions which it expresses any more than with the state of affairs or the quality which the proposition denotes. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 22).

Deleuze is using the term ‘sense’ in a very specific way here. Sense is that which forms the boundary between things and words but is reducible to neither.

Deleuze’s makes the point that there is nothing about theories of truth, when dealing with the relationship between words and things, that makes them able to explain the sense which inheres propositions, be they true or false. Any theory of the conditions of truth must contain “contain *something unconditioned*” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 19) which enables the three relations of the proposition to subsist. There must be a fourth relation of the proposition. And this unconditioned something, this fourth relation is ‘sense’. In keeping with his wider philosophical outlook, that which comprises such an ‘unconditioned something’ cannot exist in itself as substantial, for then it would either exist as an individual and, therefore, would be limited in its ability to operate, as individuality is a temporary effect of the mixing of bodies. But nor can sense be purely conceptual, it cannot be an abstract idea which forms and informs the world as, according Deleuze, such ideas are effects rather than causes. Instead:

Sense is the fourth dimension of the proposition. The Stoics discovered it along with the event: sense: *the expressed of the proposition*, is an incorporeal, complex and irreducible entity, at the surface of things, a pure event which inheres or subsists in the proposition. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 19).

Sense is ‘the expressed of the proposition’. It is not what the proposition expresses; it is not limited to the proposition. If it were then sense would remain within the circle of the proposition and would have to be explained in terms of

denotation, manifestation or signification. At the same time, sense is not a simple property of things as they are. Finally, sense is not reducible to the perceptions or judgements of subjects confronted either by propositions or things. Sense as “that which is expressed by the proposition...[is] irreducible to individual states of affairs, particular images, personal beliefs, and universal or general concepts” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 19).

Deleuze then comments on the difficulty of this notion. “It is difficult to respond to those who wish to be satisfied with words, things, images and ideas” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 20) Sense does not ‘exist’, with regard to Deleuze’s understanding of the conditions of existence. “For we may not even say that sense exists either in things or in the mind; it has neither physical nor mental existence” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 20). Furthermore, sense is something that cannot be grasped nor can it be named as such: “*in fact* we can only infer it indirectly” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 20). And it is this final statement which provides the best clue as to how an understanding of ‘sense’ can be furthered with reference to Whitehead. According to Whitehead, that which cannot be named, that which only exists insofar as it partakes of other things, that which is never encountered but must be inferred from the stubborn facts of experience, is an eternal object. It is not eternal objects as expressions of potentiality that are being alluded to here but eternal objects in their role as that which provides definiteness to the experience of becoming a subject. Deleuze’s usage of the term ‘sense’ could be seen as a way of explaining what goes on in such occurrences. Indeed, it could be argued that Deleuze’s notion of sense is a development of the notion of the term ‘event’ which Whitehead used in his early work but which he moved away from in *Process and Reality*. For sense is that which accompanies an event, in that it describes not how the subject makes sense of the world but how the world *makes* sense. It is this process of ‘making sense’ (or, perhaps, ‘constructing’ sense) that enables the creation and completion of subjects and individuals. That is to say, the world creates (or constructs) sense as an effect of the inter-relation of singularities within the virtual. Given that all subjects are part of this world they are also

created within such creativity. And this is precisely Whitehead's point in his critique of Kant:

Thus for Kant the process whereby there is experience is a process from subjectivity to apparent objectivity. The philosophy of organism inverts this analysis, and explains the process as proceeding from objectivity to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity, whereby the external world is a datum, to the subjectivity, whereby there is one individual experience. (Whitehead, 1978, p. 156).

For the moment, with Deleuze, it is the tracking down and unfolding of experience which is of interest (as it is throughout *Process and Reality*). And Deleuze's hunt starts with the Husserlian notion of the 'noema':

when Husserl reflects on the 'perceptual noema,' or the 'sense of perception,' he at once distinguishes it from the physical object, from the psychological or 'lived,' from mental representations and from logical concepts. He presents it as an impassive and incorporeal entity, without physical or mental existence, neither acting nor being acted upon - a pure result or pure 'appearance.' (Deleuze, 1990, p. 20).

In Whitehead's terms, settled actual entities have objective existence, as opposed to the formal existence of the entity which prehends that object as part of its becoming constituted as an entity.<sup>ii</sup> So, 'perceptual noema' or 'the sense of perception' could be seen as referring to the immediate process of the combining of prehensions within an actual entity or subject, in its genetic phase (Whitehead, 1978, p. 283); that is, in its becoming (i.e. before it has become). This is a description of the very moment or moments (which are not yet in time) of the sub-representative<sup>iii</sup> creation of individuality which neither relies on nor proceeds from an individual.

