

MORE THAN JUST A BOUNDARY  
DISPUTE:  
THE REGIONAL GEOPOLITICS OF  
SAUDI-YEMENI RELATIONS

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**Appendices**  
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## 1.1. Notes on Arabia, June 1907

This is one of three publications (See Appendices 1.2 and 1.3) providing historical accounts were prepared for official use by British institutions such as the Foreign Office or the War Office early last century. Their significance is in the information they contain about the status of Asir prior to the Great War of 1914-1918. These documents are especially crucial in the context of the then-existing uncertainty about the status of this district in the 1920s and 1930s.

‘Notes on Arabia’ was compiled in the General Staff, War Office, June 1907 (FO 371/353, TNA, London).

This document confirms that, since 1872, the *Vilayet* of Yemen had been divided by the Ottomans for administrative purposes into four district-based regions: Sana’a (as the capital), Ta‘izz, Asir and Al-Hudaydah. These districts are referred to by different terms in Turkish and Arabic. The districts were sometimes called *mutasarrifiyah* or a *sonjok* and a *qa’immaqamiyah*, and were each headed by a *mutasarrif*. It must be noted that these were the Turkish terms, while in Arabic the corresponding term *liwā* was used. Indeed, in today’s Yemen the term *liwā* refers to a *muhafadhah* (governorate).




Figure 1.1.1 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

1907.	TURKEY.	1 22035
July 4.	No. 22035.	JUL 4 1907 Received by <i>f 22035</i>
War Office	(Subject.) Notes of Arabia - June 1907. In 12 copies of.	
Last Paper.		
(Print.)	(Minutes.) An interesting report Copy to Constantinople Fehran Cairo. Libraries Ad. July 4. 1907.	
(How disposed of.) to { Cople no. 269 Fehran no. 118 Cairo no. 189 } July 12	This is well worth looking at & there is a useful map. see especially Summary on p. 14. <i>R.P.P.</i> It is an excellent memorandum. L.H. C.H.	
(Action completed.) <i>R.P.P.</i>	(Index.) ✓ <i>44</i>	
Next Paper.		

S. & S. Ltd. 5078/47. 50,000. 31/5/07.

Figure 1.1.2 Notes on Arabia, June 1907




Figure 1.1.3 Notes on Arabia, June 1907



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Figure 1.1.4 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

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**NOTES ON ARABIA (INCLUDING THE HEJAZ, &c.)  
AND ITS RECENT HISTORY.**

GENERAL DESCRIPTION.

The peninsula of Arabia, lying between lats. 12° 40' and 30° N., Geography. measures some 1,400 miles from the Gulf of Suez to Ras el Hadd, its mean breadth between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf being about 600 miles. Its total area is estimated at 1,200,000 square miles, and its population from five to eight millions.

The general features of Arabia are those of an elevated tableland, backed Physical features. up by low mountains to the east, and gradually rising in the direction of the west and south, where we find it bordered by a second and loftier mountain range. The mountains, if we except Jebel Akhdar in Oman, are almost wholly barren on their sea side, but are occasionally fertile enough on their inner ranges, especially in the Yemen and the southerly districts. Beyond them lies an uninterrupted ring of sterile desert, broadest in the south and east, where it expands into a huge waste of burning sand; narrower towards the west and north, where it is more rocky in its character. Within this belt rises a series of tablelands, undulating in long slopes, and intersected with deep valleys, the former rich in pasturage, the latter in field and garden produce. This central plateau constitutes about one-third of the total area of the peninsula, the desert ring another third, and the coast ranges make up the rest.

The main divisions of the country are shown in the accompanying map, Divisions. but no definite boundaries exist, except that recently demarcated between the southern Yemen and the Aden Protectorate.

From time immemorial Arabia has been almost exclusively occupied by Inhabitants. the great branch of the Semitic family called Arabs, and few Asiatic lands have a more homogeneous population. Within this branch are many divisions and sub-divisions with tribal and sub-tribal groups continually at war with each other; but all are essentially one in origin, physique, speech, and religion.

The religion of nearly all the inhabitants of Arabia is Islam. The inhabitants of the Yemen are Shias,\* but those of the remainder of the peninsula are Sunnis, and are therefore supposed to acknowledge the Sultan of Turkey as Khalifa; but it is, to say the least of it, doubtful if they really do so, the Grand Sherif of Mekka being quite as important a personage in their eyes.

In view of the great importance of this claim of the Sultan of Turkey to the headship of the Muhammadan faith, a short examination of the Khalifate may not be out of place.

The title of Khalifa has been borne by the Ottoman sovereigns since 1517, when Sultan Selim I. conquered Egypt; but, as a rule, it has been little more than a title. It has been the policy of the present Sultan to make a reality of the spiritual power, but his claims are somewhat similar to those which the Russian Emperor might put forward to be the head of Christendom. The majority of his subjects accept his pretensions without question or reserve, but large sections of Muhammadans, *e.g.*, all Shias and all the inhabitants of north-

\* The most important division of Muhammadans is into Sunnis and Shias. The latter number some 15,000,000 in Persia, India and Arabia; to the former belong practically the whole of the rest of Islam.

The Sunnis believe in the office of Khalifa, the "lieutenant" or "vicar" of Muhammad, and accept the six books of tradition which are commonly designated by the name of Sunna. They are divided into four schools, all equally orthodox, and differing only in the interpretation of minute points of law and ritual—the Hanafiyas (Turkey, Central Asia and North India), Shafiiyas (Egypt), Malakiyas (Morocco and North Africa), and Hambaliyas (parts of Arabia).

The Shias (Shia = Sectary) reject the institution of the Khalifate and hold that after the death of Muhammad the headship of the Muhammadan church was vested in an Imam. They reject the six books of the Sunni tradition, but have other collections of traditions of their own.

Figure 1.1.5 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

west Africa reject his claim altogether. There is every reason to believe that the tradition declaring that the Khalifa must be descended from the Koreish, the tribe of the prophet, reposes on historical fact, and there is no doubt that anyone who follows the Sunna must accept this tradition. Such qualification is, of course, fatal to the claims of the Sultan, who cannot possibly be descended from the Koreish or any other Arabian family.

#### ADMINISTRATION.

Hejaz. The province of the Hejaz lies between the southern limits of Syria and the northern frontier of the Yemen, lats. 29° 30' and 20° N. Its western border is the Red Sea littoral, but towards the east it has no well defined limits. Theoretically it stretches halfway across the Arabian Peninsula to meet the western extension of the Busra province, which is supposed to include Nejd.

In the Hejaz no conscription exists, no taxes are levied, and Turkish authority is limited to Jedda, Mekka, Medina, and a few coast villages, while in the interior the Beduins are under no control and a state of anarchy exists everywhere.

The Sherifs of Mekka even now consider that being descendants of the Prophet, and having ruled the country for so long, they are the only people qualified to rule the Hejaz; and this idea has not been shaken by ineffective Turkish rule. The chief value of the Hejaz is of a political rather than of an economical character, for the possession of the holy cities, which are situated in it, gives the Sultan one of his strongest claims to the Khalifate.

About 70 per cent. of the Hejaz Beduins are living only just above starvation limit. They are regularly defrauded by the Sherif of Mekka and his agent at Jedda of a large portion of grain which the Turkish Government grants them. It is not surprising, therefore, that in their wretched poverty they should be driven to commit robberies on the Mekka road.

The Yemen and Asir. The vilayet or province of the Yemen, which includes the "sanjak" of Asir to the north, fills the south-western corner of Arabia, and extends generally from the 20th parallel of latitude south-east along the coast to the 45th meridian of longitude. To the north is the Hejaz, to the south-east the British Protectorate of Aden, and to the east the southern part of Nejd and the Arabian Desert. The eastern frontier is quite undefined.

In the Yemen and Asir a very similar state of things exists as in the Hejaz, with the distinction that, here and there, there is more show of attempted provincial administration, and collection of tithes and taxes; consequently, continuous revolts, varying in magnitude, are more common, but tribal quarrelling and robbery are less frequent, the more so as many Yemenis are settled in villages, whilst in the Hejaz the great majority are nomads.

The possession of the Yemen is believed by the Porte to be necessary to its prestige at Mekka and Constantinople, and accordingly a large garrison with a normal strength of 20,000 is permanently kept there.

Nejd and the remaining parts of Arabia. Nejd is, for all practical purposes, independent, Oman entirely so, whilst the littoral east of Aden is held by independent tribes who are under British influence, as also are the Sheikh of Koweit and the Sultan of Maskat.

There is usually a revolt or insurrection in progress in some part of Turkish Arabia, while in the central provinces internecine warfare on a more or less comprehensive scale appears to be almost continuous. These conditions are due to religious and dynastic divisions, to the dislike of the native for Turkish rule, and to the usual misgovernment of the Porte, which holds the Hejaz by its bribes and the Yemen by its strong garrisons.

#### HISTORY OF ARABIA IN MUHAMMADAN TIMES.

The history of Arabia previous to the birth of Muhammad is little known. In A.D. 569 Muhammad was born at Mekka, and thenceforward the history of Arabia became part of the history of Islam.

Figure 1.1.6 Notes on Arabia, June 1907




Figure 1.1.7 Notes on Arabia, June 1907




Figure 1.1.8 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

Early in 1888 Muhammad ibn Rashid, the Shammar prince, with the help of the Turks, invaded Nejd with so large a force that Saud came to terms and agreed to retire from Riad. Ibn Rashid now styled himself "Emir of Nejd," and transferred the power from Riad to his own city of Hail, further north.

In 1897 Muhammad ibn Rashid died, and the hopes of the Saud family revived. He was succeeded by his son, Abdul-Aziz ibn Rashid.

Early in 1902 Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, a brother of Muhammad ibn Saud, who had been murdered by emissaries of Ibn Rashid, leaving Koweit, entered Riad secretly, declared himself to the populace, who acclaimed him as their ruler, and drove out Ibn Rashid's officials.

In November, 1902, he inflicted a crushing defeat on Ibn Rashid at Dillum (near Riad), the latter losing 250 killed, his baggage and camp.

An attempted advance by Ibn Rashid was repulsed in March, 1903. In July, 1903, Ibn Saud took the offensive, and in February, 1904, defeated Ibn Rashid, destroyed 300 of his force, captured Bereida, Anesa and Hail. Ibn Rashid fled to Samawa, on the Euphrates, where he claimed Turkish protection.

In a memorandum addressed to the Sultan, Ibn Rashid exposed the alleged designs of England on Koweit, whose ruler, Mubarek, he stated was plotting in conjunction with Ibn Saud to gain possession of the entire Nejd, and to come down even as far as the Red Sea, when they proposed to place themselves under British protection. The Sultan ordered the despatch of four battalions to his assistance. These, numbering 2,000 men, moved out of Samawa in April, 1904, and for 30 days marched under a tropical heat through the Nefud, finally arriving at Bereida, some 260 to 270 miles distant from Medina. Here, on the 1st June, 1904, they were attacked by Ibn Saud and utterly routed, together with some 5,000 followers of Ibn Rashid.

A Turkish expedition of 6,000 men, which started from Medina for Hail in the autumn of the same year, had to return, owing to transport and other difficulties.

The tribesmen of Asir, who had already revolted in 1902, and who after the commencement of the Hejaz Railway had hesitated between an alliance with the Hejaz tribes or with Ibn Saud, now decided for the latter, who now announced his intention of seizing Shammar from Ibn Rashid, the ally of the Turks. Anxious to retrieve their fortunes, the Turkish Government, early in 1905, despatched another expedition into the Nejd, consisting of eight battalions, under Marshal Feizi Pasha, who had suppressed the Yemen rebellion in 1903; two battalions, however, were soon sent back, presumably owing to difficulties of transport. An expedition, consisting of four battalions, left Medina about the same time under Sidki Pasha to co-operate with Feizi Pasha from that side. Both these forces eventually arrived in the Kasim district, after suffering great hardships and losing many men from desertion and disease. In April, 1905, Feizi Pasha was transferred to the Yemen to quell the rebellion in that province, and Sami Pasha succeeded him in Kasim. Meanwhile, the Turkish troops in Kasim appear to have done nothing more than "hold on." Unpaid, half-starved, brought from a cold climate and quartered, in many cases, in single tents under a burning sun, it is not a matter for surprise that they died like sheep, mutinied and deserted.

Up till April, 1906, several small skirmishes had occurred between the rival factions; towards the end of that month Ibn Rashid advanced in strength against Ibn Saud, but this time with only 200 Turks, who took little part in the engagement which ensued, and in which Ibn Rashid was killed.

Ibn Rashid was succeeded by his son, Mita'ad ibn Rashid, and a truce was now made between the rival factions.

Towards the end of 1906 the Turkish garrisons began to evacuate Kasim. It is not clear whether this was determined by the Sultan's command, or whether the troops found themselves in such straits that they came to an agreement with Ibn Saud by which they gave up their guns and arms in return for a safe conduct out of the country. The fact remains that the

Figure 1.1.9 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

evacuation of Nejd by the Turks is now reported to have been completed, the remnant of the troops having arrived at Medina and Busra in a miserable condition.

In December, 1906, Mita'ad ibn Rashid was treacherously murdered by his uncle Sultan bin Hamud ibn Rashid, who was thereupon proclaimed Emir of Shammar.

Sultan bin Hamud had been living at Jof, at enmity with the rest of his family and on good terms, apparently, with Sheikh Mubarek, of Koweit, who has always been friendly to Ibn Saud, Emir of Riad.

When Sultan became master of Hail he wrote to Ibn Saud, who was then at Bereida, telling him of the events which led to his succession and asking him to recognize that change, proposing at the same time friendly relations between Hail and Riad. Ibn Saud replied that he would be glad to maintain the good relations and accept the friendliness offered, on certain numerous and onerous conditions. Ibn Rashid refused the terms, which, if accepted, would have rendered him virtually a vassal of Ibn Saud, and marched out from Hail with 4,000 cavalry and about 15,000 camel riders to meet Ibn Saud, who was at the head of a considerable force coming from Kasim in support of his demands. Seeing that his forces were inferior to those of his rival, Ibn Saud, who never anticipated that Sultan ibn Rashid would have such a large force under him, at once retired to Kasim, where he proceeded to call on his allies to help him.

The latest reports are to the effect that fighting has taken place between the rival Emirs, which has resulted in the defeat of Ibn Saud; but details are lacking, and the reports have not yet been confirmed.

#### PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION.

##### CENTRAL ARABIA.

Turkish  
forces

All Turkish garrisons, including those in Hail and Kasim, have now been withdrawn, the last remnants of the Kasim garrison having marched into Medina without orders last February, and evacuated the country owing to want of supplies and the impossibility of maintaining their position there any longer. Sami Pasha, who held the post of Mutasarif of Kasim, reported his arrival at Medina with these troops, and was directed by the Porte to remain there. These withdrawals obviously mean a considerable loss of prestige to the Turks, as Ahmed Feizi Pasha, in 1905, formally hoisted the Turkish flag in Kasim and Woshem, annexing those districts to the vilayet of Busra. The Turkish troops now actually available consist of 5,000 men, who are employed as labourers on the Hejaz Railway from Tebuk to Madain-i-Salih, a distance of 157 miles, and are strung out in small detachments of single companies at work on successive sections.

Water is only plentiful at Tebuk and Akhdar, with a fair but limited supply at Maadam and Madain-i-Salih; at El Ala there is a good supply, and it is proposed to construct a large depôt there eventually. Between these points the troops are dependent on the train or camel transport for water. The working parties are, therefore, very vulnerable to attack, and if the wells at the above-mentioned places were seized by the Arabs and the large provision depôt at Tebuk destroyed, the Turkish troops would be in danger of perishing of thirst or hunger.

The depôts at Tebuk and other places are not protected by any defensible works or any artificial protection, and are very open to attack.

The Turkish troops have the Martini rifle, with which the Bedouins also are principally armed.

Turkish reinforcements would have to be brought by rail from Damascus, and rolling stock on the line is inadequate.

At Medina the garrison now consists of 3,000 men, who are employed on the commencement of the permanent way from that end.

The two forces of 5,000 men between Tebuk and Madain-i-Salih, and 3,000 at Medina, represent the total Turkish force available against an Arab attack on the railway from the direction of Hail.

Figure 1.1.10 Notes on Arabia, June 1907




Figure 1.1.11 Notes on Arabia, June 1907






Figure 1.1.12 Notes on Arabia, June 1907




Figure 1.1.13 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

There was now a lull again in the operations. A number of sheikhs throughout the disturbed area tendered their submission, induced to do so by bribes, but their good faith is questionable, and it is believed generally that they will rise again and join the Imam when a suitable opportunity appears.

In September, 1906, a rival Imam, Hassan Yahya ed Dhuhiani, appeared in the north of the Yemen Province and formed an alliance with Feizi Pasha. Hassan Yahya was for a time strong enough to threaten Shahara, but his alliance with the Turks was shortlived and his defection with a large following, estimated at 12,000 men to the side of the Imam Yahya bin Muhammad may explain the despatch by the Porte in April, 1907, of a Commission charged to do its utmost to bring about a peaceable settlement with the Yemenis. In the meantime the news from the Yemen continues to be most unfavourable to the Turkish arms, and Feizi Pasha is reported to have sustained a severe reverse at Amran north of Sana.

The Turks have not succeeded in attaining the principal object of their long and expensive campaign, viz., the capture of the Imam, the annexation of his territory, and the crushing of his influence for all time. The troops, besides being exhausted, are scething with discontent. Both the civil and military officials generally are dissatisfied with their lot, and would, it is said, be glad under present circumstances to abandon the mountainous parts of the province, which are held only under great difficulties and considerable expense. The Field Marshal, Ahmed Feizi Pasha, who has served at various intervals over 30 years in the Yemen, and is over 80 years of age, has hinted at the hopelessness of the situation, and should the Sultan not decide to build a railway between Hodeida and the interior at an early date, and send adequate reinforcements from time to time, with money and supplies to maintain the same, it would not be rash to predict that the Turks will be driven sooner or later to their only resource, viz., to come to some understanding with the Imam, which would also mean partial loss of territory, not to mention loss of prestige locally and in the eyes of the Moslem world generally.

Meanwhile, the drafting of regular troops from Turkey in Europe and Asia Minor to the Yemen is being watched by Bulgaria with considerable interest, and the partial denudation of the Hejaz, Syria and Mesopotamia of troops for the Yemen may have serious consequences in these provinces.

#### KOWEIT.

Over Koweit the Sultan has never attempted to assert his authority until the Baghdad Railway scheme drew attention to the importance it might acquire in the future as the terminus of a trans-continental railway through his Asiatic possessions.

The sheikh had the rank of a Turkish kaimakam, but was in reality an independent ruler. When, in 1898, the Porte began to show its hand and claimed to bring Koweit within the sphere of Turkish administration, Sheikh Mubarek appealed to Great Britain for protection, and taking our stand on the maintenance of the *status quo*, we not only entered a formal protest against any attempt on the part of Turkey to curtail the sheikh's authority, and showed our determination to defend him against any forcible interference, but concluded early in 1899 a definite agreement with him, by which his interests have been permanently placed under our protection. At first the Turks seemed, nevertheless, inclined to try and carry matters with a high hand. Troops were, from time to time, reported to be on the march overland to occupy Koweit, and on one occasion a force was sent down by sea from Busra which proceeded to another destination when it found three British men-of-war in the bay.

A *modus vivendi* has now been arrived at, but the Turks are evidently bent on confining Sheikh Mubarek's authority within the narrowest limits possible.

When Mubarek fell out with the Turks, the latter sought to set the Shammar prince Ibn Rashid against him, and Mubarek replied by taking up the cause of the Emir of Riad. Ibn Rashid at this time asked to be taken under

Figure 1.1.14 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

British protection on condition that Mubarek was deposed, and that his nephew was appointed sheikh in his place, for it was very important for him that Koweit should be in friendly hands, owing to the facilities that place afforded him for the import of arms and ammunition. His overtures met with no success, but on the other hand Mubarek and his allies were defeated by Ibn Rashid near Anesa, and Mubarek retired to Koweit. Ibn Rashid now advanced on Koweit, but, deterred partly by the presence of the British warships lying in that harbour and partly by the necessity of taking the field against Ibn Saud, who had proclaimed himself Emir of Riad, he returned without venturing upon an attack.

Mubarek is a shrewd old Arab, and he no doubt realizes that he has compromised himself hopelessly with the Turks. So long as he lives we can probably rely on his fidelity to the engagements he has contracted with us, but our position might be difficult with a new sheikh who declined our special protection, and with the Porte which has never recognised it. His friendly relations with Ibn Saud, the present Emir of Nejd, are worthy of special consideration.

Figure 1.1.15 Notes on Arabia, June 1907

## 1.2. Handbook of Asir

A Historical account of Asir, prepared by the Arab Bureau, Cairo, 1 June 1916 (WO 106 5981, TNA, London).

This document confirms that the *Vilayet* of Yemen since 1872 was divided by the Ottomans for administrative purposes into four district-based regions, largely: Sana'a (as the capital), Ta'izz, Asir and Al-Hudaydah. Subsequently, the Ottomans' sovereignty over Asir was questioned. However, although it was evident that the Porte had failed to expand its authority over the whole district, there is no mention that Asir had in fact been detached from the *Vilayet* of Yemen.




Figure 1.2.1 Handbook of Asir




Figure 1.2.2 Handbook of Asir

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## XII.—RECENT HISTORY AND PRESENT POLITICS.

Politically Asir cannot be regarded as one, except on the Ottoman theory that it forms, as a whole, the northern sub-province or *sanjak* of the Vilayet of Yemen. In reality it falls into four parts, one completely independent and three acknowledging, respectively, the influence of the Sherif of Mecca, the Turks, or the Idrissi. The three latter, it is hardly necessary to remark, are constantly changing as the power of one or the other aspirants to supremacy waxes or wanes.

(1) The number of Arabs who recognize no power but their own is comparatively small and is confined almost entirely to nomad tribes such as the Rabi'yah Mujatrah and Rabi'yet et-Tahahin, who dwell in inaccessible mountain country on the 'Aqabah, and to nomad sections of certain of the eastern tribes such as the Ghamid, Shahrān, and 'Abidah, who wander far out to the east, where they are beyond control. There is no cohesion or fixed purpose amongst these, and politically they are of little account.

(2) The Sherif of Mecca's influence is chiefly evident amongst the powerful tribes of Ghamid, Beni Shihir, and Shahrān, who live on the inland side of the Main Ridge. He is connected by marriage with the paramount chief of the Beni Shihir and is a personal friend of the Ghamid and Shahrān sheikhs; but he has never made any attempt to administer the country, and it is doubtful if he has much influence amongst the tribesmen. In 1910 he got into touch with many of the tribes between Lith and Ebbah, during his campaign against the Idrissi; but how far he has maintained relations since then is a matter of speculation.

Figure 1.2.3 Handbook of Asir



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(3) The Turks have never succeeded in completely subduing Asir, and they now have only a precarious hold on the port of Qunfudah and the inland towns of Muhail and Ebhah, with a small district round each of these places, and, intermittently, the roads from one to the other. They are in touch with the Beni Shehir and Shahran, but chiefly by virtue of their relations with the Sherif; in the event of trouble with the latter it is probable that they would find these tribes arrayed against them.

(4) As for what remains, the Idrissi either administers or federates it, that is, the Qahtan tribes of southern inland Asir and most of the Tihamah and 'Aqabah from the Wadi 'Ain in the south to the confines of Lith, a strip of nearly 350 miles from north to south by roughly seventy broad. Idrissi's homeland is in the Mikhlaf el-Yemen District, with Sabiyah as capital and the ports of Midi and Jeizan. This is a rather broad section of the Tihamah sloping up for some forty miles to the foot of the 'Aqabah or scarp of the highlands, and about eighty miles long from north to south.

Before Mohammed 'Ali cast covetous eyes on Asir, the whole country from Dahran almost to Taif was in the hands of the ruling family of Beni Mugheid, whose capital was Manadir, or Ebhah as it is now called. The Emir at the time of the Egyptian expedition in 1834 was A'idh Ibn Mura'i, who, with the help of his sturdy hill-men, succeeded in defeating the invaders. The country then had rest from foreign aggression until 1869, when, the Suez Canal having been opened, the Porte sent troops under Rauf Pasha to deal with the Yemen and Asir in earnest. In 1871, Mohammed, son of A'idh, attacked Hodeidah, but was repulsed with great loss, and in the next year Mukhtar Pasha, who had succeeded Rauf Pasha, invaded and subdued Asir. He was helped by the Rijal el-M'a, who had unsuccessfully rebelled against the Emir and were burning to avenge their defeat. The Turks administered most of the country until the revolt of the Idrissi reduced their power to its present limits.

Figure 1.2.4 Handbook of Asir

— 22 —

The house of A'idh, though deprived of much of its former glory, is still important, and Hassan Ibn 'Ali, the present head, is *Vali* or Turkish Civil Governor of Asir.

There is in Mikhlaf el-Yemen a very old tradition of independence which has been maintained against both the Turks and the Yemenite tribes on the one hand, and the tribes of the inland mountains on the other. Between 1830 and 1840 Abu 'Arish was ruled by a certain Sherif 'Ali, who made terms with the Egyptians in order to free himself from the Emir A'idh Ibn Mura'i. During his reign one Sidi Ahmed el Idrissi, a native of Fez, and head of a religious fraternity school (*tarika*), which he had preached in a school at Mecca since 1799, acquired land at Sabiyah, settled there and died (1837) in the odour of sanctity. He had been the teacher of the original Senussi, who took the covenant in his *tarika* in 1823. The Idrissi family increased in wealth during the lifetime of Sidi Ahmed's son and grandson, and appears, after the renunciation of Asir by the Egyptians in 1841, to have supplanted the Sherifial family of Abu 'Arish. It intermarried with the Senussi house, settled in Cyrenaica, and had branches at Zeinia near Luxor in Egypt, and in the Sudan at Argo. But the expansion of its political power to include not only all Mikhlaf el-Yemen, but the Tihamah and 'Aqabah north and south and a suzerainty over several tribes outside those limits (*e.g.* in the Sada district and even among the tribes of North Yemen) is the work of Sidi Ahmed's great-grandson, Seyyid Mohammed, the present El-Idris.

Born at Sabiyah in 1876, educated partly in Egypt (at Zeinia and at El-Azhar, Cairo), and partly by the Senussi at Kufra, after residence at Argo and marriage, Seyyid Mohammed returned to Sabiyah determined to render Asir independent of the Turks and to aggrandize himself at their expense. By 1910 he had driven them back to their present holding; but he failed to take Ebhah against opposition organized by the Grand Sherif. Subsidized and supplied by the Italians during the Tripolitan War, he consolidated

Figure 1.2.5 Handbook of Asir

— 23 —

himself in the south, and though the Grand Sherif seduced much of his following after the Peace of Ouchy, he recovered himself during the Balkan War. Failing, in 1914, to secure recognition from the Young Turks as more than a *kaimakan* of Sabiyah and Abu 'Arish, he declared definitely against them on their entry into the present struggle, signed a treaty with our Resident at Aden in May 1915, and took the field in June with a following of some 12,000 men from Mikhlaf el-Yemen and certain tribes of the 'Aqabah and Tihamah and the Qahtan. He has not succeeded, however, in taking Loheiah, though he has overrun much of the Northern Tihamah of Yemen, and raised part of the Zaranik and other Tihamah tribes against the Turks. His power rests largely on his personality, but to some extent also on hereditary sanctity and on the wealth and influence of his connexions, notably those with the Senussi. His most implacable foe, after the Turks, is the Imam of Yemen, and the only potentate really friendly to him in Arabia is Ibn Saud. The Grand Sherif, however, is now disposed to keep on terms and is anxious to reconcile the differences between him and the Imam Yehya.

These differences, founded on jealousy and accentuated by personal dislike, are probably too deep-seated to admit of more than a temporary settlement. In his early days the Idrissi was fully occupied in consolidating his newly won position; and in any case his schemes of expansion were directed northwards amongst the Sunni tribes of Asir rather than eastwards to the Zeidi followers of the Imam. Indeed the Imam, by his opposition to the Turks, was a source of strength, and the interests of the two chiefs were so far identical six years ago that they entered into a defensive alliance, after delimiting their respective boundaries. The Idrissi was faithful to the pact, but the Imam, having failed to avert the relief of Sana'a and attracted by the favourable terms offered to him, abandoned his ally and submitted to the Ottoman forces. The Idrissi has never forgiven him for this and has always refused to listen to

Figure 1.2.6 Handbook of Asir

— 24 —

any proposals for a reconciliation. He has gone further and for some years has been actively endeavouring to undermine the loyalty of the Imam's western tribes. He was fortunate in finding a favourable field for intrigue amongst the powerful confederation of the Hashid, which had bitterly resented the peace proceedings at Da'an in 1911, and he has succeeded in keeping them estranged till the present time. In 1913, in consequence of complaints from the inhabitants, he sent an expeditionary force to Jebel Razih, which lies between Abu 'Arish and Sa'adah, and has since administered that district. At the present time he is credited with the ambition to extend his dominions still further at the expense of the Imam. He is in communication with most of the important Sheikhs of the Northern Yemen, who are said to be ready to rise if adequately financed and armed. Whether the influence of the Sherif of Mecca is sufficiently great to induce him to forego these ambitions is a matter of speculation, but it can at least be said that the Imam's rupture with the Turks is a necessary preliminary and that the Idrissi is in a position to drive a harder bargain than in 1910.

Figure 1.2.7 Handbook of Asir

### 1.3. Handbook of Yemen

Historical account of Yemen, prepared by the Arab Bureau, Cairo, 15 January 1917 (WO 106/5977, TNA, London).

Similarly to the Handbook of Asir, the division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen is confirmed with Asir as the fourth *sonjok*.




Figure 1.3.1 Handbook of Yemen




Figure 1.3.2 Handbook of Yemen

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Figure 1.3.4 Handbook of Yemen




Figure 1.3.5 Handbook of Yemen

## 1.4. The administrative division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen (1914-1918)

This is an extract from a chronicle of the administrative division of the Ottoman Empire during the years 1914-1918. In the Arabian Peninsula, the *Vilayet* of Yemen is shown to be continued over the same geographic entity, with Asir as part of it. According to the map (see Figure 1-7) the *Vilayet* of Yemen was bounded to the north by the *Vilayet* of Al-Ḥijāz. This document is available through the *tarih ve medeniyet* [history and civilisation] Web site.

YEMEN VİLÂYETİ	
Kazaları	Nahiyeleri
Yemen Sancağı	
San'â	Bilâdü'l Bistân, Bilâdü'r Rus, Beni Behlül, Beni Hâris, Beni Hâşîş, Hemedân, Sinhân, Erceb, Nehem, Havlan, El hedâ
Cebel-i Harâz, merkez: Manâha	Harâz merkez, Mefyak, Irr, Menuh, Cemîle
Kevkebân, merkez: Tavile	Kevkebân merkez, Mahuyet, Şebam
Ânes, merkez: Zûrân	Ânes merkez: Atme, Cebel-i Sarak, Cehrân
Hicce	Hicce merkez, Beni Avâm, Şekadra, Mesur, Afâr,
Zimar	Zimar merkez, Mağrib, Anes
Yerîm	—
Redâ'	Redâ' merkez, Sevâdiye, Cebn
Umrân	İyâl-i Serih
Hudeyde Sancağı	
Hudeyde	Hudeyde merkez, Kamerân, Cebel-i Ber, Huffaş,
Zebid	Zebid merkez, Hays, Besâb'ul âlii Vesâbu's Sâfil
Lihye	Lihye merkez, Zühre
Zeydiye	
Cebel-i Rîme	Rîme merkez, Caferiye, Kisme, Selfbe,
Hücur	Mehâyişe, Âhim, Humus, Nâre,
Beytü'l Faküh	
Bâcil	Bâcil merkez, Salhân,
Ebu' Arîş	Ebu Arîş merkez, Cizân
Asir Sancağı	
Abha	Kahtân (109 Kabiledir)
Mahâil	(28 Kabiledir)
Ricalü'l ma, merkez: Betih	(Toplam 50 Kabile)
Beni Şehr, merkez: Sadvân	(61 kabiledir)
Gâmid, merkez: Rağdan	(49 kabiledir)
Sabyâ	(34 kabiledir)
Kanefide	Kanefide merkez, Dun, Hille (53 kabiledir)
Ta'azz Sancağı	
Ta'azz	Ta'az merkez, Türbetü'l Kahm, Kumâra, Makbene, Zişrâk
Eb	Eb merkez, Mehâdir
Adeyn	Adeyn merkez, Habîş
Katıba	Cebel-i merîs, Nadra, Haşâ
Hicriye, merkez: Türbe	Hicriye merkez, Kubeyte, Habîş
Mohâ	

Figure 1.4.1 The administrative division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen (1914-1918)

## 1.5. British Policy in Yemen

Imam Yahya' position and ability to extend his authority over the entire country as a successor to the Ottomans was not an easy task. The greatest challenge the Imam confronted was the enmity with Britain at the time in South Yemen. These represent a number of selected official documents concerning key highlights of British policy in Yemen. For instance, Britain established special treaty relations with most of the tribes of South-West Arabia to prevent any other colonial or domestic power from expanding into such locations. For that reason, London provided those who had signed treaties with it with recognition as independent rulers. This approach was prevalent in Britain's dealings with overlords of the hinterlands of the coastal towns, from Aden in the southwest to Kuwait in the northeast.

### 1.5.1. British Policy in the Yemen

'British Policy in the Yemen' by Major General G. J. Younghusband and Lieutenant Colonel H. F. Jacob, 23 September 1915 (L/P&S, 18/ B 216, IOR, London).

## B. 216.

SECRET.

## British Policy in the Yemen.

MEMORANDA by Major-General Sir G. J. Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., Political Resident, Aden, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob, First Assistant Resident, Aden. (Received at India Office as enclosures in Aden Residency covering letter No. C.-695, dated 23rd September 1915.)

From Major-General Sir George Younghusband, K.C.I.E., C.B., Political Resident, Aden, to The Secretary to Government of Bombay, Political Department.

No. C 694.

Aden Residency,

10th/23rd September 1915

Sir,

I beg to forward two very interesting Notes by Lieutenant-Colonel H. Jacob, First Assistant Resident, on the Italian question in so far as it affects Arabia and the general settling up, in Southern and Western Arabia, after the War.

2. My own acquaintance with these parts is only very recent and of short duration, and, therefore, any remarks I make are put forward with much diffidence.

3. There appears to be in some quarters in England a suspicion, hardly a jealousy, of Italy and Italian influence in the Red Sea. It is thought to be undermining and supplanting British influence. With that view I cannot find myself in agreement.

4. In the first place Italy knows her weakness in these regions as compared to England, and she knows that every tribe on either shore is also fully aware of the fact. Her manifest interest, therefore, is to work hand in glove with England and not against her. With England's benevolent assistance she can do much, without it she is powerless.

5. Now England's policy has been to encourage and assist weak Powers, and to keep strong ones at arm's length. We can therefore do with complacency for Italy what it would be very injudicious to do for France or Russia. We should I think earn her lasting gratitude, by taking her fully into our confidence and asking her to share with us the burden of settling the knotty problem that will remain to be solved on the Arabian coast after the War.

6. I was much interested to meet Colonel Bodrero and hear his opinion regarding the fighting value of the Arabs enlisted in the Aden Protectorate and its neighbourhood. If an Italian officer can make successful soldiers of these men, much more so can the British officer, for that way does his genius lie. The present seems to be a very favourable moment to try the experiment.

7. A commencement might be made by raising say 200 Arabs of the best fighting tribes, mounted on camels and trained as fighting scouts. The political effect would be excellent and according to Colonel Bodrero the corps would be of undoubted fighting value. It so happens that at the present moment a very suitable officer for raising such a corps belongs to the Aden garrison, Major W. J. Otley, 23rd Sikh Pioneers, whose services would be made available for this purpose.

I have, &c.,

G. J. YOUNGHUSBAND, Major-General,  
Political Resident and General  
Officer Commanding, Aden.

The Secretary to Government,  
Political Department, Bombay.

s. 283

3

Figure 1.5.1.1 British Policy in Yemen

2

## Enclosure No. 1.

## Memorandum on the employment by Italians at Mogadiscio of Askaris from Arabia.

I had an interview on 4th September 1915 with Colonel Bodrero of the Italian Benadir Colonial Service. He has been training the Arab levies we allowed him to enlist from this country. He gets them from our own protectorate and also from the Turkish side. This recruiting is of long standing, though suspended, *e.g.*, during the Turco-Italian war. Though originally enlisted for the Benadir only, the men have been sent from time to time to Tripoli, where they have been most successful fighters against the Turks and the Senussi. Colonel Bodrero tells me the men are splendid under fire, and in his opinion superior to the Abyssinians, with whom he worked for several years at Asmara. The Italians have taken some 6,000 Askaris from this source. Colonel Bodrero was surprised to hear we did not recruit local battalions in Aden.

Their pay in Mogadiscio at the coast is Rs. 12 only. From this sum they provide their own clothes. They get no rations unless they go up country to clear the jungles preparatory to motor traffic, by which the country in hinterland is gradually being opened up. After two years' service the men are permitted to return home, but those who elect to stay behind, and are of good character, are encouraged to engage in petty trade, and are liable to be called up as a reserve, drawing in that event Rs. 3 per mensem.

The men take women from Somali tribes. Their wives are necessarily left in Arabia. Colonel Bodrero takes personal interest in his men, and mixes freely with them. He tells me that nothing is of avail with Arabs save the personal factor, and if any of his officers are high-handed, he dismisses them summarily without further inquiry, as otherwise his system of paternal rule would be wrecked.

I gathered from him that the discipline exacted is not very rigid. The lash is forbidden. "We do not use it," said Colonel Bodrero, "as *you do*" (*sic*). I have questioned many of these returning Askaris, and they are pleased with Italian methods. The Italian officer is more in touch with his men than we are, and I have seen an officer in Abyssinia exchange his helmet for a Galla soldier's "sombbrero," which he thought insufficient for the other under a strong sun.

As an instance of Colonel Bodrero's popularity, prayers were offered for him in the local mosque when he left the other day to take up his appointment as Officer Commanding 12th Bersaglieri now fighting against Austria in the Alps.

Colonel Bodrero said he knew no Arabic, and though he admired the linguistic attainment of British officers, he found that it was better to induce men to understand Italian, as that increased Italian prestige. No time was wasted in ceremonial parades. Musketry was carefully attended to, but the Colonel had no mind for such things as kit inspection, which he thought a waste of time and purely spectacular! I gathered that uniform was not "de rigueur." The men are armed with magazine rifles.

I asked him what arrangements were being made to convert the Benadir roadsteads into harbours. He said nothing was attempted, and then sarcastically added "if the place was considered really productive, Government would certainly abandon her colonial enterprise there!"

I give these few extracts from our conversation to show what has often been before reported of the way Italy is imparting, in subtle form, her influence in Arabia, *i.e.*, the gradual "Italisation" of many Arabs both sides of the line whom *we* are virtually neglecting. We remember her attempts a few years back to deal directly with the Sultan of Shehr and Mokalla and get installed a Marconi system at the latter place; and there is, again, the assertion by one of her Prize Court Judges, during her war with Turkey, that a dhow carrying the Arab flag was to all intents and purposes a Turkish dhow since no recognised Arab hegemony existed! Her Consuls here for some time past coquetted with the Imam of Sanaa and for many years an

Figure 1.5.1.2 British Policy in Yemen

## 3

Italian merchant was living in Sanaa and was able to make commercial deals for that Ruler which won his confidence.

I believe that Italy's connection with the Idrisi was severed after the conclusion of peace with Turkey, but I know that during our pourparlers of recent date an Arab was despatched from Massowah to Sabia to see the Idrisi, who, although he professes at this junction supreme contempt for the Italians, remembers that country's liberality *quâ* guns and ammunition when he was a coadjutor *v.* the Turks. The Idrisi still hankers after Italian guns to which his men are accustomed, though it is true that, so far as we know, he prefers to make his requisition for them *through us*.

Were Italy able to get a footing along the Red Sea *Arabian* littoral, her rôle as an arbiter in Islamic matters would be unquestioned and her position across the water in Abyssinia would be consolidated.

If we do not wish to extend our influence materially as well as morally in Arabia, we can hardly object to Italy's programme, but I think the times demand new measures. There can never be an "Independent Arabia." The idea is unthinkable. The net result would be chaos and confusion worse confounded. The Turkish rule in the Yemen though bad, inspired fear, and on their retreat from these scenes, bloodshed and rapine will increase. We cannot suffer anarchy across, and contiguous to, our protected borders. I therefore attach a memorandum on our present policy and trust that my connection with this tract since 1897 may be sufficient excuse for my hazarding a few suggestions.

Aden,  
8th September 1915.

H. F. JACOB, Lieut.-Colonel,  
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

Figure 1.5.1.3 British Policy in Yemen



Copyright photograph - not to be reproduced photographically without permission of the India Office Library and Records	Reference L/Ps/18/6216	4 Enclosure No. 2. Memorandum on the Political Policy of our Hinterland.
INDIA OFFICE LIBRARY AND RECORDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6	Reference L/Ps/18/6216 DX IOR	<p>In the event of Turkey's dismemberment and her retirement from the Yemen the present political aspect will necessarily undergo a radical change.</p> <p>In the first place, the Imam of Sanaa will shift his headquarters southwards. He detests the Turk but cannot dispense with Turkish largesse to such Arab mercenaries of his as the "Hāshid wa Bakil," who can only be kept loyal to the Imam by large monthly doles. These doles the Imam cannot, and would not, give from his own purse, as he is avaricious and stingy. Again, as told me by one of the Imam's lieutenants quite recently, the Imam will not permit Turkish troops entirely to leave Sanaa for they are an outward and visible sign of Turkish power retained to overawe these contumacious tribesmen and further to collect the Imam's revenues. The Imam was very displeased to see the Turkish occupation of Labej, which he considers his special preserve. The Imam had a secret treaty of offence and defence with Sultan Sir Ahmed Fadl whom he treated as his own creation.</p> <p>Further, the Imam was averse to our bombardment of Sheikh Saïd, which he said was a part of his ancient possessions, and he had aspirations towards regaining his ascendancy in this part. On the disappearance of the Turks from the Yemen the Imam will undoubtedly try to come down into their relinquished possessions and we shall be confronted with a very troublesome, because an ambitious, ruler, whom it will be hard to placate. The Imam is clearly master of the Upper Yemen when the Turks removed their military headquarters to Taiz. He will continue to intrigue with our north-eastern border tribesmen. He has approached the Ruler of Marib and won him over to his side. Sheikh Abdul Rahman of Marib is a Zaidi, like the Imam, but he has been trying to approach us also to acquire a stipend. The Arabs of our hinterland are almost entirely of the Shafai persuasion, and will resent the Imam's approach, but it should be remembered that they were formerly Zaidis, and their chieftains acted in the rôle of Imam's viceroys. From what I know of the Arab it would not be impossible for them to side with so powerful an aggressor <i>if they saw us holding back</i>. For this reason it will be hard for us to disown our existing treaties. At the same time these treaties are very non-committal. They may be summed up broadly into two heads: An agreement on the part of the Arabs (1) to abstain from ceding their territories to other Powers; and (2) to allow free access to their countries. The first clause the Arab will abide by since by that way money comes to him. As regards the free access into their territories the idea is farcical. They are free to enter Aden, and they receive presents and entertainment, but if we attempted to pay a friendly visit to their countries every Arab Sheikh would scent our ulterior motive and suspect annexation. We should be met with opposition. The Arab loves a "Daula" (Government) to whom he can go for money, but otherwise he prefers our room to our company, and would be left alone. This isolation is due partly to their geographical position, and because we have so little—save for a few years on the Dala plateau—tried to make ourselves intimately known to them.</p> <p>Their blood-frends, too, set them apart, one tribe from another, and amongst themselves alliances are formed only to be broken. There are means of breaking down this reserve, and to that I shall come presently.</p> <p>Then there is the Idrisi Saiyid of Sabia. His present action was supposed to be directed against the Turks, but he will fall foul of the Imam whose borders are contiguous. They once were friends, but the Imam's change of front towards the Turks before their war with Italy, and his adhesion to the cause of Islam against the Infidel estranged the Idrisi, who charged his rival of acting without prior reference to himself, and hence the chasm now existing between them. Here was a case of two Arab chiefs of opposite religious beliefs being friendly one with another, and it lends colour to my</p>

Figure 1.5.1.4 British Policy in Yemen

assertion that the blending of Zaidi (Shia) with Shafai (Sunni) is not altogether chimerical. A transfusion of prejudices is possible at any rate.

We shall have our hands full after the war with Turkey, reconciling the conflicting interests of Imam and Idrisi, especially as the latter is now bent upon enlarging his territories at Turkish expense, and this will claim tracts which, with the departure of the Turks, the Imam would himself like to take over.

We have stated in our Treaty with the Idrisi that we did not wish to acquire any fresh tract of land in South West of Arabia. Looking, however, to the Turkish encroachments across our border and their occupation of Lahej, our policy must be amended.

Then, too, Ibn Nasir Mukbil—known as Mawia—has foiled us. He expected to be kept in his tract of Kumaira and Shurman under our aegis. He dislikes both Turks and Imam. His adhesion to the Turkish cause—the result, I believe, of “force majeure,” and also some diffidence in his mind of our bona fides, since we did not move up to meet him at Dala—though not necessarily indicative of any hostile animus against us,—will put him into a difficult position with ourselves when peace is concluded. His country is very fertile and rich, as is also that of Hujariya to the south, which also Ibn Nasir Mukbil's influence pervades, and even so far south as Sheikh Said. This country the Imam will covet. It should properly be ours in spite of our declared policy to hold aloof. The times have materially changed.

The Idrisi's representative asked the Resident in Aden why he did not take Sheikh Said, Mocha, and Hodeida, which he said “would further our joint cause,” and would certainly not be unpalatable to his master, *in spite of our expressed reluctance to take fresh territories.*

To come to our own stipendiaries. The Haushabi Sultan and the Azraki Sheikh have both joined the Turks at Lahej. The Haushabi, it is true, was compelled to join the enemy who marched down through his territories, but Sultan Ali Mani did not confine himself to this action, but was a prime mover in the sacking of Lahej, where he took special delight in destroying his rival the Abdali Sultan's property. The Haushabi has for years chafed under his position as a quasi-subordinate of the Abdali House and was glad of this opportunity of revenge. I do not think we should hereafter recognise him as a friend. I would suggest we should put up a nominee and place the country directly under the Abdali Sultan, whose tribesmen, though not a fighting clan, did their utmost to stem the Turkish advance and who came back with us to Aden—their fortunes completely shattered. The Abdali's loyalty is unassailable.

The Arab cannot understand our retreat from Dala in 1907. His prophecies all hold that we must return one day to assume possession of the country. It is Allah's will, and cannot long be delayed. The times are therefore propitious for us “to lengthen our cords and strengthen our stakes.”

We do not by our present system of dealing with ruling Sheikhs and Sultans fall in with the genius of Arab hegemony. Everyone is as good as his fellow. “Kullun Sheikh biladu,” *i.e.*, everyone is chief of his own tract—they say, and this tract is narrowed down to mean the *family unit*. By giving stipends to the headmen we are paying monies to merely nominal rulers, and though each titular ruler has to allocate some quota to influential men of the tribe, who would otherwise render his position untenable, the rank and file get practically nothing. The Arab is what Burton termed a pantisocrat, and owns no superior, and hence the frequent lootings to fill empty coffers and of blood feuds the result of penury. It is true we pay large sums of money annually *qua* Darbar presents and entertainments in Aden, but even this distribution touches but the fringe of Arab society and leaves a smouldering resentment against us and the ruling Sheikhs.

The railway is the best means of combating this inequality of treatment. The railroad would open up the country; give all and sundry a chance of disposing of their produce; introduce commodities into Arabia and create wants now unknown. By it the country will be pacified and we shall extend our influence. By it the system of transit dues will perish. All

Figure 1.5.1.5 British Policy in Yemen

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Figure 1.5.1.6 British Policy in Yemen

will get a share in the advantages that accrue. The railway creates a carrying trade. At present we depend on overseas traffic to supply our Aden garrison; this would not be altogether necessary. Again, the railway is strategic. Had we had a railway, or even a passable road to Lahej, the recent débâcle at Lahej would have been avoided. The railway opens up a sanatorium for our troops—a great desideratum, and without a railway the scheme of bringing water into Aden is doomed to failure.

It is a commonplace that Saïd Pasha had no wish to attack Aden, but encouraged by our removal to Aden in 1907 the Turks have ever striven to deflect Arab allegiance to their side, and now they have proclaimed a Jihad and have occupied Lahej to show the Arabs the superiority of Islam's claims, and the desirability of making a common cause against the Unbelievers. In this they have failed.

I do not suggest that our prestige is irrevocably lost. A few of the Arab stipendiary Chiefs have written discounting such an idea and they believe that the setback is remediable. They call on us to do our part as a Government and come up to oust the Turks. Themselves they are impotent to face the Turkish guns, and an Arab combination is difficult against the Turks by reason of the strong distrust that exists between them. It is therefore now a psychological moment to reverse the old so-called Indian "Keddah" system of employing and paying a few Head Sheikhs to keep the country in order. Such rule is not congenial to Arabia. The Arab genius lies not this way. The system has been tried and found wanting.

Another suggestion I make is that of raising levies. My attached Memorandum will show what Italy has done with this material. I asked some of the returning Askaris why they went so far afield as Mogadiscio. They replied it was a case of getting their bread and butter. "Why have you not joined *our* cause?" I asked. "Because you have never asked us!" I would propose to raise on trial 200-300 men and train them here in Aden.

This is another way of extending our influence. The up-country Arab is a fighting man and such employment would please him. It also puts money into the pocket of the yokel, where in Arabia *all* are yokels. At this time such a levy would have been particularly useful. One never knows when the next crisis will be. I put forward the suggestion without details which would be given later. I know, and am known by, the Arabs and I am sure they would flock to our standard—more especially after this war when the whole countryside will be in commotion owing to the Arab rivalries and jealousies and the ordinary avocations will be dislocated.

Yet another proposal is that of educating the Chiefs' sons. The proposal was made in 1906 but fell through. We need in Aden a school for chiefs, run on Islamic lines with a stiff British leavening. I sounded several Chiefs at the time and had scarcely one adverse comment. The young Arab boy soon becomes an inveterate *kat*-eater and what with early and over-marriage his mental powers suffer ship-wreck. This is another way of subtly extending British ideals and the seed once sown would grow. Arabia will never remain independent. Some European Power will covet it. Why not we? We are on the spot and our methods are better known and our mode of administration is admired. We have not been forward so far to spread British ideas.

Again, I would strongly recommend the introduction of medical missions. We have the example on our Indian frontiers of the late Dr. Pennell and the brothers Neve, and the same can be done here. Not many years ago Dr. Harpur, of the Church Missionary Society, opened medical work in Dala, but he was recalled because of Turkish activity at Dala, though the Amir of Dala was averse to his departure.

We have in Aden men of the stamp of Doctors Young and MacRae whose philanthropic labours are known all over the Hinterland and beyond, but the *personal* work that lies beyond Sheikh Othman and in our Hinterland would afford a large scope for the dissemination of the British "tang," and would be accumulative and reproductive.

Finally, I would say that we have a very important sphere of action by sea. The Hadramaut has been unvisited for one year, and it is there that

Figure 1.5.1.7 British Policy in Yemen

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Turkish and Imamic influence has lately been at work. The Arab's intellect lies in his eyes, and he cannot fully comprehend an absentee "Daula." There are vast potentialities on the Hadramaut sea-board in the way of mineral and oil—a commercial aspect which should give a further impetus to action on our part.

The Resident's visits to the Hadramaut have of necessity been suspended during this war, for there is now no station ship, and the absence of the flag is to them unintelligible and is likely to induce intrigue.

Aden,  
9th September 1915.

H. F. JACOB, Lieut.-Colonel,  
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

Forwarded to the Political Resident for favour of his submitting these remarks to Government, together with his own. I have treated on what is known to me of the *political* aspect of the case, but the military is so closely interwoven that much can be added to strengthen the case from a standpoint where my knowledge is necessarily limited.

Aden,  
9th September 1915.

H. F. JACOB, Lieut.-Colonel,  
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

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Figure 1.5.1.8 British Policy in Yemen

### **1.5.2. Note on the political situation in the Protectorate's Hinterland**

William C. Walton, Acting Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, 'Note on the present political situation in our Hinterland and beyond the Border', 14 March 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 227, IOR, London).




Figure 1.5.2.1 Note on the political situation in the Protectorate's Hinterland




Figure 1.5.2.2 Note on the political situation in the Protectorate's Hinterland








Figure 1.5.2.4 Note on the political situation in the Protectorate's Hinterland




Figure 1.5.2.5 Note on the political situation in the Protectorate's Hinterland

### 1.5.3. The Aden Protectorate

William C. Walton, the General Officer Commanding Aden, to the Secretary to Government of India in the Foreign Department - Notes by Colonel R.A. Wauhope and Lieutenant Colonel Jacob, 15 May 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 231, IOR, London).




Figure 1.5.3.1 The Aden Protectorate




Figure 1.5.3.2 The Aden Protectorate




Figure 1.5.3.3 The Aden Protectorate




Figure 1.5.3.4 The Aden Protectorate








Figure 1.5.3.6 The Aden Protectorate




Figure 1.5.3.7 The Aden Protectorate




Figure 1.5.3.8 The Aden Protectorate




Figure 1.5.3.9 The Aden Protectorate




Figure 1.5.3.10 The Aden Protectorate

#### **1.5.4. Note on the political situation in the Hinterland**

Note on the 'political situation in the Hinterland', Political department, India Office, 25 August 1917 (L/P&S, 18/ B 264, IOR, London).

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### ADEN: The political situation in the Hinterland.

1. The military history of the Aden Protectorate since the outbreak of war with Turkey may be very briefly related. News reached the Aden authorities on the 12th June 1915 that Turkish forces were being concentrated at Mavia, which lies just beyond the border of our protectorate, with a view to advancing, *via* Ad-dareja, upon Lahej, the headquarters of the principal British protected chief of the Hinterland (the Abdali Sultan), and situated only about 20 miles from Aden as the crow flies. On the 3rd July news was received that Lahej was actually threatened by the Turks, who had routed the Sultan's levies, and the military authorities at Aden decided to send up the local movable column for the protection of the town. The force reached Lahej but was unable to maintain its position there in the face of superior enemy strength, and was compelled to retire upon Aden and to leave Lahej to its fate. Two 10-pounder guns, several machine guns, and a considerable amount of ammunition and equipment, were abandoned during the retreat. The Turks followed up their success, and the British troops found it necessary to retire behind the defences of Aden itself, leaving Sheikh Othman—whence Aden obtains its water supply—in the enemy's hands. General Younghusband was promptly despatched to Aden with reinforcements, and had little difficulty in driving the Turks out of Sheikh Othman and regaining control over the water supply; but he made no attempt—nor has any attempt since been made—to advance upon Lahej or to clear our protectorate of the enemy.

2. The situation in which we have had to acquiesce during the past two years is anything but a satisfactory one. Indeed one of the main reasons which prompted the India Office in suggesting the transference of military control was the hope that it might lead to more effective measures. It is true that our position at Aden itself has never been seriously threatened; but we have had the humiliation of looking idly on, month after month, at the occupation of our territory by the enemy, and of presenting to the world a spectacle of inability to help either ourselves or our friends. There may have been excellent reasons for this inactivity. But, locally, its political results have been deplorable; and there is little hope that the political situation will improve until we are in a position to take effective military action. So far we have confined ourselves to attempting to induce the local Arabs (Saiyid Idrisi, &c.) to do for us what we have not found it convenient to do for ourselves—a policy which, naturally, has not been very fruitful in results. The Arabs have little love for the Turk, but so long as they are doubtful how far we really mean business they will hesitate to commit themselves irretrievably. They are moreover torn by internal rivalries and dissensions. Little effective help can be expected from them until we take the field ourselves. It seems indeed hardly reasonable to expect them to declare themselves effectively against the Turks and on our side while we to all appearances are too weak to do anything substantial ourselves.

3. There is one point on which it is desired to lay great emphasis. It is all-important, from the point of view of our future relations with the Arabs, that we should, before the war ends, ourselves expel the Turks by force of arms from Lahej and the remainder of our protectorate. Victory elsewhere, followed by a diplomatic withdrawal on the part of the Turks, will not suffice for local purposes, and will not serve to re-establish our prestige or the belief in our ability to protect our own interests and those of our friends. The Arab, as has frequently been remarked, is impressed only by what passes before his eyes.

4. It should be added that, according to the Indian military authorities, there are only about three, or at most four, months in the year (November to February) suitable, for climatic reasons, for military operations in the Aden area.

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, INDIA OFFICE,  
25th August 1917.

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Reference					
L/AS/18/B 264					
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Figure 1.5.4.1 Note on the political situation in the Hinterland



### **1.5.5. Al-Idrisi to General Stewart, Political Resident, Aden**

Letter from Al-Idrisi to General Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden, 12 May 1919 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4.p. 265). Al-Idrisi's dependence on British subsidies and support was crucial.

*State territory II: Asir, 1913-1934*

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Praise be to God.

From Saiyid Mohamed bin Ali bin Mohamed bin Ahmed bin Idris.  
(To General Stewart,  
Political Resident, Aden.

A.C.

In the beginning of the war your Government had announced that they did not desire to acquire any territory in Arabia but wished that the country of the Arabs should belong to the Arabs, and, further they had promised to expand our territory in the southern and western directions. In view of this promise of Government and as we took part in the fight and have suffered considerable losses in men and materials we have become entitled to such expansion.

Moreover now that the inhabitants of Bajil, Bait-al-Fakih and Zabid have more than once invited us in writing and through deputations expressly sent to us for this purpose, we do wish to advance towards them, but after consulting you.

We observe that others are making encroachments on places beyond their original limits, whereas we have been adhering to our original limits and the places which have now come into our hands from the Turks, were on our borders, we holding one side and the Turks the other - one of these is Zaidia. All the eastern side of this district is in our hands.

In the year 1327 al Hijra (11 years ago) our men occupied the house of Bouni Pasha, the Kaimmakam of the Zaidia district, and took possession of all its contents of magazine provided by the Turks. Severe fighting took place at al Righa, al Kanawis and As-Salib, the account of which was publicly published in the Egyptian papers and others. On your referring to this history and making enquiries you will know all these facts.

May you be preserved.

(No date)

Figure 1.5.5.1 Al-Idrisi to General Stewart, Political Resident, Aden

### **1.5.6. Example of correspondence between Al-Idrisi and Yemeni tribes**

Letter to Al-Idrisi from the chiefs of Bait Al-Fakaih, located to the south of Al-Hudaydah, west of Yemen (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 267-268). Al-Idrisi was able to attract tribes from deep within Yemen.

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1337.

PRAISE BE TO GOD THE COMPASSIONATE THE MERCIFUL.

To The Commandant of the Faithful Saiyid Mohamed bin Ali bin Idris.

<p>Signature of Abdul Kader bin Nave bin Ahmed bin Hamood Hajjain Al Ahdal.</p>	<p>The humble Abu Talib Ahmed Al Bahkil on behalf of himself and agent of all the Bahakilla residing at Bait-el-Fakih.</p>
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Be it not hidden from your virtuous Saiyidship the state of affairs, the movements, and changes prevalent at present owing to which the security and peace have been disturbed, the Sharia and laws ceased to exist and the Islamic rights have been disregarded. These things are causing the wrath of God and His apostle.

Since years all matters are neglected and there is no manager or any one who would put them in order so much so that the inhabitants generally have lost their rights. Thanks to God who put you to revive the Sharia and protect the rights of His creatures.

Your justice became general in all those places, Your virtue would like to use its efforts in the same cause, hence we, who put our names and seals below hasten to earnestly appeal to you and enlist your sympathy. We on behalf of inhabitants appoint your Saiyidship the descendant of the Prophet Hashamite to enforce the laws of God, protect the rights of the Muslims, ensure the safety of the way-farers in the road of God and defend all the districts and its people from the aggressors and evil doers and from all the wicked foes of the faith of God.

We seek your mercy to appoint officers and send a force to do the needful in accordance with our appeal to your graceful eminence. May the Almighty God give you victory and be with you wherever you go and govern and discomfit your enemies and help you in all that is to good and success by the sacredness of our Prophet Mohamed. May the blessing and Salaams of God be on him his relatives and friends.

/Sgd.

Figure 1.5.6.1 Example of correspondence between Al-Idrisi and Yemeni tribes




Figure 1.5.6.2 Example of correspondence between Al-Idrisi and Yemeni tribes

### **1.5.7. On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob's mission to the Imam**

Summary of events leading up to the despatch of a mission under Lieutenant Colonel Jacob to the Imam of Yemen, 27 January 1920, FO 406/43, TNA, London.

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[173890]

No. 45.

*Summary of Events leading up to the Despatch of a Mission under Colonel Jacob to the Imam of Sanaa.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, January 27.)*

ON the 20th March, 1918, the Resident at Aden invited the imam to come in 83622/18. definitely on our side and turn the Turks out of the Yemen. He promised that if the imam were to do this his independence would be ensured; he would be supplied with the necessary munitions; the disposal of Turkish prisoners of war would be left to him; he would be financed on a pre-war Turkish scale, tribal subsidies being paid through him and not direct, and a non-Idrisi port would be opened to trade for his benefit. The terms of our treaty with the Idrisi were explained to him at the same time.

On the 5th May, 1918, the imam sent a non-committal reply, in which he 126866/18. reiterated his previous claims to the overlordship of the Yemen, and made a few scathing remarks about the Idrisi.

He made twelve demands, as follows:—

1. Supply of munitions before commencement of operations.
2. Establishment of his rule and independence over all the Yemen, *i.e.*, over that part which was once under the sway of his predecessors, as also over that which his hand should acquire. His Majesty's Government to undertake to close access absolutely and continuously to all, whoever they might be, who propose to make aggression in the Yemen.
3. His Majesty's Government to pay the same subsidy which the Turks used to pay, all sums to pass through the imam's hands.
4. His Majesty's Government to have no direct dealings with any of the people of the Yemen, except the Sultan of Lahej.
5. Despatch of armourers.
6. Security for Yemen merchants in British dominions.
7. Prohibition of import of spirituous liquors, wanton pastimes, and all munitions except those intended for his use.
8. None but Moslem merchants to be allowed in the Yemen except with his permission.
9. Immediate opening of a port, *e.g.*, Hodeidah or Mokha.
10. No interference.
11. Prisoners of war to remain at his disposal.
12. Recovery of debts due to him by the Turkish Government.

**Figure 1.5.7.1 On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob's mission to the Imam**

- 159258/18. On the 19th September Sir Reginald Wingate proposed to reply to these demands as follows:—
- 1, 3, 9, and 11: To repeat undertaking given in the letter of the 20th March.
  - 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12: To give temporising replies.
  - 2, 4, and 10: (a.) His Majesty's Government to reaffirm their willingness to ensure his independence in the Yemen without prejudice to their protectorate rights and their obligations to the British and stipendiary chiefs.
  - (b.) His Majesty's Government to disclaim any wish to intervene in internal affairs of the country, provided that the interests of British subjects would be adequately safeguarded there.
  - (c.) His Majesty's Government to propose that, in return for their assistance, the imam should undertake not to enter into treaty relations with, nor to alienate territory, nor grant concessions to a foreign Power without their consent.
  - (d.) The imam to be asked to send an envoy with fuller powers to treat and an exact knowledge of his requirements in money and material.
- On the 29th September this proposed reply was approved, subject to the following considerations:—
1. Arms not to be supplied until more satisfactory guarantees have been received that they would be used against the Turks.
  2. Imam to be told frankly that His Majesty's Government could not agree to his second and fourth proposals.
- 159258, 18. On the 14th October Sir Reginald Wingate reported that the proposed letter to the imam was being held up in view of the change in the Aden political situation. He also brought up the question of the amount of the proposed subsidy.
- 172213/18. On the 31st October an armistice was concluded with the Turkish Government.
- 191797/18. On the 20th November a report was received that the imam was obstructing the evacuation of Turkish troops from the Yemen on the ground that the Turkish Government owed him large sums for the upkeep of Turkish troops during the war.
- 2814/19. On the 6th January a report was received that the imam was sending a deputation to Aden, and on the 15th January the General Officer Commanding, Aden, reported that his envoys had been sent back on the ground that they had presented letters to the French, American, and Italian representatives, and that this proceeding constituted a misuse of envoys.
- 29118/19. On the 21st February a letter was received from the imam to His Majesty the King, in which he begged that his independence and rights of suzerainty in the Yemen might be recognised. He also complained of the British occupation of Hodeidah. This letter had been handed in at Aden by the imam's envoys.
- 36318/19. On the 6th March the Italian Delegation in Paris informed Mr. Balfour that the imam had asked for representation at the Peace Conference, and asked what answer should be returned. They were told that as the question of representation had been finally disposed of there could be no question of complying. Mr. Balfour impressed upon the Foreign Office the necessity for pressing on negotiations to bring the imam definitely into our orbit, and Sir M. Cheetham was instructed accordingly.
- 40937/19. On the 11th March Sir M. Cheetham expressed the opinion that the imam's financial straits offered a hope that he might be induced to make a reasonable and durable agreement. He recommended the continued occupation by His Majesty's Government of Hodeidah, and perhaps Mocha, coupled with support of the Idrisi at Loheiya.
- 36308/19. On the 14th March it was suggested to Sir Milne Cheetham that, in view of the disappearance of Turkish rule in South-West Arabia, the general policy of His Majesty's Government towards the imam and the Idrisi should be reconsidered, and the system of subsidising small sheikhs should be discontinued.
- 44168/19. On the 21st March Sir M. Cheetham reported that he had received a letter from the imam deprecating the summary dismissal of his envoys, expressing a wish to maintain his old-standing friendship with us, and asking for a recognition of his territorial and financial claims against the Turks.
- On the 26th March Sir M. Cheetham was instructed to authorise the Resident at Aden to inform the imam that the question of his representation at the Peace Conference had been finally disposed of and that territorial questions were under consideration.

Figure 1.5.7.2 On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob's mission to the Imam



On the 27th March the Foreign Office pointed out to Sir M. Cheetham that the suggestions put forward in his telegram of the 11th March amounted practically to a proposal to bring pressure to bear on the imam by blockade measures. The imam might object to the Idrisi occupying Loheiyā, and it was thought unwise to take any step which appeared to prejudge the issue between the imam and the Idrisi. The suggestion was made that Colonel Jacob should be sent to ascertain the imam's views as a preliminary measure. 40937/19.

On the 10th April General Allenby telegraphed that he was in entire agreement with the general policy proposed in regard to the imam and Idrisi. He suggested that a treaty should be formulated with the imam especially excluding boundary questions. A treaty was being drafted and would be telegraphed shortly for approval. General Allenby's reply was based on the assumption that Great Britain was to be given a mandate for Arabia. This point was referred to Paris. 55445/19.

On the 14th April General Allenby reported that in his opinion His Majesty's Government should endeavour to avoid permanent occupation of any points outside the present Aden protectorate, with the possible exception of Salif. 58231/19.

He also gave his views as to the boundaries between the imam and the Idrisi. On the 16th April General Allenby telegraphed the outline of a draft treaty, by which His Majesty's Government were— 69317/19.

1. To reaffirm willingness to ensure imam's independence throughout Yemen without prejudice to present British protégés;
2. To deal with him alone within the Yemen, provided his rule is just and palatable to his subjects;
3. To prevent import of liquor and harmful drugs;
4. To allow the Yemen free trade by sea as soon as military exigencies permit;
5. To have all harbour and railway concessions;
6. Not to be liable for continuance of old Turkish stipends nor for settlement of Turkish debts;

while the imam was—

1. To guarantee religious freedom of all his subjects;
2. To correspond with the British Government alone;
3. Not to cede, sell, or mortgage any part of the Yemen to other Powers or people;
4. To forbid all import of arms, applying in case of need to His Majesty's Government;
5. To have no foreigners in his service without the consent of His Majesty's Government;
6. To put the question of frontiers in the hands of a Commission, at which all concerned would be represented;
7. Both the imam and His Majesty's Government to have official agents—the imam at Aden, His Majesty's Government both at the imam's Court and at such of his ports as they deemed necessary;
8. To arrange, where circumstances permitted, that goods for the imam's personal use and for British Government official needs be allowed to pass customs free of duty.

Finally, His Majesty's Government were to pay the imam a subsidy to enable him to carry out his obligations. 63966/19.

On the 25th April General Allenby proposed that Colonel Jacob should be sent immediately to negotiate with the imam, and on the 28th April he requested that a reply might be expedited, as it was essential that matters should be carried through before the 1st June. He was informed on the 1st May that definite instructions could not be given until a reply was received from Paris. 65026/19.

On the 6th May General Allenby proposed that negotiations should be postponed until the position of His Majesty's Government as regards Arabia was clearly defined, and on the 7th May a reply was received from Mr. Balfour from which it was clear that His Majesty's Government were not to demand a mandate for Arabia, but that efforts were to be made with a view to their special position in the peninsula being recognised by the High Contracting Parties. 69343/19. 69782/19.

The Foreign Office accordingly referred General Allenby's proposal for the postponement of negotiations to Mr. Balfour on the 13th May and proposed to concur. 69782/19.

On the 17th May Mr. Balfour replied that there appeared to be some advantage to be gained by expediting the conclusion of a treaty with the imam, as, if and when 75632, 19.

Figure 1.5.7.3 On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob's mission to the Imam

the question of Arabia came to be discussed by the Peace Conference, His Majesty's Government might be in a stronger position if they had by that time concluded a treaty with that ruler. He was content, however, to leave the date of Colonel Jacob's mission to Lord Curzon's and General Allenby's discretion.

75632/19. The Foreign Office informed General Allenby of this decision on the 24th May, and expressed the opinion that it would be well to defer the final conclusion of the proposed treaty until after the peace settlement. They thought, however, that it would be well to open negotiations forthwith, both to strengthen the British case at the Peace Conference and to reassure the imam. They decided that Colonel Jacob should be despatched forthwith to open preliminary discussions.

79665/19. On the 26th May Lord Allenby replied that Colonel Jacob was in any case unlikely to accomplish anything during the month of Ramazan (June), and that Colonel Jacob himself was convinced that it would not be possible to come to any understanding with the imam until the position of His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* Arabian rulers was clearly defined. He made alternative proposals that a committee of delegates from Arab rulers should be formed in Cairo, and that Colonel Jacob should first visit London and Paris. The Foreign Office pointed out in reply that there was no prospect of obtaining an early settlement of the Arabian question in Paris. The object of Colonel Jacob's mission was not that he should arrive at a definite understanding with the imam, but only that he should reassure him as to the policy of His Majesty's Government, and inform him that they felt bound to recognise the Idrisi. Inaction might result in a conflict between the imam and the Idrisi, which, taken in conjunction with the recent outbreak of hostilities between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, might have serious results.

The formation of the proposed committee was for the time rendered impracticable in view of the strained relations between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, and the despatch of experienced political officers to the imam and the Idrisi was considered the best policy, provided that it could be safely and expeditiously carried out. Colonel Jacob should accordingly be despatched to the imam if the latter expressed his readiness to receive him, and Captain Clayton should at the same time be sent to the Idrisi.

92266/19. On the 13th June General Allenby reported that the two officers were ready to proceed. He pointed out that by their treaty of 1915 with the Idrisi His Majesty's Government were bound to use every diplomatic means in their power to adjudicate between the imam and the Idrisi at the conclusion of the war.

92367/19. On the 22nd June General Allenby suggested that in order to ensure a good reception for Colonel Jacob His Majesty the King should write a letter to the imam, and that the latter should be informed that this was being done.

98000/19. On the 7th July the Foreign Office concurred in a proposal made in a despatch of the 19th June from General Allenby that Colonel Jacob should proceed to England and report on the conclusion of his negotiations. They presumed that he clearly understood that no actual treaty was to be signed, and added that he should be particularly careful to make no promise that a subsidy would be paid to the imam.

99705/19. On the 17th July a letter was despatched to the imam by His Majesty the King in which the object of Colonel Jacob's mission was explained.

111636/19. On the 3rd August General Allenby reported that a letter had been received from the imam in which he stated that he would receive Colonel Jacob with special distinction. He would despatch officials and cavalry to Hodeidah as escort if he were given early notice of Colonel Jacob's arrival.

1171 2/19. The mission left Aden for Hodeidah on the 14th August, and proceeded on the 25th August to Bajil, where the imam's escort was to meet them. They were escorted from Hodeidah to Bajil by two sheikhs of the Quhra tribe.

125585/19. On the 31st August Colonel Jacob reported that he and his mission were practically prisoners at Bajil, having been detained by the Quhra sheikhs. The imam's agent and escort were said to be similarly detained.

After protracted negotiations, the mission were finally released on the 13th December and returned to Aden.

H. W. Y.

Figure 1.5.7.4 On Lieutenant Colonel Jacob's mission to the Imam

### 1.5.8. Negotiations with the Imam

Despatch from the Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 April 1922 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 469-471). Al-Idrisi's role as proxy was needed. Britain was also aware of Al-Idrisi-Saudi contacts and possibly their agreement of 1920.

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PARAPHRASE TELEGRAM from the Resident at Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

(Received Colonial Office 11.50.a.m. 15th April, 1922.)

133.  
(p. 9)

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Negotiations on basis of appendix C of my despatch of 15th July 1921 have been carried on with greatest patience between envoy Imam and First Assistant Resident and it will now be possible for them to submit draft treaty which deals with all points in Appendix C except amount of Imam subsidy, Idrisi position, and the protectorate boundary. Their discussions with view to ascertain how far agreement seems possible so far have been quite informal ?views of myself and Imam are still reserved but First Assistant has kept closely in touch with me and I have little doubt that envoy has done the same with Imam.

2. Position is as follows The envoy maintains Imam claims to Idrisi territory? as far northern as Geizan - an to whole of Yemen including Aden protectorate on historical grounds. Consideration of two separate questions is involve by these claims one regarding remainder of Yemen which includes all territory of Idrisi, other regarding British protectorate. These questions are separate and not analo but Envoy endeavours to have them treated as inter-dependent Envoy has stated verbally that if Idrisi territories were settled to his satisfaction Imam would not press other claim which means Idrisi to relinquish to ?Imam all post armisti acquisitions (one corrupt group) ?Hodeidah. Imam's strong desire to possess Hodeidah is economic as it is his natural outlet to sea. He also mentioned recognition by Idrisi of Imam's religious leadership but knows this would never be accepted.

Figure 1.5.8.1 Negotiations with the Imam

accepted.

3. As regards protectorate and remainder of Yemen; old standing treaties with protectorate tribes are the basis of British rights and responsibilities in Aden protectorate. Before the war the protectorate was recognized internationally and Anglo-Turkish Commission in 1905 defined its boundary. Before and during the war Yemen outside protectorate was Turkish and I understand that its position remains to be defined by international agreement at final conclusion of Turkish Peace Treaty though we have dealt with Idrisi and Imam as independent rulers and technically is still unchanged. Actually Imam occupies major portion of it and remainder has been taken by Idrisi. If we break our treaties with protectorate tribes we should suffer grave loss of prestige even with Imam himself as we should be regarded as having done so under pressure from Imam. Moreover no concession to Imam in protectorate would be regarded by him as compensation for what he really wants and his rule would be most unpopular. I therefore propose to let Envoy understand clearly that original Treaties with Arab chiefs will be adhered to and that interference with Protectorate tribes will not be permitted and that protectorate boundary will be mainly as decided with Turks. It is necessary to consider relative positions of him and Imam as this declaration may stop our negotiations unless accompanied by concession regarding Idrisi. Idrisi has never wavered in loyalty and was first Arab chief to throw in his lot with us during the war, and we are bound to him by Treaty. He is a powerful potential factor on Imam flank and his position could be extended with our support in case of emergency south to include Zabid and Mocha. We now hold him back but he would readily take the field against Imam. Offensive and defensive alliance has been concluded by him with Ibn Saud.

If

Figure 1.5.8.2 Negotiations with the Imam

*State territory II: Asir, 1913-1934*

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If opposed to us position on coast makes Idrisi an easy prey to foreign intrigues.

He would bitterly resent losing Hodeidah. During negotiations there have been Zeidi intrigues against us and frontier aggressions which have not been without cognizance of Imam who is unknown to us. I have been told most privately that he approached the Americans for arms quite recently but was refused- if it became necessary to exercise it as regards obtaining of arms and frontier intrigues his isolated position leaves him to a great extent in our power.

4. I consider therefore on moral and political grounds we should do nothing for sake of attempting to win Imam, to alienate Idrisi, and regarding Hodeidah no compromise or concession should be made except in consultation and in agreement with Idrisi. At present I cannot suggest any compromise likely to be acceptable to Idrisi but if and when treaty concluded with Imam I propose offering to invite him and Imam each to send representative to Aden to endeavour to reach a modus vivendi under our auspices- they might be asked- if they fail to reach agreement- to accept the decision of an international or British commission which might be sent to Hodeidah in effect settlement respective claims of European inhabitants and of two rulers being taken into consideration.

5. Meanwhile all reference to Idrisi and Imam boundaries should I propose be omitted from draft Treaty except those between British Protectorate and the latter. I will await your approval to this and to my proposal in paragraph 3. Envoy wishes to keep Ramazan at his home and subject to Imam approval I agree. Unless you approve my stating position regarding protectorate at once on his return early in June I should like to be in position to state policy clearly. I suggest you should send for Major Barrett C/o H.S. King and Company Pall Mall and show him all papers if you require any explanations. This refers to your telegram of 14th October 1921. *Mc 5032/121*

Figure 1.5.8.3 Negotiations with the Imam

### **1.5.9. Britain recognised 23 independent states in South Yemen**

Memorandum by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, attached with a note on the 'Legal Position of Her Majesty's Government in the Aden Protectorate'. It confirms that the "Western and Eastern Aden Protectorates [were] made up of twenty-three States (eighteen in the West and five in the East), which [were] separate and independent of each other and other Powers" (14 April 1952, CAB 129/92, TNA, London).

SECRET

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(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

C.(58) 79

COPY NO. 55

14th April, 1958

CAB 129/92

CABINET

THE YEMENMemorandum by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs

On 14th March the Defence Committee (D.(58) 4th Meeting, Item 1) considered a proposal by the Chiefs of Staff that inter alia the Commander, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula should be given discretion to retaliate against guns firing against targets in the Aden Protectorate from inhabited villages on the Yemen side of the border, subject to the following limitations:-

- (i) no bombing of guns sited in inhabited villages to be carried out: precision air attacks against such guns to be limited to rockets and cannon fire;
- (ii) retaliatory action as above to be restricted to field guns and anti-aircraft guns which have opened fire; suspected gun positions not to be attacked.

2. The Defence Committee decided that before any decision was taken on this matter:-

- (a) our legal and treaty rights in the area in question should be further examined; and
- (b) a draft Parliamentary statement should be prepared on lines indicated in the discussion.

3. On 24th March the Colonial Secretary submitted to the Prime Minister a note on Her Majesty's Government's legal position in the Aden Protectorate, which had been seen by Foreign Office and Colonial Office lawyers. A copy of this note, minus its appendices, is attached as Annex 'A'. The Defence Committee considered the matter further on 11th April, and decided to refer it to the Cabinet on 14th April (D.(58) 7th Meeting, Item 2).

4. With regard to the Parliamentary statement a draft arranged Parliamentary Question and written Reply was prepared by the Colonial Office and, after it had been agreed with the Governor of Aden and the Commander, British Forces, Arabian Peninsula, was circulated to the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Air Ministry. The Ministry of Defence and the Air Ministry concurred, and a copy of

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Figure 1.5.9.1 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen



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the draft as agreed with those Departments is attached as Annex 'B'. The comments of the Foreign Office are still awaited, but I understand their views to be that if it is decided that an extension of counter-battery action against Yemeni guns should be authorised and that a public statement on the subject should be made, then this draft statement would be appropriate for the purpose.

5. I consider that extension of counter-battery action against Yemeni guns of the kind proposed should be authorised and that, if it is agreed that publicity for such a decision in the form of a Parliamentary statement is desirable, then the draft statement at Annex 'B' should be made.

6. I therefore ask the Cabinet:-

- (a) to approve the proposal set out in paragraph 1 above, and, if so,
- (b) to agree that a written Parliamentary statement should be made as soon as possible in reply to an arranged Question in the terms of Annex 'B'.

P.

Colonial Office, S.W.1.

14th April, 1958

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Figure 1.5.9.2 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen

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ANNEX 'A'LEGAL POSITION OF HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT  
IN THE ADEN PROTECTORATE

The Western and Eastern Aden Protectorates are made up of twenty-three States (eighteen in the West and five in the East), which are separate and independent of each other and other Powers. The legal and constitutional position of Her Majesty's Government in the Protectorates rests fundamentally on the Protectorate Treaties which were concluded with the ancestors of the present Rulers of each of these States in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The first of these Protectorate Treaties was concluded soon after the occupation of Aden by the British in 1839; the last was with the Audhali Sultan in 1914. Under these Treaties Her Majesty's Government undertakes to give protection to the States and the States undertake not to enter into relations with foreign powers without the knowledge and sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

2. Her Majesty's Government also exercises jurisdiction in the Aden Protectorate by usage and sufferance, and this has been formalised from time to time by the Aden Protectorate Orders in Council, 1937 to 1956, which were made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. The main object of these Orders is to give Her Majesty's Government jurisdiction over non-natives in the Protectorate (e.g. dealings with Petroleum Concessions Limited, who hold an exploration permit in the Protectorate, are regulated under the Order in Council).

3. The majority of the Protectorate States also have Advisory Treaties with Her Majesty's Government, the first of which was concluded with the Quaiti Sultan of Qisha and Socotra in 1954. Under these Advisory Treaties the States undertake to accept the advice of the Governor of Aden on matters connected with their own internal welfare. The authority of Her Majesty's Government over the internal affairs of the States is limited, and the right to advise Rulers is very sparingly used in practice.

Aden/Yemeni Boundary

4. Before the First World War the Yemen was part of the Turkish Empire. In the years 1905 to 1906, an Anglo/Turkish Boundary Commission demarcated the boundary as far as the Wadi Bana. This agreement was ratified by the Anglo/Turkish Convention in 1914, and at the same time the undemarcated boundary beyond the Wadi Bana was defined by a "true north-east line" known as the Violet Line. Under the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 the Turks surrendered all their Arab territory; and the Imam of the Yemen refused to recognise the validity of the Anglo/Turkish Convention although the independent Yemen, as a successor State to the Turkish Empire, should have been bound by it.

