

**Diogenes of Babylon: A Stoic on
Music and Ethics**

Linda Helen Woodward

UCL

Submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Classics

Diogenes of Babylon: A Stoic on Music and Ethics

I, Linda Helen Woodward, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to analyse Diogenes of Babylon's musico-ethical theories, to place them into their historical context, and to examine the possible influences on his thought. Earlier treatments of this Stoic's work have been hampered by the lacunose state of Philodemus' surviving text, the major source, and in some cases an opponent's views have been mistakenly attributed to Diogenes. Conversely, the state of the text together with erroneous column numbering, have resulted in part of Diogenes' philosophy being ascribed to his Epicurean opponent.

Taking Professor Delattre's recently reconstructed edition of Philodemus' *De musica* as my starting point, I attempt to more fully analyse Diogenes' theory of music and ethics. Following a short introductory chapter, I briefly examine Diogenes' other interests, analyse his psychology compared with that of earlier Stoics, and examine how that fits into Diogenes' view on music in education.

I outline Diogenes' general view on music, and compare the musical writings of Plato, Aristotle and the early Peripatetics with those of Diogenes, particularly in relation to education, and outline areas that might have influenced the Stoic. I also look at later writings where they can be seen as evidence for Diogenes' work. An examination of views on poetry as reported by Philodemus elucidates Diogenes' claim that the *mousikoi* of music were analogous to the *kritikoi* for poetry.

In the thesis as a whole, I argue that far from having a radical musical theory, Diogenes fitted easily into the traditional musico-historical context, but developed a more technical approach than those before him.

In addition to arguing for Diogenes' orthodoxy, I suggest that Philodemus had two motives in writing this polemical work. In refuting the Stoic's claims regarding music, he also vigorously defends the Epicurean school against accusations of ignorance.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Intention of thesis

In this thesis, I analyse the musico-ethical theories of the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon and attempt to place them into their historical context.

In my MA thesis, I enquired into Plato's philosophical views of music, and in particular the role of music as an educational tool, and in the course of my research it became apparent to me that there was an active debate about the effect music could have upon the soul, and upon human behaviour.

This debate about the ethical nature of music was taken up by Aristotle and his school, and it continued into the Hellenistic period; indeed it is still ongoing today. From Professor Delattre's newly reconstructed edition of Philodemus of Gadara's *De Musica*, in which Diogenes' musical theories are preserved, it is clear that Diogenes of Babylon was aware of, and himself entered into, the debate. Earlier treatments of Philodemus' writing have been hampered by the lacunose state in which the text survived, and in some cases it has been almost impossible to ascertain which views should be attributed to which philosopher. With the advantage of new, improved methods of reading the papyri,¹ it has now been possible to more accurately analyse Diogenes' views on music and ethics, which, in turn, are harshly criticised by Diogenes' Epicurean opponent, Philodemus of Gadara.

In the course of this thesis, I examine the writings of Plato, Aristotle and other Peripatetics where they can be seen as possible influences upon Diogenes' writing. I also discuss some of the later musical writings, and in particular those of Pseudo-Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, where they might be further evidence of Diogenes' views, or where their own writings help to elucidate those of Diogenes. I also look briefly into the Stoic and Epicurean views on poetry, closely linked to music, and indeed in Platonic thought, and historically prior to Plato, almost inseparable from music. Until the fifth and fourth centuries BC,

¹ On which, see the Introduction to chapter 2.

music was provided merely to accompany the words of the poetry, and hence it was of secondary importance.

From the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC, however, music began to be performed without words, and players of instruments advertised their expertise, and were recognised as professional musicians in their own right, rather than as mere accompanists to the singers or poets. Pausanias, in the second century AD, writes in his *Description of Greece*, of the celebrated flute-player named Pronomos ‘who utterly charmed audiences with his mere stage presence’,² and of whom a statue was erected in Thebes. Pseudo-Plutarch also writes of the musical ‘innovators’ who turned aulos-playing ‘from a simpler to a more intricate art’.³ When writers spoke about music, therefore, it became less clear whether they were referring to *mousikē* in the standard inclusive Greek way, as defined in Liddell and Scott,⁴ or whether they were referring to instrumental music alone, written for its own worth, not to accompany words, and not intended to have words written to accompany it. This differentiation is important, as will become clear in my discussion.

This separation of music and poetry, and the innovations that came with it, caused concern to Plato in particular, and as I will show, to Diogenes as well. I will therefore also briefly discuss what is in modern times referred to as the ‘New Music’ of the fourth century BC, and outline some of the arguments against this style raised by both Plato and Diogenes.

Arrangement of chapters

In order to gain an understanding of the arguments presented, and the issues and influences involved, I commence chapter 2 with a very short overview of

² Book IX, ‘Boiotia’, trans. Levi 1971.

³ [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1141c. For more on the [Plutarchian] work, see below, chapter 3, *passim* and Appendix.

⁴ Liddell, H. G. and Scott, R., revised H. S. Jones (1996) *A Greek–English Lexicon*. Oxford: ‘(i) [A]ny art over which the Muses presided, especially poetry sung to music; (ii) [G]enerally art, letters, accomplishment. *Mousikē*, *grammata*, *gymnastikē* as three branches of education.’

Diogenes' life and work, and list his main interests, such as these are evidenced in later writers.

I discuss Stoic psychology; how the Stoics regarded the soul, and ask whether Diogenes would have had to depart from conventional Stoic theory to hold his views on music's effects on the soul. Did he follow his teacher Chrysippus, or were his views more allied, perhaps, to the later Stoics such as Posidonius (c. 135–51 BC), whose views on psychology were suggested by Galen to have been developed along Platonic rather than traditional Stoic lines? The Stoic theory of *oikeiōsis* will also be very relevant to this discussion.

I ask the questions: 'Does Diogenes discuss music without words, or only music with words, as did his predecessors?' and does Philodemus discuss music on the same basis, i.e., what terms do they use – *mousikē*, *harmonie*, *melos*, for example, and do they use them in the same way? The latest editor of Philodemus' *De Musica*, Professor Daniel Delattre, suggests that Diogenes speaks of music only in the 'traditional' way, that is, as 'music and words', while Philodemus speaks of music in the 'new way', that is, instrumental music. However, I will argue that this is simply one of Philodemus' 'tools' to refute his opponent, and whilst Diogenes only rarely speaks of instrumental music, he nonetheless does, and far from confusing music and poetry, as Philodemus claims,⁵ Diogenes more often discusses the two together in his theory. This will be examined more fully below.

In chapter 3 I look at Diogenes' view on music generally, his beliefs on its public and private use, and his quasi-historical analysis, and discuss how, for him, it fitted into every part of Greek life. In this respect, Diogenes will be shown not to have deviated in his views from earlier writers on the subject. I also investigate the possibility that Diogenes could have seen music as a kind of medicine or therapy, contrasting his claims with other discussions of therapy and medical treatment, and the *De Musica* of Aristides Quintilianus where relevant.

In chapter 4 I compare Plato's musical theory with that of Diogenes' particularly in the realm of education and suggest that Diogenes must not only have had good access to Plato's writings, in particular the *Republic* and the *Laws*, but that he must have studied them closely. The possible influence of

⁵ E.g., col. 119.

Damon of Athens is also developed in as much as he is quoted as an authority by both Plato and Diogenes, but I will query the importance which has traditionally been assigned to Damon.

In chapter 5, I compare Diogenes' theories to those of Aristotle and members of the Peripatetic school such as Archestratus, Heraclides, Theophrastus and Aristoxenus. Aristoxenus was arguably the most important musical theorist of early times, and so one would have expected Diogenes' writings to indicate that he had at least read Aristoxenus' works if Diogenes was so interested in music. As I will show, however, there would seem to be very little, if indeed any at all, Aristoxenian influence in Diogenes' theories.

Stoic and Epicurean thoughts on poetry are outlined briefly in chapter 6. Two aspects in particular are investigated in this chapter: the first being the different ways in which Diogenes and Philodemus use the traditional Greek myths. Having stated so forcefully in the *De Musica* that music is an unnecessary pleasure, it might be surprising to see Philodemus use it as an important didactic tool, and I will look at his usage in comparison to Diogenes' more traditional approach. The second aspect of my investigation is to clarify Diogenes' claims that there is an analogy between the *mousikoi* in music and the *kritikoi* in poetry, and to analyse Philodemus' criticism of this claim.

The short final chapter draws together my conclusions, and also raises the suggestion that Philodemus had more than one motive for writing this refutation of Diogenes' musical philosophy. I will suggest that Philodemus not only wished to refute the views of the opposing school, but he took the opportunity to vigorously defend the Epicurean school against accusations of ignorance.

Notes on the text

For discussion of particular passages from the Philodemian *De Musica*, I quote the Greek text as well as translation (my own unless otherwise stated). I also quote the Greek text as well as translation where specific details of the Greek are relevant to my argument, or where the Greek text is not easily accessible. For discussion of very short extracts, I quote translation only, or insert particularly relevant Greek in parentheses.

For all other texts, unless otherwise stated, I quote translations, and text if relevant, from the Loeb Classical Library series.⁶

All abbreviations of ancient works comply with those in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edn, edited by Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (Oxford: 1996), or where not given in the *OCD*, comply with the Liddell and Scott *Greek–English Lexicon*.⁷

The following markings are used in the Greek of Philodemus' *De Musica*:

- [] indicates supplied characters
- * indicates small blank space in the papyrus line
- indicates doubtful character
- | indicate where two papyrus fragments have been joined

⁶ The Loeb Classical Library, published currently by Harvard University Press.

⁷ Ninth edn, revised and augmented by H. Stuart Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford: 1996).

Chapter 2

PHILODEMUS' *DE MUSICA* (1)

(i) Introduction

The primary evidence for my investigation into Diogenes of Babylon's ethico-musical theory is the polemical treatise¹ entitled *De Musica* by Philodemus of Gadara. An Epicurean philosopher of the first century BC (c. 110–40 BC), his work is almost the only surviving evidence of the views of Diogenes of Babylon. Along with many other texts, this work was buried in the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum during the Vesuvian eruption of AD 79. The work was first uncovered along with many other papyri during the excavations of the eighteenth century, and first published in Leipzig by Johannes Kemke in 1884. The more legible columns, which form the later columns were subsequently re-edited by van Krevelin in 1939, Rispoli in 1969, and Neubecker in 1986.

Following the setting up of the Philodemus Translation Project,² the whole treatise has recently been reassessed and reconstructed by Professor Daniel Delattre³ using new techniques for reassembling the columns, discovered independently by himself and Professor Dirk Obbink (many of the papyrus rolls had been sliced open and copied following their discovery, and subsequently stored and read in an incorrect order),⁴ and also utilising updated multi-spectral imaging facilities for

¹ I use this word guardedly as Delattre (2007) suggests that it is a 'gross impropriety to assign the word "treatise" to any of Philodemus' works'. He asserts that the philosopher's writings are not at all of the style of a monograph, as the word 'treatise' has come to be used, but very much of the style of a defence of the Epicurean school against their adversaries (see Introductory chapter, p. 4). This will indeed be confirmed in the passages discussed. See also my Conclusion, where I will argue that this work was indeed a defence of the Epicurean school against claims of ignorance.

² Created to edit and translate Philodemus' three aesthetic works: Janko (2000: vi).

³ Professor Delattre started his work on the *De Musica* for his own Ph.D.

⁴ Obbink 2002: v–ix; Delattre (2007) Introduction 'Le matériel papyrologique nécessaire à la construction du Livre IV de *La Musique* de Philodème'.

reading the papyrus columns. The reconstructed text, French translation and commentary has now been published by Les Belles Lettres (December 2007).⁵

Delattre's reconstruction shows that the surviving text, rather than consisting of the remains of four books, as was thought by the first editor (and generally not challenged by subsequent editors), in fact consists of just one book, the last of a series of four, believed to have been dedicated to the analysis and criticism of the musical philosophy of various writers. Book IV deals with that of Diogenes of Babylon. Professor Delattre very kindly allowed me to read his reconstruction in advance of its publication, and it was made clear to me that it is possible to read and analyse, as a coherent whole (albeit with some long lacunae), the musical philosophy of Diogenes as reported by Philodemus. Delattre has located some thirty-one direct parallels within the text of Book IV between Philodemus' report of Diogenes' thought, and his refutation (some of these had already been identified as closely allied by Von Arnim in his *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* Book III), and using his knowledge of Philodemus' writing techniques (on which see below), Delattre has been able to offer plausible suggestions as to what might have been written in many of the lacunae in this very damaged text.

Reconstructions of other Herculaneum papyri containing Philodemus' works have confirmed Philodemus' critical methodology, and this has enabled scholars to assume certain practices with confidence.⁶ The methodology consists of three basic stages, and these are followed in this treatise.

1. Statement of opponent's views and arguments, usually in the third-person singular – he says, he affirms, etc. (In this treatise, Diogenes' claims are laid out in columns 1–54.⁷)

⁵ In the Collections des Universités de France publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé. The Summer 2008 newsletter of the Friends of Herculaneum Society states, 'Professor Delattre also described his elation when more recent multi-spectral imaging produced pages of new readings, even though he had just completed his edition and would now have to revisit the whole text.' It will be exciting to be able to learn more about Diogenes' views, if indeed this becomes possible, in due course.

⁶ Janko 2000; Obbink 1996, for example.

⁷ All references to columns will be to numbers as they appear in Delattre 2007, unless otherwise stated.

2. Philodemus then criticises his opponent's theories. (In this work, the refutation occupies columns 55–142.)
3. A final resumé of the opponent's claims, with their refutations, and conclusion generally follows. (In this work, this occurs in columns 143–152, although Delattre suggests that this final section rounds up not just this book (IV) but probably the previous three books also.)⁸

The *De Musica IV* is clearly a philosophical work, dealing with educational theory, psychology, and, to a lesser extent, theology. It is not a technical musical treatise. Unlike the work of Aristides Quintilianus or Aristoxenus, for example, there is no discussion of musical intervals, or harmonic theory (although there is brief reference to the latter at column 48, see below, page 41), but rather in the manner of Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*, there is discussion of harmony between the soul and the body (column 10, see chapter 4, below), the use of music within education, the limit to which one should take one's musical studies, and not pursue it as a profession (column 14), a matter also discussed by Aristotle in his *Politics* Book VIII. These discussions will be analysed in chapters 4 and 5.

(ii) Diogenes of Babylon: his life and work

Diogenes of Babylon (traditionally *c.* 240–152BC)⁹ was the fifth scholarch of the Stoa, following Zeno of Tarsus.¹⁰ A pupil of Chrysippus,¹¹ and teacher of Panaetius, Mnesarchus, and Dardanus, he was interested in linguistics, music, education, philosophical psychology, rhetoric, ethics and political theory.¹²

Although none of his writings are still extant, he is known to have written on a number of subjects:

⁸ Delattre 1999.

⁹ Cicero, *De Senectute* VII.23.

¹⁰ Diogenes appears in the Herculaneum *Index Stoicorum* at 48.3–8; *Der neue Pauly* s.v. 15; see also Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 355.

¹¹ D.L. VII. 84 ; Blank 1994: 55.

¹² D.L. VII. 55–8; Cicero *Leg.* III; Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 355.

- *On Voice* referred to by Diogenes Laertius at his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* VII.55 and 57.
- *On Language*, again attested by Diogenes Laertius at VII.55–8.
- *On the Dialectical Art*, again attested by Diogenes Laertius at VII.71.
- *On the Governing Part of the Soul*, recorded by Galen in *De Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* II.
- [*On Music*, reported and refuted in book IV of Philodemus' own *De Musica*.]¹³
- *On Law* referred to at Athenaeus 526c–d, and Cicero *Laws* III.13–14.
- *On Athena* referred to by Philodemus in his *De Pietate*.

There is no known biography of Diogenes,¹⁴ and he is probably best known for his participation in the embassy that was sent to Rome (together with Carneades and Critolaus) in 155 BC to negotiate a reduction in the fine imposed upon Athens for the sack of Oropus.¹⁵

It is suggested, however, that Diogenes generally 'reformulated the early scholars' position so effectively that his became the orthodox Stoic position during the second and first centuries BC'.¹⁶ The fact that Diogenes is Philodemus' principal opponent in his *De Rhetorica*, and also the *De Musica* IV would seem to support this suggestion. Diogenes' writings or at least his views must have survived in some form for Philodemus to have known about them, and they must have been thought sufficiently important or influential for Philodemus to consider them worth attacking.¹⁷ There is always, of course, the possibility that no other Stoic wrote sufficiently on the subjects; I have been unable to find any writings on music by another Stoic, except, perhaps, for a reference by Diogenes Laertius at VII.4 to a work entitled *Pythagorean Questions* in his list of works by Zeno of Tarsus. This

¹³ Whilst it is clear that Diogenes wrote about music, however, he did not necessarily write a work specifically on that subject. His discussion *might* have been included within another work.

¹⁴ Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 356.

¹⁵ Cicero, *Acad.* II.137; Pausanias VII.11, 4–8; Blank 1994: 56; *OCD* s.v. Diogenes of Babylon; Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 356.

¹⁶ Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 358.

¹⁷ It is thought by some scholars that much of Philodemus' writing might in fact be notes taken from the lectures of his teacher, Zeno of Sidon (e.g., Janko 2000: 5, Sedley 1989: 103–4).

reference gives no indication, however, as to whether or not music is actually discussed in this work. However, if it was, then the very title suggests that any musical theory would have displayed a Pythagorean influence, and an anecdote preserved by Plutarch would seem to support this. In his *De Virtute Morali*, Plutarch writes that Zeno, on going to the theatre with his scholars to hear one Amoebus sing said:

[T2.ii.1] Come, let us observe what harmony and music gut and sinew, wood and bone set forth when they partake of reason, proportion and order.¹⁸

Cleanthes, Zeno of Citium's pupil,¹⁹ and second head of the Stoa, wrote a *Hymn to Zeus*,²⁰ a philosophical hymn, which also functions as an expression of Stoic doctrine,²¹ but there is no mention of a work on music in his list of writings preserved by Diogenes Laertius. There is a mention at column 53, line 9 in the Philodemean *De Musica*, of Cleanthes, but the papyrus is too damaged for more than a few words to be read. There is, however, a further mention of the same philosopher later in the same work, and I will discuss this more fully below, in section iii.

Cicero attests at *Laws* III.13–14 that Diogenes made important contributions to Stoic political thought, stating that ‘on the topic of magistrates there are certain special points which have been investigated. . . by Diogenes the Stoic’, and affirms that no Stoic before Diogenes had written on practical political problems.

Diogenes also ‘developed’ or indeed perhaps ‘reformulated’ the standard Stoic definition of the τέλος or ‘end’ insofar as he appears to have restated it in a more clear or definite form. Stobaeus reports at II.76.9–15 that ‘Diogenes [of Babylon represented the end (*telos*) as] reasoning well in the selection and dissection of things in accordance with nature. . .’ (this definition is repeated

¹⁸ Plutarch, *De Virtute Morali* 443A = *SVF* I. 299. This translation by W. C. Hembold in the Loeb edition.

¹⁹ D.L. VII.176.

²⁰ For a short discussion on which, see below, chapter 3, section ii.

²¹ Thom 2005: 13.

verbatim at D.L.VII.88). Chrysippus' own definition of the *telos*, as reported by Diogenes Laertius at VII.87 was 'living in accordance with nature. . . living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature'. Diogenes' definition does not appear to differ in any material way from Chrysippus', but seems to lay more emphasis on the role of selection, perhaps simply clarifying Chrysippus' original intention.²²

It could be argued that Chrysippus' wording of 'experience of the actual course of nature' in actuality does imply the notion of selection made possible by experience or knowledge. This would seem to be confirmed as Chrysippus' intention by Epictetus, who quotes a passage from Chrysippus which states 'the god himself has given me the power to select things according to nature'.²³ Both Diogenes and Chrysippus, therefore, make use of the word 'select', and so it would appear that there is no fundamental difference in their respective definitions.

The Stoic definition of *telos* was attacked by the Academic Carneades²⁴ for its obscurity and lack of clarity, the main criticism being the meaning of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, 'things according to nature', the phrase inserted by Diogenes in his own definition²⁵ (and both Cicero and Plutarch accuse the Stoics of inconsistency in terminology²⁶). The definition was further refined by Antipater (Diogenes' successor), Panaetius and Posidonius, perhaps all in reaction to this criticism. However, there is nothing to suggest that Diogenes' own definition was a reaction to criticism. Bodily and external goods have no moral value for the Stoics – they are merely preferred or dispreferred 'indifferents'. For the Stoics these preferred indifferents include 'wealth, fame, health, strength and the like' (D.L. VII.104, trans. Hicks (1995[1925]) in the Loeb edition).

²² Long 1967: 69, *pace* Pohlenz 1959: 186, who suggested that Diogenes was the 'first to concentrate on the problem of moral choice'.

²³ *SVF* III. 191; Long 1967: 68.

²⁴ See Plutarch *Comm. Not.* 1072.

²⁵ Cicero *De Finibus* III.31; Plutarch, *Comm. Not.* 1069D.

²⁶ E.g., Plut. *De Stoic. Repugn.* 1034–5, 1047–8; Cicero *De Finibus* III.52, where Cicero states the Stoic view as 'if the meaning is clear, we should be relaxed about the words we use' (trans. Woolf 2001).

The end is therefore about one's internal being – as Long states,²⁷ 'Diogenes. . . makes no concession to external goods as a source of happiness. . . happiness must be made internal, a concomitant of the rational state of mind which is the natural possession of the mature human being.' And Diogenes Laertius at VII. 89 follows his statement of Diogenes' definition of the *telos* with:

[T2.ii.2] By nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man. . . *and virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition choiceworthy for its own sake*, and not from hope or fear or any external motive.

(Trans. Hicks, emphasis mine)

In the discussion on virtue that follows, Diogenes Laertius gives no indication that he is moving from one view to another, which would suggest that there was no disagreement among the early Stoics in this respect.

The evidence discussed thus far indicates that there is no reason to suppose that Diogenes was unorthodox in his ethics.

(iii) Stoic psychology

The Stoic view of the soul as outlined by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* at VII.110 is as follows:

[T2.iii.1] According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement of the soul, or again as impulse in excess.

(Trans. Hicks, modified)

²⁷ 1967: 72.

Although he refers to ‘the Stoics’ generally, and does not give his exact source for this definition, Diogenes (Laertius) continues, citing Zeno’s *On the Passions*, and Chrysippus’ treatise of the same name as authorities two lines further on in this discussion. And with regard to the location of the soul or ‘governing part’, Chrysippus ‘went to great lengths to defend the heart as the location of the governing part of the *psuchē*’.²⁸ Galen records that Chrysippus said ‘The heart is the location of the part where all these parts [of the *psuchē* which extend to the rest of the body] meet, which is the governing part of the *psuchē*.’²⁹ Philodemus, in his *On Piety* reports that Diogenes supported Chrysippus’ view, in Diogenes’ own work *On Athena*. If Diogenes supported Chrysippus in this area, then it may be that he did so in other areas also. At any rate, the evidence so far discussed would suggest that Diogenes views did not largely differ from his predecessor (although it has to be conceded that this is not a strong argument). The relevant passage of Diogenes’ *On Athena* now only exists as paraphrase within Philodemus’ writing, and is discussed briefly in chapter 3, below. Philodemus writes:

[T2.iii.2] [Diogenes says that] some of the Stoics say that the ruling faculty of the will is in the head, for it is wisdom, and therefore is called Metis: but that Chrysippus says that the ruling element of the soul is in the breast, and that Athena, who is wisdom, was born there, and [Diogenes says that] it is because the voice issues from the head (that) they [i.e. the people] say [that Athena was born] from the head [i.e. of Zeus], and [that they say that she was born] with the help of Hephaestus because wisdom comes by art (*technē*).³⁰

From this extract it is clear that Diogenes’ search for an explanation for the claim that Athena came from Zeus’ head shows that he did not accept the obvious explanation that the mind is in the head. Whilst following his predecessor’s views

²⁸ Algra et al. 1999: 564.

²⁹ *PHP* III.1.12, trans. Algra et al. 1999: 567.

³⁰ Trans. Obbink 1996: I.18, slightly modified.

about the governing part of the *psuchē*, therefore, Diogenes did not follow blindly; he still sought an explanation for their beliefs.

Chrysippus defined the standard Stoic view of emotion, as consisting of two judgements:³¹

1. Good / bad, has occurred, and
2. It is appropriate to act in a certain way.

Emotion is, therefore, not involuntary, but consists of a series of evaluative reasonings, judgements following the acceptance or rejection of a proposition or first movement. The judgement involved in emotion is distinguished from appearance by the idea that belief or judgement involves the assent of mind or reason to the appearance,³² and thus the proposition contained within that appearance. Emotions are therefore voluntary for the Stoics in that we are free to question and evaluate the appearance (first movement) and either assent or withhold assent.

All action is voluntary, i.e., what distinguishes humans from non-rational animals is that all their impressions are rational and that there has to be assent before the initial impression can lead to an action. Music, therefore, would seem to require some rational quality to be of any psychological value to the Stoic, as the soul would have (a) to understand the rational impression for it to be able to (b) assent to or reject the proposition it posed. This would seem to highlight four problems:

1. How can music without words be rational, if, as I believe, and shall argue, the music under discussion is occasionally wordless, or is at least being discussed without reference to words in some instances?³³ If words were

³¹ Galen *PHP* IV.1.17–2.4; D. L. VII.111; Sorabji 2000: 2.

³² Plutarch *Against Colotes* 1122c.

³³ The vocabulary is quite specific, and appears to omit any reference to words – in column 34 (T2.v.1) the words used are ἡρμωσμένον καὶ ἀνάρμωστον the same words as in the Speusippus fragment (T2.App.1). Sextus (T2.iii.4) uses μέλος – tune, again no reference to words at all. For further discussion on music without words, see below, chapters 4, 5 and 6.

involved none of the parties would need to account for the music's effect on the hearer / listener: for Philodemus, the refutation would simply be that the words were the thing that affected the listener³⁴ – the music being rather incidental, although in Philodemus' view, the music would rather have detracted from the words' effect on the hearer.

2. When there are words, how can the music that accompanies them add anything to the effect as far as reason is concerned?
3. How could music have an ethical value inherent within it, and, if it could
4. How could this be understood by the soul if the human cannot verbalise that value?

As mentioned above, there is a mention of Cleanthes, the earlier Stoic at column 142, where Philodemus berates Cleanthes for saying:

[T2.iii.3] . . . that the poetical and musical patterns (παράδειγματα) are better and that even though philosophical discourse is able to express divine and human matters adequately, it does not as prose have expressions proper to sublime divine objects, while metres and melodies and rhythms come closest to the truth of the contemplation of the divine.³⁵

Cleanthes clearly had something to say about music, therefore, and as Delattre remarks in his footnote to this passage, it is very likely that Philodemus is responding to a claim made by Diogenes about Cleanthes' beliefs. I would suggest further that as it was included within Diogenes' own section, then it is likely that Diogenes shared the belief with his predecessor. As Scade states,³⁶ Cleanthes'

³⁴ Indeed, on occasions Philodemus does use this argument. See below, page 61 and n.16.

³⁵ Trans. Thom 2005: 5, as amended. Philodemus remarks, 'a more ridiculous statement than which is not easy to find (οὐ καταγελαστότερον οὐ ράϊδιον εὐρεῖν).

³⁶ 2007: 218. This scholar and I first met at a meeting of the London philosophy seminars in the 2006/7 series, where we both gave papers. During this meeting we discovered that we had both read Long 1996 [1991] (for more on which, see below, section 2.v), and had independently come to the conclusion that it was very much under appreciated. I thank Paul Scade for allowing me to use a copy of his chapter 3 from his thesis where he discusses the Long paper. I also thank him for discussing

passage clearly shows that the Stoic regarded musical harmony as a rational phenomenon; it also indicates ‘the structural side of music by emphasising rhythm and metre’,³⁷ and the passage continues, “[Cleanthes says]” ‘It is not that ideas [alone] are not helpful, but when they are set to music, the stimulus from the thoughts themselves, accompanied by melodies is even greater’. Plato himself at *Philebus* 17c ff. (below, T2.v.4) was similarly concerned with the rhythm and metre in his view of music, and I will discuss this more fully further below.

That music had an effect on peoples’ behaviour was widely accepted,³⁸ as illustrated by Sextus at *M.* VI.8, where he talks about music’s soothing effect:

[T2.iii.4] Thus, Pythagoras, having noticed on one occasion that the youths who were in a state of drunkenness differed not at all from madmen, advised the flute player who was with them in their revels to play the ‘spondean’ tune (σπονδαῖον μέλος); and when he had done as instructed, they suddenly changed and became sober just as if they had been sober from the beginning. (Trans.Bury 2000[1949])

But a plausible answer to item 4 in the above list is important if Diogenes is not to be regarded as taking a similar view to that of the later Stoic, Posidonius’ view as represented by Galen at *PHP* V.6.22–3.³⁹ Here, Galen suggests that Posidonius, like Plato, believed the soul to comprise both rational and irrational parts, and cites the effect of music on a group of drunken youths, calmed by the flute player changing from the Phrygian mode to the Dorian mode, but claiming that it could only affect the irrational:⁴⁰

Long’s views further with me, and for their possible impact on our understanding of the musical philosophy of the early Stoics, and Diogenes of Babylon in particular.

³⁷ Scade 2007: 218.

³⁸ This belief is attested to followers of Pythagoras at Iamblichus *VP* 110–11. At *Laws* VII. 790e, Plato refers to the tunes with which mothers put their fractious babies to sleep; at 791ab he refers to dances in ritual to the deities that invoke calm and relief to the frenzied soul. Aristotle, at *Politics* VIII. 1340a, remarks that it is clear that people are affected by many kinds of music; and at 1342a–b he suggests that the Phrygian mode induces ecstasy and emotion.

³⁹ De Lacy 330–1 = Posidonius fr. 168 E–K.

⁴⁰ In fact an incident almost identical to that reported in T2.iii.4, apart from the main protagonist, and one that was in fact in all likelihood the same, and indeed was reported by a number of other authors. See also chapter 3, T3.i.21–4, below.

[T2.iii.5] ...For obviously opinions held by their [the drunken young men] rational faculty were hardly changed through instruction from a musical instrument; but since the emotional element of soul is irrational, they are aroused, and calmed through irrational movements. *You see, the irrational is helped and harmed by what is irrational, the rational by knowledge and ignorance.*

(Trans. Kidd, emphasis mine)

According to Galen, Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' views on emotion and the psychology of action, preferring instead the tripartite psychology of reason, spirit and appetite.⁴¹ However, apart from Galen, no ancient writer suggests that this was the case, and it is quite possible that Galen is either deliberately or mistakenly misunderstanding Posidonius' position. At *De Fin.* I.6, Cicero includes Posidonius with no comment in his list of Stoic writers. 'For what in the case of the Stoics, has been left out by Chrysippus? Yes, we read Diogenes, Panaetius and not least our friend Posidonius.' Had Posidonius been notorious for departing from Stoic views in such a fundamental theory, surely Cicero would not have included him in his listing so casually.⁴²

Yet, at *PHP* V.1.10–11,⁴³ Galen states that Posidonius was too ashamed of Chrysippus' views on emotion to follow them, and turned instead to the theories of the ancients – 'Posidonius. . . both praises and accepts the Platonic view and refutes Chrysippus.'⁴⁴

Diogenes certainly follows Plato in much of his musical writings, as will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4 below. However, with regard to the division of the soul, I would argue that there is nothing to suggest that he followed Plato rather than orthodox Stoic thought, even though Vander Waerdt asserts that Diogenes 'divided the soul into separate parts along Platonic lines' and anticipated the modifications on

⁴¹ Cooper 1998: 71.

⁴² See also Tieleman 2007: 108, who uses the same Cicero passage to support his argument for the orthodoxy of Panaetius. Tieleman writes, 'Cicero. . . would not have mentioned Panaetius (or any of the others) if the latter had in his view differed significantly from Chrysippus on these subjects.'

⁴³ De Lacy 294.15–25.

⁴⁴ *PHP* V.1.5.

Stoic psychology,⁴⁵ citing the *De Musica* IV columns 51–2, 76 (part), 67, and 77.3 [40–1, 56, 57, and 69.3] as evidence of this.⁴⁶ Teun Tieleman has also indicated his disagreement with Vander Waerdt’s theory, stating, ‘And Obbink and Vander Waerdt. . . take [Diogenes] to have been a dualist throughout. This is a mistake however.’⁴⁷

It is indeed a mistake, because: only columns 51–2 [40–1] of the columns cited by Vander Waerdt as evidence of Diogenes’ dualism appear within the report of Diogenes’ own theory – the other three form part of Philodemus’ refutation, and all are situated within discussion on music and education, which I shall discuss in more detail in chapter 4. Columns 51–2 [40–1] appear almost at the end of Diogenes’ reported theory, and could almost have been lifted directly out of Plato’s *Laws* VII. 802b–c and II. 669b–e. They discuss the legislators, experts in poetry and music, who would be considered fit to regulate the music, and then move on to the voicing of concern about the dangers of inappropriate musical imagery with its inherent moral danger. The inferiority of the writers of music compared with the Muses is also emphasised. The early part of each column is very damaged, and Delattre suggests that column 51 might well have commenced with something like ‘It is necessary, as Plato suggests, that. . .’⁴⁸ However, there is no mention here of the parts of a soul.

The remaining three columns cited by Vander Waerdt, above, form part of Philodemus’ refutation, and column 76 [56] indeed contains a reference to ‘parts of the soul’ – the wording is μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς. At column 77, 2–3 [69], the wording is simply ἕκαστον τούτων, here the specific reference to ‘parts of the soul’, whilst plausible in the context, has been supplied by the editors of the text. As stated above, I will discuss these columns further within my discussion on education in

⁴⁵ 1991: 208nn. 53, 53; Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 355n. 4.

⁴⁶ For ease of discussion and reading, all column numbers have been converted to those in Delattre’s new edition (2007). The numbers in square brackets are those quoted in Vander Waerdt’s discussion, taken from Delattre 1989.

⁴⁷ Tieleman 2003: 243–4.

⁴⁸ Delattre 2007 commentary to column 51. See my more detailed discussion of these columns in chapter 4, below.

chapter 4. However, at no place within these columns is there a specific mention of a tripartite soul, but merely to ‘parts’ of the soul.

It is true that in an earlier column (8), which directly corresponds to the column 77 [69] mentioned above, Diogenes discusses in a very Platonic fashion the place of music and gymnastics within education, each benefiting the soul and body.⁴⁹ In column 8, Diogenes certainly uses the same wording as Plato in his references to ‘parts of the soul’, but again there is no suggestion of any division between the ‘rational’ and ‘the irrational’ part, or a number of distinct parts. Although the restoration τὰ [μέρη τῆς] ψυχῆς is again speculative, the phrase used in the corresponding line of Philodemus’ refutation uses the same wording (μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς, col. 77, 40–1). This phrase also occurs at Chrysippus *SVF* II. 841 (= Galen *PHP* V.2.49–50 and 3.1 = p. 304 De Lacy), within Galen’s criticism of Chrysippus for failing to describe the parts of the soul in Chrysippus’ own treatise entitled *Therapy and Ethics*. In his treatise, Chrysippus writes that ‘the soul will also be called beautiful or ugly in terms of the proportion or disproportion of certain parts (μερῶν)’. But Galen criticises Chrysippus, claiming he was not able to define these parts, but was forced to define them in terms of their activities, wrongly in Galen’s view (*PHP* V.2.47–9). He quotes Chrysippus as saying:

[T2.iii.6] Ἔστι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη δι’ ὧν ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος συνέστηκε καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ διάθεσις, καὶ ἔστι καλὴ ἢ αἰσχροὶ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μῦρον ἔχον <οὕτως> ἢ οὕτως κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους μερισμούς.

They are parts of the soul through which its reason and the disposition is constituted. And a soul is beautiful or ugly by virtue of its governing part being in this or that state with respect to its own proper divisions. (Trans. De Lacy)

Galen proceeds to ask Chrysippus to state ‘the proper divisions’ to ‘relieve us of our difficulty’ (*PHP* V.2.50–1), and goes on to attempt his own analysis of these parts using examples of the different (physical) parts of the eye and the ear to

⁴⁹ For a discussion on these columns, and their similarities to Platonic thought, see chapter 4, T4.1.

explain that ‘nothing is composed of its own *activities* and states that parts (μόρια) comprise rather ‘bones, cartilages, nerves, membranes and a number of other *things*’ (*PHP* V.3.4–7 = De Lacy 306, emphasis mine).

Later in the same work (*PHP* V.4.2–4 = De Lacy 312) Galen states:

[T2.iii.7] My purpose is to show that it is not a single part of the soul nor by virtue of a single power of it that both judgements and affections occur, as Chrysippus claimed, but that the soul has both a plurality of powers. . . and a plurality of parts.

(Trans. De Lacy)

It is clear, therefore, that Galen regards Chrysippus as a psychological monist, even though Galen also cites him as speaking of parts, and throughout his criticism he compares Chrysippus’ theory with that of Plato, Aristotle and Posidonius. Therefore the fact that Diogenes also refers to parts does not mean that he is not a psychological monist, like Chrysippus. Diogenes can also be seen to be following the standard Stoic psychology of action in the wording of his column 14:

[T2.iii.8] εχ[.

δὲ καὶ [δ]ιδαχ[η.

πρὸς ἀρετῆ[.

βούλεσθαι κα[.

ὀρμᾶς τινὰς ἐ[μ]ποιεῖν· ἐ-

πειδὴ περ πρᾶ[ξ]εις καὶ κα-

τὰ προαίρεσίν ἐ[ἴ]σιν, ὥς

τύπ[ω] λαβεῖν, πρ[ο]αιρ[έ]σεις

γίνε[σθαι] πάθη τινὰ με-

τὰ δυνάμεως

Moreover, an education. . . . towards virtue. . . wish . . . engender certain impulses; [and] *since moral actions arise through deliberate choice*, to grasp the matter in outline, certain affections accompanied by capacity become intentions . . .⁵⁰

Philodemus' criticism at columns 89, 27–90, 14 is more expansive:

[T2.iii.9] . . . ουθαι προ]αιρε[σ	27
. . . δι]αφέρε[ι τ]ῶι συγ[χω- ρήσει]ν, κἂν βούληται [ταύ- την] ὁρμᾶς ἐμποιεῖν, καὶ	30
προ]αιρ]έσεις εἶναι πάθη τι- νὰ με]τὰ δυνάμεως, ὅτι πο- τὲ τα]ύτῳ ἐστι. τὸ δ' ἀρχὴν εἶ-	
ναι] τοῦ λαβεῖν τὰς προαι- ρέ]σεις ταύτας καὶ τὰς δυνά-	35
μ]εις τὰ πάθη, πρὸς ἀνδρεί- α]ν μὲν θάρσος, πρὸς σω- φροσύνην δὲ αἰσχύνην	
καὶ κόσμον, ἄλλα δὲ πρὸς	
ἄλλα, γελοῖόν ἐστι συγγω-	40
ρε]ῖν· οὐχ ὅτι γὰρ τοῦ λαβεῖν τ]ὰς εἰρημένους δυνάμεις ὡ[ς ὄντα τοιαῦτα πάθη δώσει	
τις ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' ἀρετὰς ἢ τῶν	
ἀ]ρετῶν [ἀ]ποτελέσματα·	45
ἀλλὰ] μὴν τὰ θάρση καὶ τὰς	1
αἰσχύ]νας καὶ κοσμιότητα[ς καὶ τ]ὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη προσ- αγορ]εῖ· καὶ τὰς ὁρμᾶς δι'	

⁵⁰ Emphasis mine.

ῶν λ]αμβάνουσι τὰς δυνά-	5
μεις], οὐ μόνον λέγων ὑπὸ	
τῶν κυρίων γίνεσθαι πρά-	
ξεω]ν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ὀ-	
μοι]ωμάτων ἀγνοεῖ, διὰ	
φύ]σεώς τε νομίζων, ὡς εἶ-	10
πεν], ἀρετὰς τινὰς ἐνγίνε-	
σθαι], καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι τὴν ο-	
...].φόρον ἀνδρείαν ἢ δι-	
.....	14

[Diogenes] differs in that he will grant that, even if he claims that <music> inspires impulses, and that intentions are certain affections (*pathe*) accompanied by capacity, that [sometimes] it is [the same thing]. For that the origin of acquiring these intentions and strength are affections – audacity leading to courage, shame and reserve to temperance, and so on – it is laughable to grant this. For far from someone granting that the origins of acquiring the aforementioned powers are such affections, he will insist that they are virtues or the effects of the virtues. Yet Diogenes calls boldness and shame and reserve and such things affections; and in saying that the impulses through which people acquire the powers come about not only from actions in the strict sense, but also [from] things like them, he goes wrong, as also when he believes, as he says, that some virtues come to be in people as a result of nature, and still more. . . courage. . .

As Philodemus sees it, Diogenes disregards the distinction between the virtues and the affections from which they come. His refutation makes it clear that Diogenes’ psychology of action is orthodox Stoic. It seems clear also that Diogenes did not adopt Plato’s psychology, and the fact that Diogenes also argues that music’s ethical value can be recognised by a ‘knowing sense’ (see below, T2.v.1), whilst asserting that these ‘parts’ are inseparably linked, would seem to confirm that

Diogenes cannot have adopted Plato’s psychology. It is noted that Diogenes also appears to use terminology and arguments that bears a significant resemblance to Aristotle in *Politics* VIII, and *Poetics*. Janko suggests that Aristotle’s theory of tragic catharsis was, in fact, an important part of Diogenes’ musical philosophy,⁵¹ and I will discuss this further in chapter 5 below. However, the point should be made that simply because Diogenes draws upon certain parts of earlier philosophers’ theories, this does not necessarily imply that he accepted the full theory.

(iv) *Oikeiōsis*

Diogenes himself clearly believed that wordless music indeed has psychological value (a value also argued for in respect of poetry by Crates, and refuted by Philodemus – see chapter 6 below, entitled ‘Stoics versus Epicureans on poetry’), and at column 18, he explains how music has such a powerful effect upon the soul:

[T2.iv.1]

τὸ εὐήκο[ον παῖδα κ]|αὶ ὄλωσ
 εὐαί[σθητον γίνεσθα]|ι ὑπὸ ῥυ-
 θμοῦ καὶ μουσι[κῆ ἀφ]|ίησιν,
 ὡς ἔχουσά τινας ἀ[ρετ]|ᾶς συγ-
 γενεῖς ἰσχύειν γὰρ [έν] | πᾶσιν 5
 μάλιστ[α] τὸ οἰκεῖο[ν κ]|αὶ προσ-
 φέσθαι [τ]άχι[στα καὶ ῥ]|ᾶιστα
 τὸ ὅμοιον, ὡσπερ [γ’ αἰσθ]|ητά
 τινα προσφερόμ[ενο]|ν εὐθὺ
 τῆς οὐσίας· ἐξ ὧν δ[ὴ καὶ τ]|ᾶς 10
 ἀπολαύσεις κα[ὶ τὰ πά]|θη
 καὶ καθόλου τᾶς [αἰσθή]|σεις

⁵¹ Janko 1992a: 347, a suggestion that I will refute.

σφ]οδροτάτας ἔσσε[σθαι δι]|ἄ ταύ-
την ἅμα δὲ κα[. . . .τ]|ῆς [ῆ-
δο]νῆς δυνα[μ. . . .]| κα[. . . .] 15
. . .] οὐ μικρὰν το[. . . . σ]|υμ-
.]| πρ[. . . . π]|ἄθος
ἀπ]αθεστατ[.]|ιν ἄ-
ναισθητ[.]|των
κατα[.] 20
τοὺνα|[ντίον]⁵²

[for] music also allows [the child] to acquire a good ear, and in general, a keenness of perception under the influence of the rhythm, given that it [the music] possesses certain in-born natural virtues ; for he says that what is strongest in all things is what is proper, and it is what is similar that is assimilated most swiftly and easily being borne directly to [one’s] being like certain sensibles; and as a result our enjoyments and our affections and in general our sensations will be most strong on account of this [music?]. . .

With regard to the word ‘virtues’, as stated above (p. 16), for the Stoics, the only ‘good’ or ‘virtue’ was moral good/virtue. And Sextus reports at *M. XI.22 (SVF III.75 part)*:

⁵² Janko (1992b: 125) differs in his reconstruction of this column; at line 1 he chooses not to insert *οὐ πᾶσι* within the lacuna; at line 3, Delattre argues for *μουσική* being in the nominative, and so the subject of the sentence, but Janko has it in the genitive – *μουσικῆς*. Also at line 3 for *ἀφίησιν* Janko reads *αἰσθησιν*. Janko’s translation of these lines reads, ‘what is easily heard and in general easily sensed [and the] sensation (?) from rhythm and music, as if it (sc. the music) has some inborn virtues’. One would expect ‘ἔχουσά’ in line 4 to also be in the genitive to agree with ‘μουσικῆς’, but Janko states, ‘But the clause *ὡς ἔχουσά τινος ἀρετὰς συγγενεῖς*’ is not within the *oratio obliqua*, and appears to be a gloss by Philodemus, restating Diogenes’ point in Epicurean terminology’. At line 12, Janko replaces *αἰσθήσεις* with *ἐκστασίες*. Delattre acknowledges Janko’s variation, but clearly does not agree with it, and I follow Delattre’s text for the translation. See Delattre 2007: vol. I, 32, n. 7. For further discussion, see below, pp. 35–6.

[T2.iv.2] The Stoics. . . define the good (ἀρετήν) as follows: ‘Good is benefit or not other than benefit’, meaning by benefit virtue and virtuous action, and by not other than benefit, the virtuous man and his friend. For virtue which is a disposition of the commanding faculty, and virtuous action, which is an activity in accordance with virtue, are benefit. . . (Trans. Long and Sedley 1987 60G)

I would suggest that like Plato, Diogenes believed that music was a gift from the gods; the etymology of μουσική would for the Stoic confirm its link with the muses, Μοῦσαι. At Column 38, Philodemus reports that Diogenes in his own treatise wrote at great length of music’s first use – that of honouring the divinity, on which see further chapter 3, section ii below. And he states that for Diogenes the etymology confirms music’s relation to the divine, citing the word θεωρεῖν [watching], and its link to θεός [god].⁵³ The Muses are related to the gods, and so music is similarly related, by association. This etymological connection is reiterated by [Plutarch] in his *De Musica* at 1140D–E.⁵⁴

The Stoics used the writings of Homer and Hesiod to try to ‘recover the serious thoughts about the world by removing the veneers from the ancient poets’ fictions and superstitions’⁵⁵ and reinterpreting the myths in their attempts to understand nature and traditional religion, and I would suggest that for the Stoics, these myths provided an account of the origin of music, with or without words. The later Stoic writer Cornutus (first century AD) used etymology in his *Compendium of Traditional Greek Theology*, assuming that ‘Greek gods have names and epithets. . . because in their original usage these names represented the way people understood the world. Etymology enabled the Stoic philosopher to recover the beliefs about the world held by those who first gave the gods their present names.’⁵⁶ Plato, also, in his *Cratylus*, especially at 391b–410e, discussed the etymology of the Gods’ names. For example at 404c Socrates states that ‘Hera is the lovely one (ἑρατή), for Zeus,

⁵³ Philodemus ridicules this claim at col. 118, as I will discuss in chapter 3, section ii.

⁵⁴ There is nothing specific to suggest that [Plutarch] is using the Stoics as a source here. However, there are various passages in the [Plutarchan] *De Musica* that have similarities to Diogenes’ writings, for discussion of which see chapter 3, section i below.

⁵⁵ Long 1996 [1992]: 74.

⁵⁶ Long 1996 [1992]: 71.

according to tradition, loved and married her; possibly also the name may have been given when the legislator was thinking of the heavens, and may be only a thin disguise of the air (ἀήρ). You will recognise the truth of this if you repeat the letters of Hera several times over.⁵⁷ This is not to suggest that the Stoics took the myths as true, but rather sought to uncover the truth that lay behind the myths.

Philodemus also writes at *De Pietate* col. vi that ‘It was things in Homer and Hesiod that Chrysippus tried to harmonise with Stoic doctrines, that is the divine names and myths transmitted by the poets.’ And at column 43 of the *De Musica* Diogenes cites the etymology of the muse Erato as proof of music’s privileged link with virtuous love.

[T2.iv.3] ὅτι δὲ τὸ [μέλος συμ-
βάλλει[τ]αι πρὸς [τὴν ἐρωτι-
κὴν ἀρετὴν, αἰ[ρεῖν προση-
κόντως καὶ μίαν τῶν Μου-
σῶν, Ἐρατῶ γε τοῦ ὄνομα.

Appropriate proof of the fact that melody contributes to the management of erotic love is also provided by one of the Muses actually being called Erato.

If music was given to humans by the gods, then by its very nature it must be ‘good’, i.e., morally good (unless contaminated by man), as part of Nature itself. For the Stoics, the gods are providential and beneficent,⁵⁸ and so something given by the gods must at least be capable of being used for moral good. Of course, being good as in morally good, being conducive to good, and being capable of being used for moral good are three different things, and the reference to *aretē* in the context of music (T2.iv.1) may be surprising. But it would appear that Diogenes might have drawn a direct analogy between virtuous action and the correct intervals of a Greek

⁵⁷ Plato, *Cratylus* 404b, Trans. Jowett in Hamilton and Cairns eds. (1989) at 441.

⁵⁸ Cicero *De Nat. D.* II.75–6; Clement *Paidagog.* I.8.63.1–2 = *SVF* II.1116.

musical scale, as suggested by Long⁵⁹ regarding the Stoics generally (see T2.v.3 below), and I will discuss this suggestion further in the next section of this chapter. Diogenes Laertius confirms at VII.91 that the Stoics believed that virtue can be taught:

[T2.iv.4] That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work *On the End*, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his *Protrepticus*, and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good.

(Trans. Hicks)

The phrases ‘assimilated’ and ‘easily being borne’ in extract T2.iv.1 suggest that Diogenes is applying the Stoic concept of οἰκείωσις – ‘natural affinity’ – to musical theory.⁶⁰

The concept of *oikeiōsis*, or natural affinity/appropriation, is ‘in all cases concerned not with mere acquisition or appropriation, but with the establishment and recognition of a more intimate and fundamental relationship’,⁶¹ an account of a human’s personal and psychological development.

Cicero *De Finibus* III.16 states that:

[T2.iv.5] Every animal, as soon as it is born (this is where one should start), is concerned with itself, and takes care to preserve itself. It favours its constitution and whatever preserves its constitution, whereas it recoils from its destruction and whatever appears to promote its destruction. In support of this thesis, the Stoics point out that babies *seek what is good for them* and avoid the opposite before they ever feel pleasure and pain. This would not happen unless they valued their own constitution and feared destruction. But neither could it happen that they would seek

⁵⁹ Long 1996 [1991]: 202–23.

⁶⁰ Although Janko (1992b: 126) suggests that in this context, it would appear to go against the standard Stoic theory of emotion; on his arguments, see below, pp. 35 ff.

⁶¹ Kerferd 1972–3: 183.

anything at all unless they had self-awareness and thereby self-love. . . (Trans. Woolf, my italics)

So (in T2.iv.1), Diogenes is perhaps suggesting that the soul instinctively recognises and actively seeks the goodness or virtue inherent in the music, and because virtue is ‘naturally ingrained in human beings’,⁶² this virtue in the music attaches all the more easily by natural affiliation. According to the Stoics, nature initially endows humans sufficiently to orientate themselves towards goodness and virtue, by way of rational selection among indifferents. Therefore even an untutored response to music might be a recognition that it has a rational basis, because according to the Stoics, in Nature everything does. But achieving moral virtue would be the result, ‘not just of undistorted development of our natural endowment, but at least as much of education and training’,⁶³ something also emphasised by Plato and Aristotle. At *Eth. Nic.* 1179b20–32 Aristotle writes:

[T2.iv.6] Now some think it is nature that makes people good; some think it is habit; some that it is teaching. The [contribution] of nature clearly is not up to us, but results from some divine cause in those who have it, who are the truly fortunate ones. Arguments and teaching surely do not prevail on everyone, but the soul of the student needs to have been prepared by habits for enjoying and hating finely, like ground that is to nourish seed. . . [W]e must already in some way have a character suitable for virtue, fond of what is fine and objecting to what is shameful.

(Trans. Irwin (1999))

Although the concept of *oikeiōsis* was probably first introduced by the Stoics,⁶⁴ the word did occur in writings of earlier philosophers in a similar context. Pembroke, who traces the modern discussion on the origin of the concept, states that ‘not all instances of a word so versatile as *oikeion* are likely to have much relevance

⁶² Algra et al. 1999: 677.

⁶³ Striker 1996: 294.

⁶⁴ Kerferd 1972–3.

to the problem [of tracing its use in the Stoic sense]’,⁶⁵ but his discussion does suggest that similar concepts might have been identified by at least Plato and Aristotle, although not having the same importance to these philosophers as to the Stoics. At *Protagoras* 326a2–b2, Plato uses similar vocabulary in a context not unlike that with which we are concerned:

[T2.iv.7] The music masters by analogous methods instil self-control and deter the young from evil-doing. And when they have learned to play the lyre, they teach them the works of good poets of another sort, namely the lyrical, which they accompany on the lyre, familiarising (οἰκειοῦσθαι) the minds of the children with the rhythms and melodies. By this means they become civilised, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves and so more capable in whatever they do, for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole of human life.

(Trans. Guthrie in Hamilton and Cairns (1999))

Thus, the teacher, who as will be seen below (discussion of [T2.v.1]), has learned to understand the benefits to be obtained from music that encourages virtue, must ensure that the developing children are exposed to only the right kind of music if development is not to be impaired.