So, noema are not the passive reception or perception of static objects; they are not 'given' in the traditional sense. Rather, the noema constitute 'an ideational objective unity'. This relates to Whitehead's notion of the act of experience of an entity, comprised through the combining of elements into a unity; where such elements do not immediately correspond to perception. Noema are that which are somehow related to the objective existence of objects but are also distinct



from them. “We distinguish between green as a sensible color [sic] or quality and ‘to green’ as a noematic color [sic] or attribute. ‘*The tree greens*’. (Deleuze: 1990, p. 21) Whitehead puts it in the following way: “the prehension of a sensum, as an apparent object qualifying a region, involve[s]...for that prehension a subjective form also involving that sensum as a factor. **We enjoy the green foliage of the spring greenly**” (Whitehead, 1967, pp. 250-1. Emphasis added). Or, as the poet Andrew Marvell puts it in *The Garden*: ‘Annihilating all that’s made,

To a green Thought in a green Shade’ (Marvell, 1972, p. 257) .

Both Whitehead and Deleuze are attempting to describe **how** subjects or individuals occur amidst their non-essential ontological multiplicities, in a way that allows for the world to be received, and for sense to be made, without relying primarily on visual perception. This is the role of ‘sense’ in Deleuze; it is not something that the subject confers on the world rather it is something that is created; the world *makes* sense: “‘*The tree greens*’ - is this not finally the sense of the color [sic] of the tree...?” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 21). However, it is not simply that the world *is* sense, or that the world is *sensible* and all that is required is the proper rendition of its given elements to produce subjectivity. It is the complex relation of sense to language and events which Deleuze uses to preclude such determinacy.<sup>iv</sup>

Sense is indeed attributed, but it is not at all the attribute of the proposition - it is rather the attribute of the thing or state of affairs. The attribute of the proposition is the predicate - a qualitative predicate like green for example. It is attributed to the subject of the proposition. But the attribute of the thing is the verb: to green, or rather the event expressed by this verb...‘Green’ designates a quality, a mixture of things, a mixture of tree and air where chlorophyll coexists with all parts of the leaf. ‘To green,’ on the other contrary, is not a quality in the thing, but an attribute which is said of the thing. This attribute does not exist outside of the proposition which expresses it in denoting the thing. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 21).

Once again: ‘Sense is the expressed of the proposition’.

For Deleuze, sense does not exist, as such, as it only occurs through its expression ('what is expressed does not exist outside its expression'). This is not to say that sense is an attribute of a proposition ('what is expressed has no resemblance whatsoever to the expression'. Usually, trees are said to be green. They are seen to be static objects which have certain essential properties which define what they are; one of these properties is that they are green. In such accounts, trees are passive, enduring entities which are perceived or talked about by subjects which are independent of them. As has been seen, both Whitehead and Deleuze are sharply opposed to such approaches. Instead they both emphasise the processual aspect of reality, the primacy of bodily relations, and the individual moments whereby actuality arises out of this more general field. Thus 'greenness' is not a static property, rather, it is an active element which expresses the constitution of each specific tree ('the attribute of the thing [or state of affairs] is the verb': 'to green, or rather the event expressed by this verb'). Deleuze thus 'agrees' with Whitehead that there are subjects of propositions (logical sets of actual entities) and that these are surrounded by a range of predicates (complex eternal objects). Where he is, perhaps, clearer than Whitehead is in associating such predicates with the linguistic through his positing of verbs as elemental. It is not that Deleuze envisages language as the harbinger of existence, rather, that the notion of the verb best evokes the activity which comprises the real existence of the world. This is the germ of the relationship of language or the linguistic, subjectivity and individuality that I wish to draw out here.

As stated earlier, it should be noted that early on in his philosophical career, Whitehead too, attempted to use parts of speech as elements within the facticity of the universe, for example: "It is an adjective of events which to some extent conditions the possibilities of apparent sense-objects" (Whitehead, 1922, p. 34). And, Whitehead's theory of propositions does coincide, at points, with Deleuze's view of the world in terms of activity, and events as quasi-effects of the prior mixture of bodies and qualities (logical sets of actual entities and predicates - in terms of complex eternal objects). However, for Deleuze, it is verbs that express the activity of the universe; this activity is reducible neither to subjects nor

objects, for both are involved within and yet escape the formation of sense. 'Green' or the greenness of a tree is one thing; it *is* the mixing of bodies, it is a state of affairs. 'To green', the activity or expression of greenness is not inherent in such a state of affairs, it is not an essential property of a thing. Instead, 'To green...is said of the thing.'

