

**The illusion of community participation:  
experience in the irregular settlements of Bogotá**

**A thesis submitted to University College London  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**Noriko Hataya**

**Department of Geography  
University College London**

**2007**

### **Declaration**

I, NORIKO HATAYA, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

*Noriko Hataya*

*21 December 2007*

# **The illusion of community participation: experience in the irregular settlements of Bogotá**

## **Abstract**

The study focuses on community participation among the poor of Bogotá, Colombia. It explores the changing relationships between poor communities, local politicians and the city government before and after the institutional reforms and changing approach to development that occurred during the 1990s. The case studies were conducted in six irregular settlements, all developed in contravention of the city's planning regulations. Data were collected using a sample household survey and in-depth interviews with community leaders, local inhabitants and the representatives of outside organisations.

In the 1990s, clientelistic practices became less effective to push the regularisation process. City programmes toward irregular settlements became more holistic and benefited from better coordination between the different public entities. As a result, the inhabitants became more discriminating in identifying the most effective strategies for obtaining the services and infrastructure that they required.

Competent government intervention was ultimately the most important factor in furthering the regularisation process. However, regularisation could not be achieved without community participation. Community involvement was important both before and after a settlement was recognised. The community had to find the money to put down a deposit before the service agencies would install services. This required not only a minimum level of economic resources but also firm community leadership.

The study also shows that apparently contradictory decisions made by the different communities were highly rational. Whether the inhabitants were willing to pay for services depended on the benefit they expected in return. Their criteria changed through the consolidation process because their most urgent needs changed. Today, after the pricing system of public services changed, access to services depends mostly on users' purchasing power and not on the collective negotiation led by the JAC leaders.

In the 1990s, under the new constitution with its laws protecting citizen's rights, 'participation' of citizens in the political arena as well as their right to obtain basic services was clearly recognised. Under this legal framework, community participation gives the poor a voice with which they can present claims as well as criticise the negligence of public administration. However, the protests of the inhabitants against increased public service charges show that the community-based organisations sometimes still have reason, and the ability, to mobilise the local people as a final resort.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is the product of more than ten years' commitment to urban development issues in Bogotá, Colombia. I am indebted to all those who have helped, supported and encouraged me in different stages of my research and writing up periods, either in Colombia, the United Kingdom or Japan. This study would not have been possible without the support of the Institute of Developing Economies which financed my field work in Colombia.

First of all, my special thanks go to Dr. Alan Gilbert, my principal supervisor. His consistent orientation and precise and critical comments on my drafts was the most valuable education that I have ever had. I am deeply grateful for the care and considerable amount of time he has devoted to me. Dr. Julio Dávila, my subsidiary supervisor, was always there for me whenever I needed his help. Without his encouragement and support, I would never have finished this thesis.

My sincere gratitude should go to Dr. Luis Mauricio Cuervo, who received me as visiting researcher at CIDER- Universidad de Los Andes during my field work in Colombia. Samuel Jaramillo, Oscar Alfonso, Carmenza Saldías, Adriana Posada, Eduardo Restrepo, Luis Carlos Jiménez, María Margarita de Ruiz, Leonardo García and Argemiro Morales, gave me technical suggestions on data analysis and helped me with document research in Colombia. Those who assisted me, in many different ways, during my field work are too numerous to mention, but special thanks should go to Melba Rubiano and Margoth Figueredo. Carolina Ordóñez, Pio García and Alfonso Ariza always encouraged me whenever I faced difficulties in Colombia.

I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the friends and residents in the *barrios* in Bogotá who have generously received me and allowed me to take up their precious time with my persistent interviews. Without their kind acceptance and company the research would not have been possible. The fruits of this thesis belong to them.

Harry Smith, Reeitsu Kojima, Kiwa Ojiri and Ayako Kagawa generously read my previous drafts and gave me critical observations. Linda Grove, Koichi Nakano and my current colleagues at Sophia University in Tokyo, gave me moral support and intellectual insights during the final stage of writing up the thesis.

Finally, there, always thinking of me at a distance, were my parents, Takeshi and Fumiko Hataya, to whom this work is dedicated.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract .....	i
Acknowledgements .....	ii
Table of contents .....	iii
List of figures .....	ix
List of tables .....	x
List of glossaries .....	xii
List of appendices .....	xiv

### Chapter 1: Introduction

Images .....	1
Community and community participation: definitions and debates .....	3
How should we define a ‘community’? .....	3
The creation of communities by outside agencies .....	4
Community participation .....	7
Community participation and empowerment .....	10
Critical debates on community participation .....	12
Irregular settlements .....	29
Definition of irregular settlements .....	29
Changing academic approaches and policy implications for urban poverty and housing .....	31
Urban ecology school .....	31
The culture of poverty .....	32
Marginality .....	33
Self-help housing and the changing form of state intervention .....	37
Community struggle and the slum as a political issue .....	39
Holistic studies on irregular settlements .....	42
Changing approaches to irregular settlement research .....	44
Shift to neoliberal policies .....	44
The democratisation process .....	52
Research questions .....	60

### Chapter 2: Methodology

Selection of the research area: Colombia and Bogotá .....	66
---	----

The Colombian political and administrative process .....	66
Colombia's economy .....	69
Bogotá as research locale.....	72
Period of study .....	77
Research methods used for the study .....	77
Structure of the fieldwork .....	78
Research on urban policy, planning and public service provision .....	81
Chronology of settlement research .....	82
Selection of study settlements .....	87
Design and problems of sampling method .....	97
Size of sample .....	97
Gauging homogeneity and diversity .....	98
Method of selecting households .....	99
Problems with application of the questionnaire .....	102
Qualitative methods (semi-structured and non-structured in-depth interviews) .....	106
Ethical issues relating to the fieldwork .....	111
Positionality in development research .....	111
My position as an 'outsider' and its limitation .....	113
Confidentiality of the data collected .....	115
My contribution to the communities and feedback from them .....	116

### **Chapter 3: The expansion of irregular settlement and the urban management in Bogotá to the 1980s**

Bogotá's role as the capital city .....	118
Urban structure .....	122
Inequality and residential segregation .....	124
The origin of the irregular settlements .....	127
City government intervention up to the 1980s .....	130
City and public service boundaries and zoning .....	131
Minimum standards: regulation of urbanisation .....	133
Improvement of existing irregular settlements: regularisation .....	136
Public service authorities: EAAB, EEB and IDU .....	139
EAAB .....	139
Bogotá Electricity Company (EEB) .....	141
Urban Development Institute (IDU) .....	142
Integral programme for upgrading .....	143

PIDUZOB(1972-1974) .....	143
National agency sanctions on the illegal sub-division of land .....	146
Reactions of irregular settlement communities ... ..	147
Resistance to eviction .....	147
Conventional activism through officially approved community organisations .....	148
The role of the JACs .....	149
Politicians and the JACs .....	151
Unconventional strategies for obtaining services: urban protests .....	153
City government-irregular settlement relations up to the end of the 1980s .....	154

#### **Chapter 4: Policies toward irregular settlements: changes in the 1990s**

Shortage of low-cost housing for the poor .....	160
Fluctuation of land prices in the formal market.....	161
New housing policy toward the poor .....	164
Changes of urban management .....	168
Changes in regularisation policy in the 1990s.....	168
Reinforcement of legal sanctions against pirate sub-dividers .....	170
Promotion of transfer of landownership.....	171
Making public service companies more efficient .....	172
Pro-poor type development projects executed in the irregular settlements .....	180
Ciudad Bolívar Programme (1985-1994).....	180
OSP (Works with an Educational Outcome).....	182
South Bogotá Project ( <i>Proyecto de Mejoramiento de Barrios Sur con Bogotá</i> ) (1999-2003) .....	184
De-marginalisation Programme .....	188
Decentralisation and community participation .....	191
Creation of the JALs .....	191
Local elections in the 1990s .....	193
Relationship between the Bogotá mayors and the JALs: efforts to reduce clientelism and corruption .....	196
Citizen participation in decisions on local development ( <i>Encuentros     Ciudadanos</i> ).....	198
Citizen's rights to monitor public policy and file claim against city authorities .....	199
Civic protests in the 1990s .....	200

Community participation under the new urban management .....	204
Appendices for chapter 4 .....	208

### **Chapter 5: Six stories of irregular settlement in southern Bogotá**

General conditions of the settlements .....	212
Current level of consolidation .....	215
Physical consolidation .....	215
Level of provision of basic public services .....	218
Per capita income and average rent .....	221
Pace of the regularisation process .....	224
History of the six <i>barrios</i> .....	227
Diana Turbay .....	277
Jerusalén .....	233
Danubio Azul .....	241
La Paz .....	248
Juan José Rondón (JJR) .....	254
Bella Flor .....	262
Differing paces of regularization .....	269
Factors established in previous studies .....	269
Community-specific factors found in the case-study settlements.....	274
Stories of the six <i>barrios</i> : a discussion of how a variety of factors combined and interacted in each specific case .....	275
In the 1980s.....	275
New factors in the 1990s .....	279

### **Chapter 6: Community leadership, participation and interactions with outside actors: inhabitants' views**

The nature of community leadership .....	281
Who are the community leaders? .....	282
Who should be responsible? .....	286
Evaluation of community leadership .....	287
Corruption as one of the factors weakening community leadership .....	291
The relationship between the community and politicians .....	293
The changing nature of political involvement in the six settlements .....	297
The relation with other outside organisations .....	302



Community-state relations .....	305
The meaning of ‘community participation’ in the community co-financing programmes .....	305
Participation in collective activism.....	309
Local opinion about community participation.....	311
Economic conditions and community-state relations .....	321
Economic conditions necessary for the success of community co-financing programmes.....	322
Inhabitants’ reaction toward the new tariff regime during the economic recession .....	325
Conclusion: inhabitants’ interpretation of community participation .....	335
Appendices for chapter 6 .....	339

## **Chapter 7: Conclusion**

Answering and reflecting on the research questions.....	345
Question 1: How have the nature of community struggle and government approaches to the poor changed as a result of the recent strengthening of democracy and decentralised government? .....	345
Question 2: How has the increasingly market-oriented approach to urban and economic development affected the lives of people in the <i>barrio</i> ? .....	348
Question 3: How effectively has the participatory approach of the city government to the community affected the lives of people in the irregular settlements since 1990? .....	349
Question 4: How far did community participation succeed in the involvement of the community in the decision-making process and enforce its control over resource allocation? .....	351
Theoretical reflections on the findings.....	352
Community participation: the gap between theory and practice .....	352
The impact of privatisation and commercialisation of basic services on community participation and on community-state relationships .....	362
How democratisation and decentralisation influenced the effectiveness of community participation.....	363
Multilateral relationships involved in the practice of community participation: autonomy, clientelism and the market mechanism: the changing nature of the state-community relationship .....	364
Significance of the findings to communities beyond Bogotá .....	366

Methodological lessons from the research .....	369
Topics for future research .....	371
<b>References</b> .....	<b>373</b>
<b>Appendices</b> .....	<b>397</b>

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1 Republic of Colombia: political and administrative division .....	75
Figure 2.2 Localities of Bogotá District Capital.....	76
Figure 2.3 Bogotá: legalised settlements and settlements being legalised .....	92
Figure 2.4 Bogotá: stratus 1 and stratus 2 .....	93
Figure 2.5 Location of six case study settlements .....	96
Figure 3.1 Traditional steps toward regularisation of irregular settlements .....	138
Figure 3.2 Target area of intervention by PIDUZOB .....	145
Figure 4.1 Diagram illustrating the structure of Bogotá city administration in 2002.....	159
Figure 4.2 Zones of intervention under ‘South Bogotá Project’ .....	185
Figure 4.3 Monitoring and co-evaluation system of community and public institutions for the South Bogotá Project ... ..	187
Figure 4.4 Target area of intervention by ‘De-marginalisation Programme’ .....	189
Figure 5.1 Diana Turbay settlement .....	231
Figure 5.2 Photographs of Diana Turbay settlement.....	232
Figure 5.3 Jerusalén settlement .....	239
Figure 5.4 Photographs of Jerusalén settlement.....	240
Figure 5.5 Danubio Azul settlement .....	246
Figure 5.6 Photographs of Danubio Azul settlement.....	247
Figure 5.7 La Paz settlement .....	252
Figure 5.8 Photographs of La Paz settlement .....	253
Figure 5.9 Juan José Rondón settlement .....	260
Figure 5.10 Photographs of Juan José Rondón settlement .....	261
Figure 5.11 Bella Flor settlement .....	267
Figure 5.12 Photographs of Bella Flor settlement .....	268
Figure 6.1 Bogotá: annual increase of GDP per capita (1990-2003) .....	330

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1 Interests in participation by Sarah White .....	17
Table 3.1 Population of Colombia, urban area and Bogotá (1938-2005) .....	119
Table 3.2 Population and annual growth ratio of Bogotá metropolitan area .....	120
Table 3.3 Population density and growth of urban area .....	123
Table 3.4 Quality of life and poverty indices in Bogotá, 1996-2004 .....	125
Table 4.1 Housing deficit in Bogotá according to socio-economic stratus in 1997 .....	160
Table 4.2 Land prices per square metres between 1960 and 1997: real annual increase ratio (%) .....	162
Table 4.3 Subsidies provided by INURBE 1991-2002, Bogotá and total national .....	165
Table 4.4 Distribution of subsidies for VIS during the period 1994-97 (%) .....	167
Table 4.5 Basic data on the zones of intervention by South Bogotá Project .....	185
Table 4.6 Results of the elections of <i>ediles</i> in the 1990s by political party/movement .....	195
Table 5.1 Basic information on the six case-study settlements .....	214
Table 5.2 Approximate level of land occupation in 2000 .....	215
Table 5.3 Physical condition of the houses of the sampled households .....	217
Table 5.4 Rate of tenancy in the sampled households in 2000 .....	218
Table 5.5 Score of the sum of three indicators .....	218
Table 5.6 Public services available in the six settlements. ....	219
Table 5.7 Provision of social service facilities .....	220
Table 5.8 Scored indicators of public services .....	221
Table 5.9 Average income per capita of the sampled households (1).....	222
Table 5.10 Average rent for a tenant renting one room in the sampled households (1,000 pesos) .....	222
Table 5.11 Percentage of owner occupants with a title deed .....	223
Table 5.12 Total score of consolidation indicators .....	223
Table 5.13 Summary of the regularisation process of the six case study settlements .....	225
Table 6.1 Households naming community leaders .....	282
Table 6.2 Arrival year at the current settlement of the household head by category of leadership recognition .....	283
Table 6.3 First ten leaders who were identified most frequently in the household survey .....	285
Table 6.4 Institution responsible for resolving most urgent problem/needs* .....	287
Table 6.5 Households naming specific politicians* .....	293
Table 6.6 List of politicians who were identified as influential in the household survey .....	296
Table 6.7 Commitment to community-based activities by type of action (multiple responses, answered by household heads) .....	311

Table 6.8 Opinions on community participation today and in the past ...	313
Table 6.9 Evaluation of community participation between the past and the present according to the interviewee's arrival year at the settlement .....	316
Table 6.10 Evolution of service charges for water and sewerage: real annual increase ratio for basic tariffs(*) 1991-2003 .....	326
Table 6.11 Burden of service charge for water and sewerage on average monthly income (%) .....	327
Table 6.12 Evolution of average consumption of water 1994 to 2004 by strata (m <sup>3</sup> /month) .....	327
Table 6.13 Annual increase ratio of service charge for electricity by strata (%) .....	328
Table 6.14 Monthly consumption of electricity (kw/h) .....	328
Table 6.15 Approximate burden of service charge for electricity on average monthly income (%) .....	329
Table 6.16 Simulation of the burden of service charges (water, sewerage and electricity) on monthly income in six settlements in 2000 .....	329
Table 6.17 Employment rate in the past month of six settlements .....	331
Table 6.18 Job classification of the household heads in the sampled survey (frequency) .....	331

## LIST OF GLOSSARIES

- ASINDESODA Danubio Azul Association for Integration and Social Development  
(*Asociación de Integración y Desarrollo Social, Danubio Azul*)
- ASOJERUSALEN Barrio Jerusalén Association of Popular Movement  
(*Asociación de Movimiento Popular Barrio Jerusalén*)
- BCH Central Mortgage Bank (*Banco Central Hipotecario*)
- CADE Bogotá Special District Centre of Attention (*Centro de Atención Distrito Especial*)
- CAI Centre for Immediate Attention (*Centro de Atención Inmediata*)
- CAMI Immediate Medical Attention Centre (*Centro de Atención Médica Inmediata*)
- CAV Saving and Housing Corporation (*Caja de Ahorro y Vivienda*)
- CBO Community-based organisation
- CELODIJE Local Centre of Development for Jerusalén (*Centro Local de Desarrollo para Barrio Jerusalén*)
- CIDER Interdisciplinary Centre of Regional Studies (*Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regionales*)
- COOPBAUS Public service cooperative of hillside settlements of Usme (*Cooperativa de Servicios Públicos de Barrios Altos de Usme*)
- CRA Commission for Regulation of Drinking Water, Sewerage and Waste Collection  
(*Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico*)
- CREG Commission for Regulation of Natural Gas and Electricity (*Comisión de Regulación Energía y Gas*)
- CVP Popular Housing Fund (*Caja de Vivienda Popular*)
- DAAC Administrative Department of Communal Action (*Departamento Administrativo de Acción Comunal*).
- DABS Administrative Department of Social Welfare (*Departamento Administrativo de Bienestar Social*)
- DAMA Administrative Department of Environment (*Departamento Administrativo de Medioambiente*)
- DANCOOP National Administrative Department for Cooperatives (*Departamento Administrativo Nacional para Cooperativas*)
- DANE National Statistics Department (*Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadísticas*)
- DAPD Bogotá District Planning Department (*Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital*)
- DPAE Department of Prevention and Attention for the Emergency (*Departamento de Prevención y Atención para la Emergencia*)

EAAB	Bogotá Water Supply and Sewerage Company ( <i>Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá</i> )
EDIS	District Company of Public Services ( <i>Empresa Distrital de Servicios Públicos</i> )
EEB	Bogotá Electricity Company ( <i>Empresa Energía de Bogotá</i> )
EEEB	Bogotá Electric Energy Company ( <i>Empresa Energía Eléctrica de Bogotá</i> )
EMGESA	Electricity Generation Company ( <i>Empresa de Generación Eléctrica , S. A.</i> )
ETB	Bogotá Telephone Company ( <i>Empresa de Teléfonos de Bogotá</i> )
FDL	Local Development Fund ( <i>Fondo de Desarrollo Local</i> )
HOBIS	Nursery of Family Welfare ( <i>Hogar de Bienestar Familiar</i> )
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
ICES	Hillside Institute of the South ( <i>Instituto Cerro del Sur</i> )
ICT	National Housing Institute ( <i>Instituto de Crédito Territorial</i> )
IDRD	District Institution of Recreation and Sports ( <i>Instituto Distrital de Recreación y Deportes</i> )
IDU	Urban Development Institute ( <i>Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano</i> )
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INURBE	National Institute of Social Interest Housing and Urban Reform ( <i>Instituto Nacional de Vivienda de Interés Social y Reforma Urbana</i> )
JAC	Community Action Boards ( <i>Junta de Acción Comunal</i> )
JAL	Local Administrators Committees ( <i>Junta de Administradores Locales</i> )
JJR	<i>Juan José Rondón</i>
KFW	<i>Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau</i>
M-19	Movement of 19 April ( <i>Movimiento de 19 de abril</i> )
OSP	Works with an Educational Outcome ( <i>Obras con Saldo Pedagógico</i> )
PIDUZOB	Integrated Programme of Urban Development for the Eastern Zone of Bogotá ( <i>Programa Integrado de Desarrollo Urbano Zona Oriental de Bogotá</i> )
POT	Spatial Development Plan ( <i>Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial</i> )
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRI	Institutional Revolutionary Party ( <i>Partido Revolucionario Institucional</i> )
SERVIVIENDA	Association for Popular Housing ( <i>Fundación Servicio de Vivienda Popular</i> )
SIB	Banking Superintendency ( <i>Superintendencia Bancaria</i> )
UEL	Local Executive Unit ( <i>Unidad Ejecutiva Local</i> )
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institution for Social Development
UPAC	Unit of Constant Purchasing Equivalent ( <i>Unidad del Poder Adquisitivo Constante</i> )
UPZ	Zone Unit for Planning ( <i>Unidad de Planeación Zonal</i> )
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VIS	social interest housing ( <i>vivienda de interés social</i> )

## LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 4a.1 Annual real growth ratio of land price according to land use in Bogotá .....	208
Appendix 4a.2 Cost of ‘South Bogotá Project’ and source of the funds to execute the project among institutions 2001-2003 .....	209
Appendix 4a.3 Comparison between the proposal based on the feasibility study in 1998 vs. achievements in 1999-2000 .....	210
Appendix 4a.4 Institutions and their budget to be invested for ‘De-marginalisation programme’ .....	211
Appendix 6a.1 Institution responsible for resolving most urgent problems/needs .....	339
Appendix 6a.2 Bogotá quarterly unemployment rate from March 1990 to December 2000 .....	342
Appendix 6a.3 Bogotá: minimum legal wage and its real annual growth ratio .....	343
Appendix A. Locations of primary documents and bibliographical research.....	397
Appendix B.1 List of the interviewed public officials .....	398
Appendix B.2 List of the interviewees for in-depth and semi-structured interviews conducted in 2000 .....	399
Appendix B.3 List of the interviewed NGO and CBO activists and politicians .....	402
Appendix C. Questionnaire used for household survey .....	403
Appendix D. Main themes of questions introduced in the semi-structured interviews .....	411
Appendix E.1 GDP total Colombia, annual increase ratio and GDP per capita 1970-96 (1975 US dollars) .....	413
Appendix E.2 Colombia, annual increase ratio of consumer price index 1970-2004 (Base: December 1998=100) .....	414
Appendix E.3 Service charge for water by user category (2001 Colombian pesos) .....	415
Appendix E.4 Average service charge for electricity per KW/hour by strata (1992 Colombian pesos) .....	416
Appendix E.5 Daily exchange rate during the period of household survey (January to August 2000) (Colombian pesos per US dollar) .....	417
Appendix F. Bogotá: current socioeconomic stratification .....	418
Appendix G. Photographs showing examples of the results of communal work and state intervention .....	419



## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### IMAGES

*Living Conditions:* Settlements perched on steep hillsides with paths that were slippery even when they were dry. After heavy rain, no vehicle could climb the muddy unpaved roads. Dogs barking and running out of the flimsy houses whenever a stranger came.

*Water:* A donkey was climbing a steep slope carrying plastic tanks filled with water. People in Bella Flor purchased water from Don José who made his living selling to the local residents. Don José's business lasted eighteen years until the water pipe was installed. As one woman said, 'here everything takes time, but it cannot be helped, because they say that we are illegal occupants'.

*The School:* I met Leo, a school teacher and community leader, in Potosí in 1992. At the time, the 'school' was just a small prefabricated structure on the hill top.

*Regularisation:* By 1999, the settlement of La Paz had improved little in the fourteen years since its foundation. A leader there grumbled about how the state ignored them.

The ability of poor people to survive and improve their lives has been always impressive. If the police knock their homes down one day, people build two more homes the following night. They negotiate and fight with government agencies and enlist the support of different actors: politicians, the Catholic Church and NGOs. Gradually, they obtain the help they need. The speed with which each settlement obtains public services, however, varies from settlement to settlement. Sometimes residents in the irregular settlements steal water or electricity; sometimes they fight for or negotiate with the state to get these services. Some *barrios* are considered to be radical or politically astute, others to be calm or reasonable. Inhabitants sometimes work together to demand what they need. But the energy and duration of community spirit varies; in places it has a long life, elsewhere it disappears quickly.

It was the struggles of the people who lived in the irregular settlements—their problems and their hopes for the future—which first led me to study the lives of the poor and their involvement with their communities. I have been analysing Colombian urban development issues since 1984 when I started my professional career as a researcher for a Japanese semi-governmental institution which was involved in research into current socio-economic and political issues in developing countries. My research interest was always around the areas of urban poverty, rural-urban migration, the urban informal sector and so on. Two joint-research projects conducted with a group of Colombian academics gave me direct access to the poor communities living on the periphery of the capital city, Bogotá (see Hataya et al, 1994; Jaramillo; Alfonso and Hataya 1996; Hataya 1999). Research subjects such as city government policies, urban administration and provision of public services were all relevant and encouraged me to look at the whole context in which the urban poor struggle in their daily lives. However, the more I got involved in the question of urban poverty, the more I found it necessary to approach the topic from the viewpoint of the inhabitants themselves. This was my central motivation; to observe community-state relations from the position of the people. This thesis is the result of more than ten years of observation in the *barrios* of Bogotá, one of Latin America's major cities. The principal aim of this study is to explore how community struggle in the irregular settlements has changed in recent years and how relationships with the state have been affected.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the meaning of key concepts such as community and community participation. This is followed by a review of the literature on the studies of irregular settlements in the Latin American context. Finally, I outline a series of research questions for this study. I argue that my focus on community participation in the irregular settlements is relevant and important if we are to explore community-state-outsider relationships meaningfully.

**How should we define a ‘community’?**

There is a huge body of sociological and anthropological writing on the concept of the community. MacIver defines a community as:

any area of common life, village, or town, or district, or country, or even wider area.

To deserve the name community, the area must be somehow distinguished from other areas, the common life may have some characteristic of its own such that the frontiers of the area have some meaning (MacIver, 1924: 22-23).

In short, people share certain common characteristics while living in a particular area.

He notes that communities can only be defined according to their degree of intensity:

Wherever men live together they develop in some kind and degree distinctive common characteristics—manners, traditions, modes of speech, and so on.( . . . ) It will be seen that a community may be part of a wider community, and that all community is a question of degree.( . . . ) It is a question of the degree and intensity of the common life (MacIver, 1924: 23).

A community is different from an association. A community is at the centre of social life while an association is an organisation established to pursue one or more common interests. A community, therefore, may contain numerous associations, including antagonistic ones. For MacIver, the size of the community is almost irrelevant; the critical issue is whether a group of people share a common ethos.

Davies and Herbert (1993: 4) argue that the term ‘community’ is derived from shared characteristics that bind people together. These shared characteristics or common values might be derived from shared origins (kinship, tribe, history or place); similar features or activities such as economies, interactions or social structures; or similar attitudes,

behaviours and purposes. A community has a spatial or territorial context, and the term 'neighbourhood' is often used as a synonym (Davies and Herbert, 1993).

Park (1967) defines a community as 'a collection of people occupying a more or less clearly defined area. But a community is more than that. A community is not only a collection of people, but it is a collection of institutions' (Park, 1967: 115). He identifies three elements of a community: its ecology, its economic organisation, and its cultural and political forms. The three are integral but its 'ecology' is fundamental. Burgess emphasises the importance of geographical setting of the community. He argues:

Whatever else the community may be, it signifies individuals, families, groups, or institutions located upon an area and some or all of the relationships which grow out of this common location. Community is the term which is applied to societies and social groups where they are considered from the point of view of the geographical distribution of the individuals and institutions of which they are composed (Burgess, 1967: 144).

In this thesis I follow this traditional definition of a community as a group of people living in the same geographical area who share a common ethos. Community thus defined is linked to geographical area. In this thesis the territorial base is the local neighbourhood or *barrio*.<sup>1</sup>

### **The creation of communities by outside agencies**

Early definitions of communities were often based on life in rural areas or villages. People lived in traditional societies that changed relatively little over the years. The communities that are discussed in this thesis are, of course, very different. They consist of migrants from rural areas as well as locally born urban people. The very different context raises the question of whether the people living in the same area share any

---

<sup>1</sup> The debates on the heterogeneity of the community defined based on the geographical area will be discussed later in pages 23-25. See Guijt and Kaul Shah (1998). I will use this definition as the working definition of a community throughout the thesis.

common interests. Does the very fact of living in difficult conditions such as in an area deprived of services force people to identify with their neighbours? Or, does it create some kind of anomie whereby no one associates with anyone else?

In the field of development issues, regardless of the internal heterogeneity of a group of people, the term 'community' has been commonly used to refer to the targeted population (or beneficiaries) of a development project. The term community development was used first by the United Kingdom Colonial Office in the 1940s and 50s (Brokensha and Hodge, 1969; Hickey and Mohan, 2004). Promoting development at the local level in the countries of the South soon became one of the key principles of governments in the North. However, in the South, community development became not only a key strategy for combating poverty but also a way of controlling communities at the same time. While the state's main aim was to include communities in the national development plan, sometimes community development was used in an attempt to turn local communities away from leftist, particularly communist, movements during the Cold War (Campfens, 1997a; Abbott, 1996: 16; Voth and Brewster, 1989).

The strongest impetus for community development came under President John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress programme, which provided large amounts of aid for Latin American countries in the early 1960s.<sup>2</sup> Latin American countries in general established community development programmes to mobilise people in their local communities as an integral part of their national development plans (Quiróz and Palma, 1997). State-initiated community-development programmes were employed widely in developing countries, of which many were financed by aid agencies, such as United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Campfens notes that:

Community development programs were established to mobilize people in their local communities as an integral part of the five-year plans masterminded by national

---

<sup>2</sup> For details of the historical background of the Alliance for Progress, see Latham (2000).

lanners and operating under a centralized system of management and resource allocation (Campfens, 1997b: 16-17).

For example, during the 1950s, the fear that social and political marginality typified the low-income areas of Latin American cities led many outside agencies to try to engender a spirit of cooperation. People should be encouraged to work together for their collective benefit. Thus, the concept of community as put forward by community development programmes was one created by outside agencies, regardless of local initiatives, practices and the heterogeneous interests of community members.

Although community development programmes were first employed in the rural sector, they soon became a key element in the strategy to combat urban poverty. Violich and Astica (1967) argue that city governments came to recognise the limitations of conventional urban planning, such as the creation of regulator plans and the provision of subsidised low cost housing. A new type of urban planning was needed that incorporated the community development concept. General plans would aid development only if social and economic goals were incorporated and, most importantly, local communities were to share responsibility for preparing and implementing them.

The neighbourhood was understood to be the 'community' whether or not the inhabitants shared common values. In practice, neighbours often collaborated with one another in many urban areas. As Violich and Astica (1967: 39-40) point out:

There has been a considerable movement in recent years toward the formation of citizens' groups representative of the local community. Although they are not officially recognized within the existing governmental structure, these neighborhood associations for civic betterment have been a tradition in certain countries.

The citizens' groups' main objectives were to defend the rights of the inhabitants over occupied land and to secure basic public services. They employed a variety of methods, such as applying pressure on politicians to receive resources and official services, seeking assistance from religious bodies, and so on.

## **Community participation**

From the late 1970s, the concept of community participation became fashionable in the execution of development projects in the South. The emphasis on community participation was promoted after development theorists criticised the top-down nature of the implementation of community development programmes, claiming that as such they were ineffective in the fight to eradicate poverty (Midgley, 1986).

In the 1970s, development policy began to focus on new paradigms centred around the idea of basic human needs. In this context, development theorists (and governments) recognised the importance of involving the community in the planning process of more efficient, more functional development projects. Cooke and Kothari (2001: 5) explain this:

The ineffectiveness of externally imposed and expert-oriented forms of research and planning became increasingly evident in the 1980s, when major donors and development organizations began to adopt participatory research and planning methods.

The participatory approach was first identified as a technical concept for the planning of development projects in the rural sector. The work of Robert Chambers was the most influential in this area (see Chambers, 1983; 1994), and it was he who created the Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) method. The principal idea was to involve the (rural) community in identifying local needs and then to prioritise these in order to plan out the concrete development project. It was thus a concerted attempt to integrate and reflect local people's knowledge of their own needs in development planning.

The main argument in support of community participation was that it put the intended beneficiaries at the centre of the development project by encouraging their involvement in both the planning process and control over resources provided by the project. This argument influenced aid institutions such as the World Bank, which came

to adopt the idea of community participation in their development initiatives and projects (World Bank, 1994; Bhatnagar and Williams, 1992; Nelson and Wright, 1995; Rietbergen-McCracken, 1996).

In the field of housing, most slum upgrading and sites-and-services projects<sup>3</sup> in the 1970s and 1980s encouraged community participation. The state attempted to generate a spirit of participation in order to advance community development programmes on the strength of existing initiatives. Such participation, therefore, might be people-initiated or might be prompted by the state.

But what precisely does community participation mean? In a narrow sense as a development initiative, it means the mobilisation of the intended beneficiaries of a specific programme. These beneficiaries, identified here as the community, should be involved in the decision-making process of the implementation of the project in question (Paul, 1987; Imparato and Ruster, 2003; Cornwall, 2006). In a housing programme, for example, it might consist of cooperative financing, collective labour, attendance at meetings, etc. The term participatory planning or participatory programmes derived from this definition. In a wider sense, and as the real practices show, community participation ought to involve a broader level of commitment to the community, whether or not individual families would be direct beneficiaries. Such participation might include helping to finance the construction of community projects, organising bazaars or lotteries to generate funds for communal use, or taking part in demonstrations or collecting signatures to petition the city authorities for help. This is what I consider community participation in general to mean, regardless of state intervention. In other words, it means the people's involvement in communal actions in order to obtain collective needs. When the community cannot rely on the state presence,

---

<sup>3</sup> In the slum upgrading projects, the state (either national government or city authorities) invests in improvement of basic infrastructure for the existent slums. On the other hand, in the sites-and-service projects in general, the state provides the serviced land to the poor and the beneficiaries are then expected to build their own houses.



they carry out these actions as a form of collective self-help. They also resort to communal actions in order to negotiate with the state for further state intervention. Thus, from my viewpoint, we should not limit the term community participation only to the meaning of state-initiated development initiatives, but should widen it to include community-initiated development initiatives.

Desai (1995; 1996) highlights the importance of taking into account local problem solving practices, which she identifies as grass-roots-initiated community participation, as distinct from state-initiated community participation. According to Desai's critique, community participation as a framework for the implementation of development projects excludes people's involvement in traditional communal activities and local decision-making mechanisms. However, from the perspective of any leader, the collective self-help activities taking place during their period of community struggle should definitely form the central part of community participation. Desai (1995: 43) points out the problematic notion of spontaneous participation as follows:

There is a wealth of anthropological evidence to show that elaborate procedures for participation exists in rural communities throughout the Third World, such as the meetings of village elders or gathering of tribal clans to discuss common problems and find solutions, though these are seldom regarded as spontaneous participation. The exclusion of these and other forms of indigenous involvement reveals that the definition of spontaneous participation used in the literature is a narrow one and is based on western ideological preconceptions rather than on local practices.

She characterises state or outsider-initiated community participation as follows:

The novelty of community participation as a development initiative, however, derives from the fact that it involves intervention by, and cooperation with, the state and /or other development agencies (Desai, 1995: 43).

As shown, a clear definition of 'community participation' is very difficult. We need to know who participates in what and for what reason. Desai states:

the two basic terms 'community' and 'participation' are pretty useless, indeed disabling, for clear thought. They are both enormously vague and complex and are booby-trapped with begged questions (Desai, 1995: 43-44).

Despite this she decides to stick with these two basic concepts but does not exclude the local practice of community activities and decision-making mechanisms through community organisation from her idea of community participation. In her case studies of slums in Bombay, she examines the nature of community participation in the light of external as well as internal aspects of community organisation. In this way Desai manages to overcome the limitation of these two basic concepts by exploring and interpreting the complex and heterogeneous nature of community and local practices of participation in the real world. She concludes that the slum-dwellers have little conception of community participation and the very idea of participation is something imposed upon them (Desai, 1995: 301; 1996: 225-26).

I will also continue to use the term community participation. Like Desai, I will focus on the interpretation of participation in the light of local practice and the perceptions of the settlement inhabitants. Whether the inhabitants' involvement in collective self-help action should have been interpreted as participation was not always clear before my fieldwork. Therefore, I decided to use the term 'community involvement before/after the start of state intervention' in my study. I will discuss how the interpretation of community involvement changes and what 'participation' means from the inhabitants' view in chapter 6. This distinction is crucial to understand the changing nature of state-community relationships.

### **Community participation and empowerment**

Many proponents of community participation went further, arguing that it should become more independent of specific projects and should strive to do much more than simply improve physical conditions (Yap, 1990; Kaufman, 1997). What was required

was a change in the power relationship between the poor and the authorities. Such a view is implicit in United Nations Research Institution for Social Development (UNRISD)'s definition of community participation: 'a process designed to increase control over resources and regulative institutions, on the part of groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control'(UNRISD, 1979: 8).<sup>4</sup> According to this view, increasing community participation is an end rather than just a means.

Where participation is interpreted as a means, it generally becomes a form of mobilisation to get things done. . . . Where participation is identified as an end the objective is not a fixed quantifiable development goal but a process whose outcome is an increasingly meaningful participation in the development process (Moser 1983: 3-4).

When community participation is an end in itself to give the vulnerable the political power to influence the decision-making process of public policies, it then becomes a strategy for empowerment. In this sense, participation is particularly important in unequal societies. When participants are unequal in their endowments, participation means the less endowed taking part in and influencing the decision-making process in their favour. 'Taking part essentially then means the collective actions of the less endowed' (Desai, 1995: 41).

Imparato and Ruster (2003: 20) share this view and define 'participation' in development programmes as:

a process in which people, and especially disadvantaged people, influence resource allocation and policy and program formulation and implementation, and are involved at different levels and degrees of intensity in the identification, timing, planning, design, implementation, evaluation, and post-implementation stages of development projects.

---

<sup>4</sup> UNRISD stands for United Nations Research Institution for Social Development.

They also provide a scale for evaluating levels of participation: receiving information, being consulted, sharing control and being fully in control (Imparato and Ruster, 2003: 22-24).

Abbott (1996) gives a more detailed theoretical analysis on the empowerment process through community participation. The process of empowerment needs a preceding process of *conscientización* which refers to a learning process to perceive contradictions in one's society and to take action to change them. For Abbott, the whole empowerment process should be understood as a long process, from learning process to political empowerment, in which the role of external actors such as NGOs is definitely influential.

### **Critical debates on community participation**

Since the 1980s, community participation and the participatory approach have been used extensively in the field of development. For development planners, participation has become a prerequisite if projects are to receive aid from international organisations. This trend has been especially noticeable in the field of service delivery systems, either public services or social infrastructure. Brett (1996: 5) states:

The economic and political crisis of the 1970s and 1980s have now discredited service delivery systems based on centralized bureaucracy, forcing theorists of development administration to shift their focus from hierarchy and control to participation and empowerment.

According to Brett (1996: 5-6), this shift was a result of the affirmation of community participation as a useful strategy by theorists of various different leanings. The right-wing school of thought saw a participatory approach as an enabling strategy, a means to implement a development project more efficiently. For the left-wing school of thought, community participation was a means of empowering the vulnerable. Thus, support for participation has now moved into mainstream donor and private-sector

agencies, including international organisations such as the UNDP and World Bank. Community participation is considered useful in order to implement development projects more effectively, particularly within a neo-liberal ideological framework. The participatory approach has also been perceived as making public service provision more efficient and accountable, and therefore, as a step towards achieving good governance (Brett, 2003: 2).

But, while there is still support for the idea of participation as ‘a good thing’, the effectiveness of the participatory approach in terms of its impact on poverty and its ability to improve the social conditions of the poor has begun to be widely questioned.

In this section, I will highlight the main debates around community participation which explore the gap between theory and practice. First I will analyse the debates regarding the dilemma between effectiveness and empowerment and the issue of accountability. Then I will look at the multilateral relationship involved in the practice of the participatory approach. Special attention will be paid to the role of NGOs in state-community relationships. Finally, I will touch upon the issue of the ‘myth of community’ which pertains to the gap between the imposed definition of the ideal /homogeneous nature of community and the reality.

#### *Effectiveness of community participation/involvement in development projects*

Though community participation is a good thing in theory, in practice it has many limitations. In his analysis of cooperative organisations (or ‘Participatory Voluntary Organisations’ - PVOs to use his term) in Uganda, Brett (1996) explores the reasons why sometimes the participatory principle does not work. The organisations in question are rural marketing cooperatives and NGO-supporting PVOs designed to provide services and run income-generating projects for the poor. He examines how the unequal distribution of knowledge and skills among the members of the cooperatives impeded the rank and file members’ participation in the decision making process. Before

beginning participatory projects, local groups need technical support from external agencies, either donors or supporting NGOs, in order to obtain the necessary skills and knowledge. Without this support for capacity building in the preparatory period, participatory projects may fail.

Another factor Brett highlights is the cost of participation in the decision-making process. Decision-making as well as involvement of the poor takes time which means that this is an opportunity cost for them. This opportunity cost becomes particularly expensive when the decision-making process must involve the best informed members of the organisation, whose labour time tends to be more expensive than other rank and file members.

The third point he raises is overestimation of the egalitarian nature of cooperatives. Providers of participatory projects tend to assume very similar levels of commitment, contribution and distribution of rewards(output), but 'In reality most activities involve very unequal inputs, while at best some members are likely to be willing to "free ride" on the labour of others' (Brett, 1996: 16).

Jenkins (1999) explores the limits found in community involvement in service delivery and housing policy in case studies carried out in South Africa. He focuses on the difficulties experienced with community involvement in developing low-cost housing projects. In 1994, the new housing policy introduced a financial mechanism as a capital subsidy, based on projects with community partners --- called the 'project-linked subsidy'. He examined whether in practice this project-linked subsidy succeeded in involving communities but found that lack of human resources and time conflict were the main factors impeding effective community participation.

Jenkins identifies the weakness of local government (lack of administrative and financial capacity) as well as the weakness of community organisations as significant factors in the failure of these projects. The latter lack the human resources necessary to manage participatory projects. He argues that the identity of civil society is not

sufficiently developed in addition civil society itself is dominated by primordial community traditions, which can impede the conscientisation of community members towards their collective needs (Jenkins, 1999).

Another issue highlighted by Jenkins is the conflict between the time required for the community involvement and the time frame for the execution of the community-based projects. In general, housing delivery policy expects rapidity which does not fit in with the amount of time required by community participation projects (Jenkins, 1999: 438-42). As a result of this, the compulsory agreement (legal agreement between the developer and the 'community partner organisation' in the project-linked subsidy) known as the 'Social Compact' was not signed properly, backed by the community. Traditional decision making processes in the community take time. Building accountability in the community decision making system takes much longer than the time frame which top-down projects require. Therefore, the requirements and conditions of the project provider (usually a public agency or the state) do not correspond with the traditional time frame of the community.

Adato and Haddad's (2002) work also illustrate the gap between project objectives and the practice of community involvement. They base their argument on the experience of public works programmes in South Africa. These programmes had multiple objectives not only to generate jobs and reduce poverty but also to promote job training and community participation. South African public works programmes have been designed to involve community participation, targeting the poorest of the poor. Once localities receive funding for a project, the next part of the targeting process occurs when decisions are made as to which people in a community receive jobs. Adato and Haddad point out the problems inherent in the systems for selecting workers for the public works programmes when the community gets involved in the decision-making process:

The processes were generally need-based in that poverty and unemployment were

necessary criteria for eligibility, although those chosen might not be those *most* in need.... Equality of opportunity was often a high priority, so a random system was used. Community members also saw it as equitable to give some jobs to people who had given their time to promoting community development (Addat and Haddad, 2002: 31).

This is an example of how community-initiative decision-making as part of a participatory programme can in fact conflict with the objectives of the programme, and render it ineffective. Programmes are carried out as intended but the beneficiaries are not drawn from the target group that the project originally identified. A positive side of the participatory approach is that community initiatives from below are respected and participants are not guided by an externally imposed decision making system. However, in the final analysis, local initiatives to allocate resources in this way clearly do not guarantee an equitable distribution.

#### *Efficiency vs. empowerment debate*

As discussed above, the effectiveness of project implementation through community participation is doubtful in practice. The participatory approach does not fit the time frame or other performance-enhancing cost-efficient requirements embedded in public service delivery systems. This contradiction becomes more critical when we look at community participation as an end: to lead to the community's empowerment. This discussion is based on the dichotomy between classifying community participation as a means to search for cost-effectiveness and seeing it as an end for empowerment. The latter will never become established while the state controls development and resource allocation.

Cleaver (2002) discusses the efficiency /empowerment dilemma and highlights the fact that the current theorising of participatory approaches tends to be dichotomised into means/ends classifications.



These distinguish between the efficiency arguments (participation as a tool for achieving better project outcomes) and equity and empowerment arguments (participation as a process which enhances the capacity of individuals to improve their own lives and facilitates social change to the advantage of disadvantaged or marginalised groups) (Cleaver, 2002: 226).

However, I would argue that this dichotomy is based on the presupposition that participation is static, which should be reconsidered. In order to discuss the efficiency vs. empowerment issue, it is useful to recognise the danger of the generalisation of the term ‘participation’ and possible changes in the nature of participation through time.

White (2000) analyses the variety of forms and interests in participation and categorises them (see Table 1.1).

Table 1.1 Interests in participation by Sarah White

Form	Top-down	Bottom-up	Function
Nominal	Legitimation	Inclusion	Display
Instrumental	Efficiency	Cost	Means
Representative	Sustainability	Leverage	Voice
Transformative	Empowerment	Empowerment	Means/End

Source: White (2000).

As Table 1.1 shows, there are four main different forms of participation with a variety of interests. ‘And in practice, any project will typically involve a mix of these different interests which change over time’ (White 2000: 144). Therefore, the real practices of ‘participation’ should be understood as including the dynamics operating between these different interests both within a community and within the external organisations.

It is more than clear that the top-down interest of efficiency does not always fit with the bottom-up interest of empowerment. Therefore, participation is a site of conflict.

### *The issue of accountability*

Accountability is another issue influencing the effectiveness of community participation. Accountability is generally understood as a means by which individuals and organisations report on their activities to the recognised authority (Edwards and Hulme 1994). In other words, 'upward' accountability towards powerful authorities is what is mostly concerned. The accountability of local NGOs involved in participatory projects to their donor organisation is a typical example. However, in the context surrounding the implementation of participatory projects, accountability has different directions – 'upward' and 'downward'. In order to involve community members in the process of the implementation of a development project, downward accountability from project provider (or agency financing the project) towards the beneficiaries is required. The downward accountability of a participatory project became particularly acknowledged as administrative decentralisation advanced in many developing countries.

The accountability of a participatory project has different levels as well: either between donor organisations and local NGOs which deliver the projects, between NGOs and beneficiary communities, and between community leaders and the rest of the community. When the provider of the projects is the local government, their accountability towards both intermediate NGOs (if any) and beneficiary communities is required. In addition, Shah and Kaul Shah (1994) argue that accountability relates to the wider process of information exchange, decision-making, management, negotiation and bargaining between different stakeholders. 'Accountability exists between peer groups and operates at many levels' (Shah and Kaul Shah, 1994: 183).

Desai and Howes (1994) highlight the lack of downside accountability of NGOs towards the community in India. They criticise what they term functional accountability, that is, the way in which accountability to the community has become simply a matter of 'reporting' what was done by the project in the locale in a very routine and mechanical way. Desai and Howes emphasise the importance of strategic accountability

which serves to explore the gap between the objective of the project and the results at the individual project site in order to suggest changes for the long term improvement of the projects. In general, they find no strong pressure for strategic accountability coming from above, 'the merits of alternative initiative and courses of actions are actively reviewed from below' (Desai and Howes, 1994: 89). Strategic accountability can be reinforced through informal meetings with community members (beneficiaries of the project) to evaluate the projects. However, given the unequal and diverse nature of the community, sometimes NGOs do not have equal access to all the different groups in the community, neither can they transform existing power structures within the community. Therefore, the ideal of full downward accountability cannot be achieved, while there is increasing pressure from the donor institution on the project managers to provide prompt information proving the financial accountability of the funds provided.

Shah and Kaul Shah's (1994) suggestion is more straightforward. They emphasise the importance of reciprocal accountability between NGO, beneficiary community and other stakeholders. This position is based on their critical reflection on the lack of self-evaluation of NGO's activities through feedback from the community. They argue that accountability is a process of information exchange, consultation and joint decision-making. Therefore, for them, accountability is an essential means of empowerment. They state:

Participatory methods provide fertile ground for increasing the accountability of Southern NGOs to the community institutions and membership organizations they support. However, this method, when applied properly would affect the power relationship. (...) Most NGOs are happy to involve community institutions in programme monitoring and evaluation, but are less active when it comes to evaluating the performance of the NGO itself as a support institution (Shah and Kaul Shah, 1994:190).

They suggest that if local NGOs wish to improve downside accountability towards the

community, they should be prepared to adopt their own structural innovations and decision-making systems, particularly when these NGOs serve as provider of services.

On the other hand, Fox (1992) looks at the accountability of leadership within the community. He analyses leadership accountability towards the rest (rank and file members) of the community in regional peasant organisations in the democratic transition period in Mexico during the 1980s. Fox suggests that accountability has both internal and external dimensions. He states:

Leadership accountability refers to members' capacity to hold leaders responsible for their actions, but it also requires some degree of autonomy from external domination.

Autonomy refers here to a group's control over setting its own goals and making its own decisions without external intervention (Fox, 1992: 23).

Fox's argument is relevant if we are to understand how leadership accountability serves the empowerment process of the community, particularly in the state-community relationship. However, as he recognises, leadership accountability is not sufficient for the community to gain power. He suggests that the presence of participatory subgroups is crucial for leadership accountability, in order to provide a system of checks and balances within the community (Fox, 1992: 27-28).

#### *The role of NGOs in promoting community participation: potential and limitations*

The role of NGO's in promoting participatory projects is considered by some to be crucial and is much debated in studies of community participation (Abott, 1996; Hardoy et al., 1995). Before touching upon the topic, it is worthwhile recognising that the position of NGOs in relation to the state, donor organisations or to the targeted beneficiaries and communities varies, as the functions of NGOs in development diversify.

Korten(1987) analyses the evolution of NGOs and characterises them as follows. What he terms first generation NGOs started as charitable relief organisations, dedicated

to delivering welfare services to the poor and unfortunate. Those in the second generation focused on small scale local self-reliant development. In the late 1970s many NGOs undertook community development projects in areas which it was difficult for the state to access. The state also introduced the participatory approach for community development, but did so independently of the NGOs. As such there was no coordination between the state-led and NGO-led participatory projects at that time. The third generation of NGOs appeared in the 1980s when structural reforms of institutions were required in many developing countries in order to overcome financial crises and accomplish democratisation. Korten emphasises that, in this context, NGOs with the potential to serve as catalysts of institutional and policy change must assume a greater leadership role. Today, under the direction of ‘people-centred development’, both donors and national governments now look to NGOs ‘as a means of getting benefits more directly and cheaply to the poor than governments have been able to accomplish on their own’ (Korten, 1987: 147).

From the point of view of NGOs, their role shifts from being service suppliers contracted by the state or donor institutions, to becoming agents of change, influencing public policies so that they are more relevant to community needs. Clark (1995) perceives this change in NGOs as a move from a ‘supply-side’ approach to ‘demand-side’ activities (Clark, 1995: 594).

In order for NGOs to take up this position of central leadership in development policies and be able to influence policy makers, they need professionalisation and a scaling-up of activities. At the same time, if they are to act as a catalyst then NGOs must work with governments. This presents a problem in that NGOs either become overly bureaucratic or through financial pressures can no longer maintain a close relationship with the local community. Korten argues:

One reason that some NGOs have resisted dealing with their own internal development is a fear that in responding to calls for professionalisation they would

become more like the conventional bureaucracies of government that they commonly believe to be ineffective (Korten, 1987: 155).

Lee (1994) acknowledges the capacity of local NGOs to demonstrate new participatory methods of working with community organisations in improving environmental conditions in areas of urban poverty. Local NGOs can facilitate the successful implementation of a community-based effort through an empowering strategy for the poor. Principal tasks that local NGOs can offer in relation to an empowering strategy are:

building and enhancing the viability, cohesiveness, and effectiveness of community organizations through innovative participatory tools and methods; provision of technical inputs related to management and accounting skills, information, and monitoring and evaluation; and coalition-building to create linkages between communities and wider political processes (Lee, 1994: 163).

The spirit of solidarity, the principles of reciprocity and redistribution tend to be weakened in the urban context, however, local NGOs can help the urban poor to be aware of communal concerns. This is the merit of local NGOs: conscientisation of the poor of their local needs (Lee, 1994; Abbott, 1996). Local NGOs also can offer them 'how-to' strategies for negotiating with other government institutions, informing them of their right to public services and providing them with a knowledge of the legal framework to protect it. However, Lee points out that a weakness of this kind of NGO is the limited replicability of their work due to its small-scale and dedication to a limited number of local residents. Limited capacity to generate funding and a limited technical and managerial capacity also hinder the expansion of the work of this type of NGOs' (Lee, 1994; Fonjong, 2001).

One way for NGOs to ensure that their work has a greater impact would be to build a relationship of 'cooperative autonomy' (Lee, 1994: 170) between themselves and the state, however this task presents its own challenges. Clark (1995) argues that a strong

collaborative relationship between NGOs and the state can be built when the government has a positive social agenda. However, mutual distrust and jealousy between the two are deeply rooted. After all, state-NGO partnerships will affect the existing political power relations, which impedes healthy state-NGO relationships (Clark, 1995; Desai, 2002).

### *The myth of community*

Some authors argue that there are problems with the generally accepted definition of community as something unitary and homogeneous (Lee, 1994; Gujit and Kaul Shah, 1998; Cleaver, 2002). Far from being homogeneous, real communities are heterogeneous by nature. Community is a myth and therefore, the co-operational relationship between the state and the community is also a myth. The application of the participatory approach in a real community thus risks generating a new form of exclusion in the poor.

Cooke and Kothari (2001) focus on the limitations of community participation both in terms of methodological problems and of essential problems of community participation *per se*, that is, the problems of the politics of the discourse itself. In terms of its methodological limitations, Mosse (2001) points out various factors which hindered or were even contradictory to the premised conditions of the community. For example, Mosse describes how the participatory approach often overlooked the role of pre-existing organisations of community representation. This meant that if a community already had a traditionally established decision-making system, then the committee set up for the purposes of the participatory project often failed to work as the space in which the community took their decisions (Mosse, 2001: 42-44). Kothari (2001: 152) also suggests that 'By constructing dichotomies of power [powered vs. disempowered] and oppositional social groupings, participatory approaches simplify highly complicated social relations' (parenthesis added). This suggests that a local community is structured

within multiple strata and the interests and value of each stratus are different. Therefore, the preconception of a community, the presumed targeted population for a development project, as one equally disempowered society might be erroneous. Gujit and Kaul Shah (1998) argue that the participatory approach is premised on a definition of a community as something homogeneous whereas their evidence illustrates the heterogeneous internal structure of a local community. They point out that many participatory development projects employ this assumed definition as a given pre-condition and overlook the true internal complexity of a community. Peters (2000) agrees with this point and warns of the danger of using the generalised term community for local sites with internal differences. She also highlights the importance of understanding who controls the project and who makes decisions under the guise of participation.

The selection of workers by community initiative for public works programmes in South Africa shows that this apparently 'democratic' and community-based involvement in the poverty reduction programme may exclude certain groups of the community such as women. In the case studies conducted by Adato and Haddad (2002), the targeting of women for employment was one of the objectives of public works programmes, but they suggest that community-run projects gave insufficient priority to women. This finding suggests that the community-led decision-making processes may sometimes include pre-existing cultural bias and social conflict which then lead to the generation of another form of exclusion within the poor communities. Cultural bias against women in the male-dominated construction sector is a typical example.

community participation mechanisms need to be transparent, accountable, and open to participation from outsiders, so that local power relationships and biases against certain groups such as women do not exclude people who may most need jobs (Adato and Haddad, 2002: 33).

From the view point of methodological applicability, Chambers (1997) provides auto-critiques on the technical limitation of the PRA method (see also Cornwall, 1998).



These critiques suggest the difference between the assumed internal nature of the community and the reality. The participatory approach failed to capture the inherent hierarchies, power differentials and socio-economic disparities in local communities (Mosse, 2001; Puri, 2004). As a consequence, the local knowledge presented to the project planners (or donor institutions) did not necessarily represent the collective needs of the whole community.

#### *The necessity of a gender perspective in community participation*

A gender perspective is another issue emphasised in the recent debates on community participation. A focus on women's role in community development has become indispensable in any social development project, particularly in developing countries. Some of the previous studies of urban poor settlements revealed that women played an important role in community struggle as they were more aware of local felt needs and had a more realistic knowledge of community situations than men (Forweraker and Craig, 1990; Tacher and Padilla, 1997).

Women became more motivated to participate in collective activities during the 1970s and 80s particularly under authoritarian regimes such as those that existed in Chile, Argentina and Perú. Community self-help activities for survival strategies such as the community kitchens (*comedor popular*) and mothers' clubs either in Santiago de Chile or Lima, Perú were good examples (Salman, 1997; Blondet, 1990; 2004).

In the practice of community participation, however, concern with gender issues was still very limited (Beall, 1997b; Jelin, 1990). Some researchers criticised gender inequality in the implementation of participatory projects. Cornwall (1998: 53) suggests 'If participatory development is explicitly concerned with the effects of inequality, it is crucial that gendered inequalities are addressed.' In practice however, as Levy (1998: 254) points out 'much of the research and planned intervention professing to be "participatory" excludes women and other subordinate social groups.'

This limited perspective in participatory development was partly related to the internal power relations between women and men in the community. Desai (1995) points out the women have little voice or are excluded from the existent decision-making system in the community itself. In Latin American countries, the exclusion of the women in the urban communities was not explicit as such, but several authors suggest that their involvement in public representation was still limited. Tacher and Padilla (1997) emphasise that women's role in community participation was always crucial yet mostly invisible. Blondet (1990: 31) argues that the reason for this invisibility is associated with role demarcation between men and women in the community:

While the women participate *en masse* in such mobilizations, it is possible to distinguish between different types of participation. In the type of mobilization and organization among neighbours just described, involving a direct connection with the public sphere, women participate on an *ad hoc*, temporary and unstructured basis. The women do not take up positions in the organizations or assume responsibilities, since these are predominantly male functions. On the other hand, in other activities linked to neighbourhood development that take place in the immediate locality (...), women take on more active roles in the participation process.

Bennett, Dávila-Poblete and Nieves (2005) discuss the value of women's local knowledge and illustrate their capacity to manage water related affairs, as this issue is fundamental to their daily life. They suggest however, that there were still persistent cultural barriers such as *machismo*<sup>5</sup> which inhibited the women from taking up leadership positions in the local organisation. All of these aspects illustrate how the internal structure of the local community was affected by gender inequality and

---

<sup>5</sup> A concept or self-identification of men deeply rooted in Latin American society, which has its origin in a sense of honour, felt to depend on a man's own actions. Currently it is understood as the display of or pride in masculinity.

differences.

*What does community participation empower people to do?*

A further critique regards the theoretical and conceptual limitations of participation in relation to its potential to empower the community (Kothari, 2001). This questions what the participatory approach actually empowers the targeted population (participants in the development projects) to do. Though their study is limited to the PRA case, Henkel and Stirrat (2001: 182) write:

what people are 'empowered to do' is to take part in the modern sector of 'developing' societies. More generally, they are being empowered to be elements in the great project of 'the modern': as citizens of the institutions of the modern state; as consumers in the increasingly global market; as responsible patients in the health system; as rational farmers increasing GNP; as participants in the labour market, and so on. Empowerment in this sense, is not just a matter of 'giving power' to formerly disempowered people. The currency in which this power is given is that of the project of modernity. (...) It is in this sense that we argue that 'empowerment' is tantamount to what Foucault calls subjection.

In other words, they argue that community participation empowers people to fit into a society that has not been initiated by the community itself. They claim that this empowerment is aimed at rejecting or excluding the community's existing social norms and structures and has the potential to reshape the nature of participants according to the principles and values of the society of the donor countries concerned.

Hickey and Mohan (2004), on the other hand, defend the meaning of community participation as a strategy to empower the poor. They reject the contemporary critique of participation and justify the meaning of community participation with the following three arguments: First, they consider that there are scaled up and diversified methodologies of community participation across all arenas and levels of

decision-making. Second, they consider the community participation approach within a broadened agenda in order to capture political participation such as participatory governance. Third, they reject the current form of participation and seek radical alternatives for development through the reframing of community participation. These three justify the significance of community participation in itself, but not in the sense of implementation of development projects, nor in the sense of empowerment of beneficiaries of the projects. Hickey and Mohan (2004: 12-14) focus on the potential of community participation to serve for citizenship rights and for political change. In fact, as they emphasise, the term community participation is highly ideological therefore its interpretation varies depending on who uses the term.

The above discussions and debates on community participation are relevant and worth consideration when I focus on the issue of community participation in my case studies in the irregular settlements of Bogotá. As mentioned already, the nature of community we talk about here will be quite heterogeneous depending on the country, region, and locality, whether rural or urban. How has the concept of community participation been interpreted in local practice? Is there any difference in the understanding of community participation by the people of the settlements and by the public officers of the city administration?

In the next section, I will review the previous studies on irregular settlements in Latin America in order to situate my research topic of community participation within these contexts. How far did the previous studies explore the nature of community in the irregular settlements? Were there any other aspects of concern or interest when approaching these settlements?

## IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS

### **Definition of irregular settlements**

A variety of terms have been used to describe the poor urban settlements of Latin America, such as *colonia popular* (Mexico City), *favela* (Rio de Janeiro), *población* (Santiago), *barriada* or *pueblo joven* (Lima), *barrio* (Caracas), *villa miseria* (Buenos Aires), *barrio popular* (Bogotá) and so on. The terms are often translated into English as ‘squatter settlements’, ‘shanty towns’ or ‘slums’. The differences in their physical and social conditions in comparison with the higher income areas of the city have often led to them being characterised as marginal settlements (Perlman, 1976). Adjectives such as ‘illegal’, ‘irregular’, ‘self-help’, ‘squatter’, ‘spontaneous’ or ‘low-income’ have also been used to describe their socio-economic characteristics and methods of construction. As Gilbert argues, ‘different definitions reflect different philosophical approaches to the housing issue and that self-help housing takes a myriad forms. Generalization in such a situation is dangerous’ (Gilbert and Gugler, 1991: 122).

In this study, I will use the adjectives ‘irregular’ or ‘self-help’ to describe these kinds of settlements. They are irregular settlements because they lack planning permission and are sometimes developed in areas unsuitable for urban development. Many are located on the sides of steep hills, in swampy areas, or beyond the urban perimeter determined by the city administration as the area appropriate for urban development.

‘Self-help’ refers to the process through which the residents manage the construction of their houses. They build their own homes with their own resources, frequently, with little or no help. Each home is built in gradual steps according to the financial capacity of the family. Even when they employ skilled labourers, they design and finance the construction themselves, and not infrequently breach the building norms of the city—for example in terms of earthquake resistance. Self-help is also an appropriate

term in a wider sense, describing the way that collective effort produces provisional water and sewage systems. In the absence of official servicing, collective efforts sometimes satisfy the immediate needs of the community (Turner, 1976; Mangin, 1967; Gilbert and Gugler, 1991; Ward, 1982: 7).

In Bogotá, most settlers purchase plots from informal developers who subdivide the land with little consideration for the legal planning requirements. This irregular land subdivision differs from a 'squatter settlement', insofar as the residents pay for the plot rather than invading it, either individually or collectively. Unlike formal settlements, the authorities intervene in the settlement after the arrival of the inhabitants. Regularisation is the process by which city authorities recognise these informal settlements and introduce or upgrade infrastructure.

'Pirate urbanisation' in Bogotá is illegal, but is generally tolerated by the authorities (see pages 128-30 in chapter 3). How would the population have been housed otherwise? Given the lack of official solutions to the housing problem, 'illegality' has been inevitable.

If illegality has been inevitable, then it is perhaps better to use the terms 'informality' or 'irregularity'. Unlike land invasions, which take over other people's land, most forms of 'illegal' development in Bogotá obey the basic rules of ownership. Subdividers buy land, or seek the permission of the owners, to urbanise the land. The irregularity of the settlement process consists in failing to obey the planning regulations or to provide services. Since most of the poor in Bogotá who have become homeowners have done so through this irregular process, it seems harsh to label their housing illegal. Therefore, in the thesis I will use the term 'illegality' only to describe the case of settlements created by land invasion, or to the case of land brokers who subdivide land without transfer of ownership.

## CHANGING ACADEMIC APPROACHES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN POVERTY AND HOUSING

Interest in urban poverty and the housing of the poor is hardly new, and a multitude of academic studies have appeared focusing on these issues. However, the perspectives employed and the policies proposed have changed remarkably over time. As such, it is useful to understand how current understanding differs from earlier views.

### **Urban ecology school**

Academic interest in the problems of the city emerged after the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century in Europe. Preoccupation with urban poverty increased particularly after World War I, when urbanisation accelerated in Western countries. Wirth, Parks and Burgess led the group known as the Chicago School, representing an emerging American urban sociology. Wirth's 'Urbanism as a way of life' (1938) and *The city* by Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1967) analysed the structure of the modern city from the viewpoint of ecological determinism. Both works tried to explain the structure of the urban system and the development of residential areas by describing modes of life. Lind and Lind's *Middle town in transition* (1937) was a classic empirical study analysing social problems in the growing city.

Social problems in the city—crime, poverty, malnutrition, slums, etc.—were considered to be symptoms of 'urban pathology'. As a medical term, 'pathology' refers to the array of processes, including diseases, which impede life functions. Deviant behaviour in individuals, groups or even throughout society is called social pathology (Brown, 1942; Elliott and Merrill, 1941). Urban pathology brings about deviant behaviour and disorganisation and threatens life in the cities, just as disease threatens individual life functions.

### **The culture of poverty**

Further development of the field of urban pathology grew out of Oscar Lewis' work on Mexico City, Puerto Rico and New York (Lewis, 1959; 1963; 1966). His ethnographical observations on family life had a tremendous impact on the anthropological method as well as on the study of urban poverty. On the basis of his intensive observation of individual families, his 'multi-autobiographies', he tried to avoid middle-class researcher bias and to understand the causes of poverty (Lewis, 1967). From this work he conceived the concept of 'the culture of poverty'.

Lewis did not provide a concrete definition of the concept but suggested more than 70 social traits, whose presence or absence demonstrated the culture of poverty. These traits included:

lack of effective participation and the integration of the poor in the major institutions of the larger society; suspicion; apathy, cynicism; a minimum of organization beyond the level of the nuclear and extended family; high incidence of child and wife abandonment; strong feelings of marginality; helplessness, dependency, and inferiority; lack of impulse control; a strong present-time orientation with relatively little ability to defer gratification and to plan for the future; a sense of resignation and fatalism; and a high tolerance for psychological pathology of all sorts (Lewis, 1966: xiv-xvii).

According to Lloyd (1979: 58) the poor were isolated from the rest of the city. They had few forms of social organisation beyond the family and limited means to access well-paid forms of work. It was this failure to become integrated into mainstream society that caused the poor to develop their own way of coping with that social marginality—the (sub)-culture of poverty. But in turn the social traits produced by this subculture kept them poor. Their only chance of escaping poverty depended on their developing class consciousness and improving their mobility by ridding themselves of the 'culture of poverty' (Lloyd, 1979: 58).



On the basis of his comparison of the behaviour, feelings, and mentality of Mexican and Puerto Rican families, Lloyd argued that the culture of poverty emerged universally in developing countries during the process of modernisation and urbanisation. Although Lewis did not intend to create a stereotype of the urban poor, this is precisely what he did.

This interpretation of urban poverty was soon challenged by other research. Unlike Lewis, whose families lived primarily in central slum areas, the families living in self-help settlements seemed to be very different. They had a wider view of society and did not demonstrate the apathy, despair or inferiority of Lewis's families; on the contrary, they were hopeful and felt some degree of accomplishment about their lives (Lloyd, 1979; Eckstein, 1977; Cornelius, 1975; Ward, 1976). On the basis of this and other work, the concept of 'culture of poverty' came into disrepute.

### **Marginality**

The term 'marginal' has been used frequently over the years to refer to the urban poor. Perhaps the first usage was by Robert Park in his research on human migrations, cultural contacts and conflicts. Park explains the 'marginal man' as:

a man living and sharing intimately in the cultural life and traditions of two distinct peoples yet never quite willing to break, even if he were permitted to do so, with his past and his traditions, and not quite accepted because of racial prejudice, in the new society in which he now sought to find a place. He is a man on the margin of two cultures and two societies which never completely interpenetrated and fused (Park, 1928: 98-99).

Later, the term 'marginal' or 'marginality' came to be applied widely in Latin American countries to refer to irregular settlements and later to the dwellers of these settlements.

According to Germani:

In Latin America the term 'marginality' began to be used principally with reference to urban ecological characteristics, that is to say, to the sector of the population segregated into areas of improvised dwellings on illegally occupied land. From this point it was extended to the conditions of work and the level of life of this sector of the population. Then its marginality was perceived both in relationship to the socio-economic system of production and to the regular system of consumption of goods and services. Simultaneously it was noticed that this state of marginality included other essential aspects like political and union participation, formal and informal participation and in general its absence or exclusion from decision making whether at the level of the local community, the situation in work, or in the order of broader state and national structures and institutions (Germani, 1972: 5; translated and quoted in Peattie, 1974: 102).

Nelson summarised the characteristics of 'marginal' people as follows:

In Latin America, the growing numbers of unskilled, semi-employed and abysmally poor urbanites are often called the 'marginals.' (...) Their social status is low, and they are excluded from the formal organizations and associations and the informal and private webs of contacts which constitute the urban social structure. To the extent that they are rural in origin, they may also be culturally marginal, clinging to customs, manners, dress, speech and values which contrast with accepted urban patterns. They lack ties to or influence on the established political institutions. Many are marginal in a literal geographic sense, living in squatter settlements on the fringes of the cities (Nelson, 1969: 5).

According to Lómnitz (1977: 10): 'The marginals are largely occupied in unaffiliated manual labor, unpaid family labor, and small-scale family enterprise'. She thought the term marginality was a suitable descriptor of those working class people who were not employed in the formal industrial sector and therefore excluded from its associated benefits, e.g., social security cover.

Perlman (1976), however, provided the fullest review of the nature of marginality and its distinctive meanings both across disciplines and through time. She identified five broad categories of usage:

- First, architects, planners and housing authorities identified marginality largely in terms of location. They considered squatter settlements to be marginal due to their sub-standard physical conditions, such as lack of basic urban services, hygiene, peripheral location and illegal status of land occupation. Sometimes, the personal qualities of the residents were equated with their location.
- Second, those who were jobless or underemployed were often considered to form part of the marginal urban underclass.
- Third, newcomers were often included in the marginal population. Rural migrants, with their supposed distinctive sub-culture, were often thought to lack the skills or ability to become integrated into urban society. This interpretation was sometimes linked to the concept of the 'culture of poverty': any sub-culture different from the mainstream was regarded as marginal.
- Fourth, marginality was often associated with racial or ethnic status. Those with Indian or Negro blood were assumed to have characteristics that excluded them from mainstream society.
- Finally, the marginal population often included social deviants: criminals, beggars, travellers, etc. This group were deemed to be doubly marginal: they had rejected their own group but had not been absorbed into the dominant culture.

Perlman challenged these conventional interpretations of urban marginality on the basis of her research in six *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro. She found that the *favelado* had developed wide social networks beyond their nuclear families and so were not socially marginal. Nor were they politically marginal. For example, leftist activists often hid from the authoritarian military regime by seeking refuge in the *favelas*. They continued their political activity underground, mobilising the people in the self-help settlements

without resorting to the traditional patron-client relationships. Even if most *favelado* were not radical and did not participate in riots against the regime, they understood the nature of the general political situation. Perlman also realised that it was difficult to demonstrate that the *favela* population was marginalised psychologically or culturally.

On the basis of evidence from Ciudad Netzahualcoyotl, in Mexico City, Vélez-Ibañez (1983: 19), too, criticised the idea that poor people were culturally marginal: ‘Social anomie, rootlessness, non-adaptability, “traditionality”, passivity, criminality, pessimism, and fatalism are neither necessary nor sufficient descriptors of urban populations in poverty circumstances’. Rather these people were ‘economically and politically excluded from the economic and political benefits of the nation-state and its economic system’ (Vélez-Ibañez, 1983: 19). More controversially, he criticised the idea of integrating this population into the social mainstream. Any attempt to integrate marginal people as a whole, he asserted, would only succeed in integrating certain individuals, thereby increasing the level of inequality.

Generally, the principal aim of urban investigation in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s was to demonstrate that the ‘(sub)culture of poverty’, ‘marginality’ theories and human ecology were inadequate explanations for urban poverty and the life styles of the poor.<sup>6</sup> Most importantly, these works rejected the idea that the culture and behaviour of the urban poor manifest undesirable qualities that ought to be eliminated through faster economic development. Increasingly, the work showed how successfully the poor became integrated into wider society. They changed their cultural standards when they moved from rural life to an urban context. Many writers showed how the supposed peripheral slums actually offered poor people the opportunity to create better lives (Ward, 1976; Matos Mar, 1968; Riofrío, 1978). Their struggle to obtain land, build their own homes and find jobs, and their active use of social networks to sustain themselves showed that these people were anything but marginal.

---

<sup>6</sup> For the overview of the debates on marginality, see also Ward et al. (2004).

### **Self-help housing and the changing form of state intervention**

Though the concept of marginality was increasingly rejected by academics, urban administrators and planners continued to identify poor settlements as being marginal to the rest of the city. This viewpoint contributed to the dominant approach in Latin American urban planning until the early 1970s, the idea that the slums and shantytowns should be eliminated. The shantytowns should be cleared, if necessary by force, and new formal housing units created for them. This strategy soon proved to be fatally flawed as new irregular settlements emerged more rapidly than the administration could create new homes.

The new housing that had been built for displaced people also proved to be problematic. The projects were not based on consultation with the residents and did not take their specific needs into consideration. The dwellings were far too uniform in design and most seriously of all, the rents were beyond the means of the target population. The building costs were so high that the government could never have afforded to accommodate all those who needed housing (Malpezzi, Mayo and Gross, 1985; Gilbert and Varley, 1991; Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989: 107-08).

Increasingly, governments began to realise that they should leave most self-help housing in situ. Many governments adopted a laissez-faire policy, but others adopted a new orthodoxy that was to help the community to improve the settlements. Such an approach was strongly influenced by the work of John Turner and William Mangin, (Turner, 1968; 1976; Mangin, 1967) whose evidence convinced some governments and particularly international aid organisations to change their approach. Put simply, with government help ordinary people could build forms of shelter superior to the kinds of cheap standard unit dwellings provided by architects and the formal sector (Pugh, 1994; Werlin, 1999).

Turner and Mangin identified the strengths of 'self-build' and 'self-help' housing. In *Freedom to Build*, Turner and Fichter (1972) show how the design and construction of

their housing displayed the rationality of the self-help builders. 'Aided self-help' programmes could combine the rationality and innovativeness of the poor with the resources and technical expertise of the government (Mangin, 1967; Turner, 1976). In crude terms, people could build their houses and governments could supply those houses with infrastructure and services.

The debate about the virtues of a 'self-help housing' policy became one of the central issues among urban planners and academics. Turner's emphasis on the people's freedom to build was criticised by Marxist social scientists (Burgess, 1978; 1985). From a Marxist viewpoint, aided self-help leads to exploitation of the poor and encourages the government to abdicate key areas of responsibility (see also Ward, 1982 and Mathéy 1990).

Despite this critique, governments in many developing countries, particularly in Latin America, incorporated many self-help principles into their housing policies. As a result, there was a shift in thinking about housing for the poor. The perception of slums changed from one of despair to one of hope. In terms of policy, the problematic slum changed its form to being 'part of the solution'. Governments began to think about sites-and-services approaches whereby the authorities would provide low cost plots and basic services and the residents would build their own housing (Lloyd, 1979).

Gradually, international aid agencies and the multilateral development banks began to adopt this advice and try to apply the practice of aided self-help on a massive scale. The World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), for example, moved strongly in the 1970s towards slum upgrading and sites-and-services programmes (Malpezzi, Mayo and Gross, 1985; Gilbert, 2001; Zanetta, 2004).

The respective governments gave up slum clearance and shifted to improving the existing irregular settlements, utilising residents' resources (labour, self-help practice), which became a principal measure of housing policy toward the poor sector. This slum upgrading was one of the two major strategies undertaken in this period, focusing on the

need to remedy the problems of existing irregular settlements (Gilbert, 2001; Ward, 1982). As Zanetta (2004: 19) puts it:

The focus of the World Bank's strategy was on developing effective low-cost solutions that could solve the low-income housing shortages of rapidly urbanizing cities, drawing on Turner's model of self-help. While Turner's advocacy for self-help housing was based on its potential to replace public housing policies that were excessively bureaucratic and technological while providing opportunities for individual and community development, the World Bank emphasized the economic aspects of the model. The concepts of 'affordability' and 'replicability' became central tenets in the urban agenda, calling for reduced standards and the use of cost recovery mechanisms as a way of maximizing the impact of scarce public resources.

Although the sites-and-services approach was widely considered to be the best among a limited set of alternatives, the application of specific programmes were often strongly criticised. The schemes might be too small or the programme might not cater to the poorest. Frequently the cost of sites and services schemes was too expensive for the poor and as a result it was better-off families who benefited most. Hart Deneke and Silva (1982), for example, found that in a generally successful 'sites and service' programme in El Salvador the cost of the land and building materials was generally beyond the budgets of the poor.

### **Community struggle and the slum as a political issue**

Community organisations that promoted collective self-help actions became another pillar of research focusing on the irregular settlements. Political scientists were interested in how partisan forces operated in local communities and what role the *barrios* played in local politicians' campaigns for election. Those who focused on community organisations in the irregular settlements had a particular interest in clientelism (patron-client relationships) between local politicians and community

leaders (Nelson, 1979; Díaz, 1986; Auyero, 1997). Nelson (1979) analysed in detail the role of neighbourhood organisations and the reasons why they were formed. Knowing that the community organisations were used as political machinery for electoral campaigns, the inhabitants had their own incentives for committing to the struggle for their own needs, since this was the most effective method of accomplishing their aims aside from political patronage.

In some Latin American cities during the 1960s and 1970s, and sometimes until the 1980s, the urban poor often organised protests against government policies and asserted claims to fulfil their needs. Some scholars saw such community-based struggles as an indicator of the potential of people to improve their own lives. Arango (1981; 1986), Buenaventura (1984) and Torres (1993), for example, dealt with people's resistance to eviction or their efforts to obtain housing through collective land occupation in Colombian cities. They suggested that the government was guilty of neglecting the poor, and recognised the legitimacy of the arguments advanced by the leftist movement.

Sometimes, of course, popular struggles were initiated and manipulated by the government. In most Latin American countries, official party oriented community organisations were created after World War II. Whether the government regime was democratic or authoritarian, top-down community organisation was among the political strategies used to control the people and prevent the leftist movement from taking root. Civil society, defined as a sphere where citizens can exercise their own initiative in political space, therefore, did not emerge in any Latin American society. Hence promoting community-based organisations did not necessarily mean the reinforcement of popular autonomy.

The people of the irregular settlements could improve their living conditions to a certain extent by unauthorised means, such as by building provisional sewerage systems, and by illegally siphoning off drinking water or tapping into electricity lines (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1989; Kellett, 1995). To substantially improve their living conditions,



however, they needed to obtain public services in the officially authorised manner, and therefore to negotiate with the competent authorities. As De Soto (1989; 2000) explains, in a Peruvian case, the procedures involved many steps such as the production of a map of the settlement, its approval by the planning office, mitigation of risks in the construction, authorisation for the construction of service infrastructure and so on. So much paperwork was required that it could easily take more than ten years to complete. To fulfil their immediate needs while this process was going on, residents might turn to illegal methods.

Community organisations directed collective efforts towards obtaining public services, with their leaders negotiating with the respective city agencies. One way local politicians have been able to win votes in the settlements has been to offer support for such efforts. They have tended to intervene in such collective self-help activities whenever they recognised residents as potential voters. Politicians might provide either material or financial assistance for the construction of provisional infrastructure of basic services in exchange for votes. They might also offer logistical support to the community during negotiations about the regularisation of municipal services. When such partisan-inspired negotiation processes do not work however, residents might resort to 'unconventional' collective actions such as civic strikes, demonstrations, and occupation of the municipal offices (Cornelius, 1975; Torres, 1993). These unconventional actions might even be supported by local politicians. Although they might try to take the initiative, in general, the people were ultimately co-opted by partisan political forces. They were forced to admit that the most effective method for resolving their needs was dependence on politicians who could influence the city administration.