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Figure 1.5.9.3 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen

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5. In 1934 an Anglo/Yemeni Treaty was concluded by which the existing de facto boundary between the Aden Protectorate and the Yemen was to be recognised by both parties until such time as a definitive boundary settlement was made. As compared with the Anglo/Turkish boundary, there is in this 1934 boundary a considerable salient across the Violet Line in favour of the Yemen. This salient consists of what is now the Yemeni Province of Beidha, and was ceded to the Yemen at the time of the Treaty because the Emir of Beidha was not in a treaty relation with Her Majesty's Government.

6. Article 3 of the 1934 Treaty states that "the settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen is deferred pending the conclusion . . . . . of the negotiations which shall take place between them (the parties) before the expiry of the period of the present Treaty [i. e. before 1974]."

"Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of the Treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that they will prevent, by all means at their disposal, any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects, or from their side of that frontier, with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier."

7. Despite the acceptance of the de facto boundary in the 1934 Treaty, quarrels with the Yemen over the boundary persisted. Under the Anglo/Yemeni Agreement of 1951 the Yemen undertook to set up with Her Majesty's Government a joint Boundary Commission to demarcate in certain disputed areas the position of each party as it had existed in 1934 in the limitrophe areas. The Yemenis have not fulfilled this undertaking. The 1951 Agreement, despite the vagueness of the wording, may be regarded as recognition that a de facto boundary existed.

8. All the Treaties and Agreements referred to in the preceding seven paragraphs were freely negotiated and are considered valid under international law.

-4-

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Figure 1.5.9.4 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen




Figure 1.5.9.5 Britain recognises 23 independent states in South Yemen

## 1.6. Subsidies to Arab Rulers

Ibn Saud and Al-Idrisi were among the Arab leaders who received considerable political, financial and military support from Britain, because of their alliance with London against Turkey during the Great War. Imam Yahya, however, rejected any subsidies. The issue of Subsidies would become a pressing question in London in the 1920s, but the selection of reports and memorandums presented here represents examples of British commitments to Arab rulers. The aim of presenting this selection is to provide an indication of British colonial policy and the situation prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula during the post-Great War. This policy was considered by this thesis to be a factor that affected Imam Yahya's position substantially, especially when compared to the benefits secured by his enemies. This context will be illustrated further, using relevant evidence, in Chapter 2.

### 1.6.1. Arabia: Subsidies to the Rulers

Subsidies to the rulers, 1915 (L/P&S, 18/B 376, IOR, London).

Column 423

B.376

Arabia.

Subsidies to Rulers.  
(excluding loans made at various dates the repayment of some of which has been remitted).

\*\*\*\*\*

<u>Country</u>	<u>Pre-war.</u>	<u>Present day</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
<u>Kuwait</u>	nil*	nil <sup>†</sup>	<p>*A foreshore site was leased by H.M.G. before the war for Rs.60,000 per annum. This lease was terminated in 1922.</p> <p>†The Sheikh has enjoyed since 1915 immunity from taxation on his date gardens in Iraq. This is worth about Rs.60,000 per annum. This immunity still continues but it is uncertain whether the Iraq Government will continue it after the signature of the Treaty. Matter under consideration.</p>
<u>Bahrain</u>	nil	nil	
<u>Trucial Coast.</u>	nil	nil	
<u>Muscat</u>	Rs.1,86,400 per annum, consisting of Rs.86,400 paid since 1861 as settlement of the Sultan's claims in Zanzibar; and Rs.1 lakh in connection with the suppression of the arms traffic, 1912.	no increase	
<u>Shahr &amp; Mukalla</u>	360 dollars per annum since 1862	no increase	
<u>Sokatra</u>	360 dollars per annum since about 1870	do.	
<u>Aden Protectorate Malak</u>	Various sums ranging from 30 dollars per month to about 2000 a year, paid from 1850 & 1870.	as pre-war	

(1)

1/RS/8/B 376

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Figure 1.6.1.1 Arabia: Subsidies to the Rulers

2.

	<u>Pre-war.</u>	<u>Present day.</u>	<u>Remarks.</u>
<u>Usman Yalwa</u> (Usman Yalwa)	nil (Turkish subject)	nil. No proposals for payment.	
<u>Asir.</u> (Idrisi Saliyd)	nil (Turkish subject)	nil If a treaty which is at present under consideration is concluded with him he will get one single lump sum of £20,000 as compensation for certain unfavourable territorial adjustments and in consideration of the services he has rendered and we hope will render to H.M.G.	
<u>Medjaz</u> (King Hussein)	nil (Turkish subject)	If he signs a treaty satisfactory to H.M.G. within the current year he will be given a single final payment of £50,000. It is not proposed to re-vote this sum if it is not paid this year. The King is unlikely to sign the Treaty at all.	
<u>Maid</u> (Ibn Saud)	nil	Various subsidies have been paid during and since the War. In the present year a sum of £50,000 is provided as a final payment in consideration of past services and on the understanding that he makes satisfactory arrangements with his neighbours. £25,000 has actually been paid over.	
<u>Anazah and other Beduin bandying on Trans-Jordania and Iraq.</u>	nil.	nil.	Occasional doucours to various sheikhs are made from time to time from Iraq & Trans-Jordan funds. They are small in amount and are for services rendered; they are of course nothing to do with Imperial funds which are not affected.

FOR L/R/S/R/B 376

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Figure 1.6.1.1.6.2 Arabia: Subsidies to the Rulers

### **1.6.2. FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud**

FO Memorandum on British Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud; presented to the British Government on 13 July 1920 (CAB 24/109. TNA, London).



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Printed for the Cabinet. July 1920.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

C.P.-1653.

[E 8300/9/44]

THESE papers relate to a matter in dispute between the Foreign Office and the Treasury, viz., the temporary continuance of the monthly subsidy at present being paid to the King of the Hejaz. The case of this and other similar subsidies to Arab Chiefs is raised in its larger as well as in its narrower aspect in the accompanying Despatch from Lord Allenby, and is explained in the Foreign Office Note.

C. of K.

Foreign Office,  
July 13, 1920.

*Memorandum on the Subsidies to King Hussein and Ibn Saud.*

On the 5th May last Lord Allenby was consulted by the Secretary of State as to the desirability of continuing the payment of a subsidy to the King of the Hejaz. Lord Allenby gave it as his opinion that continuance was most important, and recommended that the amount should be 250,000 rupees per mensem. The Secretary of State concurred in this recommendation and approached the Treasury on the 15th May for sanction for payment at this rate to be continued until the independence of the Hejaz had been finally ratified by the Peace Treaty, or until some alternative scheme had been elaborated with the other Powers interested—which ever might be the earlier. The Treasury in their reply of the 18th June intimated that they were unable to sanction these payments until some general policy with regard to subsidies to Arab rulers could be laid down. On the 30th June the Foreign Office replied that, while fully appreciating the desire of the Treasury for a formulation of policy, it would be premature to attempt this at the present juncture. Sanction for this subsidy was again requested and it was intimated that, in the event of the Treasury being unable to concur, the question would be laid before the Cabinet. On the 7th July, the Treasury concurred in the latter course.

The attached despatch from Lord Allenby deals with the whole question of our future Arabian policy, and draws attention to the indirect responsibilities which His Majesty's Government might be deemed to have incurred in that region. The consideration of the general questions of policy raised by Lord Allenby must await the result of the negotiations now being conducted in Paris on our "special position" in Arabia, as well as a decision on the question of the machinery to be set up in London to give effect to His Majesty's Government's policy in the Middle East. But in the meanwhile, the continuance of the Hejaz subsidy is a matter of urgency and the following statement of the facts is submitted to show how considerable are the Imperial interests involved.

The Hejaz is an original member of the League of Nations and thus will be entirely independent under the Turkish Treaty. Its importance is due to the fact that the Moslem Holy Places—Mecca and Medina—lie within it. Each year these towns form the object of a pilgrimage from our Moslem dependencies, and from other Mahomedan countries outside the British Empire. Last year the number of pilgrims from within the Empire was approximately 100,000, the majority coming from India. The interruption of the pilgrimage would cause the most unfavourable reaction there, and in our other Moslem Dependencies, and incidentally a probable access of pro-Turkish and Pan-Islamic sentiment.

Nejd lies to the East of, and marches with, the Hejaz. Ibn Saud, its ruler, is the most powerful chief of Arabia from the military point of view, and would probably not have great difficulty in over-running the Hejaz, if hostilities between the two countries were to break out. His followers are coming increasingly under the influence of the Wahabi movement, which may be described as a form of extreme Moslem Puritanism. The tenets of Wahabism induce amongst its adherents a strong

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Figure 1.6.2.1 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud

tendency towards fanaticism and intolerance, the latter not only directed against everything Christian and European, but also against the followers of other Moslem sects. A Wahabi occupation of the Holy Places would probably close them effectively to the Pilgrimage from India, Egypt, and the Straits Settlements.

A strong rivalry exists between King Hussein and Ibn Saud. Among other points of difference, there remain certain frontier disputes of long standing. No actual hostilities of any importance, however, have taken place since early in 1919. An identical communication was recently sent to the two chiefs, by the Foreign Office and India Office respectively, pressing them to agree to a personal meeting, in the hope that their differences could be thus adjusted. The identical communication pointed out that, in the event of either ruler refusing the invitation to meet his rival, he could not expect a continuance of financial assistance from His Majesty's Government.

Both Hussein and Ibn Saud agreed to such a meeting, and it is hoped that they will come together at Mecca, during the present pilgrimage season, and that some *modus vivendi* will then be arrived at on the frontier and other questions at issue, and that the danger of a Wahabi occupation of the Holy Places will thus be averted.

The subsidies to King Hussein and Ibn Saud were originally purely military measures adopted during the war. The payments to the former were made in connection with his successful revolt against the Turks, during which his troops fought with us in Palestine and Syria, and to the latter to assist him in military operations on our behalf during the Mesopotamian campaign.

The subsidy to King Hussein has been continued since the Armistice on a reduced scale, in the interests of the pilgrimage. The Hejaz is an unfertile and rocky strip of land whose intrinsic trade and resources are negligible. Its inhabitants outside the towns consist mainly of desert tribes of Bedouin, who are largely beyond the control of the Hejaz Government. The various routes to the Holy Places, including the Hejaz railway itself, lie open to the attacks of these tribes, who, unless overawed or subsidised, are always ready to attack and plunder the caravans of the pilgrims and to cut the railway for the same purpose, and thus render the pilgrimage difficult or impossible. The policy of the Turks during their domination of the Hejaz, was a combination of armed force and subsidies. They maintained a considerable garrison in the Hejaz to overawe the tribes, and supplemented this by the grant of various subsidies to them. In view of the impossibility of maintaining a garrison there, His Majesty's Government has hitherto paid a monthly grant to the Government of the Hejaz to enable King Hussein to exert some restraint over the Bedouin and keep the pilgrim routes clear. It is believed that the funds received from His Majesty's Government are largely spent in direct subsidies to the tribal sheikhs.

In view of the Hejaz's membership in the League of Nations, there are obvious objections to the indefinite continuance of this subsidy. It may eventually be desirable to arrange some form of international loan, to which the various Powers interested in the pilgrimage might subscribe, or to resort to some similar measure. But any action in this sense would be premature, before the peace settlement is effected, and before the question of our special position in Arabia (excluding the Hejaz), which is now being negotiated in Paris, is disposed of.

Apart from this aspect of the subsidy question, however, King Hussein has only with great reluctance agreed to meet Ibn Saud. His assent to the meeting is believed to be to some extent due to his apprehension that the subsidy would forthwith cease in the event of a refusal on his part. If His Majesty's Government were now abruptly to withdraw their financial support there would be considerable risk of the proposed meeting not taking place, and the chance being lost of a satisfactory settlement of the Hejaz-Nejd question.

The continuance of this subsidy till the peace settlement is effected, at 250,000 rupees per mensem (the amount recommended by Lord Allenby) is thus clearly necessary if we are to prevent the outbreak of serious trouble in Arabia, which would react on Islam in general.

The payment of a subsidy to the Emir at Nejd has also been continued since the Armistice largely in the interests of the pilgrimage. The Emir is described as being in a permanent state of financial difficulty. His military strength, however, is believed to be adequate to enable him to undertake a successful invasion of the Hejaz to the west or a raid on the south-west portion of Mesopotamia on the east. The opportunities for plunder offered by such expeditions would provide him with an easy and tempting means of replenishing his Treasury. An invasion of the Hejaz by the Wahabis in the early part of the last century resulted in a general massacre of the inhabitants, and such an invasion to-day would in all probability at

Figure 1.6.2.2 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud

least result in the closing of the pilgrimage. The dangers of a raid into Mesopotamia are obvious. In the event of a preliminary success, Ibn Saud would probably be joined by the local tribes, who would be ready to seize such a favourable opportunity for plunder, and he might also meet with some support from the Extremist Party in Bagdad and elsewhere. At present, however, Ibn Saud's attitude to His Majesty's Government is perfectly friendly, and there is no reason to suppose that he now contemplates any aggression against Mesopotamia.

It is hoped to avert the danger of an attack on the Hejaz by the proposed personal meeting between the two rulers. In the meanwhile Ibn Saud is receiving a subsidy of 75,000 rupees per month from Mesopotamian funds. In the event of a satisfactory agreement being reached at his meeting with King Hussein, the question of the reduction of this amount will be open to reconsideration, but till the meeting has taken place any reduction would seem inadvisable.

*Foreign Office, July 7, 1920.*

[E 6180/2854/44]

*Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 10.)*

(No. 559.)

My Lord,

*Cairo, May 28, 1920.*

I HAVE the honour to submit the following remarks on the question of the grant of subsidies to Arab rulers, with reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 532 of the 4th May, transmitting the minutes of a meeting held at the Foreign Office on the 17th April, in which I observe that the Treasury are not yet convinced of the necessity for the continuance of the subsidies.

It appears to me that to arrive at a just decision on this subject it is necessary in the first place to compare the position of the different rulers now and before the war, to weigh the services of each during that period, to examine whether any responsibility rests on His Majesty's Government for the changes which have occurred, and, finally, to consider whether, on grounds of morality or expediency, it is justifiable to impose on the British taxpayer the burden of providing some or all of them with monetary assistance in the future.

The beginning of the war saw an effective, if not entirely efficient, Ottoman administration in the Hejaz and Yemen; Ibn Rashid a mediatised Turkish vassal; the Idrisi in revolt against the ruling power, but already discussing terms of peace; and Ibn Saud, who had not long before ejected the Turks from Hasa and Qatif, showing a disposition to resume his allegiance, provided that he was allowed a free hand as Vali of Nejd, and given an adequate stipend. It will be seen that the feeling of racial consciousness, which is now so marked, was already showing itself even in the more remote parts of the Peninsula, but a study of the records of the time will also show that the Ottoman Government, however unwillingly, was beginning to realise its incapacity to retain by force the Arab countries, and was preparing to grant a measure of self-government which might satisfy the aspirations of its inhabitants.

The consideration of the subject was, however, abruptly broken off by the commencement of the war, and after the Ottoman Government had declared against the Allied Powers, Great Britain, taking advantage of the discontent which already existed, made promise to the Shereef of Mecca, Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, which induced them definitely to cast off their allegiance and throw in their lot with the Allies. I do not propose to examine and compare in detail the services performed by these three rulers, but I think it may fairly be said that each, according to his capacity, rendered real and effective assistance at a time when the result of the war still hung in the balance and, by so doing, brought to nought the plans for a Jihad, diverted or rendered innocuous large Turkish forces, and greatly facilitated our task in keeping open to traffic the Red Sea.

It may be said with some show of justice that they have had their reward in gaining their independence and freeing themselves from the Turkish yoke, but the fact must not be lost sight of that, with the removal of the dominant influence, the Arabian Peninsula was left without administrative and financial means or experience for the preservation of order and for the substitution of effective local government in place of what had existed previously.

This applies in particular to the Hejaz, and I cannot refrain from thinking that the promises made by His Majesty's Government impose a certain moral obligation to ensure that the future of these countries is at least as prosperous as their past.

[3896]

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Figure 1.6.2.3 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud

I do not, however, wish to press unduly this point, since sentimental considerations must give way to those of economy at the present time, and I will pass on to the more practical aspects of the case.

As your Lordship is aware, the Arab revolt was not regarded with sympathy either in India or in our other Mahommedan countries. This feeling still exists to-day. The revolt can only be justified by its success, and we shall undoubtedly lay ourselves open to severe criticism if the Peninsula passes into a state of anarchy.

Further than this, the Allied policy with regard to Syria and Palestine is not in accord with the wishes of the local populations, and has already exposed His Majesty's Government to a charge of breach of promise and opened the field to Turkish and Bolshevik propaganda from the north.

The situation in the Middle East to-day gives rise to grave misgivings, and seems unlikely to improve in the near future. On this account I consider it is of great importance that, if we gain a special position in the Arabian Peninsula, His Majesty's Government should so employ it as to earn the gratitude of the people and silence the criticism of those detractors, who accuse us of cynicism and self-interest in our treatment of the Arabs.

At the present moment we are in a favourable position to achieve this, since the factors which have rendered so restless the Arabs in Syria and Mesopotamia have not operated with any great force in the Peninsula itself, and its rulers, with the exception of the Imam Yahyn and the new Emir of Hail, who has in point of fact come under the influence of Ibn Saud, have given satisfactory proofs that they are prepared to look to us for help and guidance and protection.

The questions then arise whether we can gain our object without payment, and, if not, whether the results achieved will justify the expenditure.

As regards the former point I consider that the experience of the last four years shows the answer to be emphatically in the negative. I do not advocate any undue interference in the internal and local affairs of the Peninsula, but I presume that we shall attempt to adjust the relations between the different rulers and claim to influence all foreign relations, and it is only reasonable to suppose that the rulers will require some *quid pro quo*. Furthermore, moral influence has its effect in the East, but it will not always prove such a strong deterrent as the threat to cut off supplies, more especially in countries which are far removed from civilisation and where it is impossible to achieve a purpose by armed force.

I do not think it is too much to say that if we attempt to gain a predominant influence in Arabia without being prepared to pay for it our efforts will result in failure.

As regards the advantages to be gained, I place, first and foremost, the chance of recovering and maintaining our prestige in the Middle East.

We have destroyed the Power which, however badly, ruled Arabia. We must put something in its place, and, in so doing, endeavour to re-establish our good name for disinterestedness and sympathy with Moslem races. We are, and shall continue to be, hampered in Syria and Palestine. It is, therefore, the more necessary to seize our opportunity in the Peninsula where the conditions are favourable and where we shall not be exposed to foreign rivalry once our special position is recognised.

Secondly, there is considerable evidence to show that a determined effort is being made to unite Islam against all European Powers. A friendly Arabia will be an important check to this.

Thirdly, it is necessary to have a friendly population in the countries bordering our vital sea routes.

Equal to these in importance is the necessity of keeping open the pilgrimage routes to the Holy Places and of ensuring that the pilgrimage itself is undertaken.

We are under judgment of the Moslems in all parts of the world in this matter, and failure will do us incalculable harm.

Fifthly, I would place the advantages to British trade which the opening up of the interior of the Peninsula will afford, and sixthly, the desirability of preventing other Powers from gaining a predominant position, more especially in South-west Arabia.

I trust that the above considerations will be sufficient to show that the advantages to be won are not small, and that, in the event of His Majesty's Government being granted a special position there, the necessity of affording monetary assistance, until such time as the different countries can make their own way, will be recognised.

I understand that it may be difficult for His Majesty's Government to provide all the money, and that joint subsidies or loans may be necessary. This would be unfortunate from a British point of view, but it would not alter the principle which

Figure 1.6.2.4 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud

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I am endeavouring to lay down. It would merely mean that the responsibility, and therefore the credit, to be gained would be collective. I am unaware of the reasons which call for a joint loan, and should have thought that the subsidies granted to the rulers of Bahrein, Muscat, and Koweit by the Government of India before the war would have furnished a useful precedent in claiming the sole right to give monetary assistance now.

I do not advocate the permanent continuance of subsidies on the present scale, and I would gradually replace them with stipends and loans.

All the rulers, with perhaps the exception of Ibn Rashid, possess sea ports or tracts of land or other resources which are capable of development, and I consider that loans should be granted where there seems a good prospect of a productive return and where security can be offered.

Stipends should, I think, be granted to King Husein, Ibn Saud and the Idrisi. The case of Ibn Rashid is of relative unimportance, while that of the Imam Fuhyia is still so obscure that it is idle to consider it now. Eventually we shall probably find it cheaper to pay than to fight.

I also consider that certain conditions should be attached, such as the maintenance of internal peace, acceptance of our control of foreign relations, and the keeping open of the trade and pilgrimage routes. These would doubtless be embodied in the form of a treaty with each ruler.

With regard to Mr. Phillip's suggestion that it might be more satisfactory to "back one ruler only," I would observe that it has already become evident that the ideal of subsidising the various chiefs through one overlord is an impossible one. There is no ruler who would be accepted by the remainder as paramount, and there is none who could be trusted to make the right distribution of the funds. King Husein, whom, no doubt, Mr. Phillips had in mind, has indeed proved the least likely to be accepted as suzerain and to endeavour to bolster him up as Grand King of Arabia, by paying other subsidies through him, would be a politically unsound, if not an actually dangerous, policy to adopt.

The question as to the amounts of the stipends and loans is one which requires further consideration, and in this despatch I have not attempted to do more than lay before your Lordship the broad considerations which, in my opinion, justify the adoption of the principle that their payment in the future is an investment which is necessary, and which will bring in its due return.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Resident, Aden, the Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, and to the Foreign Department, Delhi.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.

Figure 1.6.2.5 FO Memorandum on the Subsidies to Kings Hussein and Ibn Saud

### 1.6.3. Arabia: Questions of Future Policy

Arabia, Questions of Future Policy, Subsidies to the Chiefs: 'Notes by Political Department, India Office, 29 October 1920 (L/P&S, 18/ B 353, IOR, London).










Figure 1.6.3.3 Arabia: Questions of Future Policy

#### 1.6.4. Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy

‘Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on the Future Policy of His Majesty’s with Regards to Subsidies to Chiefs of the Arabian Peninsula’, 16 December 1920, FO 371/6238, TNA, London.




Figure 1.6.4.1 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy




Figure 1.6.4.2 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy




Figure 1.6.4.3 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy




Figure 1.6.4.4 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy

that the latter are determined to maintain their independence, and that there is still a possibility of their regaining the dominant position which they held during last century. However this may be, it can be said that at present Ibn Rashid is of importance to His Majesty's Government as the ruler of a country through which many thousands pass annually on their way to and from the pilgrimage, as a check on the spread of the Ikhwan to the north, and as a possible raider against Mesopotamia. His friendship is, therefore, a matter of some importance. He has made several tentative advances to Sir Percy Cox, who suggested that a meeting should take place at Nasiriyah this winter, but his attitude since that proposal was made has not been so satisfactory, and Sir Percy Cox has decided to take no further action at present.

The Imam Yahya has proved more hostile than Ibn Rashid since the armistice. He has laid claim to the whole of the Aden Protectorate, and has maintained his officials at Dhala and other places in the north since the spring of this year. Negotiations have proved of no avail, chiefly owing to the fact that he refuses to recognise His Majesty's Government as having any right to discuss the affairs of the Yemen. It is known that he has approached other foreign Governments, and until the special position of His Majesty's Government has been recognised by the Principal Allied Powers it will probably be found impossible to come to terms with him. The military strength which he could bring to bear at any time against the Aden Protectorate is apt to be exaggerated. It is true that Ahmed Feizi Pasha required 50,000 men in 1904 to reconquer Sanaa, but he had to contend with a unitedly hostile people. Since then large tribes, such as the Hashid and Bekil, have proved disloyal, and an invasion of the protectorate on a large scale is unlikely so long as the Idrisi remains hostile to him. The Imam can, however, collect sufficient forces to cause His Majesty's Government considerable embarrassment and to overcome the local tribes, and it will probably be found cheaper in the end to pay him a subsidy than to eject him by force.

Neither in his case nor in that of Ibn Rashid is there any question of immediate payment, but since there is a possibility of some arrangement being made with both of them during the financial year 1921-22, it will be advisable to make some provision in the division of the allotted sum.

It is recommended that the unsatisfactory attitude of these chiefs should be taken into account, and that their shares should each be represented by the symbol 1.

14. The proportions according to which (after the subsidies to Muscat, Shahr and Mokalla, the Aden chiefs and, if approved, Koweit, Bahrein and the crucial chiefs, have been subtracted) it is recommended that the balance of the provisional sum of 100,000*l.* should be divided between King Hussein, Ibn Saud, the Idrisi, the Imam Yahya and Ibn Rashid are, respectively, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1.

No attempt has been made to indicate the value of these shares in terms of money, since the rate at which it will be decided to calculate the rupee is unknown.

15. In view of the fact that it will be convenient in future to pay all subsidies in rupees, and of the further fact that the payment of regular and unvarying sums to the chiefs is most desirable politically, it is recommended that the provisional sum of 100,000*l.* should be converted into rupees, with due consideration of the present and possible future rates of exchange, and that the sum in rupees which is finally settled should be considered as representing the amount permanently available for subsidies. Chiefs in Arabia are not versed in the intricacies of questions of exchange, and they would undoubtedly misunderstand the reasons for a sudden reduction in their subsidies which might be necessitated by a change in the rates of exchange. The grant of fixed subsidies which will not be affected by any fluctuations in the value of the rupee is a matter which will materially influence the success of the proposed new policy.

16. The question of the subsidies to which the shares of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India should be respectively allocated is one on which it is difficult to express an opinion before receiving an indication of the views of the India Office and the Government of India. The tentative suggestion is, however, made that the Government of India should supply all the rupees required, and that their moiety should include the amounts paid to the Sultans of Muscat and Mokalla, the Aden chiefs, the Sbeikhs of Koweit and Bahrein, and the crucial chiefs, if approved, and half the amounts paid to Ibn Saud and King Hussein, on the ground that these are the chiefs with whom they are most intimately concerned.

17. The further recommendation is made that any balance of the total vote for

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Figure 1.6.4, 1.6.5 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy

subsidies, accruing at the end of each financial year, should be expended in presents to those chiefs who have done good service, it being understood that such presents should only be made by agreement between the different Departments and Governments concerned when the political situation clearly renders it necessary.

18. It has been presumed that none of the recommendations set forth above, if approved, will come into force until the beginning of the next financial year, and the question arises what action is necessary before then to give effect to the decision of the Inter-Departmental Conference, and to prepare the chiefs concerned for the coming change.

The case of Ibn Saud demands immediate decision. In the normal course of events this chief would receive 20,000*l.* during the next four months. In view, however, of the fact that, if the proposals made in this memorandum are in any way approved, his share cannot under the most favourable circumstances exceed 25,000*l.* per annum, it is suggested that he should at once be informed of the new situation on the lines already indicated, and that, as was done in the case of King Hussein last year, his subsidy should be gradually reduced during the next four months. This could be done by sending him the full amount for December, 4,500*l.* at the end of January, 3,500*l.* at the end of February, and 2,500*l.* at the end of March, making a total of 15,500*l.* for the next four months.

As regards the Idrisi, it is suggested that he should be informed without delay of the fact that His Majesty's Government have decided to grant him a small subsidy from the 1st April, 1921, and that he should be given an immediate present of 5,000*l.* in recognition of his loyalty in consulting His Majesty's Government before consenting to the recent proposals of the Ikhwan to attack the Hedjaz from Asir, and in return for the services he has rendered in drawing off Imamic troops which might have been used against the Aden Protectorate.

The present attitude of King Hussein does not merit any reward, but it is possible that a new situation may be created if the proposed negotiations with the Emir Feisal prove successful. In such a case, a monetary grant might prove of considerable value, and it is recommended that provisional approval should be given to set aside a sum of 20,000*l.* to be used if necessary.

No special action is necessary as regards the other chiefs. The Sultans of Muscat and Shehr and Mokalla and the Aden chiefs will receive their normal subsidies; the positions of Ibn Rashid and the Imam are not likely to be cleared up within the next few months, while the case of the Sheikh of Koweit, which is still under the consideration of the India Office and the Government of India, is, like those of the Sheikh of Bahrein and the trucial chiefs, of no great urgency.

#### 19. Recapitulation.

The decision of the Treasury is required on the following points:—

- (a.) The payment of subsidies in rupees on the basis of a fixed sum representing the permanent value in rupees of the provisional sum of 100,000*l.* (paragraph 15).
- (b.) The payment of unexpended balances as presents to chiefs under certain conditions (paragraph 17).
- (c.) The proposed grant to the Idrisi.
- (d.) The proposed provisional grant to King Hussein.

The decision of the Government of India is required in respect to the payment of a half share of the provisional sum of 100,000*l.* before any effect can be given to the proposed policy.

The opinion of the India Office, in consultation with the Government of India, is required on the following points:—

- (a.) The desirability of reducing the subsidy of the Sultan of Muscat (paragraph 5).
- (b.) Grant of a subsidy to the Sheikh of Koweit (paragraph 9).
- (c.) Grant of a subsidy to the Sheikh of Bahrein (paragraph 9).
- (d.) Grant of a subsidy to the trucial chiefs (paragraph 9).
- (e.) The proportions according to which King Hussein, Ibn Saud, the Idrisi, Ibn Rashid, and Imam Yahya should be subsidised (paragraphs 11-14).
- (f.) The payment of subsidies in rupees on the basis of a fixed sum representing the permanent value in rupees of the provisional sum of 100,000*l.* (paragraph 15).

Figure 1.6.4.1.6.6 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy






Figure 1.6.4.1.6.7 Memorandum by Colonel Cornwallis on Future Policy

## **2.1. Proposal for the division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen into four districts (1899)**

This is one of the early Ottoman proposals in response to difficulties arising in Yemen ‘the Yemeni Question’ (*willayahs*), 28 August 1899.

### YEMEN'DE HUZURUN TEMİNİ İÇİN ALINMASI GEREKEN ÖNLEMLER

Yemen'de emniyet ve huzurun devamı için, başında genel bir vali olmak üzere vilâyetin dört valiliğe taksim edilerek yeteri kadar mutasarrıflık, kaza ve nahiyelere bölünmesi, idaresine dürüst memurlar tayin edilmesi, ahalinin gönüllerinin hoş tutulması, efradının dörtte biri Yemen ahalisinden oluşacak bir kolordu kurulması, bir polis teşkilatı ile her vilâyet için birer jandarma taburu teşkil olunması, münasip mahallerde karakollar inşa edilmesi, polis ve komiserlerin halkı rencide etmeyecek dirayet ve maharete sahip olmasına itina gösterilmesi, şer'î mahkemelerin bir nizama bağlanması, her yerde mükemmel cami ve mektepler tesis edilmesi, zulüm ve yolsuz davranışlarda bulunduğu tespit edilen şeyhlerin buldukları bölgeden uzaklaştırılmaları

### İقتراح بتقسيم اليمن إلى أربع ولايات وتدابير أخرى لإقرار الأمن

محضر مرفوع من الصدر الاعظم وعدد من النظار المختصين بخصوص اقتراح بإتخاذ اجراءات لضمان الامن والسلام في ولاية اليمن، وذلك نظراً لاتساع اراضي ولاية اليمن وللجهود الكبيرة التي تحتاج اليها مسألة ضبط وتأمين الولاية، فيجب اتخاذ اجراءات هامة لتنفيذ ذلك ومن أهمها تقسيم اليمن الى اربع ولايات على ان يعين والي أول يشرف على الاربعة الآخرين ويكون برتبة فريق ويتم اختيار بقية الولاة من الأشخاص المشهود لهم بالاستقامة والقدره الادارية، ثم بعد ذلك يتم اشراك الاهالي في إدارة الولايات والسماح لهم بالدخول في الجيش والشرطة والبلدية، ويتم اختيار المسؤولين العثمانيين في الولايات الاربعة من المشهود لهم بالاستقامة والزاهة واصحاب الخبرة ويطبق ذلك على الموظفين في المحاكم والجيش والشرطة والبلدية، ويخضع الجميع لسلطة الوالي الاول الذي له الكلمة الاولى والاخيرة في شئون الولايات الاربعة، ويتم اصدار لائحة بمهام واختصاصات الوالي الأول من الباب العالي. ومرفق رقع من الصدر الاعظم الى السلطان بمحتوى الموضوع وإشارة من سر كاتب السلطان بصدور الإرادة السنية بالموافقة.

التاريخ : 28 أغسطس 1899م

Bâb-ı Âlî  
Daire-i Sadâret  
Âmedî-i Divan-ı Hümâyûn  
1151

Yemen Vilâyeti'nden ahîren mevki'i-i taibike konulan tedâbîr-i mûsibe netice-nümâ-yı muvaffakiyet olarak emn ü asayiş tamamen takarrür eylemiş ise de hitta-i Yemaniye'nin vûs'at ve cesâmeti cihetiyle te'min ve idâme-i asayiş ve inzibâtı için bazı tedâbîr-i esâsiye ittihâzı lâzımeden bulunduğundan bu bâbda veli-nime-i bî-minnetimiz Padişah-ı hakâyık-âgâh efendimiz hazretlerinin hâtır-ı me'âlî mezâhîri hümâyûnlarına sânih olan mütalaât-ı isabet-gâyâtı mübelliğ tezkire-i hususiye miyâne-i acizânemizde kemâli dikkat ve im'ânla mütâlâa olundu. Ahkâm-ı celîle-i emr u fermân-ı hümâyûn Yemen kıt'asının birisi birinci vali olmak ve diğerlerine nezâret etmek üzere dört vilâyete taksim ve diğer üç vilâyet idaresinin muktedir valilere ihale kılınması ve birinci vali ile diğer valilerin maiyyetlerinde birer muavîn bulundurulması ve birinci valinin ikametgâhında ferik rütbesinde bir askerî kumandanı bulunması ve gayet mükemmel olmak ve efradının bir rub'u ahali-i mahalliyeden ve üç rub'u vilâyeti saire ahalisinden mürekkeb bulunmak ve yerli ahali askerliğe alışıp ısındıkça onlardan alınan kısm-ı efrâdın nisfı derecesine iblâğ olunmak üzere ora-

Figure 2.1.1 Proposal for the division of the *Vilayet* of Yemen into four districts (1899)

## 2.2. Request to attach *qadha* Ghāmed, the *sonjok* of Asir (1889)

This was a request from the *Wali* of Yemen, sent on 3 September 1889, for *qadha* Ghāmed, the *sonjok* of Asir, to be attached to the village of Şeaia‘er (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008).

77

Buyurıdu Defteri, no: 6, s. 136.


**GAMED KAZASI MERKEZİNİN SAYĞAR KÖYÜNE TAŞINMASI**  
Asir Sancağı'na bağlı Gamed Kazası merkezinin Sayğar köyüne alınması

**نقل مركز قضاء غامد إلى قرية صيغر**

رفع من مستشار نظارة الداخلية بخصوص نقل مركز قضاء غامد التابع لسنجق عسير إلى قرية صيغر بموجب طلب والي اليمن ومحضر مجلس شوری الدولة ولتنفيذ المطلوب.

وقد صدرت الإرادة السنوية من السلطان لتنفيذ ذلك.

التاريخ: 3 سبتمبر 1889م



*Beylikçi-i Divan-ı Hümâyün Cânib-i Vâlâsı'na*

Asir Sancağı'na tabi Gamed Kazası'na sâbıkı vechile Sayfer karyesinin merkez itihâzı hususuna Yemen Vilâyeti'nden vuku bulan iş'âr ve Şürâ-yı Devletçe verilen karar üzerine tarafı sâ-mî-i Sadâret-penâhîden bi'lisfizân irâde-i seniyye-i cenâb-ı Padişahî müte'allik ve şeref-sudûr buyurularak ve keyfiyet icab edenlere bildirilmiş olmakla Beylikçi-i Divan-ı Hümâyünca da ifa-yı muktezâsı zımında işbu müzekkire i'tâ kılındı.

Fi 7 Muharrem sene [1]307 ve fi 22 Ağustos sene [1]305 / [3 Eylül 1889]

Müsteşarı Nezâret-i Dahiliye  
Rıdvan



Figure 2.2.1 Request to attach qadha Ghāmed, the sonjok of Asir (1889)

## 2.3. Kaymakam (*Qaim Maqam*) Rehmi's proposed list to effect reform

(Farah, 2002: pp. 292-293)




Figure 2.3.1 Kaymakam (Qaim Maqam) Rehmi's proposed list to effect reform




Figure 2.3.2 Kaymakam (Qaim Maqam) Rehmi's proposed list to effect reform

## **2.4. Recommendations of the commission of inquiry, 7 April 1907**

This was a commission of inquiry headed by Ferik Ferid Pāshā (7 April 1907). Its main proposal was to divide the *Vilayet* of Yemen into three new administrative districts (*willayahs*): Sana'a, Ta'izz and Asir (Farah, 2002: pp. 293-294).



II. Ferid's commission's recommendations:

- changing Ta'izz into a separate *vilayet* to divide the Zaydi from Shāfi'i regions; keep Ṣan'ā' as is;
- collections should be conducted by authority of the councils under the supervision of a police unit accompanying the *shaykh* or '*āqil* heading the team;
- changing 'Asīr's *kaza* into a separate *vilayet*, its income never exceeds five million *piastres*; it is too difficult and takes too long to reach;
- regulating and standardizing Sharī'ah laws and courts for the entire *vilayet*; the complaints submitted to courts are not uniformly acted

upon in the whole of the *vilayet*; often it is customary practices of the tribes that prevail; courts should all operate on one and the same basis, areas in which tribes are observing Jewish laws should be subject to the same regulations;

- distributing taxes fairly and evenly; this would require conducting a census and registering property; the collection of revenue should be done by *shaykhs* or '*uqqāls* heading the teams and acting under strict authority of the *meclises* (local councils) and accompanied by police units in order to keep order; and a respectable individual to accompany the on-collection missions; and
- establishing more schools to educate the inhabitants.

**Figure 2.4.1 Recommendations of the commission of inquiry, 7 April 1907**

## **2.5. Yemeni dignitaries' visit to Istanbul.**

An invitation was extended for some of the Yemeni dignitaries to visit Istanbul in 1907 so as to discuss the Yemeni Question (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008).

**İSTANBUL'A DAVET EDİLEN YEMEN İLERİ GELENLERİ**

Yemen hakkında bazı hususları görüşmek üzere davet edilen sâdât, ulema, şeyh, eşraf ve ayana kalacakları süre için ödenmesi öngörülen harcırah miktarının iki katına çıkarılması / Hizmetçi ve beraberindekilerle birlikte sayıları 109'u bulan Yemen heyetinin listesi

**دعوة عدد من سادات وعلماء ومشائخ وأعيان اليمن لزيارة مدينة****اسطنبول**

عرض من الصدر الأعظم الى السلطان بخصوص وفد علماء واعيان ومشائخ ولاية اليمن الذين سوف يصلون الى اسطنبول بموجب دعوة السلطان لمناقشة أحوال اليمن مع المسؤولين وكذلك لزيارة عاصمة الدولة اسطنبول ومقابلة السلطان كما يستأذن بزيادة مبلغ المصاريف المقررة شم إلى 1500 ليرة. ومرفق كشف بأسماء أعضاء الوفد وعددهم 48 فرداً من علماء وأعيان ومشائخ من مختلف أنحاء اليمن ويرافقهم عشرة أفراد مساعدين و 52 فرداً خدماً، والجموع 109 أفراد ويوضح الكشف الوضع الاجتماعي لكل عضو من الوفد ووظيفته وطبيعة علاقته بالدولة العثمانية.  
التاريخ : 1907/6/17 م

*Hâk-i pâyi me'âl-ihtivâ-yı hazret-i Hilâfet-penâh-ı a'zamîye cebîn-sây-ı ubûdiyet olmak üzere Yemen Vilâyeti Şahanesi'nden der-bâr-ı şevket-karara gelen sâdât ve ulemâ ve eşraf ve ayânın esâmisini mübeyyin cedveldir*

Sıra no]	Esami	Mülâhazât	[Beraberinde Gelen Yakını]	[Beraberinde Gelen Hizmetçisi]
1	San'a sâdât ve ulemasından es-Seyyid Abdullah bin Abdülkadir	Vaktiyle Zeydilere riyâset eden Seyyid Mulahtar ve Şerefüddin'in ahfâdından olup İzmir Pâye-i Mücerredî rütbesini haizdir.		Hademesi Ahmed es-Siyânî ve Ali Zemârî
2	San'a sâdât ve ulemasından es-Seyyid Muhammed bin Yahya el-Mansur	Vaktiyle Zeydilere riyâset eden Seyyid Mansur'un ahfâdındandır.		Hademesi Ahmed Hantal
3	San'a ulemasından el-Kadı Ali el-Magribî	Elyevm Kevkeban Kazası nâibi olup İzmir Pâye-i Mücerredî rütbesini haizdir. Mahdümü Muhammed Ali Efendi	Hademesi es-Seyyid Ahsen	
4	San'a sâdâtından es-Seyyid Hamud bin Galib	Ahmed Muhtar Paşa'nın tahtı kumandasında bulunan Fırka-i Islâhiye'nin Yemen'i istilası hengâmında San'a'da Zeydilere riyâset etmekte iken tav'an Devleti Aliyye'ye teslimi zimâm-ı idare eden Seyyid Galib'in mahdümüdür.		Hademesi Feth, Ahmed Gurab
5	San'a sâdât ve ulemasından es-Seyyid Muhammed Gamzan			Hademesi İhsan Âmir
6	San'a ayânından el-Kadı Ali bin Muhammed el-Cerâfî	Vilâyeti celile Arabî başkâtibi		Hademesi el-Hac Ali Uslan

Figure 2.5.1 Yemeni dignitaries' visit to Istanbul

## **2.6. The Yemeni delegation leaves Istanbul**

Confirmation of an appointment of the Yemeni delegation with the Sultan prior to its return to Yemen, 8 August 1909 (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008).

**PADIŞAH'IN YEMEN İLERİ GELENLERİNİ 1909 SENESİNDEKİ KABULÜ**  
İstanbul'da bulunan Yemenli sâdât, ulema ve meşâyih'in memleketlerine döneceklerinden  
Padişahla vedalaşmak üzere kendilerine randevu verildiği

تحديد موعد للعلماء والمشائخ والأعيان اليمنيين الموجودين في اسطنبول  
لتوديعهم من قبل السلطان

تبلغ من سر كاتب السلطان بصدور الإرادة السلطانية حول موافقة السلطان على استقبال أعيان ومشائخ اليمن الموجودين في  
اسطنبول يوم الثلاثاء الساعة السابعة بغرض التوديع بمناسبة قرب مغادرتهم دار السعادة الى بلادهم.  
التاريخ : 1909/8/8 م

Mâbeyn-i Hümâyün-ı Mülökâne  
Başkitâbeti  
Aded  
273

Bir müddetden beri Dersaâdet'de bulunan ve bu kere memleketlerine avdet edeceklerinden bahisle hâki pâ-yı şahaneye arzı vedâ' eylemek için huzurı hümâyün-ı cenâbı Hilâfet-penâhî-ye kabul buyurmalarını istid'â eylemiş olan Yemen sâdâtının önümüzdeki Salı günü saat yedide şeref-müsüle nâil olmak üzere Saray-ı Hümâyün-ı mülökâneye i'zâmları şeref-sudûr buyurulan irâ-de-i seniyye-i cenâbı hazret-i Padişahî icab-ı âlisinden olmakla ol bâbda emr u fermân hazret-i veliyyü'l-emrindir.

Ft 21 Receb sene [1]327 - Ft 26 Temmuz sene [1]325 / [8 Ağustos 1909]

Serkâtibi Hazret-i Şehriyârî  
Halid Ziya



Figure 2.6.1 The Yemeni delegation leaves Istanbul

## 2.7. Yemeni Proposals for Reform:

### 2.7.1. Imam Yahya's second proposal for reform (1907), (Farah, 2002: pp. 294-295).

- the *vali* to stay at Ṣan'ā' with some troops to keep the road to Manākhah open, since the inhabitants of Ḥaymah, Bilād al-Bustān, Qaḍā' 'Ans depend on it for their livelihood and improving their lot, and do not expect to clash with Ottoman troops;
- inhabitants of Radā' and the area around Yarīm in the Qa'ṭabah country and beyond 'are savages', so defiance can be expected from them since they are in the hands of foreigners (English); no discussion will avert this (defiance);

Figure 2.7.1.1. Imam Yahya's second proposal for reform (1907), (Farah, 2002: pp. 294-295)

- Ḥusayn, Khawlān, Niḥim, and Ḥāshid leaders whose source of livelihood is known, as are their ways and movements; if they are not tied to the imam, the government might be forced to deal with them harshly and more evil can be anticipated from them. If the imam prevents them from gaining a livelihood outside his administrative jurisdiction, rumours will increase;
- appointing a judge from Istanbul to adjudicate according to the Ḥanafite rite will not do since we are Zaydis and Shāfi'is and we rarely disagree with each other. In situations of misunderstanding, it is better to let the imam be the source of legal reference;
- defining carefully the subject and to whom it applies and by whom, which then can be applied judiciously once quickly revealed to the commoners and jurists;
- issuing an *iradé seniyé* (imperial decree) to cancel all *miri* tax exaction to give the inhabitants a chance to rebuild their homes, their farms and trading establishments and to define the amount to be paid, in instalments to the government, by the imam on behalf of the tribes;
- extend the period of the concession (*imtiyāz*) already granted to the imam so he can undertake constructions desired starting with *'ilmīyah* schools; and
- issuing a decree authorizing adjudication in the whole of Yemen administered directly by officials and specifying the responsibility of the imam according to the Sharī'ah, including punishment; whereby all would be equal and judges be of the ulema of the locality appointed according to their rite, the Shāfi'i for the Shāfi'is and Zaydi for the Zaydis.

**Figure 2.7.1.2.7.2 Imam Yahya's second proposal for reform (1907), (Farah, 2002: pp. 294-295)**

## 2.7.2. Efforts of Yemeni deputies in Istanbul according to accounts by the Ottoman press(Farah, 2002: pp. 269-270).

### Campaign for settlement in the Ottoman press

Appalled at the increased commitment of troops and scarcity of funds in what appeared to be a no-win situation, the press increased its clamouring for a peaceful solution. This was evinced in a lengthy article published in *Sadayı Millet* (Echo of the Nation) entitled ‘Yemen Ahvalı’ (Conditions in Yemen),<sup>66</sup> which stated that despite the troops making a 100 per cent effort, the insurgence could not be put down by military force. It argued for concrete reforms, as recommended in a report by Sayyid ‘Ali Maqḥafī Efendi, specifically:

- improve first and foremost the quality of the officials themselves;
- be familiar with Arabic to learn about local conditions at first hand;
- establish technical and vocational schools;
- reform and reorganize the court system;
- levy the *mīri* tax with fairness;
- entrust the collection of taxes to chiefs of tribes, not the police;
- consider the establishment of a railroad between Şan‘ā and Ḥajjah;
- establish a telegraph line between Hodeida, Ta‘izz and ‘Asīr; and
- protect and promote agriculture by abolishing internal customs dues.

The minister of the interior’s secretary promised to discuss these suggestions at the next session of the *Mebusan* (Chamber of Deputies). Süleiman Efendi (Bustāni), an Arab deputy and agriculture minister,<sup>67</sup> proposed inviting a few Yemenis to Istanbul and sending some officials to Yemen to discuss plans. During the session of the chamber Ismail Hakkı Beg said that the proposal had been taken up for discussion the year before but that, with the downfall of Sadrazam Hilmi Paşa, the

Figure 2.7.2.1. Efforts of Yemeni deputies in Istanbul according to accounts by the Ottoman press



matter had been dropped. Süleiman retorted that they decided to do something the previous year but nothing came of it and he suggested the president of the Chamber of Deputies take up the matter again with the minister of interior (Talaat), who had been stalling.

There was a heated debate in the Chamber of Deputies on 12 February 1910, with the deputy from Şan‘ā’ demanding to know why Talaat had failed to respond to the various recommendations for change in Yemen. Muḥammad Maqḥafi Efendi bluntly stated the position of his country in an animated speech, declaring:

We want to be part of the Ottoman state; if we cannot have independence, then to live as Ottoman subjects; changes are necessary; we have been neglected and abused and ignored for too long; this is why the revolt is on. Officials sent us are ignorant, negligent, abusive; they do not even mix, as in Hodeida, with local notables. They do not know Arabic, and most do not know Turkish. So Yemen becomes the place for them to get rich and forget the needs of the country. We need a commission of inquiry to investigate and recommend means for improving Yemen. We need roads, rail, better social and moral building facilities, security against marauding tribes, a police force. Soldiers and officers sent [to Yemen] do not know our traditions; those who are in authority do not know Arabic, let alone our customs. This must change.<sup>68</sup>

Under mounting pressure, Talaat acknowledged that he had received the memorial but argued that the time was not right to act on the scheme to reorganize the country’s administration, citing tribal attacks on caravans, the uprising in ‘Asīr, the threat to Hodeida by Idris, and the capture of 80 posts by insurgents. Talaat had promised that once pacification was complete, he would send a high functionary to determine the type of government suited for the country.<sup>69</sup>

**Figure 2.7.2.2. Efforts of Yemeni deputies in Istanbul according to accounts by the Ottoman press**

## **2.8. Recommendations of the Council of the State, 8 December 1908.**

The recommendations of the Council of the State were to detach the *liwā* of Asir from the administration control of Sana'a and to transform this district into a separate *Vilayet*, December 1908. The proposal was published by the *Shura-i-ummat*, 3 December 1908 (Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador at Constantinople to Sir Edward Grey the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 8 December 1908, FO 424/217, TNA, London). Schofield (1993: Vol.3. pp. 674-675). Farah (2002: pp. 261, 294)




Figure 2.8.1 Recommendations of the Council of the State, 8 December 1908




Figure 2.8.1 Recommendations of the Council of the State, 8 December 1908

III. Council of Ministers' recommendations:

- better control over the armed forces in Yemen through the appointment of competent commanders and increase of expenditures by 20,000 to 30,000 to ensure against their bilking the natives;
- more schools, ports and improvement of the Hodeida-Şan'ā' road;
- punish those who defy authority, the troops to have charge of arrests;
- better control over collections of *zakah* and *'ushr* taxes;
- more responsible officials of good character;
- provide better means of communication and transportation;
- better treatment of *sayyids* and tribal chiefs by offering them gift and hospitality;
- consult with the *vali* of Hijaz on how to make improvements; and
- invite a delegation of two to Istanbul to discuss whether Mahmud Nedim would make a better *vali* than Feyzi.

**Figure 2.8.2 Recommendations of the Council of the State, 8 December 1908**

## 2.9. Proposal of the Istanbul Chamber of Deputies, February 1909.

Proposal of the Istanbul Chamber of Deputies for the transform to a *mutasarrifiyah*, February 1909 (Farah, 2002: pp. 261, 295-296).



- appointing competent and upright officials;
  - resolving complaints re collection of revenue according to laws governing the process and preventing mishandling thereof;
  - increasing schools and Qur'ānic learning facilities and sending those willing to military and public schools and to teacher training schools in Istanbul;
  - assessing the current military force in Yemen and increasing it to the necessary level;
  - improving means of control and execution of decrees;
- 
- reviewing judicial cases in Sharī'ah courts, with the exception of those in the coastal area;
  - increasing salaries to match the increase of prices and distances;
  - dispatching a number of warships to patrol the coast and prevent smuggling;
  - detaching the *liwā'* of 'Asīr from the *vilayet* of Yemen and erecting it into a *mutaşarrıfıyah*, constructing a rail line between Hodeida and Şan'ā' to facilitate communications;
  - reviewing different plans submitted so far for such a project;
  - assigning administrative and legal matters of the Şa'dah region to the imam in order to contain the shedding of blood; and
  - limiting the term of service for military officials to three years and civil officials to two years, leaving them the choice of extension.

Figure 2.9.1 Proposal of the Istanbul Chamber of Deputies, February 1909

V. Chamber of Deputies' recommendations:

- appointing competent and upright officials;
- resolving complaints re collection of revenue according to laws governing the process and preventing mishandling thereof;
- increasing schools and Qur'ānic learning facilities and sending those willing to military and public schools and to teacher training schools in Istanbul;
- assessing the current military force in Yemen and increasing it to the necessary level;
- improving means of control and execution of decrees;

**Figure 2.9.2. Proposal of the Istanbul Chamber of Deputies, February 1909**

## 2.10. Request that *qadha* Abu Arish attached to Asir, 25 August 1910

This request from the *Vilayet* of Yemen suggests that *qadha* Abu Arish be detached from *sonjok* of Al-Hudaydah and, instead, be attached to the *sonjok* of Asir due to its close proximity to the latter, 25 August 1910 (Yemen During the Ottoman Times, 2008: p. 305).



### EBUARİŞ KAZASI'NIN ASİR'E BAĞLANMASI

Hudeyde'ye tabi Ebuariş Kazası'nın, yakınlığı sebebiyle Asir Sancağı'na bağlanmasının idarî ve siyâsî açıdan uygun olacağı.

إقتراح بضم قضاء أبو عريش إلى سنحج عسير بدلاً من تبعيته لسنحج

الحديدة

محضر من مجلس شورى الدولة بخصوص طلب ولاية اليمن بإلحاق قضاء أبو عريش بسنحج عسير لأنه الآن ملحق بسنحج الحديدة والمسافة بعيدة بين قضاء أبو عريش ومدينة الحديدة وسوف يكون هذا القرار موافقاً للمصلحة العامة إذا تمت الموافقة عليه.

التاريخ : 25 أغسطس 1910م

Şûrâ-yı Devlet  
Mülkiye Dairesi  
1199

Öteden beri Hudeyde'ye merbût ve fakat uzaklığı hasebiyle idaresi pek müşkil olan Ebuariş Kazası'nın kurb ve münasebeti bulunan Asir Sancağı'na ilhâkı idareten ve siyaseten münasib olacağına dair Yemen Vilâyeti'nden alınan telgrafnâmenin takdimini ve bazı ifadâtı mutazammın Dahiliye Nezâreti'nin Şûrâ-yı Devlet'e havale buyurulan 2 Ağustos [1]326 tarihli ve 2/1322 numaralı tezkiresi Mülkiye Dairesi'nde kırâet olundu.

Tezkire-i mezkûrede gerçi bu kabîl fekk ve tahvîli irtibât muamelâtının münferiden icra edilmeyip ileride ittihâz edilecek kararı umumîye ta'likî mukarrer ise de hıttâ-i Yemaniye'nin hususiyet ve ehemmiyet-i mevki'îye ve idaresi cihetiyle sureti istisnâiyede olarak tervîc-i iş'âr ve vilâyete muvâfıkı hâl ve maslahat bulunmuş olduğu ityân kılınmış ve sureti iş'âr şâyân-ı tervîc görülmüş olmakla ol vechile ifa-yı muktezâsının nezâreti müşârunileyhâya inbâsı tezekkür kılındı. Ol bâbda emr u fermân hazreti men lehü'l-emrindir.

Fi 20 Şaban sene [1]328 ve 12 Ağustos sene [1]326 / [25 Ağustos 1910]

(Şûrâ-yı Devlet Mülkiye Dairesi üyelerinin mühürleri)



Figure 2.10.1 Request that *qadha* Abu Arish attached to Asir, 25 August 1910

## 2.11. Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was not implemented, 1910.

The Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was a deal proposed to Al-Idrisi by Said Pāshā in 1910 and was named after the village where it was concluded. Mistakenly, Al-Shahari (1979: 40-43) and Abazāh (1975: pp. 205-214) thought that the Porte had approved the agreement. Conversely, the Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was not implemented. Here Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador at Constantinople confirmed that efforts to implement the Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir ended in failure.

(Sir Gerard Lowther, the British Ambassador, Constantinople to Sir Edward Grey the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 January 1911, Schofield, 1993: Vol.3. pp. 691-692).






Figure 2.11.1 Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir, 1910

## 2.12. Indication that Asir remained part of the *Vilayet* of Yemen

G.A. Richardson, the British Vice-Consul at Al-Hudaydah, was reporting on the situation “in this vilayet (of Yemen)” where the Porte was confronted with revolts by both the Imam “Yahya, in the mountains, and the pretender Seyyid Muhamed Elidrisee (Al-Idrisi), in the Tehama (Tihāmah)”. Obviously, the reference was to the *Vilayet* of Yemen; and indicates that the Al-Idrisi revolt was within this administrative district i.e. Asir had remained part of it (G.A. Richardson, the British Vice-Consul at Al-Hudaydah to Charles M. Marling the British Embassy Constantinople, 13 January 1911, Schofield, 1993: Vol.3.pp. 692-693).

Figure 2.12.1 Indication that Asir remained part of the *Vilayet* of Yemen

Figure 2.12.2 Indication that Asir remained part of the *Vilayet* of Yemen

### 2.13. Al-Idrisi expresses disappointment

Al-Idrisi, particularly upon realising that the Treaty of Al-Hafir with the Ottomans was not implemented, expressed deep disappointment both in the form of public declarations and in the form of correspondence - for instance, the letter he sent to the Minister of Interior (see below) or the letter he sent to Imam Yahya in March 1912. Indeed, he had complained that several attempts to reach an agreement had ended in failure.

These texts are important not merely due to the message each of them contained, but more crucially for the formulations Al-Idrisi adopted to express his aims, both in terms of the geographic context or his political goals. For instance, although Al-Idrisi was regarded as the leader of the revolt of Asir against the Turks, where his *Sayā* stronghold was located, and his influence was mainly concentrated over this town and its surrounding area, he nonetheless presented himself as having ambitions over the entire *Vilayet* of Yemen and further north into Al-Ḥijāz.

Such texts provide interesting insights into Al-Idrisi's ultimate political objectives as well as his relations with Imam Yahya. Like the other Arab leaders, Al-Idrisi presented himself as having a mission to change the situation in Yemen in general. Al-Idrisi's maintained his stance that his revolt was directed against Ottoman control of the country. He initially framed his ambitions within the problems and aspirations of the wider country, that is, the whole of Yemen. Indeed, it is evident that he was proud of being an Arab Muslim and, most importantly, of being a Yemeni. However, there were no mentions of Asir as being the aim of his revolt, neither in the letter he sent to the Minister of Interior nor in his subsequent declaration. Whenever Asir was mentioned this was in a different context, for instance when Al-Idrisi referred to a message he had received from the Ottoman commander in Asir, Husayn Effendi. Al-Idrisi's ambition to rule over Asir as an independent entity would only become clear in the 1920s.

### **2.13.1. Al-Idrisi to the Turkish Minister of Interior (27 November 1910)**

A translation of a letter Al-Idrisi sent to the Turkish Minister of Interior, 27 November 1910. In the letter, Al-Idrisi expresses his disappointment that the agreement concluded with the Porte had not been implemented (Schofield, 1993: Vol.3. pp. 690-691).




Figure 2.13.1.1 Al-Idrisi to the Turkish Minister of Interior (27 November 1910)






Figure 2.133.1.2 Al-Idrisi to the Turkish Minister of Interior (27 November 1910)

### 2.13.2. Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

This declaration was issued in the form of a letter from Al-Idrisi to an unnamed friend in Egypt. The text, however, was classified as a *Bayan* [public declaration]. It was distributed publicly in Yemen and abroad on 25 March 1912.

Here Al-Idrisi himself confirmed that the Treaty of Al-Ḥafāyir was not ratified. He stated clearly, in this statement, that the agreement he concluded with Said Pāshā was not ratified by the Porte.

The texts of both the Arabic and the English translation are taken from (Bang, 1996). It is also available in (Abazāh, 1975: pp. 466-474).

هذا بيان للناس وهدى وموعظة للمتقين

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

« الحمد لله الذي أنزل على عبده الكتاب ولم يجعل له عوجاً قيماً

لينذر بأساً شديداً من لدنه ويبشر المؤمنين الذين يعملون

الصالحات ان لهم أجراً حسناً ما كثين فيه أبداً »

Figure 2.13.2.1 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

الصلاة والسلام على سيدنا محمد بن عبد الله الصادق الأمين الذي اصطفاه الله من خيرة العرب فأرسله الى الناس كافة بالحق بشيراً ونذيراً وداعياً الى الله باذنه وسراجاً منيراً وأنزل عليه في محكم كتابه العزيز: « كنتم خير أمة أخرجت للناس تأمرون بالمعروف وتنهون عن المنكر وتؤمنون بالله » .

وأبان له من أحوال الأمم السابقة ما فيه مزدجر لقوم يعقلون فقال: « لعن الذين كفروا من بني إسرائيل على لسان داوود وعيسى بن مريم: ذلك بما عصوا وكانوا يعتدون: كانوا لا يتناهون عن منكر فعلوه: لبئس ما كانوا يفعلون » .

وحدد له الحدود وبين له الاحكام وقال: « ومن يتعد حدود الله فقد ظلم نفسه » وقال: « ومن لم يحكم بما أنزل الله فأولئك هم الظالمون – فأولئك هم الكافرون – فأولئك هم الفاسقون »

أما بعد فقد قال الله تبارك وتعالى: « يا أيها الذين آمنوا ان جاءكم فاسق بنياً فتبينوا أن تصيبوا قوماً بجهالة فتصبحوا على ما فعلتم نادمين » وقال صلى الله عليه وسلم: « آية المنافق ثلاث اذا حدث كذب واذا وعد أخلف واذا أوتى من خان »

وقد علمت ان بعضاً ممن أطلب لهم الهداية من الله ولا أزيد قد نقلوا عني ما الله يعلم انني منه براء ونسبوا الي ما لا يصدر الا عن

Figure 2.133.2.2 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

المفسدين وشوهوا كثيراً من الروايات التي يروونها عني بالباسها  
لباس التغير والتمويه  
وكذبوا على أولئك العرب المخلصين الذين قد روى عن رسول الله  
صلى الله عليه وسلم في أمرهم ما يفتخرون به فقد روي عنه عليه  
الصلاة والسلام انه قال: «اني لاشم ريح الايمان من جهة اليمن» أو  
كما قال وروي عنه صلى الله عليه وعلى آله وسلم انه قال: «العلم  
يمان والحكمة يمانية» وفي رواية: «الايمان يمان والحكمة يمانية» .  
واذ كان ذلك كذلك كان حقاً على أن أذكر مجملًا من الحقيقة  
تطمئن به نفوس اخواني المسلمين في غير جزيرة العرب والله على  
ما أقول وكيل  
نحن بحمد الله مؤمنون من أهل السنة والجماعة نؤمن بالله  
وملائكته وكتبه ورسله واليوم الآخر ونعمل على ما يوافق الشريعة  
المطهرة مبلغ علمنا وطاقتنا - نأمر بالمعروف ونهي عن المنكر  
ونجتهد في ازالة البدع الضارة بالدين وأهل الدين غير مرآين ولا  
مداجين ولا ماكرين ولا مخادعين -  
لا ندعي شيئاً من الدعاوي العريضة التي يمويه بها ذوو الاوهام على  
عقول العوام فلا ننتحل المهديّة كما يزعمون: ولا نشعوذ كما  
يفترون: ولا نزعّم كشافاً ولا شيئاً من علم الغيب كما يشيعون

Figure 2.133.2.3 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

( سبحانك لا علم لنا الا ما عتنا انك أنت العزيز الحكيم )  
 بل لا نتصدر لشيء مما يحاوله ذوو البطالة العاجزون . ولا نريد  
 خلافة ولا ملكا كما يتوهمون ولا نطلب جاهاً ولا مالا ولا شيئاً  
 من الاغراض الدنيوية الفانية التي يتهالك عليها الطامعون .  
 اللهم الا ما يكون بلاغاً الى الدار الآخرة ووسيلة لمصلحة الاسلام  
 والمسلمين من طريق شرعي نتحرى فيه ما استطعنا وسواء علينا في  
 طلب الخير أظهرت النتيجة على يدينا أو على أيدي واحد من  
 العاملين المسلمين فانا ( علم الله ) نطلب الخير للخير ونتباعد ما  
 استطعنا عن الشر وكل ما نهتم به هو الصلاح والاصلاح . وما  
 توفيقى الا بالله عليه توكلت وعليه أنيب  
 ولقد كان لي من سلفي الطاهر اسوة حسنة : وفي طريق تربيتي وما  
 يعلم العارفون بي من الاخلاق التي أنا عليها وسيري وسيرتي منذ  
 نشأتى أكبر برهان على ما ذكرته بحمد الله ولا فخر .  
 سيقول القراء – اذا فما تلك الضجة التي شغلت كثيراً من الافكار  
 وما هو السبب في هذا الذي يزعمونه من البغى والخروج التشويش  
 على الدولة قي الوقت الذي أصبحت فيه على شفا جرف هار من  
 الحرج بسبب اختلاف أحزابها وتغير أطوارها وعدم تماسك رجالها  
 والقاء زمامها بيد أغرارها وتغلب شرارها على خيارها مع ما انتابها

Figure 2.13.2.4 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

من اعتداء المعتدين وما تخشاه من أيدي الطامعين -  
 قل خلق هذا للدولة موظفوها ( وبعض ضباطها) المسارقون أولئك  
 الذين ملأت الدولة الآن بهم جوف المناصب وتركتهم على  
 غلوائهم وصلفهم وكبريائهم يعيشون في الارض بلا خشية ولا  
 حياء فتراهم يستبيحون الحرم وينتهكون الاعراض يتجاهرون  
 بالمعاصي والخروج عن الحدود التي حدها الله ورسوله غير مباليين .  
 ولا متأدبين فلا الصلاة يؤدون ولا الشهر يصومون ولا هم في  
 حكمهم يعذبون . ولا لاصاغرهم (بله أنفسهم) عن الايغال في  
 أرزاق الرعية يزجرون .  
 وناهيك بالرشوة وعكوفهم عليها مع عبثهم في أموال الرعية  
 واحتقارهم للامة العربية وللغة العربية واهمال جميع المصالح العامة  
 واهانة رجال الدين الى غير ذلك مما لا يصدر الا عن القوم الظالمين  
 الغادرين .  
 كل هذا مع رغبة أولئك العجم الذين لا خلاق لهم في ايجاد  
 القلاقل واثارة الفتن ليتكنوا من حمل الدولة (فوق ما تحمله من  
 الاثقال التي تنوء بها الدول ذات القوة) على جمع الجنود وتجهيز  
 الجيوش حتى تكون لهم مندوحة للاشتراك مع المتعهدين (سراً)  
 في تلك التعهدات الكبيرة التي تكال فيها أموال الدولة جزافاً

Figure 2.13.2.5 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

فيملؤون من هذه النار بطونهم وبتون شركائهم ولا يهتمهم بعد ذلك عمرت الدولة أم خربت صلحت أحوال الناس أو فسدت .  
 ليت شعري اذا كان هذا عمل الحاكمين في جزيرة العرب منبع النبوة ومهبط الوحي بين ظهراني عرب البادية السذج الخالص وعلى مرأى ومسمع منهم (بل قد ينال أهل البادية انفسهم ما تمن منه اهل الحاضرة) :

أترى انه مع هذا يمكن للعربي أن يصدق أن حكامه مسلمون مهما حاولت اقناعه؟ ومهما أطلت في ايراد الحجج عليه بالطرق المختلفة في حين ان بلاغة العمل فوق كل بلاغة وبيانه فوق كل بيان؟  
 كلا لا جرم انه قد أصبح من البديهي أن عمال الدولة الاحداث الاغرار هم الذين يثيرون عليها الفتن ويقىمون عليها القلاقل وسواء علينا أكان ذلك بعلم المراجع العليا ( كما يعبرون ) بحيث يكون سكوتهم عن ذلك لاي مقصد من المقاصد أو بغير علم منهم – ولقد نمت الينا في المدة الاخيرة ان أمثال هؤلاء الفتيان قد أصبح يبيعون البلدان ولا سيما العربية بأبخس الاثمان .  
 وبعد فقد عرف القراء مما نشر قبل الآن في بعض الجرائد المصرية اننا لما عدنا من طلب العلم بالديار المصرية وغيرها الي بلاد اليمن حيث المهد الاول لنا وجدنا الناس على أسوأ مما تركناهم عليه من

Figure 2.13.2.6 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad



شدة النفرة بينهم وبين رجال الحكومة لما وصفناه آنفًا  
 ووجدناهم كذلك على ما هم عليه من الامتناع عن دفع الاعشار  
 والمحكمة الى الطواغيت واختلال الامن العام في جميع الانحاء  
 بسبب المطالبات بالثار وترك الحكومة حبل الناس على غاربهم  
 ذلك الامر الذي أوقف جميع الاعمال والحركات سواء التجارية  
 والزراعية وغيرها الى حد كان الرجل معه لا يمكنه أن يخرج من  
 محله قيد شبر الا اذا كان معه من عشيرته من يجيرونه ومن  
 الاسلحة ما يدفع به الصائلة (وما أكثرها) .  
 ولو رأيت اذ ذاك لرأيت ما يفتت الاكباد ويمنع الرقاد ويطيل  
 السهاد .  
 نعم لو رأيت لرأيت المساجد معطلة والشريعة مهملة والارض  
 قاحلة والمصائب متواصلة فلا يمكن لرجل أن يخرج الى مصلاه الا  
 حاملا سلاحه مصاحباً رفقته لتتولى حراسته بل لو رأيت لرأيت  
 من السلب والنهب وقتل الارواح البريئة ما تزعج منه النفوس  
 الثابتة وتلين له القلوب القاسية  
 بل لرأيت من الحروب الاهلية الدائمة بين القبائل والفتائر والافخاذ  
 ما يذهب بالاموال ويؤيم النساء وييتم الاطفال ويقطع النسل  
 ويقلل الذرية –

Figure 2.13.2.7 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

كل ذلك تراه اذ ذاك حاصلًا على مرأى ومسمع من الحكومة  
ورجالها دون أن تحرك ساكنًا أو تعمل عملاً لا يقف سيل هذا  
البلاء الجارف .

وقد لا تجد لاحد من الحكام والموظفين اهتماماً بأمر من هذه الامور  
الا ما يكون من ورائه ربح له على انفراده أو بالاشتراك مع بعض  
أعوانه .

ولقد وصلت الحال بالحكومة نفسها الى انها لا يمكنها أن تستقي  
من مواقع الماء حتى تعد العدة وتجهش الجيوش وتحتمي بالجار  
( فكيف هذا العار )

لا ريب مع هذا أن اشتد الضيق بالكافة وصار العقلاء يبحثون عن  
مخرج من هذه الحالة

( ولو يجدون ملجأ أو مغارات أو مدخلا لولوا اليه وهم يجمعون )  
لما اشتدت الازمة وأراد الله أن يفرجها جعل لنا من ذلك مخرجاً اذ  
وفقني للدخول بين القبيلتين عظيمتين للصلح ( والصلح خير )  
فهدى الله الذين آمنوا لما اختلفوا فيه من الحق باذنه ووضع أساس  
الصلح ( وما كان ليوضع لو لا ارادة الله وقوته الالهية ) على اسقاط  
الدماء السابقة واحلال التحاكم الى الشريعة المطهرة محل التحاكم  
الى الطواغيت واقامة الحدود الشريعة على حسب ما أنزل الله في

Figure 2.13.2.8 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

كتابه وما بينته سنة نبيه صلى الله عليه وعلى آله وسلم وما أرشد  
اليه هدى السلف الصالح والائمة المجتهدين رضوان الله عليهم  
أجمعين .

بذلك استتب الامن في أرض هاتين القبيلتين

وسارت التجارة وصلحت الزراعة وأمن الناس على الانفس والامال  
وهذا البال وحفظت الدراري والاطفال وأقيمت الصلاة بين الافراد  
والجماعات وحفوظ على حدود الله تعالى (ومن يتعد حدود الله  
فقد ظلم نفسه)

هنالك اشرايت أعناق القبائل الاخرى للانتظام في هذا السلك  
ومالت نفوسهم الى الراحة النفسية وترك العناء الحاصل بسبب  
التنافر والتخاصم والتخاذل

ومن المعلوم ان أنفة العرب وشهامتهم تمنعان كل قبيلة من البدء  
بطلب الصلح فتتابعت الى رسلهم سرا فوق الله هذا العبد  
الضعيف الى الدخول بين عدة قبائل فتم الصلح بينهم ببركة  
الاخلاص

ففازوا بمثل ما فاز اخوانهم السابقون فكان ذلك قذى في أعين  
بعض المأمورين (ولو أخلصوا لله ولرسوله ولحكومتهم وأمتهم لكان  
ذلك من أكبر أمانيتهم لعموم الامن وسهولة ادائهم لمأموريتهم )

Figure 2.13.2.9 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

نعم كان ذلك قذي في أعين البعض وفرصة للبعض الآخر اذ جعلوا هذا الامر متكئًا يتكؤن عليه لحمل الدولة على انفاق النفقات الباهظة فيما لا طائل تحته وبذلك يكون لهم ولشركائهم من المتعهدين ما يشاؤون من الارباح -

لهذا أخذ الذين في قلوبهم مرض يشيعون الاشاعات ويخلقون الترهات ويذيعون الاباطيل والمفتريات ويلهبون نيران الثورة من الجانبين فاجتهدت في اطفاء تلك الجذوة في اول اشتعالها بالحكمة والموعظة الحسنة مع حسن المعاملة وكثرة المجاملة وطلب التفاهم حتى يزول ما علق بالنفوس من سيئة فلم أفلح اذ غلبت غواية الغاوين على رشد الراشدين ووجدت عبارات الضالين أذنا صاغية عند ذوي الحل والعقد من رجال الدولة البعيدين عن مشاهدة الحالة والحكم عليها بالقسط

فصدرت الأوامر بتجهيز الجيوش وارسالها المقاتلة هذا الضعيف الذي لا حول له ولا قوة الا بالله العلي العظيم وذلك بسبب ما ظهر على يديه من الاصلاح الذي لم يرق في أعين الحكام مع ظهور فائدته -

فلما رأى العرب ذلك داخلهم في حكامهم الريب وأخذت نفوسهم تفكر حتى ثبت لديهم ( وبعيد أن تقنع البدوي بضد ما

Figure 2.13.2.10 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

يظهر له العيان ) ان هؤلاء العمال انما هم على غير الملة الاسلامية  
 وظنوا وبعض الظن اثم ان هذه الجيوش انما أرسلت لمقاتلتهم حتى  
 يردوهم عن دينهم ( ان استطاعوا )  
 فتأهبوا للدفاع عن أنفسهم ودينهم وعن راحتهم وأمنهم ودبت  
 فيهم الحمية العربية والغيرة الاسلامية  
 فأخذت ألطف من حدتهم لأعيدهم الى الحكمة والسكون حتى  
 أقنعتهم بأن يقفوا موقف المدافعين عن أنفسهم وأموالهم  
 وأعراضهم مع القيام بواجب الدين .  
 وقفوا هذا الموقف حتى حضر سعيد باشا الى اليمن بجيشه الجرار  
 (والرجل على ما يظهر من العقلاء المتبصرين) عندئذ لم يرد  
 سعادته أن يقتحم ذلك الصعب حتى يرود الامر نفسه فعمد  
 وعمدت الى التلاقي فلما خبرنا وعرف الحق وظهر له كذب تلك  
 الاشاعات ظهور الشمس لذي عينين اتفق معنا على أن نبقى على  
 ما نحن عليه وان الحكومة تقبل أن تكون الاحكام في هذه القطعة  
 العربية على حسب الشريعة الاسلامية  
 فلما تم هذا الاتفاق بيننا أجهدت نفسي في مساعدة الدولة حسب  
 لله تعالى وساعدتها على مد التلغراف ولم تكن قد تمكنت من  
 عهد وجودها باليمن من ذلك على ما كان فيها من كثرة النفقات

Figure 2.13.2.11 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

التي كانت تذهب أدراج الرياح  
وقد أعنتها بعشرة آلاف عود من القوائم اللازمة لذلك وكانت قبل  
ذلك تدفع في العود الواحد ليرة ثم لا تكاد تضع ما تبتاعه من  
الاعواد حتى تتخطفه أيدي السلبه الذين لا تصل اليهم أيدي  
الحكومة  
كل ذلك عملته وأقنعت العرب بدفع ما تيسر من الاعشار باسم  
الزكاة ولم يكونوا يدفعون للحكومة شيئاً وعملت غير ذلك من  
المساعدات التي لا أري سعة في الوقت لشرحها كنت أظن اني  
بهذا العمل قد خدمت الدولة اجل خدمة وان رجالها سيحفظون  
لي ذلك ويعرفون لي اخلاصي لدولتي وملتي وديني وقومي  
فيصادقون على هذا الاتفاق ويدعون هذه البقعة التي لم تختلط  
بالاجنبي تقام فيها حدود الله ويتركونني أمر بالمعروف وأنهى عن  
المنكر مرتاح الضمير من غير تشويش ولا تكدير  
ولكن ساء مثل القوم اذ كرروا من الحوادث ما أظهر ان ذلك الاتفاق  
لم يكن الا خدعة يراد بها تخدير أعصاب العرب الى أن يدخل  
أولئك الماكرون في أحشاء الامة فيقطعوا أوصالها ويبطلوا أعمالها  
( ما الله بغافل عما يعمل الظالمون . )  
لم يرع العرب بعد ذلك الا ما فاجأهم به الموظفون من ان المراجع

Figure 2.13.2.12 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

العالية ( كما يعبرون ) لم  
تصدق على الصلح بهذه الطريقة ثم نكثوا ايمانهم من بعد عهدهم  
وطعنوا في الدين وأظهروا الرضاء بعدم اقامة الحدود أخذوا  
يشنعون على اقامة حدود الله وترك الحق لولي الدم وقالوا ان المدنية  
تأبي ذلك  
ثم أظهروا لنا منشورات نشرتها الدولة صرحوا فيها بأنهم تفضلوا  
على المسلمين في هذه بلاد أو منحوهم ( من عند أنفسهم ) منحة  
العمل بالشرعية في المدنيات دون الجنائيات  
وشنعوا بمن يتشدد في طلب ذلك في الجنائيات الى غير ذلك مما  
يخالف مقاصدهم وتأباه أغراضهم ودستورهم الحديث .  
علمنا بذلك فقلنا لا حول ولا قوة الا بالله العلي العظيم  
ياالله ولهذا الخذلان متى كانت الشريعة تقام دون أن تقام حدودها  
وما الذي يمنع ذلك في بلاد العرب وهي خلو من كل الاجانب عن  
الدين  
فاذا فرضنا ان الدولة تجد صعوبة في تنفيذ الشريعة كما هي في  
غير بلاد العرب فما هي الصعوبة في تنفيذها هنا مع رضي الاهالي  
بذلك وسرورهم به وظهور لنتائجهم وتشددهم في طلبه ؟  
ثم ما هي تلك المدنيات التي منحونا الحكم فيها على مقتضى

Figure 2.13.2.13 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

الشريعة المطهرة ولا ثروة عندنا ولا تجارة ولا تزاحم في البلاد  
يقتضى منازعات مدنية لا يفصل فيها بالتراضي أو بحكم  
محكمين ؟

أتراهم توهموا انهم عملوا اصلاحا في البلاد فأوجدوا فيها تجارة لن  
تبور وصناعات رائجات وزراعات مثمرة الى غير ذلك فظنوا ان  
المنازعات المدنية شيء كبير يعد من المنح لهؤلاء المتمسكين بدينهم  
أن يتفضل عليهم بأن يكون الحكم فيها على حسب الشريعة  
الاسلامية أعوذ بالله من محاربة الله والعمل على سخط الله .

لقد كنت أسمع قبل الآن أن تلك المفاصد التي رأيتها ورآها كل  
من وطئت قدمه الحرمين الشريفين تلك المفاصد التي تقشعر منها  
أبدان الشريعة المطهرة وتنهار بها أبنيتها وذلك الخوف الذي يلزم  
حجاج بيت الله الذي جعله الله حرماً آمناً مع فشو السلبية وقطاع  
الطريق وقتلة الانفس الطاهرة البريئة كل ذلك كنت أسمع ان  
بعض رجال الدولة القائمين بالامر يقصدون الى وجوده ويساعدون  
عليه للمآرب يريدونها وحاجات في أنفسهم يقضونها

وانه لولا هذه المآرب وتلك الحاجات لعملت الدولة (وما هي  
بالضعيفة العاجزة عن ايجاد الامن في هذه القطعة الطاهرة) على  
محوه تأميناً للمسلمين الذين توقعهم الحمية الاسلامية والقصد

Figure 2.13.2.14 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad



الى تأدية الواجب الشرعي أن يتركوا اباؤهم اخوانهم وأزواجهم  
وعشيرتهم وأوطانهم وكافة مصالحهم الدنيوية ويأتوك رجالا  
وعلى كل ضامر يأتين من كل فج عميق ليشهدوا منافع لهم  
ويذكروا اسم الله في أيام معلومات على ما رزقهم من بهيمة  
الانعام.

كنت أسمع بذلك فلا آلو جهداً في الدفاع عن الدولة ورجالها  
أما الآن وقد رأيت ورأى العرب وقوف أولئك العمال في سبيل  
اقامة الحدود الشرعية وتجهيز الجيوش لمحاربتنا على ذلك مع صدهم  
عن سبيل الله وعن المسجد الحرام وحبس الذاهبين من اليمن لاداء  
الفريضة

فقد كان يداخلني الريب ولا أخطئ اذا قلت ان دوى الرأي من  
العرب أصبحوا بحيث لا يمكن اقناعهم بغير ذلك  
ومع ما أنا عليه من الارشاد الى السلم والعمل اليه ودعوة العرب  
عليه والى ان يقفوا في موقف المدافع لم تلبث الحكومة ان أشاعت  
انها جيشت لرجال اليمن جيوشا لا قبل لهم بها وانها أغدقت  
عليهم من وفير المؤن والذخائر ما يكفي لاستئصالنا .  
وأباحت لهم تحريق المنازل كما هي عاداتها في العرب المسلمين من  
رعاياها دون غيرهم كما أباحت لهم التمثيل والتنكيل والضرب

Figure 2.13.2.15 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

على أيدي رعييتها بما لا قبل لهم به ذلك الامر الذي حظرتة على نفسها قبل أعدائها الخالص ونشرت المنشرات في شأنه خاصة على حسن المعاملة واطهار المجاملة في بدء حربيها معهم .

لما سمعنا بذلك تاهبنا مكرهين للدفاع عن أنفسنا وانتظرنا قضاء الله واذا بهم قد صرفهم صارف من الحوادث الاخرى ففضلوا العودة الى تلك الخديعة الاولى خديعة الكلام في الصلح ريثما تزول الموانع وتتوفر لديهم الاسباب لاتمام مقاصدهم .