Given that Diogenes had extended Chrysippus’ definition of the *telos*, to underline the importance of appropriate selection, perhaps he also develops the Chrysippean theory of personal *oikeiōsis*, which accounts for the natural development of a properly taught child through the various stages until it reaches the age of reason, by finding a place for music within this development. If so, the reason for Diogenes’ emphasis on a proper education and moral training becomes instantly clear.

For Chrysippus the capacity for virtue remains latent within a human,⁶⁶ despite the corrupting influences around it. The transitional stage in personal *oikeiōsis*, is from the potentially rational, to the rational, and coming ‘to terms with

⁶⁵ 1996 [1971]: 132–41 at 136.

⁶⁶ Gill 1998: 119.

oneself'. That is when one realises the difference between the primary natural goods, health and wealth, which, although preferable, are still matters of indifference, and the true 'good', i.e., virtue, which is the only good. The consistency of 'selection and disselection of things in accordance with nature' allows Diogenes to find a place for music within Chrysippus' doctrine of personal *oikeiōsis*, and to his including the notion of virtue within certain music being recognisable by the soul. Before the age of reason, the child will be drawn naturally to the image of virtue represented by the music by assimilation. As Cicero writes at *De Finibus* III.21, 'A human being's earliest concern is for what is in accordance with nature.' The baby will, after all, seek what is good for them and avoid the opposite before they ever feel pleasure or pain.⁶⁷ Thereafter, I would suggest, the teachers will ensure the child is exposed only to the right or appropriate music to habituate the child's ear to choose that kind of music, and to see value only in appropriate music,⁶⁸ until at a later stage of development, the educated child will consistently select appropriate music through the knowledge he has acquired through education. Cicero continues.⁶⁹

[T2.iv.8] As soon as one has gained some understanding, or rather 'conception' (what the Stoics call *ennoia*), and sees an order and, as it were, concordance in the things which one ought to do, one then values that concordance much more highly than those first objects of affection. Hence through learning and reason one concludes that this is the place to find the supreme human good, that good which is to be praised and sought on its own account. This good lies in what the Stoics call *homologia*. Let us use the term consistency, if you approve.

As stated earlier, Diogenes might have been the first Stoic to write in any detail on music, and it is not therefore known whether Chrysippus would have endorsed his view, but it does not appear to require any fundamental change to traditional Stoic doctrine.

⁶⁷ *De Fin.* III.16, see above, T2.iv.6.

⁶⁸ Value for the Stoics will only be seen in good, i.e., virtuous goods or actions.

⁶⁹ *De Fin.* III. 21.

Janko's objection⁷⁰ that employing the notion of *oikeiōsis* would go against the standard Stoic theory of emotion rests partly, I would suggest, on his own substitution in line 12 (of T2.iv.1) of ἔκστάσεις for Delattre's αἰσθήσεις. This substitution might be a result of another conjectural insertion at Philodemus' discussion of the passage, which appears at column 77,⁷¹ but again the state of the original text has left Philodemus' own wording open to interpretation. Janko writes 'That a Stoic should argue this case at all is very striking; the "enjoyments, emotions and sensations" which arise through music would be considered irrational and therefore hostile to virtue in orthodox Stoic theory.' The use of the conjectural ἔκστάσεις would appear to strengthen Janko's argument for a connection with Aristotle's notion of tragic catharsis (on which see chapter 5, below). In the context of a Stoic discussion, however, Delattre's αἰσθήσεις, sensations, would appear more appropriate, particularly in the context of Diogenes' own theory.

Janko states that 'enjoyments, emotions and sensations which arise... would be considered irrational'. However, music's effects on our behaviour (by way of the assent or rejection of the proposition contained within the music) would not necessarily be considered irrational simply because the music does not contain a proposition that is expressed verbally. As Nussbaum suggests,⁷² 'Language is a medium of representation. When we express the content of an emotion in words we are in many cases performing a translation of thoughts that did not originally take an explicitly verbal form . . . music is another form of symbolic representation . . . so it is not obvious why we think that there is a greater problem about expressing an emotion's content musically than about expressing it linguistically.' Similarly, if I hear a song sung in a language I do not understand, but with the words set to music in an idiom familiar to me, then whether or not I have 'understood' the music in a technical sense (see below, pp. 39 ff.), the musical line may well give me more of an appreciation of the character being expressed than the foreign words being enunciated. Perhaps for Diogenes, music (μέλος) itself was a kind of language,

⁷⁰ 1992b: 123–9, at 126.

⁷¹ In Delattre 2007, previously column 69 in Delattre 1989, Kemke III. 24.

⁷² 2001: 264.

which had to be learned before its effects could be properly understood. Nevertheless, this lack of technical ‘understanding’ will not change the fact that behaviour will be affected if the listener acts upon the impression received from the music. Hence, a mother singing a lullaby to a child will be seen to soothe and relax the infant, just as the drunken youths were soothed by the flautist (see above T2.iii.4, T2.iii.5).

As Tad Brennan points out in his discussion⁷³ of how a Stoic might defend the claim that music can affect behaviour without containing any verbally expressed propositional element:

The Stoics have no need to deny . . . that the application of thumbscrews will . . . produce in their victim the impression that something bad is occurring, and so make it more likely that the average victim will actually believe that something bad is happening. So too there is no reason for them to deny that music may have an effect on our behavior – exactly because it affects our beliefs. *True it has no propositional content, but then neither do the thumb-screws . . .* And yet they are all capable of having some effect on our behavior if, and only if we assent to the impressions and so change our beliefs.⁷⁴

(v) ‘Natural’ perception vs. ‘knowing’ perception

With regard to the question as to how one might recognise and understand the psychological value within the music, at Column 34, lines 2–21, Philodemus reports that Diogenes believed that there were two types of perception – a natural perception, which could tell what was hot, what was cold etc., and a knowing perception, which could tell ‘that which is in harmony and that which is not’. The passage and its translation are quoted below, together with Philodemus’ refutation (Greek and translation):

⁷³ 1998: 32–3 and nn. 24–5.

⁷⁴ Italics mine.

[T2.v.1]

Col. 34

συ[γκεχωρ]ηκέναι δ' αὐ-
 τῶι τὰ μὲν [αὐτο]φουῶς αἰσ-
 θήσεως δε[ῖσ]θαι, τὰ δ' ἐπιστη-
 μονικῆς, τὰ [τε θ]ερμὰ μὲν
 καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ τῆ[ς] αὐ[το]φουῶς, τὸ
 δ' ἡρμοσμέν[ον] καὶ ἀνάρμο-
 στον τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς [ἐ-
 τέραν δὲ τῆ[ν] τ]αύτη συν[ε-
 ζευγμένη[ν, κα]ὶ παρακολου-
 θοῦσαν ὡς [ἐπὶ τ]ὸ πολὺ, δι' ἧς [ἄλ-
 λοιοῦμεν τ]ῆ[ν] π]αρεπομέ-
 νην ἡδον[ὴν] ἐκ[ά]στῳ τῶν
 αἰσθητῶν, [ἡδον]ῆ[ν] τε [καὶ λύ-
 πην οὔσα[ν] τὴν αὐτήν·
 οὐ γὰρ ἂν [συμ]μειχθεῖεν δύ[ο
 αἰσθήσεις [εἰ] μὲν τὸ ὑποκεί-
 μ[ε]νον συμ[φ]ωνεῖν οἷον θ' ὅτι
 π]ικρὸν ἢ λ[ιγ]υρὸν, περὶ δὲ τῆν
 π]αρεπ[ο]μέν[η]ν ἡδονήν [. . .
 .ἔ καὶ λύ[πην] διαφωνεῖν [. . .

[T2.v.1a]

Col.115

εἴρηται δὲ [. . τὸ τὰ] μου
 σ[ικου] καὶ τὰ πο[ι]ητοῦ ᾧ [ῶ]τα
 ἀ[π]ὸ δυνάμεως περὶ τὴν
 ἀ[ῖσ]θησιν καταλαμβάν[ε-
 σθ]α[ι] τὰς ποιότητας ὧν ἀν-
 τιλαμβάνονται καὶ τὰς ἡ-
 δονὰς καὶ τὰς ὀχλήσεις
 τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν, τῆς μὲν αὐτο-
 φουῶς, τῆς δὲ ἐπιστημονι-
 κ[ῆ]ς ὑπ[ὸ] γὰρ αὐτοφουῶς καὶ
 ἀλ[ό]γου κρίνεται μᾶλλον
 τὰ γε τῆς ἀκοῆς [ἴ]δ[ι]α, [ὑπὸ δ]ὲ
 ἐπιστημονικῆς καὶ τ]ὰ τοῦ
 γε] νοῦ μᾶλλον, εἴ γ' ἔπεσ[τί] τι
 τ]οῖς ἐναργέσι παρε[πό]με-
 νον προχειροτά[τ]οις κα[τὰ] λό-
 γον δὲ καὶ τὸ το[ῦ] π]οιη[τοῦ] ἴδι-
 ον, ὃ φησιν ἐναργὲς εἶνα[ι], ε[ἴ]-
 ληπται. παραπ[λ]ήσιοι γὰρ
 αἰσθ[ή]σεις κατὰ τὴν διάθε-
 σιν οὐχ ὅτι μὲν π]ικρὸν τὸ
 ὑποκ[ε]ίμενον ὁμολογοῦ-
 σ[ι]ν, ε[ἰ] δ' ὀχληρῶς ἢ ἐπιτερ-
 πῶς [ἔ]χει διαφωνοῦσιν,
 ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ποιοῦν-
 ται κρίσιν*.

Translation [T2.v.1]

But he [Diogenes] agreed with him that [among the senses] some things need natural perception, the others a knowing perception; hot and cold things [need] natural perception, that which is in harmony and that which is not [needs] knowing perception. The one that is linked with this⁷⁵ and accompanies it for the most part is different, [and] it is through this that we distinguish the pleasure which accompanies each of the senses, [or rather] the pleasure and the pain, which are <assuredly not> the same. For the two senses would not be confused if it were possible for them to agree, on the harsh and melodious character of the relevant matter, while disagreeing regarding the consequent pleasure and pain. . .

Translation [T2.v.1a]

Moreover, [Diogenes was wrong] to say that [the ears] of a musician and of a poet comprehend the qualities of what they hear, and the pleasures and discomforts which ensue, by a capacity which is in part natural and in part knowing; for what is discerned by that which is natural, and from which reason is absent, is rather what is proper to hearing [is the proper object of hearing], by the knowing that which belongs to the mind, if anything is added accompanying what is clear and most immediate. For it is by a rational process that also what is personal/particular to a poet/musician, something which he [Diogenes] affirms is evident, is apprehended by him. It is not the case that the senses, very alike by their disposition, on the one hand do agree that the object in question is bitter but on the other disagree over whether it is disturbing or pleasant, but rather they pass the same judgement.

In Diogenes' view, there are two types of sense perception. Natural perception apprehends, for example, that we might like or dislike the music that is heard. Knowing perception would ask, and be capable of learning *why* we like or dislike that music. Philodemus, on the other hand, holds that the ear simply hears the

⁷⁵ The 'this' here might imply a third type of perception, as suggested by a number of scholars, but without resolution, e.g., Rispoli 1969, Neubecker 1986 ad loc.; *contra* Delattre 1993: 71. However, Professor Sharples suggests to me (private conversation) 'unless "the one that is linked with" knowing perception is natural perception again, and "this" in "through this" is not "the one that is linked" but the general situation of there being two.' I am grateful to Professor Sharples for this point, which would indeed resolve the problem of a third type of perception.

music – it is an organ of hearing, no more. It is the mind that will decide whether we like or dislike the music.

The phrase ‘that which is in harmony and that which is not [needs] knowing perception’ in Diogenes’ statement T2.v.1 is strikingly powerful. It suggests that this perception has to be acquired by training, indeed would seem to build upon the implications of column 18 (T2.iv.1, above) – that a good education is essential if a human is to have the ability to develop to their full potential – in the Stoic view, to ‘live in accordance with nature’, and as extended by Diogenes himself ‘reasoning well in the selection and dissection of things’.

Although this could be taken to imply that there is no natural perception of harmony, this does not need to be the case. The soul is instinctively drawn to the virtue inherent in [the correct, harmonious] music, simply by taking pleasure from the harmony, albeit not understanding why, or even that, it might be beneficial to him, and that will suffice until the child begins his education. Then once the child begins his education, the teachers, who have the necessary training will expose him to ‘harmonious’ music, and will begin that education in the acquisition of the *knowing* perception, i.e., acquiring the knowledge to perceive harmonic qualities. Diogenes earlier has said (columns 12–13) that becoming a professional musician is not proper for the free born, and so, like Plato and Aristotle before him, he argues that music should not be pursued beyond the acquisition of sufficient understanding/skill to help him to lead a virtuous life.

In his refutation of Diogenes’ claim in column 34 (T2.v.1), at Column 115 (see [T2.v.1a] above), Philodemus follows his dismissal of the knowing sense by affirming that quality within the modes of music is a matter of opinion rather than knowledge, and asserts that music does not have the power to alter character. His words do not seem to reply to any specific justification of this ‘knowing perception’.

For the Epicurean, there can be no distinction between types of senses – they are one and the same. The idea that music could by itself affect the mind would directly conflict with the Epicurean account of perception, as for the Epicureans the senses are irrational and so incapable of moving the mind directly, without a judgement being involved. Music would affect only the ear, it would be the rational

judgement of what the senses present that would be capable of moving the soul. Sextus Empiricus reports at *M. VIII. 9 (=Adv. Log. II.9)*:

[T2.v.2] And he [Epicurus] says that sense, being perceptive of the objects presented to it and neither subtracting nor adding nor transposing aught through being irrational, constantly reports truly and grasps the existent object as it really is by nature. (Trans. Bury in the Loeb edition)

Sensation is devoid of cognitive significance, and twice in his refutation, Philodemus uses the word *alogos* of music. However, Philodemus does not really take issue with Diogenes' words, he simply states they are incorrect. At other places in his refutations he ridicules a theory with biting humour (see below, chapters 3 and 5), and the absence of this here leads me to think that perhaps Diogenes' views were not so new that they needed to be refuted with any strength. It is also remarked by Barker⁷⁶ that 'Philodemus complains more than once that Diogenes' attempts at proof fall hopelessly short of genuine demonstration and are unworthy of a philosopher.' There is no such complaint here, which might again suggest that Diogenes is not claiming something that previous musical theorists had not already claimed.

It is possible that Philodemus is either misreporting or misrepresenting Diogenes' argument. A comparison with Philodemus' reporting of Crates' theories on poetry with other sources suggested a less than objective form of reporting.⁷⁷ As stated above this particular part of the text reporting Diogenes' views (column 34 and surrounding) is very damaged and the whole of the following column is lost, but it does not appear that Diogenes explains, or at least Philodemus does not report Diogenes' explanation, if there was one, as to how this 'knowing perception' came to be – he simply makes the assertion, as though assuming this not to be controversial. Or perhaps Philodemus' brevity, both in this explication of Diogenes'

⁷⁶ 2001: 361.

⁷⁷ Personal conversation with Dr Maria Broggiato; on which see further discussion below chapter 6 on poetry. See also below, chapter 6 for more on Crates and poetry.

theory, and his own refutation, is a sign of his lack of understanding rather than his lack of interest.

However, as stated above, column 114 is also severely lacunose, with some twenty-four unreadable lines. But in the lines immediately before Philodemus' critique of this part of Diogenes' psychology, Philodemus compares drunkenness and over-eating with musical passions, suggesting they lead one to welcome coarse and disgraceful movements, but not the reverse, i.e., calming, an argument repeated at column 117 and following. Philodemus seems to be inconsistent here; the context, however, does nothing to suggest that any argument relevant to the 'knowing perception' issue has been lost. The concept of the 'knowing perception' has attracted much discussion, and Delattre suggests that Diogenes might have been influenced by Speusippus, linking the reference to 'him' (αὐτῶι) in column 34, lines 1–2 (T2.v.1) to that philosopher. For a short discussion of this suggestion, see the Appendix to this chapter, below.

At column 48, 22–7 Diogenes goes beyond any claim made by Plato or Aristotle, when he states that 'music is good for the intelligence because it contains definitions, divisions and demonstrations', thus confirming his view that music is not an irrational phenomenon:

[T2.v.3]

χρη-
στήν δ' εἶ[ν]αι τῆν μουσικὴν
καὶ πρὸς σύ[ν]εσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὄ-
ρους καὶ διαιρέσεις καὶ ἀποδεί-
ξεις ἐν ἀρμονικῇι πλείους εἶ-
ναι

This claim is in itself quite remarkable, and whether Diogenes ever elucidated his comments here is now probably impossible to tell, but it is worth spending some time on the short passage. It does suggest that he held a similar view

to that of Cleanthes (above, T2.iii.3), and therefore he probably did not need to depart from orthodox Stoic psychology to hold this view, as suggested by some scholars.⁷⁸ Philodemus himself certainly does not enlarge on the claim, and in his direct criticism (column 138) he merely states that it is now ‘exposed as ridiculous’. However, Diogenes immediately moves on to suggest that the musical theorists with their skills resembled the *kritikoi* of poetry, who were ‘primarily concerned with the judgement of the composition of the sounds of poems’.⁷⁹ So, is Diogenes looking for the trained listener of music to [what we would term today] analyse the music by defining the rhythms, mode, intervals, just as we would define the key, tempo, dynamics and phrasing? I suggest that is precisely what he is saying. The very construction of the harmonic line determines its power to affect a person whether or not the listener understands it her- or himself, and this would certainly explain why Diogenes placed such importance upon its regulation. Diogenes further stated that music contained such qualities as nobility, ugliness, appropriateness or inappropriateness, and that it contained ‘likenesses’ of characters, but he stated that only the person well trained in musical theory could recognise these qualities.⁸⁰ These ‘likenesses’ are, therefore, not crude imitations, but rather they, in the words of Cleanthes, perhaps ‘mostly correspond to the truth of the theories concerning the divine’.⁸¹

The Greek word ὄρος, as well as meaning ‘definition’, however, can also mean ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’, and is the word used by Plato in his discussion of the limited and the unlimited and the connection with musical intervals and their analysis in the *Philebus* at 17c ff.:

[T2.v.4] But, my friend, when you have grasped the number and quality of the intervals of the voice in respect to low and high pitch, and the limits (ὄρους) of the

⁷⁸ E.g., Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 357. See also Scade 2007: 216, supporting my contention.

⁷⁹ Blank 1994: 55–62, at 55.

⁸⁰ For which, see T5.i.9 and discussion.

⁸¹ Above, T2.iii.3.

intervals,⁸² and the combinations derived from them, which the men of former times discovered and handed down to us, their successors, with the traditional name of harmonies, and also the corresponding effects in the movements of the body, which they say are measured by numbers and must be called rhythms and measures (μέτρα) – and they say that we must also understand that every one and many should be considered in this way – when you have thus grasped the facts, you have become a musician. . .⁸³

Plato, of course, spells out what is necessary before a man could call himself a musician, but I would suggest that in essence Plato and Diogenes are looking for similar skills. Analysis of the musical line is necessary, and an understanding of how this analysis should proceed is necessary for a man to become a reliable ‘judge’ of music. As Plato spells out at *Laws* II. 670c, a man who does not understand the elements of a tune (μέλος) will not be able to say whether or not it is correct:

[T2.v.5] [ATH.] What then of the man who does not know in the least what the tune’s elements are? Will he ever know about any tune, as we said, that it is correct?
[CLIN] There is no possible means of his doing so.⁸⁴

For Plato, the active principle is definitely the potential musician, As Frede points out in her commentary on these lines,⁸⁵ ‘The crucial point . . . is that Plato proposes a holistic model of knowledge. There cannot be knowledge of any items in isolation; to know what one letter is we have to know the whole field of *grammata*, and their interconnections. Similarly with music, it is no good knowing one note – knowledge and understanding can only be achieved by knowing all the notes in the *harmoniai* and their relationships to one another.’

⁸² These limits are spelled out at *Rep.* IV. 443d–e as *neatē, hypatē and mesē* (καὶ ξυναρμόσαντα τριά ὄντα ὡσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἀρμονίας ἀτεχνῶς νεάτης τε καὶ ὑπάτης καὶ μέσης).

⁸³ Trans. Fowler in the Loeb edition.

⁸⁴ Trans Bury in the Loeb version. Correct, for Plato, must mean ethically correct; to be ethically correct it should also be musicologically correct.

⁸⁵ Frede 1993: 10, n. 3.

A similar view is expressed by Plato in the context of rhetoric in the passage from the *Phaedrus* discussed briefly in chapter 3, below and this can usefully be quoted here also:

[T2.v.6] A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all of this, he will not be capable of pursuing the making of speeches in a scientific way, so far as speech can be controlled by method, whether for purposes of instruction or of persuasion.⁸⁶

If ‘music’ replaced all instances of the art in question (here speech, discourse), I would suggest, the claims in this passage would sound very similar to Diogenes’ own claims in T2.v.3 above. For Diogenes the music also seems to play an active part by insinuating itself into the mind by way of *oikēiosis*, as suggested in column 18,⁸⁷ and it is the ‘knowing sensation’, i.e., the ‘educated ear’ with which the musician interprets the qualities, as discussed in section iv above.

It seems that Diogenes probably agreed with Plato that music was a stochastic art,⁸⁸ and within his theory he was trying to ‘pin it down’⁸⁹ in order that a more complete ‘account’ might be given of it. In a similar way to the practice of medicine, no matter how long the practitioner has worked at his art, Diogenes’ acknowledgement that ‘everyone is affected in a different way’⁹⁰ must be

⁸⁶ *Phaedrus* 277b–c, trans Fowler (1995[1914]), as amended.

⁸⁷ See text T2.iv.1 above.

⁸⁸ For discussion on which, see below chapter 3, pp. 85–7, and chapter 4, T4.17.

⁸⁹ See Barker 1987: 108 who states ‘that it is difficult to pin down something in motion’ [in this case, the musical notes, which are correctly placed by the well-practised musician] ‘is of course a familiar Platonic theme’.

⁹⁰ Column 36. See chapter 3, T3.i.26 and discussion.

considered. Despite the skill of the practitioner, therefore, the end result can never be guaranteed – try as he might to execute his art in the way deemed to be correct, other matters can come into play. For example, a doctor can administer the correct drug for a given illness, but one patient might react more slowly than another. It is, therefore, difficult to ‘pin down’, as Barker suggests, above.

The word ‘ὄρος’ used in Diogenes’ passage quoted at T2.v.3, whilst representing the limit of the interval or scale, could also be analogous with the limits or boundaries of good behaviour, particularly for Diogenes, and the harmony of the Greek musical scale could therefore be seen as directly analogous to a virtuous character. Just as a person could not be considered virtuous if they didn’t possess all the virtues together with their subordinates, so too in a harmonic system, it was necessary for ‘any note sounding at a given moment to be concordant with all the other notes that are not being activated ... One single error is enough to wreck the whole harmony’.⁹¹

Long suggests that the early Stoics drew a ‘comparable analogy between musical and ethical harmony’. Whilst the full extent of the argument is too lengthy to discuss here, I feel it is too important to omit altogether. Long writes that:

The Stoic world is a systematic structure in which everything fits together according to a divine and rational plan. In proposing ‘harmony’ as a name for this structure and ‘harmoniously’ as the mode of life appropriate to it, the Stoics... intended to link their philosophy to the art which comes first to mind as the repository of consonance and concordance – music.⁹²

For Diogenes of Babylon, and, perhaps, for Plato too, the limit or boundary of the interval and, more importantly, the scale, thus identified, or even, defined, the character of the music, and thus the character it represented. Plato has, of course, linked ethos and harmony in the *Republic* and the *Laws*.⁹³

⁹¹ Long 1996[1991]: 218–19.

⁹² Long 1996 [1991]: 202–24, at 203.

⁹³ See below, pp. 102 ff.

Long's argument would seem to be supported by Chrysippus' view that the Stoic *telos* of living in harmony with nature was only achieved by living in harmony with oneself. Diogenes Laertius paraphrases Chrysippus' writing in *On Ends* I, saying:

[T2.v.7] [The *telos* is living] in accordance with the nature of oneself and that of the universe, engaging in no activity which the common law is wont to forbid, which is the right reason (*orthos logos*) pervading everything and identical to Zeus, who directs the organisation of reality. The virtue of a happy man and his good flow of life are this: always doing everything on the basis of the concordance (*kata tēn sumphōnian*) of each man's guardian spirit with the will of the director of the universe.⁹⁴

The word *sumphōnian* has strong musical connotations, and the Stoic *orthos logos*, as well as meaning 'right reason' may also be read as 'correct ratio', and so would imply the notion of 'determinacy, proportionality, exactitude of quantitative or numerical order'.⁹⁵ A similar choice of wording is attributed to the Stoics by Stobaeus:⁹⁶

[T2.v.8] [The Stoics] say that a right action is a proper function which possesses all the numbers (πάντας ἐπέχον τοὺς ἀριθμούς) . . . while a wrong action is one that is done contrary to right reason/ratio (τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον), or one in which some proper function has been omitted by a rational animal.⁹⁷

As suggested by Scade,⁹⁸ this does indeed support the hypothesis that some Stoics considered a 'musico-mathematical' approach to be one valid way of analysing ethics. The notion of ratios and proportion within music is, of course,

⁹⁴ Diogenes Laertius VII.88, trans. Long and Sedley 1987: vol. I, 63C.

⁹⁵ Long 1996[1991]: 207.

⁹⁶ Fifth century AD.

⁹⁷ Stobaeus II.93, 14–18.

⁹⁸ Scade 2007: 209.

fundamental to Pythagorean musical theory, and is endorsed by Plato in the *Timaeus* and the *Republic*, and whilst I can see *almost* no trace of any reference to Pythagoreanism within Diogenes' theory,⁹⁹ one very lacunose fragment¹⁰⁰ might indeed indicate at least some reference to Pythagoras within Diogenes' thought. This is not to suggest, however, that there is no link with mathematical theory in Diogenes' science of harmonics. Further, the notion of linked bodily and musical *harmonia* and *sumphōnia* are certainly very apparent. At column 80, Philodemus claims that music is not able to harmonise or discipline the soul, and although Diogenes' parallel claim that it does so is no longer extant, he must have made such a claim for Philodemus to write his refutation. The words Philodemus uses are τὴν ψυχὴν. . . καὶ σύμφωνον. If Zeno's musical philosophy was Pythagorean, as tentatively suggested on the basis of the Plutarchan anecdote mentioned earlier,¹⁰¹ then it may be that Diogenes developed the theory further, just as he developed or reformulated other Stoic theory – a common belief in the relationship between ethics and music is certainly implied.

Returning to the three qualities 'definitions, divisions and demonstrations' (T2.v.3 above), these are also to be found in the Stoic theory of logic. Both Antipater of Tarsus and Chrysippus wrote works entitled *On Definitions*, as testified at Diogenes Laertius VII.60; and 'divisions' were used by the Stoics to distinguish between neighbouring species. D.L. VII.61 reports the Stoic view that 'Divisions of a genus means dissection of it into its proximate species.' Demonstrations are explained at D. L. VII.45 as 'an argument inferring by means of what is better apprehended something less clearly apprehended'. I do not think it implausible to suggest that this language could also be used in musical contexts. The different 'scales', e.g., the Dorian or Phrygian, might be the 'neighbouring species'; and the 'likenesses' of character or *ēthos* communicated by the music, and the resulting effect on the listener, such as the changed behaviour of the drunken youths, above,

⁹⁹ Barker states 'it [Pythagorean mathematical argumentation] is simply not there', Barker 2001:356.

¹⁰⁰ Column 42, 36–45, on which, see chapter 3 below, T3.i.21.

¹⁰¹ Above, section 2, T2.ii.1.

T2.iii.4, the demonstrations, or ‘proofs’ for example, although there is of course the problem that these ‘proofs’ are external to the music rather than *within it*.

On the other hand, however, the words ‘definitions, divisions and demonstrations’ were also technical terms in Aristoxenus of Tarentum’s harmonic theory, and so it is just possible that Diogenes might be referring to him here,¹⁰² although again he does not mention him by name, and there is nothing elsewhere in the work to suggest that Diogenes relied upon, or even knew, Aristoxenian musical theory.¹⁰³ Diogenes’ language here is certainly reminiscent of Aristoxenus’ technical approach, but Aristoxenus does not refer to these terms in the context of educational tools, and I do not believe that he would have agreed with Diogenes’ claim here, as his writings make clear how dubious he was about just how great an effect music could have on the character.¹⁰⁴

As mentioned above, Diogenes further stated that music contained such qualities as nobility, ugliness, appropriateness or inappropriateness, and that it contained ‘likenesses’ of characters, but that only the person well trained in musical theory could recognise these qualities. Plato stressed the problems of music’s mimetic character,¹⁰⁵ although in another view, he makes Timaeus allow that by imitating the divine and ideal order, music was ‘capable of leading man to virtue and knowledge’.¹⁰⁶ Plato’s choice of wording here is reminiscent of the claim attributed to Cleanthes, discussed above, T2.ii.1, which again suggests that either Cleanthes or Diogenes (if Diogenes was putting the words into Cleanthes’ mouth) possibly had

¹⁰² See also Delattre’s discussion at 2007: vol. I, 77 n. 5. Philodemus himself does refer to Aristoxenus, but not in this context.

¹⁰³ For more on why it is unlikely that Diogenes is following Aristoxenus’ theory here, see Barker 201: 354–61.

¹⁰⁴ See, e.g., *El. harm.* II. 31.16–32.8, where he states ‘What we are trying to do is to show for each kind of melodic composition and for music in general that such and such a type damages the character while such and such another improves it... *in so far as music is capable of yielding such benefits...* The science is not to be despised by anyone of intelligence . . . *nor is it so important* as to be sufficient on its own for everything,’ Trans. Barker 1989: 148–9, my emphasis.

¹⁰⁵ *Rep.* III. 394–5; *Laws* II. 668a, 669b–c.

¹⁰⁶ *Timaeus* 80a–b.

Plato's writing in mind.¹⁰⁷ Aristotle, too, points out that *mousikē* was by its very nature mimetic 'of character, emotions and actions'.¹⁰⁸

As I will discuss in chapter 4, in the *Republic*, Plato's Socrates states that 'rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold on it, bringing with them and imparting grace, *if one is rightly trained*, and otherwise the contrary',¹⁰⁹ a view which Diogenes echoes himself, above, and a view again echoed in the *Timaeus*, emphasising the importance of harmony and rhythm to the rational soul (*Tim.* 47d–e):

[T2.v.9] Music too. . . was bestowed for the sake of harmony (ἁρμονία). And harmony, which has motions akin to the revolutions of the soul within us, was given by the Muses to him who makes intelligent use of the Muses, not as an aid to irrational pleasure, as is now supposed, but as an auxiliary to the inner revolution of the soul when it has lost its harmony to assist in restoring it to order and concord with itself. And because of the unmodulated condition, deficient in grace, which exists in most of us, rhythm was also bestowed upon us to be our helper by the same deities and for the same ends.

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Nothing in the above discussion suggests, I would argue, that Diogenes departed from orthodox Stoic psychology in his theory of music. True, it would appear that he developed it further than earlier Stoics, insofar as he found a place for music within that psychology, but in this respect, as I will discuss further in chapters 4 and 5, he was heavily influenced by earlier philosophers, notably Plato, and most probably Aristotle and the Peripatetic school.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. also *Republic* VI. 486e where Plato's Socrates asserts that 'truth is akin to metre and proportion, ἕμμετρία.

¹⁰⁸ *Poetics* 1447a. (There is nothing to suggest that Diogenes, or Plato for that matter, explicitly claimed to have such musical expertise. This would account for both philosophers' concern, expressed in parallel passages (see chapter 4, T4.13, 4.14), that great care should be taken to ensure the use only of the correct type of music, and for the appointment of appropriately trained judges.

¹⁰⁹ *Republic* III. 401d5–e1, my emphasis. For further reference to these lines, see chapter 4, note 4.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2

Speusippus and his influence on Diogenes' theory at column 34 (T2.v.1)

Delattre suggests that in column 34, Diogenes is influenced by Speusippus in his claim that there are two types of perception, linking the reference to 'him' at lines 1–2 of the column (T2.v.1) with that philosopher.¹ Sextus Empiricus outlines Speusippus' own view at *M.* VII. 144–7 states:

[T2.App.1] Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπέιληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ ἀύλητοῦ ἢ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειουμένην, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἢ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμοσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφυῆ. ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

But Speusippus declared that, since some things are sensible, others intelligible, the cognitive reason is the criterion of things intelligible and the cognitive sense of things sensible. And cognitive sense he conceived as being that which shares in rational truth. For just as the fingers of a pipe-player or harper possess an artistic activity, which, however, is not primarily brought to perfection by the fingers themselves but is fully developed as a result of *joint practice* under the guidance of reasoning, – and just as the sense of the musician possesses an activity capable of grasping the harmonious and the non-harmonious, this activity, however, not being self-produced but an acquisition due to reasoning, – so also the cognitive sense naturally derives from the reason the cognitive experience in which it shares, and which leads to unerring discrimination of subsisting objects. (Trans. Bury in Loeb edn.)

¹ Delattre 1993; 2007: vol. II, 346, esp. n. 2.

Speusippus' name does not occur at all in the surviving columns of Philodemus' treatise, although as remarked earlier, the text around the columns relating to the two types of perception is very damaged and quite lacunose. It has been suggested,² and will become clear from chapters 3, 4, and 5 below, that Diogenes knew of and recognised earlier 'rivals' as 'important philosophical authorities', and did not hesitate to draw upon them. In drawing upon these authorities, however, it has to be said that Diogenes does not always acknowledge the philosopher whose views he is utilising. So the fact that Speusippus' name does not appear need not mean that Diogenes was not drawing upon his theory. However, I believe that whoever Diogenes was agreeing with in the column, it was not Speusippus, as will be outlined below.

In his collection of fragments of Speusippus, and commentary thereon, Leonardo Tarán³ asserts that Sextus had derived his knowledge of Speusippus' doctrine from an intermediate source rather than directly, and agreed with the claim that 'his report is contaminated by Stoic terminology'.⁴ It seems that when Sextus has 'direct or indirect access to a statement by an ancient philosopher, he likes to quote at least part of the original'.⁵ Certainly, all references to Speusippus' theory in Sextus' extract seem to be reported in the third person – 'Speusippus declared'; 'he conceived' – and it therefore appears that no part of Speusippus' own writing is being quoted directly.⁶

Tarán denies that Speusippus is Diogenes' main influence in this passage, arguing that whilst Diogenes clearly differentiates between two kinds of perception (Diogenes refers to αἴσθησις αὐτοφύης and αἴσθησις ἐπιστημονική) Speusippus does not.⁷ Speusippus rather differentiates between the two kinds of objects of cognition – τὰ νοητά, and τὰ αἰσθητά – the sensibles and the intelligibles, as Plato did before him. Speusippus, however, might have been making a rather more subtle distinction than

² Obbink and Vander Waerdt 1991: 357–8.

³ 1981: 432–3.

⁴ This 'contamination' had led Tarrant (1985 : 96–103) to believe that the terminology derived from Antiochus of Ascalon, who originally belonged to the sceptical Academy, and who in attacking the Stoics used much of their philosophical language (see Cicero *Lucullus*, and *OCD* s.v. Antiochus).

⁵ Tarán 1981: 432n. 253.

⁶ Although this cannot be said to be conclusive, *pace* Tarán in n. 5 above.

⁷ 1981: 433.

Plato, distinguishing between ἐπιστημονικός λόγος and ἐπιστημονική αἴσθησις,⁸ or, rather, probably simply αἴσθησις according to Tarán (see below).

For Speusippus, ‘the musician’s faculty of perception possesses an activity which can apprehend what is harmonious and which is not; this activity is not spontaneous or innate, but acquired by the use of ratiocination’.⁹ Also the pipe-player’s fingers are brought to play well by practice, but reason plays a part in the development of both skills. For Speusippus, ‘Sensation can share in the truth of reason.’¹⁰ The issue is that *both the fingers and reasoning* are required at the outset, together, one skill does not precede the other. Speusippus is not discussing sensation without reason.¹¹ This sounds quite close to Aristotle, who seemed to identify sensation with *nous*, the faculty which has an intuitive grasp of truth.¹² Intuition seems for Aristotle to be involved both before knowledge is acquired, but also afterwards, to ‘make the leap to the ultimate *archai*’.¹³

Regarding sense-perception, Speusippus suggested that ‘perception (αἴσθησις) participates in the cognitive power of reason (λόγος) and is a faculty with innate and unerring powers to discriminate’.¹⁴ Tarán adds, Speusippus postulates that ‘In [sense] perception there is a comparison, analysis and classification of the data provided by the senses,’¹⁵ but that the ‘knowledge of the separately existing magnitudes is not direct, but *derivative*’.¹⁶ Tarán plausibly remarks, therefore, that in his view it is unlikely that ἐπιστημονική αἴσθησις would have been Speusippus’ own words, being, rather, Stoic terminology, and suggests that he would have used simply αἴσθησις.

Sextus’ account is clarified and supplemented by Proclus *Eucl.*, p. 179 Friedlein, which quotes Speusippus’ account of intuition and discursive reason:¹⁷

⁸ Dillon 1993: 63.

⁹ Tarán 1981: 433. Diogenes refers to αἴσθησις αὐτοφύης, which is natural, a part of one’s nature, something specifically denied by Speusippus in Sextus’ fragment, where he states ‘this activity, however, not being self-produced, but an acquisition due to reasoning’.

¹⁰ 1981: 427.

¹¹ This sounds similar to the ‘dual criterion’ of sensation and reason, associated with the Peripatetic school, and, in musical contexts, with Aristoxenus, on which see chapter 5, T5.v.11 ff., below.

¹² See Guthrie 1978: 467, for Aristotle’s views in the context of Sextus’ passage on Speusippus.

¹³ *Ibid.*, and Aristotle, *EN* VI.10–11, 1143a12–b14.

¹⁴ 1981: 54.

¹⁵ 1981: 57.

¹⁶ 1981: 425, my emphasis.

¹⁷ Tarán 1981: F73 and commentary 422–31.

[T2.App.2] καθόλου γάρ, φησὶν ὁ Σπεύσιππος, ὧν ἡ διάνοια τὴν θήραν ποιεῖται τὰ μὲν οὐδεμίαν ποικίλην ποιησαμένη διέξοδον προβάλλει καὶ προευτρεπίζει πρὸς τὴν μέλλουσαν ζήτησιν καὶ ἔχει τούτων ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαφὴν μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ὁρατῶν ἢ ὄψις, τὰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ εὐθέως αἰρεῖν ἀδυνατοῦσα κατὰ μεταβάσιν ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνα διαβαίνουσα κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν θήραν.

‘In general’, Guthrie translates, ‘says Speusippus, there are some things which the intellect in its researches simply puts forward without any elaborate process of thought, as preparation for the coming enquiry, and of these it has a clearer apprehension than has sight of what is visible. Others it cannot seize upon immediately, but progresses towards them by inference, and endeavours to track them down by way of their consequences.’¹⁸

Plato also divided ‘objects of cognition into intelligible and sensible’, as discussed by Socrates and Theaetetus at *Theaetetus* 186 b–e where Socrates insists:

[T2.App.3] Is it not true, then, that whereas all impressions which penetrate to the mind through the body are things which men and animals alike are naturally constituted to perceive from the moment of birth, reflections about them with respect to their existence and usefulness only come about, if they come at all, with difficulty through a long and troublesome process of education? . . . If this is so, knowledge does not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection of them. It is there, seemingly and not in the impressions, that it is possible to grasp existence and truth.

(Trans. Cornford)

For Plato, therefore, reason is involved as soon as one gets beyond the raw sense data. However, like Diogenes, but unlike Speusippus, ‘raw’ sensation is recognised here, but neither Plato nor Speusippus in the texts quoted distinguish between two sorts of sensation.

To return to Diogenes’ statement in T2.v.1, ‘[among the senses] the first are called natural perception, the others a knowing perception’, lines 1–4. Diogenes goes

¹⁸ Guthrie 1978: 466–7. Again, it is the objects perceived that are differentiated, rather than the means of perception.

on to accept that they are ‘inseparably connected’, and explains the detail of *what* they will perceive rather than the detail of the different perceptions themselves. He later explains that the ability to recognise harmony or otherwise has to be acquired through education, and that only after this education is someone ‘adequately qualified to prescribe the proper use of music in education and care for the soul’.¹⁹ This would seem to be similar to Aristotle’s remarks at *EN* VI.11, 1143b11–15, where he states that those in need of moral educations should listen to the ‘undemonstrated assertions and opinions of those experienced and older or practically wise. . . for on account of their having an eye from experience they see correctly’.²⁰ Diogenes’ theory is only briefly outlined, but his emphasis on the role of the teacher, as will be seen in chapters 4 and 5 would seem to endorse Aristotle’s view; perhaps Philodemus did not go into further detail because general familiarity with Platonic and Aristotelian epistemological theories would have made the point clear enough, and to go into detail would be to digress.

As Guthrie remarks, the thoughts of Plato, Speusippus and Aristotle, although not coinciding, were at least ‘converging’.²¹ Diogenes’ views of perception were, it would seem, a little different. And, as Tarán remarks, it is the confusion between ‘the examples given in comparison with the thing which is being compared to them’²² that has led to scholars thinking that Speusippus has influenced Diogenes of Babylon.²³ Tarán seems to be correct, and the suggestion that Speusippus influenced Diogenes is probably mistaken.

¹⁹ Barker 2001: 353.

²⁰ DeMoss 1990: 75.

²¹ Guthrie 1978: 467.

²² 1981: 434.

²³ *Ibid.* n. 259.

Chapter 3

PHILODEMUS' *DE MUSICA* (2)

What exactly did Diogenes say about the use of music generally, and did his opinions differ from others who wrote before him? In his introduction to Philodemus' critique of Diogenes' musical philosophy, Delattre remarks that Diogenes 'gave away' various opportunities to Philodemus, and not least his 'naïve and unmethodical' views.¹ However, given Diogenes' reputation within the Stoic tradition, I cannot believe that his writings would have been as unmethodical as they appear in this work; perhaps they only appear unmethodical because of the lacunae. Had the work not been so damaged, it may be that his method of categorisation would have been more apparent.² Perhaps indeed it is Philodemus' way of reporting that makes Diogenes' views appear so unmethodical, and perhaps also so naïve; after all, as a member of the opposing school, Philodemus would have presented his own views as being more carefully thought out – certainly some of his criticism is difficult to fault. But rather than Diogenes being naïve, perhaps Philodemus does not fully understand, or chooses not to understand, the essence of Diogenes' argument. From the tone of Philodemus' critique, the latter would seem more probable, although this will in all likelihood never be known, but given that this debate about the ethical qualities within music continues still today, it would be wrong to dismiss Diogenes purely because of Philodemus' method of reporting.

Unlike any of the earlier writers on music who could have been, and indeed in some cases were likely sources or influences on Diogenes' own theory, Diogenes only once discusses the modes by name – in the whole of Philodemus' text there is only one reference to the Dorian and Phrygian modes, discussed in more detail by

¹ Delattre 2007: Introduction to Part II of the *De Musica* (columns 56–140, 14), at vol. II, pp. 110–11.

² Indeed, Andrew Barker suggests that Philodemus' very presentation of Diogenes' arguments, starting with column 119 suggests that 'the facts had been carefully sifted and organized, through a deliberate exercise in sociological classification that goes well beyond the commonplace' (2001: 360).

Plato, Aristotle and their commentators.³ This would seem to make Diogenes almost unique in the extant musical writers. Rather, Diogenes uses the terms ‘enharmonic’ and ‘chromatic’, terms that are found in one other source that is probably earlier than Diogenes himself, but a text that holds the opposite view of music: that is the fourth-century BC document known as the *Hibeh Papyrus*.⁴ It states:

[T3.1]

λέγουσι δὲ ὡς τῶν μελῶν τ[ὰ] μὲν ἐγκρατεῖς τὰ δὲ φρονίμους, τὰ δὲ δικαίους τὰ δὲ ἀνδρείους τὰ δὲ δειλοὺς ποιεῖ· κακῶς εἰδότες ὅτι οὔτε χρῶμα δειλοὺς οὔτε ἄρμονία ἄν ἀνδρείους ποιήσειεν τοὺς αὐτῆι χρωμένους . . . ὥστε [οὔτε] χρῶμα δειλοὺς οὔτε ἄρμονία ἀνδρείους.⁵

They [the harmonicists] also say that some melodies make people self-disciplined, others prudent, others just, others brave, and others cowardly, not understanding that the chromatic cannot make cowards nor the enharmonic make brave men of those who employ it . . . The chromatic does not make people cowardly, nor the enharmonic brave. (Trans. Grenfell and Hunt, with amendments)

Diogenes of Babylon was convinced that music was useful to every part of life, and I will discuss Philodemus’ presentation of these views, in two broad sections in this chapter. In the first section, I will deal with his writing on music generally; in the second I will discuss the use of music for religious purposes. I will also discuss Philodemus’ criticisms, often voiced at length, if not necessarily in any more detail, in parallel. Diogenes’ views on the use of music in education will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, in parallel with discussion of the views of Plato and Aristotle.

³ On which, see chapters 4 and 5 below.

⁴ This papyrus was found by Grenfell and Hunt in 1902 in the Fayum region of Egypt, and was so named, presumably, after the town in which it was found. *P.Hib.* I.13; extract from cols. 1.15–2.6.

⁵ Accents inserted.

(i) Diogenes' views on the use of music generally

Diogenes asserted that music is 'a universal activity, since everyone, Greeks and barbarians practise it', τῶν δὲ κοινῶν εἶναί τι καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν· πάντας γάρ, Ἑλληνάς τε καὶ βαρβάρους αὐτῇι χρῆσθαι,⁶ and he lists a number of pursuits in which music plays an important part, which I will discuss below.

Like Plato and Aristotle before him, he allows that:⁷

[T3.i.1]

.....]ν οὐτ' εἶ-
ναι μόνον αὐτ]ὴν χρήσι-
μωτάτην πρὸς διαγωγὴν,
ἀλλὰ καὶ προσ]ήκειν ποεῖ-
σθαι [μουσικ]ὴν ὡς ἔτυ-
χεν, οὐχ ὅπως [εἰς] φυσικὴν
ἡδονὴν μόνον], μὰ Διὰ, ταῖς
χορδαῖς προσάδωμεν·

not only is music very useful for a life of leisure, but also it befits us to practise it as and how it chances, not by Zeus in order to sing in accompaniment to stringed instruments for natural pleasure alone.

Rhythms and tunes are, according to Diogenes, agreeable to everyone, and people will seek them out naturally, without needing to be encouraged by education.⁸

[T3.i.2]

εὐθέ-
ως δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἡ]δέα ταῦτ' εἶ-

⁶ Column 25.6–9.

⁷ Column 12.1–8.

⁸ Column 17.8–13.

ναι καὶ πάν]τας ἐπιζητεῖν
 φυσικῶς, ἐξ οὐ]δεμιᾶς διδα-
 χῆς [ἤ] ἐξ ἔθους προαχθέντας,
 ἀλλ' ὥσπερ αὐτομάτους συν

Just as the beauty and utility of movement and rest is demonstrated by gymnastics, so painting for its part teaches the eye about beautiful objects. As for music, even if it seems less necessary than these other two [arts], in fact its beauty is pre-eminent if it is grasped by hearing (τῆς δὲ μουσικῆς τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ἦττον τούτων ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν μάλιστα' ἐάν τις ἐπιβολῆι ἀκουστῆι χρῆται).⁹ In a column that might be a direct parallel to this claim, Philodemus writes:

[T3.i.3]

Ἄρισ]τόξενος [δὲ] τὴν ὄρ[ασιν
 καὶ τ]ὴν ἀκο[ὴν λ]έγων [καὶ
 γεγεν]ῆσθαι τὸ κύριον τῆ[ς δι-
 ανοί]ας καὶ θειοτέρας τ[ῶν
 ἄλλω]ν αἰσθήσεων, οὐ μ[ό-
 νον δι]ὰ τὸ τετυφῶσθαι δ[ι-
 ἐπιπ]τεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ [λέ-
 γειν] προάγειν καὶ παῖ[δα,
 ὄντα] παντελῶς ἀνασ[τρον,
 εἰς ἀνδ]ρείας παρασκευά-
 ζουσιν]

[Moreover] when Aristoxenus said that sight and hearing [make up] the most important part of the intellect and are more divine than the other senses he was wrong not only because he was indulging in pretentious stupidity, but also because

⁹ Column 27. That is, the beauty of the music is less-immediately apparent and so you have to listen carefully to appreciate the full meaning.

[he said] that it [music] could incite even a child, a being totally lacking in [courage], preparing [him for] acts of courage. . .¹⁰

If this is indeed a direct response to the claim made in column 27 cited above, then it strongly suggests that Diogenes might have quoted Aristoxenus by name as an authority here. Certainly there is a lacuna of some twenty-four lines at the end of column 25, and the whole of column 26 is missing. There are, however, no references to Aristoxenus in any of the extant columns within Diogenes' section of the work. He is mentioned just twice in the text as we have it today – once at column 109 as above, and once again at column 143, within Philodemus' general conclusion to the whole work. It would be a little surprising if Diogenes uses Aristoxenus as an authority here given that if my understanding of Diogenes' musical philosophy is correct, the two would not have shared many views. It may be, however, that Diogenes used his name here to indicate that he had read his work – as mentioned in chapter 1, Aristoxenus was, after all, probably one of the most important musicologists before him – and sought a point on which they would have agreed to show that he was ranging across many sources.¹¹ Philodemus does suggest that Diogenes is writing more as a historian than a philosopher, and so perhaps indeed his work was as much a musico-history as musical philosophy.

Diogenes writes further on the uses of music:¹²

[T3.i.4]

κοι]νῆι μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὰς πο-

¹⁰ Column. 109.28–38; see Delattre 2007: vol. I, 40 and vol. II, 203.

¹¹ For further discussion on Aristoxenus and the likelihood of his being one of Diogenes' sources, see chapter 5, section 5.v, below.

¹² Column 39.35–44. A similar report on the use of music within sport is made by [Plutarch] at *De Musica* 1140D, 'Nay even now it is the rule to conduct the pentathletic contests to the sound of the aulos. The music, to be sure, is in this case nothing distinguished or in the classic style, nor like the pieces that were the rule among the men of old, such as Hierax's composition for this contest which was called *Endromê*; yet feeble and undistinguished though the music is, the aulos is nevertheless played' (Loeb translation).

λεμι]κάς τοῖς ἐν τῇι σάλπι[γ
γι] καὶ νῦν τὸ πολὺ πλῆθος
τῶν Ἑ]λλήνων χρῆσθαι, τι-
σι] δὲ καὶ τῇ ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἀ-
τῶν *. πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἀθλήσεις
καὶ] τῇι σάλπιγγι σημαί[νε
σθαι τ]ὸν πολεμικὸν νόμ[ον,
ῥτα]ν [τρ]έχουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ τ[έ-
λος]· τοῖς δὲ πεντάθλοις
τ]ῆν ἄλλοις καὶ τὸν δί[αυ-
λο]ν ἀλύῳι πεποῖσθαι.

In fact, to accompany wartime activities in public, most Greeks today play nomos on the trumpet, and some of the same nomos are played in private. And to accompany athletic activities, it is on the trumpet also that they sound the war-like nomos when the runners are running towards the finishing line. In the pentathlon on the other hand, it is to the sound of the aulos that the competitors engage in the jump and the ‘double stade’.

There would seem nothing new here and most ancient writers on music would have discussed such uses.¹³ There are also many images of athletes or pipe-players marching with hoplites into battle. For example, the Chigi vase, a small oinochoe dated to the third quarter of the seventh century BC,¹⁴ depicts a hoplite phalanx marching into battle to the sound of a pipe-player; Thucydides wrote that

¹³ E.g. Pausanias V.7.10 on the introduction of the flute to accompany jumping in the pentathlon, and V.17.10 for the description of a wooden chest depicting, amongst other things, athletes competing in various contests, and an aulete with pipes standing by; Philostratus, *De gymnastica* 55.

¹⁴ Painted in Corinth, this vase was found at Veii in Etruria and now stands in the Villa Giulia in Rome.

the Spartans used the piper to keep the phalanx in step so as not to break ranks.¹⁵ Diogenes' discussion doesn't suggest that music was used in any different way, and adds that the piper sounds the signal to order the attack. Philodemus claims, however, that rather than the sound of the music, it is the warriors themselves, and their war cries that encourage their own soldiers, and strike fear into the hearts of the enemy.¹⁶

Diogenes moves on to discuss the music of the theatre:

[T3.i.5]

..... [καὶ
 μὴν πρὸς τῆ[ν] χειρονομίαν
 μὲν ἀυλεῖσθαι] τὸ ὁμώνυμον
 μέλος]. Ἀ[ργείο]υς δὲ καὶ πρὸς
 τῆν π[άλην] [ἐπαγ]αγεῖν τὸν ἀύ-
 λό]ν. προσῆχθα[ι] δὲ τὴν μου-
 σικὴν καὶ πρ[ὸς τ]ὰς χορικὰς
 κιν]ήσεις τῶν τε γυμνοπαι-
 δικ]ῶν καὶ τῶν ἐνόπλων
 καὶ τῶν δραματικῶν, τρα-
 γικῆς καὶ σατυρικῆς καὶ κω-
 μικῆς· τὴν μὲν οὖν καλλί-
 στην] τούτων, τὴν τραγικὴν,
 ...]ον[. . . .] πατέρων κα[ὶ
 γερόντων, . . .

and to accompany pantomime gestures, they play an air bearing the same name on the aulos. And the Argives too, for their wrestling, bring on the aulos. Furthermore, music was also used to accompany the movements of the chorus, the

¹⁵ *History of the Peloponnesian Wars*, V.70.