Studies that examined the question of slums as a political issue emphasised the high dependence of social movements on partisan forces among the urban poor. Collier

(1976) highlights this political dependence and control over irregular settlements in Peru in his analysis of cases observed under the authoritarian regime. He argues:

Squatter settlements and public policy toward settlements have frequently been used as a means of linking the urban poor to the state in a way that is viewed as constructive, rather than disruptive, by the government in power. (...) On the other hand, the opportunities for self-help offered by the settlements can serve to create a kind of autonomy and self-sufficiency in the settlements that make radical political alternatives irrelevant (Collier, 1976: 37-38).

While the residents of the irregular settlements were aware of the insecurity of their claim to occupation as an assertion of their housing rights, they would not initiate any sort of upheaval for fear of eviction. They thus could be easily co-opted by offers of aid in kind or of jobs. This meant that, independent of the stages of the upgrading process, the urban masses in the irregular settlements could be made to obey the dominant class.

Settlement policy, therefore, was used by the poor as a strategy for obtaining political support and by politicians as a means of stemming leftist-movement ideas from spreading. The restriction on autonomy helped to control people in the settlements (Ward, et al., 1990: 221-22). Residents in the informal settlements have been treated as potential voters in partisan elections. As long as the government political machines could control, manipulate or co-opt the urban poor, the city authorities could resolve the complaints of the urban upper class as well as the rebellion of the urban poor, which led to a certain level of political stability.

### **Holistic studies on irregular settlements**

Academic work increasingly adopted a holistic approach to the irregular settlements. Researchers analysed the socio-economic characteristics of the dwellers, the housing policies of local governments, the relationships between community and local politicians, the role of community-based organisations and their leaders, and so on.

Based on integrated analysis of a multifaceted data set, scholars tried to identify the obstacles in the regularisation process in order to make further political recommendations.

The relationship between residents of the irregular settlements and the local government, including the municipal administration and public service utility enterprises, has come to be one of the central issues of research on these settlements. Research has come to cover wider aspects, including the migration patterns of dwellers, the physical process by which the informal settlements were created (self-help housing process); clientelistic relations between community leaders and local politicians, and their relations with the state agencies. Gilbert and Ward (1982; 1984a; 1984b; 1985) were typical in approaching irregular settlements in a holistic fashion. Based on their detailed analysis of housing policies in three Latin American countries (Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico), they pointed out the limits of the strategies used by the city authorities. They also analysed the functions of community organisations in the dwellers' strategies for negotiation with local governments. They recognised the people's difficulties in maintaining such collective self-help practices, especially once some of the basic needs were provided. However, they did not deny the merit of community participation as an alternative way for the dwellers to obtain their basic needs.

Studies on irregular settlements before the 1990s were mainly based on empirical analysis of specific cases. They concentrated on one or a few aspects of the nature of residents and their interaction with the state. The principal themes were the way of life, socio-economic characteristics of the urban poor, social movements, urban and housing policies, influence of politics on the urban poor, etc. Works by Gilbert and Ward made a distinguished contribution by approaching these issues in an integral way and showing how problems of the urban poor and urban policies (housing policy in particular) should be understood in the macro-economic context of each country.

## CHANGING APPROACHES TO IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT RESEARCH

Enormous changes have taken place in the political, social, and economic situations of Latin American countries since 1990. First, most of the countries have adopted neoliberal policies and shifted toward market-oriented mechanisms (Smith and Korzeniewicz, 1997; Oxfhorn and Starr, 1999; Wiarda and Kline, 2001; Vellinga, 2002). Second, countries formerly under authoritarian regimes have made progress in the consolidation of democratic regimes. The quality of democracy in the countries, such as Colombia, which had not been governed by military regimes in previous decades, also improved through decentralisation policies and other institutional reforms.

What impact did these changes have on policies toward the urban poor and their responses to the state? Did the collective actions of the urban poor influence the democratisation process? Did the political changes result in increased autonomy for the community-based organisations? These questions have been the focus of recent studies on irregular settlements.

### **Shift to neoliberal policies**

Neoliberalism prompted a change from direct government involvement in the economy to market-led economic policy. In the field of housing policy, the government reformed the systems for providing housing subsidies, created a new organisation for providing privatised public service through regular channels, promoted the provision of land served with public utilities, transfer of land titles, and so forth. All these were strategies to enable the housing market to function more efficiently (Zetter and Hamza, 2004).

As it turned out, neoliberal reforms together with decentralisation were all part of the package suggested by the World Bank and other international financial agencies of development. The idea of 'market enablement' and good governance strategies in the

field of housing policy also came from Washington. In fact, the change in housing policy orientation was a reflection of the World Bank view on housing issues.

In 1991, the World Bank set out the pivotal role for cities in its now landmark policy statement. This encapsulated and gave substance to the shift in urban-sector policy-making under conditions of market enablement. Rejecting the large-scale public-sector role and the project-driven model of the earlier era, the strategy favoured 'urban operations on city-wide reform, institutional development and high priority investments, and puts development assistance in the urban sector in the context of broader objectives of economic development and macro-economic performance' (World Bank, 1991: 4, cited in Zetter and Hamza, 2004: 14).

The housing strategies promoted by the World Bank as a new agenda in the developing countries were called 'enabling strategies', meaning procedures for making the housing market function better. More concretely, the strategies recognised the important contribution of the private sector in meeting housing needs more effectively (World Bank, 1993: 19). Five principles guided the Bank in its recommendations. First, the Bank would encourage governments to play enabling roles, moving away from government construction, financing, and maintenance of housing and toward improving housing market efficiency and the housing conditions for the poor. Second, housing assistance would have a sectoral rather than single-project focus. Third, the Bank would seek to assist counterpart institutions (governments) that have regulatory roles and were willing to remove market distortions. Fourth, support would be provided for innovative models of lending for housing. Fifth, greater commitment of governments would be sought for improving collection and analysis of housing-related data in order to better assess housing sector performance and improve the process of policy formulation and implementation (World Bank, 1993: 7).

If the state fulfils its role in two realms, namely, modes and tools of intervention and management and modes of governance, the market enablement paradigm should

function well in the field of urban policy. Mode of intervention here refers to market-led provision of services and land, including privatisation of public service enterprises and deregulation of legal processes in order to facilitate transfer of land titles. Mode of governance refers to encouragement of civil society and capacity building of local governments through decentralisation (Zetter and Hamza, 2004: 15).

The impact of the market enablement paradigm on urban policies for enhancement of the living standards of the poor is a subject for further research. However, some case studies have focused on community participation in relation to governmental policy under the influence of neoliberalism (Pezzoli, 1998; Smith, 1999). Smith's study on irregular settlements in San José (Smith, 1999; Smith and Valverde, 2001) is an example. The study considers the political implications of the new housing policy.

Smith points out the persistent influence of political control on the urban poor in Costa Rica, as observed in the new models of upgrading programmes under the community-participation framework. From the mid-1980s, Costa Rican housing policy toward the poor shifted to an aided self-help model, ironically discouraging the mobilising power of community-based housing committees. Delay in the decentralisation process itself was definitely one factor impeding community participation. A second factor was lack of the community's right to get involved in the decision-making process. Between 1994 and 1998, the Costa Rican government created an inter-institutional mechanism to improve living conditions in the informal sector. However, this mechanism did not involve the housing committees in the decision-making process and ended up only as a coordinating organ. State institutions were persistently reluctant to recognise autonomous participation by communities, while political parties continued to manipulate the urban poor.

#### *The impact of the participation of the private sector in public service delivery*

Following the shift in development policies towards neoliberalism, privatisation, or private sector participation in the delivery of public services has had an increasing

impact on the life of the urban poor. The public-private relationships inherent in privatisation can take various forms; a combination of public ownership and private operation; private ownership and private operation; public and private consortium and so on. Budds and McGranahan (2003: 89) note that private participation 'usually refers to a contractual agreement involving a public agency and a formal (often multinational) private company'. Taking the case of water and sanitation provision, they clarify that privatisation refers to processes that increase the participation of formal private enterprises in service provision but do not necessarily involve the transfer of assets to the private operator (Budds and McGranahan, 2003: 89). Batley (1996) analyses a range of public-private relationships in service provision and discusses their implications. He emphasises the role of government in service provision as well, arguing:

None of these alternatives, at least in the case of public services, completely exonerates government from any involvement; the public role changes rather than disappears with 'privatisation'. Rather than a simple transfer of assets from public to private sectors, we are therefore usually talking about changing their roles and relationships with regard to ownership, operation, control and regulation (Batley, 1996: 724).

The aim of introducing private providers and market principles into public service delivery is to increase efficiency through competition, to increase responsiveness to consumer choice and to bring in private resources (Batley, 1996: 748). Batley's case studies examine how efficiently and effectively the new public-private arrangements for provision produce and deliver services. The results however, do not fully support the argument that privatisation provides a better performance. He claims that efficiency and effectiveness seem to derive not only from the institutional environment surrounding particular sectors, but also from the institutional conditions pertaining to particular locations. Factors other than ownership, such as the existence of competition, operational autonomy and political support for management may be more important in

determining performance (Batley, 1996: 747-48).

Like Batley, most of the debates on the impact of privatisation in service provision focus on its effectiveness, efficiency and cost (see for example, Clarke, Kosec and Wallsten, 2004). Broadly, the debates lead to two different positions on privatisation in service provision. One considers that the privatisation of public service delivery is a good thing and that the urban poor have benefited from an improvement in the quality and quantity of the services. The other argues that privatisation has been detrimental to the life of the poor, particularly as a result of increased service charges.

In fact, some Latin American cases evidence the 'failure' of privatisation, as the privatisation project was suspended due to increased urban protest against the higher service charges. The experiences of water privatisation policies in Buenos Aires and Cochabamba in Bolivia are typical examples (Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Nickson and Vargas, 2002).

However, such dichotomous debates are not necessarily relevant. Kessides (2005: 90) recognises the favourable results of privatisation, taking into account the increase in investment and service coverage, improvement of productivity and cost-effectiveness, rationalisation of prices relating to costs and improvement of responsiveness to consumer needs. He emphasises that improvements in physical performance, service quality and efficiency were accomplished through privatisation and deregulation, particularly in the case of telecommunications and electricity supply (for example, the case of Chile). On the other hand, he recognises the negative effects on distributional equity caused by job cuts in the privatised utilities. He argues that the negative distributional effects have to be offset against the improvements in service quality and the increased coverage of service supply benefiting poor people.

Some argue that this negative impact on the urban poor should not necessarily be attributed to privatisation itself, but should be interpreted as the result of privatisation and a combination of other macro-economic and political factors. Nickson and Vargas



(2002) analyse the 'failure' of water supply privatisation in the municipality of Cochabamba, Bolivia, which occurred in 2000 as a result of a six month-urban protest against water tariff increases. Following political pressure, a major franchise contract for supplying water and sanitation services in the form of a concession (granted in 1999) was cancelled. The protest was sparked by the introduction of a new tariff structure bringing considerable increases in service charges. However, Nickson and Vargas suggest the tariffs were not the only reason for the protest and argue that there was a strong interrelationship with the wider macro-economic context in which the protest occurred.

At the time there was growing opposition to the prevailing neo-liberal economic strategy. A pioneering structural adjustment programme had been introduced in 1984 and a major state reform programme was undertaken from 1993, involving decentralization and the capitalization of state-owned enterprises. But the upsurge in domestic and foreign investment generated by this strategy was less than expected. As a result, economic growth grew at an average annual rate of only 4.2 per cent from 1990-99, little above the 2.4 per cent population growth rate over the same period. (...). Despite a range of poverty alleviation programmes, towards the end of the decade seventy per cent of the population remained below the poverty line (Nickson and Vargas, 2002: 109-10).

They conclude that while the tariff increase was the major catalyst for the opposition of consumers toward the concession contract, the failure of the Cochabamba concession was due to a combination of complex political, social and economic factors (Nickson and Vargas, 2002: 116).

The case of water supply privatisation in Buenos Aires also involved increased service charges, and the project became the target of attacks by consumers, particularly those who had difficulty paying. Loftus and McDonald (2001) critically analyse the implication of water privatisation in Buenos Aires in light of the very positive

evaluation of the process by its neoliberal proponents. They argue that the claim that the water concession has aided poverty alleviation in Buenos Aires is misleading. Their argument regarding the negative impact of the privatisation of the water supply can be summarised as follows. The poor's limited capacity to pay the water tariffs meant the company could not fulfil its investment targets. It had to suspend part of its planned intervention programme due to lack of funds. This meant that the new water infrastructure did not reach all the target areas, while many poor households fell into serious arrears and were disconnected from the network. Under this market-driven framework, there was no other choice for the poor but to protest and demand their right to water, via the community-based actions against the increased tariffs. In this sense, the community-based protest had a reason.

Analysis by Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999), in contrast, estimates the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the privatisation and regulation of public services in Argentina, utilising a computable model. Although we should consider the methodological differences, the conclusion regarding the distributional implications of privatisation, measured by the Gini coefficient was the exact opposite to what Loftus and McDonald suggested in the case of Buenos Aires: privatisation served to reduce social inequality in terms of income distribution. On the contrary, Chisari, Estache and Romero observe that the poorest social groups stand to gain the most from improvements in gas and electricity, but also gain relatively more from improvements in water (Chisari, Estache and Romero, 1999: 377). They argue that regardless of social class, the citizens of Argentina have benefited from the privatisation and regulation of utilities. They suggest that it was the increase in both unemployment rates and interest rates between 1993 and 1995 caused by the '*Tequila Effect*' that had a negative effect on income distribution during that period rather than the privatisation of utilities.

Despite positive evaluations of this kind, the critics of privatisation in the Latin American context are persistent, arguing that the benefits of such schemes to the poor

do not outweigh the disadvantages. Birdsall and Nellis (2005: 26) argue that this criticism is unfair.

Privatization has been unfairly criticized in Latin America, in part, because it was the most politically visible, structural reform in that region during the 1990s, a disappointing decade of reform without growth.

They write that there is a need to analyse the impact of privatisation (or private participation in public service delivery) in a more comprehensive way. For this, at least three elements should be considered. They are: conditions before privatisation; initial level of inefficiency of the companies concerned; and environment following privatisation (such as degree of competition and regulatory arrangements) (Birdsall and Nellis, 2005: 6). According to their analysis, in the Latin American cases the equity –enhancing effects of increased access to infrastructure services outweigh the negative effects of increased prices. They also highlight the point that although the increased prices, if any, have burdened lower-income households, the bottom line is still one of absolute gains in welfare for the poor (i.e. highly subsidised). Gilbert (2007), through his analysis of the Colombian case, supports this position: privatisation has improved the living conditions of the poor the most, and their negative perception of any increases in service charges should be interpreted in the context of the country's macro-economic situation. He also emphasises that the increase in service charges is often overestimated by those who attack the privatisation process. For them, the protests of the poor against the increased service tariffs was not economically reasonable, but maybe made sense politically, particularly when the left-wing (opposition to the government in power) intended to oppose or attack the government (Gilbert, 2007).

Now, how and to what extent was the community involved in this process of privatisation? This is another important point in the discussion regarding the impact of privatisation on the relationships between the state, the private sector (or service providing NGO) and the community as beneficiaries. The case studies above found that

there was very little space for the community to be involved in the decision-making process of privatisation (Loftus and McDonald, 2001; Nickson and Vargas, 2002). Although a participatory approach has been put in place for the implementation of service delivery once the privatisation process is up and running, there is no real space for the negotiation of the introduction of the privatised service delivery itself. Therefore, the community has no alternative other than to resort to protests to express their dislike of privatisation. A closer analysis of the community's perspective on this matter is useful to clarify the difference between the concept of rationality for the regulatory agency and for the community users. In this regard, the work of McKenzie and Mookherjee (2005) is helpful. They argue that lack of adequate information about the tariff regulation methodology may cause users to misinterpret the level of increases in service tariffs and result in a protest.

### **The democratisation process**

Democratisation created new mechanisms of political participation such as the popular election of mayors and civilian control of local administration. The new mechanisms permitted the voices of the poor to be heard more than in the past. The needs of citizens came to be considered and reflected in development projects at the local level, and this was expected to eventually improve the quality of city governance, including housing policy. Obviously, there are limits to the effectiveness of representative democracy. As Devas (2004: 30) suggests, 'it would be naïve to assume that decentralization automatically ensures local decision-making reflects local needs and priorities, particularly of the poor'. The outcome of the democratic process for the poor depends on the capacity and accountability of elected representatives and local legislatures. However, whatever the shortcomings of democracy, it now allows the poor to have a voice that can be reflected in government approaches to settlement problems (Devas, 2004; Berg-Schlosser and Kersting, 2003).

Several case studies examined whether the urban poor gained a voice in the public sphere through democratisation. Gay (1994) discusses changes in the nature of community organisations in Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* and their relationship to members of the local political elite during the democratisation process. The urban poor sector in Brazil had been the object of political mobilisation and control under successive political regimes after democratisation, therefore the social movement of *favela* residents against the regime did not have a substantial influence on democratisation. However, during the process of democratisation *favela* organisations received support from external sources such as the Catholic Church and NGOs, which in turn influenced the established relationship between popular organisations and the political elite. His case studies suggested that, independent of the level of political manipulation by partisan forces, *favela* residents gained more control and autonomy over participation in the political process as well as in their relationship with the political elite.

Two studies on the *poblaciones* of Santiago de Chile during and after the Pinochet authoritarian regime have implications similar to those of Gay (1994) in their interpretation of the role of community organisations during the political transition. Salman (1997) examines what activities and community organisation roles were effective in three *poblaciones* under the dictatorship. He tried to answer the question of whether the *pobladores'* movement was the driving force of democratisation or rather, whether it had simply served as a crisis-management organisation and strategy for survival. Salman employed a multi-dimensional approach, which included the particular history of each *población*, interaction among the *pobladores* and other actors such as the Catholic Church and NGOs and the collective identity of the participants. He concluded that the *pobladores'* activities could not have been a driving force of the social movement for democratisation under the strong repression of political activities of any kind. However, the evolution of small-scale organisations designed for survival projects and the significant influence of interventions by the Church and other NGOs and the

formation of social networks reinforced the autonomy of the *pobladores* in relation to the political parties.

Conducting an empirical study of grass-roots organisations found in one area of Santiago that contained ten *poblaciones*, Guerra (1997) examines the development of networking and other informal organisations in the popular sector under the authoritarian regime and their role in alternative development. His multifaceted analysis of these organisations reveals that, after the state and the market, it was such networks in the popular sector that led development. These studies show that popular movements and activism emerging in the irregular settlements were not necessarily prompted by the democratisation process. However, the growth of the organisations and their interaction with the Church and NGOs reinforced the initiatives of the poor, making them more independent from the state and political parties.

Similar analyses have been conducted in the countries that did not experience political transformation (democratisation) from a military regime in the same period. Mexico, like Costa Rica and Colombia, did not have long periods of military rule during the 1960s and 1970s, but made progress in democratisation in the 1990s. If we compare Aguilar (1988) and Moctezuma (2001), we can observe how the urban poor gained a voice and a measure of autonomy in relation to the state in Mexico in this process. Aguilar (1988) describes the long history of limited participation by officially organised local community associations in Mexico under the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) regime. In theory, neighbourhood councils and the block leader system were channels for public participation, but the actual involvement of residents in decision-making was quite limited. As Aguilar (1988: 33) points out, 'They had only a consultative function, which made them very weak, as they did not have any legal capacity to intervene in decisions about local urban policy.' In fact, all independent popular movements were restricted under the PRI-dominated regime. Moctezuma (2001) focuses on the relation between popular movements and Mexican

democratisation. He argues that the victory of PRD (Party of the Democratic Revolution) leader Cuauthémoc Cárdenas as mayor of Mexico City—the first instance of liberalisation from authoritarian rule—had been influenced by the popular movement. ‘During the 90s, a new wave of social movements kept promoting self-reliance projects and participatory planning, seeking to consolidate community organisations’ (Moctezuma, 2001: 126), and as a result, a participatory planning scheme was introduced in Mexico City. In addition, the formation of NGOs and community-based organisations was reactivated in the reconstruction process following the earthquake of 1985. The case of Mexico City reveals the change in power relations between the state and the community in their negotiation process. Due to the state’s recognition of the value of community-based and collective self-help actions, the dominance of top-down control over the community-based social programmes weakened and community organisations in the irregular settlements gained more initiative and influence in the decision-making process.

#### *Debate on decentralisation vs. participation/ accountability*

Decentralisation is another issue which affects service delivery at the local level, and therefore, the improvement of living conditions for the urban poor. Decentralisation in general means ‘the transfer of authority over and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate, lower government organizations or to the private sector’ (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 176). Under this general definition, however, various types of decentralisation are implemented in practice: devolution, deconcentration, delegation and privatisation (Rondinelli, 1991). According to Manor (1999), decentralisation policies in Latin America are a mix of these types.

Decentralisation in many Latin American countries began in the 1980s, partly due to the requirement of international donor agencies to implement structural adjustment programmes to overcome financial crisis in the region, but was also stimulated by the

process of democratisation. Stren (2003: 10) states:

Decentralization in a meaningful sense implies the granting of substantial political autonomy to regional centers of power—a pattern that is inimical to tight, unaccountable control by a national state for an extended period of time. Real decentralization almost certainly leads to the enhancement of democratic opportunities at the local level.

Almost all Latin American countries have introduced some form of decentralisation policy since ‘democratisation was an important objective of decentralisation policies in the 1980s’ (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 176).

If decentralisation is an instrument for achieving good governance, it should stimulate citizens’ participation in local decision-making processes (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 175). Based on this hypothesis, a close relationship between decentralisation and community participation in order to accomplish local good governance has become one of the central focuses in analysing the role of decentralisation in Latin American countries in the 1990s.

Blair distinguishes the new meaning of decentralisation emerging in the 1990s from the conventional one, which emerged during the 1950s. According to his analysis, what makes the current form of decentralisation different from the earlier one is the inclusion of two new themes: participation and accountability. Blair argues:

The major promise of democratic decentralization, or democratic local governance (DLG) (... ) is that by building popular participation and accountability into local governance, government at the local level will become more responsive to citizen desires and more effective in service delivery (Blair, 2000: 21).

The achievement of good governance by decentralisation, however is based on several assumptions, for example that it will be easy to develop community participation and straightforward partnerships between local government and civil society. Oyugi (2000: vii) notes, ‘In the literature on decentralization, there is usually the assumption that



decentralization provides the setting within which participation in development by local stakeholders can take place.’ Devas and Grant (2003: 307) argue, ‘The current fashion for decentralisation is built on the assumption that it will result in decisions that reflect local needs and priorities’. Schalkwijk argues that ‘one usually assumes decentralization is accompanied by increased participation by the population’ (Schalkwijk, 2002: 158). He also notes that partnerships between the government, private sector and civil society can provide effective means for managing urban development. However, ‘the partnership model supposes that government acknowledges its shortcomings and is willing to accept the formulation and/or implementation of policy’ (Schalkwijk, 2002: 158).

Decentralisation is thought to be a good thing for a better service delivery, based on the principle of citizens’ participation. Various case studies however, provide evidence that this assumption is sometimes untrue.

Schalkwijk (2002) analyses the frustrations of community participation in Bolivia following decentralisation reforms. In Bolivia, the law on popular participation (LPP) which came into effect in 1994 was the basic legal framework for the involvement of citizens, particularly marginalised populations, in the decision making processes of the local administration. The LPP provides legal recognition for territorial-based organisations (TOBs) or neighbourhood committees (*juntas vecinales*) as representatives of the people, which can act in the decision process of planning for municipal development. The TOBs are expected to serve their communities by identifying their needs, and to participate in and supervise the execution of projects and programmes at municipal level. With the intention of reinforcing the mechanism of accountability, the LPP called for the installation of committees of vigilance which act as a link between the TOBs and municipal governments. Committees of vigilance were primarily concerned with monitoring the spending of public funds (Schalkwijk, 2002: 159-61). However, the LPP gave the task of representing the community to the

committees of vigilance, which were not trusted by the community leaders. These committees were co-opted by the political parties. This meant that local needs as recognised by the community and their monitoring function were not properly transmitted to the municipal government. On the other hand, the IDB financed projects which provided a setting for a partnership between the local government and the communities. TOBs had the chance to enter the neighbourhood improvement subprogramme through the projects. However, the federation of TOBs was also heavily politicised and failed to mobilise the community leaders to get involved in the subprogrammes. In the end, the TOBs failed to utilise both the opportunities for participation given by the LPP and the opportunities for partnership given by projects financed by the IDB. The reasons for the failure can be attributed to the following factors: lack of awareness of the communities of these opportunities and effective strategies to utilise them; a longstanding tradition of dependence on making demands through political parties; lack of motivation of the federation of the TOBs to mobilise the community and lack of administrative capacity of the municipal government to involve the residents in the process of determining local needs and priorities.

The case of Montevideo, capital city of Uruguay, analysed by Goldfrank (2002) also illustrates the flaws in the assumptions about decentralisation. He analyses the decentralisation and participation programme implemented by the municipal government of Montevideo in 1989 and further institutional reform conducted in 1993. The programme contributed to improvements in city services by providing the government with better information about citizens' needs. It failed however, to increase civic engagement among city residents because 'the channels of participation offered did not convince average citizens that their input in public forums would have a significant impact on governmental decisions' (Goldfrank, 2002: 51). Although the decentralisation of the city administration opened up new channels of citizen participation, the mechanisms failed to stimulate the residents to get involved in the

forums which directly informed the local government of the citizens' needs. The reason for this failure was attributed to institutional changes in participatory mechanisms introduced in 1993. Between 1990-1993, the participatory mechanisms involved the direct attendance of residents at public meetings to openly discuss local priorities for the administration's five-year budget plan. However, these meetings created huge lists of demands, which it was almost impossible to prioritise into a coherent budget. Based on this experience, the reforms to the project at the end of 1993 added two layers of intermediate representation between the municipal government and residents. However, this reform contributed to a decline in participation, particularly by the rank and file residents. After the reform, the meetings were more akin to information-providing than to decision-making (Goldfrank, 2002: 57-58).

The participatory budgeting experience in Brazil, in contrast, has been widely considered a successful case of decentralisation through the participatory mechanism (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002; Koonings, 2004; Baiocchi, 2004). So what are the factors which make decentralisation accompanied by citizens' participation possible?

Van Lindert and Nijenhuis analysed this using Porto Alegre's experience. They believe that the main factors behind the success of Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting venture are: the political continuity of Labour Party (leftist) administrations since 1988; the city's strong tradition of social movements since the 1970s, serving as the basis of popular participation in the 1990s and the long history of neighbourhood organisations (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 189). The participatory budgeting system in Porto Alegre is a year-round activity involving assemblies, gatherings, forums and intermediate consultations. As such it is no less complicated than experiences in other Latin American cities such as El Alto in Bolivia and Montevideo in Uruguay. The success of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre derives from adaptations and improvements over the years, which have been made possible by the intense involvement of municipal officers and community organisers. This success has also

been sustained by the stability of the Labour Party and the expertise of the community-based organisations. The local government's efforts, willingness and capacity to promote popular participation is crucial. In addition, the learning process involved in capacity building to enable the community organisations to follow the procedure of a year-round budgetary system is essential. In order to achieve this, the local government has an important role to play in raising awareness, popular education, training, and dissemination of information at the neighbourhood level (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 190). The merit of the Brazilian experience in terms of the effectiveness of community participation following decentralization is due to its direct participatory mechanism which directed efforts towards capacity building for both the municipal government and average citizens. The cases of decentralisation in Bolivia and Montevideo, in contrast, emphasised the establishment of a legal framework to facilitate community participation, but the new laws and institutions created as a result of this failed to motivate the citizens (Van Lindert and Nijenhuis, 2002: 193-94).<sup>7</sup>

Based on these case studies, I would argue that the process of decentralisation does not necessarily guarantee improvements in the accountability of the local government toward the community. Nor does it make certain the empowerment of the community through community participation.

## RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This dissertation is built upon the literature described above. There are numerous studies on irregular settlements and my review is not exhaustive. However, some of the recent case studies have demonstrated that certain aspects of the relationship between

---

<sup>7</sup> Having said this, it is important to remember that part of the reason for the success of the Porto Alegre case was the political continuity of consecutive Labour Party administrations. In other words, the sustainability of the participatory budgetary system was dependent on the fortunes of this political party.

the community and the state have been changing. Most of these studies interpret these changes either from an economic or a political perspective, few have used a multi-faceted approach. As for the discussion on community participation, there are a few examples where community struggle is examined after 1990. These studies however, tend to focus on community participation within particular meanings: for example as a 'community participatory project' to implement state-initiated projects for the improvement of living conditions; or as 'popular participation' in local elections or 'participatory local planning' in the administrative arena in the decentralisation process.

My case studies on irregular settlements in Bogotá will analyse the changes in the nature of community struggle and its interaction with the state and other external actors. My study uses an integral approach and includes the inhabitants' views. I will implement the wider conceptual definition of community participation to include community-initiated participation (struggle). The analysis of long term community collective action, including the periods before and after state intervention began aims to explore the meaning of community participation in the real world.

The analysis uses empirical data derived from the *barrios* of Bogotá in the 1990s to examine the following key questions:

- 1) How has the nature of community struggle and government approaches to the poor changed as a result of the strengthening of democracy and decentralised government?
- 2) How has the increasingly market-oriented approach to urban and economic development (including privatisation and rationalisation of public service provision) affected the lives of people in the *barrios*?
- 3) How effectively has the participatory approach of the city government to the community affected the lives of people in the irregular settlements since 1990?
- 4) How far did the presumable community participation succeed in the involvement of the community in the decision-making process and enforce its control over resource allocation?

Several hypotheses emerge from these general questions:

#### Question 1

- (a) The changes that occurred in Bogotá in the 1990s in terms of administrative decentralisation and democratisation resulted in a more efficient and accelerated urban management, particularly toward the poor sector.
- (b) The strategies taken by the communities to claim for their needs to the city authorities have become less conflictive and more collaborative.
- (c) Community struggle has become less clientelistic and more technical in nature. As a result, communities with political patrons no longer gain a major advantage over those without.
- (d) Privatisation of the provision of services has permitted the regularisation of the informal settlements without the aid of political patrons.
- (e) NGOs and the church (both Protestant and Catholic) have become more influential in encouraging community development.
- (f) Settlements with strong community-based organisations develop faster than those without.
- (g) The community's reason for struggle has come to be based on their citizens' rights to obtain basic needs.

#### Question 2

- (h) Community-based collective action tends to disappear once settlements are regularised because they are no longer necessary.
- (i) The claim for land title deeds is the last issue in the whole process of regularisation that mobilises people to take collective action.
- (j) The living conditions of the urban poor (of the former irregular settlements) have improved enormously, but sustainability depends on what people can afford.

- (k) Though community-based collective action decreases after the settlements consolidate physically, whenever the inhabitants feel the need to make claims or protests their organisations mobilise to take action.

#### Question 3

- (l) The framework of community participation in the slum upgrading projects has involved the targeted community in the execution process, but not necessarily in the decision-making process.
- (m) Local communities have become more autonomous thanks to access to the learning process of how to apply to the projects. They now demand access to services and infrastructure as human rights instead of requesting them as favours from political patrons.

#### Question 4

- (n) Community participation has flourished as the city authorities have encouraged communities to participate and dictate the ways in which their neighbourhoods should develop.
- (o) The meaning of community participation as interpreted by the city authorities is not necessarily the same as the involvement of the community in the kind of collective action which the people have traditionally conducted.

In order to examine these hypotheses, a holistic approach is necessary. Microanalysis within the macro context is essential to understanding the relationship between residents and the local government.

Some recent studies have examined the attitudes of poor residents and their relationship with other external organisations, but their approach is mostly limited to the political perspective. They lack concern for the changing nature of community

organisations and the strategies and collective action conducted at different stages in the improvement process. A perspective presenting poor people's struggle for fulfilment of their basic needs is important. Since the 1970s, numerous studies on irregular settlements have conducted micro-level analyses, but all of them concentrate on at best only a few aspects of institutional change. Few have taken up the challenge of understanding the complex dynamics of the whole.

I believe it is necessary to apply the holistic approach adopted by Gilbert and other scholars to the current situation of the urban poor. Clearly, the economic and political contexts in Latin America's major cities today are very different from the 1980s. Given the extent of the changes taking place in macro contexts, we need to analyse the interactions between communities and the new institutions that have been involved in the process of improvement of the irregular settlements. Two macro processes must be taken into consideration: the democratisation process and the shift to neoliberal policy. In particular, we need to look at the impact of the decentralisation process and of market oriented development programmes on the lives of the urban poor.

The community participation framework is an effective approach for this purpose. During the 1990s, more Latin American governments adopted the community participation approach when planning development programmes. While they recognise the role of community-based organisations and NGOs, they have also learned the necessity of activating the linkages between them and the state. Co-financing projects between the state and the community under the community participation model can help to reduce the fiscal burden of social development (Mayo and Craig, 1995). The real relationships between the community, the state, and other NGOs, however, are neither clearly revealed nor sufficiently understood. The impact of market-led development policy on the same relationships is unclear as well. A close examination of the attitudes and ideas of each actor will provide a more precise understanding of the relations



between them and thus the micro analysis of local practices is indispensable.<sup>8</sup> In addition, an analysis of how the residents themselves evaluate their own practice of so-called community participation will show whether they have gained autonomy (or independent space for negotiation) in relation to politicians and the state.

The following chapters examine the working hypotheses listed above.

Chapter 2 explains the reason why I selected Bogotá-Colombia as a research place and presents the methodology for this study. Chapter 3 describes government approaches to the settlements in Bogotá and the reactions of the people by the 1980s. Chapter 4 describes the changing context of the 1990s, the process of democratisation, decentralisation and the reforms of the city administration. Chapters 5 and 6 use case studies to analyse the ways in which the meaning and changing nature of community participation are interpreted by both the community and the government. Chapter 5 provides the history of the consolidation process of the six study settlements. Chapter 6 then analyses the determining factors of community participation, examining the gap between the value of participation from the view of the city administration and from the view of the inhabitants. Chapter 7 presents the concluding arguments of the study. It discusses how the relationship between the community and the state and other external actors has changed. It also highlights the gap between the theory and practice of community participation. Analysis of interpretations of community participation, I maintain, is crucial to understanding the nature of the relationship between the community and local governments. This framework is relevant not only to examine the level of autonomy of the community in relation to project sponsors but also to understand the meaning of community struggle with and without the intervention of the state.

---

<sup>8</sup> Kellett's intensive work on the consolidation process of three informal settlements in Santa Marta (Kellett 1995) contains many relevant insights particularly with regard to the research method (see chapter 2 for details)

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **METHODOLOGY**

The research took the form of case studies of selected irregular settlements in Bogotá, Colombia. Bogotá is an interesting city to focus on for this research topic. The issue of irregular settlements should be understood in both the local and national context. Colombia has aspects in common with other countries in the region but also has its peculiarities.

This chapter first outlines the background and rationale defining the research area as well as the period of study. It then describes the method used for selecting and carrying out the case studies. Discussions about my positionality in the research and the ethical considerations that arose during the fieldwork are also included.

#### **SELECTION OF THE RESEARCH AREA: COLOMBIA AND BOGOTÁ**

##### **The Colombian political and administrative process**

Colombia is one of the few countries in Latin America that was not ruled by what Guillermo O'Donnell called 'bureaucratic authoritarian regimes' (O'Donnell, 1973). Therefore it is usually categorised as a country with a stable democracy, but at the same time one troubled by bipartisanship, split between liberal and conservative coalition groups under elite political leadership (Berry, Hellman and Solaún, 1980; Kline, 1983; Hartlyn, 1988). From 1948 until the mid 1960s the country was embroiled in a period of political confrontation between the liberals and conservatives, known as *La Violencia*.

In 1958, the liberals and conservatives established the so-called National Front, a regime under which the two parties took power by turns and shared equally seats in parliament as well as posts as governors and councillors. The National Front regime

came to an end in 1974, but in practice, the bipartisan regime continued throughout the 1980s.<sup>1</sup> Under this regime, tensions between the organised urban poor and local governments were mostly controlled through top-down community development strategies. The poor launched demonstrations, strikes, and other collective actions to demand support for their basic needs, but they were also manipulated by partisan political forces exploiting patron-client practices (see Torres, 1993; Gilbert and Ward, 1984a; 1984b). Left-wing forces, meanwhile, organised armed guerrilla groups in several factions that plunged Colombia into violent and prolonged civil strife. A process of forging peace between the state and the guerrilla groups made progress during the time of the Belisario Betancur government (1982-86). However, the peace process has frequently become deadlocked and the Colombian democratic regime faced destabilising violence from leftist guerrilla groups and right-wing paramilitary groups in rural areas (Kline, 1995; 1999).<sup>2</sup>

Given the situation, institutional reform of the state has been a priority for successive Colombian governments. *Apertura política* (political liberalisation) was one of the principal goals of the government of César Gaviria (1991-94) and institutional reform of the state was part of the new constitution of 1991. These reforms included the redefinition of the role of state, declaration of a pluralistic partisan regime, decentralisation, reinforcement of citizen rights and so forth. Thus, in 1991 Colombia entered a new political era seeking greater democracy. Decentralisation was one of the major strategies adopted for this end.

Colombian decentralisation had both a political aspect and a fiscal-administrative aspect. It had begun in the mid-1980s through the introduction of new legislation. The

---

<sup>1</sup> The end of the bipartisan regime occurred gradually though. At the national government level, César Gaviria (1991-94), who was from the non-traditional wing of the Liberal party, won the presidential election but Pastrana (1998-2002) was elected from the traditional Conservative party. At the local level in Bogotá, the victory of Mockus in 1995 signalled the end of the bipartisan regime in mayoral elections, but the bipartisan influence persisted in the elections of city councillors.

<sup>2</sup> Although the peace process made considerable progress during the administration of Alvaro Uribe (2002-2006 and re-elected for the period of 2006 to 2010), there is still much to do in terms of finding a solution to the problem of political violence in Colombia.

budget of each municipality was reinforced through progressive increases in the transfer of resources from national government revenue. Jurisdiction over some basic services (education, health, water supply and sanitation, housing, etc.) was shifted to the municipalities. At the same time, citizen control over the administrative and fiscal policies of local government was reinforced. The popular election of mayors was passed into law and the first mayoral election occurred in 1989.<sup>3</sup> The creation of local administrative boards representing the lowest level of parliamentary government at the municipal level was determined legally in the late 80s. These reforms were confirmed under the new constitution of 1991. The new constitution also stipulated the election of city mayors, the popular election of governors, the recall of mandates, and the conducting of plebiscites (Gaitán and Moreno, 1992; Santana, 1996; Bell, 1998; Moreno et al., 1997).

Decentralisation was not without difficulties given Colombia's long history of centralism. The main problem was how to distribute administrative powers previously concentrated at the national government level. The political aspect of decentralisation promoted local participation in order to reinforce local governance. A legal framework establishing citizen control over the budgets for local administration and development and a new system of civilian (watchdog) monitoring of public projects were introduced to this end.

Recent studies have sought to explain the changing nature of relations between the state and civil society by analysing voting behaviour in local elections in the 1990s (Gutiérrez, 1998; García, 2003). They found that the traditional bipartisan model of the Colombian democratic regime was undergoing a transformation and new citizen-led political movements were expanding the space of political participation. The case studies are still limited, however, and their approach concentrates on the political

---

<sup>3</sup> The election of representatives (councillors) to local government (municipality) had started in 1935 (see Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis Carlos Galán, 2001).

perspective; the economic aspects, such as urban policies toward the poor, have yet to be examined.

### **Colombia's economy**

Colombia's economic development was relatively stable from the 1960s until 1997. The country never experienced hyper inflation nor rescheduled its external debts.

Colombian macroeconomic performance during the decade of 'crisis' was better than the rest of the countries of the region,<sup>4</sup> however the Gaviria government had to adopt a series of economic strategies suggested by international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thus, in the early 1990s the national government began to stimulate neo-liberal and market-oriented economic development. Gaviria initiated policies aimed at trade liberalisation called *apertura económica* (economic liberalisation). In fact, during his administration, protective tariffs for most imported goods were drastically reduced (Dávila, 1996). With respect to the labour market, employment contracts became more flexible. Reform of the pension system was conducted by setting up a savings system using private financial agencies. In addition, reform of the financial sector allowed access to foreign investors for the first time and rules surrounding foreign investment in general were liberalised (Caballero, 2004).

The Samper government (1995-98) put more emphasis on social investment in the fields of education, public health and so forth.<sup>5</sup> However, political corruption during its electoral campaign led to distrust of the state, which in turn led to a reduction in private investment in the real economy. On the other hand, the national government expanded public investment which increased the fiscal deficit. As a result, the Colombian economy fell into serious economic recession in 1997. The subsequent Pastrana government (1998-2002) was confronted with two urgent tasks: to reconstruct the

---

<sup>4</sup> For example, the annual growth rate of Colombia's GDP per capita was never negative during the 1980s, and its level of inflation was moderate (23 per cent annual average). See Appendix E.1 for data on annual increase of GDP and Appendix E.2 for data on annual inflation.

<sup>5</sup> See Departamento Nacional de Planeación (1994) for details.

Colombian economy and to restart the peace process. Under this administration neo-liberal economic policies and market liberalisation continued apace, for example through the promotion of private investment in public services and infrastructure. At the same time, the national government had to focus on making the public sectors function more efficiently in order to resolve the fiscal deficit. On the other hand, there was a great need to reinforce social investment, due to the economic crisis of 1997-2000 which seriously affected the life of the poor. The Pastrana government continued with 'pro-poor' programmes through efforts to expand the coverage of education and public health care. Its development plan emphasised job creation through subsidies and the generation of credits for micro and small enterprises (DNP, 1999).

What were the ramifications of the economic liberalisation process on housing policy in Colombia? Essentially this process meant that housing policy shifted from offering housing itself to 'enabling strategies,' facilitating a conducive environment for the housing market.

Gilbert (1998) analyses the main orientations of the Colombian housing policy in the 90s. The Gaviria government abolished the ICT (National Housing Institute), replacing it with a new housing authority, INURBE (National Institute of Social Interest Housing and Urban Reform). The mission of the new authority was to provide subsidies to the poor instead of actually constructing low-cost housing. INURBE channelled these subsidies to privately supplied housing options and encouraged the private sector to supply more so-called 'social interest housing' (hereafter VIS). It was expected that promotion of the labour-intensive construction sector would help to generate jobs. Thus, the new policy of the Gaviria government was highly market-oriented, following the World Bank's recommendation of enabling strategies designed to invigorate the housing market (Gilbert, 1998: 157). The Samper government continued the basic Gaviria line but made some substantial modifications: collective subsidy programmes

were emphasised over individual subsidy programmes, and programmes for upgrading squatter conditions received more priority than construction of social interest housing.

These new housing policies reflected the change in orientations of international aid organisations. During the 1980s, the World Bank, USAID and the IADB took on a less-interventionist, pro-market stance. However, the result was the deepening of poverty during the 'lost decade', the 1980s. Recognition of that worsening led the World Bank to change its strategy. By the 1990s, much higher priority was being given to poverty alleviation and social development. The general policy orientation of these agencies shifted toward a strong commitment to institutional reform, sector-wide policies, better urban management and less government intervention. It was essentially a shift toward enabling strategies in the housing market and Colombia vigorously followed this trend.

During the Pastrana government, the basic components of housing policy were similar to previous governments in the 1990s. Newly promoted in this period was the transfer of ownership (title deeds) of housing lots in order that poor families, backed by the title deed as mortgage, would have easier access to long-term loans (DNP, 1999: 128-29). Another new element was the redefinition of so-called VIS. The price of a new house in the category of VIS was increased from 135 minimum legal salaries up to 200, although the maximum price to be eligible for the subsidy was kept at 135. The promotion of housing construction was aimed at reactivating the national economy, since the construction of VIS was favoured by a series of preferential treatments such as reduction of taxation and simplification of the procedures for obtaining construction permits. The general framework of urbanisation during this period was determined by the Spatial Development Plan (POT) defined under the Law No. 338/1997, the general policy of which was to organise land use in a more rational way in terms of the market-led economy.

### **Bogotá as research locale**

Having placed these trends within the national context, Bogotá is a good locale for studying community participation in the irregular settlements.

First, it has a high proportion of its poor living in irregular settlements. The percentage of population below the poverty line was 49.6 per cent of the total population in Bogotá in 2000 (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2002a). Approximately 40 per cent of the existing urbanised area in Bogotá was originally irregular settlements (Martín, 2000).

Second, although Bogotá has a fairly high per capita income, it is a city of great inequalities. For example, in 2001, the Gini coefficient was 0.56 in 2001 compared with the national average 0.54, while Bogotá's per capita income was almost double the national average (2,690 US dollars vs. 1,773 US dollars)<sup>6</sup> (Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, 2002a; 2002b).

Third, the regional product in Bogotá District was higher than any other department (state) in the country between 1990 and 2002,<sup>7</sup> which means that the Bogotá economy was vividly reflected in national macroeconomic performance. Bogotá showed relatively stable economic growth except for the year 1999 when the annual rate of increase of GDP per capita was negative (-11.3 per cent), as a result of the national economic recession. Gilbert (2006) argues that the Bogotá's economic growth during this period was not sufficient to employ the increasing population; its unemployment rate rose to a peak of 21.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2001. These data suggest that many poor people live in Bogotá and the economic recession would have greatly

---

<sup>6</sup> In the period between 1998 and 2004, the Bogotá Gini coefficient fluctuated between 0.55 and 0.59 (Gilbert, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> In this period (1990-2002), GDP in the Bogotá District ranged between 21.4 per cent and 24.2 per cent, while GDP in Antioquia department, which was the second highest in the country, ranged between 14.5 per cent and 16.4 per cent of Colombia's total GDP (<http://dane.gov.co>, accessed 15 June 2006). See Figure 2.1 for further details of the political and administrative division of Colombia.



affected their lives. Any government attempt to resolve this inequality has been a great challenge.

Fourth, a series of institutional reforms defined in the 1991 Constitution were applied to Bogotá at the local level gradually throughout the 1990s. The process of decentralisation, which was one of the major institutional reforms defined in the 1991 Constitution, had a great impact in Bogotá. The first popular election for Bogotá city mayor had already taken place in 1989 but political and administrative decentralisation was reinforced by the establishment of the Local Administrators' Committee (JAL). JAL was created in 1992 as a new legislative institution for the twenty *localidades*<sup>8</sup> (here after localities) of which the Capital District is composed (see Figure 2.2). This gave citizens from each locality a new channel for political participation through elections. In addition, a citizens' *veeduría* (monitoring) system was created to oversee local public investment. The *tutela* system, a legal system to protect citizens' rights was also introduced in Bogotá (details will be explained in chapter 4). These new systems stimulated community involvement and control over public resources and assured the protection of citizen's rights, at least in theory.

Finally, the citizens of Bogotá were exposed to a new wave of changes as the country underwent economic liberalisation. For residents of the irregular settlements, three factors were particularly important. One was the acceleration of the regularisation process, including the promotion of transfer of land title deeds. Another was the reforms in the management of public service companies. In Bogotá, these reforms included the privatisation of the companies responsible for waste collection and electricity services.<sup>9</sup> Both processes led to a shift in policies on irregular settlements, excluding clientelistic arrangements, which traditionally characterised the relationship between local politicians and poor communities. A third element was the impact of the economic

---

<sup>8</sup> *Localidad* (locality) is the lowest category of political and administrative division of Bogotá Capital District.

<sup>9</sup> Water supply and sanitation services are still publicly owned, but a consignment system involving private capital was introduced in some areas in 2003.

crisis during the period 1997-2000 which had serious consequences for those in the irregular settlements.

Thus Bogotá experienced a period of transition in the late 1990s both in terms of political transformation as well as a change in urban management. Focus on the irregular settlements in this period therefore, is relevant in order to analyse the factors which determined the relationship between the community, the state (city government) and the market.




Figure 2.1 Republic of Colombia: political and administrative division

Source: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (1999)




Figure 2.2 Localities of Bogotá District Capital  
Source: Drawn from a map from the Bogotá city website (<https://www.bogota.gov.co>)

## PERIOD OF STUDY

The study refers to the period from 1992 to 2003 with special focus on the late 1990s during the Peñalosa administration of Bogotá city government (1997-2000), since most of my fieldwork in Bogotá took place between September 1999 and September 2000. Coincidentally, Colombia was hit by a severe economic recession in the period 1997-2000 which dramatically affected the lives of the people of Bogotá. I have taken 1992 as the first year of my time frame because the institutional reforms in Bogotá under the 1991 Constitution began to be actioned under the Castro administration (1992-1995). However, the second Mockus administration (2000-03) is also referred to in the study as my follow up research was conducted during this period.

## RESEARCH METHODS USED FOR THE STUDY

Most of the information referred to in the following chapters was collected during fieldwork conducted from the end of September 1999 to mid-September 2000 in Bogotá. Supplementary field research was conducted in November 2000, August 2001, November 2003 and August 2004, in order to collect specific additional data.

The following research methods were used in the fieldwork:

1. Review of documents and reports in the major local newspapers relating to urban planning and services provision in Bogotá (see Appendix A for a list of the locations of primary document research).
2. Open-ended interviews with policy makers and academic experts working with urban planning and policy in the Bogotá city government (see Appendix B.1 for a list of those interviewed).

3. Collection of basic published information on the case study settlements, especially, official maps and the '*Resolución*'.<sup>10</sup>
4. Questionnaire survey of sample households in the case study settlements.
5. Semi-structured interviews with residents (household heads and/or their partners) selected from the sampled households (see Appendix B.2 for a list of those interviewed).
6. In-depth interviews with community leaders, NGO representatives, representatives of the Catholic Church, and local politicians involved in the development of the case study settlements (see Appendix B.3 for a list of those interviewed).
7. Direct observation of community meetings and meetings negotiating with the representatives of the Bogotá city government.

#### STRUCTURE OF THE FIELDWORK

The one-year research period in Bogotá was devoted to four basic activities: documentary research; research on district institutions (relating to urban planning and public service provision); settlement research (household surveys and interviews with inhabitants); and research on NGOs, religious groups, politicians and other social actors connected with the development of the case-study settlements.

To place the case studies in context and determine criteria for selecting case-study settlements, I devoted the initial period of the fieldwork to reviewing documents and studying relevant institutions. The information collected was useful for examining different data sources regarding the case-study settlements. The research on the institutions became the basis for a series of interviews with key personnel at the institutions concerned who were committed to the regularisation of the case-study

---

<sup>10</sup> Regulations issued by the District council of Bogotá for recognition of the regularisation of the respective settlements.

settlements.

The settlement research proceeded in three stages: preparatory investigation; a household survey via sampling method and semi-structured interviews with selected inhabitants. General data were collected through unstructured interviews with key members of the settlements (i.e., community leaders or settlement founders).

First, all available data sources relating to the selected settlements were reviewed. Most of the leading members of the Community Action Boards (JACs; role and history to be analysed in chapter 3) in the case-study settlements possess general information on the settlement that they themselves have collected. However, the information they offered was limited to home owners with registered memberships and did not include tenant residents. In each study settlement, meetings were arranged with community leaders to explain the objective of the research and obtain information on current community activities. The information obtained made it possible to enhance the content of the questionnaire and identify some of the institutions connected with current social development projects in the study settlements. It was also helpful in creating a list of institutions to ask about in the questionnaire.

Second, a household survey conducted via the sampling method was designed to identify currently felt needs. This included perceptions of the institutions considered responsible for dealing with problems in the settlements related to those needs as well as the level of community participation in the process of improving the conditions in the settlement. Data collected using the household survey was processed by using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science).<sup>11</sup> The data processing was conducted in order to yield simple frequencies on most of the variables in the questionnaire. It also yielded a comparative analysis between two sub-groups selected from the population (e.g., comparisons according to various variables between household heads and their partners, between house owners and tenants, etc.) and among the six case-study settlements. This

---

<sup>11</sup> SPSS is a statistical computing programme.

process was aimed at obtaining quantitative information on the socio-economic characteristics of household heads and their partners, needs felt, evaluations of community actions to resolve settlement problems and attitudes vis-à-vis community participation.

The results of this survey also helped identify potential households to approach for the semi-structured, in-depth interviews. It also highlighted the external social agents involved in community development projects in the respective case-study settlements. Themes and key questions for this third stage of the settlement research were formulated in such a way as to complement the outcome of the household survey.

Open (non-structured) interviews with key actors in settlement society were conducted during the preparatory investigation in order to collect contextual information on the settlements.

The interviews, of both inhabitants and representatives of social actors, were aimed at obtaining three kinds of information: (1) more detailed information on the process and background pertaining to the involvement of different institutions and their relationship to individual households; (2) evaluations of past and present involvement of different social institutions and its linkage with community-based activities from the viewpoint of the residents; and (3) the residents' perceptions of community-based development schemes and the level of commitment of different social institutions.

Thus explained, the research was pursued at two different levels: at the institutional level (city government, related public institutions/companies) and at the barrio level, including not only community self-help activism but also the reactions to, negotiations with, and conflict with the city government.



## RESEARCH ON URBAN POLICY, PLANNING AND PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION

In order to analyse the city administration, previous development plans, urban planning programmes and current official documents on social and urban development in Bogotá District were reviewed. Interviews were also conducted with key individuals—both policy makers (government and public officials) and academic analysts in the field of urban development and urban planning in Bogotá.

In respect to the functions of public service agencies and other divisions of the Bogotá city government, the study examined, through data collection from official records and documents, the history of services provided for the settlements as well as the political agendas tied up with such services. Key officials were interviewed at such agencies as the Bogotá Water and Sewerage Company (EAAB), the Company of Energy (CODENSA),<sup>12</sup> the Bogotá District Planning Department (DAPD), the Department of Community Action (DAAC), the Secretary of Health of the Bogotá District government and the Demarginalisation Programme office. The survey of documents covered the annual reports of EAAB, CODENSA and the archives of the Bogotá Electricity Company (EEB) and DAAC. Original correspondence between the community and the agencies archived in their so-called '*barrio* files' were especially useful in investigating the negotiation process between the community and the respective agencies in relation to the regularisation of community services. Documents collected in the library of the DAPD and City Council meeting records were also reviewed.

---

<sup>12</sup> Compañía de Energía, S.A., a company created through the privatisation of the previous public electric power service company, EEB (Bogotá Electricity Company).

## CHRONOLOGY OF SETTLEMENT RESEARCH

Since this study focuses on community participation from the inhabitants' viewpoint, the case studies of the irregular settlements form its core. The bulk of the fieldwork was devoted to the household survey and in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants.

Selection of inhabitants to be interviewed as well as the research into other social actors relevant to the inhabitants' situation was based on the results of the household survey.

The year-long fieldwork period was divided into two with a two-week break between for reevaluation and consultation with supervisors. I also used this break to review the progress made during the first six months and modify the methodology where necessary.

The first period (September 1999-March 2000) included three months of preparatory investigations including: selection of the case-study settlements, collection of basic data on these settlements, testing of the questionnaire, a pilot survey, and modification of the questionnaire. Potosí-La Isla (one sector of the Jerusalén *barrio*) was selected for the pilot survey because I had maintained a good relationship with some of the community leaders there ever since conducting my first *barrio* research in 1992.<sup>13</sup> They understood my interest in the research project and gave me useful information regarding the general situation in the community. During this period, the three *barrios*, Bella Flor, Danubio Azul, and La Paz were selected for the main household survey (see below for a discussion of the criteria used in the selection process). To conduct the pilot survey, two local people were hired to assist in the supervision of the household survey. They were the same people who had participated as interviewers in my first *barrio* survey in 1992. After modifying the questionnaire in the light of the experience of trying out the pilot, the main household survey began in January 2000 in Bella Flor.

---

<sup>13</sup> About this study, see Hataya et al. (1994) and Hataya (1999).

Before starting the main survey, I conducted an orientation session with four additional interviewers that I had hired to work on the survey to familiarise them with the manual I had made to assist with the questionnaire. All the interviewers were free-lance data collectors who had worked on social surveys with some of the researchers of Universidad de Los Andes. I hired eight interviewers in all,<sup>14</sup> but their availability varied considerably during the period of the fieldwork. Sometimes I only had two people, but at other times five showed up at once, so I had to be flexible in terms of the progress of the surveys. I interviewed at least 10 informants per settlement and filled in the questionnaires accordingly, but most of the time, I concentrated on supervision of the data collection and coordination of the fieldwork.

A jeep with a local driver was also hired for a few hours a week. It was indispensable since all the settlements studied were located in very steep areas which were not easy to access. Sometimes, during heavy rain, I had to suspend the trip because the unpaved roads made it impossible to reach the settlement. The jeep served as our mobile office, too. Most of the interviewers were female, and were identified as ‘strangers’ by the *barrio* people, so it was useful for them to have some private space in the field.

When we were conducting the household survey a typical day started around six o’clock in the morning. I picked up the interviewers on the way to the *barrio* which took from one to one and a half hours. The work stopped when darkness fell at 6.00pm for security reasons. After dropping off all the interviewers on the way back to the city centre (where I lived), I reviewed all the questionnaires we had filled in during the day and made research memos whenever necessary. All these tasks often took me up to midnight.

By the beginning of March 2000, I had completed the household surveys for two more settlements, namely, Danubio Azul and La Paz. The procedure for the study of

---

<sup>14</sup> Two of the people I had initially hired had to quit so I had to replace them later in the fieldwork. These two were given a separate orientation.

each settlement up to that point is summarised as follows.

1. Pilot survey on Potosí-La Isla (Sector of Jerusalén, Ciudad Bolívar, Locality No. 19)  
Test of questionnaire design; household count of five blocks (24-25 October 1999)  
Modification of questionnaire and preparation of manual for household survey  
Household survey (12-16 and 21 November 1999) (total of 154 cases)  
Codification, data correction, data input, and processing (December 1999).  
Modification of questionnaire for application to other settlements (January 2000)
2. Bella Flor (Sector Quiba, Ciudad Bolívar, Locality No. 19).  
Site observation and informal interviews with residents (November 1999)  
Interview with community leaders (11 December 1999)  
Household counting (21 December 1999)  
Household survey (14-16, 22-23 January 2000) (total of 103 cases)  
Codification, data correction, data input and processing (February 2000).
3. Danubio Azul (Usme, Locality No. 5)  
Site observation and interviews with community leaders (7-8 and 14 December 1999)  
Presentation at community assembly (30 January 2000)  
Household count (2 February 2000)  
Household survey (4-6, 11-13 February 2000) (total of 157 cases)  
Codification, data correction, data input and processing (February-March 2000).
4. La Paz (Sector Fiscala, Rafael Uribe Uribe, Locality No. 18)  
Site observation and informal interviews with residents (7 December 1999)  
Site observation and interviews with community leaders (9 February 2000)  
Household counting and household surveys (25-28 February, 2 and 4-5 March 2000) (total of 143 cases)  
Codification, data correction, data input and processing (March 2000).

After the break in the research, which corresponded to the last two weeks in March 2000, I began qualitative research on the studied settlements, beginning with the in-depth interviews of residents in Potosí-La Isla. I prepared a series of questions that served as a scenario for each interview and organised a public meeting with members of the community in Potosí-La Isla to show them the result of pilot household survey. At that meeting, I discussed my plan for further research through in-depth interviews.<sup>15</sup> The feedback obtained from this meeting was helpful in writing the questions for further interviews.

After conducting a couple of interviews in Potosí-La Isla, I examined the relevance of the questions (both the concepts behind them and the vocabulary used) and made modifications where necessary. The in-depth interviews conducted in sector Potosí-La Isla thus served as pilot interviews, although the findings themselves were relevant to the study as a whole.

During April and May 2000, I concentrated on conducting in-depth interviews with selected residents of Potosí-La Isla and Bella Flor. I conducted all of the in-depth interviews myself, although I was usually accompanied by one of the assistants I had hired. She helped me to give further explanation when the interviewees had difficulty to understand the words I used (all in Spanish). She also rephrased the local slang when I did not understand. During these months, I also visited the other study settlements, presenting the results of my simply analysed household survey to members of the community as a way of expressing my appreciation for their collaboration and also to get feedback from them about the results.

Meanwhile, I analysed the results of the household survey to reflect the supervisory feedback obtained in the March break and considered the addition of a few more case-study settlements. In June, three more case-study settlements were added to the study: Diana Turbay, Jerusalén as a whole, and Juan José Rondón.

---

<sup>15</sup> I tried to organise similar meetings with the communities of other study settlements, but without success, being able only to organise a couple of open interviews with key persons.

The household surveys for these settlements were conducted as follows:

5. Diana Turbay (Rafael Uribe Uribe, Locality No. 18)

Site observation and informal interviews with key persons (30 May, 2 June)

Site observation and interviews with community leaders (14, 21 June)

Household count of the selected blocks (1-2 July)

Conduct of household surveys (5-6, 8-9, 16 July)

Codification, data correction, data input, and processing (July)

6. Jerusalén

Site observation and informal interviews with community leaders (14 July)

Household count of the selected blocks (15 July)

Conduct of household survey (22-23, 26-27, 29-30 July)

Codification, data correction, data input and processing (August)

7. Juan José Rondón (Sector Yomasa, Usme, Locality No. 5)

Site visit and further contact with community leaders (October 1999)

Site observation and informal interviews with key persons (5 August)

Household count of the selected blocks (12-13 August)

Conduct of household survey (19-20, 26-27 August)

Codification, data correction, data input and processing (August)

During June and July, while starting the surveys at the recently added settlements, I continued to conduct in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants of Danubio Azul and La Paz. Interviews of the inhabitants in Diana Turbay, the other sectors of Jerusalén, and Juan José Rondón were conducted during August and September (until 10 September). Throughout the second semester (April to September), I also conducted open interviews with other key individuals in external social agencies (NGOs, religious groups, politicians).

The database of results of the last three household surveys was compiled by the end of August. Most of the in-depth interviews as well as the open interviews were taped,

and about half of them, which I selected according to importance, were transcribed by a locally hired assistant.

After completing the fieldwork on 18 September 2000, I returned to Japan, but subsequently made two follow-up research trips to Bogotá. During the first, from 18 November to 8 December 2000, I visited the last three settlements (Diana Turbay, Juan José Rondón and Jerusalén) to report on my findings from the household surveys. I also revisited a couple of people whose interviews that had not been recorded due to technical problems. In my second visit, in August 2001 I mostly collected additional materials on issues related to the main topic of the thesis, including the transfer of land title deeds, security problems (especially intervention and presence of leftist guerrilla groups in the study settlements), and displaced people. I collected documentation about these issues and conducted interviews with specialists and experts on the topics of my research in order to reinforce my knowledge and obtain insights based on their experiences.

#### SELECTION OF STUDY SETTLEMENTS

The key question in this study was why in some irregular settlements the consolidation and regularisation processes advanced rapidly while in others these processes were delayed. The main task for the early stage of the fieldwork, therefore, was determining the criteria for selection of the case-study settlements. In order to obtain the ideal cases with which to examine this question, I needed to identify examples of communities that were similar in condition and nature at the initial stages of development but that had experienced different processes of regularisation and levels of consolidation. I had to find the optimum way to combine quantitative and qualitative analysis so as to select cases (settlements) that could be studied in sufficient depth, based on an overall

understanding of the entirety of the studied area, and thereby test my hypotheses.

Needless to say, any attempt at quantitative representation through case studies was almost impossible and did not make sense, since the number of ‘settlements of illegal origin’ in the periphery of Bogotá was too large (according to a DAPD approximation in 1999, there were around 1,500 illegal settlements or *barrios de origen clandestino* around Bogotá).

The following criteria were established:

1. Illegal origin of land occupation

All the settlements I considered for the study were those established either by politician (or other activist)-instigated pirate urbanisation, illegal land subdivision, or invasion.

The low-income settlements promoted by the social housing programmes of NGOs or official institutions such as the Popular Housing Fund (CVP) were omitted because in these cases the state is considered a presence from the outset and the land is not illegally occupied. Such settlements would not provide relevant data for examining whether or not communities had gained bargaining power in the course of dealing with external institutions.

2. Land occupation beginning during the early 1980s

The study settlements were chosen so as to include those where land occupation began at approximately the same time, although they might be at different levels of physical consolidation. The reference term of establishment was fixed at between 10 and 20 years prior to the study, that is, sometime during the 1980s. In this way, the selected settlements have a similar background in their historical process of consolidation. The reference term—10 to 20 years—was considered a reasonable time span in which people would remember past events and their own performance and actions (this assumption proved wrong in some cases).



### 3. Lowest socio-economic stratum

The study settlements were selected from the poor sectors classified as belonging to the lowest socio-economic strata (according to the DANE definition, either *estrato* 1 or 2)<sup>16</sup> in order to secure a certain level of homogeneity among the selected cases.

### 4. Similar topographical conditions

The cases were selected from three localities in the southern part of the city: Ciudad Bolívar, Usme, and Rafael Uribe Uribe. There are significant concentrations of irregular settlements in these three, most of which were built on steep slopes or hillsides. Expansion of the delivery of public services in these areas is alike in facing the difficulties posed by these topographical conditions.

These criteria were refined in order to include the following aspects, both shared and different.

- Aspects in common:

- 1) illegal origin of the land tenure
- 2) approximately the same terms since land occupation began
- 3) lowest socio-economic strata
- 4) initial difficulty in access to public services, networks and the transport system.

---

<sup>16</sup> Colombian socio-economic stratification is based on various indicators which appraise the living conditions in residential areas according to physical conditions such as the building material used for dwellings, access to and condition of urban infrastructure and provision of public services. Average income level is approximated for referential use according to the strata. Until 1990, each public service delivery company used a different methodology in order to create its own stratification with the aim of determining a tariff for service use differentiated by strata. In 1991, the methodology was unified at the national level and the DANE is now in charge of determining the strata by decrees. Socio-economic stratification is updated constantly according to physical changes in the cities. The city of Bogotá is classified into six strata. Stratus 1 is the lowest and Stratus 6 is the highest. See DAPD (2004) for the legal explanation on stratification. See Appendix F for the current stratification in Bogotá.

- Aspects where different:

1) current density of occupation

2) progress of regularisation

3) current level of physical consolidation (= level of improvement in self-help housing in terms of construction materials and expansion of the area constructed; the level of public service provision; the provision of other social services.)

4) level of institutional intervention

This combination of criteria permitted me to choose study settlements that were to a certain extent homogeneous in terms of initial conditions and early process of self-help construction, although they exhibited diversity in their current physical condition.

The procedure for selecting the case settlements was based on a database categorised by the above mentioned criteria: illegal origin, year of establishment; socio-economic stratification, etc. Three different thematic maps were used and their data analysed comparatively. Two thematic maps are:

- Map of legalised settlements or settlements being legalised drawn by DAPD (see Figure 2.3);
- Map of socioeconomic stratification: stratus 1 and stratus 2 drawn by DAPD (see Figure 2.4).

These were compared with another set of maps, which showed the target area of intervention by two special district programmes (the ‘South Bogotá Project’ and the ‘De-marginalisation programme’; see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.4 in chapter 4 respectively).

I discovered that the current target area for institutional intervention overlapped the entire focus area of my research. Most of the settlements that could be selected under the criteria I proposed fell within areas where public service enterprises had difficulty in intervention because of conflict (either local violence or presumed presence of leftist groups) or topographical conditions (many blocks were not suitable for urban

development.) After 1990, public service enterprises like EAAB and CODENSA (ex-EEB) came to apply alternative strategies to provide services through the ‘community-based’ approach.

Ultimately, the selection of the study settlements was not rigidly based on the at-random rule, but rather was purposeful and subjective, based on observations from my visits to the candidate settlements. Acceptance by the community proved important in the final decision.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup> In addition, I considered settlements I had surveyed in 1992, namely Potosí-La Isla and Juan José Rondón, where I had the advantage of having previously established contacts with the community.




Figure 2.3 Bogotá: legalised settlements and settlements being legalised  
 Source: DAPD, 'Mapa de barrios legalizados y en el trámite de legalización', 1999.






Figure 2.4 Bogotá: stratus 1 and stratus 2

Source: Map drawn by DAPD, Subdirección Económica de Competitividad e Innovación, 1999.

Having completed this initial selection process, I reduced the candidate settlements for application of the household survey first to ten,<sup>18</sup> and finally to six in total:

Ciudad Bolívar: Jerusalén and Bella Flor

Usme: Danubio Azul and Juan José Rondón

Rafael Uribe Uribe: La Paz and Diana Turbay

(see Figure 2.5 for their location).

Of these six, Bella Flor, Danubio Azul and La Paz were surveyed in the first semester of the fieldwork. The other three: Diana Turbay, Jerusalén and Juan José Rondón were added in the second semester of the fieldwork for two reasons. First, I realised that the influence of political intervention in the study settlements was not clearly reflected in the results of the first three surveys. So, in order to achieve a better comparative analysis, I needed to include a case established by direct political intervention, one of the most commonly known ways that irregular settlements (irregular urbanisation) were created during the 1970s through the mid-1980s. Diana Turbay was included in response to this need. Second, after postulating the fourth working hypothesis, I realised the necessity of examining topographical conditions as another determining element in

---

<sup>18</sup> One settlement of the Quiba sector in Ciudad Bolívar was initially considered, but omitted simply due to time constraints. The Alto Cazuca and Alto Estancia area of Ciudad Bolívar, where there had been vigorous illegal urbanisation activity along the border between Bogotá District and Sumapaz, was also initially selected for the research, but ultimately omitted because of the difficulty of gaining access to general information in the municipality of Sumapaz. One of the irregular settlements located in Alto Chapinero where I had studied previously was also excluded because of the particularity of its historical process and because the locality of Chapinero itself was less representative in terms of concentration of illegal settlements.

The possibility of adding study settlements from either Suba or Bosa localities, where irregular settlements were also concentrated, was initially considered, but given constraints of time and the 'topographical similarity' criterion finally adopted (4. above), I did not include them. The topographical characteristics of the irregular settlements in these two localities differ greatly: they are located in the flat area which has poor drainage and is vulnerable to flooding.

During the pilot survey in Potosí-La Isla barrio (in Jerusalén, Ciudad Bolívar), the process of selection of study settlements continued with visits to the sites and informal interviews with local residents in different areas located in the initially selected focus area. In order to include some settlements that fulfilled my criteria and that also had a high level of current state intervention, I also met several times with public officials in charge of two Bogotá District legalisation programmes (the Demarginalisation Programme and the Project for Improvement of Settlements in southern Bogotá) in order to obtain basic information on the intervention process and learn how best to gain access to their target settlements.

differing levels of state intervention. In fact, the geographical conditions were quite different between Bella Flor and the others. Therefore, I added another irregular settlement with similar conditions, Juan José Rondón.

The reason for adding the *Barrio* Jerusalén was different. I took Jerusalén as a whole in order to utilise the information gained in the pilot research on Potosí-La Isla.<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup> The results of the pilot household survey could not be utilised for comparative analysis with other settlements, because the form of the questionnaire had been modified. However, the in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants as well as key social actors in Potosí-La Isla provided rich information in regard to the history and structure of Jerusalén, and therefore seemed valuable for use in the research. In order to use them in a coherent way, the sampling needed to be carried out covering the whole area of Jerusalén.






Figure 2.5 Location of six case study settlements.

Source: Based on Decreto 200 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols added.



## DESIGN AND PROBLEMS OF SAMPLING METHOD

The sample size was statistically determined by the nature (level of homogeneity) of the study population and ideal levels of confidence and precision. Naturally, the larger the sample size, the more representative the sample, but for the purposes of the study the size of the survey had to be manageable. Information on the size of the study population is not indispensable, but a gauge for the level of homogeneity across key socio-economic variables determined according to the research aim. This is crucial, because it affects the sample size. Accurate information on the total population as well as on density and location of land occupation was not available for the case-study settlements. The principal sampling method was designed and applied in the pilot survey, which was conducted in Potosí-La Isla (a sector of the Barrio Jerusalén) in November 1999. The pilot survey proved instrumental in examining the level of homogeneity of the target population and brought to my attention many important factors that needed to be considered to shape the sampling method. Taking these aspects into consideration, I modified a few elements of the sampling method for application in the household survey in successive study settlements (Bella Flor, Danubio Azul and La Paz).

### **Size of sample**

When I conducted the pilot survey, a sample was compiled roughly, consisting of at least 100 households. In the course of compiling the sample for the pilot survey, the diversity of the population became apparent, and I subsequently added some more cases, expanding the final sample to approximately 150.

The target sample size between 100 and 150 can be explained according to the following exercise based on the preconditions I determined.

I set the preconditions where:

the confidence level of the sample is equal to 95 per cent (that means the standard deviation is equal to 1.96); and

the level of precision is equal to 8 per cent.

The level of precision was set at 8 per cent simply because of constraints of time and funding.

For example,

1. Starting with the presupposition that the population is fairly homogeneous, the

maximum variance was approximated at between 20 and 80 per cent, giving 96 as the optimum sample size.

$$N = \frac{1.96^2}{0.08^2} (0.2)(0.8) = 96$$

2. Starting with the presupposition that the population is fairly diverse, the maximum

$$N' = \frac{1.96^2}{0.08^2} (0.5)^2 = 150$$

variance can be calculated at between 50 and 50 per cent, giving 150 as the optimum sample size.

I ultimately conducted between 103 and 167 household surveys in the settlements, depending on their level of homogeneity (calculated using a dummy variable for tenancy rate, as explained below).

### **Gauging homogeneity and diversity**

The level of homogeneity (or diversity) of the study population was a central factor in defining the sample size. During the pilot survey, I sought to identify factors or variables that would make a difference in terms of interest in community participation. Had I not done so, I would have had to adopt sample sizes consistent with the maximum variance (50 per cent) for all the settlements, which was beyond my capacity. Since

selection of the study settlements was based on criteria that assumed a certain level of homogeneity in terms of socio-economic stratification, diversity of the population was difficult to detect by simply judging from physical characteristics (materials used for dwellings, etc.).

Many previous studies on irregular settlements had already demonstrated the reluctance of tenants to take part in community affairs (Gilbert and Ward 1985: 205). The 'owner-occupant' and 'tenant' classifications were therefore variables in residents' attitudes toward collective action, although this point had been overlooked in the first stage of the fieldwork. My initial estimate prior to the pilot survey was that the proportion of tenants in relation to the total study would not be significant and that therefore the home-owner and tenant distinction need not be taken into account. However, the results of the pilot survey revealed that around 25 per cent of the households in the sample were tenants and that they were indifferent to community participation even though the needs they indicated were quite similar to those of home owners. I therefore made the proportion of tenants in the study population a determining factor in the homogeneity/diversity of the population.

### **Method of selecting households**

#### *Verifying the location of blocks*

First, I made a list of blocks according to the official map on the settlement published by the DAPD. This map and not the map published by the National Statistics Department (DANE) was used because the District map has more detailed information at the block level and is larger in scale, even though it is not as up-to-date. Some of the blocks on the map no longer exist on site, however, so the information on the blocks and housing lots had to be adjusted according to the reality on the ground. Nevertheless, the District map was used as a basic reference throughout the field survey. As the geographical order of the location of each block does not coincide with the numerical

order, I selected the blocks at random from the numeric list. For the pilot survey, blocks were selected 1 for each 3, beginning with the number 2 (2, 5, 7, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21 and so on).

### *Counting of households*

For each selected block, the total number of households was counted. Here, 'household' was defined according to the definition used by DANE in its census and household survey. I defined a 'household' as a unit of residents sharing the same kitchen and food, not limited to direct family ties. Therefore, when a landowner has a tenant in the same house, the latter is counted as a separate household. It proved necessary to count the households in order to apply the systematic sampling method (explained below), since the size of blocks was found to be too irregular to approximate a priori the average number of households per block. This decision was made after conducting the initial household count of 5 randomly selected blocks where the pre-test of the questionnaire design was applied for the purposes of the pilot study.

### *Two-way systematic sampling*

Based on this list of blocks, households were then selected systematically. In the case of the pilot survey, I selected one out of every five households, beginning with a number selected randomly between one and five. The households had to be selected in advance in consecutive order. In the case of the pilot survey, the total number of blocks registered on the District map was 111. The average size of a block averaged out to 22 household units, following a count of the first five blocks. However, as there were more blocks with fewer than 22 households, the total number of the sample fell under 100 when I finished the selection of households according to the two-step systematic sampling method described above. The expansion of the sample size was conducted in such a way that the selection could be continued in a similarly systematic, two-step

fashion (selection of blocks and then households), beginning with the different number of blocks selected between 1 and 3. In the case of the pilot survey, households were selected from blocks with numbers of 1, 4, 7, and so on until a total sample of more than 150 was compiled, and this was redefined<sup>20</sup> as the minimum sample size.

This sampling method took time, especially when the level of land occupation was low and the number of houses constructed varied block by block. Nevertheless, this method had some merits. First, once the selection of households to be interviewed had been made, interviewers could begin with any block according to their convenience. Second, this method provided the interviewer with easier access to the household to be interviewed, since the interviewer could visit the interviewee with advance knowledge of his/her identification (address and name of informant). Third, in case the selected household should be replaced due to rejection or the absence of the informant (a household would be replaced if the informant was absent for three visits on different days and times), the list of households based on the household count was useful for defining systematically the replacement household (usually, the replacement was the next household on the list).

#### *Shift to the cluster method*

I shifted the sampling method from a simple two-step systematic method to a two-step combined-with-cluster (landowner and tenant) method when I conducted the household survey in Danubio Azul.<sup>21</sup> For Danubio Azul, a previous survey (a census taken in 1997

---

<sup>20</sup> While the pilot survey was being carried out, I realised that Potosí la Isla had more diversity in terms of land occupation and consolidation than initially estimated, and this made it clear that the sample size needed to be expanded.

<sup>21</sup> I did not take into consideration the owner-occupant and tenant criterion in determining the level of homogeneity/diversity of the study population in the household survey for Bella Flor, but maintained the two-step simple method with maximum variance of 20 per cent. The proportion of tenants in Bella Flor was found to be insignificant, both from my general observations (the level of land occupation was 50 per cent or less, physical consolidation was much lower than in the case of Potosí-La Isla) and in a household count of selected blocks. According to the household count I conducted later, the proportion of tenants in the population was less than 10 per cent. This proportion was less than found in the main household survey, so I did not expand the sample.

by the community and an NGO) showed that the proportion of tenants was more than 56 per cent of the total population. My approximation based on a household count of selected blocks (39 out of 118) was nearly 40 per cent. I therefore set the maximum variance in the formula for calculating the sampling size at 40 per cent, resulting in a minimum sample size of 145. In the same way, the minimum size of the sample for La Paz was set at 137 based on a maximum variance of 35 per cent. The two-step method combined with cluster was used for both the Danubio Azul and La Paz settlements. I conducted two different household counts; one for house owners and the other for tenants, and from each household list, households were selected both randomly and systematically with the same interval but with a different initial number. For the household surveys conducted in the other three settlements (Diana Turbay, Jerusalén, and Juan José Rondón), this two-step method combined with cluster was applied in the same manner.

Whether the combined with cluster method is more precise and reliable than the two-step simple systematic method should be questioned. Sometimes the information inhabitants provided about home ownership was not reliable, resulting in errors in household counts.<sup>22</sup>

#### PROBLEMS WITH APPLICATION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

As mentioned earlier, the main aims of conducting a questionnaire survey were threefold: to describe the socio-economic nature of the inhabitants, investigate the level of community participation in collective self-help actions and explore perspectives on the role of JACs and the institutional intervention of other social agencies from the

---

<sup>22</sup> I discovered that owner occupants would often deny the presence of tenants in their dwellings, because they were not paying regular property taxes, and feared revealing information to the city authorities. A landowner would be required by law to pay property tax, but they were not paying it, because in many cases they lacked the land title deed.

viewpoint of the inhabitants. Given these aims, the content of the questionnaire focused on the following themes:

1. Household structure, ownership of the housing lot; socio-economic characterization of the household heads and their partners (migrant experience, sociodemographic characterisation, education level, employment and income level)
2. Physical condition of the house
3. Provision of public services
4. Needs suggested by the inhabitants
5. Recognition and evaluation of institutional intervention
6. Evaluation of the community actions and the role of JACs
7. Self-evaluation of community participation of the inhabitants themselves
8. Perspective on community participation

To measure levels of community participation I used specific criteria such as: attendance at routine meetings of community-based organisations (CBOs), participation in demonstrations or protests, participation in communal work, knowledge of community leaders and community activities, affiliation with subgroups involved with community activities, and an individual's appraisal of his/her level of motivation for participation in community action.