عندئذ أرسلوا لنا رسولهم الشيخ توفيق ليخاطبنا في ذلك فعرضنا عليه المقابلة مع سعيد باشا فأخبرنا بانه مفوض اليه في الامر وان فيه الكفاية فقلنا مرحبا بحقن الدما على أساسنا الاول ألا وهو أن تكون الاحكام في ديارنا على حسب الشريعة الاسلامية لا فرق بين مدنيها وجنائيتها وغير ذلك وان يعرف لنا بصفة رسمية ذلك الحق الطبيعي الاسلامي الا وهو الامر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر حتى لا يكون لاحد من المأمورين الفضوليين ذوى الغايات سبيل علينا اذا نحن قمنا بما علينا من هذا الواجب أودعت الحال لان نقوم بالتوفيق بين القبائل ذلك مع بقاء الحال على ما هي عليه للدولة فتركنا وانتظرنا اجابة الدولة فأهملونا ساخرين منا ( سخر الله منهم ) وجهزوا لنا الجيوش ثانيا وأعدوا لنا حملتين عظيمتين ذاتي

Figure 2.13.2.16 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

بأس شديد كما أشاعوا والله أشد بأسا وأشد تنكيلا  
 حملت حملتا هما في آن واحد أحدهما من الشمال وهي مؤلفة  
 من عدد عظيم من الجيش العامل بعدده المستوفاة وآلاته النارية  
 ومدبراته الحربية ومدافعه السريعة الطلقات وغيرها والبعيدة المرمي  
 وعدد كبير جدا كما أذاعوا واشتهر في الجرائد السيارة من أتباع  
 الشريف حسين بن علي تحت قيادته وقيادة صاحبي السعادة ولديه  
 المحروسين

وقد لا يخفي على أحد ما نشر في ذلك الحين من أن هذا الجيش  
 المشترك قد أمرته الدولة بالمؤن والذخائر الكافية لتدمير جميع  
 البلاد العربية وثانيهما من الجنوب في جيزان وهذه الحملة القوية  
 كلها من الجيش العامل ذي الحول والطول وأذاعوا ان هاتين  
 الحملتين ستتقابلان فتأتیان على جميع العباد والبلاد التي في  
 طريقهما

فاعتمدنا على الله الذي لا حول لنا ولا قوة الا به وفوضنا أمرنا اليه  
 سبحانه وقلنا « كم من فئة قليلة غلبت فئة كثيرة باذن الله والله مع  
 الصابرين »

ولقد ساعدتنا والحق يقال معونة الله وله الشكر بشهامة العرب  
 وعدم وصول شئ من هذه الاخبار الكبيرة والتهويلات الكثيرة التي

Figure 2.13.2.17 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

على أيدي رعييتها بما لا قبل لهم به ذلك الامر الذي حظرتة على نفسها قبل أعدائها الخالص ونشرت المنشرات في شأنه خاصة على حسن المعاملة واطهار المجاملة في بدء حربيها معهم .

لما سمعنا بذلك تاهبنا مكرهين للدفاع عن أنفسنا وانتظرنا قضاء الله واذا بهم قد صرفهم صارف من الحوادث الاخرى ففضلوا العودة الى تلك الخديعة الاولى خديعة الكلام في الصلح ريثما تزول الموانع وتتوفر لديهم الاسباب لاتمام مقاصدهم .

عندئذ أرسلوا لنا رسولهم الشيخ توفيق ليخاطبنا في ذلك فعرضنا عليه المقابلة مع سعيد باشا فأخبرنا بانه مفوض اليه في الامر وان فيه الكفاية فقلنا مرحبا بحقن الدما على أساسنا الاول ألا وهو أن تكون الاحكام في ديارنا على حسب الشريعة الاسلامية لا فرق بين مدنيها وجنائها وغير ذلك وان يعرف لنا بصفة رسمية ذلك الحق الطبيعي الاسلامي الا وهو الامر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر حتى لا يكون لاحد من المأمورين الفضوليين ذوى الغايات سبيل علينا اذا نحن قمنا بما علينا من هذا الواجب أودعت الحال لان نقوم بالتوفيق بين القبائل ذلك مع بقاء الحال على ما هي عليه للدولة فتركنا وانتظرنا اجابة الدولة فأهملونا ساخرين منا ( سخر الله منهم ) وجهزوا لنا الجيوش ثانيا وأعدوا لنا حملتين عظيمتين ذاتي

Figure 2.13.2.18 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

لا يعرف أمثالنا اعراب البادية ما القصد منها  
لما أعيتنا الحيل ولم نتمكن من الوصول الى حل سلمي تحفظ معه  
حدود الله وشريعته اضطررنا الى الدفاع عن أنفسنا ووقفت العرب  
موقف المدافع حتى اذا وقعت الواقعة مع كل من الجيشين جيش  
الشمال وجيش الجنوب ظهر ان تلك الرعود والبروق جمعجة بلا  
طحن وان تلك الاشاعات ليست الا كفارغ البندق اذ زلزل ذاك  
الجيشان عند النزال زلزالا شديداً . ونصرنا الله عليهم وأعد لهم  
عذابا عظيما .  
ذلك ان جيش الشمال المشترك ناله من الخذلان ما أوقع كثيراً من  
أدواته ومؤنه وذخائره ومهماته في أيدي العرب  
فاضطر جناب الشريف هداه الله الى أن يتبع خطة أخرى هي خطة  
توسيط الرحم تارة وبعض المؤثرات التي لا تخفى تارة أخرى حتى  
يتمكن من أن يسير الي جهة أبهى من طريق وعرة غير مسلوكة  
تبعد عن الطريق المعتادة الموصلة بينها وبين القنفذة تلك الطريق  
التي مرابط العرب اليمن فيها –  
وقد فضله على طوله ووعورته لكيلا يعود مخذولا الا بعد ان  
يدخل أبهى بأية طريقة كأنما مأموريته انما كانت دخول أبهى  
فكان ذلك من غير ان يلتقي بالعرب اليمنية مرة أخرى

Figure 2.13.2.19 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

ولم يلبث ان خرج منها ( مع البازى عليه سواد ) وسار في طريقة الثالث ( الذي هو أشد وعورة مما جاء منه ) سار خائفا يترقب وقد فضل هذا الطريق الثالث الشديد الوعورة الطويل المسافات المشتمل على أصعب العقبات القليل المياه ( طريق بيثه ) ذلك الطريق الذي يسير الى شرقي الطائف جهة نجد لانه طريق الفرارين المخلولين المشردين .

وقد بلغني انهم ستروا الحقائق وأخذوا يزعمون ان دخولهم ( أبهى ) كان بما لهم من الغلبة ولكننا نحن العرب العارفين لا يهمننا كلام المتكلمين اذا ما خلوا بارض بعيدة فنحن رجال الاعمال لا اعتماد لنا الا على الله وهو حسبنا ونعم الوكيل

أما جيش الجنوب فقد انتهى أمره بواقعة الحفائر وما أدراك ما واقعة الحفائر:

تلك الواقعة التي وقف فيها العرب موقف المدافعين على مياه الحفائر على بعد ثلاثة أرباع الساعة من جيزان وقد تترس جيش الحكومة المنظم بجيزان وجبالها وتمكنوا في قلاعهم وطوابيهم وثبتوا مدافعهم الضخمة على الجبال والاكمام المجاورة للبحر وأمدتهم مراكبهم الحربية بالمساعدة وأخذوا يزعمون العرب

Figure 2.13.2.20 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

باطلاق المدافع من البحر والبر والعرب صابرون مستسلمون لقضاء  
الله وقدره حتى اذا كان يوم الاثنين منتصف جمادى الثانية سنة  
١٣٢٩ خرجت قوة الجيش المنظم هاجمة ومعها المدافع سريعة  
الطلقات تحت حماية المدافع التي فوق الاكمام والتي في المراكب  
الحربية والتي في القلاع وعملوا من حيلهم العسكرية ما شاء الله أن  
يعملوا كل ذلك

ولا حول للعرب ولا قوة الا بالله العلي العظيم الذي القى عليهم  
الصبر فثبتوا وذكروا الله كثيرا فصدقهم الله وعده للصابرين  
وانتصروا من بعد ما ظلموا سيعلم الذين ظلموا أي منقلب  
ينقلبون .

نعم صبر العرب ودافعوا عن اقامة حدود الدين فدارت رحا الحرب  
على ذلك الجيش العرمرم حتى هلك كله الا النزر اليسير الذي نجاه  
الفرار ولم تعده الجراح وقد وقع في أيدي العرب من البنادق  
والذخائر والمهمات والمدافع السريعة الطلقات والمكنات ما جعل  
لهم قوة فوق قوتهم ونشطهم نشاطا يقدره قدره من يعرف الحالة  
عادت البقية الباقية من الجيشين الى جيزان فسلط الله عليها ومن  
جاءوا من المدد اليها ريحا وجنودا جوية وأمراضا وبائية ذهبت  
بالباقى وبالمدد الا نذر نذير اضطر أخيرا الى الجلاء عن جيزان

Figure 2.13.2.21 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

فاستراح وأراح والله من ورائهم محيط وهو على كل شيء قدير .  
 بعد هذا كله لم نلبث ان جاءنا من سعادة والي العسير كتاب  
 يجنح فيه للسلم تاريخه يرجع الى ما بعد ابتداء الحوادث الاخيرة  
 مع الطليان  
 فصدعنا بأمر الله وجنحنا معه متوكلين على الله  
 وأرسلنا الى سعادته رسولا من كبار العرب ليخاطبه في ذلك  
 حسبما طلب  
 وزودنا ذلك الرسول بجميع النصائح السلمية وأرسلنا معه خطابا  
 أبنا فيه مقاصدنا وميلنا التام الى الاتحاد وجمع الكلمة واننا نريد أن  
 نكون اخوانا وعلى الحق أعوانا  
 فسمى الى ذلك الرسول في طريقه وهو على مقربة من أبهى أن  
 سعادة الوالي انما يريد بنا خدعة وانه قد نصب له شراك غيلة  
 فوقف خارج المدينة حيث مأمنه وأرسل اليه الكتاب وأعلمه بأنه  
 قد جاء ملبيا داعي السلم وانه يريد المخابرة في ذلك ليعلم ما  
 ينتهي عليه الامر والله الموفق .  
 فما كان جوابه الا أن أرسل اليه مكتوبا طويلا الذيول مملوءاً  
 بالعظمة والصلف والكبرياء لا تخلو كلمة منه من التهديد  
 والوعيد ورفض الاتفاق وهاكم شيئاً مما جاء فيه بالحرف الواحد .

Figure 2.13.2.22 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad



( قد أخذت كتابا من حسين افندي وفيه يذكر انكم سألتموه عن بيان الشروط مع الحكومة وكيفيةها فعجبت من هذا الطلب - فهذه الحال تصير الشبهة متمكنة وان الحادث الذي هو الآن واقع مع الكفار مناسب لافكاركم فلا حاجة للشروط - فهل تصير شروط بين الحكومة والرعية فما وظائف الرعية الا الطاعة للحكومة ولا وامرها -

وقد عزمنا متوكلين على الله أن نرسل حملة عسكرية لتربية العاصين المخالفين بشدة والعفو عن المطيعين واعطائهم الأمان

ولم يكن طلبنا اتحاد عسير عن عجزنا واستعانة بهم -

وان القوة التي تزيد عن الخمسين طابورا المتحشدة في الزيدية والزهرة واللحية والتي عندنا مقدار سبعة عشر طابورا هي كافية لكل عدو في اليمن وعسير في الداخل وفي الخارج وانتم تعلمون بذلك وأيضا تقدرّون عاقبة البغي والفساد الخ الخ )

وصلنا هذا المكتوب ووصلتنا مكاتيب اخرى ارسلت من بعض رجال الحكومة الى العرب وفيها أكثر من ذلك

فما أظن القارئ يخفى عليه شدة اسفنا على ان رجال الدولة الآن على هذا النمط وانهم هم الذين يخلقون الفتنة ويشيرونها كلما قربت من الانتهاء وانهم دائما واقفون حجر عثرة في سبيل اطفاء

Figure 2.13.2.23 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

الفتن على نحو ما سبق بيانه ولا سيما في مثل هذه الظروف  
والاوقات الحرجة  
هذاهم الله أو بدلنا قوما غيرهم ثم لا يكتوا أمثالهم --  
ماذا يفهم المنصف من هذا كله سوى أننا دائما نعمل للسلم  
وعمال الدولة يعلمون على هدم قواعده - نعمل للاصلاح  
وأولئك المارقون يعملون للافساد نعمل لاقامة الشريعة المطهرة  
وهم يعملون لمحوها ومحو آثارها -  
ما هذه البلية التي ابتلى الله بها الدولة وامتنحن بها الامة اذ ألقى بها  
في أيدي هذه الفئة التي تريد أن تهوي بها حتى تسقطها في  
مكان سحيق .  
كيف تؤمن بعد هذا غائلة أمثال أولئك الأشرار الذين يشرون  
الحياة الدنيا بالآخرة ويصدون عن سبيل الله ويعملون مع العرب  
هذه الأفاعيل ويبادرونهم بامثال ما سبق من الأقاويل  
وهم يعلمون ما عند العرب من الأنفة وعزة النفس وانهم لا يرضون  
بالدنية لا سيما مع كونهم أصحاب اليد العليا ولهم الغلبة الي الآن  
ثم هم مع ذلك ينصرون الله ورسوله ويتمسكون بطلب اقامة  
الشريعة المطهرة واقامة حدودها  
ولا يعملون شيئاً مما يعمله أولئك الأتراك معهم فهم يقيمون

Figure 2.13.2.24 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

الصلاة ويؤتون الزكاة ويصومون رمضان ويحافظون على الاوامر  
وترك النواهي ما أمكنهم في حين أن أولئك لا يعملون شيئاً من  
ذلك بل تراهم يجعلون المساجد ثكنات لعساكرهم ومستشفيات  
لمرضاهم وأمكنة لفسوقهم ولهوهم ولعبهم وكثيراً ما دخل كبارهم  
في المساجد بكلابهم على مرأي من العرب الخالص وعملوا من  
الاعمال الكفرية ما لا نجد في الوقت سعة لسرده

فالعرب ينصرون الله ورسوله ولا يؤذون الا في الله وطلب العمل  
بكتاب الله وسنة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم واظهار نور الله في  
حين أن أولئك يريدون أن يطفئوا نور الله بأفواههم ويأبى الله الا أن  
يتم نوره ولو كره الكافرون ليت شعري ماذا يطلب منا ومن العرب  
بعد هذا ؟

أنستكين لهذه القوة التي يشرحها سعادة الوالي ومنتظر حتى  
يحرقوا بقية بيوتنا ويستبيحوا فضلة أموال العرب ويذبحوا الابناء  
ويستحيوا النساء ( كما توعدونا بذلك وهم في جيزان فدر الله  
كيدهم في نحرهم وجعل عليهم دائرة السوء )

أو نسلمهم أنفسنا ونتاجل عن ديننا ودياننا وآخرتنا  
أو نساعدهم على اعادة الحال على ما كانت عليه ومنتظر حتى  
يقيض الله لبعض ذوى الامر منهم من يشترينا شراء سقط المتاع

Figure 2.13.2.25 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

كما اشتروا غيرنا من البلاد العربية كطرابلس فيما سمعنا .  
 اذا لاصبحنا عندهم من أكابر الناس وأحسن العاملين الذين  
 يكافؤنهم بأشر كههم فيما يكسبون ولكان الله علينا الحجة البالغة  
 وصب علينا وعليهم من عذابه ما يعرفه المؤمنون  
 أظن انه لا يوجد مسلم عاقل يريد بالسلام والمسلمين خيرا يمكنه  
 ان يقول الا انه يجب علينا ان نعد عدة الدفاع وأن لا نلقى بأيدينا  
 الى التهلكة لا سيما بعد ان حركوا جميع جيوشهم من الجنوب  
 والشمال قصد مهاجمتنا على نحو ما وصفه ذلك الباشا في كتابه  
 السابق

وعسى الله أن يأتي بالفتح أو أمر من عند الله فيصلبوا على ما  
 أسروا في أنفسهم نادمين – ان تنصروا الله ينصركم ويثبت  
 أقدامكم . والذين كفروا فتعسا لهم وأضل أعمالهم ذلك بان  
 الذين كفروا اتبعوا الباطل وان الذين آمنوا اتبعوا الحق من ربهم –  
 كذلك يضرب الله للناس أمثالهم .

مما يعجب له القارئ مع هذا ان الجيوش متحركة لمهاجمتنا  
 وأعوانهم يشيعون ما يشيعون ثم هم مع ذلك يخادعوننا اذ  
 يوعزون الى بعض الرجال من أعوانهم تارة ومن أصدقائنا تارة  
 أخرى بارسال الخطابات الخصوصية اليها بطلب الصلح مع الدولة

Figure 2.13.2.26 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

من غير ان يكون في تلك الخطابات اشارة الى ان لاحد رجال الدولة حتى ولا لاصاغرهم دخل ظاهر في هذه المخاطبات . ومع ذلك فاني وان كنت واقفا على تلك الحيل وعلمت منهم تلك الخدع ما زلت أعجيب على هذه الخطابات بالترحيب بالصلح وحقن الدماء على أساس العمل بالشرعية الغراء واقامة الحدود الشرعية وذلك هو الشجا في حلوقهم والقذى في أعينهم وقد أذكر لمن يخاطبونني اننا قبل اراقة الدماء بالفعل بين العرب والترك وقبل حصول الانتصارات المتوالية للعرب كنت موافقا على الصلح جاعلا أساس شروطه العمل بالشرعية واقامة الحدود الشرعية وأعجب لانني لا أعرف طريقا للمخاطبات مع الدولة الآن بصفة جدية ما دام عمالها على نحو ما وصفنا آنفاً . ولعل حضرات القراء الذين يريدون المحافظة على الدين يتساءلون بعد هذا عما يضمن القيام بالعقود وعدم نكثها كما سبق وما يوافقنا أن يكون مثل هذا لو فرض حصوله على لسان رجال الدولة أنفسهم ذوي الحل والعقد انما يقصد به الخدعة انا نترك الجواب على ذلك لفظنة اخواننا المؤمنين العارفين - هذا بعد أمرنا أجملناه تبيناً لكم : ومن وصل الينا من أصدقائنا على بعد الشقة ووعورة المسلك يعرف ما نحن عليه في باديتنا من اقامة الشعائر

Figure 2.13.2.27 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

الدينية واستتباب الامن الى الحد الذي يكاد معه يعتقد الانسان انه لو ترك ما شاء الله من المتاع والاموال في الطرقات العامة لا تمسه يد لامس ولا تمتد اليه عين الغير

ولا حاخة لان أصف اقامة الصلوات والجمعة والجماعات وما يتبع ذلك من باقي شعائر الدين الخالية من البدع والبعيدة عن الترهات وطرق الاعنات . من كان هذا حاله فهل يدخل في عقل عاقل أو يدور بخلد انسان ما بلغني انهم يزعمونه وهو اني يد فاسدة تعبت للفساد وقد تحركها يد أجنبية أظن ان ذلك لا يمكن أن يتصوره عاقل .

على انني أعقد ان الدول الاخرى على بينة من ان العرب أشد الناس في دينهم ( بيد عرب اليمن ) وانه لا يجمعهم جامع اكبر من جامع الدفاع عن حوزة الدين والعرض وبلاد العرب كما هو معروف . تلك البلاد المملوءة بالصحارى والقفار والجبال والتي لا ينتظر أن تجني منها دولة ثمرة تبرر لها أن تعمد الى فتح باب كثير عليها غرمة يهمل الاسلام والمسلمين في مشارق الارض ومغاربها وهو من أخص شوؤنهم الحيوية الدينية الا وهو باب العبث بوصية رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم وما عمله الخليفتان ( رضوان الله عليهما ) بعده تنفيذاً لتلك الوصية فان هذا الباب يمس مسألة من

Figure 2.13.2.28 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

أمهات المسائل تكثر فيها الظنون وتفتح لها العيون وما الله بغافل  
 عما يعمل الظالمون .  
 وفي الختام نرجو الله أن يصلح الاحوال ويوفقنا الى ما فيه الخير  
 ويساعدنا على استئصال الجرائم المفسدة ويكفينا شر المفسدين  
 ويجعلنا من الممثلين لقول الله تعالى في كتابه المبين ( ولا تهنوا  
 ولا تحزنوا وأنتم الأعلون ان كنتم مؤمنين )  
 تحريراً في ٦ ربيع الثاني ١٣٣٠  
 الامضاء محمد علي الادريسي

Figure 2.13.2.29 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

*Translation*

*This is an announcement to the people and a guide and council  
for the pious.*

In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate.

'Praise belongs to God who has sent down upon His servant the Book and has not assigned unto it any crookedness; right, to warn of great violence from Him, and to give good tidings unto the believers, who do righteous deeds, that theirs shall be a goodly wage therein to abide for ever' [K 18:1].

May the blessings and peace of God be upon our Sayyid Muḥammad b. °Abd Allāh, the truthful and trustworthy, whom God chose among the best of Arabs, whom he sent to all the people as a bearer of glad tidings and a summoner with Gods permission, and a shining light and He revealed to him the unambiguous parts of the Mighty Book: 'You are the best nation ever brought forth to men, bidding to honour, and forbidding dishonour,

**Figure 2.13.2.30 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad**



and believing in God' [K 3:110].

He made clear to him the circumstances of previous peoples; in this there is a warning, and he said: 'Cursed were the unbelievers of the children of Israel by the tongue of David, and Jesus, Mary's son; that, for their rebelling and their transgression. They forbade not one another any dishonour that they committed; surely evil were the things they did' [K 5:82]. He [God] defined for him [Muhammad] the limits and the law, and said: 'whosoever trespass the bounds of God has done wrong to himself' [K 65:1], and he said: 'Whosoever judges not according to what God has sent down—they are the unbelievers' [K 5:44].

Thereafter: God—Blessed and Exalted is He— has said: 'O believers, if an ungodly man comes to you with a tidings, make clear, lest you afflict a people unwittingly, and then repent of what you have done' [K 49:1]. And he (may God bless him and grant him peace) said: 'The hypocrite is distinguished by three things; if he gives an account, he lies; if he promises, he does not keep his word, and if trust is placed in him, he behaves treacherously' [*ḥadīth*].

I have learnt that some of these people, for whom I seek the guidance of God and nothing more, have reported things about me that God knows I am innocent of. They attributed to me acts that only come from evildoers, and they distorted many of the stories that were told about me by clothing them with deceit and distortion.

They told lies about those honest Arabs, about whom the Prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) said things of which they may be proud: 'Surely I smell the wind of faith coming from the direction of the Yemen' [*ḥadīth*] or words to that effect. Likewise he (may the blessings and peace of God be upon him and his companions) said: 'Knowledge and wisdom are both of them Yemeni' [*ḥadīth*]. Or according to one version: 'Faith and wisdom are both of them Yemeni' [*ḥadīth*].

Things being as they are, it is right that I should relate the truth, so that my brother Muslims outside the Arab Peninsula can have peace of mind. God is the guardian of what I say.

We are, praise be to God, believers belonging to the Sunnī community. We believe in God, His angels, His books, His prophets and in the Day of Judgement. We conform to the pure

Figure 2.13.2.31 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

*sharīʿa*, to the extent of our knowledge and ability; we order good and forbid evil, and we strive to eliminate innovation harmful to religion and religious people; not to show off, not plotting and not deceiving.

We do not propagate anything of the widespread claims which are misinterpreted by the false ideas in the minds of the masses. Thus, we do not claim the *mahdiyya*, as they declare. We do not practice tricks such as they falsely allege. We do not claim illumination or knowledge of the hidden, such as they rumour it.

‘Glory be to Thee! We know not save what Thou hast taught us. Surely Thou art the All-knowing, the All-Wise’ [K 2:32].

We do not occupy ourselves with anything of what the false incompetents accuse us of; they are powerless. We neither claim the caliphate nor kingdom as they mistakenly suspect. We do not search for influence or wealth nor any personal worldly objectives which the greedy and covetous ones fight one another over.

[Rather we seek] what leads to heaven, and a method for the promotion of the welfare of Islam and the Muslims by lawful means; we seek in it what is of purpose. It is the same to us whether the result comes by our hands or by the hands of those who work for Islam. So, we (God knows) seek good for its own sake, and we distance us, as much as we can, from evil. All that we are concerned with is piety and reform. My success is from God alone; Him do I trust and to Him do I turn.

I have a good example in my blameless ancestors and in the way I was brought up, and in that what those who know me know about my moral standards and my conduct and the history of my life since I was young is the greatest proof of what I have mentioned, (thanks be to God) and I am not boasting.

The reader will say, therefore, what is this outcry which has occupied so many minds? And what is the reason for what they claim to be rebellion and troublemaking, and causing confusion to the state [*i.e.* the Ottoman empire] at a time when it [the state] is tottering on the edge of an abyss of difficulty. Its leaders are not acting together, and control of the state is left in the hands of the inexperienced, and the wicked triumph over the good, in addition to which it suffers from the aggressor’s onslaught and

Figure 2.13.2.32 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

what it fears from the hands of the greedy.

The answer is that this was created for the state by its faithless civil servants (and some of its officers)—it is with these the state has filled the important offices, and allowed them, in their extravagance, arrogance and pride, to create havoc in the land, without fear or shame. We see them making the forbidden lawful and abusing honour, openly sinning and deviating from the laws that God and his Messenger sent, without care and without manners. Prayer is not called for, nor is fasting observed, nor are they just in their judgements. Neither do they restrain their junior members (or even themselves) from interfering with the livelihood of the citizens, to say nothing about their indulgence in bribery and manipulation of public money.

They display contempt for the Arab Nation and the Arabic language. Furthermore, they neglect all public welfare, and they insult men of religion and do other things that originate from tyrannical, treacherous people.

All of this, together with the desire of those foreigners who have no qualms to create unrest and to stir up riots (in order to be able) to force the state (and the state was already carrying burdens heavy enough to make powerful states groan) to raise soldiers and mobilize armies, so they might have an excuse to join their partners (secretly) in these big undertakings into which state funds are poured randomly.

So, they fill their bellies with this fire, as well as the bellies of their partners, and are not concerned with the welfare of the state or whether the conditions of the people get better or worse.

I can scarcely believe that this was the doing of the governors of the Arab Peninsula, the origin of prophecy and the place of revelation, in the midst of humble, uncorrupted beduins—before their eyes and ears (the beduins can put up with things that will make the settled people groan).

Do you think that it is still possible for the beduin to believe that his rulers are Muslims—no matter how much you try to convince him, no matter how much proof you offer him by different means, since actions speak louder than words and what they demonstrate is conclusive.

On the contrary, it certainly has become self-evident that the new and inexperienced state governors are the ones who are

Figure 2.13.2.33 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

creating unrest and stirring up discord. It is the same to us whether this was done with the knowledge of the high authorities (as they are called)—in which case they remain silent for some reason—or without their knowledge. We have come to know recently that young men like these have begun to sell lands, especially Arab lands, at the most paltry price.

Readers are aware, from what was announced earlier in some of the Egyptian newspapers, that we returned from our search for knowledge in the lands of Egypt and elsewhere to the lands of the Yemen where we have our origin.

There we found the people in even greater hostility to the rulers (than before we left them) because of the things described above.

We found them refusing to pay taxes and taking their matters to judgement by the oppressors [*i.e.* the Turks].<sup>2</sup>

[There was] a general breakdown of public security in all districts because of the demands for revenge, and the government left the people with a free rein. [*i.e.* did nothing to stop this]. This was the matter which brought a halt to all work and activity, both in trade, agriculture and other domains, to such an extent that a man was unable move a foot outside his dwelling unless some of his companions went with him, equipped with arms to fight off assailants (and they were many!).

If you had seen [what went on] at that time, you would have seen something discouraging [lit.: 'to make the liver burst'], fit to prevent you from sleeping, and to prolong wakefulness. Yes, if you had seen, you would have seen the mosques lying idle, the *sharī'a* neglected, the soil lying arid and misfortunes continuous; a man could not go to his prayer without carrying arms, and being escorted by his group to serve as his guard. And you would have seen plundering and looting and killing of innocent people, fit to upset firm souls and soften hard hearts.

You would have seen endless civil wars between the tribes, clans and subdivisions, draining the money, widowing the women, orphaning the children, dividing brothers and diminishing the

2 The Arabic word *ṭawāghīt* (sing. *ṭāghūt*, Qur'ānic: 'devil, false idol') can be translated 'oppressors'. The oppressors referred to here are the Turkish governors who, since the beginning of the twentieth century, had tried to implement Ottoman civil law (the *kanūn*) in the *vilayets*.

Figure 2.13.2.34 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

number of offspring.

All of this you would have seen taking place, in front of the very eyes of the government and its men, without their urging any move or making any effort to stop this sweeping flood of misfortunes.

You would not find any of these governors and officials having concern for any of these matters, except where there was a profit in it, for him alone or with the help of some of his associates.

The situation reached the point where the government itself was unable to obtain water from the wells unless it made preparations, recruited an army and protected itself behind its friends. (What a disgrace!)

There is no doubt that this intensified the hardship of all, and the wise ones started to look for a way out of this situation.

(If they had found a refuge, a shelter or a place to go to, then they would have turned towards it—with haste.)

When the crisis intensified, and God wanted to bring relief, then He made us a way out; He granted me success in intervening between two great tribes to make peace (and peace is good), so God guided those who believe to the truth over which they differed, by His permission, and establishing the basis for peace (and it could not have been established but for the will of God and His divine power). This was achieved by abandoning former claims to blood [revenge] and in allowing cases to be tried before the *sharīʿa* instead of before the oppressors [*i.e.* Ottoman court]. Also by implementing the punishments of the *sharīʿa* in accordance with what God revealed in His book and what is reported in the Sunna of His Prophet (may God bless Him and His family and grant them peace) and that which the pious forefathers and the *mujtahidī imāms* guided us to (May God be pleased with them all).

Thereby, security was stabilized in the lands of these two tribes.

Trade picked up, agriculture flourished, people felt secure for their persons and their property. Minds calmed down and children and babies were protected. Prayer was established among individuals and in the community and the laws of God were observed ('Whoever trespasses the bounds of God has done

Figure 2.13.2.35 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

wrong to himself' [K 65:1].)

The other tribes were anxious ['stretched their necks'] to join this system; their members wanted peace of mind and to leave behind the hardships caused by conflict, quarrelling and disunity.

It is well-known that the pride and stubbornness of the Arabs prevents any tribe from initiating the quest for peace. Thus I pursued the matter with their representatives secretly, and God granted this humble servant success in intervening between a number of tribes and peace was established between them by the blessing of sincere faith.

Thus, they succeeded as their brothers had succeeded before them. That was a thorn in the flesh to some of the commissioners. (If they had been faithful to God and His messenger, to their government and their nation, then that would have been their greatest hope for general security and would have made it easier for them to carry out their mission.)

Yes, that was a thorn in the flesh of some and an opportunity for others, since they made this matter something to lean upon, to press the state to spend exorbitant sums of money to no avail. In this way, they and their partners among the conspirators could obtain whatever profit they wanted.

Therefore, the sick-hearted started to spread rumours, announce falsities, circulate untruth and lies, and to light the fire of revolution from both sides. I strove to quench that fire when it first was ignited, by wisdom and goodly exhortation, by good treatment, much amiability and search for mutual understanding—so that the evil inside them would come to an end. I did not succeed, since the error of the misguided ones triumphed over the right of the soundly-guided ones, and the explanations of those gone astray found attentive ears among influential men of the Government—who would never examine the situation and take charge of it with justice.

Orders went out to prepare armies and send them to fight this frail being who has no might and no power except through God most High and Mighty. That was because the reform undertaken by my hands did not please the governors, despite its manifest benefits.

So, when the Arabs saw that, they began to harbour doubts

Figure 2.13.2.36 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

about their rulers, until they became quite certain that these Governors were from outside the Islamic community (The beduin is convinced only by what he sees with his own eyes). They thought—and some thoughts are sinful—that these armies had been sent to fight them until they renounced their religion (if they were able).

Thus, they [the tribesmen] prepared to defend themselves and their religion, their peace of mind and their security, and they were filled with Arab fervour and the zeal of Islam.

I started to soften their sharpness and wrath into wisdom and calm, and I convinced them to adopt the stance of defending themselves, their property and honour while keeping the obligations of their faith.

They held this position until Saʿīd Pasha arrived in the Yemen with his huge army. (He is, by all appearances, a sensible and far-sighted man.) At that time he did not want to address the problem before he could explore the matter himself. He and I worked for a meeting. Then, when we informed him, and he knew the truth and the lies of these rumours became as clear as daylight to him, he agreed with us that we should leave things as they are, and that the Government should accept that verdicts in this Arab land should be passed in accordance with the Islamic *sharīʿa*.

When this agreement was concluded I strove, as a duty to God most High, to support the state. Thus, I helped it to extend the telegraph, a task which the Government had not been able to perform since it established itself in the Yemen, due to the sums that had disappeared without trace.

So, I helped them with 10,000 poles needed for this. They used to pay one *lira* for one pole, and no sooner had they been put up before they were snatched away by plundering hands beyond the Government's reach.

All of this I did, and I convinced the Arabs to pay light taxes in the name of *zakāt*—they had not paid anything to the Government. I also gave other forms of support which I do not have the time to explain here. I thought that by these efforts I was doing the state a great favour, and its officials would credit me for that, and they would know my sincere devotion to my state, my government and my people, and that they would approve

Figure 2.13.2.37 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

of this agreement and allow the ordinances of God to be implemented in this place which has not been trodden by foreigners, and that they would leave to me to command good and forbid evil with a good conscience, unsullied and untroubled.

But, matters turned bad, since they repeated the events which made it clear that this agreement was nothing but a fraud, aimed at anaesthetising the nerves of the Arabs, so that these evildoers could enter inside the *umma* and cut its cords and neutralize its efforts (God is not unmindful of the acts of the oppressors).

The Arabs were never more surprised than when the officials suddenly announced that the high authorities (as they are called) did not approve of peace by these means.

So they [the Turks] broke the oath they had given and they defiled religion, and announced it was their pleasure *not* to implement the ordinances of God. They began to abuse upholding the punishments of God and allowing the right [of revenge] and they said that urban circumstances did not allow this.

Furthermore, they set forth proclamations which were published throughout this land. In these they declared that they granted privileges to the Muslims in the land, or they granted Muslims the favour of operating the *shari'a*—in civil cases but not in criminal cases.

They condemned those who continued the quest to implement these rules in criminal cases, and equally they condemned all those who contradicted their intentions and purposes and their new constitution etc.

We learned about it so we said 'There is no power and no strength save in God Most High and Mighty'.

By God a disappointment; when was the *shari'a* implemented and its punishments were not?

What prevents this in Arab lands which are empty of all those who are foreign to the religion [of Islam]?

If we assume that the state experienced problems in implementing the *shari'a* in non-Arab lands, then what is the problem in implementing it here where the people are agreeable to it and rejoice in it, and witness its results for them and they eagerly call for it?

Further, what are these civil cases for which they grant us the right to apply the *shari'a*; we have no wealth, no trade, and

Figure 2.13.2.38 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad



there is no such overcrowding that would bring about civil cases that could not be decided by mutual consent—or by the decision of arbitrators?

Do you think that they imagined that they were making a reform, and that they would bring about profitable trade, marketable products, fruitful farming and so on, and that they understood that civil controversies are an important matter which could be considered a privilege for these who hold fast to their religion and graciously allow them to let verdicts be in accordance with the Islamic *sharīʿa*? May God prevent us from fighting God and from acts which may anger Him.

I used to hear before that those misdeeds I saw, and which all those have set foot in the noble Sanctuaries saw—those misdeeds that make the body of the noble *sharīʿa* shiver and cause her structures to crumble, that is the dread which accompanies the pilgrims to the House of God, which God has granted inviolability and protection, with the spreading of plunderers and highway robbers and murderers of pure, innocent people—I have heard that some of the officials in charge of the matter intended this to happen and encouraged it, to satisfy their own desires and fulfil their needs.

If it were not for these desires and those needs, the state (and the state is not weak and incapable of producing peace in this blessed land) would have worked to annul it [the insecurity] and establish protection for the Muslims who are filled with Islamic zeal and who work for the accomplishment of their lawful obligation as they leave their fathers, brothers, spouses and relatives, their homelands and all their worldly affairs—and ‘they shall come unto thee on foot and upon every lean beast, they shall come from every deep ravine, that they may witness things profitable to them and mention God’s Name on days well-known over such beasts of the flock as He has provided them’ [K 22:27-8].

I used to hear about it, and I spared no effort to defend the state and its men.

But now, I have seen and the Arabs have seen how these officials are blocking the way towards the implementation of the punishments of the *sharīʿa*, and that they have prepared armies to fight us over this issue. In addition they hindered them from

Figure 2.13.2.39 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

the way of God and from the Sacred Mosque, and the devout from Yemen were hindered from performing their religious duties.

Thus, I was filled with doubt and it would not be wrong to say that it became impossible to convince those whose opinion matters among the Arabs of anything else.

Despite my guiding them to peace and peaceful behaviour, and my calling the Arabs to peace and to taking up the stance of defence—the Government did not hesitate to announce that it had mobilized armies against the men of the Yemen such as they could not overcome, and that it would give to them an ample supply enough and ammunition to bring about our extermination.

They permitted them to burn the homes such as it was their habit of doing when dealing with the Muslim Arabs among their citizens, as distinct from non-Arabs. Equally they permitted mutilation, torture and caning of their citizens, which they were powerless to stand up against. This was the very thing it forbade itself in regard to its unsuspecting enemies, and it published proclamations to this effect, in particular about fair treatment and civilized conduct, in the beginning of its war with them.

When we heard about this we were forced to prepare to defend ourselves and we anticipated the judgement of God, when, surprisingly, other events caused them to turn away. So they preferred to return to the first treachery, the treachery of talking of peace as long as obstacles are absent and they have possibilities to accomplish their objectives.

At that time their messenger was sent to address us on this matter [who was] Shaykh Tawfiq, so we suggested to him to meet with Sa'īd Pasha. He informed us that he was his [Sa'īd Pasha's] authorized agent in this matter, and he had full authority. So, we said that we welcomed the sparing of bloodshed, on our original terms which were that the laws in our lands would be on the basis of the Islamic *sharī'ah*, with no separation between its civil and criminal codes, and so forth.

This natural Islamic right should be granted us in an official manner, that is the ordaining of good and the forbidding of evil, so that no selfish meddling official should have any say in our affairs, since we had undertaken what was our duty under the circumstances, because we established peace between the

Figure 2.13.2.40 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

tribes while the situation of the government remained unchanged.

So he left us, and we awaited the reply from the government and they mocked us and ignored us (may God deride them!). Thus, armies were prepared against us for the second time, two mighty expeditions possessing great strength—such as they announced—God is strongest in prowess and mightiest in giving exemplary punishment.

The two expeditions attacked at the same time, one from the north, consisting of a mighty number of effective troops, fully equipped and with its motorized vehicles, military leaders, with rapid firing guns and other long-range artillery, such as they published in the daily newspapers, and a large number of supporters of *sharīf* Husayn b. ʿAlī under his leadership and that of his two sons, the divinely-protected.

It is well known to everybody what was published at that time, the state had equipped this joint army with provisions and ammunition enough to demolish all the Arab lands. The second of the two came from the south, from Jizān, and all of this strong expedition consisted of the regular [Ottoman] army which was of great strength and size. They announced that these two field expeditions would join together and fall upon any people and lands which came their way.

We put our trust in God, besides whom we have no power and no strength, and we entrusted our matter to Him and said: 'How often a little company has overcome a numerous company, by God's leave! And God is with the patient' [K 2:249].

Truly, God's assistance helped us. To Him is the gratitude for the Arabs' bravery.

Nothing came out of these great announcements and many alarms which the likes of us, desert beduins, do not know the purpose of.

When strategy failed us and we were unable to arrive at a peaceful solution under which the fixed laws of God and His *sharīʿa* would be preserved, we were forced to defend ourselves and the beduins took a defensive stance.

And then, when the combat occurred with both of the armies, the northern and the southern, it became clear that all the thundering and lightning had been nothing and that all the rumours were like empty shells, since these two armies were shaken at

Figure 2.13.2.41 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

the confrontation (God helped us and prepared for them a mighty punishment).

The joint Northern army was afflicted by such reverses that much of its materials, provisions, supply and equipment fell into the hands of the Arabs.

The Honourable *sharīf* (may God bless him) was forced to pursue another plan, which consisted either of splitting kin-groups or certain other ways of influencing people in subtle ways.

In this way he was able to go in the direction of Abhā on a rough road, not much used, far from the usual way connecting Abhā and al-Qunfudha, the road which joins the beduin of the Yemen together.

He preferred it despite its length and its roughness, so he should not suffer any setback until he had entered Abhā by any method, as if his mission was nothing more than entering Abhā without meeting the Yemeni Arabs one more time.

He soon departed from it, and started on a third road, having with him a falcon covered with a black cloth, a road harder and rougher than the one he had come on, travelling in fear and watchfulness. He chose this rough and roundabout route, consisting many difficult mountain passes and with little water (the Baysha road); this road which goes east of al-Ṭāʿif in the direction of Najd, because this is the road of defeated fugitives and those who are fleeing.

I came to know that they were hiding the truth, and they started to claim that their entry (into Abhā) was by force, but we are wise Arabs and we are not concerned with the words of talkers when they are alone in remote lands.

We are men of deeds; we rely on God alone, sufficient for us is He, and a most excellent benefactor.

As for the southern army, it ended up with the battle of al-Ḥafāʿir. Do you know what the battle of al-Ḥafāʿir is?

It was that battle in which the Yemeni tribesmen took up the defence by the wells at al-Ḥafāʿir, three-quarters of an hour from Jizān. The regular government army barricaded itself at Jizān and the surrounding mountains, and they sheltered themselves in their citadels and forts and fixed their artillery on the mountains and the hills near the sea.

They were supported by their war-ships, and they started to

Figure 2.13.2.42 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

harass the beduins, by rapid-firing artillery from the sea and from the land. The beduin were steadfast, surrendering to the judgement of God, and then one Monday in the middle of Jumādā II 1329 [mid-June 1911]<sup>3</sup> the regular armed forces launched an attack with rapid artillery under the protection of artillery which was on the top of the hill and on the warships and in the forts. They performed all sorts of military stratagems.

The tribesmen had no power and no strength except in God most High and Mighty; He is with the steadfast, and they were firm. They remembered God much, and He fulfilled His promise to them, and they were victorious. The wrongdoers shall know the punishment which awaits them.

Yes, the beduin were steadfast and they defended the implementation of the fixed ordinances of religion. So, war continued against that mighty army until all of it perished except for an insignificant portion who were saved by fleeing. There were innumerable wounded, and into the beduins' hands fell guns, ammunition, equipment, artillery and machines which gave them power superior to their [the Ottomans'] power and strength for activity. He who knows the situation can assess it.

The remaining survivors of the two armies returned to Jizān. God imposed on them, and on those who came to their help, wind, armies of the air<sup>4</sup> and plague-like diseases which swept away the survivors and the helpers except for an insignificant few. They were finally forced to return to Jizān, and they rested. God has everything in His hands and He has power over everything.

After all this, it was not long before a letter with proposals of peace arrived for us from his excellency the *wālī* of ʿAsīr, dated before the beginning of the recent events with the Italians.

We executed God's orders, we relied on Him and put our trust in Him.

We sent a messenger to his excellency, one of the leading beduins, to address him with regard to the request.

We provided that messenger with every peaceful proposal,

3 The exact date for the battle at al-Hafāʿir is 13 June 1911; al-Shahhārī, *al-Muṭāmiʿ al-tawassuʿiyya*, 57-8.

4 It is uncertain what is meant by this. Most likely the expression refers to locusts or some disease-bearing insect.

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and we sent a letter with him, expressing our objectives and desires for unity and unanimity, that we wanted to be brothers and helpers for the truth.

On the way, in the vicinity of Abhā, it reached the ears of that messenger that the *wālī* was only planning a deceit, and that he had laid a murderous snare for him.

So, he remained outside of the city where he was safe. He [the messenger] sent a letter to him [the *wālī*] and informed him that he had come, heeding the call for peace, and that he wanted to discuss that, in order to know how the matter would end. God grants success.

His [the *wālī*'s] answer was just to send him [the messenger] a long, extensive message, filled with arrogance, conceit and haughtiness, and not a word of it was without threat and menace and rejection of the agreement. Here is some of what was stated in it, word by word:

'I have received a letter from Ḥusayn Effendi, and in it he states that you have asked for a clarification of conditions with the government, and their modality. I was surprised by this request. This situation causes suspicion to be deep-rooted, and the events which take place now with the infidels<sup>5</sup> suits your purposes. So, no conditions are necessary. What conditions should there be between the government and its citizens? The duty of the citizens is to obey the government and its orders.

We intended, trusting in God, to send a military campaign to crush the rebels and insurgents with force, and to pardon to the obedient and to grant them safe conduct.

Our request for a unified °Asīr was not out of weakness or seeking help from them.

The force, which exceeds 50 battalions gathered in al-Zaydiyya, al-Zuhra and al-Luḥayya. We have with us 17 battalions, and that is enough for every enemy in the Yemen and °Asīr in the interior and the exterior and you know it. In addition you can assess the outcome of rebellion and uprising, etc. etc.'

We have received this message and other messages sent from some of the officials of the government to the Arabs, and in them was more than that [more threats etc.].

5 The *wālī* here refers to the outbreak of the Turkish-Italian war of 1911-12.

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It should be clear to the reader how intense is our regret over the fact that the government officials are of this type. They are the ones who cause the unrest, and whenever it approaches an end they stir it up again. [We also regret] that they always constitute a stumbling block in the way of quelling the unrest—as explained before—especially in such circumstances and such critical times.

May God guide them or give us another people in their place, and may they not be like them.

What does the fair-minded man understand from all this, except that we always work for peace, while the state officials work to destroy the state's foundations. We work for reform, and those deviant ones work to undermine it. We work for the implementation of the pure *sharī'a*, and they work to abolish it and eliminate all traces of it.

What is this calamity, by which God tested the state and the *umma*, by placing it in the hands of this group which seeks to topple it and cause it to fall into a bottomless pit.

How could you have faith, after this, in an evildoer of the same kind as these wicked ones, who purchase their life in this world with their afterlife and block the way of God. They do these deeds to the beduins, and they rush to pour threatening words upon them.

They know the pride and self-esteem of the beduin, and that they will not be content with disgraceful things—in particular when they have the upper hand and have so far been victorious.

They thereby bring victory to God and His messenger, and they persist in the quest for the implementation of the pure *sharī'a* and its restrictions.

They [the beduins] are not doing anything of that which the Turks do. The Arabs perform prayer, give *zakāt* and fast during Ramaḍān, and they observe the commands and heed the prohibitions as far as they are able. Whereas they [the Turks] do none of this. On the contrary you see them turning the mosques into barracks for their soldiers, hospitals for their sick, and into locations for their immoralities and for their games and merriment. Their leaders often enter the mosques together with their dogs, in front of the very eyes of the humble beduin. They perform other godless acts, which I do not have the time to relate here.

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The beduin help God and His messenger, and they do not harm anyone, except for in the sake of God and in the quest to work for the Book of God and the Sunna of His prophet (may God bless him and grant him peace) and for the manifestation of the light of God.

At the same time these others want to extinguish the light of God with their mouths [presumably; with their talk]. God will that His light shine—even though the infidels dislike it. I wish I knew what is required of us and of the Arabs after this!

Should we surrender ourselves to this force which the *wālī* described, and sit and wait until they burn the remainder of our houses, confiscate the rest of Arab property, slaughter our sons and violate our women? (As they promised us in Jizān. God turned their own plot against them and inflicted upon them an evil fortune.)

Or should we hand ourselves over to them and renounce our religion, our worldly life and the hereafter?

Or should we help them to restore the situation to what it was, and wait until God designates for some of those in power who will buy us like some piece of scrap, just like they bought others from Arab lands, like in Tripoli, according to what I have heard?

If we did so, we would in their eyes be the greatest of people and the most excellent of men, whom they reward with a share in their profit. God will give extensive hardships, and he will pour upon us and them an agony which the believers know.

I think every aware Muslim, who wishes well for Islam and for the Muslims, will say that it is our duty to make preparations for defence and not to subject ourselves to jeopardy. Particularly after they set in motion all their armies, from the north and the south with the purpose of attacking us, in the manner the Pasha described in his former letter.

‘But it may be that God will bring thee victory, or some commandment from Him, and then they will find themselves, for that which they kept secret within them, remorseful’ [K 5:52]. ‘O believers, if you help God he will help you, and confirm your feet’ [K 47:7]. ‘But as for the unbelievers, ill chance shall befall them! He will send their works astray’ [K 47:8]. ‘That is because those who disbelieve follow falsehood, and those who

Figure 2.13.2.46 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad



believe follow the truth from their Lord. Even so God strikes similitudes for men' [K 47:3].

The reader will be surprised that this army moving to attack us and their helpers announced what they announced. Nevertheless, they deceived us when they encouraged men, sometimes from their helpers and sometimes our friends, to send private letters to us, requesting a truce with the state. This without there being any sign in these letters of any government officials (even the least of them) having an apparent hand in them.

Despite that, though I uncovered the tricks and knew about the deceit, I kept on answering these letters welcoming the saving of bloodshed, based on practising the noble *sharīʿa* and the implementation of the punishments of the *sharīʿa*. That was a lump in their throat and a mote in their eyes. I would remind whoever wrote to me that before the actual bloodshed between the Arabs and the Turks and before the occurrence of the successive Arab victories, I was in favour of peace, making its basic condition the practice of the *sharīʿa* and implementation of the punishments of the *sharīʿa*. I am surprised because I have not found a way to correspond with the state in a serious way now, so long as its officials behave in the way described above.

Perhaps honourable readers who wish to observe the faith after this will wonder about what would guarantee observance of agreements and non-violation of them, such as before. [The reader will also wonder] about how we could be convinced that such a thing would come about—were it to be that its implementation be imposed by the word of state officials of position and influence whose own aim was treachery. We leave the answer to this to our clever and knowledgeable brothers in the faith. These are some of our matters which we have summed up clearly for you: whoever of our friends comes to us, after a difficult journey on rough roads, he knows what we are doing in our desert; establishing the rituals of religion and regular security to such an extent that one could almost believe that if a man left any of his possessions or goods on the public roads, no one would touch them and no one would covet them.

I need not describe the performance of prayers, Friday and communal prayers, and the remaining rituals of religion that follows from there, devoid of innovation and far from lies and

Figure 2.13.2.47 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

paths of evil. Being in such a state, how can it enter the mind of a sensible person or circulate in the hearts of man, that which I have heard that they allege; that I am an evil hand manipulating wickedness and perhaps being manœuvred by a foreign power. I think that no sensible person could possibly imagine that.

I, however, think that the other states are fully aware that the Arabs are the strongest people in their religion (in particular the Yemeni Arabs) and that nothing unites them more than defence of the heart of the religion, honour and the Arab lands, as is well known. Those lands [the Arab lands] are filled with deserts, wildernesses and mountains. No one can expect to reap any harvest from them, that would justify the opening of a door which would cause much damage to them and which concerns Islam and the Muslims in the east and west, and which is one of the most special of their vital religious affairs,—that is the door of mockery of the legacy of the Messenger of God (may God bless him and grant him peace) and the two Caliphs who succeeded after him (may God be pleased with them both). This door touches one of the most important questions, about which there are many doubts and upon which many eyes are open. God is not unmindful of the acts of the oppressors.

Finally we beg God to set matters right and grant us success in all that is good and help us eliminate the germs of immorality and protect us from the sin of evildoers and cause us to be obedient. ‘So loose not heart, nor fall into despair; for you must gain mastery if you are believers’ [K 3:139].

Written 6 Rabī<sup>ʿ</sup> II 1330 [25 March 1912]

Signed

Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Idrīsī

Figure 2.13.2.48 Public declaration widely distributed by Al-Idrisi in Yemen and abroad

## 2.14. The Treaty of Da‘ān of 8 October 1911

By this time, the Porte was in fact ready to delegate part of its authority to the local chiefs with a prime condition that they remain loyal to Istanbul and preserve the sovereignty of the state. This can be seen, for instance, in the unimplemented treaty with Al-Idrisi according to which he was promised the position of *Qaim Maqam*, or the appointment of Hassan Ibn ‘Aāydh as the assistant of the Ottoman *mutasarrif* in Asir in 1911, as well as the treaty concluded with Ibn Saud in May 1914 according to which he would become the *Wali* and commandant of Najd. However, the Da‘ān Treaty between the Porte and Imam Yahya remains, to a great extent, different from any of the others.

Indeed, although the Imam was given authority over part of the country only, this agreement with the Ottomans remains of significance. According to the agreement, the Imam was given full authority over the northern territories from ‘Amrān and, further north, to Sa‘adah. Shared authority with the Ottomans was granted to the Imam from the area south of ‘Amrān into the Sumarah, further south of Dhamār. The rest of the country remained under the sole authority of the Ottomans. It is possible that the Imam had accepted the agreement after being alarmed by the growth of Al-Idrisi’s power, aided by the support the latter received from Italy at the time. However, this was also a truce agreement that the Porte accepted because of the most serious rebellions they had to contend with in Yemen, at least since the rise of Imam Yahya in 1904. Indeed, while the other chiefs, Ibn ‘Aāydh, Al-Idrisi and Ibn Saud, through the agreements they accepted, were employed by the Porte, the Imam rather achieved recognition of his own power. (Salem, 1984: 516-518. Farah, 2002: pp. 297-298)




Figure 2.14.1 The Treaty of Da'an of 8 October 1911




Figure 2.14.2 The Treaty of Da'an of 8 October 1911




Figure 2.14.3 The Treaty of Da'an of 8 October 1911

### Terms of the Truce of Da‘ān

- the imam to select judges of the Zaydis and to inform the administration thereof;
- the headquarters of the court is to be in Ṣan‘ā’;
- a court of appeal to be organized to look into the complaints presented by the imam;
- decisions on punishment to be approved by the *shaykhs*, sent to Istanbul for approval after the judge fails to achieve reconciliation, and a decree of confirmation to be issued within four months;
- imam to have right to point out ill conduct of officials to the *vali*;
- government to have the right to appoint judges for Shāfi‘i and Ḥanafī Yemenis;
- mixed courts to be organized to look into disputes involving Zaydis and others;
- government to appoint supervisors for courts that seek to adjudicate disputes in villages of the countryside to lessen the burden of traveling to the locality of the fixed court;
- Waqfs and bequests to be under the jurisdiction of the imam;
- government to appoint Shāfi‘i and Ḥanafī judges outside mountain region;
- exempting for ten years levying and collecting taxes from the inhabitants of Arḥab and Khawlān to compensate them for their poverty, property losses and their loyalty;
- *mīri* levies to be collected according to provisions of the Sharī‘ah;
- complaints against tax collectors before the courts or government agencies should entail participation with the judges to investigate and pass necessary judgement;
- Zaydis should have the right to offer gifts to the imam, either directly or through *shaykhs*, or judges;
- the imam is obligated to surrender one-tenth of income to the state;

Figure 2.14.4 The Treaty of Da‘ān of 8 October 1911

- due to its poverty, the region of ‘Ans, which had suffered heavy devastation due to the fighting waged there, should be exempt from taxes for ten years; and
- the imam is to free hostages held from Şan‘ā’ and its environ, ‘Amrān and Ḥarāz.

**Figure 2.14.5 The Treaty of Da‘ān of 8 October 1911**



## **2.15. The Anglo-Idrisi Relationship**

Al-Idrisi was the first Arab chief to throw his lot in with Britain, agreeing to join Britain's war effort against the Turks. He signed with Britain the Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill of 30 April 1915. It is evident that he benefited from the support he received from Britain since the 1915 Treaty, especially as he was able to expand his domain and to attract tribes from different parts of Yemen including the tribes of Hashed and Bakail, considered the main supporters of the Imam Yahya.

### **2.15.1. The Anglo-Idrisi Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill (30 April 1915)**

The treaty is available in (L/P&S/18/B 293 IOR, London), Arabic.





Figure 2.15.1.1 The Anglo-Idrisi Treaty of Friendship and Goodwill (30 April 1915)

**2.15.2. Report on the 1915 Treaty with Al-Idrisi, Foreign and Political Department, Government of India, 20 May 1915, (L/P&S, 18/ B 250a,**



**Figure 2.15.2.1 Report on the 1915 Treaty with Al-Idrisi, Foreign and Political Department**

**IOR, London).**




Figure 2.155.2.2 Report on the 1915 Treaty with Al-Idrisi, Foreign and Political Department

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Eminence Saiyid Muhammad bin Ali bin Muhammad bin Ahmed bin Idris, the Idrisi Saiyid and Amir of Sabia and its environments.

2. Its main objects are to war against the Turks and to consolidate a pact of friendship between the British Government and the Idrisi Saiyid, above-mentioned, and his Tribesmen.

3. The Idrisi Saiyid agrees to attack and to endeavour to drive the Turks from their stations in the Yemen and to the best of his power to harass the Turkish troops in the direction of the Yemen and to extend his territories at the expense of the Turks.

4. The Saiyid's prime objective will be against the Turks only, and he will abstain from any hostile or provocative action against Imam Yahya so long as the latter does not join hands with the Turks.

5. The British Government undertakes to safeguard the Idrisi Saiyid's territories from all attack on the seaboard from any enemy who may molest him; to guarantee his independence in his own domain and at the conclusion of the war to use every diplomatic means in its power to adjudicate between the rival claims of the Idrisi Saiyid and the Imam Yahya or any other rival.

6. The British Government has no desire to enlarge its borders on Arabian soil but wishes solely to see the various Arab rulers living peacefully and amicably together each in his own sphere, and all in friendship with the British Government.

7. As a mark of its appreciation of the work to be performed by the Idrisi Saiyid, the British Government has aided him with both funds and munitions and will continue to assist him in the prosecution of the war so long as it lasts in accordance with the measure of the Idrisi's activities.

8. Finally, while maintaining a strict blockade on all Turkish ports in the Red Sea, the British Government has for some months past been giving the Idrisi Saiyid full and free scope to trade and traffic between his ports and Aden, and this concession the British Government, in token of the friendship existing, will continue uninterruptedly to maintain.

9. This Treaty will be held to be valid after its ratification by the Government of India.

Signed this day Friday, the thirtieth of April 1915, A.D., corresponding with the fiftieth of Jamad Shani 1333 Hijra.

(Sd.) D. G. L. SHAW, *Major-General,*  
*Political Resident, Aden.*

(Sd.) *i.e.,* SAIYID MUSTAFA BIN  
SAIYID ABU'L 'ALI on  
behalf on the Idrisi Saiyid.

(Sd.) H. F. JACOB, *Lieut.-Col.,*  
*First Assistant Resident.*

(Sd.) *i.e.,* SHEIKH MUHAMMAD BIN  
AWAD BA SAHL.

(Sd.) C. R. BRADSHAW, *Major,*  
*General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade.*

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Figure 2.155.2.3 Report on the 1915 Treaty with Al-Idrisi, Foreign and Political Department

### **2.15.3. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.**

- This report was attached to a despatch from the Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, 27 January 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 229, IOR, London).




Figure 2.15.3.1 Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.




Figure 2.155.3.2 Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.



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Report of a Visit to the Idrisi Saiyid Muhammad Bin Ali Bin Muhammad Bin Ahmed at Jazan.

As representative of the Political Resident, Aden, I arrived in H.M.S. *Minto*, Commander Craufurd, R.N., at Jazan, at 12.30 noon on 6th instant. I was accompanied by Colonel Wauhope, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., R.E., who sought topographical information, and Major Bradshaw, General Staff Officer, who came to discover the military situation. The Political Resident's letter of introduction was taken ashore, and later in the day Muhammad bin Yahya Ba Sahi, the Idrisi's Wazir, came aboard to give us welcome and to tender sheep and fowls as a present from the Idrisi. He said his master would see us after dark and on shore. I found that this manoeuvre was due to the Idrisi's desire to disarm his people's prejudice against the foreigner. I remarked that the whole countryside knew of the treaty between the Idrisi and British Government and the close nexus and friendship existing and proved by the monopoly given to the Idrisi *quid* opening of his ports alone to traffic from Aden, Djibouti, Massawa, and Asab. It is a commonplace that this preferential treatment has greatly enhanced the Idrisi's prestige and importance in the Arab world. Earlier in the war certain of the Idrisi's tribesmen, it is said, were averse to his fighting the Turks, and although now the Turk has fallen in Arab estimation, the Idrisi thought it better not to deal too openly with non-Moslems lest the old feeling for the Turks should be re-awakened. Again, the rôle of the Idrisi is a priestly one and too great a familiarity with us might be misinterpreted. To tell the truth, the Idrisi feared loss of caste. It is a fact, however, that during his pact with Italy, no Italian officers were allowed to land on Idrisi soil, and before our arrival at Jazan, the only privileged person to land had been Commander Craufurd of H.M.S. *Minto* on two occasions. For the same reasons the Idrisi would not board the *Minto*.

We got ashore after 6.30 p.m., when two or three officials met us and conducted us to a house hard by, where upstairs in an anteroom the Idrisi met us standing, and after salutations conducted us to an inner room where, himself seated on a couch, he gave us places on chairs each side. (The party included Commander Craufurd, R.N., who was there to watch naval interests). His Wazir, Ba Sahi, was in attendance. This Minister will not allow his master to discuss matters except in his presence. I have known Ba Sahi for several years, and have met him often in Aden. My impression is that the Idrisi depends on his advice and judgment. The Idrisi himself told me that all maritime and shipping affairs were in Ba Sahi's hands; that he himself managed affairs inland. All through the interview, which lasted three hours, the Idrisi constantly turned to his Minister to seek corroboration of his views, and on many a subject broached he would say "For this, please deal with Ba Sahi."

I had an opportunity after the interview to talk a few minutes alone with the Idrisi. I asked him if Ba Sahi were not serving his own interests rather than his master's. He replied rather dubiously and asked if I had any suspicion. He asserted that Ba Sahi was a good man. I quoted the tradition "Al Mustashar Mu'taman," i.e., "It is incumbent to trust one whose advice you seek." The Idrisi felt relieved and said these were his sentiments. I shall touch on Ba Sahi again later.

*Southern Red Sea Patrol Policy.*—I discussed the revised Red Sea patrol policy of 7th December 1914. The Idrisi asked that Khor al Birik (and not Ras Turfa) be regarded as the northern limit of his coastal area for trade and Hahl as the southerly point, though he claims that his territory extends from Hali Point to Buhés, a little south of Hahl. The trade between ports in this area he considers a most valuable asset to secure the goodwill of his maritime subjects. He was confident that no supplies could reach

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Figure 2.155.3.3 Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.




Figure 2.155.3.4 Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.






Figure 2.155.3.6. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.

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*Senussi.*—The Idrisi was anxious to know the Senussi's attitude towards Great Britain. He believed they were hostile and he was surprised.

*Saiyid Mustafa.*—He asked me to write for the presence of Saiyid Mustafa whose advice was of paramount importance to him. He was now in Egypt.

*Idrisi's Person.*—In person the Idrisi is tall and broad and of black complexion. Very courteous and suave and his manners highly polished. He was particularly friendly to us and spoke highly of the British Government and their attitude to the Moslem world. He struck me as markedly intelligent, as is natural, looking to his upbringing and education at Al Azhar. He is, as befitting his position as head of the Ahmediya tarika, an intensely religious man, and spends much of his time in religious exercises. He moves about but little in the daytime and conducts most of his business at night.

*Sheikh of Jazan.*—The Sheikh of Jazan, one Bin Zamin, is a most agreeable old man and very friendly to our warships when they call.

*Sheikh Muhammad Ychiya Ba Sahi.*—I have already said that all maritime and commercial matters are left to Ba Sahi. This is mentioned by Military Intelligence, Cairo, in his Secret telegram E.R. 327, dated 29th December 1915. His partner, Ba Zubeir, lives at Meidi, and these two control the flow of supplies in various directions. Ba Sahi is no lover of the Turks. I think his unique position and the estimation in which he is held by the Idrisi makes him a natural butt for the criticisms of the envious. We have long suspected Ba Sahi to be working for his own private ends, and he is doubtless a wealthy man. It is not feasible to contrive his removal. Nothing has so far been proved of Ba Sahi's nefarious acts.

*Honours to Idrisi.*—I will sum up this already lengthy report by pressing the importance of assisting the Idrisi by every means possible, with guns and by largesse, to impress the tribesmen. I believe it to be a sound investment. I would further suggest he be decorated by Government with a Knighthood. This honour would encourage him and elicit better work. A religious title might, however, be more greatly esteemed.

*Commander Craufurd, R.N.*—Finally, I would eulogise the excellent work, great tact and affability towards the Arabs displayed by Commander Craufurd, R.N., who is very popular in those parts, and who with the Officers of his Ship has been for so long a time in a trying climate and very difficult waters. The Idrisi spoke highly of this Officer, the first one privileged to land on Idrisi soil.

H. F. JACOB, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*  
First Assistant Resident, Aden.

17th January 1916.

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Figure 2.155.3.7. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.




Figure 2.155.3.8. Report by Lieutenant Colonel Jacob on his mission to Al-Idrisi in January 1916.

#### **2.15.4. Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob's visit to Al-Idrisi**

Colonial Jacob visited Al-Idrisi in Jizān, in January 1916. This report on the visit was attached to a despatch from the Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay, 29 January 1916 (L/P&S, 18/ B 228, IOR, London).

B. 228

SECRET.

From Brigadier-General C. H. U. Price, C.B., D.S.O., Political Resident,  
Aden, to the Secretary to Government, Political Department, Bombay.

No. C. 95. Aden Residency,  
29th January 1916.

Sir,  
In continuation of my letter No. C. 80, dated the 27th January 1916, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a letter No. 4657 G.O., dated 29th idem, from the General Officer Commanding, Aden, to the Chief of General Staff, Delhi, forwarding a report from the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, who accompanied Colonel Jacob on his recent visit to the Idrisi Saiyid.

I am forwarding copies of this letter and its accompaniments direct to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, the Foreign and Political Department, Delhi, and His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo.

I have, &c.,

C. H. U. PRICE, *Brigadier-General*,  
Political Resident, Aden.

No. C. 96. Aden Residency,  
29th January 1916.  
Copy forwarded, with compliments, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London.

I have, &c.,

C. H. U. PRICE, *Brigadier-General*,  
Political Resident, Aden.

From the General Officer Commanding, Aden, to the Chief of the  
General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi, India.

4657/55/G.O. Headquarters, Aden,  
29th January 1916.

Sir,  
With reference to my telegram No. 167 A.P. of 3rd instant, I have the honour to submit an extract of a report by Major C. R. Bradshaw, General Staff, Aden, on the Idrissi movement from a military point of view.

2. During November last, the Idrissi informed us of his dispositions, from which it was understood that his intention was to seize Lahiya. He was offered naval co-operation to achieve this object. He pointed out that though the Turks lightly held that place, they assured its safety by the presence of Turkish-Arab forces, well equipped in guns, in strong natural positions flanking his communications to the east and south, and though seizure of the town by coup-de-main would not be a difficult operation, it would result in his own discomfiture, unless his enemies were first ousted from their positions in the hill tracts, which he was not strong enough to effect. This summed up his appreciation of the situation.

3. Shortly after, his force was pressed back to its present position. It is apparent that the Idrissi has no thought of resuming the offensive. He is devoting his attention to consolidating his political influence, and to winning over influential tribes, through the assistance offered to him by our treaty and trade policy.

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Figure 2.15.4.1 Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob's visit to Al-Idrisi






Figure 2.155.4.2. Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob's visit to Al-Idrisi





Figure 2.155.4.3 Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob's visit to Al-Idrisi





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to get Weterli ammunition, or give him a large number of rifles with ammunition we can supply, his position must remain unsound.

The Idrissi has about one-third of his forces and guns disposed on his northern border, and two-thirds in the southern. He is slightly stronger than the Turks on his northern border, and with enough gun ammunition would probably try and regain ground towards Abha and Kufidah.

Although he cannot do much just now he is still of military value as an ally, by the mere fact of his unfriendliness to the Turk and Imam, rather than by any action he can take. He cannot in his present situation be relied to draw any Turks northwards from Lahej, as the threat he creates is not sufficient.

I have brought patterns of the shell he needs most, that is field and mountain.

\* \* \* \* \*

Figure 2.155.4.5. Report by the General Staff Officer, Aden Brigade, on Colonel Jacob's visit to Al-Idrisi

### **2.15.5. British commitments to the Idrisi**

Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918, (CAB 24/68/85, TNA, London and L/P&S, 18/ B 293, IOR, London).




Figure 2.15.5.1. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918




Figure 2.155.5.2 Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918

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The India Office replied on the 17th February, 1915, by approving the Viceroy's action, but requesting that they should be given an opportunity of considering the terms of the treaty in substance.\*

On the 9th March, 1915, the Resident at Aden telegraphed again :—†

"Idrisi representative here is extremely anxious to make a treaty of friendship on the basis of security of his seaboard against all enemies, and our diplomatic support after conclusion of hostilities to effect his autonomy against all rivals. All this is as already intimated reasonable, and a necessary preliminary to a pact." The telegram then proceeds to urge that certain additional requests for arms on the part of the Idrisi shall be granted. "As representative wishes to leave for Djezan in three days, I ask for early sanction. After putting case before his master this agent will return to Aden to conclude a treaty."

In answer to this telegram, the Government of India instructed the Resident as follows on the 13th March, 1915 :—‡

"You should inform Idrisi's agent that, before the Government of India can contemplate the gift of further arms or money, they must first see the draft agreement which Idrisi is prepared to conclude with them, and have some positive evidence of the co-operation he is prepared to offer in return for such agreement."

And on the 15th March, 1915, the Viceroy telegraphed in the same sense to the India Office.§

On the 16th March, 1915, however, the India Office replied to the Viceroy approving the proposals of the Resident in his telegram of the 9th March, 1915.||

The terms of a treaty were accordingly drafted at Aden by the British authorities there and the Idrisi's Minister, and on the 30th April, 1915, the Viceroy transmitted to the India Office a report from the Resident, dated the 28th April, 1915,¶ announcing that a treaty had been concluded with the Idrisi, subject to ratification by the Government of India, and that the Idrisi would lose no time in acting against the Turks.

A copy of the treaty, signed, and dated the 30th April, 1915, was communicated to the Foreign Office by the India Office on the 26th May, 1915.\*\* The text of it, in the form in which it was eventually ratified, is appended to the present memorandum, but a summary of its main provisions may be given here :—

Article 1. Names of the signatories.

Art. 2. The objects are—(a) to war against the Turks and (b) to make a pact of friendship between His Majesty's Government and the Idrisi and his tribesmen.

Art. 3. The Idrisi is to attack the Turks in the Yemen and extend his territories at their expense.

Art. 4. He will abstain from hostile or provocative action against the Imam so long as the latter does not join the Turks.

Art. 5. "His Majesty's Government undertake to safeguard the Idrisi's territories from all attack on the seaboard from any enemy who may molest him; to guarantee his independence in his own domain; and, at the conclusion of the war, to use every diplomatic means in their power to adjudicate between the rival claims of the Idrisi and the Imam, or any other rival."

Art. 6. "His Majesty's Government have no desire to enlarge their borders on Arabian soil," but desire that there shall be friendly relations (a) between all the Arab rulers, each in his own sphere; and (b) between each of them and His Majesty's Government.

Art. 7. His Majesty's Government promise to assist the Idrisi with arms and money, in proportion to the part played by the Idrisi in the war.

Art. 8. His Majesty's Government, while blockading all Turkish ports, will continue to leave trade open between the Idrisi ports and Aden.

Art. 9. Ratification by the Government of India is necessary to make this treaty valid.

On the 20th May, 1915, the Government of India commented on these terms as follows in a despatch to the India Office :—††

"The only point that appears to require definite qualification is the expression 'Arabian soil' in article 6, as this scarcely falls in with our position in Mesopotamia. If the words 'Western Arabia' were substituted for 'Arabian soil' this objection would be removed, and our intentions would be sufficiently defined in the treaty.

\* 20148/15. † 28470/15. ‡ 50398/15. § 30960/15. || 38646/15.  
 ¶ 58828/15. \*\* 68940/15. †† 75794/15.

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Figure 2.155.5.3. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918






Figure 2.155.5.4. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918

*Relation of Commitments to the Idrisi to British Desiderata.*

The British desiderata involved in this treaty with the Idrisi appear to be (a) the extension of the British "trucial system" to the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, and (b) the maintenance and improvement of our position at Aden.

The general policy underlying both these desiderata is expressed in article 6 of the treaty: but, as the Government of India remarked in their despatch of the 20th May, 1915, the terms seem to lack precision.

As regards (a) it is an essential condition in a trucial treaty that the independent ruler who is a party to it shall have no relations with foreign Powers except through His Majesty's Government, and shall not lease or alienate to them any portion of his territory. In the present treaty this is nowhere laid down, and the India Office, in their letter of the 17th June, 1915, to the Foreign Office covering the Government of India's despatch of the 20th May, 1918, justly remarked in this connection (79794/15):—

"The matter referred to in paragraph 5 of the despatch (British trade in Idrisi ports and territory) will, in Mr. Chamberlain's opinion, be more suitably dealt with after the war, when some further treaty with the Idrisi will probably be necessary in any case, e.g., to ensure that he does not cede any port or island to a foreign Power, and to regulate the arms traffic."

Again, in the stricter forms of trucial treaty, His Majesty's Government undertake to keep the peace between the other party to the treaty and his neighbours possessing similar treaties with His Majesty's Government, while the other party undertakes not to resort to force for the settlement of disputes, but to refer them to His Majesty's Government for arbitration.

In the present treaty His Majesty's Government merely undertake to endeavour, by diplomatic means, to adjudicate between the claims of the Idrisi and his neighbours. This was perhaps the most we could do at the time when the treaty was drafted, since neither the Sherif of Mecca nor the Imam of Sanaa were at that time in relations with us. But now that the Sherif has made an alliance with us, and the Imam has approached us with this object, it becomes important that we should place our relations with these three rulers as far as possible on an equal footing, and assume a greater control over their relations with one another.

The difficulties with which we shall be confronted are illustrated by the dispute in 1916 between the Idrisi and the Sherif over the possession of Kunfida (182183/16 and 215153/16 (No. 142)), in which the Idrisi accepted our award provisionally, but only subject to reconsideration, under article 5 of our treaty, at the conclusion of the war.

The still more difficult problem of demarcation between the Idrisi and the Imam was raised by the Resident at Aden in July of the same year (183274/16 and 183783/16), but this was deprecated by the Viceroy as premature (186686/16).

Whatever settlement of these questions we may succeed in making, fresh demarcation and allegiance disputes between these three rulers will continually be arising, and it is submitted that His Majesty's Government will not be able to deal with them effectively unless they conclude a trucial treaty on stricter lines with the Imam, and supplement their treaty with the Idrisi, and their still more indefinite arrangements with the Sherif, in this direction.

As regards trade, again, His Majesty's Government guarantee the Idrisi facilities at Aden under article 3, while there is no corresponding guarantee for British trade in the Idrisi's ports and territory. The Government of India, however, pointed out in their despatch of the 20th May, 1915, that this may be regarded as implicitly covered by the "pact of friendship" laid down in article 1.

Finally, as regards (b) the position of Great Britain at Aden, it may perhaps be doubted whether the words "Western Arabia" in the English text of article 6, and "Yemen" in the Arabic, do strictly admit of any territorial enlargement of our Protectorate. And our case on this point is prejudiced by our negotiations with King Husein. For in his first letter of July 1915 to Sir H. McMahon, Husein, while he excepted the Aden Protectorate from the boundaries he claimed for Arab independence, made no reference to rectifications of the Aden frontier; and Sir H. McMahon, when, in his letter of the 24th October, 1915, he accepted the proposed boundaries, subject to modifications in Syria, implicitly pledged himself, as regards Aden, to the *status quo*.

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Figure 2.155.5.5. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918




Figure 2.155.5.6. Memorandum on British commitments to the Idrisi by the Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, November 1918

## **2.16. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs.**

This memorandum was prepared for the FO by Mr W. J. Childs in spring 1916, and would be updated in May 1935. While it confirmed that Asir formed the fourth district of the *Vilayet* of Yemen, it could be considered as an early text in which Asir was regarded as a separate entity due to it being located beyond the Ottomans' control. Furthermore, seven autonomous areas in the Arabia Peninsula were identified, among them Al-Idrisi's control over Asir (FO 371/ 6238, TNA, London. Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 102-120).

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### THE SEVEN INDEPENDENT ARABIAN STATES.<sup>(1)</sup>

THE purpose of this paper is to give a brief outline of each of the seven independent Arabian States at the time of the Arab rising against the Turks in June 1916. As the part played by the rulers of these States depended largely on the physical character and economic resources, the manner and life of the people and the form of faith held by them, it has been necessary to touch upon these factors. The regions of South-Eastern Arabia, including the Aden Protectorate, the Hadramaut, the Sultanate of Oman, the Trucial Coast and Qatar, which are in effect cut off from the remainder of the peninsula by the Great Desert, and therefore played little part in the ambitions of the greater Arab rulers and the consequent political and military issues, are excluded.

The seven autonomous areas referred to are :—

- (1) The Imamate of the Yemen ruled by the Imam Yahya.
- (2) The Principate of Asir ruled by the Idrisi.
- (3) The Emirate of Mecca (or the Hejaz) ruled by Husein, Emir and Sherif of Mecca.
- (4) The Emirate of Nejd, ruled by Ibn Saud, Emir of Riyadh.
- (5) The Sheikhdom of Koweit, ruled by the Sheikh of Koweit.
- (6) The Emirate of Jebel Shammar, ruled by Ibn Rashid, Emir of Hail.
- (7) The vague territory containing the Oasis of Jauf, and various outlying oases, in possession of Nuri Bey esh Shalan, Paramount Chief of the Ruwalla.

At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 these seven States were more or less autonomous areas. Each area was vaguely defined, each peopled by a group of loosely united tribes, and each governed by a personal ruler who received the varying degrees of allegiance, which the self-interest of the tribes prompted and which the ruler found possible or politic to enforce.<sup>(2)</sup> Each area, except those of Jebel Shammar, Koweit and Jauf, had a distinct political history extending back for more than a century, and, in the case of Mecca, for many centuries. Each had political aspirations prompted, not only by the ambitions of its rulers, but by obvious considerations of advantages for the tribal group, and each had its own particular and traditional enemies and allies. In differing degree, too, these embryonic States were subjected to exterior influence, exerted chiefly by the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain.

#### I.—*The Imamate of the Yemen.*

Though chiefly a mountainous country, the Yemen is the most fertile and closely settled area in Arabia, and in 1916 contained a population of about a million. The capital is Sana. The inhabitants of the highland Yemen, a race of hardy and warlike cultivators, hold the Zeid creed, a schismatic form of Shiahism judiciously modified in the direction of Sunnism. The lowland population, on the other hand, are chiefly Orthodox Sunnis. In theory the position of the ruling Imam is that of an elective spiritual leader, but in practice the office has tended to become hereditary.

Turkish administration regarded the Yemen as part of the Turkish vilayet of the name. The whole vilayet comprised the three sanjaks of Sana, Hodeida and Taiz in the mediatised province of the Yemen; the fourth, Asir, formed part

<sup>(1)</sup> This memorandum was prepared by the late Mr. W. J. Childs and found among his papers. A few modifications and additions have been made to bring it up to date. May 1935.

<sup>(2)</sup> Complications existed in consequence of a custom well recognised in Arabia by which tribes occupying land within one autonomous area would sometimes prefer to give theoretical allegiance to the ruler of another autonomous area, as being more distant and therefore less likely to exercise an unwelcome authority.

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Figure 2.166.1 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.2 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.3 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs

of Khaibar. This boundary was accepted by the Ottoman Government and supported by the demands of religious prejudice, which forbade Christians to use the Hejaz Railway farther south than Medain Saleh, just outside the lower boundary in question, unless for special official reasons. The Hejaz, so defined, had a length from north to south exceeding 600 miles, and a depth inland, including Khaibar, of about 200 miles. The vilayet was divided into four kazaa: Yambo, Rabigh, Jedda and Lith.

Physically, this western littoral of Arabia comprised, in a broad view, a belt of coastal lowland, a parallel belt of mountain and highland, and then a parallel belt of falling country which merges into the interior plateau of Arabia. The principal surface characteristic of the Hejaz is a general barrenness due to lack of moisture. Oases are few and small; the largest the one in which Medina stands. The total population in 1918 was estimated as less than 1 million. Only one-sixth of the inhabitants are settled in towns and on the land; the remainder are Bedouins, partly or wholly nomadic.

Various circumstances combined to place the Hejaz in a position by itself among the autonomous areas of Arabia. It is the Holy Land of Islam, and its two holiest cities of Mecca and Medina, respectively the birthplace and burial place of Mahomet, are the chief shrines of pilgrimage for the great Sunni sections of the Prophet's followers. This accidental endowment has determined the whole subsequent course of the country's history. The annual pilgrimage of scores of thousands directly or indirectly provided the means of existence for a large proportion of the population.<sup>(\*)</sup> The attraction of the Holy Places for Moslems led to the construction of the Hejaz Railway to Medina in 1908, and though nominally an act of piety, this extension from Damascus, as part of the Turkish railway system, had far-reaching political and military aims, for it made Hejaz more accessible to Turkish arms than any other portion of Arabia. Further, the importance of the Holy Places in the world of Islam conferred upon the holder of the Emirate and Sherifate of Mecca, which included the Hejaz, a standing and influence vastly greater than that of a merely local Arabian ruler. The position of the Emir and Sherif<sup>(\*)</sup> of Mecca, indeed, combined both temporal and religious power. For the "reigning head of the dominant sherifial family is *ex officio* Chief of the Prophets' tribe, the Qoreish, and Hereditary Keeper of the Holy Places." It should be noted, however, that the religious bases of sherifial power lay not in any divine attribution, but in reverence for descent from Mahomet and respect for the sherif as an individual who had been entrusted with such lofty duties as were his by right.

The Emirate of Mecca dates from the 10th century and was an outcome of disintegration which overtook the early caliphial rule of the Moslem world. From that period until the close of the 18th century the Emirate was always the *de facto* power in the Hejaz. The Ottoman effort to exercise suzerainty, which began in 1538, was effective only while the high fighting prestige of Turkish arms continued; with the decline of that prestige at the end of the 17th century Turkish power in the Hejaz also declined, until, in 1783, it was represented by a single garrison precariously holding the port of Jedda. But from this time the Emirate was confronted by dangers more serious than any heretofore. The pilgrims of the Haj were first attacked by Wahabi raiders from Nejd in 1783, an outrage many times repeated in subsequent years, despite the Emir of Mecca. In 1803 a Wahabi expedition took and sacked Mecca itself, and, as an incident of the raid, beheaded twenty sherifs. In 1804 another expedition assaulted and took Medina. At this stage the great pilgrim caravans from all parts of the Mahometan world ceased. In 1810 the Wahabi Emir again entered the Holy Cities, plundered the Tomb of Mahomet at Medina, which he caused to be opened, and broke the Kaaba (the Black Stone) at Mecca in pieces. Spoliation of the Faithful on pilgrimage, complete interruption of the Haj, outrage upon the sacred shrines of Islam, at last moved the Ottoman Sultan to action. As Protector of all Moslems he did what in him lay and Turkish forces being unavailable, he sent his Mahomet Ali from Egypt against the Wahabis, an adventure which the latter, with an alert eye to his own ambitions for independence, gladly undertook. The

(\*) In normal pre-war times the pilgrimage accounted for an annual influx of nearly half a million persons into Hejaz.