So, the thing does not say 'I am green so perceive me as green or assert that I am green.' The greening of a tree is 'said of the thing'. But it is not said by a subject. In fact it is not said by anyone. It should be noted that Deleuze uses the passive tense here. However, insofar, as such an attribute 'does not exist outside of the proposition which expresses it', then it must be expressed. This is closely tied to Deleuze's usage of the 'univocity of being' where "Being is said in a single and same sense...*of* all its individuating differences" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 36). Thus being is 'spoken' in that it enacts sense. But this is not a unified sense; for within the very instantiation of being is that which creates difference. Given that there are no universal concepts or propositions, Deleuze is arguing that each moment of being is accompanied by a proposition. These are not verbal propositions but, at the same time, each becoming does entail that some position is taken with regard to the world or state of affairs; and such positioning is implicated in what has been called a 'statement'.<sup>v</sup> It is the making of this statement, which is the making of sense, which itself produces the subject and enables the designation of an 'exterior' world after the event (that is, the possibility of signification, denotation and manifestation come after the event and sense). In reality (i.e. in terms of becoming), sense, propositions, attributes, events and their relation to verbs are not strictly separate. But, as with Whitehead's analysis of the combination of prehensions into a substantial entity, it is possible, after the event to analyse or divide that which is not in itself divided; "the region is, after all, divisible, although in the genetic growth it is undivided" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 284).

However, it should be noted that it is not specific verbs, or the 'meaning' of verbs, which is of interest to Deleuze. Instead, Deleuze isolates two distinct aspects of

the verb. There is “the present, which indicates its relation to a denotable state of affairs” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 184). Under this aspect falls the triad of denotation, manifestation and signification which form “the aggregate of times, persons, and modes” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 184). The other aspect is “the infinitive, which indicates its relation to sense or the event in view of the internal time which it envelops” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 184). Under this aspect falls the range of potentiality which each specific occurrence of that verb relies on for its sense. But, the sense of the verb is not exhausted by these occurrences, it retains its own indeterminate form. “The Verb is the univocity of language, in the form of an undetermined infinitive, without person, without present, without any diversity of voice” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185). Thus, the verb replicates the role of eternal objects in Whitehead’s work. It will be remembered that eternal objects express the infinite potentiality which permeates the universe through its ongoing creative process. In this way they are eternal, out of time, in that they are not determined by, or limited to, the present. As such, they link the past and the future. For Deleuze, “The pure infinitive...permits no distinction of moments, but goes on being divided formally in the double and simultaneous direction of the past and future” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185).

Yet, one of the main roles of eternal objects is to ingress in the becoming of actual entities. In Deleuze’s reading of Whitehead: “eternal objects are...pure Virtualities that are actualized in prehensions” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 79). It is only because of such ingressions that definiteness is granted to actual entities, to individuals. Thus, under the first aspect of Deleuze’s version of the verb, (‘its relation to a denotable state of affairs’) are created ‘times, persons, and modes’; that is, the present with all its punctuations of time, space and individuals. Unlike Whitehead, Deleuze thus views language, in the form of the verb, as integral to the formations of (human) individuals. This is not language as an epiphenomenon, or supplementary explanatory device, or creation of the human ‘subject’. Language is coextensive with becoming, with the event, with the creation of sense itself. Further, language is not solely a human affair, it is not reducible to a ‘cultural intelligible’. On Deleuze’s account, the verb “inherits...the

communication of events among themselves” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185). The universe is not “shivered into a multitude of disconnected substantial things...[where] substantial thing cannot call unto substantial thing” (Whitehead, 1967, p. 133) - as Whitehead puts it. Instead, language, sense, and events are all interconnected effects of the mixing of bodies which do thereby communicate with each other. Language is not to be seen as words here, rather it is a mode of inter-action which is an integral element of the coming to be of all items of existence. Language does not represent, reflect or create, states of affairs, it is made possible by them and expresses particular actualities and delimits them. “It is language which fixes the limits” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 2). And it is here that we move onto the notion of language and individuality more directly. Language keeps singularities and actualities in touch with the infinite, with the unbridled process of becoming: “it is language as well which transcends the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 3). Language does not make (create) sense; it is only one element in the process in which individuals become actualised, their sense created, and whereby events occur. “As it expresses in language all events in one, the infinite verb expresses the event of language - language being a unique event which merges now with that which renders it possible” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 185). So, describing the verb as infinite is a philosophical device. It is an abstract characterization of the universe in terms of process and becoming. But the verb is also implicated in the ‘present’, in the actualization of individuals; it is important to recognize this distinction, that is, to accept the force of the philosophical approach, but then to delineate the operations of such infinitive verbs in their present and personalizing actualizations. It is also important to note a distinction between Deleuze and Whitehead at this point, even though this might turn out to be no more than a terminological one.