¹⁶ Delattre remarks in his notes to this column that Philodemus is seeking here, as elsewhere in *De Musica*, to persuade his reader that it is the words that are sung or spoken, and not the sounds of the music, certainly not bare sounds without words, that will have any effect on the minds or souls of the hearers.

gumnopaidiai,¹⁷ dances in arms and the theatrical dances – tragedy, satyr and comedy. Amongst these latter, the most beautiful was the tragic dance . . . of fathers and old men¹⁸ . . .

Again, there is nothing really new here – music was traditionally a significant part of everyday life in ancient Greece and its uses are attested by many writers.¹⁹

Diogenes moves on to claim that music could feed amorous desire, but also could console the chagrins of love, and this ability to seduce or comfort was of particular use to the lyric poets of old.²⁰ He remarks that Chamaeleon²¹ was not incorrect when he said that the comic authors also used a similar genre, but they wrote in their enigmatic form in their nomos about food and drink and gave them their own characters.

[T3.i.6]

πρὸς ψυχα-
 γωγίαν ἰδίαι περιειλήφαθα[ι
 παρά [γ]ε τοῖς μελοποιοῖς ὅσοι
 χρ]ησίμως πεφιλομουσή-
 κ]ασιν: μὴ γὰρ κακῶς ἐπιση-
 μ]αίνεσθαι Χαμαιλέοντα τὸ
 τοιοῦτον τι τοὺς κωμικοὺς
 α[ι]νίττεσθαι περὶ τῶν ποιη-
 τῶν προσηγορίας μὲν χρω-

¹⁷ *Gumnopaidiai* are discussed by Athenaeus at *Deipnosophistae* XIV: 631b, as being similar to the *anapalē* of the ancients, and the Spartan festival of *Gumnopaidiai* is also mentioned by [Plutarch] at *De Musica* 1134C. The *gumnopaidiai* are reputed to have been founded by one Thaletas of Gortyn, mentioned by Diogenes later at column 47.23–30, and by Philodemus at 132.37–133.3. See, below, pages 66–9 for discussion of Thaletas.

¹⁸ Column 39.46–40.14.

¹⁹ E.g. Homer, of course, Plato, Aristophanes, Athenaeus, Plutarch and Pausanias.

²⁰ Columns 43 and 47.

²¹ Col. 47.5. The Peripatetic writer from Heraclea Pontica, dating to around 350–281 BC; see fr. 1 Wehrli, and fr. 176 Wehrli (= D.L. V.92), a contemporary of Heraclides of Pontus; *OCD* 3rd edn s.vv. This might indeed be an indication, as will be suggested below, that Diogenes' principal sources might have been the Peripatetics.

μ]ένους ταῖς τῶν βρωτῶν
καὶ ποτῶν, παρῖστάντας δὲ
τὴν ιδιότητα | [τ]ούτων*.

In his critique, Philodemus once again accuses his opponent of confusing the poet with the musician.²²

‘As far back as you can go towards our origins’, writes Diogenes, ‘melody has by its nature had the [power] to incite motion and to arouse actions’.

[T3.i.7] Ἄνωθεν
δ’] ἔχειν φύσει τὸ μέλος κινη-
τικόν τι, παραστατι-
κὸν [κ]αὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις . . .²³

And Diogenes cites the examples, first of Orpheus charming the stones [with the power of his voice] (τῶι μεμυθεῦσθαι τε Ὀρφέα θέλξαι τὰς πέτρας καμπαῖς), contrasting this anecdote with the case of Amphion, who made his workers submit to his will (ἀλλὰ Ἀμφίονα πονοῦντας παριστάσθαι).²⁴ He then immediately moves on, without any further comment, to talk of Ptolemy’s rowers, who were unable to move their boat effectively until Ptolemy instructed the famous aulete, Ismenias, to accompany their actions.²⁵

²² Column 131.17–34.

²³ Column 41.17 ff. Note here that Diogenes uses *melos* rather than *mousikē*.

²⁴ Column 41.21–5. The *OCD* s.v. Amphion actually credits Amphion with ‘walking around the site of Thebes playing his lyre and charming the stones into a wall’, very similar to Diogenes’ claim. Apollodorus’ *Library* III.v.5, writes ‘And having succeeded to the sovereignty they [Amphion and his brother Zethus] fortified the city, the stones following Amphion’s lyre’ (Loeb translation). Frazer, the translator, refers to the incident as ‘the miracle of the music’ p. 339.

²⁵ Delattre (2007) suggests that the Ptolemy here referred to was in all likelihood Ptolemy I Soter. The aulete Ismenias was known before 339 BC, and it seems that he was accorded much respect by Zeno of Citium. He is cited by Diogenes Laertius at VII. 125 as ‘[playing] all airs on the flute well’, and mentioned by Plutarch at *Non Posse* 1095F, ‘Do the Epicureans not make the Scyth Ateas look as if he had more music in his soul – who swore, when the flute-player Ismenias was a prisoner and performed at a banquet, that he found greater pleasure in the whinnying of a horse!’ (Loeb translation). I have been unable to find any earlier reference to Ismenias than this, although he is again mentioned by Diogenes Laertius at IV.22 in his chapter on Crates, the Head of the Academy in

In his parallel critique, Philodemus makes no mention of the name of the aulete. He mocks Diogenes' claims that music incites movement with 'if as he affirms, it is Providence that introduced it [music] for this end, then we will not waste time examining it!'²⁶ And he moves on to suggest that:

[T3.i.8]

καὶ γὰρ διορίσας τὸ μέλος ἔ-	2
φη κινητικὸν εἶναι φύσει·	
πρὸς δ' οὖν τὴν ὑπόνοιαν	
τὴν οὕτω κωφὴν ἔοικεν ἐ-	5
πεσπᾶσθαι τὸ τοῖς ἐλα[ύ]νουσιν	
ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν καὶ τοῖς θερί-	
ζουσιν πάλαι καὶ τὸν οἶνον	
ἐργαζομένοις καὶ πολλοῖς	
ἄλλοις τῶν ἐπίπονα συντ[ε]-	10
λούντων ἔργα τῶν ὀργά-	
νων τινὰ παραπο[ζε]υγνύ-	
ειν· ὃ καὶ Πτολεμαῖον οὔτιος	
γράφει πεποικέναι τοῖς κα-	

the third century BC. Diogenes (Laertius) states that Crates and Polemo 'did not side with the popular party, but were such as Dionysodorus the flute-player is said to have claimed to be, when he boasted that no one ever heard his melodies, as those of Ismenias were heard, either on shipboard or at the fountain'. I take this to imply that Ismenias was a well-known aulete, who would have played at many public events, whilst Dionysodorus might have been more choosy about where his performances were held. If Zeno thought highly of Ismenias, however, Diogenes of Babylon would surely have heard of him via the Stoic tradition. A search of the internet under 'Ismenias' has brought up an introduction to *The Praise of Music: Wherein besides the antiquitie, dignitie delectation and use thereof in civill matters, is also declared the sober and lawfull use of the same in the congregation and Church of God*, written by the Oxford Aristotelian John Case in 1586 (although authorship is now a subject of some debate). An excerpt from chapter 4 of *Praise* states 'By the help of musicke Ismenias a Theban musician, restored men sicke of an ague, to their former health. [<http://www.philological.bham.ac.uk/music2/intro.html>]. Two earlier musicians credited with similar feats are mentioned by Diogenes at column 47, on which see below, pp. 66–9. Another example also used by Diogenes is found in the same chapter of the *Praise*.

²⁶ Presumably Divine Providence, for which Philodemus, as an Epicurean, would have no time. The Epicurean school did not believe in Divine Providence, nor did they believe that the gods would intervene in men's lives on earth. Any argument based upon gifts from the gods would have been ridiculed by orthodox Epicureans, as indeed they are by Philodemus in this treatise. Delattre remarks that here Philodemus refuses to enter into any theological argument (2007: vol. II, 225), but simply once again resorts to ridiculing his opponent (col. 121.22–30).

θέλκουσιν. Ἄλλ' οὐχ ὅτι κι- 15
 νεῖ καὶ παρίσταται τὰ μέ-
 λη πρὸς τὰς πράξεις οὐτ' [ἐ]φι-
 στάνουσιν οἱ παρέχοντες
 τὴν μουσικὴν οὔτε τ[ό]τε συν-
 τελοῦσιν οἱ πράττοντες, ἄ- 20
 νευ δὲ μουσικῆς ἤϊτον δύ-
 νανται, τῶι δ' ἀνεπ[ι]βλήτους
 ἐπὶ τὸν πόνον γίνεσθαι καὶ
 κουφότερον ποεῖν τῆ πα-
 ραμείξει τῆς ἡδονῆς *. 25

And by definition, he says, melody is by nature kinetic. Whatever it was that led him to such a stupid idea – it's probably the fact that those who row on boats, and those in former times who brought in the harvest and produced wine, and many other manual workers were seen to be closely associated with certain musical instruments. It is exactly this that Ptolemy did for his rowers as my adversary wrote. However, it isn't because tunes set into motion and carry one towards actions that those who supply the music [set themselves to it, attend to it], nor that these latter see their task through, whereas without music they have a lesser capacity, but the reason for this is that they do not pay attention to their work, and because of the fact that pleasure is mixed with it, they execute [their work] with a lighter heart.²⁷

Philodemus' argument seems difficult to fault here, and he moves on to assert, in the context of Diogenes' claims for Orpheus, that Diogenes was 'raving' when he claimed that music itself could set souls and bodies into motion. He remarks that the myth of Orpheus was today usually called hyperbole (καὶ νῦν ἡμεῖς

²⁷ Columns 122.2–25. In a note to Aristides Quintilianus *De Musica* II, 3, where Aristides remarks upon music's ability to 'take away the hardship from sailing and rowing and from the hardest kinds of manual labour, easing their toil', Barker suggests (1989: 462) that there was probably in existence 'a more or less standard compendium of [such] instances'. Certainly Aristides' comments immediately recall the Philodemian passage.

γ' εἰώθαμεν ὑπερβολικῶς λέγειν).²⁸ But, he does concede that if one does want to use the example of Orpheus, the fabled musician should be seen as analogous to an aulete playing from the bow of the trireme at the head of a team of rowers rather than the 'delirious images of my adversary!' (διὰ τὰ τούτου ληρήματα). However, one does wonder whether Philodemus deliberately reports Diogenes' beliefs in such a way to make them sound all the more unbelievable, thus making his own critique sound all the more reasonable. It is interesting that in introducing the anecdotes of Orpheus and Amphion, Diogenes states 'according to legend' (τῶι μεμυθεῦσθαι). This appears to be the only case where he distinguishes 'legend' or myth from history, and I would suggest that this must be deliberate. For a Stoic to argue that music *itself* contains *ēthos*, as I argued in chapter 2, then there must be some cognitive value to it. But to suggest that music could have an effect on inanimate objects as well, surely reduces it to some sort of magical effect; indeed the verb Diogenes uses with respect to Orpheus moving stones is θέλξαι, which in itself suggests magic, and thereby opening up the way for Philodemus' stinging rebuke.

However, there is a discussion in Aristides Quintilianus' *De Musica* II,²⁹ where Aristides states that although some people might initially seem to be unmoved by the music, everyone will in the end be affected by it. Perhaps, therefore, Diogenes' reference to the effect of Orpheus' music on the stones is a deliberate metaphor for such situations.

Diogenes doesn't only use mythical characters to illustrate his points, however; he also uses apparently genuine historical characters. One ancient musician Diogenes used as an example of music's power is the seventh-century Thaletas of Gortyn, in Crete. Although the name of Thaletas is not preserved within Diogenes' own text, Philodemus' parallel detailed criticism makes it clear that he (Diogenes) claimed that Thaletas had visited the Spartans, at their request, following a Pythian oracle ordering them to invite him to Lacedaemonia. Apparently he put an

²⁸ Column 122.25–32.

²⁹ Book II, chapter 4; for more on this, see below, T3.i.27 and discussion.

end to a plague (but see further below) through the playing of his music. According to both Diogenes and Philodemus, Thaletas also set up an *ex-voto*.³⁰

Philodemus writes:

[T3.i.9]

Λακεδαιμονίους	132.33
δὲ τοῖς ἀδιανοήτοις οὐ προσιέμεθα μαρτυροῦν- τας, ὅτι καὶ πυθόχρηστον ἔσχον μεταπ[έ]μψασθαι θα- λήταν καί, π[α]ρα[γ]ενομέ- νου, τῆς διχον[οί]ας ἔλ[η]ξαν, εἰ δὴ μαρτ[υρο]ῦσιν· ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον ὅ τι παρὰ τοῖς πεπλα- κόσιν ἄριστά γ[ε] καὶ μουσι- κοῖς ἄλλοι[ς καὶ] ἄντιλέγου- σιν, ο[ὐ]δὲ [. . .]σιν α[. .]ι- γ[.]λ[.]ον ἀλα- ζονευόμενον δι' ἀναθέμα- τος, εἴπερ ἀνέθηκεν οὕτως ἐ- πιγράψας ὡς οὔτοι λέγουσιν.	35 40 45 133.3

This story appears in few other sources today, none of them earlier than Diogenes, although Thaletas is known through Ephorus,³¹ a fifth-century writer, who records that Thaletas introduced the paeonic and cretic rhythms.³² Although he was

³⁰ Diogenes' very lacunose text at column 47.23–30; Philodemus' rather more complete criticism at 132.33–133.3.

³¹ Strabo I.1.1 suggests that Ephorus was a contemporary of Democritus, Eudoxus and Dicaearchus, and names Eratosthenes, Polybius and Posidonius as their successors. The *OCD* dates Ephorus to c. 405–330 BC.

³² Strabo X.4.16–17. *FGrH* 70 F 149, and [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1134E. More on this below.

known as Thaletas, Pausanias I.14.4 writes of a Thales,³³ who ‘stopped the plague at Sparta’;³⁴ [Plutarch] writes at *De Musica* 1146c:

[T3.i.10] the Cretan Thaletas who is said in accordance with a Delphic oracle to have visited Lacedaemon and by means of music to have brought health to the people, delivering Sparta, as Pratinas³⁵ asserts, from the pestilence that had broken out there’.³⁶

Plutarch also records the event in his *Life of Lycurgus* 4,³⁷ in rather more detail, and from this it would appear that the ‘plague’ was indeed civil unrest rather than a disease. This would seem further confirmed by Philodemus’ unequivocal statement, at T3.i.9, line 39, that it was civil unrest (τῆς διχονοίας), and so Barker’s doubts about the exact meaning in [Plutarch] (see n. 36) are now unnecessary.

Barker notes that it is probable that Thaletas wrote music for stringed instruments rather than the aulos, although he probably ‘composed new rhythms drawn from the repertoire of the aulos’. Cretan music was based primarily on stringed instruments.³⁸ Plutarch confirms in his own *De Musica* that:

[T3.i.11] while Polymnestus, after the introduction of the Terpandrian style, employed a new one, although he too remained faithful to the lofty manner; so too

³³ Strabo X.4.19 associates Thales with Lycurgus. This Thales and Thaletas are probably one and the same person; see *OCD* s.v.

³⁴ Pausanias *Guide to Greece* vol. I, trans Peter Levi. Penguin: 1971. Levi suggests at p. 43, n. 81 that Thales and the other men being discussed at the time ‘seem to have been real shamans, who were soon lost among legendary achievements and falsely attributed writings’.

³⁵ Possibly Pratinas of Phlius, who according to the *Suda*, competed in the 70th Olympiad in 499–496 BC, but it is not certain that this is the same man.

³⁶ Andrew Barker, in his note to 1134B (where Thaletas is first mentioned) of his own translation remarks, that although Thaletas was reputed to have put an end to a plague by means of music, ‘whether it was a real epidemic or a metaphor for unhealthy political unrest is not clear’.

³⁷ Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus* 4, 2–3. Plutarch writes, ‘Now Thales passed as a lyric poet and screened himself behind this art, but in reality he did the work of one of the mightiest lawgivers. For his odes were so many exhortations to obedience and harmony, and their measured rhythms were permeated with ordered tranquillity, so that those who listened to them were insensibly softened in their dispositions, insomuch that they renounced their mutual hatreds which were so rife at that time, and dwelt together in a common pursuit of what was high and noble.’

³⁸ Athenaeus 627d; [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1140c, ‘Others march into battle to the music of the lyre. The Cretans are on record as having long maintained this practice’; Barker 1984: 215, n. 75.

did Thaletas and Sacadas, these also, at least in the conduct of rhythm, being innovators, but nevertheless not departing from the lofty manner.³⁹

This might suggest that Diogenes is displaying a dislike, as evidenced in Plato and Aristotle before him, of ‘New Music’.⁴⁰ [Plutarch’s] comment that Thaletas had retained ‘the lofty manner’ suggests that in using him as evidence, rather than a later musician, Diogenes is ensuring that the story displays the use of appropriate, higher, music, rather than the [suggested] frivolous and even dangerous style of the ‘New Musicians’.⁴¹

Delattre remarks in his note on the event that only Philodemus’ *De Musica* mentions the *ex-voto*,⁴² and indeed I can find no other reference to it. Diogenes would seem therefore to be using a source that once again is no longer extant. Rispoli has suggested that his source may have been Heraclides of Pontus.⁴³ However, as Heraclides’ works are also known only in fragmentary form, it is again unlikely that this can be known for sure.

A second historical rather than mythical figure referred to as evidence of music’s power to heal or calm is Terpander, a seventh-century musician of some importance.⁴⁴ This reputation seems to be borne out by the number of writers who have referred to him.⁴⁵ Diogenes refers to him only briefly, and without introduction, immediately after his claim for Thaletas.⁴⁶ Philodemus’ own critique provides a little more information.⁴⁷

[T3.i.12] Οὐ πειθόμεθα δ’ οὐδὲ τῶι Τέρ-

³⁹ *De Musica* 1135C.

⁴⁰ For more discussion of ‘New Music’, see chapter 4, pp. 118 ff.

⁴¹ I will discuss this possibility below, pp. 118 ff.

⁴² Delattre 2007: vol. II, 368, n.8.

⁴³ Rispoli 1969: 225, see also Delattre 2007: vol. II, 367, n. 4.

⁴⁴ Barker (1984: 208, n. 18) states that Terpander was treated as the greatest of all musicians after his time in Sparta. Athenaeus (635e) writes that he instituted and won the kitharodic competition at the Carneia. He had four victories at the Pythian Games, and is thought to have invented the seven-stringed kithara.

⁴⁵ A search of the TLG shows some thirteen ancient authors to have mentioned Terpander, the oldest source, apart from Diogenes being Diodorus Siculus, who probably was using Ephorus as his source.

⁴⁶ Column 47.31.

⁴⁷ Column 133.4 ff.

πανδρον κ[α]τὰ μαντεῖαν
κεκληῖσθαι πρὸς κατάπαυσιν
ἐμφυλίου στάσεως, ἂν καὶ πά-
νυ πολλοὶ συμφωνῶσι περὶ
τούτου τῶν μουσολήπτων,
οὗτος δέ, σχεδὸν μόνος, [ἐ]ν
τοῖς φιλ[ε]ιτείοις αὐτὸν ἄι-
δοντα ποιῆ*.

And we are no more persuaded, on the other hand, by the story of Terpander who by prediction of the oracle was invited to put an end to the civil unrest even if, indeed, many enthusiasts of music agree about the event, and if my adversary (he is almost alone in this case) makes him sing in the common meals.

Once again, [Plutarch] recounts what seems to be the same event:

[T3.i.13] That furthermore the best-regulated states have taken care to concern themselves with music of the grand style we could show by citing many examples, especially Terpander, who settled the civil strife that had broken out in Lacedaemon

. . .⁴⁸

It seems that Philodemus was correct when he confirmed that ‘many enthusiasts of music agree about the event’; unfortunately most of the authors who record it whose writings remain extant, were even later than Philodemus.

Diogenes then moves to discuss the example of another seventh-century lyric poet, Archilochus, who was supposed to have said that ‘mortal men are charmed by song’ (κηλέεται δ’ ὅτις βροτῶν ἀοιδαῖς), and gives the example of the Carians, when, on the occasion of an eclipse or an assembly, a tumult erupted, but were

⁴⁸ [Plut.] *De Musica* 1146B–C.

quietened by the playing of the most calming music, becoming milder until the madness came to an end and they returned to normal.⁴⁹

[T3.i.14]

παρ[ᾶ] δὲ Κα[ρ-
σίν, ἐ]πειδὴν ἐν ταῖς εκασ[. – 40
.... θ]όρυβος γένηται, τῶν
γλυκ]υτάτων τινὰς ὠδ[ῶν
κατάρ]χειν, εἴτ' εἰς τουσ[. .
....]νεσθαι καὶ πέρασ πα-
ρανοί]ας· οὔτω δὲ κατα[π]αύ[ει 45
.....] τὸ προκείμενον.

The question of whether the original text discussed an eclipse or an assembly is probably rather academic. I can find no other reference to such an incident, and the example merely presents another occasion when the soothing music was able to restore calm and order to the gathering. Delattre remarks, ‘Un phénomène comme celui des éclipses de soleil faisait peur, et il n’est pas invraisemblable que, une sorte de panique prenant la population en cette occasion, les Cariens, réputés pour leurs auloi aux sonorités très aiguës utilisés lors des funérailles, aient eu l’idée de calmer le tumulte au son de l’aulos, jusqu’à la fin de l’éclipse. On comprend habituellement: <au cours des [assemblées]>. . .’⁵⁰ Here, Philodemus chooses not to comment upon his adversary’s discussion – whether because he didn’t consider it worthy of argument or because he couldn’t argue against something that actually happened is impossible to tell. I do, however, find it a little surprising, given Philodemus’ habit of mocking Diogenes’ examples whenever he can, that no mention is made at all within his critique. He merely interpolates ‘It is in this way that my adversary comes to the end of this question.’

⁴⁹ Column 49, lines 39–46. The word ἐκλείψει in line 40, inserted by Gomperz (1885) is doubted by Delattre, but indicates both α and σ as doubtful. ἐκκλησίας was suggested by Rispoli.

⁵⁰ Delattre 2007: vol. I, 81.

Immediately after Diogenes' words, there is a lacuna of some twenty-six lines. It appears from the parallel columns in Philodemus' criticism that Diogenes moves on to discuss music's link to justice, and it is quite possible that Diogenes quotes Plato as an authority, as Philodemus remarks that 'if Plato wanted to say the music aided towards justice we would have expected some demonstration on his part'.⁵¹ Furthermore, when Diogenes' text becomes legible again, a discussion of the lawgivers and their involvement in choosing suitable music for education follows. I will return to that discussion later.⁵²

It is interesting that Diogenes cites historical figures alongside mythological figures, apparently without differentiating between their status. Is the presence of the historical figures intended to make the fictional characters more realistic? It is interesting also that it is the seventh-century figures that are given prominence, and perhaps indeed it is the fact that they were the writers of music in the 'grand style', that makes them worthy examples in Diogenes' eyes. Certainly the 'musical innovators' of the fifth century must have been in his mind. At column 31 Diogenes refers to earlier times, when innovations in music were prohibited, in a manner reminiscent of Plato:

[T3.i.15] . . .

πᾶσι πρότερον νόμων θέσιν
 παρ[εῖ]σαν αὐτῆι χρῆσ[θ]αι καὶ
 μη[δὲν] α κ[αί]γοτομεῖν τὴν
 δὲ ν[ῦν] ἀ[κμά]ζουσιν διάθε-
 σιν ἀπ[. . . .] ὑ ἀφεστηκέ-
 ναι *. Κ[αὶ τοὺς] δειθυραμβι-
 κοὺς δὲ τρόπ[ο]υς εἴ τις συγ-
 κρίναι, τὸν τε κατὰ Πίνδα-
 ρον καὶ τὸν κατὰ Φιλοξε-
 νον, μεγάλην εὐρεθῆσθαι

⁵¹ Column 138.22 ff., and accompanying notes, vol. II, 269–70; 437–8.

⁵² Below, chapter 4, T4.15 and discussion.

τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐπιφαι-
νομένων ἡθῶν, τὸν αὐ-
τὸν δ' εἶναι τρόπον·

. . . an early institution of the law which allowed everyone to practise music whilst forbidding the introduction of innovations. But the disposition that flourishes today is very different. And regarding the styles of dithyramb, if you compare that of Pindar and Philoxenus you will see a great difference in the characters they present although the style is the same.

Philoxenus, who lived *c.* 435–380 BC was a famous dithyrambic poet. Pherecrates, an Athenian comic poet, who won his first victories at the City Dionysia and the Lenaea between 440 and 430 BC,⁵³ and a fragment of whose writing is preserved in [Plutarch]’s *De Musica*,⁵⁴ introduces him as a ‘musical innovator and corruptor of traditional music’.⁵⁵ Aristotle confirms that Philoxenus tried to compose his dithyramb entitled *The Mysians* in the Dorian mode, but was unable to and had to revert to the traditional mode, the Phrygian:

[T3.i.16] Composition itself makes it clear how the dithyramb is by common consent a Phrygian form. People who work in this field of study bring many examples to prove it, including Philoxenus, who when he tried to compose his *Mysians* in the Dorian mode, was unable to, but fell back again into the appropriate *harmonia*, Phrygian, compelled by nature itself.⁵⁶

An anonymous papyrus fragment found in Egypt in 1891⁵⁷ would seem to confirm Diogenes’ affirmation that ‘laws’ were in place in earlier times regarding

⁵³ Diodorus Siculus XV.5 places Philoxenus in Sicily with Dionysius of Syracuse in 386 BC. For more on Philoxenus, see the Appendix to this chapter.

⁵⁴ *De Musica* 1141D–1142A.

⁵⁵ For Pherecrates at the Lenaea, see Plato *Prt.* 327d.

⁵⁶ Aristotle, *Politics* VIII. 1342b.

⁵⁷ P.Graec. Vindob. 1996a and b (MPER n.s. I.22). This papyrus could be the remnants of a treatise on the dithyramb, and some scholars suggest that it might have been written by Melanippides himself (even though in that case he would be referring to himself in the third person) in the second half of

the correct ‘modes’ to be used for different types of music. This fragment confirms that the ‘Dorian harmony was inappropriate to Dionysus’ (i.e., the dithyramb):

[T3.i.17]

. . . [τὸ
μὲν] πάθος οὐκ ἄγνο-
ῶν], ὅτι θρηνόν τινα
ἀπα[ι]τεῖν δόξειν ἄν,
τὸν δὲ διθύραμβον
εἶδως, ὅτι πάντα μᾶλ-
[λον ἢ θρηνον δέχεται]
-νησε.[. . .]ω . ος ἀ[λ]λό-
τριον ἢ[γ]ούμενος εἶ-
ναι τῶι πάθει, τὸ δὲ
τῆς Δωρι[σ]τὶ τῶι Διονύ-
σῳι. τὸ μέσον ἀμφο-
[τέρων ἐλόμενος]
[εκεῖ]
.νο μέλος μαλα[κὸν ἢ-
γεῖτο πολ[λ]αχοῦ μὲν
ἀποφαίνει[σ]θαι, μά-
λιστα δ’ ἐν τῶι· τίς ἄ-
ρα λύσσα νῶι τίν’ ὑφαι-
...] . Μελανιπί-
δη]ν καὶ κατατάτ-
τ]ειν ἐκάστην ἐπὶ
τ]ὸ πρέπον αὐτῶν.
δηλοῖ δὲ ταῦτα Τε[λέστης]
δε . [. . .]κ

the fifth-century BC. (Paper given by Luigi Battezzato at the Institute of Classical Studies, London entitled ‘Dithyrambs and Greek Tragedy’, on 2 March 2009).

ἐγείρομεν ἰω[ἄν] ν[εοχ-
μόν· ἐξέγειρε δὲ Λακε-
δαιμονῶν πόδα.

. . . since he was not unaware that one could think that the suffering (*pathos*) required some sort of lamentation (*thrēnos*), and since he knew that the dithyramb [encompasses anything] sooner than [lamentation]. . . and since he thought that it [the dithyramb genre] was inappropriate (*allogrios*) to the suffering (*pathos*), and the presence of the Dorian harmony was inappropriate to Dionysus. [Choosing] the intermediate of the two [options/harmonies?]. . . he thought the tune was a delicate one [i.e. too delicate] for widespread appearance, and especially in the passage that goes: ‘what sort of frenzy (*lussa*) to the mind (*nōi*), what’. . . and Melanippides arranged each [harmony] according to what was appropriate to them. This is demonstrated by Telestes. ‘We stir up a newfangled song. Stir up the foot of the Spartans.’⁵⁸

[Plutarch] confirms that Melanippides, Philoxenus and Timotheus did not keep to the traditional music,⁵⁹ and provides more information regarding the contrast between the styles of Pindar and Philoxenus, mentioned by Diogenes, during a discussion upon the importance of correct training and instruction in music:

[T3.i.18] Yet, when [Telesias of Thebes] set out to compose music and tried his hand at both manners of composition, Pindar’s and Philoxenus’, he found himself unable to achieve success in the latter; and the reason was his excellent training from boyhood.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Translation Battezzato, with amendments. Another part of the papyrus mentions Philoxenus as well, although the context is too lacunose to make any real sense. This would seem to be worthy of investigation at a later date as the discussion would seem to bear a real resemblance to that of both Diogenes and [Plutarch].

⁵⁹ [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1141C–F.

⁶⁰ [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1142C. In his commentary on this passage, Lasserre (1954: 174) writes: ‘Le choix de Pindare d’une part et de Philoxène de l’autre pour représenter, sous le rapport de la morale, les deux tendances contraires de la musique et particulièrement de la musique dithyrambique paraît avoir été traditionnel car ils les polarisent également chez Philodème, *De mus.* [31] van Krevelin.’ [Plutarch] claims to be reporting what Aristoxenus wrote, but this exists only in fragmentary form now (fr. 76 Wehrli). Telesias seems otherwise ‘unknown’ (Loeb translator note, p. 425, n. h).

Clearly Philoxenus' music was not approved of, and considered inferior to that of Pindar, although Pindar too justified some use of innovation, stating that the old style was 'drawn out like a rope'.⁶¹ However, Pindar is obviously held in some regard by Diogenes, certainly in comparison with Philoxenus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his *De compositione verborum* links Philoxenus with Timotheus, a famous innovator, and a musician who claimed to be the 'successor' of Terpander, discussed above, pages 69–70.

Dionysius writes:

[T3.i.19] The dithyramb composers used to change their modes too, making them Dorian, Phrygian, and Lydian in the same song . . . I mean the composers of the age of Philoxenus, Timotheus and Telestes, because with the ancients the dithyramb was just as regulated as everything else.⁶²

Philoxenus was clearly renowned amongst ancient writers on music as a musical innovator, his work entitled *The Cyclops* also being parodied by Aristophanes in *Plutus*, and so the mention of him by [Plutarch] is not that unusual. But the comparison of Pindar and Philoxenus in the same context, *pace* the remarks of Lasserre,⁶³ could suggest that the writer had read either Philodemus' work, or at least a work that referred to it. I have seen no other use in other musical writers of both Pindar and Philoxenus as examples of the different styles of dithyramb, even though both Plato and Aristotle, to name but two, were eloquent in their condemnation of the misuse of musical genera.

In a fragment of his *Persae*,⁶⁴ Timotheus writes:

⁶¹ Fragment 70b; West 1992: 344.

⁶² *De comp. verb.* 131.

⁶³ Above, n. 60.

⁶⁴ Timotheus fr. 15, *PMG* 791. Translation from Barker 1984: 96.

[T3.i.20] . . . Terpander yoked music to the ten songs – and it was Aeolian Lesbos that bore this famous man. . . And now Timotheus with his eleven-struck metres and rhythms makes *kitharis* spring up anew. . .⁶⁵

Timotheus appears to be discussed briefly by Diogenes at column 43.23, although the restoration is not definite. Only the letters $\iota\mu\acute{o}$ can be read today, but the name does fit into the context of a discussion of the fifth-century poets Agathon, Democritus and Nicander, all of whom seem to be accused of ‘effeminate comportment’. All three were contemporaries of Timotheus, and it may be that Diogenes was presenting examples of the types of music that were not considered suitable.

.....

The musicians discussed in this section so far, mythological figures apart, are all musical figures that appear elsewhere within other musico-historical accounts. At column 38, Philodemus remarks that his opponent discusses his views on music as a historian rather than as a philosopher, and to an extent this would seem a fair comment. There is nothing particularly Stoic about the theory presented in this way – Plato and members of the Peripatetic school would have all been familiar with the musicians Diogenes discusses, and it is clear in some instances that Diogenes has used the Peripatetics as a main source. Only the use of mythological characters would seem to indicate that this is a Stoic writing. Indeed it has been suggested that [Plutarch] used Diogenes as one of his main sources for his own *De Musica*;⁶⁶ certainly many of the characters discussed by Diogenes appear in the later work, often, however, with much more detail added.

⁶⁵ The ‘eleven-struck’ refers to the eleven strings with which tradition links him as opposed to Terpander’s seven strings. See West 1992: 362.

⁶⁶ Conversation with Professor Dirk Obbink in Herculaneum in June 2006; also D. Babut, *Plutarque et le Stoïcisme*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1969.

It is clear that it is not only music with words that Diogenes considered useful for life. It appears that he also considers instrumental music⁶⁷ to have some power over the soul, as argued elsewhere in this thesis,⁶⁸ and as evidenced by an anecdote related in various forms by a number of philosophers, but as far as I can tell, Diogenes is the earliest philosopher to discuss it. It appears in column 42, lines 36–45 of Delattre’s reconstructed text:

[T3.i.21] καὶ καταστολ[.]-
 ξιν ἐπιτ[. . .]αμε[.]
 τόνον τινὰ κα[.]
 Πυθαγόραν δὲ [.]
 . . .]αγωγότερον [.]
 μεθυ]όντων καλε[.]
 .. αὐλ]ητρίδα ν[.]
]ναν[. . .]πα[.]
]ους τὸ σπ[ονδεῖον .
] καὶ τοῦτον [.]

It must be said that the text is too fragmentary to make any real sense, but it bears so similar a resemblance to the anecdote related in Sextus Empiricus that I would suggest it must be relating the same tale:⁶⁹

[T3.i.22] ὁ γοῦν Πυθαγόρας μειράκια ὑπὸ μέθης ἐκβεβακχευμένα ποτὲ θεασάμενος ὡς μηδὲν τῶν μεμνηότων διαφέρειν, παρήνευσε τῷ συνεπικωμάζοντι τούτοις αὐλητῇ τὸ σπονδεῖον αὐτοῖς ἐπαυλῆσαι μέλος τοῦ δὲ τὸ προσταχθὲν ποιήσαντος οὕτως αἰφνίδιον μεταβαλεῖν σωφρονισθέντας ὡς εἰ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔνηφον.

⁶⁷ That is, music written to be played without the accompaniment of, or indeed to accompany, words.
⁶⁸ See, in particular, the comparison between Diogenes’ column 51 and Plato’s *Laws* II. 669b–e in chapter 4 below, T4.13 and 14 and discussion.
⁶⁹ Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Musicians* VI.8.

Thus, Pythagoras, having noticed on one occasion that some youths who were in a state of bacchic frenzy from drunkenness differed not at all from madmen, advised the flute-player who was with them in their revels to play them the ‘spondean’ tune; and when he had done as instructed, were chastened and changed as suddenly as if they had been sober from the beginning.⁷⁰

The same anecdote is repeated in Galen, *de Placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, V. 6.21–2, which is, in fact a discussion of Posidonius’ writings,⁷¹ although the name of Damon replaces that of Pythagoras.⁷² The incident is related by Galen as part of his argument that Posidonius followed Plato rather than the orthodox Stoic view in the composition of the soul;⁷³ nonetheless it does indicate that the story was well known. The fact that Diogenes cites Pythagoras as the protagonist is interesting, and may indicate a Pythagorean influence in his musical philosophy, or at very least suggest a Pythagorean source.

Diogenes does mention Damon in other contexts (and as far as I can see, he does not mention Pythagoras again), and as a person worthy of respect, and so the anecdote could have been used by him as evidence of Damon’s knowledge of the use of music had he chosen to do so. The fact that Posidonius relates the tale using the name of Damon, rather than keeping to the story as related by Diogenes might suggest that an earlier Stoic had also have written about the event; nonetheless, it surely suggests a different source.⁷⁴

It is interesting also that Posidonius argues against the rational mind/soul being affected by ‘irrational’ music, which would mean, presumably, that he would not have agreed with his Stoic predecessor:

⁷⁰ Trans. R. G. Bury, Loeb edition, with amendments.

⁷¹ Posidonius fragment 168, Edelstein–Kidd.

⁷² Iamblichus *VP*, 112, and Quintilian *Inst. Or.* I.10.32 also relate the story, with the name of Pythagoras.

⁷³ See chapter 2, T2.iii.5 and discussion.

⁷⁴ Carnes Lord (1982: 206–7) suggests that the sources who relate the incident with Pythagoras rather than Damon are more frequent and have ‘better authority’, although his discussion is in the context of Damon’s musical teaching, into which this incident would not sit happily. It would seem to stand in the way of Lord’s understanding of Damon’s thought as regards the question of at what age men can benefit from musical education. Lord’s idiosyncratic understanding was that Damon limited music’s effects to the very young or the very old. Other modern scholars do not seem to follow this view, however.

[T3.i.23] ...For obviously opinions held by their [the drunken young men] rational faculty were hardly changed through instruction from a musical instrument; but since the emotional soul is irrational, they are aroused, and calmed through irrational movements. You see, the irrational is helped and harmed by what is irrational, the rational by knowledge and ignorance.⁷⁵

The similarity between all four versions of the anecdote strongly suggests they are referring to just one event, perhaps mythical, perhaps not. Perhaps the name of the protagonist was changed through mis-reporting, or perhaps it was changed to suit the story-teller's ends. But either Pythagoras or Damon⁷⁶ could have subscribed to the view that music could indeed have this effect.

However, the purpose here is not to question the accuracy of reporting, but simply to note the principle involved. If the aulos-player was the sole musician, which very much seems the case in the complete anecdotes, then the music said to have both induced frenzy and then soothed it must have been purely instrumental, for the player could not have played the instrument and sung at the same time. As stated earlier, it was acknowledged, certainly as early as Aristotle, but probably before, that music, even without words, could indeed have an effect on human behaviour. Whether or not Diogenes subscribed to that view, the anecdote is at least evidence for the fact that he did discuss music separately from words on occasions.⁷⁷

In his critique, Philodemus either chooses not to comment, or the columns bearing his criticism have been lost. He frequently makes the point that if music does have any effect it can only be music with words, and that it is the words that lead one to do anything. Sextus Empiricus, on the other hand, as is his style, does criticise Pythagoras' actions, but not in the way, surely, that Philodemus might have done:

⁷⁵ Trans Kidd 1999.

⁷⁶ *Pace* Lord 1982: 207, see above n. 74.

⁷⁷ See also chapter 4, pp. 118 ff., for other discussions of music without words, and chapter 2, pp. 35–6.

[T3.i.24] And, as to Pythagoras, in the first place he was foolish in desiring to render drunkards sober at the wrong moment, instead of quitting the place; and secondly, by trying to reform them in this way he confesses that flute-players have more influence than philosophers for the reforming of morals.⁷⁸

I have already argued⁷⁹ that music without words should not be considered irrational simply because it does not contain a proposition that is expressed verbally. There, I also discussed that a lack of ‘technical understanding’ of the music does not stop the music affecting behaviour or character. A mother singing a lullaby to her infant child, an example used by Plato and Aristotle, will soothe the child notwithstanding the fact that the child has not yet obtained the capability of speech or an understanding of spoken language. There should not be a problem, therefore, for the Stoic to accept that emotion can be affected without the expression of a verbal proposition. This indeed adds weight to Diogenes’, and Plato’s before him, concern that a child should be exposed to (the correct type of) music as a fundamental part of his education.⁸⁰

If Diogenes is using this anecdote as evidence of one of the uses of music, is he suggesting that it can also be used as a type of therapy or medicine? It is clear that Pythagoras used different music for different situations and indeed might have viewed it as a type of therapy. At *VP* 15.64.3–9, Iamblichus writes:

[T3.i.25] So the first stage of his system of education was music: songs and rhythms from which came healing of human temperaments and passions. . . . He made. . . blends of diatonic and chromatic and enharmonic melodies which easily transformed into their opposites the maladies of the soul. . . all these he restored to virtue, using the appropriate melodies *like mixtures of curative drugs*.⁸¹

⁷⁸ S.E. *Against the Musicians* VI, 23. Loeb translation.

⁷⁹ Chapter 2, pp. 35–6.

⁸⁰ See chapters 4 and 5, below, for further, more detailed, discussion of the use of music in education.

⁸¹ Trans. Clark 1989, italics mine.

At column 36, it is clear from Philodemus' parallel criticism (col. 117.2–26) that Diogenes not only claimed that music could set a soul into motion from rest, but similarly it could calm a troubled soul 'into a disposition by which the soul can move naturally by the effect of a melody that suits it'. He also claimed, that 'we are not all affected in the same way by the same song' ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντες ὁμοίως κινηθησόμεθα πρὸς τῆς αὐτῆς.

[T3.i.26] τιν' εἰς τοιαύτην διάθ[εσιν οἴ-
 αν αὐτῇ κινηθῆναι [κατὰ φύ-
 σιν ἔστιν ὑπὸ τῆς προ[σηκού-
 σης μελωδίας.⁸² ἐπεὶ οὐ πάν-
 τες ὁμοίως κινηθησόμεθα
 πρὸς τῆς αὐτῆς

Anderson⁸³ states that 'here we glimpse a late stage of theory of ethos when music's power was thought to be highly individualised', but I wonder if Diogenes' claim was as complicated as that. Perhaps he simply meant, as Aristotle might have done before him, that the educated person's soul would be moved in a different way from the uneducated person's. Although Aristotle states that 'we should employ all the harmonies, yet not employ them all in the same way', it does seem as though he assumes that everyone is affected in the same way, what will differ will be the intensity.⁸⁴ As Anderson comments,⁸⁵ however, Diogenes' position 'is the point of

⁸² The use of the word μελωδιαν is unusual in this text. Delattre remarks in his note to the line that the word is used only rarely in this work. It occurs just five times in Delattre's restoration, and two of these occurrences are conjectural. Delattre takes it to mean 'song' because it is used at column 150 in opposition to 'lyre-playing'. But column 150 is part of Philodemus' final conclusion to the four books, whereas column 36, above, is Diogenes' own theory. Philodemus does throughout the text try to suggest that Diogenes is mixing up music and poetry, and so he could be deliberately phrasing this ambiguously. Whilst it is impossible to be sure, therefore, the word 'song' need not be implied here, particularly as Aristides' passage, T3.i.27, is so similar, uses the same word μελωδιαν and the translation 'song' is not at all implied.

⁸³ 1966: 173.

⁸⁴ *Pol.* VIII. 1342a4–15, but the context here is the intensity of emotion felt hearing the active and passionate kinds of music when others are performing, i.e., presumably in the theatre, and of sacred tunes 'ἱερῶν μελῶν'.

⁸⁵ 1966: 284, n. 53.

view adopted by Aristides Quintilianus Book 2, in his musical psychotherapy: ‘by trial and error, you will find the right kind of music for treating your subject’.

Aristides writes, at Book II, chapter 4:

[T3.i.27] [W]e have a reply to those who doubt whether everyone is moved by melody (τὴν μελωδίαν). . . Just as one and the same drug applied to the same kind of complaint in several bodies does not always work in the same way, depending on the slightness or severity of the condition, but cures some more quickly, others more slowly, so music too arouses those more open to its influence immediately, but takes longer to capture the less susceptible.⁸⁶

It is clear that for Aristides here, music indeed has a therapeutic effect. Earlier in this section, he states that the ‘therapist’ must make a diagnosis and reveal (ἐκκαλύπτειν) the foul disposition. His action thereafter is to try out some music on the patient and test his reaction to it. This reaction will be governed by the ἐννοήματα. In chapter 9, Aristides suggests that these *ennoiai* are not fixed, but are malleable; we learn them ourselves and they can be altered by outside influences. The soul can inflict an undesirable state of mind brought about by emotional responses to outside influences. The use of music in this respect is twofold for Aristides – he looks not to change character but to change natural responses to a different set of stimuli, just as, for example, in the training of a horse, one looks not to change the natural nature of the horse, but to change its response to a stimulus.

Thus in his theory of the use of music for the human soul, Aristides has two types of treatment:

1. to totally remove a condition and replace it with another (θεραπευτικόν); and
2. immediate eradication of undesirable feelings and developments (ὠφελητικόν).

Aristides writes:

⁸⁶ Greek from R. P. Winnington-Ingram’s Teubner edition of 1963; translation in Barker 1989, 460.

[T3.i.28] If you use the *harmoniai* in the ways we have explained, applying them to each soul on the basis either of their similarity or of their opposition to it, you will disclose the bad character that lurks within it, and cure it, and replace it with a better. If the underlying disposition is coarse and stubborn, it is through what is intermediate that you will generate persuasion and bring it to the opposite state; while if it is fine and good you will use what is similar to it, and thereby augment it to the right proportion.⁸⁷

If the condition is obscure and difficult to diagnose, then the therapist should proceed by random trial and error; if a particular type of *harmonia* seems to help, then the therapist should continue, if not then a modulation should be introduced and trial and error continued until the desired effect is achieved, ‘for it is likely that someone who is resistant to one sort of melody will be attracted to its opposite’.⁸⁸ It is clear that treatment by both ‘similarity’ and ‘opposites’ is in play here.

Philodemus’ criticism of Diogenes simply accuses him of seeking a ‘science of the non-existents [τῶν ἀνυπάρκτων ἐπιστήμην]’, once again claiming that no melody *qua* melody, and thus being irrational, could either arouse a soul from tranquillity, nor calm the troubled soul.⁸⁹ However, whether we can assume that Diogenes’ theory could be likened to that of Aristides *in toto* cannot, of course, now be known. Aristides has earlier applied male and female characters to each soul – each soul will have a combination of both, but will be made up of predominantly male or female character, and these characters will in part dictate the soul’s reaction to outside influence. I have not been able to read this theory into Diogenes’ own psychology.

Indeed, Diogenes does not elaborate on his almost throw-away comment that ‘we are not all affected . . .’, or at least Philodemus does not choose to report on any elaboration, which does raise the question, if music is to be a useful educational tool

⁸⁷ Aristides Quintilianus Book II, ch. 14, pp. 80, ll. 10–18 Winnington-Ingram, trans Barker 1989: 482.

⁸⁸ Aristides Quintilianus Book II, ch. 14., pp. 80–1 Winnington-Ingram. Translation Barker 1989: 482–3.

⁸⁹ Col. 117.2–26.

to lead one to live a life of virtue, surely it is important that those who decide upon appropriate and non-appropriate music should know the likely effect of it upon the students? Cicero at *Div.* I.124–5 shows that the Stoics did admit the fallibility of human prediction, but as Anderson notes, this would imply that only trial and error would ascertain how to produce the desired effect on the individual, and this is plainly the case in Aristides' own theory. Might it be that Aristides himself was drawing on Diogenes' theory?

There is a discussion in Plato's *Phaedrus* that could be seen as a precursor of Diogenes' belief that we are not affected in the same way by the same thing. At *Phaedrus* 271b, Socrates states:

[T3.i.29] [H]e will classify the speeches and the souls and will adapt each to the other, showing the causes and effects produced and why one kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not.

(Trans. Fowler)

He later sums up the discussion with the statement:

[T3.i.30] A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly, offering to the complex soul elaborate and harmonious discourses, and simple talks to the simple soul. Until he has attained to all of this, he will not be able to speak by the method of the art, so far as speech can be controlled by method, whether for purposes of instruction or of persuasion. This has been taught by our whole preceding discussion.

(*Phaedrus* 277b–c, trans. Fowler)

This would seem to me to be very close to what Diogenes would have held in the context of music, and also to the degree that prospective teachers of the art should be expert before they were qualified to teach. However the fact that we might fail to achieve the desired ‘end’ in practising the art does not necessarily mean that we have failed to practise the art skilfully.

The second-century AD philosopher, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ *Quaestio* 2.16 divides crafts into two types – stochastic and non-stochastic. Stochastic arts are characterised ‘first by the fact that they depend on factors beyond their own control for their success’. Furthermore, these stochastic arts are also identified by the fact that the ‘craftsmanlike action is not “definite”’ because these crafts do not ‘operate exclusively by regular rules’. Alexander states:

[T3.i.31] Moreover the things that come about in accordance with the art are themselves not [completely] determinate, and they do not always produce the same [results] because they are not applied to [objects] that are in a similar condition in every way; but all or at any rate some of the things [included] in them will be different and not as was expected. So [for these, stochastic arts] the end is not the achieving of their objective, but the completion of what belongs to the art [itself].

(Alexander *Quaestio* 2.16 ll. 19–24, tr. R. W. Sharples)

It appears that Aristotle might have considered rhetoric and medicine to be two such crafts, and in the *Rhetoric*, he states:

[T3.i.32] And if it is objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except excellence, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly. It is clear, then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but it is like dialectic; it is clear, also, that it is useful. It is clear, further, that its function is

not simply to succeed in persuading, but rather to discover the persuasive facts in each case. In this it resembles all other arts. For example, it is not the function of medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the road to health; it is possible to give excellent treatment to those who can never enjoy sound health. Furthermore, it is plain that it is the function of one and the same art to discern the real and apparent means of persuasion, just as it is the function of dialectic to discern the real and apparent deduction.

(*Rhet.* 1355b3–18, trans. W. Rhys Roberts)

However, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in his account of the end of the stochastic arts, he states:

[T3.i.33] We deliberate not about ends, but about what promotes ends. A doctor, for instance, does not deliberate about whether he will cure, or an orator about whether he will persuade, or a politician about whether he will produce good order, or any other [expert] about the end [that his science aims at]. Rather, we lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it.

(*EN* 1112b11–15, trans. T. Irwin)

Ierodiakonou states that ‘Aristotle is at times aware of the fact that with a group of arts among which rhetoric and medicine are included, there is a difference between the end of the art and its competent exercise. So he is willing to take into consideration the various difficulties in the specific application of such arts, but it is unclear whether he, because of this, would be willing to compromise in his specification of their ultimate end.’⁹⁰

It seems to me that Diogenes, in acknowledging that not everyone is affected in the same way by the same music could well have been of the opinion that music is a stochastic art/craft. Certainly he uses the Greek *στοχαστέον* – ‘one must aim at’ in an earlier column (29) in the context of protection of the soul’s disposition, and this might indeed be what Philodemus is calling ‘a science of the non-existent’.

⁹⁰ Ierodiakonou 1995: 473–85, at 476.

(ii) Diogenes' theology in the *De Musica*

Although Diogenes' section of the *De Musica* opens with a discussion of the general uses of music, and his affirmation that it is useful for every part of life, at column 38, Philodemus reports that Diogenes, in his own 'third book' spoke at length of music devoted to religion. In words reminiscent of Plato at *Republic IV*, 424e,⁹¹ Philodemus reports Diogenes as saying:

[T3.ii.1]

Ἐννομόν τε καὶ σ[π]ου-
δαζομ]ένην μουσικὴν πρῶ-
τα] μὲν φη[σι]ν ἕνεκα τῆς πρὸς
τὸ θεῖον συνταχθῆναι τει-
μῆς, ἔπειτα τῆς τῶν ἐλευθέ-
ρων παιδείας.

It was a serious [type of] music regulated by laws, he says, that was created, first of all to honour the divine, and then to educate men of free birth.

Diogenes then moves on to affirm that the etymology of the terms θεωρεῖν (to be a spectator),⁹² θεατής (spectator), θέατρον (theatre) all confirm their relation to the divine (θεῖον).

[T3.ii.2]

ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ
θε[ῖο]ν καὶ αὐτὰ σημαίνειν
τὰ ὀνόματα, τὸ τε θεωρεῖν

⁹¹ See Delattre's note on this in his vol. II, 353.

⁹² 'Especially at a religious ceremony', so Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb *Plutarch De Musica* at 1140E.

καὶ τ]ὸν θεατὴν [καὶ τ]ὸ θέατρον,
.....]τάτην προσ
..... τὰ θεάματ]α μαρτυ-
ρ.....

Moreover, the terms themselves, *theōrein*, *theates*, and *theatron* are an indication of its [music's] relation to *theos*, and [the most ancient music] addresses [the divinity], as shown by the word *theamata*.⁹³

There is a remarkably similar passage in the [Plutarch] *De Musica*, at 1140 D–E. It is so similar that I will quote it in full:

[T3.ii.3]

Ἐπὶ μέντοι τῶν ἔτι ἀρχαιοτέρων οὐδὲ εἰδέναι φασὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὴν θεατρικὴν μουσικὴν, ὅλην δὲ αὐτοῖς τὴν ἐπιστήμην πρὸς τε θεῶν τιμὴν καὶ τὴν τῶν νέων παιδευσιν παραλαμβάνεσθαι, μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἤδη θεάτρον παρὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐκείνοις κατεσκευασμένου, ἀλλὰ ἔτι τῆς μουσικῆς ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἀναστρεφομένης, ἐν οἷς τιμὴν τε τοῦ θεοῦ διὰ ταύτης ἐποιοῦντο καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπαίνους· εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι, ὅτι τὸ θέατρον ὕστερον καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν πολὺ πρότερον ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἔλαβεν.