(\*) "Grand Sherif of Mecca" was a European form of title. Arabs called the ruler of Mecca Emir, and addressed him as Beyyidna (our Lord).

Figure 2.166.4 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs






Figure 2.166.5 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.6 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs

At an early stage in the negotiations with Great Britain, Husein had received vague encouragement both from Lord Kitchener and Sir H. McMahon, the British High Commissioner at Cairo, to make assumption of the Caliphate one of his purposes. He was careful, however, to avoid adopting any open policy in this direction; he always spoke of the Caliphate as being an office to be filled in this the choice of Islam, but there can be no question that it was a position which not only he himself secretly desired but his ambitious son, Abdullah, avowedly sought it for him.

After the tentative prompting to Husein to seek the Caliphate given by Lord Kitchener and Sir H. McMahon in the message of the 31st October, 1914, (\*) His Majesty's Government left no doubt that they regarded the question of the Caliphate as one for Moslems alone. They restated this traditional British policy explicitly in a telegram to Sir H. McMahon on the 14th April, 1915. On the 17th November, 1915, they warned him to avoid "all possibility of being involved in any question concerning the Caliphate." The subject was accordingly ignored by Sir H. McMahon in subsequent negotiations.

In the agreement which Great Britain eventually reached with the Emir, his territorial demands were conceded with certain limitations and reservations. The British protectorate of Aden, the British-protected island sheikhdom of Bahrein and the south-eastern part of Asia Minor were excluded, limitations to which the Emir agreed. Great Britain also specifically excluded Western Syria and made reservations regarding the Vilayets of Bagdad and Basra in Mesopotamia, but on these points the Emir temporised, and though the validity of the British reservations is not open to doubt, the agreement did not contain the Emir's full acceptance of the reservations. Another important British limitation, that nothing in the agreement should prejudice the rights of other Arab rulers then in treaty or about to execute treaties with Great Britain, was also left in a somewhat similar position. Several old treaties between His Majesty's Government and Arab States on the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf were already in force. A treaty had also been signed with the Idrisi of Asir on the 30th April, 1915, and another, with Ibn Saud of Nejd, was concluded on the 26th December of the same year. The Emir's letters nowhere show an unequivocal acceptance of the limitations imposed on him in regard to these treaties.

This matter becomes of particular interest in considering subsequent relations between Husein and other Arab rulers. The reservation, in fact, struck deeply at the Emir's ambition to unite the various Arab States, for, as far as those in treaty with Great Britain were concerned, compulsion was ruled out, and unity of the Arab race could be achieved only by friendly consent.

Subject to these limitations and reservations, Great Britain in effect undertook to recognise and support Arab independence in the territories proposed by the Emir of Mecca and to aid him with money, arms and munitions. For his part the Emir undertook to spare no efforts to attach all Arab peoples to the cause of the Allies and to give military assistance to the best of his ability. He also undertook not to make peace without the agreement of Great Britain. These broad terms having been arranged, and money, arms and munitions supplied by Great Britain, Husein and his four sons raised the Hejazi tribes in insurrection against Turkish rule on 5th June, 1916. Two days later the Emir issued a proclamation denouncing the Turkish Government as dominated by the Committee of Union and Progress and proclaiming the independence of the Hejaz.

#### IV.—*Emirate of Nejd ruled by Ibn Saud, Emir of Riyadh.*

Of all the autonomous Arab areas with which this paper deals, the Emirate of Nejd came least under Turkish influence and power. It was too remote, too inaccessible, too poor, to offer permanent attraction for Turkish conquest and occupation. Nevertheless, it did not altogether escape. The hostile acts of its own rulers courted Ottoman intervention, and in 1817 an Egyptian army, on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan, took and destroyed the capital and ensured Egyptian occupation of a kind for a generation. But thereafter Egyptian and Ottoman influence ceased. Upon this vicarious occupation rested the chief Ottoman claim to sovereignty in Central Arabia. Later, Turkish attempts to establish effective occupation were indeed made, but with little more than verbal pretension to success, as when, in 1871, Midhat Paasha occupied Haas, the Persian Gulf, the province of Nejd, and on the strength of that achievement

(\*) For this correspondence, see Confidential 18778.

Figure 2.166.7 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs

was styled "victor of Nejd," and when Feivzi Pasha, in 1906, operating in support of the Emir of Hail, hoisted the Ottoman flag in Qasim, the north-western province of Nejd, but did not keep it flying for more than a few months. In 1913, too, the Turkish Government, still clinging to the theory that Nejd was an Ottoman province, and confronted with hostile action in Hasa by the Emir of Nejd, sought escape from an embarrassing situation by giving the Emir the title of "Vali of Nejd," and condoning his aggression. The Emir attached no value to the honour, which he seems to have accepted as marking Turkish acquiescence in his opportune and profitable conquest of Hasa and Qatif.

Territorially, at the time of the Arab rising, the boundaries of Nejd, except upon the Persian Gulf and towards Koweit, were indeterminate. From east to west it extended from the Persian Gulf to those doubtful regions where the authority of the ruler of Nejd was in rivalry with that of the ruler of the Hejaz. In the south it bordered on the Great Desert and the southern continuation of the debatable lands claimed also by the Hejaz. In the north-east it reached the territory of the Shammar tribes, who gave allegiance to the Emir of Hail. The central portion of Nejd, the area from which the State derived the main part of its strength, comprises a long chain of oases scattered from north to south of the plateau of Jabal Tuwaiq or its eastward flank. Here is the district called Aridh, in which stands Riyadh, the capital of Nejd. The chain of oases, with separating intervals of steppe—which is something better than desert—covers an area of about 10,000 square miles. Dependent on this main group, but outside the area in which they lie, are other and smaller groups of oases to the south and west.

In a comprehensive sense Nejd occupies a part of the great plateau of Arabia which falls gradually from west to east, with higher masses and hills imposed upon its surface. The long and extensive tract of sometimes very broken country known as Jabal Tuwaiq, which forms the backbone of Nejd, and by the precipitation it ensures access for the great group of oases, is the chief of these uplifted masses. The eastern portion of Nejd, the lately regained province of Hasa, continues the general fall from the interior to a low-lying coastal plain upon the Persian Gulf, but also contains tracts of high ground and hills. This province possesses a water supply exceptional for Arabia. Indeed, in the great oases of Hasa and Qatif, springs and streams abound and make these districts the richest in Nejd.

Any approximate estimate of the total population of Nejd is impossible. The central 10,000 square miles of oasis country, at the period under review, certainly did not contain more than 250,000 souls, almost entirely settled on the land. The province of Hasa had 150,000, two-thirds of whom were settled, and one-third nomadic. The population of Nejd, exclusive of Hasa, where Shi'ahs predominate, hold the Sunni belief of Islam. But they are Sunnis with a difference. Nejd is the home of Wahabism, "an ascetic revivalist movement among Moslems who sympathise with the strict but orthodox Hanbali school of Sunnism." (\*) Wahabis are, in fact, the militant Puritans of Islam, to whom the sword is the appointed means of argument, conversion, or purification against Moslems who will not voluntarily accept the Wahabi teachings. Upon this primary motive for armed aggression, a motive at first strictly religious, were easily grafted the secular ambitions of Wahabi rulers, and, on the part of the people, a sense of unity, born of geographical isolation and success in arms, which had in it something of a national consciousness.

The circumstances attending human existence in the central oasis group of Nejd contributed the ample basis upon which Wahabism flourished and won its successes. Here was a population of cultivators and herdsmen, isolated, self-supporting, but poor, devoid of commercial interests and entirely unaffected by the cautious and sobering influences exerted by the presence of a trading class, even in a primitive state of society. It was a population by nature hardy, bellicose in spirit, men of their hands who supported their religious convictions with vehemence. It was, further, a population centrally placed with regard to other communities, but prevented by distance and intervening desert from ready intercourse with neighbours who differed from them in large details of spiritual belief.

(\*) D. G. Hogarth, *Handbook of Arabia*, volume I.

Figure 2.166.8 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.9 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.10. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.11. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.12. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs






Figure 2.166.13. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs

Kitchener's message of the 31st October, 1914. It was an encouraging response, but it was no more. Indeed, at the beginning of January 1915, the Emir of Mecca was uncertain on which side he could range himself with the greater prospect of advantage. His inclinations and judgment impelled him to support Great Britain, but Turkish garrisons were on his land, holding all his chief cities; the war had not begun well for the Allies; he had everything to lose by taking part in unsuccessful hostilities against the Turk.

While thus in doubt he received Ibn Saud's reply to Abdullah's letter. That the Emir of Nejd's advice carried weight in the councils of Mecca is not open to question. Thus encouraged to withstand Turkish pressure, the Chief of the Prophet's Tribe continued to temporise; sixteen months were to elapse before he actually rose in arms against the Turks. Meanwhile, he made no move, and those who looked to Mecca for a lead saw no sign, drew their own conclusions, and the *jihad* became merely Turkish in its authority and left Arabia unstirred. Nor was Mecca's silence at this critical time without its influence in the wider Islam.

But to return to events in Nejd. Ibn Saud had on the 19th January already begun operations against Ibn Rashid, who, with his pro-Turkish confederation of tribes, had entered Northern Nejd. The two forces, in great strength for Arabia, encountered at Jerab, near Majmaa, on the 24th January. The battle resulted in a draw, a result more favourable for Ibn Saud than for Ibn Rashid. Hostilities were tacitly suspended, but Ibn Rashid was put out of action; he could not join the Turks as he had intended and could not take part in the early campaign in Mesopotamia, when his appearance might have added considerably to His Majesty's Government's difficulties. A formal peace was signed by the rival Emirs on the 10th June, 1915. In this treaty Ibn Rashid recognised all Ibn Saud's claims except that of over-lordship and confined his own jurisdiction to Hail, its villages, and the Shammar tribes. It is clear too that he renounced all pretensions to Qasim. But the treaty did not have permanent results, and relations between the two Emirs remained a condition of armed neutrality varied by actual hostilities.

Later in 1915 Ibn Saud had to deal with a serious rising in Northern Hasa by the Ajman tribe. He suppressed the movement, but lost his brother in the fighting and was wounded himself. He then had trouble in Southern Hasa with the Al Murrah tribe, whom he attacked because it had sided with Ibn Rashid. His difficulties with these tribes arose from the strictness of his rule compared with that of the Turks. During these struggles the British Government assisted the despatch of arms and ammunitions from Bahrein to Ibn Saud and in October presented him with 1,000 rifles and made him a loan of £20,000.

In November 1915 the Sherif of Mecca seized the opportunity presented by Ibn Saud's embarrassments to send Abdullah with a considerable force into Western Nejd. Nominally, the purpose of this singularly ill-timed incursion was to collect taxes from the Ateibah tribe, but subsequent information shows that the real object was political and that it was to support the Sherif's interests or pretensions in Southern Qasim, a district claimed by the Ateibah. The force got within 70 miles of Riyadh, on the Mecca-Riyadh road, before it retired. As might have been expected, the movement excited Ibn Saud's violent indignation and caused him to protest to His Majesty's Government that, if they could not keep the Sherif's activities within bounds, he would have to do so himself. No untoward results ensued, however, except the creation of further illwill on the part of the Emir of Nejd.

Meanwhile, Ibn Saud followed a pro-British and anti-Turkish policy, and negotiations for a treaty with His Majesty's Government were continued; the reasons making such a treaty desirable from the British point of view are stated in a communication from the India Office to the Foreign Office, dated the 30th January, 1915:—

"The desirability of concluding a treaty with Emir Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud) follows not merely from the exigencies of the moment, which made it necessary to pay an immediate price for his friendship, but also from the general situation that will be created in the Persian Gulf in the event, as the result of the present war, of the disappearance of Turkish rule from Basra, to which His Majesty's Government are pledged. It may be anticipated that the Emir of Nejd will be left master not only of Central Arabia, but of a

Figure 2.166.14. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs

long strip of the coast, and in the interest of peace and order it will be essential for the Power that controls the Gulf to have a working agreement with him. The extent, therefore, to which his claims must be met must be measured not only by the immediate services, which he may be expected to render, but also by the potential powers for mischief which, in the event of success, he will possess, and if permanently estranged will doubtless exercise . . . . .

Negotiations for the treaty were protracted, but the instrument was eventually signed at Qatif by Sir P. Cox and the Emir on the 26th December, 1915.<sup>(10)</sup> Ratification by the Viceroy and Governor-General of India followed on the 18th July, 1916. By this treaty His Majesty's Government recognised Ibn Saud as independent ruler of Nejd, Hasa, Qatif and Jubail, and engaged to support him against aggression by any foreign Power "to such extent and in such a manner as the British Government, after consulting Ibn Saud, may consider most effective for protecting his interests and countries." For his part Ibn Saud covenanted to have no relations with any foreign Power, and absolutely not to cede, sell, mortgage, lease or dispose of any part of his territories to any foreign Power or the subjects of a foreign Power without the consent of His Majesty's Government.

Three other points in particular may be noticed regarding the provisions of the treaty:—

- (a) That article I, after defining the several "countries" recognised by His Majesty's Government as being under the independent rule of Ibn Saud, added the words "and their dependencies and territories, which will be discussed and determined hereafter . . . . ." These words appear to have committed His Majesty's Government to arbitrate in any territorial disputes that might arise between Ibn Saud and his neighbours—King Husein, for instance—and, by implication, might have taken them even further.
- (b) That the India Office, soon after the treaty was ratified, laid down the important decision that "we cannot admit that article II (promising His Majesty's Government's support against aggression by any foreign Power) is binding on us against other Arabs."
- (c) That article VII engaged His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud to conclude a "further detailed treaty . . . . ."

We must now consider the relations which existed between Ibn Saud and the Emir of Mecca from the outbreak of war in 1914 to the beginning of the Arab rising in June 1916. This period covers the secret negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Emir. Of these negotiations Ibn Saud was unaware, though the ultimate success or failure of the action contemplated in the negotiations could not leave him unaffected. Both Emirs feared the Turks (Husein, once pro-Turkish, having adopted a hostile policy since 1913), and would have been glad to see them ejected from Arabia; but each was jealous of the other as an Arab ruler and rival chief, whose large ambitions could only be satisfied at the other's expense. Moreover, fertile sources of discord lay in the uncertainty of the claims and obligations of each in the absence of boundaries, and in the fluctuating allegiance of nomad tribes, who passed from one region to another with slight concern for questions of sovereignty. Such matters notwithstanding, the two Emirs had been drawn together immediately before the war by their common dread of the Turks, and were in amicable correspondence in the spring of 1914. In January 1915 Ibn Saud, in conversation with Captain Shakespear, declared it as his view that the Caliphate would revert to the family of the Prophet, of which Emir Husein was the representative, if it dropped from the hand of the Sultan of Turkey. This expression of opinion can hardly be taken as indicating unfriendliness towards Husein on the part of the speaker.

Towards the close of 1915 a definite change appeared in the relations of the two Emirs. The expedition despatched to Qasim and Sedeir by the Emir of Mecca, under his son Abdullah in 1910, has already been noticed. In November 1915 Abdullah again appeared in Nejd with a Hejazi force, this time on the direct route from Mecca to Riyadh, for the ostensible purpose of collecting dues from the Ateibah tribe, over whom the Emir of Mecca claimed sovereignty. To

(10) Printed as appendix to F.O. 11820\*.

Figure 2.166.15. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.16. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.17. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.18. FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs




Figure 2.166.19 FO Memorandum prepared by Mr W. J. Childs

## **2.17. Anglo-Idrisi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)**

This new agreement between Al-Idrisi and the British Government was concluded on 22 January 1917.



*This Document is the property of the Secretary of State for India.*

**SECRET.**

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**ARABIA.**

**Agreement with the Idrisi Saiyid regarding the Farasan Islands and other Matters.**

From Major-General J. M. Stewart, C.B., Political Resident, Aden, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, Delhi.

C. 59.

Aden Residency,  
26th January 1917.

Sir,

I have the honour to submit the supplementary agreement (in original with translation) concluded with the Idrisi. I also forward herewith a memorandum on this agreement which has been drawn up at my request by Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob.

2. I trust that the agreement will meet with the approval of His Excellency the Viceroy and His Majesty's Government. The main object of the agreement, as set forth in paragraph III., has been secured, and without making further concessions than, as brought out in the memorandum, the situation required.

3. It must be recollected that the Idrisi is now in a very difficult frame of mind. The Kunfida affair still rankles deep; the rapidity of our action in Farasan is to him uncalled for and unintelligible, and our comparative inaction in Arabia is misunderstood. Fixed, too, is his conviction that when peace is concluded the old friendship of England and Turkey will secure for the latter very favourable terms, and allow her to concentrate her power against her present Arab enemies.

4. Extreme patience, ready appreciation, and great knowledge of the Arab were required in effecting this agreement. All were fully displayed by Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob, and I am glad to have this opportunity of bringing his services to notice.

I have, &c.,

J. M. STEWART, Major-General,  
Political Resident, Aden.

C. 60.

Aden Residency,  
26th January 1917.

Copy forwarded, with compliments, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, London, with two copies of the agreement, and memorandum.

J. M. STEWART, Major-General,  
Political Resident, Aden.

**FARASAN ISLANDS.**

A SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT AND SAIYID MUHAMMAD BIN ALI BIN MUHAMMAD BIN AHMED BIN IDRISI, THE IDRISI.

I. This agreement in no way annuls the conditions of the Treaty already concluded between the aforesaid Parties, and dated 30th April 1915, A.D., corresponding to 15th Jumad al Thani 1333 A.H.

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**Figure 2.17.1 Anglo-Idrisi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)**




Figure 2.177.2. Anglo-Idrisi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)

them very much to the fore in Arabia and holding their own. He cites Lahej, Kunfida and the failure there; the slow progress of the Sherif of Mecca, and finally Mesopotamia, and he doubts our ability to dislodge them.

His fears to-day are two-fold. He believes that—

- (1) his refusal to treat with any other Power, and his promise not to dispose of Farasan Islands and rights therein, will draw upon him Turkish animosity. The Turks up to now have watched his coquetry with us but believe they can win him back to the fold hereafter. Let them once come to know of his closer "nexus" with us as regards the Islands and they will regard him as completely ostracised. There is no arguing with a fanatic of such preconceived notions;
- (2) this engagement will deprive him of future assistance in arms and ammunition from Djibouti and Massowa, both of which places have for many years very considerably assisted in the arms traffic.

Cut off from these two sources of supply to whom, he asks, should he apply for the necessary sinews of war, and whom should he approach hereafter except the British Government? The Government must therefore take the place of these two Powers.

The sole Power the Idrisi fears now, and after the war, is Turkey aided by Germany, and the reason given for securing not only our promise of assistance in arms, but of advice in the development of his country, an asylum—should a crisis in the country compel his temporary withdrawal—coupled with the assurance of a continuation of these terms after the war to himself and successors—is this one inordinate fear of a prospectively irate Turkey. From this obsession he could not be dissuaded. At first it was our *flag* that would incense the Turks, and on the second visit it would be the engagement to refrain from a cession of the Islands that was bound to arouse Turkish resentment.

At one time in the proceedings the Idrisi had insisted on the despatch of British troops inland, if he were attacked by the Turks, but I reminded him that our earlier treaty was confined to his sea-board and to protection by sea power.

I may say that although this engagement in its inception was peculiar to the Farasan Islands, yet the Idrisi was loud in predicting for the whole of his territories the ill-forebodings he had conjured up as the likely result of his agreeing to paragraph III. It was therefore not possible—given the desideratum of securing his adhesion to this paragraph—to exclude from the agreement this extended area of his entire sea-board. His Minister (Ba Sahi) declared (and we cannot refute it) that the Farasan Islands were the Idrisi's before the 30th April 1915,<sup>1</sup>

and that, though not specifically mentioned, the Farasan became at once a part and parcel of his sea-board and within the purview of that treaty.

One result of the present agreement will be the exclusion of Italian influence in the Idrisi's domains. His Minister told me that the Italians were very desirous of concluding some agreement with the Idrisi to secure a *quid pro quo* of their long established connection *quid* the arms trade, and that even now the Italians sent him ammunition. At the same time the Idrisi scouted the idea of dealing with any Power save Great Britain, and to our Government he looked for every form of assistance.

As regards paragraph V. I found it impolitic to insist on any fixed number of his retainers on the Island. I had insisted on "a number not less than one hundred men," but this was met by the argument that many more might be required and the exact number had best be left to time and circumstance. The Minister who was deputed on board said that the Farasan Islanders were a very stout body of men who would give a good account of themselves if necessary. I waived the point of *numbers* for I was dealing with a peculiar cast of man, and was guided also by the principle that especially with Asiatics, is it unwise to insist on what one cannot enforce nor supervise without causing friction. It is enough that he has engaged to ensure his "effective occupation."

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Figure 2.177.3. Anglo-Idrisi agreement Regarding Farasan Islands (January 1917)



## 2.18. Green light from London for Al-Idrisi to expand south (December 1920)

Al-Idrisi was given the green light from London for the ultimate inclusion of Al-Hudaydah into his territory. Lord Earl Curzon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Major General T. E. Scott, Political Resident, Aden, 13 December 1920 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. p. 403).




Figure 2.18.1 Green light from London for Al-Idrisi to expand south (December 1920)

## **2.19. Political position of the Yemen: 1920s**

### **2.19.1. Note on the political situation in the Yemen**

Note on the political situation in the Yemen, by Major B. R. Reilly, Assistant Political Resident, Aden, 20 April 1923 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4.pp. 497-514).




Figure 2.19.0.1.1 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.2 Note on the political situation in the Yemen






Figure 0.3 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.4 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.5 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.6 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.7 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.8 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.9 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.10 Note on the political situation in the Yemen






Figure 0.11 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure D.12 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.13 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.14 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.15 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure D.16 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.17 Note on the political situation in the Yemen




Figure 0.18 Note on the political situation in the Yemen



### **2.10.2. Relations with the Imam of Yemen**

Cabinet Memorandum, circulated by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on 'Relations with the Imam of Yemen', in June 1927 (CAB 24/187, TNA, London).

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Printed for the Cabinet. June 1927.

SECRET.

Copy No. 30

C.P. 172 (27).

CABINET.

RELATIONS WITH THE IMAM OF THE YEMEN.

MEMORANDUM CIRCULATED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES.

IN fulfilment of the decision of the Cabinet on the 1st of December, 1926 (Cabinet 61 (26), Conclusion 6), the Resident at Aden was instructed to issue a warning to the Imam of the Yemen in regard to his occupation of parts of the Aden Protectorate. A copy of the instructions issued to the Resident (Annexure 1) is attached. The warning was duly issued, after the increase of the Royal Air Force at Aden had been effected. The Imam's reply is summarised in a telegram from the Resident of the 24th of April (Annexure 2). As will be seen, the Imam has offered to send a plenipotentiary to Aden to negotiate an agreement. The Resident proposes to reply that this offer can be accepted only on condition that the Imam undertakes to evacuate the Protectorate.

I have been in consultation on this point with the Foreign Office, Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry. The Admiralty and War Office endorse the Resident's view. The Foreign Office favour a compromise by which the Imam would obtain qualified recognition of his claims in respect of the outlying portions of the Protectorate in return for the abandonment of any claim to Aden itself and its immediate neighbourhood. They suggest that the proposed reply to the Resident should be so worded as to leave the way open for an eventual reduction of our liabilities towards the Protectorate tribes. The Air Ministry point out that, if the Imam refuses the Resident's condition, our present unfriendly relations with the Imam would continue and we might find ourselves committed to a permanent increase of the Aden garrison. They recommend that the reply to the Imam should be so worded as to leave room for compromise on the basis of a qualified recognition of the Imam's claim in respect of the outlying portions of the Protectorate.

My own view is in accord with that of the Resident. The suggestion of an agreement with the Imam on the basis of a qualified recognition of his position in outlying parts of the Protectorate was made by the Foreign Office last December. I consulted the Resident on the subject and attach a copy of his reply (Annexure 3). He took the view that His Majesty's Government could not honourably divest themselves of their obligations within the Protectorate; that if the outlying districts were surrendered to the Imam the means of safeguarding the coast would be lost and the confidence of the tribes in His Majesty's Government would be destroyed; and that, once the Imam were established on a frontier the defence of which was considered essential to the safety of Aden, the permanent garrison would have to be increased so as to put us in a position to oppose his troops on their first move. He further considered that concessions made to the Imam would only lead to further demands. I concur generally in these views. I am against any abandonment of our Protectorate rights, particularly at a time when the Imam's position is none too secure and when circumstances may well arise that will make him more amenable to our wishes. I would authorise the Resident to reply in the terms proposed. This would be simply reaffirming the position taken up by General Clayton when the last negotiations broke down, and the only effect of our doing so will be to prevent new negotiations being initiated on what

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Figure D19.D.2.1 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

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would amount to an abandonment of our previous position and a victory for the Imam. It would not commit us in any way to any attempt to expel the Imam forcibly from the areas now occupied by him, unless and until fresh provocation on his part or a serious collapse of his power warranted such action with the means at our disposal.

L. S. A.

*Colonial Office,  
1st June, 1927.*

## ANNEXURE No. 1.

*Paraphrase Telegram from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Resident, Aden. Sent 5th March, 1927.*

FUTURE relations between His Majesty's Government and the Imam reference to your despatch of 9th February\* and your despatch of 19th January.\*

His Majesty's Government concur generally in views expressed in latter despatch and have decided that communication on the lines set out below should be addressed to Imam after No. 8 Royal Air Force Squadron has arrived at Aden and flown over the Protectorate in full force for at least a week. The Imam should be informed that His Majesty's Government have every wish to maintain friendly relations with him and would welcome the establishment of a formal understanding between the two Governments. They have already given ample indication of their desire to arrive at such an understanding by sending Sir G. Clayton to Sanaa but they are quite unable to agree to the territorial demands put forward by the Imam. They have no wish to extend their sphere outside the boundaries of the Aden Protectorate or to threaten the Imam's absolute independence; on the contrary, it is to their interests that there should be a stable government in the Yemen and they are anxious to be on friendly terms with it. If at any time the Imam is prepared to come to an agreement with His Majesty's Government recognising the treaty relations between themselves and the Protectorate tribes, His Majesty's Government, for their part, would be glad to discuss with him the terms of such an agreement. While reiterating their desire to come to a friendly arrangement of this character His Majesty's Government feel it incumbent upon them to make it plain beyond all question that the Imam has no rights whatever within the Aden Protectorate, and they feel it necessary now to give him warning that continued occupation by him of a portion of that Protectorate renders him liable at any time to such measures of retaliation by land, air or sea, at such time and in such manner as may be deemed suitable, and that further encroachment in the Protectorate or any action on his part against any islands in the Red Sea is calculated to precipitate action on the part of His Majesty's Government. But there is nothing that His Majesty's Government desire less than to be driven to any such action and the advantages of a peaceful agreement between the Imam and His Majesty's Government whereby tribes within the Protectorate were guaranteed against any outside interference would be of such advantage to the progress and commerce of the Yemen that His Majesty's Government hope that the Imam will once more consider whether an agreement cannot be reached.

You will doubtless settle in consultation with the Officer Commanding the Air Force on a suitable opportunity for addressing the Imam on the above lines.

AMERY.

\* Not printed.

Figure 0.2.2 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

## ANNEXURE No. 2.

*Paraphrase Telegram from the Resident at Aden to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Dated 24th April, 1927.*

MESSAGE to Imam Yahya, reference my telegram of 10th April. The Imam has now replied to the following effect: He makes the usual protestations of friendship and of his desire to conclude a friendly agreement with His Majesty's Government. He refers to "threats" contained in communication from His Majesty's Government, and states that no action which would impair the independence of the Yemen can be tolerated by him. He concludes by offering to send a plenipotentiary to Aden to discuss the making of a treaty, and asks me to communicate with His Majesty's Government on the subject.

*Paragraph 2.* Agreement with the Imam in my opinion should, if possible, be brief; on his side recognition of the Protectorate, on His Majesty's Government's an acknowledgment of the independence of the Yemen, with perhaps a third clause to the effect that more elaborate agreements will be discussed when the Imam has implemented the treaty by the evacuation of the Protectorate.

*Paragraph 3.* Subject to your concurrence I therefore propose that a reply should be returned to the Imam acknowledging and reciprocating his hopes for a friendly agreement and continuing on the following lines:—"As he has been assured on several occasions His Majesty's Government do not desire to interfere in any way with his independence in his own territory of Yeifen. His Majesty's Government are quite unable to acquiesce in his occupation of parts of territory of tribes with whom they are in treaty-relations and such threats as were contained in my last communication plainly applied only to reprisals for acts of aggression committed or to be committed by him. His Majesty's Government are as heretofore prepared on his acknowledgment of the Protectorate boundary to recognise the Imam's independence in his own territory. If his plenipotentiary will be authorised to acknowledge on his behalf the independence of those tribes and undertake to withdraw from those areas within the Protectorate boundary which are now occupied by the Imam's troops he will be welcomed and a friendly agreement to the above effect will be easily arranged. It will be useless for his envoy to come to Aden if he will not acknowledge the Protectorate boundary as claimed by His Majesty's Government. In this explanation His Majesty's Government are animated by the desire that negotiations if opened again shall not fail for a third time. When the above agreement is signed and ratified agreements on other matters can be discussed in a friendly spirit."

*Paragraph 4.* Pending your reply I am sending a polite acknowledgment of his letter to the Imam. Despatch containing a translation of Imam's letter is being sent to you by the next mail.

## ANNEXURE No. 3.

*From Major-General J. H. K. Stewart, C.B., D.S.O., Political Resident, Aden, to His Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies, London.*

Sir,

*Aden Residency, 19th January, 1927.*

IN continuation of my telegram\* sent in reply to your Confidential despatch of the 30th December, 1926,\* I have the honour to state my views on the points raised in the Foreign Office letter No. E/7036/2260/91 of 24th December.\* I have already expressed these as shortly as possible in my telegram, and the following observations expand my comments on the paragraphs of the Foreign Office letter.

2. Reference paragraph 2 of Foreign Office letter. I understand that the Royal Air Force make no claim to be able to recover by air action any country in which the Imam has already firmly established himself, but they do claim that, in case of further incursions, they would be able to make the invaders withdraw by means of direct action against them and of an attack on the *moral* of the Imam and his Commanders by aerial action against towns and troops within the Imam's borders. Hence it is aggression in the Protectorate which is most likely to bring about active measures by us. I consider therefore that the warning to the Imam should be that his occupation of a portion of the Aden Protectorate renders him

[16228]

\* Not printed.

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Figure 019.2.3 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

liable at any time to such measures of retaliation by land, sea or air and in such manner as His Majesty's Government may deem suitable, and that any encroachment by him in the Protectorate, or action against the Islands in the Red Sea are calculated to precipitate such action. I will refer to the method in which this warning should be conveyed in a later part of this letter.

3. Reference paragraph 3 of Foreign Office letter. The Imam no doubt genuinely desires a settlement with His Majesty's Government, but, as has often been pointed out, he wants it only on his own terms. The friendly sentiments expressed in paragraph 5 of his letter of 7th October, 1926,\* are similar to many such declarations that he has repeatedly made during the last five or six years, often at times when he was actually engaged in seizing portions of our Protectorate. A better clue to his meaning is contained in paragraph 2 of the same letter in which he says: "except for the consent of the British Government to grant in full our justified and rightful requirements, the legality of which is proved, there is not the slightest cause for the postponement of the establishment of a formal and general understanding between the two Governments." What the Imam regards as his rights in the Protectorate is shown in his own draft for clause 3 of the proposed treaty, which was sent to the Secretary of State with Major Barrett's despatch of 31st July, 1924.\* Major Barrett commented on this draft in his memorandum which accompanied his despatch. I fully agree with his criticisms of it. The Imam affected to regard the illusory concessions made in his draft as a suitable *quid pro quo* for our turning the Idrisi out of Hodeidah and giving it to him. Since then he has obtained possession of Hodeidah without our help, and it has been quite clear throughout and down to the present time that he has no intention of recognising the existence of our Protectorate except under compulsion. He has consistently ignored any references to it in all his replies to our letters, however friendly his general language may have been. When Sir Gilbert Clayton permitted the opening of a discussion with the Imam on the possibility of the Zeidis retaining Dala, the Imam promptly advanced claims to other districts in the Protectorate, and Sir Gilbert Clayton thereupon abandoned the negotiations. If we wish really to satisfy the Imam, we must be prepared to surrender the whole Protectorate to him, and even then he will in his heart resent our continued presence in Aden itself.

4. Reference paragraph 4 of Foreign Office letter. I agree that a radical revision of the treaties with the Protectorate Chiefs may be desirable. But I submit it is not the right time to revise them while they are being violated by a third party, and at a moment when we are obviously finding it difficult to carry them out. A settlement with the Imam should precede a revision of our relations with the tribes inside the Protectorate. Sir Gilbert Clayton advocates a review of the Protectorate treaties, to be followed later by their limitation. But to make this revision a part of a bargain with the Imam would be tantamount to selling our friends to the Imam for a treaty; a step which Sir Gilbert Clayton did not propose, and which, I am convinced, neither he nor His Majesty's Government could regard as honourable. If the Imam puts no more value on his own words than we should by such action have shown for ours, the treaty gained would be of little value.

5. Reference paragraph 5 of Foreign Office letter. I agree that the proposed warning might be combined with a bid for friendship. We should once more make it clear that we have no wish to threaten the Imam's absolute independence or to extend our sphere outside our Protectorate, but that on the contrary we are glad to see a stable Government in the Yemen and are anxious to be on friendly terms with it. If the Imam is convinced that we mean what we say both by our warning and by our renewed offer of friendship, it is possible that he may decide to yield to hard facts, and to make the best of the situation by accepting our overtures and agreeing to our terms.

6. Reference paragraph 6 of Foreign Office letter. If my understanding is correct as given in paragraph 2 above, then the warning in the terms stated in that paragraph should be conveyed to the Imam incorporated in a friendly letter, but if it is intended to depart from the passive attitude entirely, and to try to force the Imam to evacuate the portions of the Protectorate held by him, I am of opinion that the warning should specifically tell the Imam that his retention of those portions will lead to action. At the same time he should be told that the alternative is his withdrawal and the establishment of relations on a friendly basis. This warning should certainly not be given unless His Majesty's Govern-

\* Not printed.

Figure 019.2.4 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

ment are determined to carry it out to a decisive conclusion and to maintain the application of force until the Imam submits.

7. Reference paragraph 7 of Foreign Office letter. It may be to the interest of His Majesty's Government to reduce their obligations in the Protectorate to the minimum compatible with the safety of Aden itself, but we cannot honourably divest ourselves of our obligations at the present time. This contention is supported by the first three lines of paragraph 5 of Sir Gilbert Clayton's memorandum appended to his report on his mission to Sana'a. The termination of these treaties by an understanding with the Imam would not merely lower our prestige, though our prestige would inevitably suffer seriously. It is a question whether our written treaties should or should not be honoured. If we are to carry out treaties only when it is convenient to ourselves to do so, it is rather waste of time to try to make one with the Imam, for he will not fail to draw the inference that such fair weather friends cannot be trusted, and that our readiness to sacrifice old friends in order to gain a new one who is more powerful is an indication of what he himself may expect if fortune ever turns against him.

8. The Foreign Office letter says that there are no arguments in favour of the retention of the treaties with the northern Chiefs except such as are inspired by considerations of prestige. At the same time it says that certain of the treaties must presumably be retained in any event, *i.e.*, those with the Sultans of the coast. If by the "northern Chiefs" the Foreign Office means Chiefs such as those of the Amiris, the Yafais, the Audalis, the Aulakis and Behan, the following are my comments:—

The Amiri Chief is the Amir of Dala, who visited Aden in 1919 under a written promise from the Resident that he would be protected against aggression from beyond the borders of the Aden Protectorate both then and thereafter. He was subsequently told in writing that if the Imam did not abstain from interference in his territory the Resident would recommend that British troops should be sent to Dala to protect him. The failure to carry out these promises is not simply a matter of losing prestige; it is a clear breach of faith.

9. With regard to the Yafais and the Aulakis, they are the best fighting material in the Protectorate and their abandonment to the Imam would expose to Zeidi attack the Sultans of the coast whom the Foreign Office propose to retain in any event. A sketch map showing areas of these tribes is attached to illustrate the remarks following. The Yafais' country at one time extended to the sea; but, although they no longer claim the whole of their former territory, they maintain their demand for Khanfar and other districts in Abyan which have been taken from them by the Fadlis. Under pressure from Aden the Lower Yafai Sultan has recently made a truce with the Fadli Sultan (one of the Sultans of the Coast), but if the Yafais became subordinate to the Imam while the Fadlis remained independent, the old quarrel would certainly be resumed by the Zeidis, ostensibly acting on behalf of the Yafais, and the Imam would claim the fertile tract of Abyan which lies only about 30 miles from Aden, and his possession of which would cut off our land communication with the Fadli and the other Sultans of the Coast. Moreover with Yafa and Beda and the Audali country all in his possession the Imam could seize the Fadli territory whenever he pleased.

10. The position of the Aulakis is somewhat similar to that of the Yafais. They extend to the coast and if they are excluded from our Protectorate and left to the Imam the coast would be again laid open to the Zeidis, and, with the Aulaki country gone, we could hardly hope to preserve the Wahidis of Balahaf or the other petty tribes (Irka, Haura and Bir Ali) lying along the coast up to the borders of Mokalla, nor could we prevent the extension of the Imam's influence over the Hadramaut and probably Mokalla itself.

11. The advantages of preserving our Protectorate over the Sultans of the Coast are somewhat problematical, but they are entitled by treaty to our protection and the Foreign Office letter assumes that these treaties should be honoured in any event. In practice, however, we should not have the means of safeguarding the coast if the Zeidis were in control of the mountain districts which cover them. The coastal tribes cannot be relied upon to make a serious defence, and their confidence in the British would be destroyed by our abandonment of the other tribes of the Protectorate. In my opinion abandonment of the remaining "northern Chiefs" means in practice (though it may not in theory) abandonment of all the Protectorate except the triangle of Abdali territory and possibly a few outlying districts in the immediate vicinity of Aden. The Zeidis would then be

Figure 019.2.5 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

established within sight of Aden. Their ruler is in close relations with a European Power from which he receives munitions of war of all descriptions, and he is also doing his best to obtain further munitions, aeroplanes included, from other Powers. His negotiations on this matter with a representative of an American firm have come to our knowledge. It seems improbable that he needs all this armament to wage war against the Idrisi or even Ibn Saud or for the preservation of his authority in his own country, and the question of the defence of the fortress of Aden under these changed conditions would need reconsideration from a military point of view. With the Imam on a frontier the defence of which is considered essential to the safety of Aden, there must be troops sufficient and ready to oppose the Zeidis on their making their first move, and this would involve an increase in the permanent garrison.

To my mind therefore the question of the retention of the treaties with the northern Chiefs involves far more than mere considerations of prestige. Far from neither party losing appreciably by their termination we should lose more than prestige and the tribes on their side would lose what they value more than anything else—namely their tribal independence.

12. Paragraph 8 of Foreign Office letter. The question of prestige no doubt enters largely into the Imam's attitude, but he also has more definite considerations at stake. At present he holds the most fertile portions of the Protectorate from which he can extract most revenue, and he is anxious to open the road to the comparatively rich districts of the Hadramaut. He is also impelled by his historical and religious traditions and by an Arab ruler's natural impulse towards expansion to extend his rule over the whole of South-Western Arabia. He regards the British at Aden as heretic interlopers from Europe, just as he regards the Idrisi as an interloper from Africa. He is an Arab "Nationalist" who can never look upon any foreigners established in this part of Arabia with feelings of real friendliness. Although *amour-propre* is certainly an important consideration, it is by no means the only factor in the situation either with the Imam or with us. If he ultimately gives way to our claims or if he accepts a compromise with us, he will do so only because he realises that he has not the strength to do otherwise.

13. Reference paragraph 9 of Foreign Office letter. I see no possibility in practice of giving a qualified recognition of the Imam's claims to portions of the Protectorate. The tribes cannot by themselves preserve a state of semi-independence against him, and there can be no dual control. Promises by the Imam of conditional non-interference are, as Major Barrett pointed out, quite illusory. We either support the tribes or we leave them to the Imam. He may for some reason hold his hand against them temporarily, but we cannot in fact work on the assumption that there is any half-way house. As for the Imam assuming our obligations to the Chiefs, our obligation is to protect them, and at present the only Power against whom they desire and crave protection is the Imam himself. I consider that no reference whatever should be made to the Imam's theoretical claim to Aden which he admits he has no intention at present of advancing seriously, and it should not in any circumstances be given any consideration or be made the subject of any kind of bargain.

14. Reference paragraphs 10 and 11 of Foreign Office letter. The Foreign Office wish to discover whether there is any practical basis for a conciliatory offer to the Imam which might bring about a friendly settlement with him combined with an honourable reduction of British obligations to the Chiefs. For the reasons that I have stated I do not think that any reduction can be honourable in the present situation, nor do I think that any settlement with the Imam which does not give him the whole Protectorate can be genuinely friendly, however much it might be made to appear to be so in words. But there is one course which is more dishonourable than open repudiation of our engagements, and that is professed adherence to them coupled with an intention to disregard them in practice. Experience during the last seven years has shown that only force or a genuine threat of force will check the Zeidi advance. With a squadron of the Royal Air Force at Aden I believe that further encroachments can be prevented, and in my opinion both our honour and our interests dictate that no further encroachments should be allowed.

15. The recovery of territory that has already been lost is another matter. A military reoccupation of Dala would, I think, free the Protectorate from Zeidi intrusion, but I understand that there is no possibility of this step being taken. It is open to question whether the Royal Air Force alone can bring about an

Figure 019.2.6 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

evacuation of Dala and the other occupied districts. The Royal Air Force do not claim this even themselves. Determined action by air over the Imam's own territory (combined possibly with naval action against his coast) might induce him to give way if continued with great intensity over a prolonged period, which is probably impracticable. If there is no hope of ever recovering the lost portion of the Protectorate, the question should be considered of telling the Chiefs concerned openly, of giving them such compensation as we can, and of offering to treat with the Imam on the basis of the *status quo*. The Amir of Dala would have to be pensioned off. His case is such a bad one that he should be treated most generously. The bulk of the Radfan tribes which are appanages of Dala have already submitted to the Zeidis under *force majeure*, as has also the Alawi Sheikh. The Audalis present a more difficult problem, for the present line of Zeidi occupation cuts them in two, leaving the Zeidis in possession of the best part of the country. Some compromise might possibly be effected here. The Yafais would have to submit to the loss of their outlying districts, which have been in Zeidi occupation for several years. There would be a serious risk that these concessions would encourage the Imam to make further encroachments; but if he were certain that these would be firmly resisted by us he might possibly accept and respect a boundary based on the *status quo*.

16. Personally I have not much confidence in the stability of such an arrangement and I do not advocate it. If the Imam's country breaks up on the present ruler's death, there would be risings among all Shafei tribes, and we should find ourselves in close contact with unruly tribes still hating us for our defection and creating anarchy in the country.

17. An alternative would be to continue to wait upon events. The Imam's death may be followed by a contested succession, and an opportunity may present itself of making a settlement with a new Zeidi ruler without sacrificing the friendly Shafei tribes which wish to remain under the protection of His Majesty's Government, and an opportunity would then arise for a complete review of all our protectorate treaties.

18. I consider that a definite decision of our future policy towards the Imam, and if possible a settlement with him, should precede a revision of our treaties with the tribes inside our Protectorate boundary. Meanwhile in my opinion any further encroachments in the Protectorate (with the possible exception of Behan) can be and should be, after warning issued, met by intensive and sustained Air action against the raiders and against the Imam's troops and towns across the border until the Zeidis withdraw from the area concerned. With regard to the parts of the Protectorate already in Zeidi occupation, there are three alternatives :—

- (1.) To demand that the Imam shall withdraw from them, at the same time threatening him with the use of force if he does not comply. This course should be adopted only if His Majesty's Government are satisfied that they have the means to enforce their demand, and are willing to use it if need be.
- (2.) To adopt a waiting attitude in the hope that the course of events may produce a more favourable situation. The Imam should be addressed and the warning conveyed to him that aggression means reprisals, but that when he is prepared to come to an agreement with us on reasonable terms we shall be glad to discuss them again with him.
- (3.) To reopen negotiations with him on the basis of stabilising the present *status quo*. This will involve a withdrawal from the position taken up very definitely by His Majesty's Government at the time of Sir Gilbert Clayton's mission to Sana'a, and although the Imam will no doubt welcome the change of attitude he may at the same time look upon it as a confession of weakness and be thereby encouraged to hold out for still better terms for himself. If the negotiations were consequently to fail His Majesty's Government would find themselves in the unpleasant position of having offered to break faith with their own dependants for the sake of the Imam's friendship, and of having been nevertheless rebuffed. In that case they would have forfeited the confidence of their friends without any compensating advantage.

19. Of these three alternatives, the first is the one indicated by our treaty obligations and by our promise to the Amir of Dala. Its adoption would not gain the friendship of the Imam, but it might gain his respect, which I am afraid we

Figure 019.2.7 Relations with the Imam of Yemen



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do not at present possess. He will at any rate realise that the British Government is one that is prepared to honour its obligations even when it is inconvenient and troublesome to do so, and this may make him more ready to trust us in the future when once a settlement has been effected. This alternative, however, would entail long continued and violent Air action which it is unlikely that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to undertake.

20. Of the other two alternatives I prefer the second. If it is adopted I consider the allowance to the exiled Amir should be still further increased, and he should be told frankly that His Majesty's Government are not *at present* prepared to use force against the Imam in order to restore him; that he must wait until the situation is more favourable; and that His Majesty's Government do not recognise the legality of the Zeidi occupation of his country.

To sum up, I recommend:—

- (1.) A warning to the Imam against further aggression incorporated in a friendly letter.
- (2.) In case of further aggression immediate intensive and extended and sustained Air action against raiders and as a reprisal on his towns and troops.
- (3.) Otherwise a passive attitude until the Imam sees reason, or dies and makes way for a perhaps more reasonable successor.

I have the honour to be,  
 Sir,  
 Your most obedient servant,  
 J. H. K. STEWART, *Major-General,*  
*Political Resident, Aden.*

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Figure 019.2.8 Relations with the Imam of Yemen

## 2.20. The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920

Asir was an administrative district under the Ottomans' rule, but it was evident that the Ottomans had failed to expand their authority over the entire geographic entity of this district. Yet, nor had Al-Idrisi either, however, by the 1920s, it would be regarded as the future entity for the Al-Idrisi Emirate. Clearly, what is of importance about this treaty is that there is no mention of Asir. As such, Ibn Saud would simply avoid any recognition of such district. Instead, whenever Asir was mentioned in the treaty, it was in reference to tribes or locations within Asir, such as Asir Ghāmed or the tribe of Rijal Al-Ma'a of Asir.

Significantly, as in the Anglo-Idrisi Treaty of 1915, the reference is solely to 'Yemen' simply because Asir had been known to be part of it. Presumably, since references to 'Asir' were avoided, the aim was clearly to divide Asir between the signatories according to what each recognised the other party's claims in Yemen to be. In other words, this is an acknowledgement that up to that time Asir was still understood to be part of Yemen, albeit as a geographical part of it rather than any form of political recognition. However, although unintentionally so, this is a manifest recognition of the perception of Asir as part of the Yemen. The treaty is available in (Amin Sa'id, 1959: pp. 97-98, the Saudi Green Book, 1934: pp. 472-473).

### بيان سعودي - ادريسي مشترك

ونثبت هنا نص البيان السعودي - الادريسي المشترك الذي اتفق مندوبو الامام ومندوبو السيد الادريسي عليه يوم ١٦ ذي الحجة ١٣٣٨ وهو :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله

يعلم به الناظر اليه ، والواقف عليه ، بأن الامام عبد العزيز عبد الرحمن الفيصل حفظه الله ، لما أمرنا بالتقدم على الامام محمد بن علي بن ادريس لعقد الاخوة الاسلامية الخاصة وجمع الكلمة على دين الله ورسوله ودعوة الناس الى التعاون على البر والتقوى والامر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر والجهاد في سبيل الله وان تكون اليد واحدة على أعداء الدين ، فلما قدمنا على الامام المذكور مره ذلك وأحبه حرصاً على الخير والتعاون عليه ، فاتفقت الحال منا ومنه ، على عقد الاخوة بين الامامين المذكورين على مثل ما ذكر اعلاه ، فحيث كان في مملكة الامام محمد بن علي من القبائل والبلدان في اليمن ما هو في ملك آل

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Figure 2.2020.2.20.1 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920

سعود سابقاً ، تركه الامام عبد العزيز لاجل محبته للخير ومعاونة عليه وحسن سيرته ، فعلى هذا لا بد من تعريف القبائل وتحديد ما ليقوم كل منها بما اوجب الله عليه فيمن تحت يده من الرعية فصار الذي للامام عبد العزيز من القبائل جميع يام ورداعة ومن تبعمهم من بني جماعة رسي ، وشريف ، وقحطان ، ورفيده ، وعبيده ، منهم بني بشر وبني طلق وشهران وبني شهر وغامد وعسير غامد ، وجميع قضاء محايل منهم بني ثولة واهل بارد ، وثرقش واهل الريش وغيرهم من تبعمهم وجميع قبائل حلي المذكورون في ولاية الامام عبد العزيز .

وصار للامام محمد بن علي الاهدريسي تهامة سوى ما ذكر وغير ذلك مما هو تحت يده وله رجال المع من عسير خاصة ولا يعارض كل منها من تحت يد الآخر ، وما ذكر لعبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن من القبائل في السراة وتهامة ويام وغيرهم فالمراد به قرى وبوادي في جبل وسهل وعليها في ذلك التناسح والتعاون وبذل الجهد فيما اوجب الله عليهما مما يلزم في دين الاسلام فيمن تحت ايديهما .

هذا ما صدر وقرر منا يا نواب الامام حيث كنا قائلين مقامه ومن الامام محمد بن علي ادريس بحضوره وامضائه . صدر العهد والميثاق منا ومنه ، ومن نكت فائما ينكث على نفسه والله ولي التوفيق وصلى الله على محمد وآله وصحبه .

#### نواب الامام

فيصل بن عبد العزيز المبارك      عبدالله بن محمد الراشد  
ناصر بن حمد الجارالله      محمد بن علي بن ادريس

Figure 2.200.2.20.2 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920




Figure 2.20.3 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920




Figure 2.200.2.20.4 The Saudi-Idrisi Treaty of August 1920

## **2.21. Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana'a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926**

This treaty was of political significance in its recognition of Imam Yahya as the King of Yemen. The treaty is available in (Salem, 1971: 526-528), and the English translation in (Hurewitz, 1956: Vol.2. pp. 146-147).




Figure 2.21.1 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana'a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926






Figure 2.21.2 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana'a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926




Figure 2.21.3 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana'a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926




Figure 2.21.4 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana'a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926

## ITALO-YEMENI COMMERCIAL TREATY

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he recognized. Loyal to the Ottomans in World War I, Yahya asserted his independence immediately after the Mudros armistice (Doc. 18). He occupied in 1919 certain districts in the Aden hinterland belonging to shaykhs in protectorate relations with Britain and later refused to surrender the districts, claiming that historically they formed part of his patrimony. Anglo-Yemeni talks in 1925 bore no fruit. Primarily to annoy London, the Imam began to court the Italians in Eritrea on the Red Sea coast opposite Yemen. The Italians required little prompting, as the Eritrean Governor, Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini, attested in signing the following treaty of amity and commerce with his Arabian neighbor. Italy thus became the first European country to recognize Yemen's independence. A supplemental secret agreement of 1 June 1927 (text in *Documents on International Affairs, 1928*, pp. 222-24) promised Italians limited capitulatory rights, but its preambular reference to an alliance stated an Italian objective rather than an accomplishment. Still, Italy remained the only European power with some measure of political influence at San'a through the early years of World War II. *Survey of International Affairs, 1925*, vol. 1, pp. 320-24; H. Scott, *In the High Yemen*, passim; H. F. Jacob, "The Kingdom of Yemen, its Place in the Comity of Nations" (Grotius Society, London), *Problems of War and Peace*, 18 (1933), 131-53.

ART. 1. The Government of His Majesty the King of Italy recognise the full and absolute independence of the Yemen and of its Sovereign, His Majesty the Imam Jahia. The Italian Government will abstain from all interference in the Kingdom of His Majesty the King of Yemen that might be incompatible with the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article.

2. The two Governments undertake to facilitate commercial relations between their respective countries.

3. The Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen declare that it is their desire to import from Italy the supplies, *i.e.*, the technical means and material which can advantageously be employed for the economic development of the Yemen, as also the technical staff.

The Italian Government declare their readiness to do all that is possible in order that the technical means and material and the staff shall be despatched under the most favourable conditions as regards quality, price and salaries.

4. The provisions of articles 2 and 3 do not limit the liberty of the two parties with regard to commerce and supplies.

5. No merchant of either of the two States may import or carry on trade in articles prohibited by the two Governments in their respective countries.

Both Governments shall have power to confiscate articles imported into their respective countries contrary to a prohibition to import or deal in them when such prohibition has been made known.

6. The present treaty shall not come into force until the ratification of His Majesty the King of Italy has reached His Majesty the Imam Jahia, King of the Yemen.

7. The present treaty shall have a duration of 10 years from the date of the ratification mentioned in article 6, and 6 months before its expiration the two parties shall come to an understanding in case they desire to replace it or to prolong it.

8. In witness whereof His Majesty the Imam Jahia, King of the Yemen, and his Excellency Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini, in the name of His Majesty the King of Italy, have signed the present treaty drawn up in two exactly identical copies, in the Arabic and in the Italian languages.

Since, however, there is nobody attached to His Majesty the King of Yemen who knows perfectly the Italian language, as the negotiations in respect of the present treaty of friendship and commerce were carried on by both parties in Arabic, and as his Excellency Cavaliere Jacopo Gasparini has assured himself that the Arabic text is exactly equivalent to the Italian, the two parties agree to be bound, in case of doubt or of divergent interpretations of the two texts, by the Arabic text interpreted according to the classical language.

Figure 2.21.5 Treaty of Amity and Commerce (Sana'a) between Italy and Yemen, 2 September 1926

## 2.22. Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926

Unlike the 1920 treaty in which there was no mention of Asir, here in the Mecca Treaty of 1926 the Idrisis' chief was addressed as the 'Imam of Asir' (i.e. the leader of Asir) although the Idrisi's authority was limited to only part of Asir. For Ibn Saud to recognise the Idrisis as the ruler of Asir and the entity as his emirate is questionable. Most likely, recognition of the Idrisis' independence was needed so as to legitimise the next Saudi move i.e. the conquest of the district. Indeed, there had been some international recognition of this entity as the Idrisis' emirate, mainly by Britain, and Ibn Saud wanted to absorb the district on that ground, using the Idrisis' counter-claims to oppose those of the Imam Yahya.

The treaty was concluded on 21 October 1926, but was only promulgated on 8 January 1927. (The Arabic version is available in the Treaty Series, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Arabia, Al-Jahni, 1992. The English translation is by the BLJ, AIR, 2/1020).

ملحق رقم (٢)  
اتفاقية مكة المكرمة  
بين جلالة الملك والادريسي<sup>(١)</sup>

الحمد لله وحده :

بين ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها ، وبين الامام السيد الحسن بن  
على الادريسي .

رغبة في توحيد الكلمة وحفظا لكيان البلاد العربية وتقوية للروابط بين  
أمرآء جزيرة العرب قد اتفق صاحب الجلالة ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد  
وملحقاتها عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل السعود وصاحب السيادة امام  
عسير السيد الحسن بن على الادريسي على عقد الاتفاقية الآتية :

المادة الأولى : يعترف سيادة الامام السيد الحسن بن على الادريسي بأن  
الحدود القديمة الموضحة في اتفاقية ١٠ صفر سنة ١٣٣٩ هـ المنعقدة بين  
سلطان نجد وبين الامام السيد محمد بن على الادريسي والتي كانت خاضعة

Figure 2.222,2.22.1 Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926

للادارسة فى ذلك التاريخ تحت سيادة جلاله ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها بموجب هذه الاتفاقية .

**المادة الثانية :** لايجوز لامام عسير أن يدخل فى مفاوضات سياسية مع أى حكومة وكذلك لايجوز أن يمنح أى امتياز اقتصادى الا بعد الموافقة على ذلك من صاحب الجلالة ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها .

**المادة الثالثة :** لايجوز لامام عسير اشهار الحرب أو ابرام الصلح الا بموافقة صاحب الجلالة ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها .

**المادة الرابعة :** لايجوز لامام عسير التنازل عن جزء من أراضى عسير المبينة فى المادة الأولى .

**المادة الخامسة :** يعترف ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها بحاكمية امام عسير الحالى على الأراضى المبينة فى المادة الأولى مدة حياته ومن بعده لمن يتفق عليه الأدارسة وأهل العقد والحل التابعين لامامته .

**المادة السادسة :** يعترف ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها بأن ادارة بلاد عسير الداخلية والنظر فى شؤون عشائرها من نصب وعزل وغير ذلك من الشؤون الداخلية من حقوق امام عسير على أن تكون الأحكام وفق الشرع والعدل كماهى فى الحكومتين .

Figure 2.222.2.22.2 Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926

**المادة السابعة :** يتعهد ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها بدفع كل تعد داخلي أو خارجي يقع على أراضي عسير المبينة في المادة الأولى وذلك بالاتفاق بين الطرفين حسب مقتضيات الأحوال ودواعي المصلحة .

**المادة الثامنة :** يتعهد الطرفان بالمحافظة على هذه المعاهدة والقيام بواجبها .

**المادة التاسعة :** تكون هذه المعاهدة معمولاً بها بعد التصديق عليها من الطرفين الساميين .

**المادة العاشرة :** دونت هذه الاتفاقية باللغة العربية من صورتين تحفظ كل صورة لدى فريق من الحكومتين المتعاقدتين .

**المادة الحادية عشرة :** تعرف هذه المعاهدة بمعاهدة مكة المكرمة . وقعت هذه المعاهدة في تاريخ ١٤ ربيع الآخر سنة ١٣٤٥ هـ الموافق ٢١ أكتوبر سنة ١٩٢٦ م .

ملك الحجاز وسلطان نجد وملحقاتها  
عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود  
(الختم الملوكي)

تم ذلك بحضور راقم هذه الاحرف	إمام عسير
خادم الاسلام	الحسن بن علي الادريسي
احمد الشريف السنوسي	(الختم الرسمي)
(الختم)	

Figure 2.222.2.22.3 Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926








Figure 2.222.2.22.5 Idrisi-Saudi Treaty of Mecca of October 1926

## 2.23. The Anglo-Saudi Relationship

Similarly to Al-Idrisi, Ibn Saud followed and joined Britain against the Turks during the Great War, concluding the Treaty of 26 December 1915. Ibn Saud established a good relationship with Britain, gaining its support over many important issues. A new Treaty would be concluded with Britain in Jeddah in 20 May 1927. Most importantly, Britain committed herself to lending considerable political, financial and military support to Ibn Saud even during times of internal difficulties such as the anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family in the early 1930s. Indeed, London responded positively to a Saudi request concerning the anti-Saudi activities led by Mohammad Hassan Al-Dabbagh and Taher Al-Dabbagh, while in the same period of time the opposition to the Imamate in Yemen were allowed to function freely from the Aden Protectorate.

Consequently, the significance of this relationship is not that Britain became involved directly in this section of the Saudi-Yemeni dispute. Instead, what matters is how this relationship has been perceived in Yemen among the wider public and by the elites. Indeed, although numerous issues were considered by British diplomacy as secret matters, several stories on the topic had been part of public discussions in Yemen since they first surfaced.

**2.23.1. The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 26 December 1915**

L/P&S, 18/ B 295, IOR, London.






Figure 2.233.1.2.23.2 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of 26 December 1915

### **2.23.2. The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927**

This treaty was of political significance in its recognition of Ibn Saud as sovereign. It was followed by the Italian-Yemeni Treaty of September 1926 in which Imam Yahya was also recognised as the 'King of Yemen' (Treaty Series 25, 1927).




Figure 2.23.2.1 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927






Figure 2.23.2.2 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927




Figure 2.23.2.3 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927




Figure 2.23.2.4 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927




Figure 2.23.2.5 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927




Figure 2.2323.2.6 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927




Figure 2.23.2.7 The Anglo-Saudi Treaty of Jeddah of 20 May 1927



### **2.23.3. Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana'a**

This is an example of the exchange of information between Britain and Saudi Arabia concerning the Saudi-Yemeni conflict, 16 July 33 (FO 967/52, TNA, London).






Figure 2.23.3.1 Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana'a

2/32  
X

Copies sent to : TRANSLATION.  
 F.O. under No. 237 (2171/2/37)  
 Aden 2172/2/37  
 S.N.O. Red Sea 2173/2/37  
 T.J. 2174/2/37  
 Ramleh 2175/2/37  
 Rome 2176/2/37

23rd/24th Rab-ul-Awwal 1352  
(16/17th July 1933.)

of 26/7/33.  
 My son Peysal,

We have received the following telegraphic message from the delegation at San'a and forward it for your information :

Al Amri and al Mitahhar came to us on Monday deputed by the Imâm Yahya as representatives to enter negotiations with us and after the exchange of compliments, we started discussion. They said to us that they had something to say concerning the frontier and we asked them to explain their intentions clearly so that we may know them and understand their meaning but they requested us to postpone this till the next meeting. The second meeting was held to-day and after a long preliminary discourse on the good faith of the Imâm Yahya, and that he does not like misunderstandings between the two countries they (the representatives) informed us with shame in their faces that they want the restitution of the Idrisi's territory and the districts of Qahtan and Hamazân in Asîr to their original home (country) because they are part of the territory of the Imâm Yahya. They added there is no difference between both parties and that His Majesty the King did not enter the Idrisi's territory until after the Idrisi had taken refuge with him. Now the Idrisi is completely routed so that there is no reason to prevent His Majesty the King from restoring the said territories to their original country. They also proposed other trifling matters. We answered them that we definitely do not agree to discuss anything connected with the territory (Idrisi) and Asîr and that to go more deeply into the matter would cause misunderstandings between us and that this would be of no  
 /advantage

Figure 2.23.3.2 Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana'a

12/31

advantage and we could see no necessity for discussion in this respect. They appeared to be annoyed at this and informed us that they would communicate our speech to the Imam Yahya and would give us a reply. We also wished to discuss with them the question of the Idrisi remaining at Zohb Hajar and his misdeeds, but they did not answer this. It seems that our negotiations with them will continue no longer because it appeared from the beginning that there is no good faith here to enable an agreement to be reached.

The above is the summary of the telegraphic message sent by the delegation therefore ibn Suleiman should proceed to Jedda at once to inform His Britannic Majesty's Minister about this and to inform him that we dislike evil but people provoke us to do it. In view of the friendship which exists between us and the Government of Great Britain we communicate this fact to them for their information and to let us know their (H.M.G.) opinion in this respect, specially after we have become certain that certain Governments have already supplied and will supply arms and ammunition to those coasts and we should like to know their (H.M.G.) opinion in this respect.

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Figure 2.23.3.3 Ibn Saud kept London informed on the development of relations with Sana'a

#### **2.23.4. A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen**

The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah, 16 July 1933 (FO 967/52, TNA, London).




Figure 2.23.4.1 A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen

2/32  
X

Copies sent to : TRANSLATION.  
 F.O. under No. 237 (2171/2/37)  
 Aden 2172/2/37  
 S.N.O. Red Sea 2173/2/37  
 T.J. 2174/2/37  
 Ramleh 2175/2/37  
 Rome 2176/2/37

23rd/24th Rab-ul-Awwal 1352  
(16/17th July 1933.)

of 26/7/33.  
 My son Peysal,

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 /advantage

Figure 2.23.4.2 A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen

12/31

advantage and we could see no necessity for discussion in this respect. They appeared to be annoyed at this and informed us that they would communicate our speech to the Imam Yahya and would give us a reply. We also wished to discuss with them the question of the Idrisi remaining at Zohb Hajar and his misdeeds, but they did not answer this. It seems that our negotiations with them will continue no longer because it appeared from the beginning that there is no good faith here to enable an agreement to be reached.

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Figure 2.23.4.3 A Saudi promise to show understanding of British interests in Yemen

**2.23.5. Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen**

The Saudi Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Chargé d'Affaires in Jeddah, 30 July 1933 (FO 967/52, TNA, London).






Figure 2.23.5.1 Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen




Figure 2.23.5.2 Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen




Figure 2.23.5.3 Saudi Arabia wanted direct involvement of Britain in its dispute with Yemen

**2.23.6. The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)**

Correspondence concerned with the anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family, early 1930s (FO 967 52, TNA, London).




Figure 2.23.6.1 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)




Figure 2.23.6.2 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)




Figure 2.23.6.3 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)




Figure 2.23.6.4 The anti-Saudi intrigues by Al-Dabbagh family (early 1930s)



### 2.23.7. Example of Anglo-Saudi cooperation (1934)

Charges for the cost of telegrams sent back home - through the British Navy - by the Saudi army during its occupation of Al-Hudaydah in 1934, 28 Sep 1934 (FO 371/17930, TNA, London).




Figure 2.23.7.1 Example of Anglo-Saudi cooperation (1934)

## **2.24. Yemeni claims along historic and national connections grounds**

Imam Yahya expressed his claims over Asir, Najrān and South Yemen along historic and national connections grounds in most of his correspondence with Britain and Saudi Arabia, as can be seen from this selection of examples. Other similar texts can be found elsewhere in these appendices.

### **2.24.1. Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)**

(Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 250-252).



بعض المقدم الى الله لفضيحتك ان قطعنا اليمن لنزل  
 امامه ملكك يربطنا بغيرنا  
 اماه اجراءنا منذ الف سنة وزيادة ولم تكن قطاعت حاكمية احكومة عثمانية كسائر البلدان العربية بل مستقلة بذاتها ولما كان لها  
 ربة المكونة ارتباط سوي سلاف كان انقذ به ورسله السلطان جمال اولاد السلطان المشاليه وبين اهل سلافنا الامم المسلمة  
 البرين ومقتضاه اجلت الحكومه المذكورة منها ولما زال بحكومة عثمانية تحاول الاستيلاء عليها وتحتلها بما عبادته اجلاونا ونحوها الى ان تفرقت  
 الحكومه المذكورة الى سلافنا الذين استقروا في بلادهم وبنائها وانها سكنا الرماء التي طماننا امرت من غير القطعة كما يشهد بذلك التاريخ وحب  
 والائلاف المراض تراكت لنا سلطانها باهضة لادن اولاد المذكورين من الضروني اذ لم تترك في استحصانها وكون حوزنا لوالدهن تحزنا واخرافنا  
 كسائر اسفنا فيما عن حقيقة عيبنا في المأركه الموقعه بين الاصلاف العظيمة في تركيا ومنها لادن من المكن سب القطعة العسك الضاربة باليمن  
 عقيب حصول المقاتر الروليه القطيعة وانما يطين بنا الما لينة الوفيرة وطلبنا من الواسط لرضنا بكم وسائر الدول العظيمة بكون حاكمية امامتنا بامرنا  
 سعادتنا المستقلة وقيل لنتها. الخايرة اجماعه ببناء وبن لوال المشاليه ما شوخنا الا بالمشايع كربطنا بنا العظمي لولدهن التي بالمعنى  
 الوجوديين بعبودية مخالفة لما ورد من الوالي المشاليه في بيان المقاتر الروليه في المأركه فنوق هذه الزخايل الخبايا في موقعتنا واهلنا  
 هيحنا فطينا لعمامة سكان القطر اليمني وحيث اننا طبعنا حصول علمهم سكان الرماء ولم تكن شاد الا من حجة اهل اليمن واخذة في الحروب مع تركيا  
 والاشيايين وقوع الثورة الغومونية فدارسنا بجنة مركبة من جوف اليمن لسيه على كرم حرمنا برهم بن الامام وسبوت اليمن فضاها بك والعماني  
 الفري من بلادنا لاجل المشي وسيدنا ليق العمانى موسوكو كوي لينا كوي والعمان واليمن قباير كوي العروضة لرضنا بكم والروال العظيمة فناء عليه  
 ارجون فضا ستم اتحاده للسانية والاقوام العربية والماتة كحال عتباء تاسين قوما الما كته باليه ورضنا بكم وفي اتمام اذ كوي لينا بتم اعداى الودى  
 ماتنا سنا طلبك الخباية المذكورين لعماله فضا ستم اذ المكن او الهمك سلا بجنة تامة كوي ستم هذه السلسلة واجبر فضا ستم قول جونا الى الخباية ببناء  
 الخباية تقف في ١٨ ربح الا اذ ١٢٣٧

Figure 2.24.1.1 Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)




Figure 2.24.1.2.24.2 Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)




Figure 2.24.1.2.24.3 Imam Yahya to King George V (22 December 1918)

**2.24.2. Imam Yahya to Major General J. M. Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden (22 December 1918)**

(Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 253-254).




Figure 2.24.2.1 Imam Yahya to Major General J. M. Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden (22 December 1918)




Figure 2.24.2.2 Imam Yahya to Major General J. M. Stewart, the Political Resident, Aden (22 December 1918)



**2.24.3.            Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)**

(Green Book, 1934: pp. 449-451).




Figure 2.24.3.1 Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)




Figure 2.24.3.2 Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)





Figure 2.24.3.3 Abdullah Al-Wazir to Fuad Hamzah (9 March 1934)

## 2.25. **Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen**

The Saudi counter-claims, opposing those of Yemen's association with the disputed territories, were published as part of the 'Green Book' that Saudi Arabia issued in 1934. As has been stated by this thesis, the Green Book does not unreservedly subscribe to the notion that, historically, Yemen has existed as an effectively continuous, unified political entity, particularly over the area historically known as *Bīllād Al-Yāman*; a notion for which, it could be argued, there is no definitive evidence. However, the Saudi argument, as this document proves, highlights the implications of the territorial dispute on historical narratives. Indeed, such claims initiated a selective and misinforming pattern, for instance by turning for reference to the work of several famous historians, such as Al-Hamdani, even though the information provided by the latter is actually completely the contrary to what is being claimed. (The Saudi Green Book, 1934: pp. 212-215 and 458-464).



2.25.1 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.2 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.3 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen






Figure 2.25.4 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.5 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.6 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.7 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.8 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.9 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.10 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen




Figure 2.25.11 Saudi counter-claims reject any historic connection between Asir and Yemen



## 2.26. The Idrisis surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)

It is interesting that there is no mention of Asir as an Idrisi country or Idrisi province. Clearly, the Idrisis had never extended their authority over Asir. And yet, Saudi conquest of the district was legitimised based on the agreements concluded with the Idrisis. Furthermore, in 1930 the Idrisis had lost the area they had expanded into and their actual influence was mainly over their stronghold in Jīzān, referred to here as the province or the Idrisi country.

- Telegram from Al-Hassan bin Ali Al-Idrisi, the Idrisis' chief at the time, in which he confirmed that, with his consent and agreement, he had handed over the administration of his country to Ibn Saud (9 October 1930).
- Ibn Saud's approval, on 20 November 1930, of the arrangements agreed between the Saudi representatives and those of the Idrisis on 16 November 1930. Among the arrangements agreed upon was the establishment of a legislative council for the Idrisis' province.
- Rules of administration to be followed in the Idrisi province in which it was agreed in Article 1 that Al-Hassam bin Ali Al-Idrisi would remain the head of the Idrisi Government.

(Green Book, 1934: pp 477-483).




Figure 2.26.1 The Idrisi surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)




Figure 2.26.2 The Idrisi surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)




Figure 2.26.3 The Idrisi surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)




Figure 2.26.4 The Idrisi surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)




Figure 2.26.5 The Idris surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)




Figure 2.26.6 The Idris surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)




Figure 2.26.7 The Idrisi surrender their authority to Ibn Saud (October 1930)



**2.27. Al-‘Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya  
(15 December 1931)**

The Treaty is available in (The Saudi Green Book, 1934: pp. 28-31 and 428-430).




Figure 2.27.1 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)




Figure 2.27.2 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)




Figure 2.27.3 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)

- ٢٥ -

والآحاد . وقد كانت بعض مراجعة بيننا وبين مندوبي حضرتكم الواصلين الينا  
وئمة تفرعات ملحوظة فان تفضلتم بارسال اولئك المندوبين مع توسيع خطتهم  
فلكم الفضل والسلام عليكم .

وثيقة : رقم ٢٥

« برقية جلالة الملك بالموافقة على طلب الامام يحيى وطلب تأجيل اينجاد  
المندوبين الى ما بعد الحج تاريخ ٥ شوال ١٣٥٠ » ١٢  
ح ١٥ رمضان يرقيتكم الكريمة وصلت وما ابداه حضرتكم من اننا نحن  
وانتم على اتفاق دائم فهذا فهو الحقيقة التي لاتزول ان شاء الله بل تزداد بكل  
أوان ، وايضا عرفتم ان المعاهدة ليست بالماهدات الدولية المصرية ، الحمد لله  
الجامعة التي نحن فيها أعزواتم من كل شيء ، وهي ثلاث، الاولى : الجامعة الاسلامية  
والثانية: الجامعة العربية ، والثالثة : هي الروح الناشئة بيننا وبينكم التي ان شاء الله  
لا يغيرها غير على طول الزمان. ونحن بحول الله كما تفضلتم به لا نترشح عن ذلك ،  
وايضا ما ابديتموه من سجاياكم الحميدة في حرصكم على الاتحاد وطلبكم وصول  
مندوبينا اليكم لا كمال بعض التفرعات الملحوظة فنحن موافقون على ذلك وهذا  
تراه من اكبر المصالح ومن نيتكم وشفقتكم ، ونحن مستعدون له ونريد  
ان نلبي الطلب الآن . ولكن وجدنا المندوبين الذين حضروا المفاوضات الاولى  
غير نشيطين في الوقت الحاضر ، واحد منهم الذي أمرناه في جيزان بدل الشويهر  
قدر الله عليه وانكسرت رجليه والآن الحمد لله طيب ، وابن معمر وعبدالوهاب اصحابهم  
مرض الحى وتكلفوا كثيرا فاذا وافقتم على تأخير ارسال المندوبين الى وقت الحج  
حتى يكونوا نشيطين فنحن مستعدون لارسالهم لاي مكان تريدونه مع توسيع  
النطاق لهم كما طليتم وهذا كله راجع لانظاركم ومنتظرون واياكم حفظكم الله  
وايتاكم اه .

Figure 2.27.4 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)




Figure 2.27.5 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)




Figure 2.27.6 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)




Figure 2.27.7 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)



Your brother has received from the representatives a copy of the agreement they arrived at. I have approved of what they have agreed upon. So I hope the brother will inform me of his approval, so that the officials on the frontiers may be informed to carry out the terms of that agreement as from date they receive the confirmation. We are glad that such agreement has been arrived at, because it means overcoming those who wish evil for Islam and Muslims and I believe that it will [be] a means of strengthening good relations between us and of the reasons which will cause the Arabs to be in the eyes of people as stones in a building supporting each other.

#### Document No. 19

Telegram of Imam Yahya to H.M. the King re-ratification of the Treaty dated 15th Ramadhan 1350.

Your telegram of 19th Sha'ban is received with all respect and regard. In fact we and you are in permanent agreement, God willing, although it may not be arranged in the form of International Treaties and their modern methods. The eight articles drawn up by the representatives are regarded by us before and afterwards, please God, and we do not move away (depart) from it. In any way we like to establish concord and union. Some discussions took place between us and Your Honour's representatives who came to us and there were some minor points noticed. So if you would be good enough to send those representatives with amplification on the part of your attitude we should be thankful to you. Peace be upon you.

#### Document No. 20

Telegram of H.M. the King accepting the request of the Imam Yahya and suggesting delay in sending the representatives until after pilgrimage dated 5th Shawwal 1350.

Reply. 15th Ramadhan. Your kind telegram has been received. Your Honour's statement to the effect that we and you are in permanent agreement is a true fact which will not cease, God willing, but will increase every now and then. You also state that the Treaty is not (like) the modern International Treaties. Thank God the fraternity in which we are included is stronger and more perfect than every thing. It is of three stages (1) Islamic fraternity, (2) Arab congregation, (3) the spirit developing between us and you and which nothing will change it throughout the time, God willing. And we, by the Might of God, as you stated, will not move away from it. Also regarding your statement which is due to your noble character, namely your earnest desire for union and your request for sending our representatives with a view to completing some minor points observed, we agree to this (suggestion) and consider it of the greatest advantageous matters and is due to your intention and kindness. We are prepared to (meet your wishes) and wish to respond to the request now, but

Figure 2.27.8 Al-'Arw Treaty, between Ibn Saud and Imam Yahya (15 December 1931)

## **2.28. Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)**

This proposal contains eight articles sufficient to establish proper relations between any two neighbouring countries. Only the boundary issue was not given appropriate considerations, however, and was only mentioned in the preface, stressing the necessity for finalising the boundary delimitation. Significantly, Article 4 made arbitration obligatory for solving any future disputes between both countries. The full text is available in the (Green Book, 1934: pp. 35-37 and 433-435).




Figure 2.28.1 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)




Figure 2.28.2 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)




Figure 2.28.3 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)




Figure 2.28.4 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)




Figure 2.28.5 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)




Figure 2.28.6 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)






Figure 2.28.7 Ibn Saud suggests a defensive convention to the Imam (8 October 1932)

## **2.29. The Imam's position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)**

Imam Yahya accepted the idea, albeit with reservations over the territorial issue being left without a satisfactory solution (Green Book, 1934: pp. 37-38 and 435-436).




Figure 2.29.1 Imam's position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)




Figure 2.29.2 Imam's position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)




Figure 2.29.3 Imam's position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)




Figure 2.29.4 Imam's position towards the proposed convention (4 January 1933)

## **2.30. New proposal for a 'Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity' (May 1933)**

Ibn Saud put forward a new proposal for a 'Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity' on 30 May 1933. However, he informed his delegates not to offer the Imam any recognition as the King of Yemen. The intention was thus to secure a treaty between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Imam Yahya, rather than with 'the King of Yemen'.

### **2.30.1. Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty**

— ١٠٣٦ —

إن شاء الله توكل على الله وتمشي مع الربيع ، حمد وخالد والتعليات بما يلزم معهم ، إن شاء الله إن اجتهادكم فيه بركة ، ولا بعدكم أسف على شيء ( الختم ) .

تعليات للمندوبين : وهذا نص التعليات :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

التعليات الصادرة للمندوبين والمفاوضين مع جلالة الإمام يحيى

مقدمة :

الذي يظهر من تصرفات الإمام يحيى أنه متردد في اتباع السياسة الصريحة معنا والتي سداها ولحمتها الاخلاص وحسن النية ، لذلك فإنه في الدرجة الأولى من الأهمية أن يسير الوفد في عمله على قاعدتين أساسيتين .

١ - التعرف على نواياه ، وعمل ما يمكن لا قناعه بحسن نوايا جلالة الملك تجاهه ، وتجاه بلاده .

٢ - تجنب كل أمير يثير شكوكه ، أو يراه ، سواء في الحال أو المستقبل ، ويكون ذلك بإفهامه بالأسباب التي حدثت بجلالته إلى إرسال الوفد إليه ، وتجنب مشاق السفر وعناء الطريق للحضور إلى صنعاء ، والسبب الأساسي على ما يظهر لنا هو توطيد الصداقة التي تأسست بين الجانبين بعد حوادث جبل ( العُمر ) والاتحاد على ما فيه عز العرب والإسلام ، والاتفاق على كل ما من شأنه أن يحفظ جزيرة العرب ، ويؤلف بين أهلها .

٢ - العلاقات :

إنه والله الحمد والمنة ، لا توجد بين البلدين أية أمور توجب الخلاف وأنه ليس لدى الوفد ما يقول ، لأن ما تم بعد حوادث ( العُمر ) ، قد أظهرت الصداقة بين الجانبين بأجلى مظاهرها ، وقد عقدت بين الجانبين معاهدة صداقة بالبرقيات التي تبودلت بينهما ، ثم من جهة أخرى تقدم جلالة الملك إلى الإمام يحيى باقتراح مؤداه تقوية الصداقة والألفة ، والسعي للظهور

Figure 2.30.1.1 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty



— ١٠٣٧ —

بمظهر الاتحاد المتين الذي لا تنفصم عراه ، ومع ذلك فقد أراد جلالته أن يوفد الوفد إلى صنعاء لكي يكون حاضراً بين يدي الإمام ، ويطلع على ماعنده من اقتراحات ، خاصة بتقوية العلاقات وتأييدها ، وأنه مستعد للمفاوضة فيها والبت في كل ما يعود بالفائدة على صداقة الجانبين .

### ٣ - المعاهدة :

إن المعاهدة التي وقع عليها في شعبان سنة ١٣٥٠ والتي أبرمها جلالته وسيادة الإمام معاهدة صالحة ، ولا زالت قائمة ، ونعده نحن بالمحافظة عليها ونأمل أن سيادته يكون حريصاً كذلك على بقائها .

وقد حلت هذه المعاهدة نقطتين أساسيتين يمكن لو لم تكونا منتهيتين ، أن تسبب الخلاف - لاسمح الله - بيننا ، وهما :

- ١ - مسألة الحدود بين عسير السراة وعسير تهامة وبين اليمن .
- ٢ - تسليم المحرمين الذين يرتكبون أعمالاً في بلاد الفريق الواحد ضد الفريق الآخر .

أما مسألة الحدود المشار إليها ، فكما أشرنا أصبحت الآن منتهية لأن المعاهدة أثبتت ذلك ، وجاء قبول سيادة الإمام يحيى بتحكيم جلalته بأن جبل ( المُعَرَّ ) للإمام ثم اعترف سيادة الإمام بأن ( فيفا ) و ( بني مالك ) تابعان لجلالة الملك ، وجاء قبول سيادته قاطعاً للأمر ، وباتاً فيه ، وقاضياً نهائياً على أي ادعاء كان بإمكان تغيير الحدود ، فالذي تحت يد جلالة الملك بالفعل هو لنا ، والذي تحت يد الإمام هو له ، ولن نطالبه بشيء تحت يده ، كما أنه لن يطالبنا بشيء مما هو تحت يدنا ، إلا أنه منعاً لأسباب النزاع ، وقطعاً لأبواب الاختلاف فإن جلalته رغبة في إدامة حسن التفاهم والصداقة مع الإمام لا يمانع تبديل نصف قبيلة أو قبيلة بقبيلة ، لكي يكون افخاد القبيلة الواحدة في جهة واحدة .