### **Subjectivity, Individuality and Language**

For Whitehead, subjectivity is superjectivity, that is, it is the combination of diverse elements into one unity. It is the process of this concrescence that

constitute its 'formal' existence. Once it has become, it perishes, it becomes a datum for other becomings. This is its 'objective' existence whereby it gains its immortality (Whitehead, 1978, p. 219-220). Whitehead emphasizes the processual aspect of becoming and hence the formal aspect of existence. Deleuze, on the other hand distinguishes between that form of subjectivity which is 'real', which exists, but within the realm of singularities. As Ansell-Pearson puts it: "subjectivity is never ours but always virtual" (Ansell Pearson, 2002, p. 168). Thus the present, or the 'world-as-it-is' is populated not by subjectivities but by individuals which are actualized out of the virtual. Such actualized individuals are also 'real', they are as real as the virtual. However, they are in some way delimited or controlled; they are implicated in the operations of force or power. Clearly Whitehead does not view the shift from formal to objective existence in precisely these terms. However, it would seem possible to equate his distinction between these modes of existence to Deleuze's notions of virtual subjectivity and actual individuals.

So, it has been seen how Deleuze introduces language into his ontology through an analysis of the status of the verb as infinite. It was also pointed out that this is only half the story, in that the verb is also implicated in the actualizations of the present. Deleuze elaborates this second point by building on the work of Foucault (Deleuze, 1988) (though he goes beyond him very quickly). In doing so, he makes use of the term 'statements'.

Statements are not produced by individual speakers or subjects; they do not harbour the intentionality or creativity of individual humans; "no originality is needed in order to produce them" (Deleuze, 1988, p. 3). On Deleuze's reading, statements inhabit the realm of the already decided, of the real (in the sense of the actual). Statements will delimit the utter facticity of the moment within which subjects find their place; they are, in this sense, 'social' insofar as they substantiate the actual conditions and consequences of the contemporary world. Hence, they are also resolutely implicated in the material.

Statements are not purely linguistic. They imply and require, for their operation, “the *complementary space* of non-discursive formations” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 9). Deleuze identifies such formations in relation to institutions.<sup>vi</sup> For:

Any institution implies the existence of statements such as a constitution, a charter, contracts, registrations and enrolments. Conversely, statements refer back to an institutional milieu which is necessary for the formation both of the objects which arise in such examples of the statements and of the subject who speaks from this position (for example the position of the writer in society, the position of the doctor in the hospital or at his [sic] surgery, in any given period together with the new emergence of objects.) (Deleuze, 1988, p. 9).

If medical discourse is derived from a relation of statements which enables it to talk intelligibly about specific objects, and employ specific practices, then one example of the non-discursive, the visible, might be the hospital considered as an architectural entity. However, this is not to consider the hospital as a Newtonian, physical object, for: “they [hospitals] are not just figures of stone, assemblages of things...but first and foremost forms of light that distribute light and dark, opaque and transparent, seen and non-seen, etc.” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 57).

So, Deleuze uses the terms ‘the articulable and the visible’ to distinguish and to link the realms of the discursive and the non-discursive. In some respects, the articulable and the visible are analogous but they are not isomorphic. It is, perhaps, Whitehead’s work which can best elucidate these terms and their inter-relation. At the metaphysical level, every actual entity is “dipolar, with its physical and mental poles” (Whitehead, 1978, p. 239). This ‘mental’ aspect does not refer to the psychological or to consciousness as originary. Rather, it refers to the conceptual as that potential which is instantiated within all items of being or matter; this is what grants all materiality its subjectivity. This account therefore avoids envisaging the universe as replete with simple, inert objects, only occasionally punctuated with the searing light of human subjectivity.