The household survey was conducted by way of direct interviews at doorsteps or inside homes. The questionnaire was filled in by the interviewer (either myself or a hired interviewer) during the interview. Two assistant supervisors and I supervised the survey on site. After returning from the field each time, we organised the collected data and reviewed it critically. When errors or missing values were found, they had to be dealt with as soon as possible either by a second visit or by a telephone call, if such was available. After all these screening processes, the open answers were codified into groups in order of ascending frequency.

The pilot survey revealed some problems with the questionnaire. First, I realised that

some of the references to community-based organisations (CBOs) and activities were too specific and not relevant. The questions on knowledge, attendance at meetings, and affiliation with community-based organisations were modified to refer to broader categories of community-based organisations. Second, the question ‘Why did people not participate in community action?’ had been repeated several times, which was confusing and annoying to interviewees. The duplication was removed and the question repositioned toward the end of the questions about performance and opinions about community participation (see Appendix C for the final version of questionnaire).

In general, I had to admit that there were limitations to the effectiveness of the quantitative method in measuring levels of community participation, and this problem could not be resolved by modification of the questionnaire. The questionnaire strategy, from the outset, is limited to measuring only levels that can be evaluated quantitatively. In the questionnaire, I included quantifiers, like frequency of meeting attendance and records of various categories of community action. The judgement of the informant in answering these questions could sometimes be influenced by the options given in the questionnaire. Secondly, the meaning of ‘community participation’ is ambiguous and interpretations varied; the feasibility of evaluating this concept properly via questionnaire proved limited. Some informants could not understand the concept, even though they had participated in some of the community actions listed on the questionnaire. Interpretations varied from one informant to another. People used various terms—*comunidad* (community), *entre ellos mismos* (among themselves [community leaders]), *nosotros mismos* (among ourselves), *entre vecinos* (among we neighbours)—in referring to the actors that took the initiative in carrying out what we called ‘community-based action’. In actual practice and in interpreting the questionnaire, I took the words expressed by the people at face value. The only thing that seemed to be clear was that the people distinguished clearly between ‘the JAC leaders’ and ‘we neighbours ourselves’ or ‘we the community’ (*el resto, o los habitantes en general*).



Basically, the questionnaire was designed to collect information about the ‘performance’ of residents vis-à-vis community-based actions (attendance at meetings, demonstrations, ‘civil strikes’, communal work, etc.). Statistical data obtained through the questionnaire was poor in the ‘numeric’ sense. Even though the style of the questions was designed to be open to multiple answers, in the brief span of the interview it was difficult to expect the informant to accurately recall the various incidents in the settlement and his actions or reactions to them. In addition, the attempt to determine the degree of ‘participation’ through questions about the degree of commitment to various community actions—meetings, protests, and the like—was questionable. We wrote down what people said they had done, but it did not clearly demonstrate their level of motivation or initiative in any instance.

Another limitation found in the questionnaire survey related to data collection on the activities of ‘other types of CBOs, except for JACs’ and the inhabitants’ participation in those activities. The questionnaire survey failed to capture much information on this matter. The main reason was that these organisations did not have any formalities required for confirmation of membership as in the case of JACs. Community-based activities organised beyond the level of the settlement (i.e., cross-settlement community-based activities coordinated over a wider area, for example, by Catholic priests), were not detected sufficiently either, since the geographical reference was limited to the study settlement. Most of the informants did not distinguish conceptually between NGOs and other institutions like foundations or religious organisations. Even though they did recognise the presence of these NGOs, sometimes they did not consider their function to be a part of community-based activities. This point was not captured by the questionnaire.

## QUALITATIVE METHODS (SEMI-STRUCTURED AND NON-STRUCTURED IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS)

The qualitative analysis was based on various research methods. My first and major strategy was the conducting of in-depth (semi-structured) interviews with selected inhabitants who had already cooperated with the household survey. These interviews aimed to gather more detailed information on their past and present commitment to and perspective on community participation as well as their evaluation of the involvement of outside institutions regarding service delivery and other community-based projects. Interviewees were selected from among owner-occupants who had a basic knowledge of community activities and leaders, independent of their level of community participation as indicated in the survey. Tenant inhabitants who had a relatively detailed knowledge of current community activities were also interviewed. On average, 9 to 10 people per settlement were interviewed for this purpose (see Appendix B.2 for a list of interviewees).

Second, in-depth interviews (open or focused on specific topics) were conducted with community leaders, local politicians interested in or already intervening in the studied settlements, officers or technical staff of the public service agencies and other district administration agencies relevant to the studied settlements, as well as representatives of NGOs, the Catholic Church, religious groups, etc.

Third, observations of events or key scenarios closely connected with inter-institutional relations between the community, CBOs, local governments or local public agencies, NGOs, and politicians were recorded.

The in-depth interviews were utilised, partly for fact-finding but mainly for qualitative analysis regarding the interviewees' perspectives on community participation and institutional intervention that could not be learned from the survey. The content of the in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants was analysed with

particular reference to the following points.

Focus 1: new incidents, new interpretations of institutional intervention, performance in community actions, relation of such actions to the community and the District authorities.

Focus 2: interviewees' perspective on community participation; and on institutional (state, politician-led, NGO) intervention.

Focus 3: interviewees' evaluation of the leadership of the community based on their identification of community leaders including, or by, their personal traits.

Focus 4: Recognition of intervention of other agencies, not reflected in the household survey.

From the testimony received about the attitudes of each leader, I sought to analyse his/her political aspirations, capacity to influence/manipulate people in the community, and strategy for utilising both political power and pressure in order to improve living conditions in the settlement.

In order to measure the relationship between households, the state, and other social institutions, I considered who took the initiative, who took responsibility, how roles were demarcated in the execution process, and who was in charge of maintenance afterwards. In order to investigate the real level of 'participation' of inhabitants in any so-called community-based project (*proyecto con participación comunitaria*), I asked about the involvement of the community in the following processes: negotiation, decision-making, execution, feedback, and maintenance and/or monitoring.

The interviewees for the semi-structured in-depth interviews for each settlement were selected from the sample used for the household survey.<sup>23</sup> The following selection criteria were applied: 1) a fairly long period of residence in the settlement (the period of reference is 10 years for an owner-occupant and 2 years for a tenant); and 2)

---

<sup>23</sup> The number of interviewees for Jerusalén is twice that of others, since it includes the cases conducted in the sample of the pilot survey in Potosí-La Isla. As the content of the interviews was judged relevant, I decided to use it as material for qualitative analysis.

accessibility and availability of time to receive the interviewer. In addition, the geographical distance between the interviewees was a concern in order to make the selection of the cases representative of the study settlement and avoid a concentration of interviews in one or two sections of the settlement. Most of the case settlements have more than 1 sector, so I tried to select equal numbers of interviewees from different sectors. Both the household head and his/her partner were requested to attend the interview where possible.

Appendix D lists the questions introduced in the semi-structured interview. The questions were not always asked in the same order during the interview. The purpose of the interviews was not to analyse the discourse or contents but to reveal information and insights associated with the testimony received.

Many questions included in the interviews were only asked in order to confirm or expand the content of the household survey. So, in the first instance, the in-depth interviews were used to obtain information which could not be elicited in the household survey due to the limitations of its format. For example, questions such as (0): about the history of migrant movement; (1) the process of moving into the settlement; (2) the process of dwelling construction by the self-help method were helpful in gathering more evidence regarding how people had moved into the settlement and how they had fostered solidarity in the initial stages of community participation. These would create the history of the settlement, clarifying the origins of the urbanisation, the process of land occupation and the agencies involved in the process (private developer, intermediary, political intervention, etc.).

The second and main aim of the interviews was to explore the facts not revealed or sufficiently explained in the household survey. These concerned institutional intervention other than that of the JACs; the inter-institutional relations involved in the regularisation process of the settlement from the viewpoint of the inhabitants and their own interpretation of community participation. Questions such as (3) to (6), and (9) and

(10) were helpful in achieving this purpose. Some sought to clarify the initiative of the community in negotiations with the District authorities and the others were intended to explore other types of intervention such as that by politicians and NGOs. After reviewing the results of the household survey I added Questions (7) and (8) which were new topics that now appeared relevant. Questions (12) and (13) aimed to reinterpret the concept of inhabitant participation and 'empowerment of the community'. Through these questions I discovered that some of the concepts in the household survey were sometimes open to misinterpretation.

Some interviews were interesting, providing a great deal of valuable and relevant information to supplement that obtained in the survey. Others, however, revealed very little, eliciting nothing but ambiguities. I conducted ten interviews per study settlement on average, in which rarely more than three or four at the maximum were really useful to the analysis. Interviews with tenants were generally poorer in information about incidents as well as community actions compared with those of owner-occupants. The duration of the interviews varied considerably. Those with tenants were normally finished after around 30 minutes, while those with owner-occupants lasted from one to three hours, with 90 minutes being the average.

I faced two main problems in conducting the in-depth interviews: reliability of the information and confusion over concepts. First of all, it became clear that some of the facts provided by the interviewees were not necessarily correct. The gap between what the interviewees said and the truth was the result of both poor recollections of the events concerned and of a deliberate intention to mislead. Indeed, the facts narrated in the in-depth interviews were not always coherent and sometimes did not even correspond to participants' original answers in the household survey. Some of the mistakes in the facts given by the informants could be corrected by crosschecking with other sources of information (for example, the year of the first election of JAC leaders). I discovered that some informants would deliberately give fictitious information in order to hide his/her

own opinion or role or would pretend not to have been involved in a particular activity for personal reasons. However, in some cases, I received more than two different versions of a story about one incident that occurred in the study settlement and I could not find any reliable evidence to support either of them. The reliability of the information provided by my informants, therefore, was sometimes questionable. However, this did not mean that the content (facts) recorded in the in-depth interviews was not relevant. This fictionalised history shows the inhabitants' attitudes toward the issues of community participation, which were an important part of the interview questions.

The second problem concerned the conceptual confusion between what I meant as interviewer and how the interviewee perceived what I said. I had not intended to carry out any sort of discourse analysis on the concepts used by the inhabitants. However, in trying to explore the inhabitants' views about community participation and institutional intervention I found I had to analyse their own interpretations of the key concepts of my main interest. I paid special attention to such concepts as, 'participation', 'autonomy' and 'empowerment' (which in Spanish was expressed as 'expansion of the space of negotiation in favour of the community'). During the interviews, I realised that what I meant by these concepts as an interviewer was taken in different ways by the interviewees. I learned that, although the answer in a literal sense was the same, the inhabitants' real actions were sometimes different. However, my recognition of this gap between the expression (conceptual interpretation) and their actions in practice was useful in improving the qualitative analysis of the content of the in-depth interviews (see chapter 6 for details).

Another set of semi-structured interviews was carried out with public officials or personnel in certain institutions. They were identified as 'involved institutions' either in the survey or in the interviews with the households (see Appendices B for further details). There were two main objectives in holding these interviews. First, the facts or

incidents registered in these interviews served as a counterweight to the findings of the household interviews, by either supporting them or raising further questions. Second, they helped to explore perspectives on community-based development schemes for low-income settlements from the viewpoint of outside institutions.

Key personalities—either politicians or councillors who had gained political influence in the area of informal settlements—were interviewed in order to understand their past and current involvement in the physical and social development of these settlements. Some of the community-based activities that were carried out by subdivisions of political parties were also investigated in order to gather relevant information concerning the commitment of political parties to the social development of self-help settlements.

#### ETHICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE FIELDWORK

##### **Positionality in development research**

The motivation which led me to focus on community participation at *barrio* level derived from my previous experience of studying urban poverty when I was working as a researcher for a state-funded development research institution in Japan, called IDE (Institute of Developing Economies). The dominant ethos at the Institute was that development research should explore the nature of important socio-economic and political problems in developing countries, such as inequality, injustice, corruption and social conflict, with the aim of identifying solutions. I have great sympathy with the belief that development research should provide the public and the relevant policy making agencies with 'correct' information, empirically analysed in order to solve social problems. In addition I believe that one of the principal roles of an academic from the North is to use their empirical research to provide appropriate resources not only to the policy makers of the North but also to those of the Southern countries which are the

subject of the research. In order to gather adequate information about the problems within particular local contexts, both a macro-and a micro-level approach are required.

### *The importance of considering local opinions*

I came to place more emphasis on the importance of including local people's perspectives in my study when I recognised that state officials and local people interpreted the concept of community participation in very different ways (as mentioned on page 110). This was the direct reason for my emphasis on the local perspective. However, in addition, the emphasis placed by several authors on the importance of considering local views in development research also encouraged me to include local people's narratives in my analysis.

Chambers' (1997, 2002) argument that we should recognise local people's capacity to appraise their own needs gave me the initial impetus to examine the real practices of community participation in development projects. Turner's affirmation of people's alternative solutions through 'self-help housing' and 'vernacular' technology was fundamental for me to understand the collective self-help struggle of the *barrio* people in the initial stage of occupation (Turner, 1976; Turner, John F. C. and Robert Fichter, 1972). From Sen (1987, 1992, 2002) I learned how important it was to focus on the priorities of local people and to comprehend their understanding of rationality.<sup>24</sup>

Critiques of conventional development theory written by various Japanese scholars' also led me to rethink the so-called mainstream arguments on development. Tsurumi's (1979) critique of modernisation theory led her to create an alternative theory, 'endogenous development'. This theory highlights the capacity of local people to create their own process of development based on their cultural and traditional values. Murai's work on 'alternatives from local people' (1982) criticised the way in which market-driven economic development in the South failed to consider the ecological and

---

<sup>24</sup> Kaufman ed. (2006) includes useful arguments and a critical review of Sen's capability theory.



cultural elements of local society. These arguments stimulated me to approach the issue of urban poverty by embracing the differing perspectives of the local people.

The importance of including the local perspectives of ordinary people in development analysis is also suggested by development ethics theorists (see Clark, 2002: 834, for example). The most significant insight I gained from my reading of these theorists (Clark, 2002; Gasper, 2004; Crocker, 1991; Goulet, 1983, 1995) was that we should try to be free from the 'given' understanding of the mainstream concept of development issues (that is the 'given meaning of community participation in this case) and re-consider its meaning once applied in the determined locale within its particular context.

These were the key points which were central to my research and formed the background to my approach to the local people and their daily practices.

### **My position as an 'outsider' and its limitations**

In the field I tried to make myself as 'neutral' as possible. Here, being neutral means keeping a distance from any political groups in the community and from any external agencies committed to the community. On my first contact with any local people, I clarified my personal position as an individual doing PhD research without any intention to execute any concrete aid projects. This clarification was crucial in avoiding misunderstanding or confusion among the local people.

Sometimes the local people were mistrustful of my presence as a stranger, but after clarifying my position they normally understood and opened the door. Most of the people I interviewed did not have any problems or reject me after this declaration.

Despite trying to be 'neutral' in the field, I felt that my presence as a stranger and foreign researcher had an effect on the respondents. Some were reluctant to openly discuss their personal experiences, although whether they would have been more open with Colombian interviewers of a different social class is not entirely clear. Their attitudes to me were slightly different from those towards local people, including my

assistants. However, after several visits, when the same respondents gained more confidence in their relationship with me, they became less reserved and gave more detailed information. Some spoke openly about private issues from the beginning, presumably believing that it would not matter if I knew of their personal problems or sensitive issues relevant to local society, because after all I was a stranger and would soon be gone. Others, who wanted to 'sell' their poverty to promote the international aid they believed was coming, deliberately exaggerated their 'poor' situation. Some of these people, who clearly associated my presence with a Japanese aid organisation, asked me to let them have some of my personal contacts. On these occasions, I reiterated my current position as a researcher and PhD. student, and explained that the result of the study would be used to finish my dissertation. I was absolutely clear that I should not be able to offer any aid concrete projects, nor try to influence policy makers in my country.

Clearly then, my presence as an outsider would always affect the attitude of the local people to a greater or lesser extent. There was no perfect guarantee of the reliability of the data in the narratives, although gaining the confidence of the interviewees was essential to improving the quality of the data as much as its reliability. Building a *rapport* with the interviewees during the interviews was indispensable in allowing me to ask for a repeat visit if necessary.

Although it was not my intention, local people's perception of my presence inevitably led to me being identified as in some way related to certain groups or factions in the settlements. I sometimes had difficulty in approaching community leaders who belonged to rival factions. Some community leaders were open-minded, but others were quite sceptical and reserved. Some of the community leaders were not willing to be interviewed. In the worst case, an interview was rejected. This occurred partly because, although I identified myself as being in a neutral position, I was thought to be a

sympathiser or supporter of another group hostile to the person I sought to interview.<sup>25</sup> This experience brought home to me the argument that 'value free' research is almost impossible (Gold, 2002: 224). Although I identified myself as belonging to 'nowhere', I did not feel wholly free from my own value judgements, when I came across 'unjust' incidents or conflicts between X and Y sects in the community.

With respect to the household survey, only one or two households refused to answer in each settlement. The rate of rejection by households selected for in-depth structured interviews was negligible.

### **Confidentiality of the data collected**

I told each interviewee that the household questionnaire was for statistical use and the individual information was confidential. Informants' names and addresses were filled in on the questionnaire only in order to identify the household when the case was selected for the further in-depth interview. This identification was useful when we had to come back to the same household to correct the information given in the first visit.

In-depth interviews were only recorded if the interviewee gave permission. Recording was suspended when requested, but I was always permitted to take notes.

If I needed to quote the contents of interviews with the staff of public institutions, I only identified the interviewee by their position within the institution if the quotation referred to public information. I did not identify anyone who was giving a personal opinion. In the case of interviews with the inhabitants of case study settlements, the interviewees' names were changed or reduced to Christian names to protect privacy. I also took photographs of the interviewees of local communities whenever I was permitted in order to remember the atmosphere of the interview. A copy of the photographs was offered to the interviewee and it was always received with pleasure. I

---

<sup>25</sup> I was unable to conduct an interview with one of the ex-community leaders of Potosí-La Isla, because I had been given a reference to her from the leader of another group, through whom I had first contacted the community, but the two groups were rivals and had had a conflictive relationship for years.

did not use these photographs as materials for the thesis, simply because I did not intend to do that, nor did I ask for permission to use them.

In the narratives of the interviews I found many details which were too sensitive to be repeated such as those regarding to sexual abuse, crimes and acts committed by leftist guerrilla groups. These data were restricted in order to protect the personal security of the interviewees. Issues concerning internal community conflicts which were officially documented in the *barrio* files of the DAAC as legal suits and well known publicly are described in the text of the thesis.

### **My contribution to the communities and feedback from them**

After finishing the first data analysis of the household survey, I made a brief summary of the data collected and gave a couple of copies to selected leaders in each settlement with whom I had established a special *rapport*. I had also a group discussion with some of the community leaders at one of the settlements after I conducted the household survey and they gave me some useful feedback. Unfortunately I could not arrange the same group discussion with other settlements, due to the difficulty of arranging a mutually convenient time with the leaders. The reaction and interest of the community leaders varied, as the nature of leadership and the level of academic comprehension of my research was different. Some leaders consulted my document carefully and discussed it with other JAC colleagues in order to think about further strategies for community activities. Others just gave the document to one of the NGO activists involved in the settlements as a reference resource.

Whilst I have attempted to make the findings useful to the local people, I nonetheless have limited control over the readership of the results. Because of this, Brydon (2006, 27) highlights the importance of keeping fieldwork results and similar documents anonymous, particularly when a researcher resorts to participatory research. However, this presents a dilemma if we return to the debate about ethics. Strict anonymity maybe

fair when the documented incidents might harm somebody. On the other hand, if the local people expect a concrete contribution in terms of returning systematised local knowledge and a history of the barrio , (and I do hope to respond to this request), identification of the barrio gives the document more legitimacy for them. I sympathise with Cloke et al.(2000), when they argue that it is necessary to disseminate the findings in a way which has more of an impact in favour of those local people who were involved in the research. As such, I included the real name of the barrios I studied and also used the real names of the local politicians who were publicly identified in the city administration. My decision to use real names in the thesis was intended to demonstrate the authenticity of the findings, although when, occasionally, there were any confidentiality issues I did not use real names.

My aim in this thesis was to use a holistic method to understand the nature of state-community relationships from the point of view of the local people. The combination of a household survey and in-depth interviews was critical in this regard. While certain ethical and positionality issues arose as a result of following this approach, I tried always to respond to these issues in a sensitive way.

## **CHAPTER 3**

### **THE EXPANSION OF IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT AND THE URBAN MANAGEMENT IN BOGOTÁ TO THE 1980s**

After 1950, Bogotá's population growth accelerated and housing became more socially segregated. The poor became more concentrated in irregular settlements located in the south and southwest. These settlements have presented special challenges for the city's administration ever since. This chapter will present an overview of the expansion of irregular settlement, comparing the process in Bogotá with that in other major Latin American cities. It will show the relationship between the market, the city authorities and the community in Bogotá up to the end of the 1980s and consider why the poor settled on land which was sold through illegal methods. The discussion then describes the way the authorities sought first to control and later to integrate these settlements into the formal structure of the city. Finally, it considers the reactions of the residents—seen through community-based organisations—to the city's integration efforts.

#### **BOGOTÁ'S ROLE AS THE CAPITAL CITY**

During the colonial period Bogotá developed as a trading centre for gold and silver, although not located near a mining area. After independence from Spain, it became the capital city, with the principal institutions of the national government of Colombia gathered there. Bogotá continued to serve as the centre of administration and commerce, while Medellín, currently the second-largest city, developed as the country's industrial centre (Mejía, 1999; Vargas and Zambrano, 1988).

Colombia never had the acute primacy which was characteristic of most Latin American countries. Colombia has long had a relatively balanced urban population distribution compared with countries where much of the urban population is

concentrated in the capital city, such as Santiago, Buenos Aires and Mexico City. As Gilbert (1975: 245) notes:

[I]n 1973, [the] Colombian city system was close to the ‘ideal’ distribution whereby the largest city was approximately twice the size of the second city, three times the size of the third and n times the size of the nth largest city. Colombia today has four major cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, and Bogotá’s index of urban primacy (population of the first city / the sum of population of the following three cities in terms of population size) has been until recently the lowest in the region. Data estimates for 1990 show that the primacy index of Bogotá was 1.2. This compares with a primacy index of 3.5 for Buenos Aires, 2.9 for Santiago, 2.0 for Mexico City and 4.2 for Lima (Villa and Rodríguez, 1996).

Although the urban system in Colombia remained relatively balanced, concentration of population in Bogotá has intensified since the 1950s due to the increase of rural-urban migration (Camacho de Pinto, 1970; Cardona, 1976; Rodríguez, 1967). Bogotá’s population growth began to accelerate in the late 1930s and by 1973 its share of the total population had risen to 12.5 per cent. By then, the annual population growth rate of Bogotá was more than twice that of the national population (see Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Population of Colombia, urban area and Bogotá (1938-2005)

Year	Colombia as whole		Urban area		Bogotá D.C.		
	Population (thousands) (a)	Annual growth (%)	Population (thousands) (b)	Share (b)/(a)(%) (urbanisation ratio)	Population (thousands) (b)	Share (b)/(a) (%)	Annual growth (%)
1938	8,555	-	2,643	30.8	332	3.9	-
1951	11,229	2.1	4,446	39.6	715	6.4	6.1
1964	17,485	3.4	9,092	52.0	1,697	9.7	6.9
1973	22,862	2.7	13,548	59.2	2,861	12.5	4.5
1985	30,062	2.3	19,628	65.3	4,236	14.1	3.3
1993	37,635	2.8	25,848	68.6	5,484	14.6	3.3
2005	42,090	0.9	31,566	75.0	6,778	16.1	1.6

Source: DANE, *Censo nacional de población*, Bogotá, 1964, 1973, 1985 and 1993.

Data from 1973 to 2005 were taken from the table uploaded onto the DANE web page as adjusted data after analysis of the latest census in 2005 (<http://www.dane.gov.co/>, accessed 29 November 2006.)

Since the 1970s the metropolitanisation of Bogotá in terms of the population increase of the surrounding municipalities in Cundinamarca department has become evident.<sup>1</sup> Table 3.2 illustrates this phenomenon. The annual growth ratio of the population of the municipalities inside the Bogotá metropolitan area became remarkably higher than that of Bogotá since the period of the census between 1985 and 1993. This suggests that the space for urban development within Bogotá District is almost exhausted and the march of urbanisation is now heading towards the surrounding municipalities (see also Misión XXI, 1995).

Table 3.2 Population and annual growth ratio of Bogotá metropolitan area

Year	Population (thousands)			Annual growth ratio (%)		
	Bogotá D.C.(1)	Municipalities of Cundinamarca in the metropolitan area(2)	Metropolitan area as whole	Bogotá D.C.(1)	Municipalities of Cundimarca in the metropolitan area(2)	Metropolitan area as whole
1951	715	112	827	-	-	-
1964	1,697	174	1,871	6.9	3.4	6.5
1973	2,530	232	2,762	4.5	3.3	4.4
1985	3,548	366	3,914	2.8	2.4	2.9
1993	4,945	636	5,581	4.2	7.1	4.5
2005	6,776	1,088	7,864	2.4	4.3	2.7

Source: DANE, 'Datos de censos de población y estudios temáticos', 2006, mimeo.

(1) The population data for Bogotá D.C. are different from those in Table 3.1, as the data are taken from different DANE sources.

(2) These municipalities are Bojacá, Cajicá, Chía, Cota, Facatativa, Funza, Gachancipá, La Calera, Madrid, Mosquera, Sibaté, Soacha, Sopó, Tabio, Tenjo, Tocancipá and Zipaquirá.

Medellín and Cali had rivalled Bogotá as major metropolitan centres throughout most of Colombia's history, but by the end of the 1950s, Bogotá was generating more manufacturing jobs than any other city (Gilbert, 1996). As the nation's capital, it has attracted a growing influx of people from all over the country.

<sup>1</sup> The residential area stretches continuously between Bogotá District and some of the neighbouring municipalities of Cundinamarca Department (state). The settlement of 'Altos de Cazuca' is a typical example of this phenomenon. The settlement extends seamlessly over the technical boundary between Ciudad Bolívar locality and Soacha municipality. Gilbert (1996) includes Soacha municipality as part of Bogotá's population from 1964.



Bogotá's population growth has been closely related to the capital's increasing importance as the economic centre of the country. The high ratio of population growth in the period 1951 to 1964 was partly attributable to the influx of migrants fleeing violence in neighbouring provinces (1948-1958). However, the main reason for population growth in this period was that labour migration toward the capital city was encouraged by the policies of the national government. These policies were aimed at stimulating industrialisation, thereby promoting the development of urban areas. In 1954, Bogotá became a Special District and gained juridical autonomy under Decree 17, privileging it politically and administratively. Bogotá became a separate electoral area, sending its own representatives to the national Congress. It became administratively autonomous from the Department of Cundinamarca and obtained more control over its own budget (Gilbert, 1996: 262). The basic structure of city administration, including the establishment of the major public service companies, was created in this period. This did not change substantially until the end of the 1980s, that is, until the institutional reforms accompanying promulgation of the New Constitution in 1991. These factors helped the city to develop as a centre of manufacturing and other economic activity. Its share of the gross national product rose from 6.3 per cent in 1938 to 32.3 per cent in 1988 (Cuervo, 1991). Its share of employment in the nation's manufacturing sector also grew from 16.8 per cent in 1945 to 32.3 per cent in 1988 (DANE, 1989), making it not only an administrative and commercial pivot but an industrial centre as well. Bogotá became increasingly dominant among the country's industrial cities (including Medellín and Cali) both in terms of population and economic output, especially after 1964 (Gilbert, 1975; Jaramillo and Cuervo, 1987; Cuervo and González, 1997).

Like any political and administrative centre experiencing rapid industrial development, Bogotá became the target of in-migration, which fed the increased demand for labour. For example, McGreevey (1974: 394) points out, 'About 65 per cent of the growth of the four largest cities is explained by the net inflow of migrants in the

1938-1951 period. The percentage of migrants in total growth was even higher (67 per cent) in the succeeding intercensal period, 1951-1964.' In fact, in the case of Bogotá, the population increased from 638,562 in 1951 to 1,661,562 in 1964. Of those 1,023,000 new habitants, 724,526 were categorised as net migration. Thus, 70.8 per cent of the increase was a social increase as a result of migration and the remaining 29.2 per cent was as a result of natural increase (McGreevey, 1974: 403, Table 7).

Changes taking place in Colombia's manufacturing structure in this period favoured the city's growth. New industries such as metal manufacturing, machines, and electrical appliances required complex equipment and advanced technology, which were easier to come by in the bigger cities, handicapping the smaller cities. Gilbert (1975: 251-52) points out that most of the country's largest and most efficient companies were located in the major industrial centres and that the environment of larger cities served to nurture the proliferation of entrepreneurial talent.

By 1964, Bogotá had the highest per capita income of any city in the country. With the concentration of government agencies in Bogotá and the gradual expansion of the central government bureaucracy, major companies began to transfer their headquarters to the city. This move enabled them to reduce the administrative costs associated with commuting between a local city and Bogotá (Gilbert, 1975: 253). In short, access to the government was a major factor explaining the growth of Bogotá. In addition, Bogotá had its own attraction as a cosmopolitan and metropolitan centre for entrepreneurs from other parts of the country.

## URBAN STRUCTURE

Founded by the Spanish in 1538, Bogotá's urban design was similar to that of other Spanish American cities. The Spanish Viceroyalty instructed that cities be built

according to a rectangular grid pattern of streets with the principal plaza in the centre (Mohan 1994). Bogotá grew slowly during the colonial period, and accelerated little following independence in 1810. More rapid expansion only took place toward the end of the nineteenth century.

During the twentieth century, urban expansion occurred along a north–south axis, parallel to the mountains, but was still based on the original grid pattern (Vargas and Zambrano 1988; Violich 1987). The urban area grew more rapidly; in 1900, the city occupied 909 hectares, by 1938, 2,514 hectares (Niño 1996). Table 3.3 shows the increase of Bogotá’s population, urban area and density during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Between 1938 and 1985 Bogotá’s urban area increased significantly, expanding to over 32,000 hectares.<sup>2</sup>

Table 3.3 Population density and growth of urban area

Year	Population(000s)	Area (hectares)	Density
1900	100	909	110
1928	235	1,958	120
1938	330	2,514	131
1964	1,730	14,615	118
1985	4,177	32,866	127
1991	4,960	30,300	164
2005*	n.a.	30,736	n.a.

Source: Gilbert, 1996: 96, Table 4.12. Data on urban area for 2005 is taken from Bogotá City website (<http://www.alcaldiabogota.gov.co/>, accessed 31 May 2006).

The physical characteristics of Bogotá’s urban growth also changed. Until the 1970s the city had expanded largely in a north-south direction. From around that time, the newly developed areas began expanding westward and the regular grid pattern of streets was not propagated. Moreover, residential stratification by income level became

<sup>2</sup> The reason why the urban area reduced from 1985 to 1991 is not known. Probably the different methodology was used.

entrenched during this period (Mohan, 1994). Gilbert and Ward (1982: 103) described this phenomenon as follows:

The poor live mainly in the south and north-west, the rich in the north, with middle-income groups living in between. Needless to say, the affluent suburbs are well planned, with green zones, good services, wide, paved roads and street lighting. The low-income *barrios* are poorly serviced and are located closest to the centres of pollution, flooding and heavy traffic. There is also an important difference with respect to their legal position. The upper-and middle-income sectors live in architect-designed houses located in fully serviced urbanized areas which comply with the city's planning regulations. Most of the poor live in settlements which fail to satisfy the planning regulations and are therefore technically illegal.

Bogotá's urban and industrial growth after the 1950s, in short, was accompanied by the establishment of an unequal society. Its physical expansion, moreover, was marked by clear residential segregation by income level (Amato, 1969). Those who could not afford even the low-income sector residential area had no choice but to settle on unserviced land, which led to the expansion of the irregular settlements.

#### INEQUALITY AND RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION

Although Bogotá became Colombia's richest city, it continued to suffer, like most Latin American cities, from unemployment, poverty, poor quality housing and inequality.

Table 3.3 shows that Bogotá has scored over 80 in both the quality of life and human development indices since the late 1990s. These data mean that Bogotá has a high level of human development, according to the UNDP's classification.<sup>3</sup> However, during the

---

<sup>3</sup> According to the worldwide ranking by Human Development Index (HDI) in 2003, those countries with HDI upper than 80.0 are ranked in the first 57 countries over 177. The average HDI for the countries which are classified as 'high human development' is 89.5 while the same figure for those classified as 'medium human development' is 71.8. Compared with these data, the score of Bogotá in 2003 is judged as high human development (<http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/indicators>, accessed

same period, over 40 per cent of the population were living in poverty. In 2003, 48.1 per cent of the total population of Bogotá was classified as living below the poverty line, and 14.6 per cent as living 'in misery' (DANE household survey, as registered at <http://endatos.redbogota.com>, accessed 28 December 2005). Approximately one million inhabitants were living in misery, of which 60 per cent were concentrated in the south of the city (Bogotá cómo vamos and PNDH, 2005). In 1985, the poorest 20 per cent of the population received only 4 per cent of the city's income, while the top 10 per cent of the population received 37 per cent (López, 1990a: 41). Similar figures are not available for more recent years but the Gini coefficient can provide useful indications. The Gini coefficient for Bogotá has been above 0.5 since 1997 and was 0.56 in 2003 and 0.55 in 2004 (<http://endatos.redbogota.com/>, accessed 28 December 2005) (Table 3.3). These figures suggest that Bogotá has been a very unequal society since 1997 and is becoming more so.

Table 3.4 Quality of life and poverty indices in Bogotá, 1996-2004

Year	Quality of life index	Index of human development	Gini Coefficient	Percentage of population below poverty line
1996	n.a.	83.6	n.a.	n.a.
1997	86.50	82.8	50.0	40.5
1998	87.71	82.6	55.0	47.3
1999	86.57	81.1	55.3	48.7
2000	86.89	81.3	56.7	53.7
2001	n.a.	81.7	55.5	54.6
2002	88.69	81.4	59.3	50.9
2003	88.43	82.5	56.0	48.1
2004	89.57	83.3	55.3	43.4

Source: Bogotá cómo vamos and PNDH (2005), taken from Gilbert (2006).

The limited labour opportunities in the formal sector affected the lives of huge numbers

---

30 May, 2006).

of urban poor and exacerbated the acute inequality between different strata of society. During the 1960s and 1970s, manufacturing production continued to increase, but jobs did not grow at the same rate. While there were limited opportunities for work in the formal sector in spite of increased demand; employment opportunities in the informal sector<sup>4</sup> began to expand. According to data for 1978, 60.6 per cent of employment in the commercial sector and 58.5 per cent of employment in the service sector were provided by firms employing fewer than five employees, that is, by the informal sector (Mohan, 1981). In addition, among the self-employed or in family businesses, 'a large percentage are in construction and domestic work and therefore tend to be temporary' (Lee, 1989: 15). From these data, it can be estimated that at least half of workers in the commerce and service sectors in Bogotá were in the so-called informal sector in 1978.

This trend continued in the 1980s. A survey conducted by DANE in June 1986 showed that 49.6 per cent of all employment in Bogotá was categorised as being in the informal sector (López, 1990a). In 2004, around 1.5 million people were considered to be working in the informal sector, which corresponded to almost half of all employed persons (<http://endatos.redbogota.com>, accessed 28 December 2005).

By the late 1960s, the population increase in Bogotá resulting from rural-urban migration was greater than the capacity of the city government to provide housing and related infrastructure. The housing deficit for the lower-income sector (the poor) soon became critical. Those who could not afford to pay rent in the slums of inner city tenements and those who came to need more space to house their families were forced to find an alternative. The best alternative many people found was to build houses themselves on cheap, unserviced land available beyond the urban perimeter (within this perimeter the city administration stipulated that public services must be provided properly; see below for details). These dwellings were what grew into the so-called

---

<sup>4</sup> Here the informal sector is defined as including all of the following four groups of workers: self-employed; employees of establishments which employ fewer than five persons; unpaid family workers; and workers in domestic services (housekeeping work in individual households).

irregular settlements of Bogotá.

#### THE ORIGIN OF THE IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS

Housing in Bogotá generally falls into one of three categories: the formal private housing market, low-cost housing provided by the national and district housing authorities and self-help housing. The last developed both on land developed by unauthorised brokers and was acquired through invasion (Vérnez, 1973; Gilbert, 1981b; Gilbert and Ward, 1982). By the early 1970s, roughly 40 per cent of the housing stock was formal private housing, another 10 per cent was public housing and the rest was self-help housing. It is difficult to give an exact figure for the amount of pirate urbanisation, but different authors have tried to provide an estimate. For example, Vérnez (1973) estimated that in 1970 about 46 per cent of the total number of families in Bogotá resided in illegal housing settlements, most of which were built by pirate urbanisation while in 1973 Arias calculated that 59 per cent of the total population of Bogotá was living in pirate settlements (Arias, 1974, quoted in Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 103).

Most of the self-help housing had been created on land bought from unauthorised brokers commonly known as *urbanizadores piratas*, or subdividers. Very few homes in Bogotá were located on land that was invaded. The ICT 1972 survey found that the area of settlements created by invasion was only 0.7 per cent of the total housing in Bogotá. Gilbert and Ward counted 21 invasions in relation to 800 to 900 settlements in all in Bogotá (Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 105).

Pirate urbanisers used all manner of illegal and devious means to develop settlements, sometimes in agreement with landowners, sometimes acting unilaterally.<sup>5</sup> They rarely

---

<sup>5</sup> After 'selling' the land to settlers, the brokers sometimes vanished, and 'violent incidents, including homicide' sometimes resulted from the frictions between the land brokers and settlers left in charge

provided any services or infrastructure, beyond the occasional standpipes to which each household could connect via a simple garden hose. Although pirate urbanisers usually laid out the settlements in a grid iron network, subsequent re-sale processes modified this layout. In addition, public spaces such as green zones, land for school construction and community halls were not always reserved as rigidly as city regulations on urban development required. In some cases they had decent sized roads, but in others only narrow internal roads threaded between the dwellings and no paved roads were provided (Blaesser, 1981; Mohan, 1994). The character of the land market in Bogotá is thus different from Lima, Santiago and Caracas, where most of the irregular settlements were established by invasion of public land. In Colombia itself, Bogotá also differed from cities such as Cali and Ibagué, where land invasion was more common (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).

Several studies (Vérnez, 1973; Gilbert and Ward, 1982; Zorro and Gilbert, 1982) have discussed the reasons why there was less land invasion in Bogotá. Gilbert and Ward suggest the following:

Firstly, the poor have the alternative of the pirate urbanization. Whatever the advantages of land invasion in terms of cost, a pirate urbanization is physically safer and tenure is more or less assured. Given that there is no tradition of invasion as in some other cities, pirate urbanization serves as a safety valve by offering large numbers of people land at relatively low prices. Secondly, politicians have not on the whole sought to encourage land invasion in Bogotá. Only one opposition Communist group has consistently sought political support through the invasion process, encouraging low-income tenants to occupy lands where there is some dispute over title. The major reason why politicians have not encouraged land occupation is that land has a high market value in Bogotá and the State agencies

---

of subcontracted land sales. The conflicts broke out due to the fraudulent practices of land brokers or the settlers in charge of further land sales. Violent incidents also occurred among the settlers over the clandestine 'resale' of housing lots. (Testimonies in the in-depth interviews conducted in Danubio Azul, Jerusalén and La Paz settlements; see chapter 5.)



which hold land protect it as firmly as most private owners. In addition, the political system in Bogotá has developed other forms of patronage and ways of winning electoral support (Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 105-06).

There are two further reasons for the low levels of land invasion. Firstly, in Colombian law, legal sanctions on land invasion are extremely strict, discouraging people from seizing or squatting on land, particularly on privately owned land. While the national law in theory is valid throughout the country, its application in practice varies from city to city. In some cities, the police are seldom called to remove invasions (Gilbert and Ward, 1985: 105). In Bogotá, however, police have tended to respond promptly when called on by landowners and are quick to take action to evict invaders. This being the case, illegal as the methods of the informal land market might be,<sup>6</sup> the poor tended to opt for purchase of housing lots from the latter rather than invasion. A second factor is the absence in Bogotá of the custom of community use of public property corresponding, for example, to the *ejido* (indigenous communal) land found in Mexico. Together, these elements resulted in discouraging extensive land invasion in Bogotá (Gilbert, 1981a; Gilbert and Ward, 1982).

Now, why has illegal land sub-division been so persistent? Ultimately, this large informal market offered a reasonable housing solution for the masses of urban poor (Gilbert 1981a). It also served as a safety valve for the poor and prevented them from revolting against the elite sector. From the viewpoint of the city administration, it was an inexpensive solution to the problem of housing for the low-income sector. However, the authorities simultaneously made constant efforts to control illegal land sales. The following section examines how effective those efforts were.

---

<sup>6</sup> As the case studies will show (in chapter 5), it was learned that brokers might or might not have a legitimate right to market the land, making their actions sometimes bold, de facto invasion. But even the landowners might be clandestinely involved in the transactions. Purchasers usually received a receipt of sale but rarely a title deed to their property. (These statements are based on the testimonies from the in-depth interviews in the Bella Flor settlement.)

## CITY GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION UP TO THE 1980S

Housing policy in Colombia during the 1960s, as in other Latin American countries, centred on low-cost housing built by a national housing authority. The ICT, originally founded in 1939 to help finance housing for the rural sector, was revamped and in 1956 put in charge of providing low-income urban housing. Except for a few successful cases such as the Ciudad Kennedy, the ICT was initially a failure insofar as it could not provide enough housing, especially for the very poorest (Jaramillo, 1982; 1990; Mohan, 1994; Stevenson, 1981).

The main city government agency involved with the problem of the irregular settlements was the DAPD. The early approach to city planning in the 1960s consisted of controls on the area of urban development by establishing zoning laws and defining the city limits. These controls, however, did little to inhibit the spread of illegal land sub-division. From the beginning of the 1970s the DAPD redefined the 'minimum standard' for urban development (see details in the section below) and tried to encourage the private sector to offer low-cost housing for the poor. However, the number of settlements established by private developers under this 'minimum standard' programme was limited due to the high cost of obtaining public services required under this legal framework. The DAPD's next strategy was a slum upgrading programme aimed at improving the infrastructural quality of existing irregular settlements. The upgrading programmes were usually conducted through official recognition of the settlement and then provision of service infrastructure by the respective public utility enterprises.

Initially, the city government's overall strategy was to permit the expansion of low-income housing through pirate urbanisation. Later, there were gradual efforts on the part of certain city agencies to control and finally to service and regularise these

settlements. These efforts have been ‘only partially successful’ (Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 107). Why did these institutional efforts fail to control the expansion of irregular settlements?

### **City and public service boundaries and zoning**

The ‘urban perimeter’ of Bogotá was established by the district government with the aim of controlling the physical expansion of the city. Within the established limits, public service agencies build, install, and maintain infrastructure, and the planning authority (DAPD) recognises urban development (Losada and Gómez, 1976; Gilbert and Ward, 1982). The urban perimeter for Bogotá was first defined under the Agreement No. 6/1914, when Bogotá was one of the municipalities of Cundinamarca Department. This boundary was modified several times under later agreements and decrees (see Losada and Gómez, 1976: 35-37).

Zoning laws define the use of land for all areas within the urban perimeter, with each zone dedicated to a particular kind of development: industrial, commercial, high-density residential, low-density residential, and so on. The first zoning law in Bogotá, which took effect in 1944, divided the city into seven zones. A series of standards for urban design and construction (e.g., street width and extent of public areas, plot ratio, etc.) were specified for each zone. However, most of the pirate land sub-dividers ignored them. The zoning Law of 1944 was modified by successive agreements. These modifications eased the requirements for land sub-division within the city limits. Despite this, settlement of illegally sub-divided land continued to expand.

Meanwhile, the boundary line within which city public services would be provided (*perímetro urbano sanitario*) came to be determined. The public service companies established this boundary on technical grounds, independently of the existing ‘urban perimeter’. This caused a problem, because there were always some settlements outside the urban perimeter but inside the area where public service infrastructure was provided,

and vice versa.

Agreement No. 25/1975 determined a broader scope for public service provision. From the technical and planning point of view, the constraints against the expansion of this perimeter were explained in the following way:

The boundary on the east side of the city could not be expanded due to the additional cost of pumping water to residential zones that were located above a certain altitude. Usually the maximum altitude was 2,800 metres above sea level. The boundary on the west side, too, was limited by technical considerations. These were related to its location, which was below the level of the Bogotá River, making it vulnerable to serious drainage-related problems, a matter that was recently evident when the Patio Bonito and Bosa zones were flooded (DAPD, 1981: 5).

The notion of establishing city perimeters in order to inhibit expansion of illegal land sub-division was clearly not successful. The settlements violated the urban planning regulations but needed to be integrated into the urban fabric of the city. Subsequent decrees extended the urban perimeter in order to include irregular settlements established outside it. These extensions, however, conflicted with the efforts of the water service company to uphold the boundaries of their own services. Losada and Gómez (1976) highlighted this phenomenon as follows:

Rather, development of low-income housing has consistently gone beyond the perimeter and the perimeter has later [been] modified to take account of the expansion. The existence of the perimeter has been important insofar as it has limited the availability of serviceable land and thereby increased the price of land within the perimeter and lowered the price beyond (as quoted by Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 108).

As stated, the boundaries were defined to limit the serviceable land but they were ineffective in controlling the expansion of illegal urban development. A gap also existed between the zoning laws and the regularisation process. The zoning laws as well as the

laws on the urban perimeter had actually been established to encourage the increase in the value of land categorised either as residential or within the urban perimeter.

Therefore, none of these laws helped to control the expansion of irregular settlements beyond the urban perimeter, but worked instead to encourage them.

Under pressure from the expansion of irregular settlements beyond the existing public service authority boundaries, the city authorities had no choice but to modify the urban perimeter in order to integrate existing irregular settlements into the administrative reach of the city. In fact, the urban perimeter was extended again with the Agreement No. 7/1979, which replaced the Agreement No. 25/1975. With the No. 25/1975 agreement, the previously determined urban perimeter was converted to the public services perimeter. New zoning legislation under the No. 7/1979 agreement created three categories for areas for agricultural activities (I, II, and III agricultural activity areas: AAA), and of these, AAIII were replaceable by projects for social housing construction. AAIII was located beyond the public service authority boundaries (more than 2,800 metres above sea level), but within the urban perimeter then in force. Many irregular settlements had already become established in this area. After 1979, urban development could be observed in such areas between the urban perimeter and the public service authority boundaries, but without initial guarantees of water supply.

As observed by Gilbert and Ward (1982: 108), ‘the main effects of the zoning legislation have been to increase the incidence of illegal low-income housing and to accentuate residential segregation’.

### **Minimum standards: regulation of urbanisation**

The introduction of minimum standards (*normas mínimas*) was another policy which was intended to discourage pirate urbanisation by promoting serviced urbanisation for the low-income sector. ‘Minimum standards’ were applied to a series of infrastructures

required for the regulation of urban development. The 'minimum standards'-policy had two objectives. The first was to improve existing irregular settlements by providing the services and urban infrastructure up to the required minimum standard and, in this manner, incorporate them into the formal administration of the city. The second was to ease the standards of urban regulations for low-income settlements, and in this way, reduce demand for unserviced lots developed by pirate sub-dividers. The minimum standard framework was thus designed both to regularise existing pirate settlements and to discourage the emergence of new ones.

The minimum standards stipulations dated back to 1902, when regulations were first established requiring new residential settlements to have 'water supply, public lighting, sidewalks, and roads with a width not less than twelve metres' (Losada and Gómez, 1976: 45). However, these requirements were extremely expensive and rarely met by the pirate land sub-dividers whose targeted clients were the poor.

Modification of these regulations was introduced in 1961, under which all that was required was to provide standpipes for public water supply, street lights on wooden poles, and the construction of private latrines. However, this modification did not discourage the expansion of illegal settlements as most urban developers simply chose to ignore the regulations or did not invest in the costs required to fulfil the regulations (Gilbert and Ward, 1982).

A substantial change in 'minimum standards' came about with the Agreement No. 20/1972 and the ensuing regulation decrees in 1973.<sup>7</sup> The new framework relaxed the standards of service infrastructure required for a low-income settlement. Agreement No. 20/1972 required only

- (1) that penetration roads have a stabilized base (i.e., not necessarily be paved), and that other roads be laid out and visible;
- (2) that community water spigots, one for

---

<sup>7</sup> Subsequent regulations added on numerical standards lacking in the 1972 legislation and simplified procedures under which the Planning Department would actively assist sub-dividers or the community organisations of existing settlements in their efforts to meet the new standards.

every four blocks, were sufficient if their water had been tested by the Secretary of Health; (3) that street lighting on posts was required; (4) that a public telephone be available no more than one kilometre from the community; and (5) that each lot must have a latrine. Community laundry facilities were also required. The sub-divider was charged with furnishing all of this, either on its own or through the relevant public enterprises. Provision was made for the Planning Department to assist communities with their own progressive improvement in these respects and to coordinate the activities of the public companies (Doebele, 1975: 41-42).

In practice, the 'minimum standards' policies after 1972 promoted what was called the 'sites-and-services' development scheme as a 'legalised' alternative for improvement of housing for the poor. 'Sites and services' development was a variation in low-cost housing programmes which consisted of providing serviced or serviceable land and an unfinished house.<sup>8</sup> The house was to be completed gradually through the self-help housing method.

During the five years prior to 1979, thirty-six 'minimum standard' urban development projects were approved. Other data show that the area of land developed under pirate urbanisation was slightly greater than that developed under minimum standards improvement during the period between 1974 and 1977 (DAPD, 1978, quoted in Gilbert and Ward, 1982: 109). Gilbert and Ward argue that the new legislation failed to halt the expansion of pirate urbanisation, but did at least slow the trend and made it easier for existing irregular settlements to be serviced and receive official recognition. The status of the urban perimeter and the limited amount of land available for low-income housing contributed to increasing the cost of the fulfilment of minimum-standard requirements, which in turn limited the effectiveness of the policy. The value of land as well as of required services were more expensive than developers

---

<sup>8</sup> Public services provided vary, but in the Colombian case, water supply, sewerage systems and electricity were provided. The condition of an 'unfinished house', sometimes called 'core-housing', varied case by case. This alternative housing programme was also introduced in the 1970s by the World Bank in its housing development loan programme.

had expected, thus settlement under minimum-standard development proved unaffordable to the very poor (Molina, 1990). Therefore, the very poor had no alternative but to resort to purchasing land offered by pirate developers (Carroll, 1980). The pirate sub-dividers then discovered the advantages of developing settlements beyond the boundary of the District of Bogotá and in neighbouring municipalities of the department of Cundimaraca, especially in the municipality of Soacha, where the Bogotá District minimum standards decree did not apply (Gilbert and Ward, 1982).

### **Improvement of existing irregular settlements: regularisation**

The year 1972 was the turning point for the regularisation policy of the Bogotá District government, although the immediate results were limited. In this year, with the renewed minimum standards (see above) the regulating policy focused more substantially at upgrading existing pirate settlements. In the same year, a Committee for Urban Improvement was established in the DAPD. The mission of this committee was to improve the physical conditions of irregular settlements in order that they could be integrated into official city planning schemes. The Committee for Urban Improvement consisted of the director of DAPD as chairman, four city councillors, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Public Works (of the special District), the director of social welfare, the DAAC, and the Manager of the CVP (Doebele, 1975: 43).

With the establishment of this committee the DAPD became the central authority in upgrading the irregular settlements. Figure 3.1 summarises the typical process of regularisation as practiced before 1990.<sup>9</sup> The process consisted, essentially, of DAPD recognition of the settlement in question and normalisation of public service provision. It should be noted here that the legalisation process (enabling inhabitants to obtain the title deeds to their property) should be distinguished from that of regularisation. The

---

<sup>9</sup> In Figure 3.1, the 'legalisation process' is included, since it is undertaken simultaneously with regularisation. It is described with dotted lines, in order to distinguish it from the regularisation process.



legalisation process usually began later and took more time than that of regularisation.<sup>10</sup> The actions detailed in the ‘community role’ column in Figure 3.1 were normally conducted through a community-based organisation, which represented the settlers and took an intermediary role in negotiations with city agencies. In most cases, these organisations were identified as communal action boards (JACs; see pages 149-51).

The urban improvement committee judged whether a settlement is eligible to be recognised and then coordinated the intervention of different agencies (public service authorities). Once the settlement in question was approved under the Bogotá District regulations, the public service authorities intervened to normalise the respective service infrastructures. In reality, however, as we will see below, the public service authorities had more flexibility and autonomy in serving the irregular settlements than the DAPD. They therefore sometimes went ahead in providing services, regardless of the location of the city perimeters (Gilbert and Ward, 1982). The name and the membership of the urban improvement committee changed frequently, but the basic structure and procedures for regularisation remained the same until the mid-1990s.

---

<sup>10</sup> The concept of regulation is the official recognition of the settlement and normalisation of provision of basic services, in Spanish, *legalización urbanística*. Legalisation in the sense of transfer of land property in Spanish is *legalización de propiedad de la tierra or titulación*.




Figure3.1 Traditional steps toward regularisation of irregular settlements

Source: made by the author.

Note: UPES was reformed in 1999 and renamed DADEP(Administrative Department for Ombudsman of Public Space).

## PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITIES: EAAB, EEB AND IDU

Upon recognition by the DAPD's urban improvement committee as eligible for urban improvement, the irregular settlements could count on the Bogotá District public service enterprises to upgrade their basic service infrastructure. Other agencies would intervene later on in the areas of public health, education, social welfare and culture, but water supply and sewerage, electricity and street paving were deemed fundamental to meeting the minimum standards of urban improvement, as outlined below.

### **EAAB**

In the wake of a series of institutional reforms, the EAAB was founded in 1955 as a new autonomous municipal corporation. Water shortages in Bogotá were common during the period of accelerated population growth from 1951–1964. Therefore, in the 1960s, the EAAB's principal task was to expand the water supply network as well as the sewerage system.

At this time mega-development projects were launched in Colombia financed by loans received through international organisations such as the World Bank and the IADB. Known as the 'Bogotá I' to 'Bogotá IV' and 'Santa Fe' projects, they led to the creation of huge infrastructures such as the Chingaza and San Rafael dams. New water reservoirs and distribution mains were also built to meet the rapidly expanding demand for water. The Tibitó drinking water treatment plant was constructed at the same time to improve the water quality.

From the 1960s, the EAAB turned its attention to the poor sector, especially the irregular settlements. A special branch called the Division of Communal Action was established which focused on the irregular settlements (EAAB, 1997). Its main task was to improve the water infrastructure for the poor settlements through community

involvement in coordination with the DAAC (see below). The officers of this section circulated information about EAAB projects and listened to the residents' claims and requests.

In the 1970s, the demand for a water supply in the unserved settlements became a critical issue. The EAAB discriminated against settlements that were situated beyond the perimeter of service provision, but ultimately it made water available to outlets even in the most difficult-to-access areas. Temporary supply apparatus was provided through a public standpipe, which was built by the community in collaboration with the EAAB. The community provided the labour force and the EAAB provided the pipes and other materials. The installation of the public standpipes was the preliminary solution to water supply for the irregular settlements, where the individual connection to the service network took years to be fulfilled. In this case, the EAAB did not send out regular bills to individual households, but levied a flat charge to the community.<sup>11</sup>

The expansion of the sewerage system network in some of the low-income residential areas was carried out in 1975 as the part of 'Sewerage Master Plan'. These works formed part of the Integrated Programme of Urban Development for the Eastern Zone of Bogotá (PIDUZOB; see below), which was financed partially by the IADB in 1972-1974 (EAAB, 1971; 1972; 1973 and 1975).

Notwithstanding these efforts, non-payment losses became a serious problem in the 1980s. In fact, in Bogotá during the 1970s and 1980s, 24 per cent of the total public water supply was not paid for. The majority of these losses were the result of negligence by inhabitants of the higher-strata residential areas as well as users in the commercial and industrial sectors. However, losses caused by illegal tapping in the irregular settlements were also significant. The EAAB decided to promote the normalisation of water service provision in order to more effectively charge for water consumption. Sometimes the EAAB ignored the 'urban perimeter' as defined by the DAPD, and

---

<sup>11</sup> These statements were based on the interviews to the EAAB officers as well as the residents in the case study settlements.

expanded the boundaries of public service provision according to its own technical convenience.

### **Bogotá Electricity Company (EEB)**

In 1951, the United Company of Electric Energy was founded as an autonomous municipal power company (Misión Bogotá Siglo XXI, 1995). This company became the EEEB (Bogotá Electric Energy Company) in 1959, the predecessor of today's EEB.<sup>12</sup>

In order to meet Bogotá's increasing demand, from the 1960s to the 1980s, the EEB carried out a series of projects to expand the city's power generation capacity. At the end of the 1970s, it embarked on a new mission to build hydroelectric power plants of larger capacity. The Mesitas Hydroelectric Power Station was the first constructed, and in 1981, construction on the Guavio Hydroelectric Power Station began. The Guavio plant was initially planned to have a capacity of a million kilowatts, and go into operation in 1987. However, construction was delayed considerably due to inadequate funds. The whole plant was finally completed only in July 1993. The Guavio project was one of the fundamental reasons which led to the financial deterioration of the EEB (Díaz Arbeláez, 1988).

What was the attitude of the electric power authorities toward the irregular settlements? According to Gilbert and Ward (1982: 111), 'In the sixties, it was common for the electricity company to cut illegal lines, but since 1967 an attempt has been made to supply and charge all *barrios*.' Usually, residents of the irregular settlements obtained electricity by illegal connection to existing power cables in neighbouring communities. The draining off of contraband electricity caused not only loss of power but also damage to existing cable networks due to overload. The EEB realised that it would be more efficient to provide electricity to these settlements than to cut the illegal lines, which could be easily reattached. Like the EAAB, the EEB created a division to attend

---

<sup>12</sup> As established under the Agreement No. 15/1988. Hereafter, I will use the current acronym, EEB.

to the needs of poor communities, with a special focus on the people of the irregular settlements. The main task of this office was to listen to people's demands and investigate the situation of each irregular settlement in order to understand how far EEB intervention was technically and financially possible. Intervention took place firstly by provision of one or two transformers (depending on the size of the settlement). Connecting cables were then replaced by new ones where necessary.<sup>13</sup> Sometimes the EEB requested that a community provide a certain proportion of the total cost, but most of it was covered by EEB investment. Similar to the provisional solution for water service, electricity supply was charged under a 'unified basic tariff', the lowest rate. The community would be charged on the amount used when finally the EEB installed the individual electric meters.

### **Urban Development Institute (IDU)**

The IDU was established in 1972 when the Bogotá government launched PIDUZOB, a programme for the integral development of the eastern zone of the city (see below). The mission of the IDU was to enforce the construction and maintenance of roads, pavements, and other public works, thereby facilitating the development of public transportation in Bogotá. The IDU was also assigned to build parks, plazas and sidewalks, public buildings such as community halls, public health centres and schools.

Beginning with PIDUZOB, the IDU came to undertake significant tasks in the subsequent large integral urban development programmes, particularly the improvement of road networks to facilitate links between the peripheral irregular settlements and the city centre. It also took on the task of improving roads within the settlements.

IDU intervention was beneficial to the people of these settlements, but its role was not much recognised by communities until the 1980s. There seem to have been two reasons for this lack of recognition. Firstly, before the IDU was established, most public

---

<sup>13</sup> These statements are based on an interview conducted at the EEB Planning Department in 1995.

works projects had been implemented by district institutions such as the Secretary of Public Works, the DAPD and the DAAC. Secondly, although street/road paving was a critical local need, for technical reasons its execution tended to come at the very last stage of regularisation and to be given lower priority in comparison with other basic services, such as water supply, electricity and sewerage.

#### INTEGRAL PROGRAMME FOR UPGRADING

The regularisation of informal settlements was basically conducted one at a time. From the 1970s onwards, with opportunities to obtain international financial aid from the IADB and USAID for poverty-alleviation purposes, the city government began to employ a new form of state intervention. The integrated approach involving different city government agencies was applied to wider areas of poverty concentration. Regularisation of the illegally established settlements formed one of its sub-programmes.

#### **PIDUZOB (1972-1974)**

PIDUZOB was the first attempt by Bogotá District to conduct an integrated programme for upgrading intervention efforts over an extensive area. The target area was the 'Eastern Zone of Bogotá', which was understood as the zone extending parallel to the North Highway and Caracas Avenue between the urban perimeter on the north and the west end of the city. This area is bounded by the hills that surround the city on the east end extending southward (See Figure 3.2). In the early 1970s, the eastern zone of Bogotá was considered to be the most problematic with the highest concentration of poor irregular settlements in the city.

According to a diagnostic study of this targeted area, there were approximately

635,000 inhabitants, the equivalent of more than 25 per cent of the total population of Bogotá. In this area, more than half of the population was living in irregular settlements. PIDUZOB focused on improvement of the living conditions in these settlements.

PIDUZOB started out as a plan to build a new highway in the eastern zone of the city. The original idea came from political manoeuvring to gain electoral support from the voters in the area. PIDUZOB was a representative example of how plans for intervention in the poor sector were often manipulated by party politics as liberals and conservatives jockeyed for power (Gilbert, 1978). Ultimately, PIDUZOB came to consist of nine sub-programmes: pavement and construction of roads; health (construction of new hospitals, clinics and health centres); construction of community centres; construction of water supply and sewerage systems; expansion of the electrical power supply network; building of new elementary and secondary schools; construction of a new highway, named 'Oriental Avenue', and its connecting roads; construction of low-income housing; and other technical assistance. It was co-financed by the Bogotá District and external resources from organisations such as the IADB, World Bank and USAID (DAPD, 1972).

Unfortunately, there is no further statistical information about what this programme achieved. Gilbert called the PIDUZOB 'misguided', and wrote that 'the later production of an "integrated development plan" was little more than a charade' (Gilbert, 1978: 116).






Figure 3.2 Target area of intervention by PIDUZOB

Source: DAPD (1972)

## NATIONAL AGENCY SANCTIONS ON THE ILLEGAL SUB-DIVISION OF LAND

Another attempt to control the spread of the irregular settlements was made by instituting sanctions against illegal land sub-division. When the first standards for urban regulation were established in 1902, Agreement 10 had set forth sanctions to be taken against illegal land sub-dividers (Losada and Gómez, 1976).

The Law No.66/1968 gave the Banking Superintendency (SIB) responsibility for investigating the irregular settlements and serving charges against land sub-dividers who had violated the city regulations on public service standards. The SIB had the power to put pirate sub-dividers in jail for two to six years and it could freeze their corporate assets until they demonstrated their capability to run the enterprise properly (Losada and Gómez, 1976; Gilbert and Ward, 1982). The SIB confiscated the assets of illegal sub-dividers and handed them over to the ICT for regularisation.

Neither the SIB nor the ICT, however, carried out their roles efficiently. Firstly, the administrative capacity of the SIB was too small to handle the vast number of illegally created settlements. According to Losada and Gómez (1976), in 1975 approximately 320 settlements in Bogotá were categorised as illegal, while the SIB had a staff of only 29. Secondly, even though the SIB intervened on numerous occasions, the financial capacity of the ICT to regularise these settlements was limited. In most cases, the conditions in the settlements were so poor that providing viable services was virtually impossible. The residents of the confiscated settlements distrusted the ICT and were reluctant to pay the ICT to buy back the land, which in turn discouraged the process of regularisation. The third, and probably the most persuasive reason to explain why the intervention of SIB failed to control the pirate urbanisation was the SIB's political decision to maintain the role of the pirate urbanisers as a safety valve for the poor sector in the city. Therefore, the SIB tended to intervene only when the residents of the settlement or some influential agent such as a politician complained about their situation

(Gilbert and Ward, 1982).

It is clear then that these intervention strategies failed to control pirate sub-divisions. Although there was a strict legal framework of sanctions against pirate sub-division, it was rarely applied and the pirate sub-dividers were permitted to carry on as before.

#### REACTIONS OF IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT COMMUNITIES

As shown above, state efforts to control the expansion of the irregular settlements were largely unsuccessful. The state effectively continued with the attitude of tolerance vis-à-vis the settlements that it had adopted earlier. From the 1970s onward, the regularisation process did get underway through a procedural framework coordinated by the DAPD. Intervention by each of the public service authorities was pursued according to different criteria, however, so in practice regularisation varied case by case. The next section discusses the reaction of the residents of the irregular settlements themselves with respect to this state intervention.

#### **Resistance to eviction**

Cases of land invasion were relatively few in Bogotá, but the resistance to eviction was strong, particularly in cases backed by Provienda (the housing support arm of the Communist Party). The mission of Provienda was to promote housing solutions for the poor, so invasion was its form of resistance. In the decade of the 1960s and early 1970s, most of the settlements created by land invasion were organised by Provienda (Torres, 1993). In 1961 the first massive invasion was carried out in Bogotá (Barrio Las Colinas) and the struggle of Barrio Policarpa (in the central part of the city) began soon after. The struggle between the settlers and the state (as represented by the ICT, which was the landowner) lasted six years, and became the most aggressive case of invasion for housing in Bogotá.



After Barrio Policarpa, Provivienda backed the creation of settlements such as Salvador Allende, El Quidío, and Nuevo Chile. However, because of strong government repression, which made this strategy quite dangerous, and with the increasing dominance of the community action boards (JACs; see below), which were supported by an official political party, the Provivienda invasion model of settlement lost influence (Gilbert and Ward, 1985: 106).

### **Conventional activism through officially approved community organisations**

In the initial stages of the development of an irregular settlement, most inhabitants' actions—land purchase, occupation (identification or demonstration of possession of the purchased land) and housing construction—were carried out through individual settler's efforts. People tried to settle down even in a provisional shack as soon as possible; otherwise the purchased land would be either resold or invaded by others.

Settlers soon realised the importance of helping each other to ease the difficulties of daily living, and working committees sprang up spontaneously in the settlements. The primary risk they felt was the threat of eviction by the authorities. Land sub-dividers often committed fraud during the land transaction, which could make residents' legal status as landholders unstable. In fact, such settlements were often categorised by local people as those originating in land invasion under the risk of eviction by the authorities. Therefore, these organisations helped to support residents in danger of eviction and negotiate with police.

Residents also had to guard against crime since there was no effective legal authority or police system to turn to. They formed self-defence committees which organised local patrols that took turns handling security problems and taking the night watch. These patrols, to which residents resorted as a survival strategy, became the incipient units of community-based collective action.

The spontaneously formed community-based organisations had to deal with many

other problems as well. Committees with names like *projunta* or *mejora* were created to help settlers obtain basic needs such as water and electricity. People invented various kinds of provisional infrastructure for these purposes (such as the popular method of illegal connections to existing water or electricity supply networks) through collective self-help.

Once a community wanted to improve or regularise its public utility services, it had to petition the service authorities, and for this they had to work through their ‘officially recognised representatives’. It was at this juncture that communities began to establish either JACs or equivalent community-based organisations.<sup>14</sup> The establishment of a JAC was the first step an irregular settlement could take in order to be recognised by the city authorities (see Figure 3.1). The first task of the JAC was to have a topographic survey conducted. The DAPD would offer technical assistance but the cost of the survey had to be paid by the community, so the amount was usually raised by JAC leaders through collections from residents. The survey, once accepted by the District Survey Office, would be submitted to the DAPD and the settlement would then be considered for integration into the official map of the city. The DAPD analysed the survey in order to examine whether the topographic conditions met the criteria for integration into the urban perimeter.<sup>15</sup> If the DAPD approved the survey, then the settlement in question would be included by the Bogotá city authorities in its regularisation process.

### **The role of the JACs**

The formation of a JAC was crucial both to the residents of the irregular settlements and to the state in its attempts to regularise the settlements. Why were the JACs so important? A brief explanation of the history of the JAC organisation will show the

---

<sup>14</sup> The ‘officially recognised representative’ of the community did not need to be a JAC; other types of community organisations were acceptable, as long as they met the requirements of juridical-person status as specified in the regulations (*Resolución*) issued by the City Council.

<sup>15</sup> This integration of an irregular settlement into the urban perimeter does not mean the physical expansion of the existent urban perimeter, determined by Agreement No. 6/1990, ‘Physical Ordinance of the Special District of Bogotá’.

nature of Colombian community organisation and Colombian modes of community participation, in particular, those in the poor sector.

The legal framework of the JAC was created in 1958 under the National Front Regime after a long period of political violence (see chapter 2, page 66). As part of the conciliation process during this era, the central government faced two difficult tasks. The first was to extend the two-party alternating system down to the community level in order to control the emergence of leftist movements. The second was to reconstruct rural areas devastated by long years of violence and civil strife. The promotion of so-called ‘communal (or community) action’—by the creation of JACs—was the strategy deployed to mobilise the populace toward both these goals.

‘Community action’ here meant collective action by the inhabitants designed to resolve the problems they shared, based on the concept of mutual aid or solidarity. There were already precedents for traditional community-based collective organisations in the rural sector<sup>16</sup> and the national government was able to adopt some of these.

A JAC is defined as ‘a non-profit civic body, composed of inhabitants of a specific area, the objective of which is to concentrate efforts and resources in order to resolve the most important needs of the community in question’ (Decree No. 1930/1976). Membership of the JAC is completely voluntary for neighbourhood residents, but its establishment and dissolution had to be approved by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

While the principal function of the JAC is to resolve community problems, it has other important community roles. Firstly, it is responsible for protecting the lives and property of the community. Secondly, the JAC acts as the main intermediary between the community and the city administration: information generated by government agencies that involve the community is distributed through its members, and the JAC is expected to encourage people in the community to exercise their rights and duties as

---

<sup>16</sup> Cooperative arrangements that had reinforced agricultural production in rural areas such as *minga*, *fajina*, *ronda*, *mano prestada*, *mano vuelta*, and *convite* (Borrero 1989).

citizens.<sup>17</sup>

In Bogotá, since 1968, the DAAC has taken responsibility for community-based organisations. Its main tasks are to register the JACs in Bogotá and to supervise their activities, including the audits and arbitration of internal legal matters. In short, DAAC is the representative institution of the state in dealing with citizens through the JACs. The DAAC also intervenes whenever other public institutions, including the public service delivery companies, need to consult with the community regarding how to carry out new projects. In addition, the DAAC promotes community-based activities through workshops and community education, particularly in relation to procedures required for communicating with the city administration. Through this process, the DAAC provides technical and judicial assistance where necessary. A sub-division specialising in judicial matters handles claims, suggestions and criticisms of the community related to internal conflict, political corruption and/or friction with government agencies.

### **Politicians and the JACs**

There is no membership fee for the JACs. The principal official funds which the JACs could count on were the community development funds created in 1970 under Decree 158, and 'economic assistance' which was provided through local politicians until 1991. In practice, the amount distributed to each JAC was limited. As such, each JAC had to generate resources of its own (such as by holding bazaars or lotteries) if it wanted to carry out a particular community project. Where community activities depended on the economic support of a particular politician, patron-client relationships developed (herein, to be called 'clientelistic relations'), especially in neighbourhoods with few services or little infrastructure (Borrero, 1989). In this study, 'clientelistic relations' refers to power relations based on political subordination resulting from the delivery of

---

<sup>17</sup> These statements are based on the following three decrees: Decree No. 1930/1976; Decree No. 2726/1980; and Decree No. 300/1987. See also Fisher (1984) for the debates on the functions of neighbourhood associations in Latin American countries in general.

material rewards. More precisely, this relationship is created between local politicians (or potential candidates) and the urban poor (potential voters), as an exchange of aid for votes<sup>18</sup> (Fox 1994, 153; Gay 1990; Auyero 1999).

Restrepo (1994) indicated that the accelerated growth of the communal organisations in the 1970s was supported to a great extent by the mechanisms of partisan assistance. This assistance was channelled to the communities through national, regional and local politicians. The main problem was that the 'economic assistance' in question was handled independently from the fiscal accounts of local administrations, and therefore was often used indiscriminately by politicians to strengthen their personal political influence. In time, the inhabitants of the poor settlements became accustomed to receiving partisan assistance in return for votes. However, the politicians' influence was felt not only in terms of economic aid. Their pressure on the city government authorities and intervention in the process of regularisation sometimes worked to speed up the process.

Indeed, the real impact of these clientelistic relations between the irregular settlements and politicians was not so much in obtaining public services,<sup>19</sup> but in speeding up the time needed to obtain them. Often getting the services promptly installed depended on whether or not the community had strong political patronage. As we shall see in chapter 5, patronage was a key factor. Members of these settlements believed that the services had to be obtained through political pressure, access to which should be gained by building clientelistic relations with local politicians in return for voting for them (Gilbert and Ward, 1982).

---

<sup>18</sup> The term 'patron-client relationship' originally derived from anthropologists' analysis of interpersonal power relations resulting from formal arrangements in small local communities (see Scott, 1972; Foster, 1963). The concept of 'clientelism' and/or 'clientelistic relations' was widely adopted in describing contemporary Latin American political power relations either among elite politicians or in the grass-roots category of politicians and potential voters.

<sup>19</sup> The public service companies have functioned relatively independently of the city administration and been free from the pressure of local politicians. In most of cases the providers have steadily expanded the service networks toward the poor sector, and sooner or later, irregular settlements were serviced.



### **Unconventional strategies for obtaining services: urban protests**

What could the residents of the irregular settlements do when conventional negotiations with the state did not work? Most had learned that basic public services would be provided in due course, but their tolerance was limited, so they sometimes resorted to unconventional methods.

When state intervention affected the prevailing rights of the residents, they might also react more aggressively. These actions were often supported by political parties, leftist groups and/or various NGOs. Torres (1993; 1994) identified *protestas barriales* (urban protests at the popular settlement level) that took place in Bogotá during the 1958 to 1974 period—the National Front political regime era—and analysed their characteristics. He classified the protests into three categories: *paro cívico* (civic strike hereafter)<sup>20</sup> and/or road blockades, peaceful demonstrations, and resistance against eviction.

Civic strikes referred to ‘total or partial abandonment of the economic activities either in a determined region, city, or a group of settlements with the objective of pressurising the authorities to solve some urgent problems which have affected the majority of the residents’ (Torres, 1993: 154). Civic strikes often paralysed transportation when roads were blockaded at strategic locations.<sup>21</sup> Major thoroughfares such as Caracas Avenue and South Highway, which run north-south and north-southeast respectively in the city often suffered from road blockades of this kind. The most common motives for civic strikes were efforts by local people to get the government to expand public service networks and infrastructure, or to reduce public service charges.

---

<sup>20</sup> *Paro cívico* is a type of civic strike, found in some Latin American countries. In the case of Colombia, these demonstrations started in the 1960s, as a last resort (either in the rural or urban sectors) to put pressure on the authorities for citizens’ rights or needs. The actions taken in practice are work stoppages in both the public sector and private sectors but especially in the sectors of transportation and commerce, or demonstrations, paralysing traffic on main roads, etc.

<sup>21</sup> Civic strikes and street blockades might seem to be different terms, but those who declared that a civic strike was to be held in many cases resorted to blockades as the most efficient strategy, hence they came to be treated as virtually synonymous (Torres, 1993: 154-55).

Civic strikes had a significant impact as they put pressure on the city authorities rather than on employers as workplaces were not directly obstructed.

Peaceful demonstrations tended to be second choice, although the motivation was almost the same. These demonstrations generally took the form of a march and/or open meeting among the participants in a public place. The march was often organised to move from the participants' residential area to the central plaza in front of the city hall, or to the front of the public utility company (e.g. EAAB or EEB) building. Normally the march concluded in a meeting at these strategic places where they would present their petition to the authorities in question. Members of the media would be invited to accompany the demonstration in the anticipation that they would help to win public support.

Torres (1993) observed that urban protests in these two forms increased in the 1970s and peaked with the National Civic Strike of 1977. Settlers of the irregular settlements continued to resort to these two strategies throughout the 1980s.

#### CITY GOVERNMENT-IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT RELATIONS UP TO THE END OF THE 1980S

The steady expansion of pirate urbanisation was a serious problem for the city authorities, but at the same time, it provided shelter for those who could not afford to purchase formal housing. The pirate urbanisers sold the land without public service provision but usually told the settlers that the services would come later. Therefore, the settlers demanded that the city authorities provide public services. Eventually, the city authorities, regularised these pirate settlements since they had no alternative housing policy for the poor. The state's intervention was based on its tolerance of the irregular settlements despite the illegal nature of the sub-divider's methods of selling and distributing the land. Irregular settlement provided a much cheaper solution than the

state building new housing for the poor.

There were, however, problems with this kind of intervention. Firstly, the regularisation process up until the 1980s did not prioritise the problem of transfer of land ownership. Secondly, discrepancies between the urban perimeter and the service provision boundaries often became a source of disagreement between the DAPD and the public service authorities. Thirdly, most of the service infrastructure provided did not include the installation of individual networks, which were left to the responsibility of users. In the meantime, people made do with poor quality services gained through preliminary connections as a result of communal efforts. Fourth, the use of political influence in expediting the regularisation process sometimes worked effectively, affecting the sequence and speed of state intervention procedures.

These factors taken together meant that the time spent in completing the regularisation process could vary considerably from one community to another, in some cases taking as many as ten years. Given the limitations of its administrative and financial capacity, the city government found that a certain degree of tolerance both for illegality and for the gradual improvement of the irregular settlements was the most effective resolution of the housing deficit. The state's attitude was also based on the political calculation of its need to protect the interests of the urban elite. Meanwhile, people of the irregular settlements knew that living conditions would, in due course, be improved by state intervention.

Therefore, relations between the city government, the communities of the irregular settlements and the market during this period could be summarised as follows. Regularisation usually took years and the frequent delays in this process were attributed to the negligence of the city government. As the case studies in chapter 5 will show, communities sometimes resorted to aggressive actions to protest against the authorities. Their protests, however, served as one among various tactics for negotiating with the

state, and regularisation was the result of compromise between the two sides. The politicians who intervened in the process of negotiation took an apparent stand of support for the community, but their principal aim, in winning the support of the poor, was to maintain the stability of the regime. The nature of community organisation in the settlements was highly influenced by this political co-option and this inhibited the development of autonomous and independent political movements. The state's intervention in the housing market as well as in the public services market was more obvious and constant. The informal housing market, dominated by pirate urbanisation, was 'tolerated' after all under the regularisation policy. As a result, informal settlements could be converted into formal urban communities, but they never came to compete with the existing formal housing market for the high-income sector. The physical segregation of the city by income-level was therefore maintained.

## CHAPTER 4

### **POLICIES TOWARD IRREGULAR SETTLEMENTS: CHANGES IN THE 1990s**

Development of the irregular settlements continued to expand despite the city government's continuing efforts to ease the housing deficit for the poor and control land sub-division outside the urban perimeter.

The management of Bogotá in the 1990s was different from during the 1980s. The approach of the city administration toward the irregular settlements underwent significant changes after 1990. Public service agencies which were involved in the physical upgrading of the irregular settlements became more efficient. At the same time, the city mayors of this period put even more emphasis on pro-poor projects.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the pace of regularisation was stepped up considerably. Approximately 250 settlements were regularised in 1996, followed by more than 400 between 1998 and 2000.

These changes were partly derived from institutional reforms of the Bogotá city administration. The reforms were applied through the new Organic Statute of Bogotá, stipulated in 1993 following the 1991 Constitution (Vidal Perdomo, 1994). The Organic Statute was the basis of further legislation regarding institutional reforms, which were introduced gradually during the 1990s (see Figure 4.1 for the structure of Bogotá city administration at 2002).