Certainly in still more ancient times the Greeks, it is said, did not even know of the music of the theatre, and for them the whole of this science was handed down for the purpose of honouring the gods or educating the young. No theatre had as yet even been set up among the men of those days; rather music still had its abode in the temples, where it was used in worship and in the praise of good men. This they say is likely, since the word *theatron* at a later time, and the word *theorein* much earlier, were derived from *theios*.⁹⁴

⁹³ See also below, T3.ii.6 for Philodemus' refutation of this claim.

⁹⁴ Translation Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb *Plutarch de Musica*.

Nowhere in extant texts is there another claim like this for the linking of music to the divine on etymological grounds. Symbolic etymology was of course very much a Stoic practice,⁹⁵ although it must be conceded that [Plutarch] might have had access to another work that has since been lost.⁹⁶

There is also perhaps another mention of this etymological link at Plutarch's *Table Talk* IX.15, 748. Two speakers, Thrasybulus and Ammonious, are discussing the subject of dance, the fact that it has three elements, the nature of these elements and the factors common to poetry and dance. At 748D Thrasybulus states:

[T3.ii.4] [Dancing] has lost her honour among men who have intelligence and may properly be called divine (*theiois*).

The Loeb editor notes that 'Plutarch may have in mind an etymology that connects *theatron* (theatre) with *theios*, cf. Ps.-Plutarch *De Musica* 1140E and Philodemus *De Musica*.'⁹⁷ There are indeed other possible parallels between the Plutarch *De Musica* and that of Diogenes' part of Philodemus' work, and I will look at these further below. For now, I will turn to Philodemus' criticism of Diogenes' words. At columns 118–19, Philodemus attacks Diogenes, stating:

[T3.ii.5] ΠΞ-
 ρὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρεῖν καὶ τοῦ θεα-
 τοῦ] κα[ὶ] τοῦ θεάτρου καὶ
] .σι[.....]ο[. ε]ῖρη-
 κε ἀρ]χαιο[άτην]· μᾶλ-
 λον δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ] θεωρ[ε]ῖν τ[οῦτο
 ἐπωνομάσθαι φήσ[ας]] εἰ τις
 καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν τὸ θεωρεῖν

⁹⁵ As discussed also in chapter 2, where the etymology of Erato was raised. See also, below, on the etymology of Metis.

⁹⁶ For a brief discussion on the feasibility of Plutarch having used either Philodemus or Diogenes' own writings see the Appendix to this chapter, where I will also briefly discuss the plausibility of the [Plutarch] work actually being genuine.

⁹⁷ Trans. Minar in the Loeb edition; note at p. 299.

καὶ τὸν θεατὴν καὶ τὸ θεά-
τρον – οὐ γὰρ ἐπικοινωνεῖ τὸ
θεῖον αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ θεῖν - ,
καὶ τὰ θεάματα συνάγεσθαι
τῆς τιμῆς ἔνεκα παρ[ειλ]ῆ-
φθαι τῶν θεῶν *, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῆν
μουσικὴν, ἀκουστικῆ[ν] ὑπάρ-
χουσαν *.

Concerning the terms *theorein*, *theatēs* and *theatron*, [my adversary] says [that it is to the divine that] ancient [music was addressed]. [But] it is more from the word *theōrein* that someone will say that the word *theion* took its origin,⁹⁸ and that it is from the word *thein* (to run or to shine) from which the words *theōrein*, *theatēs* and *theatron* derive (for the word *theion* has no more rapport with these words than *thein*); and further it is spectacles that tradition says were assembled to venerate the divine, and not music, which was created for hearing.⁹⁹

The Epicurean was not of course finding fault with the action of honouring the divine – he would have applauded that, but once again it is the use of the music at which he rails. At column 142.1–14 he strongly criticises Cleanthes, an earlier Stoic, for stating that ‘melodies and rhythms come closest to the truth of the contemplation of the divine’, remarking ‘a more ridiculous statement than which is

⁹⁸ I.e. ‘to watch a spectacle’. Here, suggests Delattre, Philodemus is relying on Democritus of Abdera whom Philodemus praises at 150.29–39 as a ‘peerless natural scientist, and who stated that music was a ‘recent discovery’, and that music arose ‘not from necessity but from superfluity’. What Philodemus does not mention is that Democritus also stated that ‘if children are not allowed to work, they cannot learn letters or music or gymnastics, nor that which above all things embraces virtue, reverence. For it is precisely from those studies that reverence usually grows’ (Democritus, fr. 68 B 179 Diels). It is suggested that Democritus must have agreed that music could have had some moral value, because if he had not, then surely Philodemus would have mentioned that also.

⁹⁹ Delattre remarks (vol. II, pp. 218–19), that Philodemus’ comments must have been ironic here as in his view Philodemus was referring to Plato’s fantasy etymology of the word *theos* in the *Cratylus*. See further my discussion of this passage at p. 29. He also claims that Philodemus was again trying to show that Diogenes’ reasoning was absurd. Delattre further remarks that he found it tempting to translate *theamata* as ‘visual spectacles’ to further emphasise Philodemus’ point that they were used to venerate the gods, whilst music, only created later was simply used to entertain the ear (nn. 1, 2, vol. II, p. 219).

not easy to find'.¹⁰⁰ Although this criticism is located within the final, concluding columns of the work, and therefore the part in which Diogenes is not the sole target of Philodemus' attacks, it is very likely that Diogenes had himself quoted his predecessor as an authority for this view. The very lacunose column 53, almost at the end of Diogenes' section of the text, cites Cleanthes (παρὰ γὰρ Κλεάνθει), although the remainder of the column is really too damaged to make out much further discussion.

The Stoics were, as mentioned above, very fond of symbolic etymology, and Diogenes was no exception, as evidenced in a fragment from his book *On Athena*, as preserved in Philodemus' own *On Piety*:¹⁰¹

[T3.ii.6] Diogenes of Babylon in his book *On Athena* says that the cosmos is the same as Zeus, or it contains him as man does a soul; and that the sun is Apollo, the moon Artemis; and that anthropomorphic gods are a childish and impossible story: and that the part of Zeus which extends into the sea is Poseidon, that which extends into the earth Demeter, that which extends into the air Hera, as (he says) Plato also says, so that if one says *aer* repeatedly he will say Hera; and that which extends into the aether Athena; this is what is meant by 'from the head' and 'Zeus is male, Zeus is female'; but that some of the Stoics¹⁰² say that the ruling faculty of the will is in the head, for it is wisdom, and therefore is called Metis; but that Chrysippus says that the ruling element of the soul is in the breast, and that Athena, who is wisdom, was born there, but (Diogenes says that) it is because the voice issues from the head (that) they (i.e. the people) say (that Athena was born) from the head (i.e. of Zeus), and (that they say she was born) with the help of Hephaestus because wisdom comes by art (*technē*); and that the name Athena is as though one were to say *Athrena*, and that she is called Tritogenis and Tritogeneia because wisdom has three branches, physics, ethics and logic. And he allegorizes as 'wisdom' her other epithets and manifestations very deceptively.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ See above, chapter 2, T2.iii.3. This translation from Thom 2005: 5.

¹⁰¹ *S/F* III, Diogenes 33; Obbink 1996: 18ff.

¹⁰² Perhaps Cleanthes – see Thom 2005: 59, n. 81.

¹⁰³ Translation Obbink's, 1996: vol. I, 18ff.

Nothing in the *De Musica* would seem to contradict this belief. Diogenes seems to follow the traditional Stoic approach to divinity in that the god(s) were not simply omnipotent and benevolent, but they were also immanent, ‘rational, and the active principle imbuing all matter’.¹⁰⁴ Cicero, at *De Div.* I.83–4¹⁰⁵ states that the gods are friends and benefactors of the human race, and that ‘Chrysippus, Diogenes and Antipater employ the same reasoning’; he further comments at I.86 that ‘the only dissenter is Epicurus’. Diogenes is also clearly defending Chrysippus’ view, as reported in Galen *PHP* III.8, 1–27, that the *hegemonikon* is in the chest. Obbink remarks that according to Diogenes, ‘a vast array of types of speech (φωνή), including myths told by poets, offer evidence for this’.¹⁰⁶ Philodemus, within his *De Pietate* I, defends Epicurus against Posidonius’ claim that he was an atheist:

[T3.ii.7] It is doubtless therefore truer to say, as our good friend Posidonius argued in the fifth book of his *On the Nature of the Gods*, that Epicurus does not really believe in the gods at all, and that he said what he did about the immortal gods only for the sake of deprecating popular idiom.¹⁰⁷

Philodemus also accuses Chrysippus, Persaeus and Diogenes of Babylon of ‘attempting to “accommodate” the poets and early philosophers to their views’.¹⁰⁸ And this criticism can also frequently be found within the *De Musica* whenever Diogenes uses one or more of the Homeric gods to make a point.

¹⁰⁴ Cicero, *De Div.* I.39; Long and Sedley 1988: vol. I, 331–3, at 331.

¹⁰⁵ *SVF* III, Diogenes 37.

¹⁰⁶ Obbink 1996: 20.

¹⁰⁷ Cicero *De natura deorum* I.123 = Posidonius fr. 22a Edelstein–Kidd, trans Obbink 1996: 15.

¹⁰⁸ *PHerc.* 1428 = Diogenes’ treatise ‘On Athena, see above T3.ii.6. Discussion at Obbink 1996: 316–17.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3

[Plutarch]’s *De Musica*

This treatise is now not considered to be a genuine work by Plutarch,¹ but is nonetheless a valuable piece of musical writing dated probably to Plutarch’s period – the first to second centuries AD.² In this short appendix, I will explore the notion that the parallels between this work and the Philodemean *De Musica* might suggest that the writer used Philodemus’ work as his source, or even Diogenes’ own original writings. It might also strengthen the argument that the [Plutarch] could be a genuine work by Plutarch after all.

Einarson and De Lacy write that ‘Wilamowitz suggests that Planudes [Maximus Planudes, a Byzantine scholar *floruit c.* 1302] was the first to ascribe the dialogue to Plutarch.’³ They further suggest, however, that the style shows little of Plutarch’s ‘manner or skill, or powers of assimilation’. Moreover, the work does not appear in the so-called ‘Catalogue of Lamprias’, a list dating to the fourth century AD,⁴ purporting to contain all of Plutarch’s works. The entry in the *Suda* for Lamprias states:

[T3.App. 1] Lamprias, son of Plutarch of Chaeronea. He wrote a list of his father’s works on all Greek and Roman history.⁵

The *Suda* apart, there seems to be no son recorded by the name of Lamprias, whilst the Loeb editor notes that Plutarch had one daughter and three sons. Plutarch himself, however, records that he had a brother named Lamprias – could it be that the compilers of the *Suda* mistakenly inserted the word ‘son’ for ‘brother’?⁶

¹ See, for example Barker 1984: 205; Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb Plutarch *Moralia*, vol. XIV, p. 344.

² Barker 1984: 205.

³ In the Loeb edn, p. 344.

⁴ *OCD*, third edition, p. 1200, s.v. ‘Plutarch’.

⁵ Loeb Plutarch *Moralia* vol. XV, p. 5.

⁶ *Table Talk* IX. 15, 747: ‘My brother Lamprias was appointed. . . to be judge’. Langhorne, in his 1841 *Lives*, suggests that Plutarch had four sons and a daughter. He also states that Plutarch’s grandfather was named Lamprias, although he gives no source for this information. If the name of Lamprias was a ‘family’ name, it is not unlikely that Plutarch would have named a son after his grandfather and brother.

In volume XV of the Loeb Plutarch series, Sandbach suggests that the catalogue was probably written by a third- or fourth-century forger.⁷ Certainly, if it is dated to the fourth century AD, neither a brother nor a son could have written it. However, the name of the author of the ‘catalogue’ is not essential for my purposes, and so I will not pursue this query any further here.

The ‘catalogue’ omits the *De Musica*, as it does five other works considered to be spurious: *De Liberis educandis*, *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, *De Fluviis*, *De Vita et Poesi Homeri*, *Fragmentum Tyrwhittianum ii*. It is also uncertain whether an item listed as number 58 relates to the *de Fato*, another work originally ascribed to Plutarch, today considered spurious. There were 39 MSS of the *De Musica* known to the editors of the Loeb volume. Planudes’ sources for the work are unknown. It is noted that the two oldest MSS, both dating to the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, have the name of Plutarch entered by a later hand. The anonymous state of the *De Musica* was, Einarson and De Lacy state, ‘an invitation to supply’ a name,⁸ and the opening sentence with its immediate reference to ‘Phocion the Good’ was considered a sufficient parallel with Plutarch’s work entitled *The Life of Phocion* to suggest that Plutarch was the author.⁹

Whilst it must be accepted that it is now probably impossible to identify the true author, this does not detract from the usefulness of the work. There are three major translations and commentaries of the treatise from the twentieth century – two in French – that of H. Weil and Th. Reinach dated 1900, and that of F. Lasserre dated 1954.¹⁰ Weil and Reinach consider the treatise to be a very early work by Plutarch, from when he first left university, whilst Lasserre believes it to be spurious.¹¹

The most recent treatment is that of Andrew Barker, who in his 1984 translation and commentary, considers it spurious, but emphasises that the treatise is important precisely *because of its lack of originality*.¹² Certainly, a great deal of the discussion is very familiar from other earlier writings on music, and it is possible to see many Platonic

⁷ Sandbach 1969: 5.

⁸ Loeb Plutarch vol. XIV, p. 344.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ H. Weil and Th. Reinach, *Plutarque De la Musique*, Edition critique at explicative (Paris, 1900); F. Lasserre, *Plutarque, De la Musique* (Olten and Lausanne, 1954).

¹¹ 1954: 99–104, at p. 104.

¹² Barker 1984: 205–57, at p. 205.

and Aristotelian influences throughout the work, although their names do not occur frequently as sources. Heraclides of Pontus is mentioned just once. The name of Aristoxenus does occur frequently, and was obviously a major source.¹³ However, unlike the writings of Plato and Aristotle, which concentrate on the uses of music and of its importance in education, or Aristoxenus, whose extant writings are very largely of a technical nature, this work covers a much wider range of aspects, and is indeed now the only evidence remaining today for some of the ancient musicians mentioned.¹⁴

The setting is a feast on the second day of the Saturnalia. The host, Onesicrates having brought together ‘men learned in music’ to provide a suitable sequel to the previous day’s discussion on grammar (1131B–E), invites Lysias and Soterichus to discourse on the history of music. This they agree to do, and the discussion that follows can be divided into four main topics:

- 1131F–1136B The history of music and of early musicians and their styles
- 1136B–1138C, 1140F–1143C Innovations in and corruptions of music
- 1138D–1140B Harmonic science and descriptions of the intervals
- 1140B–F, 1142C–1146D Uses of music, including musical education.

My interest lies largely in the fourth category – that of the uses of music and the discussion on the appropriate musical education, although the passages do overlap to a certain degree, and it has been suggested to me that Diogenes of Babylon might have been a major source for this treatise, although his name is never mentioned.¹⁵ There are indeed a number of passages that could refer directly to the *De Musica* of Philodemus, which is, of course, the primary extant source today for Diogenes’ musical thought, and these are investigated and discussed within my text, particularly in chapter 3, and chapter 5, section v.

Perhaps the most striking parallel between Diogenes’ thought and [Plutarch]’s writing occurs at column 38 of the Philodemus and 1140D–F of the [Plutarch], discussed

¹³ As will be seen in chapter 5, section v, below.

¹⁴ The ancient musicians that also occur in Philodemus’ text are discussed in chapter 3, above.

¹⁵ By Professor Dirk Obbink, during a conversation in Herculaneum in July of 2006.

in chapter 3, T3.ii.2 and 3, where the etymology of music in the ancient theatre is analysed.¹⁶ As mentioned there, nowhere else in extant texts does such a discussion occur, and the similarity between the two texts strongly suggests that the later writer had access either to the original, probably Stoic source, or to Philodemus' text.

If the later writer was using Philodemus as his source, and if the copy of the *De Musica* from the Herculaneum library is the only one, then the date of writing of the [Plutarchan] *De Musica* would fit well with Plutarch's own dates.¹⁷ It is just conceivable, therefore, that Plutarch could have had access to the Philodemean work before the Vesuvian eruption of AD 79, and this would seem to fit with Weil and Reinarch's theory that the work is genuine. This does of course rest on the assumption that there was only one copy of Philodemus' text, and this might not be plausible. However, I have seen no reference to the discovery of more than one copy of any of Philodemus' aesthetic works.

Lasserre¹⁸ notes the parallel with Diogenes' argument, as does Delattre in his notes to the Philodemean work,¹⁹ Delattre suggesting that perhaps this was a common theme in antiquity, or that perhaps the writers had a common source, now lost. I wonder, however, how feasible the theory of another source is. There is no mention of any other Stoic having such an interest in music,²⁰ and it would appear that only the Stoics of all Hellenistic philosophers took such an interest in etymology. Perhaps indeed [Plutarch] had access to Diogenes' own writings. Obbink notes that in August 45 BC, when writing on his *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero wrote to Atticus asking him to send a copy of Diogenes' *On Athena*:

[T3.App. 2] libros mihi de quibus ad te antea scripsi velim mittas et maxime

Φαίδου Περὶ Θεῶν et <Διογένους Περὶ > Παλλάδος.²¹

¹⁶ See pages 88 ff.

¹⁷ Plutarch of Chaeronea was born c. AD 45–50, and died after AD 120. It is known that he visited Italy, and that he taught at Rome for some time. As he is also recorded as being a priest at Delphi for the last thirty years of his life, he could have visited Italy in that capacity.

¹⁸ 1954: 174.

¹⁹ 2007: vol. II, 203.

²⁰ Although it has to be conceded that almost all writings from the early Stoics have been lost.

²¹ Obbink 1996: 22; Cicero *Ad Atticum* XIII.39.2.

Clearly, then, at least some of Diogenes' writings remained extant until at least the first century BC.

A second parallel between the [Plutarch] and the Philodemian *De Musica* occurs at chapter 31, 1142C–D of the [Plutarch], and coincidentally at column 31 of the Philodemus, discussed at T3.i.15 and T3.i.18, where both [Plutarch] and Diogenes compare the work of Pindar and Philoxenus. Lasserre remarks that 'Le choix de Pindare d'une part et de Philoxène de l'autre pour représenter, sous le rapport de la morale, les deux tendances contraires de la musique et particulièrement de la musique dithyrambique paraît avoir été traditionnel car ils les polarisent également chez Philodème, *De mus.* 1 XVIII v. Krevelen [now column 31 Delattre].'²²

Once again, this might have been a common anecdote in antiquity, and [Plutarch] claims to be reporting what Aristoxenus wrote, but unfortunately this exists now only in fragmentary form,²³ and Telesias seems to be 'otherwise unknown'.²⁴ [Plutarch] is now one of the main sources for Philoxenus (c. 435–380 BC),²⁵ but the 'deviant' or rather innovative nature of his composition is also reported and remarked upon by other writers, notably Aristotle in his *Politics*, as noted at T3.i.16.

Philoxenus was clearly renowned amongst ancient writers on music as a musical innovator, his work *The Cyclops* also being parodied by Aristophanes in *Plutus*, and so the mention of that musician by [Plutarch] is perhaps not surprising. But, the comparison of Pindar and Philoxenus in the same context, *pace* the remarks, quoted above, by Lasserre, could suggest that the writer had read either Philodemus' work or, at least a work that referred to it. I have seen no other use, in other musical writers, of Pindar and Philoxenus as examples of the different styles of dithyramb, and both Plato and Aristotle to name but two, were eloquent in their own condemnation of misuse of musical genera.²⁶

²² Lasserre 1954: 174.

²³ Fr. 76 Wehrli.

²⁴ Loeb *Plutarch* vol. XIV: 425, note h.

²⁵ See above, chapter 3, n. 53.

²⁶ For Plato and 'New Music', see chapter 4, pp. 118 ff. For Aristotle in the *Politics*, see above T3.i.16, as noted, and chapter 5, section i.

The next chapter in the [Plutarch] (number 32), goes on to discuss the same subject as the next column in the Philodemus (32), and groups the three nations of Lacedaemonia, Mantinea, and Pellene as ‘discerning’ in their rejection of a system in the selection of music.

[T3.App.3] . . . χρόνον καταρξαμέν[ων
τῶν Μαντινέων τε καὶ [Λα-
κε]δαιμονίων καὶ Πελλ[η-
νέ]ων· παρὰ τούτοις γὰρ κα[ὶ
πρ]ώτοις καὶ μάλιστα τὴν
ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιμέ[λει-
αν] γενέσθαι τῶν τε κ[αλῶν
ἐπιτηδευμάτων κ[αὶ τῆς
ἄλλης μουσικῆς·

as the citizens of Mantinea, as well as those of Lacedaemonia and Pellene have shown setting the precedent. For it was those [people] who first of all and in the best way developed to the highest degree the most strict of noble practices and that of music in particular.

[Plutarch] writes:

[T3.App.4] [T]he discerning reject such lack of system, as did in ancient times the Lacedaemonians and the men of Mantinea and Pellene. For these made a choice of some single mode or else a very small number of them, which in their belief tended to the formation of character, and cultivated this music and no other.

Both authors seem in agreement in their rejection of the ‘modern’ taste in music, preferring the music of ‘ancient times’, a common theme in musical writings, and a sentiment expressed also by Plato, Aristotle, and Heraclides of Pontus, as discussed

elsewhere in this thesis. It is interesting, however, that the discussion in [Plutarch] follows in the same order as that in Philodemus. Lasserre notes that the style of writing in the [Plutarch] is of an ‘Aristoxenian character’,²⁷ but connects the discussion only with that of Philodemus. Barker, however, remarks that the source of this passage is certainly Aristoxenus, and does not remark at all on the parallel discussion in Philodemus.²⁸

There are significant similarities also in the relating of the stories of Thaletas and Terpander, the seventh-century musicians, discussed at pp. 67–71 above. Whilst it has again to be conceded that this might have been a common theme in antiquity, the similarities between the two texts seem surely too regular to be coincidence.

Again, both texts discuss the character of Olympus – Philodemus at the very lacunose column 19, and hence a part of Diogenes’ own claim, and a number of times in the [Plutarch]. Philodemus himself does not refer to Diogenes’ claim, and the text at column 19 is so damaged as to be almost unreadable. Delattre has managed to recreate the following:

[T3.App. 5] το δὲ τὸ σῶμα [.] -
 ζεται τῶι [.]
 Ὀλύμπου [.]
 θαυμαστο[.]-
 ,]ωδι[κ]οῖς Ὀλ[ύ]μπου
 μὴ συνοπῶσι [.]
 αἰτίας τῆς ψ[υ]χαγωγίας
 θαυμασιω[.]-
 την πρὸς ταύτην τὴν μου-
 σικῆς δύναμιν. . .

²⁷ Lasserre 1954: 175.

²⁸ Barker 1984: 238n. 210.

whereas that [which moves] the body is. . . . of Olympus. . . amazing. . . [of Olympus] do not embrace to seek the cause of [its] amazing [ability to move the soul] . . . for this power [of music . . .

The [Plutarchan] work is now one of the principal sources for Olympus, and to go into detail of the information in that work would be to digress. Suffice to say that this might constitute another instance of a common theme in the two writers.

As suggested earlier, it is impossible to make any firm claims regarding either a definite source for the later work, or indeed to the name of the real author of that work. It might, however, be an investigation worth pursuing if further work on the Philodemian text enables more of the relevant columns to be read. There are, however, sufficient parallels within the two texts to strongly suggest either a common source, or indeed that the later writer had access to Philodemus or Diogenes' own works.

Chapter 4

THE RELEVANCE OF PLATONIC THOUGHT

Plato's musical thought remains to this day the archetype for all considerations of ancient musical doctrine, and must have influenced any writer on the subject who lived after the fourth century BC. Plato was one of the first, if not indeed the first, to have written at any length on the subject of music, and as already discussed, there can be no doubt in my mind that Diogenes of Babylon had access to, and was heavily influenced by, his writings as already suggested in my earlier chapters.¹ As I will show below, there is evidence that Diogenes not only uses Plato's musical theory, but in some instances quotes him at length almost word for word.²

Plato wrote no work specifically on music, but instead he incorporated his views into a number of his dialogues. His beliefs on the use of music as an educational tool, and this is the subject in which I am particularly interested here, are adumbrated predominantly in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, although discussions on music are to be found in a number of his other dialogues.³

The *Republic*, which contains an extensive discussion on the use of music within education, is the work that also contains the evidence for Plato's views on the appropriate *harmoniai*, or modes (rhythmic and melodic forms) – those forms that he believes will encourage correct 'moral character' in children and adults. Education for Plato comprises two parts: physical education, or *gumnastikē* and cultural education, or *mousikē*. The function of this education, in Plato's view, is the moral improvement of the soul, and the harmonisation of the body with the soul. Plato clearly linked ethos and harmony: for the Socrates of the *Republic*, education in poetry and music is crucially important because 'rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take strongest hold

¹ See e.g., at chapter 2, pp. 42–9; chapter 3, pp. 85–6.

² See below, this chapter, esp. T4.13 and 14.

³ References to music are also made, e.g., at *Protagoras* 316e and 326ab; *Timaeus* 18a and 47–8; shorter references in the *Philebus* (on which, see further below, pp. 117–18), 56a; *Cratylus* 423d–424; *Sophist* 253b; *Laches* 188d–189; and *Symposium* 187a–e. See also below.

upon it, bringing with them and imparting grace, if one is rightly trained, and otherwise the contrary'.⁴

At the outset of his discussion of *mousikē* in the *Republic*, Plato begins with a long treatment of the type of poetry that should be used in the education of the future guardians and free men of his ideal city. He argues that stories that depict the gods as violent, immoral and wicked should not be permitted, as these are not the proper role models for children to study, hence the poetry of Homer is banned from education.⁵

I will not discuss Plato's argument in detail here as it is well documented elsewhere,⁶ but more importantly because it will not help in my comparison with Diogenes' theory, as a similarly full discussion does not appear in the Stoic's writings, at least as they exist today. I will, however, discuss the sections where there is some similarity between the two philosophers, or where the two differ in a fundamental way. Suffice to say that Diogenes would surely have had some sympathy with Plato's strict views on 'appropriate' poetry, given their common views on the purpose of education: that is, to honour the gods and to live a moral life.

It is impossible to estimate today how Philodemus introduced Diogenes' arguments in the *De Musica*, because the first five columns are completely lost, and the parallel opening columns in Philodemus' own refutation are so lacunose as to offer little enlightenment. At column 6, however, the discussion clearly refers to 'the well-regulated cities', ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις πόλεσιν, before another column and a half is also lost. The concept of *eunomia* as an ideal 'represents the goal of Plato's political thinking both in the *Republic* and the *Laws*',⁷ and it is interesting that Diogenes also uses the term *eunomia* and its cognates when discussing his 'cities governed by good laws'. Diogenes' extant discussion

⁴ *Republic* III, 401d5–e1, trans. Shorey in the Loeb Plato *Republic*.

⁵ In this respect, it seems that Diogenes of Babylon might not have had such strong views as Plato. As I will discuss in chapter 6.i, Diogenes uses Homeric tales as evidence of music's value, although it must be conceded that the example Diogenes uses is regarding the behaviour of adults rather than children.

⁶ See, for example, Lippman 1964: *passim*, Anderson 1966: 64–110; Barker 1984: 124–69; Comotti 1991[1979] *passim*; West 1992: 179–83 (on the modes); and, more recently Woerther 2008.

⁷ Anderson 1966: 73.

resumes in column 8, affirming that, ‘. . . there is a task which regulates the powers in a unifying manner, namely education – for the body, gymnastics, and music for the soul’:

[T4.1] ἡ[νωμ]ένως ἔργον
εἶναι δυ[ν]άμ[εις κ]ανονίσαν
π[αι]δευτικήν, τῶι μὲν σώ-
μ[α]τι γυμνασ[τικ]ήν, τῆι δὲ
ψ[υχ]ῆι μουσικ[ήν].

A direct parallel, perhaps, with Plato’s sentiments as expressed at *Republic* 376e:

[T4.2] τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἢ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίω τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου
εὐρημένης; ἔστι δέ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχῆ μουσική.

What then is our education? Or is it hard to find better than that which long ago was discovered? Which is, I suppose, gymnastics for the body and for the soul, music.

Diogenes’ discussion picks up in column 9, after another lacuna of some thirty lines:

[T4.3] τας, οἷον τῆ[ν δωριστὶ καὶ
τῆν φρυγισ[τὶ]
τὴν μὲν γὰρ τε-
ταγμένον [.] –
την εἰς τὸ μὲν [.]
την δὲ ἀπει[.] [μετ-
τριον επεσον [.]
τόνον ο[ἰκ]εῖον [τοῖς ὑποκει-
μένωις πάθεσι, τὸ [δὲ μελοποι-
ίαν καὶ ῥυθμοὺς [καὶ τᾶλλα
κατὰ λόγον δι[δόν]σθαι [ὥστ’ εἶ

ναι καὶ τὰς ἐν ἡμ[ῖν διαθέ-
σεις ἀνομίας μ[.]-
λαις ὡς καὶ παρο[.]-
μιν λευ[.]
συγγεν[.]
εν μεσ[.]-
ση γινέσθω [.]⁸

Surely, Diogenes must be following Plato, who at *Republic* 399a–c stated that the only two modes to be allowed into his state are the Dorian and the Phrygian – the two that encourage bravery and temperance.

At column 12, Diogenes affirms that whilst learning music is useful for a life of leisure,⁹ in common with both Plato and Aristotle, he asserts that it should not be learned to a professional standard, it is, rather, a *diagōgē*. A similar belief is voiced at *Protagoras* 312b2–4, where the extremes of versatility and specialisation are rejected:

[T4.4] . . . the kind [of education] you got from the schoolmasters who taught you letters and music and gymnastics. You didn't learn these for professional purposes, to become a practitioner, but in the way of liberal education, as a layman and a gentleman should.

(Trans. Guthrie in Hamilton and Cairns 1989: 311)

In column 41.29–34, Diogenes voices a concern about the child performing on the aulos because playing the ‘musical tune convulses his face into ugliness’:

[T4.5] οὐ] μόνον δέ τὰς ψυχὰ[ς δια-
τιθέναι πως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ σω-

⁸ For my translation of this passage, see below T4.27. Although it must be conceded that the *dōristi kai* has been supplied, this restoration seems very secure from Philodemus' parallel criticism at column 77, which makes it clear that Diogenes is discussing the appropriate *harmoniai*, and assigning ethical characters to each in the ancient harmonic system followed by Plato and Aristotle before him.

⁹ For the Greek and translation, see T3.i.1 above.

ματα· παιδὸς γοῦν α[υλεῖν
ἀσκ]οῦντος καί τι μέλος
μουσικὸν ἀπασκαρίσαν [εἰς
δυσεῖ]δεια[ν] τὸ πρόσω[πον
...]οσ[. .]ο[.]δοντων [. . .

But it is not only the soul that [music] puts into such and such a disposition but the body also. For when a child performs a musical tune on the aulos, it convulses his face into ugliness.

Whether Diogenes took this view from one of his predecessors, or whether it was a view formed on his own, is of course, impossible to say. It was a view expressed by both Plato and Aristotle, however, and possibly others before them. In *Alcibiades I*, Plato's Socrates remarks to Alcibiades:

[T4.6]

SOC: You learnt, if I recollect, writing and harping and wrestling; as for fluting, you refused to learn it.¹⁰

And Alcibiades agrees that this is correct. Plutarch, in his *Life of Alcibiades* gives a little more detail:

[T4.7] At school. . . he refused to play the aulos, holding it to be an ignoble and illiberal thing. The use of the plectrum and the lyre, he argued, wrought no havoc with the bearing and appearance which were becoming to a gentleman, but let a man go to blowing on an aulos, and even his own kinsmen could scarcely recognise his features. Moreover the lyre blended its tones with the voice or song of the master, whereas the aulos closed and barricaded the mouth, robbing its master of both voice and speech.¹¹

It seems that Plato would have been more concerned with the loss of speech than the loss of appearance, although the deformity in appearance could stand for 'distortion from "proper" comportment – in physical, aesthetic, moral

¹⁰ *Alcibiades I* 106e.

¹¹ Loeb Plutarch *Life of Alcibiades* 193E–F.

and social terms',¹² and so could represent both physical and moral deformity. In the *Alcibiades I*, the Platonic Socrates is surely mocking Alcibiades in his effort to prove that the latter doesn't have the knowledge he claims to have rather than acknowledging something that he rightly chose not to do. Was the Platonic Socrates rather implying vanity on Alcibiades' part, perhaps, or is he simply affirming Alcibiades' own view of himself as a gentleman and the aulos, therefore, was not an appropriate instrument for him to play?¹³ In the *Republic*, after all, Plato has banned the use of the aulos for all but shepherds in the fields.

Aristotle's own criticism of the aulos seems to be rather closer to that of Diogenes in that the distortion of the face is mentioned directly:

[T4.8] The tale goes that [Athena] found an aulos and threw it away. Now it is not a bad point of the story that the goddess did this out of annoyance because of *the ugly distortion of her features*; but as a matter of fact it is more likely that it was because education in flute-playing has no effect in the intelligence, whereas we attribute science and art to Athena.¹⁴

The distortion detail could certainly therefore have been taken from Aristotle, although given Diogenes' interest in the gods and goddesses, one might have expected him to mention Athena's dislike of the instrument because of its *alogos* nature, rather than the concern about distortion of features. Perhaps neither Plato nor Aristotle were Diogenes' source here as it does seem to be a generally known anecdote. Athenaeus at *Deipn.* 616e–617a, notes that the fifth-century BC musician Melanippides¹⁵ recounted the tale:

[T4.9] On the subject of pipes one guest notes that Melanippides in his splendid ridicule of pipe-playing in the *Marsyas* said of Athena, 'Athena flung away the

¹² Wilson 1999: 64, and discussion *passim*.

¹³ In the *Symposium* it is Alcibiades who is brought, drunk, into the room led by an *aulētris*, *Symp.* 212d.

¹⁴ *Politics* VIII, 1341b4–9, trans. Rackham in the Loeb volume, my italics.

¹⁵ One of the proponents of the New Music of which Plato was so suspicious. On Melanippides, see chapter 3, above, p. 75; on 'New Music', see further below this chapter.

instruments from her holy hand and said, “Away with you, you shameful objects, outrage to the body! I consign you to ruination!”¹⁶

And so it might indeed have been a common tale in classical times. Nonetheless, it must have interested Diogenes sufficiently for him to make mention of it here, particularly as it is placed so close to his argument that music can put the body into various dispositions, and so close also to the very lacunose anecdote about Pythagoras.¹⁷ Perhaps indeed it forms one of a number of musical anecdotes recounted by Diogenes as evidence for such claims, or indeed as a sort of list of ‘tales told’.

The *Laws* contains no detailed discussion of the *harmoniai*, but rather builds on the rules laid down in the *Republic* regarding appropriateness of music, and returns to the subject of the importance of good education for the well-being of the state. The Athenian Stranger emphasises that education consists in the establishment within all people of correct dispositions for the feelings of pleasure and pain, and the appropriate attitudes to these feelings. *Mousikē* is regarded as the primary discipline to provide the foundation for development of moral goodness in childhood and in adult life, and so it is important that there are suitably qualified overseers/guardians to ensure the correct ‘policing’ of music. For, as the Stranger states, ‘the postures and tunes which attach to goodness of soul or body, or to some image thereof, are universally good, while those which attach to badness are exactly the reverse’.¹⁸ Interestingly, Diogenes uses similar language at column 20, 1–8 where he states:

[T4.10] μ[εγα-
λοπρε]πῆ, τὰ δὲ σωφροني[κ]ὰ
καὶ] ἀνδρεῖα τ[ὰ] δ[ὲ] δειλὰ
καὶ ἀκόλαστα καὶ ὄλ[ω]ς] α[ἰ]-
σχρὰ προσαγορευόντων, ὡς

¹⁶ Loeb *Greek Lyric* pp. 24–5, s.v. Melanippides. Trans. Campbell.

¹⁷ For the Pythagoras anecdote, see above chapter 3, T3.i.21 – it appears just one column later than this excerpt, at col. 42.36–45.

¹⁸ *Laws* II. 655b, trans Bury.

συνεπιφερούσης τὰς τοιαύ-
τας διαθέσεις – οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἴσως
οὐδ' ἐφαίνοντο, μὴ οὕσαί γε
κατ' ἀλήθειαν ·

(there are some people) who describe certain [tunes as magnificent], others as temperate and courageous, and still others on the contrary as shameful and intemperate, because according to them, [music] carries dispositions of this sort: and without doubt, (they) would not at all appear, unless they had some existence in truth.

Delattre remarks that it is unlikely that Diogenes' words bear some similarity to those of Plato *by chance*, and given that Diogenes will be shown below (T.4.13 and T4.14) to have quoted Plato *verbatim*, I am inclined to agree with this view.

Philodemus' refutation of this claim appears at column 98, 30–45:

[T4.11] τινάς [τ]ε καὶ π[ρο]σαγορεύον-
τες αὐτοὶ τὰ μὲν μ[ε]γαλοπρε-
πῆ, τὰ δὲ σωφρονικ[α] καὶ ἀν-
δρεῖα, τὰ δὲ ταπεινά, τ]οῦτ' ὡ-
νόμασαν εὐθ[υ] τῶι νομί-
ζειν * ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως τό[δε]
ἐφηρμόσθαι, τὴν ὁμιλίαν
δηλοῦσαν καὶ τὸν ῥήτορα·
παρῆν δὲ καὶ βρώμ[α]τα καὶ
πόματα νεαν[ικ]ά[.]
καὶ γενναῖα, τὰ [δ]ὲ | [δειλ]ᾶ
καὶ ἀκόλαστα [καλ]εῖν· ἀλλὰ
δὴ καὶ πολλὰ | [ἀνάλογα] τού-
τοις τ[ε] καὶ ἕτερ[α] κατὰ τὴν
πρ[ώ]την φύσιν α[.] . .] καὶ τὰς
.....

and in describing certain [melodies] as magnificent, and others as temperate and courageous, and certain others as vile, they have given this description because in their view it is adapted by nature [to the tunes], and is shown by the ordinary use of language, and the rhetor also. But it would be possible to call ‘young’, ‘noble’, [and good], and , in other cases, shameful and intemperate, also food and drinks, and many other things, in [analogy] to these latter, by their primary nature and. . .

Another similarly opposing view can be found in the document known as the *Hibeh Papyrus*, discussed above, chapter 3, T3.1, and I will repeat just the translation here:

[T4.12] They [the harmonicists] also say that some melodies make people self-disciplined, others prudent, others just, others brave, and others cowardly, not understanding that the chromatic cannot make cowards nor the enharmonic make brave men of those who employ it. . . The chromatic does not make a person cowardly, nor the enharmonic (make someone) brave’.¹⁹

Laws need to be set down for the poets/musicians to follow (*Laws* II, 656b), and the Athenian Stranger addresses the question of finding and appointing competent judges, those who will only take pleasure from music if it has the correct moral effect and utility. The passage that I will look at shortly explains why it is so important for competent judges to be found.

Before that, however, I would like to consider column 51 of Philodemus’ *De Musica*:

[T4.13]

13 εὐλαβείας γὰρ [πολ-
 λῆς αὐτῆ]ν [.] δεῖσθαι, μάλιστ[α
 15 πασῶν] εἰκόνων *· ἀμαρ[τόν]-
 τα τε γ]ὰρ τὰ μέγιστα βλά-

¹⁹ *P.Hib.* I.13. Extract from cols. 1, 15–2, 6. Trans. Grenfell and Hunt, with amendments. It is clear, then, that Plato, and Diogenes after him were engaging in a debate about *ēthos* in music that dated back *at least* to the fourth century BC, and quite possibly earlier as I will discuss later in this chapter.

πτεσθ]αι τὰ ἦθη, ἐργῶδές τε
 τούτω]ν αἰσθέσθαι διὰ τὸ
 τοὺς ποη]τὰς φαυλοτέρους
 20 εἶναι τῶ]ν Μουσῶν[* · τ]αῦτα[ς
 γὰρ οὐκ] ἂν ποιῆσαι τὰ μει-
 μήματα], ἐλευθέρων μέ]λη
 τε καὶ ρ]υθμοὺς προσα[ρμοσά-
 σας δούλων κ]αὶ ἀνελε[υθέ-
 25 ρων, καὶ ἀνά]παλιν, οὐ[δὲ θη-
 ρίων συνθεῖν]αι καὶ ἀν[θρώ-
 πων καὶ ὀργά]νων πάντ[ων
 φωνᾶς]ονελωνα[. . .
 . . . ποητὰς] μέν[τ]ροι, κά[ν-
 30 θρωπίνους], σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦ-
 τα ἐμπλέκον]τας καὶ συν[κ]υ-
 κῶντας ἀλόγ]ως καταγελα-
 σθῆναι ἂν δι]ασπῶντας ρυ-
 θμὸν μέ]ν καὶ σχήματα μέ-
 35 λους χωρί]ς, λόγους ψειλοὺς
 εἰς μέτρα τ]ιθέντας, μέλος [δὲ
 αὐ] καὶ ρυθμὸ]ν ἄνευ ρημάτων[ν
 ψειλῆ] κιθαρ]ίσει καὶ ἀυλήσ[ει
 χρωμένο]υς, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχά-
 40 λεπον ἄ]νευ λόγου [γινόμε-
 νον ρυθ]μόν τε κα[ὶ ἀρμονί-
 αν γιγνώ]σκειν ὃ τ[ι βούλε-
 ται καὶ ὅτ]ωι ἔοικε τῶν [ἀ-
 ξιολόγων] μιμημάτων· [ὑπο-
 45 ληπτέον δ' ὅτ]ι τό γε τοιο[ῦτο
 πολλῆς ἀγρ]οικίας με[στὸν
 47 πᾶν, ὀπό]σον τάχο[υς τε καὶ
 [ἀπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς θηρι-
 ῶδους φίλον ὥστ' ἀυλήσει γε
 χρῆσθαι . . .]

Because of all the [types of] imitation, it [music] is the one with which one should take the utmost caution. For, in the case of error, moral harm can be most great, and it is troublesome to recognise, because our poets are inferior in quality to the Muses. They indeed [the Muses] would never create their imitations by adapting melodies and rhythms for free men,²⁰ for slaves and men who were not born free and vice versa, and they would not mix together the cries of wild beasts, men's voices, and all sorts of instruments. . . [The poets], however, precisely because they are humans, by their senselessness in entangling

²⁰ Diogenes' compression compared to Plato's text in T4.14 is harder to follow. The Greek here is rather awkward, and I have attempted to give the best sense.

such things and jumbling them up together, become objects of ridicule, because they separate rhythm and gesture from the tune, putting bare discourse into metre, and again they isolate melody and rhythm from words, using the bare sounds of harp and flute, wherein it is almost impossible to understand what is intended by this wordless rhythm and harmony, or what noteworthy original it represents. One ought to realise that such methods are clownish in the extreme insofar as [they like] (much speed, mechanical accuracy and animals' cries, and consequently employ the pipe. . .)

This may be compared with an extract from Plato's *Laws* II. 669b–e. The italic in the two Greek texts indicates direct parallels:

[T4.14]

b7 *εὐλαβείας δὴ δεῖται πλείστης*
πασῶν εἰκόνων. ἀμαρτῶν τε γάρ τις μέγιστ' ἂν βλάπτοιτο,
c *ἦθη κακὰ φιλοφρονούμενος, χαλεπώτατόν τε αἰσθέσθαι διὰ*
τὸ τοὺς ποιητὰς φαυλοτέρους εἶναι ποιητὰς αὐτῶν τῶν
Μουσῶν. οὗ γὰρ ἂν εἰκειναί γε ἐξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον,
5 *ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν ποιήσασαι τὸ σχῆμα γυναικῶν καὶ*
μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα
ξυνθεῖσαι ῥυθμούς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσαρμόττειν,
οὐδ' αὖ ῥυθμούς καὶ χρῶμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ
d *λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς*
καὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταῦτόν
οὐκ ἂν ποτε ξυνθεῖεν, ὡς ἔν τι μιμούμεναι ποιηταὶ δε
ἀνθρώπινοι σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ σύγκυκῶντες
5 *ἀλόγως γέλωτ' ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὄσους*
φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος ταῦτά τε γὰρ
ὀρώσι πάντα κυκῶμενα καὶ εἴ τι διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν
e *μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρὶς, λόγους ψιλούς εἰς μέτρα*
τιθέντες, μέλος δ' αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθα-
ρίσει τε καὶ ἀυλήσει προσχρώμενοι, ἐν οἷς δὴ παγχάλεπον
ἄνευ λόγου γιγνόμενον ῥυθμὸν τε καὶ ἀρμονίαν γινώσκειν
5 *ὃ τί τε βούλεται καὶ ὅτω ἔοικε τῶν ἀξιολόγων μιμημάτων*
ἀλλ' ὑπολαβεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὅτι τὸ τοιοῦτόν γε πολλῆς ἀγροί-
κίας μεστόν πᾶν, ὅπόσον τάχους τε καὶ ἀπταισίας καὶ φωνῆς
θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον, ὥστ' ἀυλήσει γε χρῆσθαι . . .

It [music] needs more caution than any of the arts. The man who blunders [in this art] will do himself the greatest harm, by welcoming base morals; and, moreover, his blunder is very hard to recognise, inasmuch as our poets are

inferior as poets to the Muses themselves. For the Muses would never blunder so far as to assign a feminine tune and gesture to verses composed for men, or to fit the rhythms of captives and slaves to a tune and gestures framed for free men, or, conversely, after constructing the rhythms and embellishments of free men, to assign to the rhythms a tune or verses of an opposite style. Nor would the Muses ever combine in a single piece the cries of beasts and men, the clash of instruments, and noises of all kinds, by way of representing a single object; whereas human poets, by their senselessness in entangling such things and jumbling them up together, would become objects of ridicule to all the men who, in Orpheus' phrase have attained the full flower of enjoyment. For they behold all these things jumbled together, and how, also, the poets rudely separate rhythm and gesture from tune, putting bare discourse into metre, whereas they isolate melody and rhythm from words, using the bare sound of harp or flute, wherein it is almost impossible to understand what is intended by this wordless rhythm and harmony, or what noteworthy original it represents. Such methods, as one ought to realise, are clownish in the extreme insofar as they exhibit an excessive craving for speed, mechanical accuracy, and animals' cries, and consequently employ the pipe. . .

(Trans. Bury, with amendments)²¹

So what exactly is being claimed in these two passages? That of all the arts, music is potentially the most dangerous, because if the wrong type of music is studied, the listener will be in great moral danger. What is more, it is difficult to discern whether one is listening to morally pernicious music, because the human poets/musicians are far inferior to the Muses, and we as listeners cannot readily recognise what is morally good or harmful. And so it goes on. Are Plato and Diogenes really suggesting that if we listen to the wrong type of music we place ourselves in moral danger? Certainly Plato voices this concern many times. As mentioned above, in the *Republic*, he bans the works of Homer believing them to be immoral, and he bans the aulos from his ideal city, allowing only a

²¹ Greek from the Oxford Classical Text; Bury's translation in the Loeb Plato.

syrinx that may be played by the shepherds in the fields.²² The aulos is *alogos*,²³ and is therefore of no use in his education. His views on educational music are nothing if not practical. The moral message contained within the music was much more important than any pleasure that might be obtained from it, although he does concede that it is important for children to be able to enjoy what they listen to.²⁴ He believed that morality could be instilled by habituation, even before the child acquired the ability of reason, and so by habitually exposing children and adults to morally improving music and poetry, i.e. music and poetry that contained imitations of moral goodness, they would learn to act morally. But conversely, he also believed that if the child was exposed to morally damaging music, then the opposite actions would be learned, and his dislike of ‘new’ or modern music, which for Plato was a prime example of such morally damaging music, is particularly apparent in the *Republic*,²⁵ as it is also in the *Laws*. See further my discussion below, pages 118–20.

It is clear that Diogenes shared this view. The simple fact that he chose to quote Plato’s passage at length certainly would seem to indicate agreement, and I would argue that Diogenes must be quoting Plato here – the parallels between the two texts are surely too great to be coincidental. I will now turn back to Diogenes’ extract (T4.13).

Like Plato, Diogenes affirms that of all the arts, music is the one with which one should take most care, for in the case of error, moral harm could be most great, but also that morally pernicious music is very difficult to identify. His expression reproduces that of Plato almost word for word, although Diogenes’ compressed paraphrase is harder to follow. He (Diogenes) affirms that the Muses would not make the errors which the poets of his day were making,

²² *Rep.* III, 386–99. For discussion on why Plato held the view that a child should not play the aulos, and Diogenes’ apparent agreement, see above, pp. 105–8.

²³ I.e. without reason, and, hence irrational.

²⁴ But only in the *Laws*. There is no mention of pleasure or enjoyment in the context of education in the *Republic*. For more discussion, see Woerther 2008: 95–7. The enjoyment discussed above is referred to at *Laws* II, 659d. So long, that is, as enjoyment is only found in music that has been deemed ‘appropriate’ by the appointed judges. Pleasure is of minor importance here, just as in *Philebus* it is only ranked fifth in importance in the final ranking of ‘goods’ (64c–67b). See my further discussion on sections of the *Philebus*, below, pp. 117–19.

²⁵ This need not necessarily be as alien a view as it might seem at the outset. Barker (2007: 254, n. 32) notes that a modern philosopher [unnamed] considers the music of Richard Strauss to be morally corrupt, although he did not suggest that listeners exposed to it would become so corrupted.

adapting rhythms and tunes of free men for slaves, imitating the cries of wild beasts, mixing voices and all sorts of instruments. He regrets the separation by these poets of words from melody and rhythm for the solo playing on kithara and aulos, and remarks how difficult it is to understand the proper meaning of bare rhythm and harmony and indeed to recognise what model they are intended to resemble.²⁶

The context of Diogenes' passage is almost impossible to ascertain. A whole column of some 47 lines is so lacunose as to be impossible to read directly before this column (51), and the first 12 lines of this column are less than clear, although they might relate to another excerpt from the *Laws* (VII. 802b–c, where Plato affirms that the music of the ancients should be selected as suitable for dancing, singing and all choral performance, chosen by judges over the age of fifty, taking the advice of poets and musicians on the basis that even unregulated musical pursuit becomes better when brought under regulation). Diogenes states:²⁷

[T4.15]]ω ταῖς ἡδοναῖς
καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις μὴ ἐπι[.]να
.]λλ' ἢ τισιν ὀλίγοις,
.]λ[.]μενης αν[.]ισ
.]ιου[.] σινονοσο [.]η[.]σ
.]λα σωφρόνος τῆς
.]ουσης, τῆς δὲ α[.]
.] χαιτοσοσ ἐκεινη
.]τῆς μὲν ἡδεῖ[α]ς,
τῆς δὲ ψυχρᾶς καὶ ἀηδοῦς
.]σιοι[.]ς κ[α]ὶ τὸ
.]ν·

[men who do not trust] their pleasures nor their desires, except in certain few circumstances . . . when [the music] is temperate. . . while when. . . one is

²⁶ Note again that Diogenes states 'it is *difficult*' not '*impossible*' to understand the meaning of instrumental music.

²⁷ Again, in the Greek of the extract, italic denotes parallels in the Greek text.

pleasant, the other is cold and unpleasant. . . and the fact that. . . [regarding music] . . .

The passage of the *Laws* states:

[T4.16] ποιητικούς ἅμα καὶ μουσικούς ἄνδρας παραλαβόντας, χρωμένους αὐτῶν ταῖς δυνάμεσι τῆς ποιήσεως, ταῖς δὲ ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις μὴ ἐπιτρέποντας ἀλλ' ἢ τισιν ὀλίγοις, ἐξηγουμένους δὲ τὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου βουλήματα ὅτι μάλιστα ὄρχησίν τε καὶ ἄδην καὶ πᾶσαν χορείαν συστήσασθαι κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ νοῦν. πᾶσα δ' ἄτακτός γε τάξιν λαβοῦσα περὶ μοῦσαν διατριβὴ καὶ μὴ παρατιθεμένης τῆς γλυκείας μούσης ἀμείνων μυρίῳ.

For this purpose we shall call in the advice of poets and musicians, and make use of their poetical ability, without, however, trusting to their tastes or their wishes, except in rare instances; and by thus expounding the intentions of the lawgiver, we shall organise to his satisfaction dancing, singing, and the whole of choristry. In truth every unregulated musical pursuit becomes, when brought under regulation, a thousand times better even when no honeyed strains are served up.²⁸

Pleasure, as I will discuss further below, is not an important criterion in the choice of appropriate music. The Athenian Stranger states at 668d, ‘But correctness in things of this kind, to put it quite generally, would be produced by equality of quantity and quality, rather than by pleasure.’ As Barker remarks,²⁹ ‘that is, a thing not to be accounted a good representation just on the grounds that it is pleasing to look at or hear, but only if its dimensions and qualities reflect those of the original’. The *structure* of the harmonic line is what represents and conveys the ethical message. Plato’s concern about the mathematical imprecision of another aspect (i.e., composition as well as performance) of musical

²⁸ Translation Bury, in the Loeb edition.