كما أن جلalته لا يمانع أيضاً في تصحيح خط الحدود مع ذلك كضم شعيب إلى جانب ومسيل إلى جانب آخر .

Figure 2.30.1.2.30.2 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

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فإذا كان للإمام رغبة في ذلك ، فإن جلالته يوافق عليها مع المنوئية لأنها ترفع النزاع ، وتمنع الاختلاف ، بين بلاد منقسمة ما بين البلدين . هذا إذا كان للمندوبين استناد على ما عندهم من المعلومات عن الحدود والقبائل يرون ذلك في مصلحتنا ، وإن كانوا لا يرون ذلك في مصلحتنا فليأخذوا اقتراح يحبي ويرفع لجلالته مع بيان رأيهم في ذلك .

وأما مسألة تسليم المجرمين التي ثبتت في المعاهدة فإننا نرى الاحتفاظ والتمسك بها تماماً كشرط أساسي لإدامة الثقة والعلاقات الحسنة .

ولذلك فإننا نؤمل أن موقف سيادته في هذا الأمر مثل موقفنا ، وأن نعلمنا بصراحة على ذلك ، لأن موقف سيادته في حوادث الإدريسي كان موقفاً يناقض المعاهدة ، وبناء على ذلك فإننا نطلب منه يعرفنا رأيه بصراحة ويبين لنا أمرين :

١ - هل هو مُصمَّمٌ على انفاذ النص كما هو ؟ ! .

٢ - أو أنه لا يريد ذلك ويرى إلغائه ، والسير على الطريقة التي سار عليها في حوادث الأدارسة ، سواء تجاه ( الدباغين ) واتباعهم ، أو الأدارسة أنفسهم .

٤ - الحدود والاعتراف بها :

ذكرنا فيما سبق كيف أن المعاهدة المعقودة ، وحكم ( العُزْر ) قد حل مسألة الحدود بين عسير واليمن ، وذكرنا رأينا في التعديل الذي يمكن الموافقة عليه .

وأما حدودنا فيما وراء عسير من الداخل - الشرق - فإنها كذلك مبيتوت فيها منذ عام ١٣٤٦ حينما زار ابن دلیم ، وابن ماضي الإمام ، وأعلمناه بأن أهل ( نجران ) تابعون لنجد وأنهم لازمون لنجد بموجب الضرورة ، كما بَلَّغْنَاهُ ، وأن سيادة الإمام وافق في ذلك الوقت على أن ما كان من نجران وشمالاً فهو عائد لنا ، وما كان من ( وائلة ) وجنوباً

Figure 2.30.1.2.30.3 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

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فهو عائد له، حسب النص المشار إليه في المحضر ، وعن إمكان تعديل الحدود  
تعديلاً بسيطاً ، كشعب أو قبيلة أو ما أشبه ذلك في عسير فإننا لانمانع  
في إجرائه في نجران .

وعلى كل من الضرورة أن يكون موقف الوفد من هذا الأمر — أي أمر  
الحدود جليلاً واضحاً ، وأن يفهمه الإمام ، وهو أنه من المستحيل أن يتغير موقفنا  
تجاه الحدود ، بترك بلاد عسير ونجران ، أو أنه إن كان قصد الإمام أن  
نعيش معنا معيشة الصداقة والتفاهم ، فما عليه إلا الإقلاع عن التفكير بأمور  
لا يكون منها له نتيجة ، إن ما تحت أيدينا هو لنا لن نتنازل عنه ، كما أننا  
لا نطالبه بأن يتنازل عما كان تابعاً للأدارة قبل دخول قوات الإمام إلى  
( السُّحْدَيْدَة ) و ( مَيْدِي ) .

وإن الذي يوافق عليه هو التعديلات البسيطة التي أشرنا إليها ، المقصود  
من ذلك أنكم تعرفون نواياه ، إن كانت نوايا حسنة ، وقصده على أن تكون  
الحالة كما هي ، والكلام يصبر في وقت آخر ، المقصود لا تُورثُ شِدَّة .  
توجب الكدر والخلاف ، ولا تراخون في أمر يريده وفيه مضرة علينا .

#### ٥ — المعاهدة الجديدة :

قلنا إننا نرى المعاهدة الحالية أداة صالحة ، ولا بأس من بقائها ولكن  
لا نرى مانعاً من عقد معاهدة أخرى ، في حالة رغبة الإمام يحيى في ذلك ،  
ومن الموافق أن يترك أمر اختبار ذلك إلى الإمام نفسه ، فإذا كان راغباً في  
عقد معاهدة جديدة فن الضروري معرفة الشكل

نعرض في هذا الباب حالتين هما :

١ — العصرية التي تسير عليها الحكومات الأوروبية في عقد المعاهدات .

٢ — بقاء المعاهدة القديمة على حالها بعد تسيبها .

فإن اختار الطريقة الأولى ، وهو ما نُرجِّحُه ، فاطلبوا منه المشروع  
الذي يقدمه وعرفونا نصّه برفقياً ، بعد تبديل ترتيب المواد حتى لا تنكشف  
الشفرة ويمكن حلها ، لكي نرى رأينا فيه ، وقد وضعنا نصّ المشروع

Figure 2.300.1.2.30.4 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

— ١٠٤٠ —

فقدموا هذا له وستكون المخابرة متصلة بيننا لتعديل أو تبديل شيء من المواد .

#### ٦ - الاتحاد والتعاون :

بما أن الذي يظهر لنا من تصرفات الإمام يحيى خلال الوقائع الإدريسية لا يشجع كثيراً على الثقة بنوايا المذكور المستقبلية ، فإننا لا نرى بصورة جازمة ما يكون للاتفاق الهجومي الدفاعي ، من قيمة عملية بيننا على فرض دخولنا فيه معه ، ومع ذلك فإننا في حالة الدفاع عن سلامة الجزيرة العربية ، لا نرى مانعاً من قبول التعهد بما يأتي :

- ١ - وضع ذلك في المعاهدة ، أو في مكتابة ملحقة في المعاهدة .
- ٢ - وفي حالة حصول اعتداء خارجي على بلاد أحد الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين يتعهد كل فريق بما يأتي :

- ( أ ) الوقوف على الحياد التام .
- ( ب ) المعاونة الأدبية والمعنوية .

وفي حالة الاعتداءات الداخلية يتعهد كل فريق بما يأتي :

- ( أ ) اتخاذ التدابير الفعالة لعدم تمكين المعتدي من الاستفادة من أراضيه .
- ( ب ) منع التجاء اللاجئين إلى بلاده .
- ( ج ) منع رعاياه من الاشتراك مع المعتدين أو تشجيعهم أو تموينهم .
- ( د ) منع الإمدادات والذخائر والمؤن عنهم .
- ( هـ ) تسليم من يفر منهم إلى بلاده أو طرده .

#### ٧ - التحكيم :

لا مانع لدينا مطلقاً أن نتفق على إحالة كل خلاف يحصل بين الجانبين على التحكيم الذي يصدر ، ويوضع لذلك نص صريح واضح ، في المعاهدة ( كتابة ملحقة ) ويمكن الاستعانة بالنصوص الواردة في ( بروتوكول ) التحكيم المعقود بيننا وبين حكومة العراق ، والموجود في آخر مجموعة المعاهدات التي عندكم منها نسخة من قبل .

Figure 2.300.1.2.30.5 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

- ١٩٤١ -

## ٨- المؤتمر العربي في بغداد :

إن على الوفد أن يتخبر مع الإمام يحيى من أجل قضية المؤتمر العربي المنوي عقده في بغداد ، أو أن يفهم ، أنه بالنظر إلى أنه وجمالة الملك هما المستقلان دون غيرهم استقلالاً تاماً صحيحاً ، فإنه من الضروري أن يتبادلا المعلومات في كل الأمور التي لها علاقة بالعرب ومستقبلهم ، ولذلك فإننا نحب أن نعلم موقف الإمام يحيى تجاه المؤتمر العربي ، وإننا نحب وإياه أن نكون يداً واحدة ، ومن رأي واحد فيما يتعلق بشأه .

أما المؤتمر فتح أن غرض القائمين به شريف ، إلا أنه بالنظر إلى موقف أكثر البلاد العربية ، وبعض المتزعمين من العرب ، فإننا نخشى أن يكون الغرض منه شيئاً آخر خلاف ما هو معلوم عنه ، أو أن يحاول بعض النفعيين الاستفادة منه على حساب الآخرين .

أما أهل سوريا فلا شك أن قصدهم الاستفادة على مقاومة الفرنسيين مهما كانت الحالة ، ولكننا نعلم أن قوتهم لا تمكنهم من الوقوف في وجه فرنسا بالقوة ( ... .. ) ومعلوم الذي يصيبه الضرر من مساع غير وطنية هو سيادة الإمام وجمالة الملك ، ولهذا فإننا نطلب من يحيى أن يبين لنا موقفه لكي نعلم ماذا يجب علينا اتخاذه من تدابير للتفاهم على خطة العمل السليبي والإيجابي .

## ٩- الاعتراف :

إذا طلب الإمام أن نعرف به بصفته ملكاً على اليمن فإنه لا مانع عندنا من ذلك ، على شرط أن يطلب هو ذلك ، فإن لم يطلبه فلا تفتحوا بابه أما نصه فيكون كما يلي : يعترف حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك اليمن بحضرة صاحب الجلالة الملك عبد العزيز ملكاً على المملكة العربية السعودية .

## ملاحظة مهمة :

إذا تم الاتفاق بينكم وبين يحيى على الحدود ، فمن الضروري تثبيتها في مادة تكون في المعاهدة ، ولا يمكن يعترف ليحيى بملكيته على اليمن قبل

Figure 2.300.1.2.30.6 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

— ١٠٤٢ —

أن يعترف بالحدود ، والحدود هي الموجودة في محضر الأحاديث التي كانت بين ابن ماضي وابن دكليم ، ومندوبي يحيى نراها لا بأس بها ، لتكون أساساً للمادة في المعاهدة .

( مشروع معاهدة بين المملكة العربية السعودية  
وبين حكومة الإمام يحيى )

الحمد لله نشكره ، ونصلي ونسلم على خير أنبيائه الذي جاء بالهدى ودين الحق ونستفتح بالذي هو خير .

أما بعد فإن حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك المملكة العربية السعودية عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن السعود وحضرة صاحب الجلالة الإمام يحيى حميد الدين رغبة منهما في جمع كلمة الأمة العربية الإسلامية ورفع شأنها ، وحفظ كرامتها واستقلالها ، ونظراً لضرورة تثبيت الحدود بين البلدين في شكل عهدي - بعد أن تم القسم الأول من ذلك الاجتماع الذي عقد في صنعاء عام ١٣٤٦ بين مندوبي الفريقين ، وتم القسم الآخر في المراجعات البرقية والتحريرية بتاريخ أيام جرى الاختلاف على مسألة ( العثر ) .

وبناء على الاتفاقية التي عقدت بين مندوبي الفريقين ، وحازت تصديق الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين ، والمشملة على ثمانية مواد والملحقة بصورتها في صلب هذه المعاهدة ، تثبيتاً لمفعولها الدائم ، ونظراً لرغبة الفريقين في إدامة السلام بين بلديهما ورغبتهما في أن يكونا عضداً واحداً أمام المهمات المفاجئة ، من الداخل والخارج ، ورغبة منهما في سلامة الجزيرة العربية فقد انتدب حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك المملكة العربية السعودية عبد العزيز ابن عبد الرحمن الفيصل السعود وانتدب حضرة صاحب السيادة الإمام يحيى حميد الدين مندوبين مفوضين عنهما ، وبعد أن أطلع كل من المندوبين على أوراق المندوبين الآخرين فوجدت مطابقة للأصول ، اتفقا على المواد الآتية :

Figure 2.300.1.2.30.7 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

— ١٩٤٣ —

#### المادة الأولى :

يسود بين المملكة العربية السعودية ، وبين المملكة اليمنية ، وبين حكومتها ورعاياها سلم دائم ، وصدقة خالصة ، لا يمكن الإخلال بها . ويتعهد الفريقان المتعاقدان أن يحلا بروح الود والصدقة جميع المنازعات التي تقع بينهما ، وأن يسود علاقتهما روح الإخاء الإسلامي العربي في سائر المواقف والحالات .

#### المادة الثانية :

تؤسس بين البلدين علاقات التمثيل السياسي والقنصلي ، ويكون للمثلين في كل من البلدين حقوق الصيانة التي تقتضيها القواعد العربية والإسلامية وتتفق مع الحقوق الدولية .

#### المادة الثالثة :

يتعهد كل من الفريقين بأن يمنع بكل ما لديه من الوسائل استعمال بلاده قاعدة لأي عمل عدائي ، أو الاستعداد له ضد بلاد الآخر ، وكل من يسعى لذلك فإنه إن كان من رعايا الحكومة التي يعمل في أراضيها فحكومة البلد تؤدبه أدباً بيناً ، وتردعه ردعاً شديداً وإن كان من رعايا البلد الآخر فإنه يلقي القبض عليه ويسلم لحكومته التي يعمل ضدها فتجازه به بما تقتضي به الأحكام الشرعية ، وعلى الحكومة التي يقع ترتيب العدوان في أراضيها أن تحذر الحكومة الأخرى في الحال عن ذلك ، وأن تجري المراجعات البرقية والكتابية عند اللزوم لاتخاذ خطة مشتركة رادعة لأعمال أولئك المجرمين .

#### المادة الرابعة :

يتعهد الفريقان الساميان المتعاقدان بأن يلجأ إلى التحكيم لأجل أي نزاع يقع بينهما ، وأن قبلا الحكم الذي يصدره الحكم ، ويوضع للتحكيم ترتيباً مفصلاً يعين كيفية طلبه ، وكيفية حصوله .

#### المادة الخامسة :

إن الفريقين الساميين اللذين تجمعهما الجامعة الإسلامية العربية أمتهما

Figure 2.30.1.2.30.8 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty

— ١٠٤٤ —

واحدة وإنهما لا ينويان بأحد شرأ ، وإنهما يعملان جهدهما لأجل ترقية  
شئون أمتهما في ظل الطمأنينة والسكون ، وإنهما لا ينويان أية نية عدوانية  
تجاه أي أمة كانت .

**المادة السادسة :**

يعقد بين الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين اتفاق بريدي لتسهيل المواصلات  
وتزايد الاتصال بين بلديهما .

**المادة السابعة :**

في حالة حصول اعتداء خارجي على بلاد أحد الفريقين الساميين  
المتعاقدين يتعهد كل فريق بما يأتي :

١ - أوقوف على الحياد .

٢ - المعاونة الأدبية والمعنوية الممكنة .

في حالة الاعتداءات الداخلية يتعهد كل فريق :

١ - اتخاذ التدابير الفعالة بعدم تمكين المعتدين من عدم الاستفادة من  
أراضيه .

٢ - منع التجاء اللاجئين إلى بلاده .

٣ - منع رعاياه من الاشتراك مع المعتدين أو تشجيعهم أو تمويلهم .

٤ - منع الإمدادات والذخائر والمؤن عن المعتدي .

٥ - تسليم من يفر منهم إلى بلاده أو طردهم إليها .

**المادة الثامنة :**

حررت هذه المعاهدة من نسختين وتصبح نافذة من تاريخ إبلاغ الفريقين  
الساميين المتعاقدين بعضهما برقياً بالاطلاع على مواد هذه المعاهدة والموافقة  
عليها بحري تبادل قرارات الإبرام بأسرع مدة ممكنة في المكان الذي يتفق  
عليه الفريقان .

هذا النص الكامل لمشروع المعاهدة التي زود بها الوفد مع التعليمات

Figure 2.30.1.2.30.9 Instruction to the Saudi delegation with draft treaty



2.30.2. Extract from *Umm-al-Qura*, 24 May 1933. FO 967/52




Figure 2.300.2.1 Extract from *Umm-al-Qura*, 24 May 1933. FO 967/52

### **2.31. A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement**

The letter from Fuad Hamzah to the British Chargé d’Affaires in Jeddah, 17 August 1933, confirms that the idea of a treaty featuring the postponement of the settlement over boundaries had been introduced by Imam Yahya. The proposed treaty was intended to postpone agreement over the territorial dispute until a future arrangement. The text and the translation are both available in (FO 967/52, TNA, London).




Figure 2.31.1 A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement




Figure 2.31.2 A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement




Figure 2.31.3 A treaty proposal for postponing the boundary settlement

### **2.32. Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (28 August 1933)**

Here the Imam accepted Ibn Saud's proposal of a treaty, but suggested instead a treaty similar to the one that Yemen was negotiating with Britain; namely the Sana'a Treaty, which would be completed in February 1934. The aim was to postpone any agreement over the boundary until a later arrangement to be agreed upon in twenty lunar years (Green Book, 1934: pp. 77-78).

البرقية الثانية — بدون عدد وتاريخها ١٣٥٢ / ٥ / ٦  
 . . . . . ج تابع للبرقية التي مثل هذا تاريخ ٣ الجاري .  
 ما أفدتم من شان الحدود فليس المانع لنا عن ما اشترتم اليه الا نفورنا عن  
 تجزئة اليمن ومثل هذا المانع منذ عشرين سنة لا كمال معاهدة بيننا وبين الحكومة  
 البريطانية لارادتها تقرير الحدود في تلك الاراضي الجنوبية ولا تساعد الى ذلك  
 والآخر الامر كان البناء على تأخر الخوض في تلك الاراضي وتأخر البت وتكون  
 المراجعة في مدة المعاهدة هذا وقد وافقنا على ان تبقى الحالة بيننا وبين حضوركم  
 كما هي عليه لانا غير متربصين امر غير ( غلط في الجفر ) التجزية ومراد حضوركم  
 حاصل مع ابقاء الحالة بما هي عليه الآن وما تمة ما يوجب خلاف ذلك فتأملوا  
 هذا عافاكم الله فهو معنى ما اوضحناه لوفدكم الاكرم ودمتم والسلام عليكم .  
 البرقية الثالثة — بدون عدد تاريخها ١٣٥٢ / ٥ / ١٠  
 . . . . . ج تابع ابرقيتنا تاريخ ٩ جمادى الاولى : ما افدتم من امر يام  
 فهو اللازم لضبط الحدود من الطرفين لمنع كل ما هسهه يحدث من الشقاق بين

Figure 2.32.1 Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (28 August 1933)

—٧٢—  
 أهل الحدود ومع انضباط أمور يام ان شاء الله لا بد تجرى الاور كما نحبون  
 وان مقدمات قصدنا دفع كل شيء بين المسلمين عموماً وخصوصاً فيما يتفق بنا  
 وبمضوركم والسلام عليكم .

Figure 2.32.2 Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (28 August 1933)

### 2.33. Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (17 December 1933)

Imam Yahya re-affirmed his position towards the postponement of the settlement for the territorial dispute (Green Book, 1934: p. 98).




Figure 2.33.1 Imam Yahya to Ibn Saud (17 December 1933)



### **2.34. Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya (19 December 1933)**

Ibn Saud accepted the Imam's suggestion of a treaty that postponed the settlement of the boundary dispute for a period of twenty years (Green Book, 1934: pp. 98-99).

وَبَيْفَةٌ : رَقْمٌ ٧١

« جواب جلاله الملك الى الامام يحيى بتاريخ ٢ رمضان ١٣٥٢ »

تلاتينا برقية الاخ المؤرخة في سلخ شبان مساء اليوم الثاني من رمضان وقد  
احطت علما بما نفضلتم من ان لاشقاق ولا عداوة بيننا ، وان القصد هو الائتلاف  
والمحبة وترك ما يفرج الاعداء ويحقق آمالم . وانا نشكر الاخ على بيانه الذي  
هو عين ما لدنا وهو مقصدنا وغايتنا وهو الذي ندين الله به . ذكرتم انه قد  
أنحل من المطلوب عقدتان : الاولى مسألة الادارسة ، والثانية مسألة الحدود  
انتي اقترحتم فيها عقد معاهدة حبية سـلمية دينية لمدة عشرين سنة تثبت فيها  
الحدود ويكون لكل من الطرفين فيها البلاد التي تحت يده ، ورجوتم ان تلتفوا  
الله تعالى قبل هذه المدة ولا يكون بيننا وبينكم اختلاف ، انا نشكر حضرة  
الاخ على اقتراحه هذا وانا نقبل ونؤيد اقتراحه وتقبل ان تثبت الحدود التي

Figure 2.34.1 Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya (19 December 1933)




Figure 2.34.2 Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya (19 December 1933)

## **2.35. The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office (26 and 29 December 1933)**

In telegrams from the British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office, on 26 and 29 December 1933, the British diplomat confirmed the information concerning a proposed peaceful settlement. This included the prospect of an agreement being reached between Riyadh and Sana'a that postponed the final resolution of the boundary issue until later arrangements after twenty lunar years (FO 967/54, TNA, London).

3495/2/261

InterD Rec.

**TELEGRAM.**

<p><b>H.M. MINISTER,</b> <b>JEDDA.</b></p> <p>26/12/33 (19-15)</p>	<p>To FOREIGN OFFICE.</p> <p>Repeated to Aden and S.N.O.</p>
--	--

No. 223 Dated 26th December 1933.

Addressed to Foreign Office No.223 Repeated to Aden No.289  
S.N.O.No.29

My telegram No.222 (not repeated).

Fuad who returned from Riyâdh on December 21 informed me by telephone on December 23 that prospect of peaceful settlement between Ibn Sa'ûd and Imâm was greatly improved. Informant quoted in my telegram under reference now shares this view. I hope to see Fuad and get details within two or three days.

Figure 2.35.1 The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office (26 and 29 December 1933)

3512/2/265

Cypher  
or clear? K.

**TELEGRAM.**

From **H.M. MINISTER,**  
**JEDDA.**

To FOREIGN OFFICE.

Despatched 29/12/33 (11-45)  
(Date and Time).

No. 226 Dated 29th December 1933.

My telegram No. 223.

I saw Fuad Yesterday. He stated that agreement had been reached on following points :

1. Idrisi to be removed to Zebid.
2. Imâm to recognise existing position in regard to both parts of 'Asir. Parties to make a treaty affirming this. It would resemble projected Anglo-Yemen treaty inasmuch as it would be concluded for twenty years but according to Fuad it would preclude Imâm from contesting Ibn Sa'ûd's rights in 'Asir at any future time. Meeting of delegates to be arranged in due course. Place of meeting not yet fixed.
3. Intrigues of which Ibn Sa'ûd had complained e.g. among Beni Malik to cease.

This leaves question of Najrân unsettled. Fuad defined Sa'ûdi proposal in language similar to that reported in my telegram No. 217. Issue of peace or war would depend on its acceptance or rejection by Imâm who had been informed in this sense.

Fuad was categorical on last point although unofficial informant previously mentioned expressed view on December 24 that neither side would go to war over Najrân. Actual situation there seems less certain than would appear from Fuad's language on December 10.

/Unofficial

Figure 2.35.2 The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office (26 and 29 December 1933)

2/264.

**TELEGRAM.**

**H.M. MINISTER.**  
**JEDDA.**

To .....

ed .....

nd Time).

No.	Dated
<p>Unofficial informant had heard of recent clash not authorised by King between Wahhâbi forces and Yemenis. Fuad still denies any direct conflict. He again states that Yemenis have left Wadi Habûna and Badr but cannot say what this amounts to in way of evacuation owing to uncertainty as to geography of region.</p>	

Figure 2.35.3 The British Minister in Jeddah to the Foreign Office (26 and 29 December 1933)

### **2.36. Extract from Umm-al-Qura (16 January 1934)**

News confirms that the two parties agreed telegraphically on the question of the Idrisis and their position. It added that the Imam Yahya then agreed that the frontier between the two countries should be delimited and that a ‘Treaty of Friendship and Fraternity’ should be concluded between the two parties for a period of twenty years (FO 141/482, TNA, London).






Figure 2.36.1 Extract from Umm-al-Qura (16 January 1934)

treaty should be drawn up, signed and made public immediately. As regards the question of Najran, negotiations should be conducted in a conference to be held for that purpose by delegations from the two parties, with a view to settling it in such a manner as to preserve the interests of both and to prevent harm befalling them. There is still a strong hope that the proposed conference will overcome the difficulties and settle the trouble in a way which will preserve the interests of both parties as well as the interests of the people of Najran themselves. His Majesty the King sent this suggestion to his Highness the Imam Yahya on the 17th Ramadan (the 3rd January, 1934), but his Highness the Imam Yahya, as frequently happens, delayed his reply either accepting or refusing the suggestion. It happened during that time that certain of those in the mountains of the Tihamat Asir caused disturbances because of the intrigues of certain of his Highness the Imam Yahya's Amirs, which caused a bad effect, particularly in Nejd. Meanwhile, orders had already been issued to his Highness the Amir Saud, heir apparent of the Saudi Arab Kingdom, to march south with a Nejd force; orders had likewise been issued to his Highness the Amir Feisal to march south along the Tihama coast. On the 23rd Ramadan (the 9th January, 1934), however, a message was received from his Highness the Imam Yahya to the effect that he agreed to the suggestion of His Majesty the King and that his Highness admitted the activities and interference of his Amirs, in the matter of stirring up disturbances, amongst the Bani Malik and the Abadil. He stated that he had issued orders to prevent this and asked His Majesty to grant pardon to those who had committed these acts; and he manifested readiness to conclude the treaty and to depute a delegation. Thereupon orders were at once issued to the Amir Feisal to stop his march, but the Amir Saud had already started with a force in cars, and it was not possible for the orders to return to reach him; so he continued on his way.

The Government have made certain that the attitude of his Highness the Amir Saud in that direction of the kingdom will be one ensuring tranquillity in affairs and precluding any aggression or hostility, unless the situation should necessitate it for purposes of defence, which the Government hope will not be the case, they hope also that his Highness the Imam Yahya will expedite the settlement of the matter, so that the Islamic and Arab worlds may repose in the amicable settlement of this affair.

Figure 2.36.2 Extract from Umm-al-Qura (16 January 1934)

## 2.37. The sovereignty of Ibn Saud and the Idrisis: open to question

It seems that neither Ibn Saud nor the Idrisis had become sovereign prior to 1926. Indeed, Ibn-Saud remained bound by his treaty of 1915 with Britain, asking for permission whenever he intended to establish relations with a foreign country (Sir W. Tyrrell -for the Secretary of State-, to Lloyd (HC, Cairo) 9 January, 1926 (FO 406/57, TNA, London).




Figure 2.37.1 The sovereignty of Ibn Saud and the Idrisis: open to question

## **2.38. Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi**

Ibn Saud informed Imam Yahya that Britain had relinquished to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi. He added that he received the recognition of several other countries, including Italy. 18 August 1933 (Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya, 18 August 1933 (Green Book, 1934: pp. 74-75).




Figure 2.38.1 Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi




Figure 2.38.2 Britain relinquishes to Saudi Arabia its treaty with Al-Idrisi

### **2.39. The position of the Idrisis' surrender of authority to Ibn Saud open to question**

The agreements that the Idrisis concluded with the Saudis were seen as grounds in international law for the Saudi position over Asir.

2.39.1. (Chamberlain to Clayton 27 January 1927, AIR 2/1020, TNA, London).




Figure 2.3939.1.2.39.1 (Chamberlain to Clayton 27 January 1927 AIR 2/1020, London).






Figure 2.39.1.2.39.2 (Chamberlain to Clayton 27 January 1927 AIR 2/1020, London).

2.39.2. Simon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Drummond,  
Rome, 15 January 1934, FO 141/482, TNA, London.




Figure 2.39.2.1 Simon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Drummond, Rome, 15 January 1934, FO 141/482, TNA, London.




Figure 2.39.2.2 Simon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Drummond, Rome, 15 January 1934, FO 141/482, TNA, London.




Figure 2.3939.2.2.39.3 Simon Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Drummond, Rome, 15 January 1934, FO 141/482, TNA, London.

### 3.1. The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (commonly known as the 'Taif' Treaty of 1934) was signed on 20 May 1934. It was named after the city of Taif, in Al-Ḥijāz, where negotiations and the preliminary signing of the treaty took place. However, the city of Taif in Al-Ḥijāz has often been mistaken for the village of the same name (Al-Taif) situated close to Al-Hudaydah, and there has thus been some disagreement about this.<sup>1</sup> In fact, the BLJ contributed several important reports with information supporting the view that the 'Taif' being referred to in the Treaty was the city of Taif in Al-Ḥijāz.<sup>2</sup> Reportedly, after the Treaty of Taif was signed (in the city of Taif in Al-Ḥijāz) by Ibn Saud, it was taken to Sana'a by Abdullah Al-Wazir, the head of the Imam's delegation, for it to be signed by Imam Yahya. Al-Wazir left Jeddah on 12 June on the S.S. Al-Haq, bound for Al-Hudaydah.<sup>3</sup>

It seems that the final copy of the treaty was written in Jeddah.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, the Treaty itself includes a note (near its end) stating that the Treaty was "written in the city of Jeddah [Jeddah]".<sup>5</sup> Therefore, there are two possibilities regarding where it was signed, either in Jeddah where it was written or in Taif where negotiations took place. The reference to Jeddah in the Treaty was noticed at the time by the translator at the British Legation in Jeddah, who nonetheless noted that this was "probably only a slip", asserting that the Treaty had been "concluded at Taif".<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Wenner, 1967: p. 146. See also, Peterson, 1982: p. 66.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the May 1934 Saudi-Yemeni treaty and associated agreements, see British and Foreign State Papers. 1934 (London: HMSO, 1939), pp. 670-683. Extract from FO Annual Review for Saudi Arabia in 1934, FO, May 1935 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.4. pp. 763-767). The Yemeni Minister of Foreign Affairs to Simon (FS), 19 June 1934 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2. p. 415). BLJ to Simon (FS), 19 June 1934, FO 905/6, TNA, London. Ryan (BLJ) to the FO, 13 June 1934, FO 371/17928, TNA, London. Ryan (BLJ) to the Political Resident Bushire, 13 June 1934, FO 905/5, TNA, London.


<sup>3</sup> The Times, 14 June 1934.

<sup>4</sup> See, A. S. Calvert, (BLJ) to Simon (FS), 30 July 1934 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2. pp. 422-432). Mistakenly, certain Arab historians who have analysed the Treaty regard Jeddah as the place where it was concluded (Salem, 2003: p.502). See 'Jeddah Report for May 1936', Ryan (BL, Jeddah) to the FO (London), 2 June 1936, FO 371/20062, TNA, London. Bullard (BLJ) to Eden (FS), 3 March 1937, FO 371/20839, TNA, London.

<sup>5</sup> See A. S. Calvert at the(BLJ) to Simon (FS), 30 July 1934 (Schofield, 1993: Vol.2. pp. 422-432).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. Mistakenly, certain Arab historians who have analyzed the Treaty regard Jeddah as the place where it was concluded like, Salem (1984: p.502).

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﴿ وقعت في جدة في السادس من شهر صفر سنة ثلاث وخمسين ﴾  
﴿ بعد الثلاثمائة والألف ﴾

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Figure 3.1.1 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

معاهدة صداقة اسلامية واخوة عربية

- بين -

المملكة العربية السعودية

- وبين -

المملكة اليمنية

حضرة صاحب الجلالة الامام عبد العزيز بن عبدالرحمن الفيصل آل سعود

ملك المملكة العربية السعودية من جهة

وحضرة صاحب الجلالة الامام يحيى بن محمد حيد الدين

ملك اليمن من جهة أخرى

رغبة منهما في انهاء حالة الحرب التي كانت قائمة لسوء الحظ فجا بينهما وبين حكومتيهما وشعبيهما

ورغبة في جمع كلمة الامة الاسلامية العربية ورفع شأنها وحفظ كرامتها واستقلالها

Figure B.1.2 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

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— ٣ —

ونظراً لغرورة تأسيس علاقات عهدية ثابتة بينهما وبين حكومتيهما وبلاديهما على أساس  
للتنافع المشتركة والمصالح المتبادلة .  
وحباً في تثبيت الحدود بين بلاديهما وانشاء علاقات حسن الجوار وروابط الصداقة الاسلامية  
فيما بينهما وتقوية دعائم السلم والسكينة بين بلاديهما وشعبيهما .  
ورغبة في ان يكونا عضداً واحداً امام الملأ المعجمة وبنينا متراسد المحافظة على سلامة الجزيرة  
العربية فراعقد مهادنة صداقة اسلامية وأخوة عربية فيما بينهما وانتد بذلك الترض مندوبين مفوضين  
عنهما هما :

عن حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك المملكة العربية السعودية .  
حضرة صاحب السمو الملكي الامير خالد بن عبدالعزيز نجل جلالتة ونائب رئيس مجلس الوكلاء .  
وعن حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك اليمن  
حضرة صاحب السيادة السيد عبد الله بن احمد الوزير .

وقد منح جلالة الملكين كندوبيهما الآتية الذكر الصلاحية التامة والتفويض المطلق . وبمد  
ان اطلع المندوبان المذكوران على اوراق التفويض التي بيد كل منهما فوجداها موافقة للاصول قررا  
باسم ملكيهما الاتفاق على المواد الآتية :

#### المادة الاولى

تنتهي حالة الحرب القائمة بين المملكة العربية السعودية ومملكة اليمن بمجرد التوقيع على هذه  
المطهدة وانشاء فوراً بين جلالة الملكين وبلاديهما وشعبيهما حالة سلم دائم وصداقة وطيدة واخوة  
اسلامية عربية دائمة لا يمكن الاخلال بها جيمها او بعضها ويتعهد الفريقان الساميان التماقدان بأن  
يحلا بروح الود والصداقة جميع المنازعات والاختلافات التي قد تقع بينهما وبأن يسود علاقتهما روح  
الاخاء الاسلامي العربي في سائر المواقف والحالات ويشهدان الله على حسن نواياهما ورغبتهما الصادرة  
في الوفاق والاتفاق سراً وعلناً ويرجوان منه سبحانه وتعالى ان يرفقهما وخلفاءهما وورثاءهما وحكومتيهما  
الى السير على هذه الخطة القوية التي فيها رضاهم الخلاق وعز قورمها وبنهما .

#### للمادة الثانية

يترف كل من الفريقين الساميين التماقدين للاخر باستقلال كل من الملكين استقلالاً تاماً

Figure 3.1.3 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)



مطلقاً وبالمسكيتة عليها فيمتدح حضرة صاحب الجلالة الامام عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود ملك المملكة العربية السعودية لحضرة صاحب الجلالة الامام يحيى و خلفائه الشرعيين باستقلال مملكة اليمن استقلالا تاما مطلقا وبالملكية على مملكة اليمن . ويمتدح حضرة صاحب الجلالة الامام يحيى ابن محمد حميد الدين ملك اليمن لحضرة صاحب الجلالة الامام عبد العزيز و خلفائه الشرعيين باستقلال المملكة العربية السعودية استقلالا تاما مطلقا وبالملكية على المملكة العربية السعودية . ويستط كل منهما اي حق يدعيه في قسم أو اقسام من بلاد الاخر خارج الحدود الفطمية المبينة في صلب هذه المعاهدة ان جلالة الامام الملك عبد العزيز يتنازل بهذه المعاهدة عن أي حق يدعيه من حماية او احتلال او غيرها في البلاد التي هي بموجب هذه المعاهدة تابعة لليمن من البلاد التي كانت بيد الادارة وغيرها كما ان جلالة الامام الملك يحيى يتنازل بهذه المعاهدة عن أي حق يدعيه باسم الوحدة اليمنية او غيرها في البلاد التي هي بموجب هذه المعاهدة تابعة للمملكة العربية السعودية من البلاد التي كانت بيد الادارة او آل عائش او في نجران وبلاد يام

#### المادة الثالثة

يتفق الفريقان الساميان المتعاقدان على الطريقة التي تكون بها الصلات والمرامات بما فيه حفظ مصالح الطرفين وبما لا ضرر فيه على احدهما على ان لا يكون ما يمنحه احد الفريقين الساميين للمتعاقدين للاخر اقل مما يمنحه لفريق ثالث . ولا يوجب هذا على أي الفريقين ان يمنح الاخر آثر مما يقابله .  
بنته .

#### المادة الرابعة

خط الحدود الذي يمتدح بين بلاد كل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين موضح بالتفصيل الكافي فيما يلي ويمتدح هذا الخط حدا فاصلا قطعيا بين البلاد التي تخضع لكل منهما :  
يبدأ خط الحدود بين المملكتين اعتبارا من النقطة الفاصلة بين ميدي والموسم على ساحل البحر الاحمر الى جبال تهامة في الجهة الشرقية ثم يرجع شمالا الى أن ينتهي الى الحدود الغربية الشمالية التي بين بني جماعة ومن يقابلهم من جهة الغرب والشمال ثم يتدحرف الى جهة الشرق الى أن ينتهي الى ما بين حدود نعمة ووعار التابمتين لقبيلة وائلة وبين حدود يام ثم يتدحرف الى ان يبلغ مضيق مروان وعقبة وفادة ثم يتدحرف الى جهة الشرق حتى ينتهي من جهة الشرق الى اطراف الحدود بين من عدا يام من

Figure 3.1.4 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

هدان بن زيد والي وغيره وبين يام فكلما عن بين اناط المذكور الصاعد من النقطة المذكورة التي على ساحل البحر الى منتهى الحدود في جميع جهات الجبال المذكورة فهو من المملكة اليمنية وكلما هو عن يسار اناط المذكور فهو من المملكة العربية السعودية فاهو في جهة اليمن المذكورة هو ميدى وحرض وبعض قبيلة الحرت والمير وجيئال الظاهر وشذا والضبعة وبعض العبادل وجميع بلاد وجيئال رازح ومنيه مع عرو آل مشيخ وجميع بلاد وجيئال بني جماعة وساحار الشام يباد وما يليها ويحل صريضة من ساحر الشام وعموم سحار ونقمة ووعار وعموم وائلة وكذا الفرع مع عقبة نهوقة وعموم من عدا يام بوادعة ظهران من همدان بن زيد هؤلاء المذكورون وبلادهم يحدوها العلومة وكلما هو بين الجهات المذكورة وما يليها مما لم يذكر اسمه مما كان مرتبطا ارتباطا قديما أو تحت ثبوت يد المملكة اليمنية قبل سنة ١٣٥٢ كل ذلك هو في جهة اليمن فهو من المملكة اليمنية وما هو في جهة اليسار المذكورة وهو الموسم وعلان وأكثر الحرت والطوبة والجابري وأكثر العبادل وجميع فيفا وبني مالك وبني حريص وآل تليذ وتحتان وظهران وادعة وجميع وادعة ظهران مع صنيق سروان وعقبة رفادة وما خلفها من جهة الشرق والشمال من يام ونجران والحضن وزور وادعة وسائر من هو في نجران من وائلة وكلما هو تحت عقبة نهوقة الى اطراف نجران ويام من جهة الشرق هؤلاء المذكورون وبلادهم يحدوها العلومة وكلما هو بين الجهات المذكورة وما يليها مما لم يذكر اسمه مما كان مرتبطا ارتباطا قديما أو تحت ثبوت يد المملكة العربية السعودية قبل سنة ١٣٥٢ كل ذلك هو في جهة يسار اناط المذكور فهو من المملكة العربية السعودية . وما ذكر من يام ونجران والحضن وزور وادعة وسائر من هو في نجران من وائلة فهو بناء على ما كان من تحكيم جلالة الامام يحيى جلالة الملك عبد العزيز في يام والحكم من جلالة الملك عبد العزيز بأن جميعها تتبع المملكة العربية السعودية وحيث ان الحضن وزور وادعة ومن وائلة في نجران من وائلة ولم يكن دخولهم في المملكة العربية السعودية الا لما ذكر فذلك لا يمنعهم ولا يمنع اخوانهم وائلة من التمتع بالصلات والمواصلات والتعارن والعتاد والمتعارف به . ثم يمتد هذا اناط من نهاية الحدود المذكورة آنفا بين اطراف قبائل المملكة العربية السعودية واطراف من عدا يام من همدان بن زيد وسائر قبائل اليمن فالمملكة اليمنية كل الاطراف والبلاد اليمنية الى منتهى حدود اليمن من جميع الجهات . والمملكة العربية السعودية كل الاطراف والبلاد الى منتهى حدودها من جميع الجهات وكل ما ذكر في هذه المادة من نقط شمال وجنوب وشرق وغرب فهو باعتبار كثرة اتجاه ميل خط الحدود في اتجاه الجهات المذكورة وكثيرا ما ميل يتداخل ما الى كل من الملكتين اما تعيين وتثبيت اناط المذكورة وتمييز

Figure 3.1.5 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

القبائل وتحديد ديارها إلى اكل الوجوه فيكون اجراءه بواسطة هيئة مؤلفة من عدد متساو من  
الفرقيتين بصورة ودية أخوية بدون حيف بحسب العرف والعادة الثابتة عند القبائل .

المادة الخامسة

نظرا لرغبة كل من الفرقيتين الساميين المتعاقدين في دوام السلم والطمأنينة والسكون وعد  
إيجاد أى شىء يشوش الافكار بين المملكتين فانها يتعهدان تعهدا متقابلا بعدم احدث اى بناء محصن  
في مسافة خمسة كيلومترات في كل جانب من جانبي الحدود في كل المواقع والجهات على طول خط الحدود

المادة السادسة

يتعهد كل من الفرقيتين الساميين المتعاقدين بحسب جهته قورا عن البلاد التي اصبحت بموجب  
هذه المعاهدة تابعة للتويق الآخر مع صون الاهلين والجنود عن كل ضرر .

المادة السابعة

يتعهد الفرقيتان الساميان المتعاقدان بان يمنع كل منهما اهالي مملكته عن كل ضرر وعدوان على  
اهالي المملكة الاخرى في كل جهة وطريق وبأن يمنع النزو بين اهل البوادي من الطرفين وبرد كل  
ما ثبت اخذه بالتحقيق الشرعى من بعد اجرام هذه المعاهدة وضمان ما تنف وبما يلزم بالشرع فيما وقع  
من جناية قتل أو جرح وبالعقوبة الحاسمة على من ثبت منهم العدوان ويظل العمل بهذه المادة ساريا  
الى ان يوضع بين الفرقيتين اتفاق آخر لكيفية التعتيق وتقدير الضرر والخسائر .

المادة الثامنة

يتعهد كل من الفرقيتين الساميين المتعاقدين تعهدا متقابلا بان يمتنعا عن الرجوع للقوة لحل  
المشكلات بينهما وبان يعملا جهدهما لحل ما يمكن ان ينشأ بينهما من الاختلاف سواء كان سببه ومدشوه  
هذه المعاهدة او تفسير كل او بعض موادها ام كان ناشئا عن اى سبب آخر بالمراجعات الودية وفي حالة  
عدم امكان التوفيق بهذه الطريقة يتعهد كل منهما بأن ياجأ الى التحكيم الذى توضع شروطه وكيفية  
طلبه وحصوله في ملحق مرتق بهذه المعاهدة . ولهذا الملحق نفس القوة والنقوذ الذين لهذه المعاهدة  
ويحسب جزءا منها وبعضا متما للكل فيها .

المادة التاسعة

يتعهد كل من الفرقيتين الساميين المتعاقدين بان يمنع بحل ماله من الوسائل المادية والمعنوية

Figure 3.1.6 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

استعمال بلاده قاصمة وسركنا لاى عمل عدوانى أو شروعى فيه أو استمداء له ضد بلاد الفریق الآخر. كما انه يتمد باتخاذ التدابير الآتية بمجرد وصول طالب خطلى من حكومة الفریق الآخرى :

١ - ان كان الساعى فى عمل الفساد من رعايا الحكومة المطلوب منها اتخاذ التدابير فيعد لتتحقق الشرعى وثبوت ذلك يؤدب فوراً من قبل حكومته بالادب الراجع الذى يقضى على فعله ويمتنع وقوع أمثاله .

٢ - وان كان الساعى فى عمل الفساد من رعايا الحكومة الطالبة اتخاذ التدابير فانه يلتقى القبض عليه فوراً من قبل الحكومة المطلوب منها ويسلم الى حكومته الطالبة . وليس للحكومة المطلوب منها التسليم ضرر من انفاذ الطلب وعليها اتخاذ كافة الاجراءات لمنع فرار الشخص المطلوب او تمكينه من الهرب وفى الاحوال التى يتمكن فيها الشخص المطلوب من الفرار فان الحكومة التى فر من اراضيها تتعهد بدم السماح له بالعودة الى اراضيها مرة أخرى وان تحلكن من العودة اليها يلتقى القبض عليه ويسلم الى حكومته .

٣ - وان كان الساعى فى عمل الفساد من رعايا حكومة ثالثة فان الحكومة المطلوب منها والتي يوجد الشخص على اراضيها تقوم فوراً وبمجرد تاتياها الطالب من الحكومة الاخرى بطرده من بلادها وعده شخصاً غير مرغوب فيه ويمتنع من العودة اليها فى المستقبل .

#### المادة العاشرة

يتعهد كل من الفریقين الساميين المتعاقدين بعدم قبول من ينفر عن طاعة دولته كبراً كان ام صغيراً موظفاً كان ام غير موظف فرداً كان ام جماعةً ويتخذ كل من الفریقين الساميين المتعاقدين كافة التدابير الفعالة من ادارية وعسكرية وغيرها لمنع دخول هؤلاء الفارين الى حدود بلاده . فان تمكن احدهم او كلهم من اجتياز خط الحدود بالدخول فى اراضيها فيكون عليه واجب نزع السلاح من المتجيب واقراء القبض عليه وتسليمه الى حكومة بلاده الفار منها وفى حالة عدم امكان القبض عليه تتخذ كافة الوسائل لطرده من البلاد التى لجأ اليها الى بلاد الحكومة التى يتبعها .

#### المادة الحادية عشرة

يتعهد كل من الفریقين الساميين المتعاقدين بمنع الاصراء والعمال والموظفين التابعين له من المداخلة باى وجه كان مع رعايا الفریق الاخر بالذات او بالواسطة ويتمد باتخاذ كامل التدابير التى تمنع حدوث اتقاق او توقع سوء التفاهم بسبب الاعمال المذكورة .

Figure B.1.7 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

المادة الثانية عشرة

يترتب على من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين بأن أهل كل جهة من الجهات الصائفة إلى الفريق الآخر بموجب هذه المعاهدة رعاية لذلك الفريق .  
ويتمتع كل منهما بدم قبول أى شخص أو اشخاص من رعاية الفريق الآخر رعاية له الا بموافقة ذلك الفريق وبأن تكون معاملة رعايا كل من الفريقين في بلاد الفريق الآخر طبقاً للاحكام الشرعية المحلية .

المادة الثالثة عشرة

يتمتع كل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين بإعلان العفو الشامل الكامل عن سائر الاجرام والاعمال العدائية التي يكون قد ارتكبها فرد أو افراد من رعايا الفريق الآخر للقيمين في بلاده ( اى في بلاد الفريق الذى منه اصدار العفو ) كما انه يتمتع باصدار عفو عام شامل كامل عن افراد رعاياه الذين يأتوا أو انحازوا أو باى شكل من الاشكال انضموا إلى الفريق الآخر عن كل جنابة ومال اخذوا منذ لجأوا إلى الفريق الآخر إلى عودهم كائناً ما كان وبأنا ما بلغ . وبدم السماح بأجراء أى نوع من الأذى أو التعميق أو التضيق بسبب ذلك الانحياز أو الانحياز أو الشكل الذى انضموا بموجبه . وإذا حصل ريب عندى الفريقين بوقوع شىء مخالف لهذا العهد كان لمن حصل عنده الريب أو الشك من الفريقين مراجعة الفريق الآخر لاجل اجتماع اللدوين الموقعين على هذه المعاهدة وان تمذرو على احدهما الحضور فيتيب عنه آخر له كامل الصلاحية والاطلاع على تلك النواحي من له كامل الرغبة والتمنية بصلاح ذات البين والوفاء بمقوق الطرفين بالحضور اتبعة بقى الامر حتى لا يحصل اى حيف ولا نزاع وما يترده للندوبان يكون نافذاً .

المادة الرابعة عشرة

يتمتع كل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين بدم املك رعاياه الذين يعنى عنهم اليهم اوالى ورفقهم عند رجوعهم الى وطنهم خاصتهم لاحكام مملكتهم وكذلك يتمتع الفريقان الساميان المتعاقدان بدم حجز اى شىء من المشرق والاملاش التي تكون لرعايا الفريق الآخر في بلاده ولا يعرقل استثمارها او اى نوع من انواع التصرفات الشرعية فيها .

Figure 3.1.8 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

المادة الخامسة عشرة

يتعهد كل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين بعدم المداخلة مع فريق ثالث سواء كان فرداً أم هيئة أم حكومة أو الاتفاق معه على أي أمر يخل بمصلحة الفريق الآخر أو يضر ببلاده أو يكون من ورائه أحداث المشكلات والصعوبات له أو يمرض منافعها ومصالحها وكيانها للاخطار .

المادة السادسة عشرة

يعان الفريقان الساميان المتعاقدان اللذان تحميهم روابط الاخوة الاسلامية والمنصيرية العربية ان امتما أمة واحدة وانما لا يريدان باحد شر او انهما يعملان جهدهما لاجل ترقية شؤون امتهما في ظل الطائفة والسكون وان يبذلا وسعدهما في سائر المواقف لما فيه خير لبلاديهما وامتتعهما غير قاصدين بهذا اية عدوان على أية امة .

المادة السابعة عشرة

في حالة حصول اعتداء خارجي على بلاد احد الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين يتعهد على الفريق الآخر ان ينفذ التمهيدات الآتية :  
اولا - الوقوف على الحياد اتمام مرا ودلنا .  
ثانيا - المعاونة الادبية والمدنوية الممكنة .  
ثالثا - الشروع في المذاكرة مع الفريق الآخر لمعرفة الطرق لضمان سلامة بلاد ذلك الفريق ومنع الضرر عنها والوقوف في موقف لا يمكن تأويله بأنه تمعيد للمعدى الخارجي .

المادة الثامنة عشرة

في حالة حصول نتم أو اعتداءات داخلية في بلاد احد الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين يتعهد كل منهما تمهدا متقابلا بما يأتي :  
اولا - اتخاذ التدابير الفعالة اللازمة لعدم تمكين المعتدين أو الثائرين من الاستفادة من اراضيهم .  
ثانيا - منع التجاء اللاجئين الى بلاده وتسليمهم أو طردهم اذا لجأوا اليها كما هو موضح في المادة ( التاسعة والعاشر ) اعلاه .  
ثالثا - منع رعاياه من الاشتراك مع المعتدين أو الثائرين وعدم تشجيعهم أو تمويلهم .  
رابعا - منع الامدادات والارزاق والمؤن والدخائر عن المعتدين أو الثائرين .

Figure 3.1.9 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

المادة الثامنة عشرة

يملن الفريقان الساميان المتعاقدان رغبتهما في عمل كل ممكن لتسهيل المواصلات البرية والبحرية وتزويد الاتصال بين بلديهما وتسهيل تبادل السلع والمواصلات الزراعية والتجارية بينهما . وفي اجراء مناورات تفصيلية من اجل عقد اتفاق جمركي يصون مصالح بلديهما الاقتصادية بتوحيد الرسوم الجمركية في عموم البلدين أو تنظيم خاص بصورة كافية لمصالح الطرفين وليس في هذه المادة ما يقيد حرية احد الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين في أي شيء حتى يتم عقد الاتفاق المشار اليه .

المادة العشرون

يدان كل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين استعدادهم لان يأخذوا مثليه ومددو به في الخارج ان وجدوا بانثبانية عن الفريق الآخر متى اراد الفريق الآخر ذلك في أي شيء وفي أي وقت ومن المفهوم انه حينما يوجد في ذلك العمل شخص من كل من الفريقين في مكان واحد فانها يتراجعا فيما بينهما لتوحيد خطتها للعمل المصلحة للبلدين التي هي كامة واحدة . ومن المفهوم ان هذه المادة لا تقيد حرية أحد الجانبين بأي صورة كانت في أي حق له كما انه لا يمكن ان تفسر بحجب حرية احدهما أو اضطاراه لسلك هذه الطريقة .

المادة الحادية والعشرون

واني ما تضمنته الاتفاقية الموقع عليها في ٥ شعبان ١٣٥٠ على كل حال اعتبارا من تاريخ اجراء هذه المعاهدة .

المادة الثانية والعشرون

تبرم هذه المعاهدة وتصدق من قبل حضرة صاحبي الجلالة الملكيين في اقرب مدة ممكنة نظرا لمصلحة الطرفين في ذلك وتصبح نافذة المفعول من تاريخ تبادل قراوات اجراءها مع استثناء ما نص عليه في المادة الاولى من انتهاء حالة الحرب بمجرد التوقيع وتظل سارية المفعول مدة عشرين سنة قرية تامة ويمكن تجديدها او تمديدها خلال السنة الاشهر التي تسبق تاريخ انتهاء موفها فان لم تجدد أو تعدل في ذلك التاريخ تظل سارية المفعول الى ما بعد ستة اشهر من اعلان احد الفريقين المتعاقدين الفريق الآخر رغبته في التعديل .

المادة الثالثة والعشرون

تسمى هذه المعاهدة بمعاهدة الطائف وقد حررت من نسختين باللغة العربية والشريفة بيد كل

Figure 3.1.10 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)

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من الفريقين الساميين المتماثلين في الشهادة بالواقع رمنع كل من المندوبين المفوضين توقيمه .  
وكتب في مدينة جدة في اليوم السادس من شهر صفر سنة ثلاث وخمسين بعد الثلاثمائة والالف  
عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن آل سعود  
خالد بن عبد العزيز  
السعود

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Figure 3.1.11 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)



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[TRANSLATION - TRADUCTION]<sup>1</sup>

In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

A Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Arab Brotherhood

Between

*The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*

*And*

*The Kingdom of Yemen*

\*\*\*\*\*

His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman al-Faisal al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the one hand, and His Majesty Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamiduddin, King of the Yemen, on the other hand.

Desiring to end the state of war which unfortunately existed between them, their governments and peoples;

Desiring to unite the Islamic Arab nation, improve its standing and maintain its dignity and independence;

In view of the necessity to establish firm treaty relations between them, their governments and countries on a basis of mutual benefits and reciprocal interests;

Desiring to fix the borders between their countries and to establish good-neighborly relations and ties of Islamic friendship between them and to strengthen the foundations of peace and tranquility between their countries and peoples; and

Desiring to act as a united front in the face of unexpected mishaps, and as a solid structure to maintain the security of the Arabian Peninsula:

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1. Translation supplied by the Government of Saudi Arabia - Traduction fournie par le Gouvernement de l'Arabie saoudite.

**Figure 3.1.12 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

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Have resolved to conclude a treaty of Islamic friendship and Arab brotherhood between them, and for that purpose have nominated the following authorized representatives to act on their behalf:

On behalf of His Majesty the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, His Royal Highness Prince Khalid bin Abdulaziz, His Majesty's son and the Vice President of the Council of Deputies.

On behalf of His Majesty the King of Yemen, His Excellency Mr. Abdullah bin Ahmad Alwazir.

Their Majesties, the two Kings, have vested their aforementioned representatives with full powers and authority; and their aforementioned representatives, having perused each other's authorization documents and found them in proper order, have, in the name of their Kings, agreed upon the following articles:

**Article 1:**

The state of war existing between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen shall cease upon signing this Treaty, and there shall forthwith be established between their Majesties the Kings and their countries and peoples a state of perpetual peace, firm friendship and everlasting Islamic Arab brotherhood, inviolable in part or in whole. The Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to settle in a spirit of amity and friendship all disputes and disagreements which may arise between them, and to ensure that a spirit of Islamic Arab brotherhood shall dominate their relations in all situations and conditions. They call on God to witness the goodness of their intentions and their true desire for harmony and agreement, both secretly and openly. They pray to the Almighty to grant them and their successors, heirs and governments success in the continuance of this sound endeavor, which is pleasing to the Creator and honorable to their peoples and religion.

**Article 2:**

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties recognizes the full and absolute independence of each of the two Kingdoms and of the other party's sovereignty over it. His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz bin Abdurrahman al-Faisal al-Saud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, acknowledges to His Majesty Imam Yahya and his lawful successors the full and absolute independence of the Kingdom of Yemen

**Figure 3.1.13 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

and his sovereignty over it, and His Majesty Imam Yahya bin Muhammad Hamiduddin, King of Yemen, acknowledges to His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz and his lawful successors the full and absolute independence of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and his sovereignty over it. Each shall renounce any claim over part or parts of the other party's country beyond the borders fixed and defined in the text of this Treaty. His Majesty King Abdulaziz shall renounce by this Treaty any right of protection or occupation, or any other claim in the territories which, according to this Treaty, belong to Yemen and which were formerly in the possession of the Idrisid and other territories. His Majesty Imam Yahya shall similarly renounce by this Treaty any right he claims in the name of Yemeni unity or otherwise, in the territories which according to this Treaty belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and which were formerly in the possession of the Idrisid or Al-Aidh, or in Najran and the Yām territory.

**Article 3:**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties agree to conduct their relations and communications in such a manner as will secure the interests of both parties and cause no harm to either of them, provided that neither of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall concede to the other party less than he concedes to a third party. Neither of the Two Parties shall be bound to concede to the other party more than he receives in return.

**Article 4:**

The borderline which divides the countries of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties is shown in sufficient detail hereunder. This line is considered a fixed dividing boundary between the territories subject to each of them.

The borderline between the two Kingdoms begins from the dividing point between Mīdī and al Muwassam on the coast of the Red Sea, and (runs) up to the Tihāmah mountains in the east. It then turns northwards until it ends at the north-west boundary between Barī Jumā'ah and all (tribes) that are adjacent to them on the west and north. It then veers eastwards until it ends at a point between the limits of Naqa'ah and Wi'ār, which belong to the Wā'ilah tribe, and the limits of Yām. It then veers until it reaches Maḍīq Marwān and 'Aqabat Rufādah, and then it veers eastwards until it ends, on the east, on the edge of the boundary between those of Hamadān Bin Zayd to Wā'īl, and others who are outside Yām, and the Yām. Everything to the right side of the aforementioned line, which runs from the point

**Figure 3.1.14 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

mentioned on the sea shore up to the end of the borders on all sides of the mountains mentioned, shall belong to the Kingdom of Yemen, and everything to the left of the aforementioned line shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On the right side are Midī, Ḥaraḍ, part of al Ḥurrath tribe, al Mayr, aḡ Ḍāḥir Mountains, Shadhā, aḡ Ḍay'ah, part of al 'Abādīl, all the territories and mountains of Rāzah, Munabbah, with 'Arw Āl Amshaykh, all the territories and mountains of Banī Juma'ah, Saḥār ash Shām, Yabād and its vicinity, the Murayṣighah area of Saḥār ash Shām, the whole of Saḥār, Naq'ah, Wi'ār, the whole of Wā'ilah, and also al Far', with 'Aqabat Nuhūqah, the whole of Hamadān Bin Zayd, which is outside Yām and Wādī'at Ḍahrān. All those mentioned and their territories with their known boundaries, and everything in between the said areas and their vicinities the names of which are not mentioned and which were actually subject to or under the control of the Kingdom of Yemen before the year 1352AH, are on the right side and thus shall be part of the Kingdom of Yemen. On the left side of the aforementioned line are Al Muwassam, Wa'lan, most of Al Ḥurrath, Al Khawbah, Al Jabirī, most of Al 'Abādīl, all of Fayfā, Banī Mālik, Banī Ḥurays, Āl Talīd, Qaḥṭān, Ḍahrān Wādī'ah, all of Wādī'at Ḍahrān, together with Maḏīq Marwān, and Aqabat Rufādah, and the area lying beyond them on the east and north of Yām, Najrān, al Ḥaḍan, Zawr Wādī'ah, all the Wāi'lah in Najrān, and all below the 'Aqabat Nahūqah, up to the edges of Najrān and Yām on the east. All these mentioned and their territories with their known boundaries, and everything in between the said areas and their vicinities the names of which are not mentioned and which were actually subject to or under the control of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before the year 1352AH, are on the left side of the said line and thus shall be part of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. All that is mentioned of Yām, Najrān, al Ḥaḍan, Zawr Wādī'ah, and all the Wāi'lah in Najrān, shall be in accordance with His Majesty Imam Yahya's decision to refer the Yām matter to His Majesty King Abdulaziz for judgment, and His Majesty King Abdulaziz arbitral decision that all of Yām shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and since al Ḥaḍan and Zawr Wādī'ah and the Wāi'lah in Najrān belong to Wā'ilah, and their falling within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is due to what has been mentioned above, such shall not prevent them or their brothers of Wā'ilah from enjoying mutual relations and communication and the usual and customary co-operation. This line then extends from the end of the aforementioned limits between the edges of the Saudi Arabian tribal areas and of those of Hamadān Bin Zayd, and all the Yemeni tribes who are outside Yām. All the borders and the Yemeni territories up to the end of the Yemeni border in all directions shall belong to the Kingdom of Yemen; and all the borders and territories up to the end of their boundaries, in all directions, shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. All points mentioned in this Article, whether north, south, east or west, are to be considered in accordance with the general trend of the borderline in the directions indicated; which often causes it to veer into the territory of either of the two Kingdoms. Designation and demarcation of said line, the separating out of tribes and the proper fixing of the limits of their territories shall, however, be determined

**Figure 3.1.15 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

by a committee of an equal number of persons from both parties, formed in a friendly and brotherly way and without prejudice, in accordance with established tribal customs and practices.

**Article 5:**

In view of the desire of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties for the continuance of peace, tranquility and serenity, and for the prevention of anything which may disturb the thoughts of the two Kingdoms, they mutually undertake not to construct any fortified building within a distance of five kilometers on either side of the border, in all locations and directions along the borderline.

**Article 6:**

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertakes to withdraw its troops immediately from the territory which, by virtue of this Treaty, has become the property of the other party, and to protect the inhabitants and troops from harm.

**Article 7:**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to prevent the people of their respective Kingdoms from committing any harmful or hostile act against the people of the other Kingdom, in any area and route; to prevent raiding between the bedouins on both sides; to return all properties proven by legal investigation to have been seized after the conclusion of this Treaty; to give compensation for damage and, as determined by Shari'ah, for crimes of murder or wounding that have been committed; and to mete out deterring punishment to anyone proved to have committed any hostile act. This Article shall remain in effect until another agreement is drawn between the Two Parties defining the manner of investigating and estimating damage and loss.

**Article 8:**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties mutually undertake to refrain from resorting to force to resolve problems between them, and to exert their utmost effort

**Figure 3.1.16 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

to settle, through friendly negotiations, any dispute which may arise between them as a result of this Treaty or the interpretation of all or any of its Articles or as a result of any other cause. If the dispute is not resolved in this way, each of the Two Parties shall undertake to resort to arbitration, of which the conditions, the manner of demand, and the conduct are to be explained in an appendix to be attached to this Treaty. This appendix shall have the same force and effectiveness as of this Treaty, and shall be considered an integral part of it.

**Article 9:**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to prevent, by all tangible and intangible means at their disposal, the use of their territory as a base and center for any hostile action, attempted action or preparations therefor, against the country of the other party. They also shall undertake to take the following measures immediately upon receipt of a written request from the government of the other party:

- (1) If the person endeavoring to foment insurrection is a subject of the government required to take measures, he, if convicted through legal investigation, shall receive a deterrent punishment which puts an end to his action and prevents the recurrence of similar actions.
- (2) If the person endeavoring to foment insurrection is a subject of the government requesting the taking of measures, he shall be immediately arrested by the government receiving the request and handed over to the requesting government, of which he is a subject. The government required to extradite him shall have no excuse in not implementing such request and shall take all measures to prevent the person in question from fleeing or enabling him to flee. In cases where the person in question is able to flee, the government from whose territory he has fled shall undertake not to allow him to return to its territory, and if he does so, he shall be arrested and delivered to his government.
- (3) If the person endeavoring to foment insurrection is a subject of a third government, the government receiving the request, and on whose territory the person is found, shall, immediately upon receipt of the other government's request, expel him from its country, consider him undesirable and prevent him from returning to it in the future.

**Figure 3.1.17 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

**Article 10:**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake not to shelter anyone who rebels against his government, whether he is young or old, a government official or not, an individual or a group. Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall take all effective measures, whether administrative, military or otherwise, to prevent those fugitives from entering its country. If any or all manage to cross the borderline and enter into its territory, it shall be obligated to disarm the fugitives, arrest them, and deliver them to the government of the country they are fleeing from. In case of inability to arrest them, it shall use all means to drive them out of the territories to which they defected and back into the territories of the government to which they belong.

**Article 11**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to prevent their emirs, governors and officials from interfering in any way with subjects of the other party, whether in person or by proxy, and shall take all measures to prevent any disturbance or misunderstanding arising from such actions.

**Article 12:**

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall acknowledge that the people of all areas accruing to the other party by virtue of this Treaty are subjects of that party.

Each party shall undertake not to accept as its subjects any person or persons who are subjects of the other party except with the consent of that party. The subjects of the Two Parties, when in the country of the other party, shall be treated according to the local law.

**Article 13:**

Each of the Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to declare a full and complete pardon for all crimes and hostile acts which may have been committed by any of the subjects of the other party who are residing in its country (i.e. the country of the party to issue the pardon). It shall also undertake to issue a full,

**Figure 3.1.18 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

general and complete amnesty to those of its subjects who have defected or taken refuge or joined with the other party in any way for any money they have taken or crimes they have committed from the time they defected to the other party until their return, no matter what or how grave it was, and not to subject them to any harm, pursuit or harassment because of their defection or taking refuge or for the manner by which they joined the other party. If either party suspects that something occurred in violation of this undertaking, it may consult with the other party to arrange for a meeting of the representatives who signed this Treaty. If it is not possible for either of them to attend, he shall deputize another, who has full authority and knowledge as well as the desire and care for peace making and ensuring the rights of the Two Parties, to attend and investigate the matter and ensure that no injustice or dispute may occur. The decision of both representatives is binding.

**Article 14:**

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to return to its subjects who were granted amnesty, or to their heirs, all their properties, upon returning to their country and adhering to its law. The Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall similarly undertake not to seize any properties or possessions belonging to subjects of the other party, and not to create obstacles with regard to their investment or legal disposal thereof.

**Article 15:**

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake not to meddle with a third party, be it an individual, an organization or a government, or enter into an agreement therewith on any matter which may prejudice the interest of the other party, cause harm to its country, lead to problems and difficulties, or pose danger to its benefits, interests and entity.

**Article 16:**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties, sharing the bonds of Islamic brotherhood and Arab origin, declare that their nation is one and the same, that they do not mean to pose harm to anyone, that they will do their best to promote the interests of their nation in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility, and that they will

**Figure 3.1.19 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**



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exert their best efforts in all situations for the welfare of their countries and nation, intending no aggression on any nation.

**Article 17:**

In the event of an external aggression on the country of either of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties, the other party shall be bound to carry out the following undertakings:

- (i) Adopt complete neutrality secretly and openly.
- (ii) Provide possible moral support.
- (iii) Undertake negotiations with the other party to find the best of ways to ensure the security of its country and save it from harm, and to take a stand that can not be interpreted as providing help to the external aggressor.

**Article 18:**

In the event of insurrection or internal hostilities taking place within the country of one of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties, each of them shall mutually undertake to do as follows:

- (i) Take all necessary effective measures to prevent aggressors or rebels from making use of its territories.
- (ii) Prevent fugitives from taking refuge in its country and hand them over or expel them, as set forth in Articles (9) and (10) above.
- (iii) Prevent his subjects from joining the aggressors or rebels, and refrain from encouraging them or supplying them with provisions.
- (iv) Prevent assistance, food supplies, arms and ammunition from reaching the aggressors or rebels.

**Article 19:**

The Two Honorable Contracting Parties declare their desire to do everything possible to facilitate postal and telegraphic communications between their two countries and increase communications between them, to facilitate the trading of commodities as well as of agricultural and commercial products between them, and

**Figure 3.1.20 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

to undertake detailed negotiations to conclude a customs agreement that protects the economic interests of their countries through unifying the customs duties, or formulating a special system that secures the interests of the Two Parties. Nothing in this Article restricts the freedom of either of the Two Honorable Parties on any matter until the agreement referred to has been concluded.

**Article 20:**

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties declares its willingness to authorize its representatives and delegates abroad, if any, to represent the other party, whenever the other party desires so, in any matter and at any time. It is understood that whenever representatives of both parties are together in one place, they shall collaborate to unify their policy to serve the interests of their two countries, which are regarded as one nation. It is also understood that this Article does not restrict the freedom of either side in any way with regard to any of its rights. Similarly, it cannot be interpreted as restricting the freedom of either of them or compelling it to adopt this course of action.

**Article 21:**

The contents of the agreement signed on the 5<sup>th</sup> of *Shaban* 1350AH, shall be considered void on the date of the conclusion of this Treaty.

**Article 22:**

In the interest of the Two Parties, this Treaty shall be concluded and ratified by Their Majesties the two Kings at the earliest possible time. It shall come into force from the date of the exchange of its ratification instruments, except as regards what has been provided for in Article (1), in relation to ending the state of war immediately upon signature. It shall remain effective for twenty complete lunar years and may be renewed or modified during the six-month period preceding its expiration date. If not renewed or modified by that date, it shall remain in force for six months after one of the Two Contracting Parties notifies the other party of its desire for modification.

**Figure 3.1.21 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

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**Article 23:**

This Treaty shall be named 'the Treaty of Taif'. It has been drafted in two copies in the noble Arabic language, each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties having one copy. In witness whereof, each of the authorized representatives has signed it.

Drafted in the City of Jeddah on the 6<sup>th</sup> of *Safar*, in the year thirteen hundred and fifty three.

Abdullah bin Ahmad al Wazir

Khalid bin Abdulaziz al Saud

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**Figure 3.1.22 The 'Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood' between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (1934)**

### 3.2. Ratification of the Taif Treaty

The Taif Treaty was signed by the heads of negotiators from both countries, but the exchange of ratifications reportedly took place on 22 June 1934.<sup>7</sup> Yemeni acceptance of the Taif Treaty was confirmed by telegraphic messages from the Yemeni Foreign Minister to Saudi Arabia and some other countries, including Britain.<sup>8</sup> This Appendix shows a report that Imam Yahya did not sign any ratification instruments, which is evident in the copy registered by Saudi Arabia in the United Nations Secretariat. Indeed, the Taif Treaty held there is not a physical document that features an official seal by leaders of either country, nor are there any ratification instruments. Comparison between the ratification of the Sana'a Treaty, concluded in February 1934, and the Taif Treaty in May of the same year is significant here; most importantly because the ratification of the Arabic text of the Sana'a Treaty was confirmed by Imam Yahya and his official seal, while the English ratification instruments were signed by the Yemeni Foreign Minister, though not the Imam himself (see Appendix 4.1).

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<sup>7</sup> Telegram from the British warship *Penzance Al-Hudaydah* to Admiralty, 23 June 1934, FO 371/17929, TNA, London. Ryan (BLJ) to the Political Resident, Bushire, 25 June 1934, FO 371/17929, TNA, London. Ryan (BLJ) to FO, 3 July 1934, FO 371/17929, TNA, London. *The Times*, 14 June 1934.

<sup>8</sup> Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taif to Ryan (BLJ), 19 June 1934, FO 905/6 FO 967/40, TNA, London. Approval of the Taif Treaty by Imam Yahya (See telegram from the Yemeni Minister of Foreign affairs to the secretary of States, 19 June 1934, FO 371/17928, TNA, London).

MoFAS to Ryan (BL, Jeddah), 19 June 1934, FO 371/17929, TNA, London). MoFAS to Ryan (BLJ), 19 June 1934, FO 371/17929, TNA, London. Ryan (BLJ) to FO, 19 June 1934, FO 371/17928, TNA, London.

### **3.2.1. Approval of the Taif Treaty by Imam Yahya**

Telegram from the Yemeni Minister of Foreign Affairs to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 June 1934, FO 371/17928, TNA, London.

The British Legation Jeddah, 19 June 1934 (Penelope, 1992: p. 469).

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E

1934

E 4063  
60  
21 JUN 1934

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Registry Number } 4063/79/25.

**TELEGRAM FROM**  
Yemeni Minister of  
Foreign Affairs to  
Secretary of State.

Dated 19th June 1934.  
Received in Registry 21st June 1934.  
E: Saudi Arabia.

**Saudi-Yemeni dispute: signature and ratification of Peace Treaty.**

Treaty of Peace and Friendship concluded by delegates at Taif was signed and ratified on 18th June by the Imam.

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(Minutes)

(See also Jeddah tel 146 in E 4050)

Once again it seems that some reply is called for, although there are still ratifications to be exchanged. On the other hand HMS. Penzance has just reported that Abdul Wahhab al Idrisi is expected at Hodeida to-day. When he is surrendered to the Saudis the last obstacle to peace will have been removed.

A reply that the ~~report~~ news contained in this telegram has given Sir J. Simon great pleasure and copy comm. as in E 3563 (ref.) Dft tel submitted

A.C. Reshiki  
24/6

C.F.A. Warner  
22/6.

g.m. 22.6.34.

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**Last Paper.**  
E 4050

**References.**

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

2nd Kadi Mohammed Raghib  
Riy (MFA, Yemen) 22 June  
(forwarded.)

✓ Co  
✓ La  
AM  
Agencies (copies)  
N.O.

✓ Jeddah N° 251  
✓ Cairo N° 471  
Bagdad N° 435

June 25

(Action completed.)

(Index.)

90/27/6

**Next Paper.**

Figure 3.2.1.3.2.1 Approval of the Taif Treaty by Imam Yahya




Figure 3.2.1.3.2.2 Approval of the Taif Treaty by Imam Yahya

### 3.2.2. Imam Yahya did not sign a ratification of the Taif Treaty

The British Legation, Jeddah, to the Foreign Office, 18 December 1937 (Penelope, 1992: p. 325).




Figure 3.2.2.1 Imam Yahya did not sign a ratification of the Taif Treaty



### 3.3. Filing in the United Nations Secretariat (2006)

Filing and recording the Taif Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations was made by Saudi Arabia, unilaterally, on 9 October 2006. This was possibly due to unproven claims that the Yemeni copy of the Treaty had been missing. Nonetheless, this proves the point made in this thesis that in Yemen, the territorial boundary dispute with the Kingdom was unfortunately not appropriately dealt with. For Yemen, despite having a much more reasonable argument concerning its territorial claims, this has always been ignored. However, the Yemeni reaction has always been to a great extent a reactive rather than a well thought-out and carefully considered one. Nevertheless, one should not ignore the sensitivity of the issue in Yemen.

Riyadh issued *The Saudi Green Book* in April 1934, two months prior to the conclusion of the Taif Treaty. The Saudis were keen to inform the world of their point of view concerning relations with Yemen, and the territorial issue that had led the two neighbouring countries into a short war that year. The Arabic and English version are from the Secretariat of the United Nations.

**No. 1297**

**Saudi Arabia  
and  
Yemen**

**Treaty of Islamic friendship and Arab brotherhood (Treaty of Taif) between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen (with appendices and attachment). Jeddah, 20 May 1934**

**Entry into force:** *22 June 1934 by the exchange of instruments of ratification, in accordance with article 22*

**Authentic text:** *Arabic*

**Filing and recording with the Secretariat of the United Nations:** *Saudi Arabia, 9 October 2006*

**Arabie saoudite  
et  
Yémen**

**Traité d'amitié islamique et de fraternité arabe (Traité de Taif) entre le Royaume d'Arabie saoudite et le Royaume du Yémen (avec annexes et appendice). Djeddah, 20 mai 1934**

**Entrée en vigueur :** *22 juin 1934 par échange des instruments de ratification, conformément à l'article 22*

**Texte authentique :** *arabe*

**Classement et inscription au répertoire auprès du Secrétariat des Nations Unies :**  
*Arabie saoudite, 9 octobre 2006*

**Figure 3.3.1 Filing in the United Nations Secretariat (2006)**

### **3.4. Examples of pan-Arab sentiments during the Saudi-Yemeni territorial conflict**

#### **3.4.1. Translation of an extract from ‘Saut-al-Hijaz’ (2 January 1933)**

(FO 967/52, TNA, London).




Figure 3.4.1.3.4.1 Translation of an extract from 'Saut-al-Hijaz' (2 January 1933)

### 3.4.2. Translation of an extract from *Umm-al-Qura* (17 February 1933)

This article was part of a series by this Ḥijāzī newspaper titled ‘On the Path of the Arab Unity-Negotiation with the Yemen’ (FO 967/52, TNA, London).




Figure 3.4.2.1 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)




Figure 3.4.2.2 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)




Figure 3.4.2.3 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)



upon us by our Lord.

We have carefully read and deeply considered every word of your letter and understood its good purpose and object. The opinion it conveys and its comprehensive programme have pleased us. Your suggestion is the intended aim and the only desired end. We have more than once seen your representative, who pleased us by his comprehensiveness and his acquaintance with many facts.

The serious inclination shown in your kind, friendly letter has become known to us. No one who has a touch of sense or religious belief can deny that by co-operation and collaboration power is strengthened and the ambitions of enemies are weakened. We believe we have already pointed out to you that if those who have imitated the Europeans had not made easy the way for foreigners to conspire against Islam in such manner as they could have never thought of, Islām would have been amply strong and beyond reach. All your feelings which have been actuated by Islamic zeal are exactly the same as ours. We hope that you will believe this to be a fact on our part. Mischievous deceivers have found us unyielding and ungovernable. We have paid no attention to their decorated trifles. Far be it from the truth that those defeated can be met by us with anything but detestation! Although when the late Sheykh Muhammad ibn Dileym and Sheykh Mādhf ibn Turki and their companions came to us, we found them turning somewhat away from us, yet we revealed to them some primary facts which were the basis of everything. We agree to the four points indicated by you and have added some necessary details."

His Highness has asked His Majesty the King to send authorised delegates who should be empowered with final particulars regarding the agreement. The time when this may be accomplished is probably very near.

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Figure 3.4.2.4 Translation of an extract from Umm-al-Qura (17 February 1933)

### 3.5. Respect for Free Movement

This agreement was reached as part of the Taif Treaty, according to which it was agreed upon that the movements of nationals from either country for trade or Hajj (pilgrimage) would be respected. It was presented by the Saudis to Yemen's representative as an additional condition prior to finally accepting the Taif Treaty. Although it has always been published as part of the Treaty (see FO 141/482, TNA, London), this agreement was surprisingly not annexed to the treaty submitted to the United Nations' Secretariat for the filing and recording of the Taif Treaty. This was possibly because the filing with the United Nations Secretariat was made solely by Saudi Arabia on 9 October 2006.




Figure 3.5.1 Respect for Free Movement

(5) *Khalid-bin-Abdul Aziz to Sayyid Abdullah-al-Wazir, dated the 6th Safar, 1353.*

(After usual compliments.)

In connexion with the signature of the Treaty of Taif between our kingdom and that of the Yemen, I hereby confirm our agreement regarding the movement of subjects of the Saudi Arab Kingdom and of the Kingdom of the Yemen in the two countries, namely, that movements at the present time shall continue as in the past until a special agreement is drawn up between the two Governments relative to the method which they jointly agree to adopt in regard to the regulations for such movements, whether for pilgrimage, or for trade, or for any other purpose or reason. I hope to receive your reply agreeing in this matter.

With highest respects,

KHALID-BIN-ABDUL AZIZ.

(6) *Abdullah-al-Wazir to His Royal Highness the Amir Khalid, dated the 6th Safar, 1353.*

(After usual compliments.)

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your Highness's letter, dated the 6th Safar, regarding the movement of the subjects of the two parties between the two countries, and I agree with your Highness that movements at present shall continue as in the past until a special agreement is drawn up relative to the regulations of such movements in the future, and that this will be regarded by our Government as it is by yours.

With highest respects,

ABDULLAH-BIN-AHMED-AL-WAZIR.

Figure 3.5.2 Respect for Free Movement

### 3.6. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

Volume 2389, II-1297

[ ARABIC TEXT — TEXTE ARABE ]

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

عهد التحكيم

بين

المملكة العربية السعودية

و

مملكة اليمن

بما أن حضرة صاحبي الجلالة الامامين الملك عبدالعزيز ملك المملكة العربية السعودية والملك  
الحسين ملك اليمن قد اتفقا بموجب المادة الثامنة من معاهدة الصلح والسداقة وحسن التفاهم لاجاء  
ساهدة الطائف والموقع عليها في السادس من شهر صفر سنة ثلاث وخسين بعد الثلاثمائة والالف  
بان يحيلوا الى التحكيم اى نزاع أو اختلاف ينشأ عن العلاقات بينهما وبين حكومتيهما ويلاذيما  
عجزت سائر المراجعات الردية عن حله فان الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين يتعهدان باجراء التحكيم  
في الصورة المبينة في المواد الآتية :

المادة الاولى

يتعهد كل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين بأن يقبل بأحالة القضية المتنازع فيها على التحكيم  
ضمن شهر واحد من تاريخ استلام طلب اجراء التحكيم من الفريق الآخر اليه .

المادة الثانية

يجرى التحكيم من قبل هيئة مؤلفة من عدد متساو من المحكمين ينتخب كل فريق نصفهم  
من حكم وزع ينتخب باتفاق الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين وان لم يتفقا على ذلك يرشح كل منهما

Figure 3.6.1 Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

شخصاً فان قبل أحد الفريقين بالمرشح الذي يتممه الفريق الآخر فيصبح وازعاً وان لم يمكن الاتفاق على ذلك تجرى القرعة على ايها يكون وازعاً مع العلم بأن القرعة لا تجرى الا على الاشخاص المقبولين من الطرفين . فمن وقعت القرعة عليه اصبح رئيساً لهيئة التحكيم وازعاً للفصل في القضية وان لم يحصل الاتفاق على الاشخاص المقبولين من الطرفين تجرى المراجعات فيما بعد الى ان يحصل الاتفاق على ذلك.