In addition there were two major trends in Bogotá at this time: firstly, institutional reforms of public agencies to bring about greater efficiency, and secondly, moves toward increased decentralisation. This chapter will chart the development of these trends and discuss how the relationship between the city administration and the

---

<sup>1</sup> Such as the construction of the *Transmilenio* (a new tramcar system running from the northern to the southern edge of the city as part of a programme of expanded and more efficient public transport), and improved coverage of the poor by the subsidised health service through SISBEN (System for the Selection of Beneficiaries of Social Programmes).

inhabitants of the settlements changed as a consequence.

The first section will focus on land prices and the nature of housing policy in order to explain why the irregular settlements expanded in the 1990s.

Then in the second section, I will analyse the main changes in urban management, focusing on the regularisation policy. The regularisation process of irregular settlements became faster and more integrated during the 1990s. Reform of the public service companies focused on more efficient service provision. At the same time, the urban management of Bogotá put more emphasis on community involvement in order to assist in the improvement of these settlements. Therefore, the main changes to urban management in the 1990s were both neo-liberal (market-led approach) and pro-poor. In the third section I will show some of the programmes which were executed in the 1990s.

The fourth section will analyse the decentralisation process in Bogotá as the context in which community participation was promoted in the 1990s. The reaction of the community toward the city authorities after the 1990s will also be considered. The daily life of the people of Bogotá, especially the people of the irregular settlements became more difficult in the late 1990s, particularly during the period of economic crisis from 1997 to 2000. Under these circumstances civic protests occurred calling for a reduction in public service charges.

With these elements in mind, in the final section I will discuss relations between the city authorities, the market and the community in the 1990s.




Figure 4.1 Diagram illustrating the structure of Bogotá city administration in 2002

Source: Drawn from various diagrams from the Bogotá city website (<http://www.bogota.gov.co>).

Notes on the abbreviations for public institutions: IDCT (District Institute of Culture and Tourism); IDRDR (Institute of Recreation and Sports); IDU (Urban Development Institute); FAVIDI (District Fund for Saving and Housing); IDEP (Institute for Research and Pedagogic Development); IDIPRON (District Institute for the Protection of Unprotected Childhood and Youth); FVP (Popular Sales Fund); VSF (Vigilance and Security Fund); FGAA (Gilberto Alzate Avendaño Foundation); FFDS (District Financial Health Fund); CVP (Popular Housing Fund); CBC (La Candelaria barrio corporation); FOPAE (Fund for the Prevention of and Preparation for Emergencies) and FONDATT (Road Safety and Education Fund).

## SHORTAGE OF LOW-COST HOUSING FOR THE POOR

According to the projection based on the 1993 census, the population of Bogotá will continue to increase by more than 2.00 per cent until 2005,<sup>2</sup> which will create a housing deficit of more than 50,000 houses annually (<http://metrovivienda.gov.co>, accessed 1 November 2006). Table 4.1 shows the estimated housing deficit according to socio-economic stratus in 1997. The majority of the housing deficit is concentrated in the lower strata (1 to 3).

Table 4.1 Housing deficit in Bogotá according to socio-economic stratus in 1997

Stratus	Population		Occupied area		Houses	Households	Deficit of houses(1)		
	1,000	%	Hectare	%	No.	No.	No.	%(2)	%(3)
1	386	6.5	1,330	6.0	69,327	85,677	16,350	3.3	19.1
2	2,115	35.7	4,991	22.5	334,678	573,760	239,082	48.6	41.7
3	2,604	44.0	5,808	26.1	428,546	645,067	216,521	44.0	33.6
4	445	7.5	1,723	7.8	117,679	128,586	10,907	2.2	8.5
5	177	3.0	1,094	4.9	38,723	44,872	6,149	1.2	13.7
6	128	2.2	1,097	4.9	39,057	38,474	-583	-0.1	-1.5
Non residential	62	1.0	6,188	27.9	12,711	16,442	3,731	0.8	22.7
Total	5,917	100.0	22,213	100.0	1,040,721	1,532,878	492,157	100.0	32.1

Source: Data of population, houses and households were based on the projection by DANE. The table is taken from 'información sobre vivienda en Bogotá', <http://www.metrovivienda.gov.co> accessed 1 November 2006.

Note: (1) Deficit of houses is calculated as [No. of houses] – [No. of households]

(2) Proportionate distribution according to area.

(3) Proportionate deficit in each category of area.

Land prices continued to rise, due to the increasing shortage of space for new urban development in Bogotá. A new law on land development meant that tax became payable on profits from the rise in land prices. However, the introduction of this tax failed to

<sup>2</sup> See Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 in chapter 3 for the data of population census of 2005.



prevent further land price rises. Furthermore, a new national housing policy introduced in 1991 did little to help the poor of Bogotá since it was designed to benefit those employed in the formal sector. These factors combined to restrict the land market for the poor in Bogotá in the 1990s.

### **Fluctuation of land prices in the formal market**

As mentioned in chapter 3 (pages 127-29), the gap between land prices in the formal housing market and what the poor could afford was one of the major reasons behind the spread of irregular urbanisation. Table 4.2 shows the evolution of land prices during the period from 1960 to 1997 according to the zones by land use. In general land prices tended to increase both in the richer neighbourhoods in the North, as well as in the poorer areas in the South, while decreasing in the centre (downtown) of the city.

However, a closer

analysis in particular periods reveals that the trends between the rich northern sector and the poor southern sector are different. During the construction boom in the period 1991-94, prices in the residential area for middle and high stratus increased more than 20 per cent annually, while those in the residential area for low stratus increased at a rate of 9.47 per cent. Interestingly, the construction recession (1994-97) affected the land prices more in the richer sector than in the poorer sector (see also Appendix 4a.1).

Table 4.2 Land prices per square metres between 1960 and 1977:  
real annual increase ratio (%)

Zones by land use	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-97	1991-94 (1)	1994-97 (2)
Residential for high stratus	2.30	12.08	3.16	9.60	25.19	-2.59
Residential for middle-high stratus	11.57	8.09	1.09	10.31	26.06	-1.59
Residential for middle stratus	6.90	7.58	-1.98	8.54	22.51	-1.68
Residential for middle-low stratus	-0.43	6.40	0.59	6.47	13.04	2.13
Residential for low stratus	n.d.	4.25	4.48	7.24	9.47	5.89
Industrial	6.81	6.57	6.00	7.82	17.30	-0.69
Commercial and services in downtown	5.34	-0.69	-9.00	7.44	18.44	-3.01
Commercial and services in the North	10.69	10.61	-1.83	12.41	33.71	-5.07
Commercial and services in the popular sector	10.13	2.82	-0.24	9.02	17.42	1.35

Source: Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá (1996) for the data 1960-70, 70-80 and 80-90.

Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá (1997) for the data 1990-97, 91-94 and 94-97.

Note: (1) During the boom in the construction sector.

(2) During the recession in the construction sector.

This means that land prices in the south for low stratus have constantly increased, making it difficult for the poor to access land in the formal market.<sup>3</sup>

As in the 1980s, there was as yet no system to enable the state to collect on the financial gains produced by the rising price of land. The Constitution of 1991 allowed for the participation of the state in the revaluation of land, on which basis was passed Law No. 388/1997 (Law of Territorial Development). This law instituted a revaluation tax, or, in other words, a tax on the increase in land value brought about through public intervention in urban development.

Article No. 79 of Law No. 388/1997 gave the municipal and district councils the power to establish the standards on which the revaluation tax was fixed. The tax rate was to vary somewhere between 30 and 50 per cent of the highest value of the land per square metres. How much a plot of land rose in value depended on the amount of public

<sup>3</sup> Although in 1998 and 1999 the land price for low stratus areas also recorded a negative growth ratio, its fluctuation was less significant than in the other areas (see Appendix 4a.1)

works invested in the area, particularly road construction and public utility services. The tax was calculated based on the assessed value of the land, which was to be less than the market price.

Although the objective of this law had been to control the speculative purchase of land, it did not prove particularly effective. Land prices continued to rise while the supply of land available for urban use became scarcer. An analysis by the DAPD highlighted the saturation of available land inside the urban perimeter in the District of Bogotá (DAPD, 1999). In fact, the territory inside the urban perimeter of the city was estimated at 30,100 hectares of which only 8,400 hectares remained to be developed (DAPD, 2001c: 15).

Molina (1997) argues the spatial saturation of Bogotá is associated with its metropolitanisation. Cajica, Chía, Cota, Funza, Madrid, Mosquera, Sibate and Soacha are the principal municipalities of Cundinamarca Department which form the metropolitan area. Recent acceleration of population growth in these municipalities<sup>4</sup> suggests that residents may prefer to live in less expensive areas even if they are outside Bogotá District (Molina, 1997: 69). Residents who choose to live in these surrounding municipalities compensate for increased commuting time to Bogotá by being able to afford more residential space. However, those who cannot spare the time to commute nor afford to pay for land in the formal market, even in the lowest residential category have no choice but to obtain land via the informal market or to rent accommodation.

Under these circumstances: the increase in land prices and the shortage of land for development, the poor had little choice but to resort to informally developed settlements. During the period 1990-2000, the newly developed urban territory was calculated at 3,852 hectares, of which 2,140 hectares (55.6 per cent) was categorised as informal development (DAPD, 2005, mimeo).

---

<sup>4</sup> The total population of thirteen municipalities of Cundinamarca Department, including these seven, was estimated to 11 per cent of the total population of Bogotá in 1995.

## **New housing policy toward the poor**

During the 1990s, the housing authorities shifted from providing construction services and subsidised financing to the low-income sector to distributing subsidies to the target population as defined by monthly income level and tenancy of real estate. The new housing policy introduced the concept of social interest housing (hereafter VIS), or low-cost subsidised housing for the poor. Private construction companies were called on to build social interest housing using limited subsidies combined with long-term housing loans offered by private financial institutions including Saving and Housing Corporations (CAVs)<sup>5</sup> (ICAV, 1993; Gilbert, 2000; Gutiérrez, 1998).

The Urban Reform Law (Law No. 9/1989) provided the basic framework for the VIS programme. This law obliged the municipal authorities to create a special division dedicated to promoting low-cost subsidised housing. The law also simplified the administrative procedures required for purchasing land, issuing construction permits and transferring landownership (land property deed).

The last of these was accomplished through a special treatment of the term ‘acquisitive prescription’<sup>6</sup> as established originally in Law No.200/1936. The new law permitted the time of occupation required before ownership to be reduced to between three and five years in cases where the occupation was recognised as being for the construction of VIS. Not only new projects but also existing irregular settlements

---

<sup>5</sup> The CAVs were created in the early 1970s after the introduction of the Unit of Constant Purchasing Equivalent (UPAC). UPAC literally means ‘unit of constant purchasing power’. UPAC was the unit of saving for home purchase. The cost of construction and loan for a home was calculated in UPACs. Interest for UPAC savings was fixed at a slightly higher rate than that applied to general savings accounts and adjusted on a sliding scale according to fluctuations in consumer prices. The CAVs became the main private financial institutions specialising in home savings and loan. This system was introduced at the suggestion of Lauchlin Currie during the presidency of Misael Pastrana (1970-74). Currie, who was head of national planning in that period, aimed to promote economic growth by increasing domestic savings. The housing sector was therefore made a leading sector for economic growth (ICAV, 1992; Currie, 1993).

<sup>6</sup> Prescription, as a legal term, denotes the period of time required for continued action before a person can acquire or extinguish the legal effect of that action. Article No. 12, which outlined the transfer of landownership through ‘acquisitive prescription’, declared that an occupant could claim his/her right on a property as well as take legal effect of this possession (i.e., acquire ownership) once he/she had held that land for a specified period of time. The required time span varied on average from between ten to twenty years, depending on the good faith of the occupant and the category of land in which the settlement was located.

originally built through pirate sub-division were eligible to receive this recognition.

Article No. 44 of Law No. 9/1989 requires the ICT and the Central Mortgage Bank (BCH) to dedicate a significant portion of their resources toward financing VIS (Giraldo, 1989). The financial difficulties faced by ICT and BCH, however, forced the national government to abandon its policy of providing housing construction and financing through ICT. Law No. 3/1991 liquidated the ICT and created the new housing authority (INURBE) to provide subsidies for down payments and to offer technical assistance to link poor families to financing available through private institutions. Thus the primary housing policy switched to that of giving one-off subsidies (see chapter 2, pages 70-71). Despite this, the capacity of INURBE to attend to the needs of the homeless poor was quite limited. Table 4.3 shows the number of subsidies offered by INURBE during the period from 1991 to 2002.

Table 4.3 Subsidies provided by INURBE 1991-2002, Bogotá and total national

	1991-94		1995-98		1999-2002		Total (1991-2002)	
	No. subsidies	%	No. subsidies	%	No. subsidies	%	No. subsidies	%
Bogotá	13,287	7.4	9,232	4.6	7,620	8.4	30,139	6.3
National	181,247	100.0	199,591	100.0	90,799	100.0	471,641	100.0

Source: Data provided by the director of INURBE from internal document, August 2006.

These figures show that the subsidies offered by INURBE were insufficient to meet the demand in Bogotá: the housing deficit for the low stratus (1 and 2) alone was estimated at more than 250,000 in 1997 (see Table 4.1) yet only 9,232 subsidies were offered between 1995-98.

Families eligible for VIS subsidies were those earning less than four minimum salaries, without their own home, and whose accommodation was poorly constructed or overcrowded. The cost of VIS for a family earning between two to four minimum salaries was to fall somewhere between 50 and 135 minimum salaries (approximately

6,000 US dollars and 16,200 US dollars at 1995 prices). VIS for those with less than two minimum salaries were to cost no more than 50 minimum salaries, of which only up to 15 minimum salaries' worth could be paid for through subsidy (Gilbert, 2000: 174). Cash savings of at least 5 per cent of the total value of the housing was required before people could apply for a subsidy. Subsidies were never offered in cash but in the form of construction materials or labour wages. The remaining costs were to be covered through financing (loans) from CAVs.

This housing policy was clearly market-oriented. It was also exclusive for the sector covered by the social security system, given the reluctance of the CAVs to offer loans to those not tied to it (e.g., via family compensation funds). CAV lending for VIS construction, in other words, tended to be concentrated on the portion of the population with incomes between two and four minimum salaries. Those with incomes under two minimum salaries had access to INURBE subsidies but faced difficulties in obtaining loans from the CAVs. Informal sector workers were thus at a disadvantage. VIS subsidies were offered not only through INURBE but also through family compensation funds, which were expected to dedicate a fixed percentage of their resources toward the subsidies. Again, however, these subsidies were limited to formal sector workers whose companies participated in the funds. Thus informal sector workers, whose income level would most likely have been less than two minimum salaries, were excluded.

During the Gaviria administration from 1991 to 1993, the main focus of the programme lay in assisting the purchase either of used houses (20.7 per cent of total subsidies given) or of new ones in the form of sites-and-service development (61.6 per cent). After 1994, the priority shifted to upgrading rather than providing homes. This change reflected the new policy of the Samper administration to concentrate subsidies on the lowest income class (those with less than two minimum salaries). Table 4.4 shows the distribution of housing subsidies under the VIS programme during the Samper administration. Households with income levels under two minimum salaries

received 74 per cent of the total subsidies executed during this period, 44 per cent of which was earmarked for upgrading.

Practically speaking, the people in this sector could not afford a loan to purchase a new house even if they could obtain an INURBE subsidy toward a down payment (Chiappe de Villa, 1999: 13-14). Thus while the Samper administration sought to make the VIS programme attend to the needs of the lowest-income sector, its efforts did not increase the ability of the poor to purchase homes (either new or used), since they still had to combine subsidies with long-term loans offered by CAVs, which were unwilling to lend to the poor.

Table 4.4 Distribution of subsidies for VIS during the period 1994-97 (%)

(A) For households with income level under 2 minimum salaries 73.5%

Use of subsidy	Institution	%
Upgrading	INURBE	21.4
	FIU-FIS-Recrea (1)	5.9
	Municipalities	4.9
	Sub-Total	32.2
Purchase of new and used houses	INURBE	20.0
	CPVM (2)	4.5
	CCF(3)	16.9
	Sub-total	41.3

(B) For households with income level between 2 and 4 minimum salaries 26.5%

Use of subsidy	Institution	%
Purchase of new and used houses	INURBE	3.7
	CCF	18.9
	CPVM	3.8

Source: Chiappe de Villa (1999)

Note: (1) Social Investment Fund (FIS) and Urban Infrastructure Fund (FIU). Both are appropriations in the national budget for support of municipal government.

(2) Corporation of Housing for the Military Sector.

(3) Corporation of Family Compensation.

The crisis faced by UPAC (see footnote 5, page 164), the principal housing finance

system, presented an additional problem. UPAC had initially been tied to the consumer price index. However, over the next 28 years the mechanism for determining the interest rate underwent several changes, as a result of which the rate came to be adjusted more according to average fixed-deposit interest rates, rather than the consumer price index. In 1999, however, the Constitutional Court decreed that it was unconstitutional to tie loan repayments to the interest rate, leading to the end of the UPAC system. In 2000, the UPAC was replaced by the UVR (unit of constant value) system, based on the consumer price index (<http://www.icav.com>, accessed 12 December 2005).

As the UPAC system was discontinued and other banks started to provide long-term loans for individual housing purchases, the prerogatives given to the CAVs became much less significant than they once were. The CAVs now had to compete with local banks for middle- and upper-class borrowers of long-term housing loans, making it more difficult for them to maintain VIS loans at the privileged interest rate.

## CHANGES IN URBAN MANAGEMENT

There exist two types of regulations in relation to the informal settlements. The first deals with regularising existing settlements, the second with both punishing the land brokers for illegally sub-dividing land and with preventing the spread of further settlements. The following section will discuss the reforms of both of these types of regulations carried out in the 1990s.

### **Changes in regularisation policy in the 1990s**

Several reforms instituted in the 1990s facilitated the process of recognising the illegally developed settlements. Agreement No. 1/1986 simplified the procedure for regularising illegally developed land in zones categorised as AAIII (land reserved for level-three [low fertility] agricultural use). The low price of AAIII land made it a



prime target for pirate sub-division, despite the need for special legal approval in order for it to become recognised as urbanised land. Agreement No. 1 eased this approval.

The new land zoning law of 1990 (Agreement No. 6: the Statute for Regulating Space in the Bogotá Special District) also helped to streamline the regularisation process. This law substantially modified the stipulations set in the previous zoning law (Agreement No. 7/1979). First, the new law authorised the mayor of Bogotá to regularise multiple settlements under one decree and eliminated the need for such regularisation to be approved by the City Council. Second, it widened the definition of urban areas considered eligible to receive public services. Previously, the urban area of Bogotá had been divided into two zones: land inside the urban perimeter as designated under Agreement No. 7/1979, and land outside this area but within the public service boundary (*perímetro sanitario*). The latter was not intended for urbanisation but met land development criteria and therefore was eligible to receive public services. In order to regularise these settlements located beyond the urban perimeter, enforcement of a series of Agreements had been necessary. The new law made eligible for regularisation all settlements outside the service perimeter which had been developed by non-profit organisations as social interest housing prior to 28 July 1988. Third, the law simplified the prerequisites for regularising urban development by no longer making it necessary to transfer title deeds to individual settlers before commencing normalisation of public service provision. The easing of requirements on legality of property considerably reduced the time needed to complete the regularisation process.

A further change was the 1995 establishment of the principle of conditional regularisation. Under this principle, if land was partly unsuitable or dangerous for construction (although a shack or other dwelling had been built on it), that part was regularised separately after the problem was dealt with. This system helped clear the way for massive regularisation. In 1996 over 250 settlements were regularised, and Peñalosa, too, attempted to regularise more than 450 settlements during his period of

city government (1998-2000).

Finally there came changes to the structure of the directive board of the Commission of Urban Improvement, the institution in charge of regularisation. Since 1972, the board had been composed of the directors of the DAPD, the Secretary of Public Works, the Secretary of Government, representatives from the DAAC, the CVP and Department of Social Welfare and four members of Bogotá City Council each from different political wings. Decree No. 1421/1993 barred council members from the board, which depoliticised the regularisation process.

The above reforms speeded up the regularisation process, benefiting the inhabitants of the informal settlements. There were also some negative consequences, however. The quality of urbanisation suffered due to lack of compliance with requirements to create sufficient green and communal zones (Interview with Luis Carlos Jiménez, 22 August 2001). Irregular urbanisation, meanwhile, failed to disappear. Even as of 1998, irregular settlements covered approximately 6,000 hectares (23 per cent of the total urbanised area of Bogotá) and housed 1.5 million inhabitants, or about 26 per cent of the total population of the city (DAPD, 2001b: 18).

### **Reinforcement of legal sanctions against pirate sub-dividers**

The legal framework to control pirate urbanisation had existed since the late 1960s. Law No. 66/1968 gave the Bank Superintendent the power to monitor real estate transactions. Under this law, the Bank Superintendent could require urban developers to show previous records of transactions and transfer of title deeds. Land sub-dividers who did not submit the required documents were subject to a fine, temporary arrest or seizure of the real estate in question. In the 1970s, these powers were transferred to the Superintendent of Corporations. Thus throughout this time the responsibility to control pirate sub-dividers lay with the national authorities.

In 1987 this responsibility was transferred to the municipal governments. In Bogotá,

Agreement No. 16/1997 delegated the power to control and monitor illegal land sub-division to the General Secretariat of the Bogotá District government, which in turn assigned this new task to the Sub-secretariat of Housing Control. The laws stipulated in the late 1990s increased the penalty against the unauthorised brokers by setting prison terms and raising the fine. Although several high-profile cases such as Alfonso López vs. Alfredo Guerrero Estrada and Unir I and II vs. Mariano Porras were punished under these measures, on the whole the sheer number of sub-dividers in operation made it difficult for the Sub-secretariat of Housing Control to effectively control them all (Martín Molano 2000, 86-87). The reinforcement of legal sanctions against pirate urbanisation thus did not necessarily prevent illegal settlements from spreading.

### **Promotion of transfer of landownership**

The Peñalosa administration instituted a new policy of promoting transfer of land ownership to the poor in the irregular settlements. This 'Programme for Possession of Land Title Deed', which began in 1999, placed the CVP (Popular Housing Corporation) in charge of providing technical assistance to poor settlers who wished to obtain the title deed to their land. For the CVP, the programme signalled a shift from its original mission of providing the poor with finished houses and financing to that of supporting the upgrading of existing settlements.<sup>7</sup>

The CVP programme was classified into several modules based on the method taken to obtain landownership, including direct negotiation, cession of title (accomplished free of charge) and transfer of ownership by prescription (i.e., establishment of the right to possession). Of these methods, the last two were laid out in Law No. 9, Law No. 388

---

<sup>7</sup> The CVP was a municipal body created in 1942 to offer low-cost housing construction and financing in Bogotá in much the same fashion as the ICT at the national level. In the 1980s, the CVP turned toward administering sites-and-service programmes, most notably the Ciudad Bolívar Programme (see pages 181-183 of this chapter). In 1996 the CVP became involved in running relocation and rehabilitation programmes for people displaced through environmental damage or evacuation, while at the same time its main role shifted to upgrading settlements through giving technical assistance to families eligible for VIS subsidies under INURBE.

and Decree No. 540/1998, all part of a series of legal reforms issued to buttress the VIS programme. These laws accorded special treatment and privileges to VIS as well as to land earmarked for VIS construction. In order to obtain landownership through ‘cession free of charge’, for example, applicants had to establish that the land belonged to the state, that the house standing on it qualified as a VIS, and that this residence had existed prior to 28 July 1988. In order to obtain transfer of ownership by prescription, the occupant needed to show that the house qualified as social interest housing and that the land had been held peacefully and without interruption (i.e., the original owner had not called for the eviction of the settlers) for more than five successive years. During the Peñalosa administration, 1,151 land title deeds were obtained with CVP technical assistance (DAPD 2001a).

### **Making public service companies more efficient**

Changes in the public service companies could have significant implications for informal settlements given the central role of such companies in the regularisation process. The main focus here will be on the structural reforms undergone by the EAAB in the 1990s. These reforms had been enacted to save the companies from the financial crises in the early 1990s partly as a result of external debts accumulated during the 1980s. The redefinition of the role of the state with respect to provision of public services by the Constitution of 1991 also had the effect of spurring these changes forward.

#### *The new legal framework for public service provision*

The current legal regime for regulating water supply and sewerage is based principally on the Constitution of 1991 and Law No. 142/1994.

The Constitution of 1991 outlines the basic principles on which public service regulations should be based, stating in Article No. 365 that ‘It is the task of the State to

assure the efficient provision [of basic public services] to all the inhabitants of the national territory'. The constitution allows a wide variety of agencies to assume this task, including not only the state but also community-based organisations or individuals guaranteed by the state as capable of providing such services efficiently. In other words, the constitution opens up the possibility for non-public entities (i.e., the private sector) to become public service providers (CRA, 2001: 11-114; Avendaño and Basañes, 1999: 220).

Articles Nos. 365 to 367 are of particular significance. Article No. 365 gives the state responsibility for regulating, controlling and inspecting public services. Article No. 366 declares general public welfare and improvement of the quality of life to be the social objectives of the state, meaning that the state is obligated to provide for basic needs in terms of health, education, sanitation and drinking water. Finally, Article No. 367 states that the powers and responsibilities related to the provision of public services as well as their coverage, quality, financing and tariffs should be set down by law. Tariffs should be determined not only with regard to cost and economic efficiency but also in accordance with the concepts of equality, solidarity and income redistribution.

Law No. 142 implemented the above articles of the constitution by setting down the rights and duties of users and regulating local administrative agencies seeking to provide public services. The law placed the Superintendence of Public Service for Domestic Use in charge of controlling, inspecting and monitoring the public service companies. The fundamental objective of the law was to guarantee the efficiency and quality of public service, thereby improving the quality of life of the population.

Within this new legal framework, the public service companies could be separate from the state (although administered at the municipal or local level). The state became the regulator and inspector of public services, not the direct operator. Thus the state abandoned its long-time role as the monopolistic direct executor of public investment, shifting instead toward encouraging private-sector participation and civilian monitoring.

Law No. 142 set two different goals: first, to streamline the administration and operation of public services in the interests of reducing the financial burden on the state, and second, to do so while preserving the cross-subsidy system at least to some extent. New tariff regulation committees—the Commission for Regulation of Drinking Water, Sewerage and Waste Collection (CRA) for water and public sanitation and Commission for Regulation of Natural Gas and Electricity (CREG) for power, gas and other energy sources—were established in order to develop a new system for meeting these objectives.

### *EAAB*

#### *Financial crisis*

The EAAB fell into financial crisis toward the end of the 1980s. Its accumulated financial deficit grew by 64.5 per cent per year from 1980 to 1992, while external debt payments increased at an annual rate of 14.6 per cent during the same period (as calculated based on data taken from Controlaría Distrital de Santa Fe de Bogotá 1993).

Three main reasons lay behind this crisis. First was the problem of loss of water due to diversion of the supply by non-paying users. By 1991, the amount had grown to 40 per cent of total water supply charges (Jaramillo and Alfonso 1990; EAAB 1993). Second was the high proportion claimed by personnel costs within the total expenditure of the EAAB. Personnel expenses rose 10 per cent every year between 1982 and 1991, and in 1991 the EAAB was forced to take on even more debt to pay retirement benefits. Third was the foreign debt incurred through the huge investment for the Chingaza project, which was composed with the construction of the Chuza dam, the Wiesner filtration plant and conducting tunnels and pipes. The total investment for the project was estimated at 195.5 million dollars in 1980 (EAAB, 1997: 116). The Chingaza project encountered unexpected geological conditions that required changes to the original project design. These changes delayed completion, leading to major financial

difficulties in 1982-83 (Gilbert, 1990: 354). Although injection of state funds allowed the EAAB to survive this crisis, it still needed substantial reforms to become more efficient and competitive.

### *Transformation of the EAAB into a financially sound and efficient public company*

In 1993, the EAAB board of directors responded to the above fiscal crisis by developing a strategic plan for rehabilitating the company (EAAB, 1993). This plan called on the EAAB to introduce a more transparent system of personnel employment. Appointment by political recommendation was abolished in favour of a new system of public recruitment.<sup>8</sup> The EAAB also carried out organisational reforms to reduce the number of division heads, thus saving personnel costs and simplifying bureaucratic procedure (EAAB 1993). The EAAB also increased the penalties against clandestine use of water. It sought to deal with large-scale clandestine users (mostly in settlements established by pirate sub-dividers) by promoting subsidised loans for the construction of proper infrastructure.

The EAAB continued these strategies throughout the 1990s, reducing operational costs, cutting down on illegally consumed water and improving accountability and the quality of public services.

In 2002, a new system of utilising private capital through a 'third sector system' (*tercerización*: task division between the EAAB and a third company) was introduced. Tasks such as sales, public services and expansion of local networks are now performed by third companies through long-term outsourcing contracts. Public service centres known as Bogotá Special District Centre of Attention (CADEs) and *Gestores Zonales* (zone level attention centres) were also established at the same time that consumer data were systematised and put into a digital network. As a result, the number of people with access to drinking water increased and normalisation of water services in the poor sector

---

<sup>8</sup> Appointing politicians as members of the EAAB board of directors was prohibited in the new regime (Cárdenas and Olaya, 1994).

proceeded more quickly than it had previously (EAAB, 2002).

### *Revision of service charges*

The task of determining the ideal reference charges for water and basic sanitation services was entrusted to the CRA, the newly established regulatory body.

Law No. 142 was followed by several resolutions issued by the Minister of Economic Development in order to revise the service charge regime. CRA Resolution No. 151 (23 January 2001)<sup>9</sup> set down the fundamental framework for a system designed to scale tariffs by socioeconomic strata. The objective of this reform was to reduce subsidies given to lower-income users (strata 1 to 3) by gradually replacing the previous cross-subsidy system with that of 'solidarity support'. The new system set four different categories of water fees, namely fixed charges, basic charges (charge for basic consumption unit), complementary charges and 'luxury' charges. Users belonging to strata 1, 2 and 3 were to be subsidised for fixed and basic charges, but not for complementary and luxurious consumption. The solidarity support fund was paid for through a 20 per cent overcharge placed on upper-income residents (strata 5 and 6) and the industrial and commercial sector for all four types of use. Stratum 4 users were assigned no overcharge. The rates for the subsidies given to the poor were not fixed, although they were expected to fall near certain referential figures. Subsidies for users in stratum 1 (the lowest) were set to fall below 50 per cent of the total amount charged, while the upper limit was set at 40 per cent and 15 per cent for strata 2 and 3, respectively. Actual rates varied according to the balance between the solidarity support fund and total subsidy costs (the latter should be less than the former).

The above system was put into effect from 2001 to 2006. Compared to the old cross-subsidy system, the new regime reduced the burden placed on affluent users and the industrial and commercial sector while raising charges for those at lower income

---

<sup>9</sup> Subsequently modified by 2001 CRA Resolution No. 162.



levels (see Appendix E.3 for the new water charge for the period 1991 to 2003).

## *EEB*

### *Financial crisis and privatisation*

Problems faced by the EEB throughout the 80s included inefficiency, poor management of investment and production (i.e., failure to set appropriate charges), inability to control 'lost' electricity (diversion of power from either illegal tapping or from other pirate or fraudulent consumption) and accumulation of external debt resulting from delays in major projects such as the construction of the Guavio hydroelectric power plant. Lack of continuity in internal policies due to frequent changes in top management and the use of political influence in decision making also contributed to inefficient management of the company.

The inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the EEB became particularly notorious as the effects of political interest spread. The EEB board of directors included representatives of the Bogotá District Council who tended to act for their own political gain. Although the planning division of the EEB was responsible for developing investment plans within the scope of the annual budget, the final authority lay with the board and no project could possibly be approved without the patronage of the board members. Technical judgment was thus too often subordinated to political considerations in the decision-making process.

The growing burden of accumulated external debt and payments for debt service, not to mention the continuing problem of 'lost' power, drove the EEB deeper into crisis. But the definitive blow to EEB finances came with the delay of Guavio, a massive project that had turned out to cost more than initially planned. The delay of Project Guavio combined with a shortage of rainfall in 1991-92 resulted in a serious power shortage that forced the national government to resort to a planned cut-down of power in 1992.

Finally, in October 1997, the EEB was partially privatised and turned into a

joint-stock company. The consortium 'Luz de Bogotá', formed out of Spanish and Chilean joint private capital, acquired 49 per cent of the total stock. The other 51 per cent was held by the city of Bogotá. The EEB, which had previously monopolised all stages of power service from generation down to sales, was then divided into three separate companies: EMGESA (electricity generation company)<sup>10</sup>, CODENSA which specialised in distribution and service at the household level and the EEB, which now specialised in power supply from power generation sites (Benavides and Fainboim, 2002). The capital injected to privatise the EEB, more than twice the amount initially projected by Bogotá City, rescued the EEB from accumulated debt and stimulated the rationalisation of the power sector.

#### *Rationalisation of the power sector and reform of the service charge system*

Law No. 143/1994 made CREG responsible for setting referential charges for power services. Five regulators (experts on power generation and cost of production) were assigned to analyse costs and determine charges to users in each category. The previous service charge system for power, like that for water, had been based on the principle of cross-subsidies between different socioeconomic strata.

The creation of CREG prompted a review of the cross-subsidy system. New legislation issued in 1997 (Law No.79) effectively reduced the subsidies given under the former service charge system.<sup>11</sup> Under the new system, the maximum subsidy for the poorest sector (stratum 1) was set at 50 per cent of subsistence-level consumption (200 kw per month), with the upper limit placed at 40 per cent and 15 per cent for strata 2

---

<sup>10</sup> EMGESA means electricity generation company, controlled by the Spanish company ENDESA, but majority-owned by the EEB. EMGESA operates two generation plants fed by Muña under a 1997 concession. Before that, EEB owned the plants.

<sup>11</sup> Before 1994, users were assigned different charges for power according to whether they were residential customers (further divided into six income strata) or commercial and industrial users. Basic consumption tariffs were subsidised up to 85 per cent for the poorest sector (stratum 1), while the two upper income strata (5 and 6) and commercial and industrial users were required to pay 40 per cent over their own basic consumption. (Stratum 4 was considered neutral and therefore neither received nor paid any subsidy.)

and 3, respectively. Stratum 4 was neutral in terms of subsidy, while the upper strata (5 and 6) as well as commercial and industrial sectors contributed an added 20 per cent over the cost of their own basic consumption. Legislation made effective as of 2001 called for the former service charge system to be gradually phased out until completely replaced by the new system by the end of 2002 (see Appendix E.4 for electricity charges).

Following privatisation in 1997, responsibility for normalising the service for the irregular settlements fell to CODENSA, the company in charge of the distribution and sale of power. Now that it had become private, CODENSA abolished the practice of offering provisional services which had been one of the reasons behind the economic inefficiency of the EEB. 'Frontier transformers' (transformers for installation outside the urban perimeter) and other such 'provisional infrastructure' formerly offered to irregular settlements were discontinued, as a result of which the time required for regularisation of power service decreased considerably. During the time of the EEB, irregular settlements given such provisional infrastructure (which came with minimum payment obligations) had sometimes neglected to complete the regularisation process, since doing so would require them to begin paying for the actual amount consumed. Therefore, the stage of provisional services could easily be prolonged by up to five to ten years.

Today, normalisation of service takes much less time than it did previously. The whole process is now completed in approximately two months. CODENSA installs transformers, interconnecting cables and power meters to measure consumption immediately after entering into an agreement with the community, and the cost of installation is charged to each user on a two-year payment plan. Thus the residents of irregular settlements now receive a better and faster service although it costs them more.

After PIDUZOB (see chapter 3), state intervention toward the existing irregular settlements continued to be designed as an integral approach. In the 1990s, these upgrading programmes emphasised community involvement. Some project adopted the co-finance framework<sup>12</sup> to promote ownership by the beneficiaries, and others introduced a mechanism to involve the community in the decision making process. The following section describes representative cases from the 1990s and outlines the main critiques of them.

### **Ciudad Bolívar Programme (1985-1994)<sup>13</sup>**

The Ciudad Bolívar Programme, was a project co-financed by the Bogotá District and IADB. At the outset, this programme was designed to be executed in five years, but in fact it took ten years and the major results came in the 1990s. The name ‘Ciudad Bolívar’ was taken from the name of the locality of Bogotá. Ciudad Bolívar locality was the centre of the programme’s target area compound of six localities<sup>14</sup> in the southern part of Bogotá where irregular settlements were concentrated. The area of intervention covered approximately 1,100 hectares and had a population of 1,500,000 inhabitants in 1984. Both figures accounted for more than 30 per cent of the size and population of Bogotá as a whole at the time. The total expenditure for the programme was estimated at 23.5 million US dollars,<sup>15</sup> of which 13.5 million US dollars was provided by an IADB loan and the remaining amount provided by the Bogotá District (IADB, 1983).

The programme was divided into seven sub-programmes by category: roads (construction, repair and paving); provision of drinking water and sewerage facilities;

---

<sup>12</sup> See chapter 5, page 250 for the detailed explanation of community co-finance framework.

<sup>13</sup> Although the programme started in the 1980s, the sub-programmes were mainly executed in the 1990s.

<sup>14</sup> San Cristóbal, Tunjuelito, Bosa, Kennedy, Rafael Uribe Uribe and Ciudad Bolívar.

<sup>15</sup> The total amount of resources invested in this programme rose to 28.549 million US dollars, 21 per cent higher than the initial estimate.

housing by means of the 'sites-and-service' system; health; education; construction of a communal service centre; regularisation and legalisation of neighbourhoods.

According to the IADB post-evaluation report on the Programme (BID, 1997), living conditions of the lowest socioeconomic strata (strata 1 and 2) of the irregular settlements located in the target area were improved<sup>16</sup> and the target area became better integrated with the rest of Bogotá District. However, there were some negative aspects. First, the Unit for Coordination of the Programme of Bogotá District did not have the capacity to coordinate and oversee the institutional involvement of the various participating public agencies. In addition, the public service agencies, especially the EAAB, did not have sufficient understanding of the objectives of the programme, which caused delays in the execution of each project. Second, the selection of the sites for investment of some sub-programmes was not adequate. Difficult topographical conditions for construction and service provision (e.g. either steep or wetland terrain) meant additional costs for the whole programme. Third, the programme itself had the demonstration effect of prompting migration of the poor toward the southern areas of Bogotá. After commencement of the programme, not only did the population of existing settlements increase but new irregular settlements were also established by illegal land subdivision. As a result, the number of potential beneficiaries of the programme was higher than initially estimated, requiring modification of the scale of each project.

The most serious failure of the programme, as criticised by local residents is the incompleteness of the sites-and-services programme, whose implementation was assigned to the CVP. The CVP selected eligible households for the sites-and-services programme; coordinated with public service agencies such as the EAAB and EEB to provide basic services and offered technical assistance to the inhabitants for self-help

---

<sup>16</sup> Road construction and repair was carried out for approximately 100 settlements, water supply lines were installed in 15 settlements, sewerage systems were built for 33 settlements; drainage systems for conservation of rainfall were built in 40 settlements. A multi-medical centre and six health care centres were built. Three community integral service centres and 16 neighbourhood care houses were constructed. Finally, 89 irregular settlements were regularised (BID, 1997).

home building. However, the CVP failed in not only financial management but also technical support. Firstly, the construction of 'basic units'<sup>17</sup> was not completed in the scheduled period. Secondly, housing lots were not sub-divided according to the physical differentiations of the land, causing conflict among the inhabitants. Thirdly, water supply and sewerage services were not completed in the period of the programme due to CVP financial problems. Many of the inhabitants registered for this sub-programme consequently had to organise themselves in order to negotiate with the EAAB to obtain those services (Jaramillo, Hataya and Alfonso, 1996).

Persistent criticisms of the failures of the sites-and-services sub-programme gave the Programme a negative image. Yet it made possible the creation of social infrastructure such as large state certified educational centres, kindergartens and sports centres, as well as roads providing access to other parts of Bogotá that significantly benefited the inhabitants of the southern localities. The Ciudad Bolívar Programme also had a certain propaganda effect in making the area a centre of attention not only locally but internationally. 'Ciudad Bolívar' became synonymous with 'poverty' and thus the destination of international aid and NGO support.

### **OSP (Works with an Educational Outcome)<sup>18</sup>**

The OSP programme, which began in 1996 under the first Mockus administration (1995-97), aimed to stimulate community participation through implementation of small community projects. The programme trained participants to accomplish projects through mutual cooperation.

The OSP mainly carried out such small-scale projects as the construction of sidewalks, steps, parks and community halls. The programme combined financial support from the Bogotá District with community participation, hence its

---

<sup>17</sup>The foundation and framework of dwellings were to be completed with the resources of the project. The rest of each dwelling was to be built through the efforts of the eligible inhabitants themselves.

<sup>18</sup> The OSP programme started in the first Mockus administration and continued through the Peñalosa and the second Mockus administrations.

characterisation as a 'state-community partnership'. The size of the projects ranged on average from 30 to 40 million pesos (15 to 20 thousand U.S. dollars in 2000 terms).

OSP training proceeded as follows. Community leaders (JAC or other self-identified leaders) who responded to the open call of the OSP attended eight workshops organised by the DAAC over a period of about two months. The participants first learned how to perceive and define the needs of the community, after which each of them designed a proposal for a project to be funded by the OSP. The proposals were then analysed and appraised by all the members. The participants themselves selected the projects to be carried out. Finally, the leaders of the successful proposals were taught how to enter into contracts with the state or other organisations in addition to other expertise related to project management (DAAC, 2000).

Most of the costs of the projects were funded by the DAAC, while the local inhabitants provided the labour. The community signed a contract with the DAAC and assumed responsibility for all aspects of project management including accounting. The DAAC provided technical assistance and undertook supervision in order to guarantee the quality of the projects. A specialist in community education worked with the participants throughout the process to promote community participation in the field (Alcaldía Mayor de Santa Fe de Bogotá, D.E., 1998: 39).

Bogotá city government invested 14,253 US dollars to finance 592 OSP projects between 1996 and 1999. Through a series of workshops, the DAAC trained more than two thousand community leaders who then formed 1,029 organisations. Participants learned skills such as basic technical (especially architectural) knowledge, contract writing and project management. For 2000, another 12,413 dollars were appropriated in the city budget to finance 400 projects under the OSP (UN-Habitat, Best practice database, <http://www.bestpractices.org>, accessed 1 November 2006). At the end of 2000, 500 organisations were already trained and it was agreed that the first 200 programmes were to be financed by the 2001 budget. Typical projects involved the creation or

recovery of green zones (such as the construction of small parks); construction of sidewalks and communal halls in the settlement. The first two categories were co-financed by DAAC, IDR and IDU (DAAC, 2000).

**South Bogotá Project (*Proyecto de Mejoramiento de Barrios Sur con Bogotá*) (1999-2003)**

The 'South Bogotá Project' is an excellent example of a city-sponsored programme designed to promote integrated development of the irregular settlements of Bogotá. Originally conceived by the DAAC as a means of improving the living standards of the poor through community participation, the programme was partly funded through international financial support from the KFW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the German governmental agency of international assistance.

The programme set out four principal fields of intervention: construction of physical infrastructure (water, sewerage, drainage and internal roads), provision of social and communal equipment (hospitals, educational facilities and community halls), encouragement of community participation and coordination between different institutions. The aim was to achieve 'integrated upgrading', not only in the sense of cooperation between the different institutions involved in the programme, but also through improving all aspects of settlement life—from physical infrastructure, public services and social equipment to community empowerment—in an integrated manner (see Appendix 4a.2 for distribution of funds by institutions).

The target of the programme was the poorest sector in Bogotá. The intervention area covered a total of 40 settlements spread out over three zones in the three localities: Rafael Uribe Uribe, San Cristóbal and Usme (see Table 4.5 and Figure 4.2). The programme was coordinated by two working groups composed of technical and social specialists, respectively. By 2000, the programme had achieved considerable success (see Appendix 4a.3 for the goal and scope of the project).



Table 4.5 Basic data on the zones of intervention by 'South Bogotá Project'

	Zone 1 Bolonia	Zone 2 Ladrilleras	Zone 3 Via Oriente	Total
No. of settlements	14	16	10	40
Population	18,743	41,249	23,175	83,167
No. of lots	3,324	7,153	4,376	14,853
Area (hectares)	43	105	120	268
Area of local roads(square metres)	144,839	262,614	269,865	677,318

Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000).




Figure 4.2 Zones of intervention by 'South Bogotá Project'

Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000)

The project promoted community participation in the decision-making process. The head office was responsible for coordination between the public institutions (the executor of the projects) and the members of the affected communities. Figure 4.3 shows how communities were given the opportunity to participate in the design process as well as in the final decision-making. The same system was also used by community members to monitor the progress of the project.

The community was also called upon to co-finance projects having to do with road construction (i.e., development of internal transportation networks). Contracts between the IDU and the community in question required the latter to provide 15 per cent of the total cost of road construction, in what was known as ‘shared project management’ (*gestión compartida*).<sup>19</sup>

---

<sup>19</sup>One reason behind this sharing of costs was the fact that the international co-financing promised by the German government (corresponding to approximately 13 per cent of the total cost of the project) had not yet come through. Most of the executed projects were accordingly financed out of the district’s own budget.




Figure 4.3: Monitoring and co-evaluation system of community and public institutions for the South Bogotá Project

Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000)

## **De-marginalisation Programme**

The De-marginalisation Programme was one of the top priorities of the Peñalosa administration. As the name indicates, the main objective of the programme was to reduce the ‘marginality’ (both socioeconomic and geographical) of the disadvantaged population of the city. The programme, in other words, aimed to improve the quality of life of the population belonging to the lowest socioeconomic strata (1 and 2) at the same time it sought to eradicate the irregular settlements, that is, to complete the regularisation process.

Like the Ciudad Bolívar Programme and the South Bogotá Project, the De-marginalisation Programme emphasised an integral approach. A technical and social working committee each composed of outside specialists (not ordinal public officers of the district) functioned as the coordinating agencies. All the related institutions were invited to participate in these committees in order to enhance efficiency and avoid duplication or misunderstanding.

The programme commenced in March 1998, and the rest of that year was spent determining which areas to target, and how. Several meetings named ‘community works’ were held during the design and planning process to inform the inhabitants of the target areas as well as receive feedback from them.

The initial plan called for the programme to execute 1,500 community-based projects and regularise 450 settlements spread out over 11 localities. Areas for intervention were selected based on the number of strata 1 and 2 residents as well as of irregular settlements that needed upgrading. More than 70 settlements (neighbourhoods) were finally selected and then further classified into four categories according to level of priority. Figure 4.4 shows these categorisations as of 1997. Five areas designated as belonging to the first stage (highest priority) became the ‘models’ for the programme. Other settlements were assigned to stage 2- A, 2-B or 3 depending on their current




Figure 4.4 Target area of intervention by 'De-marginalisation Programme'

Source: DAPD, 'Programa de desmarginalización de barrios: fases de intervención', 2000.

state.<sup>20</sup> The area around Parque Entrelasnubes<sup>21</sup> was excluded from the programme, as it had already been made part of the South Bogotá Project.

The programme established several categories for investment but out of these, water supply, sanitary sewerage, rainfall drainage and pavements were most strongly emphasised (see Appendix 4a.4: amounts allocated for the programme by participant institutions for fiscal year 1999).

Unfortunately, the programme faced one crippling problem: uncertain funding. The Bogotá District had originally planned to procure the necessary funds by liquidating the ETB (Bogotá Telephone Company) through international tender. The actual revenue produced by the sale of the ETB, which according to plans would have provided 35 per cent of the total amount of investment in the programme, was thus expected to have a huge bearing on the scale of the projects. The disposal of the ETB was not carried out until the end of the Peñalosa administration, however, and the programme was cut back significantly as a result.

According to Oscar Moreno, a representative of the technical committee,<sup>22</sup> the programme was able to accomplish all planned projects in the five areas designated as being in the first stage. Several projects for areas in the second stage (2-A and 2-B)—most of them having to do with road paving and installation of water supply and sewerage systems—were also completed, and those that were not had already had their feasibility study, cost estimates, tender and contracts done. Whether the unfinished projects would be carried out would depend on the budgets of the related agencies during the following fiscal year. This representative's evaluation of the programme was thus generally highly positive.

---

<sup>20</sup>Assignments were made based on diagnostic analysis of the condition of such basic infrastructure as water, sanitary sewerage and rainfall drainage.

<sup>21</sup>A large reserved area not zoned for urban development located in the southeast corner of Bogotá District where the three southern localities of Usme, Rafael Uribe Uribe and San Cristóbal meet. The area had originally been set aside for an ecological park, hence its name.

<sup>22</sup>Based on an interview carried out by the author in September 2000 (three months before the end of the programme).

However, interviews with inhabitants of the stage 2 settlements revealed distrust in the programme, a finding that seems to reflect the persistent lack of faith among the poor in the ability of social investment programmes to survive changes in city administration. Making resident perceptions even worse in this case was the fact that the sale of the ETB, which had been expected to provide the financial resources for this programme, had failed to be carried out in time.<sup>23</sup>

## DECENTRALISATION AND COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

The Decentralisation process made progress in the 1990s, which created a new trend in Bogotá city governance. Community participation was promoted in city administration as well. As mentioned, these processes derived from the principles of the 1991 Constitution. The following section will describe these processes which took place at the same time as the new urban management systems (discussed above) were implemented.

### **Creation of the JALs**

Prior to 1988, the mayor of Bogotá was appointed by the nation's president, thus city politics were linked to and influenced by the two main parties (liberals and conservatives) (Dávila, 2004). The poor, especially those living in irregular settlements, have always been an attractive source of votes for these political parties. Hence the relationship between the political parties and the leaders of the JACs has most typically been that of patron and client. As shown in chapter 3 (pages 151-52), the people of the irregular settlements were often co-opted and lured to vote for local politicians in

---

<sup>23</sup> The second Mockus administration later merged the De-marginalisation Programme and the South Bogotá Project into the Programme of Integral Improvement of Barrios (PMIB) and placed them under the jurisdiction of the CVP. Thus in this case, the upgrading programmes initiated by Peñalosa did survive the change in administration.



exchange for promises of construction material, food or employment. One of the resources used to pay for these promises was a special budget item called *auxilio* (i.e., supplementary expense budgets allocated to representatives of Congress or of municipal councils). The politicians had other resources such as political pressure on the operation of public service companies through membership of the directive board.

Political decentralisation was a prerequisite for the poor to gain political autonomy and participation. Political decentralisation in Bogotá began with the introduction of popular elections for mayor in 1989 and for representatives (*ediles*) to the local administrators committees (JALs) of the city's 20 localities in 1992. These elections afforded citizens increased opportunities for political participation. The Constitution of 1991 further advanced the process of decentralisation by establishing the principle of 'administrative decentralisation', which placed local planning and public investment in the hands of the localities (through the *ediles* and locality heads, *alcalde local* [before 1991 called *alcalde menor*]). The constitution also introduced the concept of 'participative planning' (promotion of citizen participation in decisions having to do with local development) in an effort to enhance transparency of public investment. Other citizens' rights guaranteed by the constitution included the right to participate in politics, monitor public investment and make claims (*tutela*) for perceived needs and problems.

Thus it seemed at least in theory as if the poor in the irregular settlements had gained new political channels through which to express their needs directly and autonomously. In practice, however, things did not go so smoothly. The Castro administration, which created the JALs, was forced to introduce changes to the system as early as in 1993. The task of implementing the new policy of decentralisation in Bogotá fell mainly to the Mockus (1996-98) and Peñalosa (1998-2000) administrations. Mockus, although he tried to maintain a harmonious collaborative relationship with the City Council and locality heads, was genuinely non-partisan. Peñalosa concentrated administrative power



in the city mayor and his cabinet and radically decreased the authority of the JALs. The decentralisation process thus experienced something of a zigzag throughout the 1990s.

### **Local elections in the 1990s**

Election of the *ediles* was held in Bogotá for the first time in March 1992. How well the *ediles* represented local citizens, however, remained questionable for several reasons.

One problem was the high abstention rate typical of most elections in Bogotá. The rate for March 1992 was higher than usual, exceeding 80 per cent. This figure was attributed to delays in getting the election approved, which put voters on extremely short notice and gave them little chance to familiarise themselves with the issues (Velásquez, 2003: 64). The second reason was more technical. The candidacy system was based on 'lists' and not on political parties. Each candidate for the position of *edil* posted a list of supporters backed by a faction of a political party or civic movement, resulting in the atomisation of candidates. No single political party could rally enough momentum and to make matters worse, there was more segregation. As a result, the *ediles* who were elected won with only a few votes.

Jaime Castro started his administration (June 1992 to December 1994) as the first Bogotá mayor to work with the popularly elected JALs. His first task was to appoint heads of each of the localities from among three candidates backed by the *ediles* of each JAL to complete the structure of each local administration. But city councillors continued to exert strong influence on the locality heads, and this influence prevented the *ediles* from exercising true autonomy in their decision-making processes.

The second round of election for JAL representatives was held in October 1994. This time, the electoral performance of the citizens was much better. There was more recognition of the JALs and their representatives among the electorate of each district. The degree to which the JALs represented citizens, however, did not improve significantly in comparison with the 1992 election, although the rate of abstention did

slightly decrease (Velásquez, 2003; Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis Carlos Galán, 2001). Fragmentation under the same political party (via the lists) continued. Candidates seeking to run independently had to fulfil several requirements, such as to collect 5,000 signatures. Those reluctant to go through this effort had no choice but to be affiliated with a traditional political party.

The effectiveness of the elections for *ediles* continued to suffer from high voter abstention rates. Over time, however, the makeup of candidates (as gauged by affiliated political group) did slowly begin to vary. Although liberals and conservatives still claim the majority in terms of absolute numbers, this dominance has receded slightly in the more recent elections (see Table 4.6). *Ediles* backed by other political parties including the new civic movements have, meanwhile, come to assume growing significance (Gutiérrez, 1998).

This diversification in the political backgrounds of the JAL representatives (*ediles*) may have something to do with the non-partisan profiles of Bogotá mayors such as Mockus and Peñalosa. Mockus, formerly president of the National University, was the first elected mayor from a non-political background. His electoral campaign was genuinely independent and non-partisan. Peñalosa, who had run in previous mayoral elections as a liberal candidate, finally won in 1997 as an independent. Such trends in the mayoral elections of the late 1990s may very well have encouraged the growth of non-traditional political factions and civic movements.

Table 4.6 Results of the elections of *ediles* in the 1990s by political party/movement

Political party/movement	1992		1994		1997	
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
Liberal	132,238	24.3	324,404	48.4	520,232	45.6
Conservative	71,203	13.1	142,802	21.3	200,449	17.6
Leftist	25,418	4.7	18,311	2.7	14,310	1.3
Civic movement	69,815	12.9	21,172	3.2	60,262	5.3
Indigenous movement	967	0.2	10,081	1.5	14,203	1.2
Christian	22,223	4.1	11,905	1.8	37,209	3.3
ANAPO(1)	0	0.0	5,962	0.9	2,901	0.3
<i>Metapolítico</i>	6,880	1.3	4,226	0.6	5,393	0.5
Alliance	1,280	0.2	0	0.0	11,822	1.0
Other parties	60,616	11.2	37,016	5.5	127,597	11.2
Sub-total	390,640	71.9	575,879	85.9	994,378	87.2
Blank ballot	152,546	28.1	94,908	14.1	145,479	12.8
Valid votes	543,186	100.0	670,787	100.0	1,139,857	100.0

	1992	1994	1997
Poll (%)	28.9	32.6	50.3
Two major parties proportion (%) (2)	37.5	69.7	63.2

Source: Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis Carlos Galán (2001)

Note: (1) National Popular Alliance

(2) Proportionate distribution of Liberal and Conservative parties.

### **Relationship between the Bogotá mayors and the JALs: efforts to reduce clientelism and corruption**

Inefficiency, corruption and poor administration ability were the qualities most commonly attributed to the JALs before the system underwent reform in 1993. The aforementioned first appointment of locality heads (*alcaldes locales*) carried out by Castro in 1992 failed to halt clientelism and corruption, and only served to underline the strength of the connection between locality heads and city council members. The powers of the JALs, especially in relation to the management of local development funds, were not clearly defined, and they were also hampered by the unrealistically tight schedules given to them to submit proposals on local development. As a result, less than half the funds set aside for public investment in the local budgets were actually spent during the first fiscal year (1993) that the popularly elected *ediles* were in office (Velásquez 2003). The *ediles* tended to award contracts for local development projects to supporters from their own constituencies, and the locality heads did not intervene. The city mayor's authority vis-à-vis the locality heads was limited, and without power of dismissal there was little he could do to control corruption.

#### *Castro administration (1992-94)*

Castro undertook to reform the JAL system in 1993. Presidential Decree No. 1421, which approved the charter of the city of Bogotá, introduced several changes to local administration, for example by giving the mayor the power to dismiss locality heads. The decree also placed local development funds (FDLs) under the jurisdiction of the city mayor and barred *ediles* from sitting on the executive boards of the FDLs, a practice that had formerly been the source of much corruption (given that the *ediles* had the power to approve the contracts).

Budgets having to do with local development were required to be first approved by the JALs. After the decree, the rate of budget execution by the JALs improved. Castro extended technical support to local planning efforts in the 20 localities. The locality

heads and *ediles* continued to wield considerable influence, however, and clientelism and corruption did not disappear.

*Mockus administration (1996-98)*

The Mockus administration introduced several innovations into the local planning process. Mockus was concerned that the scarcity of resources made available to the JALs for local public investment<sup>24</sup> was making them easy targets for corruption. Accordingly, his administration placed the highest priority on the promotion of ‘citizen culture’, emphasising not only citizens’ rights and duties but also ethics and transparency in matters having to do with public administration. He tried to reduce corruption and improve the transparency in the decision-making process, for example through holding educational meetings to involve citizens in local planning. In other words, Mockus tried to stimulate citizen participation in city administration and to thereby impose civic control on the JAL use of local budgets without upsetting relations with them.

*Peñalosa administration (1998-2000)*

The Peñalosa administration established the UEL (Local Executive Unit) to issue contracts for local development projects. The directors of the UELs were all appointed from among the city mayor’s own subordinate officers and advisors. Thus Peñalosa effectively stripped locality heads of the power to allocate resources. His distrust in the locality heads and the *ediles* was what prompted him to take this alternative.

Velásquez (2003: 207-14) points out the merits and demerits of the UEL system. On one hand, the quality of development projects rose and opportunities for corruption decreased. On the other hand, however, efficiency and effectiveness did not improve as much as expected. All local development projects had to be inspected by the UELs and

---

<sup>24</sup> Under Decree No. 1421, the funds to be addressed to the localities had been set at a mere 10 per cent of the total district budget.

then be approved by the central municipal administration of Bogotá, resulting in too much bureaucracy and unnecessary paperwork. Increase in central control over local budgets also meant delays in project execution, since the UELs had to work in accordance with the financial state of the central government. The UELs proved too slow to respond to urgent projects, most of which actually required only small amounts of funds. Finally, the UELs almost certainly impeded the progress of local autonomy (i.e., of the JALs) and citizen participation in development planning, thus casting doubts over the districts' commitment to the principles of decentralisation and democratisation.

### **Citizen participation in decisions on local development (*Encuentros Ciudadanos*)**

It took some time before the concept of 'participatory planning' as laid out in Article No. 342 of the Constitution of 1991 could be properly institutionalised. The first Mockus administration attempted to involve citizens in local development decisions through educational sessions held during town meetings. At these sessions, residents wrote down on cards what they thought their locality needed before depositing them in transparent ballot boxes. The citizens were also required to assign priorities to the needs they identified. After the meeting, the JAL of that neighbourhood analysed the results and determined which projects to implement. Approved projects were then funded from the locality budget (Rojas, 2004: 309-10; Villareal, 2001). In this way, people became more assured of the transparency of the decision-making process, which in turn helped to reduce clientelistic practices.

The Peñalosa administration created a system of participatory planning in which projects proposed from within the community (either by individuals or by organisations) openly competed for funds at town meetings called *Encuentros Ciudadanos* (Citizen Meetings). The JALs were to analyse and select submitted projects based on the scores assigned to each by the participants. In 1998, 252 projects were selected through five *Encuentros Ciudadanos*. The *Encuentros Ciudadanos* were prized events among the

communities, although the insufficient time given to administrative officers to analyse the submitted projects did present some difficulties.

As previously discussed, Peñalosa later established the UEL to take charge of designing local development projects, thus withdrawing from the participatory planning campaign. This turnaround was in part due to the failure of Citizen Encounters to stop clientelism. *Ediles* continued to demonstrate partisan influence, and they cleverly found ways to manipulate the supposedly participatory decisions on local planning made at *Encuentros Ciudadanos* (Velásquez, 2003: 217).

The second Mockus administration (2000-2003) continued the citizen meetings introduced by Peñalosa. Once again, however, not enough time was allotted to analyse and select the proposed projects within the schedule necessary to execute the budget during the fiscal year. Thus clientelistic practices persisted and the frustration of the citizens remained (Interview with Eduardo Restrepo, a district officer in charge, August 2004).<sup>25</sup>

### **Citizens' rights to monitor public policy and file claim against city authorities**

The Constitution of 1991 protected citizens' rights to make a claim against the state whenever the latter infringed citizen resources or property or failed to fulfil its duty. This right to make a claim or the right to protection was known as *tutela* (O'Brien, 1995: 19). City institutions were bound by law to respond to *tutela* filed against them by citizens, although this by no means guaranteed a favourable outcome.

The civic monitoring system established by Law No. 563/2000 provided another framework for ensuring accountability in local administration. This law, based on Article No. 270 of the Constitution of 1991 and Article No. 100 of Law No. 134/1994, required the appointment of one or more civic ombudspersons from the affected neighbourhood for all instances of public intervention (execution of public investment).

---

<sup>25</sup> For the positive view on citizen encounters, see Pizano (2003).

### **Civic protests in the 1990s**

The number of civic movements in the 1990s declined in comparison to previous decades. But ad hoc protests and collective action continued to arise, if less frequently.<sup>26</sup> The achievement of greater political participation and speedier regularisation in the 1990s hardly meant that there was no more reason for protest. Civic strikes and urban protests, after all, remained the last recourse of the people to speak out against the city authorities.

García (1997) analyses the events reported in the press as civic protests during the Castro administration and during the first half of the first Mockus administration. From June 1992 to December 1994, 77 civic protests occurred in Bogotá, of which 65 were demonstrations against the district government or local administration (García, 1997: 113). Most of these protests were related to the demand for public services, housing, regularisation of settlements and environmental preservation. They requested the city government transfer a greater proportion of the local development fund in order to resolve their demands. During the Castro administration, there were a number of reasons for urban protests, however protests against the increased cost of public services, particularly of water, and against the partial adjustment of stratification<sup>27</sup> of the city were most prominent.

In 1993 a series of civic strikes occurred in Bogotá the most significant of which took place on 11 October. The civic strike was carried out in the Ciudad Bolívar, involving various settlements in the same locality (*El Tiempo*, 1993a; 1993b; 1993c; *El Espectador*, 1993d; 1993e; 1993f; *Voz*, 1993c; *El Nuevo Siglo*, 1993a). It aimed to protest against the city administration's failure to address the needs of the poor

---

<sup>26</sup> See García (2002) for the analysis of urban protests at national level. At regional level, the causes of protests were more diversified, such as protest for peace building, protest against political violence. However, around fifty per cent were related to the shortage of public services and housing.

<sup>27</sup> The change of stratification happened when the authorities decided to categorise some of the residential sectors in an upper stratus. This meant the increase of service charge, which affected the life of the poor.



adequately with respect to health, education, public services and security problems. The organisers, the representatives of the committee of the civic strike, requested that the city authorities allocate a greater proportion of their budget to tackling these issues in the local development plan (*El Nuevo Siglo*, 1993c). On 15 October, Bogotá district administration signed the agreement based on the proposal of the civic strike commission. It confirmed that the residents of Ciudad Bolívar maintain in the lowest stratus (estrato 1) and committed the district administration to assisting them with particular regard to public service charges. It was agreed to create a special EAAB commission to review the pending claims on the increased tariff as well as claims of erroneous charges; to accelerate the installation of new telephone lines; to build a youth centre and to promote job creation for young people in the locality. For this project, a budget of 22 million Colombian pesos was reserved (*El Espectador*, 1993g).

The result of the civic strike of the Ciudad Bolívar had a ripple effect. Movements to organise a civic strike of the same nature spread to other localities, such as Usaquén, Kennedy, Engativá, Suba and Bosa.

The poor sectors of the Usme locality also organised civic strikes in this year. The first attempt was in April 20 1993. The reason for the protest in April was to protest against erroneous invoices for service charges for water and sewerage. As a result, the EAAB agreed to review the charging system. The people again plunged into a civic strike in 17 June 1993, claiming that they had been abandoned by the city administration. In both cases, the people's conventional strategy was to block the avenue leading to Villavicencio, the capital city of neighbouring Meta Department. In the June civic strike, the communities of the settlements near Caracas Avenue also participated, demanding the construction of a bypass between their settlements and Caracas Avenue. For them, blockage of Caracas Avenue was the most popular strategy (*El Espectador*, 1993a; 1993b). To negotiate with the communities, the city government sent a commission made up of representatives of related institutions (such as the

Secretary of Public Works, EAAB, etc.) who signed a memo promising execution of works to respond to their needs (*El Espectador*, 1993c; *Voz*, 1993a; 1993b). The content of the agreement included the acceleration of regularisation of the settlements, road construction and construction of a pedestrian bridge over Caracas Avenue toward the south.

As these examples show, in this period the communities claims regarding public services related to either the lack of service provision or to erroneous service charges, particularly with reference to the EAAB. This tendency continued through 1994. In many cases, the civic strikes, if well organised, pressurised the city authorities into providing the space for negotiation. These experiences reveal that the civic strike has become a useful strategy for getting the communities heard.

According to García (1997), 80 urban protests occurred during the Mockus administration between January 1995 and June 1996, of which 47 were protests against the Bogotá district administration or local administration. In these cases, the issue of education was the most significant, while the issues of the extension of public services and tariff problems were less common compared with the Castro administrative period. Other notable causes for urban protests in Bogotá at this time were the eviction of some irregular settlements in the upper area of the Chapinero locality due to plans for the construction of a new highway and the removal of downtown street vendors in an attempt at gentrification.<sup>28</sup> Another new type of protest was held by taxi drivers who strongly objected to the rationalisation of the transportation system executed by the Mockus administration.

In June 1996, tension increased when the communities in the South and South-east sectors organised a big civic strike. The communities in Kennedy and Bosa (Patio Bonito and El Tintal Central) blocked the critical avenues leading to the Corabasto (central wholesale market) in the Kennedy locality. The communities'

---

<sup>28</sup> These attempts by the Bogotá administration were not particularly successful and the related protests continued intermittently throughout the 90s.

demands were the same as in the previous period: regularisation of settlements, extension of public service provision, pavements and expansion of public schools. They criticised the Mockus administration claiming that it was not addressing their needs sufficiently and complaining that the execution of the budget for social investment was less than thirty per cent of what had been planned (Voz, 1996). The blockage of the entry of the central wholesale market affected the circulation of food enormously and in one day, 100,000 tones of food were lost. In order to end the blockade, mayor Mockus himself had to attend the negotiating commission with the civic strike organisers.

The inhabitants of the Ciudad Bolívar as well as Usme localities conducted civic strikes during the Mockus administration. Both localities mobilised in May, July 1996 and August 1997. In the case of Ciudad Bolívar, the people were frustrated by the failure of the city government to fulfil what they promised in the negotiations to end the civic strike of October 1993. Their principal argument and critique was the delay of regularisation of the irregular settlements and the expansion of public services. As for the case of the protests in Usme, the principal reason was complaints about the frequent shortage in water supply and poor attention of the EAAB (*El Espectador*, 1996).

During the Peñalosa administration, the reasons for the mobilisation of urban protests varied, from protests against the district gentrification programme involving the eviction of street vendors and recycling workers in downtown Bogotá<sup>29</sup> to protests by transportation workers against the introduction of a new transport system.<sup>30</sup>

In respect to the protests related to problems with the public services, the Usme communities' claim for water continued in March and June of 1998. Ciudad Bolívar organised several civic strikes in 1999. Until 1998, as discussed above, the typical reasons for protests were delayed regularisation, lack of services and erroneous or

---

<sup>29</sup> For example, the controversy over the street vendors and small shopkeepers in Chapinero Park (April-May 2000), collective negotiation by downtown 'cartoneros' (*cartuchos*) against the eviction (December 1999–March 2000).

<sup>30</sup> The new system called *transmilenio* is a tramcar running in its own lane, which excludes buses belonging to other private companies.

exaggeratedly increased invoicing for the services. From late 1999 to 2000, a new type of protest emerged: protests against the increased public services tariff after the introduction of the new tariff regime. Typical cases were the demonstration marches jointly organised by the inhabitants of Ciudad Bolívar and Usme to demand a review of public service fees by the responsible agencies (e.g., ETB and CODENSA) in November 1999. In January 2000, community leaders of some sectors of Ciudad Bolívar mobilised the inhabitants to demonstrate to request a reduction in the service charge, burning a copy of the invoice in front of the offices of public service companies and CODENSA (*El Tiempo*, 2000). In many cases, the mobilisation of the popular sector in this way was accompanied by either labour unionists or members of leftist political movements.

In sum, the characteristics of and the reasons for urban protests became more diversified during the 1990s. As the decade progressed the poor communities began to make different demands on the local government, in order to have their needs addressed by the local development plan. In the late 1990s, the nature of the protests reflected not only the organisers' demands with regard to the lack of public service provision but also the difficulty of their lives as a result of the rationalisation of urban management, such as the increase of service charges.

#### COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION UNDER THE NEW URBAN MANAGEMENT

Integral upgrading programmes of irregular settlements in the 1990s, particularly during the Peñalosa administration, considerably reduced the time required for normalisation of public services. In 1997, at the beginning of the Peñalosa administration, there were approximately 380 informal settlements awaiting regularisation; by the end, only 70 still

remained.<sup>31</sup>

Rapid regularisation also accorded well with the need of public service agencies to accelerate normalisation of service tariffs in the face of the looming financial crisis. Rationalisation and reform of the tariff system were the two main consequences of changes designed to ensure these public service agencies better conformed to market mechanisms.

Thus during the 1990s the regularisation process, previously beset by delays, became much more efficient and rational. Irregular settlements were upgraded more swiftly and the living conditions of the urban poor improved.

Problems still remained, however. The first was the persistence of patron-client relationships. The second was that, due to increasing demand, irregular land sub-division did not stop. One reason was the economic crisis in the late 1990s and the other was the increase of internally displaced persons. Internal political conflict in Colombia prompted a massive flow of displaced people from the countryside to the cities, especially Bogotá, thus continuing the need for irregular settlements. Finally, previously informal settlements continued to face serious social and economic difficulties even after regularisation. While institutional intervention in the 1990s certainly did improve basic infrastructure, that did not necessarily do anything to alleviate other socioeconomic problems such as unemployment, lack of public safety, and drug consumption among the youth. Physical upgrading of settlements was obviously no guarantee that inhabitants' income would automatically rise. Without more income, however, the residents could not hope to pay the higher public service charges. Thus while many former irregular settlements now enjoyed better public services and physical infrastructure, whether these improved living conditions were truly affordable for the poor was another question.

The city mayors of the 1990s actively adopted the framework of community

---

<sup>31</sup> Data provided by Clemencia Escallón through my interview conducted at Regularisation Section, DACD, Bogotá, 9 June 2000.

participation in seeking to upgrade the informal settlements. Top-down community participation had long been maintained through the JACs, and in the 1990s they were mobilised again through participation-oriented development projects such as OSP. For all the 'participative' nature of these programmes, there is some doubt as to the degree to which people were actually able to partake in the decision-making process (see case studies in chapters 5 and 6).

One innovation introduced during this period was the concept of 'participative planning' developed by Mockus and Peñalosa. While participative planning did stimulate the proposal of local development projects from within the community, the results of these *Encuentros Ciudadanos* proved generally disappointing due to the time constraints imposed by budgetary schedules.

The Constitution of 1991 guaranteed such citizen's rights as the right to make a claim and serve as ombudspersons against the city administration in matters of public investment. Such legal frameworks allowed the people, especially the poor, to make their voices heard. The citizen ombudsperson system, for example, required all public investment to be examined by a citizen representative of the affected area, thus ensuring the accountability of the city administration. While this has had the undoubtedly positive effect of increasing civic control over local administrations, the full implications of the system remain to be seen.

Whenever the above schemes did not work or were violated or state and public institutions reneged on their promises, communities could resort to strikes, demonstrations and other forms of collective protest. But citizens now carry out such actions while also knowing that they have other, more regular options for insisting on their rights. Thus community-based activism, too, has become institutionalised, and each time it becomes increasingly more difficult to mobilise large numbers of people.


Patron-client relationships are still far from eradicated. Clientelistic relations persist among the *ediles*, city council members and representatives of Congress. Some JAC

leaders have clearly been co-opted by the *ediles* in exchange for local development projects of benefit to his/her own areas. As discussed earlier, however, the influence of the bipartisan regime does seem to be gradually weakening over time. Popular election of the *ediles* and mayors has had a positive impact on the civic movement. Thus, in this sense, opportunities for political participation have expanded. Yet whether this progress in political participation has had any significant influence on the nature of community-based struggle remains unclear.

Gilbert (2006) credits other factors with improving governance in Bogotá, among them the competence of recent mayors Mockus and Peñalosa, continuity in city policies and increased availability of resources. While his explanation certainly seems to be valid in explaining the recent good governance of Bogotá, whether the same factors also account for the changes in the regularisation process in the 1990s bears further investigation.

A final question is whether the community involvement in development projects has helped to promote solidarity and collective self-help. According to a survey conducted by Sudarsky (2003), levels of community participation (as measured by commitment to community-based organisations) actually decreased from 1997 to 2002, prompting him to suggest that people still tended to be more trustful of clientelistic arrangements than they were of community participation. The JACs and parents' communities remained exceptions to this decline, but even for these organisations the level of participation averaged only 5 per cent of the population surveyed. One of the objectives of my case studies will thus be to examine the true significance of this 'decreased participation'. Have people naturally drifted away from community activities because they feel their living conditions have already been improved enough? Or is the *raison d'être* of community-based organisations itself in crisis? If so, why?

## Appendix 4a.1 Annual real growth ratio of land price according to land use in Bogotá



Land use	Residential areas					Industrial area	Area for commerce and services			
	Stratus	high	middle-high	middle	middle-low		low	downtown	North	popular sector
1990		-3.7	-3.1	-5.4	0.3	0.1	-1.5	2.9	2/2	2.5
1991		4.7	4.2	1.8	1.8	4.4	7.7	9.1	11.4	9.3
1992		15.3	14.8	19.3	10.2	7.6	12.3	13.4	24.6	13.8
1993		33.3	33.5	26.9	19.1	11.2	18.8	23.3	42.8	21.2
1994		30.5	33.3	23.5	15.5	9.8	23.2	21.0	36.9	19.6
1995		19.1	17.2	14.4	12.8	7.6	13.6	5.5	12.1	12.2
1996		-6.6	-4.7	-2.6	-1.5	0.6	-3.4	-6.4	-9.2	-0.2
1997		-16.1	-13.9	-14.0	-3.3	7.4	-9.6	-6.5	-14.4	-5.4
1998		-18.0	-17.0	-14.3	-11.9	-6.8	-19.9	-15.0	-15.7	-10.2
1999		-10.9	-8.6	-6.9	-6.6	-6.6	-8.3	-12.3	-12.3	-13.9
2000		-8.2	-9.0	-3.0	-1.5	2.0	-8.0	-6.5	-7.6	-6.7
2001		-9.0	-3.6	-2.6	-4.7	-1.1	-9.6	-4.1	-6.2	-5.2
2002		0.0	-0.7	-0.9	-2.6	-5.4	-5.1	-6.2	-6.4	-8.1
2003		9.5	4.5	5.7	3.7	1.6	-4.7	-1.4	-3.2	-3.8
2004		7.1	7.1	-0.6	-1.8	-4.3	-4.8	-1.6	0.6	0.4
2005		3.6	4.4	1.6	1.2	0.9	2.4	1.6	1.2	2.5

Source: Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá (2005).



**Appendix 4a.2**  
**Cost of 'South Bogotá Project' and source of the funds to execute the project**  
**among institutions 2001-2003**

(a) By source of funds

	District institution		Localities		Community support		Aid from KFW(1)		Total
	1,000 pesos	%	1,000 pesos	%	1,000 pesos	%	1,000 pesos	%	1,000 pesos
Physical infrastructure	51,580,515	81.6	1,294,705	2.1	3,039,753	4.8	7,264,060	11.5	63,170,032
Social infrastructure	1,517,450	62.9	150,000	6.2	52,000	2.2	695,000	28.8	2,414,460
Regularisation	3,675,522	71.9	50,000	1.0	37,500	0.7	1,346,940	26.4	5,109,962
Sub-total	56,773,487	80.3	1,494,705	2.1	3,129,253	4.4	9,306,000	13.2	70,703,454
Unexpected revenue	2,838,674	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2,838,674
Total cost of the project	59,612,161	81.6	1,494,705	2.0	3,129,253	4.3	9,306,000	12.7	73,542,119

(1) Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. Leading German government aid agency.

(b) By distribution of funds broken down by district institutions

(1,000 Colombian pesos, at September 2000 prices)

Institution	Physical infrastructure	Social infrastructure	Regularisation	Unexpected revenue	Total
EAAB	5,150,727	0	0	257,536	5,408,263
IDU	23,300,449	0	0	1,166,022	24,496,471
DAMA(1)	271,250	0	0	19,563	284,813
DPAE(2)	1,992,000	0	0	98,600	2,091,600
Botanic Garden	40,000	0	0	2,000	42,000
DABS(3)	2,650,000	0	0	132,500	2,782,500
Sec. of Education	14,841,900	0	0	742,095	15,583,995
IDRD(4)	2,263,568	30,000	0	114,678	2,406,246
CVP	250,000	0	0	12,500	262,500
Localities	1,294,705	150,000	50,000	0	1,494,705
DAAC	800,620	314,000	367,522	239,507	5,029,649
Sec. of Health	0	805,000	0	40,250	845,250
Total	52,855,219	1,299,000	417,522	2,825,251	60,727,992

Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000).

Notes: Total value of the table (b) should be the same as the sum of the total cost of the project shared by the Bogotá District government and Localities in the table (a), however, the original figures in the source were different as shown above.

(1) Administrative Department of Environment.

(2) Department of Prevention and Attention for the Emergency.

(3) Administrative Department of Social Welfare.

(4) District Institution of Recreation and Sports.

Appendix 4a.3  
 Comparison between the proposal based on the feasibility study in 1998 vs. achievements in 1999-2000  
 (South Bogotá Project)

Component	Project	Proposal in 1998 Target	Readjusted target	Achievements in 1999-2000 Results	Actors
<b>Physical infrastructure and public space:</b> Improvement of infrastructure for water and other public services	Water supply	connection of 671 lots to master network	Connection of 4652 lots to master supply mains and connection of individual houses through community participation Regularisation of local networks connected to the Juan Rey water deposit tank for 2,004 lots.	100% for diagnostic survey. 0% for construction.  70% for regularisation.	EAAB (division for community action) CBO Usme Locality South Bogotá Project
	Sewerage	4,555 lots	Direct investment for 5,482 lots  Co-financing with community for 1,953 lots	83% for design 77% for construction 100% for construction	
	Drainage for rainfall	184 hectares	107 hectares	79% for design 72% for construction	
Road network	Roads in the zone	10km	30km	0% for advance	IDU CBO Localities DAAC (OSP division) South Bogotá Project
	Local roads	45kms	30kms	33% for design 20% for construction	
	Terminal and bus stops	20 bus stops and 1800 square meter terminal		Design for the new New transport system, Transmilenio	
Intervention for 'Parque Entrenubes' ecological park	Environmental management plan	Not specified	Determination of park for 670 hectares	100% for design for environmental education. 100% for workshop and environmental study. 3 meetings.	DAMA DAPD EAAB DAAC IDRD Botanic Garden IDU Subsecretariat of Control of Housing District Supervisory Office CBO and NGO Landowner Localities South Bogotá Project
	Urban planning and housing scheme	3 plans for the zone	Plan for 106 settlements bordering on the 'Parque Extrenubes'	100% for design	
	Construction of ecological paths	10 km	6 paths 10 km. each	100% for identification 0% for construction.	
	Cycling paths	10 km	30 km	Determination of the area 0% either for both design and construction	
<b>Social infrastructure</b> Education-related	Day care	Expansion to capacity for 1,900	Construct 3 day care centers (1,900 children)	33% for design 0% for construction	DABS Secretariat of Education Localities CBO South Bogotá Project
	Primary and secondary schools	6,500 new students	Construct 3 schools (3,000 students)	67% for design 20% for construction	
	Reform of schools	for 500 students	Reform of 5 schools	67% for design 43% for construction	
Recreation and sports	Sport centre for multiple use Park for children Equipment for sports	6has. 20 units. 30 units.	12 parks in neighbourhood (1/2 has each) 12 units 20 units	77% in design and 51% in construction (as a whole)	IDRD DAPD Localities Botanic Garden IDU South Bogotá Project
<b>Urban Planning</b> Regularisation of irregular settlements	Regularisation of irregular settlements	19 settlements	25 settlements	37 settlements 4 settlements in process	DAPD Ombudsman for public space DPAE EAAB CBO Localities South Bogotá Project

Source: Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000).