²⁹ 1984: 152.

representation is voiced further at *Philebus* 55e–56a, especially 56a, where it is clear that he regards music as a stochastic art:³⁰

[T4.17] For a start, then, music is full of this (τῆς στοχαστικῆς) getting its concordance in tune not by measurement, but by taking a shot at it on the basis of practice, and so too is the whole art of pipe-playing, hunting the proper pitch of each note by shooting at it as the note moves, so that it has a great deal of uncertainty mixed into it, and little that is sure.³¹

Plato regards it with some mistrust due to its status of an inferior *technē* because of this uncertainty. Whilst it is possible, in his view, to give an account of the criteria required to produce appropriate music, just as it is possible to give an account of the right way to practise medicine, it is still imprecise. As Gosling remarks to *Philebus* 55e, ‘it is the extent of the use of mathematical techniques that makes a *technē* [more or less] worthwhile’.³²

The experts or critics of Plato’s *Laws* (VII. 802b–c, discussed above) require three types of knowledge:

1. Knowledge or understanding of what is being represented;
2. The ability to judge the correctness of the copy or representation;
3. A knowledge of the excellence with which the copy is executed.

Glen Morrow asserts that ‘This higher knowledge puts the masters of music above not only the younger citizens, but even above the poets, for although a poet needs to know the technicalities of harmony and rhythm, he may not, as a poet know whether the representation is “noble or ignoble”.’³³ This, I believe, is exactly the point, and one of the main concerns of both Plato, and Diogenes, after him.

The context of the Plato passage T4.16, above, is as follows: At 796e ff., Plato returns to the subject of music (having previously left it as completed at 673e), saying ‘the gifts of Apollo and the Muses. . . one which we previously

³⁰ For further discussion on music as a stochastic art in Plato, and perhaps Aristotle and Diogenes, see above, chapter 3, pp. 85–7.

³¹ Trans Barker 1987: 109. See further below, this chapter.

³² Gosling 1975: 154.

³³ Morrow 1993[1960]: 314 and n. 55.

thought we had done with'. The subject is reintroduced by the Athenian Stranger with a discussion of the dangers of innovations, firstly in children's games, but then broadening out the discussion at 797e to include 'everything, save only what's bad – in respect of seasons, winds, bodily diet, mental disposition, everything in short with the solitary exception, as I said just now, of the bad. The evil wrought by changes in outward forms. . .' (798d). He moves on to affirm that children should be prevented from innovating in any aspect of their learning or recreation, and moves on to propose a set of laws regarding music – that the poet shall compose nothing which goes beyond the limits of what the State holds to be legal and right, fair and good, nor shall he show his compositions to any private person until they have first been shown to the judges appointed and have been approved by them (801d). Finally the Stranger comes to the passage leading into extract T4.16, suggesting that to honour with hymns and praises the gods and heroes, choice should be made from 'the compositions of the ancients'. Amongst these, the stranger states:

[T4.18] there exist many fine old pieces of music, and likewise dances, from which we may select without scruple for the constitution we are founding such as are fitting and proper. To examine these and make selection, we shall choose out men not under fifty years of age, and whichever of the ancient songs are approved we shall adopt, but whichever fail to reach our standard or are altogether unsuitable, we shall either reject entirely or revise and remodel. For this purpose we shall call in the advice of poets and musicians, and make use of their poetical ability, without, however, trusting to their tastes or wishes. . .For if a man has been reared from childhood up to the age of steadiness and sense in the use of music that is sober and regulated, then he detests the opposite kind whenever he hears it, and calls it vulgar. . .(802b–d)

This passage has been interpreted by many commentators³⁴ as an attack on the 'New Music' of the fifth century, produced by musicians such as Timotheus of Miletus, Philoxenus of Cythera and Phrynis of Lesbos, for

³⁴ For example, Anderson 1966; Barker 1984; Csapo 2004, an interpretation that I fully support, and which I wrote about in more detail in my MA thesis entitled 'Plato and New Music' in 1999. For more on 'New Music', see above, ch. 3, pp. 68 ff., and below, this chapter.

example. Whilst Plato does not mention any of these musicians by name, except for one Cinesias, mentioned at *Gorgias* 501e–502a,³⁵ his references to innovation in music would seem to strongly suggest that this is what was in his mind. Plato’s suspicion of these innovative musicians can be seen in the *Protagoras* as well as the *Laws* and the *Republic*, and at *Gorgias* 462b8–c7, the music of pleasure-giving public display is argued to be of as low a status as flattery, the knack of producing gratification. Just as rhetoric was dangerous because of the way the well-practised speaker could manipulate his audience, so too clever musicians could manipulate their audiences by appealing to their love of novelty and pleasure. Plato’s view on the ability or lack of it of spectators to judge the merits of both musical or rhetorical display are clear from two comments made in the *Laws* and the *Republic*:

[T4.19] [Passing] of verdicts [should not be] left as it is today to the catcalls and discordant outcries of the crowd, nor yet to the clapping of applauders. The educated made it their rule to hear the performers through in silence, and for the boys, their attendants and the rabble at large, there was the discipline of the official’s rod.³⁶

[T4.20] . . . The multitude are seated together in assemblies or in courtrooms or theatres. . . and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done, and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands.³⁷

Whilst musical and rhetorical display gratify the ‘multitude’, they also appeal to that ‘unstable, emotional part of us and subvert reason, whilst yet seeming to proceed from and transmit knowledge’.³⁸ Plato regards the new musicians as aiming only at entertainment and novelty, and the whole of the discussion in the *Laws* passages above in this chapter (T4.14; 4.16; 4.18; 4.19)

³⁵ Cinesias was singled out, I suggested in my MA thesis, because he came from Athens, and was therefore more likely to be known to Athenians, not least from Aristophanes’ parodies of him in *Birds* (esp. 1373–9) and *Frogs* (e.g., 152 and 366 and scholia *ad loc.*).

³⁶ *Laws* III. 700b ff. trans. Taylor in Hamilton and Cairns 1989: 1294.

³⁷ *Republic* VI. 492b–c, trans. Shorey in Hamilton and Cairns 1989: 728.

³⁸ Janaway 1995: 11.

relates, I would suggest, to his concern that choices of music suitable for either recreation or, more importantly the ‘honouring of the gods and heroes’ not be left to such musicians. His seemingly staid and strict regulations regarding the choice of appropriate judges and the skills required to become such judges are his way of ensuring that music is not left to the self-proclaimed ‘experts’ who merely resort to innovation and entertainment.

It seems clear that Plato not only held an elitist view of music, but he also imposed upon it the requirement of containing some form of rational expertise and moral improvement, and criticised it when it does not. As Woerther notes,³⁹ in the *Republic*, ‘Socrates and his interlocutors seek to purify music by following the same rules as those which were adopted when they defined the principles of imitation for narrative discourse and poetry. This process takes place in two steps: purification of harmonies, then purification of rhythm.’

It has traditionally been believed by modern scholars that Plato was influenced to some large degree by Damon of Athens. A fifth-century philosopher and musical theorist, and one-time adviser to Pericles, not much is now known of Damon’s musical theory apart from a few references in Plato, and fragments in various other writings.⁴⁰ Damon was believed to have formulated a theory of musical ethics and was said, by Plato, to have been the leading authority in the field of specific moral effects of music.⁴¹ It is also clear from a fragment attributed to him that he *accepted* that music could influence the soul:

³⁹ 2008: 91.

⁴⁰ A collection of Damonian fragments together with analysis and commentary, and history of his life such as can be constructed is currently being prepared by R. Wallace, and it is hoped that this important work will be forthcoming in 2009. It will be interesting to analyse just what can confidently be attributed to Damon himself, and what might be mythical reputation built upon Plato’s writings.

⁴¹ In his commentary to [Plutarch]’s *De Musica*, Lasserre argued strongly that Damon had invented the notion of ethos in music (Lasserre 1954: ch. 6 ‘Damon d’ Athènes’). However, there would appear to be nothing original in any theory attributed to Damon. Even Pindar suggested that there was ethos in music, as in *Pythian I*: 1.5, ‘You quench the warriors Thunberbolt’s everlasting flame’; ll. 11–14, ‘Even Ares the violent | leaves aside his harsh and pointed spears | And comforts his heart in drowsiness. | Your shafts enchant the souls even of the Gods.’ There would appear to be no further references to the ‘*hoi peri Damona*’, mentioned by Aristides Quintilianus at Book II, 14 (80, 23–81, 6 Winnington-Ingram), which continues on from my quotation at T5.iii.5, and the notion of Damon as ‘founding father’ was possibly a creation of later writers, possibly on the basis of Plato’s discussion in *Republic III*. It is not the existence of Damon that is in doubt – his invention of the ‘slack Lydian’ mode, mentioned by Aristotle in the *Politics* (VIII. 1342b31–2), is evidence that he was possibly an enterprising musician, but not necessarily a theorist. I must thank Professor Barker for this outline of his argument from a conference on Aristides Quintilianus in Corfu in July 2008.

[T4.21] Song and dance necessarily arise when the soul is in some way moved, liberal and beautiful songs and dances create a similar soul and the reverse kind a reverse kind of soul.⁴²

It would appear that Plato had a somewhat ambivalent relationship with Damon. At *Laches* 180cd, Plato's Nicias refers to Damon as 'a teacher of music. . . the pupil of Agathocles, who is a most accomplished man in every way, as well as a musician and a companion of inestimable value for young men at their age'. But this glowing description of Damon is given by Nicias, who is shown in Thucydides Book VII to have been lacking in judgement.⁴³ Although it will be seen below that Plato quotes Damon as a source for his views on the musical modes, it may be that he did not *altogether* trust Damon's teachings.

Warren Anderson suggests that Plato saw him as a dangerous ally. Being sympathetic, as Damon was claimed to have been, to the Sophists, his beliefs were to be treated with caution.⁴⁴ Plutarch's *Life of Pericles* 4 suggests that Damon used his profession as a musician as a 'cover' for his political activities.⁴⁵ He was apparently ostracized some time after delivering a speech on public morality to the Athenian Council of the Areopagus, and is said by Diogenes Laertius at II.19, to have taught Socrates. Plato's *Laches* 197d, where Damon is called Socrates' *hetairos*, would seem to support this to an extent. Nowhere in extant musical writings from the classical or Hellenistic period other than those of Plato is Damon mentioned directly, except where he is mentioned in similarly

⁴² Fragment 37 B6 Diels.

⁴³ Thuc. VII.86. Thucydides tempers his remarks by qualifying his criticism with the comment that 'he had spent his whole life in the study and practise of virtue'. Cf. also *Laches* 197d, where Damon is said to be a constant companion of the Sophist Prodicos (described at *Prt.* 315e, probably ironically, as a man 'of inspired genius'), and *Laches* 200ab, where Damon is mocked by Laches but defended again by Nicias.

⁴⁴ Anderson 1955: 88–102. However, cf. now, Barker 2007: 47 and n. 18, where it is queried how much influence Damon actually had on Plato's musical theory.

⁴⁵ Plutarch writes, 'As for Damon, he seems to have been a politician, who under the pretence of teaching music, concealed his great activities from the vulgar. . . However, Damon's giving lessons upon the harp was discovered to be a mere pretext, and, as a busy politician and friend to tyranny, he was banished by the ostracism', (trans. Langhorne (Langhorne 1841)). Damon is also linked with Pericles in [Plato] *Alcibiades I*, and the Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.* discusses some of his political activities; Athenaeus 628c for more on Damon's views on musical *ēthos*. For more on Damon and references to him, see Wallace 2004: 249–68.

respectful terms by Diogenes of Babylon at column 22 of the *De Musica*, and not at all respectfully by Philodemus in his parallel critique:⁴⁶

[T4.22]

ἐπιζητή-
5 σάντος] δέ τινος πότερον εἰς
πάσας] τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τινὰς ἢ
μουσικ]ῆ προάγει, Δάμωνα
.] εἰν τὸν μουσικὸν
εἰς πάσ]α^s σχεδὸν οἴεσθαι· λέ-
10 γειν γὰρ] αὐτὸν προσήκειν
ἄιδον]τα καὶ κιθαρίζοντα
τὸν [π]αῖδα μὴ μόνον ἀνδρε[ιό-
τερον γίνεσθαι καὶ σωφρο-
νέστερον ἀλλὰ καὶ δικ[αί-
στερον

Moreover, when someone asked if music promotes all the virtues or just some of them, Damon, the musician, believed that [it will incite] the listener to all of them or nearly all. For, he said that the effect of singing and playing the kithara renders the child not only more courageous and more temperate, but also more just. . .

Plato doesn't use these exact words, but in the *Republic*, within the discussion of which modes are suitable for admission into the city, he does say 'Well, on this point we will take counsel with Damon, too, as to which are the rhythms appropriate to illiberality, and insolence or madness or other evils, and what rhythms we must leave for their opposites', asserting that Damon will know which rhythms will encourage the sober and good dispositions:⁴⁷

[T4.23]

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ μετὰ Δάμωνος βουλευσόμεθα, τίνες τε

⁴⁶ Cols. 100 and 148; see below, T4.24.

⁴⁷ Plato, *Republic* III. 400b. However, cf. Barker (2007: 252, n.29), 'Plato at *Rep.* 400b–c seems to guarantee that Damon had things to say about the ethical significance of rhythms. On the other hand the notions that he had set out comparable ideas about the ethical characters or influences of the various *harmoniai*, a notion that was current in later antiquity and has been built up by modern scholars into an elaborate "Damonian theory of *ēthos*", seems to me to rest on the flimsiest of foundations.'

ἀναλευθερίας καὶ ὕβρεως ἢ μανίας καὶ ἄλλης κακίας πρέπουσαι βάσεις, καὶ τίνας τοῖς ἐναντίοις λειπτέον ῥυθμούς.

It may of course be that some of Damon's writings still existed when Plato lived, although there is no evidence that Damon left any written work at all.⁴⁸ It is probably implausible, therefore, that Diogenes could have been drawing on Damon's work directly, and in no other extant text from before the first century BC is Damon mentioned. It seems apparent, therefore, that Diogenes must have used Plato's writing when speaking of Damon. Amongst later writers, Damon is mentioned by name once by Cicero, once by Ps.-Plutarch in his *De Musica*, and a number of times in his *Lives*, and four times by Philodemus – twice in the words attributed to Diogenes of Babylon, and twice in Philodemus' own refutation. He is also mentioned by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's *Republic*, as noted below (T4.26), and Aristides Quintilianus possibly preserves some of his musical philosophy in Book II of his own *De Musica*.⁴⁹

In text T4.22 above, Diogenes appears to refer to Damon in the same way that Plato did before him – as a man who had some authority in musical matters, in other words, a *mousikos*, but he gives no earlier authority for this belief. Is he referring to Plato's writings here also? At *Republic* IV. 424c–d, Plato's seeming admiration of Damon's musical philosophy is shown in the words of the Platonic Socrates: 'For the modes of music are never disturbed without unsettling of the most fundamental political and social conventions, *as Damon affirms, and I am convinced*'.⁵⁰ Other than quoting Damon as his authority, Plato does not cite any evidence to support this theory, surely a reference once again to the 'new music'. I would suggest that Diogenes quotes Damon with similar respect – 'when one asked if music incites all the virtues or just some of them, Damon the musician . . .'⁵¹ – he seems to take it for granted that Damon needs very little introduction, perhaps following Plato? If Plato's comments in the *Laches* do indeed suggest that Damon's words are not as authoritative as they appear in the *Republic*, the question must be raised as to whether Diogenes had misunderstood Plato's

⁴⁸ See Wallace 2004: 256; also Barker 2007: 47.

⁴⁹ Suggested by Lord 1982, but not, it seems supported by other modern scholars. See, e.g., Barker 1989, ch. 12 *passim*.

⁵⁰ My italics. The Greek reads οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ κινουῦνται μουσικῆς τρόποι ἄνευ πολιτικῶν νόμων τῶν μεγιστῶν, ὡς φησί τε Δάμων καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι.

⁵¹ Extract T4.22.

possible distrust of Damon. There would seem to be no hint of irony in Diogenes' writings, or indeed in Philodemus' own criticism. Both writers seem to have taken Plato's words at face value.

Philodemus' stinging rebuke of Damon's view comes at column 100, 37–45, where he says:

[T4.24] Δάμων [μ]έν τοί-
νου | [δι' ἀλαζονε[ία]ν εἶπευ
έν | [. . . τ]ῆν μ[ουσι]κῆν [εἰς
τὰς πλείσ]τ[ας] ἀρετὰς χρή[σι-
μεύειν, λ] | ἔγων δεῖν ἄδο|ν-
τ]α καὶ κιθ | ἀρίζοντα τὸν
π]αῖδα μὴ | μόνον ἀνδρε[ιό-
τερον γί | νεσθαι καὶ σώφρο-
νέστερο]ν |, ἀλλὰ καὶ δίκ[αι-
ότερον. . .

As for Damon, it was [quackery] when he said [publicly] that music is [useful to most] virtues, arguing that by singing and playing the kithara, the child will become not only more courageous and [more] temperate but also more just.

Philodemus follows up this criticism at column 148, 1–5, where he says, 'and if Damon said these things to a real Areopagus and not to a fictional one, then he lied shamelessly':

[T4.25] καὶ Δά[μ]ων, εἰ τοιαῦτα
πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς Ἄρεο-
παγε[ί]τας ἔλεγε, καὶ μὴ τοὺς
πλαττομένους, ἐφενάκι-
ζεν ἀτηρῶς*.

The evidence of Plato's influence on Diogenes in the choice of musical modes has already been discussed, above, T4.3 and discussion. In his

commentary on the *Republic*, Proclus notes ⁵² that the Platonic Socrates accepts as proper the ‘the other’ *harmoniai*, the Phrygian and the Dorian, of those that Damon taught:⁵³

[T4.26]

τὰς δὲ αὖ ἄρμονίας ἤδη μὲν τινες τῶν θρηνοποιῶν καὶ συμποτικῶν, ὧν αἱ μὲν τὸ φιλήδονον χαλῶσιν, αἱ δὲ τὸ φιλόλυπον συντείνουσιν, τούτων δ’ οὖν ἐκβεβλημένων ἀξιοῦσιν τὰς λοιπὰς, ὧν Δάμων ἐδίδασκεν, τήν τε Φρύγιον καὶ τήν Δώριον αὐτὸν ὡς παιδευτικὰς παραδέχεσθαι.

Clearly, then, if Diogenes had access to Damon’s writings, which, as argued above, seems unlikely, he chose to follow Plato’s choice of musical modes rather than Damon’s, which leads me to ask the question why he also quoted the name of Damon in his work? If there was no written work left by Damon, as suggested by Barker and Wallace above, then was Diogenes merely perpetuating the ‘myth’ in the belief that Plato would not quote an unreliable source? Did Philodemus himself believe that Damon’s reputation was chiefly due to his being quoted as an authority by such an important philosopher as Plato? He certainly accords him no respect, and clearly suggests at column 148, above (T4.25), that the so-called speech to the Areopagus might indeed have been fictional. These questions of course cannot be answered now, but Diogenes’ references to Damon are clear evidence that Diogenes had access to Plato’s writings, and that he held them in some regard.

It seems clear that Diogenes of Babylon would have endorsed Plato’s views and arguments in the *Laws*, and it may be, as suggested by Delattre,⁵⁴ that he did indeed open his discussion of the topic with words such as ‘It is necessary, as Plato said’, but again, that is impossible to tell from the state of the papyrus as it is today. The column immediately following column 51 (T4.13) is also almost completely lost, and certainly unreadable, and column 53 is not much better. It does seem, however, that Diogenes is probably continuing his

⁵² in *Rempub.* I. 61.19–24 Kroll.

⁵³ Italics mine. Proclus, in noting that Plato differed in his choice of modes from Damon, suggests that he was working from another source for Damon other than Plato alone.

⁵⁴ Delattre 2007: vol. I, 82 n. 1.

discussion of ‘proper’ music, and how it is an appropriate pastime for a refined man. The remaining text in the section devoted to Diogenes’ writings up to the end of column 55 is extremely lacunose, and very little can be read today. Despite my earlier comments about how it has been possible to reconstruct the text using parallel columns where Philodemus directly criticises Diogenes’ claims, Delattre has been unable to find any clues as to what might have been contained within these lacunae, and has therefore been unable to reconstruct any text here.

Scholars have looked at Diogenes’ theories, such as they were available before Delattre’s work, and Andrew Barker has suggested that Diogenes’ theory was probably unique.⁵⁵ This would seem to be true, although Diogenes was clearly very much influenced by Plato and perhaps also Aristotle, as I will discuss in the next chapter. I believe, however, that Diogenes’ musical philosophy was much more technical than that of either of these philosophers.

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Very early in his critique of Diogenes’ theory, Philodemus accuses his opponent of ambiguity, pointing to the linguistic confusion that arises when words such as ‘hardness’ and ‘softness’ were used to describe a harmony, where they would have a completely different meaning in other contexts.⁵⁶ The examples he uses are bodily hardness compared with musical hardness, and the use of words such as ‘relaxed’ in relation to melody. He states that such usage renders any valid predication impossible, but I would suggest that he deliberately misinterprets. This would have to apply also to Plato in his use of similar adjectives to describe harmonies, and probably all the early musical theorists, and indeed modern-day writers on music. However, as argued by Paul Scade, ‘when viewed in the light of the tension that will determine the quality of a sound, or, analogously, a soul, this language does make sense’.⁵⁷ Scade continues, ‘This understanding is

⁵⁵ Barker 2001: 353–71.

⁵⁶ Cols. 60–1. It was not uncommon for the Stoics to be accused of obscurity or ambiguity; The Academic Carneades criticised the Stoic definition of *telos* for lack of clarity; Cicero *De Finibus* and Plutarch *De Communibus Notitiis* accuse the Stoics of inconsistency of terminology, on which see chapter 2, p. 15 above.

⁵⁷ Scade 2007: 214. See discussion above, at chapter 2, sections 2.iii and 2.v.

supported by the characterisation of some music as ‘relaxed’ (ἄνετος), which seems to clearly indicate the degree of tension, the particular ratio, in a thing.⁵⁸ This argument appears all the more plausible when, at column 77 of the *De Musica* Philodemus claims that his adversaries (the Stoics) ‘rave’ when they state that ‘each harmony (ἁρμονία) has a *tension* (τόνον) naturally akin to the emotions in question’.⁵⁹ Philodemus’ criticism at this column parallels Diogenes’ claim at column 9 above regarding the Dorian scale:

[T4.27] . . . as for example the [Dorian and] Phrygian [harmonies]. The former, because, . . . ordered. . . , so that, for one part. . . assuredly. . . [measured] . . . a tension (τόνον) akin to the emotions [in question], and [on the other hand the melodic composition,] the rhythms, etc., are ‘given’ in proportion (κατὰ λόγον διδόνθαι [so that] the dispositions of lawlessness in us, too, are . . .⁶⁰

As Andrew Barker has stated, and as argued in chapter 5.i, below, ‘Diogenes argued vehemently for the reality of ethical and aesthetic attributes such as nobility / ugliness and appropriateness / inappropriateness within music, and believed that these attributes could have a significant effect on human character.’⁶¹ Diogenes argued, for example, that music could arouse the soul to valour, or calm the troubled soul.⁶² As argued in chapter 2, an orthodox Stoic would have considered these or any emotions to be results of evaluative reasoning – judgements following the acceptance or rejection of a proposition. Therefore, to have any psychological value, the music would require some rational quality to enable the soul to (a) understand the rational impression, and so (b) assent to, or reject, the proposition it posed. And as Scade remarks, ‘by assenting to the impression conveyed by a piece of music, the mind will take on

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Or, as Delattre translates ‘ton’ – ‘tone, shade, colour or pitch’. This could be a deliberate play on words. τόνος certainly does mean tension, or strain in normal terminology. In musical discussion, however, the more common translation would be ‘mode’ or ‘key’, ‘difference in pitch, i.e. tone’. I thank Paul Scade for highlighting this particular interpretation, and his different reading from that of Janko 1992b: 126–7, which, in this respect, I had followed. See also my discussion of Janko’s interpretation of this passage in chapter 2, above, where I also differed from Janko, but in a different context.

⁶⁰ For the Greek, see above, T4.3 this chapter.

⁶¹ Barker 2001: 353.

⁶² Col. 36, ridiculed by Philodemus at col. 117. See also extract T3.i.26 and discussion.

the structure of the impression'.⁶³ I believe that Diogenes argued that melody *itself* possesses ethos, even if the proposition that it contains is not expressed verbally, a fact that is implied in passages T4.13 and T4.14, even if both passages say that 'it is *almost* impossible to understand what is intended by the wordless rhythm and harmony'.⁶⁴ And it seems that both Diogenes and Cleanthes, his predecessor, believed that the structures of the musical scale could both correspond to and communicate the 'qualities' or ethical values to which they correspond. This is implied, for the Stoics at least, by the listing of music as part of the study of *phōnē* at Diogenes Laertius VII.44.⁶⁵

I am not suggesting that Plato or Diogenes would normally discuss music in terms of rhythm and harmony only, that is, bare (*psilos*) rhythm. I believe their discussions would normally assume rhythm *and* words. T4.13 and T4.14 would seem to be the exceptions rather than the rule in terms of discussing wordless music. As mentioned earlier, this raises the question of if, in the context of these extracts, it should be understood that either Plato or Diogenes, or indeed both, are referring to their 'modern poets' only (that is, the poets producing what in the twenty- and twenty-first century AD discussions of the new style of music produced in the fourth century BC is termed 'New Music').⁶⁶ However, it would appear that their concerns would be the same whether they were directed at a specific group of poets, or to human poets generally – as both say, 'our poets are inferior in quality to the Muses'. Does Diogenes use the word 'poets' in the same way as Plato? One cannot be sure. Delattre suggests that he does, but that Philodemus does not.⁶⁷ I do not wholly agree with this, however, as I argue elsewhere.⁶⁸

⁶³ Scade 2007: 214.

⁶⁴ The effect of the music need not be considered irrational simply because the music does not contain a verbally expressed proposition. For discussion, see above chapter 2 at pp. 35 ff.

⁶⁵ As remarked by Scade 2007: 216. I thank Paul Scade for his argument here. As Scade states, 'One might take this to refer to a combination of music and text, but. . . this would be redundant as written language, poetic diction and melodic speech are already listed. So there is no reason to believe that music, as listed here, is anything other than pure, non-verbal music.' And as noted in chapter 2, section ii, Diogenes was particularly interested in, and indeed wrote a treatise on, *phōnē*.

⁶⁶ For more on 'New Music', see above, pp. 118–20 and e.g., Csapo 2004: 207–48. As Csapo writes, this term is 'a useful but misleading term... When ancient critics spoke collectively of works in the style (of what we call) New Music, they tended to speak of "theatre music",' 207.

⁶⁷ See above, p. 7.

⁶⁸ See e.g., chapter 2, pp. 35–6.

As mentioned above, Diogenes argued that music contained ‘likenesses’ of characters that are not mimetic, but which at the same time make all ethical qualities absolutely clear to the person properly trained in music, i.e., the *mousikos*. Professor Neubecker, in her 1986 translation of the final thirty-nine columns of this work,⁶⁹ suggested that Diogenes’ views entailed music that we would today call ‘Programme music’. The term ‘was introduced by Liszt, for music of a narrative or descriptive kind’ ... ‘music that is distinguished by its attempt to depict objects and events’.⁷⁰ It may well be a good analogy – music was certainly written for specific purposes, and, as discussed at length by Plato in the *Republic*, and referred to also by Diogenes, certain rhythmic or melodic forms were regarded as only appropriate for certain purposes. This would seem to be confirmed in the anonymous fragment T3.i.17, which states that ‘the Dorian harmony is inappropriate to Dionysus’. However, using Scade’s interpretation (see above, at n. 59), it is clear that the music can also represent ‘the tensional structure of abstract qualities as well as being able to imitate sounds, because. . . the quality of the music is determined by ratios (rhythmic and harmonic) and the structure of the sound is able to carry and communicate in its ratios the proportional structures that determine other qualities’.⁷¹ Perhaps, then, this is what Diogenes was referring to when he stated that music contained likenesses that were not imitations – the tensions and structure of the music ‘defined and demonstrated [or, perhaps, proved]’ and also communicated the qualities contained within it to the experienced musician.

At column 138, Philodemus claims that Diogenes had misunderstood Plato’s views on the relationship between music and justice. Having just refuted the claim that Diogenes made for Heraclides of Pontus,⁷² he states that ‘what some people make of justice is ridiculous’, and affirms that the claim that the ear (which is for him *alogos*, and therefore has no part to play in reason), is able to determine in some way what is good or not for the citizens of a state, and to

⁶⁹ Neubecker 1986.

⁷⁰ See the *Grove Concise Dictionary of Music*, (= Sadie 1995) s.v. ‘Programme music’.

⁷¹ Scade 2007: 214.

⁷² See below, chapter 5, section iii.

choose music on the basis of that with the aid of rules is totally unthinkable. He writes:

[T4.28] τὰ δ' ἐπι-
χειρήματα τῆι δόξει π[α]ρ-
πλήσια φαίνεται· καὶ γὰρ εἰ
Πλάτων ἔλεγε πρὸς δικαιο-
σύνην ὠφελ[ε]ῖν, ἀπό[δ]ε[ι]ξι-
ν ἂν παρ' αὐτοῦ προ[σε]δεχ[όμ]ε-
θα· νῦν δ' ὅμως ἀν[α]λογ[εῖ]ν
φησιν τῶι μουσ[ι]κ[ῶ]ι τὸν [δί-
καιον, οὐ τὸν μου[σ]ικὸν [δί-
καιον εἶναι, καθάπερ οὐδὲ
τὸν δίκαιον μουσ[ι]κὸν οὐ-
δὲ συνεργεῖν οὐδέτε[ρο]ν οὐ-
δετέρωι πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν
ἐπιστήμην·

As for ‘dialectical deductions’,⁷³ these are obviously very similar to ‘opinions’. For also if Plato had wished to say that it [the music] led to justice, we would have expected a demonstration from him. But what he really said was that the just man is analogous to the musician, not that the musician is just; just as he did not at all say that the just man is a musician, nor that the one helps the other to the knowledge that is fitting for him.

He moves on, ‘But no doubt what he wanted to say was that the musician resembles a cobbler, a painter or another craftsman (τέχνητης) in skill. . . to the extent that in the matter of [music] he doesn’t want to have the advantage over the specialist.’⁷⁴

Diogenes’ parallel claim is now lost, but it should have occurred very close to the columns where he was talking about the lawgivers helping the

⁷³ Explained by Aristotle in *Topics* VIII, 162a16, as noted by Delattre 2007: vol. II, 269, n. 2.

⁷⁴ Col. 138. 28–35.

musicians and poets to choose music suitable for education, discussed above, pages 115–17, and indeed Philodemus’ refutation does suggest this.

From Philodemus’ continued critique, it is inferred that Diogenes had claimed that the musician was ‘just’, and Philodemus strongly denies that music by nature either obeyed or disobeyed laws, contrary to what ‘certain people’ claimed. The ensuing discussion regarding ‘spectacles’ (ὄψεις) could very much parallel a similar claim to the Platonic passage at *Laws* 700a ff. (part of which is cited above, T4.19), outlining the decline of music to ‘unmusical licence’. This passage starts, responding to a question, posed by Megillus about the type of laws over which the demos had previously had no control:

[T4.29] Those [laws] dealing with the music of that age, in the first place – to describe from its commencement how the life of excessive liberty grew up. Among us, at that time, music was divided into various classes and styles. . . . So these and other kinds being classified and fixed, it was forbidden to set one kind of words to a different class of tune. . . . but later on, with the progress of time, there arose as leaders of unmusical illegality poets who, though by nature poetical, were ignorant of what was just and lawful in music. . . . and they. . . . mixed dirges with hymns and paeans with dithyrambs. . . . they unwittingly bore false witness against music, as a thing without any standards of correctness.⁷⁵

Given that Diogenes quoted an earlier passage of the *Laws* at such length, and in a similar vein, a parallel claim to that of Plato’s here would not be at all out of place in Diogenes’ text, particularly in view of his own comments regarding Damon, who also advocated the use of regulation in music, if Plato’s comments about him are accurate. As suggested earlier, Diogenes would surely have shared Plato’s dislike of the ‘new music’, which must be the subject of criticism in the Platonic quotation here.

Philodemus’ choice of the wording ἐπιχειρήματα suggests that Diogenes might have used the same wording. The word doesn’t appear anywhere else within the extant parts of the *De Musica*, and as far as I have been able to

⁷⁵ Trans. Bury in Loeb Plato *Laws*.

ascertain, is only used on one other occasion by Philodemus himself.⁷⁶ The word is used much more often by Aristotle than by Plato (20 occasions for Aristotle, only 5 for Plato), but it is used once by Plato in contexts analogous to music, in the *Gorgias*, at 502b:

[T4.30] Then what of the purpose that has inspired our stately and wonderful tragic poetry? Are her endeavour (ἐπιχείρημα) and purpose, to your mind, merely for the gratification of the spectators. . .?⁷⁷

Aristotle's usage would seem much more technical, and given the context of Philodemus' critique, and the context of the discussion of music's relationship to justice, plus the contrast with demonstration, it would seem that 'dialectical discussion' is a more appropriate translation here. This conclusion would seem to be supported by the discussion of Plato's justice in the *Republic* in the *Magna Moralia* attributed to Aristotle at *MM* I, 1194a5–28, which does seem to bear some resemblance to Philodemus' own discussion in T4.28 above:

[T4.31] Plato also seems to employ proportional justice in his *Republic*. For the farmer, he says, produces food, and the housebuilder a house, and the weaver a cloak. Now the farmer gives the housebuilder food, and the housebuilder gives the farmer a house: and in the same way all the rest exchange their products for those of others. And this is the proportion. As the farmer is to the housebuilder, so is the housebuilder to the farmer. In the same way with the shoemaker, the weaver, and all the rest, the same proportion holds towards one another. And this proportion holds the republic together. So that the just seems to be the proportional. For the just holds republics together, and the just is the same thing as the proportional.

But since the work which the housebuilder produces is of more value than that of the shoemaker, and the shoemaker had to exchange his work with the

⁷⁶ I have searched the TLG for any occasion of usage by Philodemus in the few works listed there; and LSJ indicates that it was used once in the plural again in *De Signis* 29, and the meaning there is 'dialectical deductions' as well. I have searched the index of the *SVF* but can find no listing of the word there. It must be said, however, that work is still being undertaken on many of the other writings of Philodemus, and therefore, my searches cannot be said to be in any way conclusive.

⁷⁷ Trans Lamb in the Loeb edition.

housebuilder, but it was not possible to get a house for shoes; under these circumstances they had recourse to using something for which all these things are purchasable, to wit silver, which they called money, and to effecting their mutual exchanges by each paying the worth of each product, and thereby holding the political communion together.

Since, then, the just is in those things and in what was mentioned before, the justice which is concerned with these things will be an habitual impulse attended with choice about and in these things.

Although the specialist in music is not mentioned there, the other craftsmen who contribute to the workings of state are mentioned in Plato's 'proportional justice' as outlined by the Aristotelian writer. However, it may be that the contexts are rather different, and that Philodemus is merely discussing stock examples of craftsmen rather than proportional exchange. It would, nonetheless, be interesting to be able to read Diogenes' exact wording here, given the doubt over the availability of Aristotle's writings then, and to investigate further whether or not there is indeed some parallel between the passages.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ See chapter 5, section i, pp. 134 ff.

Chapter 5

THE RELEVANCE OF ARISTOTELIAN AND PERIPATETIC MUSICAL THOUGHT

(i) Aristotle

It will be worth spending some time analysing Aristotle's musical philosophy, because it would seem that in his attack on Diogenes of Babylon's musical theory, Philodemus criticises almost every claim that Aristotle makes for music. Aristotle is not mentioned at all by name in the *De Musica* as it has come down to us, and it is clear that Philodemus was attacking Diogenes and not Aristotle. It would seem, therefore, that Diogenes' theory must have shared quite a lot of common ground with that of Aristotle, and therefore an analysis of Aristotle's musical philosophy might enable some of the gaps in Diogenes' own thought to become more clear.

This of course raises the question of whether or not Diogenes might have had access to Aristotle's, or Theophrastus', esoteric writings, given the doubt about the transmission of the two philosophers' writings after the death of Theophrastus in around 288 BC, some forty years before Diogenes' birth. According to tradition,¹ Aristotle left his library to Theophrastus, who bequeathed his own library, which presumably included those books he had inherited from Aristotle, to Neleus of Scepsis.² It is surely unlikely, however, that there was only one copy of each of Aristotle's writings, and although they are rarely referred to until the first century BC,³ this might be because they were simply 'little read'.⁴ Callimachus (305–240 BC) clearly had read at least some of Aristotle's work, as he quotes Aristotle in his

¹ Importantly, Strabo 13.608; Plutarch, *Life of Sulla* 26.

² From whom the libraries were passed to his heirs, and were hidden, perhaps in a cellar or tunnels when it became known that the Attalids were looking to create the library in Pergamon. Some books might have been sent to Ptolemy II's new library in Alexandria according to Athenaeus (3ab), but it seems that much of the Aristotelian corpus, as we have it today, was not available to the early Peripatetics. For detailed discussion on the transmission of Aristotelian texts, see e.g., Barnes 1997; Sharples 1999; Gottschalk 1998[1990].

³ Cicero clearly had read and admired some of Aristotle's writing, see, e.g., *De Finibus* book III.

⁴ Sharples 1999: 152. This might be because Aristotle's esoteric writings were so much more difficult than those of Plato. For further discussion, see also Barnes 1997: 14.

own description of the swan.⁵ And, as remarked by Barnes,⁶ Philodemus himself preserves a letter from Epicurus, which refers to Aristotle's *Analytics*.⁷ Some writings might therefore have been still in circulation at the time Diogenes lived. That some more were widely available in Philodemus' time (first century BC) does not seem to be in doubt, but from Philodemus' own method of critical writing, I find it implausible that he might have put words into Diogenes' own mouth if they had not been part of the latter's theory in the first place.

It seems that some of Aristotle's writings might have remained accessible throughout, therefore, particularly, remarks Barnes, the exoteric works.⁸ This is not to suggest that Diogenes had access to them in the same way that he did to the works of Plato, but there is sufficient similarity between the two theories to suggest that he had at least read some of Aristotle's work on music in education, as I will discuss below. Indeed, Diogenes Laertius records that Aristotle wrote two works on music,⁹ and perhaps at least one of these was incorporated into what we now have as the *Politics* (although it must be said that a work of eight books on *Politics* is also listed by Diogenes Laertius).¹⁰ Boethius also presents Theophrastus as filling in points that Aristotle had not fully covered,¹¹ and it may be, as suggested by Gottschalk, that rather than treating Aristotle's writings as canonical, the early Peripatetics rather continued his work, and perhaps his writing too, which again would suggest that some copies of some works were not lost to his successors, and the *Politics* as it has come down to us today at least, could be seen as one of the more exoteric works? It should not be forgotten also, that in later times at least, Diogenes travelled to Rome in 156/5 BC with Critolaus, one time head of the Peripatetic school, and so was definitely in touch, in some way, with Aristotle's successors. This is of course, pure

⁵ Athenaeus 389b.

⁶ Barnes 1997: 14.

⁷ *PHerc.* 1005 fr. 111 Angeli.

⁸ 1997: 16.

⁹ D. L. V.22–7, at 26.

¹⁰ Albeit titled *Eight books of a course of Lectures on Politics like that of Theophrastus* (D. L. V.24). Perhaps that is not the same work that we now know as the *Politics*, or perhaps Diogenes (D.L.) has listed part of the *Politics* both under the general title of the whole work *and* as a separate work with a specific title. But that is another question, one that cannot be addressed here.

¹¹ FHS & G, fr. 72A. See Gottschalk 1990: 1089–97 for further discussion.

hypothesis, but surely does leave the way open for Diogenes to have known of Aristotle's views.

Aristotle's views on music and its place in education are adumbrated in Book VIII of the *Politics*, within his discussion of a proper education of the freeborn citizen. His uses for *mousikē* were threefold:

1. For education – *paideia*; leading to
2. cultured exercise or leisure – *diagōgē*; and
3. for entertainment and relaxation – *paidia* – this was less important, and so *on its own* would not justify music forming part of a liberal education.

For Aristotle, as for Plato, education is a matter of the public good, for the benefit of the state, and so is a matter that should rightly be subject to public supervision. Aristotle's concerns are directed, as were Plato's before him, towards free men and all education, in his view, is undertaken to habituate future citizens into a life of virtue. He shares with Plato, and as I will show, with Diogenes of Babylon also, the conception that character must be formed by habituation before the intellect can be instructed.¹² He seeks to ensure that musical education pays due regard to its purpose, that is the cultivation and exercise of the virtues proper to leisure activity for the freeborn citizen. Music is for him one of those pastimes that is both practically useful and morally edifying (1337a42–b10), and whilst he believes that most people undertake music for the sake of pleasure, its original purpose would have been to enable them to develop their cognitive powers with a view to equipping them to engage properly in business of the state, but also to learn to occupy their leisure time in a noble manner, *diagōgē*. The emphasis on a noble manner is important – for Aristotle it is the 'first principle of all things' (1337b30–3). Leisure too, is not play in the modern sense, but a 'proper' end for free-born men, a proper pastime; Anderson suggests that it is to be understood in this context as 'more a way

¹² For Plato, see e.g., *Laws* II. 653b–c: 'In fact, if pleasure and the liking, pain and dislike are formed in the soul on the right lines before the age of understanding is reached, and when that age is reached, these feelings are in concord with understanding, thanks to early discipline in appropriate habits – this concord, regarded as a whole, is virtue,' (trans. Taylor in Hamilton and Cairns 1989). Aristotle confirms his agreement at *EN* 2.3, 1104b10–12, saying 'hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.' (trans. Ross in Barnes revised Oxford translation.) For Diogenes' view, see above, T4.1.

of life’, not simply passing time in a trivial manner, and Aristotle’s concern for not making future citizens ‘servile’ is apparent (1337b21). A state’s leisure was the ‘central fact of existence for a fourth-century Greek *eleutherios*: he had no more important continuing problem than the proper handling of *diagōgē*’.¹³ As stated in *Politics* VII, war is only for the sake of peace, *occupation is for the sake of leisure, and necessary and useful things for the sake of noble things* (1333a33–6, my emphasis).

At *Politics* VIII. 1337b23–8, Aristotle writes:

[T5.i.1] The branches of study at present established fall into both classes, as was said before. There are perhaps four customary subjects of education, reading and writing, gymnastics, music, and fourth, with some people, drawing. . .¹⁴

Diogenes of Babylon lists the same elements in his discussion of components for education at the beginning of column 27:

[T5.i.2] || δ[. .]α[.]λικ[.]σω-
 μ[α]τικῶν· [τὸ] δὲ κα[λ]ῶς [καὶ
 χρησίμως κινεῖσθαί τε καὶ
 ἡρεμεῖν τῷ σώματι τῆς [γυ-
 μναστικῆς, καὶ τὰς ἐπὶ τού-
 των τεταγμένας αἰσθήσεις
 κριτικὰς ποιεῖν· ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς
 γραφικῆς τῆν ὄψιν διδάσκε-
 σθαι καλῶς κρινεῖν πολλὰ
 τῶν ὀρατῶν· τῆς δὲ μουσι-
 κῆς τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον ἦ[τ-
 τον] τούτων ἔχειν, τὸ δὲ κα-

¹³ Anderson 1966: 270, n. 51.

¹⁴ All translations of Aristotle’s *Politics* are those of Rackham in the Loeb edition, unless otherwise stated.

λον μάλιστ' ἐάν τις ἐπιβοδ[ῆ
ἄκουσ]τῆι χρῆται *

Moreover, the beauty and utility in movement and rest is characterised by the healthy body in gymnastics, and also [the capacity to] render capable of discernment those senses which apply to these. Painting for its part, teaches the sense of sight to judge well many visible things. As for music, if it is less necessary than the others, its extreme beauty is obvious if it is seized by the ear.¹⁵

Delattre suggests that, ‘Le parallélisme des sujets et de la terminologie nous assure que Diogène renvoyait explicitement ici à Aristote.’¹⁶ Certainly the terminology seems similar, and it might indeed suggest that Diogenes was referring to Aristotle’s writing here, although see above, chapter 3, pages 58–9 where there is also a suggestion that Aristoxenus *might* have been Diogenes’ source here.

For Aristotle, an appropriate education in music will not only assist the student in judging good/appropriate music, just as studying drawing ‘also seems to be useful in making us better judges of the works of artists’ (1338a16–19),¹⁷ but will aid in contemplation and may lead on to many other branches of knowledge (1338a40); and as Depew states:

Contemplation is best conceived as an intensification of the learning (*mathesis*) that goes on in music, in the best regime, theoretical pursuits will be continuous with and to some extent will emerge naturally from musical pursuits. . . contemplation will be

¹⁵ See also discussion at chapter 3, pp. 58–9.

¹⁶ Delattre 2007: vol. II, 340, n. 1.

¹⁷ Although Aristotle draws an analogy between music and drawing here, he clearly does not consider the two ‘arts’ of similar use. Drawing, he states, ‘makes a man observant of bodily beauty’ (1338b2–4). Musical likenesses (representations – *homoiōmata*) or *mimeseis* are different from artistic signs, or *semeia*, in figurative art, where ethos is concerned. With music it is a matter of nature being investigated – musical *homoiōmata* are very close to the real nature of the ethical qualities to which they correspond (1340a19) and human beings have a natural instinct for the tones and rhythms. Aristotle seems to ascribe no or at least very few mimetic properties to figurative art where qualities of ethos and feelings are concerned. For more discussion on this, see Halliwell 2002: 241, and my further discussion, below, pp. 147–9. See also now Woerther 2008, for a comparison between Plato’s and Aristotle’s views on music in education.

regarded as the highest pursuit even by those. . . incapable of engaging in it. . . by virtue of the practical wisdom (*phronesis*) they can all be expected to have.

(Depew 1991: 347)¹⁸

Aristotle is concerned to emphasise that contemplation is as important an activity in the well-ordered state as active politics, for unless contemplation is allowed and valued in its own right, correct political decisions will not be made, and it will not be possible to pursue ‘what is good in political life’.¹⁹ Aristotle’s concerns with political science are also shown at *EN* X.9, 1181a14–20, where he declares the Sophists to be ‘altogether ignorant about the sort of thing political science is’, and emphasising the importance of ‘comprehension’ to enable correct judgement, which is the most important thing, ‘as it is in music’. This analogy between judgement in politics and that in music could suggest that he considers them to be of an equivalent importance, or, perhaps, of equivalent complexity. The ideals set down in *Politics* VII. 1–3²⁰ are best embodied in a state whose way of life centres on the cultivation and exercise of the virtues proper to leisure activity, especially the love of wisdom (1334a11–40).

Aristotle states that an education in music will aid in character formation; it is capable of producing certain qualities of character (1339a25); it is a source of pleasure, as it is one of the pleasantest things, whether in verse alone, or with a melody (1339b21ff.²¹); the pleasure that springs from it is perceptible to everyone, for the pleasure contained within it is of a natural kind (1340a1–5).

At 1340b9–19, Aristotle asserts:

[T5.i.3] It is plain that music has the power of producing a certain effect on the moral character of the soul (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος) , and if it has the power to do this, it is clear that the young must be directed to music and must be educated in it. Also

¹⁸ In Keyt and Miller 1991.

¹⁹ Depew 1991: 347.

²⁰ The best life, whether separately for an individual or collectively for states, is the life conjoined with virtue furnished with sufficient means for taking part in virtuous actions (1323b40–1324a2). In a happy state, citizens lead an active life (for happiness is activity of the soul in accord with virtue).

education is well adapted to the youthful nature, for the young cannot endure anything not sweetened by pleasure, and music is by nature a thing that has a pleasant sweetness. And we seem to have a certain affinity with tunes and rhythms.²²

Learning to take pleasure from the correct music will come from habituation, and the notion of the acquisition of ethical virtue by means of habituation can also be found in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1103a17–18:

[T5.i.4] Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (ἔθους), whence also its name is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ‘habit’ (ῥθους).²³

Nothing in the preceding two texts would differ in any way from Diogenes of Babylon’s musical philosophy, and Philodemus’ criticism in the *De Musica*²⁴ would certainly seem to relate as much to Aristotle’s theory as to that of Diogenes.

Aristotle is concerned that children should actually take part in music and learn to play an instrument (although not the aulos (1341a17–19) nor any other professional instrument²⁵), for in his opinion, one cannot judge (music, or perhaps any of the arts?) unless one has taken part in it (1340b20–5). However, he does express a concern that the student should not become too skilled at playing because this would render the pastime as banausic (1339a35–6; 1340b20–1341a9). At 1339a39–42 he appears to be testing this theory, because he suggests, ‘But if it is proper for them to labour at accomplishments of this sort, then it would also be right for them to prepare the dishes of an elaborate cuisine.’ He does not respond other than to say ‘but this is absurd’ (1339a42), although he returns to the subject of engaging with the activity again at 1340b35–40.²⁶ Here he asserts that active

²¹ For further discussion of this passage, see below, pp. 142–5.

²² For discussion on ‘natural affinity’ with music, see my chapter 2, section 2.iv.

²³ Trans. Ross and Urmson in Barnes 1995: 1742.

²⁴ Especially cols. 115 and 117 (T2.v.1a and T5.i.9); see also p. 82 above.

²⁵ For a discussion on why the aulos is not suitable for the free-born, see above, pp. 105–8.

²⁶ The analogy between music and cooking is also used to great effect by Philodemus at col. 117 Delattre, where he suggests that music had no more similarity to moral feelings than does cookery. See also n. 49 below.

participation is much more effective than passive exposure, although once the student reaches maturity he should be released from the need to participate, because by then he will have acquired sufficient skill to be able to judge correctly, and it is necessary to avoid the risk of being accused of being a *banausos*. This implies a definite cognitive element, it also implies acquisition of a theoretical knowledge of the music, although unlike Plato, Aristotle does not go into detail in his discussion of the music which he considers to be appropriate for education, merely stating that the music must be appropriate or suitable. He states that the Dorian mode ‘alone provokes greatest composure’ (1340b4). He does concede some usefulness in the Phrygian mode, but not in education. At 1342b12–17, he concludes ‘All agree that the Dorian mode is more sedate and of a specially manly character. . . it is clear that it suits the younger pupils to be educated rather in Dorian melodies.’

At 1341b25–30 he explains why he does not go into the details of his reasoning:

[T5.i.5] Now, we consider that much is well said on these matters by some of the musicians of the present day and by some of those who are engaged in philosophy who happen to be experienced in musical education, and we will leave the precise discussion as to each of these matters for any who wish it to seek it from those teachers, while for the present let us lay down general principles.

Just who these musicians are is not known; Lord suggests it is probably Aristoxenus,²⁷ but it could also perhaps be any one of Theophrastus, Arcestratus or Heraclides of Pontus.²⁸ I am not at all sure that it could be Aristoxenus, as his extant writings do not suggest so great an interest in the uses of music in education.

It is clear throughout Aristotle’s discussion of music, however, that he does

²⁷ Lord 1982. See below, pp. 173–88 for discussion of Aristoxenus’ writings.

²⁸ Anderson (1966: 129–30) suggests Damon of Athens, but Aristotle’s words suggest to me rather a contemporary of his, and both Heraclides and Theophrastus are known to have written works on music. Arcestratus, a little-known musician of the mid-fourth century mentioned by Philodemus, and referred to later by Porphyry, is another possibility, although so little of his writing has been preserved that it is probably impossible to make any confident assertion. For discussion of these

believe in music's ability to affect the character. He states at 1340a8 that:

[T5.i.6] [W]e come to be of a certain sort [of character] both by the many other kinds of music and not least by the melodies of Olympus [Phrygian mode²⁹].

(Trans Rackham, with emendation)

And at 1340a40–1:

[T5.i.7] [P]ieces of music on the contrary do actually contain . . . imitations (*mimēmata*) of character; and this is manifest, for even in the nature of mere melodies there are differences.

These beliefs are repeated in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*. At XIX.27, the writer asks, 'Why is what is heard the only object of perception that possesses moral character? For every tune, even if it has no words, has nevertheless character,' and *Problem* XIX. 29 asks, 'Why do rhythm and tune, which are only an emission of the voice, resemble moral character?' *Problem* XIX. 38 asks, 'Why does everyone enjoy rhythm and tune, and in general all consonances? . . . We enjoy different types of song for their moral character, but we enjoy rhythm because it has a recognised and orderly numerical arrangement and carries us along in an orderly fashion.'

I am not suggesting that the *Problems* are Aristotelian, but it is generally believed that they were written by one or more members of the Peripatetic school, and they surely echo Aristotle's beliefs about music in his *Politics*.³⁰ The question of whether it is instrumental music that is being discussed, or music as an accompaniment to words, or even *mousikē* in its broadest sense – liberal studies

philosophers and their likelihood of being those referred to by Aristotle, see below, pp. 154–72. For more on Damon, see above chapter 4, and below pp. 169–70.

²⁹ For Olympus' tunes being in the Phrygian mode, see Plutarch *De Musica* 1137B and Plato *Symp.* 215c. Olympus was a famous aulete from Phrygia, and the Phrygian mode, in which he played his tunes, was named for his native country.

³⁰ I will return to a discussion of the *Problems* below, where I will briefly compare the terminology used with Diogenes' own words.

generally – is always one that needs to be considered. Aristotle certainly uses different words in his discussion for music, varying from *mousikē*, to *melos*, *rhuthmos* and *harmonia*. Whilst it must be conceded that he more often talks of *mousikē* seemingly to denote music generally, he does on occasion specifically mention music without words in the context of moral character, as is also the case in the *Problems*. I think it is clear that Aristotle uses the word *mousikē* in three different senses in his discussion:

1. When using it in opposition to *gumnastikē* he uses it in the inclusive way to denote music and the liberal arts (I believe there is only one occurrence of this use in *Politics* VIII);
2. As harmony and words – the most common usage in his discussion;
3. Finally, and less frequently, as harmony without words.