#### المادة الثالثة

يجب أن يتم اختيار هيئة التحكيم ورئيسها خلال شهر واحد من بعد انقضاء الشهر المعين لاجابة الفريق المطلوب منه الموافقة على التحكيم لقبوله لطلب الفريق الاخر . وتجتمع هيئة المحكمين في المكان الذي يتم الاتفاق عليه في مدة لا تزيد عن شهر واحد بعد انقضاء الشهرين المعينين في اول المادة . وعلى هيئة المحكمين أن تعطى حكمها خلال مدة لا يمكن باى حال من الاحوال ان تزيد عن شهر واحد من بعد انقضاء المدة التي عينت للاجتماع كما هو مبين اعلاه . وعلى حكم هيئة التحكيم بالاكثرية ويكون الحكم ملزماً للفريقين ويصبح تنفيذه واجباً بمجرد صدوره وتبليغه . ولحل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين ان يعين الشخص او الاشخاص الذين يوادم للدفاع عن وجهة نظره امام هيئة التحكيم وتقديم البيانات والحجج اللازمة لذلك .

#### المادة الرابعة

اجور محكمي كل فريق عليه واجور رئيس هيئة التحكيم مناصفة بينهما وكذلك الجرم في نفقات المحاسبة الاخرى .

#### المادة الخامسة

يعتبر هذا العقد جزءاً متكاملاً لمعاهدة الطائف الموقع عليها في هذا اليوم السادس من شهر صفر سنة ثلاث وخمسين بعد الثلاثمائة والالف ويظل ساري المفعول لمدة سريان المعاهدة المذكورة، وقد حرد هذا من نسختين باللغة العربية يكون بيد كل من الفريقين الساميين المتعاقدين نسخة .  
وقرأ بذلك جرى توقيعه في اليوم السادس من شهر صفر سنة ثلاث وخمسين بعد الثلاثمائة والالف

خالد بن عبد العزيز  
السعودي

Figure 3.6.2. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Arbitration Covenant

between

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen

Whereas Their Majesties King Abdulaziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and King Yahya, King of Yemen, have agreed, in accordance with Article Eight of the treaty of peace, friendship and good understanding, known as the "Treaty of Taif", signed on the 6<sup>th</sup> of Safar 1353H, to refer to arbitration any dispute or disagreement which may arise out of the relations between them, their governments and countries, when all amicable negotiations fail to settle it, the Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to resort to arbitration in the manner shown in the following articles:-

Article 1:

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to accept referring the issue subject of dispute to arbitration within one month from the date of receipt of the request for arbitration from the other party.

Article 2:

Arbitration shall be undertaken by a panel composed of an equal number of arbitrators, half of whom shall be selected by each of the Two Parties, and an umpire to be selected by mutual agreement between the Two Honorable Contracting Parties. If they do not agree in this respect, each of them shall nominate a person, and if said person is accepted by the other party, he shall become the umpire. If an agreement cannot be reached in this regard, the umpire shall be decided by ballot, on the understanding that the ballot shall only be drawn on persons acceptable to both parties. The person chosen by ballot shall become the head of the arbitration panel, and shall become the umpire in the case. If, however, no agreement can be reached on the persons acceptable to both parties, negotiations shall continue thereafter until an agreement is reached in this regard.

Article 3:

The selection of the arbitration panel and its head shall be completed within one month from the end of the month fixed for the reply of the party whose acceptance of arbitration was requested by the other party. The arbitration panel shall convene at a venue to be agreed upon within a period not exceeding one month after the expiry of the two months provided for at the beginning of this Article. The arbitration panel shall render its award within a period which may not, in any case, exceed one month from the expiry of the period fixed for

Figure 3.6.3. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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the meeting, as set forth above. The award of the arbitration panel shall be rendered by majority vote, and shall be binding on both parties. It shall also become enforceable immediately upon issuance and notification thereof. Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties may appoint the person or persons it desires to defend its viewpoint before the arbitration panel and produce the necessary arguments and evidence.

**Article 4:**

Each Party shall pay for the charges of its respective arbitrators. The charges of the chief arbitrator shall be paid in half by the Two Parties, and the same applies to the other costs of arbitration proceedings.

**Article 5:**

This Covenant shall be considered supplementary to the Treaty of Taif signed on this day, the 6<sup>th</sup> of Safar, 1353H, and shall remain in force during the effectiveness period of the said Treaty. This has been drafted in two copies in the Arabic language, one for each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties.

In witness thereof, it was signed on the sixth day of Safar, of the year thirteen hundred and fifty three.

Abdullah bin Ahmad Al Wazir

Khalid bin Abdulaziz Al Saud

**Figure 3.6.4. Convention on Arbitration (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**



### 3.7. The Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

The committee in Tihāmah (which reported in three stages) consisted of a Saudi team that included<sup>9</sup>: Abdulla Almohammed Bin Aqeel (Chairman), Muhammad Al-Suleiman Bin Turki, and Abdulla Kadhi; as well as a Yemeni team, comprising: Abdulla Bin Othman (Chairman), Muhammad Bin Kassim Najmuldeen and Muhammad Bin Dhaif Allah Bin Ghathya<sup>9</sup>.

The Committee in the mountains consisted of a Saudi team composed of: Abdul Wahab Bin Muhammad Abu Milha (Chairman), Abdul Aziz Bin Abdul Rahman Althamiri, Ibrahim Zain Alabedeen, Duliam Abu La'atha, Husain Bin Mustafa and Talat Wafa; as well as a Yemeni team composed of: Muhammad Bin Hassan Alwadi'ee, Head of Saqeen (Chairman), Ismail Bin Hasan, Wali of Hamdan, Abdulla Bin Mana, Ruler of Sahar, and Abdulla Alghabiri. The text is available in the United Nations' Secretariat.

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<sup>9</sup> *Umm-al-Qura*, 22 November 1935, *Op. cit.* 'Jeddah Report for November 1935', 1 January 1936, *Op. cit.* 'Jeddah Report for December 1935', 2 January 1936, *Op. cit.*

# ملحق لمعاهدة الطائف

بتحديد الحدود

بين

المملكة اليمنية

والمملكة العربية السعودية

Figure 3.7.1 The Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

## تقرير اللجنة

### تحديد الحدود

بين

### المملكة اليمنية

### والمملكة العربية السعودية

الحمد لله الذي آخى بين المسلمين والف بين قلوبهم والصلاة والسلام على سيدنا محمد صفة نبياته وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم .  
 أما بعد فنحن يحيى بن حميد الدين ملك المملكة اليمنية نظراً لما جاء في آخر المادة الرابعة من معاهدة الطائف المنقذة بيننا وبين جلالة اخينا الملك عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الفيصل آل سعود ملك المملكة العربية السعودية بتاريخ ٦ صفر سنة ١٣٥٣ والتي تنص على ما يأتي : « ماتعيين وتثبيت الخط المذكور وتمييز القبائل وتحديد ديارها على كل الوجوه فيكون اجراؤه بواسطة هيئة مؤلفة من عدد متساو من الفريقين بصورة ودية اخوية بدون حيف بحسب العرف والمادة الثابتة عند القبائل » فقد تم الاتفاق على انتداب هيتين مشتركتين لتحديد الحدود بين المملكة اليمنية والمملكة العربية السعودية بصورة فعلية احدهما لتحديد الحدود في تهامة والاخرى في الجبال وما اليها وقد كانت هيئة تهامة المعينة من قبلنا مؤلفة من محمد بن ضيف الله بن غناية ومحمد بن قاسم نجم الدين وعبد الله بن عثمان كما كانت الهيئة المعينة من قبل جلالتنا لتحديد الحدود في تهامة مؤلفة من عبدالسلطان بن ركي وعبد الله قاضي وعبد الله بن عقيل كما كانت الهيئة المعينة من قبلنا في جهات الجبال مؤلفة من عبد الله بن مناع كبير سحار وعبد الله الغبيرى و اسماعيل بن حسن عامل همدان ومحمد بن حسن الوادعي ناظرة ساقين والهيئة المعينة من قبل جلالتنا لتحديد الحدود في الجبال مؤلفة من عبد الوهاب بن محمد ابو ملحمة وعبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن الثميرى و ابراهيم بن زين العابدين ودليم ابولمعة وحسين بن مصطفى وطلعت وفا وقد قامت هذه الهيئات بالاتفاق بتحديد تلك الحدود ووضعت الهيئة المشتركة التي حددت الحدود في الجبال تقريراً واحداً بتاريخ ٢١ شوال ١٣٥٤ موقفاً من مندوبي الطرفين عيبت فيه مواقع الحدود في سائر الجبال وما اليها موقفاً موقفاً وبدأت بجبل النار وانتهت بجور الودانة ووضعت الهيئة المشتركة التي حددت الحدود في تهامة ثلاثة تقارير موقفة من مندوبي الطرفين الاول منها موقع بتاريخ رمضان ١٣٥٤ يبدأ من رصيف البحر رأس المروج وينتهي عند الملوخ والثاني موقع بتاريخ ٢٧ شوال ١٣٥٤ يبدأ من أسفل مير عليا أطراف الوادي وينتهي عند أسفل جبل السوده من شرق والثالث موقع بتاريخ ٢١ القعدة ١٣٥٤ يبدأ من ملس السوده وينتهي عند جوار الودان وقد عيبت فيها مواقع الحدود التهامية كلها موقفاً موقفاً ونص تلك التقارير الاربعة كما يلي :

Figure 3.7.2 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
 تقرير الحدود  
 بين المملكة العربية السعودية و بين المملكة اليمانية  
 ( ١ )

في اليوم الخامس والعشرين من شهر شعبان ١٣٥٤ هـ اجتمعت في طهران ، الهيئتان الموقعتان أدناه، الموقعتان من قبل صاحب الجلالة الامام عبد العزيز السعود ملك المملكة العربية السعودية ومن قبل صاحب الجلالة الامام يحيى حميد الدين ملك المملكة اليمانية من أجل تقرير خط الحدود بين المملكتين المشار اليهما عملاً بما نصت عليه المادة الرابعة من معاهدة الطائف .

وكان الابتداء من أطراف البلادين المتجاورين فيهما من جهة الشرق الى آخر حد في جهة الغرب حيث ينتهي العمل في ذلك بنظر هيئة تهمية .

وقد صار الاتفاق على أن يكون وضع أول اشارة في الحدود في — رأس جبل النار — بين وائلة وبين يام . وأما القفرة المسماة (صله) وما يتصل بها من جهة الشرق فبناء على الاختلاف الواقع بين وائلة ويام عليها وعدم اللزوم لوضع الامارات فيها رأينا بقاءها حسب عاداتها . وإذا حصل اختلاف عليها في المستقبل بين القبيلتين فيكون فيه الحل بشرع الله بموجب ما نص عليه في معاهدة الطائف .

وأما أماكن خارجا عن صلح جنوبا فالى وائله ومن اليهم وما كان خارجا عنها شمالا فالى يام . وقد عقدت الهيئتان المذكورتان عدة جلسات دامت حتى تحرر هذا من أجل الغرض المنوه عنه آنفا بحضور رؤساء القبائل المتحددة ، وبمد التحقيق ومصادقة رؤساء القبائل المذكورة بدون اجبار ولا اكراه تميئت الحدود وتقررت وميزت باسماء جبال وأكام وأودية مروفة باسمائها لا تتحول ولا تتبدل . وسيأتي ذكر هذه الالباء مفصلة فيما بعد . وقد دونت في محاضر مختلفة التواريخ وصدقت من الهيئتين المذكورتين، وأخذت كل هيئة نسخة منها ، وانتدبت الهيئتان رجالا أمناء من قبيلها ذهبوا لوضع علامات من الحجارة على طول خط الحدود بين كل كيلومتر وآخر اشارة تمهيدا لبناء الساريات في الوقت الذي يتفق على تعيينه جلالة الملكين وعلى تعيين الاشخاص الذين يقومون بها والنقطة التي تنفق عليها .

وقد أعطي كل قبيلة بيانا مصدقا من الهيئتين بمحدود هامع القبيلة المقابلة لها قطما لكل حجة ومنعما لكل تشويش والتباس ؛ ليعرف كل ذي حد حده ويقف عنده ويمتنع من تجاوزه والتمدى على مجاوره برعي أو غيره

Figure 3.7.3 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

- ومن تمدى عوقب من حكومته بما يكون به العبارة والارتداع بعد ذلك .  
وهالك بيان الحدود من الشرق الى الغرب :
- ابتداء خط الحدود بين المملكة العربية السعودية والمملكة اليمنية بعد قفرة صلد .
- ١ — جبل النار
  - ٢ — جبل الاصيدة
  - ٣ — رأس مسكوزعنيان
  - ٤ — ذراع الشارعة
  - ٥ — قاع عثينة
  - ٦ — رأس العبلا
  - ٧ — رأس الكوكب
  - ٨ — رأس الصبر } المطل على السهل الممتد الى حوجخيبي على أن يبقى الياميون يردون الماء الذي  
في حوجخيبي كما ذمهم .
  - ٩ — الفخذين
  - ١٠ — رأس عربية
  - ١١ — رأس عقبه شوقه
  - ١٢ — عشاره
  - ١٣ — فرع مدر
  - ١٤ — جبل الشافرة
  - ١٥ — فرع الدغماء
  - ١٦ — مقبرة آل ثملة
  - ١٧ — متاشع
  - ١٨ — رهوة ضرك
  - ١٩ — جبل مرشحه
  - ٢٠ — قهر فرد
  - ٢١ — شحاط النميرة
  - ٢٢ — صلفح
  - ٢٣ — جبل الاتم

Figure 3.7.4 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

- ٢٤ — رأس جبل هضاض } فما سال منه جنوبا فلوائله وما سال منه شمالا فلوادعه وما سال شرقا فليام .  
وهنا ينتهي الحد بين وائلة وبين يام
- ٢٥ — رأس الحنكة } هذان الحدان بين وائلة وبين وادعه .
- ٢٦ — جبل عار
- ٢٧ — حلقة الحماة
- ٢٨ — الجديله } هذان الحدان بين بنى حذيفة وبنى جماعة وبين وادعه .
- ٢٩ — جبل وعوع } وأما الصخيرة فتبقى على عاداتها السابقة فما كان ملكا لخاصة ابن خير فهو يختص به وما سوى ذلك فهو على ما جرت به العادة سابقا يكون بيد ابن خير ومن تخلف بعده ويدفع سبع الفلة الى سالم بن دمنان ومن تخلف بعده .
- ٣٠ — الشعبة
- ٣١ — ضراويه } هذان الحدان بين سحار الشام ووادعه .
- ٣٢ — جبل فريض الزاكة
- ٣٣ — جبل عضد
- ٣٤ — جبل فريض أسمر
- ٣٥ — جبل فريض المحدث
- ٣٦ — جبل صبحطل } هذه الحدود بين سحار الشام ووادعه .
- ٣٧ — المزيرعة } فما سال منها غربا فلسحار الشام وما سال منها شرقا فلوادعة .
- ٣٨ — شعب القوم
- ٣٩ — رأس جبل علب
- ٤٠ — الشمشاء } ما سال منها غربا فلاك نصر من سحار الشام وما سال شرقا وشمشالا فلوادعة .
- ٤١ — مدفع الحنكة « اي رأس بن مولى » على ان يبقى كل من آل محض وسنجان وآل نصر على حقه في قرية الزهوة من املاك كما كانوا عليه سابقا وكما هم عليه الآن .
- ٤٢ — الصبصب
- ٤٣ — نليد الكمل } ما كان من جهة الشمال فلاك محض من وادعة وجهة الجنوب لآل نصر من سحار الشام
- ٤٤ — جبل آل محض } ما سال منه جنوبا فلاك نصر وباقي الجهات لآل محض من وادعة وهنا تنتهي الحدود بين سحار الشام ووادعة .

Figure 3.7.5 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

- ٤٥ — وادى الرابضة فى المنا { فالجلمة الجنوبية لآل نصر من سحار الشام وبقى الجهات لسنحان من قحطان .  
 ٤٦ — خشم المقلّة فى خرق { وهو الحد بين آل سعيد من سنحان و بين بنى جماعة .  
 و بعد ذلك يبدأ الحد الفاصل بين آل تليد و بين بنى جماعة وهو يمتد من الشرق الى الغرب الجنوبي .
- ٤٧ — تليد قشبة } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٤٨ — وادى مجنح القرص } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٤٩ — رأس الحارة } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٠ — عقم الواكف } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥١ — رأس الثائنة } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٢ — جبل الجيش } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٣ — سيل الجوه } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٤ — قهر نعامه } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٥ — جبل شفا الزبير } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٦ — جبل المعجمة } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٧ — جبل عرب } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٨ — نيد الشريانى } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .  
 ٥٩ — وادى الرصيفى } فما كان منه شمالا وغربا فلاك تليد وجنوبا وشرقا لبنى جماعة .
- واما أصل وادى دفا من أم زراد الى قمع مر وب الى الرصيفى فهو مشترك بين  
 التليدى والحيسى والثابى . ومن وادى دفا شمالا فلاك ثابت ولاك تليد وغربا وجنوبا  
 لأهل حيس ولاك يحيى من بنى مالك وشرقا لآل ثابت . واما جبل مهران فتصادق  
 آل ثابت وآل تليد وآل القهر على انه مشترك بينهم فيجرؤا فيه حسب عادتهم  
 ما كان منه غربا وجنوبا فلاك يحيى ولاك حيس من بنى مالك وما كان منه شرقا فلاك  
 ثابت من بنى جماعة .
- ٦٠ — قمع مر وب }  
 ٦١ — جبل امقلحة }  
 ٦٢ — نيد جلال }  
 ٦٣ — نيد السحايا }  
 ٦٤ — نيد الرفصة }  
 ما كان غربا وجنوبا فلاك يحيى وما كان شرقا وشمالا فلاك ثابت .

Figure 3.7.6 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

- الممتد من الشمال إلى الجنوب من نيد الرقصة إلى كنفه وهو الحد بين آل يحيى وبيز  
 ٦٥ - جبل العريف } أهل حنبة فالجهة الغربية لآل يحيى والجهة الشرقية لأهل حنبة وقد أعطى لكل  
 قبيلة منها وثيقة بيدها في ما هو لها من جهة القبيلة الأخرى .
- ٦٦ - جبل السلم } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .  
 ٦٧ - حرف أمشينة } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .  
 ٦٨ - نيد الخطف } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .  
 ٦٩ - نيد الفسيح } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .  
 ٧٠ - قلة أم سحاي } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .  
 ٧١ - جبل الجبدار } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .  
 ٧٢ - ساقية أم منطيط } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .  
 ٧٣ - وادي أم شريفة } فما كان منه شمالاً فلاك يحيى من بني مالك وما كان جنوباً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .
- ٧٤ - نيل الطفة } ما كان منها غرباً وشمالاً فلاك زيدان وما كان منها جنوباً وشرقاً فلبني خولى وأما  
 آل سبولة فمالهم في جبل شهدان من بيوت وأموال وغيرها فيبقون فيده على عاداتهم .
- ٧٥ - نيد خرمة } ما كان منها غرباً وشمالاً فلاك زيدان من آل يحيى من بني مالك وما كان منها  
 جنوباً وشرقاً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .
- ٧٦ - حياذ الردح } ما كان منها غرباً وشمالاً فلاك زيدان من آل يحيى من بني مالك وما كان منها  
 جنوباً وشرقاً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .
- ٧٧ - بئر الشرح } ما كان منها غرباً وشمالاً فلاك زيدان من آل يحيى من بني مالك وما كان منها  
 جنوباً وشرقاً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .
- ٧٨ - نيد سره } ما كان منها غرباً وشمالاً فلاك زيدان من آل يحيى من بني مالك وما كان منها  
 جنوباً وشرقاً فلاهل جلدحا من بني خولى .
- ٧٩ - نيد الوقر } ما كان منها شرقاً وجنوباً فلاك عياش وما كان شمالاً وغرباً فلاك سعيد من بني  
 ٨٠ - نيد الفرو } مالك وبيتي آل سعيد يردون ماء جرعه التي في نيد الفرو كما دأبهم السابقة .  
 ٨١ - نيد الترع } ما كان منها شرقاً وجنوباً فلاك عياش وما كان شمالاً وغرباً فلاك خالد وآل  
 ٨٢ - مجنب البحار } عزة من بني مالك .  
 ٨٣ - الحنكر

Figure 3.7.7 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)



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فاكان منها شرقا وجنوبا فلاك الالهب وآل ام دوشه وما كان شمالا وغربا فلاك خالد وآل عزه من بنى مالك	}	٨٤ - وادي انطرش
		٨٥ - قرن بكحلج
فاكان منها جنوبا مائلا للغرب فلينى أم شيخ وشمالا وغربا فلاك خالد وآل عزة من بنى مالك .	}	٨٦ - نيد شوكان
		٨٧ - غيباس
	}	٨٨ - انلرق
		٨٩ - تبرى ام تليله
		٩٠ - جور الودافه

وهنا تنتهى الحدود بين بنى مالك وبين بنى جماعة وبين بنى منبه .

وهذا آخر الحدود التى قامت الهيئتان الموقمتان ادناه بتقريرها فا كان واقعا من شمال خطهذه الحدود فهو من المملكة العربية السعودية وما كان واقعا من جنوبه فهو من المملكة اليمنية باستثناء بعض نقاط الحدود - المنحرفة الى جهة الشرق اولى جهة الغرب حسب اتجاه ميل الخط كالتبين ذلك بصورة مفصلة حذاء كل حدمنها .

وبيانا لما ذكر وضع هذا القرار ووقع من الهيئتين ، وقد حرر من نسختين باللغة العربية الشريفة، بيد كل من الهيئتين نسخة . وكتب في مدينة ظهران في اليوم الحادى والعشرين من شهر شوال سنة اربع وخمسين بعد الثلاثمائة والالف . في ٢١ شوال ١٣٥٤ هـ .

هيئتا تحديد الحدود بين المملكة العربية السعودية وبين المملكة اليمنية .

الهيئة المنتدبة من المملكة العربية السعودية			الهيئة المنتدبة من المملكة اليمنية		
الرئيس	عضو	عضو	الرئيس	عضو	عضو
عبد الوهاب محمد	عبد العزيز بن	ابراهيم	محمد بن حسن الوداعي	اسماعيل بن حسن	عبد الله
ابوملحه	عبد الرحمن النجدي	زين العابدين	ناظرة ساقين	عامل همذان	النجدي
عضو	عضو	عضو	عضو		
ذليح ابولمنه	حسين بن مصطلق	طلعت وفا	عبد الله بن متاع كبير سحار		

Figure 3.7.8 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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( ٢ )

الابتداء من ساحل البحر الى آخر حدود بني مروان مما يلي الحرث والى حدود وعلا

رقم الموضوع	اسم الموضوع فيه	الجهة الشمالية	الجهة الجنوبية	اسماء القبائل التابعة للحكومة العربية السعودية	اسماء القبائل التابعة للحكومة المتوكلية
١	رصيف البحر مما راس الموح شامي لمنفذ رديف قراد .				
٢	طرف الرسيب الشامي من الشورى				
٣	ذيل العلم نمرة ٢ مسافة الف متر	من الغرب الى الشرق	العربي بن مروان	زييلع بن مروان	١٠٠٠
٤	ذيل العلم نمرة ٣ متصل بالرسيب القبلي مسافة ٣٠٠ متر				٣٠٠
٥	يمين وأصل الى قاعدة الدقور				١٠٠٠
٦	متصل بمنأخو الشرق موضوع طرف شجرة الرديف				١٠٠٠
٧	موضوع قبل كتف الحافية من الجهة الغربية	من الشمال الى الجنوب	العربي بن مروان	زييلع بن مروان	١٠٠٠
٨	موضوع شامي عن رديف القراد				١٠٠٠
٩	موضوع فوق رديف القراد				١٠٠٠
١٠	موضوع في التقاريد نحو الف متر				١٠٠٠
١١	موضوع في التقاريد				١٠٠٠
١٢	موضوع في التقاريد مقابل للفصله				١٠٠٠
١٣	موضوع في قرى ممتد من الفصله مسافة الف متر				١٠٠٠
١٤	موضوع في قرى ممتد من الفصله مسافة الف متر	من الغرب الى الشرق	العربي بن مروان	زييلع بن مروان	١٠٠٠
١٥	موضوع في بلاسم ممتد من الفصله مسافة الف متر				١٠٠٠
١٦	موضوع في بلاسم ممتد من الفصله مسافة الف متر				١٠٠٠
١٧	موضوع في شعيب ام ذيايه مسافة الف متر				١٠٠٠
١٨	موضوع في شعيب ام ذيايه مسافة الف متر				١٠٠٠
١٩	موضوع في مشعان مسافة الف متر				١٠٠٠
٢٠	موضوع في مشعان حد القيروس				١٠٠٠
٢١	موضوع في مشعان حد القيروس				١٠٠٠
٢٢	موضوع في مشعان حد القيروس	من الغرب الى الشرق	العربي بن مروان	بنو زييلع	١٠٠٠
٢٣	اتمام المشعان وهم يتجنى قبليين زييلع والقيروس والمسافة ٦٤٠ متر				٦٤٠

Figure 3.7.9 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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رقم الترتيب	اسم القبائل التابعة للحكومة المتوكلية	اسماء القبائل التابعة للحكومة العربية السعودية	الجهة	اسم الموضوع فيه	الرقم
١٠٠٠	المغفلى بنى مروان	القيوس بنى مروان	من الجنوب الى الشمال	اتمام مشعبان أرض القيوس	٢٤
١٠٠٠				اتمام مشعبان أرض ابراهيم عثمان منقارا والحدى	٢٥
١٠٠٠				واقف على خزن حاج شرق مجد محمد مدحش مغفلى	٢٦
١٠٠٠				واقف في غرب الحشيرة حد القيوس والمغفلى	٢٧
١٠٠٠				واقف في خبنة الطينة قبلى الحشيرة	٢٨
١٠٠٠	المغفلى بنى مروان	القيوس بنى مروان	من الجنوب الى الشمال	واقف في شعيب الحزب .	٢٩
١٠٠٠				واقف في خبنة الحزب .	٣٠
١٠٠٠				واقف في زيارة السر .	٣١
١٠٠٠				واقف في سداة خبنة السر	٣٢
١٠٠٠				واقف في شعبة زمار السرحه .	٣٣
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين أم القمع ومفجر الزمار بخط مستقيم نحو الشرق .	٣٤
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين أم القمع والقو به بخط مستقيم نحو الشرق	٣٥
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين عداية المراو يدوحدو والقو به بخط مستقيم نحو الشرق .	٣٦
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين كشف المراو يدو وخبنة عسله	٣٧
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين مفجر الحوسيه	٣٨
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين عداية الخلوبه التي نحو القبلة	٣٩
١٠٠٠	المغفلى والحدادى	بنى حمد	من الغرب الى الشرق	واقف فيما بين يماني سداد الدعاسيه	٤٠
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين خرط الحوسيه	٤١
١٠٠٠				واقف فيما بين سرحه المغربى بين الجدارة وبنى مزيد	٤٢
١٦٠				واقف فيما بين طريق جبلبان الى حررض المسافة ١٦٠ متر .	٤٣
١٠٠٠				واقف في السرحه التي على طريق جبلبان الى حررض	٤٤
١٠٠٠	الاشريم من بنى مروان	اشراورعلان والقيوس	من الغرب الى الشرق	واقف في مقص الشعوب .	٤٥
١٠٠٠				واقف في مقص الشعوب	٤٦

Figure 3.7.10 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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رقم الموضوع فيه	اسم الموضوع فيه	من الغرب الى الشرق	اسماء القبائل التابعة للحكومة العربية السعودية	اسماء القبائل التابعة للحكومة المتوكلية	رقم القبايل
٤٧	واقع في المحفور طريق وعلان الى حرص	من الغرب الى الشرق	اشراق وعلان والقورس	الاشريم من بني مروان	١٠٠٠
٤٨	واقع في ابوصول بمنان باضره				١٠٠٠
٤٩	معال بومشى				١٠٠٠
٥٠	خلفت المشى				١٠٠٠
٥١	دنديقه صغيره	من الغرب الى الشرق	القورس واهل وعلان	الاشريم من بني مروان	١٠٠٠
٥٢	شامى الدنديقه الكبيره				١٠٠٠
٥٤	قاعة جبل الدوحه				١٠٠٠
٥٥	شامى الذراع باعلى تمشرومنه مسافة للشمرة الاولى بنحو ٥٠٠٠ متر	من الجنوب الى الشمال	القورس واهل وعلان	مضاب الجبال	٥٠٠٠
٥٦	مريخ المعالين نحو الشرق مسافة ٣٦٠ مترا اسفل من الغرب الى الشرق الجبل فوق الوادى	من الغرب الى الشرق	حسن فقيه	مضاب جبال المير	٣٦٠
٥٧	موضوع في خلفه الجروب				١٠٠٠
٥٨	موضوع في ضلعة الحقاقر				١٠٠٠
٥٩	روس الحقاقر وام الجابر	من الجنوب الى الشمال	حسن فقيه	مضاب جبال المير	١٠٠٠
٦٠	شرق المطينة في اسفل الجبل الى منضى حالبيه بلاد على منال				١٠٠٠
٦١	عشة السيد				١٠٠٠
٦٢	جبل ازيادى				١٠٠٠
٦٣	موضوعه رأس المتمس من الجهة الشرقية				١٠٠٠
٦٤	مجن شرق قرية بني الجراح ومزارعهم				١٠٠٠
٦٥	المشة فيما بين وادى ذباب وادى القارى	من الجنوب الى الشمال	الحكاميا	مضاب الجبال	١٠٠٠
٦٦	اسفل عشة السري رشام				١٠٠٠
٦٧	دمنة السيد				١٠٠٠
٦٨	الملوس شمال المقياله				١٠٠٠

بما أن البيان الموضوع بهذه الكشوفات التي هي ثلاثة صحائف من تمره واحد الى تمره ثمانية وستين هي بيان المراسم الموضوعه بالحدود فيما بين المملكة العربية السعودية والمملكة المتوكلية من ساحل البحر الى المقياله آخر حدود بني مروان وبما انه صار وضع هذه الرسوم للحدود المذكورة باتفاق الهيئتين المنتدبة من قبل الحكومتين الموضوعه اسماءهم بهذا القرار وذلك بعد الفحص والتروى من اصحاب الخبرة من مشايخ القبائل التابعين للحكومتين

Figure 3.7.11 The Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

وعليه صار كل ما هو شمال وغرب حدود المراسم المذكورة هو تابع للحكومة العربية السعودية وما هو جنوب وشرق  
 مراسم الحدود هو تابع للحكومة المتوكلية وقد حررت هذه الوثائق على نسختين لكل من الحكومتين نسخة وقد  
 صار مقابلة النسختين فوجدت صحيحة وعليه صار القرار والتوقيع . رمضان ١٣٥٤

الهيئة المتوكلية  
 عضو الرئيس محمد بن قاسم نجم الدين عبد المطلب عبد الله بن عثمان  
 عضو الرئيس محمد السليمان بن تركي عبد الله قاضي عبد الله المحمد بن عقيل  
 الهيئة العربية السعودية  
 عضو الرئيس  
 ( ٣ )

بيان المراسم الموضوعة بالحدود فيما بين الحكومة العربية السعودية والحكومة المتوكلية وهي التي اوطأ من بلاد الحارث

المراسم الموضوعة فيه	الجهة من	الى	اتساء المرابن التابعين للحكومة العربية	المرابن التابعين للحكومة المتوكلية	ملاحظات
١ أسفل مير عليا أطراف الوادي من الغرب الى الشرق ١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٢ ام لبده	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٣ جحر العبد	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٤ منجر جاضع ام مخرحاه	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٥ المطلاه	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٦ داحر مضه معلى	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٧ خلقة محرم صبايا	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٨ منجر امهيج	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
٩ غرب ام دهشيله	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١٠ خلقة ام سباقه	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١١ مهد داحرا مسوده	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١٢ معطب	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١٣ أسفل جبل ام عطب شرق	من الغرب الى الشرق	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١٤ رأس مخوفه	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١٥ رأس جبل امعطب	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١٦ باطن الكامح من الغرب السوده	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	
١٧ رأس الكامح امروى	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الحارث الهزاهيز	بنى مروان	

منها ٢٠٠ متر متروك  
 ينحرف من الجنوب  
 الى الشمال باطن وادي  
 مسدج

Figure 3.7.12 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)



رقم	المكان الموضوعة فيه	تسم	س	الاسماء العربية	العربان التابعين للحكومة المتوكلية	ملاحظات
٤٥	مفجر الوحشى	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الكموب	بني صياح وبنو دهلي	
٤٦	مهد العقم	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الكموب	بني صياح وبنو دهلي	
٤٧	قبة الخبيسي	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الكموب	بني صياح وبنو دهلي	بعض مزارع للامام ثم اشتد نحو الشمال
٤٨	رزمة العجبي	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	الكموب	بني صياح وبنو دهلي	
٤٩	مدهوس رأس الملح	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني الحرث الكموب	بني صياح وبنو دهلي	
٥٠	رأس المروه	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني الحرث الكموب	بني صياح وبنو دهلي	
٥١	لجج أم وعر شرق جبل تويرلق	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني الحرث الكموب	بني صياح وبنو دهلي	
٥٢	رفه أم حسيبي مفجر شران	من الجنوب الى الشمال	٧٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٥٣	المكاس قبلة وادي شران	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٥٤	شرق جبل المشادف	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٥٥	شرق شعب اللويح	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٥٦	غرب الحسكول	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٥٧	رأس الحسكول	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٥٨	رأس الحصر النجاشي	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٥٩	رأس الوادي الواقع بين المعينين	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٦٠	موا ضلامه	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٦١	معتق الصيد	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٦٢	بين المشافين	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٦٣	البحصه الدرديده	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	
٦٤	أسفل جبل السوده من شرق من الجنوب الى الشمال	من الجنوب الى الشمال	١٠٠٠	بني شراحيل	بني عجيبي	

بما ان المراسيم الموضحة بهذه الكشوفات من نمرة (١) الى نمرة (٦٤) بموجب البيانات وهي التي تبتدىء من المنيايه الى السوده هي الحدود الفاصلة فيما بين الحرث رعايا جلالة الملك عبدالعزبز بن سعود والحرث وبنو دهلي وبنو صياح من رعايا جلالة الامام يحيى وما هو بجميع الخط من الغرب والشمال هو تابع لحكومة جلالة الملك عبد العزيز وما هو شرق وجنوب هو تابع لحكومة الامام يحيى أما القرى التي رؤيت متناظرة ومزارعها متداخلة وقد فصلها خط الحدود وهي المقبص والملاحيط اولا وتم فيما بين مبروكة والمجهم ومجدعه ثانيا فهذه المزارع تتبع قراها وركزاتها للحكومة التي لها تلك القرية وكذا المزرعة التي لابن غاشي في قرية المعين ودخلت في حدود قرية عبيد

Figure 3.7.14 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

جناده التابعين للملك عبد العزيز فزكاة تلك الاراضي تابعة لكرات المعين ولكن هذه الرسومات وضمت بنظر الهيئتين والامناء وأصبحت هي الحدود الفاصلة فيما بين المملكتين وذلك تحت اشراف الجميع بعد التروى من معرفة الحدود معرفة تامة وبعد وقوف الجميع على جواب مشائخ القبائل التابعين للحكومتين وعليه حصل هذا القرار وبالله الاعتماد في ٢٧ شوال ١٣٥٤ هـ

الهيئة العربية السعودية			الهيئة اليمنية المتوكلية		
الرئيس	عضو	عضو	الرئيس	عضو	عضو
عبدالله بن عقيل	عبدالله قاضي	محمد السليمان بن تركي	عبدالله بن عثمان	محمد بن قاسم نجم الدين	محمد بن ضيف الله بن غثايه

( ٤ )

رقم	المكان الموضوعة فيه	الجهة من	رقم	القبائل التابعين للحكومة العربية السعودية	القبائل التابعين للحكومة اليمنية المتوكلية
١	ملس السوداء	جنوب	١٠٠٠	العبادل	وقيش
٢	كرس أم زربية	جنوب	١٠٠٠	العبادل	وقيش
٣	مهد غرنوقة خيط الماء	غرب	١٠٠٠	العبادل	وقيش
٤	بطن الوادي خيط الماء شرق غرنوقة	غرب	١٠٠٠	العبادل	وقيش
٥	مضجر القدرين	قرب	١٠٠٠	العبادل	وقيش
٦	حياد المزار	غرب	١٠٠٠	العبادل	وقيش
٧	مهد معلق ومهد الخيط	غرب	١٠٠٠	السحاري	وقيش
٨	قاعة عصامه خيط الماء	غرب	١٠٠٠	السحاري	وقيش
٩	مجر خيط الماء	غرب	١٠٠٠	السحاري	وقيش
١٠	جحا في خيط الماء	غرب	١٠٠٠	السحاري	جها شذا
١١	آل شره	جنوب	١٠٠٠	الكعبي	الوقري
١٢	خيط الماء وادي صراط	جنوب	١٠٠٠	الكعبي	عطيفي
١٣	خيط الماء رفيس مخسر	جنوب	١٠٠٠	الكعبي	عطيفي
١٤	قطع خيط الماء جبل الشوكان طرف جميلة	جنوب	١٠٠٠	الكعبي	عطيفي
١٥	وسط زراع الشرقيات وادي معطل	غرب	١٠٠٠	الكعبي	آل مجد
١٦	المكيال	جنوب	١٠٠٠	بنو مجد العبادل	بنو مجد العبادل
١٧	معتق الواسط	جنوب	١٠٠٠	بنو مجد العبادل	بنو مجد العبادل
١٨	معتق السري على خط الماء	جنوب	١٠٠٠	بنو مجد العبادل	بنو مجد العبادل

Figure 3.7.15 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)



القبائل التابعة للحكومة النمانية المتوكلية	القبائل التابعة للحكومة العربية السعودية	عدد	جهة	المكان الموضوعه فيه	رقم
بني عبدالمبادل	بني عبدالمبادل	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	١٩ القذنة
بني محمدالمبادل	بني محمدالمبادل	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٠ القلة
بني محمدالمبادل	بني محمدالمبادل	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢١ السد
آلة عطيف	آلة عطيف احمد بن شرقه	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٢ وادي المباح
آلة عطيف	آلة عطيف حمد بن شرقه	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٣ قلة ثوبان على قلة البولة
آلة عطيف	آلة عطيف حمد بن شرقه	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٤ قلة الممرات
آلة عطيف	آلة عطيف حمد بن شرقه	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٥ قلة المسة
آلة عطيف	آلة عطيف حمد بن شرقه	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٦ السقاي
آلة عطيف	آلة عطيف حمد بن شرقه	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٧ ممتق الرديم
آلة عطيف	آلة عطيف حمد بن شرقه	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٢٨ نسيد المحرق
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٢٩ غارجمار
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣٠ القريحا السفلي
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣١ رأس الجوالاسفل
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣٢ عارم شط السودي
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣٣ حسر المشمر خيط الماء
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣٤ حسر المجازع
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣٥ المصار
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣٦ سعي القابسية
آلة عطيف	اللقبي	١٠٠٠	من الغرب الى الشرق نحو الشمال	جنوب	٣٧ حسر المنحريات
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شرق	غرب	٣٨ خطوة قلقبل
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شرق	غرب	٣٩ خطوة الدحيله
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شرق	غرب	٤٠ خطوة الجارد
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شرق	غرب	٤١ خطوة نيه
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شرق	غرب	٤٢ قلعة الصفر
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شرق	غرب	٤٣ رأس زراع فيفا
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شرق	غرب	٤٤ رأس عمق
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٤٥ رأس شعب مراعي
آلة عطيف	قيس	١٠٠٠	شمال	جنوب	٤٦ رأس تقيل خرياف

Figure 3.7.16 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

رقم	المكان الموضوعة فيه	إلى	من	القبائل التابعة للحكومة العربية للحكومة الهاشمية المتوكلية	القبائل التابعة للحكومة السعودية
٤٧	اسفل نقييل جريان	جنوب	شمال	قيس	الزهور
٤٨	مفتح السمرين	جنوب	شمال	قيس	الزهور
٤٩	ظاهر القتاد	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٠	ظاهر الجبل	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥١	اسفل النوعه	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٢	وادي الحلاله	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٣	معزب ممدان	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٤	خطرة فالخ	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٥	طريق الجبال	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٦	المصيده	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٧	المهل	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٨	قاة الشيعة	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٥٩	قاة الباقر	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٦٠	جبل الظهوه	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٦١	حسر النمرين	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٦٢	اسفل محضوه	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٦٣	اسفل النياحه	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٦٤	المنفس	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٦٥	الركيس	غرب	شرق	قيس	الزهور
٦٦	مفتح الصهلات	غرب	شرق	بنى حريص	آل مشيخ
٦٧	نيد صروعه	غرب	شرق	بنى حريص	آل مشيخ
٦٨	مفتح الحيدر	غرب	شرق	بنى حريص	آل مشيخ
٦٩	رأس الدقيقه	غرب	شرق	بنى حريص	آل مشيخ
٧٠	الجحيرة	غرب	شرق	بنى حريص	آل مشيخ
٧١	خطوة القفلة	غرب	شرق	بنى حريص	آل مشيخ
٧٢	جوار الوداف	غرب	شرق	بنى حريص	آل مشيخ

قد جرى تمييز الحدود الميمنة بعاله وترسيمها فيما بين المملكة العربية السعودية والمملكة الهاشمية المتوكلية في حدود القبائل الموضحة بينهم بعاله وهي من عمرة ١ الى عمرة ٧٢ من اول حدود القبائل التابعة للحكومة

Figure 3.7.17 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)



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ملحق  
(٢)  
معاهدة الطائف المنعقدة  
بين  
المملكة العربية السعودية  
والمملكة الحجازية

Figure 3.7.19 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)



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In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

**Border Reports between  
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen  
(1)**

On the twenty fifth day of the month of Sha'aban 1354H, the two undersigned committees delegated by His Majesty Imam Abdulaziz Āl Saud, the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and by His Majesty Imam Yahya Hamiduddin, the King of the Kingdom of Yemen, convened in Dhahran in order to determine the border line between the two Kingdoms referred to above, in compliance with the provision of Article (4) of the Treaty of Taif.

The starting point was from the outskirts of the two neighboring countries from the east to the last border on the west – where the Tihāmah Committee work ends.

Accordingly, it was agreed to put the first border marker on the peak of Jabal Ath Thar between Wa'ilah and Yām. As to the wasteland called (Qafrah Şilah) and its vicinities to the east, and because of the dispute over it between Wa'ilah and Yām and as there was no need to put markers thereon, we decided to leave it as it used to be. If a dispute between the two tribes arises over it in the future, it shall be settled in accordance with the principles of Shari'ah as provided for in the Treaty of Taif.

As to the area outside Şilah to the south, it shall belong to Wa'ilah and those related to them; the area outside Şilah to the north shall belong to Yām.

To prepare this Report for the said purpose, the two mentioned committees held several sessions, in the presence of the chiefs of the neighboring tribes. Upon the investigation and approval of the chiefs of the said tribes, without force or coercion, the border was designated and identified by the names of mountains, hills and valleys known by their names which were not subject to change or modification. These names will be mentioned in detail hereinafter. They were also recorded in minutes of different dates and ratified by the two said committees, of which each committee obtained a copy. The two committees delegated persons of integrity from both sides to put stone marks along the border line at each kilometer as a preliminary step towards building the posts at a time agreed upon by their Majesties the two Kings and the appointment of the persons to carry out such task and the related expenses.

Each tribe was given a statement approved by the two committees showing its border with the opposite tribe in order to eliminate any disagreement and prevent any confusion and ambiguity so that everyone becomes aware of the limits of his border, complies with it and does not trespass on his neighbor by grazing or otherwise. Any one who trespasses shall be subject to a deterring punishment by his government.

The border from east to west is as follows:

**Figure 3.7.21 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**

Beginning of the border line between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen after Qafrat Şilah		
1.	Jabal Ath Thār	Overlooking the plain extending to Ḥisū Khujaymī, provided that Yām people have access to the water existing in Ḥisū Khujaymī as usual.
2.	Jabal Al Aşyadah	
3.	Ra's Markūz 'Anabān	
4.	Dhirā' Ash Shāri'ah	
5.	Qā' 'Uthaythah	
6.	Ra's Al 'Ablā	
7.	Ra's Al Kawkab	
8.	Ra's Aş Şabr	
9.	Al Fakhdhayn:	
10.	Ra's 'Arabah (Gharbah)	
11.	R's 'Aqabat Nuhūqah	
12.	'Ashārah	
13.	Far' Madarr	
14.	Jabal Ath Thāfirah	
15.	Far' Ad Daghmā'	
16.	Maqbarat Āl Thi'lah	
17.	Maqāshi'	
18.	Rahwat Qarak	
19.	Jabal Murshshahāh	
20.	Qahar Farad	
21.	Shaḥāt (Shiḥāt) Al Ghumayrah	
22.	Şalfah	
23.	Jabal Al Iitim	
24.	Ra's Jabal Haḍāḍ	
Here ends the border between Wā'ilah and Yām.		
25.	Ra's al Ḥanakah	These two boundaries are between Wā'ilah and Wādi'ah.
26.	Jabal 'Ār	
27.	Ḥalaqat Al Ḥamād	These two boundaries are between Banī Ḥuthayfah and Banī Jamā'ah and between Wādi'ah.
28.	Al Jadaliyah	
29.	Jabal Wa'wa'	As for aş Şukhayrah, it shall remain as it used to be: what is a private property of Ibn Khayr shall belong to him. The rest shall remain with Ibn Khayr and his successors, as it used to be in the past, and he shall pay one seventh of the yield to Sälem Bin Damnān and his successors.
30.	Ash Shi'bah	Those two boundaries are between Sihār Ash Shām and Wādi'ah
31.	Qarāwiyah	
32.	Jabal Farīḍ ar Rākah	These boundaries are between Sihār Ash Shām and Wādi'ah
33.	Jabal 'Aqad	
34.	Jabal Farīḍ As'ar	
35.	Jabal Farīḍ Al Maḥdath	
36.	Jabal Şabaḥṭal	

Figure 3.7.22 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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37.	Al Muzayri'ah	What flows west is for Sihār Ash Shām and what flows east is for Wādī'ah
38.	Sha'ab Al Qawm	
39.	Ra's Jabal 'Alb	
40.	Ash Sha'thā'	What flows west is for Āl Naṣr of Sihār Ash Shām and what flows east and north is for Wādī'ah
41.	Madfa' Al Ḥanakah	(i. e. Ra's bin Ma'li) provided that Āl Maḥq, Sanḥān and Āl Naṣr continue to have right to their properties in the village of Ar Rahwah as they are now and have been.
42.	Aṣ Ṣabṣab	
43.	Talīd (Nayd) Al Ku'l	What is to the north is for Āl Maḥq of Wādī'ah and what is to the south is for Āl Naṣr of Sihār Ash Shām
44.	Jabal Āl Maḥq (Āl Miḥaqi)	What flows south is for Āl Naṣr and the other sides are for Āl Maḥq of Wādī'ah. Here ends the boundary between Sihār Ash Shām and Wādī'ah.
45.	Wādī Ar Rābiqah fī Al Masna	The southern side is for Āl Naṣr of Sihār Ash Shām and the other sides are for Sanḥān of Qalḥān.
46.	Khasham Al 'uqlah fī Al Kharq	It is the boundary between Āl Sa'id of Sanḥān and Banī Jamā'ah
Thereafter starts the dividing boundary between Āl Talīd and Banī Jamā'ah and it extends from the east to the south-west.		
47.	Talīd (Nayd) Qashbah	
48.	Wādī Majza' Al qard	
49.	Ra's Al Ḥamārah	
50.	Aqm Al Wākif	
51.	Ra's Ash Shā'inah (Ash Shāthinah)	What is to the north and west is for Āl Talīd and what is to the south and east is for Banī Jamā'ah
52.	Jabal Al Jaysh	
53.	Sayl Al Jawwah	
54.	Qahar Na'amah	
55.	Jabal Shafā Az Zubayr	
56.	Jabal Al 'Ajramah	
57.	Jabal 'Arb	
58.	Nayd Ash Shiryānī	
59.	Wādī Ar Ruṣayfi	
60.	Qam' Ma'rūb	As for the source of Wādī Dafā from Umm Zarad to Qum' Ma'arūb to Ar Raṣīfiis, it shall be commonly shared by Āl Talīd, Āl Habsi and Āl Thābitī. From Wādī Dafā to the north belongs to Āl Thābit and Āl Talīd; west and south-ward shall belong to Ahl Habs and Āl Yahyā of Banī Mālik, and east-ward shall belong to Āl Thābit. As for Jabal Thahrān, it has been agreed between Āl Thābit, Āl Talīd and Āl Al Qahr to be commonly shared as usual.
61.	Jabal Amqalḥah	What is to the west and south is for Āl Yahyā and Al Habs of Banī Mālik and what is to the east is for Āl Thābit of Banī Jamā'ah.
62.	Nayd Jalāl	
63.	Nayd As Saḥāya	What is to the west and south is for Āl Yahyā and what is to the east and north is for Āl Thābit
64.	Nayd Ar Ruṣṣah	
65.	Jabal Al 'Arīf	The part extending from north to south, from Nayd Ar Ruṣṣah to its shoulder which is the boundary between Āl Yahyā and Ahl Ḥanbah, of which the western side belongs to Āl Yahyā and the eastern side belongs

Figure 3.7.23 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)



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		to Ahl Ḥanbah. Each tribe was given a document showing its territory on the side of the other tribe.
66.	Jabal As Sullam	What is to the north of it belongs to Āl Yahyā of Banī Mālik, and what is to the south belongs to Ahl Jalhā of Banī Khawlī
67.	Ḥarf Amshaynah	
68.	Nayd Al Makḥḥaf	
69.	Nayd Al Fasīh	
70.	Qullat Umm Siḥāmi	
71.	Jabal Al Mijdār	
72.	Sāqiyat Umm Amughuṭayt	
73.	Wādī Umm Shurayfah	What is to the west and north belongs to Āl Zaydān and what is to the south and east belongs to Banī Khawlī. As for Āl Sabulah, their houses, properties and other possessions in Jabal Shadhān shall remain theirs as usual.
74.	Naqīl Aṭ Ṭaffah	
75.	Nayd Khurmah	What is to the west and north of it belongs to Āl Zaydān from Āl Yahyā of Banī Mālik and what is to the south and east belongs to Ahl Jalhā of Banī Khawlī.
76.	Ḥiyād Ar Radḥah	
77.	Bi'r Ash Sharh	
78.	Nayd Surmah	What is to the east and south belongs to Āl 'Ayyāsh and what is to the north and west belongs to Āl Sa'īd of Banī Mālik. Āl Sa'īd shall also continue to have access to Jar'ah water located in Nayd Al Farw (Al Gharw) as usual.
79.	Nayd Al Waqar	
80.	Nayd Al Farw (Al Gharw)	
81.	Nayd Ath Thaw'	
82.	Majnab Al Bahḥār	What is to the east and south belongs to Āl 'Ayyāsh and what is in the north and west belongs to Āl Khālīd and Āl 'Azzah of Banī Mālik.
83.	Al Ḥunkur	
84.	Wādī Al Khirsh	What is to the east and south belongs to Āl Al Iahab and Āl Umm Dūshah and what is to the north and west belongs to Āl Khālīd and Āl 'Azzah of Banī Mālik.
85.	Qarn Makḥilah	
86.	Nayd Shawkan	
87.	Ghabbas	What is south and veers towards the west belongs to Banī Umm Shaykh and what is north and west belongs to Āl Khālīd and Āl 'Azzah of Banī Mālik.
88.	Al Kharq	
89.	Tabrī Umm Thamīlah	
90.	Jawr Al Widāfah	
The boundaries between Banī Mālik and Banī Jamā'ah and Banī Manbah end at this point.		

This is the end of the border which the two undersigned committees have determined. All territories located on the northern side of the border line shall belong to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and all territories located on the southern side of the border line shall belong to the Kingdom of Yemen, with the exception of some border points - veering towards the east or the west according to the direction of the border line, as shown in details parallel to each border.

In evidence to the above, this resolution has been issued and signed by the two committees, and has been drawn up in two copies in the Noble Arabic language, each committee being in possession of one copy. Written in the city of Dhahran on the twenty first of the month of Shawwāl, the year one thousand three hundred fifty four ( 21 Shawwāl 1354H).

Figure 3.7.24 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

The two committees for designation of the border between  
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen

The committee representing  
the Kingdom of Yemen

Chairman: Muhammad Bin Hasan Al Wadi'i –  
Natherat Sāqain  
Member: Ismael Bin Hasan – Governor of Hamadan  
Member: Abdullah Al Ghubayri  
Member: Abdullah Bin Manna' – Chief of Sihar

The committee representing  
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Chairman: Abdulwahhab Muhammad Abu Melhah  
Member: Ibrahim Zein Zainulabdin  
Member: Abdulaziz Bin Abdurrahman Al Thumairi  
Member: D'laim Abu La'thah  
Member: Husein Bin Mustafa  
Member: Tal'at Wafa

Figure 3.7.25 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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(2)

Starting from the sea coast to the last border of Banī Marwān tribe next to Al Hurrath up to the border of Wa'lān.

No.	Name of Location	Starting Direction	Ending Direction	Names of Tribes belonging to the Government of Saudi Arabia	Names of Tribes belonging to Al Mutawakilita Government	Distance in meter
1	Raṣīf al Baḥar Tamāman Ra's al Mu'awwaj Shāmī Li Manfadh Radīf Qirād	West	East	Al 'Uraybī Banī Marwān	Zayla' Banī Marwān	1000
2	Ṭaraf ar Rasīb ash Shāmī Min ash Shūrā					1000
3	Fayaḥī al 'Alam Nimrah 2 Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000
4	Fayaḥī Al 'Alam Nimrah 2 Muttaṣil Bi ar Rasīb al Qibalī Masāfat 300 Mitr					300
5	Mayman Waṣīl Ilā Qā'idat ad Danqūr	North	South	Al 'Uraybī Banī Marwān	Zayla' Banī Marwān	1000
6	Muttaṣil Yamanan Naḥw ash Sharq Mawḍū' Ṭaraf Shajarat ar Radīf					1000
7	Mawḍū' Qabl Katīf al Hāfiyah Min al Jihah al Gharbiyah					1000
8	Mawḍū' Shāmī 'An Radīf al Qirād					1000
9	Mawḍū' Fawq Radīf al Qirād					1000
10	Mawḍū' Fī al Naqārīd (at Tafārīd) Naḥw Alf Mitr	West	East	Al 'Uraybī Banī Marwān	Zayla' Banī Marwān	1000
11	Mawḍū' Fī al Naqārīd (at Tafārīd)					1000
12	Mawḍū' Fī al Naqārīd (at Tafārīd) Muqābil Lil faṣlah					1000
13	Mawḍū' Fī Qizī Mumtad Min al Faṣlah Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000
14	Mawḍū' Fī Qizī Mumtad Min al Faṣlah Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000
15	Mawḍū' Fī Balāsīm Mumtad Min al Faṣlah Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000
16	Mawḍū' Fī Balāsīm Mumtad Min al Faṣlah Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000
17	Mawḍū' Fī Sha'ib um Dhiyābah Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000
18	Mawḍū' Fī Sha'ib um Dhiyābah Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000
19	Mawḍū' Fī Mash'ān (Mathān) Masāfat Alf Mitr					1000

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Figure 3.7.26 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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20	Mawqū' Fi Mash'ān (Mathān) Ḥadd al Quyuṣ	West	East	Al Quyuṣ Banī Marwān	Banī Zayla'	1000
21	Mawqū' Fi Mash'ān (Mathān) Ḥadd al Quyuṣ					1000
22	Mawqū' Fi Mash'ān (Mathān) Ḥadd al Quyuṣ					1000
23	Itmām Ash Shi'bān (Mathān) Wa Thumma Yanḥanī Qiblah Bayn Zayla' Wa al Quyuṣ Masāfat 640 Mitr					640
24	Itmām Shi'bān (Mathān) Arḍ al Quyuṣ	South	North	Al Quyuṣ Banī Marwān	Al Mighfalī Banī Marwān	1000
25	Itmām Shi'bān (Mathān) Arḍ Ibrāhīm 'Uthmān Minqārā Wa al Ḥamdi					1000
26	Wāqi' 'Alā Khazn Hāj Sharqī Muḥammad Ḥamad Madḥash Maghfālī					1000
27	Wāqi' Fī Ḥarb al Ḥashīrah (al Ḥathīrah) Ḥadd al Quyuṣ Wa al Maghfālī					1000
28	Wāqi' Fī Khabtat aṭ Ṭinah Qiblī al Ḥashīrah (al Ḥathīrah)					1000
29	Wāqi' Fī Sha'ib al Khirb					1000
30	Wāqi' Fī Khabtat al Khirb					1000
31	Wāqi' Fī zibārat as Sirr					1000
32	Wāqi' Fī Sidādat Khabtat as Sirr					1000
33	Wāqi' Fī Shu'bat Zummār as Sarḥah					1000
34	Wāqi' Fimā Bayn Umm al Qam' Wa Mafjar az Zummār Bikhaṭṭ Mustaqīm Naḥw ash Sharq	West	East	Banī Ḥummad	Al Maghfālī and Al Ḥaddādī	1000
35	Wāqi' Fimā Bayn Umm al Qam' Wa al qūbah Bikhaṭṭ Mustaqīm Naḥw ash Sharq					1000
36	Wāqi' Fimā Bayn 'Adāyat al Marāwīd Waḥudūd al Qawbah Bikhaṭṭ Mustaqīm Naḥw ash Sharq					1000
37	Wāqi' Fimā Bayn Katf al Marāwīd Wa khuznat 'Asala					1000
38	Wāqi' Fimā Bayn Mafjar al Ḥawsīyah					1000

Figure 3.7.27 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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39	Wāqī' Fimā Bayn 'Adāyat Al Khawbah al Yumnā Nahw al Qiblahh					1000
40	Wāqī' Fimā Bayn Yamānī Sadād Ad Da'āsiyah (Ad Daghāsiyah)	West	East	Banī Ḥammad	Al Maghfālī and Al Ḥaddādī	1000
41	Wāqī' Fimā Bayn Kharj al Ḥawsīyah					1000
42	Wāqī' Fimā Bayn Sirḥat al Maghrabī Bayn al Jidārah Wa Banī Mazyad Wa al khaṭṭ Kamā Huwā					1000
43	Wāqī' Fimā Bayn Ṭarīq Jalbān ilā Ḥaraḍ al Masāfah 160 Mitr					1000
44	Wāqī' Fī as Sirḥah al latī 'Alā Ṭarīq Jalbān ilā Ḥaraḍ	West	East	Ashraf Wa'lān and al-Quyūs	Al Ashram of Banī Marwān	1000
45	Wāqī' Fī Maqaṣṣ ash Shu'ūb					1000
46	Wāqī' Fī Maqaṣṣ ash Shu'ūb					1000
47	Wāqī' Fī al Maḥfūr Ṭarīq Wa'lān ilā Ḥaraḍ					1000
48	Wāqī' Fī Abū Ṣūl Yamanān Min Bādīrah					1000
49	Mī'māl Bū Mashnī	West	East	Al Quyūs and Ahl Wa'lān	Al Ashram of Banī Marwān	1000
50	Khalfat al-Mamshā					1000
51	Dandīfah aṣ-Ṣaghīrah					1000
52	Shāmī ad Dandīfah al-Kabīrah					1000
54	Qā'at Jabal ad-Dawḥah					1000
55	Shāmī adh Dhirā' Bi A'lā Ta'shur Wa minhu Masāfah Linnimrah al ūlā Binahw 5000 Mitr	South	North	Al Quyūs and Ahl Wa'lān	Hidhāb Al Jibāl	5000
56	Marbaḥ al Ma'āyin Nahw ash Sharq Masāfat 360 Mitr Aasfal al Jabal Fawq al Wādī	West	East	Ḥassan Faqīh	Hidhāb Jibāl Al Mīr	360
57	Mawqū' Fī Khalfat al Majrūb	South	North	Ḥassan Faqīh	Hidhāb Jibāl Al Mīr	1000
58	Mawqū' Fī Dil'at al Ḥaqāfir					1000
59	Rūs al-Ḥaqāfir and Umm al-Jābir					1000
60	Sharqī al Maṭīnah Fī Aasfal al Jabal Ila Manaḍd, ( Manfas) Ḥālīyah Bilād 'Alī Madāl					1000
61	'Ashshat as Sayyid					1000

Figure 3.7.28 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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62	Jabal Azziyadi (Azzibādi)	South	North	al Hakāmiyā	Hidhāb Jibāl	1000
63	Mawqū'ah Ra's al Ta'as Min al Jihah ash Sharqiyah					1000
64	Mihjin Sharq Qaryat Banī al Jarrāh wa Mazāri'him	South	North	al Hakāmiyā	Hidhāb Jibāl	1000
65	Al 'Ashshah Fimā Bayn Wādī Dhibāb Wa wādī al Qamāri					1000
66	Asfal 'Ashshat as Sirayr Shām					1000
67	Dimnat as Sayyid					1000
68	Al Mulūs Shamāl al Mighyālah					1000

Whereas the list detailed in these tables, which are composed of three pages from No. (1) to No. (68), is a representation of the markers placed on the border between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Mutawakelite Kingdom, from the sea coast to al Mighyālah, which is the last border of Banī Marwān, and whereas these markers for the mentioned border are placed by mutual agreement between the two Governments' delegated committees and whose names are stated in this report, after thorough inspection by experienced tribal chiefs subjects of the two Governments; accordingly, all that is north and west of the mentioned border markers belongs to the Saudi Arabian Government. All that is south and east of the mentioned border markers belongs to the Mutawakelite Government.

These documents have been executed in two copies, one copy for each Government. Both copies have been cross-examined, one against the other, and found to be accurate. Hence, this decision has been adopted and signed.

Ramadhan, 1354AH

**The Mutawakelite Committee**

Member: Muhammad bin Qāsim Najmuddīn

Member: Abdulmuttalib

Chairman: Abdullah bin 'Othmān

**The Saudi Arabian Committee**

Member: Muhammad Al Suleiman bin Turki

Member: Abdullah Ghādhi

Chairman: Abdullah Al Muhammad Bin Ageel

**Figure 3.7.29 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**

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(3)

List of the markers placed on the border between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Mutawakelite Government, the first of which is from Al Hurrath territories

No	Name of Location	Starting Direction	Ending Direction	Distance	Names of Tribes of the Arabian Government	Names of Tribes of the Mutawakelite Government	Remarks
1	Asfal Mīr (Minbar) 'Alyā Aṭrāf al Wādī	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	From which 200m, then it veers from south to north, to Wādī Mahdaj
2	Um Libdah	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
3	Juḥr al 'Abd	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
4	Mafjar Jādī' Umm Mimriḥā'	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
5	Al Maḡlāh	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
6	Dāḥir Maḡdaḡ Ma'lā	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
7	Khalfat Maḡram Ṣabāyā	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
8	Mafjar Amhadajj	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
9	Charb Umm Dahshaylah	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
10	Khalfat Umm Sibāqah	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
11	Mahd Dāḥir Amsawadah	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
12	Bim 'aṭab	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
13	Asfal Jabal Umm 'Aṭb Sharq	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
14	Ra's Miḡawwafah	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
15	Ra's Jabal Umm 'aṭb	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
16	Bāṭin al Kāmiḡ Min al Charb as Sūdah	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
17	Ra's al Kāmiḡ Amarawī	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
18	Niṣf Qāyim Bashīr	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Banī Marwān	
19	Sharq Nabirat (Ḍabirat) Amarawī	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Al Hurrath Al 'Aqarib	
20	Mawḡū' Balḡashīrū	South	North	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Al Hurrath Al 'Aqarib	
21	Abū al Ḥijlī	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Al Hurrath Al 'Aqarib	
22	Mad Mitwi' Qāyim Balḡashīrū	East	West	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Al Hurrath Al 'Aqarib	It includes the land of Mashūl
23	Al Mawqīd	West	East	1000	Al Hurrath al Hazāhīz	Al Hurrath Al 'Aqarib	

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Figure 3.7.30 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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24	Mishbāh Umm Ranaff	South	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
25	Jāḍi' Amḥisin	North	West	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	Opposite to Yahyā Masfūh Land
26	Jāḍi' Amḥisin al A'lā	West	East	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
27	Rūs Bū Maḍḍ	East	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
28	Ghārib Khaṭwat Nasrah	West	East	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
29	Ghārib Bū Maḍḍi Amma'raḍāh	West	East	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
30	Qāyim Umm al Baṣal	West	East	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
31	'Ashshat Sir Mujadda'ah	West	East	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
32	Sharq 'Ishāsh Khufaynah	West	East	300	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
33	Ghārib Ḥaram	North	South	700	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	Beginning of Al Hayjah
34	Bā Amdaghwi	West	East	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
35	Sirr Am Mada'āni (Al Wad'ani)	West	East	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
36	'Ashshat al Mawqūd Shamāl al Mishāf	South	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	
37	'Ashshat al Kharāyij Sharq Mujadda'ah	South	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Ḥurrath Al 'Aqarib	End of Al Hayjah
38	Arḍ al Fayāḥ	South	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	The Line veers to the west to the road going west of the Land of Zumar and then returns to the north.
39	Khashm Malaj	South	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath al Hazāhiz	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	

Figure 3.7.31 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)



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40	Faṣīlah Bayn Dihmī Wa Ḥasan	South	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath AlḤazāhiz	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	
41	Bi Jabal Miḥwal	South	North	1000	Al Ḥurrath AlḤazāhiz	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	
42	Ra's Wādī Maḍḍ	South	North	1000	Al Ki'ūb	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	
43	Ghārib Madba'	South	North	400	Al Ki'ūb	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	
44	Ghārib amm Sawāyid (amm Sawādid)	South	North	1000	Al Ki'ūb	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	
45	Mafjar al Waḥshī (al Waḥsh)	South	North	1000	Al Ki'ūb	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	
46	Mahadd al 'Uqum	South	North	1000	Al Ki'ūb	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	
47	Qullat al Khumaysī	South	North	1000	Al Ki'ūb	Al Malāhiz al 'Aqarib	Bending westward to include some of Imam's farms then extends north
48	Ruzmat al 'Ujaybī	South	North	1000	Al Ki'ūb	Banī Sayyāh & Banī Dahīf	
49	Mad/hūs Ra's al Miḥjah	South	North	1000	Banī Al Ḥurrath Al Ki'ūb	Banī Sayyāh & Banī Dahīf	
50	Ra's al Marwah	South	North	1000	Banī Al Ḥurrath Al Ki'ūb	Banī Sayyāh & Banī Dahīf	
51	Lajj Umm Wa'r Sharq Jabal Tuwayliq	South	North	1000	Banī Al Ḥurrath Al Ki'ūb	Banī 'Ajībī	
52	Raffat Umm Ḥusaybī Mafjar Sharrānah	South	North	700	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
53	Al Makās Qiblat Wādī Sharrānah	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
54	Sharq Jabal al Mashādīf (al Mashāwīf)	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
55	Sharq Shi'b al Luwayḥ	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
56	Gharb al Ḥaskūl	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
57	Ra's al Ḥaskūl	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
58	Ra's al Ḥaṣr al Yamānī	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
59	Ra's al Wādī al Waqī' Bayn al Malḥamatayn	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
60	Muwāḍlāmāh (Muwāḥlāmāh)	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
61	Ma'qar aṣ Ṣayd	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
62	Bayn al Mishāfayn	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
63	Al Baḥṣah ad Durayḍiyah (ad Durayḍibiyah)	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	
64	Asfal Jabal as Sūdāh min Sharq	South	North	1000	Banī Sharāhīl	Banī 'Ajībī	

Figure 3.7.32 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

As the markers listed in these tables from No. (1) to No. (64), according to the data, and which begin from al Mighyālah to as Sūdah, represent the dividing border between Al Hurrath who are the subjects of His Majesty King Abdulaziz bin Saud, and Al Hurrath, Banī Dihlā and Banī Şayyāh who are the subjects of His Majesty Imam Yahya, and all that is west and north of the borderline belongs to the Government of His Majesty King Abdulaziz and what is east and south belongs to the Government of Imam Yahya. As for the villages viewed to be facing one another and their farms interlaced and divided by the border line— namely Al Maqbaş and Al Malāhiz in the first place and then between Mabrūkah, Al Majham and Mujadda'ah in the second place— these farms shall belong to their respective villages and the *zakats* of each shall be paid to the government to which each village belongs. This applies to the farm of Ibn Ghāshi in the village of Al Ma'in which has been included as part of the territories of 'Abīd Jīnādah village which belongs to King Abdulaziz; so, the *zakāt* of such lands shall follow the *zakats* of Al Ma'in. Since these markers were posted according to the judgment of the two committees as well as people of integrity and thus became the dividing border between the two Kingdoms, under the supervision of all concerned parties and after taking all care to become fully aware of the border and after all have become aware of the answer of the tribes' chiefs of the two Governments. Accordingly, this resolution was taken and dependence is on God.

27 Shawwāl 1354H.

**The Yemeni Mutawakelit Committee**

Member: Muhammad Dayfullah bin Gathayah

Member: Muhammad bin Qāsim Najmuddīn

Chairman: Abdullah bin 'Othmān

**The Saudi Arabian Committee**

Member: Muhammad Al Suleiman bin Turki

Member: Abdullah Ghādhi

Chairman: Abdullah bin 'Ageel

**Figure 3.7.33 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**

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(4)

No	Name of Location	Starting Direction	Ending Direction	Distance	Names of Tribes of the Saudi Arabian Government	Names of Tribes of the Yemeni Mutawakelite Government
1	Mals as Sūdah	South	North	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
2	Kirs Umm Zuraybah	South	North	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
3	Mihadd Gharnūqah Khayṭ al Mā'	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
4	Bajr al Wādī Khayṭ al Mā' Sharq Gharnūqah	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
5	Maḍjar (Maḍjar) al Qadarayn	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
6	Hiyād al Mazār	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
7	Mihadd Ma'laq Wa mahd al Hāyṭ	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
8	Qā'at 'Iṣāmat Khayṭ al Mā'	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
9	Maḥmar Khayṭ al Mā'	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Waqīsh
10	Jaḥā Fi Khayṭ al Mā'	West	East	1000	Al 'Abādil	Jihāt Shadhā
11	Al Shirah	South	North	1000	Al-Ka'abi	Al Waqrī
12	Khayṭ al Mā' Wādī Ṣirāṭ	South	North	1000	Al-Ka'abi	'Aṭīfī
13	Khayṭ al Mā' Rafīs Makhsar	South	North	1000	Al-Ka'abi	'Aṭīfī
14	Qaṭ' Khayṭ al Mā' Jabal ash Shawkān Ṭaraf Jamīlah	South	North	1000	Al-Ka'abi	'Aṭīfī
15	Wasṭ Zirā (Dhirā') ash Sharqiyāt Wādī Ma'ṭal	West	East	1000	Al-Ka'abi	Al Muḥammad
16	Al Mikyāl	South	North	1000	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil
17	Mi'tiq al Wāsīt	South	North	1000	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil
18	Mi'tiq as Sirayū 'Alā Khaṭ al Mā'	South	North	1000	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil
19	Al Qudhnah	South	North	1000	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil
20	Al Qullah	South	North	1000	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil	Banī Muḥammad – Al 'Abādil
21	As Sadd	South	North	1000	Āl Atīf Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif
22	Wādī al Majāyīḥ	South	North	1000	Āl Atīf Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif

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Figure 3.7.34 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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23	Qullat Thawbān 'Alā Qullat al Bawlah	South	North	1000	Āl Atif Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif
24	Qullat al 'Amriyāt	South	North	1000	Āl Atif Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif
25	Qullat al Massah (Al Maththah)	South	North	1000	Āl Atif Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif
26	As Siqāmi	South	North	1000	Āl Atif Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif
27	Ma'taq ar Radīm	South	North	1000	Āl Atif Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif
28	Nayd al Miḥarraḡ	South	North	1000	Āl Atif Ahmad Bin Shawqah	Ālat 'Itaif
29	Chār Jī'ār	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
30	Al Qirīḥā as Sufiā	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
31	Lower Ras Al-Jaw	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
32	'Ārim Shaṭṭ as Sawaḍī	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
33	Ḥasr al Mash'ar Khayṭ al Mā'	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
34	Ḥasr al Majāzi'	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
35	Al Maṣāwir	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
36	Sa'y al Qābisīyah	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
37	Ḥisr al Miṭḥarriyāt	W-E-N	W-E-N	1000	Al Lugbī	Ālat 'Itaif
38	Khuṭwat Qulqul	West	East	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
39	Khuṭwat ad Duḥaylah	West	East	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
40	Khuṭwat al Jārid	West	East	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
41	Khuṭwat Nabbah	West	East	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
42	Qal'at aṣ Ṣafir	West	East	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
43	Ra's Zirā (Dhirā') Fayfā	West	East	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
44	Ra's 'Amq	West	East	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
45	Ra's Shi'b Marā'ī	South	North	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
46	Ra's Naqīl Kharbān	South	North	1000	Qays	Ālat 'Itaif
47	Asfal Naqīl Kharbān	South	North	1000	Qays	Az Zuhūr
48	Maftaḡ as Sutrayn	South	North	1000	Qays	Az Zuhūr

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49	Zāhir al Qatād	West	East	1000	Qays	Az Zuhūr
50	Zāhir al Jamal	West	East	1000	Qays	Az Zuhūr
51	Asfal ath Thū'ah	West	East	1000	Qays	Az Zuhūr
52	Wādī al Ḥalālah	West	East	1000	Qays	Az Zuhūr
53	Ma'zab Hamadān	West	East	1000	Qays	Qays
54	Khuḡwat Fālīḡ	West	East	1000	Qays	Qays
55	Ṭarīq al Jimāl	West	East	1000	Qays	Qays
56	Al Maṣīdah	West	East	1000	Qays	Qays
57	Al Mahmal	West	East	1000	Qays	Qays
58	Qullat ash Shay'ah	West	East	1000	Qays	Ghamr
59	Qullat al Bāqir	West	East	1000	Qays	Ghamr
60	Habāil az Ḥahrah	West	East	1000	Qays	Ghamr
61	Ḥasr al Ḥamrayn	West	East	1000	Qays	Āl Mishyakh
62	Asfal Maḡḡawah	West	East	1000	Qays	Āl Mishyakh
63	Asfal an Niyā'ah	West	East	1000	Qays	Āl Mishyakh
64	Al Manfas	West	East	1000	Qays	Āl Mishyakh
65	Ar Rakīs	West	East	1000	Qays	Āl Mishyakh
66	Maftaḡ aṣ Ṣahlāt	West	East	1000	Banī Ḥarīs	Āl Mishyakh
67	Nayd Ṣarū'ah	West	East	1000	Banī Ḥarīs	Āl Mishyakh
68	Maftaḡ al Ḥaydar	West	East	1000	Banī Ḥarīs	Āl Mishyakh
69	Ra's ad Diqayyiqah	West	East	1000	Banī Ḥarīs	Āl Mishyakh
70	Al Jihayrah	West	East	1000	Banī Ḥarīs	Āl Mishyakh
71	Khaḡwat al Quflah	West	East	1000	Banī Ḥarīs	Āl Mishyakh
72	Jiwār al Widāf	West	East	1000	Banī Ḥarīs	Āl Mishyakh

The above described boundaries have been defined and demarcated between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni Mutawakelite Kingdom among the tribes' boundaries described above from No. (1) to No. (72), commencing from the beginning Al 'Abādīl tribe of the Arabian Government, and Al Waqīsh tribe of the Mutawakelite Government, extending towards Al 'Abādīl and their adjacent tribes of Qays and Banī Ḥarīs along

**Figure 3.7.36 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**

with their adjacent tribes of Al Mushaykh, Al Zuhuri and Āl 'Itaif. This was done by the tribal chiefs of the two Governments and people trusted by all parties, under the supervision of the border committees. What is to the west and north belongs to Saudi Arabian Government and what is to the south and east belongs to the Mutawakelite government. As for Ālat 'Itaif of the Mutawakelite Government and Ālat 'Itaif of Ahmad bin Shawqah who are subjects of the Arabian government, and since their lands overlap, the demarcation of the boundaries led to some of the subjects of the Arabian Government to fall within the territories of Mutawakelite Government while they are subjects of the Arabian government. They are: Ahmad bin Shawqah, Yahya bin Shawqah, Yahya bin Ahmad bin Shawqah, Salim Shaiy'a, Jabir Jobran, Jobran Shaiy'a, and also some of the subjects of Mutawakelite Government fell within the territories of the Arabian Kingdom while they are subjects of the Mutawakelite government. They are: Asa'd bin Hasan, Jobran As'ad and Sulaiman As'ad. All of them, along with their farms and *zakats*, shall belong to their respective government. Besides, the lands of Āl Muhammad tribe are also overlapping and the border is defined between them, and accordingly all that is within the territories of the Arabian Kingdom belongs to them and all that is within the territories of Mutawakelite Kingdom is theirs. Each one of them, along with his farms and the *zakats*, shall belong to his government, except for Hasan bin Ahmad who is within the territories of the Arabian Kingdom but belongs to the Mutawakelite government, along with his farms.

After careful consideration and cross-examination, this resolution was adopted with the agreement of the committees, and may God guide the steps of all.

On 21 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1354H.

The Yemeni Mutawakelit Committee

Member: Muhammad Dayfullah bin Gathayah

Member: Muhammad bin Qāsim Najmuddīn

Chairman: Abdullah bin 'Othmān

The Saudi Arabian Committee

Member: Muhammad Al Sulaiman bin Turki

Member: Abdullah Ghādhī

Chairman: Abdullah bin 'Ageel

Upon perusal and careful consideration of the abovementioned Reports, we ratified, accepted and approved them, together and separately with respect to each article and paragraph of them. Likewise, we ratify, conclude, undertake and give a royal truthful promise that we will carry out with the help of God all that is mentioned in them with complete honesty and truthfulness, and will not permit – with God's will – any breach of them in any way, as long as we are capable of doing so. For additional confirmation of the correctness of all that

Figure 3.7.37 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)

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is mentioned therein, we ordered our stamp to be put on this document and signed it by our hand, and God is the best of witness

On Friday the 3<sup>rd</sup> of Ramadhan of the year one thousand three hundred fifty six of Hijra (1356H.).

The dependent on God, Amirulmu'mineen Yahya, the son of Amirulmu'mineen Muhammad Yahya, may the grace of God be upon them. Amen.

**Figure 3.7.38 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**

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In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Appendix  
(2)  
to the Treaty of Taif  
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
and the Kingdom of Yemen

As it is established that a mistake was committed by the two committees in designating the top of 'Aqabat Nahūqah as the Eleventh Landmark, and since 'Aqabat Nahūqah belongs to the Mutawakelite Kingdom of Yemen in accordance with the provision of Article (4) of the Treaty of Taif. Hence, the landmark separating the two Kingdoms shall be placed below 'Aqabat Nahūqah. In order to correct the mistake in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, we have drafted this (Appendix) on Friday the second of the holy month of Ramadhan in the year one thousand three hundred fifty six.

Amirulmu'mineen Yahya the son of Amirulmu'mineen Muhammad Yahya, may the grace of God be upon them. Amen.

345

**Figure 3.7.39 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**



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*Volume 2389, II-1297*

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In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Arbitration Covenant

between

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom of Yemen

Whereas Their Majesties King Abdulaziz, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and King Yahya, King of Yemen, have agreed, in accordance with Article Eight of the treaty of peace, friendship and good understanding, known as the "Treaty of Taif", signed on the 6<sup>th</sup> of Safar 1353H, to refer to arbitration any dispute or disagreement which may arise out of the relations between them, their governments and countries, when all amicable negotiations fail to settle it, the Two Honorable Contracting Parties undertake to resort to arbitration in the manner shown in the following articles:-

**Article 1:**

Each of the Two Honorable Contracting Parties shall undertake to accept referring the issue subject of dispute to arbitration within one month from the date of receipt of the request for arbitration from the other party.

**Article 2:**

Arbitration shall be undertaken by a panel composed of an equal number of arbitrators, half of whom shall be selected by each of the Two Parties, and an umpire to be selected by mutual agreement between the Two Honorable Contracting Parties. If they do not agree in this respect, each of them shall nominate a person, and if said person is accepted by the other party, he shall become the umpire. If an agreement cannot be reached in this regard, the umpire shall be decided by ballot, on the understanding that the ballot shall only be drawn on persons acceptable to both parties. The person chosen by ballot shall become the head of the arbitration panel, and shall become the umpire in the case. If, however, no agreement can be reached on the persons acceptable to both parties, negotiations shall continue thereafter until an agreement is reached in this regard.

**Article 3:**

The selection of the arbitration panel and its head shall be completed within one month from the end of the month fixed for the reply of the party whose acceptance of arbitration was requested by the other party. The arbitration panel shall convene at a venue to be agreed upon within a period not exceeding one month after the expiry of the two months provided for at the beginning of this Article. The arbitration panel shall render its award within a period which may not, in any case, exceed one month from the expiry of the period fixed for

**Figure 3.7.40 Committees' Reports (annexed to the Taif Treaty)**

## **3.8. Renewal of the Taif Treaty in 1953**

### **3.8.1. Communiqué announcing the renewal**

M. B. Jacomb, British Minister (Ta'izz) to Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 25 March 1953 (FO 371/104532, TNA, London).




Figure 3.8.1.1 Communiqué announcing the renewal




Figure 3.8.1.2 Communiqué announcing the renewal

### 3.8.2. Communiqué published in Yemen

In Sana'a newspaper, the only Yemeni official newspaper at the time, 31 March 1953.