#### Appendix 4a.4

#### Institutions and their budget to be invested for 'De-marginalisation programme'

Institution	1999		Plan for 1998-2001(1) %
	Million pesos	%	
DAAC	17,333	2.7	0.7
DABS(2)	60,568	9.5	8.3
DAPD	700	0.1	0.1
EAAB	52,473	8.2	19.8
FPAE(3)	11,310	1.8	0.9
IDU	155,570	24.4	16.1
IDRD(4)	20,197	3.2	0.5
Botanic Garden	1,311	0.2	0.2
Secretary of Education	151,013	23.7	20.8
Secretary of Finance/ FDL	114,806	18.0	20.6
Secretary of Health	49,000	7.7	11.2
CVP	3,463	0.5	0.8
Total	637,944	100.0	100.0

Source: Committee of coordination of the De-marginalisation programme.

(1) According to the Bogotá mayor's three-year-development plan (Plan de Desarrollo 1998-2001).

(2) Administrative Department of Social Welfare.

(3) Fund of Prevention and Attention of Emergence. Institution in charge of this fund is DPAAE.

(4) District Institution of Recreation and Sports.

## CHAPTER 5

### SIX STORIES OF IRREGULAR SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHERN BOGOTÁ

While the regularisation of self-help settlements became established practice in Bogotá from the 1970s onwards, this did not mean that the process worked at the same speed in all settlements. Leadership of community organisations, political patronage and city government administrative capacity are key factors in determining the pace of the regularisation process. This chapter will analyse the origin, current consolidation status and regularisation process of the six selected case-study settlements. The aim of this chapter is to explain why these six settlements, all of which started out as irregular settlements, showed notable differences in the pace of their regularisation.<sup>1</sup> I will discuss how three conventional factors listed above explain the experiences of the six settlements as well as exploring other specific conditions.

#### GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE SETTLEMENTS

Table 5.1 describes the six case-study settlements. The case-study settlements have several factors in common. Firstly, all were established on land developed without consideration for city regulations. Three of them, Jerusalén, Danubio Azul and Bella Flor, were established on land that was illegally sub-divided. One, Diana Turbay, was developed by a local politician who was influential at the time. Another, Juan José Rondón (hereafter JJR), was promoted by an NGO.<sup>2</sup> The sixth, La Paz, began as a

---

<sup>1</sup> This is the analysis of my survey of the six settlements and in-depth interviews with selected inhabitants, supplemented by interviews with city government officials and NGO activists who worked with these settlements. The survey and interviews were all conducted between October 1999 and August 2004 (see chapter 2 for details).

<sup>2</sup> (ex) Father Saturnino Sepúlveda Niño, the original founder of JJR, stood as a non-partisan-independent candidate for election to Bogotá district council four times between the

large-scale organised invasion but later also involved illegal land sub-division.

Secondly, in all of the areas, settlement started between 1981 and 1985. Thirdly, in their initial period of development, all were located outside the urban perimeter, categorised either as 'AAA III' (area with low capacity for agricultural use) or '*reserva agrícola*' (area reserved for agricultural use). Fourthly, all fall into the lowest strata (1 and 2) of society as defined by DANE. These four elements served as the criteria for selection of the case-study settlements (see chapter 2, pages 88-90).

In-depth interviews with the founders of the settlements revealed two further elements in common.<sup>3</sup> First, until the *barrio* was recognised by the city authorities, most basic public services such as water, electricity and sewerage systems were provided in a rudimentary way through community efforts, sometimes resorting to illegal means. Second, irrespective of the way the settlement was formed, newly elected JAC leaders took the initiative in these collective self-help strategies.

---

late 1970s to the mid 1980s in vain (Martín 2000: 91).

<sup>3</sup> I named an inhabitant a 'founder' if they had settled in the *barrio* during the earliest period of land occupation.

Table 5.1 Basic information on the six case study settlements

Name of settlement	Locality	Origin	Strata (1) JACs	No. of JACs	State intervention	Level of conflict community vs. State	Other external agency	Estimated population (2)	Surface area (m <sup>2</sup> )(3)	Level of land occupation(4)	Category in Agreement	Distance from the centre of Bogotá (6)	No. sample for survey
Diana Turbay	Rafael Uribe Uribe	(Key person) Political pirate urbanisation (A. Guerrero Estrada)	1&2	9	High in the initial stage	Low	Local politicians Hope International (NGO)	40,000	656,725	98%	779 AAAI(5)	6.4km~6.6km	167
Jerusalén	Ciudad Bolívar	Illegal land sub-division	1&2	9	Low in the initial stage Indirect influence by Ciudad Bolívar Programme	High	Fundacion Social(NGO) Local politicians	100,000	1'270,656	95%	AAAI	9.2km~10.6km	169
Danubio Azul	Usme	Illegal land sub-division	1&2	1	High De-marginalisation programme	High	Catholic parish church Fe y Alegria (NGO)	23,000	315,520	95%	AAAI	7.4km (the centre)	158
La Paz	Rafael Uribe Uribe	Invasion & Illegal land sub-division	1&2	4	Low in the initial stage South Bogotá Project	High if joined with D.Azul	Local politician Catholic parish church Fe y Alegria (NGO)	20,000	251,432	85%	AAAI	7.2km (the centre)	143
Juan José Rondón	Usme	NGO-promoted pirate urbanisation (Saturnino Sepúlveda)	1	1	Low	Low	Religiosa Adratrices (Catholic religious group) and its NGO	1,500	141,754	60%	Reserva agrícola (5)	10.5km (the centre)	128
Bella Flor	Ciudad Bolívar	Illegal land sub-division	1	2	Low	Low	Pastoral Social (social programme of Catholic church) Politicians	4,000	n.d.	40%	Reserva agrícola (5)	10.6km (the centre)	103

Source: Compiled by the author, based on her interviews with community leaders.

Note: (1) Socio-economic stratification categorised by DANE.

(2) Estimated data based on the interviews to community leaders and field observation.

(3) Data registered on the map issued by District Register (*Catastro Distrital*).

(4) Area de Actividad Agrologica III (Area with low capacity for agricultural use)

(5) Area conserved for agrarian use.

(6) The centre point was taken as 'Plaza Mayor'

## CURRENT LEVEL OF CONSOLIDATION

When the survey started in early 2000, the six settlements displayed very different levels of consolidation. I used the following criteria to measure the level of consolidation: land occupation (proportion of lots occupied); physical condition of dwellings (measured by the material of construction); rate of tenancy; availability of public services; per capita income; average rent and percentage of owner occupants with a title deed. The data per criterion were scored and summed up for each settlement to give a final figure. I decided on the rank of the six cases according to that figure.<sup>4</sup>

### **Physical consolidation**

The level of land occupation, the physical condition of the dwellings and the rate of tenancy are the basic indicators used to measure the settlement's physical consolidation.

#### *Land occupation*

The findings of the study on land occupation for the six settlements are shown in Table 5.2. The pace of land occupation is very different in each settlement.

Table 5.2 Approximate level of land occupation in 2000

	D. Turbay	Jerusalén	D.Azul	La Paz	JJR	B. Flor
Level of land occupation	98%	95%	95%	85%	60%	40%

Source: Data approximated by on-site observation (count) in comparison with the lots indicated on the maps provided by the DAPD.

All six cases were developed on land outside the urban perimeter which was not equipped with public service infrastructure. Knowing this, settlers bought the lots anyway because the price was cheap and they expected that public services would be installed in the future as had happened in other *barrios* with similar origins. However,

---

<sup>4</sup> To score the criteria, I referred to Ward's method (Ward, 1976: 393-97).

as can be seen from table 5.2, after 15 years, the occupation levels of JJR and Bella Flor were much lower than in the other settlements. What was the reason for this?

Most of the interviewed inhabitants of the other four settlements pointed to the arrival of the water supply as the turning point in the development of the *barrio*. Water was the most indispensable collective need for survival. As I will show in the next section, JJR and Bella Flor were the only two settlements which lacked a proper water supply provided by the EAAB at the time of survey. The lack of water therefore impeded the occupation process.

The process of land occupation is closely related to the valorisation of land (Ward 1989). Independent of the origin of land occupation (either by invasion or land-sub-division), the transaction of plots in the irregular settlement has provided a land market for the poor. Kellett (1992) points out that the low land price in the very initial stage of development reflects the uncertainty of the situation (i.e. the risk of eviction) and the lack of infrastructure.

It is important to note that at the time of my survey no more land was for sale (except for resale). The vacant lots had already been sold. In JJR and Bella Flor, most of the vacant lots were found in the plain, physically advantaged parts of the settlements.<sup>5</sup> The current owners, who are often land brokers, had purchased them with the aim of speculation.<sup>6</sup> These speculative lots would be resold once public services and basic infrastructure had been improved, since the owner of the land could charge an increased price for the better equipped lots. In these settlements, the cost of network construction is paid for by the direct investment of public service companies and the cost of local connection to an individual house is charged to the user (or owner occupant of the

---

<sup>5</sup> As for the case of La Paz, the vacant lots were partly those which were purchased for speculation, but the others were situated on the ground not suitable for construction. These lots needed special reinforcement in order to get permission from the city government for further regularisation.

<sup>6</sup> Kellett (1992), in his case study settlements in Santa Marta, Colombia, put the reason for the relatively high percentage of empty plots and dwellings down to speculation, though the evidence was inconclusive. As stated here, I interpreted the situation in JJR and Bella Flor in the same way, based on the narratives of the inhabitants in informal interviews with them.



house). Therefore the land broker profits from the difference between the price for land only and the price for land with service infrastructure without paying any additional costs himself.

These two elements suggest that higher land occupation levels reflect higher consolidation levels of the settlement.

### *Physical conditions of dwellings*

Residents in irregular settlements build their dwellings using self-help methods as time and resources permit. People are prepared to invest more in their house as the settlement becomes more secure and better serviced. However, not all have the same ability to build quickly (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Physical condition of the houses of the sampled households

	Diana Turbay	Jerusalén	Danubio Azul	La Paz	JJR	B. Flor
More than one storey	72.1%	38.9%	48.7%	31.5%	18.0%	2.9%
With a terrace	73.7%	41.4%	48.7%	39.9%	10.2%	2.9%
Durable wall material	98.8%	95.9%	97.5%	93.0%	88.3%	58.3%
Concrete roof	78.4%	43.2%	58.9%	44.8%	25.0%	2.9%

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

### *Rate of tenancy*

As self-help settlements develop and houses get larger some owners begin to supplement their incomes by renting out rooms. Some previous studies showed a positive correlation between the level of consolidation of the settlement and the level of renting (Gilbert, 1988; Kellett, 1992). This indicator also shows major variations between the six settlements (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4 Rate of tenancy in the sampled households in 2000

	D.Turbay	Jerusalén	D.Azul	La Paz	JJR	B.Flor
Rate of tenancy	52.1%	40.3%	42.4%	37.1%	29.7%	20.4%

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

From these three indicators: level of land occupation; physical condition of the houses and rate of tenancy, the physical consolidation level in 2000 of the six case-study settlements is, from highest to lowest: Diana Turbay, Danubio Azul, Jerusalén, La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor (see Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 Score of the sum of three indicators <sup>7</sup>

D.Turbay	Jerusalén	D. Azul	La Paz	JJR	Bella Flor
4.7	3.5	3.9	3.3	2.3	1.2

Source: Table 5.3 and Table 5.4.

### **Level of provision of basic public services**

Basic public services and social infrastructure available in the *barrio* reflect the level of consolidation of the settlement.

#### *Public utility service availability*

As shown in Table 5.6, Danubio Azul and La Paz were ultimately better equipped than Diana Turbay and Jerusalén in terms of completion of street paving, but before 2000, the latter two settlements were more advanced in terms of service infrastructure. JJR and Bella Flor, meanwhile, were less consolidated due to the delay in completing the water supply and sewerage system.

---

<sup>7</sup> For example, the score of Diana Turbay was calculated as [0.98+0.721+0.737+0.988+0.784+0.521=4.73]. The same method was adopted for the other cases.

Table 5.6 Public services available in the six settlements

	Diana Turbay	Jerusalén	D. Azul	La Paz	JJR	Bella Flor
Water*	1995	1989	1996	1999	2002	2000
Electricity*	1995	1990	1997	1998	1999	1999
Sewerage*	1995	1998	1999	2000	2004	Not yet in 2004
Street paving**	Most streets	Most streets	2000	2001	Main street Only	Main street Only
Bus stop /terminal	1	3	1	None	1 nearby	None

Source: Interviews with residents in 2000 and follow-up research in 2001, 2003 and 2004.

Notes: \*Years show time of installation or commencement of service provided properly by public service companies.

\*\*Year completed.

### *Provision of social services*

As shown in Table 5.7 and the maps shown in Figures 5.1 to Figure 5.6, Diana Turbay and Jerusalén were the best equipped in terms of education and primary health care.

Diana Turbay is the only settlement with a police patrol box within the *barrio*.<sup>8</sup>

Jerusalén stands out with regard to the activities of NGOs devoted to social and cultural development. Danubio Azul, which has a number of private schools, is the third best equipped. By contrast, La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor lag behind considerably in facilities for social services, in education as well as health.

---

<sup>8</sup> Though a police patrol box was built in Danubio Azul in August 2006.

Table 5.7 Provision of social service facilities

	D. Turbay	Jerusalén	Danubio Azul	La Paz	JJR	Bella Flor
Kindergarten/day nursery	Various private and HOBISs*	Various private, one public and HOBISs	Various private and HOBISs	HOBISs only	HOBISs only	HOBISs only
Primary schools	2 public	8 public 6 private	1 public 6 private	1 public 1 private	No public 1 private	No public 1 private
Secondary schools	Various private	1 public 3 private	No public 2 private	No public	None	none
Primary health care centres	1 CAMI** 1 private	2 CAMI	None	1 private	none	none
Community hall	2	3	1	1	1	none
Police patrol box (CAI)	CAI	None	None	None	None	none
Church	1 Catholic 3 non-Catholic	2 Catholic 5 non-Catholic	1 Catholic 2 non-Catholic	1 Catholic 1 non-Catholic	1 Catholic	1 Catholic

Source: In-depth interviews with residents and on-site observation in 2000. Based on some of the data on Jerusalén (Niño and Chaparro, 1998).

Notes: \*HOBIS (Nursery of Family Welfare) is day care services provided by a care-giver from the community called a *madre comunitaria* (community mother). Community mothers are housewives who run the HOBIS in their own homes supported by technical and financial assistance from the ICBF (Colombian Institute for Family Welfare) (see Libardo, 1999). To run a HOBIS, a woman has to receive some training and satisfy certain conditions required by the ICBF.

\*\*CAMI (Immediate Medical Attention Centre) is a public health care centre run by district subsidy.

The data on service infrastructure shown in Table 5.6 and Table 5.7 are summarised by scored indicators as shown in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8 Scored indicators of public services

Score	D.Turbay	Jerusalén	D.Azul	La Paz	JJR	B.Flor
Water	3	2	2	1	1	1
Electricity	3	2	2	1	1	1
Sewerage	3	2	2	1	0	0
Paving	2	2	3	3	1	1
Bus stop	1	1	1	0	1	0
Kindergarten	2	2	2	1	1	1
Prim. school	1	2	2	1	1	1
Sec. school	1	2	1	1	0	0
P.health c.	2	1	0	1	0	0
Comm. Hall	1	1	1	1	1	0
CAI	1	0	0	0	0	0
Church	2	2	2	2	1	1
Sum	22	18	18	13	8	6

Source: Table 5.6 and Table 5.7.

Note: For water, electricity and sewerage: 3=provided in less than 5 years from the year when the land occupation started; 2=provided between 5 and 10 years, 1=provided more than 10 years, 0=not available in 2000.

For road paving: 3=fully paved; 2=mostly paved, 1=only the main road paved.

Bus stop, Primary health care, community hall, CAI (Centre for Immediate Attention): 1= any; 0=not found.

Kindergarten: 2=both kindergarten and HOBIS, 1=only HOBIS.

Primary school and secondary school: 2=both public and private schools found, 1=one of these found.

Church: 2=both Catholic and other protestant churches found, 1=only Catholic church.

### **Per capita income and average rent**

The level of consolidation is also reflected in indices of living standards such as per capita income and average rent. In theory, residents in a settlement that is well served in terms of infrastructure and public services are required to pay service fees and revaluated land taxes; their level of income is therefore expected to be higher than residents of poorly equipped settlements.

Table 5.9 shows the average income per capita of the households in the sample

survey. In terms of per capita income, the *barrios* are ranked from the highest to lowest as follows: Diana Turbay, Jerusalén, Danubio Azul, La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor.

Table 5.9 Average income per capita of the sampled households (1)

	D. Turbay		Jerusalén		D. Azul		La Paz		JJR		B. Flor	
	1,000 pesos	US\$	1,000 pesos	US\$	1,000 pesos	US\$	1,000 pesos	US\$	1,000 pesos	US\$	1,000 pesos	US\$
Owner-occupant	189.3	87.4	139.7	64.7	99.1	50.9	81.7	41.9	86.3	39.4	65.0	33.7
Tenant	118.5	54.8	118.6	54.9	96.8	49.7	89.7	46.0	79.7	36.4	51.3	26.7
Other (2)	132.2	61.1	71.3	33.0	89.3	45.9	86.8	44.5	54.0	24.6	90.0	46.7
Total average	152.8	70.6	130.6	60.5	97.9	50.3	84.6	43.4	83.7	38.2	66.3	34.4

Source: Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Note: (1) The average exchange rate between pesos and the US dollar was calculated for the period of the household survey conducted in each case study settlement. See Appendix E.5 for the daily exchange rate.

(2) Other includes freeloaders (*usufructos*) and those who supervise the house.

Average rent reflects the valuation of the land and living conditions in the settlement. The index of rents would be expected to reflect the same order as the average income level, but rents in Danubio Azul were slightly higher than those in Jerusalén (see Table 5.10).

Table 5.10 Average rent for a tenant renting one room in the sampled households (1,000 pesos)

	Diana Turbay	Jerusalén	Danubio Azul	La Paz	JJR	B. Flor
Rent	118.1	91.9	94.8	69.1	42.7	37.0
No.	64	63	62	48	35	9

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

The discrepancies shown here reflect the differences in levels of transfer of land ownership (title deed) between the two settlements (see Table 5.9). As stated in chapter 4, in the 1980s, transfer of title deeds was not strictly required by the DAPD for the regularisation process. However, since the late 1990s, transfer of title deeds has been

encouraged and has become a requirement for prompt regularisation. The more clearly ownership is established, naturally, the higher the valuation of the land, which in turn is reflected, in the rent levels.<sup>9</sup>

Table 5.11 Percentage of owner occupants with a title deed

	D. Turbay	Jerusalén	D. Azul	La Paz	JJR	B. Flor
Percentage	91.3%	2.0%	36.3%	0.0%	62.2%	0.0%

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

All indicators considered together, the consolidation level of the *barrios* studied as of 2000 was as follows: Without doubt, Diana Turbay enjoyed the highest level of consolidation. Jerusalén and Danubio Azul were less well consolidated, but the difference between the two was not significant. La Paz was further behind. Bella Flor was less well-consolidated than JJR. These two ranked the lowest in terms of consolidation (see Table 5.12).

Table 5.12 Total score of consolidation indicators

	D. Turbay	Jerusalén	D. Azul	La Paz	JJR	Bella Flor
Physical consolidation	4.7	3.5	3.9	3.3	2.3	1.2
Public services	22	18	18	13	8	6
Income	152.8	130.6	97.9	84.6	83.7	66.3
Rent	118.1	91.9	94.8	69.1	42.7	37.0
Holding title deed	0.91	0.02	0.36	0.00	0.62	0.00
Total	298.51	244.02	214.96	170.00	137.32	110.50

Source: Table 5.5, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11.

Note: I used the same number as the score when it was given either in percentage or number in pesos.

<sup>9</sup> The study of Mexico City by Ward (1989) indicates the same trend.

## PACE OF THE REGULARISATION PROCESS

As discussed in chapter 3 (pages 137-38), the standard regularisation process starts with the issue of a *resolución* by which the Bogotá city authorities recognise the irregular settlement. Once the *resolución* has been issued, residents can feel more secure since they know they no longer need to fear eviction. The *resolución* guarantees that the settlement in question is now permitted to start negotiation with public service agencies to normalise their utility service infrastructures. Obtaining this *resolución*, therefore, is crucial.

The juridical status of the JAC (formation of a JAC and its recognition by the DAAC) is another factor closely related to the issuing of the *resolución*, since the JAC is the officially recognised institution of the *barrio* through which the community can communicate with the respective city authorities.

Table 5.13 summarises the regularisation process of the six case-study settlements. Let us compare this process focusing on the two key points mentioned above. As already seen, except for JJR and Bella Flor, the other four settlements (Diana Turbay, Jerusalén, Danubio Azul and La Paz) had basic public utility services (water, electricity and sewerage) by 2000. However, the time spent between the initial year of occupation and the formation of a JAC, and the issue of the necessary *resolución* was significantly different from one to another.

First, the time between the beginning of land occupation and establishment of a JAC (defined as JAC designation as juridical person) varies. In Diana Turbay it took six years, in Jerusalén three years; in Danubio Azul five years; in La Paz four years; in JJR three years and in Bella Flor two years.

Second, the time between the first recorded land occupation and the issue of the *resolución* also varies. This process took twelve years in Diana Turbay, seven in



Table 5.13 Summary of the regularisation process of the six case study settlements

Year	D. Turbay	Jerusalén	D. Azul	La Paz	JJR	B. Flor
1980						
1981						
1982	water prov.					
1983	power prov.					
1984						
1985	power prov.					
1986						
1987				<civic strike>		
1988						
1989						
1990						
1991				<civic strike>		
1992				water prov.		
1993				<civic strike>		
1994	<liquidation of cooperative>					
1995				power prov.		
1996						
1997						
1998	CODENSA*					
1999						
2000						
2001						

Source: Made by the author, based on the interviews to the inhabitants.

Note: Diana Turbay and D. Azul had the renewal by CODENSA after 1998.

'Water prov.' means the provisional provision of water supply by EAAB.

'Power prov.' means the provisional provision of electricity by EEB.

- Initial year of occupation
- Year of issue of judicial person for JAC
- Year of issue of *resolución*
- Year of installation of water service
- Year of installation of power service
- Year of installation of sewerage system
- Year of completion of pavement work

Jerusalén, ten in Danubio Azul, twelve in La Paz, fifteen in JJR and twenty years in Bella Flor.<sup>10</sup>

Until the late 1990s, after issue of the *resolución*, it was standard process, for water and electricity to be supplied first. In general, provision of sewerage was delayed and not built in conjunction with the water supply services, since sewers were not considered a matter of life or death. Sewerage also required a more complex study of the foundations and took more time to construct. Until a sewer system was installed, however, street paving could not be completed. Therefore, the regularisation process took years in many irregular settlements and in most of the cases, street paving was all but abandoned or indefinitely postponed.

One might expect that the earlier a *barrio* was recognised by the city, the faster its regularisation would proceed. The findings of this study, however, do not bear this out. For example, Jerusalén was recognised relatively quickly, but its level of consolidation in 2000 was almost the same or lower than Danubio Azul and Diana Turbay, where much more time had passed between the initial year of land occupation, formation of its JAC and issue of the *resolución*. Under urban regulations, public service agencies cannot start normalisation of service infrastructure before a settlement is recognised by the city, but in the case of Bella Flor, public services were provided before the issue of the *resolución*. In the case of Diana Turbay, even before the approval of its JAC, provisional services such as water and electricity were provided. Water was generally provided before electricity but in the cases of La Paz, Bella Flor and JJR, electricity was normalised before water services.

What were the reasons for these discrepancies? As shown in chapter 4, institutional reforms in Bogotá in the 1990s were bringing about changes in the legal framework of regularisation, which in general speeded up the process. How were the changes reflected in the six cases?

---

<sup>10</sup> The *resolución* for Bella Flor was never issued during my follow up research, but was finally issued in May 2005.

## HISTORY OF THE SIX *BARRIOS*

Each history will describe by whom the *barrio* was founded and how the inhabitants met their basic needs. The chronological review will introduce the main outside actors who intervened and describe significant anecdotal evidence, which will help to understand why the pace of regularisation differed in each settlement.

### **Diana Turbay**

Diana Turbay was founded by the politician Alfredo Guerrero Estrada. Guerrero Estrada promoted irregular settlement both as a means of building his political constituency among the poor of Bogotá and as a means of personal financial gain. The construction of Diana Turbay began in 1981, but its origins date back to 1979. That year a group of people invaded housing built for the metropolitan police of Bogotá in the San Cristóbal locality. The Mayor of Bogotá, Jaime Durán Dussan, asked Guerrero Estrada, who at the time was *alcalde menor*<sup>11</sup> of San Cristóbal, to find a way to relocate the invaders peacefully.

Guerrero Estrada convinced the invaders to leave the occupied houses, promising them an alternative place to settle through new urban development. In 1980 he purchased part of a farm which became the settlement of Diana Turbay. He created an organisation called the Popular Housing Cooperative of Southeast Bogotá through which he organised a collective self-help housing programme. People who wanted a lot in this settlement were required to join this cooperative.<sup>12</sup> When the programme began in 1981, more than 4,000 families signed up as members of the cooperative. They paid a membership fee of 2,000 pesos and purchased a housing lot on a flexible instalment

---

<sup>11</sup> This is the head administrator of the locality (*localidad*), who was appointed by the Mayor of Bogotá until 1991.

<sup>12</sup> The settlement was named after Diana Turbay, daughter of ex-president of Colombia, Turbay Ayala, who was his personal secretary during Turbay's presidential period (1979-82).

plan.

Guerrero Estrada gave the people an introductory lecture on the principles of community participation, communal work, and other self-help strategies. Land readjustment was the first communal project, carried out under the supervision of Guerrero Estrada and engineers in his employ. He also provided heavy machinery for excavations and road-building. Provisional infrastructure for public services was created through collective self-help. Housing was constructed by individual members of the community. Guerrero Estrada ran a brickyard nearby which sold bricks to the inhabitants.<sup>13</sup>

In 1982, Guerrero Estrada was elected to the city council thanks to an electoral campaign supported by the working committees of the Cooperative of Diana Turbay. He won the following election to the city council for the period 1985-87, and also became a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress in 1988 thanks to the voters of Diana Turbay. He was re-elected to the House of Representatives in 1992 but his strong political influence in the development of the settlement was most effective in the period up to the end of the 1980s. During this period, the political patron-client relationship between him and the settlement inhabitants worked effectively to facilitate the provision of public services. There were two principal water mains in Diana Turbay from which inhabitants easily obtained drinking water thorough hose connection. The committee leaders of the Cooperative also mobilised the inhabitants to obtain electricity by illegal connection to neighbouring settlements. Some inhabitants worked for the EEB and negotiated to the use of the wooden telegraph poles. Through these processes, Guerrero exerted political pressure in the negotiations with the EAAB and the EEB, and soon the provisional service system was established. By 1985 the settlement was divided into nine sectors (*Sp. sector*; subsections) most of them were named after the heroes of the war of independence. A working committee was formed

---

<sup>13</sup> The brickyard was not run on a charitably basis, but as a business from which Guerrero Estrada made money.

in each sector, mainly directed by the coordinators of the Cooperative, but Guerrero was reluctant for the inhabitants to create JACs (interview with ex-community leaders, Leonor Unibio, Santos Maldonado and José Pinto, August 2000).

Diana Turbay took longer than the other five settlements for the issue of juridical person status of the JACs as well as for the *resolución*. Two factors explain the delay in Diana Turbay's recognition by the city. The first was related to its location. The settlement was located outside the urban perimeter as defined by Agreement No. 7/1979. Therefore, it could not obtain the *resolución* under the framework of urban regulation at that time (see chapter 3, page 133). However, thanks to Guerrero Estrada's political influence, Diana Turbay was able to obtain most of the public services it needed without the *resolución* (which was the prerequisite for regularisation), therefore this matter was of little concern to both the community and Guerrero Estrada himself. When the new law (Agreement No.6/1990) made Diana Turbay eligible for regularisation, the *resolución* was finally obtained.

The second factor was the conflict which emerged between the community leaders and Guerrero Estrada. Although the provisional services benefited the communities, the infrastructure was not evenly provided to all sectors and there was much still to do in terms of the physical upgrading of the *barrio*. Having established the JACs in 1987, the inhabitants started to struggle for regularisation. However, from the view of the communities, Guerrero Estrada was not interested in the process and neglected to transfer the title deeds to the inhabitants. This negligence slowed down the process of obtaining the *resolución*. According to the ex-leaders' remarks, Guerrero's political and economic interest in Diana Turbay was waning and he began creating other popular settlements in different localities. The JAC leaders had to mobilise the members of the Cooperative to make the DANCOOP (National Administrative Department for Cooperatives) and other related institutions to cite Guerrero Estrada for negotiation. The transfer of the deeds was finally accomplished in 1992 by order of the DAPD. Guerrero

liquidated the Cooperative without giving a statement of final accounts in 1994. After that, Guerrero's political influence as well as the inhabitants' support for him declined rapidly.

After 1995, the basic public services: water and sewerage and power system were all regularised. Individual connections were renewed and a meter was installed to charge for installation costs as well as consumption. For this renewal, the communities accepted the co-finance programme offered by the EAAB. As for electricity, firstly the EEB came to replace the posts and cables in 1995 and then after privatisation, CODENSA intervened to install individual meters to normalise the charges. In the meantime, the users paid only the minimum flat service charge. Additionally a public school run by the District and a public medical care centre (CAMI) was built in the *barrio*, after much effort by the JAC leaders and a JAL representative (*edil*) living in the settlement. Efforts were also made to establish a transport service and the construction of a police patrol box (CAI) in this period.

However, there were remarkable differences among the internal sectors in Diana Turbay. Although occupation in all the settlements began at the same time, the regularisation process varied from one part to another depending on the topographical conditions. Sectors located in the central and plain area such as Vencederos, Comuneros, Lanceros, Plan 95 and Plan Especial progressed faster than those in the more remote, steeply inclined part, such as Ayacucho, Valle, and Rincón del Valle (see Figure 5.1). The least developed sector, Rincón del Valle, did not have a complete sewer system or paved roads until 2000.

Local as well as international NGOs (mentioned above) began to intervene from the late 1980s onwards, particularly in the fields of day nurseries, non-formal education and primary health care.





Figure 5.1 Diana Turbay settlement  
 Source: Based on Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols and legend added.





Sunday market in the main street, Lancero sector (June 2000).



Consolidated sectors (August 2000).



Paved *arameda* above Media Torta sector (August 2000).



Edge of Rincón del Valle sector (August 2001).

Figure 5.2 Photographs of Diana Turbay settlement



## **Jerusalén**

Jerusalén was started in 1982 on land that was originally a farm owned by the Gaviria family, one of the biggest landowners in Bogotá. The area was divided between two members of the family.<sup>14</sup> One part was sub-divided by land brokers, who created an association for land sale. This was the origin of Jerusalén. Called the South Organisation Society (la Sociedad Organizadora del Sur), it started with 32 core members and one of them (Pedro Borda) was put in charge of signing the certificates of land transactions. These members had names like 'Evangelista', 'Tomás', 'San Pedro Borda', 'Celso Cordero', 'el doctor Carvajal', 'los Albarracín', 'los Contreras', 'Romero', 'Beltrán' and so on, most of which were assumed or alias names. As the business of land sub-division expanded, they hired commissioners specialising in land sales and then disappeared from the *barrio* (the interview with Carmen Fernández, community leader of Tanque-Laguna sector, 1 November 2003; Alape, 1995; Niño and Chaparro, 1998; Morales, 1993).

María Cholo and Nohemí Ríos were two local women who had been employed by the landowner and permitted to live there as watchwomen-supervisors of the land. The land developers convinced these women to overlook their sub-division of the land for sale in exchange for their own individual lot. Later, María and Nohemí joined the Association and became involved in the illegal land sale. They were living in the lowest part of Jerusalén, today called 'Plan-Cantera', where the land sub-division started in 1982.

In the initial stages (1982-1983) construction in the settlement was predominantly through self-help efforts and as a result, relations with the city authorities were ridden with conflict. In 1983, a member of the Gaviria family went to the police complaining of land invasion on their farm. The policemen came to evict the settlers and had many of the settlers' shacks torn down, but by the next day more of the flimsy dwellings made

---

<sup>14</sup> Elivira Gaviria de Croes and Mercedes Gaviria de Hollman.

of scrap timber and other crude materials had appeared (Hernando, interviewee of Jerusalén, 2 September 2000). The police soon gave up evicting the settlers, but then began to charge a 'transit tax' as a bribe for letting settlers bring in building materials.

The first *projunta* (community-based working committee) was formed in 1982. It was dedicated to carrying out various tasks such as organising a local security force, providing assistance to settlers in bringing in construction materials, and finding ways to obtain drinking water from a natural water source in the village of Quiba, two kilometres away.

At that time, Jerusalén was already divided into nine sectors: Plan-Cantera, Plan-Media Loma (today these two together are 'Plan Cantera-Media Loma'), Bellavista-La Ye, Paraíso, Nueva Argentina, Santa Rosita-Las Vegas, Pradera-Esperanza, Tanque-Laguna, Potosí La Isla (see Figure 5.3).<sup>15</sup>

In 1985, the JACs of all nine sectors gained the status of juridical person. With juridical person status, the JACs were in a stronger position to confront attempts by the police to evict settlers as well as to campaign for recognition by the city.

Negotiations with public service agencies started before the *resolución* was issued in 1989 at the convenience of the agencies. As most of the lower sectors of the *barrio* started out obtaining electricity through illegal connections to power lines in the neighbouring settlement, the EEB was faced with claims from that settlement as well as requests for service from the inhabitants of Jerusalén. The EEB started provisional service by installing a couple of transformers. For water, the settlers set up a water-collecting tank to pool water from Quiba, and hoses from each house were connected to this. Soon the capacity of this system fell short due to increased population so community leaders mobilised the residents to bore a hole in the water main of the neighbouring settlement and divert water from it using a hose.

---

<sup>15</sup> Manuela Beltrán was omitted from Jerusalén in the study due to the different origin of land occupation. Manuela Beltrán was built by Priest Sepúlveda, the same activist for autonomous popular urbanisation who founded barrio JJR. He bought the land formally and then subdivided it irregularly.

The mid-1980s was also characterised by the intervention of multiple outside actors. In 1985 the armed leftist group the April 19 Movement (M-19)<sup>16</sup> used Jerusalén as their urban hide-out and as a base for recruiting sympathisers in Bogotá. This meant that the settlement was labelled a ‘red zone’ which discouraged the Bogotá District authorities from intervening during that time. Intervention by the M-19, for its part, sparked internal violence. Calling it ‘social cleansing’, the M-19 killed those who had been involved in fraudulent land sales. The suspected illegal land brokers then armed and organised a ‘civil self-defence force’ to defend themselves against the M-19.

Although the Ciudad Bolívar Programme (see chapter 4) benefited the surrounding area, no direct investment was made in Jerusalén due to the illegal origins of its land occupation. However, as the Ciudad Bolívar locality became a major destination for international NGOs and aid organisations, the Jerusalén *barrio* also benefited from their assistance.

The Fundación Social<sup>17</sup> intervened in Jerusalén from 1986 until 1998. Its community-based programme aimed to increase the capacity of the people to improve their own living conditions. The programme covered a wide range of fields such as health, housing, youth and day nursery care.<sup>18</sup> The Fundación Social provided technical assistance as well as financial support to the small projects organised by the people’s working groups. Intervention of the Fundación Social was influential, but it was not necessarily welcomed by all the residents, since some leaders feared losing their clientelistic relations with political patrons and others feared having their autonomous leadership challenged (Interview with ex-coordinator of the Fundación Social intervention in Jerusalén, 17 May 2000).

The Fundación Social also financed the construction of a centre of activities for

---

<sup>16</sup> One of the major leftist guerrilla groups active during the 1960s to 1980s. In 1990, after the peace agreement with the national government, the M-19 put down their arms.

<sup>17</sup> This is the NGO backed by the Jesuit Foundation and the Colmena Corporation (one of the biggest CAVs in Colombia). Jerusalén was presumably a potential market for social housing through CAV Colmena, but this potential was not realised.

<sup>18</sup> Most of the day nurseries were run by community mothers. See the note for Table 5.7.

recruiting community leaders, named CELODIJE (Local Centre of Development for Jerusalén). The CELODIJE building located in the Bellavista-La Ye sector was inaugurated in 1987.

ISNEM (Social Institute for Adult Education) was another influential NGO that began to work in the upper sector of Jerusalén (currently Potosí-La Isla) in 1983. ISNEM's mission was to promote primary education and a literacy (*alfabetización*) programme for the poor. It set up primary health care and non-formal education programmes for children. In 1984, ISNEM built an educational facility in Potosí-La Isla, the origin of the present ICES (Hillside Institute of the South), a private school for primary and secondary education. In 1985 ICES set up primary education and evening literacy classes for adults. The teachers at the ICES soon got involved in other community problems and became leaders of the sector. Evaristo Bernate, head of the teachers, had a charismatic personality as well as a strong commitment to socialism (Corporación Taliber-Grupo de Danzas Colegio ICES-ISNEM, 1998). He soon gained the support of the inhabitants and was elected president of the JAC in 1988. His political orientation did not harmonise well with the paternalistic orientation of other NGOs or with the other community leaders who clung to the clientelistic support of local politicians. His rebellious attitude and strong emphasis on autonomous community struggle kept the other external institutions from approaching the sector.<sup>19</sup> Additionally he was criticised as being sympathetic to the M-19 and created a rival sect in Potosí-La Isla. Finally he was murdered in 1992. His successors, who were also teachers at the ICES, led the JAC in the 1990s. Due to the 'rebellious spirit' image of its community-based struggle, Potosí-La Isla was left behind in the overtures to the city government for regularisation and became one of the less developed areas of Jerusalén. The ICES still plays a key role in the community and one of the teachers, Leonidas

---

<sup>19</sup> For example, according to the testimony of an ex-activist of the Fundación Social, the group had difficulty intervening in the sector Potosí La Isla. Evaristo was ideologically opposed to the intervention of any outside actor that seemed to him to infringe upon the autonomy of the community.

Ospina has been identified as one of the best recognised community leaders of the sector (see chapter 6).

Politicians were also actively involved. Rafael Forero Fetecua made available heavy machinery for opening up the land and excavating roads (Cabrera, 1985). He also provided a water tank truck for water sales and two electricity transformers in the very early period before the respective public agencies provided the proper infrastructure.

All these actors together helped the community to learn how to negotiate with the state. Finally in 1989 Jerusalén was recognised by the city and the *resolución* issued. After that, regularisation progressed steadily. The EAAB provided official standard pipes for drinking water in 1989, and then expanded the network for distribution. Lalo Gil, a community leader based in Manuela Beltrán sector, pressured the EAAB for normalisation of the water supply, which was finally accomplished in 1992. He ran for the position of *edil* and won the second election of the JAL in 1995. His influence was particularly strong in the lower and flatland sectors.

The EEB maintained provisional services with a flat, unified charge. For sewerage, the process was delayed due to topographical difficulties in some areas, but from 1992 onwards, construction gradually made headway and finished in 1996. The community of Jerusalén continued pressuring the District authorities and public service agencies, claiming their right of access to basic public services. Their dissatisfaction with the response of the District authorities ended with a civic strike in 1993. This was the biggest protest in the 1990s, involving the Ciudad Bolívar locality as a whole.

From the mid 1990s to 2000, community-based activism in Jerusalén has shifted its focus to problems caused by reform of the tariff regime and privatisation of the EEB. They launched protests at the respective agencies calling for reduction of service charges. Community leaders requested meetings with these public agencies to discuss the increase in charges, although with no concrete result. From late 1999 to 2000, they organised a couple of demonstrations at the head office of the ETB as well as at

CODENSA, calling for lowering of service charges (*El Tiempo*, 2000).

Another serious problem for Jerusalén was the lawsuit filed by the Gaviria family against the District of Bogotá demanding compensation for the value of the land taken over from them by urbanisation. As a result, in 2000, the *resolución* was suspended, which further impeded upgrading projects (especially paving) in the settlement.





Figure 5.3 Jerusalén settlement  
 Source: Based on Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols and legend added.






Panoramic view of Tanque Laguna sector taken from Potosí La Isla sector (October 1999).




Recreation area and school in Tanque Laguna sector (October 1999).



Edge of the Potosí la Isla sector with view of Caracolí settlement in the background (October 1999).



Typical consolidated houses (August 2001).



Edge of Plan Cantela-Media Loma sector (August 2001).

Figure 5.4 Photographs of Jerusalén settlement



## **Danubio Azul**

The *barrio* Danubio Azul has grown up on the land of two different landowners. Sector A (upper part of the *barrio*) was property belonging to ColCerámica (a ceramic company of Corona group), one of the country's principal producers of ceramic goods. The lower part, Sector B, was part of an ancient, state-owned farm called Chiguasa.<sup>20</sup>

ColCerámica had held the land corresponding to Sector A since the 1950s as a quarry for kaolin clay, the raw material for tiles and other products. After the kaolin supply was exhausted in the mid-1970s, the land was abandoned until a certain party filed a claim of ownership in 1978. Then, the police put up no-trespassing signs, built a fence around the land, and set up a watchman's hut.

While the ownership of the land was in dispute, the property was supposedly under the control of the police, but in practice it was unsupervised. Taking advantage of the situation, a group of land-invading brokers led by Aniceto Rojas began illegal land sub-division not only in Sector A, but also in Sector B. Many of the early settlers bought lots from Aniceto Rojas and most of the certificates of land sale were signed by him.

The 1978 claim of landownership was found to be fraudulent and was settled in favour of Azulejos Corona, the predecessor of ColCerámica, in 1988. However, the suit kept Azulejos Corona from taking care of the land and when his representatives visited the land again, occupation by settlers living in flimsily built shacks had advanced considerably.

Finally, the Corona company gave up ownership of the land and placed it under supervision of an affiliated organisation, 'Fundación Corona' (a non-profit organisation financed by Corona to develop projects for social welfare) with the aim of further reconciliation with the settlers. Fundación Corona decided to facilitate the transfer of title deeds to the land to individual settlers (current owners), requiring them to pay only for the paperwork. The transfer of title deeds in Sector A was conducted gradually

---

<sup>20</sup> At first, it was considered that the land belonged to the Ministry of Justice, but after analysis by the CVP, it was revealed that the land came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture.

(interview of Miguel Núñez, employed of Fundación Corona, 30 October 2003).

The land in Sector B had also been sub-divided and sold by land brokers, but it was categorised as invasion of state property, so no activity corresponding to transfer of title deeds was conducted during the 1990s.

The land occupation process accelerated in 1988, when Ramón Agudelo purchased a lot to settle there. He encouraged former neighbours and tenants to come together and build their own houses. Ramón became the first president of the JAC and it was he who named the *barrio* Danubio Azul.

Ramón was a competent and effective community leader, since during his presidency he succeeded in negotiating with the public service companies for regularisation for the settlement. However, at the same time, testimony by some inhabitants, as well as the prosecution documents submitted to the justice sector of the DAAC, reveal that Ramón cheated the inhabitants by illegal sale of the lots. For example, he resold lots that had already been sold to other inhabitants. He also came into conflict with Aniceto Rojas over the transfer of title deeds. Aniceto Rojas and his fellow land brokers never lived in Danubio Azul, except in the very initial stages, they seldom appeared in the *barrio* and eventually disappeared for good, leaving the rest of the business in the hands of the *barrio* leaders, led by Ramón.<sup>21</sup>

In terms of recognition by the DAAC, Danubio Azul is made up of one sector, run by one JAC. However, there were two more community-based organisations, which competed with the JAC. These were ASINDESODA (Danubio Azul Association for Integration and Social Development) and Prodesarrollo. These two organisations were run by ex-leaders of the JAC. After a disagreement on the inner politics of JAC, three of its leaders created independent organisations. Both organisations obtained juridical person status as community-based organisations to serve social development in the

---

<sup>21</sup> Testimonies of the inhabitants indicate that many of the brokers (who sold the land to settlers) in the initial stages of urbanisation either absconded or were killed. Their sales practices caused problems and violence amongst themselves and with the settlers to whom they sold the lots, who accused them of fraud and threatened to kill them.

settlement. ASINDESODA, led by José (until the middle of 2000) had a leftist ideological background. Prodesarrollo, led by Coronado, supported the Liberal party and became a rival political organisation opposing the JACs in electoral campaigns for Bogotá city mayor. Relations among the three have been contentious, leading to violent incidents in the community. Ramón Agudelo was eventually shot dead in public, during a community assembly. His widow (Inés) suspected the leader of ASINDESODA to be responsible for the murder, but there was no evidence.<sup>22</sup> However, it was also suggested that Ramón may have been killed due to problems caused by his illegal land transactions.<sup>23</sup>

The regularisation of Danubio Azul moved remarkably quickly after the *projunta* was created in 1989. The first JAC was soon organised and gained juridical person status in May 1990. Ramón became the first president of the JAC, and coordinated the efforts of the inhabitants in obtaining water and electricity by illegal connection to the neighbouring settlement supply lines. He then started negotiations with public service agencies endeavouring to attain normalisation of the services. However, after that the regularisation of the settlement did not run as smoothly, since certain parts of Danubio Azul overlapped with areas of environmental preservation and were considered unsafe for construction. After a topographical analysis and the relocation of several households from the areas in question following intervention by the DPAE,<sup>24</sup> the settlement was eventually recognised in 1994.

In February 1995, the community organised a big civic strike to demand that the

---

<sup>22</sup> The leader of ASINDESODA was threatened with ostracism from Danubio Azul on suspicion of this murder.

<sup>23</sup> Ramón and his family (especially his widow, Inés) may have been the principal pirate land brokers. Some testimonies from the inhabitants reveal that Ramón Agudelo's family held the title deeds of some residents' housing lots without transferring them to the residents, even after Fundación Corona started the transfer of individual ownership to the residents. Ramón worked hard to push the regularisation process for public services, but his main motivation in working for the community seems to have been to benefit from the increase of land prices.

<sup>24</sup> The DPAE (Direction of Prevention and Attention of Emergency) is the direction of Bogotá District city administration in charge of relocation programmes for people whose residences are designated as located on land not suitable for housing construction.

District authorities and the public service companies accelerate the regularisation process. The inhabitants occupied Caracas Avenue blocking traffic for two whole days, until finally the representatives of the public service companies such as the ETB, EEB, EAAB, IDU, as well as representatives of the Mayor and the DAPD came to talk to them. The District authorities representatives tried to convince the inhabitants to suspend the blockade, guaranteeing that regularisation would be expedited. After the demonstration, the regularisation process was pushed ahead, and in July 1995, the agreement between the community and the EAAB was signed for a project to renew the water supply system. In December of the same year, the *resolución* recognising the settlement was issued. Water supply, sewerage system and electricity were provided during 1995-96.

The JAC leaders worked hard to tap other sources of funding from the city government. In 1997, the Danubio Azul JAC was chosen by the OSP (Work with an Educational Outcome; see chapter 4 for details) programme financed by the DAAC for a project to build a community park. Through this project the community built a park in an area marked as vulnerable to soil subsidence. This area had been the central kaolin clay quarry site, and when the residents moved in, there were huge holes in the land. The DPAE strongly recommended relocation of the settlers who were living near the holes, because of problems with drainage and pollution. The JAC leaders mobilised the inhabitants, especially those living in the surrounding areas, to participate as community labour in the OSP's scheme. The ground was filled in order to build a firm foundation for the park and as a result, the families at risk were saved from relocation.

A further, decisive stage of regularisation came when Danubio Azul was selected as an area for intervention in the first stage of the De-marginalisation Programme (explained in chapter 4). From the viewpoint of the District administration, keeping an eye on this settlement was the most effective strategy for maintaining public order in this area and staving off another damaging civic strike. The infrastructure for a drainage

system to handle heavy rainfall and the paving of internal roads in the settlement were completed under the De-marginalisation Programme.

As for the presence of NGOs, Fe y Alegría (an NGO sponsored by a Catholic organisation in Spain) and groups belonging to the Catholic parish church of the neighbourhood,<sup>25</sup> have made great contributions. Fe y Alegría runs a private school which provides both primary and secondary education and is considered to be the best of Danubio Azul's educational institutions. Members of the clergy (Catholic priests and sisters) are engaged in social welfare activities set up under the leadership of Father Manolo, head priest (from 1991 until 2005) of the parish church for the neighbourhood which includes Danubio Azul and La Paz. Manolo coordinated community-based work in the fields of education, health and nutrition. A typical example was the creation of a community restaurant for needy children (*comedor infantil*). Community volunteers run the restaurant, which provides lunch and a snack between meals to children in the settlements at minimal prices. Manolo was very charismatic and his work was much praised by residents of all political persuasions. The sisters' group has been dedicated to non-formal educational efforts for adolescents with the aim of reducing juvenile delinquency and other social problems such as juvenile pregnancy, domestic violence, mistreatment of children, and so on.

---

<sup>25</sup> This is the concept of *parroquia*, or geographical parish unit by which people attend the Catholic Church. This unit became customary in Spain, and, after its introduction in the colonial period, spread through most Latin American countries. The members of one *parroquia* usually come from two or more settlements (*barrios*). In this case, the corresponding *parroquia*, called Fiscala, includes the Fiscala, Danubio Azul, La Paz and other settlements.





Figure 5.5 Danubio Azul settlement  
 Source: Based on Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols and legend added.





Community assembly at the recreation area (January 2000).



View of Sector A before the intervention of the de-marginalisation programme (January 2000).



Installation of sewerage system financed by the de-marginalisation programme (February 2000).



Finishing the pavement (June 2000).



Panoramic view of Danubio Azul after completion of the de-marginalisation programme, taken from La Paz showing the *arameda* avenue in between (August 2004).

Figure 5.6 Photographs of Danubio Azul settlement

## **La Paz**

La Paz is located immediately to the north of Danubio Azul, but its development has been very different. The whole of La Paz was long considered to belong to the state-owned Chiguasa farm (in the same way as Sector B of the Danubio Azul *barrio*). In 1984, a group of activists from Provivienda backed by the Communist Party promoted a massive invasion involving approximately 500 families. This group was called 'Civic Movement for Peace' from which the name of the settlement came.<sup>26</sup>

Another testimony explained that the watchmen of the Picota Jail built their own houses near the jail, currently part of the *barrio* of La Paz. Later these watchmen sub-divided the land into housing lots to sell.

However, the majority of the land was urbanised by professional land sub-dividers using illegal methods who began selling the land in 1985. These sub-dividers were identified by the inhabitants as: 'Black María', 'Bald Fernández', Alfredo Guerrero Estrada, Yudí Consuelo Pipelón, Evarito Guerrero, Ciervo Cruz, Blanca, Ciro Antonio Flores, José Beltrán and Gustavo Espitia. Enrique Sampedro Borda was the head of the sub-dividers and signed most of the certificates of land transaction. Most of those named above did not live in the settlement, and some were killed in conflicts sparked by their own fraudulent land transactions. Soon after the land-sub-division started, the land sub-dividers had already sub-contracted to a few of the first settlers of the *barrio*, who took charge of land sales in their place. As the pirate urbanisation of La Paz became common knowledge, more potential buyers came and the land sale business became more competitive. On occasion the settlers re-sold lots previously sold to someone else who had not yet taken up residence. According to the testimonies of the residents in La Paz, many lots were re-sold more than once (Flor del Carmen, interviewee of La Paz, 18 June 2000).

---

<sup>26</sup> Based on the interview to Miguel Angel Caicedo, ex-leading member of the JAC of the Torre sector and on the interview to Nelson Velazco, community leader and *edil* of the Usme locality from 2004.



José Naranjos was the first president of the JAC of the sector named after him. He was himself engaged in the land sub-division business but worked for the community as the *barrio's* first leader. The relationship between Naranjos and the land brokers was not clearly understood, and the stories of the inhabitants surveyed suggested that his land sale business had been consigned to him by the initial land sub-dividers.

The occupation process started from the central and rather steeply inclined sectors, currently named Naranjos, La Torre and Caracas. The flattest and most topographically advantageous places such as Cebadal Medio and Cebadal Chicó were the last to be occupied.

During the initial period (1984-1986), there were frequent attempts by the police to evict settlers. Sometimes the policemen demanded a bribe in exchange for allowing settlers to stay on the land. If people refused to pay, they risked assault by the police.

The *projunta* (the first working committee) was organised in 1985 representing the entire area of present-day La Paz. At the beginning, the committee was called the Civic Committee for Peace derived from the activism of Provienda. However Provienda failed to expand their leadership to include new comers during the first few years. By 1987, La Paz had been divided into four sectors: Torre, Naranjos, Caracas and Cebadal, and each sector organised its own JAC. By then, the influence of Provienda had mostly disappeared. Recognition by the DAAC was delayed. Juridical person status was finally received in 1988 for one unified JAC for the whole settlement. Later in 1989 individual juridical person status was given to the JAC for each sector.

Issue of the *resolución* was delayed until 1996. Public services were supplied in the meantime through collective self-help action. Community leaders took the initiative to organise residents, and they acquired a provisional system for water supply as well as for electric power by illegal connection to neighbouring settlements in the same area.

In the late 1980s, the head of Rafael Uribe Uribe locality (*alcalde menor*) provided the inhabitants with machinery to build internal roads. Guerrero Estrada, city councillor

and promoter of Diana Turbay, supported the community in pressuring the public service agencies (e.g., EAAB and EEB) to respond to their need for normalisation of services.

For water service, at first the JACs coordinated illegal hose connections to supply lines for the neighbouring settlement of Palermo. Following this, the people organised a sit-in protest at the offices of the EAAB to demand water delivery by water tank truck. As a result, water supply by tank truck continued for almost six months. After the civic strike in 1990, held jointly with Danubio Azul, the EAAB introduced a provisional service charging a minimum fixed rate, called 'Plan 50,' which meant that the user was charged for 50 cubic metres per month. However, this system was not acceptable to the residents, since the rationalisation of consumption was not reflected in the payment. So, people again organised a collective sit-in demonstration at the EAAB's offices in 1993. The EAAB's Division of Community Action responded by negotiating with the JACs and finally agreed a contract to install a local water supply network under the programme currently called 'community participation'. In this programme, the community should pay a pre-determined percentage of the total cost of the work for individual connection to the network in advance. The rest of the cost should be paid for using a two to three-year loan.<sup>27</sup> However this programme was successful only in the Cebadal sectors. Its failure in the other sectors was firstly as a result of the residents finding it difficult to pay the required amount and secondly because there was corruption among the JAC leaders in the management of community payments. The EAAB ultimately decided to invest without relying on co-finance from the community in building the water supply infrastructure for the *barrio*.<sup>28</sup>

To obtain an electricity supply, the people of La Paz organised their first civic strike

---

<sup>27</sup> I will call this sort of programme a 'community co-finance programme'.

<sup>28</sup> This option resulted in higher monthly payments for users. The cost of installation of the local network of water pipes was charged (with long-term credit) in addition to the fees for individual consumption and installation of internal connection and of a meter, thus in sum, charges added up to 40,000 pesos per month in 2000, which was more expensive than the regular monthly charge for a stratification 3 (middle-income) stratum community.

in 1989. In 1990, the EEB installed provisional transformers at several sites and people started to pay a fixed minimum charge.

State intervention was minimal and the regularisation process for La Paz was practically abandoned during the 1980s. In 1999, however, after being selected as one of the target areas of intervention under the South Bogotá Project, La Paz was suddenly converted into one of the best cared for areas in the city of Bogotá.

With the arrival of CODENSA, the normalisation of power delivery and the installation of a meter at every individual dwelling were completed in 1997-1998. By September 2001, most of the physical upgrading projects, such as the rainfall drainage system, sewerage and paving of internal roads were completed.

Since 2001, the transfer of individual housing lots has been studied by the legalisation division of the CVP, with the aim of legalising the settlement in favour of the inhabitants, under the category of special transfer of state property for social housing.<sup>29</sup>

The community leaders' tendency to rely on clientelistic relations with local politicians continued into the 1990s. In 2000, Nubia Medrano, one of the *ediles* (representatives of JAL) of Rafael Uribe Uribe locality, and her colleague, councillor Severo Correa, were highly influential. Some of the projects that benefited La Paz (for example, building a community hall for the Caracas sector) were funded by FDL (Local Development Fund), after she submitted a proposal. In this way, she gained the support of the inhabitants, but the key element was her patron-client relationship with the JAC president of the Cebadal sectors, Agapito García.<sup>30</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> This process will take a long time, because one of the pirate developers who sub-divided many plots of La Paz asserted his right of ownership, and, while the court once supported his claim in the District civil court, the CVP later overturned the judgement.

<sup>30</sup> A typical example of her political intervention is illustrated by an incident where she pressured the Mayor into modifying the design for a local road construction project according to the inhabitants' preferences, rather than following the technical specifications recommended by Project South Bogotá.






Figure 5.7 La Paz settlement  
 Source: Based on Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols and legend added.






'Olla'. This area is considered by locals to be a 'red zone' (high risk) at the edge of la Torre sector on the border between La Paz and Danubio Azul (December 1999).



Rudimentary 'steps' made from used tyres (December 1999).



Community participation in a paving project financed by the Bogotá South Project (February 2000).



The Catholic church in La Torre sector showing the paved road financed by the Bogotá South Project (August 2001).



Caracas Sector, after the completion of work to upgrade the infrastructure financed by the Bogotá South Project (August 2004).

Figure 5.8 Photographs of La Paz settlement

### **Juan José Rondón (JJR)**

JJR was created as a social housing programme settlement based on communal work under the guidance of Father Saturnino Sepúlveda. A Catholic priest and community activist, he also had a background in sociology. He initiated the practice of mobilising communal labour for social development in the rural sector in the early 1970s,<sup>31</sup> and then applied a similar programme to community development for urban areas in Bogotá during the 1980s. He created a community-based self-help organisation called 'Integral Community Companies' under which he conducted social development programmes at 16 sites in Bogotá; JJR was one of them. Its principal aim was to provide social housing for the poorest sector through collective self-help management.

Saturnino did follow the regular procedures for settling urban areas, but he was not interested in negotiating with the city authorities to obtain public services. The participants in the programme were required to attend a training course of 40 hours in total, which was composed of theory of community work, human relations and basic engineering skills for construction.

Saturnino purchased part of a farm called San José that corresponds to the upper part (called the First Sector) of JJR today. He began sub-dividing the land in 1983, and sold each housing plot, with an area of 72 square metres (6m x 12m), unequipped with basic services, at an average of 30,000 pesos with the option to pay by instalments.

Saturnino helped inhabitants to obtain basic services during the initial stage of development. He rented heavy machinery to prepare the land, adjust the size of housing lots and to create internal roads. The participants in the programme affiliated with the JJR Association were organised into small groups for communal tasks. Other basic public services were also performed by community-based self-help work. In the initial stage, the inhabitants of JJR tapped natural sources of water such as a spring on a neighbouring farm, but as the number of inhabitants increased, this supply proved

---

<sup>31</sup> He introduced a system called 'rural community self-management companies.'

insufficient. Saturnino's aim was to build a utopian community based on autonomous management by residents, so he rejected any kind of intervention by the city administration. One group of inhabitants, however, did not accept his inflexible adherence to the principle of self-management, so the community eventually divided into two groups: 'pro' Saturnino and 'anti' Saturnino. What started off as minor friction between the inhabitants and Saturnino, escalated to the point of death threats being made against Saturnino. He ultimately left JJR in 1986, appointing one of the community leaders, Canizares, as president of the JJR Association in charge of transferring the individual title deeds to each plot of land to the settlers.

After this, the struggle for public services started through the JAC leadership which was formed in 1986. The inhabitants negotiated with the owner of a brewery located 1 km away for permission to tap water from a mountain stream running through the factory property. The community built three water tanks<sup>32</sup> to serve as supply reservoirs and finally water supply from the brewery started in 1990. The water was distributed to individual houses by hoses connected to the water tanks. The inhabitants appointed a person to be in charge of maintaining this communal water-supply system.<sup>33</sup> Each household was expected to pay him a monthly fee of 500 pesos to maintain the system. However, soon the system deteriorated due to high water pressure and the poor quality of the tank material. Despite this, the communal water system remained in use throughout the 1990s.

The situation changed following the agreement between the EAAB Division of Community Action and a group of seven irregular settlements of the Usme locality, including JJR, to introduce an alternative system of water supply co-financed by the community.<sup>34</sup> The project was not executed immediately, however. The EAAB

---

<sup>32</sup> A child of the community fell into one of the water tanks by accident and drowned, which caused a crisis in relations between Saturnino and the inhabitants, who attributed the accident to his poor management of the project.

<sup>33</sup> This water watchman was called '*aguadero*' and in practical terms made his living on the maintenance fees.

<sup>34</sup> The seven settlements that were the target of EAAB intervention are now collectively known as

commissioned CIDER (Interdisciplinary Centre of Regional Studies) of Universidad de Los Andes (a private university in Bogotá) to carry out a diagnostic study of the socio-economic situation and inhabitants' needs and to promote understanding in the community about EAAB intervention. Intervention of the EAAB under the CIDER programme continued from 1997 to 1999. Its overarching mission was to raise popular awareness regarding the regularisation process and bolster the people's capacity for community development so as to carry out regularisation through the co-finance programme. The regularisation of the water supply system consisted of four sub-projects: construction of a water-treatment plant; construction of a local-district network of water mains; construction of a sector-specific water supply network, and individual house connections. Under the scheme of community participation, the first two were carried out by direct investment of the EAAB, the third was undertaken by the community, and the cost of the last was charged to the user. Community funds collected for the third sub-project were to be controlled by a new organisation called COOPBAUS (Public Service Cooperative of Hillside Settlements of Usme). A board of directors of the COOPABUS was created, including representatives (JAC leaders) from the seven settlements covered by the project. The relationship between the leaders of COOPABUS and the inhabitants did not run particularly smoothly, due to a general distrust of cooperatives at that time. The general manager of COOPABUS was Alberto Hernández, who was a candidate for the post of *edil* in the Usme locality.<sup>35</sup> The COOPABUS initiatives produced friction with other political groups in the seven-settlement area (called 'Yomasa') where the EAAB was intervening, particularly with those who administered the rudimentary water supply system that had been created by the community (interview with Alberto Hernández, 16 August 2000). According to

---

the 'Yomasa sector'.

<sup>35</sup> Law on cooperatives in Colombia requires a general manager from outside of the affiliated membership. In the case of COOPABUS, the eligible person for this post should be a non-resident of the seven settlements. Hernández lived in Usme but outside of these settlements. As he was ex *edil* of the locality and influential in the neighbourhood, people affiliated with COOPABUS requested him to take the position.



Hernández, the JAL of Usme locality appropriated approximately 250 million pesos from the FDL for the third sub-project (sector-specific water supply network). However, the COOPABUS was not eligible to contract work for such a large amount of money. Ultimately, the funds were transferred to the jurisdiction of the UEL (see chapter 4 regarding the function of the UEL). As a result, the budget that was supposed to be used for the sector-specific water supply network was not realised, and the construction process was delayed.<sup>36</sup>

With regard to the remaining services and infrastructure; the sewerage and drainage systems were built by community labour, but their quality was very poor. Electric power was initially obtained by illegal connection to lines in neighbouring settlements where a regularised power network was available. This situation was left uncorrected for a long time, but after the EEB was privatised, CODENSA approached the community and regularised the power supply network. Waste collection was another problem in JJR, since EDIS (District Company of Public Services), then the District of Bogotá official waste collection company, did not collect waste in the residential areas, but only at the highway in front of the *barrio*. The inhabitants of JJR built a container for the deposit of waste at the edge of the highway so that the EDIS truck could easily collect the garbage deposited there once a week.<sup>37</sup>

In 1989, the Michalenas Catholic sisterhood purchased a series of plots from Saturnino with the aim of building a centre for their activities.<sup>38</sup> These included a rehabilitation and training programme for women and social housing for disadvantaged women from their shelters in downtown Bogotá. In the early 1990s, the sisters settled in JJR and gradually became involved in other community development activities. Soon after, the church that is today located in JJR was built with funds donated by a Canadian

---

<sup>36</sup> The COOPABUS project failed and the EAAB finally invested to regularise the water supply system in 2002 without relying on the community co-finance programme.

<sup>37</sup> In 1995, EDIS was privatised. Today one of the four private waste collection companies collects waste from the JJR area.

<sup>38</sup> Based on an interview with Ester Castaño Mejía and Ana de Jesús Rodríguez Jiménez, 5 August 2000.

voluntary group that had visited the settlement. The building of the church had important implications not just for JJR but also for the other irregular settlements nearby. Although these settlements did not compose a parish, in practice the newly built church became a central point of reference for the people as well as Bogotá District authorities and other external organisations.

At first, the inhabitants did not welcome the sisters and the women under their protection as the latter had all previously been street prostitutes. However the sisters gradually gained the inhabitants' sympathy and recognition through their other activities, such as workshops providing manual training for local women in garment manufacturing and handicraft skills, social activities for mothers and children and emergency first-aid courses. In 2003 the Michalenas convent built a new garment manufacturing factory, with the aim of developing it as a satellite of their factory in downtown Bogotá.<sup>39</sup>

After the departure of Saturnino Sepúlveda, the community was divided into different groups with competing candidates for the presidency of JAC and there was no strong leadership of JAC activities. When the regularisation process began, especially after the water service normalisation project began in 1997, the sisters assumed the role that would have been played by the JAC, negotiating with the Bogotá District authorities as representatives of the community.

The lower half of the current area of JJR was purchased and sub-divided by another group of urban developers. This is now called JJR's '2nd sector'. Started as illegal land sub-division without any coordinating leader, its development process was totally different from the upper sector. Although there was intervention by NGOs for example through social housing programmes provided by SERVIVIENDA<sup>40</sup> and San Vicente

---

<sup>39</sup> The main site of the convent's rehabilitation activities had been carried out downtown and in another neighbourhood in the south called 20 de Julio. Their garment factory had international clients in such places as the UK and their products were mainly export-oriented.

<sup>40</sup> Association for Popular Housing. A cooperative producing cheap prefabricated housing units (Gilbert, 2000: 190).

Paúl, there was no leader who coordinated activities for the whole sector. It did not, therefore, succeed in forming its own JAC, and today JJR as a whole (first and second sector together) is represented by one JAC.





Figure 5.9 Juan José Rondón settlement  
 Source: Based on Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols and legend added.



First sector (August 2000).



Second sector (August 2000).



Social housing built with the help of the loan programme run by the sisterhood (August 2000).



Entrance to the barrio. A small plaza built by a new barrio upgrading programme run by Bogotá city with the church in the background (August 2004).



An example of consolidated houses in the first sector (August 2004).

Figure 5.10 Photographs of Juan José Rondón settlement

## **Bella Flor**

The land where Bella Flor and its neighbouring settlements, Mirador and Paraíso, are located was originally called 'Los Alpes', a farm belonging to Victor Cangrejo Cobos and then to his son Luis Augusto Cangrejo Cobos. Luis Augusto divided the land into three and sold two parts to Hernando Ruiz and Juan Borda and left the last part to his half-brother, Victor Cangrejo Jr. Located on land more than 2,800 metres above the sea level, the farm was not categorised as land suitable for urban development until 1990. Hernando Ruiz and Juan Borda used the land as a stone and earth quarry, so the housing which was later developed there is surrounded by quarried areas where disturbed earth poses the risk of landslides.

Illegal land sub-division on property belonging to Victor Cangrejo Jr. began in March 1984. Victor Cangrejo Jr. failed to get the settlers evicted in 1987, because the transfer of title deeds of the land had not been completed before Luis Augusto died and Victor Cangrejo Jr. was recognised as his heir to the property. Other testimony suggested, however, that Victor Cangrejo Jr. was acquainted with the head of these land sub-dividers and had employed him to handle the sub-division of the land with the aim of benefiting from its future increase in value. According to the inhabitants, David Salguero Franco, his brother Salmón Salguero Franco, Heder Ramón Ramírez, Luis Otalora, Efrain Giraldo and Francisco Redondo were the first group of sub-dividers. David Salguero was the head of the group and signed most of the certificates of land sale. Francisco Redondo lived in the neighbouring Mirador *barrio* and was president of the JAC there, but the other land sub-dividers soon disappeared from Bella Flor, consigning the rest of the land for sale to other early community leaders.

In 1986 the first settlers organised a *projunta* headed by Jaime Rico Vargas (one of the directing members of the JAC as of 2000). He collaborated with another community leader, José Chacón, who became the first president of the JAC. Flor Elba Cárdenaz

(then a councilwoman) and her partner José Antonio Rodríguez (a politician) assisted in the initial stages of *barrio* development, finding a way to obtain water through a provisional system and organising the first JAC. Through their political influence, the JAC received juridical person status in 1987. Originally known by other names, the *barrio* was renamed, after Flor Elba Cárdenaz, by the JAC leaders at this time.

In 1988 an urban activist group affiliated with the guerrilla group M-19 intervened with donations of food and other assistance to the residents in social projects, but their presence did not last long due to conflict with JAC leaders over leadership of the *barrio*. After the disarmament of the M-19 group, ex-member Patricia Arévalo came forward as a candidate for the post of *edil* and was elected in 1995. She became involved in the upgrading process of Bella Flor, but due to the topographical difficulties her contribution was very limited.

In fact, State intervention was restricted during the 1980s, since Bella Flor is located more than 2,800 metres above sea level and categorised as an area reserved for agrarian use as defined under Agreement No. 7/1979, which remained in force until 1990.<sup>41</sup>

The poor leadership of the JAC has also impeded the negotiation process with the city authorities for regularisation of the settlement. The first community leader, José Chacón, died in an accident and his efforts to negotiate with the public service agencies were not followed up effectively by succeeding JAC directors, who engaged in corrupt practices. The *barrio* was divided into several sectors and two JACs were created. At the time of the survey the lower sector was directed by Miguel Carrero and the upper sector was directed by Excelino, but little collaboration was observed between the two sectors.

Until the construction of the road connecting the *barrio* to the lower sector of Ciudad

---

<sup>41</sup> 2,800 metres above sea level was stipulated as the boundary line between the urban perimeter and land for agrarian use, under Agreement No. 25/1975. According to the stipulations of Agreement No. 7/1979, regularisation of settlements located in '*reserva agrícola*' (land reserved for agrarian use) requires the issue of another agreement by the District Council of Bogotá to incorporate them into the urban perimeter. This procedure was simplified by Agreement No. 1/1986 and by Agreement No. 6/1990.



Bolívar in 1995, the role of the state in this settlement was insignificant. In 1997, the negotiations between the EAAB and the community made some progress. A community co-finance project, called 'alternative water service provision,' was undertaken following a contract between the EAAB and the community in 1997, but the construction of infrastructure for the water supply was suspended due to corruption in the contracted company. Madres Comunitarias,<sup>42</sup> a Bella Flor-based group, launched a demonstration demanding water supply infrastructure from the District of Bogotá. As a consequence, in 1998 the EAAB agreed that it would start direct investment in Bella Flor to build water supply infrastructure, which was finally completed in June 2000. In the meantime, the EAAB and the Metropolitan police delivered water by tank truck to the sector three times a week, continuing until May 2000.

At the same time as the arrival of the EAAB project, CODENSA came in to replace the provisional utility poles with more permanent ones and install electricity meters and connecting cables for individual dwellings. This process of normalisation of the power supply was finished by May 2000. The project to build sewerage was also contracted and the design and planning processes finished by September 2000.

Additionally, in 1999 the DPAE intervened to facilitate the regularisation of Bella Flor, since there were several plots categorised as unsafe for construction.

Community organisation remained problematic in Bella Flor, however. JAC leaders of the upper sector were suspected of lining their own pockets with fees charged to new settlers for the cost of provisional infrastructure, when in fact this had been built by communal work. They never clarified the accounts for use of communal funds. Rumours circulated that the JAC leaders had engaged in illegal transactions with the aim of speculation. In 2000, Excelino, president of the JAC, was accused of fraud and finally discharged.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>42</sup> Abbreviation of *Asociación de Madres Comunitarias Zonal*, a local organisation with members from neighbouring *barrios* Paraíso, Los Alpes and Mirador.

<sup>43</sup> He was accused of selling off plots which had been reserved for community use.



In 2000, there were two more community development groups in Bella Flor backed by politicians. The first, the association for female household heads, the elderly and children, was named 'ASIMITER B.F.' (Bella Flor Integral Association of Female Household Heads and the Aged Group) and financially supported by an aspirant for district councillor (Fernando Mansilla). This intervention was in part motivated by his campaign for councillor in the upcoming election. The other group was a non-formal education programme run by 'Negra Grande' (the nickname of Leonor González Mina), a member of the House of Representatives with whom Miguel Carrero, JAC president of the lower sector, had created a patron-client relationship. Additionally Flavio Maya, a lawyer, and a candidate for district councillor, was advising inhabitants of the sector on land-owning legalisation, offering to do the paper work for the procedure. As he stood for district councillor soon after, his intervention is similarly categorised as action initiated to drum up support for a campaign to achieve regularisation of the electricity supply.

Some NGOs, however, were not motivated by political interests. The Catholic priest, Father Garavito, built a private school for primary education (el Colegio María Auxiliadora) using charitable donations from members of his parish community. This was the only educational establishment in the settlement, though the quality of the teachers was very low.<sup>44</sup> Another cleric, Brother Dairo, was known for his creation of a solidarity group named Pastoral Group. He was affiliated with a Catholic Church located in the residential area of stratus 6 (the highest socio-economic stratus) in Bogotá. He organised a group of women in the wealthy Catholic parish and another group of women in Bella Flor. Together they coordinated community-based social work projects for women and children, such as bazaars, the celebration of Mothers' Day, building a mini park for small children, coordinating a nursery programme for the children of the settlement and so on. Support both in material and pecuniary form was collected from

---

<sup>44</sup> There were no officially recognised schoolteachers; a couple of policemen were teaching as part of their social contribution to the community.

members of the high-income parish. A church for the community of Bella Flor and a facility for their activities were also built by this charity.

Another intervention by a non-official agency was that of a German philanthropist based in Bogotá. He provided a series of prefabricated houses through charitable donations from volunteers in Germany collected through his personal networks.




Figure 5.11 Bella Flor settlement


Source: Based on Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD. Symbols and legend added.



Sector A. The first view of Bella Flor when approaching from the centre of Ciudad Bolívar (November 1999).



Donkeys carrying water in plastic tanks. Sector D, flat area. (November 1999).



Rudimentary water distribution via a hose connection. Sector E, in front of the electricity pylon (November 1999).



Inhabitants running out with drums to collect water from the water-tank car (November 1999).



A newly installed tap after the regularisation of the water supply (August 2001).

Figure 5.12 Photographs of Bella Flor settlement

## DIFFERING PACES OF REGULARISATION

As we have seen in the accounts above, intervention by the state can be a decisive factor in the regularisation of the settlements in Bogotá. While the topographical conditions of the settlements were obviously technical factors that affected state intervention, the pace of improvement in infrastructure and community services, however, depended on other factors such as political involvement, NGO intervention, nature of the local leadership and community participation.

### **Factors established in previous studies**

The factors pointed to in previous studies as having the greatest impact on the regularisation process are as follows. I will relate each of them to the experience of the six case settlements.

#### *Clientelistic relations between local politicians and community leaders*

Cornelius (1975) and Peattie (1968) showed that ‘doing politics’ with local politicians was a common tactic through which the poor pressured the governmental bureaucracy to meet their needs. When the political regime is based on a system of competition among different political parties, the poor sector is often targeted as a group with whom to expand partisan influence. This was certainly the case in Venezuela and Colombia from the 1960s to the 1980s. In Venezuelan cities, institutional intervention in the irregular settlements was subordinated to the particular interests of political parties (Grohmann, 1996: 46).

Where the political regime was authoritarian or quasi authoritarian such as in Mexico under PRI, neither the PRI nor opposition parties had the need to seek the political support of the poor (Cornelius, 1975: 201). However, inhabitants of Mexican irregular settlements had to resort to politics to solve their problems, because the decisions on

social subsidies were made through ties between local politicians (PRI members) and public officials. In Mexico, therefore, partisan influence was indispensable in order to attain the upgrading of the irregular settlements (Cornelius, 1975; Eckstein, 1977).

In Colombia, too, community leaders of the popular sector found it effective to seek the help of political patrons to resolve their collective needs. In fact, the community without any technical capacity or assistance (either from a pirate urbaniser, outside NGO activist, or community leader with technical knowledge) had enormous difficulty in obtaining basic services. Therefore, communities tended to ask local politicians for assistance as a last and easy resort. The linkage between local politicians and the community in the poor sector can be attributed to the patron-client relations that arose in the context of the bipartisan coalition in Colombia (Leal and Dávila, 1990; Gutiérrez, 1998).

We can find this tendency in the process of the formation of JACs in the studied communities. Independent of the nature of the founder of the *barrio*, all six communities struggled to build JACs due to the need for these to be approved by the Bogotá District government. The settlement of La Paz began as a result of an organised invasion backed by the communist party, but soon the emerging leaders preferred to form conventional JACs to facilitate the linkage with traditional partisan politicians. The inhabitants of JJR demonstrated a similar way of thinking when they rejected Saturnino's anarchical (non partisan) position. In the case of Danubio Azul, though political patronage was not so strong, the emergence of dominant JAC leadership was fundamental to push forward the regularisation process. Diana Turbay is a typical case of a settlement founded on a patron-client relationship between the first settlers and a politician, Guerrero Estrada. The later conflict between the community and Guerrero can also be explained by the end of the patron-client relationship. Even Jerusalén, an atypical case in which the community leaders sought to establish a civic movement against such partisan practices, was not entirely free from clientelism. In its initial

period, the intervention of Rafael Forero Fetcua, one of the most influential politicians in Bogotá during the 1980s, was significant in order to push forward the development of Jerusalén.

*The nature of community leadership and its relations with the state and other outside actors*

Ward and Chant (1987) examine the role of community leadership and its relationship to the state and other outside agencies intervening in the development of the irregular settlements. Based on numerous case studies conducted in different countries, they categorise the character of leadership by types of leader-state relationship: patron/client; co-option/incorporation; routinisation and autonomy/independence (Ward and Chant, 1987: 89-92). They argue that the state will ultimately intervene whatever the leader-state relation is, but the first reaction and approach of the state is different. While the leader is more collaborative and flexibly accepts the state approach, the relationship facilitates improvement of infrastructure and service provision. In contrast, when the leadership aspires to be independent or autonomous, this is interpreted as a challenge to the state that can cause state intervention or control to be either delayed or abandoned (as a penalty). As they state, 'The position of independence and class mobilization that they adopt represents a considerable threat to the state which may respond in one (or several) ways: to co-opt, to 'divide and rule', to 'starve' into submission or, ultimately, to repress' (Ward and Chant, 1987: 92).

Under the same logic, the nature of intervention by outside agencies such as NGOs (including churches) has also been influenced by relations with community leaders. When the external actor and the internal community leadership combine forces to fight for community needs, the result is a mutually beneficial situation that advances the regularisation process. Outside actors may be local politicians, NGO activists, or religious groups. The concerns of the community leader and those of the intervening actors must of course seek benefits for the whole community and not be privately motivated.