Andrew Ford argues that in fact Aristotle uses *mousikē* throughout book VIII to denote harmony and words without the other liberal arts,³¹ and to a certain extent I agree with him, but Ford's intention stated at the very outset of his chapter is 'to put the music back into *Politics* 8', and so he will have been seeking evidence to aid that intent.³²

At 1340a13–14 the text states 'when listening to *mimeseis*, everyone feels a sympathetic response, and [or even] apart from the rhythms and melodies themselves'. Susemihl emended this to read 'everyone feels a sympathetic response through the rhythms and melodies themselves, even apart from [the words]'.³³ The Greek words used by Aristotle here are *rhuthmos* and *melos*, and the argument to accept Susemihl's emendation seems to me very persuasive, particularly as Aristotle has just mentioned the 'melodies of Olympus' (1340a9–10), and Olympus was

³¹ Ford 2004: 309–36 *passim*.

³² *Ibid.*, 309.

³³ Susemihl-Hicks 1894 [1976]. The Loeb translator notes Susemihl's emendation, but does not use it. Halliwell 2002: 244 states, 'we are virtually obliged to accept the thrust of Susemihl's emendation', and continues 'Without his textual emendation, it remains opaque why Aristotle, when trying to show that music can change its hearers psychologically, would wish here to cite the power of words to elicit emotional sympathy independently of rhythms and melodies.' Kraut 1997: 42, 194–5, however, translates the passage as 'everyone who listens to representations comes to have similar emotions, even apart from the rhythms and melodies of those representations', with none bracketed. He makes no mention of Susemihl's emendation and goes on to say, 'even if we were to strip away rhythm and melody what remains (i.e., words) contain a likeness of emotions'.

known as a composer for the aulos.³⁴ As the aulete could not sing at the same time as playing, this would seem to imply music without words. The three *Problems* quoted above are also quite specific – *mousikē* is not used at all in those contexts, but rather *melos* and *rhuthmos* only.

Halliwell cites 1339b21 as further evidence of Aristotle’s acknowledgement of the power of unaccompanied music.³⁵ The line reads ‘τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας. . .’ Presumably he is reading the word *psilos* as bare music, as I too was hoping to do, but have been persuaded by Lord (1982: 86) and Anderson (1966) that *psilos* here in fact refers to ‘bare words’ unaccompanied by music. Barker 1984: 174 translates this line as ‘We all say that music is one of the pleasantest things, whether it is purely instrumental or accompanied by song.’ Andrew Ford also translates *psilos* as ‘bare music’ stating in his accompanying note ‘The passage is distorted by Lord. . . who incredibly, glosses *mousikēn psilēn* as poetry unaccompanied by music’.³⁶ Ford is not convinced by Lord’s argument that the normal way of referring to instrumental music would have been *psilē kitharisis te kai aulēsis* or *kitharistikē*.³⁷ However I am inclined to agree with Lord and Anderson, and translate ‘. . . bare poetry or accompanied by song’, even if it must be conceded that the usage here does seem very unclear, and scholars clearly still disagree about the exact meaning in this passage. LSJ, s.v. *psilos* IV.3 also quotes this very passage translating as instrumental music unaccompanied by the voice; and Kraut translates as ‘music. . . unadorned or accompanied by singing’.³⁸ But, Aristotle uses the word *mousikē* here; generally when he is talking about instrumental music, I believe he more commonly uses *melos*, *rhuthmos*, *harmonia*. Whilst I fully concur that Aristotle is clearly discussing music without the liberal arts at 1339b21, I do believe that elsewhere he chooses to

³⁴ See above n. 29, and e.g., [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1133E; Plato, *Symp.* 215c.

³⁵ Halliwell 2002: 244, n. 21. See also note 38 below, for Plato’s use of *psilos* in the same context, i.e., words without music, at *Symp.* 215c–d. But I happily concur with Halliwell’s continuation, ‘it is wrong to think. . . that Aristotle (and others) did not conceive of music at all as a separate art’.

³⁶ Ford 2004: 318, and esp. n. 32.

³⁷ Lord 1982: 86 and n. 28, citing Plato’s *Laws* 669e1–2 and, more relevantly, Aristotle’s *Poet.* 1447a15, 24. For more discussion on these passages, see below, n. 39.

distinguish between *mousikē* as harmony and words and *melos* and/or *rhuthmos* in the specific sense. At 1341b23–4 he defines *mousikē* as ‘consisting of the composition of tunes and rhythms’ (ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὔσαν). And given that Aristotle uses *mousikē* (in the inclusive sense, I believe) as the other discipline in education to complement *gumnastikē*, then surely if he wanted to specify unaccompanied music, he would have used *melos*, tune, which is much less ambiguous.³⁹ But, whichever meaning is to be applied in the context here, it nonetheless confirms that music not accompanying words was a subject of discussion just as was music with words. Music without words is specifically referred to from 1340a38–9, where Aristotle asserts, ‘there are imitations of character in the tunes themselves’ (ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ μιμήματα τῶν ἡθῶν). This is important for my purposes, because in the *De Musica* Philodemus continually either implies that Diogenes is confusing ‘words set to, and accompanied by music’ with ‘unaccompanied poetry’, or asserts that it is only the words that accompany the music that can have any effect. As shown, particularly in the section where I look at Plato’s influence on Diogenes, I argue that Diogenes also makes claims for instrumental music. I am not suggesting that Diogenes makes these claims for instrumental music *only*, or even most of the time, but in a few instances, I believe it is clear that he is discussing purely instrumental music, i.e., music that was never intended to be accompanied by, or indeed to be the accompaniment (and therefore secondary) to, words.

³⁸ Kraut 1997: 42. Kraut glosses at p. 191 ‘I take unadorned music to consist in playing an instrument unaccompanied by the voice. Contrast Lord (1982), 86.’ But he does not discuss any further.

³⁹ The use of *psilos* with *mousikē* here is interesting. Lord, above (1982: 86) cites a number of passages as evidence of the use of *psilos* being predominantly associated with words ‘bare of music’. But what is clear from the examples is that the word attached to *psilos* is usually more explicit. At Aristotle’s *Poetics* 1447a29, the words are ‘Ἡ δὲ [ἐποποιία] μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις meaning bare words, i.e., prose rather than verse; at Plato *Symp.* 215c the words are similarly *psilois logos*; at *Menexenus* 239c they are *logoi psiloi*; at *Phaedrus* 278c3 they are *poiesin psilen*. As I will discuss below, Philodemus also uses *psilos* in a more exact context. The word occurs five times in the extant text of the *De Musica*, always attached to an unambiguous word: *logous*, *kitharisei*, *aulesin kai kitharisin*, *logou psilou*, *mele*. I can find no other instance, in that work, of it being attached to such a general word as *mousikē*.

Warren Anderson states in a note to his discussion on Aristotle's view on sound as a medium in the *De Anima*:⁴⁰

Both Plato and Aristotle contend that music is the great medium of ethos.⁴¹ One view is that such sound in itself has no ethos. If we grant this, however, Plato's annoyed concern over animal imitations and the like in music would seem to be baseless. The explanation may be that anything at all may take on potential ethical force, once it has been transmuted into musical terms for in music the two types of sound are often very closely intermingled. We know that a musical sound, i.e., a tone has a regular pattern of vibration frequencies, while a non-musical sound is identifiable as such because its pattern lacks regularity. Though Aristotle could not have known this, Kahl (1902, 52–3) believes that his exceptionally keen aesthetic sense nevertheless brought him some presentiment. *Prb.* 19.27 speaks of the kinesis that is consequent upon a tone and is perceived by the listener. According to Kahl, [Aristotle] means that there are tones of a class which not only please the ear, but also rouse in us a consciously experienced emotion, and that it is just these which are musical notes.

Although Kahl's view that the *Problems* were written by Aristotle is now outdated, this does not also render his interpretation of the ancient writer's aesthetic sense outdated. As mentioned above, Aristotle says nothing in Book VIII of the *Politics* that disagrees with the *Problems* quoted above, in fact the very same views are expressed. Frustratingly, however, Aristotle does not go into any detail, but it is quite possible that he either intended to, or in fact did write more on music,⁴² and it is probable that he would have intended to set down his explanations for this very

⁴⁰ Anderson 1966: 260, n. 2.

⁴¹ But see now Woerther (2008: 89–103, at 89), who suggests, wrongly in my view, that only Aristotle speaks of *ēthos* in the context of musical education.

⁴² See, e.g., Lord 1982: 204. It is suggested that 1339a11 might be the title of a separate book that was either never finished, or that has become separated from its remainder, which has been lost. The first few words, *Peri de mousikēs* could indeed be a new title; however the ensuing discussion does not run on awkwardly from what has gone on before.

strong statement. Halliwell analyses Aristotle's theory as follows:

[T]he *mimesis* entails something like a kinetic or dynamic correspondence between the use of rhythms, tunings and melodies on the one hand, and the psychological states and feelings belonging to qualities of 'character' on the other: the music 'moves' emotionally, and we 'move' with it.⁴³

At *De anima* 408b1–33, Aristotle discusses movements of the soul according to its state – sad/happy, cheerful/fearful. Halliwell further suggests a link here with Damonian theory as cited by Athenaeus *Deipn.* xiv, 628:

[T5.i.8] With good reason Damon of Athens and his school say that songs (ὠδᾶς) and dances are the result of the soul's being in a kind of motion; those songs which are noble and beautiful produce noble and beautiful souls, whereas the contrary kind produce the contrary.⁴⁴

There are two distinct but very important points here:

1. The notion of imitations of character within the songs themselves; and
2. the ability of the songs themselves to move the soul.

Although the implication here is that this involves words set to music, both points form very much a part of Diogenes of Babylon's musical philosophy, and both are very heavily criticised by Philodemus.

At column 117, 23–28 Philodemus states:

[T5.i.9] οὐ-
δὲ γὰρ μιμητικὸν ἢ μου-
σική, καθάπερ τι[ν]ἔξ ὄνει-
ρώπτουσιν, οὐδ' , [ὡς] οὗτος, ὁ-

⁴³ Halliwell 2002: 245.

⁴⁴ This view is also echoed by Plato in *Rep.* 400–2, where Damon is also cited as an authority. For more on Damon and his possible influence on Diogenes and these matters generally, see above, pp. 120–6.

μοιότη[τα]ς ἡθῶν, οὐ μιμη-
τικὰς δέ

for music is not at all something able to imitate, as some dream, nor, as our adversary claims, does it contain likenesses of characters which are not imitations.⁴⁵

For Philodemus, therefore, music is neither mimetic, nor does it contain likenesses of character. Diogenes clearly believed, as did Aristotle before him, that music contained ‘likenesses’ that are not mimetic, as opposed to what Halliwell terms ‘nonmimetic “signs” or indices’.⁴⁶ This seems rather different from Plato’s claim, examined above, chapter 4, that the music could somehow *sound like* the character to which it is related, in for example *Republic* III. 399a, where he states ‘leave us that mode that would fittingly imitate the *utterances and the accents* of a brave man’.⁴⁷

Diogenes uses ὅμοιος and ὁμοιότης rather than μίμησις here, as Aristotle also does at *Politics* VIII. 1340a19–20:

[5.i.10] Rhythms and melodies contain representations (ὁμοιώματα) of anger and mildness and . . .the other moral qualities.

Although it has to be conceded that Plato also uses ὁμοιοτης in other contexts, there would appear to be more similarity between Aristotle and Diogenes than Plato and Diogenes in usage. In his discussion of Aristotle’s meaning, Halliwell explains:

Correlates of ethical qualities exist in rhythms and melodies in a sense not predicable by visual art. . . paintings and sculptures can convey. . . features of character . . . indications which fall short of ethical qualities, e.g., a painting might give evidence of characters of those involved. . . The qualities of music on the other

⁴⁵ Probably responding to the very lacunose column 36. See Delattre 2007: vol. II, 409, although Philodemus uses the word μουσική here rather than ᾠδή.

⁴⁶ Halliwell 2002: 242.

hand . . . have a direct communicative effect on the mind and the emotions of the (appropriately receptive) hearer.⁴⁸

Halliwell moves on to say that the hearer ‘doesn’t infer that the music embodies certain ethical traits, but seems to experience appropriate feelings as a necessary part of attending the music: the listener’s mind is “changed” in the very act of listening’. For Philodemus, music, as a mere sound, cannot have such an effect. He argues that everyone will hear the music in the same way, just as everyone will experience taste in the same way, thus simplifying it to mere comparison with taste and smell – purely sensory, with no cognitive element. He states that music is no more capable of imitating moral character than is cookery.⁴⁹ He makes no mention of personal preference here, although the way is clear for him to do so, but once again to discuss preference would require the admission of some cognitive element.

At column 36, Diogenes also states that music can arouse the soul from a state of inactivity and draw it towards a natural disposition, but that it could also bring it from a state of excitement into a state of calm, a claim once again ridiculed by Philodemus.⁵⁰ Both the claim that music is in itself kinetic, and that it contains ‘non-mimetic likenesses’ are also made in the Pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata*, and in particular at *Prb.* XIX.27 and 29:

⁴⁷ Trans Shorey in the Loeb edition.

⁴⁸ Halliwell 2002: 242–3.

⁴⁹ Halliwell 2002: 255 remarks, ‘the rhetoric of the comparison with tastes and odors betrays a failure on Philodemus’s part to see why a model of music as mere auditory stimulus cannot begin to do justice to the emotional value attached to it in the Greek (or any other) tradition’, but as an Epicurean, he would probably have *refused* to recognize such a value – music for him was *alogos*, and hence could only affect the irrational sense, i.e. the ear. Neubecker in the commentary to her earlier edition observed that Philodemus betrays his view of music with this analogy. She writes, ‘For him it stood on just the same level as the arts that minister to the other senses, e.g., cookery, which works upon our sense of taste.’ Anderson states, ‘Here. . . [Philodemus] tacitly bases himself on the older Greek estimate of the artist, an attitude which had been generally overcome in the Hellenistic period. It will be noted that the attempt to ridicule musical ethos by means of this analogy is one which we have already seen in Aristotle’s acknowledgment of opposition views.’ Anderson 1966: 283, n. 37, and Neubecker *apud* Anderson *ibid.* Aristotle’s acknowledgement occurs at *Pol.* VIII. 1339a ff., see my discussion above at p. 140 this chapter.

⁵⁰ Col. 117.2–26. See above, chapter 3, pp. 82–3.

[T5.i.11] *Prb.* XIX.27

διὰ τί τὸ ἀκουστὸν μόνον ἦθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ἦ ἄνευ λόγου μέλος, ὅμως ἔχει ἦθος· ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐδὲ ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει. ἢ ὅτι κίνησιν ἔχει μόνον, οὐχὶ ἦν ὁ ψόφος ἡμᾶς κινεῖ; τοιαύτη μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει· κινεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ χρῶμα τὴν ὄψιν· ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐπομένης τῷ τοιούτῳ ψόφῳ αἰσθανόμεθα κινήσεως. αὕτη δὲ ἔχει ὁμοιότητα ἔν τε τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν φθόγγων τάξει τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων, οὐκ ἐν τῇ μίξει. ἀλλ' ἡ συμφωνία οὐκ ἔχει ἦθος.⁵¹ ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστιν. αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὗται πρακτικαὶ εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἦθους σημασιᾶ ἐστίν.

Why is what is heard the only object of perception which possesses moral character? For every tune, even if it has no words, has nevertheless character; but neither colour, smell nor flavour have it. Is it because sound alone has movement, though not of course the movement which it produces in us? For movement of this kind exists in other senses too, for colour moves our sight; but we are conscious of the movement which follows such and such a sound. This movement has a semblance [of moral character] both by the time and by the arrangement of the higher and lower sounds, but not in their mixture. Consonance⁵² has no moral character. This character does not exist in the other perceptibles. But the movements with which we are dealing are connected with action, and actions are indications of moral character.⁵³

As Andrew Barker states, the resemblances between the *Problem* and Diogenes' passage 'seem altogether too striking to be coincidental'.⁵⁴ Barker goes

⁵¹ Forster (1927) surely mistranslates here; he writes 'for symphony does possess moral character'.

The οὐκ appears not to have been translated.

⁵² 'Consonance' (*sumphonia*) here probably means a number of notes played together. The double aulos could play one note underneath the musical line, and this may be what is being referred to here; or, of course, multiple notes on more than one instrument. The moral character lies in the consonance between the individual notes in the scale. See also Barker 1984: 197, n. 55: 'moral character is represented by movement from note to note, not by notes played simultaneously'.

⁵³ For strikingly similar language see below my discussion of extract T5.v.9, an extract from [Plutarch] *De Musica*, which has been identified by some scholars as deriving from Aristoxenus.

⁵⁴ Barker 2001: 363.

on to remark, ‘All of the major ingredients of Diogenes’ theory seem to be present in this passage, along with pivotal elements of his terminology.’⁵⁵

The *Problem* states that every tune, even if it has no words, possesses *ēthos*, a claim implied by Diogenes at column 51, T4.13 above. Melody (*melos*) is kinetic, and the *kinēsis* in the melody contains *homoiōtes* – likeness, not imitation, of *ēthos*. As mentioned above, both Diogenes and [Aristotle] use the word *homoios* or its derivatives, and Diogenes actually specifies ‘likenesses which are not imitations’ (column 117, 23–8). And as argued above in chapter 2, it is the movement of the harmonic line itself that both contains and communicates the likeness of *ēthos*, and thus inspires movement, not the individual notes themselves, which, heard in isolation would have no meaning at all.

As Barker further states, ‘It would be unreasonable to doubt that the theory of this *Problem* and the theory of Diogenes are intimately related to one another, and the *Problem* unquestionably enriches our understanding of Diogenes.’⁵⁶ The theories outlined in both the *Problem* and in Diogenes’ own writing certainly seem to have a common view – unfortunately neither go far enough to make the treatment fully explained. The *Problem* does, however, help to explain why Diogenes’ theory was not as ridiculous as Philodemus claimed, and why the latter’s attempt to view music on a par with cookery was not justified.

(i.i) Music and Catharsis

It is necessary to address the subject of musical catharsis, because several scholars⁵⁷ have suggested that Diogenes of Babylon might have adapted the theory that musical catharsis could contribute to virtue to his own musical philosophy. Much has been written regarding Aristotle’s theory of tragic catharsis and its relevance to the notion of ethos/character within music, and, thus, in education,⁵⁸ but I want to argue that neither Aristotle nor Diogenes believed that catharsis had any place in

⁵⁵ Barker 2001: 363–9 at 363.

⁵⁶ 2001: 365.

⁵⁷ E.g., Zagdoun 2007: 95; Janko 1992: 127.

⁵⁸ For example, Lord 1982; Janko 1987 and 1992b; Delattre 2007.

education. Thus, I would support Ford's view that it simply does not apply.⁵⁹ Aristotle's theory of education is surely directed, in the first instance at any rate, at the young. At *Politics* 1341a17–24, Aristotle states quite clearly that one of the reasons he will not allow the aulos into schools is that 'it has rather an exciting influence so that it ought to be used for occasions of the kind at which attendance *has the effect of purification rather than education*' (my emphasis). The context of *Politics* Book VIII is education, and purification is only mentioned on a couple of occasions, and both times it is clearly distinguished from 'education'. Whilst Aristotle certainly argues for the use of all types of music, he clearly believes that different types of music should be used in different situations. At 1341b37–9, where he states that music ought to be employed not for the purposes of one benefit that it confers, 'but on account of several (for it serves the purpose both of education and purgation [*katharsis*] – the term purgation we use for the present without explanation, but we will return to discuss the meaning that we give to it more explicitly in our treatise on poetry – and thirdly it serves for amusement . . .)'. Here he has once again given the music three distinct uses, and he goes on to say that 'we should not employ all "the harmonies" in the same way'. Once again, therefore, he has distinguished the cathartic melodies from the 'ethical' melodies. Whilst catharsis is mentioned regularly in the *Poetics*, in the context of performance, this is a different medium. In the context of education, at *Politics* VIII. 1341b32–1342a18, Aristotle is surely emphasising the importance of moulding the young characters by habituation – that is by habitual exposure to the right melodies and tunes, not those that excite, but those which create the right movements of the soul, and instil in the students a 'proper' character. At 1342a18–28, he remarks that what gives pleasure to the educated isn't the same as what gives pleasure to the uneducated, and that one should make allowances for this in criticising entertainment. Cathartic melodies are fine in tragedy, but the place for such music is the theatre, and not the schoolroom.

Jonathan Lear has given a very clear account of the most 'sophisticated view of catharsis, which has been powerfully argued in recent years'.⁶⁰ He writes that it

⁵⁹ Ford 2004: 325–7.

⁶⁰ Lear 1988: 297–326, at 303.

has been argued that catharsis could contribute to education of the emotions – an ethical education consists in training youths to take pleasure or pain in the right sort of objects. If Aristotle did admit catharsis into his education, the argument goes, then perhaps tragedy helps us to better understand the world, and thereby gain a deeper insight into the human condition.⁶¹ Aristotle did concede that it was not necessary to attend a performance of tragedy – reading the text should be sufficient to feel the effects.⁶² However, Lear argues strongly that this is still wrong for two reasons:

1. A virtuous person will experience the catharsis, but he does not need further education; and
2. The *Politics*' discussion of music distinguishes music that is educative from that which produces catharsis, as argued above.

Therefore, whilst musical catharsis is fine for the theatre, and might be the subject of enjoyment for all, as Aristotle seems to recognise that everyone takes a particular pleasure from tragic catharsis, it will not fit into his educational curriculum insofar as ethical education is concerned.

I would take this still further in respect of Diogenes of Babylon – I cannot see how the introduction of the notion of catharsis into a Stoic ethical account of the emotions can be at all plausible.⁶³ As argued in my chapter 2, pp. 34–6, and n. 52, Janko's argument rested heavily on his own insertion of the Greek ἐκστάσεις in line 12 of column 18 for Delattre's αἰσθήσεις, and the argument that any 'enjoyments, emotions, and sensations' would be irrational, against which I argued there. However, the Greek word κάθαρσις nowhere appears in the Philodemian text as it has come down to us, nor any apparent argument for or against it. I would suggest that had there be any suggestion of such a notion, Philodemus would have railed as strongly against that as he does Diogenes' belief in music's kinetic power, as discussed in chapter 2.

⁶¹ Lear 1988: 303–4.

⁶² *Poetics* 1450b18–19; 1453b4–7; 1462a11–12.

⁶³ *Pace* Janko 1992a and b; Zagdoun 2007.

Archestratus, Heraclides, Theophrastus and Aristoxenus

(ii) *Archestratus*

Very little is known about Archestratus of Gela. A mid fourth-century poet, the main evidence for him is contained in Athenaeus' *Deipnosophistai*, and this largely comprises fragments from Archestratus' poem *The Life of Luxury*. That work is concerned with food, more primarily 'the [selection] and purchase of the best produce that could be found',⁶⁴ and as such does not contain any evidence for Archestratus' musical theories.

More useful evidence in this context is to be found within Philodemus' *De Musica* Book IV, column 137 Delattre, and reads as follows:

[T5.ii.1] The followers of Archestratus, who say that issues about the natures of sound and notes and intervals and similar things are philosophical aspects of music, were quite intolerable, not only because they set off into a thoroughly extraneous domain of theory, and babbled childishly about these things with no benefit to knowledge, but also because they represented music as no more than study of these matters. (Trans Barker 1989)

The only other definite mention of the philosopher thus far found is in Porphyry's *Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics*. 26.6–29, where Porphyry cites the writings of Didymus 'the musician', an author of significant harmonic writings.⁶⁵ He states:

[T5.ii.2] And there are others who give a place to both perception and reason [in music], but who give some sort of precedence to reason: one of these is Archestratus. (Trans Barker 1989)

⁶⁴ For this work, see Athenaeus Book VII, or *Archestratus, The Life of Luxury*, translated with introduction and commentary by John Wilkins and Shaun Hill, 1994 (Prospect books). Quotation from Wilkins and Hill 1994: 30.

⁶⁵ Ptolemy's description in *Harm.* Book II. Not much is known about Didymus apart from references in Ptolemy and Porphyry. Barker suggests (*OCD* s.vv. that he might be the *Suda*'s son of Heraklides the Younger, 'a grammarian and musician in Neronian times'.

Barker comments,⁶⁶ ‘These remarks show plainly that Archestratus was a devotee of musical theory rather than practice, and that he was no Aristoxenian.’ As will be shown in section 5.v, Aristoxenus, whilst giving a place to perception and reason, argued that ‘they should keep abreast of each other’, neither taking precedence.⁶⁷ This is interesting, because by the time of Archestratus, most musical theorists followed one of two schools of thought: the Pythagorean / mathematician school, or the Aristoxenian school. However, it seems clear from the writings of Didymus that there was a further group, who, as Barker suggests, were ‘too rationalistic in [their] approach to fall into the latter group, but too empirical to fit into the former group’.⁶⁸ I will argue that there is very little, if any Aristoxenian theory contained within Diogenes’ music theory either.

The citation in Philodemus’ work is particularly interesting because it comes within the author’s criticism of Diogenes of Babylon’s musical theory, and therefore implies that it is answering a statement made by Diogenes. However, there is no mention of Archestratus within the extant columns of Diogenes’ thought. He is mentioned in column 137, as stated above, just before Philodemus answers Diogenes’ claims regarding Heraclides of Pontus. If Philodemus is answering Diogenes’ points in the same order as his opponent’s, as he often does, as can be seen from the parallels identified by Delattre, Archestratus should be mentioned just before the discussion of Heraclides in column 49,⁶⁹ where there is a lacuna of some fifteen lines, following a discussion of how good the study of music was to the intelligence, and the claim that musicians were almost akin to the *kritikoi* only in the subject of music.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Barker 1989: 243, n. 153.

⁶⁷ See below, extract T5.v.11.

⁶⁸ Barker 2001: 366.

⁶⁹ Although it must be conceded that here Heraclides’ name is supplied by Delattre on the basis of the parallel passage in Philodemus’ critique (col. 137, l. 30). Here only part of the name can be read (Ἡρα). The restitution does appear safe, however; see my discussion on restoration of text, chapter 2, pp. 11–12.

⁷⁰ *De Musica* col. 48, ll. 22–6 Delattre, on which, see my discussion in chapter 6, pp. 206 ff.

The context would, therefore, seem to be appropriate for a theorist such as Archestratus to be introduced, but if he was, none of the discussion remains, only (perhaps) the criticism thereof. Given Diogenes' provision for 'knowing perception' in column 34, as discussed in my chapter 2, pages 36 ff., and Porphyry's mention of Archestratus in the context of perception and reason above, it seems quite feasible that Archestratus might have been one of the musical philosophers with whom Diogenes shared some sympathies. Archestratus also seems to be qualified to be one 'of those engaged in philosophy who happen[s] to be experienced in musical education' mentioned by Aristotle at 1341b25–30. It seems impossible to be able to say any more than *perhaps* he might have been one of those to whom Aristotle was referring.

(iii) Heraclides of Pontus

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Politics* VIII. 1341b25, where Aristotle has left to the philosophers who are also engaged in musical education the details of which modes are or are not suitable for use in the realm of education, Kraut suggests that Aristotle is referring to either Theophrastus or Aristoxenus.⁷¹ Kraut does not appear to entertain Heraclides as a possibility, although Heraclides would appear to have been a closer contemporary of Aristotle, and, in Cicero *Laws* III.14, is apparently regarded as on a par with Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus, at least as a writer on political philosophy.

Rather more is known of Heraclides of Pontus than of Archestratus. Attested by Diogenes Laertius at Book V, 86–94, and *floruit* (probably)⁷² around 360 BC, he was a pupil of Speusippus, and later of Aristotle, probably whilst Aristotle was still at the Academy.⁷³ Further, Heraclides stood for, but was defeated by Xenocrates for

⁷¹ 1997: 206.

⁷² Although see Gottschalk's comments on Heraclides' dates below, p. 157.

⁷³ D.L. V.86.

the scholarchate of the Academy in 339BC following the death of Speusippus,⁷⁴ so he must have been in a position of some seniority. Diogenes Laertius attests that he wrote two books on music, but a third book is mentioned by Athenaeus, in which Heraclides discussed the number and characters of the true Greek modes.⁷⁵ Although Plutarch clearly regarded Heraclides primarily as a musical historian, the fact that he is attacked by Philodemus for his views on musical ethos indicates that he was much more than this, and like Arcestratus, must be considered as a likely candidate to be one of Aristotle's philosophers with a musical interest, and almost certainly an influence on Diogenes of Babylon's musical philosophy.

Gottschalk notes some discrepancy amongst the sources regarding Heraclides' relationship to Plato, Aristotle and their schools, which also places some doubt about Heraclides' exact dates.⁷⁶ The discrepancy is not important in the context of this thesis, apart from one point, as whichever sources are correct, Heraclides will not move significantly in historical time, and so the order of possible influence on Diogenes will not change. It is reported in various sources, amongst which Diogenes Laertius (V. 92), that Chamaeleon, a 'compatriot who probably joined the Peripatos in Athens',⁷⁷ complained that Heraclides had plagiarised him in his own works on Homer and Hesiod. This is interesting, because both Heraclides and Chamaeleon are mentioned by name both by Diogenes of Babylon, at column 49, and by Philodemus, at column 131. Given that Philodemus complains that Diogenes is writing as a historian rather than a philosopher, this might be additional evidence that the two (Heraclides and Chamaeleon) were indeed contemporaries.

It is also interesting that there was a connection between Heraclides and Speusippus. I have argued in the Appendix to chapter 2,⁷⁸ that Speusippus was

⁷⁴ Fr. 9 Wehrli.

⁷⁵ D.L. V, 87; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* xiv. 624c. For more on Heraclides' discussion on the Greek modes, see below, pp. 159–60.

⁷⁶ Gottschalk 1998[1980]: 2–5.

⁷⁷ Fr. 176 Wehrli .

⁷⁸ See above, pp. 50–4.

probably not Diogenes'⁷⁹ main influence in his concept of ἐπιστημονική αἴσθησις.⁸⁰ However, as I will show below, Diogenes certainly relied upon and directly referred to Heraclides for a part of his own musical theory; perhaps Heraclides had also developed Speusippus' earlier theory, and so influence on Diogenes theory there maybe should not be ruled out.

[Plutarch] writes at *De Musica* 1131F–1133F that Heraclides paid particular attention to the divine origin of the modes, and that he attempted to trace each back to a god or goddess, and a part of Heraclides' account of music's early history is preserved within [Plutarch]'s writings. Parallels with Diogenes' own account are noted in section i to chapter 3 where I discuss Diogenes' writing on music's origins.⁸¹ Heraclides was also interested in the ethical character of music, and Diogenes of Babylon quoted his writings in support of his own belief in the moral value of education.⁸² Heraclides' interest in music's divine origin is particularly interesting here, and Diogenes was clearly also very interested in that aspect. although it appears that the gods to whom Heraclides gives particular prominence are not mentioned in Diogenes' text as we have it today. Nonetheless, it does indicate that Diogenes was not alone in emphasising music's divine origins. Both philosophers refer to Amphion and Terpander and his contemporaries.⁸³ Both philosophers also remark that Terpander and his followers adhered to the 'grand style', and as Gottschalk remarks, 'Heraclides, like most theorists in the Academic-

⁷⁹ Future remarks in this chapter to 'Diogenes' will all refer to Diogenes of Babylon; if Diogenes Laertius is mentioned again, either the name will be written out in full, or in the abbreviated form 'D.L.'.

⁸⁰ Eleanora Rocconi remarked in her paper given at the Moisa Annual Seminary on Ancient Greek Music in July 2005 that some scholars have suggested that Diogenes was influenced by Aristoxenus of Tarentum in this theory, wrongly in the view of Prof A. Barker. On Aristoxenus and the unlikelihood of his having any influence on Diogenes' musical theory, see below, section v. I must thank Professor Rocconi for allowing me to use the unpublished transcript of her paper on chapters 31–44 of [Plutarch's] *De Musica*, where this discussion occurs at p. 3.

⁸¹ See above, T3.ii.1 and discussion.

⁸² H. B. Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 135, 138–9.

⁸³ For Diogenes' references, see chapter 3 above p. 63 (Amphion), p. 69 ff. (Terpander); for Heraclides', see [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1131F–1132 (Amphion); 1132C–F (Terpander), although on whether the whole of this section can rightly be ascribed to Heraclides, see Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 133–5.

Peripatetic tradition, favoured the old style against more recent innovations’,⁸⁴ something that seems almost to go without saying – none of the musical writers thus far encountered has any time at all for music of the ‘new style’.

Heraclides’ account of the musical modes, mentioned above, is further evidence of his interest in the ethical nature of music. He asserts that there are only three true Greek modes since ‘there are also only three kinds of Greeks – Dorians, Aeolians and Ionians’, and he continues, ‘There is no small difference in the character of these three. . .’⁸⁵ The characters of the three modes therefore reflect the characters of the Greek races:

1. The Dorian reflected ‘manly vigour, of magnificent bearing, not relaxed or merry, but sober and intense, neither varied nor complicated’,⁸⁶
2. The Aeolian ‘contains elements of ostentation and turgidity, and even conceit. . . yet this does not mean malice, but is, rather, lofty and confident. Hence also their [the Aeolians’] fondness for drinking is appropriate to them, also their love-affairs, and the entirely relaxed nature of their daily life’,⁸⁷
3. The Ionian mode is ‘neither bright nor cheerful, but austere and hard, having a seriousness which is not ignoble; and so their mode is well adapted to tragedy. But the character of the Ionians today is more voluptuous and the character of their mode is much altered’.⁸⁸

The other modes mentioned are all stated to be ‘originating with barbarians’, and hence brought to Greece from elsewhere. No mention is made by Athenaeus here of any use Heraclides might have ascribed to the modes; indeed other than assigning character to them, Heraclides’ comments would seem to fit easily into a historical account of the origins of the various modes. Gottschalk notes that

⁸⁴ Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 134.

⁸⁵ Athenaeus *Deipn.* 624c ff.; Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 134–5.

⁸⁶ Athenaeus 624d–e.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 624e.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 625c.

Heraclides' groups have some affinity with Dicaearchus' account of the development of Greek civilisation.⁸⁹

The only other real evidence for Heraclides' concern with the ethical nature of music is contained within Philodemus' *De Musica*. At column 49, Philodemus reports that:

[T5.iii.1] . . .]ποις κατανοήσαντά τι-
να τῶ]ν εἰρημένων, ἐν οἷς
περὶ πρέποντος μέλους καὶ
ἀπρεποῦς καὶ περὶ ἠθῶν ἀρσέ-
νων καὶ μαλακῶν καὶ περὶ
πρά[ξ]εων ἀρμοττουσῶν κα[ὶ
ἀ]ναρμόστων τοῖς ὑποκειμέ-
νοις προσώποις ἄπερ ὁμολο-
γουμέ]νως οὐ μακρὰν ἀπηρτ[η]-
μ[έ]ν[α τ]οῦ φιλοσοφεῖν· καὶ παρα-
λαβῶν] πο[λ]λὸν πρ[ὸ] | τού[των] Ἡρα-
κλείδου πλείω φησὶ|ν ἐ[ξ] αὐ-
τῶ]ν [εἶ]ναι φανερόν [τ]ὸ πρὸς
π[ο]λλ[ὰ] μέρη τοῦ βίου χρησι-
μεύειν τὴν μουσικὴν, [καὶ
δύ]νασθαι τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν
φιλοτεχνίαν οἰκείως ἡμ[ᾶς
δια]τιθέναι πρὸς πλείους ἀ-
ρ[ε]τὰς δοκεῖν αὐτῶι, καὶ πρ[ὸς
π]άσας*.

⁸⁹ Gottschalk 1998 [1980]: 136–7. Gottschalk notes here that this might have been why Sotion classified Heraclides as a Peripatetic. At a conference on Heraclides in June 2003, it was argued strongly that Heraclides should in fact be regarded as a Platonist rather than a Peripatetic. I thank Professor Sharples for his notes and comments on that conference, which I was unable to attend. I will not attempt to catalogue or analyse the arguments surrounding that discussion in this thesis.

. . . reflecting well on [some] of the things said [by Heraclides of Pontus], in which the topics are the question of appropriate and inappropriate melody, masculine and effeminate characters and actions that are or are not in harmony with the persons they represent, which subjects that are not remote from philosophy. And having before this helped himself to much more from Heraclides, he says that it is manifest from it that the usefulness of music shows itself in many areas of life, and that [in his opinion] working hard at this skill can put us in an appropriate disposition to many virtues, perhaps towards all.

In his parallel criticism in columns 137 and 138, Philodemus remarks that he has already attacked this theory in the third book of this work,⁹⁰ where he says he showed ‘point by point’ how ‘all of this is sheer delirium’.⁹¹ Andrew Barker has drawn attention to a passage in Aristides Quintilianus’ *De Musica* Book II, where a similar view is expressed and the male/female dichotomy is related to the composition of the soul and the types of music that would have appealed to individual souls. At a note to the Aristides passage, Barker writes, ‘There is a hint in Philodemus (*De Mus.* IV.23.27–24.9)⁹² that the idea was adopted by Heraclides.’ The Aristides passage reads:

[T5.iii.2] when [the soul] turns towards earthly things and seeks to learn by experience about life here, it comes to need a body, and seeks one that is suitable for it. It has a capacity to perceive the duality that exists among them (male and femaleness, I mean), a duality which is present not only in those that have souls, but also in those that are directed by nature alone. . .⁹³

⁹⁰ Columns 137, 27–138, 9. Delattre’s footnote at this point remarks that Gigante (1999) does not doubt that the theory belonged to a Peripatetic. But see also n. 89, above.

⁹¹ Or as Barker translates, ‘<and> we showed what a heap of nonsense it is’ (Barker’s paper given at the conference on Heraclides of Pontus in 2003).

⁹² This passage has now been renumbered 137.27–138.9, following Delattre’s reconstruction of the text. See Delattre’s concordance of editions at his 2007: vol. I, CCLXXVII–CCLXXXI.

⁹³ Aristides Quintilianus, *De Musica* Book II, chapter 8, 1–10 in Barker 1989: 469–70.

This male/female dichotomy is central to, although greatly developed in, the musical theory that followed in Aristides' work, and a discussion of this may throw light on Heraclides' own theory, if indeed he did adopt that idea. There is also a similar view expressed in Plato's *Laws* VII. 802e, where the Athenian states:

[T5.iii.3] It will further be necessary to make a rough general distinction between two types of song, those suited for females and those suited for males, and so we shall have to provide both with their appropriate scales and rhythms; it would be a dreadful thing that the whole tune or rhythm of a composition should be out of place, as it will be if our various songs are inappropriately treated in these respects.⁹⁴

It must be emphasised, however, that it was not only Heraclides who might have adopted this theory; as Diogenes clearly did, this might be evidence that he is using Heraclides as an authority. The first mention of this male/female dichotomy in the Philodemian work is at column 48, within the report of Diogenes' musical theory. Further, Philodemus' refutation comes at columns 137–8, firmly within the part of the treatise where he is attacking Diogenes' theory. His general rounding up of the work starts only at column 143. At column 137, Philodemus explicitly states that he will not revisit the arguments against the theory here because he has already done this in his Book 3, where he is probably arguing against Heraclides, on which, see below, T5.iii.6. The theory must, therefore, have been part of Diogenes' own philosophy as well.

Aristides' psychology proceeds as follows, having been introduced at the end of his chapter 7 (pp. 65–6 Winnington-Ingram) with the words 'But since music is a treatment for the passions of the soul, we should first investigate the ways in which they arise in it. . . If these points are not established, our discussion of subsequent matters will fail to be clear.'⁹⁵ 'Passions arise in the soul', he states, 'out of its

⁹⁴ As discussed elsewhere in this thesis, at pp. 115–16, it is very likely that Diogenes alludes to this chapter of Plato in his own theory, which further suggests to me that both Heraclides and Diogenes himself may have thought along similar lines.

⁹⁵ This and subsequent quotations from Aristides come from Barker's translation in his 1989, this from p. 469.

affinity with the male or the female or with both. The female is slackened, and has a lack of resistance to pleasures and desires, whilst the male is predominantly self-confident, has courage, but also has anger and recklessness.⁹⁶ Since the predominance of male or female differs from soul to soul, so too will arise the difference of conception (*ennoia*).

[T5.iii.4] It is through conceptions, then, that approval of things in life first comes, conceptions that have either grasped each thing successfully through an inherent capacity for learning,⁹⁷ or have later been persuaded to change. Here the common talk of the majority has as much power to instil character as have the doctrines of the sciences. For everyone's soul constantly remodels the impressions and representations that it contains in light of the ideas aroused through words. . . Moral education is divided into two types. One kind, that through which we correct vice is therapy. . . the second kind is cultivation.⁹⁸

Having assigned the male/female dichotomy to souls, so too for Aristides letter-sounds and the *harmoniai* are either male, female, or intermediate, hence their appeal to different types of souls as discussed in chapter 3, pp. 82–7. At Winnington-Ingram 80, ll. 22ff., Aristides writes:

[T5.iii.5] . . . at any rate, in the *harmoniai* that he (Damon) handed down we can see that of the moveable notes it is sometimes the female and sometimes the male that are in the majority, or else are used less or not at all. The reason is clearly that the usefulness of the *harmoniai* depends on the character of each individual soul. Hence the most important part of melodic composition is that known as 'distribution' (*petteia*),⁹⁹ which consists in the selection of the notes most appropriate on each occasion.

⁹⁶ Barker 1989: 470; p. 67, ll. 15 ff. Winnington-Ingram.

⁹⁷ Could this be a hint of the Stoic concept of *oikeiōsis*? For discussion of this, see ch. 2, section iv.

⁹⁸ Barker 1989: 471–2; p. 68, ll. 14 ff. Winnington-Ingram.

⁹⁹ LSJ s.v. πεττεία I translates as a 'game resembling draughts' or, in Cleonides' *Harmonics*, 'repetition of the same note'. This might suggest that the meaning in Aristides is metaphorical as it

This passage clearly suggests that Aristides is drawing on earlier writers, as he refers to Damon here. Whether or not it implies that the male/female classification was handed down from Damon has been the subject of some debate for many years.¹⁰⁰ But Aristides is also aware of the views of other earlier philosophers; indeed he refers to Plato as ‘the wise Plato’ at chapter 6, (p. 59, 1.24 Winnington-Ingram). He affirms that early education must be ‘training by habituation’,¹⁰¹ and his views on education seems to reflect a combination of both Plato and Aristotle. Aristides’ use of the words ‘appropriateness’ and ‘inappropriateness’ (τὸ πρέπον, τὸ ἀπρέπον) also recall the writings of Plato, Heraclides, and indeed, the Stoics.¹⁰²

It is, of course, impossible to claim with any certainty that Heraclides’, and so Diogenes’, musical philosophy is the basis for Aristides’ theory, but I would suggest that there are sufficient similarities for it to be considered a real possibility.

It is clear from Philodemus’ words at columns 138 that when he attacked the theory in his ‘third book’, he was attacking a view that came not only from Heraclides, but probably from the Peripatetic school generally, when he says:

[T5.iii.6] ἐκθέντες ἡμεῖς
 ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν ὑπομνη-
 μάτων καὶ τὰ παρ’ ἄλλοις δὲ
 συγγενῶς εἰρημένα¹⁰³ παρεδεί-
 ξαμεν ὅσης ἐστὶν γέμοντα
 ληρείας.

seems unlikely that the most important part of melodic composition would be the ‘repetition of the same note’. Does it perhaps infer ‘a game of chance’ or indeed ‘a game of skill’?

¹⁰⁰ In his footnote to this passage, Andrew Barker outlines the debate that has occurred amongst many scholars. However, see my notes 40, 44 to chapter 4, where I explain that Professor Barker has now changed his view, and moots the possibility that Damon has been credited with much more influence than he actually had.

¹⁰¹ Chapter 3, p. 55, ll. 8–11 Winnington-Ingram.

¹⁰² Gottschalk remarks that the ideas of appropriateness ‘became fundamental principles of Hellenistic and Roman criticism’ (1998 [1980]: 138), and that Heraclides’ views on this were criticised by Aristoxenus, on which, see below, section 5.v.

We set all this out in the third [book] of our commentary, as well as other things from other [writers], and we showed point by point how all this is sheer delirium.

This seems perfectly feasible – Dicaearchus and Heraclides are both named within Diogenes' part of the text, and from Philodemus' criticism it is clear that Archestratus and Theophrastus were also cited by Diogenes as authorities.¹⁰⁴

(iv) *Theophrastus*

As mentioned above, Theophrastus is also suggested by Kraut to be one of the philosophers to whom Aristotle refers at *Politics* VIII. 1341b25 ('some of those engaged in philosophy who happen to be experienced in musical education'),¹⁰⁵ and certainly he would also appear to be a plausible candidate. However, my reasons for looking into his views on music are rather that he is mentioned in the Philodemean *De Musica*, and therefore he possibly had some influence on Diogenes of Babylon's musical philosophy. A pupil first of Plato, and then of Aristotle, Theophrastus succeeded Aristotle as head of the Lyceum.¹⁰⁶ He also wrote at least two books on music.¹⁰⁷

Sources attest to his belief in music's power to cure ills; both Athenaeus (*Deipn.* 624a–b) and Apollonius (*Historia Mirabilium* 49.1–3) write of his view that playing the aulos could relieve and even cure sciatica. However, very little of Theophrastus' writing on music survives today. The largest fragment exists within Porphyry's *Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics*, and is, according to Ptolemy, an extract from Book II of Theophrastus' own *De Musica*.¹⁰⁸ It primarily constitutes a polemic against the group of writers he calls the *mathematikoi* regarding the human ability to replicate musical melody. The fragment has attracted more scholarly

¹⁰³ Emphasis mine.

¹⁰⁴ Dicaearchus is mentioned at column 49.20–3; see T6.i.7, where it seems plausible that Dicaearchus was one of Diogenes' sources.

¹⁰⁵ Kraut 1997: 20.

¹⁰⁶ Diogenes Laertius V.36.

¹⁰⁷ Porphyry, *On Claudius Ptolemy's Harmonics* 13 (FHS & G 716).

attention than any of the other of Theophrastus' musical fragments today extant, but because of the nature of the fragment, the ensuing discussions are more on the lines of technical musical analysis.¹⁰⁹ The fragment is largely a technical discussion regarding melodic accuracy, arguing against the view that 'music exists in quantity',¹¹⁰ with very little discussion of any psychological value in music.

Theophrastus refutes the theory of this group of writers who say that 'the accuracy of the intervals [of singing] arises in accordance with the ratios of the numbers'¹¹¹ i.e., that the soul identifies the mathematical relations between the notes in a melody and reproduces them in perceptible form.¹¹² The *mathematikoi* would, of course, include the Pythagoreans, but also to an extent Plato, Aristotle and other Peripatetic writers. Although not directly aligning himself with the alternative group identified at the outset of the discussion, 'the *harmonikoi*, who judge by perception',¹¹³ Theophrastus does seem to prefer their position, as I will discuss below. It could be, suggests Barker,¹¹⁴ that Aristoxenus might be included in this latter group – certainly as will be shown below, section v,¹¹⁵ '[Theophrastus] dismisses the independent claims of logos' in musical analysis and 'bases his investigations on *aisthēsis* first and foremost.¹¹⁶ However, it is clear that Theophrastus does not accept Aristoxenus' framework of musical analysis either, and from 64.24 (Düring) sets out to attack that theory also. He emphasises that it is not the interval (*diastēma*) that gives different notes their pitch, because an interval is, by definition, a gap between notes, and therefore silent, hence the pitch of a note must be something intrinsic to itself. My understanding of his theory of the creation of accurate musical melody is discussed further briefly below, but more importantly for my purposes are the two hints of Theophrastus view of music's psychological

¹⁰⁸ Porphyry, *On Claudius Ptolemy's Harmonics* 61.17, Düring; Barker 1985: 289.

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., Barker 1977, 1985, 2007; Sicking 1997.

¹¹⁰ Porphyry, *Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics* 62 Düring.

¹¹¹ Page 62, lines 10–12 Düring.

¹¹² Barker's explanation, 2007: 413.

¹¹³ Page 62.2 Düring.

¹¹⁴ 1985: 308ff.

¹¹⁵ Pages 173–88.

¹¹⁶ Barker 1985: 308.

value within the fragment; both relate to its creation. The first hint occurs near the beginning of the fragment.¹¹⁷

[T5.iv.1] ἔστι γὰρ τὸ γινόμενον κίνημα μελωδικὸν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν σφόδρα ἀκριβές, ὁπότεν φωνῇ ἐθελήσῃ ἐρμηνεύειν αὐτό, τρέπει μὲν τήνδε, τρέπει δ' ἔφ' ὅσαν οἶα τ' ἔστι τῆν ἄλογον τρέψαι, καθ' ὃ ἐθέλει·

For the movement productive of melody, when it occurs in the soul, is very accurate, when it (the soul) wishes to express it (the movement) with the voice. It (the soul) turns it (the voice), and turns it just as it wishes, to the extent that it is able to turn that which is non-rational. (Trans Barker, as amended)

This does not necessarily mean that the ‘movement productive of melody’ in the soul is a sudden imagining of a melody ‘in the mind’s ear’,¹¹⁸ but the occurrence of an emotion or disturbance within the soul that can be interpreted by the singer in the language of melody.¹¹⁹ By producing appropriate vocal/musical sounds accurately – and the discussion would appear to be about a musical line, not words – the singer expresses the psychic movements that have the required effect on the soul, i.e., to release it from the evils due to the emotions. In so doing, states Barker,¹²⁰ the singer stimulates these movements in the souls of others, and perhaps reinforces them in his own: ‘that this should be so is no causal secondary effect, but constitutes its essence’.¹²¹ But to accurately interpret the emotion within the soul, Barker states, ‘he must be able to discriminate between what makes melodic sense and what does not. He must also be able to produce a melody of the right sort to represent his psychic state’.¹²² Barker’s first sentence would seem to bring us back once again to

¹¹⁷ Page 61.25–62 Düring = FHS &G 716 (part).

¹¹⁸ See Barker 1985: 313.

¹¹⁹ For my discussion of the notion of melody as language, see chapter 2, pp. 18–19, 35–6.

¹²⁰ 1985: 316.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

¹²² Barker 1985: 313–14.

Plato's 'judges', and Aristotle's 'experts', and perhaps even to Diogenes' equivalent of the *kritikoi*.

The second fragment occurs right at the end of Porphyry's extract:¹²³

[T5.iv.2] μία δὲ φύσις τῆς μουσικῆς κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ κατ' ἀπόλυσιν γινομένη τῶν διὰ τὰ πάθη κακῶν, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦν, οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τῆς μουσικῆς φύσις ἦν.

The nature of music is one. It is the movements of the soul that occurs in correspondence with its release from the evils due to the emotions; and if it were not this, neither would the nature of music exist.¹²⁴ (Trans Barker)

Music and melody, for Theophrastus therefore, originate within us; when either is played or sung in public, it is a secondary manifestation of music, wholly dependent upon the first, i.e., the composer in whom the music originated.¹²⁵ That is, the soul brings about the transition from psychic movement, i.e., the movement of the soul, into audible sound – that is it interprets or expresses outwardly the inward movement of the soul. There are two important points here:

1. Music has its primary mode of existence within the soul; and
2. Its role there is essentially therapeutic.

'By producing appropriate vocal/musical sounds [not words, but sounds] the singer expresses the psychic movements that have the required effect on the soul [i.e., to release it from the evils due to the emotions]. In so doing, we may infer, he stimulates these movements in the souls of others, and perhaps reinforces them in his own; that this is so is not a casual or secondary effect but constitutes its essence.'¹²⁶

¹²³ Page 65.10–15 Düring = FHS & G 716 (end).

¹²⁴ Barker's alternative translation, 'neither would it be the nature of music', 1989: 118 seems to be less apt. See also FHS & G 716 for the same translation and note.

¹²⁵ See Barker's very clear discussion on this rather complicated extract at 2007: 411 ff.

¹²⁶ So Barker 1985: 316.

As Barker remarks, ‘No other Theophrastean view about music, in fact, is so frequently mentioned in later antiquity, and it probably figured prominently in the work from which our fragment is taken,’¹²⁷ and certainly the same view is expressed in the two extracts below, T5.iv.3 and 5.iv.4. Sicking claims that Theophrastus had little or no affinity with Damon or Plato’s belief that music had an important role to play in the education of the human soul to *aretē*,¹²⁸ and whilst it must be conceded that there is no specific statement to state that Theophrastus did see such a role for music, nor, I would suggest, is there any statement to the effect that he did not. If Theophrastus was in any way influenced by Damon, then it is much more likely that he saw some educational role for music, even if in a lesser way than, say, Plato.

Theophrastus’ views are further confirmed at Plutarch’s *Quaest. Conviv.* 623A.¹²⁹

[T5.iv.3] Sosius says. . . that one would not be approaching the matter badly if one began from what Theophrastus said about music, ‘For I recently’, he said, ‘read the book, and he says that there are three sources of music: pain, pleasure and inspiration, for each of these emotions turns the voice aside and deflects it from its usual (inflection).