المسجلات والبرقيات  
شؤون الجريدة  
جريدة تصدر مرتين في الشهر  
الاشتراك السنوي في الداخل ريالان  
وربع في الخارج: جنبه لتقريب



الإمام محمد بن عبد الوهاب  
والشيخ محمد بن عبد الوهاب

رئيس التحرير والمدير المسؤول  
السيد عبد الكريم بن ابراهيم الامير  
صنعاء  
١٥ شهر رجب سنة ١٣٧٢  
الموافق ٣١ مارس ١٩٥٣

١٥ شهر رجب سنة ١٣٧٢  
الموافق ٣١ مارس ١٩٥٣

#### شقي طريق للسيارات

من وادي السعول الى قاع الحقل  
يجري الآن العمل لتوسيع طريق  
الحقل طريق قبيارات تمتد من  
اسفل وادي السعول تابع لواء  
ابن ابي قحافة الحقل بالقرب من  
مدينة بريم وتمت هذه بقية  
عقبات النزول والجله وجبل حبله  
الفاوق، ثم تم في العواض حتى  
تخرج الى قاع الحقل المذكور انقل  
وبعد ان أصبح طريق السيارات من  
عدين الى الحجاز قريبة وسهية وتم  
بتم وسنما وكانت من قبل تم  
بتم والمزيد تمكنت معييه  
وخطره وتبدأ العمل لتوسيع  
بوجب الامر من مولانا صاحب  
الجلالة ايداه الله وقد خرف العمل  
على الانتهاء وجمعا قريب آهه  
قوافل السيارات من صنعاء الى نيز  
في سرعة وبسر وسهولة وبسلاخ  
تزداد حركة التواصلا وينتفع

#### محادثات رئيس الوزراء (في المانيا)

في ٦ رجب الجاري اذيع من  
المانيا ان حضرة صاحب السمو  
الملك الامير سيف الاسلام الحسن  
رئيس الوزراء الموجود الآن في  
المانيا الغربية اجتمع في (بون)  
بالدكتور شاختن الجير  
الاقتصادي الالماني المعتبر  
وتحدث معه حول بعض المسائل  
الاقتصادية

#### افتتاح خمس مدارس في ملحان

صدر الامر لشريف اعزه الله  
بفتح خمس مدارس ابتدائية في  
أحياء ملحان مدرسة في عمل المغرب  
عزت بن سيف ومدرسة في عمل  
باحث ومدرسة في بني عمل

#### طلب الدورتين الرابعة والخامسة

من جيش التقامي  
صدر الامر لشريف الملك اعزه الله الى حضرة  
صاحب السمو الملكي الامير سيف الاسلام البدر امير  
الجيش العام حذاه الله بطلب الدورتين الرابعة والخامسة  
من الجيش التقامي لاكمال التدريب العسكري حسب  
التعليمات المقررة وذلك بعد ان قضا امدد الاجازة اللازمة  
التي كانت عقب اكلهم التدريب الاول وقد اعتم صاحب  
السمو مولانا سيف الاسلام البدر بهذا الشأن واستمر  
وامره السياسي الى الجهات المختصة بسمرة الاجراءات اللازمة  
ولم تحض ايام قليلة حتى اجتمعت كتابت الادارة الى  
الكتبات العسكرية من مختلف الجهات واخذت في اعمال  
التدريب العسكري همة ونشاط للاشتراك من كتابت  
الدورتين السابقتين الثانية والثالثة الموجودتين من قبل  
وبعد ان يكمل التدريب المقرر تحضر كتابت الدورات  
تالية وهكذا دور اليك وبهذا النظام المتبع يكون الشعب  
كله من اللب مدنا على ما

#### تجديد معاهدة الطائف بين المملكتين اليمنية والسعودية

#### عشرين سنة اخرى

يسرنا ان نفتح هذا العدد بنشر البلاغ الرسمي الذي ورد اليها  
من القام الشريف الامامي اعزاه الله بشأن الاتفاق الذي تم اخيراً  
بين جلالة مولانا امير المؤمنين البدر ملك المملكة التركية  
اليمانية المعظم والملك عبد العزيز آل سعود ملك المملكة العربية  
السعودية على تجديد معاهدة الطائف امدان اتمت في مدها عشرين سنة  
اخرى حسب البرقيات المتبادلة التي ورد نصها من القام الشريف ال  
اهازة جريدة (الامانة) وفيما يلي نص البلاغ  
بالنظر لما بين المملكة العربية السعودية والحكومة التركية  
اليمانية من روابط الصداقة المنيعة والثقة المتبادلة والاعتناء الى ان  
صاهدة الطائف المقررة بتاريخ ربيع اول سنة ٥٣٣ انتهى مفعولها  
بمه امد فقير فقد اتفق الملكان ملك المملكة العربية السعودية  
الملك عبد العزيز بن عبد الرحمن بن فيصل آل سعود والملك احم  
بحمي حميد الدين ملك المملكة التركية اليمانية على تجديد  
المصاهدة المذكورة عشرين سنة اخرى ابتداء من اتمام صدة  
المصاهدة للصلح لاجلها وان الشمين بمتقيلان هذا الحادث من تأيد  
المودة بين البلدين بكل مرور وهناه بتاريخ ١٥ رجب سنة ١٣٧٢

Figure 3.8.2.1 Communiqué published in Yemen

### 3.8.3. Communiqué of the renewal, published in Saudi Arabia

In *Al-Billād as Su'udiyah*, on 19 March 1953 and *Umm-al-Qura* on 20 March 1953 (G. C. Pelham, British, British Ambassador, Jeddah to Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1 April 1953) (FO 371/104532, TNA, London).




Figure B.8.3.1 Communiqué published in Yemen




Figure B.8.3.2 Communiqué published in Yemen






Figure 3.8.3.3 Communiqué published in Yemen

### **3.9. Al-Hajri Communiqué, Riyadh (17 March 1973)**

#### **3.9.1. The Arabic text of the Communiqué**

(Al-Jahāni, 1994: pp. 369-371).




Figure 3.9.1.1 The Arabic text of the Communiqué




Figure 3.9.1.2 The Arabic text of the Communiqué




Figure 3.9.1.3 The Arabic text of the Communiqué

### **3.9.2. The BBC Report**

(Schofield, 1992: Vol.20.p. 719).




Figure 3.9.2.1 The BBC Report




Figure 3.9.2.2 The BBC Report



#### 4.1. The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty, known as the ‘Sana’a Treaty’, was signed in Sana’a on 10 February 1934. The ratification instruments were exchanged in Sana’a on 4 September 1934. The Arabic text is available at *The National Archive*, London (FO 94 1261). The English text is at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London (Treaty Series No. 34, 1934).






Figure 4.1.2 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)




Figure 4.1.3 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)




Figure 4.1.4 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

YEMEN 493



Treaty Series No. 34 (1934)

# Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Co-operation

between

His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and of India  
and the King of the Yemen

(With Exchange of Notes)

San'a, February 11, 1934

[Ratifications exchanged at San'a, September 4, 1934]

*Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs  
to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE  
To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses  
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1934

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Cmd. 4752

Figure 4.1.5 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL CO-OPERATION  
BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY IN RESPECT OF THE UNITED  
KINGDOM AND OF INDIA AND THE KING OF THE  
YEMEN (WITH EXCHANGE OF NOTES).

*San'a, February 11, 1934.*

[*Ratifications exchanged at San'a, September 4, 1934.*]

PREAMBLE.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, on the other part, being desirous of entering into a treaty on a basis of friendship and co-operation for their mutual benefit, have resolved to conclude this treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries :

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India :

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland :

Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Rawdon Reilly, C.I.E., O.B.E. ;

For India :

Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Rawdon Reilly, C.I.E., O.B.E. ;

His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam :

The Qadhi Muhammad Ragheb-bin-Rafiq ;

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good order and due form, have agreed as follows :—

ARTICLE 1.

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, acknowledges the complete and absolute independence of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam, and his kingdom in all affairs of whatsoever kind.

ARTICLE 2.

There shall always be peace and friendship between the high contracting parties, who undertake to maintain good relations with each other in every respect.

Figure 4.1.6 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

4

## ARTICLE 3.

The settlement of the question of the southern frontier of the Yemen is deferred pending the conclusion, in whatever way may be agreed upon by both high contracting parties in a spirit of friendship and complete concord, free from any dispute or difference, of the negotiations which shall take place between them before the expiry of the period of the present treaty.

Pending the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in the preceding paragraph, the high contracting parties agree to maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this treaty, and both high contracting parties undertake that they will prevent, by all means at their disposal, any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier, and any interference by their subjects, or from their side of that frontier, with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier.

## ARTICLE 4.

After the coming into force of the present treaty, the high contracting parties shall, by mutual agreement and concord, enter into such agreements as shall be necessary for the regulation of commercial and economic affairs, based on the principles of general international practice.

## ARTICLE 5.

(1) The subjects of each of the high contracting parties who wish to trade in the territories of the other shall be amenable to the local laws and decrees, and shall receive equal treatment to that enjoyed by the subjects of the most favoured Power.

Figure 4.1.7 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)



## 6

(2) Similarly, the vessels of each of the high contracting parties and their cargoes shall receive, in the ports of the territories of the other, treatment equal to that accorded to the vessels and their cargoes of the most favoured Power, and the passengers in such vessels shall be treated in the ports of the territories of the other party in the same manner as those in the vessels of the most favoured Power therein.

(3) For the purposes of this article in relation to His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India :—

- (a) The word “territories” shall be deemed to mean the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, India and all His Majesty’s Colonies, protectorates and all mandated territories in respect of which the mandate is exercised by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.
- (b) The word “subjects” shall be deemed to mean all subjects of His Majesty wherever domiciled, all the inhabitants of countries under His Majesty’s protection, and, similarly, all companies incorporated in any of His Majesty’s territories shall be deemed to be subjects of His Majesty.
- (c) The word “vessels” shall be deemed to mean all merchant vessels registered in any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

## ARTICLE 6.

This treaty shall be the basis of all subsequent agreements that may be concluded between the high contracting parties now and in the future for the purposes of friendship and amity. The high

Figure 4.1.8 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

8

contracting parties undertake not to assist nor to connive at any action directed against the friendship and concord now sincerely existing between them.

## ARTICLE 7.

The present treaty shall be ratified as soon as possible after signature, and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at San'a. It shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications, and shall thereafter remain in force for a period of forty years.

And in witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have thereto affixed their seals.

This treaty is done in two copies, in the English and Arabic languages, and, should doubt arise as to the interpretation of any of these articles, both high contracting parties shall rely on the Arabic text. Done at San'a in the Yemen, this eleventh day of February, 1934, A.D. (corresponding to the twenty-sixth day of Shawwal, 1352, A.H.).

MUHAMMAD RAGHEB-BIN-RAFIQ.

(L.S.)

B. R. REILLY.

(L.S.)

Figure 4.1.9 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

50:

11

all enlightened nations to co-operate in the suppression of the slave trade, and to enquire whether your Majesty will enable me to convey to His Britannic Majesty's Government your Majesty's assurance that you will by every possible means assist them in their endeavours to prevent the African slave trade by sea.

(Respects.)

B. R. REILLY,  
His Britannic Majesty's Commissioner  
and Plenipotentiary.

San'a, February 10, 1934 (Shawwal 25, 1352, A.H.).

No. 2.

The Imam to Lieutenant-Colonel Reilly.



بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

With inscription:- ختم امير المؤمنين المتدك على الله رب العالمين  
الامام محمد بن محمد بن عبد الله بن يوسف

حضرة صاحب السعادة المندوب المفوض السامي الاسترالي والي عدن المحترم بندي بهذا الكمال  
الاحترام وجواباً للمحرر العالي الموجه بهول سعلا احادي لسان ما ترغبون فيه من الاضاح عن تكديرات  
حكومتنا في منع تجارة الرق نحن نعيد جابكم العالي انا نوافق على منع بيع الرقيق الافريقي وسنأمر  
كافة عمالنا بانه لا يجد لنفسه من جميع البلاد والمواني المتوكلية وتقبلوا منا مزيد الاحترام بحري ابي ٢٦  
١٣٥٢

(Translation.)

In the Name of God the Merciful and Compassionate!

After tendering our sincere respects, in reply to your esteemed note dated the 25th Shawwal, 1352 (corresponding to the 10th February, 1934), wherein you expressed a desire to have assurances from our Government as to the prohibition of the slave trade, we inform your Excellency that we agree to the prohibition of the African slave traffic, and we will command all our 'Amils (Governors) to do their utmost to prevent it in all the Mutawakkili (Yemen) country and ports.

(Respects.)

(L.S.)

San'a, Shawwal 25, 1352, A.H. (February 10, 1934).

7482 A Wt. — 875 12/34 F.O.P. 10747 Gp. 340

Figure 4.1.10 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)




Figure 4.1.11 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

10

*Exchange of Notes.*

No. 1.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Reilly to the Imam.*

من مندوب المفوض لجلالة ملك بريطانيا العظمى الى جلالة ملك اليمن حضرة الامام يحيى بن محمد حميد الدين  
ابوالم

يا صاحب الجلالة

لي الشرف ان اشير الى عا دثتي مع مندوب جلالتكم المفوض المتعلق بالرغبة  
الحاضرة عند جميع الاطم التنورة في الاتحاد لانحدار تجارة الرقيق والاستفسار  
عما اذا كنتم جلالتكم تملتونني من تبليغ حكومة جلالة ملك بريطانيا العظمى  
تالكيات جلالتكم في مساعدتكم بكل ما لديكم من الوسائل في سعي المنع تجارة  
الرقيق الافريقي عن طريق البحر .

وتفضلوا بقبول فائق احتراماتي سيدي

صحيح بي ار رايلي

المندوب المفوض لجلالة ملك بريطانيا العظمى

صنعاء : بتاريخ ١٠ فبراير ١٩٣٤ سنة الموافق ٥ شوال ١٤٥٦

(Translation.)

Your Majesty,

I HAVE the honour to refer to my conversations with your Majesty's plenipotentiary relating to the present common desire of

Figure 4.1.12 The Anglo-Yemeni Treaty (10 February 1934)

## **4.2. Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti**

This was probably written in January 1899 (CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).




Figure 4.2.1 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti

-2-

mentioned one-third and its products. Our late father has granted the power of election etc., as mentioned to us and those whom we elect as a Chief after us. My afore-said two brothers Salih and Abdulla have already passed away to the mercy of the Almighty God and I remain solely the Ruler, protector, administrator, and possessor with full discretion in what my late above-mentioned father bequeathed in his will. That I was and am as long as I am breathing the Ruler, protector, administrator, and supervisor, in dealing in all the affairs that depend on the guarded city of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, Shehr, Mukalla, and all their dependencies of ports and cities that are now under my sway. I have granted the order of election, administration etc., after my death to my son Ghalib bin Awadh bin Umar the Ka'iti during his life-time. I have made him the ruler, administrator, and superior, as afore-said as well as that which he will occupy and possess after me of lands, countries, etc., and act in my place and do all things that are interesting to him and Government, Chieftainship, and subjects, to incur the necessary expenditure without squandering. He is also allowed to use out of the remainder of (the willed) one-third and its production the necessary expenditure without squandering and thus use out of the income of the countries such as the custom ~~tax~~ duties, etc., which have connection with the finance and Government the necessary expenditure that concern the Chieftainship in the way of developing and establishing the countries and cities and for expelling evil-minded persons, invaders, raiders, etc., which may be advantageous and by which disturbances are avoided as above mentioned. I also recommend him to obey me and the commands of the Almighty God and his Prophet upon whom His mercy and Peace be, to do good deeds which be possible, to honour virtuous people, learned men, and S<sup>u</sup>uids; to

Figure 4.2.2 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti



-3-

appoint and dismiss servants, and those that are under his Government; to hear complaints, rule the subjects justly, dispense the law which God has sent to His Prophet, His Peace and Mercy be on him upon himself and those whom God has placed under him, to put in force the impartial Mahomedan law, to pass orders, prohibit wicked deeds; and use all possible action in repressing any mischief that may befall the subjects, to consult his brother Omar and all those who are his relatives who are believed to be of good nature upon every subject and subjects that may be interesting to the Chieftainship position, and upon all important affairs. The adviser of every ruler must be his successor in all affairs and that they must assist each other. After the death of the aforesaid Ghalib bin Awadh his successor is his brother Omar bin Awadh bin Omar the Ka'iyti who should be the ruler and the successor of the said Ghalib bin Awadh over the aforesaid countries of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, and the others that are in the direction of Hadhramaut; also the ports of Shihr and Mukalla and their dependencies as above mentioned, and after the death of the aforesaid Omar his successor is to be Saleh bin Ghalib who should be the ruler and Chief over the above mentioned countries that are in the direction of Hadhramaut, Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, etc., as well as those in the direction of the coast, such as Mukalla, Shihr, and their dependencies, etc., as above mentioned. After the death of the aforesaid Salih bin Ghalib his successor should be the son of Omar bin Awadh but if he has no son Mahomed bin Ghalib should be the successor and if he has a young son Mahomed bin Ghalib should act in his place and thus the succession should be amongst the sons of Ghalib bin Awadh and Omar bin Awadh and their descendants to generation and lineage. Every ruler who will be elected if he makes his residence at

Figure 4.2.3 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti

-4-

Shihr he should appoint his successor at Mukalla to officiate on his behalf in Government affairs and if he makes Mukalla the place of his residence he should appoint his successor at Shihr to officiate on his behalf in the affairs of Government, if his successor is absent the heir of his successor should act, but if both the successor and his heir are away (the successor or his heir) should appoint any one that the ruler may approve until he returns. In case the ruler be absent on a journey he should appoint in his place his successor to administer the affairs of the Government until he returns, if his successor is also absent he should appoint the heir of his successor but if his successor as well as the heir of his successor are both absent he may appoint any one he may approve until he comes back. As long as Ghalib bin Awadth is a ruler and administrator his successor the aforesaid Omar bin Awadth should be the Chief Official over the goods, properties, their products the revenues of the countries, etc., in crediting, safeguarding and receiving from any ~~one~~ and whatever direction may be and from every person or persons, he also should be under the command of the ruler Ghalib bin Awadth. If Omar bin Awadth becomes the ruler after the aforesaid Ghalib his successor should be the aforesaid Salih bin Ghalib bin Awadth who should be the supervisor receiver and keeper of the properties, etc., above mentioned and concern the chieftainship and Government and in any and whatever direction may be and from any person or persons, he should also be under the command of the aforesaid ruler Awadth bin Omar and thus for every ruler his successor should be the superior receiver and keeper as above mentioned. The supervisor is allowed to appoint and constitute whomever he desires to receive the income keep the goods and their products, to demand, ask and

Figure 4.2.4 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti

-5-

receive from every person or persons whatever is due to the Chieftainship, and dispute, legate, satisfy and defend either personally or by his attorney the recovery of debts from any person or persons whatever may be due by them to the Chieftainship in the way of debts, rights, and deposits. If the successor is absent in the direction of India his heir should act in the interior of Arabia in administering receiving and appointing attorneys for the recovery of debts that are due to the Chieftainship but if the successor is in the interior of Arabia his heir should act in his place in the direction of India in administering receiving and appointing attorneys for the recovery of what are due in the way of debts, rights, deposits, etc., to the Chieftainship, dispute, legate and negotiate settlement but if both of them (the successor and his heir) are in one place they should assist each other in the administration and recovery, also the one that is present is to be quite efficient to act in the place of the absent. The successor should be under the orders of the ruler and the heir of the successor should be under him (successor). The ruler may appoint in the city of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, and all the cities that are within the district of Hadhramaut whom he approves either one or more representatives in each of them to administer on his behalf and be under his command. The representative should judge judiciously reign over the subjects justly, hear complaints, give just orders, prohibit wicked deeds and dispense the law that the Almighty God has sent to His Prophet, may His mercy and peace be on him, and endeavour in improving the affairs of the country and people and to have compassion and pity on those whom God has made him a superior, such as the weak and poor persons and others, to give account to the ruler of the income, outcome, taxes, products and all things that the ruler appoints him over. If any opposition

(6)  
(18)

Figure 4.2.5 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti




Figure 4.2.6 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti

-7-

do not revoke, annul, or modify, all that which has been mentioned should remain in force and effective.

I acknowledge all that which this letter comprises and acknowledge the same by own hand.

(Sgd.) Awadth bin Omar bin Awadth the Ka'ytī.  
Sultan Nawaz Jung Sham-Shir el Molk. (3/11)

Witnesses:-

(Sgd.) Hoosain bin Hamed bin Ahmed Al Muhdar  
bin Awad Alkaiy, /  
" Jabar bin Abdulla Awadth Al Muslah  
succeeded the late Sultan Khalib in accordance with the will executed by Sultan Awad bin Umar Alkaiy, Sultan Nawaz Jung Bahadur on the 1st Shaaban 1315 Hijri. Sultan Salih bin Khalib and Sultan Nawaz Jung Bahadur will succeed Sultan Umar in accordance with the abovesaid will of the late Sultan Awad bin Umar. It is further settled and arranged between ourselves according to the same will that the eldest son of Sultan Umar bin Awad Shamsheer Nawaz Jung Bahadur (the present Sultan of Mukalla) shall take the place of Sultan Salih bin Khalib and the eldest son of the latter shall succeed the eldest son of Sultan Umar and so on.

2. Now that Sultan Umar has succeeded to the State of Mukalla and Sultan Salih bin Khalib is to be his successor the status of the latter shall therefore be that of Heir Apparent and every successor to the State shall in his turn be recognized as the heir apparent of his predecessor. Sultan Umar bin Awad binds himself to act according to the above stipulation as also the will of the late Sultan Awad. Anything done by him contrary to these documents shall not be acceptable. Each and every Sultan who succeeds in relation to the State of Mukalla shall act according to these two documents.

Sultan Umar and Sultan Salih parties to the agreement with a (8) to the upkeep of the State

Figure 4.2.7 Will of Sultan Awadh bin Omar bin Awadh Al-Qu'aiti

### **4.3. Treaty with the Sultan of Shiher and Al-Mukallā (13 August 1937)**

This is the Treaty between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and His Highness the Sultan of Shiher [Shiher] and Mukalla [Al-Mukallā], 13 August 1937. By this agreement the Sultan of Al-Mukallā finally agreed to conclude a treaty with Britain, accepted a British resident and sacrificed his independence. Such a change in the Sultan's position was linked to his intention to safeguard the succession of his son to the throne and also for securing a loan. London was aware that such development was problematic and this would be the case as noticed among diplomatic correspondences following the conclusion of the treaty of August 1937 (CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).




Figure 4.3.1 Treaty with the Sultan of Shiher and Al-Mukallā (13 August 1937)




Figure 4.3.2 Treaty with the Sultan of Shiher and Al-Mukallā (13 August 1937)



#### **4.4. Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937.**

Despatch from the Sir Bernard Reilly, Governor of Aden to W.G.A. Ormsby Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937 (CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).




Figure 4.4.1 Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937

-2-

mentioned one-third and its products. Our late father has granted the power of election etc., as mentioned to us and those whom we elect as a Chief after us. My afore-said two brothers Salih and Abdulla have already passed away to the mercy of the Almighty God and I remain solely the Ruler, protector, administrator, and possessor with full discretion in what my late above-mentioned father bequeathed in his will. That I was and am as long as I am breathing the Ruler, protector, administrator, and supervisor, in dealing in all the affairs that depend on the guarded city of Shabam, Hura, Hajrain, Shehr, Mukalla, and all their dependencies of ports and cities that are now under my sway. I have granted the order of election, administration etc., after my death to my son Ghalib bin Awadth bin Umar the Ka'iti during his life-time. I have made him the ruler, administrator, and superior, as afore-said as well as that which he will occupy and possess after me of lands, countries, etc., and act in my place and do all things that are interesting to him and Government, Chieftainship, and subjects, to incur the necessary expenditure without squandering. He is also allowed to use out of the remainder of (the willed) one-third and its production the necessary expenditure without squandering and thus use out of the income of the countries such as the custom ~~tax~~ duties, etc., which have connection with the finance and Government the necessary expenditure that concern the Chieftainship in the way of developing and establishing the countries and cities and for expelling evil-minded persons, invaders, raiders, etc., which may be advantageous and by which disturbances are avoided as above mentioned. I also recommend him to obey me and the commands of the Almighty God and his Prophet upon whom His mercy and Peace be, to do good deeds which be possible, to honour virtuous people, learned men, and Syids; to

Figure 4.4.2 Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937

-3-

Khan Bahadur Sheikh Ali Ba-Akza to see me the day after the signature to express his apologies for his hesitation, and to say that he was perfectly content with the situation.

6. The Sultan was not particularly anxious to insert in the Treaty provision for the dispossessed heir and for this reason I consented to the arrangement embodied in the Notes which, as you will observe, reserves final approval to His Majesty's Government.

7. The Sultan was subjected to considerable pressure in the shape of anonymous letters and other reproaches from persons who accused him with selling his State to the British, but he eventually brought himself to a sufficient pitch of courage to sign, and I thought it advisable to conclude the matter at once, subject to the final approval and confirmation of His Majesty's Government.

8. The Sultan has requested that the Treaty should not be made public for a month, during which time the opposition will get more used to the idea. I have consented, if and when your approval is given, to issue the enclosed Notice, and the Sultan, in consequence of advice he has been given by Mr. Ingrams, decided also to issue a Notice at the same time indicating that he had made a very good bargain with His Majesty's Government, rather than to leave himself in the undefended position of having gibes made at him by those who have pressed him not to sign. I enclose for your information a copy of the Sultan's proposed Proclamation.

22 9. As I was authorised in your telegram No. 29 of the 12th February, I have given the Sultan to understand that the salary of the Adviser will be paid by His Majesty's Government, and I shall shortly address

\* No. 7808/37 [No. 22]

Article 2.

Figure 4.4.3 Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937




Figure 4.4.4 Despatch to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 18 August 1937

#### **4.5. Public notice distributed by the Sultan of Al-Mukallā, August 1937.**

(CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).




Figure 4.5.1 Public notice distributed by the Sultan of Al-Mukallā, August 1937.




Figure 4.5.2 Public notice distributed by the Sultan of Al-Mukallā, August 1937.



## **4.6. Public notice distributed by the Governor of Aden (August 1937)**

(CO 725/42/8, TNA, London).




Figure 4.6.1 Public notice distributed by the Governor of Aden (August 1937)

## **4.7. Reconstituting the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)**

(FO 371/23178, TNA, London).




Figure 4.7.1 Reconstituting the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)




Figure 4.7.2 Reconstituting the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)




Figure 4.7.3 Reconstituting the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)




Figure 4.7.4 Reconstituting the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)

201  
135

X. The Qu'aiti Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun on behalf of the Sultans of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri alike agree to give mutual assistance in so far as in them lies in any organisation which is directed to the promotion of well-being and prosperity of the Hadramaut States.

XI. In order to promote the furtherance of the aforesaid condition His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom agrees to endeavour to settle all differences arising in future between the Qu'aiti Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla and the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun, from the date of the signature of this treaty through the intermediary of the Governor of the Aden Protectorate or his representative.

The present agreement, which has been concluded in triplicate in the English and Arabic languages shall come into force this day.

Done at Seiyun & Mukalla the 24th & 26th days of February, 1939, and at Aden the second day of March 1939.

(Sgd.) B.R. REILLY.  
For His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

(Sgd.) W.H. INGRAMS.  
Signature .....

Sultan of Shihr and Mukalla on his own behalf and on behalf of his heirs and successors. Signature ....  
(Sgd.) W.H. INGRAMS

Signature .....

Sultan of Seiyun on behalf of the Sultans of the Family of 'Abdulla al Kathiri, their heirs and successors. Signatures.....  
(Sgd.) W.H. INGRAMS.

Figure 4.7.5 Reconstituting the Qu'aiti-Kathiri Agreement of 1918 (February 1939)



#### **4.8. Treaty with the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun (2 March 1939)**

Treaty between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun, Aden, 2 March 1939 (FO 371/23178, TNA, London).




Figure 4.8.1 Treaty with the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun (2 March 1939)




Figure 4.8.2 Treaty with the Kathiri Sultan of Seiyun (2 March 1939)

#### **4.9. Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sāi‘ar (1937)**

This agreement was concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the chief of the Al-Musellem Al-Sāi‘ar on 13 December 1937 (FO 371/23178, TNA, London).




Figure 4.9.1 Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sāi'ar (1937)




Figure 4.9.2 Agreement with the chiefs of the Al-Musellem Al-Sāi'ar (1937)

#### **4.10. Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāi'ars (1938)**

This agreement was concluded between the Government of the United Kingdom and the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāi'ars on 5 March 1938 (FO 371/23178, TNA, London).




Figure 4.10.1 Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāi'ars (1938)



98  
165

7. We accept and agree to place six hostages one each on behalf of Bin Jerbu'a and Bin Mulhi and four on behalf of 'Abdulla bin 'Aun at Seiyun as our pledge for the maintenance of the peace and fulfilment of our undertakings. We understand that these hostages may be exchanged at such intervals as we wish with the approval of the Great British Government providing the hostages offered in exchange are considered suitable by the Great British Government.

Signed by:

'Ali bin Muhammad bin As Sibani, 'Ali bin Musellem bin Mana' al 'Aun bin Kundash, on behalf of Al 'Aun bin Kundash

Suleiman bin Muhammad, Ahmed bin Muhammad, 'Aun bin Suheil and Yahya bin Salim - Al 'Ali and Al Mulhi, on behalf of all Al 'Ali and Al Mulhi.

'Ali bin Salih Bal Lahli on behalf of Al Ma'ruf bin 'Abdulla and Muharek bin 'Ali Hajla, on behalf of Al Ma'ruf bin 'Abdulla.

Sa'id bin 'Awadh, Salim bin Muhammad and Salih bin Sammar - Al Dahyan on behalf of all Al Dahyan.

'Aidh bin Sarur bin 'Ubeidun on behalf of all Al 'Ubeiding and 'Ali bin 'Awadh and Salim bin Muhammad bin Marqa and Sa'id bin Yeslem Bal Hashidi and Zein'fer bin 'Abdulla on behalf of Al Zein'fer.

Sa'id bin 'Aidh Huweilan and 'Ali bin Al Kota' and Salim bin 'Amir Al Huweilan on behalf of Al Huweilan, 'Abdulla bin 'Amir bin Huweilan, Sa'id bin Salih bin Ta'iz bin Huweilan, 'Abdulla bin Sa'id Harras and Sada bin Ahmed bin Harras bin Huweilan.

Salih bin Badr, Salim bin 'Aun, 'Aun bin Musellem bin Shakel, 'Umar bin 'Aun and Ahmed bin Ash Sheikh Al Musaddas on behalf of all Al Musaddas.

Suleiman bin Zalman bin Adh Dhalikh and 'Abdulla bin Muhammad bin Adh Dhalikh on behalf of all Al Adh Dhalikh.

Muhammad bin Salim and Muhammad bin Faraj Al 'Ayaf on behalf of Al 'Ayaf.

'Awadh bin Kundash and Yeslem bin Muhammad bin Salih bin At Tamur bin Al Jerbu'a on behalf of Al Jerbu'a.

Salim bin Muhammad bin Thutteut and 'Ali bin 'Awadh Mukeihil bin Sahlan on behalf of all Al Saliha.

Ma'ruf bin 'Abdulla Bal Hattish on behalf of Al 'Uweira

'Amir bin Sa'id bin Shureihiban on behalf of Al Ba Shureihiban

'Umar bin 'Abdulla Ju'eil on behalf of Al Ju'eil

'Awadh bin 'Umar and Salim bin Muhammad on behalf of Al Asakira

Salih bin Yeslem bin Milqat on behalf of Al Malaqit.

'Ali

Figure 4.10.2 Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāi'ars (1938)




Figure 4.10.3 Agreement with the chiefs of the Ḥatims of the Sāi'ars (1938)

## **4.11. Despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (9 May 1938)**

Despatch from Sir Bernard Reilly, Governor of Aden to W.G.A. Ormsby Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies (The GA to the CS, 9 May 1938, CO 725/59/18, TNA, London).




Figure 4.11.1 Despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (9 May 1938)

## 4.12. Anglo-Yemeni Relations: the 1950s

### 4.12.1. The Anglo-Yemeni *Modus Vivendi* (20 January 1951)

The Anglo-Yemeni *Modus Vivendi*, reached in London on 20 January 1951, though intended to signal the beginning of a new era in Anglo-Yemeni relations, crucially represented a change in the Yemeni position concerning the territorial issue, despite the absence of significant developments. For London, this agreement was of significance and was regarded as an agreement defining the disputed areas.<sup>10</sup> The understanding prevalent at the Foreign Office was that the agreement, “despite the vagueness of the wording, maybe was regarded as recognition that a de facto boundary existed”.<sup>11</sup> The text is available at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, Treaty Series No. 42 (1952).

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<sup>10</sup> See ‘Minutes of Meeting between the Yemeni Minister to London Mr. Hassan Ibrahim and Mr Fry from the FO’, 18 February 1954, FO 371/109976, TNA, London.

<sup>11</sup> See Cabinet Memorandum, the ‘Legal position of Her Majesty’s Government in the Aden Protectorate’, 14 April 1958, CAB 129/92, TNA, London.

YEMEN 549



Treaty Series No. 42 (1952)

Exchange of Notes  
regarding relations between the Government  
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain  
and Northern Ireland and the  
Government of the Yemen

London, 20th January, 1951

*Presented by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament  
by Command of Her Majesty  
August 1952*

LONDON  
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE  
FOURPENCE NET

Cmd. 8590

Figure 4.12.1.1 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)

Text

**EXCHANGE OF NOTES REGARDING RELATIONS BETWEEN  
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF  
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE  
GOVERNMENT OF THE YEMEN**

*London, 20th January, 1951*

No. 1

*The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Yemen to the  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs*

*Grosvenor House,  
Park Lane,  
London, W. 1,*

Your Excellency,

*20th January, 1951.*

I have the honour to refer to the negotiations which took place between the representatives of the Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen and representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which commenced on 29th August, 1950, and ended on 12th October, 1950, as a result of which an agreement was reached to submit to the Governments of the two countries recommendations for a *modus vivendi* composed of ten articles the text of which is as follows:—

1. That diplomatic representation shall be established between the two countries according to normal practice, as soon as possible before the end of 1951.
2. That His Majesty's Government should co-operate with the Government of His Majesty the Imam on economic development, culture, education, hygiene and other matters in the Yemen on which the Government of His Majesty the Imam might wish to seek such co-operation. His Majesty's Government should, if the Yemeni Government so wish, provide to the best of their ability the assistance of experts or any other technical assistance which may be required in these matters.
3. That for the purpose of settling certain incidents or disputes which have occurred at various places in the limitrophe areas and which have already been the subject of discussions between the two Governments, they should agree to set up a joint commission, composed of an equal number of representatives of the two Governments, with the following terms of reference:—

To demarcate on the ground in all the disputed areas, without prejudice to the reservations laid down in paragraph 7 of this *modus vivendi*, the position of each party as it existed at the time of the signature of the 1934 Treaty<sup>(1)</sup> and as it exists at the present time and to recommend on the basis of their findings such solutions of these incidents or disputes as may be required by the application of the 1934 Treaty or by equitable considerations, as appropriate.

(<sup>1</sup>) "Treaty Series No. 34 (1934)," Cmd. 4752.

Figure 4.12.1.2 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)

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4. That in the event of the commission failing to agree in regard to any of the matters submitted to it under the terms of the preceding paragraph, the two Governments may, in consultation, co-opt an impartial commissioner or may appoint each an impartial commissioner, who shall assist the commission to reach a unanimous recommendation.
5. That the commission be appointed and plan its method of work as soon as possible and that the Governments thereupon fix a date for the commencement of its work. The commission shall from time to time submit reports of progress to both Governments.
6. That it be agreed by the two Governments that, pending the conclusion of the work of the commission both Governments will refrain from taking any action which may alter the *status quo* existing in the disputed areas at the present time.

For the purposes of this article it is understood that in the town of Shabwa there are no military forces or administrative services at the present time.

7. That it be understood between the two Governments that their acceptance of any finding or recommendation by the commission under paragraph 3 shall not prejudice the claims of either Government based on that Government's interpretation of the *de jure* position, nor any claims in connection with the final settlement which is provided for in Article 3 of the 1934 Treaty.

In case of disagreement between the two Governments on the commission's findings or recommendations each party shall continue to pursue a settlement in accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Charter.<sup>(2)</sup>

8. That the two Governments should take appropriate measures, within the framework of their existing law and with the due regard to the local situation, to check any propaganda, which by its seditious or subversive character tends to impair the friendly relations between the two countries or which tends to defame their sovereigns or Royal Families.
9. That the two Governments will consider at an appropriate time any specific proposals put forward by either with a view to reaching an agreement relating to fugitive offenders.
10. That as soon as the commission provided for in paragraph 3 of this Agreement begins its work, and pending conclusion of its work, His Majesty's Government shall agree to the evacuation of the customs house at Nagd Marqad. The Yemeni Government shall agree during the same period not to re-occupy the demolished building in the vicinity of the customs house.

M. A.

G. W. F.

The Yemen delegation submitted this proposal to the Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen, Imam Ahmed.

The Government of His Majesty the King of Yemen, Imam Ahmed, confirmed this proposal, the terms of which were approved by His Majesty, Imam Ahmed.

My Government instructed me to inform your Excellency officially of the final approval to these terms by the Government of Yemen.

<sup>(2)</sup> "Treaty Series No. 67 (1946)," Cmd. 7015.

Figure 4.12.1.3 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)



Moreover, the Government of His Majesty the King of the Yemen are prepared to start negotiations for the necessary measures required to implement the said agreement.

If His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom also approve the said recommendations, I have the honour to suggest that the present Note and your Excellency's reply to that effect should be regarded as constituting an agreement between the two Governments.

Please accept, &c.

ALKADI AL-AMRI,

*Minister of State, Acting Foreign Minister  
of the Government of Yemen.*

No. 2

*The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Acting Minister for  
Foreign Affairs of the Yemen*

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, S.W. 1,  
20th January, 1951.*  
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's Note of  
to-day's date couched in the following terms:—

[As in No. 1.]

2. In reply I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have also approved the recommendations of the Anglo-Yemeni Conference as set forth in your Note and are prepared to enter into negotiations forthwith with a view to their implementation. They will regard your Note and this reply as constituting an agreement between the two Governments.

I have, &c.  
(for the Secretary of State),

G. W. FURLONGE.

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Figure 4.12.1.5 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)

ARABIC TEXT

Grosvenor House,  
Park Lane.

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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

صاحب المعالي :

لن الشرف ان اشير الى الحوادث التي جرت بين ممثلي حكومة حضرة صاحب الجلالة ملك المملكة المتوكلية اليمنية وممثلي حكومة حضرة صاحب الجلالة في المملكة المتحدة وهذه الحوادث ابتدأت في ٢٩ اغسطس سنة ١٩٥٠ وانتهت في ١٢ اكتوبر سنة ١٩٥٠ ونتيجة لهذه الحوادث تم الاتفاق على تقديم مقترحات لنظام مؤقت الى الحكومتين تحتوي على عشر مواد نصها كالآتي :-

مشروع اقتراح لنظام مؤقت مع اليمن

١ - أن يتم تبادل التمثيل السياسي بين البلدين بالطريقة العادية في اقرب وقت ممكن قبل نهاية سنة ١٩٥١ .

٢ - تقوم حكومة حضرة صاحب الجلالة بالتعاون مع حكومة جلالة الامام لتنمية الشؤون الاقتصادية والثقافية والتعليمية والصحية وجميع المسائل الاخرى التي قد تطلب الحكومة اليمنية التعاون فيها .

وتبذل حكومة صاحب الجلالة البريطانية ما في وسعها من جهد اذا طلبت اليه من قبلها ذلك في تقديم مساعدة الخبراء الفنيين او اية مساعدة فنية اخرى تطلب في شأن هذه المسائل .

٣ - وللوصول الى تسوية ما وقع من حوادث او منازعات في اماكن مختلفة من مناطق الاطراف وهي الحوادث والمنازعات التي كانت حلا للمحادثات بين الحكومتين عواقب الحكومتان على اثناء لجنة مشتركة تتألف من عدد متعادل من ممثلي الحكومتين ويكون اختصاصها ما يأتي :-

تبين على الطبيعة (اي على وجه الارض) دون اخلال بالصفحات الواردة في الفقرة رقم ٧ من هذا الاتفاق. مركز كل من الطرفين في جميع المناطق المتنازعة كما كان قائما سنة ١٩٣٤ وكما هو قائم في الوقت الحاضر . وللجنة ان تعرض بطلب نتائج تحقيقها بحلول للحوادث او المنازعات على نحو ما يقتضيه تطبيع معاهدة سنة ١٩٣٤ او على نحو ما تقتضيه العدالة على حسب الاحوال .

٤ - اذا لم توافق اللجنة الى الوصول الى اتفاق في شأن أية مسألة من المسائل التي تعرض عليها وفقا للفقرة السابقة تقوم الحكومتان بعد التفاوض بينهما باختيار مندوب محايد او تقوم كل منهما باختيار مندوب محايد وتكون مهمة المندوب المحايد او مهمة

Figure 4.12.1.6 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)

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لقد امرتني حكومتى ان اخبر معاليكم رسميا بالموافقة النهائية على نص هذا  
 الاتزام الذي وافقت عليه (حكومة المملكة المتوكلية اليمنية) .  
 بالإضافة الى ذلك، فان حكومة جلالة ملك المملكة المتوكلية اليمنية مستعدة ان  
 تبدأ بمفاوضات بالاجراءات اللازمة لتنفيذ هذه الاتفاقية .  
 واذا وافقت حكومة حضرة صاحب الجلالة في المملكة المتحدة المعظم على هذه  
 المقترحات يكون لي الشرف ان اقترح بأن المذكرة هذه وجواب معاليكم عليها تعتبر  
 مكونة لاتفاقية بين الحكومتين .  
 الرجاء ان تقبل يا صاحب المعالي التأكيدات باعلى احترامى .

القاضي محمد العمري  
 وزير دولة  
 وكيل وزير خارجية حكومة اليمن

صاحب المعالي  
 المستر ارست بيغن  
 وزير خارجية حضرة صاحب الجلالة  
 وزارة الخارجية  
 لندن

لندن في ٢٠ كانون الثاني سنة ١٩٥١.

Figure 4.12.1.7 The Anglo-Yemeni Modus Vivendi (20 January 1951)

#### **4.12.2. On British Policy towards Yemen**

Despatch 'on the British Policy towards Yemen' from Anthony Eden (later Sir Anthony Eden (1954) and Earl of Avon) to Mr Jacomb (Sana'a), 8 December 1951. The text is available in (Gökay, 2005: Vol.5. pp. 75-77).




Figure 4.12.2.1 On British Policy towards Yemen




Figure 4.12.2.2 On British Policy towards Yemen




Figure 4.12.2.3 On British Policy towards Yemen



## **5.1. International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the 'Jeddah Treaty' and its appendices)**

The Jeddah Treaty was signed on behalf of the Yemeni Government by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Development, Abdul-Kader Ba-Jamal. It was ratified by the Yemeni Parliament in an exchange of ratifications.

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[ ENGLISH TEXT — TEXTE ANGLAIS ]

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF  
YEMEN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

With a view to cementing the ties of brotherhood and friendship and the links of kinship that bind the two fraternal peoples of the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

Invoking the norms and principles of the Islamic faith they share and whose foundation is cooperation for the sake of piety and godliness,

Proceeding from the bonds woven by a common history based on cooperation and solidarity and on the promotion of security, peace and tranquillity,

Building on the distinctive character of the brotherly relations obtaining between the leaders of the two fraternal countries, namely His Excellency President Ali Abdullah Saleh of the Republic of Yemen and his fellow leader the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia (may God preserve them), in terms of regard, candour and commitment to every means of further enhancing and strengthening the intimate relations between the two fraternal peoples, and given their concern to devise a permanent solution to the question of the land and maritime boundaries between their two countries that will be found to be satisfactory and will be preserved by succeeding generations, present and future, with respect to both the boundaries determined by the Treaty of Taif signed by the two kingdoms in A.H. 1353, corresponding to A.D. 1934, and delimited by joint commissions in the manner set forth in the boundary reports annexed to that Treaty and to those that have yet to be delimited,

Agreement has been reached as follows:

*Article 1*

The two contracting parties affirm that the Treaty of Taif and its annexes, including the boundary reports appended thereto, are binding and valid. They also affirm their commitment to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the two countries on 27 Ramadan A.H. 1415 [26 February A.D. 1995].

*Article 2*

The definitive and permanent boundary line between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall be established as follows:

(a) First section: This section begins at the coastal marker on the Red Sea (precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Mu'wajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet) at latitude 16° 24' 14.8" north and longitude 42° 46' 19.7" east, and it ends at the Jabal al-Tha'r marker at coordinates 44° 21' 58.0" east and 17° 26' 00.0" north. The coordinates [of the intermediate markers] are given in detail in annex I. The identity of the villages located along the path of the line in this section, including their tribal affiliation, shall be determined in accordance with the

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Figure 5.1.1 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (the 'Jeddah Treaty' and its appendices)

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provisions of the Treaty of Taif and its annexes. In the event that any of the coordinates should coincide with the location of a village, the frame of reference for establishing its possession shall be its association with one of the parties and the path of the line shall be modified accordingly when boundary markers are put in place.

(b) Second section: This is the section of the boundary line which has not been delimited. The two contracting parties have agreed to delimit this section in an amicable manner. This section begins at Jabal al-Tha'r, the coordinates of which are given above, and it ends at the intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east. Detailed coordinates [of the intermediate markers] are given in annex II.

(c) Third section: This is the maritime section of the boundary. It begins at the onshore marker on the sea coast (precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Mu'wajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet), the coordinates of which are specified above, and it terminates at the extremity of the maritime boundaries between the two countries. Detailed coordinates [of the intermediate points] are given in annex III.

*Article 3*

1. For the purpose of placing markers (pillars) along the boundary line beginning at the tripoint of the two countries with the Sultanate of Oman at the intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east and ending precisely at the sea wall, Ra's Al-Muwajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet, the coordinates of which are given in annex I and annex II, the two contracting parties shall engage an international company to conduct a field survey of the full length of the land and maritime boundaries. The company concerned and the joint team of the two contracting parties shall adhere strictly to the distances and bearings from one point to the next and to the other specifications set forth in the boundary reports annexed to the Treaty of Taif, these provisions being binding on both parties.

2. The company concerned shall prepare detailed maps of the land boundary between the two countries, and these maps, once signed by representatives of the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, shall be recognized as official maps indicating the boundary between the two countries and shall be an integral part of this Treaty. The two contracting parties shall conclude an agreement on meeting the costs of work undertaken by the company engaged to erect the markers along the land boundary between the two countries.

*Article 4*

The two contracting parties undertake to abide by the terms of article 5 of the Treaty of Taif as they relate to the removal of any military position located less than five kilometres from the boundary line delimited on the basis of the boundary reports annexed to the same Treaty of Taif. The boundary line that has yet to be delimited, from Jabal al-Tha'r to the point of intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east, shall be governed by the terms of annex IV to this Treaty.

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*Article 5*

This Treaty shall enter into force following its ratification in accordance with the procedures in effect in each of the contracting countries and the exchange of instruments of ratification by them.

For the Republic of Yemen:

ABDUL-QADER ABDUL-RAHMAN BA-JAMMAL  
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

SAUD AL-FAISAL

Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Jeddah, 10 Rabi ` I A.H. 1421  
corresponding to 12 June A.D. 2000

**Figure 5.1.3 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

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**Annex I**

**Geographical coordinates of the marker positions stipulated in the boundary reports annexed to the Treaty of Taif.**

**Schedule 1**

Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
1	Jabal al-Tha'r	17	26	00.0	44	21	58.0
2		17	25	19.6	44	16	16.4
3		17	25	17.1	44	15	47.6
4		17	25	09.4	44	14	22.9
5		17	25	04.4	44	13	37.1
6		17	24	50.0	44	12	30.0
7		17	24	52.5	44	11	25.0
8		17	24	45.4	44	10	45.4
9		17	24	32.0	44	08	17.0
10		17	23	01.0	44	07	51.0
11		17	21	59.0	44	06	39.0
12		17	21	57.8	44	06	02.2
13		17	24	21.0	44	04	00.0
14		17	24	17.7	44	02	58.5
15		17	23	28.7	44	01	23.8
16		17	24	08.9	44	00	40.9
17		17	23	26.5	44	00	14.4
18		17	22	19.5	43	59	32.4
19		17	19	50.0	43	58	00.0
20		17	20	30.0	43	54	20.0
21		17	20	21.9	43	50	32.7
22		17	20	20.0	43	49	55.0
23		17	21	23.8	43	48	21.0
24		17	22	30.0	43	47	20.0
25		17	22	28.0	43	46	04.2
26		17	22	05.3	43	42	02.1

**Figure 5.1.4 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

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Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
27		17	22	00.0	43	41	00.0
28		17	23	36.1	43	39	12.9
29		17	25	34.0	43	37	04.1
30		17	26	20.1	43	36	24.3
31		17	28	18.9	43	34	36.3
32		17	29	00.1	43	33	59.5
33		17	30	51.3	43	31	37.9
34		17	30	32.6	43	31	13.2
35		17	31	26.5	43	30	22.2
36		17	31	36.8	43	29	44.5
37		17	32	42.4	43	29	04.7
38		17	33	08.7	43	27	52.3
39		17	33	09.1	43	27	33.5
40		17	33	00.0	43	26	43.5
41		17	33	50.1	43	25	52.6
42		17	33	57.0	43	25	10.6
43		17	33	23.9	43	23	57.2
44		17	33	19.4	43	22	46.0
45		17	32	38.4	43	22	32.0
46		17	33	23.0	43	21	17.1
47		17	33	07.8	43	21	00.3
48		17	32	23.4	43	20	09.2
49		17	31	39.6	43	18	36.8
50		17	31	54.8	43	18	17.0
51		17	31	39.0	43	18	09.7
52		17	31	23.3	43	17	39.3
53		17	31	02.2	43	17	07.3
54		17	29	23.8	43	15	37.6
55		17	28	49.9	43	14	26.7
56		17	27	28.2	43	15	23.4
57		17	25	34.2	43	13	31.8

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Figure 5.1.5 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Marker No.	Assigned geographical coordinates					
	North			East		
	°	'	"	°	'	"
58	17	24	05.4	43	14	49.4
59	17	23	26.0	43	14	06.1
60	17	23	21.1	43	14	05.3
61	17	23	07.9	43	13	40.9
62	17	22	15.6	43	14	46.6
63	17	21	44.3	43	15	31.8
64	17	21	29.4	43	16	36.3
65	17	19	42.1	43	19	33.6
66	17	18	14.4	43	20	11.4
67	17	18	11.6	43	19	59.5
68	17	18	12.3	43	19	53.5
69	17	18	12.0	43	19	47.4
70	17	18	12.1	43	19	42.2
71	17	18	08.2	43	19	25.7
72	17	18	00.7	43	18	46.9
73	17	18	03.9	43	18	35.9
74	17	17	57.4	43	18	35.1
75	17	17	35.5	43	18	08.8
76	17	17	32.2	43	17	32.4
77	17	17	28.0	43	16	20.0
78	17	17	32.0	43	16	02.0
79	17	16	42.5	43	15	21.1
80	17	16	32.4	43	14	41.4
81	17	16	08.1	43	13	56.8
82	17	15	31.7	43	12	06.2
83	17	14	33.9	43	11	59.7
84	17	12	37.3	43	12	58.7
85	17	12	25.7	43	12	39.7
86	43	11	21.3	17	11	20.0
87	17	11	18.5	43	11	34.4
88	17	11	07.8	43	11	25.0

Figure 5.1.6 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
89		17	10	57.0	43	10	53.9
90		17	10	21.6	43	10	15.0

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**Figure 5.1.7 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**



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Annex I  
Schedule 2

Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
1	Precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Mu'wajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet	16	24	14.8	42	46	14.8
2		16	24	15.8	42	46	15.8
3		16	24	12.3	42	47	25.2
4		16	24	11.1	42	47	36.1
5		16	24	04.6	42	48	13.2
6		16	23	43.5	42	48	38.9
7		16	23	31.4	42	49	06.5
8		16	23	17.6	42	49	38.5
9		16	22	46.3	42	49	50.2
10		16	22	51.9	42	50	22.7
11		16	22	57.3	42	50	57.3
12		16	23	02.3	42	51	29.9
13		16	23	08.3	42	52	03.1
14		16	23	13.7	42	52	36.4
15		16	23	19.2	42	53	10.1
16		16	23	24.4	42	53	43.1
17		16	23	30.1	42	54	16.4
18		16	23	35.3	42	54	49.9
19		16	23	40.9	42	55	23.9
20		16	23	55.8	42	55	53.8
21		16	23	54.0	42	56	26.7
22		16	23	58.1	42	56	59.1
23		16	24	07.7	42	57	23.3
24		16	24	27.4	42	57	00.0
25		16	24	58.7	42	56	47.5
26		16	25	28.5	42	56	37.4

Figure 5.1.8 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
27		16	25	58.4	42	56	26.8
28		16	26	28.9	42	56	14.2
29		16	27	02.6	42	56	16.7
30		16	27	40.1	42	56	25.1
31		16	28	14.1	42	56	30.2
32		16	28	48.3	42	56	35.7
33		16	29	23.3	42	56	41.1
34		16	29	49.1	42	57	01.1
35		16	30	09.1	42	57	29.4
36		16	30	24.7	42	58	00.5
37		16	30	44.1	42	58	30.1
38		16	30	55.1	42	59	00.6
39		16	31	18.1	42	59	31.8
40		16	31	17.4	43	00	04.8
41		16	31	20.9	43	00	37.2
42		16	31	23.4	43	01	12.1
43		16	31	21.1	43	01	17.4
44		16	31	23.4	43	01	51.1
45		16	31	27.1	43	02	24.6
46		16	31	28.2	43	02	58.2
47		16	31	30.6	43	03	31.8
48		16	31	46.8	43	04	01.8
49		16	31	42.1	43	04	34.2
50		16	31	43.0	43	05	09.1
51		16	31	41.9	43	06	08.3
52		16	31	41.9	43	06	42.8
53							
54		16	31	42.9	43	07	14.6
55		16	34	28.8	43	07	35.1
56		16	34	26.1	43	07	47.1
57		16	35	03.2	43	07	51.6

Figure 5.1.9 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
58		16	35	33.4	43	07	46.1
59		16	35	48.8	43	08	23.4
60		16	36	19.6	43	08	31.8
61		16	36	49.9	43	08	29.8
62		16	37	19.1	43	08	21.5
63		16	37	43.1	43	08	39.9
64		16	38	11.1	43	08	46.8
65		16	38	43.8	43	08	34.8
66		16	39	18.1	43	08	26.9
67		16	39	45.8	43	08	09.4
68		16	40	17.5	43	07	53.0

**Figure 5.1.10 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

Annex I  
Schedule 3

Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
1		16	40	25.4	43	08	58.5
2		16	40	38.1	43	09	05.9
3		16	39	59.7	43	09	26.6
4		16	39	56.3	43	09	26.6
5		16	39	34.8	43	10	35.3
6		16	39	26.4	43	10	58.8
7		16	39	13.6	43	11	34.6
8		16	38	51.5	43	12	22.4
9		16	38	49.7	43	12	55.6
10		16	38	52.4	43	13	25.0
11		16	38	30.1	43	13	36.7
12		16	38	34.2	43	14	05.0
13		16	39	02.7	43	14	04.4
14		16	39	34.2	43	14	04.8
15		16	40	01.3	43	14	11.1
16		16	40	10.7	43	13	36.8
17		16	40	33.9	43	14	01.6
18		16	41	06.4	43	13	59.7
19		16	41	34.3	43	13	46.5
20		16	42	07.0	43	13	39.5
21		16	42	00.3	42	13	09.1
22		16	42	02.5	43	12	37.2
23		16	42	34.9	43	12	42.0
24		16	43	00.7	43	13	06.1
25		16	43	25.8	43	13	28.2
26		16	43	49.9	43	13	49.9
27		16	44	13.8	43	13	26.4
28		16	44	45.2	43	13	34.7

Figure 5.1.11 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
29		16	44	33.9	43	13	55.5
30		16	44	29.2	43	14	22.9
31		16	44	37.6	43	14	52.4
32		16	44	33.5	43	15	05.2
33		16	44	14.5	43	15	20.3
34		16	44	33.5	43	15	52.9
35		16	44	39.3	43	16	02.5
36		16	44	48.7	43	16	31.7
37		16	45	12.1	43	16	04.9
38		16	45	19.1	43	15	31.7
39		16	46	11.0	43	15	11.0
40		16	46	24.6	43	15	33.8
41		16	46	45.4	43	15	06.6
42		16	47	10.6	43	15	26.5
43		16	47	13.1	43	15	45.1
44		16	47	41.8	43	15	59.8
45		16	48	03.1	43	15	41.9
46		16	48	17.0	43	15	08.5
47		16	48	19.7	43	14	28.9
48		16	48	25.0	43	13	57.2
49		16	48	53.7	43	13	43.0
50		16	49	23.7	43	13	28.6
51		16	50	17.3	43	13	16.6
52		16	50	58.8	43	12	08.2
53		16	51	11.9	43	11	57.5
54		16	51	05.9	43	11	38.2
55		16	50	54.0	43	11	23.9
56		16	50	56.6	43	10	47.9
57		16	51	28.3	43	10	30.3
58		16	52	00.8	43	10	33.5
59		16	52	15.3	43	10	04.0

Figure 5.1.12 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
60		16	52	33.8	43	09	34.8
61		16	52	48.2	43	09	05.9
62		16	53	25.0	43	08	59.3
63		16	54	00.4	43	08	43.3
64		16	54	07.2	43	08	22.1

**Figure 5.1.13 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

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Annex I  
Schedule 4

Marker No.	Assigned geographical coordinates					
	North			East		
	°	'	"	°	'	"
1	16	54	38.1	43	08	15.0
2	16	55	03.3	43	08	17.2
3	16	55	28.7	43	08	37.3
4	16	55	30.4	43	08	47.4
5	16	55	41.2	43	09	08.4
6	16	55	44.1	43	09	15.1
7	16	55	50.0	43	09	51.4
8	16	55	53.2	43	10	20.1
9	16	56	12.8	43	10	31.7
10	16	56	19.5	43	10	57.9
11	16	56	30.8	43	11	24.8
12	16	56	40.3	43	11	40.8
13	16	57	02.2	43	11	37.2
14	16	57	18.5	43	11	41.2
15	16	57	33.7	43	11	11.5
16	16	57	48.0	43	10	41.0
17	16	58	05.1	43	10	39.9
18	16	58	17.3	43	10	39.0
19	16	58	31.9	43	10	38.8
20	16	58	40.9	43	10	39.6
21	16	58	42.6	43	10	45.3
22	16	58	43.4	43	10	52.3
23	16	58	44.3	43	10	59.9
24	16	58	49.9	43	10	52.2
25	16	59	02.2	43	10	54.3
26	16	59	11.8	43	10	46.9
27	16	59	23.2	43	10	39.2
28	16	59	35.7	43	10	37.2

Figure 5.1.14 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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Marker No.	Assigned geographical coordinates					
	North			East		
	°	'	"	°	'	"
29	16	59	47.9	43	10	42.2
30	17	00	10.6	43	10	43.6
31	17	00	22.1	43	10	47.0
32	17	00	32.4	43	10	48.1
33	17	00	51.3	43	11	02.7
34	17	00	57.1	43	10	49.4
35	17	01	00.3	43	10	44.4
36	17	01	33.0	43	10	45.2
37	43	10	46.2	17	01	48.6
38	17	01	55.6	43	10	51.4
39	17	01	49.3	43	10	55.2
40	17	01	34.2	43	11	31.5
41	17	01	29.4	43	11	25.5
42	17	01	11.4	43	11	29.3
43	17	01	04.8	43	11	30.8
44	17	00	57.9	43	11	27.6
45	17	00	48.7	43	11	44.6
46	17	00	50.2	43	11	52.9
47	17	00	36.3	43	12	09.8
48	17	01	15.5	43	12	26.3
49	17	01	21.4	43	12	41.5
50	17	01	19.0	43	12	52.5
51	17	00	51.6	43	13	16.4
52	17	00	41.1	43	13	31.4
53	17	01	14.5	43	13	38.9
54	17	01	19.5	43	13	56.4
55	17	01	46.3	43	13	51.4
56	17	01	45.3	43	14	14.9
57	17	01	25.6	43	14	23.2
58	17	00	54.9	43	14	55.1
59	17	02	00.6	43	14	33.4

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Figure 5.1.15 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia



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Marker No.		Assigned geographical coordinates					
		North			East		
		°	'	"	°	'	"
60		17	02	50.6	43	14	22.9
61		17	03	32.0	43	13	43.6
62		17	04	31.3	43	13	38.0
63		17	04	42.0	43	12	29.0
64		17	05	06.0	43	12	02.0
65		17	05	55.0	43	11	07.0
66		17	05	13.1	43	09	36.6
67		17	06	16.1	43	09	28.4
68		17	06	50.6	43	09	28.9
69		17	07	31.5	43	09	49.6
70		17	07	36.4	43	10	01.4
71		17	07	50.6	43	10	40.4

**Figure 5.1.16 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

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**Annex II**

No.	North			East		
	°	'	"	°	'	"
1	19	00	00	52	00	00
2	18	47	20	50	47	00
3	18	37	00	49	07	00
4	18	10	00	48	11	00
5	17	27	00	47	36	00
6	17	07	00	47	28	00
7	16	57	00	47	11	00
8	16	57	00	47	00	00
9	17	17	00	46	45	00
10	17	14	00	46	22	00
11	17	15	00	46	06	00
12	17	20	00	45	24	00
13	17	26	00	45	13	00
14	17	26	00	44	39	00
15	17	24	20	44	34	00
16	17	26	00	44	28	00
17	17	26	00	44	21	58 Jabal al-Tha'r

**Figure 5.1.17 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

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ANNEX III

MARITIME BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA

1. The line begins at the onshore point along the sea coast "precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Muxwajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet" at coordinates  $16^{\circ} 24' 14.8''$  north and  $42^{\circ} 46' 19.7''$  east.
2. It proceeds in a straight line parallel to the lines of latitude until it reaches the point at coordinates  $16^{\circ} 24' 14.8''$  north and  $42^{\circ} 09' 00.0''$  east.
3. It then turns to the south-west as far as the point at coordinates  $16^{\circ} 17' 24.0''$  north and  $41^{\circ} 47' 00.0''$  east.
4. From there it proceeds in a straight line parallel to the lines of latitude in a westerly direction to the extremity of the maritime boundary between the two countries.

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**Figure 5.1.18 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

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ANNEX IV TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN AND THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF RIGHTS TO PASTURE, THE POSITIONING OF ARMED FORCES BY BOTH SIDES ALONG THE SECOND SECTION OF THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AS ESTABLISHED BY THIS TREATY, AND THE EXPLOITATION OF SHARED NATURAL RESOURCES ALONG THE LAND BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

*Article 1*

(a) The grazing zone on each side in the second section of the boundary-line indicated in this treaty shall be established as 20 kilometres.

(b) The herdsmen of the two countries may use the grazing zones and water sources on both sides of the boundary line in this section in accordance with prevailing tribal traditions and customs up to a depth of not more than 20 kilometres.

(c) The two contracting parties shall hold annual consultations for the designation of crossing points for grazing purposes in accordance with prevailing conditions and prospects for pasture.

*Article 2*

Herdsmen who are nationals of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or nationals of the Republic of Yemen shall be exempt from:

(a) The regulations governing residence and passports. Such herdsmen shall be issued with a transit document by their own authorities;

(b) Taxes and duties on the personal effects, foodstuffs and consumer goods that they carry with them. This shall not prevent either of the parties from imposing customs duties on livestock or merchandise crossing for purposes of trade.

*Article 3*

Each contracting party may impose the restrictions and controls it deems appropriate on the number of vehicles crossing into its territory with the herdsmen and on the type and number of firearms that may be carried subject to their licensing by the relevant authorities of the two countries and the identification of those carrying them.

*Article 4*

In the event of an outbreak of contagious disease in livestock, each party may take the necessary preventive measures and impose restrictions on the importation and exportation of infected animals. The relevant authorities in both countries shall cooperate to the extent possible in limiting the spread of the disease.

Figure 5.1.19 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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*Article 5*

Neither contracting party may deploy its armed forces within 20 kilometres of the second section of the boundary line indicated in this Treaty. Activity by either party on either side shall be limited to the dispatch of mobile security patrols armed with regular weapons.

*Article 6*

In the event of the discovery of a recoverable and exploitable shared natural resource on the boundary line between the two countries from precisely at the sea wall, Ra's al-Mu 'wajj Shami, Radif Qarad outlet, to the point of intersection of latitude 19 north and longitude 52 east the two contracting parties shall undertake the necessary negotiations between them for the joint exploitation of that resource.

*Article 7*

This annex shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall be ratified in accordance with the procedures in effect in each country.

**Figure 5.1.20 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

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PROCÈS-VERBAL OF RECTIFICATION

In view of the fact that there are certain typographical in the text of the International Boundary Treaty between the and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in its four annexes, the corresponding corrections being as follows:

1. In article 3, paragraph 1, of the Treaty - the omission of the words "and annex II" after "annex I"; and their handwritten insertion, with accompanying signatures, into the body of the Treaty;

2 . In annex II - the transposition of the words "North"and "East ; and the reversal of this transposition;

3. In annex III - the formally incorrect sequence in which the elements of the coordinates for the maritime boundary are given (in the Arabic text); and its reversal;

4. In annex IV - the occurrence, by typographical error of the word "Agreement" in place of the word "Treaty"; and its correction - and the transposition of the words "North" and "East"; and its reversal;

The necessary corrections have accordingly been made to of the Treaty and its annexes.

In Witness Whereof, this Procès-verbal was signed in two be retained by each State, on Tuesday, 2 Rabi' II A.D. 1421, corresponding to 4 July A.D. 2000.

Signed at Sana'a,

For the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

SAUD AL-FAISAL  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

For the Government of the Republic of Yemen:

ABDUL-QADER ABDUL - RAHMAN BA - JAMMAL  
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

بِسْمِ اللّٰهِ الرَّحْمٰنِ الرَّحِیْمِ

معاهدة حدود دولية بين

الجمهورية اليمنية والمملكة العربية السعودية

ترسيخاً لعرى الأخوة والمودة وصلة القربى التي تربط الشعبين الشقيقين في  
الجمهورية اليمنية والمملكة العربية السعودية.  
واستناداً إلى ما يجمعهما من أسس ومبادئ العقيدة الإسلامية وقوامها  
التعاون على البر والتقوى.  
وانطلاقاً من ما تنسجها روابط تاريخهما المشترك وأساسها التعاون  
والتعاقد وإشاعة الأمن والسلام والسكينة بينهما.  
وتأسيساً على ما تتميز به العلاقة الأخوية القائمة بين قبلاطي البلدين  
الشقيقين ممثلة بفخامة الرئيس / علي عبدالله صالح رئيس الجمهورية اليمنية  
وأخيه خادم الحرمين الشريفين الملك / فهد بن عبدالعزيز آل سعود ملك المملكة  
العربية السعودية حفظهما الله من مودة وصفاء وحرص على كل ما من شأنه  
ترسيخ وتوطيد العلاقات الأخوية الحميمة بين الشعبين الشقيقين، وحرصاً منهما  
على إيجاد حل دائم لمسألة الحدود البرية والبحرية بين بلديهما بما ترتضيه  
وتصونه الأجيال المتعاقبة حاضراً ومستقبلاً، سواء الحدود التي عيّنتها معاهدة  
الطائف الموقعة بين المملكتين في عام ١٣٥٣ هـ الموافق ١٩٣٤ م ورسمتها

Figure 5.1.22 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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هيئات مشتركة حسبما هو ورا د ومبين في تقارير الحدود الملحقة بالمعاهدة، أو تلك التي لم يتم ترسيمها. فقد تم الاتفاق على ما يلي :

المادة ( ١ ) :

يؤكد الجانبان المتعا هدان على إلزامية وشرعية معاهدة الطائف وملحقاتها بما في ذلك تقارير الحدود الملحقة بها. كما يؤكدان التزامهما بمذكرة التفاهم الموقعة بين البلدين في ٢٧/رمضان/١٤١٥هـ.

المادة ( ٢ ) :

يحدد خط الحدود الفاصل النهائي والدائم بين الجمهورية اليمنية والمملكة العربية السعودية على النحو التالي :

أ - الجزء الأول : يبدأ هذا الجزء من العلامة الساحلية على البحر الأحمر (رصيف البحر تماماً رأس المعوج شامي لمنفذ رديف قراد) وإحداثياتها هي : خط عرض (١٤٠٨٠٢٤٠١٦) شمالاً وخط طول (٧٠١٩٠٤٦٠٤٢٠) شرقاً وينتهي عند علامة جبل الشار وإحداثياتها هي (٥٨٠٢١٠٤٤) شرقاً و(٠٠٠٢٦٠١٧) شمالاً ، وتفصيلها بالإحداثيات الواردة في الملحق رقم (١) ويتم تحديد هوية القرى الواقعة على مسار هذا الجزء من الخط وفقاً لما نصت عليه معاهدة الطائف وملاحقها بما في ذلك إنتماؤها القبلي، وفي حالة وقوع أي من الاحداثيات على موقع أو مواقع قريبة أو قرى أحد الطرفين فإن المرجعية في إثبات تبعية هذه القرية أو القرى هو إنتماؤها لأحد الطرفين ويتم تعديل مسار الخط وفقاً لذلك عند وضع العلامات الحدودية.

ب : الجزء الثاني : هو ذلك الجزء من خط الحدود الذي لم يتم ترسيمه ، فقد اتفق الطرفان المتعا هدان على ترسيم هذا الجزء بصورة ودية ويبدأ هذا الجزء من

Figure 5.1.23 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia



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جبل الثار المحددة إحداثياته أعلاه وينتهي عند نقطة النسق الجغرافي لتقاطع خط عرض (١٩) شمالاً مع خط طول (٥٢) شرقاً وتفصيلها بالإحداثيات الواردة في الملحق رقم (٢).

ج : الجزء الثالث : هو الجزء البحري من الحدود الذي يبدأ من العلامة البرية على ساحل البحر (رصيف البحر تماماً رأس المعوج شامي لمنفذ رديف قراد) المحددة إحداثياتها أعلاه وينتهي بنهاية الحدود البحرية بين الدولتين وتفصيلها بالإحداثيات في المرفق رقم (٣).

المادة ( ٣ )

١- بغية وضع العلامات (الساريات) على خط الحدود بدءاً من نقطة إلتقاء حدود البلدين مع حدود سلطنة عُمان الشقيقة عند النسق الجغرافي لتقاطع دائرة العرض (١٩) شمالاً وخط طول (٥٢) شرقاً وانتهاء برصيف البحر تماماً رأس المعوج شامي لمنفذ رديف قراد بإحداثياته الواردة في الملحق رقم (١) فإن الطرفين المتعاهدين سوف يكلفان شركة دولية بالقيام بالمسح الميداني لكامل الحدود البرية والبحرية، وعلى الشركة المنقذة المتخصصة والفريق المشترك من الجانبين المتعاهدين التقيد الصارم بالمسافات والجهات بين كل نقطة والنقطة التي تليها وبقيّة الأوصاف الواردة في تقارير الحدود الملحقة بمعاهدة الطائف وهذه أحكام ملزمة للطرفين.

٢- سوف تقوم الشركة الدولية المتخصصة بإعداد خرائط مفصلة لخط الحدود البرية بين البلدين وسوف تعتمد هذه الخرائط بعد توقيعها من قبل ممثلي الجمهورية اليمنية والمملكة العربية السعودية بصفتها خرائط رسمية تبين

Figure 5.1.24 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

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الحدود الفاصلة بين البلدين وتصبح جزءاً لا يتجزأ من هذه المعاهدة، وسوف يوقع الطرفان المتعاهدان على اتفاق حول تغطية تكاليف أعمال الشركة المكلفة بتشييد العلامات على طول خط الحدود البرية الفاصل بين البلدين.

المادة ( ٤ ) :

يؤكد الطرفان المتعاهدان التزامهما بالمادة الخامسة من معاهدة الطائف وذلك فيما يتعلق بإخلاء أي موقع عسكري ثقل مسافته عن خمسة كيلومترات على طول خط الحدود المرسم بناءً على تقارير الحدود الملحقة بمعاهدة الطائف. أما بالنسبة لخط الحدود الذي لم يتم ترسيمه بدأ من جبل الثار حتى نقطة تقاطع خط عرض (١٩) شمالاً مع خط طول (٥٢) شرقاً فيحكمه الملحق رقم (٤) المرفق بهذه المعاهدة.

المادة ( ٥ ) :

تصبح هذه المعاهدة نافذة المفعول بعد التصديق عليها طبقاً للإجراءات المتبعة في كل من البلدين المتعاهدين وتبادل وثائق التصديق عليها من قبل الدولتين.

عن المملكة العربية السعودية  
سعود الفيصل  
وزير الخارجية

عن الجمهورية اليمنية  
عبدالقادر عبدالرحمن باجمال  
نائب رئيس مجلس الوزراء  
وزير الخارجية

جدة ١٤٢١/٣/١٠ هـ  
الموافق ٢٠٠٠/٦/١٢ م

Figure 5.1.25 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

[ ARABIC TEXT — TEXTE ARABE ]

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

محضر اجتماع

بشأن إجراء بعض التصحيحات

نظراً لوجود بعض الأخطاء المطبعية والشكلية في معاهدة الحدود الدولية بين الجمهورية اليمنية والمملكة العربية السعودية وملحقاتها الأربعة، وتتمثل هذه الأخطاء التي جرى تصويبها على النحو التالي:-

١- في نص المعاهدة المادة رقم (٣) فقرة (١) وهو عدم وضع [الملحق رقم (٢)] بعد الملحق رقم (١)، وقد جرى إضافة ذلك بخط اليد في صلب المعاهدة، وجرى التوقيع عليه.

٢- في الملحق رقم (٢) ورد خطأ مطبعي بوضع كلمة [شماليات] وكلمة [شرقيات] كل منهما مكان الأخرى، وتم التصحيح.

٣- في الملحق رقم (٣) وجد خطأ شكلي بعدم ترتيب إحداثيات خط الحدود البحرية، وقد تم ترتيبها على النحو الصحيح.

٤- في الملحق رقم (٤) وجد خطأ مطبعي بإيراد كلمة [اتفاقية] بدلاً من مطاهدة ووضع كلمة [شمالاً] وكلمة [شرقاً] كل منهما مكان الأخرى، وتم التصحيح.

وعليه فقد تم إجراء التصحيح اللازم في النسختين الأصليتين للمعاهدة وملاحقها، وإثباتاً لذلك تم توقيع هذا المحضر من نسختين أصليتين احتفظت كل دولة بنسخة منه، وذلك في يوم الثلاثاء الثاني من شهر ربيع الآخر من عام ١٤٢١ هـ الموافق لليوم الرابع من شهر يوليو من عام ٢٠٠٠ م.

وقع بصنعاء :

عن  
الجمهورية اليمنية  
عبد القادر عتبة الترحيم باجمال  
نائب رئيس الوزراء - وزير الخارجية

عن  
المملكة العربية السعودية  
سعود الفيصل  
وزير الخارجية

Figure 5.1.26 International Border Treaty between the Republic of Yemen and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

## 5.2. Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

The MoU was formally accepted by the two governments, and signed by only one representative of each country. It was signed on behalf of the Yemeni Government by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Development, Abdul-Kader Ba- Jamal. It was however not treated as an international treaty and was consequently not ratified by the Yemeni Parliament.

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[ ARABIC TEXT — TEXTE ARABE ]

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ  
مذكرة تفاهم

بين حكومة المملكة العربية السعودية وحكومة الجمهورية اليمنية  
رغبة في ترسيخ وتمتين أواصر العلاقات الاخوية بين المملكة  
العربية السعودية والجمهورية اليمنية وشعبيهما الشقيقين.  
فقد اتفق الطرفان على مايلي:

المادة الأولى:

يؤكد الطرفان تمسكهما بشرعية والزامية معاهدة الطائف الموقعة في  
السادس من شهر صفر سنة ١٣٥٣هـ الموافق ٢٠ مايو لسنة ١٩٣٤م  
وملاحقتها وهي المعروفة باسم "معاهدة الطائف" (التي يشار إليها  
لاحقا باسم المعاهدة).

المادة الثانية:

تشكل لجنة مشتركة من عدد متساو من الطرفين خلال مدة لا تتجاوز  
ثلاثين يوما تكون مهمتها تجديد العلامات المقامه طبقا لتقارير  
الحدود الملحقة بالمعاهدة الموجود منها والمنثدر وذلك ابتداء من  
نقطة الحدود (رصيف البحر تماما رأس المعوج شامي لمنفذ رديف  
قران) بين ميلدي والموسم وحتى آخر نقطة سبق ترسيمها في جبل  
الشار. واستخدام الوسائل العلمية الحديثة لاقامة العلامات (السايرات)  
عليها وذلك بالاتفاق مع شركة متخصصة لتنفيذ ذلك يتم اختيارها  
من قبل الطرفين وتقوم الشركة بعملها تحت اشراف اللجنة.

المادة الثالثة:

تستمر اللجنة الحالية المشكله من البلدين في عملها لتحديد  
الاجراءات اللازمة والخطوات التي تؤدي الى ترسيم ماتبقى من

Figure 5.2.1 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

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الحدود بدءاً من جبل النار وحتى منتهى حدود البلدين، بما في ذلك الاتفاق على كيفية التحكيم في حال الاختلاف بين البلدين.

المادة الرابعة:

تشكل لجنة مشتركة تتولى التفاوض بشأن تعيين الحدود البحرية وفقاً للقانون الدولي ابتداءً من نقطة الحدود على ساحل البحر الأحمر المشار إليها في المادة الثانية أعلاه.

المادة الخامسة:

تشكل لجنة عسكرية مشتركة رفيعة المستوى من الطرفين لضمان منع أي استحداثات أو تحركات عسكرية أو غيرها وذلك على الحدود بين البلدين.

المادة السادسة:

تشكل لجنة وزارية مشتركة لتطوير العلاقات الاقتصادية والتجارية والثقافية بين البلدين وتعزيز أوجه التعاون بينهما وتبدأ هذه اللجنة عملها خلال ثلاثين يوماً من تاريخ التوقيع على هذه المذكرة.

المادة السابعة:

تعيين لجنة عليا مشتركة للعمل على تحقيق مأسبق وتسهيل مهمات اللجان المذكورة وإزالة ما قد يعترض سير أعمالها من معوقات أو صعوبات.

المادة الثامنة:

يؤكد البلدان التزام كل منهما بعدم السماح باستعمال بلاده قاعدة ومركزاً للاعتداء على البلد الآخر أو للقيام بأي نشاط مياسي أو عسكري أو اعلامي ضد الطرف الآخر.

المادة التاسعة:

من أجل الاستمرار في المحافظة على تهيئة الاجواء الودية المناسبة

Figure 5.2.2 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

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دجاج المحادثات يلتزم كل طرف بعدم القيام بأي نشاط دعائي ضد  
الطرف الآخر.

المادة العاشرة:

ليس في هذه المذكرة ما يتضمن تعديلا لمعاهدة الطائف وملاحقها بما  
في ذلك تقارير الحدود.

المادة الحادية عشرة:

يتم ضبط وتدوين كل ما يتم بحثه في اللجان المذكورة في محاضر  
يوقع عليها من قبل المسؤولين في الجانبين.  
تم توقيع هذه المذكرة في مكة المكرمة في يوم الأحد السابع والعشرين  
من شهر رمضان المبارك لعام ١٤١٥ هـ الموافق السادس والعشرين من  
شهر فبراير لعام ١٩٩٥ م وتصيح نافذة من تاريخ تبادل وثائق التصديق  
عليها،



عن حكومة المملكة العربية السعودية	عن حكومة الجمهورية اليمنية
المستشار الخاص لخادم الحرمين الشريفين	نائب رئيس الوزراء ووزير التخطيط والتنمية
	
أبراهيم بن عبدالله المتقري	عبدالقادر عبدالرحمن باجمال
١٤١٥/٩/٢٤	

Figure 5.2.3 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

**No. 43166****Saudi Arabia  
and  
Yemen**

**Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Government of the Republic of Yemen. Mecca, 26 February 1995**

**Entry into force:** *15 May 1995 by the exchange of instruments of ratification, in accordance with article 10*

**Authentic text:** *Arabic*

**Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations:** *Saudi Arabia, 9 October 2006*

**Arabie saoudite  
et  
Yémen**

**Mémorandum d'accord entre le Gouvernement du Royaume d'Arabie saoudite et le Gouvernement de la République du Yémen. La Mecque, 26 février 1995**

**Entrée en vigueur :** *15 mai 1995 par échange des instruments de ratification, conformément à l'article 10*

**Texte authentique :** *arabe*

**Enregistrement auprès du Secrétariat des Nations Unies :** *Arabie saoudite, 9 octobre 2006*

Figure 5.2.4 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)



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[TRANSLATION - TRADUCTION]

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE MOST GRACIOUS, THE MOST MERCIFUL

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARAB AND THE GOVERNMENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Desiring to promote and strengthen the brotherly bonds between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Yemen and their brotherly peoples, the Two Parties have agreed as follows:

*Article 1*

The Two Parties confirm their commitment to the legality and binding Treaty of Taif signed on the 6th of Safar 1353H, corresponding to the 20th of May 1934, and its annexes, which is known as the "Treaty of Taif" (referred to hereinafter as "the Treaty").

*Article 2*

A joint committee of an equal number of members from the two parties shall be formed within a period not exceeding thirty days. Its task shall be to renew existing and erased markers established in accordance with the border reports annexed to the Treaty, starting from the border point (Rasif al Bahar Tamaman Ra'sal Mu'awwaj Shami Li Manfadh Radif Qirad) between Midi and al Muwassam until the last point previously demarcated at Jabal ath Thar, and to use modern scientific means to install the marks (pillars) thereon. A specialized company, chosen by the Two Parties, shall be contracted to execute the said task under the committee's supervision

*Article 3*

The current committee formed by the two countries shall continue its work to determine the necessary procedures and steps which lead to the demarcation of the rest of the borders starting from Jabal ath Thar until the end of the borders of the two countries, including agreement on how to seek arbitration in case of disagreement between the two countries.

*Article 4*

A joint committee shall be formed to negotiate the designation of maritime borders in accordance with international law, starting from the border point of coast mentioned in Article 2 above.

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Figure 5.2.5 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

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*Article 5*

A joint high-ranking military committee from both parties shall be formed to ensure that no installations or military movements or others take place on the borders between the two countries.

*Article 6*

A joint ministerial committee shall be formed to promote economic, commercial and cultural ties between the two countries and to enhance mutual cooperation between them. This committee shall start its work within thirty days from the date of signing this Memorandum of Understanding "Memorandum".

*Article 7*

A joint high committee shall be appointed to work towards achieving the aforementioned, facilitate the work of the said committees, and remove any obstacles or difficulties that might arise during the course of their assignments

*Article 8*

Each of the two countries affirms its commitment not to permit the use of its country as a base and center for carrying out aggression against the other staging any political, military or propaganda activities against the other

*Article 9*

In order to continue maintaining the friendly atmosphere necessary for the success of talks, each party shall be obliged not to carry out any hostile propaganda against the other party.

*Article 10*

This Memorandum contains no amendment to the "Treaty of Taif" and its annexes, including the border reports.

*Article 11*

All matters discussed by the said committees shall be recorded in m signed by the officials of the two sides.

Figure 5.2.6 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)

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This Memorandum was signed in Mecca on Sunday, the 27th of Ramadhan 1415AH, corresponding to the 26th of February 1995, and shall become effective date of exchanging its ratification documents.