As for the community leader-state relationship of the case-study settlements, we can classify it by the nature of collective actions conducted in the regularisation process. Diana Turbay was the most obedient in its relationship with the state as it seldom protested against the city government. In fact, the community organisation's first function was to organise the electoral campaign for Guerrero. There was no need for the inhabitants to make a claim on the state, while they could rely on Guerrero's political patronage. After the community leaders confronted Guerrero over the ownership transfer, however, the community resorted to calling for the state to intervene. In contrast, Jerusalén's leaders have aspired to be independent and searched for autonomy from partisan politics. The civic strike with the biggest magnitude in 1993 in Bogotá showed its resistant position against the state. Although the civic strike helped the community to start up a dialogue with the city authorities, the result was negative and further delayed the regularisation process. Contrary to the experience of Jerusalén, the management of civic strikes organised by Danubio Azul and La Paz sometimes meant that the state intervened to restore public order in the neighbourhood. In the case of JJR, Saturnino rejected the idea of a relationship with the state. After he left, however the community failed in creating a strong leadership to develop its approach toward the state. Bella Flor, like JJR, experienced a delay, but the reason was slightly different. The intervention of leftist activists and rumours of other armed groups in the 1980s was one of the explanatory factors impeding state intervention. Corruption amongst the leadership also prevented effective community-state interactions. Finally, in JJR and Bella Flor difficult topographical conditions made it difficult for the state to approach these communities both literally and in terms of urban planning.

As for relations between the community and NGOs, the experience of the Fundación Social in Jerusalén and the Michalenas sisterhood in JJR are typical examples of how friction arose over community leadership. The case of ICES in Jerusalén is a rather more positive example where the NGO was accepted by the community and reinforced



community organisation and capacity to negotiate with the state.

*Public service agencies' capacity to manage the regularisation process*

Based on comparative case studies in Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico, Gilbert confirms that politicians assisted communities in attaining regularisation but also criticises the gap between their own appraisals and actual practice (Gilbert, 1981a). He shows examples of settlements where political influence was clearly a factor in obtaining prompt services (Gilbert and Ward, 1985: 163). Under the 'exaggerated' effects of political influence, sometimes the real impact of public service agencies' attention to the irregular settlements was not properly evaluated. Gilbert also criticises exaggeration of the virtues of community participation in the irregular settlements. He argues that the notion of 'community participation' or 'solidarity' is ambiguous, because sometimes community participation is stimulated by political interest (Gilbert, 1987). Particularly in the case of Bogotá, the public service agencies are fully capable of providing services to areas even with topographically difficult conditions, so sooner or later any irregular settlement should be serviced (Gilbert and Ward, 1985).

Gilbert points out that neither community-based activism nor pressure by local politicians has been particularly effective in promoting the regularisation process. The administrative capacity and technical efficiency of the respective public service agencies have in reality been the decisive factors in the advance of regularisation.

The experiences of JJR and Bella Flor clearly support this argument. These two, the most disadvantaged in terms of topographical and technical conditions, gained basic service infrastructure in the end. The setting up and subsequent failure of the community co-finance programme also suggest that neither community development efforts nor political intervention were effective. The accelerated regularisation in Danubio Azul and La Paz after being included in the special upgrading programmes also provides supportive evidence. Jerusalén, though labeled as a 'red zone', was

gradually upgraded after all. The most striking case is Diana Turbay. I first assumed that the installation of all the public services was accomplished thanks to Guerrero's political influence. However, my interviews with the inhabitants revealed it was not entirely correct. After the formation of JACs in 1986, the rest of the regularisation process was carried out according to the state's technical concerns and administrative procedures without Guerrero's patronage.

The above three factors were prominent features of previous case studies conducted in different Latin American countries. They clearly help to explain the regularisation process in the 1980s for the settlements surveyed in this study as well. There were further aspects of the process, however, that should be elaborated upon.

### **Community-specific factors found in the case-study settlements**

Cornelius, based on case studies in Mexico, analysed the differences of progress in public service provision among the settlements as follows: 'extreme disparities arose from the varying conditions under which specific communities were formed, as well as from incidents involving local leadership and other community-specific factors (...)' All these have influenced the quality of the communities' relationships with political and governmental officials over time' (Cornelius, 1975: 215).

Each of the settlements examined in my study has what Cornelius called 'community-specific factors': topographical features, original promoter of urban development—local politician, NGO activist, or illegal land sub-dividers—intervention of leftist groups, etc.

The impact of internal conflict/segregation among the residents or between the community and intervening outside actors is a typical case in point. The city authorities are not concerned with whether a community's claim is based on the consensus of the settlers or not, but are concerned when the *barrio* has a reputation for violence or instability. This was the case of Jerusalén in the 1980s when public security was heavily

affected by the presence of leftist-movements.

Internal conflict also weakens community activism aimed at the fulfilment of local needs. Particularly while the *barrio* was still in the process of filing for recognition under the *resolución*, the community needed to struggle for the provisional services either by communal effort or by negotiating with the respective public service companies. In this period, therefore the strength of community integration is crucial for settlement development. Bella Flor is a good example. It was still at the stage of filing for recognition in 2000 but there was no community integration due to the absence of a strong leader. The leadership of Bella Flor collapsed after the ex-JAC president was charged with fraud in the illegal sale of land to settlers.

In the cases of Diana Turbay, Danubio Azul, La Paz and the very initial stages of JJR, the internal relations between the landowner, land brokers and first community leaders caused the conflicts. However, the effects of the conflict varied settlement by settlement.

Internal conflict or segregation is sometimes sparked by intervention from outside actors. The case of JJR after Saturnino left is a good example of this. The initiative of the Michalenas sisterhood group helped to facilitate the city intervention process. Some accepted its commitment but others did not. Those who did not accept it as representing the community, claimed that the sisterhood was manipulating the JAC president at the time. This split in the community weakened further community-based collective efforts.

STORIES OF THE SIX *BARRIOS*: A DISCUSSION OF HOW A VARIETY OF FACTORS COMBINED AND INTERACTED IN EACH SPECIFIC CASE

### **In the 1980s**

As discussed, in addition to the three factors mentioned above, other community-specific factors determined the nature of the regularisation process. The

differences in the 1980s among the six case-study settlements can be explained by noting the different combinations of the factors at play in their development.

### *Diana Turbay*

Political clientelism was the telling force in regularisation in the case of Diana Turbay. The time span between the beginning of the occupation and the installation of basic service infrastructure was the shortest of the six cases. Most services were obtained in a matter of five years. Negotiations between the community and the public service companies were carried out through the JAC by means of letters of petition with the signatures of the inhabitants listed. The logistical work done by the JAC was accompanied by letters of recommendation written by Guerrero Estrada. The inhabitants of Diana Turbay never resorted to violence to demand that the related agencies provide services. Their typical strategy was rather to use political pressure on the Bogotá district administration with the backing of influential patrons like Guerrero Estrada, although this patronage was lost gradually in the late 1980s due to the conflict between the JAC leaders and Guerrero over transfer of land ownership. This is also a typical phenomenon of clientelistic relations. As Gay points out in his case study of *favelas* in Rio de Janeiro, 'The relationship between politician and community is purely transactional and, therefore, neither static nor stable (Gay, 1990: 655).

### *Jerusalén*

In Jerusalén, by contrast, advances toward regularisation are mainly explained by the second factor: strong community leadership and its sometimes conflictive relationship with the city authorities. Until 1989 the inhabitants struggled a great deal in negotiations, either with the DAPD or the public service companies. After the *resolución* was issued in 1989, the public service infrastructure was gradually installed. However, the work did not progress smoothly and sometimes collective protests occurred. The presence of

leftist movements in the mid-1980s presented a threat, making public service agencies reluctant to intervene for a time. Ultimately, the District authorities were able to utilise the Ciudad Bolívar Programme, the large-scale development project implemented in the surrounding area, to increase state presence and control the ‘rebellious’ settlement. The impact of political clientelism is nevertheless undeniable. Rafael Forero Fetecua, one of the big names in Bogotá, identified as a ‘politician and pirate urban developer’ during the 1970s and 1980s, aided the development of Jerusalén in its initial stage. However, his political influence was not strong enough to gain the sympathy of residents in all sectors of the settlement. In fact, the JAC leaders association (ASOJERUSALEN<sup>45</sup>) was formed in 1984 to establish their own non-partisan civic movement.

#### *Danubio Azul*

The regularisation of Danubio Azul was also rapid, but it was achieved mostly in the 1990s with the arrival of a charismatic community leader, Ramón. During the 1980s the occupation process was delayed because of the condition of the land, and its recognition was suspended due to controversy over the ownership of the land.

#### *La Paz*

The regularisation process was extremely slow in La Paz. At the beginning, the commitment of Provienda had a negative effect on state intervention. Having settled the area as a result of invasion of state property, the inhabitants’ right to live there was not guaranteed, so they found it difficult to fight for their needs. The limited economic capacity of the community was another obstacle. In the mid-1980s, the EAAB proposed an alternative means of establishing a water supply through a community co-finance (or cost-sharing) programme. This project failed due to the residents’ inability to pay the required amount in advance. It was also said that the failure was caused by the corrupt

---

<sup>45</sup> *Barrio* Jerusalén Association of Popular Movement.

management of the community leaders in that period. The weakness of its community leadership was, therefore another crucial factor explaining the delay in the development process.

#### *Juan José Rondón*

In the case of JJR, the land developer Saturnino Sepúlveda's firm belief in self-help development and thus his rejection of any intervention by the city authorities, divided the settlers. The resulting internal conflict weakened community spirit and negatively affected negotiations between the community and the city authorities. Saturnino left in 1986, putting Canizares in charge of the transfer of land ownership to individual settlers, but he did not push forward the regularisation process.

#### *Bella Flor*

Yet other factors explain the delay in regularisation in Bella Flor. First was the corruption of the JAC leaders involved in illegal land sale after the initial land sub-dividers left. The settlers' poor economic resources also made it impossible for them to resort to finance-sharing for upgrading projects. As in the case of Jerusalén, in the late 1980s, Bella Flor experienced the intervention of leftist activists (members of the M-19 guerrilla group), which had the effect of discouraging intervention by the city authorities.

For Bella Flor as well as JJR, the location of the land (more than 2,800 metres above sea level) was an obstacle to the improvement of infrastructure throughout the 1980s. Consequently, the regularisation of the water supply took more than 15 years.

Topographical disadvantages, therefore, were perhaps less significant than lack of the kind of firm community leadership that facilitated the process in places such as the neighbouring settlements of Mirador and Paraíso.

### **New factors in the 1990s**

In the late 1990s, the legal framework for recognising the irregular settlements was eased, speeding up the regularisation process. The privatisation of the EEB expedited provision of energy services to the more disadvantaged areas. The integrated upgrading projects such as the De-marginalisation Programme and the South Bogotá Project were aimed at improvement of broader areas and did not undertake regularisation at the *barrio* level. The state's intervention came to work through the merits of scale, thereby achieving a broader impact than for other poor areas where no intervention was going on.

These changes were clearly reflected in developments in the settlements covered in the case study. First was the acceleration and completion of regularisation through the efforts of a competent mayor and his special investment programme. The process that took place after 1997 in Danubio Azul and La Paz worked more efficiently than that in Jerusalén and Diana Turbay in the 1980s. In Danubio Azul and La Paz, the installation of power service, building of the sewerage system and completion of street paving were conducted as part of an integrated project, while in Diana Turbay and Jerusalén, some services—such as street paving—remain incomplete even now (observed in August 2006). The reason is simple: Danubio Azul and La Paz were selected for intervention under the special programme for integrated upgrading promoted by the Bogotá District government under the Peñalosa administration (1997-2000). In addition, the case of Danubio Azul involved a combination of strong community leadership and internal struggle for hegemony among the leadership. In fact, it is said that the strong intervention of the city authorities was prompted by the internal conflict erupting from rival factions' antagonism toward the JAC leaders and the resulting security crisis in the community. Political decisions by the city administration regarding this situation led to the selection of Danubio Azul as one of the first five settlements for intervention under the De-marginalisation Programme.

Second, the reform of urban planning regulations brought in to speed up the regularisation procedure changed the situation for Bella Flor and JJR after 1990, where the process had been slowed due to the disadvantages of their topographical location. The new plan to promote transfer of land ownership also worked in favour of Danubio Azul and the ensuing transfer to individual title deeds hastened its regularisation process.

Third, privatisation of the EEB became a new element accelerating the regularisation process. In the cases of Bella Flor, La Paz and JJR, installation of electric power service had preceded the normalisation of water supply services, unlike in other settlements where regularisation took place in the 1980s. The EAAB also became more efficient due to institutional reforms, promoting the installation of individual water meters and thereby accelerating intervention in these informal settlements.

As shown, the regularisation process of the six cases was mostly determined by conventional factors such as leadership, political clientelism and intervention of the city authorities. On the other hand, in the 1990s, notable developments in regularisation were often the result of the new city government's approach and the drive for efficiency adopted by the mayor.

We have seen that all of the above factors, combined differently, determined the different pace of the regularisation process in the six case study settlements. The case studies have also shown that the differing relationships between community leaders, the state and other outside actors influenced the chronological development process of the settlements. However, the changes in the regularisation policy in Bogotá during the 1990s suggest that increasingly the most influential factor is the city government's capacity and will to upgrade these settlements.



## **CHAPTER 6**

# **COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP, PARTICIPATION AND INTERACTIONS WITH OUTSIDE ACTORS: INHABITANTS' VIEWS**

This chapter will analyse the nature of leadership, community participation and relationships between the inhabitants and community-outsiders in specific cases. It explores who community leaders really are, as identified by the inhabitants, and tries to establish which qualities are highly valued in a leader. This chapter will also discuss whether the community-politician relationship has changed and will examine the role of other forms of outsider intervention. It will go on to critically analyse the relationship between the community and the state, attempting to clarify their contradictory interpretations of the meaning of community participation. In addition, it will suggest that economic factors and trust/distrust of the community could affect state-community relations and the applicability of community co-financing projects.

### **THE NATURE OF COMMUNITY LEADERSHIP**

In the initial stage of their development, the city authorities were not involved in these settlements and inhabitants had to struggle to obtain their basic needs through collective action. Among the six studied settlements, Diana Turbay is unusual in that it had more support from the public service companies from the very beginning thanks to its political patronage. Despite this, the community still had to organise to further the regularisation process. The JACs were, without exception, the main channel for the communication of residents' needs to the city government. Strong and effective leadership was crucial to advance the regularisation of the settlements. Frequently, however, community leaders became involved in corruption or internal conflicts which impeded either community

integration or negotiations with the city government.

I will begin by discussing the people who the inhabitants recognised as community leaders. Then I will analyse how they evaluated the work of the leaders and whether this evaluation of the community leadership changed at the different stages of consolidation.

### **Who are the community leaders?**

In the household survey, we asked the household heads to identify those who they judged to be community leaders. We defined a community leader as anyone who led any kind of effort to resolve collective needs. However, there was no single concept of leader as understood by the inhabitants and the result of the survey was different in each settlement. Some defined the leader as those who dedicated themselves to serving the community. Others identified the leader mechanically with the president or directing members of the JAC. They frequently added negative comments about these leaders after they identified them.

Except for in Diana Turbay, more than the half of the surveyed household heads identified the names of those they judged to be the leaders (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Households naming community leaders

	Diana Turbay	Jerusalén	Danubio Azul	La Paz	JJR	Bella Flor
Named(1)	81(15)	95(24)	96(19)	84(16)	78(13)	57(7)
Not named(1)	86(69)	74(42)	62(46)	59(37)	50(23)	46(14)
Total no.	167	169	158	143	128	103
% (2)	48.5	56.8	60.7	58.7	60.9	55.3

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Notes: (1) The figure in parenthesis is the number of tenants in each category.

If we analyse the household heads that identified the leaders by their arrival year at the settlement, we can see that those who named the most leaders arrived at the settlement in the period when the land occupation process was very active. Table 6.2 shows this trend clearly in the cases of Diana Turbay, Danubio Azul and La Paz (see the highlighted figures). The trend is less defined in the other cases possibly because their occupation

process was more gradual than the first three settlements.

Table 6.2 Arrival year at the current settlement of the household head by category of leadership recognition

Arrival period	Diana Turbay		Jerusalén		Danubio Azul		La Paz		JJR		Bela Flor	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
-1985	44	16	35	12	2	0	8	2	18	3	7	1
1986-90	24	12	21	14	42	5	41	11	21	5	10	3
1991-95	12	15	25	18	33	12	25	11	27	10	20	5
1996-2000	1	43	14	30	19	45	10	35	12	32	20	37
Total	81	86	95	74	96	62	84	59	78	50	57	46

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

(A) means 'named leader'. (B) means 'did not name leader'.

In some settlements there was a clear consensus about particular people, but in others not. Table 6.3 shows the first ten leaders who were named most frequently in the survey.<sup>1</sup> In Diana Turbay, Guerrero's presence as the community leader was still significant, but those who named him were the inhabitants who arrived at the settlement in the very initial period. The others, except for Rosiasco, were ex JAC leaders. These people served on the directing board of the JACs in earlier periods. Rosiasco has served as *edil* for Rafael Uribe Uribe locality since 1994.

As for the case of Jerusalén, in contrast, the first two names, Leo and Humberto are currently the active leaders. Leo is a school teacher but has also devoted himself to the working committee of the JAC since the death of an earlier leader, Evarist. Humberto is the JAC president of his sector. He has also led the ASOJERUSALEN since its foundation and is its current president. Both Evaristo and Rafael Forero were dead but they were identified as the community leaders who had been of greatest service to the settlement. Lalo Gil has served as *edil* for the locality since 1994.

Danubio Azul is the most striking case, with Ramón and his group being clearly identified as the leaders (in fact 66 of the household heads surveyed named Ramón, see Table 6.3). Ramón was the first JAC president and Inés, his widow, succeeded him as

<sup>1</sup> For Jerusalén and JJR, more than ten leaders were listed, as there were several persons in the same group of frequency.

president until 2001. Rómulo was the vice president of the directing board of the JAC during Inés' presidency. The other leaders named were from community-based organisations; some of which were competing for leadership against the JAC (see chapter 5).

In La Paz, Agapito was the most active JAC president in the settlement and it was he who created the clientelistic relation with Nubia Mederano (*edil* for the locality) in 2000. Miguel was one of the first presidents of the JACs just after the JAC got its juridical person. He was a member of the electoral campaign for Serpa (a member of the Colombian Liberal Party) but did not get along with the political position of Agapito. José Naranjos was one of the founders of the JACs but he had left the settlement at the time of the survey. Sifredo was another JAC president, of the Caracas sector in 2000.

The list from JJR shows a more marked segregation of leadership. Jesuan was the ex-JAC president after the period of Primitivo and Felipa. Since Jesuan tried to maintain the water supply system set up by community action, he was opposed by the other JAC leaders who supported the regularisation of the public services. By contrast, Felipa worked together with the sisterhood group to promote regularisation of the settlement.

In Bella Flor, Excelino, José and Francisco were identified as the leaders of the settlement, as they worked for the regularisation process of the settlement. At the same time however, the inhabitants' frequently criticised them for their corruption and reported rumours of the illegal land transaction committed by Excelino and Francisco. Francisco is a relative of Excelino and was involved in the self-help housing process in the initial period of the Bella Flor settlement. However, he had to leave the settlement due to the scandal of his corrupt land transaction. The others were leading members of the JACs but did not necessarily get along with Excelino.

Table 6.3 First ten leaders who were identified most frequently in the household survey

Settlement	Diana Turbay		Jerusalén		Danubio Azul		La Paz		JJR		Bella Flor	
	Name	No. Profile	Name	No. Profile	Name	No. Profile	Name	No. Profile	Name	No. Profile	Name	No. Profile
	†Arturo	14	Leo	15	†Ramón	66	Agapito	33	Jesuan	31	Excelino	14
	A. Guerrero	13	Humberto	14	Inés	41	Miguel	13	Felipa	22	†José	13
	Graciela	7	†Evaristo	9	Rómulo	12	†J.Naranjos	9	Primitivo	18	Francisco	12
	Henry	6	Niño	8	Coronado	10	Jairo	7	Rafael	10	Domingo	11
	Lucinda	5	Lalo Gil	6	Gildrado	10	Marcos	7	Tobias	7	Vitaliano	9
	Fabio	4	†R. Forero	5	Manolo	9	Amanda	6	Sisterhood*	6	Jaime	7
	Alfredo	4	Martha	5	José	6	Edgar	6	José	4	Nubia	7
	Rosiasco	4	Angelica	4	Alfrio	4	Germán	6	Ana	2	Miguel	3
	Placido	4	Arquimedes	3	Guillermo	4	Rosalba	6	Ignacio	2	Alejandro	3
	Santos	4	Jairo	3	María	3	Sifredo	6	Jaime	2	Luis	3
			Jorge	3					Miguel	2		
									S. Sepúlveda	2		
									Victor	2		
Total Records	155		169		191		182		138		117	

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Notes: Leaders are identified by only a first name (or nickname) for the regular inhabitants.

A surname is given only in the case of politicians or NGO activists who were publicly well known.

Profile: A=founder of the settlement, B=local politician, C=JAC leader, D=NGO activist, E=clergy, F=land sub-divider

\*People identified the sisterhood group just as 'sisters' without identifying individual names.

† means the person was dead at the time of the survey.

As Desai (1995) found in slums in India and Cornelius (1975) in his cases in Mexico, those identified as leaders were in general slightly better-off than the rest of the inhabitants. Many of them had a small business at home and/or their partners had a stable job. This economic condition permitted them to dedicate more time to community activities. A few of these leaders became involved in the business side of land transactions after the land brokers had left, having, in many cases, consigned their business to the leaders. Some had already worked as a leader in a previous community and most of them originally came from the rural sector to Bogotá. When the leaders were NGO activists or clergymen, their educational level was significantly higher than the rest of inhabitants and they had more knowledge on how-to negotiate with the state.

### **Who should be responsible?**

Why were these individuals recognised by the inhabitants as leaders? The qualification for a community leader is based on his perceived capacity to solve collective problems and to promote the improvement of living conditions. As discussed, the JAC is the officially recognised community organisation of these irregular settlements through which the inhabitants could negotiate with the city authorities for regularisation. The city authorities and public service companies are ultimately the agencies responsible for providing public services. However, the results of the household survey suggest that the community considered the JAC leaders to be the agencies directly responsible for bringing about public service improvements.

In the segment of the household survey regarding ‘Diagnosis of (Unsatisfied) Needs’, respondents were asked to identify the ‘three most problematic services’. Table 6.4 lists the institutions the surveyed household heads considered responsible for resolution of the three identified needs (responses to Question 44: Who [or what institution] do you think is responsible for improving public utility services?; see also Appendix 6a.1 for details).

Table 6.4 Institution responsible for resolving most urgent problem/needs\*

Institution	D. Turbay		Jerusalén		D. Azul		La Paz		JJR		Bella Flor	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Government	243	48.5	218	43.0	200	42.2	151	35.2	157	40.9	94	30.4
Public companies/ Institutions	78	15.6	81	16.0	59	12.4	36	8.4	91	23.7	128	41.4
JAC	131	27.9	172	33.8	181	38.2	230	53.6	116	30.2	78	25.2
Politicians	17	1.6	12	2.4	3	0.6	3	0.7	0	0.0	0	0.0
Other CBOs	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.4	0	0.0	2	0.5	5	1.6
Catholic church	0	0.0	1	0.2	3	0.6	2	0.5	4	1.0	2	0.6
NGO	0	0.0	3	0.6	1	0.2	0	0.0	1	0.3	0	0.0
Don't know	32	6.4	20	4.0	28	5.9	7	1.6	13	3.4	2	0.6
Total	501	100.0	507	100.0	474	100.0	429	100.0	384	100.0	309	100.0

Source: Responses to Question 44, Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Note: The respondents of the survey were requested to record only one main institution.

When the need identified was a public service such as water supply, sewerage or electricity, the respective public service company was clearly identified as responsible. The institutions identified for other services such as schools, medical centres or paving were either 'government' or 'government through JAC intermediary'. When they could not identify easily which institution was responsible they tended to give '*junta*' (meaning the JAC), as the quickest and easiest response (see Appendix 6a.1). The prevalence of this response suggests that the inhabitants delegated to the JACs matters relating to the fulfilment of their collective needs or problems.

### **Evaluation of community leadership**

A good leader was one who could obtain a real and visible service for the community. The narratives of interviewees manifested that the JAC leaders' main role was to obtain resources to improve settlement infrastructure and the supply of public services. Those who contributed a great deal to obtaining these services (mainly water and electricity), even in a provisional form, were highly valued by the settlers.

Political skill is another factor used to judge leadership ability. Political autonomy in a

community leader is not necessarily regarded positively. What is seen as more important is the ability to use political contacts to obtain outside resources for the collective benefit of the community.

Settlers have two options regarding the political autonomy of community leaders. One view is that the community should be independent of local politicians' influence. Adherents of this position are determined to solve communal problems using the community's own initiative, without resorting to the assistance of politicians. In order to be able to do this there has to be a strong local figure with a firm political ideology and knowledge of politics, who could gain the sympathy of the community. Some of the community leaders of Jerusalén with these capacities took the initiative in creating their own civic movement (ASOJERUSALEN) independent of traditional partisan politics. A contrasting example was that of Father Saturnino Sepúlveda, founder and developer of JJR. He was a socialist activist who rejected reliance on the influence of local politicians. He sought to develop an autonomous community, but failed in getting support from the settlers.

The other dominant view is that the community has no choice but to depend on the power and influence of local politicians. The occupation process of the studied settlements began in the early 1980s without the presence of the city authorities. Up to the end of the 1980s, against the backdrop of municipal government 'tolerance', the expansion of the irregular settlements was encouraged by clientelistic relations between the community and local politicians who promoted the upgrading process in the initial stages (chapter 3). Except for a few cases where leftist activism played an influential role, settlers tended to consider that they had no choice but to resort to clientelistic relations with local politicians in order to press their interests with the city government. Indeed, this tendency led to the widely accepted perception of the JACs as intermediate institutions whose express purpose was to obtain funding from the local district administration and other outside sources. A community had to have a political patron in



the local district that would facilitate access to development funds (cf. the examples of La Paz, Bella Flor).

The JAC (leaders) earn respect when they have the backing of certain politicians. The JAC has collaborated a lot [in the electoral campaigns of] these politicians, since without the JAC support in our *barrio*, they (these politicians) [might not be persuaded to give the resources to us but] hand them over to some other *barrio* (community). Without politics (the help of politicians), there would be no money (funds). By means of the politicians there is money. However, in return, the people (we) have to vote for them. [María del Carmen, La Paz]

In the list of leaders given by the inhabitants, those who had led the community in the struggle to gain a water supply in the very initial stage of land occupation were identified without exception. However, those leaders in office at the time of the survey were less recognised, as shown by the case of Diana Turbay in particular. This tendency however, should be understood in the light of who named the leader and when the community struggle was heaviest. In Diana Turbay, for example, the peak of negotiations for regularisation came at the time when the first JACs were searched for recognition from the DAPD. The conflict against Guerrero emerged at the same time as the liquidation of the cooperative, between 1991 and 1993. Therefore, the people who were living through that period could name the first JAC leaders, such as Arturo, Graciela, Santos and so on whereas the first settlers who became associated with the cooperative named Guerrero. These settlers were grateful to him for providing access to their lots with favourable payment conditions. Those who arrived at the settlement after 1995 were mostly tenants and had little information about the community. Owner occupants who arrived during the same period should have known who the current JAC leaders in their sector were, but they had fewer opportunities to get involved in the collective action to acquire basic needs.

In fact, inhabitants who had arrived in the early 1980s seldom named the incumbent JAC leaders at the time of my study but rather those who had struggled for the *barrio*. This was firstly because there were no longer any urgent needs in terms of basic services and therefore the inhabitants were less interested in community struggle and secondly because there were now more tenants who were not involved in community activities.<sup>2</sup>

Jerusalén showed the same tendency as Diana Turbay. The only notable difference is the high recognition of current leaders such as Leonidas and Humberto. The reason for this can be found in their particular profiles. Leonidas arrived in Jerusalén in 1983 to serve as a school teacher but also dedicated much of his time to community action. Leonidas had a reputation as a community activist as well as an educator but one who never got himself involved in political campaigns. As for Humberto, he had had a hand in coordinating the ASOJERUSALEN since the mid-1980s and had stood for *edil* in the local election in 2003 and won a seat for the period 2004-07.<sup>3</sup> In Jerusalén, the civic movement that created ASOJERUSALEN meant the the JAC leaders were active in advocacy at city government meetings. The identification of these leaders therefore was firm thanks to their high visibility.

As for Danubio Azul, the reason for the high presentation of Ramón and Inés was simple. The history of the JAC in this barrio was relatively short and these two were the only JAC presidents by 2000. As shown in chapter 5, the occupation process in this settlement was accelerated by the arrival of Ramón in 1988. In fact, the majority of the surveyed household heads who named the leaders arrived at Danubio Azul in the period 1986-95 (see Table 6.2). 1995 was the year when the JAC, led by Ramón, signed the contract with the EAAB for the work to regularise the water supply. Therefore, it was obvious that the inhabitants would name him and his successor, his widow Inés, as their

---

<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, the tenants who were the children of the first settlers named similar leaders to the old settlers. They remembered the experience of community struggle from their childhood or adolescence.

<sup>3</sup> The civic political movement backed by ASOJERUSALEN formed an independent party called 'Movimiento político communal y comunitario' (Communal and community political movement).

community leaders. Inés was also recognised in her own right as she was associated with the sudden acceleration of the city government's approach through the De-marginalisation Programme. The other leaders from community-based organisations, which were mostly opposed to the JAC were also active. Those who sympathised with them named the representatives of these organisations, for example Coronado, José and Maria.

In the case of La Paz, the high number of nominations of Agapito was mainly thanks to his political capacity to mobilise resources. Sometime he resorted to his linkage with *edil*, Nubia Mederano. He was most active in the distribution of information on recent state intervention, such as the application of the South Bogotá Project. During his presidency of the JAC the regularisation process was accelerated. Miguel and Amanda were the leaders of the Torres sector. Miguel took a strong initiative to confront the police when the settlement was to be evicted. After his retirement from the JAC directing board in 2000, he created his own NGO to promote a community restaurant for the local children backed by his political connections with the Serpista group.<sup>4</sup>

JJR and Bella Flor were in the very earliest period of their regularisation process when they were studied. All the leaders named in the case of JJR were currently active in 2000 except for Fr. Saturnino in JJR. Here, the nomination of leaders demonstrates the rivalry of the groups surrounding different leaders. As for Bella Flor, no strong leadership was established due to the internal conflict and corruption of the JAC leaders. The inhabitants named them knowing their defects, because after all, through their negotiations, the regularisation process made gradual progress with frequent delays and interruptions.

### **Corruption as one of the factors weakening community leadership**

Leaders whose management of community activities was transparent were able to obtain the trust of the community. However, in practice, few leaders were felt to be honest. Inept

---

<sup>4</sup> A local group which was supporting Serpa's wing of the Colombian Liberal Party.

management or the corrupt handling of community funds quickly aroused settler distrust. As pointed out in chapter 5, one of the crucial factors delaying the regularisation process in Bella Flor was the poor quality of community leadership. The majority of interviewees in that settlement blamed the corruption of the JAC leaders for its slow development. Community leaders committed the initial sale of land and sometimes engaged in fraudulent transactions. Cases were reported where they sold land in La Paz that belonged to individual settlers and in Bella Flor where they disposed of land set aside for community use.

Numerous interviewees also complained about community leaders pocketing funds that had been collected for community expenses. As one settler in Bella Flor put it:

They (JAC leaders) charged (requested the money from) us as much as possible on the pretext that the money should be invested in communal work, but in fact, they made use of it only for their own benefit. [Fanny, Bella Flor]

In Bella Flor, settlers were asked to contribute funds to pay for a professional to prepare the map that had to be submitted to the District Surveyor's Office for regularisation. Then they were asked to make further payments on the grounds that the authorities had refused to accept the plan and another was required. Interviewees suspected that these funds had been siphoned off. In La Paz, the leaders were suspected of fraudulently managing the funds collected as the deposit required by the EAAB for constructing a provisional water supply. In Bella Flor, Danubio Azul and La Paz the leaders were accused of skimming funds from the contributions made to pay for service charges. When a provisional supply system was installed, the JAC leaders received a collective bill for the whole settlement as individual houses did not yet have official addresses. They sometimes charged inhabitants more than they should have done.

Of course, it is understandable that community leaders should be tempted to take some

money. After all, their efforts on behalf of the community were voluntary and although they were slightly better-off in the community, they were definitely poor, categorised as strata one or two. But when temptation led to malfeasance, it stimulated distrust in the community toward the leaders.

#### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNITY AND POLITICIANS

Settlers realised that initially they needed the patronage of politicians to bring services. Many interviewees considered resort to politicians' support to be the only functional strategy to obtain services. 'A poor settlement without a political patron will not get ahead' is a typical expression among many inhabitants. As two residents put it:

We had to fight (struggle) politically, since services can be provided only through *política*. We can do nothing if we do not have a political patron in the government. [Dora, Diana Turbay]

The needs and services have been obtained all the time through 'politics'. When one needs to do something, they say always that 'this should be handled with [the help of] politicians, since they will help in exchange for votes'. [Martha, Diana Turbay]

Table 6.5 records the number of politicians who settlers recognised had either been influential in the development of the settlement or had frequently visited the settlement.

Table 6.5 Households naming specific politicians\*

	Diana Turbay	Jerusalén	Danubio Azul	La Paz	JJR	Bella Flor
No.	88	42	43	71	21	47
Total no.	167	169	158	143	128	104
%	52.7	24.9	27.2	49.7	16.4	45.2

Source: Bogota Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

\*Number of households in the sample survey indicating recognition of any politicians (for list of politicians, see Table 6.6).

Inhabitants of Diana Turbay, La Paz and Bella Flor registered high rates of recognition of politicians, while Danubio Azul, Jerusalén and JJR showed very low rates. Notably, the stories of the former three settlements feature a politician who played a prominent role in settlement development. Guerrero Estrada in Diana Turbay, Nubia Medrano (*edil* of the Rafael Uribe Uribe locality) in La Paz, and Flavio Maya, candidate for city councillor, in Bella Flor are typical examples.

The fact that a politician was identified by many people in the settlement does not mean that the community actually had confidence in him. Most local politicians showed up, to offer support for various programmes for upgrading living conditions in the settlements, only at election times. Once those elections were over —whether they won or lost— few returned or did anything to fulfil the promises made in their campaign speeches. As Martha, in Diana Turbay, put it: ‘Politicians promise a lot but never carry out their promises.’

Most settlers gradually became disenchanted with the high-handedness and populism of politicians. They came to recognise how those politicians tried to manipulate people like themselves. In Bella Flor, for example, many people were persuaded to support one candidate in exchange for receiving donations of food. This happened frequently in the other settlements as well. As time went by, such attempts to ‘buy votes’ were less successful:

Nowadays we are not so stupid as to buy votes only in exchange for food at the price of 20,000 pesos! Such a gift does not do anything (for us) at all. They visit us to ask for our votes whenever they are campaigning, but they are all liars! They never do what they promise. We do not need such shady *politiqueros*. What we need people who really do things. [Leonor, JAC president Diana Turbay]

In practice, while many settlers were disillusioned with politicians generally, they often

held inconsistent views about individual politicians. Ultimately, their judgement depended on what politicians did to help their settlement independent of their electoral campaign. In fact, I seldom heard anyone say that a politician had fulfilled the promises he made during his campaign.

Table 6.6 shows that current members of JAL (*ediles*) form the most commonly mentioned group. In the case of Jerusalén, Lalo Gil and Hugo Gaona, both incumbent *edils* of Ciudad Bolívar, score quite highly on the list. Interviewees from Diana Turbay identify Jorge Rocciasco, the incumbent *edil* who is a resident of the settlement. For La Paz, Nubia Medrano was most often identified. Bogotá District councillors, mayors and national presidents were other politicians mentioned by the inhabitants, though their score were quite limited.

Most of the names of incumbent politicians identified by the community were associated with a specific project to upgrade the physical condition of the settlement. Political manoeuvring to obtain the inhabitants' votes through political promises in electoral campaigns does not work quite as simply as it used to.

The predominance of the names of *ediles* as the most influential politicians is an indication of the spread of the political and administrative decentralisation process in Bogotá. The community's overtures to local politicians are now more concentrated on the *ediles* in their locality than before. The settlers believe that they are more likely to understand local needs. They are beginning to promote candidates from their own community to attract direct attention from the local administration. In Jerusalén, for example, community leaders reinforced the ASOJERUSALEN institutionally in order to place their own community leaders on to the JAL.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup> The original civic movement, named JERCOM, was created in 1985. JERCOM was later renamed ASOJERUSALEN in order to obtain juridical person status in order to meet electoral regulations.

Table 6.6 List of politicians who were identified as influential in the household survey

Diana Turbay			Jerusalén			Danubio Azul			La Paz			JIR			Bella Flor		
Name of politician (No.of record)	Position	Name of politician (No.of record)	Position	Name of politician (No.of record)	Position	Name of politician (No.of record)	Position	Name of politician (No.of record)	Position	Name of politician (No.of record)	Position	Name of politician (No.of record)	Position	Name of politician (No.of record)	Position		
Guerrero Estrada (58)	Ex councillor, ex representative of Congress	Lalo Gil(19)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Enrique Peñalosa	Bogotá mayor in 2000	Nubia Medrano(55)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Luis Alfredo Hernández	Candidate for <i>edil</i> in 2000	Flavio Elicer Maya Escobar (22)	Candidate for councillor in 2000						
Jorge Rosstasco (21)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Rafael Forero Feteuca (9)	Ex councillor	Horacio Serpa (7)	Senator, candidate for president in 2000	Severo Correa(19)	Councillor in 2000	Jaime Calderón (3)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Flor Elba Cárdenas (5)	Ex councillor						
Nelson Pereira(6)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Moreno de Caro(4)	Councillor in 2000	Jairo Calderón(6)	Councillor in 2000	Fario Polania (6)	Ex councillor	Martha Luna (3)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Hugo Gama (4)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000						
Nubia Merano(3)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Andrés Pastrana(3)	President of Colombia in 2000	'Polania'(4)	Ex councillor	Roberto Camacho(6)	Councillor in 2000	Telesfora Pedraza (3)	n.a.	Moreno de Caro(2)	Councillor in 2000						
Hugo Piedra(3)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	Jairo Oliveira(2)	Ex <i>edil</i>	Moreno de Caro(4)	Councillor in 2000	Enrique Peñalosa (5)	Bogotá mayor in 2000	Moreno de Caro(2)	Councillor in 2000	Pablo Ardila(2)	Councillor in 2000						
Dimas Rincón(2)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	J.M. Caicedo Ferrer (2)	Ex Bogotá mayor	Nelson Cruz	Local mayor of Usme in 2000	Horacio Serpa(4)	Senator, candidate for president in 2000	Andrés Pastrana(1)	President of Colombia in 2000	León González Mina (2)	Representative of Congress in 2000						
J.M. Caicedo Ferrer (2)	Ex Bogotá mayor	Enrique Peñalosa	Bogotá mayor in 2000	J.M. Caicedo Ferrer (3)	Ex Bogotá mayor	Julio Sánchez (2)	Congressman?	Enrique Peñalosa (1)	Bogotá mayor in 2000	'Hector'(1)	Candidate for <i>edil</i> in 2000						
Enrique Peñalosa (2)	Bogotá mayor in 2000	'Vargas'(2)	n.a.	Albaracin(1)	n.a.	María Eugenia Rojas (2)	President of ANAPO	Nelson Cruz(1)	Local mayor of Usme in 2000	Jorge Lozada(1)	n.a.						
Diana Turbay (2)	Ex secretary of president of Colombia	Frabio Amaya(2)	Candidate for councillor in 2000	Efraín Páez (1)	<i>Edil</i> in 2000	'Zambrano'(2)	n.a.	Digoberta Cherry(1)	n.a.	Patricia Arevato(1)	Ex <i>edil</i> (ex member of M-19)						
Hernando Durán Dussan (1)	Ex Bogotá mayor	Guerrero Estrada(2)	Ex councillor, ex representative of Congress	Jaramillo(1)	Councillor in 2000	Jaime Lombarna(1)	n.a.	Flavio Maya(1)	Candidate for councillor in 2000	Enrique Peñalosa	Bogotá mayor in 2000						
Turbay Ayala(1)	Ex president of Colombia	Dister Lisen(1)	n.a.	María Rincón(1)	n.a.	Alfonso Angaritia(1)	n.a.	Others(4)	n.a.	Mariano Bravo	Councillor in 2000						
Antanas Mockus (1)	Ex Bogotá mayor	Flor Elba(1)	Ex councillor	Ciro Rodríguez(1)	Councillor in 2000	Moreno de Caro(1)	Councillor in 2000			n.a.	Local mayor of Ciudad Bolívar in 2000						
'Jaramillo'(1)	Councillor in 2000	Luis Alfredo Rodríguez(1)	n.a.	Nohra de Pastrana(1)	First lady in 2000	Naranjo Porras(1)	n.a.			'Estela'	n.a.						
'Alvaro'(1)	Councillor in 2000	Others(2)	n.a.	Hernando Cruz(1)	n.a.	Pedro Caro(1)	n.a.			Julio César Sánchez(1)	Senator in 2000						
Others(5)	n.a.			Others (14)	n.a.	Others (3)											
Total records	112	Total records	53	Total records	57	Total records	102	Total records	25	Total records	57	Total records	25	Total records	57		

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.



### **The changing nature of political involvement in the six settlements**

The following stories tell of the politicians involved in the case-study settlements. They demonstrate that while people need political help, they soon learn to distrust most of the politicians concerned.

#### *Diana Turbay*

The settlement was founded by Guerrero Estrada who eventually was voted on to Bogotá's council largely with the support of the community. In the early stage of development, the settlers voted for him in exchange for his assistance in obtaining a housing lot. One resident sees political intervention as something natural and is convinced that the community cannot carry out any concrete project without a political patron.

The community goes on relying on the aid of the politicians, after all, because we ourselves, just residents, what can we do? Anyway, one is grateful for what they have done. This settlement has become what it is now, we know because of what they have done (especially pavement) and we appreciate that. [Segundo, Diana Turbay]

Luis accepts that he helped the community and retains a feeling of obligation to him.

He did ask for our votes, but he did many things for the community as well. For that, I feel grateful to him. [Luis, Diana Turbay]

But people soon began to realise that Guerrero was not acting in their best interests:

Of course, the people knew that the services were not provided at the beginning of this project [run by Guerrero's Cooperative: Southeast Bogotá Popular Housing Cooperative], but they were told the services would be there soon. Frustrated, the inhabitants decided to organise a

JAC. Forming the JAC, they sought to be independent from [Guerrero's] Cooperative and manage the regularisation process in their own way. The movement in favour of organising a JAC was not convenient for Guerrero, as it undermined the control over the settlement and people he had held through the cooperative. [José, Diana Turbay]

Other residents of the community, especially those who settled after Guerrero's influence had begun to decline, tended to criticise him most strongly:

He had *auxilio* funds from the Bogotá City council. But they say he used the money to purchase more land! He also committed 'fraud', having some people pay for land without actually handing it over. For these reasons, right now people do not allow him to enter Diana Turbay. People reject him or in some cases accuse him of wrong doing. [José, Diana Turbay]

It does appear that Guerrero's urban development project for the popular sector became little more than a business for his own profit. He made a considerable amount of money in Diana Turbay, which he used to buy more land to develop other large scale projects such as Alfonso López in Usme, Juan José Rondón<sup>6</sup> in Ciudad Bolívar, and elsewhere. Meanwhile he abandoned Diana Turbay, although the community still needed more support from him in order to acquire further social infrastructure.

Others, of course, defend him on the grounds of what he did for the settlement in the initial stages of its development.

There are a lot of people saying things about Guerrero that are untrue . . . Here people accuse Dr. Guerrero of many things. They always attack

---

<sup>6</sup> This is a different settlement from the one of my case study settlements with the same name, Juan José Rondón.

him. His actions reveal many contradictions and he has a lot of enemies. The people are very ungrateful. He is actually very honest, and people accuse him of things he has not done. [Segundo, Diana Turbay]

Politics have not disappeared from Diana Turbay with the departure of Guerrero. Some *ediles* actually live in the settlement and appear to have been successful in helping the settlement. Everyone recognises that they have done this with the purpose of political self-promotion. But, perhaps because of the precedent set by Guerrero, the inhabitants are now accustomed to living in an atmosphere full of political propaganda and manipulation.

### *Jerusalén*

Jerusalén is known for its association with Rafael Fetecua, a politician of great influence, particularly in its initial period of development.

Fetecua helped deal with road-building problems, but he did not help as much as they (people) say. Fetecua had more to do with the other side of the neighbourhood, [areas] like Sierra Morena and Arobriadora, which were covered by the Caja de Vivienda Popular programme.\*

Intervention by politicians has been limited in this settlement. They came and helped the people, but afterwards they wanted votes in return. They said that they would help with such and such after received our votes, but they could not promise. Evaristo\*\* said he would not permit the politicians to intervene, since if that happened, development of the settlement would become just a matter of political interest and politicians would just come here to purchase votes. It should be better for the community to handle its projects itself. [Pedro, Jerusalén]

(\*Rafael Forero Fetecua was the owner of the territory around the Jerusalén.

\*\*Former community leader. See chapter 5, page 236.)

The policy followed by Evaristo has been maintained and carried on by Leonidas, an ICES teacher and the current community leader of Jerusalén.

However, the arrival of NGO activists with socialist sympathies and the intervention of the leftist guerrilla group (M-19) transformed the settlement into one of the most conflict-ridden communities in the city. Although there is still a group that seeks to resort to traditional partisan support, Jerusalén is wary of any manipulation of the community by politicians and has tended to reject interventions undertaken at their initiative.

There is no such political manipulation as there used to be. Today one is more aware of what is going on . . . But, before, when this settlement started, many politicians came in and manipulated us as they wished. We received all the offers they provided. We voted them into the seats (of the city council or Congress), voting for them even when it was not necessary. But they soon forgot about us and our community (*barrio*) (...). Today we do not believe so readily when a politician says he will give us such and such. If we accepted 20 offers before, today we may accept just two, for example. Today the influence of politicians (and politics) has greatly decreased due to their lies. Also, today we are more aware of things. [Beatriz, Jerusalén]

Jerusalén has not, however, abandoned the strategy of seeking political support through lobbying. The difference between the arguments of the leaders of Jerusalén and those of Diana Turbay or La Paz may be found in the level of consciousness of their autonomy in selecting a political patron as ‘partner’ in support of their development. For example, in the 2000 electoral campaign, ASOJERUSALEN put two JAC leaders forward as candidates for *edil* in Ciudad Bolívar, backed by their own citizen’s movement. It also supported the electoral campaign of Hernando Gómez who was running for mayor of Bogotá. He was backed by his independent civic movement and his election pledges

had much in common with ASOJERUSALEN. Gómez and ASOJERUSALEN struggled jointly in support of his political statement criticising the new urban planning policy POT (Spatial Development Plan),<sup>7</sup> which was one of the big issues in the city administration at the time.

### *La Paz*

Nubia Medrano (*edil* of Rafael Uribe Uribe locality) played an outstanding role in La Paz. Some of her project proposals (such as the construction of a community hall for the Caracas sector) were approved by the local administrators' committee. She also intervened when the community did not agree with the original street-paving plan proposed under the South Bogotá Project and approved by the DAPD. She supported the inhabitants' counter plan and requested a hearing on the matter with the director of the DAPD. She succeeded in submitting a *tutela* and secured a change in the pavement plan in favour of the inhabitants.

The inhabitants' evaluation of Nubia Medrano is the most positive, but their narratives also suggest that the community was thoroughly accustomed to receiving political intervention and Nubia's initiatives reinforced their dependence on political patronage.

Government programmes can be here, and the government can do many things for us, but it can be done only when there is somebody (a politician) who struggles to get *auxilios!* Without his/her presence, nothing can be done! These two (Nubia Medrano and Severo Correa) have been getting support for the improvement of this settlement. Thanks to their good advice and support, the community gained the space for

---

<sup>7</sup> POT is a master urban planning scheme approved under Decree 619 of 2000. There was a series of debates over the central philosophy of the plan. In general, this plan was based on a concept seeking the merits of scale for government intervention. The geographical unit for urban planning was changed from the '*barrio*' to UPZ (Zone Unit for Planning), a unit composed of several *barrios*. Under the UPZ system, the identity of particular barrios would be weakened and community-based activities would also be affected (Ortiz-Gómez and Zetter, 2004). This is one point in Gómez's criticism of the POT.

negotiation. [Flor del Carmen, La Paz]

She pushed a lot in order that the resources (*partida*) would not go to benefit other *barrios*. It is thanks to her efforts that we have received all these services we are using!' [María del Tránsito, La Paz]

She (Nubia) is the one (politician) who really cooperated for the improvement of the settlement. Many (politicians) visit a lot and promise to do a lot but never do anything at all. She is different.  
[Ludovina, La Paz]

La Paz is a settlement where one politician after the other came to offer something in return for votes. In this context, Nubia Medrano ran for the position of *edil*. By 2002 she and Severo Correa (a councillor), who was linked to Nubia through a political alliance, were the two politicians who worked for this settlement. Most of the testimonies of the inhabitants show that the community has the common understanding that it can only negotiate with the city authorities for the improvement of the settlement when it has the support of local politicians like these.

#### THE RELATION WITH OTHER OUTSIDE ORGANISATIONS

As described in the histories of the six settlements, relationships with a variety of institutions—political parties, NGOs, religious organisations, and so on—have been instrumental in the development of the informal settlements of Bogotá. Building partnerships based on equal power relationships between the actors was far from effective as far as I could observe. The relationships with these organisations were ambivalent, but

ultimately distant and often conflictive.

Religious groups were present in all of the settlements. They ran various kinds of social services: care giving for the aged or support for households with sick persons; education and medical care, training centres for women (sometimes with special attention to single mothers), and community restaurants (*comedor popular, comedor escolar*). There appears to be a clear division of labour between the religious organisations, on the one hand, and the JAC and local administration, on the other; no form of partnership between them was revealed in the results of interviews.

Non-religious NGOs were also involved in the settlements, mostly in the field of education: primary school or supplementary educational courses,<sup>8</sup> day nurseries, management of community restaurants or micro financing for women. Many of their activities overlap with those conducted by the religious groups. In some cases, the NGOs are social action groups managed by supporters of political parties. Like the religious groups, however, they seldom form partnerships with the JAC leadership. Their intervention is usually totally independent.

In most of the cases, the inhabitants of the settlements greatly appreciate the social activities conducted by these groups, but also consider the organisations to be somewhat aloof, not encouraging the inhabitants to help plan their activities. '*Son muy de ellos*' (they run their own thing) was an expression that frequently came up in the testimonies of the interviewees regarding the NGOs.

The different NGOs do not collaborate with one other. Each organisation or each group has its own projects and its own way of doing things. Indeed, when an NGO is backed by a political movement, its presence can result in conflict with the other organisations. Leftist political movements, in particular, tended to compete with and come into conflict with the JAC, as in the case of Danubio Azul. In La Paz, for example,

---

<sup>8</sup> These courses were designed to help pupils who had missed classes to catch up with the ordinary primary curriculum.

one of the NGOs that managed the ‘school canteen’<sup>9</sup> was run by the activist Miguel Angel, a supporter of the Colombian presidential candidate Horacio Serpa. This NGO made clear its rivalry with the political group supporting Nubia Medrano. As long as the decision-making process is not open to the community, these organisations will continue to be ‘strangers’ and their activities will be considered temporary, stopgap measures.

Another problem impeding continuity and ‘localisation’ of outsider-group initiated activities in the settlements is their subordination in the hierarchical structure of the central bodies they answer to (in many cases based elsewhere in the world) and their dependence on financial support provided by the donor organisations. The activities of the NGOs are therefore largely controlled by the central (external) organisation. This may be the reason why they have failed to develop the potential for recruitment of local successors (leaders, administrators) to continue the programmes they have introduced. At best they can recruit people at the assistant level from the community but it is hard to foster top leaders who are capable of managing the whole project. As illustrated by the example of the Fundación Social in Jerusalén (see chapter 5, page 235), the projects begun by the NGOs are often not sustainable once they withdraw from the settlement and financial support from the central organisation is withdrawn.

Too much involvement by an NGO, on the other hand, such that it becomes a dominant force in the community, as in the case of the Catholic sisterhood in JJR, can generate problems as well. The inhabitants’ evaluations of that NGO were both positive and negative: the nuns were contributing to the upgrading process of the settlement but they trod on the toes of the community leaders. Because the sisters were well educated they were better equipped to manage the projects than the local leaders. As they were honest in their financial management, they gained the trust of the city authorities and the public service enterprises. As a result, they now play an important role as mediators between the

---

<sup>9</sup> Although called a school canteen, this eating establishment was not affiliated with any proper school in the settlement. It was built to serve meals at low prices to serve the primary school-aged children in the barrio whose families could not afford to feed them properly.



poor communities in JJR and its surrounding Yomasa sector as a whole, and the Bogotá city authorities. Their indifference toward local politicians was also sometimes criticised. Those who were interested in reinforcing the relationship with local politicians feared that their political influence in the community would be threatened by the sisterhood's strong leadership. In this sense, the sisterhood was not fully welcomed by the community. However well intentioned the Catholic sisterhood's activities in JJR may have been, they ultimately generated internal conflicts and divisions among the inhabitants.

#### COMMUNITY-STATE RELATIONS

In this section I will analyse the community-state relationship in order to discuss whether the increased state approach stimulated community participation. During my field research, I realised that the community interpreted the concept of community participation in a different way from that of the public officers of the city administration (see chapter 2). I will start by clarifying this conceptual problem: what does 'community participation' mean in practice?

#### **The meaning of 'community participation' in the community co-financing programmes**

Ties have been established between different institutions and the settlements in the course of promoting development projects for the poor settlements. However, there is little evidence that partnerships in which both participate freely and equally in the decision-making process have been forged between the two. Most of the collaboration has been very limited and most power has rested with the city authorities.

For years the public utilities have tried to involve the community in the sense of getting them to contribute to the cost of the project. The community would be required to pay an agreed-upon proportion of the total cost, usually varying from 30 to 40 per cent.

After construction, the community would pay off the rest of the installation cost on a monthly basis together with a charge for their consumption (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). The EAAB is effectively providing credit to the community. This framework has been applied since the 1970s, and in 2000 the EAAB began to use the term ‘community participation’ to refer to it. The term ‘community participation’ makes the arrangement sound positive, but in reality the plan is about getting the residents of the irregular settlements to pay the costs of installing the local water supply infrastructure. Therefore, I decided to name it ‘community co-financing project/programme’ through this thesis (see chapter 5, page 250). The relationship between the company and the community is therefore, essentially one of creditor and debtor.

As one employee of the water company pointed out:

We may as well say outright that the EAAB ended up charging the people of these irregular settlements the cost of expanding local networks! However, there are options. Under the community participation method, the residents have to collect a considerable fund, but if they succeed in doing so, the regularisation process should be more rapid and the total cost of the construction should be less expensive. Therefore, this method had merit both for the community as well as the EAAB. [Representative of EAAB, 3 November 1999]

The ‘community administration’ (*gestión comunitaria*) method was a similar attempt by the public investment executor to involve the community in sharing the cost of street-paving projects. The Bogotá South Project in La Paz and the De-marginalisation Programme in Danubio Azul implemented this method whereby the IDU (responsible for local street paving) commissioned the community to administer the collection of funds. The resources the community was requested to provide were symbolic (less than 5 per

cent) in relation to the total cost of the project.<sup>10</sup> The JAC leaders appointed one responsible person per block to remind the residents (owner occupants) to deposit the money into the designated account.<sup>11</sup>

According to some city officials, however, the commitment of the community to the scheme served another purpose:

The share of the community in the total cost is very reduced and symbolic, the aim being to create the perception of 'ownership' in the beneficiary community. [We believed] the people should be responsible for administering the money collected among the beneficiary households. Through this experience, the community would attain a consciousness of ownership toward the project, and not be mere passive receivers. [Director of South Bogotá Project, 12 April 2000]

Although a sense of ownership was intended to increase the autonomy of the community, the shared responsibility was ultimately symbolic and rhetorical. All the testimony of the residents in the community in question indicated that the project design had already been finalised when it was offered to the community. There was no participation in the decision-making process about what it should do or how it should proceed.

This is shown by the way that the South Bogotá Project was implemented in La Paz. A committee was established in which community representatives and the staff of the Project could discuss action plans. In most cases, however, when new action plans were proposed, the Project staff would state that the budget had already been negotiated and approved by the district authorities, which said implicitly that changes could not be made.

---

<sup>10</sup> Each beneficiary household had to pay 100,000 pesos (approximately 5.00 US dollars in 2000) in the case of the De-marginalisation Programme and 30,000 pesos in the case of Bogotá South Project per street frontage.

<sup>11</sup> In the cases of both 'community participation' and the 'community management' methods, labour is contracted on the discretion and according to the criteria of the contracting company. In all the cases I observed, residents of the settlements concerned called for labour to be hired from the community. In the case of La Paz, the South Bogotá Project took the community's request into consideration but it was not made obligatory for the contractor.

Thus, in practice the committee served only as a channel for presenting information and consulting on formalities. For example when the pavement plan was shown to the community representatives and they requested changes to the plan, a row broke out. The community representatives challenged the top-down nature of the community participation in the Project, and were forced to resort to political patronage to get themselves heard. Eventually Nubia Medrano (*edil* of the locality) intervened. She requested an audience with the director of DAPD and succeeded in convincing her to change the plan. Whereas, in theory the committee should have allowed the community representatives a role in the decision-making process, in fact this was not the case and the community's only real influence was through political pressure.

A similar situation occurred between the community and the district officers who were in charge of the De-marginalisation Programme in Danubio Azul. Taking the South Bogotá Project as a model of community participation, the De-marginalisation Programme also sought to stimulate communication with people in the beneficiary communities. They introduced an apparatus for raising awareness in the community concerning Programme intervention. Section coordinators accompanied by social workers paid frequent visits to the sites with the intention of informing the people about what was going on. Again their approach was top-down and no allowance had been made for two-way discussion in the decision-making process. As a result, there were apparently serious misunderstandings regarding arrangements for payment for the project. Many interviewees said they did not understand why they had to pay for the paving project that was supposedly financed by the district government.

In contrast, the OSP scheme (see chapter 4) for building small-scale social infrastructure provided more space for the beneficiaries of intervention projects to express their own ideas and present requests in the decision-making process. The OSP projects were selected through competition so people could propose their own project designs. Once a proposal was selected, the winning group could execute the project with

technical assistance and funds provided by the DAAC, but the community had to handle the administration of the project. In this way, the OSP succeeded in promoting community administration in the real meaning of community responsibility and autonomous development. The OSP scheme accorded greater respect to community initiative and the communication between the community and the DAAC (city authorities in charge) was two-way. In this sense, the partnership was created directly between the community involved in the OSP and the DAAC.

### **Participation in collective activism**

The methods and strategies which the six communities used to obtain their collective needs varied considerably according to their circumstances. For the irregular settlements, community participation is generally understood to mean a commitment to collective action to address collective needs. In the very initial stage of development, when there is no state presence, communal work (*trabajo comunitario*) is the most common strategy to solve problems. Opening up local roads, construction of water deposit tanks, installation of conduits for provisional sewerage are typical examples.<sup>12</sup> Then, once official negotiations with the city government are established, they use more conventional methods, such as petitions signed by the residents to express their demands.

Community meetings and assemblies are the principal decision-making space for the community. Normally these meetings are held on Sunday mornings because they are the only days when most of the household heads can be present. The rules of the JACs call for the recording and filing of the minutes of all these meetings. The JAC assembly is the supreme organisation for the discussion of communal matters but if the community is

---

<sup>12</sup> Usually adult and young men are requested to provide their labour while the women are put in charge of preparing food and beverages for them. Those who are not available to take on any of these jobs collaborate by providing some monetary payment.

negotiating with the city authorities, or when a public service company is planning intervention through a certain project, the representatives of these outside organisations are often invited to the assembly. They give an explanation of the projects, discuss work to construct service infrastructure, outline requirements for community payments and so on.

When this conventional procedure does not work, or if there are delays in the regularisation process, the JAC leaders (sometimes joined by the labour unions) resort to various forms of protest, such as demonstrations, occupation of the offices of the city authorities and civic strikes. For the inhabitants, involvement in these violent actions is also seen as participation. In colloquial terms, they use the expressions 'we participate' or 'we collaborate' in order to refer to their involvement in these actions. Whilst community leaders come out with statements such as 'we always organise protests whenever we need', the real number of inhabitants who take part in these actions is usually limited (see Table 6.7).

Regularisation of most of the public services was obtained through negotiations between the JAC leaders and the respective agencies of the Bogotá city administration and public service companies. While most of the leaders of the six settlements used petitions signed by the residents to demand services, tactics varied from one settlement to another. In Diana Turbay, the leaders used negotiation; in Jerusalén, leaders were far more aggressive in expressing their demands to the city authorities. In Bella Flor the residents protested violently when the government tried to evict the community in the early stages of land occupation.

Table 6.7 summarises the strategies or collective action used to obtain public services.

Table 6.7 Commitment to community-based activities by type of action (multiple responses, answered by household heads)

(A) Past (B) Present	D.Turbay		Jerusalén		D. Azul		La Paz		JJR		Bella Flor	
	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)	(A)	(B)
Attend meetings	164	77	131	68	150	128	189	195	103	106	34	97
Sign a petition	26	10	25	16	20	11	30	26	2	13	11	13
Civic strike	0	0	3	2	11	10	11	6	0	0	1	2
Demonstration	3	0	12	6	11	9	11	5	0	0	4	6
Make claim	1	1	11	10	4	4	7	4	1	0	3	6
Office occupation	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
Communal work	88	9	60	25	37	8	86	6	100	13	30	20
Others	7	1	17	5	19	4	10	8	13	3	9	8
Total	289	98	260	133	254	174	344	250	221	135	92	152

Source: Responses to Question 57, Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

‘Attendance at meetings’, ‘signing a petition’ and ‘participation in communal work’ were the three most common kinds of action. Violent protests, such as civic strikes, demonstrations, and city authority office sit-ins, were less common and involved fewer people.

After the regularisation process started, the need for communal work declined. The differences between the accounts for the past (A) and the present (B) in all six settlements reflect this tendency clearly. After a few years the situation described by one resident no longer applied:

When we came here, there was nothing here. [To obtain services]  
 Everybody worked with a pickaxe and a shovel in their hands! We all  
 had to struggle and toil. It was hard, but we did not have any other option.  
 [Elvira, Jerusalén]

### **Local opinion about community participation**

Some of the previous studies suggest that the pace of collective self-help actions or community participation in informal settlements usually slows down as living conditions improve and basic public services are installed (Eckstein, 1977; Torres, 1993). Each

inhabitant loses his/her own motivation for getting involved in communal actions and becomes content to leave these matters in the hands of a small number of community leaders. However, the figures from the sample household survey do not fully support this argument.



Table 6.8 Opinions on community participation today and in the past

	Diana Turbay		Jerusalén		Danubio Azul		La Paz		JJR		Bella Flor	
	Owner	Tenant*	Owner	Tenant*	Owner	Tenant*	Owner	Tenant*	Owner	Tenant*	Owner	Tenant*
More active	33.3	30.1	42.6	25.6	35.4	34.3	50.4	44.6	28.3	26.8	53.9	46.2
Less active	52.9	24.7	37.4	29.5	26.5	10.5	31.3	20.0	53.8	41.5	22.5	11.5
Equal	9.2	14.0	13.9	12.8	10.2	11.4	12.2	13.8	10.4	7.3	13.7	7.7
Not know	4.6	31.2	6.1	32.1	27.9	43.8	6.1	21.5	7.5	24.4	9.8	34.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Responses to Question 63, Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Note: \*Tenant' includes *usufructo* non-rent-paying tenants and occupants who are caretakers of the buildings.

Table 6.8 shows that the community thinks that there is more community participation than previously in Bella Flor, La Paz, Danubio Azul and Jerusalén. One inhabitant explains this as follows:

Now people are for the first time seeing the results of the state intervention in the form of officially provided services, so they feel more motivated to participate  
[Martha, Bella Flor]

People used to be resigned to the idea that this *barrio* would not develop since it started as land invasion. However, suddenly the attention of the city [government] increased [through inclusion in the South Bogotá Project], and this reawakened the people's awareness of the importance of working together.  
[Pedro, La Paz]

The community is now 'more motivated', since we observe the change [progress] in the *barrio*. Whenever there is something [any project] of benefit to the people, they [we] are motivated to collaborate to carry it out. [Dina, JJR]

The perspective of the inhabitants on community participation is mainly determined by their experiences of involvement in community action. The intervention of the state gave them more confidence and the stimuli to greater involvement, since there is no longer a fear of eviction. Thus, in this sense, greater state intervention could bring about greater community participation.

However, the case of Jerusalén, which had been mostly consolidated, cannot be explained by this statement. In settlements that had access to most of the basic public services—water supply, sewage, electricity, natural gas and telephones—the inhabitants thought that current community participation was 'passive' or 'slowing down'. These were the perceptions prevalent in the case of Diana Turbay. However, why did JJR, which

was just at the take-off point in the development process at the time the survey was conducted, record such a clear slowing-down tendency (54 per cent for 'less active' against 28 per cent for 'more active' among owners)?

My 'past' and 'present' categorisation in the question on the level of community participation was problematic since the time frame which defined 'the past' varied among interviewees. Those who settled in the very initial period considered today's community less active than in the past. Their argument was that 'the people are no longer struggling for basic services as we did when we came in.' Those who came later, once state intervention had increased, found the current community to be more active than when they arrived. They argued, 'the people are now more conscious of what is going on and they are trying to collaborate with each other.' Thus, these differences occurred because the starting point of reference varied according to inhabitants' year of arrival.

I intended to clear up this problem by analysing the interviewees' opinion according to their arrival period (see Table 6.9).

Table 6.9 Evaluation of community participation between the past and the present according to the interviewee's arrival year at the settlement

Settlement	Arrival period	More active	Less active	Equal	Not know
Diana Turbay (total 167)	-1985	24(8)	28(3)	10(5)	0
	1986-90	13(4)	16(6)	4(3)	1(1)
	1991-95	7(5)	12(7)	0	7(5)
	1996-2000	8(7)	4(3)	3(3)	31(29)
	Total	52	60	16	39
Jerusalén (total 169)	-1985	21(3)	18(3)	7(1)	5(2)
	1986-90	19(3)	8(2)	7(2)	5(3)
	1991-95	10(4)	21(8)	4(2)	5(5)
	1996-2000	12(8)	5(4)	1(1)	20(17)
	Total	62	52	19	35
Danubio Azul (total 158)	-1985	3(2)	0	0	0
	1986-90	17(3)	25(2)	5(0)	1(0)
	1991-95	25(9)	10(2)	7(0)	1(1)
	1996-2000	20(9)	6(3)	8(8)	30(27)
	Total	64	41	20	32
La Paz (total 143) 1 missing	-1985	6(1)	4(1)	0	0
	1986-90	27(8)	19(1)	6(0)	1
	1991-95	18(6)	10(2)	6(2)	1
	1996-2000	10(3)	5(3)	6(4)	23(10)
	Total	61	38	18	25
JJR (total 128)	-1985	5(0)	14(4)	2(0)	0
	1986-90	6(0)	20(3)	0	0
	1991-95	13(6)	18(3)	5(1)	1
	1996-2000	8(3)	7(1)	3(1)	26(15)
	Total	32	59	10	27
Bella Flor (total 103)	-1985	8(1)	0	0	0
	1986-90	7(0)	4(1)	2(1)	0
	1991-95	15(4)	6(0)	3(0)	1(0)
	1996-2000	11(1)	11(1)	5(0)	30(11)
	Total	41	21	10	31

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

The highlighted periods indicate times when there was an influx of newcomers (owner occupants). In all of the communities except Jerusalén, more interviewees who arrived in the initial period of the community struggle for public services answered that the current community was 'less active'. In contrast, those who arrived later tended to answer 'more active'. A possible explanation for the case of Jerusalén is that there was a considerable difference in the regularisation process between the upper sectors and lower sectors and therefore the evaluation of the inhabitants varied accordingly. The continuing protest activities of the community in the early 1990s (such as their involvement in a locality-wide protest in 1993) could also explain the higher frequency of 'more active'

answers from inhabitants who arrived between 1991 and 1995.

There were two further possible reasons for the inhabitants' contradictory answers: distrust of the leaders and disillusionment with community activities. Therefore, regardless of their own involvement in community struggle or identification of the community leaders, many people did not value the process of their struggle in itself but only whenever they saw positive results. There are various causes of this disillusionment and the next section attempts to explain them.

#### *Disillusionment with community action*

People's two-fold appreciation of community action mainly derived from their distrust of those who were handling the community-based projects. Those who had been actively involved at the initial stages of development often became reluctant to participate again, due to disillusionment and negative feelings about the worth of working for the community. Those who had been close observers of the JAC activities (e.g., frequently attending the community assemblies) tended to be negative about their own participation, since they were very familiar with the internal conflicts generated by rivalries among different sects of the JAC and the jealousies created toward JAC leaders.

The work with JAC is voluntary and economically not worth doing, and it is not even properly appreciated. People show no gratitude for the work of the JAC! [Jesuan, JJR]

People are totally unmotivated, since they think that critical comments or individual opinions are being ignored. There are many factions and many arguments, so it is impossible to arrive at a consensus. That is the fundamental reason for the delay in the progress [of physical upgrading of the settlement]. [Rafael, JJR]

The increasingly bureaucratic manner in which the JAC organisation functions also disillusioned people. The more populous the settlement, the more likely the board of directors of the JAC is to become arrogant and high-handed in its handling of community affairs. Furthermore, the older the settlement becomes, the bigger the generation gap between the 'founders' (the first generation of inhabitants and their community leaders) and the younger community leaders. In many cases the older generation grows more conservative and its leaders tend to cling to their positions with the result that JAC internal politics sometimes become more closed. Since they are not included in the real decision-making processes on community action, inhabitants may increasingly leave matters in the hands of the JAC leaders and grow apathetic and disinterested in what the latter are doing. The distance between the JAC leaders and the inhabitants increases, and responsibility for community-related activities is increasingly concentrated in the hands of the few members of the JAC board.

People are now less involved in the community actions. They tend to wait for the JAC (leaders) to do everything and do not collaborate at all. This settlement practically has all the services, [so] people in the community do not feel the need to fight for anything more.

[Luis, Diana Turbay]

The inhabitants are less active than before in community activities, because they have all the necessary services. So, most people are satisfied. Also, there is no leader to promote new projects.

[José, Diana Turbay]

The community is now less active and motivated to participate. So many people and organisations have been involved in community development that people have come to think that things are taken care

of by So-and-so A, Such-and-such organisation, or So-and-so politician. That leads them to assume: 'We can just leave it up to them!' On the other hand, those who once had the passion and spirit to work hard [for the community] have already have done so much that they are now too exhausted to continue. [Flor del Carmen, La Paz]

Two further obstacles to increased community participation appear to be on the one hand a lack of any sort of charismatic personality, or, on the other hand, the presence of individuals so deeply entrenched as leaders that they cannot be replaced.

I feel less motivated to get involved in community participation now, because the JAC leaders are always the same, and they have not done much to improve the settlement. [Martha Lucia, Diana Turbay]

The impression of many interviewees was that the inhabitants have become content to leave any difficult procedures required for the regularisation process up to the JAC leadership. Increasingly, the more they have left administrative matters up to the discretion of the core members of the JACs, the more these organisations have become indispensable to the community. This situation, however, varies considerably according to the awareness of the inhabitants regarding the collective needs of the settlement, the level of education of the inhabitants, and political interest at the individual level.

In fact, other testimonies recorded in the interviews indicated positive trends in community participation thanks to what the inhabitants have learned from experience.

Individual inhabitants are now acting more autonomously and independently of the activities conducted under the direction of the JAC leaders, since many people are now better trained and have learned how to handle the procedures for dealing with state or city authorities. [Beatriz, Jerusalén]

Now the people at least know where and how and with whom they have to talk when they (we) have a problem or a need they want fulfilled.

[Blanca, JJR]

In this sense, people in the community have improved their capacity to negotiate.

However, since they tend to hand over all their problems to the JAC, the better organised the JAC, the less likely people are to learn how to handle individual matters and deal with the kind of documentation required by the city offices.

Community participation is also sometimes affected by the ill feeling that arises when economic development creates feelings of jealousy and competition among the residents.

No one wants to go back to the poor and miserable way they lived before. [Therefore] even the smallest advantage can trigger jealousy among the neighbours. Any improvement of a house causes other people to feel jealous. [Fabio, Diana Turbay]

The sense of unity that formed among the residents when conditions were poor and the settlement was marginalised by the city disappears over time. As living conditions in a settlement improve, economic disparities among its population begin to appear that negatively affect the motivation of inhabitants to become involved in community activities. The arrival of tenants, who are usually less interested in the settlement's problems affect this as well. The interviews with tenants revealed that they had little knowledge or interest in the issue of community participation and found it difficult to evaluate.



## ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND COMMUNITY-STATE RELATIONS

The service companies, from their standpoint, were always prepared to service these settlements, but it took time because of technical and financial difficulties (Gilbert and Ward, 1985). In the meantime, these marginal communities struggled to obtain basic water supply, sewage, and electrical supply services through various—including illegal—means. In the 1980s, the services were installed more quickly either by aid provided by individual politicians or by pressure applied by politicians to push ahead the regularisation process. In the 1990s, with the introduction of the idea of pro-poor growth, public programmes played a dominant role in the regularisation of the settlements' public service needs. Public service companies also had to make their management more efficient in order to resolve their financial crisis. As a result, the regularisation process speeded up significantly.

In the late 1990s however, there were a series of collective protests against increased service charges and fees. Usually, the cost of the service before and after regularisation differs. People understood that they should pay more for the new, properly installed service (Estache and Gómez-Lobo, 2001). However, the economic recession of 1997 to 2001 meant that the burden of the new service charges and fees on their household budget was a heavy one. Should the protest against the increased fees in 2000 be understood as a result of the new tariff system or simply as a result of the economic crisis? Could these economic factors affect the applicability of community co-financing programmes as well? The following section will discuss the impact of the economic recession on state-community relations.

### **Economic conditions necessary for the success of community co-financing programmes**

Most of the irregular settlements are located in areas where the topography made the regularisation of public services technically quite difficult. Thus, from the beginning, these areas were at a disadvantage as far as service installation was concerned. To serve them properly (i.e., expand the service networks to these settlements), appropriate infrastructure had to be built, the cost of which was even greater than that for communities with standard topography<sup>13</sup>.

However, perhaps an even more critical factor was whether the proposal to make the residents pay for the work through loans to be paid back in instalments over a period of years is feasible. Such an approach depended on the economic capacity of the residents to pay, but also—when it came to intervention by the public service authorities—on the percentage of occupation of the land.

There is no requirement regarding population (in order to conduct regularisation through the ‘community participation’ model). However, what happens is that their low income level affects the number of persons who can pay. Or, [if the land occupation level is too low and there are very few lots/households that are potential users], the number of lots defines whether the programme (through ‘community participation’) will succeed or fail. We (the EAAB) intervene to install infrastructure and provide training courses (for consciousness-raising in the community) when the land-occupation indicator exceeds 75 to 80 per cent. It is extremely difficult to carry out an upgrading programme by the community participation model in a settlement with a land-occupation index less than that. [Representative of EAAB, 10 May

---

<sup>13</sup> For example, to provide water service to the settlements located at elevations of 2,800 metres or higher above sea level, pumps had to be installed at an additional cost. In the case of the settlements located along the banks of a river or stream, moreover, special treatment facilities were required in constructing sewerage networks.

2000]

Due to its own financial limitations, the EAAB placed higher priority on settlements with higher land-occupation density (more than 50 per cent). The delay in the EAAB approach to settlements such as JJR and Bella Flor was partially due to their low-land-occupancy rates. In most of the cases, the EAAB, particularly the office in charge of the irregular settlements (headed by Fernando Fandiño in 2000), was responsible for promoting regularisation through the community co-financing programme. For the community, the more it could pay in advance, the lighter the burden of monthly fees for loan repayments would be. For the EAAB, the more capital available at the outset, the greater the advantage in financing the work contracted under the programme. After all, this cost for expansion of the local networks would normally have been charged to the urban developers who would have passed on the costs to the purchasers of the real estate. In the case of the irregular settlements, the members of the community were required to pay directly. This was the trade-off for the low price of the land, but in the longer term, the community had to pay very high costs to attain regularisation.

Of the six case-study settlements, only Danubio Azul and La Paz were successful in achieving regularisation of the water supply network under the community co-financing programme. In 1995 these two settlements signed the contract for the integrated regularisation of water supply under the programme. In the case of La Paz, there had been a failed attempt to regularise services in the late 1980s when land occupation was still low. But the programme was suspended when the community failed to collect the necessary down-payment funds. Ultimately, the regularisation of public services (water and sewerage simultaneously) was advanced under the integrated upgrading programme of the South Bogotá Project. Regularisation under the community participation model was partially implemented in some sectors of Jerusalén, as well as Diana Turbay. Diana Turbay had been served earliest, but its final upgrading was conducted in the 1990s using

the community co-financing programme<sup>14</sup>. Bella Flor however, failed to implement the community co-financing programme since its physical and economic conditions did not meet the standards of the EAAB.

The inter-settlement COOPABUS project launched in the nine-settlement area (including JJR) of Yomasa was a variation of the community co-financing programme. The limited economic capacity and low level of land occupation of the individual settlements had impeded the EAAB in installing the service in a relatively efficient and financially sustainable way. Work had not started at the end of 2000 because of strong distrust in the community regarding the down-payments to be deposited in the COOPABUS account. In the end, the project failed due to the corruption of the COOPABUS.

The community co-financing [or cost-sharing] programme for regularisation was essentially a strategy for encouraging people to pay part of the cost of the infrastructure in advance. The reasoning behind this framework is clearly based on cost-benefit logic. Similar to the term ‘ownership building’, ‘community participation’ (or administration) programmes were a form of rhetoric used to convince the beneficiaries to share the costs and thereby enable the work to start. At the same time, once a settlement could fulfil its duty to pay, it gained the right to make a claim for the process of regularisation to start. Beyond this, the three indispensable elements for carrying out this programme were a sufficient minimum economic capacity to meet the requirements of the EAAB, strong leadership and the trust of the inhabitants to guarantee the payment.

However, when the installation costs and regular payments were too high relative to the economic capacity of the population, there might be problems.

---

<sup>14</sup> This statement is based on the correspondence and records of the JAC in the DAAC ‘barrio file’ and testimonies of the inhabitants.

### **Inhabitants' reaction toward the new tariff regime during the economic recession**

The privatisation of the EEB in 1995 and the new regime under the CODENSA speeded up regularisation of the electrical power supply in the irregular settlements. The EAAB, while it continued as a public enterprise, has been expected to be more efficient in its management since surviving the financial crisis in the early 1990s.

As described in detail in chapter 4, a new regime for water and electric power supply was established under the Constitution of 1991 and the National Law No.142/1994 on public services. Under this law new commissions (CRA and CREG) were set up to regulate tariffs and fees. Subsidies for the lowest socio-economic strata were to be gradually reduced. Some interviewees thought that they would pay increased fees in exchange for a better service. Others complained about the increased fees since they could not afford to pay them. Let us look at how the service charge increased and how it burdened the household economy in these settlements. And then, we will look at the inhabitants' arguments against the new service charges.

#### *Increase of water and sewerage charges*

As discussed, implementation of the gradual reduction of subsidies for low socio-economic strata (1 to 3) for water and sewerage services was delayed during the previous plan. There had been a lot of political polemic against the possible increase of water tariffs since the CRA was established, even though service charges had been increasing since 1994. Table 6.10 shows the real annual increase ratio of basic tariffs for water and sewerage for the period between 1991 and 2003. It takes 1994 as the base year when the new regulatory regime started. Clearly enough, the basic tariff for all strata grew gradually until it reached a peak in 2000 when it started to decline. Proportionally, the increase of the ratio for strata one and two were higher than the other strata. Except for the sudden steep increase in the ratio for stratus 6 in 2000, the ratios for strata one and two were highest even after 2000.