So, consistent with Whitehead's insistence on the priority of becoming over being and his epochal theory of time (and space), it is the pulse of becoming which creates time and space; so to speak of relations within such becomings is to preempt actuality. The visible and the articulable do not exist within time and space, they create it. And this goes for the hospitals, prisons and so on, which literally<sup>vii</sup> fabricate their own spatio-temporal systems.

However, Deleuze (and Whitehead) would not want to over-emphasize the heavy, stratified, domains of discourse and institution (the articulable and the visible), or the rigidity of such institutions and the final completion of each bounded creation (or subject). The co-workings of power and knowledge do not completely render their material as subject, or object, so that there is nothing beyond or left over.

### **Conclusion: Language, Individuality and Materiality**

For Deleuze, human language is not creative in any ordinary sense and nor is it unique. "Events make language possible" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 181). Human language is only one of the elements within the constitution of humans as individuals. It is the realm of sense which informs and surrounds such temporary individuality, and proscribes the events within which they occur. There are other diverse languages: "There is even a white society and a white language, the latter being that which contains in its virtuality all the phonemes and relations destined to be actualised in diverse languages" (Deleuze, 1994, p. 206). Such languages are not limited to humans as they can arise from the communication of non-human singularities. This notion builds upon Whitehead's assessment of eternal objects as those potentials which inform the creation and definiteness of all subjects. A white stone is not only white because human language calls it white. It is white because whiteness is one of the defining elements of its becoming. It feel itself to be white. Whitehead's choice of colours as his preferred method of explaining the role of eternal objects takes



on renewed importance with Deleuze's analysis. Deleuze is also clear in linking colour, matter and subjectivity:

Included in the notion as subject is forever an event marked by a verb, or a relation marked by a preposition...(and if things had the gift of speech, they would say, as might, for example, gold: 'I will resist melting and nitric acid'). (Deleuze, 1993, p. 52).

Or, as Whitehead puts it, quoting Locke: "Thus we say, fire has a power to melt gold;...and gold has a power to be melted" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 57).<sup>viii</sup> Thus subjectivity or individuality is not solely a human affair. And the actualization of individuals is not entirely separate from the singularities which enable actualization: "singularities are actualized both in a world and in the individuals which are parts of the world" (Deleuze, 1990, p. 110). In 'fact', in *actuality*, each individual entity is presented with its own world, its own history, its own grouping of singularities or objectified entities as it is "somewhere in the continuum, and arises out of the data provided by this standpoint" (Whitehead, 1978, p. 67). And with regard to the body, this entails, as Deleuze puts it, that:

In each world, the individuals express all the singularities of this world - an infinity -...but each monad envelops or expresses 'clearly' a certain number of singularities only, that is, *those in the vicinity of which it is constituted and which link up with its own body*. (Deleuze, 1990, p. 111).

With which Whitehead concurs:

the animal body is nothing more than the most intimately relevant part of the antecedent settled world. (Whitehead, 1978, p. 64).

Thus, it is possible to view Deleuze as a continuation of Whitehead's project. As he and Guattari state of his philosophy of organism: "Interaction becomes *communication*" (Deleuze, and Guattari, 1994, p. 154). Hence, it is possible to outline an approach which includes 'nature' (in the sense of the physical world of the natural sciences and philosophy) as a cohesive and yet infinite milieu within which individuality and subjectivity are not simple constructions, representations or epi-phenomena. Instead, they comprise the limited, physical and social

actuality of the 'world-as-it-is' but do not fully exemplify, incarnate or exhaust its potentiality.

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<sup>i</sup> See, Whitehead, 1978: 168-183, and Whitehead, 1928, *Symbolism. Its Meaning and Effect*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

<sup>ii</sup> See, Whitehead 1978: 219-220

<sup>iii</sup> “Anyhow ‘representative perception’ can never, within its own metaphysical doctrines, produce the title deeds to guarantee the validity of the representation of fact by idea.” Whitehead, 1978: 54

<sup>iv</sup> See, Ansell-Pearson, 1999: 132

<sup>v</sup> The status of such ‘statements’ shall be taken up later on in this chapter.

<sup>vi</sup> This demonstrates Deleuze’s continuing interest in the relation of philosophy to immediate, social concerns from *Empiricism and Subjectivity* to his later texts; (for example, Deleuze, 1991 [1953]: 47).

<sup>vii</sup> This word is over-used but seems pertinent here

<sup>viii</sup> The citation is from Book II, Chapter XXI, Section 1 of Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Locke, 1988: 105). In the original the word ‘power’ is in italics on both occasions.