For the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia :  
Special Advisor to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques  
IBRAHIM BIN ABDULLAH AL ANGERI

For the Government of the Republic of Yemen:  
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning and Development  
ABDULQADER ABDURRAHMAN BAJAMMAL  
[Signed on 27/9/141 5H]

**Figure 5.2.7 Memorandum of Understanding (26 April 1995)**

### **5.3. Daham Tribe Rejects the Jeddah Border Treaty and Threatens Demarcation Companies**

This statement, issued by the Dahm Al-Hamraa tribe, affirms that the tribe would not allow any demarcation company to work on its land according to the Jeddah border treaty signed between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in 2000.

Here is a summary of the statement:

“We are awaiting a just solution to the issue of our land and tribal borders as illustrated by the documents beforehand, a copy of which has been handed to the President, which includes: verdicts by the Sheriff of Nijran In 1027 and 1130 Hijrah, a verdict by the Sheriff of Mecca Abdulqader bin Abdulhameed in 1182, etc. and other documents. After we have notified the leadership of Saudi Arabia about our legal and ancestral right to our land that we inherited from our grandfathers 400 years ago, we were totally surprised to hear about the company assigned to demarcate the borders. Despite our appeal to the leadership of the two countries to seriously consider our problem we have been ignored and neglected. Therefore, we find ourselves forced to forbid any company from working on our land. At the same time we trust that there are still opportunities for those who are determined to solve the problem before the aforementioned company starts its activities”.

For and on behalf of Sheikhs and tribesmen of Daham Al-Hamraa Tribe Yahya b. Abdullah Al-Shayef (Yemen Times, 18- April 2001).



Figure 5.3.1 Daham Tribe Rejects the Jeddah Border Treaty and Threatens Demarcation Companies

## 6.1. Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

Unlike the years since June 2000, 2012 was completely different. Several groups of Yemeni activists and lawyers announced the establishment of what they called the 'Asir Movement' and the 'Yemeni Organisation for the Restoration of Sovereignty' (*siadah*). It defines its aims as the liberation the Yemeni territories from Saudi Arabian occupation and to enhance Yemeni domestic awareness of their rights to the territories under Saudi occupation as a prelude to the establishment of civil and public rejection of both the Taif and Jeddah Treaties.

The inflammation of the situation in 2012 is certainly linked to the uncertainty regarding the Saudi position towards the revolt against President Saleh that erupted in 2011, and which culminated in him being forced to step down from power by the end of that year. This was despite the fact that Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries played a significant role in precipitating Saleh's departure, including in their GCC initiative and its operational mechanism (based upon which President Ali Abdullah Saleh transferred his authorities to Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, the Vice President). Despite the importance of the Saudi role and support during such a difficult time the territorial issue resurfaced onto the political arena.

These developments, however, prove the argument advanced in this thesis that the Saudi-Yemeni dilemma is more than just a boundary dispute. Significantly, Saudi Arabia was blamed because the developments in June and July 2012 had coincided with the publication of reports detailing (by *Al-Ahali* newspaper) the amounts the Saudis had been spending through 'The Special Office for Yemen Affairs'. It is alleged that the list of names receiving such a regular payment comprises important politicians in Yemen, including the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the sons of Sheikh Al-Ahmer, as well as many others.

Nevertheless, those who denounced the agreement over the boundary dispute made explicit the links between their position on the treaty and their views on a number of other matters. For instance, among the issues brought to light in addition to the territorial issue was the legality of Saudi Arabia's building of a barrier along its boundary with Yemen. In addition, attention was drawn to reports of Saudi mistreatment of Yemeni migrants in the Kingdom.





7/19/12

عرجلنا تعبروملها ، ايديبوشيو - ريس ع تفرح  
الدقيق لقضاياه الوطنية و مشاريعه السيادة الحقيقية و الكبرى المسجدة لحضارة اليمن و مساحتها و عمقها التاريخي العظيم .

## الأهداف الإعلامية

- 1- تأسيس صحيفة يمنية داخلية أو خارجية تحت اسم : عسير اليمنية .. تكون ناطقة باسم الحركة باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية . و موقع ويب تفاعلي و ناشط . و مواقع على شبكات التواصل الإجتماعي .
- 2- طباعة بروشورات تعريفية بكميات ضخمة و توزيعها في كل المحافل و المنظمات و الندوات و المؤتمرات اليمنية .
- 3- إنتاج أفلام وثائقية تاريخية تحكي قصة الإحتلال السعودي للأراضي اليمنية و كيفية ضمها و إلحاقها قسراً و كرهاً . و إنكار الحق اليمني فيها و بثها في قنوات تلفزيونية حليفة و مؤيدة للحق اليمني .
- 4- طباعة خرائط جغرافية محكمة تضم كافة أراضي اليمن الطبيعي و توزيعها في كافة المكتبات و المحال و المؤسسات و المنظمات اليمنية في الداخل و الخارج ، و تشجيع الزارات و السفارات اليمنية على تعليقها و كذلك تشجيع وزارة التربية و التعليم اليمنية على ضمها إلى مقررات التدريس الاساسي للمنهج الوطني لطلاب الابتدائية و الإعدادية .
- 5- عقد المؤتمرات و الندوات الداخلية و الخارجية المطالبة بالدعم العربي و الإقليمي و الدولي المساند للقضية اليمنية الشرعية في إستعادة أراضيها و بسط نفوذها على كافة جغرافيتها و حدوده الطبيعية و التاريخية .
- 6- التعريف الإعلامي الحكيم و الرصين و الثابت باتجاه الوعي المحلي و تعزيز دوره في تبني قضية الحركة داخلياً و حشد تأييدها و حراسة أهدافها بعمق و مسؤولية و وطنية كاملة غير منقوصة الولاء أو الإيمان لما من شأن ذلك من تأثير حقيقي على مستوى الإنجاز للأهداف و المُثل الثابتة و المحددة في أساسيات حركة "عسير اليمنية" .
- 7- تبني إصدار البيانات و المنشورات و عقد المؤتمرات الصحافية المستمرة للتعريف الثابت بالحق اليمني المغطى و المحتل وفق رؤية إستراتيجية و منهجية إعلامية يمكن إعدادها من قبل عدد من الحكماء و الخبراء المؤسسين لهذه الحركة الوطنية الوجودية .
- 8- نشر كتيبات تعريفية عن أهمية دور و موارد طبيعة الأراضي اليمنية المغتصبة و شرح ما تم نهبه منها و ضرورة تعريف الناس بأهميتها و تأثيرها كأساس لا يمكن لأي شخص أو حكومة التنازل عنها بإعتبار أراضي الشعوب لا تخضع للمساومة و لا يملك كائننا من كان حق التنازل عنها أو التوقيع نيابة عن الشعب اليمني بما لا يملك و منحه للغاصب و شرعنة إحتلاله و إغتصابه و إيذائه المستمر لليمن و إهانتها للكرامة اليمنية المغدورة هناك .

## أنشطة

عقدت الحركة عدة لقاءات تشاورية مع عدد من الحقوقيين بهدف العمل على رفع دعوى قضائية في المحاكم اليمنية و الدولية لإدانة الإحتلال السعودي و الإعراف بالحق اليمني على كافة حدوده الطبيعية و الجغرافية و التاريخية و تجري تحضيرات لعقد مؤتمرات وطنية و لقاءات مع مختصين بالقانون الدولي ، وحقوقيين و جغرافيين و مؤرخين ، في كل من صنعاء وبيروت من أجل إعداد مشروع متكامل و خطة عمل للحركة و طباعة خرائط و ملصقات و كتيبات و وثائق عن الأرض اليمنية المحتلة ، إضافة إلى إقامة و فئات احتجاجية و لقاءات ميدانية و ندوات توعوية في العديد من المناطق اليمنية و المؤسسات التعليمية بهدف تعزيز الوعي اليمني الكامل تجاه قضاياه و حقوقه الإستراتيجية ، كأهداف مرحلية في سبيل إستعادة الحق اليمني في أراضيها

## أحكام عامة

- 1- إن إستعادة الأراضي اليمنية (عسير و نجران و جيزان) هو إستعادة للسيادة و الإستقلال من الهيمنة السعودية ، وإن أي مساومة أو تنازل هو تنازل عن سيادة الوطن و إستقلاله.
- 2- ترفض الحركة أن تكون قضية الأراضي اليمنية المحتلة مادة للمساومات و التجاذبات و التسويات و ترفض من المنطق نفسه أن تكون الأراضي اليمنية ورقة بيد كائن من كان لعقد الصفقات و إمضاء التسويات .
- 3- تأمل الحركة من كل الدول العربية و الإقليمية أن يكون لها دور إيجابي و سيط في سبيل إستعادة الأرض اليمنية.
- 4- تعتبر الحركة قضية إستعادة الأرض اليمنية هماً وطنياً مشتركاً ، ينبغي أن ينأى الجميع به عن التجاذبات السياسية و الانقسامات الحاصلة بين الأفرقاء ... و تؤكد أيضاً أن المعركة (السياسية) لإستعادة الأراضي اليمنية تحت الإحتلال السعودي هي معركة كل اليمنيين ، مهما كان موقعهم ، و أنها تتطلب موقفاً وطنياً و مسؤولاً ينأى بها عن أي شكل من أشكال التوظيف في الصراع السياسي بين الأحزاب السياسية .
- 5- فتح باب الإنتساب للحركة غير ضروري بقدر ما هو شعور وطني و حس عام .

حركة عسير ([http://arabic.rt.com/news\\_all\\_news/news/586916/](http://arabic.rt.com/news_all_news/news/586916/))

تصنيف: الثورات العربية

- آخر تعديل لهذه الصفحة في 20:09، 14 يوليو 2012.
- النصوص منشورة برخصة المشاع الإبداعي: النسبة-الترخيص بالمثل 3.0. قد تنطبق مواد أخرى. طالع شروط الاستخدام للتفاصيل.

الرئيسية » حركة «عسير» اليمنية تعلن عن تحرك لاستعادة أراضي من «الاحتلال» السعودي

## حركة «عسير» اليمنية تعلن عن تحرك لاستعادة أراضي من «الاحتلال» السعودي

تاريخ نشر هذا الخبر: 06 يونيو 2012 - الساعة: 08:03 - من: اليمن - آخر المستجدات - محليات

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يمن فويس- صنعاء :

دعت حركة «عسير» الحقوقية اليمنية الأربعاء 6-6-2012 الى استعادة اراض يمنية تضم محافظات نجران وجيزان قائلة ان نظام الرئيس السابق علي عبد الله صالح تنازل عنها لمن وصفته بـ «الاحتلال السعودي» الذي اتهمته بالسيطرة على إقليم عسير اليمني بموجب معاهلتي الطائف وجدة الحدوديتين بين اليمن والسعودية.

وأعلن الناطق باسم الحركة عبد الرحمن الأشول في بيان وفقاً لـ«يوتيبي أي» «عن مساعي الحركة لاستعادة الأراضي اليمنية (عسير ونجران و جيزان) كمنخل لاستعادة السيادة والاستقلال من الهيمنة السعودية».

واعتبرت الحركة «قضية استعادة الأرض اليمنية هماً وطنياً مشتركاً، ينبغي أن يناه الجميع به عن التجاذبات السياسية والانقسامات الحاصلة بين الفرقاء».

وقال الأشول «أن المعركة السياسية لاستعادة الأراضي اليمنية تحت الاحتلال السعودي هي معركة كل اليمنيين، مهما كان موقعهم، وأنها تتطلب موقفاً وطنياً ومسؤولاً يناه بها عن أي شكل من أشكال التوظيف في الصراع السياسي بين الأحزاب السياسية».

وطالب بضرورة «تحقيق عدد من الأهداف التي تؤكد الحق اليمني التاريخي والجغرافي للأراضي اليمنية، وتوحيد الجبهة اليمنية الداخلية في رفض التحكم السعودي اتصل بنا خريطة الموقع معرض الصور كاريكاتير سياسة الخصوصية English

Figure 6.1.3 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

وأدان "الشخصيات اليمنية التي تمد يدها للمال والدعم السعودي، وضرورة اتخاذ موقف قنوني بحققها باعتبار أنها ساعدت و ساهمت في إغماط الحق اليمني التاريخي في أرضه المحتلة من قبل الجارة المقصبة لثروات اليمنيين وأرضهم و مواردهم الطبيعية".

وأشار الأشول إلى ان الحركة "ستقوم بعقد عدة لقاءات تشاورية مع عدد من الحقوقيين بهدف العمل على رفع دعوى قضائية في المحاكم اليمنية و الدولية لإدانة "الاحتلال السعودي"، والاعتراف بالحق اليمني على كافة حدوده الطبيعية و الجغرافية و التاريخية".

وكشف عن انه تجري تحضيرات "لعقد لقاءات تشاورية مع مختصين في القانون الدولي وحقوقيين وجغرافيين ومؤرخين في كل من صنعاء وبيروت من أجل إعداد مشروع متكامل وخطة عمل للحركة وطباعة خرائط وملصقات وكتيبات ووثائق عن الأرض اليمنية المحتلة، إضافة إلى إقامة وقلات احتجاجية ولقاءات ميدانية وندوات توعوية في العديد من المناطق اليمنية، والمؤسسات التعليمية".

يشار إلى أن اليمن والسعودية وقعتا على اتفاقية نهائية للحدود بين البلدين التي تصل الى نحو 1800 كلم في 12 يونيو / حزيران 2000. وتقول المعارضة اليمنية في تلك الفترة ان نظام الرئيس السابق تنازل بموجبها عن إقليم عسير مقابل نحو 18 مليار دولار توزعها كبار النافذين في النظام.

Figure 6.1.4 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)



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يمن نيشن < سياسة وأحزاب

**حركة يمنية تدعو لاستعادة إقليم عسير ونجران وجيزان من السعودية**

08:37 2012/06/06

يمن نيشن- وكالات



دعت حركة "عسير" الحقوقية اليمنية اليوم الأربعاء الى استعادة  
أراض يمنية تضم محافظات نجران وجيزان وقالت ان نظام الرئيس  
السابق علي عبد الله صالح تنازل عنها لمن وصفته بـ "الاحتلال  
السعودي" الذي اتهمته بالسيطرة على إقليم عسير اليمني بموجب  
معاهدتي الطائف و جدة الحدوديتين بين اليمن والسعودية.

وأعلن الناطق باسم الحركة عبد الرحمن الأشول في بيان اليوم " عن  
مساعي الحركة لاستعادة الأراضي اليمنية (عسير ونجران و  
جيزان) كمدخل لاستعادة السيادة والاستقلال من الهيمنة السعودية "

واعتبرت الحركة "قضية استعادة الأرض اليمنية همأ وطنياً مشتركاً، ينبغي أن يبنى الجميع به عن التجاذبات السياسية  
والانقسامات الحاصلة بين الفرقاء".

وقال الأشول "إن المعركة "السياسية" لاستعادة الأراضي اليمنية تحت الاحتلال السعودي هي معركة كل اليمنيين، مهما  
كان موقعهم، وأنها تتطلب موقفاً وطنياً ومسؤولاً يبنى بها عن أي شكل من أشكال التوظيف في الصراع السياسي بين  
الأحزاب السياسية".

وطالب بضرورة "تحقيق عدد من الأهداف التي تؤكد الحق اليمني التاريخي والجغرافي للأراضي اليمنية، وتوحيد الجبهة  
اليمنية الداخلية في رفض التحكم السعودي بمسارات القرارات اليمنية".

وأدان "الشخصيات اليمنية التي تمد يدها للمال والدعم السعودي، وضرورة اتخاذ موقف قانوني بحقها باعتبار أنها ساعدت  
و ساهمت في إغماط الحق اليمني التاريخي في أرضه المحتلة من قبل الجارة المتغصبة لثروات اليمنيين وأرضهم و  
مواردهم الطبيعية".

وأشار الأشول إلى ان الحركة "ستقوم بعقد عدة لقاءات تشاورية مع عدد من الحقوقيين بهدف العمل على رفع دعوى  
قضائية في المحاكم اليمنية و الدولية لإدانة "الاحتلال السعودي"، و الاعتراف بالحق اليمني على كافة حدوده الطبيعية و  
الجغرافية و التاريخية".

وكشف عن انه تجري تحضيرات "لعدد لقاءات تشاورية مع مختصين في القانون الدولي وحقوقيين وجغرافيين ومؤرخين  
في كل من صنعاء وبيروت من أجل إعداد مشروع متكامل وخطة عمل للحركة وطباعة خرائط وملصقات وكتيبات ووثائق  
عن الأرض اليمنية المحتلة، إضافة إلى إقامة وقفات احتجاجية ولقاءات ميدانية وندوات توعوية في العديد من المناطق  
اليمنية، والمؤسسات التعليمية".

يشار إلى أن اليمن والسعودية وقعتا على اتفاقية نهائية للحدود بين البلدين التي تصل الى نحو 1800 كلم في 12 يونيو /  
حزيران 2000. وتقول المعارضة اليمنية في تلك الفترة ان نظام الرئيس السابق تنازل بموجبها عن إقليم عسير مقابل نحو  
18 مليار دولار توزعها كبار النافذين في النظام.

يو بي أي

Figure 6.1.5 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

خبراء محليين وإقليميين في مجال التاريخ والجغرافيا والحقوق للإطلاق الشامل نحو تأسيس الدولة اليمنية الطبيعية، وتأسيس لجنة حامرين متطوعين للمساهمة في رفع قضايا في الداخل والخارج وتعريف المجتمع بأهمية و أساسية الحق اليمني التاريخي في أرضيه محتملة كما جاء في بيان التأسيس.

أضافت الحركة في بيان تأسيسها أنها تسعى إلى استخدام كافة الوسائل المتاحة لاستعادة الحقوق والأراضي اليمنية المنهوبة من قبل نظام الرياض، ومطالبة نظام آل سعود بالاعتذار العلني عن الاحتلال المستمر للأراضي اليمنية المعروفة "جيزان، نجران، عسير"، تعويض الأمة اليمنية التعويض المناسب والطبيعي لما تم نهبه وإخضاعه للمصلحة السعودية من ثروات اليمن المقصبة، ودعوة لمنظمات المدنية اليمنية إلى عقد تحالف إستراتيجي ولوجستي مع حركة عسير اليمنية لتبني مواقفها والتعاضد بشأن استعادة السيادة ليمنية الكاملة غير المنقوصة، وتهيئة الرأي العام اليمني الداخلي والخارجي من أجل الاهتمام الشامل و الدقيق لقضايا الوطنيه و شاريعه السيادة الحقيقية والكبرى المجسدة لحضارة اليمن و مساحتها و عمقها التاريخي العظيم.

نوّهت الحركة على أنها ستقوم بعقد عدة لقاءات تشاورية مع عدد من الحقوقيين بهدف العمل على رفع دعوى قضائية في المحاكم ليمنية و الدولية لإدانة "الاحتلال السعودي"، والاعتراف بالحق اليمني على كافة حدوده الطبيعية و الجغرافية و التاريخية، حيث تجري حضيرات لعقد لقاءات تشاورية مع مختصين في القانون الدولي، وحقوقيين وجغرافيين ومؤرخين في كل من صنعاء وبيروت من أجل عداد مشروع متكامل وخطة عمل للحركة وطباعة خرائط وملصقات وكتيبات ووثائق عن الأرض اليمنية المحتلة، إضافة إلى إقامة لقاءات احتجاجية ولقاءات ميدانية وندوات توعوية في العديد من المناطق اليمنية، والمؤسسات التعليمية.

Figure 6.1.6 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

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رابطاً | «ريسح» قد عتصمياً ظرح

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6 June 2012

حركة استعادة «عسير»

مطالبة مشروعة أم أهداف مشبوهة؟



من التظاهرات المنددة بالتدخل السعودي في نجران العام الماضي (خالد عبد الله - رويترز)

أعاد الإعلان عن ولادة حركة «عسير»، الهادفة إلى «استعادة الأراضي اليمنية من الاحتلال السعودي»، الملف الحدودي بين اليمن والسعودية إلى دائرة الضوء. وبينما تصّر الحركة على أن تحركها محض محلي نابع من الرفض للمعاهدات المجحفة التي اقتطعت أراضي يمنية، تلاحق الحركة تهمة الارتباط بأطراف إقليمية تسعى إلى مناكفة السعودية من البوابة اليمنية

جماعة فرحات

قبل أيام كشفت صحيفة «الشارع» اليمنية عن لائحة بأسماء كبار مسؤولي الدولة اليمنية ومشايخها الذين يتلقون أموالاً شهرية من السعودية. أموال يدرك اليمنيون أنه لولاها لما كانت السعودية قد نجحت في تأمين ولاء كبار المسؤولين والناقدون اليمنيين، وجعلهم رهينة لها ولمصالحها في اليمن طوال السنوات السابقة. ولعل أبرز تجليات هذا الارتهان، في نظر الكثيرين، كان عبر التوقيع على معاهدة جدة الحدودية لعام 2000، والتي أقر بموجبها تنازل اليمن نهائياً عن مناطق عسير ونجران وجيزان، التي كانت موضع نزاع بين البلدين منذ عقود.

ضمن هذا المنطلق، أعلنت مجموعة من الناشطين والحقوقيين اليمنيين، قبل فترة وجيزة، إنشاء حركة «عسير» الهادفة إلى استعادة هذه المناطق. الحركة التي تعرّف عن نفسها بأنها «مدنية شعبية»، حددت أهدافها في بيانها التأسيسي «الأولي» «بتشكيل وعي يمني داخلي وتأسيس وتعميق أهمية الوعي الجماهيري الوطني نحو حقوقه وأراضيه الواقعة تحت الاحتلال السعودي»، تمهيداً أمام تأسيس رفض جماهيري ومدني لمعاهدتي الطائف وجدة الحدوديتين.

Figure 6.1.7 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

رابطه ال | «رييس ع» تداغ عسرا ظرح

كذلك، شددت الحركة على ضرورة «توحيد الجبهة اليمنية الداخلية في رفض التحكم السعودي بمسارات القرارات اليمنية، وإدانة الشخصيات اليمنية التي تمد يدها للمال السعودي»، فضلاً عن «ضرورة اتخاذ موقف قانوني يحقها باعتبار أنها ساعدت وساهمت في إضاعة الحق اليمني التاريخي في أرضه المحتلة من قبل الجارة المغتصبة لثرواتنا وأرضنا ومواردنا الطبيعية».

لكن ظهور الحركة، في وقت تحول فيه اليمن إلى ورقة للتجادبات الإقليمية، لم يكن ليتمر دون ظهور العديد من المواقف اليمنية المنتقدة للحركة، فضلاً عن ظهور من يشكك في الأهداف من وراء تأسيسها وتوقيتها. مدير «مركز سبأ للدراسات الاستراتيجية»، أحمد سيف المصعبي، رأى، في حديث مع «الأخبار»، أن «ما تطالب به الحركة أمر غير قابل للتحقيق»، ووضعا الحركة في سياق المناقشة الإقليمية. وشدد على أن الحدود تم التوافق عليها في إطار ميثاق دولية وضعت نسخ منها في الأمم المتحدة. وأضاف «الحركة ليس هدفها مصلحة اليمن، بقدر ما هو استدراج السعودية إلى نزاعات جانبية»، متهماً إيران بالوقوف وراء الحركة وتمويلها، قبل أن يؤكد أن ليس لدى هذه الحركة، من وجهة نظره، أي حظ في النجاح.

لكن المتحدث باسم الحركة، عبد الرحمن الأشول، نفى الاتهامات التي تصب في هذا الإطار. وأكد لـ«الأخبار» أن الحركة «لا تقف وراءها أطراف يمنية أو غير يمنية، ولا تسعى لذلك أبداً». وشدد على أن الحركة تسعى خلال الفترة المقبلة لعقد «عدة لقاءات تشاورية مع قانونيين ومختصين عرب ويمنيين للخروج بدراسة عميقة ومشروع يكون خارطة طريق لاستعادة الأرض اليمنية، وهو مشروع وطني 100 في المئة».

بدوره، فضل مصدر يمني مطلع على الملف القانوني للقضية، بعدما طلب عدم ذكر اسمه، حصر المسألة في تحقيق المطالب المشروعة وعدم الالتفات إلى مسألة الانتقادات الموجهة للحركة، بالرغم من إقراره بأن أهداف الحركة قد تكون تلتقي مع مصالح أطراف داخلية أو حتى خارجية.

وبلغت المصدر إلى أن الحديث يدور حول حقوق مشروعة للشعب اليمني تم الاستيلاء عليها بتواطؤ رسمي يمني أفضى إلى شرعنة هذه العملية. ويوضح أن الخلافات الحدودية قائمة منذ عشرات السنين. وفي عام 1934 تم توقيع اتفاقية الطائف بوصفها «معاهدة صداقة إسلامية وأخوة عربية بين المملكة اليمنية وبين المملكة العربية السعودية»، ولم تكن تمثل اتفاقية ترسيم نهائية للحدود بين البلدين، بالرغم من نصها في المادة الرابعة منها على خط الحدود الذي يفصل بين البلدين.

ويضيف المصدر نفسه أنه بعد عام 1934 بقي الوضع على ما هو عليه، إذ كان نص المعاهدة يؤكد على تجديدها كل 20 عاماً. لكن مع تولي الرئيس إبراهيم الحمدي السلطة، في عام 1974، عاد الحديث عن ضرورة تسوية الأوضاع الحدودية بين البلدين. ويشير إلى أن الحمدي خلال فترة حكمه، التي اقتصر على 3 سنوات، وبينما كان في زيارة لمنطقة الطائف السعودية، طرح معه المسؤولون السعوديون الملف الحدودي، فكان جوابه: «أنا ما زلت في الأراضي اليمنية، وإذا ما أردتم التباحث حول الموضوع نبدأ من هذه النقطة». إلا أن الحديث عن المناطق الحدودية تراجع بعد اغتيال الحمدي، الذي تتهم بعض الأطراف اليمنية، السعودية، بأنها كانت وراءه بالتعاون مع عدد من الشخصيات السياسية اليمنية، بعدما التقت مصالح داخلية وخارجية على خطورة وجوده في السلطة.

أما خلال مرحلة حكم علي عبد الله صالح، فيوضح المصدر أنه حصل مدّ وجزر حول مسألة الحدود، قبل أن يعمد البلدان في عام 2000 إلى التوقيع على معاهدة جدة الحدودية. وأدت المعاهدة ليس فقط إلى منح السعودية بشكل نهائي منطقة عسير ونجران وجيزان، بل أيضاً إلى اقتطاع جزء واسع من الأراضي اليمنية تقترب مساحتها من مليون كيلومتر مربع.

ولفت المصدر إلى أنه في حينه قدمت الكثير من الوعود إلى الشعب، وبينها تسهيل انضمام اليمن إلى مجلس التعاون الخليجي، واستقبال العمالة اليمنية ودعم الاقتصاد المتهالك، لكن سرعان ما ذهبت هذه الوعود أدراج الرياح، بعدما صقّق الشعب للمعاهدة من دون أن تبرز اعتراضات جوهريّة عليها.

مع ذلك، يؤكد المصدر أن الحقوق في الأراضي اليمنية لا تسقط بالتقادم. وعلى الرغم من اعترافه بأن المفاوضين على الاتفاقية وموقعيها هم أشخاص مفوضون يحملون صفة تمثيلية بحسب الدستور، لكن ذلك لم يمنعه من الحديث عن توافر خيوط تسمح بتكوين قضية ورفعها أمام الجهات المختصة لإبطال المعاهدة. وتحدث عن وجود خلل في أركان المعاهدة، وتحديدًا في ما يتعلق بمسألة التفويض والرضا. ولفت إلى أن التركيز سيجري على إبطال صفة الشخص الموقّع على المعاهدة بسبب الرشى التي يُتهم صالح بأنه تلقاها من السعودية، في مقابل بيع الأراضي اليمنية، إلى جانب القيادات التي وقّعت المعاهدة، وخانت صفتها التمثيلية. وهو ما

Figure 6.1.8 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

رابعاً | «رييسج» تداعيساً فطرح

يوجب، وفقاً للمصدر اليمني، على الطرف المقابل في المعاهدة تحمّل تبعاته، ولا سيما أنه كان شريكاً في عملية الخداع.

ويؤكد المصدر أن الذين يحملون لواء القضية يدركون أن الأمر يحتاج إلى وقت إلى حين الانتهاء من تجهيز الملف القانوني والوثائق، فضلاً عن ضرورة تهيئة البيئة المناسبة لرفع القضية أمام الجهات القضائية المختصة.

ومع ذلك، لا ينفى المصدر وجود عقبات عديدة ستكون في مواجهة الرافعين للواء هذه القضية، وبينها مدى استعداد الطبقة السياسية في اليمن لإعادة المطالبة بهذه المناطق من خلال المؤسسات الدولية. وأعرب عن اعتقاده بأن هذه الطبقة، وحتى ممن كانوا منها في صفوف الثورة وتبين تسلّمهم رواتب شهرية من السعودية، لن يطول الزمن قبل أن يحرقوا سياسياً، ليكون الزمن كفيلاً بإظهار التلاعب الذي حصل للتوقيع على معاهدة حدة.

لكن محسن عبد الله حشاش العولقي، أحد المسؤولين الذين شاركوا في اللجنة العسكرية المكلفة بمراقبة المشاكل الحدودية وقياسها، لم يؤكد لـ«الأخبار» حصول أي تلاعب، وبعدما أكد أن مهمة اللجنة، التي كان يرأسها، كانت تتركز على تهيئة الظروف للجان الفنية المختصة للقيام بعملها، لفت إلى أن المسألة لم تحل بين ليلة وضحاها، بل استغرقت قرابة 10 سنوات حتى استكملتها شركة ألمانية. وأعرب عن اعتقاده أن الاتفاقية واقعية، وأنها جتبت البلدين نزاعات وكوارث.

وفيما يبدو الانقسام واضحاً داخل اليمن، ليس فقط إزاء الحركة وأهدافها بل حتى حول وجود حقوق يمنية مسلوبة، سنتوه أهداف الحركة في بحر التجاذبات الداخلية والإقليمية، ومن المؤكد أن الانقسام اليمني ليس الوحيد في إطار العوائق التي تواجهها الحركة.

على الجانب الآخر من الحدود، لا يمكن توقع إبداء السعودية أي مرونة إزاء التفريط بأي أراض لها، وخصوصاً أن المنطقة التي تطالب حركة «عسير» باستعادتها تضم ثروات نفطية. وهي بالتأكيد لن تتواني في أي لحظة عن استخدام شبكة الولاءات التي تحتفظ بها منذ عشرات السنين داخل اليمن، لإجهاض أي محاولة لتوحيد البلاد حول مثل هذا الهدف، وذلك إذا شعرت أن القضية جدية. لكن حتى اللحظة لا يوجد أي مؤشرات على أي شعور سعودي بالخطر. وفيما رفضت أكثر من شخصية سعودية، مقربة من السلطات، التعليق على مطالب الحركة، مجمعة على اعتبار أن الأمر لا يستحق حتى المناقشة، ذهب البعض إلى الحديث عن «أضغاث أحلام» لـ«أطراف يمنية مشبوهة».

#### دعم عبد الناصر



يحلو لليمنيين، في إطار الاستشهاد بأحقّيتهم في منطقتي نجران وجيزان تحديداً، العودة إلى الخطاب الذي ألقاه الزعيم المصري الراحل جمال عبد الناصر (الصورة)، إبان احتدام التوتر السياسي بين السعودية ومصر، على خلفية دعم الرياض للملكيين في مقابل دعم القاهرة للجمهوريين في أعقاب ثورة 1962. سأل عبد الناصر في خطابه «هل تستطيع أي قوة

أن تضرب الشعب اليمني؟»، قيل أن يؤكد أن «ثورة اليمن ثورتنا، وثورة العرب كلهم، وإلا لما كنا بعننا أولادنا ليستشهدوا ويضربوا أكبر صفحات البطولة».

وأضاف «وإحنا ببساطة نستطيع أن نعزل السعودية كلياً عن اليمن بأن نأخذ جيزان ونجران، وأصل منطقة جيزان يمنية، وسنة 30 اغتصبها السعوديون بالغزو من اليمنيين، وممكن لليمنيين المطالبة بجيزان ونجران وسنحارب في هذه المعركة، نحن المصريين مع اليمنيين... إذاً لن نستطيع أي قوة أن تضرب ثورة الشعب اليمني».

عربيات

العدد ١٧٣٤ السبت ١٦ حزيران ٢٠١٢

مقالات أخرى لجماعة فرحات:

عام علي، انفصال جنوب السودان (node/97272)

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Figure 6.1.9 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)



7/19/12

في طولها تداي سلاو ريس ع تدا عتساب بلطت و يدوع لعل قضيه انم قطنم سي سات : نميلا يف قزم لوال

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يونيو 12

## أول مرة في اليمن : تأسيس منظمة مناهضة للسعودية تطالب باستعادة عسير والسيادة الوطنية

الأخبار المحلية الجدد 3 comments



السفير برس - خاص

أسس ناشطون سياسيون ومسلحة التغيير منظمة شعبية تهدف إلى ما وصفوه باستعادة السيادة اليمنية المسلوبة من التراب اليمني، تحت أي شكل من الأشكال. وقال بلاغ صدر عن المؤسسين بأن هذه المنظمة تحمل اسم "منظمة سيعة"، ودعوا جميع وسائل الإعلام إلى حضور حفل إشهارها، والمؤتمر الصحفي في خيمة المنتدى السياسي، صباح غد الأحد في ساحة التغيير بصنعاء.

وأوضح المؤسسون بأن المنظمة ستكسر نشاطها للعمل على إزالة ما وصفوه بالجدار الفاصل الذي أنشأته المملكة العربية السعودية على الحدود اليمنية السعودية، بالإضافة إلى استعادة الأراضي اليمنية المسلوبة من قبلها، وفرض السيادة اليمنية عليها، ورفض كافة الاتفاقيات والمعاهدات التي تم بموجبها التنازل عن الأراضي اليمنية من قبل نظام الرئيس علي عبد الله صالح.

وقمما يلي نص بيان إشهار المنظمة اليمنية لاستعادة السيادة

Yemeni Organization for the restoration of sovereignty

استناداً إلى حق الشعب اليمني التاريخي والجغرافي في سيادته على أراضيه المضمومة من قبل الاتفاقيات الجائرة التي تنازل بموجبها النظام الحاكم ورموزه عن حق الشعب

قبل الاتفاقيات الجائرة التي سلبت من اليمن حقه المشروع وما يترتب على هذه الاتفاقيات التي تفننها الوثائق التاريخية والأدلة الحدودية من مصادرة ثروة أجيال اليمن والتهالك حريتهم وكرامتهم بكل الصور أكلانسية وكون اليمنيين لم يستفيدوا أبداً من هذه الاتفاقيات الجائرة التي تنازل بموجبها النظام الحاكم ورموزه عن حق الشعب اليمني مقابل تحقيق مصالح شخصية فقط فقه من واجبنا تصحيح هذا الخطأ التاريخي الفادح الذي دفع لشبه أبناء شعبنا اليمني وغيب فيها كل أسس وخطوط القنون الولي والأليات القنوتية في التحكيم الولي والفصل في النزاعات الحدودية بموجب الحكم العادل الذي سنده إلى مرجع القنون الولي وما ترتب على هذه الاتفاقيات من معاناة وظلم لحقت كل مواطني الحدود وحرمان اليمن من العيش الكريم في الأراضي التي تعود مكتسباتها إليها واستثمارها في تطوير قدراته وإمكانياته الحضارية السلمية. وستنتج من خلال هذه المنظمة الباب أمام القنوتيين والمنظمات الدولية والمحلية لدراسة آثار هذه الاتفاقيات الباطلة على اقتصاد وحياة المجتمع توثيق وإظهار اليمني وما يتعرض له اليمنيون منذ عام 1990م وحتى اليوم على أيدي السلطات السعودية التي أصعدت المال لإثارة الفتن والفتن و شراء الذمم بين قبائل الحدود وممارسة أفسس وأشنع أساليب المطاردة الوحشية لطبائقي اليمنيين و طرد وإخراج ما يزيد عن ثلاثة مليون يمني أبان حرب الخليج ومصادرة حقوقهم وأموالهم والاضطع عليهم لبيعها والتخلي عنها بالتشديد عليهم و اهانتهم وفرض نظام الكفالة والتضييق على من بقي منهم في المملكة من ممارسة أعمالهم التجارية مما كبد اليمن وأبناء اليمن خسائر مادية فلكحة التي ما زالت آثارها مثقلة للباحثين حتى اليوم.

كما تقضت المملكة العربية السعودية معاهدة الطائف التاريخية وضغطت بكل ثقلها الدولي والمادي لإللال اليمن وتركيع اليمنيين و أهانتهم عبر الحدود بارتكاب جرائم بشعة أبرزها إعلامياً محرقة خميس مشيط التي راح تضحيها عشرات الشباب كل ذنبيهم أنهم يخطون عن لقمة العيش الحلال في أرض لهم فيها أحيوية التاريخ والجغرافيا وقامت السلطات السعودية بإحراقهم عمداً و ترحيلهم بحجة أنهم مسلمين ومجهولين وتحت هذا المسمى العنصري ما رمت السلطات السعودية جرائم ضد الإنسانية بحق أبناء اليمن وقتلت الأمنت منهم تحت و سمع ويصر النظام اليمني المتهاكك ولم يحرك ساكناً.

من هنا جاء دور المنظمة للدفاع عن السيادة اليمنية و فتح هذه الملفات التي لا تسقط بالتقدم وما عمدت إليه السلطات السعودية في الأونة الأخيرة من انتهاكات خطيرة للسيادة اليمنية في ضرب مختلف قرى ومدن اليمن ولا بد من تحريرها وما تسببت به من إهلاك وتدمير قرى ومسكن الأرياء بالأسلحة المحرمة دولياً و لم تكف بذلك بل عملت على إقامة الجدار الشائك على الأراضي اليمنية إمعاناً في تعذيب اليمنيين والكلية بهم بسددهم في ذلك النظام القمعي المستبد الذي رضى لليمنيين بهذا الوضع و باع أراضيهم و ثرواتهم.

هذه الحقائق يورفها و يلم بها و يعيشها أبناء الشعب اليمني يومياً.

أهداف المنظمة :

- العمل على استعادة الأراضي اليمنية المسلوبة وفرض السيادة اليمنية عليها ورفض كافة الاتفاقيات والمعاهدات السابقة التي أبرمت بهذا الشأن .
- العمل على إزالة الجدار الفاصل الذي أنشأته المملكة العربية السعودية على الأراضي اليمنية
- الدفاع عن سيادة اليمن من أي انتهاك يطل هذه السيادة بكافة أشكاله وتحت أي مبرر .
- تعزيز مفهوم السيادة الوطنية لدى المواطن اليمني بكل قناته .
- التنسيق مع كل المنظمات والمؤسسات الوطنية بما من شأنه تحقيق السيادة الكاملة على كل التراب اليمني .

ال-عضانم-قطنم-سي-سات-نم-يلا-يف-قزم-لوال/news/as-saferpress.com

1/3

Figure 6.1.10 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

7/19/12

في طولنا تداي سلاو ريس ع تدا عتس اب لبا طت ذي دوع س ل ك تضا نام قهظن م س سيات : ن م ي ل ا ي ف ترم ل و ا ل

و المنظمة إذ تبارك لثورة الشباب الشعبية السلمية و تتمنى لها تحقيق أهدافها فإبها تهيب بجميع الثوار الوقوف إلى جانبها لتحقيق أهدافها و استعادة حقوق اليمنيين .

!!!

حرر بتاريخ 6 / جماد الثاني / 1432 هـ الموافق 5 / 9 / 2011م

### التعليقات 3

1. **ياسر محمد علي** قال:

12/06/2012 الساعة 6:06م

لقد تم بيع الاراضي اليمنية من قبل النظام السابق وشركائه الشيخ عبدالله حسين الاحمر واللواء علي محسن الاحمر وجميع اولادهم ولقد حصلوا على مبالغ تحت مسمى سعاليات (سمسرة) مبالغ كبيرة وجسيمة وتم بيع جميع الاراضي اليمنية من السعودية وعليه لا بد على كل يمني حر ان يناضل من اجل استرداد جميع الاراضي المعتصبة من قبل جميع جيران اليمن وفي مقدمتهم السعودية

رد

2. **صقر رشيد الجياحي** قال:

12/06/2012 الساعة 6:13م

نعم تأيد هذا ضد المملكة الطاغية وتعسفها ضد اليمنيين وفوق هذا اغلاق السفاره السعوديه في صنعاء وعن وحرموننا العمرة

رد

3. **asaad** قال:

12/06/2012 الساعة 6:50م

ممتاز جدا جدا سيروا

رد

Figure 6.1.11 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

7/19/12

إنجيليا-يف هورتت-كفلجمل

وإداري كبير، قوُض من قوة الموقف الرسمي اليمني في ظل التجاذبات الداخلية، وأفضى عن عجز سياسي فلاح لدى النظام اليمني، فكان من نتائج ذلك نشوء العلاقة الأكثر غموضاً بين القبيلة اليمنية والنظام السعودي الحاكم.

واللافت أن العلاقات اليمنية السعودية عدلت إلى مناهطها الطبيعي بين السلطينين السياسيّين للثولتين إبان فترة حكم الرئيس إبراهيم الحمدي، حيث أخذت بالتطور بعد زيارة الحمدي للرياض عام 1974م، وما تمخض عن هذه الزيارة من عقد المؤتمر الأول للمعتريين عام 1976م والذي جاء ملازماً للتجاذبات التي حققتها الدبلوماسية اليمنية في ضمان حقوق الشغيلة اليمنيين في المملكة وتضمين امتيازات خاصة بالعمالة اليمنية ضمن التشريعات والأنظمة الخاصة بالعمل في المملكة.

وباستثناء فترة حكم الأكمة الشيعة والرئيس الحمدي، فإن أطرافاً أخرى "غير السلطة السياسية" في شمال اليمن شاركت في بناء العلاقات اليمنية السعودية على أساس المصالح المشتركة بين هذه الفئات والمملكة.

أما جنوباً فقد حققت المملكة العربية السعودية الكثير من النجاحات من خلال علاقاتها بالسلطة السياسية في الجنوب بعد سنوات العداء، حيث أسفرت استمالة المملكة للنظام الرئيس علي ناصر محمد ووعود الدعم الاقتصادي والعسكري عن قرار النظام الاشتراكي في الجنوب إيقاف الدعم عن جبهة تحرير ظفار والتي كانت تقود ثورة شعبية ضد نظام الحكم في عُمان آنذاك، الأمر الذي أعطى السعودية حينها من مواجهة النفوذ الإيراني القادم إلى جزيرة العرب عقب محاولة السلطان قابوس بن سعيد الاستمالة بشركاء العقيدة الشيوعية في إيران لمواجهة ثورة الشيوعيين المدعومة من النظام الماركسي في اليمن الجنوبي آنذاك، وهو ما كان يمثل قلقاً لسعودية، ناهيك عن ضمور المحاولات الأولى لتأسيس حزب شيوعي في باطن المملكة العربية السعودية مستنداً في طموحاته إلى دعم مفترض لم يند له وجود من النظام الشيوعي في الجنوب.

لكن قيام الوحدة اليمنية بين شرطي اليمن عام 1990م حمل معه التكتاسة كبيرة في العلاقات السعودية اليمنية، حيث تسبب تحيط الموقف الرسمي اليمني ودعوه للفتوى العراقي للكويك وما تلاه من مضاعفات إلى سوء العلاقات بين البلدين وعودة مليوني مغرب من العمالة اليمنية في المملكة والخليج، وهو الموقف الذي جعل المملكة ضمن معطيات أخرى إلى دعم الحزب الاشتراكي اليمني في حربه لـ "فك الارتباط" بين شرطي اليمن عام 1994م والتي خاضها ضد نظام صالح، وهو ما أسفر لاحقاً عن انتصار قوات صالح على الجنوبيين، بينما ظلت العلاقات اليمنية السعودية على حالها من السوء والجمود الذي لم يكسر إلا بزيارة تاريخية قام بها صالح إلى المملكة بغرض إعادة تطبيع العلاقات وتوقيع اتفاقية ترسيم الحدود بين البلدين في جده العام 1996م.

هذا الاضطراب الذي شهدهته العلاقات بين البلدين إبان فترة صالح جعل دوائر الحكم في السعودية لا تنظر بارتياح إلى علي عبد الله صالح، الذي تعبّره مرواغاً وانتهازياً ومتمرداً، ومع ذلك فقد ارتأت الحفاظ عليه باعتباره "أقل المجذنين"، ولكونه لا يمثل عائقاً أمام تعزيز خطوط الاتصال بين المملكة وحلفائها التقليديين من شيوخ القبائل اليمنية، الذين لم تكن نظرة النظام السعودي إليهم أفضل من نظرتهم لصالح، لكن العلاقة مع شيوخ القبائل اليمنية كانت أكثر توازناً واستقراراً وطبيعياً، وتمكنت المملكة من خلال علاقاتها مع القبائل اليمنية سواءً أكان ذلك عبر اللجنة الخاصة أم عبر المكرمات الإضافية من تحقيق الكثير من أهدافها.

هذه العلاقة مثلت عامل استقرار مهم لصالح؛ إذ يعتقد الأخير أنه المضي بأي علاقة تفعّلة تخص أطرافاً في الداخل اليمني، أي أن نزاع صالح من العلاقة بين القبائل والمملكة السعودية لم يكن بدافع الحفاظ على القرار السياسي، ولهذا حافظ الأخير على نشاطه ضمن جبهة خلفاء السعودية لأسباب مختلفة، بل ويبرح أحياناً بتكديم المواقف الداعمة للمصلحة السعودية لتقوية الفرصة على حلفاء السعودية الآخرين في الداخل اليمني.

إذن؛ 80 عاماً من الجوار بين اليمن والسعودية تكوّن أن علاقة الشقيقة الكبرى باليمن كانت أكثر توازناً وإيجابية عندما كان النظام السياسي اليمني قوياً على الصعيد الداخلي بينما تراجعت أدوار السعودية باتجاه تعزيز نفوذها كلما ضعفت قوة الدولة، وهذا يتأتى بدواعي حفظ أمن المملكة واستقرارها من حيث المبدأ، ثم سعى المملكة للحفاظ على مصالحها في ظل غياب رؤية يمنية موحدة يمكن البناء عليها، وفي هذه الحالات من ضعف الدولة اليمنية كان القرار اليمني أكثر ارتهاقاً للخارج، وبالتحديد للمملكة العربية السعودية.

من هنا تأتي نقمة بعض الأطراف في المعارضة السياسية اليمنية على السعودية، ومن هنا أيضاً يأتي الموقف "الثوري" المناهض لسياسات المملكة في اليمن، لكن هذا الموقف ذو الطبيعة الآتية (حيث لم يكن الحال كذلك قبل أشهر) لم يعكس في حقيقته وعياً كافياً بمحظرات وواقع سياسات المملكة التي تخشى أكثر من غيرها من انهيار الدولة اليمنية بما يضع البوصلة على المملكة في التعامل مع الطرف اليمني الذي ستتعهد بالتأكد فواء، بما يعطي احتمالاً كبيراً لتناقض سياسات وتوجهات هذه القوى، ويجعل مهمة المملكة أصعب في التعامل مع اليمن إذا ما تجذرت الثورة.

وعلى ذلك يمكننا أن نستنتج أن المملكة غير مهووسة بالمصلحة اليمنية الظنياً فضلاً عن سعيها لتقدم اليمن وازدهاره، أو لإلحاق ثورته، لكن الأطراف اليمنية المعنية في علاقتها مع السعودية خلال عقود مضت أثبتت هي الأخرى أنها لم تكن مشغولة إلا بمصالحها الخاصة؛ الأمر الذي أضف من هبة الدولة اليمنية وقتعتها السياسيين، ناهيك عن سياسة الإبتزاز والتحايل التي تنتهجها أطراف يمنية قبلية ورسمية مع رب المال السعودي، وست جولات من الحروب التي خاضها النظام مع جماعة الحوثي في صعدة كشفت في بعض التفاصيل عن حجم العبث الذي أقدم عليه النظام اليمني الحاكم بغرض استمرار المال السعودي بزعم حربه ضد "البعج" الحوثي، عامداً في ذات الوقت إلى تصفية الخصوم الداخليين واستئزافهم في حروب لا يبدو عليها أدنى نزاهة!

هذه السياسات المكيفلية التي أقدمت عليها وجود النظام السياسي في التعاطي مع المملكة الجارة على مدى عقود كشفت سواءً اليمنيين وقلّت من وزن واحترام قائلهم لدى نظرائهم السعوديين، وكثيراً ما عكست المعلومات الشحيحة المسوّية عن طبيعة التعامل الشخصي والدبلوماسي من قبل أفراد العائلة المالكة مع بعض القيادات السياسية اليمنية الحليفة سواءً أكانت رسمية أم قبلية حجم التهميش الذي يتلقاه الطرف اليمني نظراً لطبيعته المتلاعبة والمرتهنة للدعم السعودي.

ولئن عزوف الملك عبد الله وكبار رجالات الحكم في المملكة العربية السعودية عن زيارة الرئيس صالح وعطامه الرافدين في المستشفى العسكري بالرياض أبلغ الأدلة على هذا التهميش واللامبالاة.

فصالح وكبار قيادات دولته يرقون مثلهم مثل غيرهم من مسلحي الشيخ صادق بن عبد الله الأحمر الذي خاض مع صالح أوار حرب شرسة قبل شهرين كان مسرحها حن الحصبة بالعاصمة صنعاء، والدور السعودي تجاه الطرفين لا يبدو في ظاهره أكثر من دور الراعي الإنساني لمجموعة من الجرحى والمصابين، بيد أن الشارع الثوري يجعل من موقف الرياض غير المأخوذ بالثورة مبرراً حاسماً لتحميل السعودية بكل فشل الثورة أو إجهاض حلم الجماهير في التغيير والازدهار.

بيد أن الثورة بمحمولها الراديكالي والجماهيري والبتاليين الذي تحمله لا تصب في مصلحة المملكة السعودية المشغولة بأمنها الذي تمثل إيران (وفقاً لوجهة النظر السعودية) أحد أهم تهديداته، إضافة إلى حماية حدودها من تسلل المواطنين اليمنيين فضلاً عن الهجمات المحتملة سواءً أكانت من القبائل اليمنية أو جماعة الحوثي، وهذا يتعارض مع حتمية الحفاظ على استقرار الدولة الأولى في تصدير النفط ونظامها السياسي،

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Figure 6.1.12 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

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إنجيليا يفت هونت نكل مبلها

وهذا الاستقرار المنشود بطبيعة الحال لا يقبل أي نوع من المراهنات على ثورة شعبية غير موحدة ولا معروفة التوجه.

ولذا فالسعودية سعت على الدوام من خلال علاقتها بالأطراف اليمنية المختلفة إلى الحفاظ على مصالحها الإستراتيجية وحماية أمنها واستقرارها، بينما استمرت الأطراف اليمنية المعنية بسعيها المعتاد لتحقيق مصالحها الذاتية أو الفئوية ذات الصبغة الأمنية الصرفة، ولم تسفر اندلاع الثورة الشبلبية الشعبية عن تغير في أسلوب القوى اليمنية النافذة التي اتخذت من الثورة أداة جديدة لممارسة الإبتزاز تجاه الحليف السعودي.

فصالح وجد في اتساع جبهة الخصوم المتبلدة ضده والتي كانت أن تجهز على نظامه طوقاً للتجاة عبر استمالة الدعم السعودي لخدمته وتقوية نظامه شبه المنهالك في مواجهة خصوم السعودية داخل الثورة، فيما وجد حلفاء السعودية الآخرين في الثورة فرصة جديدة للفت الأنظار إليهم بعد دخولهم على خط الثورة وتنشيط قرارها بموازاة دعم سعودي محتمل قد يؤدي غيابه إلى تجميع الثورة كورقة ضغط على السعودية، وهو ما فعله حلفاء آخرون لم يتوفر مصالحهم مع الراعي السعودي فاتجهوا للصلة الأخرى، محتفظين بسعة معاوية التي قد تصبح ذات جنوى.

لقد ضيع اليمنيون فرصة من أهم وأثمن الفرص التاريخية، حين أساءوا للنموذج الأخلاقي والحضاري المشرف الذي قدموه إبان نشوب الثورة الشعبية العارمة التي عمت أرجاء البلد، فلم يكن هيناً بالمرّة خروج اليمنيين إلى الشوارع والساحات بدون أسلحة ولا متفجرات ولا حروب سعياً منهم للتغيير والتخلص من يمن موبوء بالتخلف والجهل والفقر والمرض، لكن هذا النموذج لم يجد التكاطة ناضجة وأخلاقية من القوى السياسية التي تبرعت بالدخول في مساومات مع النظام الحاكم، حيث تحولت المواجهة من مواجهة فاصلة بين نظام استبدادي يحمل مشاعر التخلف والقتل وشعب متطلع للتغيير، إلى مواجهة رخوة بين طرفين سياسيين يارعين في الانتهازية، لتدخل الثورة بعدها في لعبة المقايضات في المواقف، والمصالح الضيقة للأطراف السياسية وبعض القيادات الكبيرة، وهي اللعبة التي تترك السعودية "كلاعب مؤثر في السياسة اليمنية" أكثر من غيرها مدى ردايتها، وتفتح أمام المملكة الجارة فئرة الأسرار للقوى التي استبطنت الفعل الثوري العظيم لتجييره - كما جرت عادة أغلب النخب اليمنية المعاصرة - لمصالحها باسم الشعارات البراقة، وليكون قدر الشعب اليمني أن يخسر أحلامه العظيمة بفضل من صنعوا عليها ليقودوه وإياها قريباً بخصماً لأحلامهم الرخيصة.

حديث المدينة

Figure 6.1.13 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

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إن ميلا يف يرتت نكل مبلأ

وهذا الاستقرار المنشود بطبيعة الحال لا يقبل أي نوع من المراهنات على ثورة شعبية غير موحدة ولا معروفة التوجه.

ولذا؛ فالسعودية سعت على الدوام من خلال علاقتها بالأطراف اليمنية المختلفة إلى الحفاظ على مصالحها الإستراتيجية وحماية أمنها واستقرارها، بينما استمرت الأطراف اليمنية المعنية بسعيها المعتاد لتحقيق مصالحها الذاتية أو الفئوية ذات الطبيعة الأنية الصرفة، ولم تسفر اندلاع الثورة السليبية الشعبية عن تغير في أسلوب القوى اليمنية النافذة التي اتخذت من الثورة أداة جديدة لممارسة الابتزاز تجاه الحليف السعودي.

فصالح وجد في اتساع جبهة الخصوم المتبلية ضده والتي كانت أن تجهز على نظامه طوقاً للنجاة عبر استمالة الدعم السعودي لخدمته وتقوية نظامه شبه المتهاك في مواجهة خصوم السعودية داخل الثورة، فيما وجد حلفاء السعودية الآخرين في الثورة فرصة جيدة للفت الأنظار إليهم بعد دخولهم على خط الثورة وتثبيت قرارها بموازاة دعم سعودي محتمل قد يؤدي غيابه إلى تجميح الثورة كورقة ضغط على السعودية، وهو ما فعله حلفاء آخرون لم تتوفر مصالحهم مع الراعي السعودي فاتجهوا للصفحة الأخرى، محتفظين بشعرة معاوية التي قد تصبح ذات جدوى.

لقد ضيع اليمنيون فرصة من أهم وأثمن الفرص التاريخية، حين أساءوا للنموذج الأخلاقي والحضاري المشرف الذي قدموه إبان نشوب الثورة الشعبية العارمة التي عمت أرجاء البلد، فلم يكن حينها بالمرءة خروج اليمنيين إلى الشوارع والساحات بدون أسلحة ولا متفجرات ولا حروب سعياً منهم للتغيير والتخلص من يمن موبوء بالتخلف والجهل والفقر والمرض، لكن هذا النموذج لم يجد النقطة ناضجة وأخلاقية من القوى السياسية التي تيرعت بالمخول في مساومات مع النظام الحاكم، حيث تحولت المواجهة من مواجهة فاصلة بين نظام استبدادي يحمل مشاغل التخلف والقتل وشعب متطلع للتغيير، إلى مواجهة رخوة بين طرفين سياسيين بارعين في الانتهازية، لتدخل الثورة بعدها في لعبة المقايضات في المواقف، والمصالح الضيقة للأطراف السياسية وبعض القيادات الكبيرة، وهي اللعبة التي تترك السعودية "كلاعب مؤثر في السياسة اليمنية" أكثر من غيرها مدى رداعتها، وتفتح أمام المملكة الجارة فئرة الأسرار للقوى التي استبطنت الفعل الثوري العظيم لتجييره - كما جرت عادة أغلب النخب اليمنية المعاصرة - لمصالحها باسم الشعارات البراقة، وليكون قدر الشعب اليمني أن يخسر أحلامه العظيمة بفضل من صنعوا عليها ليقودوه وإياها قريباً بخساً لأحلامهم الرخيصة.

حديث المدينة

Figure 6.1.14 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

### Wall Photos

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بوابة اليمن الإخبارية

بوابة اليمن الإخبارية

شرورة .. أرض يمنية محتلة من النظام السعودي تتبع إداريا محافظة نجران , كان يسميها سلطان بن عبد العزيز (سرورة) , لأنها كانت تبعث السرور في قلبه , وهي بالفعل أدخلت السرور إلى قلوب آل سعود لأنها تحوي أكبر حقل نفط في الجزيرة العربية ..

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Figure 6.1.15 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

The screenshot shows the homepage of the Suhail Press website (www.suhailpress.net). The header features the site's logo and the slogan 'البحث عن الحقيقة أينما كانت'. A navigation bar lists various sections: 'الصفحة الرئيسية', 'أخبار سهيل اليمن', 'عربية وعالمية', 'مقالات وآراء', 'بالخط الأحمر', 'مال وأعمال', and 'رياضة'. The main content area is divided into two columns. The left column contains a poll titled 'هل تؤيد إجراء حوار بين الاطراف السياسية للخروج من الازمة الراهنة?' with 'نعم' and 'لا' options. Below the poll is a section for 'مقالات وآراء' with several article thumbnails. The right column features a large photograph of a man in a checkered keffiyeh and a light blue shirt, with his arms crossed. Below the photo is a headline in Arabic: 'ري للغاية:الحراك يدعو أبناء الجنوب إلى إعلان الحرب على السعودية لاستعادة عسير نجران'. The article text below the headline discusses the call for war against Saudi Arabia to liberate the region of Asir and Najran.

Figure 6.1.16 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

The screenshot displays the homepage of the 'Aden Online English Website'. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the site's name 'عدن أون لاين' and a logo. Below this, a banner for 'ADEN ONLINE ENGLISH Website' is visible. The main content area features a large headline in Arabic: 'الشيخ طارق الفضلي: الأحزاب خانت الثورة والحراك.. قطر وحدوية أكثر من الوحدة وعلى السعودية أن تعيد نجران وعسير'. The article is dated 'الأربعاء 11 يناير 2012 08:35 مساءً'. To the left of the article, there is a sidebar with a search bar and a list of articles, including one about 'إختوتنا في ميانمار' and another about 'هشاشة الوفاق اليمني..!'. At the bottom of the article, there is a photo of a man with a beard and a turban, and a small advertisement for 'Ginger' with the text 'Will you be at the party?'. The overall layout is typical of a news website from that period.

Figure 6.1.17 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)



The screenshot shows the homepage of the Al-Safir newspaper website. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the newspaper's name 'السفير برس' (Al-Safir Press) and a tagline 'صحيفة الكترونية - يومية - سياسية - شاملة' (Electronic newspaper - daily - political - comprehensive). Below the navigation bar, there are social media icons for email, RSS, and Facebook. The main content area features a large red banner with the headline 'بعد المشايخ وكبار الشخصيات : السعودية اشترت ولاء كبار المسؤولين اليمنيين منذ توقيع إتفاقية الحدود' (After the sheikhs and prominent personalities: Saudi Arabia bought the loyalty of senior Yemeni officials since the signing of the border agreement). The article text discusses the Saudi government's efforts to buy the loyalty of senior Yemeni officials and the implications of the border agreement. On the left side, there is a sidebar with a section titled 'للإعلان هنا' (Advertisement here) and a section titled 'أقلام السفير' (Al-Safir's pens) featuring portraits of several individuals.

Figure 6.1.18 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

The screenshot shows the homepage of the Al-Safir newspaper website. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the newspaper's name 'السفير برس' (Al-Safir Press) and a tagline 'صحيفة إلكترونية - يومية - سياسية - شاملة تصدر عن مؤسسة السفير للإعلام والطباعة والنشر'. Below the navigation bar, there are social media icons for email, RSS, and Facebook. The main content area features a large red banner with the headline 'بعد المشايخ وكبار الشخصيات : السعودية اشترت ولاء كبار المسؤولين اليمنيين منذ توقيع إتفاقية الحدود' (After the sheikhs and prominent personalities: Saudi Arabia has bought the loyalty of senior Yemeni officials since the signing of the border agreement). The article text discusses the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Asir, mentioning the involvement of Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni officials. The article is dated 19th of the month. On the left side, there is a sidebar with a section titled 'إعلام السفير' (Al-Safir Media) and three sub-sections: 'إهدار الحقوق' (Wasting rights), 'الى كل من لا يهمه الأمر' (To all who do not care), and 'الإرهاب.. الخضم المدلل في اليمن..!!' (Terrorism.. the pampered stream in Yemen..!!).

Figure 6.1.19 Examples of the media coverage of the establishment of a group of activities called 'The Asir Movement', Sana (June and July 2012)

**6.2. Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif,  
Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith,  
U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)**

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## US embassy cables: Saudis praise American strike against al-Qaida in Yemen

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**SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: GENERAL JONES' JANUARY 12, 2010**

MEETING WITH PRINCE MOHAMMED BIN NAIF, ASSISTANT MINISTER OF INTERIOR

Classified By: Ambassador James B. Smith for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

### Summary

Arab state says al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (Aqap) went quiet after attack, while voicing concerns about Yemen's overall commitment to rooting out extremists on its soil. Key passage highlighted in yellow.

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### SUMMARY

1. (S) Summary: During a 30-minute meeting with Prince Mohammed, General Jones reviewed U.S. and Saudi efforts to combat Al-Qaida extremists in the region and discussed Afghanistan/Pakistan, Yemen, and Iran. Prince Mohammed highlighted Saudi Arabia's continued and growing concerns

Figure 6.2.1 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)

about Al-Qaida operations originating from Yemen and praised the Yemeni government's successful December attacks against Al-Qaida operatives. The meeting was followed by a lunch and a briefing on the situation on the Saudi-Yemeni border.

WE MUST KEEP AL-QAIDA ON THE RUN

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2. (S) General Jones noted that the attempted bombing of a U.S. aircraft on December 25 is another reminder that we are passing through difficult times. He assured Prince Mohammed that while the U.S. recognizes that screening procedures can be improved, the U.S. has confidence that the systems in place are basically sound. The General also noted that terrorism concerns seem to be spreading beyond Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and now are being heard from governments in north Africa, particularly Niger, Mali, Morocco and Algeria.

3. (S) Prince Mohammed responded that we are likely to see many more attempts like the December 25 incident. He also noted that the Saudi experience against Al-Qaida demonstrates that the best response is to "keep them on the run." Right after the 9/11 attacks, he noted, nearly eighty percent of the mosques in Saudi Arabia voiced support for Bin Laden. That is when the Saudi leadership realized how dire the problem they faced was. Over the last 6 years of combating Al-Qaida inside Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom has foiled many Al-Qaida plots and in the process learned that we must not only to fight Al-Qaida "in the field," but also to counter their ideology in order to curtail recruitment.

4. (S/NF) In this light, the recent attack against Al-Qaida in Yemen "was very positive." Prince Mohammed noted that the Saudis have been monitoring conversations of Al-Qaida operatives in Yemen very closely, and whereas before the attack they were hearing relaxed 20-minute phone conversations over cell phones, after the attack the phones went virtually silent. This suggests that at least for now these operatives are more focused on their own security rather than on planning operations.

SAUDI CONCERNS ON YEMEN

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/244077>

20/07/2012

**Figure 6.2.2 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)**

that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.

¶9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help. The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.

¶10. (S/NF) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad's February 11 boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent, Iran "is now a nuclear nation." The King told General Jones that Iranian internal turmoil presented an opportunity to weaken the regime -- which he encouraged -- but he also urged that this be done covertly and stressed that public statements in support of the reformers were counterproductive. The King assesses that sanctions could help weaken the government, but only if they are strong and sustained. The King will want you to elaborate on the President's statement that the time for sanctions has come. He will also want to hear our plans for bolstering Gulf defenses vis a vis Iran. (The King has invited General Petraeus to his desert camp for discussion on this topic on Tuesday.)

¶11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: Your visit offers an important opportunity to head off a serious climate change. Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they face significant costs to diversify their economy. We want to get beyond the obstructionism that Saudi negotiators have often shown during the negotiations and persuade senior leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet their strategic concerns, including by cooperating on developing solar and biomass energy. The King is particularly sensitive to avoid Saudi Arabia being singled out as the bad actor, particularly on environmental issues. Your conveying the importance the President places on working as partners with Saudi Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be very important in making this dialogue more constructive. Secretary Chu intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during his February 21-23 visit.

SAUDI REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS  
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¶12. (S) PREVENTING A COLLAPSE OF YEMEN: Saudi participation in international diplomatic efforts to stabilize Yemen reflect Saudi fears that instability on its southern border is a clear and present danger. The King will tell you that Yemen's strategic location makes an Al-Qaida presence there more threatening than in Afghanistan; he will stress the need to support Yemeni unity, despite his mistrust of Ali Abdullah Saleh. With respect to Saudi involvement in the war against the Houthis, the King will stress that the SAG's motivation was self-defense. As Al-Qaida infiltrators from Yemen multiplied, the SAG concluded that the Houthi rebellion had distracted Saleh's government to the detriment of Saudi security. The military intervention was triggered by a Houthi incursion into Saudi territory, but it presented a long-sought excuse to fortify the porous Saudi-Yemeni border. On February 7, Prince Khalid also informed Ambassador Smith the fighting is wrapping up, and that a ceasefire arrangement could be in place by mid-February.

¶13. (C) GESTURES AFTER ALL?: The King appreciates the President's commitment to Middle East peace but is skeptical the U.S. can bring sufficient and sustained pressure to bear on Israel, especially regarding settlements. The King told General Jones that progress on Middle East peace was only possible if President Obama was willing to pressure Israel, and Saudi officials have rebuffed U.S. requests for confidence-building gestures to help restart negotiations. Despite their adamant rhetoric, however, several members of a private Jeddah-based think tank run by a retired Saudi general have very quietly been participating in Track Two discussions, apparently with SAG knowledge, and even put forward a proposal on Gaza. In a more dramatic public encounter that has provoked commotion in the region, former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal shook hands with Israeli Deputy FM Ayalon to settle a dispute over joint seating at a Munich conference. Both sides have since insisted the gesture did not signal changes in policy, with a "senior Saudi diplomat" issuing a statement emphatically denying that the incident constituted any form of recognition for Israel.

¶14. (S/NF) AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN: King Abdullah firmly believes that Asif Zardari is the primary obstacle to the government's ability to move unequivocally to end terrorist safe havens there ("when the head is rotten, it affects the whole body"). The King told General Jones that U.S. development assistance would rebuild trust with the Army, which he asserted was staying out of politics in deference to U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it should." On Afghanistan, the King has expressed support for the new U.S.

Figure 6.2.3 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)

10. (C) General Jones described the administration's current thinking on Iran, noting that Iran has failed to enter into a serious dialogue with the international community about its nuclear program. With the deadline of the end of the year now passed, it is time to start looking at sanctions. Prince Mohammed said Saudi Arabia remains greatly concerned about Iran's nuclear program and noted that there is now a big crack in the Iranian government, particularly following the recent attack on Karroubi. (Embassy note: Opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi's car was fired upon on January 9, an attack that oppositionist attribute to Iran's Revolutionary Guard. End note.)

High Marks for U.S.-Saudi Counterterrorism Cooperation

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11. (C) General Jones asked Prince Mohammed if there was anything needed from the U.S. to improve our counterterrorism coordination. Prince Mohammed responded that King Abdullah has made very clear that U.S.-Saudi security cooperation must remain independent of political buffeting. He said that our cooperation is very good, and has developed to the point that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in "simultaneous mode" regarding the sharing of raw data and threat information. Gen. Jones remarked that Prince Mohammed has played an

important role in bringing about this strong security relationship, and conveyed President Obama's appreciation for this strong partnership.

Comment

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12. (S) We note that Prince Mohammed did not raise the matter of recently introduced heightened screening procedures on Saudi citizens. While we have heard that these new measures provoked strong reactions from some in the Saudi leadership, the absence of any expressions of concern or upset on Prince Mohammed part is fully in keeping with his reputation as one who fully understands the difficulty of maneuvering against extremist elements to prevent attacks. The Embassy views this meeting as

**Figure 6.2.4 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)**

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5. (S) Prince Mohammed said that the Saudi government has been watching with great concern Al-Qaida's growth in Yemen over the last five years. Yemen's geography makes it a much more convenient place for Al-Qaida operations. Not only does the mountainous terrain help them hide, but the shoreline also gives them an ability to move over the water - extending their potential reach much further abroad.

6. (C) One of Al-Qaida's objectives in its confrontation with Saudi Arabia, Prince Mohammed explained is "to control Mecca and Medina." He said that they want to be able to control who makes the Hajj, and if they were able to do so, they would limit the visits of those coming to the Hajj to one week, something that could cause chaos. (Embassy note: Among Al-Qaida's basic objectives is its call to "liberate" the Islamic holy sites from the corrupt hands of the Al Saud, but this is the first time we have heard a Saudi official point out the more specific goal of limiting how long Muslims can visit the holy places as part of their Hajj. End note.)

7. (C) Prince Mohammed also noted that Saudi Arabia has been making an effort to seal the Saudi-Yemen border, noting that "we have been arresting between one to two thousand people each day." He also admitted that the Saudis have maintained a common practice of feeding those caught crossing before transporting them back across the border. "We need to change

that," he went on, since many may be crossing the border only to get a meal. Prince Mohammed pointed out that a key feature of the Saudi approach to undermine Al-Qaida's growth in Yemen is to bolster the central government, in particular with substantial financial assistance. A Saudi-Yemeni Council meets twice a year to review development projects in Yemen funded by Saudi Arabia. However, up to now, he reported, the Saudis have not been satisfied with the distribution of these development and infrastructure projects because the Yemeni government has been concentrating them in Sanaa and other urban areas. The Saudis now insist on having a say in distributing these infrastructure investments with remote areas receiving priority "to give the

**Figure 6.2.5 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)**



accomplishing the important objective of reinforcing our strong counterterrorism cooperation. As is evident from his brief responses to Gen. Jones' briefs on Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan, these issues are ones on which Prince Mohammed carefully defers to the King. SMITH

**Figure 6.2.6 Minutes of meeting between Prince Muhammed bin Naif, Saudi Assistant Minister of Interior, and James B. Smith, U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh (12 January 2010)**

**6.3. Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)**



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TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PTER SA YM IR ECON  
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16  
VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA  
Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES SMITH  
REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)  
INTRODUCTION

¶1. (C) Madam Secretary, Mission Saudi Arabia warmly welcomes your visit to the Kingdom, a country which, by virtue of its energy resources, financial power, counterterrorism efforts and leadership of the Muslim world, plays a critical role in many global and regional issues of importance to us. Your visit comes at a time of emerging opportunities for engagement to advance the goals that you and the President have laid out in your speeches in the region.

¶2. (C) Our alliance with Saudi Arabia, while complicated and subject to occasional disjunctions, has proven durable. Taking stock of where we stand, we see a mixed picture. The good news is that the Saudi leadership still sees the United States as its most important strategic partner and guarantor of its stability. We also share many global and regional objectives, including the need for global financial and energy stability, a common view of threats posed by terrorism and extremism, the dangers posed by Iran and destabilization in Pakistan, and the linkage that progress toward Middle East peace has to virtually all other regional issues. Finally, Saudi Arabia has become one of our most important allies in the fight against Al-Qaida and terror financing.

¶3. (C) The bad news is that we differ on tactics in some key objectives, and we are often frustrated by Saudi unresponsiveness and a dearth of interlocutors among an aging collective leadership. The status of women, religious freedom, and human rights are ongoing concerns. On the Saudi side, King Abdullah believes we are not always reliable, consistent, or willing to heed his advice on important issues such as Iraq. Saud Al-Faisal and others have openly been critical of U.S. policies they describe as having shifted the regional balance of power in favor of arch-rival Iran. Differences of opinion on some of these issues can be exacerbated by our differing cultures and value systems, which can introduce a degree of skepticism and hesitancy in the relationship.

¶4. (C) Despite the problems, a negative assessment of the bilateral relationship would miss a critical point relevant to U.S. goals in the region: Saudi Arabia is a country in transition, and the changes underway present opportunities for engagement that can advance U.S. interests and national security. Saudi Arabia faces transitions on multiple levels, from the geopolitical, where its trade and energy relations are shifting from west to east, to economic, where greater integration in the world economy is steadily exposing Saudis to international best practices. Domestically, greater access to internet and cell phones is unleashing new forms of social activism, something demonstrated by an outpouring of Saudi spontaneous voluntary assistance in the aftermath of the Jeddah floods.

EDUCATION & DIVERSIFICATION TO COMBAT EXTREMISM

¶5. (C) Having faced down what amounted to an insurgency by Al-Qaida from 2003 to 2006, Saudi Arabia's leadership

<http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10RIYADH178.html>

20/07/2012

Figure 6.3.1 Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)

acknowledged the pressing need for systemic reforms to combat extremist ideology and provide for a rapidly expanding population (the annual growth rate is about 2 percent). King Abdullah's strategy is two-pronged: he has attacked the roots of the extremism that fed Al-Qaida through education and judicial reforms to weaken the influence of the most reactionary elements of Saudi Arabia's religious establishment. He is also promoting economic diversification. The King is keenly aware of the urgent need to make Saudi education more relevant to today's workplace and increase the role of women in the economy, goals which remain controversial in this deeply conservative, inward-looking desert Kingdom. Guided by a vision that dovetails with some key elements of the President's Cairo speech, King Abdullah has begun to implement an ambitious plan to transform Saudi Arabia's economy away from excessive reliance on hydrocarbons and towards a knowledge-based economy that can provide sustainable development for the long-term. Achieving these goals will require nothing short of a revolution in the education system and significant changes in most aspects of Saudi society, especially the status of women.

¶6. (U) Seen from the outside, the pace of political reform seems glacial (a notable exception is that changes introduced after the WTO negotiations have been very fast for any country; regulatory agencies are also standing up quickly). Yet for certain elements of Saudi society, the changes are coming too fast. Whatever the pace, however, the reality is that serious reforms are gradually but irrevocably changing Saudi society. Recently implemented reform measures include re-shuffling the Ministry of Education's leadership last February (bringing in the King's pro-reform son-in-law as the new minister); a top-to-bottom restructuring of the country's courts to introduce, among other things, review of judicial decisions and more professional training for Shari'a judges; the creation of a new investment promotion agency to overhaul the once-convoluted process of starting a business here; the creation of a regulatory body for capital markets; the construction of the King Abdulah University for Science and Technology (the country's new flagship and controversially-coed institution for advanced scientific research); and a substantial budgetary investment in educating the workforce for future jobs. The Saudi government is also encouraging the development of non-hydrocarbon sectors in which the Kingdom has a comparative advantage, including mining, solar energy, and religious tourism. The Kingdom's 2010 budget reflects these priorities -- about 25 percent is devoted to education alone -- and amounts to a significant economic stimulus package.  
U.S. PARTNERSHIPS TO SUPPORT REFORM & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

¶7. (SBU) Saudi officials have been candid in stressing the importance they place on strong ties with the United States to help them meet reform challenges, both through increased engagement at the government level, including educational exchanges and more FDI, particularly in energy, high tech, and manufacturing. The past year has seen several large investments by prominent U.S. firms in advanced technology areas, and we are working to raise the profile of our trade and investment relations, including through a major Saudi exposition in Chicago at the end of April. The Mission has also steadily expanded USG engagement in education, public health, science & technology, entrepreneurship, and civil society. There are now more than 22,000 Saudi students studying in the US, exceeding pre-9/11 levels. Public health engagement has included breast cancer awareness and CDC cooperation to set up an advanced epidemic screening network that protected this year's 3 million Hajj pilgrims. Our Science & Technology umbrella agreement is already expanding cooperation, including new projects with NASA. Our MEPI programs include a first-time ever exchange visit by a group of Saudi judges, leadership development for women, prevention of violence against women and children, and youth exchange and study. One female participant in our Social Entrepreneurship Forum was a finalist in the 2009 Global Student Entrepreneur Awards. She and seven other Saudi entrepreneurs will attend the President's April summit. Mission elements have also provided training to help the SAG implement a new law to combat trafficking in persons. Intensive engagement with the SAG on IPR is another success story. You will want to congratulate Saudi officials for the significant progress Saudi Arabia has made over the last several years in improving IPR protection, which resulted in the Special 301 Committee deciding to remove Saudi Arabia from the Watch List.  
SAUDI STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS

¶8. (C) TURNING EAST: Saudi Arabia is trying to come to terms with the shift in global energy and trade ties towards Asia, RYADH 00000178 003 OF 005 which has both political and economic consequences. Bilateral trade with China has more than tripled, and China will soon be Saudi Arabia's largest importer. Saudi Arabia has also committed significant investments in China, including the \$8 billion Fujian refinery. Increased trade has also brought increased friction, including anti-dumping complaints from both sides. Saudi Arabia is thinking through how best to take a leaf from the Chinese playbook and use these expanded trade ties to achieve important political goals. In this regard, Saudi Arabia has told the Chinese

Figure 6.3.2 Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)

that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.

9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West. While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help. The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.

10. (S/NF) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad's February 11 boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent, Iran "is now a nuclear nation." The King told General Jones that Iranian internal turmoil presented an opportunity to weaken the regime -- which he encouraged -- but he also urged that this be done covertly and stressed that public statements in support of the reformers were counterproductive. The King assesses that sanctions could help weaken the government, but only if they are strong and sustained. The King will want you to elaborate on the President's statement that the time for sanctions has come. He will also want to hear our plans for bolstering Gulf defenses vis a vis Iran. (The King has invited General Petraeus to his desert camp for discussion on this topic on Tuesday.)

11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE: Your visit offers an important opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate change. Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they face significant costs to diversify their economy. We want to get beyond the obstructionism that Saudi negotiators have often shown during the negotiations and persuade senior leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet their strategic concerns, including by cooperating on developing solar and biomass energy. The King is particularly sensitive to avoid Saudi Arabia being singled out as the bad actor, particularly on environmental issues. Your conveying the importance the President places on working as partners with Saudi Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be very important in making this dialogue more constructive. Secretary Chu intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during his February 21-23 visit.

SAUDI REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS

12. (S) PREVENTING A COLLAPSE OF YEMEN: Saudi participation in international diplomatic efforts to stabilize Yemen reflect Saudi fears that instability on its southern border is a clear and present danger. The King will tell you that Yemen's strategic location makes an Al-Qaida presence there more threatening than in Afghanistan; he will stress the need to support Yemeni unity, despite his mistrust of Ali Abdullah Saleh. With respect to Saudi involvement in the war against the Houthis, the King will stress that the SAC's motivation was self-defense. As Al-Qaida infiltrators from Yemen multiplied, the SAC concluded that the Houthi rebellion had distracted Saleh's government to the detriment of Saudi RYADH 00000178 004 OF 005 security. The military intervention was triggered by a Houthi incursion into Saudi territory, but it presented a long-sought excuse to fortify the porous Saudi-Yemeni border. On February 7, Prince Khalid also informed Ambassador Smith the fighting is wrapping up, and that a ceasefire arrangement could be in place by mid-February.

13. (C) GESTURES AFTER ALL?: The King appreciates the President's commitment to Middle East peace but is skeptical the U.S. can bring sufficient and sustained pressure to bear on Israel, especially regarding settlements. The King told General Jones that progress on Middle East peace was only possible if President Obama was willing to pressure Israel, and Saudi officials have rebuffed U.S. requests for confidence-building gestures to help restart negotiations. Despite their adamant rhetoric, however, several members of a private Jeddah-based think tank run by a retired Saudi general have very quietly been participating in Track Two discussions, apparently with SAC knowledge, and even put forward a proposal on Gaza. In a more dramatic public encounter that has provoked commotion in the region, former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal shook hands with Israeli Deputy PM Ayalon to settle a dispute over joint seating at a Munich conference. Both sides have since insisted the gesture did not signal changes in policy, with a "senior Saudi diplomat" issuing a statement emphatically denying that the incident constituted any form of recognition for Israel.

14. (S/NF) AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN: King Abdullah firmly believes that Asif Zardari is the primary obstacle to the government's ability to move unequivocally to end terrorist safe havens there (when the head is rotten, it affects the whole body"). The King told General Jones that U.S. development assistance would rebuild trust with the Army, which he asserted was staying out of politics in deference to U.S. wishes rather than doing what it "should." On Afghanistan, the King has expressed support for the new U.S.

Figure 6.3.3 Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)

strategy, saying that spending on roads, schools, hospitals and mosques would dissipate popular mistrust and help rebuild the country. The King has not yet acknowledged the Saudi role in Taliban mediation in conversations with USG officials; GIP Director Prince Muqrin has explained to several recent USG visitors that the SAG prefers to keep such discussions in intelligence channels until any agreement is reached. Perhaps reflecting this, the Saudi media downplayed President Karzai's recent visit and the Afghan Ambassador reported that the meeting with the King lasted only ten minutes.

A NOTE ABOUT THE KING

¶15. (C) The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques will offer you a traditional Saudi welcome at the desert "encampment" outside Riyadh, where he likes to spend his winter vacations. You will find in 86-year old King Abdullah a wry and forthright interlocutor. Having struggled with a speech impediment throughout his life, he tends to express himself tersely. Reflecting his Bedouin roots, he judges his counterparts on the basis of character, honesty, and trust. He expects commitments to be respected and sees actions, not words, as the true test of commitment; and he expects good-faith consultations, not surprises. Once the King has lost trust in a counterpart, as has been the case with Nouri Al-Maliki or Asif Zardari, his personal antipathy can become a serious obstacle to bilateral relations. On the other hand, as with President Obama, the King's esteem will help navigate differences and at times change policies. The King is undoubtedly looking forward to his discussions with you, and Mission Saudi Arabia enthusiastically looks forward to supporting your visit.

MISSION STAFFING

¶16. (U) The U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia includes Embassy Riyadh, and Consulate Generals Dhahran and Jeddah. The entire Mission, representing ten agencies, consists of 605 staff (212 U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) and 393 Locally Engaged RIYADH 00000178 005 OF 005 (LE) staff).

SMITH

Figure 6.3.4 Despatch from the U.S. Ambassador at Riyadh to Secretary Clinton on her visit to Saudi Arabia in February 2010 (10 February 2010)