Table 6.10 Evolution of service charges for water and sewerage:  
real annual increase ratio for basic tariffs(\*) 1991-2003

Stratus	1991 -92	1992 -93	1993 -94	1994 -95	1995 -96	1996 -97	1997 -98	1998 -99	1999 -2000	2000 -01	2001 -02	2002 -03
1	8	-7	3	0	19	20	20	23	39	36	31	32
2	-1	3	2	0	11	23	23	23	23	20	17	17
3	-1	1	3	0	9	13	14	16	23	20	17	17
4	-1	2	3	0	7	7	7	9	18	11	10	10
5	-1	1	3	0	4	4	4	7	21	15	8	9
6	-1	1	3	0	1	1	1	5	37	19	3	3

Source: EAAB, Tarifas acueducto Resolución CRA 76/99 Acuerdo 15/99 EAAB.

Note: In this table, the 'tariffs' mean the sum of the water tariff and sewerage tariff. Basic tariff means the sum of the 'fixed charge' and the 'charge for basic consumption of 20 cubic metres'. See Appendix E.3 for the table on the evolution of the basic tariff for water and sewerage (in 2001 Colombian pesos).

Table 6.11 approximates the changes in the burden of service charge for water and sewerage (for a monthly consumption of 20 cubic meters) on the estimated average monthly income for each stratus.<sup>15</sup> This approximation suggests that the burden of payment for these services proportionally increased from the late 1990s. This tendency is particularly marked for strata one and two (CRA, 2006).

<sup>15</sup> The indices used for calculating the weight for the different strata were taken from those used in Junca Salas (2000) for a similar exercise. Junca based his indices on the estimated salary calculated by strata in Medellín (Colombia's second city). If the base salary was under-estimated then the burden on the monthly income for Bogotá would be less, but the effect of such an under-estimation would affect all the strata equally.

Table 6.11 Burden of service charge for water and sewerage on average monthly income(%)

Stratus	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
1	1.19	1.29	1.20	1.24	1.24	1.48	1.77	2.13	2.62	3.65	4.91	6.47	8.53
2	1.49	1.48	1.53	1.55	1.55	1.71	2.11	2.59	3.19	3.91	4.70	5.49	6.42
3	1.49	1.48	1.51	1.56	1.55	1.69	1.92	2.18	2.52	3.10	3.73	4.36	5.11
4	1.39	1.38	1.40	1.45	1.45	1.54	1.65	1.78	1.95	2.30	2.56	2.81	3.10
5	1.38	1.37	1.39	1.44	1.43	1.49	1.54	1.61	1.72	2.08	2.39	2.59	2.82
6	0.97	0.97	0.98	1.02	1.01	1.02	1.04	1.05	1.10	1.51	1.80	1.86	1.92

Source: As Table 6.10.

Note: As the basic tariff was calculated at the 2001 value, I applied the legal minimum salary in 2001 as the basic reference for the monthly income as follows:

Stratus	Index for weight	Base monthly income(Col.\$)
1	0.79	225,940
2	1.62	463,320
3	3.37	963,820
4	6.25	1,787,500
5	10.5	3,003,000
6	20.2	5,777,200

Legal minimum salary (per month) for 2001 was 286,000 (Colombian pesos).

The residents responded to the increase in the service charge by reducing their consumption. In fact, the average consumption of water for stratus one was reduced from 47.91 cubic metres/month in 1994 to 24.52 cubic metres/month in 2004. However, this strategy of rationalisation of water consumption was similarly observed in the other socio-economic strata (see Table 6.12).

Table 6.12 Evolution of average consumption of water 1994 to 2004 by strata (m<sup>3</sup>/month)

Stratus	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
1	47.91	52.30	43.45	39.64	34.21	32.20	30.60	29.54	27.08	26.60	24.52
2	48.67	48.15	47.01	40.15	36.82	34.36	32.25	30.83	28.77	27.81	26.45
3	46.12	44.92	42.47	36.60	34.47	32.29	30.81	28.89	27.04	26.35	24.50
4	41.69	40.43	37.87	34.10	29.91	29.12	28.57	27.77	26.59	26.97	24.56
5	46.56	45.61	43.55	38.25	34.16	33.37	33.02	32.33	31.27	31.59	29.35
6	56.68	52.34	50.87	46.27	39.08	37.25	37.42	36.14	25.55	36.93	35.47

Source: EAAB, as Table 6.10.

### *Increase in electricity charges*

We can also look at the fluctuation of the service charge for electricity. I will approximate this based on the figures of reference created by CREG. CREG had eliminated the

subsidies provided for the fixed charge (*cargo fijo*) by 2002, as it had planned. Table 6.13 gives a summary of the increase ratio of the service charge for the period 1983-2004. It highlights the steep increase after the privatisation of the EEB in 1997. It also suggests the effect of the elimination of subsidies by strata. Since 1997, the service charge for the lower strata (one to three) increased much more than the upper strata (four to six).

Table 6.13 Annual increase ratio of service charge for electricity by strata (%)

Stratus	1983 – 2004(average)	1983-1997(average)	1997-2004(average)
1	0.53	-6.21	15.50
2	4.82	1.54	11.71
3	6.94	5.32	10.25
4	3.99	5.27	1.47
5	2.68	3.30	1.44
6	-0.12	-0.44	0.52
Total (average)	3.35	0.33	6.41

Source: Otero Prada, 2006: 20.

Note: see also Appendix E.4 for average annual service charge (in 1992 Colombian pesos /KW/Hour).

As in the case of the water and sewerage service, the inhabitants began to reduce their electricity consumption in the late 1990s.

Table 6.14 Monthly consumption of electricity (kw/h)

Strata	1985	1990	1992	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
1	142	191	194	178	140	119	117	120
2	167	234	171	180	156	141	137	138
3	220	282	243	201	192	176	170	170
4	411	350	300	239	243	220	211	207
5	548	460	376	310	305	279	274	272
6	742	614	494	445	436	403	399	393

Source: Data for 1985 from EEB, other figures from CREG, cited in Otero Prada, 2000: 21.

As a consequence, the burden of payment for electricity on the average monthly income slightly increased in strata 1 to 3 after the decrease between 1998 and 2000, but the burden decreased in strata 4 to 6 (Table 6.15).



Table 6.15 Approximate burden of service charge for electricity on average monthly income (%)

Strata	1985	1990	1992	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004
1	3.70	3.30	3.75	4.59	4.64	9.31	5.04	5.18
2	2.15	2.94	2.43	3.51	3.23	3.35	3.44	3.43
3	1.57	2.24	2.27	2.98	2.49	2.65	2.72	2.78
4	2.31	2.20	2.50	2.11	2.18	2.02	2.07	2.08
5	2.85	3.67	4.04	1.96	2.03	1.83	1.92	1.94
6	3.10	2.18	3.22	1.56	1.53	1.38	1.45	1.46

Source: Data for average service charge by strata were taken from Otero Prada 2006: 18.

Data for consumption is taken from Table 6.14.

Calculated according to the same monthly income by strata used in Table 6.11.

*Approximation of burden of service charges (water, sewerage and electricity) on monthly income in six settlements in 2000*

Based on the statistics above, Table 6.16 intends to simulate the burden of charges for basic public services in the studied settlements.

Table 6.16 Simulation of the burden of service charges (water, sewerage and electricity) on monthly income in six settlements in 2000

	Diana Turbay	Jerusalén	Danubio Azul	La Paz	JJR	Bella Flor
Income (1) Col. \$	603,000	526,000	346,000	311,000	317,000	247,000
Ratio vs. SML(2)	2.31	2.02	1.33	1.19	1.21	0.94
Water (3)	10,906.17	10,906.17	10,906.17	4,667.64	4,667.64	4,667.64
Electricity(4)	13,616.31	13,616.31	13,616.31	9,537.00	9,537.00	9,537.00
(3+4)/(1)(%)	4.06	4.66	7.08	4.56	4.48	5.75

Source: Income data taken from Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Service charge data taken from Appendices E.3 and E.4. Data for monthly consumption of electricity taken from Table 6.14.

Note:

(1) Weighted average (mean) of household income in the sampled survey.

(2) Legal minimum salary in 2000= 260,100 Colombian pesos.

(3) Monthly service charge for water and sewerage consumption of 20 cubic metres.

The figure for stratus 2 in 2000 for Diana Turbay, Jerusalén and Danubio Azul. The figure for stratus 1 in 2000 for La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor.

(4) Monthly service charge for average electricity consumption in 2000. The figure for stratus 2 in 2000 for Diana Turbay, Jerusalén and Danubio Azul. The figure for stratus 1 in 2000 for La Paz, JJR and Bella Flor.

We also have to understand that this increase in the service charge occurred during the period of economic recession. As Figure 6.1 shows, in the period 1997 to 2001 an

economic crisis hit Colombia which was felt harshly in Bogotá (see Dávila 2004).




Figure 6.1: Bogotá: annual increase of GDP per capita (1990-2003)  
Source: DANE (<http://www.dane.gov.co/>), accessed 1 December 2006.

During the same period, the performance of the labour market deteriorated. The unemployment rate in Bogotá increased from 11.3 per cent in March 1993 to 20.3 per cent in December 2001 (see Appendix 6a.2). The real growth ratio of the minimum salary in Bogotá was negative throughout the 1990s (see Appendix 6a.3).

In the six case study settlements, the rate of household heads in the sample survey who were not occupied in the previous month represented between 9.5 per cent to 16.2 per cent of the whole sample (Table 6.17). This rate was not exactly the same as the ‘unemployment rate’ since many household heads were categorised as informal sector workers.

Table 6.17 Employment rate in the past month of six settlements

	Diana Turbay		Jerusalén		Danubio Azul		La Paz		JJR		Bella Flor	
(A)	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%
Occu- pied	144	86.2	148	87.6	143	90.5	113	79.0	108	84.4	91	88.3
Not occu- pied	23	13.8	21	12.4	15	9.5	30	21.0	20	15.6	12	16.7
Total	167	100.0	169	100.0	158	100.0	143	100.0	128	100.0	103	100.0
(B)	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%	Nos.	%
Occu- pied	61	46.2	47	39.2	67	57.3	58	55.8	42	53.2	35	46.7
Not occu- pied	71	53.8	73	60.8	50	42.7	46	44.2	37	46.8	40	53.3
Total	132	100.0	120	100.0	117	100.0	104	100.0	79	100.0	75	100.0

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Note: (A): household head, (B): household head's partner.

In Table 6.18, which summarises the job structure of the sampled households, those who are identified as 'independent workers' and 'self-employed workers at home business' together are categorised as informal sector workers. To install a home business at their own house is one of the survival strategies for these communities, but in general, the income generation by most of the jobs found in the settlements was unstable.

Table 6.18 Job classification of the household heads in the sampled survey (frequency)

	Diana Turbay		Jerusalén		Danubio Azul		La Paz		JJR		Bella Flor	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Independent Worker(1)	67	25	74	23	59	31	65	36	66	19	57	26
Home business(2)	14	15	18	12	16	14	6	7	7	4	9	2
Unskilled employed	63	21	56	12	68	22	42	15	35	19	25	7
Total	144	61	148	47	143	67	113	58	108	42	91	35

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Note: A: household head, B: household head's partner.

(1) Includes assistant/worker in construction, informal vendors, assistants to bus drivers, domestic service workers and other informal service workers.

(2) Includes owner of shops, restaurants, bakeries and other workshops run by the household head and his family at their own home.

As analysed, there was a real increase in service charges both for water, sewerage and electricity in the late 1990s. I only have income data for the year 2000 for the studied

households but during the economic recession of 1997-2001, the burden of these service charges on the household income would have been sorely felt. Interviewees explained that this was because many inhabitants had to pay not only the increased charges for regular consumption but also extraordinary costs for individual connection to the newly regularised service. This cost was usually paid with an initial deposit and a two or three year-loan for the balance. The monthly payment was normally invoiced together with normal payment for service charge. As Tránsito explains,

In La Paz, most of the people finished paying off the loan for the installation two years ago (1998). The setting of a meter for the consumption of the service was charged at either 191,000 pesos, for a house with a business or other commercial activity and 67,000 pesos for an ordinary house. This payment could be paid in a one or two year-loan, which was charged monthly with the consumption fee. (. . .) For example, the minimum tariff was about 2,000 pesos or 3,000 pesos, which has increased drastically now to 20,000 or 30,000 pesos [for consumption only]. The loan for installation of the meter was charged separately [and paid in instalments of] about 2,000 pesos per month. This change was considerable. [Tránsito, La Paz]

The first reactions to the increase in public service charges were negative. After the public utility meters for recording consumption were installed in their homes, many inhabitants expressed dismay at what were, by their standards, expensive charges, although they admitted that the quality of service had improved.

Since the CODENSA [came in to upgrade the infrastructure] in 1998, the power supply system changed. The quality is improved. The power supply used to be very unstable but now there are no more power shortages. I am paying an average of 10,000 pesos per month for

consumption. The cost of installation of the local network was a one-time payment of 160,000 pesos. The water supply was also regularised and a meter installed. Now, whenever I am late in paying the fees, the service is immediately suspended. [Luis Beltrán, Danubio Azul]

The charges for a proper service usually rose because they had been undercharged before (during the semi-regularised provision). The charges after the late 1990s also increased because the EAAB had to abide by Law 142 and subsidies were reduced. A further perceived change in the new tariff regime was the fact that the payment was no longer negotiable between the community and the respective companies, even if political pressure was applied. This was more clearly understood in the case of electricity after the privatisation of the EEB.

At ICES [JAC office], I asked them [the JAC leaders] what to do. Then they made me sign the [CODENSA] document to be included in the computer [on-line system]. By that signature, they would put the meter at my house and then the power would come. I had to do as I was told, since the letter we sent would not serve at all! The JAC did nothing to support us! (Since the power service has changed to a private company, JAC's negotiation process does not work.) [Pedro Sierra, Jerusalén]

Pedro's criticism of the JAC leaders' attitudes implies his understanding that it was no longer possible for the JAC leaders to negotiate with CODENSA to make changes if the inhabitants protested against the cost.<sup>16</sup> Under the EEB system, he had been paying what was called a 'minimum fee' of 3,300 pesos (for unlimited use), but after the arrival of CODENSA, he had to join their system or lose the right of access to electric power.

---

<sup>16</sup> However, the JACs of Jerusalén organised a big demonstration to protest against the high fees charged by different public service companies in 2000 (*El Tiempo*, 2000).

Most people viewed the change to a regularised power system run by CODENSA as the exchange of increased tariffs for improved quality of service. Tránsito, an inhabitant of La Paz, said that in the days when they had only a ‘provisional service’ and paid the ‘minimum tariff’ they had some advantages such as not having to worry about the cost in terms of how many household appliances they used, though they had many technical problems due to the overuse of the power. Some people quickly grasped the value of the improved quality of the service and better quality of life that they could enjoy as a result.

Regarding the power supply, I prefer the CODENSA system, since the service is more efficient. When I asked about the fee, they immediately sent someone to check the fee and admitted that the meter had not been correctly read. What we consume, we have to pay for. [Marina Garzón, Danubio Azul]

The new regime left no more room for fuzzy, flexible payments. Access to the service is not a matter of negotiation but a business transaction. The payment was generally standardised, although the lowest strata did continue to receive a subsidy.

When we were paying the ‘minimum fee’, the charge for water was from 5,000 to 10,000 pesos, but now it is from 15,000 to 17,000! The minimum fee for electricity was from 5,000 to 10,000 pesos but now is 16,000 pesos! This [must be] a trap! [Bernabé, Jerusalén]

This comment clearly expresses the inhabitants’ feeling of the ‘sudden increase of charges’ and therefore the increased burden on their household budget.

#### *Reaction of the community to protest against the increased service charge*

As discussed in chapter 4, in the 1990s the communities in the poor settlements continued to mobilise the people to join protests such as demonstrations and civic strike once all the

conventional strategies of negotiation had stalled. The biggest civic strike in Ciudad Bolívar in 1993 had a ripple effect and in 1993-94, the civic strikes spread to other localities such as Usme, Usaquén, Engativá, Kennedy and Bosa. As mentioned in chapter 5, the community leaders of Jerusalén, Danubio Azul and La Paz often resorted to these protests in order to negotiate with the city authorities. Their complaints against the public services up until 1999 included delayed regularisation, shortage of services (water, specially) and erroneous invoicing for public services. However, in 2000, they also organised protests to complain against the increased tariffs. During my field work, I accompanied the protest against CODENSA organised by ASOJERUSALEN backed by some labour unions (January 2000). They also got together with the communities of Usme to organise a manifestation in which they burned copies of the service charge invoice in front of the respective public service companies' offices and requested a reduction in the service charge (June 2000) (*El Espectador*, 2000a; 2000b; 2000c). However, no community-state relation negotiations on this issue took place and the community had not achieved a positive result by the end of my field work (2000).<sup>17</sup>

#### CONCLUSION: INHABITANTS' INTERPRETATION OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

This chapter has shown that the community recognised good leadership as that which was able to mobilise resources and get results in terms of benefits for the community. Political patronage was always considered important and close relations between leaders and local politicians were positively valued as long as the relationship was effective and brought tangible results. Qualifications for leadership were judged by concrete outcome, so the

---

<sup>17</sup> From late 2000, emerging leftist political movements such as Polo Democrático Alternativo (PDA) began to provide greater support for these community protests. In fact, Luis Garzón from the PDA launched his electoral campaign promising a reduction in the water service tariff. After he became mayor of Bogotá in 2003, the basic charge for water was significantly reduced (*El Tiempo*, 2004a; 2004b; *El Nuevo Siglo* 2004; 2005). However, for the purposes of this thesis I have separated political negotiations regarding public services from the protests which occurred under the initiative of community leaders.

leaders continued to resort to political patronage as long as it worked. Before the start of state intervention, community leaders were crucial to the organisation of collective actions. Once the JAC leadership was recognised by the city authorities, the JAC directing board was recognised as the intermediary agency between the community and the state. The variety of collective actions to which the community resorted reflected the strategies of the JAC leaders. However, the JAC leaders were often tempted to help themselves from the money that passed through their hands, and chronic cases of corruption generated distrust in the community, hindering the process of development. Therefore, the quality of the leadership was an important factor in determining the speed of consolidation of the irregular settlements.

Although the effect of clientelistic practices was reduced, the close relationship between the community leaders and local politicians, particularly *ediles* of the locality remains. The influence of politicians over the regularisation process itself (especially with CODENSA) has declined so assistance from politicians is now exclusively based on the procurement of resources for community development. Predominant among the local politicians identified by the residents were the *ediles* who had access to such resources. Today the community has other ways of obtaining services for example from the pro-poor programmes (which were widely offered by Mockus and Peñalosa), so they no longer rely on clientelist practices as they used to. In addition, they are now more aware of the possibility of gaining a seat in the JAL through a civic political movement.

The role of outside organisations (politicians, NGOs, religious groups) was crucial to the development process of irregular settlements. However, the analysis showed that enduring partnerships were rarely created between the community and outside organisations particularly in terms of decision-making processes.

Inhabitants commit themselves to communal activities when they can see its returns in terms of improvements in their living conditions in the settlements. In the initial stages of land occupation, the residents had to collaborate for their survival and to secure their



place on the land. However, as the consolidation process progressed, their motivation for participating in communal activities decreased for the simple reason that they now had most of what they needed and did not need to fight for anything. The cases which were just in the initial stage of regularisation highlighted the circumstances in which the inhabitants were stimulated to participate as they observed the recent intervention of the state. However, even in such circumstances, without firm and transparent leadership, the community activities were not well attended. Once becoming disillusioned with their community leadership, despite knowing the necessity of participation, inhabitants are often reluctant to get involved in collective action. The combination of these factors means that sometimes the opinions, actions and reactions of the inhabitants are contradictory.

The residents' attitudes toward the improved but more expensive service provision in 2000 had to be understood in the light of the economic recession. The community co-financing programmes implemented by the public service companies helped them to learn the logic of cost in exchange for economic benefits, as well as the logic of consumption. From the late 1990s, under the new tariff regime, the service charges began to be based on the units consumed. Subsidies which greatly benefited the users in the lower strata were gradually reduced. Under these circumstances political intervention was largely ineffective and community reliance on local politicians in respect to the problems of service charges declined. There was little role for the JAC leaders either, since the space for negotiations on the tariff issue was quite limited. Regarding the reluctance of the inhabitants to pay for the installation of local networks, many people were unwilling to pay the down-payment because they distrusted the JAC leaders who were collecting the money. People were sceptical of any delays in the installation of the work due to technical problems since they tended to associate such problems with bad management or corruption among the JAC leaders. Though the public service companies tried to convince the inhabitants to join the community co-financing programme under

the rhetoric of community participation, this did not necessarily increase community involvement. The main determining factors in encouraging the community to pay were firm, competent and transparent leadership and the inhabitants' purchasing power.

In fact, the economic circumstances of the case study communities affected not only the applicability of the community co-financing programme but also determined community reaction to the increased public services charges. Under the new tariff regime, the burden of public service charges on the average household income increased. This increase occurred at the same time as the economic recession hit the poor hard. The subsequent protests against the increased public services tariffs were with good reason as there was no alternative channel for negotiations between the community and the city authorities on this issue.

**Appendix 6a.1**  
Institution responsible for resolving most urgent problems/needs

**Diana Turbay**

Institution	Water	Sewer- age	Drenage rainfall	Electric- ity	Natural gas	Waste collection	Pavement	Public phone	Transpor- tation	Nursery school	Primary School	Secondary School	Medical centre	Market	Police	Commu- nity hall	Green zone	Others	Total (3 needs) Freq.	%
Government	4	3	3	1	3	1	22	5	7	4	10	54	33	10	38	1	44	0	243	48.5
Public enterprises/insts(*)	20	2	8	6	2	3	6	26	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	78	15.6
JAC	3	0	2	2	5	2	26	6	9	3	3	8	8	9	14	2	29	0	131	26.1
Politicians( <i>edil</i> , etc.)	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	3	0	2	0	0	6	0	16	3.2
Other CBO	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.2
Not know , Not inform	3	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	3	5	4	1	2	8	32	6.4
Total	31	6	13	9	12	6	59	37	20	9	14	65	44	26	57	4	81	8	501	100.0

**Jerusalén**

Institution	Water	Sewer- age	Drenage rainfall	Electric- ity	Natural gas	Waste collection	Pavement	Public phone	Transpor- tation	Nursery school	Primary School	Secondary School	Medical centre	Market	Police	Commu- nity hall	Green zone	Others	Total (3 needs) Freq.	%
Government	1	1	6	1	1	3	30	4	11	5	5	21	17	17	74	1	19	0	217	42.8
Public enterprises/insts(*)	18	2	5	6	7	2	1	33	4	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	79	15.6
JAC	2	0	2	1	6	3	40	10	11	1	2	6	16	20	29	4	19	0	172	33.9
Politicians( <i>edil</i> , etc.)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0	2	12	2.4
Other CBO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.2
Catholic church	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.4
NGO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	3	0.6
Not know , Not inform	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	6	0	3	2	21	4.1
Total	23	4	13	9	14	8	76	48	29	6	8	28	37	40	113	5	44	2	507	100.0

Note: (\*) Includes CODENSA.

Appendix 6a.1 (continued)

**Danubio Azul**

Institution	Water	Sewer- age	Drenage rainfall	Electric- ity	Natural gas	Waste collection	Pavement	Public phone	Transportation	Nursery school	Primary School	Secondary School	Medical centre	Market	Police	Communi- ty hall	Green zone	Others	Total (3 needs) Freq.	%
Government	7	1	1	0	9	2	12	1	17	6	9	12	55	8	47	2	7	3	199	42.0
Public enterprises/insts(*)	10	0	1	7	6	2	1	7	4	1	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	11	11.6
JAC	6	2	3	1	8	1	17	2	22	2	4	6	40	11	47	1	5	3	181	38.2
Politicians( <i>edil</i> , etc.)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0.6
Other CBO	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.4
Catholic church	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	7	1.5
NGO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.2
Not know /	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	1	1	0	1	2	5	2	7	0	1	0	26	5.5
Total	25	5	6	8	27	7	30	12	45	10	15	21	103	21	104	3	13	19	474	100.0

**La Paz**

Institution	Water	Sewer- age	Drenage rainfall	Electric- ity	Natural gas	Waste collection	Pavement	Public phone	Transportation	Nursery school	Primary School	Secondary School	Medical centre	Market	Police	Communi- ty hall	Green zone	Others	Total (3 needs) Freq.	%
Government	5	2	1	4	2	3	17	3	27	0	6	5	29	6	27	1	11	2	151	35.2
Public enterprises/insts(*)	4	0	0	6	4	4	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	12	36	8.4
JAC	2	1	5	2	11	1	14	1	49	1	8	9	49	6	49	2	18	2	230	53.6
Politicians( <i>edil</i> , etc.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.7
Catholic church	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.5
Not know /	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	7	1.6
Total	11	3	6	12	18	8	34	5	80	1	14	15	83	12	78	3	30	16	429	100.0

Note: (\*) Includes CODENSA.

Appendix 6a.1 (continued)

JJR

Institution	Water	Sewerage	Drenage rainfall	Electricity	Natural gas	Waste collection	Pavement	Public phone	Transportation	Nursery school	Primary School	Secondary School	Medical centre	Market	Police	Community hall	Green zone	Others	Total (3 needs)	
																			Freq.	%
Government	12	13	8	2	1	0	19	3	2	3	3	10	35	4	38	1	2	0	156	40.6
Public enterprises/insts(*)	23	18	7	2	1	0	1	33	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	89	23.2
JAC	16	12	5	1	7	0	20	16	2	0	0	2	20	3	15	0	0	0	119	31.0
Politicians( <i>edil</i> , etc.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.3
Other CBO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.3
Catholic church	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	1.3
Not know /	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	2	0	13	3.4
Total	53	47	20	5	10	0	42	53	7	3	3	15	58	8	54	2	4	0	384	100.0

Bella Flor


Institution	Water	Sewerage	Drenage rainfall	Electricity	Natural gas	Waste collection	Pavement	Public phone	Transportation	Nursery school	Primary School	Secondary School	Medical centre	Market	Police	Community hall	Green zone	Others	Total (3 needs)	
																			Freq.	%
Government	16	14	0	2	1	0	1	2	6	1	18	6	19	1	7	0	0	0	94	30.4
Public enterprises/insts(*)	52	22	2	21	1	0	1	21	3	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	126	40.8
JAC	18	17	1	5	1	2	0	11	10	2	2	0	9	0	1	0	1	0	80	25.9
Politicians( <i>edil</i> , etc.)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.0
Other CBO	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	1.6
Catholic church	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.6
Not know /	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.6
Total	91	56	3	28	3	2	3	34	19	3	20	6	29	2	8	0	1	1	309	100.0

Source: Bogotá Irregular Settlement Household Survey conducted from January to August 2000.

Note: (\*) Includes CODENSA.

## Appendix 6a.2

### Bogotá: quarterly unemployment rate from March 1990 to December 2000




Quarter	Unemployment rate (%)	Quarter	Unemployment rate (%)	Quarter	Unemployment rate (%)
1990/Mar.	7.96	94/Mar.	8.14	98/Mar.	14.76
90/Jun.	10.09	94/Jun.	7.71	98/Jun.	13.28
90/Sep.	8.84	94/Sep.	4.92	98/Sep.	14.41
90/Dec.	10.76	94/Dec.	7.24	98/Dec.	18.03
91/Mar.	9.18	95/Mar.	6.49	99/Mar.	18.00
91/Jun.	8.90	95/Jun.	7.82	99/Jun.	19.10
91/Sep.	8.14	95/Sep.	6.25	99/Sep.	19.30
91/Dec.	8.12	95/Dec.	8.23	99/Dec.	16.90
92/Mar.	8.41	96/Mar.	9.48	2000/Mar.	19.60
92/Jun.	9.09	96/Jun.	10.33	2000/Jun.	20.70
92/Sep.	7.30	96/Sep.	9.13	2000/Sep.	20.30
92/Dec.	8.54	96/Dec.	8.46	2000/Dec.	20.30
93/Mar.	7.33	97/Mar.	11.39		
93/Jun.	7.02	97/Jun.	9.89		
93/Sep.	5.24	97/Sep.	10.59		
93/Dec.	5.68	97/Dec.	12.91		

Source: DANE, *Encuesta de hogares*, various numbers (1990-2000). Data from 1990 to 1999 are taken from DAPD (2000). Data for 2000 are from DANE website: <http://www.dane.gov.co/>, accessed 15 November 2006.

### Appendix 6a.3

#### Bogotá: minimum legal wage and its real annual growth ratio (1986-2004)

Annual growth ratio of minimum legal wage



Year	Monthly minimum legal wage (Colombian pesos)
1985	13,558
1986	16,811
1987	20,510
1988	25,637
1989	32,560
1990	41,025
1991	51,716
1992	65,190
1993	81,510
1994	98,700
1995	118,934
1996	142,125
1997	172,005
1998	203,826
1999	236,460
2000	260,100
2001	286,000
2002	309,000
2003	332,000
2004	358,000

Source: Banco de la República, website:  
[http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see\\_prod\\_salar.htm](http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see_prod_salar.htm),  
 accessed 30 November 2006.

## **CHAPTER 7**

### **CONCLUSION**

The thesis has discussed community involvement in Bogotá as it has evolved over time. It has also analysed the nature of the relationship between the community, the state and other outside actors in the irregular settlements.

First, the study outlined the relationships between poor communities, local politicians and the city government before and after implementation of institutional reforms in the 1990s. A comparison of the pace of regularisation and intervention by outside institutions in the six case-study settlements illustrated this change.

Second, the study clarified the meaning of community participation as it evolved through time. Community participation in terms of co-financing projects was widely established among Bogotá government institutions in the 1970s. This kind of community involvement was very different from the real community participation that they had experienced in their struggle for land and basic services when the neighbourhood was first established.

In this concluding chapter, I summarise my principal findings with respect to the research questions raised in chapter 1. Then I discuss how the findings relate to the key theoretical ideas and issues discussed in chapter 1. I also discuss the relevance of the findings to poor communities beyond the context of Bogotá and Colombia. Next, I comment on my research method and reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of my approach. Finally, I suggest some relevant topics for future research.



**Question 1: How have the nature of community struggle and government approaches to the poor changed as a result of the recent strengthening of democracy and decentralised government?**

Before institutional reforms in the urban regularisation process came into force, regularising irregular settlements often took years. To accelerate the process, people resorted to various tactics to negotiate with the city authorities, using either political pressure through their patron or aggressive protests such as blocking roads. Many politicians were directors on the boards of public service companies, which made political intervention in the regularisation process possible. Acquiring political patronage therefore was often an essential route to obtain legal title and/or services.

Other factors were also critical in determining the extent and timing of government intervention. Topography was influential insofar as it influenced the cost of servicing. Similarly the number of people in the community was important, particularly to those politicians who were interested in increasing their support at times of election. Before 1990, therefore, the settlement regularisation was largely dependent on patron-client relationships. Find a patron and the whole process was likely to run faster.

During the 1990s, the relationship between local communities and politicians gradually changed. After 1991, politicians were no longer allowed to act as directors of the public service agencies and a special allowance (*auxilio*) for city councillors and congressmen to allocate to good causes was also withdrawn. These elements reduced the space for political intervention in the regularisation process.

Today a formally recognised procedure exists by which JALs can propose projects through their *ediles* to the District administration. Each *edil* proposes projects which should in theory reflect the local needs expressed by specific communities. Today, community leaders now evaluate local politicians on the basis of whether or not they respond to community requests; in the past, the link was based much more on the

politician's party affiliation. In this sense, community leaders today have more bargaining power and can pick and choose from the offers of politicians depending on what fits their needs. The creation of JALs generated a new route for the urban poor to represent their needs to the local government. Now the communities' strategies for meeting their needs are directed through the *ediles*.

Of course, most communities were aware of the 'ineffectiveness' of political patronage and some leaders were always critical of the political manoeuvres of local politicians. The changes introduced by the 1991 Constitution which restricted clientelism at the local level were welcomed even if patron-client relationships between local leaders, *ediles* and their city councillor patrons still persisted. What changed was that the communities learned that they could now follow a number of alternative strategies and as a result their approach to local politicians became more selective.

In the 1990s, communities continued to ask politicians for help, but this was only one tactic. The city's focus on regularisation as a priority policy turned erstwhile passive clients into citizens with rights to press the authorities to give them what they wanted. As a result, local politicians' traditional manoeuvring ceased to be as effective as it was in the 1980s.

From the mid 1990s urban management became more efficient and accelerated the regularisation of informal settlements. Even the most disadvantaged irregular settlements now received government attention. As demonstrated in chapter 5, the time elapsed between recognising the juridical status of a JAC and receiving full legal rights (issue of *resolución*) was cut considerably.

Whether the new accelerated procedures reduced conflict between the settlements and the authorities is less than clear from the case studies. There was a great deal of variation between the communities. The people in Diana Turbay never used aggressive tactics in their negotiations with the city authorities whereas those in La Paz, which were led by the Communist Party, were at first very aggressive. In Jerusalén

mobilisation of the community and the organisation of protests has remained a regular strategy.

Privatisation of service provision also reduced the potential for clientelism. Privatisation of the electricity company led to the new company supplying even the most disadvantaged informal settlements. The procedure involved in the provision of power services has become an individual matter (i.e. individual connection to the network and installation of a meter are provided on the basis of individual credit-payment) rather than a matter for collective negotiation.

Several NGOs and church activists have intervened in the all of six settlements I studied, but the extent and length of their commitment varied depending on the nature of community leadership. In every case, there was some conflict between the NGOs, the Church and the community inhabitants. In the case of JJR, the community was set up at the initiative of an NGO activist who later came into conflict with the community over their wish to seek state support. When he left the community created its own JAC although it never had any real ability to mobilise the community.

In Jerusalén, the community benefited from the intervention of numerous NGOs even though competition among them generated divisions amongst the inhabitants. In cases like Bella Flor, where strong leadership never developed, different NGOs came and went without ever linking closely to community activity.

Did the settlements with strong community-based organisations develop faster than those without? Yes and no. In Jerusalén, the strong community-based organisations had a very difficult period at the beginning of the 1980s, due to rumours about its leader's sympathy with a left wing guerrilla group. These rumours discouraged the state from helping the community. In contrast, in Danubio Azul, several community-based organisations came into conflict in the mid 1990s. As a consequence, the settlement was targeted for strong intervention through the de-marginalisation programme. Overall strong community-based organisation seems to have been influential insofar as it

attracted the state's attention, although how the state responded depended on the political circumstances.

The 1991 Constitution increased community autonomy, by recognising the legal rights of citizens to make demands on the State. Communities now have the right to demand services and help from the state. The city government has even campaigned to raise people's awareness (*conscientización*) of their rights<sup>1</sup> and taught them how to make claims (*tutela*) against the relevant city authorities for delays or negligence. The appointment of an ombudsman to monitor the public infrastructure provision also gave the citizens more influence over resource allocation. This is one of the positive implications of democratisation, equipping citizens with an awareness of their own rights and the strategies with which to demand them.

Thus this thesis has shown that the decentralisation process ensured that the community struggle was no longer wholly dependent on political patronage. The relation between communities and state has become more direct and made political mediation less essential. On the other hand, communities have also lost some influence as service provision has been increasingly influenced by market forces. Private companies negotiate with individuals rather than with communities.

**Question 2: How has the increasingly market-oriented approach to urban and economic development affected the lives of people in the *barrio*?**

The Bogotá city government made public service agencies work more efficiently while introducing a series of pro-poor programmes in the 1990s. Competent mayoral leadership led to the implementation of well-integrated upgrading programmes in the peripheral areas of Bogotá. As a result, the physical upgrading of the settlements made remarkable progress and living conditions in the poor sectors improved significantly.

---

<sup>1</sup> There is a special division in every department and secretariat of the city government to deal with 'claims' and 'demands' (*tutela*) submitted to the city authorities. The division responsible for the (poor) communities has the job of making these citizens' rights known to everyone in order to justify the functions of the city. Involvement in such popular education activities has become a strategy for politicians to gain popularity.

Community-based collective action tends to disappear once settlements are regularised because it is no longer necessary. In the late 1990s, the upgrading of infrastructure stimulated by the privatisation of electricity delivery and the commercialisation of water delivery were noted in most of the case study settlements.

Whether the inhabitants (at the individual level) can sustain this new level of living conditions depends increasingly on what they can afford to pay given the policy to raise tariffs to more 'economic' levels that was applied more rigorously after 1994. As Bogotá utilities attempted to rationalise public service provision, so the burden of payment for public services on the household income increased.

There was no longer a space for negotiation between the communities and the public service delivery companies. The relationship changed from that of collective action to simply that of consumer and provider.

Having stated this however, it cannot be said that collective community action disappeared all together. My study found that the poor communities still maintained the potential to reactivate community action whenever necessary to demand that new collective needs were met. For example there were protests against the increased public service tariff in the final stage of my fieldwork in 2000.

Thus, as the case studies have shown, the pro-market orientation of the city government improved the living conditions of the urban poor, but at the same time it reduced the space for them to negotiate collectively. In the end, individual purchasing power has become key to determining the sustainability of improved life for the poor. However, this shift means that communities will still organise collective protests but only when they have no other way of making their needs known.

**Question 3: How effectively has the participatory approach of the city government to the community affected the lives of people in the irregular settlements since 1990?**

What was most significant in the relationship between the state and communities in the

1990s was the emphasis by the city authorities and public service companies on adopting community co-financing programmes to facilitate regularisation.

Community participation was an essential part of these community upgrading programmes. This form of 'participation' was introduced by the city government as part of their search for cost-effectiveness. It was therefore different from the kind of participation which existed at the very initial stages of development of the irregular settlements whereby inhabitants were involved in communal work in order to obtain rudimentary utility services. Communal collaboration in upgrading projects was lumped together under the rubric of 'community participation'. Central to the earlier form of community participation was the idea of mutual help among the residents in a spirit of solidarity and it also had its own decision-making system. So, although the living conditions of the poor improved remarkably as a result of the new type of community participation, the 'participatory' approach introduced was different from that practised earlier under the community's own initiative.

The concept of 'community participation' employed by the city government and public service companies, referred to an investment strategy to back up the implementation of community-development projects. It did require a certain level of economic capacity, though the payments made by the communities were still highly subsidised. If the inhabitants did not have the purchasing power to pay the requested amount in advance, the project would fail.

In the most economically disadvantaged settlements, where the total burden of charges for the construction of service infrastructure would have been quite expensive, people were given the opportunity to pay with longer-term credit. The total cost for the poorest people was thus lower than for those with greater purchasing power. The community participation programmes, therefore, did contribute to the improvement of daily life in the poor settlements.

As discussed above, the participatory approach of the city government is different

from that traditionally practised in the irregular settlements. However, the state-initiated form of community participation has successfully executed community development projects, and once completed, these projects have definitely improved the living conditions of the urban poor.

**Question 4: How far did community participation succeed in the involvement of the community in the decision-making process and enforce its control over resource allocation?**

The framework of community participation in the slum upgrading projects has involved the targeted community in the execution process, but not necessarily in the decision-making process. This was clearly proved by the community co-financing programmes executed in conjunction with either the EAAB or the IDU which did not offer any real space for the beneficiaries to become involved in the decision-making process.

Many inhabitants to whom I talked demonstrated that they had learned their own rights and become more aware of what they could do to make claims. They can now demand access to services and infrastructure as their human right, instead of requesting them as a favour from political patrons. However, whether the whole community became autonomous or self-aware of their own rights was questionable. Some people stated that they now knew where to go to make a claim and how to manage problems themselves without resorting to the support of politicians but these were generally the community leaders. Others have continued to believe in the effectiveness of patron-client relationships in negotiations with the state. In general, the rank and file inhabitants of the consolidated settlements have become more dependent on the JAC leaders and accustomed to having their needs met through their mandate.

Community participation in terms of community co-financing projects flourished as the city authorities encouraged communities to participate and plan the ways in which their neighbourhood should develop. This was true of the EAAB and IDU as well as

de-marginalisation programmes which promoted this financial framework in order to involve the targeted beneficiaries.

However, once again, the meaning of community participation thus interpreted by the city authorities is not the same as the involvement of the community in the kind of collective action traditionally undertaken. This was more than clear from the findings of my case studies which led me to label current community participation practices an 'illusion'. People are always consulted whenever community participatory projects are to be executed, but this does not mean that they are involved in the decision making process. As a consequence, they do not have any degree of control over resources.

#### THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE FINDINGS

How do the findings of this research relate to the theoretical ideas discussed in chapter 1? I now focus on three debates: the meaning of community participation; the effects of decentralisation on popular participation; and the results of the privatisation of public services on the urban poor.

#### **Community participation: the gap between theory and practice**

If there are various meanings of community participation, particularly if community participation is understood differently by the state and poor communities, why is the concept still being used?

Community participation in the six case study settlements is an illusion insofar as practice falls so short of the ideals embodied in the notion. The kind of participation that was taking place in the poor settlements of Bogotá pretended to be something that it was not.

People sometimes trust the possibility of community struggle or community



participation in order to fulfil their needs. They sometimes engage in community affairs, but for many reasons, often drop out. Sometimes they drop out because they have come to distrust the leadership and this leads to disillusionment with the whole idea of community participation.

In using the term 'illusion' I am not saying that 'real' community participation never takes place. Many people in the study settlements did believe in the virtue of community participation. However, once they found out about the various negative aspects, problems and conflicts associated with their collective action and communal struggles, they realised that their image of community participation was an illusion. They learned that state-initiated community participation schemes were being employed to improve cost-effectiveness in project implementation rather than for community control over resource allocation. However, they accepted this situation and were extremely pragmatic in their attempts to obtain services for the settlements.

The ways in which the authorities failed to involve the community in planning most projects is a further sign that community participation in Bogotá is an illusion. None of the regularisation programmes which I analysed in my case studies involved the inhabitants at the design stage. The views of the community were listened to at various times but there was never any hint that the population would be permitted to discuss the budget and how it was to be spent. Community participation often meant little more than co-financing. Surely participation involves more than putting one's hand in one's pocket?

Finally, community participation in practice often broke down because of the nature of the local leadership. Many of the JALs and community organizations demonstrated major failings in terms of leadership. Some proved to be corrupt, some were too authoritarian, some were afflicted by internal conflict. Community participation is clearly an illusion if the local leadership does not reflect the views of the community or are unable to implement those views. The case studies revealed how many initially

enthusiastic people became disillusioned with local leaders and ceased to participate.

So, did the community ever get together to press for neighbourhood improvement? Clearly they did, but the involvement was much stronger when the settlements lacked any kind of service. As the literature has repeatedly shown, community participation declines as settlements consolidate and receive services. This is what White (2000: 144) has termed the dynamic nature of participation.

Desai (1995) criticises the notion of spontaneous or authentic community participation as identified by Western academics. Reflecting on this argument in my study on urban settlements in Colombia, I found that it is partly true because it is very difficult to find 'purely spontaneous community participation', except for at the very beginning stage of land occupation. The JAC was a state-created community organisation, but based on the traditional practices of communal work in the rural sector, such as reciprocal self-help communal action. Once a JAC is recognised and registered to the DAAC, it gains legitimacy to negotiate with the city administration in exchange for being controlled and inspected by the DAAC. Thus, people struggle spontaneously to gain this legitimacy but after they create a JAC, it is controlled by the state organisation.

I would argue that the illusion of community participation should be interpreted in various ways as community participation itself takes different forms. 'Community participation' has been employed as a positive tool in order to accomplish 'good governance' in line with the current thinking of mainstream international aid organisations. Nevertheless, previous studies in Africa, Asia and Latin America suggest that there are a series of factors in the local context which impede the full implementation of community participation. Failures in the participatory approach are mainly believed to derive from problems with the different pre-conditions necessary to make community participation work (see Desai, 2002; Brett, 1996; Jenkins, 1999). The following are my reflections on some of the critical issues related to community

participation and its limitations based on my findings.

*Debate on the effectiveness of participatory projects (local conditions which may impede effectiveness)*

Previous studies outlined the limitations of community participation when it is employed for service delivery in search of cost-effectiveness. Although community participatory projects should have a positive effect if they are implemented as planned, local conditions can constitute negative factors which impede the projects (Brett, 1996; Jenkins, 1999; Adat and Haddad, 2002). The failures of the community co-finance project which the EAAB intended to conduct in JJR and Bella Flor and in several sectors of La Paz are examples which illustrate these negative factors at community level. Brett (1996) suggests 'unequal distribution of knowledge and skills among the members of the community' (see chapter 1) may be problematic, but in these cases, the obstacles were the rank and file inhabitants' distrust of the community leaders who were in charge of collecting money combined with the limited ability of the inhabitants to afford the down payment. In fact, community leaders (mostly either the president or other members of the directing board of the JAC) were accused of corruption.

My findings suggest that the quality of community leadership is the key to driving the upgrading process of irregular settlements. This involves the leaders' dedication and capacity to run effective strategies, including their ability to maintain good communications with both politicians and the local government. Conversely, corrupt and unmotivated leaders are one of the causes of failure in development projects. Brett (1996) argues that the 'cost' of community participation is also problematic, since the labour time of leaders in participatory projects is relatively expensive. Community leaders' work as members of the JAC is voluntary and not economically recognised. Ex and current leaders frequently commented that 'people do not appreciate what we have done for the community' reflecting the frustration felt by community leaders. Their frustration over the lack of reward could lead to corruption.

Lack of accountability is another issue relating to the corruption of leaders. As Fox (1992) points out, leadership accountability within the community is key to whether participatory projects succeed or fail. In most of the cases where inhabitants claimed JAC leaders were corrupt, lack of accountability in the communal activities under the JAC institutional framework was more than obvious. In contrast, accountability can be enforced by the existence of participatory subgroups as Fox (1992) suggests. The experiences of Jerusalén and Danubio Azul are good examples of this. In Jerusalén, several community-based organisations beyond the JAC monitored the activities initiated by the JAC directing boards. In Danubio Azul, several rival community organisations monitored each other, therefore, the JAC was always under pressure from inside the community.

Differences between leaders and rank and file members in terms of knowledge of how to manage the participatory projects, including communications with public agencies was clear in my case study settlements. The more bureaucratic a JAC becomes, the less motivated the rank and file members of the community become, tending to delegate community issues to the JAC leaders. As Jenkins (1999) highlights, a gap between the interest and motivation of the leaders and the rest of the community can weaken the level of engagement of the community in participatory projects.

Another obstacle to the completion of participatory projects is the conflict between the time frame requested by the project managers and the time required by the community for its decision making processes (Jenkins, 1999; Schalkwijk, 2002; Goldfrank, 2002). The limitation of the results of participatory local planning via citizens' focus groups (*Encuentros Ciudadanos*) clearly illustrates this conflict (see chapter 4).

Government officials also became disillusioned as a result of the limitations of the participatory approach. A typical comment that I often heard from the community leaders was: 'Here, nobody participates when they (the state) really encourage the

community participation in terms of involvement in the projects. People [only] get together and “participate” in the meeting or events whenever they can get something free.’ Adjectives such as ‘participative’ or ‘communal’ (or ‘*convivencia*’ meaning to live together in a spirit of solidarity) were fashionable in the titles of community based-development projects or programmes, yet the projects clearly did not live up to their name. Sudarsky’s (2003) analysis of community participation revealed that the residents’ commitment to grass-roots organisations declined over time, including their participation in the state-created JACs. This means that the potential achievements of community participation through community-based organisations was limited. For the city administration, having a ‘counterpart’ organisation (such as the JACs) should have been indispensable in approaching these settlements, therefore, the result of the study is disappointing, since it highlights the fact that it was difficult for the state to access and involve the people in participatory projects. This means that community participation is an illusion for the state as well. This raises the question of the effectiveness of the participatory approach (pages 13-16 in chapter 1).

*The issue of empowerment: beyond the efficiency vs. empowerment dichotomy*

In the late 1990s, Colombia was moving towards a more neo-liberal form of economic and state management and was also encouraging greater decentralisation as part of that shift in policy. I was convinced that under these circumstances, the state would need more participation from the community and other non-governmental actors in the execution of development projects. The community should have gained more autonomy, a stronger voice to call for its needs to be met. And, the state should have greater respect for the citizens’ voice.

I soon realised that my expectations were wrong, or at least that the reality was neither so clear nor so simple. The real practices looked contradictory, ambiguous and complicated. It was not difficult for me to understand that the rhetoric of community

participation used by the public officers and the one used by the inhabitants were not the same. However, it took me more than a year—after I left Colombia- to understand the reason why the inhabitants expressed their idea of participation in different and often contradictory ways.

I used the term community participation as a key tool in my study, to assist me in my main intention to examine the relationship between the community and the state, focusing on the regularisation process. My awareness of the different meanings of community participation at the community and state level led me to the term ‘illusion’ to express the gap between the intention of the state and the expectation of the community. However, it was more than obvious that those community participatory projects I observed were mainly designed with cost-effectiveness in mind (and as such community participation was considered as a means) and not for community empowerment. No space in which the community could influence the decision-making process was offered.

If we perceive participation as something static, we tend to use a simple dichotomous classification: community participation as a means (to search for cost-effectiveness) vs. community participation as an end (empowerment). However, as I stated in chapter 1 (page 17), it is more than clear that the top-down interest of efficiency does not always fit with the bottom-up interest of empowerment. Therefore, participation is a site of conflict.

Community participation has many meanings and is a term that is, after all, an ideological one. The case study settlements revealed that certain practices had always existed at the initial stage of development, which I called community-initiated participation—i.e., collaboration based on a spirit of solidarity and the concept of mutual aid. The so-called community participation programmes adopted in the 1990s (i.e., state-initiated participation) in order to implement regularisation projects mobilised only the intended beneficiaries of a specific project.

Community participation should mean something more than that. In practice, the evidence from the communities shows that at different times various forms of participation were involved:

- community involvement for mutual benefit in a spirit of solidarity and collaboration;
- a payment and investment plan created as a finance-sharing alternative to propel regularisation through the public service authorities;
- mobilisation of the inhabitants either to support a politician or to launch a civic movement to present their demands to the state.

Each form of community participation depended on the inhabitants' notion of what they needed most at the time. Initially, people might work together because of mutual need; there were no services and only collective effort would provide them. However, it is difficult for inhabitants to maintain a strong sense of community solidarity in the long term. In the informal settlements of Bogotá, the inhabitants have also used 'community participation' whenever it has served their purpose. It has been a highly pragmatic approach to satisfying their basic needs. The city administration also increased its ability to provide services in the 1990s which helped greatly to improve the physical conditions of these settlements.

In the 1990s, under the new constitution with its laws protecting citizens' rights, 'participation' of citizens in the political arena as well as their right to demand basic needs was clearly recognised. Under this legal framework, community-based organisations and community-based participation have gained legitimacy. They had official legitimacy before, but this only functioned under the patron-client system. Today, communities have a real voice, with which they can represent their needs as well as criticise the negligence of the public administration. Citizens' rights to insist on public audits and transparency of public investment are now officially recognised.

After all, as Mohan (2007: 781) states 'participatory development is both an end and a means', and I would argue that community participation has the dual potential of cost

efficiency (a mean) and empowerment (an end). As discussed, community participation has different meanings for different stakeholders. However, in the end, both functions (end and mean) are imbedded in the concept and efforts to accomplish these two sometimes results in conflict, leading to limited effectiveness. These contradictions are due to the limited or erroneous assumptions of mainstream debates on participatory development, which lack sensitivity to the local conditions and structural determinants (Desai, 2002; Mohan, 2007). As Mohan (2007) suggests, the poor's involvement in political processes is another agenda to be focused on.

### *Role of NGOs*

The community participatory development projects initiated by Bogotá city or by the public were usually implemented in a 'top-down' way. Any proposal to build infrastructure had to be approved at the assembly of the JAC in the settlement in question, but the community's real participation in the decision-making process was extremely limited.

On the other hand, many NGOs provided assistance in the irregular settlements. The timing of NGO intervention varied according to the needs and level of state intervention. In the case of communities completely without state intervention, the role of NGOs in supporting the collective self-help activities of the community was considerable from the very initial stage of development. Once state intervention had begun, however, NGO activists became less important. Clark (1995) and Desai (2002) discuss the difficulties inherent in creating healthy state-NGO relationship, and my findings also illustrated the friction between NGOs and community leaders. Real partnerships between NGOs and community leaders were rare. To make the situation worse, internal conflict often occurred between the existing community leaders and NGO activists, when the latter challenged the leadership. The experience of Jerusalén and JJR provide typical examples of this.



### *The myth of community debate*

The mainstream concept of community participation is based on several assumptions, one of which is that the targeted community is homogeneous and the socio economic conditions of inhabitants are equal. Those who put forward the ‘myth of community’ argument have demonstrated the complicated internal structure of community (Lee, 1994; Gujit and Kaul Shah, 1998; Cleaver, 2002). The internal segregation between different sects or organisations in the case study settlements (i.e. Danubio Azul, JJR and the initial stage of Jerusalén) evidences the heterogeneous nature of so-called ‘community’ in the poor urban settlements. Conflict among these groups in the settlement tends to weaken the community involvement in a participatory project, as it impedes the creation of consensus in the community. Participatory projects such as community co-financing projects request the acceptance and agreement of the intended beneficiaries in order to meet cost-effectiveness targets, but this may not be possible in such segregated communities.

In addition, when the settlement becomes consolidated and different sectors are established within it, such as in Diana Turbay and Jerusalén, the identification of inhabitants with the larger community of the settlement tends to disappear or at best weaken. The identification of the inhabitants with the concept of ‘community’ is equal to ‘we community’ (see narratives in chapter 6) which means the group of neighbours with whom they share daily activities and communication. In contrast, the identification of ‘community’ by a participatory project defines the community as the targeted population, which may exclude local ‘neighbours’ in the same settlements. In addition, eligibility of the community co-finance projects is limited to homeowners, which excludes tenants, for example.

Thus, the various complex definitions of ‘community’ that emerged during the course of this research as used by the people of the *barrios* and other relevant actors

highlighted the inadequacy of the rather static conceptual definition of ‘community’ that I had employed as a working definition at the beginning of my study (see chapter 1). As a consequence, my findings contribute to the debate around the myth of community.

### **The impact of privatisation and commercialisation of basic services on community participation and on community-state relationships**

Bogotá has greatly expanded its service coverage and improved the quality of its service delivery over the last fifteen years (Dávila, 2004; Gilbert, 2006). The downside of this improvement is that it has reduced the space for negotiation between the community and the delivery companies. Community participation was less effective because the new form of service delivery created a direct relationship between the companies and individual households. The community was not involved in that relationship and therefore could not help when sometimes individuals could not afford to pay for the new service. This is the negative side of privatisation or at least of the more commercial pricing of public utilities. However, when many people could not pay the tariffs the community sometimes responded by protesting against the company.

Protest by the barrio people against the increased tariffs was valid as they had no alternative means of negotiating with the respective agencies open to them. While they sometimes attempted to organise a meeting with representatives of the company these attempts did not usually meet with a quick or concrete response. This reaction was similar to those found in the other Latin American countries.

As I argued in chapter 1, rising tariffs had a negative effect on the poor. Prices rose because both public and private utilities were following the rules laid down by the national government to improve service delivery. Law 142 of 1994, which was intended to improve the finances of Colombia’s public utilities companies, demanded that average tariffs rose and that the subsidies given to the very poor should be cut. Thus the rise in tariff has nothing to do with privatisation (Gilbert 2007).

As discussed in chapter 1, the negative impact on the life of the urban poor in my

cases in Bogotá; should be interpreted as the result of a change in tariff policy and a combination of other macro-economic factors, such as the economic recession that hit Colombia in 1997 and the increase in unemployment. Life clearly became more difficult for many people. However, the inhabitants' perception of 'service charges being too expensive' is not necessarily based on empirical fact, but based on their comparison with the period before regular water or electricity services had been installed when they were using rudimentary services very cheaply. Clearly, obtaining electricity through an illegal hook-up was bound to be cheaper than the cost of a proper service.

### **How democratisation and decentralisation influenced the effectiveness of community participation**

New legal frameworks to protect citizen's rights and to introduce an ombudsman system to monitor the public administration were benefits brought by democratisation which conferred legitimacy on community participation. The decentralisation process created a new local administrative board (JAL) through which demands relating to local needs could be referred directly to the local government. The intention of this reform was to reduce clientelism amongst local politicians (councilors and JAC leaders) but inadvertently generated a new type of patron-client relationship between *ediles* and JAC leaders. However, the role of the *edil* to address local needs at barrio level and make proposals for development projects financed by the FDL was significant and provided more options for the community to make their own choices. In this sense, decentralisation was a good thing in that it promoted more community participation in the decision-making process at the level of local administration. A typical example of this was the new participatory planning system, called '*Encuentros Ciudadanos*' introduced during the Peñalosa administration (see chapter 4, pages 198-99). The experiences of *Encuentros Ciudadanos*, however show the limitation of effective community participation in the selection of local development projects due to conflicts over the time frame available for decision-making as discussed earlier.

Thus, the findings show that the institutional reforms for decentralisation and democratisation aimed to empower the community in the local state-community relationship, but partly failed in practice.

**Multilateral relationships involved in the practice of community participation: autonomy, clientelism and the market mechanism: the changing nature of the state-community relationship**

Following the decentralisation and privatisation processes, how did the relationship between the state, community and market change? Does community participation work in the regularisation process of the poor settlements in this context?

First, during the process of regularisation of the irregular settlements the state-community relationship became closer and more direct than in the period when clientelism was more influential. At the same time, politician-community relationships became less influential as did politician-state (city administration) relationships. Community participation programmes (co-financing programmes) are nothing new, but now that the circumstances under which the framework was introduced have changed: there is less space for local politicians to exert political pressure.

Second, despite the application of community participation programmes, the empowerment of the community did not occur. The contact between public service companies and the most disadvantaged settlements increased and the community had more access to information and knowledge regarding the regularisation process. In this sense, the community became more informed, with a better technical knowledge of state intervention. However, this does not constitute the empowerment of the community itself, as all the programmes were delivered in a top-down way.

Third, the political co-option of the community by local politicians with the aim of expanding their pool of potential future voters reduced, as urban administration became more competent and rational. A series of institutional reforms in the 1990s technically impeded the execution of political co-option.

Fourth, economic circumstances, in other words, the market-community relationship in terms of public service consumption, affected the life of the poor. Furthermore, macroeconomic performance, the market-community relationship in terms of the labour market, also affected the affordability of the payments necessary to carry out community co-financing projects in the name of community participation. This last point is an external factor which affected community participation.

The case studies revealed that community organisation was an internal factor determining how community participation functioned. The representative community organisation such as the JAC promoted community participation as a reinforcement of collective control of the public works rather than as something which would empower the inhabitants.

This, from the point of view of public officials, was in order to promote the idea of ownership<sup>2</sup> of the project by the community. However, collective responsibility in order to establish ownership by the beneficiaries will not work in the final analysis without individual responsibility. If any one inhabitant fails to pay, then the co-financing programme gets stuck and in this situation collective responsibility is ineffective. Moreover, this collective responsibility (or communal administration) is usually entrusted to the hands of a few directing members of the JAC. Any serious distrust of the leadership of the JAC limits the applicability of the community-co-financing project.

Entrusting community organisation to the JAC leaders can be dangerous in that it delegates all of the decision making process regarding community affairs to them, even though a community assembly exists and forms the highest level community decision-making organ. This administrative delegation could lead to delegated communal activities, and as a result, the motivation of the rest of the members of community would decrease. Therefore, if the delegated community leader (president of

---

<sup>2</sup> 'Ownership' here means having the self awareness to become involved and be responsible for something, in this case, a project.

the JAC, for example) becomes corrupt, then the negotiation with the state will fail, and intervention will soon be suspended. This happens when there is internal segregation or conflict among the community which leads to the absence of a community leader who actually represents the community. This was the case in Bella Flor where the absence of a JAC president due to accusations of corruption caused a delay in further state intervention for regularisation. Conversely, in the case of Danubio Azul, although there was an ongoing conflict between three different groups, they maintained a pragmatic alliance and concentrated their efforts on making their demands, thus helping to push forward state intervention.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FINDINGS TO COMMUNITIES BEYOND BOGOTÁ

Following the findings of my case study settlements in Bogotá, I would argue that the points below would be of use in other cases, particularly in those which are undergoing reforms of a broadly neo-liberal nature such as market-led urban management reforms, and decentralisation.

First, community participation does not work as part of market-led development policies and even less so during an economic recession. This is because the most decisive factor for community participation under these programmes is the purchasing power of the individual. All the relationships become simply a contract between individual users and providers and there is no real space for negotiation between the community and the state.

Community participation can gain legitimacy through democratisation when related institutional reforms recognise it as part of citizens' rights. The voices of the poor and the vulnerable have increasingly been heard as civil control of public administration through the ombudsman system has strengthened. However, this institutional framework does not work under a highly market-led urban administration because the

potential for the execution of development projects which include a community participatory approach is limited by the targeted population's purchasing power.

Despite these considerations, the role of community-based organisations will not totally disappear. However corrupt the leadership is, however the distrust of the inhabitants is demonstrated, community-based organisations can be the last resort for mobilising the people if necessary. Under the market-led mechanism, political patronage has less influence and the community loses the space for negotiation with the state. Urban protest or aggressive demonstrations organised by community-based organisation with or without the support of the left wing should be the final alternative for the poor to make their needs known to the state.

Second, despite having mentioned the limitations of community participation under the market mechanism, the findings support the relevance of community participation. I would say it is not a waste of time. All the stakeholders, including the state, the community, the NGOs and politicians have continued to use the concept of community participation, knowing its limitations and the gap between theory and practice. Why? One quick answer is the political standpoint of the city administration, or specifically the mayor, in gaining the support of the poor communities. He (or the city administration) is also concerned with the need to accomplish 'good governance' for which community participation is one of the key means. In other words, using a participatory approach is 'politically correct'.

The other reason found in my study, and which has general significance is, the pragmatism of the community. Even if the practice of community participation is far from what the community expects, it is generally accepted. However disillusioned they are by the poor performance of their community leaders, they nonetheless appreciate the importance of the communal collective works in meeting their needs. The connotations of the statement of one community leader: 'we would accept whatever the state offered, although we knew it was not real participation' suggested that communication between

the community and the state was founded on the community's pragmatism.

Third, the findings highlight the fact that community participation is not static but dynamic, and this can be explained through examining the perspective of the inhabitants. There is always a gap between the mainstream concept of 'community participation' and the practices in the local context. This gap is not a simple dichotomous distinction between 'community participation' for cost-effectiveness (means) and that for the empowerment (end) of the community. It has different interpretations from the perspective of the community, according to the changes in the internal structure and the local needs of the community. Therefore, the mainstream concept of community participation should be understood when contextualised within the local situation.

Fourth, it should be recognised that community participation reflects the power relationships between the state and the community. If in the practice of community participation, there is respect for the initiative of the beneficiaries (communities), then the community is more independent and free to express their own ideas, particularly in the decision-making process. If there is very limited space for negotiation, or space in which the community can express their opinions, or they are excluded from the decision-making process, then the state-community relationship is quite authoritarian and imperative. The legal framework to protect citizens' rights is key to controlling the state's power over the community. Community leadership and its capacity to mobilise the inhabitants and engage them in community participation is crucial to protecting the position of the community vis a vis the state.

Fifth, community participation (even state initiated programmes) should be considered in a positive light if the limitations in the local context are resolved and the factors below dealt with satisfactorily. These factors are: the state's appropriate knowledge of local needs, firm community leadership; minimum level of purchasing power of the community (to support cost-effectiveness), effective legal framework to protect citizen's rights, the consensus to accept and engage in the participatory projects



in the community, the capacity of the local administration, among others. The decentralisation process provides elements to reinforce some of these items, but can fail to provide other conditions (for example, administrative decentralisation can actually reproduce the patron-client relationship which can corrupt community leadership as discussed above). Privatisation does not necessarily impede these factors, but combined with other external conditions (such as macro-economic performance), it can affect them.

#### METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS FROM THE RESEARCH

My plan was to study a number of poor settlements through a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. The first consisted of a household survey, the second took the form of in-depth interviews. I thought that was the best way of understanding community participation. While the plan still seems reasonable, carrying out that plan was more difficult.

First, there was the problem of how best to select the case studies. I wanted to choose irregular settlements (i.e. settlements that were formed without planning permission, usually through pirate urbanisation or invasion) that had been formed about the same time and occupied similar kinds of problematic topography. From this uniform base I could then consider how different forms of community participation had led to different rates of *barrio* improvement and servicing. In practice, however, finding similar kinds of settlement that had been formed at exactly the same time was impossible. Rather than choosing settlements that had been formed in the same year, I had to work in communities formed at different times in the 1980s.

Second, using a household survey had both merits and limitations. The socio-economic information gathered in the six settlements provided a useful profile of the community. The survey was also helpful in providing data from which potential

interviewees could be selected for the in-depth interviews and in generating information from which histories of the different sections of the settlements could be constructed. However, in hindsight I collected far too much information and much of it has not been used in the thesis. In addition, I had a problem in rigorously following my sample design. Sometimes the maps that I was using proved unreliable and I had to adapt the sample, making it slightly less rigorous.

Third, the qualitative approach was also more complicated than I had expected. The in-depth interviews were sometimes problematic insofar as people's replies were often inconsistent. Sometimes, too, I did not fully understand what my informants said, particularly when they used local slang. Equally, they did not always understand the kinds of words and concepts I used. In such cases, I relied on my research assistants for help. However, the in-depth interviews did prove valuable in providing the detailed information which was lacking in the household survey. The opinions expressed in the interviews turned out to be the most useful source of information about the changing nature of community participation in poor settlements. The inhabitants' narratives led me to completely re-think my understanding of the concept of community participation. Overall, it is clear that the interviews were an essential complement to the quantitative survey.

Finally, I was unsuccessful in organising more than one group meeting with the people in the settlements; both because I ran out of time and because some groups proved uncooperative. Group meetings with selected leaders or those inhabitants who were particularly interested in my study would have proved useful in two ways. First, to obtain feedback on my results and to correct any errors of interpretation and, second, to communicate the results of my study back to the communities. In hindsight, it is a pity that I could not organise more than one group meeting.

## TOPICS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The results of the case studies suggest that upgrading projects are not necessarily the best solution for poor communities. The key problem is that services have to be paid for and many of the inhabitants have very limited budgets. While perhaps the majority benefited from the new services, some did not. The extent to which formal service provision puts pressure on poor households is perhaps worthy of further study.

Many organisations often work in a community and the relationships are not always harmonious. My study suggested that some communities, such as JJR, were split by the conflicts between the different types of community organisation. In other neighbourhoods, such as Jerusalén, different organisations worked harmoniously. A closer analysis of the relationship between the JACs and other community-based organisations such as the association of community mothers and the social activities of the Catholic Church, would therefore be useful. How can collaboration be improved at settlement level? Can alliances be established that will build up a wider community-based civic movement?

In chapter one I touched upon gender issues and the role of women in community leadership. Although I did not pay sufficient attention to women's roles in the thesis, it is clear that women played an important role in all six settlements. One of the most active JAC leaders of nine sectors in Diana Turbay was a woman. Danubio Azul was also led by a woman and Jerusalén had two women presidents of the JACs. It is true that women were in a minority on the boards of most JACs, but their presence was significant and they had a significant voice in the meetings. Future research should further explore the role of women in community leadership, examining why they get involved and the reasons why they are sometimes excluded from leadership roles.

The relationship between NGOs and local communities also proved interesting.

However, I was unable to make an exhaustive study of all the NGOs operating in the different settlements because there were so many. Future work might investigate whether their involvement in poor settlements represents a more positive way of empowering the communities than state involvement alone. Equally, the relationship between the NGOs and the state needs further clarification.

One issue arose after the research had begun. As a result of so much violence in the Colombian countryside large numbers of displaced people are coming to the city, indeed, Bogotá is the largest recipient of these refugees. During the fieldwork, I heard numerous complaints about the ‘newcomers’ who had arrived in the community, especially when the migrants were Afro-Colombians. Perhaps as a result of discrimination in the settlements, black families have sometimes established separate colonies. This phenomenon, especially when it creates local conflict, is very worrying – a case of discrimination of the poor by the poor. Given the sheer numbers of the displaced people, few will have much choice but to settle in the self-help settlements in the city. This could develop into a major source of conflict and further analysis would be useful.

A final question worthy of further work comes back to the issue of participatory development: its effectiveness and the degree to which it empowers poor people. While the quality of life in poor settlements also depends on the state of the local economy and the effectiveness of urban governance, effective local participation can only help improve living conditions. But how communities can be empowered is less than clear. Perhaps the whole nature of the citizen-state power relationship needs to change, particularly in cities as unequal as Bogotá. Community involvement forms part of the empowerment process but how it can best be used to improve people’s lives needs further reflection and research.

## REFERENCES

- Abbott, John (1996) *Sharing the city: community participation in urban management*, Earthscan.
- Adato, Michelle and Lawrence Haddad (2002) 'Targeting poverty through community-based public work programmes: experience from South Africa', *The Journal of Development Studies*, 38(3): 1-36.
- Aguilar, Adrian Guillermo (1988) 'Community participation in Mexico City: a case study', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 7(1): 33-46.
- Alape, Arturo (1995) *Ciudad Bolívar: la hoguera de las ilusiones*, Bogotá: Planeta.
- Alcaldía Mayor de Santa Fe de Bogotá D.E. (1998) *Formar ciudad 1995-1997*, Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá
- Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá D.C., Secretaría de Hacienda Distrital, Dirección de Estudios Económicos (2002a) *Desarrollo social de Bogotá*, Primer semestre.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2002b) *Actualidad económica de Bogotá*, Segundo trimestre.
- Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá and Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (1987) *Bogotá para todos 1987-1990*, Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá and Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá.
- Amato, Peter (1969) 'Environmental quality and locational behaviour in a Latin American city', *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 11: 83-101.
- Arango Z., Carlos (1981) *Crónicas de la lucha por la vivienda en Colombia*, Bogotá: Editorial Colombia Nueva Ltda.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1986) *La lucha por la vivienda en Colombia*, Bogotá: Ecoe Ediciones.
- Arias, Jorge (1974) *Estudio de estratificación socioeconómica de los barrios de Bogotá*, Bogotá: DAPD (Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital).
- Auyero, Javier (1999) "'From the client's point(s) of view": how poor people perceive and evaluate political clientelism', *Theory and Society*, 28: 297-334.
- Auyero, Javier (comp.) (1997) *¿Favores por votos? Estudios sobre clientelismo político contemporáneo*, Buenos Aires: Losada.
- Avendaño, Rubén and Federico Basañes (1999) 'Private participation at the subnational level: water and sewerage services in Colombia', in Federico Basañes, Evamaría Uribe and Robert Willig (eds.), *Can privatization deliver? Infrastructure for Latin America*, Washington, D.C.: IADB (Inter-American Development Bank), 217-44.

- Baiocchi, Gianpaolo (2004) 'Porto Alegre: the dynamism of the unorganised', in Daniel Chávez and Benjamin Goldfrank (eds.), *The left in the city: participatory local governments in Latin America*, London: Latin America Bureau, 37-66.
- Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) (1997) 'Programa de infraestructura urbana Ciudad Bolívar', Washington, D.C.: BID.
- Batley, Richard (1996) 'Public-private relationships and performance in service provision', *Urban Studies*, 33(4-5): 723-51.
- Beall, Jo (ed.) (1997a) *A city for all: valuing difference and working with diversity*, London: Zed Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997b) 'Participation in the city: a gender perspective', in Beall(ed.), 38-48.
- Bell, Gustavo Lemus (1998) 'The decentralised state: an administrative or political challenge?', in Edurado Posada-Carbó (ed.), 97-108.
- Benavides, Juan and Israel Fainboim (2002) 'Private participation in infrastructure in Colombia: renegotiations and disputes', in Federico Basañes and Robert Willig (eds.), *Second-generation reforms in infrastructure services*, Washington, D.C.: IADB, 89-132.
- Bennett, Vivienne, Sonia Dávila-Poblete and María Nieves Rico (eds.) (2005) *Opposing currents: the politics of water and gender in Latin America*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk and Norbert Kersting (eds.) (2003) *Poverty and democracy: self-help and political participation in Third World cities*, London: Zed Books.
- Berry, Albert, Ronald Hellman and Mauricio Solaún (eds.) (1980) *Politics of compromise: coalition government in Colombia*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Bhatnagar, Bhuvan and Aubrey C. Williams (eds.) (1992) *Participatory development and the World Bank: potential directions for change*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Birdsall, Nancy and John Nellis (2005) 'Privatization reality check: distributional effects on developing countries', in Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis (eds.), *Reality check: the distributional impact of privatization in developing countries*, Washington D.C.: Center for Global Development, 1-30.
- Blaesser, Brian William (1981) *Clandestine development in Colombia: the pirate housing submarket of Medellín*, Washington, D.C.: Agency for International

- Development, Office of Housing.
- Blair, Harry (2000) 'Participation and accountability at the periphery: democratic local governance in six countries', *World Development*, 28(1): 21-39.
- Blondet, Cecilia (1990) 'Establishing and identity: women settlers in a poor Lima neighbourhood', in Jelin (ed.), 12-46.
- \_\_\_\_\_(2004) 'Community kitchens: a Peruvian experience', in Karen Mokate (ed.), *Women's participation in social development: experiences from Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean*, Washington, D.C.: IADB, 111-28.
- Bogotá Cómo Vamos and PNDH (Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Humano) (2005) '¿Quiénes son y dónde están los pobres en Bogotá?', Bogotá: Conference 'Foro Bogotá Cómo Vamos', 17 August.
- Borrero García, Camilo (1989) *Acción comunal y política estatal: ¿un matrimonio indisoluble?* Bogotá: CINEP (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular).
- Brett, Edwin (1996) 'The participatory principle in development projects: the costs and benefits of cooperation', *Public Administration and Development*, 16: 5-19.
- \_\_\_\_\_(2003) 'Participation and accountability in development management', *The Journal of Development Studies*, 40(2): 1-29.
- Brokensha, David and Peter Hodge (1969) *Community development: an interpretation*, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.
- Brown, Lawrence Guy (1942) *Social pathology: personal and social disorganization*, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Brydon, Lynne (2006) 'Ethical practices in doing development research', in Vandana Desai and Robert B. Potter (eds.), *Doing development research*, London: Sage, 25-33.
- Budds, Jessica and Gordon McGranahan (2003) 'Are the debates on water privatization missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America', *Environment and Urbanization*, 15: 87-113.
- Buenaventura, Nicolás (1984) *¿Para quién la ciudad?* Bogotá: Ediciones CEIS.
- Burgess, Ernest W. (1967) 'Can neighborhood work have a scientific basis?', in Park et al., 142-55.
- Burgess, Rod (1978) 'Petty commodity housing or dweller control? A critique of John Turner's views on housing policy', *World Development*, 6(9-10): 1105-133.

- \_\_\_\_\_ (1985) 'The limits of state self-help housing programmes', *Development and Change*, 16: 271-312.
- Caballero Argáez, Carlos (2004) 'Economía y política social', in Fernando Cepeda Ulloa (ed.), *Fortalezas de Colombia*, Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombiana, 261-92.
- Cabrera, Gabriel (1985) *Ciudad Bolívar: oasis de miseria*, Bogotá: Aurora.
- Camacho de Pinto, Teresa (1970) *Colombia: el proceso de urbanización y sus factores relacionados*, Tunja: Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, Fondo Especial de Publicaciones y Ayudas Educativas.
- Campfens, Hubert (ed.) (1997a) *Community development around the world: practice, theory, research, training*, Tronto: University of Toronto Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997b) 'Part II: international review of community development: theory and practice', in Campfens (ed.), 11-46.
- Cárdenas, Mauricio and Juanita Olaya (1994) 'Empresas de servicios públicos: una administración ágil y eficiente', *Revista de Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá*, 89: 57-64.
- Cardona, Ramiro (ed.) (1976) *Colombia: distribución especial de la población*, Bogotá: FESCOL.
- Carroll, Alan (1980) *Pirate subdivisions and the market for residential lots in Bogotá*, World Bank Staff Working Paper, 435, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Chambers, Robert (1983) *Rural development: putting the last first*, London: Longman.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1994) 'Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA): challenges, potentials and paradigm', *World Development*, 22(10): 1437-54.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997) *Whose reality counts? Putting the first last*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Chiappe de Villa, María Luisa (1999) *La política de vivienda de interés social en Colombia en los noventa*, Santiago de Chile: CEPAL.
- Chisari, Omar; Antonio Estache and Carlos Romero (1999) 'Winners and losers from the privatization and regulation of utilities: lessons from a general equilibrium model of Argentina', *The World Bank Economic Review*, 13(2): 357-78.
- Clark, David (2002) 'Development ethics: a research agenda', *International Journal of Social Economics*, 29(11): 830-48.



- Clark, John (1995) 'The state, popular participation, and the voluntary sector', *World Development*, 23(4): 593-601.
- Clarke, George R.G.; Katrina Kosec and Scott Wallsten (2004) *Has private participation in water and sewerage improved coverage? Empirical evidence from Latin America*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 3445, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
- Cleaver, Frances (2002) 'Paradoxes of participation: questioning participatory approaches to development', in Michael Edwards and Alan Fowler (eds.), *The Earthscan reader on NGO management*, London: Earthscan, 225-39.
- Cloke, Paul et al.(2000) 'Ethics, reflexivity and research: encounters with homeless people', *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 3(2): 133-54.
- Collier, David (1976) *Squatters and oligarchs: authoritarian rule and policy change in Peru*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Comisión de Regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento Básico (CRA) (2001) *Regulación integral del sector de agua potable y saneamiento básico en Colombia: resolución CRA-151 de 2001*, Bogotá: CRA.
- \_\_\_\_\_(2006), 'Impactos regulatorios en los sectores de acueducto, alcantarillado y aseo', CRA website, <http://www.cra.gov.co/>, accessed 15 November 2006.
- Cooke, Bill and Uma Kothari (eds.) (2001) *Participation: the new tyranny?* London: Zed Books.
- Cornelius, Wayne (1975) *Politics and the migrant poor in Mexico City*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Cornwall, Andrea (1998) 'Gender, participation and the politics of difference', in Guijt and Kaul Shah (eds.), 46-57.
- \_\_\_\_\_(2006) 'Historical perspectives on participation in development', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 44(1), March: 62-83.
- Corporación Taliber-Grupo de Danzas Colegio ICES-ISNEM (1998) *Potosí-La Isla: historia de una lucha, segundo encuentro de regiones*, Bogotá: Corporación Taliber-Grupo de Danzas Colegio ICES-ISNEM, Red de Solidaridad Social, Programa Presidencial para la Reinserción.
- Crocker, David (1991) 'Toward development ethics', *World Development*, 19(5): 457-83.
- Cuervo, Luis Mauricio (1991) *El futuro de la capital: un estudio de prospectiva urbana*,

- desarrollo económico*, Bogotá: Misión Bogotá Siglo XXI.
- Cuervo, Luis Mauricio and Josefina González (1997) *Industria y ciudades en la era de la mundialización: un enfoque socioespacial*, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo.
- Currie, Lauchlin (1993) 'El sistema UPAC después de veinte años', in ICAV (ed.), 37-48.
- Davies, Wayne K. D. and David T. Herbert (1993) *Communities within cities: an urban social geography*, London: Belhaven Press.
- Dávila, Julio (1996) 'Bogotá, Colombia: restructuring with continued growth', in Nigel Harris and Ida Fabricius (eds.), *Cities and structural adjustment*, London: UCL Press, 136-60.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004) 'La transformación de Bogotá', in Fernando Cepeda Ulloa (ed.), *Fortalezas de Colombia*, Bogotá: Planeta, 417-39.
- De Soto, Hernández (1989) *The other path: the invisible revolution in the Third World*, New York: Harper and Row.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2000) *The mystery of capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails everywhere else?* New York: Basic Books.
- Departamento Administrativo de Acción Comunal (DAAC) (2000) 'Informe de empalme para la nueva dirección', noviembre 27, mimeo.
- Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital (DAPD) (1972) 'Programa integrado de desarrollo urbano de la zona oriental de Bogotá', mimeo.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1978) 'Normas mínimas de urbanización y de servicios. Consideraciones a su aplicación', mimeo.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1981) *Ordenamiento y administración del espacio urbano en Bogotá 1981*, Bogotá: DAPD.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1999) *Observatorio de dinámica urbana*, Bogotá: DAPD.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2001a) *Balance de cumplimiento de metas, Plan de Desarrollo: a la fecha del proceso de armonización*, Bogotá: DAPD.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2001b) *Plan de ordenamiento territorial (POT), documento resumen*, Bogotá: DAPD.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2001c) *Plan de ordenamiento territorial (POT), anexos*, Bogotá: DAPD.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004) *La estratificación en Bogotá D.C. y estudios relacionados 1983-2004*, Bogotá: DAPD.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) 'Colombia: suelo urbano y vivienda para los hogares de bajos ingresos:

- Bogotá-Soacha-Mosquera; Medellín y área metropolitana’, mimeo.
- Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) (1964) *Censo nacional de Colombia 1964*, Bogotá: DANE.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1973) *Censo nacional de Colombia 1973*, Bogotá: DANE.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1985) *Censo nacional de Colombia 1985*, Bogotá: DANE.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1989) *La pobreza en Bogotá 1985: descripción cuantitativa*, Bogotá: DANE.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993) *Censo nacional de Colombia 1993*, Bogotá: DANE.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2006) ‘Datos de censos de población y estudios temáticos’, mimeo.
- Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) (1994) *El salto social: plan nacional de desarrollo, Ley de inversiones 1994-1998*, Bogotá: DNP.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1999) *Plan nacional de desarrollo 1998-2002: cambio para construir la paz*, Bogotá: DNP.
- Desai, Vandana (1995) *Community participation and slum housing: a study of Bombay*, New Delhi: Sage.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996) ‘Access to power and participation’, *Third World Planning Review*, 18(2): 217-42.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2002) ‘Community participation in development’, in Vandana Desai and Robert B. Potter (eds.), *The companion to development studies*, London: Arnold, 117-21.
- Desai, Vandana and Mick Howes (1994) ‘Accountability and participation: a case study from Bombay’, in Edwards and Hulme (eds.), 83-191.
- Devas, Nick et al. (2004) *Urban governance, voice and poverty in the developing world*, London: Earthscan.
- Devas, Nick and Ursula Grant (2003) ‘Local government decision-making – citizen participation and local accountability: some evidence from Kenya and Uganda’, *Public Administration and Development*, 23: 307-16.
- Díaz Arbeláez, Juan (1988) ‘Los servicios públicos en el Distrito Especial de Bogotá’, in Pedro Santana et al. (eds), *Bogotá 450 años: retos y realidades*, Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional, 247-313.
- Díaz Uribe, Eduardo (1986) *El clientelismo en Colombia: un estudio exploratorio*, Bogotá: Ancora Editores.
- Doebele, William A. (1975) *The private market and low income urbanization in developing countries: the ‘pirate’ subdivisions of Bogotá*, Discussion Paper, D75-11, Cambridge: Department of City and Regional Planning, Harvard

University.