A similar view is repeated by Aristides Quintilianus in his *De Musica* Book II, 57.31ff.:

[T5.iv.4] It has also been observed that there is no one single cause that makes us turn to making melody. For those who are happy it is pleasure, for those in sorrow it is grief, and for those possessed by the impulse of a divine breath, it is inspiration.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Barker 2007: 433–4.

¹²⁸ Sicking 1997: 142.

¹²⁹ = FHS &G 719A.

¹³⁰ Translation by Barker 1989: 462. Cf. also Plato *Ion* 536c, where people will react differently to music according to which god is possessing them.

Aristides does not give a source here, but what he says certainly reflects the views of Theophrastus as outlined in T5.iv.3. As Barker notes, the extracts that can be linked to Theophrastus hint at his view of the power of music, a view that bears some similarity in part to Plato's with respect to emotion and character, which was believed to be in turn very much led by Damon,¹³¹ who also is attested to have written that music arises from the soul.¹³²

'If music's nature is that of a movement of the soul, and specifically that of one capable of releasing it from emotional stress, the patterns of movement which constitute the music will be marked off from those that do not by criteria of an essentially psychological sort.'¹³³ The principles governing it will be those that determine which inner movements are capable of generating emotional 'release'. This, remarks Barker, sounds very similar to the sentiments outlined in Plato's *Timaeus* 47d–e:

[T5.iv.5] [M]usic too, in so far as it uses audible sound, was bestowed for the sake of harmony. And harmony which has motions akin to the revolutions of the Soul within us, was given by the Muses, not as an aid to irrational pleasure, as is now supposed, but as an auxiliary to the inner revolution of the Soul, when it has lost its harmony to assist in restoring it to order and concord with itself.¹³⁴

However, as Barker states, whilst the end result is a harmonised soul, the origins of the music cannot be the same in Plato's mind as in Theophrastus'. It is difficult to understand how the very music that will restore the afflicted soul to harmony could have originated within that same troubled soul. On this basis, concludes Barker, Theophrastus cannot have supposed that a healthy soul was structured on a musical basis in precisely the same way as it was for Plato in the *Timaeus*, given that for Theophrastus, music was psychic movement of an

¹³¹ But see now Barker's query about the extent of any Damonian influence on Plato, see chapter 4, pp. 120–6 and notes.

¹³² By Athenaeus *Deipn.* 628c: 'With good reason, Damon of Athens and his school say that songs and dances are the result of the soul's being in a kind of motion' (Loeb translation).

¹³³ So Barker 2007: 434–6.

essentially therapeutic sort.¹³⁵ Furthermore, the ideal musical structure of the soul in the *Timaeus* is grounded in the principles of mathematical order and perfection, but it is the *mathematikoi* who hold this view that Theophrastus has spent so much time arguing against in the fragment.

There are just two references to Theophrastus in the Philodemian *De Musica*, and it must be said that neither reference really adds to our knowledge of either Theophrastus or Diogenes. Further, whilst the Theophrastean fragments above perhaps account for (in Theophrastus' view, at least) the origins of music, and perhaps to a lesser extent their effects, Diogenes' theory would seem to be primarily interested in the effects of music rather than its creation. The Philodemus references do, however, serve to confirm that both philosophers, unlike Philodemus, but in accordance with the other philosophers cited by Diogenes, believed that music had some psychological power, and indeed some therapeutic value.

It was previously thought that the suggestion of expulsion of evils mentioned above in T5.iv.2 also arises in Philodemus' *De Musica*, at column 81, although it does not in Delattre's newly constructed text. Delattre's text runs as follows:

[T5.iv.6]]ωντος Θεοφράσ[του
π]ρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῖς
]ιν μόνον, ἴσως δὲ
 ἀ]κολασίαν συνερ-
 γεῖν . .]ντας φαίνεται βέλ-
 τιον] ἀποτε[θε]ωρημέ-
 ν.]α καὶ φυ[σι]κῶς καὶ
 ἀ]πορίπτ[εσθ]αι τὸ με-
]εἰ ἰ σ[ώ]ματος εἰ ἴ ναι τι
]ς καὶ τὸ τῶν
]εν εὐκοσμίαν

¹³⁴ Trans Bury, in Loeb edition.

¹³⁵ Barker 2007: 434–5.

we [don't agree] at all, with the permission of Theophrastus, that [melodies] contribute for those [who sing] only to virtue, and perhaps [also] to disorder, it is clearly preferable for [us], who have for our part developed some serious thought on [these questions] from the point of view of physics, to reject [the claim that a tune] will be [naturally] [able to move] the body and . . . good conduct.¹³⁶

Whilst the expulsion of evil may well have formed part of Theophrastus' theory, if Delattre's reconstruction is correct I do not see any mention of that within Diogenes' writings as they have come down to us, although Diogenes clearly allowed for some therapeutic value in music.

Another reference to Theophrastus appears just one column later, at Delattre 82.39:¹³⁷

[T.5.iv.7] . . . Moreover, when Theophrastus writes that it is unreasonable that music does not at all move and harmonise souls, he is far from proving that my statement conflicts with the truth.

Unfortunately, the claims that Philodemus is refuting are not extant in the text, but clearly Diogenes must have written that Theophrastus held the view that music both moved and harmonised the soul, and indeed the writings of both Philodemus and Porphyry are evidence that he believed that music could in some way contribute to virtue and the expulsion of evil. Censorinus, too, recorded that Theophrastus '[thought] at any rate it has a great deal of divinity and has great

¹³⁶ Philodemus is, of course, speaking *in propria persona* here, rather than reporting Diogenes. I insert the Greek with Delattre's preferred translation here as it differs a little from that of Sedley in FHS & G (720, pp, 574–6). Sedley's reconstructed text and translation ran, [συνορ]ώντος Θεοφράστ[του π]ρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τοῖς | [παισ]ίν μόνον, ἴσως δὲ | πρὸς ἀ[κολασίαν] συνερ[γού]ς ὄντας, φαίνεται βέλ[τιον ἂν] ἀποτε[θε]ωρημέ[ν]ος ἔνι|α καὶ φ[υσι]κῶς κα[κ]ί[ων] ἀ[πορί]πτ[εσθ]αι, τὸ μέ[λος δὲ] σώματος εἶναι τι | [κινητικόν], καὶ τὸ τῶν [χ] [παθῶν] χαρ[ί]εν εὐκοσμίαν | 'Since Theophrastus sees that (rhythms barely) contribute to virtue and only for children, and that perhaps they contribute to intemperance, it seems as if he would have been better speculating that some vices are also expelled naturally, and that a tune is something capable of moving the body, and that gracefulness of the passions (produces) orderliness. . .'

¹³⁷ FHS & G 721A, pp. 576–7.

influence in moving (our) souls'.¹³⁸ Plutarch (*Non posse* 1095E–1096A) attests to the fact that Theophrastus was also quite willing to take part in discussion of music at a banquet, unlike the Epicureans, confirming that one might find him giving 'a discourse on concords'.

The Theophrastean fragments considered are good evidence that Theophrastus regarded music as an important therapeutic tool, and in this respect at least, Diogenes could have used him both as a source and/or as an authority for his own views. If Theophrastus did indeed privilege *aisthēsis* over *logos*, then Diogenes might even have adopted some of his psychology. Sadly, Diogenes' citation of Theophrastus, if indeed there was one, is no longer extant; the columns where, on the basis of the positioning of Philodemus' refutation, any discussion on this philosopher should appear, are extremely damaged, and no hint of his name can be made out today.

(v) *Aristoxenus*

When analysing the musical theory of any writer who lived after the fourth century BC, the possible influence of Aristoxenus of Tarentum must be considered. A member of the Peripatetic school, and a philosopher in his own right,¹³⁹ Aristoxenus is best known for his developments in the science of harmonic theory. Whilst, as I will discuss below, he may have allowed some ethical value in music, as did Plato, Aristotle, and members of his school before him, his primary concern seems to have been with the strict science of harmonics and rhythmic, and a theory of musical aesthetics.

Born around 370 BC,¹⁴⁰ his best-known, and only work preserved in more than fragmentary form, entitled *Elementa Harmonica* (henceforth *El. harm.*), in three, now incomplete, books comprise most of the extant evidence of his harmonic

¹³⁸ Censorinus, *About the Day of Birth* 12.1 = FHS & G 721B.

¹³⁹ *Suda* fr. 1 Ἀριστοῦξενος.

¹⁴⁰ The *Suda* lists him as a contemporary of Dicaearchus of Messina.

theory. Of a second work entitled the *Elementa Rhythmica*, only a very small part survives today.

As mentioned above, and as quoted elsewhere,¹⁴¹ Aristoxenus did not appear to be convinced that music could have any effect on the character, as spelt out in the *El. harm.* at 31.16–32.9:

[T5.v.1] Mistakes can be made in either of two directions. Some people suppose that the discipline is massively important, and that by listening to a discussion on harmonics they will become not only *mousikoi* but better in their characters. They have misunderstood things that we said in our *deixeis*: ‘we are trying to create each kind of melodic composition’, and of music in general, ‘one sort damages peoples’ characters, while another sort benefits them’. They not only misunderstood that, but completely failed to notice our qualification, ‘in so far as music can provide such benefits’. Others imagine it to be insignificant, of no importance, and yet profess themselves not to be ignorant of what it is. Neither of these positions is correct. The science is not to be despised by anyone of intelligence: that will become clear as our discussion progresses: nor is it so important as to be sufficient on its own for everything, as some people think.¹⁴²

However, Aristoxenus clearly believed that musical compositions could contain *ēthos* and could indeed, in the right circumstances, express that character. As highlighted in text T5.v.1 above, however, he was not convinced that in expressing a certain *ēthos*, music also had the power to influence human character and in *this* belief, he clearly differed from the other, earlier, philosophers I am considering in the context of their possible influence on Diogenes of Babylon.

Most of the evidence for Aristoxenus’ views on the ethical value of music is preserved in the Plutarchan *De Musica*, and, in particular within chapters 31–7.¹⁴³ At the very beginning of chapter 31 (1142B2), Sotericus of Alexandria, the musical

¹⁴¹ Ch. 2, pp. 47–8 and nn. 102–3.

¹⁴² Trans. Barker 1989: 148–9, as amended by Barker 2007: 251. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the *El. harm.* are taken from Barker 1989.

¹⁴³ See Rocconi 2005: 1.

expert talking here about music training states, ‘That success or failure in music depends on one’s training and instruction is shown by Aristoxenus.’ Unsurprisingly, the analysis that follows opens with a comparison between, the ‘καλλίστη μουσικῆ’ of the ancient poets, such as Pindar, Dionysius of Thebes, Lamprus and Pratinas, and the ‘New Music’ of Philoxenus and Timotheus, which contained ‘variety and innovation’ (ποικιλία and καινοτομία). Like his predecessors, Aristoxenus firmly favours the old style. Earlier in the *De Musica* (1135C–D), albeit in a passage not attributed to Aristoxenus, the Plutarchan writer states:

[T5.v.2] Cræxus, Timotheus, Philoxenus, and the composers of that time had a streak of coarseness in them, and were fond of novelty, aiming at the manner that is now called ‘popular’ and ‘mercenary’.¹⁴⁴

A similar comparison between Philoxenus and Pindar is, of course, made by Diogenes of Babylon in the Philodemian *De Musica*, at Col. 31.8, where Diogenes states:

[T5.v.3] κ[αὶ τοὺς] δειθυραμβι-
 κοὺς δὲ τρόπ[ο]υς εἴ τις συγ-
 κρίναι, τὸν τε κατὰ Πίνδα-
 ρον καὶ τὸν κατὰ Φιλόξε-
 νον, μεγάλην εὐρεθήσεσθαι
 τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἐπιφαι-
 νομένων ἡθῶν, τὸν αὖ-
 τὸν δ’ εἶναι τρόπον·

Moreover, concerning the styles of the dithyramb, if one compares one [written] by Pindar with one of Philoxenus’, you will see that the difference between the characters of each is very great, but the style (τρόπον) is the same.

The Plutarchan treatise, this time quoting Aristoxenus moves on to state:

[T5.v.4] And so, if one wishes to cultivate music nobly (καλῶς), and with discrimination, one should copy the ancient manner. But one should not stop there, one should supplement it with the disciplines, and take philosophy for guide in youth, since philosophy is competent to decide the point to which the various skills can be employed so as to be appropriate to the musical art (τὸ μουσικῆ πρέπον), and thus determine the question of their use. (De Mus. 1142c–d)

The translator of the Loeb edition notes here the similarity with Plato's *Phaedrus* 268e6–270a8, where the Platonic Socrates and Phaedrus discuss the various disciplines that are appropriate to one another, but as Barker remarks, 'there is nothing surprising about that'.¹⁴⁵ Barker continues, '[Aristoxenus] is assigning the whole business of critical judgement to an intellectual elite', as indeed did Plato before him.

There is also a distinct similarity, however, to the opinion attributed to Heraclides of Pontus by Diogenes of Babylon, where he (Diogenes) remarks at column 48: '[T]he question of appropriate and inappropriate melody. . . you will see that they are subjects not remote from philosophy' (for more on this and other references to Heraclides, see above, sub-section (iii) this chapter, and in particular T5.iii.1). Plato, Aristotle, Heraclides, and I would suggest, Diogenes of Babylon would all have agreed with Aristoxenus in 'assigning the whole business of critical judgement to an *intellectual elite*'.¹⁴⁶ This, as I will argue in chapter 7, below, is the crucial point to which Philodemus objects, and probably one of his primary purposes of this polemical work. I believe that he felt that Diogenes (and, probably, all those who influenced him) had lost sight of what was for him the primary purpose of

¹⁴⁴ Loeb edition, trans Einarson and De Lacy.

¹⁴⁵ Barker 2007: 259.

¹⁴⁶ Quotation, as above, from Barker 2007: 259, emphasis mine.

music – pure pleasure – in favour of their intellectualised theory ‘linking music to morality and psychology’.¹⁴⁷

The Plutarchan writer continues, still with Aristoxenus as authority:

[T5.v.5] Now first it must be understood that all the instruction given in music is a mere habituation which has not yet advanced to any insight into the reason why each detail is a necessary part of what the student must learn.¹⁴⁸

Again, the Loeb commentator notes the similarity with Plato’s *Phaedrus* 270b5–271c1, the principal point of which is where Socrates emphasises that one cannot understand the nature of the soul without an understanding of the nature of the whole body. But once again, these are sentiments with which Plato, Aristotle and later Peripatetics would surely not find fault. This is an important component in laying down a secure grounding on which the student may build. At *El. harm.* 33.6–10, Aristoxenus states:

[T5.v.6] Taken as a whole, our science is concerned with all musical melody, both vocal and instrumental. Its pursuit depends ultimately on two things: hearing and reason. Through hearing we assess the magnitudes of intervals, and through reason we apprehend their [the intervals’] functions (*dunameis*). We must therefore become practised in assessing particulars accurately.

In this important respect, I would suggest, it is clear that Aristoxenus differs from Diogenes of Babylon. As discussed in chapter 2, Diogenes believed that those who had learned the technical discipline of music judged good and bad music, melody, harmony and rhythm with a rational or ‘scientific’ *sense* of hearing (ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις), sensation was always involved rather than reason; for Aristoxenus, judgement involved both hearing and reason (see T5.v.6 above, and further discussion below, at T5.v.11).

¹⁴⁷ Delattre’s words, Delattre 1998: 226.

¹⁴⁸ [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1142D–E.

The Plutarchan writer now moves on to remark how a systematic approach is required to learn the appropriate modes, a practise not followed by ‘the majority’, who tend to learn at random. He remarks that the ‘discerning reject such a lack of system as did in ancient times the Lacedaimonians, and the men of Mantinea and Pellene’.¹⁴⁹

This passage is very interesting, because there is a direct parallel to this in Diogenes’ writings, at (the Philodemian) *De Musica* column 32, ll. 1–11:

[T5.v.7]

..] χρόνον καταρξαμέν[ων
 τῶν Μαντινέων τε καὶ [Λα-
 κε]δαιμονίων καὶ Πελλ[η-
 νέ]ων· παρὰ τούτοις γὰρ κα[ὶ
 πρ]ώτοις καὶ μάλιστα τὴν
 ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιμέ[λει-
 αν] γενέσθαι τῶν τε κ[αλῶν
 ἐπιτηδευμάτων κ[αὶ τῆς
 ἄλλης μουσικῆς

. . . as the citizens of Mantinea as well as those of Lacedaimonia and Pellene have shown the example. Amongst them was developed first of all, and to the highest degree, the rigorous practice of the most noble activities, and that of music (*mousikēs*) in particular. . . to be. . . the one starting from the others. . .¹⁵⁰

If indeed the Plutarch text is still quoting Aristoxenus,¹⁵¹ and the reference to the Mantineans does fit with records of Aristoxenus having stayed there around 350BC,¹⁵² then this is also good evidence that Diogenes might have had access to, and was familiar with, the content of Aristoxenus’ ethical writings at the very

¹⁴⁹ *De Musica* 1142E.

¹⁵⁰ Here the text becomes very lacunose, a number of lines being completely lost.

¹⁵¹ Rocconi (2005) is confident that Aristoxenus may be read as the authority right up to at least 1144E, *contra* Wehrli fr. 76 and comments there.

¹⁵² *Suda* s.v. Aristoxenus; I owe this point to Eleonora Rocconi, see Rocconi 2005: 6.

least.¹⁵³ Philodemus makes no reply to this claim of Diogenes, although at col. 109 he states:

[T5.v.8] Ἀριστόξενος [δὲ] τὴν ὄρ[ασιν
καὶ τ]ὴν ἀκο[ὴν λ]έγων [καὶ
γεγεν]ῆσθαι τὸ κύριον τῆ[ς δι-
ανοί]ας καὶ θειοτέρας τ[ῶν
ἄλλω]ν αἰσθήσεων, οὐ μ[ό-
νον δι]ὰ τὸ τετυφῶσθαι δ[ι-
ἐπι]τεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ [λέ-
γειν] προάγειν καὶ παῖ[δα,
ὄντα] παντελῶς ἀνασ[τρον,
εἰς ἀνδ]ρείας παρασκευά-
ζουσαν]

When Aristoxenus said that sight and hearing [constitute] the most important part of the intellect, and are the most divine senses of all,¹⁵⁴ he was wrong, not only because he was consumed by a foolish pretentiousness, but also because he said that it [music] incites even a child, a being completely lacking in courage into acts of courage. . .

If Philodemus is following his usual pattern of parallel criticism, then Diogenes' claim, which this refutes, should appear towards the end of column 27, and the fact that Philodemus mentions Aristoxenus by name here also strongly suggest to me that Diogenes would have done so as well. Philodemus, as far as I can see, nowhere introduces new 'characters' into his polemic whilst attacking Diogenes' theory. He may well do so in his concluding columns, where he rounds up his four books, but not, I believe, elsewhere. It is clear, also, that where

¹⁵³ Pace Barker 2001: 354.

¹⁵⁴ Cf. [Aristotle] *Magna Moralia* II.7, 1205b25–8, where [Aristotle] remarks 'the pleasures of sight, hearing and thought will be best'.

Philodemus mentions Aristoxenus again, in his own conclusion, he treats him with respect, perhaps because by then Aristoxenus' own reputation amongst Philodemus' contemporaries was such that anything he claimed would be treated with some seriousness, unlike Philodemus' own treatment of Diogenes' claims.¹⁵⁵ Delattre suggests,¹⁵⁶ '[Aristoxenus] was, in [Philodemus'] eyes, the most important musical authority to have deliberately cut off music from ethico-pedagogical thought, which, until then had been considered essential as a means to lead a child to virtue.' Philodemus indeed would have applauded such sentiments, although I am not convinced that Aristoxenus removed music from this field altogether. Philodemus, also, is reluctant to see Aristoxenus as a serious philosopher – for Philodemus he is simply, I would suggest, a (much respected) musical expert, no more.¹⁵⁷

At column 95, however, Philodemus has already remarked that the senses relative to sight and sound are much less important than those relating to those of taste – these are of course necessary to life. Here, remarks Delattre,¹⁵⁸ Philodemus is probably responding to a claim made by Diogenes (now lost) regarding the hierarchy of the senses, a claim Philodemus also appears to be refuting at column 109 (above, T5.v.8). For an Epicurean, things necessary to life would of course be privileged above those not so.

Returning to the text at the first fifteen lines of column 27, then, it is clear that a discussion of the senses and their appreciation of beauty is beginning,¹⁵⁹ but there is a lacuna of some thirty lines before the very damaged first twenty-five lines of the next column, plenty of room, therefore, for some claim citing Aristoxenus as authority to parallel Philodemus' criticism at column 109. This cannot, of course, be taken as firm evidence that Diogenes had seen Aristoxenus' writing, but taken with

¹⁵⁵ This either suggests that Philodemus misrepresented Aristoxenus in T5.v.8, which is unlikely in my view as he does not usually misrepresent even his opponents' claims, or that he has conveniently forgotten what he said in that column. I would suggest that the latter possibility is more likely.

¹⁵⁶ 2007: vol. I, CCXLIII.

¹⁵⁷ For further discussion on this, see Delattre 2007: vol. II, 203, n. 3. But Philodemus probably would not have seen any non-Epicurean as a serious philosopher.

¹⁵⁸ 2007: vol. II, 184, n. 2.

¹⁵⁹ As discussed above, T5.i.2, and pp. 137 ff., Delattre (2007: vol. II, 340, n. 1) suggests that Diogenes is referring back explicitly to Aristotle's *Politics* VIII. 1337b23–8 here, evidence perhaps

the common discussion of the citizens of Lacedaimonia, Mantinea and Pellene discussed above, it does constitute a definite probability, I would suggest. Evidence, also perhaps, that Aristoxenus was not as sceptical about music's ability to affect human behaviour as previously thought.¹⁶⁰

At *El harm.* 2.1–6, Aristoxenus states that melodic composition does not form part of the science of harmonics included within his own *mousikē paideia*. Instead, he states that it belongs to the '[science] which includes both this and others through which all musical matters are investigated, and that is the science whose possession makes a man a musical expert'.

The composition of a piece of music, however, *is* an important element when its character is to be identified, as stated by the Plutarchan writer:

[T5.v.9] The science of harmonics. . . is blind to the nature of appropriateness (*tēs oikeiotētos dunamin*). For neither the chromatic nor the enharmonic carries with it an understanding of what it is to be appropriate, through which the moral character of a musical composition (*to tou pepoiēmenou melous ēthos*) is revealed. This is the task of the possessor of the art. It is clear that the sound of a *sustēma* and that of the melody composed in it are two distinct matters, and the study of the latter is not within the scope of the science of harmonics.¹⁶¹

For discussion of the two musical styles, enharmonic and chromatic, see below, p. 186. For now, the ability to judge music is the subject in hand, and in language that sounds very similar to *Problem XIX.27*, T5.i.11 above, the Plutarch writer continues, 'Good' and 'bad' do not exist in isolated notes, but 'in the series',¹⁶² i.e., in the way they are mixed; hence an understanding of continuity is, according to Aristoxenus, essential if one is to be able to make a judgement on the

that Aristoxenus at least agreed with his predecessor that practice at analysis of the arts did indeed assist in learning how to analyse and understand music.

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., Barker 1989: 148–9; Woodward forthcoming.

¹⁶¹ *De Musica* 1143A.

¹⁶² Above, pp. 149–51, and nn. 51–3.

ēthos of a piece.¹⁶³ Proficiency in practical music, and possession of the theoretical knowledge of music in themselves are not sufficient to become a *mousikos*, for Diogenes of Babylon, the equivalent to a *kritikos*.¹⁶⁴ For Aristoxenus, music is beneficial to understanding, as it was for Plato, for whom music could aid development of comprehension and judgement of ethical value, as stated at *Republic* 402c:

[T5.v.10] Then, by heaven, am I not right in saying that by the same token, we shall never be true musicians, either, neither we nor the guardians that we have undertaken to educate, until we are able to recognise forms of soberness, courage, liberality, and high-mindedness and their opposites too, in all the combinations that contain and convey them, and to apprehend them and their images wherever found, disregarding them neither in trifles, nor in great things, but believing the knowledge of them to belong to the same art and discipline?

For Plato, then, as for Aristoxenus, in order to fully understand a composition, both perception and interpretive thought will be involved, as confirmed at [Plutarch] *De Musica* 1143F–1144A:

[T5.v.11] Thus, to speak in the broadest terms, perception (*aisthēsis*) and the mind (*dianoia*) must keep abreast of each other when we pass judgement on the various elements of musical composition, and the ear must not outstrip the mind, as happens when perception is hasty and in headlong motion, nor yet lag behind, as happens when perception is sluggish and inert. In some, perception even suffers from a combination of the two failings and is both too slow and too fast, owing to some unevenness of nature. All this is to be eliminated if perception is to keep in step with the mind.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶³ 1144B.

¹⁶⁴ Philodemus, *De Musica* col. 48, on which see chapter 6, section ii.

¹⁶⁵ Trans. Einarson and De Lacy (Loeb edition) as amended.

Diogenes of Babylon also likened his musical experts to the *kritikoi*, when he stated that ‘music is good for the intelligence. . .’¹⁶⁶ However, for Diogenes the crucial part of judgement was made by ‘knowing’ or ‘scientific’ sensation (*epistemonikē aisthēsis*), rather than *aisthēsis* and *dianoia* together. It is clear, then, I would suggest, that in this respect too, Diogenes differed from Aristoxenus.

At column 112, 16–28 of his *De Musica*, however, Philodemus is clearly addressing a claim that also involves the pairing of perception and the mind, where he writes:

[T5.v.12] π]αιδὸς [.
]ς ὠφελι-
] τὸ τὴν αἴ-
 σθησί]ν τε [πρ]ός τι τῶν κα-
 λῶν π]ροσβάλλειν καὶ συν-
 εθίζε]ιν τὴν διάνο[ι]αν ἀ-
 ποδέ]χεσθαι καὶ στέ[ργειν
 τῶι ὄ]ντι τὸ καλὸν κ[αὶ τὸ
 ἀγαθ]ὸν οὐδ’ ἐν ὕπνω[ι . . .
 . . . κ]αὶ τὸ τὴν ἰν [.
 . . . τ]ινὰ δ.[. . .]λου[. . .
 . . . κ]ατὰ τοῦτω[ν] ἔλε[γ. ν·

. . . of the child. . . profitable. . . [the fact that] if he applies his perception to one of the noble subjects and accustoms his thought to welcome and to cherish the beautiful [and the good] in a real way, and not in a dream . . .

Was Diogenes utilising Aristoxenus’ pairing of perception and reason in his discussion of the way music could accustom the child to beauty and prepare him little by little to virtue (columns 22–7)? Unfortunately both Diogenes’ and Philodemus’ arguments are very lacunose at this point. From his discussion at

¹⁶⁶ Column 48; for more discussion on this passage, see below chapter 6, section ii.

column 34 on *epistēmonikē aisthēsis*, I cannot see that this would sit easily within Diogenes' theory unless this could be the means by which 'scientific' sensation is developed. This could, perhaps, be the case – Diogenes cannot, and indeed did not, claim that we are born with this 'scientific' sensation, but simply with natural sensation – that of recognising hot and cold. If the Plutarchan extract (T5.v.11) reflects Aristoxenus' true view, which, given Aristoxenus' own writing at T5.v.6 would seem to be the case, this would also align well with the Peripatetic concept of 'dual criterion',¹⁶⁷ explained, for example, by Sextus Empiricus at *M.* VII.217–18:

[T5.v.13] The followers of Aristotle and of Theophrastus, and the Peripatetics in general, since the nature of things is at the highest level double, some, as I said beforehand, being perceptible by the senses and others intelligible, themselves too bequeathed [us] a double criterion, sense-perception for the perceptibles, intellect for the intelligibles, and for both in common, as Theophrastus said, clarity. In order the irrational and indemonstrable criterion comes first, [that is] sense-perception, but in power intellect [comes first], even if it is thought to be second in order as compared with perception.¹⁶⁸

But this process of acquisition might indeed be hinted at by Diogenes himself at column 18, where he states:¹⁶⁹

[T5.v.14] [for] music also allows [the child] to acquire a good ear, and in general, a great sensitivity to the rhythm, given that it [the music] possesses certain natural virtues; for he says that what is strongest in all things is what is proper, and it is

¹⁶⁷ For a concise discussion on the dual criterion, see e.g., Barnes 2007: 550–9.

¹⁶⁸ I thank Professor Sharples for bringing this extract to my attention, taken from his forthcoming Sourcebook (Sharples forthcoming).

¹⁶⁹ For the Greek, see above, chapter 2, T2.iv.1.

what is similar that is assimilated most swiftly and easily being borne directly to [one's] being like certain sensibles. . .¹⁷⁰

Further possible agreement between Aristoxenus and Diogenes might be suggested by Diogenes' comments regarding the use of music and wine at banquets, at column 46.19–28:

[T5.v.15] καὶ γὰρ εἰ μή τις ἐπι-
τηδεύοι, «τὸν οἶνον ἐκκαλεῖ-
σ[θ]αι πολύφρονά π[ερ μά]λ' [ἀεῖ-
σα] καὶ θ' ἀπαλὸν γ[ελάσαι
κ]αί τ' ὀρχήσα σ[θ]αι», ταῦτα [δὲ
ποιεῖν ὄλ[ως ἀ]ναγκαίω[ς] κα-
λῆς δὲ δι[αγω]γ[ῆς] οὔση[ς], ἐμμε-
λῶς ἢ μὴ σκαί' ὧς' ἐν αὐτ[οῖς] ἀνα-
στρέφουσθαι φιλο[πότας] . . .
]ναι π[.]]υτ[.]

Indeed, even if one is not used to these activities [singing, playing the cithara and dancing] 'wine incites however sedate [or wise?] you might be, to sing as well as laugh kindly and dance' and one gives oneself up to it in [an altogether] necessary way, but since it is itself a good pastime [*diagōgē*], appropriately or not awkwardly do those who love to drink behave in [the banquets] . . .

The Plutarchan *De Musica* records at 1146F–1147A:

[T5.v.16] Song and dance, the 'graces of a feast' . . . For it is a fact that music was there introduced for its efficacy in counteracting and soothing the heat latent in wine, as your favourite Aristoxenus somewhere says, for it was he who said that

¹⁷⁰ Delattre remarks that any parallel criticism would probably occur at column 95 or 96, both of which are too badly damaged to be read. See also chapter 2, at T2.iv.1 and discussion.

music was introduced for as much as wine makes the bodies and minds who overindulge in it disorderly, while music by its order and balance brings us to the opposite condition and soothes us.

This latter quotation, however, is also reminiscent of the Pythagorean/Damonian anecdote related at chapter 3, pp. 78–81 and notes. Philodemus' criticism of Diogenes' column 46, at column 131, remarks that music is no better when played to the poems of Homer or Hesiod. Here, however, Philodemus clearly implies that Diogenes is confusing music and poetry – perhaps because there is no other way for him to find fault with Diogenes' statement?

In my examination of the musico-ethical theory of Aristoxenus, I have not attempted to analyse his very complex science of harmonics, as set out in the *El harm.*, firstly because there is nothing in Diogenes of Babylon's ethical theory with which to compare it, and secondly, but more importantly perhaps, because Aristoxenus' theory is clearly just that – theoretical. Diogenes' theory is, on the other hand, more practical – he is not suggesting, I believe, proofs such as mathematical theorems, which can be shown on paper, as Aristoxenus' theory of *genē*, correct intervals, etc., may be, but as proofs that will be displayed on living individuals, the evidence will be apparent in the way human beings react, or not, to different types of music.

At column 116, Philodemus argues that the musical modes are the business of opinion, not sensation. People will have different opinions about different modes, he states. The important point about this particular discussion is the different modes referred to. Only enharmonic and chromatic modes are mentioned – there is no reference at all to the third of Aristoxenus' three *genera* – the diatonic; nor are they referred to as '*genē*' as they would have been by Aristoxenus, but as *mousikē*. This is one of the main reasons that Barker uses in his argument¹⁷¹ that Diogenes' musico-ethical theory differed *in its very essence* from that of Aristoxenus. Certainly for the latter, the three *genera* formed the basis of his theory, and no extant

discussion by Aristoxenus considers only two. If the Aristoxenian system of *genera* were being discussed here, holds Barker, it should be the diatonic and one other at the mainstay of the discussion.¹⁷² Further, as argued above, Aristoxenus was of the view that ‘no conclusions about ethical and aesthetic qualities of a piece of music could legitimately be drawn from a technical analysis of its harmonic structure’.¹⁷³

In looking at Aristoxenus’ ethical theory of music, so far as he had one, what I have not considered thus far is whether or not Diogenes’ theory of the soul, i.e., that which is affected by the music, is in any way similar to that of Aristoxenus, and in this study, I am much indebted to an article written by Annie Bélis in 1985.¹⁷⁴

There are two main sources for Aristoxenus’ theory of the soul, and both would seem to confirm that his theory would not have been acceptable to any Stoic.

Eusebius, in his *Evangelical Preparation* 15.20.6,¹⁷⁵ states:

[T5.v.17] [The Stoics] say that the soul is subject to generation and destruction. When separated from the body, however, it does not perish at once, but survives on its own for certain times, the soul of the virtuous up to the dissolution of everything into fire, and of fools only for certain definite times.

This notion that the soul lives on once the person has died does not, I would suggest, go as far as Plato’s ‘immortal’ soul as depicted in the ‘Myth of Er’ in *Republic* Book X, but it is certainly in direct opposition to the Aristoxenian theory of the soul as adumbrated in Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*, and Lactantius’ *Divinae Institutiones* and *De officio Dei*.

Cicero suggests that Aristoxenus was incapable of understanding the whole concept of the soul. At *Tusc.* I. xxii, 51–2 he states:

¹⁷¹ 2001: 357–9.

¹⁷² 2001: 357.

¹⁷³ Barker 2001: 358; Plutarch *De Musica* chs. 33, 36 above, and Aristoxenus *El. harm.* 31, 16–32, 8.

¹⁷⁴ ‘Le théorie de l’âme chez Aristoxène de Tarente’, *Révue de Philologie* LIX. 2 1985: 239–46.

¹⁷⁵ Long and Sedley 1987: 53W, their translation.

[T5.v.18] It is true that Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus said that the soul had no existence at all, because of the difficulty of understanding what the soul was and what its nature was.¹⁷⁶

Lactantius goes further at *Inst.* VII. 13.9–10, where he states:

[T5.v.19] What about Aristoxenus, who said there is absolutely no soul at all, even when it is alive in the body? He made comparison with stringed instruments, saying that a power of perception exists in bodies as a result of the structure of the guts, and the vitality of the limbs in the same way that a harmonious sound, the harmony that musicians speak of, can be produced from tensioning the strings of an instrument. Nothing can be madder than that. Aristoxenus' eyes were sound enough, but his heart was blind: he failed to see that he was living by his heart, and did possess a mind with which he had done his thinking. Philosophers commonly disbelieve in the existence of anything not visible to the eye, though their ability to see mentally things whose force and aim are felt rather than seen ought to be much greater than their ability to see physically.¹⁷⁷

Clearly, then, whilst Diogenes *might* have had some sympathies with Aristoxenus' musico-ethical theory, he would have had no time for his psychology. The notion that the mind/soul had no existence outside the body would have been anathema to the Stoic. Further, as outlined by Lactantius,¹⁷⁸ it appears that Aristoxenus drew a direct analogy between the soul and the lyre, although this would seem to contradict Lactantius' own statement in T5.v.19, above:¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ Trans. J. E. King, Loeb edition.

¹⁷⁷ Lactantius *Inst.*, trans. A. Bowen and P. Garnsey in *Lactantius Divine Institutes*. Liverpool: 2003.

¹⁷⁸ *De Opif. Dei*. XVI. Translation W. Fletcher in *The Writings of Lactantius*, 2 volumes, Edinburgh: 1871.

¹⁷⁹ Perhaps this is to mean that for Aristoxenus, the soul did not have a separate existence, therefore, but was simply a way of describing the body when it is in a certain state, e.g., tense, or relaxed? As Gottschalk suggests (1971: 187–8), 'the soul is not a distinct entity. . . having any claim to exist in its own right, but psychic activity or consciousness is a secondary manifestation of the correct functioning and interaction of the bodily parts of organisms'.

[T5.v.20] And as in the lyre, when anything has been interrupted or relaxed, the whole method of the strain is disturbed and destroyed; so in the body, when any part of the limbs receives an injury, the whole are weakened, and all being corrupted and thrown into confusion, the power of perception is destroyed: and this is called death.

Such an analogy is, perhaps, not surprising for a musical theorist, and is in fact reiterated by Cicero at *Tusc.* I. x. 19–20:

[T5.v.21] There was Aristoxenus, musician as well as philosopher, who held the soul to be a special tuning-up of the natural body analogous to that which is called harmony in vocal and instrumental music.

But, Cicero qualifies his view of Aristoxenus' theory with the words:

[T5.v.22] [Aristoxenus] is so pleased with his own tunes that he attempts to bring them into philosophy as well.¹⁸⁰

Whilst it is clear that both Cicero and Lactantius were using Aristoxenus' theory to attack him, as Bélis points out,¹⁸¹ the fact that the two highlight different parts of Aristoxenus' theory, whilst both provide evidence of a similar theory, would seem to confirm their fidelity to Aristoxenus' own writing.

¹⁸⁰ *Tusc.* I. xviii, 41.

¹⁸¹ 1985: 239.

Chapter 6

STOICS AND EPICUREANS ON POETRY

In the *De Musica*, whilst Philodemus is primarily concerned with reporting and attacking Diogenes' views on music, in the course of the work he also says quite a lot about poetry. Further, on a number of occasions, he implies that Diogenes confuses music with poetry, as for example at col. 131.14–17:

[T6.1]

μουσικῇ δὲ πῶς ἀμείνονι
χρηταί ποητάς, ἀλλ' οὐ μου-
σικ[ο]ύς, τούς γε τῶν μέτρων
εἰσ[ά]γοντα;

but how do they [sc. the banquets] employ a better kind of music in introducing epic poets as poets and not as musicians ?

However, whilst it is clear that Diogenes at times certainly talks about music and poetry together in the traditional way,¹ I would suggest that he does not at all confuse the two. It would seem useful, therefore, to briefly discuss the ways in which Philodemus and Diogenes use poetry. Further, as mentioned in the Introduction and in chapter 2,² Diogenes saw an analogy between the experts in music, the *mousikoi*, and the critics of poetry and literature – the *kritikoi*. This claim in itself is clear evidence that Diogenes consciously considered music and poetry separately at times. In section (ii) of this chapter, I will examine this claim and attempt to further analyse Diogenes' analogy.

There would seem to be a number of apparent contradictions in Philodemus' own views on poetry, one of which was that whilst he asserted that like music, it was only useful as a form of entertainment, he still considered both sufficiently important to write four books on music, the fourth running to some 155 columns, and at least five books on poetry. Furthermore, he wrote a number of epigrams, which in itself would seem to go against Epicurus' own teachings

¹ Indeed, more often than not Diogenes discusses the two together.

² See page 42 above.

that one should not spend time in the pursuit of poetry.³ It may be, however, that Epicurus' own view of poetry was similarly contradictory; Diogenes Laertius writes that Epicurus himself only turned to philosophy 'because he despised the schoolmasters since they were unable to explain to him the passage about Chaos in Hesiod'.⁴ It seems that Hesiod's poetry could not provide answers to Epicurus' questions, and so Epicurus thereafter turned to the philosophers to further his education.⁵ This did not, however, mean that Epicurus did not himself quote poetry when it suited his purpose; Diogenes Laertius reports at X.137–8 that Epicurus quotes two lines from Sophocles' *Trachiniae* in an explanation of how men seek to avoid pain.⁶ Epicurus describes Heracles actions when 'devoured by the poisoned robe' as crying aloud, 'And bites and yells, and rock to rock resounds, | Headlands of Locris and Euboean cliffs.'⁷

In the first section of this chapter, therefore, I propose to test the theory that far from considering music and poetry as unimportant, Philodemus certainly, and probably Epicurus and members of his school generally, considered that it indeed had an important function to play in life, but *outside* the field of education.⁸ Perhaps Philodemus' concern was to demonise the view held by Plato and the Stoics alike, that to have any worth, something must be of some moral value, and to assert that pleasure and entertainment, whilst not fundamentally necessary to life itself, nevertheless formed an important part in a *balanced* life. Indeed, Philodemus might be seen to be accusing both Plato and the Stoics of intellectualising all pleasures, as I will discuss further below.

In this chapter I will use, principally, two of Philodemus' works, sometimes in parallel with the *De Musica*, in an attempt to reconcile these problems, and to further elucidate Philodemus' own aesthetic theory. The two

³ See D. L. X.120–2, although as pointed out by Asmis (1995a: 22), Epicurus' teaching, as transmitted by Diogenes Laertius is ambiguous on this point. The traditional interpretation is that whilst the wise man has poetic ability, he will not use it. But Diogenes' report could also mean that that he will not practise poetry *in the manner of a professional*. Therefore, Philodemus' writing of epigrams might not go against Epicurus' teaching in the strict sense. This suggestion is supported by Sider 1995a: 36, responding to Asmis' chapter in the same book.

⁴ D.L. X.2.

⁵ For more discussion of this, see Obbink 1995: 190.

⁶ Of course, there is always the possibility that Diogenes (Laertius) added this himself.

⁷ Sophocles, *Trachiniae* 787–8, trans. Hicks in the Loeb Diogenes Laertius II.

⁸ Although compare Lucretius, a contemporary of Philodemus, who clearly believed that poetry could also be used in the field of education, and indeed wrote his *De rerum natura*, in six books, all on poetry.

works are the short political treatise *On The Good King According to Homer*, and *On Poems*, mainly Book V, but with some use of Book I.

For Epicurus, *technē* is a method of producing what is advantageous to life.⁹ Like Plato, Epicurus thought the educational system was corrupting, because it used the teachings of Homer and the poets. It seems that Philodemus also believed that the poetry of Homer could do much harm. In his *De Pietate*, he cites a number of examples of how Homer encouraged false beliefs about the gods. For example he states: ‘[D]oes Homer not represent Ares, the son of Zeus, as foolish, lawless, murderous, a lover of strife and battle, and generally such a one as his closest relations disparage?’¹⁰ But unlike Plato, Epicurus approved of poetry as entertainment. Plato’s concern with poetry seems to have been from two points of view: firstly he considered it unsuitable from the point of view of the listener, as stated at *Republic* III. 387b:

[T6.2] We will beg Homer and the poets not to be angry if we cancel those and all similar passages, not that they are not poetic and pleasing to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are, the less are they suited to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be free and more afraid of slavery than of death.

(Trans. Shorey in Loeb edition)

Secondly, Plato was also concerned with the effect the performance of poetry might have on the performer, as evidenced a little later in the same discussion, at *Republic* III. 395c–e:

[T6.3] But if they imitate they should from childhood up imitate what is appropriate to them – men who are brave, sober, pious, free and all things of that kind – but things unbecoming to the free man they should neither do nor be clever at imitating, nor yet any other shameful thing, lest from imitation they imbibe the reality, or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from

⁹ Fr. 227b Usener; Obbink 1995: 178–9.

¹⁰ *De Pietate*, *P. Herc.* 1088 fr. 10.26–8; Obbink 1995: 205.

youth far into life, settle down into habits and second nature in the body, speech and thought. . . We will not allow our charges. . . to play these parts. . .¹¹

The apparent contrast between Plato's and Epicurus' views on performance of poetry might, however, be more chronological, as by Epicurus' time, poetic performance would have been increasingly professional. Plutarch states that Epicurus, in his *Problems*, declares that the wise man is 'a theatre lover, who gets more joy than anyone else from festival concerts and shows'.¹² 'Presumably', suggests Asmis,¹³ '[Epicurus believed that] a person would derive enjoyment. . . without being contaminated by morally bad subject matter. . . [H]e held that it is sufficient protection to come to a poetic performance with a philosophically trained mind.' Plato, however, disagreed, and he refers disparagingly to theatre-goers as 'the rabble at large' at *Laws* 700c.¹⁴

Philodemus, as it would seem Epicurus would have done, approves of Diogenes of Babylon for admitting Homer, Hesiod and the other poets, but does not approve of his reasons.¹⁵

[T6.4] τὴν μὲν-
τ[ο]ῖ μουσικὴν οἰκείαν μὲν
εἶ[ν]αι συμποσίων, κα[ὶ] τὰ παρ'
Ὅμ[η]ρωι δεόντως ἐπισεσή-
μανται*.

The Homeric poems too have shown, in the required fashion, that music is appropriate at symposia.

[T6.5]
κάκεινο δὲ
χρηστομαθῶς εἴρηται τὸ
«φαίνε[σ]θαι μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἰδι-

¹¹ See also above chapter 4, where the Athenian Stranger shows similar concerns with regard to musical imitation; relevant also is the discussion of *oikeiōsis* in chapter 2 above.

¹² Plutarch, *Non posse* 1095C, trans. Einarson and De Lacy in the Loeb edition.

¹³ Asmis 1995a: 21.

¹⁴ See above, chapter 4, T4.19 and discussion.

¹⁵ *De Musica* 130. 17–21 and 131.2–13.

ώτας ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκειότητος
παραλαμβάνειν γέ τοι καὶ
ἄκροάματ' εἰς τὰ συμπόσι-
α* , διαπίπτειν δὲ τῶι μὴ
τὸν Ὅμηρον καὶ τὸν Ἡσίο-
δον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιητὰς
τῶν μέτρων καὶ μελῶν»
βελτίω γὰρ ἔστω τὰ χρώμε-
να συμπόσια τοῖς τούτων.¹⁶

Moreover, as one who was adept in polite learning said, 'It is clear that because of the appropriate character [of music], even the ignorant have professional musicians at their banquets as well, but they fail in their purpose because they do not have Homer, Hesiod and the other epic and lyric poets. One should recognise the superiority of those banquets which call on the ornaments of these poets.

Philodemus is looking simply for enjoyment, whilst Diogenes is looking for some moral worth just as Plato would have done. In the *De Musica*, Philodemus claims to enjoy musical and poetical performances so long as they are in the correct media – both are fine as entertainment, but neither have a place in education, moral or otherwise. At column 151.8 ff., Philodemus further states that the acquisition of technical skill in music adds nothing to happiness – so many people do it, it is not worth toiling at oneself. Expertise in musical theory is equally an obstacle to happiness as this requires practice:

[T6.6]

μικρόψυχον δὲ καὶ
μηδὲν ἀξιόλογον ἐχόν-
των ὦ[ι] παραπέμψουσιν
αὐτούς – τί γὰρ δεῖ λέγειν
εὐδαίμονας ποιήσουσιν; -

¹⁶ See T6.1 for the next four lines.

τὸ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῖς γέποτε
 παρασκευὴν τῆς τέρψε-
 ως ζημίωσιν μανθάνειν,
 καὶ τὴν ἀφθον[ί]αν οὐχ ὀ-
 ρώντων ὅση τῶν ἀκροα-
 μάτων ἐστὶν τῶν δημο-
 σίαι παρισταμένων, οὐδὲ
 τῆν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ διὰ παν-
 τός, εἰ [β]ουλοίμεθα, μετέχε[ι]ν
 κατὰ πόλιν *, οὐδ' ἐφισταμ[έ-
 νω]ν ἐπὶ τὸ κα[ί] διὰ μα-
 κρῶν χρόνων τὴν φύσ[ιν
 ἐπακούειν καὶ ταχέως προσ-
 κο[ρ]ῆ [γ]ίνεσθαι *. δι' ὃ καὶ
 πα[ρε]κτεινόντων πολλά-
 κι τῶν ἀγώνων ἄλλο τι
 πράττομεν *. ἐῷ [γ]ὰρ τὸ τὴν
 μὲν ἡδονὴν οὐκ ἀναγ-
 καίαν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ μάθη-
 σιν καὶ μελέτην, ἵνα τέρ-
 πωμεν αὐτούς, ἐπίπονον
 τ' εἶναι καὶ τῶν κυριωτά-
 των πρὸς εὐετηρίαν ἐκκλεί-
 ουσαν καὶ τε[ί]νου[σ]αν π[ρ]ὸς ἀ-
 πρ[έ]πειαν τοῦ μείρακιω-
 δῶς [ἄδ]οντος ἢ κιθαρίζον-
 τος ἐπ' ἔργωι *.

It is a sign that men are poor spirited and have nothing worthwhile with which to occupy themselves – for why should I say make themselves happy? – if they labour to learn music for the sake of providing pleasure for themselves in the future, and do not realise what a wealth of recitals is provided publicly, nor the possibility of taking part continuously in the city if you want to, and if they fail

to consider that when it [here, the labour of learning] goes on for too long it exhausts our powers and begins to pall, for which reason on many occasions, when the exercises [with the instruments?] are extended for too long, we do something else; not to mention that the pleasure is not necessary, and the process of learning and practice that our enjoyment involves is laborious, and excludes the things most important to our well-being and tends towards the unseemliness in the person, in the manner of a youth who sings or plays the kithara as work..¹⁷

Philodemus claims that poetic expression blunts any useful message a poem might have. Similarly, melody weakens any utility in the words as the listener is distracted by the pleasure he derives from the melody (*De Musica* col. 152). Just as with musical rhythm, so too the rhythm of the poem distracts the listener from the actual message being enunciated.¹⁸

However, Philodemus did write poetry in the form of epigrams, as already mentioned – he did not find that ‘culture’ suffocated moral progress, as previously claimed by Epicurus, who is famously reported by Athenaeus (588a) as saying, ‘I congratulate you, Apelles, for embarking on philosophy while still untainted by any culture.’¹⁹ This enabled Cicero to taunt Philodemus for his association with Lucius Calpurnius Piso, against whom Cicero delivered a speech in 55BC. At the same time, however, Cicero conceded that Philodemus cultivated with refined elegance not only philosophy, but ‘those other disciplines that were commonly neglected by Epicureans’.²⁰ Epicurus had banished traditional ‘culture’²¹ from philosophy – he formulated the position that natural philosophy did not need traditional education, even while allowing it some entertainment value. Indeed, it seems from the Athenaeus quote, above, that he welcomed the uneducated to his school. But Philodemus seems to have given music and poetry superior roles to those afforded by Epicurus, although he did not deny that the teaching of moral truths is the province of philosophy – poetry in his view had no *moral* use *qua* poetry. But that surely would not preclude the possibility that a poem might have, *incidentally*, a moral message. I suggest that

¹⁷ Trans. Wilkinson 1938: 180, with some amendments.

¹⁸ As will be repeated in *On Poems*, see below, section (ii).

¹⁹ Trans. Long and Sedley 1987: 25F.

²⁰ *Against Piso* 70, trans. Watts in the Loeb edition.

²¹ I.e. a liberal education.

Philodemus, in using the poetry of Homer as a tool for education in politics, believed that this was the case. Homer was, of course, in public ownership, and as such would be known by all, even those less well educated, as Piso was claimed to be by Cicero, above. ‘The lewd Piso’ is how he is described at *Against Piso* 69. But even he would have been familiar with the stories of Homer and Hesiod, particularly as a member of the upper classes.

(i) *The use of Homeric tales*

As mentioned above, and in chapter 3, Diogenes of Babylon explicitly used anecdotes from Homer to illustrate his views. In column 49 of the *De Musica*, Diogenes asserts that in older times, poets and musicians were held in high regard, and were seen almost as sages, and as evidence of this he cites the example of Agamemnon (only referred to as ‘the one’), who left Clytemnestra with his bard when he went off to fight in the Trojan war:

[T6.i.1] τὸ τοὺς πα-
λα]ιοὺς καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ᾠδῶν
νο]μίζειν, ὡς εἶνει δῆλον
ἐπὶ] τοῦ παρὰ τῆι Κλυταιμή-
στραι κατ]αλειφθέντος²²

²² Column 49.23–7, referring to *Odyssey* Book III. 265–72. As Warren Anderson remarks of the episode, ‘the reference to Agamemnon’s leaving his wife under the protection of a bard may be thought more appropriate to “Dark Age” conditions. Still, it shows a court bard entrusted with grave responsibilities.’ Anderson 1994: 24–5. On the other hand, one could argue that it might simply have been the case that all able-bodied men went to war with their king, leaving only those who could not fight at home with ‘the women’? Professional musicians might not have been the most feared in battle. Interestingly, this episode is also recounted, but with a little more detail in John Case’s 1586 *The Praise of Musicke*, mentioned in chapter 3, above. Case states, at *Praise*, chapter 4, ‘Touching the first effects of musick (*sic*) we read that “Agamemnon going to war of Troy left behind him Demodocus, an excellent musician, skillfull in *Modo Dorio* to keep chast his wife Clitemnestra, whom he nicely had in suspicion of wantonness and leuity with Aegistus”.’ (Sourced from the same Birmingham University website as in chapter 3, above.) The *Odyssey* passage makes no direct mention of the name of the bard. In his note to the column, Delattre comments that the scholia to the *Odyssey* suggest the bard’s name to have been Chariades, brother of Phemius. However, Demetrius of Phaleron identifies the bard as Demodocus, whom he also names as brother of Phemius. Demetrius writes that Menelaus and Agamemnon ‘went with Odysseus to Delphi to consult the god about the imminent expedition. . . Demodocus the Laconian won first prize – a student of Automedes of Mycenae, who was the first to write in epic verses. . . Agamemnon took Demodocus to Mycenae with him and set him the task of watching over Clytemnestra’. (Demetrius of Phaleron, fr. 144 in Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2000.) See also Wilson 2004: 269–306, at 269–70. A blind bard named Demodocus

The fact that the ancients surely held the bard to be a sage; as is evident in the case of the one who was left in charge of Clytemnestra.