Eckstein, Susan (1977) *The poverty of revolution: the state and the urban poor in Mexico*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Edwards, Michael and David Hulme (1994) 'NGO performance and accountability: introduction and overview', in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds.), 3-16.  
\_\_\_\_ (eds.) (1994) *Non-governmental organizations: performance and accountability beyond the magic bullet*, London: Earthscan

El Espectador (1993a) 'Por abandono, Usme se iría hoy a paro: la administración condicionó el diálogo a suspender la jornada de protesta. El alza de las tarifas, "llenó la copa"', *El Espectador*, 17 June.

\_\_\_\_ (1993b) 'Usme levantó el paro y tendrá acta de compromiso', *El Espectador*, 18 June.

\_\_\_\_ (1993c) 'Administración define acciones en Usme', *El Espectador*, 20 June.

\_\_\_\_ (1993d) 'El lunes, paro cívico sin clases, en Ciudad Bolívar', *El Espectador*, 9 October.

\_\_\_\_ (1993e) 'Ciudad Bolívar hizo sentir su pobreza', *El Espectador*, 12 October.

\_\_\_\_ (1993f) 'El 42% de la población con necesidades insatisfechas', *El Espectador*, 12 October.

\_\_\_\_ (1993g) 'El convenio de Ciudad Bolívar se firma el martes', *El Espectador*, 16 October.

\_\_\_\_ (1996) 'Bloqueo de la vía a Usme', *El Espectador*, 23 June.

\_\_\_\_ (2000a) 'Barrio Venecia encabeza movimiento cívico: localidades se unen contra abuso en tarifas', *El Espectador*, 2 May.

\_\_\_\_ (2000b) 'Hubo quema de facturas y anuncio de desobediencia civil en pago de cuentas: protesta por tarifas de servicios', *El Espectador*, 25 May.

\_\_\_\_ (2000c) 'Alzas hasta del 500% en tarifas: habitantes de Ciudad Bolívar, en desobediencia. Facturas que en enero ascendían a \$15.000 en promedio, han llegado a estratos 1 y 2 por un millón y medio', *El Espectador*, 1 July.

El Nuevo Siglo (1993a) '13 horas duró paralizada Ciudad Bolívar', *El Nuevo Siglo*, 12 October.

\_\_\_\_ (1993b) 'Por inconformidad de los habitantes: paros, menú diario en Bogotá', *El Nuevo Siglo*, 16 November.

\_\_\_\_ (1993c) 'El año de los paros cívicos en Bogotá', *El Nuevo Siglo*, 31 December.

- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004) 'A más tardar en diciembre bajan costos del agua', *El Nuevo Siglo*, 10 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) 'Se insistirá en rebaja de tarifas de agua: Garzón', *El Nuevo Siglo*, 25 January.
- El Tiempo (1993a) 'El lunes no hay clase en las escuelas de la zona 19: militarizan a Ciudad Bolívar por el paro', *El Tiempo*, 9 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993b) 'Hoy, paro en Ciudad Bolívar', *El Tiempo*, 11 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993c) 'Bogotá, paro a paro', *El Tiempo*, 12 December.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996a) 'Desde el lunes no tienen servicio: Usme protestó por falta de agua. Los habitantes de la localidad de Usme bloquearon la avenida Boyacá con la vía Villavicencio y la carrera 33 con calle 91 sur. El corte se produjo para realizar obras de adecuación en la planta de La Laguna', *El Tiempo*, 23 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996b) 'La alerta no se ha ido de Usme', *El Tiempo*, 25 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2000) 'Se anticipa nueva alza de energía la próxima semana: protesta contra CODENSA', *El Tiempo*, 14 January.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004a) 'Tarifa de agua sí puede bajar: CRA', *El Tiempo*, 18 February.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2004b) 'Las tarifas del agua bajarán', *El Tiempo*, 17 July.
- Elliott, Mabel A. and Francis E. Merrill (1941) *Social disorganization*, New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá(EAAB) (1971) *Informe de gerencia*, Bogotá: EAAB.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1972) *Informe de gerencia*, Bogotá: EAAB.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1973) *Informe de gerencia*, Bogotá: EAAB.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1975) *Informe de gerencia*, Bogotá: EAAB.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993) *Plan de rehabilitación y expansión del sistema de acueducto y alcantarillado de Santa Fe de Bogotá*, Bogotá: EAAB.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997) *El agua en la historia de una ciudad (Tomo 2)*, Bogotá: EAAB.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2002) *Transformación empresarial: informe 2002*, Bogotá: EAAB.
- Estache, Antonio, Andrés Gómez-Lobo and Danny Leipziger (2001) 'Utilities privatization and the poor: lessons and evidence from Latin America', *World Development*, 29(7): 1179-98.
- Fisher, Julie (1984) 'Development from below: neighborhood improvement associations in the Latin American squatter settlements', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Spring: 61-85.

- Fonjong, Lotsmart (2001) 'Fostering women's participation in development through non-governmental efforts in Cameroon', *The Geographical Journal*, 167(3): 223-34.
- Forweraker, Joe and Ann Craig (eds.) (1990) *Popular movements and political change in Mexico*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Foster, George (1963) 'The dyadic contract in Tzintzuntzan: patron-client relationship', *American Anthropologist*, 65: 1280-94.
- Fox, Jonathan (1992) 'Democratic rural development: leadership accountability in regional peasant organizations', *Development and Change*, 23(2): 1-36.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1994) 'The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: lessons from Mexico', *World Politics*, 46: 151-84.
- Gaitán Pavia, Pilar and Carlos Moreno Ospina (1992) *Poder local: realidad y utopía de la descentralización en Colombia*, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores.
- García, Martha Cecilia (1997) 'Descentralización y movilización popular en Bogotá', in Martha Cecilia García y José Vicente Zamudio (comps.) (1997) *Descentralización en Bogotá bajo la lupa (1992-1996)*, Bogotá: CINEP, 102-44.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2002) 'Luchas urbano-regionales', in Mauricio Archila, et al. (eds.), *25 años de luchas sociales en Colombia 1975-2000*, Bogotá: CINEP, 73-120.
- García, Miguel (2003) *Ciudadanía avergonzada? Democracia local y construcción de ciudadanía en Bogotá*, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Gaspar, Des (2004) *The ethics of development: from economism to human development*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Gay, Robert (1990) 'Community organization and clientelist politics in contemporary Brazil: a case study from suburban Rio de Janeiro', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 14 (4): 648-66.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1994) *Popular organization and democracy in Rio de Janeiro: a tale of two favelas*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Germani, Gino (1972) 'Aspectos teóricos de la marginalidad', *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología*, 9 (23), enero-abril.
- Gilbert, Alan (1975) 'Urban and regional development programs in Colombia since 1951', in Wayne A. Cornelius and Felicity M. Trueblood (eds.), *Urbanization and inequality: the political economy of urban and rural development in Latin America*, (Latin American urban research, v.5), Beverly Hills: Sage, 241-75.

- \_\_\_\_\_ (1978) 'Bogotá: politics, planning, and the crisis of lost opportunities', in Wayne A. Cornelius and Robert V. Kemper (eds.), *Metropolitan Latin America: the challenge and the response*, (Latin American urban research, v.6), Beverly Hills: Sage, 87-126.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1981a) 'Pirates and invaders: land acquisition in urban Colombia and Venezuela', *World Development*, 9: 657-78.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1981b) 'Bogotá', in Michael Pacione (ed.), *Problems and planning in Third World cities*, London: Croom Helm, 65-93.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1987) 'Forms and Effectiveness of Community Participation in Squatter Settlements', *Regional Development Dialogue*, 8(4): 56-80.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1988) 'Home enterprises in poor urban settlements: constraints, potentials and policy options', *Regional Development Dialogue*, 9(4): 21-37.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1990) 'The provision of public services and the debt crisis in Latin America: the case of Bogotá', *Economic Geography*, 66: 349-361.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996) 'Santa Fé de Bogotá: a Latin American special case?', in Gilbert (ed.), 241-69.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1998) 'Colombian housing policy during the 1990s', in Posada-Carbó (ed.), 155-83.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2000) 'Financing self-help housing: evidence from Bogotá, Colombia', *International Planning Studies*, 5(2): 165-90.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2001) *Housing in Latin America*, INDES-European Union Joint Program Working Papers, Washington, D.C.: IADB.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2006) 'Good urban governance: evidence from a model city?', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 25(3): 392-419.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2007) 'Water for all: combining public management with commercial practice for the benefit of the poor?', *Urban Studies*, 44(8): 1549-79.
- Gilbert, Alan (ed.) (1996) *The mega-city in Latin America*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Gilbert, Alan and Julio Dávila (2002) 'Bogotá: progress within a hostile environment', in David Myers and Henry Dietz (eds.), *Capital city politics in Latin America: democratization and empowerment*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 29-63.
- Gilbert, Alan and Joseph Gugler (1991) *Cities, poverty and development: urbanization in the Third World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Gilbert, Alan and Ann Varley (1991) *Landlord and tenant: housing the poor in urban Mexico*, London: Routledge.
- Gilbert, Alan and Peter Ward (1982) 'Low-income housing and the state', in Alan Gilbert, Jorge Hardoy and Ronaldo Ramírez (eds.), *Urbanization in contemporary Latin America: a critical approach to the analysis of urban issues*, New York: Wiley and Sons, 79-127.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1984a) 'Community action by the urban poor: democratic involvement, community self-help or a means of social control?', *World Development*, 12(8): 769-82.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1984b) 'Community participation in upgrading irregular settlements: the community response', *World Development*, 12(9): 913-22.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1985) *Housing, the state and the poor: policy and practice in three Latin American cities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Giraldo Isaza, Fabio (ed.) (1989) *Reforma urbana y desarrollo social*, Bogotá: CAMACOL.
- Gold, Lorna (2002) 'Positionality, worldview and geographical research: a personal account of a research journey', *Ethics, Place and Environment*, 5(3): 223-37.
- Goldfrank, Benjamin (2002) 'The fragile flower of local democracy: a case study of decentralization/participation in Montevideo', *Politics and Society*, 30(1): 51-83.
- Goulet, Denis (1983) 'Obstacles to world development: an ethical reflection', *World Development*, 11(7): 609-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1995) *Development ethics*, London: Zed Books.
- Grohmann, Peter (1996) *Macarao y su gente: movimiento popular y autogestión en los barrios de Caracas*, Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.
- Guerra, Carlos (1997) *Nueva estrategia neoliberal: la participación ciudadana en Chile, México*, D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
- Guijt, Irene and Meera Kaul Shah (eds.) (1998) *The myth of community: gender issues in participatory development*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Gutiérrez, S., Francisco (1998) *La ciudad representada: política y conflicto en Bogotá*, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo-IEPRI (Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales).
- Hardoy, Jorge et al. (1995) *Funding community initiatives*, London: Earthscan.



- Hardoy, Jorge and David Satterthwaite (1989) *Squatter citizen: life in the urban third world*, London: Earthscan.
- Hart Deneke, Alberto and Mauricio Silva (1982) 'Mutual help and progressive development housing, for what purpose? Notes on the Salvadorean experience', in Ward (ed.), 234-50.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan (1988) *The politics of coalition rule in Colombia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hataya, Noriko (1999) *Raten Amerika no Toshika to Jumin-soshiki* [Urbanization and people's organization in Latin America], Tokyo: Kokon Shoin.
- Hataya, Noriko et al. (1994) *Barrio a barrio se construye una ciudad: descentralización y servicios urbanos en Bogotá*, Bogotá: CINEP.
- Henkel, Heiko and Roderick Stirrat (2001) 'Participation as spiritual duty; empowerment as secular subjection', in Cooke and Kothari (eds.), 168-184.
- Hickey, Samuel and Giles Mohan (eds.) (2004) *Participation: from tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to participation in development*, London: Zed Books.
- Imparato, Ivo and Jeff Ruster, (2003) *Slum upgrading and participation: lessons from Latin America*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Instituto Colombiano de Ahorro y Vivienda (ICAV) (ed.) (1992) *La financiación de la vivienda en Colombia*, Bogotá: ICAV.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993) *El crédito de vivienda, pasado, presente, futuro*, Bogotá: ICAV.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) ICAV website, <http://www.icav.com>, accessed 12 December 2005.
- Instituto para el Desarrollo de la Democracia Luis Carlos Galán, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, D.C. (2001) *Comportamiento electoral en Bogotá 1982-1997*, Bogotá: Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, D.C.
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (1983) 'Colombia: Proposal for loans for the Ciudad Bolívar Urban Infrastructure Program', mimeo.
- Jaramillo, Samuel (1982) 'La política de vivienda en Colombia: ¿hacia una redefinición de sus objetivos?', *Desarrollo y Sociedad Cuaderno*, 4: 11-26.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1990) 'La estructura urbana y la vivienda en Bogotá,' in José Fernando López et al. (eds.), (1990) *Vivir en Bogotá*, Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional por Colombia, 51-85.
- Jaramillo, Samuel and Oscar Alfonso (1990) *Agua potable y alcantarillado en Bogotá:*

- realizaciones y limitaciones*, Bogotá: CINEP.
- Jaramillo, Samuel and Luis Mauricio Cuervo (1987) *La configuración del espacio regional en Colombia*, CEDE Serie Estudios, 1, Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes.
- Jaramillo, Samuel, Noriko Hataya and Oscar Alfonso (1996) *Urban development and people's organization in Bogotá*, Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies.
- Jelin, Elizabeth (ed.) (1990) *Women and social change in Latin America*, London: Zed Books.
- Jenkins, Paul (1999) 'Difficulties encountered in community involvement in delivery under the new South African housing policy', *Habitat International*, 23(4): 431-46.
- Junca Salas, Juan Carlos (2000) *Determinación del consumo básico de agua potable subsidiable en Colombia. Documento 139 de Archivos de Economía*, Bogotá: DNP, Dirección de Estudios Económicos.
- Kakwani, Nanak and Ernesto Pernia (2000) 'What is pro-poor growth?', *Asian Development Review*, 18(1): 1-16.
- Kaufman, Alexander (ed.) (2006) *Capabilities equality: basic issues and problems*, New York: Routledge.
- Kaufman, Michale (1997) 'Community power, grassroots democracy, and the transformation of social life', in Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso (eds.), *Community power and grassroots democracy: the transformation of social life*, London: Zed Books, 1-24.
- Kellett, Peter (1992) 'Residential mobility and consolidation process', *Third World Planning Review*, 14(4): 355-369.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1995) 'Constructing home: production and consumption of popular housing in northern Colombia', doctoral dissertation submitted to University of Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Kessides, Ioannis N. (2005) 'Infrastructure privatization and regulation: promises and perils', *The World Bank Research Observer*, 20(1): 81-108.
- Kline, Harvey (1983) *Colombia: portrait of unity and diversity*, Boulder: Westview.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1995) *Colombia: democracy under assault*, Boulder: Westview.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1999) *State building and conflict resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994*, Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.

- Koonings, Kees (2004) 'Strengthening citizenship in Brazil's democracy: local participatory governance in Porto Alegre', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 23(1): 79-99.
- Korten, David C.(1987) 'Third generation NGO strategies: a key to people-centered development', *World Development*, 15: 145-59.
- Kothari, Uma (2001) 'Power, knowledge and social control in participatory development', in Cooke and Kothari (eds.), 139-52.
- Latham, Michael (2000) *Modernization as ideology: American social science and "nation building" in the Kennedy era*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Leal Buitrago, Francisco and Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara (1990) *Clientelismo: el sistema político y su expresión regional*, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo.
- Lee, Kyu Sik (1989) *The location of jobs in a developing metropolis: patterns of growth in Bogotá and Cali, Colombia*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lee, Yok Shiu (1994) 'Community-based urban environmental management: local NGOs as catalysts', *Regional Development Dialogue*, 15(2): 158-79.
- Levy, Caren (1998) 'Institutionalization of gender through participatory practice', in Guijt and Kaul Shah (eds.), 254-67.
- Lewis, Oscar (1959) *Five families*, New York: Basic Books.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1963) *The children of Sánchez: autobiography of a Mexican family*, New York: Vintage Books. (Orig. pub. 1961; New York: Random House)
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1966) *La vida: A Puerto Rican family in the culture of poverty*, New York: Random House.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1967) Book Review: 'The children of Sánchez, Pedro Martínez, and La Vida by Oscar Lewis: author's précis', *Current Anthropology*, 8(5): 480-83.
- Libardo Herreño, Angel (1999) *No hay derecho... las madres comunitarias y jardineras frente al derecho laboral*, Bogotá: ILSA (Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos).
- Lind, Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lind (1937) *Middle town in transition: a study in cultural conflicts*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.
- Lloyd, Peter (1979) *Slums of hope? Shanty towns of the Third World*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Loftus, Alexander J. and David A. McDonald (2001) 'Of liquid dreams: a political ecology of water privatization in Buenos Aires', *Environment and Urbanization*, 13(2): 179-99.
- Lómnitz, Larissa Adler (1977) *Networks and marginality: life in a Mexican shantytown*, New York: Academic Press.
- Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá (1996) *El valor del suelo urbano en Bogotá 1988-1996: análisis de la evolución de los precios de la tierra desde 1960*, Bogotá: Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997) *El valor del suelo urbano en Bogotá 1997: análisis de la evolución de los precios de la tierra en el último ciclo económico y de la construcción*, Bogotá: Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (2005) *El valor del suelo urbano en Bogotá*, Bogotá: Lonja de Propiedad Raíz de Bogotá.
- López, José Fernando (1990a) 'Características económicas de Bogotá', in López et al. (eds.), 21-50.
- López, José Fernando et al. (eds.) (1990b) *Vivir en Bogotá*, Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional por Colombia.
- Losada L., Rodrigo and Hernando Gómez B. (1976) *La tierra en el mercado pirata de Bogotá*, Bogotá: FEDESARROLLO (Fundación para la Educación Superior y el Desarrollo).
- MacIver, Robert M. (1924) *Community: a sociological study*, New York: Macmillan.
- Malpezzi, Stephen; Stephen K. Mayo and David J. Gross (1985) *Housing demand in developing countries*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Mangin, William (1967) 'Latin American squatter settlements: a problem and a solution', *Latin American Research Review*, 2(3): 65-98.
- Manor, James (1999) *The political economy of democratic decentralization*, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Martín Molano, Juan de Dios (2000) 'Formación y consolidación de la ciudad espontánea en Santa Fe de Bogotá: el caso de Altos de la Estancia en Ciudad Bolívar', tesis del grado para maestría en planeación administrativa y desarrollo regional, CIDER (Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regionales), Universidad de Los Andes.
- Mathéy, Kosta, (ed.) (1990) *Beyond self-help housing*, London: Mansell.

- Matos Mar, José (1968) *Urbanización y barriadas en América del Sur: recopilación de estudios realizados entre 1956 y 1966*, Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos.
- Mayo, Marjorie and Gary Craig (1995) 'Community participation and empowerment: the human face of structural adjustment or tools for democratic transformation?', in Gary Craig and Marjorie Mayo (eds.), *Community empowerment: a reader in participation and development*, London: Zed Books, 1-11.
- McGreevey, William Paul (1974) 'Urban Growth in Colombia', *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, 16(4): 387-408.
- McKenzie, David and Dilip Mookherjee (2005) 'Paradox and perception: evidence from four Latin American countries', in Birdsall and Nellis (eds.), 33-84.
- Mejía Pavony, Germán Rodrigo (1999) *Los años del cambio: historia urbana de Bogotá 1820-1910*, (2nd ed.), Bogotá: Centro Editorial Javeriano: Bogotá.
- Midgley, James et al. (1986) *Community participation, social development and the state*, London: Methuen.
- Misión Bogotá Siglo XXI (1995) *Estudio prospectivo de energía eléctrica*, Bogotá: Misión Bogotá Siglo XXI.
- Misión Siglo XXI (1995) *Estudio prospectivo de las relaciones de Santafé de Bogotá con Cundinamarca*, Bogotá: Misión Siglo XXI.
- Moctezuma, Pedro (2001) 'Community-based organization and participatory planning in south-east Mexico City', *Environment and Urbanization*, 13(2): 117-33.
- Mohan, Giles (2007) 'Participatory development: from epistemological reversals to active citizenship', *Geography Compass*, 2(5): 779-96.
- Mohan, Rakesh (1981) 'Población, ingresos y empleo en una metrópoli en desarrollo: un análisis especial de Bogotá, Colombia', *Revista Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá*, 41-42 (diciembre 1980-marzo 1981): 9-116.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1994) *Understanding the developing metropolis: lessons from the city study of Bogotá and Cali, Colombia*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Molina, Humberto (1990) 'Bogotá: competition and substitution between urban land markets', in Paul Baróss and Jan van der Linden (eds.), *The transformation of land supply systems in third world cities*, Aldershot: Avebury, 295-308.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1997) 'Bogotá Metropolitana en perspectiva: crecimiento y saturación', *Foro económico, regional y urbano*, abril-junio número 7: 64-82.
- Morales Cruz, Jairo (1993) *Urbanizaciones piratas: la explotación de la miseria*,

- Bogotá: FIEL Instituto de Estudios Sociales Juan Pablo II.
- Moreno Ospina, Carlos et al. (1997) *Procesos y tendencias de la descentralización en Colombia*, Bogotá: Fundación Universidad Central.
- Moser, Caroline O. N. (ed.) (1983) *Evaluating community participation in urban development projects*, Development Planning Unit (DPU), Working Paper, 14, London: DPU.
- Mosse, David (2001) “‘People’s knowledge’, participation and patronage: operations and representations in rural development’, in Cooke, Bill and Uma Kothari (eds.), *Participation: the new tyranny?* London: Zed Books, 16-55.
- Murai, Yoshinori (1982) *Chiisana Tami kara no Hasso* [Alternatives from local people], Tokyo: Jiji-tsushin-sha.
- Nelson, Joan M. (1969) *Migrants, urban poverty, and instability in developing countries*, Occasional Papers, 22, Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1979) *Access to power: politics and the urban poor in developing nations*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Nelson, Nici and Susan Wright (eds.) (1995) *Power and participatory development: theory and practice*, London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Nickson, Andrew and Claudia Vargas (2002) ‘The limitations of water regulation: the failure of the Cochabamba concession in Bolivia’, *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 21(1): 99-120.
- Niño, Carlos and Jairo Chaparro (1998) *Usos, costumbres e imaginarios en el espacio público: el caso del sector Jerusalén*, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo.
- Niño, Ricardo José (1996) ‘Santa Fé y Bogotá: el círculo de la exclusión’, in Veeduría Distrital, Santa Fé de Bogotá, D.C., *Utopia del habitar urbano: diez estrategias para el control social de la gestión pública*, Bogotá: Veeduría Distrital, 83-266.
- O’ Brien, Philip (1995) ‘Participation and sustainable development in Colombia’, *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies*, 59: 7-35.
- O’Donnell, Guillermo (1973) *Modernization and bureaucratic-authoritarianism: studies in South American politics*, Berkeley: Institute for International Studies.
- Ortiz-Gómez, Andrés and Roger Zetter (2004) ‘Market enablement and the reconfiguration of urban structure in Colombia’, in Zetter and Hamza (eds.), 185-204.

- Otero Prada, Diego (2006) *La evolución de las tarifas de energía eléctrica en Bogotá: un análisis crítico*, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas.
- Oxhorn, Philip and Pamela K. Starr (1999) *Markets and democracy in Latin America*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Oyugi, Walter (2000) 'Decentralization for good governance and development: the unending debate', *Regional Development Dialogue*, 21(1): iii-xix
- Park, Robert E. (1928) 'Human migration and the marginal man', *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(6): 881-93.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1967) 'Community organization and juvenile delinquency', in Park et al., 113-22.
- Park, Robert E., Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie (1967) *The city*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925. Reprint.
- Paul, Samuel (1987) *Community participation in development projects: the World Bank experience*, World Bank Discussion Papers, 6, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Peattie, Lisa (1968) *The view from the barrio*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1974) 'The concept of "marginality" as applied to squatter settlements', in Wayne A. Cornelius and Felicity M. Trueblood (eds.), *Anthropological perspectives on Latin American urbanization*, (Latin American urban research, v.4), 101-9.
- Perlman, Janice (1976) *The myth of marginality: urban poverty and politics in Rio de Janeiro*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Peters, Pauline (ed.) (2000) *Development encounters: sites of participation and knowledge*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Pezzoli, Keith (1998) *Human settlements and planning for ecological sustainability*, Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Pizano, Lariza (2003) *Bogotá y el cambio: percepciones sobre la ciudad y la ciudadanía*, Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia.
- Posada-Carbó, Eduardo (ed.) (1998), *Colombia: the politics of reforming the state*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Proyecto Sur con Bogotá (2000) 'Propuesta actualizada de intervención 2001-2003', mimeo.
- Pugh, Cedric (1994) 'Housing policy development in developing countries: the World Bank and internationalisation', *Cities*, 11: 159-80.

- Puri, Ellora (2004) 'Understanding participation: theoretical foundations and practical implications', *Economic and Political Weekly*, June 12: 2511-517.
- Quiroz Martín, Teresa and Diego Palma Rodríguez (1997), 'Part VIII Chile', in Hubert Campfens (ed.), 385-436.
- Restrepo, Luis Fernando (1994) 'Estudio para el diagnóstico de la acción comunal en Colombia y la formulación de su nuevo marco de desarrollo', Bogotá: Federación Comunal de Cundinamarca, Ministerio de Gobierno-DIGIDEC.
- Rietbergen-McCracken, Jennifer (ed.) (1996) *Participation in practice: the experience of the World Bank and other stakeholders*, World Bank Discussion Paper, 33, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Riofrío Benavides, Gustavo (1978) *Se busca terreno para próxima barriada: espacios disponibles en Lima 1940-1978-1990*, Lima: DESCO (Centro de Estudios y Promoción del Desarrollo).
- Rodríguez, Luis Raúl (1967) *El desarrollo urbano en Colombia*, Bogotá: Ediciones Universidad de los Andes.
- Rojas, Cristina (2004) 'Decentralization and the culture of citizenship in Bogotá, Colombia', in Isabel Licha (ed.), *Citizens in charge: managing local budgets in East Asia and Latin America*, Washington, D.C.: IADB, 291-327.
- Rondinelli, Dennis (1991) 'Decentralizing water supply services in developing countries: factors affecting the success of community management', *Public Administration and Development*, 11: 415-30.
- Salman, Ton (1997) *The diffident movement: disintegration, ingenuity and resistance of the Chilean pobladores, 1973-1990*, Amsterdam: Thela Publishers.
- Santana Rodríguez, Pedro (1996) 'Legitimidad política y descentralización', *Revista Foro*, 29: 23-33.
- Schalkwijk, Aart (2002) 'Popular participation and urban poverty alleviation in Bolivia', in Isa Baud and Johan Post (eds.), *Realigning actors in an urbanizing world: governance and institutions from a development perspective*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 157-73.
- Scott, James (1972) 'Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia', *The American Political Science Review*, 66: 91-113.
- Sen, Amartya (1987) *On ethics and economics*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- \_\_\_\_\_(1992) *Inequality re-examined*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.



- \_\_\_\_\_ (2002) *Rationality and freedom*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Shah, Parmesh and Meera Kaul Shah (1994) 'Participatory methods for increasing NGO accountability: a case study from India', in Edwards and Hulme (eds.), 183-91.
- Smith, Harry (1999) 'Networks and spaces of negotiation in low-income housing: the case of Costa Rica', PhD Thesis submitted for School of Planning and Housing, Edinburgh College of Art, Heriot-Watt University, September 1999.
- Smith, Harry and José Manuel Valverde (2001), 'Community development becomes a political bargaining tool: the case for structural change in low income housing provision in Costa Rica', in Michael Carley, Paul Jenkins and Harry Smith (eds.), *Urban development and civil society: the role of communities in sustainable cities*, London: Earthscan, 121-38.
- Smith William C. and Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz (eds.) (1997) *Politics, social change, and economic restructuring in Latin America*, Coral Gables: University of Miami, North-South Center Press.
- Stevenson, Rafael (1981) 'Los programas y las políticas de vivienda en Bogotá', *Revista Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá*, 43: 91-149.
- Stren, Richard E. (2003) 'Introduction: toward the comparative study of urban governance', in Patricia L. McCarney and Richard E. Stren (eds.), *Governance on the ground: innovations and discontinuities in cities of the developing world*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1-30.
- Sudarsky, John (2003) *Densidad y articulación de la sociedad civil de Bogotá: localidades y sectores 1997-2000*, Bogotá: Instituto de Cultura y Turismo and Departamento Administrativo de Acción Comunal.
- Tacher, Lucy and Lourdes Mondragon Padilla (1997) 'Women in solidarity in Mexico', in Beall (ed.) (1997a), 268-75.
- Torres Carillo, Alfonso (1993) *La ciudad en la sombra: barrios y luchas populares en Bogotá 1950-1977*, Bogotá: CINEP.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1994) 'Estudios sobre pobladores populares urbanos en Colombia. Balance y perspectivas', in Julián Arturo (comp.), *Pobladores urbanos: ciudades y espacios*, Tomo I, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 299-316.
- Tsurumi, Kazuko (1979) *Aspects of endogenous development in modern Japan*, Tokyo: Sophia University.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996) *Naihatsuteki-hatten-ron no Tenkai [Evolution of the theory of endogenous*

- development*], Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobo.
- Turner, John F. C. (1968) 'Uncontrolled urban settlement: Problems and policies', in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ed.), *Urbanization: development policies and planning*, (International Social Development Review, No. 1), 107-29.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1976) *Housing by people*, London: Marion Boyars.
- Turner, John F. C. and Robert Fichter (eds.) (1972) *Freedom to build: dweller control of the housing process*, New York: Macmillan.
- United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) (1979) *Inquiry into participation: a research approach*, Geneva: UNRISD.
- Van Linder, Paul and Gery Nijenhuis (2002) 'Popular participation and the participatory planning practice in Latin America: some evidence from Bolivia and Brazil', in Isa Baud and Johan Post (eds.), 175-96.
- Vargas Lesmes, Julián and Fabio Zambrano (1988) 'Santa Fé de Bogotá: evolución histórica y servicios públicos 1600-1957', in Pedro Santana et al., *Bogotá 450 años: retos y realidades*, Bogotá: Ediciones Foro Nacional, 11-92.
- Velásquez Gavilanes, Raúl (2003) *Bogotá: políticas públicas de gobierno local*, Bogotá: CEJA.
- Vélez-Ibañez, Carlos (1983) *Rituals of marginality: process, and culture change in central urban Mexico, 1969-1974*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Vellinga, Menno (2002) 'Globalization and neoliberalism: economy and society in Latin America', *Iberoamericana*, 32(2): 25-43.
- Vérnez, Georges (1973) 'Bogotá's pirate settlements: an opportunity for metropolitan development', Doctoral dissertation, University of California at Berkeley.
- Vidal Perdomo, J. (1994) 'De Distrito Especial a Distrito Capital', *Revista de la Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá*, 89: 47-56.
- Villa, Miguel and Jorge Rodríguez (1996) 'Demographic trends in Latin America's metropolis, 1950-1990', in Gilbert (ed.), 25-52.
- Villareal Barón, José Miguel (2001) *La planeación local: espacios para la participación ciudadana y comunitaria*, 2d. edition, Bogotá: Tiempo de Leer.
- Violich, Francis (1987) *Urban planning for Latin America: the challenge of metropolitan growth*, Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain.
- Violich, Francis and Juan B. Astica (1967) *Community development and the urban*

- planning process in Latin America*, Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California.
- Voth, Donald and Marcie Brewster (1989) 'An overview of international community development', in Jame A. Christenson and Jerry W. Robinson, JR. (eds.), *Community development in perspective*, Ames: Iowa State University Press, 280-305.
- Voz (1993a) 'Crece protesta en barrios de Bogotá: Usme: el paro cívico obligó al alcalde a conversar', *Voz*, 24 June.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993b) 'Paquete de acuerdos: el paro obligó a negociar', *Voz*, 14 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993c) 'Ante desatención oficial: a Ciudad Bolívar se le acabó la paciencia', *Voz*, 14 October.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1996) 'Protestas en Usme y Bosa: el pueblo pide a Mockus soluciones', *Voz*, 26 June.
- Ward, Peter (1976) 'In search of a home: social and economic characteristics of squatter settlements and the role of self-help housing in Mexico City', PhD dissertation for the University of Liverpool.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1989) 'Land values and valorisation processes in Latin American cities: a research agenda', *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, 8(1): 47-66.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1990) *Mexico City: the production and reproduction of an urban environment*, London: Belhaven Press.
- Ward Peter (ed.) (1982) *Self-help housing: a critique*, London: Mansell.
- Ward, Peter et al. (2004) 'From the marginality of the 1960s to the 'new poverty' of today: a LARR Research Forum', *Latin American Research Review*, 39(1): 183-204.
- Ward, Peter and Sylvia Chant (1987) 'Community leadership and self-help housing', *Progress in Planning*, 27(2): 71-135.
- Werlin, Herbert (1999) 'The slum upgrading myth', *Urban Studies*, 36(9): 1523-34.
- White, Sarah C. (2000) 'Depoliticising development: the uses and abuses of participation', in Deborah Eade (ed.), *Development, NGOs and civil society*, Oxford: Oxfam, 142-55.
- Wiarda, Howard J. and Harvey F. Kline (2001) *An introduction to Latin American politics and development*, Boulder: Westview.

- Wirth, Louis (1938) 'Urbanism as a way of life', *The American Journal of Sociology*, 44(1): 1-24.
- World Bank (1991) *Urban policy and economic development: an agenda for the 1990s*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1993) *Housing: enabling markets to work*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- \_\_\_\_\_ (1994) *Poverty reduction in South Asia: promoting participation by the poor*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Yap, Kioe Sheng (1990) 'Community participation in low-income housing projects: problems and prospects', *Community Development Journal*, 25(1): 56-65.
- Zanetta, Cecilia (2004) *The influence of the World Bank on national housing and urban policies: the case of Mexico and Argentina during the 1990s*, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Zetter, Robert and Mohamed Hamza (eds.) (2004) *Market economy and urban change: impacts in the developing world*, London: Earthscan.
- Zorro, Carlos and Alan Gilbert (1982) 'Tolerancia o rechazo de los asentamientos urbanos irregulares: el caso de Bogotá', *Revista Interamericana de Planeación*, XVI (62): 138-70.

APPENDIX A

**Locations of primary documents and bibliographical research**

Bogotá:

Central library of Universidad de los Andes

Central library of Pontificia Universidad Javeriana

Documentation centre of Bogotá city council

Documentation centre of El Espectador

Documentation centre of El Tiempo

Documentation centre of EAAB (Empresa de Acueducto y Alcantarillado de Bogotá)

Library of CIDER (Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Regionales), Universidad de los Andes

Library of CINEP (Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular)

Library of DAPD (Departamento Administrativo de Planeación Distrital)

Library of Luis Carlos Arango

London:

British Library

Senate House Library

UCL (University College London) Main Library

UCL Science Library

Tokyo:

Central library of Sophia University

Library of IDE (Institute of Developing Economies)

Washington, D.C.:

Library of IADB (Inter-American Development Bank)

APPENDIX B.1  
List of the intervieweed public officials

Name	Institution	Date of interview
Norberto Rodríguez	<i>Alcaldía Ciudad Bolívar</i>	28 Sept. 1999
Maria Margarita Ruíz	South Bogotá Project (Director)	28 Sept. 1999; 12 April 2000
Julio Gómez	DAPD	4 Oct. 1999
Martha Isabel González	Ministry of Development	5 Oct. 1999
Diego Bravo	CAR	26 Oct. 1999
Fabio Giraldo	CRA	27 Oct. 1999
Fernando Fandiño	EAAB, ( <i>Gestión Comunitaria</i> )	3 Nov. 1999, 21 June 2000
Alba Garzón	EAAB, ( <i>Gestión Comunitaria</i> )	3 Nov. 1999
Sonia Gaviria	UPES-DPAE	26 Jan. 2000
German Rey	Office of Demarginalisation	2 Feb. 2000
Isabel Caro	Secretay of Health	14 Feb. 2000
Martha Leticia Suárez	South Bogotá Project	12 Apri. 2000
Carlos Restrepo	EAAB	19 May 2000
Glenda Luna	DAPD, (direction of regularisation)	23 May 2000
Humberto Pederazal	DAAC	24 May 2000
Fernando Mantilla	DAAC	24 May 2000
Amanda Chiribí	Subsecretary of Control and Housing	25 May 2000
Jorge Mendoza	Subsecretary of Control and Housing	29 May 2000
Humberto Lizalazo	Inst. Culture, Recreation and Sports	31 May 2000
Jairo Suárez	CVP(Popular Housing Fund)	31 May 2000
Miguel Bejarano	CVP(Caja de Vivienda Popular)	31 May 2000
Clemencia Escallón	DAPD, (direction of regularisation)	9 Jun. 2000
Favio Acero	Planning, <i>Alcaldía Ciudad Bolívar</i>	13 Jun. 2000
Andrés Escobar	Metrovivienda	16 June 2000
Nelson Cruz	<i>Alcaldía Usme</i>	19 June 2000
Coronel Betancur	Metropolitan Police of Tequendama	21 June 2000
Uriel Gómez	EAAB	21 June 2000
Eduardo Restrepo	DAPD, (direction of regularisation)	24 Aug. 2000
Victor Firstman	EAAB	29 Aug. 2000
Silvia Olano	BIC-EU Cd. Bolívar Programme	4 Sept. 2000
Nicolás	EAAB (assistant of ex-CIDER project)	4 Sept. 2000
Astríd Alvarez	EAAB (director)	6 Sept. 2000
Asdribal Romero	IDU	12 Sept. 2000
Henry Navarro	EEB	15 Sept. 2000
Edilia Aldana Méndez	ICBF	1 Dec. 2000
Olga Cecilia Pinilla	DAAC	6 Dec. 2000
n.a.	DABS	7 Dec. 2000
Francesco Ambrosi	DAAC-OBS	28 Aug. 2001
Luz Dari León	CVP(legalisation)	30 Aug. 2001
n.a.	CREG	31 Aug. 2001
Sandra Fonseca Arenas	CREG(sub-director)	12 Aug. 2004

APPENDIX B.2  
List of the interviewees for in-depth semi-structured interviews conducted in 2000

**1. Diana Turbay**

Assumed name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Household structure (total number of persons including household head)	Owner/tenant	Time period of residence(**)	Other observation	Date of interview
1 Luis Flor	F	50	fish vendor	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	18 years		04/08/00
2 Dora	F	42	garment worker	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	15 years		05/08/00
3 Martha Lucia	F	34	saleswoman of cosmetics	partner, 3 children (5)	tenant	11 years (6 years)		05/08/00
4 José V.	M	49	carpenter	partner, 1 child (3)	owner	18 years		16/08/00
5 Yolanda	F	25	house-wife	partner, 1 child (3)	tenant	5 years		19/08/00
6 Tránsito	F	41	machine operator	partner, 6 children (8)	owner	17 years		20/08/00
7 Segundo	M	64	disabled	partner, 2 children, 4 others (8)	owner	20 years		21/08/00
8 Fabio	M	62	plumber, construction worker	partner, 3 children (5)	owner	18 years		21/08/00
9 Flor Marina	F	42	house-wife	partner, 3 children (5)	tenant	18 years		21/08/00

**2. Jerusalén (\*Potosí-La Isla)**

Assumed name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Household structure (total number of persons including household head)	Owner/tenant	Time period of residence(**)	Other observation	Date of interview
1(*) José Vicente	M	51	salesman of miscellaneous store	partner, 5 children (7)	tenant	16 years		16/04/00
2(*) Elvira	F	53	owner of a beauty salon	5 children (6)	owner	16 years	ex-leader	17/04/00
3(*) Beto	M	33	fish vendor	2 children (4)	owner	10 years	ex-leader	19/04/00
Nancy (P)	F	27	food vendor					
4(*) Albina	F	47	knitting and art flower arrangement	partner, 2 children, 1 grandchild (5)	owner	16 years(8 months)	ex-leader	22/04/00
5(*) Pedro	M	64	construction worker	1 child (3)	owner	16 years (14 years)		26/04/00
Blanca (P)	F	57	flower vendor					
6(*) Maria Inés	F	59	lottery vendor	2 children (3)	owner	17 years (10 years)		01/05/00
7(*) María	F	50	house-wife	partner, 4 children, 2 others (8)	usufructo	16 years		17/05/00
8(*) Mariela	F	42	tailor at home	partner, 5 children, 2 no relative (9)	owner	9 years (6 years)		05/05/00
9(*) Luz Marina	F	24	cleaning woman at school	partner, 2 children, 2 others (6)	tenant	4 years		06/05/00
10(*) Angel	M	54	guardian of a workshop	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	7 years		08/05/00
11(*) Piter	M	20	package maker for sweet	partner, 2 children (4)	usufructo	1.5 years		09/05/00
12(*) Yaeline	F	31	house-wife	partner, 2 children (4)	tenant	11 years(1 month)		14/05/00
13 Julio	M	57	Pensioner	partner, 1 child (3)	owner	16 years		26/08/00
14 Blanquita	F	40	community mother	partner, 1 child (3)	owner	17 years		26/08/00
15 Bernabé	M	53	unemployed	1 child, 1 grandchild (4)	owner	19 years		26/08/00
Beatriz(P)	F	54	house maid					
16 Felix	M	56	printer (hired)	partner, 3 children (5)	owner	16 years		26/08/00
17 Lucrecia	F	39	community mother	partner, 2 children, 1 other (5)	owner	16 years	ex-leader	02/09/00
Hernando(P)	M	44	unemployed					
18 Flor María	F	38	house-wife	1 child, 5 others (7)	owner	16 years		02/09/00
19 William	M	21	assistant of furniture maker	partner (2)	tenant	16 years		02/09/00
20 Luz Eduardo	M	70	retired	partner, 1 child (3)	owner	15 years		09/09/00

\* Interviews conducted to the cases selected from the sample survey on the sector Potosí-La Isla.

\*\* Time period in the parenthesis is the period of residence in the current house.

(P) stands for partner of the household head.

APPENDIX B.2 (continued)

3. Danubio Azul

Assumed name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Household structure (total number of persons including household head)	Owner/tenant	Time period of residence(**)	Other observation	Date of interview
1 José Eduardo	M	37	assistant of shoe-maker	5 children (7)	owner	12 years	leader of the sector	04/06/1
2 Lucy Stella	F	31	community mother	2 children (4)	owner	5 years		04/06/1
3 Juan	M	34	advertising agent (self identified)	3 children (4)	owner	10 years (5 years)		04/06/1
4 Olga	F	37	assistant at a laboratory	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	8 years	leader of the sector	05/06/1
5 Dominga	F	37	worker at floriculture	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	12 years		05/06/1
6 Anibal	M	53	disabled	partner, 4 child, 1 other (7)	owner	11 years (1 year)		05/06/1
7 Marina	F	39	tailor	partner, 2 children (4)	tenant	4 years		10/06/1
8 Luz Mila	F	45	house-wife	partner, 2 children (4)	tenant	4 years		10/06/1
9 Ruth	F	32	house-wife	partner, 2 children (4)	tenant	4 years		10/06/1
10 Nelson	M	30	assistant of transporter for moving	parents, 3 brothers, 2 others (8)	owner	10 years		10/06/1
11 Ramón	M	40	guardian	partner, 3 children, brother, grandchild (7)	owner	13 years		10/06/1
12 Luis	F	40	construction worker		owner			18/06/1

4. La Paz

Assumed name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Household structure (total number of persons including household head)	Owner/tenant	Time period of residence(**)	Other observation	Date of interview
1 Celina	F	45	community mother	3 children, 1 other (5)	owner	16 years (8 years)		11/06/1
2 Ludovina	F	26	vendor of sweet	partner, 1 child (3)	tenant	26 years (6 years)		17/06/1
3 Porfirio	M	60	repairman of electrodomestic goods	partner (2)	tenant	15 years	directorial member JAC	17/06/1
4 Flor del Carmen	F	40	disabled	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	11 years (9 years)	ex-illegal land broker	18/06/1
5 Cesar Julio	M	53	guardian of a private company	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	20 years		24/06/1
6 Ma. Martha	F	34	saleswoman of a shop	partner, 3 children (5)	owner	12 years		24/06/1
7 Luis Norberto	M	35	garment worker	partner, 1 child (3)	tenant	8 years (1 year)		24/06/1
8 Alcides	M	41	porter at the market	partner, 6 children (8)	tenant	11 years (6 months)		25/06/1
9 Leonor	F	46	various services at floriculture	partner, 2 children (4)	owner	13 years		26/06/1
10 María del Tránsito	F	54	vendor of cooked food	partner, 1 other (3)	owner	13 years		02/07/1

\*\* Time period in the parenthesis is the period of residence in the current house.



APPENDIX B.2 (continued)

**5. Juan José Rondón**

Assumed name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Household structure (total number of persons including household head)	Owner/tenant	Time period of residence(**)	Other observation	Date of interview
1 Maria Antonia	F	57	house-wife	3 children, 2 grandchildren (7)	Owner	12 years		27/08/00
2 Alfonso(S)	M	73	retired	Spouse (2)	Owner	11 years	Ex JAC president	03/09/00
3 Jesusan	M	47	administrator of community water ser	Spouse, 5 children (7)	Owner	12 years(2 years)		03/09/00
4 Estevan	M	35	assistant worker of construction	Spouse, 3 children (5)	Owner	17 years		09/09/00
5 Maria del Carme	F	44	house-wife					
6 Jesus(S)	M	44	assistant worker of construction	Supose, 2 children (4)	Tenant	7 years		09/09/00
7 Juan C.	M	30	electrician	4 children 1 other (8)	Tenant	6 years (3 years)		10/09/00
8 Miguel Angel	M	41	guardian					
9 Maria(S)	F	35	waiter at a restaurant	3 children (5)	Owner	7 years?		10/09/00
10 Rafael	M	38	porter					
11 Dina(S)	F	39	various services (domestic service)	6 children (7)	Owner	17 years		10/09/00
12 Blanca A.	F	59	house-wife	Spouse, 5 children (7)	Owner	10 years		10/09/00
13 Victor S.	M	43	electrician, plumber, painter.					

**6. Bella Flor**

Assumed name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Household structure (total number of persons including household head)	Owner/tenant	Time period of residence(**)	Other observation	Date of interview
1 Fanny	F	37	House maid	4 children (5)	Owner	11 years (10 years)		08/05/00
2 Emilio	M	29	Porter in the market	2 children (4)	Owner	9 years	invader	16/05/00
3 Martha	F	21	house-wife					
4 Virginia	F	46	community mother	Spouse, 2 children (4)	Owner	15 years		16/05/00
5 Maria Ligia	F	47	owner-vendor of proper shop	6 children (7)	Owner	14 years		18/05/00
6 Rosalba	F	46	cookie baker	5 children (6)	Tenant	2 years		18/05/00
7 Jose	M	60	Merchant	(1)	Owner	3 years	ex-JAC president	18/05/00
8 Luz Eliyer	F	21	house-wife	Spouse, 2 children (4)	Tenant	13 years(3 years)		20/05/00
9 Custodia	F	54	House maid	Child (2)	Usufructo	7 years (6 years)		21/05/00
10 Jose Alberto.	M	46	Shoe-shiner	Spouse, 3 children., other (6)	Tenant	1 year		21/05/00
11 Jose Armando	M	23	Assistant worker of construction	Spouse, 3 children	Owner	2 months		22/05/00

\*\* Time period in the parenthesis is the period of residence in the current house.

(P) stands for partner of the household head

APPENDIX B.3  
List of the interviewed NGO and CBO activists and politicians

Name of activist	NGO/CBO name (related barrio)	Date of interview
Margareth Flórez	Fundación Corona	3 Nov. 1999
José Castiblanco	ASINDESODA (D. Azul)	8 Dec. 1999
Father Manolo	Church (La Paz)	2 Feb. 2000
n.a.	Hogar Integral (Jerusalén)	10 May 2000
n.a.	Jardín Alegría de Vivir (Jerusalén)	12 May 2000
Brother Dairo Pérez	Pastor Social (Bella Flor)	15 May 2000
Rodrigo Quintero	Fundación Social (Jerusalén)	17 May 2000
Streengel	Social Housing NGO (Bella Flor)	7 June 2000
Barbara Romero	Asociación Madre Comunitaria (B. Flor)	11 June 2000
Hugo Villamíl	Promotoria Comunitaria Usme	17 June 2000
Father Garavito	School backed by the church(Bella Flor)	20 June 2000
Joséfa	Hope Internacional (Diana Turbay)	23 June 2000
Leonidas Ospina	ICES (Jerusalén)	26 June 2000
Ester Castaño Mejía, Ana de Jesús Rodríguez	Sisterhood group for women's vocational training (JJR)	5 Aug. 2000
Alberto Hernández	COOPBAUS (JJR)	16 Aug. 2000
Father Saturnino Sepúlveda	Founder of JJR (JJR)	22 Aug. 2000
Fernando Tamayo	Fundación Social (Jerusalén)	6 Sept. 2000
Patricia Zapata	Fundación Fe y Alegría (La Paz, D. Azul)	28 Nov. 2000
Teresita de Jesús Mendito	Centro Comunitario Champagnat(La Paz)	1 Dec. 2000
Sister Elsa	CEC(Danubio Azul)	1 Dec. 2000
n.a.	Club Michen (Diana Turbay)	18 Aug. 2001
Carmen Fernández	CELODIJE (Jerusalén)	25 Aug. 2001
Name of politician	position (related barrio)	Date of interview
Antanas Mockus	ex mayor	6 Oct. 1999
Flavio Maya	candidate (Bella Flor)	31 Jan. 2000
Jorge Rociasco	<i>edil</i> of Rafael Uribe Uribe(Diana Turbay)	30 May 2000
Alfredo Guerrero	candidate (Diana Turbay)	2 June 2000
Jaime Castro	ex mayor	6 June 2000
Juán Betancourt	candidate (La Paz)	7 June 2000
Hugo Gaona	<i>edil</i> of Ciudad Bolívar (Bella Flor)	13 June 2000
Nubia Medrano	<i>edil</i> of Rafael Uribe Uribe (La Paz)	14 June 2000
Leonor González Mina	Congresswoman (Bella Flor)	23 June 2000
Teresa Baracaldo	Bogotá councillor	8 July 2000
Fernando Mejía	<i>edil</i> of Usme (Diana Turbay)	18 July 2000
Hermán Arias	candidate (Jerusalén)	20 Nov. 2000

APPENDIX C

**Questionnaire used for the household survey**

**Irregular Settlement Household Survey 2000**

(Translated from Spanish to English)

**I. IDENTIFICATION**

1. Name of settlement
2. Sector of settlement
3. No. of sector block
4. No. of household
5. Address
6. Telephone number
7. No. of households in this house
8. Name of informant
9. How many persons live in the household?
10. Ownership/tenancy of the house in which the household is situated.
  - (1) Owner
  - (2) Tenant → Go to question I-10-(1)
  - (3) *Usufructo*
  - (4) Supervisor of the house
- 10-(1) How much do you pay as the monthly rent?

**II. MIGRANT RECORD OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD**

11. Where were you born?  
Bogotá → Continue  
Other departments:  
Specify department ( )  
Specify municipality ( ) → Go to 13.
12. Have you lived anytime outside of Bogotá?
  - (1) Yes → Continue
  - (2) No → Go to 15.
  - (3) Not inform → Continue
13. When did you leave your birthplace?  
Year:
- 14 (a) Native of Bogotá (born in Bogotá)  
What year was the last time when you came back to live in Bogotá?

Year:

- 14 (b) Those born outside of Bogotá:

When did you arrive to live in Bogotá?

Year:

15. When did you come to live in this settlement?

Year:

16. How long have you been living in this house?

17. For the owner of the house:

(1) In what year did you obtain the lot?

- (2) How did you obtain the lot?                      (a) Purchase  
(b) Invasion  
(c) Inheritance  
(d) Gift  
(e) Other

(3) Do you have title deed to the lot?            If yes → When did you get it?

No

Not inform

### III. DESCRIPTION OF MEMBERS OF THE HOUSEHOLD

18. Name

19. Sex: Man/Woman

20. Age

21. Relationship to the household head (household head, children, sibling, parent, parent-in-law, brother/sister-in-law, grandchild, nephew/niece, children, sons/daughters-in-law, other relation, no relation).

22. Marital status (married, free union, single, separated/divorced, widow)

23. Which of the following activities mainly occupy you during the last week? (for household members 5 years or older).

(1) Work

(2) Work, but in the last week I was on holidays/on leave

(3) In search of work

(4) Study

(5) Housekeeping

(6) Live on rent

(7) Retired (live on pension)

(8) Sick (unable to work)

(9) No particular occupation

24. Who is the primary breadwinner of the household?

#### IV. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD AND HIS/HER PARTNER

25. Did you have work during the last month? Or, do you have work now?

26. What kind of job do you have?

27. Field of work: agriculture, mining, manufacturing, electricity/gas/water, construction, commerce, transportation, finance, services, other.

28. Position in that job: (owner/employer, self-employed, employed in the public sector, employed in the private sector, worker of the public sector, worker of the private sector, domestic worker, unremunerated work in the household)

29. How many persons work in your enterprise?

30. Do you have any work other than the job you mentioned above?

31. Do you do any of your work at home?

32. Do you have any additional income? (multiple responses):

(income from work of other member of household; rent; pension; aid from relatives outside the household)

33. What is your approximate monthly income?

34. Do you have any type of social security plan? (Prepaid medicine, SISBEN, EPS, other)

35. What schooling have you completed?

(1) None

(2) Primary school

(3) Secondary school (traditional system)

(4) Secondary school (technical school)

(5) University and other advanced school

(6) Other vocational/technical education

#### V. PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES

36. What type of power (fuel) do you use for cooking? (electricity; propane gas; natural gas; kerosene; firewood)

37. Are you connected to a sewer system?

38. What type of toilet do you use? (toilet connected to sewer system; toilet and septic tank, toilet without connection to any system, pit latrine, nothing available at home)

(1) Are you sharing toilet facilities with another household?

39. From where do you get water for cooking? (tap at home, by hose connection, purchase water from the water tank truck, buy bottled water)

40. What do you do generally with garbage? (pick-up by a private company; leave at

common settlement dump, burn)

## VI. DIAGNOSIS OF (UNSATISFIED) NEEDS

41. Can you identify your level of satisfaction with the following public services and social infrastructure in the settlement?  
(excellent, good, ordinary, bad, very bad, services not available, don't know)
42. What services in the following list are the most problematic for you and your family?  
Can you identify the three most problematic in the order of urgency to improve?  
List of services: water, sewerage, electricity, gas, transportation, road pavement, waste collection, public telephone, (home) telephone, health care centre, kindergarten, primary school, secondary school, market, park and/or green zone
43. What types of problems are there with the three services identified above?
- (1) Not available
  - (2) Service is frequently suspended
  - (3) Poor service (of the public service company)
  - (4) Cost is very expensive
  - (5) No vacancies in the school
  - (6) A lot of delinquency
  - (7) Difficult access
  - (8) Other
44. Who (or what institution) do you think is responsible for improving public utility services?  
(government, public enterprises, *edil*, NGO, JAC, other types of community-based organisations, politicians, Catholic church, NGO, other)
45. Was any communal action or community project undertaken in order to improve these services you identified as problematic?
46. Is the community doing anything to improve these services?
- 47-50: Questions about the needs regarding to economic aspects
47. What services or systems in the following list are the most necessary for you and your family? Can you identify the three most necessary in level of urgency?  
List of the services [systems]:
- (1) Community credit for housing
  - (2) Cooperative bank
  - (3) Training centre for technical work
  - (4) Arbitrary system to resolve the conflict between owners and tenants or among inhabitants.
  - (5) Employment agency (centre)

- (6) Communal information board for exchange of information on employment
- (7) Credit (microfinance) for micro enterprises
- 48. To whom would you resort to obtain these services or systems above identified?  
(Government, *edil*, political party, politicians, JAC, other type of community organisation, religious community or parish church, NGO, others)
- 49. Was any communal action or community project undertaken in order to improve the services you identified as problematic?
- 50. What other type(s) of community service or system do you think would improve the economic condition of you and your family?

#### VII. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNITY-BASED ACTIVITIES

- 51. Do you know any of the organisations in the following list?
  - (1) JAC
  - (2) Committee of JAC
  - (3) Association of parents of family [Parents Association]
  - (4) Association of community mothers
  - (5) Tenant association
  - (6) Church (parish church)
  - (7) Youth group /organisation
  - (8) Group/organisation of the aged people
  - (9) Group/organisation of sports
  - (10) Cultural group/ organisation
  - (11) Religious group (identify:     )
  - (12) NGO
- 52. Do you attend the meeting of the above organisations? Which one? If not, what is the reason?
  - (1) Short of time, for work
  - (2) Not interested in
  - (3) Don't like
  - (4) Attend the other household member (partner)
  - (5) Problem with the people
  - (6) Negligence
  - (7) Do not socialise much with people in the settlement
  - (8) Because I am very new in the settlement
  - (9) Because I am a tenant
  - (10) Other
- 53. Although you do not attend, do you know the frequency of the meetings of any of the

organisations? Which ones:

54. Are you affiliated with or a member of any of the organisations identified above?
55. Do any other members of your household attend the meetings of any organisation on the list?
56. Who are the principal community leaders (in this settlement)?

Did you participate in any community action during the past year (1999)?

Identify the type of action, aim of action, and the organisation(s) that led the action.

Aims (purpose of the action):

- (1) Rolling the land
- (2) Installation of electric power
- (3) Installation of water supply system
- (4) Installation of sewerage
- (5) To defend the kerosene distribution system
- (6) Installation of natural gas
- (7) Problem relating to public service tariffs
- (8) Street paving
- (9) To have a school built
- (10) To have a health care centre built
- (11) Other: Identify

Actions:

- (1) Attend meetings
- (2) Sign petition letter
- (3) Civic strike
- (4) Demonstration/protest
- (5) Present claim for the need at government office
- (6) Protest sit-in at government office
- (7) Participate in communal work
- (8) Other

Organisation leading the action:

- (1) JAC
- (2) Other community-based organisation
- (3) Labour union
- (4) NGO
- (5) Provienda
- (6) Developer (*urbanizador*)
- (7) Politician
- (8) Other



57. Did any of the members of your household participate in community actions during the last year?
58. Between the time you came to live in this settlement and 1998, did you participate in any type of collective action or community-based action in order to fulfil the following aims?  
(\*options same as above).
59. Can you identify the community leaders during that period (from the time you came to live in this settlement until now)?
60. (For those who answer 'No' to 58 nor 59):  
Why have you never participated?
- 61-(2) (For those who answered 'No' to 59 although they participated in some action in the past year (= yes to 58): Why, although you once participated in actions, have you not participated in any recently?
- 61-(3) (for those who answered 'No' to 58 but 'Yes' to 59): Why did you not participate in the past, although you have recently?
62. Do you think that your participation in community-based activities serves to solve the problems in the settlement?
63. Do you feel that the community is more active or less active than before in making efforts to solve the problems of the settlement?
64. Do you feel yourself more motivated or less motivated than before to participate in community actions?
65. Do you know other entity that is working or that has worked for improvement of the settlement?
66. Do you know any politician who has had influence in bringing about improvement of the barrio?
67. Do you know any project/programme of the city (government) or public companies which is now in process or which was going on in the past?  
Yes → identify: → go on to 68  
No → continue to 69
68. Do you think that such projects/programmes will bring about improvement of the quality of life of this settlement?

#### VIII. PHYSICAL CONDITION OF THE HOUSING AND THE GOODS THE HOUSEHOLD HAS

69. What is the size of the lot?
70. The principal materials of the walls are:  
(1) Brick, cement-block, concrete

- (2) Sun-dried brick *bahareque*
  - (3) Zinc
  - (4) Wood
  - (5) Other non-durable materials (paper, *paroy*, plastic sheeting, etc.)
71. The predominant materials of the roof are:
- (1) *Eternit* (tile)
  - (2) Zinc
  - (3) Concrete
  - (4) *Paroy* (plastic sheeting)
72. Number of stories of the house
- Does the house have a terrace?
- Does the house have a basement?
73. Number of rooms in the house (other than toilet and kitchen)
74. Goods that belong to members of the household.
- (1) TV (colour)
  - (2) TV (black and white)
  - (3) Washing machine
  - (4) Refrigerator
  - (5) Radio
  - (6) Telephone
  - (7) Video set (Betamax, VHS) \*Identify: To whom does this device belong?
  - (8) Audio set
  - (9) Computer
  - (10) Motorbike/ motorcycle
  - (11) Automobile (pre 1994 model)
  - (12) Automobile (post 1994 model)

## APPENDIX D

### **Main themes of questions introduced in the semi-structured interviews (original in Spanish)**

- (0) Personal history of migrant experience
- (1) The process of moving into the settlement
  - How and by whom did you learn about this place (present neighbourhood)?
  - How did you obtain the land (housing lot)?
  - Did you have any particular connection with a local politician who gave you the information?
  - How much was the land when you purchased it?
  - Did anybody (politician, church, NGO, family, etc.) help you financially with the purchase of the land?
- (2) Process of house construction by the self-help method
  - How and where did you get the materials for construction, assistance for the labor, technical assistance, and financial support?
  - Was there any process of mutual aid (among neighbours) available for this process?
  - What was the relation between you, your family and the JAC directing members?
  - Were you the target of any eviction notice conducted by the authorities (police)?
  - If so, what was the situation and how did you defend yourself?
  - Who helped you and your neighbours at that time?
- (3) Process of obtaining provisional services (water and electricity), opening of roads and access to transport systems.
  - How was the process started?
  - In which type of community action did you participate?
  - What were relations like between the community and the JAC leaders in that period?
  - Were there any other institutions or persons who assisted the community in that period?
  - Who were the 'leaders' you identified in the previous survey?
  - What was the nature of the process of negotiation (or of struggle) between the community and the local government with respect to the provision of public services in that period?
  - Do you remember any kind of conflict within the community at that time?
- (4) Process of obtaining other institutions of social infrastructure (schools, day care centers, primary health care centres)
  - What was done to get the process going? Who took the initiative in promoting these services?
  - What action did the community and you yourself take?
  - Who helped the community in the process and how?
- (5) Process of regularisation of the settlement
  - Who took the initiative?
  - Who took the responsibility to finance the work?
  - How were the related tasks distributed in the process of execution?
  - Who was in charge of maintenance and monitoring of the construction process?
  - To what extent was the community involved in the negotiation process?
  - To what extent was the community involved in the decision-making process?
  - To what extent was the community involved in the execution process?
  - Did the community have a chance to give feedback to the local government?
  - To what extent was the community involved in the maintenance and monitoring process?
- (6) The present process of state intervention in terms of public investment, if any
  - To what extent was the community involved in the negotiation process?
  - To what extent was the community involved in the decision-making process?

- To what extent was the community involved in the execution process?
  - Did the community have a chance to give feedback to the local government?
  - To what extent was the community involved in the maintenance and monitoring process?
- (7) Process of transfer of title deed of land
- Do you hold the property rights to the land already?
  - If not, at which stage of the negotiation process are you in respect to this issue?
  - What does the community think about the process of transfer of title deed and what is your own opinion on this matter?
- (8) Question on current problems of tariffs on public services
- Please give the average amount you pay for the public services.
  - Approximately what percentage of your total monthly income does it correspond to?
  - Please approximate the structure of your monthly (household) expenses vs. monthly income.
- (9) Evaluation of the functions of the JAC and self-evaluation of your own involvement in the community work organised by JAC leaders.
- (10) Relations with other community-based organisations and NGOs identified in the previous survey.
- (11) Perceptions of horizontal relations between the household and other social actors.
- (12) Perception of his/her own participation in community action.
- (13) Perception of capacity for negotiation between the community and the state.
- Do you consider that the community has gained more room for negotiation?

APPENDIX E.1

GDP total Colombia, annual increase ratio and GDP per capita  
1970-96 (1975 US dollars)

	GDP total		GDP/cap 1975 US\$
	million US\$ at 1975 price	Annual increase ratio(%)	
1970	9,942.5	6.7	440.7
1971	10,535.1	6.0	456.0
1972	11,343.1	7.7	479.5
1973	12,105.7	6.7	499.9
1974	12,801.2	5.7	516.3
1975	13,098.6	2.3	516.1
1976	13,718.0	4.7	528.1
1977	14,288.4	4.2	537.5
1978	15,498.7	8.5	569.9
1979	16,332.4	5.4	587.1
1980	16,999.9	4.1	597.6
1981	17,387.0	2.3	597.9
1982	17,551.9	0.9	590.6
1983	17,828.1	1.6	587.2
1984	18,425.5	3.4	594.3
1985	18,998.0	3.1	600.1
1986	20,104.5	5.8	622.3
1987	21,183.9	5.4	642.6
1988	22,044.8	4.1	655.2
1989	22,797.4	3.4	664.4
1990	23,773.6	4.3	679.8
1991	24,249.5	2.0	679.5
1992	25,230.4	4.0	693.0
1993	26,589.1	5.4	716.2
1994	28,135.2	5.8	743.4
1995	29,776.2	5.8	772.6
1996 (pr)	30,386.4	2.0	773.3

Source: DANE and Banco de la República.

Taken from [http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see\\_prod\\_salar.htm](http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/see_prod_salar.htm)  
accessed 26 November 2006.

(pr) means preliminar data.

## APPENDIX E.2

Colombia, annual increase ratio of consumer price index  
1970-2004 (Base: December 1998=100)

Year	Annual increase ratio of CPI(%)
1970	6.58
1971	14.03
1972	13.99
1973	24.08
1974	26.35
1975	17.77
1976	25.76
1977	28.71
1978	18.42
1979	28.80
1980	25.85
1981	26.36
1982	24.03
1983	16.64
1984	18.28
1985	22.45
1986	20.95
1987	24.02
1988	28.12
1989	26.12
1990	32.36
1991	26.82
1992	25.13
1993	22.60
1994	22.59
1995	19.46
1996	21.63
1997	17.68
1998	16.70
1999	9.23
2000	8.75
2001	7.65
2002	6.99
2003	6.49
2004	5.50

Source: DANE, taken from  
<http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas>,  
accessed 26 November 2006.

APPENDIX E.3  
Service charge for water by user category (2001 Colombian pesos)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
<b>RESIDENTIAL SECTOR</b>													
<b>Fixed charge</b>													
Stratus 1	199.70	198.63	201.59	208.20	207.60	367.76	651.01	1,120.73	1,657.33	2,030.55	2,432.32	2,848.56	3,336.04
Stratus 2	998.49	993.12	1,007.94	1,041.06	1,038.06	1,339.13	1,726.29	2,226.18	2,814.05	3,216.55	3,622.41	4,019.33	4,459.74
Stratus 3	3,993.74	3,972.27	4,031.60	4,164.10	4,152.12	4,253.03	4,353.26	4,457.46	4,658.06	5,331.61	6,011.66	6,677.50	7,417.08
Stratus 4	6,989.15	6,951.58	7,055.41	7,287.30	7,266.34	7,266.34	7,266.33	7,266.33	7,516.13	9,151.06	9,151.06	9,151.06	9,151.06
Stratus 5	13,978.30	13,903.16	14,110.83	14,574.61	14,532.70	14,537.92	14,532.69	14,532.69	15,143.55	19,271.56	22,033.20	22,631.31	23,245.66
Stratus 6	19,968.96	19,861.62	20,158.31	20,820.84	20,760.95	20,768.43	20,760.96	20,760.96	21,629.90	27,497.59	31,419.97	32,269.18	33,141.35
<b>For basic consumption (1)</b>													
Stratus 1	79.91	87.26	80.66	83.29	83.04	83.07	89.15	90.00	96.90	150.52	222.66	310.40	432.32
Stratus 2	179.70	178.72	185.39	187.32	186.77	186.84	228.28	278.78	341.95	428.11	522.76	616.20	725.65
Stratus 3	279.61	278.11	282.25	291.50	290.65	328.19	404.08	492.13	597.30	740.82	897.09	1,049.74	1,227.21
Stratus 4	479.27	476.62	483.84	499.72	498.26	566.63	643.92	732.02	835.18	968.68	1,105.15	1,227.50	1,362.11
Stratus 5	679.01	675.36	685.43	707.93	705.88	773.67	847.36	938.40	1,025.22	1,183.71	1,345.04	1,488.69	1,646.12
Stratus 6	878.71	874.31	887.02	916.15	913.50	945.47	977.86	1,011.72	1,073.53	1,502.75	1,811.49	1,861.14	1,910.34
<b>For complementary consumption(2)</b>													
Stratus 1	279.61	278.11	282.25	291.50	290.65	847.46	847.16	847.16	868.09	999.10	1,752.98	1,677.24	1,677.24
Stratus 2	399.39	397.24	412.11	416.41	415.19	847.46	847.16	847.16	868.09	999.10	1,752.98	1,677.24	1,677.24
Stratus 3	536.06	536.28	544.30	562.17	560.53	847.46	847.16	847.16	881.03	1,108.12	1,752.98	1,677.24	1,677.24
Stratus 4	679.01	675.36	685.43	707.93	705.88	847.46	847.16	847.16	896.71	1,253.76	1,752.98	1,677.24	1,677.24
Stratus 5	818.82	814.42	826.55	853.70	851.23	1,303.64	1,379.10	1,379.10	1,425.96	1,731.94	2,103.57	2,012.69	2,012.69
Stratus 6	958.42	953.56	967.53	999.31	996.42	1,303.64	1,379.10	1,379.10	1,425.96	1,731.94	2,103.57	2,012.69	2,012.69
<b>OTHER SECTORS</b>													
<b>Commercial</b>													
Fixed charge	4,672.75	4,647.63	5,425.41	5,603.72	5,587.60	5,784.66	5,984.36	6,193.21	6,498.93	7,217.79	7,923.26	8,596.88	9,327.78
Consumption	1,111.19	1,103.98	1,323.57	1,366.99	1,363.11	1,363.60	1,363.11	1,363.11	1,410.64	1,722.61	2,103.57	2,012.69	2,012.69
<b>Industrial</b>													
Fixed charge	4,672.75	4,647.63	5,425.41	5,603.72	5,587.60	5,784.66	5,984.36	6,193.19	6,498.93	7,217.79	7,923.26	8,596.88	9,327.78
Consumption	1,111.19	1,103.98	1,323.57	1,366.99	1,363.11	1,363.60	1,363.11	1,363.11	1,410.64	1,722.61	2,103.57	2,012.69	2,012.69
<b>Official sector</b>													
Fixed charge	3,738.20	3,718.11	5,425.41	5,603.72	5,587.60	5,589.61	5,587.60	5,587.60	6,250.84	6,803.36	7,326.73	7,890.37	8,500.37
Consumption	888.77	884.02	1,323.57	1,366.99	1,363.11	1,363.60	1,363.11	1,363.11	1,375.51	1,443.86	1,507.47	1,549.32	1,590.84

Source: EAAB, Tarifas acueducto Resolución CRA 76/99 Acuerdo 15/99 EAAB

(1) The charge per cubic metre up to 20 cubic metres

(2) The charge per cubic metre between 20 and 40 cubic metres

#### APPENDIX E.4

Average service charge for electricity per KW/hour by strata (1992 Colombian pesos)

Year	Stratus 1	Stratus 2	Stratus 3	Stratus 4	Stratus 5	Stratus 6
1990	8.21	11.81	14.30	20.32	32.06	37.14
1991	8.58	12,17	15.05	20.37	49.24	55.24
1992	9.18	13.20	16.30	26.80	61.80	71.80
1993	9.35	14.15	18.63	27.45	58.67	67.67
1994	9.25	14.40	19.73	27.13	55.07	63.13
1995	8.89	13.94	20.11	29.00	54.28	62.33
1996	9.95	15.12	21.55	42.05	56.60	59.86
1997	9.65	14.39	21.58	44.07	52.61	56.07
1998	12.34	17.58	24.76	37.44	51.78	55.29
1999	15.36	20.01	26.64	35.86	44.86	44.96
2000	19.10	24.44	31.74	41.01	51.12	51.69
2001	25.07	29.77	38.90	44.13	53.00	53.00
2002	24.63	29.02	38.29	43.17	51.95	51.95
2003	25.86	30.89	40.96	46.68	55.84	55.84
2004	26.46	31.24	42.73	48.81	58.13	58.13

Source: Otero, Diego (2006).

Note: Original data for 1990-94 from CID, 'Estudios de penetración del gas natural en la EEEB'; and the data for 1995-2004 from CREG.




APPENDIX E.5

Daily exchange rate during the period of household survey (January to August 2000)  
(Colombian pesos per US dollar)

Date	January	February	March	April	May	June	July	August
1	1,873.77	1,973.36	1,948.05	1,958.12	2,004.47	2,096.96	2,150.76	2,174.55
2	1,873.77	1,970.61	1,950.88	1,958.12	2,004.47	2,095.10	2,150.76	2,175.02
3	1,873.77	1,965.61	1,956.80	1,958.12	2,001.62	2,118.57	2,150.76	2,173.62
4	1,874.35	1,947.55	1,961.16	1,963.22	2,015.92	2,118.57	2,150.76	2,177.67
5	1,895.97	1,948.60	1,961.16	1,964.10	2,027.26	2,118.57	2,151.05	2,180.64
6	1,912.69	1,948.60	1,961.16	1,968.92	2,033.17	2,118.57	2,163.44	2,180.64
7	1,911.33	1,948.60	1,965.63	1,986.96	2,033.17	2,121.73	2,168.65	2,180.64
8	1,900.14	1,950.59	1,964.26	1,996.24	2,033.17	2,127.03	2,165.51	2,180.64
9	1,900.14	1,949.54	1,960.47	1,996.24	2,044.59	2,125.30	2,165.51	2,176.52
10	1,900.14	1,946.51	1,959.77	1,996.24	2,031.86	2,115.86	2,165.51	2,176.17
11	1,900.14	1,952.29	1,958.48	1,998.25	2,021.68	2,115.86	2,171.63	2,179.60
12	1,902.25	1,948.16	1,958.48	1,986.75	2,031.96	2,115.86	2,182.56	2,180.89
13	1,904.54	1,948.16	1,958.48	1,987.38	2,039.29	2,106.97	2,172.16	2,180.89
14	1,917.38	1,948.16	1,957.50	1,987.36	2,039.29	2,122.24	2,166.22	2,180.89
15	1,920.83	1,950.77	1,955.75	1,987.39	2,039.29	2,111.09	2,156.32	2,180.99
16	1,920.83	1,949.61	1,954.26	1,987.39	2,035.54	2,110.57	2,156.32	2,185.45
17	1,920.83	1,946.79	1,950.01	1,987.39	2,037.10	2,114.80	2,156.32	2,185.46
18	1,919.21	1,945.31	1,952.98	1,996.29	2,047.79	2,114.80	2,144.01	2,185.75
19	1,928.51	1,947.41	1,952.98	2,003.02	2,055.35	2,114.80	2,151.56	2,183.01
20	1,945.17	1,947.41	1,952.98	1,996.07	2,076.85	2,115.15	2,155.81	2,183.01
21	1,938.84	1,947.41	1,952.98	1,996.07	2,076.85	2,123.58	2,155.81	2,183.01
22	1,931.97	1,943.83	1,956.98	1,996.07	2,076.85	2,134.34	2,152.30	2,183.01
23	1,931.97	1,941.54	1,959.84	1,996.07	2,094.73	2,129.13	2,152.30	2,187.83
24	1,931.97	1,944.18	1,954.57	1,996.07	2,111.94	2,123.99	2,152.30	2,196.72
25	1,943.88	1,947.72	1,954.83	1,991.17	2,142.14	2,123.99	2,147.65	2,205.60
26	1,939.63	1,947.28	1,954.83	1,988.65	2,113.28	2,123.99	2,153.91	2,208.82
27	1,958.17	1,947.28	1,954.83	1,998.95	2,096.52	2,123.99	2,165.37	2,208.82
28	1,976.14	1,947.28	1,958.93	2,002.95	2,096.52	2,135.65	2,173.78	2,208.82
29	1,976.72	1,946.17	1,955.14	2,004.47	2,096.52	2,136.22	2,172.79	2,208.17
30	1,976.72		1,949.75	2,004.47	2,077.28	2,139.11	2,172.79	2,204.22
31	1,976.72		1,951.56		2,084.92		2,172.79	2,208.21

Source: Banco de la República website (<http://www.banrep.gov.co/series-estadisticas/>, accessed 15 September 2006).



Appendix F: Bogotá: current socioeconomic stratification.

Source: Decreto 200/30 June 2004, Bogotá: DAPD.

## APPENDIX G

Photographs showing examples of the results of communal work and state intervention





Photograph 1. Communal work to build a provisional sewerage system in Bella Flor (February 2000).



Photograph 2. '*Aeroducto*' (hose connection of water supply in the air) built by communal work in JJR (November 1999).



Photograph 3. Bella Flor showing electricity posts recently installed by CODENSA (August 2001).





Photograph 4. Jerusalén (foreground) and the settlements of social interest houses and school (in the background) built by the Ciudad Bolívar Programme. (August 2004).



Photograph 5. Paved *arameda* between Danubio Azul (right-hand side) and La Paz (left-hand side) financed by the South Bogotá Project (August 2004).





Photograph 6. Steps built by 'OSP' in La Paz (August 2004).