Delattre remarks in his notes to the passage that this incident was described by many ancient authors.²³ Sextus Empiricus relates the anecdote in *M.* VI.11–12:

[T6.i.2] Furthermore, it was customary for other heroes, whenever they left home and set out on a long voyage, to leave the musicians behind as being the most trusty guardians and controllers of their wives. Thus Clytemnestra was accompanied by a minstrel, to whom Agamemnon gave strict orders regarding chastity of his wife. (Trans. Bury)

It was only once the ‘minstrel’ had been taken to, and abandoned on, a desert island that Aegisthus was able to seduce Clytemnestra.²⁴ In his corresponding comment at VI.26, Sextus remarks:

[T6.i.3] These [claims that ‘minstrels’ are sober-minded guardians] are the fiction of story-tellers. . . for if music was trusted as a means of rectifying the passions, how was it that Clytemnestra slew Agamemnon on his own hearth-stone ‘like an ox at the stall’? (Trans Bury)

Of course, Sextus had answered his own question at VI.12 where he stated that Aegisthus had removed the ‘minstrel’, thus removing the music, and with it Clytemnestra’s protection.

appears in Alcinous’ palace on Phaeacia, but this cannot be one and the same. One has to wonder about the source of the sixteenth-century scholar, there are no notes as to sources on the most recent edition of this text, that of Ben Byram-Wigfield, in electronic format at [www.cappella.demon.co.uk/music/goodies.PraiseMusic.pdf], dated 2002. Despite inspection of the four sixteenth-century copies held in the British Library, no annotation as to sources can be found.

²³ Delattre 2007: vol. I, 80.

²⁴ Sheppard (1980:169) remarks, ‘Homer, exalting his own profession, implies that the bard had a good influence on Clytemnestra. . . The Homeric account led later writers to stress this bard’s *sōphrosyne*.’ I must thank Dr Sheppard for drawing my attention to the reference in Proclus, which is part of a discussion of eikastic poetry – and to other references relating to this anecdote.

At columns 64 and 65, Philodemus berates Diogenes for using Agamemnon as an example of the usefulness of poets and musicians as custodians of wives and daughters – he remarks that no one should entrust kitharodes (κιθαρωδοῖς) with the safety of their wife or daughter – and suggests that it would be some sort of joke to use Agamemnon as an example of someone who charged his poet (ποιητήν) with the safety of his wife, simply because those who were regarded as sages in olden times were given undertakings of this type of activity:²⁵

[T6.i.4] τὰς δ' οἰκείας γ[υ-
ναϊκας ἢ] θυγατέρας οὐδ[εῖς
ἀ]πὼ[ν ἄν] κιθαρωδοῖς φ[υλά-
ξι]ειν [ἐ]ν[χ]ειρίσ[ειε]ν, οὐ[χ] ὄ-
τι φίλωι συλ[. . .]ουν[. . . .
ἐπιτ]ρέψειεν· ὡς δὲ πάλι[ν
. . . .]οντα συνηγορεῖν τὰ-
γαμέ]μνον[ι] ράιδιον, λέγοντα
ποιητ]ήν εἶναι τὸν παραζευ-
χθέν]τα, τῶν τότε σοφῶν νο-
μιζ]ομένων τοιοῦτο εἶδος
ἐπιτη]δευόντων.

No one should hand over their [wives] and daughters in his absence to the kitharodes to keep them safe, let alone entrusting a friend . . . But . . . one more time . . . it is easy to defend Agamemnon by saying that he who is yoked with the protection [of his wife] was a poet when the people thought to be wise at that time practised that type of thing.

²⁵ The parallels between the report of Sextus and that of Philodemus here suggest that Sextus might have been drawing directly upon Philodemus. Certainly there are a number of similar discussions in the two works. Apart from the Clytemnestra anecdote, both authors refer to the discussion on the merits of music in education: Sextus at VI.4, Philodemus at IV.20 and 77; both refer to the Spartans going into battle to the sound of music: Sextus at VI.8, Philodemus at IV.72–7; both also use the music–food analogy: Sextus at VI.25, Philodemus at IV.114, 118. Of course, these might all have been common themes in antiquity, and Sextus adds nothing to the information in Philodemus. Asmis (1995a: 29) suggests that Philodemus' teacher, Zeno, might have been the two authors' common source; as mentioned in chapter 2, above, Philodemus drew upon Zeno's lecture notes when writing his own works.

In using the term ‘kitharodes’ here, Philodemus seems to be implying something like ‘a common musician’, a mere *banausos*; then later he uses the term ‘poet’ rather than ‘musician’. Perhaps he deliberately juxtaposes the two terms musician–poet to once again imply that Diogenes is confusing music with poetry. Philodemus is certainly taking another opportunity to claim that music could have no effect. Music cannot guarantee the virtue of one’s spouse, as the example of Agamemnon’s wife clearly shows!

Just why Diogenes used this specific example is not clear, given Agamemnon’s subsequent murder by his wife as recounted further on in the *Odyssey*, at XI. 453, and Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*, which surely must also have been known to Diogenes. Perhaps, however, his discussion should be read as another example of the moralising effect of music (and poetry), and the whole anecdote a metaphor for the disastrous results of the removal of music. Athenaeus, reporting the same anecdote, writes:

[T6.i.5] Agamemnon, for example, leaves his bard behind to guard Clytemnestra and serve as a sort of adviser. The fellow used to offer her first of all, a detailed account of feminine virtue to inspire her with eagerness to become a noble person, while also providing a pleasant way of passing the time so as to divert her attention from base thoughts.²⁶

Demetrius of Phaleron suggests that Clytemnestra did indeed need some distraction, although Demodocus, if that was his name, only partially succeeded. Demetrius writes:

[T6.i.6] People used to have vast respect for singers as teachers of matters divine and of the noble deeds of men of the past. Even Clytemnestra demonstrates her respect for the man: for she gave orders not for his slaughter but his banishment. . .²⁷

²⁶ Athenaeus I, 14b, Loeb translation. An intriguing insight into how women’s behaviour was perceived.

²⁷ See Wilson 2004: 270, supporting Gostoli’s argument (1986) that these lines should be ascribed to Demetrius.

The clear implication is that Clytemnestra herself arranged for the musician to be removed. The absence of music was certainly traditionally seen as a manifestation of the absence of pleasure, such as in times of war, and/or death, but here it could be seen as the removal of moral rectitude as well. It is indeed quite common for the Stoics to use ancient myths to make sense of their past, and their world,²⁸ although it would seem that they were more often used in theological discussions and analysis.

Diogenes' source (other than Homer) here might, for once, be explicitly named. Immediately before the example of Clytemnestra, Philodemus writes:

[T6.i.7]

ἐξ ὧν δὲ παρατίθετ[αι
 Δ[ικ]αιάρχου λάβοι τις ἄν ὄ-
 σ' ἄν κ]αὶ πρὸς τῆν ἐνεστηκω[ῖ-
 αν] ὑπόθεσιν ἧ[ι] τὸ τοὺς πα-
 λα]αιοὺς καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ᾧδὸν
 νο]μίζειν. . .

Moreover, amongst the citations that he [Diogenes] makes of Dicaearchus, one should derive as much as one wants for our present discussion: the ancients thought that the singer was also wise.²⁹

Dicaearchus of Messana was a 'polymath and prolific writer, pupil of Aristotle, and contemporary of Theophrastus and Aristoxenus'.³⁰ The use of Dicaearchus' name is a rare indication by Philodemus of Diogenes' sources, and it would seem to suggest that Diogenes quoted Dicaearchus on other occasions. This would seem quite feasible – at other places in the work, although not within Diogenes' own section, Philodemus cites both Aristoxenus and Theophrastus, and Diogenes was surely influenced by the writings of the Peripatetics, as I have

²⁸ For discussion, see Long 1996[1992]: 58–84; also briefly, chapter 2 above.

²⁹ Column 49.20–3. Delattre (2007: vol. II, 375) remarks that Dicaearchus of Messana was a follower of Aristotle and author of a short history of the Greek people, known through Porphyry's *De Abstemio* IV.2. See also fr. 39 in Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2001.

³⁰ Dicaearchus *fl.* 320–300 BC. *Suda* s.v. Δικαίαρχος; fr. 2 Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf 2001; *Suda* s.v. Ἀριστόξενοσ. See my earlier reference to Dicaearchus at pp. 67 and 165.

argued in chapter 5, and as suggested by his own reference to Chamaeleon at column 47.5.³¹

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Philodemus' use of Homer is much more extensive in *On the Good King According to Homer*. The treatise is short, consisting of just one book, and extends to some eighty columns,³² and as with the majority of Philodemus' writings, is very fragmentary. In this treatise, a prose work addressed to the man considered to have been his patron, Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus,³³ Philodemus judges the best ruler on a par with the archetype found in Homer, and 'thus eliminates', claims Gigante, 'in a unique demonstration, the separation that Epicurus had made between philosophy and poetry'.³⁴ Although it could be argued that this might be overstating the case somewhat, it is indeed surprising that Philodemus should use a poem, albeit Homer, as a didactic tool, given his claims to be an orthodox Epicurean. However, as mentioned above, Cicero had suggested that Piso was not well educated, and if this was indeed the case, perhaps Philodemus had come to the conclusion that examples from Homer might more easily elucidate the points he wished to make.

Philodemus compares Hellenistic rulers with the mythological characters of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Gigante/Obbink states, 'By mining from Homer suggestions for the reform of political rule, Philodemus links poetry as a basis for moral education with the figurative art that evokes the sovereigns in sculpture in the Villa' [of the papyri, Piso's (probable) home at Herculaneum].³⁵ Perhaps Philodemus even used the art of the villa to further illustrate his work. The treatise, whilst clearly written as an educational tool directed at Piso, could in fact also be read as an attack on Plato's poetic theory as presented in his *Republic* Book III, with his denial of any good in Homeric poetry, and his insistence on the exclusion of poetry from his ideal city. Philodemus seems almost to copy the style utilised by Plato there – but for the opposite reasons. Whereas Plato uses extracts from the Homeric texts to illustrate his argument

³¹ See above, chapter 3, p. 62 and note 21.

³² Asmis 1991: 19–20 with nn. 90, 91.

³³ Cicero, *in Pisonem* 68ff.; Gigante, trans. Obbink 2002: 49.

³⁴ Gigante, trans. Obbink 2002: 66.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 69.

that poetry should be banned from his ideal state, so Philodemus uses extracts to highlight the actions of a good ruler.

Discussion of a number of columns of *On the Good King* will provide examples of Philodemus' usage of the Homeric poem:

At columns 4–5,³⁶ Philodemus depicts the good ruler, citing Hector as one such, referring to such a leader as 'god-fearing'.

Column 13 refers to *Iliad* 19.228–31, and Odysseus' advice to Achilles on the death of Patroclus – it is good to moderate one's grief. Philodemus illustrates Homer's disapproval of excessive mourning, perhaps something that the Epicurean would have had in common with the poet. Plato, too, condemns excessive mourning at *Republic* III. 388b, but does not refer to Homer's own disapproval of this, he simply condemns Homer for portraying grief at all. The Stoics too might have been in agreement with Philodemus here. Epictetus³⁷ in his *Enchiridion* 5 writes, '... death is nothing terrible, otherwise Socrates would have thought so. What is terrible is the judgement that death is terrible.'³⁸

Homer's Telemachus is used by Philodemus in columns 22 and 23. At column 22, Philodemus asserts 'Let Telemachus' [who left home to save his property] 'be an example for us', contrasting him with the suitors who left their homes to 'waste' (Asmis' term) other people's property. Philodemus also identifies Nicomedes (probably Nicomedes III),³⁹ father of Nicomedes Philopator, who resembled the suitors in trying to take over neighbouring properties. In the column that follows, Telemachus is again contrasted favourably with the suitors, claiming the latter to be 'wastrels'.

At column 24, Philodemus moves on from leisure activities and states, 'Let us advise serious [concerns] for the king', and he proceeds to list the attributes of a good king: 'to practise mildness, fairness, royal gentleness, and harmony of disposition to the greatest extent possible, as leading to a stable monarchy and not to a despotic exercise of fear'. Although not directly relying

³⁶ All column references to *On the Good King According to Homer* are from Asmis' translation in *Classical Antiquity* of 1991: 1–45.

³⁷ Whilst Epictetus was a later Stoic (mid-first to second century AD), his philosophy was largely consistent with earlier Stoicism, and he quoted the basic works of Stoicism, especially Chrysippus. Further, because for the Stoics, good health was merely a preferred indifferent, they would not have seen death as anything other than a 'dispreferred indifferent' (D.L. VII.103).

³⁸ Trans. Long and Sedley 1987: 65U.

³⁹ Asmis 1991: 24.

on Homer here, it may be that the description ‘he was gentle like a father [to his subjects]’ refers to Homer’s ideal of kingship⁴⁰ – Telemachus’ description of Odysseus at *Odyssey* II.47, again an Epicurean view of a good ruler in opposition to the Stoic view cited by Diogenes Laertius at VII.123:

[T6.i.8] At the same time, [the wise] are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind which affects kindness in place of chastising. Nor do they deem punishments too severe.

At column 25, Philodemus reminds Piso that just as a ruler should be kind, he should also be ‘strict when appropriate in order that he may not be despised’.

He then moves on to army discipline, introducing the section with ‘if it is fitting for a philosopher’ to deal with such things – an acknowledgement, perhaps, of Epicurus’ views that philosophers should not partake in politics, in keeping with his desire for a pleasurable life? Or, perhaps, an indication that Philodemus is aware of the need to maintain the good will of his patron? Dorandi’s view in his 1982 edition of the work is that Philodemus wished to act as mentor to the ‘young Piso’.⁴¹ Perhaps this treatise was written, therefore, to persuade Piso that Philodemus could be such a mentor.

Philodemus moves on to cite Homeric kings as evidence that good discipline is only secured by a system of punishment and reward, and asserts, at columns 27–9, that Homer disapproved of war, reminding his reader that Homer depicted Zeus as calling Ares ‘the most hateful to him of the gods’ at *Iliad* V.890–1;⁴² and Agamemnon rebuking Achilles for the same reason at *Il.* I.177: ‘you are most hateful to me of Zeus-nurtured kings’. Nestor is used as an example of a peacemaker compared with a ruler promoting discord amongst his subordinates to secure his own position, when Nestor shows that such discord leads to the overthrow of kings.

⁴⁰ Asmis 1991: 39.

⁴¹ In Asmis 1991: 1.n.1.

⁴² A reference to Ares is also to be found at *De Musica* IV, columns 67.5 and 72.33, acknowledging the god’s connection to war, but without any apparent disapproval.

However, Philodemus moves on to assert that those trained and prepared for wars can, in reality, enjoy a secure peace, this time citing the Phaeacian people as an example of a nation who pride themselves on athletic prowess and so can ‘dine and listen to song’, relaxed.⁴³

In the final four columns, Philodemus discusses trust and the subject of fame. He cites Clytemnestra (*Od.* XXIV.200–1) as an example of someone who is famous because of her terrible deeds, in contrast, perhaps, to Diogenes of Babylon’s use of the same character in the *De Musica*, where she is simply the background figure in Diogenes’ example of the wisdom of the court’s bard; and then Odysseus, Achilles, Penelope and Orestes of those who have earned fame through good deeds. Whilst as an Epicurean, he might not have sought fame for himself, he seems to imply that if one’s fame has come about for being a good ruler, then this would not be a bad thing.

In the final column he remarks to Piso that ‘these *starting points* may be taken from Homer’ (emphasis mine). However, implicit is the fact that it is also necessary to use philosophy to make use of these starting points. The same phrase ‘starting points’ (ἀφορμάς) is found at Sextus Empiricus *Against the Grammarians* I.270, when Sextus states that the Grammarians claimed ‘for poetry furnishes many [starting points] to wisdom and a happy life’, asserting that ‘this is plain from the fact that the best and character-forming philosophy had its original roots in the gnomic sayings of the poets’.⁴⁴ Perhaps Sextus again might have been using Philodemus or even Zeno, Philodemus’ own teacher, as his source;⁴⁵ Sextus counters the arguments of the Grammarians in a similar fashion to that of Philodemus – only philosophy can distinguish the harmful from the useful statements within poetry. Thus poetry can only ever provide starting points to any moral use, and then only if one has had the philosophical education to interpret it.

It is clear, I would suggest, that in utilising Homer for this treatise, Philodemus also chooses his examples very carefully, extracting only the topics he finds positive in Homer, and having chosen them, he uses them in very specific ways.

⁴³ *On the Good King*, column 31.

⁴⁴ *M.* 1.271.

⁴⁵ Asmis’ suggestion, 1991: 12.

Nor does he leave his reader free to interpret the examples for himself (the reader, from Philodemus' point of view is also specific – he is writing primarily for Piso), but rather explains precisely why the figure has been chosen to illustrate the point.⁴⁶ He concedes nothing to Homer's theology, which would be anathema to an Epicurean, with the gods interceding on behalf of favourites, or punishing others for a supposed insult, but seems to look favourably on Homer's politics. There is perhaps, however, another, unstated, purpose in Philodemus' writing. Whilst supposedly writing a didactic treatise, aimed at the young Piso, Philodemus is also illustrating his own erudition. Of course, Homer would have been 'common property', and known to all who had listened to any poetry, but Philodemus is surely also displaying his familiarity with the texts, and emphasising his knowledge of the detail in choosing his examples so carefully. Unlike Diogenes of Babylon, who cites his Homeric examples by name, but without explanation, Philodemus explains in detail how his characters should be seen. Whilst Philodemus rejected the requirement for utility in poetry, and suggested that only pleasure was needed, it is clear that he also saw that whilst it could not have any moral utility of its own, when interpreted and explicated by a person educated in Epicurean philosophy, then any value could be recognised, extracted, and utilised.

(ii) Philodemus' *On Poems* and Diogenes of Babylon on the *kritikoi*

As mentioned in chapter 2, above, at column 48, Diogenes suggests that the musical theorists with their skills resembled the *kritikoi* of poetry.⁴⁷ Unfortunately any further detail or explication is now lost as the remainder of that column is badly damaged. However, Philodemus' criticism of the claim, at column 136, 10–137, 2 is better preserved. He strongly refutes Diogenes' claim stating:

⁴⁶ Asmis remarks that in this, Philodemus' method 'invites comparison with Plutarch in his *On How a Young Person Should Listen to Poetry*. Plutarch also finds that poetry, whilst pleasing, can confuse "if it is heard without guidance"', *De Aud. Poetis* 15C; Asmis 1991: 21.

⁴⁷ It seems from Plutarch *Non posse* 1095c that Epicurus might also have linked these *mousikoi* and *kritikoi*, as Plutarch reports, '[Epicurus] allows no place, even over the wine, for questions about music and the enquiries of critics and scholars'.

[T6.ii.1] τῆι δὲ κριτικῆι λέγων πα-	10
ραπλησίαν τινὰ θεωρί-	
αν ἔχειν τοὺς φιλομουσοῦν-	
τας, οὐ μόνον ἀγνοεῖ καθό-	
σον, ὡς ἐμ μέλεσι καὶ ῥυθμοῖς	
πρέποντος καὶ ἀπρεποῦς ὄν-	15
τος καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ,	
κριτικὴν αὐτῶν ἀπέλειπε	
θεωρίαν *, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθό-	
σον, εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἦν, οὐχὶ	
τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἀπεδίδου	20
τὴν κρίσιν, καί, νῆ τὸν Δία,	
καθόσον τὴν κριτικὴν,	
ἦι τι παραπλήσιον ἔχειν	
τὴν μουσικὴν ἔφασκεν, οὐ-	
χὶ τούτοις, ἀλλὰ [τ]οῖς ὀνομα-	25
ζομένοις κριτικοῖς [συν]ε-	
χώρει· καὶ τῆι ποητικῆι [ῆι] δὲ	
γράφων ἀναλόγω[ς] ἔχ[ε]ιν	
κατὰ τε τὴν μίμησ[ι]ν [κ]αὶ	
κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην εὐρ[ε]σιν,	30
κατὰ μὲν τὴν μίμησιν	
οὐκ ἂν ἀπέδειξεν· κατὰ δὲ	
τὴν εὐρεσιν οὐ ταύτ[ηι] μᾶλ-	
λον ἢ ταῖς ἄλλαις [τέχ]ναις.	
κατὰ μέντοι τὸ γρά[φεισ]θαι	35
καὶ ἀνταποδιδόναι τ[ὸ] μέ-	
λος, ἔστω τι παραπλήσι[ο]ν αὐ-	
τῆς καὶ τῆι γραμματικῆι·	
τί γὰρ δεῖ φθονεῖν αὐτ[ῶι]	
γι]νομένωι περὶ [τοι]αύτας	40
ἀ[ν]αλογίας; εἰ δ[ὲ] . . . π[ρὸ]ς	
τ]ό τε αἰδεῖν καὶ [κιθ]α[ρί-	

ζ]ε[ιν .]σ[...].]ντιο[....

θ' ὑποκρίσει δῶμεν αὐτῶι καὶ
ὑποκριτικῆι.

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But when he said that practitioners of *mousikē* have a theory similar to *kritikē*, he not only falls into error inasmuch as he admitted a critical theory of these items as if fitting and unfitting, and good and bad, existed in melodies and rhythms, but also inasmuch as, if any such things existed, he did not give the critical judgement of them to the philosophers, and by Zeus inasmuch as he allowed *kritikē*, to which he says music has something similar, not to these (sc. philosophers) but to the so-called *kritikoi*. And when he wrote that it was analogous to *poiētikē* as well, in respect of both imitation and the rest of invention, he would not have demonstrated this in respect of imitation, and in respect of invention (he would not have demonstrated this for music) any more than for the other arts. However, with respect to the melody's being written and responding, let there be some similarity between music and grammar; for why should one begrudge it in relation to such correspondences . . . in performing let us grant him (that music is similar) to acting too.⁴⁸

Within his criticism, Philodemus is suggesting that Diogenes has removed the responsibility of judgement from the philosophers, and has assigned it to the so-called 'experts', the *mousikoi* and, in the case of poetry, the *kritikoi*. Although Philodemus seems to refer to these *kritikoi* as though they were a formal group, it seems that there was no such formalised grouping; rather the term was simply used to refer to literary theorists, some of whom might have had some theories in common, and in particular, regarded the *sound* of the language used in a poem as the most important element, and what made it 'good' or not.⁴⁹ However, Crates of Mallos did indeed identify himself as one of these *kritikoi*,⁵⁰ and also insisted that to be recognised as skilled, the practitioner should be

⁴⁸ Trans Blank 1994: 58, with amendments.

⁴⁹ Asmis 2004: 5; see also Janko 2000: 125; Blank 1994: 55.

⁵⁰ S.E. *M.* 1.79. *Suda s.v.* Crates notes him to be a contemporary of Aristarchus in the first half of the second century BC.

experienced in *pasa logikē epistēmē*.⁵¹ In order to ascertain just what Diogenes was asserting in his own theory, when he claimed that the *mousikoi* were similar to the *kritikoi*⁵² in poetry, therefore, it will be useful to look into the views of Crates and the other poetical theorists whom Philodemus attacks.

In *On Poems* book V, Philodemus continues to assert the Epicurean view that if something gives pleasure, then it is of some value simply because of that, whereas for Plato and, later, the Stoics, to have value a thing needed to have *moral* value, and perhaps this is why Philodemus attacked their theory of aesthetics generally. The Stoics would always argue for moral worth, whereas for Philodemus, as mentioned above, poetry could be regarded as good poetry if it fulfilled his criteria of ‘giving pleasure’ – even if the subject matter was immoral. For example, in *On Poems* V, col. 1.10–31 Jensen,⁵³ he complains that Heraclides of Pontus censored many of the most beautiful poems:

[T6.ii.2] Also, the finest poetry of the most famous poets, since it gives no profit whatever – of some poets, indeed the majority of their poetry, and of several poets all of it – he expels from excellence altogether.

This suggests that Heraclides, like Plato before him, required that to be considered of any worth, a poem had to contain ‘some profit’, presumably ‘moral value’, and if this requirement was not met, the poem would not be considered ‘good’, a theory with which Philodemus disagreed.

Philodemus later states:

[T6.ii.3] [Heraclides’ opinion should be thrown out] also because it jettisons so much of the most beautiful poetry, some of which is useless.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Janko (2000: 125) suggests that ‘the use of the term [*kritikos*] in the plural must be Philodemus’. He used it as a convenient way to denote theorists whom he believed to share certain views about euphony.’ This would indeed seem to be borne out by the extant evidence. See also Asmis 2004: 13.

⁵² For detailed discussions on the *kritikoi*, see e.g., Schenkeveld 1968; Asmis 1990; 1992a; 1992b; and more recently 2004; Blank 1994; Janko 2000; Fantuzzi and Hunter 2004.

⁵³ = Mangoni col. 4, trans Armstrong in Obbink 1995. Unless otherwise stated, all translations from *On Poems* V are Armstrong’s.

⁵⁴ Jensen col. 29; Mangoni col. 32.

Philodemus seems to claim that bad men could make good poets ‘if they could write movingly and well about bad things’,⁵⁵ as confirmed at his work entitled *On Rhetoric* at col. 21.12–15, where he similarly asserts that bad men can produce good literature.⁵⁶ The context of that discussion is of course in respect of speakers, but it seems plausible that the same could apply to poets as well.⁵⁷ Some slippage seems to be indicated therefore, between Philodemus’ claims in the *On Music* and *On Poems*, where he claims that poetry holds no moral, practical function, and his practice in the context of *On the Good King*, where he clearly felt that Homer could have some use morally, even if Cicero at *N.D.* I.41 has the Epicurean Velleius refer to the writings of Homer and Hesiod as ‘fairy stories’ (Latin *fabellas*).⁵⁸ Philodemus wrote his educational treatise *On the Good King* in prose, however, and not poetry – prose was the correct medium for educational writing in his view, and he affirms that any moral improvement that results from reading poetry is incidental. Moreover, he took care to interpret his examples for his reader, thus leaving no room for mis-interpretation. He states that poetry dulls any message held within words, and so in seeking to ‘educate’ his patron he would necessarily write in prose.

For Philodemus, the excellence of poetry comes from the aesthetic qualities – use of euphony and word order, although the language should never be considered separately from its meaning,⁵⁹ and in *On Poems* V, he elucidates his own (or maybe his teacher, Zeno’s) standards by which excellence in poetry should be measured:⁶⁰

[T6.ii.4] [F]or diction, that it should imitate diction that also teaches what is useful; and for thought, that it should partake of thought that is intermediate between the thought of the wise and that of the vulgar. This is the case whether one thinks so or not, and one must judge by referring to these [standards].⁶¹

⁵⁵ See Clay in Obbink 1995: 9.

⁵⁶ Sider 1997: 31.

⁵⁷ See discussion at Sider 1997: 31 and n. 37.

⁵⁸ Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods*, trans. P. G. Walsh, OUP 1997: 18.

⁵⁹ *On Poems* V, 13.32–14.2; Asmis 2004: 6.

⁶⁰ Column 26 Mangoni; xxii Jensen. I use Asmis’ translation for this extract, 1992a: 147.

⁶¹ This last remark, notes Asmis, could also be read as an attack on Plato’s poetic theory. At *Rep.* III. 398a–b, Plato demanded that the poets must ‘imitate the diction of a good man’ (Princeton Plato, p. 643). As Asmis remarks, therefore, Philodemus asks for ‘thought *between* that of the

Philodemus absolves the poet of the need to instruct; for him the excellence of a poem lies in its artistic merging of thought and the standard elements of poetry: composition, diction and, to a lesser extent, euphony. He then turns his criticism to Crates, who, Philodemus implies, ‘took the extreme view that the goodness of a poem lies entirely in good sound or euphony’ rather than euphony plus composition and diction (Crates’ criterion of goodness, as Asmis remarks, being not the pleasure produced by the sound, but the fact that the poem has been worked out according to certain principles of sound; *On Poems* book V, column 24.33–25.4).⁶² But first, Philodemus remarks that:

[T6.ii.5] He [Crates] departs from the opinion of Heracleodorus⁶³ and of the like – for instead of praising the composition, he praises the sound displayed by it, just as he also departs from the opinion of Andromenides, although he thinks that Andremonides agrees in every respect and totally with what he says.⁶⁴

According to Philodemus, Crates in fact misunderstood Andromenides’ theory. Unfortunately, Philodemus does not explain what these views are.⁶⁵ At *On Poems* I, column 131 Janko,⁶⁶ Philodemus states that:

[T6.ii.6] [Andromenides] posits that it is appropriate for poets to work out dialect and wording, and that it is the function of poets not to say what no one [else would say], but to speak in such a way as no one else would interpret [a subject matter] and [to construct] a catharsis and . . . of Muses. . . of sounds. [He posits] that humans naturally care for. . . and have a self-learned kinship with the

wise and of the vulgar’, (my italics) i.e. of ordinary people, rather than Plato’s demand for morally exemplary characters. Philodemus requires only ‘commonplace morality’; so Asmis 1992a: 150.

⁶² Asmis 1992b: 398. De Lacy (1958: 254) remarks also that for Crates, ‘the poem is not good when it pleases the ear, but because it is composed according to the principles of the art. But a poem composed to these principles *will* please the ear’ (my italics), or at least, surely, the ear of the *kritikos*, maybe not necessarily an uneducated listener or a theatre crowd generally.

⁶³ If this man was a literary theorist, ‘he seems to be unknown outside Philodemus’, so Janko 2000: 155.

⁶⁴ *On Poems* V, cols. 24.27–25.1, trans. Asmis 2004: 12.

⁶⁵ For discussion, see Janko 2000: 143.

⁶⁶ Janko 2000. *P.Herc.* 460, fr. 26. I use Asmis’ translation here.

Muses, as is shown by the inarticulate chants that are sung to put infants to sleep, and beautiful locutions. . . with respect to the hearing. . .

It appears, suggests Asmis,⁶⁷ that ‘Andremonides took these lullabies, chanted without articulated letters, as evidence of a natural bond between humans and music’. She continues, ‘Since the sound of these songs is not verbal, their effect lies entirely in their musical quality, not their meaning.’ The implication of the passage is, therefore, that the poet should compose poems comprising words that contain a similar ‘musicality’.⁶⁸ Plato, too, referred to the use of tunes sung by nurses ‘to put their fractious babies to sleep’,⁶⁹ but he seemed to regard it as some sort of ‘spell’, and he compares it with a similar spell cast upon ‘the distracted in Dionysiac treatments by this combination of the movements of dance and song’.⁷⁰ I do not think that for Andromenides or Crates there is any sense of a suggestion of magic spells. If Philodemus had understood it as such, he would surely have used it as a part of his criticism.

Another ‘critic’, tentatively so identified by Janko⁷¹ supported Crates in his claim that we are moved by sound even when we do not understand the semantics, citing birdsong as an example:

[T6.ii.7] So one must observe. . . the sounds in itself, separated from the underlying meanings, as it has the supremacy over the words. . .But [he says that] when a mixture of [sound] dominates us, it arouses us to sympathetic feeling. One can see from birds too that the voice is a sovereign principle. For in their case, as separable sound emerges, precisely a kind of articulated voice is produced just as is held to be true of the nightingale.⁷²

Clearly, for this ‘critic’, sound can affect us even when the sense it not articulated by words.

⁶⁷ 1992a: 145.

⁶⁸ Following Asmis 1992a: 145.

⁶⁹ *Laws* VII. 790d–e.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Janko 2000: 165, n.3.

⁷² Philodemus, *On Poems* I, 114.10–115.1, trans Janko.

At *On Poems* V, col. 27 Mangoni, Philodemus criticises Crates for claiming that the composition is ‘not understood⁷³ by reason, but understood by the trained hearing’,⁷⁴ a criticism very similar to one he levels at Diogenes of Babylon in the context of music at *De Musica* column 115.28ff. (see chapter 2, above, section (v) and T2.v.1 and 2.v.1a), and also his Stoic opponent in this book of *On Poems*, as I will discuss below, pages 215–16.

The ‘Stoic theory of language divides it sharply into *phonē* (physical sound) and *lekton* (meaning)’.⁷⁵ Like the Stoics, perhaps, ‘Crates thought that a poem should have enough pure sonic beauty to appeal to the trained ear (this first postulate he thought dealt with many topics put separately by non-Stoic critics); that its language should survive the examination of a Stoic grammarian trained in the *technē* of words; and that its meanings (perhaps as Jensen argues, Stoic-allegorical meanings present ‘by nature’ or divine inspiration) should reflect some kind of philosophical truth’.⁷⁶ However, I believe that whilst this may well be the Stoic view, and one to which Crates was, to a certain extent sympathetic, I do not believe that he required that poetry’s ‘meaning should reflect some kind of philosophical truth’. Asmis would seem to agree, as she writes, ‘There is no evidence that Crates did any philosophy except what *kritikē* and philosophy have in common, although there is evidence that he was affiliated with the Stoics’.⁷⁷ Philodemus states quite clearly that although Crates demanded that the poem should be judged ‘not without the thoughts, but not judging the thoughts themselves’; he did not require that thought itself to be ‘judged’, because such a judgement would be ‘non-technical’, i.e., it could not be judged by the sense of ‘practised hearing’ alone; it would have required some technical expertise, that is the use of reason regarding the content of the thought. Crates’ point is that what makes the poem ‘good’ is the sound in relation to the meaning, regardless of what that meaning is.⁷⁸ One of Philodemus’ primary complaints about this theory

⁷³ Armstrong’s insertion in his translation of the book in Obbink 1995: 265, n. 44.

⁷⁴ Crates is criticised separately from the Stoic Aristo (?) in book V. In his article ‘Stoic views of poetry’, De Lacy discussed Crates as a Stoic. However, Crates is now considered to have been rather a ‘specialist of language’, a *kritikos*, than a member of a school of philosophy. I am advised by Maria Broggiato that indeed Crates was not a member of the orthodox Stoic school.

⁷⁵ D. L. VII.55–7.

⁷⁶ Armstrong in Obbink 1995 at 265, n.47.

⁷⁷ Asmis 1992a: 139.

⁷⁸ *On Poems* V.28; Asmis 1992a: 160; Asmis 1995b: 152.

is that the sense of hearing is an irrational sense, and so is not capable of making any judgement at all, it was merely the sense by which things were heard, it is the mind that makes the judgement. Asmis remarks that ‘strictly speaking. . . whenever a poem is judged. . . it is judged by the mind “through” the hearing’.⁷⁹ Crates, however, asserts that it is this ‘practised hearing’ that does the judging. But as so often with the text that is still extant, and indeed, with the *De Musica* as well, Philodemus does not go on to explain exactly what his opponent’s theory involved; it appears that he has already done so in an earlier book, book II. At the end of the section he states:

[T6.ii.8] Now as for what he says about letters of the alphabet, on which he says depends the judgement of what is good poetry, what sort of folly that is full of, and how great it is, we have established in the second book on this work. . . and have decided not to repeat here.⁸⁰

This seems to suggest that Crates might have assigned certain characters or attributes to certain sounds, a practice developed in much detail by Aristides Quintilianus in his own *De Musica* in the second century AD. He assigned not only character to both notes (*pthongai*) and letters, but gender also, arguing that certain letters, e.g., *lambda* were regarded as softer and so more feminine, whereas a *tau* or a *chi* were harsher and therefore more masculine. See Aristides Quintilianus, book II chapters 12–13.⁸¹

Philodemus’ argument against Crates seems to have a direct parallel with the argument he uses against Diogenes of Babylon’s theory of ‘knowing hearing’ in the *De Musica*. It seems, therefore, that Andromenides and Crates held parallel beliefs to Diogenes: just as sound *regardless* of thought in poetry can affect the soul, so too could pure music, i.e., music not accompanying words, have a similar effect. If this is the case, and if it the case also that Crates thought that the harmony, or as Asmis puts it, ‘the musicality’ of the poem is what makes

⁷⁹ Asmis 1992a: 160.

⁸⁰ Translation Armstrong’s in Obbink 1995: 265–6.

⁸¹ Translated in Barker 1989: 479. Aristotle also discusses the letter sounds and language in his *Poetics* 1456b20–1458a22, but does not appear to assign such qualities to the actual sounds. But at the outset of his discussion, he does suggest that the study of letter sounds should ‘properly concern students of metre’.

the difference between a good and a bad poem, then it would appear that the three men held some view in common in their aesthetic theory. This notion would seem quite plausible for the Stoics, and indeed Crates if he was sympathetic to their theory of sound. Diogenes Laertius VII.55–7 attests that Diogenes of Babylon was interested in sound, as shown in Chapter 2, section ii above. At D.L. VII.44, Diogenes (Laertius) specifically states that the Stoics were interested in ‘poetical diction, verbal ambiguities, euphony and music’.

But Philodemus continues to assert that the primary importance of poetry is to provide the listener with pleasure, of a correct Epicurean sort. Any moral use, as mentioned earlier, is purely incidental. He mocks Heraclides of Pontus at column 5 Mangoni for ‘loading down’ the poet by recommending that *all* branches of learning are necessary for the education of the perfect poet, i.e., expecting the poet to write knowledgeably and instructively about anything he includes in his poetry. In this, Heraclides would seem to agree with not only Crates, but Plato also, see above, T2.v.6. For Plato in the *Phaedrus* passage quoted there, ‘until a man knows the truth about what he to speak or write, he will be unable to speak or write well’. For Philodemus, as mentioned previously, if poems do benefit the listener, they do not do so *qua* poems. Similarly, Philodemus claims in the *De Musica* that if poets were to know virtue, they would not know virtue as poets, but as philosophers. This maintains the Epicurean dictum that the wise man should not over-exercise himself with the composition of poetry: Sider suggests that original compositions should look as though they have not required any effort, an argument that he suggests resolves any potential contradiction in Philodemus’ writing of his epigrams. Epigrams meet this requirement of not taking any effort ‘as no other genre does’.⁸²

At column 17 Mangoni (*On Poems* V), Philodemus commences his report of the poetic theory of, and his attack on a Stoic, as mentioned above, traditionally believed by scholars to be Aristo of Chios.⁸³ For this Stoic, the thought and the composition have equal importance when judging if the poem is good, bad, or indifferent. Asmis ‘attributes moral qualities to aesthetic properties to resolve the dilemma’,⁸⁴ and applies the terms good, bad, or intermediate to the

⁸² Sider 1997: 32.

⁸³ Book V, columns 13.28–21.22 Jensen, translated and analysed by Asmis 1990: 147–201.

⁸⁴ Porter 1994: 66, n. 15.

poetry's qualities, to comply with the traditional Stoic division of things into categories.

These three predicates may then be applied to both the thought and the composition individually. The Stoic's term for fine, *asteion*, meant, in the traditional sense, witty or elegant. The particular use for the Stoics, Asmis suggests, is a 'striking example of the Stoic habit of transforming ordinary meaning into new technical meaning'.⁸⁵ The Stoics gave the term connotations of good as virtuous good, a usage also found in connection with music at S.E. *M.* VI.48: οὕτω τις μὲν μελωδία σεμνά τινα καὶ ἀστεῖα ἐμποιεῖ τῆ ψυχῆ κινήματα 'and a certain kind of melody produces in the soul stately and fine motions'.

For the Stoic, a poem cannot be good as an object in itself, but only insofar as it portrays the action of a good person. So it can 'participate in virtue only as an action performed by the poet – the thought of the poem is an activity of the mind of the poet; it is expressed in linguistic sound, an activity that originates in the mind. But since, according to the Stoics, a good person had a mind that is perfectly in harmony with the nature of the universe, a good poet will present, in a perfectly harmonious manner, truths about the world while expressing his own thoughts'.⁸⁶

Blank suggests that Diogenes of Babylon might have used artistic analogies in his ethical works, assigning a passage from Cicero's *De Officiis* to him.⁸⁷

[T6.ii.9] But that duty which those same Stoics call 'right' is absolute and perfect and 'satisfies all the numbers'. . . and is attainable by none except the wise man. On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see 'intermediate'⁸⁸ duties (*media*) manifested, that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of

⁸⁵ Asmis 1990: 159.

⁸⁶ Asmis 1990: 160–1.

⁸⁷ *De Off.* 3.3.15. Blank 1994: 58–9, supported, in my view, by the analysis in chapter 2 of Diogenes' analogy between musical and ethical harmony. See above, section 2.v, and in particular the excerpt from Stobaeus T2.v.8.

⁸⁸ 'Intermediate' i.e. those which are not perfect because not performed by a wise person.

poems, paintings and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of excellence, which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have not the ability to discover the points of weakness. . . And so when they are instructed by experts, they readily abandon their former opinion.⁸⁹

De Lacy suggests that for Philodemus' Stoic opponent of book V, the uneducated are 'unable to appreciate philosophical discourse and must be drawn to philosophy gradually through poetry and music'.⁹⁰ Certainly both poetry and music are regarded as a preparation for philosophy in the thought of Diogenes of Babylon in the *De Musica*, and the Cicero passage quoted above would seem to confirm the Stoic view that men are unable to judge correctly without expert tuition, a view also held by Plato in both the *Republic* and the *Laws*. At *De Musica* column 136, music is considered as analogous to poetry 'in imitation and in the rest of invention' κατά τε τὴν μίμησιν καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην εὔρεσιν, strongly refuted, of course, by Philodemus. Sextus Empiricus further remarks at *M. VI.7* ' . . . we welcome music because it produces the same results as philosophy not by commanding us in a violent manner but by means of seductive persuasiveness'. For the Stoics, therefore, poetry and music were important not for the pleasure they might give the listener, but as important educational tools, for the moral benefit the right poetry could offer the listener, contrary to Philodemus' view, but exactly the view that one would expect of a Stoic. Galen reports also at *PHP III* that Chrysippus also made a habit of quoting lines from the poets in support of some doctrine.⁹¹ The worth of the poetry was defined, therefore, in terms of what is rational and beneficial rather than pleasure.

At column 23 Mangoni (20 Jensen), Philodemus attacks his Stoic opponent,⁹² again on the judgement of a poem's 'worth':

⁸⁹ Trans. Miller in Loeb edition, with amendments. Compare also, Plato's comments on the 'common crowd', above chapter 4, T4.19 and 20.

⁹⁰ 1958: 269.

⁹¹ Galen *PHP III.2.2*, where Chrysippus quotes *Iliad XVIII.109–10* as part of his argument that 'the passionate part [of the soul] is in the heart'; De Lacy 1958: 264.

⁹² Possibly Aristo, see text at n. 83 above.

[T6.ii.10] But it is laughable for him to lay down that even good composition is not recognisable through reason, but just the exercise of one's hearing. It is wretched when he introduces the notion that euphony arises by the composition of the style, and ascribes the criticism of it to the exercise of hearing, and more wretched still to take the composition itself of the words, which is recognised by thought as being good or bad, and ascribe it to the reasonless centre of hearing that has no business with its successes and failures. . .

Perhaps, Asmis suggests, Philodemus is here referring to 'experienced perception';⁹³ it is certainly reminiscent of his ridicule of Diogenes of Babylon's '*epistēmonikē aisthēsis*' in the *De Musica* (see above, chapter 2, section v, and above, this chapter, pages 213–14). As De Lacy notes, 'the musician is concerned with certain dispositions of sounds, which are apprehended by a kind of perception distinct from that by which simple qualities of sound are perceived'.⁹⁴

As already mentioned, Philodemus attacks Crates for his similar suggestion that 'trained hearing' could judge the worth of a poem. The criterion for 'goodness' was, of course, different for the *kritikoi* and the Stoics, but it does suggest that Aristo, Crates, Andremonides and Diogenes of Babylon all had theories that placed great importance upon the sense of some sort of 'trained hearing'. The other similarity between these '*kritikoi*' and Diogenes would seem to be the requirement of some knowledge of the thing about which they write either poems or music.

The overriding similarity, however, would appear to be the requirement of harmony. As mentioned above, for the *kritikoi*, the sound was the most important thing, and for Diogenes, the correctness of the musical line was of paramount importance. I would suggest, that it is in this respect, that Diogenes aligned the *mousikoi* with the *kritikoi* in T6.ii.1 above.

⁹³ 1990: 192.

⁹⁴ 1958: 246.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSIONS

I would suggest that at the heart of Philodemus' intentions in the *De Musica* is a defence, an *apologia*, for the followers of Epicurus against those who accused them of a lack of culture. Philodemus makes it quite clear throughout this work, and indeed throughout his writings on poetry as well, that he had read, and was familiar with, many works that had been written about music and poetry, as well as the works of Homer and Hesiod. Indeed, he even wrote some epigrams of his own. I will discuss what his writings on poetry suggest about his own intentions a little later in this chapter. My initial intention, however, is to sum up what can be said with any confidence about Diogenes' own musical philosophy.

The evidence discussed in the preceding chapters strongly suggests that Diogenes, far from holding a completely new view on *ēthos* in music, fits very well into the traditional historical orthodoxy, beginning with Damon of Oa, perhaps,¹ but which developed into a more intellectual arena by Plato, and then made much more practical by Aristotle and the Peripatetics. The question must remain as to whether Diogenes had access to Aristotle's writings on the subject; some of the evidence presented in chapter 5 strongly suggests that he had, but it would appear that in working to give a more scientific account of his views, Diogenes also had a unique approach in some important areas.

Education for the Stoics of course aimed at living a morally excellent life and working towards becoming a sage.² Respect for the gods would always have been uppermost in Diogenes' mind, and to this end music had to accord that respect if it was to have any moral value at all.

Diogenes found, I believe, a place for the Stoic notion of *oikeiōsis* in his musical theory. He held that even the infant could absorb the virtues contained within the music itself before the age of reason,³ and through habituation, much lauded by Plato. The importance of only being exposed during developing years

¹ Always with the *caveat*, however, that his importance might have been exaggerated through traditional scholarship, as discussed above, in chapter 4.

² See chapter 2, section ii and D. L. VII.88.

³ See chapter 2, section iv.

particularly, to the ‘right’ or ‘appropriate’ music was of utmost importance, and to this end it was equally important to appoint the correct judges of music to advise which was or was not appropriate.⁴ Important also, I believe, is the fact that catharsis did not play a part in Diogenes’ theory of music in education.

However, Diogenes also claimed that music itself contained ‘divisions, demonstrations and proofs’,⁵ inherent, probably, I believe, in the tensions in the intervals and scales handed down by the ancients. As discussed in chapter 2, in this I support the view of Long and Scade that number and proportion were important in Stoic psychology and ethics.

In seeming contrast to earlier writers on music, Diogenes talked about a ‘knowing perception’, i.e., an ‘educated ear’, a means by which ‘that which is in harmony and that which is not’, could be recognised. This could only be achieved by the correct education in early years, and then in later times, the practise of listening and learning to recognise the appropriate tunes and watch and learn how they affected different people.

Uniquely it seems, Diogenes not only recognised that music could set a soul into motion from rest, or similarly could calm a troubled soul, but importantly he also recognised that we are not all affected in the same way by the same music. It may be that he saw music as a stochastic art. As such the right results could not be guaranteed every time, but would be aimed at, and more likely to be achieved by the trained craftsman, in a similar way to that of medicine. It may also be that the later writer Aristides Quintilianus, who himself discussed the homeopathic qualities in music, could have been influenced by Diogenes.⁶

However, I do not think that Diogenes would have needed to stray from orthodox Stoic psychology in his beliefs on music. As argued in chapter 2, there is nothing in traditional Stoic psychology to preclude Diogenes’ beliefs in music’s power, and indeed there is evidence that an earlier Stoic, Cleanthes, at least, may have held similar views.

Diogenes’ search for a scientific account of music is further evidenced, I believe by his analogy between the *mousikoi* and the *kritikoi* in poetry, as

⁴ Above, chapter 4, T4.15.

⁵ T2.v.3, refuted by Philodemus at column 117.23–8, T5.i.9.

⁶ See discussion above, chapter 3, pp. 82 ff.

discussed in my chapter 6, part ii above. This, taken together with the claim that music contained ‘definitions, divisions and demonstrations, strongly suggests, as argued in chapter 2 above, that Diogenes was looking for the *mousikos* to be capable of analysing the music in a similar way that the *kritikos* would analyse poetry, in order to identify ‘good’ from ‘bad’ music.

It is clear, however, that Diogenes also believed in, and wrote about the use of music in traditional ways, as is indicated in his listing of its uses in weddings, funerals, to help when working or going into battle, but none of these uses deviate in any significant way from the traditional uses listed in many other writers. It seems also that Diogenes told a number of standard anecdotes in his tales of musicians of old, and his disapproval of the ‘New Music’ would seem to be on common with most of the musical writers. There seems to be much common ground between the stories told by Diogenes, and those recounted by [Plutarch], and indeed in one instance Diogenes’ writing clarifies details of an anecdote previously held in some doubt by scholars.⁷

It is clear from chapter 4,⁸ that Diogenes had not only read Plato, but had read him closely and consulted his works when writing his own musical theory. Like Plato before him, Diogenes advocated the use of Dorian and Phrygian scales in the first instance.⁹ That he chose to quote, almost *verbatim*, such a long passage from the *Laws* must raise a number of questions. First of all, what purpose would be served by using an earlier, albeit distinguished, philosopher’s words rather than his own? As mentioned, the state of the evidence precludes us from telling how Diogenes introduced the passages; he might well have opened with ‘As Plato said’. However, nothing in Philodemus’ critique of these claims suggests that he did. If then he did not, did he consider that by quoting Plato’s words he would give his own words more authority? If so, then he must have expected readers to recognise his authority without his naming him. Views on plagiarism were, to be sure, very different in antiquity, but it was not unknown for such accusations to be made.¹⁰ But equally, if Plato’s name was there, why quote him at such length? Did Diogenes believe that any work treating a subject

⁷ See above, chapter 3, T3.i.9 and discussion.

⁸ Especially T4.3; T4.13 and 14; T4.15 and 16.

⁹ T4.3, above.

¹⁰ Chamaeleon accused Heraclides of Pontus of plagiarising material from his own work for the latter’s *On the Age of Homer and Hesiod*; see Heraclides fr. 176–7 Wehrli. See above, p. 157.

previously studied by such a famous predecessor needed to show that the latter's work had been studied closely before the newer work could be taken seriously? Perhaps it was used to indicate that Plato's theory was seen as a starting point from which to build his own more scientific theory. The fact that Philodemus mentions Plato by name in the closing columns¹¹ of his critique of Diogenes' theory suggests that Diogenes had mentioned Plato *somewhere* in his own writing. But if Philodemus is following his usual pattern of parallel criticism, he is not in column 138 referring to Diogenes' longer quotations.

Diogenes may well have mentioned Theophrastus in his writings, but the only other possibly Peripatetic's name still extant in Diogenes' own writings is that of Heraclides of Pontus.¹² The fact that Philodemus himself mentions Archestratus, Theophrastus and Aristoxenus might indicate that Diogenes did also. However, it may also be that Philodemus was using these writers as evidence to refute a suggestion by Diogenes; evidence too, perhaps, of Philodemus' own wide reading on the subject. Unless and until better readings of the relevant columns of the work can be made, then that will not be known.

One fundamental point against which Philodemus and any Epicurean would have railed was, I suggest, the notion of the sense of 'hearing' as having *logos*. To attach any reasoning to the ear was anathema to Philodemus, and without that reasoning, Diogenes would indeed be 'searching for a science of the inexistent' as suggested by Philodemus himself.¹³

In rejecting out of hand Diogenes' claims for music, as mentioned above, I believe that Philodemus was also constructing a defence against accusations of ignorance made against the Epicurean school. In his refutation of Diogenes' views, he continually claims that Diogenes confuses poetry with music,¹⁴ and claims that any use in the music will be contained in the words that go with the music and not the music itself.¹⁵ He cites Ibycus and Anacreon as examples of

¹¹ Column 138, see above T4.28.

¹² Column 49, if indeed Heraclides should be described as a Peripatetic; see chapter 5.iii above.

¹³ Col. 117, see p. 84 above.

¹⁴ E.g., column 119.13 ff.

¹⁵ Col. 73 – it is the words in the war songs that incite men to bravery, not the music itself. Also columns 128 (it is the ideas within the words rather than the tune); col. 140, again it is the thoughts within the words rather than the melodies and rhythms.

poets who could affect men with the power of their words rather than their music.¹⁶

His criticisms make it clear that for him, and the Epicurean school, the value of any music and poetry was precisely for the non-essential pleasure it gave to its listeners. And as argued in chapters 4, 5 and 6, it seems that Philodemus particularly took issue with Plato's and indeed the Peripatetics' and Diogenes' insistence on moralising these pleasures. In chapter 6 above, he is seen to criticise Heraclides of Pontus for censoring many of the most beautiful poems,¹⁷ and attacking another Stoic's method of judgement of a poem's worth.¹⁸ In the *De Musica*, Philodemus makes it clear that he knows the Homeric tales Diogenes uses as evidence of music's power, but also knows them well enough to disparagingly refute Diogenes' claims. This knowledge of the detail of the Homeric tales is also shown in his didactic work *On The Good King According to Homer*, which I discussed in chapter 6.i.

The very fact that Philodemus wrote his four books on music, and at least five books on poetry show that he had studied these fields in some depth. Indeed his three aesthetic works (he also wrote a number of books on rhetoric) could be seen as a defence against any claims of ignorance.

The main purpose of my study has, of course, been to analyse and place into their historical context the musico-ethical theories of Diogenes of Babylon. I think this has now been possible due to the recent reconstruction of Philodemus' treatise. It remains to be seen whether these theories may be further clarified if and when more advanced techniques become available to read the currently illegible columns of this very important work.

¹⁶ These poets do not appear to have been quoted by Diogenes in his own claim.

¹⁷ *On Poems* V, col. 1, T6.ii.2 above.

¹⁸ T6.ii.9 and discussion.

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